

**The Poverty and Riches of Social Citizenship in the UK:
how lived experiences affect attitudes towards welfare,
rights and responsibilities**

Daniel David Edmiston

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds
School of Sociology and Social Policy

August 2015

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

The right of Daniel David Edmiston to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

© 2015 The University of Leeds and Daniel David Edmiston

Abstract

The civil-political character of citizenship makes the attitudes and experiences of citizens central to an effective examination of social citizenship and inequality. With this in mind, this thesis explores the differing ways in which those marginalised and validated by the existing citizenship configuration, negotiate the institutions and ideals that have come to structure welfare and inequality.

The thesis draws on secondary quantitative data analysis of a large-scale national survey and qualitative interviews undertaken in a Northern city of England. To examine the 'divergent discourses and practices of poor and better-off citizens' (Jordan and Redley, 1994: 156), the attitudes and experiences of two distinct groups are explored: employed individuals living in affluent areas on an income well above the national average, and unemployed individuals living in deprived areas below the relative poverty line. Through a structured dialogue about their experiences, attitudes and behaviours, this thesis examines the everyday language, ideals and practices that underpin social citizenship, welfare and inequality.

The findings of this study confirm that the topographies of social citizenship are reflected in the attitudes and identities of those experiencing deprivation and affluence. Lived experiences of inequality generate unique forms of knowledge about the relationship between structure and agency. This appears to inform conceptions of social citizenship, in particular attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities. The *fixed fragmentation* of social politics has benefited those validated by the prevailing citizenship paradigm. Those able and desiring to proactively engage can alter the terms of citizenship in ways that serve their material and discursive ends. By contrast, lived experiences of deprivation tend to lead to defensive forms of (dis-) engagement without challenging the existing socio-political settlement. The findings of this thesis are considered with respect to their significance for social policy design and delivery as well as the character of public deliberation surrounding inequality.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Abstract	iii
Table of Contents	iv
List of Tables	vii
List of Figures	viii
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Research Objectives and Methods	4
1.3 Thesis Outline	7
Chapter 2: Incorporating the lived experience of deliberative citizens into accounts of social citizenship and inequality	10
2.1 Introduction	10
2.2 The contested function of social citizenship: capitalism, democracy and inequality	12
2.3 From normative to empirical accounts of citizenship	16
2.3.1 'Vertical' vs. 'horizontal' citizenship	17
2.3.2 Constructing citizenship through citizens	20
2.3.3 Citizen identity and rationality	24
2.4 The relationship between inequality and social citizenship	28
2.5 Deliberative Citizens and Citizenship	32
2.6 Conclusion	36
Chapter 3: The variegated praxis and experience of social citizenship in the UK	38
3.1 Introduction	38
3.2 The social democratic period of welfarism	39
3.3 The post-Keynesian era of neo-liberal citizenship	43
3.4 The changing distributional effects of social security provision	54
3.5 Citizenship Status and Identity: Validation and Contingency	59
3.6 Conclusion	64
Chapter 4: Methodology	66
4.1 Introduction	66
4.2 <i>Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens: operationalizing concepts</i>	67
4.3 Explaining attitudinal divergence: a mixed methods 'lived experience' approach.....	73

4.4 Secondary Quantitative Data Analysis.....	76
4.5 Qualitative Interviews	81
4.5.1 Research Design	82
4.5.2 Interview Schedule and Vignettes.....	84
4.5.3 Recruitment and Sample	86
4.5.4 Analysis of Qualitative Data	88
4.6 Conclusion	89
Chapter 5: Negotiating validation and contingency in social citizenship: the material and symbolic significance of deprivation.....	91
5.1 Introduction	91
5.2 Support for Social Citizenship: Rights and Responsibilities.....	92
5.3 Quantifying the effect of inequality on conceptions of social citizenship	95
5.4 Poverty and Plenty	100
5.5 Work and Worklessness	105
5.6 Area Deprivation and Affluence	110
5.7 The material and symbolic significance of inequality	114
5.8 Discussion and Conclusion.....	120
Chapter 6: Agency vs. structure: how lived experiences shape the sociological imagination of the rich and poor	122
6.1 Introduction	122
6.2 Knowledge accumulation and attitude (trans-) formation.....	123
6.3 The ‘deserving workless poor’: Becky.....	128
6.4 The ‘undeserving workless poor’: Aimee	132
6.5 The ‘deserving working poor’: James	139
6.6 The ‘undeserving working rich’: Robert.....	142
6.7 Discussion.....	146
6.8 Conclusion	151
Chapter 7: Heterodox conceptions of social citizenship?	153
7.1 Introduction	153
7.2 Attitudes towards the Social Rights of Citizenship.....	154
7.3 Attitudes and Behaviours relating to the Responsibilities of Social Citizenship.....	163
7.4 Resistance and Resignation to the Dominant Citizenship Paradigm.....	170
7.5 From Welfare Deficits to Institutional Disengagement	175

7.6 Conclusion	178
Chapter 8: Deliberating the structural determinants of poverty and inequality: galvanising public opinion towards social policy ends.....	181
8.1 Introduction	181
8.2 The relationship between public attitudes and policy.....	183
8.3 Poor debate: entrenched attitudes towards poverty and inequality.....	190
8.4 Learning lessons from attitudinal divergence: galvanising public support for tackling deprivation	195
8.5 Discussion and Conclusion.....	204
Chapter 9: Conclusion.....	209
9.1 Summary of research findings and policy implications	210
9.2 The Objective Significance of Lived Experience	214
9.3 Future Research Agenda.....	218
Bibliography	220
Appendix A Citizenship Survey 2005: Survey Questions	257
A.1 Attitudes towards social rights and responsibilities	257
A.2 Experiences and subjective impressions of local area	258
A.3 Behaviours associated with civic engagement	259
A.3.1 Civic activism, consultation and participation	259
A.3.2 Personal behaviours.....	261
Appendix B Qualitative Fieldwork.....	262
B.1 Profile of Leeds.....	262
B.2 Interview Schedule	264
B.3 Recruitment leaflets.....	272
B.4 Information sheet and consent form	274
Appendix C Secondary Quantitative Analysis: Additional Results	277
C.1 Binary logistic regressions exploring socio-economic determinants of attitudinal and experiential difference.....	277

List of Tables

Table 1: Demographic profile of qualitative research participants	87
Table 2: Support for social rights by lived experience of inequality	92
Table 3: Support for social responsibilities by lived experience of inequality	94
Table 4: Social rights respondents feel they actually have	96
Table 5: Effect of deprivation on attitudes and experiences related to social citizenship	98
Table 6: Effect of deprivation and actually having rights on support for rights and responsibilities	99
Table 7: Experiences and impressions of local area and neighbourhood..	110
Table 8: Comparison of means for different aspects of informal kinship and support	168
Table 9: Differences in attitudes by political affiliation.....	190

List of Figures

Figure 1: Value of benefits as a proportion of average earnings 1971-2014	45
Figure 2: Real value of benefit, £ / week at 2014 prices (RPI) 1971-2014	47
Figure 3: Proportion of population below 60% median income after housing costs 1961-2012	49
Figure 4: Average proportion of gross income made up of direct cash benefits for 3 groups across the income distribution 1977-2012	58
Figure 5: Selection criteria for <i>Validated Active Citizens</i> and <i>Residual Contingent Citizens</i>	68

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

This thesis examines the relationship between social citizenship, inequality and welfare politics. In recent years, the changing ideals and function of social citizenship have intervened on and structured lived experiences of inequality in new and patterned ways in the UK. Against the backdrop of fiscal austerity, this thesis considers the significance of these developments with respect to citizen identity and attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities.

In 2010, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government inherited a relatively high level of public sector debt in the UK. The two primary drivers of a growing public deficit were the costs associated with financial sector support and revenue losses through reduced outputs (Chote et al., 2010). In spite of this, the Coalition government repeatedly cited welfare profligacy as the key cause of the budget deficit and a significant barrier to the UK's economic recovery (Farnsworth and Irving, 2012). On this basis, the Coalition government cultivated a political mandate for public service and welfare reforms alongside cuts to public social expenditure. Since then, a substantial restructuring of the welfare state has taken place. Wealthier individuals have largely benefited from tax and social security changes whilst low income individuals have been worst affected by changes to the coverage and design of public services (Lupton et al., 2015). In many respects, this represents a continuation of successive welfare reforms that have led to an increasingly 'fractured model of social citizenship' (Lister, 2002a: 108).

Throughout its term in office, the Coalition government committed to modifying, what it saw as a 'complex and chaotic system, which failed to promote work and penalised responsible choices – all at a great cost to hard-working taxpayers' (Duncan Smith, 2015: n.p.). As such, there has been a concerted effort to move towards a variegated praxis of social citizenship that valorises certain forms of civic contribution whilst devaluing others (Deacon and Patrick, 2010). The extension and intensification of welfare conditionality has, in certain instances, vitiated the character and quality of social rights (Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Watts et al., 2014). Since 2010, changes to direct taxes, benefits and tax credits have been highly regressive (Brewer et al., 2011). Overall, absolute poverty and child poverty have grown substantially (Crawford et al., 2015). The global financial crisis and ensuing stagnation in

real-term median and upper incomes has reduced the extent of relative poverty and inequality. However, welfare reforms and substantial cuts to low-income social security have had a negative impact on income inequality overall (Browne and Elming, 2015). With further cuts announced and yet to come, child and working age poverty are set to increase significantly in the short and long term (Hills, 2015).

Contrary to much of the evidence on the electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment (cf. Giger and Nelson, 2011), the Conservatives were able to consolidate their political position. A thermostatic effect is normally observed where welfare cuts and reforms induce greater support for welfare (Soroka and Wlezien, 2005). However, it appears an 'austerity consensus' (Farnsworth and Irving, 2012) has emerged where the limits and function of welfare are being challenged and reformulated. As noted by many, political administrations are bound by public opinion towards welfare and inequality and are only able to achieve as much as is politically expedient (Bamfield and Horton, 2009; Dean, 2013).

With this in mind, this thesis explores the topographies of social citizenship and the differing ways in which citizens make sense of the institutions, practices and outcomes that have come to structure deprivation and affluence. As Andrea Campbell puts it, public policies and institutions 'help make citizens' (Campbell, 2003). Invariably then, the structures, status differentials and lived experiences arising from state action 'influence the ways individuals understand their rights and responsibilities as members of the political community' (Mettler and Soss, 2004: 61).

Since 2010, the incumbent political administration has drawn upon increasingly 'individualistic explanations about the moral failings of poor people to account for economic inequalities' (Valentine and Harris, 2014: 89). Welfare institutions and policies have increasingly come to individualise the causes and consequences of poverty and inequality (Taylor-Gooby, 2013a). A series of 'welfare myths' surrounding welfare dependency, social and moral breakdown and cultures of worklessness have been used to rationalise the persistence of poverty and increased unemployment (Hancock and Mooney, 2013; Jensen, 2013; MacDonald et al., 2014a). This is by no means a novel feature of welfare politics in the UK (Prideaux, 2010). The attitudes and behaviours of the poor have been an enduring concern of policymakers, practitioners and commentators (Welshman, 2013).

There is a strong heritage of accounts claiming that the poor 'are miserable mainly from their own fault' (Vincent, 1991: 2). Those living in poverty and

without waged labour have frequently been characterised as work-shy or lacking in moral integrity. Beatrice and Sydney Webb acknowledged wider structural factors at play, but also suggested that ‘destitution in all its forms is invariably associated with a defective “citizen-character”, a “failure’ in the person who is destitute’ (Webb and Webb, 1912: 8). Whilst it may not have been the intention of authors such as Rowntree and the Webbs (Veit-Wilson, 1986; Ward, 2011) to propagate such an idea, arguments such as this have dominated welfare politics. William Beveridge himself believed that the ‘whip of starvation’ could reform the moral character and work incentives of the poor (Harris, 1998: 2). The underclass proposition suggests that the permissive nature of welfare corrupts common mores and ideals surrounding work and welfare (Mead, 1986). This idea has proven pervasive in public discourse surrounding welfare, unemployment and inequality and has been used to justify welfare reforms and cuts to public social expenditure (Dwyer, 2004; MacDonald et al., 2014b; Gaffney, 2015). In the UK, there has been an ostensible hardening of public attitudes towards welfare, or at least an increasing distinction between deserving and undeserving welfare claimants (Rowlingson et al., 2010a; Baumberg et al., 2012).

Many have sought to rebut the claim that the (unemployed) poor demonstrate damaging and distinctive orientations towards work, welfare and social citizenship (Vincent, 1991; Dean and Taylor-Gooby, 1992; Heath, 1992; Gallie, 1994; Marshall et al., 1996; MacDonald et al., 2014a). These studies challenge ‘zombie arguments’ and ‘welfare myths’ that pervade policy discourse surrounding the poor (MacDonald et al., 2014a). This thesis contributes towards this body of evidence by examining the ‘divergent discourses and practices of poor and better-off citizens’ (Jordan and Redley, 1994: 156). Until relatively recently, comparatively little academic attention had been paid to the attitudes, and behaviours of the rich. However, there is growing recognition of the need to re-focus attention on the experiences and motivations of the wealthy in citizenship and welfare debates (Burchardt and Propper, 1999; Orton, 2006; Rowlingson and Connor, 2011; Dorling, 2014). Within the context of rising poverty and inequality, material affluence and capital accumulation are fast becoming recognised as a defining (social) policy problem (Sayer, 2014; Savage, 2015). As such, ‘wealthy elites’ have become a site of contestation and deliberation in social politics (Dorling, 2011; Khan, 2012; Keister, 2014). This thesis contributes fresh empirical and conceptual insight to citizenship studies in this regard.

A growing body of research has already outlined how people 'make sense of social citizenship' (e.g. Dwyer, 2002: 273). This thesis analyses the attitudes and experiences of both the rich and poor to examine the processes of structuration that give rise to inequalities. Social citizenship is essentially a relational practice that articulates the preferences and actions of citizens through welfare institutions and policies (Somers, 1993; Clarke et al., 2014). The inherently civil-political character of citizenship makes the experiences, attitudes and practices of citizens particularly important if we are to fully understand the existing citizenship configuration and its distributional effects. As a result, this thesis explores the experiences and attitudes of those who are both marginalised and validated, materially and symbolically, by the existing citizenship configuration. In doing so, this thesis offers a novel contribution towards understanding the relationship between lived experience, public attitudes, social citizenship and inequality.

1.2 Research Objectives and Methods

Two linked ideas underpin this thesis. Firstly, the notion that the edifice of social citizenship is shaped in large part by the institutions that validate its function and ideals. Political rhetoric and social policy mechanisms structure the meanings and values attached to social and political life. Secondly, the idea that these meanings and values are re-enacted and internalised by citizens to produce and propagate dominant conceptions of social citizenship in such a way that they become 'a fundamental identity that...situates the individual in society' (Conover et al., 1991: 805).

Just as welfare systems are no more than a collection of services and transfers, citizenship is no more than the sum of its parts. As socio-legal entitlements and concomitant liabilities shift, the praxis and status of citizenship changes. Notions of collective belonging and shared identity are dynamic that shift with entitlements, obligations and outcomes (Isin and Wood, 1999). This not only has material consequences, it also has symbolic repercussions for those (tacitly or otherwise) conferred citizenship status. The distributional and rhetorical dimensions of citizenship affect how members are positioned 'vis-vis non-members, one another, the State and other major societal institutions' (Schram et al., 2010: 743). Depending on the dominant paradigm of citizenship, welfare has the literal and figurative capacity to include and exclude.

This thesis explores how citizens negotiate the prevailing social settlement and how lived experiences of marginality and validation inform attitudes

towards welfare, social citizenship and inequality. To this end, there were four key interlinked research objectives of this thesis:

- To establish whether and how lived experiences of poverty and affluence affect citizen identity and orientation.
- To examine how contingency and validation affect attitudes and behaviours related to social citizenship, welfare and inequality.
- To explore how poverty and affluence generate unique forms of knowledge about the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and action.
- To explore whether, and in what ways, citizens engage with or deviate from the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship.

To meet these research objectives, this study explored the attitudes and experiences of two distinct groups: employed individuals living in affluent areas on an income well above the national average, and unemployed individuals living in deprived areas below the relative poverty line. Throughout the thesis, these two groups are referred to as *Validated Active Citizens* and *Residual Contingent Citizens* respectively. Effectively, the trappings of social citizenship are bestowed upon the *Validated Active Citizen*. Their lived experiences affirm the figurative and material benefits of engaging in the Social Contract. They fulfil the duties of social citizenship by engaging in socially and economically rewarded paid employment. Their status and belonging is validated through the existing economic and welfare configuration. By contrast, *Residual Contingent Citizens* are subject to very different treatment and outcomes. Unable to fulfil the 'work-biased construction of citizenship responsibilities' (Lister, 2002a: 107), narrow conceptions of civic duty invalidate the civic contribution made by many of these individuals. Their citizenship status and minimal level of assistance is contingent on prescribed behaviours and duties. Their material and symbolic position undermines their sense of common belonging and purpose.

Of course, 'people's lives as citizens or (partial citizens) and their relation to citizenship are not lived in neat, separate compartments' (Lister, 2002b: 191). These two bimodal categories inevitably oversimplify the dynamic nature of citizenship orientation and outcomes. At any one time and across the life course, citizens may occupy multiple private and public spaces assuming diverse associations and subject positions along the way (Young, 1990). This pluralistic 'differentiated' conception of citizenship is not rejected as a result of the categories outlined above. Rather, it is precisely because these categories persist as empirical phenomena, that the attitudes, experiences and practices

of these two groups are so significant to pluralistic accounts of citizenship. Examination of these two groups highlights the differentiated nature and effects of social citizenship within the context of rising inequality. To understand any sense of alienation or belonging felt by these two groups, this thesis explores the significance of socioeconomic circumstance, but also how social policy instruments and political discourse affect citizen status and attitude formation.

This study adopted a mixed-methods approach with an initial phase of secondary quantitative data analysis of the 2005 Citizenship Survey, followed by qualitative fieldwork to explore the experiences, attitudes and behaviours of *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*. The first phase of the research project established support for the rights and responsibilities of social citizenship and examined the drivers of attitudinal divergence that arise out of lived experiences of inequality. The second phase of the project involved a series of in-depth, structured 'scenario-driven' qualitative interviews. Participants were sampled from the Leeds City region and were interviewed between February 2013 and January 2014. In total, 28 interviews were conducted: 15 interviews with participants notionally identified as *Residual Contingent Citizens* and 13 interviews with participants notionally identified as *Validated Active Citizens*. Scenario-driven interviews were used to facilitate an applied discussion about the principles underpinning social citizenship. Through a structured dialogue about the rights, responsibilities and outcomes of different citizens, it was possible to explore how poverty and affluence generate unique experiences and patterns of knowledge that underpin 'theories about the way the world works' (O'Brien and Penna, 1998: 3). This enabled a critical examination of the everyday language, ideals and institutions that structure social citizenship, welfare and inequality.

Based on the research objectives and methodological approach of this study, this thesis makes two interlinked novel contributions to knowledge in the field of citizenship studies and social policy. The first concerns the persistent 'imbalance between theoretical and empirical advances in our understanding of citizenship' (Isin et al., 2013: 57). Almost 25 years ago, Conover et al. (1991: 801) claimed that a great deal of citizenship theorising is 'conducted in what is virtually an empirical void'. Since then, a burgeoning body of literature has sought to address the problem that 'very little is known about the realities of how different people understand themselves as citizens' (Jones and Gaventa, 2002: 28). Whilst substantial progress has been made, Isin et al. (2013) claim that more needs to be done to enrich the field both empirically and

conceptually. They outline a research agenda for studies that capture 'the everyday world of citizenship' (Desforges et al., 2005), the socio-structural practices that structure lived citizenship (Lister, 2007c), and how citizens and non-citizens experience the inclusive and exclusive tendencies of citizenship (Isin et al., 2013: 57). This thesis provides a timely contribution to citizenship studies in this regard by presenting new evidence on the inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics of social citizenship and what bearing this has on the lived experience, identity and orientation of citizens. This evidence is used to both challenge and refine citizenship theorising by making empirically driven insights about social citizenship, inequality and the contradictions and tensions that arise as a result.

This relates to the second principle contribution of this thesis: the (re) insertion of everyday lay accounts into citizenship debates. Many have observed that 'grassroots' views are notably absent from welfare discourse (Dwyer, 2002; Lister et al., 2003). In particular, the poor are 'a group largely ignored in citizenship studies' (Lister, 2007b: 49). However, as an emerging site of social scientific and theoretical interest, the everyday lay accounts of the rich are also of particular importance (Orton, 2006: 251). By examining the voices of the poor alongside the rich, it becomes feasible to do two things. Firstly, it is possible to bolster the deliberative character and potential of social citizenship, so that the views, experiences and preferences of *all* citizens are heard and accounted for in social politics. Secondly, everyday views provide insight into the processes and interpretive practices drawn upon by those experiencing validation and marginality. The structured and structuring nature of discursive practices can be critically examined within this context to establish what bearing social citizenship and inequality have on institutions, practices and outcomes. In this respect, this thesis demonstrates the value of moving between 'everyday or lay concepts and meanings and social scientific or technical concepts and theories' (Blaikie, 2007: 90).

1.3 Thesis Outline

Organised into nine chapters, this thesis explores the relationships between social citizenship, inequality, lived experiences and public attitudes. This introductory chapter provides a brief policy background to the thesis. In doing so, the empirical and theoretical value of the research is established. The chapter also outlines the key research objectives, methodological approach and academic contributions made by this study. Chapter two draws upon theories of citizenship in a schematic way to demonstrate how gaps in the

existing literature have informed the research agenda of this thesis. Rather than conceiving of citizenship as a static status conferred through membership, this chapter demonstrates the value of a polity-driven approach where rights, responsibilities, citizen identity and orientations are understood as socially embedded and relational. This 'horizontal' conception makes it possible to move from normative to explanatory accounts of the relationship between social citizenship and inequality. In light of this, the attitudes and experiences of citizens assume a renewed importance for public deliberation and the (re) configuration of social citizenship.

Chapter three explores the extent of continuity and change in social security policy in the UK. This serves to situate recent welfare reforms and developments within context. The chapter focuses particularly on how economic inequality and social security affect citizenship rights and identity. It also demonstrates how political rhetoric and policy instruments have not only shaped dominant ideals underpinning social citizenship but also how this has affected socio-economic outcomes. The chapter principally serves to illustrate the increasingly variegated praxis and experience of social citizenship in the UK. As such the conceptual and empirical categories of *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* are more fully introduced and elaborated on here.

Having outlined the theoretical and policy significance of exploring lived experiences of social citizenship, chapter four moves on to describe the methodology employed for this study. It starts by explaining how key concepts were operationalized to make them empirically tractable as well as the benefits of employing a mixed-method 'lived experience' approach to attitudinal research. The chapter then provides details of the secondary quantitative data analysis undertaken and the research design, sampling and recruitment strategy chosen for qualitative fieldwork.

Chapters five to eight communicate the key findings of this thesis. Each chapter follows on from the last to explain how and why lived experiences affect conceptions of social citizenship. These findings are discussed in light of relevant empirical research already undertaken. Chapter five explores whether attitudes differ between those notionally defined as *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*. The chapter starts by outlining support for universal entitlements and duties and offers some potential explanations. Exploring differences between the two sample groups, the chapter then turns to explore how deprivation and other socio-demographic factors affect attitudes. The chapter concludes by reflecting on

how lived experiences of inequality affect citizen identity and attitudes towards the figurative and applied potential of social citizenship. Building on findings from the last chapter, chapter six demonstrates how those who experience deprivation and affluence exhibit a radically different 'sociological imagination' (Mills, 1959). During the qualitative fieldwork, *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* were presented with the same vignettes but differed markedly in what they understood to be the structural determinants of action, agency and socio-economic outcome. Chapter six draws a number of conclusions about the role lived experiences play in knowledge accumulation and thus attitude (trans-) formation surrounding social citizenship.

Chapter seven reflects upon the findings of the previous two chapters to examine how lived experiences affect attitudes and behaviours towards the constitutive features of social citizenship. In doing so, the chapter considers the orientations of those experiencing inclusion and exclusion. The chapter explores the extent to which these two groups deviate or conform to the current ideals of citizenship that are expressed through and regulated in interpersonal, communal and institutional life. Reflecting on the distinctive frames of reference and action shaped by welfare policies and citizenship practices, chapter eight explores the possible means by which to tackle poverty and inequality. Reflecting on the factors contributing towards attitudinal divergence, the chapter outlines how, given certain constraints, public attitudes might be engineered to galvanise popular support for inclusive citizenship practices.

Finally, chapter nine concludes the thesis by highlighting the key findings that have emerged from this study. The chapter reflects upon the findings of this thesis to offer a number of implications for theorising public attitudes towards social citizenship as well as lived experiences of inequality. Acknowledging the limitations of this study, the chapter concludes by suggesting how this thesis has contributed towards but also pointed to new research agendas.

Chapter 2: Incorporating the lived experience of deliberative citizens into accounts of social citizenship and inequality

2.1 Introduction

Social citizenship is shaped in large part by the institutions that validate its function and ideals. The centrality of the welfare state in mediating this process is demonstrable in the policy instruments that structure the meanings and values attached to socio-political life. Beyond the pivotal role of the state in articulating the terms of collective membership and identity, citizenship reflects and manifests itself through interpersonal, communal and market relations. The dynamic relationship between state, civil society and individual makes citizenship a site of conflict and change. The tensions and transformations that arise are a functional necessity for the efficacy and democratic legitimacy of citizenship in both an institutional and procedural capacity. The status, rights and duties of citizenship are not conferred in a social vacuum but are (re-)constructed in relation to the demands and needs of the polity. Whether a passive or active conception of citizenship is taken in academic analysis, the 'dominant paradigm is relatively indifferent to the necessary civil-political character of citizenship' (Roche, 1992: 37). The preferences, attitudes and responses of the citizenry are often underplayed, overlooked or assumed in theoretical accounts of citizenship (Conover et al., 1991; Lister et al., 2003). The trade-off between individual interests and the common good has been a perennial feature of citizenship debates, but less attention has been paid to how this is affected by social citizenship itself, how inequality intervenes in this process and ultimately what implications this has for the changing nature of social citizenship, deprivation and the potential contradictions therein.

Due to its contextual contingency and character as a contested concept, Turner (1993: 11) suggests there is not, as yet, and neither should there be, a unitary theory of citizenship. Whilst the multidimensional and multi-layered phenomenon of citizenship makes an exhaustive theory problematic, a 'systematic' sociology of citizenship is necessary to understand its mechanisms, outcomes and how it may be engineered towards particular ideological or normative ends (Clarke et al., 2014). A significant body of literature has explored the theoretical and normative terrain of citizenship. Indeed, 'the way we define citizenship is intimately linked to the kind of social

and political community we want' (Mouffe, 1992: 255). Generally, citizenship theorists defend or critique an existing ideological account. As a result, a great deal of academic attention has centred on debates surrounding normative rather than explanatory questions concerning the relationship between social citizenship, deprivation and polity preferences. Nevertheless, an expansive literature also exists attempting to explain the relations and processes that give rise to the prevailing conception of social citizenship, the persistence of poverty and inequality, their respective impacts on citizens and the capacity for citizens to affect or inhibit change. For the purposes of this thesis, this literature will be considered in a schematic way to focus on the domains of relevance here.

This chapter starts by briefly outlining T.H. Marshall's seminal account of *Citizenship and Social Class* (Marshall, 1950). Reflecting on Marshall's contribution, section 2.2 considers the prospective effects of social citizenship on inequality and capitalism. Mindful of the civil-political character of citizenship, section 2.2 also touches upon the functional relationship between political democracy and the rights and status of citizenship. Section 2.3 problematises some of the core empirical assumptions that underlie normative and ideological accounts of citizenship. To move towards an explanatory account of the relationship between inequality and social citizenship, Section 2.3 suggests that citizenship needs to be understood as a polity-driven practice in which citizen identity and rationality are recognised as socially embedded. Such an approach exposes empirical gaps in the existing literature and informs the research agenda for this thesis. Section 2.4 examines the relationship between inequality and social citizenship to consider what affect this might have on citizen identity, lived experiences and attitudes. Through a citizenship lens, it is possible to understand poverty and inequality as a fluid socio-structural relation. Public actions and preferences are expressed through institutional and macro-structural mechanisms that in turn shape material deficits and accretions. Social citizenship is just one of these institutional mechanisms and its distributional effects demonstrate a porous dynamic between agency and structure. With this in mind, the final section of the chapter reflects upon the plurality of attitudes, experiences and orientations that characterise any given polity but particularly one with a rising degree of inequality such as the UK. Section 2.5 considers the role of public deliberation and what part the lived experiences and attitudes of citizens might play in the construction and revision of social citizenship, in particular, its emancipatory potential.

2.2 The contested function of social citizenship: capitalism, democracy and inequality

T.H. Marshall (1950) offers a historical account of the development and evolution of citizenship in Britain. According to Marshall, an understanding of British citizenship is 'dictated by history even more clearly than by logic' (Marshall, 1950: 8). A linear accumulation of rights has occurred with the incremental development of each dependent upon the latter. Marshall distinguishes between civil, political and social rights assigning the ratification of each set to the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century respectively. Similarly to Beveridge (1942), Marshall saw the inception of the UK Welfare State as an inevitable compromise between the aspirations of a political democracy and the vagaries of market capitalism. Citizenship, as defined by Marshall, 'is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All those who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which that status is endowed' (Marshall, 1950: 28). According to Marshall, the social rights of citizenship help uphold the equality of status articulated through membership. These social rights include 'the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society' (Marshall, 1950:10-11). For Marshall, equality of status, rights and duties in social citizenship creates a baseline from which income inequalities may legitimately arise. Put simply, 'equality of status is more important than equality of income' (Marshall, 1950: 56). Understood in this way, the practice and legislative architecture of social citizenship co-exists alongside market-based inequalities. This conception of citizenship and its relation to inequality can be interpreted in three ways.

Firstly, it could be argued that social citizenship is inherently at odds with the principles of a capitalist market economy. Marshall (1950: 29) himself suggests that 'the impact of citizenship on social class should take the form of a conflict between opposing principles'. The social rights of citizenship have profound (re-)distributional effects on income and wealth, but also enhance access to services such as education and healthcare. Depending on the content of these rights and their corresponding duties, social citizenship has the capacity to transform goods and services from 'private' to 'public' entities. As a result of citizenship, access to these is not so much determined by the existing economic capital of individuals, but rather, their membership status and 'performance' as a citizen. This process grants 'people a status or worth independent of their market value' (Dwyer, 2004: 84) and therefore cuts

through the distributional power and logic of the market economy. Social citizenship insulates certain goods and services from the realms of private production and consumption and therefore appears to be in an antagonistic relationship with capitalism. By its very nature, capitalism results in an accumulation of capital for some and a deficiency in capital for others - this underlines the basis of the profit logic (Piketty, 2014). Social citizenship transforms collective organisation and power relations to undermine the socio-economic stratification arising from market processes.

Accordingly, social rights enable recourse from both absolute and relative poverty; 'to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society' (Marshall, 1950: 11). Having said that, inequalities arising within the polity are still deemed legitimate 'provided they are not an expression of hereditary privilege' (Marshall, 1950: 76). This falls neatly within the meritocratic parameters of a liberal defence of social citizenship. Economic freedom and earned inequality are core principles of an open market economy. In practice, these principles intersect with a range of factors that extend beyond individual effort such as luck and the non-market transference of economic, cultural and social capital. As such, Marshall's liberal defence of social citizenship could be said to challenge the practice, if not the principles of market capitalism and the inequalities that fall out as a result.

Secondly, rather than directly tackling market principles and inequalities, social citizenship could be said to serve a mitigation role. According to Marshall, the status attached to social citizenship offers a means by which to 'impose modifications' (Marshall, 1950: 110) on a capitalist class system that re-produces inequality. To understand the legacy and existing topographies of social citizenship in the UK, this notion of modification is particularly important. Marshall understood there to be an inevitable compromise between parliamentary democracy and economic prosperity. Through social citizenship, Marshall believed it was possible and indeed desirable to *moderate* but not to considerably *infringe upon* the functioning of the market. Democratic-welfare-capitalism requires the generation and uneven distribution of private resources. This phenomenon has to precede the conversion of private resources into public goods and their subsequent redistribution. With this in mind, Marshall suggests that 'the hyphenated society can succeed only if it is recognised that both the welfare sector and the mixed economy are contributing to the creation of welfare' (Marshall, 1950: 131).

According to neoclassical economics, certain degrees of unearned inequality then are to be tolerated if, through the private accumulation and eventual distribution of public resources, they contribute to the overall wealth and welfare of the polity (cf. Fleischacker, 2009). Marshall argues that this distribution of resources cannot intervene on market processes to such an extent that the profit logic and motivation of private producers and consumers is undermined. Accordingly, social citizenship ameliorates the conditions of the free market but does not restrict them to the extent that they cease to operate on their own terms. This idea of 'not biting the hand that feeds you' is particularly limiting for the potential and jurisdiction of social citizenship. As discussed in chapter three, this mitigation approach (i.e. primacy of the market) has proven particularly pervasive in conceptions of social citizenship since the 1980s and has limited the capacity of the state to more effectively tackle inequality. If the political aspirations of social citizenship are bound by the structural limits imposed by a capitalist market economy, public values and ideals also come to operate within the confines of a neoclassical economic logic. In turn, this embeds market principles in the legislative entitlements and duties prescribed by the state. Social citizenship, then, runs the danger of becoming complicit in the maintenance and propagation of inequalities.

Finally, this leads to the third interpretation of social citizenship as a concept functioning to safeguard the sustainability and political legitimacy of the capitalist system. Arguably, the interlocation between democracy and capitalism made the provision of social rights a functional necessity for the maintenance of the free market. Civil rights grant economic freedom, political rights guarantee political expression (as opposed to power) and the 'right to a modicum of economic welfare and security' (Marshall, 1950: 10) placates the polity into an acceptance of the capitalist system (Offe, 1985). Due to their liberal heritage, it has been suggested that citizenship rights fail to contribute towards the effective transformation of civil society: 'the concept of security does not raise civil society above its egoism. On the contrary, security is the *insurance* of its egoism' (Marx, 1975: 162-163). Rather than the collective and common ownership of social, natural and economic goods, citizenship is conceived on the basis of a private property-owning principle that is reflected in the rights and duties of common membership (Turner, 1993: 3). Marshall (1950: 8) even goes so far as to say that 'the inequality of social class may be acceptable provided the equality of citizenship is recognised'. Perhaps then, there are legitimate grounds for pessimism in the capacity of social citizenship to meaningfully tackle unjust inequalities arising from the market.

Rather than economic transfers, Marshall (1950: 81) considers 'the major social services, such as health and education' to be the core rights of social citizenship. Marshall (1950: 56) suggests that the provision of these services helps ensure the effective participation of all citizens irrespective of their socio-economic circumstance by removing these goods from private or privileged areas of consumption (Marshall, 1950: 86). However, there is no necessary reason why a distributive mechanism based on criteria other than individual capital would, with any certainty, result in equality of access (Hindess, 1993: 25). In addition, the lack of sufficient attention paid to economic transfers in Marshall's account enshrines a basic level of market dependency in the rights and duties of citizenship. If only a 'modicum' of welfare and security is provided, a 'white able-bodied male breadwinner model' will tend to prevail over the socio-economic settlement (Prideaux and Roulstone, 2012).

If 'the right of the citizen... is the right to equality of opportunity' (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992: 65), social citizenship serves to exercise meritocratic influence over the distribution of resources. This is essentially an equal right to become unequal through differences in individual ability and effort. According to this logic, the agentic capacities of the individual should be the primary determinant of inequality. However, inherited talent and ability are beyond the realms of individual agency and are thus difficult to compensate for in policy instruments (Elias and Jensen, 2014). In fact, it is almost impossible to organise a system of distributive justice that is able to separate out inherited characteristics and agentic capacities (cf. Dench, 2006). Arguably, a pure 'right to equality of opportunity' is not practicably feasible and if an unrealised conception of this right operates within a liberal paradigm, unjust inequities will go unaddressed. If the substance of citizenship cannot guarantee a redistribution of resources via significant economic transfers, this is particularly problematic for the phenomenon of inequality. Economic differences translate into (but are also a reflection of) status differences that do indeed 'cut too deep' (Marshall, 1950: 76) by undermining notions of common belonging and membership. In this sense, social citizenship could be said to structure rather than alleviate inequality.

This section has explored how Marshall's account of social citizenship can be variously interpreted, what implications this has for the phenomenon of inequality and its relation to a capitalist market economy. Citizenship can be seen as either opposing, mitigating or supporting market-based inequalities (Habermas, 1975; Offe, 1982). Perhaps most clear is that, depending on the policy domain or time in question, social citizenship has the capacity to do all

of these things. These three functions of social citizenship are not necessarily mutually exclusive but contingent on the value systems and beliefs propagated within a particular welfare domain or political period. Beyond the problematic of unearned poverty or wealth, Marshall is reluctant to define and confine the function of social citizenship:

There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed (Marshall, 1950: 28-29).

Whilst he does not 'provide a causal explanation of how citizenship expands' (Turner, 1993: 8), Marshall does capture the dynamics at play between citizenship, inequality and the market. Various normative and ideological projects have sought to more clearly define 'the ideal to which we may aspire' (Oldfield, 1990b: 182) and the appropriate principles underpinning the relationship between state, civil society and individual. These will now be considered to explore their utility in explaining the relationship between inequality, institutions and citizens.

2.3 From normative to empirical accounts of citizenship

Due to its polysemic nature, citizenship as a concept and practice is highly contested (Clarke et al., 2014). Since Ancient Greece, theorists have debated the nature of citizenship, as well as the constitution of individuals that make up any given polity. Theoretical accounts have tended to focus on the 'ought' rather than the 'is' in citizenship debates (Young, 1990). Ideological or normative accounts can expose inadequacies in existing theories or practices of citizenship. However, these contributions and their claims about the idealised function of citizenship often rest on assumptions about: the mutually constitutive relationship between citizenship structures and the polity; how individual citizens negotiate and respond to the socio-economic and political landscape; and how social relations and outcomes are accommodated within citizenship as a concept and practice. These assumptions inform how inequality and citizenship are analysed, but also constrain what is deemed possible in the citizenship project (Somers, 1993). As a result, some theories of citizenship can have less explanatory power when it comes to exploring the relationship between lived experiences, inequality and citizenship.

Rather than a linear rehearsal of developments in citizenship debates, this chapter takes a more schematic approach to focus on the key areas of relevance for this thesis. As a result, it has not been necessary to outline citizenship theories in chronological order or in significant depth. Of course, there is no intention to be ahistorical. It is both recognised and appreciated that key contributions to citizenship debates arose out of and in reaction to the circumstances of the time as well as pre-existing theories. For example, neo-republican accounts of citizenship made by key figures such as Amitai Etzioni (1995) and Adrian Oldfield (1990a) were responding to the ostensible decline in civic and social capital as much as they were responding to the arguments of social liberals such as John Rawls (1973). Indeed, many of the seminal theories of citizenship draw on empirical material to support their claims. One of the earliest Social Contract theorists, Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1991), reflected upon the atrocities of the English Civil War and concluded that absolute state sovereignty was necessary to maintain social order and avoid a 'state of nature' that is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short' (Hobbes, [1651] 1991: 89). The intention of this chapter is not to discredit such theories by misrepresenting their use of evidence. Instead, this chapter demonstrates how their selective use of evidence can, at times, limit their analytical capacity to understand citizenship as 'a set of institutionally embedded social practices' (Somers, 1993: 589).

From classical to post-structural accounts, theories of citizenship are based on suppositions and empirical observations that are not necessarily generalizable. As previously stated, this is due, in part, to the fact that no theory or practice of citizenship is unitary (Turner, 1993). However, it is also symptomatic of an approach to citizenship theorising that has tended to gloss over the 'dynamic social relations and political struggle' that make up citizenship (Beyers, 2008: 362). This section explores dominant assumptions pertaining to the 'vertical' nature of citizenship, the construction of citizenship vis-à-vis citizens, and the constitution of individual rationality and citizen identity. In doing so, it is possible to identify empirical gaps in the existing literature that have shaped the research agenda of this thesis.

2.3.1 'Vertical' vs. 'horizontal' citizenship

Traditionally, social and political theorists have tended to take a 'vertical' conception of citizenship (Clarke et al., 2014). Such a treatment views citizenship as a *status bestowed upon*, rather than a *process enacted by*, citizens. This approach focuses on the formalised interactions that exist between citizens and the state within the political-legal system. Accordingly,

the rights and duties conferred in membership are granted by the state and informed by social forces that bear on the structure and prevalence of inequality. Arguably, such an approach bypasses the means, and focuses on the ends of citizenship. Due to its classical heritage, this view has proven particularly influential amongst social liberals (e.g. Marshall, 1950). Whilst most social liberals recognise the contingency between civil, political and social rights, they concomitantly fail to acknowledge how citizenship, as both a status and a process, can only be mediated and formalised through individual citizens. The relations, preferences and actions between individuals are a key dimension of citizenship (Isin and Wood, 1999). By failing to account for this fact, social liberals have tended to take a rather static and overly deterministic view of the structures that exist between market, state and polity. A top-down characterisation neglects the inherently civil-political character of citizenship that extends well beyond formal civil and political engagement.

A more 'horizontal' approach tends to view citizenship as a set of relationships among individuals, groups and communities (Clarke et al., 2014). These *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* relations are believed to have a significant influence on the construction and development of citizenship (Somers, 1993). As such, a more 'horizontal' treatment can accommodate citizenship as a process as well as a status. Communitarian thinkers have been particularly keen to emphasise the role (and value) of social networks, values and relations in the construction of citizenship (Barber, 2003). Participation in public life and civil society has been a central concern of civic republicans as they seek to 'preserve as much of the autonomy of the political field as possible to prevent politics from becoming privatistic or statist' (Delanty, 2000: 33). Critiquing the centrality of individual rights in liberal theories of citizenship, neo-republicans are concerned with striking a balance between private interests, state power and community participation. In doing so, they advance an active ideal of citizenship that seeks to function according to common rather than individual interests (Oldfield, 1990a).

Put towards rather different ends, reflexive and post-structural theorists also adopt a more horizontal conception of citizenship that seeks to problematize and address the purported elision between liberalism and citizenship (Habermas, 1975; Mouffe, 1992). Influenced by Gramscian thought, reflexive and post-structural accounts of citizenship contend that individuals are (or at least should) not be bound by structural arrangements. In this vein, individuals have the capacity to affect change in institutions, outcomes and discourses. This re-kindling of the public and democratic sphere, contrasts quite markedly

with a passive 'vertical' notion of citizenship. Re-inserting the 'horizontal' dimension into citizenship debates gives explanatory depth to studying the relationship between citizenship and inequality. Somers (1993) suggests that reconceiving of citizenship as an 'instituted process' (Polanyi, 1957) rather than a status, opens up analytical space to more fully consider the dynamic between civil society, citizenship and inequality.

Analytically, a focus on status is attached to individuals and categories, while an "instituted process" focuses on networks of memberships and relationality. Thus, the abstractions of state and capitalism, citizenship, and social class can be replaced with the concept of contingent patterns of relationships and social practices grounded in time and space... English citizenship was not granted as a right - it was created by the activities of peoples in particular situations who interacted with institutions, ideals, and rules of legal power and governmental participation... Citizenship rights were relational social practices, not 'things' (Somers, 1993: 611).

Once understood in this way, citizens, or civil society more broadly, can be understood as actively involved in the construction and transformation of citizenship. In this sense, citizenship as a *practice* and *process* is always 'in the making' (Balibar, 2009). Whilst civil society is influenced by the parameters and conditions imposed, it is equally involved in the reproduction and revision of citizenship structures. For example, there is an ineluctable correspondence between the rights and duties of social citizenship. A citizen can only claim their entitlement to welfare if there is resource to secure it (Plant, 1988: 73). The (much-vilified) declaration by Margaret Thatcher that 'there is no such thing as society' is of significance here. To fully understand her meaning, it is important to view the claim in context:

I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand "I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!" or "I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!" "I am homeless, the Government must house me!" and so they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then also to help look after our neighbour and life is a reciprocal business and people have got the entitlements too much in mind without the obligations... (Thatcher, 1987: 8-10).

The primacy of the individual in securing welfare and protecting against risk is perhaps most explicit (and problematic) here. However, Thatcher was also referring to a category error. One's rights and responsibilities as a citizen are not ordained from an abstract entity such as 'society'. Rather, they are negotiated and realised through socio-economic (trans-) action and political arbitration. This is facilitated through individuals, who (whether consenting or not) pay tax and exist in and as society. Whilst my claim to the rights of social citizenship may well be directed to the State, it is principally derived from other citizens. Social citizenship mediates this process through administrative and legislative adjudication but this settlement in itself only functions with legitimacy as a result of individual cooperation and collective negotiation.

Of course, despite the equality of status notionally codified in membership, citizens are not equally able to support or challenge the character of citizenship. Systemic forms of inequality undermine the capacity of some individuals to affect change (Isin and Wood, 1999). This is something considered in greater detail in chapter seven. However, for the purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to consider, more generally, the extent to which civil society affects the construction of citizenship. Ideological accounts greatly differ in how they view the appropriate role and capacity for civil society to shape citizenship institutions.

2.3.2 Constructing citizenship through citizens

In *Leviathan* Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1991) argues that a Social Contract is needed between individual citizens and the state. Under this Social Contract all citizens are considered equal with respect to the rights conferred in their status but are equally duty-bound to abide by the laws imposed by the state. Under the Social Contract, individuals cooperate to fulfil their negative responsibilities to one another i.e. self-restraint. In order to maintain social order, Thomas Hobbes argues for a system of absolutism. By limiting the capacity for individuals to affect the actions and sovereignty of the state, Hobbes suggests it is possible to protect the function and value of the Social Contract (Hobbes, [1651] 1991). As a classical liberal, John Locke also advances the idea that there should be universal rights embodied in the Social Contract (Locke, [1690] 1988). According to Locke, all individuals have a *natural* right to life, liberty and property. To protect these natural rights and avoid a *state of nature*, Locke subscribes to the notion of a Social Contract. However, contrary to Hobbes, Locke argues that sovereignty ultimately resides with the people. Locke stipulates that the polity have the right to affect change in state structures and rules *if* the state defaults on its responsibilities

to protect *natural* rights. According to this logic, obedience to the state should be conditional on the state fulfilling its obligations to citizens. Despite this right to revolution, classical liberals advance a highly individualistic, passive and rather 'thin' notion of citizenship (Burchell, 1995). Rather than actively engaged in the practice of citizenship, classical liberals saw the polity as necessarily constrained and subject to its pre-defined character (Faulks, 2000).

Whilst modern social liberals argue for a system that extends well beyond the minimal rights and duties embodied in the classical Social Contract, they nonetheless adopt a notably passive or private conception of citizenship (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 354). For social liberals such as T.H. Marshall (1950) and John Rawls (1973), citizenship is understood as 'an important but occasional identity, a legal status rather than a fact of everyday life' (Walzer, 1995: 215). This status establishes the rights and duties of membership and as such the character of citizenship is somewhat pre-ordained. According to this approach, citizenship principally concerns the governance of laws, norms and institutions rather than participation and involvement in their formulation. Social liberals deliberate the articulation and distributional effects of these laws, norms and institutions in an attempt to reconcile the notional rights of citizenship with the tangible inequalities in power and resource arising in liberal democracies. Whilst citizenship theorists previously touched upon matters of inequality and citizenship, social liberals were the first to substantively address questions of distributive justice (Beckett, 2006). That is not to say classical theorists overlooked questions of desert, inequality and justice. For example, John Locke considered the inequalities arising from individual effort (that is, the conversion of natural resources through labour) and Jean Jacques Rousseau suggested that a degree of material equality is necessary to safeguard the formalised and applied liberties of citizens.

For social liberals, the social rights of citizenship are a means by which to protect the formal equalities and liberties instantiated in membership and in certain instances are seen as a necessary precondition of citizenship status and participation (Berlin, 1958). As such, social liberals tend to focus on how the state, market and civil society respond to and affect the abilities and outcomes of individuals. The rights of citizenship are conceived as an end in themselves rather than a means to participate in the structuration of distributive justice. Whilst Marshall suggests that 'societies' 'create an image of ideal citizenship... towards which aspiration can be directed' (Marshall, 1950: 28-29), there is little specification of how this occurs or whether the

process itself might be a functional necessity or feature of the citizenship ideal. John Rawls (1973) goes some way further but restricts his attention to a hypothetical process whereby citizens (under certain constraints) agree to the conditions and outcomes of distributive justice. In sum, the social liberal model underplays the participatory nature and civil-political character of citizenship to focus on the more advanced role of the state in social provision.

In response, neo-liberals such as Friedrich Hayek (1982) and Robert Nozick (1974) advocate a minimal role of the state in social provision. According to a neo-liberal model of citizenship, the civil and political rights of membership are the primary concern of citizens and the state. State interference, beyond upholding market exchange and civil law, infringes upon the primacy of individual liberty. In this sense, the citizen's capacity to affect citizenship structures is limited to that which is deemed institutionally appropriate in protecting libertarian ideals. For example, Nozick (1974) argues that any form of welfare available should be delivered philanthropically rather than via some institutional mechanism that would obligate citizens to contribute to the welfare of others via mandatory taxation. Whilst 'private redistribution' may be the morally right thing to undertake, it is not morally right to enforce people to do this (Wolff, 1991: 12). It is not that forms of collective association or action are actively discouraged, rather, community organisation and participation is deemed to be well beyond the confines of the state's jurisdiction and should therefore operate at that level. Again, this promulgates a rather passive conception of the polity vis-à-vis its relationship with the state. Civil society may flourish in shaping the experience and outcomes of citizens, but not in a way that interferes with market processes or that which is codified in state laws, norms and institutions. Whilst liberal conceptions of citizenship endorse the right to participation, this rarely extends beyond the narrow formalised systems of political representation (Heater, 2013). As such, (neo-)liberals tend to view civil society as operating within the existing boundaries of citizenship, rather than actively engaged in its formulation.

In stark contrast, communitarian and republican accounts of citizenship (Oldfield, 1990a; Etzioni, 1995; e.g. Barber, 2003) tend to emphasise more participatory and deliberative forms of engagement that shape both the objectives and operation of the state. According to republicans, collective action and association is, by definition, the substance of citizenship. Without a 'share in the government to the utmost' (Aristotle., 2001: IV, 63), members of a polity are merely subjects rather than citizens. Through a dynamic and multi-layered relationship between civil society and the state, *socially defined*

citizenship (Oldfield, 1990b) maintains its legitimacy by operating according to the general will of the polity (Rousseau, [1896] 1913). According to this approach, the co-construction of rights and responsibilities is supposed to ensure the appropriate balance between private interests and the public good. Communitarians are principally concerned with the socially embedded nature of human action and orientation. For example, Robert Putnam (1993; 2000) argues that community participation is necessary for the effective functioning of democracy (Delanty, 2000). Neo-republicans, such as Hannah Arendt (2013 [1958]) and Adrian Oldfield (1990a) suggest that, beyond the formalised rights and duties of membership, participation is an equally if not more important component of citizenship. The provisions and conditions laid out in citizenship must be constructed in a dialectic with the citizenry. Even the passive receipt of citizenship rights must, at least on occasion, be accompanied by the 'activist politics of citizens' (Walzer, 1995: 217).

Underlying these accounts of citizenship is an emphasis on the co-dependent relationships that exist between individuals and society - the former is inevitably shaped by the latter and vice versa (Twine, 1994).

Placing an emphasis on inclusive participation as the very foundation of democratic practice, these approaches suggest a more active notion of citizenship: one which recognises the agency of citizens as 'makers and shapers' rather than as 'users and choosers' of interventions or services designed by others (Gaventa, 2002: 4).

With this in mind, the dispositions, ideals and beliefs of the general public are particularly important if we are to fully understand and explain the institutionalisation and development of citizenship. However, the dominance of liberal accounts of citizenship means that the preferences and attitudes of citizens are often underplayed or overlooked (Lister et al., 2003). One major criticism of communitarian and republican accounts is that they fail to consider the degree of diversity in public opinion, life circumstances and identities (Beckett, 2006). These differences amount to significant tensions that potentially undermine common belonging, purpose and direction. The universalising tendencies of liberal citizenship often undermine group-based rights, cultures and identities. Multicultural and pluralist theorists suggest that these endogenous differences extend across and beyond civil, political and social domains and as such this 'politics of difference' has to be accommodated within the rights, responsibilities and institutions of citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995; Joppke, 2001). Whilst reflexive and post-structural accounts of citizenship are less willing to essentialise identity, they nonetheless grapple

with reconciling the increasingly complex attachments of late modernity with a liberal conception of citizenship (Mouffe, 1992; Habermas, 1996)¹.

2.3.3 Citizen identity and rationality

Many accounts of citizenship offer a specification of how to balance the interests and character of the individual with the collective interests and associations that are deemed functionally necessary (or ideal). These theories tend to rest on 'taken-for-granted ideas' (Hopkins, 2009b: 34) about citizenship and the constitution of human nature, civic identity and individual interests. If the attitudes and behaviours of citizens have a significant bearing on the organisation and outcomes of citizenship, it is necessary to explore the validity of assumptions about the interests and motivations of citizens as well as the formation of individual and citizen identity. The belief that a balance needs to be struck between individual and collective interests suggests that there is something inconsistent between the two.

Ancient Greek theorists conceived of citizenship as a status that delineated between the private and public sphere as well as the rights of citizens and non-citizens (Faulks, 2000). According to Aristotle, 'good citizenship' was characterised by self-less interest and participation in public life. Active citizenship required individuals to surrender their private preferences or interests for the sake of the common good. Such an act was believed to enrich the identity and constitution of individual citizens (Heater, 2004). Since the *ancient* conception of citizenship as an active, self-less and collective endeavour, various theorists have sought to articulate an appropriate balance between private interests and the common good. Liberalism and republicanism are the two primary schools of thought that seek to explore how effective quotidian citizenship might enable 'individuals to occupy public spaces in a manner that does not compromise their self-identity' (Painter and Philo, 1995: 115). However, these two paradigms greatly differ in their conception of rationality, morality and identity. These differences shape the institutional and non-institutional measures liberals and republicans deem necessary in instantiating their ideal (cf. Oldfield, 1990b).

Liberal accounts of citizenship tend to view individual identity and moral autonomy as logically prior to society. According to Hobbes ([1651] 1991), individuals desire 'felicity' - the power to exercise one's agency and attain the goods one values. Individuals are essentially self-interested: if given the

¹ Section 2.5 considers these contributions to citizenship debates in much further detail.

chance, they will pursue their own ends with little regard for others due to a 'restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death' (Hobbes, [1651] 1991: 70). Individuals elect to enter into a Social Contract to attenuate the effects of other peoples' proclivities to dominate and exploit. Whilst citizens may forfeit some aspects of their individual freedom, this is ultimately a rational thing to do. With its roots in the classical liberal tradition, social liberalism similarly conceives of rationality as informed by self-interest.

In his seminal work, John Rawls (1973) offers *A Theory of Justice* that attempts to move away from particularist self-interested rationality in social co-operation, towards an idea of *Justice as Fairness*. Rawls offers a hypothetical situation that divorces people from any delineating knowledge that could result in an unjust or unfair distribution of social goods or resources. In this thought experiment, Rawls places people behind what he terms a *veil of ignorance* and behind this, individuals are deprived of a) knowledge about their own interests, talents and identity and b) the capacity to outline and pursue their ideas about what makes life good or valuable (Swift, 2006). Rawls argues that in this *original position*, individuals will arrive at a conception of justice that is *fair* because there is no particularising knowledge that could corrupt the principles informing a fair distribution of resources. Rawls proposes that the talents, resources and circumstances into which we are born are not arrived at by some principle of merit, they are in fact subject to luck. Whilst we may exercise inherited talents or resources to affect personal circumstance, it is hard, if not impossible, to distinguish between individual effort (desert) and inherited capacities (privilege). By acknowledging this, an important question is raised. Is it just that inherited talents or resources may be appropriated to the advantage of some and not others? Rawls believes 'reasonable citizens' would generally agree this was not just and would arrive at a principle of redistribution to resolve the problem:

Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation (defined by principles and ideas) and they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that others also accept the terms. For these terms to be fair terms, citizens offering them must reasonably think that those citizens to whom such terms are offered might also reasonably accept them (Rawls, 1996: 49-58).

Rawls believes that there would be a number of principles of agreement. In order of priority, the first principle concerns the equal basic rights and liberties

of all individuals. The second principle states that any socio-economic inequalities that persist within society are to be arranged so that they a) emerge under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and b) are then of greatest benefit to the least advantaged. Essentially, Rawls is suggesting that an individual's lived experience, including their material position and the accompanying knowledge therein, dictates their political and distributive preferences. According to Rawls, 'ignorance about talents and social background models the sense in which people are conceived as equal (Swift, 2006: 23).

Communitarians and civic republicans, on the other hand, believe that one's sense of self, rationality and moral autonomy is socially embedded (cf. Taylor, 1989). Individual identity and capacity for social cooperation is not logically prior to society but the contingent product of social and community relations. For example, Sandel (1998) questions whether the veil of ignorance is actually achievable. He argues that faculties and principles are intrinsic and cannot be separated from the values and aspirations that define us (Sandel, 1998). A conception of anything must arise from an agent and when the foundational aspects of that agent are stripped away there is no recognisable individual left. Ultimately, Sandel is questioning whether any *original position* is possible and thus whether impartiality is realistic. Beyond this, Sandel is also offering a critique of liberal egalitarianism more generally. Without recognising individuals as grounded within culturally-defined communities, Sandel believes one 'fails to capture those loyalties and responsibilities whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are' (Sandel, 2010: 224). In this regard, communitarian and civic republican accounts of citizenship suggest that rationality and identity are socially embedded and constituted - a desire or compulsion to cooperate cannot exist independently of an agent or community. In sum, social liberals suggest that identity and morality is logically prior to society - that lived experiences and the knowledge accumulated as a result corrupts the morality of individuals. By contrast, republicans suggest that individual identity, preferences and moral autonomy are only developed through our lived experiences. This thesis will examine how lived experiences shape attitudes, preferences and moral autonomy in relation to welfare and social citizenship – particularly within the context of inequality.

Liberals and republicans both believe 'the practice of citizenship may not be a natural one for human beings, in the sense that they would not spontaneously

engage in it, but it is not thereby inconsistent with what their nature can become, and thus not one that they are congenitally unfitted for' (Oldfield, 1990b: 187). Just as liberalism emphasises (and attempts to protect against) the self-interested tendencies of individuals, republicanism is also concerned with protecting against the 'predatoriness of other individuals' (Oldfield, 1990b: 179). However, these two philosophical traditions differ in what they believe these systems of restraint should ultimately achieve. For liberalism, citizenship as a status entitles members to the same legal rights in order to safeguard the autonomy and freedom of individuals. For republicanism, citizenship as a practice shapes group identity and rights to further the common good rather than protect individual interests. According to this approach, citizenship is essentially a civic identity underpinned by a sense of common belonging and public culture.

Whether the ends of either account of citizenship are desirable is greatly contested. Liberal and communitarian theories of citizenship each provide insight into the relationships that exist between individuals, polities and institutions, with distinct values and goals intrinsic to their explanation. However, as Beyers suggests, it is important to

move beyond the fallacy of presuming that the problems of defining citizenship can be resolved theoretically or normatively, whether under the guide of communitarianism or liberalism... as a phenomena that exists vis-à-vis dynamic social relations and political struggle, citizenship can only be adequately understood through a context specific analysis' (Beyers, 2008: 362).

For the purposes of this thesis, it is clear that a 'horizontal' account of citizenship offers greatest conceptual and analytic space to explore the relationship between inequality and the attitudes, behaviours and identity of citizens. Civil society and public institutions operate in conjunction to legitimate the jurisdiction and effects of social citizenship. Any theory of citizenship that divorces a polity's experience from the structures of citizenship, particularly with regard to inequality, fails to account for how individuals can come to be engaged in its construction and revision.

By conceiving of citizenship as a practice, individuals and communities can be understood as actively engaged in the construction of their civic rights, duties and identity. Doing so makes it possible to explore the complex ways in which 'alternative identities vie for instantiation in the political institutions and discourses of society (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 458). Within the context of rising inequality in the UK, it is particularly pertinent to explore how lived

experiences of poverty and affluence affect attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities. In light of this, the following section considers the relationship between inequality and citizenship and its significance for citizen identity, attitudes and behaviours.

2.4 The relationship between inequality and social citizenship

There are inherent tensions underlining the relationship between inequality and social citizenship. The presence and experience of inequality may compromise the identity, membership and rights of social citizens (Isin and Wood, 1999). Equally, social citizenship can serve to moderate inequalities. According to liberal egalitarians, the social rights of citizenship help uphold the equality of status notionally guaranteed through membership (Marshall, 1950). Provided inequalities 'do not cut too deep' (Marshall, 1950: 75-76), the formal rights guaranteed to all legally defined citizens are purported to safeguard the status and character of citizenship. However, this 'liberal' or 'passive' ideal of citizenship obscures the symbolic, material and political inequalities that pervade and destabilise the foundations of citizenship (Dickinson et al., 2008). As Jo (2013: 517) notes, 'behind the veil of 'universal citizenship' and equality before the law', there lay systemic forms of domination and oppression' that misrecognise and marginalise those supposedly recognised as social citizens.

As a result, liberal conceptions of citizenship can be poorly equipped to analyse and intervene on inequality in a number of important respects. Firstly, liberal egalitarians often conceive of inequality as an inevitable and (according to meritocratic principles) desirable function of democratic-welfare-capitalism (Faulks, 2000; Dench, 2006). Secondly, poverty tends to be treated as a peculiarity of the socio-economic configuration rather than an endemic effect of the existing socio-structural order (Offe, 1982). Inevitably, institutional responses react accordingly by focusing on 'after-market interventions'. Thirdly, the universalising tendencies of liberal citizenship make it difficult to accommodate or attend to difference without compromising its integrity (Joppke, 2001). Liberal prescriptions of citizenship assign the same rights and duties to all members of a politically defined community irrespective of the diversity that exists therein. As a result, liberal citizenship 'propels us towards an ideal of transcendence, a greater collectivity in which we get beyond our local identities and concerns' (Phillips, 1991: 81). Such an approach divorces

citizenship from the everyday routines, experiences and attachments that give it meaning and moral purpose (Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). After all,

if citizenship is to mean anything in an everyday sense it should mean the ability of individuals to occupy public places in a manner that does not compromise their self-identity, let alone obstruct, threaten or even harm them more materially (Painter and Philo, 1995: 115).

For some, the disjuncture between the formal assurances and lived realities of liberal citizenship undermine its capacity to recognise the presence and character of inequality (Dietz, 1992). Individuals may be notionally recognised as full and equal citizens of a given polity, however they may also systematically lack the material, political and cultural resources necessary to exercise or attain their rights as citizens (Held, 1991). Beyond concealing the phenomenon of inequality, a liberal conception of citizenship can also obfuscate its causes. As previously stated, liberal egalitarians tend to adopt a more 'vertical' approach to theorising citizenship (Clarke et al., 2014). This restricted consideration of citizenship as an abstract status poses particular limitations for analysing inequality. By understanding social citizenship as a set of 'specific social configurations' (Leca, 1991: 171) it is possible to reconsider the origins of inequality and the socio-structural dynamics that give rise to it.

As a practice, citizenship reproduces and reformulates the structures and conditions that exist between communities, institutions and markets. As such, exploring the phenomenon of inequality through the lens of citizenship, 'allows poverty to be analysed within a framework of institutional relationships' (Jordan, 1996: 81). At its most general, deprivation is not a fixed or isolated condition – it is a signifier of socio-economic and political relations within any given context. Understood in this way, deprivation can be seen as a relational condition – an artefact of systemic processes structured by citizenship. Acknowledging the figurative and applied character of social citizenship offers an analytical basis through which to understand inequality and the relations that result in inclusion or exclusion. Citizenship, as a socio-cultural form, captures the relational dimensions of inequality – raising questions about 'who is accepted as a worthy, valuable and responsible member of an everyday community' (Painter and Philo, 1995: 115).

Whilst citizenship is not a concept immediately recognised as influential in daily life, the principles underpinning it prove pervasive in lived experiences (Dean and Melrose, 1996; Dwyer, 2002; Lister et al., 2003; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). For some, it is only through the 'accumulation of individual

practices that citizenships emerge' (Dickinson et al., 2008: 104; Isin and Nielsen, 2008; Clarke et al., 2014). Everyday experiences and encounters are, by their nature, derived from individual interpretation. In isolation, citizen's accounts offer valuable insight into experiences of citizenship. In addition though, they also help analyse the structuring nature of citizenship and its bearing on inequality (Dwyer, 2002). Social citizenship shapes, but is also bound by socio-political and economic dynamics that alleviate and propagate inequality (McEwan, 2000). In certain instances, social citizenship can be configured in such a way that it propagates rather than smooths out the material and status differentials between citizens (Jordan, 1996: 81-82). With this in mind, the phenomenology of deprivation is as much a reflection of citizenship arrangements as it is of lived experience. In this sense, the lived experience of citizens offers diagnostic insight into the reality of, but also the structuring of, inequality. Such an approach opens up analytical space to understand social citizenship through lived experiences of inequality and equally understand lived experiences of inequality through social citizenship (Condor, 2011).

The presence of poverty within any polity corrupts the material and symbolic significance of social citizenship (Lister, 1990; Isin and Wood, 1999). For those experiencing deprivation, their lives are often characterised by precarity, upheaval and vulnerability (Hooper, 2007). Such an experience makes it difficult for these individuals to reconcile their own situation with the apparent benefits inherited in social citizenship. Sustained and intense forms of deprivation threaten the material and 'ontological security' (Giddens, 1991: 47) of social citizenship:

Someone who was living in absolute poverty could not be considered a citizen in any meaningful sense... their continued exclusion from many of the day-to-day practices that are taken for granted by the wider population indicates that the full promise of social citizenship remains a distant dream for many, and that Marshall's expansive vision of a 'civilised life' remains an illusion (Dwyer, 2004: 84).

Those experiencing deprivation in their day-to-day life are, to some extent, alienated from the common experiences that underpin and reinforce sentiments of collective belonging and mutuality. Deprivation and the consequences of it that are negotiated in day to day life compromise self-definition and a common identity as equal citizens (Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011).

Inclusion and exclusion are a necessary function of all social formations. However, what is interesting is to explore the processes that lead to such a condition. Once poverty is recognised as both a material condition and a corrosive social relation (Lister, 2004), it is possible to capture the material and symbolic significance of inequality. Poverty research has tended to focus on the material features of deprivation. However, there is an increasing appreciation for the social and figurative facets of poverty (e.g. Chase and Walker, 2013). Jo (2013: 517) suggests that 'social needs are inherently connected to the broader context of the social, cultural and economic systems and institutions at work'.

In *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*, Runciman (1966) goes some way to defining poverty according to the views and experiences of individuals. Runciman (1966) explores people's perceptions of their material and non-material welfare in relation to others. He claims that people tend to compare their situation with a reference group similar to themselves rather than the whole of society. This tendency means some are less aware of the extent of income inequality and poverty and where they lie on the income distribution. Various studies have shown that people tend to make comparisons within their own social groups and networks rather than across abstract sociological categories (Evans and Kelley, 2004). As a result, people tend to assess their socio-economic position and the relative value of their income and wealth inaccurately in relation to the rest of the population (e.g. Toynbee and Walker, 2009). Those in a position of ostensible deprivation have been known to deny their own poverty (Flaherty, 2008; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). Equally, people in relative affluence have said that they 'struggle' to meet their individual or household needs (Hamilton, 2003). Issues of 'status anxiety' (de Botton, 2004) can be seen as confounding the credibility of subjective perceptions in defining and measuring poverty. Equally, the validity of an individual's judgment 'may be seriously limited by his or her social experience' (Sen, 2002: 860). However, some have suggested that people's exposure to and thus awareness of poverty and affluence has grown and as a result people have become better at making comparisons across different reference groups (Pradhan and Ravallion, 2000). Whilst limitations may remain in allowing the poor to define themselves, 'the views and experiences of people who consider themselves poor need not be neglected' (Roll, 1992: 21).

It is entirely possible and indeed desirable to incorporate subjective impressions into an account of inequality (Deleeck and Van den Bosch, 1992). One productive way of undertaking this task is to scrutinise subjective

impressions within their social context (Sen, 2002: 861). Chase and Walker (2013) recently did so by exploring how feelings of shame amongst poor people can be conceived as a 'social fact' in a consumerist society. The authors demonstrate how a 'self-conscious' emotion such as shame is constructed in reference to an individual's expectations and circumstance as well as the expectations and circumstance of others. Exploring lived experiences and attitudes through the lens of social citizenship makes it possible to do the same thing.

By grounding poverty research in the lived experiences of notionally equal citizens, it is possible to better understand the processes that shape the prevalence and character of inequality. In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the phenomenological and reflexive significance of inequality and social citizenship (e.g. Andreouli and Howarth, 2013; Chase and Walker, 2013; Howarth et al., 2014). Against the backdrop of rising inequality (Crawford et al., 2015), it seems particularly pertinent to examine 'how social actors subjectively perceive (or sometimes fail to see) the unequal conditions of class and place that frame their biographies' (MacDonald et al., 2005: 874). This thesis examines whether and how individuals experiencing deprivation and affluence develop distinctive frames of reference when it comes to their attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities. Crucially, any attitudinal or behavioural divergence between those experiencing deprivation and affluence needs to be 'understood within a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion' (Jordan, 1996: 111). Examining attitudes and behaviours in relation to social citizenship, this thesis explores the orientations of those who experience diverse material circumstances, but also who occupy radically different public spaces and positions. Importantly, the attitudes, behaviours and orientations of citizens will have a bearing on the institutions and processes that structure marginality. As such, these attitudes are particularly crucial to understanding inequality and particularly how it endures within a political democracy.

2.5 Deliberative Citizens and Citizenship

T. H. Marshall (1950: 28) suggests that 'citizenship is a status bestowed' upon citizens, rather than democratically adjudicated. Many have critiqued Marshall's historicism in that it fails to account for the socio-economic and political struggles that secured the rights of citizenship (Turner, 1993). Whilst Marshall suggests that the securement of each right is contingent upon the latter (civil, political, social), he fails to theorise their relationship and mutual dependence in any detailed specification. Importantly, this exposes an

inadequacy in Marshall's conception of collective membership and organisation.

If social citizenship has macro-structural, rather than democratically determined origins, citizens are regarded with little, if any, political agency to endorse, deliberate or contest ideals about the common good. In a recent article, Hay (2014) argues that the state is an analytical abstraction that shapes and constrains political agency. Hay's argument about the state as a dynamic institutional complex could also be extended to social citizenship. As perhaps the largest and most significant demonstration of the state's political ontology, it could also be argued that social citizenship has 'no agency per se though it can be seen to define and construct a series of contexts within which political agency is both authorised... and enacted' (Hay, 2014: 460). In turn, the (uneven) exercise of political agency shapes the configuration of citizenship and inequality. Importantly, this political agency should be understood as extending well beyond the conventional confines of representative democracy.

Representative democracy enables citizens to exercise their political agency by electing representatives to serve their values and interests. Conceiving of political democracy in these terms advances a rather ahistorical and static conception of the relation between policy, politics and institutions. In reality, the relationship between citizenship, institutions and political agents is much more dynamic and contingent. Political, social and economic actors shape the institutions and character of citizenship through their day-to-day practices and orientations (Barber, 2003). In particular, the attitudes of the general public cultivate direction and legitimacy in the institutions of social citizenship:

the successful operation of institutions and the dispositions of citizens in liberal democracies tend naturally to reinforce each other's orientation toward liberal democratic ends... liberal democracies that view institutions and dispositions as interacting in a way that is reciprocally determining (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 458).

Accordingly, institutions need to be understood as a demonstration of collective membership and contestation that 'express ideas and embody a continuing approach to resolving the issues which arise' (Johnson, 1989: 131). If institutions promulgate interests and ideals, it is important to establish whose interests and ideals these institutions serve. Within the context of inequality, institutions may come to serve the interests and ideals of those with the greatest social, economic or political agency (Phillips, 1995). Without checks and balances, institutions creating inequality may become self-reinforcing. As

discussed in chapters seven and eight, the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship are shaped in the image of polity preferences. Certainly, some have a greater capacity than others to exert their influence on social, political and economic institutions. How this process intersects with inequality is of particular interest for this thesis and is given due consideration in sections 7.4 and 7.5 later. For the moment though, it is necessary to more fully consider how citizenship can be understood 'as socially and politically constructed, as located within cultural formations and inscribed in the conception and contestation of political projects' (Neill, 2011: 4).

The attitudes, values, interests and 'truth claims' of citizens create different political projects (Clarke et al., 2014). These political projects give expression to what citizens believe the ideal socio-political and economic configuration should and could be. These political projects extend well beyond formalised settings and guide political agency and action on a quotidian basis that, in turn, defines and redefines citizenship. Different political projects coalesce to instantiate the 'official, authoritative or dominant conception' of social citizenship (Clarke et al., 2014: 16). In tandem, the state is engaged in a range of attempts to define and produce 'ideal, loyal and dutiful citizens' (Benei, 2005: 8). Political actors involved in both processes include political representatives, citizens and social movements but also include 'non-citizens' and those marginalised by the existing socio-political or economic configuration. Indeed, citizenship results 'in part from the practice of those who are excluded from it' (Sassen, 2006: 65).

How the attitudes and identity of these different actors are negotiated within the public sphere, and in accordance with the institutions of social citizenship, is of central concern to reflexive and post-structural theorists. Influenced by the Marxist tradition, reflexive and post-structural theorists have tended to focus on the role of civil society and how this interacts with state institutions, power and ideals (cf. Petersen, 1999; McAfee, 2000). According to this approach, civil society represents the private interests and associations that are negotiated in the public sphere. Sceptical of the social liberal conception of citizenship, reflexive and post-structural theorists believe a 'reinvigoration' of democracy is necessary to ensure civil society is able to avoid instances or systemic forms of domination and state hegemony (Habermas, 1996). Hegemony occurs either through economic, political or cultural means where one group exerts control over another group in a way that subjugates the latter and encourages conformity to a particular way of doing, being or seeing something (Calhoun, 1992). Contrary to Gramsci's original conception, post-

structural theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001) argue that these forms of power and domination manifest themselves in competing discourses.

As a reflexive theorist, Jürgen Habermas argues that the development and promotion of a 'deliberative democracy' is necessary to overcome hegemonic forms of domination (Habermas, 1996). To avoid an encroachment of the 'system' onto the 'lifeworld', an invigoration of 'consensual norms' would help inform the direction and character of collective coordination (Calhoun, 1992). In this instance 'system' refers to systematically structured contexts of social interaction and cooperation such as markets and bureaucracies where 'instrumental rationality' prevails to answer questions concerning how to efficiently realise an objective. By contrast, 'lifeworld' refers to contexts and cultural systems of mutual understanding and deference where individuals jointly engage in 'communicative rationality' and action to consider what should be the objectives and ideals that a collective or polity tries to move towards:

Instrumental rationality refers to those practices which are formed through institutions and bureaucracies of the state and the economy (the 'system'), and which are the foundations of social stability. Communicative rationality refers to those everyday practices of everyday people (the 'lifeworld'), which function to socialize people, facilitating a sense of order, social knowledge and cultural reproduction. In communicative action individual 'actors' are able to assert themselves and their knowledge, bringing their private 'truth claims' into a public space. Communicative rationality, thereby, allows individual actors to present their personal truths and measure them against the truths of other individuals (Lewis, 2008: 209).

By examining quotidian experiences and practices of social citizenship in this thesis, it has been possible to examine how communicative rationality pertaining to inequality and welfare is articulated by the rich and poor.

Despite starting with divergent viewpoints, Habermas (1996) believes, through public deliberation, it is possible to arrive at a conception of the common good grounded in 'consensual norms' that people would come to agree is 'right' for everyone (McAfee, 2000). Others have a less utopian view of human nature and are sceptical about the commensurability of diverse subject positions and attitudes. Given the ineradicability of power relations in deliberative democratic settings, post structural theorists such as Mouffe (1992) introduce the idea of a 'radical democracy' that enables 'multiple

selves' to engage in political struggle. In particular, this political struggle is understood to facilitate collective resistance to hegemonic systems and instances of domination (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). For Mouffe, a shared definition of the common good is neither possible nor desirable. Public deliberation will demarcate the interests and attitudes of 'multiple selves'. Rather than a *universitas*, driven by a common purpose, Mouffe argues, a polity should comprise a *societas*, as a collection of individuals with shared interests. The antagonistic process that characterises this 'radical democracy' gives expression (and perhaps legitimacy) to the institutions shaping social citizenship. Mouffe (1999) argues that this conception of 'agonistic pluralism' offers a more convincing means by which to instigate and realise the democratic ambitions of civil society.

Whether public deliberation is grounded in 'consensual norms' or 'agonistic pluralism', it is clear that the attitudes and orientations of the general public do not operate in a vacuum: they are a key feature of social politics and citizenship. If social citizenship is democratically conceived and configured in a way that meets the needs and interests of the polity, the institutional and structural arrangements by which this occurs must 'allow for a diversity of doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of existing democratic societies (Rawls, 1985: 225). It is therefore necessary to consider the quotidian and informal nature of public deliberation and citizen orientation that occurs through lived experiences of social citizenship. This thesis will contribute towards such an examination by exploring the attitudes and behaviours of *deliberative citizens* within the context of rising poverty and inequality.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the conceptual and analytical value of reconceiving of social citizenship as a bottom-up practice rather than a top-down status (Clarke et al., 2014). Deliberation and negotiation surrounding the mores and modalities of citizenship occurs through a collection of 'institutionally-embedded social practices' (Somers, 1993: 589). This not only shapes the ideals and effects of social citizenship: it is, in fact, the very basis and character of social citizenship. Such a conception suggests the attitudes and behaviours of the general public are particularly important if we are to understand the relationship between social citizenship and inequality. The lived experience of citizens offers insight into the socio-structural dynamics

that shape the character of social citizenship and the prevalence and experience of inequality.

To further debates surrounding citizenship, as well as shift from normative to empirical accounts, this thesis problematizes the dominant 'passive' conception of citizenship by attending to the (sometimes constrained) political agency of citizenship that is embedded in day-to-day practices (Robins et al., 2008). The thesis does so by exploring how individual and civic identity is derived from institutional and social relations and how lived experiences of inequality shape attitudes towards the principles and outcomes of social citizenship.

As previously discussed, inequality has the capacity to undermine citizen identity and collective belonging. Social citizenship can have a substantial bearing on the extent to which, notionally equal citizens identify with and feel a member of a politically defined community (Dwyer, 2010). Chapter three examines how the changing praxis of social citizenship has intervened on the institutions and processes that propagate inequality. The welfare state, as an assemblage of services and financial support, can create or inhibit common expectations and experiences. The following chapter outlines how social citizenship and its attendant ideals have been articulated and practiced through political rhetoric and policy instruments over time. In doing so, it is possible to establish the current praxis of social citizenship, how this interacts with inequality, and its material and symbolic implications.

Chapter 3: The variegated praxis and experience of social citizenship in the UK

3.1 Introduction

This chapter illustrates how the dominant praxis of social citizenship has changed over time. Status, rights, and identity are a *gestalt* of the Social Contract (Joppke, 2007). In this spirit, the key features of citizenship cannot be considered in isolation. By examining the changing function and relationship between rights and responsibilities, it is possible to understand how citizenship status and identity is both nurtured and negated by the welfare state. This chapter situates welfare reform within its historical context in order to moderate some of the claims made about its impact and repercussions for social citizenship. To do so, the chapter focuses principally on how social citizenship has been articulated through the social security system. Whilst all domains of welfare activity have a significant bearing on social rights, the ability to fully exercise other social, civil and political rights is dependent on a minimum level of income (Torry, 2013). Without this, other rights are rendered 'empty moral possessions' (Melden, 1979: 248). Social security, including pensions, makes up the largest share of public social spending in the UK and its share of total expenditure has grown substantially over time (Hood and Oakley, 2014a). Social security then is the core welfare domain, but it is also the most contested. Compared to areas such as health, education and housing, social security more clearly demonstrates the relationship between rights and responsibilities. Through this lens it is possible to understand how social citizenship is articulated, practiced and experienced at both the individual and collective level. The social security system is characterised as much by continuity as it is by change and this chapter demonstrates how political rhetoric and policy instruments have not only shaped dominant ideals underpinning social citizenship but also how this has affected socio-economic outcomes.

Examining the case of social security, it is clear that the content and resultant experience of social rights has been in a state of flux since 1948. Entitlements and duties have shifted according to the political paradigm in vogue, the target beneficiary group in question, and the demographic and economic pressures bearing down on public finances. The changing enactment and experience of social security can be broadly characterised into two episodes: the social

democratic period of welfarism (section 3.2) and the post-Keynesian era of neo-liberal citizenship (section 3.3). This chapter examines how the rights and responsibilities pertaining to social security have changed over the course of these two time periods. Doing so, illustrates how a bifurcated system of social citizenship has come to authenticate the status and reward the practices of some but not others. Section 3.4 reflects on the distributional effects of this and, in particular, on the capacity of social security instruments to tackle poverty and inequality. Section 3.4 describes two conditions that emerge from the shifting logic and impact of welfare: the *Validated Active Citizen* and the *Residual Contingent Citizen*. These categories are outlined to understand how the variegated praxis of social citizenship shapes the identity and status of *notionally* equal citizens.

3.2 The social democratic period of welfarism

In 1948, the National Assistance Act was passed, obligating the State 'to assist persons in Great Britain who are without resources to meet their requirements' (HMSO, 1948: 2.4). In many ways, this was the final piece of the legislative jigsaw that saw the inception of the UK Welfare State. Prior to this, there was little, if any, effective system of social security in the UK. That is, the right to a minimum income for citizens was limited to a few industry-specific workers and war veterans and even then only for a specified period. Many resorted to draconian Poor Law provision which was disciplinary and punitive, subjecting recipients of 'help' to hard labour and a seizure of their civil and political liberties (Welshman, 2013). The 1911 National Insurance Act came some way to protecting citizens against the precarities of industrialised life, with coverage extended to 15.4 million workers by 1938 (Glennister et al., 2004: 79). However, many still lacked a basic right to social security. In the 1930s, around 200,000 young unemployed men were sent to work camps to undertake heavy manual labour as part of their 'reconditioning' (Colledge and Field, 1983: 153; Field, 2013). Ultimately, a patchwork of health, education and insurance-based services left any public claim to social rights an ambition rather than a reality.

William Beveridge was tasked with mapping these existing services and provisions and making recommendations based on his findings. Beveridge went beyond the remit of his task and published the Social Insurance and Allied Services Report in 1942. Alongside this, political momentum and public support was rising for a more comprehensive system of social insurance and assistance. This arose largely from the maltreatment of war veterans after the

First World War and the destitution witnessed during the Great Depression (Fraser, 2003). Keen to act upon lessons from the 1930s and bolstered by a new found sympathy for Socialist Russian sacrifice, the UK was fighting for a society antithetical to the Nazi regime; a social democratic polity realised in a 'cradle to grave' plan for *all* citizens (Sullivan, 1996: 32-37).

The initial system of social security provision mandated flat rate contributions in return for flat rate unemployment benefit. This was paid 'as of right and without means test, so that individuals may build freely upon it' (Beveridge, 1942: 7). Beveridge advocated for a minimum level of 'benefit adequate to all normal needs, in duration and in amount' (Beveridge, 1942: 15). Below this, there was a basic safety net for as those not satisfying conditions under the National Insurance 1946 Act. Whether on national assistance or national insurance, these payments helped move towards a 'decent minimum standard of living for all' (Addison, 1975: 215-16). However, articulating the 'decent minimum standard' and the 'normal needs' of citizens, greatly limited the capacity and scope of social security to ensure effective participation in society (Veit-Wilson, 1992). In spite of the consolidation, extension and nationalisation of insurance services, there was still a high level of poverty and social exclusion (Vincent, 1991). The higher insurance benefit rates that Beveridge initially recommended were never introduced. As a result, there was little financial difference between national insurance and national assistance payments and after some years national assistance became the primary mechanism of social security provision (Hughes and Lewis, 1998: 304-306). Between 1946 and 1953, the number of people in receipt of national assistance more than doubled (Lodemel, 1989: 111-113). Efforts were made to address this by increasing national insurance benefit rates substantially (Rutherford, 2013: 10). However the numbers relying on the National Assistance Board remained relatively static until the 1960s (Sullivan, 1996).

Amidst the 're-discovery of poverty', social security moved towards a more rights-based approach in the mid-1960s. The Supplementary Benefits Commission replaced the National Assistance Board, and guidance notes became codified in law. Whilst far from perfect, this removed some of the administrative discretion and stigma associated with claiming and increased the justiciability of social security rights (cf. Titmuss, 1971). The value of benefits was updated with a further commitment to target provisions where they were most needed through means testing. There was a growing concern that the social security system was 'providing indiscriminate benefits and subsidies for citizens, many of whom do not need them and some of whom do

not want them' (Goldman, 1958: 8). The universalism underpinning Beveridge's plan was being challenged.

With enlarged provision but greater selectivity, the claimant count jumped significantly and Harold Wilson declared with some pride; 'hundreds of thousands of the least well off members of the community have now claimed their rights' (Wilson quoted in Timmins, 2001: 227). Quite explicit in this statement and the welfare discourse of the time, was the legitimacy of claiming a minimum income from the state. Whilst the punitive and disciplinary condition of poverty remained for some, it existed less in the support mechanisms delivered by the State and the political rhetoric of the time (Fraser, 2003). During the 1970s, increased social security entitlements included an income guarantee for pensioners, the introduction and extension of disability and disability-related benefits such as attendance allowance, and increased child allowance (Hood and Oakley, 2014a). Statutory redundancy payments were introduced and targeted benefits were up-rated annually 'to concentrate better care and biggest benefits on those in most need' (Heath, 1966: 2). For many, 1948 to 1979 is considered part of the social democratic golden era of welfare in the UK (Esping-Andersen, 1994), characterised by a universal rights-based approach to social security and an increasingly progressive system of taxation (Lowe, 2004). This helped secure the social rights of millions that fulfilled the basic needs of many and provided some level of protection from of 'the rigours, vagaries, demands and inequities of the market' (Clarke, 2005: 452).

The national insurance system was financed by contributions from individuals, employers and the state (Seely, 2014: 5). From the outset there was an explicit legislative framework that acknowledged the finite capacity of the State and individual to fund and affect the redistribution of economic resources. Having said that, 'Beveridge was skating over the problems of low pay and of what could really be achieved without progressive ways of raising money and redistribution between classes' (Glennerster et al., 2004: 163). Nevertheless, the tripartite system was founded on the understanding that the 'institutions governing economic life' (White, 2003: 90) extend well beyond the State, to the role of employers as well. Corporation tax was introduced with the passing of the Finance Act 1965. Previously, company profits were subject to the same tax liabilities as individual incomes with an additional profits tax (Clark and Dilnot, 2002: 8). In addition, the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 obligated employers to provide redundancy pay. This epitomised the climate of the time and the belief that employers should be incorporated into the citizenship dialectic:

In a period of rapid industrial change it is only elementary justice to compensate employees who, through no fault of their own, find that their job has disappeared. Directors and senior executives have long received a 'golden handshake': the same principle of compensation for job loss will now be applied to the whole workforce (Labour Party., [1964] 2007: 117).

Despite idealised portrayals of the social democratic 'golden era' (cf. Pierson, 1998: 121-128), there was an enduring concern about orientations of the unemployed towards work during this period. The duty to undertake paid work has always been a cornerstone of the social security system in the UK (Lewis and Fink, 2004). Arguably, it was the starting point from which the national insurance system was conceived. From the outset, measures were taken to remind citizens of their responsibility to be economically self-sufficient:

The State should offer security for service and contribution. The State in organising security should not stifle incentive, opportunity and responsibility; in establishing a national minimum it should leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to provide more than the minimum for himself and his family (Beveridge, 1942: 6-7).

National assistance was initially intended to be a minor part of social security provision, with entitlement principally derived from engagement in the paid labour market. Because there was very little material difference in receiving national assistance and national insurance in the late 1940s, this element of conditionality had more symbolic rather than fiscal significance for claimants. Whilst social security can be seen as a nod to the interdependency and mutual fragility of material circumstance, its design was largely based on the belief that citizens can and should be financially autonomous (Beveridge, 1942).

Relatively high levels of employment of the 1940s and 1950s made conditionality and work-contingent benefits a relatively benign feature of the social security system. However, despite dramatic changes to the productivity and industry base of the UK, unemployment and under-employment was increasingly framed as a supply-side issue from the 1960s onwards. This drew a figurative (and procedural) line in the sand between the deserving and undeserving poor. That is, those deemed to be legitimately claiming their entitlements and those largely responsible for their own misfortune. The increased rates of unemployment and numbers receiving benefits became a moral question. One in which a portion of society, was apparently not only failing to meet its economic obligations of citizenship, but also failing to

conform to the socially validated forms of behaviour prescribed by the polity. Media coverage of benefit fraud and 'scroungers' became more frequent and political responses pandered to anecdotes rather than evidence (Golding and Middleton, 1982). As unemployment and those claiming benefits grew, there was a shift in policy towards a more work-centred end to benefit payments. In the 1970s, this manifested itself in programmes run by the Manpower Services Commission such as the Temporary Employment Subsidy and the Youth Opportunities Programme (Timmins, 2001: 350-351).

Many argue that the period running from 1948 to 1979 was a watershed in the British history of welfare – an unremitting expansion of social rights that at best provided a minimum income for some and at worst moved closer towards achieving such an ambition for others. Changes in the provision of welfare incorporated all actors, organisations and institutions into the citizenship dialectic, encouraged progressive forms of social assistance and embedded a principle of universalism in welfare politics. To some extent, high employment rates, a younger population and a less globalised economy made all these achievements more politically palatable and feasible (Pierson, 1998: 121-128; Taylor-Gooby, 2002). Nevertheless, substantive and procedural shifts were moving towards a social security system designed to safeguard the material and figurative promises of social citizenship.

3.3 The post-Keynesian era of neo-liberal citizenship


Following the tumultuous 'Winter of Discontent', the Conservatives came to power and remained there for 18 years. Thatcher had a minimal and selective conception of social rights and believed that public social services should be reserved for a residuum of society (Waine, 1991). For example, she considered it 'disgraceful' that many with the financial means to do so did not pay for their own healthcare and insurance (Timmins, 2001: 372). In keeping with previous conservative political administrations, Thatcher and Major were committed to greater selectivity to target resources where they were most needed. As such, means tested benefits rose from 16 per cent to 34 per cent of all benefits over the 18 years (Dean, 2013: 260).

This period is often characterised as one of unprecedented welfare withdrawal (Alcock, 1990; Wilding, 1997). In reality though, policy was marked by an ebb and flow of social security entitlement. There were admittedly substantial cuts in rates and entitlement. Child benefit, earnings-related pensions, unemployment and sickness benefit were either reduced or frozen for a number of years. Following a ballooning of claims, supplementary payments

were replaced by the Social Fund. This transformed the rights-based approach previously in place. Caps on the Social Fund meant that claims to state assistance were now more discretionary and contingent on sufficient local authority resources. The Fowler reviews of social security ended the £30 death grant (Grover, 2011: 168). Alongside these cuts, Income Support, Family Credit and Incapacity Benefit all replaced their predecessors. Higher payments for specific circumstances were granted for those in receipt of Income Support. Substantial increases in Family Credit helped increase take up and alleviated the 'poverty trap' by reducing marginal deduction rates (Field and Piachaud, 1971). Consolidating and extending the Mobility Allowance and Attendance Allowance, Disability Living Allowance was introduced to provide greater financial support to households incurring extra financial costs as a result of a severe disability (Kennedy, 2011).

That said, the vast majority of people relying on social security as their main source of income found it increasingly difficult to protect their standard of living relative to the working population. By linking benefits to prices rather than earnings (that then eventually excluded costs associated with rent, mortgage interest and local taxes) the government 'effectively rejected the idea of relative poverty' (Barr and Coulter, 1990: 280-283). Between 1979 and 1996, the value of unemployment benefit fell from 21 per cent to 14 per cent of average earnings, and for state pensions, it fell from 26 per cent to 17 per cent (see Figure 1) (DWP, 2015a). In 1983, Thatcher, paradoxically suggested that 'people who are living in need are fully and properly provided for' (quoted in Mack and Lansley, 1985: 1). Perhaps as powerful as the worsening material circumstance faced by many, was the rhetoric surrounding poverty and social security. As the quote above suggests, there was little appreciation for the relative nature of poverty. Social rights were fulfilled in as much as a minimum level of support was provided, but whether this support would keep pace with rising living standards was another matter. Increasingly, the right to participate according to the standards prevailing (Townsend, 1979) was framed as a threat to individual incentive propagating the 'why work' problem (Glennerster, 1995: 108).

Figure 1: Value of benefits as a proportion of average earnings 1971-2014



Source DWP (2015a), Tables 2.1a, 2.4a, 2.7a, 2.8b, author's own analysis

The apparent 'laxness, excessive generosity, inefficiency and vulnerability to exploitation of the welfare system' (Golding and Middleton, 1982: 109) lead some to suggest that the social security system was setting a permissive precedent allowing citizens to claim welfare without fulfilling their civic duties (Murray, 1990). Concerns about the 'fecklessness' of the unemployed and the rising cost of welfare, drove a campaign to tackle benefit fraud and embed 'active citizenship' in the welfare system (Welshman, 2008). This political and policy paradigm sought to re-imagine the terms upon which social security was granted by encouraging citizens to 'recognise that s/he must accept, first and foremost, responsibility for their own (and their family's) welfare' (Dwyer, 1998: 497). Concerns about a 'culture of dependency' gained prominence with the rise of the New Right. As a result, the late 1980s saw the most significant shift towards work-centred social security provision with the introduction of the ReStart programme (Sullivan, 1996). This obligated those on unemployment benefit for a set period of time to attend an interview. Claimants were offered a range of options to assist in their job search. Long-term claimants were eventually required to attend a ReStart course and subsequently a workshop on actively looking for work. Failure to comply with these requirements resulted in benefit sanctions. The Jobseeker's Act 1995 required claimants to be available for and actively seeking work as a condition of their payments (National Archives, 2012).


As the right to social security became increasingly difficult to defend, 'poor work', characterised by involuntary part-time low-paid employment, became more and more common during this period (Brown, 1991). At this time, the

mechanisms of collective organisation that protected many from the precarity of low-skilled low-paid work were being dismantled (Griggs and Bennett, 2009). The benefits of some strikers and their families were stopped or reduced, the arbitration of trade unions became increasingly difficult and wage councils were dissolved (Timmins, 2001: 508; National Archives, 2012).

Despite a residual conception of welfare and attempts for a smaller State, there were real term increases in social security spending and as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) between 1979 and 1996 (Hood and Oakley, 2014a: 4). Social security entitlements both expanded and contracted, depending on the target group in question but across the board, the value of benefits relative to average earnings fell drastically (see Figure 1) (DWP, 2015a). Remarkably, the incomes of the very poorest 'were lower in real terms in 1994/95 than they had been in 1979' (Hills et al., 2009: 1). Between 1979 and 1997, the gap between the rich and the poor doubled and poverty and inequality returned to its pre-WWII levels (Dean, 2013: 261-263). Those claiming social security found it increasingly difficult to safeguard an income that enabled them to participate in activities deemed 'customary' (Townsend, 1979). Whilst they may have secured the right to a basic minimum, the utility of this minimum was becoming increasingly ineffectual in protecting the equality of status supposedly guaranteed through membership.

The period from 1997 to 2010 saw the rise of the 'Third Way' in the UK: a confluence of liberal market strategies and social democratic social policies (Giddens, 1994; Giddens, 1999). Social security reforms centred on the activation of social security recipients with the concurrent extension of means-tested benefits for particular groups (Hills, 1998; Dwyer, 2004). There were big real term increases in certain benefits, particularly for pensioners, lone parents and working families (see Figure 2) (DWP, 2015a). The vernacular of social citizenship shifted further away from rights and towards the concept of support (Carmel and Papadopoulos, 2003). There was a move towards increased support for those 'actively seeking work' and a tailoring of services to provide the right services to the right people: 'staff became 'personal advisors' not mere providers of benefit cheques' (Timmins, 2001: 564).

Figure 2: Real value of benefit, £ / week at 2014 prices (RPI) 1971-2014



Source: (DWP, 2015a), Tables 2.1a, 2.4a, 2.7a, 2.8b,d,e, author's own analysis


In 1996, Job-seeker's Allowance (JSA) was introduced with entitlement to contributory provision capped at 6 months and a range of measures introduced to create a compact between claimant and the State that they would 'actively seek work' (National Archives, 2012). New Labour's social security policy can be seen as a continuation and concentration of efforts to tie social security receipt much more closely to work or at least to actively seek it. The discursive strategies drawn upon by New Labour were driven by the idea that individuals were 'rationally choosing to live their lives on welfare' (Prideaux, 2010: 301). In the words of Gordon Brown: 'when they sign on benefit, they will be signing up for work' (Brown, 1997). In 1998, New Labour published the Green Paper *New ambitions for our country: a new contract for welfare* which laid out their vision for 'an active welfare system which helps people to help themselves and ensures a proper level of support in times of need' (DSS, 1998: 16). The move towards activation intensified the 'creeping conditionality' of social rights for many (Dwyer, 2004).

The New Deals for young people, the long-term unemployed, people aged over 25, lone parents and disabled people embedded welfare-to-work within the social security system. In 2001, the Employment Service and Benefits Agency was combined with existing sanction and support systems to create Jobcentre Plus. Employment zones and work-based training were introduced, as well as mandatory work-focused interviews for many benefit recipients, such as lone parents in receipt of income support (cf. Stewart and Wright, 2014). Gradually, exemptions from work-centred conditions narrowed (cf. Johnsen, 2014). The maxim of 'no rights without responsibilities' became the

zeitgeist of welfare policy with a series of measures introduced to 'rebuild the welfare state around work' (DSS, 1998: 23). During the years of New Labour, this approach was heavily influenced by the works of Amitai Etzioni (1995). Symbolically significant was the renaming of the Department of Social Security as the Department of Work and Pensions.

With his stated ambition to end child poverty within a generation, Tony Blair generated political support for increasing social security expenditure (Dean, 2013). By mobilising resources around the 'deserving poor', New Labour channelled vast amounts of money towards those at the bottom end of the income distribution (Sefton, 2009). Family Credit was replaced with the much more generous Working Families Tax Credit. The transition to Working Tax Credits and Child Tax Credits increased entitlement for families towards the middle of the income distribution. Since then, Tax Credits have accounted for the second biggest growth in social security expenditure after Pensions (Edmiston, 2011). Child Benefit was increased and unlike many other benefits, Child Tax Credit uprating was linked to earnings (DWP, 2015a). Although child poverty rates fluctuated, they fell from 34 per cent to 27 per cent between 1997 and 2010 (see Figure 3) (Crawford et al., 2015). The Minimum Income Guarantee and later Pension Credit were also linked to earnings (DWP, 2015a). Along with winter fuel payments, and concessions including free TV licences and reduced travel costs, real value of the basic state pension and pension credit increased substantially (DWP, 2015a), the pensioner poverty rate fell from 29 per cent to 14 per cent between 1997 and 2011 as a result (see Figure 3) (Crawford et al., 2015). Whilst there was relative success in targeting the above groups, working-age single people and couples without children lost out (Hills et al., 2010). The distinction between deserving and undeserving poor was explicit in targeting social security provision, not only where it was most needed, but also where it was considered most politically viable (Edmiston, 2014b).

Figure 3: Proportion of population below 60% median income after housing costs 1961-2012



Source: (Crawford et al., 2015), for GB till 1993, UK onwards

In 1997, Mandelson said ‘judge us after ten years of success in office. For one of the fruits of that success will be that Britain has become a more equal society’ (Mandelson, 1997: 7). Taking stock of their achievements (and failures), New Labour did make significant headway in extending and enhancing the rates (and targeting) of social security for particular groups (Hills, 2013). It introduced improved support and training for moving into work; increased in-work income and employment protection for the low-paid; and the rates of benefits for targeted groups (Carmel and Papadopoulos, 2003; Brewer and Shephard, 2004). At the same time, it also diminished and commodified the social rights of targeted groups by making it increasingly difficult to secure a minimum income independent of the labour market (Dwyer, 2004). By 2010, social rights were less accorded by your status as a citizen and more by your socio-demographic characteristics and by your status as a (prospective) worker. The right to a decent income became legitimate for some and not others. These developments were symptomatic of the Third Way approach and the individualism that pervaded conceptions of citizenship responsibilities (Dean, 2004: 79).

Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis and ensuing economic recession, the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition government came to power in 2010. Since then, the Conservative Party has set out to implement the ‘the most far-reaching programme of change that the welfare system has witnessed in generations’ (DWP, 2010a: 1). This has been pursued through

significant cuts to social security and increased conditionality for the low-income working-age population in particular (Dean, 2012; Ginn, 2013; Ridge, 2013; Stewart and Wright, 2014). Since 2010, a series of reforms have been made to benefit structures, entitlements and rates to reduce public spending by £21 billion in 2015-16 (HM Treasury, 2015: 30).

Whilst the Conservative Party initially endorsed a relative understanding of poverty, benefit uprating has been moved from the Retail Price Index to Consumer Price Index with anticipated savings of £1.1 billion in cash terms in 2014 and £1.9 billion in 2015 (DWP, 2013b: 1). Again, this has reduced the relative value of certain social security payments (see Figures 1 and 2) (DWP, 2015a). Council Tax Benefit has been abolished, social tenants now face financial penalties for under-occupation and a Local Housing Allowance cap has been introduced. The transition from Disability Living Allowance to Personal Independence Payments is expected to see current claimants lose £2,240 million in payments (DWP, 2012b: 8). Crisis Loans have been abolished, delayed payments for jobseekers have been introduced and Tax Credits have been cut (Hills, 2015; Lupton et al., 2015). Almost thirty years after John Moore initially proposed the idea, tapered child benefit was introduced in 2013.

In 2013, an annual benefit cap was introduced for the working age population, with only a few groups exempt (primarily those in receipt of disability-related payments). The Coalition government introduced the cap so that social security payments could not exceed £26,000. In May 2015, the Conservative government announced that the benefit cap was being reduced to £23,000 to 'incentivise work – so people are always better off after a day at the office or factory than they would have been sitting at home' (Cabinet Office, 2015: 6). Since Beveridge's insurance plan, there has been an enduring concern about raising benefits too prodigiously. In the late 1970s concerns were raised that 'many lower wage earners, especially those with families would be better off unemployed and dependent on supplementary benefit' (Field et al., 1977: 231). Thatcher also believed that 'it's right to have a large difference between those in work and those out of work' (Thatcher, 1980 quoted in Timmins, 2001: 375). However, these reforms signal the first explicit attempt at a remedy: a range of policies and cuts to reduce the fiscal burden of low-income, working-age social security (Ginn, 2013). Changes inclusive of those proposed up until 2015 in the UK show the austerity measures proposed and taken to be very regressive with those in the middle of the income distribution actually being net beneficiaries of reforms undertaken (Brewer et al., 2011; Avram et

al., 2013; HM Treasury, 2013). With further cuts announced and yet to come, child and working age poverty are set to increase significantly in the short and long term (Hills, 2015).

Throughout its term in office, the coalition government committed to modifying, what it saw as a 'complex and chaotic system, which failed to promote work and penalised responsible choices – all at a great cost to hard-working taxpayers' (Duncan Smith, 2015: n.p.). During this period, political discourse and media coverage has promoted the idea that:

income through benefits maintains people on a low income, and can even risk bolstering welfare dependency and feeding social problems... Work, on the other hand, and the income it brings, can change lives' (DWP, 2012a: 10).

This has cultivated a political mandate for welfare reforms and activation programmes targeted at working-age low-income benefit recipients (Dean, 2013: 285). As part of their welfare reform programme, the Department for Work and Pensions published the White Paper *Universal Credit: Welfare that Works* in 2010 (DWP, 2010a). With this, Universal Credit was introduced to consolidate a range of benefits into one assessment and payment. According to an early impact assessment, Universal Credit is anticipated to increase entitlements by 'nearly £1.1 billion a year and low-income families will see their entitlements rise by more than high-income families' (Brewer et al., 2012: 39). However, once fully implemented, Universal Credit will lead to the intensification, personalisation and extension of conditionality to recipients of social security that were previously exempt (Pennycock and Whittaker, 2012; Dwyer and Wright, 2014). Those receiving Universal Credit will be 'assigned to different levels of conditionality based on perceived ability and readiness to work' (Stewart and Wright, 2014: 3). This is coupled with the Work Programme, which has increased and extended work placements and job search requirements. Non-compliance by particular 'job-seekers' now incurs tougher and longer (financial) sanctions (CAB, 2013; Webster, 2013). The rate and extent of sanctions has increased substantially. For example, the number of Jobseeker's Allowance sanction decisions rose from 439,112 in 2009 to 605, 595 in 2014 and the number of Employment and Support Allowance sanction decisions rose from 18,843 to 36,810 per year during the same period (DWP, 2015b).

In addition to this, those claiming Employment and Support Allowance are having their entitlement re-assessed with many undergoing Work Capability Assessments. Whilst a range of maternity, paternity, parental and care policies have been introduced to recognise the value of unpaid care and domestic work, there are financial and career penalties involved in taking up such opportunities (Lewis and Campbell, 2007). These developments are also largely restricted to those parents engaged in 'gainful' employment. The care work of unemployed lone parents has also been delegitimised with restrictions and caps applied to income support (Johnsen, 2014). Those subject to such treatment are 'invisible as mothers or moral citizens, and visible only as low waged worker citizens' (Pulkingham et al., 2010: 287). In this instance, the work caring for children is only socially validated when financially facilitated by an independent labourer (Prideaux, 2005: 128). As such, those involved in unpaid domestic and care work have also been systematically marginalised from mainstream conceptions of responsible citizenship (Williams, 2001).

Before David Cameron came to power, he described poverty as a 'moral disgrace' and suggested that social security should keep pace with rising standards of living: 'in the end the test for our policies will not be how they affect the better off, but how they help the worst off in our country' (Guardian, 2006: n.p.; cf. Lister and Bennett, 2010). This sentiment has not carried over to the policies implemented since 2010. The move towards a more absolute understanding of poverty has damaged the rights to social security for those most in need of it (Edmiston, 2014b). The ability to secure a minimum income has become (even more) contingent on fulfilment of obligations to engage in the paid labour market. Some have rather sensationally suggested that the current age of austerity and political-economic paradigm signals a 'post-welfare consensus' (Peck, 2010; Chakraborty, 2013). In spite of all the 'cuts': 'total Government spending on social security benefits and tax credits is forecast to increase from £210 billion in 2013-2014 to around £218 billion rather than £220 billion in 2015-16' (DWP, 2013b: 6). Importantly though, the utility of social security for working-age low-income benefit recipients has been damaged due to falling benefit rates (see Figures 1 and 2) (DWP, 2015a). In May 2015, the Conservative party won an overall majority in the general election. They have committed to pursuing a series of cuts to social security, extending and increasingly conditionality and reducing the real-term and relative value of benefits. As a result, an increasingly liberalised model of social rights has been embedded within welfare provision so that one's claim to a minimum income is becoming increasingly contingent on engagement

with the paid labour market or one's status as a 'deserving citizen' (DWP, 2010b; HM Treasury, 2015).

Since 1979, there has been a dramatic shift in the design, delivery and impact of social security. This shift is symptomatic of a major reorientation 'away from redistributive concerns based on expanding welfare rights in a nation-state towards more productivist and cost-saving concerns in an open economy' (Jessop, 1993: 17-18). Against the backdrop of contemporary post-Fordist welfare capitalism (Burrows and Loader, 1994), Jessop (1993) pointed to the emergence of a Schumpeterian workfare state. Jessop (1993) believed this new workfare state would focus increasingly on supply-side issues in structural competitiveness by promoting individual freedom and flexibility in and through social policy instruments. Leaving behind the Keynesian welfare paradigm, this observation has been borne out by the changing role and distributional effects of social security.

Means-testing has become an increasingly prominent feature of the social security system (Hood and Oakley, 2014a). The growth in expenditure on contributory benefits is almost entirely due to increases in the basic state pension (Seely, 2014: 4). Benefit uprating has diverged according to the benefit and target group in question (Hood and Oakley, 2014b). There has been an increasing trend towards selectivity and targeting of social security provisions, with working-age, childless and low-income groups losing out the most (Hood and Oakley, 2014a; Hills, 2015).

The rejection of a Keynesian approach to economic and welfare governance is clear from the prevailing 'austerity consensus' that has dominated political and public discourse in recent years (Farnsworth and Irving, 2012). Alongside this, there has been an increasing reluctance to incorporate employers into the citizenship dialectic. Poor wages and tax benefit measures mean that the marginal deduction rates for low-skilled low-paid workers are now much higher than for those in secure full-time employment with well-above average earnings (Torry, 2013). As a result, the financial benefits of paid work are not so apparent for those transitioning from unemployment to low-paid work (Shildrick et al., 2012). Gordon Brown pledged to Make Work Pay and a statutory national minimum wage was introduced in 1999. However, the real-term value of this increased until 2006 but has stagnated and fallen thereafter (Tobin, 2010; LPC, 2015: 52). The main rate of corporation tax was 52 per cent in 1973 but dropped drastically to 33 per cent during the early years of Thatcher (HMRC, 2013a). This downward trend continued throughout the years of New Labour falling from 31 per cent to 28 per cent and has since

fallen to an all-time low of 21 per cent in 2014-15 (HMRC, 2013b; Crawford et al., 2015; Pope and Roantree, 2015: 29).

Policy responses have not only increased conditionality but also increased the conditioning of the poor: 'the more the State gave in the name of the poor, the more it denied the poor control over its disbursement' (Vincent, 1991: 206; Jessop, 2002: 260). Measures have increasingly come to centre on individual culpability rather than the structural determinants of agency and outcome (Wright, 2012). As a result, the structural determinants of unemployment or inequality are largely ignored and human agency is narrowly conceived as rational and calculated (Prideaux, 2010). Whilst 'there are still many benefits and many groups of claimants for whom the responsibilities to be available for and actively seeking work are not relevant' (Griggs and Bennett, 2009: 21) this group is getting smaller. The 'creeping conditionality' (Dwyer, 2004) imposed by New Labour has developed into a personalised, intensified and extended practice targeting more and more low-income recipients that were previously exempt (Pennycock and Whittaker, 2012; Dwyer and Wright, 2014). The centrality of paid work in recognising the responsibilities of social citizenship has ultimately delegitimised any deviation from full-time employment and denigrated the position of low-income groups. Unless previous life-time contribution or sufficiently mitigating circumstances preclude citizens from the imperative to actively seek or do paid work, their entitlement to even the basic minimum is increasingly brought into question. This has led to a patch-work system of social security and redistribution that undermines the right to a minimum income for many of those who most need it. The remainder of the chapter examines the distributional effects of this and implications for citizenship status and identity.

3.4 The changing distributional effects of social security provision

In broad brush strokes, it is possible to assess the extent to which the right to a minimum income has been fulfilled by examining poverty rates over time. Since 1948, absolute poverty has fallen dramatically across all demographic groups. Whilst this may suggest that the 'right to a modicum of welfare and security' has been largely achieved, it tells us very little about how social security measures taken have supported the 'right to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society' (Marshall, 1950: 11). Measures of the relative poverty rate are able to capture such an experience and more appropriately reflect a maximalist interpretation of social citizenship

rights. In 1958, Brian Abel-Smith said that 'with rising living standards of life, a belief in a subsistence minimum is a belief in ever increasing inequality and class distinction' (Abel-Smith, 1958: 69). Even those with a minimal conception of social citizenship, believe that the value of the minimum should rise with the standards of society (Hayek, 2006). Abject poverty of the type witnessed at the turn of the 20th Century has been significantly reduced, but relative poverty has grown since the early 1980s (see Figure 3) (Crawford et al., 2015). In spite of substantial expansions in social security entitlement from 1961 onwards, poverty rates for the population as a whole changed very little until 1984. From Thatcher's second term until Major's departure, relative poverty grew from 15 per cent in 1984 to 25 per cent in 1997. Under New Labour, significant efforts were made to tackle poverty but at least a fifth of the UK population has remained in relative poverty since 1986.

Between 1961 and 2012, poverty rates for children, working age parents, and working age non-parents all increased by 14 percentage points (see Figure 3) (Crawford et al., 2015). During the early 1990s, child poverty reached its peak at 34 per cent and fell during the early years of New Labour. Pensioner poverty fluctuated considerably falling from 41 per cent in 1972 to 13 per cent in 1984 and then rising back up to 41 per cent in 1989 after the link between earnings and pensions was broken. Since then, pensioner poverty has fallen to just 14 per cent. Overall then, there was an increase in the poverty rate from the early 1980s onwards.

Part of the explanation for this was that social security payments struggled to keep pace with rising median incomes and the growing income share of the top 10 per cent of earners. From 1949 to 1978 the total income share of the top 10 per cent of earners fell from 32.3 per cent to 27.8 per cent, reflecting the progressive system of taxation in place (Alvaredo et al., 2015). However, between 1979 and 1997 the income share of the top 10 per cent of earners rose to 38.9 per cent, peaking at 42.6 per cent in 2007 and dropping slightly to 39.1 in 2012 (Alvaredo et al., 2015; Atkinson and Ooms, 2015). In 1949, the top 1 per cent of earners lost 41.1 per cent of their income due to income tax. By 2003, this fell to just 11 per cent (Alvaredo et al., 2015). Within this context, it became increasingly difficult for social security payments to compensate for the significant rise in inequality. Over the years, there has been an increasing policy focus on closing the gap in incomes between the bottom and the middle of the income distribution. However, successive political administrations have failed to address the increasing gap in income between those at the top of the income distribution and everyone else.

Irrespective of capability, there has been an increasing lack of political will to tackle rising income inequality. Encapsulating New Labour's position, Peter Mandelson famously said: 'we are intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich as long as they pay their taxes' (Peter Mandelson quoted in Lister, 2011: 72).

Joyce and Sibieta (2013) illustrate that the rise in inequality in the UK is principally due to the substantial gains of those at the very top (1 per cent) of the income distribution. Beyond the distributional effect of this, it remains to be seen what effect this may have on what is (normatively at least) deemed to be the 'standards prevailing in society' (Marshall, 1950: 11). Between 1961 and 2012, the income ratio between the 90th and 10th percentile of the income distribution rose from 3.2 to 3.9, the income ratio between the 90th and 50th percentile rose from 1.7 to 2.0 and perhaps most significantly the income ratio between 50th and 10th percentile rose from 1.9 to 2.0 (Crawford et al., 2015). Over the last 50 years, income redistribution measures have not only failed to reduce income inequality between the extreme ends of the income distribution, they have also failed to close the gap between the bottom and middle of the income distribution. As a result, the right to participate according to the standards prevailing in society has not been enhanced at an aggregate level.


The efficacy of social transfers in providing a decent income can be measured by looking at the real value of payments over time. The following statistics are drawn from the Annual Abstract of Statistics and are summarised in Figures 1 and 2 above (DWP, 2015a). Since 1971, the value of the Basic State Pension has risen in real terms from £75 to £113. Unemployment benefit rose dramatically until 1972 and has fluctuated since (DWP, 2015a). Uprating of Child Benefit for the first child initially increased in real terms but its value peaked at £24 in 2009 and has gradually fallen since. Due to shifting entitlements, the real value of Income Support varies significantly depending on the circumstances of the claimant. Income support for single people aged over 25 has changed very little since 1989 but fell to its lowest level of £57 in 2014. By contrast, the real value of Income Support for a couple with 1 child has seen substantial increases and fluctuations: it was worth £167 in 1997, peaked at £215 in 2009 and has since fallen to £197 in 2014. Between 1971 and 2014, the value of the Basic State Pension fell from 20.9 per cent to 18.2 per cent of average earnings and unemployment benefit from 20.9 per cent to 11.7 per cent. Between 1988 and 2014, Income Support for single people aged over 25 fell from 15.3 per cent to 11.7 per cent. Child Benefit initially rose

to 4.4 per cent but has since fallen to 3.3 per cent of average earnings. All this would suggest a cumulative degradation of the financial position of those reliant on social security, but in particular working-age individuals that are on a low-income, single and childless. Of course, it's important to acknowledge that very often these payments do not exist in isolation. Expansions in entitlement and a proliferation in the schema of benefit provision have increased claims to passport benefits that help either top up incomes or subsidise the cost of living.

Spending on social security has risen exponentially, rising from 4 per cent of GDP in 1948 to 13.4 per cent of GDP in 2012, increasing in real-terms for 55 consecutive years (Crawford et al., 2015). In 1948-9, total benefit expenditure was £13 billion (in 2012-13 prices) and total benefit expenditure is forecast to be £163 billion in 2012-13 (DWP, 2013a). It would seem that this vast increase in social security spending illustrates, at least at some level, the commitment of the State to provide a minimum income. However, increases in social expenditure have not led to a reduction in relative poverty. To the contrary, relative poverty has increased. Increased means-testing was designed to target resources where they were most needed. However, there has been a mismatch between political rhetoric and policy implementation over the last thirty-five years.

Those in the middle of the income distribution have disproportionately benefited from expansions in social security spending and activity (see Figure 4). Between 1977 and 2012, the average proportion of income received in benefits by those in the middle of the income distribution doubled from 12 per cent to 24 per cent. During the same period, the average share of income received by those at the bottom of the income distribution rose from 61 per cent in 1977 to 71 per cent in 1986 but dropped to 58 per cent in 2012. Despite exponential increases in income for the top 20 per cent of earners in the UK, this group has maintained around 3 per cent of their gross income from cash benefits. On average this amounts to an extra £2,218 a year for the richest households when comparing cash payments between 1977 and 2012. Compared to 1977, those at the bottom of the income distribution have received an extra £6,403 a year on average and those in the middle have received an extra £6,660 a year on average (ONS, 2013).

Figure 4: Average proportion of gross income made up of direct cash benefits for 3 groups across the income distribution 1977-2012



Source: (ONS, 2013), author's own analysis

As a result, there is now very little nominal difference in the amount of direct cash benefits received by those at the bottom and those in the middle of the income distribution. In 1983, Deacon and Bradshaw claimed that 'the paradox of the means-test is that it has a discredited past and an expanding future' (Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983: 204). It should be borne in mind that means-testing became more prominent amid the rediscovery of poverty and the realisation that the diversity of people's needs and circumstances necessitated a more targeted system of provision with higher rates of benefits *and* contributions. The system of flat rate contributions in return for flat rate benefits was minimal and could not generate enough to effectively tackle poverty (Townsend and Abel-Smith, 1965). Whilst the means test attaches stigma to social security receipt; it has also helped increase the level of payments to certain groups. Universal and contributory systems are often advocated as the ideal because they generate collective political support for collective benefits (Horton and Gregory, 2009; Torry, 2013).

The idea here is that if the middle classes benefit from programmes, then they will use their not inconsiderable political skills to obtain more resources for those programmes or to defend them in periods of decline (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987: 210).

However, in spite of receiving a growing proportion of social security expenditure since 1977, attitudes towards welfare and particular recipients of social security have hardened overall in the UK (Park et al., 2012). In their

seminal work on the 'paradox of re-distribution', Korpi and Palme (1998) suggest that means-testing leads to less redistribution and this would appear to be the case here. Poorly targeted social security provision has meant resources are not meeting those most in need of them *and* payments are not keeping pace with living standards. Abandoning flat-rate contributions for flat-rate benefits, the social security system has moved away from a principle of universalism towards targeted provision with contingent generosity and entitlement.

Nevertheless, this evidence jolts with the common characterisation of the population as 'divided into people who 'depend on' state support (such as the unemployed, single parents, invalids [sic] and retired people), and people who support and insure themselves out of their own income and property' (Jordan and Redley, 1994: 154). In reality, all social citizens, over the course of their lifetime make claims on welfare (Titmuss, 1958). How this is experienced, though, will greatly differ. For those solely reliant on mean-tested benefits, a residual 'minimalist' interpretation of social rights is principally their reality. For those with sufficient capital and prior earnings, a more relative and 'thick' conception of social rights is experienced. This differentiated provision and experience of social rights invariably affects the status and identity of citizens. This is a key area of examination covered in chapters five, six and seven but is first elaborated on below.

3.5 Citizenship Status and Identity: Validation and Contingency

The distributional and symbolic dimensions of citizenship affect how members are positioned 'vis-à-vis non-members, one another, the State and other major societal institutions' (Schram et al., 2010). Depending on the dominant paradigm of citizenship, welfare has the material and figurative capacity to include and exclude. Reflecting on the provision of free school meals at the turn of the century, Gray (1908) suggests that:

The school dinner is an education in citizenship. Without a word being said, the child gradually absorbs the knowledge of its own dependence on and place in social life. He finds himself a guest at the common table of the nation (Gray, 1908: 168).

The same can be said of the collective heritage and efforts arising from welfare provision more generally. The transition from philanthropic discretion to statutory entitlement inculcated a sense of common belonging and

interdependence in social and economic life (Griggs and Bennett, 2009). Welfare provision sought to protect against and moderate the excesses of the market. Whilst the philanthropic provision of free school meals for poor children provided crucial relief, it also obfuscated the structural determinants of its necessity. In other words, assistance made it less urgent or necessary to question why children were malnourished or why their families suffered economic hardship. The tripartite system of the 1940s and 1950s offered some attempt beyond perfunctory provision to readdress the distributional effects of the market. No longer were benefit recipients 'guests', they were 'members' of an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 2006).

Since then, the right to social security has become ever more contingent on fulfilling work-related obligations. The entrenchment of private patriarchal responsibility (Williams, 2001) has served to vitiate the right to social protection. Escalating inequality and poverty has compromised the notion that we are at a 'common table of the nation'. The growing gap between the richest and poorest citizens marks a move towards what Malcolm Dean has described as a 'drawbridge society' (Dean, 2013: 246). A society in which the 'winners' have isolated themselves from the 'losers'. Paid work and independence from the State and others is broadly construed as responsible citizenship. Within such a paradigm, the structural determinants of behaviour and outcomes are largely ignored (Orton, 2009).

The rise of neo-liberalism has had a two-fold mutually degrading effect on welfare and welfare outcomes. Firstly, the rise of free-market individualism threatens the efficacy of welfare instruments. As illustrated in the case of social security transfers: social security policies struggle to address rising inequalities and consequent poverty arising from the market (Hills, 2013). Under these conditions, the capacity of welfare to affect life and resource outcomes becomes tangential to the power of the free market to determine the distribution and allocation of social goods. Secondly, neo-liberalism has not only damaged welfare outcomes, it has also compromised the notion and function of welfare itself. Public services have increasingly come to operate according to market rather than social or ethical imperatives. Entitlement to a satiated understanding of social rights is not so much dictated by virtue of one's status as a citizen. It is not even dictated according to the needs of the polity as increased means-testing would have us believe. Rather, social goods are predicated on one's capacity and success in 'earning' citizenship status through paid civic contribution (Van Houdt et al., 2011). Hegemonic ideals of

the virtuous citizen centre on work, self-sufficiency and existing capital. Welfare, then, increasingly comes to operate according to market principles.

King and Waldron (1988: 436) argue that welfare provision helps constitute 'what it is to be a member of society'. In a rather different context, Kymlicka observes that 'if citizenship is differentiated, it no longer proves a shared experience of common status' (Kymlicka, 1995: 174). Nonetheless the point stands, the individualisation and liberalisation of welfare has resulted in a bifurcated system and experience of citizenship. What it means to be a citizen varies according to exposure to market-based inequalities, but also how welfare positions citizens within the polity. The current design and delivery of welfare configures citizenship in such a way that it propagates rather than smooths out the status differentials between citizens. In *Money for Everyone* (2013), Malcolm Torry makes the case for a universal citizens income and highlights some of the pitfalls of means-testing:

Means-testing divides society into the means-tested and the non-means-tested; into those whose choices in the labour market are constrained by means-tested benefits regulations and those whose choices in the labour market are relatively unconstrained. These divisions in our society add up to a serious social rift (Torry, 2013: 171).

Postulated as such, welfare provision can, in certain instances, delineate citizen status and identity as much as market-based inequalities. Not only is this true in statutory entitlements, but also in the conditions placed on benefit receipt. Taken as a whole, the status of citizenship has changed dramatically over time so that rights and duties are no longer synergetic for a portion of the polity. Rodger (1992) suggests that there is much to be gleaned from social closure theory in this respect. Weber's theory of social closure explains the process by which open and closed relations are created vis-à-vis class and collective action (Parkin, 2007 [1974]; cf. Weber, 2013). Taking a more expansive approach beyond private capital, Rodger explores how the State can be understood as a principal actor that 'systematically structures marginality for the poor in society' (Rodger, 1992: 45). The open and closed relations of citizenship, then, are created and sustained by the rights, responsibilities and ideals of social citizenship. This process results in a distinction between what could be termed here as the *Validated Active Citizen* and the *Residual Contingent Citizen*. Based on the discussion above and existing literature, these two proposed conditions are operationalized and examined in subsequent chapters. In part, the discussion below represents a

brief anticipation of how these two conditions might be experienced by citizens given the existing political-economic paradigm and welfare landscape.

Effectively, the trappings of social citizenship are bestowed upon the *Validated Active Citizen*. Their lived experiences affirm the figurative and material benefits of engaging in the Social Contract. They fulfil the duties of social citizenship by engaging in socially and economically rewarded paid employment. Their status and belonging is validated in the structure and design of the economy and welfare. Their identity and ideals centre on self-perceived independence from the State and others. Their own efforts for material security obscure them from the structural effects of their privilege. In sum, they benefit from the trappings of a hegemonic and organisational framework that has been designed in their name.

By contrast, the *Residual Contingent Citizen* experiences very different treatment and outcomes. Their social rights are minimal and 'thin' (Dean, 2010). The State provides residual social provisions and any extension beyond this is deemed welfare profligacy and a threat to individual incentive. Underlying a residual realisation of welfare is a previously implicit but increasingly explicit belief that poverty and poverty alleviation lies in the hands of those subject to it. The ascendancy of neo-liberal citizenship has privatised both risk and reward (Clarke, 2004: 33), negating the structural factors that impinge on decision-making and life outcomes. Narrow conceptions of civic duty invalidate the unpaid care, domestic and social work undertaken and assume a moral corruptness possessed by many in receipt of welfare. Their citizenship is contingent on a minimal level of assistance. They are once again 'guests' rather than 'members' at the 'common table of the nation'.

Interpreting this group as 'conditional citizens' (Dwyer, 1998) can only be accurate if the structures that they operate within are conducive to effective social and citizen mobility. Analytically, conformity should lead to citizenship. However, the current 'age of austerity' has slashed welfare entitlement and increased governmentality in activation and poverty alleviation measures (Hancock and Mooney, 2013; Wilkinson, 2013; Cromby and Willis, 2014). This has stripped away crucial mechanisms that would otherwise enable citizens to move from subjects to full citizen members. Not only does the dominant paradigm invalidate a sense of belonging or legitimacy they may feel as citizens, it also makes it hard to move into a space and condition in which they would be recognised as such. Their status is *contingent* rather than *conditional*, in that their capacity to attain full and meaningful citizenship status

is possible but less certain than merely administrative requirements being met (Dwyer, 1998).

Welfare provision and its underlying principles constitute a dominant praxis of citizenship. The assumed rationalities of political, economic and social life can result in what Jean Harvey describes as *Civilized Oppression*. She suggests the 'common sense' workings of daily life can form:

'...long-term patterns of exclusion, subordination, and denigration that can have a devastating cumulative impact, not only on the psychological well-being of the victims, but also on their opportunities, life-path, and chances of fulfilment in various ventures that involve others. Civilized oppression, then, poses a special challenge in that apparently trivial acts that often pass under the social radar screen can wreck the lives of those systematically at the receiving end. For the non-oppressed the perceived triviality is a barrier to taking the claims about oppression seriously' (Harvey, 2010: 15).

Whilst 'welfare provision is now conceived of as a core element of citizenship in Western society' (King and Waldron, 1988: 417), it can also be used to mollify the problematic condition of deprivation and avoid social disorder (Titmuss, 1971: 115; Piven and Cloward, 1993). Even if the rights of social citizenship are not fulfilled, the 'myth' of their attainment proves pervasive in the formation of collective citizenship identity (Roche, 1992). The provision of meagre benefits placates pleas against such injustice with the rhetorical justification that 'something is being done'. For those unable or choosing not to conform to hegemonic conceptions of responsible and worthy citizenship, the lived experience of deprivation can be both materially and symbolically alienating. This is something to be further explored in chapters five, six and seven. The dominant paradigm of social citizenship isolates those subject to deprivation from the rest of society: 'the excluded are often characterised as individual failures, in need of ethical reconstruction and re-attachment to the virtuous community before they may be accepted into the citizenship fold' (Hart, 2009b: 643). Increasingly, the function of the State centres on addressing moral rather than economic deficits. As such, sustained and intense forms of deprivation threaten the material and 'ontological security' (Giddens, 1991: 47) of citizenship.

The categories of *Validated Active Citizen* and *Residual Contingent Citizen* have been described here in rather absolute terms. It should be borne in mind that whilst this distinction is very much real in the structuring and outcomes of citizenship, it has principally been used here as a heuristic device. Reflecting

on the current nature of rights and responsibilities, this distinction helps explain how citizens are positioned within the polity and how this shapes their lived experience. A bimodal understanding of this process does inevitably simplify the multiplicity of citizen's lived experiences. A confluence of factors will determine how one is subjected by and positioned according to the dominant welfare paradigm. In reality, citizens have multiple, overlapping and conflicting citizenships (Oliver and Heater, 1994; Isin and Wood, 1999). The point of focus here, however, is on the bifurcating function of social citizenship currently propagated by state apparatus.

As illustrated in the case of child and pensioner poverty, the legitimacy of a claim to social rights changes across the life course. In addition, the extent to which these statuses apply across different welfare domains will largely rest on how universally a particular social right is conceived. At present, healthcare and education is less informed by the distinction between validated and contingent citizen. Having said that, access to and quality of education and health services is highly correlated with the income and capital of recipients (Tudor Hart, 1971; Matthews and Hastings, 2013). Within this context, even rights conventionally understood as universal and egalitarian can be seen as undergoing a process of 'privatisation' (Clarke, 2004). These positions can be understood as two ends of continuum where sites of tension arise that push citizens towards one end or the other. For some, the extent of fluidity is extremely limited so that 'poverty means the exclusion from living standards, the lifestyles and the fellowship of one's fellow citizens' (Donnison, 1981: 226). Escape from this condition is not only stifled by socio-economic structures but also aggravated by the hegemonic paradigm of social citizenship and welfare governance.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated how the dimensions of social citizenship have changed over time. In doing so, it is apparent that through welfare politics, policies and discourse, citizenship is 'a much more differentiated and far less homogenous concept than has been presupposed by political theorists' (Parekh, 1990: 702). Based on this, there is both empirical and conceptual warrant to explore lived experiences of the current hegemonic conception of citizenship; how those subjected to deprivation position themselves; but perhaps most importantly, how they interpret and negotiate a welfare landscape that has increasingly structured their marginality (Rodger, 1992). In order to do this, it is necessary to explore the experiences and attitudes of

both *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*. In exploring and contrasting their lived experiences, the thesis does not intend to detract from or simplify the multi-layered nature of citizenship and identity (Ellison, 1999a; Isin and Wood, 1999). Indeed, there are multiple areas of conflict and congruence in how citizens negotiate citizenship and welfare. Rather, this empirical study helps:

uncover and challenge the cultural and institutional practices that support fixed notions or normative assumptions of 'ideal' citizenship, which serve to exclude citizens who may differ from these norms. (Hart, 2009b: 645).

Adopting a 'cultural citizenship' approach (Hart, 2009a), this empirical study explores how the ostensible winners and losers of the current socio-economic system and welfare configuration negotiate the rights, responsibilities and status of social citizenship. Chapters five, six and seven of this thesis explore differences in the attitudes and experiences of *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*. These chapters examine whether and how lived experiences of material and status inequality, shape citizen identity and orientation. In particular, how poverty and affluence nurture distinctive frames of reference and knowledge surrounding social citizenship and the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and action. Doing so makes it possible to reflect upon and engage with the existing empirical and theoretical literature in this area. Before doing so though, chapter four outlines the methodological approach and research design taken for this empirical study.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken for this study as well as the practical and theoretical considerations that have informed the research process. As discussed in chapter two, to understand the relationship between social citizenship and inequality, citizenship needs to be conceived as a bottom-up process rather than a purely top-down status (Clarke et al., 2014). The experiences, attitudes and behaviours of the general public are particularly important in this regard. This study explored the extant realities of social citizenship that emerge as a result of rising poverty and inequality. As illustrated in chapters two and three, further in-depth empirical research is needed to consider exactly how people understand and identify with social citizenship and how this changes according to experiences of validation and contingency. With that in mind, this thesis sought to answer the following research questions:

- Do lived experiences of poverty and affluence affect citizen identity and orientation? If so, how?
- In what ways do these experiences affect attitudes and behaviours related to social citizenship, welfare and inequality?
- How do lived experiences of poverty and affluence affect knowledge about the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and action?
- To what extent do 'poor' and 'rich' citizens engage with or deviate from the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship?

In tandem with the aforementioned research questions, the study sought to explore how, in light of the determinants of attitudinal divergence, it might be possible to galvanise support for policies designed to tackle poverty and inequality. To answer these research questions, this empirical study adopted a mixed-methods approach with an initial phase of secondary quantitative data analysis of the Citizenship Survey 2005, followed by a series of in-depth, structured and 'scenario-driven' qualitative interviews. Undertaking a two-stage research design, made it possible to move from nomothetic to idiographic consideration of phenomena; from causal inferences to theoretical accounts.

This chapter describes the key stages of the research process as they broadly occurred in sequence. The first stage, and challenge, of the research was to operationalize the categories of *Residual Contingent Citizen* and *Validated Active Citizen* developed in chapter three. The second section of the chapter outlines the selection criteria employed to make these categories conceptually cogent and empirically tractable with the phenomena of poverty, affluence, deprivation and inequality. The third section outlines the mixed-methods 'lived experience' approach developed for this project and the benefits of such a method. The fourth section provides some detail regarding the Citizenship Survey 2005, which was the principle data source used to undertake secondary quantitative data analysis. This section describes the data preparation, domains of analysis and statistical tests undertaken. The fifth section outlines the qualitative research phase of the project, including details regarding sampling, recruitment, the design of the interview format and process, data handling and analysis and due ethical considerations. The final section summarises the overall methodological approach taken for the project.

4.2 *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*: operationalizing concepts

The aim of this study was to explore how individuals, who are categorically included or excluded from dominant discourses and praxes of social citizenship, experience and make sense of inequality. The categories of *Residual Contingent Citizen* and *Validated Active Citizen* developed in chapter three were operationalized in such a way to ensure that they were conceptually and empirically tractable with phenomena observed in the world.

Rather than a definition of deprivation and affluence that focuses solely on material resources, this study captures the phenomenological and relational significance of differing socioeconomic circumstance. In doing so, attitudinal divergence between those experiencing deprivation and affluence can be understood within the context of rising structural inequality. With this in mind, the definition of deprivation advanced by Peter Townsend is perhaps of most use:

people can be said to be deprived if they lack the types of diet, clothing, housing, environmental, educational, working and social conditions, activities and facilities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the society to which they belong (Townsend, 1979: 413).

Residual Contingent Citizens not only lack the material resources to meet their basic needs, their disadvantage is also 'relative to the local community or the wider society' to which they belong (Townsend, 1987: 125). Their deprivation is conceived in relation to the common or shared standards of social citizenship notionally guaranteed through membership. In this sense, all those that fall below these shared standards lack the right 'to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society' (Marshall, 1950: 11). These standards are multi-dimensional and extend to the lived environment of individuals and their capacity to engage with the dominant ideals and practices of social citizenship. With this in mind, three selection criteria were used to distinguish between *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*: employment status, household income and area deprivation.

Exploring how validation and contingency affect citizen identity and orientation, this study examined the attitudes, experiences and behaviours of two groups: those that were a) unemployed, living in deprived areas and below the poverty line, and b) employed, living in affluent areas with earnings above the national average:

Figure 5: Selection criteria for *Validated Active Citizens* and *Residual Contingent Citizens*



As discussed in chapter three, the distinction between *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* is between those that lack, and those with more than, 'a sufficiently generous share of the social product' (White, 2003: 17). By virtue of their economic status and material circumstance, it is believed *Residual Contingent Citizens* cannot fully engage with dominant ideals and practices of social citizenship that predicate engagement in the paid labour market and that make (often false) assumptions about the lived experience and benefits of social citizenship. For *Validated Active Citizens*, their employment and lived environment affirm the material and symbolic

benefits of subscribing to the dominant ideals and practices of social citizenship.

The three selection criteria were chosen because it was believed these coalesce in a way that creates severely 'deprived' and 'affluent' situations in which individuals occupy radically different 'citizenship spaces' in relation to one another (Painter and Philo, 1995). Whilst the secondary quantitative data analysis and qualitative interviews explored each of these geo-demographic characteristics in isolation and their relative significance for attitudes and experiences in relation to social citizenship, their compounding effects were of particular interest for this study. As such, the majority of the analysis undertaken focused on these two distinct sample groups. Hereafter, the nomenclature employed to refer to these two groups changes according to the dimension of deprivation or affluence under consideration and the symbolic and relational significance of their experiences, attitudes and behaviours.

Rather than looking at all those that fell above and below a certain income or area deprivation threshold (i.e. the 'poor' and 'non-poor'), compound selection criteria were used to create a large enough material and symbolic distance between the two sample groups. This study aimed to explore attitudes and experiences related to social citizenship within the context of rising poverty *and* inequality. Exploring deprivation and relative affluence through the lens of citizenship, makes it possible to analyse these phenomena 'within a framework of institutional relationships' (Jordan, 1996: 81). Understood in this way, poverty and wealth can be seen as a relational condition that is essentially an artefact of systemic processes and a manifestation of citizenship structures. Exploring the attitudes and experiences of *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* offers two linked opportunities in this regard. Firstly, it makes it possible to contribute to an area of study that has, until recently, received relatively little attention: the study of the 'rich' and 'elite' (Sayer, 2014). Given their sociological and policy significance, the characteristics, attitudes and behaviours of this elusive social group have been rather neglected in the social sciences (Rowlingson and Connor, 2011). This study contributes towards the relative dearth of empirical research in this area (Khan, 2012). Secondly, studying relative poverty and affluence alongside one another provides analytical depth to examining the relationship between inequality and citizenship. Exploring experiences and attitudes of 'the poor' in reference to material wealth problematizes the assumption that 'resources are always scarce [and therefore], hard choices have to be made' about their distribution (Walzer, 1995: 66). Examining

material deficits alongside material accretions stimulates critical consideration of the distributional role of social citizenship and challenges ideas surrounding the function and limits of welfare.

Particularly in the initial phase of secondary quantitative data analysis of the Citizenship Survey 2005 and the recruitment of participants for qualitative fieldwork, effective measurement and analysis depended greatly on the selection and construction of variables. The sample selection variables were chosen carefully to operationalise the aforementioned concepts, but it is important to acknowledge that these were used (and understood) as proxy rather than definitive measures. Further detail on the content of these variables and the logic of their selection is outlined below:

Employment status: In this study, a binary distinction was made between those that did and did not engage in the paid labour market. Those engaging in part-time work, apprenticeships, and so on were excluded from the study. Individuals engaged in unpaid domestic labour, full-time education or of pensioner age were classified as unemployed for the purposes of this study. It was believed the focus on paid employment in citizenship and welfare discourse precluded them from full validation or 'active' status. Individualistic patriarchal conceptions of social citizenship are dominant within the UK (Williams and Deacon, 2004). As a result, moral conduct and civic virtues are often imagined or lived in such terms. With this in mind, employment status is understood to be a significant determinant of whether individuals can engage and identify with the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship. In addition, research identifies unemployment as a significant factor that means individuals can be excluded from customary 'living patterns and activities' (Murphy and Athanasou, 1999).

Area Deprivation: Area deprivation (and affluence) was measured using the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). This is an official statistics publication commissioned by the Department for Communities and Local Government. It is a relative ranking of small geographical areas (Lower Super Output Areas - LSOAs) according to their level of deprivation (DCLG, 2011; McLennan et al., 2011). Administrative data is used to arrive at the IMD, which is essentially a composite indicator that measures deprivation in various aspects of daily life: education, income, crime, employment, health, housing and local public services. Originally developed by the Social Disadvantage Research Centre at the University of Oxford, the IMD reflects a commitment to Townsend's explanation of deprivation:

people are in poverty if they lack the financial resources to meet their needs and escape deprivation, whereas people can be deprived due to a lack of resources of all kinds, not just financial. Following Townsend, deprivation should be defined in a broad way to encompass a wide range of aspects of an individual's living conditions (McLennan et al., 2011: 8).

The IMD does not measure the deprivation of an area as such, rather, the proportion of people experiencing deprivation within that area. For the purposes of this study, people living in the top 30 per cent of the IMD (deprived areas) and the bottom 30 per cent of the IMD (affluent areas) were included to identify those occupying radically different 'spaces of citizenship' (Painter and Philo, 1995). During analysis of the Citizenship Survey 2005, a derived variable based on respondents' household postcodes was used to identify those living in relatively 'deprived' and 'affluent' areas. This derived variable is based on the IMD data published in 2004. For qualitative interviews, participants were recruited from the top 30 per cent and bottom 30 per cent of the IMD published in 2010. This was the most recent publication IMD data available at the time qualitative fieldwork was undertaken.

Income: Those on an income of 60 per cent below the median are conventionally understood to be in relative poverty (Hills et al., 2010). With this in mind, this study explores the differences in attitudes, experiences and behaviours of those that have an equivalised net household income below 60 per cent of the median and those that have an above average (mean) equivalised net household income.

Due to constraints on sample size, it was not possible to undertake secondary quantitative analysis exclusively on those with an equivalised household income that was considerably above the mean. Whilst the Citizenship Survey 2005 benefits from a relatively large sample size, the compound selection criterion employed in this study significantly reduce those subjects satisfying all three selection criteria. If a higher income threshold were to be used, the sample size for the *Validated Active Citizens* category would have been so substantially reduced as to make it near impossible to undertake statistically significant or robust quantitative analysis. As such, it has been necessary to compromise with an above average (mean) income for the upper income threshold. However, as discussed in section 4.5 of this chapter, significant attempts were made to recruit participants for qualitative fieldwork that represented those at the two most extreme ends of the income distribution.

For qualitative fieldwork, it was relatively straightforward to identify whether participants satisfied the income selection criterion outlined above. Prospective participants were asked about their net household income (before housing costs), their relationship status and whether they had any children before being interviewed. In conjunction with the most recent data available at the time of recruitment (DWP, 2012c), this information was used to establish the financial situation of respondents.

Identifying the two sample groups for secondary quantitative data analysis proved to be more challenging. To arrive at a measure of household income, a new income variable was constructed from the data available in the Citizenship Survey 2005 so that household income counted as just the respondent's income if they were single. However, if a respondent was cohabiting with a partner or spouse, the incomes of both parties were aggregated to count as household income. Of course, an assumption is being made that the cumulative income of a couple is 'fairly shared' between them which is a potential limitation of the secondary quantitative analysis (Vogler, 1989). The Citizenship Survey 2005 only provided an ordinal measure of income as opposed to a continuous variable, so it was not possible to identify income with absolute precision. As a result, a mid-point range of a respondent's income (and their partner's or spouse's income if applicable) was used to calculate household income. This method has been used previously (Smith, 2004b; Vizard, 2010). Only a gross income measure was available in the Citizenship Survey 2005, which included income from earnings, self-employment, benefits, pensions, and interest. The typical rates of taxation for the period 2005/2006 were applied to the mid-range of individual level gross income before these variables were aggregated to construct a net household income variable.

The most common thresholds of equivalised net household income are based on a couple living together with no children (DWP, 2014: 12). To reflect the relative utility of a respondent's income, equivalised net household income thresholds were constructed based on the relationship status of a respondent and the number children they had. Official statistics for 2005-2006 (DWP, 2007) were used to categorise respondents based on their circumstances and then establish if they had an equivalised net household income below 60 per cent of the median or an above average (mean) equivalised net household income.

This section has elaborated on the indicators employed to operationalize the concepts and lived realities of *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated*

Active Citizens in this study. Area deprivation, income and employment status were applied as compound selection criteria to capture the perspicuous material differences between these two groups. The selection criteria chosen are powerful determinants of social inclusion and exclusion in isolation (Townsend, 1979; Buck, 2001; JRF, 2014). Combined together however, they aim to capture the markedly different lived experiences of social citizenship and inequality. In doing so, it becomes possible to explore the effects of lived experience on attitudes towards rights, responsibilities and welfare.

4.3 Explaining attitudinal divergence: a mixed methods 'lived experience' approach

Quantitative attitudinal research has frequently attempted to: track changes in public opinion over time; explain drivers of difference; and identify covariance with socio-economic policies, media coverage and political discourse. There is much to be gleaned from quantitative attitudinal research on welfare, inequality and citizenship in this area and much of this literature is incorporated into this thesis. However many still conclude that attitudes are 'complex, ambiguous and contradictory' (Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Orton and Rowlingson, 2007: 40; Humpage, 2008b). Such studies recognise the finite potential of survey research in its capacity to capture the complexity of people's reasoning and judgements. Very often, attitudes of respondents can appear to lack continuity and internal logic (Taylor-Gooby, 1982). However, Humpage (2008b: 227) argues that 'contradictions in public opinion are not necessarily the result of 'illogical' thinking but rather demonstrate how 'the public' draw upon conflicting sets of traditions and moral repertoires when thinking about political issues'. As in any realm of social or personal life, our intuitions, desires and needs may appear ambivalent but are actually quite cogent. The mediating factors that explain these contradictions are of principle interest if we are to better identify and understand attitudinal differences between *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*.

For the Citizenship Survey 2005 alone, the appropriate interpretation of, and meaning behind, attitudes is open to conjecture. Whilst secondary quantitative data analysis can help to identify differences in attitudes, it can only tell part of the story, and in some respects, the least insightful part. What is interesting about a person's attitude is often not the attitude in isolation but how that attitude is informed by socio-economic and political structures, and the principles from which it has been derived. In this instance, the underlying meaning behind and drivers of statistical observations could only be explored

rather than established. However, it is hoped the integration of qualitative data contributes towards a richer understanding of differing attitudes and 'moral repertoires' in this instance (Dean, 2004; Humpage, 2008b: 227). A mixed methods approach is the best means by which to 'ascertain what – to put it provocatively - people *really* think... by pointing towards a research agenda better able to explore how people construct and justify their beliefs' (Skilling, 2013: 18-19). With this in mind, this thesis examines attitudinal differences in a way that incorporates both quantitative and qualitative data to offer some measure of explanation.

Existing attitudinal research (particularly quantitative data analysis) has tended to neglect the significance of lived experience in shaping attitudes towards welfare, inequality and social citizenship. Attitudinal differences observed between socio-demographic and economic groups are repeatedly explained by self-interested rationalities (Roberts, 1977; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Linos and West, 2003; Cusack et al., 2006; Lelkes, 2009) or conflate material position with material interest (Evans, 1993; Brooks et al., 2006; Brooks and Svallfors, 2010: 208; Evans and de Graaf, 2013).

Dean and Melrose (1999: 98) propose that people's support for social citizenship is motivated by their own class interests. Various studies have also shown that 'richer people are more averse to redistribution' than lower income groups who have much more to gain (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Sefton, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009: 3). In addition, Park et al.'s (2007) analysis of public attitudes found that unemployed, low-income and benefit groups are more likely to problematize inequality and support redistribution. When presented with conflicting evidence to the self-interested hypothesis, researchers still attempt to explain this discrepancy in terms of rational utility:

But self-interest cannot explain views about redistribution entirely, given that a quarter of those on higher incomes, who say when asked that they put themselves first over others, still support redistribution. Perhaps some of these see it in their own best interests to reduce inequality (for reasons of social cohesion or economic performance (Rowlingson et al., 2010b: 3).

These studies presuppose that if a person on a high income does not support redistribution or an elderly person does not endorse free child-care, that this is in some way a signifier of self-interest. Support for policies or principles that may not work in the material interests of respondents are equally characterised as altruistic (Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Papadakis and Bean, 1993; Groskind, 1994; Van Oorschot, 2000). Attitudinal differences can be

described as egocentric or altruistic given the material position of respondents. However, this is not necessarily the cause of attitudinal difference and conflating material position with self-interest is potentially attributing causative explanation to the characteristic of an attitude. Rational class theories appear to pervade much of the analysis explaining attitudinal differences in relation to welfare and social citizenship (cf. Sumino, 2014). In reality, there is a range of factors attendant to material position that also play a role in shaping conceptions of social citizenship (Taylor-Gooby, 1985; Jordan, 1996). In fact, a review of attitudinal research in this area found that self-interest performs particularly poorly in terms of predicting political and social attitudes (Kinder, 1998).

Similarly to other research, Kearns et al. (2014) equate material position with self-interest. Yet, the study fruitfully illustrates that lived experiences greatly affect attitudes, particularly the nexus between knowledge and attitude formation. Recent empirical research suggests that higher social class and income helps predict self-interested attitudes and behaviours (Piff, 2014; Powdthavee and Oswald, 2014). A systematic review of the empirical literature (Kraus *et al.*, 2012) concludes that a person's material position affects their lived experiences: the authors claim this can obscure or magnify the structural determinants of their situation which in turn shapes their attitudes towards themselves and others. Material position then could be as much a measure of knowledge as it could be of egocentricity. Covariance between higher 'material position' and lower support for inclusive social citizenship is not purely or even necessarily explained by self-interest. In sum, much of the existing evidence overplays the significance of utility judgments and neglects the potential effects of lived experience.

To offer a nuanced account of attitudinal difference it is necessary to disentangle the respective and collective effects of material position, knowledge, self-interest, and lived experience. The interplay between individual characteristics, lived experiences and welfare institutions has been successfully theorised (e.g. Isin and Wood, 1999). However, much of the existing empirical research talks quite separately about the determinants of public attitudes (for example: Fraile and Ferrer, 2005). This thesis seeks to remedy this and account for the ways in which lived experiences could figure in the reasoning and judgments of the general public.

Attitudinal differences related to social citizenship have been variously explained according to: welfare regimes and structural and institutional characteristics (Svallfors, 2012; Wlezien and Soroka, 2012), individual and

group characteristics (Brooks and Svallfors, 2010; Evans and de Graaf, 2013), ideological and value systems (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; Kulin and Seymer, 2014) and knowledge (Sefton, 2005). Mau (2000: 2) attempts to reconcile some of the different factors at play:

The institutional architecture is viewed as a decisive component which conditions the self-interest motives of the population. But moreover, it carries ideological and ideational notions which influence likewise the orientations of the general public.

The lived experience of citizens is not explicitly accounted for here but the experiential literature illustrates how central this is to any understanding of attitude formation. Alongside individual and group characteristics, the institutional landscape of a welfare regime structures the lived experiences of citizens. These lived experiences intervene on knowledge accumulation and value systems that underpin attitude formation. With this in mind, it is important to utilise and re-examine the mass of evidence on attitudinal divergence in a way that attends to the significance of lived experience and the relationship between inequality and social citizenship.

4.4 Secondary Quantitative Data Analysis

For the first phase of the research process, secondary quantitative data analysis of the 2005 Citizenship Survey was undertaken. This survey was biennial from 2001 to 2007 and moved to a continuous design from 2007 to 2011. The 2005 Citizenship Survey dataset was downloaded on 13th November 2011 from the UK Data Archive.

The 2005 Citizenship Survey is a nationally representative survey of England and Wales, with a core sample of 9,691 and an ethnic minority boost of 4,390 (Michaelson et al., 2006: 15). A pre-designed weight to account for non-response or selection bias was applied where appropriate. Owing to the large-scale of the survey, the multi-stage random probability sampling method ensured a highly representative sample of England and Wales. The response rate for the core sample was 63 per cent (Michaelson et al., 2006: 16)

Secondary quantitative data analysis can in certain cases be 'perfect' for research questions pursued (Hakim, 1982). In this instance, the quantitative dataset in question presented a unique opportunity to consider some of the core research questions of this thesis. Specifically, the data included in the 2005 Citizenship Survey made it possible to establish whether and how much *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* differed in their

experiences and attitudes in relation to social citizenship, welfare and inequality. This particular dataset was selected because it is the only recent survey (known to the researcher) that directly covers questions pertaining to core areas of the thesis. There are many national surveys that explore attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities. Perhaps the most contemporary and notable example is the annual British Social Attitudes survey run by NatCen Social Research. However, the questions asked often focus on levels of inequality, government spending, benefits and public services. Whilst it might be possible to infer conceptions of social citizenship from this data, it was felt that direct and explicit questions concerning the key features of social citizenship would be more appropriate. The complexity and contradictions inherent in welfare attitudes made it all the more pertinent to obtain data that directly explored the rights and responsibilities of social citizenship. The 2005 Citizenship Survey and its dedicated module on rights and responsibilities appealed in this regard. In addition, this was the only dataset that was large enough to accommodate the statistical tests required for this study.

Given the time at which data for this survey was collected, it is important to recognise its inevitable limitations. Perhaps, most crucially, findings from the quantitative data analysis are not necessarily representative of contemporary conceptions of social citizenship. Having said that, given the size of the dataset and the level of generality at which the questions are asked, it is possible to make a number of inferences about attitudes towards social citizenship and the causes of attitudinal difference more generally. The mixed-methods research design also seeks to overcome this by drawing on contemporary qualitative data to interrogate and enrich statistical observations.

The dataset includes a number of relevant questions on the rights and responsibilities of social citizenship. Specifically, the survey includes questions on the following rights:

- To have access to free education for children.
- To be looked after by the State if you cannot look after yourself.
- To be treated fairly and equally.
- To have free health-care if you need it.
- To have a job.

With respect to these, respondents were asked if they thought they *should* have any of these rights and whether they felt they *currently have* any of these rights (see Appendix A.1). Notably, respondents were asked which rights and

duties should be held and performed by *everyone living in the UK*. Prior to being asked, respondents were encouraged to view rights as entitlements:

Now some questions about the rights of people living in the UK. By rights I mean the things that people are entitled to if they live in this country. Which of the rights, if any, listed below do you think you should have as someone living in the UK? (Michaelson et al., 2006: 76)

The definition of a right suggests that citizens have either a legal, social or moral entitlement (Ashford, 2007; Tomalty, 2010). As such, it is reasonable to assume that when a respondent expresses support for a right in this instance, it is an expression of support for a universal entitlement. When gauging support for rights, the question asks about *people living in the UK* rather than *UK residents* or *citizens*, which are legally and normatively different. This may also be a significant factor that affects how individuals interpret the rights attached to social citizenship.

Of course, it should be borne in mind that some respondents could be interpreting the question differently. Potentially, people's expression of support in this context might not be based on some abstract principle but rather on a desire or need for these rights. The question asks which rights respondents think *you* should have as someone living in the UK, rather than which rights you think *someone* living in the UK should have. As a result, some people's expression of support could be self-referential. Nevertheless, from these questions it was possible to establish the extent to which the (aforementioned) rights of social citizenship were both supported and indeed 'felt' by *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*.

The unique module of the 2005 Citizenship Survey also included questions on responsibilities, and whether any of the following should be the responsibility of everyone living in the UK:

- To help and protect your family.
- To raise children properly.
- To work to provide for yourself.
- To behave responsibly.
- To help others.

Emphasis on universalism over particularity extends even further to the duties of social citizenship. When asked about what should be the responsibilities of people living in the UK, respondents were asked which duties '*all* people are obliged to do'. Namely, they were asked to identify a range of *universal* duties that *all* citizens should have. This could have affected support for

responsibilities as people's reasoning may be based on their own perceived capacity to fulfil such duties. However, as mentioned above, it is important to resist the self-interested rationalities that tend to dominate attitudinal research, and beyond this, explanations of attitudinal variation are more thoroughly considered in chapters five, six and seven.

Vizard (2010) argues that the 2005 Citizenship Survey offers 'an overall picture of public support for...rights that the public are willing to endorse at a "higher" or "abstract" level' (Vizard, 2010: 11). Significantly, the general public are much more likely to subscribe to an idea or principle, than to endorse substantive measures relating to social citizenship (Bartels, 2005). In addition the general public struggle to identify the relationship between socio-economic outcomes and public policies (Hedges, 2005; Horton and Gregory, 2009). Because the questions concerning rights and responsibilities work at a level of abstraction, it is likely that any support witnessed for particular rights and duties is higher than it might otherwise be (Feldman, 2003: 491). Nevertheless, the survey questions on rights and responsibilities demonstrate, in broad brushstrokes, the ways in which the general public seek to define the constitutive features of social citizenship. Mouffe (2005: 60) suggests that 'the way we define citizenship is intimately linked to the kind of society and political community we want'. In this regard, support for the aforementioned rights and responsibilities in the 2005 Citizenship Survey represents a political commitment or orientation towards the ideals of citizenship.

Beyond questions concerning the rights and responsibilities of social citizenship, respondents to the 2005 Citizenship Survey were also asked about their impressions and experiences of their local area, neighbourhood and community (see Appendix A.2). These questions covered a broad range of areas such as whether a respondent felt that they were able to make a change in their local area to whether they felt their neighbours could be trusted or would participate to help solve a community problem. The differences between *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* are briefly referred to in chapter five. Unfortunately, due to limitations on space it has not been possible to go into greater depth to elaborate on the secondary quantitative analysis undertaken on these components of the 2005 Citizenship Survey.

Similarly, the survey also measures dimensions of formal and informal civic engagement and participation in public and private social networks (see Appendix A.3). Formalised civic engagement includes activities such as

involvement in local decision-making, engagement in community consultations, contacting an elected representative and formal volunteering (Kitchen, 2006). Informal dimensions of civic engagement entail providing 'help', 'support' and 'informal voluntary help' to relatives, household members and others. These forms of 'help' and 'support' include activities such as doing shopping or chores for someone, providing childcare or providing transportation assistance. These sorts of measures were able to capture the support given and received, as well as the social networks of *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*. Again, due to limitations on space it has not been possible to discuss these dimensions in any great depth. However, these are referred to in chapter seven.

The secondary quantitative data analysis undertaken for this study moved from bivariate to multivariate analysis to establish whether any statistically significant relationships exist between lived experiences of inequality and conceptions of social citizenship. The first stage of analysis entailed a summary of the observed differences between the attitudes and experiences of the two sample groups. The second stage of analysis explored the extent to which distinct lived experiences of inequality were able to predict the attitudes of respondents. By undertaking a series of binary logistic regressions, it was possible to predict the probability of a citizen's orientation towards the constitutive aspects of social citizenship. Once established, a number of multiple linear regression models were run to establish whether and how lived experiences of inequality affect attitudes towards citizenship. The selection criteria used to operationalize the lived experiences of inequality were also examined separately to establish their relative and compound effect on attitudes, behaviours and experiences.

Whilst there have been numerous studies undertaken to utilize the rich data available in the Citizenship Survey (e.g. Kitchen, 2006; Vizard, 2010), these studies tend to focus on area-level or socio-economic characteristics. It is therefore believed that a mixed methods approach offers a unique and timely contribution to this field of study; providing analysis at an individual level rather than generalizing neighbourhood or area effects which can often prove problematic (Lupton, 2003).

The primary objective of this phase of research was to provide an empirical background and understanding of whether there are significant differences in conceptions of social citizenship according to lived experiences of inequality. To enrich any causal inferences made and to fully explore the underlying relationships between lived experience, attitude formation and citizenship

structures, it was necessary to move towards a more generative view of causation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). A generative view of causation that argues:

events cannot be seen as being discrete and isolatable; they are part of a network or system of events. To isolate them artificially is to produce connections that may bear little relationship to how things actually behave. In addition, they argue that establishing connections or relationships is only the starting point. It is necessary to discover the underlying structures and mechanisms that are responsible for producing such connections (Blaikie, 2003: 17).

With this in mind, the limitations of the quantitative dataset have to be acknowledged. Whilst the findings of the secondary quantitative data analysis provided an important empirical background, they could not fully explain how and why potential differences were observed. Adopting a critical realist approach, the second stage of the research process was particularly crucial to move towards a deeper level of social explanation that captured the relational and phenomenological significance of inequality, as well as the drivers shaping conceptions of social citizenship.

4.5 Qualitative Interviews

The second phase of the research process involved a series of in-depth, structured 'scenario-driven' qualitative interviews with *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*. Participants were only eligible for inclusion in the study if they satisfied all three of the selection criteria outlined above. Participants were sampled from in and around the Leeds city area and were interviewed between February 2013 and January 2014. As a post-industrial city, the demographic, economic and household profile of Leeds is broadly similar to that of England and Wales (ONS, 2014). Drawing on data from the 2011 Census, Appendix B.1 demonstrates some of the dimensions and degrees of similarity observable. Across many dimensions, the characteristics of Leeds city region are typical of the national profile. This includes dimensions such as the gender split, the proportion of the population that identifies as a Black or Minority Ethnic group and those classified as economically 'active' and 'inactive'. The proportion defined as having 'never worked' and as 'long-term unemployed' are similar to the national profile, as are the proportion of households that experience dimensions of deprivation (see Appendix B.1). According to the latest data available from the Index of

Multiple Deprivation 2010, when compared with 56 other English cities, Leeds is currently middling and is ranked the 23rd most deprived (Bee, 2015: 6).

In light of the broadly similar demographic profile and institutional environment within which qualitative interviews were undertaken, it was possible to draw inferences at a number of different levels about the demographic profile and lived environment of research participants. All fieldwork was undertaken in one geographical location to ensure that participants were (at least in theory) exposed to the same administrative, institutional, and public service settings. It was later felt this was particularly important given the localised experiences and comparisons of public services and institutions articulated by research participants.

Invariably, there are characteristics of Leeds that are somewhat idiosyncratic to its geography, production base and population. For example, by virtue of the relatively high full-time student population in the city there is a slightly higher proportion of young people and people renting in Leeds compared to the rest of England and Wales (see Appendix B.1). Leeds also exhibits a relatively high level of internal inequality relative to other cities (Bee, 2015: 7). This made it particularly important to isolate fieldwork to one geographical area. When comparing the attitudes, behaviours and experiences of the two sample groups, it was felt it would be easier to account for differences in one area rather than across multiple areas.

A total of 28 interviews were undertaken. This phase of the research explored the underlying dynamics that underpin lived experiences of inequality and attitudinal divergence towards social citizenship, welfare and inequality. Specifically, these scenario-driven interviews offered insight into how poverty and affluence generate unique experiences and patterns of knowledge about the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and action. From this it was possible to consider how and why people engage with or deviate from the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship.

4.5.1 Research Design

In his seminal text, Allport (1935: 810) defines an attitude as 'a mental and neural state of readiness, organised through experience, exerting a directive and dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related'. This study prescribed to such a definition and sought to identify how lived experiences of inequality intervene on an individual's orientation and disposition towards the ideals and praxes of social citizenship. As a consequence, during the interview, questions regarding

attitudes towards the rights, responsibilities and ideals of citizenship were interleaved with questions about a respondent's individual circumstance, experience and behaviour in relation to welfare, work and inequality. This made it possible to stimulate and structure discussion of social citizenship around a participant's own knowledge of and involvement with citizenship structures. Such an approach was particularly important given the abstract and figurative nature of social citizenship.

As acknowledged in previous studies (e.g. Dwyer, 2002; Lister et al., 2003), it can be difficult to explore notions of social citizenship amongst the general public. Miller (2000) argues that 'citizenship – except in the formal passport-holding sense – is not a widely understood idea in Britain. People do not have a clear idea of what it means to be a citizen' (Miller, 2000: 26). However, this thesis brings to bear evidence that the concept and practice of social citizenship is more 'contested' rather than 'poorly understood'. Chapters five, six and seven demonstrate that the *principles* rather than the *nomenclature* of social citizenship figure more vividly in the 'moral repertoires' of citizens (Dean, 2004).

An abductive research strategy (Blaikie, 2007; Blaikie, 2010) was therefore used to understand tacit attitudes, behaviours and experiences in relation to social citizenship and then develop social scientific explanations on this basis. Blaikie (1993: 176) argues that it is possible 'produce social scientific accounts of social life by drawing on the concepts and meanings used by social actors and the activities in which they engage'.

Lister et al. (2003) suggest that the values and ideas that shape conceptions of social citizenship, particularly rights and responsibilities are embedded within 'real world' values and are not recognized as something immediately relevant to participants. Grounding interviews in the lived experiences and intuitions of participants made it possible to explore conceptions of social citizenship in a way that was meaningful to them. This required some capacity to identify the relational and institutional significance of participant's 'lay accounts'. However, it was also borne in mind that

we should not invent the viewpoint of the actor, and should only attribute to actors ideas about the world they actually hold if we want to understand their actions, reasons and ideas (Becker, 1996: 60).

This strategy informed the design of the interview schedule and analysis of qualitative data.

Along similar lines, care was also taken not to superimpose the findings of the secondary quantitative data analysis onto the qualitative data collected. Whilst the first phase of the research helped 'to inform and complement the analysis of freshly collected data' (Hakim, 1982: 2), assumptions were not made about the attitudes, experiences or behaviours of participants in the second phase of the research process. Beyond the selection criteria, no homogeneity was assumed between respondents to the Citizenship Survey and those participating in qualitative interviews.

4.5.2 Interview Schedule and Vignettes

The interview schedule facilitated a structured, scenario-driven 'conversation' between the researcher and participant (see Appendix B.2). The interviews covered a range of topics that both directly and indirectly relate to social citizenship, in particular, rights and responsibilities. The first part of the interview asked participants about their social networks and engagement with public affairs, institutions and their local community more generally. This section of the interview sought to explore the behaviours of participants. Participants were then asked about their lived experiences, material circumstance and the repercussions of this. Participants were particularly encouraged to elaborate on how and why they felt the way they did about their employment status, income and local area. Following this, a range of vignettes were presented to and discussed with participants. These are discussed in detail shortly. The final section of the interview schedule covered a broad range of topics to explore attitudes towards welfare, inequality, social policy and citizenship. The interview schedule was designed and refined based on cognitive testing and two pilot interviews with individuals satisfying the three selection criteria. Each interview lasted between 50 minutes and 1 hour 45 minutes and the same interview schedule (with a few additions) was used for individuals identified as *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*.

During the interview, the researcher read out four vignettes. As discussed in greater detail in chapter six, these vignettes drew upon caricatures of individuals that are commonly (mis-) represented in public discourse and by the media: 'the deserving workless poor', 'the undeserving workless poor', 'the deserving working poor' and 'the undeserving working rich' (see Appendix B.2). The scenarios touched upon welfare provision, individual behaviour and activity that could be deemed as virtuous or transgressive to dominant conceptions of social citizenship. Participants were then asked a range of questions based on these scenarios. The vignettes served as a heuristic to

explore participant's intuitions and attitudes related to social citizenship. They were a means by which to ground abstract principles associated with social citizenship in situations that participants found believable (Rahman, 1996).

Rather than just looking at how people's attitudes towards social citizenship were shaped by lived experiences of inequality, it was possible to understand the processes by which people arrive at a particular conception of social citizenship and the significance of that conception. In this instance, vignettes proved to be:

a useful tool to illuminate and tap into these complex processes by isolating certain aspects of a given social issue or problem. When integrated within a multi-method approach our understanding of these processes and the relationship between belief and action can be enhanced (Renold, 2002: 4).

For each vignette, respondents were asked the following question: "How responsible is X for her/his situation?" There may be some concern about whether respondents either understood this question or interpreted it correctly given its potentially ambiguous nature. However, 'short-staged written vignettes' are often used to identify and establish the significance of differences in the interpretation of open-ended or ambiguous questions (Soydan, 1995; Sheppard and Ryan, 2003). In fact, it has been suggested by some that *truly* open-ended questions and reactions offer a more accurate picture of real-life attitudes and behaviours (Kalafat and Gagliano, 1996). The ambiguity of the vignettes made it possible to elicit normative intuitions around social citizenship, identify how participants 'fill in the gaps' and explore how lived experiences of inequality intervene on attitude formation:

The notable grey areas that vignettes produce, through the selective representations of various elements of reality, can be harnessed and used to help uncover and clarify the concepts at work and under study (Hughes and Huby, 2004: 45).

Having said that, vignettes should not be too ambiguous. Previous studies have shown that respondents may feel unable to answer questions without sufficient information (Wilson and While, 1998). With this in mind, the researcher struck a balance between complexity and ambiguity to elicit meaningful responses from participants. This approach made it possible to explore supplementary areas or points that *participants* felt were particularly relevant to a vignette or topic under consideration.

4.5.3 Recruitment and Sample

The researcher initially planned to recruit participants by leafleting local areas and liaising with a gatekeeper to assist with recruitment. Unfortunately, this was not possible and the researcher focused almost entirely on leafleting residential areas across the Leeds City region. Using the three compound selection criteria, a clear distinction was drawn between *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* during the recruitment of participants. The researcher visited the most and least deprived Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) across Leeds and delivered leaflets to households encouraging residents to take part in the research. All areas targeted were in the top and bottom 30 per cent of the Indices of Multiple Deprivation according to the latest administrative data available at the time of qualitative fieldwork (DCLG, 2011). One version of the leaflet was delivered to households in the least deprived areas and another version was delivered to households in the most deprived areas. The leaflets were slightly different to target prospective participants based on their income and employment status (see Appendix B.3).

These leaflets provided preliminary information on the study as well as a contact email address and mobile phone number. The leaflets mentioned that a £10 high street shopping voucher was available to all participants as a 'thank you' for their time. It was hoped that this would encourage individuals to participate and make contact either via email or telephone. Mindful of the ESRC's Framework for Research Ethics, the researcher ensured that all 'research participants...participated in a voluntary way, free from any coercion' (ESRC, 2010). If contacted, the researcher spent a short amount of time explaining the purpose of the study to potential participants and asking if they would like to partake at a time and location that best suited them. A great deal of flexibility was firstly required to generate interest in the study by delivering leaflets and, secondly to secure interviews at times and locations that accommodated the (often complex) needs of participants.

Throughout the research process, the researcher abided by Leeds University's ethical and health and safety guidelines. The good practice guidelines outlined in the Statement of Ethical Practice of the British Sociological Association were also followed. An information sheet and consent form were provided to all participants to ensure they understood their participation in the research (see Appendix B.4). Participants were able to opt out at any stage of the qualitative fieldwork. All information used in the final research outputs of this thesis is and will be suitably edited to safeguard the confidentiality and anonymity of participants.

In total, 28 interviews were conducted: 15 interviews with participants satisfying the selection criteria for *Residual Contingent Citizens* and 13 interviews with participants satisfying the selection criteria for *Validated Active Citizens*. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these two groups exhibited unique characteristics (see Table 1). The demographic profile and circumstance of participants classified as *Residual Contingent Citizens* all contribute towards their lived experience of inequality. For participants in this sample group, the period of time they had been unemployed ranged between 2 weeks and 19 years. They all lived within the top 18 per cent of the most deprived areas of England, just under 75 per cent lived in the top 10 per cent and more than half lived in the top 1% (DCLG, 2011). All had an income that was well below the equivalised income poverty line and an equivalised income that was in the bottom fifth of the income distribution. They were aged between 24 and 66 years old. Just below half had dependent children. Two thirds were women. Just below half identified as an ethnic minority. One participant in this sample group identified as physically impaired (wheel-chair bound) and 4 others indicated that they were suffering from a mental health issue. These correlates of disadvantage proved crucial to the biographies of these participants and their orientation towards the key features and institutions of social citizenship.

Table 1: Demographic profile of qualitative research participants

	Residual Contingent Citizens	Validated Active Citizens
Employment Status	All unemployed: for between 2 weeks and 19 years	All in full-time employment
IMD status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All in top 18% of IMD • Almost 75% in top 10% of IMD • Over 50% in top 1% of IMD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All in bottom 27% of IMD • Over 50% in bottom 14% of IMD • Over 33% in bottom 5% of IMD
Income	All below poverty line and in bottom fifth of income distribution	All well above the national mean and in top fifth the income distribution
Age	Between 24 and 66 years old	Between 31 and 62 years old
BME	Almost 50% BME	1 BME
Dependents	Almost 50% had dependents	Almost a quarter had dependents
Gender	Two thirds were female	More than 60% were male
Disabilities	1 participant wheel-chair bound 4 suffering from mental health issues	N/A

Participants classified as *Validated Active Citizens* all lived in the bottom 27 per cent of the IMD (i.e. the most affluent areas in England), over half lived in the bottom 14 per cent of IMD and just over a third lived in the bottom 5 per cent of IMD. All were either engaged in full-time employment or were self-employed. All had an equivalised net household income that was well above

the mean and within the top 20 per cent of the income distribution. They were aged between 31 and 62 years old. Over 60 per cent were male. Three participants had dependent children. One participant identified as an ethnic minority. Evidentially, the demographic profile and circumstances of these participants radically differed from those classified as *Residual Contingent Citizens*. This created a sufficiently large psychological and material gap between the two sample groups when it came to exploring how lived experiences of inequality affect citizen identity and orientation.

4.5.4 Analysis of Qualitative Data

With the permission of participants, all interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed. Due to the structured nature of the interview schedule, the questions asked by the interviewer were only briefly noted during transcription. However, the responses of research participants were transcribed verbatim. By undertaking transcription throughout the period of fieldwork, it was possible to reflect upon the interview process and the data collected. The researcher made fieldwork notes before and after each interview to include relevant information and reflections during data processing and analysis. The effective storage and synthesis of this data proved instrumental to the thematic analysis subsequently undertaken; particularly the capacity to move from descriptive to analytic consideration of the data.

There were two key stages to the qualitative data analysis. The first stage of analysis entailed a broad and thorough consideration of all the qualitative data as a whole. Bearing in mind the overall research questions of the thesis, key themes and codes emerged from the data. Subsequent to this, the second stage involved a deeper consideration and comparison of the attitudes, experiences and behaviours of the two sample groups.

As stated at the outset of this chapter, the research questions underpinning this thesis are principally concerned with comparing and contrasting lived experiences of deprivation and affluence and exploring what impact this has on conceptions of social citizenship. To do so, the verbatim responses from each transcript were input into an excel spread sheet and organised according to specific questions and areas of discussion in each interview. The relatively structured interview schedule was designed in such a way as to ensure the interviews and responses of 'poor' and 'rich' research participants were broadly replicable and comparable. This made it possible to explore how each respondent across a range of demographic characteristics responded to specific research questions. From this, patterns emerged about the differences *between* but also *within* the two sample groups. Adopting a critical

realist approach, this research process sought to understand 'people's perspective in the context of the conditions and the circumstances of their lives' (Ormston, 2013: 22). Such a strategy was intended to capture the complexity of people's responses but also to identify the themes, differences and similarities that became observable from research participants (Huberman and Miles, 2002).

Whilst all questions asked were comparable in terms of their thematic content, many of the questions were left open and purposefully ambiguous to capture the concepts and categories advanced and articulated by respondents. This meant codes and frames of references emerged from the data and their significance could be explored with reference to the core research questions. Drawing on phenomenological analytical techniques (cf. Smith, 2004a) it was possible to explore how research participants interpreted abstract concepts such as responsibility, justice and welfare on their own terms and how their diverse vantage points and experiences lead to differing ways and strategies of understanding the social world. This essentially provided the analytical framework and resources necessary to move from lay accounts to social scientific categories and explanations (Blaikie, 2010).

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the methodological approach taken to meet the key research objectives and questions of this thesis. The multi-stage mixed methods research process involved secondary quantitative data analysis and a series of in-depth, structured, scenario-driven interviews with *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*. A particular challenge of the research was to make these two categories empirically tractable and conceptually cogent based on the data available to the researcher and feasible within the confines of the research project. The research methods were employed to incorporate the lived experiences and accounts of citizens into explanations of how and why individuals engage with or deviate from the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship. Recognising the often ephemeral and contradictory nature of public attitudes, the research process sought to identify and then explain the causes of attitudinal divergence. This research and methodological approach makes a unique empirical contribution to citizenship studies and critical social policy in this regard. Rather than assessing the efficacy of welfare regimes on their own terms (i.e. via different structural welfare arrangements), the lived experience of citizens can help

uncover the extent to which the dominant praxis of social citizenship operates effectively to tackle or at least temper deprivation and inequality.

Qualitative and quantitative methods 'are fundamentally complements, not substitutes – and certainly not rivals. They mutually inform each other' (Robb, 2002: xii-xiii). A mixed methods approach can strengthen the credibility and external validity of lived experiences in this regard. In spite of significant differences within and across social groups, this methodology made it possible to consistently measure and explore inequality across a range of contexts. This is precisely because the socio-structural dynamics that give rise to inequality are manifest in the experiences, behaviours and attitudes of citizens.

Chapter 5: Negotiating validation and contingency in social citizenship: the material and symbolic significance of deprivation

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores whether and why attitudes differ between those notionally defined as *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*. As outlined in greater detail in chapter four, three selection criteria were used to operationalize these categories: income, area deprivation and employment status. Drawing on secondary quantitative data analysis and qualitative data from in-depth interviews, the hypothesis that lived experiences of inequality affect conceptions of social citizenship is tested here. In doing so, the chapter explores the material and symbolic significance of deprivation and its implications for citizen identity and orientation.

Some have suggested that there is little that distinguishes the attitudes of 'poor citizens' from the rest of society (Vincent, 1991). According to this line of argument, those in a position of material deprivation exhibit the same interpretive practices and attitudinal discourses as other citizens. Beyond their inability to fulfil their aspirations as a result of poverty, a number of studies conclude that 'the poor' exhibit broadly similar attitudes to the rest of the population when it comes to work, family, welfare services and social citizenship (e.g. Heath, 1992; Gallie, 1994; Marshall et al., 1996). These studies rebut the 'immoral underclass' hypothesis (Murray, 1994) and the narrative of 'irresponsibility' that pervades dominant political and policy discourse (Hancock and Mooney, 2013). They nonetheless tend to neglect the 'divergent discourses and practices of poor and better-off citizens' (Jordan and Redley, 1994: 156). Whilst these studies recognise the presence and effects of inequality, they tend to overlook how domains of social, economic and political life are differently constituted, experienced and negotiated within and between social groups of a given polity. Inevitably, those facing validation and contingency are 'influenced by the particular opportunities and constraints that confront them' (Jordan, 1996: 111). With this in mind, this chapter examines how the attitudes of *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* are influenced by their respective lived experiences of inequality.

The chapter starts by outlining levels of support for the rights and responsibilities of social citizenship. The next section explores the factors contributing towards attitudinal divergence. Specifically, section 5.3 examines how, in isolation and together, income, area deprivation and economic status affect lived experiences and attitudes related to social citizenship. To explain the statistical differences observed, findings from the qualitative in-depth interviews are then considered to understand how income, employment status and local area affect lived experiences. To conclude, the chapter reflects on how lived experiences affect citizen identity and attitudes towards the figurative and applied potential of social citizenship.

5.2 Support for Social Citizenship: Rights and Responsibilities

In her own analysis of the 2005 Citizenship Survey, Vizard (2010) concludes that there is broad support for social rights. Despite evidence that support for welfare and redistribution is in decline (Park et al., 2007; Dorey, 2010; Park et al., 2013), the general public do seem to intrinsically value social rights (see Table 2). Rather than a paradigmatic shift in public attitudes towards social citizenship, there appears to be a degree of resistance to neo-liberal reforms in this regard (Dean and Melrose, 1999; Dwyer, 2000; Humpage, 2008b; Rowlingson et al., 2010b). Of course, this is not to suggest that there is not complexity and caveats to this support (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Whilst there is a high level of endorsement across different social rights, there is variation in the extent of support. For example, 96 per cent of people support the right to be treated fairly and equally whilst only 77 per cent support the right to have a job.

Table 2: Support for social rights by lived experience of inequality

	To have access to free education for children	To be looked after by the State if you cannot look after yourself	To be treated fairly and equally	To have free health-care if you need it	To have a job
All	91%	85%	96%	93%	77%
'Deprived'	84%	80%	90%	91%	75%
'Affluent'	96%	86%	99%	93%	70%

There are many mediating factors that could influence the level and nature of support for social rights. Variation might be explained by the differing content of social rights. Rights such as free healthcare are generally understood as *universal entitlements* not predicated on individual behaviour or performance (Dwyer, 2000: 130). The indiscriminate provision of healthcare and education has historically been seen as less problematic than the indiscriminate

provision of social security (Lipsey, 1979). Rights such as being looked after by the State are much more ambiguous; with principles of fairness and desert featuring more significantly in the interpretation of these social goods (Taylor-Gooby, 1996; Dwyer, 2000: 143-161; Wendt et al., 2011).

Perceptions of those receiving social rights can also greatly affect support. For example, people tend to distinguish between deserving and undeserving citizens with greatest moral warrant granted in the following order: elderly people, sick and disabled, the unemployed and finally immigrants (Van Oorschot, 2006). Van Oorschot (2000) also illustrates how people are more likely to support state assistance if the recipient of support is: similar to them, not personally responsible for their own disadvantage, docile and grateful for help, in *sufficient* need, and earning assistance through reciprocation. Whilst, there is to some extent resilient support for social rights and welfare more generally, the general public are increasingly pre-occupied with the deservingness of citizens (Jeene et al., 2013). A universal entitlement within such a framework becomes invariably contested.

Depending on the content of a right, its fulfilment will be contingent on state actors, non-state actors, or both. How the public believes these should be fulfilled and what role 'responsibility' has is less clear (Johnson and Gearty, 2007; Whiteley, 2008). Who delivers such universal entitlements and whether the general public see this as feasible affects attitudes and levels of support for certain rights. For example, it could be argued that the right to have a job is more associated with questions of market capability rather than state responsibility. In the UK, the general public and political elite remain reluctant to recognise employers as corporate citizens (Hill, 2011) and tend to see the state as an employer of last resort (Hills and Lelkes, 1999). This means that for some, the right to a job is neither viewed as a universal entitlement nor a responsibility of the State.

Variation can also be explained by the policy landscape and informational role of the welfare state (Gingrich, 2014). Guaranteeing a (potentially costly) universal entitlement may provoke questions about individual and state financial capabilities. Covariance between the level of government spending and support for attendant policies suggests that increased welfare spending results in a 'thermostatic effect' on public attitudes:

'a responsive public behaves much like a thermostat. That is, the public adjusts its preferences for 'more' or 'less' policy in response to what policy makers do. When policy increases (decreases), the preference

for more policy decreases (increases)' (Soroka and Wlezien, 2005: 667).

Perceptions of public social spending and welfare activity are often distorted by interchangeable and coarse definitions of welfare (Bamfield and Horton, 2009; Baumberg et al., 2012; Osborne, 2012). This may greatly affect public beliefs about the effectiveness of welfare institutions and thus what the economic capabilities are for guaranteeing certain rights. It is likely that these factors compete, compound and complement one another to condition support for social citizenship rights. Beyond this speculative introduction, these factors are considered in much greater detail in chapters six, seven and eight.

Overall, there are very high levels of support for social rights across the board with less than one per cent of all respondents feeling that people are not entitled to any social rights. Such high levels of support point to the importance and value of these rights for citizens as a pillar of social citizenship. Rather than detract from the salience of particularism in welfare discourse, this suggests that public attitudes are perhaps tempered by a concern for welfare more fundamentally. This may help explain the resilience of attitudes that support social rights also, but it tells us little of how responsibilities feature in conceptions of social citizenship.

As with rights, overall support for responsibilities is high (see Table 3). The most supported is the responsibility to raise children properly (97 per cent). It goes without saying that these responsibilities are normatively laden, with ideas such as 'behaving responsibly' inevitably construed differently by respondents. Nevertheless, they offer an indication of the level of support for universal social responsibilities.

Table 3: Support for social responsibilities by lived experience of inequality

	To help and protect your family	To raise children properly	To work to provide for yourself	To behave responsibly	To help others
All	95%	97%	89%	95%	91%
'Deprived'	93%	94%	78%	89%	90%
'Affluent'	97%	98%	94%	98%	92%

The least (but still very strongly) supported responsibilities were the duty to help others (91 per cent) and to work to provide for oneself (89 per cent). A universal obligation to help others is perhaps unsurprisingly contested because it extends beyond individual obligation to issues of collective responsibility and mutuality for fellow citizens. The ambiguous meaning and content of this as a duty may lead to greater ambivalence amongst the general public.

The obligation to work to provide for oneself centres on ideals of economic self-sufficiency and financial autonomy. The fiscal and non-fiscal interdependencies of respondents may well compromise support for this universal obligation (Berlin, 1958: 4). Given the work-centric approach that dominates the institutional and discursive features of welfare (Prideaux, 2010; Patrick, 2012), it is striking to note that this is the least supported responsibility. Similarly to support for the rights of social citizenship, it is likely that individual, institutional and structural factors intervene on support for responsibilities.

In summary, it would appear that there are high levels of support for the rights and responsibilities of social citizenship at a level of abstraction. The finer details of entitlement and obligation are likely to intercede on attitude formation (Bartels, 2005). In conjunction, the institutional and material environment within which knowledge and value systems are cultivated is also known to affect attitudes towards social citizenship (e.g. Marx, 2014). With this in mind, the following section explores what bearing lived experiences of deprivation and relative affluence have on conceptions of social citizenship.

5.3 Quantifying the effect of inequality on conceptions of social citizenship

Overall, support for rights and responsibilities differs between *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* (see Tables 2 and 3). With one exception, those experiencing deprivation are less likely to support social rights. The only instance in which this is not the case is the right to have a job, where 75 per cent of people in the 'deprived' sample support this compared to only 70 per cent of people in the 'affluent' sample. Given that all respondents in the deprived sample are not engaged in paid employment, this is perhaps unsurprising, and may well suggest that people's support is to some extent self-referential. However, if support were by and large rational and rooted in class interest (Dean and Melrose, 1999: 98), we would also anticipate a higher level of support for social rights amongst those experiencing deprivation.

Lived experiences of deprivation also seem to affect the extent to which people subscribe to citizenship responsibilities. The most considerable difference is the responsibility to work to provide for oneself, with 78 per cent of *Residual Contingent Citizens* and 94 per cent of *Validated Active Citizens* supporting this respectively. Murray (1984) and Mead (1986) would argue that a lower level of support for responsibilities such as this points to the permissive nature of welfare. However, lower levels of support for responsibilities

amongst the deprived sample are coupled by lower levels of support for social rights (except the right to have a job). It is therefore reasonable to challenge the claim that, given the chance, individuals would shirk their responsibilities whilst exploiting the social entitlements of an overgenerous welfare system.

Before going any further, it is worth reiterating that, in the majority of cases, support for citizenship rights and responsibilities still remains relatively high amongst *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* with only minor differences observed in certain cases. Nevertheless, understanding the causes of attitudinal difference is crucial to explaining conflicting accounts of social citizenship and the rights and responsibilities it accrues. Perhaps a more cogent explanation of attitudinal divergence is the discord between the promises and outcomes of social citizenship:

as people's rights to benefits as citizens of the welfare state have been eroded or become increasingly conditional..., could it be that their sense of obligation to the welfare state has also been eroded? (Dean and Melrose, 1996: 4).

Given the material position of those experiencing deprivation, it is perhaps unsurprising that they are less likely to feel they actually have social rights (see Table 4). Comparing the two groups, the most significant differences are the right to have a job and the right to have access to free education for children. Importantly, social rights such as free education for children are not categorically stratified according to employment status, income or area deprivation. All children are legally entitled to free education in the UK and yet only 81 per cent of respondents actually felt they had this right. Whilst all may recognise that there is a legal right to free education, there may well be (and indeed are) marked discrepancies in the quality and geographical and financial accessibility of this education (Thrupp and Lupton, 2011). This perhaps explains why only 72 per cent of 'deprived' respondents felt they actually had the right to free education compared to 89 per cent of 'affluent' respondents. With this in mind, it seems citizens not only reflect on the actual securement of social citizenship rights in assessing its value, but also the nature and quality of these rights according to their own lived experiences of it.

Table 4: Social rights respondents feel they actually have

	To have access to free education for children	To be looked after by the State if you cannot look after yourself	To be treated fairly and equally	To have free health-care if you need it	To have a job
'Deprived'	72%	61%	63%	83%	39%

'Affluent'	89%	63%	74%	81%	59%
------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

The extent of support for rights and responsibilities seems to be moderately affected by whether citizens feel they actually have social rights. There is a medium positive correlation between whether a respondent feels they have a particular right and whether they think everyone living in the UK should have that right, $r = .324$, $n = 7,772$, $p < .001$. Before computing these Pearson correlation coefficients, it was necessary to create an index to capture the extent of support for rights, for responsibilities and the extent to which respondents felt they had social rights. This was measured by constructing an index that assigns a score from 0-5 to each respondent for the respective dimensions covered in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Looking at the correlation between people's support for responsibilities and the rights they feel they actually have, a moderate positive relationship is also observed, $r = .254$, $n = 7,721$, $p < .001$.

In many respects, the feeling that one lacks social rights and the lived experience of deprivation, are conceptually and empirically inseparable:

The main advantage that accrues from citizenship status is, in effect, a guarantee that no citizen will be allowed to fall into poverty and destitution; their status as a citizen (regardless of class position) gives them access to limited social support (Dwyer, 2010: 83).

In this instance, deprivation represents the failed promises of social citizenship: an absence or lack of effectual social rights. As outlined in chapter four, three selection criteria have been used as a proxy: an indicator of the extent to which individuals experience contingency or validation in their economic and socio-political life. In doing so, it is possible to explore how those failed by the prevailing notion of 'ideal citizenship' (Marshall, 1950) support social citizenship as an institution and means of social organisation. If the lived experience of deprivation is a proxy, the extent to which citizens feel they actually have social rights is arguably a direct measure of this phenomenon.

As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the majority of respondents support social entitlements and responsibilities. In addition, Table 4 demonstrates that a significant proportion of respondents feel they have social rights. However, there are some noteworthy statistically significant differences in the experiences and attitudes of *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens*. In order to understand the extent to which lived experiences of inequality affect conceptions of citizenship and how this occurs, it is necessary to identify the factors of significance affecting attitudes towards social citizenship. By undertaking a series of binary logistic regressions, it is

possible to predict the probability of a respondent's attitudes and how this is affected by lived experiences of deprivation, other socio-economic conditions, social identity characteristics and subjective impressions (see Appendix C.1 for details). Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to predict the probability of a respondent's attitude towards the following:

- the right to be looked after by the State;
- the right to have a job;
- the responsibility to work to provide for yourself;
- the responsibility to help others;
- feel they actually have the right to be looked after by the State; and
- feel they actually have the right to be treated fairly and equally.

These particular dimensions were selected because they represent some of the more contested features of social citizenship. With two exceptions, a test of the full model versus a model with the intercept only is statistically significant. A test of the model coefficients shows that the overall lived experience of deprivation cannot help improve prediction of a respondent's support for the responsibility to help others; $X^2 (1, N = 1,462) = 1.464, p = .226$; or whether a respondent feels they actually have the right to be looked after by the State; $X^2 (1, N = 1,458) = 1.987, p = .159$. The success of all the other regression models in predicting cases was nonetheless quite high.

Table 5 summarises the results of the regressions undertaken to explore the effect of lived experiences of deprivation on the attitudes and experiences of respondents (see Appendix C.1 for details). Overall, the lived experience of deprivation was the most effective predictor of support for rights, responsibilities and whether individuals feel they have specific socio-economic rights.

Table 5: Effect of deprivation on attitudes and experiences related to social citizenship

	B	Wald (X^2)	P	Odds Ratio: Exp(B)
The right to be looked after by the State	-.669	22.137	<.001	.512
The right to have a job	.433	10.987	.001	1.541
The responsibility to work to provide for yourself	-1.496	70.011	<.001	.224
The responsibility to help others	-.228	1.464	.226	.796

Feel they actually have the right to be looked after by the State	-.161	1.987	.159	.851
Feel they actually have the right to be treated fairly and equally	-.722	37.429	<.001	.486

As illustrated above, lived experiences of deprivation were found to affect attitudes and experiences in a number of statistically significant ways. Lived experiences of deprivation:

- almost halve the odds ($\text{Exp}(B) = .512$) of an individual supporting the right to be looked after by the State;
- increase the odds of supporting the right to have a job by ($\text{Exp}(B) = 1.541$);
- reduce the odds of supporting the responsibility to work to provide for oneself by ($\text{Exp}(B) = .224$); and
- more than halve the odds ($\text{Exp}(B) = .486$) of an individual feeling as if they have the right to be treated fairly and equally.

Running multiple linear regression models, it is possible to infer that the lived experience of deprivation reduces support for rights as well as responsibilities (see Table 6). For *Residual Contingent* Citizens, the regression models predict that respondents will score .729 less on their support for rights and score .971 less on their support for responsibilities. Accounting for interaction effects, again the extent to which an individual feels they have social rights also greatly affects support for rights and responsibilities. With each right that an individual feels they have the regression models predict that respondents will score .179 more on their support for social rights and .188 on their support for responsibilities.

Table 6: Effect of deprivation and actually having rights on support for rights and responsibilities

	Index of Rights				Index of Responsibilities			
	B	t	Sig.	R ²	B	t	Sig.	R ²
Constant	3.800	44.002	$P < .001$		4.485	59.346	$P < .001$	
Overall deprivation	-.729	-5.607	$P < .001$.015	-.971	-8.539	$P < .001$.054
Feel have Rights	.177	7.964	$P < .001$.134	.084	4.327	$P < .001$.118
Feel have rights*	.179	5.004	$P < .001$.149	.188	6.001	$P < .001$.140

*accounting for interaction effects

For a multiple regression model with all three covariates summarised in Table 6, it is possible to predict 15 per cent of the variance in support for rights, and 14 per cent of the variance in support for responsibilities. The most significant and successful predictor of support for the rights and responsibilities of social citizenship is whether a respondent feels they have social rights. This confirms the hypothesis that if a social good is not experienced as a social right it is less likely to be interpreted as such. In addition, individuals are less likely to support some of the social responsibilities that citizenship demands if they lack a 'sufficiently generous share of the social product' (White, 2003: 17)

From the above analysis, it is clear that there is broad support for social citizenship rights and responsibilities amongst both 'poor' and 'better-off' citizens. Nevertheless, there are notable attitudinal differences between the two groups. Those in a position of material deprivation tend to express lower levels of support for rights and responsibilities and are less likely to feel they actually have social rights. Better off citizens tend to have higher levels of support for rights and responsibilities and are more likely to feel they have social rights. From the findings, it is reasonable to conclude that lived experiences of inequality do affect conceptions of social citizenship.

Those experiencing deprivation and contingency in their day-to-day life are, to some extent, alienated from the common experiences that underpin and reinforce sentiments of collective belonging and mutuality. In response, those experiencing deprivation appear to have developed distinctive frames of reference in subscribing to certain citizenship ideals and practices. Jordan (1996: 111) argues that these differences 'should be understood within a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion'. In this spirit, the remainder of the chapter draws on qualitative interviews undertaken with *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* to examine how people reconcile the promises of social citizenship with their own lived experiences of it. By exploring how people navigate and give meaning to a social, political and economic system that structures their marginality, it is possible to see how the substantive and figurative significance of social citizenship is undermined for those experiencing deprivation.

5.4 Poverty and Plenty

Recent qualitative research suggests that people stuck in the 'low-pay, no-pay cycle' tend to distance themselves from both the material and increasingly moral category of poverty (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). Despite facing everyday hardship, some studies have found that those living in poverty resist

the claim that they are excluded from mainstream society because of their financial situation (Flaherty, 2008). Shildrick and MacDonald (2013) suggest that this ostensible contradiction can be explained by the increasing propensity to individualise the causes of poverty in public and welfare discourse (Tagler and Cozzarelli, 2013). Identifying as 'poor' within such a climate is tantamount to conceding 'moral and personal failure' (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013: 293).

Whilst qualitative fieldwork undertaken for this thesis did not directly ask whether participants identified as 'poor', participants were asked about the extent to which they thought they had enough money to have a good quality of life. Perhaps unsurprisingly, all those below the poverty line did not feel that they had enough money to have a good quality of life. All respondents recognised that they were on a low income relative to other people living in the UK. It was left open for respondents to decide what they deemed to be a good quality of life, but it was clear that their conceptions of this were rather modest (Backett-Milburn et al., 2003). The majority of respondents felt they lacked the necessary resources to secure a sufficient standard of living to meet the immediate needs of themselves and their family:

Enough money? To have enough money to just live a basic life and still be happy... No, not right now. It depends what you want though and what your dreams are... I don't want to go higher, I want a manageable life. To survive at this stage I'm at in life. (Jackie, Female, RCC²)

I don't think I've got enough money. By the time I've put my gas and electric on, got me shopping and then there's me television licence, me water - I'm left with like £20 for the fortnight once I've got all me shopping and that. So it's just not enough. (Ben, Male, RCC)

Respondents attributed this hardship to a range of barriers, changes and life circumstances. Disability-related costs and expenditure, the rising cost of living and fuel and the inability to secure well-paid, meaningful or secure employment were all cited as factors limiting their ability to safeguard their basic well-being (Athwal et al., 2011). Some respondents also attributed

² As detailed in chapter four, all qualitative participants were recruited on the basis that they satisfied the selection criteria for either *Residual Contingent Citizens* (RCC) or *Validated Active Citizens* (VAC). "RCC" and "VAC" is used here to indicate which sample group participants belonged to. This method of notation is used throughout the thesis when citing participants.

responsibility to public services and institutions. Some felt their income was or recently had been actively restricted by administrative and bureaucratic structures but also by the discretionary actions taken by public servants:

It's hard. You know, I've heard a lot of people complaining, what with the poor tax coming in. All these bedrooms, you know. (Jade, Female, RCC)

You've gone down to sign on, and sometimes, depending on who you get, they can be hard on you. You might end up in an argument with them, and then they can just suspend your money like that, for how many bloody months. So I depend on my family and friends, for food and stuff like that. (Liam, Male, RCC)

Interviews were conducted at a time of particular stress and uncertainty for many respondents. Many had recently been affected by reforms to public service provisions and social transfers. Others were concerned about current and forthcoming changes to social security entitlements, council tax exemptions, housing benefit and payment methods. Chapter seven explores how respondents engaged with public service and welfare institutions under these circumstances.

All these respondents were in receipt of social security, which was their main source of income. A significant body of research confirms the 'degrading, devaluing, dehumanising and belittling' experience of those receiving low-income social security public assistance (McIntyre et al., 2003: 304-5; Wacquant, 2009). This feeling and experience was clearly articulated by low-income participants. Overwhelmingly people's response was one of resilience and resourcefulness with many describing attempts to accommodate and cope with increased financial hardship and material deprivation (Middleton et al., 1994; Dean and Shah, 2002; Batty and Cole, 2010). Respondents drew upon a range of coping strategies (Anderson et al., 2010; Flint, 2010) that included borrowing money, food and clothes from friends, family and neighbours, getting into debt, reducing fuel and food consumption, walking considerable distances to save on public transport costs and selling possessions:

It comes sometimes, where I might have to borrow something off a friend, off my mum, you know, till when I get paid. And then, when I do get paid, I'm handing it back out to my mum. Then I'm left with nothing again... (Beth, Female, RCC)

I shop everywhere, I shop at Morrisons, Sainsbury's, Asda, so if they've got an offer on I will buy a load of it. So it saves me money. But erm, I'm very careful with money... I don't have lights on at night (Tom, Male, RCC)

These coping strategies helped overcome exigent barriers to meeting human need. However, this came at a significant physical and psychological cost to both family members and those trying to keep their 'heads above the water' (Orr et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2010; Ridge, 2011). Coping strategies were felt to be damaging to the sense of self-worth of some respondents. Other respondents described feelings of alienation, degradation and depression (Hooper, 2007):

You see people that are smarter dressed and all that and they budge past you and that. It's just the way they look at you and like "ah look at him you can tell"... because it's hard to afford nice clothes and that. You've just got the clothes that you've got. (Ben, Male, RCC)

I needed a shed for my mobility scooter... and, I had to fundraise to get that money and I felt like quite soul destroyed, I just like... I want a shed... I felt like I was begging. Yes, if you're not earning your own money, you have to do that. (Lucy, Female, RCC)

Respondents gave the impression and very often gave expression to the idea that they were 'surviving' rather than 'living': 'you have to make sacrifices in order to be able to survive'. Respondents were engaged in a great deal of hard 'work' in an attempt to secure or at least come close to meeting their basic needs (Patrick, 2014). Research suggests that the concerns arising require a great deal of 'cognitive bandwidth' leaving less mental resources available for other tasks (Mani et al., 2013). Consumption patterns and activities largely deemed to be normal or customary by the general public (Mack et al., 2013) were felt to be a 'luxury' or 'indulgent' by many respondents. In this sense, respondents were primarily concerned with their 'hedonic' rather than their 'eudaimonic' needs and future aspirations (Dean, 2010).

Without legal recourse from destitution, many were left without the necessary tools and resources to exercise their citizenship responsibilities and claim their citizenship rights. For these individuals, even a 'modicum of welfare and security' (Marshall, 1950) guaranteed to people by virtue of their citizenship status, appears to more of an 'ideal citizenship' (Marshall, 1950) rather than a

reality. Lister (2003) suggests poverty undermines the treatment of citizens as of 'equal worth' (Lister, 2003: 121). A sizeable portion of research notes the sense of exclusion, isolation and alienation felt by those on a low income (cf. Jo, 2013; Walker, 2014). In this light, the presence of poverty within any polity corrupts the symbolic and material significance of social citizenship.

These lived experiences contrast strongly with those of better-off citizens. All those in a better pecuniary position felt that they had enough money to have a good quality of life. Some respondents noted that they gave relatively little thought to money and focused their attention on other matters:

Well we're very comfortable because we... I think I mentioned to you in my email... my husband sold his business in 2005 so we invested a lot of that money into property and we live from property rentals.
(Emma, Female, VAC)

I don't really think about money at the moment. I think about my brother and mother. (Richard, Male, VAC)

The one exception to this was a respondent who had *chosen* to take a drop in income. Whilst he did not feel he now had enough money to have a good quality of life, this was an active decision to make a career change. His income nonetheless exceeded the national average quite considerably.

More than half of affluent respondents felt that their income was somewhere around the middle of the income distribution with the rest feeling like it was high relative to others. Many affluent respondents emphasised their financial autonomy and were keen to stress that their income and capital were a product of their own effort and decision-making. One respondent spontaneously affirmed that she did not receive any assistance from the government:

We're not rich or anything... We're in the middle. We have a good life. We don't live off the government, either... (Sophie, Female, VAC)

Despite having an income that was well above the national average, a third of affluent respondents felt that they would like a higher income than they currently have access to:

I'm sure, like anybody, I'd like to have a bit more. But I'm reasonably happy with money. I've got my mortgage paid off and I've got no loans

so there's no debts or anything. There's no pressure on me workwise but it would be nice to have more. (William, Male, VAC)

The desire for a greater income can perhaps best be explained by the 'status anxiety' experienced by most people irrespective of their social or economic position (de Botton, 2004). People tend to compare their situation, consumption patterns and lifestyle against that of their peers. This may come some way to explain why those on a very high income tend to; underestimate their income and wealth relative to the national average; significantly overestimate what they believe to be average occupational wages; and place the national poverty threshold very close to the average national income (Toynbee and Walker, 2009: 22-26). As the top one per cent pull away from the rest of the income distribution, the poor and the 'moderately wealthy' are likely to feel more alienated from the conspicuous consumption of the wealthy elite.

Going into further detail, a number of affluent respondents revealed anxieties about their financial position. In spite of significant capital accumulated and a relatively secure financial position one respondent intimated that her family were 'struggling':

At the moment I would say we get by, but I only get by because I've got a husband who works flat out as well. And because I've actually managed to accrue that capital in my house and everything and I've paid my mortgage off. (Rachel, Female, VAC)

Only two respondents explicitly identified as 'rich'. These two respondents were particularly keen to emphasise their wealth relative to others. They expressed gratitude for their own life circumstances and opportunities and were concerned that other generations and social classes were not being afforded the same.

5.5 Work and Worklessness

Much of the existing literature suggests those that are unemployed and living below the poverty line exhibit a clear desire to be engaged in paid employment (Kempson, 1996; Shildrick et al., 2010; MacDonald et al., 2014a). All those unemployed respondents interviewed for this thesis expressed a similar desire to be in paid work. However, to suggest that this is indicative of their 'work ethic', neglects the significant amount of voluntary, care and/or domestic

labour already undertaken by these individuals (as detailed in chapter seven). To suggest that their desire to engage in paid work is indicative of their 'work ethic' is to subscribe to a rather narrow conception of what constitutes 'work'. Respondents gave a number of reasons for wanting to engage in paid work, relating to improved mental health, greater freedom, independence, choice and financial security, a greater sense of purpose, and avoiding substance abuse:

It's not just for the money, although the money would be nice. But just to get out of the house instead of... having a purpose... because when I'm in the house that's when I tend to fall back into drinking and into drugs. If I'm out a lot more it's better. (Ben, Male, RCC)

I think basically, you just feel better about earning your own pennies, then you don't have to justify how you spend your money. When you're getting something from the State, you have to justify everything... And I find that incredibly intrusive, I find that hard and frustrating, because really and truly I would like to pay for my own care. (Lucy, Female, RCC)

Yeah. I think it's more mentally for me as well because being in the house and stuff all the time... I'm just constantly on a downer all the time. (Brooke, Female, RCC)

Unemployed respondents with caring responsibilities (almost two thirds) were keen to engage in paid work that could accommodate the needs of their children, family and friends (Preston, 2006; Finn and Gloster, 2010). Part-time work was often viewed as the most desirable option for these individuals. Many were also keen to engage in paid work that was meaningful to them or was aligned to their own interests and ambitions. Many said they were willing to do a job that was not necessarily what they wanted to do permanently but that they wanted this to eventually lead to meaningful work that they would enjoy (Crisp et al., 2009). In this sense, respondents' desire to engage in paid work was not 'blind'. Rather than an indiscriminate desire to undertake any form of work, respondents were keen to find gainful employment that enhanced their own sense of self and worth. This related to types of activities that respondents were willing to engage in but also the financial remuneration that was deemed to be acceptable. Whilst respondents were aware of the integrative potential of employment (Murphy and Athanasou, 1999; Lindsay,

2010), they were also concerned about many of the challenges and compromises that came with it:

Yeah, I'd love to work. As long as it's around the hours of my kids.
(Beth, Female, RCC)

I've said to myself, if I have to go back into doing that - not that I really want to, but I would, I suppose, go back into looking after the elderly. I've said to my advisor, maybe, from there, I could work my way up, and get into working with children. (Jade, Female, RCC)

Some felt that public services did not give them the appropriate support they needed to transition into paid employment. A number of respondents found that their financial situation (as well as life circumstances) made it difficult to fulfil behavioural requirements prescribed by welfare institutions such as Jobcentre Plus. Some found it difficult to search for work in an efficient or meaningful way because this incurred financial and time costs. Three respondents felt that they were just going through the motions and were not making genuine progress in moving closer towards paid employment. Many respondents felt as if they were under a significant amount of pressure to conform to the expectations of public institutions and servants they came into contact with. A few respondents had been subject to benefit sanctions.

Others felt as though they were being repeatedly sanctioned in spite of efforts to fulfil work-related obligations. These respondents felt that they were regularly questioned, watched and inspected by welfare institutions with some feeling that their treatment and material condition actually constituted a form of punishment. All this points to the increasingly governmental approach to social policy and particularly social security provision (Marston and McDonald, 2006; Schram et al., 2010). Respondents pointed to many structural and discretionary acts of control that were dictating their behaviours, consumption patterns and lifestyle choices. When discussing the concept of work, the lexicon of many respondents shifted to expose the internalised logic of welfare reforms and workfare (Dwyer and Ellison, 2009). Many respondents used terms such as 'actively seeking employment' and 'active job search' redolent of the governmentality unemployment benefit claimants were subject to:

Well, they want to know if you've been looking for jobs out there, and stuff like that, and they want proof. Well, I'll tell them straight-up that I've been looking on my sister's laptop. I go on there - because I haven't got one, I got to go my sister's. (Selina, Female, RCC)

You could apply for ten jobs... and they're like "Is that all you've done?"... like they talk down to you kind of thing. Like you've never done enough you always go away thinking oh I could have done more and when you're getting your benefit it's like it's coming out of their personal pocket... (Ashley, Female, RCC)

The length of time respondents had been unemployed varied significantly: from 2 weeks to 19 years. Long-term unemployed respondents were more likely to express anxiety and concern about their job prospects and opportunities to find gainful employment. These respondents had applied for a considerable array and number of jobs but felt that competition was now too high and they were 'on the bottom of the pile'. One respondent noted difficulties that her 'well-qualified' daughter was having in finding a job: 'if she's got no chance then what sort of chance have I got'. After making many unsuccessful job applications some respondents lacked confidence and did not feel that they would ever find a job again:

You know I been out of it so long and then I get back into it. When you kind of get into a set routine and expecting nothing every day. You don't want to better yourself. (Amber, Female, RCC)

Jobs are very limited, competition is so stiff. (Liam, Male, RCC)

Some respondents struggled to see the financial benefits of engaging in the paid labour market (MacDonald et al., 2005). For those falling in and out of low-paid employment, concerns were expressed about the lack of security that came with transitioning into paid work (Jordan et al., 1992: 122-133; Shildrick et al., 2012). Two respondents also noted how difficult it was to transition out of poverty and alluded to questions concerning the perverse incentives of taking up paid work, high marginal deduction rates and the poverty trap experienced by many (Ray et al., 2010):

They've got to realize it costs so much traveling. It eats up half of your wages, so the bit of ease of going back to work and having a little bit of income support paid for my bus fares to go back to work without directly taking out my wages. Because right now we're working for gas, electric, and bus fares... We're not working for ourselves. I'm just going round in circles - how are we going to enjoy this life? (Jackie, Female, RCC)

Where unemployed respondents had previously been in paid work, they did not necessarily experience the fiscal and non-fiscal integrative potential of employment. The experience of low-paid low-skilled work undermines the theoretical notion and practical desire to 'Make Work Pay' (McQuaid et al., 2010). By virtue of their household income and nature of employment, *Validated Active Citizens* could see the multiple values of work. The vast majority of these respondents were engaged in work that they found worthwhile, stimulating and enjoyable. In addition, they were able to pursue their own desired ends as a result of this employment. As previously mentioned, the financial and non-financial benefits of employment featured in the collective imagination of unemployed respondents seeking work. However, their actual experiences suggested that these benefits were far from tenable given their qualifications and life circumstances (Saunders et al., 2006).

Within the current citizenship framework, unemployment and 'poor work' (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2007) have a number of detrimental effects on citizen status and identity. As discussed, unemployed benefit claimants face multiple barriers that prevent them from obtaining gainful employment (Fletcher et al., 2008). Many struggle to engage with and subscribe to the dominant ideals surrounding citizenship duties and work (Lister, 2002a: 107). As a result, unemployed citizens are less likely to feel they have the right to a job and are less likely to support the responsibility to work to provide for themselves (see Tables 3 and 4). This may come some way to explain the result of one study that found unemployed, socially excluded people 'did not feel they had a responsibility to work, nor did they see any value in work other than as a source of income' (Page, 2000: 26). With a limited ability to identify with and perform the role of 'citizen worker' many are denied full citizen status through institutional and discursive means.

All unemployed respondents interviewed felt judged for not being employed or being on unemployment benefit:

Yeah, I feel degraded because I feel worthless. If you say to people 'I'm unemployed', they look down their nose at you. It's hard. What do you say, what do you do? I mean I've tried. I've applied for so many jobs and I think age has got a lot to do with it. (Tom, Male, RCC)

People looking down their nose at me and just thinking I'm sponging off the government or... stuff like that. So yeah... But like I say it's not through a choice of my own I do want to go back to work but at the

minute obviously we're still in recession supposedly and everybody is losing their jobs and it's just hard trying to find work. (Brook, Female, RCC)

Without capacity or willingness to fulfil prescribed forms of behaviour, unemployed individuals are alienated from the validating dogma of 'active citizenship'. For these individuals, work is very often experienced as a responsibility which they are less able to fulfil and an unrealised right to which they aspire. For *Validated Active Citizens*, work is experienced and venerated as a reward of effective citizen engagement and performance. The categorical and material cleavages that arise as a result undermine common citizen status and identity.

5.6 Area Deprivation and Affluence

As detailed in chapter four, respondents interviewed for this study were recruited from some of the richest and poorest areas of Britain. There are considerable differences in the characteristics of these areas related to housing quality, population density, ethnic diversity, employment opportunities and so on (Hooper, 2007; DCLG, 2011). The 2005 Citizenship Survey (see Table 7) suggests that those living in deprived areas are much less likely to feel that they belong to their immediate neighbourhood. They are less likely to feel that their neighbours can be trusted, are willing to help them and would pull together to help solve community or local problems. These differences were discernible in the experiences of participants in the qualitative phase of this study.

Table 7: Experiences and impressions of local area and neighbourhood

	'Deprived'	'Affluent'	All
Strongly feel that they belong to their immediate neighbourhood	69%	73%	72%
Agree that people in their neighbourhood pull together to improve the neighbourhood	53%	79%	70%
Agree that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted	17%	66%	50%
Agree it is likely that people in their neighbourhood would participate if they were asked by a local organisation to help solve a community problem	64%	87%	80%

Agree that people in their neighbourhood are willing to help their neighbours	72%	95%	87%
Feel that they can influence decisions affecting their local area	31%	45%	40%

About half of the respondents living in deprived areas felt that they were part of a community where they lived. These respondents felt that they got on with their neighbours and that they could get help and support from local friends if needed. A number of respondents also felt that their familial roots and history anchored them to their local area. The other half of respondents living in deprived areas did not feel as though they were part of a community for a number of reasons. Some cited feelings of isolation from people they knew and people they could relate with. A significant number of those living in deprived areas (even those who felt part of their community) felt unsafe in their local area. Violent crime, drug abuse, vandalism and robbery were felt to be a persistent problem that prevented many from feeling positive attachment to their local area and neighbours:

The area where I live, I don't think it is a good area... I don't belong to that place... we are different from the others, neighbours and the other people who live around. (Julia, Female, RCC)

I don't feel safe around here at all. I don't feel as if I'm part of the community at all and just the area is going downhill which you probably heard from the news anyway because of the stabbing which I think it were last week or the week before just up the road... (Brooke, Female, RCC)

Over two thirds of respondents living in deprived areas did not feel as if they could make a change in their local area. For some, meeting their own immediate needs was a greater priority that took up the majority of their time and effort:

You know, getting through every day is enough for me at the moment do you know what I mean. At the moment in my life I don't feel like I have much left to give. (Ashley, Female, RCC)

Oh! Me? Not now at the moment because we are really focusing on living. So not now. Maybe three years ago if my son was better. Julia, Female, RCC)

Some who were keen to engage with and make changes to their local area either lacked knowledge of who to contact or how to go about this. Others that had tried to engage with local authorities, housing associations and services were faced with significant challenges and did not feel as if they had the power to get local issues resolved:

No. Because it doesn't matter what you do. You try and make a change and it's like. It's like you walk round and you're constantly avoiding dog muck on the floor and stuff. I've been in touch with the Council and stuff over it and they haven't done anything. I've been in touch with other people and like school and everything. Erm, problems with school and it's just...trying to get something done about it. Nobody listens to you.
(Brooke, Female, RCC)

This contrasts quite markedly with the experiences of respondents living in affluent areas. More than two thirds of respondents living in affluent areas felt that they could make a change in their local area. Those that were less inclined to agree still felt that they could make some changes but that this would not be easy. Many were actively involved in community groups and organisations that, in some measure, enhanced the built environment, facilities and activities available in their local area. Interaction with the local authority and service groups paid dividends on a number of occasions and many were able to readily cite examples of where they had been concerned about something and were able to affect change. There was a feeling from many of these respondents that public services were responsive to their needs and concerns:

Down there at the playground - there was a problem there for a while. Particularly now that it is the summer and the clocks change, so children will start having GCSE exam leave, and all that kind of thing. Sometimes there are teenagers that hang around there, and they'll be drinking, and just doing normal teenage stuff. But then, there has been a problem with smashed glass, down there, and I did contact the Council saying, "Look, this is a playground. There's bottles smashed here from teenagers." I've seen them cleaning it up, and stuff being repaired and replaced, and stuff. I also know that somebody must have contacted the police, because the police do a second round there, on the summer evenings. (Rachel, Female, VAC)

Some felt that public services and community groups were less responsive to their needs. Having made little progress with the council on particular issues, a number of respondents had decided to join or establish community ventures that they felt would remedy the problem. This ranged from 'guerrilla planting' (gardening on land that an individual or group has no legal right to use in that capacity) and litter picks to fundraising activities and local petitioning.

As illustrated in Table 7, individuals living in affluent areas are much more likely to feel they can influence and affect change in their local area. In addition to this, these individuals are more likely to trust their neighbours and feel that people in their local area are willing to pull together and help one another to solve community problems. Some respondents were aware of the unique characteristics and experiences related to their local area. One affluent respondent noted that her immediate neighbourhood was 'a bit of a bubble' in the sense that it was much wealthier and 'nicer' than other neighbourhoods surrounding it. One respondent living in a deprived area noted that she felt a sense of alienation when visiting wealthier areas that differed so starkly from her own:

Yeah...I guess...I feel part of my community. But in the bigger scheme of things I don't feel comfortable in other areas. Do you know what I mean, there's a lot of people like me where I live so I kind of feel like I fit in there. But when I go up to my dad's area where it's all posh I don't feel like I fit in at all... (Ashley, Female, RCC)

Runciman (1966) claims that people tend to compare their situation with a reference group similar to themselves rather than the whole of society. This tendency means some are less aware of the extent of income inequality and poverty and where they lie on the income distribution. When individuals become aware of this, a 'revolution of rising expectations' (Runciman, 1966) may occur where there is increased support for redistribution. In this instance, we can see that the lived experience of area deprivation has not led to such a 'revolution' but *Residual Contingent Citizens* are very much aware of their structural disadvantage. This is reflected in their surrounding and built environment and they negotiate the challenges that this brings in ways that prove either constructive or manageable to their day-to-day lives. Recent studies have shown that there are significant neighbourhood effects that 'may influence people's views about inequality and redistribution, namely attitude transmission and knowledge accumulation' (Bailey et al., 2013; Kearns, 2014: 459). Macdonald et al., (2005: 885) demonstrate 'the continuing sociological

relevance of class and place in understanding lived experience'. They suggest that young people growing up in poor neighbourhoods derive some sense of attachment and inclusion via their families, class background, local economy and lived environment. 'Networks of inclusion' though are created against, rather than within, a common citizenship praxis. Chapter seven explores the extent to which this was the case for participants interviewed in this study.

5.7 The material and symbolic significance of inequality

Having encouraged respondents to reflect upon their lived experiences, respondents were then asked whether they felt they had social rights as someone living in the UK. Only two respondents experiencing material deprivation felt that they did. However, both of these respondents qualified their answers stating that these rights were either ineffectual at times or undermined by conditionality, political rhetoric and stigma associated with dependence on public services and transfers. Along with many others living below the poverty line, one of these respondents felt that service provision and support did not work in their interests or address their concerns:

The way they speak to you makes you feel you are not entitled to it. So just kind of going back to the benefit and the welfare system; I think it's unfortunate we've got a system that undermines these people... I do feel I have social rights, but you have to fight for them. (Selina, Female, RCC)

Obviously I've got rights, but...I don't think many people take much notice of anything I have to say really so... erm... I suppose it would depend on what issue I was making. I feel like yeah I got rights and people listen and people are there to help if I choose to use their services but erm...when I've come for help in the past it has never really got me anywhere so I just tend to not bother... (Liam, Male, RCC)

The vast majority of respondents living in material deprivation did not feel that they had social rights at all. These respondents also expressed similar concerns about the efficacy of social rights and the procedural effects of welfare reform. For these respondents, this was felt to be one of the key reasons that undermined their claim to a meaningful universal entitlement. Others felt that some claims for assistance were met with punitive treatment or indiscriminate decision-making on benefit receipt. Many drew connections between a lack of social rights and a lack of basic material resources to meet

their basic requirements. Some also recognised that this damaged their capacity to meet 'thicker' eudaimonic needs (Dean, 2010) intrinsic to human flourishing and self-determination:

No, I don't. For my present situation as a carer, no, I've got no welfare rights. It's all been taken away. How has it affected me? It's just slowed down progress, kept me from growing, expanding... It just stops me from being who I want to be. I love to help me kids and I love to travel, but I'm not able to do that because I'm stuck in this stupid welfare. Some people are lucky and some people are not. Some people can go to get loads of money from the welfare system where I go and I get penalized for working for three months. It doesn't make sense. (Jackie, Female, RCC)

Like I say, we don't have no rights, full stop. (Brooke, Female, RCC)

The vast majority of better-off respondents felt that they had social rights. Affluent respondents interpreted the substance and purpose of these rights in very different ways to respondents experiencing deprivation. Two respondents were ambivalent and one respondent did not feel as though they had social rights. Those that were ambivalent felt that social rights in the UK were being eroded. One person felt like they had social rights but that other citizens did not due to welfare reforms. A number of others responded as if social rights were reserved for a particular portion of society. These people felt that their relatively affluent position precluded them from an entitlement to social rights. They saw social rights as reserved for a small portion of the population but that they were entitled to these *if* they had a need to draw upon or claim them. However, as illustrated in chapter three, those in the middle and at the top end of the income distribution receive a non-trivial amount of social security payments (see Figure 4). A number of other respondents engaged in highly remunerated work, felt that their entitlement to social rights was derived through their employment status and earnings record. This points to the social divisions of welfare that continues to characterise social politics (Titmuss, 1958). For these individuals, social rights were conceived of as something to be earned, traded and bargained for. These 'exchange-orientated relationship strategies' are typical of upper-class individuals (Kraus et al., 2012: 562):

Yes I feel that I've got social rights probably...well... on the basis that I'm contributing financially to society then I should have whatever social

rights, whatever that means, so to live within the law in this country and enjoy the things you know that society offers as and when we wish to dip into it. Having contributed you know both of us throughout our lives as being higher rate taxpayers then yes all those things [education, NHS, social security] we do feel totally entitled to use them. (Emma, Female, VAC)

I don't suppose I have rights under the current circumstances I am in but do I... I suppose I do take them for granted so yes I do think there are rights that I have. Erm, but that's because I put something in. With rights you've got obligations to put something back again. If you can afford it you should pay the tax to try and help those who can't afford it. (Owen, Male, VAC)

For this last respondent, social rights were to be conferred to those on a low income and 'earned' for those on a reasonable income. Not only were the rights of social citizenship deemed to be different, but also the responsibilities in a way that recognised the material differences and thus capacities of the two groups to contribute in the same way.

As is apparent, whether people feel they have social rights does not always match up with their legal entitlement. Nevertheless, people's experience of public services and provisions appears to substantially affect whether they feel they have social rights. In terms of their capacity to affect change in their local area, the previous section pointed to noteworthy differences in the experiences of poor and affluent citizens. These differences carried through to other domains of interaction between citizens, public institutions and service providers. Affluent respondents generally had more positive and constructive experiences: these individuals felt more confident approaching service providers because problems were resolved or concerns were addressed or at least responded to. In contrast, respondents experiencing deprivation generally had more negative experiences with service providers who were often perceived to be ineffective and/or unresponsive.

After seeking help from local authorities and service providers, some respondents felt 'ignored', 'judged' and 'patronised'. One respondent complained about, what she felt was, particularly poor treatment from the police. There had been an attempted burglary at the respondent's house whilst her family and children were there. In spite of a violent altercation with the burglars, she said police spent less than five minutes in the house and then left without recording the incident. This contrasts strongly with the

experience of one affluent respondent. A burglar was seen outside her house, the police were called and a helicopter search was subsequently undertaken to search for the prospective burglar in the fields behind the respondent's house. Faced with similar circumstances, these two respondents reported radically different responses from emergency services. Those experiencing deprivation reported numerous difficulties in securing what many would conceive as basic services and facilities to ensure a safe living environment for their family (Mack et al., 2013). Such deficiencies included: no locks on children's bedroom windows, no sink in a bathroom for 10 years, and a lack of appropriate advice from health visitors.

For those respondents experiencing deprivation, their lives were often characterised by precarity, upheaval and vulnerability (Hooper, 2007). It would appear that such an experience makes it difficult for these individuals to reconcile their own material condition with the apparent benefits and substance of social citizenship (Cole, 2011). The broken promises of citizenship are materially and symbolically alienating and many struggle to identify with social citizenship as a meaningful status given their own experience of it. When asked, only a third of these respondents felt as if they were social citizens. These respondents recognised the exclusionary potential and reality of citizenship but nonetheless felt that they were able to challenge this in their interactions with public institutions. The other two thirds of respondents did not feel as if they were social citizens. Some felt unable or unwilling to conform to prescribed forms of responsible citizenship centring on paid employment. Strikingly, a number of respondents said they would feel more like a social citizen if they were employed. They felt that this would enable them to participate in domains of life that they were currently excluded from. Others felt that they lacked core life opportunities and social rights accessible to others. Some felt that they lacked political power and input into public institutions and policies. The demands of being poor and on welfare were also cited as factors jeopardising citizen status. For those living in a condition of deprivation, their life circumstances, interaction with public services and employment status appear to undermine feelings of common belonging and purpose:

I know that if I had a job I'd feel more like a social citizen than I do now at the moment being unemployed. I would feel as though I fitted into society more. Yeah if that happened... I would feel more like a social citizen. [Researcher: Why?] I dunno, just probably the way I've been brought up and that. I've always like... had it bad... well not bad, but I

haven't had a lot of stuff other people have had. Maybe if I did I could be classed more as a social citizen but if I was in full-time employment and actively paying my taxes and this, that and the other, I think I would be classed more as a social citizen. (Ben, Male, RCC)

You feel not listened to... like you don't care... you just go through a day to day, hand to mouth kind of life. (Ashley, Female, RCC)

If I was working, I would probably think more about voting and what have you... about my rights and fitting into society more because you do feel more of a different person when you're working. Like I worked in a call centre a while ago and actually getting in a suit and getting up and when you're walking around the town you do feel as though you fit in more. (Liam, Male, RCC)

I mean, obviously I have the right to vote, so I have some choices. But I think, like I have said before, I think that my choices are limited, and I think that's partly down to the government and partly down to my health, that I don't engage as much. You're a burden on the state and society and I actually, I feel like I do contribute through my voluntary work, through educating people about the importance of health. So, I do feel like I have a role in society, but no, I think it's not like a bankable or a... it doesn't have a value on it, so...I feel that people, have assumed, and it is coming from the government, that somebody with a disability is a lower class. (Lucy, Female, RCC)

The condition of deprivation is meaningful and potent in isolation. However, the relativity of deprivation is perhaps most meaningful for understanding the sense-making of citizenship orientation. People seem to evaluate the worth of their resources, orientate their experiences and authenticate their position in relation to and against others. The material resources at one's disposal are socially constituted (Dittmar and Pepper, 1994). Deprivation and affluence then are not only a material deficit or accretion; they are an expression of one's citizenship status and position (Beresford et al., 1999; Palmer et al., 2008). In this sense, the material and symbolic repercussions of deprivation that are negotiated in day-to-day life, compromise a common citizen identity. Other studies have found similar psychosocial effects with individuals feeling like 'second class citizens' or 'excluded from citizenship' (Dean and Melrose, 1996; Dwyer, 1998; Lister et al., 2003; Humpage, 2008a; Scanlon and Adlam, 2013; Roseneil, 2014).

Whilst heavily critiqued, the idea that engagement in the paid labour market is in some way constitutive of social citizenship status and identity is uncontroversial. Hegemonic conceptions of social citizenship have almost always been predicated on citizen participation in the form of paid labour (Lewis and Fink, 2004). However, it is striking to see this idea expressed so patently by those marginalised by citizenship ideals and institutions. Just as the processes entangled in cultural citizenship are subject-making, it appears the nexus between work and citizenship is part of the 'dual process of self-making and being-made' (Ong, 1999: 738). Within the current praxis of citizenship, belonging and common identity rest substantially on one's capacity and willingness to undertake paid work. That people feel alienated from society because of this, demonstrates the extent of exclusion currently at play in citizenship practices:

Citizenship, like freedom, tends to be regarded as an absolute condition, but the history of poor citizens in Britain demonstrates the fundamental relativity of the term. Despite and in some respect because of the welfare state, many degrees of citizenship have survived or developed. Wealthier householders are more effective citizens than those with less certain sources of income, and indeed are frequently able to make better use of the common services of the welfare system (Vincent, 1991: 181).

From this chapter, it is clear that the topographies of social citizenship resulting in a stratification of resources and status feed into the lived experiences of different social groups. This 'contingent' and 'validated' citizenship gives rise to differing 'ways of construing the self, perceiving the world, and relating to others' (Kraus et al., 2012: 561). Deprivation affects conceptions of social citizenship in ways that reflect its exclusionary capacity.

If citizenship is to mean anything in an everyday sense it should mean the ability of individuals to occupy public spaces in a manner that does not compromise their self-identity, let alone obstruct, threaten or even harm them more materially (Painter and Philo, 1995: 115).

Due to their lived experiences, *Residual Contingent Citizens* are less likely to feel that they have social rights and that they can perform prescribed citizenship responsibilities. As a result, they are less likely to feel like social citizens or identify with and subscribe to dominant citizenship structures and ideals. By contrast, support for formalised social citizenship is higher amongst *Validated Active Citizens* because their rights and responsibilities are conceived on a basis conducive to their lived experience and capacities:

I feel quite a social citizen, in terms of – I work hard, I pay my taxes, I give things back to the community, I'm responsible for my own children, I make sure they don't break the law, I don't break the law. (Michael, Male, VAC)

I would feel that I'm certainly a law-abiding citizen who contributes hefty financially to the system obviously as I did explain I'm not involved in the local society so I'm not contributing in that way but certainly in terms of compliance yes I'm a very social citizen. (Emma, Female, VAC)

One affluent respondent captured the stark difference of experience and feeling between *Validated Active Citizens* and *Residual Contingent Citizens*:

I think I have a stake in society. (Catherine, Female, VAC)

A number of studies have explored how structured inequalities shape the divergent experiences and attitudes of citizens. However, as discussed in chapter four, studies that have incorporated lived experiences into an explanation of attitudinal difference, tend to conflate material position with material interest (Evans, 1993; Brooks et al., 2006; Brooks and Svallfors, 2010; Evans and de Graaf, 2013). These studies fail to account for the complex ways in which citizens may mediate their own experiences and interactions with citizenship structures. Social citizenship structures and welfare policies 'help make citizens' (Campbell, 2003). Material and status inequalities arising as a result are likely to inform the relational orientations and attitudes of individuals within a collective (Mettler and Soss, 2004: 61).

5.8 Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter has shown that, overall, there are high levels of support for social citizenship rights and responsibilities. Having said that, *Residual Contingent Citizens* have different experiences and thus attitudes to *Validated Active Citizens*. Secondary analysis found that there were a range of factors that affected individual conceptions of social citizenship but these effects were often not consistent or one-directional. Overall, the lived experience of deprivation proved to be the most significant determinant of people's attitudes. Qualitative data points to a disjuncture between the dominant ideals of social citizenship and its material and psychosocial effects.

Throughout this write-up of findings there has been some discussion of the extent to which people's support for rights or responsibilities is self-referential. In the case of those experiencing deprivation it is apparent that people's understanding of these facets of social citizenship is not self-interested but is certainly referential. Conceptions of social citizenship, rights and responsibilities are grounded in the lived experiences of everyday life. It would seem individuals orientate their own interpretation of social citizenship around what it has as an institution and practice been able to offer them. Espousal of fairness, equality and desert has less meaning to those in a condition of deprivation because these principles are not built on anything substantive. Quite literally, a lack of social goods, makes discussion of their fair or just distribution less meaningful. If social citizenship has failed to deliver a 'sufficiently generous share of the social product' (White, 2003: 17), then there is a somewhat perverse incentive for them to subscribe to the assumptions upon which it is built. Effectively 'a sense of citizenship... is a key motivation for the practice of citizenship' (Conover, 1995: 135) and with the status of citizenship undermined by deprivation, support for it becomes compromised.

Social citizenship structures that, notionally, guarantee a meaningful level of welfare and security, have failed to do so for *Residual Contingent Citizens*. As previously stated, their lived experiences of public institutions and policies suggest that it is less feasible to secure certain social goods than might otherwise be assumed. The intensification and extension of conditionality (Dwyer and Wright, 2014) has re-formulated the terms and conditions of entitlement. For those experiencing poverty and social exclusion then, claims to social rights are not so much seen in isolation but in a dialectical relationship with citizenship responsibilities and ideals that have come to structure their marginality. The lived experience of these groups is a constant reminder of the 'social structural limits' that infringe upon their agency and capacity to embrace prescribed forms of citizenship behaviour and benefit. In this sense, 'certain phases of social structure generate the circumstances in which infringement of social codes constitutes a 'normal' [in the sense of a culturally, if not approved] response' (Merton, 1938: 672). Whilst, *Validated Active Citizens* are able to employ reasonable means to perform and realise prescribed citizenship ends, *Residual Contingent Citizens* are more likely to deviate in a way that reflects their relative exclusion from the ideals and practices of social citizenship.

Chapter 6: Agency vs. structure: how lived experiences shape the sociological imagination of the rich and poor

6.1 Introduction

As illustrated in the previous chapter, there are high levels of support for social citizenship rights and responsibilities at a level of abstraction. The general public tend to oppose absolute poverty and excessive inequality and support redistribution and poverty alleviation as a matter of principle (Coughlin, 1980; Kumlin, 2007). Generalised support for welfare state activity can therefore be seen as an expression of collective values, norms and orientations (Feldman, 2003). However, attitudinal divergence tends to occur when the specificities of institutional and individual action feature in moral reasoning (Hedges, 2005). Attitude formation within and between social and economic groups has been explained by a range of factors but this chapter explores the hypothesis that lived experiences amount to knowledge accumulation and thus attitude (trans-) formation in relation to social citizenship. Analysis thus far suggests that attitudes are shaped by how aligned one's own experiences are with the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship. This chapter develops such an idea to consider how lived experiences affect knowledge accumulation about the structural determinants of action, agency and socio-economic outcome.

This is done by comparing the attitudes of those notionally termed here as *Residual Contingent Citizens* (unemployed individuals living below the poverty in deprived areas) and *Validated Active Citizens* (wealthy individuals engaged in full-time work and living in affluent areas). It is believed these material and relational conditions shape what individuals see as a legitimate responsibility, the capacity and resilience of individual agency and the role of structural barriers and enablers. This affects attitudes towards poverty and deprivation and in turn these attitudes affect what the general public believe should specifically and in principle be done to address such phenomena (Groskind, 1991; Roff et al., 2002; Lepianka et al., 2009; Mullen and Skitka, 2009; Jeene et al., 2013; Tagler and Cozzarelli, 2013).

To explore this, vignettes were used in qualitative fieldwork to discuss operational notions of justice, responsibility and fairness. As discussed in section 4.5.2, respondents were presented with four vignettes or 'case studies' (see Appendix B.2). Built into each of the vignettes, were a number of

structural constraints or enablers that informed the opportunities, outcomes and treatment of individuals. Each vignette culminated in a 'problem' or 'challenge' and respondents were then asked how responsible they felt each of these individuals were for their situation. Crucially, every vignette demonstrated some interplay between the structural and agentic determinants of socio-economic outcome. Capturing the duality of structure inherent to all social processes (Giddens, 2013), respondents were left to interpret notions of responsibility as they saw fit. This proved useful in exploring conceptions of responsibility drawn upon by respondents and whether they attributed desert, blame or effective behaviour to the individuals described in the vignettes. As such, these vignettes were used as a heuristic to explore tacit and explicit attitudes fundamental to conceptions of social citizenship.

The chapter begins by outlining the existing literature and evidence on the relationship between knowledge accumulation and attitude (trans-) formation. This section considers the lessons and limitations of existing research and the apparent contradiction between high levels of support for social citizenship rights and lower levels of support for social security spending on particular groups. The chapter then considers each of the vignettes in turn to explore how 'responsible' individuals are seen in terms of their behaviour and/or the situation that they find themselves in. Some of the vignettes talk about particular policy instruments, forms of work, taxation, and educational or life opportunities. Finally, the chapter draws some conclusions from this analysis and discusses some implications.

6.2 Knowledge accumulation and attitude (trans-) formation

The empirical literature has illustrated that the general public are highly misinformed about poverty, inequality, benefit fraud, welfare spending, and public services reform (Sefton and Stewart, 2009; Baumberg et al., 2012; Park et al., 2012). Kuklinski et al. (2000) find that misinformation plays a significant role in determining policy preferences and attitudes. When participants are presented with the correct information, a dramatic shift occurs in their attitudes (see also Bamfield and Horton, 2009). Perhaps then, negative attitudes towards welfare activity and recipients are contingent on sufficient knowledge and accurate information. Whilst the presentation of correct information may not amount to a wholesale shift in attitudes or opinion (Kuklinski et al., 2000), it may help facilitate informed debate and consideration pertaining to social citizenship and social policy.

Studies have shown that support for welfare spending and activity is informed by whether the general public view poverty and inequality as primarily caused by individual or structural factors (Linos and West, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). For example, Sefton (2005) finds that those attentive to structural causes of disadvantage are much more likely to support redistributive policies. Similarly, those more inclined to recognise the structural determinants of poverty and affluence are more inclined to support progressive and inclusive welfare policies (Bullock et al., 2003). Attitudes related to poverty and deprivation then, have a significant effect on the political legitimacy and nature of social citizenship practices (Applebaum, 2001).

A great deal of the existing research that explores attitudes towards the causes of poverty rests on a rather crude distinction between structural, individual and fatalistic (such as luck) explanations of poverty. In reality, these determinants of poverty are not easily or entirely separable. Studies that draw an exclusive distinction between structural and individual explanations can generate simplistic interpretations of knowledge accumulation and attitudinal (trans-) formation that fail to capture the 'compound nature of public perceptions and the existence of composite explanations' (Lepianka et al., 2009: 422). For example, Henry et al. (2004) find that explanations of poverty vary according to the demographic characteristics of the poor in question – respondents will ascribe different causes of poverty according to the age, gender, race and residential status of those that are destitute (see also Wilson, 1996). Such varied ascriptions reflect the multi-dimensional nature and causes that feature in people's reasoning. However, it may well also reflect a bias in the attitudes and stereotypes that people often attach to the phenomenon of poverty and deprivation.

Material and socio-cultural position have a profound effect on the attributes and characteristics ascribed to different social groups. Empirical research suggests that wealthier individuals tend to be

seen as intelligent, responsible hard-working, successful, skilful, physically attractive and resourceful. In contrast, poor people are viewed as lazy, unmotivated, lacking in abilities and skills, irresponsible, unattractive and lacking proper money management (Dittmar, 1992: 162).

A number of other studies have also found the same: that the poor tend to be described as 'stupid', 'dirty' and 'lazy' and middle-income groups tend to be described as 'hardworking', 'attractive' and 'intelligent' (Cozzarelli et al., 2001; Woods et al., 2005). This patterned attribution reveals a generalised collective

consciousness about the relationship between structure and agency. Whilst, the general public tend to recognise that poverty and inequality are caused by a range of factors, they are also more likely to cite individual, rather than structural bases of socio-economic outcome in liberal welfare regimes (Jordan, 1996; McNamee, 2009; Kallio and Niemelä, 2013; Tagler and Cozzarelli, 2013). Shirazi and Biel (2005) emphasise the importance of country or culture specific studies in this area owing to the differing philosophical foundations at play. The Victorian legacy of the Poor Law period may serve as such an example of individualised attributions in the UK context. However, with some consistency it is possible to establish that the tendency to ascribe negative characteristics and behaviours to poor people and positive characteristics and behaviours to rich people is a reflection of people's intuitions about whether people are poor or rich as a result of their own being and doing.

A number of studies proffer insight into how socio-demographic factors affect attitudes towards the determinants of poverty and action. Some have suggested that factors such as age, education and gender do not unilaterally affect attributions of poverty (for example Van Oorschot and Halman, 2000; Cozzarelli et al., 2001; Sun, 2001; Swank, 2005). However, a significant body of research has found that socio-economic characteristics substantially affect attitudes towards the causes of poverty. Empirical research has found that those occupying a higher social or economic status tend to individualise poverty, whilst those with a lower social status are more likely to draw upon systemic explanations (Hunt, 1996; Reutter et al., 2005; Shirazi and Biel, 2005; Reutter et al., 2006b).

For example, a study undertaken with middle class respondents and welfare recipients found that welfare recipients were much more likely to stress the structural determinants of poverty (Bullock, 1999). In addition, household income significantly affects attitudes towards poverty: 'support for the external causes of poverty is greatest among people who have difficulty getting by on their family income' (Niemelä, 2008: 26). Ostensibly contradictory findings suggest that those on the lower end of the income distribution and in receipt of social security are more likely to attribute negative characteristics and qualities to those they identify as poor (Golding and Middleton, 1982). However, this 'othering' appears to be endemic amongst certain groups most vulnerable to market and status inequalities (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). Research suggests that an infringement upon individual identity or collective belonging induces anxiety about acceptance which can lead to a tendency to

over-conform or commit to groups ideals, norms and objectives (Sleebos et al., 2006).

Another apparent contradiction lies in the attitudes of those occupying a higher economic or social position. As illustrated in chapter five, these individuals are more likely to support social citizenship rights and yet they are also more likely to individualise poverty and be less supportive of redistribution. This apparent contradiction is summed up nicely by Coughlin (1980) who suggests that there is

widespread public acceptance of the general principles of the 'social rights' of citizenship, entailing positive government efforts to promote individual security and social equity, with simultaneous allegiance to individual freedom, the 'free market,' and individual responsibility for success or failure in a competitive economic order (Coughlin, 1980: 155).

Whilst some may support social citizenship rights as a matter of principle, their experiences and thus knowledge will shape the extent to which they support specific welfare policies. Attitudinal differences between social and economic groups have been explained according to a number of factors. Perhaps the most pervasive explanation of all is that of self-interest (cf. Sears and Funk, 1990). Crucially, this paradigm of attitudinal research fails to account for how one's socio-cultural or material position is, to a great extent, an expression of systemic features. If attitudinal differences are stratified according to the material resources at one's disposal, this cannot be seen in isolation from the factors that give rise to material inequality. Explanations that rely on rational economic actor theory abstract individuals' preferences and behaviours from the structural determinants of resource allocation and lived experience. Importantly, it has long been suggested that that an individual's capital represents, in great part, the extent of control they have over their socio-economic situation (Furby, 1978). How one conceives of the relationship between structure and agency will invariably be mediated by their relation to and experience of structural features of a given polity. Attitudes, then, are constructed in relation to structuration processes and features. With this in mind, awareness of, or exposure to, the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and action should significantly affect attitudes towards the nature of poverty, as well as its causes and remedies.

A study undertaken with students in Croatia, Ljubotina and Ljubotina (2007) found that respondents tended to recognise the structural causes of poverty first, followed by micro-environmental factors (such as intergenerational

poverty), individual factors, and finally fatalistic factors. Compared to agriculture and economics students, social work students were much less likely to individualise the causes of poverty (Ljubotina and Ljubotina, 2007). Similarly, Guimond and Palmer (1996) found that, over the course of their higher degrees, social science students are more likely to recognise the systemic features of poverty, and commerce students are more likely to emphasise the individual causes of poverty. In part, this indicates a process of political socialisation but it also reflects the different knowledge accumulated about the causes of inequality and disadvantage.

Bullock's (2004) study noted differences between the attitudes of social workers and welfare recipients but also noted that these groups shared similar views about the causes of poverty. Bullock (2004) recognises the different socio-cultural and economic positions that these two groups occupy, but also suggests that they 'share a working and/or lived knowledge of poverty' that goes some way towards explaining similarity in their attitudes. More education and knowledge about poverty appears to increase the likelihood of making structural attributions:

respondents who had worked with low-income people and, particularly, those who had a close friend or family member living in poverty or had learned about poverty in courses and workshops were more likely to hold this perception (Reutter et al., 2006b: 14).

Wilson (1996) suggests that the nature and extent of exposure to poverty affects whether respondents are more likely to attribute poverty to structural or individual factors. Those that have 'been panhandled' or informally discuss poverty are more likely to individualise poverty, whereas those who have friends who are poor or have exposure to expertise on the phenomenon of poverty are more likely to attribute poverty to structural factors. Wilson (1996) categorises being 'panhandled' as direct exposure to poverty but this is arguably a rather fleeting and superficial interaction that does not capture the processes resulting in destitution.

Overall then, the empirical literature suggests that *genuine* and *prolonged* exposure to or experience of poverty increases structural attributions: 'the raw stuff processed by sociological imagination is human experience' (Bauman, 2005: 123). Increased support for progressive and inclusive social policies is not necessarily rooted in economic or class self-interest (Sears and Funk, 1990). It may well be a reflection of the knowledge accumulated through one's lived experiences. The following four sections will explore whether individuals occupying different material and symbolic positions differ in their attitudes

towards responsibility, justice and fairness. The existing empirical literature is dominated by quantitative studies that often rely on crude distinctions between structural, individual and fatalistic explanations of poverty. By employing qualitative vignettes, it is possible to a) avoid false dichotomies between structural and individual determinants of socio-economic outcome and action, b) tap into lay accounts of justice and fairness and c) explore the extent to which knowledge generated through lived experiences affects attitude (trans-) formation. To do this, qualitative respondents in positions of deprivation and relative affluence were presented with four vignettes. Each of these will be discussed in turn to consider whether attitudinal differences exist, how these can be explained and what implications this has for inclusive social citizenship practices.

6.3 The 'deserving workless poor': Becky

All respondents participating in qualitative fieldwork were presented with the following scenario:

Becky lives alone with her two children. At 18, Becky got good grades and wanted to go to University but was worried about the cost and debt that she might face. Instead, Becky got a secretarial job in a small company hoping to work her way up. After one year, Becky was made redundant and fell pregnant shortly after. Since then, Becky has been unable to find a job. Becky split up from her boyfriend five years ago and has relied on benefits and occasional help from her parents ever since. She lives in social housing and has done for four years. Becky would like to work but has been unable to find a job that is flexible enough for her to gain career prospects and also care for her children. Becky volunteers three times a week whilst her children are at school. The Job Centre has told Becky that she needs to get a job as some of her entitlement to Income Support will soon finish.

More than two thirds of deprived respondents felt that Becky's situation was primarily caused by fatalistic or structural factors beyond her control. The vast majority of these respondents cited structural determinants of her situation:

It's obviously not her fault that she's fallen pregnant and stuff. It's not her fault she's been made redundant either so she's not responsible.
(Brooke, Female, RCC)

Whilst many felt that life events absolved her of responsibility for her situation, two thirds of respondents still felt that she was assuming responsibility and responding in a constructive and positive manner:

She's still out there helping people with voluntary work that is still in the community. She's not sat about drinking and watching Jeremy Kyle all day! (Ben, Male, RCC)

Only two deprived respondents cited individual reasons for Becky's situation and only one respondent felt that it was entirely her fault. Other explanations were the 'permissive' nature of welfare and a lack of appropriate information provided about the costs associated with higher education. Interestingly, both of these reasons came from respondents who were born in transitioning welfare regimes with much lower levels of social protection but had subsequently moved to the UK. Their reference point was therefore a much more residual conception of welfare.

For respondents in a position of relative affluence, there was greater ambivalence surrounding Becky. Just below a third of respondents thought that Becky was not responsible for her situation and cited exogenous factors contributing towards her behaviour and circumstance. By contrast, just below two thirds of respondents thought Becky was at least partially responsible for her situation with many citing her 'poor choices' such as deciding to have more than one child and not going to university. One respondent could not come to a conclusion without further information due to the efforts Becky had made to improve her situation. Interestingly, affluent respondents were more likely to moralise or caricature her biography. Despite evidence presented to the contrary, some affluent respondents suggested Becky had multiple children from different fathers, had chosen to fall pregnant and that she was a teenage mother:

Well... you see there are several strands to this story aren't there. Have I got this right? That she's now 18? [clarification provided] Oh, I see, okay. But you also, erm, used a phrase which is used quite a bit "she fell pregnant". Hmmm, and you've got to be very careful here because this happens... You know, pregnancy is not something that is pushed on you. It happens because you do something. It just seems to me that she's got parents, erm, she has allowed herself to become pregnant. And if you look at it from... you would say well hold on a minute she's living a life of... she's not working full-time. Although she's got two children, that's you know that's down to her. And yet she's expecting

society to subsidise what some would call her fecklessness. However, it's a common story. The answer is surely that her parents, given that she is only 23 and plenty of people are living, are still living at home at 23 because they can't afford anything else. It seems to me she needs to go back and live with them. And, if you like, it brings in this whole question of the family and the responsibility they need to take rather than expecting the State to step in all the time... I think, just to develop this theme. I mean I'm quite a liberal broad-minded person you know. There's no... I'm not one of these moralistic types at all. But, erm, I think you see on television a lot now young girls who are interviewed and they have like four children to three separate fathers. And they say that they see no link between benefits from somebody else and money being given to them to subsidise what is a pretty racketsy lifestyle and I think we need to get back to a little bit of personal responsibility. (Peter, Male, VAC)

Some affluent respondents went as far as to 'search' for bad decisions in Becky's biography to help explain her situation. A minority of affluent respondents were much less willing to mischaracterise Becky's situation and decisions:

Well, I don't know what her childcare costs are. I don't know whether her parents live locally. Or whether the boyfriend is contributing anything towards the child. So you know, without getting that information I wouldn't jump to any great conclusions to be quite frank. (Joe, Male, VAC)

When asked if Becky should be 'forced to work rather than volunteer', all respondents in the deprived category did not agree that this should happen. Over half of deprived respondents believed that Becky's child-rearing and volunteering activities were of societal benefit and she should therefore be precluded from work compulsion. Others were keen to emphasise the prohibitive costs associated with working parenthood and the potential utility of volunteering for Becky's eventual transition into employment. Relatively affluent respondents were similarly reluctant to enforce work obligations. Only one respondent believed this should happen. Around a quarter of affluent respondents felt that Becky should be encouraged to work rather than volunteer. These individuals cited paternalistic reasons for such an approach and one believed the luxury of 'volunteering' should be open to all, not just those that did not work. Many of those reluctant to enforce work obligations

cited Becky's virtuous efforts and behaviours as a reason to continue financial support. This appears to support the empirical literature that says support for welfare is mediated by whether recipients of welfare are seen as deserving (Sefton, 2009). Interestingly, a number of affluent respondents drew a direct link between their own social citizenship responsibilities and Becky's social citizenship rights:

I think she's doing well, and I think it's the job of the state, or us taxpayers, provided she is looking for a suitable job. I'm quite happy that the state continues to support her, or that me as a taxpayer, continues to support her. (Mark, Male, VAC)

Whilst this sort of justification evokes some notion of collective identity between unconnected citizens, it also constructs a division between contributors to and recipients of welfare: A distinction between 'us' and 'them' fails to acknowledge that the majority of people receiving public assistance are also contributors (financial or otherwise) to the common project of social citizenship. This sort of framing is potentially problematic for cultivating a sense of cooperative solidarity, especially if this is based upon some principle of conformity or desert. For respondents that did suggest Becky was responsible for the situation that she found herself in, the vast majority did not believe that she should (permanently) suffer the consequences of her actions:

Well she is responsible but I don't think you can hold that sort of thing against people. People can always do something about their situation if they've got the mind to do it. Erm. But you know, there are always elements of bad luck in people's lives and good luck so you know it's... she is responsible. But in some ways it's irrelevant. It's what she does in the future not what has happened in the past. (Rachel, Female, VAC)

Becky was a caricature presented to explore people's intuitions about those notionally conceived as unemployed and 'deserving' of public assistance. Her situation was largely determined by factors beyond her control and her response to life circumstances was portrayed as virtuous. It appears that Becky's 'culpability' was tempered by her actions and overall the majority of respondents did not see her as responsible for her situation. However, a substantial minority of affluent respondents were more likely to see Becky as responsible and to moralise her behaviour and decisions. The extent to which respondents saw Becky as responsible for her situation seemed to affect whether and what public assistance respondents thought her and her children

should be entitled to. Those experiencing deprivation were more likely to recognise the concessionary factors that precluded Becky from engaging in full-time work and commended her non-fiscal contribution to society. The following section will explore how the actions and decisions of individuals conceived as less 'deserving' or 'virtuous' are understood and what effect this has on support for public assistance.

6.4 The 'undeserving workless poor': Aimee

In the mainstream media, benefit recipients are regularly characterised as 'work-shy', 'deceitful' and 'lazy' (Likki and Staerklé, 2015). As a result, there has been increasing concern about the deservingness of welfare recipients (Park et al., 2012). Aimee was presented to respondents as an exemplar of this stereotype that tends to dominate public and political discourse (Baumberg et al., 2012):

Aimee and her partner claim Incapacity Benefit. Aimee has claimed benefits on and off for 15 years. Aimee began claiming benefits when she had a bad back, and although she can now go dancing, these days, she has got used to being on benefits and is stuck in a bit of a rut. She was unable to cope with her children because of her drinking and her two children are now in care. Aimee's entitlement to Incapacity Benefit has recently stopped and she now must look for work in order to claim another benefit (JSA).

Just under a third of respondents experiencing deprivation felt that Aimee should still receive some form of public assistance from the government. A number of justifications were given for this. Many suggested that Aimee's substance abuse, loss of children and long-term unemployment could be symptomatic of broader problems and challenges. They felt that alongside financial assistance, Aimee may benefit from the opportunity to attend lifelong learning courses, seek medical help with her alcohol dependency and receive support in raising and caring for her children. For these respondents, a withdrawal of entitlement was not seen as a solution. Some believed that Aimee should be encouraged, but also assisted to find gainful employment. Particularly for those that were long-term unemployed, Aimee's story seemed to resonate in terms of 'being stuck in a rut':

It like kinda creeps up on you. I don't think you ever set out in life and think I want to claim benefits for the rest of my life you know just sponge off society. You don't intend to get that way but over years it really does

drag you down, you lose a lot of motivation you know and you just get into this rut of picking up that giro every two weeks you know. You don't... you're responsible for putting yourself there but I think we need more help to get out of the rut before it happens. They should crack onto this quicker rather than leaving you on benefits for 5 or 6 years and then blame you for sitting there and getting like free money every fortnight. But it's no picnic you know – it's not as easy as people think – just sitting there looking for a hand-out every two weeks – It's very hard to make that spin out. It's not fun. (Ashley, Female, RCC)

This respondent felt that public agencies should do more to assist people back into work rather than punishing them for not finding work. Prompted by Aimee's story, a number of other respondents also discussed instances of, what they felt was, particularly unconstructive treatment from public agencies and officials. Some reflected on their own treatment whilst others talked about friends, family or neighbours. One respondent described how his daughter-in-law, who faces multiple mobility issues, was compelled to travel substantial distances for an interview, only to find that the job was unsuitable. A great number of respondents experiencing deprivation suggested that there was a lack of consistency in the judgments and support provided by agencies such as JobCentre Plus. These respondents cited instances of benefit fraud that they were aware of, whilst talking about the hardship they or others had faced as a result of harsh treatment:

I know people driving round in £20,000 cars and there's nothing wrong with them. Do you know what I mean, and then I know people who are sick and can't get on it so I think how they hand it out needs to be looked into further. (Liam, Male, RCC)

These respondents expressed frustration at those they believed were claiming benefits fraudulently. They felt the relatively comfortable lifestyle of fraudulent claimants contrasted quite starkly from their own lived experiences and therefore believed administrative systems needed to be refined in order to ensure money was going where it was most needed. Many discussed how hard they found it to get by on the social security payments they received. For many, this appears to affect their attitudes towards Aimee and other people in a similar situation. One respondent had been employed for thirty years before being made redundant and was struggling to find employment despite significant efforts. This respondent felt that his attitudes towards benefits had

changed drastically since struggling to meet his basic needs on the social security payments he received:

Since I been on benefits I sit back and wonder how people manage. I mean like me, I watch what I spend. Every penny. I see people going to [sic] pub and I couldn't do it. I can't afford to do it – I watch my money. So they must be getting something that I'm not. It's like all these people coming to this country... They come here to get a home, get paid, they get help with everything. They get money. And then they send money back home. It makes me angry because they've got rights here. Not me though. (Tom, Male, RCC)

Whilst this respondent struggled on his own social security payment, he felt that there should be more rigorous checks for those that are potentially making fraudulent claims. This typifies the 'politics of resentment' that Hoggett et al. (2013) argue is driving social divisions and anti-welfare populism in the UK. Notably, this respondent also expressed frustration that his relative on incapacity benefit was subject to intrusive and, in his mind, unnecessary checks when it should have been quite clear that they were unable to work. These sorts of contradictory sentiments embody the ambivalence expressed by a number of respondents. Half of respondents experiencing deprivation thought Aimee should no longer be entitled to any benefits from the government. As a matter of principle, these respondents did not feel it was fair for Aimee to receive assistance. Whilst many recognised that Aimee's bad back was not her fault, her response to life circumstance made her responsible for her situation now. Overall, the majority of respondents experiencing deprivation felt that Aimee's situation was primarily explained by individual factors. However, over a third of respondents experiencing deprivation still cited structural determinants of her situation.

Similarly, the majority of affluent respondents felt that Aimee's situation was explained by her own actions and decisions and a third felt that systemic explanations were more relevant. Half of affluent respondents felt that Aimee should no longer receive public assistance from the government. Many of these respondents felt that Aimee had defaulted on her responsibilities and had therefore forfeited her 'entitlement' to social security. Beyond notions of welfare contractualism that seem to pervade this principle, affluent respondents also gave expression to paternalistic notions of *noblesse oblige* (Dean, 2007). Many felt that Aimee was not as 'deserving' of social security

as others, and that the contributions of 'decent working people' would be better spent on those less able to affect their own situation:

I think for a person like her I think that she needs to do something in return for her benefits so she needs to demonstrate that she's trying to improve herself rather than just living her life her own way off other people and that actually is the scenario that you know I find really abhorrent and we all know people like that and it's very irritating. [Interview: Why is it irritating?] Well because other people like myself and lots and lots of other, as I call them, decent working people have paid into this system for a long, long time taking very little out for their own benefit and that's fine feeling that you're paying major taxes if those taxes are going to help people who are justifiably needy. But if those people are actually working the system so that they are using the benefits to fund the lifestyle that they have chosen rather than a lifestyle that actually has been imposed upon them by disability or an accident or other misfortune then I think that those people aren't deserving of those benefits. (Emma, Female, VAC)

This encapsulates the 'us' and 'them' distinction that affluent respondents seem keen to make between those that receive and those that contribute to public assistance. Equally, it draws a distinction between those apparently in command of their own environment and those 'justifiably needy' and vulnerable to structural factors of socio-economic outcome. Both distinctions are, of course, a false dichotomy (Williams, 1998) but seem to pervade affluent conceptions of social citizenship. Other respondents that believed Aimee's benefits should be stopped were sceptical about her initial claim to incapacity benefit and felt that social security provision was too permissive in 'giving people an excuse' to not work:

Whether she should have ever been on benefits is another matter but she certainly shouldn't now. She's perfectly capable of working. For instance, I'll give you a personal example. I'm profoundly deaf in my left ear – I can't hear a thing and it doesn't affect me at all because in a situation like this I can hear everything. But if I'm in a crowded room which is very noisy and people are on my left I've got to turn round that way. I could say well you know it's a disability really. But I just ignore it. I think sometimes you've just got to be robust about these things. (Joe, Male, VAC)

Those that believed Aimee should still be entitled to benefits attached a number of conditions to its receipt. Two affluent respondents said that 'if it wasn't for the drinking', they would be more inclined to withdraw Aimee's entitlement to social security altogether. However, they believed that Aimee should still receive benefits but also more non-financial support that could include counselling to ensure Aimee recovers from her alcohol dependency. Other affluent respondents supporting continued payments felt that greater welfare-to-work conditions should be placed on Aimee to ensure that she actively looks for work. One respondent suggested that financial assistance could be explicitly time-limited to 'motivate' Aimee into employment.

Having discussed the above issues, respondents were subsequently presented with additional information about Aimee and asked whether this changed how they felt about her:

Aimee spent the majority of her childhood in care and went to four different secondary schools. She was heavily bullied and therefore attended school very little. Aimee left education at 16 with few qualifications and little idea of what she might like to do in the future. She wanted to become a social worker, but did not get onto the course. Aimee then went onto work as a cleaner.

Despite presenting this additional information, almost two thirds of respondents said this did not change how they felt about Aimee - a similar proportion of deprived and affluent respondents expressed this sentiment. One might reasonably conclude from this that additional knowledge about the structural factors affecting individual outcome and agency do not seem to affect attitudes. It might be assumed that the attribution of responsibility is somewhat canalised – buffered against accumulated knowledge. Importantly though, respondents remained unchanged in their attitudes for different reasons. The majority of deprived respondents that were unchanged in their opinion already had an idea of what Aimee's biography might look like. Whilst some felt that this exonerated Aimee of her responsibility, this information did not change their attitudes as it was already present in their mind. Others still felt she had an opportunity to assume responsibility now and this did not excuse her fraudulently claiming benefits:

I kind of expected it. I'm sitting thinking about this fictitious person but that's kind of where I think she would be coming from anyway you know. I think like she's been in care so she's used to all this benefits stuff – you don't have much guidance in how you...I think she's still responsible for her own situation, I think we're all responsible. I don't

think it has helped her but I think she's responsible for herself still.
(Ashley, Female, RCC)

Affluent respondents remained unchanged in their attitudes for a number of different reasons. For some, this additional information reinforced what they had previously felt about Aimee – that she needed non-financial assistance and support, rather than social security payments:

I still think that she needs the same type of help as before, which is non-monetary, because she's going to spend it on the wrong things. I don't trust her with that... I still definitely wouldn't give her any more money now, because she's not going to change her behaviours. She's got no motivation to change. (William, Male, VAC)

A number of affluent respondents were public services workers and drew upon their own interaction with others facing structural constraints to arbitrate between Aimee's biography and her agentive responsibility. In certain instances, these respondents remained unchanged in their opinion because these circumstances are what they 'would have imagined' for Aimee. Two affluent respondents whose opinion remained unchanged, cited their own 'rags to riches' stories to invoke the idea that, despite her 'background of disadvantage', Aimee should have 'broken the cycle' and 'bettered her life'. Affluent respondents were more likely to express sympathy for Aimee's 'tough start in life' but found her behaviour 'inexcusable' and 'simply unfair':

Whilst I would sympathise with her upbringing, what she is actually doing is giving the same sort of upbringing to her children that have gone into care. So, at this stage I would be more worried about them and making sure that the cycle didn't repeat itself than about enabling her to continue living on benefits and what she needs is some sort of focus in life rather than going out dancing, you know and drinking and all this other sort. She does need a job and if cleaning is the only thing that she can do then you know she needs to get those values back.
(Emma, Female, VAC)

I've had first-hand experience of children who have been in care and it can be incredibly troubling and disturbing and so there's an awful lot of emotional issues there. In terms of the other part of your scenario no it doesn't change anything because I left school when I was sixteen. I had very few qualifications and I happen to now own a cleaning

company so [laughter]. So in terms of sort of the second section, my response would be 'and what's wrong with that'? (Richard, Male, VAC)

The latter respondent draws on his interaction with children in care to recognise the challenging circumstances that Aimee has faced. However, he equates his own socio-economic trajectory without recognising how 'agency is overlaid onto structural inequality' (Orton, 2009) and how that could impinge upon the actions of someone like Aimee. Orton (2009) demonstrates that, due to different starting points in the broader socio-economic structure, two individuals (such as the respondent and Aimee) are likely to experience very different outcomes even if they were to exercise agency in similar ways. The reality is that 'agency cannot be divorced from people's severely disadvantaged structural position' (Orton, 2009: 496) and affluent respondents interviewed were slightly more inclined to neglect this factor in explaining individual agency and believe that 'people can always do something about their situation if they've got the mind to do it'.

Despite broad recognition across the two sample groups that 'unhappy beginnings usually don't help you to have happy endings' (Holly, Female, VAC), the majority of respondents felt that Aimee was responsible for her situation and tended to cite individual reasons for her life circumstances. There were, however, notable differences between the two sample groups. Both deprived and affluent respondents drew upon various notions of 'fairness' when discussing Aimee but were concerned at the injustice faced by different groups. Deprived respondents tended to express concern that social security payments were not going to those who most needed them. Affluent respondents were concerned about those 'doing the right thing' - they felt taxpayers were fulfilling their obligations only to subsidise the poor lifestyle choices and behaviours of characters such as Aimee. Those exposed to the structural determinants of outcome and agency were more inclined to recognise the mitigating circumstances that may explain Aimee's actions. However, those with direct *lived* experience of structural constraints were more likely to recognise that Aimee's circumstances and actions were symptomatic of broader problems and challenges. For example, deprived respondents were more inclined to prescribe support and training to enable Aimee to find fulfilling employment, whilst affluent respondents tended to suggest Aimee should find any form of work irrespective of its financial remuneration or self-realising potential. Finally, deprived respondents were more inclined to recognise how Aimee's life circumstance explained (but did not excuse) her individual actions, whilst affluent respondents were more likely

to emphasise the resilience of individual agency in the face of structural constraints.

6.5 The 'deserving working poor': James

According to government rhetoric (if not policy), James epitomises the 'hardworking decent people' that current political discourse characterises as 'deserving' of public assistance (Ridge, 2013). James is still in receipt of public assistance despite engaging in (more than) full-time employment:

James left school with one O-level and has always felt that he is better at practical 'hands-on jobs' than being in an 'office job'. At 46, James lives with his wife and 4 children. He works for a large supermarket and does a lot of shift work, working nights and evenings. He works very hard and has recently taken on an extra part-time cleaning job. As a result, he is not always able to help his children with school work. James's family receive Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credits which help a lot but they are often short at the end of the month. The rising cost of food and energy means James is in debt as he cannot always afford to pay the bills. He wants more hours at work to pay this off but cannot get any more at the moment. James's wife does not work as she feels the cost of childcare would be too much to make it worthwhile.

The vast majority of respondents experiencing deprivation felt that James was acting responsibly and 'trying to do the best he can'. Over two thirds of respondents felt that James's situation was not his fault. Many of these individuals recognised wider structural challenges facing James's family such as the rising cost of food and energy and a low minimum wage. Some of these individuals attributed responsibility for James's situation to the government, whilst others blamed employers for not providing what is often termed a 'living wage'. Many empathised with James's situation and felt that they had experienced similar financial challenges themselves:

There is something wrong if the minimum wage is not enough to have the minimum cost of the house. Like, pay the rent and pay the bills and food... bring food home. If the minimum wage is not enough to do that, the Government is wrong. Something's wrong. The prices going up and electricity going up, the food going up so is not his fault. (Julia, Female, RCC)

With rising cost of food and everything else it's a struggle. I know that myself. Struggling day in, day out, basically. In this day and age, like I say, it's trying to get the work and get the extra hours and everything else which is hard... (Brooke, Female, RCC)

These respondents discussed falling behind with bills and how easily this can happen as a result of unexpected costs associated with children's schooling, broken household goods and rising energy bills. A number of these respondents also suggested that it would be a 'false economy' for James's wife to seek paid employment due to the significant costs associated with travel and childcare. All respondents experiencing deprivation felt that James and his family should receive tax credits from the government. Respondents justified this by emphasising the significant efforts James was making to support his family.

In stark contrast to those discussed above, affluent respondents were much more likely to blame James for his situation. Two thirds of these respondents thought James was at least partially responsible for his financial difficulties. Whilst almost all respondents recognised that James was working hard to provide for his family, some questioned his lifestyle choices. These individuals suggested that James should not have had so many children given the sort of low-wage work that he had *chosen* to go into:

The fact that he's short of money... yeah... four children. Yeah I mean he is responsible because I don't have children. And you could say well, why should people with one child just pay him. No I think... I would say he's got to cut his coat according to his cloth. (Joe, Male, VAC)

Other affluent respondents struggled to understand why James might not be able to afford his household costs. Some were keen to clarify the sort of spending and consumption habits of James and his family. These individuals questioned whether James was making sound financial decisions, for example, whether he was smoking or spending money on 'unnecessary' household goods. Whilst many attributed responsibility to James as a result of this, some were still keen to emphasise that his family were 'worthy' and 'deserving' recipients of public assistance:

He's working hard, from the story that we've heard so far. Are you going to add on a bit to this story, as well? Because he's – you'd like to know, what does his house look like, when you go into it? What is he spending? Has he got all of the Sky channels, going on in there? Has

he got a huge TV in there? Or is he just living within his means, in terms of he's working really hard, and he's just got the six Free View channels, or whatever it is. Do you know what I mean? Why is he working two part-time jobs, and why are things still not meeting? [Interviewer: Because he's on minimum wage] Yeah. This is what I said to you on the phone – I'm not sure that I'll know enough about how much that means, in practical terms. (Sophie, Female, VAC)

Does James smoke? I think if James smokes then this is where it becomes an issue... there's so much money that goes on tobacco and alcohol that I think people assume that they should be able to get that first and then all the money for their food and their children if you see what I mean. They don't mentally categorise it that way round but erm, it's when you see people on the television how much they get a week and that they can't go to the supermarket and buy the food they need. You sometimes question it... I think somebody has got to investigate really what the cost of living should actually be if you see what I mean. And people like that shouldn't expect to have all the extras they should only expect... they should only be able to get the essentials. The risk is of course that if you actually reduce the amount of money they've got. Will they actually give up the tobacco and the alcohol or is it the children that will start to be neglected because it's the children that are lower down the list. (Rachel, Female, VAC)

Limited exposure to, and awareness of, financial management in a low-income household appeared to affect the judgments of more affluent respondents with many moralising the presumed behaviours and decisions of characters such as James. When asked about whether James's family should receive tax credits from the government, affluent respondents were more ambivalent. Just over half believed James's family should receive assistance, with the rest of the respondents more inclined to suggest alternative revenue streams. Despite a statement that James's wife did not work because she thought the costs of childcare would be too prohibitive, a number of respondents insisted that she should still find paid employment. This affected some respondent's judgment so that they were more inclined to blame James for his financial difficulties. One respondent suggested that the children, if old enough, should find employment to support the household. For those affluent respondents that were employers, concerns were raised about how raising the minimum wage would have a negative impact on employers and the

overall number of staff employed. However, a sizeable proportion of affluent respondents disagreed with the principle of tax credits more generally:

As a taxpayer, I resent the fact that companies and shareholders – despite having a few shares myself – and particularly well-paid chief executives, directors, are being subsidized by taxpayers, because they're not paying their workers enough to live on. (Mark, Male, VAC)

Once again, many affluent respondents seemed to root their judgments of fairness and justice in their identity as taxpayers, that is, as contributors to the collective *financial* project of social citizenship. In this instance, their attitudes were bound up with their identity as active citizens and this appears to have a significant bearing on how these individuals interpret the responsibilities and deservingness of other citizens in receiving public assistance. Overall, respondents experiencing deprivation were more aware of the exigent financial pressures and challenges that a family such as James's might face. By comparison, more affluent respondents tended to under-appreciate how and why low-waged families might find themselves in debt or hardship. Whilst mindful of macroeconomic and policy governance structures that affect socio-economic outcomes, affluent respondents tended to moralise the presumed behaviours and decisions of James and suggested alternative means by which he could avoid resorting to social security.

6.6 The 'undeserving working rich': Robert

The final vignette describes the life opportunities and actions of Robert. Robert was presented to respondents to explore whether people were more or less likely to recognise the conditions that had increased his agency and affected his socio-economic trajectory:

Robert is very clever and did very well at school. He received a great deal of support and help from his parents with school work. Robert went to University and received financial support from his parents when moving for his first job. Since starting his first job, Robert has always worked hard, often staying late in the office and taking work home at the weekends. He earns a lot from his job and has private health insurance. He has decided to buy a second property and rent this out to tenants. He is concerned about how much tax he will have to pay when he eventually sells this second property. He is worried that he could be made to pay for the hard work he has put into building a good life for himself.

In general, respondents felt that a confluence of factors had shaped Robert's situation. Respondents were mindful of the financial assistance and non-financial support that Robert received from his parents, but also emphasised the efforts he had put into his own education and career. Only two respondents experiencing deprivation felt that Robert was entirely responsible for his situation with the majority more inclined to recognise the opportunities afforded to Robert. These respondents suggested that such opportunities had not only had a significant impact on his material position, but also his opportunity to exercise agency in determining his income and work-life balance. Whilst they recognised that Robert may have made the most of his opportunities, they still felt he was given many opportunities that others were not and as result he was seen as less responsible:

Obviously he was privileged, many people don't get help like that. And his parents were supporting him. It's always an advantage when you come from a very good social setting or a privileged social environment. To some extent he is responsible. When you went into the classroom, he's the one that paid attention, he's the one that read the book, do you understand what I'm saying? So in that way, he is the architect of his own success. But obviously it's different when you come from a privileged social setting. But in the sense that he's the one that read books, he's the one that remained focused because it's not everyone who has that background who makes it in life. Some people fail in life and fall off the rails but obviously if we take someone who comes from a poor background and then manages to achieve, let's say, what Robert has achieved even though they came from a poor background we would obviously say they are more an architect of their own success than say Robert. Obviously they deserve more credit than Robert.
(Liam, Male, RCC)

Reflecting on the disparity in opportunities available to different people, a number of respondents drew on fatalistic explanations of Robert's situation suggesting he was lucky to 'be born clever' and 'have parents like that'. Some went further to suggest life outcomes and opportunities were, in some respects, preordained. These respondents felt that one's ability to take control over their life circumstances, opportunities and material environment was already determined by birth – affected by factors that extended well beyond their agentive responsibility:

Yeah, I think it's luck. It's just a struggle and it's chance. It's a chance...
[Interviewer: Do you think it's fair then?] *No, because that's what's planned out for him and everybody's got their own destination.*
[Interviewer: Do you think it's possible to change that destination?] *Not really.* (Jackie, Female, RCC)

A small minority of affluent respondents were conscious of the inequality of opportunity presented across the vignettes, and therefore felt that Robert was less responsible for his situation. However, on the whole, affluent respondents were much more inclined to ascribe personal responsibility to Robert for his 'good grades' and 'professional achievements'. Whilst some acknowledged fatalistic and structural factors affecting Robert's opportunities and agency, over two thirds emphasised his entitlement to and ownership of his success:

Oh he seems to be very responsible. You know he seems to have his head screwed on the right way. You know for his own personal situation. (Owen, Male, VAC)

Well he's created his situation yes. He's done well for himself so yes he's responsible for achieving that success. (Joe, Male, VAC)

From this, it is clear that the two sample groups differed dramatically in their intuitions about the role of structure in affecting Robert's life opportunities, actions and subsequent socio-economic position. Whilst no respondents blamed Robert for the inequality of opportunity from which he had benefited, some expressed concern that he was somewhat 'undeserving' of the capital he had accumulated as a result. Respondents were asked whether it was fair that Robert earned more than James. Respondents were told that both individuals worked hard and for the same number of hours per week. Respondents experiencing deprivation were more likely to interpret the question as a suggestion that the gap between their incomes was too great or that James was not paid enough. Half of respondents experiencing deprivation felt it was fair whilst the other half did not. For those who thought it was fair, a number said that Robert's qualifications justified him earning a higher wage. Others also said that Robert had 'a more up the chain job' where his skills were more socially and therefore economically valued. For the half of respondents that did not think it was fair, they recognised that Robert's profession may be more socially valued but did not think this meant James should receive such a low wage. These respondents felt uneasy about

justifying unequal pay as a result of qualifications or intelligence and felt effort would be a more just determinant of one's remuneration:

He's more hardworking aint he James but that's just how it seems to go innit? Yeah, James should really probably get more than Robert but it's not how it goes is it. Robert's paid more in definitely and because Robert's done that - he's a more valuable member of society in everyone's eyes but to me I personally think James works hard and puts in a lot of hours and keeps Britain ticking over probably in more ways than Robert does, so I think James should get a little bit more help. (Ashley, Female, RCC)

All but one affluent respondent felt that it was fair that Robert earned more than James. Interestingly, affluent respondents were much more likely to interpret the question as a suggestion that Robert and James should receive the same pay for the work that they do. These respondents were strongly opposed to such an idea and felt that there were many problems associated with such a 'socialist idea' or 'communist situation'. Despite not having information about his profession, a substantial number of respondents believed that Robert's employment contributed more to society and involved more 'sophisticated knowledge, understanding or work'. Perhaps, by virtue of his qualifications and remuneration, this was a reasonable assumption to make. However, respondents experiencing deprivation were not as likely to express such an opinion. Affluent respondents tended to say Robert's work was, categorically valuable, whereas deprived respondents tended to suggest that it was socially and economically valued. This subtle distinction in understanding 'value', points to a differential appreciation of the structural determinants of one's socio-economic position and consequent actions.

Yes I think it's fair. I don't think we can live in a society where everyone gets paid the same. Erm. Sometimes it's down to people's... erm... ambitions and drive but there's also the issue of people's abilities... So you could say that well... erm... James is less capable so why should he be penalised for that? But I think we can't go back... we can't have a communist state where everyone gets paid the same. (Rachel, Female, VAC)

Yes I do because, I don't know what Robert's job is, but he is probably contributing more to the company or the department that he works through from an intellectual sense and people like that are needed

because if... not everybody can be Queen Bee but you do need it for the hive to run properly... (Emma, Female, VAC)

Many affluent respondents oscillated between recognising Robert's good fortune and emphasising his hard work to justify the capital he had accumulated. Intelligence was recognised by some as a legitimate determinant of pay differentials. Some felt that any system that tried to countervail this was running against the 'natural order' and when discussing intellectual abilities and differences in pay, there was some resignation to a process that resembled natural selection:

Yes because it's a cruel world and some people are either more intelligent than others or have more physical ability or just get on more. It's just a fact of life. It's the human existence isn't it. (Peter, Male, VAC)

In this instance, it appears affluent citizens were less able to recognise the somewhat arbitrary distribution of natural abilities and talents and less willing to approve of mechanisms which attempted to counteract this. Interestingly, these individuals were less inclined to see closing the gap between rich and poor as desirable or feasible and more inclined to accept the current state of play.

6.7 Discussion

From the evidence, there is a propensity for the left wing to emphasise the structural determinants of poverty and right-wing people to stress individual behaviours and decision-making as a determining factor of inequality (Williams, 1984; Cozzarelli et al., 2001; Hopkins, 2009a). This appears to significantly affect attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities and the political and policy preferences that fall out as a result. The existing literature has tended to suggest that this can largely be explained by material and class interests. However, the majority of this literature fails to account for the phenomenological significance of material position. That is, how one's position is perceived or understood by oneself and others, and what individuals believe to be the determinants of their own situation and behaviour as a result. Material position and interest cannot be fully understood in isolation from lived experiences. The above analysis suggests that lived experiences substantially affect knowledge accumulation, which in turn, informs attitude formation and potentially the construction of material interests.

Any sociological account that entirely attributes or discounts agentic responsibility to an individual creates a false binary distinction that fails to capture the relationship between agency and structure (cf. Sewell, 1992). Whilst it is important to avoid causal determinism, there is an overwhelming body of evidence that behaviours, decisions and socio-economic trajectories are significantly informed by structural or fatalistic factors. The efficacy of human action will vary for different groups and in this study respondents experiencing deprivation were much more likely to recognise the structural determinants of their situation and others. This goes some way to explain why people in poverty find it hard to imagine becoming rich and equally rich people find it hard to imagine being poor (Shapiro, 2002). One respondent noted his own lack of awareness prior to experiencing financial hardship:

I didn't think of what could happen. I never thought I'd ever be made redundant. I never thought I'd be in a situation like this. (Tom, Male, RCC)

At the end of the day, it is not something that I made happen, it is actually just something that happened. And I think that's the message that's lost a lot of the time. (Liam, Male, RCC)

Some have suggested that people facing deprivation develop negative self-narratives (Creegan et al., 2009). However, Batty and Flint (2010) find that those drawing on structural explanations of their disadvantage are better able to mitigate the damaging effects of poverty on self-esteem. Reviewing the evidence, Haidt (2012) concludes that 'people who are able to construct a good narrative, particularly one that connects early setbacks and suffering to later triumph, are happier and more productive than those who lack such a 'redemption' narrative' (Haidt, 2012: 371). Those living in hardship are more inclined to feel powerless, trapped and lacking options or means to affect change in their lives (Beresford et al., 1999; Lister, 2004; Hooper, 2007). The barriers and constraints they face mean they have greater exposure to and knowledge of the systemic features shaping decision-making, agentic capabilities as well the causes of poverty. As a result of their lived experiences, affluent respondents were much less aware of how institutional, cultural, or economic factors may shape the agency and outcomes of individuals. Even when presented with such information, affluent respondents were inclined to view agency as resistant to or superseding structure. This finding supports much of the existing evidence that socio-economic status affects how individuals conceive of and exercise choice (Stephens et al.,

2011; Piff, 2014). For example, Kraus and Keltner (2013) found that wealthier people were much more likely to say their affluence, achievements and position were a product of their own doing. They were also more inclined to believe that societies functioned in a just manner and that people got what they deserved.

Importantly though, just as people's life experiences and circumstances are changeable, it appears that attitudes are malleable in conjunction. Through analysis of panel data, Owens and Pedulla (2014) find that when people lose their job or suffer a loss of income, their support for redistributive policies increase. The authors argue that this supports the idea that there are material underpinnings to political and policy preferences. However, the authors also concede that loss of income or employment may be explained by people becoming 'more empathic toward other individuals who are also down on their luck or facing structural barriers to economic security' (Owens and Pedulla, 2014: 1105). One affluent respondent noted how his own life experiences had informed his attitudes towards responsibility:

The possible assumption, is that somebody with a fairly reasonable employment history, hasn't been involved in that situation. I have been made redundant three times. I have, in periods of redundancy, stocked shelves in Sainsbury's, worked as a market trader type, and where I mentioned that – When I started my own business, the exchange rate went against me, so I got a job working for an events company, doing stewarding, and so on. Of course, not only was I there, working for the minimum wage, but most of my fellow employees were people who were – that was their sole source of income, on the minimum wage. If the company didn't have a lot of events to do, some weeks they were on the dole, and some weeks, they were out. So I've got a fairly good understanding, both from personal experience, and, as I say, from talking to other people in those situations, of what are the chances of this world – what the situation is. (Mark, Male, VAC)

Those affluent respondents that had had sustained interaction with or experience of structural constraints were much more likely to recognise the factors that might mitigate an individual's responsibility for their situation or action. Knowledge accumulation then, appears to mediate awareness of and appreciation of the relationship between structure and agency.

As a result of their lived experiences, deprived respondents demonstrated a stronger capacity to make use of their 'sociological imagination' to understand

individual action, decision-making and the socio-economic order. Their material and symbolic marginalisation meant they held a more 'vivid awareness of the relationship between experience and the wider society' (Mills, 1959: 3). In contrast, affluent respondents, who experienced financial and figurative validation were less cognisant of the systemic features shaping socio-economic and political life. Mills argues that the 'narrow' daily milieu the general public operates within alienates them

not only from the product and the tools of their labour, but from any understanding of the structure and the processes of production...men [and women] cannot see the top, and cannot state the issues that will in fact determine the whole structure in which they live and their place within it (Mills, 1999 [1956]: 322).

Mills claims that all those outside the military, economic and political oligarchy are similarly affected and that this 'narrow' daily milieu obscures individuals from the socio-structural dynamics that shape behaviour and circumstance (Mills, 1999 [1956]). However, the qualitative findings considered thus far suggest that those most perniciously affected by social structures, with an infringed capacity to affect its systems as a result, are better able to identify the interplay between agency and structure. Put another way, those with lived experiences of poverty and inequality seem better able to factor in 'the whole structure in which they live and their place within it' in their moral reasoning. The lived realities of deprivation compel individuals to reflect upon their socio-economic position within the context of their 'daily routines and look at them anew' (Mills, 1959).

Summarising the findings from a battery of psychological experiments, Kraus et al. (2012) find that knowledge and attitudinal differences relating to structure, agency and identity are stratified according to socio-economic position:

Differences in resources and rank that define lower- and upper-class contexts give rise to contextualist and solipsistic social cognitive patterns... The rich do indeed differ from the poor. With respect to the self, lower-class individuals show elevated sensitivities to threat and conceptualize the self in a communal fashion, whereas upper-class individuals experience an elevated sense of control and experience the self in personally agentic ways. With respect to perceiving the world, lower-class individuals are more empathic, explain events in terms of broad contextual forces, and conceive of social categories as cultural constructions, whereas upper-class individuals invoke dispositional

explanations to make sense of the world and essentialise social categories (Kraus et al., 2012: 562).

As illustrated above, this influences how individuals view the role and nature of responsibility in social citizenship ideals and practices. If people see and experience life as more determined by their own individual efforts they are more likely to value liberty over equality and their political and policy preferences will fall in line accordingly (Smith and Stone, 1989; Likki and Staerklé, 2015). They will support a socio-economic and political system that reflects the way they believe the world works but also one from which they feel they have gained most.

It would seem, then, that attitudinal differences relating to welfare, citizenship and social policy are shaped by material position but it is not entirely clear that this represents material interest. The knowledge accumulated through lived experiences instantiates the worldview of the general public, which may in turn shape material interests. It is important though to see attitude formation around welfare and citizenship as a process that extends beyond rational economic calculation or value systems, there are multiple cognitive processes preceding this that help explain and understand attitudinal difference. Alongside this study, there is a growing body of evidence that knowledge accumulation affects attitudes towards poverty and inequality (Iyengar, 1990; Kearns, 2014).

In light of increasing poverty and income inequality, these research findings are particularly pertinent. Socio-spatial inequality and residential segregation are increasingly prevalent across liberal welfare regimes, including the UK (Fry and Taylor, 2012; Bailey et al., 2013; Reardon and Bischoff, 2013). In addition, there has been a substantial decline in relative intergenerational income mobility over the last three decades (cf. Hills et al., 2010). As Reardon and Bischoff (2013) highlight, increasing economic and geographical segregation between rich and poor communities leads to marked disparities in exposure to certain social risks, environments and institutions. Essentially, 'the more extreme the income inequality, the greater the psychic distance between the have-nots and the haves' (Shapiro, 2002: 120). This results in an 'empathy gap' whereby wealthier individuals are increasingly divorced from the precarities of daily life and their ability to understand and identify with the circumstances, experiences and behaviours of others becomes limited (Mitchell, 2010).

As a result, the disintegration of social relations between different socio-demographic groups could be 'leading to a lack of understanding of, and

concern for, inequality' (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007: 35). Wilkinson and Pickett (2009: 57) claim that 'we are less likely to empathise with those not seen as equals; material differences serve to divide us socially'. Research suggests that the extent of interaction in mixed social environments and the socio-cultural distance between groups greatly affects attitude formation and support for redistributive policies (Fong et al., 2006; Christ et al., 2014). In addition though it also informs pro-social behaviour and inclinations. For example, lower and middle-income groups are known to give a greater proportion of their income to pro-social behaviour and charitable activities compared to upper income groups (Daniels, 2015). In addition, wealthier donors tend to give to colleges and cultural institutions whereas lower income groups tend to donate to food banks and social services (Daniels, 2015).

Against the backdrop of rising structural inequality, median voters are less exposed to the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and action. Without greater knowledge of and exposure to these processes, individuals are more inclined to adopt individualistic rather than structural explanations of poverty, which in turn, reduces support for redistributive policies. This appears to have occurred in the UK where there has been an ostensible hardening of attitudes towards welfare and an increasing distinction between deserving and undeserving welfare recipients (Park et al., 2012).

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter has found that deprivation and affluence generate unique forms of knowledge about the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and action. As a result of their lived experiences, deprived respondents were much more likely to recognise exogenous factors impinging on individual agency. Owing to their experiences and material position, affluent respondents exhibited less awareness of the systemic features of deprivation but particularly struggled to grasp the 'exercise of agency within structural inequality' (Orton, 2009). The vignettes presented to participants offered the opportunity to explore lay accounts of justice, fairness and responsibility that were grounded in specific examples. These enabled respondents to more fully consider the interplay between structure and agency. In spite of this, affluent respondents were still more inclined to emphasise the resilience of agentive capacities and individualise poverty. This significantly affected attributions of personal responsibility for hardship or affluence. The following chapter explores how this affects conceptions of social citizenship, specifically how

different groups view the nature and relationship between rights and responsibilities.

Chapter 7: Heterodox conceptions of social citizenship?

7.1 Introduction

As stated at the outset of this thesis, there is a tendency in the social policy literature to overlook the 'divergent discourses and practices of poor and better-off citizens' (Jordan and Redley, 1994: 156). New-Right thinkers contend that low-income welfare recipients exhibit attitudes and behaviours that are in many ways distinct from the rest of society (e.g. Murray, 1994). The following chapter gives some credence to this idea but challenges the manifestation and nature of this difference by exploring the repercussions of inclusion and exclusion, validation and contingency. Thus far, this thesis has demonstrated that attitudes relating to social citizenship are significantly affected by lived experiences. Chapter five confirms that lived experiences of deprivation decrease support for social citizenship rights and responsibilities. Chapter six illustrates that individuals (symbolically and materially) rewarded by the current citizenship praxis are much less likely to recognise the structural determinants of circumstance and were, therefore, more likely to individualise the responsibilities of citizens. This chapter reflects upon how this affects attitudes and behaviours relating to the constitutive features of social citizenship. In doing so, the chapter considers the orientations of *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* and explores the extent to which these two groups deviate or conform to the current ideals of citizenship that are expressed through and regulated in interpersonal, communal and institutional life.

A number of studies identify and categorise the ways in which people understand the rights and responsibilities of citizenship (e.g. Dwyer, 2000; Lister et al., 2003; Dean, 2004). Based on a study of public attitudes towards dependency, responsibilities and rights, Dean (2004) identifies fluid moral repertoires that are drawn upon or subjugated in public and political discourse. Dean (2004) finds that whilst most people appear to recognise collective interdependencies in their own and other people's lives, the majority still draw upon an entrepreneurial moral code that emphasises economic independence and a contractarian understanding of the relationship between rights and responsibilities. Dean (2004) argues that entrenched individualism in the public psyche and political landscape inhibits the capacity to endorse inclusive and solidaristic conceptions of citizenship. Current and forthcoming welfare

reforms are set to sharpen the focus on individualism and further undermine the collectivism embodied in common inalienable social rights. What is less clear is how individuals that are differentially affected by this development resist, endorse or resign to the dominant ideals of citizenship that are currently promulgated in the UK.

In a review of evidence on public attitudes to economic inequality, Orton and Rowlingson (2007) conclude that more research needs to focus on the values and discourses underpinning attitudes towards inequality, redistribution and citizenship. With this in mind, this chapter starts by drawing on different attitudinal and discursive categories developed by Dwyer (2000) and Dean (2004), to explore how different groups interpret and realise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. The following section considers how individuals attempt to either enforce or subvert existing citizenship structures. Finally, the chapter concludes by exploring the significance and nature of engagement exhibited by those experiencing affluence and deprivation.

7.2 Attitudes towards the Social Rights of Citizenship

The social rights of citizenship are an aggregation of services, outcomes and opportunities. To ask participants about these in a general capacity would have made discussion with and comparison between the two sample groups difficult. Respondents were therefore asked a number of questions about the specific right to social security. As stated in chapter three, the right to social security is particularly useful to consider because it is arguably the most important (Torry, 2013), but also the most contested social right (Wendt et al., 2011). It best demonstrates the relationship between rights and responsibilities and therefore the differing conceptions of social citizenship exhibited by respondents. These questions were preceded by a discussion of the vignettes summarised in chapter six and therefore enabled participants to ground their discussion in specific examples and various expressions of justice and fairness.

All questions asked about the social rights of citizenship were normative: participants were asked what they thought *should* be the case. Respondents quickly moved from an abstract ethical discussion to consider the benefits and drawbacks of existing welfare services and provisions within the UK. From this, participants situated their own beliefs alongside or in opposition to current social security policy. As a result, there were many caveats and stipulations attached to people's intuitions about what they felt the social rights of citizenship should be. As illustrated in much attitudinal research, there tends

to be much higher levels of support for the principles of welfare, rather the specificities of its implementation and use (Feldman, 2003; Roosma et al., 2013). Nonetheless, discussion of the right to social security offers an opportunity to explore the justificatory frameworks drawn upon to support or temper the rights of welfare citizenship. Overall, respondents drew upon a range of 'principles' (Dwyer, 2000) and 'moral repertoires' (Dean, 2004) to consider the terms upon which social rights should (or indeed, should not) be granted. Dwyer (2000) identifies three primary principles of welfare salient in public discussions of welfare: 'universal', 'contributory' and 'social assistance'. These will be considered in light of the findings discussed below.

Participants were initially asked whether everyone living in the UK should be entitled to benefits. Respondents excluded from the symbolic and material benefits of the current citizenship paradigm were much more likely to support this entitlement. Only one respondent experiencing deprivation did not believe this should be an entitlement and this individual was making a direct comparison between the meagre levels of welfare provision within her own (less economically developed) country of origin and the relatively generous forms of provision available in UK. Whilst she recognised her own dependence on social security provision, she worried about the moral and behavioural repercussions for those that saw social rights as an 'entitlement' rather than a 'privilege'. Whilst the overwhelming majority of respondents experiencing deprivation supported benefit provision, respondents differed in what they felt the terms of entitlement should be. Around half of those that supported 'universal' benefit provision drew upon humanist and solidaristic principles to explain their support for welfare rights. These individuals emphasised the inherent interdependencies and mutual vulnerabilities faced in personal and public life:

I think we should help each other out. There's always gonna be weak links in the chain aint there. And yeah I think we should be there for each other more because you never know what is gonna happen.
(Ashley, Female, RCC)

This typifies what Dean (2004: 67) has called a 'reformist' moral repertoire based on substantive social rights and collective ethical responsibilities and what Dwyer describes as a 'universal' principle of welfare. Irrespective of other factors, these individuals recognised that there were common life risks that should be buffered against through common associational links and activities. Other respondents that were supportive of benefit entitlements qualified their

endorsement. For some respondents, it was felt that entitlement should be predicated on the legal status of citizenship. Two respondents directly linked this to concerns around immigration. These individuals appeared to make sense of their own material grievances within the context of, what they saw as an unequal and thus unjust, distribution of provisions between (il)legal immigrants and themselves:

Not other communities, because they're coming from all over the world. Obviously, I don't think you'll be able to put that down. Well it's like how I'm trying to get rehoused, I'm only general needs but it's like my friend. She's trying to move over to [x location]. She's got a son who is epileptic. The house is not suitable for where she is. And there's Asians that got the house what she was bidding for over her. They've knocked walls down and stuff without permission. They said they were homeless to get the house but yet there's brand new cars outside and stuff. So to me there's a lot of fraud going on. Me myself, I'm trying to do everything legally and stuff to get moved and I don't have no rights in moving, I'm just general needs and everything else. Like I say, with that, I just don't think we have rights full stop. (Brooke, Female, RCC)

Whilst 'othering' typifies the 'discursive devices deployed to protect the self from social and psychic blame' (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013: 301), it also demonstrates the ways in which individuals attempt to justify or defend their own entitlement to ostensibly scarce resources (Cook et al., 2011: 734). Both respondents expressing this view had engaged very little in the paid labour market and would not be able to coherently defend their entitlement to benefits based on a (work-biased) 'contributory principle' of welfare citizenship. Equally, these individuals felt it difficult to endorse a 'universalist principle' when they felt that the benefits of welfare citizenship were being unevenly distributed. These individuals resorted to 'othering' whilst simultaneously drawing upon the 'social assistance principle' to stress that they were truly needy, rather than 'others' who were 'just abusing the system' (Dwyer, 2000).

Some respondents had previously engaged in the paid labour market but had since become unemployed owing to illness, redundancy or child-care commitments. These individuals were more likely to invoke contributory and social assistance principles of welfare citizenship (Dwyer, 2000). Whilst these respondents were critical of the 'centrality of paid work' (Patrick, 2012), they also felt that contribution, in its various forms, should inform the basis upon which social rights are guaranteed. These individuals felt that non-economic

contributions (such as childcare and volunteering) should be recognised in the current citizenship paradigm. Where this was not demonstrable, respondents felt that questions of need superseded concerns about contribution and should therefore inform entitlement to benefit receipt:

If they need it, then yes. Because the system, if the Welfare State is about your work, and part of your earnings go into the State - into this pot of money. So, if at some point, you are unable to work, because you are ill, had an accident, or you've been laid off, well that's what you've, it's like an insurance policy. And what is happening now, it's like you've paid for the insurance policy and it's like the insurance have turned around and said, well actually, we're not going to pay you, or we are going to pay you, but we are going to make you feel rubbish about it. (Lucy, Female, RCC)

In stark contrast to those experiencing deprivation, over half of all affluent respondents did not believe that everyone living in the UK should be entitled to benefits. The majority of these respondents drew upon survivalist or entrepreneurial moral repertoires to recommend minimal and targeted welfare provision. Other respondents invoked a strong contributory principle of welfare citizenship but narrowly focused on financial contribution via paid work as the key determinant of entitlement. In this sense, affluent respondents were more likely to advance contractarian terms of entitlement that were conducive to their own lived experiences and circumstances. By virtue of their employment status, these individuals could readily defend a contributory and contractarian basis of entitlement:

Yeah, I think the two things that would – two of the things that would dictate it; one would be yes, contribution and then I suppose number two would be really what you're questioning, your citizenship, I think, of – are you a citizen? You know, who are you? What gives you this right? And I suppose that would be then that citizenship is something that can either be earned or be sort of yours by birth. (Michael, Male, VAC)

On a number of occasions, affluent respondents expressed the notion that citizenship was something to be earned and this seemed to reflect their own success in securing validation in citizenship status and outcomes. Affluent respondents that were sceptical of a common entitlement to benefits were also concerned about questions of justice – that somebody might accrue resources

to which they had no claim. In certain instances, this appeared to countervail questions of need. One affluent respondent drew upon humanist principles to suggest that entitlement to benefits should be unconditional and universal. However, this respondent was something of an exception and self-identified as 'left-leaning'. Other affluent respondents with sustained exposure to or lived experiences of deprivation were more inclined to suggest that entitlement to benefits should be means-tested. Interestingly, both deprived and affluent respondents tended to conceive of benefits as the reserve of the low-income unemployed rather than something that the majority of the population receive in one form or another (see Figure 4 in chapter three).

When asked whether everyone living in the UK should be guaranteed a minimum level of income, respondents interpreted the question in different ways. Respondents experiencing deprivation understood the question as concerning whether there should be a minimum income threshold, below which nobody should fall. Implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) these individuals talked about the presence and moral significance of poverty in their discussion. As a result of their own experiences, these respondents were much more likely to agree that everyone should receive a minimum income. Whilst there were, again, some caveats concerning legal citizenship status, all but one respondent supported this. Respondents did not only see this as important for meeting basic and immediate human needs. It was also considered necessary so that people were able to effectively participate in and contribute towards society. Notably, respondents were also much more likely to raise issues concerning the minimum wage, working poverty and income inequality. It would seem these individuals were much more mindful of the broader economic and social processes that structured their exclusion. One respondent suggested that a guaranteed minimum income would have positive psychosocial effects:

Yeah, like if you're working like the minimum wage. If you're not working it would be nice to have a little bit more so you could have just a couple of treats that other people do get when they're working... Dunno, I would feel as though it's more fair. I would feel a lot better in my head I think. If everyone was a bit closer to the same it would feel more fairer. (Ben, Male, RCC)

Affluent respondents were much less likely to support the idea of a minimum income for everyone living in the UK. Only one respondent did and another was ambivalent. For those that did not support the right to a minimum income,

some were worried that such a policy would enable, and perhaps excuse, 'irresponsible' behaviour. Interestingly, these respondents tended to pathologise poverty, alcohol and drug dependency and focus on low-income individuals as the principle recipients of welfare:

No, I don't. Because I think some people have problems that society has created, say – addictions that will not help them spend their money wisely, and from that, they shouldn't just be giving carte blanche of: "Okay, you've got 15 grand a year, regardless". (Sophie, Female, VAC)

For affluent respondents, the overriding concern was that certain people receiving a minimum income might not deserve it. These individuals seemed less concerned with safeguarding the welfare of those exposed to deprivation and more preoccupied with tying individual income to individual effort. Affluent respondents were particularly uneasy about guaranteeing a minimum level of income and tended to endorse an 'entrepreneurial' or 'survivalist' moral repertoire (Dean, 2004: 67) to justify welfare conditionality:

No. Why? Because some people don't put any effort in at all themselves. (Rachel, Female, VAC)

This justificatory framework was typified by respondents stating that a minimum level of resources is something to be 'earned' rather than 'guaranteed'. Whilst there has been a great deal of political and public attention directed towards the (un-)deserving 'poor', there has been less attention directed towards the (un-)deserving 'rich' (Rowlingson and Connor, 2011). This social division of public and state paternalism is reflected in the attitudes of affluent respondents and is symptomatic of the current paradigm of responsible citizenship that appears to prevail over social rights.

Respondents were subsequently asked whether there was anything they thought the government should do for them as someone living in the UK. Despite qualitative fieldwork principally concerning the substance and principles of social citizenship, affluent respondents were keen to emphasise that the government could do more to protect their civil and political liberties. Affluent respondents tended to envisage a more residual level of government activity that reflected Nozickian principles of libertarianism (Nozick, 1974). These individuals felt that the State was interfering with their basic property rights without sufficiently protecting their civil liberties:

I don't feel from a financial point of view that I need help in terms of benefits or donations. However, I do feel that they [government] have

a responsibility to ensure that people like myself and my husband who have worked hard throughout our lives and contributed heavily into the system... are not penalised for being successful... They don't need to use penal rates for successful people. (Emma, Female, VAC)

For the above respondent, high financial remuneration was deemed an appropriate proxy for identifying 'successful people'. Embedded within this assumption, is that those reliant on 'benefits or donations' were in some regard 'unsuccessful'. This is demonstrative of an 'entrepreneurial' orientation that tends to characterise public and political discourse towards welfare citizenship (Dean, 2004: 67). Equally apparent in the above quotations is a desire for the government to take on a more neo-conservative role in socio-economic and civil life. When affluent respondents expressed a desire for the government to fulfil social rights, these tended to concern the right to healthcare and the right to a pension. These individuals emphasised the capacity of the government to operate as a moral authoritarian that might encourage desirable forms of behaviour amongst the polity to improve public health and the economy. Some respondents stated that the government had 'a responsibility to care for its citizens' but suggested it was more about people getting a return on their investment or their 'contribution to the collective pot'. Respondents experiencing deprivation suggested that there were range of things that the government had a responsibility to do. This extended well beyond civil and political rights and concerned the outcomes and opportunities institutionalised through welfare citizenship. A number of unemployed respondents wanted the government to do more to provide employment assistance to those capable of looking for work. These individuals felt the government had a responsibility to provide better, tailored support that enabled people to find gainful employment:

I think the government should. People who have worked for thirty years like me... two jobs most of the time. They should help us right? They should help us. Give us proper support to go and get a job but they won't. They do nothing. The Work Programme is a waste of time. Waste of time and a waste of money. I've got certificates. What good is food hygiene to me? What good is it? First aid. All right, I've learnt first aid but what am I actually gonna do with it. (Tom, Male, RCC)

Others that were unable to enter into or find paid employment felt the government had a responsibility to support and protect citizens. These respondents drew upon principles of care and respect to inform their support

for increased government spending on those facing barriers to paid employment. Some of these respondents also felt that the government should follow through on promises to appropriately educate and house certain groups. Many of these respondents did not see unemployment as a permanent feature of their biographies and planned to 'leave some kind of lasting legacy of contribution'. A significant number of deprived respondents also expressed an egalitarian or solidaristic conception of social rights that they felt should inform welfare citizenship:

I don't know. I think it would be lovely if everyone was the same or had the same and had the same chances but then everything would be equal and it's never gonna be like that is it. I don't know... Just my opinion yeah, it would be nice if everyone had equal chances – the same crack in life. The same things and what have you. (Ashley, Female, RCC)

As illustrated in the above quotation, respondents often simultaneously drew upon different (and indeed contradictory) moral repertoires to articulate what they felt the social rights of citizenship should be. This respondent suggests that there should be equality of opportunity but also that equality of outcome is a desirable objective. Such an orientation does not sit comfortably within Dean's (2004) taxonomy of moral repertoires but perhaps reflects more of a liberal egalitarian principle of welfare citizenship.

In many respects, when talking about what the responsibilities of the government should be, respondents were identifying a deficit in the current institutions and outcomes of social citizenship. Whilst, affluent respondents tended to underline an infringement on their civil liberties and property rights, respondents experiencing deprivation were more concerned with the inadequacy of social rights in meeting human need and enabling effective participation in society. In this regard, individuals appear to make sense of and advance their own conceptions of welfare citizenship in reference to their lived experiences.

To some extent, lived experiences appear to calcify the attitudes of those validated within the current citizenship praxis. Their lived experiences affirm the material and symbolic benefits of engaging in the Social Contract as it is currently conceived. As a result, affluent respondents are more likely to conceive of social citizenship rights in individualistic and contractarian terms. Despite high levels of support for social rights (see Table 2 in chapter five), these individuals drew upon 'entrepreneurial' or 'survivalist' moral repertoires

(Dean, 2004) to justify the distribution of and conditionality attached to social provisions. Concerns about contribution, effort and desert often superseded questions of poverty, inequality and participation. Notably, concerns about effort and desert appear to apply unevenly as affluent respondents were less likely to recognise the lack of correspondence between their own (relatively high) receipt of resources and their individual effort. As discussed, in chapter six, this appears to be symptomatic of a lack of awareness amongst affluent respondents about the structural determinants of socioeconomic outcome and agency. The terms upon which the Social Contract is institutionalised in the UK appear to be conducive to socio-economic and political life for affluent individuals. There was a small degree of divergence in the attitudes of affluent respondents. Some expressed concern about the State's infringement on civil liberties. This principally concerned issues relating to property rights and perhaps reflects the sharper end of entrepreneurial and survivalist discourse expressed by affluent participants. In addition though, it also highlights a greater tendency for affluent respondents to articulate a more libertarian conception of social citizenship.

In stark contrast to affluent respondents, those excluded from the figurative and applied potential of citizenship tended to diverge greatly in their attitudes and intuitions about social rights. Those with lived experiences of deprivation were more likely to exhibit solidaristic and universalistic orientations towards welfare citizenship that extended well beyond the existing institutional remit of social policy in the UK. These individuals tended to conceive of social citizenship in collectivist terms that reflected a concern for and appreciation of how structural factors impinge on individual agency and significantly shape socioeconomic outcomes and opportunities. Many problematized the ethical category of poverty to invoke a thicker conception of social rights. Ostensibly, this raises a contradiction between the quantitative and qualitative findings of this study. Lived experiences of deprivation were found to reduce levels of support for social rights (see Table 6 in chapter five). However, it appears that respondents experiencing deprivation were more likely to reject the prevailing (conditional) conception of social rights and advance an alternative to the existing paradigm of social politics. The hegemonic conception of social rights centres on a contractarian basis of justice and fairness. Those experiencing deprivation struggled to engage with social citizenship on these terms. For some, this was because their entitlement to social rights could not be defended according to work-biased contributory prescriptions. More broadly though, the lived experiences and consequent knowledge accumulated by these participants challenged core assumptions inherent within citizenship

ideals. The purported performance of state apparatus and ethical coherence of distributional justice (in its current form) did not resonate with the outcomes and opportunities of *Residual Contingent Citizens*. As a result, many were critical of current social policies and outlined an alternative means by which to realise the promises of social citizenship.

7.3 Attitudes and Behaviours relating to the Responsibilities of Social Citizenship

When discussing social citizenship, there is some evidence to suggest that people find it 'much easier to talk about responsibilities than rights' (Lister et al., 2003: 251). When asked what they think it means to be a responsible citizen, respondents articulated a range of attitudes towards the responsibilities of social citizenship and these extended well beyond institutional and juridical duties. Deprived respondents were more likely to see responsibility as something expressed in relation to and with others. Rather than focusing on individual responsibilities, these individuals grounded conceptions of responsibility in principles of collectivism and solidarity. A number of respondents felt that care, respect and dignity should be core inalienable features of both private and public life.

I think it's about a way of life, rather than money. Being responsible towards other human beings, just treat everyone with some respect and dignity. (Amber, Female, RCC)

In order to realise these goals many deprived respondents believed there should be common and collective responsibilities expected of all citizens. It was felt that these responsibilities should be embedded within institutional action and public provision but also through interpersonal and communal duties.

You're responsible for everybody. Everybody's safety. (Tom, Male, RCC)

Being honest, love your neighbours as you love yourself. (Beth, Female, RCC)

In many respects, these respondents viewed care 'as a constitutive responsibility and right of social citizenship' (Kernshaw, 2005: 4).

Some respondents experiencing deprivation also suggested that work and 'respecting the law' were important responsibilities of citizenship. However,

this “hyper-conventional” valuing of work’ was not as prevalent as it has been in other qualitative research with economically marginalised groups (MacDonald, 2008). Interestingly, deprived respondents tended to talk about responsibilities in a way that stressed a duty to others, rather than a duty to the State. Care, work and obeying the law were not only seen as significant in isolation, they were also seen as having repercussions at an aggregate level. In contrast, affluent respondents tended to talk about responsibilities in more fragmented terms. An exchange-orientated conception of citizenship appeared to pervade much of the discussion regarding responsibilities with these individuals. As a result, affluent respondents tended to individualise the fulfilment of responsibilities and underplay their actual and potential effects on other citizens.

Affluent respondents tended to see economic self-sufficiency and self-reliance as a cornerstone of responsible citizenship. In keeping with other research (e.g. Baxter and Kane, 1995), individuals were particularly contradictory about their own valorised independence and the legitimate dependency of their families. Some felt that responsibility was exemplified by financial contribution through the fulfilment of tax liabilities. Affluent individuals were also more inclined to stress the importance and value of paid work. A number of respondents went further to suggest that *hard* work was a signifier of responsible behaviour. For these individuals it was important to work as hard as you can, rather than as much as you need to.

To work hard, as hard as you can. To pay your taxes. (Sophie, Female, VAC)

By contrast, deprived respondents were more likely to see work and income as a means to live ‘a manageable life’. Not only did affluent respondents conceive of *hard* work as an entrepreneurial enterprise, they also saw this as a duty of citizenship. That is, to work towards economic and social independence:

Be prepared to look after yourself and your own family. That they get on with their neighbours and that they’re independent I suppose. (Rachel, Female, VAC)

Attitudes towards these responsibilities were couched in a contractarian framework of justice whereby claims to the benefits of citizenship were predicated on certain behaviours:

The rights that you have come with responsibilities and you have to contribute to be part of it. (Michael, Male, VAC)

Where possible these people are responsibly planning and carrying out their own lives so that, even if something goes awry, they are actually planning to look after themselves and planning to get proper work and doing something alternative if it does not happen, fine, but just not giving up and having a life of existing on benefits without actually contributing anything to the system. (Emma, Female, VAC)

Whilst the majority of affluent respondents expressed such ideals, a small number also emphasised the importance of care and respect. These individuals were much more likely to cite and recognise structural factors shaping the lives and outcomes of individuals. This appeared to affect how they viewed the conditional relationship between rights and responsibilities but also the content and nature of responsibilities:

I think we need to look after people who can't look after themselves. (Holly, Female, VAC)

Affluent respondents discussed a range of behaviours relating to responsible citizenship. Through the payment of taxation, some affluent respondents felt they were fulfilling their social responsibilities. Some discussed more abstract values such as 'living within a society and not neglecting others' whilst other respondents focused on more specific and mundane examples such as 'picking up your own litter'. At some point during the interview, almost all affluent respondents stressed the importance of obeying the law. This procedural behaviour appeared to be seen as an antecedent to forms of responsible social citizenship such as 'taking part in society'.

When thinking about whether all people living in the UK should have the same responsibilities, there was a high degree of ambivalence amongst respondents. There was a greater tendency for affluent respondents to suggest that the responsibilities of social citizenship should be standardised across the population:

Yeah. I think they should be. I think maybe if you applied, like, a minimum set, you know, that – this is the sort of minimum set of social responsibilities that everybody should have, knowing that you can take on whatever else you want. But I think there should be a sort of baseline of what we might accept from each other. (Joe, Male, VAC)

However, the majority of respondents across both sample groups felt that the responsibilities of social citizenship should be differentially distributed. This tempered the contributory and contractarian principle previously advanced by some respondents: 'everybody can't put the same back in'. Many affluent and deprived respondents recognised that there were concessionary factors that prevented people from fulfilling certain responsibilities: 'it depends on the individual'.

... should have the same responsibilities? No. Because you're going to have older people, who need care. You're going to have disabled people, mental and physical, who need care. You're going to have mothers of young children, who are single mothers. (Sophie, Female, VAC)

Young single parents, children, the elderly, and individuals with physical or intellectual impairments were all identified as groups that, in certain instances, may be exempt from citizen duties. Implicitly, and occasionally explicitly, the working age and physical ability of respondents seemed to be a determining factor for respondents.

Well clearly if somebody is disabled or old or young then they're not going to have the same responsibilities. But I think healthy people of working age should all have the same responsibilities. (Emma, Female, VAC)

Respondents experiencing deprivation were more inclined to emphasise mitigating circumstances and focus on the specificities that might preclude someone from engaging in the paid labour market. These respondents were also more likely to recognise that (partial) exemption from citizenship responsibilities was an inevitable feature of the life course. This is perhaps unsurprising given their own life histories and circumstance. By virtue of their lived experiences, these individuals were more able to appreciate situations and life events that might prevent someone from fulfilling the duties of social citizenship.

A minority of affluent respondents believed that there were certain responsibilities of citizenship that should be inalienable. These individuals drew a distinction between 'economic' and 'non-economic' duties. It was felt that the 'non-economic' duties of civil and political citizenship should always be upheld, irrespective of the circumstances of the individual, whereas greater contingency should be granted on the 'economic' duties of social citizenship.

A number of respondents across both sample groups suggested that individuals earning a higher wage had a greater responsibility to financially contribute to the collective project of welfare.

The wealthier people should have more responsibility than the less well-off, and should contribute more, financially particularly. (Mark, Male, VAC)

Notably, more respondents experiencing deprivation saw this as important function of redistribution and poverty alleviation.

It should be different responsibilities depending on who you are. People that are working, with big families, a couple of cars and that – they should be doing a little bit more to help people out on their street who are poorer. It would be nice for them to help them out a bit. (Ben, Male, RCC)

When asked what forms of behaviour they felt should be recognised as responsible, many respondents living in affluence and deprivation stressed the importance and value of volunteering and equated it specifically with citizenship. For some deprived respondents, volunteering was particularly important because it went above and beyond what they saw as the formal requirements of citizenship. These individuals saw volunteering as enhancing (rather than regulating) the quality of social relations and standards between individuals:

I actually think it [volunteering] is more important than paid work because it's a choice. Because, you could easily not do it. You don't have to do it. And it is, and sometimes some of the volunteer work is harder than some paid work, because it is a choice and it is more valuable and it is actually supporting society, because they do not have to pay for it. Some people who volunteer, get some minimal expenses, and some people just don't get anything at all. But I think, it is about improving people's quality of life. (Liam, Male, RCC)

A number of these respondents derived their own sense of self-worth from helping and supporting others. In many instances, this was done in a way that justified their entitlement to social security and rejected dominant notions of responsible citizenship.

And I feel that they everybody is all for themselves. I mean that has come from the government. Yes, for them worthy is about what you do

with your money, and your work, it's not about what kind of person you are. (Lucy, Female, RCC)

These respondents helped friends, family, neighbours in various ways. Some offered companionship and support for those isolated from their local community. Others raised money for charities by supporting community events and activities. A number of respondents provided emergency care, food and manual labour to safeguard the welfare of neighbours and the elderly. Many did this because they preferred it to 'being sat around' but these individuals also felt that it demonstrated their contribution to society, outside the paid labour market, and consequent claim to the rights of social citizenship. Whilst a voluntary ethic appeared to be prevalent amongst those experiencing deprivation in qualitative fieldwork, poverty, unemployment and area deprivation have previously been identified as factors that tend to reduce the degree and frequency of civic engagement and participation (e.g. Mohan and Bulloch, 2012). Equally, quantitative findings from the 2005 Citizenship Survey suggest that informal kinship and support networks tend to be lower amongst those experiencing deprivation (see Table 8) (Kitchen, 2006).

Table 8: Comparison of means for different aspects of informal kinship and support

	'Deprived'	'Affluent'	All
Number of people a respondent has given help or support to in their household in the last month	1.60*	1.62*	1.61
Number of people a respondent has received help or support from in their household in the last month	1.41*	1.45*	1.43
Number of relatives a respondent has had contact within the last month	3.78	4.72	4.40
Number of relatives a respondent has given help or support to in the last 12 months	2.09	3.33	2.92
Number of relatives a respondent has received help or support from in the last 12 months	1.98	2.61	2.40
Number of instances where respondent has given informal voluntary help in last 12 months	1.66	2.22	2.03

*not a statistically significant difference

Ostensibly, these findings challenge the assumption that lower socio-economic groups are 'city survivors', building strong networks of interpersonal social capital to cope with precarity (Power, 2007; Young and Wilmott, 2013). However, surveys attempting to quantify rates of civic engagement and participation tend to capture and favour the activities of middle and upper class, older individuals (e.g. Davies, 2014). This obscures the extent of participation amongst lower-income groups and communities. Such a weakness is apparent in the Citizenship Survey. Behaviours such as 'looking after a property or a pet for someone who is away' were deemed to be an example of help or support and evidently favoured those with a higher level of capital and resources at their disposal (see Appendix A.3.2). Kearns and Parkinson (2001) suggest that 'the neighbourhood for poorer people has more often served as an arena for 'bonding' social capital that enables people to 'get by', rather than as a platform for 'bridging' social capital that enables people to 'get on' (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Kearns and Parkinson, 2001: 2105).

This was clearly the case in qualitative interviews with deprived respondents who saw help and volunteering as a way of managing uncertainty and life risks. By comparison, affluent respondents tended to see support and informal voluntary help as a way of building upon and improving the social and public goods already available within their community. This supports evidence that social class positively predicts self-serving orientations and behaviours (Dubois et al., 2015). These attitudes tended to arise from a feeling that there were limitations upon what the state, civil servants and public institutions could achieve. Some affluent respondents talked about how community and voluntary work could help improve the local environment through activities such as painting railings, planting flowers and tidying pavements. Others focused more on broader responsibilities relating to education and healthcare:

They talk about people who lack education or aspiration but you've got to be responsible for bringing up your own children. You know, you're taking on a huge responsibility with children and understand first and foremost when you understand what responsibilities you have. If you're not responsible. You don't want to spend more on people, have more laws - we've got to take responsibility for ourselves. Take more control of our own lives. (William, Male, VAC)

This final quotation demonstrates the distinction in attitudes between deprived and affluent respondents. As previously discussed, citizenship ideals currently

promulgate a 'social policy orientation privileging labour force attachment' (Kershaw et al., 2008: 183) in the UK. In many instances, unemployed respondents resisted this focus on paid work and emphasised care, respect and dignity as organising principles of social and economic life. These individuals tended to see responsibilities as a form of collective action and cooperation between individuals. They were also more likely to recognise the mitigating circumstances that might preclude someone from performing active citizenship. In response, they tended to engage in forms of voluntary help and support that both recognise and try to address disadvantage and inequality in their local area. In summary, lived experiences of deprivation appear to induce a 'wider 'differentiated', pluralist, citizenship, which embraces diversity and addresses socio-structural divisions' (Lister, 2002b: 191). In contrast, affluent respondents were more likely to endorse an 'employment-orientated vision of active citizenship' (Kershaw et al., 2008: 184). These individuals tended to individualise responsibilities and focus on tax liabilities, financial contribution and economic self-sufficiency. An atomised conception of social life privileged dependency on familial, but not State resources. Many agreed that the responsibilities of social citizenship should differ according to age and ability, but this was tempered by a belief that 'all able-bodied people should work'. Whilst affluent respondents gave informal voluntary help, activities tended to be 'self-serving'. Overall, it would seem that individuals conform or struggle against the existing citizenship paradigm in ways that reflect their own experiences and thus conceptions of social justice and citizenship.

7.4 Resistance and Resignation to the Dominant Citizenship Paradigm

Amidst the hegemonic ideals and practices of social citizenship in the UK, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the beliefs, motivations and outcomes of citizens. As illustrated above, affluence and deprivation represent two extreme ends of both the material continuum but also the value systems of those subject to its condition. The following section explores how citizens make sense of and respond to this phenomenon and the public and market institutions involved in its reproduction. Deprivation represents a paucity of social goods that are notionally guaranteed under the auspices of citizenship. In both a material and symbolic sense, those experiencing deprivation are aggrieved by the current function and outcomes of social policy. As a result many were critical of the current socio-economic and political system and felt they lacked core public provisions and goods to which they were entitled.

Some individuals challenged what they saw as a meagre level of financial and social worth attached to their role in society. One individual in receipt of Carer's Allowance condemned the low level of social security she received to look after a relative. She asserted that *'I am helping other people and that's why I'm definitely worth as much as the Queen'* (Jackie, Female, RCC). Other respondents, who had since become unemployed, problematized the inadequate level of remuneration and recognition they had previously received for low-skilled work:

There should be a system that respects people that have worked for many, many years. They've paid taxes, they've lost a job. Deal with them fairly. These people are not benefits frauds; these are hardworking people who keep this society, this country running and have for many, many years. (Selina, Female, RCC)

A number of respondents also felt there was a lack of consistent and constructive support available for those unable or attempting to transition into employment. Criticisms concerned poor public services and training, but also the derisory level of benefits provided to clothe, feed and house poor families. One respondent suggested that there was a lack of understanding on the part of politicians, policymakers and practitioners. To this respondent, those making decisions about welfare had little grasp of what it was like to live on a low income or benefits:

I would say, like, all these people...you know, these big politicians and them. They need to come and live in our shoes, to find how life really is. Do you understand? Scandalous. It's really, really scandalous, honestly. (Jade, Female, RCC)

For some individuals experiencing deprivation, there was an attitude and approach of passive forbearance. Whilst these individuals were critical of the current system, they felt, to a great extent, powerless to affect change and challenge the dominant citizenship paradigm. These individuals felt that the terms upon which social rights were granted and responsibilities were conceived should be reformulated. However, the consuming nature of poverty in the private sphere appeared to prevent these individuals from communicating and acting upon their concerns in the public sphere (Bennett, 1991: 330). As a result, some deprived respondents resigned themselves to (and indeed, withdrew from) the current citizenship paradigm:

Why would the government care about what we got to say...we're down there [gesturing to the floor]...we're nothing to them...this aint gonna change a thing... I don't see the point. (Ashley, Female, RCC)

These individuals tended to conform and perform according to the requirements and expectations set out by service and benefit providers. Some had faced benefit sanctions in the past and were therefore acutely aware of the repercussions of challenging state apparatus. This is demonstrative of how 'poverty governance as a disciplinary regime' has the capacity to regulate behaviours and create new forms of self-discipline and submission (Schram et al., 2010: 739). Despite its governmental capacity (Jones and Novak, 1999), a number of respondents experiencing deprivation actively resisted the dominant citizenship paradigm. These individuals contacted councillors, lodged complaints with housing associations and local authorities and entered into disputes with JobCentre Plus. All these respondents were currently engaged in some sort of activity to secure the social rights to which they believed they were entitled. In certain instances, they were successful. In others, respondents were 'still fighting':

It's like the bedroom window upstairs, we had to put a lock on it because my son could lift the handle up. So we asked if they could put a lock on it. 'Well not really it's a fire hazard'. So I says well, if..I don't know if you heard about the boy that fell at [x place] from the Tower Block. I said 'what's it take for me to get something done in my house?'. For my son to open that window and fall out. He'll end up dead. And it finally happened... I haven't had a sink in my bathroom for ten years. I reported it, reported it, reported it and nowts been done about it. (Brooke, Female, RCC)

These individuals were engaged in more procedural means of critiquing and extending the current benefits of social citizenship. Others took a more adversarial and dissident approach. One respondent diverged from the dominant ideal of an acquiescent and grateful claimant (Howe, 1985), to confront the decision of her benefit advisor. A decision was taken to withdraw her benefits and she challenged this on the basis of facts. This soon led to a verbal confrontation between claimant and advisor:

I told him to "Fuck off," really, and I told him, "What do you think I'm going to do?" It might be something like three months at a time, like, what do you think I'm going to do? Not eat? Do you really, truly think

I'm not going to eat? I just told him, "Fuck off," and I walked out. (Amber, Female, RCC)

This respondent was subsequently subjected to extreme material hardship. She recounted instances of looking for 'food in bins' and 'not having heating on'. Nevertheless, she seemed happy with her decision to confront the benefit advisor rather than 'just take it'. Some respondents were less adversarial but were still subversive in their approach to claiming their social rights. Two respondents said that they had previously claimed for social security whilst taking on undeclared part-time or temporary work. These individuals justified their actions by saying that they 'couldn't survive' on their wages alone and that claiming provided some stability when transitioning in and out of work. This echoes existing qualitative findings that suggest 'fiddling' is primarily done out of economic necessity and includes a work ethic (MacDonald, 1994; Dean and Melrose, 1996). Arguably though, it also demonstrates an unwillingness to accept the terms and conditions of active citizenship that are felt in low-skilled, low-paid, precarious work. Marginality and exclusion typify the lives of those trapped in a low-pay, no-pay cycle (Shildrick et al., 2010). Benefit fraud within this context can be seen as an active rejection of (and remedy to) the existing citizenship discourse that insists work is the best form of welfare (Johnston, 2009). Regev-Messalem (2013) suggests that benefit fraud can be understood as 'a socio-political struggle for inclusion and deservedness—as a political act that reflects an alternative concept of citizenship (Regev-Messalem, 2013: 993). In this regard, there were multiple types and levels of 'rational resistance' (Jordan, 1998: 182) enacted by those experiencing deprivation.

In rather different ways, and for equally different reasons, some affluent respondents also engaged in activities that attempted to challenge the existing citizenship paradigm. As previously stated, the contractarian basis of active citizenship had greater purchase for those able to identify and enjoy the benefits of engaging in the Social Contract. However, there were a number of notable exceptions where individuals attempted to reformulate citizenship structures according to their own value systems and advantage. Affluent respondents tended to raise concerns about the overbearance of the State and its infringement on civil liberties:

They can be very difficult to get these things done because the minute you want to do them, there are hurdles put in your way. (Michael, Male, VAC)

Many resigned themselves to these inconveniences. However, others were more proactive in seeking alternative ways of realising their own means and ends. Most commonly, affluent respondents did so in a way that exercised their pre-existing civil and political rights. Many engaged in formal volunteering and civic engagement to affect changes in public services and their local area. As noted in chapter five, these individuals were much more likely to feel that they could affect change and recounted several examples of where this had been possible. A number of affluent respondents were active members of local community and church groups. Some regularly attended neighbourhood meetings, one was a trustee of a local charity and another was a school governor at the school attended by their children. Rather than *resisting* and *reacting against* public and communal institutions, affluent respondents were more often actively engaged in altering citizenship structures *from within*. In this respect, the behaviours and attitudes of deprived respondents can be seen as a defence of basic liberties, whereas the actions of affluent respondents can be seen as an exercise and execution of basic liberties. Affluent respondents tended to work with the procedural grain of citizenship to alter its function or improve the quality of certain social rights.

Whilst many affluent respondents expressed disaffection with 'red tape' and 'bureaucracy', only a smaller number actually undertook activities to *circumvent* existing citizenship structures. These individuals engaged in behaviours such as guerrilla planting, community fundraising, and undertaking repairs without the necessary approval and documentation from the local authority:

All these railings down the park are always stained and look like crap, so why don't we get some wire brushes and go and paint them all white? Yeah, but you've got on high-vis jackets and health and safety and mission statement, 10 foot barriers, you know? You kind of get bedded down then in all this stuff by the end of which the fence is just rusted and fallen away and people have fallen by the wayside who just kind of give up. And the alternative is, you know, if we want – if we actually really do want those things, let's go and paint them in the dark, you know? We'll go at 2 O'clock in the morning and do – and in the morning, it'll have just happened. (Michael, Male, VAC)

Notably, all these individuals had substantial financial capital and resources at their disposal. Previous research suggests that those with a higher economic and social status are more effective at initiating and coordinating

collective action (cf. Clark et al., 2006). Overall, affluent respondents engaged in a variety of activities to either endorse or reshape the ethic and outcomes of social citizenship. The contractarian basis of rights and responsibilities was conducive and indeed endorsed by many respondents. However, some respondents engaged in activities to maximise their autonomy over public goods and their socio-economic and political lives.

Chapter five illustrates that extant material inequalities reflect institutionalised and reflexive status hierarchies between 'citizens' and 'non-citizens'. Based on the analysis above, it appears that these status inequalities gave rise to divergent strategies to make sense of and engage with the dominant paradigm of citizenship prevailing in the UK.

7.5 From Welfare Deficits to Institutional Disengagement

The shifting function and governance of social and economic policy has resulted in a variegated praxis and experience of social citizenship in the UK. In response to this fragmentation in the public realm, Ellison (2000) argues that there are two primary forms of engagement manifest in the social politics of late modernity:

Actors will engage as *citizens* in one of two ways, depending on how the prevailing social and political context and the particular configuration of demands either promotes or inhibits collective action and the creation of new forms of belonging. First, citizenship can be understood as 'proactive engagement'. Here social actors are able to exploit a particular political 'conjuncture' to further their own interests (or those of others) through significant interventions in those dimensions of the public sphere which privilege or 'recognise' these particular types of action... Second, and perhaps more significantly, citizenship can be characterised as 'defensive engagement'. 'Defence' has always been an integral aspect of citizenship, but its meaning has been radically transformed from earlier associations with universalist, state collectivist and, above all, passive forms of defence against specified risks, particularly in the context of the socially protective Keynesian Welfare State, to an association with the defensive strategies of collective actors. 'Engagement' is used to denote the fact that citizens increasingly have to *defend themselves* against the erosion of their social rights created by the persistent and occasionally dramatic demands of rapid economic, social and political change (Ellison, 2000: 1.2-1.3).

Due to the increasing multiplicity of identity and relations, Ellison (2000) argues that 'temporary solidarities' may arise around specific policy issues that transcend entrenched social divisions. Nevertheless, Ellison (2000) also suggests that those with greater and fewer resources are more likely to enact different forms of engagement, 'proactive' and 'defensive' respectively. This tendency is not so much materially determined, but shaped according to the 'range of 'discourses' and ideologies' that tend to coalesce around socio-political and material categories.

Whilst this may result in a 'fractured social politics', the above analysis suggests that this fragmentation is perhaps more *fixed* than anticipated. In certain instances, variegated citizenship may promote 'increasingly porous social and political identities' (Ellison, 2000: 1.5). However, thus far, this thesis has suggested that there are increasingly hermetic formations of identity and status, particularly for those marginalised according to the current citizenship paradigm. As citizen identities, status and economic outcomes become increasingly entrenched for these individuals, so do the proclivities of their engagement.

Affluence and deprivation shape the attitudes and behaviours of individuals in patterned ways that can, in certain instances, further propagate inequalities of status and outcome. The power manifest in the status and outcomes of *Validated Active Citizens* equips these individuals with the necessary resources to *proactively* affect change and reformulate the terms of citizenship. By contrast, those excluded from the bases of citizenship status and entitlement resort to *defensive* actions and attitudes to reconcile their lived experiences with the failed promises of social citizenship. With this in mind, the fragmentation of social politics is becoming increasingly fixed according to status and material hierarchies arising out of citizenship practices and differing forms of engagement. This is particularly problematic for the future of welfare politics and outcomes because 'defensive forms of engagement are more likely to be organised around social divisions already shaped by existing discourses, while proactive forms could push beyond these discursive parameters' (Ellison, 2000: 7.3).

As the causes and consequences of poverty and inequality become ever more complex and multifarious, it becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile these with pre-existing conceptual and ideological schema. As a result, existing discourses lack the theoretical and pragmatic tools to make sense of and address the challenges faced by post-industrial societies. Proactive forms of engagement that transcend current forms of thinking are not only likely to be

more tractable in political and policy terms, they are also more prone to privilege those that endorse the current citizenship paradigm.

The effective utilisation of certain urban spaces and infrastructures by better-off groups through strategies of proactive (dis)engagement splinters not only service provision but further, represents a retreat from collective understandings of citizenship and social belonging. (Ellison and Burrows, 2007: 310)

This is likely to further the individualisation of politics and welfare in future and reinforce the processes that lead to material accretion for some and welfare deficits for others. This poses significant challenges for the health of democracy and the legitimacy of social citizenship in its current and future form.

Thus, 'proactive' and 'defensive' forms of engagement become particularly important for and by those suffering economic and social marginalisation. In spite of this, there was a high level of 'institutional disengagement' apparent amongst this group. This is perhaps unsurprising given that both the ability and inclination to 'act as a citizen requires a sense of agency, the belief that one can act and affect change' (Lister, 2003: 39). As illustrated in Table 7 in chapter five, *Residual Contingent Citizens* are much less likely to feel they can affect change or engaged in collective organisation or co-operation in their local area. Many of those deprived respondents participating in qualitative fieldwork were cynical about the interests and motivations of policymakers, practitioners and politicians. They were sceptical about the ability of these groups to understand and therefore assist in tackling the challenges they faced in personal, interpersonal and structural life. For deprived respondents that had been involved in forms of defensive engagement, attempts at resistance and protest were often met with little, if any, recognition or positive change (material or otherwise). Such experiences undermine citizen identity and agency and corrode the notion that it is possible to realise one's right to have rights (Isin and Wood, 1999). Many of those defensively engaged were therefore concerned with short-term, remedial concessions. Consequently, the welfare politics of deprivation tended to centre on matters of survival, rather than questions of future progress (Murphy, 2014). At times, this included instances of defensive engagement whereby individuals sought to protect their 'already precarious ability to prosper' against 'increased competition for scarce jobs and welfare services' (Cook et al., 2011: 734).

Voter turnout and formal civic engagement is particularly low amongst those in a position of socio-economic hardship (Pattie et al., 2003; Birch et al., 2013).

For example, in the 2010 general election 'individuals in the highest income group were 43 per cent more likely to vote than those in the lowest income group' (Birch et al., 2013: 8). However, Manning and Holmes (2013: 480) argue that this 'disengagement is a critical rather than apathetic response to mainstream politics'. Indifference hardly ever characterised the attitudes and behaviours of respondents experiencing deprivation. These individuals vividly articulated conceptions of social citizenship, rights and duties that challenged the existing paradigm. However, this rarely translated into expansive forms of action and engagement. Whilst there was some evidence to suggest that these individuals were 'preoccupied with material rather than post-material issues' (Manning and Holmes, 2013: 481), deprived respondents also felt that civic and political processes were not conducive to either their material or post-material concerns. As a result, many expressed frustration that social politics and social citizenship failed to attend to their pressing and discursive needs and acted in ways that were most exigent on their time, health and well-being. In short, welfare deficits appeared to lead to institutional disengagement with the procedural substance, if not the principles, of social citizenship. These individuals acted defensively where necessary, but withdrew or disengaged where it was not felt possible to affect change more broadly.

7.6 Conclusion

From the above analysis, it is clear that affluence and deprivation generate fault lines in the attitudes and orientations of individuals. This chapter has shown that these two groups tend to develop distinct discourses of citizenship that reflect their lived experience of socio-economic and status inequality.

Affluent respondents tended to adopt a contractarian understanding of the relationship between rights and responsibilities. These individuals were more inclined to believe that the social rights of citizenship should be predicated on one's fulfilment of duties. They conceived of rights and responsibilities in atomised terms that underplayed the interconnectedness and interdependency inherent in private and public life. These individuals commended a framework of justice that focused on contribution, effort and desert. Successful and responsible citizenship was seen as principally related to one's engagement with the paid labour market. A number of affluent respondents suggested that there needed to be a greater focus on the individual, rather than collective, responsibilities of social citizenship. Whilst some recognised the mitigating circumstances that might preclude someone

from the responsibilities of citizenship, they still felt that 'in an ideal world', citizenship responsibilities should be the same. By and large, affluent respondents endorsed the terms of social citizenship in a way that reflected their own positive experience of it. Where this was not the case, individuals attempted to alter citizenship structures *from within* or circumvent them all together by making use of their own capital to achieve particular ends.

As a result of their lived experiences, deprived respondents tended to adopt a more universal and solidaristic conception of social rights. Deprivation appeared to induce principles of collectivism and mutual vulnerability to inform the content and function of public provision. Many were critical of the work-centric approach to social citizenship and emphasised alternative forms of behaviour and contribution that could be deemed responsible. Care, dignity and respect were valorised and social reciprocity was seen as an important duty to others rather than the State. Overall, lived experiences of deprivation cultivated counter-hegemonic discourses that deviated from the ideals and practices venerated by affluent respondents. This heterodox conception of social citizenship was enacted through various behaviours that sought to, or by proxy, challenged the existing paradigm and outcomes of social politics.

These divergent conceptions of social citizenship occurred alongside unique forms of (dis-) engagement. The *fixed fragmentation* of social politics has benefited those validated by the dominant citizen paradigm. Those able and desiring to proactively engage can alter the terms of social citizenship in ways that meet their material and discursive ends. By contrast, lived experiences of deprivation tend to lead to defensive forms of engagement that pursue short-term substantive concessions without challenging the overall conception of social citizenship. This has a number of significant repercussions for the future direction and outcomes of social citizenship that 'deprives the public sphere of insightful viewpoints and diminishes the overall functional effectiveness of liberal democracies' (Galston, 2007: 638). Given these observations, we may reasonably anticipate an increase in inequality and poverty. This is anticipated, not just in spite of, but because of the way in which social citizenship works. The current citizenship paradigm privileges attitudes, behaviours and engagements in a way that reflects and reinforces extant material and status hierarchies in the UK. Without a substantial shift in the attitudes and engagement of citizens, this is likely to get worse.

Given what is now known about the relationship between lived experiences, attitudes and engagement, the following chapter will consolidate these

findings to consider how these can be put towards tackling poverty and inequality through inclusive citizenship practices and discourses.

Chapter 8: Deliberating the structural determinants of poverty and inequality: galvanising public opinion towards social policy ends

8.1 Introduction

Thus far, this thesis has explored how structured inequalities give rise to differing conceptions of social citizenship. In a number of important ways, the rich really do differ from the poor (Kraus et al., 2012). Of course, diversity in public opinion is a valuable feature of any democracy, but welfare services and provisions are also supposed to serve an integrative function. The establishment of the welfare state was partly intended 'to heal social divisions or at least mitigate social inequalities; not only in terms of material inequalities, but also in ideological and political terms' (Mau, 2001: 3). However, social citizenship and its attendant systems of welfare have increasingly come to calcify rather than moderate material and attitudinal differentiation. When the fault lines of difference and the capacity to influence social politics are drawn based on existing socioeconomic divisions, the (political) legitimacy of social citizenship is compromised. In effect, social citizenship becomes a self-reinforcing practice that reformulates itself in a way that continues to privilege some whilst penalising others. As a result, the channels of policy influence are broadened for those at the top and narrowed for those at the bottom.

This poses a significant challenge to tackling poverty and inequality. If those controlling (and benefitting from) the current citizenship paradigm, endorse the features that give rise to poverty and inequality, how then can these structures be feasibly reformulated? By virtue of their status and rights, *de jure* (if not *de facto*) citizens are able to shape the nature and function of social citizenship, but the current configuration can only be altered with popular and political support. As highlighted at the beginning of this thesis, without collective commitment to policies that tackle deprivation and support inclusive citizenship practices, little substantive progress can be made (Harker, 2006). Whilst some suggest that the British public have resisted anti-welfare populism (Baumberg, 2014), there is strong evidence to suggest that popular welfare discourse now endorses the values and features of social citizenship that reproduce inequality (Coughlin, 1980; Raco, 2009; Donoghue, 2013). Endorsement of this welfare discourse should not comfort those concerned by the prevalence of poverty and inequality. A shift in the framing and discussion

of poverty and inequality is required. Without this, social policy is rendered ineffectual at tackling deprivation, and at times complicit in its propagation.

Critical Social Policy scrutinises the politics and policies currently at play and offers an invaluable account intended to improve welfare outcomes. However, political and moral disagreements remain. The left-wing media and public tend to suggest that median voters and the institutional elite acquire dubious moral reasoning that fails to address the pressing questions of social justice (Manne, 2014). Those opposed to progressive social policies tend to have countervailing concerns such as desert, individual responsibility and financial capability (Williams, 1984; Shirazi and Biel, 2005). At present, political and moral debate has become entrenched with neither 'side' conceding, nor indeed attending, to the concerns of the other. Presuming citizens are 'reasonable', that is, 'prepared to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation' (Rawls, 1996: 54), it should be possible to engage in some measure of constructive deliberation surrounding poverty, inequality, redistribution and social citizenship.

So far, this thesis has illustrated that those experiencing poverty and affluence tend to develop distinctive frames of reference that inform attitudes towards socio-structural dynamics, social citizenship and inequality. Whilst patterned value systems and ideological orientations may arise out of these distinctive frames of reference, this is neither necessary nor sufficient to conclude that being poor makes you left wing or being rich makes you right wing. Of course, lived experiences and political views are entirely distinct categories of phenomenology and ideology. This chapter does not seek to conflate these two dimensions of socio-political life. Rather, it aims to explore the possible means by which to tackle poverty and inequality given the distinctive frames of references shaped by and shaping welfare policies and citizenship practices.

Reflecting on the determinants of attitudinal divergence, this chapter explores how public attitudes can be 'engineered' to galvanise popular support for tackling poverty and inequality. To say that 'solidarity' or 'recognition of mutual vulnerability' can offer a challenge and tool to tackle deprivation is true (Turner, 2006; Taylor-Gooby, 2013a) but the general public first need to be effectively sensitised to the *causes* of as well as the *effects* of deprivation. By making the structural determinants of disadvantage clear to the general public, it is possible to constructively deliberate the means and ends of social citizenship and policy. This chapter starts by exploring the relationship between public attitudes and policy and then turns to examine the roots of

attitudinal disagreement around poverty and inequality. The following section reflects upon what is known about the determinants of difference and suggests how support for tackling poverty and inequality can be strengthened given what is known. The chapter closes by discussing what implications this has for the health and efficacy of social citizenship in a democratic, institutional and procedural capacity.

8.2 The relationship between public attitudes and policy

Public attitudes are one of the most widely researched topics in the social sciences (Brannon, 1976; Summers, 1977). Underlying a great deal of research in this area is a belief that there is a necessary and valuable correlation between the views of the general public and the actions and effects of public institutions (Backett-Milburn et al., 2003). As discussed in chapter two, an operational dynamic between attitudes and policy can be seen as the *right* and *act* of political citizenship (Bellamy, 2008). Citizen-centred policy enhances the political legitimacy of state action and reflects the institutional and democratic health of social citizenship (Dahl, 1973). However, some have problematized this relationship to suggest that attitudes are not necessarily a constructive dictate of policy and neither are they efficacious for achieving progressive social policy objectives (Bartels, 2005; Kelly and Enns, 2010). Attitudes antithetical to tackling poverty and inequality serve as a case in point that present challenges to policymakers, practitioners and academics (Taylor-Gooby, 2013a). Whilst the link between attitudes and public policy should be critically considered, it is equally important to examine this relationship for all its instrumental worth. Certain public attitudes may or may not be conducive to tackling poverty and inequality, but if their bearing on public policy can be better understood, their influence on the political and policymaking processes can be enhanced, minimised or reformulated accordingly.

Between 1997 and 2010, attitudes of the general public were increasingly integrated into the policymaking process in the UK. During this period there was a significant growth in 'new ways of engaging in dialogue with citizens' through polling, co-production, market research, public consultations and e-participation strategies (Barnes et al., 2004: 270; Clarke, 2005). Alongside this, a litany of National Performance Indicators (NIs) were outlined in 2008 (Audit Commission, 2011). NIs quantified and tracked the performance of public services and institutions and a significant minority of these were based on the attitudes and subjective impressions of the general public. Not only did this increase the accountability of public institutions but it also strengthened

the link between public attitudes and policymaking. Whilst attitudes expressed by the general public may not always be reflected in policy outcomes, public attitudes have played an increasingly prominent role in the policymaking process since 1997 (Bochel et al., 2008). Since 2010, a number of NIs have been scrapped, including many constructed from the attitudes and impressions of the general public. In some respects, this signifies a weakening of the link between attitudes and public policy (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). Overall though, a growth in public participation and deliberative initiatives has intended to facilitate 'democratic renewal' (Barnett, 2002) and create accountable and responsive public services (Cabinet Office, 1999; Cabinet Office, 2014).

These measures rest on an assumption that democratic structures enable a polity to affect institutional governance and the outcomes of social citizenship. Many have questioned whether these structures are suitably equipped or genuinely attentive to the needs and desires of the polity (SCIE, 2004; Williams, 2004). Others have demonstrated how attitudes and behaviours are actually shaped (and on occasion, regulated) by political and policymaking processes (Brooks, 1985; Barnett, 2002; Hacker, 2002). Having said that, it is perfectly possible that there is a mutual relationship between attitudes and policy whereby each shapes, reshapes and challenges the other. At present, there is some contestation over the nature and strength of the relationship between attitudes and public policies (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2005). This section explores that relationship to consider what can be established about the drivers and effects of policies designed (and in many instances, failing) to tackle poverty and inequality.

Hills (2002) succinctly asks whether public policy is 'following or leading public opinion'. The findings from his own analysis suggest there is generally a high level of correspondence between the attitudes of the general public and a raft of social security policies implemented under New Labour (Hills, 2002). Since then, a strong (and growing) body of evidence has demonstrated the 'importance of public opinion in explaining the evolution and sustainability of welfare states' (Horton and Gregory, 2009: 76). Controlling for endogenous and exogenous factors, many of these studies are cross-national and demonstrate the strong predictive capacity of attitudes in shaping the nature and extent of activity across welfare regimes (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2005; Brooks and Manza, 2006; Wlezien and Soroka, 2012). Brooks and Manza (2006) argue that this explains the persistence of welfare state activity in spite of exigent pressures on post-industrial economies. However, many have

recognised the shifting focus of welfare, with retrenchment in some policy domains accompanied by expansion in others (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1994). Given the divergence in attitudes towards cash entitlements and public services (Lipsey, 1979; Wendt et al., 2011), it is important to make a distinction between transfer-orientated and service-orientated welfare activity (Kautto, 2002; Swank, 2002; Bambra, 2005), so as to not oversimplify or overstate the relationship between policy and attitudes (Burstein, 2006).

It is well established that there tends to be an electoral mandate for policy choices implemented by political administrations (e.g. Stimson et al., 1995; Harker, 2006; Page and Shapiro, 2010). However, less is known about the circumstances and conditions required for attitudes to affect policy change. In this sense, attitudes are somewhat 'ethereal, an invisible hand that guides and constrains policymaking across the political cycle', but not in a systematic or predictable way (Horton and Gregory, 2009: 79). Whilst a relationship between attitudes and policy has been identified, there is less certainty about what enables and disables this relationship. Various studies have attempted to clarify how the attitudes-policy nexus can be affected. Based on their findings, three key inferences can be garnered from these studies. Firstly, the extent to which the public respond to policy domains determines the level of influence they have over political and policy direction. There tends to be a more direct relationship between policy preferences and change when the issue at hand is considered of 'public importance' (Wlezien, 2004). Of course, by their nature, all policy issues are of 'public importance', but they are not always *publicly* recognised as such. Policy areas that receive media, political and public attention are most likely to be affected by attitudes (Burstein, 2006). As a result, how socio-economic and political issues are framed will determine how and whether public attitudes towards inequality shape political and policy decision-making (e.g. Prabhakar, 2008). Soroka and Lim (2003) demonstrate that 'issue definition' alters the salience of policy domains and thus the strength of the relationship between public attitudes and policy decisions.

Secondly, the opinion-policy link appears to be greatly affected by 'the structuring role of institutions' (Soroka and Wlezien, 2005: 665). Where political responsibility and accountability are diffuse, there is a weaker relationship between attitudes and policy decisions. Where the locus of responsibility is clear and direct, attitudes have a much more significant bearing on the policy process. Policy responsiveness tends to be higher in proportional democracies than it is in majoritarian democracies such as the

UK where 'large parliamentary majorities make the governments more insulated from public pressure' (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2005: 397).

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the efficacy of political and procedural representation shapes the development and responsiveness of public policy. There is an assumption that 'democracy is the continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals' (Dahl, 1973: 1; Beitz, 1989). However, attitudes of the general public are not uniformly attended to. Evidence suggests policy shifts tend to reflect the policy preferences of those with a higher social or economic status (Gilens, 2005; Bartels, 2006; Gilens, 2009; Giger et al., 2012; Kulin and Svallfors, 2013). This representational bias is significant because there are clear attitudinal cleavages between socio-economic and cultural groups. Despite demonstrating a lack of attitudinal difference across a variety of policy domains, Soroka and Wlezien (2008) find that there are clear differences in attitudes towards welfare, poverty and inequality according to income and education. This corroborates much of the attitudinal research discussed in chapter five. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the attitudes of politically engaged citizens tend to have a greater impact on public policy than the attitudes of those that are less engaged (Griffin and Newman, 2005; Adams and Ezrow, 2009). This goes some way to explain the high level of inequality in policy responsiveness that compromises a consistent link between the attitudes of *all* citizens and the actions of political administrations. Given the stratification of policy preferences and political representation, efforts to tackle poverty and inequality may be hindered rather than helped by the attitudes-policy dynamic.

In a review of attitudinal data, Orton and Rowlingson (2007: 41) find that 'there is certainly no evidence that people see the income gap in the UK positively, nor do they believe it is necessary for the country's prosperity'. However, there appears to be incongruence between the beliefs and policy preferences of the general public (Bartels, 2005; Hedges, 2005; Roosma et al., 2013). In spite of increasing poverty and inequality, there has been a gradual reduction in support for 'spending on the poor' and a gradual increase in the belief that 'benefits are too high' (Taylor-Gooby, 2013a). Having said that, there is also evidence to suggest that there is growing concern about income inequality and increasing support for government intervention (Rowlingson et al., 2010b; Park et al., 2013). These ostensibly contradictory findings are drawn from the same dataset (British Social Attitudes Survey) but focus on different questions to gauge public opinion towards welfare, poverty and inequality over time. Similarly to others, Rowlingson et al. (2010b) suggest that the framing of

questions is particularly important for explaining different levels of support: references to 'the poor', 'poverty' and 'redistribution' tend to reduce support for government intervention.

Many have suggested that New Labour undertook a strategy of 'redistribution by stealth' and 'selective universalism' in an attempt to go with what they understood to be the grain of public opinion (e.g. Sefton, 2005). However, some have suggested that New Labour could have gone much further given the support for redistribution expressed by the general public (Hills, 2002). Whilst many claim welfare attitudes have hardened, the Coalition government and current Conservative government appear much further out of step with public opinion when it comes to questions of poverty, inequality and welfare. Since the 'Great Recession', support for redistribution has increased, concerns about income inequality have grown, and a greater proportion of people agree that the government should spend more on benefits (as demonstrated in section 8.4).

In spite of this, the Conservative government remains committed to a reduction in social security expenditure for certain groups and a battery of welfare reforms. In an attempt to cultivate a political and public mandate, the Conservative government has framed the issue of welfare reform in terms of fiscal burden and drawn upon questions of desert and fairness (Edmiston, 2014a). 'Scrounging' became the welfare issue of choice and media representations drew upon cultural stereotypes of the poor fostering a heightened climate of stigma attached to certain forms of social security receipt (Baumberg et al., 2012; Garland, 2015). This appeared to temporarily reduce public support for tackling poverty and inequality, but since then, public support has recovered, albeit with a radically different character (Pearce and Taylor, 2013).

This demonstrates the resilience of public support for tackling inequality through welfare (Mau, 2001), but it also highlights the capacity for political rhetoric, policymaking and the media to affect the attitudes of the general public. Based on national and cross-national studies, there appears to be a degree of policy feedback whereby attitudes and policy preferences are affected by and constructed in relation to political action (Wlezien, 1995; Soroka and Wlezien, 2005; Wlezien and Soroka, 2012). Wlezien's 'thermostatic model' (Wlezien, 1995) suggests that there is a reciprocal relationship between public opinion and policy: as political administrations increase efforts and spending in a particular policy domain, support for spending in that area tends to decrease. Correspondingly, as governments

reduce welfare efforts, public demand for government activity increases. Whilst there is considerable evidence that demonstrates the 'attitude-forming effects of institutions' (Svallfors, 2010), it is not entirely clear that this relationship is always 'thermostatic'.

In certain instances, increased spending on welfare institutions and services can increase public support for poverty alleviation and redistribution (Jaeger, 2006). Patterned attitudinal differences have been observed as a result of welfare regime outputs and activities (Svallfors, 1997). For example, the visibility and informational role of welfare institutions appears to cultivate a more consistent set of policy preferences that place welfare related issues high on the political agenda (Gingrich, 2014). In addition, welfare provision can also determine how individual characteristics and circumstances inform policy preferences (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012). Whilst some studies have not found a link between welfare activity and attitude formation (Papadakis and Bean, 1993; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003), more methodologically and conceptually refined studies suggest that 'welfare regimes affect both the mean and the variance in public support for redistribution' (Jæger, 2009: 12). Jæger (2009) finds that attitudes can be rank-ordered and explained according to welfare regime types, with conservative and social democratic welfare regimes expressing higher levels of support for redistribution and liberal welfare regimes indicating the lowest level of support. Similarly, Larsen (2007) offers an 'institutional explanation' of attitude formation: he suggests that differences in regime characteristics intervene on attitudes towards deservingness that, in turn, affect popular support for redistribution and poverty alleviation. From this, it is reasonable to conclude that the extent and nature of support for tackling poverty and inequality is shaped, at least in part, by the architecture and experience of welfare policy (Hacker, 2002)³.

A recent study (Valentine, 2015) found that welfare reforms in the UK are reinforcing class prejudice and reducing support for redistributive policies. In this regard, there is potentially a 'policy ratchet' effect where progressive or regressive policies gain public support. From this basis, successive political administrations are compelled to work with the grain of public opinion and

³ Of course, this is not to say that the UK always fits comfortably within the liberal welfare regime typology it is regularly assigned. Due to relatively high levels of social expenditure in certain areas and social insurance based systems of social security, the UK has also been identified as both a 'hybrid' and 'Christian-democratic' welfare regime (Conservative) (Ebbinghaus, 2012).

continue with policies that may not sit well with partisan politics (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Ball, 2008; MacCoun, 2014).

This reciprocal relationship can best be explained by the structuring function of governmental action. Welfare policies and institutions have the capacity to shape:

the contexts in which people make subsequent judgements about welfare policy. Institutions can align or de-align the interests of particular groups in society, they can impose particular social identities on individuals and groups, they can mould the social relationships between individuals and groups, and they can help to generate social norms about fairness. Through these dynamics, they play a significant part in constructing and sustaining the very attitudes which, in turn, sustain them (Horton and Gregory, 2009: 81).

Social policy can create, moderate or sustain socio-economic divisions. Policy preferences are not autonomous - they are constructed and mediated in relation to this phenomenon. As social divisions arise or dissipate, so do attitudinal cleavages around poverty and inequality. This process could be seen as a functional fallout of policymaking, but some have suggested that it is part of a 'manipulative' attempt to maintain a public mandate for ideologically-driven reforms (Hewitt, 1974; Brooks, 1985; Garland, 2015). Political and policy handling of 'public issues' shape attitudes and therefore determines the extent to which policymakers are constrained by the electorate. Misnomers and tactics of distraction and misdirection often characterise the execution of welfare reform (Kuklinski et al., 2000). Political administrations have regularly drawn upon narratives of social and moral breakdown, 'irresponsibility' and unemployment as a supply-side issue to justify increased conditionality and cuts to social security entitlement (Hancock and Mooney, 2013). The Conservative party have drawn upon this tactic particularly heavily since 2010. This may, in part, explain increased concerns about the deservingness of low-income social security claimants (Baumberg et al., 2012) and a purported (if only temporary) 'hardening' of attitudes towards welfare (Kearns, 2014).

From the above discussion, it is clear that there is a dialectical relationship between attitudes and policy that becomes difficult to disentangle. Researchers are reluctant to assign causality but there is an emerging consensus that 'public opinion tends to drive policymaking rather than vice versa' (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2005: 380). Importantly though, public sentiment and support for tackling poverty and inequality can also be affected

by political discourse, action and institutions. Whilst policies negotiate between the attitudinal cleavages of a given polity, they are equally accountable for sustaining such differences. With this in mind, the following section explores the extent to which the policy and political debate concerning poverty and inequality has become entrenched.

8.3 Poor debate: entrenched attitudes towards poverty and inequality

Overall, the majority of the general public are against poverty and *excessive* inequality as a matter of principle (Coughlin, 1980; Kumlin, 2007; Park et al., 2013). However, those on the left and right of the political spectrum differ dramatically in how they view and understand these phenomena (Park et al., 2007). In fact, the Left and the Right quite consistently disagree on almost all questions surrounding poverty and inequality. They disagree on causes and effects, on policy solutions, and on the role and responsibility of individuals, government and the market (Park et al., 2007; Hickson, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2014). This discord arises out of competing ideological, moral and social priorities (Taylor-Gooby and Hastie, 2003). In many ways, these two 'sides' are diametrically opposed in terms of how they believe the world should and does work. Some differences are crudely summarised in Table 9 below.

Table 9: Differences in attitudes by political affiliation

	The Left	The Right
Poverty		
Causes	Structural	Individual
Personal effects	Infringement of rights	Moral corruption
National effects	Social fissures	Social breakdown
Solution	Redistribute & regulate market	Labour supply initiatives

Inequality		
Causes	Structural	Individual and Functional
Personal effects	Creates disincentives	Creates incentives
National effects	Poorer health, education, social relations, crime & social mobility	Necessary & good for growth
Solution	Redistribute & regulate market	Support & equip market
Social Security		
Purpose	Redistribute & Protect	Protect <i>truly</i> needy/deserving
Positive effects	De-commodification	Reward <i>truly</i> needy/deserving
Negative effects	Control, Stigma by virtue of design, conditional	De-commodification

NB: There are a broad range of causes, effects and solutions proffered by both the Left and the Right. This table is intended to capture the *tendencies*, rather than the *diversity* of public opinion by political affiliation.

As a result of these differences, the Left and the Right have reached something of a political and moral stalemate. Manichaeian-like public and political discourse has fossilised the ethical and pragmatic debates surrounding poverty and inequality. Intense vilification has alienated and strengthened the resolve of both ‘sides’ with neither camp willing to accept nor listen to the concerns of the other (Ditto and Koleva, 2011). Attitudes have become hermetic – impervious to rational argument and consideration. Constructive deliberation is only possible through the verification and discussion of facts, but the manipulation of information is endemic in poverty and inequality debates (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2003; White, 2013). Whilst the majority of people agree that that poverty and excessive inequality is a bad thing, there is much less agreement about how best to tackle it. Without collective commitment for policies designed to tackle deprivation, political administrations are less accountable for and thus responsive to the problem of poverty and inequality.

In *The Righteous Mind* Jonathan Haidt (2012) argues that both those on the left and right want to ‘make the world a better place’, but that they have very different ideas about what this might look like and what it would and should take to make it happen. Drawing on a battery of moral and social psychology experiments, Haidt (2012) demonstrates that there are notable moral differences between the Left (liberals) and the Right (conservatives) across and within cultures⁴. For example, conservatives tend to exhibit lower levels

⁴ Haidt also observes a moral distinction between libertarians and social conservatives which, for the sake of brevity, cannot be discussed here.

of empathy than liberals and are thus less likely to be concerned with questions of poverty, suffering and oppression (Davis, 1983; McCue and Gopoian, 2000; Iyer et al., 2012). However, this is not because questions of social justice do not concern conservatives. Rather, their 'moral matrix' fundamentally differs from that of liberals. According to Haidt (2012), there are six key moral foundations that underpin political and social attitudes. These are principles of: care/harm; fairness/reciprocity; in-group loyalty /betrayal; authority/respect; sanctity/purity and liberty/oppression. Self-identified liberals are much more likely to build their moral foundations on principles of care, social fairness, and liberty. The strongest and most consistent of these principles is based on caring for victims of oppression (Graham et al., 2009). The moral foundations of self-identified conservatives tend to be more diverse but principally centre on loyalty to one's own group, deference to authority and purity of the self (Graham et al., 2009). Broadly speaking, conservatives care about institutions and tradition – they see social, moral and economic stability as necessary even if it comes at the expense of those at the bottom. By contrast, liberals are much less concerned about stability and are open to change – their policy preferences tend to prioritise the needs of marginalised groups even if this reduces the overall utility of the polity (McAdams et al., 2008; Haidt, 2012).

Haidt (2012) suggests that divergence in the moral foundations of liberals and conservatives can be explained by how these two political enclaves conceive of human nature. Despite evidence to the contrary (Henrich et al., 2001), conservatives tend to take a *homo economicus* view of human nature. They see constraints, divisions, and institutions as a necessary mechanism that regulates and fosters social cooperation. This ensures that people do not free-ride, cheat or act in a way that is detrimental to the collective. Without this, conservatives believe that self-interested instincts would damage moral and social capital (Graham et al., 2009). Liberals on the other hand, tend to take a more optimistic view of human nature. They believe that citizens, if left to their own devices, would flourish, assume responsibility and choose to cooperate for the benefit of the collective (Graham et al., 2009).

These observed differences come some way to explain why those on opposite sides of the political spectrum struggle to understand, let alone agree with, the attitudes and concerns of the other. Haidt (2012) argues that this hyper-partisanship inhibits the opportunity to constructively deliberate political issues. He suggests that partisans are stuck in a 'moral matrix':

Morality binds and blinds. It binds us into ideological teams that fight each other as though the fate of the world depended on our side winning each battle. It blinds us to the fact that each team is composed of good people who have something important to say (Haidt, 2012: 313).

Initially, Haidt (2012: 288) wanted to use 'research on moral psychology to help liberals win', but he rather unsatisfactorily concludes that we should all simply agree to 'disagree more constructively'. In spite of the conceptual tools he develops and the empirical findings of his research, he offers little indication of what 'constructive disagreement' might look like or how one might arrive at it. Whilst there may be some broader validity to his claim concerning the democratic health and vitality of social politics, he fails to account for the exigent power dynamics already at play that inhibit a 'respectful and constructive yin-yang disagreement' (Haidt, 2012: 312). As previously stated, there is a representational bias in the political and policymaking process that privileges those with greater capital and those on the right of the political spectrum. Haidt's (2012) utopian vision of disagreement does not acknowledge the role of power in politics that impedes any prospect of complementarity. He also fails to recognise that certain issues may not be effectively advanced or resolved through bi-partisan deliberation. Whilst certain areas of 'public policy might be improved by drawing on insights from all sides' (Haidt, 2012: 295), there are equally policy domains that may be considered less appropriate for this approach. Effective redress of poverty and inequality necessitates redistribution of capital either during or after market processes. Those on the right of the political spectrum are less likely to consider poverty, suffering or marginalisation a moral priority. Equally, their policy preferences are derived through lived experiences and assumptions about human nature that reduce rather than increase support for antipoverty policies. Given the correlation between power, capital and political interest, it may also be reasonably assumed that the input of those on the right of the political spectrum hinders rather than assists effective policy development in this area.

In spite of all this, a number of observations can be made from Haidt's (2012) research. Not only in terms of how to disrupt the current political deadlock surrounding poverty and inequality, but also how to shift debates in a direction that might galvanise public support for tackling deprivation. Given the discrete moral concerns of those on the left and right, it may reasonably be assumed that disagreement and political polarisation on the issue of poverty and

inequality is inevitable. However, there are a number of ways in which poverty and inequality can be framed to cut across the concerns of those of the Left and the Right. In *The Spirit Level*, Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) demonstrate that greater income inequality is associated with poorer social, economic and civic outcomes. Despite methodological criticism (e.g. Goldthorpe, 2010; Snowden, 2010), the research has received a great deal of bipartisan policy and political attention. The authors suggest that societies with greater income equality tend to have better health, education and crime outcomes, stronger social relations and greater social mobility, trust and cohesion. Whilst questions of care and social fairness were a principle motivation of the study (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2014), *The Spirit Level* does not focus solely on these aspects of inequality. The authors also explore how inequality affects loyalty and authority and the functional legitimacy and stability of the existing socioeconomic order. As a result, Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) successfully frame the matter of inequality as a bipartisan issue that resonates, even if those considering it are focused on very different matters. This approach has proven successful: the thrust of the argument and findings of the study have been widely cited by senior political leaders, politicians and policymakers at both the national and international level (Devichand, 2010).

Haidt (2012) demonstrates that proportionality matters across the political spectrum - both those on the left and right have strong intuitions about principles of reciprocity. However, each side tends to focus on the unearned resources of only one end of the income distribution. The Left tends to focus on the problem of the 'undeserving rich' and their purportedly unjust accumulation of capital (Rowlingson and Connor, 2011). Those on the right tend to focus on the 'undeserving poor' and their ostensible lack of contribution to wider society (Duncan Smith, 2013). At the core, is a common concern – this is simply directed at different groups. By sensitising the Right to the unearned resources received by those at the top, it has been possible to put inequality on the political, and at times policy agenda. The accumulation of wealth by those in the top 1% of the income distribution has received widespread attention and has been recognised as a socioeconomic quandary for political administrations – not only in terms of its repercussions for social justice but, due to profit shifting and base erosion, also its implications for economic growth and the financial sustainability of welfare programmes (McCall, 2013; Ostry et al., 2014; Soroka and Wlezien, 2014). It is now widely accepted that 'getting filthy rich' (Peter Mandelson quoted in Lister, 2011: 72) is a policy problem.

These two examples demonstrate how poverty and inequality can be discussed in a way that transcends and shifts existing political debate. An appreciation of the moral foundations that motivate partisan attitudes offers some indication of what will and will not be successful in attempting to increase public support for tackling deprivation. Emphasising the importance of care and social fairness will not resonate for those principally concerned with questions of authority, loyalty and stability. Equally, claims that we are all mutually vulnerable and interdependent in a system governed by the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and agency will have little currency for those with such divergent life narratives and attitudes. Arguments conceived from an 'ethic of care', 'solidarity' or 'mutual vulnerability' (Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Turner, 2006; Torry, 2013) can make little progress in this regard. Those with attitudes subverting the objective of tackling poverty and inequality are resistant to these arguments for two reasons: their differing moral foundations and their lived experiences. Strategies that attempt to bridge across the moral priorities of left and right are particularly effective, as are issues that draw upon common bipartisan intuitions about reciprocity. However, there are inevitably limits to these approaches. If sustainable and constructive public support for anti-deprivation policies is to be generated, those with divergent attitudes need to be effectively sensitised to the *structural causes* of poverty and inequality. Moral foundations hinge on the life narratives and world system beliefs of individuals (Haidt, 2012). If these are challenged, it becomes possible to re-orientate the moral priorities of those who do not view poverty, suffering or oppression as a policy priority in the UK.

8.4 Learning lessons from attitudinal divergence: galvanising public support for tackling deprivation

Despite a widening gap between those at the top and bottom, there has not been 'a proportionate response in popular attitudes, discourse or party politics' (Taylor-Gooby, 2013a: 36). Mindful of the attitudes-policy nexus, Taylor-Gooby (2013) suggests that this limits the range of policy options available to address poverty, inequality and unemployment. Given what is already known about the determinants of attitudinal difference, there are a number of ways in which public support for tackling poverty and inequality can be enhanced. This section considers five key factors affecting conceptions of social citizenship and proposes a range of measures that could help increase awareness of structured inequalities and galvanise public commitment to tackling deprivation.

Firstly, as discussed in chapter six and seven, the existing evidence suggests that the (non-) evaluative knowledge and information an individual possesses greatly affects their attitudes towards poverty and inequality. Support for redistribution and poverty alleviation is mediated by whether people attribute disadvantage to structural or individual factors (e.g. Bullock et al., 2003). In liberal welfare regimes such as the UK, there is a tendency to pathologise poverty and rationalise wealth (Woods et al., 2005; Tagler and Cozzarelli, 2013). There is a propensity to believe that those who have 'failed' and 'succeeded', have done so as a result of their own doing. Underlying this attitude is a belief that the existing citizenship configuration is conducive to socio-economic and cultural mobility (McNamee, 2009). However, when individuals experience or are confronted by the structural determinants of deprivation, they are more likely to express positive attitudes towards welfare recipients, draw upon systemic explanations of disadvantage and exhibit greater support for measures that tackle the causes and effects of deprivation (Reutter et al., 2006a; Owens and Pedulla, 2014). For example, subjective job insecurity increases demand for redistribution (Marx, 2014) and structural or fatalistic explanations of poverty induce greater support for social security (Niemi, 2008). It appears then that 'preferences for redistribution are malleable, rather than fixed' (Owens and Pedulla, 2014: 1087) and lived experiences profoundly shape popular attitudes.

With rising poverty and inequality, median voters are becoming increasingly divorced from the reality and causes of deprivation (Rodger, 2003). Bailey et al. (2013: 3) suggest that residential segregation has reduced 'the knowledge accumulated in daily life' that increases support for tackling social and economic divisions.

If you are rich and the gap between you and the poor you see around you is so vast that no calamity you can imagine befalling you will put you into their circumstances, then any prudential reasons you might have for improving their lot disappear (Shapiro, 2002: 120).

Without awareness and knowledge accumulated about the realities of deprivation, it is likely that social citizenship practices are set to become increasingly exclusionary.

Egalitarian theorists and researchers have stressed the role of education in tackling inequalities (e.g. Tawney, 1964). In and beyond the classroom, the dissemination and appraisal of knowledge has the capacity to both propagate and moderate inequalities – not only in terms of outcomes, but also dialogically in the attitudes and expectations of individuals (Beckett, 2009).

The provision and distribution of detailed non-partisan information about the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and agency is a crucial first step in challenging existing attitudes. With this in mind, the exploration and understanding of systemic disadvantage is a core project. However, a detailed examination and appreciation of structured inequalities is required at both ends of the societal spectrum. As demonstrated in recent years, the rise of 'poverty porn' runs the danger of desensitising the public, patronising the poor and misrepresenting the *nature* of deprivation (Jensen, 2014). It is of course important for people to understand the processes and mechanisms that result in periodic or perpetual disadvantage. In conjunction though, it is equally, if not more important, to raise public awareness about the inheritance and transference of privilege, wealth and 'success'. Without this, the dissemination of information about structural disadvantage may well prove innocuous to the established order and runs the danger of reproducing anti-welfare attitudes. Structured inequalities are not only propagated by but are reflected in educational, health and socio-economic outcomes (cf. Hills et al., 2010). Public education of this fact has the capacity to encourage critical self-reflection so that people reconceive of their own position, actions and outcomes, but also that of others marginalised *and* validated by the current citizenship praxis.

The second factor affecting conceptions of social citizenship is that, whilst people are generally aware of rising poverty and inequality, a growing body of research suggests that the general public are highly misinformed about it and the policy solutions deemed feasible as a result. The UK general public tend to grossly overestimate and misunderstand the costs of welfare activity, social security expenditure, benefit fraud and expenditure on the unemployed and single parents (Taylor-Gooby, 2008; Horton and Gregory, 2009; Baumberg et al., 2012; TUC, 2013). They also overestimate the progressivity of welfare provision, expenditure and taxation (Taylor-Gooby, 2013b). When there is stratification in the treatment of different groups by the welfare system, people tend to recognise greater generosity to the middle classes but neglect the privation caused for lower income groups (Wilson et al., 2012).

Media coverage and political rhetoric play a significant role in shaping these knowledge gaps and drawing a distinction between deserving and undeserving recipients of state assistance (Golding and Middleton, 1982; McKendrick, 2008; Dean, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2013a). The manipulation and misappropriation of information in welfare discourse overplays the fiscal burden of social security and mischaracterises the root causes of deprivation

(Garthwaite, 2011). In turn, this can lead to 'collective preferences that are far different from those that would exist if people were correctly informed' (Kuklinski et al., 2000: 790). Trust in the legitimacy and efficiency of public institutions leads to higher support for direct and indirect taxation (Torgler and Schneider, 2006). Inaccurate and misleading information decreases support for institutional action as it is seen as ineffectual in tackling poverty and complicit in transgressing societal norms of self-reliance and hard work (Kelly and Enns, 2010; Likki and Staerklé, 2015). Debunking 'welfare myths' about the means, costs, and effects of welfare helps improve knowledge about the causes of poverty and inequality and in turn the suitability of pre-distribution, redistribution and poverty alleviation (Class, 2013). Proactively challenging the use, abuse and misdirection of information around welfare and inequality can 'change that knowledge in order to make more progressive policies possible' (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2003: 19).

Although the poor are more likely to recognise the systemic causes of disadvantage than the rich, both groups are similarly aware of rising poverty and inequality. Between 2006 and 2013, the proportion of the British public that believed poverty was increasing doubled (from 32 to 64 per cent) (Baumberg, 2014: 28). Between 2007 and 2012, the proportion believing that the income gap was too large rose from 76 to 82 per cent (Pearce and Taylor, 2013: 60). From this, Pearce and Taylor (2013: 41) infer that there is 'a widespread and enduring view that the income gap is too large, and considerable support for the proposition that the government should reduce income differences'. However, despite increasing concern about poverty and inequality, support for policies to tackle it do not appear to have shifted correspondingly. Between 2007 and 2012, the proportion agreeing that the government should redistribute income only rose from 32 to 41 per cent (Pearce and Taylor, 2013). This typifies a marked discrepancy between recognition of inequality as a policy problem and support for policy solutions. For example, between 2010 and 2014, the proportion of the population agreeing that cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people's lives rose from 42 to 46 per cent and the proportion believing the government should spend more on welfare benefits rose slightly from 29 to 30 per cent (Taylor-Gooby and Taylor, 2015: 24). This incongruity is perhaps explained by how these policy problems are framed and handled by the media, public institutions and political discourse.

This leads us to the third factor contributing towards attitudinal divergence. Institutional responses to socioeconomic events have the capacity to shape

attitudes and thus support for tackling inequality (Horton and Gregory, 2009). Mechanisms that attempt to tackle the structural causes of poverty and inequality in a covert way are particularly problematic in this instance. Working tax credits are one such example of social security policy that attempts to *moderate* rather than *directly tackle* inequalities arising out of the market. Some have argued that such strategies, including 'redistribution by stealth', work with the grain of public opinion (Hills, 2002; Lansley, 2014). However, whilst these activities may produce short-term and piecemeal results, they concomitantly fail to sensitise the general public to the structural causes of inequity. This makes it particularly difficult to justify and make the case for significant welfare expenditure and state intervention in times of fiscal austerity. For example, means-tested tax credits for low-income groups raise public consciousness in a narrow way that fails to offer a systemic explanation and response to a systemic problem. Whilst some active labour market policies more effectively engage with and attend to shifts in the production base and relations of a national economy, others tend to frame structural unemployment, almost exclusively, as a supply-side issue. This falls short of effectively responding to and framing exigent pressures facing post-industrial welfare systems.

Without social policies that offer *structural* solutions to *structurally determined* poverty and inequality, progress is likely to be fragmented and ineffectual in the long term. Policies that attempt to directly intervene in socioeconomic processes tend to be politically controversial. However, if delivered and pitched appropriately, they have the capacity to highlight universal social risks, underline principles of mutualism and raise public consciousness about their necessity. By engineering social proximity and affinity between individuals from different socioeconomic groups, welfare institutions and policies are able to engineer compassion and a duty of virtue between fellow citizens (Gregory, 2015).

Social policies operate in a dialectic with societal values, ideological traditions and social divisions (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). Attitudes are not entirely determined by independent cognitive processes - social, political and economic context also play a significant role. These situational factors define and confine public support for tackling deprivation and welfare state intervention. Social and economic conditions have the capacity to (de-)sensitise the public to social risks and this appears to factor in their belief systems and attitudes. For example, in periods of high unemployment, support for redistribution and public assistance generally tends to increase

(Blekesaune, 2007). How political administrations choose to respond to such societal challenges will be predicated on a range of factors but 'the understanding and articulation of these problems influences public attitudes towards welfare policies as well as toward specified groups of recipients' (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003: 425). Institutional (in-)action then frames the nature of social and economic 'problems' and can challenge or resonate with the attitudes of the general public. Within a liberal welfare regime such as the UK, the dynamic between attitudes and responses to deprivation can become mutually reinforcing so that there is a downward spiral in support for tackling poverty and inequality (Kelly and Enns, 2010). The increasing individualisation of poverty in public policy could be said to both follow and define the existing contours of public opinion (Hills, 2002).

In the UK, the institutional and ideological legacy of social policy is reflected in a system of residual means-tested benefits for low-income groups and higher contributory payments for those engaged in decently remunerated work. This perhaps explains why support for welfare spending tends to be much higher in social democratic welfare regimes than in liberal welfare systems where the framing of and responses to social problems are so markedly different (Svallfors, 1997; Niemelä, 2008). In liberal welfare regimes, individuals that defend the provision of welfare tend not to draw on egalitarian arguments (Feldman and Zaller, 1992). In the absence of a strong egalitarian public and political discourse, these individuals tend to resort to expressions of sympathy and humanitarianism and problematize inequality of opportunity (Feldman and Zaller, 1992). These rebuttals to anti-welfare sentiment tend to sit much more comfortably within the existing confines of liberal welfare ideology that centres on individualism, meritocracy and recommodification (Bullock, 2008). Achterberg et al. (2014) argues that this goes some way to explain the apparent contradiction between increased neo-liberal sentiments and a growth in welfare state support. The case for state intervention is defended on reciprocal rather than redistributive grounds:

It is the strong support for commodifying reform that explains the support for neo-liberal policies and that, at the same time, explains the high support for the welfare state: Because welfare states develop in the direction of increasing reciprocity, they receive high and increasing support. So, the new politics of the welfare state, the politics of retrenchment, is supported in public opinion when these policies strengthen reciprocity through recommodifying policy (Achterberg et al., 2014: 222).

Whilst this process can offer some mileage in galvanising support for tackling deprivation, the prevailing values in liberal welfare regimes 'severely limit the development of a more encompassing ideological justification for the welfare state' (Feldman and Zaller, 1992: 298). Any discourse promulgated in tackling deprivation needs to have traction with prevailing notions of justice and fairness but it must also challenge interpretation of these ideals if poverty and inequality are to be efficaciously addressed. A strong, detoxified egalitarian discourse could tap into and transform the existing attitudes-policy nexus around reciprocity. Importantly though, this would only succeed alongside a greater sensitisation to common risks, belonging and purpose. Doing so requires incremental and dialogical efforts to tap into and thus alter the existing moral foundations of the general public.

With this in mind, differing moral concerns and foundations are the fourth factor informing public attitudes towards citizenship and welfare. As this chapter has already discussed, differing moral foundations underline the attitudes of those supportive of and against redistributive policies (Graham et al., 2009). Nonetheless, if the language used to deliberate and frame social issues is used carefully, it is possible to bridge between the moral priorities of different groups and identify shared moral concerns. Reciprocity is the most commonly shared principle between the Left and the Right (Haidt, 2012). It seems then, reinforcing principles of reciprocity in public discourse and policy could be a key lever in increasing support for welfare state activity. New Labour and the Coalition government both attempted to tap into the public value of proportionality by making social rights increasingly conditional on the fulfilment of responsibilities (Dwyer, 2010). The current Conservative government appears to be doing the same with the Welfare Reform and Work Bill 2015-16. However, 'once the issue of reciprocity becomes simply, or even primarily, a question of how tough to get with welfare recipients, the left has already lost the battle' (White, 2010: 26). The temptation to increase conditionality and thus proportionality stems from a politically-fuelled public belief that resources are often unjustly garnered by those who have failed to contribute to society. In this regard, Hoggett et al. (2013) suggest that a 'politics of resentment' appears to drive a great deal of anti-welfare populism. It is possible to cut through this interpretation of fairness in three ways. Firstly, rather than focusing solely on paid work as a form of societal contribution, the notion of reciprocation needs to be expanded to incorporate care, domestic, voluntary and societal labour (Deacon, 2007). Those opposed to policies tackling poverty and inequality struggle to recognise the mutuality occurring in

daily life (see chapter six). By raising awareness of the non-economic contributions made by individuals, it is possible to dissipate concerns about unearned resources. Secondly, public education about the systemic determinants of agency and the true extent of benefit fraud might help challenge public beliefs fuelling the 'politics of resentment' (Hoggett et al., 2013). Finally, greater media and public attention needs to be directed at the unearned resources and reliefs received by those at the top end of the income distribution. This taps into principles of fairness shared across the political spectrum and does successfully increase public support for a more progressive (and enforced) taxation system (Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014). By recognising those that already proportionally contribute to society and enforcing those that currently do not, reciprocity in its various manifestations, can enhance the legitimacy and popularity of policies that tackle poverty and inequality.

The attitudes of some individuals will be impervious to these activities because principles of fairness are superseded by other concerns. Those worried about the fiscal burden of welfare activity and the stability of the existing socioeconomic order may well concede a lack of fairness according to the reciprocity principle but ultimately defer to the constraints and pragmatics they feel override other moral issues. In this instance, it is necessary to draw upon instrumental arguments against poverty and inequality. Research indicates that poverty and inequality place a greater financial burden on public services and damage economic growth in the long term (Griggs and Walker, 2008; Ostry et al., 2014). In addition, a growing body of evidence suggests the current (poorly enforced) taxation system threatens the financial sustainability of post-industrial welfare regimes through profit shifting and base erosion (cf. Dharmapala, 2014). Greater dissemination of these facts could increase support for redistribution and greater macro-economic governance based on instrumental grounds.

The fifth and final element of attitudinal divergence to be considered is the presence and condition of deprivation itself. As illustrated in chapter seven, lived experiences of poverty alienate low-income individuals from the policymaking and political process. At best, these individuals tend to resort to defensive forms of civic engagement (Ellison, 2000), and at worse they withdraw from social politics altogether (Pattie et al., 2003). A lack of institutional and procedural participation from low-income groups indicates 'severe limitations to the impact of rising inequality on public and political discourse' (Taylor-Gooby, 2013a: 37). Overall, electoral turnout in the UK has

fallen considerably in the last 30 years: from 76 per cent in 1979 to 65 per cent in 2010, falling to just 59 per cent in 2001 (Birch et al., 2013). During this period, there has been a marked divergence in voter turnout amongst different income groups. There were very minor differences in voter turnout during the 1987 UK general election. However, during the 2010 UK general election, it is estimated that just over 50 per cent of those in the lower income quintile voted, compared to over 75 per cent of those in the top income quintile; put simply, 'individuals in the highest income group were 43 per cent more likely to vote than those in the lowest income group' (Birch et al., 2013: 8). This undermines the legitimacy and notion of democratically informed public institutions and policies. Political citizenship confers an equal 'political voice' to all citizens. The relative dearth of 'political voice' present from those experiencing deprivation points to an unequal representation in the political and policymaking process between rich and poor. This is particularly problematic because of the attitudinal divergence arising out of lived experiences of poverty and affluence.

Despite finding a dispersal of attitudes across policy domains, Soroka and Wlezien (2008) identify clear attitudinal cleavages related to welfare across socio-economic groups. A broader examination of policy preferences finds much clearer attitudinal divisions between socio-economic groups (Gilens, 2009). Generally, there tends to be much higher support for policies tackling poverty and inequality amongst lower-income groups (Park et al., 2007; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). In a review of 10 OECD countries, Pontusson and Rueda (2010) find that political and policy responsiveness to rising inequality depends on the level of political mobilisation of low-income groups. The authors found that left wing party politics is responsive in as much as the polity dictates (Pontusson and Rueda, 2010). Without meaningful institutional and procedural engagement from low-income citizens, democratic responsiveness is limited and biased towards those benefiting from the current socio-economic order. In this sense, inequality in representation breeds inequality in the life chances and outcomes of those already marginalised. This deepens social and political divisions and severely limits the capacity for increased publicly expressed support for tackling deprivation. Lister (2007a: 451) argues that marginalised citizens need to be reinserted into the policymaking process to cultivate 'a politics of redistribution and of recognition and respect'. Inclusive, collaborative and open democratic spaces come some way to incorporate the experiences and attitudes of 'the poor' into policy decisions (Lister, 2007a). Political and institutional change can only

occur through politically active citizenship and representative democracies (Green, 2012). The redistribution of political power enhances the legitimacy of public institutions and their sensitivity to socioeconomic challenges. Importantly though a paradigm shift is required in the substance, language and framing of politics. There are not only classed divisions in voter turnout but also in political awareness, partisanship and knowledge. Comparison between socio-economic class groups (DE and AB) reveals that lower social classes are less likely to: be interested in politics (30 versus 60 per cent); know at least a fair amount about politics (35 versus 66 per cent); and be absolutely certain to vote (38 versus 63 per cent) (Hansard Society, 2014: 35, 37, 41). In addition, individuals in social class DE have a weaker sense of partisanship compared to individuals in social class AB (26 versus 34 per cent) and are also more likely to say they are not a supporter of a political party (43 versus 23 per cent) (Hansard Society, 2014: 46).

Without trust or interest in the political process, the policy preferences of those affected by deprivation cannot be meaningfully represented. This highlights the importance of making political and social issues resonate with those most affected by poverty and inequality. Marginalised groups in the UK feel their concerns are not being addressed by political figures and the policymaking process and this goes some way to explain their institutional disengagement (Holmes and Manning, 2013). To address the political disaffection of lower-income groups, political institutions must negotiate and engage with all citizen groups so political discourse and policy reflects and responds to their concerns. In addition, increased awareness about instances of policy efficacy could enhance trust in public institutions and politics more generally. This may encourage greater political mobilisation and participation of lower-income groups and improve public support for tackling poverty and inequality.

8.5 Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter has proposed a number of ways in which it is possible to overcome attitudinal difference and increase support for tackling deprivation. By raising awareness about the structural determinants of socioeconomic outcome and agency, drawing on areas of mutual policy and moral concern, and reformulating the political language surrounding poverty and inequality, it is possible to re-orientate public discourse and consciousness in this area. There are of course limits to attitudinal transformation. Existing public and political debate has become entrenched. The problem of poverty and inequality has proven divisive with conflicting and countervailing moral

priorities informing the policy preferences of different groups. As this thesis and chapter have illustrated, there are a range of factors driving attitudinal divergence. These factors generate distinctive frames of reference surrounding poverty, inequality and the relationship between the state, market, and individual (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003). The moral concerns and priorities of some individuals will mean their attitudes are somewhat impervious to attitudinal transformation. In addition, daily partisan media coverage and political rhetoric that misinforms the general public about the realities of deprivation can mitigate efforts made otherwise (Baumberg et al., 2012). Public policies and debate often misdirect and detract from the issues of substantive significance in this area and can skew perceptions about the capacity of the nation state to pursue progressive social policies.

This is not only pertinent to tackling deprivation. It is also a necessary process by which to safeguard the democratic health of social citizenship in an institutional and procedural capacity. Dynamic and informed public debate nurtures a sense of common purpose and commitment to the project of social citizenship (Young, 2000). Without it, willingness to cooperate and participate diminishes (Torgler and Schneider, 2006). As this thesis has illustrated, socioeconomic inequality reflects existing divisions in citizenship status, identity and outcomes. Accessible and accurate deliberation can reinvigorate social politics to challenge and reshape the mechanisms that currently structure deprivation. This includes the vagaries of the global market economy, but also, the public institutions that legitimise and reproduce inequality. Social politics is a constitutive and necessary feature of social citizenship that enables marginalised groups to reshape the socioeconomic and political landscape according to their own lived experience. Whether this takes the shape of a more 'deliberative democracy' or an 'agonistic pluralism' (Habermas, 1996; Mouffe, 1999), the presence and execution of such a process demonstrates the efficacy and legitimacy of public institutions and social citizenship. Without it, social policy can fail to respond to the attitudes and needs of the deliberative citizenry.

In light of the ways in which structural inequality has intervened on institutional (dis-) engagement (see section 7.5), it is perhaps worthwhile returning to the concept of deliberative democracy discussed in chapter two. The assumption that deliberative citizens are capable of coalescing around 'consensual norms' assumes an active, effective and concise political agency exercised by all stakeholders (Habermas, 1996). However, as demonstrated in chapter 7, political agents are often engaged in multiple and conflicting political projects

(Clarke et al., 2014). In addition, the success of these projects differs according to their focus and the character of agency that is exercised and accommodated within particular political parameters. In light of this, some degree of political struggle or agonistic pluralism appears necessary to account for and address the inequalities arising in social politics (Mouffe, 2005). Somewhat ironically, the character and strategy of this political struggle may well be most effective if it is grounded in consensual norms that undermine the logic of structural inequality. The role of the deliberative citizen in such a setting may well endorse the practices of citizenship that give their social democratic ends legitimacy.

As explained in chapter two, the robust relationship between public attitudes and social policy is both a necessary mechanism and prospect for transforming the existing citizenship configuration.

Citizen beliefs and assumptions about the relevant issues are important in determining the scope and direction of policy debate. A more querulous citizenry will measure new policies against its understanding of what is possible and what the impact of changes will be on the services it receives and on the taxes it pays, and will be more likely to respond electorally to governments in terms of its understanding. This process is itself reflexive. Governments will take into account their own understanding of public responses in formulating and presenting policies (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2003: 5).

Importantly, political ideology and social policy has to be pre-emptive as well as responsive to public concerns and issues. The policymaking process needs to read public opinion but also be insulated from short-term political interests. In doing so, it becomes possible to lead public opinion in a way that makes genuine progress possible.

With this in mind, what agenda does this set for the Social Policy Academy? Firstly, it requires further research on how communicative frames affect public opinion, what role knowledge plays in attitudinal formation and whether political and policy efficacy can specifically increase support for policies tackling deprivation. Secondly, and more importantly, it requires the dissemination, and effective communication of existing research that focuses on the causes and reality of poverty, affluence and inequality. Critically, this dissemination needs to extend beyond the existing confines of academic and political debate. Enlightened conversation between ideological or epistemological 'friends' enriches knowledge, but it achieves very little (discursively or substantively) in terms of tackling deprivation.

If social policy research is to have the desired 'impact' that academic authors aspire to, the findings of social policy research need to reach and resonate with those that 'matter'. That is, those that are currently marginalised or disengaged from existing public and political debate, those who currently control it and those whose attitudes are currently antithetical to tackling poverty and inequality. In doing so, social policy research on the realities of deprivation can assist in the political mobilisation of marginalised citizens, increase public consciousness and *informed* discussion, and transform attitudes related to deprivation. This is only possible if the findings of social policy research use language and thematic frames that resonate across the polity. This requires a variety of simultaneous communicative strategies that account for and attend to the lived experience, knowledge and concerns of *all* citizens. Of course, this is by no means a fixed or finite project, with determinate activities leading to a clearly defined process or outcome. Rather, it is an undertaking that is both reflexive and inter-subjective in its attempts to shift public discourse and consciousness surrounding poverty and inequality. Through gradualist means, a re-orientation and sensitisation towards the structural determinants of deprivation would enhance the legitimacy and efficacy of social citizenship practices.

Finally, as Ellison (1999a: 81) points out, 'the increasingly fractured nature of contemporary social politics' compels welfare theorists to move beyond the binary distinction between universalism and particularism. Social fragmentation in post-industrial societies makes it difficult to garner sustainable support through a universalist ethos. Equally, particularism runs the risk of descending into 'unlimited relativism' (Ellison, 1999: 69) that fails to address multi-dimensional inequalities. Ellison (1999: 81) argues a 'deliberative approach to social policy' is needed that both embraces and accounts for difference by incorporating *all* stakeholders in welfare policy processes and discourse. Ellison (1999) suggests this offers the most promising strategy to develop inclusive institutions able to meaningfully capture and address inequalities in post-modern societies. To evade the 'unlimited relativism' that a politics of difference can engender, this deliberative approach needs to account for the patterned stratification of status, identity and resources arising out of citizenship practices. As illustrated in chapter three, the variegated praxis of social citizenship configures welfare in such a way that propagates rather than smooths out material and status differentials between citizens. Chapters five, six and seven demonstrated that this development has resulted in hermetic formations of citizenship identity, experience and status between *Validated Active Citizens* and *Residual*

Contingent Citizens. As such, a fragmentation of social politics is occurring alongside calcified status and material hierarchies that result in differing forms of engagement. To address this development and safeguard the emancipatory potential of social citizenship, marginalised individuals and behaviours need to be re-inserted into public discourse surrounding welfare. This is essentially the right to difference or recognition (Lister, 2007a) within the parameters that that a plural and inclusive welfare system seeking to tackle deprivation allows. As stated by Ellison this may serve to 'better legitimate particularist patterns of resource distribution, paradoxically fostering greater social inclusion' (Ellison, 1999: 57).

Chapter 9: Conclusion

This thesis has examined the relationship between inequality and social citizenship through the everyday accounts of notionally equal citizens. The study has demonstrated that individuals make sense of their material and figurative position within society in different and patterned ways according to their lived experience. Social citizenship as an institutional and relational practice has the capacity to both include and exclude. The mores promulgated through welfare institutions and policies structure the experiences and outcomes of citizens. Having said that, the distributional and figurative effects of this are far from linear or one-dimensional. As noted by previous studies, public attitudes towards welfare, citizenship and inequality are often 'complex, ambiguous and contradictory' (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007: 40). Within the context of rising inequality, the experiences and beliefs of the general public are no less complicated (Humpage, 2008b; Roosma et al., 2013). The 'poor' have been known to deny their poverty and participate in 'othering' strategies that devalue their own economic and social position (Flaherty, 2008; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). In addition, 'rich people' have said that they 'struggle' to meet their household needs and tend to critique but also maximise their receipt of social services and transfers (Hamilton, 2003; Matthews and Hastings, 2013). In this respect, attitudes and behaviours can often appear inconsistent. However, this thesis has shown that citizens make sense of and legitimise their own relationship to the state and others through manifold cognitive and social processes.

Citizens occupy multiple private and public spaces. The identities and associations that develop as a result can be weak, diffuse and fleeting but they can also be concentrated, lasting and strong (Isin and Wood, 1999). The diverse subject positions acquired in contemporary everyday life give rise to complex attachments and orientations. This complexity is enacted at the individual and collective level and a 'person inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position' (Davies and Harré, 1990: 46). This, in part, explains the 'fragmented social politics of the public sphere' that has developed in late modernity (Ellison, 2000: 1.3). As a series of 'existential engagements' through which new identities, interests and belongings develop' (Ellison, 2013: 53), social citizenship and attitudes towards it are underpinned by countervailing and shifting subject positions. Importantly though, this thesis has shown that structural inequality, or rather 'unequal citizenship', has intervened in patterned ways to form divergent experiences

and attitudes of the rich and the poor. Whilst distinctive frames of reference arise from structural inequality, these still develop alongside shifting identities and interests. Within this context, it becomes particularly difficult to identify and develop coherent solidarities around a shared conception of the common good (Ellison, 2013: 61). Beyond those currently valorised by the existing citizenship configuration, the capacity of marginal claims and identities to supervene on structural inequality becomes considerably limited.

With this in mind, this thesis has captured and considered the significance of the grassroots views of the 'poor' alongside those of the 'rich'. It has done so by examining how the modalities of social citizenship in the UK cohere with lived experiences and attitudes towards it. Section 9.1 of this chapter distils the findings of the thesis and outlines some of the ramifications for social policy. Section 9.2 reflects upon the relative value of the methods and research findings of this study. Finally, section 9.3 outlines the research agenda emergent from this thesis.

9.1 Summary of research findings and policy implications

This mixed-methods study drew upon secondary quantitative data analysis of the 2005 Citizenship Survey and qualitative interviews with 28 individuals to explore how lived experiences of inequality affect conceptions of social citizenship. The study explored the experiences, attitudes and behaviours of two distinct groups: unemployed individuals, living below the poverty line in deprived areas and wealthy employed individuals living in affluent areas. These two groups were identified as *Residual Contingent Citizens* and *Validated Active Citizens* respectively.

Despite broad support for social citizenship, this thesis has demonstrated how lived experiences of inequality cultivate divergent attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities. Through the voices of those experiencing deprivation and affluence, this thesis has shown how everyday accounts and actions of citizens contribute towards a 'normative struggle, a political struggle – a struggle over the visions of collective life that we want to embrace and enact' (Bosniak, 2001: 239). Chapter two developed this notion of citizenship as a relational and horizontal practice. Through a schematic consideration of the existing theoretical literature, chapter two established the particular significance of public attitudes and participation for explanatory accounts of social citizenship. From this it was possible to explore how this study might incorporate new empirical insights into both explanatory and normative accounts of citizenship and inequality.

Chapter five explored how the topographies of social citizenship are reflected in the experiences and identities of those experiencing deprivation and affluence. Due to the material and symbolic significance of deprivation, chapter five demonstrated how *Residual Contingent Citizens* are less likely to feel they have social rights. Perhaps most importantly though, these respondents were also less likely to feel like they *were* social citizens. For these individuals, the promises of equal membership and status were undermined by lived experiences of inequality. By contrast, affluent citizens were more likely to feel like they had 'a stake in society'. This material and symbolic authentication affirmed their belonging and identity as *Validated Active Citizens* within a 'work-biased construction of citizenship' (Lister, 2002a: 107).

Chapter six illustrated how deprivation and affluence generate unique forms of knowledge about the relationship between socio-economic structure and agency. The phenomenology of poverty appeared to increase awareness of the exogenous factors that impinge on individual agency. As such, the 'poor' exhibited a richer 'sociological imagination' and were better able to identify and appreciate the 'exercise of agency within structural inequality' (Orton, 2009). By virtue of their position, affluent respondents were more likely to believe individuals could affect or overcome systemic features to serve their own interests. As a result, affluent respondents were more likely to individualise hardship and affluence by pointing to the agentive capacities of individuals to affect their socio-economic circumstance. This appears to inform lay accounts and conceptions of social citizenship, in particular attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities.

In chapter seven, affluent respondents were found to advance a more contractarian ideal of social citizenship that underplayed personal, social and economic interdependency. Welfare was supported, but was conceived in rather residual and conditional terms. In this respect, *Validated Active Citizens* tended to endorse a conception of social citizenship that reflected their own engagement with it as an ideal and practice. By contrast, *Residual Contingent Citizens* demonstrated a more solidaristic conception of social citizenship that recognised mutual vulnerability, alternative forms of civic contribution and a collective principle informing the provision of public welfare. The divergent moral repertoires drawn upon by these two groups comes some way to explain their engagement and identification (or lack thereof) with existing citizenship structures and ideals. Affluent respondents were much better able to affect change in their local area and public services. As a result, they were

more inclined to proactively engage with systems of participation and representation to meet their material and discursive ends. Those experiencing deprivation were less likely to feel that civic and political institutions were conducive to either their material or 'post-material' concerns (Manning and Holmes, 2013) and this lead to *defensive* forms of (dis-) engagement focused on short-term concessions (Ellison, 2000). A tendency towards defensive forms of institutional (dis-) engagement, by those failed by the existing citizenship configuration, poses a particular challenge for political institutions and systems of public deliberation. Without robust and sustained instances of civic engagement by *all* citizens, there is a danger that social citizenship as a relational and distributional practice comes to serve and reflect the interests of those gaining most from structural inequality. The repercussions of this and the other research findings established in this thesis are briefly considered below.

In recent years, there have been considerable and regressive cuts to public social expenditure (Lupton et al., 2015). Against the backdrop of fiscal austerity, the increasing 'individualisation of the social' has altered the welfare landscape (Ferge, 1997; Valentine, 2015). Chapter three demonstrated how this has manifested itself in the changing rights and responsibilities of social citizenship. A variegated praxis of social citizenship is threatening the status and claims making of low-income working-age unemployed individuals. Within this context, rather than functioning to mitigate structural inequality, social citizenship can serve as an institutional and discursive system of division and inequality.

As noted at the outset of this thesis, 'welfare myths' and 'zombie arguments' about the costs and effects of welfare provision sustain both public support for welfare reforms and cuts to public social expenditure (MacDonald et al., 2014a). Given the attitudinal divergence observed between the 'rich' and 'poor', chapter eight considered the logic and limits of public opinion and how it might be possible to galvanise public support for policies tackling deprivation and structural inequality. Beyond, the rhetorical strategies that might be employed to tackle structural inequality, the findings of this thesis raise a number of questions for social policy design and delivery.

It is widely recognised that 'public support towards social welfare programmes for the less well-off is the essential basis for a robust welfare state' (Sumino, 2014: 109). Without this, the capacity to structure and sustain an effective welfare system is considerably undermined. Economic and social stratification reduces support for redistributive policies (cf. Kelly and Enns, 2010). As social

and economic lives become increasingly fragmented by inequality, individuals begin to lose empathy for one another (Bailey et al., 2013). The dynamics between social policy, public opinion and inequality make it particularly difficult to maintain public support for redistribution that intervenes on structural inequality in this instance (Brooks et al., 2006).

This inevitably shapes conceptions of social citizenship and attitudes towards welfare but most importantly the policy preferences that fall out as a result. As support for welfare becomes increasingly individualised, so do the mechanisms of need provision tackling poverty and inequality. Chapter three demonstrated that social security has become less effectual at targeting resources where they are most needed. Those at the bottom of the income distribution have seen the proportion of their income secured through social security decrease significantly over time. By comparison, those in the middle and at the top of the income distribution have seen their total share of income derived through cash benefits increase (see Figure 4 in chapter three). In this instance, it appears that an increasingly individualised conception of welfare leads to and sustains an increasingly individualised function of welfare: where social security is secured and allocated according to the existing distribution of capital. As many have illustrated, those with the most social and financial capital at their disposal are the biggest beneficiaries of public services (e.g. Matthews and Hastings, 2013). Various studies have also shown that those most able to wield political power over social policies and provision are the greatest beneficiaries of public services (Le Grand and Winter, 2000; Manow, 2009). Chapter seven considered how wealthier individuals are better able and thus more inclined to affect the terms upon which public services and social transfers are designed and delivered. As a result, welfare provision runs the danger of serving the interests of those most capable of affecting change rather than the interests of those who most need it. Unequal engagement threatens the efficacy of redistributive policies and this is borne out by the regressive cuts to public social expenditure and welfare reforms instigated since 2010 (Brewer et al., 2011; Avram et al., 2013).

The individualisation and residualisation of welfare for those most in need of it, is particularly problematic because those with the most power to reformulate welfare provision are becoming increasingly divorced from the factors that shape inequality. Chapter six explained how exposure to or experience of deprivation increases knowledge about the structural determinants of inequality. With this in mind, it becomes particularly important to raise

awareness about the causes of poverty and inequality through welfare instruments and policies.

Between 1997 and 2010, the redistributive ambitions of New Labour were, to some extent, constrained by public opinion (Dean, 2013). Welfare reforms were pursued in a way that went with the grain of public opinion and the increasing distinction between deserving and undeserving welfare claimants (Horton and Gregory, 2009). Meanwhile, a process of 'redistribution by stealth' took place to tackle poverty through intensified, but surreptitious, means-testing (Sefton, 2009). Tax credits played a particularly significant role in moderating, but not directly tackling, the causes of structural inequality. This 'softly, softly' approach to social policymaking failed to raise public consciousness about the factors that necessitate such state intervention. Low-profile programmes of poverty alleviation damaged public understanding about the socio-structural dynamics and factors that contribute towards inequality. Without collective awareness about the structural determinants of inequality, collective support for redistribution is weakened. As Piachaud (2001: 448) noted, 'there are limits to redistribution by stealth, and a clear, explicit recognition of the need for more redistribution, as well as public explanation and defence of it, are necessary'. Without this, the long-term sustainability of an inclusive welfare state is threatened.

Using social citizenship as a framework, this thesis has explored the relational nature of deprivation and affluence, and the implications of this for policy design and coordination (Jordan, 1996: 82). This thesis has shown that lived experiences of inequality are structured by institutional arrangements and the changing dynamics of social stratification that are exercised by and against individual citizens. In this sense, lived experiences (and their effect on conceptions of social citizenship) can be understood as a reflection of macro-institutional structures. This points to the policy relevance and credibility of lived experience. The following section considers the objective significance of lived experience in this regard.

9.2 The Objective Significance of Lived Experience

Whilst definitions and measures of poverty are often relative to the standards prevailing in society, the existence of poverty is frequently understood as ontologically independent. It has therefore been argued that objectivity in poverty research occurs when 'a definition is independent of the feelings of poor people' (Roll, 1992: 12). A significant body of research has explored subjective perceptions of poverty (Danziger et al., 2000; Dunlap et al., 2003;

McIntyre et al., 2003; Saunders et al., 2006; Hooper, 2007; Ridge, 2011). However, these studies are generally recognised as capturing qualitative experiences, rather than quantifying the nature, of deprivation and inequality. These studies often operate within epistemological confines that restrict their capacity to explore the social relations that are constitutive of poverty (Harriss, 2007). As a result, the phenomenological significance of deprivation and inequality has often been overlooked in mainstream poverty research (Charlesworth, 2000; Van der Merwe, 2006).

Psychosocial studies and well-being research (Goffman, 1963; Tomlinson et al., 2008; Chase and Kyomuhendo, 2014), by virtue of their interdisciplinarity, seek to 'rethink some key popular and disciplinary constructions of the welfare subject and the scope of social policy' (Stenner and Taylor, 2008: 443). Affective states that were once considered part of the private or emotional sphere are now being attended to in comparative poverty research to understand how institutional arrangements can affect individual experience and behaviour across a range of contexts in similar ways. Underlying research in this area is a basic recognition that affective states cannot be understood in isolation from the circumstances in which they arise. For example, in response to being bitten by a dog, an individual may violently retaliate, cry, run away, or do nothing. Irrespective of the (in-) action taken, the individual's affective state, experience and action can only be understood in relation to the actions of the dog and the broader context within which they arise. Similarly, the affective states and experiences of 'poor' people are significant independent of socio-economic structures - but their meaning, cause and consequence can only be fully understood in relation to the social policies and market forces that shape contextual and material circumstance.

Recent work on the psychology of scarcity demonstrates this point well. Mani et al. (2013) find that compared to better-off individuals, worse-off individuals are more likely to make bad decisions and mistakes. A reasonable conclusion may be that individuals are worse off as a result of their poor decision-making. However, Mani et al. (2013) demonstrate that scarcity arising from socio-political and economic systems, greatly affects an individual's psychological capacity for good decision-making. Arguably, lived experiences are an objective reflection of institutional and structural arrangements as much as they are an individualised affective state or subjective perception.

The fact that subjective perceptions and lived experience cannot be fully understood in isolation from structural or relational schema does not undermine their objective significance. Indeed this interdependency

demonstrates the importance of theorising the relationship between subjective experience, material circumstance and institutional arrangements. This produces new forms of poverty knowledge 'more capable of taking account of the relational complexities of subjectivity' (Taylor, 2011: 789). As previously stated, subjective perceptions do not always correspond with material circumstances or social positions (Flaherty, 2008; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013):

people who are poor try not to admit it to themselves exactly because the admission of 'failure' adds to the misery they feel from their objective situation. Thus in interviews poor people, lower class people, are often able to characterise the situation of others like themselves in lively detail, but they often seek to distance themselves personally from that common plight (Rainwater, 1990: 3).

Findings such as this do not undermine the credibility of subjective perceptions and lived experiences in poverty research. Neither do they necessarily represent a discord between the structural and affective realities of deprivation. As the quote above illustrates, poverty denial could very well be an articulation of the relational nature of poverty. Reference groups, cultural praxes, normative frameworks, agentic choice, and other complex determinants of experience will shape lived experiences of and affective responses to material hardship. By exploring how people navigate and give meaning to a social, political and economic system, it is possible to see how the substantive and figurative significance of social citizenship is undermined for those experiencing inequality.

Citizenship is by no means the only framework through which to explore the significance of lived experience, but it does proffer three inter-related conceptual benefits. Firstly, the 'equality of status' premise of citizenship makes the analysis of structural inequalities meaningful independent of normative critiques of poverty and vulnerability. Secondly, citizenship is based on principles of common membership that govern the relations between polity, state and market. In this way, poverty can be understood, not as a peculiarity of market processes, but as a systemic feature of citizenship arrangements. Finally, despite differences across domestic and international settings, citizenship offers a common conceptual and analytical framework through which to explore the distributional effects of institutions within and across national boundaries.

Grounding poverty analysis and debate in lived experiences can be transformative for those facing poverty and those seeking critical and

efficacious policy solutions to address it (Dutro, 2009). One challenge is to make the rich micro-level data that is drawn from such research 'policy relevant' (Brock, 1999). The structural macro-level data that tends to treat the poor as a unit of observation needs to be refined and complemented by poverty definitions, experiences and solutions that originate from poor people themselves (Marti and Mertens, 2014). By integrating disparate paradigms and methods of poverty research, it is possible to develop new understanding about the existence and nature of poverty, as well as effective poverty prevention and alleviation strategies.

A number of studies have combined objective and subjective measures to arrive at a definition of poverty (Mack and Lansley, 1985; Deleeck and Van den Bosch, 1992; Eroğlu, 2007). However, fewer studies have accounted for the objective significance of lived experience. That is, qualitative and mixed methods studies of poverty often fail to treat lived experiences and subjective perceptions as a manifestation and reflection of structural relations (e.g. Novak, 1996). Such an approach would offer new insights into measuring poverty and vulnerability but most importantly it would also offer a new methodological framework through which to assess the efficacy of poverty alleviation processes in a comparative context. Rather than assessing the efficacy of welfare regimes on their own terms (i.e. via different structural welfare arrangements), the lived experience of citizens helps uncover the extent to which the dominant praxis of social citizenship operates effectively to tackle or at least temper poverty and vulnerability. These benefits can only be reaped by integrating mixed methods to overcome the limitations of purely quantitative or qualitative research. In this sense, qualitative and quantitative methods

are fundamentally complements, not substitutes – and certainly not rivals. They mutually inform each other, to everyone's benefit...Developing powerful and effective diagnoses of the causes of poverty, and appropriate treatments to reduce poverty, requires both well-designed quantitative investigation and giving a genuine voice to poor people (Robb, 2002: xii-xiii).

Mixed methods can strengthen the credibility and external validity of lived experiences. Whilst lived experiences tend to be part of the qualitative paradigm, this thesis has demonstrated that researching lived experiences of deprivation could be seen as a methodology in its own right. A number of recent studies have made significant contributions in this arena (e.g. Chase and Kyomuhendo, 2014). Understanding the causes and consequences of

poverty is contingent on capturing the socio-economic and political relations that shape the nature of inequality. A methodological approach that can examine these relations comes some way towards an 'objective' measure that captures the complexities of poverty and inequality in a systematic way.

9.3 Future Research Agenda

This thesis has contributed towards the existing literature and evidence on the relationship between inequality, social citizenship and public attitudes. In light of the limitations and research findings of this study, there are three key areas that require further consideration.

Firstly, this thesis has drawn upon a strong and varied body of evidence that explains attitude formation and divergence in relation to welfare and inequality. A myriad of qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods studies examine the relationship between social policy, inequality and public attitudes. Many of these offer conflicting accounts about the causes of attitudinal formation and divergence. This thesis has challenged some of the dominant 'welfare myths' and assumptions surrounding welfare attitudes, the primary one being that conceptions of social citizenship are principally derived from personal and economic self interest. Whilst this thesis has succeeded in this respect, it has not been able to reconcile the conflicting evidence and interpretations on welfare attitudes. As such, there is a clear need to distil and consolidate the existing research and evidence in a way that develops a systematic theory of welfare attitudes and their relationship to inequality.

Secondly, this thesis has demonstrated the value of exploring lay accounts of social citizenship from the perspective of the 'poor' *and* the 'rich'. However, this thesis would benefit from both a deeper and broader examination of how lived experiences of inequality affect conceptions of social citizenship. Broader in the sense that the study would have benefited from interviewing more people across a range of institutional contexts. Extending qualitative fieldwork beyond Leeds and the surrounding area would strengthen the inferences made about the relationship between inequality and social citizenship in the UK. Deeper in the sense that a comparative element would refine some of the claims made about how the institutional architecture of welfare and inequality shapes the lived experiences, outcomes and attitudes of citizens. In 2013, the researcher secured funding to replicate this study in New Zealand. Following this thesis, the researcher will undertake a comparative analysis to consider the relationship between inequality and social citizenship in liberal welfare regimes more generally. The intention is to

replicate the study across a range of welfare regimes and institutional contexts to consider how differences in public discourse and institutions structure, but are also structured by, inequality and welfare attitudes.

Building on the 'horizontal' understanding of social citizenship advanced in this thesis, the third key research agenda to emerge from this research is the need to develop an explanatory account of the relationship between inequality, social citizenship and public attitudes. Chapter two highlighted the tendency to conflate normative with explanatory theories of social citizenship in social policy academia. This thesis offers empirical insight into the dynamics arising from the relationship between inequality and social citizenship, in particular, what role public opinion has to play in this. However, more attention is needed to develop a systematic, applied theory of the relationship between inequality and social citizenship. This theory should account for the multiple cognitive, institutional and procedural ways in which the relationship between social citizenship and inequality is formulated.

Bibliography

- Abel-Smith, B. 1958. Whose welfare state. *In: MacKenzie, N. (ed.) Conviction*. London: McGibbon.
- Achterberg, P., Veen, R. & Raven, J. 2014. The ideological roots of the support for welfare state reform: Support for distributive and commodifying reform in The Netherlands. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 23, 215-226.
- Adams, J. & Ezrow, L. 2009. Who do European parties represent? How Western European parties represent the policy preferences of opinion leaders. *The Journal of Politics*, 71, 206-223.
- Addison, P. 1975. *The road to 1945: British politics and the Second World War*, London, Jonathan Cape.
- Alcock, P. 1990. The end of the line for social security: the Thatcherite restructuring of welfare. *Critical Social Policy*, 10, 88-105.
- Alesina, A. & La Ferrara, E. 2005. Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities. *Journal of Public Economics*, 89, 897-931.
- Alesina, A. & Giuliano, P. 2009. Preferences for redistribution. *IZA discussion paper 4056*. Bohn: Institute for the Study of Labour.
- Allport, G. W. 1935. Attitudes. *In: Murchison, C. (ed.) Handbook of social psychology*. Worcester, Massachusetts: Clark University Press.
- Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T. & Saez, E. 2015. The world top incomes database. Retrieved May 15 2015. (<http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu>).
- Anderson, B. 2006. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* London, Verso.
- Anderson, W., White, V. & Finney, A. 2010. "You just have to get by": Coping with low incomes and cold homes. Bristol: Centre for Sustainable Energy.
- Andreouli, E. & Howarth, C. 2013. National identity, citizenship and immigration: Putting identity in context. *Journal for the theory of social behaviour*, 43, 361-382.
- Applebaum, L. D. 2001. The influence of perceived deservingness on policy decisions regarding aid to the poor. *Political Psychology*, 22, 419-442.
- Arendt, H. 2013 [1958]. *The human condition*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Aristotle. 2001. *Politics [electronic resource]*, Blacksburg, VA, Virginia Tech.
- Ashford, E. 2007. The duties imposed by the human right to basic necessities. *In: Pogge, T. (ed.) Freedom from poverty as a human right: who what to the very poor?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Athwal, B., Brill, L., Chesters, G. & Quiggin, M. 2011. Recession, poverty and sustainable livelihoods in Bradford. *York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation*.

Atkinson, A. & Ooms, T. 2015. UK Estimates of Top Income Shares 2012-2013: Methodological Note. *The World Top Incomes Database*. (<http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/Country:United%20Kingdom>).

Audit Commission 2011. Record of changes to the National Indicator Set following its implementation in April 2008. London: HMSO.

Avram, S., Figari, F., Leventi, C., Levy, H., Navicke, J., Matsaganis, M., Militaru, E., Paulus, A., Rastringina, O. & H., S. 2013. The distributional effects of fiscal consolidation in nine EU countries. *Euromod Working Paper No.2/13*. (<https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/publications/working-papers/euromod/em2-13.pdf>).

Beckett-Milburn, K., Cunningham-Burley, S. & Davis, J. 2003. Contrasting lives, contrasting views? Understandings of health inequalities from children in differing social circumstances. *Social Science & Medicine*, 57, 613-623.

Bailey, N., Gannon, M., Kearns, A., Livingston, M. & Leyland, A. H. 2013. Living apart, losing sympathy? How neighbourhood context affects attitudes to redistribution and to welfare recipients. *Environment and Planning A*, 45, 2154-2175.

Balibar, E. 2009. *We, the people of Europe?: Reflections on transnational citizenship*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Ball, S. J. 2008. The Legacy of ERA, Privatization and the Policy Ratchet. *Educational Management Administration & Leadership*, 36, 185-199.

Bambra, C. 2005. Cash versus services: 'worlds of welfare' and the de-commodification of cash benefits and health care services. *Journal of Social Policy*, 34, 195-213.

Bamfield, L. & Horton, T. 2009. Understanding attitudes to tackling economic inequality. *Joseph Rowntree Foundation Publication*, 6, 1-69.

Barber, B. R. 2003. *Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age*, Berkeley, University of California Press.

Barnes, M., Newman, J. & Sullivan, H. 2004. Power, participation, and political renewal: Theoretical perspectives on public participation under New Labour in Britain. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, 11, 267-279.

Barnett, N. 2002. Including ourselves: New Labour and engagement with public services. *Management Decision*, 40, 310-317.

Barr, N. & Coulter, F. 1990. Social Security: Solution or Problem? In: Hills, J. (ed.) *The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bartels, L. M. 2005. Homer gets a tax cut: Inequality and public policy in the American mind. *Perspectives on Politics*, 3, 15-31.

Bartels, L. M. 2006. Is the water rising? Reflections on inequality and American democracy. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 39, 39-42.

Batty, E. & Flint, J. 2010. Self-esteem, comparative poverty and neighbourhoods. *CRESR Research Paper No. 7*. Sheffield: Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University.

- Batty, E. & Cole, I. 2010. *Resilience and the recession in six deprived communities: Preparing for worse to come*, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Bauman, Z. 2005. Chasing elusive society. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 18, 123-141.
- Baumberg, B., Bell, K. & Gaffney, D. 2012. Benefits stigma in Britain. London: Turn2us.
- Baumberg, B. 2014. Benefits and the cost of living: Pressures on the cost of living and attitudes to benefit claiming. In: Park, A., Bryson, C. and Curtice, J. (ed.) *British Social Attitudes: the 31st Report*. London: NatCen Social Research.
- Baxter, J. & Kane, E. W. 1995. Dependence and Independence: A Cross-National Analysis of Gender Inequality and Gender Attitudes. *Gender & Society*, 9, 193-215.
- Becker, H. 1996. The epistemology of qualitative research. In: Jessor, R., Colby, A. & Shweder, R. (eds.) *Ethnography and human development: Context and meaning in social inquiry*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Beckett, A. E. 2006. *Citizenship and vulnerability : disability and issues of social and political engagement*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Beckett, A. E. 2009. 'Challenging disabling attitudes, building an inclusive society': considering the role of education in encouraging non-disabled children to develop positive attitudes towards disabled people. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 30, 317-329.
- Bee, P. 2015. Deprivation and Inequality in Leeds: analysis of the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010. Leeds: Leeds Church Institute and The Oastler Centre.
- Beitz, C. R. 1989. *Political equality: An essay in democratic theory*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Bellamy, R. 2008. *Citizenship: A very short introduction*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Benei, V. 2005. Introduction. Manufacturing citizenship - confronting public spheres and education in contemporary worlds'. In: Benei, V. (ed.) *Manufacturing citizenship: education and nationalism in Europe, South Asia and China*. London: Routledge.
- Bennett, S. E. 1991. Left behind - exploring declining turnout among non-college young whites, 1964-1988. *Social science quarterly*, 72, 314-333.
- Beresford, P., Green, D., Lister, R. & Woodard, K. 1999. *Poverty First Hand: Poor people speak for themselves*, London, Child Poverty Action Group.
- Berlin, I. 1958. Two Concepts of Liberty. In: Berlin, I. (ed.) *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Beveridge, W. 1942. Social Insurance and Allied Services: Memoranda from Organisations. London: HMSO.
- Beyers, C. 2008. The Cultural Politics of "Community" and Citizenship in the District Six Museum, Cape Town. *Anthropologica*, 359-373.

- Birch, S., Gottfried, G. & Lodge, G. 2013. *Divided Democracy: political inequality in the UK and why it matters*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Blaikie, N. 1993. *Approaches to Social Enquiry*, Cambridge, Blackwell.
- Blaikie, N. W. H. 2003. *Analyzing quantitative data: from description to explanation*, London, SAGE Publications.
- Blaikie, N. W. H. 2007. *Approaches to social enquiry*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Blaikie, N. W. H. 2010. *Designing social research : the logic of anticipation*, Cambridge, Polity Press Ltd.
- Blekesaune, M. & Quadagno, J. 2003. Public Attitudes toward Welfare State Policies. *European Sociological Review*, 19, 415-427.
- Blekesaune, M. 2007. Economic conditions and public attitudes to welfare policies. *European Sociological Review*, 23, 393-403.
- Bochel, C., Bochel, H., Somerville, P. & Worley, C. 2008. Marginalised or enabled voices? 'User participation' in policy and practice. *Social Policy and Society*, 7, 201-210.
- Bosniak, L. 2001. Denationalising citizenship. In: Aleinikoff, T. A. & Klusmeyer, D. B. (eds.) *Citizenship today: global perspectives and practices*. Brookings Institution Press.
- Boudreau, C. & MacKenzie, S. A. 2014. Wanting What Is Fair: How Party Cues and Information About Income Inequality Affect Public Support for Taxes. Available at SSRN 2405294 (<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405294>).
- Brannon, R. 1976. Attitudes and the prediction of behaviour. In: Seidenberg, B. & Snadowsky, A. (eds.) *Social psychology: an introduction*. New York: Free Press.
- Brewer, M. & Shephard, A. 2004. *Has Labour made work pay?*, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Brewer, M., Browne, J., Joyce, R. & Payne, J. 2011. Child and working-age poverty from 2010 to 2020. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Brewer, M., Browne, J. & Jin, W. 2012. Universal Credit: A Preliminary Analysis of Its Impact on Incomes and Work Incentives. *Fiscal Studies*, 33, 39-71.
- Brock, K. 1999. It's Not Only Wealth that Matters--It's Peace of Mind Too: A Review of Participatory Work on Poverty and Illbeing. Washington: World Bank.
- Brooks, C., Nieuwbeerta, P. & Manza, J. 2006. Cleavage-based voting behavior in cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies. *Social Science Research*, 35, 88-128.
- Brooks, C. & Manza, J. 2006. Why do welfare states persist? *Journal of Politics*, 68, 816-827.
- Brooks, C. & Svallfors, S. 2010. Why does class matter? Policy attitudes, mechanisms, and the case of the Nordic countries. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 28, 199-213.

- Brooks, J. E. 1985. Democratic frustration in the Anglo-American polities: A quantification of inconsistency between mass public opinion and public policy. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 250-261.
- Brown, G. 1997. Budget speech to the House of Commons. London: HM Treasury.
- Brown, P. 1991. *Poor work: disadvantage and the division of labour*, Milton Keynes, Open University.
- Browne, J. & Elming, W. 2015. The effect of the coalition's tax and benefit changes on household incomes and work incentives. *Election 2015: Briefing Note 2*. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Buck, N. 2001. Identifying neighbourhood effects on social exclusion. *Urban studies*, 38, 2251-2275.
- Bullock, H. E. 1999. Attributions for Poverty: A Comparison of Middle-Class and Welfare Recipient Attitudes¹. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 29, 2059-2082.
- Bullock, H. E., Williams, W. R. & Limbert, W. M. 2003. Predicting support for welfare policies: The impact of attributions and beliefs about inequality. *Journal of Poverty*, 7, 35-56.
- Bullock, H. E. 2004. From the Front Lines of Welfare Reform: An Analysis of Social Worker and Welfare Recipient Attitudes. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 144, 571-590.
- Bullock, H. E. 2008. Justifying Inequality: A Social Psychological Analysis of Beliefs About. *National Poverty Center Working Paper Series 06/08*. http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/working_papers/: National Poverty Centre.
- Burchardt, T. & Propper, C. 1999. Does the UK have a private welfare class? *Journal of Social Policy*, 28, 643-665.
- Burchell, D. 1995. The attributes of citizens: virtue, manners and the activity of citizenship. *Economy and Society*, 24, 540-558.
- Burrows, R. & Loader, B. 1994. *Towards a post-Fordist welfare state?*, New York, Psychology Press.
- Burstein, P. 2006. Why estimates of the impact of public opinion on public policy are too high: Empirical and theoretical implications. *Social Forces*, 84, 2273-2289.
- CAB 2013. Punishing Poverty? A review of benefit sanctions and their impacts on clients and claimants. Manchester: Citizens Advice Bureau.
- Cabinet Office 1999. Modernising Government (cmd 4310). London: HMSO.
- Cabinet Office 2014. Open Public Services: 2014 progress report. London: HMSO.
- Cabinet Office 2015. Queen's Speech 2015: background briefing notes. London: HMSO.
- Calhoun, C. J. 1992. *Habermas and the public sphere*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT press.

- Campbell, A. L. 2003. *How policies make citizens: Senior political activism and the American welfare state*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Carmel, E. & Papadopoulos, T. 2003. The New Governance of Social Security in Britain. In: Millar, J. (ed.) *Understanding Social Security: Issues for Policy and Practice*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Chakraborty, A. 2013. The Welfare State, 1942-2013, obituary. *Guardian*, Tuesday 8 January 2013.
- Charlesworth, S. J. 2000. *A phenomenology of working-class experience*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Chase, E. & Walker, R. 2013. The co-construction of shame in the context of poverty: beyond a threat to the social bond. *Sociology*, 47, 739-754.
- Chase, E. & Kyomuhendo, G. (eds.) 2014. *Poverty and Shame: Global Experiences*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chote, R., Crawford, R., Emmerson, C. & Tetlow, G. 2010. The public finances: 1997 to 2010. *2010 Election Briefing Note No. 6 (IFSBN93)* London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Christ, O., Schmid, K., Lolliot, S., Swart, H., Stolle, D., Tausch, N., Al Ramiah, A., Wagner, U., Vertovec, S. & Hewstone, M. 2014. Contextual effect of positive intergroup contact on outgroup prejudice. *PNAS* 111, 11, 3996-4000.
- Clark, C. R., Clark, S. & Polborn, M. K. 2006. Coordination and Status Influence. *Rationality and Society*, 18, 367-391.
- Clark, T. & Dilnot, A. 2002. Long-term trends in British Taxation and Spending. *IFS Briefing Note No. 25*. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Clarke, J. 2004. Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neo-liberalism. *Journal of Social Policy*, 33, 27-48.
- Clarke, J. 2005. New Labour's citizens: activated, empowered, responsabilized, abandoned? *Critical Social Policy*, 25, 447-463.
- Clarke, J., Coll, K., Dagnino, E. & Neveu, C. 2014. *Disputing citizenship*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Class 2013. Exposing the myths of welfare. (http://classonline.org.uk/docs/2013_Exposing_the_myths_of_welfare.pdf): Centre for Labour and Social Studies.
- Cole, I. 2011. Low-income neighbourhoods in Britain: the gap between policy ideas and residents' realities. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Colledge, D. & Field, J. 1983. 'To Recondition Human Material...': An account of a British Labour Camp in the 1930s. An Interview with William Heard. *History Workshop Journal*, 5, 152-166.
- Condor, S. 2011. Towards a social psychology of citizenship? Introduction to the special issue. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 21, 193-201.
- Conover, P., Crewe, I. & Searing, D. 1991. The nature of citizenship in the United States and Great Britain: empirical comments on theoretical themes. *Journal of Politics*, 53, 800-832.

- Cook, J., Dwyer, P. & Waite, L. 2011. 'Good relations' among neighbours and workmates? The everyday encounters of Accession 8 migrants and established communities in urban England. *Population, Space and Place*, 17, 727-741.
- Coughlin, R. M. 1980. Ideology, public opinion, & welfare policy: attitudes toward taxes and spending in industrialized societies. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cozzarelli, C., Wilkinson, A. V. & Tagler, M. J. 2001. Attitudes toward the poor and attributions for poverty. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57, 207-227.
- Crawford, R., Emmerson, C., Tetlow, G., Adam, S., Browne, J., Joyce, R., Phillips, D., Wenchao, J., Joyce, R., Phillips, D., Sibieta, L. & Cribb, J. 2015. IFS Fiscal Facts and Incomes in the UK. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Creagan, C., Warrener, M. & Kinsella, R. 2009. Living with social evils: further views from people in disadvantaged groups. In: Utting, D. (ed.) *Contemporary social evils*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Crisp, R., Batty, E., Cole, I. & Robinson, D. 2009. Work and worklessness in deprived neighbourhoods: Policy assumptions and personal experiences. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Cromby, J. & Willis, M. E. H. 2014. Nudging into subjectification: Governmentality and psychometrics. *Critical Social Policy*, 34, 241-259.
- Cusack, T., Iversen, T. & Rehm, P. 2006. Risks at work: The demand and supply sides of government redistribution. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 22, 365-389.
- Dahl, R. A. 1973. *Polyarchy: participation and opposition*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Daniels, A. 2015. As wealthy give smaller share of income to charity, middle class digs deeper. *The Chronicle of Philanthropy* (<https://philanthropy.com/article/As-Wealthy-Give-Smaller-Share/152481-note>).
- Danziger, S., Corcoran, M., Danziger, S. & Heflin, C. M. 2000. Work, income, and material hardship after welfare reform. *Journal of Consumer Affairs*, 34, 6-30.
- Davies, B. & Harré, R. 1990. Positioning: The discursive production of selves. *Journal for the theory of social behaviour*, 20, 43-63.
- Davies, J. 2014. The volunteering experiences of young people in disadvantaged areas. *Voluntary sector and volunteering research Conference, New Researchers' Sessions*. Sheffield.
- Davis, M. H. 1983. Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 44, 113.
- DCLG 2011. The English Indices of Deprivation 2010. London: HMSO.
- de Botton, A. 2004. *Status Anxiety*, London, Hamish Hamilton.
- Deacon, A. & Bradshaw, J. 1983. *Reserved for the poor: the means test in British social policy*, London, Blackwell.

- Deacon, A. 2007. Civic Labour or Doulia? Care, Reciprocity and Welfare. *Social Policy and Society*, 6, 481-490.
- Deacon, A. & Patrick, R. 2010. New Welfare Settlement? The Coalition Government and Welfare to Work. *Annual Conference of the Social Policy Association*. University of Lincoln.
- Dean, H. & Taylor-Gooby, P. 1992. *Dependency culture : the explosion of a myth*, New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Dean, H. & Melrose, M. 1996. Unravelling citizenship The significance of social security benefit fraud. *Critical Social Policy*, 16, 3-31.
- Dean, H. & Melrose, M. 1999. *Poverty, riches and social citizenship*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dean, H. & Shah, A. 2002. Insecure families and low-paying labour markets: comments on the British experience. *Journal of Social Policy*, 31, 61-80.
- Dean, H. 2004. Popular discourse and the ethical deficiency of 'Third Way' conceptions of citizenship. *Citizenship studies*, 8, 65-82.
- Dean, H. 2007. The ethics of welfare-to-work. *Policy & Politics*, 35, 573-589.
- Dean, H. 2010. *Understanding human need*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Dean, H. 2012. The ethical deficit of the United Kingdom's proposed universal credit: pimping the precariat? *The Political Quarterly*, 83, 353-359.
- Dean, M. 2013. *Democracy under attack: how the media distort policy and politics*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Delanty, G. 2000. *Citizenship in a global age: Society, culture, politics*, Buckingham, Open University Press.
- Deleeck, H. & Van den Bosch, K. 1992. Poverty and adequacy of social security in Europe: a comparative analysis. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 2, 107-120.
- Dench, G. 2006. *The rise and rise of meritocracy*, London, Wiley-Blackwell.
- Desforges, L., Jones, R. & Woods, M. 2005. New geographies of citizenship. *Citizenship studies*, 9, 439-451.
- Devichand, M. 2010. The Spirit Level: Britain's new theory of everything? *BBC News* (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11518509>), 12 October 2010.
- Dharmapala, D. 2014. What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature. *Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 702*. Chicago: University of Chicago, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics.
- Dickinson, J., Andrucki, M. J., Rawlins, E., Hale, D. & Cook, V. 2008. Introduction: Geographies of everyday citizenship. *ACME*, 7, 100-112.
- Dietz, M. 1992. Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship. In: Mouffe, C. (ed.) *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community*. London: Verso.
- Dittmar, H. 1992. *The social psychology of material possessions: To have is to be*, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf.

- Dittmar, H. & Pepper, L. 1994. To have is to be: Materialism and person perception in working-class and middle-class British adolescents. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 15, 233-251.
- Ditto, P. H. & Koleva, S. P. 2011. Moral Empathy Gaps and the American Culture War. *Emotion Review*, 3, 331-332.
- Donnison, D. V. 1981. *The politics of poverty*, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell.
- Donoghue, M. 2013. Welfare and cohesion contested: A critical discourse analysis of New Labour's reform programme. *British Politics*, 8, 79-100.
- Dorey, P. 2010. A Poverty of Imagination: Blaming the Poor for Inequality. *The Political Quarterly*, 81, 333-343.
- Dorling, D. 2011. Underclass, overclass, ruling class, supernova class. In: A. Walker, Sinfield, A. & C. Walker (eds.) *Fighting Poverty, Inequality and Injustice*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Dorling, D. 2014. *Inequality and the 1%*, London, Verso.
- DSS 1998. *New Ambitions for Our Country: A New Contract for Welfare*. Green Paper on Welfare Reform. London: HMSO.
- Dubois, D., Rucker, D. D. & Galinsky, A. D. 2015. Social class, power, and selfishness: When and why upper and lower class individuals behave unethically. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 108, 436.
- Duncan Smith, I. 2013. Welfare Speech at 2013 Party Conference. *Conservative Party Conference*. Manchester.
- Duncan Smith, I. 2015. Keynote Speech on the Welfare State in 2020. *Reform Conference 'The welfare state - continuing the revolution'*. London: Reform.
- Dunlap, E., Golub, A. & Johnson, B. D. 2003. The Lived Experience of Welfare Reform in Drug-Using Welfare-Needy Households in Inner-City New York. *Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare*, 30, 39-58.
- Dutro, E. 2009. Children Writing "Hard Times": Lived Experiences of Poverty and the Class-Privileged Assumptions of a Mandated Curriculum. *Language Arts*, 87, 89-98.
- DWP 2007. *Households Below Average Income (HBAI) 1994/95-2005/06*. London: HMSO.
- DWP 2010a. *Universal Credit: welfare that works*. London: HMSO.
- DWP 2010b. *21st Century Welfare*. London: HMSO.
- DWP 2012a. *Social Justice: transforming lives*. London: HMSO.
- DWP 2012b. *Disability Living Allowance Reform Impact Assessment*. London: HMSO.
- DWP 2012c. *Households Below Average Income (HBAI) 1994/95-2011/12*. London: HMSO.
- DWP 2013a. *Summary table: Benefit expenditure 1948/49 to 2016/17*. London: HMSO.
- DWP 2013b. *Welfare Benefits Up-rating Bill Impact Assessment*. London: HMSO.

- DWP 2014. Households Below Average Income: An analysis of the income distribution 1994/95 – 2012/13 July 2014 (United Kingdom). London: HMSO.
- DWP 2015a. The Annual Abstract of Statistics for Benefits, National Insurance Contributions, and Indices of Prices and Earnings: 2014 edition. London: HMSO.
- DWP 2015b. Jobseeker's Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance sanctions: decisions made to December 2014. London: HMSO.
- Dwyer, P. 1998. Conditional citizens? welfare rights and responsibilities in the late 1990s. *Critical Social Policy*, 18, 493-517.
- Dwyer, P. 2000. *Welfare rights and responsibilities: contesting social citizenship*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Dwyer, P. 2002. Making sense of social citizenship: some user views on welfare rights and responsibilities. *Critical Social Policy*, 22, 273-299.
- Dwyer, P. 2004. Creeping Conditionality in the UK: From Welfare Rights to Conditional Entitlements? *The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie*, 29, 265-287.
- Dwyer, P. & Ellison, N. 2009. Work and welfare: the rights and responsibilities of unemployment in the UK. In: Giugni, M. (ed.) *The politics of unemployment in Europe*. Surrey: Ashgate.
- Dwyer, P. 2010. *Understanding social citizenship: Themes and perspectives for policy and practice*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Dwyer, P. & Wright, S. 2014. Universal Credit, ubiquitous conditionality and its implications for social citizenship. *Journal of Poverty and Social Justice*, 22, 27-35.
- Ebbinghaus, B. 2012. Comparing welfare state regimes: are typologies an ideal or realistic strategy? *European Social Policy Analysis Network, ESPAnet Conference*. Edinburgh, UK.
- Edmiston, D. 2011. The Shifting Balance of Private and Public Welfare Activity in the United Kingdom, 1979 to 2007. *CASEpaper155*. London: LSE: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
- Edmiston, D. 2014a. The age of austerity: contesting the ethical basis and financial sustainability of welfare reform in Europe. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 22, 118-131.
- Edmiston, D. 2014b. Social Security Privatisation: a means to whose end? *People, Place and Policy*, 8, 113-128.
- Elias, N. R. & Jensen, C. 2014. Merit, Luck, and Historical Recognition: A More Comprehensive Treatment of Justice in Public Administration. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 38, 466.
- Ellison, N. 1999a. Beyond universalism and particularism: rethinking contemporary welfare theory. *Critical Social Policy*, 19, 57-85.
- Ellison, N. 1999b. Towards a New Social Politics: Citizenship and Reflexivity in Late Modernity. *Sociology*, 31, 697-717.

- Ellison, N. 2000. Proactive and Defensive Engagement: Social Citizenship in a Changing Public Sphere. *Sociological Research Online*, 5, (<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/5/3/ellison.html>).
- Ellison, N. & Burrows, R. 2007. New spaces of (dis) engagement? Social politics, urban technologies and the rezoning of the city. *Housing Studies*, 22, 295-312.
- Ellison, N. 2013. Citizenship, space and time: engagement, identity and belonging in a connected world. *Thesis Eleven*, 118, 48-63.
- Eroğlu, S. 2007. Developing an index of deprivation which integrates objective and subjective dimensions: extending the work of Townsend, Mack and Lansley, and Halleröd. *Social indicators research*.
- Esping-Andersen, G. 1994. After the golden age? Welfare state dilemmas in a global economy. *Welfare states in transition: National adaptations in global economies*, UNRISD/OP/94/7. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- ESRC 2010. Framework for research ethics. Swindon: ESRC.
- Etzioni, A. 1995. *The spirit of community: rights, responsibilities and the communitarian agenda*, London, Fontana.
- Evans, G. 1993. Class, prospects and the life-cycle: explaining the association between class position and political preferences. *Acta Sociologica*, 36, 263-276.
- Evans, G. & de Graaf, N. D. 2013. *Political choice matters: Explaining the strength of class and religious cleavages in cross-national perspective*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Evans, M. D. & Kelley, J. 2004. Subjective social location: data from 21 nations. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 16, 3-38.
- Farnsworth, K. & Irving, Z. 2012. Varieties of crisis, varieties of austerity: social policy in challenging times. *Journal of Poverty and Social Justice*, 20, 133-147.
- Faulks, K. 2000. *Citizenship*, New York, Routledge.
- Feldman, S. & Zaller, J. 1992. The political culture of ambivalence: Ideological responses to the welfare state. *American Journal of Political Science*, 268-307.
- Feldman, S. 2003. Values, ideology, and the structure of political attitudes. In: Sears, D., Huddy, L. & Jervis, R. (eds.) *The Oxford handbook of political psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ferge, Z. 1997. The changed welfare paradigm: the individualization of the social. *Social Policy & Administration*, 31, 20-44.
- Field, F. & Piachaud, D. 1971. The poverty trap. *New Statesman*, 3, 772-773.
- Field, F., Meacher, M. & Pond, C. 1977. *To Him Who Hath: a study of poverty and taxation*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Field, J. 2013. *Working Men's Bodies: Work Camps in Britain, 1880-1940*, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

- Finn, D. & Gloster, R. 2010. Lone Parent Obligations: Early Findings of Implementation as well as Experiences of the Income Support and Jobseeker's Allowances Regimes. *DWP research report*. London: HMSO.
- Flaherty, J. 2008. Getting by, Getting Heard: Poverty and Social Exclusion in the Borders. *Listening to the Voices of Experience*. Glasgow: Poverty Alliance.
- Fleischacker, S. 2009. *On Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations": A Philosophical Companion*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Fletcher, D., Gore, T., Reeve, K., Robinson, D., Bashir, N., Goudie, R. & O'Toole, S. 2008. Social Housing and Worklessness: Qualitative Research Findings. *DWP Research Report*. Norwich: HMSO.
- Flint, J. 2010. Coping Strategies? Agencies, Budgeting and Self Esteem Amongst Low-Income Households. *Living Through Change in Challenging Neighbourhoods: A research project by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation*. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Fong, C. M., Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. 2006. Strong reciprocity and the welfare state. *Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity*, 2, 1439-1464.
- Forrest, R. & Kearns, A. 2001. Social cohesion, social capital and the neighbourhood. *Urban studies*, 38, 2125-2143.
- Fraile, M. & Ferrer, M. 2005. Explaining the determinants of public support for cuts in unemployment benefits spending across OECD countries. *International Sociology*, 20, 459-481.
- Fraser, D. 2003. *The evolution of the british welfare state: a history of social policy since the industrial revolution*, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fry, R. & Taylor, P. 2012. The rise of residential segregation by income. *Washington, DC: Pew Research Center*.
- Furby, L. 1978. Possessions: Toward a theory of their meaning and function throughout the life cycle. *Life-span development and behavior*, 1978, 297-336.
- Gaffney, D. 2015. Retrenchment, Reform, Continuity: Welfare under the Coalition. *National Institute Economic Review*, 231, R44-R53.
- Gallie, D. 1994. Are the unemployed an underclass? Some evidence from the social change and economic life initiative. *Sociology*, 28, 737-757.
- Galston, W. 2007. Civic Knowledge, Civic Education, and Civic Engagement: A Summary of Recent Research. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 30, 623-642.
- Garland, C. 2015. Framing the Poor: Media Illiteracy, Stereotyping, and Contextual Fallacy to Spin the Crisis. *tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society*, 13, 5-10.
- Garthwaite, K. 2011. 'The language of shirkers and scroungers?' Talking about illness, disability and coalition welfare reform. *Disability & Society*, 26, 369-372.
- Gaventa, J. 2002. Exploring citizenship, participation and accountability. *IDS Bulletin*, 33, 1-14.

- Giddens, A. 1994. *Beyond left and right : the future of radical politics*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. 1999. *The Third Way: the renewal of social democracy*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. 2013. *The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration*, John Wiley & Sons.
- Giger, N. & Nelson, M. 2011. The electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment: Blame avoidance or credit claiming in the era of permanent austerity? *European Journal of Political Research*, 50, 1-23.
- Giger, N., Rosset, J. & Bernauer, J. 2012. The poor political representation of the poor in a comparative perspective. *Representation*, 48, 47-61.
- Gilens, M. 2005. Inequality and democratic responsiveness. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 69, 778-796.
- Gilens, M. 2009. Preference gaps and inequality in representation. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 42, 335-341.
- Gingrich, J. & Ansell, B. 2012. Preferences in Context: Micro Preferences, Macro Contexts, and the Demand for Social Policy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45, 1624-1654.
- Gingrich, J. 2014. Visibility, Values, and Voters: The Informational Role of the Welfare State. *The Journal of Politics*, 76, 565-580.
- Ginn, J. 2013. Austerity and Inequality. Exploring the Impact of Cuts in the UK by Gender and Age. *Research on Ageing and Social Policy*, 1, 28-53.
- Glennerster, H. 1995. *British social policy since 1945*, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell.
- Glennerster, H., Hills, J., Piachaud, D. & Webb, J. 2004. *One hundred years of poverty and policy*, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Goffman, E. 1963. *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall.
- Golding, P. & Middleton, S. 1982. *Images of welfare: Press and public attitudes to poverty*, Oxford, Martin Robertson.
- Goldman, P. 1958. *The Future of the Welfare State. Seven Oxford Lectures*. London: Conservative Political Centre.
- Goldthorpe, J. H. 2010. Analysing Social Inequality: A Critique of Two Recent Contributions from Economics and Epidemiology. *European Sociological Review*, 26, 731-744.
- Goodin, R. E. & Le Grand, J. 1987. *Not only the poor: the middle classes and the welfare state*, London, Allen & Unwin.
- Graham, J., Haidt, J. & Nosek, B. A. 2009. Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 96, 1029-1046.
- Gray, B. K. 1908. *Philanthropy and the State or Social Politics*, London, PS King.

- Green, D. 2012. *From poverty to power: How active citizens and effective states can change the world*, Oxford, Oxfam.
- Gregory, J. 2015. Engineering Compassion: The Institutional Structure of Virtue. *Journal of Social Policy*, 44, 339-356.
- Griffin, J. D. & Newman, B. 2005. Are voters better represented? *Journal of Politics*, 67, 1206-1227.
- Griggs, J. & Walker, R. 2008. *The costs of child poverty for individuals and society: a literature review*, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Griggs, J. & Bennett, F. 2009. Rights and responsibilities in the social security system. *Social Security Advisory Committee Occasional Paper No. 6* London: Department for Work and Pensions.
- Groskind, F. 1991. Public Reactions to Poor Families: Characteristics That Influence Attitudes toward Assistance. *Social Work*, 36, 446-453.
- Groskind, F. 1994. Ideological influences on public support for assistance to poor families. *Social Work*, 39, 81-89.
- Grover, C. 2011. *The social fund 20 years on: historical and policy aspects of loaning social security*, Farnham, Ashgate.
- Guardian. 2006. Cameron: poverty is a 'moral disgrace'. *Guardian*, Friday 24 November 2006.
- Guimond, S. & Palmer, D. L. 1996. The Political Socialization of Commerce and Social Science Students: Epistemic Authority and Attitude Change¹. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 26, 1985-2013.
- Habermas, J. 1975. *Legitimation crisis*, Boston, Beacon Press.
- Habermas, J. 1996. *Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Hacker, J. S. 2002. *The divided welfare state: The battle over public and private social benefits in the United States*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Haidt, J. 2012. *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion*, London, Penguin.
- Hakim, C. 1982. *Secondary analysis in social research : a guide to data sources and methods with examples*, London, Allen & Unwin.
- Hamilton, C. 2003. Overconsumption in Britain: A culture of middle class complaint? *Discussion Paper Number 57*. Canberra: The Australia Institute.
- Hancock, L. & Mooney, G. 2013. "Welfare Ghettos" and the "Broken Society": Territorial Stigmatization in the Contemporary UK. *Housing, Theory and Society*, 30, 46-64.
- Hansard Society 2014. Audit of Political Engagement 11: The 2014 Report with a focus on the accountability and conduct of MPs (<http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Audit-of-Political-Engagement-11-2014.pdf>): Hansard Society.
- Harker, L. 2006. *Delivering on Child Poverty: What Would it Take?; a Report for the Department for Work and Pensions*, London, HMSO.

- Harris, J. 1998. *William Beveridge: a biography*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Harriss, J. 2007. Bringing politics back into poverty analysis: Why understanding social relations matters more for policy on chronic poverty than measurement. *CPRC Working Paper No. 77*. <http://www.chronicpoverty.org/>: Chronic Poverty Research Centre.
- Hart, S. 2009a. The 'problem' with youth: young people, citizenship and the community. *Citizenship studies*, 13, 641-657.
- Hart, S. 2009b. The 'problem' with youth: young people, citizenship and the community. *Citizenship studies*, 13, 641-657.
- Harvey, J. 2010. Victims, resistance, and civilized oppression. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 41, 13-27.
- Hasenfeld, Y. & Rafferty, J. A. 1989. The determinants of public attitudes toward the welfare state. *Social Forces*, 67, 1027-1048.
- Hay, C. 2014. Neither real nor fictitious but 'as if real'? A political ontology of the state. *The British journal of sociology*, 65, 459-480.
- Hayek, F. A. 1982. *Law, legislation and liberty: a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Hayek, F. A. 2006. *The constitution of liberty*, London, Routledge.
- Heater, D. 2004. *Citizenship. The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education*, New York, Longman.
- Heater, D. 2013. *What is citizenship?*, London, John Wiley & Sons.
- Heath, A. F. 1992. The social attitudes of the underclass. *In*: Smith, D. (ed.) *Understanding the underclass*. London: Policy Studies Institute.
- Heath, E. 1966. *The 1966 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto*. London: Conservative Party.
- Hedges, A. 2005. Perceptions of redistribution: report on exploratory qualitative research. *LSE STICERD Research Paper No. 96*. London: London School of Economics.
- Held, D. 1991. Between State and Civil Society: Citizenship. *In*: Andrews, G. (ed.) *Citizenship*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H. & McElreath, R. 2001. In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. *American Economic Review*, 73-78.
- Henry, P., Reyna, C. & Weiner, B. 2004. Hate Welfare But Help the Poor: How the Attributional Content of Stereotypes Explains the Paradox of Reactions to the Destitute in America¹. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 34, 34-58.
- Hewitt, C. 1974. Policy-making in Postwar Britain: a Nation-Level Test of Elitist and Pluralist Hypotheses. *British Journal of Political Science*, 4, 187-216.
- Hickson, K. 2009. Conservatism and the poor: Conservative party attitudes to poverty and inequality since the 1970s. *British Politics*, 4, 341-362.
- Hill, M. 2011. The economic crisis and paradigm change. *In*: Farnsworth, K. & Irving, Z. (eds.) *Social Policy in challenging times*. Bristol: Policy Press.

- Hills, J. 1998. Thatcherism, New Labour and the welfare state. *CASEpaper 13*. London: LSE: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
- Hills, J. & Leikes, O. 1999. Social security, selective universalism and patchwork redistribution. *In: R. Jowell, Curtice, J., Park, A., Thomson, K., L. Jarvis, Bromley, C. & Stratford, N. (eds.) British Social Attitudes: The 16th Report: Who Shares New Labour Values?* Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Hills, J. 2002. Following or Leading Public Opinion? Social Security Policy and Public Attitudes Since 1997. *Fiscal Studies*, 23, 539-558.
- Hills, J., Sefton, T. & Stewart, K. 2009. *Towards a More Equal Society?*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Hills, J., Brewer, M., Jenkins, S. P., Lister, R., Lupton, R., Machin, S., Mills, C., Modood, T., Rees, T. & Riddell, S. 2010. An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK: Report of the National Equality Panel. *CASEREport60*. London: LSE: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
- Hills, J. 2013. Labour's record on cash transfers, poverty, inequality and the lifecycle 1997-2010. *Social Policy in a Cold Climate Working Paper 5*. London: LSE: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
- Hills, J. 2015. The Coalition's Record on Cash Transfers, Poverty and Inequality 2010-2015. *Social Policy in a Cold Climate Working Paper 11*. LSE: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
- Hindess, B. 1993. Citizenship in the modern West. *In: Turner, B. S. (ed.) Citizenship and social theory*. London: Sage Publications.
- Hitlin, S. & Piliavin, J. 2004. Values: reviving a dormant concept. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30, 359-393.
- HM Treasury 2013. Impact on households: distributional analysis to accompany the Budget 2013. London: HMSO.
- HM Treasury 2015. Budget 2015 - March 2015 as laid before the House of Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer when opening the Budget. London: HMSO.
- HMRC 2013a. Income tax statistics and distributions, Table 2.4 - Shares of total income (before and after tax) and income tax for percentile groups, 1999-00 to 2012-13. London: HMSO.
- HMRC. 2013b. *HMRC Archives of Personal Income Allowance thresholds* [Online]. London: HMRC. [Accessed 13th September 2013 2013].
- HMSO 1948. National Assistance Act 1948 11 & 12 Geo 6. Ch 29. London: HMSO.
- Hobbes, T. [1651] 1991. *Leviathan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Hobolt, S. B. & Klemmensen, R. 2005. Responsive Government? Public Opinion and Government Policy Preferences in Britain and Denmark. *Political Studies*, 53, 379-402.
- Hoggett, P., Wilkinson, H. & Beedel, P. 2013. Fairness and the Politics of Resentment. *Journal of Social Policy*, 42, 567-585.

- Holmes, M. & Manning, N. 2013. 'Them that runs the country don't know what they're doing': political dissatisfaction amongst members of the white working class. *The Sociological Review*, 61, 479-498.
- Hood, A. & Oakley, L. 2014a. The social security system: long-term trends and recent changes. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Hood, A. & Oakley, L. 2014b. A Survey of the GB Benefit System. *IFS Briefing Note BN13*. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Hooper, C.-A. 2007. Living with Hardship 24/7: the diverse experiences of families in poverty in England. London: Frank Buttle Trust.
- Hopkins, D. J. 2009a. Partisan Reinforcement and the Poor: The Impact of Context on Explanations for Poverty. *Social Science Quarterly*, 90, 744-764.
- Hopkins, N. 2009b. Organising Action: Citizenship, Identity and Culture. In: Tiwari, A. K. (ed.) *Psychological Perspectives on Social Issues and Human Development: Selected Papers from the Proceeding of 15th Annual Convention of National Academy of Psychology (NAOP), India*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.
- Hopkins, N. & Blackwood, L. 2011. Everyday citizenship: Identity and recognition. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 21, 215-227.
- Horton, T. & Gregory, J. 2009. The Solidarity Society: why we can afford to end poverty and how to do it with public support. *A Fabian Special*. London: Fabian Society.
- Howarth, C., Wagner, W., Magnusson, N. & Sammut, G. 2014. "It's Only Other People Who Make Me Feel Black": Acculturation, Identity, and Agency in a Multicultural Community. *Political Psychology*, 35, 81-95.
- Howe, L. 1985. The 'Deserving' and the 'Undeserving': Practice in an Urban, Local Social Security Office. *Journal of Social Policy*, 14, 49-72.
- Huber, E. & Stephens, J. D. 2001. *Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties and policies in global markets*, Chicago, University of Chicago press.
- Huberman, M. & Miles, M. B. 2002. *The qualitative researcher's companion*, London, Sage.
- Hughes, G. & Lewis, G. 1998. *Unsettling Welfare: the reconstruction of social policy*, New York, Psychology Press.
- Hughes, R. & Huby, M. 2004. The construction and interpretation of vignettes in social research. *Social Work and Social Sciences Review*, 11, 36-51.
- Humpage, L. 2008a. Talking about citizenship in New Zealand. *Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online*, 3, 121-134.
- Humpage, L. 2008b. Radical Change or More of the Same?: Public Attitudes Towards Social Citizenship in New Zealand since Neoliberal Reform. *The Australian Journal of Social Issues*, 43, 215.
- Hunt, M. O. 1996. The individual, society, or both? A comparison of Black, Latino, and White beliefs about the causes of poverty. *Social Forces*, 75, 293-322.
- Isin, E. F. & Wood, P. K. 1999. *Citizenship and identity*, London, Sage.

- Isin, E. F. & Nielsen, G. M. 2008. *Acts of citizenship*, London, Zed Books Limited.
- Isin, E. F., Nyers, P. & Turner, B. S. 2013. *Citizenship between past and future*, London, Routledge.
- Iversen, T. & Soskice, D. 2001. An asset theory of social policy preferences. *American Political Science Review*, 95, 875-894.
- Iyengar, S. 1990. Framing responsibility for political issues: The case of poverty. *Political behavior*, 12, 19-40.
- Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Graham, J., Ditto, P. & Haidt, J. 2012. Understanding libertarian morality: The psychological dispositions of self-identified libertarians. *PloS one*, 7, e42366.
- Jacobs, L. R. & Shapiro, R. Y. 2000. *Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Jaeger, M. M. 2006. What makes people support public responsibility for welfare provision: Self-interest or political ideology? A longitudinal approach. *Acta Sociologica*, 49, 321-338.
- Jæger, M. M. 2009. United But Divided: Welfare Regimes and the Level and Variance in Public Support for Redistribution. *European Sociological Review*, 25, 723-737.
- Jeene, M., van Oorschot, W. & Uunk, W. 2013. Popular Criteria for the Welfare Deservingness of Disability Pensioners: The Influence of Structural and Cultural Factors. *Social indicators research*, 110, 1103-1117.
- Jensen, T. 2013. Riots, restraint and the new cultural politics of wanting. *Sociological Research Online*, 18, 7.
- Jensen, T. 2014. Welfare commonsense, poverty porn and doxosophy. *Sociological Research Online*, 19, 3.
- Jessop, B. 1993. Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary remarks on post-Fordist political economy. *Studies in Political Economy*, 40, 7-39.
- Jessop, B. 2002. *The future of the capitalist state*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Jo, Y. N. 2013. Psycho-social dimensions of poverty: When poverty becomes shameful. *Critical Social Policy*, 33, 514-531.
- Johnsen, S. 2014. Conditionality Briefing: Lone Parents. *Welfare Conditionality: sanctions, support and behaviour change*. (http://www.welfareconditionality.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Briefing_LoneParents_14.09.10_FINAL.pdf).
- Johnson, M. & Gearty, C. 2007. Civil Liberties and the Challenge of Terrorism. In: Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Phillips, M. & Johnson, M. (eds.) *British Social Attitudes: The 23rd Report*. London: Sage.
- Johnson, N. 1989. *The Limits of Political Science*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Johnston, P. 2009. Why welfare is Gordon Brown's greatest failure. *The Telegraph*, 29th August 2009.

- Jones, C. & Novak, T. 1999. *Poverty, welfare and the disciplinary state*, New York, Psychology Press.
- Jones, E. & Gaventa, J. 2002. *Concepts of Citizenship, A Review*. Brighton: Institute for Development Studies
- Joppke, C. 2001. Multicultural citizenship: A critique. *European Journal of Sociology*, 42, 431-447.
- Joppke, C. 2007. Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity. *Citizenship Studies*, 11, 37-48.
- Jordan, B., James, S., Kay, H. & Redley, M. 1992. *Trapped in Poverty? Labour Market Decisions in Low Income Households*, London, Routledge.
- Jordan, B. & Redley, M. 1994. Polarisation, underclass and the welfare state. *Work, Employment & Society*, 8, 153-176.
- Jordan, B. 1996. *A theory of poverty and social exclusion*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Jordan, B. 1998. *The New Politics of Welfare: social justice in a global context*, London, Sage.
- Joyce, R. & Sibieta, L. 2013. An assessment of Labour's record on income inequality and poverty. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 29, 178-202.
- JRF 2014. *Reducing poverty in the UK: a collection of evidence reviews*. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Kalafat, J. & Gagliano, C. 1996. The use of simulations to assess the impact of an adolescent suicide response curriculum. *Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior*, 26, 359-364.
- Kallio, J. & Niemelä, M. 2013. Who Blames the Poor? *European Societies*, 16, 112-135.
- Kautto, M. 2002. Investing in services in West European welfare states. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 12, 53-65.
- Kearns, A. & Parkinson, M. 2001. The significance of neighbourhood. *Urban Studies*, 38, 2103-2110.
- Kearns, A., Bailey, N., Gannon, M., Livingston, M., and Leyland, A. 2014. 'All in it together'? Social cohesion in a dividing society: attitudes to income inequality and redistribution in a residential context. *Journal of Social Policy*, 43, 453-477.
- Keister, L. A. 2014. The One Percent. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 40, 347-367.
- Kelly, N. J. & Enns, P. K. 2010. Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self - Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54, 855-870.
- Kempson, E. 1996. *Life on a low income*, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Kennedy, S. 2011. Disability Living Allowance Reform. *Standard Note: SN/SP/5869*. London: House of Commons Library.
- Kernshaw, P. 2005. *Carefair: Rethinking the responsibilities and rights of citizenship*, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press.

- Kershaw, P., Pulkingham, J. & Fuller, S. 2008. Expanding the subject: Violence, care, and (In) active male citizenship. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, 15, 182-206.
- Khan, S. R. 2012. The sociology of elites. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 38, 361-377.
- Kinder, D. R. 1998. Opinion and action in the realm of politics. In: D. Gilbert, S. F., and G. Lindzey (ed.) *Handbook of Social Psychology*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- King, D. S. & Waldron, J. 1988. Citizenship, social citizenship and the defence of welfare provision. *British Journal of Political Science*, 18, 415-443.
- Kitchen, S. 2006. *2005 Citizenship Survey*, London, Department for Communities and Local Government.
- Korpi, W. & Palme, J. 1998. The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality: Welfare state institutions, inequality, and poverty in the Western countries. *American sociological review*, 63, 661-687.
- Kraus, M. W., Piff, P. K., Mendoza-Denton, R., Rheinschmidt, M. L. & Keltner, D. 2012. Social class, solipsism, and contextualism: how the rich are different from the poor. *Psychological review*, 119, 546-572.
- Kraus, M. W. & Keltner, D. 2013. Social class rank, essentialism, and punitive judgment. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 105, 247-261.
- Kuklinski, J. H., Quirk, P. J., Jerit, J., Schwieder, D. & Rich, R. F. 2000. Misinformation and the currency of democratic citizenship. *Journal of Politics*, 62, 790-816.
- Kulin, J. & Svallfors, S. 2013. Class, Values, and Attitudes Towards Redistribution: A European Comparison. *European Sociological Review*, 29, 155-167.
- Kulin, J. & Seymer, A. 2014. What's Driving the Public? A Cross-Country Analysis of Political Attitudes, Human Values and Political Articulation. *Sociological Research Online*, 19, 14.
- Kumlin, S. 2007. *The welfare state: Values, policy preferences, and performance evaluations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. & Norman, W. 1994. Return of the citizen: A survey of recent work on citizenship theory. *Ethics*, 104, 352-381.
- Kymlicka, W. 1995. *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*, Cambridge Univ Press.
- Labour Party. [1964] 2007. Labour Party General Election Manifesto 1964: "The New Britain". In: Dale, I. (ed.) *Labour Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997*. London: Routledge.
- Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. 2001. *Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics*, London, Verso.
- Lansley, S. 2014. Britain's Wages Crisis—Is 'Predistribution' or 'Redistribution' the Way Forward? *The Political Quarterly*, 85, 3-10.
- Larsen, C. 2007. The institutional logic of welfare attitudes: How welfare regimes influence public support. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41, 145-168.

- Le Grand, J. & Winter, D. 2000. The middle classes and the welfare state under Labour and Conservative governments. *In: Goodin, R. E. & Mitchell, D. (eds.) The Foundations of the Welfare State*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Leca, J. 1991. Individualisme et citoyenneté. *In: Birnbaum, P. & Leca, J. (eds.) Sur individualisme*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Lelkes, O. 2009. Attitudes to inequality. *Tárki European Social Report*. Budapest: TÁRKI Social Research Institute.
- Lepianka, D., Van Oorschot, W. & Gelissen, J. 2009. Popular explanations of poverty: A critical discussion of empirical research. *Journal of Social Policy*, 38, 421-438.
- Lewis, G. & Fink, J. 2004. 'All that heaven allows': the worker-citizen in the post war welfare state *In: Lewis, G. (ed.) Citizenship: personal lives and social policy*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Lewis, J. & Campbell, M. 2007. UK work/family balance policies and gender equality, 1997–2005. *Social Politics: international studies in gender, state & society*, 14, 4-30.
- Lewis, J. 2008. *Cultural Studies: The Basics*, London, Sage.
- Likki, T. & Staerklé, C. 2015. Welfare Support in Europe: Interplay of Dependency Culture Beliefs and Meritocratic Contexts. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 27, 138-153.
- Lindsay, C. 2010. In a lonely place? Social networks, job seeking and the experience of long-term unemployment. *Social Policy & Society*, 9, 25-37.
- Linos, K. & West, M. 2003. Self - interest, Social Beliefs, and Attitudes to Redistribution. Re - addressing the Issue of Cross - national Variation. *European Sociological Review*, 19, 393-409.
- Lipsey, D. 1979. The reforms people want. *New Society*, 4, 12-14.
- Lister, R. 1990. *The exclusive society: citizenship and the poor*, London, Child Poverty Action Group.
- Lister, R. 2002a. 'Work for those who can, security for those who cannot': A third way in social security reform or fractured social citizenship? *In: Edwards, R. & Glover, J. (eds.) Risk and citizenship: key issues in welfare*. London: Routledge
- Lister, R. 2002b. Sexual Citizenship. *In: Isin, E. & Turner, B. (eds.) Handbook of citizenship studies*. London: Sage.
- Lister, R. (ed.) 2003. *Citizenship: feminist perspectives*, New York: New York University Press.
- Lister, R., Smith, N., Middleton, S. & Cox, L. 2003. Young people talk about citizenship: empirical perspectives on theoretical and political debates. *Citizenship studies*, 7, 235-253.
- Lister, R. 2004. *Poverty*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Lister, R. 2007a. From object to subject: including marginalised citizens in policymaking. *Policy & Politics*, 35, 437-455.

- Lister, R. 2007b. Inclusive citizenship: Realizing the potential. *Citizenship studies*, 11, 49-61.
- Lister, R. (ed.) 2007c. *Gendering citizenship in Western Europe: new challenges for citizenship research in a cross-national context*, Bristol: Policy Press.
- Lister, R. & Bennett, F. 2010. The new 'champion of progressive ideals'? Cameron's Conservative Party: poverty, family policy and welfare reform. *Renewal*, 18, 84-109.
- Lister, R. 2011. The age of responsibility: social policy and citizenship in the early 21st century. *Social Policy Review*, 23, 63-84.
- Ljubotina, O. D. & Ljubotina, D. 2007. Attributions of poverty among social work and non-social work students in Croatia. *Croatian Medical Journal*, 48, 741.
- Locke, J. [1690] 1988. *Two treatises of government*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Lodemel, I. 1989. *The quest for institutional welfare and the problem of the residuum*. PhD, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Lowe, R. 2004. *The Welfare State in Britain since 1945*, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
- LPC 2015. National Minimum Wage: Low Pay Commission Report 2015. London: Low Pay Commission.
- Lupton, R. 2003. 'Neighbourhood Effects': Can we measure them and does it matter? *CASEpaper73*. London: LSE: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
- Lupton, R., Burchardt, T., Fitzgerald, A., Hills, J., McKnight, A., Obolenskaya, P., Stewart, K., Thomson, S., Tunstall, R. & Vizard, P. 2015. The Coalition's Social Policy Record 2010-2015. *Social Policy in a Cold Climate Research Report 4*. London: LSE: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
- MacCoun, R. J. 2014. New evidence on the tenuous state of evidence-based drug policy. *Addiction*, 109, 1234-1235.
- MacDonald, R. 1994. Fiddly jobs, undeclared working and the something for nothing society. *Work, Employment & Society*, 8, 507-530.
- MacDonald, R., Shildrick, T., Webster, C. & Simpson, D. 2005. Growing Up in Poor Neighbourhoods The Significance of Class and Place in the Extended Transitions of 'Socially Excluded' Young Adults. *Sociology*, 39, 873-891.
- MacDonald, R. 2008. Disconnected youth? Social exclusion, the 'Underclass' & economic marginality. *Social Work & Society*, 6, 236-248.
- MacDonald, R., Shildrick, T. & Furlong, A. 2014a. In search of 'intergenerational cultures of worklessness': Hunting the Yeti and shooting zombies. *Critical Social Policy*, 34, 199-220.
- MacDonald, R., Shildrick, T. & Furlong, A. 2014b. 'Benefits Street' and the Myth of Workless Communities. *Sociological Research Online*, 19, 1.
- Mack, J. & Lansley, S. 1985. *Poor Britain*, London, George Allen & Unwin.

- Mack, J., Lansley, S., Nandy, S. & Pantazis, C. 2013. Attitudes to necessities in the PSE 2012 survey: are minimum standards becoming less generous? *PSE UK Working Paper, Analysis Series No. 4* (<http://www.poverty.ac.uk/pse-research/pse-uk-2012>).
- Macmillan, H. 1969. *Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955*, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mandelson, P. 1997. Labour's Next Steps: Tackling Social Exclusion. *Fabian Pamphlet 581*. London: The Fabian Society.
- Mani, A., Mullainathan, S., Shafir, E. & Zhao, J. 2013. Poverty impedes cognitive function. *Science*, 341, 976-980.
- Manne, A. 2014. The age of entitlement: how wealth breeds narcissism. *The Guardian*, Monday 7 July 2014.
- Manning, N. & Holmes, M. 2013. 'He's snooty 'im': exploring 'white working class' political disengagement. *Citizenship Studies*, 17, 479-490.
- Manow, P. 2009. Electoral rules, class coalitions and welfare state regimes, or how to explain Esping-Andersen with Stein Rokkan. *Socio-Economic Review*, 7, 101-121.
- Marshall, G., Roberts, S. & Burgoyne, C. 1996. Social Class and Underclass in Britain and the USA. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 47, 22-44.
- Marshall, T. H. 1950. *Citizenship and Social Class: and other essays*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Marshall, T. H. & Bottomore, T. B. 1992. *Citizenship and social class*, Pluto Press London.
- Marston, G. & McDonald, C. 2006. *Analysing social policy: A governmental approach*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
- Marti, T. S. & Mertens, D. M. 2014. Mixed Methods Research With Groups at Risk New Developments and Key Debates. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 8, 207-211.
- Marx, K. 1975. On the Jewish Question. *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Marx, P. 2014. The effect of job insecurity and employability on preferences for redistribution in Western Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 24, 351-366.
- Matthews, P. & Hastings, A. 2013. Middle - Class Political Activism and Middle - Class Advantage in Relation to Public Services: A Realist Synthesis of the Evidence Base. *Social Policy & Administration*, 47, 72-92.
- Mau, S. 2000. Attitudinal cleavages and the welfare state: A comparison between the United Kingdom and Germany. (*Unpublished*), (<http://aei.pitt.edu/648/1/ICMau.pdf>).
- Mau, S. 2001. Patterns of popular support for the welfare state: a comparison of the United Kingdom and Germany. *WZB Discussion Paper, No. FS III 01-405*. Kiel: Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (<http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/50218/1/337447373.pdf>).

- McAdams, D. P., Albaugh, M., Farber, E., Daniels, J., Logan, R. L. & Olson, B. 2008. Family metaphors and moral intuitions: how conservatives and liberals narrate their lives. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 95, 978.
- McAfee, N. 2000. *Habermas, Kristeva, and citizenship*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- McCall, L. 2013. *The Undeserving Rich: American Beliefs about Inequality, Opportunity, and Redistribution*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- McCue, C. P. & Gopoian, J. D. 2000. Dispositional Empathy and the Political Gender Gap. *Women & Politics*, 21, 1-20.
- McEwan, C. 2000. Engendering citizenship: gendered spaces of democracy in South Africa. *Political Geography*, 19, 627-651.
- McIntyre, L., Officer, S. & Robinson, L. M. 2003. Feeling poor: the felt experience low-income lone mothers. *Affilia*, 18, 316-331.
- McKendrick, J. H. 2008. *The media, poverty and public opinion in the UK*, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- McLennan, D., Barnes, H., Noble, M., Davies, J. & Garratt, E. 2011. The English Indices of Deprivation 2010: Technical Report. London: Department for Communities and Local Government.
- McNamee, S. J. 2009. *The meritocracy myth*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- McQuaid, R., Fuertes, V. & Richard, A. 2010. How can parents escape from recurrent poverty. *York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation*.
- Mead, L. 1986. *Beyond entitlement: the social obligations of citizenship*, London, Collier Macmillan.
- Melden, A. I. 1979. *Rights and persons*, Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Merton, R. K. 1938. Social structure and anomie. *American Sociological Review*, 3, 672-682.
- Mettler, S. & Soss, J. 2004. The consequences of public policy for democratic citizenship: Bridging policy studies and mass politics. *Perspectives on politics*, 2, 55-73.
- Michaelson, J., Pickering, K., Wood, N. & Scholes, S. 2006. 2005 Home Office Citizenship Survey: Technical Report. London: Home Office.
- Middleton, S., Ashworth, K. & Walker, R. 1994. *Family fortunes: pressures on parents and children in the 1990s*, London, Child Poverty Action Group.
- Miller, D. 2000. Citizenship: what does it mean and why is it important? In: Pearce, N. & Hallgarten, J. (eds.) *Tomorrow's Citizens: critical debates in citizenship and education*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Mills, C. W. 1959. *The sociological imagination*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Mills, C. W. 1999 [1956]. *The Power Elite*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

- Mitchell, L. 2010. *Stacked deck: a story of selfishness in America*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
- Mohan, J. & Bulloch, S. L. 2012. The idea of a 'civic core': what are the overlaps between charitable giving, volunteering, and civic participation in England and Wales? *TSRC Working Paper 73*. Southampton: Third Sector Research Centre.
- Mouffe, C. 1992. *Dimensions of radical democracy: pluralism, citizenship, community*, London, Verso.
- Mouffe, C. 1999. Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? *Social Research*, 66, 745-758.
- Mouffe, C. 2005. *The return of the political*, London, Verso.
- Mullen, E. & Skitka, L. J. 2009. Comparing Americans' and Ukrainians' Allocations of Public Assistance The Role of Affective Reactions in Helping Behavior. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 40, 301-318.
- Murphy, G. C. & Athanasou, J. A. 1999. The effect of unemployment on mental health. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 72, 83-99.
- Murphy, M. 2014. Politics of Irish Social Security Reform; Lessons from three cases of successful resistance to social security retrenchment. . *SPA Conference 2014 - Social Policy Confronting Change: Resistance, Resilience and Radicalism* Sheffield.
- Murray, C. A. 1990. *The Emerging British Underclass*, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, Health and Welfare Unit.
- Murray, C. A. 1994. *Underclass: the crisis deepens*, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, Health and Welfare Unit.
- National Archives 2012. The administration of Social Security 1979-1997. *Operational Selection Policy 5*. London: National Archives.
- Niemelä, M. 2008. Perceptions of the causes of poverty in Finland. *Acta Sociologica*, 51, 23-40.
- Novak, M. 1996. Poverty: facts and feelings. *Družboslovne razprave (Sociological Essays)*, 12, 84-98.
- Nozick, R. 1974. *Anarchy, state and utopia*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- O'Brien, M. & Penna, S. 1998. *Theorising welfare: enlightenment and modern society*, London, Sage.
- Offe, C. 1982. Some contradictions of the modern welfare state. *Critical Social Policy*, 2, 7-16.
- Offe, C. 1985. *Disorganised Capitalism*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Oldfield, A. 1990a. *Citizenship and community: Civic republicanism and the modern world*, London, Routledge.
- Oldfield, A. 1990b. Citizenship: an unnatural practice? *The Political Quarterly*, 61, 177-187.
- Oliver, D. & Heater, D. 1994. *The Foundations of Citizenship*, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf.

- Ong, A. 1999. Cultural citizenship as subject making: Immigrants negotiate racial and cultural boundaries in the United States. *In: Torres, R., Miron, L. & Inda, X. J. (eds.) Race, identity, and citizenship: a reader.* Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- ONS 2013. Statistical Release: Tables from the Effects of Taxes and Benefits on Household Income, 1977-2011/12. London: Office for National Statistics.
- ONS 2014. Leeds - The Big Picture. *A summary of the result of the 2011 Census.* Leeds: Office of National Statistics and Leeds City Council.
- Ormston, R., Spencer, L., Barnard, M., Snape, D. 2013. The foundations of qualitative research. *In: Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, C. M. & Ormston, R. (eds.) Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers.* London: Sage.
- Orr, S., Brown, G., Smith, S., Way, C. & Waters, M. 2006. When Ends Don't Meet: Assets, vulnerabilities and livelihoods, an analysis of households in Thornaby-on-Tees. Manchester: Church Action on Poverty.
- Orton, M. 2006. Wealth, citizenship and responsibility: the views of "better off" citizens in the UK. *Citizenship studies*, 10, 251-265.
- Orton, M. & Rowlingson, K. 2007. *Public attitudes to economic inequality*, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Orton, M. 2009. Understanding the exercise of agency within structural inequality: the case of personal debt. *Social Policy and Society*, 8, 487-498.
- Osborne, G. 2012. Budget 2012 statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Rt Hon George Osborne MP. London, House of Commons: Treasury.
- Ostry, J., Berg, A. & Tsangarides, C. 2014. Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth. *IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/14/02.* Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Owens, L. A. & Pedulla, D. S. 2014. Material Welfare and Changing Political Preferences: The Case of Support for Redistributive Social Policies. *Social Forces*, 92, 1087-1113.
- Page, B. & Shapiro, R. 2010. *The rational public: Fifty years of trends in Americans' policy preferences*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Page, D. 2000. *Communities in the balance: The reality of social exclusion on housing estates*, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Painter, J. & Philo, C. 1995. Spaces of citizenship: an introduction. *Political geography*, 14, 107-120.
- Palmer, G., MacInnes, T. & Kenway, P. 2008. *Monitoring poverty and social exclusion 2008*, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Papadakis, E. & Bean, C. 1993. Popular support for the welfare state: A comparison between institutional regimes. *Journal of Public Policy*, 13, 227-227.
- Parekh, B. 1990. The Rushdie affair: research agenda for political philosophy. *Political Studies*, 38, 695-709.

- Park, A., Phillips, M. & Robinson, C. 2007. *Attitudes to Poverty: Findings from the British Social Attitudes Survey*, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Park, A., Clery, E., Curtice, J., Phillips, M. & Utting, D. (eds.) 2012. *British Social Attitudes: the 29th Report*, London: NatCen Social Research.
- Park, A., Bryson, C., Clery, E., Curtice, J. & Phillips, M. 2013. *British Social Attitudes: the 30th Report*. London: NatCen Social Research.
- Parkin, F. 2007 [1974]. *Strategies of Social Closure in Class Formation. The Social Analysis of Class Ctructure*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Patrick, R. 2012. Work as the primary 'duty' of the responsible citizen: a critique of this work-centric approach. *People, Place & Policy Online*, 6, 5-15.
- Patrick, R. 2014. Working on Welfare: Findings from a Qualitative Longitudinal Study Into the Lived Experiences of Welfare Reform in the UK. *Journal of Social Policy*, 43, 705-725.
- Pattie, C., Seyd, P. & Whiteley, P. 2003. Civic attitudes and engagement in modern Britain. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 56, 616-633.
- Pawson, R. & Tilley, N. 1997. *Realistic evaluation*, London, Sage.
- Pearce, N. & Taylor, E. 2013. Government spending and welfare: Changing attitudes towards the role of the state. In: Park, A., Bryson, C., Clery, E., Curtice, J. & Phillips, M. (eds.) *British Social Attitudes: the 30th Report*. London: NatCen Social Research.
- Peck, J. 2010. *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Pennycock, M. & Whittaker, M. 2012. Conditions uncertain: Assessing the implications of Universal Credit in work conditionality. London: Resolution Foundation.
- Petersen, A. R. 1999. *Poststructuralism, citizenship and social policy*, New York, Psychology Press.
- Pew Research Center 2014. Most see inequality growing, but partisans differ over solutions. *A Pew Research Centre/USA TODAY Survey*. (<http://www.pewresearch.org>).
- Pfau-Effinger, B. 2005. Culture and welfare state policies: Reflections on a complex interrelation. *Journal of Social Policy*, 34, 3-20.
- Phillips, A. 1991. *Democracy and difference*, University Park, PA, Penn State University Press.
- Phillips, A. 1995. *The politics of presence*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Piachaud, D. 2001. Child poverty, opportunities and quality of life. *The political quarterly*, 72, 446-453.
- Pierson, C. 1998. *Beyond the welfare state?: the new political economy of welfare*, University Park, PA, Penn State University Press.
- Piff, P. K. 2014. Wealth and the Inflated Self Class, Entitlement, and Narcissism. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 40, 34-43.
- Piketty, T. 2014. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

- Piven, F. F. & Cloward, R. 1993. *Regulating the poor: The functions of public welfare*, New York, Vintage.
- Plant, R. 1988. Needs, agency and welfare rights. In: Donald, M. T. (ed.) *Rights and Welfare: the theory of the welfare state*. Boulder, Connecticut: Westview Press.
- Polanyi, K. 1957. The Economy as an Instituted Process. In: Polanyi, K., Arensberg, C. M. & Pearson, H. W. (eds.) *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*. New York: The Free Press.
- Pontusson, J. & Rueda, D. 2010. The politics of inequality: Voter mobilization and left parties in advanced industrial states. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43, 675-705.
- Pope, T. & Roantree, B. 2015. A survey of the UK Tax System. *IFS Briefing Note BN09*. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Powdthavee, N. & Oswald, A. 2014. Does Money Make People Right-Wing and Inegalitarian? A Longitudinal Study of Lottery Winners *Warwick Economic Research Papers No 1039*. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Power, A. 2007. *City survivors: bringing up children in disadvantaged neighbourhoods*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Prabhakar, R. 2008. Wealth Taxes: Stories, Metaphors and Public Attitudes. *The Political Quarterly*, 79, 172-178.
- Pradhan, M. & Ravallion, M. 2000. Measuring poverty using qualitative perceptions of consumption adequacy. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 82, 462-471.
- Preston, G. 2006. Families with disabled children, benefits and poverty. *Benefits*, 14, 39-43.
- Prideaux, S. 2005. *Not so New Labour: a sociological critique of New Labour's policy and practice*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Prideaux, S. 2010. The welfare politics of Charles Murray are alive and well in the UK. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 19, 293-302.
- Prideaux, S. & Roulstone, A. 2012. *Understanding Disability Policy*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Pulkingham, J., Fuller, S. & Kershaw, P. 2010. Lone motherhood, welfare reform and active citizen subjectivity. *Critical Social Policy*, 30, 267-291.
- Purvis, T. & Hunt, A. 1999. Identity versus citizenship: Transformations in the discourses and practices of citizenship. *Social & Legal Studies*, 8, 457-482.
- Putnam, R. D. 1993. *Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, R. D. 2000. *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*, London, Simon & Schuster.
- Raco, M. 2009. From expectations to aspirations: State modernisation, urban policy, and the existential politics of welfare in the UK. *Political Geography*, 28, 436-444.

- Rahman, N. 1996. Caregivers' sensitivity to conflict: The use of the vignette methodology. *Journal of Elder Abuse & Neglect*, 8, 35-47.
- Rainwater, L. 1990. Poverty and Equivalence as Social Construction. *The Luxembourg Income Study Working paper No.55*. Luxembourg: CEPS/INSTEAD.
- Rawls, J. 1973. *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Rawls, J. 1985. Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 14, 223-251.
- Rawls, J. 1996. *Political Liberalism*, New York, Columbia University Press.
- Ray, K., Hoggart, L., Vegeris, S. & Taylor, R. 2010. Better off working? Work, poverty and benefit cycling. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Reardon, S. & Bischoff, K. 2013. Growth in the residential segregation of families by income, 1970–2009. In: Logan, J. (ed.) *The Lost Decade? Social Change in the US after 2000*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Regev - Messalem, S. 2013. Claiming Citizenship: The Political Dimension of Welfare Fraud. *Law & Social Inquiry*, 38, 993-1018.
- Renold, E. 2002. Using vignettes in qualitative research. *Building Research Capacity*, 3, 3-5.
- Reutter, L. I., Veenstra, G., Stewart, M. J., Raphael, D., Love, R., Makwarimba, E. & McMurray, S. 2005. Lay understandings of the effects of poverty: a Canadian perspective. *Health & Social Care in the Community*, 13, 514-530.
- Reutter, L. I., Veenstra, G., Stewart, M. J., Raphael, D., Love, R., Makwarimba, E. & McMurray, S. 2006a. Public Attributions for Poverty in Canada. *Canadian Review of Sociology*, 43, 1-22.
- Reutter, L. I., Veenstra, G., Stewart, M. J., Raphael, D., Love, R., Makwarimba, E. & McMurray, S. 2006b. Public Attributions for Poverty in Canada*. *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie*, 43, 1-22.
- Ridge, T. 2011. The Everyday Costs of Poverty in Childhood: A Review of Qualitative Research Exploring the Lives and Experiences of Low - Income Children in the UK. *Children & Society*, 25, 73-84.
- Ridge, T. 2013. 'We are All in This Together'? The Hidden Costs of Poverty, Recession and Austerity Policies on Britain's Poorest Children. *Children & Society*, 27, 406-417.
- Robb, C. M. 2002. Can the poor influence policy? Participatory Poverty Assessments in the Developing World. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Roberts, K. W. 1977. Voting over income tax schedules. *Journal of Public Economics*, 8, 329-340.
- Robins, S., Cornwall, A. & Von Lieres, B. 2008. Rethinking 'citizenship' in the postcolony. *Third World Quarterly*, 29, 1069-1086.

- Roche, M. 1992. *Rethinking citizenship: welfare, ideology and change in modern society*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Rodger, J. 1992. The welfare state and social closure: social division and the 'underclass'. *Critical Social Policy*, 12, 45-63.
- Rodger, J. J. 2003. Social solidarity, welfare and post-emotionalism. *Journal of Social Policy*, 32, 403-421.
- Roff, L. L., Klemmack, D. L., McCallum, D. M. & Conaway, M. B. 2002. Assessing public support for state government social welfare expenditures. *The Social Policy Journal*, 1, 55-70.
- Roosma, F., Gelissen, J. & van Oorschot, W. 2013. The multidimensionality of welfare state attitudes: a European cross-national study. *Social Indicators Research*, 113, 235-255.
- Roseneil, S. 2014. On meeting Linda: An intimate encounter with (not-) belonging in the current conjuncture. *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society*, 19, 19-28.
- Rousseau, J. J. [1896] 1913. *The Social Contract*, London, J.M Dent.
- Rowlingson, K., Orton, M. & Taylor, E. 2010a. Do we still care about inequality? *British Social Attitudes: the 27th Report: Exploring Labour's Legacy*. London: Sage.
- Rowlingson, K., Orton, M. & Taylor, E. 2010b. Do we still care about inequality? *British Social Attitudes: the 27th Report: Exploring Labour's Legacy*. London: Sage.
- Rowlingson, K. & Connor, S. 2011. The 'deserving' rich? Inequality, morality and social policy. *Journal of Social Policy*, 40, 437-452.
- Runciman, W. G. 1966. *Relative deprivation and social justice : a study of attitudes to social inequality in twentieth-century England*, London, Routledge.
- Rutherford, T. 2013. Historical rates of social security benefits. *House of Commons Library, Standard Note: SN/SG 6762*. London: HMSO.
- Sandel, M. J. 1998. *Liberalism and the limits of justice*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Sandel, M. J. 2010. *Justice: What's the right thing to do?*, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sassen, S. 2006. *Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Saunders, P., Sutherland, K., Davidson, P., Hampshire, A., King, S., Taylor, J., Australia, M. & Anglicare, N. 2006. *Experiencing Poverty-the Voices of Low-income Australians: Towards New Indicators of Disadvantage Project, Stage 1: Focus Group Outcomes*, Sydney, University of New South Wales, Social Policy Research Centre.
- Savage, M. 2015. Introduction to elites From the 'problematic of the proletariat' to a class analysis of 'wealth elites'. *The Sociological Review*, 63, 223-239.
- Sayer, A. 2014. *Why we can't afford the rich*, Bristol, Policy Press.

- Scanlon, C. & Adlam, J. 2013. Knowing Your Place and Minding Your Own Business: On Perverse Psychological Solutions to the Imagined Problem of Social Exclusion. *Ethics and Social Welfare*, 7, 170-183.
- Schram, S. F., Soss, J., Houser, L. & Fording, R. C. 2010. The third level of US welfare reform: governmentality under neoliberal paternalism. *Citizenship Studies*, 14, 739-754.
- SCIE 2004. Has Service User Participation Made a Difference to Social Care Services? *SCIE Position Paper No. 3*. London: Social Care Institute for Excellence.
- Sears, D. O. & Funk, C. L. 1990. The limited effect of economic self-interest on the political attitudes of the mass public. *Journal of Behavioral Economics*, 19, 247-271.
- Seely, A. 2014. National insurance contributions: a introduction. *Standard Note SN4517*. London: House of Commons Library.
- Sefton, T. 2005. Give and take: attitudes to redistribution. In: A. Park, J. C., K. Thomson, C. Bromley, M. Phillips and M. Johnson (ed.) *British Social Attitudes: The 22nd Report. Two Terms of New Labour: The Public's Reaction*. London: Sage.
- Sefton, T. & Stewart, K. 2009. *Towards a more equal society?: poverty, inequality and policy since 1997*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Sefton, T. 2009. Moving in the right direction? Public attitudes to poverty, inequality and redistribution. In: Hills, J., Sefton, T. & Stewart, K. (eds.) *Towards a more equal society? Poverty, inequality and Policy since 1997*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Sen, A. 2002. Health: perception versus observation: Self reported morbidity has severe limitations and can be extremely misleading. *British Medical Journal*, 324, 860.
- Sevenhuijsen, S. 1998. *Citizenship and the ethics of care : feminist considerations on justice, morality, and politics / Selma Sevenhuijsen ; translated from Dutch by Liz Savage*, London, Routledge.
- Sewell, W. J. 1992. A theory of structure: Duality, agency, and transformation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1-29.
- Shapiro, I. 2002. Why the poor don't soak the rich: notes on democracy and distribution. *Daedalus*, 130, 118-128.
- Sheppard, M. & Ryan, K. 2003. Practitioners as rule using analysts: A further development of process knowledge in social work. *British Journal of Social Work*, 33, 157-176.
- Shildrick, T. & MacDonald, R. 2007. Biographies of exclusion: poor work and poor transitions. *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 26, 589-604.
- Shildrick, T., MacDonald, R., Webster, C. & Garthwaite, K. 2010. The low-pay, no-pay cycle: understanding recurrent poverty. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Shildrick, T., MacDonald, R., Webster, C. & Garthwaite, K. 2012. *Poverty and insecurity: life in low-pay, no-pay Britain*, Bristol, Policy Press.

- Shildrick, T. & MacDonald, R. 2013. Poverty talk: how people experiencing poverty deny their poverty and why they blame 'the poor'. *The Sociological Review*, 61, 285-303.
- Shirazi, R. & Biel, A. 2005. Internal-External Causal Attributions and Perceived Government Responsibility for Need Provision A 14-Culture Study. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 36, 96-116.
- Skilling, P. 2013. Egalitarian Myths in New Zealand: A review of public opinion data on inequality and redistribution. *New Zealand Sociology*, 28, 16-43.
- Sleebos, E., Ellemers, N. & de Gilder, D. 2006. The carrot and the stick: Affective commitment and acceptance anxiety as motives for discretionary group efforts by respected and disrespected group members. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32, 244-255.
- Smith, J. A. 2004a. Reflecting on the development of interpretative phenomenological analysis and its contribution to qualitative research in psychology. *Qualitative research in psychology*, 1, 39-54.
- Smith, K. B. & Stone, L. H. 1989. Rags, riches, and bootstraps. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 30, 93-107.
- Smith, S. 2004b. Can the retirement consumption puzzle be resolved? Evidence from UK panel data. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Snowdon, C. 2010. *The Spirit Level Delusion*, London, Democracy Institute/Little Dice.
- Somers, M. R. 1993. Citizenship and the place of the public sphere: law, community, and political culture in the transition to democracy. *American Sociological Review*, 587-620.
- Soroka, S. & Wlezien, C. 2014. Economic crisis and support for redistribution in the United Kingdom. In: Bartels, L. & N., B. (eds.) *Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Soroka, S. N. & Wlezien, C. 2005. Opinion-policy dynamics: Public preferences and public expenditure in the United Kingdom. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35, 665.
- Soroka, S. N. & Wlezien, C. 2008. On the limits to inequality in representation. *Political Science & Politics*, 41, 319-327.
- Soydan, H. 1995. A cross - cultural comparison of how social workers in Sweden and England assess a migrant family. *Scandinavian Journal of Social Welfare*, 4, 85-93.
- Stenner, P. & Taylor, D. 2008. Psychosocial welfare: Reflections on an emerging field. *Critical Social Policy*, 28, 415-437.
- Stephens, N. M., Fryberg, S. A. & Markus, H. R. 2011. When choice does not equal freedom A sociocultural analysis of agency in working-class American contexts. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 2, 33-41.
- Stewart, A. & Wright, S. 2014. Conditionality Briefing: unemployed people. *Welfare Conditionality: sanctions, support and behaviour change*.

(http://www.welfareconditionality.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Briefing_Unemployment_14.09.10_FINAL.pdf).

Stimson, J. A., MacKuen, M. B. & Erikson, R. S. 1995. Dynamic representation. *American Political Science Review*, 89, 543-565.

Sullivan, M. 1996. *The development of the British welfare state*, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Sumino, T. 2014. Escaping the Curse of Economic Self-interest: An Individual-level Analysis of Public Support for the Welfare State in Japan. *Journal of Social Policy*, 43, 109-133.

Summers, E. G. 1977. Instruments for assessing reading attitudes: A review of research and bibliography. *Journal of Literacy Research*, 9, 137-165.

Sun, A.-P. 2001. Perceptions among social work and non-social work students concerning causes of poverty. *Journal of Social Work Education*, 37, 161-176.

Svallfors, S. 1997. Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to Redistribution: A Comparison of Eight Western Nations. *European Sociological Review*, 13, 283-304.

Svallfors, S. 2010. Policy feedback, generational replacement, and attitudes to state intervention: Eastern and Western Germany, 1990–2006. *European Political Science Review*, 2, 119-135.

Svallfors, S. 2012. *Contested welfare states: welfare attitudes in Europe and beyond*, Redwood City, Stanford University Press.

Swank, D. 2002. *Global capital, political institutions, and policy change in developed welfare states*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Swank, E. 2005. Welfare-Spending Judgments Through Class, Race, and Gender Lenses: Exploring the Influence of Stratification Beliefs, Racial Attitudes, and Gender Norms. *Journal of Poverty*, 9, 49-72.

Swift, A. 2006. *Political philosophy : a beginners' guide for students and politicians*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

Tagler, M. J. & Cozzarelli, C. 2013. Feelings Toward the Poor and Beliefs About the Causes of Poverty: The Role of Affective-Cognitive Consistency in Help-Giving. *The Journal of Psychology*, 147, 517-539.

Tawney, R. H. 1964. *Equality*, London, Unwin Books.

Taylor, C. 1989. *Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

Taylor, D. 2011. Wellbeing and welfare: a psychosocial analysis of being well and doing well enough. *Journal of Social Policy*, 40, 777-794.

Taylor-Gooby, P. 1982. Two cheers for the welfare state: public opinion and private welfare. *Journal of Public Policy*, 2, 319-346.

Taylor-Gooby, P. 1985. *Public opinion, ideology and state welfare*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Taylor-Gooby, P. 1996. The UK: radical departures and political consensus. In: George, V. & Taylor-Gooby, P. (eds.) *Squaring the Welfare Circle*. London: Macmillan.

- Taylor-Gooby, P. 2002. The silver age of the welfare state: perspectives on resilience. *Journal of Social Policy*, 31, 597-621.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. & Hastie, C. 2003. Paying for 'World Class' Services: a British Dilemma. *Journal of Social Policy*, 32, 271-288.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. 2004. The work-centred welfare state. In: Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Bromley, C. and Phillips, M. (ed.) *British Social Attitudes: the 21st Report*. London: Sage.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. 2008. *Reframing social citizenship*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. 2013a. Why do people stigmatise the poor at a time of rapidly increasing inequality, and what can be done about it? *The Political Quarterly*, 84, 31-42.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. 2013b. *The double crisis of the welfare state and what we can do about it*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. & Taylor, E. 2015. Benefits and welfare Long-term trends or short-term reactions? In: Curtice, J. & Ormston, R. (eds.) *British Social Attitudes 32*. London: NatCen Social Research.
- Taylor - Gooby, P., Hastie, C. & Bromley, C. 2003. Querulous citizens: welfare knowledge and the limits to welfare reform. *Social Policy & Administration*, 37, 1-20.
- Thatcher, M. 1987. Aids, education and the year 2000! *Woman's Own*. pp. 8-10: 31 October 1987.
- Thrupp, M. & Lupton, R. 2011. Variations on a middle class theme: English primary schools in socially advantaged contexts. *Journal of Education Policy*, 26, 289-312.
- Timmins, N. 2001. *The five giants: a biography of the welfare state*. London: HarperCollins UK.
- Titmuss, R. M. 1958. The social division of welfare: some reflections on the search for equity. *Essays on the welfare state*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Titmuss, R. M. 1971. Welfare "Rights", Law and Discretion. *The Political Quarterly*, 42, 113-132.
- Tobin, J. 2010. The impact of the National Minimum Wage on household and individual poverty. *House of Lords Library Notice LLN 2010/008*. London: HMSO.
- Tomalty, J. 2010. Socio-economic rights as human rights: overcoming the claimability objection. *Political Studies Association Conference*. Edinburgh: PSA.
- Tomlinson, M., Walker, R. & Williams, G. 2008. Measuring Poverty in Britain as a Multi-dimensional Concept, 1991 to 2003. *Journal of Social Policy*, 37, 597-620.
- Torgler, B. & Schneider, F. 2006. What shapes attitudes toward paying taxes? Evidence from multicultural European countries. *Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA) Discussion Papers No. 2117*. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.

- Torry, M. 2013. *Money for everyone: why we need a citizen's income*, Bristol, Policy Press.
- Townsend, P. & Abel-Smith, B. 1965. The poor and the poorest. *LSE Social Administration Occasional Papers No. 17*. London: G. Bell & Sons.
- Townsend, P. 1979. *Poverty in the United Kingdom: a survey of household resources and standards of living*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Townsend, P. 1987. Deprivation. *Journal of Social Policy*, 16, 125-146.
- Toynbee, P. & Walker, D. 2009. *Unjust rewards: ending the greed that is bankrupting Britain*, London, Granta Books.
- TUC 2013. Support for benefit cuts dependent on ignorance, TUC-commissioned poll finds. (<http://www.tuc.org.uk/social-issues/child-poverty/welfare-and-benefits/tax-credits/support-benefit-cuts-dependent>): Trade Union Congress.
- Tudor Hart, J. 1971. The Inverse Care Law. *The Lancet*, 297, 405-412.
- Turner, B. 2006. *Vulnerability and Human Rights*, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Turner, B. S. 1993. *Citizenship and social theory*, London, Sage.
- Twine, F. 1994. *Citizenship and social rights: the interdependence of self and society*, London, Sage.
- Valentine, G. & Harris, C. 2014. Strivers vs skivers: Class prejudice and the demonisation of dependency in everyday life. *Geoforum*, 53, 84-92.
- Valentine, G. 2015. Inequality and class prejudice in an age of austerity. *SPERI British Political Economy Brief No. 8*. Sheffield: University of Sheffield.
- Van der Merwe, K. 2006. The phenomenology of experiencing poverty-an exploration. *TD: The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa*, 2, 131-144.
- Van Houdt, F., Suvarierol, S. & Schinkel, W. 2011. Neoliberal communitarian citizenship: Current trends towards 'earned citizenship' in the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. *International sociology*, 26, 408-432.
- Van Oorschot, W. & Halman, L. 2000. Blame or Fate, Individual or Social? An International Comparison of Popular Explanations of Poverty. *European Societies*, 2, 1-28.
- Van Oorschot, W. 2000. Who should get what and why? On deservingness criteria and the conditionality of solidarity among the public. *Policy and Politics*, 28, 33-48.
- Van Oorschot, W. 2006. Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 16, 23-42.
- Veit-Wilson, J. 1986. Paradigms of poverty: a rehabilitation of BS Rowntree. *Journal of Social Policy*, 15, 69-99.
- Veit-Wilson, J. 1992. Muddle or mendacity? The Beveridge Committee and the poverty line. *Journal of Social Policy*, 21, 269-301.

- Vincent, D. 1991. *Poor Citizens - The State and The Poor in Twentieth Century Britain*, Harlow, Essex, Longman.
- Vizard, P. 2010. What do the public think about economic and social rights? Research Report to Inform the Debate about a Bill of Rights and a Written Constitution. *CASereport 61*. London: LSE: Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion.
- Vogler, C. 1989. *Labour market change and patterns of financial allocation within households*, Oxford, University of Oxford.
- Wacquant, L. 2009. *Punishing the poor: The neoliberal government of social insecurity*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
- Waine, B. 1991. *The rhetoric of independence: the ideology and practice of social policy in Thatcher's Britain*, Worcester, Billing & Sons.
- Walker, R. 2014. *The shame of poverty*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Walzer, M. 1995. *Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Ward, M. 2011. Beatrice Webb: her quest for a fairer society: a hundred years of the Minority Report. London: The Smith Institute.
- Watts, B., Fitzpatrick, S., G., B. & Watkins, D. 2014. Welfare sanctions and conditionality in the UK. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Webb, S. & Webb, B. 1912. *The Prevention of Destitution*, London, Longman.
- Weber, M. 2013. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Webster, D. 2013. The DWP's Updated Statistics on JSA Sanctions: What do they show? *Evidence presented to the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee Inquiry into the Role of Jobcentre Plus in the reformed welfare system*. London: HMSO.
- Welshman, J. 2008. The cycle of deprivation: myths and misconceptions. *Children & Society*, 22, 75-85.
- Welshman, J. 2013. *Underclass: a history of the excluded since 1880*, London, Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Wendt, C., Mischke, M. & Pfeifer, M. 2011. *Welfare states and public opinion: Perceptions of healthcare systems, family policy and benefits for the unemployed and poor in Europe*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
- White, A. 2013. Lies, Damn Lies, and Department for Work and Pensions Statistics. *New Statesman*, 30th April 2013.
- White, S. 2003. *The civic minimum: on the rights and obligations of economic citizenship*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- White, S. 2010. The Left and Reciprocity. *Soundings*, 46, 18-30.
- Whiteley, P. 2008. What makes a good citizen? Citizenship across the democratic world. In: Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Philips, M. & Johnson, M. (eds.) *British Social Attitudes: The 24th Report*. London: Sage.
- Wilding, P. 1997. The Welfare State and the Conservatives. *Political Studies*, 45, 716-726.

- Wilkinson, E. 2013. Learning to Love Again: 'Broken Families', Citizenship and the State Promotion of Coupledness. *Geoforum*, 49, 206-213.
- Wilkinson, R. & Pickett, K. 2009. *The spirit level: why equality is better for everyone*, London, Allen Lane.
- Wilkinson, R. & Pickett, K. 2014. The Spirit Level authors: why society is more unequal than ever. *Guardian*, 9 March 2014.
- Williams, F. 1998. Agency and structure revisited: rethinking poverty and social exclusion. . In: Barry, M. & Hallett, C. (eds.) *Social exclusion and social work: issues of theory, policy and practice*. Lyme Regis: Russell House Publishing.
- Williams, F. 2001. In and beyond New Labour: towards a new political ethics of care. *Critical Social Policy*, 21, 467-493.
- Williams, F. & Deacon, A. 2004. Personal Qualities and Civic Virtues: Care, Values and Future of Welfare. *Annual Conference of the European Network for Social Policy Analysis*. Oxford.
- Williams, M. 2004. Discursive Democracy and New Labour: Five Ways in Which Decision-Makers Manage Citizen Agendas in Public Participation Initiatives. *Sociological Research Online*, 9.
- Williams, S. 1984. Left-right ideological differences in blaming victims. *Political Psychology*, 5, 573-581.
- Wilson, G. 1996. Toward a revised framework for examining beliefs about the causes of poverty. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 37, 413-428.
- Wilson, S., Meagher, G. & Hermes, K. 2012. The social division of welfare knowledge: policy stratification and perceptions of welfare reform in Australia. *Policy & Politics*, 40, 323-346.
- Wlezien, C. 1995. The public as thermostat: dynamics of preferences for spending. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39, 981-1000.
- Wlezien, C. 2004. Patterns of Representation: Dynamics of Public Preferences and Policy. *Journal of Politics*, 66, 1-24.
- Wlezien, C. & Soroka, S. 2012. Political Institutions and the Opinion-Policy Link. *West European Politics*, 35, 1407-1432.
- Wolff, J. 1991. *Robert Nozick: Property, Justice, and the Minimal State*, Redwood City, Stanford University Press.
- Woods, T., Kurtz-Costes, B. & Rowley, S. 2005. The Development of Stereotypes About the Rich and Poor: Age, Race, and Family Income Differences in Beliefs. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 34, 437-445.
- Wright, S. 2012. Welfare-to-work, agency and personal responsibility. *Journal of Social Policy*, 41, 309-328.
- Young, I. M. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Young, I. M. 2000. *Inclusion and democracy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Young, M. & Wilmott, P. 2013. *Family and kinship in East London*, Routledge.

Appendix A

Citizenship Survey 2005: Survey Questions

Appendix A details the specific wording of the survey questions of the 2005 Citizenship Survey (Kitchen, 2006) that were examined for the purposes of this thesis.

A.1 Attitudes towards social rights and responsibilities

10.1 Which of the rights, if any, listed below do you think you **should** have as someone living in the UK? **[Eshould]**

- (1) To have access to free education for children
- (5) To be looked after by the State if you cannot look after yourself
- (7) To be treated fairly and equally
- (8) To have free health-care if you need it
- (9) To have a job
- (10) *None of the above*

10.2 And which do you think you actually have now? **[Ehave]**

- (1) To have access to free education for children
- (5) To be looked after by the State if you cannot look after yourself
- (7) To be treated fairly and equally
- (8) To have free health-care if you need it
- (9) To have a job
- (10) *None of the above*

10.3 Which, if any, do you feel should be the responsibility of everyone living in the UK? **[EResp]**

- (2) To behave morally and ethically
- (3) To help and protect your family
- (4) To raise children properly
- (5) To work to provide for yourself
- (6) To behave responsibly
- (9) To help others
- (10) To treat others with fairness and respect
- (12) *None of the above*

A.2 Experiences and subjective impressions of local area

3.1.2 How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood? [*SBeneigh*]

- (1) Very strongly
- (2) Fairly strongly
- (3) Not very strongly
- (4) Not at all strongly
- (5) Don't know

3.1.5 To what extent would you agree or disagree that people in this neighbourhood pull together to improve the neighbourhood? [*SPull*]

- (1) Definitely agree
- (2) Tend to agree
- (3) Tend to disagree
- (4) Definitely disagree
- (5) Don't know
- (6) Nothing needs improving

3.1.7 Would you say that [*STrust*]

- (1) many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted,
- (2) some can be trusted,
- (3) a few can be trusted,
- (4) or that none of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted?
- (5) Just moved here

3.1.12 How likely is it that people in your neighbourhood would participate if they were asked by a local organisation to help solve a community problem? [*SProb*]

3.1.13 To what extent you agree or disagree that people in this neighbourhood are willing to help their neighbourhood. [*SHelp*]

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Disagree
- (4) Strongly disagree
- (5) Don't know

4.8 Do you agree or disagree that you can influence decisions affecting your local area (15-20 minutes walk)? [*PAffLoc*]

- (1) Definitely agree
- (2) Tend to agree
- (3) Tend to disagree
- (4) Definitely disagree
- (5) Don't know

A.3 Behaviours associated with civic engagement

A.3.1 Civic activism, consultation and participation

7.1 In the last 12 months have you done any of the following things? Please include any activities you have already told me about. Please do not include any activities related to your job. [Civact1]

- (1) Been a local councillor (for the local authority, town or parish)
- (2) Been a school governor
- (3) Been a volunteer Special Constable
- (4) Been a Magistrate
- (5) None of these

7.2 In the last 12 months have you done any of the following things? Please include any activities you have already told me about. Please do not include any activities related to your job. [Civact2]

- (1) Member of a group making decisions on local health services
- (2) Member of a decision making group set up to regenerate the local area
- (3) Member of a decision making group set up to tackle local crime problems
- (4) Member of a tenants' group decision making committee
- (5) Member of a group making decisions on local education services
- (6) Member of a group making decisions on local services for young people
- (7) Member of another group making decisions on services in the local community
- (8) None of these

4.5 And in the last 12 months have you taken part in a consultation about local services or problems in your local area in any of the ways listed on this card? [PConsul]

- (1) Completing a questionnaire (about local services in the local area)
- (2) Attending a public meeting (about local services in the local area)
- (3) Being involved in a group set up to discuss local services or problems in the local area.
- (4) None of these

6.1.1 Which of the following groups, clubs or organisations have you been involved with during the **last 12 months**? That's anything you've taken part in, supported, or that you've helped in any way, either on your own or with others. *Please exclude giving money and anything that was a requirement of your job.* [Fgroup]

- (1) Children's education/ schools
- (2) Youth/children's activities (outside school)
- (3) Education for adults
- (4) Sports/exercise (taking part, coaching or going to watch)
- (5) Religion
- (6) Politics
- (7) The elderly
- (8) Health, Disability and Social welfare
- (9) Safety, First Aid
- (10) The environment, animals

- (11) Justice and Human Rights
- (12) Local community or neighbourhood groups
- (13) Citizens' Groups
- (14) Hobbies / Recreation / Arts/ Social clubs
- (15) Trade union activity
- (16) Other
- (17) None of these

6.1.2 And in the last 12 months have you taken part in any formal voluntary help? [*Zforvol*]

A.3.2 Personal behaviours

2.1 Thinking of all the people living in your household, have **you given** any of them practical help or support, in the **last month**? Please exclude any financial help. **[Hgive]**

2.2 Thinking of all the people living in your household, have any of them **given you** practical help or support in the **last month**? Please exclude any financial help. **[Hreci]**

2.4 Which of these relatives do you have contact with at least once a month? (If applicable) Please include your husband's/wife's/partner's relatives. **[FConnr]**

2.5 Thinking of **all** the relatives not living with you, have **you given** any of them practical help or support in the **last 12 months**. Please exclude financial help. **[FGive]**

2.7 And again, thinking of all the relatives who are not living with you, have any of them **given you** practical help or support in the **last 12 months**. Please exclude any financial help. **[FReci]**

6.4.1 In the **last 12 months** have you done any of the following things, unpaid, for someone who was not a relative? **[Ihlp]** *This is any unpaid help you, as an individual, may have given to other people that is apart from any help given through a group, club or organisation. This could be help for a friend, neighbour or someone else but not a relative.*

- (1) Keeping in touch with someone who has difficulty getting out and about
- (2) Doing shopping, collecting pension or paying bills
- (3) Cooking, cleaning, laundry, gardening or other routine household jobs
- (4) Decorating, or doing any kind of home or car repairs
- (5) Baby sitting or caring for children
- (6) Sitting with or providing personal care (e.g. washing, dressing) for someone who is sick or frail
- (7) Looking after a property or a pet for someone who is away
- (8) Giving advice
- (9) Writing letters or filling in forms
- (10) Representing someone (for example talking to a council department, or to a doctor)
- (11) Transporting or escorting someone (for example to a hospital, or on an outing)
- (12) Anything else
- (13) No help given in last 12 months

Appendix B Qualitative Fieldwork

B.1 Profile of Leeds

Drawing on the latest data available from the 2011 Census it is possible to consider the demographic, economic and household profile of Leeds and compare this against the rest of England and Wales. Based on the data outlined below, it is clear that the population and characteristics of the Leeds City region are broadly similar to the rest of England and Wales:

Demographic, Economic and Household Profile	Proportion of reference population	
	Leeds	England and Wales
Male	49.0%	49.2%
Female	51.0%	50.8%
Mean age of population	37.6	39.4
White	85.1%	86.0%
Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Groups	2.6%	2.2%
Asian or Asian British	7.8%	7.5%
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British	3.4%	3.3%
Owner Occupied	58.6%	64.3%
Rented	39.9%	34.4%
Economically active	69.5%	69.7%
Economically inactive	30.5%	30.3%
Higher managerial and professional occupations	10.4%	10.3%
Never worked' and 'long-term unemployed'	6.0%	5.6%
Household is not deprived in any dimension	41.7%	42.3%
Household is deprived in 1 dimension*	32.2%	32.6%
Household is deprived in 2 dimensions	19.5%	19.3%
Household is deprived in 3 dimensions	5.9%	5.2%
Household is deprived in 4 dimensions	0.7%	0.5%

Source: (ONS, 2014)

*These dimensions are based on four selected household characteristics:

- Employment (any member of a household not a full-time student that is either unemployed or long-term sick)

- Education (no person in the household has at least level 2 education, and no person aged 16-18 is a full-time student)
- Health and disability (any person in the household has general health 'bad or very bad' or has a long term health problem)
- Housing (household's accommodation is either overcrowded, with an occupancy rating -1 or less, or is in a shared dwelling, or has no central heating)

B.2 Interview Schedule

Outline of the questionnaire:

Section	Approximate Timing
Behaviours	8 minutes
Experiences	8 minutes
Case Studies	20 minutes
Attitudes	34 minutes
Total	70 minutes

Using this questionnaire:

Key Questions	Timings
Underlined = Title <i>Italics</i> = Interviewer to read out CAPS = Instructions for interviewer Bullet = prompt	How long it takes
The researcher will ask questions and use the prompts to guide where necessary	

- THANK PARTICIPANT FOR AGREEING TO TAKE PART, INTRODUCE SELF AND EXPLAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH REFERRING TO INFORMATION SHEET.
- COLLECT PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM AND EMPHASISE THE ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF ANYTHING THAT THEY SAY ADHERING TO THE PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM SIGNED AND THE DATA PROTECTION ACT.
- NOT LOOKING FOR SPECIFIC ANSWERS: NO RIGHT OR WRONG RESPONSES – ENCOURAGE HONESTY AND OPENNESS FROM PARTICIPANT.
- PERMISSION TO AUDIO RECORD - ALL CONFIDENTIAL.

Topic areas, questions and probes	Timing
1. Behaviours	8 mins
Do you watch the news? Why/Why not? Do you vote? Why/Why not? Do you regularly help friends, family or neighbours with any of the following activities? PRESENT SHOWCARD AND ASK RESPONDENT TO LIST LETTERS A-M APPLICABLE TO THE HELP THEY GIVE FRIENDS/FAMILY/NEIGHBOURS. ONLY ASK TO RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWER A-L If you did not provide this help, how do you think it would affect the day to day life/lives of INDIVIDUAL(S) HELPED?	

<p>PRESENT SHOWCARD AGAIN AND ASK RESPONDENT TO LIST LETTERS A-M FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTION</p> <p>Do you receive any of the following help from friends, family or neighbours?</p> <p>ONLY ASK THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS TO RESPONDENTS WHO RECEIVE HELP</p> <p>If you didn't receive this help, how do you think it would affect your day to day life?</p> <p>Do you think more people should give help to each other in these ways?</p> <p>Why do you say that?</p>	
<p>2. Experiences</p>	<p>8 mins</p>
<p>To what extent do you agree that you have enough money to have a good quality of life?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Why do you say that? <p>In comparison to everyone in the UK, do you think you have a low, middle or high income? <i>Now, thinking about your local area...</i></p> <p>Do you feel that you are part of a community here?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Why do you say that? <p>If you wanted to, do you feel that you could make a change in your local area or approach someone about an issue?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Perhaps a club, society, school, local council (bins)?- Why do you say that? <p>ONLY ASK TO RESPONDENTS THAT ARE EMPLOYED</p> <p>Do you think that it's unfair that some people do not work? *</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Why do you say that? <p>ONLY ASK RESPONDENTS WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED. APPROACH EXPERIENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN A WAY THAT FITS THE BIOGRAPHY OF RESPONDENT/CONTENT OF DISCUSSION SO FAR.</p> <p><i>You were recruited on the basis that you are currently unemployed. I just want to ask a few questions about that.</i></p> <p>Would you like to work?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Why do you say that? <p>Are other things more important to you?</p> <p>Do you ever feel judged for not being employed?</p>	

<p>- Why do you say that?</p>	
<p>3. Case Studies</p>	<p>20 mins</p>
<p><i>Along with the information sheet and participant consent form, I sent you a sheet of four case studies. If it is okay, we will begin by discussing each of these in turn. I will read out each case study and then ask you a few questions on it. If you have anything that you would like to add at any point, please let me know. READ OUT EACH CASE STUDIES AND POSE QUESTIONS IN TURN. RANDOMISE THE ORDER IN WHICH THE CASE STUDIES AND SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS ARE DISCUSSED.</i></p> <p><u>Becky</u></p> <p>Should Becky be forced to work rather than volunteer? Why/Why not?</p> <p><i>The government states that people should look for work as a condition of being entitled to benefits (JSA)</i></p> <p>Should Becky looking after her children or volunteering be counted as work? Why/Why not?</p> <p>How responsible is Becky for her situation?</p> <p>*Please interpret the question how you think it is meant?</p> <p>- Why do you say that?</p> <p><u>Aimee</u></p> <p>Should Aimee still receive benefits from the government? Why/Why not?</p> <p>How responsible is Aimee for her situation? *</p> <p>- Why do you say that?</p> <p>PRESENT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON AIMEE</p> <p>Does this change how you feel about Aimee? If so, how?</p> <p><u>James</u></p> <p>Do you think James's family should receive Tax Credits from the government? Why/Why not?</p> <p>How responsible is James for his situation? *</p>	

<p>- Why do you say that?</p> <p><u>Robert</u></p> <p>Is Robert's concern about the tax he will have to pay reasonable in the light of his circumstances?</p> <p>Is it fair that Robert earns more than James? IF YES, PROBE ABOUT JAMES HAVING LEARNING DIFFICULTIES AND ROBERT BEING BORN VERY INTELLIGENT WITH SUPPORT FROM PARENTS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Both working same hours – what is valued: effort/intelligence/benefit (economic or otherwise) to society? <p>How responsible is Robert for his situation? *</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Why do you say that?	
<p>4. Attitudes</p>	<p>34 mins</p>
<p><u>Social Citizens</u></p> <p>What do you understand a social citizen to be?</p> <p>To what extent do you feel like a social citizen?</p> <p><u>Social Rights</u></p> <p>To what extent do you feel you have social rights as someone living in the UK? Has this had any effect on your life?</p> <p>Do you think everyone living in the UK should be entitled to benefits? Why/Why not?</p> <p>Do you think everyone living in the UK should be guaranteed a minimum level of income? Why/Why not?</p> <p><u>Social Responsibilities</u></p> <p>REFER TO THE CASE STUDIES IF NECESSARY</p> <p>What do you think it means to be a "responsible" person living in the UK?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- What sort of behaviours do you think show someone to be responsible?- Anything else? <p>What behaviours do you think the government expects of people living in the UK?</p>	

- Anything else?

Do you feel that this is fair?

Do you think there are other behaviours that the government should recognise as “responsible”?

Do you think everyone living in the UK should have the same responsibilities as a social citizen? Why do you say that?

Do you think there are factors which limit an individual’s ability to fulfil these responsibilities?

Do you think responsibilities as a citizen are important? If so, why?

- Integration/fairness/finance

Conditionality and Fairness

There has been a lot of stuff in the news, talking about restrictions to benefits. David Cameron, the leader of the Coalition government, has said that people on benefits should not be able to earn more than the average wage.

What do you think about this?

IF RESPONDENT DOES NOT FEEL THAT THEY CAN ANSWER THE QUESTION WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT THE AVERAGE WAGE IS – LET THEM KNOW

Why do you think that?

According to an Ipsos MORI survey conducted in September 2011: 76% of people agree that there are some groups of people who claim benefits that should have their benefits cut.

What do you think? * Why/Why not?

According to government figures, 0.7% of money spent on benefits is fraudulently claimed.

Does this surprise you? Why/Why not?

What percentage of your tax do you think goes towards unemployment benefit?

Less than 1% of taxes go towards unemployment benefit - Does this surprise you?

Thinking about the last few questions – how do you feel about this?

What about as a “social citizen”?

Role of the Government and Citizens

To what extent do you think that we have a collective responsibility to other citizens?

<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Institutional or moral <p>To what extent do you think that we have a responsibility to help and care for others?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Family/friends/strangers? <p>Do you think other people have a responsibility to do anything for you as someone living in the UK?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Not your family or friends, but other citizens?- Why do you say that? <p>Do you think the government has a responsibility to do anything for you as someone living in the UK?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Why do you say that? <p>Do you think the government fulfils those responsibilities you mentioned previously?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Why do you say that?	
--	--

CLOSE BY STATING THAT YOU VOUNTEER AT CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU AND IF THERE ARE ANY ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE DEALT WITH THEY CAN SPEAK TO A TRAINED ADVISER THERE - OFFER A LEAFLET WITH INFORMATION AND DETAILS. THANK RESPONDENT FOR THEIR TIME AND PARTICIPATION.

Case Studies (Vignettes)

Becky: lives alone with her two children. At 18, Becky got good grades and wanted to go to University but was worried about the cost and debt that she might face. Instead, Becky got a secretarial job in a small company hoping to work her way up. After one year, Becky was made redundant and fell pregnant shortly after. Since then, Becky has been unable to find a job. Becky split up from her boyfriend five years ago and has relied on benefits and occasional help from her parents ever since. She lives in social housing and has done for four years. Becky would like to work but has been unable to find a job that is flexible enough for her to gain career prospects and also care for her children. Becky volunteers three times a week whilst her children are at school. The Job Centre has told Becky that she needs to get a job as some of her entitlement to Income Support will soon finish.

Aimee: and her partner claim Incapacity Benefit. Aimee has claimed benefits on and off for 15 years. Aimee began claiming benefits when she had a bad back, and although she can now go dancing, these days, she has got used to being on benefits and is stuck in a bit of a rut. She was unable to cope with her children because of her drinking and her two children are now in care. Aimee's entitlement to Incapacity Benefit has recently stopped and she now must look for work in order to claim another benefit (JSA).

Aimee(2): spent the majority of her childhood in care and went to four different secondary schools. She was heavily bullied and therefore attended school very little. Aimee left education at 16 with few qualifications and little idea of what she might like to do in the future. She wanted to become a social worker, but did not get onto the course. Aimee then went onto work as a cleaner.

James: left school with one O-level and has always felt that he is better at practical 'hands-on jobs' than being in an 'office job'. At 46, James lives with his wife and 4 children. He works for a large supermarket and does a lot of shift work, working nights and evenings. He works very hard and has recently taken on an extra part-time cleaning job. As a result, he is not always able to help his children with school work. James's family receive Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credits which help a lot but they are often short at the end of the month. The rising cost of food and energy means James is in debt as he cannot always afford to pay the bills. He wants more hours at work to pay this off but cannot get any more at the moment. James's wife does not work as she feels the cost of childcare would be too much to make it worthwhile.

Robert: is very clever and did very well at school. He received a great deal of support and help from his parents with school work. Robert went to University and received financial support from his parents when moving for his first job. Since starting his first job, Robert has always worked hard, often staying late in the office and taking work home at the weekends. He earns a lot from his job and has private health insurance. He has decided to buy a second property and rent this out to tenants. He is concerned about how much Tax he will have to pay when he eventually sells this second property. He is worried that he could be made to pay for the hard work he has put into building a good life for himself.

SHOWCARD 1

- (A) Keeping in touch with someone who has difficulty getting out and about
- (B) Doing shopping, collecting pension or paying bills
- (C) Cooking, cleaning, laundry, gardening or other routine household jobs
- (D) Decorating, or doing any kind of home or car repairs
- (E) Babysitting or caring for children
- (F) Sitting with or providing personal care (e.g. washing, dressing) for someone who is sick or frail
- (G) Looking after a property or a pet for someone who is away
- (H) Giving advice
- (I) Writing letters or filling in forms
- (J) Representing someone (for example talking to a council department, or to a doctor)
- (K) Transporting or escorting someone (for example to a hospital, or on an outing)
- (L) Anything else
- (M) No help given

B.3 Recruitment leaflets



UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

YOUR OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE PART IN RESEARCH ON SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP

**Are you unemployed with a household
income of £13,100 or less after tax?**

- **If so, we'd like to hear from you. We want to know what you think about being a social citizen, rights and responsibilities.**
- **We'd like to interview you about your attitudes and experiences and learn about how you feel about and act in your local community**

**If you are interested in taking part in the
research, please contact Daniel Edmiston
on at socialcitizenship@gmail.com or call
07507351830**



UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

YOUR OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE PART IN RESEARCH ON SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP

Are you in full-time employment with a household income of £26,600 or more after tax?

- **If so, we'd like to hear from you. We want to know what you think about being a social citizen, rights and responsibilities.**
- **We'd like to interview you about your attitudes and experiences and learn about how you feel about and act in your local community**

If you are interested in taking part in the research, please contact Daniel Edmiston on at socialcitizenship@gmail.com or call 07507351830

B.4 Information sheet and consent form



UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

Research on Social Citizenship: attitudes and experiences

Thank you for expressing an interest in taking part in this research. Before you decide whether you will agree to be interviewed, it is important that you understand what the research is about and what it will involve. The information below provides some important details, so please take the time to read this. If you have difficulty understanding anything or would like this information in a different format, please feel free to contact me at any time.

What is the purpose of the project? I am currently undertaking research on Social Citizenship to understand the attitudes and experiences of the general public. This research will contribute towards my PhD thesis and will offer some fresh insights into how people feel about and act in their social community.

Why have I been chosen? You are being contacted because I am hoping to speak to a range of people, based on where they live, their income and whether or not they are employed. I would like to learn about your experiences and thoughts.

What do I have to do? I only ask for an hour and a half of your time to interview you at a time and place that is good for you. You can see the interview questions before the interview if you would like.

Do I have to take part? You do not have to take part in the research and can cancel or leave the interview at any time. You will be given a summary of the research findings and able to comment on them. You can remove your information from the research until 01/4/2014.

Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? Your information will always remain confidential and anonymous meaning that only I know what you have said. By law, I must keep your information private and confidential.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? If you tell the research team about anything that might negatively affect the safety or well-being of someone then action must be taken. The relevant authorities may be contacted to deal with this issue.

Will I be recorded, and how will the recording be used? With your permission, your interview will be recorded. The recording will only be used for the purposes of this research and only the independent research team will be able to access the original recording.

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet, it is very much appreciated. Please feel free to get in contact if you would like to take part in the research or have any questions or concerns, please contact Daniel Edmiston on 07507351830 or at socialcitizenship@gmail.com.



UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

Social Citizenship: attitudes and experiences

Participation Consent Form

	Add your initials next to the statements you agree with
I confirm that I understand the information explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.	
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. The researcher can be contacted on 07507351830 or at socialcitizenship@gmail.com .	
I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the research documents that result from the research. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential.	
I agree that any disclosure that I make negatively affecting the well-being of an individual or collective group will need to be followed up by contacting the relevant authority so that they may deal with this issue in the appropriate manner.	
I agree for the data collected from me to be used in relevant future research.	
I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform Daniel Edmiston should my contact details change.	

Name of participant	
Participant's signature	
Date	
Name of lead researcher	Daniel Edmiston
Signature	
Date*	

*To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant.

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, the letter/ pre-written script/ information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and

dated consent form should be kept with the project's main documents which must be kept in a secure location.

Appendix C Secondary Quantitative Analysis: Additional Results

C.1 Binary logistic regressions exploring socio-economic determinants of attitudinal and experiential difference

For the binary logistic regressions undertaken, the null hypothesis is that the probability of giving an affirmative response to the dimensions outlined in section 4.4 is the same across a range of socio-economic conditions, social identity characteristics and subjective impressions. The following predictor variables have been used in a series binary logistic regressions:

Predictor	Classification & Coding	Predictor	Classification & Coding
Overall Deprivation	0 = Validated Active Citizen, 1 = Residual Contingent Citizen	Sex	0 = Male, 1 = Female
Income Deprivation	0 = affluent, 1 = deprived	Age	Continuous = 18-64
Employment Status	0 = employed, 1 = not economically active	Number in household	0 = Below (1-3), or, 1 = Above (4+) Median number living in respondent's household
Area Deprivation	0 = affluent, 1 = deprived	Trust in neighbourhood	0 = at least some can be trusted, 1 = many can be trusted
Feel have Rights	Index of Rights = 0-5	Able to influence	0 = disagree can influence decisions affecting area, 1 = agree can influence decisions
Education	0 = No qualifications, through to 7 = Degree or equivalent	Given informal voluntary help	Amount of informal voluntary help given in last 12 months: continuous 0-12, 1 point for each activity
Race	0 = White, 1 = BME		

Where appropriate, a predictor variable of whether a respondent feels they have a corresponding right has been included. Two logistic regressions were undertaken for each dimension of social citizenship, one just with the compound selection criteria and one with all the other predictor variables. Tables C.1 to C.6 show the logistic regression coefficient, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of the predictors. A .05 criterion of statistical significance was used to consider which predictor variables are shown to have significant partial effects.

Table C.1: The right to be looked after by the State

	B	Wald (X ²)	P	Odds Ratio: Exp(B)	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) - Lower	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) - Upper
Overall deprivation	-.669	22.137	<.001	.512	.388	.677
Constant	1.834	380.858	<.001	6.262		
Income Deprivation	.056	.131	.718	1.058	.779	1.437
Employment Status	.035	.058	.809	1.035	.781	1.372
Area Deprivation	.210	2.465	.116	1.233	.949	1.603
Feel have Rights	.232	18.674	<.001	1.261	1.135	1.401
Feel have right to be looked after by State	.617	14.956	<.001	1.854	1.356	2.535
Education	.123	14.571	<.001	1.131	1.062	1.205
Race	-.602	13.570	<.001	.548	.398	.755
Sex	-.119	1.052	.305	.888	.708	1.114
Age	.014	9.285	.002	1.014	1.005	1.024
Number in household	-.044	.126	.723	.957	.750	1.221
Trust in neighbourhood	.163	1.594	.207	1.178	.914	1.518
Able to influence	-.058	.237	.626	.944	.748	1.191
Given informal voluntary help	.066	4.955	.026	1.069	1.008	1.133
Constant	-.698	4.466	.035	.497		

Table C.2: Rights should have – To have a job

	B	Wald (X ²)	P	Odds Ratio: Exp(B)	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) - Lower	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) - Upper
Overall deprivation	.433	10.987	.001	1.541	1.193	1.991
Constant	.839	141.324	<.001	2.314		
Income Deprivation	.317	4.244	.039	1.373	1.016	1.856
Employment Status	.225	2.394	.122	1.253	.942	1.667
Area Deprivation	.409	10.052	.002	1.506	1.169	1.939
Feel have Rights	-.059	1.520	.218	.942	.857	1.036
Feel have right to a job	2.500	283.562	<.001	12.184	9.108	16.300
Education	-.071	4.945	.026	.931	.875	.992
Race	.070	.149	.699	1.073	.751	1.533
Sex	.307	7.898	.005	1.360	1.097	1.684
Age	.011	5.710	.017	1.011	1.002	1.020
Number in household	.222	3.355	.067	1.249	.985	1.584
Trust in neighbourhood	.073	.361	.548	1.076	.848	1.365
Able to influence	-.084	.554	.457	.920	.738	1.146
Given informal voluntary help	.009	.107	.743	1.009	.957	1.063
Constant	-.512	2.582	.108	.599		

Table C.3: Responsibility should have – To work to provide for oneself

	B	Wald (X ²)	P	Odds Ratio: Exp(B)	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) - Lower	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) – Upper
Overall deprivation	-1.496	70.011	<.001	.224	.158	.318
Constant	2.811	402.560	<.001	16.634		
Income Deprivation	-.742	13.943	<.001	.476	.323	.703
Employment Status	-.334	3.917	.048	.716	.514	.997
Area Deprivation	-.362	4.635	.031	.697	.501	.968
Feel have Rights	.476	99.156	<.001	1.610	1.466	1.768
Education	-.070	2.895	.089	.932	.859	1.011
Race	.007	.001	.974	1.007	.670	1.512
Sex	.006	.002	.969	1.006	.758	1.334
Age	.010	3.272	.070	1.010	.999	1.022
Number in household	.045	.083	.774	1.046	.768	1.425
Trust in neighbourhood	-.006	.001	.970	.994	.719	1.375
Able to influence	-.277	3.525	.060	.758	.567	1.012
Given informal voluntary help	.019	.293	.588	1.020	.951	1.093
Constant	1.429	11.944	.001	4.175		

Table C.4: Responsibility should have: To help others

	B	Wald (X ²)	P	Odds Ratio: Exp(B)	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) - Lower	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) – Upper
Overall deprivation	-.228	1.464	.226	.796	.550	1.152
Constant	2.378	418.134	<.001	10.780		
Income Deprivation	.207	1.025	.311	1.230	.824	1.837
Employment Status	-.168	.817	.366	.845	.586	1.218
Area Deprivation	.043	.063	.802	1.044	.748	1.456
Feel have Rights	.443	81.402	<.001	1.558	1.415	1.715
Education	-.014	.105	.746	.986	.908	1.072
Race	.139	.347	.556	1.149	.724	1.822
Sex	.242	2.672	.102	1.274	.953	1.704
Age	.028	20.924	<.001	1.029	1.016	1.041
Number in household	.193	1.370	.242	1.212	.878	1.674
Trust in neighbourhood	.037	.051	.821	1.038	.751	1.435
Able to influence	-.135	.790	.374	.874	.648	1.177
Given informal voluntary help	.175	16.708	<.001	1.191	1.095	1.295
Constant	-.604	2.113	.146	.547		

Table C.5: Actually have right to be looked after by the State

	B	Wald (X ²)	P	Odds Ratio: Exp(B)	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) - Lower	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) - Upper
Overall deprivation	-.161	1.987	.159	.851	.681	1.065
Constant	.511	58.318	<.001	1.667		
Income Deprivation	.144	1.547	.214	1.155	.920	1.450
Employment Status	.137	1.592	.207	1.147	.927	1.419
Area Deprivation	-.131	1.761	.184	.878	.724	1.064
Education	.027	1.221	.269	1.027	.979	1.078
Race	.024	.032	.858	1.024	.788	1.331
Sex	-.320	14.274	<.001	.726	.615	.857
Age	.007	4.148	.042	1.007	1.000	1.014
Number in household	-.102	1.215	.270	.903	.753	1.083
Trust in neighbourhood	.219	5.320	.021	1.244	1.033	1.499
Able to influence	.192	4.801	.028	1.211	1.020	1.438
Given informal voluntary help	-.027	1.708	.191	.973	.934	1.014
Constant	.100	.187	.665	1.106		

Table C.6: Actually have right to be treated fairly and equally

	B	Wald (X ²)	P	Odds Ratio (Exp(B))	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) - Lower	95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B) - Upper
Overall deprivation	-.722	37.429	<.001	.486	.385	.612
Constant	1.032	196.615	<.001	2.807		
Income Deprivation	-.072	.351	.554	.931	.735	1.180
Employment Status	-.237	4.496	.034	.789	.634	.982
Area Deprivation	-.128	1.553	.213	.880	.719	1.076
Education	.018	.496	.481	1.018	.968	1.071
Race	.136	.940	.332	1.145	.871	1.507
Sex	-.049	.301	.583	.952	.799	1.134
Age	.013	13.361	<.001	1.013	1.006	1.021
Number in household	.103	1.099	.295	1.108	.914	1.344
Trust in neighbourhood	.246	6.035	.014	1.279	1.051	1.557
Able to influence	.444	22.526	<.001	1.558	1.298	1.872
Given informal voluntary help	-.052	5.656	.017	.950	.910	.991
Constant	.135	.311	.577	1.145		