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Language Policy and Russian-Titular Bilingualism in Post-Soviet Tatarstan

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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father

Alan Wigglesworth

1944-2011

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// Abstract
This thesis examines language policy and Russian-titular bilingualism in the Republic of Tatarstan twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Tatarstan is an autonomous and multi-ethnic republic situated within the political framework of the Russian Federation and has its own language policy which was implemented in 1992. Both Russian and Tatar were declared to be of equal status in all spheres of language use. Additionally, as a result of an education policy implemented in 1998, Tatar language learning was made a compulsory subject in schools for all nationalities. These policies were part of Tatarstan's nation-building processes (Sharafutdinova, 2003; Wertheim 2003 and Yemelianova, 2000).

In particular this research aims to compare Tatar language use between the Russian and Tatar populations as a way to measure how successful the Tatar language policy as a nation-building process has been. According to Rodgers (2007) and Polese (2011), people's attitudes show the extent to which they are participating in the reconstruction of nation-building and identity. Therefore, if Russians show that they are able to use written Tatar and that they use it in everyday situations without showing resistance, then the language policy could be deemed as successful.

Empirical research was carried out during two field trips to Kazan in October 2010 and April-May 2013. The results of the study revealed that overall the language policy seems to have been successful amongst the Russian population, particularly in the sphere of education due to Tatar language being compulsory in schools. However, it does not seem to have changed attitudes towards the Tatar language.

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Introduction

This thesis is situated within the field of sociolinguistics and examines language policy and Russian-titular language use within the Russian Federation twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The thesis will specifically focus on the Republic of Tatarstan, an autonomous and multi-ethnic republic politically situated within the Russian Federation. The main aim of the thesis is to find out to what extent Tatar language policy has been successful in promoting Tatar language spread in post-Soviet Tatarstan and to see if attitudes towards the Tatar language have changed since the collapse of Communism.

At the end of the Soviet period the titular political entities (Soviet Republics or other autonomous and quasi-autonomous units) states and republics of the former Soviet Union began nation-building processes as a way to declare their identity after seventy years of cultural and linguistic repression. These nation-building processes were concerned with de-Sovietisation, such as the replacement of Soviet political institutions with institutions of the majority titular nationality; the re-establishment of titular nations, which included the codification of identity characteristics such as language and origin (Laitin, 1998), and finally, the rediscovery of the titular nation's past (Tishkov, 1997).

However, nation-building processes have been the cause of many tensions within these societies. One of the main reasons for these tensions is the fact that Russians lost their dominant ethnic status to national populations in the independent states and republics after the collapse of Communism (Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001, p.771). Russians in the 'near abroad' felt threatened, particularly with the introduction of titular national symbols and the interest in the revival of the titular language as an official language during the early 1990s. Russians never assimilated into the indigenous societies of these independent political entities during Communism. They did not learn the titular language and did not identify with the titular population or with these political entities in which they resided (Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003). According to Brubaker (1996), this was because Russians enjoyed a privileged existence with full language, cultural and educational rights in the Soviet Union. They took for granted that the whole territory of the Soviet Union was their homeland and not just the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (henceforth RSFSR). Their status was considered to be stable and was therefore never questioned because they were the dominant ethnic group.

This thesis will focus on language policy as one of these nation-building processes. In the Republic of Tatarstan a language policy was implemented in 1992 that declared both Russian and Tatar as the official state languages that shared equal status in all official domains of language use. Furthermore, in 1997 a law on education was passed that made Tatar language learning compulsory in all secondary schools for *all* nationalities. These policies were part of Tatarstan's nation-building processes (Sharafutdinova, 2003; Wertheim, 2003 and Yemelianova, 2000) that is also referred to as Tatarstan's *sovereignty project* (Alvarez Veinguer and Davis, 2007; Graney, 1999 and 2009). The Tatar identity has been promoted through cultural and linguistic policies by the political elites, as have many other titular identities in the post-Soviet space. The Tatar language policy and compulsory Tatar language learning are considered to be symbols of Tatar identity that have been imposed on the republic's citizens by the Tatar political elites (Yemelianova, 2000 and Alvarez Veinguer and Davis, 2007).

Many studies have focused their interests on the Tatar population and how far the language policy has been successful in the development of Tatar-Russian bilingualism (Iskhakova, 2002; Garipov et al, 2000 and 2008). Furthermore, most research focuses on the spoken language amongst the Tatar population. However, very little research has been carried out into *Russian-Tatar* bilingualism, i.e. the linguistic behaviour and attitudes of those who self-identify as 'Russian'. Therefore the original contribution to knowledge from this thesis concerns *Russian-Tatar* bilingualism. In particular this research aims to compare Tatar language use between the Russian and Tatar populations as a way to measure how successful the Tatar language policy as a nation-building process has been.

This research examines if there has been a shift in *written* Tatar language use amongst the Russian population and whether their attitude towards it has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to Rodgers (2007) and Polese (2011), people's attitudes show the extent to which they are participating in the reconstruction of nation-building and identity. Therefore, if Russians show that they are able to use written Tatar and that they use it in everyday situations without showing resistance, then the language policy could be deemed as successful.

The research questions for this thesis are the following:

1. How successful has the Tatar language policy been in promoting Tatar language spread?
2. Is there any resistance to language policy as a nation-building process and if so, how is it manifested?
3. Have attitudes towards the Tatar language changed during the post-Soviet period?

The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part is a literature review and consists of four chapters. Chapter one contextualizes the study of language planning and policy in post-Soviet Tatarstan. The focus of chapter one is therefore to define the sphere of language planning and policy as well as to define the specific terminology used throughout the thesis (which follows Grin (1991); Shohamy, 2006 and Spolsky, 2004, among others). The chapter analyses models and frameworks of language policies, including how these are implemented in society through domains of language use (as per Fishman, 2004 and 1999; Spolsky, 2004). This chapter also gives an explanation of implicit and explicit language policy through the examination of language education policies and language testing (Shohamy, 2006; Spolsky, 2004). Following on from this, the motives behind language planning and policy are examined, such as various definitions of ideology (Ager, 1991; Blommaert 1999; Fishman, 2004; Sebba, 1993; Woolard, 1998) and identity (Bairamova, 2004; Gumperz, 1982; Alvarez Veinguer and Davis, 2007; Wertheim, 2003 and 2005). Finally, Brown's (2007) study into language use in Belarus is analysed.

The aim of chapter two is to examine language planning and policy in the Soviet Union and to analyse how these were linked to the engineering of a Soviet identity. The themes and issues discussed in this chapter help to contextualize the attitudes and tensions that are present in post-Soviet space. The chapter first of all looks at the history of identity and language policies in the Soviet Union after the 1917 Revolution (found, for example. in Alpatov, 1997; Grenoble, 2003; Lewis, 1972; Smith, 1998). Secondly, the nationalities question is analysed (as per Grenoble, 2003; Laitin, 1998; Smith, 1998; Lewis, 1972). The third section examines corpus and status planning issues in the development of the Soviet language policies (detailed in Alpatov, 1997; Connor, 1984; Crisp cited in Kirkwood, 1989; Grenoble, 2003; Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001; Smith, 1998) The fourth section of the chapter highlights language and identity issues in education (found in Bilinsky, 1962; Connor, 1984; Grenoble, 2003; Kreindler cited in

Smith, 1998; Silver and Anderson, 1990; Smith, 1998). The final section analyses ethnic mobilization, and power and resistance (as per Grenoble, 2003; Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001; Marshall, 1996; Silver and Anderson, 1990).

The literature in chapter three looks at the issues of language and identity in the post-Soviet period and the nation-building processes that were developed at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first section of this chapter explains definitions used in the post-Soviet context (following Jenkins, 2008; May, 2001). The following section examines theories and models of identity, nationhood and nation-building (for example, Brubaker, 1994, 1996 and 2011; Kolstø, 2000; Kuzio, 2001; Shevel, 2002) and then looks at features of Russian-titular identity (see Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003; Tolz, 1998). The next section examines features of titular-Russian identity (e.g. Laitin, 1998; Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001; Smith *et al*. 1998; Tishkov, 1998). Studies into attitudes are also discussed (Hagendoorn, Poppe and Minescu, 2008; Loner and Peri, 2009; Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003). The second section of this chapter gives an analysis of the language policies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, including the alphabet laws, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly focusing on amendments made over the last twenty-four years.

Chapter four explores the themes highlighted in the literature from previous chapters in the context of Tatarstan. First of all it gives an historical overview of the country (relying on Davis et al., 2000; Garipov and Faller, 2003; Graney, 1999; Graney, 2009; Rorlich, 1986; Yemelianova, 2000). Secondly the political background and Tatar nation-building processes are analysed (Cashaback, 2008; Giuliano, 2000; Graney 1999 and 2009; Gorenburg, 1999; Iskhakov, 1997; Sharafutdinova, 2003; Tishkov, 1997). Thirdly, corpus planning aspects are discussed (Bairamova, 2004; Sebba, 2006; Wertheim, 2003 and 2005) followed by status planning aspects (Garipov et al., 2000; Graney, 1999; Alvarez Veinguer and Davis, 2007). The next section analyses attitudes and stereotyping in post-Soviet Tatarstan (Garipov et al., 2000; Giuliano, 2000; Khabenskaia, 2002; Stoliarova, in Garipov et al., 2008; Alvarez Veinguer and Davis, 2007). The final section of chapter four examines functional language use in Tatarstan in the post-Soviet period (Iskhakova, 2001 and 2002).

The second part of this thesis addresses the research questions, using empirical methods to find out how successful the Tatar language policy has been in the post-Soviet period. Chapter five is therefore about the quantitative research that was carried by the author of

this thesis during two fieldtrips to Kazan in 2010 and 2013. The chapter first of all describes the methodology that was used for the data collection and then explains the procedure, including how the University's ethical guidelines were adhered to. The hypothesis is stated and is then operationalized for each test that was carried out. The aim of test one was to examine to what extent language could be an indicator of nationality in post-Soviet Tatarstan. The idea for this test was based on identity studies mentioned in the previous chapters such as Giliazova, (in Minzaripov, 2013); Khabenskaia, (2002); Laitin, (1998); Poppe and Hagendoorn (2001 and 2003); Shevel, (2002). The second test aimed to find out whether the 1998 educational reforms introducing compulsory Tatar language learning in Tatarstan were having an effect on the levels of Tatar proficiency of the Russian population. The Tatar population was also tested in order to compare levels of Tatar written proficiency between the two populations. The idea for this test came from studies that had been carried out in Tatarstan; however, these studies were based on the personal preferences of respondents in spoken language rather than any written tests. The final test aimed to analyse self-reported language use by the respondents within the spheres of work, the home and information technology. This test was based on Fishman's Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale framework (henceforth GIDS) (1991) and Iskhakova's study (2001).

The final chapter is focused on qualitative research methods. The data used in this chapter is based on observations, informal discussions and interviews with people in Kazan. The aim of chapter six is to qualify the results of chapter five and to examine Russian and Tatar attitudes towards the Tatar language from a subjective perspective. This is of interest because Shevel (2002) states that nation-building policies, such as language policy, are often negotiated and contested at citizen level. First of all, the methods are discussed and secondly the procedure for the interviews is explained. Thirdly the coding process for the interviews is described and then the themes and issues are given in the context of the interview data. The themes discussed are language policy and structures of power, spheres of language use with particular reference to the home and communication, education, the media, work and officialdom, the generation gap, how language is distributed geographically within the Republic of Tatarstan and socio-psychological issues.

The conclusion of the research brings together all issues that arise from the literature (chapters one to four) and from the original contribution to knowledge (chapters five to six) and determines to what extent the Tatar language policy has been successful

amongst the Russian population and what the effects of compulsory Tatar language learning have been.

Chapter One - Language planning and policy

The aim of this first chapter is to contextualise the research that has been carried out for this thesis. First of all some frequently used definitions within the field of study are explained, such as *top-down bottom-up, multilingualism, plurilingualism* and *bilingualism*. Secondly, the sphere of language planning and policy are defined. Following this, models and approaches of language planning and policy are explored and include frameworks for language implementation in domains of language use. Next, the motives of language planning and policy are analysed and finally considerations from the citizen level towards language planning and policy are discussed.

1.1 Definitions in context: *top-down bottom-up, multilingualism, plurilingualism* and *bilingualism*

Before examining theories of language planning and policy, it is necessary to define some key terms that are frequently used in the context of language planning and policy activities. Some of the most common terms that are used in the discussion about language planning and policy in this thesis are *top-down bottom-up*, *multilingualism, plurilingualism* and *bilingualism*.

1.1.1 Top-down bottom-up

The distinctions between *top-down bottom-up* perspectives that are used in this thesis first emerged in the 1960s in studies about new identity politics and were associated with ethnic minority issues and feminism (Smith and Wilson, 1997, p.846). These perspectives have often been used within the context of the social and political sciences. Smith and Wilson (1997, p.846) explain that the *top-down* perspective was also known as the *political process model* and emphasized 'the role of the state and political system and expanding or contracting political opportunities as a stimulus or break on collective action'. The *bottom-up* perspective was known as the *resource mobilisation model* and focused on the 'critical role of cultural, material and formal organisational resources in the mobilisation of communities or marginal groups'. However, these perspectives have been subject to constructive criticism, due to the fact that the interactive dynamics of these perspectives appear to have been neglected (Smith and Wilson, 1997, p.847).

Another interesting explanation of these perspective is given by Fuchs, Hofkirchner and Klauninger (2002, p.132). First of all, they mention that *top-down* refers to 'structure' such as a government and *bottom-up* refers to 'agency' that refers to the individual. Fuchs, Hofkirchner and Klauninger note that both structure and agency exist within social systems: from the *bottom-up* perspective, values, rules, ethics and morals are

formed by the individual, but these are affected by *top-down* processes. From a *top-down* perspective, a structure (such as a government) may ‘constrain the individual by setting conditions that limit the scope of possibilities to act. However, the actions are mediated by individual agents and dominance cannot control the outcome’. In other words, a government cannot guarantee that their conditions (i.e. laws and policies) will be realized and accepted by individuals. It is the *interaction* between the individual and the structure that maintains or alters the conditions. This reveals that the interaction between the *top-down* and *bottom-up* perspectives are a process or a negotiation between a government and individuals. For the purpose of this study I am interested in the interaction between the citizens of Tatarstan and the Tatar government’s implementation of the Tatar language policy through the education system. The Tatar language policy could be considered as *top-down* from the Tatar government and the reaction of the citizens to this policy could be considered as *bottom-up*. This thesis examines the interaction between these two perspectives by analysing to what extent this policy is accepted or rejected by citizens of Tatarstan and how the policy and its conditions are negotiated in post-Soviet Tatar society.

The interplay between these *top-down bottom-up* perspectives will be revisited in chapter three in the discussion of *nation-building* and in chapter four that will examine Tatar language policy processes in more detail.

1.1.2 Multilingualism, plurilingualism and *bilingualism*

Edwards (1994) defines *multilingualism* as being when more than one language is used on one territory between different communities. Spolsky (2004, p.4) similarly uses *multilingualism* to refer to the number of languages used in a society.

In addition to the term *multilingualism*, Spolsky mentions the term *plurilingualism*, to refer to the different language skills of each individual member of a community. All languages within a community are used for different purposes: the situation which the person finds themselves in determines which language they will use. Examples of these situations might be family and friends, trade and work and are often named as domains that will be mentioned later in this chapter. *Multilingualism* is used more to refer to society or the community, whereas *plurilingualism* refers to an individual, although this distinction is not consistently observed in the literature.

The term *bilingualism* is often referred to in the literature either as a specific type of plurilingualism (i.e. an individual’s use of two languages), or of multilingualism (a state’s acceptance of two languages). For example, Edwards (cited in Bhatia and

Ritchie, 2012, p.5) accepts both definitions of 'bilingual', while Mackey (1962 cited in Kreindler, 1985, p.317) only accepts the first.

As far as Russian terminology is concerned, two types of bilingualism exist: titular-Russian and Russian-titular, with the languages given in order of acquisition. Haarmann (cited in Kreindler, 1985, p.324) asserts that titular-Russian bilingualism was promoted by Soviet language planning and was a means to develop the socialist nation. It was developed to eradicate language and cultural barriers in order to create a new kind of Soviet identity and as a way to integrate the peoples of the Soviet Union. It was a way of promoting the Russian language. This type of bilingualism was asymmetrical: Russian-titular bilingualism was not promoted because it was presumed by the Soviet government that Russians already knew the Russian language and they did not need any other language in Soviet society. In the post-Soviet period this kind of dual bilingualism still exists in society, although there have been attempts to develop the Russian-titular aspect of it in post-Soviet society through language and education policies, as will be discussed in this thesis.

In terms of Tatarstan, *Tatar-Russian* refers to the form of bilingualism of the Tatar population and *Russian-Tatar* bilingualism refers to the Russian population (Iskhakova, 2001, p.3 and 2002; Nabiullina, 2013, p.92). Therefore bilingualism is defined in terms of the nationality of the person and the language they consider to be their 'native' language. However, it is not such a simple concept as it appears. A Tatar-Russian would be classed as Tatar by birth and would consider Tatar to be their native language, although they may not have been brought up speaking Tatar within their family environment and may not even know the Tatar language. A Tatar-Russian might thus conceivably know Russian best. Furthermore, there are other Tatar people who were brought up speaking Tatar within the family environment and spoke Russian as a second language or language of communication outside of the home. On the other hand, a Russian-Tatar person would use only Russian within the family environment and for everyday purposes. These conventions will be used throughout this thesis.

1.2 What is language planning?

According to Spolsky (2004, p.5), there are three components involved in language planning. Firstly, language practices within the speech community concern the patterns that make up the linguistic repertoire. The second component comprises language ideology and beliefs, and the third involves efforts to modify or influence the practice of language intervention or management. The first two components therefore pertain to

language planning and the third pertains to language policy. Spolsky states that language planning exists in a highly dynamic and interactive context in which if any part of it is modified, then there will be a direct impact on its other components. Spolsky points out that non-linguistic factors – political, cultural, psychological, religious, social and demographic – often influence language intervention. These factors were also mentioned by Cooper (1989, ch.8) alongside others such as physical environment, discovery and invention and decision-making.

Many linguists, including Ager (1990), Cooper (1989), and Fishman (2004, following Kloss, 1952 and 1967), divide language planning into two main components: corpus planning and status planning. Corpus planning concerns lexical, grammatical and orthographical changes made to a language as well as decisions about new scripts. Status planning concerns the functional aspect of a language and how it is to be implemented in spheres such as education, the media, courts and government. Fishman (2004) posits a hidden status agenda in corpus planning. He explains that corpus planning and status planning influence one another and cannot exist separately.

Cooper (1989, p.157) posits that there is an additional category to the two mentioned above, which he terms 'acquisition planning'. This category concerns 'organized efforts to promote the learning of a language'. He explains that there are three goals of acquisition planning that are: firstly, the creation of improvement of the opportunity to learn, where the language is part of classroom based learning; secondly, the creation or improvement of the incentive to learn that involves the language being compulsory in education and thirdly, the creation and improvement of both opportunity and incentive simultaneously, that means that the target language is used as the medium of interaction in contexts that the learner either must or wants to enter.

1.3 What is a language policy?

Schiffman (1996, p.13) posits that there are two types of language policy that can be covert (implicit, informal or grass-roots) or overt (explicit, formalized, codified). A covert language policy is one that may be embedded within education policies or human rights laws. Examples of countries that do not have a language policy *per se* are the UK and the USA. An overt language policy can be a written document that designates particular languages certain privileges of use such as in the sphere of government and officialdom, the media, education and within the public space. Spolsky (2004, p.11) mentions that an explicit or overt language policy can be an official proclamation that could be part of a national constitution or even a separate language law. However, just

because a language policy may be explicit, does not mean that it will be implemented or that its implementation will be effective in changing the language behaviour of the country's population (Spolsky, 2004, p. 11).

Shohamy (2006, p.1) believes that a language policy is a device used to impose and perpetuate language practices and language behaviour at both macro and micro levels. Shohamy refers to the macro level as a nation-state and the micro level as a community or individuals. Many constitutions in the world name just one official language for their country (such as France), some may name two (Ukraine: Ukrainian and Russian) and others may have a more multilingual policy such as Switzerland (French, German, Italian and Romansch). Language policies can be both overt and covert at the same time due to some languages being given official status in a written policy and covert by not including other languages in use within the communities of the country in question. Both covert and overt aspects of language policies can cause many issues within a country.

Grin (1991 in Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1995, p.35) posits that there are two types of models to consider with regard to language policy and linguistic human rights. The first concept is the 'personality principle' and refers to language rights attached to the individual. This concept is similar to the way in which an individual has traditional human rights. The second concept is the 'territorial principle' that Grin describes as the correspondence between a language and a geographical space. Thus, language rights are considered to be 'rationalized', but at the same time offer better protection for the collective rights of a community where their language and culture can thrive (Turi cited in Grin 1991 in Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1995, p.35).

Grin notes that many language policies are based on the territorial principle, including the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. However, he believes that there are many shortcomings of these types of policies that include issues of asymmetry, inclusion and dynamics. As far as asymmetry is concerned, he believes that it is an arithmetical approach to languages in contact and the problem with asymmetry is the choice of languages in contact in one demographical area. He describes an asymmetrical policy as one that has the intention of reducing the power of a more dominant language in order to promote language spread of a minority language. Examples of countries where this has happened are the Baltic States, where Russian was excluded from the language policy in order to promote the titular language of each state. On the other hand, Grin's definition of an asymmetrical policy may not reflect the actual language practices at the citizen level. On the contrary, it is usually the case that the dominating

language is used in every sphere of language use whilst the titular language struggles to compete in spheres of language use due to economic and political forces that have long been established using the dominant language.

Grin states that the 'personality principle' works better for individuals because it provides an individual with linguistic rights regardless of where they live or reside. However, Grin's 'personality principle' may have several drawbacks as is illustrated in the following example. In the UK, individual linguistic rights are implemented into the social services that provide interpreters for foreign migrants and asylum seekers needing access to health care and legal services. This provision has met with many difficulties due to several reasons. Firstly, the demand for interpreters in certain languages cannot always be provided; in some cases interpreters are asked to travel long distances to assignments that can be costly. Secondly, the UK government made significant funding cuts to interpreting services in 2012 and interpreting services were outsourced to private companies that underperformed (BBC, 2013)[1]. These companies missed targets to provide interpreters for every appointment that was booked. Another problem was that there was no quality control over interpreters and many of them were reported to be working without recognized qualifications or having had criminal records checks. A consequence of this was that many translation errors were made that resulted in the collapse of many court cases (BBC, 2012)[2]. Therefore from these examples, it is evident that provision for individual linguistic rights is not always a viable option.

Spolsky (2004, p.13) states that newly formed independent countries often write language policies to 'define the roles of competing languages'. The independent states and autonomous republics of the former Soviet Union implemented such types of language policies soon after the collapse of communism. The Republic of Tatarstan, for example, has a bilingual policy that proclaims Russian and Tatar as the official languages of the republic.

So far this section has examined language planning and policy from more of a *top-down* perspective. However, it is equally important to consider the *bottom-up* perspective in more detail because the success of these language policies depends on how far they are accepted or rejected by society (Shevel, 2002, p.405). Shohamy (2006, p.135) asserts that, 'although policy affects practice, practice has the power to affect policy'. She states that *bottom-up* forces include lobbying groups, language activist groups, courts and education and these are all part of the negotiation process.

[1] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22030779

[2] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19186942

As far as inclusion and dynamics are concerned, Shohamy (2006, p.151) and Grin (1991 in Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1995, p.46) mention that it is difficult to give language provision to all ethnic groups in nation-states. This is due to societies being in a constant state of flux as a result of migration flows. Grin states that models of territorial language policies try to force people to fit into a mould to reshape their identities and to assimilate, but these groups of 'other' people who do not fit into a specific mould may often resist or resent state assimilation, such as Russians residing in independent former Soviet states and autonomous republics.

1.3.1 Language Education Policies (LEPs)

A language education policy is a form of language policy through which political ideologies may be put into practice (Shohamy, 2006, p.76-7). Language education policies can be either overt or covert or even include elements of both. An example of an overt language education policy could be an educational curriculum that specifies what is to be taught, to who, for how long and which teaching methodologies and materials are to be used. A national curriculum is often set out in an official document and distributed to educational institutions. However, the curriculum may have covert aspects that may include the exclusion of some subjects or languages depending on the political ideologies of the government in power. Shohamy (2006, p.76) mentions that a language education policy is a powerful mechanism through which language behaviour is imposed, particularly if a language has been made compulsory to learn by the government or the education authorities. A language education policy sets out which languages are to be taught, learned and used within society. Shohamy considers that language education policies can be used by authorities to compel language loyalty from the population, a sense of patriotism and a demonstration of collective identity. On the other hand, a language education policy can be manipulated from a bottom-up level; parents and grass-roots groups may demand a certain language to be taught within schools. Spolsky (2004, p.46) points out that there is often a gap between the languages a child learns to speak within the home and the languages on offer within the education system of a country.

1.3.4 Language Testing

It is important to discuss the significance of language tests here because these tests form part of the analysis of the research in chapter five. Language tests are considered to be both overt and covert mechanisms of language policy that are imposed on students within an education system. The results of language testing can be used to find out to

what extent a language policy is having an effect on the population and whether or not the population is learning a language with a positive outcome. Shohamy (2006, p.93) notes that language tests are used as social and political instruments that are capable of redefining and standardizing language realities. Language tests can be used for three main purposes (Shohamy, 2006, p.95). Firstly, they may be used to determine the prestige and status of languages within society. Many universities require entrance examinations to be taken in a specified language that is usually the dominant language of use within a particular society. In the Russian Federation, for example, university entrance exams are taken in Russian. Other languages may additionally be given high prestige; tests in English are usually required in many educational institutions around the world due to the fact that English is regarded as a global language. However, language tests can also be a way to exclude languages or designate a language as low-prestige. If there are no test requirements for a certain language, then people may not learn it because there is no identifiable gain from learning it. This could be considered as covert policy that means that the government has a hidden agenda to exclude some languages from the education system for whatever reasons.

Secondly, language tests are a means to impose linguistic norms and uphold linguistic correctness. In other words, a language is standardized foremost in terms of the written language and tests are often used as a measure of written language proficiency and ability. Test results are viewed as an objective form of assessment and everybody is expected to comply with the standard (Milroy and Milroy, 1999 in Shohamy, 2006, p.96). Testing is also useful to see to what standard a minority or second language is being taught in comparison to dominant languages in a multilingual or bilingual environment.

Thirdly, language tests can be used to supress language diversity. Shohamy (2006, p.98) points out that in multicultural societies, ethnic groups are expected to acquire the knowledge of the dominant language that can result in leaving behind the knowledge of their native languages. This reveals how tests can be used to impose monolingual policies on the population and reflects how the culture and language of ethnic groups may not be valued or appreciated. Therefore language tests can show that minority rights are being violated by denying native language and cultural learning of minority groups. Many students in schools are only tested in one language, which may not be their native language, and testing in their own languages may not exist. On the other hand, resources may not be available to teach the minority languages.

1.4 Frameworks for Language Planning and Policy

This next section explores frameworks through which governments and political actors may implement language policy in society. Many of the frameworks used in the study of language policy include features such as the type of language policy of the country in question (for example, monolingual, bilingual), the history of a country, including ethnic composition, categorization of varieties of language and the functional distribution of languages, to name but a few (Cooper, 1989; Fishman 2004; Schiffman 1996; Spolsky 2004). These features are influenced by political, economic and social motives.

The framework that will be used in this study is Fishman's (1991) GIDS framework. Fishman takes an instrumental approach to find out how and where language planners and top-down actors can implement policy. In Fishman's framework, the higher the number on the scale, the more disruption there is to the maintenance and continuity of the language network. Fishman compares it to the Richter scale, that is to say, the greater the tremors, the greater the disruption. Fishman refers to the minority language as *Xish* and the majority language as *Yish*. As far as the Republic of Tatarstan is concerned, *Xish* would be considered as the Tatar language and *Yish* as Russian for the purposes of this thesis. The stages can be summarized as follows:

- Stage 8 – words and expressions of *Xish* used by the elderly that can be found in folklore and songs;
- Stage 7 – *Xish* speakers are 'beyond child-bearing age' (p.89-90) and are socially integrated within their communities, but not all of their family members of the younger generation are *Xish* speakers and the *Xish* speakers may not be fluent in it;
- Stage 6 - *Xish* is used in the home, the neighbourhood and in communities. The goal of this stage is to pass on *Xish* to a younger cohort who will use it as a second language;
- Stage 5 – Literacy in the home, school and the community. This concerns the protection of *Xish* in a broadened functional periphery. There is written correspondence between members of the community. The written language is a sign of prestige of *Xish*. It means that views and opinions can be spread. *Xish* has little or no funding from the government;
- Stage 4 - *Xish* is used in lower educational domains and the work environment. It is funded through the local community. Education is a way of supporting *Xish* in the family and the neighbourhood;

- Stage 3 – At this stage there is interaction between *Xish* and *Yish* in the lower work sphere. *Xish* and *Yish* markets seek to help each other. If the business is *Xish*, then work is conducted in *Xish* even with *Yish* speakers and vice versa;
- Stage 2 – *Xish* is used bilingually in local government services and the media;
- Stage 1 – *Xish* is used at higher level government services as well as in education and the media.

Stages 8-6 are therefore more concerned with the spoken language, whereas stages 5-1 are concerned with the written language. Prestige and competition between languages assume more visible importance at stage 5, although there may also be prestige and competition issues with languages that are only spoken. Furthermore, writing brings *Xish* into direct competition with *Yish* across a new range of functions. The written language is a key to social mobility and competitiveness in the work environment. After examining the GIDS above, it is evident that the lower the stage number, the more official structures becomes involved because the language is being used for purposes where the state is involved and more money is needed to fund and promote it.

Fishman is interested in language maintenance, language death and the process of language loss that occurs naturally as a community moves from stage 1 down the scale to stage 8. Fishman, on the other hand, starts from stage 8 because he is interested in reversing language shift. He is particularly interested in what is appropriate for the language in order to move up a grade. The use of written language increases as the stage number decreases. The more widely used the written language, the higher its status and the more official recognition it gets as well as more funding.

The GIDS framework could be considered as very useful for evaluating how effective a language policy is in a multilingual country by looking at where a particular language falls on the scale. Written language tests could be devised at each stage of the scale to assess whether any progress has been made towards stage 1 or whether its use has been reversed towards stage 8. If the written language seems to be reversing, then action can be taken by the government in question to reactivate it.

This framework will be important to consider when looking at the language situation in Tatarstan, particularly the analysis of language use in official domains and official written documentation. There appears to be a power struggle between languages in Tatarstan when it comes to increasing the status of Tatar. As will be shown in the analysis of the Tatar language policy in chapter three, many of its declarations seem to be designed around attributes and domains of power from which it was excluded during

the Soviet period. However, this will be discussed more in the following chapters. The next section examines domains of language use in more detail.

1.4.1 Domains of language use

Studies in sociolinguistics have revealed that domains of language use can be regarded as sociolinguistic contexts for language choice (Cooper, 1989; Fishman et al., 1972; Spolsky, 2004). These domains are often categorized as the home, education, religion, the media, work and the government.

The home is regarded as an extremely important domain of language use by sociolinguists because it is the place where language is first acquired. Spolsky (2004, p.42-6) notes that language proficiency is dependent on other family members within the home. However, he states that external pressures often have an effect on language use such as intermarriage and immigration.

As for education, schools are considered as one of the most important areas in which language policy is implemented (Cooper, 1989; Fishman et al., 1971; Spolsky, 2004). Quite often education policies are implemented alongside language policies and they set out which languages are the medium of instruction, which languages are to be taught, the number of hours each language is to be taught, the textbooks to be used, teaching methodologies, the age a person must start learning a language as well as the standard of language to be taught.

Religion is a domain that has not been studied so much in the context of language policy according to Spolsky (2004, p.48). Cooper (1989, p.116-7) mentions that language is used to convey religious messages, such as the promotion of Islam through the Arabic language. Religion has become a popular domain of language study in Tatarstan and other former Soviet republics as a sign of political and national identity (see Johnson, 2005).

Language use within the workplace may be determined by the language practices of the business in question (Spolsky, 2004, p.52) and if a country is bilingual, then government institutions may require their employees to have knowledge of both languages in order to be able to work in government positions (French and English in Quebec). Fishman's GIDS framework (1991) incorporates all of these domains that is considered in the analysis of the sociolinguistic context in Tatarstan.

1.5 Motives of Language Planning and Policy

It is evident from the above language planning and policy framework posited by Fishman (1991) that there must be motives behind language planning and policy. A

motive could be defined as an impulse which drives somebody to do something. Many scholars who have written about the motives behind language planning and policy have mentioned motives of identity and ideology (Ager, 2001; Blommaert, 1991; Fishman, 2004; Spolsky, 2004). All the scholars agree that motives are influenced by politics, society and economics and these motives can concern individuals, a community or a state. These motives are important for nation-building processes of countries that are in transitional states, such as countries of the former Soviet Union and autonomous republics such as Tatarstan. Identity and ideology can both be considered from the *top-down* perspective of a country that is trying to assert its independence from a former colonizing country. This meaning of identity usually pertains to the collective identity that is discussed below. Ideology can refer to the ideas a government has and its vision for the future of society. As far as identity and ideology are concerned from the *bottom-up* perspective, citizens may demonstrate resistance against the political ideologies of the newly forming identity of the nation state (Shevel, 2002, p.405). This is seen particularly in multilingual countries where certain ethnic groups may feel that their rights are not being taken into consideration as far as socio-economic and cultural resources are concerned (for example, Russians residing in former Soviet countries).

1.5.1 Ideology

The motive of ideology broadly speaking tends to be defined as a set of beliefs or ideas that can be considered as having both *top-down* and *bottom-up* influences. From the *top-down* perspective, these beliefs may form the basis of political, economic and social ideas of a government (Ager, 2001, p.55). From the *bottom-up* perspective, beliefs may be formed through a social group or individual. Ideologies are often determined by the goals of social actors from both perspectives.

It is evident that there are many different concepts and definitions of ideology and each depends on what the beliefs are, who the social actors are and what the goals are. Woolard (in Schieffelin et al., 1998, p.5-7) offers four types of definitions. The first is the broadest and the fourth one is the narrowest:

1. The first definition is subjective and conceptual. It refers to ideology as mental phenomena such as consciousness, beliefs and ideas;
2. Ideology in this definition is dependent on the material and practical aspects of human life. It is rooted in the experience of interests of a particular social position;
3. In this definition ideology is linked to positions of power such as social, political and economic. Ideology is used as a tool to acquire or maintain power;

4. This is corrupt ideology such as Communist ideology. The beliefs of the political system are designed to deceive and distort.

Woolard points out that most scholars of ideology are divided between the second and third definitions above. For example, Shohamy (2006, p.45) states that governments use language policies to promote their ideology and to try to influence language practices of society; this ideology pertains to Woolard's third definition.

In terms of post-Soviet countries, ideologies are often influenced by nation-building processes, as a way to distance themselves from the Soviet past. Language planning aspects of these nation-building processes have included attempted alphabet reforms and lexical reforms such as the purging of Soviet lexemes from titular languages. Fishman (2004) posited that there were four different bipolar ideological dimensions in language planning and policy and asserted there was a hidden status planning agenda in corpus planning which is often reflected as a hidden state ideology. Fishman's dimensions are: *Purity versus Vernacularism; Uniqueness versus Internationalization; Classicization versus Sprachbund* and *Ausbau versus Einbau*. Ideology concerning the implementation of language policy in the post-Soviet period could fit within Woolard's third definition since ideology seems to be used as a tool for political power with the goal of nation-building. This concept of ideology is explored in more depth in chapters three and four. Woolard's fourth definition of a corrupt ideology is examined more in the next chapter in relation to Soviet language planning and policy. Both the third and fourth concepts of ideology seem to have a more *top-down* perspective.

As for the bottom-up perspective of ideology in relation to language planning and policy, Shohamy (2006, p.45) notes that language policy only has a limited effect on actual language practice because populations can openly challenge and resist polices. Jaffe (cited in Blommaert, 1999, p.39) explores how enactments of linguistic and social identity are shaped by ideological structures and how dominant ideologies can be transformed. Both Shohamy and Jaffe reveal how there could be a mismatch of ideological beliefs between the state and the citizens. This therefore creates tensions within society. The concepts of ideology, which Shohamy and Jaffe illustrate in their works, seem to be contextualized in Woolard's first and second definitions. These particular concepts of ideology are explored throughout the thesis by looking at how citizens in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods demonstrated their resistance against the political regimes.

1.5.2 Identity

There are many definitions of identity. According to Gee (2001 cited in Weber and Horner, 2012, p.83), identity can be *ascribed* and *achieved*. Ascribed identity means that a person is assigned a particular identity. This could be by a government who requires that its citizens identify with the nation, such as the Soviet citizen and the Soviet state. On the other hand, an individual may reject this ascribed identity in pursuit of their own achieved identity. An achieved identity is where a person is recognized as they wish to be identified, but they may strive to gain this recognition in opposition to the identity a state ascribes to its citizens. The end of the Soviet Union provides another example of citizens rejecting the Soviet identity that was ascribed to them and that different ethnic groups rejected as they pushed for ethnic mobilization towards the end of the Soviet period. Other perspectives of identity depend on how we perceive ourselves and also on how others see us.

Many definitions seem to link the motive of identity with political influences, particularly when the discussions refer to nation-building processes. Ager (2001, p.13) asserts that nationalism is usually connected with identity, but identity can also be about a group of people who share the same characteristics such as language, culture and territory. Joireman (2003, p.6-7) similarly states that identity concerns symbols of belonging to part of a community or a nation.

Most of the above definitions of identity seem to be politically motivated, but there are other perspectives that appear to be more bottom-up in their approach. Some scholars point out that identity can be defined through language behaviour. This type of behaviour is particularly prevalent in countries that have a diglossic situation such as Wales, the Basque country, Catalonia and Quebec. This type of behaviour is referred to as *in-group out-group* behaviour. According to Gumperz (1982, p.64-66), in-group behaviour is formed through members of a particular community where similar customs, religion and language are shared. Other communities are referred to as the out-group. He defined the code of the in-group as the 'we' code and the code of the out-group as the 'they' code. The 'we' code refers to the language used in the village among peers and in the home, whereas 'they' refers to the language used to talk to outsiders, for official business and encounters with other communities. The language of the out-group is usually used as the language of socio-economic advancement. Sebba (1993) states that this kind of code switching relies on notions of psychological motivation to account for particular switches; this type of code switching occurs between communities where societal bilingualism is prevalent as is the case in Tatarstan and it is

ethnographic as opposed to the analysis of grammatical, pragmatic and discourse aspects of code switching. In-group and out-group behaviour is usually dependent on the perspective of the person or group in question and influences of this behaviour are due to feelings of association, dissociation, marginality and integration as well as socio-economic factors such as competition for shared resources and perceived threat (Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2003, p.772).

In this section on identity, several types of definitions have been examined. The theories examined on identity have revealed that identity is multifaceted. It can be analysed from both top-down and bottom-up perspectives and can be political, historical, economic, cultural and societal. Identity is also a more general term that incorporates many other concepts such as nationality and ethnicity as is discussed in more detail throughout this literature review (chapter three).

1.7 Studies

Sociolinguistic studies are often carried out to find out what the attitudes are towards certain languages in societies where language use is in flux or how languages are used within certain domains so that measures can be taken to reverse language shift or governments and language planners can decide which measures of implementation are needed. One study of particular interest for this thesis was carried out was by Brown (2007).

The purpose of Brown's (2007) study was to find out whether there was a functional hierarchy in political, economic and social domains of the Belarusian and Russian languages and the factors that contributed to the composition of the socio-linguistic environment in Belarus.

Brown used quantitative research methods and distributed a survey in universities in three main cities. The participants had to choose which language, Belarusian or Russian, they found *useful* or *necessary* to know in certain functional situations such as in the home, at work, in school or in government institutions. The author looked at the 18-21 age groups because this generation received its education after the collapse of Communism when Belarus declared its independence and therefore would have had the choice to learn both Belarusian and Russian.

According to the data collected, Russian was the primary language used in the home. Factors that influenced this were the move from rural areas to cities, choice of education and economic advantages. The educational domain got the biggest response rate of both Belarusian and Russian being *necessary*. This finding reflected the language law in

Belarus that made it compulsory in higher educational institutes to pass a Belarusian language exam in order to graduate. The results of the work domain showed that Belarusian was considered as *useful* and Russian as *necessary*. In some professions only Russian was recorded as *necessary*, due to the supply and demand of the dominant language of the country and the government's capacity to provide linguistic services for it. These findings reflected that Russian was the *lingua franca* and that everybody had to learn it if they were to get anywhere in the global market. In the government domain, the results showed this to be the highest category of Belarusian *useful* and Russian *necessary*. Brown concluded from the results of the surveys that it was likely that the Belarusian language would continue to be used in education as a way of showing symbolic tradition, but in other domains its usage faced uncertainty. He believed that language use in the home was of utmost importance for continual interaction and rehabilitation in the other domains.

Brown's study is very useful as a basis for the survey that has been used for this thesis because it is primarily about language use and how languages are used in different domains. The survey that was used for the data collection in chapter five was similar to Brown's, but the design was extended to include levels of proficiency of both Russian and Tatar *written* languages. The survey for this thesis is used to measure how successful these language policies have been, particularly with regard to how far the Russian population use the Tatar language in their everyday life and what their attitudes towards it are. Similar studies that have examined language use in different domains are discussed in chapter four in relation to the use of Russian and Tatar in Tatarstan (Iskhakova, 2001 and 2002).

1.8 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to set the context in which to study issues of language planning and policy in the post-Soviet period in Tatarstan. Language planning and policy were first of all disambiguated as well as language education policies and language testing. Different types of language policy were examined (Grin 1991 in Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1995; Shohamy, 2006; Spolsky, 2004). The analysis in chapters five and six determines how effective the Tatar language and education policies have been by comparing the written Tatar levels of proficiency through the use of a written test in the survey. Thisforms the analysis for part of chapter five.

Furthermore, the themes from the literature have also revealed that there are two perspectives which create a push-pull factor regarding language planning and policy; these are termed as *top-down* and *bottom-up* perspectives. The top-down perspective has been visible particularly through the language policies and how they are implemented by governments. Government forces influence language planners and other social actors to create language development in social domains of language use (Cooper, 1989; Fishman 1991 and 2004; Schiffman 1996; Spolsky 2004). However, what is of interest for this study into the spread of the Tatar language, is the dynamics between the *top-down* and *bottom-up* perspectives of language policy and planning. My research examines the Russian and Tatar's attitudes towards the Tatar language and education policies to find out if there is any resistance to these policies. Resistanceis examined both quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantitative data collection is based on a survey and the analysis is discussed in chapter five. Resistance is tested through the completion of a survey by the Russia and Tatar respondents and their answers help to determine whether or not there is any resistance to Tatar language and education policies. The qualitative data helps to find out attitudes from a bottom-up perspective through interviewing and observation methods. Fishman's (1991) GIDS is helpful for examining the domains of language use, especially in terms of how the Tatar government has implemented the Tatar language policy to try to increase the use and prestige of Tatar within official spheres of language use such as in the government, work and education. The GIDS framework has informed both the survey design that is analysed in chapter five and the coding system for the qualitative analysis in chapter six.

Following the frameworks of language planning and policy, the motives of ideology and identity were analysed. The literature has shown that both ideology and identity influence language planning and policy decisions from both the top-down and bottom-

up perspectives. Both linguistic and political ideologies are discussed further in the literature review and the competing ideologies of citizens and political actors are revealed through the interviews that form the basis of chapter six. Identity is alsoexamined in more detail in the following chapters and has influenced the survey design and post-Soviet identity tests in chapter five. In addition, chapter one demonstrates that language planning and policy seem to be a process of negotiation. It is worth noting that language policies are implemented to try and regulate the use of a *written* language, but everyday use of language and language behaviour usually pertains to the spoken language. Brown's (2007) study revealed that attitudes play an important role in language use. This study has therefore influenced my own research regarding the survey design.

The next chapter examines Soviet language planning and policy as well as issues of identity and ideology that contributed significantly to the development of the Soviet state.

Chapter Two - The Soviet Period: Identity Formation and Language Planning

This chapter examines language planning and policy during the Soviet period and the formation of the Soviet identity. Soviet language planning and policy and Soviet identity were intrinsically linked because language policy was used as one of the measures in the formation of the Soviet identity. Grenoble (2003, p.vii) states that the Soviet Union was an example of how a nation-state used language policy to promote its political goals. A stronger viewpoint on language policy is expressed by Rannut (in Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1995, p.179) who points out that linguistic rights in the Soviet period were sacrificed 'for an ideal that was clearly an attempt at linguistic genocide'.

The aim of this chapter is to examine to what extent the Soviet nationalities question and language policies were successful in creating a single Soviet identity that used Russian as a single union language. This analysis helps to contextualise identity and language use in the post-Soviet periodthat is examined in the following chapters. According to Alpatov (2010, p.17), the events that resulted in the 1917 Revolutions had important impacts on social and linguistic changes during the early years of the Soviet Union. These led to the attempt to modernize the nation through mass industrialization and the development of a Communist state.

The chapter first of all considers the background of Soviet language policies and the nationalities question by examining the pre-Revolutionary period and the linguistic composition of the Russian Empire. Secondly, the nationalities question throughout the Soviet period is explored, and then I divide the development of the Soviet language policy into three stages for discussion: pluralistic, bilingual and monolingual. Corpus and status language planning developments for Russian and the local languages are included in the discussion. The third part of the chapter examines Soviet language and identity issues through the themes of education and language choice, bilingualism, ethnic mobilization, forces of resistance and power and concludes with a discussion about whether or not Soviet policies were successful.

These themes will help us to understand the attitudes and tensions that are present in post-Soviet society concerning language use and behaviour towards immigrant and minority groups that may have resulted from Soviet nationalities policies. Smith (1998, p.2) similarly believes that,

‘*by surveying the attitudes and designs of people towards their own and other languages, we can reconstitute the web of self-perception, shared communities and mutual antagonisms which at one time informed Soviet state policies and may yet speak to us today about their mixed legacies*.’

2.1 Background of Soviet Language Policy and the Nationalities Question

2.1.1 Pre-Revolutionary period – evolution of territorial and linguistic composition of the Russian Empire

Lewis (1972, p.17) points out that the Russian Empire went through several phases of expansion. The first major phase was in 1552 with the conquest of the Kazan Khanate by Ivan the Terrible. During the mid-seventeenth century the Cossacks and Ukrainians were brought under Russian rule. The Baltics and parts of Poland followed under the rule of Peter the Great. The territories of Turkestan were brought together under Russian rule in 1881 by Alexander II that completed the expansion of the Russian Empire. This empire was a vast multilingual and multi-ethnic territory; over one hundred and eighty languages were spoken (Lewis, 1972, p.17). According to Alpatov (1997, p.27) and Smith (1998, p.1), the people inhabiting the rural areas of this vast territory identified themselves in terms of kinship, language and religion, not nationality. The Russian people were classified together with Ukrainians and Belarusians as the Slavonic peoples. The state supported the Orthodox religion as well as Russian culture and language. Even at this early stage in the history of Russian language policy, it is evident that language was used as an important feature of status and officialdom. Smith (1998, p.1) notes that the idea of nationality was ‘growing strong amongst the elites of the major nationalities’. Minority languages were not taught in schools and the vast majority of the Russian and non-Russian populations alike were illiterate. Only the elites in urban areas of the territory were educated. Grenoble (2003, p.35) states that only 28% of the 9-49 age group were literate at the time of the Revolution. Under Tsarist rule the official use of national languages was suppressed as a way to russify the country and publishing in national languages was banned from the mid-nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century (Alpatov, 1997, p.29). Although non-Russian languages were suppressed, Mansurov (1927 cited in Smith, 1998, p.1) notes that ‘the native language prevails in family and daily life’.

Many years before the Bolshevik revolution Lenin and some of his followers had outlined a plan for a policy of the equality of nationalities and languages; this was a

reaction to the oppression of minority groups and languages. Lenin wanted all nationalities to have some opportunities to use their native languages as a counteractive move away from Tsarist oppression. His plans included language choice in schools and other public institutions and he advocated the citizens' legal right to equality and self-determination. Paradoxically, however, Lenin's ultimate aim was the assimilation of all peoples unified under the Communist state and he envisaged the Russian language as an important part of Soviet ideology (Grenoble, 2003, p.35). This was strongly supported by Lenin's followers and Stalin, who in 1913 had expressed the 'merging of the backward nations and nationalities' as a way to create a single unified state that would enable the country to reach a higher stage of Communist development. Grenoble, (2003, p.35) proposes that Lenin's advocacy of the people's right to self-determination was only an intermediary stage of the proletarian cause. However, this is discussed in more detail in section 2.4.

2.2 Engineering attitudes and nationalities

2.2.1 Early Soviet Period 1920s – early 1930s

The Soviet Union was modelled on the territorial principle in order to manage what Smith (1998, p.3) called 'a poorly developed multi-ethnic country'. When the Bolsheviks came to power after the Revolution in 1917, they were faced with the difficulty of having inherited such an ethnically diverse country. The Bolshevik leaders saw huge gaps between the centre and the peripheries. Stalin and other government officials termed them 'civilised' urban areas and 'backwards' villages (Smith, 1998, p.2). The peripheral areas where ethnic groups resided were regarded as the 'other' in terms of identity from the point of view of the government in the urbanised centre, according to Smith (1998, p.2). On November 2nd 1917 the Declaration of Rights of the People of Russia proclaimed:

> '1. *The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.*
> *2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to the point of separation and the formation of an independent state.*
> *3. The abolition of any and all national and national-religious privileges and disabilities.*
> *4. The free development of national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia*'[3].

[3] http://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/1917/11/02.htm

This declaration was seen as a way to solve the problems of past discrimination and oppression by the Tsarist regime and to gain the trust of the masses. Therefore a period of political and economic equality ensued in which cultural pluralism was allowed to flourish (Connor, 1984, p.201). Before looking at this period in history in a little more detail, it is worth examining the term 'self-determination' in the context of Marxism because this will help with the understanding of how the Soviet Union and its ideology were constructed.

Self-determination in Marxist terms was, according to Stalin (1913) an 'essential element to the solution of the national question'[4]. Lenin (1917) stated that self-determination was 'the political separation of these nations [ethnic groups residing on different parts of the Soviet territory] from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state'[5] (the independent national state being Russia). Lenin declared that nations had the right to secession, but that this would lead to the oppression of feudalism and they would end up in the hands of the bourgeoisie, just as they had under the Tsarist rule. The right to self-determination in proletarian terms was therefore covertly a *negative* demand on the part of any nations that opted for this.

The Soviet state therefore saw itself as the benefactor of the backward nationalities, bestowing gifts of class consciousness and nationhood on them through the education system (Smith, 1998, p.4). As was mentioned above, economic, political and cultural policies were fostered by the Bolshevik government to help the construction of the Soviet state. As far as the economic policy was concerned, the countries of central Asia, Transcaucasia, Belarus and many other territories of Russia were believed to be economically backwards, so a process of industrialization began. In a party statement by Brezhnev (1922 in Connor, 1984, p.215) about the achievements of the Soviet state, these countries were said to have suffered from 'poverty, illness and ignorance' and had been brought out of darkness as a result of industrialization by the state. However, Connor points out that this was achieved through the recruitment and purging of elites and the redistribution and gerrymandering of national groups.

As for Lenin's political policy, political discrimination was prohibited 'on the basis of nationality and race' (Connor, 1984, p.217). Internal political structures were designed to reflect ethno-political distributions based on a hierarchical system of power. The aim of these hierarchies of power was to reduce the risk of nations demanding separatism.

[4] http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03a.htm#s1

[5] http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch01.htm

Other policies implemented to curtail the demand for separatism included the language policy (Connor, 1984, p.217).

Cultural policies were concerned with the indigenization of the population. This process of indigenization was known as *korenizatsiia* and included linguistic developments such as the literacy campaign, the standardization of the Russian language, non-Russian languages and writing systems for languages that did not have a written form (see section 2.4 for a more detailed discussion). All national groups were encouraged to study their native language and nobody was overtly pressured into studying Russian during this period (Connor, 1984, p.256). However, the situation began to change during the 1930s, as is outlined below.

2.2.2 Early 1930s and beyond

During the early 1930s, further steps were taken towards the construction of the Party's Soviet nationality through the assimilation of all peoples and the Russification of all languages. Stalin's views had evolved since Marxism and the National Question that had been written in 1913. He regarded Lenin's plan for achieving homogeneity as contradictory. He believed that nurturing cultural pluralism would lead to greater awareness of national uniqueness rather than a route to transnational fusion (Connor, 1984, p.203). In the paper *Marxism and National, Colonial Questions* in 1930 on 'Deviations on the National Question,' Stalin criticised how Lenin presented the right of nations to self-determination, 'Just think – disunion for the purpose of union! It even smacks of the paradoxical,' (Connor, 1984, p.203). It is important to understand Stalin's change in the concept of nation in order to understand the language policy developments he implemented. According to Stalin's essay, *The National Question and Leninism* written in 1929, his definition of a nation is the following:

> *'a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of the common possession of four principal characteristics, namely: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture.'*[6]

Grenoble (2003, p.43) notes that this definition was fundamental in many policy decisions throughout the Soviet period particularly in determining what was and was not considered a 'nation'. It determined which languages had legal rights and privileges,

[6] http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/NQL29.html

including their use in education and administration. Stalin's rule marked the second stage in the development of the nation state. In this stage Russian was to become the 'international lingua franca for economic, political and cultural cooperation' existing alongside separate nations and their separate languages (Grenoble, 2003, p.43).

According to Smith (1998, p.4), Stalin perceived language as 'one of the most fundamental public signs of difference, by which the common people identified their friends and strangers or by which a government might measure loyalty to itself'. He believed that the nation was created on the basis of 'common native tongues' in which folklore and literature was written. However, Connor (1984, p.262) argues that language cannot equate with nationality because a person can lose their language without losing their national identity.

According to Smith (1998, p.3), the Soviet government believed that language had a central place in Soviet nation-building because 'it was a traditional and accepted component of nationhood'. It believed that equality and freedom of languages was part of the equality and rights of minorities and nations. Smith (1998, p.7) asserts that in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory, language was used as a tool of political power, economic production and social management.

As far as political power was concerned, language was used by the government to promote its own political goals (Connor, 1984, p.254-8). The main political goal of the Soviet government was the unification of all nationalities under a single Communist state based on assimilation of ethnic groups and not diversity. The purpose was to reach a higher stage of Communist development. Communication of the political agenda was of utmost importance for the Soviet government and communication would be eased if it went out in the multiplicity of languages spoken by the populace. Smith (1998, p.8) states that language was used to shape national identities and manipulate class. He mentions that national leaders also had their own political agendas, one of which was 'to fix a group identity in which both intellectuals and illiterates could recognise themselves' (Allworth, 1990 in Smith, 1998, p.12). As a result, people who shared kinship, religion and who resided on the same territory used the national language they had learned for self-representation and as a symbol of national consciousness. Therefore the language became a representation of their identity.

The economic goals of the government were to industrialize the whole country to catch up with the industrial developments of Western Europe. In order to do this they had to educate the masses and improve literacy skills (Grenoble, 2003, p.46-7). The initial

stage of illiteracy was considered a political advantage (Smith, 1998, p.8) because the masses could be educated and controlled through language.

As for social management, the government had to attain hegemony not by force, but by persuasion through language, media and education (Gramsciu, 1975 in Smith, 1998, p.6). The government needed the support of 'backward' communities to further its cause as a supreme state and so therefore they began the process of converting these communities into 'civilised societies' to conform to Russian national values through the process of education and the teaching of Russian language to all communities.

An official Soviet hierarchy of the eastern nationalities was developed by the Soviet government during the 1930s. This nationalities hierarchy designated more cultural autonomy and privileges for some nationalities than for others (Smith, 1998, p.4). There were four levels that corresponded thus (Lewis, 1972, p.19):

Level 1: nations with a high level of industrial development, a sophisticated culture, civilised people with a strong national consciousness. These nations included the western states such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, the Baltics, Armenia and Moldova. These nations gained more privileges for their national cultures such as the right to have native language education alongside the language of the Union;

Level 2: less advanced nations that were undergoing the process of industrialization and had features of feudalism. These nations included Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Tatarstan;

Level 3: splintered[7] communities such as the Kirghiz, Uygur and Mari peoples who had not passed the semi-feudal stage;

Level 4: the peoples of the far north, Siberia and the Far East. These peoples were considered as clans.

2.3 Soviet Censuses

The establishment of a classification of nationalities was one of the fundamental underlying principles in the construction of the nationalities in the Soviet Union (Grenoble, 2003, p.38). This differed from classification by the Tsarist regime because people had been classified according to religion and language. The first All-Union

[7] According to Lewis (1972, p.19), splintered communities are communities which reside in separate enclaves within much larger unified communities and which retain their ethnic roots and language. They remain isolated from other enclaves within the community.

Census was carried out in 1926. The 1926 census was designed from the approach that the people had some choice in defining their ethnic affiliation and native language.
Different populations were often referred to using the terms *natsional'nost'*, *natsiia*, *narodnost'* and *narod*, although the definitions of these terms were not as clear cut as what the nationalities hierarchy levels in the above section seem to be. The purpose of these terms was to categorize people according to race, religion, language, daily life, culture and occupation.
Early Soviet ethnographers and government officials had to define what *nationality* actually meant. According to Grenoble (2003), the terms *natsional'nost'*, *natsiia* and *narodnost'* were used inconsistently by Soviet officials during the early period of Soviet history. According to Hirsch (1997, p.260 in Grenoble, 2003, p.39) the term *natsional'nost'* (nationality) was defined as 'a population united within a nationally self-conscious community'. Grenoble states that this term implied a conscious understanding of one's cultural and historical development and referred to a highly developed group of people. The term *natsiia* (nation) was used to describe people in a governmental nation who shared the same territory, culture, language and economy. Grenoble (2003, p.41) notes that *natsiia* (nation) would have corresponded to Stalin's concept of 'nation' that was quoted above. Grenoble argues that although *natsional'nost'* and *natsiia* could be linked since a *natsional'nost'* resided in a *natsiia*, a nation could be considered as a nationality, but not every nationality was a nation. *Narodnost'* referred to a group of people with no economic ties, but who had a degree of linguistic, cultural and territorial unity. This term therefore referred to a group of developing peoples (Lewis, 1972, p.18). *Narod* referred to a clan or tribe who were primitive in their social organisation (Grenoble, 2003, p.39-40 and Lewis, 1972, p.18).
These terms caused many problems in the censuses because ethnographers could not agree on the differences between the definitions, particularly between *natsional'nost'* and *narodnost'*. There were many political connotations linked to the terms that implied one group of people were more evolved than another and should be registered as such.
The 1937 census differed from the earlier censuses, such as the 1926 census. Previously citizens had been allowed some freedom to choose which ethnic affiliation they belonged to and which was their native language. The 1937 census and future censuses were created by government officials with a pre-determined list of nationalities, rather than citizens being free to name their own nationality. Instead, citizens had to choose the category of nationality into which they fitted the best.

These definitions mentioned above varied according to the type of populations being classified: in European Russia people were classified more according to language; in central Asia the classification was based more on religion. Grenoble states that the meanings of these terms only began to take shape in the 1930s when the Soviet government developed theories of nationality which included a class component in a hierarchical nationalities organizational framework. Grenoble (2003, p.30-1) and Tishkov (1997, p.15-21) state that the Soviet government required that smaller nationalities be classed with larger ones to reduce the number of categories. This process was repeated throughout the history of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (henceforth USSR) as part of Soviet ideology as a means to unite all nationalities into one Soviet nationality.

Silver (cited in Laitin, 1998, p.44) points out that Soviet census data was not very reliable because people gave subjective accounts of their language ability and used the census to express their opposition to the regime; he notes that this applies to both the early and late Soviet periods. Laitin mentions that people would deny competence in Russian and instead claim they were competent in their native language even though they might not have known their native language. No language competency tests were carried out and thus it seems plausible that people used the language census questions as a way to declare their nationality.

Silver (1974, p.48) points out that many Soviet scholars believed language was a stable ethnic indicator and that ethnicity and language were two indicators of Soviet identity. They thought that if these two indicators coincided then the identity was preserved. If the language and ethnicity diverged, this indicated a weakening of ethnic identity or a sign that ethnic identity was changing. If the national language was not nominated as the native language in the censuses, this therefore demonstrated that the individual had partly undergone assimilation by naming the language of the group to which they belonged.

Silver states that ancestry can be hidden by the censuses due to the adoption of a different native language and therefore nationality. He notes that the extent of identity change could have been seriously underestimated. Tishkov (1997, p.15) similarly points out that there is little reliable information about people's ethnography and history from the Soviet period. The censuses were used as a mechanism to create a Soviet identity, but they were increasingly used as a way to express the people's attitudes towards the regime, particularly towards the end of the Soviet era in 1989, which was 'nationally charged' (Laitin, 1998, p.45).

2.4 Soviet language policy

This section focuses on the Soviet-Marxist language policy which, according to Connor (1984, p.254-5), evolved through three stages: the first was a policy based on pluralism; the second bilingualism and the final stage would be a monolingual policy with Russian used as the sole language.

2.4.1 Stage 1: Pluralistic Policy

The first stage of language planning and policy was carried out during the early years of the Soviet Union under Lenin's rule. Russification during this stage was abandoned because it was believed that people would rebel due to the legacy of the Tsarist period (Smith, 1998, p.2-4). A term synonymously linked with this stage in language policy developments is *korenizatsiia* that referred to the deliberate state policy of nativization. Laitin (1998, p.47) declares that this policy gave special rights to minorities to promote their national cultures and languages. This policy was developed to educate the masses and prepare them for the workforce to industrialize the country as quickly as possible (Grenoble, 2003, p.44). One of the first steps taken towards *korenizatsiia* was the literacy campaign that began in 1923 and was to last until 1928 (Clark, 2000, p.18). This campaign (also known as *Likbez*) was the driving force of educational and language policies of the 1920s. According to the policies of the time, Russian and the languages of the national republics needed to be standardized and codified to improve communication between speakers of the wide variety of dialects that existed between urban and rural dwellers as well as to make written Russian more accessible to the masses. It was also a way to close the gap between the educated urban elite in urban areas and peasants in rural areas. Laitin (1998, p.68) states that all nationalities and their languages were considered equal at this time and if assimilation towards Russian had been desired, it would have been impossible.

From a bottom-up perspective, Clark (2000, ch.5) mentions the resistance of the literacy campaign of the older generation and the rural populations of the Soviet Union. Similarly, Smith (1998, p.7) emphasizes the push-pull relationship between the government and the people in terms of how the government tried to gain power over the people through the use of language policy, but on the other hand he points out that language 'empowered people to move rather freely within political and cultural spaces'. Although the literacy campaign was considered successful to some extent, particularly in terms of promoting national languages and Russian, Smith (1998, p.35-6) posits that it was patchy and met with some resistance. Clark (2000, p.27) also describes how this resistance towards the literacy campaign emanated particularly from the older

generation and peasants in rural communities. Clark mentions that citizens who attended courses obtained privileges, whereas those who did not could not move on in a career. Furthermore, Clark notes that the literacy campaign was concentrated more on the younger generation (the 18-35 year age group) due to the fact that this age group was not as set in its ways as the older generation. In addition, Clark points out that the Soviet government did not have the financial resources to direct the campaign at the entire population so they focused on the younger generation. Smith (1998, p.149) states that many workers and peasants were only semi-literate due to the lack of resources. Clark also notes that the literacy campaign was not entirely responsible for encouraging the population to read and write: he states that from the beginning of the twentieth century, education programmes were implemented for *those who wished* to improve their literacy skills. The process had begun before the literacy campaign.

Furthermore, according to the Soviet government, many of the other non-Russian languages needed to be standardized and codified, but many of them also needed writing systems to be created. Although some areas of the Soviet Union already had long standing literary traditions, such as Georgia and the Turkic languages of central Asia, others lacked written forms for example, the Siberian languages (Grenoble, 2003, p.45). These were the two main tasks that had to be accomplished through the literacy campaign.

At the time of the Revolution a spelling reform of the written Russian language took place; its goal was to make the script easier to use and more accessible to those who wanted to acquire literacy skills. Consequently, in the 1920s the main issue facing reformers of the Russian language was not the script, but the vocabulary: the Bolshevik leaders wanted the language to reflect the socio-cultural changes of the period (Lewis, 1972, p.172). Soviet leaders wanted the language planners of the time to make the Russian language easier for the masses to learn by simplifying its phonological, morphological and syntactical forms. New concepts of Soviet ideology, industrialization, political and scholarly technical terminology were introduced into the Russian language as well as infiltrating other non-Russian languages. According to Smith (1998, p.148), language planners working on the development of both the Russian and non-Russian languages were heavily influenced by the Soviet government. The Soviet standardization policies were therefore linked to the political ideologies of the Soviet government.

As was mentioned above, in order for the literacy reform to have any success, the non-Russian languages needed to be codified and writing systems created. Grenoble (2003, p.45) notes that only thirteen languages had a written form at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution. Codification was based on one dialect of a language with a mixture of features from other dialects of the same language. The aim of codification was said to achieve 'maximum correspondence between written and spoken forms' to ease the acquisition of literacy (Crisp in Kirkwood, 1989, p.32).

Grenoble (2003, p.48) states that at the beginning of the Soviet period languages could be roughly divided into six categories: the first category was languages without a written form; the second category was languages which used the Cyrillic script; the third was languages that used a Roman script (German and Moldavian); fourthly was the category that used the Arabic script (Turkic languages and other languages of Caucasia); the fifth category concerned languages that used the Mongolian script and the final category was for languages that had their own unique script such as Georgian and Armenian.

Grenoble notes that because there were so many languages it was impossible to create a writing system for all of them. Decisions were taken to create scripts based on demographics; larger ethnic groups living in close proximity together would have a script developed for them. However, the linguistic boundaries were not clear due to the fact that people did not identify with ethno-linguistic groups, but through religion and geographical regions (Grenoble, 2003, p.45). This therefore made the task very difficult. In addition to deciding which languages to create scripts for, the early Soviet language planners had to decide *which* character set to use. Discussions took place about the conversion of some alphabets to Cyrillic, such as languages that used the Arabic script. The Arabic script was considered too difficult to educate the Turkic peoples (Crisp in Kirkwood, 1989, p.26). On the other hand, the Cyrillic script was linked to Russian and the Tsarist oppressions; the Bolsheviks wanted to move away from this because it would have been perceived as 'blatant Russification' (Crisp in Kirkwood, 1989). Therefore at the 1926 Turkological Congress in Baku the Latin alphabet was declared the new alphabet for languages with Arabic-based character sets as a way to assimilate them. The Latin alphabet was chosen because it was considered to be politically neutral and was more practical for publishing and printing in Europe and the United States. As far as Soviet ideology was concerned, it was considered to be a form of 'internationalization':

> *'Latin characters are not only signs of science and technology; they are those of the common written culture of all civilised nationalities. By adopting the Latin alphabet, we shall be able to make use of the fruits of international culture as we approach a proletarian-peasant international.'* (Navshrimanov, 1924 in Grenoble, 2003, p.50).

It was also a step towards the assimilation of the central Asian populations. Alpatov (1997) mentions that there were four aspects in the alphabet decisions that were linguistic, politico-cultural, psychological and economic. The linguistic aspect was concerned with which character set should be used and how many graphemes should be used to represent the sounds of the languages in question. The psychological aspect was concerned with how a new alphabet would affect literate people because they already knew how to read and write. These people would not have access to literature produced in the new alphabet and the literature that existed in their previous alphabet would be inaccessible to future generations. A new alphabet would have only been potentially advantageous for people who were illiterate at the time of the Revolution. The politico-cultural aspect played a role in leading the people towards new cultural orientations and was linked to Europeanization. Crisp (in Kirkwood, 1989, p.37) believes that the political aspect of language planning had the most impact on alphabet decisions and that the Latin script was a deliberate move against Islam.
Another aspect of non-Russian languages, which was developed during the early Soviet period, was lexicon. New Soviet words were introduced into all native languages that related to the new industrial processes taking place and that represented the new political structures and ideology. These Soviet words were 'international' Latinate vocabulary that came into the Soviet vocabulary through Russian. Such lexicon did not exist in the native languages and consequently these languages were infiltrated by the new Soviet words. Many of the Turkic languages, which had borrowings from Arabic and Persian, had their languages purged of such words and replaced with Russian terms. Alpatov (1997) states that this was a covert move towards Russification.

From the mid to late twenties, when Stalin became the leader of the Communist party in 1924 after the death of Lenin, the pendulum of language policy began to swing more towards Russification and the assimilation of nationalities (Smith, 1998, p.6). The codification of languages and creation of writing systems led to an ethno-linguistic hierarchy of languages that reflected the socio-linguistic circumstances of the national languages. This hierarchy of languages was known as the ABCD hierarchy (Grenoble,

2003, p.46) and became the basis for the nationalities hierarchy in the 1930s. Briefly this corresponded to:

> A: Small nationalities without scripts: bilingual people who lived in compact groups, but were territorially scattered and were surrounded by larger nationalities. Education was in the language of the Union;
>
> B: Small-medium nationalities without scripts that lived as compact masses, who were agricultural but not territorially united. These had primary schools, educational literature and mass political propaganda in their native language. In secondary schools and higher education, work was conducted in the language of the Union;
>
> C: Medium-large monolingual nationalities with traditional scripts who lived in compact groups and were territorially united. Primary to mid-professional education was in the native language and the language of the union was introduced no later than the third grade and continued into higher education;
>
> D: Economically and culturally developed nationalities, had traditional scripts and were territorially united. Education from primary schools to universities and literature was in the native language. The language of the union was introduced no later than the third grade.

The hierarchy clearly focused on population size and on whether the people were united territorially or not. It also set out when the language of the union should be introduced into the school curriculum. Connor (1984, p.254-263) states that this hierarchy encouraged discrimination; if the traditional language of the ethnic group was the lingua franca of the state then this group had a favoured status. This caused many underlying tensions in society (Connor, 1984, p.263). The more people wanted to work, the more they needed to acquire of the Russian language in order to perform their work duties. Native speakers with a high level of literacy in their native languages could not access the highest job positions because of the language hierarchy.

The Soviet government decided that *korenizatsiia* was not working as well as they had hoped and so this resulted in stricter measures being taken to reach the proletarian cause. According to Connor (1984, p.301), Marxists observed that people were more likely to assimilate if they were outside of their national homeland. Therefore the gerrymandering of nations was put into action to maximise intermingling and minimise

the notion of the homelands (Connor, 1984, p.300-2). *Korenizatsiia* was abandoned in 1934 and the move from a pluralistic language policy to an asymmetrical bilingual one was put in place as the second stage towards the unification of all peoples and assimilation of languages *(sblizhenie i sliianie narodov)*.

2.4.2 Stage 2: Bilingual policy

During the late 1920s and 1930s three main events occurred which changed language policy towards a deliberate policy of Russification (Grenoble, 2003, p.54). The first was the end of *korenizatsiia* in 1934, which was discussed above; the second was the Cyrillicisation of some writing systems that used the Latin script and the third was the introduction of compulsory Russian education in schools.

According to Alpatov (1997, p.81), a decision was made about the change from the Latin to the Cyrillic alphabet in 1933. Cyrillicisation campaigns were not publicly discussed. Grenoble (2003, p.54) states that the change of alphabet had *supposedly* been requested from the Soviet people, but Smith (1998, p.151) mentions that the change was influenced by Stalin's industrial and agricultural revolutions: therefore the alphabet change was more likely to have been motivated by economic and socio-political factors. In addition, Smith (1998, p.158) asserts that the Soviet government considered the Latin alphabet as an 'obstacle to the mastery of the Russian language' and that its 'discrepancies made for confusion and inefficiency in learning'. By switching to the Cyrillic script, the acquisition of Russian became easier and publication costs were reduced because there was no need to publish in two scripts. Between 1937 and 1938 the majority of Latin-script languages were switched to Cyrillic and the switch was complete by the mid-1940s. This meant that some languages, such as the Turkic languages, had undergone three script changes in a decade. The only languages which were not cyrillicized were Armenian, Georgian, and Karelian. Yiddish continued to use the Hebrew alphabet and the Baltic States that did not become part of the Soviet Union until 1940, used the Latin alphabet.

Russian and non-Russian languages continued to be standardized during the 1930s and the Cyrillicisation of the scripts for these languages intended to make the process easier (Grenoble, 2003, p.48-51). Soviet language planners based the standardization of literary languages on the phonemic orthographical principle, but this was not an easy task due to the fact that different dialects of the same language had different phonemic inventories. The language planners typically chose one dialect for standardization purposes which also incorporated features of other dialects. As far as the central Asian languages were concerned, Fierman (2009, p.1210) states that the choice of dialect was

a very contentious issue because often the choice would be based on whether the dialect was pure Turkic and not 'spoiled' by Persian influences, as was the case with Uzbek. Fierman points out that although one dialect was chosen to be standardized, this did not stop people from speaking their own dialects at home and amongst their communities. However, for people who attended schools, this meant that they had to learn the standardized literary norm of their language that was, in many cases, different from their own dialect; in some cases the differences were so great that the learners might have been learning a foreign language. Media sources also used the newly developed norms (Grenoble, 2003, p.47). As far as Soviet lexicon was concerned, many new terms were introduced into Russian and non-Russian languages alike in order to describe new concepts that had emanated from educational and industrial processes of the time. The lexicon also reflected the new political structure and economic processes. The lexicon was created from Russian and western loanwords; spelling was dictated by the 'Common Rule' that was a decree issued under the influence of Marrist linguistics in the 1940s (Grenoble, 2003, p.53). It is evident that standardization was based on the Soviet government's ideologies of linguistic and cultural assimilation.

2.4.3 Stage 3: Monolingual policies

The Soviet government stopped compulsory Russian-language education where it had been introduced during the Second World War firstly because Soviet leaders did not have the means to enforce it and secondly because they did not want to incite any opposition from the republics (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.54). They needed the support from all of the republics and to unite as one country i.e. the Soviet Union, against the Nazi forces.

The period after the Second World War marked an important turning point in language policy (Grenoble, 2003, p.57). The Soviet Union was domestically and internationally strengthened after its victory against Germany and work on policies restarted, including the language policy (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.54). The leaders of the Soviet Union perceived the state as an industrialized country that needed to advance its technology and that required a common language of communication.

According to Desheriev (1979, in Kreindler in Kirkwood, 1989, p.48), the social sciences section of the USSR Academy of Sciences questioned the roles and functions of other languages apart from Russian in the advance to communism. Lewis (1972, p.76) also confirms that under Khrushchev's rule the term 'national' no longer needed to coincide with 'national language' as it had done under Lenin's rule. This is because under Khrushchev's rule a new vision of the Soviet people was introduced that was

‘united not only politically, but also through the use of one language’ (Grenoble, 2003, p.57). Russian was used as the language of the government and education. Kreindler (in Kirkwood, 1989, p.47) notes that the policy of ‘nationalist in form, socialist in content’ was almost abandoned. Both Grenoble (2003, p.57) and Kreindler (in Kirkwood, 1989, p.47) state that during this period it became acceptable to view some languages as more viable than others. Kreindler (in Kirkwood, 1989, p.49) points out that languages were put into categories and the disappearance of some even became legitimate. Kreindler states that Isaev, a Soviet linguist, was able to divide languages into five categories. These ranged from ‘non-written languages with few speakers on the way to extinction all the way up to Russian’ that was classed as the most developed language of the nation. Isaev also stated that languages, which were facing extinction, should not have their equal rights realized. Publications in the local languages were additionally cut back by the Soviet government that also contributed to the extinction of some languages (Grenoble, 2003, p.58). The funding of publications was reduced because the Soviet government felt that it was too expensive to publish in different languages.

Kreindler (in Kirkwood, 1989, p.52) notes that during Brezhnev’s rule, the glorification of the Russian language was on a par with the Tsarist Russification campaign. She mentions that Russian increasingly became the instrument of socialisation and integration and it was regarded as superior to all other languages. Kreindler asserts that although national languages and cultures had never been overtly attacked, the viewpoint existed that only Russian was necessary to fulfil most cultural needs. The shift to Russian was considered as one of the ‘laws of natural development’ (Kreindler in Kirkwood, 1989, p.56). Lapierre (1988 in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.55) states that Russian was considered as ‘a national treasure’ and was thus promoted.

2.4.4 Summary of Soviet policies

The early period of Soviet history witnessed two main changes in the shaping of the Soviet identity through its language policies. The first period in the 1920s can be identified through its policies towards self-determination and granting citizens the freedom to learn their native languages. The second period in the 1930s can be identified as a complete turnaround from the policies of the 1920s when policies towards Russification began to develop. However, although the policies changed, the motives behind the policies remained the same. The ultimate goal was the construction of the Soviet state that unified all its citizens as one nationality and who spoke the language of the state; Russian. How this was achieved was very different according to

the leaders of the Party and how they exerted power in the language debate. Many authors have likened these types of powers to the metaphors of a carrot and a stick (for example, Rannut in Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1995, p.182). It must be added here that language policy measures and assimilation of nationalities were not only brought about by laws, but by much severer measures, particularly when Stalin became leader of the Communist Party. These measures included purges of the elites and intellectuals. Many ethnic groups were persecuted under Stalin's rule. This kind of treatment continued under Soviet power and as was mentioned above; the ultimate goal of a Soviet nationality and a Soviet language (Russian) seemed to become closer to reality after the Second World War under Khrushchev's rule. However, this was not to last because many non-Russian ethnic groups began to resist the Soviet regime and its repression of their languages and cultures, as is shown in the next section.

2.5 Education and Language Choice

This section examines education as a key to the enforcement of Soviet policies, particularly language policy (Adler, 1980 in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.55). According to Adler, although the promotion of Russian in the Soviet Union was not always consistent across the different republics, in the sphere of education it hardly faltered from the early 1920s to the end of the Soviet period.

2.5.1 Early Soviet period 1920s-early 1930s

As has already been mentioned in section 2.4 above, during the early Soviet period national groups were encouraged to learn their native languages whilst Russian was maintained as the lingua franca, the language of the central government and for use in the army. There was no pressure to learn Russian in non-Russian language schools and this intermediary period towards assimilation was known as 'the flourishing of nations' (Connor, 1984, p.388). Although the learning of non-Russian languages was encouraged during this period, it is quite evident that Russian had more prestige due to the fact that it was the lingua franca and used as the language of central government. A defining slogan from the Communist Manifesto that represented the Party's ideology in education was 'nationalist in form, socialist in content'. According to Grenoble (2003, p.42), the 'form' referred to the shape of the language that Lenin believed was a tool for political communication. This was the reason why the national languages were developed. The 'content' referred to the essence of communication that represented the socialist ideas of the Communist party. This meant that through the national languages, the message of the Communist party and its ideology could be passed on through

education in schools and educational institutions in order to advance the proletarian culture.

2.5.2 Early 1930s – 1950s

Every citizen in the Soviet Union was guaranteed legislated rights to education in their native tongue in the 1936 Constitution, article 121 (chapter 2.1)[8]. However, many non-Russian languages had still not had their literary languages developed enough to be used in schools. The development of native languages was very uneven, particularly with regard to non-Russian-medium and Russian-medium languages of instruction. The age at which Russian was introduced in the curriculum varied and was increasingly lowered (Grenoble, 2003, p.59).

Connor (1984, p.258) states that schools offering non-Russian language instruction were restricted to particular union republics, autonomous republics and regions that coincided with the importance and level of development of the republic within the nationalities hierarchy. The more developed the republic, the more hours of non-Russian language instruction were allowed. In terms of the research for this thesis, these levels of non-Russian language development may have additionally contributed to the attitudes that were held towards some non-Russian languages not being as prestigious as others and that have continued into the post-Soviet period.

In 1938 a law was passed on Russian compulsory language learning in all schools for all school-age children (Grenoble, 2003, p.60) that guaranteed bilingualism in Russian and the non-Russian languages. Emphasis was put on the Russian language for three reasons: for the future economic and cultural development of the Soviet state; for advanced training and education, and finally as a common language for defence. The emphasis placed on the Russian language meant that the teaching of maths and science subjects was moved away from the non-Russian languages to Russian; non-Russian languages were taught as a secondary subject.

On the other hand, Grenoble (2003, p.61) points out the problems the education system faced during the 1930s. Many non-Russian language teachers as well as Russian teachers were not literate enough to teach their students to the level that the government required. There was a distinct lack of textbooks and pedagogical materials. Furthermore, when the alphabet was changed, all the textbooks, which had been printed in Latin, became obsolete. Smith (1998, p.166) similarly states that the intentions of the 1938 education law were not fulfilled and that resources were not available for teachers to

[8] https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1936/12/05.htm

teach Russian in schools, particularly in the Caucasus and central Asian republics. He reports that in some Uzbek, Mari and Tatar schools the standards of Russian were so low that students were not able to enter higher education. Furthermore, Russian as the medium of instruction in primary and secondary schools was not successful because non-Russian-medium languages were still being used. This was because the teachers did not know Russian to a sufficient level to use it as a language of instruction.

However, a turning point in language policy occurred under Khrushchev's rule with the introduction of the Education Reforms in 1958-59. Kreindler (in Kirkwood, 1989, p.47) emphasizes that these reforms helped to shift Russian language use into a more dominant position in the spheres of government and education. Russian language use was referred to by Khrushchev in pragmatic terms; in other words, it was used for the language of communication, science and technology. Russian language was compulsory for all students. The President of the RSFSR Academy of Sciences declared that Russian should be learned by all children and that the non-Russian languages were only to be learned by non-Russian children (Bilinsky, 1962, p.140). This could be one of the reasons which led to language asymmetry in language learning with Russians remaining monolingual and non-Russians becoming bilingual.

As far as language choice was concerned, although parents could choose whether to send their children to a Russian or non-Russian school, the Russian schools were better equipped and access to higher educational institutions was easier through these schools (Bilinsky, 1962, p.152). A choice in the type of school still existed, but according to Kreindler (1985, p.355), educators incorrectly presented the choice of schools available to parents as a way to get them to choose Russian-only schools.

2.5.3 Language of instruction and curriculum subjects

From the 1960s Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication was expanded throughout all of the fifteen union republics and autonomous republics (Anweiler, 1982 and Kriendler, 1982 in Landau & Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.56). According to Grenoble (2003, p.57), after the education reforms of 1958-9 there was more pressure in schools to use Russian as the language of instruction and from very early grades, such as in elementary schools. Many schools replaced the non-Russian language with Russian as the language of instruction. In Karelia, for example, all schools started to change the language of instruction to Russian almost immediately. In other schools of the Soviet Union (for example, in Central Asia) the language of instruction in the non-Russian language of the republic continued and Russian was taught as a compulsory subject. New types of schools that were opened under Khrushchev's rule taught all subjects in

Russian as the language of instruction and the local language and literature were 'relegated' to secondary subjects (Grenoble, 2003, p.58). Anderson and Silver (1990 cited in Marshall, 1996, p.21) point out that bilingual education was 'highly differentiated' after 1959. They state that if the local languages were available to study, then the non-Russian populations would choose to study them as far as it was possible. However, the higher the level of education was pursued, the less likely the non-Russian languages were available. Russian was the language of socio-economic improvement and if individuals wished to obtain a higher standard of living, they had to know Russian.

According to Rakowska-Harmstone (1994 in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.56), higher educational institutions and professional technical schools used Russian as the medium of instruction for technical subjects and the arts, humanities and social science subjects were taught in the titular languages.

Bilinsky (1962, p.138) asserted that the 1958-59 education reforms had the approval of government officials, administration, parents and teachers alike. However, according to Spechler (1990 in Marshall, 1996, p.19) the curtailment of the native languages caused many people to 'sign petitions and demonstrate on the streets'. Many republics formed coalitions for the preservation of the national languages (Nahayo and Swoboda, 1990 in Marshall, 1996, p.31). Kreindler (in Kirkwood, 1989, p.56) also declared that 'the increasing pressure for Russian has given rise to a growing national self-assertiveness'.

2.6 Bilingualism

Throughout the Soviet period asymmetrical bilingualism gradually developed as a result of Soviet language planning and policies. Compulsory Russian education during the late 1930s and late 1950s, both a subject and as the medium of instruction, contributed to this asymmetry as well as changes in publishing trends. According to Grenoble (2003, p.58), bilingualism during the Soviet period was considered asymmetrical because Russians were monolingual while non-Russians declared that they were bilingual in their native language and Russian. Tishkov (1997, p.85) also points out that there were more non-Russians who could speak Russian than non-Russians who could speak their native language. Grenoble states that people were using Russian instead of their native languages, particularly in urban areas. In this respect, Soviet language policies could be deemed as effective. This could have been due to Russian being used as the functional language in all state run institutes. Landau and Kellner-Heinkele (2001, p.52) state that Russian was used in the spheres of government, industry and commerce, medicine,

transport, school and in the training of specialists. The 1977 Constitution declared that the ‘opportunity’ to learn the non-Russian languages had replaced the ‘right’ to learn the non-Russian languages from the 1936 Constitution (Gitlin 1998 in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.52). According to Tortosa (1982 in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.52), this downgrading of non-Russian languages was not unique to the Soviet Union; many unitary states promoted the ‘language of the empire’.

2.6.1 Demographical influences on bilingualism

According to Lewis (1972, p.144-6) and Marshall (1996, p.10), the spread of Russian amongst non-Russians depended on centripetal and centrifugal forces within society through urbanization, interethnic group contact with Russian speakers, the size of the minority group, religion, intermarriage, social class, educational opportunities, ethnic consciousness and political factors. Silver and Anderson (1990, cited in Marshall 1996, p. 9) declare that Soviet language policy had not succeeded in creating Russian monolingualism amongst the non-Russian citizens. This was due to nationalities safeguarding their languages and ‘creating domains such as the home and religious institutions in which they [the national languages] were protected’. Silver and Anderson (1990, cited in Marshall 1996, p.20) assert that ethnic attachment was stably maintained. Marshall (1996, p.33) notes that many domains of non-Russian language use were kept within the *union* republics, but highlights that in *non-union republics* this was not the case and their national languages were displaced by Russian in most domains, except in the home.

A study by Silver (1974, p.56) revealed that urbanization and exposure to Russians had a large impact on the Russification of the Soviet non-Russian populations. The study showed that if Russians had migrated to rural areas then there was more likely to be a weakening of rural traditions as well as more exposure to modern technology and mass communications. Therefore, if there were more Russians present demographically, then the Russification process would be more effective.

Smith (1998, p.57) mentions that although non-Russian language courses were set up for Russians in parts of Central Asia, such as in Uzbekistan, many Russians refused to attend courses because they believed they could not afford to lose out on a day’s work. Smith states that contemptuous attitudes towards non-Russian languages were bred which was a sign of ‘Russian autocratic chauvinism’. He mentions that disrespect towards the non-Russian languages was often shown in schools by Russian literacy teachers who apparently encouraged Russian students ‘to leave native language classes

and join their "own kind"'. Smith states that such prejudice stemmed from family life and suspicions about religions, identity and different customs were passed down from generation to generation.

During the late Soviet period under Gorbachev's rule the promotion of Russian never ceased despite growing demands from the non-Russian nationalities. Russian was still the dominant language in the formation of a single socialist culture and of the new social and international community of the Soviet people (Mikhailovskaia, 1985 cited in Kirkwood, 1989, p.57). The importance of Russian was cast in 'business-like tones' (Kreindler, cited in Kirkwood, 1989, p.58). According to Anderson and Silver (1990, cited in Marshall, 1996, p.9), bilingualism in 1989 amongst non-Russians was 48% and only 3.4% amongst Russians.

2.6.2 Publishing

Another factor that contributed to asymmetrical bilingualism in the Soviet Union was the evolution in publication trends in language reading habits of the population. According to Landau and Kellner-Heinkele (2001, p.57), publishing in the non-Russian languages was decreasing, whereas publishing in Russian was increasing in the Central Asian Muslim republics. Publications on display in libraries in non-Russian languages were also in retreat. Despite the increase in Russian publications during the Soviet period, Allworth (1989 in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.57) notes that book publications in the languages of the Central Asian republics remained stable from 1958 to 1986. Landau and Kellner-Heinkele also state that important publications were published in the non-Russian languages during the Soviet period.

An interesting point which Fierman (1995, p.577) highlights is that although the number of publications in Russian increased, this did not actually reflect the numbers of Russians residing in these republics: in Uzbekistan, for example, Fierman asserts that Russians only represented 10% of the entire population. Landau and Kellner-Heinkele (2001, p.57) state this signified that the local populations of these republics were reading in Russian more than they were reading in their native languages and could read better in Russian than in their native language. As bilingualism increased amongst the non-Russian populations, there was less need to publish in the non-Russian languages (Rodgers, 1987 in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.55). Many non-Russian writers had their works published in Russian or had the works translated into Russian. Kreindler (1995, p.197) notes that in Kyrgyzstan towards the end of the 1980s, 95% of all scientific publications were in Russian.

2.7 Ethnic Mobilization

Under Gorbachev's *glasnost'* and *perestroika* policies the situation began to change. A resurgence of interest in the non-Russian languages started during the 1980s and under glasnost' the losses of these languages were allowed to be made public. Grass-roots movements formed to work towards the preservation of their cultures and to try to reverse asymmetrical bilingualism. In Ukraine and Belarus there was a particularly strong demand for two-way bilingualism (Grenoble, 2003, p.206). In other republics, such as Georgia and the Baltics, many demonstrations took place against the domination of Russian and for the preservation of the non-Russian languages. Protests also took place over the low level of proficiency in non-Russian languages of Russians residing in these republics: non-Russian residents did not feel it was fair that they were bilingual or multilingual when Russians were monolingual (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.58). Marshall (1996, p.34) points out that protests were about reinstating the titular languages as the official languages as well as the curtailment of Russian immigration. According to Grenoble (2003, p.206), the majority of Soviet citizens had studied Russian and there was evidence to suggest that Russian bilingualism amongst non-Russians was high, as was large-scale language shift away from non-Russian languages to Russian. Kostamarov (in Kirkwood, 1989, p.57) notes that English was readily accepted as a counterweight to the spread of Russian in many of the republics.

Furthermore, problems of teaching Russian were brought into the open and publications devoted to these problems were published. According to Kirkwood (1991 in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.58), there were many complaints in schools about pupils not being able to master any language sufficiently. The Soviet government held control over national finances, allocating only a minimum to local governments and institutions. Many non-Russian languages suffered because finance to develop textbooks and teacher training did not exist for these languages (Grenoble, 2003, p.61). Criticisms were expressed about the marginalization of non-Russian languages in schools and in everyday life as well as complaints regarding the preference of Russian over other languages on television (Norr, 1985, in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.58). Even applications for positions of employment were required to be completed in Russian in many of the central Asian republics (Khazanov, 1991, cited in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.58). The increasing domination of the Russian language had consequently led to the growth of national assertiveness. More opportunities arose for the non-Russian languages to serve as symbols for dissent (Marshall, 1996, p.33).

Gorbachev's *perestroika* programme focused more on political and economic problems than language problems. However, language problems were dealt with at the All-Union Conference of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow in June-July 1988: the republics were instructed to deal with their own language policies (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.61). The responsibility for the tensions over sociolinguistic inequalities seemed to have been passed over to the peripheries.

The perceived threat of Russian to the non-Russian languages resulted in the creation of legislation within the newly emerging republics that made their titular languages official and mandatory in all spheres for all citizens (Anderson and Silver, cited in Marshall 1996, p.31). Estonia was one of the first to change its language policy in 1989, Turkmenistan in 1990 and the Russian language law of the Russian Federation was changed in 1991. These republics had a timeframe in which to shift their language policies to the titular language of the republic. According to Marshall (1996, p.33), the linguistic complaints of the nationalities became sentimental symbols, inciting new dynamics for ethnic unity. These symbolic demands became instrumental demands as a consequence of Russian citizens residing in the territories of the Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR). In order to try to oust Russian citizens, laws were passed on the individual sovereignty of the non-Russian republics where separate trade delegations and currencies were established. Horowitz (cited in Marshall, 1996, p.35) declared that this led to ethnic conflict: in order for Russians to survive in these ethnic republics, they had to become bilingual to be able to continue in employment. However, this is discussed more in the next chapter.

2.8 Conclusion

A great deal of the literature analysed in this chapter has mentioned either how successful the Soviet language and identity policies were or how these policies failed. Khazanov (1991 in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.56) believed that Soviet language planning was successful to some extent, but that nationality policies failed. The success of Soviet language policies appears to be evident in the creation of asymmetrical bilingualism amongst non-native Russians, particularly towards the later period of Soviet rule. It also could be regarded as successful in improving Russian literacy rates amongst the whole population. Russian became the recognized language of communication that helped in the process of industrializing the country and advancing its technology. This was achieved through the influx of Soviet lexicon and the literacy campaign as was discussed earlier in this chapter. According to Haarmann (1992 in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.56), the success of Russian was in the covertness of language spread.

However, the literature has also revealed that many non-Russian languages continued to be used throughout the Soviet period. The languages that were used were in countries with more cultural autonomy and with a high level of industrial development (Lewis, 1972). Examples of these countries that became independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union are the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus and the Central Asian republics. As was mentioned in section 2.6.2, publications in these native languages also continued throughout the Soviet period. Other autonomous regions that became federal republics, such as Tatarstan, also continued to develop and publish their native languages, but not on such a large scale as the independent states.

As far as the nationalities question is concerned, the literature has shown that attempts to engineer a Soviet identity were effective to a certain extent, particularly for Russians residing in the union republics and the federal republics of the USSR as well as other citizens of mixed descent. However, it was not very effective for those of non-Russian origin; the creation of borders and ethnic territories led to a readymade template of nations for the independent states and republics during the end of the Soviet period (Brubaker, 1996, p.24). These borders and ethnic territories ended up highlighting people's differences rather than fusing them together as one Soviet identity with one Soviet language. Furthermore, Soviet cultural policies did not seem to be successful due to non-Russian citizens' attachments to their traditions, language and culture. Resistance to government cultural policies was manifested by the different nationalities that came together to safeguard their languages in the home and religion and ended up

with people being forced people to protest that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The subjective feelings of the repressed minorities brought them together as a collective that used language as their symbol to represent their nationality. Laitin (1998, p.58) affirms that the non-Russian nationalities never bilingually assimilated, even after seventy years of Soviet rule. The impact of the Soviet nationalities question and language policy on the Russian, and non-Russian identities will be explored further in chapter three by examining how the events of the post-Soviet period affected the lives of the citizens after seventy years of communist rule.

The literature in this chapter has contributed to the formation of the research design for the analysis in chapters five and six in the following ways. The literature on the Soviet censuses and categorizations of identity has particularly informed the post-Soviet identity tests in the first part of the survey for chapter five. In both Soviet and post-Soviet censuses, language was used as a proxy for identity (Grenoble, 2003; Silver, 1974; Tishkov, 1997 and Laitin, 1998). The post-Soviet identity tests attempts to establish which characteristics of identity are revealed as part of the respondents' self-identification in the survey. The literature in this chapter has also revealed that the censuses never questioned proficiency levels regarding languages (Silver, cited in Laitin, 1998, p.44); therefore this gap in knowledge will be fulfilled by testing the respondents' levels of written language proficiency in Russian and Tatar in the survey. Furthermore, after examining the linguistic and identity assimilation processes during the Soviet period, it will be necessary to find out if language shift and asymmetrical bilingualism are being reversed in the post-Soviet period. Therefore, the survey will help to examine how important people feel Russian and Tatar are within various spheres of language use, such as officialdom, the home and information technology. This will help to determine if the Tatar language has gained any prestige alongside Russian and will demonstrate attitudes from a bottom-up perspective towards how languages are used within contemporary Tatar society.

Finally, the literature revealed that Soviet linguistic and nationality policies had taken their toll on the non-Russian languages in terms of status planning and also in terms of the low prestige associated with these languages. The literature in this chapter particularly contributes to the qualitative analysis that forms the basis of chapter six. Interview questions explore what the attitudes are towards the Russian and Tatar languages in the spheres of education, with particular focus on attitudes towards compulsory Tatar education, languages of instruction in the education system in Kazan, teaching methodology, the home, work, the media, symbolic language use, the

differences in attitudes between the older and younger generations as well as geographical language use. This analysis helps to clarify whether attitudes towards non-Russian languages have changed since the Soviet period.

Chapter Three - The Post-Soviet Period

After seventy years of Communist rule and the events leading up to the failed coup in August 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated. In its place, independent states and autonomous republics formed. A great deal of literature about this area of study (such as Brubaker, 1994 and 1996; Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001; Smith, 1998; Tishkov, 1997) discusses the formation of the independent states and territorial divisions within the Russian Federation. These authors, amongst many others, mention that the formation of the independent states and republics was a result of the Party's Soviet policy which, in the post-Revolutionary period, had paradoxically delimited territories for ethnic groups as a way to control the population and to prevent resistance towards the regime (Connor, 1984; Grenoble, 2003; Smith, 1998). When the Soviet Union collapsed, these territories, which had been labelled as belonging to one ethnic group or another, declared themselves as independent countries.

The Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, countries in Transcaucasia and the Central Asian Republics became fourteen independent countries and the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic became the independent Russian Federation. A federation refers to a broad category of political units where two or more levels of government exist. These levels combine elements of shared rule through common institutions and regional self-rule for governments of constituent parts (Watts, 1996, p.6). The Russian Federation is governed by the central government in Moscow under the Russian Constitution and at the beginning of the post-Soviet period it was composed of eighty-three 'federal subjects'. These federal subjects consisted of twenty-one autonomous republics that had some degree of power, their own constitution, government and president as well as a language policy, but they remained politically situated within the Russian Federation (such as the Republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). There were forty six *oblasts,* each of which had a government representative and had less power than the autonomous republics. There were also *krais* and *okrugs* within the Federation plus *Moscow* and *St Petersburg* that were classed as federal cities and in 2014 *Sevastopol* in Crimea was also given the status of federal city. It must be pointed out here that the status of the republics has changed since this research began, but these changes are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

The discussion in chapter two revealed that during the Soviet period, Russian was considered as the language of inter-communication and socio-economic advancement in the Union even though approximately one hundred and fifty languages were spoken

throughout the country (Alpatov, 1997; Lewis, 1972). As a result, many of these languages of the Soviet Union declined in prestige and Russian became the language of choice in the education system and in many spheres of language use (Grenoble, 2003; Lewis, 1972; Smith, 1998). Many tensions and fears regarding the demise of the ethnic languages and cultures were expressed under Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost'* policies (Grenoble, 2003; Kirkwood 1991 and Norr 1985 both cited in Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.58). These tensions amongst many others eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Chapter three therefore examines the events of the post-Soviet period. At the end of the Soviet period the titular states and republics of the former Soviet Union began nation-building processes as a way to declare their identity after seventy years of cultural and linguistic suppression. Nation-building was concerned with de-Sovietization processes, such as the replacement of Soviet political institutions with institutions of the titular nationality; the re-establishment of titular nations that included the codification of identity characteristics such as language (Laitin, 1998) and finally the discovery of the nation's past (Tishkov, 1997). The main focus of this chapter is on language policy as one of these nation-building processes. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the independent countries of the former Soviet state (such as in the Baltic States, where the titular language of each country was named as the official language) and the non-independent countries of the Russian Federation such as the autonomous republics all adopted either monolingual language policies or bilingual language policies that named Russian and the language of their titular nation as the official languages. The countries that had the most success in promoting the titular language in *all* spheres of use after the collapse of the Soviet Union were the countries that included only the titular language in their language policies, such as the Baltic States (Ozolin, 1994). These countries quickly implemented monolingual language policies soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a means of establishing their identity.

The literature concerning language as a nation-building process states that language was the most important aspect of nation-building because it was equated with the choice of identity (Brubaker, 1994 and 1996; Kuzio, 2001; Laitin, 1998; Smith, 1998; Tishkov, 1997). Most of the literature on post-Soviet nation-building examines the use of language as a nation-building process from a top-down perspective that is regulated by governments through the implementation of language policy. On the other hand, it is equally important to consider how effective language policy has been at the citizen level. Recent studies of nation-building processes have challenged the top-down

perspective by demonstrating that nation-building is negotiated and contested at citizen level (Kuzio, 2001; Polese, 2011; Polese and Wylegala, 2008; Rodgers, 2007 and Shevel, 2002).

The first part of this chapter gives definitions of terminology that is frequently used in the literature concerning nation-building processes and identity during the post-Soviet period. These definitions include *nationalism, nation, ethnicity* and *national identity*, *nation-building* and *nationalizing* and are analysed to establish the context of language policy and planning of the post-Soviet period. Then theories and models of identity are examined because identity was a key motive in language planning and policy projects. The final section of part one examines studies into in-group out-group influences on post-Soviet identity.

The second part of this chapter looks at the language policies and alphabet laws of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, paying particular attention to amendments that have been made over the last twenty-four years.

3.1 Definitions in the post-Soviet context: *Nationalism, nation, ethnicity and nationality, nation-building, nationalizing states*

Nationalism and Nation

These terms are central to issues of languages such as language loss and language maintenance. Many of the terms are used interchangeably in the scholarly literature, but here I attempt to define the terms according to how their meaning will be used throughout this thesis.

Nationalism

Jenkins (2008, p.167) states that nationalism is, 'an ideology of ideologies of ethnic identification, historical contingency and variation, a state context, ethnic criteria of political membership and a claim to a historical collective identity'. He explains that nationalism is rooted in ethnic attachments at a high level of collective abstraction. It could therefore be viewed as a type of extreme loyalty to a particular ideology or ideologies that may be territorial, political, social, and cultural or that may consist of all four elements. He believes that discussions of nationalism are abstract ideals from reality and that the world is full of nationalisms. This definition of nationalism can be further clarified by Joireman (2003, p.12) as a 'politicized ethnicity'. Hobsbawm (1990 as cited in Joireman, 2003, p.12) asserts that 'nationalism comes before nation' and that

an ethnic group must become politically mobilized before it can become a nation that happens through collective recognition.

Nation

A nation can be defined as having five dimensions that are psychological, historical, cultural, political and territorial (May, 2001, p.54). The psychological dimension means that there is a desire for some kind of political or social self-determination. The historical dimension refers to common ancestry and memories which people share. The cultural dimension pertains to a common language, religion and traditions. The political dimension relates to a common political destiny and the territorial dimension incorporates the shared historical territory on which the citizens of the nation reside. The nation therefore refers to a group of people who share a common history, ancestry and a perceived destiny that may or may not include a common language or religion. May defines a nation in similar terms to Jenkins; as a historical-cultural community and as a legal-political one.

In addition, May (2001, p.61-2) mentions that the definition of nation is used by many scholars to mean 'nation-state'. According to May (2001, p.55), a nation-state is a 'political sovereignty over a clearly designated territorial area' that consists of citizens who are loyal to the state. He states that the boundaries of the nation-state are bound up in the congruence of political and national identity. Internally, the nation-state holds political and legal jurisdiction over its citizens, whilst externally it proclaims sovereignty and self-government. Leaders of nation-states assert that they liberate communities from tyranny and guarantee equality and civil rights to all citizens (p.55). These rights are usually written into constitutions of nation-states.

May (2001, p. 56) mentions that language is an important feature of the nation-state because usually there is a requirement for citizens of the nation-state to have a common language. May points out that the congruence of a common language with the nation-state is also a recent historical phenomenon. On the other hand, the nation-state may be viewed as being culturally and linguistically homogenous and ethnically exclusive. Coulmas (1998 in May, 2001, p.7) states that the nation-state is 'the keenest threat to both the identities and the languages of small (minority) communities.' After examining the definitions of nation and nation-state, it is clear that these definitions are very similar; the definition of 'nation-state' appears to be more of a development based on the definition of 'nation'.

Ethnicity and Nationality

Jenkins (2008, p.169) believes that ethnicity is a matter of shared cultural meanings, but that it is produced through social interactions. He points out that ethnicity can be defined as segmentary and hierarchical, yet fluid and dependent on a social context. For example, a person may self-identify as *A* one day and as *B* the next. It is a two-way process across the boundary of 'us' and 'them' and can apply to both individual and collective forms of identity. The individual self-identifies with the group collective identity. The collective group therefore shares common traits. These traits could be a shared language, religion, ancestry and traditions that are known as 'cultural stuff', a term first coined by Barth (1969 in Jenkins, 2008, p.111). However, Jenkins asserts that it is the *boundaries* that define the group, not the 'cultural stuff'. The boundaries are therefore formed as a result of cultural differences between communal and local groups and the consequences for each group lies within the powers and prejudices of society for rights and responsibilities, access to sources, such as education and employment, and social recognition. Cultural differences could be perceived as emanating from attitudes towards individuals or groups and stereotyping, either in a positive or negative sense. This type of behaviour is often referred to as *in-group out-group* behaviour and was examined in chapter one section 5.2.

According to Jenkins (2008, p.171), there are two types of identity that are essential to the understanding of ethnicity. The first is called *nominal* identity and the second, *virtual.* Jenkins says that both types of identity are implicated in each other and cannot really be separated. He points out that both types may or may not be in harmony with each other and that these identities lead to the consequences of identity defined by others. The nominal identity refers to categorizations that are segmentary and hierarchical. These categorizations often refer to the named identity of an individual or a group and are used by political actors for example, in the collection of census data or for identification on passports. This type of identity is known as 'nationality'. It is a label created to identify a person as being a citizen of a nation-state, for example, a Russian, Welsh or French person. It is a term used for a civic/official identity that the nation-state recognizes.

Virtual identity relates to experiences within everyday society. Jenkins believes that a person's experiences can influence how they self-identify. For example, nominally a person may be labelled as Welsh, although their experience of being Welsh may change according to the situation they find themselves in. External influences can have a dramatic effect on how a person self-identifies, such as social groups, employment,

economics, politics and cultural factors which may include fashion and music. It may be convenient to identify as Welsh with friends and family members, but this person may identify differently at work or school depending on societal influences. Jenkins (2008, p.171) believes that these virtualities of experience are likely to be central to processes of change; the relationship between nominal and virtual identity may contribute to a useful image of continuity, but on the other hand, it may sow the seeds of confusion and conflict.

In addition to Jenkins' nominal and virtual identities within ethnicity, May (2001, p.38) posits the existence of hybrid identity that has become an important form of identity to consider in modern society, particularly with increased migration flows in the globalizing world. He defines hybridity as 'a plurality of cultures, knowledge, languages, and their continuous interspersion, where "ethnic absolutism" has no place' due to the categorization of people being no longer meaningful. In other words, a person can be from a mixed ethnic background, speak many languages and have knowledge and access to many different cultures. Therefore a person may not be able to self-identify as belonging to one ethnic group or another. May (2001, p.39) states that 'multiple, shifting and non-synchronous identities are the norm for individuals'.

The above definitions are extremely important for the discussion of identity in the post-Soviet space, and have significantly influenced the design of the survey for the data analysis in chapter five. In the survey I have asked people to invoke a *nominal* identity by asking what their nationality is (Russian, Tatar for example) and I compare this to their *virtual* identity. The virtual identity concerns how people label themselves i.e. Tatar and how this is linked to the extent to which they identify as using Tatar in certain situations.

Nation-Building

This thesis uses the concept of nation-building as a process of negotiation between top-down actors and who try to implement policies that need the acceptance of citizens in order for these policies to be successful. Many scholars have contributed to the discussion that nation-building is constructed from an internal perspective (Billig, 1994: Connor, 2004; Polese and Wylegala, 2008 and Polese, 2011, Rodgers, 2006). According to Kolstø (2000, p.16), 'nation-building' is an architectural metaphor which became a popular term of use amongst political scientists during the 1950s. Kolstø states that nation-building covers not only strategies implemented by governments, but also social change. Østerud (1978, cited in Kolstø, 2000, p.16) believes that nation-building

examines 'the macro historical and sociological dynamics that have produced the modern state'. On the other hand, Connor (1994, cited in Kolstø, 2000, p.16) states that concepts and definitions of nation-building 'ignored ethnic diversity' because they are preoccupied with what he terms as 'social cleavages' such as the 'nobles and commoners… elites and masses'. Connor's definition of nation-building is more about the common ancestry shared by members of a group.

However, perhaps the most useful approach of nation-building for this thesis is one posited by Shevel (2002, p.387). Shevel believes that politics is an influencing factor in the nation-building process, but it is the attitudes of citizens towards politics that play an important role in the shaping of state policies. She has posited that there are two forces in the nation-building process: political and population forces. She proposes that there is a dichotomy of national versus non-national in both of these forces and contextualizes these two forces within Anderson's (1991) 'imagined community'. According to Anderson, any community that is larger than a primordial village is 'imagined' and can be political, religious, linguistic or a regional group. It is 'imagined' because 'regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship' (Anderson, 2006, p.7). Shevel applies her national versus non-national dichotomy to Ukraine, but it could refer to any post-Soviet state.

Shevel (2002, p.387-9) therefore defines national political forces as wanting to develop and preserve the state. She points out that the national population would support the existing state because the policies presented by the state are in the population's interests and it identifies with the nation as the 'imagined political community'. The nation is considered therefore as the community's proper political and territorial home. This refers to titular nations, such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan. These nations use national symbols for the formation of their collective national identity. One such example is language, which Shevel says is a proxy for national identity.

As far as non-national is concerned, Shevel states that this population identifies with a sub or supra-national community that is viewed as their 'imagined community'. Their attitude towards the existing state is that the nation is not the proper home for their community and they favour the formation of a different state. Shevel refers to these types of communities as the Russian communities who are living on post-Soviet territories such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Shevel states that there are two competing areas that are central in the process of nation-building: citizenship and language policy. She says that if state policies are favourable

for the citizen, then the government can win the support of society. However, she notes that if a citizen is presented with a choice within a situation then this could also be a determining factor of whether or not a policy is accepted. For example, as far as language is concerned, Shevel mentions that the choice of language is personal because a person must make an effort to learn it and decide if the language in question is a wise future investment. It is therefore about future economic return. Another point that Shevel mentions is that if an individual speaks two languages, then they must make a decision about which situation they will use each language for. Therefore language is about personal preferences. Shevel states that the use of a language can be changed through political support and how the population feels about the government. In other words, Shevel proposes that, 'shifts in language use in educational and political settings suggest the acceptance of rules of engagement set by the state' and thus legitimizes the state. Polese (2011, p.40) agrees with Shevel and believes that common people can participate in the nation-building process at a local level by accepting or rejecting government policies.

Nationalizing States

Another interesting concept that is used frequently in the literature concerning the post-Soviet space is 'nationalizing'. In order to illustrate this concept, Brubaker's (1996) triadic framework of the 'nationalizing' state will be used. Brubaker's triadic framework consists of three types of nation-building: the first is that of new states whose elite promote the language, culture, geographical positioning and economics of the state-bearing nation.

The second type of nation-building state according to Brubaker is termed as 'bi-national' because there are usually two or more ethnic majorities who are trying to build the nation. The national minorities residing within these nation-states demand cultural and territorial autonomy and resist the process of assimilation. The role of ethnicity in state policies is more important in this kind of state.

The final type of nation-building that Brubaker defines is that of the 'external homelands' who protest against violations of their human rights and assert the right to defend their interests within these territories. This is sometimes defined as a 'nationalizing' state by Brubaker and is viewed in ethno-cultural terms. The titular majority of the nation tries to promote its national identity at the expense of other minorities residing within the state. He believes that these three types of nation-building are 'interlocking and interactive, bound together in a single nexus' (1996, p.4).

However, Kuzio (2001) has challenged Brubaker's triadic framework of nationalizing states because he believes that Brubaker and other traditional scholars place nation-building in the context of the 'civic' west and the developing 'ethnic' east. This context stems from traditional literature on nationalism and divides Europe into the democratic west and the east. Kuzio states that all states are comprised of both civic and ethnic factors depending on how much democratization has taken place. He additionally points out that Brubaker's triadic framework can only selectively be applied to non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union, but the framework cannot be applied to autonomous regions of the Russian Federation, such as the Republic of Tatarstan because the framework would have to incorporate more than three aspects (2001, p.141).

To conclude this section, the definitions discussed above show that citizens are part of the nation-building process and as Shevel (2002) suggests, the government needs the acceptance of citizens in order for their policies to be successful. Shevel's definition of nation-building will be an important aspect of consideration in my study, particularly for analysing to what extent citizens in Tatarstan accept the Tatar language policy and how far they resist it. The next section will examine characteristics of identity in more detail, particularly with regard to different characteristics between the Russian and titular identities in order to gain a deeper insight into how post-Soviet societies are shaped and their driving forces.

3.2 Russian and Titular Identity

3.2.1 The Russian Identity

According to Brubaker (1996, p.36-39), Russians enjoyed a privileged existence with full language, cultural and educational rights in the Soviet Union. They thought of the Soviet Union as their national territory and not just as the RSFSR. The territory of the national republics/homelands was not considered as significant for the Russians because they had a wider home territory. Their considered their identity to be stable because they were the dominant ethnic group and therefore they never questioned their identity. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union more than twenty-five million Russians became ethnic minorities in the newly formed territories of the Commonwealth of Independent States (henceforth CIS) (Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001, p.57 and 2003, p.771; Smith et al., 1998, p.7). The Russians had lost their dominant status. They were no longer identified as the majority ethnic group of these new territories, nor were they identified as having titular identity. They had never learned the national language of the titular nation in which they resided, nor had they assimilated with the titular population.

They were classed as living in the 'near abroad' (Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001, p.57 and 2003, p.771).

Many studies into Russian identity in countries of the 'near abroad' have been carried out over the last twenty-four years. One such study was carried out by Poppe and Hagendoorn (2001). The study was based on theories of social constructivism, perceived threat and ethnic competition. The authors point out that Russian identity is more political in nature and they believe the reason for this is because the Russians have a weak ethno-cultural identity and therefore they may compensate for this lack by expressing themselves in terms of political loyalty and identity.

On the other hand, Poppe and Hagendoorn mention that in Kolstø's civic identity theory (1996 cited in Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001, p.58) there were some elements of Russian cultural identity as well as political elements. These features included Russians identifying with Russian culture, a newly developed Russian-rooted identity and identification with titulars.

The typology of Russian identity which Poppe and Hagendoorn created, however, is a political typology based on a 'territorial sense and not an ideological one' (2001, p.59). This typology includes a primary Russian, a Soviet Russian, divided loyalty, marginal, republican and finally, primary titular. A *primary Russian* was used to define someone who felt that they were a citizen of Russia. A *Soviet Russian* was a term used for a person who emigrated to another republic to live and work during the Soviet period. They may identify themselves as being a Soviet citizen because everybody was classed this way at that time. When the Soviet Union collapsed the notion of a single type of 'Soviet citizen' lost its reference points. The people who had emigrated to the republics did not really fit in with the new identities that were developing because they were neither native citizens of the republics in which they were residing, nor citizens of the new Russia. They therefore still identified themselves as Soviet citizens. A person with *divided loyalties* was used to define Russians who identified as both Russian and titular. Someone who defined himself or herself as *marginal* felt that they neither identified with one group nor another. A person who defined himself or herself as *republican* had loyalties towards the titular nation and finally, a primary titular was someone who defined himself or herself as being a citizen of their republic of residence. The authors came up with this typology through examining ethnic Russians within their communities, particularly basing the typology on their attitudes towards the political situation of their countries and how they perceived themselves through the questionnaire.

The results showed that there were different varieties of identification within the Russian communities of these republics and different factors affected how the Russians identified themselves. These factors were early assimilation, which included mixed marriages and parentage, being born in the republic, geographical distance from the Russian Federation, titular language proficiency and lower socio-economic status, although the authors cannot explain why this final factor contributed to a stronger titular identification of Russians. As well as these factors contributing to the varieties of identification, the results of the studies show Russians' attitudes towards Russian and republican patriotism, and how socially distant the Russians feel from the titulars. Perceptions of each other also influenced how they identified themselves.

Tolz (1998) has also created a typology of Russian identity in her work, but this is more focused on the collective of the Russian nation rather than the individual. She notes that the Russian national identity was formed on similar terms to colonial and post-colonial societies in Asia and Africa. She posits that the identity of the Russian nation is about participating citizens within its territories in contrast to the ethnic nations that are more concerned with their own culture, language and history. She states that civic nations and ethnic nations are only ideals, since the roots of civic nations can be traced back to earlier ethnic communities.

Her typology consists of the following five definitions and is derived from current intellectual debates in Russia: the first is labelled as *union identity* and defines Russians as an imperial people or as a people who created a supranational state, i.e. the Soviet Union; the second definition is labelled as *Russians as a nation of all eastern Slavs, united by common origin and culture* which concerns ethno-cultural features and a common past. A criticism of this particular definition is that it includes Ukrainians and Belarusians in the same nationality; the third definition is *Russians as a community of Russian speakers, regardless of their ethnic origin* and is about how the Russian language plays the role of a unifying force, such as its role during the Soviet Union; the fourth is *Russians defined racially* and concerns blood ties as a basis of identity and the fifth definition is a *civic Russian nation*, which is about citizenship within the Russian Federation regardless of ethnic background. Tolz says that these definitions of Russian identity are used to suit political purposes and politicians.

All of these above mentioned scholars present competing definitions of identity. Poppe and Hagendoorn (2001) present a typology that reveals more political aspects of Russian identity. In addition, they believe that identity is fluid and it changes according

to political, economic and social factors. Their study is also based on attitudes and they use methodology that measures and classifies the subjective feelings of the respondents. Tolz (1998) uses contemporary intellectual debates to form her typology and takes a more objective stance in defining the Russian nation. Furthermore, she seems to base her typology on both political and ethno-cultural aspects. She believes that civic nations have roots in more ethno-cultural ties from the past. Civic nations were formed during the Soviet period and therefore this has had an effect on how nations and people have been defined.

To summarize this section, the literature defines the Russian identity in terms of political and territorial aspects, although some cultural elements of Russian identity have also been mentioned. As was mentioned by Brubaker (1996, p.36-39), the Russians did not have such a strong ethnic identity as the titular nationalities because the Russians never questioned their identity and saw the whole territory of the Soviet Union as their homeland.

3.2.2 Titular Identity

At the end of the Soviet period many ethnic groups residing within the Soviet-designated territories began to push for self-determination and mobilization after seventy years of cultural and linguistic repression. According to Brubaker (1996), these titular nations were formed as political territorial categories during the Soviet period rather than ethno-cultural ones as a way of controlling nationalism. However, he states that the ethno-cultural aspect of titular identity became extremely important in the process of nation-building after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In this section, features of titular identity are examined in order to make a comparison with Russian identity in the post-Soviet period. First of all, general themes regarding titular identity will be discussed. Secondly, studies into titular identification will be examined with further analysis of in-group out-group behaviour of both titulars and Russians.

Many themes, which have been highlighted in the literature on titular identity in the post-Soviet period, are concerned with de-Sovietisation processes, such as the replacement of Soviet political institutions with institutions of the majority titular nationality; the re-establishment of titular nations that includes the codification of identity characteristics such as language and origin; finally, the rediscovery of the titular nation’s past. All of these themes are examined below.

- De-Sovietisation

According to Smith et al. (1998, p.13), de-Sovietisation concerns the removal of all Soviet symbols of power and their replacement with new political institutions and new national symbols such as national flags, monuments, language and culture. The new political institutions and symbolic representations of the new nations were also seen as an instrument by which the national elites could take control and gain more power. Landau and Kellner-Heinkele (2001, ch.2) also state that the collapse of the Soviet Union saw a mobilization of ethnic groups for political ends. Smith et al. (1998, p.13) mention that de-Sovietisation instilled a sense of mistrust towards other non-Russian ethnic groups living in these nations who were viewed as a threat to the titular group.

- The re-establishment of the titular nation

According to Laitin (1998, p.21), titular nations established their national identity based on national characteristics such as common origin, territoriality, culture, history and language. He states that national identities in the post-Soviet period were based upon myths or scientific facts which both promoted legitimacy and loyalty to the nation.
Smith et al. (1998, p.16) believe that these above mentioned national characteristics are all part of what they label as *cultural standardization* and posit that linguistic, cultural and education aspects of the titular identity are bound up in politics. They point out that the most important of all these aspects is language because the choice of language equates with the choice of identity.

- The rediscovery of a nation's past

This is a dominant theme in literature on titular identity in the post-Soviet period. It concerns the rediscovery of a so-called Golden Age, an ethnic past and the re-invention of national heroes, particularly literary figures and poets. In many post-Soviet countries and republics, monuments were erected in honour of these literary figures as well as the renaming of streets and public spaces after them. Smith et al. (1998, p.15) say that nations' pasts 'become standards against which to measure the alleged failings of the present generation and the contemporary community'.
Tishkov (1997, p.103) agrees with the above statement and labels this rediscovery as an 'ideology of return'. He illustrates the importance of history and language in the formation of newly developing nations through Foucault (1993, p.164-5 cited in Tishkov, 1997, p.103):

‘*…There is a widespread and facile tendency, which one should combat, to designate that which has just occurred as the primary enemy, as if this were always the principal form of oppression from which one had to liberate oneself. Now this simple attitude entails a number of dangerous consequences: first, an inclination to seek out some cheap form of archaism or some imaginary past forms of happiness that people did not, in fact, have at all …There is in this hatred of the present or the immediate past a dangerous tendency to invoke a completely mythical past*’.

Tishkov notes that this attitude illustrated in Foucault’s quotation is typical in all aspects of post-Soviet society. This attitude starts from national elitist discourses and is passed down to grass-roots discourses. An example he gives of this ideology of return is the rediscovery of the image of the pre-Mongol invasion in Tatarstan and the restoration of Tatar history based on the Bulgar state that is deemed to be the ancient homeland of the Tatars. He states that this history has been popularised in order to reconnect with a past. He also illustrates this point by mentioning the restoration of flags and other such symbols in the Baltic States.

It appears therefore, from the above examination of nation-building processes and motives, that these processes are politically motivated. Nation-building processes seem to have been instrumental for the political ends of the titular elites. On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest that ethno-cultural elements of titular identity are prevalent, especially with regard to the re-establishment of the history, customs and traditions of the titular nationalities of these nations. However, these histories could be just based on myths and therefore these historical claims would have a weak basis.

The ethno-cultural aspects of identity seem to be much more prevalent in the literature on the titular identity than the Russian identity. As was mentioned in section 3.3.1, this could be because Russians identified more with Soviet identity, although they also have their own ideology of return based on imperial Russia before the Revolution. The analyses in this section therefore reveal a binary opposition between Russian and titular identities. This binary opposition gives the impression that both groups are homogenous. However, identity is not so clear-cut and this opposition does not take into account hybrid identity that was mentioned in section 3.1 of this chapter by May (2001, p.38). This observation is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The next section deals with studies about in-group out-group influences on post-Soviet identity.

3.3 Studies into in-group out-group influences on post-Soviet identity

This section examines how identity can be formed through attitudes, particularly through in-group out-group influences. A detailed explanation of in-group out-group behaviour was given in chapter one section 5.2. As Shevel (2002) mentioned earlier in this chapter, attitudes play an important role in the acceptance or rejection of social policies that consequently has an impact on the government. In looking at the formation of ethnic identities in the post-Soviet space, for the most part, in-group behaviour refers to the titular nationalities and out-group behaviour refers to Russians. However, this status of in-group out-group is ambiguous – Russians living in the titular republics are classed as the out-group, but as citizens of the Russian Federation they are classed as the in-group. The same holds true for the titular nationalities – within their republic they as considered as the in-group, but within the Russian Federation they are considered as the out-group.

Hagendoorn, Poppe and Minescu's study (2008) examined in-group out-group behaviour in the post-Soviet space from a political aspect. The authors showed that the concept of identity could be formed by analysing the populations' support for separatism. The study examined both Russian and titular nationalities in ten autonomous republics of the Russian Federation: Bashkortostan; Tatarstan; Komi; Karelia; Udmurtia; Adygea; Dagestan; Kabardino-Balkaria; Sakha-Yakutia and Tuva. These republics were examined because they are not researched as often as the independent states and republics and they still depend on the Russian Federation for subsidies and bargain for economic assets. Furthermore, according to Hagendoorn et al. (2008), the elites in these republics wanted to enhance regional autonomy and did so by enhancing popular support for separatism. The authors stated that economic advantages were the focus of the elites in the republics and not ethnic revival aspects as Gorenburg pointed out (1999, cited in Hagendoorn et al., 2008, p.356-7). Gorenburg pointed out that laws and programmes *were* put in place that promoted titulars to privileged positions, but titular culture and language were promoted by the elites by expanding native schooling and promoting ethnic symbols.

The intention of revival policies was to increase awareness of the titular populations of the republics, but the aim of Hagendoorn et al.'s study (2008) was to examine identity through political and economic aspects.The authors believed that four reasons existed that contributed to the differences between Russians and titulars and their support for separatism that were reflected in the differences between identities: inter-group relations

within these territories; economic and political competition between the two groups; negative out-group attitudes and finally, demographics.

The differences in inter-group relations within these territories are examined first of all. As far as the titular nationalities were concerned, Tajfel (1982, cited in Hagendoorn et al. 2008, p.355) mentioned there was a lack of trust and cooperation outside of the boundaries of the in-group. Titulars historically defined their territory restrictively as a result of Soviet policy that designated each territory for a single ethnic group.

As far as the Russians were concerned, their homeland was considered as the Russian Federation or even the Soviet Union, as Poppe and Hagendoorn discovered in their studies (2001 and 2003). These claims reveal that Russian identity seems to be more civic in nature than ethnic. Poppe and Hagendoorn discovered that if a Russian had married a titular, then they would be more inclined to identify with the titular identity.

Hagendoorn et al. (2008, p.358) pointed out that there were also differences in support for separatism regarding economic and political competition between the two groups. They discovered that labour markets and the political system were controlled by the titular group to a large extent within the boundaries of their territory and they believed that this could lead to the exclusion of other ethnic groups within these countries, including Russians.

Hagendoorn et al. (2008) stated that economic reasons to support separatism depended on rewards. In other words, if the republic was economically wealthy and many tax contributions were made, then both groups would favour separatism because the standard of living for both groups would be improved. If the Russian Federation caused harm politically to a republic, then Hagendoorn et al. (2008, p.370-1) believed that Russians would be *for* separatism since they would feel isolated and let down by the Russian government.

Negative out-group attitudes were also another reason which was found to contribute towards support for separatism. According to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981 and 1982, cited in Hagendoorn et al. 2008, p.358), members of the in-group positively identified with other members of their group, but identified with the out-group negatively. Poppe and Hagendoorn (2001 and 2003) classed this type of behaviour as stereotyping. This type of behaviour between the titulars and Russians was about competing for social status. After the collapse of Communism, Russians lost their dominant status to the titular group and they became the out-group in the territory of the titular nations. The final reason for the differences in support for separatism was group size. Hagendoorn et al. (2008, p.370) believed that group size could determine the

position of the ethnic group within the republic. A large out-group was considered as a threat to the titulars because the titulars only had power within their republic. A large Russian out-group could reject policies and proposals aimed at maintaining titular demands.

The results of the study revealed that the titulars would strongly support separatism based on strong ethnic inter-group relations, the ethnic entitlement of their republic, group size, negative attitudes towards the out-group and the economic wealth of their republic. In addition, titulars were able 'to affirm their own language and culture' within their republics even though there may have been a large out-group presence within their republic. This reveals that they were concerned with expressions of their identity and the symbols of their identity.

On the other hand, the results did not show support for separatism from the Russians. This was attributed to Russian identity being more civic than ethnic and according to Hale (2005, cited in Hagendoorn et al. 2008, p.366), other non-Russian ethnic groups who had participated in the study may have identified as Russian. Laitin (1998, p.299 cited in Hagendoorn et al. 2008, p.366) mentioned that 'Russian ethnic identification may be more limited' than titular identification. Furthermore, although the results revealed that the Russians negatively evaluated the titulars and vice versa, this did not motivate support for separatism from the Russians.

Another interesting point to note that was revealed in Hagendoorn et al.'s study was the difference in attitudes towards separatism between different generations. The younger Russian generation and less educated Russians showed support for separatism. Hagendoorn et al. believed that this was due to the economic prospects of the republics. If economic prospects for the republic were higher as a separate republic, then there was a tendency to support separatism. If the economic prospects were low for the republic then separatism was not favoured. The younger titular generation were also found to have strong ethnic bonds. This therefore makes a study into the beliefs of younger Russians in Tatarstan rather timely and it will be interesting to discover whether the attitudes towards separatism in these above mentioned studies, are reflected in attitudes towards language use at the collective and individual levels. This study suggested that power and territory contributed to support for separatism. The more power an ethnic group had, the more the support for separatism. Russians do not have as much power as they did during Communism within these republics and therefore do not support separatism. This is because they are out of their homeland, but this homeland as they knew it no longer exists. It is 'imagined' (Anderson, 1991). Thus, this study

complements the above studies into identity and strengthens the findings that Russian identity concerns civic aspects while the titular identity concerns ethnic and cultural aspects, which Poppe and Hagendoorn (2001 and 2003) and Tolz (1998) revealed in their studies into post-Soviet identity.

Many of these theories and studies within this chapter have highlighted the political and socio-economic aspects of identity from the perspective of the collective group rather than the individual. The categorization of the Russian identity and the titular identity assumes that both these groups are homogenous and the diversity of the individuals who form part of these groups is not taken into account. However, ann individual can be from a mixed ethnic background, as May (2008, p. 38-9) pointed out earlier in this chapter. The binary opposition that has been postulated seems to stem from the historical influences of Soviet policies that categorized people as one identity or another with the aim of assimilating peoples from different ethnic backgrounds into one Soviet identity. This method of categorization seems to have instilled attitudes towards different ethnicities through stereotyping, particularly regarding the status and prestige of some ethnicities over others and the competition for shared resources.

3.4 Language Policy and Laws of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan

This section discusses the language laws of both the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan and examines the changes that have taken place within these laws since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is important to discuss the changes because they reflect the changes in the balance of power between the federal central government and the republican government in Tatarstan. Linguistic policies have historically formed an important part of power processes as was discussed in chapter two, and continue to play a significant role in the power processes of the post-Soviet period. The laws will be examined in chronological order and commentary will be included on the amendments throughout. The laws that are discussed are the following:

- 1991 Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR;
- 1992 Law on Languages of the Peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan;
- 1993 The Constitution of the Russian Federation;
- 1998, 2002 and 2013 Amendments to the 1991 Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR;
- 1999 Law on the Restoration of the Tatar Alphabet Based on the Latin Alphabet;

- 2013 Law on the Use of the Tatar Language as a State Language in the Republic of Tatarstan;
- 2013 Law of the Republic of Tatarstan on the Annulment of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan on the Restoration of the Tatar Alphabet Based on the Latin Alphabet;
- 2014 Amendments to the 2005 Federal Law N-53 on 'The State Language of the Russian Federation'.

3.4.1 1991 Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR was signed by Boris Yeltsin on 25th October. The law set out provisions for linguistic protection and linguistic diversity in the RSFSR. In the introductory section of the law the languages of its people were proclaimed as the property of the Russian state. In addition these languages were referred to as having historical and cultural significance and were under protection of the state. A significant section of this introduction declared that the languages of its peoples were an important element of culture and formed the basis of a national and personal 'self-actualization'. Furthermore, it declared that the language situation in the RSFSR was multi-faceted within different spheres of communication and multilingualism and bilingualism existed on the territory of the Russian Federation. At the beginning of the post-Soviet period this particular law set out to create conditions for the preservation and development of all languages within the system of regulatory law. In clauses 1 and 2 of this law the use of the peoples' languages of the RSFSR was legitimized and the language sovereignty of its peoples was guaranteed by the state.

On closer analysis of the law, and despite the fact that article 3.1 declared that the state gave equal rights and support to preserve and develop *all* languages, it became apparent in the next three clauses of article 3 that a three-tiered hierarchy of language was embedded within the law. The first tier of this hierarchy in clause 2 declared that Russian was the international language of communication across the whole territory of the RSFSR and that it was the state language across the whole territory. The second tier was set out in clause 3 and stated that the republics could establish their own titular language as a state language alongside Russian. The third tier was set out in clause 4 and declared that in areas where people of the same nationality lived in close proximity to each other, they could also use their native language alongside Russian and the state language of the republic in which they resided. All languages on the territory of the

RSFSR were protected within this three-tiered hierarchy under the state government of the RSFSR. However, it did not mention that all languages had equal rights to be used in all situations. Language use was therefore tightly controlled by the RSFSR.

In addition to the three-tiered level of hierarchy of language use, a further complexity was added to the law that set out language use at both the federal and regional levels. The higher the power or officialdom, the more Russian was used. An example of this was in chapter 3.2 that concerned language use in higher legislative bodies of state power within the RSFSR. In article 11.1 the state language of the RSFSR (Russian) was mentioned as the language to be used in higher legislative bodies. In article 11.2 it was declared that the state language of the republic could be used in the higher legislative bodies of power at the republican level and translated into the state language. In addition any legislative publications at the RSFSR level had to be published in the state language of the RSFSR as well as the state language of the republic. If documents were official and legal then they had be published in both state languages.

A further example in the differences of powers and language use could be seen in chapter 4 that set out language use in activities with state bodies, organizations, businesses and institutions within the federal and republican levels. In article 15 of this chapter it declared that the state language of the RSFSR had to be used at the federal level, state languages at the republican level and other languages were also allowed to be used. If a citizen did not know the language being used then translations could be provided. Similarly in article 20, which outlined language use in the mass media, federal-wide publications were to be published in the state language of the RSFSR, but media at the republican level could be published in the state language of the republic and other languages of peoples living within these republics. In article 21.1 Russian was defined as the language to be used in accordance with international and republican agreements within the RSFSR. So, the higher the level of power, the more likely Russian would be used as the state language of the RSFSR.

Other representations of power within the complexities of this law can be seen through the terminology used. Although all languages had equal status, the labelling of the languages of the RSFSR suggested otherwise. Throughout the law languages were referred to as *state* language (Russian), *state* language*s* (Russian and another state language of the republic), *native* languages or *other* languages. So the terminology also reflected the power hierarchy between the federal and republican levels. The terminology was vague and contradictory in places, particularly as far as the term *native language* was concerned. For example, in article 10.1 the *native language* and *other*

languages of the RSFSR were mentioned in terms of state provision for the learning and teaching of these languages. In article 10.2 Russian as the *state* language was written and in 10.3 the terms *state languages* and *other languages* were mentioned. In article 10.4 it was stated that each language which did not have its own writing system could create one for its *native language*. The status of most of the languages was clear except for the term *native language.* Sometimes *native language* seemed to be referred to as a *state* language and at other times as an*other* language.

The examination of this law has provided a summary of the main themes embedded in the 1991 Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR that have revealed the different levels of power between the federation and the republics. This law was therefore based on a politico-territorial model of policy. The following analyses of laws in Tatarstan and amendments are compared to this law.

3.4.2 The Republic of Tatarstan Law no.1560-XII on the 'Languages of the Peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan,' 8th June 1992.

This law was implemented within the framework of the federal legislation and within the framework of the Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR in 1991. The wording of the law was taken directly from the framework of the 1991 RSFSR law and adapted to republican level jurisdiction. The differences between these laws will be discussed below. What is particularly noticeable about the Tatar law was the emphasis on *state languages* and the explicit naming of Tatar and Russian as the state languages with Tatar being placed before the Russian throughout the entire law.

Article 3.2 of the 1992 Tatar language law set out the *equal status* of Tatar and Russian as the state languages of the republic, whereas article 3.2 in the 1991 RSFSR law emphasizes the status of the Russian language as the *state language* of the RSFSR. The Tatar law did not seem to explicitly state that Russian was the state language of the RSFSR in any part of this law. The Russian language as the state language of the RSFSR is only mentioned at the federal level in the 1991 law. Throughout the 1992 Tatar language law Tatar and Russian were always defined as the state languages at republican level and in article 7.1 it was written that the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan were responsible for the preservation, study and development for the languages of the peoples of the republic. Article 7.3 was an additional clause that was not mentioned in the 1991 RSFSR law and emphasized the development for the Tatar language. In this clause it declared that nursery educational institutions would be opened to provide a system of education and upbringing in the Tatar language, to develop pedagogical Tatar language learning materials as well as the development of

dictionaries, media outputs and publications in the Tatar language. This clause was added in response to the lack of Tatar language use and its weak presence within the RSFSR. It had had very low prestige during the Soviet period and this law was written asymmetrically with the intention of increasing the status of Tatar. Another article that differed between the 1991 RSFSR law and the 1992 Tatar language law was article 10 on the study and teaching of the people's languages at the federal and republican levels. In the 1991 law of the RSFSR article 10.1 declared that the state provided conditions for the learning and teaching of native languages and other languages of the RSFSR. In clause 2 of this same article it proclaimed that Russian was the state language of the RSFSR and it would be studied in secondary, specialist secondary and higher educational institutes. In the 1992 Tatar language law article 10.2 stated that both state languages of the republic would be taught in nurseries in addition to the secondary and higher educational institutions mentioned in the 1991 RSFSR law. It also proclaimed that the state languages would be taught in equal volume within these institutions. The amount of learning and teaching allotted to language learning was not mentioned in the 1991 RSFSR law.

Two other articles in the 1992 Tatar language law that were not included in the 1991 RSFSR law were articles 22 and 23. Article 22 referred to language use in the academic sphere and article 23 referred to language use in the sphere of culture. Article 22 declared that academic publications written in Tatar had to provide a summary in Russian and in another foreign language and vice versa if publications were published in Russian in the first instance. Article 23.1 declared that in order to enrich Tatar national culture, academic, cultural, political and other literature, had to be translated into the Tatar language and clause 2 declared that any Tatar cultural publications had to be translated into Russian.

In clause 3 of article 23 it was written that conditions could be created for the study of historical Tatar written language in the Arabic script. The clause additionally declared that conditions to study the Arabic and Latin graphemes could be provided for those who wished to study them and that pedagogical materials and publications of textbooks and literary historical sources could also be published using these graphemes. The alphabet pertained to the use of Arabic and Latin scripts in the sphere of culture and for anthropological reasons within faculties of Tatar Philology and History. The 1991 Federal Law on Languages of the People of the Russian Federation did not mention anything about scripts in which languages were to be written. Therefore nothing was written which *prevented* the development of alphabets.

3.4.3 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12th December 1993.

The articles that mentioned linguistic rights were article 19 that guaranteed the prohibition of language discrimination, such as the individual's native language or language of self-expression. Article 26.2 recognized the right of any person to use their native language and to be able to choose their language of communication, upbringing, education and creativity. Article 29.2 referred to the prohibition of propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic superiority. Furthermore, in article 68 it was proclaimed in clause 1 that the state language of the territory of the Russian Federation was Russian, although in the introduction to the constitution and in article 3 clause 1 it stated that the Russian Federation was multinational. Clause 2 proclaimed that the republics had the right to establish their own state languages and that in bodies of state power, local government and state institutions within the republics the state languages were to be used equally with the state language of the Russian Federation. All amendments, which were made to the 1991 Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR, were based on article 68.2. Clause 3 declared that the Russian Federation guaranteed its people the right to preserve their native language and to create conditions for its study and development.

3.4.4 1998, 2002 and 2013 Amendments to the 1991 Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR.

This next section deals with the amendments that were made to the 1991 Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR. The amendments particularly reflect how the balance of power between the federal centre and the regions shifted more towards central control after the re-election of Yeltsin for a second term in office in 1997. Attempts were made to gain more control over the regions of the Russian Federation.

The first noticeable amendment to be made in 1998 was in the introductory paragraph. There was no mention of the historical and cultural significance of the languages or that the languages of its peoples were an important element of culture and formed the basis of a national and personal sub-consciousness. The next significant amendment to be made throughout the law was in the terminology. The *RSFSR* was changed to the *Russian Federation*. Furthermore the terminology, *republics of the RSFSR,* was changed to *subjects* of the Russian Federation. The change in terminology throughout the law revealed a loss of status of the republics as the federal government in Moscow clawed back some powers from the republics. More specifically, in article 2 the term *sovereign language* was also eliminated. Many amendments were made to article 3 on language rights. Clause 1 declared that Russian was the state language of the whole of the

Russian Federation. In clause 2 it was mentioned that languages of the republics must be in keeping with the Russian Constitution that was implemented in 1993. The use of the word *republics* in clause 2 was contradictory to the changes in terminology which changed *republics* to *subjects* and the same contradiction was made again in article 12.

After Vladimir Putin's rise to power in 2000, the federal government introduced a decree that declared that all legislation of the regional sovereign republics must be brought in line with federal legislation. Putin divided the country into seven federal districts that incorporated federal subjects; these subjects included republics, krais, okrugs, federal cities and an autonomous oblast'. The purpose of this politico-territorial restructuring was to bring equality between all constituent units of the Russian Federation under the Russian Constitution. Therefore the republics had to concede their sovereign powers to the central government in Moscow to put them on equal footing with other subjects. Putin declared the Russian Federation as the only sovereign state; therefore no other constituent of the Russian Federation could claim to be a sovereign state. Further amendments were made to the 1998 Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR in the 2002 version of the law as a measure to centralize the powers of the republics with the federation. The most significant amendment to this version was to article 3 with the addition of clause 6. This amendment was made in response to Tatarstan's 1999 law on alphabet reform, which is discussed in more detail in the section on alphabet laws below. Clause 6 of the 2002 amendment stated that the state language of the Russian Federation and the state languages of the republics had to be written in Cyrillic graphemes. This was a measure to bring the Tatar republic in line with federal legislation. The use of any other graphemes of a state language within the Russian Federation had to be decided through federal law.

Other noticeable amendments made in 1998 that demonstrated the asymmetry of powers between the Russian Federation and the subjects was illustrated in article 27. This article concerned the languages to be used between the centre and the regions. In 1991 article 27 declared that the state language of the RSFSR, the state languages of the republics and other languages under RSFSR legislation were to be used equally. In 1998 an amendment was made to article 27 that stated that the language to be used between the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation had to be the state language of the Russian Federation i.e. Russian.

The main amendments made to the 1998 version of the Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation in 2013 were to chapter 2 on the rights of citizens and

language use within the Russian Federation. Article 9 of the 1998 version comprised five clauses, but in the 2013 version there were only two clauses. Clauses 2, 3 and 4 had been excluded. Clause 2 stated that citizens had the right to receive education within their native language if this was possible within the limits of the education system and if there were sufficient numbers and conditions to run classes. Clause 3 stated that the right to choose the educational institution depending on the languages of upbringing and education was the decision of the parents or guardians. Clause 4 proclaimed that the language/s of instruction was/were determined by the educational institutions in accordance with the federal law and laws of the subjects of the Russian Federation. In the 2013 version of amendments, only clauses 1 and 5 remained, which significantly reduced the rights to education in a non-Russian language. Clause 1 guaranteed each citizen of the Russian Federation the *free choice* of language in education in accordance with the federal education law. Clause 2 (previously clause 5) declared that there was provision for minority peoples and minority ethnic groups to receive education in their native language *if there is sufficient demand*. Article 10 was about the learning and teaching of languages of the Russian Federation. Clause 1 stated that provision for learning and teaching languages was set out in accordance with legislation on education. Clauses 2, 3 and 4, which were included in the 1998 version of the law, were excluded from the latest version and reference was given to refer to the 2009 Law on Education and its 2012 amendments that are discussed next.

It is useful to examine the wording of the federal education law that came into effect in 2009 and that was then amended in 2012. It particularly had an effect on republics such as Tatarstan that had introduced the second state language as a compulsory subject in secondary schooling (1997 Law on Education of the Republic of Tatarstan). Article 14 of the federal education law particularly referred to the language of education and was asymmetrical, giving more priority to Russian than to the other languages within the federation. In clause 1 education in the state language of the Russian Federation was guaranteed, as well as the choice of language training and education within the possibilities offered by the education system. Clause 2 declared that educational organizations and educational activities were to be conducted in the state language of the Russian Federation, unless it was specified otherwise within article 14. Teaching and learning the state language of the Russian Federation within the framework of state-accredited educational programs were to be carried out in accordance with the federal state educational standards, educational standards. Clause 3 stated that official languages could be taught within the federal legislative framework and that the teaching

and learning of the official languages of the republics of the Russian Federation should not be to the detriment of teaching and learning of the state language of the Russian Federation. However, it must be noted that the Unified State Exam, which all students were required to sit in order to enter the university, was only taken in the Russian language. There were no components available in any of the other languages of the Russian Federation that meant that parents would choose not to send their children to national schools anymore. Therefore both education and language policies became asymmetrical and seemed to be following the same path as Khrushchev's educational policies during the 1960s which led to linguistic Russification (see chapter two).

The following section analyses the 2012 amended version of the Law on Languages of the Peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan. First of all, article 1 stated that all legislation regarding language use in the Republic of Tatarstan must be in accordance with the Russian Constitution and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan. It must be pointed out that both state languages were mentioned as were the other languages that were used in the republic. Many of the other articles remained the same, but there were notable differences in article 3. In the 1992 law there were 6 clauses proclaiming the legal situation of languages, but in the 2012 amended version there was only one clause that proclaimed that the state languages of the Republic of Tatarstan (Tatar and Russian) had equal status. In contrast to the 1992 law, no other languages used on its territory were mentioned.

Article 4, which guaranteed the protection and functioning of the state languages and other languages within the republic, also contained some amendments. One of these was that the state guaranteed language courses in a second state language for its citizens at work where this was practical. Furthermore, for citizens who were able to use both state languages at work, there was an added bonus of 15% to their salaries. This probably pertained to the Tatar language and was not written within the 1992 language law, although there were increments paid to citizens who knew or even learned the Tatar language at the beginning of the 1990s (Gorenburg, 2005, p.15). However, this was not enough to motivate the citizens of Tatarstan into learning Tatar at that time.

Other changes related to the financing of maintenance of the state languages that was provided for at the regional level by the Tatar government budget. This latest version of the law still asserted that both Tatar and Russian were the state languages. Moreover, it did not explicitly mention anywhere that the Russian language was the state language of the Russian Federation. This law appeared to have kept the wording of the 1992 law that contradicted the 1998 version of the Law on Languages of the Peoples of the

Russian Federation. In article 9 of the 2012 version in Tatarstan, it kept the statement relating to the fact that the Tatar and Russian languages were to be studied in equal amounts, despite article 14 of the federal law that declared that Russian was the state language and no other language learning could be detrimental to the study of Russian. The fact that the wording in the 2012 version of the law did not change significantly seems to demonstrate that the Tatar government is unwilling to give up its language rights or comply with the wishes of the federal government.

3.4.5 Law no. 2352 'On the Restoration of the Tatar Language based on the Latin Alphabet'.

As well as the discussion on the implementation of the Law on Languages of the Peoples of Tatarstan in 1992, the attempted alphabet reform that began during the 1990s must be discussed. This reform was another measure that the Tatar government took to increase the prestige of Tatar and to bring it up to equal standing with Russian. During the early 1990s many former Soviet states and republics started to change back their scripts from Cyrillic to Latin as part of their de-Sovietization policies. The Tatar government started to work on the script reforms very soon after the Law on Languages was implemented as a step forward in strengthening the sovereign status of the republic, to increase the status of the Tatar language and to help to establish the survival and development of the Tatar people as a distinct national group (Suleymanova, 2010). In 1997 Shaimiev declared that the Cyrillic script did not conform to the rules of Tatar speech (Kotoshikin, 2001).

On 15th September 1999 president Shaimiev signed law no. 2352 'On the Restoration of the Tatar Language based on the Latin Alphabet'[9] that declared that by 2011 the Latin alphabet would be fully functioning alongside the Cyrillic alphabet (article 3). Preparatory measures would begin and the law was supposed to come into force on 1st September 2001. The federal government in Moscow strongly opposed the Tatar Latin alphabet reform. In November 2002, as part of Putin's measures to gain vertical power, the Russian government made an amendment to the 1991 Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation. Clause 6.3 declared that the state languages of the Russian Federation had to use the Cyrillic graphemes unless otherwise determined by the federal law. This amendment to the 1991 Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation did not create any resistance from the Tatar population. The law was accepted by the general Tatar public. Yet Tatar activists and Tatar state authorities continued to protest against this amendment. The State Council of Tatarstan made an

[9] http://1997-2011.tatarstan.ru/00001296c.html

appeal against the amendment to the Russian Constitutional Court claiming that the alphabet law violated several articles of the Russian Constitution. For example, article 55, clause 2 of the Russian Constitution declared that no laws should be issued that revoked or reduced citizens' rights and freedoms; article 68, clause 2 stated that republics had the right to establish their own state languages and clause 3 declared that the Russian Federation guaranteed all peoples the right to preserve their native language and created conditions for its study and development.

The State Council of Tatarstan framed its argument within the framework of international documentation that had been signed by the Russian Federation. These documents included the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). The State Council of Tatarstan asserted that the amendment did not comply with international norms. In response to this appeal, the Russian Constitutional Court replied that the amendment did not contradict the Russian Constitution and that language-related issues such as the alphabet reform could not be under the jurisdiction of constituent units of the Russian Federation because this would discriminate against citizens of the entire country and '*could lead to the limitations of the rights of citizens who live outside the republics to use to use their native language or freely choose their language of communication*'[10]. The appeal was rejected by the Russian Constitutional Court in 2004.

3.4.6 № 1-Law of the Republic of Tatarstan, "The Use of the Tatar Language as a State Language in the Republic of Tatarstan' 24th December 2012.

On 24th December 2012 a law was signed by the president of Tatarstan on 'The Use of the Tatar Language as a State Language of the Republic of Tatarstan' in which significant amendments were made. Before the law was passed, a debate ensued on the transition to the Latin alphabet for the Tatar language[11]. Sixty-two deputies voted in favour of the law and eighteen were against. The arguments put forward for the law to be passed were based on globalization policies and due to the fact that English was the language of international communication, Latin graphemes were becoming part of their lives[12]. In a discussion I had with Firaya Shaikhieva, the former director of the Language Policy Department in the Cabinet of Ministers in Tatarstan, she mentioned that when she goes to Moscow she sees signage and writing everywhere in Latin

[10] Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on November 16, 2004, in *Rossiskaia Gazeta*, November 23, 2004.
[11] http://www.ng.ru/regions/2012-12-24/100_graphics.html
[12] http://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/72417/

graphemes due to western advertising and western products that are on sale. She said that it did not seem fair that Latin graphemes were on display in Moscow when the Tatar Latin alphabet had been banned. However, the 2012 law skirted around this by making provision for the support of Latin-script Tatar – not as the 'official' script of Tatar. Therefore the Tatar government made another appeal to the federal government.

An interesting point to note here is that in July 2013 an international student Universiade was held in Kazan. Many international athletes participated in these games and there were many foreign visitors to the capital of Tatarstan. During one of my field trips to Kazan in April-May 2013, I noticed that public signage in tourist areas and around the Olympic stadium was written in Tatar, Russian and English, although the English signage contained many orthographical errors. On a previous field trip to Kazan in 2010, there had not been so many street signs written in English. Therefore this new law on the Tatar language and the effects of the global Latin alphabet seemed to be taking effect within the public space.

The first significant amendment was in the preamble of this law on the Tatar language that stated that every citizen had the right to use Tatar as the state language and that provision was given for the protection and development of Tatar language culture and for *the preservation and continuation of historical written traditions* of the Tatar people. Article 3 clause 1 declared that the Tatar language as the state language was to be written in Cyrillic graphemes in accordance with article 3 of the federal law dated 25th October 1991 no. 1807-1 on 'The Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation'. In article 5 clause 1 of the 2013 law, it was asserted that business and official correspondence in the Tatar language had to be written in Cyrillic graphemes in accordance with the federal law. However, in clause 2 of the same article it stated that any correspondence in the Tatar language to state and local bodies of power within the Republic of Tatarstan could be written in either Latin or Arabic graphemes, but replies from these official bodies had to be written in Cyrillic. A duplicate document written in either Latin or Arabic graphemes could be provided with the reply. Clause 3 declared that if state and local government documents were in the Tatar language that were written in Latin or Arabic graphemes, then adequate transliteration had to be provided for the Tatar lexemes, names and titles into Cyrillic. In clause 4 there was an amendment that stated that any rules pertaining to the use of Latin, Arabic or Cyrillic and that had not been regulated by the current law would be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan.

3.4.7 № 5-Law of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On the annulment of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan" On the Restoration of the Tatar alphabet based on the Latin alphabet 24th December 2012.

The former law № 2352 on the Tatar alphabet, which was passed by the Tatar government on 15th September 1999, was annulled by the Tatar Supreme Court.

On examination of both of these two laws, it seemed that the 1999 Tatar alphabet law was considered as a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation because it was the law and therefore was banned. The new amendments to the 2012 law on the Tatar language asserted that the Tatar language as the state language of Tatarstan had to be written in Cyrillic graphemes, but it allowed Latin and Arabic graphemes to be used for *less formal* purposes and for the development of historical cultural traditions of the Tatar people.

Therefore the 2012 law on the Tatar language appears to be two-tiered. At the state level, the Tatar language had to be written in Cyrillic graphemes that still reflected the power of the federal government. At the republican level, state organisations and bodies had to use Cyrillic graphemes in all documentation and in replying to any complaints or requests from citizens, which again reflects compliance with the federal laws. If any official or business documents were used that were written in Latin or Arabic, these had to be transliterated correctly into Cyrillic. However, if a person wanted to write to the authorities using Latin or Arabic graphemes then they could, although the response would be in Cyrillic and they might get a duplicate response in Latin or Arabic graphemes. Therefore from a bottom-up perspective Latin and Arabic graphemes were allowed. From a top-down perspective only Cyrillic was permitted. The amendments additionally appear to assign a lower status to Latin and Arabic graphemes due to the fact that official documents must be written in Cyrillic.

3.4.8 2014 Amendments to the 2005 Federal Law N-53 on 'The State Language of the Russian Federation'.

On 5th May 2014 new amendments to the 2005 Law on the State Language of the Russian Federation were passed and then implemented on 1st July of the same year. On the surface the amendments related to the censorship of obscene language in the media and the arts in order to preserve the purity of the state language (Russian). However, the amendments also tightened control over information in the media by the central government, including how other state languages of the republics of the Russian Federation were to be used.

The main amendments were firstly made to article 1.6. The wording remained the same as the original law in 2005, but with the addition of the ban on using obscenities. There were several amendments to article 3.1 that set out the use of the state language (Russian) in spheres of language use, such as the media in 3.1.9. Further amendments to 3.1.9 declared that the state languages of the republics and other languages of the Russian Federation were to be used alongside the state language (Russian) in the cases stipulated in the legislation. These amendments also included the use of foreign languages. Thus, the ban on obscenities and their use in the spheres of the media and the arts could be assumed to apply to the state languages of the republics and other languages of the Russian Federation as well.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the terms *nation-state, nation, nationalism, ethnicity* and *nationality, nation-building* and *nationalizing* in the context of the post-Soviet space that are used throughout the rest of this thesis and form the basis for the quantitative and qualitative analyses in chapters five and six. These definitions and studies examined in this chapter have demonstrated that identity is multifaceted, as was posited in chapter one. The term 'identity' incorporates both ethnicity and 'nationality' (in the Soviet/post-Soviet sense of the term) and are used in this way throughout the thesis. The definitions and studies are particularly important for the analysis of the post-Soviet identity tests in chapter five because the data will reveal to what extent language is used as a marker of identity according to how the respondents self-identify and which language/s they claim to use with family members and friends. This may help to reveal any in-group out-group language behaviour and will be helpful to determine whether the Tatar language is being used not only as a symbol of Tatar identity on a collective level, but also whether it is being used as a functioning language in the everyday lives of the citizens of Tatarstan. The above terms have helped to contribute to the main hypothesis of chapter five.

The definitions of 'nation-building' and 'nationalizing' are useful because they highlight that nation-building is a process of negotiation. These definitions have revealed the use of a top-down perspective. However, there is a body of literature that has shown that the top-down perspective has been challenged and that nation-building is negotiated and contested at citizen level, particularly when it concerns language policy (Kuzio, 2001; Polese, 2011; Polese and Wylegala, 2008; Rodgers, 2007 and Shevel, 2002). As a contrast to this top-down perspective, the analyses of chapters five and six focus more on the bottom-up perspective of language use as part of the nation-building process in Tatarstan. This discussion surrounding nation-building therefore sets the context in which to study people's attitudes towards language use and language policy. It also enables us to see what external or internal factors influence these attitudes and whether attitudes towards languages have changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This investigation forms the basis of chapter six.

Another interesting point to be taken into consideration is the fact that many of the studies within this chapter have focused specifically on the differences between Russian and titular identity (Hagendoorn, Poppe and Minescu, 2008; Loner and Peri, 2009; Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003; Tolz, 1998). The studies have shown that Russian identity is closely related to territorial divisions and political loyalties. In

addition, titular identity also seems to be related to these territorial and political divisions, but the ethno-cultural side of the titular identity is manifested more in these studies. The ethno-cultural side of Russian identity is hardly mentioned at all in the literature, although it was briefly referred to in Kolsto's civic identity theory in Poppe and Hagendoorn's studies (2001 and 2003). Another aspect of Russian identity that is not touched upon very often in the literature is Tishkov's (1997) ideology of return. The reason for this could be because the studies only want to highlight the territorial political aspects of Russian identity and not the ethno-cultural ones. It therefore appears from these studies that a dichotomy of identity is being postulated between Russians and titulars. However, nothing is mentioned in the post-Soviet literature about the possibility of hybrid identities. Therefore the data collection and interview analysis in my study are also set within this dichotomy of identity.

The second part of this chapter focused on a discussion of the language laws of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan which revealed the power relationship between the two governments and how amendments made to the language laws reflected a shift in the balance of power over the past twenty-four years. The analysis of these laws showed that many of the powers which the Tatar government had at the beginning of the post-Soviet period have been reversed by the central government in Moscow. It is evident from the analysis of the language laws of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan that these policies are still shaped by the social classifications of the USSR.

Finally, it is evident that a language needs acceptance within society to make language shift happen (Shevel, 2002; Polese, 2011; Polese and Wylegala, 2008). A language law alone is not enough to change people's behaviour towards language, but it gives it impetus to allow some changes to be made. Language policy implicitly gives prestige to one language over another in terms of which language will be used in the public sphere and for official documentation, as was seen in the analysis of the language laws of the Russian Federation and Tatarstan. Language policy could instigate feelings of discrimination between different ethnic groups and the use of their languages, competition for linguistic resources and perceived threat depending on which language is allocated which resources within the domains of language use. The use of languages and language choice in the spheres of officialdom, the home, work and information technology will be examined in the self-reported language use test in chapter five to see whether people feel Tatar is being used more within these spheres and to identify whether or not it has increased its prestige alongside Russian. The qualitative research

analyses interviews based on revealing attitudes towards language use and language policy within these spheres of language use. The written language tests of Tatar and Russian levels of proficiency will determine whether or not the language and education policies in Tatarstan have had any effect in promoting Tatar language competence amongst the Russian population.

Chapter Four - The Republic of Tatarstan

Chapter three examined definitions of nation, nationalism, ethnicity and nationality, nation-building and nationalizing in the post-Soviet context. It examined the processes that newly forming states and republics go through in order to establish their national identity. Many of these were called de-Sovietization processes, which aimed to re-establish the titular language as the official language alongside Russian, as well as national symbols such as national flags. Another process of de-Sovietization was the rediscovery of the nation's history as part of the Russian Empire. The previous chapter also revealed that language policy was an important part of nation-building processes from a top-down perspective. An equally important part of these nation-building processes were the attitudes of the populations from a bottom-up perspective. The aim of this chapter therefore is to explore nation-building processes in the context of the Republic of Tatarstan. The first part of this chapter gives a brief historical overview of Tatarstan to contextualize the post-Soviet period. Then the political background is examined in terms of the power relationship between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan. This section includes an overview of Tatarstan's sovereignty project under the rule of Boris Yeltsin and its demise when Putin came to power in 2000. Tatarstan's de-Sovietization processes is then analysed through an examination of corpus and status planning aspects of the language policy. The corpus planning aspects looks at the historical and ideological contexts of script and lexical reforms; the status planning aspects examines identity and in-group out-group attitudes. Finally, functional language use in Tatarstan in the post-Soviet period is analysed to set the context of the research undertaken in chapters five and six.

4.1Historical Overview of Tatarstan

Kazan, the capital city of Tatarstan, is situated at the convergence of the Kama and Volga rivers approximately eight hundred kilometres east of Moscow and Tatarstan is situated on the west of the Ural Mountains and on the eastern edge of the European part of the Russian Federation (Garipov and Faller, 2003; Graney, 1999, p.612; Yemelianova, 2000, p.37). It shares its borders with the republics of Mari El, Udmurtia, Bashkortostan and the *oblasts* of Samara, Kirov, Orenburg and Ulyanovsk.

According to the 2010 all-population census results[13], 3.7 million people reside in Tatarstan of which 53.2% are Tatars, 39.7% Russians, and 3.1% Chuvash, with 4%

[13]http://www.tatstat.ru/VPN2010/DocLib8/%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%86%20%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B2.pdf

made up of other nationalities, such as Udmurts, Kriashens, Bashkirs, Bulgars and Azeris. Tatars and Russians have coexisted and clashed with each other over many centuries. Theories about the origins of the Volga Tatars are contradictory, but the most popular theory seems to be that they are a mixture of the Bulgar, Kypchak and Mongol peoples (Graney, 2009, p.3). Islam was adopted during the Bulgar polity around the eleventh century and influenced the Tatar culture, economics and politics until the collapse of the Kazan Khanate, when the government fell to the Russians in the sixteenth century (Wertheim, 2005, p.106).

4.1.1 Early Tatar History

According to Davis et al. (2000, p.205) and Graney (2009, p.4-5), the fall of the Kazan Khanate marked a significant turning point in Tatar history. It is considered so significant that Tatars today claim that one of the many reasons they fought for sovereignty was a means of gaining compensation and to try and reverse this historic loss. The period after the fall of the Kazan Khanate is generally considered to be the first major expansion of the Russian Empire. However, according to Yemelianova (2000, p.38), Tatars integrated into Russian politics and became intermediaries between the Russians and other Muslims from the Islamic world. Graney (2009, p.5) reported that the Tatars of the Russian Empire evolved into a powerful trading and commercial bourgeoisie. They had a significant influence on industry in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Furthermore, an ideology called *Jadidism* was developed in Tatarstan. According to Yemelianova (2002, p.38), *Jadidism* is Tatar Islamic modernism of the late nineteenth century. According to Graney (2009, p.7), Jadidists believed that Muslim communities in the Russian Empire were ‘guilty of stagnation, ignorance and backwardness’ and they should ‘reform, adapt, modernize’ in order to be civilised. Tatar ideology was developed based on cultural, ethnic and religious differences, although it was not aimed at separation from Russian society; its aim was to join this society through successful achievements and enlightenment. As a result, Russians integrated the Tatars into their political and administrative society because the Tatars had significant economic potential and they wanted to prevent any rebellious tendencies. In return the Tatar community was allowed some degree of cultural and religious autonomy. They became the most educated and socially advanced Muslim community in the Russian Empire (Graney, 2009, p.8).

4.1.2 Post-Revolution – early 1930s

After the Revolution the independent Tatar-Bashkir state of Idel-Ural was declared. This state covered the territories of present day Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as well as territories that extended down to the Caspian Sea and the Orenburg region. According to Smith (1998, p.48), this state was to become 'the base for a Tatar-led anticolonial revolution in the east' led by the Muslim communist, Mir Said Sultangaliev. However, the Bolsheviks opposed this revolution through the use of power politics and superior armed forces. This state of Idel-Ural was abolished by the Bolsheviks in 1918 and Sultangaliev's communist nationalism was also suppressed. The Bolsheviks annexed this territory and forced parts of these areas into a new much smaller administrative unit called the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (henceforth ASSR) in May 1920. This new administrative unit had its own language policy that declared Tatar as an official language alongside Russian and its use was made compulsory in governmental and administrative spheres. However, this policy was 'quietly forgotten' during the 1930s, according to Grenoble (2003, p.71). As a result of these new administrative boundaries, many Tatars found themselves residing in territories outside of Tatarstan in the Bashkir ASSR and other territories of the Urals (Yemelianova, 2000, p.38). Grenoble (2003, p.69) noted that this division of territory split the Muslim population and created an ethnic division between Tatars and Bashkirs. In addition, the new Tatar state was multi-ethnic. Grenoble stated that only 25.1% of the total Tatar population resided on the territory of the Tatar ASSR. In 1970 only 49% of Tatars lived on the territory and a further 49% of the inhabitants were Russian. Furthermore, Grenoble mentioned that only 36% of Tatars lived in cities of the Tatar ASSR.

The Tatars had a long established literary tradition that included Islamic and Turkic texts, poetry and Tatar legends. These texts were written in the Arabic script. In 1927 the Tatars began using the Latin script instead, and in 1939 the Latin script was switched to the Cyrillic. These script changes had the impact of making older Tatar publications inaccessible to the younger generations and according to Grenoble (2003, p.70), was a way of increasing exposure to Soviet texts and decreasing exposure to traditional Tatar sources. However, more details of these script reforms and their consequences will be discussed in section 4.3 below. Literacy rates in the Tatar ASSR were considered to be quite high compared to other Turkic republics. In 1926 it was 48.2% in comparison to 25.2% in Azerbaijan in the same year (Grenoble, 2003, p.70).

4.1.3 1930s – World War II

Towards the end of the 1920s purges of national communists began and many Tatar Muslim Communist leaders fled Soviet Russia or were either deported or killed. They were replaced by Soviet trained national cadres (Valeev, 1995 in Graney, 2009, p.14). According to Rorlich (1986, p. 155), in 1930 2,056 Tatar Communists were expelled from the party organization of Tatarstan, 2,273 were killed due to their nationalist deviation and a further 329 were fired from the posts they occupied. In addition Muslim religious and cultural institutions were closed down by the Soviet government and replaced by Soviet institutions.

As far as education was concerned, the number of Tatar-medium schools was relatively high at the beginning of the 1930s despite the end of *korenizatsiia*. Grenoble (2003, p.71) reported that in the academic year 1930-31, more than 96% of Tatar school children attended Tatar-medium schools. Arutiunian et al. (1973, p.238) noted that in 1948 the number of Tatar pupils studying in Tatar-medium schools was 45.7%, the number studying in Russian-medium schools was 48.5% and other language-medium schools accounted for 5.8%. Grenoble pointed out that in 1958, at time of Khrushchev's Education Reform, there were 2000 Tatar-medium schools. However, by 1966 as a consequence of Khrushchev's intensifying Russification policies, the number of pupils attending Tatar-medium schools had decreased to 32% and the number attending Russian-medium schools had increased to 65.4%. Other language –medium schools had decreased to 2.6% (Arutiunian et al., 1973, p.238). Parents were choosing to send their children to Russian-medium schools because there were more socio-economic opportunities available for people educated in Russian (Grenoble, 2003, p.61). Only 7% of Tatar children were attending Tatar-medium schools by 1980 (Grenoble, 2003, p.71). As for higher education, Rorlich (p.249) states that in 1958 only 27% of Tatar students attended higher educational institutes. This number had increased to 35% in 1966 and reached 42% by 1972. These figures suggest that there was an increase in Tatar-Russian bilingualism from the second half of the twentieth century.

Urbanization, migration and mass industrialization during the Soviet period also contributed to the Russification process and development of Tatar-Russian bilingualism. Grenoble (2003, p.72) mentioned that Tatars residing on territories outside of the Tatar ASSR were discriminated against because they could not receive native language instruction in schools, even though they formed large Tatar populations in other central Asian republics. Grenoble stated that the Tatar language retention rate in 1926 was 98.9%, but this had decreased to 83.2% by 1989 (p.72).

4.1.4 Post-World War II

From the 1950s more centralization policies were put in place by the Soviet government. The majority of television and radio programmes were in Russian, even during peak viewing times. Rorlich (1986, p.172) stated that Tatar language programmes were only broadcast for a few hours and she considered them as useless for promoting the Tatar national culture. Furthermore, according to Novitskii (1980 in Rorlich, 1986, p.173), angry reactions were expressed towards the disrespect with which the Soviet officials treated Tatar culture. The Medressa Galiye Tatar Muslim School, which had been established after 1917, was converted into an asylum for disabled children in the 1970s by the Soviet authorities. By 1980 there was only one mosque left in Kazan.

According to Iskhakov (citied in Graney, 2009, p.18), Tatar political activism against the Soviet government's centralization policies began as early as the 1960s and 1970s. Tatar political activists petitioned for more Tatar language schools and even appealed to the Soviet government to upgrade the Tatar ASSR to the status of union republic as amendments were being made to the 1977 Soviet Constitution, although this was not granted (Iskhakov, 1993, p.25-27). Despite the centralization policies and repression of national languages and cultures during the Soviet period, the Tatar ASSR had more autonomy to pursue control over its own affairs than any other ASSR. Gorenburg (2003, p.33-36) states that there was a fully functioning Institute of Tatar Language and Literature, which was a branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Grenoble (2003, p.70) mentions that Tatar publications continued throughout the Soviet period. Iskhakov points out that during the Soviet period, Tatar publications constituted early demonstrations of political activism, particularly a publication on the ethno historiography of the Tatar people (in Graney, 2009, p.18). According to Rorlich (1986, p.166), Tatar publications from the 1960s helped the Tatar national heritage to survive. Other works that were published in the 1960s included a Reference Dictionary of Islam period and a three-volume encyclopaedic dictionary of the Tatar language.

The four decades following World War II represented an increase in Tatar cultural resilience and a commitment to the promotion of a Tatar ethos (Rorlich, 1986, p.157). The Tatar national consciousness had been preserved in coexistence with Russian over many centuries through the development of a narrative of Tatar national history and the struggle for survival. Graney (2009, p.8) commented that throughout history the Tatars always bargained political positioning for greater educational, religious and cultural demands.

4.1.5 Late Soviet period

During *Glasnost* a Tatar nationalist movement was formed called the Tatar Public Centre (also known as TPC). This movement comprised academics from Kazan State University and members of the Tatar intelligentsia. With the help of Mintimir Shaimiev, the First Party Secretary of the Tatar Communist Party Obkom Committee at this time and later the Tatar President, they pushed forward a draft for the Declaration on Sovereignty that demanded that the Tatar language become the official language of the Tatar ASSR, for economic sovereignty and the social status of Tatars to be increased as well as to have its own education policies recognized and science and culture to be developed more from within the republic.

With the weakening political situation in Moscow in the late 1980s to early 1990s, many regional leaders could no longer rely on Moscow for their political legitimacy or economic livelihoods. As a result, many of the regional political elites had to increasingly rely on their own emerging political forces within their republics to promote their political powers during enormous political unrest particularly with the emergence of mass organizations and pro-sovereignty sentiment (Beissinger, 1992 and Roeder, 1991 in Graney, 2009, p.20). During a visit to Tatarstan in August 1990, Yeltsin told the leadership of the republic to 'take as much sovereignty as you can swallow' (Graney, 2009, p.18). As the result of Yeltsin's advice, the Tatar republic was one of the first republics under Yeltsin's rule to seek sovereignty. It had always had some degree of control over its own affairs and had had some influence over central policies in the Soviet Union (Graney, 2009, p.18). Garipov and Faller (2003, p.165) also noted that Tatarstan had a leading role within sovereignty politics movements in Russia and they argued that this showed Tatarstan's status as 'symbolically pivotal in terms of the country's continued existence as an authoritative state'.

4.2 Political Background and Nation-building Processes in Post-Soviet Tatarstan

This section moves onto the events that immediately followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and examines the political background and nation-building processes within Tatarstan in order to put the language policy into context. The nation-building projects in Tatarstan during the 1990s were referred to as *sovereignty* projects and were an important part of the power relationship between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan. This section first analyses these nation-building projects under Yeltsin's rule and then secondly trace the demise of these projects under Putin's centralization policies.

4.2.1 The Sovereignty Project under Yeltsin

In August 1990 the Declaration on Sovereignty was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which was signed by Mintimir Shaimiev, the chairman of the Tatar Supreme Soviet Social Republic at that time (Williams, 2011, p.107). The declaration was motivated by the right of all peoples on its territory to self-determination after seventy years of communist oppression. The declaration proclaimed the renaming of the republic by dropping the term 'autonomous' and renaming it as the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic - The Republic of Tatarstan[14]. The reason for this was that the Tatar political elites at this time foresaw the republic as a political organization that was contained within the boundaries of the existing Soviet territory; therefore renaming the republic would enable the Tatar political elite to claim union republic status within the USSR (Graney, 2009, p.25). Furthermore, the territory of Tatarstan was named as a republic; republics represented areas of non-Russian ethnicity, although several of them had Russian nationality majority. The republics differed from other regions of the RSFSR because they had the right to establish their own official language alongside Russian and they also had their own constitution and a president as the head of the republic.

The Declaration on Sovereignty was the first document that formulated Tatarstan's official language policy (Garipov and Faller, 2003, p.170). It declared Tatar and Russian as the state languages that were equal, but at the same time guaranteed the preservation and development of all national languages. In addition, Graney (2009, p.90) and Williams (2011, p.107) stated that the declaration promoted Tatar language revival and its increase in status, whilst guaranteeing civic multiculturalism for all citizens of the republic. Cashaback (2008, p.249) mentioned that 'language policy was extremely important for political and symbolic assertiveness in the late Soviet Union' and language shift was one of the main mobilising factors of nationalist movements in the late 1980s. The inclusion of the status of languages in the declaration demonstrated that the sovereignty project intended to promote 'civic and multicultural understandings of nationhood alongside ethnic Tatar claims' (Graney, 2009, p.26).

Mintimir Shaimiev was elected as the first president of Tatarstan on 4th June 1991. The Tatar Public Centre supported him in his election campaign and he was the only presidential candidate (Giuliano, 2011, p.119). On 25th October 1991 the Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR was signed that declared Russian as the state

[14] http://1997-2011.tatarstan.ru/english/00002028.html

language of the RSFSR and gave rights to the republics to establish the titular language of the republic as a state language alongside Russian. On December 25th 1991 the RSFSR was renamed as the Russian Federation. After signing the Law on Languages of the RSFSR in 1991, the Tatar government went a step further in giving official status to the Tatar language and wrote into the 1992 Tatar Constitution that Tatar and Russian had equal status (article 3); in the same year the Tatar Law on Languages was implemented.

During the period of negotiation for sovereignty in Tatarstan, the Tatar political elite felt that it would be beneficial for their republic to remain within the Russian Federation while wanting the same political rights as the independent states and republics; they thus looked for ways to maximize their claim to sovereignty (Graney, 2009, p.34). In March 1992 a republic-wide referendum was held in Tatarstan to gain support for its sovereign status and to be recognized under international law. Representatives of the Russian Constitutional Court saw the referendum as a threat to the territorial and constitutional integrity of the Russian Federation; Boris Yeltsin warned that the referendum presupposed that Tatarstan was not part of Russia (Graney, 2009, p.35). The referendum in Tatarstan passed with a 61% majority who voted for Tatarstan to become a sovereign republic.

Negotiations continued between the Russian and Tatar governments and, after the Tatar government made many compromises to the federal centre, the Tatar Constitution was signed in November 1992. In this constitution it stated in articles 1 and 61 that Tatarstan was a sovereign state. Article 61 also declared that it was a subject of international law and that it was associated with the Russian Federation. It must be pointed out that the Russian Federation was only referred to twice within the Tatar Constitution; the other instance was in article 19 that stated that the residents of Tatarstan could possess citizenship in the Russian Federation (Graney, 2009, p.36).

A draft of the Russian constitution, in which the Tatar government had participated, was drawn up in 1993. However, the Tatar government and representatives of other regions expressed their disappointment with the draft because it neither recognized republican sovereignty nor minority group rights over individual rights within its text (Graney, 2009, p.37). Earlier drafts of the constitution had included clauses that allowed separate republican citizenships, but were not included in the final draft. As a result of the backlash from Tatarstan over the Russian Constitution, a new bilateral treaty was drawn up between Moscow and Tatarstan in February 1994 that finally recognized the sovereign status of Tatarstan. The original document was entitled 'Treaty on the

Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authorities between the State Bodies of Power of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of Power of the Republic of Tatarstan'. This treaty-type agreement became known as the 'Tatarstan Model' (Iskhakov, 1997; Sharafutdinova, 2003; Graney 1999 and 2009). The treaty was an asymmetrical, power-sharing agreement that allowed Tatarstan more political freedom to pursue economic and cultural ties abroad.

However, many different viewpoints on the 'Tatarstan Model' (Iskhakov, 1997; Tishkov, 1997; Yemelianova, 2000). There seemed to be a consensus that Shaimiev used the bilateral treaty to establish an authoritarian government made up of his family and friends (who were from the rural districts). At the beginning of the 1990s Graney (2009) mentioned that Shaimiev was supported by the Tatar Nationalist movement, who demanded full independence from Russia at the time. However, the Tatar nationalist movement later accused Shaimiev as being a traitor because they believed the signing of the 1994 bilateral treaty was not in the interests of its citizens. They felt it ignored the interests of the Tatar diaspora and the Tatars in Bashkortostan. They claimed that Shaimiev had signed the treaty for his own advantages. In order to avoid any confrontations and to weaken the possibility of a nationalist uprising within the republic, Shaimiev started to employ members of the intelligentsia who were in control of the Tatar Nationalist movement. Furthermore, Shaimiev's government tried to undermine the Tatar Nationalist movement's ideology by creating a parallel pro-government institution and incorporating some of their ideas into its own agenda. Some examples included opening mosques, Tatar schools and gymnasiums. Both Tishkov and Iskhakov mentioned how Shaimiev had visited Harvard University to give a lecture and to establish business contacts between the US and Tatarstan. Both scholars implied that he was more interested in personal gain and acquiring power for himself than for his country (Iskhakov, pers. comm. October, 2010; Tishkov, 1997, p.45).

Tatarstan's status as a sovereign republic depended not only on external and internal influences to gain recognition for itself as a sovereign state, but also on recognition from Moscow as a federal audience. As was mentioned above, the relationship between Tatarstan, the Russian Federation and international law was written into the Tatar Constitution in 1992. Tatarstan's sovereignty projects therefore reflected this relationship because they were subject to continual negotiation with both internal and external audiences from various political arenas. Sovereignty projects, according to Graney, could be examined from international, federal and domestic sides. Cashaback (2008, p.249) similarly proposed that there were different levels of legitimacy

concerning the sovereignty project. He defined them as *federal* and *regional* that reflected the power relations between the centre and the periphery. The next section briefly examines the international, federal and domestic aspects of the sovereignty project.

International aspect

The international audiences of sovereignty projects included political actors of other sovereign states and international organisations such as the United Nations as well as the mass media. According to Graney (2009, p.xxvi), it was important for a sovereign state to negotiate political and economic deals as well as the 'symbolic and discursive dimensions' in order for it to have been recognised as 'sovereign'. It needed to show that it was subject to international law and it had recognized interaction with the international community.

As far as Tatarstan was concerned with regard to the international side of its sovereignty project, relations between Russia and the UN, the Islamic world and Europe were strengthened due to the economic and political freedom that was granted to Tatarstan as a result of the 1994 bilateral agreement with Moscow. Many trade, scientific and technological agreements were signed with international organizations and countries, such as the US, some CIS states, Turkey, Egypt and the Czech Republic. In May 1998, Tatarstan's Vice-President Vasily Likhachev was named as the Russian Federation's representative in the European Union that was beneficial for both Russia and Tatarstan because of trade links (Graney, 2009, p.74 and Tishkov, 1997, p.45).

Federal aspect

Graney reported that the framework of federalism in the Russian Federation was based upon the needs of a multiethnic state that 'assumes the worth and validity of diversity' (Gagnon and Gibbs, 1999, p.75 cited in Graney, 2009, p.30). Graney (2009, p.31) mentioned that since the collapse of Communism, Tatarstan and other sovereign republics found themselves continually in a push-pull situation between the central government and the periphery. According to Graney, Tatarstan was used as an example to show how a sovereign state could reap potential benefits not only for itself, but also for the host state by creating a 'creative and flexible view of sovereignty' as well as providing a 'peaceful framework' to help develop federalism in Russia, and help Russia foster ties with the EU and other international communities.

Domestic Aspect

Tatarstan's domestic nation-building processes included political, economic, cultural and social developments. A brief explanation of the political, economic and cultural developments is given first of all before a more detailed analysis of the social developments that includes language policy developments.

Graney stated that as far as economic reforms were concerned, developments included the adoption of market reform and privatization. Tatarstan was allowed to control its own taxes from oil revenue and kept approximately half of the proceeds, whereas other republics were only allowed to keep a quarter.

As far as political developments were concerned, Tatarstan's sovereignty project was developed through domestic political reforms that included political actors legitimizing their claims over their citizens. Norms and practices of citizenship were established through the education system and both Russian and Tatar were declared as the official state languages, as mentioned previously (Graney, 2009, p.95 and Tishkov, 1997, p.98-102). Furthermore, all citizens, regardless of nationality, were declared to have equal rights under the Declaration of Sovereignty. However, the Tatar nationality seemed to be prioritized because the flag and other sovereign symbols all promoted the Tatar nationality. Graney said that the flag only represented the Tatar nationality because it was a way for the republic to emphasise the Tatar ethnic community's right to self-determination. Furthermore, the Constitution of Tatarstan required the President to be proficient in both Tatar and Russian. More aspects of political nation-building processes will be dealt with below as part of the discussion on social policies because these are interlinked.

With regard to social developments, money accrued from oil and taxes brought more social benefits for citizens in Tatarstan than anywhere else in the Russian Federation (Graney, 2009, p.40). The social benefits experienced by the citizens of Tatarstan included cultural, language and education policies. These are explained briefly below.

a) The Cultural Policy as a Nation-building Process

Cultural policies in Tatarstan included the restoration of the Islamic religion and the development of the urban landscape. The Tatar government restored Islamic culture through *Jadidism*. As was mentioned in section 4.1 of this chapter, Jadidism was considered as the Tatar Islamic modernism of the late nineteenth century. It was developed as the Tatar ideology based on cultural, ethnic and religious enlightenment. However, according to Yemelianova (2000, p.48), religion was morally corrupt in

Tatarstan. She stated that Shaimiev and his government were not religious and used religion to suit their political purposes: religion was a façade.

In addition, the urban landscape of Kazan was transformed with the goal of making it look like a modern capital city worthy of European recognition (Graney, 2009, p.60). Shaimiev ordered a 'Program for Slum Clearance and Modernization of Slum Areas' (1995-2004) to begin to get rid of all the old buildings that were regarded as unsafe or unfit to live in. He commissioned many new buildings to be built that would reflect the multicultural aspects of the city, such as the Kul Sharif Mosque built inside the Kremlin walls, and other mosques around the city were renovated or rebuilt. However, in order to transform the city many people had to relocate so that the buildings they lived in could be knocked down and replaced by newer buildings (personal communication, October 2010). A significant number of the buildings were made of wood and were of historical interest. The people who had lived in such buildings were offered new apartments in other parts of the city. Many citizens of Kazan argued that their history was being destroyed[15] and even set up a petition on Facebook in 2011 in protest of the destruction to the historical buildings. National Tatar monuments and museums were erected and bilingual Tatar-Russian street signs appeared. However, the government ran out of money for the slum clearance project and Kazan city centre was left with many half broken down buildings. However, as a result of the 2013 Universiade in Kazan[16] and the successful bid for the 2018 football World Cup in Russia, more money was donated to Kazan by the central government to reconstruct its buildings and roads in order to make it into a more international and global city[17].

b) The Language and Education Policies as Nation-building Processes

Due to the low status of the Tatar language of the end of the Soviet period, many Tatar nationalists fought for the right to self-determination, which included more equal status for the Tatar language, in the same way as all the other union republics and states pushed for self-determination and equal rights for languages at the end of the Soviet period. Cashaback (2008, p.253), Faller (cited in Cashaback, 2008, p.253) and Wertheim (cited in Cashaback, 2008, p.253) reported that Tatar speakers in the public sphere were faced with everyday intimidation and there was a distinct lack of Tatar language education in urban areas as well as its absence in professional organisation,

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[15] http://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/34289/14/

[16] Approximately $4.5 billion for the 2013 Universiade <http://www.baltinfo.ru/2013/07/15/Skolko-stoit-Universiada-367242>

[17] http://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/34289/14/

state institutions and in commercial settings (Bairomova, 2001; Iskhakova, 2001 cited in Cashaback, 2008, p.253). According to Zakiev and Sharypova (1991, cited in Cashaback, 2008, p.253), 'the peoples who lived within the autonomous units were worse off in terms of cultural and socioeconomic development than those peoples who had Union republic status'. As far as the status of the Tatar language was concerned, Giuliano (2000, p.305) noted that Tatar was considered as 'unnecessary' or even as 'unscientific' by many and that it was not developed enough to be used for twentieth-century industrialized society. Therefore policy makers, people from nationalist movements, academics and legislators felt that political actions were needed to expand the spheres of use for the Tatar language. According to Garipov and Faller (2003, p.171), the sovereignty movement wanted to change national politics by 'introducing Tatar language into domains outside of the domestic sphere'. Cashaback (2008) mentioned that the preparations towards the implementation of the 'language policy in Tatarstan was a crucial avenue for political and symbolic assertiveness in the late Soviet period' (p.249).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Law on Languages was implemented in 1992. Prior to this law being passed, there were debates about declaring Tatar as the only official state language, but concessions were finally made and both Russian and Tatar were declared equally as the official languages. Tatar language was introduced as part of the school curriculum in the 1990s and it became *compulsory* for all schoolchildren regardless of nationality to learn Tatar in 1998.

Cashaback (2008, p.249) stated that language policy decisions were political decisions of the regional governments as a symbol of titular identity and status. The language policy in Tatarstan was a key element of Tatarstan's sovereignty status within the Russian Federation for Tatar leaders (Graney, 1999, p.244). The Tatar language policy was implemented through legislation and institutional changes and framed within the federal constitution (as was discussed in chapter three section 3.4). At republican level, the Tatar language was considered to have special status, but at the federal level the language policy was part of Tatarstan's sovereign status *within* the Russian Federation that formed part of the bilateral treaty signed in 1994 (Cashaback, 2008, p.250).

It is important to point out that the language policy was linked to constitutional status at the republican level and was managed entirely at republican level. Giuliano (2000, p.306-7) stated that there was a split in political interests between the Tatar elite and the masses concerning the language policy. Many members of the Tatar elite achieved high positions of power because they were 'native Tatars'. In fact, these native Tatars had

been brought up speaking Russian and the use of Russian was considered normal in public. These Tatars were third and fourth generation whose parents or grandparents had moved from the countryside to cities where only Russian was required. Therefore these Tatar elites were, according to Giuliano (2000, p.307), far removed from Tatar culture and language. The Tatar language was therefore only a symbol. However, this symbol proved important in the nation-building processes of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Education policies were therefore used as a conduit for Tatar nation-building processes.

Khakimov (1990, cited in Cashaback, 2008, p.254) declared that education policies were necessary in order to increase the use of Tatar into professional spheres. According to Davis et al. (2000), 'only 7% of Tatar children studied at Tatar schools'. At the beginning of the 1990s there was a *free choice* of language instruction (articles 7 and 8), but the education policy prescribed Russian and Tatar as subjects in pre-school, primary and secondary education. In 1997, the Law on Education (article 6.1, chapter 2) declared that Tatar and Russian had to be taught in equal amounts. However, in schools only Tatars were opting to learn Tatar, whereas Russians were not. During the mid-1990s according to Iskhakova et al. (2002, p.21), the figures for Tatar language learning were quite low and one of the reasons was the lack of qualified Tatar teachers and lack of Tatar textbooks. Furthermore, parents were not convinced that Tatar language learning could be beneficial for their children in the future.

Many leaders of Tatar cultural organizations as well as members of the Tatar government wanted to see the development of not only Tatar-Russian bilingualism, but Russian-Tatar bilingualism as well (Iskhakova, 2001, p.3). It is assumed by scholars in Tatarstan (Giliazova in Minzaripov, 2013, p.48; Iskhakova, 2002, p.17) that Russians do not know any Tatar, so this type of bilingualism that is defined is a kind of ideal. Bilingualism in Tatarstan seems to be defined only in terms of self-reported speaking proficiency; levels of writing proficiency are not covered in the literature. Therefore in 1998 the Law on Education made Tatar language learning *compulsory* in schools for all nationalities to overcome this imbalance of bilingualism.

Cashaback (2008, p.253) pointed out that the federal government was responsible for the state-wide educational curriculum and that the regions were responsible for the regional component of the federal curriculum (approximately one third of the curriculum was regional). The Russian Federation was in control of state education in schools and funded its teaching. The regional component of the curriculum included subjects such as national language courses, national history, culture and literature. In the

region republics, the local governments were responsible for the provision of courses and the funding of these courses. As a result of this responsibility, Graney (2009, p.68) stated that the production of public knowledge[18] was taken out of the hands of Moscow by reinventing the Soviet and Russian Academy of Sciences. An independent Tatarstan Academy of Sciences was created that replaced the branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Kazan. Management of textbook production was transferred from Moscow to Kazan and as a result, the content of the textbooks was changed so that it reflected Tatar patriotism and civic pride rather than Russian patriotism and pride. Furthermore, the Institute of History was set up to develop an independent account of Tatar history and the Ministry of Education opened a Tatar publishing house called *Magarif*. Magarif was responsible for developing Tatar educational textbooks.

However, as stated above, only one third of the curriculum was devoted to the regional component, which caused problems in terms of how much time was allocated to the minority languages of the republic. Therefore space allocated to teaching was competitive. Several Mari, Udmurt and Chuvash language schools were set up during the early 1990s as centres of learning for the minority languages in Tatarstan instead of them being taught in state schools (Graney, 1990, p.620 and 631).

As for higher education, Gorenburg (2005, p.10) stated that higher educational institutes were motivated to start Tatar language programmes within their faculties after the opening of the Tatar State Humanities Institute in 1996. However, many science and technology departments did not offer Tatar language learning or Tatar as the language of instruction. This was probably due to the lack of suitable teaching materials and poor subject knowledge in Tatar on the part of the teachers. Gorenburg noted that there were hopes to build a Tatar national university by 2000, but due to the lack of funding and control of financial resources from the central government in Moscow, this plan did not go ahead. According to Garipov and Faller (2003, p.179), ‘no more than 10% of students within higher education receive instruction in Tatar throughout the duration of their studies’. Cashaback (2008, p.261) mentioned that there was no offer or demand for Tatar at this level.

Despite these education laws, the budget for their implementation was constrained, which in turn had repercussions for other bodies such as libraries, publishing companies and other cultural organizations. Cashaback (2008, p.260-4) stated that there was not

[18] Graney refers to public knowledge as educational knowledge. This means the historical and cultural content of textbooks which, during the Soviet period were ‘nationalist in form, socialist in content’ (Graney, 1999, p.612). During the post-Soviet period, extensive work was carried out in the Tatar Academy of Sciences to change the content to reflect the Tatar history and culture.

enough funding to fully develop the Tatar language in every sphere of language use. Furthermore, it appeared that if Tatar was only taught at the regional level in schools, then there would be little motivation to continue learning it after school.

In sum, it is evident that the Tatar identity was promoted through cultural and linguistic policies by the political elites as many other titular identities did in the post-Soviet space. The language policy and compulsory Tatar language learning were considered to be symbols of Tatar identity that were imposed on the republic's citizens by the Tatar political elites (Yemelianova, 2000 and Alvarez Veinguer and Davis, 2007).

According to Graney (2009, p.55) and Tishkov (1997, p.45), it was important for political actors to use a pre-existing sense of ethnic nationhood to lay claims to state sovereignty in order to pursue more autonomy within an existing host-state such as the Republic of Tatarstan within the Russian Federation. In other words, states had to adopt or rediscover their historical roots in order to prove to both insiders and outsiders that claims to be a nation-state were justified.

Graney asserted that Tatarstan fostered federal and local identities as well as ethnic and civic identities. However, it seems that asymmetry was present even within these civic and ethnic identities: the Tatar elite strongly pursued the promotion of Tatar ethnic identity, but this helped with the Tatar elite's claim to sovereignty, particularly in the first part of the 1990s.

Other scholars, for example Stoliarova (in Garipov et al., 2008, p.106-8) and Yemelianova (2000, p.50) mentioned that the domestic aspect of the sovereignty project caused discrimination against the Russian population[19]. Yemelianova pointed out that Russian citizens in Tatarstan were denied the right to take part in referendums and their political rights were restricted. They were not allowed to stand for candidature for presidential jobs or hold key positions in politics, military or education. Yemelianova believed that the ousting of Russians from key jobs was done under the guise of promoting linguistic equality. However, according to the 1992 Tatar Law on Languages, both Russian and Tatar were the official languages of the republic and knowledge of both was required for government positions *in a limited sense only* i.e. for cabinet positions and for those employees of the party in power. Furthermore, the Tatar Law on Languages declared that a person was required to know both languages to carry out their job within the public sphere and that they would get a fifteen percent pay

[19] Giuliano (2000) similarly mentions that minority groups were discriminated against in terms of language learning within the educational curriculum.

increase if they used both languages. The law also stated that a person should be able to carry out their business with public offices in the language they chose.

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Soon after the re-election of Boris Yeltsin to a second term in office in 1996, he began to make moves to bring Tatarstan in line with unilateral legislations of the Russian Federation. Graney (2009, p.41) stated that Yeltsin only signed the 1994 bilateral treaty as a means of acquiring regional loyalty in order to be re-elected. During Yeltsin's second term in office, his government continued to push for harmonization between the republican and federal constitutions. However, Tatarstan's government did not bow to Yeltsin's wishes because they believed that the Russian federal government was too weak to enforce the harmonization processes. Despite the continued calls for harmonization from the Russian federal government, Tatarstan continued with its sovereignty projects. Furthermore, according to the 1994 bilateral treaty between the Russian federal government and the government of Tatarstan, it was proclaimed that Tatarstan had the full legal right to exercise jurisdiction over all internal political organization and development in the republic. Shaimiev argued that due to the fact that the 1994 February agreement was signed on the basis of equality in both the 1993 Russian and 1992 Tatar Constitutions, the harmonization process would have to take place through a process of mutual and bilateral change.

Citizenship was another controversial issue under the Yeltsin regime. According to the 1994 bilateral treaty article 21, Tatarstan had its own citizenship, but this law was very vague. Russia attempted to ban internal passports in favour of a single nationality of the Russian Federation. According to Graney (2009, p.44), minority groups claimed that the aim of this attempt was to marginalize non-Russians and ethno-national representatives in Russia. However, in 1998 dual citizenship was provided for citizens in both Tatarstan and the Russian Federation.

Amidst Yeltsin's attempts to centralize power, amendments were made to the 1991 Law on Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR. In the 1998 version of this law, the term 'republics of the RSFSR' had been replaced by 'subjects of the Russian Federation' (as was discussed in chapter three, section 3.4). This was a measure to bring equality between all the constituent units of the Russian Federation and was a significant step towards future centralization processes. By the end of Yeltsin's rule, the Russian federal system had clearly become more centralized.

In August 1999 at the end of Yeltsin's rule, Chechen separatists invaded the Republic of Dagestan and soon after this invasion, there was a series of bombings in Moscow which were quickly blamed on Chechen separatists[20]. As a consequence, Russian troops invaded Chechnya. Soon after this, Vladimir Putin was elected as president of the Russian Federation in an overwhelming victory in the 2000 elections.

4.2.2 The Demise of the Sovereignty Project under Putin

Although the Tatar government was highly motivated in its attempts for Tatarstan to be recognized as a sovereign republic in international, federal and domestic aspects, this was not shared from a bottom-up perspective. Derrick (2009, p.61) mentioned that early promises of Tatarstan becoming an oil-rich republic, and any benefits which would have affected the lives of Tatar citizens, never materialized. According to interviews that Derrick carried out in Tatarstan at the end of the 1990s, the general mood of the population towards the sovereignty projects was one of disillusionment, since very little had changed since the Soviet period; during the interviews people had reported that life was even harder than it had been under the Soviet regime. In addition, the rise of Islam and the terrorist attacks in Moscow, which were blamed on Islamic separatists, had instilled fear amongst citizens of Tatarstan and the rest of the Russian Federation alike. Citizens of Tatarstan did not want what had happened in Chechnya to happen in Tatarstan, and many felt that the Tatar government should comply with the Russian federal government's wishes.

When Putin was elected as president in 2000, one of his main aims as president was to re-establish vertical power from Moscow down to the regions. His policies were built upon the weaknesses of the Russian Federation in domestic and foreign affairs (Lynch, 2005, p.143). Putin's first wave of centralization legislation was what came to be known as the 'federal package'. Lynch (2005, p.144) states that the federal package was implemented as a measure against separatism attempts from regions such as Chechnya and Tatarstan. One of the first measures that Putin carried out was to restructure the administration of the country by dividing it into seven new federal districts as a means to bring equality between all constituent federal units of the federation. Furthermore, new presidential envoys were sent to these districts in order to re-establish direct control of the federal government over policy-making. Regional presidents were not allowed to run for more than two terms in office: Shaimiev was elected for a third term in 2001, but this was just before Putin implemented the law on presidential terms of office. In

[20] http://postsovietpost.stanford.edu/discussion/re-examining-1999-apartment-bombings-russia

addition, tighter financial control was put in place: the tax code was changed so that under federal law Tatarstan had to send fifty percent of its tax revenues to Moscow. Under Yeltsin, approximately fifteen percent of tax revenues had been sent to Moscow (Graney, 2009, p.123).

Another measure that was put in place was the establishment of 'Harmonization Commissions' that brought regional constitutions and bilateral treaties in line with federal norms. As a result of the federal package, many subjects of the Russian Federation repealed their declarations of sovereignty and changed their constitutions under the 'Harmonization Commissions'. A total of forty-two bilateral treaties were annulled in 2002 (Graney, 2009, p.126). Putin declared that Tatarstan's claim to sovereignty was unconstitutional and illegal under federal law (Graney, 2009, p.116). According to a Russian Federation Report published on the website of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2000 in Graney, 2009, p.129), the Russian Constitutional Court declared that sovereignty only belonged to the Russian Federation, and the subjects within the federation did not possess any. However, Tatarstan did not immediately comply with the harmonization legislation and insisted that the 1994 February bilateral treaty had formed the basis for the legal relationship between Tatarstan and Russia. Another report from the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Tatar-Bashkir Service (2001 in Graney, 2009, p.129) quoted the Deputy Russian Presidential Administration Head, Dmitrii Kozak, as saying that power-sharing treaties between the centre-peripheries would 'destroy the integrity of the legal system in our country and its economic space' and additionally that these treaties would 'bring separatism even to those federal subjects which are now calm'.

Arguments also ensued about the Tatar Constitution, particularly with reference to clauses that concerned republican sovereignty, the citizenship requirement of the Tatar president to speak Tatar and Russian as well as Tatarstan's claim to being a subject of international law. The Russian Constitutional Court ordered the Tatar Constitutional Court to harmonize its constitution. Graney (2009, p.129) stated that bilateral meetings between Shaimiev and Putin took place to discuss the harmonization processes. During these discussions concessions were made, including substantial payments to the Tatar government to spend on socio-economic development between 2001 and 2006 (Sharafutdinova, 2003, p.625). As a result, the Tatar Constitution was amended and signed into law in April 2002. The Tatar Constitution was cut from 167 paragraphs to 124. The *Respublika Tatarstan* newspaper reported that 128 corrections to Tatarstan's

Constitution had been made[21]. Articles that had previously stated that Tatarstan was a sovereign republic and a subject of international law as well as being *associated* with the Russian Federation, had been changed to read that Tatarstan was *united* with the Russian Federation and that it was a *subject of the Russian Federation*. It additionally mentioned that Tatarstan could retain legislative, executive and judicial sovereign powers for itself, which were not explicitly given by the Russian Federation (article 1). Other articles of the power-sharing process declared Tatarstan's borders could not be changed without its agreement (article 5), Tatar and Russian hold equal status (article 8), it provided separate republican citizenship (article 21) and the 1994 bilateral treaty still formed the legal basis between Moscow and Tatarstan.

Another blow to the Tatar government came in 2002 after the Russian government made an amendment to the 1991 Law on Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation. As was already discussed in chapter three section 3.4.5, the amendment was made to part 1, article 3, clause 6 that declared that the state languages of republics of the Russian Federation must use Cyrillic graphemes unless otherwise determined by federal law. This amendment was made in response to the law that was signed by Shaimiev in 1999 on the 'Restoration of the Tatar Language based on the Latin Alphabet'. The federal government claimed that a change to the Latin alphabet would threaten the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation (Suleymanova, 2010, p.47).

Putin's next attempts to gain more vertical power intensified in 2004 after the suicide bombing of the Moscow metro in August and the Beslan terrorist attacks at the beginning of September. In a statement made on NTV in September soon after the Beslan attack, Putin blamed the attacks on the desires of Islamic terrorists whose aim was the disintegration of the country, the break-up of the state and the collapse of the Russian Federation. He also blamed the attacks on the failure of the central government to build a unified system of executive power in Russia and saw the country's weakness as a viable way to gain full power over the regions (Lynch, 2005, p.153).

Therefore, as part of intense security measures and in order to exercise more control over the regions, Putin declared that all presidential candidates for the regions should be nominated by him and that all elections should be converted to the State Duma through proportional representation. He created a Special Federal Commission on the North Caucasus and a Ministry of Regional and Ethnic Policy because he believed that terrorism was linked to domestic issues such as cultural pluralism (Graney, 2009, p.134). This second wave of centralization policies was regarded as 'the end of

[21] http://www.rt-online.ru/aticles/rubric-72/41712/

federalism in Russia' and likened to a unitary state based on the Soviet model (Christian Science Monitor, 2004 in Graney, 2009, p.135).

Despite these centralization measures, Tatarstan put on elaborate festivities in 2005 that marked the 1000th year of the founding of Kazan. A new millennium bridge was built over the Kazanka River to mark the occasion and three days of public holidays ensued. The festivities were used by the Tatar government to promote federalism and cultural pluralism and Putin attended and gave several speeches in honour of the anniversary (Graney, 2009, p.140). In October 2005 a new draft of the 1994 bilateral treaty was proposed between Moscow and Tatarstan that was finally signed in 2007. Although Tatarstan was no longer considered a sovereign republic, it still retained some of its economic, political and cultural powers.

As far as the media was concerned, Devlet (2009) mentioned that radio and television broadcasting in native languages was curtailed in Tatarstan and in other republics of the Russian Federation as part of Putin's control over media sources. In Tatarstan, there was no longer any twenty-four hour Tatar radio or television broadcasting (Devlet, 2009). According to Faller (2011, p.293), many Tatar journalists working in the media were harassed by members of the Federal Security Bureau (FSB, formerly the KGB) and threatened to stop publishing. Faller stated that an opposition Tatar journalist was fired at in October 2007 and another was 'mysteriously' killed. In addition, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was threatened with closure; the Russian government attempted to ban FM radio stations in foreign languages, including the BBC that lost its license to broadcast in Russia in 2008 (Faller, 2011, p.306). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty continued to operate online, but for people living in Tatar villages with no online access or computers, they were left without any alternative news services.

In 2010 a new president of Tatarstan was appointed by the then-president of the Russian Federation, Dmitri Medvedev. The new president of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhanov was of ethnic Tatar background and had served as Tatarstan's prime minister under Shaimiev. During Medvedev's rule, the centralization policies continued along with economic reform as well as police reforms and tighter security measures across the Russian Federation against Islamic extremism.

Towards the end of 2011 many large-scale anti-regime protests took place across Russia in response to fraudulent parliamentary elections and just before the elections in March 2012 against the unpopular re-election of Putin. When Putin was re-elected to power in 2012 there were mass protests against vote-rigging and corruption within the government (Owen, 2012). As a consequence of these protests, Putin signed a law that

criminalized street protests. This law was one of the newest measures that Putin had implemented as a way to control public discourse and the freedom to exchange information. Other legislative measures that were signed by Putin were the ban on homosexual propaganda to minors and measures to curb low-level bribery and corruption within the police force and particularly within higher education. He additionally signed an 'Executive Order on Ensuring Interethnic Unity'. The aim of this order was 'harmonising interethnic relations, strengthening the unity of the multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation and promoting conditions for its full development' (President of Russia, 2012)[22]. Some of the measures that were signed included a recommended reading list for schoolchildren, which comprised of texts on the history, literature and culture of different ethnic groups within Russia, efforts to prevent interethnic conflict such as ethnic and religious extremism and teaching of fundamentals of the federal laws for migrant workers.

In Tatarstan, hours before the Muslim holiday of Ramadan was to take place in Kazan on 19th July 2012, Valiulla Yakupov, the deputy mufti of Tatarstan was killed in a terrorist attack outside his home. At the same time, Ildus Faizov, the chairman of Tatarstan's Religious Board and chief mufti was injured in a car bomb attack as he was just being informed of Yakupov's death on his mobile phone (Keenan, 2013).

Both Yakupov and Faiizov had begun a campaign in 2011 against foreign-influenced Islam that had been infiltrating the country since the collapse of communism, with the arrival of Islamic clerics from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The type of Islam they were campaigning against was called Salafism, or Wahhabism. Yakubov and Faizov said they believed that many followers of this type of Islam were resident in Tatarstan and they feared they would do harm to local Tatar traditions and religious teachings. Faizov had banned textbooks that had originated from Saudi Arabia and he had many radical imams removed from their roles as religious teachers, claiming that the roots of traditional Islam would be destroyed. Yakupov went as far as an outright ban on Salafism (Keenan, 2013).

The attacks were carried out by radical Islamists from the North Caucasus who claimed in a video to be part of a group called the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan. In another video recording two weeks later, Keenan (2013) reported that the same Islamists warned of further operations that would be carried out in Tatarstan. Following these video recordings, the FSB carried out a large-scale operation in Tatarstan against the suspected attackers of Yakupov and Faizov in October of 2012. The FSB forces

[22]http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/3775

surrounded the apartment block where the attackers had been hiding and killed both of them. Information from the FSB revealed that the two men had planned an attack in a crowded civilian area in Kazan at the start of the Eid festival and found explosives in the apartment. This counter attack was seen as a victory by the FSB by the federal and regional governments.

As a direct result of these attacks, the president of Tatarstan signed a law that banned foreign nationals from establishing religious groups in Tatarstan and made it a requirement that all foreign-educated imams had to have a Russian-certified diploma before they were allowed to teach. In signing this law, Minnikhanov, as well as the federal government, were seen as favouring one form of Islam over another. The traditional Islam of Tatars was called Hanafi. According to Keenan (2013), Salafists viewed the establishment as anti-Islamist.

According to Keenan (2013), before 2012 there had been no history of militancy reported in Tatarstan. Tatarstan had always been proud of the fact that it was a multi-ethnic state in which many different ethnic and religious groups lived peacefully side by side. The people had never wanted separatism as in Chechnya. The main problem was said to be emanating from Tatar nationalist youth groups who were disaffected by the government and felt rejected by society (Keenan, 2013). Increasingly, radical Islamist groups were targeting Tatar youth groups to join their cause of promoting Muslim heritage and showing sympathy for their brothers in the North Caucasus. This often appeared as an attractive alternative to government policies (Keenan, 2013). However, there were many fears amongst the Tatar community who believed the crackdowns on Islamist institutions were another means to discriminate amongst the ethnic populations. They feared an even greater tightening of regional control over the freedoms they had been given since the collapse of communism.

One more final point to note in the recent history of the relationship between the federal centre and Tatarstan is the recent bargaining that was carried out by Rustam Minnikhanov on Putin's orders to negotiate with the Crimean Tatars in order to get them to vote for the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation in early 2014. The Crimean and Volga Tatars always had separate histories and were being referred to as 'brothers' in the recent political upheaval between Ukraine and Russia. Putin promised political powers to the Crimean Tatars by representation in the local Crimean government if they voted for annexation to Russia. According to an informal conversation with a member of the Faculty of Sociology in Kazan Federal University (pers. comm. June, 2014), the Tatar government has been assigned the task of drawing

up cultural and education policies for the Crimea by the Russian government. These latest events reveal that Putin is still re-establishing vertical control. Another development in Putin's quest for vertical power is the fact that presidents of the republics will no longer be able to call themselves 'president'. They will just be called 'representatives' of the president; the only president will be the President of the Russian Federation. However, these trends are continuing beyond the period in which I have conducted my research.

4.3 Corpus Language Aspects: Tatar Linguistic Ideologies

The body of work in this section examines the Tatar language and the ideologies that have underpinned its redevelopment both during the twentieth century and during the post-Soviet period. An overview of the Tatar language is given first of all, then language reforms such as the alphabet and the lexical reforms are discussed; both occurred at intensely political moments during the twentieth century and in the post-Soviet period. The linguistic ideologies are therefore largely politically motivated and concern de-Russification as a means to purify the Tatar language. Amongst some of the works to be examined are Bairamova (2001), Sebba (2006) and Wertheim (2003 and 2005). The works by Wertheim and Sebba were chosen because much of the information on which they based their research was taken from local newspapers in Tatarstan such as *Gazeta.ru*, *Šähri Kazan (Kazan City)*, *Mädäni Jomga (Cultural Friday)* and the *Daily Review from Tatarstan* Wertheim (2003) states that the press played an important role in ideological debates and nation building in Tatarstan. Many of the reforms discussed below appear to give weight to Fishman's (1991) contention that there is a hidden status agenda in corpus planning.

4.3.1 The Tatar language

Tatar is a western Turkic-Altaic language and is the result of complex linguistic contact from Kipchak Turkic, Volga Bulgar, Volga Finnic and Mongolic (Brown, 2006, p.509). It is closely related to the Bashkir language (Grenoble, 2003, p.69). The language consists of three dialects: central Tatar, also known as Kazan Tatar; western dialect, known as Misher Tatar and eastern Tatar. The phonetic basis for modern Tatar is Kazan Tatar and the standard written language is based on the Kazan dialect. Tatar is an agglutinating language that is a common feature of the Altaic languages. It also has suffixing morphology and sound harmony (Comrie et al. 2003). Tatar lexicon has many elements of Turkic origin as well as many loanwords from middle Mongolian, Arabic, Persian and Russian (Brown, 2006, p.510). It was considered as one of the most highly

developed Turkic languages at the beginning of the twentieth century, but during the Soviet period it was limited to being a national, regional language (Brown, 2006, p.510).

4.3.2. Twentieth Century Script Reforms

The Tatar language on the territory of what is now the Republic of Tatarstan has had approximately four script changes over the last one hundred years. During the early twentieth century it used the Arabic script; during the 1920s and 1930s it used the Latin script, which was called *Janalif;* from the late 1930s it used the Cyrillic script and during the post-Soviet period there was a move to change from the Cyrillic to the Latin script (Bairamova, 2001[23]; Sebba, 2006, p.103; Wertheim 2003, p.357-8 and 2005, p.112).

The first script reform occurred in the 1920s, when Tatar shifted from the Arabic to the Latin script. Many discourses centred on this particular script reform are concerned with the cultural changes that were happening at the time. Bairamova (2001) asserted that new cultural paradigms at the beginning of the Soviet era did not match the old ideas and cultures of the late nineteenth - early twentieth century. Therefore the government of the Tatar ASSR decided that a script change would reflect new cultural beliefs and values. Bairamova noted that this was not a new idea since the Tatar poet S. Ramiev had pushed for the shift from the Arabic script to the Latin as early as 1911. According to Bairamova, a Latin script would enable the Europeanization of Tatar culture. Davis et al. (2000) mentioned that the Latin script was chosen because it represented modernization and innovation.

Wertheim (2005), on the other hand, believed that this script change was regarded by some (Makhmutov, 1993 cited in Wertheim, 2005, p.114) to be discriminatory since the Arabic script had been used for the Tatar writing system for approximately one thousand years. The script had been changed from a runic system to a modified Arabic system in the tenth century, which had continued to be used until 1927. Wertheim believed that the script change was politically motivated for religious reasons. The Soviet government wanted to distance the country from Islamic influences and therefore a Latin alphabet was considered more appropriate for the Tatar language and other Turkic languages on the Soviet territory. According to Sebba (2006, p.102), the Cyrillic script would have appeared too reminiscent of the Tsarist Russification programme and

[23] See <http://www.ksu.ru/f10/publications/2004/articles_1_1.php?id=5&num=4000000>

the Latin script was considered more neutral in comparison to the Arabic and Cyrillic scripts.
The shift in political ideology behind the script change resulted in a break from Tatar culture and traditions. Makhmutov (1993 in Wertheim, 2005, p.114) stated that the alphabet was changed without the consent of the people by the Tatar Regional Committee of the Bolshevik Party (Davis et al. 2000, p.210). The younger generation could not understand the literature that had been written in the Arabic script and the older generation could not understand literature written in the Latin alphabet. Therefore both generations were distanced from their native culture and there was a feeling of spiritual disconnection. Bairamova (2001) pointed out that the script change was a difficult process and Tatar spiritual and cultural connections with the past were destroyed because Tatar literature had up to that point been written in the Arabic script.

Other important events were happening at the time that also influenced the choice of script. Many other Turkic-speaking countries were changing their alphabets from Arabic-based scripts to Latin ones. According to many scholars who have written about the script change of the 1920s (for example Sebba, 2006, p.102), the first Turkological Congress was held in Baku in 1926 to discuss how unsuitable the Arabic script was for Turkic languages. As far as Tatar was concerned, the Arabic script was deemed unsuitable because of the lack of symbols for vowel sounds. The representatives of the Turkic-speaking countries decided that a unified alphabet for all Turkic languages would be more appropriate, with a few additional letters to meet the needs of individual Turkic languages. Alpatov (1997) and Bairamova (2001) both pointed out that during this period there were also considerations about the Latinization of the Cyrillic script in Russia. It was considered as a move towards internationalization. If there was one common script then this could facilitate language learning of not only of Russian and the national languages of the USSR, but also of foreign languages. This would lead to more economic benefits for the country as a whole. However, these considerations were never acted upon and the Cyrillic script remained in use within the Soviet Union.
Sebba (2006, p.103) stated that during the 1930s Moscow started to become suspicious of the cultural links that were developing between the Turkic-speaking peoples of the USSR. According to Henze (1977 in Sebba, 2006, p.103), a unified Turkic script could have facilitated contact across the Turkic speaking countries. The Communist Party believed that this contact could have resulted in feelings of unity and common purpose that could have been regarded as a possible threat towards the Soviet government and

the stability of the USSR as a whole. In 1937 the Communist Party began the Cyrillicisation programme as a means of assimilating the people of Central Asian into Russian culture. The Tatar Latin script was cyrillicized in during the late 1930s and this script change was not contested until the end of the Soviet period.

4.3.3 Post-Soviet ideological script reforms – for and against

This section focuses on the debates for and against the attempted post-Soviet script reform that was discussed in the previous chapter in section 3.4.5. After the Tatar Law on Languages was passed in 1992, work began on script reforms to strengthen the sovereign status of Tatarstan and to increase the prestige of the Tatar language. However, many debates ensued as a result of this proposed reform and seemed to follow certain ideological discourses that are outlined below.

One of the official debates for the script change was concerned with the fact that the Cyrillic script did not suit the sounds of Tatar (Kotoshikin, 2001)[24]. According to Shaimiev at the Second World Congress of Tatars in Kazan in 1997, the Cyrillic alphabet '*does not conform to the rules and spirit of Tatar speech*.' Wertheim (2005, p.112) also noted that Cyrillic letters had distorted the pronunciation of the Tatar language because the Cyrillic letters did not represent nine of the sounds found in Tatar. Sebba (2006, p.114) suggested that Cyrillic was made a scapegoat for the phonological problems and noted that even if two different alphabets had separated both languages, problems would still have existed due to local varieties of Russian and Tatar.

Another reason for the script reform was that if the Tatar language used the Latin script, this would facilitate integration with information and communication technologies such as the Internet and computer software. Tatar language learning would therefore be made easier to learn. Khasanova (1997) stated that there was a lack of computer skills amongst the Tatar population during the early 1990s and the Latin alphabet could be used as a conduit to receive global information through the Internet at the same time as a way to learn the Tatar language. Furthermore, Khasanova pointed out that Tatars would be able to use the Internet without having to change fonts. This reason for the script reform seemed to belong to an ideology of globalization that eventually helped the Tatars to be allowed to use a Latin alphabet if they wished as was explained in chapter 3.4.5.

Other reasons for the alphabet reforms carried political overtones and discourses of belonging. At the Second World Congress of Tatars in 1997, Shaimiev declared that in

[24]http://1997-2011.tatarstan.ru/index.php?DNSID=aba5709f13e337efe5f9ba87c8df8d3a&node_id=1003

1939, '*without any discussion, and without consulting the Tatar intelligentsia, the Tatars were forced to adopt the Cyrillic alphabet*'[25]. The reform was regarded as a de-Sovietization process that would help to counteract the marginalization of the native languages of minority groups under the Soviet regime. In addition, Shaimiev mentioned that in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan the Latin script had already been legitimized and in Turkey the Latin script had been used for the past seventy years. He said in this same speech that, '*Tatars are part of the Turkic world, and it would be wrong to remain outside this general trend*'[26]. The Latin script was viewed as a symbol of integration and belonging with Turkey and Europe.

As for the arguments against the alphabet reform, the federal government accused Tatarstan of '*linguistic separatism*' (Saiganova, 2001, p.3), ethno-national separatism and pan-Turkism. Saiganova reported that the Duma considered Tatarstan's participation in the '*preparation of cadres in madrasahs in several Russian cities…*' as '*a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation*'. There were fears that the Latinization of the Tatar alphabet would lead to the spread of ethno-cultural separatism from other nationalities that could cause the collapse of the Russian Federation (Derrick, 2009, p.55). In Tatarstan there was a shocked reaction and it was pointed out by a representative for the Ministry of Education that many students in Tatarstan were studying English and this was not a threat to the security of the Russian Federation (Machneva, 2001). The Tatar government responded to these accusations by pointing out that in article 68, clause 3 of the Russian Constitution the Russian Federation guaranteed all peoples the right to preserve and create conditions for native language study and development. This argument against the Tatar Latin alphabet also seemed to have an ideology of belonging attached to it in the sense that the Latin alphabet would encourage separatism within the Russian Federation.

Another argument against the alphabet reform was put forward by the Russian deputy Bicheldeia[27] who declared that if the Latin script was passed, then only two million people who resided in Tatarstan would be able to use it, whereas the other four million Tatars who lived outside of the Tatar territory would not be able to use it since the law would only apply to the Tatar republic. The reform was also considered as discriminatory against Russians living in Tatarstan. According to Ravil' Gainutdin, who

[25]http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=19920&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=219#.U_xwN7dOVi4

[26]http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=19920&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=219#.U_xwN7dOVi4

[27] http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/11/15/tatarlisauta.shtml

was the head Mufti and representative of the Russian Council of Muslims, a change to the Latin script would cause a divide between Tatars living in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as well as a divide in Muslim society that was undesirable; some Muslims would use the Cyrillic script whilst others would use the Latin[28].

Furthermore, some Tatar intellectuals believed that many Tatar literary traditions would be lost in the same way as they had been during the last script change from Arabic to Latin during the 1920s. Many literary works had been published in the Cyrillic script and it would have been costly to translate and republish them in the Latin script. New textbooks for schools would also have had to be printed (Sebba, 2006, p.113).

Despite the arguments for and against the alphabet reform, no consensus was ever reached amongst the Tatar community. The Tatar Latin alphabet during the post-Soviet period seemed to embody two different discourses. The first was connected with the 1999 Tatar law on alphabet reform that was treated as a threat to the political stability of the Russian Federation. Secondly, the recent amendments were based on the discourse of globalization and did not seem to threaten the integrity of the Russian Federation, due to the fact that Latin graphemes were a part of everybody's life. The annulment of the 1999 alphabet reform seemed to have been the concession that the Tatar government had to make in order to gain some leeway to use Latin graphemes for purposes of globalization. It will be interesting to see what developments take place in Tatarstan in the future, regarding the use of Latin graphemes.

4.3.4 Lexical Reform

The script reforms of the last one hundred years were not the only ways that showed how political ideologies underpinned the motives of language planning. According to Wertheim (2003, p. 358 and 2005, p.112) lexical reform was another way to purify the Tatar language from Russian loanwords that had been introduced into the Tatar language since the 1930s when the Russification process had begun to impact on languages of the Soviet Union. However, unlike the script reform, the lexical reform was not legislated. It was a reform developed by language planners and professionals who were part of a language purification movement. This section attempts to explore language purism firstly from a historical perspective by examining early twentieth century ideologies, then by looking at ideologies of post-Soviet language purism.

[28] http://1997-2011.tatarstan.ru/index.php?DNSID=a0183535e6f67e5d61bbce7609240eec&node_id=992

4.3.5 Early Twentieth Century Lexical Ideologies of Purism

Wertheim (2003, p.358 and 2005, p.113) stated that from the tenth century the Tatar language was heavily influenced by Arabic and Persian loanwords. This was due to Tatar culture being converted to Islam during the Bulgar polity that preceded the Kazan Khanate of the sixteenth century. Wertheim (2005, p.113) noted that the first recordings of Arabic words in the Tatar language could be dated back to this period and Persian words entered slightly later than this. She mentioned that Tatars had established religious, economic and political links to the Islamic world during this period. Wertheim pointed out that there were two levels of the Tatar language; the first was high Tatar that included lexemes of Arabic origin. Low Tatar was the everyday spoken variety. The uneducated people had great difficulty understanding texts written in Arabic. However, during the nineteenth century, Tatar poets and writers such as K. Nasir and G. Tykai started to work on closing the literacy gap by increasing the amount of native Tatar words into the written language[29]. Glossaries were provided for the general public to be able to read pre-Revolutionary texts.

During the period of Russification in the 1930s, Wertheim (2005, p.114) stated that Arabic and Persian political and economic terminology was replaced with Russian words. Soviet language policy was to purify its national languages of external cultural influences, such as Islam in the Tatar language. Furthermore, with the process of industrialization during the Soviet era, many new technologies were being developed and therefore many new words were created as a result of these new technologies. These words entered the Tatar language via Russian. It appears, therefore, that the early language ideologies of the twentieth century enabled the Russification of the Soviet languages. In Tatarstan as well as many other Islamic states and republics, the ideology underpinning the Russification process was to turn the people away from Islam. By introducing Russian words into their languages the idea was to align the population with Soviet beliefs and ideologies. According to Wertheim (2005, p.114), it was supposed to disassociate people from their native identities to form one overarching Soviet identity.

4.3.6 Post-Soviet Lexical Ideologies of Purism

The post-Soviet period marked a process of de-Russification for the Tatar language in the same way as was mentioned above in the section about script reform. According to Wertheim (2003, p.357 and 2005, p.119), language planners and professionals formed several Tatar language purist movements with the aim of cleansing the Tatar language

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[29] Wertheim (2005) took this information from Makhmutov's re-printing of the *Dictionary of Arabic Borrowings in Tatar,* 1993.

of all Russian influences. The linguistic ideologies that seem to be most common throughout the literary works of studies about Tatarstan and other countries of the former-Soviet Union concern identity, romanticism and purism.

The first linguistic ideology to be analysed is the linguistic ideological identity. Wertheim believed that there was a metonymic representation of the Tatar language in the press as a 'barometer of the health of the nation' (Wertheim, 2005, p.106) meaning that the impurity of the language at the beginning of the 1990s was a reflection of the 'poor health' of the Tatar nation due to seventy years of imposed Russian influences.

Wertheim stated that the three traits of Tatar identity were Tatar language, culture and religion and they were intrinsically linked together. She stated that because religion was banned under the Soviet regime, Islam was being revived in Tatar society. It was believed that religion was accessed through the Tatar language, but this had to be learned properly in order to access religious writings. According to Khayrullina, 1999 cited in Wertheim, 2005, p.110),

> '*A native language is ... the means of expression of the most fine and holy feelings in a person's soul ... Keeping away from the native language and its foundation deprives the young people who purposely do not learn the native language of national awareness, personal pride, and of the ethical and moral sources of our people.*'

Linguistic and religious purity were therefore linked, but Wertheim stated that the Koran was only written in Arabic and summaries of it were taught in Tatar *medresses* by religious leaders. This therefore reveals that Tatar has no functional significance in terms of people learning it in order to access the texts for themselves.

Another linguistic ideological discourse that ran through the literary works about post-Soviet society concerned romanticism. This was referred to by Tishkov (1997, p.103) as Foucault's 'ideology of return'. It was common for the newly independent states and autonomous republics to begin to express a longing for the past when the situation in the country was viewed as presumably much better than it was in the present. People had a romantic notion of how life used to be before the Russification began. According to Wertheim (2003, p.358-68 and 2005, p.115-19), this was reflected in the lexical reforms by the language planners, who decided that the best way to bring about a lexical reform would be to replace Russian loanwords with archaic Arabic and Persian words of the pre-Revolutionary period. The words that were being revived at the beginning of the post-Soviet period were connected with politics, literature, culture and religion.

However, their use had not been standardized and there was even some resistance from some Tatars. They believed that the Russian words that were being replaced had become part of the standard Tatar language. According to Faziljanov (1997, p.3 cited in Wertheim, 2003, p.362), the revived archaic Arabic loanwords were incomprehensible to the average person. However, some Russian words that had been used in the political and cultural spheres were in fact replaced by archaic Arabic words that were used in the media and therefore eventually gained recognition from the public.

The final linguistic ideology that is discussed in this section is linguistic purism. According to Iskhakova (2001, ch.3), the Tatar lexical reforms tried to purify the Tatar language of Russian words that were being used in everyday Tatar speech. Words that were replaced described, amongst other things, Tatar national cuisine, names for members of the family, and words connected with Tatar national holidays. Therefore these types of words were connected to Tatar culture and heritage. Another phenomenon of post-Soviet Tatar language is code switching and language mixing. This is particularly prevalent amongst Tatar youth. Wertheim mentioned that there was a continuum from pure Tatar used for Tatar cultural events, to language mixing with Russian used by the youth, to pure Russian. Iskhakova (2002, p.23) stated that correct Tatar language must be taught properly in schools and that Tatar teachers were being trained in the pedagogical university in Kazan to combat language mixing and code switching. She believed that Tatar youth would only understand their culture, heritage and history through correct language learning. Then they would be able to access more information about their past. This ideology therefore assumes that unless 'pure' Tatar is used, it is not really Tatar. However, this poses the question of what it means to reject all but a 'pure' Tatar that most people may not use all of the time. It is necessary to see if this ideological assumption about 'pure' Tatar influences my results in any way.

4.3.7 Summary

After analysing the Tatar language ideologies above, there are several important points that have come to light. The first is that both script and lexical reforms of the early twentieth century and the post-Soviet period have a political dimension. The political ideology of the ruling government of the time has had a significant effect on the Tatar language. It has undergone both Russification and de-Russification in less than one hundred years.

The second point is that although both Russian and Tatar are regarded as equal according to the 1992 Law on Languages, Russian is still the language of power and it is dominant in all spheres of public life. According to Woolard and Schieffelin (1994,

cited in Wertheim, 2003, p.349) ‘language ideologies are “thrown into high relief” by social inequalities and colonial encounters’. The Tatar language was demoted to a position of low prestige in Soviet times. This low prestige and inequality that is also felt in the post-Soviet period has been mirrored by the amount of work done by language planners during this period to standardize the Tatar language and replace Russian linguistic ideologies with Tatar linguistic ideologies (Wertheim 2003, p.350).

Furthermore, it is evident that the language is a significant part of the Tatar identity and has been used as a symbol of nation-building and mobilization away from the Russian identity. The Tatar language represents purity of religious knowledge and access to the romantic view of Tatar culture and heritage. However, asymmetry still exists between the use and usefulness of Tatar and Russian by both Russians and Tatars (Wertheim, 2003, p.350).

Although the Law on Languages increased the prestige of Tatar to a certain extent, it seemed as if the Tatar language was only allowed to be developed explicitly in the cultural sense, but implicitly it was not allowed to be developed as a fully functioning language for everyday activities. If the language showed any hint of being a threat to the position of Russian in an official way, then it appeared to have been stopped in its tracks (such as the attempted alphabet reform).

Finally, although the script and lexical reforms mentioned in this chapter were part of the corpus language planning agenda of the Tatar political elite and intellectuals, it is clear that this agenda had a definite hidden status planning agenda that was concerned with the Tatar language as a symbol of identity to help promote nation building and self-determination (Fishman, 1991 and 2004; Smith et al. 1998, p.160-1).

4.4 Status Planning Aspects: Identity and Attitudes towards Language Use

The status planning aspects examined in this section concern identity and attitudes towards language use in post-Soviet Tatarstan. Most of the works written about identity in post-Soviet society mentioned in chapter three discussed aspects of Russian-titular identity from both top-down and bottom up perspectives. This section therefore examines identity in post-Soviet Tatarstan through the analysis of attitudes and sociolinguistic behaviour. The first part examines Tatar identity in society with particular focus on the Tatar education system and educational resources. Following on from this, attitudes towards in the spheres of socio-economics, the sphere of rural versus urban space and education are analysed particularly in-group out-group behaviour.

4.4.1 Tatar Identity in Society

The promotion of Tatar identity seems to be one of the main the goals of the 1992 language policy[30] and relates to Cooper's (1989, p.72) metaphor of marketing. In this respect, identity here is imposed upon the population from the Tatar government from a top-down perspective using the education policy to promote the Tatar language. According to Alvarez Veinguer and Davis (2007, p.187), the asymmetry of the language policy has encouraged the younger Tatar generation to develop an identity through language, ethnicity and religion. Identity particularly seems to have been promoted through the education system with a focus the rewriting of Tatar history to reflect Tatar patriotism instead of Soviet patriotism, the introduction of compulsory Tatar language learning in schools, the teaching of Tatar culture, history and literature and the opening of specialist Tatar schools. Fishman (1985, p.373) stated,

> '*It is in a large part, through their schools that ethnic communities define themselves, define their past, define their future, define their goals and orient their future leaders.*'

This quotation was used in Alvarez Veinguer and Davis (2007, p.189) work to contextualise the promotion of the Tatar identity. Garipov et al. (2000) examined the ethnic aspects of education and found that the Tatar cultural side of education was developed to promote the Tatars as the titular nationality. Similarly, Graney (1999, p.620) implied that the education system was about heightening the awareness of Tatar identity rather than promoting the functional use of the Tatar language.

Alvarez Veinguer and Davis (2007, p.189) also agreed that Tatar identity was promoted through the education system and it aimed to develop the Tatar conscience and the symbolic side of Tatar ethnicity. The authors stated that the education system followed the top-down structure of the Soviet regime, but the elites were Tatar and not Russian. In their study of the education system within Tatar Gymnasiums in Kazan, they found that the school curriculum was dedicated to monoculture and the mono-ethnic transmission of Tatar culture. Graney (1999, p.620) stated that Tatars were being taught to respect other cultures and ethnicities, which legitimized Tatar language and identity, and that this was considered to be promoting multiculturalism. This respect for other ethnicities seemed to have emanated from Jadidism. Furthermore, Graney stated that the language policy declared that other ethnic groups could have their own schools if they wished and if there were enough people who demanded this, then ethnic minority

[30] See chapter three for a more detailed analysis of the 1992 Law on Languages.

schools could be opened. This implies that *tolerance* and *multiculturalism* led to a belief in 'separate but equal' provision, in other words, if a person wanted Russian or Chuvash schooling, they could have it, but in a separate school, not in a Tatar school. These concepts seem to have been developed from a Tatar perspective and the main concern seems to be the promotion of the Tatar culture and identity. The development of Tatar culture and identity could be seen as the development of the in-group whereas any other ethnic group could be considered as the out-group.

The next part of this chapter examines identity in terms of educational resources that highlights ethnic competition for space since this is the sphere of language use that has been promoted the most by the Tatar government.

4.4.1.1 Educational resources

Educational resources include textbooks, the subjects taught in Tatar and Russian and teaching methodology. These resources have all been used as tools to promote Tatar history, culture and ethnicity.

a) Textbooks

As far as textbooks are concerned, the works examined in this section all state that school textbooks were rewritten to promote Tatar history and culture. As was mentioned previously, history textbooks were used to promote Tatar patriotism and pride. According to Graney (1999, p.622-3), these textbooks promoted Tatar territory and emphasized that their lands were invaded by 'other' nationalities throughout history, but that in the modern world it was the Tatars who were the indigenous, legitimate people of the territory of Tatarstan. Other features included in these textbooks were folk traditions of the Tatar people, literature, theatre and the arts. Garipov et al. (2000, p.33) believed that Tatar history teaching was important for the ethnic consciousness of the Tatar people and this was the reason why the textbooks were rewritten. One aspect of these textbooks that none of the authors seemed to have mentioned, was whether or not these textbooks were written in Tatar or Russian. However, according to Guzel'baeva (2011, pers. comm.), textbooks are still written in Russian. Even twenty-four years later, textbooks are still in the process of being developed in the Tatar language (Iskhakova, 2010, pers. comm.)[31].

[31] For more information about textbook development see chapter six and details of Iskhakova's interview.

b) Subjects

Garipov et al. (2000, p.31) also mentioned the distinction between Tatar subjects and Russian subjects taught in higher education institutes. They stated that new faculties were opened in the Tatar Pedagogical University that taught Tatar language and literature as well as history. Teachers were being trained in this university to teach the cultural elements of Tatar society in schools. The humanities and agricultural subjects were taught in Tatar, especially in more rural areas of the republic, but technical subjects were taught in Russian. Guzel'baeva (2011, pers.comm.) confirmed that only students in Tatar philology departments were taught subjects in Tatar. Stoliarova (in Garipov et al., 2008, p.105-6) also mentioned the choice of subjects; technical subjects were taught in Russian and humanities subjects were taught in Tatar. According to Garipov et al. (2000), it was difficult to change the teaching of technical subjects from Russian to Tatar, but they did not state why. The subjects taught in the school curriculum were mentioned in Alvarez Veinguer and Davis' study and discovered that the subjects taught in Tatar gymnasiums were more concerned with Tatar culture and included instruction in Tatar wrestling and Tatar craft workshops as additional subjects to the school curriculum (p.193).

c) Hours of Study

Garipov et al. (2000, p.11) considered the language of instruction and the amount of hours of language instruction as a very important question. Russians believed that there was no point in having Tatar language learning in school because there was nowhere to use it in the working environment. According to Salagaev (cited in Cashaback, 2008, p.263), who was the director of the Russian Cultural Centre, only a limited knowledge of Tatar was obtained in schools, despite the fact that it was compulsory. Russians felt that the time they spent learning Tatar at school could be better spent learning something more useful for everyday life. They therefore believed that they were being discriminated against because they felt that Tatars already knew the language and it was easy for them. However, this was just the Russian viewpoint; many Tatars also did not know the Tatar language. In Alvarez Veinguer and Davis' study (2007, p.198-9) the issue about the number of hours regarding Tatar language learning was also raised. The Russian parents at the Russian gymnasium mentioned above complained that an equal number of hours was spent on Russian and Tatar language learning, whereas before, their children spent time learning other subjects that were considered more useful for their everyday lives. They could understand why Tatars should learn Tatar, but not

Russians. On the other hand, the Tatar parents complained that there were not enough hours of Tatar language study. Despite these complaints, the parents were speaking about the subject of Tatar language learning and not the language of instruction that was in Russian for all other subjects.

d) Languages of Instruction and Teaching Methodology

During the early 1990s there was a shortage of Tatar teachers who could deliver subjects through the medium of the Tatar language because they did not know it well enough and few textbooks were available in Tatar because they were under development. The language of instruction was Russian and the Tatar language was taught as a subject. In Alvarez Veinguer and Davis' (2007, p.193) study, according to the head teacher of one of the Tatar gymnasiums in Kazan, there were enough specialists to teach all subjects in Tatar, but the implication was that subjects were not taught in Tatar. Alvarez Veinguer noted that in this particular gymnasium she visited, once the pupils were outside of the Tatar classroom space, they could be heard speaking in Russian.

To conclude this section about educational resources, Tatar identity was promoted through textbooks as well as arts and humamities subjects taught in schools and higher education. It seemed that there was some competition for these resources in terms of the languages of instruction and teaching methodology by both ethnic groups: Tatars wanted to promote their identity through the textbooks and subjects, even though the language-medium was Russian.

4.4.2 Attitudes and Stereotyping

This section examines attitudes and behaviour of the Tatar and Russian ethnic groups in Tatarstan. It must be emphasized here that although Tatar and Russian groups are mentioned as a binary opposition, which assumes that these identities form homogenous groups, in reality this distinction is frequently not so clear-cut. On the surface a person may self-identify as being a Russian or Tatar, particularly if they find themselves in an official setting where they need to identify their nationality. This is what Jenkins (2008, p.171) defined as a *nominal* identity. However, amongst family members or friends they may self-identify differently. In fact they may not even be aware of this identity switching. It is just part of their daily life and the situation they may find themselves in may influence how they self-identify. Jenkins defined this as *virtual* identity (2008, p.171).

It is important to analyse people's attitudes and behaviour because these can reveal much about identity, not just on an individual level, but also on a societal level. Attitudes and behaviour are therefore important in the negotiation of nation-building processes. As was mentioned in chapters one and three, one way of defining attitudes and behaviour is through the study of in-group and out-group behaviour (Gumperz, 1982, p.66). Furthermore, Khabenskaia (2002, p.47) posits that within this 'in-group out-group' classification, stereotyping exists that can influence how people perceive themselves in relation to others as well as influencing the behaviour of individuals or groups towards another group. She states that there are two types of stereotyping, which she defines as auto and hetero-stereotyping.

Khabenskaia (2002, p.47) defines 'auto-stereotyping' as being when one ethnic group values themselves by comparing and contrasting their group against the merits and deficiencies of another ethnic group. Furthermore, auto-stereotyping is about painting an exaggerated portrait of one's ethnic group to emphasize its positive qualities that helps to create the sense of a collective identity and favouritism towards the 'in-group'. Khabenskaia (2002, p.48) states that if a person has positive feelings about the in-group then they are likely to have positive attitudes towards other minority ethnic groups, but not towards the majority ethnic group. 'Hetero-stereotyping' concerns the 'other group' or the 'out-group'. A strong ethnic differentiation causes negative attitudes towards the out-group. This definition is used in the interview analysis of in-group out-group behaviour in chapter six.

In this next section attitudes and stereotyping are examined in the socio-economic and educational spheres to illustrate how Tatar identity is promoted and to examine the space in which people from Tatar and Russian ethnic groups in Tatarstan perceive this space as 'in-group' or 'out-group' space.

4.4.2.1 In-group out-group phenomena in the sphere of socio-economics

Stoliarova (in Garipov et al., 2008) examined how the structure of social status was linked to economic conditions. She stated that national processes within different social groups are not the same. In other words, the level and intensity of ethnic features differed.

In a survey carried out in 1998 by Stoliarova (in Garipov et al., 2008, p.107), strong competition was found between different ethnic groups. The results from the survey showed that 55.7% of Russians felt they would find it difficult to find a good job if the Tatar population grew. Only 8.7% of Tatars thought this about the Russian population. In response to a question about whether or not the economic situation would worsen if

the number of Tatars in Tatarstan increased, 58% of Russian respondents replied yes. Most of the Russians in the republic felt that Tatars had better chances of finding a good job and advancing further than Russians, and in the face of competition, being Tatar had many more advantages as far as good work and position are concerned. This partially confirms the opinions of many other researchers (such as Garipov et al., 2000) in the field, who have found that in the work and employment domain there is strong competition between ethnic groups whereas in the home domain there is no competition because the cultural norms take precedence. However, these opinions are one-sided: Tatars do not feel this to be an issue whereas Russians do.

The results also confirmed differences in values between the two ethnic groups. Tatars considered the following a priority:

1. Law and order;
2. A healthy environment;
3. Development of national culture;
4. Strengthening the consciousness of the republic;
5. Religious support;
6. Development of the market economy.

The Russians priorities were as follows:

1. Law and order;
2. A healthy environment;
3. Development of the market economy;
4. To have their interests represented by organs of power;
5. Development of national culture.

This showed that both groups wanted a peaceful harmonious environment within the republic, but Tatars prioritized their identity and culture. Russians prioritized the economy more and it suggests that they felt their identity and interests were threatened, therefore they wanted their interests represented through the organs of power. The reason Russians did not seem to value culture more highly seemed to be because they took the existence of a strong and established tradition for granted. Stoliarova's (in Garipov et al., 2008, p.109) evidence also showed a resemblance to the typologies of identity explained in chapter three (Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003; Tolz, 1998). Russians seemed to take on political and economic traits of identity related to the functional side of identity. Tatars, on the other hand demonstrated more ethnic and

cultural traits of identity. Stoliarova's study suggested that Russians perceived themselves to be unequal to Tatars in spheres of work and economic status; however her results showed that they were actually equal to Tatars or slightly better off in socio-economic terms.

In-group and out-group behaviour can clearly be seen between the Russian and Tatar ethnic groups in Stoliarova's study. A particular difference between the socio-economic levels was also demonstrated in the study. The lower classes, that is to say, the rural population and people not living in Kazan (both Russians and Tatars) had a tendency to adjust to their work situation. Poppe and Hagendoorn (2003) also found that if Russians were from a lower educational class, they assimilated more with the 'in-group', but the authors could not say why.

Furthermore, it was found that if a company was considered to be Tatar, that is to say, it is run by Tatars, sells Tatar products and is therefore aimed at Tatar audiences, then Tatar customs were respected and Tatar was the language spoken at work. The same applied to Russian-run companies. The language of higher-level socio-economic groups was determined by prestige and social status and positions of power were highly sought after. There was much more ethnic competition amongst higher-level socio-economic groups because there was more opportunity for language to be an issue in those types of occupations such as desk-type occupations, where written language was used.

4.4.2.2 In-group out-group phenomena in the sphere of education

In Alvarez Veinguer and Davis' (2007) study, they showed how 'in-group out-group' behaviour was manifested in attitudes towards Tatar language use in the system of education in two gymnasiums in Kazan; one was non-Tatar and the other was Tatar. The authors stated that the mother tongue (*rodnoi iazyk*) was constantly being referred to in both gymnasiums and that this seemed to represent 'the clearest boundary marker in teachers' and pupils' representations of "others" and in the construction of collective identities' (p.194). The study also found that parents had a strong attitude towards the Tatar language. In the interviews Tatar parents expressed how the Tatar language was a sign of belonging to the Tatar group and not to the Russian group. One of the Tatar pupils in particular said that he, 'feels at ease inside his clan, free to talk about the "others" and to define himself' (p.195). He also said that Russian teachers did not care about Tatar pupils. However, the pupil's parents could have influenced this attitude. Many of the Tatar interviewees said they felt Russians had no interest in the Tatar language whatsoever and when they were asked their opinions about Russians learning Tatar in schools, one interviewee responded that Russians 'study it, but they do not

speak it, I have never heard a Russian speaking Tatar' (p.198). This interviewee also declared that when Russians and Tatars were together they all spoke Russian together. This implied that it would contravene expectations for a Russian to communicate in Tatar, because they were not Tatar; thus, they were not part of the 'in-group'.

Russian interviewees in Alvarez Veinguer and Davis' study believed that they should not have to learn the Tatar language if they did not want to. They thought that Tatar was not a fully functioning language and it was therefore not necessary. Hence, there was a distinct difference in the viewpoints between the Russians and the Tatars concerning Tatar language use. The Tatars had an emotional attachment to the language as a sign of their group belonging whereas the Russians did not feel this about the Tatar language. Alvarez Veinguer and Davis reported that Russians saw it as an unnecessary subject that they had to learn and it did not have a function in their everyday lives. Alvarez Veinguer and Davis (2007, p.202) also mentioned that during their fieldwork in Kazan, many references were made to "our" history, traditions and culture that suggested a code of collective Tatar identity.

Furthermore, these authors discovered that the failure of bilingualism was blamed on the teaching methods in schools. Tatars claimed that non-specialists were teaching the Tatar language and therefore the development of bilingualism was slow. The authors felt this implied that the Russian teachers were to blame because they could not possibly teach Tatar due to the fact that the Russian teachers were not Tatar. Once again, it was evident that Tatars believed their language was a sign of Tatar in-group belonging.

In this article the attitudes of both ethnic groups towards each other were clear regarding language use. Tatars attached emotional importance to the Tatar language and they had a negative attitude towards Russians learning it. Russians perceived language as something functional that was useful in everyday life – Tatar was not.

4.4.2.3 In-group out-group phenomena in rural urban spaces

Another theme that recurred throughout the works mentioned in this section was attitudes towards identity and language use in rural and urban spaces. As has already been mentioned above, a sense of Tatar patriotism and pride was promoted through the rewriting of school textbooks that emphasized how in the past, the Tatar territory had been 'invaded' by other nationalities (Graney, 1999, p.622-3). Tatars were supposed to feel proud that the territory of Tatarstan had been declared a sovereign republic after centuries of being classed as part of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. This discussion could be considered to have focused on the macro level of geography.

At the micro level of geography, Garipov et al. (2000, p.39-40) pointed out that the language a person chooses to speak depends on whether they were brought up in a village or in a town and which language they spoke with their parents. Garipov et al. (2000, p.41) found that Tatars were more likely to speak both Russian and Tatar within a city and they would be more likely to speak Russian than Tatar, whereas in a more rural area they would be more likely to use Tatar. Giuliano (2000, p.306) noted that a 'social status cleavage existed between rural and urban Tatars' that added to the problem of Tatar language use in these areas. The urban Tatars considered this divide to be psychological, a 'rural inferiority complex', even as if rural Tatars were from a different culture altogether. Giuliano noted that this attitude about status was further qualified by urban Tatars, who claimed their rural counterparts could not even speak Russian. Garipov et al. (2000, p.41) mentioned that it was more difficult to use Tatar in a city due to Russian being the dominant language. This also could be due to more Russians residing in cities than in rural areas. On the whole, Tatarstan is considered as the Tatar homeland and where an individual resides influences the language he or she speaks. Urban spaces are more Russian and rural spaces are considered as Tatar.

4.4.3 Summary

The body of scholarly works examined in this section has shown that language use is not the only important factor determining identity in what are said to be language-based communities. There is also a nexus of other issues related not just to language use, but to beliefs about language and identity that divide Tatars from Russians and from the other autochthonous nationalities of Tatarstan. This confirms the findings of the studies that were carried out into Russian and titular identity in chapter three (i.e. Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003).

As far as the Tatar identity is concerned, the above discussion has shown that attitudes and stereotyping coalesce due to family ties and influences and place of residence, as was shown in Giuliano (2000). As for identity traits such as culture, tradition, values, language and ethnicity, Graney (2009) and Alvarez Veinguer and Davis' study (2007) have shown how the Tatar revival included the development of the Tatar national consciousness and reawakening of Tatar identity after seventy years of Communist rule and oppression. These works show that the Tatar language has been promoted by the republic's government through the education system and educational resources as a symbol of Tatar identity.

As far as the Russian population was concerned, none of these works mentioned the Russian identity or language explicitly. One reason for this could be that, as Graney stated (1999, p.613), Russians were not considered as a minority group because their 'cultural needs were taken for granted and Russians did not receive special recognition as a separate ethnic group' - this seems to be reflected in the scholarly literature. Another reason could be that most scholarly literature written about post-Soviet Tatarstan deals exclusively with Tatar identity. Despite this, there was evidence to show how Russians were perceived and how they perceived themselves in the analysis of attitudes and 'in-group out-group' behaviour. Tatars appeared to consider Russians as the 'out-group' because of their nationality and did not seem to want to share their language with them. On the surface this would appear to be true, but as was discussed above, Russian was still the dominant language in functional spheres such as education and economics and it was implied that Russian was still the language of instruction for all subjects except Tatar language learning. In any case, Tatars did not believe that Russians could be as proficient in Tatar as a Tatar person because Russians were not Tatars. Tatar language was a sign of belonging to the 'in-group'. Tatars seemed to be painting a romantic view of their ethnicity in order to strengthen the collective Tatar identity (Giliazova, 2013; Tishkov, 1997). It seemed that Tatars were battling for their identity to be recognized both to international and domestic audiences, whereas the Russians did not have to do this because they *felt* that they had been the dominant ethnic group for many centuries (including times from the Kazan Khanate). These attitudes were therefore rooted in the behaviour of both ethnic groups towards each other (Graney, 2009).

Finally, most of the scholarly works analysed in this section so far have been based on qualitative studies. This thesis also uses qualitative based research methods to discover attitudes towards Tatar language use expressed in interviews to see if there has been a change since the 1990s in the attitudes expressed in the literature in this chapter to the present day. A further aim of the research is to find out more information about Russian attitudes towards the Tatar language in Tatarstan.

4.5 Functional Language Use in Post-Soviet Tatarstan

This section focuses on the functional use of the Tatar language in spheres of language use such as education, the media, government and administration, work and the home as well as language fluency rates.

Quantitative studies carried out by Iskhakova (2001) and Iskhakova et al. (2002) focus on Tatar-Russian bilingualism and look at the effects the language policy has had on improving the status of the Tatar language and language spread in all spheres of society. Tatar-Russian bilingualism is examined as opposed to Russian-Tatar bilingualism, because at the time of this research native Tatars were rediscovering their cultural and spiritual life. The authors point out that the growth of national self-consciousness has had significant changes on language use. In addition, the authors wished to define language orientation of the Tatar and Russian urban populations in Tatarstan in communicative situations. The research was therefore set in towns and cities because of intense urbanization processes that occurred, the variety of socio-professional groups and the multinational population who reside there.

As far as the socio-demographic findings were concerned, the 1989 all-population census results showed that the population comprised of 48.5% Tatars and 43.3% Russian. Furthermore 73% of the whole population lived in towns and cities whereas 27% lived in rural areas. Of these figures 50% of the population living in towns were of Russian nationality and 42% were Tatar. In rural areas 65% of the population were of Tatar nationality and only 22% were Russian (Bairamova, 2001 cited in Iskhakova, 2002, p.13). These results showed that the Russian population were more prominent in urban areas of the republic.

As far as Tatar levels of language proficiency were concerned, the 1989 all-population census revealed that 1.1% of Russians claimed to speak Tatar fluently whereas the results showed that 96% of Tatars reported speaking Tatar fluently Iskhakova (2001, p.17). However, these results must be read with caution due to the supposition that the census results were not a true measure of language proficiency, but a measure of which ethnic group people belonged to that explains why the results for the Tatar population were so high. The levels of self-reported proficiency in Tatar for Russians were lower than for any other ethnic group within the Tatar republic. Iskhakova stated that the levels of Russian language proficiency of the Tatar population in the late 1980s were shown to be very high in Tatarstan. However, in rural areas only 63% of Tatars self-reported to be fluent in Russian.

Iskhakova pointed out that these census results were taken before the implementation of the language policy in 1992, but the fact that Russian was reportedly spoken proficiently by both populations, especially in towns and cities, showed that conditions for the development of the Tatar language in Tatarstan were not favourable. The studies

reveal the main developments in Tatar language shift in the spheres of language use below.

4.5.1 Sphere of Education

One of the main developments in Tatar language shift took place in the sphere of education. Gorenburg (2005, p.17) placed these changes at stages 4 and 5 of Fishman's GIDS scale, which concerned education and literacy of the Tatar language. According to Gorenburg, Tatar language education was aimed at increasing its use amongst the ethnic Tatar population at the beginning of the 1990s and at this time sociolinguistic studies[32] that had been carried out showed that Tatar children who had been educated in Russian were more likely to use Russian amongst their peers. Prior to 1993, only 24% of Tatars were studying Tatar and no non-Tatar children were learning it. However, Tatar language learning became a requirement in all schools, including all Russian schools, and by 1998 the total number of all schoolchildren learning Tatar had increased to 99%.

4.5.2 Spheres of Government and Administration

Iskhakova et al. (2002, p.14) found that only Russian was used in the spheres of government and administration, although the language policy declared that the government should conduct their business and publish laws in both state languages. As for administration and judicial services, the authors stated that both languages should be used, especially when representing individuals in court cases since it was the individual's right to use their native language, but only Russian was actually used. According to the authors, legal and technical bilingual dictionaries existed to help people develop their language in these spheres, but people were not using them.

4.5.3 Sphere of Media

In the media sphere, Iskhakova et al. (2002, p.149) found that since the language policy had been introduced, there had been a boom in Tatar language publications. In 2001 the number of newspapers published in Tatar was 314 compared to only 147 in 1985; magazines – 85 compared to 14 in 1985. However, although Tatar language publications were available, this did not mean that everybody was reading them. The authors discovered that 13.8% of Tatars reported that they preferred to read *only* Tatar newspapers and magazines, 12.3% of Tatars claimed that they read *mainly* Tatar newspapers and magazines, but that 36.5% reported that they preferred to read in both Tatar and Russian, 19.8% of Tatars declared they read only in Russian, 3.3% reported

[32] Sharypova, (1989 in Gorenburg, 2005, p.8)

they did not read newspapers or magazines and 0.4% found it difficult to answer. As for Russians, 81.5% reported that they read *only* in Russian and 11.9% claimed they read *mainly* in Russian. 0.3% reported that they read *mainly* in Tatar and 0.5% reported reading in both Russian and Tatar. 5.3% claimed that they did not read any newspapers or magazines and 0.5% found it difficult to (p.33).

As for TV and radio broadcasting, the authors found that there was an imbalance between the amount of Russian and Tatar broadcasting. The authors attributed this to competition between Russian and English programmes. In other words, if there was a choice to watch Russian, English or Tatar programmes, then people would choose either Russian or English over Tatar due to Tatar programmes not being relevant to real life because the content was about Tatar culture[33] (p.25). The results of the survey found that 17% of Tatars watched TV and listened to radio in Tatar and Russian and 46% watched and listened only in Tatar. 20% watched TV and listened to the radio only in Russian. The results for Russians were similar to those for printed publications; 43% watched TV and listened to the radio only in Russian and the rest responded that it was difficult to say.

The results of the study by Iskhakova et al. (2002) showed that Tatar became widely available in the media after the implementation of the language policy, but only Tatars used Tatar media. Furthermore, Tatars also used Russian media, while Russians only used Russian media. According to Gorenburg (2005), these developments in the media would be placed on Fishman's GIDS scale at stage two, although this is debatable: the function of Tatar has been widened in the media sphere, but this is not a reflection of how people use it.

4.5.4 Spheres of Work and Home

As far as language use at work and within the home were concerned, in the work environment Russians only used Russian, but 41.5% of Tatars used both Tatar and Russian depending on the situation they were in. 43.4% of Tatars used only Russian at work (Iskhakova et al., 2002, p.31). Furthermore, if the work environment was Tatar, then Tatar would be used and if Tatars were communicating with each other they would also use Tatar. The results of the study by Iskhakova et al. (2002) are also very similar to Stoliarova's findings (in Garipov et al., 2008). In rural areas 70% of Tatars would use Tatar at work. Gorenburg (2005) does not mention Fishman's GIDS framework regarding the sphere of work, but the sphere of work would fall into stage 3 GIDS.

[33] Observations made by the author of this thesis of Tatar TV programmes in October 2010 revealed that most programmes portrayed a folk/traditional way of Tatar life.

In the home environment, Russians would only use Russian and 37% of Tatars would use either Russian or Tatar depending on which language their parents used. 36% would use only Tatar at home compared to 90% in rural areas. There was a clear difference in Tatar language use between urban and rural dwelling Tatars (Iskhakova et al., 2002, p.31).

4.5.5 Language fluency rates

Iskhakova et al. (2002, p.29) also examined self-reported language proficiency levels of the Tatar language. The results showed that 70% of Tatars considered that they spoke, read and wrote in Tatar fluently whereas only 2% of Russians revealed that they did. 18% of Tatars felt that they could read and write in Tatar with some difficulties, although they felt that they spoke Tatar fluently. Only 3% of Russians felt the same way.

In sum the above studies have shown that there has been some development in widening the functions of Tatar language use, particularly in the sphere of education and the media since the language policy was implemented. However, the authors felt that the implementation of the language policy had not been as effective as they had hoped due to attitudes towards the Tatar language. They believed neither time nor language policy would change the language behaviour of the people. They pointed out that more funding was needed to implement a policy of bilingualism, and that although much attention was given to Tatar at that time, it still needed more support. There was a large gap between the legal status of the Tatar language and its functioning in real terms – Russian was still the dominant language in all spheres. The authors concluded that the language situation in Tatarstan was not just a political concern, but it was also a concern for schools, families, the media and social organizations. Finally, although Tatar language development still had a long way to go, the authors believed that the language policy has increased the prestige of the Tatar language.

4.5.6 Summary

The studies analysed in this section show that there had been some developments in Tatar language shift, especially in the spheres of education and the media. However, Russian was still the dominant language in science and technological areas, particularly in higher education; both Russians and Tatars were still using Russian in the public domain; Russian was still dominating family and socio-economic spheres in urban areas. Bairamova (2001) noted that Tatar was used in the national cultural sphere for religion, theatre, art, translation and pedagogical publishing as well as on the radio and

on TV. Bairamova stated that although the function of Tatar was widened (to the cultural sphere), Russian was still used as the language of power and it did not lose any of its functions.

These studies and many other similar studies that were carried out in the immediate post-Soviet period, only focused on the Tatar-Russian side of language development. The studies posited that Tatars have more bilingual proficiency in Tatar and Russian, but Iskhakova et al. (2002, p.32)stated that this was still not the desired outcome:, language behaviour needed to be changed. Furthermore, and they believed that this must begin in the home and that this was even more important than language learning in educational spheres. Gorenburg (2005, p.17) analysed Iskhakova's results based on Fishman's GIDS framework (1991). He stated that the Tatar government focused its revival in Fishman's stages 4 and 5 (education) and in stages 1 and 2[34]. He stated that in stage 6 intergenerational language transmission was losing ground to Russian, but there was hope that work on the Tatar language revival in stages 5-1 might reverse this effect amongst family members in urban areas. In other words, if Tatar was used in the public domains and in education, this might instigate family members to start using Tatar in the home.

Gorenburg (2005, p.17) noted that the language revival programme was considered a failure due to the decline in Tatar language usage amongst Tatars in Fishman's GIDS stage 6 as a consequence of decreasing intergenerational language use in urban areas, but as was mentioned above, there was hope that the government's efforts at Tatar language revival in stages 5-1 would 'increase Tatar language usage and stop the erosion of intergenerational language transmission' (p.17).

Despite this, Gorenburg mentioned that although the language revival programme was considered a failure *amongst Tatars*, it had not been a failure as far as improving *knowledge* about the Tatar language was concerned. He stated that in a survey[35] carried out amongst Russians, the results revealed that there had been a significant rise in the number of Russians who had some knowledge of the Tatar language, although the number of Russians who claimed to be fluent in Tatar remained very low. This increase in Tatar language knowledge was due to the language revival programme in schools. Furthermore, he reported that Gabdrakhmanova's study found that 6.2% of urban Russians spoke Tatar fluently in 1990 and that this figure had nearly doubled to 12.3% in 2001. The study reported that Russians who reported they understood Tatar, but

[34] Ethnologue puts Tatar at GIDS stage 2, see https://www.ethnologue.com/cloud/tat

[35] Gabdrakhmanova, in Iskhakova et al. (2002, p.121, cited in Gorenburg, 2005, p.19).

could not speak it had also risen from 12.1% in 1990 to 16.8% in 2001. Gorenburg said that the study showed this percentage was greater amongst Russian youth of which 22% claimed to speak some Tatar and 21% self-reported to understand it, but claimed not to write it. Gorenburg said that these results were not surprising, since before 1990 there was no opportunity for Russians to learn Tatar, whereas during the 1990s there were opportunities for them to learn it in schools. Therefore, the Tatar language revival programme has been considered a failure amongst Tatars, but not amongst Russians. Researchers seem to be more interested in the Tatar side of the language revival programme because it is a means of strengthening the Tatar identity.

Although Gorenburg reported that *some* research has been carried out into Tatar language knowledge amongst the Russian population, none of the surveys used any language testing techniques to determine the *written* Tatar proficiency levels of both the Tatar and Russian populations; they all just seem to be based on opinions and personal preferences from the respondents.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the politico-historical background of Tatarstan to put language planning and policy into context for the research in chapters five and six. The literature has revealed that during the 1990s, an important part of Tatarstan's nation-building process was the sovereignty project. This was a means of establishing the identity of the republic as *Tatar* to both external and internal audiences as was discussed by Graney (2009), Tishkov (1997), Sharafutdinova (2003) and Yemelianova (2000). The political background also illustrated how the Tatar nation-building processes, such as the sovereignty project were reversed when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. This background information is essential for the research in chapters five and six because it sets the context in which attitudes are expressed towards language policy, planning and language use in post-soviet Tatarstan. The attitudes expressed may clarify whether or not any resistance is shown towards Tatar government policies by the types of answers given in the surveys for chapter five and the interviews that are analysed in chapter six.

Furthermore, the literature has shown that Tatar language ideologies have a strong political dimension (Bairamova, 2001; Sebba, 2006; Wertheim 2003 and 2005). Corpus planning, which took place in Tatarstan immediately after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, revealed a hidden status agenda based on political motives of the de-Russification process. The literary works (Garipov et al. 2008; Graney, 1999; Khabenskaia, 2002; Stoliarova in Garipov et al., 2008; Alvarez Veinguer and Davis, 2007) that discussed identity in post-Soviet Tatarstan reflected the societal dimension of identity and revealed that attitudes towards Tatar identity and Tatar language use seemed to be the result of stereotyping between Russian and Tatar ethnic groups. The analysis of identity and stereotyping has highlighted the dichotomy between Russian and Tatar identities that was first posited in chapter three. In addition, these works particularly focus on the Tatar language more as a cultural symbol of Tatar identity rather than it having a functional use. This cultural component was a strong theme, especially in the qualitatively based research in this chapter, so I examine it closely in my own surveys and qualitative data collected from interviews. The final works (Iskhakova, 2001 and Iskhakova et al., 2002) examined the functional side of Tatar language and used a more quantitative approach in their methodologies. However, the focus of these studies was on the Tatar population and the results were based on opinions and personal preferences, not actual language use.

What seems to be particularly prevalent in the literature discussed in this chapter is the gap between the functional and symbolic sides of the language situation in Tatarstan. Furthermore, this functional/symbolic dichotomy shows a strong focus on Tatar over all other languages and ethnicities, although the republic promotes itself as a multilingual republic. However, in reality Russian was still shown to be the dominant language that was used for everyday functions in all spheres of language use, despite the promotion of Tatar and its status as one of the official languages of Tatarstan. The works in this chapter (for example Khabenskaia, 2002) have particularly highlighted the gap between perceptions and actual usage of the Tatar language. In Tatarstan, only Tatars appeared to use it, and only amongst family members or as a sign of belonging to the Tatar ethnic group. Russians perceived Tatar as having no functional value and did not see the need to learn it, since Russian was used for everything in every sphere of language use.

The aim of my research is to focus on Russian-Tatar bilingualism using a mixed-methods approach. Quantitative research is carried out using a survey in order to test the *written* levels of Tatar language proficiency of the Russian population alongside the Tatar population. This has formed an epistemological approach to the research in order to obtain a more objective stance on the language situation than the studies that were carried out in the 1990s in Tatarstan. The aim of the research is to find out how successful the language law and education policies have been in promoting Tatar language shift. As was mentioned by Shevel (2002) in chapter three, if the public accept a policy then they will engage with the rules of the state that in turn legitimizes government policy. As far as this research is concerned, if the Tatar language policy and education policy are successful, then people may demonstrate they have a written level of Tatar language proficiency. This hypothesis has contributed to the language proficiency tests in the survey that is analysed in chapter five.

Furthermore, my research focuses on how *useful* Tatar language is considered to be in spheres of language use by examining how the respondents self-report their use of written languages within the spheres. The spheres of language use were chosen based on Fishman's (1991) GIDS model that was mentioned in chapter one, Iskhakova's spheres of language use in her studies that were analysed in this chapter and Brown's (2007) study of language use in Belarus (chapter one). In order to examine the usefulness of Tatar language, a Likert table was designed for the survey that formed part of the analysis for chapter five. In addition, the interview questions, which were used for the analysis in chapter six, were designed for people to respond in a way that would enable them to express their attitudes towards language use in their daily lives and to

examine whether attitudes towards the Tatar language had changed at all since the research that was carried out in this chapter. It will be interesting to see if the language policy has had any further influence in spheres of language use twenty-four years after its implementation.

Chapter Five – Quantitative Data Analysis[36]

This chapter examines Russian and titular language use within the Russian Federation twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The aim of this research is to examine *written* levels of Tatar proficiency amongst both the Russian and Tatar populations to how successful the Tatar language policy has been. The focus of this research is to examine if there has been a shift in *written* Tatar language use amongst the Russian population and their attitude towards it. Therefore, if Russians show that they are able to use written Tatar and that they use it in everyday situations, then the language policy could be deemed as successful.

This chapter firstly describes the methodology, the procedure and the hypothesis used for the research. Secondly, a brief overview is given of three types of tests that were carried out. Thirdly the analyses of the results and summaries the main findings of the data are discussed. The conclusion determines to what extent the Tatar language policy has been successful and the effects of compulsory Tatar language learning.

5.1 Methodology

Before beginning the analysis of the data collection, a justification of why a quantitative approach has been chosen for this research is given. Quantitative research begins with a hypothesis that derives from theories concerning the field, which in this case were presented in the literature review in chapters two, three and four. Quantifiable (numerically analysable) data is then sought to confirm or refute the hypothesis. One of the key features of epistemological research of this sort is that the social world should be studied using the same principles and procedures as the natural sciences. The aim is therefore to conduct the data collection and analysis in a way that is value free (Bryman, 2008, p.13), yielding objective, quantifiable measures on a larger scale rather than interpretation of individual comments. The research questionnaire (see appendix 1) was designed to minimise bias on the researcher's part. Ethical approval for this study was sought and obtained according to the University of Sheffield's Research Ethics Policy.

5.1.1 Procedure

The data in this research was collected by the author of this thesis in Kazan in the Republic of Tatarstan in October 2010. Kazan was chosen because it is the urban centre of the republic and more Russians live here than in other areas of the republic. Two hundred surveys were distributed amongst staff and students at Kazan Federal

[36] An abridged version of this chapter and chapter six are to appear as a chapter in an Ashgate publication. See bibliography Wigglesworth-Baker, T. for more details.

University and the response rate was 88%. 90% of the respondents were in the 17-24 age group, so it was decided to analyse the results from this age range only due to the fact that there were not enough respondents from the other age groups. Another reason for choosing this age group was due to the fact that these students would have had to learn Tatar at school and therefore this generation would be the first to have undergone their education with compulsory Tatar language learning. This generation can in many respects be considered the future of the country. The respondents comprised 104 Russians and 71 Tatars. The gender of the respondents was 60% females and 40% males. Only university-educated people were used in this study because the practicalities of organising research amongst less-educated people were practically impossible from outside of Tatarstan and the timeframe in which the author carried out the research within Tatarstan was limited.

In Kazan there are approximately nine universities, but Kazan State University was chosen for this research because the author had contacts within various departments at this university who had granted her permission to carry out the study. The surveys were carried out in the faculties of Law, History, Mathematics, Computer Programming and Sociology. These faculties were chosen to get a wide variety of subjects. This was to ensure that answers did not give too much weight to the situation in any one particular profession open to students, and to ensure that students came from a variety of educational backgrounds. The researcher distributed the surveys during lectures with the permission of the lecturer that was arranged beforehand. The students were told that the surveys were voluntary and they were given a choice to either complete them or they were allowed to leave the lecture early. It was noted that many male students did not want to complete a survey so they left the lecture hall. Four versions of the surveys had been created with items in a variety of orders, so that the students could not copy their friends' answers and so as to avoid the possibility of 'order effects' influencing the data collection. The instructions were explained clearly before beginning the survey and the lecturer closely observed the students to make sure that the surveys were completed in an appropriate manner. The survey gave the respondents the opportunity to note down anything that they wanted to about the questions or the subject of the survey, but nobody did.

The survey comprised three sections: section one asked the respondents' personal details such as year of birth, place of birth, nationality, nationality of parents, languages first spoken within the family, educational specialism, languages studied amongst others. The term nationality in the survey refers to the nominal identity of the

respondents (as per Jenkins, 2008, p.171), and is a rather narrow definition to apply to the respondents because it does not take hybrid identity into account. With the limited number of surveys that were collected it would have been difficult to incorporate hybrid identity into the study. In addition, categorizations are necessary to carry out statistical analyses in quantitative research. Furthermore, other scholars have framed their research within the identity categories of Russian and Tatar, therefore I decided to analyse these two categories. However, I have taken into account Jenkins' (2008, p.171) *virtual* identity of the respondents by comparing the dependent variables of native language, nationality of mother and father, languages spoken with the mother and father, language first learned to speak, language spoken with relatives, language spoken with friends and language spoken at work with the independent variable of nationality (as per Jenkins *nominal* identity).

The second section examined tests of self-reported language use. The idea for this section came from a study carried out by Brown (2007). He looked primarily at language use in Belarus and the functional hierarchy of Belarusian and Russian in different domains in order to find out which factors contributed to the socio-linguistic environment. The questions he used in his quantitative survey asked the respondents how *necessary* they believed the Russian and Belarusian languages to be within certain spheres. He discovered that attitudes towards the Belarusian language had not changed since the collapse of Communism and that Russian was still the dominant language in use within all spheres of language use. A similar approach was used in the survey for this research in Tatarstan: the questions in this section asked respondents to decide how useful they thought Russian and Tatar were for certain functions within the spheres of work, the home and information technology. These spheres were chosen based on Fishman's GIDS framework and research carried out by Iskhakova (2002), but with the addition of the sphere of information technology.

Both Russians and Tatars were asked to fill in a table of Likert scales to report the frequency with which they used languages in particular settings and for particular purposes. These tests examine whether respondents believe Russian and Tatar are being used equally or whether there is asymmetry between the languages in the spheres mentioned where both populations have the same experiences within society. Their experiences within these spheres pertain to *written* language use. Everybody has the same opportunity to use Russian or Tatar for activities such as form filling and the Internet, but the choice of language from the respondents can also reflect attitudes towards language use in terms of whether they believe the languages to be useful or not.

The third section comprised a reading and writing exercise that required the respondents to read two short texts and summarize the contents of each in a short paragraph. One text was in Russian and the summary had to be written in Russian and the other text was in Tatar and had to be written in Tatar. The aim of this language test was to find out whether educational reforms on compulsory Tatar language learning are having an effect on the Russian population. The test was designed to measure the Russian and Tatar reading and writing proficiency levels for both of the Russian and Tatar populations using written evidence gathered from the respondents. This test was developed in order to take an objective view of written language competence rather than using the subjectivity of opinions and language preferences.

5.1.2The Hypothesis

The general research hypothesis for this study is:

> *Education is having an effect on Russians' level of Tatar and their ability to at least passively understand it. Therefore Russians are using Tatar in everyday communications.*

The hypothesis aims to measure how successful the Tatar government's language policy and 1998 education law have been in the promotion of Tatar as one of the official languages of the country and as a symbol of Tatar identity. The acceptance and support of this policy and law by both Russian and Tatar citizens would give the Tatar language and identity more political significance as part of the country's nation-building processes. Shevel (2002, p.405) also confirms that shifts in language use 'in educational or political settings suggest acceptance of rules of engagement set by the state'.

In order to operationalize this hypothesis, three types of data needed to be collected which correspond to the three tests in the questionnaire. The aims of the tests were to firstly find out about how people self-reported their nationality (nominal identity), secondly how they self-reported their language behaviour (virtual identity) and thirdly how they measured their performance of language proficiency.

Each test was based on the following three premises that follow from the existing literature on Tatar nationhood and on Russian in the former Soviet space:

1. People define themselves as having Russian or Tatar nationality: Russian nationality is defined as only weakly predictable from the home and through

personal factors that favour the use of Russian, whereas Tatar nationality is defined as strongly predictable from the home and through personal factors that favour the use of Tatar (see test 1 below).

2. People who are Russian have different levels of competence in Tatar from those who are Tatar, but levels of competence in Russian are similar (see test 2 below).
3. People who define themselves as Russian have different perceptions of the usefulness of Russian, Tatar and English than do people who are Tatar (see test 3 below).

After the analysis and discussion of the results, the above general hypothesis will then either be rejected or not rejected and suggestions for further research will be recommended.

5.2 Test 1: Post-Soviet Identity Tests

These tests aim to find out to what extent language can be an indicator of nationality in post-Soviet Tatarstan. As was discussed in chapter two, the term *nationalnost'* in Russian is different to the English term 'nationality' as a result of Soviet nation-building policies. For example, although nationality no longer features in passports (the current ones give Russian Federation as the nationality), it can be listed on birth or marriage certificates and is listed in the census, and again there is no room for choice: one is not half-this, half-that, but either this or that. Furthermore, defining features of the Russian nationality seem to differ from those of the Tatar nationality. According to Poppe and Hagendoorn (2001 and 2003), length of residency in the state, nationality of parents and native language were all predictors of Russian nationality amongst the Russian citizens in the independent states where their research was carried out; on the other hand, according to Khabenskaia (2002), Giliazova (in Minzaripov, 2013) and other scholars who have written about Tatar language and identity (see chapter four for more information), the Tatar nationality seems to be defined more in terms of culture, ethnicity and as a spiritual consciousness. It therefore seems that the Tatar language is not always a defining feature of Tatar nationality; many Tatars do not know the Tatar language, yet they assert it is their native language as a symbol of ethnic belonging for example, on census forms. This suggests that there is asymmetry between Russians and Tatars in terms of nationality and this may influence the choices they have to make within society about which language they will use.

As was just mentioned above, the term 'native language' (*rodnoi iazyk*) is generally perceived as being synonymous with ethnicity amongst the Tatar population (Giliazova in Minzaripov, 2013; Khabenskaia, 2002; Laitin, 1998; Shevel, 2002)[37]. It is used as a symbol of ethnic identity. This does not have anything to do with fluency or how it is actually used. Tatar is often reported as the native language by Tatars when filling in census forms. It is a way to strengthen their identity and set themselves apart from the Russian population. On the other hand, Russians perceive it differently; although it is still a part of their identity, it does not seem as big an issue as it is amongst the Tatar population. According to the 2010 census results, 92.4% of Tatars reported that Tatar was their native language and 99.9% of Russians declared Russian to be their native language. Russian has been an official state language in Tatarstan for a long time and is therefore used in every sphere of life. As with nationality there may be asymmetry regarding how the native language is perceived between both populations.

In order to find out how far language was a reliable predictor of nationality amongst the respondents, two asymmetrical predictors were posited based on the above theories of identity. An alternative null hypothesis is posited in point 3:

1. *Russian nationality is a reliable predictor of Russian as a native language, but Russian as a native language is not a reliable predictor of nationality;*
2. *Tatar language is a reliable predictor of Tatar nationality, but Tatar nationality is not a reliable predictor of Tatar being the native language.*
3. *Nationality has no effect on the native language and the native language shows nothing significant in relation to nationality.*

The first hypothesis was framed in this way because according to the above theories, other nationalities as well as Russians use Russian as their native language. Furthermore, in the literature we find repeatedly (Grenoble, 2003; Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001) that Russians assign titular languages and titular identity lower status than Russian; we therefore expect them to have lower proficiency in the titular language, but acknowledge that some titular nationality members are also more proficient in Russian than in the titular language. The second hypothesis was framed to acknowledge the latter fact.

This test used background information collected from the respondents from the first part of the questionnaire and it was classified into three categories: language use within the home; language use amongst friends and finally language use in the place of work. The

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[37] Please see chapters two, three and four for more information.

independent variable for this test was nationality versus the dependent variables of native language, nationality of mother and father, languages spoken with the mother and father, language first learned to speak, language spoken with relatives, language spoken with friends and language spoken at work. The independent variable of *nationality* was used to invoke a *nominal* identity and the dependent variables were used to compare to the respondents' *virtual* identity (as per Jenkins, 2008, p.171). These variables were used to focus more on the spoken language and were therefore useful to help determine whether Russians felt they were using Tatar in everyday communications. The responses which the respondents wrote down as the languages they spoke were not from a list of given choices: the respondents were given the freedom to write down the actual languages they believed they used, and then the researcher put the languages into categories and assigned codes to these categories.

The Chi-squared test for independence was used as a measure of effect size between the behaviour of the sample versus the behaviour of the whole population. A Chi-squared test is used to measure categorical data of paired observations on independent variables. In the case of this test, the independent variables are the Russian and Tatar nationalities and both of their responses are observed on the dependent variables of languages used in certain domains as mentioned above.

Categorization tables were used to estimate the predictive ability of the model and a level of 100% would mean that the basic model with a cut point of 0.5 percent predicted the dependent variable. This would therefore predict the probability of these results reoccurring if these tests were to be repeated in the future. It must be pointed out that there may be some bias due to over or under-reporting on the respondents' behalf. These tests refer more to the spoken language form.

5.2.1 Spoken language use within the home

The following data from the study examines the language behaviour of the Russian and Tatar respondents in Kazan within the home. This is an important sphere because it is where language acquisition first begins and where language behaviour is determined. Iskhakova et al. (2002) asserted that language use within the home was more important than language use in any other sphere because the home was where behaviour was first learned and where attitudes were first formed.

5.2.1.1 Nationality versus native language

Results and implications

Table 1: Cross tabulation of nationality versus native language

Native language			Russian	Tatar	Total
Nationality of respondent	Russian	Count	99	3	102
		% within Nationality	97.1%	2.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	15	56	71
		% within Nationality	21.1%	78.9%	100.0%
		Total Count	116	59	175
		% of Total	66.3%	33.7%	100%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 107.398$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.00$.

Table 1 shows that two thirds (66.3%) of all respondents in the study self-reported that Russian as their native language and one third (33.7%) of Tatars self-reported Tatar as their native language. The results show that almost all (97.1%) of the population identifying as Russian claimed that Russian was their native language and 21.1% of the respondents identifying as Tatar also acknowledged that Russian was their native language. 78.9% of the Tatar population self-reported that Tatar was their native language, whereas only 2.9% of the Russian respondents self-reported that Tatar was their native language. The Chi-squared test for independence revealed that these results were significant: $\chi^2= 107.398$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.00$.

These results suggest that there is a significant difference between the behaviour of nationalities and which language they considered as their native language and this was expected. The Tatar results revealed a more even distribution of native language use across both languages than the Russian results because 21.1% believed Russian to be their native language whilst asserting to be of Tatar nationality. This suggests that Tatars behave differently from Russians: some of the Tatars reported being of Tatar nationality, but did not use the Tatar language.

These results confirm two asymmetrical predictors of nationality versus native language: the Russian nationality predicts Russian native language whereas Tatar native language predicts Tatar nationality. However, Russian native language does not predict Russian nationality to the same degree, which is probably due to the fact that Russian is the most used language across the population as a whole. Tatar nationality does not predict Tatar native language to the same degree. This suggests that Tatar language behaviour is different from Russian language behaviour.

As was mentioned above in the introduction to this particular section, the Tatar native language is often defined in terms of ethnicity, although the speaker may not be a fluent speaker in this language. The Tatar native language is often used as a symbol of ethnic identity amongst the Tatar nationality (see Giliazova in Minzaripov, 2013; Khabenskaia, 2002; Laitin, 1998; Shevel, 2002 in chapter four). Therefore it is difficult to predict whether the Tatar native language is actually used or whether it is just being used as a symbol of identity. Russian nationality is a good predictor of Russian native language amongst the Russian nationality (as per Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2003).

5.2.1.2 Nationality versus father's nationality
Results and implications

Table 2: Cross tabulation of nationality versus father's nationality

Father's nationality			Russian	Tatar	Total
Nationality of respondent	Russian	Count	88	3	104
		% within Nationality	84.6%	2.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	3	65	71
		% within Nationality	4.2%	91.5%	100.0%
		Total count	91	68	175[38]
		% of Total	52%	38.9%	100%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 140.965$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.00$.

Table 2 shows that 52% of all respondents in the study had a Russian father, 38.9% had a Tatar father. Of the Russian respondents, a large majority (84.6%) reported they had a Russian father, whilst only a small minority (2.9%) had a Tatar father. 4.2% of the Tatar respondents had a Russian father and 91% had a Tatar father. The Chi-squared test for independence revealed that these results were significant: $\chi^2 = 140.965$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.00$. These results suggest that there is a significant relationship between the respondent's nationality and the nationality of the father. These results are not surprising because

[38] 9.1% of the respondents claimed that their father was neither Russian nor Tatar and so therefore these results have not been included in this table.

during Soviet times the father's nationality was the nationality chosen to be registered on a child's passport and therefore may still be a strong influencing factor on the choice of child's nationality during the post-Soviet period. A person's nationality is no longer registered in passports today; the passports declare people as citizens of the Russian Federation.

5.2.1.3 Nationality versus mother's nationality

Results and implications

Table 3: Cross tabulation of nationality versus mother's nationality

Mother's nationality			Russian	Tatar	Total
Nationality of respondent	Russian	Count	75	21	104
		% within Nationality	72.1%	20.2%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	2	66	71
		% within Nationality	2.8%	93.0%	100.0%
		Total Count	77	87	175[39]
		% of Total	44%	49.7%	100%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 91.798$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.00$.

Table 3 shows the total percentage of Russian respondents who had a Russian mother was 44%. The total percentage of all respondents who had a Tatar mother was 49.7%. The results show that 72.1% of the Russian population had a Russian mother and 20.2% had a Tatar mother. The results for the Tatar population show that 2.8% had a Russian mother, 93% had a Tatar mother. The Chi-squared test for independence revealed that these results were significant: $\chi^2 = 91.798$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.00$.

These results imply that, as with the father, an individual's nationality is influenced by the mother's nationality. However, we note that a fifth of those considering themselves 'Russian' had a mother whose nationality they considered to be 'Tatar', while very few of those who considered themselves 'Tatar' had a 'Russian' mother. This suggests that those who considered themselves as 'Tatar' might have declared their mother's nationality as 'Tatar' as a sign of allegiance to nationality. In fact, if we examine the results of nationality with both the father's and mother's nationality, we can see that those who considered themselves as 'Tatar' reported a higher percentage of both their father and mother as being Tatar than those who declared themselves to be of Russian nationality. This is significant because the results imply that being of Russian

[39] 4.6% of the total respondents reported that their mother was from elsewhere in the CIS so these results have not been included because this phenomenon is not part of this study.

nationality is influenced more by the father's nationality, even though one fifth declared their mother's to be 'Tatar'.

5.2.1.4 Nationality versus language spoken with father

Results and implications

Table 4: Cross tabulation of nationality versus language spoken with father

Language spoken with father			Russian	Russian/ Tatar	Tatar	Total
Nationality of respondent	Russian	Count	98	0	1	104[40]
		% within Nationality	94.2%	0%	1%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	30	17	21	71
		% within Nationality	42.3%	23.9%	29.6%	100.0%
		Total Count	128	17	22	175
		% of Total	73.1%	9.7%	12.6%	100%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 68.002$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.00$.

Table 4 shows that 73% of all respondents in the study self-reported that they spoke Russian with their father, 9.7% self-reported that they spoke both Russian and Tatar and 12.6% self-reported that they spoke Tatar with their father. The results reveal that 94.2% of the Russian respondents reported that they spoke Russian with their father. As far as the Tatar population was concerned, 42.3% reported that they spoke Russian with their father, 23.9% used both Russian and Tatar and 29.6% used only Tatar. The Chi-squared test for independence revealed that these results were significant: $\chi^2 = 68.002$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.00$.

These results suggest that there was a significant relationship between nationality and the language spoken with the father. If the respondent had a Russian father then Russian was spoken. If the father was Tatar both Russian and Tatar were spoken. This implies that being of Russian nationality is a good predictor that Russian is spoken in the home with the father; therefore having Russian nationality improves Russian fluency because it is used frequently. However, being of Tatar nationality was not so good a predictor of language spoken with the father within the home. The results from table 2 show that although 91.5% declared their father to be 'Tatar', the results in table 4 show that almost half of the Tatar respondents claimed they spoke Russian with their father. Almost a quarter spoke bilingually Russian and Tatar and just over a quarter spoke only

[40] 4.6% of the total respondents reported that they spoke another language with their father, but these results are not part of this study.

Tatar. This suggests that being of Tatar nationality is not a reliable predictor of Tatar language being spoken with the father in the home.

5.2.1.5 Nationality versus language spoken with mother

Results and implications

Table 5: Cross tabulation Nationality versus Language Spoken with Mother

Language spoken with the mother			Russian	Russian/ Tatar	Tatar	Total
Nationality of respondent	Russian	Count	100	3	1	104
		% within Nationality	96.2%	2.9%	1.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	34	8	29	71
		% within Nationality	47.9%	11.3%	40.8%	100.0%
		Total Count	134	11	30	175
		% of Total	76.6%	6.3%	17.1%	100%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 56.707, df = 2, p = 0.00$

Table 5 shows that 76.6% of all respondents in the study self-reported that they spoke Russian with their mother, 6.3% self-reported that they spoke Russian and Tatar and 17.1% self-reported that they spoke only Tatar. These results reveal that 96.2% of Russian respondents reported that they spoke Russian with their mother whereas the results for the Tatar respondents show that 47.9% reported that they spoke Russian with their mother, 11.3% reported that they spoke bilingually Russian and Tatar and 40.8% reported that they spoke Tatar. The Chi-squared test for independence revealed that there was a relationship between the respondents' nationality and the language spoken with the mother: Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 56.707, df = 2, p = 0.00$.

These results suggest that being of Russian nationality was a good predictor of Russian being the language spoken with the mother in the home. The results for the Tatar respondents, however, revealed that being of Tatar nationality was not a good predictor of Tatar being spoken with the mother. The results above revealed that half of the Tatar respondents professed speaking Russian with their mother, even though the results from table 3 showed that 93% of the Tatar respondents had a Tatar mother. The results in table 5 revealed that half of the Tatar respondents also proclaimed to speak Tatar with their mother, which was more than they spoke with their father (29.6%).

The Russian nationality is a far stronger predictor overall of the Russian language spoken with the mother and the father than the Tatar nationality is for the Tatar

language spoken with the mother and father since only a minority of Tatar nationals declared they speak only Tatar with their mother and father.

5.2.1.6 Nationality versus First Language Spoken with Relatives

As well as parents influencing the language behaviour of a child, family relatives, such as grandparents, also play an important role in shaping the attitudes and behaviour towards language use. The following data examines nationality versus the first language spoken with relatives.

Results and implications

Table 6: Cross tabulation of Nationality versus First Language Spoken with Relatives

Language first spoken with relatives			Russian	Russian/ Tatar	Tatar	Total
Nationality of respondents	Russian	Count	90	4	5	104[41]
		% within Nationality	86.5%	3.8%	4.8%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	8	3	59	71
		% within Nationality	11.3%	4.2%	83.1%	100.0%
		Total Count	98	7	64	175
		% of Total	56%	4%	36.6%	100%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 114.845, df = 3, p = 0.00$.

Table 6 shows that the total percentage of all respondents in the study who self-reported that they first spoke Russian with their relatives was 56%. The total percentage of respondents who self-reported they spoke Russian and Tatar bilingually with their relatives was 4% and the total number of all respondents who self-reported they spoke Tatar was 36.6%. The results of the respondents who were of Russian nationality self-reported that 86.5% first spoke Russian with their relatives. The results of the respondents who were of Tatar nationality self-reported that 11.3% first spoke Russian with their relatives and 83.1% first spoke Tatar. The Chi-squared test for independence reveals that there was a significant relationship between nationality and the language spoken with relatives: $\chi^2 = 114.845, df = 3, p = 0.00$.

The results therefore reveal that the Tatar population spoke Tatar more during their childhood if their family was Tatar and the Russian population spoke Russian during their childhood. This suggests that there is a significant relationship between nationality and the language that was first spoken with relatives. This could be due to the fact that

[41] A total of 3.4% respondents reported that they used another language to communicate with relatives, but these results are not part of this study and therefore not reported here.

grandparents passed down their family traditions through their native language and therefore established a language pattern with their grandchildren. Perhaps some children were brought up by their grandparents during their early years while their parents went out to work.

However, if we analyse the results of the respondents' nationality versus language spoken with the father and mother, it is evident that the results for Tatar spoken with the parents are much lower than Tatar spoken with relatives. These results suggest that the language spoken with relatives has been the strongest link with nationality and language so far. Russians claimed to speak Russian and Tatars claimed to speak Tatar with relatives, therefore nationality is a strong predictor of language spoken with relatives and the language spoken with relatives is a good predictor of nationality.

5.2.1.7 Nationality versus first language learned to speak

In addition to testing nationality versus the language first spoken with relatives and the language spoken with the father and mother, this test examines the first language the respondents learned to speak.

Results and implications

Table 7: Cross tabulation of Nationality versus first language learned to speak

First language learned to speak			Russian	Russian/ Tatar	Tatar	Total
Nationality of respondent	Russian	Count	97	3	3	104
		% within Nationality	93.3%	2.9%	2.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	29	5	33	71
		% within Nationality	40.8%	7.0%	46.5%	100.0%
		Total Count	126	8	36	175
		% of Total	72%	4.6%	20.6%	100%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 59.906$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.00$.

Table 7 shows the total percentage of all respondents who self-reported that they first learned to speak Russian was 72%. The total percentage of all respondents who self-reported that they first learned to speak Russian and Tatar bilingually was 4.6%. The total percentage of all respondents who self-reported that they first learned to speak Tatar was 20.6%. The results of the respondents who were of Russian nationality who reported they first learned to speak Russian was 93.3%. The results of the Tatar respondents who reported they first learned to speak Russian are 40.8%, 7% first spoke Russian and Tatar bilingually and 46.5% first learned to speak Tatar. The Chi-squared test for independence reveals that there was a relationship between nationality and the first language the respondents learned to speak: $\chi^2 = 59.906$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.00$.

These results suggest, unsurprisingly, that parents and other members of the family have a strong influence on the first language of the child spoken within the home. Russian nationality seemed to be a strong predictor of first speaking the Russian language in the home, but speaking the Russian language did not predict being of Russian nationality. The results for the Tatar nationality revealed that half first learned to speak Russian and half Tatar. This implies that only a minority of the Tatars in this survey grew up feeling that Tatar was their first language. Therefore being of Tatar nationality was not a predictor of first speaking the Tatar language in the home. However, if a person asserted that the first language they learned to speak was Tatar, then this shows there was a strong possibility that they were of Tatar nationality.

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This next part of the post-Soviet identity tests examines the dependent variables of language spoken with friends and language used at work with the independent variable of nationality to determine whether language behaviour changes outside of the family situation based on the theories of in-group out-group behaviour which were explained in chapters three and four (Gumperz, 1982; Hagendoorn, Poppe and Minescu, 2008; Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003).

5.2.1.8 Nationality versus Language spoken with friends

Results and implications

Table 8: Cross tabulation of Nationality versus Language spoken with friends

Language spoken with friends			Russian	Russian/ English	Russian/ Tatar	Total
Nationality of respondent	Russian	Count	86	11	7	104
		% within Nationality	82.7%	10.6%	6.7%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	48	11	12	71
		% within Nationality	67.6%	15.5%	16.9%	100.0%
		Total Count	134	22	19	175
		% of Total	76.6%	12.6%	10.9%	100%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 6.085, df = 2, p = 0.04$.

The results of table 8 show that 76.6% of all respondents self-reported that they spoke Russian with their friends, 12.6% self-reported that they spoke both Russian and English and 10.9% reported that they spoke both Russian and Tatar. Almost all (82.7%) of the Russian respondents reported that they spoke Russian with their friends and of the Tatar respondents, 67.6% self-reported speaking in Russian with friends, 15.5% believed they spoke both Russian and English and 16.9% reported speaking both Russian and Tatar. As was mentioned in the introduction to the tests on post-Soviet identity, options were not given for respondents to choose a language; they had the freedom to write down the languages they spoke. In this category, 'Tatar' as the sole language was not specified. The Chi-squared test for independence revealed that there was a significant relationship between nationality and the language spoken with friends: $\chi^2 = 6.085, df = 2, p = 0.04$.

These descriptive statistics suggest that the majority of respondents use Russian when speaking to their friends. This reveals that Russians were not using Tatar as a language of everyday communication. Furthermore, the Tatar population may only use Tatar

when speaking to a friend of the same nationality. If Tatars spoke to Russian friends they would switch to Russian. This suggests that Tatar was used as part of the in-group behaviour between fellow Tatars. On the whole, Russian was still the language of everyday communication in Kazan amongst this age group. However, the appearance of English showed that this language might be gaining some prestige within society because people were using it.

These results show a significant difference in language behaviour between family and friends. In the home people were more likely to use their native language with family members, but this seemed to change outside of the home. Russian was mainly used amongst Russian friends. This implies that using Russian outside of the home is more prestigious than Tatar. Russians were *not* inclined to learn Tatar, whereas Tatars did seem to have learned Russian. This attitude to language learning may stem from the language situation inherited from the Soviet period: that only Russian is necessary to communicate amongst all members and nationalities of society. The results above and the theories about language use of in-group out-group behaviour suggest that outside the home, either Tatar is not regarded as necessary for every day communication or that it is used as a sign of belonging amongst Tatars (Khabenskaia, 2002).

5.2.1.9 Nationality versus Languages spoken at work

The final test in this section is nationality versus languages spoken at work. According to a study carried out into socio-economic status by Stoliarova (in Garipov et al., 2008), there were both Russian and Tatar run companies and businesses within Tatarstan. She mentioned that in Russian-run companies, of which the majority incidentally were state-run, the spoken language used by all employees was Russian. Tatar-run companies used both Tatar and Russian for spoken language. Some knowledge of Tatar was required in these companies. In Kazan it was usual to have places of work that were either only Russian or only Tatar. Even within the state hospitals some departments might be Tatar and others Russian (pers. comm. with doctor). Whatever the dominant nationality was in the place of work, this would be the expected language of communication.

Results and implications

Table 9: Cross tabulation of Nationality versus Languages Spoken at Work

Languages spoken at work			Russian	Russian/ English	Russian/ Tatar	Total
Nationality of respondent	Russian	Count	91	3	4	104
		% within Nationality	87.5%	2.9%	3.8%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	49	2	12	71
		% within Nationality	69.0%	2.8%	16.9%	100.0%
		Total Count	140	5	16	175[42]
		% of Total	80%	2.9%	9.1%	100%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 11.263, df = 3, p = 0.01$.

Table 9 shows that the total percentage of all respondents who claimed that they used Russian at work was 80%. The total percentage of all respondents who self-reported they used Russian and English was 2.9% and the total for those who self-reported that they used Russian and Tatar was 9.1%. Almost all (87.5%) of the Russian respondents asserted that they used Russian at work. The percentage of Tatar respondents who self-reported that they used Russian at work was 69%, and for those who used *both* Russian and Tatar at work, 16.9%. Again, it must be pointed out that the response to languages used at work on the questionnaire was not included as an option of choice. The Chi-squared test for independence revealed that there was a relationship between nationality and languages spoken at work: $\chi^2 = 11.263, df = 3, p = 0.01$.

These results confirm Stoliarova's findings (in Garipov et al., 2008) and the general perception of spoken language use at work. Russians only used Russian at work to

[42] 10.9% of the total number of respondents did not give an answer for this question.

communicate with colleagues, unless they worked for a Tatar company and Tatars mainly used Russian unless they worked for a Tatar company or spoke to their fellow Tatar colleagues. Therefore languages used at work were not a reliable predictor of nationality for Tatars because they showed a tendency to switch languages depending on the nationality of the person they were speaking to. The results also revealed that only a minority used a mix of Russian and Tatar. Russians, however, showed that they mainly used Russian in the place of work.

In October 2010 one newspaper reported that the president of Tatarstan was going to introduce compulsory Tatar language learning in places of work. Many Russians felt quite nervous and threatened by this.

5.3 Conclusions for Post-Soviet Identity Tests

These tests on post-Soviet identity have revealed that patterns of language use and behaviour do not appear to have changed since the Soviet period. The problem seems to arise from the attitudes of the older generation who grew up during the Soviet era and influenced their children's behaviour and attitudes towards language use even before the child began school and entered into society. The attitudes of the older generation and language use within the home were also a feature of Poppe and Hagendoorn's (2001) Soviet identity.

The results have shown that language is a good predictor of nationality amongst the Russian population, but it is not such a good predictor of nationality amongst the Tatar population, possibly due to a cultural variable. It was also revealed that Russian language was not a good predictor of nationality because many Tatars acknowledged their native language as being Russian. The Tatar language is a good predictor of being 'Tatar' nationality because nobody would use it unless they were Tatar. The first two hypotheses for these tests are therefore not rejected, but the null hypothesis is rejected.

There is a clear dichotomy of identity shown between the Russian and Tatar nationalities that seems to coincide with what the studies into Russian and titular identity examined in chapters three and four (for example, Jenkins, 2008; May, 2001; Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003). The Tatar language still seems to be a symbol of identity because it is used with the in-group as a sign of belonging in the home as well as with Russian. Additionally, there is further evidence from the results that this in-group out-group behaviour is apparent outside of the home when the respondents communicate with friends and in the place of work as was explained above.

Characteristics of nationality in the post-Soviet period and language use do not seem to have moved on from the Soviet era and the results of these tests confirm this.

5.4 Language Test 2: Russian and Tatar reading and writing proficiency levels

The aim of this language test was to find out whether the 1998 educational reforms on compulsory Tatar language learning were having an effect on the levels of Tatar proficiency of the Russian population. Since this law was passed, Tatar language learning has been a compulsory subject in secondary education for all nationalities in Tatarstan. In addition, in article 3.4 of the 2004-2013 language policy measures of implementation were set out to widen the use of the Tatar language in all educational sectors. Methodologies for teaching the Tatar language were to be improved, including methodologies to teach non-native Tatars and Tatar teaching standards were targeted for improvement. The language policy also declared that there should be free provision of courses for the official languages of Tatarstan for people who were not classed as citizens of the republic. The implementation of these measures implies that education is one of the most important spheres through which to improve and widen Tatar language provision.

Many previous studies into language use appear to have been based on respondents' preferences and subjective opinions that can only reflect attitudes to language use (see chapter 4, Iskhakova et al., 2002; Iskhakova, 2001). Gorenburg (2005) confirmed that these studies only examined what people believed their knowledge of the Tatar language was in terms of fluency rates. Therefore these studies cannot give a true picture on the written levels of Tatar language proficiency amongst the population. Furthermore, according to several Russian and Tatar interviewees in Kazan during this fieldtrip, Russians had a *passive* knowledge of Tatar and according to Iskhakova (pers. Comm., 2010) this was considered as a positive step in the development of Tatar language planning within the republic.

This test was developed in order to take an objective view of written language competence rather than using the subjectivity of opinions and language preferences. It also aimed to further establish how successful the 1998 education law and 2004-2013 language policy had been at the citizen level by examining the levels of written Tatar proficiency of the Russian population in comparison with the Tatar population. Gorenburg (2005, p.20) noted that there had been no research into written levels of Tatar language proficiency of Russians to date. Another reason for carrying out this

type of test was that if Russians said they did not use Tatar, then it was necessary to know whether this was because they had no functional knowledge of Tatar, (in other words, the ability to understand and compose texts) or whether they had this knowledge, but simply did not exercise it for various other reasons. Shevel (2002, p.405), for example, suggested that people's belief about their own language use could be seen as either a declaration of political support or resistance. It may be possible that Russians did not attempt the question due to their resistance of compulsory Tatar language learning or resistance against the Tatar government who brought in the 1988 education law.

The hypotheses for these tests therefore are laid out below in (1) and (2), with the alternative null hypothesis being formulated in (3):

- *Russians are able to demonstrate knowledge of Tatar in a passive sense and Russian in an active sense;*
- *Tatars are able to demonstrate knowledge of both Russian and Tatar in an active sense.*
- *Nationality has no effect on levels of language competency and language competency shows no relationship with nationality.*

5.4.1 Procedure

The test comprised a reading and writing exercise that required the respondents to read two short texts and summarize the contents of each in a short paragraph. One text was in Russian and the summary had to be written in Russian and the other text was in Tatar and had to be written in Tatar. The texts were about everyday news and were not politically orientated. Texts were chosen that would reflect the kind of articles that were found in the daily press. The Russian text was about how the supermodel Naomi Campbell had hit a taxi driver and the Tatar text was about a new sports centre that was opened in Kazan. Many staff in the Russian and Tatar faculties in Kazan Federal University commented on how difficult Russian people would find the Tatar text. However, these comments were based on attitude and not on any concrete evidence. Once all the surveys had been collected the Russian texts were marked by Russian native speakers in the faculty of Russian language in Kazan Federal University and the marking of the Tatar texts was carried out by Tatar native speakers in the faculty of Tatar philology in the same university. Both faculties had a standardization meeting to

discuss the marking criteria. The researcher specified that they marked the texts according to traditional Russian marking criteria, which is explained in detail below.

5.4.2 Marking Criteria

The scores of this particular analysis are based on the traditional Russian marking scale. A score of 1 would mean ‘fail’, 2 would mean ‘unsatisfactory’, 3 ‘satisfactory’, 4 ‘good’ and 5 ‘excellent’. Each answer was marked for grammatical accuracy and style and understanding of the text. The criteria were applied to each of these aspects and then a total was given out of 10 by adding the two together. This means that a score of 6 was considered as ‘satisfactory’ and anything below this would be ‘unsatisfactory’.

The marking criteria for scores one to ten are explained in the table below:

Table 10: Marking criteria for levels of proficiency for Russian and Tatar reading and writing

Level of proficiency	**Reading and comprehension**	**Grammar and style**
1-2	Very limited understanding	An attempt to answer has been made, but only a one or two word answer has been given. Grammatically incorrect and with spelling mistakes. (Maybe written in Russian for the Tatar text.)
3, 4, 5	Limited understanding	Answer may consist of a very short phrase, but with many grammatical and spelling errors that persistently impede communication.
6, 7, 8	Shows satisfactory to good understanding.	Shows an ability to communicate meaning in an appropriate style in a paragraph. There may be some errors, but they do not impede understanding.
9-10	Shows a very good understanding of the text.	Shows a very good ability to communicate ideas in an appropriate style and with infrequent errors.

In addition, the scores were grouped into two subgroups. The first included all scores from 1 to 5 and the second subgroup included all the scores from 6 to 10. The first subgroup represented incomplete acquisition of written language because of the ability

to understand the text and therefore this subgroup would be classified as having *passive* language proficiency. The second group represented more complete acquisition of written language because of the ability to write grammatically correct language and use an appropriate style so this group would be classified as having more *active* language proficiency.

5.4.3 Zero scorers

Zero was given for either non-ability or for people who identified themselves as non-performers in Tatar or Russian. On the other hand, people who scored 1 were therefore analysed differently. A score of 1 indicated that *some* attempt had been made even though the answer was very limited in terms of understanding, grammar and style. The score of zero was not included in the calculations for the descriptive statistics of the mean or median because it would have given a disproportionate result. The results were based only on scores of 1-10 of the marking criteria.

5.4.4 Results and implications

5.4.4.1 Levels of Russian written proficiency

The independent variables of Russian and Tatar nationalities were tested against the dependent variable of levels of Russian proficiency in a frequency table and descriptive statistical tests for the mean and median were carried out on the results.

Russian levels of proficiency for the Tatar and Russian populations



Figure 1: Level of Russian proficiency for Tatar population



Figure 2: Level of Russian proficiency for Russian population

Figure 1 shows the distribution of results for Russian reading and writing proficiency amongst 71 Tatar students and reveal that 42% scored 9-10 marks for proficiency for Russian reading and writing, 25% scored 6-8, 2% scored 3-5, 0% scored 1-2 and 5% did not answer the question. 67% of these results show that Tatar students scored between 6-10 marks, which shows that they could use the Russian language *actively* with more complete acquisition of the language. These results show that the Tatar population had a

high level of proficiency in Russian. This result was expected due to the Russian language being the language of instruction in schools.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of results for Russian reading and writing proficiency amongst 104 Russian students. The results show that 76% of Russians scored 9-10 marks for proficiency in Russian reading and writing, 16% scored 6-8 marks, 4% scored 3-5 marks, 1% scored 1-2 and 4% scored 0%. 92% of the Russian students scored between 6-10 marks. These results show that the Russian population had a very high *active* level of Russian proficiency, which was expected, due to Russian being the dominant language in use in all spheres and because it was the native language of the Russian population.

5.4.4.2 Summary for Russian levels of proficiency

These above results suggest that both nationalities had similar levels of proficiency for Russian reading and writing, although the mean score for the Russian population for Russian reading and writing (8.52) was slightly higher than the mean score for the Tatar population (8.08). Therefore, both populations showed a good understanding of the Russian text and that they showed a good ability to communicate ideas in an appropriate style and with infrequent errors in written Russian.

These results were also tested using the Mann Whitney *U* test to compare the independent variables of nationalities with Russian and Tatar levels of proficiency in reading and writing. The Mann-Whitney *U* test is a non-parametric test used to compare the medians of two independent variables for any significant differences between two groups if the data is shown to be skewed in any way. The data of these two tests was considered to be negatively skewed. The Mann-Whitney *U* test revealed no significant difference in the Russian levels of proficiency of the Russian population $Md = 9.00$, $n = 104$ and the Tatar population $Md = 9.00$, $n = 71$, $U = 2896.500$, $z = -2.331$, $p = 0.02$, $r = 0.2$. The Cohen effect size was small to medium. This suggests that there was no significant difference between both populations in terms of Russian levels of proficiency, which implies that both nationalities have the same opportunity to learn Russian and the fact that Russian is the dominant language, confirms these results. If these tests were repeated then the expectation for the results would be quite similar.

5.4.4.3 Levels of Tatar written proficiency

The dependent variables of Tatar and Russian nationalities were tested against the independent variable of levels of Tatar proficiency in a frequency table and descriptive statistical tests for the mean and median were carried out on the results.

Results: Tatar levels of proficiency for the Tatar population



Figure 3: Tatar levels of proficiency for Tatar population



Figure 4: Level of Tatar proficiency for Russian population

Figure 3 shows the distribution of results for Tatar reading and writing proficiency amongst Tatar respondents. The results reveal that 30% scored 9-10 marks for proficiency in Tatar reading and writing, 18% scored 6-8, 4% scored 3-5, 2% scored 1-2 and 20% scored 0%. The respondents who scored zero for Tatar reading and writing may show that they did not answer the question because they did not have any knowledge of Tatar – some of the respondents may have been brought up in a Russian speaking environment, or it could be because they did not want to answer the question or ran out of time. If we examine the results of Russian reading and writing levels of proficiency above in figure 1, the results show that 5% of Tatars did not answer the question. 48% of the Tatar students scored between 6-10 marks, which showed that they have more *active* complete acquisition of language.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of results for Tatar reading and writing proficiency amongst 104 Russian students. The results reveal that 17% scored 9-10 marks, 13% scored 6-8 marks, 4% scored 3-5 marks, 9% scored 1-2 and 58% did not answer the question. There could be a number of reasons why 58% did not answer this question. One reason could be that they did not know enough Tatar to be able to understand the text or respond in Tatar; another reason could be that they judged this part of the question to be unimportant. It appears that the response of zero is not necessarily a demonstration of a lack of fluency, but it may have a cultural component attached to it that shows how the importance of the Tatar language and or how worthy it is considered to be.

These results show that 30% of Russians scored between 6–10 marks for Tatar reading and writing. This suggests that almost one third of the Russian population were able to

use Tatar language with a functional acquisition of the language. These results demonstrated that 30% of Russians in this test had *active* levels of Tatar proficiency as opposed to *passive* levels.

5.4.4.4 Summary for Tatar levels of proficiency

The above results revealed a marked difference in means between the Russian population (2.86) and the Tatar population (6.13) for levels of proficiency for Tatar reading and writing. The results suggest that Russians were not as proficient in Tatar as the Tatar population and the mean score (2.86) for Tatar levels of proficiency shows that they had an incomplete acquisition of the language. The means suggest that the Tatar population was more proficient in Russian than Tatar (8.08, 6.13). A mean of 6.13 suggests that the Tatar population had a satisfactory level of proficiency, which shows they had an *active* acquisition of the language.

The Mann-Whitney U test revealed a marked difference in the Tatar levels of proficiency of the Russian population $Md = 0.00$, $n = 104$ and the Tatar population $Md = 6.13$, $n = 71$, $U = 2112.000$, $z = -4.909$, $p = 0.00$, $r = 0.4$. The Cohen effect size is therefore medium to large. This suggests that if the tests were carried out again in similar settings on a random sample of the Russian and Tatar populations then the results would probably be similar.

5.4.5 Russian High Scorers Analysis

As a result of 30% Russians demonstrating that they had active levels for the levels of Tatar written proficiency, a within-group analysis was carried out between the Russian and Tatar high scorers who scored 6 points or more in the reading and writing test to see if there were any significant differences between the two groups. The results can be seen in the graphs below:



Figure 5: Levels of Tatar proficiency of Russian high scorers



Figure 6: Levels of Tatar proficiency of Tatar high scorers

A total of 30% of the Russian respondents scored between 6 and 10 points and the mean score for this group was 8.67. 47% of the Tatar population scored between these marks and the mean score was 8.83. The median score for both populations was equal: 9.00. These results suggest that there was no significant difference between the levels of proficiency for Russian reading and writing and Tatar reading and writing between these within-groups analyses of the Russian and Tatar populations. This suggests that people who had considerable exposure to Tatar language, such as in a school, were able to use the Tatar language with more complete acquisition. This could be due to the fact

that compulsory Tatar language learning in schools was having an effect on the proficiency levels of the younger generation. However, further statistical analyses are carried out below to determine the factors that have influenced these results.

5.4.6 An investigation of possible influencing factors on reading and writing levels of proficiency amongst the Russian and Tatar high scorers

Non-parametric tests were carried out to find out the possible influencing factors of the reading and writing levels of proficiency amongst the Russian and Tatar high scorers. Kruskal-Wallis and Mann Whitney *U* tests were conducted to compare the medians of two independent variables for any significant changes between groups. The Kruskal-Wallis test is an extension of the Mann Whitney *U* test and is used to test more than three categories within an independent variable. The independent variables tested in this section were the languages of instruction in primary, secondary, higher educational institutes, educational specialism, language courses attended and languages used for reading against the dependent variables of Russian and Tatar nationalities. These variables were tested based on the spheres of language use from Iskhakova's study (2002) and Fishman's GIDS framework (1991) and because these particular variables are more concerned with the written language rather than the spoken language.

5.4.6.1 Language of instruction in primary, secondary schools and in higher education

As far as the 2004-2013 language policy is concerned, article 3.4 states that the quality of Tatar language teaching will be improved, provision of the state languages will be introduced in all secondary and vocational educational institutions in the republic, Tatar will be introduced into the curriculum in pre-school institutions and bilingual education will be provided for those who wish to specialise in subjects in competitive fields. However, this article is rather vague and does not mention what the languages of instruction are in these institutions in the sphere of education.

The independent variables used were language of instruction in primary school, language of instruction in secondary schools and language of instruction in further/higher education. These variables were tested against Russian and Tatar levels of proficiency between the Russian and Tatar nationalities. These tests revealed nothing significant for either population, which was expected, because 80% of the respondents in the study showed that Russian was the language of instruction throughout all of their education.

5.4.6.2 Languages studied

As a result of the 1998 education law, Tatar language learning was made compulsory in all secondary schools for all nationalities within Tatarstan. Furthermore, as the 2004-2013 language policy stated in article 3.4, the Tatar language was to be developed through the education system as was discussed above.

A marked difference across languages studied and Tatar levels of proficiency amongst the Russian population for reading and writing was revealed using the Mann-Whitney *U* test. The independent variable was split into two categories: one was for English and the other Tatar. The test revealed a difference between the levels of Tatar proficiency of Tatar language studied $Md = 2$, $n = 32$ and the English language $Md = 0$, $n = 22$, $p = 0.02$. The Tatar language rating was higher due to Russians' exposure in school to the Tatar language earlier than to other languages: Tatar language learning was first introduced into the school curriculum from Year One. Other languages, such as English, were taught in the third or fourth year. All students in schools in the Republic of Tatarstan had an equal number of hours of Russian and Tatar language and literature training. The students were streamed in these language classes according to ability. Tatar students were often in a higher level class for Tatar language and literature than the Russian students (according to many of the people interviewed during my field trip). Therefore this suggests that the factor that affects Tatar levels of proficiency amongst the Russian population was related to the compulsory Tatar language learning in schools. This result was expected.

After examining the levels of Russian and Tatar levels of reading and writing proficiency and the factors that could influence this, we can see that if Russians have frequent exposure to Tatar such as in school, then they may acquire the language with some degree of proficiency, although they may have other, extra linguistic reasons for nonetheless refusing to use it. The results of these tests showed that 58% did not even answer the question or bother to try which could be a sign of resistance of compulsory Tatar language learning and the language policy (as per Shevel, 2002, p.405). The Tatar population were comfortable using Tatar because it was their own language. There could be many factors that influenced the level of Tatar proficiency amongst Tatars, for example, nationality, nationality of parents and the language of upbringing (Garipov et al., 2000; Iskhakova, 2001).

To summarise this section we can see that there was a difference between levels of proficiency and how languages were being used. 30% of the Russian population showed that they were able to use Tatar language to a high degree of functionality, presumably

as a result of compulsory Tatar language learning at school. The results showed that this was the only possible influencing factor that affected Russians' use of the Tatar language.

However, Russians' exposure to Tatar is completely different to the Tatars' exposure to the language. The results show that Tatars used the Tatar language more at home and amongst friends who were of Tatar nationality. Nationality was an important influencing feature of language use and levels of proficiency of the Tatar language and the Russian language. Tatar was used more outside of educational institutions by Tatars, whereas the results suggest that Russians did not use it unless it was a compulsory requirement, as it was in schools. Therefore the 1998 education law and the 2004-2013 language policy were having some effect on the levels of Tatar proficiency amongst the Russian population and if they were exposed to Tatar they were able to use it with an equal level of proficiency as Tatars. Therefore the first hypothesis for this test can be rejected and restated as:

Russians are able to demonstrate knowledge of Tatar and Russian in an active sense.

The second hypothesis cannot be rejected, but the null hypothesis is rejected.

5.5 Language Test 3: Self-reported language use within the spheres of work, the home and information technology

Part two of the questionnaire focused on self-reported language use within the spheres of work, the home and information technology. These spheres were chosen to reflect areas of language development and maintenance in the Tatar language policy and the measures of implementation that were set out for the period 2004 to 2013. The aim of this language policy was to promote and develop the Tatar language equally with Russian as the state languages of the Republic of Tatarstan as well as promoting the development of minority languages.

As well as using the Tatar language policy, ideas for these spheres were also based on Fishman's GIDS framework (1991) and Iskhakova's study (2001), but with the addition of information technology to reflect technological changes within society in a globalizing world. The GIDS scale describes a language's viability and makes use of a variety of factors, such as literacy in the home, lower educational domains such as nurseries and primary schools, higher educational domains such as secondary schools, higher educational institutes and universities, the media and finally governmental spheres such as administration and juridical activities. Tatar seems to be somewhere in the range of 1-5, so if efforts are being made to move it up the scale, these efforts can be

assessed by looking at the factors that contribute to GIDS[43]. Additionally, Iskhakova's study also examined language use and spread within the spheres of government, administration, education, the media, work and industries as well as the home[44].

Therefore the aim of these tests in this chapter was to examine whether Russian and Tatar were being used equally or whether there was asymmetry between the languages in the spheres mentioned above where both populations had the same experiences within society. The Russian and Tatar populations' experiences within these spheres pertained to *written* language because if a language was used for official documents it was considered to have more status and prestige (Fishman, 1991). Stages 1-5 of Fishman's (1991) GIDS scale particularly emphasizes the use of the written language within public official spheres and its increase in prestige. Everybody has the same opportunity to use Russian or Tatar for activities such as form filling and the Internet, but the choice of language from the respondents can also reflect attitudes towards language use regarding how useful or necessary they believed the languages to be.

The hypotheses for these tests are based on the theories of identity, which were explained in chapters three and four and above in the section on post-Soviet identity tests. The perceptions of language use in these tests are therefore part of Jenkins' (2008, p.171) virtual identity. Once again, two asymmetrical hypotheses are given to find out if nationality is a reliable predictor in the choice of language used and whether attitude plays a part in language choice, and an alternative 'null' hypothesis is also formulated.

1. *Russian nationality is a reliable predictor of Russian language use, but the use of Russian is not a reliable predictor of nationality.*
2. *Tatar language use is a reliable predictor of Tatar nationality, but Tatar nationality is not a reliable predictor of Tatar language use.*
3. *Nationality has no effect on language use and there is nothing significant between language use and nationality.*

[43] For a fuller explanation of Fishman's GIDS framework please see chapter 1.
[44] Please see a detailed account of Iskhakova's study in chapter 4.

5.5.1 Procedure

Both Russians and Tatars were asked to fill in a table of Likert scales to report the frequency with which they *felt* they used languages in particular settings and for particular purposes. Due to the nature of Likert scale testing, the results may have had some limitations due to under or over-reporting on the part of the respondents. The scale range was as follows: 1 signified the language in question was *never* used; 2 *rarely*; 3 *sometimes*; 4 *often* and 5 *always*. An additional column was included for any comments the respondents might have about a particular question. Most respondents used this column to specify which their *other language* was. Most of them reported that English was the *other language*. The Chi-squared test for independence was used to test the nominal variable of nationality and the ordinal variables of the Likert scales.

5.5.2 Reading and writing language behaviour within the sphere of work

In the sphere of work, the different situations presented to the respondents were form filling, official documentation, legal documentation, public notices and technology. These situations were chosen because it was felt that a person working in the public sector or an administrative post would have to deal with these kinds of situations on a daily basis. Furthermore, the language policy relating to these types of documents within the public sector states that they should be available in both state languages. Therefore an individual would have a choice as to which language they would use for completing these documents.

According to Stoliarova (in Garipov et al., 2008, p.106), if a work environment was predominantly Tatar then Tatar employees would use Tatar amongst other Tatars, similarly if it was Russian then Russian would be used. However, Tatars would only use Tatar with other Tatars and would switch to Russian with Russian employees. These findings were also confirmed in Iskhakova’s study (2002, p.31), which revealed that 41.5% of Tatars *felt* that they used both Russian and Tatar within the sphere of government and administration if the working environment was Tatar and only Russian if the working environment was Russian. Russians would only use Russian.

5.5.2.1 Results and implications in the sphere of work

Cross tabulation was run on the independent variables of nationality versus the ordinal variables for form filling, official documentation, legal documentation, public notices and technology to see if there was a difference in the use of languages between the two nationalities. The results revealed nothing significant for the variables of form filling,

official documentation, public notices and technology and the Chi-Squared test for independence did not reveal anything significant either.

These results suggest that both nationalities *felt* that they only used Russian within the work place for form filling, official documentation, public notices and technology. The reason for these results could be that the respondents were mainly based in a university setting and these limitations of this research contributed to these results. However, in a similar study by Brown (2007, p.79) into the necessity of both Belarusian and Russian within the workplace, similar results were also found. His study revealed that very little had changed regarding language use for government correspondence since the Soviet era.

It appeared that Russian was still the only language necessary for form filling, official documentation, public notices and technology in the workplace in Tatarstan even though the language policy implementation measures stated that official documents for these activities should be available in both Russian and Tatar as the state languages. It appeared that although there was a choice of language for these documents, people were choosing Russian either because they were *used* to working in Russian or because they only associated using Russian for these activities[45]. However, the results *did* reveal a significant difference between Russian and Tatar nationalities and language use for legal documentation in terms of reading and writing.

Table 11: Cross-Tabulation of Nationality versus Language Use in Legal Documentation

Nationality		Tatar reading and writing legal documentation				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Russian	Count	100	1	1	0	102
	% within Nationality	98.0%	1.0%	1.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	59	6	4	2	71
	% within Nationality	83.1%	8.5%	5.6%	2.8%	100.0%

Chi-squared: x^2= 12.800, *df* = 3, *p* = 0.001.

The results reveal that while 83.1% of the Tatar nationality felt that they *never* used Tatar for legal documentation, 8.5% revealed that they used it *rarely*, 5.6% used it *sometimes* and 2.8% felt they *often* used it. The Chi-squared test for independence revealed that the difference between groups was significant: x^2= 12.800, *df* = 3, *p* =

[45] See appendix 2 for full results for the sphere of work.

0.001. These results imply that Tatars use Tatar for reading and writing for legal documentation in some instances.

To summarise these analyses on the sphere of work, it is clear that Russian was still the language used for both reading and writing for form filling, official documentation, public notices and technology activities for both nationalities in Kazan. It appears that by designating Russian as the language that was most used in these activities of work that this was the only language necessary. However, the results revealed that some Tatars used Tatar for legal documentation.

In these tests of self-reported language use within the sphere of work, Tatar was reported as not being used perhaps because people did not know the written language enough to be able to use it at work, or they chose not to use it because of its low prestige or maybe they could use it, but did not because there was a strong chance that other people would not understand it. The second set of tests in this chapter examines the actual Tatar written competency. According to Iskhakova (2002, p.19; pers. Comm. 2010), dictionaries were still being developed in the Tatar language in order to expand its functional vocabulary for use in the sphere of work. According to interviewees in Kazan, people in the work sphere were no longer learning Tatar at work, despite financial incentives that were offered by the government during the 1990s. The prestige of Tatar seemed to be very low within the sphere of work. It was not compulsory to learn it; therefore if people did not need it, they would not learn or use it. One of the interviewees reported however, that the president was thinking of making Tatar language learning compulsory at work once again. Although Russian was the dominant written language within the sphere of work, Tatar may still be used for communication between colleagues at work as was mentioned above in the post-Soviet identity tests in section 1.

5.5.3 Reading and writing language use within the sphere of home

In the sphere of home the situations presented were how often Russian, Tatar or another language were used for personal correspondence such as reading and writing letters and how often these languages were used for reading and responding to Internet sites. These activities were chosen because it was felt that they would be the main written activities carried out within the home. Article 3.4 of the language policy stated that the home was considered as one of the leading institutions for language development. The home was where a child's education and development began and therefore the language policy stated that the role of the family in the child's education should be developed to encourage good language habits. The language policy did not specify *which* languages

should be developed, although the implication was that the native language should be encouraged.

According to Iskhakova's study (2002, p.31), 37% of Tatars reported that they used Tatar within the home depending on the situation and on which language they used with their parents. In towns 36% of Tatars reported that they used Tatar whereas in rural areas 90% of Tatars reported that they used Tatar. Iskhakova believed that language education within the home was more important than it was in educational institutions because the home was where behavioural patterns begin and attitudes were formed. However, she was concerned more with the spoken language whereas this study focuses on written language use. Despite this, the tests in this section only revealed what people *thought* they used; the results did not reveal actual language proficiency. As far as Fishman's GIDS framework is concerned, language use within the home would relate to stage 5. This stage relates to literacy within the home, at school and within the community. It is the first stage in the GIDS framework where written language is used. Fishman stated that the written language was a sign of prestige for members of the community, in this case for Tatars. Stages 6-8 only concerned the spoken language.

Results and implications in the sphere of the home

Cross tabulation was run on the independent variables of nationality versus the dependent variables of personal correspondence and the internet to find out how often both nationalities felt they used Russian and Tatar for these activities. The results revealed a significant difference in how these languages were used for both reading and writing with personal correspondence and the Internet. The results revealed that the Tatar respondents felt that they used both Russian and Tatar, but the Russian respondents felt that they only used Russian. The results for personal correspondence are discussed first of all, then the results for the Internet.

5.5.3.1 Personal Correspondence: Reading

a) Results - Personal Correspondence: Tatar Reading

Table 12: Cross-tabulation of Nationality versus Tatar language use for reading personal correspondence.

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	95	6	1	0	0	102
	% within Nationality	93.1%	5.9%	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	42	10	12	3	4	71
	% within Nationality	59.2%	14.1 %	16.9%	4.2%	5.6%	100.0%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 33.327$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.000$

The results show that almost all (93.1%) of the Russian respondents self-reported that they *never* used Tatar for reading at home. Although 59.2% of the Tatar respondents self-reported that they *never* read in Tatar at home, 40% of the Tatar respondents self-reported that they read in Tatar in varying degrees of frequency[46]. The Chi-squared test for independence showed a marked difference between the nationalities and how often they read in Tatar at home: $\chi^2 = 33.327$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.000$.

The results suggest that the Tatar respondents read more often in Tatar at home. This could be due to the influence of other members of the family, particularly if the family was Tatar and Tatar was used as a language of communication within the home. Many Tatar interviewees in Kazan mentioned that they learned Tatar with their grandparents and that they used Tatar more with members of their own community. Another reason they may have reported they used Tatar more for these activities could be to do with the in-group phenomenon that was mentioned in chapters three and four. They may have over-reported using Tatar as a sign of belonging. In fact, from these results it was difficult to know if Tatars were actually reading in Tatar: they may just be reporting they used Tatar for reading for the sake of answering the survey question. Therefore this would be just a symbolic statement because it would not reveal what they actually used. The survey was designed to find out what the attitudes towards languages were when there was a choice.

[46] This contrasts with how the Tatar language is portrayed in the literature in chapter 4.6, that was primarily as a symbol of Tatar identity and as a cultural component.

b) Personal Correspondence: Russian Reading

Table 13: Cross tabulation of Nationality versus reading Russian correspondence

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	7	1	0	5	89	102
	% within Nationality	6.9%	1.0%	0.0%	4.9%	87.3%	100%
Tatar	Count	6	0	3	14	48	71
	% within Nationality	8.5%	0.0%	4.2%	19.7%	67.6%	100%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 15.555$, df = 4, p = 0.004

The results for the Russian nationality in table 13 show that a large majority (87.3%) self-reported that they read personal correspondence in Russian, whereas the results for the Tatar nationality show that just over two thirds (67.6%) *always* read personal correspondence in Russian. The Chi-squared test for independence showed a marked difference between the nationalities and how often they read personal correspondence in Russian: $\chi^2 = 15.555$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.004$. These results imply that Russians read more personal correspondence in Russian than Tatars, which was expected because as the results above show, Tatars used both Russian and Tatar for reading personal correspondence at home.

5.5.3.2 Personal Correspondence: Writing

a) Results - Personal Correspondence: Tatar Writing

Table 14: Cross tabulation of nationality versus Tatar written correspondence

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	95	4	2	1	0	102
	% within Nationality	93.1%	3.9%	2.0%	1.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	44	10	10	4	3	71
	% within Nationality	62.0%	14.1%	14.1%	5.6%	4.2%	100.0%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 26.720$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.000$

The results for the Russian respondents show that almost all (93.1%) *never* wrote in Tatar, in the home for personal correspondence. On the other hand, the results for the Tatar respondents show that 62% *never* wrote in Tatar at home for personal correspondence, but the remaining Tatar respondents self-reported that they did write in Tatar within the home in varying degrees of frequency. The Chi-squared test for independence showed a marked difference between the nationalities and how often they

wrote in Tatar for personal communication within the home: $\chi^2 = 26.720$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.000$. These results suggest, as with Tatar reading within the home, that family members might have had an influence on which language was used to write personal communication to each other. If the family was Tatar, they might use Tatar to write to their relatives.

b) Results - Personal Correspondence: Russian Writing

Table 15: Cross tabulation of nationality versus Russian writing for personal correspondence

Nationality		1	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	7	1	7	87	102
	% within Nationality	6.9%	1.0%	6.9%	85.3%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	8	3	14	46	71
	% within Nationality	11.3%	4.2%	19.7%	64.8%	100.0%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 10.832$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.01$.

Table 15 reveals that most of the Russian respondents (85.3%) self-reported that they *always* wrote personal correspondence in Russian The results for writing in Russian for personal correspondence amongst the Tatar population show that just under two thirds (64.8%) self-reported that they *always* used Russian. The remaining Tatar respondents self-reported that they used Russian less frequently for writing personal correspondence. A Chi-squared test for independence revealed a marked difference between the nationalities and how often they wrote personal correspondence in Russian: $\chi^2 = 10.832$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.01$. These results suggest that the nationality of the family had a big influence on which language was used to write personal correspondence in and how often it was used. The analysis implies that Russians wrote in Russian more than Tatars and this was expected.

To summarise the results for language use within reading and writing for personal correspondence within the sphere of the home, Russians reported that they only used Russian for reading and writing personal correspondence, whereas Tatars used both Russian and Tatar which was expected, based on the theories mentioned above. There was also a distinct difference between languages reportedly used at work and in the home. Russians reported that they only used Russian both at work and in the home and Tatars reported they used Russian at work and both Tatar and Russian at home. This suggests that a Tatar person may choose which language to use depending on the situation and the nationality of the person they are communicating with[47].

[47] For results of Other reading and writing see appendix 2 question 6.

5.5.3.3 The Internet

The next variables to be examined were nationality versus language use for the Internet.

a) Results - The Internet: Tatar reading

Table 16: Cross tabulation of nationality versus Tatar Internet reading

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	93	8	0	1	0	102
	% within Nationality	91.2%	7.8%	0.0%	1.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	47	12	8	2	2	71
	% within Nationality	66.2%	16.9%	11.3%	2.8%	2.8%	100.0%

Chi-squared: $\chi^{2=}$ 21.379, df = 4, p = 0.000

The results in table 16 reveal that almost all (91.2%) of the Russian respondents self-reported that they *never* read Tatar Internet sites at home. The results show that two thirds (66.2%) of the Tatar respondents self-reported that they *never* read Tatar Internet sites at home, but the remaining Tatar respondents self-reported that they read Tatar Internet sites in varying degrees of frequency. The Chi-squared test for independence showed a marked difference between the nationalities and how often they read Tatar Internet sites at home: $\chi^2 = 21.379$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.000$. The results suggest the Tatar respondents read Tatar Internet sites more than the Russian respondents. This may be because the Tatar population were able to use it due to Tatar language use within the home and because they chose to use it.

b) Responding in Tatar for internet use

'Responding' means sending emails and using social media sites to chat with friends.

Table 17: Cross tabulation of Nationality versus Responding in Tatar for internet use

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	94	6	1	1	0	102
	% within Nationality	92.2%	5.9%	1.0%	1.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	50	11	6	1	3	71
	% within Nationality	70.4%	15.5%	8.5%	1.4%	4.2%	100.0%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 16.460$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.002$

The majority of the Russian respondents (92.2%) self-reported that they *never* responded to Tatar Internet sites in written Tatar. Almost three quarters of the Tatar respondents (70.4%) self-reported that *never* responded to Tatar Internet sites in written Tatar, but the remaining 30% self-reported that they responded to Tatar Internet sites in written Tatar in varying degrees of frequency as shown in table 17 above. The Chi-squared test for independence showed a marked difference between the nationalities and

how often they responded to Tatar Internet sites in written Tatar at home: $\chi^2 = 16.460$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.002$. These results suggest that Tatars responded to Tatar Internet sites in written Tatar more often than the Russian respondents did, although compared with the results for reading Tatar Internet sites, they read Internet sites in Tatar more often than responding to them in written Tatar.

To summarise language use for reading and responding to Internet sites, it appeared that the Tatar and Russian populations used Russian in similar ways. However, Tatars and Russians used Tatar in different ways, because the results showed that only Tatars used Tatar. As far as the results for reading and responding in Russian were concerned, nothing significant was revealed. Apparently both populations used Russian in similar measures to surf the web, responded to social media sites and emails, so these results are not reported here[48].

5.5.4 Summary: Reading and writing in the sphere of the home

The results revealed that Russian was the only language used by Russians that suggests that this is a characteristic of Russians' virtual identity (as per Jenkins, 2008, p.171), but both Russian and Tatar were used by Tatars within the home. Russians did not think of themselves in terms of the Russian language because they only used Russian. Even if Russians knew the Tatar language they did not use it.

Language choice within the home therefore was more concerned with *personal* choice. Russians used Russian and Tatars used both Russian and Tatar. It appears that language use is down to choice, although both Russian and Tatar are available to use.

The language policy could be deemed as successful in this sphere because as the results showed, both Russian and Tatar were encouraged within the home and used as the languages of upbringing, although nothing was mentioned in article 3.4 about which languages were to be used within the home. However, language used within the home seemed to be based on family choice and not on a law. It was related more to patterns of language use that were passed down from generation to generation. Attitude seems to be the key to changing language behaviour within the home, but this is difficult because the parents of this generation were brought up under the Soviet regime and they may still have a negative attitude towards use of the titular language even twenty-four years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

[48] For full results of Russian and other language responses please refer to appendix 2, question 7.

5.5.5 Language behaviour within the sphere of information technology

This section examines the use of languages with information technology. It includes situations such as reading online newspapers, Internet searches, online courses, word processing documents, formal emails and personal emails. There is some overlap with previous sections of the test on workplace and the home but it is worth treating on its own more systematically as well.

This sphere has not been included in any previous studies of language use and maintenance to date within Tatarstan, so the ideas have been based solely on section 5.2.4 of the 2004-2013 language policy that concerned the implementation measures for the Tatar language within the sphere of information technology. A brief synopsis of these measures is given first of all.

The measures stated that all IT standards should be improved and brought up to international standard in the Tatar language. Dictionaries of computer terminology were to be developed in both English and Tatar up to 2005. All general information Internet sites were to be developed throughout the whole period of the language policy 2004-2013 that included online newspapers, magazines, books and dictionaries. The Tatar language was to be developed for functional use within all government departments and ministries and online computer courses were to be developed for education needs. Media sources were also to be developed in both state languages. Last, but not least the Tatar alphabet was to be developed for IT use, although the use of which script was not specified. These measures would have been implemented before the ban on the Tatar Latin script by the Russian government in 2004.

This sphere is not specifically related to work or the home, but is more generalistic to enable a wider perspective of the situations where Russians and Tatars may use the official languages and the language choices they may make based on these situations. It will enable us to see if there was any language asymmetry with information technology at the time the survey was undertaken.

Results and implications for the sphere of information technology

Cross tabulation was run on the independent variables of nationality versus the dependent variables for online newspapers, magazines and books, online searches, online courses, word processing and formal and personal email correspondence, to see if there was a difference in the use of languages between the two nationalities. The dependent variables of online courses, word processing and formal email correspondence revealed nothing significant between the two nationalities that suggests

that the respondents *felt* they only used Russian for these activities[49]. However, the dependent variables for online newspapers, magazines and books, online searches, as well as personal email correspondence revealed significant results between the two groups and each is discussed in turn below.

5.5.5.1Online Newspapers, Magazines and Books: Tatar Reading Results

Table 18: Cross tabulation of nationality versus reading online newspapers, magazines and books in Tatar

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	93	6	3	0	0	102
	% within Nationality	91.2%	5.9%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	43	14	5	7	2	71
	% within Nationality	60.6%	19.7%	7.0%	9.9%	2.8%	100.0%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 26.374$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.000$

The results for the Russian nationality show that the majority of respondents (91.2%) self-reported that they *never* read newspapers, magazines or books in Tatar. The results for the Tatar nationality show that 60.6% self-reported that they *never* read online newspapers, magazines or books in Tatar and the remaining 40% self-reported that they read online newspapers, magazines and books in Tatar with various degrees of frequency as shown in table 18. The Chi-squared test for independence showed a marked difference between the nationalities and how often they read online newspapers, magazines and books in Tatar: $\chi^2 = 26.374$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.000$. This suggests those self-identifying as Tatar did in fact read more in Tatar.

The results for Russian reading did not report a significant statistical difference between the nationalities that suggests that both nationalities reported that they read online books, magazines and newspapers in Russian[50].

[49] See appendix 2 for survey questions 10, 11 and 12 for all results.

[50] See appendix 2, question 8 for full Russian and other language responses.

5.5.5.2 Online Searches

The following independent variable of nationality versus the dependent variables of online searches for reading and writing activities such as entering search terms and key words were analysed next.

a) Results - Online Searches: Tatar Reading

Table 19: Cross tabulation of nationality versus Tatar language use for online searches

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	93	4	1	2	2	102
	% within Nationality	91.2%	3.9%	1.0%	2.0%	2.0%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	47	12	9	1	2	71
	% within Nationality	66.2%	16.9%	12.7%	1.4%	2.8%	100.0%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 20.966$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.001$

The results for the Russian respondents show that almost all (91.2%) self-reported that they *never* read in Tatar for online Internet searches. These results contrast with the results of the Tatar respondents where two thirds (66.2%) self-reported that they *never* read in Tatar for online Internet searches, but approximately 34% reported that they read in Tatar with varying degrees of frequency as shown in table 19. The Chi-squared test for independence showed a marked difference between the nationalities and how often they read in Tatar for online Internet searches: $\chi^2 = 20.966$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.001$. These results suggest that the Tatar respondents may use Tatar language more often, due to their nationality and cultural background.

b) Results - Online Searches: Tatar Responding

Table 20: Cross tabulation of nationality versus online searches in Tatar

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	94	6	1	1	0	102
	% within Nationality	92.2%	5.9%	1.0%	1.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	48	12	8	1	2	71
	% within Nationality	67.6%	16.9%	11.3%	1.4%	2.8%	100.0%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 19.414$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.001$

Table 20 shows that the majority of the Russian respondents (92.2%) *never* wrote in Tatar for online Internet searches. The results for the Tatar respondents show that although 67.6% self-reported that they *never* wrote key words or search terms in Tatar for online Internet searches, the remaining Tatar respondents did write in Tatar for online Internet searches with various degrees of frequency as can be seen in table 20. The Chi-squared test for independence showed a marked difference between the nationalities and how often they wrote key words and search terms in Tatar: $\chi^2 = 19.414$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.001$. As with the results for reading, these results for writing suggest that there was a relationship between nationality and language use and that cultural background may also be a feature in choice of language used. As far as the results for responding to online searches in Russian was concerned, nothing significant was revealed between the two groups. This suggests that both groups used Russian in the same way[51].

In sum, the above results have shown statistically that there was a significant difference between the Russian and Tatar nationalities with the use of Tatar for both reading and writing with online searches. The results for Russian reading and writing for online searches revealed no significant statistical difference between the nationalities for these activities. Therefore, this suggests that being of Tatar nationality was not a good predictor of Tatar language use because the results revealed that Tatars use both Tatar and Russian, whereas being of Russian nationality was a good predictor of Russian language use because Russians only used Russian.

However, another finding was discovered in the analysis of reading and writing for online searches that was that *another* language was being used in addition to Tatar and Russian. The majority of respondents who reported that they used another language specified that English was the language they used. Due to the results for reading and

[51] See appendix 2 for survey, question 9 for Russian responses.

writing for online searches being very similar, both of these test results are analysed together here.

c) Online Searches: Other language Reading and Responding

Table 21: Cross tabulation of nationality versus other language use for reading for online searches

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	22	16	26	23	15	102
	% within Nationality	21.6%	15.7%	25.5%	22.5%	14.7%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	21	10	16	17	7	71
	% within Nationality	29.6%	14.1%	22.5%	23.9%	9.9%	100.0%

Table 22: Cross tabulation of nationality versus other language use for responding to online searches

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	26	15	26	22	13	102
	% within Nationality	25.5%	14.7%	25.5%	21.6%	12.7%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	25	12	12	16	6	71
	% within Nationality	35.2%	16.9%	16.9%	22.5%	8.5%	100.0%

The responses for the Russian respondents in tables 21 and 22 show that the results are very similar for reading and responding for online searches in another language. The results show a relatively even distribution across all five categories within the frequency table. The results for the Tatar respondents show a slight contrast from the results of the Russian respondents. The percentage of Tatar respondents who self-reported that they *never* used another language for reading online searches (29.6%) was slightly higher than the result of the Russian respondents in the same category (21/6%). The results of the Tatar respondents who self-reported that they *never* responded in another language for online searches were just over a third (35.2%). In contrast, the result for the Russian respondents for the same category was slightly lower at 21.6%. The Chi-squared test for independence did not reveal anything significant for this test because the results between the two nationalities were very similar. These results reveal that the rate at which the Russian respondents used the other language (English) was higher in both of these tests than the rate at which Tatars used this other language.

5.5.5.3 Personal Emails

In this section the results for Tatar reading and writing were very similar and the results for Russian reading and writing were almost identical, so the analyses of these tests have been synthesised.

a) Results - Personal Emails: Tatar Reading and Writing

Table 23: Cross tabulation of nationality versus Tatar language use for reading personal emails

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	
Russian	Count	92	5	2	1	2	102
	% within Nationality	90.2%	4.9%	2.0%	1.0%	2.0%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	49	11	5	4	2	71
	% within Nationality	69.0%	15.5%	7.0%	5.6%	2.8%	100.0%

Chi-squared: χ^2 =13.322, df = 4, p = 0.01

Table 24: Cross tabulation of nationality versus responding to personal emails in Tatar

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	94	4	2	1	1	102
	% within Nationality	92.2%	3.9%	2.0%	1.0%	1.0%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	48	12	4	5	2	71
	% within Nationality	67.6%	16.9%	5.6%	7.0%	2.8%	100.0%

Chi-squared: χ^2 =17.578, df = 4, p = 0.001

The results for the Russian respondents in tables 23 and 24 are very similar and reveal that almost all respondents self-reported that they *never* read personal emails in Tatar (90.2%) and *never* wrote personal emails in Tatar (92.2).The responses for *rarely* were 4.9% for reading and 3.9% for responding. The results for *sometimes* were 2% for reading and 2% for responding. The responses for *often* were 1% for reading and 1% for responding. The responses for the Russian respondents for *always* were 2% for reading and 1% for responding. The results for the Tatar respondents show that 69% *never* read personal emails in Tatar and 67.6% *never* responded to personal emails in Tatar whereas 30% read personal emails in Tatar and responded in Tatar (32.3%) with varying degrees of frequency as shown in tables 23 and 24 above. A Chi-squared test for independence revealed that there was a difference between nationalities and how often they read personal emails in Tatar: χ^2 =13.322, df = 4, p = 0.01. Similarly the Chi-squared test for independence between nationalities revealed that there was a difference between nationalities and how often they responded to personal emails in Tatar: χ^2 =17.578, df = 4, p = 0.001.

The above results reveal that Russians did not use Tatar, but Tatars did use Tatar for reading and responding to personal emails. The results for Russian reading and responding is discussed next to qualify this language behaviour.

b) Results - Personal Emails: Russian Reading and Responding

Table 25: Cross tabulation of nationality versus Russian reading for personal emails

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	7	2	4	5	86	102
	% within Nationality	6.9%	2%	3.9%	4.9%	84.3%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	6	0	3	14	48	71
	% within Nationality	8.5%	0%	4.2%	19.7%	67.6%	100.0%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 8.733$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.049$

Table 26: Cross tabulation of nationality versus Russian writing for personal emails

Nationality		1	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	7	4	5	86	102
	% within Nationality	6.9%	3.9%	4.9%	84.3%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	6	3	14	48	71
	% within Nationality	8.5%	4.2%	19.7%	67.6%	100.0%

Chi-squared: $\chi^2 = 10.026$, $df = 3$, $p = 0.015$

The results for the Russian respondents in tables 25 and 26 show that almost all of the respondents (84.3%) *always* read and wrote personal emails in Russian. Tables 24 and 25 reveal that just over two thirds (67.6%) *always* read and wrote personal emails in Russian. The remaining 33% of Tatar respondents self-reported that they did not always read or write personal emails in Russian. The Chi-squared test for independence showed a marked difference between the nationalities and how often they read in Russian for reading personal emails $\chi^2 = 8.733$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.049$. A marked difference was also between nationalities was also revealed for responding to emails in Russian: $\chi^2 = 10.026$, $df=3$, $p=0.015$.

After examining these results of reading and responding to emails in Russian of both nationalities it is clear that the pattern of language use is very similar to the other results for written language use in the sphere of information technology. Russians used Russian for reading personal emails and Tatars used both Russian and Tatar. These results suggest that the use of Tatar language was a good predictor of being Tatar nationality, whereas the use of Russian was not a good predictor of nationality because it was used by both nationalities. Tatars seemed to choose the language they used based on the situation they were in and the nationality of the person they were communicating with.

Another feature of these test results was the use of *another* language for reading and responding to personal emails. This was also a repeat of the pattern for another language used for the online searches tests above. Therefore these the results for language use and personal emails are analysed next.

c) Personal email: other language Reading and Responding

Table 27: Cross tabulation of nationality versus reading personal emails in another language

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	49	12	20	13	8	102
	% within Nationality	48.0%	11.8%	19.6%	12.7%	7.8%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	36	12	9	9	5	71
	% within Nationality	50.7%	16.9%	12.7%	12.7%	7.0%	100.0%

Table 28: Cross tabulation of nationality versus responding to personal emails in another language

Nationality		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Russian	Count	51	15	17	12	7	102
	% within Nationality	50.0%	14.7%	16.7%	11.8%	6.9%	100.0%
Tatar	Count	35	11	13	7	5	71
	% within Nationality	49.3%	15.5%	18.3%	9.9%	7.0%	100.0%

The results of tables 27 and 28 reveal that approximately half of the respondents of both populations self-reported that they *never* used another language for reading and responding to personal emails. Similarly, the spread of results for the other frequency categories was very similar between both nationalities. The Chi-Squared test for independence was run but did not reveal anything significant due to the similarities between both nationalities.

These results suggest that *another* language was being used for reading and responding to personal emails in the same way as it was being used for reading and responding to online searches. However, there was not quite so much difference in the use of this other language for reading and responding to personal emails as there was for online searches, but it was evident that this other language seemed to be used as the second language for Russians and the Tatar language was considered as their third language. Similarly, Tatars seemed to use Russian as language two and the other language as their third.

5.5.6 Summary: Language Use in the Sphere of Information Technology

To summarize this section about languages in use in the sphere of information technology it is seems that if information is used on a personal more informal level, then there appears to be more language choice by the user.

The Tatar respondents used Tatar, Russian and another language, whereas the Russian respondents used Russian and another language in these particular situations. The results also revealed that Russians used another language much more than Tatars did. This suggests that Russians choose to use another language over Tatar because they may find it more useful and perhaps more information is available in the other language than in Tatar. This implies that for informal situations in the sphere of information technology, different languages are being used out of personal choice, whereas for formal situations Russian is still the language of choice.

However, by examining the more *formal* situations above such as formal emails, online courses and word processing, both nationalities are still choosing to use Russian and some are choosing another language. These findings imply that the use of Tatar is governed by nationality and cultural background, such as an in-group marker of belonging. The use of Russian seems to be dominant in formal situations within this sphere amongst both the Russian and Tatar nationalities and it seems to be still associated with technology. The use of Tatar seems to be used alongside Russian for more *personal* language use amongst the Tatars.

5.5.7 Conclusions for language test 3 analyses of written language behaviour within the spheres of work, the home and information technology

One of the aims of this section of the questionnaire was to find out if language policy had been successfully implemented in the spheres of work, the home and information technology with regard to the written language. These areas were examined because Russians and Tatars share the same experiences within these spheres in society. Another aim was to find out whether their language experiences differed and if the language they chose to use was influenced by the situation they were in. Therefore this would help to determine whether there was an asymmetrical language situation.

The major findings of this section have therefore been that language choice seems to be dependent on whether the situation is formal or informal. Formal situations are found in the work sphere and some situations relating to information technology whereas informal situations are more personal. Cultural background also influences language choice. As far as attitudes were concerned, the results suggested that those who self-identified as Russians did not judge Tatar necessary for use in most situations; they used

it occasionally or sometimes and when a third language was available, such as English, for example, they used this language more than they used Tatar. Due to English being used as the global language across the world, these results are not surprising. Both Russian and Tatar are available to use, but Russians choose not to use Tatar. This reflects their attitude towards the Tatar language. The way self-identified Tatars perceive their exposure to Tatar is different due to their cultural background.

The first two hypotheses for these tests of self-reported language use within the spheres of work, the home and information technology mentioned at the beginning of these tests are therefore not rejected, but the null hypothesis is rejected.

5.6 Conclusions of quantitative research

The aim of this chapter was to find out how successful the Tatar language policy had been on the Russian nationality in terms of written levels of Tatar proficiency in comparison with the Tatar nationality.

The first tests that were carried out examined to what extent language could be an indicator of nationality. The tests revealed that the Tatar language was a good predictor of nationality amongst the Tatar population. On the other hand, the Russian language was not a good predictor of Russian nationality because a Russian speaker could be any other nationality within the republic. The tests additionally demonstrated that the Tatar language was considered as more of a symbol of identity and a marker of belonging to the in-group. Russian was considered more of a functional language for everyday use. The tests revealed that attitudes towards language use were formulated within the home and these attitudes were passed down from generation to generation.

The analysis of the data collected for the second language test, which measured the levels of proficiency of both nationalities, revealed that many Russians were able to use the Tatar language with varying degrees of facility and that one third of the Russian respondents were able to use Tatar at a higher level of functionality. In all other areas Russians reported that they made very little use of the Tatar language, so the only credible explanation for this proficiency was compulsory Tatar language learning at school. In this respect, the law on education for compulsory Tatar language learning in schools seems to have been successful as a measure of language policy implementation from a top-down perspective. Primary and secondary education is the only sphere where Tatar language use is compulsory by law.

However, after examining how written languages were used in the third set of tests in the spheres of work, the home and information technology in the self-reported language test, we can conclude that Russian is the language of choice for formal situations whereas Tatar is the language of choice for informal situations amongst the Tatar population. This suggests that self-identifying as a Tatar is one reason for choosing to use the Tatar language. The analyses have shown that both nationalities are also using another language for certain situations; Russians are choosing to use another language more than Tatar, which suggests that they find less use for Tatar than for a foreign language. It can be concluded that the results of this quantitative analysis reflect two different facets of society. This suggests that there is a gap between the promotion and production of Tatar language at school and the practice of it in everyday situations within spheres such as work, the home and information technology.

Overall the language policy seems to have been effective in the sphere of education due to Tatar being compulsory in schools. However, it does not seem to have changed attitudes towards the Tatar language. It appears that although the language policy has been successful in the sphere of education, it has not been as fully developed in other areas. This seems to be due to the fact that a language choice exists in areas outside of education and it is the population who make this choice depending on the setting. The Tatar language therefore appears to be used on two levels: firstly as a collective symbol that represents Tatar identity and culture and secondly, as a language that is used in the sphere of the home and as part of the in-group phenomenon. Russian is the language used within the spheres of work and technology. If Tatar language learning within the workplace is not compulsory for all nationalities, then people will choose not to use it because they do not need to use it. The areas where Russians and Tatars share the same experiences are therefore asymmetrical regarding language use.

The general hypothesis for this study thus needs to be modified as follows:

> '*Education is having an effect on Russians' level of Tatar proficiency and their ability to actively use it, but it has not had an effect on Russians' use of Tatar in everyday situations'*.

The results have suggested that Tatar compulsory language learning at school is the reason why some Russians are able to use the Tatar language. Therefore these results could be applied to any sample of the population, no matter what they choose to do after finishing school.

As was mentioned in the methodology section at the beginning of this chapter, the procedures for carrying out this survey were designed to get people to evaluate their own behaviour rather than to ask them to comment on attitudes and reasons. The next chapter analyses peoples' individual attitudes and opinions towards language use in Kazan and are therefore examined from an ontological perspective.

Chapter Six - Qualitative Data Analysis

The aim of this chapter is to qualify the findings from chapter five and to examine in more detail the attitudes of both Russian and Tatar populations towards Tatar language use. This chapter examines in detail the attitudes towards Tatar language use from the subjective perspectives of the Russian and Tatar populations. As Shevel (2002, p.405) posited, nation-building policies, such as the language policy are often negotiated and contested at citizen level. According to and Polese (2011, p.40) and Rodgers (2007), people's attitudes show that they are participating in the reconstruction of nation-building and identity. Therefore this chapter focuses on the bottom-up perspective that is fundamental in nation-building processes such as the language policy.

The data is based on seven interviews that were led by the researcher during the field trip to Kazan at the same time as the data collection on which chapter five is based in 2010. As well as these seven interviews, the chapter is also based on informal conversations with people in Kazan, group discussions with students at Kazan Federal University, observations and is linked to events that have been happening throughout the period of this research. This chapter first of all describes the methods used, the interviews and the coding process before finally giving the analysis of the interviews that is grouped into the themes that emerged from the coding process.

6.1 Methods

Before beginning the analysis of the data an explanation of what qualitative data analysis comprises will be given. Qualitative data analysis generally uses two strategies that are called analytic induction and grounded theory. These strategies use a framework to help guide the analysis of the data. According to Bryman (2008, p.539),

> '*Analytic induction is an approach to the analysis of data in which the researcher seeks universal explanations of phenomena by pursuing the collection of data until no cases that are inconsistent with a hypothetical explanation (deviant or negative cases) of a phenomena are found.*'

Grounded theory on the other hand, is defined as,

> '*Theory that was derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed through the research process. In this method, data collection, analysis, and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another*' (Strauss and Corbin 1998, p.12 cited in Bryman 2008, p.541).

In other words, grounded theory takes an inductive view of the relationship between the theories from a literature review and emerging themes from interview analysis. The strategy used for this research was contextualized in grounded theory because the interview questions were based on ideas from the theories in the literature review in chapters two -four.

The research is ontological and is both objectivist and constructionist: it is objectivist because it 'implies that social phenomena confront us as external facts that are beyond our reach or influence' (Bryman, 2008, p.18). In relation to this research, this signifies that the language policy exists as an external fact and people should use language in one way or another, but it is also constructionist because 'it implies that social properties are outcomes of the interactions between individuals' (Bryman, 2008, p.366). In the case of this analysis, we examine how people view Tatar language use within post-Soviet society and examine how they designate it to being used one way or another through their attitudes.

It is important to describe judgments and opinions about language use because these allow us access to information based on cultural norms, even though there is a strong bias. We therefore have to take into consideration who the speakers are and what their personal circumstances are. It is important to point out that we can only get generalised patterns of social evaluation from a study of language attitudes. Therefore it is necessary to examine not only language attitudes, but language ideologies because they are both part of the process of using language. According to Coupland and Jaworski (2009, p.345), 'speakers and listeners conduct interaction against a set of beliefs and assumptions as they communicate. This is all part of what communication is'. Nekvapil and Sherman (2013, p.85-6) similarly posit that it is not possible to make sense of what is being said without a shared assumption between the speakers and state that, 'any given setting contains a constellation of language ideologies which then influence observable practices of language management'.

6.2 The Interviews[52]

The seven interviews took place in higher education establishments such as Kazan Federal University, the Tatar State University of Humanities and Education, Kazan Technical University and the Russian Academy of Sciences. All formal interviews were held with teachers and professors in these institutions in their offices or in empty

[52] Some of the data from the interviews was a result of a second field trip to Kazan in 2013 when I carried out research for the Tatar government during an internship funded through the support of CEELBAS. For more details of this internship and reports see Wigglesworth-Baker, T. (2013b) in the bibliography.

classrooms. The interviewees were teachers of technology, maths, Tatar philology and Russian as a foreign language, sociology and history. The interviews were all individual and permission was given to record them. However, the interviewees seemed to open up more once the Dictaphone had been switched off, so field notes were made as soon as was possible after the interview concerned. The interviewees were both Tatar and Russian in order to get as balanced a view as possible of their opinions. The interviewees were asked if the content of the interviews could be used in the study and they agreed and signed a consent form. However, it was decided to keep the interviewees anonymous in the analysis of the chapter with the exception of Iskhakov and Iskhakova, who are very prominent figures in the language planning field and Salagaev, who was the head of the Russian Cultural Society in Kazan. All three gave their consent to the inclusion of their names in this study.

The interviews were given in Russian by the researcher because she did not know the Tatar language. The interviewees said they did not mind talking in Russian and the fact that the researcher did not know Tatar was not a barrier. The role of outsider was adopted. The interviews were semi-structured and the questions can be found in appendix 3. Due to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, it was decided not to use the interview questions as a framework for the analysis; the interviews did not all follow the same pattern. Although the questions asked for the same information from each interviewee, some of the questions were framed differently depending on who the interviewee was. For example, question 4 in appendix 3 was changed from '*Do you know anything about the language policy in Tatarstan*' to '*How successful do you think the language policy has been in RT?*' Iskhakov and Iskhakova because they were influential characters within the field of language planning in Tatarstan.

All of the interviews were transcribed by the author of this thesis and sections used in this chapter have been translated into English without reproducing the original Russian, because it is the content of the conversations which is more important than actual language analysis in this type of study. The recordings totalled two hours. Some interviews were only ten minutes long because many of the interviewees were pressed for time. Others were between twenty and forty minutes.

In addition, many informal conversations took place during my time in Kazan, particularly with groups of younger people who I was teaching English to at the time. These groups comprised of three to five people who were either Russian, Tatar or of mixed Russian-Tatar nationality. I also had the opportunity to lead a sociology class in Kazan Federal University with Tatar students in order to find out informally about their

feelings towards the language situation in Kazan. There were approximately thirty students in this class and they were all of Tatar nationality, with the exception of one Russian student. Particular care was taken when reporting their feelings due to bias.
Field notes were made on the content of the discussions immediately afterwards. It was important to talk to members of the younger generation in order to have a balance with the interviewees who were from an older generation.

6.3 The Coding Process

Coding in grounded theory is used as a tool to break down data such as transcripts, into components that are given names and categories (Bryman, 2008). It is an exploratory process. In the first stages of the coding process, the names and categories are mainly key words that are descriptive. In later stages of the coding process, these descriptive categories and names are paradigmatically linked to theories from the scholarly literature in chapters two - four. As a result, the categories become more analytical. These categories help to give theoretical significance from the scholarly works to the social contexts being examined in this study. This method of analysis is sometimes known as thematic analysis.
After the initial transcriptions for this research had been completed, each interview was read as a whole and notes and ideas were made on the transcripts, particularly if there were any unusual issues or interesting ideas that arose during reading. The ideas for the codes came from the data itself. During further readings the codes from each interview were constantly compared to reflect on the similarities and differences between data. These codes were then reviewed and interconnections between the codes were made and combined further into categories in order to reduce the number of codes[53]. Each section of each interview that corresponded to a particular code was then cut and pasted into another word document and labelled as one category. The categories were education, language policy, urban versus rural, mutual understanding, language use and spheres and finally the generation gap. Each response from the interviewees was labelled so that it could be identified where it came from. Furthermore, the researcher kept going back to listen to the whole interviews to ensure that no meaning had been taken out of context as a result of cutting and pasting. Then analytical coding of each of these categories took place by combining the codes with the theories from the literature in chapters two - four, observations made in Kazan and events happening at the time of

[53] Please see the coding table in appendix 3.

this research into themes. This was put together on large sheets of A3 paper from which the written analysis of this chapter began.

The explicit themes which emerged from the coding process were language policy and structures of power, spheres of language use with particular reference to the home and communication, education, the media, work and officialdom, the generation gap, how language is distributed geographically within the Republic of Tatarstan and socio-psychological issues. Another theme, which was implicit from the codes, was status planning. No issues that were discussed related to corpus planning.

6.4 Language Policy and Structures of Power

This category examines people's attitudes to the language policy that was implemented in 1992. The language policy declared that both Russian and Tatar had equal status in all spheres and they were both the official languages of the republic. However, it was necessary to find out how the population viewed the policy and to what extent they believed it had been successful or made a difference to their everyday lives. According to Shevel (2002, p.405), citizens were an important part of the negotiations in nation-building processes because a policy could only be deemed successful if citizens accepted it. This discussion was instigated by the question, 'What do you know about the language policy?' and was intended as a very general prompt.

When the Tatar interviewees from the university gave their responses, it was noticeable that they referred to the language law as something that had happened a long time ago in the past. They mentioned that a significant amount of work had been done to bring the Tatar language back into use during the early 1990s. They felt that in recent years work had stopped or that nobody was bothered about it anymore. However, they continued by pointing out that the language law had made it compulsory for students of all nationalities to learn Tatar in schools. One of the interviewees thought the language law was necessary for people living in Tatarstan to communicate with each other and to find out about the local people, culture and history. In this case, the language law was therefore viewed as symbolic which had helped to reawaken the national consciousness

On the other hand, when the Russians were interviewed, it was noticeable that they all mentioned the language law in the first instance. Many of them spoke about how Russian and Tatar were considered equal and that this was as a result of the language law. One interviewee recalled how she had seen an article in a newspaper that stated that all people working in the public sector might have to learn Tatar in the future. The interviewee seemed afraid of this and in general, there seemed to be a fear of the

language law amongst the Russian interviewees who I spoke to. Another Russian interviewee believed the language law was necessary,

> '*Every republic has its own peculiarities and each republic has its own ethnic composition, its traditions and forms of language interactions. Therefore a language policy is necessary. The language law says that the official languages are Tatar and Russian and they must be studied equally in schools.*'

Perhaps this interviewee thought that a language law was necessary for all ethnic groups to be equally represented, although the language law in Tatarstan only represents two of the languages spoken on its territory. Later in the interview this person asked what purpose learning Tatar had for Russians. He did not see why Russians should learn a language that he believed was not used for any role in everyday life because Russian already fulfilled these roles and purposes. Therefore this interviewee gave the impression that although the law was necessary, many Russians did not agree with it, but there was nothing they could do. They had to tolerate it. Overtly Russians express agreement with the language law, but covertly there are underlying tensions regarding the language situation.

In an interview with Iskhakov[54], a lecturer in the Department of History at Kazan Pedagogical University and a political activist for Tatar language planning and policy and development of Tatar history, he believed that the mechanisms for developing the language law had not been fully developed or thought out. He mentioned in particular the territorial aspects of the national state languages that should have been taken into consideration. He believed that this was the local government's fault and they should have had a different variant of the language law, such as the Swiss language law. The language law in Switzerland is multilingual and includes four languages as the official languages: French, German, Italian and Romansch. Each territory of the country has adapted the language law to suit the nationalities living in close proximity together[55]. However, there are still many problems within these territories as different ethnic groups are continually competing against each other for linguistic space in spheres such as education and work (Watts in Coulmas, 1991).

The language law in Tatarstan is bilingual, but many more languages are spoken on its territory[56]. Iskhakov gave the impression that a bilingual policy was not suitable for the

[54] Interview on 21.10.10

[55] See chapter one for more details on language planning and policies.

[56] See chapter four and the 2010 All-population census results.

Republic of Tatarstan because many more languages are spoken on its territory in addition to Russian and Tatar. He also expressed his dissatisfaction of the political situation and its influence on the Tatar language at the present moment. He said that the language situation was declining because he felt the present Tatar ruling elite was not doing enough to support the Tatar language. He said that during the 1990s when Mintimir Shaimiev was in power, more was done to protect Tatar because the president was more proactive than the current president, Rustam Minnikhanov. This point of view about how fruitful developments appeared to be at the beginning of the 1990s in comparison with language planning developments during the present period, was similar to the opinions held by the other Tatar interviewees above.

Despite holding this opinion, Iskhakov mentioned that it was good that Russians were able to passively use the Tatar language. He said this was a result of Tatar compulsory language learning in schools as part of the education sphere. However, he pointed out that the language law had only been successful as far as the ethno-cultural language sphere was concerned and that it had not been successful in any other spheres. By this he meant that the development of the Tatar language had been successful for culture, traditions and for the reawakening of the ethnic conscience of the Tatar people. Therefore the Tatar language seemed to be synonymous with identity.

In an interview with Iskhakova[57], a very positive attitude towards the language law was expressed. She said that both Tatar and Russian had achieved equal status, but more needed to be done to make the law a reality rather than just a piece of paper that stated this fact. She felt that the status and prestige of the Tatar language had been improved significantly as a result of the language law. She said that it was thanks to the language law that Tatar was being taught in schools and higher educational institutes and that people were now able to learn Tatar, but she added that they must keep trying to develop the language and not to just to '*sit back on our hands and do nothing*'. She said they still had a great amount of work to do, but at least the language law had helped them to be able to continue with this work. Furthermore she mentioned that now it was even possible to talk about Russian-Tatar bilingualism as well as Tatar-Russian.

6.4.1 Summary

Judging from the attitudes to the language policy above, it seems that Tatars look upon the law as something that happened a long time ago in history. This appears to be because they did not believe much had been done recently to continue its progress.

[57] Interview on 22.10.10

Another reason for this could be the failed alphabet reform that was banned by the Russian government in 2002. They may have felt as if this was a huge knock back for their efforts. Many seemed to look back to the early 1990s as being a very industrious period for Tatar language planning. People in independent states and autonomous republics had the freedom to develop and implement language policies (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.6; Marshall, 1996, p.16-17). There was generally more interest in language planning at that time because people had a newfound freedom after their titular languages had been suppressed under Soviet rule for seventy years. However, the mood seemed to have changed and there was a general sense of apathy amongst the Tatar interviewees towards the Tatar language. Another reason why this could be is that since the Putin administration took over the government in 2000, there was an attempt to centralize more political power from the regions to Moscow. However, Tatarstan still retained many of its powers, but these powers were always negotiated with concessions made on both sides (Graney, 2009, p.xxv). It might have been a possibility that the Tatar government were more preoccupied with trying to keep Tatarstan's status in the federal and international arenas than they were with domestic policies. It was evident from a bottom-up perspective, that citizens thought not enough was being done by the government to enforce language laws. However, from a top-down perspective it was the federal government that ultimately controlled the laws[58].

Despite this feeling of gloom amongst the Tatar population about language planning issues, in reality Russians have been learning Tatar as a result of this language planning and the compulsory Tatar language learning programme in schools as was revealed in the results of the quantitative tests in chapter five. However, this did not seem to have been taken into account as many of the Tatar interviewees believed there had been a decline in Tatar language learning. In addition, the law has increased the prestige of Tatar and in this respect it seems to have been a success. The Russian interviewees were very aware of Tatar having equal status to Russian as an official language. They did not seem to like this, but they knew they could do nothing about it because it was the law. This also seems to fit with the theories of Russian and titular identities mentioned in chapter three (see Hagendoorn et al. 2008; Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003; Tolz, 1998). The Russians interviewees seemed to demonstrate a more political stance on the Tatar language in the way that they were very aware of the language laws and by the way that they felt Tatar was not useful in everyday life for them because they used Russian that was the language of the Russian Federation. The Tatar interviewees

[58] See chapter three for more details about laws and the federal government.

seemed to demonstrate a more ethnic symbolic stance on the Tatar language and seemed to be rather vague as far as the language law was concerned. This could have been due to be possibility that they perceived Tatar as being used amongst Tatars and not by any other ethnic group.

6.5 Spheres of Language Use

This category is based on Fishman's (1991) GIDS framework and examines to what extent the eight stages of language maintenance and spread can apply to the Tatar language situation in Kazan. This category aims to determine whether attitudes towards the Tatar language have changed since the 1990s as well as its prestige and whether Tatar is fulfilling its role in a functional capacity within society. The themes that arose from the analyses were connected to the spheres of officialdom and work, education, the media, which are linked to GIDS stages 5–1. The sphere of home/communication links to GIDS stages 8–6. As was mentioned earlier in chapter one, stages 5–1 are concerned with the written form of the language and in these stages it is considered to be a key to social mobility and competitiveness in the work environment. Stages 8–6 concern the spoken language. In addition to these above-mentioned functional themes, the symbolic side of the Tatar language was also prevalent in the discussions with interviewees. As well as examining the symbolic side of the language synonymously with the functional side, it is also discussed as a separate theme because of its significance for the Tatar language and because of how people perceived the language.

Fishman examines language maintenance from the highest score on the scale to the lowest, therefore analysing the process of language and what makes it appropriate for it to move to up to the next stage. This section is examined in the same way by starting the analysis from stages 8–6 with language use in the sphere of the home and communication.

6.5.1 Language in the home and communication

Fishman's stages 8–6 are concerned with language use through intergenerational continuity and how it is spread across the neighbourhoods and communities. These stages are concerned with the cultural aspect of the minority language. Members of families are not necessarily fluent in the language, as was discovered in chapter five in the self-identity tests regarding languages used in the home.

One of the aims of this study was to find out whether or not Tatar was being used more as a language of everyday communication. Many people of the younger generation I spoke to on an informal basis which were either from Tatar or mixed Tatar-Russian

families, told me they spoke Tatar with their grandparents who lived in villages and in the more rural areas of Tatarstan. They felt that they spoke more Tatar to their grandparents than they did in the home with their parents. They also said they use Tatar to communicate with other Tatars within their communities, but never used it to communicate with Russians. One Tatar interviewee mentioned that it was more common these days to hear Tatar spoken on the streets, although she felt that this was only between Tatar people. Another Tatar interviewee, on the other hand, believed that *unfortunately*, Tatar was only used in the home.

A Russian interviewee said that in shops, everybody spoke Russian so there was not even the need to learn Tatar to communicate. In fact, after observing and listening to many spoken exchanges in shops in Kazan, I only heard Tatar being spoken in Tatar-run enterprises or Tatar shops. Here the shop assistant would address the customer in Tatar, but would switch to Russian if the person did not speak Tatar. Another Tatar person who was interviewed believed that unfortunately, Tatar was only needed for spoken communication,

> '*There is no need to write anything in Tatar. You can communicate in Tatar, you can read in Tatar, you can watch TV in Tatar, but there is no need for a literary written language and this is a very big problem.'*[59]

It appeared that although Tatar was available on TV and publications were available in Tatar, there was a general belief that there was no need for anybody, whether they were Russian or Tatar, to read or watch anything in Tatar because everything was available in Russian and as one interviewee put it, it had become a *habit* to use only Russian. It seemed as if it would only be down to the wish or desire of an individual to choose to read and watch TV in Tatar. It was just not necessary.

Although it was evident that Tatar was present within the community and it was used amongst Tatars, it seemed that Tatars would often self-designate their language to the sphere of the home and communication; there was a general feeling of apathy about its use.

As far as attitudes were concerned, there seemed to be an underlying prejudice from the Tatars that Russians would never learn Tatar. This prejudice seemed to be present amongst many ethnic groups towards outsiders. It was as if there was the idea that outsiders could not learn their language; the Tatar language seemed to equate more with ethnic belonging than about the functional use of the language. It therefore shows

[59] This person gave the interview in English so all words are directly transcribed from the interview.

evidence of the in-group out-group phenomenon that was discussed in chapters three and four and is linked to features of Tatar identity mentioned in chapter four (see Gumperz, 1982; Khabenskaia, 2002; Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003; Shevel, 2002).

As well as Tatar being the language that people considered as being used only in the home, another subtheme that was mentioned was bilingualism. On the subject of bilingualism, Iskhakova illustrated the differences between Tatar-Russian and Russian-Tatar bilingualism. This showed that even in the nature of bilingualism in Tatarstan there existed in-group and out-group attitudes. Iskhakova herself was a native Tatar and was more interested in Tatar-Russian bilingualism. She pointed out that bilingualism was difficult and problematic to achieve because a person always knows one language better than the other. She said she was brought up in a Tatar environment and therefore the Tatar language was very close to her. Her response was quite contradictory at times, especially concerning Russians' use of the Tatar language.

She was striving for native Tatars to learn their native language more and, as a prominent language planner within this field of study, she believed that it was up to language planners to make the language interesting and stimulate motivation by reviving an interest through Tatar culture. She mentioned how Russians never knew Tatar in the past, but nowadays Russians were being educated about the ethnography of the Tatar population and Tatar culture so that they could understand about Tatar identity. She believed that Russians needed to know the Tatar language in the Republic of Tatarstan so that all members of society could communicate and understand one another. She believed that Russians who studied Tatar language were showing tolerance to the bilingual situation in Kazan. She said it was a positive moment when her Russian students began to communicate freely in Tatar. She explained that it was also a common phenomenon these days for Russians to know Tatar passively. Iskhakova mentioned the Russians' passive use of Tatar quite frequently. She believed that a Russian student could only know Tatar passively because their parents never knew Tatar, never having had the opportunity to learn it in school during the Soviet period. A Tatar student, on the other hand, knew Tatar actively because they were brought up in a Tatar-speaking environment. This implies that Tatar language learning was related to the sphere of the home and it was impossible that a native Russian would acquire fluency, despite living in an environment with easy access to native speakers and other resources for improving the Tatar studied at school. Another reason for this opinion could be due to the impracticality for Russians learning Tatar. Therefore, Iskhakova may not see any

practical objective for non-Tatars to learn the language. However, the results in chapter five of this work did show that Russians could use Tatar as actively as Tatars as result of the compulsory Tatar language-learning programme in schools.

6.5.1.1 Summary

It seems that attitude plays a large part in designating Tatar to the sphere of the home and communication by both Russians and Tatars alike that is represented as an ideology used in language management (Nekvapil and Sherman, 2013, p.85-6). Russians feel as if there is no need to learn Tatar for communicating because everybody speaks Russian anyway, and the Tatars seem to self-designate their language to this sphere and appear to be apathetical about its use outside of the home. This self-designation could be due to an ideology of belonging from which Russians are excluded by Tatars. Furthermore, there seems to be a prejudice towards the Russians that they will never know Tatar in any active sense, even though they are learning it in schools and it is obvious from the results of chapter five that some self-identified Russians achieve high fluency in Tatar (30%), presumably on the basis of Tatar language learning in schools. This prejudice bears resemblance to Nekvapil and Sherman's (2013, p.112), *ideology of a difficult language*. Nekvapil and Sherman identified an ideology of Czech as a 'hard language' that foreigners could not learn.

The interviews in this part of the analysis revealed that Tatar was being used beyond stage 6 of the GIDS because it was being used by not only the Tatar community, but by the Russian community as well, even though it appeared to be used only in schools because it was compulsory. In sum, Tatar was considered as a language of ethnic belonging and was designated as a tool to teach other nationalities about the symbolic side of Tatar ethnicity. It appeared that it was the attitude of the people that was forming a barrier towards increasing the prestige of Tatar and the fulfilment of its functional capacity.

Stages 5–1 of Fishman's GIDS are examined next, beginning with the sphere of education. The function of the minority language is broadened in stage 5 because literacy in the written language commences, although it is still considered as being within the boundaries of the minority community.

6.5.2 Language in the sphere of education

In the Republic of Tatarstan during the Soviet period the Tatar language was still taught. Although the republics of the USSR were allowed to use their native language as the language of instruction, the curriculum had to be 'national in form, socialist in content'

(Connor 1984, p.202; Graney 1999, p.612; Grenoble, 2003, p.41). Therefore only the Tatar language was taught and not the history or culture of the Tatars. During this period there was only one school in Kazan where you could learn Tatar and only two hours per week were devoted to Tatar language learning (Cashaback, 2008, p.260; Graney, 1999, p.619). Tatar language was non-obligatory: nobody had to learn it, but they could if they wished. Russians did not learn Tatar and only Tatars who wanted to, learned it (Cashaback, 2008, p.261).

According to a Tatar professor of history who was interviewed[60], Tatar was '*ousted*' from schools before the Second World War in 1938 and Russian was made the obligatory language. Assimilation with the Russians came about because many native Tatars were 'ousted' from their homeland and many Russians settled in the republic. As a result, the Tatar language suffered because people did not learn it. The gap, which exists nowadays between those who know Tatar (the younger generation) and those who do not, for example, those who were educated during the Soviet period, is a result of this. The interviewee explained that after the collapse of the USSR, Russians living in the Republic of Tatarstan had the choice to leave and were offered apartments in Russia, but they chose to stay. In his opinion the Russians '*tolerated the Tatar cultural and language revival programmes because they saw what was happening in Dagestan and the northern Caucasus and they decided not to kick up a fuss because they understood that this tolerance was a very low cost for peace*'.

In 1998 a law was passed that made it compulsory for all nationalities in schools in the Republic of Tatarstan to learn the Tatar language within the curriculum. This was not a popular law amongst the Russian population and there are still many protests about it today. In the following discourses the current arguments are highlighted through the attitudes towards compulsory Tatar language learning, languages of instruction and subjects taught, methodology and educational gaps in language learning between school and further educational institutes.

6.5.3 Attitudes towards Compulsory Tatar Language learning

At present the arguments have shifted to focus on the number of hours given to Russian and Tatar language learning in schools, but the ongoing question of why Russians should be made to learn Tatar at all was still prevalent in the arguments.

[60] Interview 16.10.10

On February 18th 2011 the parents of Russian children from educational institutions across the Republic of Tatarstan sent a letter with a petition[61] to the Minister of Education and Science in Moscow, Andrey Fursenko, to protest about the number of hours given to Tatar language learning in comparison with the numbers hours being spent on Russian language learning in schools. They complained that the number of hours for Tatar language learning was now greater than for Russian language learning. They asserted that the native language of most children in the republic was Russian and that the children needed to have an equal number of hours of Russian language learning as in other parts of the Russian Federation. They felt that their children were being put at a disadvantage because their children's standard of Russian would get worse and lower their chances of entering higher educational institutes within the Russian Federation in the future. They also felt that knowledge of their culture was being put at risk because the children would not have a sufficient standard of Russian to be able to learn about it. In response to the letter and petition, the Minister for Education and Science replied that the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had examined the matter and that the Tatar government was not in violation of any law. As a result of this setback for the Russian parents, they staged a protest on April 16th 2011 against the number of hours of Tatar compulsory language learning for Russian children outside the Ministry of Education and Science in Kazan. On the same day, a couple of kilometres away from the Russian protest, the Tatar activist youth movement *Azatlyk* also staged a protest in opposition to the Russian parents to underscore to young people that they should learn their '*mother's native language*'[62]. None of these protests achieved anything from either the central or local governments. This appeared to be a result of the central government not having any responsibility for the regional educational curriculum and therefore the regional Tatar government having the power to increase Tatar language learning (Cashaback, 2008, p.256). This therefore showed power on the part of the Tatar government and resistance from the Russian protesters who were subject to Tatar regional law in Tatarstan (Shevel, 2002, p.405).

One of the Russian interviewees, who worked at the technical university in Kazan, elaborated on the above argument about the number of hours. He thought that Russians were studying Tatar more than was necessary and believed that the number of hours devoted to studying the Tatar language were more than those devoted to Russian language learning in secondary schools. He also mentioned that the standards of

[61] http://open-letter.ru/letter/24551

[62] http://www.kazan.aif.ru/society/article/18655

Russian language were decreasing and that his students made so many mistakes in their writing, inferring that the reason was because so many hours were spent on learning Tatar. However, he thought that there was nothing specific written in the law about the number of hours that should be taught. He seemed to think that there were six hours of Tatar language learning per week and four or five hours for Russian language learning. Many other interviewees also mentioned the number of hours. One mentioned that his son received three to four hours of Tatar each week and three hours of English.

Furthermore, according to Mikhael Shcheglov[63], a prominent representative for the Society for Russian Culture in the Republic of Tatarstan[64], who was present at the demonstrations by Russian parents in Kazan earlier in 2011,

> '*Over the last twenty years in Tatarstan, the Russian language for Russian speaking children has been taught as a non-native language and that's why school children make mistakes in speaking and writing and have a poor understanding of other subjects, don't read books and are having difficulty entering higher education institutes*.'

Amongst some of the requirements put forward by the parents to the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Tatarstan was to increase the standards of Russian in schools and to have Tatar literature taught in Russian in Russian schools and widen the Russian ethno-cultural component of the curriculum in Russian gymnasiums throughout the republic.

In contradiction to the above argument about the decrease in standards of Russian, Iskhakova mentioned that the standards of Russian in the Republic of Tatarstan and the quality of Russian language teaching were far higher than in many other parts of the Russian Federation. This opinion was also reflected in a newspaper article in *Tatar-Inform*, 15th June 2011, which reported that the results for the Russian language component of the EGE[65] were higher than the average for the whole of the Russian Federation and this was found to be the case for literature, chemistry, biology, IT and foreign languages as well.

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[63] http://www.ruskline.ru/news_rl/2011/04/18/kazan_vybiraet_russkij_yazyk/ 18/04/11

[64] This society was set up towards the end of the 1980s in Tatarstan, as were other similar societies in other republics, for the protection of Russians and their culture at a time of great political instability. According to one newspaper article, (http://www.kazan.aif.ru/onlineconf/1600016) the society has not been active for a long time. However, the current debates about the number of Tatar and Russian hours of learning in schools has sparked recent activities such as the demonstration organised on 16.04.11.

[65] *Edinyi Gosudarstvenyi Ekzamen* The Unified State Exam, which all school leavers have to take in the Russian Federation.

Other Tatar interviewees thought that if Russians were living in the Republic of Tatarstan, then they should learn the language. What is more, they said that all subjects within the curriculum were taught in Russian. According to many interviewees, the Tatar language was not developed enough to use it as the language of instruction for most subjects at school. Furthermore, the teachers did not know it well enough to be confident in teaching their subjects through the medium of Tatar.

As far as compulsory Tatar language learning was concerned, many Russian people did not see why their children should have to learn Tatar in the first place, even though they accepted that it was the law and they had to learn it. A blog site[66] was set up by the above-mentioned Shcheglov for people to add their opinions about the compulsory law on languages. Many opinions from the Russian bloggers were concerned with the fact that they felt it unfair that they should have to learn Tatar when they already knew Russian that was one of the official state languages. They felt that there was no need to learn Tatar because everything was in Russian anyway. Furthermore, they wrote that Russian was the official language of the Russian Federation and that the Republic of Tatarstan was part of the Russian Federation. It was not independent from Russia and they believed they did not need to learn Tatar because of this.

There were some Russians who wrote that they should learn Tatar because they lived in Tatarstan. Most Tatar bloggers wrote that if Russians reside in the republic, then they must learn it. If they did not want to learn it they should go and live elsewhere. The majority of the Tatar people I spoke to informally said that most people who lived in Tatarstan, whatever their nationality, would probably never go and live outside the country because it was difficult to do this due to economic constraints. Therefore they felt that everybody should learn Tatar because it might be beneficial for them in acquiring some promotion at work.

6.5.3.1 Summary

After looking at attitudes towards compulsory Tatar language learning in schools and the discourses about the number of hours devoted to Tatar language learning, it can be assumed that the arguments were about competition of linguistic space within the school curriculum. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the arguments being put forward were by parents of the children being taught. These parents were educated under the Soviet system of education and seemed to be passing on their conditioned ideas and opinions from the Soviet period onto their children. They assumed that

[66] http://my.mail.ru/mail/m.sheglow/

everybody wanted to be educated in Russian and everybody seemed to be. Anything that they felt threatens their heritage assumed a symbolic status out of proportion to its actual value, i.e. a difference of one hour of language learning between Tatar and Russian. Obviously their opinions were at variance with statistical evidence, as the report in *Tatar-Inform*, 15th June 2011, showed that standards of Russian were higher in the Republic of Tatarstan than in other parts of the Russian Federation. Moreover, there was evidence to suggest within this discourse that the arguments from both the Russians and Tatars were based on a territorial perspective: Russians felt that their loyalty was towards the wider nation, the Russian Federation, but Tatars felt that Russians should learn Tatar to assimilate more into society within Tatarstan because Tatar language was part of the Tatar nation. These attitudes appear to confirm Poppe and Hagerdoorn's findings that revealed particular loyalties of Russians towards the Russian Federation and the state in which they resided (2001 and 2003, see chapter 3.3).

6.5.4 Languages of instruction and subjects taught within the curriculum

This theme examines languages of instruction and subjects taught within the curriculum. From discussions with the interviewees, it became evident that there was a clear divide between the types of subjects that were associated with Tatar and those that were associated with Russian. There was also a clear divide between the nationalities that studied certain subjects (Garipov et al., 2000, p.14, 26-35; Stoliarova, in Garipov et al., 2008, p.105). This was also apparent in the studies carried out by Iskhakova (2001 and 2002) that were mentioned in chapter four.

According to one interviewee, historically, the sciences, mathematics and technical subjects were taught in Russian. However, this still seemed to be the case at present. Many interviewees mentioned how Russian would be used for the sciences and Tatar was used more in the home and in the sphere of communication. Apparently there were attempts to teach technical subjects in Tatar, but this was never fully realized due to the fact that the majority of materials were published in Russian. According to one interviewee[67], technical terminology in Tatar was not sufficient enough,

> '*In KFU there is a specialist Tatar department < … > you can study Tatar history there, Tatar philology in the pedagogical university and that's all … There were attempts to teach theoretical mechanics in Tatar, but nothing came of it because the technical language was practically non-existent, so we taught the Russian engineers in Russian. Tatar is related to the humanities …*'

[67] Interview 16.10.10

However, a brief examination of the history of the Tatar language in chapter 4.3.3 showed that technical terminology did exist in Tatar. However, it could be argued that the technological language of the early twentieth century would need to be significantly supplemented to serve as a modern scholarly language. Before the Revolution, Tatar was heavily influenced by Arabic and Persian loanwords. The types of loanwords used were associated with politics as well as culture and literature. Mathematics was taught in Tatar using Arabic loanwords. During the Soviet period, the Arabic and Persian loanwords were replaced by Russian borrowings. New scientific and technological developments, which were taking place in society during the industrialization process, were given Russian names. According to Wertheim (in Johnson et al. 2005), religion was at the heart of de-Arabicization during the Soviet period. However, during the post-Soviet period language planners in Tatarstan have been working on a lexical reform by replacing Russian loanwords with archaic Arabic and Persian loanwords. Russians educated during the Soviet period would not be aware of Tatar language developments because they did not learn it. Thus, the interviewee above was ignorant of the Tatar language.

Iskhakova in her interview mentioned that Tatar was not yet ready to be used to teach all subjects in it. She was a prominent Tatar language planner and said that when Tatar language development was complete, they would be able to teach the history of the Republic of Tatarstan in Tatar. However, she only mentioned the cultural aspects of the subjects that could be taught in Tatar in the future and not the functional, practical ones, which once again, only highlighted the symbolic side of Tatar. Perhaps Tatar language developments were only symbolic and cultural because there was a prevailing ideology that said this was what the language was most useful for.

Others that were interviewed told me that Tatar had definitely developed within the sphere of education, especially for pedagogical courses to teach Tatar. However, the nationality of people studying the humanities and pedagogical courses seemed to be only from the Tatar population. According to one of the Russian interviewees, Tatar '*is not useful in real life: people do not need it and nobody demands it*'.

6.5.4.1 Summary

It was evident that Russian was still associated with the sciences and other functional subjects for the practical world of work, whereas Tatar was considered a language for the humanities and having the stance of being for softer subjects that related more to the cultural and symbolic heritage of the republic. It did not seem as if Tatars were really

pushing for the Tatar language to be used for more practical and functional subjects. The symbolic aspect of Tatar seemed to be more important.

6.5.5 Teaching Methodology

Teaching methodology is an important topic relating to education because if a teacher knows his or her subject well and has appropriate materials to deliver the subject knowledge, such as textbooks, then the student is able to learn to the best of his or her ability.

The discourses in this section illustrated the attitudes towards how Tatar was taught and the quality of teaching materials used to teach the Tatar language. These discourses often were in answer to the question, 'Has the role of Tatar been developed as a language of instruction in higher education institutes over the last few years?'

Some of the interviewees spoke not only about higher education, but about children and language learning in primary schools. This indicated that in their minds these issues were closely related. A Russian interviewee reported that generally, Russian parents were not against their children learning Tatar in schools. A Tatar interviewee believed that children in primary schools were interested in learning Tatar because they could play games as a method of learning. It seemed therefore, that learning was more about developing a positive relationship with the subject, rather than the utility of the subject studied. She believed that there was a very positive attitude towards learning Tatar in primary schools. Furthermore she said that Tatar had spread in all educational establishments nowadays and there had been an increase in interest in learning Tatar in the Tatar faculty in Kazan Federal University. However, she only mentioned Tatar as a subject and not as the language of instruction in educational institutions. Another interviewee highlighted that Tatar was only taught as a subject and it was not used as a language of instruction for the teaching of other subjects, therefore people did not see the need or usefulness of it.

As far as Tatar textbooks were concerned, in the interview with Iskhakova, she mentioned that there were not any Tatar textbooks earlier, but some were being prepared and it was an ongoing process. She said that a conference was held in Kazan Pedagogical University in 2009 to discuss amongst many issues, textbooks and the standard of the Tatar language in teaching practice. She said that now they had Tatar language textbooks for the first and second language courses.

After visiting many bookshops in Kazan to examine Tatar textbooks, none of them seemed to offer anything functional in the learning of the language. The textbooks used folk tales and poetry to teach the language, or rather the Tatar culture. When I asked if

there were any teach-yourself Tatar books or other language learning books for adults in the Tatar faculty in Kazan Federal University, they replied that there were not any such books at the moment, but they were working on them. Students who were studying the Tatar language in the university told me that they did not learn Tatar through any kind of textbooks, but that the teacher just stood at the front of the class and taught from the blackboard. When they spoke about what exactly was being taught; they said it was mainly cultural.

As well as looking at the quality of Tatar language textbooks in bookshops, Tatar dictionaries were also available, but the volumes were very small in comparison to the Russian and foreign language dictionaries on sale. There were some mathematics and technical subject books available in Tatar, but they were for primary schools and their breadth of coverage did not appear to be very wide.

6.5.5.1 Summary

After examining teaching methodology and attitudes towards Tatar language teaching and learning, it was evident that only the cultural side of Tatar was being taught as a symbol of identity and this therefore did not seem to have moved on since the study carried out by Alvarez Veinguer and Davis (2007). Available textbooks used the language to teach about the cultural side of Tatar life and not about how to use the language in a functional sense that could be used for everyday situations. Although textbooks were being written, they did not seem to be accessible for the public to buy in bookshops. It appeared that only the cultural side of Tatar had been developed in literature, but to develop the functional side seemed to be taking a very long time.

6.5.6 Educational gaps in language learning between school and further education

This discourse was almost exclusively with Iskhakova. As a language planner she had more of an idea of the bigger picture of language learning in the Republic of Tatarstan. She highlighted that although Tatar was compulsory in schools, it could not be used functionally anywhere else at the moment. Tatar language learning was not compulsory in higher education (Cashaback, 2008, p.261; Garipov and Faller, 2003, p.178). Iskhakova said that Tatar was being taught in some higher educational institutes and they had trained some specialists to teach the Tatar language already.

In fact training teachers as Tatar language specialists was not a new phenomenon that has only occurred during the post-Soviet period. It actually began to be taught in the early twentieth century. A department of Tatar language in the Kazan Teaching Institute was opened in 1925 when Tatar first became an official state language. Even during the

Soviet period, teachers were still being trained at this teaching institute. It was the only institute in the Soviet Union where teachers could train. In 1944 the department of Tatar Language and Literature was opened in Kazan University and in 1989 the faculty of Tatar Philology and History opened. In 2011 many educational institutional reforms were made and as a result, the Tatar departments of Kazan State University and the Tatar State Pedagogical University were united to become the Faculty of Tatar Philology of Kazan Federal University[68]. Although there was always the opportunity to study the Tatar language and train as a Tatar language specialist, very few people did and only Tatar people would have undertaken this training. This was the reason why there were very few Tatar language specialists who could teach Tatar during the early 1990s. These days more people have undergone the training as Iskhakova mentioned.

She mentioned that within five years, all the students currently studying at university, who had had compulsory Tatar language learning in schools, would have graduated from university where their knowledge of Tatar language would not have been used, and would go to work in different areas of society where it would not be used either. She posed the question, '*but where will they use Tatar?*' She explained that Tatar language learning needed to be continued in higher education so that people could learn it in a functional way and for their areas of study. She said that children were learning Tatar in schools and it needed to be continued because otherwise, '*how could they use it?*' She admitted that progress still needed to be made. It was understandable that people did not see the need or purpose of learning Tatar if there was no place to use it. As the results of the quantitative study showed in chapter five, both Russians and Tatars were able to use Tatar actively even though there were limited opportunities to use it. Iskhakova repeatedly said that they were continuing to develop the Tatar language further so that it could be used in other spheres and she believed that this could be done through universities. It was interesting to note that Tatar language planners saw the goal of Tatar language development as continued instruction at university – Tatar continues to be a subject and is never mooted as an educational medium. It seemed strange that after twenty-four years the development of Tatar as a functional language had still not been achieved. It felt as if people were losing interest in the language situation.

When I asked Iskhakova about Tatar language courses that were available for adults she gave a very robust response,

[68] http://www.ksu.ru/f11/index.php

> '*We have courses, if you don't mind, Tatar language courses and they are advertised on notices, there are French, German and Tatar language courses, if you don't mind, and there are special circumstances for workers who want to learn Tatar at work, let's say, special courses are taught by teachers at the pedagogical university and conversation classes are held there. For adults, courses can be created in special circumstances. We don't have a problem [teaching adults] if there was the desire, and I believe that there isn't a problem. We've got many bilingual dictionaries, teach-yourself books and reference books, phrase books, that is, we have everything, and there is no problem. If a person wants to learn Tatar then there will be no problem because **I know** that such courses exist.'*

I saw many centres around Kazan that advertised language courses in 2010, but only for French, German and Spanish. There was nothing for Tatar and when I informally asked where adults could go to learn Tatar, people did not seem to know, although it was thought that it was now possible to learn Tatar for free at the local Medresses around Kazan. This seemed to suggest that religion might be taught through language. A Russian interviewee told me she had seen in a newspaper article that soon it was going to be necessary for people working in the public services to learn Tatar: she seemed afraid and did not want this to happen.

Since these interviews took place, Kazan Federal University announced that it was offering free Tatar language lessons twice a week for adults who wished to learn it. In particular, doctors, bankers and businessmen were targeted. It was run by the Institute of Philology and Research with the support of the government's cabinet ministers[69]. A new language school in the centre of Kazan called *English First* also developed online Tatar courses that were free for everybody. These courses were funded by the Tatar government[70]. Furthermore, in a conversation with Firaya Shaikhieva[71] in May 2013, I was told that the Tatar government were developing free online Tatar language learning courses for citizens. However, most of these courses seem to be aimed at children because Tatar culture and language was taught through cartoons.

6.5.6.1 Summary

After examining the attitudes towards compulsory Tatar language learning and the number of hours devoted to it in schools, the subject division between Russian and

[69] http://prokazan.ru/newsv2/53790.html
[70] Information from the director of English First in Kazan, May, 2013.
[71] Director of the Department of Culture and Language Policy in the Tatar government.

Tatar, the methodology and the gap of Tatar language learning in adult education, we can see that there are two strands that are very prominent in all of these discourses. Firstly, although Tatars reported using Tatar in speech and in some personal contexts such as reading and wed surfing (as reported in chapter five) there was significant importance placed more on the *symbolic* side of written Tatar; secondly, there appeared to be a relative lack of attention towards its functional side, with Russian serving as the functional written language. Attitudes towards Tatar have not changed and it is these attitudes that seem to relegate Tatar to being used as a cultural language. If it is only used to teach history, culture and philology then it will never be used as a fully functional language.

Explicit ideological support is apparent through the compulsory Tatar language learning in schools, where the ideological representation of Tatar is about cultural and ethnic identity (Graney, 1999, p.620 and 2009, p.67-71; Alvarez Veinguer and Davis, 2007, p.189-190). It was evident from the above interviews and observations that Tatar was considered as the language of culture and Russian for everything functional and this was set out early on in a child's life, within the education system. This may be intentional – if Tatar were used as a functional language, then it could be viewed as a threat to the stability of the Russian Federation because Tatarstan could seek ties with other countries, particularly Turkic countries. The Republic of Tatarstan is rich in oil and natural resources that the Russian Federation exports to other countries in the world. If this tie were severed in any way, it could be detrimental for the central government in Moscow.

As far as Fishman's GIDS is concerned, Tatar is used in lower educational domains in stage 4 because it is compulsory for everybody to learn it; both Russians and Tatars are literate in it because they are able to use it actively for reading and writing, as was shown in the results of language test 2 in chapter five. We can see that prestige and ethnic competition within the linguistic space are happening at this stage because of the protests about the number of hours given to Tatar and Russian in schools. Another noteworthy point to mention here is that Tatar is classed at stage 2 on the GIDS scale according to Ethnologue. However, the results from chapter five and from the interviews in this chapter have revealed that Tatar seems to be nearer to stage 4. Perhaps Ethnologue classed it as stage 2 because it is used for some mass media, such as newspapers and some TV programmes. In this respect, GIDS is used to class how language is classed from a top-down perspective, but this does not represent how the language is used from the bottom-up perspective.

The attitudes in this section have also underscored people's strong feeling of belonging to one ethnic group or another and this is clearly happening due to the belief from Tatars (the in-group in this case) that Russians (the out-group) could not learn their language i.e. understand the Tatar culture (as per Nekvapil and Sherman. 2013, p.93).

6.5.7 The Media

The next prominent theme that was prevalent in the interviews was related to culture and the media and how Tatar was used in this sphere. The responses were a result of the question I asked about where the Tatar language could be used[72]. Many of the interviewees replied that there was Tatar TV and radio. However, after observing many TV channels in Kazan during the field trip for this research, it was clear that only part of the day was dedicated to Tatar TV and there was not a particular channel fully designated as Tatar. The majority of the programmes seemed to broadcast soap operas in which all of the characters were clothed in folk costumes. It seemed to be trying to represent a long forgotten Tatar way of life. Radio stations seemed to represent a more mixed variety of programmes in Tatar. Some stations were more of a religious nature and others were targeted at Tatar youth and played Tatar hip-hop and contemporary Tatar music. However, the advertisements were bilingual with Tatar used as the first language of the advertisement and the news was often just read in Russian. The Tatar theatre put on plays only in Tatar and non-native speakers of Tatar were given headphones through which they could hear a simultaneous translation of the play in Russian. According to one of the Russian interviewees,

> '*Tatar is used most of all in the sphere of culture, TV then newspapers, magazines and Tatar writers, practically everything < ... > and there are Tatar theatres….*'

When I asked if he listened to anything in the media in Tatar he said that sometimes he listened to the radio.

6.5.7.1 Summary

It appeared that all forms of media were available in Tatar, but it was not available twenty-four hours a day and the content that was reported was more often than not related to the Tatar culture. Davis et al. (2000, p.211-212) reported that Tatar language media was marginal, 'dull' and 'unexciting' and the audience was mainly in rural areas. This did not appear to have moved on in ten years. Fishman's stage 2 included the media, but all programmes would have to be in the minority language, including the

[72] Appendix 3, question 3.

news to be able to fulfil this stage properly. As far as it could be seen, Tatar fulfilled the cultural role in the media, but not much else.

6.5.8 Language use in the sphere of work and officialdom

This discourse refers to Fishman's GIDS stage 1 and examines Tatar language use in official documentation as well as in the workplace. It was considered that if the language was used in writing for official documents then it was accepted as having full status alongside Russian (Fishman, 1991).

One Tatar interviewee said as far as he knew, all official documents were written in Russian and then translated into Tatar. He said that you could write to the structures of power in Tatar and get an answer in Tatar, and then added that this was especially the case in areas of Tatarstan where the majority of people who resided together were Tatar. He emphasized the fact that all official documents were in Russian and then translated into Tatar and it was for this reason he believed, 'that's why it's hard to say two languages exist' in the sphere of officialdom. However, the fact that official documents had been translated into Tatar seemed to be a significant step.

In chapter five the results of language test 3 similarly showed that nobody reported that they used Tatar for official documents. They all used Russian. One of the interviewees said that if Russians were able to use the Tatar language for officialdom, then it would be their chance '*to go upstairs*'. In the context of the interview, they could get promoted.

In the sphere of work Iskhakova touched on the possibilities for Tatar as a functional language. She mentioned that in trade and economics professions there was a need for the knowledge of Tatar. She said it would be better for trade because they could promote the product further using the Tatar language. She felt that the traders would feel closer to the buyers and the buyers would purchase the products more often and make more profit so therefore it would be a win-win situation for everybody. She also said that if Tatar was used as a language of communication in the health service, then there would be more trust between the Tatar doctors and patients,

> '*Again, we can't do without doctors. We go to the doctor who sees people of different nationalities and if he [the doctor] can lead a conversation with the patient in their language then they will believe him more and have more contact with him and strengthen the mutual understanding …*'

It appears from this conversation that Tatar being used as a language of communication was the main concern and nothing was mentioned about official documentation within

the sphere of work. It also seemed that the above statement was based on the assumption that it was more trustworthy or real if the doctor used the patient's native language. However, there was no known research that showed that it would be better for doctors to speak Tatar to Tatar patients. It could be a possibility that doctors had greater authority if they spoke Russian. Perhaps patients would prefer to discuss their problems in Russian. People seemed to be more concerned about interactions between Tatar people and the symbolism of mutual understanding and trust than of it being a fully functional written language.

6.5.8.1 Summary

As far as Fishman's GIDS stage 1 is concerned, it appears that Tatar would not be able to fully enter this stage. Tatar was not used fully in the sphere of work or for official documentation, according to the above opinions. Even Tatar as a language of communication within the sphere of work had not been fully realized. Iskhakova pointed out that more language planning work needed to be carried out before Tatar could become a realistic functional language within these spheres. This raises the question of the prestige of the Tatar language and its realistic official status.

6.6 Symbolic Language Use

After examining all of the above themes that came to light during the interviews, it was clear that the symbolic side of Tatar language use was extremely prevalent amongst both Tatars and Russians when defining how it was used in the linguistic space. This discourse examines the symbolic side of the Tatar language, where the language served as an emblem of Tatar culture, but it had little to do with the knowledge or function of the language. As was mentioned in chapter four, Khabenskaia (2002, p.96) also stated that language had a dominant position in the structure of ethnic consciousness amongst titular nationalities and that the language as a symbol of ethnic identity could be more important than its use for communicative purposes within a group. It could therefore be said to represent an 'imagined community' of a past Tatarstan (Anderson, 1991, p.7).

This discourse was illustrated in the interview with Iskhakova, who explained that she had carried out some research and one of the questions in her survey asked the respondents what their native language was. She said that she encountered some problems with this question because when she looked at the responses, many had written that Tatar was their native language, but when she asked how well they knew Tatar and if they were able to read, write and speak it they replied that they did not

know how to. She therefore asked herself what the definition of native language was in this instance. She explained,

> '*... every person must define his native language for himself and when he defines it, it comes from somewhere within. It is deep within and when songs are heard in a person's native language it is like a holiday for the soul <...> everything is understood, it's from the heart <...> it is difficult to explain what it is [the native language]. In this case, the native language is a symbol <...>a person feels comfortable <...> a person considers his native language as his nationality'.*

She continued further, saying that the politicians considered that Russian was the native language because everybody spoke it, but she pointed out that Russian was a functional language first and foremost. She believed that the politicians needed to consider the symbolic elements when defining the native language.

It was evident from this interview with Iskhakova and with many other people that expressed their views informally, that the symbolic side of the Tatar language was connected to identity. Furthermore, while I was carrying out research in Kazan, I heard informally that a Tatar political party was calling for all Turkic speaking peoples residing in the Republic of Tatarstan to put down on the 2010 census form that they were of Tatar nationality in order to make it look as if there was a big Tatar majority so that they could show themselves as a strong majority within the republic. Of course this was only a rumour, but it showed to a certain extent what measures people would go to in order to strengthen their identity. Language unites an ethnic group as a symbol and as Gorenburg (2005, p.26) stated about Tatar identity, it is based on 'ethnicity and is not open to Russian assimilation'.

6.6.1 Summary

It was clear from this discourse that Tatar language affinity was strongly tied to the symbolic aspects of identity and it was not necessarily linked to knowledge or use of the language. As was found in Khabenskaia's (2002) qualitative research, language had a dominant position in the structure of ethnic consciousness amongst titular nationalities. How a person viewed his/her native language depended on their circumstances, for example, background, place of residence, other group members, how accessible the language was (Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003). If identity is threatened then people fight for their linguistic and cultural space/rights as they are continuing to do so in the Republic of Tatarstan.

6.7 Generation Gap

This category concerned the differences in attitudes towards language use between the older and younger generations in Kazan. Differences in attitudes towards language use became apparent while discussing areas of education, marriage, religion and culture during interviews and informal discussions. A separate category was formed rather than incorporating it within the other categories because it was felt that the differences in attitudes between the generations could be important regarding the language situation in the Republic of Tatarstan.

The interviewees used in this research to represent the older generation were from above thirty years old to fifty-five years old and were educated under the Soviet regime. They were all professors and teachers within various institutions mentioned in the *procedure* section at the beginning of chapter five within the higher education system in Kazan. They were all of either Tatar or Russian nationality. They never had the opportunity to learn Tatar at school.

The younger generation of people I spoke to were mainly students at university in Kazan and was studying in different faculties such as law, sociology, and history. Some of them were also working as administration assistants within their faculties. They had all been educated at the time when the education law had made it compulsory to learn Tatar in school. I also had the possibility to talk to a class of Tatar philology students in a sociology seminar at Kazan Federal University. Although there was an obvious bias in their attitudes, it was still useful to get their opinions from the point of view of the young Tatar generation. Furthermore, all opportunities that arose to interview people during the field trip were taken in order to get as much information as possible. I was asked to lead this particular seminar session so that the lecturer of this class could find extra participants to answer the surveys used for chapter five of this thesis.

6.7.1 The Older Generation

In this subsection we examine the attitudes towards Tatar language use of both Russian and Tatar nationalities. The attitude of the Russian interviewees of this generation I spoke to was often against learning the Tatar language because they claimed that everyone in Tatarstan spoke Russian. They did not see the point of the younger generation learning it at school because they said in their interviews it was useless and the time could be better spent learning something more useful and practical for daily life that would help them in the future (see section 6.5.2).

This attitude towards the Tatar language seemed to stem from ingrained Soviet ideology whilst this generation was studying at school and from their parents. Russian was the language of education and technology (see Grenoble, 2003 and Kreindler cited in Kirkwood, 1989 in chapter two). It was the dominant language that carried prestige and still does to a large extent (see Cashaback, 2008; Garipov and Faller, 2003; Giuliano, 2000 and Wertheim, 2003 in chapter four). This generation of Russians still believed that Russian was the only language that was necessary and therefore could not understand why another language, which appeared not to be useful, was being taught in schools. On the other hand, they all understood that the language policy declared that Tatar and Russian carried equal status as the official languages of Tatarstan and knew they could not do anything about it. This attitude towards the Tatar language could also been dependent on how these Russians identified themselves within the Republic of Tatarstan during the post-Soviet period. This links back to the differences between the Russian and titular identities highlighted in chapter three (Laitin, 1998; Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003; Tolz, 1998).

As far as the attitudes of the older Tatar generation were concerned, this was very different to the Russians' attitudes. To begin with, according to some members of staff of the Tatar philology faculty in Kazan Federal University, there were very few older Tatars alive these days who could still read the Arabic script; one elderly Tatar lady who used to work in the university during the Soviet period still visited the Tatar philology department today, but unfortunately there was no opportunity to interview her during my visit to Kazan. This older generation would have seen many changes during last century regarding language and script changes. The Tatars who were interviewed and who were the same ages as the Russians did not seem particularly bothered about Russians learning the Tatar language. They did not see how Tatar could be useful for them. On the other hand, some of the interviewees felt that if Russians were living in Tatarstan they should learn the national language because they were living on Tatar territory. This generation of Tatars would have only learned Tatar within the home when they were younger. They considered Tatar as a family language and as a sign of their identity. The interviewees said that they used Russian in their everyday lives except for when they communicated amongst their Tatar friends, and then they would use Tatar. It appeared that Tatar was used by this generation as a sign of ethnic belonging, in other words, as part of the in-group phenomenon (Gumperz, 1982; Khabenskaia, 2002). This attitude ties in with the results on the post-Soviet identity tests

in chapter five and also links to the theories in chapter four about in-group out-group attitudes (Garipov et al., 2000; Stoliarova in Garipov et al., 2008).

Many of the Tatar interviewees also gave the impression that Tatar would never have the possibility to be used in all spheres like Russian. There was a sense of apathy towards the Tatar language amongst these interviewees. One particular Tatar interviewee mentioned the volume of work that was done during the early 1990s regarding the implementation of the language policy and language planning,

> '*There was **such** a government programme/ there was a large range of such work /and almost everybody began to study the Tatar language, in schools, in higher educational institutes <…>there was a lot [of work]… and unfortunately it wasn't followed through to the end …'*

She felt that the work done at the beginning of the 1990s had been futile because the work had been stopped and it was a great pity for the Tatar culture and language. In this particular case, the interviewee meant the work on the alphabet reform had been halted, but she also felt that not much work had been done in any respect regarding language planning. She felt that people did not care and they just had to accept the situation. She felt that people had other more important problems to contend with.

6.7.2 The Younger Generation

The attitude towards the Tatar language was very different amongst the younger Russian generation from their parents' generation. As far as the compulsory Tatar language learning in schools was concerned, many Russians did not seem bothered by it. It was just another subject they had to learn in school. As was mentioned above and in chapter four, Tatar was taught as a subject and was not the language of instruction. It was often the attitude of the Russian parents that was reported rather than the opinions of the younger generation who were the ones learning it. The majority of this generation of Russians would have been born in the Republic of Tatarstan and would have been brought up in an environment where it was normal to study both Tatar and Russian in schools. They would not have known any different because they were educated during the post-Soviet period. Furthermore, during an informal conversation about the younger generation and Tatar language use, one person mentioned that nowadays, on public transport all signs and announcements were bilingual Tatar-Russian. This person told me that on buses she had noticed that when a Tatar announcement was broadcast, some parents sitting with their children would ask them what the announcement was about because they did not understand Tatar and their children did. She said the children could

translate the meaning into Russian for their parents, who may have been either Russian or Tatar. This proved that Tatar language learning amongst the younger generation was having some effect on their ability because they were able to use it within society and did not seem to be questioning it as their parents did. This also qualifies the results from chapter five that revealed that compulsory Tatar language learning in schools was having an effect on the Russian population.

However, another point of view of this generation of Russians was that Tatar language learning in schools was useless because there was nowhere to continue its use once they had left school. This gap was identified by Iskhakova and in the results of the self-reported language tests in chapter five. Another possible reason for this point of view may have come from the attitude of their parents. If the family was Russian, then the parents may have influenced their children regarding what they believed about learning the Tatar language.

Members of the younger generation who were from mixed Russian-Tatar families stated that their language use was determined by what the dominant language was in their family. The interviewees pointed out that this used to depend on what nationality the *father* was, but these days they felt that this did not seem to matter as much. One reason for this could be the fact that many children come from single-parent families or the mother has married more than once. Therefore the nationality of the father was not considered as the deciding factor of language choice within the family unit any more. Most said they spoke Russian at home with their parents, but they would speak Tatar with their grandparents and other members of their close family and friends. They said they never spoke Tatar with their Russian friends. However, some people said that Tatar was the dominant language within their family circle. These attitudes also confirm the results of the identity tests and language use test in chapter five.

The younger Tatar generation seemed to have a much stronger attitude towards the Tatar language than other young people from Russian families or mixed nationality families. Their attitude seemed to be based on their identity and the preservation of their ethnicity. Language appeared to take on a symbolic form, but they also regarded it as an important language to learn for their future and the future of their country. Similar attitudes concerning the symbolic nature of the Tatar language were highlighted in many of the scholarly works in chapter four (for example Giliazova in Minzaripov, 2013; Graney, 2009; Tishkov, 1997; Alvarez Veinguer and Davis, 2007).

As mentioned above in the introduction to this section, I had the possibility to talk to a group of Tatar philology students in Kazan Federal University during one of their seminar sessions where they expressed very strong feelings about their language and about the banned alphabet reform. Their attitude was completely different from the older generation of Tatars I had spoken to. This younger generation said they felt extremely proud of their ethnic identity and said they would fight for their linguistic and cultural rights in the future. They felt that the politicians in power were not doing enough for the Tatar people or the preservation of their identity. They felt quite strongly about the alphabet reform ban because they felt the Tatar alphabet was part of their Tatar identity. They felt that the Cyrillic script did not represent their language, especially in linguistic terms and because it was not representative symbolically. These students told me that in the future they would strive for the revival of the Latin Tatar alphabet as the future Tatar generation, presumably after they had graduated from university and entered the world of work. It must be pointed out that this group of Tatar philology students may not have been representative of Tatar youth due to the subject they were studying at university and the obvious bias involved, but it was still interesting to hear their opinions. These attitudes seemed to represent the discourses of script reform posited by Davis et al., (2000, p. 209-10), Sebba (2006, p.113-115) and Wertheim (2005, p.111) as mentioned in chapter four.

Other Tatar people I spoke to from the younger generation mentioned that Islam was a large part of their identity, although many said they drank alcohol and did not attend a mosque. Others said that these days, marriages were becoming more segregated: Russians were marrying other Russians and Tatars were marrying Tatars. It seemed as if the younger Tatar generation wanted a cleaner, purer identity for themselves.

6.7.3 Summary

This category has highlighted the differences in attitude towards the Tatar language between the older and younger generations in Kazan. The differences seemed to stem from the different educational upbringing of both generations: the influences of Soviet ideology on the older generation and the compulsory Tatar language learning in schools of the younger generation during the post-Soviet period.

6.8 Geography

This theme is split into two categories: the first concerns people's perceptions of how language is used regarding different territories such as which language appear to be used in an urban space and which appear to be used in a more rural area. It also

examines how historical events such as urbanization, Russification and industrialization have changed how language is used within certain geographical areas of Tatarstan. The second category concerns the physical linguistic landscape within Kazan regarding public signage. It examines the different ideologies and identities of behind the public signage and whether the signage is representative of how language is used in the immediate environment.

All of the interviewees lived in Kazan and self-reported that they were of either Russian or Tatar nationality and from the Republic of Tatarstan. When the interviewees were asked where or how they could use Tatar, many designated its use to a particular geographical area.

6.8.1 Geographical Language Use

More Russians reside in Kazan than in any other city or district of Tatarstan[73]. Historically, Russians have inhabited cities more than small towns or villages within the republic (Brubaker, 1996; Graney, 1999; Grenoble, 2003; Laitin, 1998; Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001 and 2003; Silver, 1974; Smith, 1998). According to research carried out by Stoliarova (in Garipov et al., 2008) and Iskhakova (2001 and 2002), city life was considered as the socio-economic centre of life and villages were considered as the cultural-family centre of (Tatar) life. Education, technology and science were words that were usually associated with cities and Russian was considered the language of higher education, science and technology (Iskhakova 2001 and 2002). Agriculture and humanities were usually associated with the Tatar language because Tatar people from villages would go to agricultural and humanities institutes. Stoliarova (p.105) noted that many of the Tatar intelligentsia attended such institutes. Stoliarova (in Garipov et al., 2008, p.103) stated that during the Soviet period there was a disproportionate imbalance between education levels in villages and cities. This was due to the fact that education in secondary and higher education institutes in cities was considered to be more advantageous for career prospects because the language of instruction was in Russian. In villages the language of instruction was Tatar. According to Stoliarova (in Garipov et al., 2008), more Russians attended higher educational institutions in cities whereas Tatars attended more in rural areas. Tatars had a tendency to choose humanities subjects and both Russians and Tatars chose technical subjects. Giuliano, (2000, p.305) stated that Tatars living in rural areas chose to study humanities and agricultural subjects because of problems with learning the Russian language, so these subjects were

[73] According to the 2010 All-Russian census results.

regarded as rural subjects. By the end of the 1980s, however, educational levels became more equal due to Tatars moving to the cities for higher education and work. Stoliarova acknowledged that the proportion of Russian and Tatar students at universities towards the end of the 1990s was the same.

The research carried out by Stoliarova suggests that the city was a place where Russians chose to reside due to the economic possibilities, and because more Russians lived there, Russian was the language that was used. Furthermore, during the Russification programme of the Soviet period, mass migration into traditionally non-Russian areas took place that affected the demographics of regions and the languages that were spoken there (Connor, 1984, p.300-20; Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, p.36; Silver, 1974, p.54-8). However, it appeared that language use in designated geographical regions could also be historically linked to ideologies that were current at certain times. These ideological underpinnings affected the attitudes of the people throughout history who associated a certain language with one place or another. The recurring themes, which emerged from these interviews about where language was used within the context of linguistic spaces, were connected to both the city and the village as was expected. Further subthemes that came to light were related to urbanization, Russification and industrialization.

6.8.2 Urban territories

According to many of the Tatar interviewees and other Tatar people I spoke to on an informal basis, it was felt that Russian people residing in the Republic of Tatarstan should know the Tatar language because they were living on Tatar territory. According to Iskhakova, knowing the language would help the Russians to acquire more information about the ethnography of the [Tatar] people and it would help mutual understanding within society. She continued saying that they '*needed to teach their history, national culture and language to those living on the same territory, who eat the bread which also grows on this earth and then we will be able to strengthen understanding…'* So here there is a connection between the territory of Tatarstan and the symbolic, ethnic side of Tatar language use (as was similarly confirmed in Alvarez Veinguer and Davis' study, 2007).

If we now turn to language use specifically within Kazan as a large urban centre of Tatarstan, Russian was heard the most on the streets. This was due to many Russians living in Kazan for socio-economic reasons as a result of the industrialization process during the Soviet period. However, one of the Tatar interviewees pointed out that nowadays it was quite common to hear younger people speaking Tatar to each other on

the streets. She said that younger people move to cities for education, therefore this was the reason why Tatar could be heard more. It was not clear whether this was a real reason why Tatar could be heard more because this was just one person's opinion. On the other hand, many people were generally attracted to work in more urban areas than they were in the past due to globalization (Stoliarova, in Garipov et al., 2008).

Many younger people who I had the opportunity to speak to about the language situation in Kazan told me that they would usually only speak Tatar when they visited their grandparents in the village. At home they would speak Russian with their parents. This suggested that Tatar language use was generational and that there did not seem to be much opportunity to use Tatar in the city with their parents' generation. This was confirmed by Iskhakova who explained that the older generation did not have any Tatar language learning in schools during the Soviet period. Young Tatar people had a tendency to speak to each other in Tatar perhaps as a sign of belonging and also perhaps this was due to the compulsory Tatar language learning in schools that enabled them to speak more.

Another Russian interviewee said there was '*no need for Tatar in towns … there is no requirement'* and later said she did not understand why Russians should learn the Tatar language when the Tatars did not even know it properly themselves. However, according to other people I spoke to on an informal basis, in some companies there was a requirement to speak Tatar if the company was predominantly a Tatar company as was mentioned in chapter four (Stoliarova, in Garipov et al., 2008) and that was also confirmed in the identity tests from chapter five. In this case, language use could appear to be associated more with the in-group out-group phenomenon rather than the territorial issue. It was also a possibility that some Russian people did not know that Tatar companies existed within a city due to their ingrained attitude that Tatar existed only outside of the city or that they chose not to acknowledge these companies.

6.8.3 Rural territories

Many of the interviewees and other people I spoke to on an informal basis from English language classes I was teaching made references to how useful it was for old people living in villages to know Tatar because they could communicate between themselves. It appeared that Tatar was spoken more than Russian in the rural areas. According to one of the Russian interviewees from Kazan Federal University, people in villages used Tatar for work because they did not know Russian very well. It appeared from this particular interview that the village was seen as a place where people were not literate in Russian, even though they themselves had never been to a village or rural place within

Tatarstan. Furthermore this attitude became apparent while I was interviewing the other Russian respondents. On the one hand the Tatar interviewees I had had the opportunity to speak to during my English language classes, associated Tatar with the village because of family ties and said they would only speak Tatar with their grandparents; on the other hand the Russian interviewees also associated it with Tatar family life and low socio-economic status. It was given low prestige due to being used more in the village amongst the population who lived there. These opinions confirm what Giuliano (2000, p.306) reported regarding attitudes of people living in cities towards those living in rural areas (see chapter four).

It has also become evident from these interviews that Tatar people were more able to adapt their language to whichever social situation they were in. According to one Tatar interviewee, if Tatars were in the village then they would speak and communicate in Tatar. This particular interviewee stated that, '*maybe urban [Tatar] dwellers speak two languages at their home, but there are some situations when they go to Moscow [and speak Russian], when they go to the village, when they are among the company of mainly rural dwellers, they talk Tatar and they understand each other*'[74]. Therefore, it was clear that a Tatar person adjusted their language to the geographical territory they were in. It appeared that Russians were not able to adapt their language to any geographical area other than a city because they only used Russian. This also confirmed what Garipov et al. (2000) reported in their study (see chapter four). This may be one reason why they were not reported as going to rural areas of Tatarstan. Of course, Russian people did live in rural areas, but they were not as numerous as in the cities and they may know Tatar.

Another point that this particular interviewee made was that all official documents were printed in Tatar in the villages. By this, the interviewee might have meant that official documents were seen more than they were in a city due to more people of Tatar nationality residing within close proximity of each other in one particular area. However, this was not verified because this study only considers urban perceptions of the urban/rural divide.

6.8.4 Russification and Industrialization

In this category, the Tatar professor of Tatar history described the historical and geographical changes that had taken place during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries that had undoubtedly had an effect on the shape of the linguistic landscape. He

[74] This interviewee gave the interview in English and therefore the content has been transcribed keeping the interviewee's exact words.

began by describing how Kazan used to be divided into specific Tatar and Russian areas and how this affected which language was spoken within these areas,

> '*In the 1920s when there was real autonomy in the Tatar parts of the city you could go to the quarter and everything was in Tatar – in the city there were Tatar districts, Tatar "Sloboda" and also education was there in Tatar.*'

So in these specific areas where people of Tatar nationality lived in close proximity together, the Tatar language was used within these communities. The houses where they lived were built in the traditional Tatar style of wooden buildings and painted in vivid bright colours. However, the interviewee explained that just before the Second World War in 1938, Russian was introduced as an obligatory language and a process began, '*when the Tatar was ousted from the city schools.*' Russian had to be taught in every school, even in the Tatar districts of the city. Alongside this process of Russianization, another process began which the interviewee said was connected with the Nikita Khrushchev era. This particular process concerned building new houses; the '*so-called Khrushcheby'*, were built in all districts of the city, including Tatar districts. In this way, these districts, according to the interviewee, '*were dislocated*' and this happened everywhere across the country during this era of Soviet history. In the Tatar district of Kazan today, you can see how this process happened because there still remain some of the brightly coloured wooden Tatar houses next to the Khrushchev-style blocks on the same streets. It was clear to see how the physical landscape reflected the history of the people who lived there and the Soviet ideologies of that period in history.

At the time of this research, the landscape of Kazan was dramatically changing and had been since the early 1990s[75]. More and more authentic Tatar houses in the Tatar Settlement area of Kazan were being destroyed to make room for modern blocks of concrete apartments. According to several people I spoke to informally, the wooden houses were set on fire to 'clean' them before 'renovations' were carried out. The older generation of Tatars who lived in the old-style houses were offered new apartments on the grounds that their own houses were not safe to live in. The local residents, members of Tatar activist groups and local councillors often accused the government of destroying evidence of Tatar history. Petitions were sent to the Tatar government in protest of the destruction of historical Tatar buildings. According to Graney (2009, p.59-60), the changes in the physical landscape in Kazan were due to the Tatar government's sovereignty project. A 'Program for Slum Clearance and Modernization

[75] http://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/34289/14/

of Slum Areas (1995-2004)'[76] started to change the aspect of the city centre to make Kazan look more like a capital city of a sovereign state so that President Shaimiev could show how Tatarstan was playing the role of a multi-ethnic state to both international and domestic audiences. Furthermore, the residents who were living in these so-called slum areas at this time were not consulted about these rebuilding projects or about where they were to be rehoused. Kinossian (2005, p.45 cited in Graney 2009, p.60) stated that this slum clearance project, 'removed from the city centre not only slums, but "social pollutants" too, in order to make it look more attractive'. In addition, this situation continued futher because the Tatar government received significant funding[77] from Moscow to improve Kazan for the 2013 Universiade, which took place in July 2013, as well as for the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics and the Football World Cup in 2018. As a result, significant urban development occurred, with many new roads built, and hotels and hostels constructed to house the participants and visitors of these sporting events.

According to the interviewee, the Russianization process of the mid-twentieth century could be deemed as successful to a large extent because ethnic territories and districts were populated with Russians who went to these areas of the Soviet Union for employment. The interviewee said that Kazan was historically the capital city of Tatarstan, but during the Soviet period it was considered as only a provincial town. This assertion from the interviewee seemed to be more of an ideological position since this person was a Tatar historian and had very strong viewpoints on the presence of Russians in Tatarstan both historically and in the present.

In addition to ethnic districts being dislocated in Kazan, the interviewee described how industrialization had shaped the territory of Tatarstan. He said that another part of the Russification process was the industrialization of the territory. He said that huge industrial cities were built such as Naberezhnye Chelny and Nizhnekamsk, which were oil and petro-chemical cities. He claimed that there was not a single Tatar school or kindergarten within these cities. This proclamation also appears to be from the same ideological position stated above. These cities were developed for industry only and were built by Russians. The language spoken in these cities was predominantly Russian and technology and education was therefore in Russian.

[76] According to Graney (2009, p.60) this project was financed through oil export revenues.
[77] Approximately $4.5 billion for the 2013 Universiade <http://www.baltinfo.ru/2013/07/15/Skolko-stoit-Universiada-367242>

However, the interviewee said that the situation changed in the 1990s '*because there was a strong movement of the Magarif*[78] *association, the Enlightenment association and the people demanded to have the opportunity to study Tatar in these cities*'. During the 1980s there was a great amount of unrest amongst the Tatar population living in Tatarstan, as well as other nationalities in other parts of the Soviet Union (Graney, 2009, p.14). People protested against the suppression of their nationality and national language. Therefore many intellectual national groups formed, such as *Magarif* in Tatarstan, to try to overcome this suppression.

Although the Republic of Tatarstan became an autonomous republic with its own language policy declaring both Russian and Tatar equally as the official state languages, the interviewee pointed out that the republic did not have the same status as some of the countries in the Caucasus. He said,

> '*We have huge plants, petro-chemical plants. There are a lot of pipelines, gas, oil and there are railways and a lot of roads and then technically we are part of Russian industrial complex and that is why it is simpler to speak one native language <…>The cities of Tatarstan are huge industrial centres and they are centres of many technical education and everything is in Russian.*'

It appeared that although Tatar had equal status with Russian, most people believed that Russian was still the dominant language and this was due to the industrialization process from the Soviet period, but also because the Republic of Tatarstan remained a territory that was part of the Russian Federation. The oil and gas industries, which were situated in Tatarstan, were economically very important for the Russian Federation and therefore the state may have had an interest in seeing that Russian was the language associated with industry there.

After analysing the above interview, it was clear that history played a big role in shaping language use within the landscape of Tatarstan as it did in many other countries of the former Soviet Union (Connor, 1984; Grenoble, 2003; Silver, 1974; Smith, 1998). The politics of the Soviet period were manifested through the physical reshaping of the landscape with the building of huge industrial cities in Tatarstan, populated by Russians who brought technology and a higher level of education to these areas. As has already been mentioned above and in chapters two, three and four, language use in different

[78] This association was named after the Tatar publishing house which was established in 1901. It was closed down under Communism, but reopened during the early 1990s. It is from a Tatar word meaning '*enlightenment*'.

areas underwent a shift due to political ideology. Russian became the dominant language of education and technology that was spoken in the major cities. It iss probably due to the history and ideologies of the Soviet Union that people nowadays associate the cities with where Russian is used and rural areas with where Tatar is used.

6.8.5 Post-Soviet linguistic landscaping in the Republic of Tatarstan

After analysing people's attitudes to language use with regard to designated geographical territories, it was necessary to observe the physical surroundings to get an impression of external influences there may be on the population within the immediate environment. According to Coulmas (cited in Shohamy and Gorter, 2009, p.13), language that is exhibited within a public space has the capacity to change how people see the world and change their attitude and awareness of language. Therefore public signage was analysed to try to get an impression of what was happening linguistically within the surroundings of the people living in Kazan in order to gain an insight into other possible phenomena taking place, such as how the language policy had affected the physical language environment. Public signage in Kazan is a mixture of different scripts that bears witness to changes in political ideologies and identities, particularly during the post-Soviet period.

The analysis of Kazan's linguistic landscaping was based around a study by Ben-Rafael (2009) who examined top-down bottom-up signage in Israel as well as Scollon and Scollon's (2003) 'discourses in place' framework. Briefly, Ben-Rafael stated that top-down signs were official signs that were usually issued by the government or other official agents from authorities who wanted to pass down information to the public. Top-down signs were usually written in the dominant language of the country or region at the top and therefore represented the dominant culture. The other language in use was placed underneath. Representations of power were seen in such signage – the prestigious culture was placed in a dominant position. Bottom-up signs were usually informal and issued by individuals who wanted to pass on some kind of information or they could even be representations of political rejection that defied the dominant powers and dominant culture.

Scollon and Scollon's (2003) 'discourses in place' framework included the examination of a coding preference system that was similar to Ben-Rafael's top-down bottom-up theory of signage; an inscription system that took into account the colour of the fonts and background on signage including how clear different fonts were; an emplacement system that was about the history of the area in which the signage was placed. The

analysis below analyses the public signage in Kazan in the context of Scollon and Scollon's coding and inscription, then emplacement.

Coding and Inscription

Most of the street signs in Kazan had a blue background with white lettering and the size of the lettering in each language was identical. The majority of street signs were bilingual with Tatar Cyrillic or Tatar Latin placed above the Russian Cyrillic script. The fact that the Tatar scripts were placed above the Russian Cyrillic seemed to suggest that the Tatar was in a more dominant position. This could be a visual representation of the identity of the republic, a marker of the ethnic territory as an autonomous republic. On the other hand a couple of streets had signs that were trilingual: Tatar Cyrillic, Russian Cyrillic and an English variant (see figure 7). There did not seem to be any particular area of Kazan where the signs were in one script or another; the signs were a mixture of different scripts varying from street to street. Even in the Tatar Settlement (*Tatarskye Slobody*) area of Kazan, a region historically renowned for where Tatars used to live, the scripts on the street signs were varied. Some buildings such as mosques in the Tatar Settlement area even had signs displaying Tatar Cyrillic then Russian Cyrillic and then Arabic.

Figure 7: Example of trilingual street sign on Dzerzhinskii Street

Emplacement

As was mentioned briefly above, emplacement can reveal much about the history of the area in which the sign is placed. According to Coulmas (cited in Shohamy and Gorter, 2009, p.13), language that is exhibited within a public space has the capacity to change how people see the world and change their attitude and awareness of language. Signs therefore take on meanings from the places they are found in. In 2010, there were many buildings around Kazan city centre that had been abandoned and left to ruin. Just the

shells of once palatial buildings remained, covered in graffiti with weeds growing out of where rooms and apartments had once been occupied by the nobility and full of rubbish which people dumped there. During this field trip I observed that street signs in Russian Cyrillic and Tatar Latin scripts were often displayed on a side of a street where broken vandalized buildings were situated (see figure 8), whereas on the opposite side of the same street, the signage would be in Russian Cyrillic and Tatar Cyrillic scripts and the buildings were clean, new and brightly painted (see figure 9).

Figure 8: Example of Tatar Latin and Russian Cyrillic Street Sign on one side of Rakhmatullin Street

Figure 9: Example of Tatar Cyrillic and Russian Cyrillic Street sign on the opposite side of Rakhmatullin Street

However, it was not clear whether there was a connection or not between the broken buildings and the bilingual street signs. The Tatar Latin street signs were probably put up earlier during the 1990s when the push for the Tatar Latin alphabet reform was going ahead. Since the ban on any alphabet within the Russian Federation except the Cyrillic one by the central government in Moscow, street signs appeared only in Cyrillic for both languages. In a more recent trip to Kazan (2013) the presence of English on

signage around Kazan's tourist centre was more evident than in 2010. The reason for this was due the number of foreign tourists and participants that were expected for the 2013 Universiade in Kazan. In a conversation with Firaya Shaikhieva (May, 2013) the director of the Department of Culture and Language Policy in the Tatar government, the signs that displayed Tatar Latin and Russian Cyrillic would be taken down in the future. She said that the decision had nothing to do with the government's Language Policy Department and that it was the decision of the Municipal Department.

As well as observing bilingual street signs many Tatar shops had Tatar Cyrillic signs displayed on them and menus in Tatar restaurants were printed in Tatar Cyrillic or Russian Cyrillic scripts. In Russian restaurants menus were only printed in the Russian Cyrillic script. The same applied to newspapers and books. If they were Tatar, the script would be printed in the Tatar Cyrillic script. Signs on public transport were also in both the Russian Cyrillic and Tatar Cyrillic scripts. In all cases, public bilingual signs displayed Tatar Cyrillic before the Russian Cyrillic. This appeared to signify that although the alphabet reform did not go ahead, the fact that the street signs and other public signage displayed the Tatar Cyrillic at the top of the sign showed that the territory was first and foremost Tatar. It seemed that public signage was used as a symbolic display of Tatarstan's sovereignty.

6.8.6 Attitudes to public signage

After making observations of the public signage, I decided to ask the interviewees and other people on an informal basis about the signage and the fact that some of the street signs were written in different scripts. It was particularly interesting to hear about the Tatar Latin script with reference to the alphabet reform. One respondent replied that the street signs, which had the Tatar Latin script written on them, were the only evidence left of the alphabet reform,

> '*Today all that is left [of the alphabet reform] is the street signs / because there were discussions for a long time/ they were going to change [?] to the Latin alphabet in 2003/ there was the Latin alphabet, and it wasn't even that long ago, but now it seems to me that it was probably a very expensive project … because of the economic crisis'*

She seemed to think that the reasons for it being abandoned were because of the lack of funding. In fact the respondent was not even sure about the reason for the street signs being in different scripts and thought it was for the benefit of foreigners who had come to Kazan for a sporting event,

'*The reason they did it/ because there was an Olympiad in 2002/ in Kazan many people came/ they decided/ for them to be able to read because/ in principal because they couldn't read in Cyrillic ...'*

This view is also shared by Iskhakova[79] who said,

'*Bilingual street signs are in Latin for foreigners when they visit Kazan. The signs are for trade and academic purposes only. Foreigners come to Kazan and can't read the signs.'*

Many people I spoke to about the street signs being in Latin on one side of old streets and Cyrillic on the other side of the same street told me that Latinization began, but that maybe the Latin script was used for foreigners when they came to visit as was illustrated above. This vagueness about the street signs seemed to show that people were not very clear about the alphabet reform. The Tatar Latin alphabet seemed to be a thing of the past that people had forgotten about or that they should forget about it. In fact, there was nothing they could do because of the ban imposed on it by the central government in Moscow.

However, it could be seen that bilingual signage in Kazan is physical evidence of the reforms that were taking place at the beginning of the 1990s when the Republic of Tatarstan was declared a sovereign state. The signs therefore could be a visual reminder of the political ideologies of the post-Soviet period. The Latin alphabet was seen as a political motive against Moscow (as was mentioned in chapter four). Many of the people interviewed for this research felt that the Tatar Latin script was a way for the Republic of Tatarstan to try to distance itself from the Russian Federation during the 1990s and that it was seeking a rapprochement with Turkey. It was a move viewed as anti-Russian and pro-European. These reasons were also a reflection of the ideas that emanated from scholars who wrote about ideology and the alphabet reform such as Davis et al. (2000), Sebba (2006) and Wertheim (2005). Many interviewees believed that the alphabet reform was more of a political decision than anything else. One interviewee drew a parallel with the previous Cyrillicisation of the former Tatar Latin alphabet in the 1930s as an example of the then political decision to assimilate Russians and Tatars. This interviewee declared,

[79] Interview with Z. A. Iskhakova 22.10.10

'But it was a political decision because the use of Cyrillic was supposed to assimilate Tatars with Russians and the use of the Latin [alphabet] was to do with Turkey, it was a Turkish influence …'

Another interviewee also maintained that the Russian Federation felt there would be a threat to its territory if Tatarstan was to change to the Latin alphabet and strengthen its ties with Turkey. The motive of insecurity (Ager, 2001) could be considered as one reason for banning the Latin alphabet. As Iskhakov[80] points out,

'At present, the situation won't change because of the internal politics of the Russian Federation ... it's to do with terrorism why they won't allow us this project [on the alphabet]'

As many people I spoke to confirmed, they did not want what was happening in the northern Caucasus and Chechnya to happen in Tatarstan, so there was very little resistance to the decision by the central government. The assumption that a Caucasian-style separatist war could be started by writing in the Tatar Latin alphabet is rather an exaggeration that could be attributed to an ideological position in the geopolitical context of language policy and alphabet reform (Nekvapil and Sherman, 2013, p.86).
Another reason given by the central government for an end to the alphabet reform was that it was discriminatory against the Russian population living in the Republic of Tatarstan and that it would violate their human rights. This is also a similar type of ideological position mentioned above that assumed that writing Tatar in the Latin alphabet violated the human rights of resident Russians. The above debates about the alphabet reform concerning territorial issues seemed to have strong political underpinnings that pointed to the alphabet as being an ideological problem politically and were visually manifested in the linguistic landscape of Kazan.

6.8.7 Summary

It can be concluded from this theme that historical events shaped the linguistic geographical landscape during the last century in Tatarstan in the same way as they did in other countries of the former Soviet Union. Urbanization, Russification and industrialization were responsible for which languages were used within these areas and how people's attitudes towards language use had been influenced by this. Russian was associated with being used in cities and Tatar was associated with being used in villages and being of lower prestige (Davis et al., 2000; Garipov et al., 2000; Giuliano, 2000).

[80] Interview with D. M. Iskhakov 21.10.10.

Even twenty-four years after the collapse of Communism, people's attitudes do not seem to have changed. However, this appeared to be changing according to some of the people who were interviewed. Tatar could be heard more on the streets by younger people.

As a result of the language law, Tatar became more visible in the urban centres of Tatarstan such as Kazan, particularly in the sphere of public space and signage. However, this did not represent how language was actually used within this linguistic space. It was more a representation of political ideologies and identities of the post-Soviet period. It could have been seen as a kind of advertising to make people change their opinions about Tatar and make them want to learn it. However, it seemed to be used as symbolism that represented the area as an ethnic Tatar space. It was as if it showed a certain tolerance towards both Tatars and Russians who lived side by side. Finally, the use of the Tatar Cyrillic alphabet could be seen as being more accessible to Russians who wished to learn Tatar.

6.9 Socio-psychological issues

This final category looks at language use as a bridge to foster mutual understanding between two different ethnic groups, Russian and Tatar, within society. The interviewees were both Russian and Tatar and this theme came to light while the interviewees were discussing language use within different spheres, such as education, the language policy and geographical use of language.

One of the interviewees explained that learning the language of the country where a person resided was a way to promote peaceful relations between two cultures and used Dagestan as an example of a country that had many problems due to differences between ethnic groups and that contrasted with Tatarstan,

> '*Russians who decided to stay in Tatarstan understand the knowledge of Tatar / history is their plus. Those who didn't want to [learn Tatar language and history] could change a flat for some other Russian region; very little people preferred this variant. There was a movement that said "enough Tatar", but most of them understood a very low cost of peace. They used Internet and saw what happened in the northern Caucasus and they know that everything in Dagestan was in Russian – no national classes, they taught Dagestan literature in Russian. I was shocked. <…> they [the ethnic nationality] have their own values, national cultural traditions, not a territorial autonomy, everything was concentrated in religion. Turkic people there don't talk about this because they*

are afraid. The only variant [for a peaceful society] is in Tatarstan / to live peacefully and to preserve our religious and national identity but nobody proposes another better way.'[81]

This interviewee claimed that people in Tatarstan tolerated learning the Tatar language because as they saw in Dagestan, there were many problems between the Russians and the titular population who lived together there. Perhaps he felt that if the Russians showed they were making an effort to tolerate the language law, then their society would be safer and more peaceful to live in and they could avoid any ethnic tensions such as in Dagestan. He described Dagestan as a society that had many religious extremes and in which the titular nationality seemed afraid to stand up for themselves in the face of other dominant nationalities such as the Russians and extreme religious groups. He seemed to think that one outlet for national consciousness was needed, and if it was not language, then it would be religious extremism. This was an ideological perspective (it implied that the two were equivalent or convertible).

Other Tatar interviewees mentioned a psychological barrier that they believed the Russians needed to overcome if they were to have mutual understanding between the Tatar and Russian ethnic groups. D. M. Iskhakov explained,

'*The younger generation of Russians understand the [Tatar] language on a basic level, but perhaps they are not psychologically prepared for this. It wasn't necessary for them before. With Tatars they have a strong [ethnic] consciousness and this [the Tatar ethnic consciousness] is lacking amongst the Russians. They need to change psychologically. There are some spheres where Russians use Tatar ...*'

This statement seemed to reveal that ethnicity was the key to understanding and using language. This, once again, highlights the in-group out-group mentality that seemed to be more prevalent amongst the Tatar population towards the Russian population (Gumperz, 1982; Khabenskaia, 2002; Alvarez Veinguer and Davis, 2007). This interviewee seemed to assume that people would only be able to express themselves through the language if they had sufficient knowledge of the Tatar ethnic background. However, this would be difficult because as it was highlighted in the literature and the studies into functional language use in chapter four, Tatar history and culture were taught through the medium of Russian.

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[81] The interviewee gave the interview in English, so therefore the words are directly transcribed.

This point was also emphasized by Iskhakova, who said that mutual understanding between two ethnic groups such as Tatars and Russians was very difficult without ethnographic knowledge of the ethnic nationality, especially in terms of culture. She believed that this knowledge would be best passed on through the Tatar language so that both groups living side-by-side in society could develop mutual trust. She said that the psychological barrier must be broken to have a better understanding of each other's cultures.

All of these interviewees revealed that they believed the problems of mutual understanding within society lied with the Russian population and their attitude towards the Tatar language. However, what was evident from these opinions was that they saw the Tatar language more as an ethnic symbol and an expression of their ethnic consciousness rather than a language that could be used for everyday practicalities. The symbolic side of the language seemed to be of more importance to the Tatar people. They also gave a distinct impression that language was part of the in-group out-group phenomenon that was mentioned previously in this chapter. It was a sign of belonging, that would be difficult for Russians because they were a different nationality.

6.10 Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to examine in detail the attitudes of both Russian and Tatar populations towards language using grounded theory as a method of qualitative analysis. An inductive view of the relationship between the theories from the literature review and emerging themes from interviews was used. The analysis examined how people viewed Tatar language use within post-Soviet society in an autonomous republic of the Russian Federation. It examined how people designated Tatar to being used one way or another. The themes that emerged from the interviews that related to this were the home and communication, education, the media, work and officialdom, the generation gap, how language was distributed geographically within Tatarstan and socio-psychological issues. The attitudes towards the use of Tatar did not seem to have changed very much during the post-Soviet period.

The analysis of these interviews and the observations, which were carried out in Kazan during this field trip in 2010, has highlighted several important discourses. The first seemed to be a territorial discourse that was highlighted from the Russian perspective that Tatarstan was part of the Russian Federation and Russian was the state language of the Russian Federation. Therefore the Russians felt that Tatar was not necessary. This confirms the results of language test 3, chapter five where a large majority of Russian respondents self-reported that they only used Russian for writing in the spheres of work, the home and information technology. On the other hand, Tatars acknowledged that the official languages of Tatarstan were Tatar and Russian and people living within the republic should learn Tatar as well as Russian because it was the *national* language. The results of language test 3, chapter five revealed that Tatars used both Russian and Tatar bilingually in the spheres of work, the home and information technology. However, despite the fact that Tatars believed Russians should learn Tatar, their attitudes towards Russians learning Tatar appeared to be very different. The interviews and the post-Soviet identity tests in chapter five revealed that Tatars seemed to be self-designating the Tatar language to the sphere of the home and they assumed that Russians could not learn Tatar because they were not Tatars. This seemed to be more to do with the Tatar language being used as part of the in-group status, as a sign of belonging. They may have been proclaiming that Tatar culture was their own. The results of language test 2, chapter five proved, however, that Russians were perfectly able to use Tatar just as well as Tatars if they were given the opportunities to learn and use it within the right environment. The Tatar attitude seemed to be forming a barrier towards the acceptance

of the language policy to widen the functional roles of Tatar language use within post-Soviet Tatar society.

This symbolic discourse was also very prominent in the attitudes towards Tatar language use in all of the themes that emerged from the interviews. This symbolic side of Tatar language use seemed to represent the political ideologies of those in charge. The Tatar language used in a symbolic sense seemed to represent the collective Tatar identity. Tatar fulfils its use in all spheres associated with culture and heritage. Even Tatar language learning and historical books seem to promote the symbolic aspect of Tatar identity. This contradicts what some of the interviewees said about how the Tatar language had significantly developed in society. In fact this development was only visible on the surface. The development of the Tatar language in educational textbooks only promoted the symbolic side of Tatar history and culture through Tatar fairy tales, myths and cartoons that may be uninspiring for people wishing to learn the language because there is nothing to help people learn the functional Tatar language use for everyday purposes. The development of cartoons for Tatar language learning seems to have been aimed more at children. Moreover, the language only appears to have been developed up to a certain level. This may be the reason why people find the Tatar language not useful and unnecessary.

These discourses reveal differing views on the post-Soviet nation-building processes. The Tatar view was about the strengthening of the Tatar collective identity using the Tatar language as an ethnic symbol, as a sign of in-group belonging to which Russians did not belong. The Russian view was about functioning in a society in which they used to be considered as the dominant national group with full privileges for their nationality and language. These views seemed to substitute the practical decisions of which language children should be learning.

Finally, the interviewees and observations showed that the younger Russian generation did not seem to mind living in a bilingual environment and they also may be able to influence their own children in a different way to how they were influenced themselves by their parents. Despite the fact that the younger Russian generation said that they did not mind living in a bilingual environment, the results of the tests in chapter five revealed that two thirds of Russians regarded Tatar as an irrelevance because they either could not be bothered to learn it at school or they thought it was not worth their time to complete the task involving Tatar in language test 2.

However, it seemed as if the future of the Tatar language lied in the hands of the younger generation who may have better conditions than their parents did for

intergenerational transmission of the language. Perhaps then there may be more continuity to language learning through the generations.

7.0 Conclusion

The main aim of this thesis was to find out how successful the Tatar language policy has been as a nation-building process in promoting Tatar language shift in post-Soviet Tatarstan and to find out if attitudes towards the Tatar language had changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Tatar-Russian bilingualism has been a popular focus of many scholars who have carried out studies into Tatar language behaviour of the Tatar population. This study examined *Russian-Tatar* bilingualism as its original contribution to knowledge and the aim was to measure the levels of Tatar *written* proficiency of the Russian population in comparison with the Tatar population. As was pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, studies into Tatar language use only focused on the spoken language and the language preferences of respondents. No studies had been carried out into written levels of Tatar language proficiency and hardly any research into Tatar language use amongst Russians (Gorenburg, 2005). If the Russian respondents of this study demonstrated that they could use written Tatar, then this would confirm that the Tatar language policy had been successful in Tatar language spread and as a nation-building process (Polese, 2011; Rodgers, 2007).

The research for this thesis was contextualized in themes of politics, identity and nation-building, attitudes and functional language use in the multi-ethnic post-Soviet Tatarstan. Many models and theories that exist on these themes and that were discussed in the literature review used more of a top-down perspective (for example, Brubaker, 1994 and 1996; Cashaback, 2009; Connor, 1984; Cooper, 1989; Graney, 2009; Grenoble, 2003; Smith, 1998). However, this research has contributed to the body of work on post-Soviet nation-building processes and has shown resistance of the citizens against Tatar government policies (Polese, 2011; Polese and Wylegala, 2008; Rodgers, 2007; Shevel, 2002). It has shown that the success of a language policy was determined by the citizens and whether they accepted or rejected the policy. This research also used Fishman's (1999) GIDS framework and spheres of language use in studies by Iskhakova (2001 and 2002) in which the study was situated.

The thesis sought to answer the following research questions and formed the basis of the empirical research that used a mixed-methods approach. A synthesis of the empirical findings to answer the study's research questions is given below.

1. How successful has the Tatar language policy been in promoting Tatar language spread?

The tests that were carried out in chapter five into the levels of written Tatar language proficiency amongst the *Russian* population revealed that they were able to use written Tatar language with varying degrees of facility. Based on these results and on the data from interviews discussed in chapter six, the only possible reason that could have contributed to this ability was the compulsory Tatar language learning in schools. From a top-down perspective, the implementation of the Tatar language policy and the 1998 law on education could be considered as successful within the sphere of education, particularly with respect to Tatar nation-building strategies (Polese, 2011; Rodgers, 2007). However, it seemed as if the only reason why these measures of implementation had been successful amongst Russians was because these measures were law and there was no choice in primary or secondary education regarding the study of Tatar. Therefore, if Tatar language learning was not compulsory, Russians would choose not to learn it because there would be no need to learn it.

2. Is there any resistance to language policy as a nation-building process and if so, how is it manifested?

According to the results of test two in chapter five into the reading and writing levels of Tatar written proficiency of the Russian population, some possible resistance seemed to have been demonstrated due to the fact that more than half of the Russian respondents did not attempt to reply to this question. This may have been a demonstration of their resistance against compulsory Tatar language learning or resistance against the Tatar government who brought in the 1998 education law. It may also be a statement that they foundd Tatar irrelevant.

Furthermore, chapter six revealed that there had been evidence of protests in Kazan against the increase in the number of hours of Tatar language learning in schools by the Russian parents of schoolchildren. The protests demonstrated resistance by the Russian population to Tatar language policy implementation. This resistance confirmed that the linguistic policies implemented by the Tatar government were part of a process that had to be negotiated with citizens (Shevel, 2002). This resistance to the linguistic policies in Tatarstan by many of the Russian population seemed to stem from the fact that Tatarstan was situated within the political framework of the Russian Federation and Russians felt that they should not have to learn the titular language because they already spoke the official language of the Russian Federation.

3. Have attitudes towards the Tatar language changed during the post-Soviet period?

As far as attitudes were concerned in post-Soviet Tatarstan, there appeared to be a clear distinction between the attitudes of Russians and Tatars towards the Tatar language that was expressed as a feature of each population's identity. The results of the post-Soviet identity tests in chapter five revealed that Russians only used Russian, whilst Tatars used both Russian and Tatar. The Tatar language was shown to be a prominent feature of a Tatar person because only people who self-reported that they were Tatar used it. The post-Soviet identity tests also revealed that attitudes towards language use began in the home and resulted from parental and close family influences. Linguistic behaviour patterns were therefore formulated before a child begins school and enters society. These attitudes were clarified further in many of the interviews in chapter six. The interviews showed that there was a significant difference in attitude towards language use between the older and younger generation. This was particularly noted in the protests by Russian parents in 2011 that were against the increase in the number of Tatar language learning hours their children had to study in schools. The post-Soviet identity tests and interviews thus revealed that characteristics of Soviet identity were still predominant in the older generation of Russians. This attitude seemed to confirm the political dimension of Russian identity that Shevel (2002) and other previously mentioned scholars such as Poppe and Hagendoorn (2001 and 2003) and Tolz (1998) found in their studies.

As for the Tatar population, the post-Soviet identity tests showed that they used Tatar in the home and when speaking to friends of Tatar nationality. This suggested that Tatar was used as a sign of in-group belonging and was a symbol of Tatar identity. Tatar was often referred to as being part of the ethnic consciousness of the Tatar people in the interviews, although this did not have anything to do with proficiency in the language. As was pointed out in chapter six, Tatars seemed to believe that outsiders could not learn the Tatar language or understand their heritage or culture. In this respect, it appeared that barriers were formed by the Tatar population towards other ethnic groups who may have wanted to learn the Tatar language. Therefore it could be possible that Tatars were demonstrating some resistance towards Russians learning Tatar. This is paradoxical because Tatars wanted people to understand their culture, for which they believed the Tatar language was necessary, but at the same time they seemed to believe that outsiders could not really learn the Tatar language. Perhaps this was a pre-emptive move to claim Tatar culture as their own.

Attitudes were also prevalent in the third language test in chapter five that examined self-reported language use in different domains of language use. Russian was the written language of choice for formal situations for both Russians and Tatars, whereas Tatar was the language of choice for informal situations amongst the Tatar population in the spheres of the home and information technology. In addition Russians reported that they made very little use of the Tatar language in these spheres. Many Russians regarded Tatar as unimportant in their everyday lives. In the sphere of work and officialdom in both chapters five and six the results and interviews revealed that Tatar was not considered as functional as Russian because everybody used Russian. Furthermore, Tatar was not considered as prestigious as Russian and according to some of the interviewees, it had not been fully developed in this sphere (Iskhakova). It was evident that the attitudes towards Tatar language use by both populations therefore designated it to the sphere of the home and use for personal purposes.

Despite some success in the sphere of education, the implementation of the 1992 Tatar language policy and the 1998 law on education do not seem to have changed attitudes towards the Tatar language amongst the older Russian generation and in fact it would be very difficult to change the attitudes of this Russian generation towards the Tatar language because attitudes appeared to be firmly rooted in Soviet history. The research carried out in this thesis showed that the linguistic policies implemented by the Tatar government were symbols of Tatar identity that helped to build the image of Tatarstan as a sovereign republic. The research also showed that these policies were met by some resistance and refusal to accept them at the citizen level. This proved that the Tatar nation-building processes did not only depend on state forces implementing the policies, but they also depended on the acceptance and desire of the population. This confirmed that there was another perspective to the nation-building processes as Brubaker (2011), suggested and as was also similarly confirmed in Polese's study (2011). It additionally confirmed that nation-building was shaped by people's attitudes rather than by language (Polese and Wylegala, 2009; Shohamy, 2006).

This study pointed to some steps that could potentially be taken to strengthen the position of Tatar within the Republic of Tatarstan. Tatar language materials in the sphere of education could be developed so that they reflect the everyday lives of people and not only the cultural aspect of the Tatar nationality. Furthermore, the use of Tatar could be widened to include all specialisms within higher educational institutions, not just agricultural and humanities subjects. If all students registered for at least one Tatar language course for the duration of their study, then this might encourage Tatar

language learning within professional spheres of society and close the gap between leaving school and starting work after their higher education courses are finished. More choice of languages in the spheres of sport, art and music could also strengthen the position of Tatar.

From a wider perspective regarding recommendations and future research, it would be useful to have more written language tests carried out in countries that are trying to promote language spread in all spheres of language use in society to find out the proficiency levels of their citizens. This would give a clearer picture of how effective language and education policies are. Many studies into post-Soviet titular language use have focused on the subjective preferences and opinions of the population to report how language is being used, which by itself does not give a realistic picture of language proficiency.

Furthermore, more research could be carried out into the wishes and desires of the citizens and how they would like to see language developed in their society. Such a study was conducted in Wales and revealed that the Welsh language had spread to spheres of language use where it had not been used before (Urdd Gobaith Cymru, 2011). If citizens in Tatarstan were able to have some input into how and where languages should be used, this might give them more motivation to learn the Tatar language and minority languages that are spoken on the territory of Tatarstan.

Finally, it must be pointed out that there is a salient difference between the use of the language policy in an independent country such as Latvia, where the Russian population can effectively be made to take the titular language seriously by having their rights to use Russian withdrawn, and the use of the language policy in Tatarstan, an autonomous republic situated within the political framework of the Russian Federation where both languages have legal status. However, as has been revealed in this thesis, the choice of language in Tatar society has meant that Tatar and Russian language use is asymmetrical.

Despite the fact that the usage of Tatar and Russian within society is asymmetrical, this societal bilingualism seems to be generally accepted. Russians are content using Russian for all of their needs and Tatars are happy using Tatar in the home and as a symbol of their identity.

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Appendix 1

Информированное согласие

На кафедре русистики и славистики Шеффилдского Университета в Великобритании проводится исследование языковой ситуации в Республике Татарстан. Ваше участие в этой анкете поможет выявить реальную картину языковой ситуации в Республике Татарстан.

Анкета носит анонимный характер. Ваше участие является добровольным и у Вас есть права отказаться от участия в любое время. Вся полученная информация будет использована только для моей диссертации и не будет использована коммерческих целей.

Анкета состоит из трех части:

Часть 1 к вопросам о себе;
Часть 2 заполнение таблицы о каких языках Вы пользуютесь в данных ситуациях;
Часть 3 упражнение чтения.
Внимание! Обратите внимание на порядок заполнения анкеты.

Время заполнения анкеты - 15 минут.

Я прочитал(а) текст и понял(а) цель и характер исследованя. Я настоящим даю согласие на участие в исследовании.

Дата______________

Подпись участника________________________________

Имя исследовательницы: Тереза Уиггелсворт-Бакер
э. почта: rup07tjw@sheffield.ac.uk

The University Of Sheffield.

Анкета

На кафедре русистики и славистики Шеффилдского Университета в Великобритании проводится исследование языковой ситуации в Республике Татарстан. Анкета носит анонимный характер.

Заранее Вам благодарны!

Часть 1

1. Год рождения
2. Пол
3. Место рождения
4. Национальность
5. Национальность Вашего отца (или отчима)
6. Национальность Вашей матери (или мачехи)
7. Уровень образования
8. Профессия Специальность по образованию
9. Родной язык
10. Каким был первый язык Ваших ближайших родственников?

11. На каком (каких) языке(ах) Вы обычно разговариваете ?

а) С отцом (или отчимом) ________________________________

б) С матерью (или мачехой)________________________________

в) С друзьями ____

г) На работе с коллегами _________________________________

12. На каком (каких) языке(ах) Вы сначала научились говорить?

13. На каком (каких) языке(ах) Вы получили обучение:

а) В начальной школе

б) В средней школе

в) В техникуме, ВУЗе, университете

14. На каком языке Вы читаете газеты?

____

15. На каком языке Вы смотрите ТВ?

____

16. На каком языке Вы читаете художественную литературу?

____

17. Посещали ли Вы какие-либо курсы языков, не являющихся для Вас родными языковые курсы?

а) Нет (*переходите к **Части 2***)

б) Да (ответьте на вопросы 18-20)

18. Какой (какие) язык(и) Вы изучали?

____

19. Где Вы изучали этот (эти) язык (и)? (*например: в школе; в центре образования для взрослых; онлайн; на работе*)

____
____
____

20. С какой целью Вы изучали язык (и)? (*например: для работы; путешествий; для себя*)

____
____
____

(*переходите к **Части 2***)

Часть 2

Какими языками пользуютесь ли Вы в данных ситуациях?

Приведите любую дополнительную информацию, которую сочтете нужной:

Т*=Татарский язык,* ***Р****=Русский язык,* ***Д****=другой язык, (пожалуйста, уточните, какой).*

1*(=никогда)* ***2*** ***3*** ***4*** ***5****(= всегда)*

Ситуация	**Чтение**	**Написание**	**Дополнительная информация**
На работе Официальные документы	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
При заполнении форм и бланков	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
В юридической сфере	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
Официальное извещение	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
В научно-технической сфере	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
В быту Личная корреспонденция	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
В сети Интернет	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
Информационные технологии Электронные газеты, журналы, книги и др.	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5		
Поиски в сети Интернет	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5	

	Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
Курсы он-лайн	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
Печать документов		Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
Официальная электронная корреспонденция	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	
Личная электронная корреспонденция	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	Т: 1 2 3 4 5 Р: 1 2 3 4 5 Д: 1 2 3 4 5	

(*переходите к* ***Части 3***)

Часть 3

Внимание! Эти упражнения ни тест ни экзамен. Ваши ответы не будут оцениваться.

А. Прочитайте текст и напишите его краткое изложение в двух предложениях **по-русски**:

Наоми Кэмпбелл избила водителя: материал размещен 3 марта 2010

Известная модель продолжает заниматься рукоприкладством

Известная своим скандальным нравом супермодель Наоми Кэмпбелл в очередной раз распустила руки. На этот раз пострадал ее водитель, которого она ударила по голове, после чего скрылась с "места преступления".

Инцидент произошел во вторник в Нью-Йорке. По словам 27-летнего шофера, Кэмпбелл напала на него с заднего сиденья и так ударила по голове, что он стукнулся лицом о руль. Молодому человеку пришлось остановить машину и обратиться за помощью к дорожному полицейскому. Пока суть да дело - 39-летняя модель вышла из автомобиля и скрылась с "места преступления".

О причинах, толкнувших Кемпбелл на рукоприкладство, ее шофер предпочел не сообщать, решив особо не "раскручивать" это дело, так как свидетелей того, что произошло между ним и топ-моделью, не было.

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Б. Прочитайте текст и напишите его краткое изложение в двух предложениях **по-татарски**:

"2006-2015 елда РФдә физик культура һәм спортны үстерү" программасына - 100 млрд. сум акча

5 мартта ТР Яшьләр, спорт һәм туризм министрлыгында РФ Дәүләт Думасы депутаты Илдар Гыйльметдинов, журналистлар белән очрашып, соңгы вакытта федераль дәрәҗәдә эшләнгән һәм кабул ителгән, физик культура һәм спорт белән бәйле законнар, "2006-2015 елларда Россия Федерациясендә физик культура һәм спортны үстерү" федераль максатчан программаны тормышка ашыру турында сөйләде.

Илдар Гыйльметдинов сүзләренчә, РФ Дәүләт Думасы депутатлары законнар эшләү белән ныклап шөгыльләнә. "Узган ел ахырында көченә кергән яңа редакциядәге "Физик культура һәм спорт турындагы" закон маддәләрне һәм нормаларны яхшы якка үзгәртте. Закон, тулаем алганда, начар түгел. Анда федераль, төбәк һәм муниципаль хакимиятнең вәкаләтләре төгәл билгеләнгән. Допинг турында аерым бүлек бар. Бу мәсьәлә хәтта 4 маддәдә чагылыш таба", - дип аңлатып үтте И.Гыйльметдинов. Федераль законда спорт федерацияләренә күп вәкаләтләр һәм йөкләмәләр бирелә. Законга беренче тапкыр спорт паспорты дигән төшенчә кертелгән. Спортчылар белән шартнамәләр төзү тәртибе күрсәтелгән.

<http://www.tatar.ru/?DNSID=80b58c5d5d2114006810567ec608ab1d&full=34180>

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Благодарим за заполнение!

Appendix 1 (English version)

Informed Consent Form

The department of Russian and Slavonic Studies at the University of Sheffield in the UK is carrying out research about the language situation in the Republic of Tatarstan. Your participation in the questionnaire will help to us to have a better understanding of the language situation in the Republic of Tatarstan.

All data collected from the questionnaires will be kept anonymous and used only as part of my dissertation. The data will not be used for any commercial purposes. Your participation in the research is voluntary and you may withdraw from it at any time if you wish.

The questionnaire is in three parts:

i. Part one asks you to give some general information about yourself.
ii. Part two asks you to fill in a table.
iii. Part three asks you to do a small reading activity.

Please fill in the questionnaire in the order of the questions!

The questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

I have read the form and understand the purpose of the research. I hereby give my consent to take part in the research.

Date_____________

Signature of participant______________________________

Researcher's name: Teresa Wigglesworth-Baker
email: rup07tjw@sheffield.ac.uk

Summary of SURVEY

Part 1

1. Year of birth
2. Gender
3. Place of birth
4. Nationality
5. Nationality of father (or step-father)
6. Nationality of mother (or step-mother)
7. Level of education
8. Profession
9. Educational specialism
10. Native language
11. What was the language spoken in your immediate family?
12. Which languages so you usually communicate in with the following people?
    - Father (or step-father)
    - Mother (or step-mother)
    - Friends
    - Colleagues at work
13. Which language(s) did you first learn to speak?
14. Which was the language of instruction in:
    - Primary school
    - Secondary school
    - Technical college, higher educational institute, university etc.
15. In which language do you read newspapers?
16. In which language do you watch TV?
17. Have you ever attended any foreign language courses?
    a. No (please go to part 2)
    b. Yes (please fill in questions 18-20)
18. Which language(s) did you study?
19. Where did you study this language? *(e.g. in a school, in an adult educational institute, online, at work)*
20. Why did you learn this language? *(e.g. for work, for travel, for pleasure)* (please go to part 2)

Part 2

1. Which language(s) do you use in the following situations? *(Feel free to add any comments in the space provided)*

T=Tatar, R=Russian, O=other language, please state which.

1 = never 2 3 4 5 = always

Situation	Reading	Writing	Comments
At work Official documents	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	
Form filling	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	
Public notices	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	
Legal, juridicial	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	
Technical/scientific	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	
At Home Letters	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	
Internet	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	
Information Technology Online newspapers, magazines, books	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5		
Internet searches	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	
Online courses	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5	

	O: 1 2 3 4 5	O: 1 2 3 4 5	
Word processing documents	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	
Formal emails	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	
Personal emails	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	T: 1 2 3 4 5 R: 1 2 3 4 5 O: 1 2 3 4 5	

Part 3

(*Your summary is not a test and you will not be judged on the quality of your responses*)

a. **Please read the text below and summarize the content *in Russian* in no more than 2 sentences.**
   Text here is a short newspaper article about an incident involving Naomi Campbell. It is intended to be none political and easy enough to summarize.

b. **Please read the text below and summarize the content *in Tatar* in no more than 2 sentences.**
   Text here is about a new sports centre that has been opened in the centre of Kazan. It is intended to be non-political and easy enough to summarize.

Appendix 2

Question 1

Official documentation: Tatar Reading

Crosstab

			Tatar reading 1					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	91	8	2	0	1	102
		% within Nationality	89.2%	7.8%	2.0%	0.0%	1.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	56	7	5	2	1	71
		% within Nationality	78.9%	9.9%	7.0%	2.8%	1.4%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	6.334[a]	4	.176	.157		

Official documentation: Tatar Writing

Crosstab

			Tatar writing1					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	94	7	1	0	0	102
		% within Nationality	92.2%	6.9%	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	59	6	4	1	1	71
		% within Nationality	83.1%	8.5%	5.6%	1.4%	1.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	153	13	5	1	1	173
		% within Nationality	88.4%	7.5%	2.9%	0.6%	0.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	6.538[a]	4	.162	.107		

Official documentation: Russian Reading

Crosstab

			Russian reading 1					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	8	2	1	5	86	102
		% within Nationality	7.8%	2.0%	1.0%	4.9%	84.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	1	1	2	3	64	71
		% within Nationality	1.4%	1.4%	2.8%	4.2%	90.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	9	3	3	8	150	173
		% within Nationality	5.2%	1.7%	1.7%	4.6%	86.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	4.425[a]	4	.352	.391		

Official documentation: Russian Writing

Crosstab

			Russian writing1					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	8	2	1	3	88	102
		% within Nationality	7.8%	2.0%	1.0%	2.9%	86.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	1	0	1	2	67	71
		% within Nationality	1.4%	0.0%	1.4%	2.8%	94.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	9	2	2	5	155	173
		% within Nationality	5.2%	1.2%	1.2%	2.9%	89.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	.312[a]	4	.989	.990		

Official documentation: Other Language Reading

Crosstab								
			Other reading1					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	60	14	16	7	5	102
		% within Nationality	58.8%	13.7%	15.7%	6.9%	4.9%	100.0%
		% within Other reading1	57.7%	63.6%	59.3%	58.3%	62.5%	59.0%
	Tatar	Count	44	8	11	5	3	71
		% within Nationality	62.0%	11.3%	15.5%	7.0%	4.2%	100.0%
		% within Other reading1	42.3%	36.4%	40.7%	41.7%	37.5%	41.0%
Total		Count	104	22	27	12	8	173
		% within Nationality	60.1%	12.7%	15.6%	6.9%	4.6%	100.0%

Official documentation: Other Language Writing

Crosstab								
			Otherwriting1					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	63	12	13	10	4	102
		% within Nationality	61.8%	11.8%	12.7%	9.8%	3.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	47	11	6	4	3	71
		% within Nationality	66.2%	15.5%	8.5%	5.6%	4.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	110	23	19	14	7	173
		% within Nationality	63.6%	13.3%	11.0%	8.1%	4.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.179[a]	4	.703	.713		

Question 2

Form Filling: Tatar Reading

Crosstab								
			Tatar reading 2					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	91	5	5	1	0	102
		% within Nationality	89.2%	4.9%	4.9%	1.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	59	6	2	2	2	71
		% within Nationality	83.1%	8.5%	2.8%	2.8%	2.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	150	11	7	3	2	173
		% within Nationality	86.7%	6.4%	4.0%	1.7%	1.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	5.147[a]	4	.273	.275		

Form Filling: Tatar Writing

Crosstab								
			Tatar writing2					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	92	5	5	0	0	102
		% within Nationality	90.2%	4.9%	4.9%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	60	5	3	1	2	71
		% within Nationality	84.5%	7.0%	4.2%	1.4%	2.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	152	10	8	1	2	173
		% within Nationality	87.9%	5.8%	4.6%	0.6%	1.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	4.837[a]	4	.304	.308		

Form Filling: Russian Reading

Crosstab							
			Russian reading2				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	8	0	6	88	102
		% within Nationality	7.8%	0.0%	5.9%	86.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	1	1	2	67	71
		% within Nationality	1.4%	1.4%	2.8%	94.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	9	1	8	155	173
		% within Nationality	5.2%	0.6%	4.6%	89.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	5.925[a]	3	.115	.082		

Form Filling: Russian Writing

Crosstab							
			Russianwriting2				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	7	0	6	89	102
		% within Nationality	6.9%	0.0%	5.9%	87.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	1	2	1	67	71
		% within Nationality	1.4%	2.8%	1.4%	94.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	8	2	7	156	173
		% within Nationality	4.6%	1.2%	4.0%	90.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	7.872[a]	3	.049	.038		

Form Filling: other reading

Crosstab								
			Otherreading2					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	58	14	15	10	5	102
		% within Nationality	56.9%	13.7%	14.7%	9.8%	4.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	43	12	7	4	5	71
		% within Nationality	60.6%	16.9%	9.9%	5.6%	7.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	101	26	22	14	10	173
		% within Nationality	58.4%	15.0%	12.7%	8.1%	5.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.384[a]	4	.666	.675		

Form Filling: other writing

Crosstab							
			Otherwriting2				
			1	2	3	4	5
Nationality	Russian	Count	60	14	12	11	5
		% within Nationality	58.8%	13.7%	11.8%	10.8%	4.9%
	Tatar	Count	46	10	7	3	5
		% within Nationality	64.8%	14.1%	9.9%	4.2%	7.0%
Total		Count	106	24	19	14	10
		% within Nationality	61.3%	13.9%	11.0%	8.1%	5.8%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.943[a]	4	.567	.575		

Question 3

Legal Documentation: Russian reading

Crosstab							
			Russian reading 4				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	6	1	4	91	102
		% within Nationality	5.9%	1.0%	3.9%	89.2%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	5	1	8	57	71
		% within Nationality	7.0%	1.4%	11.3%	80.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	11	2	12	148	173
		% within Nationality	6.4%	1.2%	6.9%	85.5%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	3.802[a]	3	.284	.299		

Legal Documentation: Russian writing

Crosstab							
			Russian writing 4				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	8	1	4	89	102
		% within Nationality	7.8%	1.0%	3.9%	87.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	5	1	7	58	71
		% within Nationality	7.0%	1.4%	9.9%	81.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	2	11	147	173
		% within Nationality	7.5%	1.2%	6.4%	85.0%	100.0%
		% within Russian writing 4	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.576[a]	3	.462	.511		

Legal Documentation: Other reading

Crosstab								
			Other reading 4					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	70	10	8	8	6	102
		% within Nationality	68.6%	9.8%	7.8%	7.8%	5.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	49	4	7	7	4	71
		% within Nationality	69.0%	5.6%	9.9%	9.9%	5.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	119	14	15	15	10	173
		% within Nationality	68.8%	8.1%	8.7%	8.7%	5.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	1.297[a]	4	.862	.868		

Legal Documentation: Other writing

Crosstab								
			Other writing4					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	67	13	10	9	3	102
		% within Nationality	65.7%	12.7%	9.8%	8.8%	2.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	51	5	3	7	5	71
		% within Nationality	71.8%	7.0%	4.2%	9.9%	7.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	118	18	13	16	8	173
		% within	68.2%	10.4%	7.5%	9.2%	4.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	4.845[a]	4	.304	.316		

Question 4

Public Notices: Tatar Reading

Crosstab							
			Tatar reading3				Total
			1	2	3	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	93	5	3	1	102
		% within Nationality	91.2%	4.9%	2.9%	1.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	63	4	3	1	71
		% within Nationality	88.7%	5.6%	4.2%	1.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	156	9	6	2	173
		% within Nationality	90.2%	5.2%	3.4%	1.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	.336[a]	3	.953	.960		

Public Notices: Tatar Writing

Crosstab							
			Tatar writing3				Total
			1	2	3	4	
Nationality	Russian	Count	96	3	3	0	102
		% within Nationality	94.1%	2.9%	2.9%	0.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	61	5	4	1	71
		% within Nationality	85.9%	7.0%	5.6%	1.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	157	8	7	1	173
		% within Nationality	90.8%	4.6%	4.0%	0.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	4.020[a]	3	.259	.246		

Public notices: Russian reading

Crosstab								
			Russian reading 3					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	7	1	0	5	89	102
		% within Nationality	6.9%	1.0%	0.0%	4.9%	87.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	3	1	1	7	59	71
		% within Nationality	4.2%	1.4%	1.4%	9.9%	83.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	10	2	1	12	148	173
		% within Nationality	5.8%	1.2%	0.6%	6.9%	85.5%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	3.474[a]	4	.467	.525		

Public notices: Russian writing

Crosstab							
			Russian writing3				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	8	1	5	88	102
		% within Nationality	7.8%	1.0%	4.9%	86.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	5	2	7	57	71
		% within Nationality	7.0%	2.8%	9.9%	80.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	3	12	145	173
		% within Nationality	7.5%	1.7%	6.9%	83.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.512[a]	3	.473	.512		

Public notices: Other reading

Crosstab								
			Other reading 3					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	67	12	13	5	5	102
		% within Nationality	65.7%	11.8%	12.7%	4.9%	4.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	47	11	8	3	2	71
		% within Nationality	66.2%	15.5%	11.3%	4.2%	2.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	114	23	21	8	7	173
		% within Nationality	65.9%	13.3%	12.1%	4.6%	4.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	1.006[a]	4	.909	.911		

Public notices: Other writing

Crosstab								
			Other writing 3					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	73	8	13	6	2	102
		% within Nationality	71.6%	7.8%	12.7%	5.9%	2.0%	100.0%
		% within Other writing 3	59.3%	47.1%	68.4%	60.0%	50.0%	59.0%
	Tatar	Count	50	9	6	4	2	71
		% within Nationality	70.4%	12.7%	8.5%	5.6%	2.8%	100.0%
		% within Other writing 3	40.7%	52.9%	31.6%	40.0%	50.0%	41.0%
Total		Count	123	17	19	10	4	173
		% within Nationality	71.1%	9.8%	11.0%	5.8%	2.3%	100.0%
		% within Other writing 3	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	1.843[a]	4	.765	.782		

Question 5

Technical/scientific: Tatar reading

Crosstab							
			Tatar reading				Total
			1	2	3	4	
Nationality	Russian	Count	98	2	2	0	102
		% within Nationality	96.1%	2.0%	2.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	62	6	1	2	71
		% within Nationality	87.3%	8.5%	1.4%	2.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	160	8	3	2	173
		% within Nationality	92.5%	4.6%	1.7%	1.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	7.107[a]	3	.069	.047		

Technical/scientific: Tatar writing

Crosstab							
			Tatar writing				Total
			1	2	3	4	
Nationality	Russian	Count	98	2	2	0	102
		% within Nationality	96.1%	2.0%	2.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	62	6	1	2	71
		% within Nationality	87.3%	8.5%	1.4%	2.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	160	8	3	2	173
		% within Nationality	92.5%	4.6%	1.7%	1.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	7.107[a]	3	.069	.047		

Technical/scientific: Russian reading

Crosstab								
			Russian reading					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	7	2	2	8	83	102
		% within Nationality	6.9%	2.0%	2.0%	7.8%	81.4%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	5	0	2	10	54	71
		% within Nationality	7.0%	0.0%	2.8%	14.1%	76.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	12	2	4	18	137	173
		% within Nationality	6.9%	1.2%	2.3%	10.4%	79.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	3.243[a]	4	.518	.591		

Technical/scientific: Russian writing

Crosstab								
			Russian writing					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	7	2	2	8	83	102
		% within Nationality	6.9%	2.0%	2.0%	7.8%	81.4%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	6	0	3	8	54	71
		% within Nationality	8.5%	0.0%	4.2%	11.3%	76.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	2	5	16	137	173
		% within Nationality	7.5%	1.2%	2.9%	9.2%	79.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.956[a]	4	.565	.615		

Technical/scientific: Other reading

Crosstab									
			Other reading					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	56	11	12	14	9	102
		% within Nationality	54.9%	10.8%	11.8%	13.7%	8.8%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	42	11	8	6	4	71
		% within Nationality	59.2%	15.5%	11.3%	8.5%	5.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	98	22	20	20	13	173
		% within Nationality	56.6%	12.7%	11.6%	11.6%	7.5%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.447[a]	4	.654	.669		

Technical/scientific: Other writing

Crosstab								
			Other writing 5					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
		Count	60	9	10	14	9	102

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.327[a]	4	.676	.686		

Total	Count	104	18	18	20	13	173
	% within Nationality	60.1%	10.4%	10.4%	11.6%	7.5%	100.0%

Question 6

Personal correspondence: Other reading

Crosstab								
			Other reading					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	59	9	16	12	6	102
		% within Nationality	57.8%	8.8%	15.7%	11.8%	5.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	36	10	11	10	4	71
		% within Nationality	50.7%	14.1%	15.5%	14.1%	5.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	95	19	27	22	10	173
		% within Nationality	54.9%	11.0%	15.6%	12.7%	5.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	1.626[a]	4	.804	.811		

Personal correspondence: Other writing 6

Crosstab								
			Other writing					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	60	6	19	12	5	102
		% within Nationality	58.8%	5.9%	18.6%	11.8%	4.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	36	11	14	7	3	71
		% within Nationality	50.7%	15.5%	19.7%	9.9%	4.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	96	17	33	19	8	173
		% within Nationality	55.5%	9.8%	19.1%	11.0%	4.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	4.638[a]	4	.327	.336		

Question 7

Internet: Russian reading

Crosstab							
			Russian reading 7				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	5	4	11	82	102
		% within Nationality	4.9%	3.9%	10.8%	80.4%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	4	1	14	52	71
		% within Nationality	5.6%	1.4%	19.7%	73.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	9	5	25	134	173
		% within Nationality	5.2%	2.9%	14.5%	77.5%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	3.446[a]	3	.315	.351		

Internet: Russian writing

Crosstab							
			Russian writing 7				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	4	1	15	82	102
		% within Nationality	3.9%	1.0%	14.7%	80.4%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	7	2	13	49	71
		% within Nationality	9.9%	2.8%	18.3%	69.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	11	3	28	131	173
		% within Nationality	6.4%	1.7%	16.2%	75.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	4.187[a]	3	.242	.252		

Internet: Other reading

Crosstab								
			Other reading					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	25	16	22	25	14	102
		% within Nationality	24.5%	15.7%	21.6%	24.5%	13.7%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	27	10	12	15	7	71
		% within Nationality	38.0%	14.1%	16.9%	21.1%	9.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	52	26	34	40	21	173
		% within Nationality	30.1%	15.0%	19.7%	23.1%	12.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	3.803[a]	4	.433	.440		

Internet: Other writing

Crosstab								
			Other writing					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	30	12	22	24	14	102
		% within Nationality	29.4%	11.8%	21.6%	23.4%	13.7%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	28	9	10	15	9	71
		% within Nationality	39.4%	12.7%	14.1%	21.1%	12.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	58	21	32	39	23	173
		% within Nationality	33.4%	12.1%	18.5%	22.5%	13.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.693[a]	4	.610	.616		

Question 8

Online newspapers/journal/books: Russian reading

Crosstab							
			Russian reading				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	5	1	10	86	102
		% within Nationality	4.9%	1.0%	9.8%	84.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	2	2	14	53	71
		% within Nationality	2.8%	2.8%	19.7%	74.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	7	3	24	139	173
		% within Nationality	4.0%	1.7%	13.9%	80.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	4.717[a]	3	.194	.211		

Question 9

Online newspapers/journal/books: Other reading

Crosstab								
			Other reading					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	26	23	23	16	14	102
		% within Nationality	25.5%	22.5%	22.5%	15.7%	13.7%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	23	12	12	18	6	71
		% within Nationality	32.4%	16.9%	16.9%	25.4%	8.5%	100.0%
		Count	49	35	35	34	20	173

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	5.022[a]	4	.285	.286		

Internet searches: Russian reading

Crosstab								
			Russian reading					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	2	1	2	18	79	102
		% within Nationality	2.0%	1.0%	2.0%	17.6%	77.5%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	2	0	2	13	54	71
		% within Nationality	2.8%	0.0%	2.8%	18.3%	76.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	4	1	4	31	133	173
		% within Nationality	2.3%	0.6%	2.3%	17.9%	76.9%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	.982[a]	4	.912	1.000		

Internet searches: Russian writing

Crosstab							
			Russian writing				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	6	3	12	81	102
		% within Nationality	5.9%	2.9%	11.8%	79.4%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	2	3	11	55	71
		% within Nationality	2.8%	4.2%	15.5%	77.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	8	6	23	136	173
		% within Nationality	4.6%	3.4%	13.3%	78.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	1.508[a]	3	.681	.731		

Question 10

Online Courses: Tatar reading

Crosstab							
			Tatar reading 10				Total
			1	2	3	4	
Nationality	Russian	Count	98	3	1	0	102
		% within Nationality	96.1%	2.9%	1.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	67	0	3	1	71
		% within Nationality	94.4%	0.0%	4.2%	1.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	165	3	4	1	173
		% within Nationality	95.4%	1.7%	2.3%	0.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	5.444[a]	3	.142	.115		

Online Courses: Tatar writing

Crosstab								
			Tatar writing 10					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	98	3	0	0	1	102
		% within Nationality	96.1%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	64	2	3	1	1	71
		% within Nationality	90.1%	2.8%	4.2%	1.4%	1.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	162	5	3	1	2	173
		% within Nationality	93.6%	2.9%	1.7%	0.6%	1.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	5.973[a]	4	.201	.183		

Online Courses: Russian reading

Crosstab								
			Russian reading 10					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	31	0	2	5	64	102
		% within Nationality	30.4%	0.0%	2.0%	4.9%	62.7%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	19	1	1	10	40	71
		% within Nationality	26.8%	1.4%	1.4%	14.1%	56.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	50	1	3	15	104	173
		% within Nationality	28.9%	0.6%	1.7%	8.7%	60.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	6.058[a]	4	.195	.178		

Online courses: Russian writing

Crosstab							
			Russian writing 10				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	32	2	7	61	102
		% within Nationality	31.4%	2.0%	6.9%	59.8%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	20	1	10	40	71
		% within Nationality	28.2%	1.4%	14.1%	56.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	52	3	17	101	173
		% within Nationality	30.1%	1.7%	9.8%	58.4%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.524[a]	3	.471	.497		

Online courses: Other reading

Crosstab								
			Other reading 10					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	56	9	17	11	9	102
		% within Nationality	54.9%	8.8%	16.7%	10.8%	8.8%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	43	4	7	10	7	71
		% within Nationality	60.6%	5.6%	9.9%	14.1%	9.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	99	13	24	21	16	173
		% within Nationality	57.2%	7.5%	13.9%	12.1%	9.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.624[a]	4	.623	.634		

Online courses: Other writing

Crosstab								
			Other writing10					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	59	6	19	10	8	102
		% within Nationality	57.8%	5.9%	18.6%	9.8%	7.8%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	42	6	8	7	8	71
		% within Nationality	59.2%	8.5%	11.3%	9.9%	11.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	101	12	27	17	16	173
		% within Nationality	58.4%	6.9%	15.6%	9.8%	9.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.394[a]	4	.664	.674		

Question 11

Word processing: Tatar writing

Crosstab								
			Tatar writing 11					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	90	3	7	0	2	102
		% within Nationality	88.2%	2.9%	6.9%	0.0%	2.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	56	8	3	2	2	71
		% within Nationality	78.9%	11.3%	4.2%	2.8%	2.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	146	11	10	2	4	173
		% within Nationality	84.4%	6.4%	5.8%	1.2%	2.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	8.509[a]	4	.075	.056		

Word processing: Russian writing

Crosstab							
			Russian writing 11				Total
			1	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	6	3	8	85	102
		% within Nationality	5.9%	2.9%	7.8%	83.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	3	1	10	57	71
		% within Nationality	4.2%	1.4%	14.1%	80.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	9	4	18	142	173
		% within Nationality	5.2%	2.3%	10.4%	82.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.261[a]	3	.520	.534		

Word processing: Other writing 11

Crosstab								
			Other writing 11					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	46	10	16	15	15	102
		% within Nationality	45.1%	9.8%	15.7%	14.7%	14.7%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	36	13	7	7	8	71
		% within Nationality	50.7%	18.3%	9.9%	9.9%	11.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	82	23	23	22	23	173
		% within Nationality	47.4%	13.3%	13.3%	12.7%	13.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	4.770[a]	4	.312	.316		

Question 12

Formal email correspondence: Tatar reading

Crosstab							
			Tatarreading12				Total
			1	2	3	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	93	2	5	2	102
		% within Nationality	91.2%	2.0%	4.9%	2.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	62	5	4	0	71
		% within Nationality	87.3%	7.0%	5.6%	0.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	155	7	9	2	173
		% within Nationality	89.6%	4.0%	5.2%	1.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	4.176[a]	3	.243	.246		

Formal email correspondence: Tatar writing

Crosstab								
			Tatar writing 12					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	94	2	4	1	1	102
		% within Nationality	92.2%	2.0%	3.9%	1.0%	1.0%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	62	4	3	1	1	71
		% within Nationality	87.3%	5.6%	4.2%	1.4%	1.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	156	6	7	2	2	173
		% within Nationality	90.2%	3.4%	4.0%	1.2%	1.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	1.879[a]	4	.758	.820		

Formal email correspondence: Russian reading

Crosstab								
			Russian reading 12					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	7	1	0	6	88	102
		% within Nationality	6.9%	1.0%	0.0%	5.9%	86.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	5	1	2	8	55	71
		% within Nationality	7.0%	1.4%	2.8%	11.3%	77.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	12	2	2	14	143	173
		% within Nationality	6.9%	1.2%	1.2%	8.1%	82.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	4.835[a]	4	.305	.308		

Formal email correspondence: Russian writing

Crosstab								
			Russian writing 12					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	10	0	0	6	86	102
		% within Nationality	9.8%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	84.3%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	10	2	3	4	52	71
		% within Nationality	14.1%	2.8%	4.2%	5.6%	73.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	20	2	3	10	138	173
		% within Nationality	11.6%	1.2%	1.7%	5.8%	79.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	8.495[a]	4	.075	.056		

Formal email correspondence: Other reading

Crosstab								
			Other reading 12					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	53	17	12	13	7	102
		% within Nationality	52.0%	16.7%	11.8%	12.7%	6.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	39	12	8	8	4	71
		% within Nationality	54.9%	16.9%	11.3%	11.3%	5.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	92	29	20	21	11	173
		% within Nationality	53.2%	16.8%	11.6%	12.1%	6.4%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	.254[a]	4	.993	.994		

Formal email correspondence: Other writing

Crosstab								
			Other writing 12					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Nationality	Russian	Count	60	12	15	9	6	102
		% within Nationality	58.8%	11.8%	14.7%	8.8%	5.9%	100.0%
	Tatar	Count	44	12	8	5	2	71
		% within Nationality	62.0%	16.9%	11.3%	7.0%	2.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	104	24	23	14	8	173
		% within Nationality	60.1%	13.9%	13.3%	8.1%	4.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests						
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)	Point Probability
Pearson Chi-Square	2.252[a]	4	.689	.702		

Appendix 3
Interview Analysis

1. Расширилась ли роль татарского языка в качестве языка обучения в сфере высшего образования в последнее время? *Do you think the role of Tatar as a language of instruction has developed in the sphere of higher education?*

2. Как, по-вашему мнению, относится русское население к обязательному образованию на татарском языке в образовательных учреждениях сегодня? *In your opinion, what do the Russian people think about Tatar compulsory education in schools today?*

3. Считаете ли Вы, что татарский язык может быть использован для повседневных нужд так же хорошо, как и русский? *Do you think that Tatar can be used as well as Russian for all daily needs?*

4. Знаете ли вы что-то о языковой политике Республики Татарстан? *Do you know anything about the language policy in Tatarstan?*

5. Считаете ли Вы, что русское население использует татарский язык в качестве языка коммуникации в большей степени, чем раньше? *Do you think that the Russian population use Tatar as a means of communication more than they did previously?*

6. Какими преимущества дает владение татарским языком? *What advantages does knowing Tatar have?*

7. Считаете ли Вы, что со времени распада Советского Союза роль татарского языка возросла? *Do you think that the role of Tatar has increased since the Collapse of the Soviet Union?*

8. В настоящее время правительство требует знания татарского языка от должностных лиц и работников некоторых профессий. Сталкивались ли Вы или кто-нибудь, кого вы знаете, с подобным требованием?
At the moment, the government requires people working in various professions to have knowledge of the Tatar language. Do you know anything about this?

Observations made in Kazan **Key words/Codes**

	Nina	Zoya	Regina	Aidar	Salagaev	Codes
Q 1	• Different faculties teaching Tatar, obligatory • Previously only if wanted to	• 1990s increase in T learning • Language situation going backw	• T used more nowadays in schools and unis			• 1990s and present • Education sphere

		ards in unis				
Q 2	• Rs not against • Today's children are learning Tatar • Parents don't know Tatar • Future generations will know T	• Rs – some are bilingual whereas others have no interest in learning it	• Good for Rs to learn Tatar if live in RT • Tatar is state language • At school children love learning Tatar • A positive attitude at school to Tatar	• Historically the younger generation of Rs learned the native language of the rep. • Territorial problems i.e. Chechnya • R and T are the most needed languages in RT	• More T than R lang learning in schools these days • Lang law R &T equal in schools • Isn't a T standard lang, but is a R standard lang • Use T in cultural sphere – TV, radio, newspapers, theatres • T used at home • Rs study T more than is necessary • Everything in R so no need for T if R • T linked with humanities subjects only • Standards in R have dropped	• Attitude towards education of different generations • History and territory • Lang linked to culture and history • humanities subjects
	Nina	**Zoya**	**Regina**	**Aidar**	**Salagaev**	**Codes**
Q 3	• Everybody speaks R so not necessary • Supposedly can	• Would like to say it could be used	• Not at the moment because even native		•	• Family and home life • No requirement • Education • Communicatio

	use Tatar in different spheres • No requirement to learn T except in education • In towns	for everyday purposes, but can't at the moment • Tatar still not used enough • In RT Tatar is used more in the family	speakers of Tatar use R for everyday communications			ns
	Nina	**Zoya**	**Regina**	**Aidar**	**Salagaev**	**Codes**
Q 4	• We have 2 state langs • Read in newspaper civil servants will have to learn T • Will be very difficult to learn • Even many Tatars don't know the standard T lang • It's used at home • In villages they don't know R very well	• Was a language programme in 1990s • Lots of work done in schools and unis • Work done in R and T was parallel • Didn't follow it through to end unfortunately • Offered a 15% incentive on top of salaries to learn T, but it didn't really work	• It's already a long ago • Use lang for communicating in RT, at school • T lang useful for understanding T culture, history • LP has helped this (above)	• Official docs are written in R then translated into T • Can write to one of structures of power in T and get answer in T • If district consists of majority of T then use T • Lang law says one thing but in reality v different		• Lang law exists and it is effective • Some people believe it hasn't worked well enough • Others believe it has had a big effect • R people seem fearful of the law! • Territorial/villages • culture, history • communicating • at home

	Nina	Zoya	Regina	Aidar	Salagaev	Codes
Q 5	• No, not necessary for communication, everybody speaks Russian	• Yes, in the last 10 years. • People use it more than they did in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s	• No		• Absolutely not! • Rs understand it • Listens to news on radio in T • Everything in R	• Rs are using it more for communication • Passive use of T
	Nina	**Zoya**	**Regina**	**Aidar**	**Salagaev**	**Codes**
Q 6		• Many educational institutions require knowledge of both langs • Can communicate with other people who speak other Turkic langs i.e. Uz, Bashk, Kaz • Language is a cultural bridge between people	• Helps communication between people • Old people in villages find it an adv because it helps them communicate • Young people speak T more • Young T people move to towns for work and study –			• For communication • Towns and villages • Good to understand other Turkic langs • Cultural bridge • Old people/ Young people
	Nina	**Zoya**	**Regina**	**Aidar**	**Salagaev**	**Codes**
Q 7			• Yes, if we look at education • Tatar used in other educational spheres these days such		•	• Communication • Educational spheres

			as science • Used more for communication			

	Nina	Zoya	Regina	Aidar	Salagaev	Codes
Q8	• Don't know • Supposedly everybody knows R		• Yes, I heard about it, but it's not obligatory		•	• Everybody knows R • T not obligatory
Comments (individual)	• Negative attitude towards T • Doesn't want to know about T lang • Seems afraid of lang law – worried about what read in newspaper – might have to learn it! • Feels uncomfortable, threatened • Doesn't want to acknowledge T • Feels superior to Ts	• Feels negative about the lang sit in RT, but although there is a feeling of gloom, Rs are learning T and some are bilingual	• Mentions more about different generations, towns vs villages and communication	• Cynical about whole lang sit in RT • T= villages, culture, religion, history and ordinary life R=officialdom, towns, education • In Tat areas speak T • If rs go to village speak T • Generation gap – middle gen didn't learn T at school, younger gen learn T at school, but only as a subject, not for everyday life. • Science, industry, economy=R • New Khrushchev housing in 1950s started assimilation with Rs.		

	Iskhakov, D.M.	Aidar	Salagaev	Codes
Q5 above	• Yes, especially amongst younger R generation • Younger generation understand T more • Not psychologically ready • T consciousness strong in today's society • Use T more at home • Use it in work sphere if Ts dominate	As above	• Absolutely not! • Rs understand it • Listens to news on radio in T • Everything in R	
В чём именно удачно или неудачно вы считаете языковую политику в РТ? *How successful do you think the language policy has been in RT?*	• Status of T changed because of lang law • Law not fully developed • Swiss variant of lang law would have been better • Despite this, during 2000s was progress in RT • Rs are learning T • Understanding increased, use T passively • New situation seems to be emerging • Lang sit declining due to new president and loss of political power in education	See answers above for q5	See answers above for q5	• Law good for status of T • Has been progress • Passive understanding • Lang sit declining
Какие предложения у правительство есть относительно языковая политика в будущее? *What future proposals do gov have for LP?*	• None! All proposals are from T elite • Shaimiev more pragmatic about LL • Ethnic language sit will get worse • Economic probs			• Changes in gov • Economy • T elite

	Iskhakov, D.M.	**Aidar**	**Salagaev**	**Codes**
Вы думаете что языковой политике нужен в республике Российской Федерации? Почему/нет? *Do you think a language policy in a republic of the Russian Federation?*			• Every republic has its own population, traditions and interactions so lang law is necessary	
Comments (individual)	Despite a gloomy outlook for T lang learning, Rs are learning it, the younger generation, although passively Seems to be v against the gov Useful for political/lang planner POV.	Made v useful comments about development of lang sit from a historical perspective	As above	

Iskhakova, Z.A.

Note: This interview was more of a discussion about language learning and the language situation in Tatarstan. It did not follow any of the above interview patterns, but the codes/key words which emerged are highlighted in blue.

Key words and categories
Mutual understanding / tolerance / federal centre / language law (positive)/ psychological barrier of Rs/ Passive/Active language

Opinions of Rs – Rs vs Ts 'us' and 'them' / Older generation vs younger generation (parents/children)
Language maintenance concerns different generations. Older people know Tatar, Soviet citizens don't know Tatar. The younger generation have to learn it
Mechanisms – schools and universities = education / upbringing / textbooks and teaching aids
Territory – composition of territory and ethnic groups / country of birth / towns vs villages / religion
Comments
Interesting from POV of one of main language planners in RT with regards to plans for future and how she sees the situation in RT.
A feeling of 'us' and 'them' Ts vs Rs. Thinks it's thanks to the language law of 1990s that they've been able to develop T lang, but admits much more needs to be done.
Rs do know T passively but for communication/the home use. She's interested in pushing these boundaries further and therefore T is taught in universities. This will help T acquire more prestige.

Has a strong opinion about how well T language teaching is going, but later admits there are Ts who don't know the T lang very well. Was quite defensive about public lang learning and accessibility.
Get impression that lang law was a good thing and the policy was authoritarian at the time – a feeling that this authoritarianism is disappearing under the new president. Lang spread and maintenance is still being worked on and it seems as if it the responsibility for lang development is now in the hands of those in education and the people of the republic.