**League Memories: Recollections of Catholic political engagement in late sixteenth-century Paris**

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Abstract

The *Histoire anonyme* is an important manuscript for our understanding of the Catholic *Ligue* – especially in Paris – in the late sixteenth century. Written a generation after the demise of that movement in the mid-1590s, the original manuscript was later copied and then bound in two large volumes which were housed – until the Revolution – in the library of the Paris Oratoire. They now reside in the Bibliothèque nationaleas *manuscrits français* 23295 and 23296. The first volume of the *Histoire* traces the story of the *Ligue* down to spring 1589. A severely edited version made by Charles Valois appeared in 1914.

The second volume, a direct mid-story continuation from the first, takes the narrative through to Henri IV’s triumphal entry into Paris in March 1594. As well as covering events in the capital – particularly the regicide, the long siege and the Brisson affair – the *historien anonyme* frequently leads us into the provinces for (borrowed) accounts of battles and sieges. The work is frequently punctuated by inserts of contemporary documents and it is laced with the author’s opinions. Yet, for all its evident interest, it has been largely overlooked by historians and it remains unpublished.

The *Histoire* is a story written by the defeated, one of only a few contemporary accounts of the *Ligue* – and the only comprehensive one – not to have emerged from the Politiquecamp which had stood by Henri of Navarre through the turbulent years after the regicide in 1589. Not that the historian is some haranguing Paris preacher, a hispanophile, *un zélé*. Rather, we pick up a voice hitherto rarely heard – that of a reasonable, moderate but devout *Ligueur*, seeking to correct misrepresentations issued by earlier writers. Thus, the text is a precious legacy, offering a story that royalist writers such as de Thou and L’Estoile neither told nor wished to hear. There is wistfulness… an admission that the *Ligue* made mistakes, an exploration of why they occurred, perhaps a ‘putting-in-order’ of memories in the autumn of life.

In this dissertation, the nature of manuscript 23296 will be brought to light through examination of its early seventeenth-century historiographical context and by analysis of the text itself. After building on the work of Valois, and exploring the worlds of the Palais de Justiceand the Oratoire with which the writer was associated, we will seek to identify our author. We will be able to inspect his bookshelf and become acquainted with his beliefs, values and opinions. And we will rediscover the *Ligue*. It is hoped that the dissertation will lay the groundwork from which others may one day publish a complete edition of the *Histoire anonyme*.

Abbreviations

*AB* *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l’Histoire de France*

Ascoli Ascoli, P. M., ‘“The Sixteen” and the Paris League, 1585-1591’, unpublished doctoral thesis (University of California, 1971)

Descimon (1983) Descimon, R., *Qui étaient les Seize?* (Paris, 1983)

De Thou Thou, J-A. de, *Histoire universelle depuis 1543 jusqu’à 1607*, 16 vols(London, 1734)

*Dialogue* Cromé, F., *Dialogue d’entre le maheustre et le manant*, ed. P.M. Ascoli, (Geneva, 1977)

Gérard Gérard, A., ‘La révolte et le siège de Paris, 1589’, *Mémoires de la Société de l’Histoire de Paris et de l’Isle-de-France* 33 (1906)

*H1* Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, *ms. fr*. 23295

*H2* Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, *ms. fr*. 23296

Jouanna Jouanna, A., and others, *Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion* (Paris, 1998)

Labitte Labitte, C., *De la démocratie chez les prédicateurs de la Ligue* (Paris, 1841)

L’Estoile L’Estoile, P. de, *Mémoires-journaux,* eds G. Brunet and others, 12 vols (Paris, 1875-1896)

Mariéjol Mariéjol, J-H., *La Réforme, la Ligue et l’Edit de Nantes (1559-1598)* (Paris, 1904)

*ML Mémoires de la Ligue*, compiler S. Goulart, ed. C.-P. Goujet, 6 vols (Amsterdam, 1758)

Pallier Pallier, D., *Recherches sur l’imprimerie à Paris pendant la Ligue (1585-1594)* (Geneva, 1975)

Palma-Cayet Palma-Cayet, P.V., *Chronologie novénaire*, in *Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de France*, eds J.-F. Michaud and J.J.F. Poujoulat, 32 vols (Paris, 1836-1844)

*RDBVP Registres des délibérations du Bureau de la Ville de Paris, 1499-1624*, 18 vols (Paris, 1883-1953)

Salmon (1972) Salmon, J.H.M., ‘The Paris Sixteen, 1584-94: The Social Analysis of a Revolutionary Movement’, *Journal of Modern History* 44 (1972)

Valois *Histoire de la Ligue, œuvre inédite d’un contemporain*, ed. C. Valois(Paris, 1914)

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**Chapter 1: Charles Valois**

We begin by following a path first trodden by a young historian working in Paris shortly before the outbreak of World War 1. Charles Valois (1880-1948) explored a little-known handwritten text whose title suggested that it was a history of the French Catholic Ligue. In 1914, the young historian produced a book: Histoire de la Ligue – tome premier.

Valois’ publishers were the *Société de l’Histoire de France*. Established by François Guizot in 1833, and recognised by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte in 1851 ‘comme établissement d’utilité publique’, the Society had declared in the second article of its *Règlement* that its purpose was to publish ‘documents originaux relatifs à l’histoire de France, pour les temps antérieurs aux Etats généraux de 1789’.[[1]](#footnote-1) Valois’ work was fit for purpose: the three manuscripts he had studied, penned in the seventeenth century, offered significant fresh insights on the Ligue years, ‘cette époque si discutée’.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Valois was connected with the Society by family. His father, Noël Valois (1855-1915), was one of only three men to have served as secretary to the Society since its inception.

Figure 1 : The Secretaries of the *Société de l’Histoire de France* up to World War 1

*Secrétaire Secrétaire-adjoint*

Jules Desnoyers (1833-85) Arthur de Boislisle (1873-85)

Arthur de Boislisle (1885-1908) Noël Valois (1885-1908)

Noël Valois (1908-15)

At the Society’s Annual General Meeting on 16 May 1916, the president, Paul Guilhiermoz, drew his listeners’ attention to the importance of the secretary’s role: ‘Seul parmi les membres de votre bureau, le secrétaire est élu pour quatre ans. C’est dire qu’il est en droit l’organe permanent, la pierre angulaire de la Société...’[[3]](#footnote-3) Thus Noël Valois had a crucial role in the Society at the time that his son was working on the *Histoire*.

Noël Valois knew the first secretary of the Society, and worked closely with the second for over two decades. In an address to the Society in 1897 this second secretary, Arthur de Boislisle, urged the membership to make new historical endeavours. ‘Vous voyez, Messieurs, que la prétendue pénurie de textes intéressants n’existent pas pour nous,’ he enthused, as he proceeded to identify texts awaiting editors.[[4]](#footnote-4) One of the texts he identified had lain dormant for nearly three centuries; ms. 10270 in the fonds français of the Bibliothèque nationale dealt with ‘les temps de la Ligue’.[[5]](#footnote-5) It was this manuscript and two others – mss 23295-96 (which together constituted a copy of the whole work of which ms. 10270 was a fragment) – that absorbed Charles Valois’ energies a decade later, as he set out to edit a small part – ‘que les pages originales ou instructives’ – of what he planned would be the first of two volumes of the *Histoire.*[[6]](#footnote-6)

There is no reason to suppose that Charles heard Boislisle’s address, for he did not join the Society until 1916, but it is possible that his father made a mental note of what might become a project for him. Boislisle too might have played a decisive role once Charles entered the Ecole des Chartes in 1904, for he served there on the *Conseil de perfectionnement* and had a reputation for encouraging young researchers, ‘leur indiquant des sujets de travaux, mettant à leur disposition et souvent même leur abandonnant les documents qui pouvaient leur être utiles’.[[7]](#footnote-7)

For inspiration, Charles needed to look no further than to his own father. Noël Valois was a highly esteemed scholar.[[8]](#footnote-8) Generous with his time, he must also have had considerable stamina, for he was active in numerous learned societies.[[9]](#footnote-9) Valois came from the ‘vieille bourgeoisie parisienne’.[[10]](#footnote-10) ‘C’était un gentilhomme français, c’était un gentilhomme chrétien.’[[11]](#footnote-11) By all accounts he was polite but reserved, with perhaps a certain *froideur*; he did not engage in idle conversation.

What was it like for Charles to have this man as father? Was an academic career his own choice? Did he experience doubts when, one year after the ‘triumph’ of his first book, news arrived that his brother Jean had just received *la croix de guerre* and had been nominated for *la Légion d’honneur* for action in the Dardanelles? We can be sure that Charles was aware of the expectations of his father’s friends. Langlois pointed out that the manuscript of the work on Charles IX should not be lost: ‘les soins pieux d’un fils accompli, très bien préparé pour procéder à une revision nécessaire par ses études personnelles à l’Ecole des Chartes, le mettront, aussitôt après la guerre, en état d’être publié’.[[12]](#footnote-12)

It was in June 1908 that Charles Valois, a newly qualified *archiviste-paléographe*, made known to the Société de l’Histoire his desire to produce an edition of the *Histoire de la Ligue*. He already knew the text well: it had been the subject of his thesis at the Ecole. He had noted Albert Gérard’s use of passages from the *Histoire* in the late historian’s unfinished work, *La Révolte et le siège de Paris*, published posthumously in 1907. Charles’s proposal to the Society was full of youthful enthusiasm for the text – ‘[une] vaste et intéressante compilation écrite par un contemporain anonyme et restée jusqu’à ce jour presque inconnu’.[[13]](#footnote-13) His goal was to produce ‘une édition partielle... environ un quart du texte.’ In his proposal he noted that the writer had been not only a *Ligueur*, but also one of the few who had not renounced their former affiliations.[[14]](#footnote-14) The text offered insights that other writers had, ‘par calcul ou par négligence’, omitted. In addition, it carried ‘certaines relations contemporaines des faits, aujourd’hui perdues...’.[[15]](#footnote-15)

Already in 1908 – six years before publication – Charles Valois (simply ‘Valois’ hereafter) knew how he intended to present his edition of the *Histoire*. It would appear in two volumes. There would be an introduction explaining the provenance of the manuscripts and elucidating the writer’s views and sources. The main part of the work would comprise key passages copied *in extenso* from the manuscripts, interspersed with résumés of the rest. Finally, Valois would provide an index of names which ‘faciliterait les recherches que les défauts de composition de cet écrivain rendent parfois difficiles’.

Soon we will see how Valois’ plans worked out in practice, but first it is worth remarking that the young man’s decision to study France in the late sixteenth-century may have been influenced by political developments in the late-nineteenth. Valois was well aware that the periods bore comparison, noting on one occasion that the deeply-held convictions of moderate *Ligueurs* were ‘moins grossier, moins bas que chez beaucoup d’autres sectaires de divers partis et de diverses époques, **même modernes’**.[[16]](#footnote-16) Over much of the nineteenth century, the Catholic church had been viewed as ‘une ennemie de la modernité, de la liberté et de la démocratie’.[[17]](#footnote-17) Valois became politically aware at a time of intense struggle between church and state. In addition, he was in his teens while the Dreyfus Affair raged. By the turn of the century, *anti-Dreyfusard* monarchists and Catholics were widely vilified as enemies of the Republic. Rather as the Catholic *Ligue* was subjugated by Henry IV, so, after Dreyfus, the Assumptionist Order paid the price for ‘conducting a Holy War against the Republic...’ and was dissolved by Waldeck-Rousseau.[[18]](#footnote-18) Pius X may be compared with Gregory XIV: both popes had openly confronted the French state. The 1905 law of Separation brought to an end ‘the dog-fight between Church and state’.[[19]](#footnote-19) It is possible that this allowed a more moderate Catholic voice to flourish. This seems to have impressed Valois, for early in his first published essay he suggested that, ‘pour pénétrer les sentiments des Ligueurs ...’, historians should pay attention not only to ‘[des] diatribes exagérées’ but also to ‘des discours et des écrits plus modérés’.[[20]](#footnote-20)

The First World War marks the end of the greatest years of the Third Republic, but in truth a dark side had emerged more than a decade earlier with the creation of Action Française. In a similar way, although 1914 marked the end of Valois’ historical output – at least in terms of publications – there had been signs along the way that all was not well. Class-sizes in the Ecole des chartes in the early 1900s averaged around twenty-five students. Thanks to the *Bibliothèque* – the annual bulletin published by the Ecole – we can trace students’ progress. Valois joined the Ecole in 1903 as the highest-placed entrant. He finished his first year in fourth place, and his second in eleventh. By the end of his third year, Valois was deemed ready to submit his thesis – on the *Histoire de la Ligue* – but when, in 1907, the rest of the class had their theses upheld, our young man did not. Having fallen at this final hurdle, he had to wait a further twelve months to be named *archiviste-paléographe* – at which point he was excluded from the Order of Merit, ‘comme appartenant à des promotions antérieurs’.[[21]](#footnote-21) His repeat-year was, unhappily, the very year when his father held the presidency of the *Ecole*.Valois received no mention in the *Bibliothèque* for the years 1909-14.

Although it would be fair to say that Valois had not lived up to expectations at the Ecole, we note that he had nonetheless gained a highly-prized title from one of the most prestigious places of learning in France. Moreover a full list of his historical publications shows that he had developed a marked enthusiasm for the late sixteenth century – and in particular for the *Ligue*. We will see shortly that there was a remarkable thematic cohesion between the individual essays of 1908-11, and between them, taken as a whole, and the monograph of 1914.

Figure 2 : The Published Historical Works of Charles Valois

1908 *Un dialogue historique du temps de la Ligue* (in 8˚, 34p)

1909 *Un des chefs de la Ligue à Paris, Jacques de Cueilly* (in 8˚, 38p)

1910 *Une discussion politique au XVIe siècle* (in 8˚, 18p)

1911 *Une conspiration d’honnêtes gens en 1590* (in 8˚, 24p)

1914 *Histoire de la Ligue: œuvre inédite d’un contemporain* (in 8˚, xlv-304p)

His edition of the *Histoire de la Ligue* was Valois’ last historical publication. Unlike his father who produced history throughout his career, Charles seems to have written none after his thirty-fourth year. In his last three decades he threw himself into ecology: his final work – on reforestation – appeared in 1946.[[22]](#footnote-22) Thus, as a historian, Valois fell by the wayside. His most substantial work, whilst remarkable in itself, delivered less than had been expected. Of the two volumes promised only the first appeared, and although this one terminated at a major turning point (the murders of the Guise brothers), it ended abruptly, leaving sixty per cent of the text unedited. There was no index of names. Key passages were not quite given *in extenso*, for Valois was fond of ellipsis and not all these excisions were slight. Even if we ignore these gaps, Valois’ provision of word-for-word text amounted to less than eight per cent of the *Histoire de la Ligue*, a far cry from the quarter he had hoped to deliver.[[23]](#footnote-23)

Before examining Valois’ main work, it is useful to look at his earlier published essays. Valois’ approach to the writing of history soon becomes apparent: he chose a manuscript, introduced it, and then edited it. All his published history followed this pattern. The selected manuscripts were invariably little-known, ‘conservés, isolés, dans diverses bibliothèques’.[[24]](#footnote-24) Valois judged the manuscript that he first worked with – the *Arraisonnement du sieur de Vicques avec un bourgeois de Paris* – to be the principal example of a genre: ‘des pamphlets dialogués’.[[25]](#footnote-25) Shortly we will see why he believed it to be ‘un document précieux’. For his second essay Valois turned to a letter lodged in the Vatican archives, written by Jacques de Cueilly to a friend shortly after the *Ligue* preacher’s expulsion from Paris. In the same year – 1910 – he published an edition of a manuscript held in Reims, the *Propos et devis, en forme de dialogue, tenus entre le sire Claude, bourgeois de Paris, et le sieur d’O...*, and in 1911 his last essay focused on a report of ‘une conspiration d’honnêtes gens’ which was sent to Philip II around 15 March 1590, under the title *Note sur les troubles de France*. When Valois published what turned out to be his final history in 1914, he drew on solid experience; all that was new was the daunting length of the text that carried the Histoire.

Naturally, Charles Valois felt the allure of rare manuscripts and saw the value of making them better known. But why *these* manuscripts? That there is a purpose to be discovered is suggested by their common focus upon a discrete world: that of the moderate *Ligueur*. Valois was intrigued by the complex middle ground of Catholic opinion. He found that there existed in *Ligueur* Paris an oft-overlooked world between royalist Catholics and fanatical *Ligueurs*, and he set about disclosing the nuanced attitudes held by the men who inhabited it*.* The story of some of these men – Michel Marteau sieur de La Chapelle, François de Vigny, and Pierre d’Epinac – as related in the *Note sur les troubles de France*, appealed to our essayist: ‘Cette scène... nous apprend du moins quelque chose des charactères et des mœurs de **la vraie société parisienne**de ce temps’.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Thus in 1908 Valois single-mindedly embarked on a purpose from which his subsequent historical writing seldom deviated: he would rehabilitate the *Ligue*. The corpus of his works has an inner coherence: the *Histoire de la Ligue* was where they ended, but also where they began for it is apparent from his first essay that Valois’ interest in little-known sources arose from his reading of the manuscript material that formed the *Histoire*. He had found embedded there four accounts of late sixteenth-century conversations which together highlighted the quality of moderate *Ligueur* thought. Valois’ intention was to publish these accounts – which included most notably a report of a discussion between Henri III and Jean Boucher in June 1587 – in his edition of the larger work of which they formed a small part.[[27]](#footnote-27) Why mention them in the *Dialogue historique*? Because they provided the context ‘pour montrer à quel genre historique et littéraire, très en vogue à la fin du XVIe siècle, appartiennent certains dialogues manuscrits... dont on va lire ici le principal...’.[[28]](#footnote-28) The coherence of Valois’ essays is furthered by his references from one to another of them. Thus in 1908 he stated his intention to write subsequently about the conversation between the bourgeois *Ligueur* Claude and François d’O; and in both his essays of 1910 he refers back to that of 1908. In view of these links, it is almost possible to consider Valois’ different works as being a single work published in instalments.

The opening words of his first essay reveal his goal – to discover the ‘heartbeat’ of the *Ligue*, and his misgiving – his predecessors’ dependence on too narrow a range of sources:

Pour pénétrer les sentiments des Ligueurs et comprendre les mobiles qui ont déterminé une moitié des Français à soutenir une guerre de plus de quatre ans contre nos rois, les historiens s’attachent généralement aux plus ardents pamphlets, écoutent, avec l’aide de Pierre de l’Estoile, les déclamations les plus passionnées des prédicateurs et croient trouver dans ces paroles enflammées... la principale ou même la seule cause du mouvement de la “Sainte-Union”.­[[29]](#footnote-29)

Valois frequently returned to these themes. After reviewing the conventional negative portrayal of Jacques de Cueilly, he provided the text of the priest’s letter and concluded: ‘Telle est cette apologie, dont la précision et, sur quelques points, l’incertitude franchement avouée sont de bon aloi... On y sent même une relative modération’.[[30]](#footnote-30) How had Cueilly attracted such bad publicity? Valois explained: historians had relied on too few sources. ‘[L]’on connaissait mal ce prêtre, de même que maint autre ligueur’, he says, ‘quand on le jugeait exclusivement d’après les caricatures, très chargées, que publièrent de lui ses ennemis victorieux.’[[31]](#footnote-31)

Valois resumed his condemnation of misconceptions of the *Ligue* in the opening paragraphs of *Une discussion politique au XVIe siècle*:

Il est encore de mode, dans certaines écoles, de considèrer les productions littéraires de la Ligue comme un fatras d’injurieux libelles, que l’on rejette avec horreur... parmi les tristes monuments du fanatisme religieux, tandis que l’on réserve... aux porte-parole des “Politiques” et des “Catholiques royaux” armés contre la Sainte-Union le monopole du bon sens et de l’équité ...[[32]](#footnote-32)

Referring to his essay of 1908, he continued,

Nous avons déjà rencontré l’occasion d’avouer ce que nous pensons de cette classification simpliste, et signalé plusieurs polémistes ligueurs qui écrivaient sinon avec une rigoureuse impartialité... du moins avec le souci d’exposer l’une et l’autre thèse... Là, point de ces fades bouffonneries que Pierre de l’Estoile recueille avec une si narquoise complaisance de la bouche de plusieurs prédicateurs parisiens; point de fureurs aveugles ...[[33]](#footnote-33)

Valois reserved his stongest words for the end of the passage. Here he was defending the reputation of Rolin Thierry, publisher of the *Propos et devis* and ‘un des piliers de l’Union’: ‘...dans le feu même de la guerre civile, un de ces ligueurs que tant d’historiens se plaisent à nous dépeindre comme des forcenés écumant de fureur, croyait au contraire servir sa cause en publiant honnêtement un exposé lucide et franc des deux doctrines en présence’.[[34]](#footnote-34)

Intent on showing that most *Ligueurs* were not ‘raving maniacs’, Valois introduced fresh evidence: ‘des discours et des écrits plus modérés’.[[35]](#footnote-35) He brought out the moderate *Ligueur* views and attitudes which his sources contained. ‘La finesse’ and ‘la profondeur de la pensée’ were the hallmarks of the bourgeois *Ligueur* in conversation with Dominique de Vic.[[36]](#footnote-36) The bourgeois *Ligueur* had a good knowledge of history and a sharp mind. He wanted a king, but not Philip II; rather, ‘un roy vray françois et vray catholicque tout ensemble’.[[37]](#footnote-37) He subordinated the Salic law to the law of Catholicity, and on the crucial question of which should come first, the king’s conversion or the surrender of the *Ligue*, he had a ready reply: ‘Je croy que c’est à luy à commencer : car si, après qu’il seroit receu, il ne se vouloit faire catholicque, où en serions-nous?’[[38]](#footnote-38) By contrast with the bourgeois *Ligueur*,de Vic was sometimes insecure in debate. At one point he sought to show that the king was not a Protestant by suggesting that he really had no religion at all – as if a *Ligueur* could find reassurance in that. Valois summed up: ‘tout bien pesé, l’avantage de ce combat oratoire demeure nettement au Ligueur’.[[39]](#footnote-39)

Our essayist developed his theme of *Ligue* moderation rather differently when he considered the case of Jacques de Cueilly. Here the focus was on attitude rather than opinion. Cueilly’s letter testified to his conciliatory mood after being expelled from Paris, a mood that was remarkable when compared to the robust stance that he had taken in 1591, for example, when from the pulpit he had called on his congregants to attack anyone they found celebrating the fall of Chartres to the royalists, and had later eulogised Barnabé Brisson’s executioners. The letter cited part of Cueilly’s final sermon at Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois:

Dieu, qui permet le mal, dont Il sait, en temps et lieu, tirer le bien, a voulu que Paris fût pris. Il a fait couler peu de sang; nous devons L’en remercier. Supplions-Le de nous accorder la grâce de vivre en paix sous la puissance de celui qui actuellement est ici le maître. Plaise à Dieu qu’il observe les serments que les Rois très chrétiens ont coutume de jurer et les promesses qu’il a faites en entrant dans Paris...[[40]](#footnote-40)

Cueilly’s words carried key *Ligueur* concepts: submission to God’s will, of course, but also the reminder that France must be ruled only by *les Rois très chrétiens*, and that vows must be honoured. In his third essay, Valois returned to dialogues. In conversation with François d’O, it was Sire Claude, the unidentified bourgeois de Paris, who carried the day for the *Ligue*. Royalist Catholics were at fault because, in supporting the unconverted king, they associated themselves with the Huguenots and became ‘fauteurs de leur secte’.[[41]](#footnote-41) Of course, true Catholics understood the Christian obligation to obey the king – but ‘ce n’est pas rendre à Dieu ce que lui appartient que d’admettre un Cæsar qui soit contre Dieu, quand nous le pouvons éviter’.[[42]](#footnote-42) Claude went on to argue that France could be strong only when it stood by the axiom *un roi, une foi et une loi*. Before long he had François d’O tied up in knots, making the most of the royalist’s contradictory statements on whether disloyalty to the king might ever be countenanced, and remarking triumphantly, ‘... de parler de révolte et prendre les armes contre un roy, je ne pensois pas qu’en ces quartiers cy, que vous nommez pays d’Etat, on y tinst tels propos!’[[43]](#footnote-43) D’O soon made matters worse, as had de Vic, by claiming that the king – no theologian – cared little about religion provided he was obeyed; Claude was swift to point out how disastrous that would be. Like our earlier bourgeois *Ligueur*, Claude refused to see the Salic law as the key determinant of the royal succession, noting that ‘la loy qui est entre les princes et le peuple... n’admet un roy [s’il n’est] capable de bien gouverner un peuple selon la religion du royaume’.[[44]](#footnote-44)

In his fourth essay - *Une conspiration d’honnêtes gens* – Valois concentrated on the integrity of the *Ligue*. The action takes place in Paris. The unlikely hero, Michel Marteau sieur de la Chapelle, shines against the murky background of the Politiques - the *honnêtes gens* – whose clumsy attempts to turn the prominent *Ligueur* backfire disastrously with the imprisonment in the Bastille of the leading conspirator, François de Vigny. No wonder, claimed Valois, the rebellious population of the capital distrusted the royalists with ‘leurs mensonges’, their ‘lâcheté de caractère’ and their ‘apparences équivoques’.[[45]](#footnote-45) By contrast, La Chapelle-Marteau was resplendent in virtue as, before his *Ligueur* friends (‘gens d’honneur’), he replied to Vigny’s offer of financial security: ‘Monsieur le recepveur,... vous sçavez... que j’ay tousjours preferé ma conscience et le debvoir de ma charge à tout aultre respect. J’ay plus d’obligation à ma religion qu’à nostre amytié; j’ay tousjours servy le publicque très fidellement et n’y veulx encorres mancquer.’[[46]](#footnote-46) Although Valois’ source – the *Note sur les troubles de France* – ends with the imprisonment, the story itself did not. In relating the sequel, Valois portrayed the *Ligue* as the people’s bulwark against the corruption of royalist office-holders. For reasons that are not entirely clear, Vigny was very soon released from the Bastille and re-instated. The prominent *Ligueur* Oudin Crucé and others promptly complained to the municipality. As *receveur de la Ville*, Vigny had built up a personal fortune. He had been more assiduous in selling *rentes* than in paying interest. If he was set free, argued Crucé,

ledict de Vigny, qui avoit manié tous les deniers de la Ville, ne satisferoit au paiement des rentes d’icelle Ville et emporteroit tout le bien et revenu d’une infinité de pauvres, hospitaux, religions [*couvents*, explains Valois], vefves, orfelins et autres pauvres personnes, ausquelz il est deubt pour le moins trois années d’arréraiges desdictes rentes, et dont ledict de Vigny n’a aulcune chose paié, encores qu’il ayt receu de grandz deniers pendant ledict temps : ce qui est une pure vollerie et ravissement de la vie de infinies personnes...[[47]](#footnote-47)

Royalist malpractice, but *Ligueur* probity. As in earlier essays, Valois had placed the rebels of Paris in a fresh light.

Valois possessed valuable editorial skills. We find clear biographical details of key protagonists, along with footnote directions to other informative sources. Where previous writers had confused identities – as in the case of the brothers Dominique and Merry de Vic – Valois showed how the confusion had arisen and untangled it. The historian showed good judgement. Thus the most notorious episodes of Cueilly’s *Ligue* involvement over a twenty-five year period are provided before any reappraisal is attempted. Source dates are carefully explored. Valois used four clues from the source along with a detail taken from Pierre de L’Estoile in order to place de Vic’s conversation with the *manant* between 8 October and 27 November 1592. Two assertions by a former writer, Jean Lacourt (d. 1730) – that the *Propos et devis* dated from 1593 and that it was penned by Louis Dorléans – are carefully considered; Valois concluded that the first was wrong and the second unlikely.

Most importantly, the essayist carefully considered source reliability. His *dialogues manuscrits* had immediate appeal, offering ‘une impression saisissante de l’état d’âme des adversaires en présence’.[[48]](#footnote-48) But were they trustworthy? *Pamphlets dialogués*, often ‘incontestablement factices’, were a popular genre in the late sixteenth century.[[49]](#footnote-49) Did the conversations presented by Valois really take place, or were they made-up, like the most famous example of the genre, the *Dialogue d’entre le maheustre et le manant*? And if they took place, were they faithfully recorded? Not entirely, admitted Valois in answer to the second question : ‘Ces relations, il est vrai, ne nous donne pas le procès-verbal scrupuleusement fidèle des entretiens qu’elles prétendent reproduire: ce sont des comptes rendus destinés à la publicité, revus et modifiés par l’un des interlocuteurs’.[[50]](#footnote-50) Valois generally addressed these difficulties by reference to what was already known. The moderate tone of Jacques de Cueilly’s final sermon in Paris was entirely likely, given that the preacher was concerned about the prospect of expulsion.[[51]](#footnote-51) De Vic’s conversation with the bourgeois *Ligueur* was believable because other sources – Valois cited L’Estoile and d’Aubigné – testified that it was something of a habit: ‘Quand le gouvernement ligueur instruisait le procès d’un suspect, l’élément capital du dossier était généralement une lettre au gouverneur de Saint-Denis interceptée par les Zélés. Il en sera ainsi de la célèbre affaire Brigard...’[[52]](#footnote-52)

We turn now to Valois’ main work. The book of 1914 begins with a substantial introductory essay that can be conceived of as comprising two unequal parts. In the first of these Valois explained the nature of ms. 10270 and the provenance of two later manuscripts (23295-96); we soon find ourselves in the world of seventeenth-century Oratorians who had *Ligue* antecedents – Jean-François Senault, Daniel Hotman, Denis Héron, Jean Rosée and Alexandre Rosée. Valois included facsimiles of handwriting from the manuscripts, and there is a convincing exposition of where and when the *Histoire de la Ligue* was penned. In the much longer second part, the focus turns to the seventeenth-century writer himself: his age and profession, his written style, his views and his sources. We devote chapters 2, 3 and 4 to all but one of the topics in Valois’ Introduction; the exception, the exploration of the seventeenth-century writer’s views, we reserve for chapters 5 to 9.

The early lines of Valois’ Introduction are disconcerting. Referring to what he considered to be ‘la confiance sans bornes’ that early, published royalist histories had long inspired, Valois judged that the text before him was by no means their equal.[[53]](#footnote-53) Again toward the close of the chapter he was critical of the seventeenth-century writer’s deployment of evidence: sources were used arbitrarily and were sometimes plagiarised; criticisms of other writers were emphatic but ill-founded; in all, the work was ‘celle d’un compilateur honteux de sa propre indigence.’[[54]](#footnote-54) Yet despite these reservations, Valois was in no doubt of the importance of his text: the manuscripts carried moderate *Ligueur* views that earlier historians had overlooked, indeed almost silenced.

There is no doubt that seventeenth-century historians had created from the *Ligue* story ‘une légende noire’.[[55]](#footnote-55) For Maimbourg, *Ligueurs* were ‘Faux-zelez’ who, along with the Huguenots, were ‘les deux ennemis les plus dangereux qu’on ait jamais eû à combatre en ce Royaume’; they were conspirators who dealt in ‘intrigues… artifices, & les motifs les plus secrets’.[[56]](#footnote-56) For his part, Péréfixe advised his king that beneath the supposed zeal of the *Ligue* lay the factiousness of a ‘cabale’.[[57]](#footnote-57) Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet saw the *Ligue* as an enemy of both monarchy and liberty.[[58]](#footnote-58) Eighteenth-century writers maintained therhetoric. The *Encyclopédie* considered the *Ligue* to be ‘monstrueuse’.[[59]](#footnote-59) Montesqueiu noted the influence of Philip II in *Ligueur* political thought.[[60]](#footnote-60) Voltaire was horrified by religious fanaticism.[[61]](#footnote-61) Writing just after the Revolution, Anquetil warned his readers against dangerous writings and factions: ‘[T]oute révolution commence par des écrits, qui, de modérés, deviennent insensiblement audacieux; par des associations qui, formées sous des prétextes plausibles et avec apparence de droit, sont comme des foyers où les factieux viennent ensuite allumer les flambeaux qui embrasent les royaumes’.[[62]](#footnote-62)

For some the Revolution had provoked a reappraisal. In the nineteenth century Louis de Bonald and François-René de Chateaubriand, seeking to resuscitate and defend the Catholic Church, were disposed to regard the *Ligue* favourably.[[63]](#footnote-63) Later, eager to defend the papacy and in response to Auguste Poirson’s work on Henri IV, E.-A. Segretain addressed his readers, ‘Amis ou ennemis, fidèles ou incrédules, c’est au Vatican qu’il faut prendre le fil conducteur, parce que c’est véritablement là que se sont nouées et dénouées les destinées des nations chrétiennes’.[[64]](#footnote-64) In 1866 the launch of the *Revue des Questions Historiques* gave a fresh impetus to the pro-*Ligue* persuasion, as a clutch of authors including Henri de l’Epinois and Gustave de Baguenault de Puchesse – like the *Ligueurs*, ‘catholiques intégristes sous un régime qu’ils détestent’ – claimed that the *Ligue* had saved not only the Catholic religion in France but the nation itself (by defending it against German and English invaders).[[65]](#footnote-65)

However a very different view was more widely held. Jules Michelet considered the *Seize* to have endangered both national interest and individual freedom, while Paul Robiquet saw them as an instrument of Spain, Rome and the Guise family.[[66]](#footnote-66) Particularly after the catastrophe of 1870-71, France looked back fondly to Henry IV who had sacrificed all (including his religion) to save the nation, who had driven away the enemy (Spain) and had healed the wounds sustained in the conflict with the *Ligue­*.[[67]](#footnote-67) In those pages of the *Histoire de France* edited by Ernest Lavisse and written by J.-H. Mariéjol, we find the *Seize* described as ‘la fraction la plus violente et vraiment intransigeante du parti’; they were inflexible fanatics who could not even get on with their Pope, disorderly demagogues, unpatriotic, sectarian, intransigent... a jealous group of ‘petite bourgeoisie’ excluded from the top jobs.[[68]](#footnote-68) Contempt for the *Ligue* leadership in Paris persisted into those pre-war years in the 1900s which may still be regarded as nineteenth-century. In an article published posthumously Albert Gérard betrayed a strong bias against the *Seize*: L’Estoile’s views were liberally quoted, and Gérard ironically described hypocrisy as one of the *Ligue*’s strong points, later stating that ‘les zélés Catholiques de la Ligue … commettaient … toutes sortes d’excès contre les Catholiques…’.[[69]](#footnote-69) Further on we read: ‘Les trahisons de la Ligue n’empêchent nullement certains historiens modernes d’affirmer hautement et de célébrer le patriotisme de la Ligue. Cela paraît impossible et cela est’.[[70]](#footnote-70) The contibutors to the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, whom Gérard presumably had in mind, have attracted adverse comment more recently: ‘plus consciencieux que talentueux’ was Descimon’s verdict.[[71]](#footnote-71)

Unable in 1914 to lift the mask of anonymity, Valois was nonetheless able to demonstrate convincingly that the writer had penned his work in Paris in 1620 or shortly after. Possibly a man of the cloth but more probably a lawyer – using good French but lengthy and sometimes laboured sentences – the writer had been above all well-read.[[72]](#footnote-72) Valois discovered that his seventeenth-century predecessor hadused a wide range of material: the well-known contemporary histories, both Catholic and Protestant, as well as royal decrees, declarations, letters, *arrêts*, speeches and dialogues. Valois traced the deployment of these sources attentively, passing judgement along the way, and noting with enthusiasm what was ‘new’. The ‘new’ included a letter, ‘peu connue’, written by Henri de Guise to Pope Sixtus V in late 1588, and, ‘pour les annales militaires du Mans, de Melun, de Sens et de Paris, pour l’histoire du duc de Mayenne, de Jean Boucher, du parti des Zélés et de celui des Politiques, plusieurs sources importantes, jusqu’à présent ignorées’.[[73]](#footnote-73)

As for the writer’s views, we soon find ourselves in the company of a man who well reminds us of those bourgeois *Ligueurs* who had carried the argument against Dominique de Vic and François d’O. It was Valois’ view that the *Histoire* constituted the best defence of the Catholic *Ligue* – ‘le plaidoyer le plus complet et plus sérieux’ – to have been written in three centuries.[[74]](#footnote-74) The moderate nature of its writer’s *Ligue* affiliation was obvious from the way he had closed his account. By ending with Henry IV’s triumphant entry into Paris, he had managed to conceal ‘la phase injustifiable’ of the civil war, ‘les convulsions sanglantes de l’agonie de la Ligue’.[[75]](#footnote-75) The writer had lamented the fact that many Catholics had been concerned more with worldly success than with spiritual wealth. He had respected the papacy but had had no compunction about criticising Sixtus V. Robust in his dislike of heretics, and denouncing their atrocities, he had distrusted edicts of pacification and believed that Protestantism had to be repelled by force. In this work, the Politiquestoo are dangerous, claiming that the state matters more than religion, and failing to see the Catholic faith as the very foundation of the state. Yet the writer had not been on the fanatical wing of the *Ligue*: he had been reticent, even evasive, about Spanish intentions. It is clear that he had not wanted France’s national integrity to be jeopardised: the only few lines of poetry in the whole text carry the message that no invaders, be they Spanish, English or German, would have been welcome.[[76]](#footnote-76) Nor was he a republican. The writer had believed in monarchy,reconciling respect for the king with support for the *Ligue* by reminding his readers that Henri III had supported the movement before being misled by poor advisers. The writer had not supported *Ligue* leaders indiscriminately: the duc de Nemours had served the cause, but the duc de Mayenne had ruined it. In all, we have a work single-mindedly devoted to restoring the reputation of the Catholic *Ligue*. This purity of purpose was emphasised by the writer’s refusal to be drawn into topical allusions relevant to 1620. The Histoire, wrote Valois, was no ‘œuvre de circonstance’, and he brought this part of the Introduction to a close by reiterating the rare nature of the text: ‘L’intérêt des manuscrits que nous publions est d’émaner d’un de ces vaincus [Ligueurs] dont la voix s’était perdue parmi les cris de triomphe des royaux revenus au pouvoir’.[[77]](#footnote-77) Publication would rehabilitate the *Ligue*.

Valois was well-read. In addition to being versed in the works of the early royalist writers – especially Matthieu, de Thou, L’Estoile, Palma-Cayet, d’Aubigné and Goulart – he was familiar both with lesser-known early writings and with well-known later histories by Dupleix, Maimbourg, Voltaire, Michelet, Poirson and others. He read monographs about the Oratoire as well as the school’s unpublished records.[[78]](#footnote-78) He was equally at home in the vast outpouring of literature in his own lifetime. He read the work of provincial history societies – from Paris and the Ile-de-France, of course, but also from Bourges, the Orléannais, Champagne, le Maine, and Loir-et-Cher – and he kept up with the work of contributors to the revisionist *Revue des questions historiques* such as Henry de l’Epinois, and Baguenault de la Puchesse.

As with his Introduction to the *Histoire*, so in his footnotes to the edited text Valois displayed a profound knowledge of late sixteenth-century France. Many of the notes are simply explanatory; others direct us to further reading.[[79]](#footnote-79) But Valois’ favourite reason for adding footnotes was to censure the writer of the *Histoire*. ‘Ces violences de langage nous donnent déjà la mesure de la partialité de l’auteur contre le protestantisme,’ he declaimed.[[80]](#footnote-80) Later, ‘l’historien néglige à tort d’adjouter...’, and, ‘On voit dans quelle confusion tombe encore une fois notre historien!’[[81]](#footnote-81) Valois’ strongest allegation was that the writer hadsuppressed evidence: ‘Pour ménager la mémoire de Henri IV, notre auteur s’abstient de reproduire la bulle qui déclarait le roi de Navarre déchu et ses sujets déliés du serment de fidélité’.[[82]](#footnote-82) The point was unfair because it suggested a motive (‘pour ménager la mémoire’) which could not be proved, neglecting other possible reasons for the omission (for example, it was the fact and not the wording of the well-known excommunication that mattered); in any case, as we will show later, the writer had gone to some lengths (despite the omission) to expound the arguments for and against Sixtus V’s ruling.

Moreover, just as the seventeenth-century writer left gaps, so did Valois, and it is to this issue that we now turn. Even by the most generous calculation – ignoring all cases of ellipsis and considering only the first 443 pages of manuscript 23295 (because Valois did) – the young editor omitted over eighty per cent – more than 350 pages – of what his predecessor had written. Valois’ explanation for this root-and-branch censorship appeared in the opening paragraphs of his book: the discarded pages were neither ‘originales’ nor ‘instructives comme termes de comparaison’.[[83]](#footnote-83) We are at the editor’s mercy – and not just with regard to the text: Valois indicated the writer’s sources only where ‘cette identification paraîtra possible et intéressante’.[[84]](#footnote-84) He acknowledged that his choice would be ‘fatalement arbitraire’.[[85]](#footnote-85) It is time to examine what all of this meant in practice.

Certainly, the material that Valois presented *in extenso* was ‘original’ and ‘instructive’ in that it amounted to a substantial vindication of moderate *Ligueur* thought. As in his earlier essays, Valois saw clear grounds for according respect to the *Ligue*. The material included two conversations that Valois had promised in 1908 to make known. In the first, which dated from 1577, a *Ligueur* was in discussion with a Politique*.* The debatehad already featured in Pierre Matthieu’s *Histoire des derniers troubles de France*. By selective omissions, Matthieu had contrived to give the last word in each part of the discussion to a Politiquespeaker, but the writer of the *Histoire de la Ligue* restored the devout *Ligueur*’s response, thus overturning the verdict of the royalist historian’s account. For the second discussion, we know the exact date – 5 June 1587 – and the identities of both speakers, Henri III and Jean Boucher. Again it is the *Ligueur* who carried the day. The two conversations alone account for one-third of Valois’ *in extenso* extracts from the *Histoire*. The rest of them largely continued the theme of a moderate *Ligue*. We are reminded that the *Ligue* came about only because Protestants had brought their ‘infection’ into the one true church, that it was the king himself who founded the *Ligue*, and that it had the Pope’s blessing. Meanwhile, the Guises are presented as devout Catholics and completely loyal subjects.

Valois cut hundreds of manuscript pages when preparing his 1914 book.[[86]](#footnote-86) He judged a few of them to have some interest, and the rest to be valueless. He was right on both accounts. In lively passages of interest that Valois only summarised, the earlier writer had revealed a range of opinions.He had passed censure on La Rochelle (‘ville funeste... aux provinces voisines et à tout le Royaume’), dismissed suggestions that Guise leadership of the *Ligue* concealed designs on the throne, emphasised Henry III’s leading role in the formation of the League of 1576, and rejected the king’s devotional excesses as mere ‘artifices’.[[87]](#footnote-87) Elsewhere in the subsequently excised pages the earlier writer hadshown his concern for historical accuracy. Thus, for example, he had launched a vigorous attack against flawed interpretations of the memo found on the murdered *avocat* Jean David. By contrast, *lettres patentes* were beyond reproach: they constituted ‘la certaine declaration de ce qui s’est passé (qui est ce que nous recherchons en l’histoire) et ont plus de considerations que les discours publiez de part et d’autre’.[[88]](#footnote-88) But for all the interest of these pages, the fact remains that large swathes of the manuscript comprised well-known stories of the religious wars, and documents reproduced verbatim that could be found elsewhere. Valois did well merely to summarise these sections, and a simple comparison of the summaries shows that he was faithful to the original manuscript.

To complete this survey of the 1914 edition of the *Histoire* we touch on two remaining issues: Valois’ use of ellipsis, and his decision to terminate his book at a point more than one hundred pages before the end of the first volume of the manuscript he was studying. The first issue need not detain us: I have found no case where the original writer’s meaning was altered by ellipsis.[[89]](#footnote-89) Regarding the second, we believe that Valois chose to ignore the division of the seventeenth-century text into two bound volumes because that division was apparently the result of an arbitrary decision (by binders) which left readers with a mid-thought interruption in the narrative. The murders of the Guise brothers were a turning-point of such significance that its consequences merited the opening of the second volume that Valois had in mind but never published.

Charles Valois’ edition of part of the *Histoire de la Ligue* is a fascinating early example of the editing and publication of texts in the twentieth century. For better or worse, historians a century later often rely on these works, despite the preconceptions of their authors and sometimes unaware of their deficiencies. Valois himself simultaneously managed both to indicate the potential importance of the text in question, and to occlude the most important part of it, most notably by failing to continue what he had started into the period when it would have been most likely to fill in the gaps in our understanding created by the widespread destruction of other sources about what actually went on in Paris and other *Ligueur* centres during the period of *Ligue* ascendancy. It is to remedy the deficiencies in Valois’ work that we now turn in the remainder of this thesis.

**Chapter 2: The Work**

During its protracted emergence from obscurity the text that came to absorb Charles Valois’ interest was given several titles. In 1897 Arthur de Boislisle referred to that part of the work contained in ms. 10270 as a Journal. In the previous year the fragment had been catalogued under the title Journal historique du temps de la Ligue.[[90]](#footnote-90) Earlier still, someone had scribbled ‘un recueil…’ on the document’s cover.[[91]](#footnote-91) To complicate matters, we find that the only manuscripts containing the whole (copied) text (mss 23295-96 in the fonds français of the Bibliothèque nationale) carry the words Hist. de la Ligue on their covers; the same four words (with Hist. now expanded to Histoire) appear also at the head of the first side of writing.[[92]](#footnote-92) Thus, before Valois, several titles had been given to the same work: *Histoire… Recueil… Journal historique… Journal*. In 1908 Valois wrote a short piece introducing the work as *Une histoire inédite de la Ligue: œuvre d’un contemporain anonyme* – a title which he refined in 1914 to read *Histoire de la Ligue: œuvre inédite d’un contemporain*. Robert Descimon’s wording – *Histoire anonyme* – is short and pleasing to the ear; but for reasons that will become clear in the next chapter, I will be referring to the work as simply the *Histoire*.[[93]](#footnote-93)

Happily, the *Histoire* has been more appreciated in recent years. In the 1970s Peter Ascoli judged it to be by far the most informative source on the siege; J.H.M. Salmon identified neglect of the work as one of the reasons for historians’ limited understanding of the *Seize*, and Denis Pallier found it valuable on points of detail. Later, Philip Benedict acclaimed this ‘anonymous work’ as ‘one of the best sources available on the League in the provinces’.[[94]](#footnote-94) In 1983, Robert Descimon consulted this ‘remarquable texte’ in his ground-breaking analysis of the leadership group in the Paris *Ligue*. Pierre Chevallier found the work indispensable in his analysis of the first regicide, noting in particular that it presented ‘une analyse qui paraît exacte’ of Jacques Clément’s state of mind.[[95]](#footnote-95)

In this chapter I seek to contribute to the re-instatement of the *Histoire* by exploring the nature of the whole work, thus including the areas not covered by Valois. In addition, the work will be viewed against the background of the renaissance in historiography that took place in France in the second half of the sixteenth century. We begin with the manuscripts.

Mss 23295-96 – volumes I and II of the Histoire – have an identical outward appearance. Roughly bound in parchment, they measure 360 x 240 millimetres. The first volume has 574 numbered sides, the second 541 with ten blank sheets at the end.[[96]](#footnote-96) Ms. 10270 is a little smaller (340 x 225 millimetres) and considerably shorter (152 sheets); every second sheet is numbered, each number thus pertaining to four sides of writing. [[97]](#footnote-97) That it once formed part of a longer work is beyond doubt: it opens with page 75, and in its first words we find the author reminding his reader of what he had written a few pages before. In addition, although reading as a history, it neither begins nor ends with major events. Most importantly, the text of ms.10270 forms about one quarter of the much longer mss 23295-96, and the presence of a title and ‘pièces justificatives’ suggests that these latter two volumes comprise a complete work.[[98]](#footnote-98) Clear terms of reference strengthen this impression: ms. 23295 begins with an exploration of the antecedents of the Catholic Ligue of 1576; ms. 23296 closes with Henry IV’s entry into Paris in March 1594.

Ms. 10270 is all in one hand. That its author was writing (or dictating) as he composed is betrayed by the large number of alterations and additions. It is in pages 279-556 of ms. 23295 that we have what is clearly a copy of the earlier fragment: here, the alterations and additions are all ironed out. Though a little careless, the copy is accurate in essence. From this we can reasonably suppose that mss 23295-96 constitute a faithful copy of the original work – with one possible exception which we will visit in chapter 3.

Some time after this copy was made mss 23295-96 were revisited. A second hand over-wrote much of the original writing, making frequent but inconsequential adjustments. Valois considered that the likely goal of this curious procedure was to prepare the text for printing, adding wryly, ‘le but est certes mal atteint’.[[99]](#footnote-99)

One author, two scribes, but no identities: that was the puzzle facing Valois at the turn of the twentieth century. Fortunately there were clues. Scribbled on the cover of ms. 10270 were the words *un recueil de L’Estoile*. Ms. 23295 has a fly-leaf bearing two names in different handwriting: ‘Rozée’, and then ‘Heron’. In addition, in a third hand which Valois identified as that of Champollion-Figeac, there is an inscription: ‘Oratoire n˚ 99 ǁ Tome 1er ǁ Premier travail pour ou bien par Maimbourg’.[[100]](#footnote-100) Ms. 23296 carries a shorter inscription, ‘Oratoire n˚ 99 ǁ Tome 2 ͤ ’, and, on the back of the first page, the name ‘Heron’ again. These tantalising clues will be pursued in chapter 3 (‘The Author’). For now, it is time to explore the text.

Regarding the date of the *Histoire*,Valois established three points. First, the section covering 1574 to May 1588 was written before 3 August 1621; secondly, the section covering July 1587 to May 1588 was written between 1 January 1620 and 3 August 1621; and last, the section covering May 1588 to March 1594 was written after May 1616.[[101]](#footnote-101) As the section covering July 1587-May 1588 comes in the first third of the whole work and was certainly written in 1620 or 1621, it is possible that the work was not completed until well into the 1620s. Several decades may then have passed before mss 23295-96 were written, for Valois noted that some old-fashioned spellings in ms. 10270 were modernised by the copyist.[[102]](#footnote-102)

We know that the copy of the *Histoire* was at some stage bound into two volumes. About the original we are more in the dark, but important clues appear in the second half of the copy where references are made to sheets 27, 48 and 49 of the original.[[103]](#footnote-103) Clearly the original must have appeared in at least two volumes (Valois: ‘plusieurs cahiers’), for if there had been only one, and if fewer than fifty pages were used to reach a point almost three-quarters of the way though the whole work, then (even allowing for numbering of only every fourth side of writing) its sheets would have been impracticably large, and the numbering from 75 at the beginning of ms. 10270 would make no sense.[[104]](#footnote-104)

Whether from two volumes or more, the fact is that only the second quarter of the original *Histoire* has survived to the present day. What happened to the other three? While it is possible that they were lost accidentally – for example during or in the aftermath of the Revolutionary confiscations – it is hard to believe that in such circumstances one of the four survived.[[105]](#footnote-105) More likely a conscious decision was made, once the copy had rendered the original obsolete, to preserve as a keepsake that part which attested to the *Ligue*’s most influential period, the twelve months beginning May 1588. How it made the journey to the *fonds français* of the Bibliothèque nationale is obscure. Unlike mss 23295-6, there is no evidence that ms. 10270 was ever shelved in the library of the Oratoire. Nonetheless we suppose – in the absence of other clues – that it is thanks to the Oratorians that we still have part of the original work. Why they should have had a part to play will be explored shortly.

The *Histoire* begins with a statement of authorial intentions: the work is to be history, not apologetics; its purpose is to correct earlier writings; sound historiographical principles will underpin the argument.[[106]](#footnote-106) The issues of genre and underlying principles will be addressed later in this chapter, and the writer’s purpose in the next. But we begin with content.

Back in 1566, in his *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*,Jean Bodin had argued that those producing works of history must limit their field of enquiry to human activity, leaving natural history for scientists and divine history for theologians. At the same time, however, human activity was to be explored expansively, and as far as possible the human story was to be told in its entirety, encompassing all known civilised societies. It was a tall order. The impracticability of writing universal, human history was recognised by Henri Lancelot sieur de La Popelinière: his 1581 history focused on the human history of France alone. Even narrower was the scope of our writer.

The *Histoire* is primarily about French politics, and there is a marked emphasis on Paris and the *Seize*. The late sixteenth-century Catholic *Ligue* is presented as a briefly powerful pressure group promoting as its key political objective the pre-eminence of the fundamental law of Catholicity should the royal succession become a contended issue. Valois’ judgement that ‘le récit des événements militaires’ was for our author ‘le premier devoir de l’historien’ is unsafe.[[107]](#footnote-107) After all, were not the civil wars merely a by-product of the political struggle? Thus,

la principale partie de cette histoire n’est la description du siège des villes, les entreprises ou surprises d’icelles, les événements des batailles; le récit de tout cela n’est que la souvenance de nos misères; mais c’est de scavoir ce que l’on mettoit en avant de part et d’autre pour la justification des armes des deux partys.[[108]](#footnote-108)

In the light of this statement, we will need to consider later why reports of sieges and battles beyond Paris – though in most cases no further than neighbouring provinces – account for nearly a half of the second volume of the *Histoire*. For now, we assert that this is no military history. Accounts of engagements, invariably lifted from royalist writings, are afforded no serious analysis. Admittedly, the author believed he understood military affairs, as betrayed by his frequent use of rather plain aphorisms: ‘... durant la guerre les places foibles sont contrainte de suivre la fortune des grandes villes voisines’, ‘un long siège est la ruine d’une grande armée’, and so on.[[109]](#footnote-109) But this writer had surely never experienced war; Valois thought that at the most he might have taken his place in the Paris militia.[[110]](#footnote-110) Our writer was far from the world of Monluc. Similarly the work is by no means an ecclesiastical history. There is no attempt to trace and explain developments in the Catholic church; references to Protestantism amount to no more than systematic, perfunctory denunciations; and infrequent references to the church in the distant past serve the sole purpose of defending the resolve of the *Ligue* to bring about a political outcome in the author’s own lifetime. Our writer was no Baronius.

Containing over half a million words in more than eleven hundred pages, the *Histoire* embodies substantial content. The second (unpublished) volume, where most of my research has been focused, is longer (at 270,000 words in 541 pages) than any other known contemporary account of the years it principally covers (1589-92). As an account of the Catholic *Ligue* (or *Sainte Union*), the *Histoire* is more about a movement than individuals: ‘il seroit hors de propos de dire’, claimed the writer, ‘quelles ont esté les conceptions de chacun des ligueurs, qui ont eu quelque pouvoir dans l'un ou l'autre party; la generalle qui a paru…’.[[111]](#footnote-111)

At the outset, the writer asserted that he would explain:

ce que ça esté, que cete ligue catholique, quand elle a commencé, qui en a esté le premier autheur, qui sont ceux qui ont esté les ligueurs, ceux lesquels, pour s'en estre retirez, ont été appellez politiques, et ceux qui n'ont jamais participe a cete ligue; puis quel a esté son progrez, quelles ses actions, comment elle a achevé et quels effets elle a produit…[[112]](#footnote-112)

This ‘mission statement’ was largely accomplished – albeit with an unmistakable emphasis on developments in the capital. After a preliminary survey of religious leagues of the 1560s, and a rather closer examination of the 1576 *Ligue* de Péronne (whose ‘premier autheur’ he considered to be the king), the writer moved on swiftly to the princely *Ligue* of 1584 – by which stage we are only one-sixth of the way through the whole work. Thereafter we discover that at the heart of the *Histoire* lies the Paris *Ligue* – its early and clandestine growth from humble beginnings, its defence of the capital at the *journée des barricades*, its seizure of power in December 1588, and – in its most glorious ‘hour’ – the resistance mounted during the long and gruelling siege of 1590. In addition, and increasingly as the narrative proceeds, we are left in no doubt about the gulf between *Ligueurs* and Politiques.

The final fifth of the work describes the decline of a movement marred in 1591-92 by in-fighting and recriminations. Here, the course of the *Histoire* loses the optimism of the opening statement. What exactly had been the *Ligue*’s achievements? Although the narrative closes brightly with Henri IV’s entry into Paris the writer was unable to show that this outcome had been delivered by, rather than in spite of, the *Ligue*, and the reader might ask how much sooner peace could have come had it not been for Catholic obduracy. Thus we are left with siege-resistanceas an ‘achievement’, followed by the long last section of the work in which the writer’s increasingly bitter attacks on Mayenne’s leadership and his description of the jurisdictional feud between Rome and Tours both fail to hide the *Ligue*’s ignominious collapse from within, and in which there is no mention of the expulsions of March 1594. Yet at the same time, the writer has left no doubt in the reader’s mind that the *Ligue* had made a clear and resounding statement of conscientious objection against impending desacralisation of the state. In addition, with his detailed narrative of battles and sieges elsewhere in France, particularly in the Paris basin, the writer delivered much more than he promised at the outset. Far from being an unnecessary diversion, this narrative reminds us that the *Ligue* was, after all, a *Sainte Union*, and that the *Seize*, far from being a lone voice, had served – particularly after December 1588 – as an inspiration to towns across the country.[[113]](#footnote-113)

Beneath the broad flow of thenarrative lie currents that we will consider in later chapters: the corporative nature of the Paris *Ligue*; its relationship with other towns and, beyond France, with Spain and the papacy; the issue of rebellion; the role of key individuals; the contribution made to Catholic renewal in the early seventeenth century. Two points we may note from the outset. First, and unlike the contemporaneous histories of Palma-Cayet and de Thou, the *Histoire* deals almost exclusively with France. Thus the duc d’Anjou’s adventure in the Netherlands (at the turn of the 1580s) ‘n’est pas de nostre histoire’; war in Portugal is excluded on the same grounds.[[114]](#footnote-114) Later, the writer explained further: ‘rapporter icy tout ce qui se passa [regarding Dutch Protestantism after mid-1584] …ce seroit par le meslange de l’histoire de nos voisins rompre le fil de la nostre’.[[115]](#footnote-115) The reasoning is plausible: all works of history must have boundaries, and in any case Anjou’s death in June 1584 had implications for the French monarchy that dwarfed its ramifications north of the border. Yet we may wonder. Might not attention to the rebellion of Dutch Protestants against ‘le Roy d’espagne leur prince naturel’ have unfavourably influenced the reader’s perception of the *Ligue*’s stand after the Blois murders?[[116]](#footnote-116) The writer showed no such compunction about recounting the execution of Mary Stuart, ‘une brieve narration [several pages] laquelle ne sera pas un discours de l’histoire estrangère’.[[117]](#footnote-117) The disingenuousness was laid bare when the writer explained that an account of Mary’s death was instructive because ‘la cause de sa mort (car on disoit que c’estoit pour conserver la religion Reformée en Angleterre) a esté semblable à la cause pour laquelle on a fait la ligue catholique en france’.[[118]](#footnote-118)

Secondly, the *Histoire* carries a recurrent theme of integrity, a word whose Latin root suggests not only wholeness but also innocence, uprightness, soundness and honesty. *Intégrité* was the ‘Qualité d’une personne qui ne se laisse entamer par aucun vice’.[[119]](#footnote-119) When the word itself appears in the *Histoire* – infrequently, and almost always in imported documents – it is usually amidst a cluster of similar qualities. Thus, where it was applied to the duc de Guise in the imported text of the *Mémoires et instructions* given to *Ligue* deputies to Rome in spring 1589, we read ‘La **douceur**, **prudence** et **continence** dudit deffunct s[eigneu]r de guise, lequel ayant entre ses mains et la personne du Roy et l’Estat… fut si **temperant** qu’un seul de ses ennemis ne reçeut aucune iniure. Cette **integrité** et **innocence** a rendu preuve de ce qu’il avoit en l’ame…’.[[120]](#footnote-120) Four years later, having read the king’s proposals for peace-talks, *Ligue* leaders replied with a confident challenge: ‘louez nous comme **gens de bien** qui ont eu **le courage** et **la résolution** de mespriser tous les perils, pour conserver leur religion et de **l’integrité** et **moderation** pour ne penser a chose qui fut contre leur **honneur** et **devoir**…’[[121]](#footnote-121) Integrity, courage, resolution, duty… As we will see in later chapters, these were the qualities possessed by *Ligueurs* such as Urbain de Montmorency-Laval, seigneur de Bois-Dauphin at the siege of Le Mans; the duc de Nemours during the siege of Paris; and Robert Legoix on the *journée du pain ou la paix*. These were men of action. It was in an inspired moment, whilst reflecting upon the outpouring of polemical writings in the mid-1580s, that the writer observed, ‘Ainsy chacun deffendoit sa cause par escrit, mais lors il n’y avoit que la ligue catholique a cheval’.[[122]](#footnote-122)

The workhas a doubly odd ending. First, post-1594, the *Histoire* is silent. Unquestionably sensitive to church-state relations, why did our author have nothing to say about the papal absolution of the new king, the Edict of Nantes, the Estates-General of 1614, the recatholicisation of Béarn, or the rise of the bishop of Luçon to political eminence? Scandalised by the first regicide, why was he silent about the second, and why did this observer who so valued good order not testify to the enormous anxiety felt by those contemporaries who were ‘struck by the ominous comparisons’ between the situations in 1560 and 1610?[[123]](#footnote-123) The matter becomes even more surprising when we remember that the author’s principal interest – the *Ligue* – had an important history after 1594.[[124]](#footnote-124) Although most towns followed the example of Paris in acknowledging Navarre as their king (1594), many fanatical Catholics still awaited the total victory of Catholicism – that is, a resumption of the principle of *un roi, une foi, une loi*.[[125]](#footnote-125) Secondly, the *Histoire* ends abruptly with an apparently bolted-on final paragraph. It is conceivable that our writer made a willing decision to conclude his narrative with Henry IV’s triumph in 1594 – for a conclusion there certainly is, with sententious closing words. Indeed we may suppose that to have maintained a pro-*Ligue* commentary into the post-1594 years of pacification would have been to increase significantly the danger of offending contemporaries. Besides, if the author’s driving purpose had been to re-interpret *Ligue* history, then his job was done, for in their post-1594 narratives other writers turned from defaming the *Ligue* to different matters, and by this stage the author had demonstrated the glory of the *Ligue*. The puzzle of the abrupt ending is one we will pick up again in chapter 3.

Fittingly for an account of the changing fortunes over time of its principal subject, the *Histoire* follows a clear chronological structure. Despite characterising faults in the work – disorder, absence of chronological markers, and gaps – as ‘trois vices graves’, Valois accepted that the writer’s departures from the chronology were for good reason and usually well indicated, and that in some places time-references were plentiful.[[126]](#footnote-126) The gaps – we learn little of developments in distant provinces – arise from a focus on the Paris basin; we consider this focus to be not only a legitimate ‘bias’ in a history of the *Ligue* – ‘sans Paris, point de Ligue’, wrote Descimon – but also, in its rarity, the source of the value of the *Histoire*.[[127]](#footnote-127)

‘Les *Histoires* apparaissent comme une galerie de règnes et de dynasties,’ wrote Claude-Gilbert Dubois of sixteenth-century works whose authors selected time-spans co-terminous with the reigns of monarchs.[[128]](#footnote-128) For our writer, unfailingly respectful of monarchy but also an ‘observer’ of an acute devaluation in the institution of monarchy and of two regicides, such an approach was inappropriate. Ideologies and the movements they spawned, not kings, were evidently dictating the course of events. The *Histoire*’s terminal dates, 1576 and 1594, both fell mid-reign. Mss 23295-96 include formal markers of the passage of time, in the form of headings, for each new year: ‘1584’… ‘1585’… ‘1586’, and so on.[[129]](#footnote-129) There are also brief headings (every few pages, sometimes more frequently) indicating the content that will follow; thus, in the closing stages of the long siege of Paris, ‘Acheminement du secours pour paris’, ‘Le siege de paris levé’, and ‘Le capitaine jacques amène un grand convoy a paris’.[[130]](#footnote-130) The yearly time-markers and the headings give little assistance to the reader seeking an overview of the whole work, because the narrative is structured around well-known turning points that have no correlation to year-endings and which frequently encompass a series of the episodes that the headings introduce.[[131]](#footnote-131) Reading the *Histoire* is like travelling through rough open country. Imported documents, like water features, detain us from time to time; our ‘countless’ short episodes are gently rolling hills; defining moments such as the *journée des barricades* and the Blois murders are towering peaks that inevitably overshadow the landscape.

Like the well-known histories of Palma-Cayet and de Thou, the *Histoire* comprises a continuous narrative without footnotes or appendices. Placed within it are numerous supporting documents which together take up about one-fifth of the whole. Two of these documents – a 1587 agreement whereby Henri of Navarre secured assistance from German troops, and Henri III’s opening speech at the 1588 Blois Estates-General – are provided as *pièces justificatives* at the end of ms. 23295.[[132]](#footnote-132) Each had been introduced earlier in the text by an *incipit*.[[133]](#footnote-133) We assume that it was merely an oversight that then led them to be omitted from the main text and subsequently added at the end.[[134]](#footnote-134)

Valois was unimpressed by the author’s style of writing, considering it to be verbose, ‘sans grâce et sans légèreté’.[[135]](#footnote-135) It compared poorly with the works of L’Estoile, d’Aubigné and Palma-Cayet. Sentences typically degenerated into almost interminable subordinate clauses, and signposts to the reader, such as *maintenant il nous faut dire*, were over-used.[[136]](#footnote-136) Valois’ judgements had some validity, but they also missed the point. His predecessor had not set out to write pleasing literature but to vindicate the *Ligue*; the reader was rather to be convinced than to be entertained.[[137]](#footnote-137) In any case, as Valois reluctantly conceded, the writer had not been unaware of literary devices.

The author liked to use imagery, particularly metaphor. Thus the consequence of Mayenne’s perverse self-distancing from the *Seize* was that ‘chacun commença à penser comme il pourrait faire du bois de l’arbre qu’il prévoyoit être prêt à tomber’.[[138]](#footnote-138) Elsewhere our author held in contempt men whose attachment to faith was so slight that, when conflict arose, they stayed at home, ‘considérant auquel des navires le vent seroit plus favorable, pour s'y embarquer’.[[139]](#footnote-139) Whilst in royalist hands, the Bois de Vincennes was ‘longtemps une mauvaise espine au pied des bourgeois parisiens’.[[140]](#footnote-140) Similes feature too. After the Blois murders, Mayenne was welcomed by the townsfolk of Chartres, ‘comme par des gens lesquels accablez de frayeur en l’attente d’un prochain naufrage, voyent cet astre lequel promet aux mariniers la serenité du temps, la fin de la tempeste et l’asseurance de leur salut’; for the king, the welcome was a devastating blow, ‘comme c’est la derniere mesure qui remplit le vaisseau, ores qu’elle ne soit pas si grande que les precedentes’.[[141]](#footnote-141)

There is alliteration: it was with ‘le feu et la flamme’ that Protestants ravaged the kingdom.[[142]](#footnote-142) Juxtaposition is used to good effect. ‘A l’heure que ces gens monterent pour faire mourir le Cardinal, le Roy sortit pour aller a la messe’ – this in reference to 24 December 1588; and regarding the death of the comte de Randan at Issoire we read, ‘les uns on dit qu’il fut tué de sang **froid**, les autres, qui ont asses **froidement** excusé cete mort tant subite, on dit, qu’il estoit mort d’une blessure’.[[143]](#footnote-143)

An important feature of the writing is its restraint. Careful restraint marks the expression of anger and sorrow:

ie me contenteray de dire que la Reyne d’Escosse eust la teste tranchée par les mains d’un bourreau qui a… mis a ses pieds l’honneur de la Maiesté des Roys en coupant la teste d’une Reyne souveraine, et d’une Reyne non jamais capable d’autre crime que d’avoir esté chrestienne et catholique, persistant en la sainte et seule religion de ses ancestres…[[144]](#footnote-144)

And it is with rhetorical effect that the writer claimed that the birth of the 1576 *Ligue* was rooted not…

dedans une rebellion coniurée, ains dedans la deüe obéissance au prince souverain: non a perronne ains a blois; non dedans les desseins des princes de Lorraine, ains dans les commandements du Roy de France; non dans le crédit du duc de guise, ains dans l’authorithé du Roy; non dans le pretexte de la religion, ains dans le zèle de l’honneur de dieu; non dans le remuement de l’estat, ains dedans la protection de l’esglise; non dans la mutinerie d’aucuns particuliers, ains dans l’advis de l’assemblée generale des Estats; non en la ruine de l’authorité du Roy, ains en la conservation de la religion; non en une faction populaire, ains en la résolution du Roy; non pour un changement d’Estat; ains pour conserver la Monarchie catholique, contre l’aristocratie protestante;[[145]](#footnote-145)

It is ‘good’ writing. But is it history?

When writing about the death of Mary Stuart, the writer claimed he could show that the Queen of Scots had suffered a more unjust and shameful death than any sovereign before her… ‘si ce que [nous] escrivons estoit l’apparat d’un discours et non la relation d’une histoire…’.[[146]](#footnote-146) Valois was in no doubt that the work was a history. Down to today the only publisher of any significant portion of the text, he entitled it *Histoire de la Ligue*, and in the very first sentence of his 1914 publication he placed it without disfavour in the company of those works by Palma-Cayet and de Thou that have been widely recognised as histories. Our author gave an account of events in the past. He firmly believed that it was a history that he was writing; this is clear particularly where, typically after a digression, he would reassure the reader that he was returning ‘au fil de nostre histoire’.[[147]](#footnote-147) Further, applying what was a relatively recent development in historiographical practice, he sought to make sense of what had happened.[[148]](#footnote-148) In particular, misunderstandings of the Catholic *Ligue* had to be corrected. The writer had a point of view but did not indulge in fabrication. By genre, this was, broadly-speaking, a history. But what kind of history? Identification of sub-genres of history is not an exact science.[[149]](#footnote-149) We offer some preliminary analysis.

Earlier we saw that our author used markers for the passing years, as did writers of *Annales* in the sixteenth century. The *Annales* normally provided a record of key events, year by year, within a region.[[150]](#footnote-150) However, the expansive narrative and analysis (as well as imported documents) that our author offers – and his focus on turning-points, not year-endings – makes his work very different. This work does not belong with the *Annales.*

The *Histoire* rarely refers to an exact date or the day of the week. It does not merely record events, nor consist only of ‘enregistrement et… accumulation’; it is not ‘l’histoire au ras du sol’.[[151]](#footnote-151) The writer almost never referred to himself. The work is not a diary or a journal.

Nor does the *Histoire* take the form of memoirs. It is true that, as in memoirs, the author was, in part, making use of memories; he had experienced some of the events he described and had rubbed shoulders with some of the men whose names he cited. But there are important differences too. Memoirs generally contained no claims about the nature of history; ‘les réflexions sur le temps [sont] le fait des présentations des Histoires’.[[152]](#footnote-152) Yet it was our author’s thoughts about history that produced the assertions with which this section began. Memoirists tended to steer clear of state matters, focusing rather on an event in which they had performed well and which might interest the family or peer-group who were the intended audience.[[153]](#footnote-153) Here again the *Histoire* differed: the only line our writer would not cross was his respect for the crown as an institution, as he readily examined the deeds and misdeeds of popes and bishops, kings and noblemen, judges and municipal leaders, *Ligueurs*, Huguenots and Politiques. The memoirist usually presented himself prominently in a first-person narrative, but in the *Histoire*, written in the third person, the author was self-effacing.[[154]](#footnote-154) Absent too are other conventions of memoirs: the writer did not follow the ‘liturgie littéraire’ of offering himself to God in prayer at the outset of his work.[[155]](#footnote-155) Nor did he offer the customary apology for a poor style of writing. Above all we find few of the subtleties that memoirists could indulge in – ‘des passions ou des nostalgies, des sursauts de tendresse, éclats de rire ou de colère’; thus the *Histoire* conveys little sense of ‘[une] « recherche du temps perdu »’.[[156]](#footnote-156)

In 1574 the fear was expressed that Frenchmen spent so much time reading history that it might harm the nation.[[157]](#footnote-157) Two kinds of history book – the *Abrégé* and the *Recueil* – were partly responsible for what has been seen as a second stage in the sixteenth-century revival: ‘le passage d’une phase de création à une phase de vulgarisation... le passage d’une curiosité de spécialistes à un désir culturel de masse.’[[158]](#footnote-158) The *Histoire* was not a shortened version of an earlier work; but could it be viewed as a *Recueil*? A substantial example of this genre appeared at the end of the century: Simon Goulart’s *Mémoires de la Ligue*. Amy Graves has called this work a *Recueil mixte*, a form which she described as ‘l’incorporation des pamphlets dans une histoire narrative’, continuing, ‘les “mémoires” qui en résultent mélangent les récits et les documents. Ni chair ni poisson, l’ouvrage de ce type fait alterner la narration des événements et les preuves que l’historiographe cite *in extenso*.’[[159]](#footnote-159)

By Graves’s description, we would need to consider our *Histoire* to be a *Recueil mixte*. This is problematic, for the balance between narrative and sources in Goulart’s *Mémoires* and the *Histoire* is very different; if one is fish, the other is certainly fowl. Whereas the *Histoire* is predominantly a narrative with supporting documents, the *Mémoires* amount to a collection of pamphlets interspersed with brief comments. ‘Il [Goulart] choisit non pas d’écrire une histoire, mais de faire un travail de compilateur,… ne faisant entendre sa voix que dans les préfaces et les commentaires en italique encadrant les documents’.[[160]](#footnote-160) By genre, Palma-Cayet’s *Chronologie novenaire* is the closest match we have discovered to our *Histoire*. We conclude that by both genre and sub-genre our author wrote history. He was a historian.

‘There has been nearly universal agreement that the seventeenth century... was a poor field for the cultivation of history,’ wrote Donald Kelley in 1970.[[161]](#footnote-161) The view would seem to cast a shadow over the *Histoire*, written in the 1620s. But we recall that, though technically a seventeenth-century work, the *Histoire* was almost certainly completed before the 1628-29 siege of La Rochelle, thus before the dust finally settled at the end of the religious wars and before growing absolutism was fully free to impose rigid censorship. We therefore consider the work to have been born of experiences and historiographical traditions proper to the later decades of the sixteenth century; it is here that comparisons and judgements can appropriately and usefully be made.

Much medieval historiography had been pedestrian.[[162]](#footnote-162) It is not that the early works were unpalatable: the popularity of Nicole Gilles’ stirring *Annales* (1492), in which legends and miracles were happily woven into a story of the kings of France, is attested by its publishing history. But such writing was not ‘good’ history: it lit the imagination but paid scant attention to accuracy.[[163]](#footnote-163) Traditional political histories had attracted readers: ‘[written] from within a rhetorical tradition, …they eloquently described examples of good and evil… that would provide moral and political lessons valid in all times and places’, but ‘they were more interested in virtue and vice than in sources and dating’.[[164]](#footnote-164) Our *Histoire* is very different. It did not seek to impress or to light the imagination.[[165]](#footnote-165) Almost all of its content was chosen to support a line of argument.[[166]](#footnote-166) The historian was fastidious in his pusuit of accuracy and he deployed sources with some skill. And yet one fundamental medieval feature survived: our author considered divine intervention to be a legitimate part of the explanation of the human story.

New thinking about history, and more critical histories, emerged in the second half of the sixteenth century. By the early seventeenth century the change was obvious and, in some circles, unwelcome. Reflecting bitterly on the new historians, the Jesuit François Garasse wrote in 1622, ‘Quand vous raconterez quelque histoire d’importance prise de Moyse, de Xenophon, de Caesar, de Thucydide, de Paul Emile, un impertinent vous dira froidement, *cela est faux, vous vous trompez, il n’est pas ainsi que vous le dites, mon papier-journal & Clopinel disent le contraire*.’[[167]](#footnote-167) What the priest found disconcerting had resulted from the recent developments in historical method. In the new histories sources were quoted – and evaluated; prejudices were acknowledged; events were not only narrated but also explained. Myths such as the Trojan origins of France were exposed. It all amounted to a revolution in historical-mindedness. Along with fresh historical accounts came works about the nature of history: the two *genres* nourished each other. George Huppert put it succinctly: ‘history ceased to be literature and became a science.’[[168]](#footnote-168)

We suppose that for Garasse an additional concern was the growing tendency of sixteenth-century historians to assign to God little or no place in the human story. Some considered both God and Fortune to be out of place in historical explanation, for that which could not be universally discerned could not be relevant.[[169]](#footnote-169) And so, the familiar meta-narrative of a long fall from grace began to fade. Paolo Emilio, for whom Garasse evidently had a certain respect, had published as early as 1539 a history that dispensed entirely with divine intervention and concentrated on the achievements of men. Two decades later a young barrister Estienne Pasquier published a much better history that worked from the same premise. Next, Jean Bodin, another prominent lawyer, argued that historians must limit their field of enquiry to human activity, leaving divine history for theologians – a message that was susbsequently heeded by Nicolas Vignier, La Popelinière and the royalist historians of the *Ligue*.[[170]](#footnote-170)

In choosing to exclude divine intervention from historical explanation, the great historians of the period did not consider themselves to be working in the dark. The ‘new history’ has been characterised by Dubois as imitative of the old. Still subordinate, it was now subject to new masters: ‘la Raison et la Méthode... sont en train d’instaurer leur dictature à elles, à préparer le royaume de la science universelle hors duquel il n’y a pas de salut.’[[171]](#footnote-171) Though pre-Enlightenment, it was enlightened history: explanations would be so reasonable and based on such sound evidence that the narrative could gain wide acceptance. Moreover, Pasquier, de Thou, Palma-Cayet, d’Aubigné… all shared our historian’s Christian faith. Where our author differed was in the degree to which he allowed faith to influence his judgements. His God was inscrutable and inescapable: ‘le (*sic*, ‘les’?) discours de l’humaine providence ne peuvent rompre ny retarder les coups du ciel’.[[172]](#footnote-172) In perhaps his profoundest theological statement, the historian observed that Henri of Navarre’s intention to convert was a matter more for God than the king, for ‘chacun croyoit que c’estoit un don provenant de la grace provenante de dieu’.[[173]](#footnote-173) As for the timing of the conversion, it too lay with God.[[174]](#footnote-174) The point was emphasised at the end of the work:

La justice de dieu estant enfin satisfaite et voyant le Roiaume de france tout remply de miseres, la Religion catholique prestre d’estre perdüe et toute la chrestienté laqu’elle couroit grand hazard de se voir ensevelie dans le mesme malheur, ne regarda plus ce Roiaume avec ses yeux d’Ire et indignation et sa colere estant appaisée par tant de miseres et de souffrance que son pauvre peuple avoit souffertes, ouvrit les yeux du Roy… [[175]](#footnote-175)

Placed late in the text, these words capture another belief that the historian had expressed from time to time in earlier pages: France’s misfortunes were a sign of God’s chastisement. In most cases, the punishment was perceived as falling on ‘les françois’ collectively.[[176]](#footnote-176) However, the young duc de Guise’s escape from prison (15 August 1591) was interpreted by ebullient *Ligueurs* as evidence of God’s punishment of the royalists for rulings published at Tours against papal bulls.[[177]](#footnote-177)It was not the first time that divine intervention had favoured the *Ligue*: in March 1589, the discovery by the *Seize* of a fortune in the home of Molan, the *trésorier de l’épargne*, was understood by the historian to have been a gift from God – in fact a response ‘aux humbles prières qu’ils avoient fait tant de bonnes gens’.[[178]](#footnote-178)

The historian sometimes resorted to divine intervention as an explanation of last resort. If God’s impenetrable wisdom accounted for Mayenne’s rejection of the *Ligue* deputation to Corbeil in September 1590, then His grace explained Pope Gregory XIV’s support for the *Seize* in 1591 and Parma’s escape from imminent danger in early 1592.[[179]](#footnote-179) At the same time, he was sensitive to perceived misuse of the device by other writers. When the Protestant Jean Taffin ascribed to the providence of God a circumstance of the first regicide that could be easily disproved by reason, the historian was scathing: ‘voyla des circonstances notables et de (*sic*, des?) remarques de la providence de dieu légèrement et faussement publiées’.[[180]](#footnote-180) It was not the factual error that riled our historian, rather the guilt of Henri III that Taffin had deliberately implied. A few lines later, when the collision of belief in divine intervention with respect for an anointed king occurred again, the historian took care to point out that amidst the general thanksgiving to God for the deliverance of Paris there were those who questioned whether it was right to express joy after the death of the king. The historian concluded adroitly, ‘il ne s’y fit aucun acte public de reioüissance pour la mort du Roy, chacun ne parloit en public que de la délivrance de la ville’.[[181]](#footnote-181)

The *Histoire* is hybrid. Whilst its references to divine intervention suggest the influence of medieval historiography, the historian’s commitment to certain self-imposed principles gives his work some resemblance to the new histories. We have no evidence that our author was well-read in theories of history. There is no sustained passage on historical method. Any positive qualities of his work should rather be seen as evidence of his legal training and of his determination to rectify misrepresentations of a subject close to his heart. Only once – and briefly – might we wonder if the historian had a particular method in mind, when we read: ‘« tout cela [the *Ligue* story] s’apprendra par la déduction de l’histoire; »’.[[182]](#footnote-182) The expression is obscure – deduction from what? – but it is likely that the author was using the word *déduction* simply to mean ‘explanation’.[[183]](#footnote-183) Thus telling the *Ligue* story ‘par la déduction de l’histoire’ is a matter of genre, not method. The work would be a history, not *une apologie*.

Although not (observably) inspired by a particular methodology, the historian gave himself two guiding principles. First, in the opening paragraphs of the work, he explained his intention to write with moderation. This was the historian’s solution – in fact the only possible solution – to the paradox facing contemporary writers who sought to provide faithful accounts while not opening old wounds.[[184]](#footnote-184) Personal feelings would be kept in check: it was acceptable to write with ‘passion’, but not ‘invectiver’; there was no place for ‘vicieuses passions’.[[185]](#footnote-185) To write well required an open mind: ‘ce sera librement et sans envie’.[[186]](#footnote-186) The past would be recorded ‘fidellement’.[[187]](#footnote-187) Recording later Mayenne’s assault on Tours in early May 1589, the historian reiterated his point. Writers who had claimed that the Catholic soldiers had committed atrocities were guilty of calumny. Better writers (‘plus judicieux’) had not made the same mistake; ‘Mais quel remède, puisque la calomnie et l’imposture sont aussy vieilles que le monde[?]’.[[188]](#footnote-188) ‘[B]ien souvent,’ he continued, ‘un homme d’esprit pense faire une histoire qui se trouve enfin avoir fait une invective et un libelle diffamatoire’ – it was a trap that our author intended to avoid.[[189]](#footnote-189)

Secondly, the historian proposed to deal in facts, in what was known: ‘Assez de gens ont escrit… pour invectiver…; il faut encore sçavoir…’[[190]](#footnote-190) Thus, a few lines later:

…autant peu seroit-il à propos de vouloir escrire les divers desseins et esperances interieures de ceux qui, comme chefs, ont fait la guerre…, puisqu'on n'en peut parler que par soupçon…; aussy cete conjecture des intentions d'autruy n'est pas chose séante à un historien, qui ne doit pas escrire les desseins des hommes, s'ils ne sont manifestéz ou confesséz, mais rapporter… les intentions declarées et les actions qui ont paru;[[191]](#footnote-191)

On the other hand, where royalist historians had been silent, our author would ‘speak’ – thus, after narrating the long siege of Paris, he felt obliged to point out how many royalist soldiers had died during the cruel months, ‘car pendant ces guerres il ya eust beaucoup d’occasions assez considérables dont on n’a point fait mention dans les histoires’.[[192]](#footnote-192) But was not this in fact a major reason why the whole work was written? It is a question we will address in the next chapter. For now, we note that the inclusion of sources had a large part to play in the building of knowledge and the offering of correction. A transcript of the *Pouvoir* provided to the *Ligue* deputies to Rome in spring 1589 was included so that the reader might truly understand – ‘connoistre au vray’ – the task they had been set. Later, letters were included because ‘il convient scavoir qui estoient ceux qu’on appelloit les Seize: car beaucoup de gens s’y sont trompés’.[[193]](#footnote-193) It mattered to the historian that ‘ce qui sera du mien ne dément point ces pieces inserées en mon discours;’ and that ‘l’un ne fera point de tort a l’autre…’[[194]](#footnote-194) The spirit of the comment was good, but the flesh is weak! Evidently, as both narrator and selector of sources, the historian would have no difficulty in achieving the desired consistency. We re-visit the issue of sources in chapter 4. But first, we meet the historian.

**Chapter 3: The Historian**

Lost to view along with the manuscript was its author until Charles Valois placed the spotlight on the former and found he could make some deductions also about the latter. His reading of the *Histoire* led him to believe that its author was neither born into nor bound by allegiance to any great family.[[195]](#footnote-195) He was well read, and he knew Latin and Italian. He thought and wrote like a cleric, from time to time lamenting the licence of the times, but he was not necessarily a man of the cloth, for ‘tant de laics... parlaient, à cette époque, la même langue que les prêtres’.[[196]](#footnote-196) A Parisian, he no doubt helped defend the city walls – yet, as noted in the previous chapter, he was surely no professional soldier. Valois noted that the historian was well acquainted with the Palaisand he believed that he probably worked there, perhaps as a *secrétaire* or *greffier*; he also considered it likely that the historian was a member of the Oratoire.[[197]](#footnote-197)

As noted in chapter 2, by the time Valois encountered the *Histoire* others had already – long before – surmised that its author was perhaps Pierre de L’Estoile, or Louis Maimbourg. Valois was unimpressed. The idea that L’Estoile had penned the *Histoire* could be dismissed at once: such a resolute defence of the *Ligue* could hardly have come from a staunchly Politique writer. In any case, the earliest part of the original text of which mss 23295-96 were a copy had been composed (at the earliest) in 1616, five years after L’Estoile’s death.[[198]](#footnote-198) For similar reasons Valois could dismiss Maimbourg – the seventeenth-century Jesuit historian had considered *Ligueurs* to have been dangerous enemies; moreover the early part of the *Histoire* (350 pages at least) had been composed at the latest by 3 August 1621 – when Maimbourg was eleven.[[199]](#footnote-199)


Building on foundations laid by Jacques-Joseph Champollion-Figeac (1778-1867), one- time keeper of manuscripts at the *Bibliothèque nationale*, Valois showed that mss 23295-96 had been shelved at some time in the library of the Oratoire. He believed that they had probably been deposited there by *Père* Jean-François Senault (fourth *supérieur général* of the congregation, and son of Pierre, the *greffier* of the *Seize*), but that, despite the honour that the texts accorded to Pierre, they were probably not the father’s work.[[200]](#footnote-200) Other Paris *Ligueurs* whose descendants found their way to the Oratoire included Odouart Raynssant, Nicolas Ameline and the brothers Charles and Antoine Hotman. Raynssant’s son Sébastien served as librarian; perhaps it was he who catalogued the *Histoire*. All of this allows us to suppose, for reasons that will be explored later, that these pro-*Seize* manuscripts were welcome at the Oratoire, but it does not explain the appearance of the two further names – ‘Rozée’and ‘Heron’– on the end-paper of ms. 23295. Valois’ examination of the handwriting – particularly of letter-formation – led him to conclude that ‘Heron’was the second scribe – the ‘inutile ouvrier’ whose petty alterations had rendered the text ‘[un] enchevêtrement… inextricable’ – and was probably *Père* Denis Héron, Oratorian (c. 1629-1713). Accordingly the first – the one who made the copies that are mss 23295-96 – was a Rosée, either Jean, (an Oratorian in the 1620s, who died in 1669) or Alexandre (who joined the congregation in 1650).[[201]](#footnote-201)

If a Rozée was the first copyist of the *Histoire*, then it made sense to consider whether a Rozée from a previous generation of the family had composed it in the first place. Valois came close to making this connection. Regarding the first appearance of the name Rozée in ms. 23295, he noted: ‘Ce nom est aussi celui du copiste à qui nous devons la conservation de cette *Histoire de la Ligue*; car il se retrouve sur la garde du ms. 23295, écrit de la même main’.[[202]](#footnote-202) Also he observed that the ‘z’ in the Rozée signature on the end-paper of ms. 23295 was conspicuously similar in shape to the ‘z’ in the marginal addition on page 407 (ms. 23296) of the phrase ‘un Parisien nommé Rozée, advocat’. Then he noted that the author, anonymous and discreet (‘Non seulement aucune signature, mais point de préface’), risked ‘quelques allusions fugitives à sa vie’ which allowed a calculation of when the work was composed: the 1620s, a decade ‘**qui coïncide singulièrement** avec le début de la carrière de Jean Rosée’.[[203]](#footnote-203)

In the 1980s Robert Descimon took the quest further. It was through the publication of the results of his scientific approach to identifying the *Seize* that a truly reliable corpus of these Paris *Ligueurs* became available.[[204]](#footnote-204) Within the ranks of the *Seize* was Pierre Rozée, *avocat*. Descimon offered the view – ‘sous toute réserve’ – that Rozée would prove to be the *historien anonyme*.[[205]](#footnote-205) Later, and on the basis of his studies of *actes notariés*, Descimon was able to construct a family-tree showing Pierre to be the uncle of Jean, ‘prêtre de l’Oratoire’.[[206]](#footnote-206) The circle was almost complete.

‘Proof’ of Pierre’s authorship will only be definitively established if it can be shown that the handwriting in ms.10270 matches any examples of Pierre Rozée’s signature which might be located in the notarial records of the *minutier central*, or in other records of the municipality of Paris. Relevant features of the historian’s letter-formation in ms. 10270 are shown in Figure 3 (p. 64). At the time of writing a match has not been achieved, but the balance of probability currently seems sufficiently strong for us to be able in this thesis to regard the *Histoire* as indeed the work of Pierre Rozée.

Rozée was the author of the *Histoire* – but perhaps not of the whole. We suggested in chapter 2 that mss 23295-6 could reasonably be judged to be a faithful copy of the historian’s original work, with one possible exception. It is the final page that is so different; it left the work with what Valois called ‘une forme tronquée’.[[207]](#footnote-207) The obvious indicator of change of authorship – different handwriting – cannot, of course, be investigated, for the original manuscript of this part of the text has not survived. But other textual evidence is suggestive. Even as the last page begins there has been no prior indication that the narrative is about to end, no heading to denote an imminent conclusion, no attempt to summarise the ground that has been covered or to celebrate assertions that have been made. Nothing, then, has prepared the reader for a marked change half-way



through the penultimate paragraph. After a patient listing of the names of most of the deputies to the Suresnes Conference, suggestive of an in-depth analysis to follow, we find the event itself dismissed in just a few lines: ‘on en fit l’ouverture le 29 avril mais le légat vint à la traverse… les deputez travaillerent chaqu’un de son costé selon leurs memoires mais n’advancerent pas grande chose’.[[208]](#footnote-208) This brevity is surprising, for earlier in the work Rozée had given plenty of space not only to controversies such as the origins of the *Ligue*, the role of the *Seize*, the purposes of the Guises, and the relationship between papal and royal jurisdictions, but also to conferences and deputations.

With the abandonment of the story of the Suresnes Conference, the ten months up to the king’s entry into Paris were about to be compressed into just one final paragraph. This uncharacteristic conciseness would be applied to just two events: the king’s abjuration, and his entry into Paris – as if nothing else of note had occurred.[[209]](#footnote-209) Here the style of writing changed. It was a sudden change, for hallmarks of Rozée’s tone and style had persisted well into the final ten pages of the *Histoire*. The historian had again lamented the ‘licence’ of those times when men had felt free to write what they would.[[210]](#footnote-210) Moreover, his tendency to lose the plot for a while, and then to have to confess to the reader what had happened, had reappeared. Thus: ‘Le fil de l’histoire et la venüe de l’armée estrangere … nous a fait obmettre de dire des Estats lesqu’els le duc de Mayenne avoit promis d’assembler de le commencement de l’année 1589’.[[211]](#footnote-211) The reference to 1589, reminding the reader of the four-year gap between the promise of an Estates-General and its realisation, had exemplified another of Rozée’s habits: he was always quick to expose the failings of Mayenne. He recounted how Mayenne had no sooner opened the Estates than he was away again on (unspecified) war business; the duke had left ‘sans donner ordre aux factions qu’il y avoit luy mesme formées.’[[212]](#footnote-212) At a subsequent important moment for the deputies – the reading of the king’s edict of 29 January condemning the calling of the Estates-General – Mayenne had gone off sick. Not that Mayenne was Rozée’s only target, for in these late pages he also questioned Navarre’s grasp of the nature of Catholicism, and noted the apparent helplessness of the papal legate to resist *Ligueur* representation at the Suresnes conference.[[213]](#footnote-213) There is no surprise here: throughout the *Histoire*, Rozée had drifted easily into criticism, and had given sharp shrift to double standards, to hypocrisy.

But, come the final paragraph, light dispels gloom, the narrative acquires pace, uncertainties fade. A device that the sober Rozée had avoided, hyperbole, now appears. Henri IV ‘entra glorieusement dans Paris … sans effusion de sang, pacifia toutes choses, et restablit la paix et la tranquillité que le desordre en avoit chasse il y avoit si longtemps’.[[214]](#footnote-214) Taken in conjunction with the thin coverage of Suresnes, the last paragraph suggests a bolted-on ending of uncertain authorship. We consider it unlikely that Rozée willingly reduced to thirty-or-so lines the complicated dénouement of a long story relating as many years of civil war, and that he had nothing to say about the Catholic renewal that the *Ligue* bequeathed to the seventeenth century. Of course, if he was facing handicap or sickness he might have had no choice. Another possibility is that the *Histoire* had a post-1594 section (now lost) and that someone else – perhaps the copyist – chose, for reasons we cannot know, not to reproduce it. If, as we will try to show later, an intention behind the work was to correct earlier misrepresentations of the *Ligue*, then the sooner it was printed the better. Perhaps it was with this in mind that a friend or relative hastily added an ending, only later to conclude that publication would be problematic while Richelieu ruled.[[215]](#footnote-215) The ending could not have been added after the production of mss 23295-6: Valois would have noticed the change of handwriting. Valois thought it likely that it was preparation for the press that led *Père* Denis Héron to make petty alterations to the copy of the original text.[[216]](#footnote-216) As the priest was born around 1629, it follows that this second preparation for printing took place in the second half of the seventeenth century. But by then, had it not become an irrelevance?

Much of what we know about Pierre Rozée naturally derives from what (and how) he wrote. Unfortunately he never explained why he joined the *Ligue*, but the text as a whole suggests fear for religion as the dominant factor.[[217]](#footnote-217) We can also approach the man through his professional life. We know from the family tree constructed by Descimon that law ran in the Rozée family: Pierre’s father, Guillaume, and an uncle had worked at the Chancellory, Pierre and his older brother Guillaume were both *avocats*, and a younger brother, Jean, was a *procureur*. The *Histoire* tells us virtually nothing of Pierre’s education or training, but we can be sure that he practised at the Palais. He said of Barnabé Brisson, *président* of the Parlement, ‘Ce savant homme disoit toujours quelque chose de bon’, and later he recalled a comment passed in 1588 about François de La Noue’s *Déclaration… sur sa prise des armes…*: ‘J’étois présent quand un grand de ce royaume, après avoir vu cette déclaration en une grande compagnie, dit…’.[[218]](#footnote-218)

Antoine Loisel’s posthumous *Dialogue des Advocats* reveals the qualities expected of exemplary barristers. The work was composedbecause of an order issued – not for the first time – in 1602 that barristers declare their fees. This was perceived as an insult – having to declare income ‘comme les sergents’ – at a time when morale at the bar was already low mainly because of increasing venality of office at the higher levels of the legal profession.[[219]](#footnote-219) Loisel wrote, therefore, with the intention of showing the *barreau* at its best. Barristers’ qualities are made memorable through mini-biographies drawn from the first three centuries of the Parlement’s history. An example amongst many is François de Montholon: ‘...il avoit acquis une telle reputation de probité qu’on le croyoit sur ce qu’il disoit, non comme advocat, mais comme s’il eust esté rapporteur d’un procez, sans luy faire lire aucune pièce. Aussi estoit-il un tres-homme de bien, vivant honorablement, sans avarice ny ambition, venerable et craignant Dieu’.[[220]](#footnote-220) Montholon, who in 1589 relinquished the post of Keeper of the Seals on grounds of conscience, is shown by Loisel to have been upright and honourable. Above all, his word could be trusted.

Loisel had to make his work believable – and a little entertaining. Thus not all his stories point in the same direction – we find variations in educational background, and some *avocats* were lazy, distracted by other business, or frankly risible.[[221]](#footnote-221) The *Dialogue* is heavily reliant on anecdote. It was written to give an impression (of barristers’ professionalism), not to quantify or explain or analyse. Perhaps one-fifth – certainly no more – of the five hundred or so barristers working at the Palais in the late sixteenth century are mentioned by name. Rozée himself is unmentioned in the *Dialogue* – and not only because the interlocutors wisely established the ground-rule that lawyers living at the time of writing would not be discussed. In fact, Loisel conceived his work as a conversation amongst some of the great legal dynasties (*les familles* Loisel, Pasquier and Pithou); as a result, it mostly concerned itself with only the élite of the *barreau*. It was by emulation of the best practices of this elite that less eminent lawyers like Rozée might climb. Thus Loisel’s work reveals ideals to which Rozée was invited – in the *mercuriales* each year which the members of the Paris bar were obliged to attend, and in the attestation of good character which accompanied appointments to judicial office – to aspire.

It is known that an *avocat* in the Paris Parlement had to show personal integrity, including evidence of Catholicism; he had to be at least seventeen and in possession of a law degree.[[222]](#footnote-222) Colin Kaiser has shown that against a backdrop of the muti-faceted disorder of the second half of the sixteenth century, it came to be seen as indispensable that judges be beyond reproach.[[223]](#footnote-223) They should avoid gambling and entering into debt, and should keep aloof from idle conversation in the streets. The ideal magistrate was *un* *homme de bien*, *un homme bien vivant*; possessed of ‘vertu, [bonne] conversation et réputation’.[[224]](#footnote-224) Above all, he must be Catholic. But did the standards expected of the *parfait magistrat catholique* filter down to the *barreau*? Common sense suggests that aspiring barristers would emulate the qualities being increasingly expected of those whose ranks they might hope to join. Thus Kaiser: ‘Le “parfait magistrat” doit inspirer le “parfait avocat”…’[[225]](#footnote-225) In general terms, a reading of the *Histoire* suggests that Rozée had high standards. Apparently devoid of careerist apsirations, he seems nonetheless to have been a man of sober judgement, one who approved of good order in society and of integrity in individuals.

In early seventeenth-century France the connection between law and historiography was well established. As a lawyer writing history in the 1620s, Rozée was continuing a tradition that had become particularly apparent at least seventy years earlier. Lawyers accounted for about eighty per cent of the French (male) writers whose books made a significant contribution to the culture of their age and whose first books were published between 1540 and 1584.[[226]](#footnote-226) Along with clerics they were also amongst the most avid readers.[[227]](#footnote-227) The men responsible for the transformation of historiography after the 1550s had generally supplemented their initial studies in ancient languages and texts with higher studies in law. The contribution of lawyers was decisive ‘in shifting attention from drum and trumpet history to institutional, social and cultural studies.’[[228]](#footnote-228) Lawyers brought political history to the fore. Unlike earlier military histories written by the nobility and ecclesiastical histories written by the clergy, political history offered an integrated account, ‘dans la mesure où la vie politique coiffe toutes sortes d’activités dont chacune n’est que partie d’un tout.’[[229]](#footnote-229) The *Histoire* provides a political history in so far as Rozée concentrated on struggles for power and authority: Royalists are pitted against the *Ligue* (at national, provincial and municipal levels), the *Seize* against Barnabé Brisson – and then against Mayenne, Claude de Sainctes against royalist parlements, gallicans against ultramontanists, preacher against preacher...

Lawyers were trained to be critical. They sifted evidence and reached verdicts. Three notable theoreticians of historiography – Loys Le Roy, Jean Bodin and La Popelinière – all studied law in Toulouse. The men writing new histories of the distant past – Estienne Pasquier, François Hotman, Nicolas Vignier, Pierre Pithou, and others – were steeped in law. Well-known memoirists and interpreters of contemporary events had legal backgrounds. Pierre de L’Estoile and Jacques-Auguste de Thou both studied law at Bourges; de Thou moved on to Valence, where Pierre Mathieu trained. Even the *compilateur* Simon Goulart, who hated ‘[les] avocats braillards de la place publique et de la Cour’, studied jurisprudence before moving into the Protestant ministry.[[230]](#footnote-230)

Pierre Rozée was well-read. He knew the works of the royalist historians, and he was conversant with the views of the early church fathers. In his writing he used and evaluated a range of sources, considering only recorded words and actions (not suppositions) to be admissible evidence. He explained and analysed a course of events, producing two long volumes of revisionist history. For these reasons, he belongs in the *écrivain-juriste* tradition.

We will see in chapter 4 that Rozée took a fastidious approach to historical evidence – a likely consequence of his practice of law and perhaps also of a temperament that manifested itself in high standards. In other ways too the historian’s legal background marked his work. He was, for example, keenly interested in the 1591 clash of royal and papal jurisdictions. Moreover, as a devout Catholic and a barrister, he was committed to the principle of justice. He believed that France’s troubles had ended only once God’s justice had been satisfied.[[231]](#footnote-231) At the temporal level, the *conseil de l’union* had been governed by principles of ‘le droit et la justice’, it had been ‘légitimement élu’, and its members had conducted themselves ‘selon dieu et la justice’.[[232]](#footnote-232) Had not the *conseil* been established to ensure ‘la juste administration de la justice’?[[233]](#footnote-233) Thus it was galling for the historian when those charged with administering justice judged unjustly.

Rozée lamented the summary hanging of the *Cordelier* priest Robert Chessé (at Vendôme in November 1589) and he was troubled by the deaths in mysterious circumstances of the comte d’Egmont at Ivry, the comte de Randan at Issoire (on the same day), and Bishop Claude de Sainctes in prison at Caen. A certain evasiveness suggests that, to his credit, the historian also had qualms of conscience over Brisson’s execution.[[234]](#footnote-234) By 1592, justice seemed to Rozée to have been turned upside down, for *Ligueurs* alone were being brought before the courts, ‘condamnés pour leurs actions ordinaires, au lieu que quand ils avoient descouvert les entreprises journalieres que faisoient les politiques pour le service du Roy, et qu’ils en exhiboient pour preuve les lettres qui avoient esté surprises l’on s’en mocquoit’.[[235]](#footnote-235) Finally, in 1591, there was a clash of royal and papal jurisdictions: ‘la France vivait... dans un régime de schisme *de facto*.’[[236]](#footnote-236) Rozée devoted roughly four times more space to this crisis than to his account of the first regicide in France.[[237]](#footnote-237) This was a lawyer writing history.

Nowhere better does the historian’s concern for justice stand out than in his account of the trial, torture and execution in February 1590 of Edmé Bourgoing (superior of the Paris monastery where Jacques Clément had been an inmate). This short passage – a little over six hundred words – is not only replete with legal vocabulary, it also shows the historian’s investigative approach and his concern when he thought that justice might not have been done. Rozée sensed a hidden story behind official accounts. The court wanted to ‘expier [un] crime’ (the regicide) which remained so far ‘non sufizament puni’. Expiation could be achieved by finding Bourgoing to be ‘coupable’ - but ‘la preuve en estoit dificile’. ‘Interrogé’, Bourgoing had answers that would have saved him ‘s'il eut esté en lieu ou il eut eu moyen d'en faire preuve’. This poor cleric knew little of ‘[les] formalitez de la justice’ and made the mistake of trusting in ‘son innocence’.[[238]](#footnote-238) After undergoing ‘la question ordinaire et extraordinaire’ (two degrees of torture), Bourgoing was led away. In the short time that he had left, he reflected upon ‘la fausse deposition des temoins’ and observed that the judges’ verdict would have been valid *if* ‘les preuves eussent esté veritables’. Rozée was troubled by Bourgoing’s fate; he noted that later ‘plusieurs publierent les argumens de son innocence’.[[239]](#footnote-239)

Unlike the Palais de Justice where he worked, the Oratoire, another Paris institution near Rozée’s home, was founded in the historian’s lifetime. The Oratoire’s first congregation met in Paris in the rue St Jacques in 1611; its founder had been educated in the rue de la Harpe. Both streets were a two-minute walk from Rozée’s home. After 1616 the priests moved to the Hôtel du Bouchage, across the street from the Louvre.[[240]](#footnote-240) This was close to where Rozée worked. Our historian’s nephew Jean joined the Oratoire. Sébastien Raynssant, son of one of Rozée’s colleagues in the *Seize*, became its librarian. These are striking links – but they cannot alone explain why the *Histoire* was welcome in the Oratoire. For that, we look for closeness in the thinking of Rozée and the founder of the new congregation.

Pierre de Bérulle was born into an aristocratic family in 1575. He studied philosophy and theology at the recently founded Jesuit Collège de Clermont. Before long he was participating in his cousin Barbe Acarie’s circle of mystically inclined believers, and in 1599 he was ordained a priest.[[241]](#footnote-241) His subsequent support for the French Carmelite sisters, established in Paris by Madame Acarie, was recognised when the Pope named him their third co-superior in 1603. Bérulle’s most lasting achievement was his founding of the Oratoirein 1611. Approved by the Pope in 1613, this congregation of priests was established to further the cause of ecclesiastical reform.[[242]](#footnote-242) Recognition of Bérulle’s work came in the form of a cardinalate in 1627. By 1631 the Oratoirehad seventy-one houses – but by then Bérulle was two years dead.[[243]](#footnote-243)

He had not sought greatness. When after the Edict of Nantes his success in converting Huguenots won him repeated offers from Henri IV of promotion into the episcopacy, Bérulle refused, adding that ‘si on le pressait davantage, il se verrait contraint à sortir du royaume’.[[244]](#footnote-244) On founding the congregation in 1611, he tried hard but in vain to avoid being its only leader.[[245]](#footnote-245) Shortly before accompanying Henrietta Maria to England in June 1625, Bérulle addressed a *mémorial* to the heads of the congregations, reminding them how to conduct their ministry: ‘Abaissons-nous en nous-mêmes et en toutes nos conditions naturelles telles qu’elles soient: car elles ne sont rien au regard d’un ouvrage si grand’.[[246]](#footnote-246) Madeleine de Saint-Joseph, the first French prioress of the French Carmelites and friend to the priest, wrote after his death that he had been ‘particularly outstanding in humility’; ‘[i]t seemed,’ she added, ‘that he could act only for Jesus Christ, thinking and speaking only of him and his mysteries’.[[247]](#footnote-247)

Pierre Rozée, a lawyer in his fifties when thefirst congregation assembled, was not an Oratorian. The Oratoire was for priests only, and young ones at that.[[248]](#footnote-248) The *Histoire* contains no reference to the Oratoire, nor to Bérulle, not even to Barbe Acarie whose husband Pierre had been prominent in the *Seize*, nor to the Carmelite sisters. We know that Rozée had a marked sympathy for the poor as innocent victims of powerful men. Thus, for example, ‘le petit peuple… ne se resentoit de la guerre que par les pertes et les vexations; au lieu que les autres y proffittoient’.[[249]](#footnote-249) We recognise the selflessness implicit in choosing to write a defence for a cause that had been defeated three decades earlier and relentlessly scorned thereafter. But apart from this shadowy ‘evidence’ we cannot know if the historian was humble in spirit, nor if he practised the self-abasement that Bérulle ‘preached’.

Vows mattered to both men. The oath of union used by the *Ligue* in January 1589 required adherents to preserve their faith even to the shedding of ‘la dernière goute de nostre sang’.[[250]](#footnote-250) For Bérulle, full sufficiency lay in vows to Jesus Christ and Mary, devotion to whom governed all (necessarily inferior) commitments.[[251]](#footnote-251) The ecclesiastical and theological controversies that arose from Bérulle’s formula – considered by some to be non-canonical, by others to be virtually heretical – need not detain us here.[[252]](#footnote-252) Rather we note the comprehensiveness of both formulae. Given the successive edicts of pacification and eventually the Edict of Nantes, it must have appeared in the early seventeenth century that preservation of the uniqueness of Catholicism would be a long-term, perhaps permanent struggle. For Oratorians, devotion to Jesus Christ and Mary could only have been understood as a lifelong commitment. Rozée never opened his soul when writing the *Histoire*, but his work, infused with devotion to a movement whose goal was no less than to preserve the Roman Catholic faith even to the point of death, must surely have found favour with the Oratoire.

We know that Rozée detested heresy. Like a wild boar in a vineyard, it left its foul odour behind.[[253]](#footnote-253) Calvinism was poisonous.[[254]](#footnote-254) The hand of Satan could be discerned behind the survival of Protestantism:

Car c'est une chose que les plus sages ont observée, que depuis que Satan se transformant en ange de lumiere eust tiré du puis de l'abisme cette maudite et sanglante ligue [the Protestant League] laquelle, ayant coniuré contre dieu et son eglise, a mis le feu aux quatre coins de ce Royaume et au milieu, les affaires de ceux de la Religion reformée ne se sont iamais restablies que par de nouveaux Edits de pacification;[[255]](#footnote-255)

Bérulle shared the historian’s feelings: ‘L’hérésie constitue à ses yeux un scandale absolu et l’édit de Nantes (1598) une loi abominable.’[[256]](#footnote-256) At the outset of his sustained rebuttal of Protestant thought – the *Œuvres de controverse* (1609) – he portrayed heresy as a novelty:

Nous ne voyons aucun témoignage que sa lumière ait jamais paru en l’univers, ni que sa piété ait jamais adoré Dieu en la terre, que sa foi et son zèle ait reconnu le Christ et invoqué son nom avant nos jours, ni que sa voix ait en aucun lieu annoncé l’Evangile, tant cette Eglise, Messieurs, est visible en sa naissance, en sa rébellion et en sa nouveauté, et invisible en son autorité, en sa foi et en son antiquité.[[257]](#footnote-257)

It was a novelty, but dangerous, for Bérulle believed that Protestantism was born of Satan. As a result of his involvement in the case of the apparently demon-possessed Marthe Brossier (an affair that broke very soon after the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes) the priest wrote his first major treatise, the *Traicté des Energumènes* (1599). Here God’s work in incarnation was contrasted with the demon-possession brought about by Satan: ‘En sa qualité de “Singe de Dieu”, Satan imite l’union hypostatique en possédant, dans la personne de l’énergumène, le corps humain’.[[258]](#footnote-258) It could be concluded that the role of Satan consisted in undoing the work of God, and thus that heresy was no less than a diabolical attack on the church – leaps of logic which the faint-hearted perhaps found easier to make when they heard the rumour circulating in Paris in spring 1591 that Marthe’s demon had cried out against the Huguenots.[[259]](#footnote-259)

Similar in their views on vows and on the origins of heresy, the historian and the priest were also close in their thinking on the relationship between religion and the state. In simple terms, the conclusion of both was that secular concerns must be subordinate to religious requirements.[[260]](#footnote-260) It was a stance that led Bérulle into the well-known conflict with the French government in the late 1620s: on religious grounds, the ‘cardinal *dévot*’ advocated peace with Catholic Spain and a concerted effort against Protestantism. In practice this led him to oppose Richelieu’s projected intervention in the Mantuan succession crisis (for fear that it would lead to war with Spain) and, after the siege of La Rochelle, to propose a Catholic crusade against England. Unimpressed, Richelieu made plans to send the cardinal to Rome as ambassador, an ignominious fate that Bérulle avoided only in death (2 October, 1629). More than a generation earlier, Rozée had been satisfied that Spanish assistance to the *Ligue* (cash, soldiers, Mendoza, Parma) was invaluable in the struggle to preserve the faith; in addition he had railed at peace talks with heretics because what was required was nothing less than a Catholic reconquest of France. We think that Sébastien Raynssant, or some other Oratorian librarian, noticed the similarity.

They were confusing times. Rozée and Bérulle – *Liguers* and *dévots* – had constantly to decide how far to resist or comply, whether to fight for Roman Catholic values in public life or to retreat into that world of private spiritualitythat led finally to mysticism. Jean Boucher questioned the genuineness of Henri IV’s conversion and would have been expelled from Paris in March 1594 if he had not already fled on the day the king arrived. In those last days Rozée too sailed close to the wind. It was not the first time he had confronted political realities in person for, in November 1592, he stood for election (unsuccessfully) to the *échevinage* of the *Bureau de la Ville*.[[261]](#footnote-261) On 16 March, 1594 – one week before the king’s arrival – he took on Charles de Cossé, *comte* de Brissac, governor of Paris. The story was told by L’Estoile:

Ce jour, un Advocat de la Cour nommé Rosée, grand faciendaire, et qui estoit des Seize, alla trouver M. le Gouverneur, auquel il demanda permission de s’assembler, non obstant les défenses de la Cour; lui dit que c’estoit pour la manutention de leur Religion Catholique, laquelle autrement ne se pouvoit conserver. Et sur le refus que lui en fist M. de Brissac, lui disant qu’il ne pouvoit passer par dessus les arrests de Messieurs du Parlement, pource qu’ils y estoient contraires, fust si effronté de lui dire que la pluspart d’eux estoient Hérétiques et fauteurs d’Hérétiques et de l’Hérétique, comme ils avoient toujours monstré par leurs arrests, et qu’en les favorisant comme il faisoit, il mettoit en hazard la Religion, pour la défense de laquelle ils vouloient tous mourir. Lors M. de Brissac, se montrant fort retenu, lui respondit que ces affaires-là passoient son esprit; que la Cour n’avoit rien fait, qui ne fust bien fait, et qu’on n’en feroit autre chose.[[262]](#footnote-262)

L’Estoile was no friend of the *Ligue*, and it is impossible to know how closely this passage represents what happened. Was Rozée foolhardy or courageous, impertinent or determined? Evidently his private conviction that heresy must be thwarted was strong enough still in 1594 to evoke a response sufficiently public for the diarist to hear about it. That Rozée remained in Paris – as far as we know – must be explained as the fortuitous result of Brissac’s forebearance (magnanimity in imminent victory) and Rozée’s political insignificance.

Rozée must have known considerable inner turmoil in the *Ligue* period. Both as a loyal subject and as an employee in a sovereign court he should have supported the Protestant Henri of Navarre’s claim to the throne, but because of his loathing of heresy he could not. It was a matter of state versus religion. Rozée had none of the prominence of Bérulle, yet three decades later the ‘cardinal *dévot*’ was caught up in a similar conflict. Drawn by a high Christological theology into involvement in the world, he found himself in an ‘impossible’ position: ‘Refusant de se rallier à un “catholicisme royal” qui mettait l’Eglise dans l’Etat, fidèle à l’enseignement de l’ancienne Eglise dans ses prétentions à la catholicité, Bérulle joua sa partie avec la grandeur de ceux qui acceptent l’éventualité de la défaite, mais n’y voient pas une raison de se renier’.[[263]](#footnote-263) As my Conclusion will show, Rozée too learned to live with disappointment.

After March 1594, the *Sainte Union* collapsed. Protection of Protestantism after 1598 realised what had been the *Ligue*’s worst fears. Out of this bitter defeat emerged the *Histoire*. We believe that Rozée chose to write partly because, even as sieges and battles retreated from the land, a new and insidious offensive was advancing on paper. With words such as ‘reconciliation’, ‘pacification’ and – worst of all – ‘toleration’, royalist historians honoured the king, heralded a new era, and set out to destroy what remained of the *Ligue*’s reputation. Rozée wrote in order to redress the balance.

The capacity of conflict to generate the writing of history is well-known. ‘[L]e concept... d’histoire est inséparable du principe d’opposition’.[[264]](#footnote-264) History presupposes conflict, because conflict produces difference and change, and these in turn produce an awareness of the passing of time. Specifically in the case of the *Histoire*, unsuccessful engagement in conflict provoked the writing of a work of vindication.

A strong interest in history was ‘one of the marked characteristics’ of the turbulent years after the 1550s.[[265]](#footnote-265) There was a greater demand for historical works in the second half of the century than in the first.[[266]](#footnote-266) ‘Cette floraison historique’ was quantified, in part, by Corrado Vivanti in the mid-1960s. Vivanti found 657 historical works to have been published in France between 1550 and 1610, of which 271 were first editions. More than half of the 657 books – 343 – were published in the troubled years 1560 to 1588.[[267]](#footnote-267) In 1574 Charles de la Ruelle feared that Frenchmen spent so much time reading history that it might harm the nation.[[268]](#footnote-268) But it was the ‘bad’ history that Frenchmen read, not the time they spent reading it, that troubled Rozée. Our historian wrote not just as a victim of a period of conflict but also in order to correct the flawed views that emerged from it.

To correct was to expose the errors of others. It was an approach hardly likely to contribute to the Bourbons’ strategy of pacifying the state and reconciling enemies. Rozée should therefore be placed apart from those historians in the generation after 1594 who wrote partly to help posterity avoid repeating mistakes, and also to build confidence in the new regime by emphasising the value of tolerance (accepting what could not be altered), the generosity of the king’s clemency, and the opportunity to refuse to remember the past.[[269]](#footnote-269)

Implicit in the process of correction was a commitment to truth. Rozée was intent on delivering ‘une histoire véritable’.[[270]](#footnote-270) Borrowing a tale from d’Aubigné, he felt obliged to reassure the reader: ‘ie veux adiouster un conte… lequel ie n’eusse pas mis entre les veritez de cete histoire, s’il n’eust esté grandement affirmé par un autheur qui a fort prisé son histoire: et l’a escrit avec beaucoup d’attestation’.[[271]](#footnote-271) It was good to keep the reader interested, but only provided there was intellectual honesty; thus, regarding Mayenne’s post-Ivry letter to Sixtus V, the historian commented, ‘Voicy pour le contentement du lecteur, et pour connoistre la verité de ce qui se passoit, la copie de cette lettre, traduite du texte italien le plus juste qu’il m’a esté possible’.[[272]](#footnote-272) It followed that unsafe evidence was inadmissible. Thus some letters published by Goulart, ‘qu’il suppose avoir esté escrites par le duc de guise a quelques uns de ses amis et par les parisiens aux habitans des autres villes’, were omitted by Rozée because he was unconvinced of their veracity.[[273]](#footnote-273)

For Rozée the truth which needed more than any other to be established concerned the integrity of the *Ligue*. There was considerable ground to be made up.‘Ne sont-ce pas icy ces bravaches qui devoyent manger tout le monde et qui ont réduit la France en désert? Les voilà saccagés telle qu’une charogne foullée aux pieds et en pire estat: *leur mémoire fait peur*, l’odeur de leur nom empuantit l’Europe,’ Simon Goulart had raged about the *Ligue*.[[274]](#footnote-274) Dissecting what hehas called ‘le catéchisme de la Ligue “populaire”’, Descimon has shown that *Ligueurs* had been considered ‘“la lie du peuple, gens ruinés ou qui avaient sujet d’appréhender la rigueur de la justice” (de Thou), “lie du peuple hormis quelque bien petit nombre” (Pithou), “gens de basse condition” (Pasquier), “tous gens de sac et de corde” (*Satyre Ménippée*)’.[[275]](#footnote-275) L’Estoile had spotted within *Ligue* circles a wide range of ‘vices’: ‘hatred, violence, faithlessness, zeal, gluttony, bad-neighbourliness, ignorance, youth and homosexuality’.[[276]](#footnote-276) Extending his analysis of the Politiques’ ‘légende noire’, Descimon has discerned three types of alleged social disqualification concerning the *Seize*: mediocrity of social status as demonstrated by lowly jobs; indebtedness and constant penury; and base family backgrounds. Even worse, contemporaries alleged that the *Seize* were immoral, guilty of ‘luxure et sodomie, violence, ambition et envie, avarice voire brigandage, incertitude de la foi religieuse…’.They were also young and lacked intelligence, blindly following the Guises, the Pope and Spain.[[277]](#footnote-277)

That these Politique views became commonplace after the 1590s is not surprising, for as they set about re-building the monarchy it suited the Bourbon victors to remind observers that in place of turmoil they alone had offered stability and the possibility of peace and prosperity. When histories came to be written in the century after the events, ‘s’est propagée comme vérité historique une légende noire’.[[278]](#footnote-278) It helped, of course, that alternative contemporary views were hard to find. The defeated were swift to destroy incriminating evidence. Pro-*Ligue* writing after 1598 was a lonely – and potentially risky – enterprise. The significance of Rozée’s work – understandably not written until some of the dust had settled, and left anonymous and unpublished – lies largely in the rarity of its sympathy for the *Seize*.

Though occasionally unable to resist exposing what he considered to be the failings of royalists, the historian sensibly chose proclamation of the merits of the *Ligue* as the safest means of dissenting from prevailing opinion. Acting only ever with integrity, the Paris *Ligue* had brought about a deep transformation of society. As evidence of this reading of the troubled years Rozée drew not only on the *Seize*-inspired resilience shown during the long siege but also on the apparently spontaneous turning to God of ordinary people after the Blois murders: ‘Pendant que les uns travailloient a paris a l’asseurance de leur party,’ he wrote, ‘… combien de luxe y fut reformé; et certes ces actions de devotion, et de pieté si ferventes et si frequentes, exercées par toutes sortes de personnes, ne monstroient que l’ambition eust porté ces gens ala rebellion’.[[279]](#footnote-279) Far from being rebels, the *Ligue* had been the salt of the earth.

Rozée’s voice went unheard. With the king’s entry into Paris on 22 March 1594 the Paris *Ligue* had collapsed.[[280]](#footnote-280) Many of its leaders swiftly fled the capital, and over one hundred more were expelled a few days later. Only bishops – notably Rose of Senlis – were allowed to stay.[[281]](#footnote-281) In the following months the *Sainte Union* across the country disintegrated. With the *Béarnais* on the throne, it was to be only a matter of time until his former co-religionaries would be granted a range of religious, civil and political privileges. All seemed lost, but the seed sown in tears was to be reaped with joy: the seventeenth-century Catholic renewal has been interpreted by Denis Richet as evidence of ‘une révolution silencieuse’.[[282]](#footnote-282) The *Ligue* had given birth to the *dévots* – to the French Catholic Reformation. Tridentine principles at last began to bear fruit in France.

Richet wrote about the *Ligue*’s role in the *acculturation* of the ordinary people of Paris. Twice in the second half of the sixteenth century Paris witnessed an outpouring of religious devotion. Between 1555 and 1562, God moved amongst the Protestant notability. Drunken revellers found themselves over-awed when they heard prayers and psalm-singing in the streets, and the unconverted well-to-do looked on in grudging admiration.[[283]](#footnote-283) A generation later, such was the popular mood created by the *Seize* that the murder of the Guise brothers unleashed a huge outpouring of grief marked by public prayers and processions. During the siege of 1590 piety lent fortitude to the starving capital as, guided by powerful preachers, Parisians turned to God in prayer and supported one another – acted as a ‘commune’ – in the time of suffering.[[284]](#footnote-284)

Evidence of apparent spiritual renewal in *Ligueur* Paris is plentiful. Richet identified ‘l’adoration publique et perpétuelle du Saint Sacrament,... la pratique de l’oratoire où était exposé le corps du Christ’, and, alongside the official processions, ‘un nouveau type de *procession* accompagnée du chant de cantiques’.[[285]](#footnote-285) We know that repentance and a desire for holiness were prominent aspects of the city’s aspiration to mirror the heavenly Jerusalem.[[286]](#footnote-286) And there is evidence that public behaviour adapted to the moment: Pierre de L’Estoile noted of Shrove Tuesday 1589 – ‘... Tant que le jour dura, se firent à Paris de belles et dévotes processions au lieu des dissolutions et ordures de masquarades et quaresme prenants qu’on y souloit faire les années précédentes’.[[287]](#footnote-287)

Children – symbolic of innocence and purity – were particularly important in some manifestations of the new spiritual awareness. Back in 1572 they had been allowed to cut the head and genitals from Coligny’s body; on 10 January 1589 tens of thousands of barefoot boys and girls stamped out candles before the church of Sainte-Geneviève, thus pronouncing the excommunication of the tyrant.[[288]](#footnote-288) It is likely that this occasion and others left a lasting impact on a generation of young minds. Part of Rozée’s purpose was to try to ensure that this heritage was not forgotten.

In seeking to sustain co-religionaries, Rozée was similar to Goulart. For both, the motivation to write was grounded in the Christian faith. Both disregarded the prohibition on recalling things past, spectacularly in Goulart’s case. On the other hand, unlike Rozée, Goulart had the opportunity still to change the course of events through his writings. Amy Graves has shown the very close correlation between the publishing history of the first two volumes of the *Mémoires de la Ligue* and the concurrent efforts to raise support in Germany for the French Protestant cause.[[289]](#footnote-289) Additionally, again unlike Rozée, Goulart’s role as a pastor allowed him to adopt a prophetic tone. As ‘the prophet of France’ – Samuel du Lys – he felt free to reassure his readers that the wicked would one day be brought to judgement. Rozée, who doubtless shared the sentiment, was not in a position to make such pronouncements.

Goulart wrote partly because later generations had to understand: ‘…nous présentons quelques-unes [des remonstrances et traités]… pour plus ample intelligence des choses, & pour donner contentement à la Postérité’.[[290]](#footnote-290) Rozée was like-minded: he would tell the story, ‘laissant a ceux qui viendront après nous la liberté d'en juger’.[[291]](#footnote-291) He expected to be read: ‘Toute la postérité’, he believed, would be astonished by the deeds of Jacques Clément.[[292]](#footnote-292) And, ‘il est raisonnable que la posterité sache par ma plume les termes de la resolution prise en cette assemblée’ (the gathering of senior royalist clergy at Chartres in September 1591).[[293]](#footnote-293)

Come the 1620s, Rozée was probably in his sixties.[[294]](#footnote-294) His heavy dependence on written sources suggests that he had needed to re-script his memory. In his fondness for proverbs he was a man who felt the need to point the reader to former (solid) values. His references to the atmosphere of the *Ligue* period suggest that he considered his world to have changed considerably. The interval between events and narration had helped him see how disordered Paris had become, especially after the Brisson affair. He was dismayed as he remembered ‘qu’alors il y avoit en france une grande liberté de mesdire de l’eglise et du pape; et confondre toute religion’ – a remark provoked by his recall of the opening words of an unequivocally gallican publication of 1611, *Philipiques*.[[295]](#footnote-295) Towards the close of the *Histoire*, Rozée found the word ‘licence’ helpful in the explanation of his thinking.[[296]](#footnote-296) It was ‘la licence du temps’ which had beguiled *Ligue*-supporters into referring to August as a lucky month.[[297]](#footnote-297) The author cited responses to Mayenne’s *Déclaration* of December 1592, one of which – *La fleur de lys* – he named, as evidence of ‘la licence d’escrire’ which ‘estoit lors tres grande’.[[298]](#footnote-298) As a man who placed a high value on the maintenance of good order, our author may have been prone to exaggerate the breakdown of publishing conventions in Paris once the *Ligue* began to disintegrate. All the same there is little doubt that censorship did indeed collapse after 1591.[[299]](#footnote-299) Our historian was aware that even within the Sorbonne all was not well. Jean Prévost and Gilbert Génébrard ‘escrivirent l’un contre l’autre par livres imprimez et vendus publiquement’.[[300]](#footnote-300)

While royalist, official historiography flourished in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries Protestant and *Ligueur* works became unwelcome. Censorship began to be an issue.[[301]](#footnote-301) Writing in the 1620s Rozée still had the opportunity to publish at once – we do not know why he did not.[[302]](#footnote-302) Official scrutiny before the 1630s was at best a motor to ‘self-censorship’ in a world where writings could still be published anonymously and without indications of place of publication. Nonetheless, in 1625 (and 1630), Scipion Dupleix took apart the *Inventaire general de l’histoire de France* by Jean de Serres (1597) / Jean de Montlyard (1598), exposing error, line by line, with a veritable obsession.[[303]](#footnote-303) Some writers chose to publish outside (or *as if* outside) France.[[304]](#footnote-304) One such publication, the *Admonitio ad regem* (1625) ‘denounced Louis XIII’s alliances with heretical powers as contrary to Scripture’.[[305]](#footnote-305) It was quickly rebutted by Richelieu’s aide, François Langlois, *sieur* de Fancan: his *Le miroir du temps passé* (1625) branded the *dévots* as former *Ligueurs.* Rozée’s window of opportunity was closing.

Circumstances had been easier a generation earlier, when Henri IV had actively campaigned to win the hearts and minds of French Catholics. Barbara Diefendorf has discerned three stages in that campaign. At first, the king adopted a patient approach which combined public demonstration of his commitment to the Catholic faith with a firm but tactful offensive against unconvinced clerics. Then in 1598 the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes called for a more prominent strategy, which the king delivered both through vigorous promotion of the royal will and by his well-publicised delight in the Catholic debating victory at Fontainebleau in spring 1600. Finally the king was active in supporting groups working for Catholic renewal, allowing the return of the Jesuits in 1603 and taking a close interest in the foundation of houses of reformed communities.[[306]](#footnote-306)

Several reasons may be suggested why Rozée wrote in the 1620s. Leaving aside demands of family and work which doubtless had absorbed his energies in earlier decades but of which we have very little knowledge, we may suppose he had been stirred by the outpouring of histories that had followed the turn of the century.[[307]](#footnote-307) What would have been more natural than to respond to the Politiqueaccounts of de Thou, Pasquier and L’Estoile, all of which saw publication in 1621 (in L’Estoile’s case, first publication)?[[308]](#footnote-308) By writing recent, not contemporary history, the historian was able to take into account works that had already appeared.[[309]](#footnote-309) Moreover, having lived through and beyond the wars, Rozée had no doubt needed time to make sense of what had happened. Two decades of peace had provided space for him to reflect, to open up the recent past, to take a second look at the documentation that the wars had spawned, and above all to separate truth from falsehood.[[310]](#footnote-310) In addition, Rozée wished to express his judgements freely; this would have been virtually impossible if he had written straight after the events when many of the players were still alive. Lastly, it was perhaps his wish to avoid the unnecessary hurt that writing too soon after the wars might occasion. Palma-Cayet feared upsetting his readers with horrific stories; Davila would later compare the historian to a surgeon opening old wounds; even as late as the 1680s Maimbourg was almost apologetic about what he would have to write.[[311]](#footnote-311)

Of course, by the 1620s Rozée was also in a position to use hindsight. Compared with memoirists whose contiguity to events usually allowed little scope for historiographical comment, Rozée had greater possibilities. He examined the veracity of earlier predictions: *un discours* of January 1591 had turned out to be ‘une vraye profetie de ce qui s’est depuis fait’.[[312]](#footnote-312) His knowledge of outcomes gave him opportunities to criticise earlier commentators: thus he remarked that Julien Peleus ‘[avait] perdu le jugement’ when he wrote about the regicide a generation after the event.[[313]](#footnote-313) Hindsight allowed Rozée to comment on how the descending mist of time had distorted interpretations. The battle of Arques, ‘qui s’est depuis rendu fameuse… n’ait esté qu’une escarmouche’, whilst, conversely, he noted, of the Parisians’ heroic efforts to prepare for the great siege, ‘les escrivains ont si peu parlé’.[[314]](#footnote-314) Regarding Henry IV he added, ‘il estoit plus sage que ceux qui ont controlé ses actions vingt ans après’.[[315]](#footnote-315)

In his sixties, Rozée might wait no longer, if his memories were not to die with him. What he actually wrote was *un lieu de mémoire*. Pierre Nora has shown that the *lieu de mémoire* comes into being when the *milieu de mémoire* has gone.[[316]](#footnote-316) The real environment, characterised by true and unself-conscious shared memory, once over, becomes the subject of history which then sifts and sorts historical evidence. There immediately begins a ‘conquest and eradication of memory by history.’[[317]](#footnote-317) Nora explained, eloquently…

…if history did not besiege memory, deforming it and transforming it… there would be no *lieux de mémoire*. Indeed, it is this very push and pull that produces *lieux de mémoire* – moments of history torn away from the movement of history, then returned; no longer quite life, not yet death, like shells on the shore when the sea of living memory has receded.[[318]](#footnote-318)

For Rozée the real environment of collective memory had been shattered by a series of blows in the years 1589-94. Among these we may number Mayenne’s suppression of the *conseil-général de l’union*, the duke’s refusal to deal firmly with the Politiquesin 1591 and the swift retribution he brought upon Brisson’s murderers, the collapse of the *Ligueur* Estates-General, the abjuration and entry of the king, and the proscription of key *Ligueurs* in the aftermath. Put simply, gone were the heady days of the *Ligue*’s noble defence of religion over state, and worse had followed. By 1620, writer after writer had painted the *Ligue* as the villains. History was fast destroying memory, but the *lieu de mémoire* could provide a refuge.

Nora distinguished between ‘true memory’ (involving ‘unstudied reflexes’) and memory which is ‘voluntary and deliberate, experienced as a duty, no longer spontaneous; psychological, individual and subjective…’.[[319]](#footnote-319) In writing the *Histoire*, our historian was delivering the latter. Although collective memory was as irretrievable as the reality of the past, Rozée’s work could still achieve two objectives. First, it could honour the *Ligue*, building for them ‘un tombeau avec des mots.’[[320]](#footnote-320) Secondly, it could bring him peace, for he had blocked ‘the work of forgetting’.[[321]](#footnote-321)

**Chapter 4: The Sources**

In the early seventeenth century there were no prevailing orthodoxies as to how historians should present evidence. No conventionsdictated the use of citation or annotation. Often only polemical and didactic purposes governed how sources were used. Given this background it is no surprise that the *Histoire* presents difficulties to the modern critical reader: Pierre Rozée made no annotations, and his intermittent citations seem not to have been subject to self-imposed rules. Undeterred, in this chapter we seek to identify the key sources which the historian consulted when writing the part of his work that Valois did not edit in 1914; we re-constitute, as it were, a shelf of his book-case. In addition we consider Rozée’s special position as an eye-witness in *Ligueur* Paris, and we investigate how his views affected his deployment of the evidence at his disposal.

A stray example illustrates the challenge. In February 1592, in Normandy, a court jester with a penchant for fighting, one Chicot, found himself confronted by the *Ligueur* comte de Chaligny.[[322]](#footnote-322) A skirmish ensued in which Chicot managed to wound Chaligny in the leg before receiving a blow to the head that shortly ushered him into eternity. Analysis of Rozée’s handling of this episode reveals the challenges facing the modern reader seeking to understand the historian’s approach to sources. Rozée’s introduction to the skirmish is not promising: ‘on a dit sur le rapport d’un homme, qui a voulu plustost mesdire que bien escrire’.[[323]](#footnote-323) This imprecise strings of words is immediately problematic. It is not only that names are suppressed. Given the distinction made between ‘mesdire’ and ‘bien escrire’, we have to consider whether Rozée had in mind speech rather than text? If so, is that speech to be understood as a general characteristic or as the exact content of the ‘rapport’? If the former, was the ‘rapport’ itself spoken or written? And what should we make of ‘on a dit’? Are we dealing with the view of an individual or with widely held opinion? And again, was Rozée listening to or reading *ce que* ‘on a dit’? Put simply, are we dealing here with one, two or three texts – or none? On this occasion it turns out that the unnamed man *qui a médit* was Jacques-Auguste de Thou, and that we are dealing with written text.[[324]](#footnote-324) But elsewhere *dire* (also *parler, discourir…*) refers to spoken rumour, hearsay – and we will find that what Rozée heard was an important source. Meanwhile, more problems arise from the example above. Why did the historian not name de Thou? Was it out of respect for a renowned author with whom he was about to disagree? Had he simply forgotten where he had read the story? Why did Rozée name some contemporary writers but not others, and why – in some cases – did his practice vary regarding individual authors? Comparison of Rozée’s account of the Normandy episode with de Thou’s raises another difficulty: it becomes obvious that the point of Rozée’s account was to take issue with de Thou’s claim that for a brief interval Chicot managed to hold Chaligny prisoner. ‘Pour estre creu,’ observed Rozée, ‘il falloit rendre le conte probable et monstrer comment un homme blessé d’un coup mortel a la teste en avoit pu prendre un autre prisonnier qui n’estoit blessé qu’en la jambe.’[[325]](#footnote-325) This observation is encouraging – we are dealing with an author who took the trouble to interrogate his sources – but it also raises the question of the extent to which the historian’s source selection was driven by the desire to correct perceived misrepresentations, especially any that might taint the reputation of the *Sainte Union* (or of the house of Lorraine, from whom Chaligny issued).[[326]](#footnote-326) There is throughout the text a remarkable clustering of sources around key controversies. Was Rozée’s text merely reactive? Would he have written if others had not done so first? Given his handling of the Chicot-Chaligny encounter, we will need to consider how often and how subtly he adapted the material at his disposal, and for what reasons? And why did he write about what could be considered minor episodes? Answers to these questions will help us determine what mattered to this author, and what his values were.


By far the most comprehensivenarrative of *Ligueur* Paris, the *Histoire* was written by a sympathiser who stayed in the capital throughout the period. Choosing neither to follow the judges who left for Tours, nor to retire to the relative safety of the family property at Château-Thierry, the historian saw and heard much of what went on.[[327]](#footnote-327) As a trained lawyer, this eye-witness and listener was doubtless able to identify, retain and later recall details of significance. The *Histoire* yields less visual than oral evidence – perhaps because most of what Rozée saw, being seen also by many others, was hardly noteworthy, whilst what he heard was less likely to be common knowledge; perhaps too because barristers did not spend time in the streets. In any case it is reasonable to suppose that it was what he had seen that enabled him to state that ‘quelque graveur qui avoit envie de gagner une pièce d’argent fit imprimer en taille douce le portrait de ce jacobin nommé frere Jacques Clement, et fut debité a paris’.[[328]](#footnote-328) It is likely that Rozée saw (from a distance) Enrico Caetani (1550-1595) once or twice in the papal legate’s first week in Paris in January 1590. And Rozée knew all too well about the long siege of summer 1590:

...la lecture de céte misere ne peut estre que deplorable a ceux qui la lisant sans passionneserontentierementdéspouillésd’humanité ; mais on a parlé de ce siege en tant d’endroits et ceux qui le sçavoient le moins en ont ecrit si diversement, que i’ay pensé estre de mon devoir, comme temoin oculaire, d’en dire a ceux qui viendront apres nous, ce qui est dela verité.[[329]](#footnote-329)

Though more discreet than Pierre de L’Estoile, Rozée occasionally shared snippets of conversation he had heard. He was confident that he recalled ‘quelle language on parloit lors a Paris.’[[330]](#footnote-330) He noted that after the regicide people were claiming that the engraver of Clément’s portrait was acting under instruction. Thinking later about the siege, he felt contemptuous of ‘ceux qui on dit que les maisons des ecclesiastiques estoient fournies de vivres pour un an.’[[331]](#footnote-331) We learn that, after the king’s retreat from the Paris suburbs back in early November 1589, ‘selon le bruit commun on disoit que ceux qui avoient esté d’avis de faire venir le Roy n’y avoient rien gagné.’ A few weeks later, news had reached Paris that Ponts-de-Cé and Verneuil had fallen to the royalists. It was a talking point: ‘quelques uns disoient que ces villes s’estoient rendües, d’autres qu’elles avoient esté vendües.’[[332]](#footnote-332) Other topics of conversation were whether help from Spain was welcome, whether Rouen was going to be given as short-term security to the English Queen, whether circumstances could allow the crown to withdraw the right of preferment from papal control – and whether, in challenging the seigneur de Villars to a duel, the earl of Essex knew perfectly well that he would be turned down![[333]](#footnote-333) Rozée was not gullible. He did not believe everything he heard: ‘ceux qui avoient fait faire cette execution [that of Brisson], on dit, qu’il y avoit eust des commissaires deputez pour connoistre de cette affaire, et qu’ils avoient donné sentence, laquelle ils avoient seulement executée; ce que ie passe pour n’en sçavoir la verité.’[[334]](#footnote-334) The historian treated hearsay – *aucuns on dit* – with caution. The rumour that, directly after the loss of his brothers, Mayenne had received a letter from the king assuring him that he was safe, did not ring true: ‘cela est fort incertain, et convient peu avec l’estat lors present des affaires, et ce qui s’estoit passé’; the historian then proceeded to explain how the rumour must have arisen.[[335]](#footnote-335) It was thoughtful writing.[[336]](#footnote-336)

Clearly the word *dire* can mean *écrire*; it has indeed been defined in part as ‘énoncer par écrit’.[[337]](#footnote-337) Rozée himself wrote ‘Nous avons dit’ in reference to earlier pages of his own writing; elsewhere he used the device to introduce the writings of others: ‘ceux qui… ont depuis ecrit ont dit…’.[[338]](#footnote-338) Nonetheless, to ignore *dire* as the spoken word is to miss an important area of Rozée’s sources. Consideration of oral evidence from a society pre-dating sound recordings takes us into a minefield. In using such material, Rozée was relying not on what was spoken, nor on what he heard, but on what he remembered hearing (and even then it would often surely have been hearsay). Two issues of the creation of the *Histoire* come into play at this point. Did Rozée use commonplace books, and was ms. 10270 written over a long period? Answers to these questions (see chapter 2) affect the value of the oral evidence. What we know is that at the PalaisRozée worked in the company of well over a thousand other legal practitioners. While working – or rather resting – there, he had the opportunity, in any of several *buvettes* (refreshment rooms) to share views or just to listen in to conversation while enjoying a refreshing wine and bread and butter, tongues, sausages, and so on.[[339]](#footnote-339) From the *Parquet*, the latest pamphlets could be bought – and discussed.We may imagine how the conversation must have flowed. Since when did lawyers not have opinions?

Attending the adjacent parish church of St Séverin and going about his daily life, Rozée heard – and doubtless contributed to – conversations about the issues of the day. The historian had a choice of routes from his home in the rue du Foin to the Palais(see Figure 4, p. 100). The shortest led him via the rue de la Harpe to the river. From there, as he used



the pont St Michel and then the rue de la Barrillerie (today’s boulevard du Palais), he passed several bookshops.[[340]](#footnote-340) Was not the purchase of a book a time also to exchange views with the seller? To reach the rue de la Harpe, Rozée could walk down the rue du Foin and turn right, or he could take what was probably a quieter route via the rue de Boutebrie (where illuminators of manuscripts had once worked and perhaps still did) and the rue de la Parcheminerie (‘[rue] toujours vouée à la fabrication et à la vente des éléments du livre’): more opportunities for conversation.[[341]](#footnote-341) No doubt the historian talked as he walked to or from work with others whose employment was at the Palais.[[342]](#footnote-342) Other routes were available. As the parish church was closer to the rue St Jacques than to the rue de la Harpe, it is possible that Rozée sometimes took that slightly longer way round towards the Palais, especially as it gave access to so many bookshops: Philippe Renouard has identified 160 bookshops that existed on the great arterial road to the south of the river.[[343]](#footnote-343) Rozée must have met and conversed with his fellow worshippers at the church of St Séverin. Among these were eleven of the *Seize*. The fact that across his whole work Rozée named only one of them – Roland Hacte – is less likely to mean that he had not known the others than that he did not wish to attract any adverse comment against their descendants (or possibly that names had slipped from his memory – six of the eleven, Roland Hacte included, were dead before 1597, thus almost a quarter of a century before Rozée wrote).[[344]](#footnote-344)

As well as verbs denoting speech the text contains other indicators that oral evidence was being used. We know that Rozée had his ear to the ground in summer 1589 because he tells us that his reading of the *Mémoires de la Ligue* allowed him to verify what he had already heard as rumours: Goulart’s words ‘approchent assez bien au bruit qui courut lors entre les ligueurs, lequel aigrit beaucoup de personnes quand ils entendirent qu’ils auroient a obeir a un prince lequel ils tenoient pour heretique’.[[345]](#footnote-345) Nor was Rozée the only writer using hearsay: ‘Ceux qui ont escrit la mort de ce prince, selon le bruit qui en couroit lors a paris et au milieu de la division, ont dit… ’.[[346]](#footnote-346) Again, when the news of the regicide reached the streets, ‘ce coup n’estonna pas seulement ceux qui lors en ouirent parler, mais ceux qui en ont depuis oüy le discours et consideré les circonstances; elles sont si grandes et si diverses, que tel en a escrit trente ans apres…’.[[347]](#footnote-347) Where Rozée described events or opinions that cannot now be located in other written texts, it might simply mean that he used written sources that have not survived; alternatively – and especially if the setting was Paris – we may suppose that he was relying on what he heard.

The *Histoire* alludes to such moments. We read that Mayenne’s sojourn in Paris (November 1589 – February 1590) was ‘le sujet de plusieurs discours’.[[348]](#footnote-348) The question of Spanish involvement in France was a topic on which even ‘le commun de Paris’ (probably non-writers) had things to say.[[349]](#footnote-349) Three homely stories testifying to *Ligueur* integrity during the worst days of the siege have the ring of truth; it is not unlikely that they were widely shared in *Ligueur* circles, and that in those days of shared suffering Rozée had the opportunity to hear them.[[350]](#footnote-350) A discussion in the king’s council on 6 July 1591 – a ‘petit dialogisme’ regarding the Edict of Mantes which Rozée could not have overheard but nonetheless reported in close detail – seems to have become a topic of conversation: ‘chacun en discourit à sa phantaisie’.[[351]](#footnote-351) On momentous occasions, when to remain silent would have been dishonourable but to publish would have been unthinkably dangerous, people talked. Thus the death in custody of the bishop of Evreux – which surely caused outrage – led to comment.[[352]](#footnote-352) Even more inflammatory was the execution of Brisson’s assassins; Rozée noted the exchange of recriminations, the priests’ refusal to carry on preaching – ‘ce qui faisoit murmurer le peuple’ – and the points made subsequently during Mayenne’s frosty discussions at the Sorbonne.[[353]](#footnote-353) In providing these examples the historian allows us to listen in to the authentic voices of the *Ligue*.

The substance of the *Histoire* derived from material that Rozée read. In 1914, Charles Valois was impressed by the range of the historian’s written sources across the two volumes of the *Histoire*.[[354]](#footnote-354) He noted that they had been drawn from both sides of the religious and political divides. Prominent Protestant historians such as Simon Goulart, Agrippa d’Aubigné and Jean de Serres stood beside the Catholics Pierre Victor Palma-Cayet, Jacques-Auguste de Thou and Julien Peleus, and *Ligueur* pampleteers were pitted against royalist controversialists that included François Hotman and Michel Hurault du Faye.[[355]](#footnote-355) There was considerable variety of source-type, as histories and polemic *libelles* were complemented by letters, royal edicts, *arrêts*,declarations and *pamphlets dialogués*.[[356]](#footnote-356) Here was a historian who had read widely. However, when it came to how precisely the sources had been deployed, Valois – a graduate of the *Ecole des Chartes*, we recall – was sharply critical. He noted that the historian hadtreated his sources unequally, copying out some passages in full while only summarising others, failing to consult the well-known histories in parallel, and giving the names of some authors as readily as he concealed others. In addition, he found our author apt to dismiss some sources too summarily while relying on others too credulously. Valois’ sharpest criticism was reserved for the historian’s heavy dependence on Goulart whose work, he argued, he had overtly scorned but covertly plagiarised. We consider that Valois was surely right to draw attention to the range of Rozée’s sources but was over-critical when it came to how they were used.[[357]](#footnote-357)

The religious conflict that raged through France after 1562 generated a massive literature.[[358]](#footnote-358) By 1620, Rozée faced a vast array of sources. ‘Pource que les sermons estoient oüis de peu de gens,’ he lamented, ‘on vint aux escrits qui estoient leus de tous, la liberté d’escrire s’estant augmenté[e] par la diversité des partis, lesquels… jamais ne manquent d’escrivains pour faire leurs excuses, publier leurs raisons et justifier leurs actions.’[[359]](#footnote-359) He noted that discussion over the Catholic succession in particular ‘produisit une infinité de livres’.[[360]](#footnote-360) The murders of the Guise brothers had had the same effect: ‘Comme a paris il n’y avoit si pauvre escrivain qui ne mit la main a la plume pour detester ce qui avoit esté fait a blois… aussy se trouva[-t] il assés de gens dedans le party du Roy pour justifier ses actions et condamner celles du deffunct duc de guise…’.[[361]](#footnote-361) The historian had to be selective. We are in a position to consider the choices he made and the reasons behind them. In the second volume of the *Histoire* Rozée made over 300 references to written sources. Except in a few obscure cases, the references carry sufficient clues for us to deduce what works that he had studied, read, dipped into – or at least knew about.

That is not to say that the historian made the task simple: the *Histoire* does not readily yield its secrets. In the second volume – 541 pages – Rozée provided the title-and-author combination of just three sources: Thomas Beaux-Amis’ *Remonstrance au peuple françois* (1575), the *Ad assertionem seu famosum libellum contra clericos… responsio* (1589), penned by three authors of whom Rozée named only Jean Prévost, and Jean Taffin’s *L’Estat de l’Eglise* (1605).[[362]](#footnote-362) We might suppose that these works were being honoured – but in fact Rozée disagreed with the views of all three.

We have already noted that the historian had no fixed policy regarding citations. Sometimes he was reticent because he needed to protect a witness’s identity. Although he regularly referred to Jean Boucher, he took care not to connect him with the *De justa abdicatione*: ‘l’autheur... ie ne nomme point, pour ce que des lors il ne voulut point se nommer.’[[363]](#footnote-363) It was an understandable reticence, for in the *Ligue* years Boucher had been ‘un de ceux qui parloient plus franchement [des] affaires; et pour ce plus mal voulu de plusieurs, et espié de plus prés en ses actions’.[[364]](#footnote-364) Diminishing freedom of expression in the early seventeenth century was doubtless a sufficient reason for Rozée to avoid naming names, even a generation after the events. In exile in the Netherlands Boucher had continued to write in support of tyrannicide and of the sovereignty of the people.[[365]](#footnote-365) When in 1625 there appeared in Paris ‘un pamphlet virulent et anonyme’ against Louis XIII, Boucher had trouble convincing detractors that it had not been penned by him.[[366]](#footnote-366)

Elsewhere too the historian was circumspect. Regarding a declaration issued by senior royalist clergy at Chartres in September 1591, Rozée had no compunction about including the text but he stopped short of naming the signatories – ‘ie n’ay point pensé estre a propos de nommer icy ceux qui la signèrent’.[[367]](#footnote-367)

Rozée’s favoured way of exercising caution was to use a term of plural anonymity – a double concealment of identity. Thus we find: *ceux qui ont escrit*, and *ceux qui ont un peu entendu les affaires*, and *quelques uns ont rapporté* – and variations of the same. Of course, it would have been helpful to the modern historian if Rozée had named all his sources – but it is better to have them un-named than not at all. Apart from their intrinsic value, un-named sources serve as a testimony both to the outpouring of historical writings and the acuteness of sensitivities provoked by the religious conflict.

Rozée was occasionally elaborately obscure: ‘un huguenot qui a dedié son histoire a ceux du magistrat de la ville de dordrecht’ turns out to be Jean de Serres.[[368]](#footnote-368) It is possible that Rozée was unaware, or at least uncertain, of who the author was, for he believed that Protestant writers habitually covered their tracks. They gave their works false titles which could ‘faire apparament coniecturer que les autheurs en estoient catholiques’.[[369]](#footnote-369) Moreover they had long practised concealment of their identities: ‘…quand Calvin ne vouloit pas paroistre en ces escrits il se faisoit appeller alcuin, ainsy beze reprit le nom de thebault de May; celuy qui a fait le recueil des escrits de ses compagnons se fit appeller samuel dulis’.[[370]](#footnote-370)

At first the sheer mass of Rozée’s source material is daunting – but it soon turns out that many of the sources cluster around key issues.Although a description of where clusters begin and end is not always possible – there are overlaps – the densities of the clusters are safe indicators of Rozée’s priorities. Accordingly he was particularly exercised by the 1589 regicide, making – in the space of twenty-five pages – around thirty references (including quotations) to writings as diverse as the standard works of Palma-Cayet and Goulart, and pamphlets published by the Paris *Ligue*.[[371]](#footnote-371) Another key episode was Caetani’s time in Paris in spring 1590: in just a handful of pages reference is made to the content of eight *Ligue* pamphlets, two royalist responses from Tours and four letters written by senior royalist clergy.[[372]](#footnote-372) The historian’s narrative of the 1591 stand-off between royalist Catholics and Rome includes thirty references (in a sixteen page-section) to a wide variety of texts: *lettres patentes*, a couple of *Ligue* pamphlets, *arrêts* from the Parlements at Tours and Châlons, papal bulls and a range of royalist treatises.[[373]](#footnote-373)

For other controversies, typically ones localised and/or of short duration, source-clusters remain dense but are smaller. Thus, dealing with allegations of misbehaviour by Catholic troops at Tours in May 1589 Rozée called on Jean Boucher’s *De justa abdicatione*, the anonymous *Conseil salutaire* and Jean de Serres’ *Inventaire*.[[374]](#footnote-374) Later, in response to a controversy that broke out in Chartres, the historian referred to Charles de La Saussaye’s *Annales Ecclesiæ Aurelianensis* to refute Peleus’s assertion that the confidentiality of the confessional might be over-ridden in cases of suspected treason.[[375]](#footnote-375) Later again, narrating the fate of Claude de Sainctes, bishop of Evreux, who lost his life in 1591 for defending a bishop’s right to decide who preached in his diocese, Rozée quoted several pertinent documents which had been brought together in one *Ligueur* collection published in Rouen and Paris, as well as using de Thou’s reference to the bishop’s personal papers.[[376]](#footnote-376)

Some sources were excluded by virtue of Rozée’s own perceptions and priorities. The historian did not think much oftheoretical writings, ‘des discours inutils et ennuyeux qui n’ont autre fondement que des imaginaires suppositions, que le foible esprit d’un escrivain fait sortir de sa plume pour tesmoigner bien souvent son ignorance’.[[377]](#footnote-377) He believed that the inclusion of *discours* made histories too long – this, even though he later confessed, ‘ie ne m’amuse point a penser si mon livre sera gros, mais s’il sera bon’.[[378]](#footnote-378)

Other sources could be included, but not without adverse comment. Rozèe was very apt to criticise evidence that he could not trust. ‘Au moins le faut il faire convenir aux circonstances du temps et à la verisimilitude de ce qui s’est passé’, he remarked in exasperation about the history produced by some (unnamed) writers.[[379]](#footnote-379) His rejection of letters that an earlier writer had supposed had been written by the duc de Guise after the *journée de barricades* was typical of his thinking: ‘elles conviennent si peu a l’estat des affaires, a ce qui s’estoit passé à la veue de tant de gens, et en un mot elles ont si peu de verité, qu’elles ne meritent pas d’estre raportées en une histoire. Le contenu des lettres… n’estoit lors n’y possible ny veritable’.[[380]](#footnote-380)

Rozée accepted that mistakes and confusion had sometimes arisen because his predecessors themselves had worked from ‘de mauvaises mémoires’.[[381]](#footnote-381) Forgetfulness was forgivable: those who had written that the duc de Guise had weapons at his disposal at the time he was set upon at Blois ‘ont escrit sur des mauvaises mémoires’.[[382]](#footnote-382) But the historian accorded short shrift to writers who offered retrospective advice to the king, ‘vingt ou vingt-cinq ans aprés sur des choses qu’ils n’ont pas veües’.[[383]](#footnote-383) Reflecting later on the king’s situation after the Blois murders, he wrote, ‘Ceux qui ont escrit vingt ans après ce que le Roy devoit faire alors n’ont jamais esté assez instruits de ce que le Roy pouvoit en ces nouveaux et non prevus evenements’.[[384]](#footnote-384)

The historian rarely had a good word for Protestant writers, judging their texts to be characterised by calumny.[[385]](#footnote-385) Simon Goulart was a particular target because of his decision to include in his *Mémoires* a distasteful and pernicious piece about the corpse of the chevalier d’Aumale in January 1591:

Un miserable ministre, qui a escrit le premier les memoires de la ligue, escrivant contre verité ce qui se passa lors (et il a esté suivy par ceux qui ont escrit plus de vingt ans apres) a dit que quand on le tira du cercueil, ou il estoit en cete esglise, on trouva le cercueil plein de rats et de souris, et la dessus force vers de mesdisance a la huguenote.[[386]](#footnote-386)

Elsewhere, those who wrote ‘d’une plume purement huguenotte’ about Henry III’s last moments were guilty of caring more about the condition of the kingdom than a dying man’s soul.[[387]](#footnote-387) And in a passage on the subsequent debate over recognition of the new king we sense Rozée’s disgust with Huguenot ministers…

lesquels aprez avoir preché cinq[uan]te ans durant la rebellion contre les rois souz le pretexte de la religion, aprez avoir defiguré le royaume par les guerres qu’ils y ont suscitées, ceux la mesmes lesquels, en l’an 1559 vivant le Roy François second en un livre souz le titre de deffence contre les tirans, avoient traité jusques où s’etend l’obeissance aux Rois, a quelles causes et par quels moyens on peut prendre les armes a qui il apartient de les authoriser, si l’on peut apeller les etrangers, si eux peuvent donner secour legitimement, ceux la dis-ie, ne pouvoient trouver assez d’imprimeurs pour quelque fois souz leurs noms d’autrefois souz les nom des catholiques auxquels ils estoient joints, publier qu’il ne se peut imaginer une cause suffisante pour laquelle il soit permis aux suiets de lever les armes contre leurs princes souverains.[[388]](#footnote-388)

Here Rozée principally took issue with the cynical opportunism of the Protestants, but an underlying concern was the assault upon monarchy contained in ‘un livre souz le titre de deffence contre les tirans’. At first sight the title seems to be an allusion to the *Vindiciae contre tyrannos*, but the reference to Francis II suggests an earlier work, perhaps Etienne de La Boétie’s *Discours de la servitude volontaire* which had been begun after the 1548 tax riots in the southwest, re-worked in the 1550s, and finally brought to a wider audience through the third volume (1577) of Goulart’s *Mémoires de l’Estat de France sous Charles Neufiesme*. Perhaps it was Goulart’s inclusion of the work that was at the back of Rozée’s mind? We are reminded of the paradox whereby Goulart was both the explicit and implicit target for a good deal of Rozée’s criticism – to the extent that we might even see the *Histoire* as having been written in reaction to the Protestant minister’s *Mémoires* – but also a key source from which he drew a lot of material, albeit selectively.

It was particularly galling for Rozée when Catholic writers let the side down. Whereas defamatory statements were normal in Protestant accounts, ‘on s’est estonné de les oüir dans les escrits de ceux qui ont voulu faire croire qu’ils sont catholiques’.[[389]](#footnote-389) Could a Catholic have written the *Conseil salutaire*? – Rozée was doubtful.[[390]](#footnote-390) In the wake of the bull excommunicating Henry III the condemnation of Sixtus V launched by the ‘hérétique’ Michel Hurault was understandable – but ‘on s’estonna fort de voir ceux qui faisoient profession de la religion catholique combattre cette bulle’.[[391]](#footnote-391) And the Catholic historianJulien Peleus, wrote ‘[avec] sa plume mouillée dans une mauvaise encre’.[[392]](#footnote-392)

The Peleus reference can detain us a moment because it throws into relief the difficulty we face in trying to read Rozée’s mind.[[393]](#footnote-393) Approximately the same age as Rozée, Peleus was a prolific and published author and a leading barrister in the Paris Parlement. Under Henri IV he became *conseiller d’Etat* and *historiographe*. Was there jealousy? Rozée may have known his colleague in person, and he knew, or knew of, his *Histoire de Henri le Grand*, from which he quoted. There are other possible reasons why our author took him to task. Peleus wrote immoderately: Jacques Clément was a wild dog from hell. Our author rarely indulged in hyperbole. Worse still was Peleus’s claim that Henri III had died in the very room where the fateful decision had been taken in 1572 to launch what became known as the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. The claim, which clearly had immense propaganda value, had been borrowed from the earlier Protestant writers Jean de Montlyard, Simon Goulart and Jean Taffin.[[394]](#footnote-394) It was a slur, suggestive of guilt by association: ‘il a dit tout seul en une ligne plus de mal de ce prince, que tous les ligueurs n’ont fait ensemble’. Rozée himself was always careful to show respect for the last Valois. That the claim was also inaccurate Rozée demonstrated by lifting from the ‘plus discret’ Palma-Cayet a passage in which the royal chronographer dismissed the claims by the Protestant writers, pointing out that the house in question had been in the possession of a private individual, one Chapelier, in 1572 and had not been purchased by the queen mother until after the death of Charles IX.[[395]](#footnote-395) Another issue was the timing of Peleus’s *Histoire*. Rozée noted its recent appearance (the two volumes covering *Ligueur* Paris had been published in 1616). That it was in the public’s eye surely added urgency to his task: soon there would be few alive whose memory alone could serve to correct perceived misrepresentations of the past.

If Rozée was occasionally aware of shifting perceptions, he was positively fastidious about detail. His readiness to correct was not that of the kind of memorialist (generally amateur) who might become obsessed by certain details at the expense of the overall picture but that of an apologist sensitive to injustices inflicted by malicious misrepresentation of his cause. He pointed out that the author of *La fleur de lys* was wrong to claim that Mayenne, in his *Déclaration* of December 1592, had attributed the death of Henry III to ‘un coup du ciel’. Presumably Rozée sensed malice behind the ‘error’, for the implication was that the duke had been covering up a *Ligue* conspiracy in which Clément was a mere pawn. Rozée corrected the error by quoting Mayenne’s precise words: the regicide resulted from ‘un coup malheureux d’un seul homme, sans l’ayde ny sçeu de ceux qui n’avoient que trop de passion dela desirer’.[[396]](#footnote-396) Elsewhere too, Rozée had his red pen at hand. Those who wrote that the troops accompanying Caetani to France ate meat during Lent (1590) were evidently wrong: civic leaders had alreadywelcomed Caetani to Paris on 8 January.[[397]](#footnote-397) Allegations that during the great siege the Paris clergy had a year’s supply of food hidden away were based on ‘de mauvaises mémoires’.[[398]](#footnote-398) Even in the darkest days, children were not eaten: ‘ceux qui l’ont escrit ne le sçavoient pas bien’.[[399]](#footnote-399) And, contrary to what some had written, Mayenne and Parma parted on good terms after the siege: ‘ceux qui ont dit le contraire se sont fort trompez et ils confondent le premier voyage avec le second voyage quand le duc de parme vint au secours de Rouen’.[[400]](#footnote-400)

Inaccuracy was not the only focus of Rozée’s criticism of the writings of others about the *Ligue*. In an extensive passage he explored the tension which emerged in 1591 between royalist Catholics and *Ligueur* ultramontanists.[[401]](#footnote-401) Rozée sought to expose the triviality and woolly thinking of royalist Catholics by interrogating their witnesses: the rulings from their Parlements at Châlons and Tours (6 June and 5 August respectively) and the declaration issued by royalist clergy at Chartres in September. Why did they bother to score points against Gregory XIV (‘se disant pape’, according to the judges at Tours) when they intended in any case to use the device of *appel comme d’abus* to disregard papal bulls? If they believed the pope was self-styled, and if the *procureur-général* at Châlons required a general council to investigate the circumstances of his election, what was the point in sending François de Luxembourg duc de Piney as their ambassador to Rome? And what precedent could possibly exist to justify the questioning of the validity of a papal censure by the very people against whom it had been issued?

In similar vein – very much in court-room mode – our author catechised three further royalist publications: Charles Faye’s *Discours des raisons et moyens…* (1591),Denys Godefroy’s *Maintenue et défense…* (1592) and François de Clary’s *Philippiques contre les bulles…* (1611). The first of these treatises was firmly dismissed: even if Faye’s arguments (of which Rozée listed several) had had relevance in the distant past they could not simply be transposed into the different circumstances of 1591. In the second work, Godefroy had accused Rome of keeping France’s civil wars alive, claimed that the only winner would be Mahomet, and argued that because neither Jesus, Peter nor Paul had tried to remove rulers the pope’s excommunication was contrary to God’s laws.[[402]](#footnote-402) Later, in the fifth of twenty-six *nullités* which he had established in order to claim that papal authority was limited, he argued that just as a father might not punish his son without first giving him a hearing, so the pope, spiritual father of the whole church, could not excommunicate Henri of Navarre. Had the king been asked to give an account of himself? No. Had he been invited to Rome? No. Yet in the Garden, even God searched for Adam.[[403]](#footnote-403) Rozée’s answer to all of this was to cite a riposte to Godefroy’s work in which it was argued that the Huguenot’s approach might work at the Palaisbut cut no ice in ecclesiastical discipline.[[404]](#footnote-404) In the *Philippiques* (published in 1611 but probably begun two decades earlier) François de Clary had developed a familiar theme: Gregory XIV had been elected ‘par toutes les corruptions de l’ambition Espagnolle’, and it was time for French judges to stand up to him: ‘Le Magistrat ne seroit-il plus Magistrat? Quand est-ce donc qu’il useroit de son pouvoir s’il chomoit icy?[[405]](#footnote-405) Again, Rozée was dismissive: the work exemplified the licence and confusion of the times, and demonstrated how ‘beaucoup de gens coururent pour tirer la barbe du lion qui estoit abbatu’.[[406]](#footnote-406)

Rozée played his trump-card regarding the 1591 jurisdictional stand-off by producing as his own witness Matteo Zampini, an Italian jurist (and ardent *Ligueur*) who had been in the entourage of Catherine de Medici and who, according to de Thou, wrote *Ad Calumnias, …responsio* at the behest of the *Ligue*. De Thou was not impressed by Zampini’s treatise: ‘il défendit une mauvaise cause par des raisons encore plus mauvaises’.[[407]](#footnote-407) By contrast, Rozée evidently found Zampini’s views helpful. Popes were not chosen through the intrigue of powerful nations, but rather were called by God. Excommunication of French kings in the past had been profitable in bringing them to repentance and thence to absolution. Those bishops who in the past had argued that the pope’s powers of excommunication were limited had themselves been schismatics; consequently their views could be discounted. Royalists who asserted that French kings had special privileges always stopped short of revealing their sources, for, in truth, ‘ne pouvoir estre excommunié d’aucun, mesme du pape, n’est pas un privilege duqu’el un chrestien et baptisé soit capable’.[[408]](#footnote-408)

Analysis of Rozée’s exploration of sources regarding the 1591 controversy has vindicated Valois’ 1914 observations: Rozée drew on a range of sources (and source-types) from both sides of a major debate. At the same time he has treated them unevenly – Zampini was named whilst royalist polemicists were not, and the presentation of the Italian’s views occupied three times the number of words devoted to the collective views of Faye, Godefroy and de Clary. Our author has demonstrated both his flawless Catholic orthodoxy and his caution when dealing with the king’s party.

Rozée knew the dangers of both supposition and exaggeration: ‘ie n’escris point les circonstances de cette execution [the punishment of Brisson’s assassins], ...pourceque… ceux qui, a la relation d’autruy, en ont escrit selon leur passion, ont dit sur ce suiet comme sur beaucoup d’autres plus qu’il n’en a esté.’[[409]](#footnote-409) Elsewhere he accused earlier writers of displaying ‘trop de vicieuse passion’.[[410]](#footnote-410) Allegations in an unnamed *discours* that in the winter of 1587-88in the *comté* de Montbéliard troops under the command of the duc de Guise had committed ‘toutes les cruautez qu’un esprit sans religion se peut imaginer’ had to be refuted; not only were the claims ‘contre vérité’, they had been maliciously characterised in the *discours* as ‘les inhumanitez et fureurs brutales de la ligue’.[[411]](#footnote-411) Outraged, Rozée rounded on the authors: ‘à ces gens là, les heretiques sont impecables, et ils ne veulent pas reconnoistre qu’il n’y a point de cruautez au monde qui esgallent celles des heretiques, car l’heresie et la cruauté engendrées en l’abisme de l’enfer furent produites au monde en un mesme moment’.[[412]](#footnote-412) Seeking to reinforce the point, the historian later named a *Ligue* pamphlet that charged the Protestants with committing terrible cruelties at Niort in December 1588.[[413]](#footnote-413) Rozée acknowledged that Protestant historians had denied the charges – but not before provocatively observing that a description of the atrocities ‘seroit horreur au lecteur et scandale à la douceur naturelle des françois’.[[414]](#footnote-414) Of course, in suppressing the title of the anti-*Ligue* source and advertising that of the one attacking the Huguenots, Rozée manifested his own partiality. It is to this issue that we now turn.

Rozée called on many witnesses. Two clues help us understand those to which he accorded the most weight: his words and his choices. The historian frequently provided explicit reasons, usually stated directly before or after the text of an imported source. These clues are valuable at only a particular level: they pertain to the exact source in question and cannot be used to establish an overall policy. Rozée’s choices – the actual inclusions – are more useful. Here we find a simple rule of source selection: material that was given prominence invariably witnessed to the integrity of the *Ligue*.

The prominence of a source-extract is a safe guide to Rozée’s thinking. We have in mind here the amount of space accorded to a source, rather than its positioning in the whole text (which was largely governed by the chronological framework). The longest extracts in the *Histoire* all favoured the *Ligue*. Around a dozen of the imports in the first volume stand out because of their length: they required four or more sides of handwriting. These long excerpts are representative of what we may take to be Rozée’s own views. Studied comparatively, these sources sought to honour both the king (in the period before the Blois murders) and the law; they also sought to validate *Ligueur* thinking. Thus, prominent in the first volume are the appeal to Henri of Navarre to return to the Catholic fold, and the *Ligue* Declaration of 31 March, both of 1585.[[415]](#footnote-415) A third distinctive document was the *Ligue*’s 1587 statement of objectives and strategies.[[416]](#footnote-416) Even Palma-Cayet in his disapproval had acknowledged that this work revealed the heart of the *Ligue*.[[417]](#footnote-417) In Rozée’s view, it showed that the *Ligue* had been born amongst ‘[de] bonnes gens’ sustained by ‘leur zèle à la religion’.[[418]](#footnote-418) A similar pattern emerges from the second volume. Here the longest passages of source material were the *Mémoires et instructions…* given to the *Ligue* delegation to Rome and the papal bull excommunicating Henri III, both of 1589, along with a *Supplication faicte à Henry de Bourbon* (1591) and a letter from the duc de Parme to the Catholic King, dated 15 January 1592.

These long extracts, imported into the two volumes of the *Histoire*, convey central themes of *Ligueur* thought. The *Ligue­ –* the *Seize* in particular *–* were men of substance and integrity pursuing clear and worthy goals. It was because of his perceived determination to rid France of heresy and due to his self-restraint on the *journée des barricades* that the duc de Guise was a hero. By contrast, Henri de Valois could not be supported because of his irreverence in church, his collaboration with Protestants, and – above all – because of the Blois murders. Mayenne, saviour of the *Ligue* in early 1589, was to be blamed for its collapse after 1591. Because preservation of the Catholic faith counted for more than affairs of state, the law of Catholicity over-rode the Salic law in the disputed succession. It argued that Henri de Navarre must convert.

A good example of a source serving the historian’s purposes is his inclusion of a reply to a letter from Henri III in spring 1589. In the weeks and early months after the Blois murders Henri III was dismayed by the degree of hostility expressed against him from the capital. Amongst the preachers who were castigating him from the pulpit was one who had once been his confidant, Dom Bernard, dean of the Feuillants.[[419]](#footnote-419) We will see that Rozée had good reasons to reveal to his readers the content of the correspondence that the two men exchanged, a disclosure that was possible because of the publication in June – by two publishing houses at once – of the monk’s reply to the king.[[420]](#footnote-420)

It is highly unlikely that Rozée had seen the king’s initial letter, yet he purported to quote from it:

[V]ous avez, [wrote the king], trop reconnu par vos paroles publiques et particulieres le mensonge de ceux de la ligue, pour maintenant mettre en vostre ame un tel bourreau qu’une asseurée damnation, les favorisant par vos actions et discours indignes d’un bon chrestien et catholique, parlant mal de moy qui me connoissez jusques dans l’ame pour plus et meilleur catholique que ceux qui me veulent nier pour Roy.[[421]](#footnote-421)

This quotation is of interest. It reminds us of a handicap that hindered Rozée in his source selection: there could be sources that he wished he had seen at first hand, but which he only knew from copies or, still less satisfactorily, from summaries made by other commentators, often from a hostile perspective (typically from Goulart or Palma-Cayet). In the case of the king’s letter, it is clear that Rozée deduced its content from dom Bernard’s reply: the words given above are the only words from the king’s letter that Rozée quoted, and the only direct quotations of the king’s sentiments that Dom Bernard’s letter included. Furthermore, the quotation allowed Rozée to introduce a contentious issue which, because he was in charge of what his witnesses ‘said’, was bound to be resolved by a verdict that he favoured.

The issue was clear. The king claimed that because he had ruled as an exemplary Catholic the *Ligue*’s withdrawal of allegiance was wrong. Dom Bernard disagreed. Onlookers who considered the king to be a good Catholic must have been bewitched, for Henri had encouraged a revival of the Protestant heresy: ‘c’est vostre connivence qui l’a nourrie, vostre faveur qui l’a confirmée, et vostre protection qui l’a haussée’.[[422]](#footnote-422) The true (Catholic) faith would be destroyed… ‘si la bonté de dieu n’y pourvoit promptement de puissant remede’.[[423]](#footnote-423) Aware of the approaching disaster, could onlookers remain dumb? ‘O silence desloyal, O traistresse connivence, laquelle non seulement l’esprit chrestien deteste, mais les oreilles mesmes abhorrent’.[[424]](#footnote-424) Rejection of the king had been inevitable: ‘la raison manifeste fondée en la necessité de sauver l ’Estat, pour lequ’el est le Roy, non l’Estat pour luy… nous absout de vostre obeissance, voire nous oblige de la reietter’.[[425]](#footnote-425) For his part, Henri should renounce the throne and repent – in a monastery.

Although Rozée provided less than twenty per cent of Dom Bernard’s letter, that part was a faithful representation of the whole. It would have been hazardous to misrepresent it, given that the text was well-known and in the public domain. But in any case the letter served the historian’s purposes exactly, for it allowed him to express his own thoughts in the 1620s, albeit through the words of others. Just as *Ligueurs* could not have remained silent in 1589 – what they would have regarded as ‘[un] silence desloyal’ – so Rozée had to refute the unjust attacks against them that had appeared since. The letter was a perfect vehicle because the points Rozée picked out amounted to ‘un abregé des raisons de ceux de l’union’.[[426]](#footnote-426) Above all, it expressed the arguments of those who believed that religion mattered more than affairs of state – even if it meant rejecting a crowned king. All of this, Rozée could claim with impunity, for the thoughts were those of *ceux* (not *nous*, for there is careful distancing going on here) *de l’union*, and the words were not his but dom Bernard’s.

Though less important than the preservation of the Catholic faith, respect for the Parlementand the law was close to Rozée’s heart and affected his source selection. In 1588 a prominent lawyer had made a statement that appeared to justify the *Ligue*’s take-over of Paris; three decades later, Rozée seized upon it. The lawyer responsible, almost certainly Guillaume du Vair, a judge in the Paris Parlement, had delivered the *Discours des Barricades* shortly after the king’s flight to Chartres in mid-May. Rozée had good reason to cite this work at length. At the very time he was writing, du Vair held the highest legal office as *garde des Sceaux*, had become a respected figure in dévot circles, and had also maintained his reputation as a loyal royal servant – thus he deserved attention.[[427]](#footnote-427) Moreover, the *Discours* appeared to show good understanding of what had been a time of great uncertainty: ‘Du Vair… fit paroistre la bonté de son jugement ez affaires publiques’.[[428]](#footnote-428) In his statement, the judge had shown understanding of the innocence and suffering of the people. He had considered an Estates-General to be the way forward: ‘[L]à s’advisera des moyens pour la conservation de la religion; là s’asseurera la succession du roïaume; là se composeront les differens d’entre les grands; là se rendra le repos à la france, et là d’un commun consentement sera pourveu des moyens de faire executer ce qui sera resolu’.[[429]](#footnote-429) In a critical sentence near the conclusion of the *Discours*, du Vair had stated that kings must be respected and obeyed ‘autant que l’honneur et le service de dieu le peut permettre’.[[430]](#footnote-430) It was this final rider, claimed Rozée, that ‘les ligueurs, qui rapportoient toutes les actions à la conservation de la religion souz l’authorité du Roy, prirent a leur avantage’.[[431]](#footnote-431)

Later in the first volume of the *Histoire* Rozée again showed his admiration of du Vair by providing the text of the judge’s moving plea to the king to consider an exchange of prisoners (after the purge of the Parlement). In the event, the plea was never presented.[[432]](#footnote-432) Admiration was also the motive when the historian chose to include the text of a speech written by an *avocat du roi*,Antoine Séguier.[[433]](#footnote-433) The speech – it too undelivered – had been prepared for reading in the Parlement on the occasion of the publication of the king’s *lettres patentes* of early August 1588 whereby the duc de Guise was appointed commander-in-chief of the king’s armies.[[434]](#footnote-434) We may surmise that for Rozée the text had the merits of showing great respect for both the king and Guise, whilst at the same time celebrating the value in troubled times of the Parlement, ‘un element eternel aux affaires qui tendent tousjours contrebas’.[[435]](#footnote-435) It was a speech that should not be forgotten: ‘je crains que l’autheur pour sa modestie ne laisse perir une si belle piece avec beaucoup d’autres’.[[436]](#footnote-436)

Rozée did not name Séguier, who was no favourite of the *Seize*. That he chose to include the draft of the *avocat*’s speech suggests that, at least in the case of leading men of the law, it was possible – temporarily – to put religious differences to one side. A similar conclusion may be drawn from the historian’s decision to quote (in the second volume of the *Histoire*) a significant part of Jean Bodin’s letter from Laon. As a Catholic and a lawyer, Pierre Rozée – born a generation after Bodin – had a similar background to his predecessor, but the two men’s views differed. Describing Bodin’s advocacy of religious tolerance in 1576, Rozée did not hesitate to express strong opinions, describing him as ‘homme fort esgaré en matière de religion’, and stating that many others called him ‘le diable de Laon’.[[437]](#footnote-437) The historian favoured the view, expressed by the king at the Blois Estates-General, that military conflict was inevitable because the Huguenots would certainly fight for their existence. Thus, already in 1576, Bodin’s orthodoxy was suspect.

Why, shortly after the Blois murders, had Bodin, the defender of royal sovereignty and religious freedom, become an apologist for the rebellious and intolerant *Ligue*? Paul Lawrence Rose has judged the transformation to be more apparent than real.[[438]](#footnote-438) Bodin was not so *ligueur* as the *Ligue*. His support for the rebellion was based not on a legal doctrine of resistance but on circumstance: the universality of the uprising. Furthermore, unlike the *Ligueurs*, who opposed Henry III partly because he had failed to deal with heretics, Bodin’s justification was that the king was a God-forsaken tyrant.[[439]](#footnote-439) The *Ligue* wanted Protestantism driven out of France, but Bodin saw all religious war as evil.[[440]](#footnote-440) On the succession debate, Bodin made no appeal to the law of Catholicity so popular amongst *Ligueurs*. In his view, Navarre should convert to Catholicism not to qualify for the throne but as a matter of prudence.[[441]](#footnote-441)

Rozée’s doubt about Bodin’s religious orthodoxy – already apparent from his account of 1576 – surfaced again when he described Laon’s decision to join the *Sainte Union* in 1589. Claiming that the town’s decision hung in the balance for a month, Rozée blamed key royalists for obstructing the wishes of the people.[[442]](#footnote-442) In particular, he singled out Bodin – ‘plus dressé aux affaires politiques de l’estat, qu’en la voye de son salut’. But there was some ambivalence. Rozée recognised that this was the time too when – at least in appearance – Bodin had himself capitulated to the *Ligue*. The *procureur du Roy* had expressed his loyalty to the (purged) Paris Parlement, aired his disappointment with the king, and warned that, as Henry III was ruler number ‘63’, ‘le nombre climaterique’, great changes were to be expected.[[443]](#footnote-443)

It was in the second volume of the *Histoire* that Rozée most showed his interest in Bodin’s views. After describing the arrival of Cardinal Caetani in Paris in January 1590, he digressed in order to reproduce parts of a letter published by Bodin in Laon on the twentieth of the same month. An outline of this letter can help us understand why Rozée found himself drawn to a writer whose religious views he had so far found to be unsound.

Two purposes had motivated Bodin to write: he wanted to vindicate his recent conversion and to advocate a way through the succession crisis. Although his letter was a personal address to an esteemed friend – probably Barnabé Brisson in Paris – Bodin appears to have had a wider audience in mind. He began by defending his desertion from the royalist cause on both political and moral grounds. His political argument was simple: ‘estant dans une ville il est très nécessaire, ou estre le plus fort, ou du party du plus fort, ou ruyné du tout’. Bodin proceeded to show that though the royalists seemed to be strong, both military superiority and force of argument lay with the *Ligue*. Furthermore, joining the *Ligue* was morally justified because it extended protection to the royalists of Laon at a dangerous time: ‘...voyant le Régiment du Capitaine Bourg prest d’entrer en ceste ville pour tuer, piller, saccager ceux que l’on appelloit Realistes, ie vous confesse que ie passay carriere, me souvenant de la maxime tant vulgaire, qui dit que le salut du peuple est pour loy souveraine’.[[444]](#footnote-444) Having justified himself, Bodin painstakingly developed the argument for recognition of Charles, cardinal de Bourbon, as rightful king, and suggested that Henri de Navarre’s best course of action would be to recognise his uncle as Charles X while himself taking steps to convert to Catholicism.

We can suppose that Rozée, committed *Ligueur* and one of the *Seize*, found Bodin’s conversion to the *Ligue* cause and his support for the Cardinal de Bourbon very satisfying. It is true that, before quoting from the letter, and perhaps with a thought to his own reputation, he referred to Bodin as ‘politique’ and, noting that the Huguenots considered him to be *Ligueur*, asserted: ‘moy je crois qu’il ne le fut jamais’. Nonetheless, he used the letter thoroughly – quoting about forty per cent of its four thousand or so words – and at no stage did he disagree with the points made.[[445]](#footnote-445) Although he borrowed fairly evenly from across the letter, he focused particularly on those sections dealing with the preponderance of *Ligue* strength and with the succession, indicating that he was at one with Bodin on the letter’s principal tenets. He clearly respected Bodin’s legal expertise, referring to him as an ‘avocat consultant’ and an ‘esprit clairé au dessus du commun’. Perhaps most strikingly, he argued that Bodin’s ideas were relevant and his prophecies fulfilled: ‘Je veux raporter la substance [de la lettre]; pour ce qu’outre ce qu’il a dit pertinament de l’etat des afaires *lors* present, il semble avoir prevû et predit une partie de ce qui est arivé, tant au general du parti que pour le particulier du president Brisson’. After citing Bodin’s prediction that the troubles would end after five years, he added, ‘Ce que nous avons vu arriver’.[[446]](#footnote-446)

What are we to make of the uncopied sixty per cent? Although Rozée had adequate editorial reason to summarise, some of his omissions point to shades of difference between the two lawyers. Rozée wrote tellingly, ‘Voyla une partie de ce que contient la lettre de Bodin que je n’ay pas voulu raporter toute entiere pour quelques considerations’.[[447]](#footnote-447) Comparison of the text of the *Lettre* with Rozée’s account suggests that there were matters the historian found uncomfortable. Rozée made no mention of the two men, undoubtedly *Ligueur*, who nearly killed Bodin, nor of Captain Bourg, who Bodin had claimed was ‘prest d’entrer en ceste ville pour tuer, piller, saccager ceux que l’on appelloit Realistes’.[[448]](#footnote-448) The historian found it equally convenient to skip over Bodin’s effusive praise for the duc de Mayenne: ‘Prince doüé de tres-grandes vertus tant de corps comme d’esprit: un des meilleurs Capitaines de la Chrestienté qui oncques n’assiegea place qu’il ne l’aye prise...’[[449]](#footnote-449) Despite these partisan omissions, there are other places where Rozée seemed to forego clear opportunities to use Bodin’s *Lettre* to advantage. Caution guided him to omit Bodin’s reference to some of Navarre’s soldiers ‘que l’on appelle les dragons, plus horribles aux petits enfans que n’ont esté ceux de la fabuleuse antiquité...’ and the historian was equally careful to skirt round Bodin’s long condemnation of the late king’s crimes at Blois.[[450]](#footnote-450) In all, we can say that Rozée treated the *Lettre* fairly.

Indeed fairness is the over-riding characteristic of the *Histoire*: it is above all an honest piece of work. Like all history it has a viewpoint. Rozée wrote to repair the damage done by what he perceived to be the dishonesty of others. It was an enterprise rooted in courage and conviction. If the historian lacked erudition – and his work, polish – we nonetheless have the only substantial, Paris-based, sympathetic history of the *Ligue*. Unlike Goulart, collating leaflets at a safe distance (in Geneva) and too soon after the events to draw durable conclusions (all six volumes of the *Mémoires* had appeared by 1599), Rozée took a long view and possessed an authority conferred by personal experience. Rozée had read widely, he produced a long and coherent narrative skilfully structured around dominant events, and he tested sources against each other, by comparison with established histories and for their consonance with his own experiences as one of the *Seize*. It is to the Paris *Ligue* leadership that we now turn.

**Chapter 5: The *Seize***[[451]](#footnote-451)

The *Ligue* that Rozée supported in 1589 had several antecedents. In the very first paragraph of his work, Rozée asserted that it was ‘la ligue protestante’ [qui] ‘a esté cause que la ligue catholique a esté faite’.[[452]](#footnote-452) Thus, whilst early Catholic associations derived both a model and a raison d’être from earlier Protestant associations, they also viewed themselves as explicit manifestations of a ‘contre-ligue’.[[453]](#footnote-453) Heretics (by definition), not Catholics, had introduced division. Perhaps wary of sounding defensive, Rozée followed this opening gambit with a firm assertion (‘ce n'est pas mon dessein d'escrire l'histoire de la ligue protestante’) and an announcement of his agenda: ‘il faut encore sçavoir ce que ça esté que cette ligue catholique… quel a esté son progrez, quelles ses actions, comment elle a achevé et quels effets elle a produit’.[[454]](#footnote-454) Not once in the following eleven hundred pages will our historian be less than proud of the movement to which he belonged.

After brief references to fledgling leaguesin the 1560s, Rozée’s first substantial example, and – by ‘tradition historique’ – the starting point for *Ligue* history, was the 1576 ‘Ligue de Péronne’.[[455]](#footnote-455) This league, established to resist Protestantism, was soon adopted by Henri III. By insisting that the king had thus become the driving force behind the association, Rozée sought to register his (and *Ligueurs*’) loyalty to the crown and to dispel any notion that the duc de Guise had been either separatist or covetous of the throne in the mid-1570s.[[456]](#footnote-456) He noted the support in Paris from Jean Delabruyère, a wealthy merchant, and his son Mathias, Pierre Hennequin and Nicolas Luillier (all senior lawyers), as well as the opposition led by Christophe de Thou on behalf of leading judges. Rozée’s arrangement of the discussion of the issues at stake made his own opinions clear. Far from being divisive among Catholics the *Ligue* had goals that *all* Catholics must surely share. As for judges who were offended at not being consulted in advance, the simple answer was that if their views had been sought, the *Ligue* would never have got off the ground.[[457]](#footnote-457)

In clawing back many of the liberties extended to Protestants by the Edict ofMonsieur, and by banning leagues, the 1577 Edict of Poitiers rendered the 1576 League largely redundant and ushered in a period of relative calm. ‘Mais la Ligue, si elle hiberne, est loin d’être mourante’.[[458]](#footnote-458) In June 1584 the heir apparent, the duc d’Anjou, died. ‘[L]e funeste accident arrivé au prince,’ wrote the historian, ‘…ouvrit la boîte de laquelle sont sortis tant de maux, qui ont depuis affligé ce Royaume.’[[459]](#footnote-459) Defending the re-formation of the princely *Ligue*, Rozée focused on the obvious danger of a Protestant succession (Henri III had no sons and little likelihood of any in the future) and on the integrity of the *Ligue*’s leaders – particularly of Henri duc de Guise.[[460]](#footnote-460) His main interest, however, lay in developments in the capital; it was where he lived, and what he experienced.[[461]](#footnote-461) There, in the years 1584-89, the efforts of the *Ligue* were largely directed against the king himself.[[462]](#footnote-462) At the least, Henri III must name a Catholic successor and create some form of ongoing union of Catholics.[[463]](#footnote-463) Writing in the early 1620s, a time when the Bourbon monarchy was struggling to assert royal authority, Rozée exercised his customary caution; instead of directly criticising Henri III he targeted those advisers who, in apparently caring more for matters of state than for religion, had been called Politiques.[[464]](#footnote-464)

For Rozée, Politiqueswere Catholics ‘qui n'estoient point de la ligue’.[[465]](#footnote-465) They thought more about earthly than heavenly matters, and they considered religion to be a mere adjunct of the state.[[466]](#footnote-466) They held that, because men could not be compelled to believe, warfare against heretics was pointless, even counter-productive.[[467]](#footnote-467) With no claims to personal expertise in theology, Rozée countered Politiques’claims by citing preachers and the church fathers. Because believers must seek first the kingdom of God, it followed that church must matter more than state, and that a prince’s primary duty was to nourish faith. To allow freedom of conscience would be to incur God’s wrath. Politiqueswho claimed that heretics should be engaged in discussion, not punished, were wrong, for St Jerome, reflecting on the Arian controversy, had stated that a first spark of fire must be immediately extinguished and that diseased flesh had to be promptly cut away. Those who argued that any attempts to revoke edicts of pacification would unleash conflict should be reminded that the early church had chosen to obey God rather than men. In allowing space to heretics, the Politiqueswere like household servants providing burglars with ladders with which to break into the master’s home.[[468]](#footnote-468)

It is evident that Rozée had a good grasp of Politiquethought. This is unsurprising in view of the attention given to the topic by *Ligue* pamphleteers in the late 1580s.[[469]](#footnote-469) It is likely that the term came into common usage in the capital only after the Blois assassinations, for there were very few Protestants in the city, and until late 1588 Catholics had hopes of winning the king’s commitment to the securing of a Catholic succession. Writing about Paris in early 1589, Rozée used the term – only infrequently – to denominate those who persisted in standing by the king; we read that *from that time* they came to be called ‘politiques ou catholiques Royaux’.[[470]](#footnote-470) In the months before the regicide they were not always easy to identify.[[471]](#footnote-471) For most of his second volume (as we will see in chapter 6) Rozée’s references to the Politiques became substantial in frequency, in texture, and in venom. For now, we return to the early *Ligue*.

Rozée described how in 1584 the Paris *Ligue* developed ‘une forme de Conseil’, a steering group, small in number, that met from time to time and in several places, ‘in secret’ (but closely watched by ‘plusieurs personnes’); at the same time, across France, at least 300 other towns joined the *Ligue*.[[472]](#footnote-472) Support in Paris was soon strong: 700-800 mourners attended the funeral of the leader Charles Hotman in 1587; the *conseil* grew from eight to twelve members (so that correspondence with other *Ligue* towns could be properly maintained); the authorities considered it advisable not to intervene.[[473]](#footnote-473) Compared to Nicolas Poulain’s report, and especially to the *Dialogue*, Rozée’s account of the clandestine *Ligue* (1584-88) offers little factual detail; it is likely that the historian had little or no role in the movement in the early years.[[474]](#footnote-474) Nonetheless, his writing conveys a strong sense of conviction and pride. He recalled how a scornful senior judge had been roundly admonished by *un Ligueur*: ‘Monsieur nous faisons tout ce que nous pouvons pour conserver nostre religion, …faisant vostre devoir, vous feriez ce que nous faisons.’[[475]](#footnote-475) He gave space to an early *Ligueur* statement of objectives and *modus operandi* which revealed clarity of vision and a desire that all Catholics, being one community, must work together.[[476]](#footnote-476) Above all, Rozée shared the pride of *Ligue* independence: ‘ny le pape ny le Roy d’Espagne, ny les princes de la maison de Lorraine (les desseins desquels ne leur estoient point communiquez) n’avoient point fait leur ligue, …ainsi que les bonnes gens d’entre eux l’avoient commencée, leur zèle à la religion continuée et leur conseil disposée…’[[477]](#footnote-477)

Among ‘les bonnes gens’ were *Ligueur* preachers.[[478]](#footnote-478) Rozée chose to focus particularly on the robust defence of the *Ligue* position mounted by Jean Boucher in early summer 1587 when, on 5 June, the priest had an audience with the king.[[479]](#footnote-479) Although the origins of Rozée’s account of the conversation are murky, one historian’s observation that at this time ‘Boucher n’est pas inquiété, ses collègues jouissent comme lui d’une liberté quasi sans limite’ seems reasonable.[[480]](#footnote-480) In early September, in a confrontation in the historian’s *quartier* of St Séverin, armed *Ligueurs* protected priests – Boucher amongst them – from seizure by royal authorities.[[481]](#footnote-481) Because it was suggestive of where power lay at the time, the incident has been called ‘la répétition générale, en quelque sorte, de la journée des Barricades’.[[482]](#footnote-482)

Before we consider Rozée’s thoughts on the events of May 1588, it is worth pausing to notice the effect on his *Histoire* of the dilemma he faced in these years when the *Ligue*’s principal opponent was the king. A supporter of the clandestine *Ligue*, but determined not to show disloyalty to the crown, Rozée had to marginalise or in some cases suppress material that he surely knew about, such as rising food prices and taxes, the explosion in venality, frivolous royal expenditure, the cost of royal favourites, the injustice of Le Breton’s fate, and Guincestre’s venomous sermon in September 1587. All of this was barely mentioned as Rozée worked with customary skill and prudence around difficult issues.

In early May 1588, ‘Paris was seething with discontent’.[[483]](#footnote-483) The introduction of troops into the city in the early hours of Thursday 12 sparked off the well-known events of that day, including the killing of two or three dozen soldiers, and although the next day was much calmer, it was towards the end of Friday 13 that the king panicked and fled to Chartres.[[484]](#footnote-484) Having dreamed of countless coups against the king, the *Seize* were as shocked as anybody when one finally happened.[[485]](#footnote-485) In the city in contravention of the king’s clear orders, Guise too was taken by surprise.[[486]](#footnote-486) Peter Ascoli has judged that the most convincing explanation of the events was the king’s incompetence and mis-management.[[487]](#footnote-487) This was largely the view taken by Rozée, who pointed out that it was the arrival of foreign troops that caused the disturbance, and that there had been no prior planning by the *Ligue*.[[488]](#footnote-488)

Having won the city fortuitously, the Paris *Ligue* took immediate steps to retain it. It was the first stage of a municipal revolution which would be completed at the year’s end. The Bastille and the Arsenal were seized, and militia colonels and captains who had stayed loyal to the king on May 13 were replaced.[[489]](#footnote-489) Changes took place also at the Hôtel de Ville where the leadership team was promptly sacked (and the mayor imprisoned in the Bastille); Rozée’s view was that they abandoned their posts and so *had* to be replaced.[[490]](#footnote-490) Steps were taken to protect transport routes into Paris.[[491]](#footnote-491) A lively correspondence was opened with like-minded towns.[[492]](#footnote-492) Though of *Ligueur* persuasion, Rozée was carefully equivocal about the Day’s outcome: ‘on y trouva plusieurs fautes faites de part et d’autre’.[[493]](#footnote-493) He considered that the changes had not amounted to rebellion; all had gone smoothly – ‘il n’y eust autre changement en la ville, et chacun se remit a sa fonction’.[[494]](#footnote-494) The charge of rebellion levelled later by Huguenots incensed him, coming from ‘ceux qui vivoient en la rebellion comme en leur element, preschoient l’obeissance par rodomontades…’[[495]](#footnote-495) For him the Day was ‘fameuse’ and ‘merveilleuse’; it had come out of the blue, ‘un esclair veu en une saison assez calme’.[[496]](#footnote-496) He saw that in the long term it had marked the start of ‘une longue ligne de misères, qui ont tant travaillé ce pauvre Roïaume’, but he was amazed that there had been no immediate bloodshed or looting.[[497]](#footnote-497) He observed that many believed that this day had divided the Catholics.[[498]](#footnote-498) Further speculation as to how the Day had happened was (conveniently) pointless, for who could see into the minds of great men?

In the immediate aftermath of the *journée des barricades* there was a spate of acts of *Ligueur* hostility against supposed enemies that Guise could not or would not prevent. The mainly royalist Parlementtried to woo the king back to the capital, but failed.[[499]](#footnote-499) Meanwhile the judges regarded with concern the willingness of the new *Ligueur* city government (inferior in law to the sovereign courts) to give itself new powers.[[500]](#footnote-500) Negotiations between the *Seize* and the crown led to the Edict of Union (July). By the terms of that agreement the *Ligue* won a great victory. The new city government was recognised. The succession question was resolved (in favour of the cardinal de Bourbon).[[501]](#footnote-501) An Estates-General was to be called with a view to renewing the military offensive against heretics. But for all this, the king would not return.[[502]](#footnote-502)

With the ink on the Edict of Union barely dry, and in the wake of the king’s subsequent dismissal of his foremost councillors (as demanded by the *Ligue*), the Estates-General dawned full of promise. The majority of the delegates from the first and third orders were *Ligueurs* who, if Nicolas Roland’s *Humble remonstrance* of 1588 was anything to go by, sought only to return the country to a past where, free of heresy and guided by a pure church, it had been led by a sober and God-fearing monarch.[[503]](#footnote-503) Rozée was pleased that from the outset the deliberations were ‘offered to God’. He reported that the king and all the deputies swore allegiance to the Edict of Union.[[504]](#footnote-504) Both sides agreed that France must be rid of heresy. The king told La Chapelle-Marteau that the *journée des barricades* was ‘in the past’.[[505]](#footnote-505)

But it was a false dawn. *Ligueurs* wanted to know what the prince de Conti and the comte de Soissons were doing at Blois.[[506]](#footnote-506) Negotiations over the king’s finances soon degenerated into interminable wrangling.[[507]](#footnote-507) In other sessions, no agreement could be reached on whether a converted King of Navarre could one day be King of France, nor on whether the decrees of the Council of Trent should at last be accepted. Was the *Ligue* pushing too hard, too fast?[[508]](#footnote-508) The record of an interview that took place between Henri III and Louis Dorléans in late November reveals a king who by then was feeling isolated and in despair of ever regaining his kingdom.[[509]](#footnote-509) Recent news of the Saluces incident had been unsettling.[[510]](#footnote-510) Had Guise been involved? After all, Charles-Emmanuel of Savoy was an ally of the house of Lorraine. The suspicion might well have increased the king’s fear that if he did not act decisively, he would end up being subservient to the duke.

Rozée did not speculate in the *Histoire* as to how and when the king made his fateful decision. Rather he prepared the way for the time when it would be important for the *Ligue* to demonstrate that by the Blois assassinations the king forfeited his subjects’ loyalty. He noted that some time after the *journée des barricades*, in an address to the Parlement, Du Vair had dwelt on the paramount duty of loyalty to the crown... but there had been a caveat, of interest to the *Ligue*: loyalty, yes,‘autant que l’honneur et le service de Dieu le peuvent permettre’.[[511]](#footnote-511) In murdering the duc de Guise the king had forfeited his claim on his subjects’ loyalty because the duke’s behaviour in 1588 had been unexceptionable. Rozée portrayed Guise in May 1588 as merely an unarmed plaintiiff, come to Paris solely to defend himself before the king against his detractors.[[512]](#footnote-512) He had no part in setting up the new (rebel) government.[[513]](#footnote-513) It was ‘l’innocence de sa conscience’, thought the historian, that explained the duke’s loyalty.[[514]](#footnote-514) Later Rozée dismissed out of hand the idea of any collusion between Guise and the duc de Savoie in the seizure of Saluces (August, 1588).[[515]](#footnote-515) And had not the vulnerable Guise rejected that ‘conseil sanguinaire’ which had suggested that he should strike first?[[516]](#footnote-516)

The assassinations of the duc and cardinal de Guise took place on 23-24 December 1588. Rozée was in no doubt about their importance. He considered the four hundred or so pages he had written up to that point to be just one side of a coin; ‘il y avoit de la peine à escrire d’une mesme plume ce qui est gravé sur le revers’; the king’s actions gave ‘au théâtre une nouvelle face’.[[517]](#footnote-517) The elimination of the Guise brothers was a defining moment; it may be considered to bring to a close the first volume of the *Histoire*.[[518]](#footnote-518)

When writing about the Blois assassinations, Rozée was confronting an event which seems to have had a personal impact upon him but whose significance had been overlaid in the subsequent restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. Writing with that monarchy uppermost in his mind, Rozée proceeded with prudence: ‘il y a des choses dont la memoire est deffendüe et le recit en est ennuyeux’.[[519]](#footnote-519) He spread the blame. The king’s ‘hayne extreme contre le duc et son frère le Cardinal’ (undeniable) had been ‘eschaufée par les artifices de leurs ennemis’; besides, Guise’s ‘jalousie concüe de la bien veillance publique’ had been evident.[[520]](#footnote-520)

Such restraint was not to be shown in *Ligueur* Paris after news of the atrocities was brought to the capital by one Verdiveau in the afternoon of 24 December. Shock soon gave place to outrage – and fear – as it became known that in the very place they had been received as guests – the château at Blois – the Guise brothers, one of them a senior cleric, had been cut down.[[521]](#footnote-521) Unlike after the *journée des barricades*, this time there would be no willingness to treat with the king.[[522]](#footnote-522) The *Ligue*’s focus would switch ‘from reform to revenge’.[[523]](#footnote-523)

‘Si tost qu’il [Verdiveau] fut arrivé, il avertit ceux qu’il sçavoit estre du conseil de la ligue, que nous avons dit avoir esté estably ez années precedentes…’ – thus Rozée wishes to remind us that the preponderance of power in the capital lay with the *Ligue* leadership(not with the Parlement), and that the *Ligueurs* who headed the *Bureau de la Ville*, far from being suddenly propelled into positions of authority, were well used to governing the city.[[524]](#footnote-524) The historian’s choice of words suggests that prompt and firm action ensued: the *conseil* assembled ‘en peu de temps… [ils] résolurent… en peu d’heures… à l’instant même...’[[525]](#footnote-525) An early royalist assault was anticipated. While a messenger was dispatched to the duc de Mayenne at Lyon, the citizens were issued with weapons and the city was put on a state of alert. So dark was the mood that many Parisians who had previously steered clear of radical attachments now thought again. Some decided to keep their heads low and watch. Others panicked: Rozée noted wryly that in one hour there appeared one hundred thousand new *Ligueurs* ‘lesquels le matin ne sçavoient ce que c’estoit de la ligue’.[[526]](#footnote-526)

The king’s account of Blois arrived after Verdiveau’s and was delivered to Achille de Harlay, *premier président* at the Parlement*.* It came too late: the *Seize* had already seized the initiative. Rozée tells us that on Christmas Day morning an assembly was convened at the Hôtel de Ville by *échevins* Nicolas Roland and RobertDesprez.[[527]](#footnote-527) It was attended by presidents of the sovereign courts, several royal officers and some *notables bourgeois*.[[528]](#footnote-528) Opening the debate, Harlay called for continued obedience to the king and for the governorship of the city to remain in the hands of René de Villequier. Even perhaps as the *premier président* was speaking, ‘il estoit entré dans la salle un grand nombre de bourgeois, les uns armez et les autres non’.[[529]](#footnote-529) It was a critical moment. On behalf of the *Seize*, Nicolas Ameline asserted that it was they whowould appoint the new governor. Their choice was the duc d’Aumale (cousin of the Guise brothers), ‘lequel avec l’advis des magistrats populaires et du conseil qui seroit estably aupres de luy, composé d’ecclesiastiques, des Nobles et du tiers Estat, pourvoiroit à la conservation [de la ville]’.[[530]](#footnote-530)

It was a remarkable announcement. In response, Harlay protested that in all previous times of crisis the Parlementhad assumed the responsibility of government. At this point, prominent and vocal elements of the meeting, speaking for the *Seize* and probably having concerted their views beforehand, retorted that, by a principle that pre-dated the birth of the sovereign court, *le peuple* retained the right to defend themselves through a meeting of the estates; furthermore, the Parlement, though expert in political theory, was unsuited for the job of day-to-day government.

There was silence.[[531]](#footnote-531) Then Roland, ‘craignant de déplaire à la cour’, expressed misgivings.[[532]](#footnote-532) This was inconvenient, and other *Ligueurs* promptly intervened. They requested Harlay to limit the Parlement’s activity to the administration of justice, then proceeded to a vote on the governorship. Aumale was elected. Other positions too had to be filled. The arrests at Blois of those deputies to the Estates-General whose criticism of the king had been determined and vigorous turned out to serve the *Seize* well: the imprisonment of key men from the *Bureau de la Ville* – Michel Marteau sieur de la Chapelle, Jehan de Compans and François Costeblanche – allowed the leadership to demonstrate their influence in Paris as they secured by popular election replacements who were even more radical – Jehan Drouart, Oudin Crucé and Guillaume de Bordeaux.[[533]](#footnote-533) The replacements were needed ‘pour empescher le mal qu’on craignoit de Roland premier eschevin de ville’.[[534]](#footnote-534)

Thus the Blois executions provoked the second stage of Paris’s municipal revolution. It was‘[une] grande secousse’.[[535]](#footnote-535) In defiance of tradition and of royal prerogative, the *Ligueurs* had chosen the governor.[[536]](#footnote-536) Furthermore, Aumale, conveniently young and inexperienced, was to be advised by *magistrats populaires* and by a new *conseil*.[[537]](#footnote-537) The *magistrats populaires* comprised the well-established *conseil de la Ligue*, the *prévôt des marchands* and the four *échevins*. The new *conseil*, devised by the *Seize* and authorised by a municipal assembly, became known as the *conseil des quarante*, comprising as it did forty representatives from the three estates. Beside its advisory function it assumed a role in governing the city (by poaching the authority of the *conseillers de la ville*) and in keeping watch over the Parlement. In particular, it was an early step towards the achievement of a goal that the *Ligue* had had in mind since at least 1587: that of building and overseeing a *Sainte Union* of like-minded towns and cities.[[538]](#footnote-538)

The *conseil de la Ligue* had begun as a small group of fervent Catholics that first assembled under the leadership of Charles Hotman in late 1584 and worked in a somewhat *ad hoc* and informal way towards preserving the Catholic religion. As its support base grew to hundreds and then thousands, the *conseil* – the leadership team – grew from a handful to eight, and then to twelve because of the amount of business to be transacted with like-minded towns elsewhere.[[539]](#footnote-539) It is possible that at some stage there were exactly sixteen members – one for each *quartier* of Paris – but the following passage from the *Histoire* suggests otherwise:

ils [les chefs de la Ligue] eslevèrent un bourgeois en chacun des seize quartiers de la ville, qu’ils chargèrent de veiller sur tout ce qui se passeroit en leur quartier, et en faire leur rapport en ce conseil auquel, a cet effet, ils avoient séance et voix deliberative; ce nombre de Seize fut cause que depuis ce conseil (qui n’estoit point limité a ce nombre de Seize, car il estoit plus grand) fut appellé le Conseil des Seize, pour le distinguer du conseil general de l’Union duquel nous parlerons cy aprés. Et ceux qui avant ce temps ont parlé du conseil des Seize, ou qu’on réduit ce conseil à ce nombre, en ont aussy peu sçeu l’establissement que le nom des conseilleurs.[[540]](#footnote-540)

Thus the *conseil de la Ligue* that Rozée remembered numbered more than sixteen, and any confusion about this had arisen from the existence at the same time of sixteen informers – one for each *quartier*.[[541]](#footnote-541) At least some of these informers had been operating covertly since 1585. Probably in January 1589 their activities became overt. It is likely that these men were not just informers but were also pro-active on behalf of the *Ligue* in the *quartiers*, and that the *conseil* perceived them as supplementing the work of the *quarteniers*, the traditional local leaders.[[542]](#footnote-542)

If the *quarteniers* felt undermined by the *Ligue*’s key men in the *quartiers*, they must also have been dismayed by Aumale’s decision, suggested by the *Seize*, that each district should also have a *conseil des neuf*.[[543]](#footnote-543) These local cells were intended to supervise, possibly even to supersede, the *quarteniers*, though Salmon’s suggestion that they had the opportunity to build up electoral support for the *Seize* is open to question, being dependent upon the number of places in the *Bureau de la Ville* that they might have been allocated, had they survived.[[544]](#footnote-544) Made up of *quelques notables bourgeois*, the *conseils des neuf* were given tax-collection responsibilities.[[545]](#footnote-545) They were also tasked with handling any disputes in their *quartier*; those they could not settle were to be passed on to the *échevins* – a procedure that would undermine the role of the Parlement.[[546]](#footnote-546) By early 1589 the new *conseils* were in place, but they were destined not to last, for before long they were being infiltrated by Politiques – the very rivals whose influence their existence was presumably supposed to minimise.

The king’s unpopularity in Paris increased markedly after the murders of the Guise brothers, and during the seven weeks before Mayenne arrived the *Seize* ruled without check to their power. The tone was confident and authoritative, their business forged in regular and formalised meetings; it was a far cry from the secretive and peripatetic *rendezvous* of the mid-1580s.

With the turn of the new year, the significance of the humbling of the Parlementat the Christmas Day meeting became clear. On January 1, the radical preacher Jean Guincestre felt free to humiliate *premier président* Harlay in church, bullying him into swearing to spend up to his last drop of blood to avenge the murdered Guises. Meanwhile at the end of December, *président* Lemaître led a deputation on behalf of the judges to the king at Blois to ask for the release of the imprisoned deputies; the mission resulted in the release of Compans and Costeblanche from prison and the issue of *lettres patentes* intended to explain the Blois events to the Parlement. On his return to Paris, Lemaître chose not to tell the *Seize* about the *lettres patentes*, and instead delivered them privately to Harlay. Once Lemaître’s actions became known, the *Seize* were in danger, for if the Parlementregistered the *lettres* then the *Ligueurs*’ continued resistance to the monarch could only be seen as outright rebellion. They acted swiftly. On Monday 16 January, armed *Ligueurs* led by Bussy Leclerc arrested Harlay and other judges and imprisoned them. It was at this point that Barnabé Brisson became *premier président* (and Lemaître’s son Jean was promoted along with Louis Dorléans to be the new *avocats du roi*). The incident marked a clear subjugation of the Parlementto the *Seize*.[[547]](#footnote-547) At the end of January *parlementaires* were required to swear the oath of union. After subsequent departures of judges to serve the king at Tours there remained only a rump of about eighty at the Palais de Justice – frightened men, politically marginalised, afraid to do more than turn a blind eye to the radical tendencies of those who had imprisoned their colleagues, and habitually compliant with *Ligueur* initiatives.[[548]](#footnote-548) On all of this, Rozée, a man who loved good order, passed no comment other than to include the text of the *discours* that Du Vair would have addressed to the king if he had had the opportunity.[[549]](#footnote-549) Whilst it was a gentle and deeply respectful request for an exchange of prisoners, it also made no apologies for the past. In essence, this was Rozée’s position.

Meanwhile, from printing presses the Guises were eulogised and the king was denounced. We know that an outpouring of pamphlets – mostly *comptes rendus* of recent events – sought to maintain support for the *Ligue* within Paris, and to inform the provinces.[[550]](#footnote-550) Rozée was understandably reticent about seditious writings. He was unquestionably aware of them, commenting in one place that ‘tant d’escrivains ont… taché la memoire du Roy henri 3’.[[551]](#footnote-551) Many of the titles alone were treasonable: *Cruauté plus que barbare infidèlement perpétrée par Henry de Valois…* ; *La Detestation des cruautez sanguinaires et abominables de Henry Devalé…* ; *La Recompense du tyran de la France et porte banniere d’Angleterre…*.[[552]](#footnote-552)Rozée cited no such pamphlets; indeed by contrast he provided the full text of the 30 December *Déclaration* whereby the king sought to explain his recent actions. While the printers were busy, so were the parish priests: from pulpits across the city so many sermons were preached against the king that he wrote in dismay to his long-standing confidant, dom Bernard – only to be advised in reply that he should abdicate the throne and enter a monastery.[[553]](#footnote-553) When in early January the Sorbonne liberated the people from allegiance to the king, Rozée was apparently untroubled:

On reprocha aux docteurs qu’ils avoient mis entre les mains du peuple les armes offensives contre leur Roy: a quoy ils respondirent qu’ils n’avoient parlé que des deffensives, pour conserver la religion; on leur dit que jamais les docteurs n’avoient en france condamné leur Roy. Ils respondirent qu’en france jamais Roy n’avoit mis la religion en si grand peril que de designer un heretique pour successeur.[[554]](#footnote-554)

From an identical standpoint, Rozée later quoted from Thomas Beaux-Amis’ *Déclaration dernière…*,in which the Carmelite monk explained that obedience to those placed in authority by God clearly could not, in the last resort, be demanded of subjects of a heretical ruler.[[555]](#footnote-555)

Rozée generally avoided engagement with politically contentious ideas. Did not the atrocity against the Guise brothers speak for itself? It was to Blois, not to Péronne, that one should look for explanations of France’s plight. Far from being a pretext for rebellion, religion was all about according honour to God. The *Ligue* sought not to bring change but to save the Catholic monarchy from ‘l’aristocratie protestante’.[[556]](#footnote-556) The absence from this text of any in-depth engagement with *Ligueur* political thought suggests the compactness of Rozée’s world view. It may be significant that he offered no opinion when recording the potentially explosive assertion made at the Christmas Day meeting that the people had always had the right to defend their interests through an Estates-General.[[557]](#footnote-557) This author did not welcome, perhaps barely noticed, any deviation from the principle of hereditary monarchy provided it complied with what he considered to be the more fundamental law of Catholicity.

Rozée was deeply impressed by the religious fervour of clergy and people in Paris in early 1589: ‘on eust dit qu’ils exercoient les actions de la religion comme si c’eust esté la dernière fois, et que le lendemain la religion eust deü estre perdüe’.[[558]](#footnote-558) Many memorial services were held for the murdered brothers, the most notable being at Notre Dame at the end of January.[[559]](#footnote-559) There had been a particularly poignant occasion a few days earlier when a posthumous son to the duc de Guise was baptised François.[[560]](#footnote-560) Penitential processions – often spontaneous in the early weeks – took place in the winter cold.[[561]](#footnote-561) Prayers were recited through day and night.[[562]](#footnote-562) Other cities – Rouen, Orléans – followed suit. Even non-*Ligueurs* participated, no doubt a sure sign for the historian that *Ligueur* devotion was reasonable, not extreme.[[563]](#footnote-563)

In early 1589 the *Seize* knew considerable power and popularity. It was a combination that allowed them to raise funds through a range of devices for the purposes of defending the city and ransoming prisoners.[[564]](#footnote-564) This was also a time of some chaos in the capital.[[565]](#footnote-565) Huguenotsand royalists were liable to be flung into prison and their houses looted.[[566]](#footnote-566) Rozée claimed that this was not done for private gain, that accounts were kept and that such actions were entirely justified: the victims were ‘ennemis du party et infracteurs de leur serment’.[[567]](#footnote-567) In any case, there was an army to be paid for; Rozée pointed out that it was expected of Paris to raise the troops who must deal with the inevitable royalist counter-attack, and that that was one of the reasons why Mayenne was still in the capital come April.[[568]](#footnote-568) The historian considered the biggest cash windfall – almost one million *livres*, found in the home of royal financier Molan – to be an answer to the people’s prayers.[[569]](#footnote-569)

Unquestionably, there was vandalism: Henri de Valois’ coat of arms was torn from several prominent positions, and there is evidence that statues on the tombs of some of the *tyran*’s former *mignons* were smashed.[[570]](#footnote-570) Turning a blind eye to this disorder in the streets, Rozée wrote instead about measures taken at the institutional level to maintain the provision of national government. A critical development was the election of Mayenne as *lieutenant général de l’estat et couronne de France, jusque à la tenüe des Estats generaux du Roiaume*.There followed the duke’s addition of fourteen *supernuméraires* to the *conseil de quarante*, his creation of his own *conseil d’état*, and the development of protocols for the signing and sealing of his orders. One such order, issued in April, had as its goal: ‘pourveoir et remedier aux desordres advenus a l’occasion des troubles’.[[571]](#footnote-571)

In May 1588 the municipality of Paris had experienced a major upheaval. In early 1589 the title conferred upon Mayenne implied that the succession to the throne might be subject to a meeting of an Estates-General. Historians have considered whether it all amounted to revolution.[[572]](#footnote-572)

Certainly the *Seize* were innovative. After Blois, they chose the governor of Paris. In February, they created a new body with distinctly radical leanings: the *conseil des quarante*.[[573]](#footnote-573) Such was their belief in their own importance that the *Seize* then proceeded to appoint Mayenne *Lieutenant-Général du Royaume*. They then proceeded to conduct a vigorous three-year campaign, driving out and deposing one king, keeping the next out of his capital, purging the Parlement, executing traitors, and opening (short-lived) careers in high office to those who would not otherwise have obtained them.

But for all this, after May 1588 the *Seize* worked through ‘the normal elective mechanisms of the city’.[[574]](#footnote-574) The *conseil-général* – admittedly new, but short-lived – seems to have allowed most of the business of government to carry on as usual, though on this point the *Histoire*’s silence may simply reflect Rozée’s lack of interest in and/or knowledge of any *Ligueur* innovations in mechanisms of municipal government.[[575]](#footnote-575) The new *conseils des neuf* were soon abandoned. ‘For the most part,’ wrote one historian, ‘the Sixteen merely took over the existing institutions and failed to carry through their proposed reforms’.[[576]](#footnote-576) As we have already suggested, the radical thrust was essentially reactionary, motivated by the desire to re-establish a model of urban government currently under siege. In the *Dialogue d’entre le Maheustre et le Manant* the *Seize* were presented as ‘a confraternity for the protection of the wider community of Paris rather than as an insurrectionary movement for its potential transformation’.[[577]](#footnote-577) And in the ‘end-times-atmosphere’ generated by *Ligueur* preachers, denunciations of the vices of the powerful were more about cleansing the city than bringing social upheaval; all men were equal before God, all needed to repent.[[578]](#footnote-578)

In spring 1589, the need to protect the capital presented itself in very practical terms. Could *Ligueur* Paris survive against its internal and external enemies? For the *Ligue*, all might be lost if rich and politically conservative Parisians – the enemy within – managed to win the ear of the *lieutenant-général*. For the time being Mayenne resisted their seductive suggestions that he distance himself from the *Seize*. Nonetheless, Rozée was unsettled by the subsequent release of some royalist judges from prison.[[579]](#footnote-579) The more tangible threat lay beyond the city walls in royalist towns and armies. If river-borne supplies were threatened, the Paris masses would become hungry and perhaps defeatist, even dangerous. Measures were taken to try to keep food moving.[[580]](#footnote-580) Meanwhile, enemy forces grew. Within weeks of the famous reconciliation of Henry III and the Protestant King of Navarre – and the uniting of their armies – at Plessis-les-Tours (30 April 1589), Paris was in dire peril. News of the *Ligue*’s failure to take nearby Senlis (17 May) and of the suspicious death of the *Ligueur* Charles de Saveuse at Beaugency the next day was alarming and discouraging.[[581]](#footnote-581) By the last week of July, many of Mayenne’s soldiers had defected to the king in the hope of booty; 40,000 royalists were encamped outside Paris; their commanders believed that a siege would soon reveal how many Parisians had joined the *Ligue* only to save their lives and property.[[582]](#footnote-582)

Apprehensive but not paralysed, the capital made preparations. Trenches were dug, then manned night and day.[[583]](#footnote-583) The men knew their business and stuck to the task; Rozée recalled that ‘les parisiens ne perdirent point de courage’; nonetheless, humanly speaking, there was no hope.[[584]](#footnote-584) In a strikingly analytical passage the historianidentified three reasons why the city must fall. First, it was divided, for many of the better-off were covert royalists; second, there were unpaid soldiers, for – an uncharacteristic admission – *Ligue* funds were being mismanaged; third, there were already food shortages.[[585]](#footnote-585) Mayenne was ready to quit, weapons were put in the hands of students and priests, and prayers were offered.[[586]](#footnote-586) After only a short period of hegemony in Paris, the *Ligue*’s star seemed bound to plummet. Only a miracle could save them. Rozée believed in miracles.[[587]](#footnote-587) He came close to seeing God behind the fate of Henri III in early August 1589.[[588]](#footnote-588)

The assassination of Henri III occurred outside Paris on 1 August 1589. Ostracised from his capital and declared deposed by the Sorbonne (with the retrospective accord of the Papacy) he was killed at the headquarters established at St Cloud for the royalist army which he and Navarre had recently assembled. His assassin was Jacques Clément, a Jacobin monk killed by the royal guards in the immediate aftermath of his attack. Clément was instantly accorded the status of a martyr. Rozée, however, seems to have found the episode uncomfortable; he wrote only a few pages. The account begins with uncharacteristic but befitting style:

Ainsy se disposoient les affaires dedans la ville, avec beaucoup de crainte, et dehors avec beaucoup d’esperance, quand voicy arriver ce qui estonna lors tout le monde, et fera esmerveiller toute la posterité; car un chetif moine sorty du couvent des Jacobins de paris, alla tuer un Roy de france dans sa chambre logé au milieu d’une armée de 40000 hommes, accompagné dela pluspart de la noblesse de france.[[589]](#footnote-589)

The monk is described pejoratively. He was ‘mal-otru’, and ‘lourdant’; his fellows had learned to mock this ‘capitaine Clément’who went round saying his would be the hand that killed the king.[[590]](#footnote-590) We are told how Clément gained access to the royal camp, how the assault took place and how swiftly the stricken king’s condition deteriorated. Rozée was surprisingly keen to affirm the healthy state of the dying king’s conscience, quoting the substance of his last words. He was also very mindful that the victim was none other than *un prince souverain*. Clément killed not merely the king but *un Roy de France*. In closing, he interpreted the emotion that swept through Paris once the news broke as being relief that the city was safe rather than joy that the king was dead.[[591]](#footnote-591)

Rozée was often adept at making selective use of the evidence to produce a text which provided a positive gloss on the *Ligue* without accepting the arguments of its royalist critics. The assassination of Henri III was no exception. The text is ‘informative’ regarding what was in any case widely known, carrying opinion where it was safe but otherwise studiously non-commital. It was wise to affirm that the monk’s *si horrible action* would have merited severe punishment had he lived, and typical of Rozée to want to establish the facts of the king’s final state of mind with care. The historian appropriately raised the questions of whether Clément had acted alone and whether he had been the instrument of divine will, but sensibly avoided drawing firm conclusions.[[592]](#footnote-592) Jean Boucher crops up in the narrative – he and Bourgoing mulled over the breaking news on 1 August – but there is no reference to the views contained in his *De justa abdicatione*.[[593]](#footnote-593) Rozée kept a safe distance by hiding behind what others (unnamed) thought. We learn not what was in Clément’s mind but what his fellow monks later said was in his mind, not that the monk was kicked to death but that such a rumour was circulating in Paris. As for whether God was in Clément’s work, Rozée was open about what the preachers thought… but reticent for himself.[[594]](#footnote-594)

The account is devoid of triumphalism. There is nothing here to suggest that Rozée thought regicide was ever acceptable; it is likely that he thought it was not, especially when it was committed as a random act by an unauthorised individual. He clearly respected royal authority, though it may be that he considered such respect to be conditional in part upon the business of confession and absolution. One thing is certain: *Ligueur* Paris was free from immediate danger. Rozée’s description shows that many people knew relief and joy when they heard the news.[[595]](#footnote-595) In chapter 6 we will see that the euphoria was not to last; for now we try to understand in more depth the historian’s characterisation of the *Seize*.

The most novel and striking feature of the *Histoire anonyme* is its extended sympathetic portrayal (unique in its era) of a Paris *Ligue* leadership group that comprised, almost without exception, highly principled, devout, intelligent and respectable Catholic believers, determined to preserve a world that they feared was slipping away. The single most important achievement of the modern historiography of the *Ligue* has been its grasp of this fresh perspective. We have already seen that over a period of more than three hundred years few writers on the *Ligue* had found anything to admire in their subject.[[596]](#footnote-596) Then came Henri Drouot’s famous book which argued that, in Burgundy at least, affiliation to the *Ligue* arose from conflict within the *bourgeoisie* – hardly the rabble.[[597]](#footnote-597)

Drouot studied the *Ligue* in Dijon with a commitment to understanding its socio-economic background – an approach which the positivist school (Labitte, Poirson, and others) might have envisaged but had not realised. The historian used mss 10270 and 23295-96, as well as Charles Valois’ work, but only ‘in passing’; his main focus was on Burgundy. All had appeared well there in 1588: no food shortages (‘ce stimulant essential des révoltes populaires)’, no ‘furie révolutionnaire’.[[598]](#footnote-598) ‘Garder la paix sur la voie du cheminement social: on reconnaissait bien à ce souci l’esprit communal bourguignon’.[[599]](#footnote-599) Dijon had appeared to have no trouble-makers, ‘pas de “caboches”’.[[600]](#footnote-600) Yet by spring 1589, there was ‘un désordre social… [u]ne guerre sociale’; and ‘quant à l’hostilité des “ligueux” de mairie contre les gentilshommes, tous les gentilshommes, et contre les officiers, c’est là fait certain’.[[601]](#footnote-601) In essence, Drouot discerned – in Burgundy – serious conflict within the *bourgeoisie*. The lower ranks – ‘les bourgeoisies mineurs’, later more felicitously called ‘la bourgeoisie seconde’ – found themselves unable to rise to join the privileged few who constituted ‘les grands bourgeois’.[[602]](#footnote-602) For them the way forward seemed to lie in espousing the *Ligue* cause.

In overturning the royalist tradition of a *Ligue* led by n’er-do-wells (at least for Burgundy) Drouot’s work marked a break from the past. In fact, what was truly new was the ‘scientific’ method used, for the significance of frustrations within the *bourgeoisie* had been noted before. ‘Ainsi que l’observe Palma-Cayet,’ wrote one nineteenth-century essayist, ‘ce qui avait poussé bien des gens à se mettre du parti de l’union, c’était l’espoir d’arriver par une révolution dans l’état à des charges plus élevées, à des emplois plus lucratifs que ceux qu’ils occupaient’.[[603]](#footnote-603)

Drouot’s thesis did not win universal acceptance. Whilst noting the evident significance of social tension, Mousnier considered religion to be the key determinant of affiliation to the *Ligue*.[[604]](#footnote-604) More recently Mack P. Holt has cast doubt upon the degree and impact of social tension in Dijon and has suggested that a more critical factor there was Mayenne’s patronage.[[605]](#footnote-605) Nonetheless, broadly speaking, Drouot’s work marked a sea-change in *Ligue* studies and stimulated debate. Although focused on Burgundy, its relevance to investigations into *Ligueur* Paris was apparent to J.H.M. Salmon and to Robert Descimon.[[606]](#footnote-606) For his part, Denis Richet took the theme of tension between two levels of *bourgeoisie* but subsumed it under what he considered to be a more fundamental conflict over cultural control. We have also been shown that if hopes of promotion motivated middle-ranking lawyers to join the *Ligue*, the same hopes induced those at the bottom of the legal profession – the *basochiens* (registrars, clerks, sergeants, and ushers) – to steer well clear.[[607]](#footnote-607)

Provisional quantitative analyses produced by Salmon (1972), Barnavi (1980) and Descimon (1983) have facilitated our understanding of changes over time in *Seize* membership. Barnavi noted that for the period between the start of the clandestine movement and the eve of the *journée des barricades*: ‘[D]e dix-neuf qu’ils étaient en 1585, les “nobles hommes maîtres”, magistrats, officiers des finances et avocats, passent en 1588 à quarante et un. Pour la Ligue, c’est un immense succès, car cette progression numérique se traduit – chose rare – par un net progrès qualitatif’.[[608]](#footnote-608) Salmon observed that the inner group of the *Seize* in late 1591 looked very different from the roughly equally sized group of known conspirators before the barricades: ‘magistrates, merchants and senior officers of justice and finance are less important, and the avocats and procureurs dominate the movement’.[[609]](#footnote-609) Descimon refined the analysis by differentiating *avocats*’ views from those of *procureurs*: ‘Le groupe des gens de loi recouvre en réalité des comportements opposés : 50 % des avocats “seize” figurent dans les conseils [ligueurs] contre 22,5 % des procureurs. La participation responsable au meurtre de Brisson… se répartit de façon presque contraire… 45 % des procureurs contre 23,1 % des avocats…’.[[610]](#footnote-610) After taking into account differences in categorisation we have a picture of the notability’s growing disenchantment with a *Seize* increasingly willing to take the law into its own hands.

Beyond question the best quantitative and qualitative analysis of the *Seize* is to be found in Descimon’s *Qui étaient les Seize?* (1983). At the heart of this book, flanked by chapters of interpretation, lies a directory of 225 biographical notices of members of the *Seize* that the author identified by means of *critères forts* (such as having taken part in the founding or early days of the clandestine *Ligue*, having served in *Ligueur conseils* or having had a part in the Brisson affair) and of *critères faibles* (such as being identified as *Ligueur* in L’Estoile or other contemporary memoirs). For each of the 225 *Ligueurs* we are given comprehensive details: name, title(s), address, parentage, occupation, role in the *Ligue*, and so on, as well as source references which range from well-known historical narratives through to the boxes upon boxes of records held in the *Minutier central des notaires parisiens*.

It is, of course, difficult to match Rozée’s *Seize* with the descriptions that recent historiography has delivered. The *Histoire* provides little detail for quantitative analysis. ‘C’estoit une compagnie composée… d’Evesques, d’abbez et autres ecclesiastiques, de quelques gentilshommes des cours et chambres souveraines et autres jurisdiction, des prévôt des marchands et Echevins de Paris avec quelques notables bourgeois.’[[611]](#footnote-611) This snapshot, ‘taken’ in November 1589, lacks precision and, in offering no numeric values, bears only a dim resemblance to modern objective social compositions.[[612]](#footnote-612) Even less useful is a description that appears 250 pages later in the *Histoire*, where the *Seize* (in September 1590) are ‘une compagnie de bourgeois de toutes qualités’.[[613]](#footnote-613) It was Rozée’s last attempt to provide a social analysis of the Paris *Ligue* leadership.[[614]](#footnote-614) But despite the difficulties, some quantitative investigation is possible. We focus first on elected office-holders of the Paris municipality, and then on members of the *Seize*.

Given that the *Seize* had to win the Hôtel de Villeif they were to control the city, we might expect Rozée to trace the events that unfolded there.[[615]](#footnote-615)At first sight there is disappointment. The historian’s version of the *Seize* assumption of power in the Hôtel de Ville in 1588 is brief, vague and sanitised.[[616]](#footnote-616) Subsequent elections all pass unmentioned.[[617]](#footnote-617) However, if we focus on those *prévôts* and *échevins* whom Rozée named, an impression emerges of a historian determined to recordwhat he considered was best about the Paris *Ligue*. Exactly half of the municipal leaders in the years 1589-93 are named in the *Histoire*.

Figure 5A : Leaders of the *Bureau de la Ville*, May 1588 – March 1593 (alphabetical)

(Those named in the *Histoire* are shown in bold type; members of the *Seize* are underlined)

Bordeaux, Guillaume de Desprez, Robert **Luillier, Jehan**

Brethe, Jacques Desprez, Robert II **Marteau, Michel**

**Boucher, Charles** Drouart, Jehan Néret, Denis

**Compans, Jehan de** **Hotman, Antoine** Pichonnat, Jehan

**Costeblanche, François** **Langlois, Martin** Poncher, Pierre

**Crucé, Oudin**  Lemoine , Denis **Roland, Nicolas**

Some of the named men appear not to have greatly interested the historian.[[618]](#footnote-618) Elsewhere, Rozée’s attention was lively. We learn that in August 1590 Compans, one of the *Seize*, was active as *colonel* of the *quartier* de la Cité, helping to deal with plots, and that towards the end of the siege he was carrying out orders to prevent the *avocats* from reaching the Palais de Justice.[[619]](#footnote-619) Again in 1590 Crucé was a hero for the *Seize* when he and the men he captained repelled royalist attackers near the *abbaye* de Sainte-Geneviève in the late summer.[[620]](#footnote-620) In the case of municipal leaders from outside the *Seize*, Rozée could be dismissive. Charles Boucher, cousin of the preacher and *prévôt des marchands* for the two years from October 1590, received only one mention: he sent a note to the duc de Mayenne, assuring him of his ongoing allegiance – provided he was properly paid.[[621]](#footnote-621)

The nine municipal leaders named in the *Histoire* were a heterogeneous group. Seven of them held office for two or more years, the other two managed only seven months between them. There were shopkeepers, a solicitor, a couple of barristers and several more senior lawyers. Seven of the nine belonged to the *Seize*. Of these seven no two lived in the same *quartier*; nor does a shared degree of commitment to the *Ligue* cause seem to explain their inclusion. In Robert Descimon’s view, Compans was ‘un archétype du ligueur’ and Crucé ‘le Seize par excellence’, but Luillier and Roland were both inclined to caution; La Chapelle-Marteau began well but fell away.[[622]](#footnote-622)

Given the lack of homogeneity, it is possible that Rozée’s provision of the nine names was random. However a more likely explanation can be drawn from the following table. With most of the bold type at the top and to the left of the table, we can reasonably infer that, thirty years after the events, Rozée best remembered (or perhaps liked to record) the key players and the best years. All three *prévôts des marchands* but only six of the fourteen *échevins* are named. For 1588 and 1589, when confidence among the *Seize* was high, eighty per cent of the leadership group are named; thereafter the percentage drops to forty. Rozée was an older man, perhaps recalling the *Ligue* better in the period of its greatest aspirations than in the later time of decay.

Figure 5B: Leaders of the *Bureau de la Ville* (chronological and by status)

(Those whose names appear in Volume 2 of the *Histoire* are shown in bold type)

Date of election Names of elected candidates

*Prévôt des marchands* Four *échevins*

May 1588 **La Chapelle-Marteau** **Compans**, **Costeblanche**, Desprez, **Roland**

Jan. 1589 replacements Drouart Bordeaux, **Crucé**

August 1589 **La Chapelle-Marteau** **Compans**, **Costeblanche**, Desprez, **Roland**

October 1590 **Boucher** Brethe, **Langlois**, Desprez (II), Poncher

August 1591

First assembly **Boucher**  Brethe, **Langlois**, Desprez (II), Poncher

Second assembly **Boucher** Brethe, Lemoyne, **Hotman**, Poncher

November 1592 **Luillier** Néret, Lemoyne, **Langlois**, Pichonnat

We turn now to forty-eight individuals within the Paris *Ligue* leadership that Rozée named.[[623]](#footnote-623)

Figure 6 : Forty-eight Men of the *Seize* named by Rozée

(Those named in 909 pages between his first mention of the 1584 Paris *Ligue* and the end of the *Histoire*)

**Ameline, Nicolas** (3) Dufresnoy, Pierre (1) **Messier, Jehan** (2)

Anroux, Barthélemy (1) Emonnot, Jehan (1) Midorge, Jehan (1)

**Anroux, Nicolas** (4) Feuillet, Pierre (1) Morin, François (1)

**Baston, Jacques** (1) Granrue, Jehan de (1) **Nivelle, Nicolas** (3)

**Bazin, Jacques** (1) **Hacte, Roland** (2) Nully, Estienne de (7)

Bordeaux, Guillaume de (1) Hotman, Antoine (3) Oudineau, François (2)

**Bourdereul, Joseph** (2) Hotman, Charles (1) Passart, Michel (1)

Bray, Estienne de (1) **Leclerc, Jehan** (16) Pigneron, Mathurin (2)

Brigard, François (4) **Legoix, Robert** (1) Raynssant, Odouart (1)

**Compans, Jehan de** (5) Lemaître, Pierre (5) Roland, Martin (1)

Coqueley, Lazare (1) Lenormant, Nicolas (1) Roland, Nicolas (4)

Costeblanche, François (4) Louchart, Jehan (1) Rozée, Pierre (1)

**Crucé, Oudin** (7) Luillier, Jehan (1) **Senault, Pierre** (9)

**Delabruyère, Mathias** (7) Machault, J.-Baptiste de (1) **Taconnet, Nicolas** (1)

Dorléans, Louis (3) Marteau, Michel (12) Tronson, Nicolas (1)

Drouart, Jehan (1) Masparraulte, Pierre de (1) Turquet, Jacques (1)

Notes

The number in brackets shows how many pages bear the name.

Names of prominent *Ligueurs* are underlined.

Names of *Ligueurs* who particularly impressed Rozée are in bold type.

Of the forty-eight, thirty need not detain us long. Nine of them appear in a list of colonels.[[624]](#footnote-624) Others achieved notoriety – Anroux (Barthélemy), Emmonot and Louchart were named only for being hanged. Hotman (Charles) – named on just one page – did not live beyond the clandestine stage of the *Seize*. Brigard, Costeblanche, Dorléans and Antoine Hotman were all mentioned from time to time, but with no authorial opinion, and of the others all except two were named rarely in passing. One of the exceptions was Nicolas Roland whom Rozée mentioned enough times to reveal his distrust of a man whose loyalties were divided.[[625]](#footnote-625) The second was ‘un parisien nommé Rozée advocat’, ‘un ad[voc]at nommé Rozée’. [[626]](#footnote-626) We note that our historian did not single out his own role for special treatment in his account; for him the *Seize* was a collectivity in which individual roles were less important than the achievements of the group as a whole.

Of the remaining eighteen men, three – Lemaître, La Chapelle-Marteau and Nully – were named because their political and judicial stature allowed them to make decisive interventions.[[627]](#footnote-627) A further four distinguished themselves by memorable contributions to the cause during the long siege. Crucé dislodged the invaders’ ladders during the escalade of 10 September, Senault was found to dine frugally, Delabruyère organised the capital’s food supplies, and Leclerc was injured in a skirmish while his horse was killed beneath him.[[628]](#footnote-628) We think that these four, along with the eleven men to whom we now turn, were Rozée’s heroes for the cause.

Five of these last eleven *Ligueurs* are well-known. Ameline spread the good news to other towns, Nicolas Anroux handled Rome, Baston signed the oath with his own blood, and Compans distinguished himself on the *journée du* *pain ou la paix*.[[629]](#footnote-629) Rozée was particularly careful to acknowledge the contribution to the cause of Nicolas Nivelle, printer and book-seller, killed at Corbeil, ‘[un] bourgeois de paris qui avoit rendu de grands services au party de l’union’.[[630]](#footnote-630) All these men died years before Rozée wrote – four of them in 1590-91. For the historian they personified the spirit of the *Seize*.

Six of the forty-eight remain to be considered: one notaire, one commissaire and four marchands. By naming them Rozée seems to show his belief that there was a role for modest people in the movement. Roland Hacte lived round the corner from Rozée and held *Ligueur* meetings in his home in 1587 prior to *the journée de Saint-Séverin*.[[631]](#footnote-631) Was it at such a meeting that Rozée committed himself to the cause? Nicolas Taconnet (wine-merchant) and Jehan Messier (draper) both attended a general assembly at the Hôtel de Ville (14 June, 1591).[[632]](#footnote-632) Rozée was there too. Did they meet? We can know so little of this – but for our historian these were outstanding men: Taconnet refused overtures from the Politiques, while Messier helped Joseph Bourdereul track down artillery with which Paris might be defended. And the *commissaire* Jacques Bazin made do with horse-flesh while his Politique neighbour indulged in beef.

We come last to Robert Legoix, ‘Seize assez discret, n’eût été sa mort tragique’.[[633]](#footnote-633) Legoix died because the conspiracy of the *journée du pain ou la paix* was launched prematurely. The *Ligueur* captain found himself isolated and surrounded by armed enemies who accused him of disturbing the peace; ‘il respondit que le Roy estant heretique il ne falloit point de paix avec luy; mais endurer toutes les misères qu’il plairoit a dieu de leur envoyer’.[[634]](#footnote-634) The words could have been spoken by our historian. They represent exactly what the *Ligue* meant to him.

We do not know why Rozée made no mention of seven in every nine of the *Seize*. It may have been memory-loss, or fear of consequences for the descendants of those whose company he had joined.[[635]](#footnote-635) It is possible that he himself joined late and remained on the fringe, a likelihood suggested by the weak correlation between what we know of Rozée and the criteria established by Descimon in 1983 for identification of the *Seize*.[[636]](#footnote-636) Rozée’s portrayal of the *Seize* is flawed because it rests on an inadequate sample. But as the representation of a pure, simple and integrated strand of *Ligueur* thought it is invaluable.

Rozée surely understood that counting and calculating were neither the only nor the best ways of explaining the *Seize*.Perhaps nowhere more clearly, Rozée revealed his admiration of the *Seize* when relating views expressed in a meeting called by the king in May 1590 to reach a final decision on whether or not to besiege the capital.[[637]](#footnote-637) Here, the quantifiable is of little significance. We learn that the king spoke of ‘la grandeur de la ville de Paris, pleine d’un grand peuple, un prince [Nemours] accompagné de gens de guerre qui y commandoit, la défiance qu’il avoit de la fidélité, résolution et valeur de ceux dedans…’[[638]](#footnote-638) Inclusion of such praise served Rozée’s purpose – as did his account of warnings from some of the king’s advisers that besieging the city would be a waste of time (‘il perdroit une saison… toute entière’): Nemours was both valiant and much too honourable to fall prey to Politique persuasion; Aumale was by his side; the militia were well organised and ready to defend the city; and there was no shortage of weapons.[[639]](#footnote-639) Consideration had to be given to the *Seize*, ‘lesquels avoient toute la créance du peuple… hommes roides, qui pour le peuple s’opposoient au duc de Mayenne, à son conseil et aux magistrats’.[[640]](#footnote-640) It was on account of their influence that the *prévôt des marchands* had allied himself with the *Seize*, and that, along with the *échevins*, *colonels* and captains, he had sworn never to recognise nor negotiate with the king without the blessing of the Pope.[[641]](#footnote-641)

Rozée’s frequent use of the word *compagnie* when describing the *Seize* is suggestive of reminiscences of fellowship and companionship. It is the word he used for gatherings of corporations, for example when various groups of civic dignitaries assembled to welcome Cardinal Caetani to Paris in January 1590.[[642]](#footnote-642) Much more frequently in the *Histoire*, the word *compagnie* referred to detachments of soldiers, and of armed clergy, and of groups of city militia. Thus Rozée remembered the *Seize* as men who had fought together in a common cause, men for whom preservation of the Catholic faith had been of greater significance than any individual’s life. Only in the last sixth of the manuscript did a different collective noun assume prominence: the word *parti* was used to denote that faithful remnant from whom Mayenne had gradually distanced himself.

For Rozée, faithfulness had principally to do with zeal for the Catholic faith.[[643]](#footnote-643) Sadly, he noted early in his work, the *Ligue* had become besmirched with the passage of time: ‘l’histoire suivante nous apprendra… les soupçons qu’on a fait naistre; l’envie qui s’est engendré contre elle; les calomnies qu’elle a soufferte; les mutations qui y sont arrivées; le mal qui s’y est glissé; les fauts qu’on a faits; les mesaises qu’on y a enduré…’.[[644]](#footnote-644) Rozée was honest on the issue of motivation; not all *Ligue* adherents had been driven by ardour for the true religion. He knew that after the Blois murders people had flooded into the *Ligue* for all kinds of reasons.[[645]](#footnote-645) After the regicide the lure for the Marquis de Vitry had been prestige and wealth.[[646]](#footnote-646) Infiltrators too were a problem: ‘[L]e Roy estoit… bien servi dedans la ligue à paris’.[[647]](#footnote-647) The fact that the Estates-General promised by Mayenne in 1589 had still not taken place two years later could be blamed on infiltrators.[[648]](#footnote-648)

Memories, wide reading and clear-sightedness, not lists of data, resourced the historian’s writing about the *Seize* and about *Ligueur* representation in the Hôtel de Ville. Without, we think, so many memories, these same resources informed Rozée’s pages dealing with links between the capital and other towns. Paris did not exist in a cocoon; the *Ligue* leaders in the capital fervently wished to work with like-minded Catholics elsewhere. There were many of these, for, according to Rozée, fear of a Protestant succession after 1584 had caused *Ligueur conseils* to be founded ‘quasi dans toutes les villes de france’.[[649]](#footnote-649) The existence of these groups had later facilitated the seizure of power by *Ligueurs* in hundreds of towns and cities, in some cases in the aftermath of the *journée des barricades*, in others after the Blois murders. It was a phenomenon that has produced in recent decades an impressive outpouring of local studies of urban *Ligue* experience.

A key feature of these studies has been their investigation of the reasons why towns rebelled against the king. We can safely establish two premises. First, pro-*Ligue* decisions were always embedded in a fervent commitment to Catholicism. Secondly, towns in those provinces which were governed by the Guise family (most of northern France) were likely to be moved by reasons of clientage towards the *Ligue*.[[650]](#footnote-650) However, while Catholicism and clientage offered compelling motives, it is reasonable to assume that they bore fruit most readily where social and political grievances provided fertile ground.[[651]](#footnote-651)

There seems little doubt that it was resentment of state interference that drove many towns into the *Sainte Union*.[[652]](#footnote-652) Often the decision issued from a largely united municipal leadership team; this was the case in Amiens, Abbeville, Lyon, Morlaix and Saint-Malo.[[653]](#footnote-653) Elsewhere – for example Rouen, Rennes, Angers and Nantes – studies have suggested that decisions regarding the *Ligue* emerged from deep factional rivalries within the Hôtel de Ville.[[654]](#footnote-654) Unconvinced by the notion that these towns might have been following a pattern peculiar to western France, Descimon has concurred with the authors’ own cautions regarding the studies. Thus, for example, account has to be taken of the smallness of the sample of *Ligueurs* in the Rouen study, and of the impact of the duc de Mercœur’s clientage on towns in Brittany.

Other grievances too came into play. Poitiers cared more about the king’s religion than about state encroachment on civic liberties.[[655]](#footnote-655) The magnetism of Guisard clientage was felt across the north and east, yet other motives clearly acted more powerfully in those towns that resisted the pull and remained royalist, towns such as Meulan, Pontoise, Senlis, Château-Thierry, Châlons-sur-Marne, and Sainte-Menehould.[[656]](#footnote-656) Elsewhere, old jealousies intervened: Caen and Rouen went different ways, as did Clermont-Ferrand and Riom, and Langres and Chaumont. The desire to be rid of a ruling élite dictated choices at Limoges, Toulouse and Le Puy.[[657]](#footnote-657) Armies led by Catholic nobles were decisive in the thinking of Orléans, Chartres and Le Mans.[[658]](#footnote-658) In many cases, ‘Paris, Parisians, or people who had close connections with Paris were instrumental in inciting the people [of other towns] to rebellion’.[[659]](#footnote-659) Far from Paris, Marseille and Morlaix used the *Ligue* excuse to rebrand themselves as urban republics.[[660]](#footnote-660) If not a mosaic, the picture is nonetheless richly variegated.

However individual and particular their reasons might be for joining the Union, *Ligue* towns stood to gain from working with each other. Louis Dorléans held that, in the absence of a lead from the crown, a league of Catholic cities was the way to counter the spread of heresy.[[661]](#footnote-661) The *Ligue* statement of 1587 considered it vital that cities pool their resources – ‘forces… conseil… moyens’; they should correspond regularly with the Paris *Ligueurs* and receive instructions from them.[[662]](#footnote-662) The municipal registers for the weeks following the Blois assassinations show the *Seize* taking the lead.[[663]](#footnote-663) Letters were sent to other *Ligue* towns, encouraging them to help one another.[[664]](#footnote-664) It was about more than goodwill. By insisting that town governments swear the new oath of union which sanctioned the fight against Henri III, Paris had in mind a Sainte Union of towns committed irrevocably to the cause.[[665]](#footnote-665) Towns close to Paris, particularly those vital to the free flow of goods and supplies into the city, would be closely supervised.[[666]](#footnote-666) Can it be that provincial *Ligue* towns who were only too glad to repel royal interference would take orders from the *Seize*?

In some cases towns had little choice. Those who traded with Paris could hardly afford to fall out with their principal market.[[667]](#footnote-667) And Montereau-faut-Yonne was given a harsh lesson in June 1589 when some of its citizens were taken to Paris and hanged.[[668]](#footnote-668) But generally, provincial towns had little to fear. It is true that the *Seize* sent representatives – notably Nicolas Ameline – and preachers to fan the *Ligue* flame in places such as Chartres, Orléans, Blois and Tours. Nonetheless, Paris mostly gave advice not orders: ‘Elle agit en grande sœur, non en despote’.[[669]](#footnote-669) In any case, towns that declared themselves *Ligueur* had much to gain: reduced taxation and less billeting of troops were two likely advantages. Significantly, Abbeville in Picardy was happier to be led by the more distant Paris than by her closer neighbour, the provincial capital, Amiens. In effect, the *Seize* headed a loose federation.[[670]](#footnote-670) Towns were linked to the capital on matters of common interest but were otherwise autonomous. And importantly, the links were ad hoc, never institutionalised.[[671]](#footnote-671)

Rozée’s thoughts on the *Sainte Union* during the months of *Seize* predominance in the capital mirror the *ad hoc* nature of the association itself: that is, they appear randomly (over fifty-or-so pages toward the end of his first volume). As if accidentally, the historianoffered from time to time explanations why towns joined the *Union*; these can be grouped into three categories.

First, small towns simply copied big ones. Thus, in parts of Bourgogne, Champagne and Brie, towns decided for the *Ligue* because Paris and Orléans had.[[672]](#footnote-672) In Picardy, Abbeville followed the example of Amiens.[[673]](#footnote-673) Probably satellite towns followed larger neighbours because it had become their habits to do so, and because they hardly had the information or resources to do otherwise: ‘les villes de Sable, Laval, Mayenne et La Ferté, qui sont petites villes, sujettes à la discretion de celuy qui est plus fort en la campagne, suivirent l’exemple dela ville du Mans’.[[674]](#footnote-674)

Secondly, and interestingly given his later views of the duke, Rozée frequently mentioned the positive contribution made by Mayenne in early 1589. For the historian it was a matter of note that all the towns in Burgundy were persuaded by Mayenne to offer him support with the single exception of Langres.[[675]](#footnote-675) At Orléans, it was the approach of Mayenne that caused the *maréchal* d’Aumont to quit trying to win the city for the king; the duke proceeded to establish order in just the way the *Seize* had done in Paris: ‘[il] asseura la ville au party de la ligue, il restablit la justice qui avoit esté delaissée durant le siege de la citadelle, fit faire plusieurs prieres et processions en la ville…’.[[676]](#footnote-676) Chartres was another town where Mayenne’s input was significant.[[677]](#footnote-677) The important river town of Meulan was won because Mayenne sent the baron de Rosne to secure its loyalty.[[678]](#footnote-678) At Rouen the duke encouraged the *Ligue* council to keep in regular touch – ‘garder une bonne correspondance’ – with Paris.[[679]](#footnote-679)

Thirdly, the leaders in Paris played a crucial role in other towns’ decsions. Even before the events at Blois they had been in the habit of writing to other *Ligue* towns.[[680]](#footnote-680) Now to Orléans they sent troops.[[681]](#footnote-681) At Amiens, a messenger, Nivelle, arrived as early as Monday 26 December 1588 to announce what decisions Paris and Orléans had reached; he found the ground well prepared by the Advent (1588) sermons of another Parisian, the *recteur de la Sorbonne*, Jean Boucher.[[682]](#footnote-682) A little later, Boucher’s Lent sermons won over several towns in the diocese of Reims.[[683]](#footnote-683) Links with Paris seem to have been crucial to the direction taken by Beauvais:

[D]eux frerez nommés Lucquain docteurs en la faculté de theologie a paris, et chanoine en l’esglise cathedralle, Nicolas Godin l’un des principaux bourgeois dela ville, lequel l’année precedente avoit esté a paris jurer la ligue au nom de tous les habitans, et quelque nombre des plus affectionnez a la religion catholique firent faire une assemblée generale des bourgeois, où il fit resolu que la ville se rangeroit au party de l’union des catholiques.[[684]](#footnote-684)

In early February the recently humbled Paris Parlementissued on behalf of the *Seize* a ruling to all towns under its jurisdiction, requiring them to deal firmly with royalists; additionally, it was expected that ‘pour avoir une mutuelle et entière correspondance entre elles, elles ayent a deputer quelques bonnes et notables personnes audit paris, pour asister aux conseils et deliberations qui s’y feront, et respondront pour le bien de la religion et de l’Estat’.[[685]](#footnote-685)

Although Rozée’s text allows the above three-fold categorisation of explanations for *Ligueur* affiliation, I would suggest that for this author the heart of the matter lay much deeper. The following passage is helpful:

Ainsy il sembloit qu’un mesme esprit conduisoit toutes les villes à la défection de l’obeissance qu’ils devoient a leur prince souverain, car elle se faisoit sans l’entremise des princes ou des seig[neu]rs, et les habitans des villes, s’estant declarez, appellerent des gouverneurs ou les reçeurent de l’ordonnance du duc de Mayenne, ausquels habitans quand on demandoit la cause de ce soulevement, que l’on pouvoit justement appeler une rebellion, ils repliquoient incontinent, que c’estoit l’apprehention de la perte de leur religion (qu’ils tenoient de Dieu et non du Roy) qui leur avoit fait prendre les armes, pour l’execution de l’Edit de juillet, publié et confirmé aux estats depuis la mort du duc de guise.[[686]](#footnote-686)

For Rozée, the single sufficient cause for adherence to the *Ligue* was the simple fear of otherwise losing the religion that God had revealed. In the face of such danger, how could there not emerge a consensus amongst all towns?

**Chapter 6: The *Seize* in Decline**

With the death of Henri III, the *Seize* experienced joy and relief; by the end of 1591 they were in disarray. Two events – the long siege of Paris and the Brisson affair – dominate the narrative of this decline.[[687]](#footnote-687)

The regicide turned out to be a mixed blessing for the *Seize*, opening up ‘contradictions within the Union which their unity against the tyrant had masked’.[[688]](#footnote-688) On 5 August there was a shift in the balance of power: following the proclamation of the imprisoned cardinal de Bourbon as ‘Charles X’ (5 August) it fell to Mayenne to appoint to the highest offices in the land.[[689]](#footnote-689) Relations between Mayenne and the *Seize*, cemented six months earlier, came under strain in mid-August during the elections for control of the municipality of Paris. Believing that the *prévôt* and *échevins* they had appointed fifteen months earlier had lost their cutting edge, the *Seize* tried to replace them. They failed: Mayenne, angry, over-ruled them.[[690]](#footnote-690) Two points emerge. First, the *Seize* leadership had become both more radical and less influential. Secondly, the *Seize –* Mayenne – *Bureau de la ville* axis of power had weakened.[[691]](#footnote-691)

Frustrated, the *Seize* resorted to acts of terror. Politiqueslearned to fear confiscations, physical assaults, imprisonments, even death.[[692]](#footnote-692) What Rozée thought, we cannot know.[[693]](#footnote-693) What seems clear is that terror won the *Seize* more enemies: ‘La noblesse nous mesprise; noz Magistrats … ont esté faicts noz ennemis, nous ayans abandonnez au besoing,’ wrote one anonymous author.[[694]](#footnote-694) The duke’s decision at the end of 1589 to suppress the *conseil-général* and to govern through his own council, whilst driven in part by pressure from close advisers who wanted a free hand in negotiations with Spanish agents, was also probably a response to the Paris *Ligueurs*’ self-disqualification from normal political life.[[695]](#footnote-695) It was a move that weakened the *Seize* both as public policy-makers and as guardians over ultra-Catholic towns across the country.[[696]](#footnote-696) The *Seize* felt snubbed, treated as ‘gens de basse qualité’.[[697]](#footnote-697) Initially, theyreacted quietly – but they were hurt.[[698]](#footnote-698) At the same time, the duke appointed four secretaries of state and chose to reserve the granting of publication *privilèges* to himself and the Parlement. Arlette Jouanna has claimed that, if one is to use the anachronistic term *Thermidor*, then it is at least as applicable at the close of 1589 as in the aftermath of the Brisson affair.[[699]](#footnote-699) Meanwhile, a consequence of Mayenne’s defeat at Arques was an attack on Paris by royal troops (at *Toussaint*): ‘800 ligueurs furent tués, autant faits prisonniers’.[[700]](#footnote-700)

Despite the recent difficulties, 1590 began well. The arrival of the papal legate Enrico Caetani boosted morale. Mayenne was conciliatory: ‘[J]'ay telle espérance de votre fidelité que je me repose de tout sur votre vigilance et diligence pour la conservation de la ville,’ he told the leaders of the *Seize* – ‘ses anciens amis’ – as he left for the siege of Meulan in January.[[701]](#footnote-701) A few weeks later, it was they who reassured him that despite the disaster of Ivry he retained their confidence.[[702]](#footnote-702) Meanwhile, aware that they were under surveillance, Paris royalists kept a low profile.[[703]](#footnote-703) The *Seize*-led harassment of the *receveur* François de Vigny played on the minds of some of the king’s advisers.[[704]](#footnote-704) There was no hope, said one of them, of a successful plot in the city, ‘a cause de la perpetuelle vigilance, diligence et exacte recherche de ces seize, lesquels estoient ordinairement avertis comme a point nommé de tout ce qui se passoit dans la ville’.[[705]](#footnote-705)It was a statement that would be vindicated during the long siege, a time of such travail that, for a few months, friction between the duke and the *Seize*, and suspicion between *Ligueurs* and Politiques, both waned.

The siege – that ‘calvaire du petit peuple’ (Constant) – lasted four months.[[706]](#footnote-706) It was ‘the most crippling siege in the history of any major European city since that of Constantinople in the fifteenth century’.[[707]](#footnote-707)

Figure 7 : Timetable of the Main Events of the 1590 Siege of Paris

(shown in weeks beginning Sundays)

Sunday Main events (with page numbers in ms. 23296) Events unrecorded in ms. 23296

May 6 Sorbonne articles *De jure divino...* (200, 328-33) Cannon volleys from Montmartre and Montfaucon (231)

Death of the cardinal de Bourbon, ‘Charles X’ (255)

Debate within the king’s council (231-35) Skirmishing in the *faubourgs*; La Noue wounded (235-39)

May 13 Procession of armed monks

May 20

May 27 Ascension Day procession

June 3 *Ligue* delegates prevented from meeting Mayenne (244)

June 10 Bombardment from Montmartre (246) The king’s letter to Paris

June 17 Courage of the defending *lansquenets* (246) Execution of Noiret

June 24 Execution of Renard

Clergy ordered to provide meals

July 1 Guincestre at the defences (247) Vows to Notre-Dame de Lorette

Unproductive peace talks chez Gondi (247-48) July 8 Fall of St Denis (258)

An apparition (249)

Food found at the convent of St Ant.-des-Champs (249)

July 15 Skirmishing (251-52)

July 22 *Ligue* loss of the Abbaye de St Germain-des-Prés (269-70)

Failure of the royalist assault at the Porte St Honoré (254)

July 29 Parlement discusses options (282-84)

August 5 Truce while the king meets the Paris deputies (291-94)

The *Journée du pain ou la paix* (295-99)

August 12 First appearance of bone-bread

August 19 Failure of a further round of peace talks (318-19)

Reactions to the death of Sixtus V (328)

August 26 The lifting of the siege (324)

September 2 Food reaches Paris (325-28) September 9 *L’escalade* (343-48)

To win the kingdom, Henri IV had first to gain the capital. Buoyed by his brisk victory over *Ligue* forces at the battle of Ivry in mid-March 1590, the king proceeded in early summer to impose an economic blockade and, as the weeks passed, an ever-tightening military stranglehold on the city.

Henri’s policy – not to storm Paris but to starve it into submission – came close to succeeding as food supplies dwindled, prices soared and Parisians’ lives became increasingly miserable. Assisted by the papal legate, the Spanish ambassador, *Ligueur* preachers and the *Seize*, the duc de Nemours managed to uphold morale and to guide the city through its darkest hours. There were moments of danger, as when the king’s supporters in the city – the Politiques – staged an uprising demanding *du pain ou la paix*, and also times of soul-searching, as the city leaders grudgingly acceded to calls for peace talks with the heretic King of Navarre. The talks were fruitless and in the end it was the approach of forces led by the dukes of Parma and Mayenne that caused the king to lift the siege at the end of August. The city was to remain in rebellion for nearly four more years.

Several facets of the siege have attracted the attention of modern historians. Michael Wolfe explored the significance of events for the process of the king’s conversion.[[708]](#footnote-708) In Jean-Pierre Babelon’s biography of Henri IV the focus was naturally the activities and character of the king.[[709]](#footnote-709) By contrast, Jean-Marie Constant took his readers into the streets, and both he and Arlette Lebigre remarked the spirit of Catholic resistance shown there.[[710]](#footnote-710) Our understanding of how that resistance was sustained has been enlightened by Ann Ramsey’s work on the city’s strong liturgical culture.[[711]](#footnote-711)

Back in 1972, Peter Ascoli wrote a comprehensive siege account which demonstrated the part played by the *Seize*.[[712]](#footnote-712) He noted that no previous historian of the siege had used the *Histoire*, a work which he judged to be ‘very accurate when compared with the accounts of Pigafetta and Corneio’.[[713]](#footnote-713) Like Rozée, Filippo Pigafetta and Pedro Corneio were eye-witnesses of the horrors unfolding in Paris in summer 1590.[[714]](#footnote-714) This at once sets them apart from royalist writers such as Matthieu (who was in Lyon), and de Thou and d’Aubigné (both with the king outside the city walls). Corneio’s account – from which Pigafetta acknowledged borrowing some details – was published in both Paris and Madrid in 1590.[[715]](#footnote-715) Goulart’s editor in 1758 called Corneio ‘un ami zélé de ce Parti Fanatique’, and Goulart himself accused him of saying as little as he could get away with about the people’s suffering.[[716]](#footnote-716) ‘Ce Ligueur Corneïo,’ he wrote, ‘amoindrisse les choses en des endroits, les grossisse en d’autres, faisant le censeur & discoureur très impertinent’; yet, despite these limitations, the account was instructive because Corneio, ‘contraint par la force de la vérité’, could not avoid testifying to the misery experienced in the capital.[[717]](#footnote-717) Unlike the two foreign writers, Rozée wrote a generation after the events took place. He had had time to gather information and to reflect, and he had little to gain from partiality. On the downside, he risked sounding ‘out of touch’: ‘(ainsy que on parlait lors)’, he added on one occasion as he referred to the Politiques as belonging to the ‘party du Roy’.[[718]](#footnote-718) It is perhaps for this reason that he was emphatic – as we saw earlier – about his eye-witness status.

Among Peter Ascoli’s sources were the fifty or so pages of the *Registre de la Ville de Paris* covering the siege.[[719]](#footnote-719) In these pages we find the city fathers busy introducing short-term measures to see the city through the crisis: for example, defensive bags of soil must be prepared, an additional tax of one *écu* per day is imposed, and priests are told to encourage alms-giving.[[720]](#footnote-720) Ascoli also made use of the *Journal du siège de Paris en 1590* and the *Journal historique de Pierre Fayet*. Jean-Pierre Babelon took account of the *Histoire du siège de Paris fort soigneusement et véritablement redigée par escrit*, edited in 1880 by Alphonse Dufour shortly after its acquisition by the *Bibliothèque nationale*. We also have some smaller pieces. Goulart’s 1758 editor, *l’abbé* Goujet, believed it was Francesco Panigarola who left a glowing résumé of *Ligue* successes against the troops around Paris in the early weeks of the siege.[[721]](#footnote-721) Then there is a vigorous reply to the king’s overtures in mid-June to the *manans et habitans de Paris*. Identifying himself as M.D.P., *bourgeois de Paris*, the author denied that there was a serious shortage of food and troops in the capital, and apostrophised the king in no uncertain terms: ‘Vous pensez nous esbranler & faire condescendre à vostre volonté allegant la nécessité & disette de viures ou nous sommes, & remonstrant le peu d’esperance qu’il y a du secours ...mais croyez que tous voz discours ont fort peu d’energie en nostre endroict.’[[722]](#footnote-722) A calmer narrative – this time completely anonymous – focused on an assault on the *faubourgs* Saint Denis and Saint Martin in mid-May. Here the author repeatedly praised the tactics of ‘mondict Seigneur de Nemours’ and exulted in the set-back to the King of Navarre – a reverse most obviously betokened by the ‘death’ in action of La Noue.[[723]](#footnote-723)

Before we move to a consideration of Rozée’s coverage of summer 1590, it is worth noting that there are interesting siege accounts from within the king’s camp. Admittedly the worst of these amount to little more than Protestant propaganda. We encounter the mother who supposedly not only ate the bodies of her recently deceased infants but also, come the time for their burial, had the wit to place objects of equal weight in the coffins.[[724]](#footnote-724) In these pages, the death toll in the city leaps from the standard estimates (around 30,000) up to 100,000, soldiers behave badly, and grass grows in the streets.[[725]](#footnote-725) But it is also from the king’s camp that we have d’Aubigné’s narrative.[[726]](#footnote-726) Here we have thoughtful writing. Alongside the fifty thousand or so men under arms in Paris, and beside the preachers, ‘il y avoit une autre sorte de garnison qui fomentoit merveilleusement les resolutions de ce peuple, c’estoyent les Dames; entre celles-là la Duchesse de Montpensier’; within the same military metaphor, ‘les espions... ne furent pas pieces inutiles à l’endurcissement’.[[727]](#footnote-727) D’Aubigné distinguished carefully between what was only rumour and what he had actually seen, and was open about gaps in his knowledge. Very different from this measured military report was a confession penned in late May by a Catholic defector from the king’s camp who identified himself merely as P.D.B.[[728]](#footnote-728) Tired of waiting for the promised religious conversion, the writer had lost confidence in the king: ‘C’est un faux basque, c’est un renard’.[[729]](#footnote-729) From his position in the king’s army he lamented the closed shops and deserted houses of Paris, and admired the people who had displayed ‘une patience admirable en leurs miseres, un grand contentement en leur peu’.[[730]](#footnote-730) In the past he had considered the word *Ligueur* to mean ‘mutin, rebelle, seditieux’, but now he respected the *Ligue* as ‘l’union de gens de bien resoluz à tout employer pour la conservation de la religion Catholique’.[[731]](#footnote-731) For the *Ligue* this letter was dynamite and it was soon with the printers.

Ascoli rightly emphasised that Rozée produced a more detailed account of the siege of Paris than anyone else who had lived through it. Unlike L’Estoile who had plenty to say on his personal hardships, the more diffident historian occluded his own story. The general suffering could not go unmentioned – particularly the horror of death by starvation.[[732]](#footnote-732) Loss of business – ‘les officiers et ceux de la pratique ne gagnoient rien’ – must have been comparatively bearable.[[733]](#footnote-733) Rozée seems not to have been motivated to write by religious fervour – preachers and processions scarcely figure. Guincestre’s zeal at the ramparts was noted, but the notorious processions were quietly forgotten, and in the *escalade* of 10 September the Jesuits became merely ‘quelques ecclesiastiques’.[[734]](#footnote-734) Judging from the places where he betrayed personal opinions, I conclude that his main purpose in writing so much on the siege was to draw attention to the role of the *Seize*.

Rozée had no qualms about promoting the *Seize*. He asserted that their role was both legitimate and indispensable. He was interested in what the *Seize* did, and how they did it. It is a very practical account. One of the *Seize*, the *prévôt des marchands* Michel La Chapelle-Marteau, was instrumental in securing Nemours as governor. Another, Mathias Delabruyère, organised food supplies; he served ‘à la diligence’, organising a supply network that assured the maintenance of ‘le bon ordre’.[[735]](#footnote-735) Provision of artillery was undertaken by Joseph Bourdereul and Jehan Messier. On one occasion the *Seize* lent two hundred *écus* to the beleaguered governor. Diligence, vigilance and resolution were the hallmarks of these men. Their importance was recognised by the *grands*. Mayenne wrote to them.[[736]](#footnote-736) It was ‘volontiers’ that Nemours took account of their advice, for the *Seize* were not usurpers but servants.[[737]](#footnote-737)

The success of the *Seize* in holding the line against the king needs to be placed against the background of the mood in Paris: any catastrophic loss of morale would have made a humiliating surrender inevitable. Rozée’s assessment is balanced. He acknowledged that from the outset some *Ligueurs* were defeatist: ‘une partie des ligueurs, qui n’attendoient point de Dieu des miracles pour leur conservation, ainsi regardoient aux moyens humains et ordinaires, remontroient l’impossibilité de defendre cette ville...’.[[738]](#footnote-738) In truth, much of the intermittent bombardment of the city issued from cannon too distant to do much damage, but Rozée was aware of its capacity to reduce morale.[[739]](#footnote-739) Yet, confronted as they were by famine and intimidation, what our historian best recollected was the people’s spirit. Of course some, ‘plus soigneux de leur interest particulier que de public’, advocated a settlement, but there was also selflessness in adversity: ‘les ligueurs avoient pitié les uns des autres’.[[740]](#footnote-740) People were resourceful: ‘chascun ouvroit l’esprit pour trouver des moyens pour se soulager’.[[741]](#footnote-741) In an approving tone, Rozée provided a simple example of good-neighbourliness:

Ceux qui estoient charitables aydoient un peu les pauvres de ce qu’ils avoient ; entre les autres un honneste homme ne pouvant continuer ses aumosnes de pain qu’il avoit accoustume de faireaux pauvres, s’advisa qu’autrefois en bretagne, il avoit veu faire certaine boulye, de la qu’elle les pauvres paysans usent ordinairement avec du son d’avoyne bien accommodé et destrempés ; il fit de céte boulye, et en mangea le premier ; puis en donna aux pauvres qui la trouvèrent fort bonne, car ce bon homme y metoit du miel, pour oster l’amertume de l’ausyne.[[742]](#footnote-742)

There was more than charity: Rozée’s *Ligueurs* were righteous. It was the holiness of their cause that distinguished them from rebels. They were men and women ‘pleins d’espérance pour la justice de leur cause,... résolus de... souffrir les incommodités qui plairoit à Dieu de leur envoyer ; s’asseurant que Dieu feroit miséricorde à ceux qui, succombant à la misère, mourroient pour la confirmation de la religion’.[[743]](#footnote-743) Apart from occasional lapses, they maintained self-discipline. Rozée found it hard to grasp how they did this ‘parmy les fureurs de la faim’.[[744]](#footnote-744) They worried that the supple Cardinal de Gondi’s attendance at talks with the papal legate might compromise the status of the Catholic faith. By a simple contrast with the king’s men, Rozée painted Parisians as innocent: their womenfolk dared not take advantage of permission to leave the city for fear of what would be done to them beyond the walls. They also knew how to be patient: Rozée hid behind those who said, after the lifting of the siege:

L’on avoit veu que les simples artisans de paris, les femmes et les enfans, avoient supporté courageusement la disette, faim, et toutes les misères qui s’estoient présentées pendant le siège de six mois, sans avoir seulement souspiré une simple plainte mal à propos ; et ceux qui faisoient profession de porter les armes et de faire le metier de la guerre n’avoient pü patir quatre iours dans le camp de chelles, sur le point de donner quelque memorable bataille ou ils auroient pü acquérir dela reputation et de l’honneur.[[745]](#footnote-745)

Elsewhere, Rozée could not resist pointing out that it was after his observation of the people’s resolution that the captured Charles marquis d’Andelot abjured his Protestant faith.

Steering Paris through the siege was Mayenne’s brother, the duc de Nemours. Rozée had nothing but praise for this twenty-three year old who possessed ‘la sagesse et... la resolution plus que son aage n’en pouvoit porter’.[[746]](#footnote-746) One of the historian’s imported documents is a letter in which the king paid tribute to Nemours’ ‘valeur et generosité à la deffence de paris jusques icy’.[[747]](#footnote-747) Rozée’s assessment of the duke’s leadership can be summarised under three heads. First, he worked tirelessly:

Le duc de Nemours... fortifia les corps de garde posez aux premiers rangs et aux plus grandes avenües, ordonna le gros pour envoyer secours ou besoin seroit, parla aux gens de guerre pour leur augmenter le courage, visita le rempart pour voir si ses commandements avoient esté bien executez, encouragea les bourgeois qu’il y trouva, les instruit de ce qu’ils devoient faire, pourveut aux deffaux, et donna ordre a ce qu’il voioit estre necessaire ; fit faire une ronde par quelques uns de ses gentilshommes par la ville, pour sçavoir si en chacun quartier, specialement aux avenües des ponts, le peuple estoit en armes en gros comme il l’avoit ordonné ; et ayant le tout bien disposé, il se retira a la porte de S[ain]t Martin pour pourvoir a la ville, et voir s’il y avoit quelque remüement ; conduisant de l’oeil et du commandement les gens de guerre qui estoient aux fauxbourgs.[[748]](#footnote-748)

Nemours was at the ramparts every night; ‘il ne negligéa rien’.[[749]](#footnote-749) Secondly, Nemours had the common touch. He welcomed advice and listened carefully to it. He worked with the men at the fortifications. He ate as the ordinary people ate, actively dissuading his mother from pulling strings in order to acquire food from outside the city, ‘disant qu’il ne vouloit pas estre mieux traité que le peuple’.[[750]](#footnote-750) Thirdly, there were opponents to be managed. Rozée noted that ‘avec raison il [Nemours] ne si fioit a plusieurs des premiers de la ville’.[[751]](#footnote-751) It was important for Nemours to be vigilant without being provocative, especially as it was a grudging respect for him that kept on board some leading citizens who might otherwise have tried to open the city to the king. Nemours distinguished himself in his resolution of the tumult known as the *Journée* *du pain ou la paix*, when, in the aftermath, he took time to explain to the leading ‘perturbateurs du repos public’the considerable risk of popular reprisals that they were exposed to, and the obligation that was his, as governor, to punish them. Rozée was full of admiration for the way in which Nemours defused the situation:

Comme il estoit d’un naturel fort doux, il les conduisit dehors, et les fit conduire en seureté en leurs maisons, qui fut une grande prudence en ce jeune prince, car si ceux qui demeurerent les plus forts eussent esté conduits par le mesme esprit lequel avoit fait soulever les autres, pour commencer une partie si mal faite, on eust veu beaucoup de sang respandu a paris.[[752]](#footnote-752)

For Nemours, the preservation of Paris was a responsibility placed upon him by the *lieutenant-général* of the kingdom; it was therefore a matter of honour to die, if need be, before surrendering the charge.[[753]](#footnote-753) The same spirit burned in the hearts of the *Seize*, to whom we now turn. Ascoli noted that Corneio and Pigafetta never mentioned the *Seize*.[[754]](#footnote-754) The explanation may simply be that, writing some years before the royalist historians’ dismissive obituaries of the *Ligue*, early writers sensed no need to establish, let alone rescue, the reputation of the *Seize*. Rozée, by contrast, felt the need to speak up. One way in which his account emphasises the stature of the *Seize* is by showing their political opponents – the Politiques– to be men of straw. It was not that the threat they posed was negligible: the *Journée du pain ou la paix* was possibly the greatest challenge to *Ligue* rule before March 1594.[[755]](#footnote-755) Rather, theylacked moral fibre. They criticised Caetani for his charity to the distressed, refused to pay taxes for the town’s defence, selfishly secured their own food supplies through private arrangements, lampooned the *Ligue* preachers, undermined confidence in the imminent arrival of relief, and gloated that the king could not but emerge victorious. Damningly, while they ‘firent contenance’ of being loyal to the city, they operated ‘sous main’.[[756]](#footnote-756) Furthermore, the royalists within the walls were cowards:

...personne ne vouloit paroistre le premier pour sortir en rüe; les grands s’excusoient sur leur qualité, et disoient aux petits, qu’ils devoient paroistre comme avoient fait les Seize; et les petits repliquoient qu’ils ne vouloient pas faire la faute qu’avoient fait les Seize; que les plus interesses devoient monstrer le chemin aux autres.[[757]](#footnote-757)

On 26 July the king’s cannon bombarded the Porte Saint-Honoré. It was the pre-arranged signal for royalists to stage an uprising. However, ‘pas un ne parut en une si belle occasion, et ceux qui avoient beaucoup promis monstrerent la foiblesse de leur courage’.[[758]](#footnote-758)

Rozée emphasised the contrast between the *Seize* and leading Politiques by recounting three short tales.[[759]](#footnote-759) Fable-like in that they all have a moral, the use of real names in two of them suggests that the events really took place. Pierre Senault, whom the Politiques believed was living well off ‘les affaires de la ligue et l’assistance des Espagnols’, was found to be eating frugally. The ‘grand politique’ Le Normand lost a bet when it was found that while he had beef and mutton cooking in the pot, the *ligueur* Jacques Bazin had ‘un morceau de chair de cheval seulement’.[[760]](#footnote-760) The tales are worthier, the historian assures us, than ‘le conte impertinent qu’on a fait du chien de la douairiere de Montpensier et de tant de sornettes qu ’on a escrites’.[[761]](#footnote-761) Rozée’s purpose in telling them was to defend the *Seize* against allegations that they ate well while the poor starved – claims which, had they gone unchallenged, would have made his goal of extolling the role of the *Seize* in the siege virtually impossible to achieve. The *Seize* led by example: they ate no better than their followers. At least two of them – Jehan de Compans and Antoine Fontanon – lost their lives in the process.

Just three days after the passing of Fontanon, and when it seemed that Paris could hold out no longer, long-awaited *Ligue* troops arrived. ‘Sur cete approche des troupes, on redoubla les prières publiques…; le peuple quoyqu’il fut pressé de tant de miseres et incommodités, et affligés de tant de maladies, estoit fort soigneux d’assister aux prieres, de sorte que nuit et jour les eglises ne desemplissoient point…’.[[762]](#footnote-762) It seemed that, ‘avec la grace de dieu’, the city would be delivered.[[763]](#footnote-763) And so it was, for in the night of 29-30 August the besieging troops withdrew. In partnership with Nemours and (at last) Mayenne and Parma, the *Seize* had triumphed. But their joy was to be short-lived.

In September, tension between Mayenne and the *Seize* re-surfaced. Jean Boucher led a delegation to Corbeil to give the duke *mémoires* penned by the Paris *Ligue* leadership. These claimed that there was still much to fight for, provided no deal was made with Navarre; assistance should be sought from Spain and the Pope; on the home front, the duke should get rid of self-seeking advisers, set up a tribunal to investigate the activities of high-ranking royalists (particularly in the justice system), reconvene the *conseil-général*, and move to the calling of an Estates-General.[[764]](#footnote-764) The delegates were rebuffed, denied even the opportunity to meet Parma. Rozée was stoical – ‘Ces memoires, soit qu’ils ne fussent pas conformes a l’estat des affaires présentes, ou qu’ils touchoient de trop pres ceux qui possedoient entierement la volonté du duc de Mayenne, ou que le duc avoit d’autres desseins, ou que dieu en eust disposé autrement, ne furent pas bien reçeus’ – but he could not hide his disappointment: ‘ce mespris de leurs deputez et de leurs memoires ofensa fort une grande partie du peuple de paris, qui commença a perdre une partie de la croyance qu’ils avoient au duc’ [[765]](#footnote-765).

It is at this point in the *Histoire* that Rozée introduced what became a motif in the later pages of his text: the ‘trois partis à Paris’ – Politiques, ‘les ligueurs de la religion catholique’, and ‘les ligueurs partisans du duc de Mayenne’.[[766]](#footnote-766) Significantly, all the references to this tri-partite division come immediately after an account of some rebuff from Mayenne.[[767]](#footnote-767) The duke was thus to be increasingly blamed for weakening the movement. For now, we note that the setback at Corbeil was soon followed by another. In the delayed municipal elections of October, Mayenne used his influence to replace La Chapelle-Marteau as *prévôt des marchands* with Charles Boucher, and to replace three of the *échevins* with conservatives who had no affiliation to the *Seize*.[[768]](#footnote-768) The fourth *échevin*, Robert Desprez, the only survivor within the leadership group from May 1588, did not need to be replaced; by 1590 the increasingly radical *Seize* already viewed him as an enemy.[[769]](#footnote-769)

1591 began badly for the *Seize*. January saw the loss of the chevalier d’Aumale and the shock of the *journée des farines*.[[770]](#footnote-770) Before long there was a return to violence. Attacks were launched against magistrates in the *chambre des comptes*, and François Oudineau had some of the humbler targets executed.[[771]](#footnote-771) At the same time the *Seize* asked Mayenne to reconvene the *conseil-général* and to establish a tribunal of fifteen judges to deal with high-placed traitors, including some named troublesome notables who needed to be expelled from the capital. Disappointment followed. After initially agreeing to expel troublemakers the duke issued a reprieve and, beyond suggesting leadership changes, he refused to interfere with the proceedings of the Parlement.[[772]](#footnote-772) He then left (escaped from?) the capital. Rozée returned to his motif of the three parties in Paris, a city now ‘plein de confusion’.[[773]](#footnote-773) He observed gloomily that though the *Seize* had the largest support base the other two parties had the combined strength to ruin them.

Rebuffed by Mayenne, the *Seize* wrote to Pope Gregory XIV; perhaps in an attempt to reassure himself that his associates still had widespread support, Rozée emphasised that this was a duty placed upon them by the municipal magistrates and other (unspecified) *Ligueur* towns.[[774]](#footnote-774) Dated 24 February 1591, the letter thanked the Pope for his help so far and asked that the financial and military support might continue.[[775]](#footnote-775) Evidence of fluidity within the fundamentalist Catholic movement, François Brigard, the trustedemissary from the *Seize* to the duc de Guise back in May 1588, now found himself targeted by his own cousin, Bussy Leclerc, for alleged contact with the enemy. While the case dragged on, the *Seize* turned their attention to the militia colonels. The formerly reliable François Costeblanche was replaced by Jehan-Baptiste de Machault, but attempts to remove Claude Daubray were unsuccessful.

In summer, the *Seize* tried once again to make progress at the institutional level. Thinking ahead to the Estates-General that Mayenne habitually promised but never seemed to deliver they considered but failed to agree upon whom they would elect as king. In the August municipal contest, despite forcing a second electoral assembly to be convened, and despite the consolation prize of securing the resignations of Martin Langlois and Robert Desprez, the *Seize* failed to prevent Mayenne’s moderates from holding the *Bureau de la Ville*. As the end of the year approached, simmering tensions bolied over.

‘Je me noie et ne m’en puis sauver’; it is with Barnabé Brisson’s cry of despair amidst a political storm that we approach a critical juncture in the history of the *Ligue*.[[776]](#footnote-776) In mid-November 1591, Brisson and two other lawyers – Claude Larcher and Jean Tardif – were arrested by the *Seize*, charged with conspiracy, and summarily executed. It was an act of intimidation that Mayenne, *lieutenant-général du Royaume*, could not ignore. In December, the duke arrived in Paris to deal with the perpetrators, four of whom were hanged. Thereafter the *Seize* existed only on the duke’s sufferance.

We consider this reverse in *Ligue* fortunes by comparing the accounts left by Rozée and Pierre de L’Estoile. These two contemporary commentators, respectively *avocat* and *audiencier*,had very different views. Rozée produced his cautious but firm defence of the *Seize* years after the dust had settled. In L’Estoile’s lively and engaging journal we have the thoughts of one whose decision to stay in the city rather than withdraw to Tours was interpreted by some contemporaries as evidence that he had gone *Ligueur*.[[777]](#footnote-777) Nothing could have been further from the truth. Briefly imprisoned by the *Seize*, and a friend of Tardif, L’Estoile was a confirmed Politique.His account, replete with oral testimony, was designed to guide the reader to the desired (anti-*Ligueur*) opinion.[[778]](#footnote-778)

For Rozée the Brisson affair was puzzling, having ‘produit des effets tant dissemblables aux desseins de ceux qui l’ont commis.’[[779]](#footnote-779) In considering why the *premier président* died, we note at the outset that terror was not new in *Ligueur* Paris. Before November 1591, much of it had been spontaneous. Very much in the tradition of St Bartholomew’s Day and the *journée des barricades*, violence had erupted after the Blois assassinations. Luke-warm Catholics found themselves liable to be branded Politiques. In May 1590 the *colonel* Jehan Midorge had been dragged through the streets, then nearly drowned; three months later another waverer – Jean Prévost – received the same treatment. L’Estoile described the dangerous atmosphere: ‘Il n’estoit pas permis à Paris de se montrer autre que ligueur; les gens de bien y estoient exposés à la perte de leurs vies et de leurs biens, et aux mouvements d’une populace furieuse et emportée.’[[780]](#footnote-780) Individuals in the *Seize* found they could use violence against Politiques with impunity: Jehan Emonnot killed and stole, Jean Hamilton terrorised a student and took his money; Bussy le Clerc practised extortion against prisoners in the Bastille.[[781]](#footnote-781)

By contrast, the murder of Brisson was orchestrated, and its real target was the Parlement: ‘frapper le Premier Président devrait prendre valeur de symbole: c’est l’ensemble de la Justice officielle tant honnie que l’on frapperait à travers lui, et l’effet de terreur ainsi obtenu devrait inspirer à l’ensemble de la gent “politique” de salutaires réflexes de prudence.’[[782]](#footnote-782) Official terror would cow the enemy and encourage commitment from nervous *Ligueurs*.

Elie Barnavi considered the execution of Brisson to mark the culmination of the second of two waves of organised terror. The first wave had been provoked by the Blois murders.[[783]](#footnote-783) In January 1589 it had been the purge of the Parlementthat allowed Brisson to gain the premier presidency – in what Paul Gambier regarded a two-fold act of betrayal.[[784]](#footnote-784) In summer 1589 the terror was fed by fears thatParis would soon be captured, and not even the regicide calmed nerves for long.[[785]](#footnote-785) The second wave of terror had begun as a response to the renewed confidence of the king’s supporters during the extremities of the second siege of Paris in the early summer of 1590, though warning signs had appeared during the Vigny affair in March.[[786]](#footnote-786) During the siege, summary executions became more common, and anyone mentioning peace-talks risked the death penalty. Tensions ran high.[[787]](#footnote-787) In April 1591 the *Seize* persuaded Mayenne to effect a purge of the Parlement: fifteen *conseillers* were sacked and exiled from Paris for their Politique leanings. Brisson was cited but on this occasion pardoned. In July, in an unprecedented move, the *Seize* closed the Parlement down for eight days; four months later they took Brisson’s life.

It is important to avoid likening the terror in *Ligueur* Paris to terrorism in the late twentieth century and since. Modern terrorism has typically involved an assault on the establishment by a disaffected and violent group who do not share the values of the majority. This was not true of the *Seize*, many of whom not only shared the values of office-holders but also aspired after their jobs. What annoyed L’Estoile so much was that upstarts from the lower classes were attempting to supplant the notables whose right to govern was an age-old tradition. They were thus rising from a private world where they belonged to threaten a public domain where they did not. The *Ligue* had managed to place Jean Borderel-Rosny in the post of *receveur de la Ville*, but most of the levers of power still eluded them. Bussy le Clerc put it simply: ‘Messieurs, nous devrions souhaitter que ceux de ceste compagnie eussent les principalles charges de la Ville, ce seroit un grand bien et grand advancement pour nostre religion’.[[788]](#footnote-788) In Barnavi’s own words, ‘une vingtaine d’extrémistes… devaient ouvrir une ère de purges sanglantes destinées à éliminer l’opposition et à assurer aux *Seize* les places ainsi libérées.’[[789]](#footnote-789)

Thanks to Elie Barnavi and Robert Descimon a great deal is known about Brisson’s rise to eminence.[[790]](#footnote-790) His subsequent fall can be partly explained by his preoccupation with work: ‘Il est… possible qu’accaparé par ses fonctions et par les tâches érudites que le roi ou ses propres passions lui avaient suggérées, Brisson ait négligé l’évolution dramatique de la situation politique.’[[791]](#footnote-791) Mark Greengrass has suggested that in throwing in his lot with the *Seize*, Brisson ‘had become involved in a dangerous political arena where he had much to lose and little power to wield.’[[792]](#footnote-792)Had the senior judge been over-ambitious, coveting the position of *premier président* even if it meant serving the *Seize*? The argument is plausible. ‘Il est trop imbu de lui-même pour fuir, trop ambitieux pour abandoner son perchoir sans être sûr de le retrouver de l’autre côté: un intellectuel pesant indéfiniment le pour et le contre, sans jamais se résoudre à l’action.’[[793]](#footnote-793)

Out of his depth, Brisson was also disliked. For all his erudition, he was an upstart, one who had risen ‘by a single-minded application of family, favour and fortune’.[[794]](#footnote-794) He was a mere Poitevin at a time when provincial men rarely made it to the top in Paris. His ascension to the premier presidency had been disturbingly swift, and in so far as it had been bought it was an affront to traditional urban values.[[795]](#footnote-795) His wealth had come from his wife and was certainly a cause of jealousy: ‘…il est évident que la réputation de Brisson souffrit de cette trop rapide fortune… pour ceux qui le firent pendre, le prodigieux enrichissement du nouveau président tenait du scandale, quels qu’aient été ses dons et ses mérites. Il prenait place parmi les profiteurs du système.’[[796]](#footnote-796) Thus the Brisson affair sprang out of contempt for the upper echelons of a legal system which this judge epitomised. He was destined to play ‘le rôle de bouc émissaire’.[[797]](#footnote-797)

Brisson’s execution can be partly explained by his handling a few months earlier of a case involving François Brigard, *procureur de la Ville*. A committed member of the *Seize* in May 1588, by summer 1591 Brigard had become luke-warm.[[798]](#footnote-798) In 1591, with the king strengthening his stranglehold around Paris and Politiquesin the city growing in confidence, the *Seize* decided that the time had come to provoke a showdown in order to assert their authority and to wring greater support from Mayenne. The Parlement was ‘la principale citadelle de l’opposition’; it was in that arena that the fight had to be won.[[799]](#footnote-799) But disappointment followed: the case no sooner reached the Parlement than Brigard was acquitted. By a ruling of 30 October 1591 charges against the *procureur* were dropped and he was set free. As a sop to the *Seize* (but also to protect the defendant) the judges ordered Brigard to quit Paris for two years.

Rozée was not impressed. Brigard and other defendants with him ‘avoient pour juges ceux qui estoient… coupables de mesmescrimes’.[[800]](#footnote-800) Hence, Descimon’s assertion that the *procureur*’s ‘prétendue trahison… déclencha l’affaire Brisson’.[[801]](#footnote-801) Except in presenting the chronology in sharper focus and in furnishing more detail, L’Estoile’s Brigard story is similar to Rozée’s. Alert to the evident disunity within the *Seize*,L’Estoile expressed surprise at the action against Brigard *‘*quiavoit tant fait de services à l’Union comme un des premierspillards et principaux supposts d’icelle’.[[802]](#footnote-802) He wrote in mid-August that the word on the street was that Brigard would not be hanged. We learn that Jean Boucher preached against Brigard, pointing out that if the *procureur* was not hanged then he himself ought to be.[[803]](#footnote-803) From L’Estoile we know that Brisson received two letters warning him that the *Seize* intended to do him harm. Brisson’s predicament is explicitly linked to the Brigard case in the *journalist*’s entries for November, by which time rumours were rife that those judges who had refused to proceed against Brigard would die for it.[[804]](#footnote-804) It was said that the time had come for a new St Bartholomew’s Day. Brisson was again given warnings, but still did not flee.

Two reasons may explain why L’Estoile gave more detail than Rozée about Brigard. First, writing three decades after the events, Rozée did not recall all the facts. Secondly, L’Estoile saw the opportunity of making political capital. Brigard’s alleged faults were hardly good publicity for the *Ligue*. L’Estoile’s reference to Brigard’s erstwhile *Ligue* credentials allowed him to plant in the reader’s mind severe doubts about the fitness of the divided *Seize* to govern. Rozée’s failure to mention Brigard’s early *Ligue* service allowed him to avoid raising the suspicion that *Ligueurs* could be turncoats.

Of course, the case against Brisson did not rest just on his clemency. ‘L’acquittement de Brigard n’est… que la goutte qui fait déborder le vase.’[[805]](#footnote-805) Rozée pinned a catalogue of crimes upon the judge by citing the arguments that the *Seize* presented to Mayenne: ‘les preuves qu’ils avoient des conspirations faites par le président Brisson contre le party catholique, dedans lequ’el il n’estoit demeuré que par l’ambition de se voir le chef du parlement, ou par avarice d’y faire une plus grande fortune’.[[806]](#footnote-806) Neither Rozée nor L’Estoile mentioned the particular reason why Cromé was glad to help eliminate Brisson (Brisson had once prosecuted his father, a *trésorier*, for peculation), but both were aware of a bigger picture.[[807]](#footnote-807) Rozée, equipped by the passage of thirty years to take a longer view than L’Estoile, was particularly expansive on the background to the executions.

The context established by Rozée was one of growing *Ligue* frustration with Mayenne. The duke seemed to be distancing himself from his erstwhile friends.[[808]](#footnote-808) With their list of offenders ready they had asked Mayenne to establish a special court with powers to deal with the Politiques. Mayenne had demurred: it was wrong to act unconstitutionally – the Parlement was there to guarantee justice to all. Moreover a law-suit against the Politiques would allow Henri de Navarreto ill-treat Catholics. Having imprisoned Brigard, it was with the unease of men who had overstepped a line that the *Seize* next sent deputies to Mayenne at Reims to advise him of the situation in Paris. The deputies were away for three months. During this period, the *Seize* in Paris fretted, deciding eventually to send letters to the Pope and to Philip II; their letters complained about Mayenne and toyed with the idea of the young duc de Guise replacing him as their patron. At last, tired of waiting for Mayenne to return and angered by the acquittal of Brigard, the *Seize* decided to let blood. Julien Pelletier exclaimed, ‘Messieurs, …il ne faut pas espérer jamais avoir raison de la cour de parlement en justice. C’est trop endurer. Il faut jouer des couteaux’.[[809]](#footnote-809) It is a measure of the authority that the *Seize* enjoyed, or the terror they inflicted, that ‘neither the city authorities nor the garrisoned troops of the duc de Mayenne moved a finger to prevent the deaths [of Brisson, Larcher and Tardif]’.[[810]](#footnote-810)

Placing the executions in the context of the very evident mistrust between Mayenne and the *Seize* allowed Rozée to imply that had Mayenne taken a stonger lead matters might have turned out differently; the blood was therefore on the duke’s hands. In truth, Rozée could not hide the bind in which the *Seize* found themselves: they were unable to act both decisively and lawfully, at a time when action was vital, with the king almost at the door to his capital and his friends inside eager to open it.

Far from concealing their difficulties, L’Estoile sought to demonstrate that the *Seize* were unfit to govern. The Politique *secrétaire du Roi* Jean Trumel had been seized and delivered to the *Seize* by a mere gardener eager to claim a monetary reward.[[811]](#footnote-811) Jean Tardif, ‘un desplus gens de bien et des plus catholiques de sa paroisse’, had been called traitor from the pulpit.[[812]](#footnote-812) Meanwhile, Cromé had advocated a new St Bartholomew’s Day.[[813]](#footnote-813) Later, Bussy le Clerc’s assurances in a pre-execution cabal that signing a blank sheet of paper carried no risks won L’Estoile’s scathing riposte that ‘à telles gens, les brigandages, penderies, meurtres etassassinats, et toutes autres èspeces de meschancetés, servent à la conservation de laReligion’.[[814]](#footnote-814)

It is an irony that in November 1591, locked on a collision course, both the *Seize* and Brisson blamed Mayenne. Rozée shared the *Ligue* view that the duke had failed to give them adequate support in the preceding months. Brisson’s perspective emerges from L’Estoile’s moving account of a late-night conversation between the *président* and his friend, Jean Prévost, on the eve of the executions. Warned by the priest that he would die, Brisson refused to flee; ‘Dieu me gardera, s’il lui plaist, et disposera de moicomme il lui plaira’.[[815]](#footnote-815) Only the duke could defuse the situation: ‘nous ne pouvons rien: car nous ne sommes juges que de ce qu’il plaist au duc de Maienne.’[[816]](#footnote-816) Too late to save Brisson, Mayenne’s intervention when it came dealt a blow from which the *Ligue* never recovered.

Thirteen days elapsed between the hangings and Mayenne’s arrival. Rozée and L’Estoile handled the interval differently. In around 3,000 words L’Estoile described chaos and immediate reactions. Using fewer than five hundred words, Rozée mostly speculated about how the duke would respond.

After the shock of the executions, fear of more to come swept through the city. From L’Estoile we know that while some judges plucked up courage and returned to work, others stayed well away, and with good reason: no sooner were the bodies on display than Bussy le Clerc tried to whip up the crowd to go on the rampage against all traitors. Three days later, the *Seize* established a c*hambre ardente* to deal with more heretics and traitors. There appeared *un papier rouge* – a list of Politiques to be expelled from the city or killed.[[817]](#footnote-817) Such was the perturbation that Madame de Nemours sent a message imploring her son to come quickly. Yet even Mayenne might not be able to contain the situation: Bussy’s neighbour Arnoul Choulier swaggered that the *Seize* had made Mayenne, that they could unmake him – and that they would tell him so to his face (*à sa barbe*).[[818]](#footnote-818)

Others knew matters had gone too far. Pierre Delarue, no saint, quit the *Seize* in disgust and was at once branded Politique.[[819]](#footnote-819) Onlookers incited by Bussy le Clerc to shed more blood slipped away without a word, ‘estans plus esmeus à miséricorde qu’à sédition’.[[820]](#footnote-820) The *avocat* Louis Dorléans said he would return to work only to hang the killers; a few days later he too left the *Seize*.[[821]](#footnote-821) Invited to conduct the mopping-up operation against the Politiques, the Spanish and Neapolitan regiments declined to move, claiming that only Mayenne had the authority to initiate such a course of action. Over all these dangerous days hung the certainty that the *lieutenant-général* would come. Hoping to mitigate his likely anger the *Seize* sent Martin and Nicolas Roland to Lâon to meet him. Five days later word came that Mayenne would soon arrive – and that he was ‘fort mal content’.[[822]](#footnote-822)

Thirty years later Rozée barely referred to the terrorised Parlement and the *Seize* in disarray.[[823]](#footnote-823) More to his purpose was to present Mayenne’s subsequent reprisals as the cause of the ultimate collapse of the *Ligue*. Recognising that the Brisson affair had given Mayenne the opportunity to destroy the *Seize*, he claimed that such had been the duke’s intention ever since learning that they had turned in despair to Rome and Madrid.[[824]](#footnote-824) Now the Union would disintegrate, hopes of an Estates-General would fade and the crown would eventually fall to the duke.[[825]](#footnote-825)

Mayenne reached Paris, ‘after a few weeks of typical indecision’, on 28 November.[[826]](#footnote-826) He was met by two deputations. The first was led by the city governor, the comte de Belin; Bussy le Clerc failed to deliver the customary cannon salute from the Bastille, ‘ce qui fut remarqué’.[[827]](#footnote-827) The second comprised members of the *Seize*.[[828]](#footnote-828) From Rozée and L’Estoile we learn that the meeting was tense but was conducted with restraint. The deputies hoped Mayenne would assist them in thwarting the city’s royalists.[[829]](#footnote-829) The duke assured them of his concern for the public good. He promised – though ‘d’une façon assez renfrongnée (*sic*)’ – that justice would be done.[[830]](#footnote-830)

When Mayenne met leaders of the *Seize* again on Friday 29, views were exchanged more frankly. We learn from Rozée that, after expressing resentment for the contempt that had been shown for his authority, the duke asserted that the recent crisis was ‘fort aisé d’appaiser’.[[831]](#footnote-831) In defence of their action against Brisson the deputies produced memoirs in the *président*’s hand ‘contenans lesmoyens de ruiner le party de l’union’ and claimed that their departure from normal judicial procedures had been necessary because the Parlementwas filled with Navarre’s supporters.[[832]](#footnote-832) Mayenne’s response was double-edged. He would continue to support the Catholic party, but his authority must be upheld – and to that end he would need control of the Bastille.

In a stormy meeting next morning, Mayenne announced that if he was not granted the Bastille he would turn cannon against it. L’Estoile scorned the *Seize*: ‘[ils] tumultuoient et parloient haut, sans aucun respect, trestous ensemble, à leur manière accoustumée’.[[833]](#footnote-833) Rozée blamed the duke: protests by the *Seize* deputies ‘ne firent autre chose que de mettre le duc en colère, lequel leur dit avec des paroles dures et hautes…’[[834]](#footnote-834)

On Sunday 1 December Bussy le Clerc quit the Bastille; he was replaced by the Mayennist *capitaine* du Bourg. Years later, Rozée judged that the *Seize* had had no choice but to concede, leaving for Mayenne ‘le reproche sur le front (comme ils disoient) de la ruine du party’.[[835]](#footnote-835) At the time, the extent of their setback was not so obvious, for on Monday 2 the leaders petitioned the duke again. Would he establish a *chambre de justice* so that they could deal with royalist traitors? And would he put their minds at rest by publishing ‘lettres d’oubliance et silence perpetuel’.[[836]](#footnote-836) That they had overstepped the mark became obvious when the duke’s demeanour visibly changed: ‘Ce n’estoit a eux,’ he said, ‘de se mesler d’affaires si avant’ – to which one of them replied, ‘si haut que le duc de Mayenne le pouvoit entendre’ that they had gone too far in according him authority in the first place.[[837]](#footnote-837)

Later the same day the duke decided that Brisson’s murderers must die. Villeroy observed with delight that the king’s party would be the beneficiaries.[[838]](#footnote-838) Barnavi and Descimon concluded that in aiming to replace radicalism with a balanced middle road Mayenne had attempted the impossible : ‘Sa politique d’équilibre n’avait qu’un défaut : il n’y avait pas d’équilibre possible. Le parti décapité, certains de ses chefs les plus prestigieux morts, en fuite ou réduits à la défensive et toujours divisés, c’est désormais l’ère des « Politiques ».’[[839]](#footnote-839)

Having determined a course of action, Mayenne did not look back. On 3 December he prepared a list of twenty victims to be tracked down that night. Several of them, including Bussy le Clerc, managed to escape; but five were seized: Jehan Louchart, Oudin Crucé, Barthélemy Anroux, Nicolas Ameline and Jehan Emonnot. Boucher was incensed; ‘jamais tyrans n’avoit fait dedestruire son party, pour eslever celuy de ses ennemis’.[[840]](#footnote-840) On 4 December, four of the five were hanged at Montfaucon. Crucé was spared – thanks to Mme de Montpensier’s intervention, according to Baptiste Legrain.[[841]](#footnote-841) It was probably because of Mayenne’s concern for consequences that clerical accomplices too escaped punishment.[[842]](#footnote-842) Rozée refrained from giving exact details of the hangings because ‘cela ne sert de rien à l’histoire’.[[843]](#footnote-843) Less reticent, L’Estoile sought to demonstrate that the victims had got what they deserved.[[844]](#footnote-844)

In the following days Paris clergy asked their congregations to pray for the martyrs.[[845]](#footnote-845) For a while they refused to preach, and when the Sorbonne complied with Mayenne’s demand that normal service be resumed they stated pointedly that it would be for God and for the consolation of the poor, not for him.[[846]](#footnote-846) After talks with the *docteurs* and a speech before the Parlement, the duke left Paris on 11 December, taking with him Bussy le Clerc, Mathieu de Launoy, and others of the *Seize*.[[847]](#footnote-847) By then the Parlement had issued a pardon; far beyond being placated, the *Seize* pointed out that they had done nothing for which they needed to be excused.[[848]](#footnote-848)

Public condemnation of Mayenne’s recent activities issued from *Ligueur* priests alone.[[849]](#footnote-849) Politiquescould barely contain their joy. The Parlementwas delighted almost to a man with the duke’s performance.[[850]](#footnote-850) There was an outpouring of verse.[[851]](#footnote-851) Jules Gassot noted that ‘l’action de Monsieur du Mayne fut grandement estimée’.[[852]](#footnote-852) L’Estoile, deeply appalled by the *Seize*, had no interest in vilifying their tormentor. By contrast – and a safe thirty years later – Rozée felt no inhibition as he built his case against the *lieutenant-général*.

One of his witnesses, the dean of the Sorbonne berated Mayenne: ‘Monseigneur, depuis que vous avez esté estably chef du party nous n’avons point veu punir un seul hérétique, quoy qu’on en ait mis plusieurs en prison, mais nous avons veu qu’on a fait mourir les plus affectionnez catholiques pour ce qu’ils veilloient pour le salut du partycatholique.’[[853]](#footnote-853) Another witness, dom Diego d’Ibarra, warned that Philip II would recall his troops. *Ligueurs* with good memories observed that there had been no reprisals after the deaths of Duranti and Daffis in Toulouse; others added sharply that on that occasion no letters had been sent to Spain. Royalists murmured that the murder of Brisson had been avenged more readily than the regicide.[[854]](#footnote-854)

Rozée believed that the letters to Spain and the Pope explained Mayenne’s reprisals.[[855]](#footnote-855) He reckoned that the Politiques had gained more credibility in one day than in the past three years.[[856]](#footnote-856) Mayenne had discouraged and weakened the *Seize* – his support-base – and had lost Spain’s favour. His authority was diminished, and he had earned the contempt and boosted the hopes of watching royalists.[[857]](#footnote-857) But here Rozée was ignoring the duke’s legitimate concerns. Was the law to ignore summary executions?[[858]](#footnote-858) Did the head of the Guise family count for less than his nephew? Was Spain to have a voice in the French royal succession?[[859]](#footnote-859) Some *Ligueurs* might believe so, but the Brisson affair revealed the hopelessness of such thinking. Barnavi and Descimon have explained: ‘… ont-ils [the leaders of the *Seize*] compris ce que cette fuite en avant de la faction avait de suicidaire, d’autodestructeur? Tout ce qui avait été accompli jusque-là l’avait été “pour la religion” – ont-ils estimé que l’assassinat du premier president du Parlement de Paris, catholique zélé s’il en fut, pouvait difficilement entrer dans cette catégorie?’[[860]](#footnote-860) Thus it was the Paris leadership, not Mayenne, that broke the *Seize*.[[861]](#footnote-861)

After Brisson, Mayenne sought to humble the *Seize*.[[862]](#footnote-862) Banned from meeting, they met anyway.[[863]](#footnote-863) That the ban was not enforced may be explained by the duke’s realisation that the *Seize* still had their use as a counter-weight to the flourishing Politiquecamp.[[864]](#footnote-864) Yet at the same time, attempting to placate both parties and to buy time, Mayenne took steps to strengthen the Parlement: reliable moderates were elevated to key positions. In response to requests from nervous Politiques he secured the withdrawal of foreign troops from the capital.[[865]](#footnote-865) In the *quartiers*, radical militia captains were dismissed. Spring 1592 saw further reprisals, particularly against lesser *Ligueurs* whose violence had previously gone unpunished. It is against the background of this reduction of radical influence that we should understand the *Lieutenant-Général*’s decision in the delayed municipal elections of November 1592 to secure the elections of the *Ligueur* Jehan Pichonnat as one of the *échevins*, and Jehan Luillier, a moderate within the *Seize*, as the new *prévôt des marchands*. In order to keep alive his hope of becoming king, Mayenne had both to keep the Spanish at bay by allowing negotiations with the royalists, and also to hamper the moderates by keeping the *Seize* reasonably strong.[[866]](#footnote-866) The duke’s eventual decision to call the long-promised Estates-General is best understood as just one more turn in this tortuous policy.[[867]](#footnote-867)

Rozée was not fooled by the duke’s manoeuvrings: in what would be his final sustained passage on the *Seize* he described a devastating unravelling of their support in 1592.[[868]](#footnote-868) By 1593 the *Seize* were a spent force. The legitimacy of the *Ligueur* Estates-General was debatable.[[869]](#footnote-869) The attendance was low.[[870]](#footnote-870) Deserted early by the apparently uninterested *lieutenant-général*, who went back to his army and then fell sick, the convocation would later provide excellent material for satirists.[[871]](#footnote-871) *Ligue* delegates protested (in vain) against the opening of peace-talks at Suresnes, but were divided on the issue which seemed to them to be more important, the election of a Catholic king. While they were coming to terms with their impotence, discredited *Ligueurs* were slipping back into Paris. They found a different world. Labruyère was subjected to public condemnation, Cromé survived only with Mayenne’s protection, and Odouart Raynssant found he had to flee again. Some of the clergy who had sustained the *Ligue* through the terrible summer of 1590 had defected – among them, Jean Prévost in the parish of St-Séverin. By the close of 1593, what remained of the *Seize* was that part which had ‘survived every phase in increasing isolation until in the end it found itself entirely divorced from the traditional power structure’.[[872]](#footnote-872) In 1594 the *Ligue* collapsed across France, and when Crucé and Hamilton tried to prevent Henry IV from entering Paris, they were easily brushed aside. Five years after the start of their decline, the *Seize* became a memory.

**Chapter 7: Political leaders**

A large union of devout Catholic believers working together for an honourable cause was how Rozée best liked to remember the *Seize*, but their history in the difficult years after 1589 could not be written without reference to influential leaders and supporters. The contributions of Mayenne, of two renowned ambassadors (Enrico Caetani and Bernardino de Mendoza) and of an outstanding general (Alexandre Farnèse, prince de Parme) are the focus of this chapter. We consider both the nature of the help they brought and Pierre Rozée’s assessment of its value. The *Histoire* does not yield easy answers. Rozée cared more for integrity than for status. Unlike other contemporary historians, he was not close to high politics.[[873]](#footnote-873) Moreover, he had ‘une timidité avouée… vis-à-vis des grands personnages du temps’.[[874]](#footnote-874)

Rozée considered the motives of *les grands* to be inscrutable; he would therefore limit himself to reporting their actions and public statements. Perhaps he was naïve, but his approach also allowed the hiding of uncomfortable truths. Rozée surely knew – and did not wish to remind his readers – that the imaginative writers of *La* *satyre ménippée* had had a field day exposing the supposed motives of prominent *Ligue* supporters. Under the influence of the Spanish-administered drug catholicon, a standard galenical medical treatment, Mayenne had (by this fiction) declared: ‘[D]epuis que j’ai pris les armes pour la Sainte Ligue, j’ai toujours eu ma conservation en telle recommandation, que j’ai préféré de très bon cœur mon intérêt particulier, à la cause de [Dieu]’.[[875]](#footnote-875) Later in the same speech he had ‘honoured’ his sister, madame de Montpensier, and Caetani ‘[qui] ont fait de signalés services à l’Union, par subtiles nouvelles & *Te Deum* chantés à propos, …qui ont donné occasion à plusieurs de mourir allégrement de mal rage de faim, plutôt que parler de paix’.[[876]](#footnote-876) In deciding to avoid examining *Ligue* leaders’ motives, Rozée took a line that was inconsonant with the historian’s duty to reveal and explain; fortunately, particularly with respect to Mayenne, he let down his guard. Moreover, his humble station gave him an advantage over contemporaries whose published views might be affected by closeness to their superiors.

A matter of great importance to Mayenne and Parma, and to the ambassadors, was the state of relations between France and Spain. Mendoza and Parma were in Philip II’s employ. The cardinal legate Caetani was cautiously sympathetic to Spain’s support for the *Ligue*.[[877]](#footnote-877) Mayenne distrusted Spanish intentions while being heavily dependent on Philip’s financial aid.[[878]](#footnote-878)

In 1559 the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis had ended sixty-five years of warfare between France and Spain, but it had not brought trust. The saddleback Pyrennean kingdom of Navarre and parts of the Flemish border remained disputed territories, and the religious situation in France – the spread of Protestantism, with its potential to inflame the deeply troublesome revolt in the Netherlands – chagrined the Catholic king. In the 1560s and ’70s relations were uneasy. Catherine de Medici’s willingness to negotiate with the Huguenots seriously worried Madrid. Philip II’s ambassadors in Paris kept in close touch with the Guise; the queen mother distrusted the first and had the second recalled. Later, the duc d’Anjou’s activities in the Spanish Netherlands aggravated the situation, particularly when Catherine made it clear that Cambrai, seized in August 1581, would not be returned.[[879]](#footnote-879) Anjou’s death in June 1584 introduced the inevitability that a Huguenot would in due course inherit the French throne, and presented Philip II with an opportunity that he could not refuse: the chance to intervene decisively in French affairs alongside the Guise. It fell to Mendoza to devise the strategy. [[880]](#footnote-880)

Before examining Mendoza’s work, we pause to consider our historian’s position. Rozée was no *Ligueur Espagnol* – a term used by Etienne Pasquier to denote one who would willingly see the French throne fall under the sway of Spain.[[881]](#footnote-881) On the other hand, unable to stomach a pluralist France, he welcomed Spanish assistance in the fight against heresy*.*[[882]](#footnote-882)It was the standpoint of the moderate *Ligueur*.[[883]](#footnote-883)

The readiness of some radical *Ligueurs* to welcome Spanish solutions to French problems would in time be perceived as a mistake. Apart from the use of summary justice, no other strategy so deeply stained the reputation of the *Seize*. Rozée proceeded cautiously: ‘Discourir icy sur l’intervention du Roy d’Espagne…,’ he wrote, ‘ne seroit autre chose que deviner ce que nous ne pouvons savoir’.[[884]](#footnote-884) Nonetheless, the issue had to be confronted, and the historian did this in a passage investigating Spanish intentions in spring 1589:

[I]ls demandoient en ofrant; leurs ofres estoient belles et leurs demandes raisonnables au jugement de plusieurs qui esperoient que rien ne leur pouvoit manquer s’ils pouvoient assurer la continuel et libre exercise de la religion catholique; mais ceux qui par des considerations d’etat vouloient asseurer leurs afaires, et, comme ils parloient, laisser faire dieu pour le fait de la religion, acceptoient leurs ofres et n’admetoient pas leurs demandes…[[885]](#footnote-885)

By this analysis Politiques,caring more about their own affairs than religion, rejected Spanish demands. By contrast, in calling Philip’s offers (of funds) ‘belles’ and the accompanying conditions ‘raisonnables’, Rozée showed his attachment to what was perhaps the dominant view among the *Seize*.[[886]](#footnote-886) Exactly what Spanish agents expected for their money he went on to explain: ‘[I]ls requerroient que leur maitre fut reconnu le chef et declaré par honneur protecteur en france de la religion et de l’etat; c’estoit toute la reconnoissance et recompense qu’il atendoit des moyens qu’il y emploiroit; ils protestoient que ce n’estoit point demander la couronne et la monarchie…’.[[887]](#footnote-887) The historian was willing to record Politique concerns that Spanish demands showed their help to be self-interested, that French sovereignty was at stake, and that receipt of charity would shame France. Nonetheless he aligned himself with ‘le commun de paris [qui] disoit que cette feinte vergogne de faire connoitre nos defautes, qui ne procedoient que de l’iniure d’une guerre civile, a celuy qui ofroit d’y subvenir a ses depens, reduiroit cette guerre a une guerre auxiliaire au lieu d’en faire une guerre de mesme parti’.[[888]](#footnote-888) The phrase ‘une guerre de mesme parti’ is obscure, but it seems clear that Rozée considered the struggle for purity of religion to be worth any shame that might be attached to the receipt of charity.

Writing in the 1620s as one who had welcomed Spanish assistance a generation earlier Rozée adopted a defensive tone. The *Ligue* had had no intention of letting the French crown fall into foreign hands.[[889]](#footnote-889) In spring 1591 the mandate of Spanish troops in Paris – Neapolitans and Walloons – had been merely to support the *bourgeois* militia; ‘ils n’occupoient pas une douzaine de maisons en chaque quartier’.[[890]](#footnote-890) As for the letters sent by the *Seize* to Rome and to the Catholic King, what else could have been done to safeguard Paris, ‘les affaires allant de mal en pis, par la continuation des conspirations’?[[891]](#footnote-891) What Rozée did not mention – perhaps never knew – was that by 1591 Madrid was demanding in return for further assistance an early convocation of the Estates-General where the Spanish dynastic claims could be advanced.[[892]](#footnote-892)

Equally by 1591, the mission of Bernardino de Mendoza, the most famous of Spain’s ambassadors to *Ligueur* Paris, was over. Mendoza had steered Spanish diplomacy in France for a little over six years.[[893]](#footnote-893) Upon his arrival in October 1584 his most pressing objective had been to negotiate a treaty with the Guise-led nascent *Ligue*.[[894]](#footnote-894) Rozée’s account of those meetings of the Guise faction in late 1584 which produced the (secret) Treaty of Joinville is understandably very sketchy. He makes no mention of Spanish involvement, though he does concede that the duc de Guise ‘forma les intelligences tant dedans que dehors le Royaume’.[[895]](#footnote-895)

At Joinville, the *Ligue* and Spain committed themselves to the extirpation of heresy from France and the Netherlands. Mendoza’s first open involvement in French affairs occurred early in 1585 after delegates from some of the Dutch estates arrived at Senlis with a mandate to seek French protection over the Netherlands. The danger to Spanish interests was obvious and Mendoza lost no time in protesting to the king that audience should not be given to rebels; he received a royal reprimand for interfering.[[896]](#footnote-896) Rozée’s account of this encounter is notable for its careful attention to the arguments of both sides in what was evidently an acrimonious debate; it carries no hint of the author’s opinion.[[897]](#footnote-897) In February, facing enough problems of his own, the king declined the Dutch offer.

After Rozée’s account of the 1585 meeting, Mendoza disappears from the *Histoire* until 1590. He is absent from the narratives of both the *journée des barricades* and the aftermath of the Blois assassinations. Nor does he feature in the relation of the defence of the Paris suburbs at *Toussaint* November 1589.[[898]](#footnote-898) This is not surprising. Because the ambassador’s links with the *Seize* had to be clandestine, and given that, to our knowledge, Rozée did not have a leadership role in the *Seize*, the historian was probably unaware of Mendoza’s influence; even if he was *au fait*, he had good reason in the 1620s to play down Spanish involvement in the *Ligue* years. All the same, the silence raises questions about the portrayal of Mendoza’s role which was provided by De Lamar Jensenin 1964.[[899]](#footnote-899)

For Jensen, the Spanish ambassador was a key figure, close to Madame de Montpensier and in touch with François de Mayneville, right-hand man of the duc de Guise.[[900]](#footnote-900) This is plausible. More controversial was the assertion that Mendoza helped plan the *journée des barricades* and probably had an active role in its execution.[[901]](#footnote-901) An underlying difficulty with this bold claim is that it rested heavily on an employee’s reports to a distant pay-master. It is also troubling that Mendoza is absent from key Politique sources.[[902]](#footnote-902) Mark Greengrass has drawn attention to the frailty of the evidence underlying Jensen’s view of Mendoza’s role in May 1588, and has argued that it was more pressure from within the capital than leadership from without that produced the ‘explosion’.[[903]](#footnote-903) Yet for all this, Mendoza had not been inactive, for, a few weeks later, formal protest was made by the French ambassador in Madrid against Mendoza’s recent activities in Paris.[[904]](#footnote-904)

Whatever his role in the *journée des barricades*, Mendoza was soon a powerless observer of two set-backs to the Catholic cause: the failure of the Armada, and the Blois murders. The loss of the Guise brothers cancelled out four years’ work, and on 27 December 1588 Mendoza wrote in despair to Philip to offer his immediate resignation.[[905]](#footnote-905) The offer was rejected. Mendoza was away from Paris when the *conseil-général* of the union was established (February 1589), and it is difficult to sustain Jensen’s claim that in spring 1589 he was ‘the chief advisor and leader of the Paris Sixteen itself’.[[906]](#footnote-906) More likely, once back in the capital, Mendoza was able to plant ideas in the minds of individual *Ligueurs* who then carried them through to council meetings. Jensen himself conceded that even after the regicide, when Mendoza was assisted in France by Juan de Moreo and Jean Baptiste de Tassis, the *Triumvirat Espagnol* was ‘more symbolic than effective’.[[907]](#footnote-907)

Mendoza reappears in the *Histoire* during the long siege of 1590. The historian dismissed as malicious gossip a story that linked the ambassador to the provision of bread made from bones which were exhumed at the Cemetery of the Innocents and then ground into flour.[[908]](#footnote-908) By contrast he noted Mendoza’s commitment, self-denial and compassion. The ambassador was at early disaster-prevention talks, and as the noose closed round the city he chose not to leave; he ate frugally; he sold his silverware and provided 120 *écus* a day for food for the poor.[[909]](#footnote-909) ‘Ceux qui reçeuvoient ses ausmones benissoient sa charité’, we read; ‘les autres louoient son zélé’.[[910]](#footnote-910) But the siege took its toll, and at the end of 1590, tired and almost blind, Mendoza secured release from his mission.[[911]](#footnote-911)

Another foreigner who withstood the rigours of the siege was Enrico Caetani. The cardinal legate had set off from Rome in October 1589 with one over-arching purpose: to restore religious (Roman Catholic) unity to France. Given that Catholic unity could imply healing within the *Ligue* (for example after the contentious Paris municipal elections in August), and would certainly require reconciliation between the *Ligue* and Catholic supporters of a heretical king, the task was nigh-on impossible. In fact, as was explained by Henri Drouot, by the time Caetani reached Paris in January 1590 his mission had already been fatally undermined.[[912]](#footnote-912) Early in the journey, Caetani made his conciliatory task harder by admitting, at Chambéry, that his own preferences were *Ligueur*. Once in France, he headed not to Tours but to Paris, a destination that suggested to watchful Navarrist Catholics a greater interest in the *Ligue* than in Catholic unity. Crucially, the legate chose the ‘wrong’ road from Lyon, heading north through Burgundy to Dijon, a route which inevitably exposed him to a bombardment of the *Ligueur* opinions of a small group of hard-liners, rather than crossing first into the Nivernais (as instructed by Sixtus V) to hold talks with the duc de Nevers, a man who had the credentials to mediate between Tours and the legate. The journey dragged on: three weeks were ‘lost’ in Dijon. Perhaps Caetani began to lose confidence in the feasibility of his mission. Drouot concluded: ‘[la] traversée de la Bourgogne … ébranle son autorité et ses volontés d’arbitre. Elle prépare l’échec de sa mission.’[[913]](#footnote-913)

Rozée made little mention of the legate’s journey, but what he did write was accurate in detail: he noted the diversion of the first escort, the comte de Brissac, to Le Mans; the neutralisation of the second, led by La Bourdaisière, before it reached Dijon; and the eventual arrival of *lansquenets* provided by Charles III, duc de Lorraine, and led by St Paul, to accompany the legate on his final stage to Paris.[[914]](#footnote-914) It is here that Rozée also took the opportunity to dismiss de Thou’s allegation that these troops made light of the legate’s presence amongst them by eating meat during Lent. What the historian did not do at this stage was reveal his opinion of the legate’s visit.

Caetani’s stay in France lasted nine months. After spending the night of Saturday 20 January in the Paris *faubourg* of Saint-Jacques, he entered the city next day to a rapturous welcome. A few days later, he presented his credentials before the Parlement. It soon became obvious where his sympathies lay. Having been himself castigated in royal declarations against his legation, he in turn scuppered a plan floated by the Navarrist cardinal de Vendôme to convene a conciliatory assembly of all French bishops at Tours. In a similar vein, he was closely involved in the Sorbonne’s articles of early May which declared that Navarre could never be King of France. Meanwhile, the *Ligue* in Paris enjoyed Caetani’s wholehearted support. Convinced of the city’s worsening plight he pleaded with Sixtus V for more help to be sent, whilst doing his best to ensure that soldiers were paid. He remained in Paris during the hardships of the great siege, living simply, and encouraging the defenders at the walls. Just after the lifting of the siege, it was news of Sixtus’s death that brought the legation to a close.[[915]](#footnote-915) Caetani left Paris on 24 September.[[916]](#footnote-916)

Throughout the mission Caetani’s relationship with the pope was strained. A letter dispatched from Rome on 12 January – thus before Caetani’s arrival in Paris – criticised the legate’s disobedience. By spring Sixtus’s patience with the cardinal was exhausted: ‘Au lieu d’être un ange de paix,’ he moaned, ‘il n’a été qu’un ferment de désordre.’[[917]](#footnote-917) At this point the relationship broke down, and Caetani, no longer trusted, was left to fend for himself. We know that Rozée had disapproved of Sixtus V. Did he accordingly approve of Caetani?

Rozée described the legate’s arrival in Paris in considerable detail. We learn where precisely Caetani lodged on the Saturday night, who his first visitors were, which dignitaries were in his retinue, and which churches in the city he visited on the Sunday afternoon. This density of detail, along with references to the quality of the visitors (leading men from the Hôtel de Ville, the *cours souveraines* and the Sorbonne) and to the joy of the people, suggests approval even though no overt opinion is given. What was the historian’s source? We need not doubt that he remembered the events of that exhilarating January weekend, and perhaps he witnessed the public moments. The *Ligue* press had been quick to publish a commemorative pamphlet, but it is unlikely that Rozée had this before him when writing: the accounts differ on which day the legate received his visitors, and the pamphlet supplies no names of his companions.[[918]](#footnote-918) Given his disappointment with the pope it is uncertain in any case that Rozée would have enjoyed reading it: its text constituted ‘preuves de l’affection du pape pour l’Union’.[[919]](#footnote-919) L’Estoile, d’Aubigné, Palma-Cayet, de Thou: none of these authors – not even all of them cumulatively – provided the dense detail of the *Histoire*. Nor did the registers from the Hôtel de Ville.

After the weekend’s celebrations, it was down to business on the Monday, as the legate began meetings with the dukes of Mayenne and Nemours.[[920]](#footnote-920) Rozée noted, perhaps with some pride, that amongst the visitors were ‘les docteurs de la theologie et les principaux des Seize’; these men informed Caetani of the ‘peu d’ordre’ that beset the capital.[[921]](#footnote-921) Then, on Friday 26 January, the legate presented to the Parlement sitting in Paris the bull issued in Rome in September 1589 whereby the pope authorised him to exercise a range of ministries in France. Registration of the bull ensued in early February and the event was marked at once by pamphlets on sale in Paris and Lyon.[[922]](#footnote-922) Due process mattered to our *avocat*-author. He noted that Caetani needed the court’s sanction of his activities, and that in addition to considering the bull, along with a separate document stating the legate’s mandate, the magistrates paid attention both to letters they had recently received from the pope and to Caetani’s spoken *harangue*. Thus, it was with ample evidence and ‘aprez mûre deliberation’ that the magistrates moved to registration.[[923]](#footnote-923) There is little doubt that Rozée was glad of Caetani’s performance before the judges; it is evident from what he included in – and omitted from – his narrative. He noted that the pope’s letters commended the legate for ‘sa religion, integrité, dexterité au maniment des afaires les plus serieuses d'un Etat, pour la grandeur de sa maison et de sa noblesse, de son sçavoir et de son bon jugement’.[[924]](#footnote-924) He recalled the part of Brisson’s speech where the *premier président* noted Caetani’s qualities: ‘son eloquence… sa doctrine… ses doctes ecrits’.[[925]](#footnote-925) On the other hand, he was silent about de Thou’s subsequent opinion that the papal bull amounted to an infringement of national liberties, and about the royalist historian’s remembrance of Caetani’s ‘orgueilleux dessein’ in trying to sit in a highly prominent position in court’.[[926]](#footnote-926)

Just as it was the leaders of the *Seize* who had updated Caetani on the plight of Paris, so it was probably they who arranged the pageant that took place the following Sunday. Rozée proceeded cautiously – ‘On jugea estre expédient que le peuple entendit l'intention du pape’ – before recalling that there was a ‘procession générale’ involving ‘le corps des eccelésiastiques… toutes les paroisses… tous les moines’, with preaching by Francesco Panigarola (at Nôtre-Dame, in the presence of the legate) and Pierre Christin (‘prédicateur fort célebre’) at St-Estienne du Mont.[[927]](#footnote-927) We know that, although popular among moderate *Ligueurs*, Panigarola did not always have the support of the *Seize*.[[928]](#footnote-928) Our author gave more space to Christin: this *Niçois* preacher made specific mention of ‘ceux qui s'estoient unis pour la defence et la conservation de la religion catholique, apostolique et romaine’, insisted that only a Catholic could be king of France, and assured his listeners that papal assistance was at hand.[[929]](#footnote-929)

It was not just in Paris that awareness of thepope’s steadfastness encouraged Catholics. While Caetani had still been journeying north, the *Ligueur* Estates-General of Languedoc had declared that they would never accept Henri of Navarre as King of France, a decision that the Toulouse Parlement had promptly registered. Quoting word-for-word from a *Ligueur* pamphlet, Rozée was apparently pleased that decisions were being made in an orderly fashion.[[930]](#footnote-930) By contrast, the mood at Tours was frosty. Rozée conceded that the legate’s mission cut no ice at the royal court and, perhaps with a thought to the Bourbon court as he wrote, he proceeded to quote in full the royal declaration of 5 January which reminded its readers that until Caetani presented himself before the king he could have no authority in the land.[[931]](#footnote-931)

In describing that phase of the ‘cold war’ between Paris and Tours that took up the early weeks of 1590, Rozéeseems at first sight to have aimed for impartiality: his text includes not only a copy of the notice of the registration in the Tours Parlement of the royal declaration, and a reference to a second ruling of a few days later, but also provides the complete text of a retaliatory ruling in which the Paris magistrates argued that because the court in Tours had no legitimacy its rulings were of no consequence, and that the pope and his envoy should be both recognised and revered.[[932]](#footnote-932) However, all may not be as it seems, for Rozée’s omission of any of the content of the second ruling from Tours is surprising. It is likely that he had read it; he certainly knew that it had been published (the Paris response said as much, dating it 26 January). Was he being evasive? After all, the second ruling constituted a direct attack upon the legate whose arrival he had so welcomed. In Henri de l’Epinois’ words, Caetani was now accused of being ‘espagnol et suspect’, one with whom all contact was prohibited,’ verbalement ou par écrit, directement ou indirectement’.[[933]](#footnote-933)

The atmosphere of mutual suspicion among the judges affected the senior clergy too. We know that efforts were made by the royalist cardinals Vendôme and Lenoncourt to bring prelates together with the aim of expediting the king’s conversion. In the event, Caetani and the *Ligueur* bishops turned down the invitations. Rozée handled the matter in a balanced way, stating the key arguments of both camps and avoiding any partisan comment.[[934]](#footnote-934) His text leaves little doubt that he had read at least one of the cardinals’ letters, though how he came by this material is unclear.[[935]](#footnote-935) The *Ligueur* clergy replied both collectively and individually.[[936]](#footnote-936) Given the scope of his reference to their arguments, it is likely that Rozée read some of these responses but, strikingly, he did not include the points made by the legate himself in a pamphlet published by the *Ligue* press on 10 March.[[937]](#footnote-937) Here Caetani argued that only he could assemble the bishops, that an invitation from cardinals serving a prince whom the pope had anathematised could not be accepted, and that to accept was to risk excommunication. It is possible that the tension between general support for the cardinal on the one hand, and sensitivity to gallican liberties on the other, caused our author to suppress these points. It is equally possible that Rozée had not read the legate’s pamphlet, for he went on to say that Caetani himself later invited all bishops to an assembly, a claim that is not only absent from the rest of the contemporary literature but is also at odds with Caetani’s conviction, stated in the pamphlet, that there was no need for such a meeting. One thing is certain: no cross-party assembly met. Rozée saw it as a lost opportunity. It might have brought peace to the realm, ‘si les temps de la punition que Dieu luy avoit ordonné eut esté expiré’.[[938]](#footnote-938) Meanwhile, ‘les heretiques avançoient leurs afaires’.[[939]](#footnote-939)

Back in January, Caetani had brought two letters from Rome for the Sorbonne. Mention of these allowed Rozée to make a brief detour in which we learn that the faculty received them with pleasure, that the legate conferred regularly with its teachers, and that a statement issued by the college on 10 February sought to control the content of sermons.[[940]](#footnote-940) It is in this intriguing passage that we learn of the existence of *la feuille 27* where, we are told, we can discover the drift of the letters to the Sorbonne, as well as a copy of letters sent from Rome to the cardinal de Vendôme.[[941]](#footnote-941) In the same passage we are promised a copy of the Sorbonne’s statement. Disappointment follows: ms. 23296 includes none of this material. Whilst hardly sinister the omission is suggestive – particularly in the case of the Sorbonne’s statement. Against a background of equivocal preaching in some quarters the faculty denounced those who claimed that foreign assistance was unwelcome and lambasted preachers who taught that Henri of Navarre should be recognised as king, or who held that a relapsed heretic, excommunicated, might yet in due course occupy the throne. All of these, along with those who maintained that a pope could not excommunicate a French prince of the blood, were ‘dignes d’être retranchés du corps des Fidèles comme des membres pourris et gangrenés’.[[942]](#footnote-942) If, thirty years later, Rozée blanched upon re-reading this material, was it because its radicalism undermined his quest to reinstate the *Ligue*’s reputation? After all, the Sorbonne’s position had subverted both the Salic law and gallicanism. Caught between the faculty’s resolve never to see the crown on the head of a relapsed heretic and Sixtus V’s contrary view that Navarre was by no means disqualified (not having truly converted to Catholicism in 1572), our author tried to paper over the cracks. Diverting the reader’s attention to the failings of some preachers, he emphasised the unity of pope, legate and faculty: ‘il se trouva des predicateurs, mesme du corps de la faculté, qui … tenoient des propositions que la faculté ne pouvoit aprouver comme contraires a celles de Sa Sainteté, temoignées par son legat, et les precedentes resolues par la mesme faculté’.[[943]](#footnote-943)

Rozée feared that the French Catholic church was on the verge of schism in early 1590.[[944]](#footnote-944) His desire forunity is evident from the way he interpreted Mayenne’s decision to re-issue an earlier order for convocation of the estates at Melun: the duke was responding to a request from ‘le légat et generalement tous les Catholiques de l’Union’.[[945]](#footnote-945) In March Caetani was central to a much more public show of *Ligueur* unity and commitment which took place at the convent des Augustins on the Sunday before the disaster at Ivry. Our author emphasised the commitment of ‘les habitants de la ville’ as, ‘entre les mains du legat’, they confirmed their allegiance to the defence of Paris and the securing of a Catholic king.[[946]](#footnote-946) It may be significant that he did not draw attention to words that made this oath more radical than the one sworn in late January 1589. The new commitment to obey Mayenne might have jarred: with the passage of time, his disillusionment with the duke had increased.[[947]](#footnote-947) The text of the oath, along with a description of the ceremony, went on sale in Paris almost at once.[[948]](#footnote-948) Although Rozée’s account bears no close similarity to the wording of that publication, it is likely that he was aware of its content, particularly as de Thou had already drawn attention to it.[[949]](#footnote-949)

After Ivry, a royalist assault on the capital seemed inevitable. In a passage drawn heavily from a pro-*Ligue* account written anonymously by an Italian in Paris during the siege, Rozée described the mood at a meeting hosted by the legate on 16 March.[[950]](#footnote-950) Politiques crowed that the city could not be saved, and even some *Ligueurs* were losing hope: it was feared that the people would readily surrender to the king if food supplies dwindled. Some went so far as to suggest the opening of peace talks. Even the representatives from the Sorbonne, holy men but idealistic, had no idea how the resolute defence that they advocated could be put into effect. At this point in the narrative, Caetani is introduced as a man of steadfastness and action: ‘Parmy ces confusions et difficultés, l’advis du Legat fut…’[[951]](#footnote-951) To sue for peace was unthinkable; Caetani threatened that he would leave the country if that course was followed. He argued that it was too early to be thinking of defeat, and that the best course would be to liaise swiftly with Mayenne on military options for dealing with the threat. After the meeting, he at once wrote to Rome, Spain and Flanders, and – the same evening – obtained reassurance from his advisers that his presence in the capital was beneficial. Rozée fondly recalled that ‘tous furent d’advis qu’il estoit non seulement convenable, mais absolument necessaire qu’il demeurast’.[[952]](#footnote-952)

Rozée was impressed by Caetani’s willingness to remain in Paris in summer 1590: ‘[Il] resolut de ne point abandoner la ville, ainsi courir la mesme fortune et subir la mesme condition que ce peuple’.[[953]](#footnote-953) The banker del Bene, armed with offers of a passport for Italy and four thousand *écus* (travelling expenses), failed to dislodge him.[[954]](#footnote-954) In a session of the Parlement at the end of July, Pierre de Gondi bishop of Paris was advised to follow the example of the legate (and Mendoza), ‘lesqu’els quoy qu’estrangers et peu riches avoient vendu et engagé tout ce qu’ils avoient, jusques mesme a s’obliger pour soulager les pauvres’.[[955]](#footnote-955) The legate was by no means just a victim of circumstances. He managed to obtain funds from Sixtus V – no small feat – and in order to win time for help to reach the beleaguered city, he suggested the calling of an Estates-General and a truce; he was invariably present at high-level meetings regarding the city’s survival.[[956]](#footnote-956) Meanwhile, Paris needed spiritual sustenance. In mid-August, Caetani again presided over a re-swearing of the oath of the Union, and a fortnight later, even as the siege entered its final hours, he ordered ‘[qu’] on redouble les prieres publiques’.[[957]](#footnote-957)

The siege over, Caetani left Paris. Palma-Cayet believed his visit had been a disaster.[[958]](#footnote-958) The *Seize* would have disagreed. So perhaps did Mayenne and Parma, who both made a point of honouring the cardinal when he stopped off at their camp outside Corbeil.[[959]](#footnote-959) While they had been assembling the army whose approach finally relieved Paris, the cardinal had been sustaining the spirit of the people. With his task completed, it is to the generals that we now turn.

Born in Rome in 1545, raised in Italy and Spain, a soldier at Lepanto and in the Netherlands, the prince of Parma died in December 1592 from an injury sustained in France. The general made a considerable impression on prominent contemporary Frenchmen. For La Chapelle-Marteau he was ‘l’un des premiers capitaines du monde’; the *seigneur* de Guitry, a prominent royalist soldier, considered him ‘[un] homme bien entendu au mestier de la guerre’; the duc de Nevers regretted that ‘un tel ennemi’ had ever been allowed into France.[[960]](#footnote-960) ‘Il est mort un grand personnage, un grand capitaine’, reflected Henri IV in December 1592.[[961]](#footnote-961) A generation later, Pierre Rozée concurred: Parma had been ‘l’un des plus grands capitaines de son temps’.[[962]](#footnote-962)

Royalist historians handled the news of Parma’s death variously. D’Aubigné gave frank and succinct praise: ‘c’estoit le plus accompli de son temps en toutes les vertus de Capitaine general’.[[963]](#footnote-963) While noting some question-marks hanging over Parma’s attitude to the Armada expedition, de Thou spelt out the prince’s virtues – ‘la prudence, l’habileté, la vigilance, la fermeté & le bonheur’ – but felt it wise to add that Henry IV ‘n’étoit pas moins bon Capitaine’.[[964]](#footnote-964) Equally unwilling to offend was L’Estoile who noted that the Italian prince had the *reputation* of being one of Europe’s greatest soldiers, before offering his own more restrained assessment: ‘un des plus grands Capitaines qu’eust le Roy d’Espagne’.[[965]](#footnote-965) With considerable sensitivity, Palma-Cayet described the courage shown by Parma in his last hours.[[966]](#footnote-966)

Already renowned for his courage at Lepanto (1571) and for leading the Spanish reconquest of Flanders and Brabant (1583-85), Parma made two notable expeditions to France, relieving Paris (1590) and Rouen (1592) from besieging royalist armies. Rozée had every reason to be circumspect in telling the story. Under orders from Philip II, Parma led Spanish troops, funded by Spanish resources, over French soil. Strategically and tactically, Henri of Navarre was outwitted while disloyal subjects were assisted in their rebellion. Only from a narrow religious viewpoint could this foreign interference be deemed defensible.

Rozée proceeded with caution. Because the sieges which Parma relieved took place eighteen months apart, and because each was a protracted affair lasting several months, the historian could weave in the general’s story unobtrusively. Thus, although Parma is mentioned over 160 times in ms. 23296, the references are spread thinly, with 453 pages separating the first from the last. Where clusters of references occur, Parma’s contibution is only one thread in dramas whose prominent actors were the besieged: Nemours and the *Seize* in Paris, André de Brancas, seigneur de Villars in Rouen, and the ordinary people in both cities.

Parma’s activities in France were thoroughly analysed by Léon Van der Essen in the 1930s.[[967]](#footnote-967) Having been placed on stand-by after the Blois assassinations, and having prepared troops on the frontier after the regicide, Parma was finally instructed by Philip II to move into France in spring 1590. Unwilling to cross the border until he was sure that he had adequate resources, the prince did not leave Brussels until 6 August. He finally entered France with just one objective: to relieve Paris. In the event, this meant not only inducing Navarre’s army to withdraw from the city walls but also securing food supply routes into the capital by taking nearby Lagny (5 September) and Corbeil (16 October). Following a brilliantly organised retreat, Parma was back in Brussels by 4 December.

Twelve months later the prince returned to France, and by mid-January 1592 he had assembled a force of thirty thousand men at La Fère. ‘L’armée se trouve… dans une triste situation,’ he wrote; ‘[p]rès de 1,000 soldats espagnols sont malades, et la moitié des Italiens et des Wallons sont incapables de se battre. La majeure partie des nouvelles recrues déserte… Quant aux Suisses… ils sont très exigeants et réclament leur solde’.[[968]](#footnote-968) Despite these concerns – and despite numerous disagreements with Mayenne – Parma went on to achieve his objective, the relief of Rouen. In June 1592 Parma returned again to the Netherlands. By September, ever obedient to Philip, he was planning a third trip south. It was not to happen. A wound the prince had sustained at Caudebec (25 April) claimed his life some time in the night of 2-3 December. He was forty-seven.[[969]](#footnote-969)

Two features of Parma’s generalship stand out from Van der Essen’s work. First, he led his men well. In 1590 he delayed leaving for Paris until he was sure that he had adequate resources.[[970]](#footnote-970) His later withdrawal – November – was so well executed that Navarre, in close pursuit, could gain no purchase.[[971]](#footnote-971) In February 1592 at Aumale the royalists found Parma’s army so well positioned as to be unassailable.[[972]](#footnote-972) In May, when his men were in difficulties near Yvetot, the general moved amongst them, offering encouragement, before skilfully moving them across the Seine and to safety.[[973]](#footnote-973) Secondly, Parma understood political realities. Often against his better judgement, he deferred to Philip II – and to Mayenne during operations in France. In 1590, it was in compliance with Philip’s wishes that he set off from the Netherlands sooner than he deemed wise.[[974]](#footnote-974) After saving Paris, he spurned crude attempts by the *Ligue* to keep him attached to French interests.[[975]](#footnote-975) In February 1592, following Villars’ astonishing sortie during the Rouen siege, Parma conducted what he feared was a premature withdrawal from the region because Mayenne insisted.[[976]](#footnote-976)Two months later, he had to forgo what he considered an excellent opportunity to harry the royalist forces, again on account of Mayenne.[[977]](#footnote-977)

Rozée’s account of Parma’s activities in France derived from his reading of Palma-Cayet and de Thou.[[978]](#footnote-978) He greatly admired the general. Aware of the delay in Parma’s arrival in 1590 – ‘la longueur du secours prommis’ – he contrived to paint a positive picture: Philip II’s command was ‘promptement executé’; Parma moved ‘aussy tost que l’esquipage de l’artillerie fut prest’.[[979]](#footnote-979) Approaching Lagny in September the general showed charisma: ‘quand cete ville seroit assize sur la moustache du prince de Bearn, il la prendroit devant qu’il put lever le bras pour la secourir’.[[980]](#footnote-980) But Parma also displayed admirable caution – the attack on Lagny was preceded by painstaking preparation – and he showed restraint – there was no need to sack Caudebec (in spring 1592), for it sufficed to send their ‘vivres et munitions’ to Rouen.[[981]](#footnote-981) Rozée was surely impressed by Parma’s focus when the general declared in late summer 1590 ‘qu’il estoit inutil de luy proposer aucun traitéavecleroyheretique, estant envoyé dela part du Roy Catholique son Maistre, au secours des catholiques de france, a l’extirpation de l’heresie et deffence dela religion catholique’.[[982]](#footnote-982) And wounded at Caudebec, Parma displayed courage: ‘[C]e coup ne luy fit pas seulement changer de couleur; il ne laissa de continuer son propos jusques a ce que le sang coulant hors la manche de son pourpoint, il ne le put plus celer a ceux qui estoient aupres de luy, lesqu’els le prierent de se retirer’.[[983]](#footnote-983)

Rozée praised Parma too readily. The general arrived seriously late for two sieges, yet escaped the historian’s censure. Rozée glossed over Parma’s mistake in early February 1592, when near Aumale with a force of 23,000 he had shied away from a royal army of 7,000.[[984]](#footnote-984) He also accused Mayenne of jealousy when the duke was unwilling to divert his army from purpose, but Parma had not been blamed when he had done the same in 1590.[[985]](#footnote-985) The explanation lies in the historian’s conviction that it was Mayenne who destroyed the *Ligue*. Parma has a role in the *Histoire* as a foil to Mayenne’s failings. We learn that *Ligueurs* believed Ivry had unnerved Mayenne, and that this was evident come the siege of Paris, ‘lequ’el il avoit laissé couler quatre mois sans donner une seule al’arme aux assiegeans, jusqu’es ala venüe du duc de parme…’[[986]](#footnote-986) When deputies from the *Seize* visited Corbeil it was Mayenne ‘[qui] ne leur avoit voulu permettre de saluerleducdeparme…’.[[987]](#footnote-987) In February 1592, when Villars’ sortie from Rouen created an opportunity for the king’s army to be pursued and destroyed, Parma was ready; not so, Mayenne, ‘qui monstra lors un trait de la jalousie qu’il avoit contre le duc de parme’.[[988]](#footnote-988) One of Parma’s commanders, Charles, prince comte d’Arenberg, ‘protesta tout haut, que le refus que l’on faisoit de combatre, estoit une trahison au party de la s[ain]te union catholique’.[[989]](#footnote-989) In summer 1592, Parma left France ‘apres avoir acquis la reputation d’avoir fait lever le siege de Rouen et d’avoir reduit l’armée du Roy en estat que sans la jalouzie du duc de Mayenne il la pouvoit perdre’.[[990]](#footnote-990) Finally, inclusion of the text of a letter to Madrid allowed the historian to expose Parma’s own doubts about the duke’s commitment to the cause.[[991]](#footnote-991)

Rozée was right to discern rivalry between the two generals, and was not the first to do so.[[992]](#footnote-992) However, even taking into account his lack of military experience and his understandable need to explain the failure of the *Ligue*, we judge that Rozée, uncritical in his praise of Parma, was also excessive in his condemnation of Mayenne. As we turn to the duke’s contribution to the *Ligue*, we recall that he was a critical factor in the building of the *Sainte Union* in early 1589 and a morale-boosting presence in Paris; for much of that year he and the *Seize* worked well together. In 1590, despite the setback at Ivry, the *Seize* remained confident in Mayenne and, after the siege was relieved, the memoir of requests that they presented to the duke at Corbeil (September 1590) asserted ‘[que] les catholiques ayent tres justement et dignement esleu pour leur chef et protecteur Mons[ieu]r le duc de Mayenne prince tres fidelle et magnanime, auqu’el tous les catholiques ont tendu et tendent le bras’.[[993]](#footnote-993)Notably it is in his ultimate assessment of Mayenne that Rozée broke his self-imposed rule against investigating the motives of *les grands*. We are told that the duke’s reprisals against Brisson’s murderers were motivated by letters from the *Seize* to Rome and Madrid, and by the duke’s realisation that, by destroying a support-base that he believed he no longer required, he could let hopes of an Estates-General evaporate and, in due course, by default, gain the throne.[[994]](#footnote-994)

Despite their importance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Guises have been largely written out of history.[[995]](#footnote-995) Mayenne has not attracted a biographer since 1613, yet after 1588 he dominated French politics for five years, enjoying quasi-monarchical status as *lieutenant-général* (particularly after the regicide). It was the Blois murders that brought Mayenne to major prominence.

‘Mort Guise, morte la Ligue, à moins que Mayenne n’échappât au roi’: thus Henri Drouot interpreted the fears and hopes of Charles de Lorraine’s contemporaries at the end of 1588.[[996]](#footnote-996) By then in his mid-thirties, the duke had already established a considerable reputation.[[997]](#footnote-997) On hearing the news of the family tragedy at Blois, he reacted with spirit.[[998]](#footnote-998) He had options. In the long term he had a chance of one day winning the crown; in the short term he could ‘dig in’ in Burgundy, ‘se faire dans son gouvernement “demi-roi”’ (like Mercœur in Brittany) or he could declare his loyalty to the king, ‘cueillir en 1589 les fruits de la “modération” passée, se faire entre Henri III et la *Ligue*, et fructueusement, arbitre...’[[999]](#footnote-999)

It was after the Sorbonne had released the people from allegiance to the king, and in response to repeated invitations from Paris, that the duke made his move.[[1000]](#footnote-1000) Arriving in the capital in February, he was fêted: ‘… depuys qu’il eust entré dans les faulxbours de ceste dicte ville jusques au dit hostel où il alla loger, l’on ne cessoit de cryer : “Vive les princes catholicques! Vive la maison de Loraine!”’[[1001]](#footnote-1001) Rozée, mindful of later disappointments, writing wistfully and somewhat distancing himself, conceded: ‘le duc de Mayenne… arriva en cette grande ville, ou il fut très bien reçu du peuple, lequel en son affliction, avoit conceu des grandes esperances de luy’.[[1002]](#footnote-1002)

In Paris, Mayenne was elected *lieutenant général*.[[1003]](#footnote-1003) Promptly asserting his authority, he added fourteen *supernuméraires* to the *conseil de quarante*. Rozée observed that these advisers were less committed than the *Seize*.[[1004]](#footnote-1004) It is perhaps with the newcomers in mind that he later wrote, ‘tous ceux du conseil de l’union n’estoient pas de la ligue’.[[1005]](#footnote-1005) Next, Mayenne created his own *conseil d’état*, a move which the *Seize* would come to see as a considerable blow.[[1006]](#footnote-1006)

In due course, the logical corollary of Mayenne’s early accretion of power – and perhaps of the *Ligue*’s criticism of his performance – was his suppression of the *conseil-général* (at the end of 1589).[[1007]](#footnote-1007) By then he had been beaten in battle at Arques.[[1008]](#footnote-1008) In March 1590 there followed swifter defeat at Ivry.[[1009]](#footnote-1009) Still the *Ligue* leadership remained supportive and, come summer, they were too dependent on the duke’s raising of relieving troops to risk falling out.[[1010]](#footnote-1010) But once the siege was over, the tensions that emerged between Mayenne and the *Seize* at Corbeil (September 1590) hardened into the division which culminated in the Brisson affair . The closing two hundred or so pages of the *Histoire* provide a litany of the duke’s perceived failings. In a soldier’s throw-away comment that Rozée chose to record, Mayenne was but ‘[un] duc de paille’.[[1011]](#footnote-1011)

The duke died in 1611. Two years later Antoine de Nervèze, his only biographer to date, praised his achievements: ‘Charles de Lorraine, duc de Mayenne… [a] armé toute l’Europe pour la manutention de la religion catholique, fait lever trois sièges et retirer trois armées royalles… a soustenu, mais à son grand regret, sept ans une forte guerre… a gardé et empesché les eslévations populaires et dissipation de l’Estat rompu…’[[1012]](#footnote-1012) In 1866 Joseph de Croze acknowledged some positive qualities, but emphasised the duke’s personal faults: ‘Médiocre dans l’intrigue, paresseux dans l’action, facile à persuader et à tromper, n’ayant ni l’intelligence ni la prévoyance des choses, profondément égoïste…’[[1013]](#footnote-1013)

These sweeping statements hold some truth; here we seek merely to demonstrate that in a specific six-month period – from autumn 1590 to spring 1591 – in hugely difficult circumstances, Mayenne acquitted himself well.[[1014]](#footnote-1014) Our source has been a collection of the duke’s letters, published in the mid-nineteenth century.[[1015]](#footnote-1015) By definition, letters are one-sided, demonstrating and justifying the role played by their author. Nonetheless, comprising private communications unintended for a wide audience, this collection serves as unwitting evidence of the difficulties Mayenne faced and of the personal qualities with which he addressed them.

There were practical difficulties. Money was a constant requirement, thus a recurring subject in the duke’s letters to Rome.[[1016]](#footnote-1016) Within twenty-four hours of the election of Gregory XIV, Mayenne implored Caetani to press for financial assistance. Later to the commandeur de Dion, his ambassador to the Vatican, he stressed that a large lump-sum would be much more useful than a constant trickle. On the same day, he wrote directly to the Pope, beseeching him to respond swiftly.[[1017]](#footnote-1017) Three weeks later, he assured the governor that he would be sending the men’s pay in two or three days’ time.

The security of Paris was hugely important; Europe’s largest city must be supplied and defended. The duke assured the Hôtel de Ville that as soon as the men left behind by Parma had had sufficient rest, they would be employed to open up supply routes into the capital.[[1018]](#footnote-1018) In a sequence of eight letters in November he demanded the co-operation of all parties involved in the movement of salt from Rouen up the river to Paris. On 6 December, instructions were sent to Belin regarding the allowance of grain: no more than one *muid* per day might be made available in the city.[[1019]](#footnote-1019) Meanwhile, the fortifications must be maintained – Navarre might attack at any time. ‘Je croys qu’il sera à propos pour réparer les endroictz faibles de la ville,’ – this to the *prévôt des marchands*.[[1020]](#footnote-1020) And a few days later he reminded Belin always to keep the château du Louvre properly defended.[[1021]](#footnote-1021)

The royalists’ military activities were a constant source of anxiety. Caught off guard in early December by Navarre’s march on Pontoise, Mayenne rushed a directive to Belin: men from Paris must aid the stricken town until further help arrived. A letter to the *Messieurs de Paris* a few days later testifies to the uncertainty about where the royalists would go next. By the end of the month, Mayenne had further cause for concern: Navarre was acquiring troops from Switzerland and Germany much more quickly than expected. Worse followed. In a letter to Belin in early February 1590, Mayenne remarked that the fall of Grenoble threatened the *Ligue* hold in the region and consequently might jeopardise the movement of any assistance sent from Italy.[[1022]](#footnote-1022)

Roads were notoriously unsafe. Letters and money could find their way into the wrong hands. In February 1591, Mayenne wrote to Scipion Balbani thanking him for safely delivering his letters in Rome and in Spain.[[1023]](#footnote-1023) But a few weeks earlier he had written to M. du Pescheray at Chartres to tell him that the *sous-gouverneur*’s earlier correspondence had been seized en route. In late January, he sent two copies of the same letter to the commandeur de Dion, in the hope that at least one of them would reach him.[[1024]](#footnote-1024)

Beside practical difficulties, the perceived incompetence of other men exercised Mayenne. Some routine administration proceeded smoothly.[[1025]](#footnote-1025) In other cases, Mayenne felt let down: the marquis de Vitry had promised but failed to get food to Paris, the comte de Colatte had disobeyed an order to send men to assist La Chastre, and Barnabé Brisson had neglected to appoint a *président* in the Parlement.[[1026]](#footnote-1026) Mayenne felt isolated after the fall of Chartres, a loss, he wrote, ‘dont il est impossible de croire le regret que je reçois, voyant comme chacun s’employe froidement en cez affaires, s’en remettant sur moy, comme si je debvois tout seul réparer les faultes d’autruy et faire des miracles pour establir les affaires en plus de prospérité.’[[1027]](#footnote-1027) A short time later he was offended that Hercule Sfondrato, on his arrival in France, had reported to Parma rather than to the *lieutenant-général* of the kingdom, and he noted with satisfaction Parma’s immediate attempt to remedy the diplomatic blunder.[[1028]](#footnote-1028)

The defensive tone of some letters shows that Mayenne had his share of critics. Obliged to explain Parma’s return to the Netherlands in December 1590, he assured his readers of the general’s intention to return in spring.[[1029]](#footnote-1029) Elsewhere he instructed Dion to assure the Pope that papal accountants were welcome to audit *Ligue* expenditure.[[1030]](#footnote-1030) After the fall of Chartres, the duke had to explain to the Paris municipality why he had not been able to prevent the disaster.[[1031]](#footnote-1031) On one occasion he appealed to Caetani to testify to his credentials as true leader of the French Catholic cause: ‘je vous prens à tesmoing, Monsieur, et vous supplie très humblement de vouloir juger de tous mes départementz…et vous représenter la condition des gens à qui j’ay à faire, la disposition des choses que j’ay eues à manier…’[[1032]](#footnote-1032)

Faced with criticism, Mayenne was not unresourceful. A devout Catholic in any case, he had the political wit to take advantage of the *Ligue*’s religious predilections. The new Pope, he wrote, was ‘le plus favorable à ceste saincte cause que nous pouvons desirer.’[[1033]](#footnote-1033) Aware that Rome’s endorsement carried weight, he urged Dion seek overt papal blessing on the *Ligue* and on attempts to call an Estates-General.[[1034]](#footnote-1034) Paris preachers too were courted; Mayenne told the *prévot* Charles Boucher:

N’oubliez à asseurer Messieurs les prédicateurs qu’en tout ce qui se présentera pour leur promotion aux dignitez ecclésiastiques, ils ne doubtent point que je ne les préfère à tous aultres, et qu’il ne se passera occasion de les gratifier que je ne leur tesmoigne combien je les honnore et désire leur contentement; que c’est à cest heure plus que jamais qu’il fault entretenir ce peuple en la dévotion dans laquelle il est.[[1035]](#footnote-1035)

The duke spared a thought even for the people – ‘[qui] ne trouve rien impossible à supporter pour sa religion et pour l’honneur de Dieu.’[[1036]](#footnote-1036)

Mayenne attended well to business, writing at least 457 letters in about two hundred days.[[1037]](#footnote-1037) He showed considerable perseverance, whether it was in the quest for salt supplies from Rouen and money from Rome, or to remind individuals of promises they had not kept. He was committed to the well-being and safety of Paris, checking that key points were being properly fortified. He assured Pierre Acarie that he longed for ‘le salut de vostre ville qui m’est si chaire et prétieuse’.[[1038]](#footnote-1038) To Brisson he wrote, ‘vous vous asseurerez…que j’y donnerai tel ordre que chascun cognoistra que je n’y espargne aucune diligence.’[[1039]](#footnote-1039)

Attentiveness to Paris required Mayenne to be active well beyond the capital. After chasing the royalists from Corbeil, he asserted that his enemy would think twice ‘devant que de faire une… enterprise.’[[1040]](#footnote-1040) To the *messieurs* de Chartres, he wrote that he would pursue the enemy ‘à ses talons pour… [leur] secours.’[[1041]](#footnote-1041) Apologising to the *parlementaires* of Rouen for not visiting them, he excused himself by reference to his activities in Picardy and the Laonnais. Mayenne looked also beyond France. The support of Madrid and Rome was constantly solicited. Writing twice to the Porte, the duke assured Murad III that Navarre was not the accepted King of France, and instructed his ambassador there to do all within his power to prevent Navarrist envoys from gaining access to *le Grand Seigneur*.[[1042]](#footnote-1042) When Navarre’s envoy to Venice, the duc de Luxembourg, secured assurances of help from the republic, Mayenne saw at once an opportunity to focus the Pope’s mind on intervention sooner rather than later. Upon learning that the duc de Savoie too was seeking help in Rome, he struck the delicate balance between rejoicing that the Pope could be relied upon to reach out to all Catholics in need, and instructing Dion to ensure that any help given to Savoie was not off-set by reductions for the French. Mayenne asked Rome for money rather than men because he understood that the French nobility were unlikely to be attracted to his cause by the prospect of leading foreign troops.

A well-informed and dedicated leader faced with a range of competing demands might expect sympathy. Writing nearly three centuries after the events, Henry and Loriquet found ample cause to admire the duke. A patriot, Mayenne had shown no intention of surrendering the throne to Spain, or gallican liberties to the Pope.[[1043]](#footnote-1043) Although he had found authority difficult to exercise, following events ‘avec une lenteur et une prudence excessives’, he had been devoted to the Catholic faith. Friends and enemies alike had seen in him ‘[un] prince de foy…’[[1044]](#footnote-1044) In the next chapter we explore that religious fervour which both inspired Mayenne and was at the very heart of the *Sainte Union*.

**Chapter 8: Religion**

Devout French Catholics like Rozée recognised only one Christian faith: Roman Catholicism. All deviations from Roman Catholicism were therefore ‘heretical’ and ‘schismatic’. Rozée’s faith was, as Charles Valois put it, ‘“l’aiguille de sa conduite”, l’idée directrice de son livre’.[[1045]](#footnote-1045) The *Histoire* is silent on devotional and doctrinal matters, and contains only one notable passage on liturgy.[[1046]](#footnote-1046) What greatly interested Rozée and is a recurrent theme in his work was the relationship between religion and politics. Initially this interest led him to question the place of Protestantism in the French polity, but before long, and consequent partly upon the post-1584 succession crisis, a second issue became dominant: the compass of papal authority in France.[[1047]](#footnote-1047)

For Rozée Christianity was Roman Catholicism. Side-stepping the doctrinal debate, he argued not that Calvinism was heretical – which he considered self-evident – but that the new faith could not be practised in France. One kingdom could not contain two religions:

[L]e prince est tenu par la loy de dieu de s'informer de la religion de ses sujets, sur les advis que luy donnent les prelats de l'esglise et empescher par sa puisance temporelle que rien ne s'introduise contre la religion; estant un blaspheme de dire, qu'il peut y avoir deux religions en un royaume car il n’y en a, et n'en peut avoir qu'une en tout le monde, tout le reste est impieté.[[1048]](#footnote-1048)

At the outset of the work we are told that Protestants were subversive, Catholics loyal:

[L]es uns ont voulu faire reçevoir leurs opinions nouvelles en la religion, par la force, contre la volonté de nos Roys: les autres ont sous l'authorité du Roy, puis selon ce qu'ils pensoient devoir à leur conscience, voulu conserver par les armes, leur antienne religion, et en la conservation d'icelle, conserver la Monarchie Chrestienne…[[1049]](#footnote-1049)

The practice of Calvinism had to be eradicated, not least because the Protestant league, born of Satan, had brought trouble throughout the realm.[[1050]](#footnote-1050) A forceful approach was required, ‘[car] l’ortie touchée légèrement pique, mais, si on la presse d’une main rude, elle s’émousse et perd sa force’.[[1051]](#footnote-1051) While the historian considered edicts of pacification to be unexceptionable in principle he pointed out that in practice they contravened the royal coronation oath to preserve the Roman Catholic religion.[[1052]](#footnote-1052) They were also disastrous, always carrying the seed of further wars.[[1053]](#footnote-1053)

Further, Huguenots had engaged in iconoclasm and had committed atrocities:

[L]es esglises furent ruisnée, les sacremens profanez, les reliques des S[ain]ts bruslées, les ornemens pillés les sepulchres de nos Roys violez, et sur toutes sortes de personnes sans discretion d’ordre, de qualité, d’aage ou de sexe commis de cruautés qui feront horreur ala posterité, et iustifieront ce qui a esté dit il y a long temps, qu’il ny a cruauté que d’heretiques.[[1054]](#footnote-1054)

The word ‘Huguenot’ may derive from a custom in Tours to name any ghost *le roi Huguet*.[[1055]](#footnote-1055) Like ghosts, Protestants worked evil at night.[[1056]](#footnote-1056) Ms. 23296 begins with a reference to Jean Boucher’s description of how Huguenot soldiers behaved: ‘à sçavoir, piller les esglises, pouller les sacraments, rançonner et meurtrir les pretres, et commetre toutes les actes qui ont mis ce Royaume en desolation’.[[1057]](#footnote-1057) Before long Rozée re-launched his attack by citing the bishop of Orléans’ reply to a letter from Henri III. The bishop alleged that Huguenots had murdered priests, raped nuns, burnt relics, stolen church valuables and destroyed churches. Rozée had no doubt that the bishop could be believed, noting that he was ‘tenu pour un des plus sçavants personnages de son temps’.[[1058]](#footnote-1058)

An admirer of integrity, Rozée opposed Protestants because they could not be trusted:

‘[C]eux dela ligue protestante ont tousiours esté… secrets en leurs conseils et… hardis en l’execution d’iceux. les autres [les *Ligueurs*] plus ouverts et plus confidans, disant que toutes leurs resolutions tendoient au bien…’.[[1059]](#footnote-1059) They wrote under pseudonyms.[[1060]](#footnote-1060) Worst of all was their U-turn on obedience to kings after the *journée des barricades*: ‘[I]l ne s’y remarquà point de plus grand miracle… les huguenots de france commencerent a blasmer la rebellion contre le Roy…’.[[1061]](#footnote-1061)

With the excommunication in 1585 of the heir-apparent Henri de Navarre, the question of the extent of papal authority in France became a key issue for Rozée. Gallicanism – the belief that the French church was entitled to a degree of independence from both the Papacy and from French kings – had emerged in the early 1400s. In 1516 the Concordat of Bologna had the effect of breathing new life into the debate between gallicans and those who believed that papal authority covered matters temporal as well as spiritual. Ratification in France of the Tridentine decrees was resisted on the grounds that they threatened gallican liberties. Meanwhile the coming of the Jesuits, bound by strict vows of obedience to the pope, evoked similar fears. In the *Ligue* years Protestants, rejecting the papacy as an institution, found common ground with royalist Catholics who were outraged by the excommunication of Henri de Navarre and even questioned the imposition of the same censure on Henry III.

Gallicanism had considerable support within the secular courts. This may be explained by the ‘traditionally close association between the professions of the law and the Catholic Church’ and by the awareness of both institutions that freedom from interference was esential.[[1062]](#footnote-1062) At first sight Rozée, *avocat* in the Paris Parlement, seems to have been unmoved by the gallican spirit: evidence from the *Histoire* suggests that in the matters of the Tridentine decrees and the Jesuits he was loyal to Rome.[[1063]](#footnote-1063) This perception can be tested through consideration of those parts of the *Histoire* that trace the interest in French affairs shown by Popes Sixtus V (1585-90) and Gregory XIV (1590-91).[[1064]](#footnote-1064)

Sixtus’s excommunication in 1585 of the King of Navarre clearly exercised Rozée’s mind, for the manuscript contains not only the full text of Navarre’s *Opposition*, but also a summary of arguments for and against the excommunication.[[1065]](#footnote-1065) The arguments against were numerous and of varying quality: canon law provided for the case to be heard in a council of the church; papal denial of this provision was itself tantamount to heresy; the papacy was guilty of confusing temporal and spiritual matters; popes, having been established after kings, had no say in the disposal of kingdoms; in any case, Sixtus was a malicious liar, a tyrant and an usurper – in fact, ‘[un] soit disant pape’.[[1066]](#footnote-1066) Rozée countered with a sustained passage of ultramontanist thought: Navarre did not need a council-hearing for his was no new heresy; French kings were clearly subject to popes, for several had been excommunicated in the past; when it was a Catholic country that faced a succession crisis, popes had authority; as for the allegation of tyranny it should be borne in mind how the apostle Peter had dealt with Ananias and Sapphira, and with Simon the Sorcerer.[[1067]](#footnote-1067) Finally, Navarre had shown no signs of conversion. How far, lamented the historian, France had fallen since that time when Francis I had expressed his loathing of Lutheranism, saying, ‘quand a moy qui suis vostre Roy si ie sçavois l’un de mes membres maculé ou infesté de cete detestable erreur, non seulement ie le baillerois a couper, mais davantage, si j’apperçois aucuns de mes enfans entachez ie les voudrois moy mesme sacrifier’.[[1068]](#footnote-1068)

Rozée’s approval of the excommunication of Navarre placed him squarely in the ultramontanist camp. This was still his position in early 1589 when in his *Proposition* of 27 January the pope refused to absolve Henri III.[[1069]](#footnote-1069) The crime against the cardinal de Guise was so serious that, at the very least, the French king must come to Rome for absolution.[[1070]](#footnote-1070) That the historian was at this stage supportive of Sixtus V is suggested by his decision to provide the text of most of the *Proposition*, for he was aware that its severity against a French king was controversial.[[1071]](#footnote-1071) Further evidence of his satisfaction with Sixtus’s strong line was his inclusion of a summary of points made by the pope in meetings with Claude d’Angennes, bishop of Le Mans and recorded by the bishop in a letter to the king. The summary was published in May as the *Advis de Rome*; some of the pope’s arguments amounted to a resounding vindication of the *Ligue*.[[1072]](#footnote-1072) Thus, dismissing the bishop’s suggestion that an unabsolved king would be ill-equipped to safeguard Catholicism, the pope declared, ‘qu’il y avoit encor des bons catholiques en france qui deffendroient l’Esglise et la religion’.[[1073]](#footnote-1073) It was Rome’s view that the problems in France were the king’s fault, and ‘dieu permettoit que ses suiets se bandoient contre luy’.[[1074]](#footnote-1074)

Henry III was excommunicated on 5 May.[[1075]](#footnote-1075) Rozée was confident that the pope had reached his decision on good grounds (the king had recently formed a union with Navarre) and after due deliberation.[[1076]](#footnote-1076) Nonetheless it caused a stir: ‘Chacun parla diversement de cette bulle tant dedans que dehors le Roiaume’.[[1077]](#footnote-1077) Royalists, in particular, were aghast for its implications about the king’s authority. Protestants were naturally dismissive of papal interference. More difficult for Rozée was that some Catholics now dredged up old arguments ‘tirées des livres de ceux qui, pendant les schismes eslevez contre l’esglise, ont escrit contre l’estat monarchique de l’Esglise, et la souveraine authorité que les papes vicaires de Jesus Christ ont en l’esglise’.[[1078]](#footnote-1078) The historian’s rejection of such arguments amounted to a repudiation of gallicanism.

In August Jacques Clément’s deed brought immediate relief to Paris; in September news that the pope judged the regicide to be miraculous encouraged the *Ligue*.[[1079]](#footnote-1079) But there followed an unexpected development in Rome’s relations with France when the pope not only received the new king’s ambassador, François de Luxembourg duc de Piney, but also expressed warm support for the royalist Catholics.[[1080]](#footnote-1080) Admitting that this produced ‘beaucoup de contentement’ in the king’s camp, Rozée swiftly added a *Ligue* perspective:

les politiques ne devoient de la teneur de ce bref soupçonner que le pape approuvoit leurs actions, ou improuvoit le party de la ligue, dela quelle il estoit le pere et le patron, pour ce qu’il leur prescrivoit de faire par ce bref, et qui ne se pouvoit executer, sous l’obeissance du Roy heretique, estoit estre ligueur, c’est a dire conservateur de la religion catho[lique].[[1081]](#footnote-1081)

This is essential Rozée: the only true Catholic was the *Ligueur* Catholic. He closed the passage ominously, ‘cy apres nous dirons ce qui se passa en cette affaire avec le pape’.[[1082]](#footnote-1082)

Before long it was obvious that Sixtus V supported the *Ligue* ‘plus par de bonnes paroles que par une aide concrète’.[[1083]](#footnote-1083) Trying to come to terms with this development, Rozée noted that the pope’s increasing coolness toward the *Ligue* might be Mayenne’s fault for suppressing the *conseil-général*; Sixtus’s failure to deliver promised funds could be blamed on pernicious royal agents in Italy.[[1084]](#footnote-1084) But by introducing the main points from a letter of complaint written by Mayenne to Rome, Rozée made it clear what he thought.[[1085]](#footnote-1085) The duke pointed out that defeat had occurred partly because mercenaries had been unpaid – and this because the pope had not contributed men and money. Indeed, the pope had been readier to support the struggle against the late king than he was to contribute to war against Henry IV, a heretic. And, sharply, ‘la qualité de chef de l’eglise ne luy permettoit point d’estre simple spectateur de cete guerre… puisque c’estoit un des cas ausquels il avoit destiné la despence du grand tresor, qu’il avoit amassé au chateau St. Ange’.[[1086]](#footnote-1086) Rozée drew the conclusion that Sixtus planned to use his resources in due course to capture Naples, and that, toward France, ‘[il] ne changea pas de volonté’.[[1087]](#footnote-1087)

In April came news that Sixtus intended to lift the 1585 excommunication from Navarre and recognise him as King of France; ‘cete nouvelle estoit la plus triste qu’on pouvoit apprendre a paris’.[[1088]](#footnote-1088) The *Histoire* contains a detailed account of the process whereby, at the request of the Hôtel de Ville, the Sorbonne deliberated on several questions of which the principal was whether, before God, Navarre could ever be accepted as King of France.[[1089]](#footnote-1089) It was not long before the doctors found against Navarre and his supporters, and any conciliators; conversely, all who held fast to the faith – that is, *Ligueurs* – could expect ‘les recompenses eternelles’.[[1090]](#footnote-1090)

The Sorbonne’s decision was published in early May.[[1091]](#footnote-1091) Its value for the *Ligue* lay in its potential to stiffen Catholic resolve in the besieged city, and to undermine the hopes of royalist Catholics, particularly after the death of the cardinal de Bourbon on 8 May. Before long the ruling was known in union towns across France, and had reached Spain where the clergy enthusiastically supported it.[[1092]](#footnote-1092) Informing the pope was another matter, for who would face his ‘humeur aspre’?[[1093]](#footnote-1093) With the support of five hundred cavalry, the Spanish ambassador carried the message that may have taken the pope to his grave.[[1094]](#footnote-1094) Sixtus died on 28 August. When the news reached France, ‘ceux du party du Roy en furent marris pour les esperances qu’ils en avoient concües, et ceux de l’union catholique disoient, c’est un coup dela main qui jamais ne faillit’.[[1095]](#footnote-1095)

There were two papal elections in autumn 1590. Rozée considered Urban VII – pope for a few days in September – to be ‘[un] homme fort recommandable pour sa pitié et grande doctrine’, noting that he had had an important role at the Council of Trent and had latterly supported the Sorbonne’s *Résolution* against Henri de Navarre .[[1096]](#footnote-1096) It was not until 5 December that his successor – cardinal Niccolò Sfondrati – was named pope Gregory XIV.[[1097]](#footnote-1097) Rozée was pleased, noting that the new pope ‘se trouva autant affectionné à l’union des catholiques de france que Sixte avoit esté contraire à la fin de ses jours’.[[1098]](#footnote-1098)

The *Ligue* lost no time in contacting the new pope.[[1099]](#footnote-1099) In so far as the help they requested would be turned against Navarre and his supporters it is not surprising that Rozée forbore to mention these diplomatic initiatives. Embarking upon a vigorous ‘politique interventionniste’, Gregory responded swiftly.[[1100]](#footnote-1100) In January 1591 he sent a request to Philip II for continued assistance to the *Ligue*. This was followed by letters of encouragement to Sega, the *conseil de la Ligue*, undecided noblemen, the Sorbonne, and the city fathers; to Mayenne he announced the appointment of a new nuncio, Marsilio Landriano, to work alongside Sega in France.[[1101]](#footnote-1101) Sharpening the focus, Gregory went on to write to the royalist cardinals Vendôme, Lenoncourt and Gondi: as it was unlikely that Navarre still planned to convert, was it not time they abandoned him?

The *Seize* were quick to see the propaganda value of papal commendation and promises, and Parispresses were kept busy printing some of the letters.[[1102]](#footnote-1102) At the same time the *Ligue* published writings of their own designed to sustain the faithful and win over the uncertain.[[1103]](#footnote-1103) As evidence of the *Ligue*’s mood in early 1591, and exposing his own view of Gregory, Rozée copied into his text a letter of 26 February, signed by eight of the *Seize*, thanking the pope for his support, and fondly recalling the assistance they had previously received from Caetani.[[1104]](#footnote-1104) He also appended the pope’s reply of 1 May.[[1105]](#footnote-1105) With reference to this he observed that just as royalists had earlier flaunted the recognition they had received from Sixtus V, so now, ‘[c]eux du party de l’union qui virent ce bref en firent grande estime et s’en servoient...pour monstrer que l’union n’estoit point une faction de rebelles’.[[1106]](#footnote-1106)

Royalists were well aware of the *Ligue* propaganda campaign of early1591.[[1107]](#footnote-1107) On 7 April noblemen with Navarre at Chartres wrote to the pope explaining that he was being duped by mis-information from the *Ligue*; they added that ‘Dieu donne les roys et n’est pas permi aux subiectz d’en choisir à leur volonté’.[[1108]](#footnote-1108) The royalist envoy to Rome, François de Luxembourg, wrote the next day beseeching the pope not to judge hastily; replying on 4 June, the pope conceded no ground.[[1109]](#footnote-1109) Indeed he could not, for by then his assistance to the *Ligue* had gone far beyond moral support. Landriano had reached Paris; 15,000 *écus* per month had been made available to the *Ligue* for the upkeep of a garrison in Paris.[[1110]](#footnote-1110) More money had followed.[[1111]](#footnote-1111) Next had come news that infantry from Switzerland and cavalry from Naples would soon set off for France under the leadership of Ercole Sfondrati, duke of Montemarciano, a nephew of the Pope.[[1112]](#footnote-1112) ‘Les Ligueurs applaudirent,’ wrote L’Epinois.[[1113]](#footnote-1113) Referring probably to *Ligue* influence, Rozée noted that the army had been procured through ‘les agents qui estoient a Rome’.[[1114]](#footnote-1114)

In chapter four we noted that when Rozée imported long passages from contemporary writings – typically several sides – it was because the views expressed in them mirrored his own. A key import on the 1591 gallican controversy was the *Supplication et advis fait au Roy de se faire Catholique* which sought with an array of arguments to bring Navarre to conversion.[[1115]](#footnote-1115) There was the force of antiquity: the Catholic church had outlasted all others, its doctrines unchanged, and all previous kings had professed the Catholic faith. Then there were political arguments: if the king remained Protestant, all his key men would be in a different church, meaning that they would have more support from the people than the king himself. As for the Protestants they would surely remain loyal to a converted Navarre (‘s’ils ont obey au deffunct Roy, ils vous obeiront a plus forte raison’).[[1116]](#footnote-1116) Conversion would also eradicate Spanish interference. On a different tack, the writer noted that if Navarre hardened his heart against God, the hearts of the people would harden against him.[[1117]](#footnote-1117)

Landriano reached France in early summer, bearing a bull aimed at Navarrist clergy (they would be excommunicated if they did not abandon Navarre within fifteen days) and a monitory for all Navarre’s lay supporters (in due course, they could expect the same fate).[[1118]](#footnote-1118) On 10 June the royalist Parlement at Châlons formally rejected these threats and talked of using the legal device *appel comme d’abus*.[[1119]](#footnote-1119) There followed what Penzi has called ‘[une] guerre des arrêts’.[[1120]](#footnote-1120) The *Ligueur* Parlement of Paris declared the Châlons arrêt to be schismatic and ordered copies to be burned. In July, from Mantes, Navarre called on his parlements to act swiftly in defence of gallican principles. The response from Flavigny was to declare the papal bulls to be ‘nulles & abusives’. One week later, Tours declared that the papacy itself had been schismatic; the Parlement forbade all communication with the pope, thus legitimising a break-away gallican church; Landriano should be imprisoned. In late August, Châlons re-entered the fray, declaring to be deprived of their benefices in France all who had had recourse to Gregory; all ecclesiastical benefices were declared to be under royal control.[[1121]](#footnote-1121) In September, the Paris Parlement’s declaration that the Tours *arrêt* was treasonable changed nothing: in practical terms, France was in complete schism from Rome.

Following the purge of documents after March 1594 it had been possible for royalist historians such as Pierre Matthieu to dismiss the schism in just a few words, rendering it a mere adjunct to civil war.[[1122]](#footnote-1122) Rozée redressed the balance by discussing the controversy at length, paying attention to both the legal documents and to related polemical writings. As we saw in chapter 4 he had no difficulty in identifying what he considered to be the inaccuracies and illogicalities of royalist statements. Further arguments were at hand. Responding to the *Discours des raisons et moyens*,which had observed that if royalist priests were excommunicated then the flock would be abandoned in all non-*Ligue* towns, Rozée sheltered behind the views of others to make the obvious point that the Pope’s intention had not at all been that the flock should be abandoned but that the clergy, by being obedient, should protect the flock and abandon Navarre. Picking up another argument in the *Discours* – that to excommunicate the king was to infringe the liberties of the French crown – he called on ‘un des predicateurs de paris [qui] fit une reponse’: the crown’s greatest glory was that it might not belong to a heretic.[[1123]](#footnote-1123) The Paris preacher was used also to point out that it was not the papal bulls that were schismatic, but the royalist clergy who persisted in siding with a still unconverted king.[[1124]](#footnote-1124)

On 21 September the royalist prelates at Chartres stepped into the debate. Asserting the invalidity of the pope’s excommunication warnings, they suggested that Sixtus V’s policy – pursuit of the king’s conversion – was one that Gregory might have learnt from. In late October, with Gregory two weeks dead, even Landriano felt able to criticise the late pope’s policy: ‘les Monitoires rendaient les nobles plus attachés à son parti [celui de Navarre], en leur persuadant que le Pape agissait à la requête du roi d’Espagne, dans le seul but d’exclure de la couronne la maison de Bourbon’.[[1125]](#footnote-1125) In L’Epinois’ view, ‘C’était constater... l’inanité de la politique suivie par Grégoire XIV.’[[1126]](#footnote-1126) Nowhere does Rozée’s text echo such views. We believe he would have been more comfortable with Mayenne’s verdict, in January 1592: Gregory had been ‘un des plus grands chefs de l’Eglise qui ayt esté depuis mil ans.’[[1127]](#footnote-1127)

In his attachment to the Tridentine decrees and his sympathy for the Jesuits Rozée showed ultramontanist leanings.[[1128]](#footnote-1128) Never, of course, disaffected from the papacy, he nonetheless felt free to judge popes’ deeds.[[1129]](#footnote-1129) His disappointment with Sixtus V issued not from his own but from the pope’s betrayal of principle. During the 1591 stand-off the historian found fault with the royalist parlements, not with Rome. Yet for all this, Rozée was not devoid of gallican sentiment. His interest in the *Supplication et advis* suggests that he believed Navarre needed only to convert to be eligible for the throne, and when Clément VIII’s 1592 bull requiring Sega to procure a Catholic king was rejected by the royalist parlements, Rozée reflected on ‘la grace que dieu a fait a l’esglise gallicane, de l’avoir retirée du precipice ou elle estoit’.[[1130]](#footnote-1130)

Popes influenced the mood of the *Ligue* leadership, but it fell to local priests to win popular support. Of these, the foremost was, of course, the bishop of Paris, Pierre de Gondi, cardinal de Retz.[[1131]](#footnote-1131) Rozée considered Gondi a disappointment, principally because the bishop had remained loyal to Henri III after Blois.[[1132]](#footnote-1132) In 1590, when the besieged city knew intense suffering, it was Gondi who called on the Paris Parlement to launch peace talks. Rozée was suspicious; was the cardinal motivated ‘par la compassion qu’il avoit du peuple, ou pour ne laisser perdre une bonne occasion de servir le roy’? [[1133]](#footnote-1133)

The Paris *Ligue* operated under ‘[un] magistère clérical’; the *Ligue* knew ‘[une] dépendance spirituelle’ and was ‘assimilée à une construction d’essence religieuse’.[[1134]](#footnote-1134) Descimon meant that the Catholic church was the very heart of the *Ligue*, giving life to the movement through a range of means – ‘la prédication, la procession, sans compter le serment, le secret et, naturellement, la confession’.[[1135]](#footnote-1135) The potential significance of preaching was well understood by contemporaries. ‘J’ai fait plus par la bouche de mes prédicateurs qu’ils [my brothers] ne font tous ensemble avec toutes leurs pratiques, armes et armées,’ Mme de Montpensier is reputed to have proclaimed.[[1136]](#footnote-1136) The anonymous author of the *Conseil salutaire* noted only ill-effects:

Je ne me puis souvenir qu’avec un extrème dépit des infames & villaines parolles que i’ay ouy prononcer à vos Prédicateurs, au lieu estably pour annoncer la parolle de Dieu, prescher l’Evangile, asseurer le repos des consciences...; & au contraire, auiourd’hui destiné pour vomir des blasphèmes contre l’honneur de Dieu & de son Eglise, pour animer le populaire au feu et au sang..., mettre le glaive de iustice entre les mains des furieux & assassinateurs...[[1137]](#footnote-1137)

‘Tout mon mal vient de la chaire,’ complained Henri of Navarre ..[[1138]](#footnote-1138) François observed that it was the Good Friday preaching of a Feuillant monk that deterred a would-be assassin from attacking the duc de Mayenne.[[1139]](#footnote-1139) Pierre Matthieu believed that ‘[des] Prescheurs empoisonnez... envenimèrent tellement les Parisiens contre leur Roy... qu’ils résolurent de périr misérablement en ce siege [summer 1590]’.[[1140]](#footnote-1140) In the nineteenth century Charles Labitte concurred on preachers’ readiness to use sermons for political goals.[[1141]](#footnote-1141)

Rozée named few preachers.[[1142]](#footnote-1142) Other than the memorable moment in Guincestre’s New Year’s Day sermon and a taste of what Pierre Christin preached one year later, references to sermons are scant.[[1143]](#footnote-1143) Moreover the historian gave a clear picture of declining respect for *Ligueur* preaching from 1592:

quand aux predicateurs qui se trouverent divises selon que chacun d’eux estoit afectionné a l’un des partis, ils prescherent leur opinion ez esglises ou ils estoient appellez, selon l’affection des marguilliers qui estoient en charge; de façon que comme on avoit dit ez années precedentes que les predicateurs avoient esté les trompettes dela ligue, ou trouva qu’ils furent les trompettes pour la decrier; sur cela, les politiques choisirent gens, lesquels ayant ouy les sermons des predicateurs ligueurs disoient tout haut en l’esglise ou au milieu des rouées, que le predicateur estoit un seditieux.[[1144]](#footnote-1144)

The term ‘magistère clérical’ should be used with care. Noting that clerics were indeed ‘[i]nspirateurs, formateurs de l’opinion publique, directeurs de conscience’, Descimon himself has reminded us that even in the *Ligue* period they functioned within a tri-partite society (clergy, law, commerce) and that ‘[l]a communion espérée par l’Union n’instaurait au mieux qu’une collaboration’.[[1145]](#footnote-1145) Rozée had good memories of *Ligueur* priests. He was impressed by Jean Boucher’s defence of the *Ligue* before Henri III in 1587, noting the testimony that Pierre Damours, one of Mayenne’s *supernuméraires*, gave to the king: ‘Sire, s’il [Boucher] a parlé a V.M. avec resolution, il a suivy son naturel, car autre qu’il est vostre fidel suiet, l’esguille de sa conduite est la conservation de la religion catholique’.[[1146]](#footnote-1146) Rozée recalled that the priest was a target of enemies of the *Ligue*, some of whom called him ‘le boucher en chaire’, and he noted the injustice whereby Protestant ministers – ‘vrays trompettes de Sathan’ – went unpunished while Catholic preachers were reported to the king by those who wished to see them imprisoned.[[1147]](#footnote-1147) Jean Guincestre’s verbal attack on Harlay (1 January, 1589) was a mark of zeal, and the priest had gone on to show courage during the long siege: ‘il estoit lors des plus zélés a la defence de la ville, des plus diligents aux allarmes et des mieux suivis’.[[1148]](#footnote-1148) Rozée was keenly aware of the clergy’s importance in maintaining the morale of the people of Paris before the aborted siege in summer 1589 and the long siege of 1590.[[1149]](#footnote-1149) Very different from Matthieu’s was Rozée’s interpretation of priests’ contribution during the long siege: when relief came, ‘les predicateurs qui avoient asseuré le peuple que dieu leur envoiroit du secours, l’excitoient a remercier dieu dela patience qu’il leur avoit donné et du soulagement qu’il avoit reçeu’.[[1150]](#footnote-1150)

For all their traditional importance, it may be that in early 1589 the priests were barely needed in order for the people to be moved. Denis Crouzet has shown that horror and fear after the Blois murders were felt not only by clergy but by the whole of Paris. God’s judgement seemed near; ‘[u]ne grande angoisse mobilise les Seize, d’être dans l’ordre impur du péché et de l’impudicité, dans un temps eschatologique de Jugement divin… Mais cette angoisse est une angoisse collective, elle ne leur est pas propre, elle est l’angoisse d’une société tout entière...[[1151]](#footnote-1151)

‘L’angoisse collective’ is present in Rozée’s account of the early days of January 1589 – and we remind ourselves that he was there – but cautious, diffident, perhaps inclined to be private, he maintains a certain distance from it: ‘Les ecclesiastiques et le peuple s’appliquerent à la dévotion, on ne peut dire combien il fit de prières, combien de mortifications.’[[1152]](#footnote-1152) There is no sense of the laity needing to be goaded into action by priests. The people were driven by fear: ‘Ils caressoient aux affections ce qu’ils craignoient le plus de perdre; on eust dit, qu’ils exercoient les actions de la religion, comme si s’eust esté la derniere fois, et que le lendemain la religion eust deü estre perdüe.’[[1153]](#footnote-1153) François noted, 2 January, ‘[C]hacun s’est mis en prières et oraisons pour appaiser l’yre de Dieu.’[[1154]](#footnote-1154) Yet even here we may detect a time-honoured priestly authority, for had not Christian devotion always required more than attention to sermons? As Ann Ramsey has shown, *Ligueur* religion was to do with not only the word but also the ritual performance of acts which had a sacral, but also social, purpose. The clergy required ritual performance to be carried out not least because it was their job to maintain social order.

François and L’Estoile were both struck by the incidence of religious processions. Crouzet has drawn attention to their spontaneity: ‘Ce n’est ni la Ligue des prédicateurs, ni celle des Seize, si d’ailleurs elles peuvent être dissociées, que l’on peut observer à l’origine de la quête ambulante de Christ, mais Paris, toute une ville qui se tourne vers Dieu...’[[1155]](#footnote-1155) In early February, fearful of disorder, the diocese of Paris took steps to regain control by issuing the *Mandement pour le reglement des processions…*.[[1156]](#footnote-1156) Spontaneity was discouraged; the people were to attend ordinary church services in the mornings, and to listen to the preaching of the word. Processions might take place only in the afternoons, each parish being allocated just one afternoon per week.[[1157]](#footnote-1157) It was by no means the end of public enthusiasm. Rozée was well aware of the rapturous welcome given to Caetani in January 1590. The occasion was a good example of what Ann Ramsey has called ‘performativity’ – the shared performance of religious rituals.[[1158]](#footnote-1158) In so far as the welcomers encompassed several social levels of both laity and clergy it reinforced unity in *Ligue* ranks. At the same time the presence of dignitaries gave the occasion legitimacy and enhanced the plausibility of the *Ligue*.[[1159]](#footnote-1159)

Though the Blois assassinations provoked a mood in Paris that left preachers temporarily redundant, the *Seize* were generally glad of support from clerics. But their organisational structure they borrowed from the laity. Using the term ‘Ligue-confrérie’, Descimon has suggested that the 1585 founders of the Paris *Ligue* had in mind the devotional lay confraternities that had been engaged in the struggle against Protestantism for a quarter of a century.[[1160]](#footnote-1160) Thus, ‘[i]l n’est pas de meilleur définition du mouvement des Seize que celle qui l’assimile à une confrérie laïque’.[[1161]](#footnote-1161)

One of four confraternities discussed in an article by Robert Harding, the Confrérie du Saint Nom de Jésus appeared in Paris, and then shortly afterwards in Orléans, in 1590.[[1162]](#footnote-1162) Its goal was ‘la manutention de la Religion Catholique, Apostolique, & Romaine, sous l’authorité du Roy, des Princes, & magistrats Catholiques’.[[1163]](#footnote-1163) Claiming to have ‘aucune esperance d’honneur mondain, ou proffit particulier’, the ‘brothers’ pledged themselves to personal holiness.[[1164]](#footnote-1164) They vowed obedience to the Pope, the bishop and other senior clergy, to Charles X, Mayenne and the leaders of the *Sainte* *Union*. They would seek help from the Catholic King and never recognise Henri de Navarre as King of France.

Clearly, the *Seize* and the Paris confraternity shared aspirations. They also shared the same eventual fate – suppression.[[1165]](#footnote-1165) Difficulties arose in the Orléans confraternity too. There the brothers were required to be ready day or night ‘en armes et bon équipage, pour exécuter les commandemens des chefs...’[[1166]](#footnote-1166) Naturally this requirement perturbed the secular authorities, who in 1591 tried – unsuccessfully – to have the confraternity closed down.[[1167]](#footnote-1167) Rozée believed that the Orléans confraternity had been founded in order to protect the town from Politique plots; if he knew of the brothers being armed, he did not mention it.[[1168]](#footnote-1168)

Home in the early 1590s to a confraternity, Catholic Orléans had required more prosaic help thirty years earlier – from builders. Civil-war damage in the 1560s left the church needing to make repairs.[[1169]](#footnote-1169) Unencumbered by concerns for the holiness of buildings, for God indwelt the human soul, the Huguenots had not hesitated to put churches to secular use.[[1170]](#footnote-1170) The Franciscan place of prayer became an arsenal and a foundry; the church of Saint-Euverte provided stabling.[[1171]](#footnote-1171) We turn, then, to the issue of sacred space, asking first what our historian made of its secularisation in times of conflict, and later whether he shared the views of some contemporaries who considered Paris – even France – to have a special place in the divine wisdom.

Rozée was well aware of sacrilege, yet many of his examples of the invasion of sacred space are unaccompanied by opinion. Thus, during the royalist assault at *Toussaint* 1589, killings in the cemetery at St Sulpice pass without comment.[[1172]](#footnote-1172) In spring 1590, Henry IV’s soldiers seized the churches of St Laurent and St Lazare in the suburbs of Paris; as the great siege unfolded, the king observed the course of the combat from the windows of Montmartre Abbey, where cannon had been placed; royal troops were garrisoned in the Abbey of St Antoine des Champs, ready to fight against *Ligue* forces themselves stationed in the Abbey of St Germain. Not once did Rozée pass comment on these invasions of sacred space.[[1173]](#footnote-1173)

Even when the historian gave an opinion, he did not see sacredness as the key issue. The nearest he came to outrage was when describing the king’s bombardment of Noyon in August 1591.[[1174]](#footnote-1174) After six cannon had been trained upon the Abbey of St-Eloy, English soldiers ‘se jettèrent dedans, la pillèrent, la ruinèrent et y mirent le feu’. Rozée offered two observations. The first was military – the seizure of the Abbey had facilitated the besieging of the town; the second was anglophobic – the English had come ‘plutost pour ruiner les églises, que pour y faire quelque autre bon service’.[[1175]](#footnote-1175) Aesthetics mattered: at Pontoise in 1589, the church of Notre-Dame – ‘cette belle et ancienne esglise collégialle’ – was ruined; at Gournay in 1592, the convent that was demolished so that a fort could be built in its place is twice described as beautiful – that is all.[[1176]](#footnote-1176) It was hardly righteous indignation.[[1177]](#footnote-1177)

In 1562 Huguenot invaders of Orléans burnt the bones of saints, pillaged reliquaries and stole ecclesiastical gold and silver ware.[[1178]](#footnote-1178) What might Rozée have thought of similar sacrilege in Paris a generation later? Perhaps he was uneasy about the seizure (and sale?) of relics by *Ligueurs* during the long siege for he did not mention it.[[1179]](#footnote-1179) He did, however, note with approval that local churches employed what means they had – including plate – to maintain the city’s resistance. He added that these sacrifices were later repaid ‘par les bourgeois’.[[1180]](#footnote-1180) This *addendum* is important, suggesting that for Rozée holiness was about behaviour, not buildings or objects. What most disturbed the historian was when beliefs and words were not supported by actions. Thus the allegation that starving Parisians ate deceased babies deeply angered him, but the sight of armed priests and monks, whilst extraordinary, was understandable.[[1181]](#footnote-1181)

One aspect of the sacredness of physical space that has provoked several studies has been the way Paris and France were perceived by contemporaries. Undoubtedly Paris was loved by its citizens, honoured throughout France and famous across Europe.[[1182]](#footnote-1182) Its reputation reached mythical proportions during the religious troubles, particularly amongst Catholic observers of the dignity with which its citizens faced the siege of 1590.[[1183]](#footnote-1183) Had not the city been chosen by God to provide inspirational leadership to the Catholic cause? Rozée was cautious. Of course Paris was grand in scale.[[1184]](#footnote-1184) Its *Ligue* affiliation served as an example to other cities.[[1185]](#footnote-1185) But appointed to this role by God? The historian chose a more modest explanation for the developments of early 1589: ‘…il sembloit qu’un mesme esprit conduisoit toutes les villes à la défection’ and, by their own accounts, these towns’

motivation had been fear for their religion.[[1186]](#footnote-1186) By contrast, some contemporaries compared the *Ligue* coup to the Jewish Revolt of 66-70 CE: the *Seize* were guilty of violent theft (of the state) , under the cloak of religious zeal.[[1187]](#footnote-1187) Doubtless aware of such allegations, Rozée proceeded with care. The *journée des barricades* could be explained by the king’s incompetence, and afterwards Henri had refused to return to Paris. Significantly, the historian included none of the seditious material that *Ligue* presses produced after the Blois assassinations.[[1188]](#footnote-1188) In the final analysis, Rozée was convinced that the *Seize* had moved not to shake the constitution but to preserve religion. We know that Old Testament stories stirred the minds of *Ligue* propagandists.[[1189]](#footnote-1189) Just as the Israelites had risen up against oppressors such as Goliath, so the Paris *Ligue* must remove Henri III. By extension, was not King David a forerunner of Jacques Clément?[[1190]](#footnote-1190) Rozée took care to narrate the regicide non-commitally, and he steered well clear of the France-Israel comparison.[[1191]](#footnote-1191)

Like the ancient Israelites, sixteenth-century French Catholics believed that God dwelt among them. Many in Paris held that the space within their city walls was sacred.[[1192]](#footnote-1192) It was believed that God’s presence and goodness were mediated to the city through the protection of Sainte Geneviève.[[1193]](#footnote-1193) The saint was greatly venerated and regularly invoked in her role as guardian of the city.[[1194]](#footnote-1194) Rozée described how, on 10 January 1589 (the feast day of the Revelation of the Relics of Sainte Geneviève), a procession of young children (more than ten thousand, Rozée thought) carried candles to the Abbey of Sainte Geneviève. Prayers were offered for the safety of the city and for the souls of the slaughtered Guise brothers, and mass was celebrated.[[1195]](#footnote-1195) This occasion apart, our historian was silent on the cult of the patroness, perhaps because for him it was a matter of private spirituality, or because by the 1620s spiritual devotion had retreated from the public arena. Moshe Sluhovsky has noted a ‘growing politicization of the cult of Sainte Geneviève’ – that is, an increasing tendency of the saint’s devotees to allow their invocations to be motivated and shaped by political goals.[[1196]](#footnote-1196) If Rozée was aware of this, he he did not write about it.[[1197]](#footnote-1197)He knew that Catholics in Paris were politically divided – the ‘trois partis’ – but, as if in a separate chamber of his mind, he always admired Catholic religious commitment. Best of all was when religious devotion bore fruit in action. Demonstration of this ultimate proof of a believer’s integrity partly explains the historian’s interest in developments beyond Paris, to which we now turn.

**Chapter 9: Beyond Paris**

With hundreds of towns joining the *Ligue* in 1588-89, the journey to the throne required Henri of Navarre to maintain a military offensive. Rozée related the struggles beyond Paris – battles and sieges – because the *Ligue* was a *Sainte Union*. It was crucial to Paris that other towns should show solidarity by joining the movement; for their part smaller towns derived from Paris inspiration and encouragement in their hazardous journeys into disloyalty to the crown. Whereas Rozée told the Paris story with the engagement of an eye-witness, his account of developments beyond Paris, reliant on the writings of others, generally offers less compelling reading – but we may not ignore it. The historian accorded considerable space to events beyond the capital.[[1198]](#footnote-1198) Moreover this part of his narrative richly demonstrates that quality of integrity which we believe was fundamental in his thinking.

Rozée had no pretensions to being a military historian and, as we noted earlier, he was reluctant to revive painful memories.[[1199]](#footnote-1199) It can hardly be that he intended to produce a work comparable in scope to the Politiquehistories of Palma-Cayet and de Thou for, having lived in Paris through the *Ligue* years, our historian had had no choice but to cull facts from their accounts, thereby revealing his indebtedness to them. More likely, the historian paid particular attention to conflict within the Paris basin because nearby river-side towns had been of critical importance to the capital.[[1200]](#footnote-1200) Moreover, stories of *Ligue* victories ‘in the field’ had been fed to Paris printers so that pamphlets might boost morale in the capital; a generation later, Rozée’s skilful reiteration of those successes might also serve to rescue the *Ligue*’s reputation, reminding readers that the *Ligue* had not been an unmitigated military failure.[[1201]](#footnote-1201) Even where *Ligue* resistance had been overcome, conflict resolution had in many cases been achieved through negotiated settlements, not abject defeat. The historian could craft his narrative in such a way that integrity emerged as the characteristic quality of *Ligueurs* wherever they might be found.

Beyond Paris, five adjacent provinces – the Ile-de-France, Normandy, Maine, the Orléanais, and Champagne – most interested the historian. It is true that, with a nod to comprehensiveness, he added two digressions which gathered up happenings further afield, but his narrative is most compelling and thought-provoking when the focus is upon major sieges or battles within a hundred miles or so of the capital. Thus Arques, Ivry and six sieges are at the heart of this chapter.

The battle of Arques (near Dieppe) consisted of a sequence of confrontations between forces led by Navarre and Mayenne in the second half of September 1589.[[1202]](#footnote-1202) Rozée knew the story from his reading of Palma-Cayet.[[1203]](#footnote-1203) A comparison of the two authors’ opening paragraphs on Arques leaves no doubt that our historian was closely following his predecessor’s work: details are presented in exactly the same order and there are several instances of identical strings of words.[[1204]](#footnote-1204)

At the same time, Rozée was not entirely in Palma-Cayet’s thrall. He omitted some of the royalist historian’s exuberant passages.[[1205]](#footnote-1205) Elsewhere, he showed his reluctance to believe all that he heard or read.[[1206]](#footnote-1206) Moreover, Rozée had more than just the *Chronologie novenaire* on his desk. At the very least he was also consulting de Thou’s *Histoire*, and the work of one or both of Pierre Matthieu and Jean de Serres.[[1207]](#footnote-1207) We can agree with Valois that ‘il [Rozée] traite fort inégalement les documents’ – a disproportionate dependence on Palma-Cayet – but the oblique suggestion that our author worked ‘aveuglément’ with just one source was unfair.[[1208]](#footnote-1208)

Regarding Arques, two questions interested Rozée. First, was the outcome significant? Albert Gérard and, before him, Auguste Poirson believed so: the campaign had delivered more than a military success. Gérard judged the victory to have consecrated Henry King of France.[[1209]](#footnote-1209) For Poirson, ‘la campagne d’Arques... donna à la France le règne de Henri IV’. For L’Estoile, Arques was a miracle from God.[[1210]](#footnote-1210) Rozée was of a different mind: it had been little more than a skirmish.[[1211]](#footnote-1211) He was right. Arques was little more than a morale-booster to the royalists and a disappointment to those who had rented windows in the rue Saint-Antoine in the hope of seeing the vanquished ‘bâtard d’Albret’led to the Bastille. Whilst the retention of Dieppe as a landing-place for English reinforcements was important to the royalists, time was to show that neither Paris nor Rouen could be won while the *Ligue* could call on Spanish help from the north.

Secondly, had a detachment of Mayenne’s army behaved treacherously?[[1212]](#footnote-1212) Matthieu, de Serres, Palma-Cayet and de Thou all alleged that on 21 September a detachment of *lansquenets* launched a surprise assault against captors to whom they had already formally surrendered.[[1213]](#footnote-1213) This was a difficult issue for Rozée since he sought to demonstrate through his writing the uprightness of the *Ligue*. He sought to extricate himself by three devices. First, as elsewhere, he introduced the story with the words, ‘plusieurs ont écrit...’ – a device that allowed him to give an account without owning a verdict. Secondly, he was selective from his sources, happily concurring with Palma-Cayet and de Thou on the inscrutability of the *lansquenets*’ motives, but conveniently omitting the historians’ account of a threefold, hence unmistakable, declaration of surrender. Thirdly, avoiding the idea of treachery, he described the *lansquenets*’ resumption of hostility as an act of loyalty to their comrades: ‘voyant qu’... le gros de la cavalerie venoit fondre sur les suisses de [G]alaty, estimant qu’elle les dut enfoncer, ils commencèrent a tourner leurs armes contre le Roy...’[[1214]](#footnote-1214) It all amounted to a contrived and tenuous vindication.

Rozée was also indebted to Palma-Cayet for his account of the battle of Ivry.[[1215]](#footnote-1215) He described parts of the action with Palma-Cayet’s words and phrasing, and his list of significant casualties and prisoners contained twenty-six of the twenty-seven names provided by the royalist historian, in exactly the same order.[[1216]](#footnote-1216) But again there are important differences. Rozée omitted Palma-Cayet’s text of Mayenne’s exhortation to his troops, presumably because it sounded so hollow in the light of the subsequent defeat, but perhaps also because he believed Mayenne had made tactical mistakes which nullified his fine words.[[1217]](#footnote-1217) Like Palma-Cayet, Rozée noted the cowardice of some of Mayenne’s men, but his comments were more heavily infused than Palma-Cayet’s with the language of honour. He suggested that the shortage of reserves resulted in ‘une deroute … **honteuse**’; and later, changing tack, he claimed that the shortage would not have mattered ‘s’il n’y point eu **faute de courage et de bonne volonté** et que tous eussent fait leur **devoir**’.[[1218]](#footnote-1218) How different, he observed, was the king, who deserved honour as ‘un tres vaillant chef de guerre’, and who honoured trustworthiness in others as he chose to spare Mayenne’s Swiss soldiers, ‘se ressouvenant de l’ancienne amitié et alliance que cette nation a de tout temps eu avec la … couronne de France’.[[1219]](#footnote-1219) Lastly, it was concern for honour that prompted Rozée’s most striking departure from Palma-Cayet’s account. He had suspicions about the death of the count of Egmont. Had Egmont died fighting? And if so, why were some saying that ‘il avoit esté seulement blessé, abatu et fait prisonnier, et depuis tué de sang froid’?[[1220]](#footnote-1220) Rozée had no answer, but his questions sufficed to cast aspersions against the royalists.

‘Victoire, Victoire, Victoire!’ wrote Etienne Pasquier.[[1221]](#footnote-1221) Equally triumphalist was the poet du Bartas:

He Dieu! quel beau soleil va sur nous rayonăt?

Quel hymne triumphal va sur nous resonant

Dans les temples voutez? quel bruit court par les rues?

…

[La?] victoire est donc notre, et la iuste rigueur

[Du?] ciel est cheute en fin dessus le camp ligueur.[[1222]](#footnote-1222)

But for Rozée, Ivry was ‘une si grande disgrace’.[[1223]](#footnote-1223) He noted the mood in Paris – ‘les uns esperans, les autres desesperans la conservation de la ville’.[[1224]](#footnote-1224) He distanced himself from those *Ligueurs* who had lost hope, ‘qui n’atendoient point de Dieu des miracles pour leur conservation, …[qui] remontroient l’impossibilité de defendre cette ville’.[[1225]](#footnote-1225) But at the same time he was sceptical of the purely spiritual response emerging from the theologians at the Sorbonne: ‘leurs raisons estoient plus speculations, et vessant [visant?] mieux une sainte contemplation, qu’une solide pratique et experience des afaires’.[[1226]](#footnote-1226) Rozée seems to have favoured the course of action advocated by the papal legate Caetani: Paris should keep its nerve and await Mayenne’s arrival.

Large battles were rare. After the spate of urban defections to the *Ligue*, 1588-89, royalists had no choice but to engage in siege warfare. How *Ligueurs* responded under siege mattered enormously to Rozée, and in places his accounts are absorbing, even inspirational. In what circumstances, if any, a *Ligue* town might surrender, and under what terms a settlementmight be deemed acceptable, were critical issues. We will see that for Rozée a settlementmight be honourable if it saved soldiers for future combat (and even then, only provided it secured liberty for the practice of Catholicism); but more commonly his sympathies lay with those who fought on in the knowledge that they were part of a union with other towns, and because Catholicism must be saved, and because God himself had shed his blood.

Before considering the siege at Rouen, 1591-92, we visit five others which attracted the historian’s interest. These took place at Le Mans (December 1589), Dreux (March 1590), Melun (March-April 1590), Sens (April-May 1590) and Troyes (September 1590).[[1227]](#footnote-1227) Only at Troyes was the besieging army forced to withdraw.[[1228]](#footnote-1228) Why did Rozée accord so much space to *Ligueur* defensive actions yielding such a poor return? Part of the explanation lies in location: Melun and Dreux were close to the capital. But the common denominator linking the five sieges was the integrity that they elicited from thedefenders. Here we meet heroes – at Le Mans, Urbain de Montmorency-Laval, seigneur de Bois-Dauphin; also le sieur de Phalandre at Dreux and one ‘Jaulges’ at Melun – as well as steadfast citizens in Sens and Troyes.[[1229]](#footnote-1229)

Light has been shed on perceptions of personal integrity in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France by Ellery Schalk’s book *From Valor to Pedigree*. Schalk has shown that, toward the end of the sixteenth century, understandings of ‘nobility’ were shifting. At root, the change was from a mediaeval perception based on military function – Schalk called this the ‘Feudal-Military’ view – to a modern perception based on birth. Put simply, for most of the sixteenth century, observers believed that virtue, not birth, conferred nobility. *La vertu* was primarily to do with courage and prowess in battle, but, by a broader definition, it included a range of personal qualities such as uprightness, selfless defence of the poor and needy, loyalty and honesty.[[1230]](#footnote-1230) Our study of the main sieges suggests that Pierre Rozée placed a high value on *la vertu*.

Personal integrity is a strong theme in Rozée’s account of the royalists’ siege of Le Mans. Declining the king’s offer to pay for an immediate surrender, Bois-Dauphin recalled the oath that he had sworn to conserve the Catholic faith, and his vow of loyal service to the duc de Mayenne. It was a matter of ‘l’honneur que tout gentilhomme doit plus estimer que toutes les autres choses de ce monde’.[[1231]](#footnote-1231) Shortly after, he turned down a further invitation to surrender, explaining that, because protection of the town had been entrusted to him by Mayenne, it was not his to give away. The fact remains that Le Mans was surrendered to the royalists, an outcome that Rozée explained in three ways. First, he listed the difficulties facing the defenders: some sections of the town wall were irreparably broken while others were very vulnerable to an *escalade*, and there was a serious shortage of fighting men. Secondly, he defended the governor by suggesting that the move to cede the town originated from ‘les plus avisez de la noblesse et les principaux bourgeois de la ville’, whose argument was that surrender would allow the bravest men to fight again.[[1232]](#footnote-1232) Thirdly, he celebrated the content of the settlement, both through well-chosen adjectives – it was **honneste**…, **avantageuse**...**, honorable** –and by citing those terms, particularly the safeguarding of the practice of the Catholic faith in the town, which did most to save the Le Mans from **l’opprobre**. This is Rozée at his nimblest, concealing the shame of surrender behind the cost of inevitable defeat.

A few weeks after Le Mans, the king laid siege to Dreux. Sent by Mayenne to assist the governor Phalandre was Jaulges. Jaulges doubted if Dreux could be saved, but nonetheless pitched in to help, ‘suivant l’opinion commune fondée sur la bonne volonté des habitans’.[[1233]](#footnote-1233) Grim news of recent atrocities at Nonancourt strengthened the resolve of the men of Dreux. Phalandre reminded the leading citizens that, whatever the risks, the only honourable course of action was to resist the siege:

ils acquireroient un nom tres **glorieux** a leur ville, … ils serviroient d’**example** aux autres villes plus fortes et plus puissantes a se comporter **valeureusement** en une pareille occasion et a leur posterité de continuer **courageusement** en la s.te religion chrestienne … ; il adiôuta que d’entrer en **composition honteuse** avec l’ennemi sans combatre ni rien sôutenir , c’etait **lachement** exposer en proye la religion, de **nier** a Dieu ce que nous luy **devons**, a scavoir que comme il a liberalement repandu son sang pour notre salut, nous repandions aussi librement le notre pour sa gloire ; que ce seroit semblablement **violer le serment** que nous avons fait avec les autres villes de l’Union catholique, crime qu’ils ne pouroient commetre sans se couvrir la face d’**ignominie laquelle ne se pouroit jamais essuyer**; que ce seroit se rendre **perfides** a la posterité …; qu’ils avoient **le coeur, le courage et la valeur** …[[1234]](#footnote-1234)

The tone was unmistakable. Dreux must discount unfavourable odds for the sake of honour.[[1235]](#footnote-1235) Rozée showed his approval by stating that ‘ces propos [étaient] tenues sans artifice entre de vrais Ligueurs’, and by quoting, a few lines later, Jaulges’ estimation of the townsfolk he had come to help: ‘veritablement ces honestes bourgeois sont propres a metre la main a la charuë, ils feront droit *labourage*, car ils ne regardent point derriere eux’.[[1236]](#footnote-1236)

Shortly after Ivry the king laid siege to Melun. Once again the *Ligue* called on Jaulges to help, but he was placed in a difficult position when the town’s leaders proved unreceptive to his advice. Rozée admired the way Jaulges handled this rebuff:

Jaulges voyant que son conseil n’estoit suivy, se resolut avec quelques gentilshommes … d’y mourir, ou d’y demeurer es le dernier des capitaines ayant leur honneur en recommandation; pour faire connoistre, que n’y faute de coeur n’y manque de bonne volonté luy avoient fait proposer ce conseil ; mais la raison, laquelle avoit touiours *lien* entre ceux qui sçavent le mestier de la guerre.[[1237]](#footnote-1237)

In the event, once the siege was under way, not even Jaulges could stop the Melunais from losing heart and descending into mutual recriminations and confusion: ‘les femmes pleuroient leurs maris, les enfans leurs peres ; les gens de guerre ne sçavoient qu’elle (*sic*) resolution prendre… chacun faisoit comme bon luy sembloit, l’un remparoit, l’autre demeuroit les bras croisés, il ny avoit plus de commandement…’.[[1238]](#footnote-1238) On 9 April, the town was sold to the enemy. Rozée exposed the town’s dishonour when he recorded that one of the clauses of the *composition* prohibited any inquiry into the way the defence had been conducted. But he guarded the reputation of Jaulges, telling us that when the king later honoured him by inviting him to join the royalists, Jaulges gained even greater honour by declining the offer, stating that ‘il avoit donné parole au duc de Mayenne, auquel il ne pouvoit manquer avec honneur non plus qu’a sa religion, et au repos de sa conscience’.[[1239]](#footnote-1239)

Drawing from a range of urban settings, Rozée promoted his theme of *Ligueur* integrity partly by recording the misbehaviour of royalists.[[1240]](#footnote-1240)Royalists committed petty theft at Le Mans (after assurances had been given that this would not occur).[[1241]](#footnote-1241) They needlessly burnt down a convent at Château-Thierry.[[1242]](#footnote-1242) Outside the walls of Rouen they attacked women and children rooting for edible herbs.[[1243]](#footnote-1243) And worse had been reported – at Vendôme, where ‘la ville fut pillée hostillement… et soufrit tout ce qui se pratique dans une ville prise d’assaut’, and at Nonancourt, where ‘la ville fut abandonnée au pillage aux soldats qui la ravagerent et la passerent au file de l’epée tout ce qu’ils rencontrerent, mesme n’epargnerent pas ceux qui s’estoient retirez dans les eglises, ou il pensoient trouver quelque refuge, aprez avoir abandonné leurs maisons et leurs biens…’.[[1244]](#footnote-1244) At Dreux, some of the town’s leaders advocated an early surrender, arguing that they risked otherwise ‘[un] sac indubitable, dont ils avoient dernierement l’exemple a Nonancourt et a Vendôme’.[[1245]](#footnote-1245) A few weeks later, La Motte Coutelas spoke in similar vein at Sens, warning his listeners of what might happen. Other towns, he said,

n’estant point secourües, ne pouvoient touiours resister aux forces ennemies; qu’enfin ou elles estoient contraintes de composer, et se rendre le plus souvent, avec conditions desavantageuses, ou bien estre emportées de force; et par consequent sacagées, la vie des hommes, lhonneur (sic) des femmes et filles, et les biens exposés a la mercy du soldat, insolent, lequel en tels accidents, est sans misericorde voyre sans humanité.[[1246]](#footnote-1246)

That integrity amongst true Catholics was as much a civic duty as a personal responsibility was well understood by the citizens of Sens and Troyes. In Sens there was outrage among the citizens when they discovered that their leaders had made a deal to hand the town over to the king.[[1247]](#footnote-1247) At Troyes, after royalist troops managed to penetrate well into the town before being detected, about two thousand citizens subsequently drove them back out.[[1248]](#footnote-1248) Rozée noted their bravery: ‘ils descendirent courageusement sur ceux qui les assailloient par autant de rüees et passages qu’ils rencontroient, et les arresterent; ceux du bas de la ville n’eurent pas moins de courage’.[[1249]](#footnote-1249)

After Paris, no siege absorbed Rozée’s attention more than the one laid in 1591-92 against France’s second city, Rouen. The Norman capital had known confessional strife in the 1560s and early 1570s but thereafter had remained calm. The Blois murders changed everything: in February 1589 *Ligue­*-minded Catholics seized control of the city. Shortly after, Mayenne established in Rouen a new administrative body for Normandy, the *Conseil de l’Union*, whose job would be to provide provincial government in the interests of the *Ligue* and to liaise with the Paris *Ligue* leadership. The change was profound: ‘In place of men whose power was legitimized by custom and precedent and derived ultimately from a king who in turn received his power from God, there now ruled men whose authority was sanctioned by the people and sanctified by commitment to a holy crusade.’[[1250]](#footnote-1250)

The *conseil* set out to convert the whole province of Normandy to the *Ligue*, believing that this could provoke the early calling of an Estates-General to resolve the issue of the succession. In the event, Normandy became the chief theatre of war between royalists and *Ligue* forces over the next three years. The resulting increase in lawlessness in turn provided the conditions for a gradual shift in power from the *conseil* to Rouen’s military governor. By the time of the siege that man was André de Brancas, seigneur de Villars.

In July 1591, Henri of Navarre and Elizabeth of England agreed to mount an expedition against Rouen.[[1251]](#footnote-1251) The siege that followed – ‘a long, slow, brutal attempt to starve Rouen into submission’ – failed.[[1252]](#footnote-1252) The city’s repeated requests for assistance eventually brought Mayenne and Parma in April 1592. Their forces were enough to drive away the royalists but in truth, by then, Rouen’s spirit was already broken. In March 1594 the opportunistic Villars sold the city’s loyalty to the recently crowned Henry IV.[[1253]](#footnote-1253)

Understandably Rozée edited his siege account. ‘Ce seroit chose trop longue,’ he wrote, ‘de dire icy toutes les approches des assiegeans et les sorties des assiegez; il ne faut dire que les principales, quand l’occasion se presentera.’[[1254]](#footnote-1254) It is still seriously long – over 12,000 words, excluding imported documents – partly because he was telling three interwoven stories: the activities of the *Rouennais* themselves, the tactics – sometimes antics – of the king’s forces, and the slow progress towards the Norman capital of the *Ligueur* generals.[[1255]](#footnote-1255)

The journeys of both royalist and *Ligueur* armies were slow not least because their commanders were easily distracted. Here is another reason for the length of the Rouen narrative: primarily a tale of one city, it also visits several small towns. Gournay, Caudebec, Neufchâtel, Pont-Rémy and Pont-Audemer all changed hands during the campaign. Parma’s route to Normandy – from the frontier to Guise, then via La Fère, Ham, Nesle, Amiens and Aumale finally to Neufchâtel – is carefully described, as is his later exit route from Rouen, around Paris, and via Château-Thierry, Reims and Rethel. There were river-crossings – over the Somme, the Cailly, and the Seine. Prisoners were released (the duchesse de Longueville at Amiens) and taken (the *Ligueur* comte de Chaligny, incarcerated at Pont de l’Arche). A castle near Amiens surrendered needlessly because of ‘la fievre poltronne’ of its royalist occupants.[[1256]](#footnote-1256) Elsewhere, Mayenne survived a skirmish in an unnamed village.

The campaign was mostly ‘cold’ war. The two large armies avoided battle. Both contained regiments from elsewhere in a divided Europe.[[1257]](#footnote-1257) Conspiracies abounded.[[1258]](#footnote-1258) There were high-profile casualties, and fatalities.[[1259]](#footnote-1259) It was often a war of words. The petulance of the duke of Essex to Villars (‘ie maintiendray que la cause du Roy est plus juste que celle du party de l’union, que ie suis meilleur que vous, et que ma maistresse est plus belle que la vostre’) drew a robust response (‘vous en avez menty’), including a majestic put-down (‘toutesfois ce n’est chose qui me travaille fort pour le present’).[[1260]](#footnote-1260) Leaders employed rhetoric. In July 1591 Mayenne warned the Rouennais of the fate that awaited them if the king were to win their city, reminding his listeners of ‘le rude traitement de ceux qui furent trouvez dedans Vendosme; la honte de ceux qui avoient vendu Melun et autres places’.[[1261]](#footnote-1261) In November the king addressed the city’s leaders; they must acknowledge him, ‘afin que secouant le ioug dela domination Espagnole, ils devinssent bons francois, luy obeissant comme plusieurs autres villes catholiques’ – disobedience would bring consequences.[[1262]](#footnote-1262) In a robust reply, the *maire et échevins* asserted that ‘ceux de Rouen ne se soucioient pas de ces menaces, ne pensant point que dieu eust esté si liberal de ses graces envers luy, qu’il n’en eust reservé, quelque petite part pour son peuple catholique,’ and they added that, having heard about the treatment of Robert Chessé at Vendôme, ‘ils connoissoient le lion aux ongles’.[[1263]](#footnote-1263)

Rozée’s Rouen narrative is troubling. The density of ‘unimportant’ detail disconcerts. In a narrow escape, Villars’ hat was knocked from his head by a stone dislodged by a cannon-ball.[[1264]](#footnote-1264) We learn of the Irish soldier who deserted from the king’s side and later informed Villars where the royalists had laid a mine.[[1265]](#footnote-1265) Describing the eventual withdrawal of the union army, Rozée was fascinated by a ruse employed by one of the commanders: Antoine de Saint-Paul called for the beating of a variety of drums ‘de toutes nations, ce qui fut fait; l’on entendit toute la nuit... un tambour a la françoise, d’un autre costé a l’italienne, un a la vuallonne, un autre a l’espagnolle, un a la bourguignonne, et autre a l’allemande’, the purpose being to confuse the pursuing royalists by suggesting that the *Ligue* troops were sitting ducks when in fact the bulk of them had already evacuated the area.[[1266]](#footnote-1266) A few lines later, the historian described in detail the withdrawing army’s complicated passage over the Seine. Elsewhere, introducing the famous invitation to a duel from the count of Essex to Villars, the historian included the correspondence ‘pour faire connoistre la galanterie de l’un et de l’autre.[[1267]](#footnote-1267) And of a later incident, he wrote, ‘il faut dire cete galanterie pour desennuier le lecteur.’[[1268]](#footnote-1268)

It is not that the matter of integrity is absent – we have already noted the historian’s differing judgements of Mayenne and Parma during the Rouen campaign. Rozée acknowledged that the Rouennais had acquitted themselves well. Rather than pin their hopes on countless promises of approaching help, they had frequently broken out and attacked the royalists.[[1269]](#footnote-1269) All the same, and despite its light moments, Rozée’s Rouen account is essentially listless. Is it that, in these late, post-Brisson pages, the historian sensed the hollowness of Rouen’s ‘victory’? The *post bellum* behaviour of *les grands* was hardly inspiring:

[Mayenne] s’advisda d’aller prendre le plaisir de Villers costerets; il partit avec tous les courtisans, la duchesse de Mayenne qui estoit lors a Soissons le suivit et avec elle toutes les dames y estant, il y avoit tous les iours dances reiouissances et festins; les françois passoient le temps selon leur humeur, dom Jean baptiste de taxis et dom diego d’Ibarra jouient au pail-mail(sic) dans le bois, **bref on ne se souvenoit point dela guerre**, pendant que le Roy faisoit bastir sur la riviere de Marne le fort de gournay, pour servir de bride a paris… ces passetemps qui se prenoient a Villers costerets duroient environ trois semaines.[[1270]](#footnote-1270)

Although the historian’s belief in God’s providential support for the *Ligue* seems secure – it was, for example, God who one day kept Parma from being captured – the Rouen account carries a hint of world-weariness. The soldiers had followed the king to Normandy ‘[pour] gagner a Rouen ce qu’ils avoient esperé gagner a paris l’année precedente.’[[1271]](#footnote-1271) Caudebec’s surrender to Biron, he observed, was based on ‘asses honnestes conditions, si elles eussent esté fidellement entretenües.’[[1272]](#footnote-1272) The siege of Rouen was ‘memorable’, but the context of this judgement – it is a passing comment in parentheses – suggests that it was formulaic.[[1273]](#footnote-1273) Was Rozée disappointed that there was no individual hero in the Rouen campaign – no Bois-Dauphin, no Phalandre, no Jaulges? Villars was capable of acts of bravado but the historian, perhaps conscious of the governor’s lukewarm attachment to the *Ligue*, accorded him little honour.[[1274]](#footnote-1274) Mayenne had been a disappointment, not least in failing to recognise Parma’s military pre-eminence.[[1275]](#footnote-1275) Even the admiration of Parma – ‘un grand capitaine’, ‘un des plus grands capitaines de son temps’ – sometimes sounds perfunctory.[[1276]](#footnote-1276)

Like Paris, Rouen attracted international assistance in its struggle to remain *Ligueur*. Smaller towns made do with less prestigious support. We have already noted that there was no formal network linking *Ligueur* towns and, indeed, the *Histoire* never suggests that such a structure existed. Nonetheless, the text reveals a keen awareness amongst towns of one another’s needs, and many *ad hoc* charitable responses. Typical requirements were for food, fighting men, gunpowder or simply a boost in morale. Sometimes a town appealed to higher authority – as distinct from a ‘horizontal’ plea for help from a neighbouring town. Such requests were usually made to the duc de Mayenne (as when Bois-Dauphin appealed on behalf of Le Mans) or the duc de Nemours (called upon by Beaulieu to assist the Château du Bois de Vincennes), and only rarely to the *conseil-général* or to other civic authorities in Paris. An unusual case was the enlistment of Jaulges to help Melun. Already conveniently in Paris, Jaulges was pressed by Nemours to take his regiment to the stricken town. When Jaulges demurred, it was the turn of the *prévôt des marchands* to apply pressure, and it appears that Jaulges did not finally give way until the archbishop of Lyon used honeyed words: ‘il [Jaulges} avoit si bien fait a Dreux, …il en avoit acquit beaucoup de louange…’.[[1277]](#footnote-1277)

Military assistance was invaluable. When La Chastre aimed to win Tours from the royalists in November 1589, he was optimistic because ‘ceux de l’Union tenoient beaucoup de villes aux environs et en icelles des garnisons qui se pouvoient assembler sans bruit en peu de temps et peu de gens de guerre a Tours’.[[1278]](#footnote-1278) A month later, when Le Mans was under siege, Bois-Dauphin feared the town lacked sufficient infantry because some men had gone off to help the duc de Mercœur in Brittany. His remedy was to contact Mayenne who in turn sent the *comte* de Brissac and other commanders with their men.[[1279]](#footnote-1279) As well as gaining encouragement and tactical expertise from Jaulges, the leaders of Dreux acquired powder from Chartres and the 1600 cavalrymen who had just entered France with the count of Egmont. When Sens was besieged by the royalists in Holy Week, 1590, the duc de Nemours sent a company of men led by the marquis de Fortunat. But not all requests could be met, for the *Ligue* was hopelessly overstretched. Chanvalon at Sens and Beaulieu on the edge of Paris both knew disappointment.[[1280]](#footnote-1280) And in spring 1591, Mayenne himself lacked the resources to lift the siege of Chartres.[[1281]](#footnote-1281)

Besieged towns hungered while widespread conflict jeopardised food supplies. Parisians were complaining in late 1589 that enemy occupation of the citadelle de Montmorency was causing ‘beaucoup d’incommoditez, impechant les vivres qui venoient a paris’.[[1282]](#footnote-1282) Rozée believed that Mayenne took steps to win ‘les places qui empechoient la liberté des chemins entre les villes de la ligue et les rendre libres jusques a Paris’.[[1283]](#footnote-1283) The king’s capture of Corbeil in spring 1590, along with enemy presence in the Brie plain, contributed to the shortages in Paris:

[I]l n’y avoit plus moyen d’amener aucun vivre par la riviere de Marne; de façon qu’il ne restoit plus que la riviere d’Oyse, laquelle n’estoit libre que jusques a Beaumont: tellement que le bled qui ne se vendoit que cinq ou six escus le septier, se vendit dix ou douze escus, tant en consideration du hazard ou se mettoient les marchands, que a cause des impots, qu’ils payerent, a ceux qui tenoient les passages …[[1284]](#footnote-1284)

When Jaulges decided to make the journey to Melun, it was after other men had shied away because ‘les chemins estoient entierement occupes par leurs ennemis’.[[1285]](#footnote-1285)

Morale mattered. Mayenne understood that ‘le desespoir de secours avoit fait perdre une partie des villes du Perche, du Maine et de Normandie, qui avoient changées de parti’.[[1286]](#footnote-1286) Phalandre knew that if the citizens of Dreux held out, ‘ils serviroient d’example aux autres villes plus fortes et plus puissantes a se comporter valeureusement en une pareille occasion et a leur posterité de continuer courageusement en la s[ain]te religion chrestienne…’[[1287]](#footnote-1287) Thus towns drew strength or learnt despair from each other. With the collapse of the *Seize* in 1594, *Ligueur* outposts across France clamoured to declare their loyalty to Henri IV.

Understandably, the stories of many towns, particularly those in distant provinces, barely feature in the *Histoire*. ‘[P]our rapporter particulierement tout ce qui se passa en ces provinces et autres il faudroit faire un autre volume,’ explained Rozée.[[1288]](#footnote-1288) Nonetheless, two digressions allowed the historian to gather some fragments. Located in the text at the two ends of the long siege narrative, the digressions allowed the historian to visit dramas that unfolded in the months before and after the trauma of summer 1590.[[1289]](#footnote-1289) Perhaps by bracketing the siege narrative in this way Rozée sought to remind his readers that the Sainte Unionwas not just about Paris. Certainly he wished to avoid confusion, remarking at one point:

[V]oicy en bref ce qui s’y passa, que nous rapporterons en entiere encore qu’une partie ait esté faite pendant le siege de Paris, mais c’est a fin de moins embrouiller l’histoire, en ce qui concerne le siege de Paris, et ce qui a esté fait ez armées principales de chaque party.[[1290]](#footnote-1290)

Within the digressions confusion is a constant risk, for dates are rarely given. Rozée was at least aware of the difficulty and offered a little reassurance:

[A]fin de ne changer souvent de propos, ie ne garde pas exactement l’ordre du temps, ce que ie ne fais pas volontiers, pour ce qu’il me semble que ces diverses narrations rompent la continuité de l’histoire faite principalement pour reconter ce que faisoient les chefs des deux partis; il pourra sans aller bien loin reprendre le fil de l’histoire quand il voudra.[[1291]](#footnote-1291)

It annoyed Rozée that royalist historians had extended their narratives beyond France: ‘[E]n faisant ceste disgresion, ie ne conduiray point mon lecteur hors du Royaume pour luy conter ces gazettes estrangeres’.[[1292]](#footnote-1292) The fact that his digressions take us to the borders but not beyond may indicate a nascent national consciousness; after all, if his purpose was to avoid reminding his readers that the *Ligue* had welcomed foreign help, it is surprising that in his second digression he openly described the warm reception given in Aix-en-Provence to the duc de Savoie, and that he mentioned the Spanish troops brought to Brittany by Juan del Águila.[[1293]](#footnote-1293)

With two exceptions, the writing seems perfunctory, as if Rozée felt obliged to leave no gaps. A few details suffice. We learn that in the aftermath of a failed *Ligueur* plot to win Tours in November 1589, Union forces nonetheless secured Montrichard and La Flèche. At Le Mans, an unedifying power struggle took place between Louis de Saint-Gelais, seigneur de Lansac and Bois-Dauphin shortly before the town fell to the royalists.[[1294]](#footnote-1294) There follow the stories of Mayenne, Sablé and Châteaudun, three towns which fell to the Union only to be recovered shortly after by the royalists, and of Nogent-le-Roy, where the feckless behaviour of both *Ligueurs* and royalists is described without comment. Rozée gave a glimpse of human ambition in warfare when describing the prince de Conti’s siege of La Ferté-Bernard: ‘Le prince... desiroit avoir cete place, pourvu que c’estoit la premiere qu’il avoit assiegée, depuis que le Roy l’avoit fait son lieutenant en ces pais là’.[[1295]](#footnote-1295) Later, in a passage on Guyenne, the historian offered no opinion on the banishment of Jesuits from Bordeaux, and described dispassionately Matignon’s success in imposing on the Parlementthe use of a new seal in the name of Henry IV. The digressions draw to a close with detail of the conflict in Brittany between the duc de Mercœur and the prince de Dombes.

The digressions come alive in two instances where Rozée described theintegrity of prominent *Ligueurs*. Even though La Ferté-Bernard had eventually fallen to the royalists, its resistance under its commander le sieur Dragues de Commene had been resolute: ‘les assiegés ne perdirent point courage et resolurent de se bien deffendre; car Commene en ce siege fit tout ce qu’il put pour la deffence de la place’.[[1296]](#footnote-1296) In the Auvergne it was the *Ligueur* provincial governor Jean de la Rochefoucauld comte de Randan whose honourable deeds Rozée admired. Issoire, a town that had known atrocities in earlier years, had been taken by Randan in 1589. After royalists recaptured the town in February 1590 Randan tried to regain it, but the arrival of relieving troops from Clermont drew him into battle. He died shortly after, in unclear circumstances.

The battle for Issoire has not much attracted historians’ attention.[[1297]](#footnote-1297) Rozée found plenty to say. He was impressed by Randan’s instructions to his men upon the initial seizure of the town in 1589:

Je puis dire pour l’honneur du comte de Randan... que voyant la ville prise, il y fit un acte digne de memoire et de louange pour luy; car bien que la ville estant prise de force, il sembla que le droit de la guerre luy en permit le sac; neantmoins il y fit donner logis par fourrierset ne se contenta de faire, et publier les deffences de faire aucun ravage, ny desplaisirs car il alla en personne armé comme il estoit de logis en logis, priant et suppliant les gentilshommes, et mesme commandant aux soldats expressement de n’user d’aucune violence envers les femmes...[[1298]](#footnote-1298)

How different was the typical behaviour of Protestants, remarked the historian, ‘[qui] pensent que toutes choses leur sont permises, pour rien que le royaume de Christ soit avancé’.[[1299]](#footnote-1299) Rozée admired Randan’s magnanimity after winning the town:

La bonté du gouverneur, et l’importunité de ceux qui se plaignorent d’estre bannis de leur ville, fut cause que la plus part de ceux, qui en avoient esté chassés, furent restablis, et remis dans leurs maisons, et en leurs biens, apres un serment solemnel de ne rien entreprendre contre le répos et l’estat present de la ville.[[1300]](#footnote-1300)

And Rozée pitied Randan’s last hours: ‘son cheval blessé en plusieurs endroits, tombant dans la presse, le fit tomber, et… soudain la foule… se jetta sur son corps terrassé, ainsy que les chiens qui courant un cerf se jettent dessus quand ils le voyent tombé par terre’.[[1301]](#footnote-1301) As if this was not bad enough, the historian knew that later, in captivity, the soldier had died in unexplained circumstances, and might have been ‘tué de sang froid’.[[1302]](#footnote-1302)

The *Histoire* has no developed discussion of martyrdom.[[1303]](#footnote-1303) Nonetheless we are confident that it mattered to the historian how an individual died. He knew that both Jacques Clément and Brisson’s murderers had been considered martyrs – but did not give his own opinion. He knew too that in May 1590 the Sorbonne had declared that all those defending Catholicism ‘seront fort recompensez au ciel et attireront sur eux les recompenses eternelles s’ils persistent jusques ala mort…’.[[1304]](#footnote-1304) By this measure, Randan was a martyr. Rozée believed Mary Queen of Scots had been martyred.[[1305]](#footnote-1305) And on martyrdom, he recorded what he believed were the *Cordelier* priest Chessé’s last words to his devout followers:

serons nous les premiers endurant pour Jesus Christ, n’est ce pas la mesme cause par laquelle les bien heureux martires sont morts, cette mort nous sera un second baptesme pour laver nos pechez; prenons patience courageuse garnie de constance et nous serons certains d’avoir ce que Jesus Christ a promis a ceux qui font peu de cas a cette vie pour soutenir son nom;[[1306]](#footnote-1306)

We will see shortly that Rozée, like Chessé, believed that the death of a good man might expiate sin. Death, then, was not the end of the matter.

**Conclusion**

This thesis has been devoted to a detailed examination of one extraordinary text: the only surviving history of the Catholic *Ligue* to be written by someone who lived through and was a close-hand observer of the tumultuous events in Paris which marked the six years between the *journée des barricades* and Henri III’s retreat from the French capital in May 1588, and the re-entry of his successor, the Bourbon Henri IV in March 1594. The *Histoire* carries a judicious and sympathetic account of the *Seize*, with the historian giving particularly close attention to the impact on Paris of news of the Blois murders in December 1588 and to the siege of Paris in summer 1590. Though mindful that he was writing about a movement, the historian gave significant attention to key individuals, above all to the duc de Mayenne on whom principally he blamed the *Ligue*’s collapse. We have seen that both in Paris and beyond, the integrity of the devout *Ligueur* was what this historian best remembered.

A century after the publication of an edition of the first part of the manuscripts in question, the thesis has sought to provide the basis for an eventual edition of the remainder of the work. It has tried to do this in three ways. The first has been to determine the genre of the work – a process that has involved a close examination of the status of the manuscripts, such as we have them. We have found that the author was not intending to provide a day-by-day commentary upon the events which he had lived through. Unlike Pierre de L’Estoile, he did not offer a ‘mémoire-journal’ of the *Ligue*. Indeed, the work is not that of a ‘memorialist’ at all, at least in the way that term has come to be applied to a distinct genre of writing about contemporary affairs in the later sixteenth century. Rather, the author strove to write what he regarded as a ‘history’ – that is, a coordinated narrative of the events of the *Ligue*. He was driven to do so by a conviction that the history which was emerging about the *Ligue* in print from royalist Catholic and Protestant sources did a grave disservice to those who, like himself, had dedicated themselves to the cause.[[1307]](#footnote-1307) Written to establish a counter-truth, the work required the historian to show considerable discretion (so as not to compromise contemporaries still alive and not to earn the displeasure of the authorities) and to heap on Mayenne the blame for the eventual collapse of the *Ligue* (so as not to dishonour the movement).

Secondly we have examined what we might call the authorial ‘imprint’ of the work in question. Although we have not succeeded in determining with absolute certitude who the historian actually was, all the circumstantial evidence points to it having been composed by Pierre Rozée. It is likely that further research, currently being undertaken by Robert Descimon in the notarial archives in Paris, will reveal a good deal more on the rather extensive and complicated Rozée family, and may even furnish the missing elements enabling us to prove that Rozée was, in fact, the historian in question. Concentrating on identifying the authorial imprint through analysis of the text itself, we have become convinced that Rozée was a Roman Catholic of ultramontanist persuasion, an admirer of those who supported their words with good deeds, a lawyer with a keen instinct for the reliability of evidence, a cautious but uncompromising revisionist historian, and an older man seeking to preserve memories that were dying.

Thirdly, we have paid close attention to passages in the manuscript where Rozée seems to have been relying on his own experiences (in Paris), or where he tells us things which he was in a position to know, and which are not revealed by the other sources to which we now have access. Thus in particular, our chapter on sources has taken into account what the historian tells us of what he saw and heard in the streets, at the Palaisand at church.

Rozée wrote about the *Seize* as a political movement. The *Seize* entertained a single short-term political ambition (to secure a good – that is, Catholic – resolution of the post-1584 succession crisis) and they acted in ways that materially altered the way power was exercised within the state (for example by making Mayenne head of state, running the Paris municipal government, establishing a degree of control over the media, and imprisoning, or occasionally executing, opponents). Whereas L’Estoile judged the *Seize* to be political rebels, for Rozée, nothing could be further from the truth, for the *Ligue*’s political strategies were merely a means to an end: the securing of a Catholic succession, an outcome which would, as surely as day follows night, lead France back into God’s favour, particularly if a crusade against Huguenots ensued.

Of course, the movement was rooted in religious fervour. The initial cause of the *Ligue* phenomenon had been the success of Calvinism in gaining a firm foothold in France. Because heresy must bring down God’s judgement on France, it had to be eradicated. Early responses to Protestantism had on occasion involved ritual massacre, but other – less bloody – strategies had also been used.[[1308]](#footnote-1308) The advent of Protestantism had generated a flood of almanacs, accounts of prodigies and forecasts of disaster.[[1309]](#footnote-1309) There can be little doubt that these writings, so frowned upon by the clergy, contributed to the ‘angoisse collective’ that seized Paris for a short time in early 1589, as penitential processions and prayers became daily occurrences.

We knowthat Rozée witnessed the spiritual dread that sometimes clearly gripped Paris. He was also aware of the contemporary fascination with stars, signs and wonders. Many of the works that dwelt on such things were published by presses located in the streets around Rozée’s home by the same printers who later poured out *Ligueur* pamphlets – men such as Guillaume Bichon, who took out a lease in the rue St Jacques in November 1589 and Pierre Menier, who had moved into the rue d’Arras seven months earlier.[[1310]](#footnote-1310) We also have textual evidence. Rozée had read Jean de Serres’ account of freak weather that the Huguenots believed had determined the outcome of an armed confrontation in late 1587: ‘ceux qui ont escrit cete histoire… ont remarqué… que les huguenots sont si grands amis de dieu que l’infanterie de chastillon fuyant devant Mandelot… fut par une singuliere merveille couverte d’une espaisse nuée qui la couvrit en un instant pour la faire perdre de veüe aux poursuivans…’.[[1311]](#footnote-1311) It is unclear if Rozée was moved by the story for his only comment – ‘il est vray que cete merveille arriva en pleine nuit’ – is probably ironic (darkness, not a miracle, saved the men).[[1312]](#footnote-1312) Yet Rozée’s own belief in miracles is clear from a passing comment he made later about the unbelief of defeatist *Ligueurs* on the eve of the long siege.[[1313]](#footnote-1313) The historian knew too of a vivid apparition that hung above the Place de Grève in the late-evening of 10 July 1590 and was seen by many, including ‘gens de qualité’: ‘les politiques en eurent la veüe aussy bien que les ligueurs…’[[1314]](#footnote-1314) A reader of Palma-Cayet, and of Jean Bodin’s letter from Laon, Rozée surely knew that these writers took seriously events and beliefs that defied rational explanation.[[1315]](#footnote-1315) Last, we have a memorably evocative short passage where Rozée surely identified himself with the common judgement that the weather in Blois on 23 December 1588 was a heavenly sign: ‘il faloit lors comme il avoit fait toute la matinée, une si grande pluye, que chacun disoit que le ciel pleuroit ou la mort du duc de guise, ou les miseres qui devoient suivre cette impitoyable mort’.[[1316]](#footnote-1316)

For all this, the *Histoire* is not about a citizenry riddled with anxiety for its salvation; we should therefore be wary of characterising the *Ligue* movement principally by reference to eschatological writings and extraordinary but intermittent periods of angst. Denis Crouzet has portrayed a *Ligue* stranded, trapped in a moment in time because of its ritualisation of religion:

le temps de la Ligue devient un temps de réitération sacrale, les pénitents déambulant jour après jour dans les rues de la capitale, …[N]uit et jour, la ville est et reste un lieu pénitentiel total.Le rituel, dans son épaisseur, immobilise la durée, puisque, par sa nature même, il la transcende; par sa permanence et par sa continuelle réitération, il situe la Ligue parisienne dans un écart.[[1317]](#footnote-1317)

But the picture is more variegated than that. Far from being paralysed, the *Ligue* from May 1588 was mostly enjoying the exercise of power. Would royalist historians have so roundly scorned and condemned the *Seize* if their key fault had merely been an ‘excess’ of religious devotion?

It is because the *Histoire*’s main focus is on aspects of politics that the work could be made to end – perhaps not by Rozée himself – on a positive note, for even though Protestants had not been driven out, a Catholic succession had been secured. Rozée did not, we think, beat his breast in response to the enduring presence of heresy; rather we envisage him retiring into that quieter world of reflection that would lead many French Catholics – following a route ‘from penitence to charity’ – to the Catholic renewal with which seventeenth century France is identified.[[1318]](#footnote-1318) Perhaps he foresaw what turned out to be the case: that the best way to deal with Protestantism was to ignore it.

Despite the Catholic succession, we believe that the historian felt disappointment as he recalled his past. He was at least sixty when he wrote the *Histoire*. Like many in their later years, he often quoted proverbs. Here we meet regret. Rozée understood the sadness of self-deception (‘l’on croit facillement ce que l’on désire’).[[1319]](#footnote-1319) He knew about misplaced hopes (‘souvent par un malheur on mesure les conseils par la qualité de ceux qui le donnent’).[[1320]](#footnote-1320) He was aware that good times might not last (‘un soleil de mars… ne dure gueres’), and, with a certain fatalism, he understood that men could achieve only so much (‘on dit qu’en vain les hommes se fournissent de prudence contre le ciel et d’intelligence contre le Roy’).[[1321]](#footnote-1321) Through writing,Rozée objectivised his experiences, perhaps mellowed the disappointment, achieved catharsis.

It is particularly in the *Histoire*’s final eighty-or-so pages that we sense the historian’s disillusionment. Post-Brisson, the *Seize* were demoralised; they found it harder to keep the fire burning. Reading the Rouen siege-narrative we sense Rozée raking through embers, searching for live coals. Parma left France – to die. After a string of imported texts a short paragraph abruptly puts an end to the work. Of course, all had not been in vain. The sacredness of Paris had been preserved against massive odds, a Protestant succession had been avoided and there were countless tales of individual *Ligueurs*’ courage and integrity. But heresy had not been expunged, and the *Ligue*, rent by division, had been ‘betrayed’ by its leader, and then maligned by royalist historians. Perhaps Rozée yearned for the short years during which, in fellowship with others, he had joined a noble cause.

In the 1620s, like a man preparing for death, Rozée was coming to terms with his past and putting his affairs in order. The task was hampered – or perhaps facilitated – by the inscrutability of his God. ‘O que dieu est reculé loin de nous,’ he lamented; and, much later, ‘Dieu dispose par un ordre qui nous est inconnu les moyens par lesquels il veut puis après executer Sa S[ain]te Volonté’.[[1322]](#footnote-1322) God’s impenetrable wisdom was the only explanation for Mayenne’s rejection of the *Ligue* deputation to Corbeil in September 1590, and later Navarre’s conversion – including its timing – had been brought about by divine not human will.[[1323]](#footnote-1323)

Rozée supposed that France’s sufferings signified God’s punishment for sin. Sensitive to what he considered irresponsible extrapolation from this basic point – he was incensed by Jean Taffin’s attempt to link the regicide to the St Batholomew’s Day Massacres – he nonetheless accepted the underlying tenet: God had been angered. Thus, the realm might have known peace in early 1590 – ‘si les temps de la punition que Dieu luy avoit ordonné eut esté expiré’.[[1324]](#footnote-1324) When peace finally did come it was because God’s justice had been satisfied. Expiation of sin had been costly:

… le sang du duc de guise… [a] produit en peu de temps un million de ligueurs… qui n’avoient autre pretexte que la conservation de la religion. [D]eplorable pretexte, si dieu a voulu qu’elle ait esté conservée par l’effusion de tant de sang, et la desolation d’un si beau Royaume, pour l’expiation de la dissolution d’un siècle si corrompu…[[1325]](#footnote-1325)

Just as dissolution and corruption (principally heresy) had led to bloodshed and desolation, so expiation (the fruit of suffering) allowed God’s mercy to flow. In 1591 schism was averted because of ‘la grace que dieu a fait’ and ‘par sa bonté’.[[1326]](#footnote-1326) In particular instances, divine grace explained Gregory XIV’s support for the *Seize*, the young duc de Guise’s escape from prison in August 1591 and a narrow escape for Parma in early 1592.[[1327]](#footnote-1327)

In so far as his God was merciful but inscrutable, close yet distant, Rozée was the type of what Lucien Goldmann called the ‘tragic man’, aware that complete withdrawal from the world and any hope of satisfaction within it were equally illusory, and resolved therefore to live with a God who was there and not there at the same time.[[1328]](#footnote-1328) It may be that the tension of this position – coupled with his sense of disappointment – required of Rozée that particular habit of constancy which was being advocated in his lifetime by neo-Stoicism, an emerging movement of which Guillaume du Vair was a leading exponent.

Neo-Stoics sought to achieve control over feelings such as anger, despair and hope. It helped if one distanced oneself from a world whose vicissitudes were unsettling; it may be that by the time he was writing Rozée had withdrawn from the legal profession. Prose composition by its nature required thought, itself a moderating influence on feelings and expression. The historian distanced himself further by writing himself out of the narrative. A simple examination of first- and third-person pronoun use in the second volume of the *Histoire* is revealing. Whilst Rozée aligned himself with the reader around a hundred times (*nous avons dit*, *nous verrons*, etc), he placed himself with the people of Paris in just three places, and he never used *nous* when referring to the *Ligue*. Rozée referred to himself as *je* or *ie* fewer than forty times, often – and perhaps inadvertently – at moments when enthusiasm for a source or admiration of a hero caused him momentarily to let down his guard. We know that Rozée admired the comte de Randan and that the *Seize* felt honoured to be addressed (in a letter) by Pope Gregory XIV; here the historian betrayed the strength of his feelings as he used the first-person pronoun. Three times Rozée used *je/ie* as hedrew attention to *Ligueurs*’ valour, loyalty, *esprit*, and self-denial – qualities which he so admired; but even in these places *Ligueurs* are other than he.[[1329]](#footnote-1329)

Rozée greatly esteemed honourable deeds; by contrast, feelings and words were untrustworthy. If ever there was a time for the reigning in of passions and of ill-considered statements it was in France after the religious wars. The Catholic theologian and philosopher, Pierre Charron (1541-1603), who had flirted with the *Ligue*, later recalled with some regret how agitated he had been, and the essayist Montaigne, his contemporary, remarked on how much scribble the wars had produced.[[1330]](#footnote-1330) Early seventeenth-century France saw a movement toward quietness and restraint. It is in its restraint that the *Histoire* perfectly exemplifies that movement toward de-escalation of rhetoric.

In 1621, a heavily edited version of L’Estoile’s journal was published by Pierre Dupuy. If Rozée knew about Dupuy’s alterations they surely reminded him of the need to to strike a balance between *oubliance* (forgetting) and provocation. He was under an obligation, one dictated by integrity, to write ‘a truthful account of what happened in the past… without… revisiting unsavoury moments… The solution was… to exercise discretion…’.[[1331]](#footnote-1331) It was precisely this delicate balance that Rozée achieved when, almost four hundred years ago he produced the only known substantial revisionist history of the *Ligue*.

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1. See, for example, *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l’Histoire de France* (Paris, 1863), p. xi. The *Annuaire-Bulletin*, published in Paris, is hereafter abbreviated in the footnotes for this chapter as *A-B*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Valois, p. i. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. *A-B* 53 (1916), p. 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *A-B* 34 (1897), p. 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *A-B* 34 (1897), p. 108. It may be that ms. 10270 had been in Boislisle’s mind since its listing in a catalogue published the year before: Henri Omont and C. Couderc, eds, Catalogue général des manuscrits français / Bibliothèque nationale. *A*ncien supplément français, 3 vols (Paris, 1895-1896), 2, p. 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Valois,p. i. Mss 23295-96 had been brought into the Bibliothèque nationale in 1796 or 1797, and had been given reference numbers by 1868 – Léopold Delisle, *Le Cabinet des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale*,3 vols (Paris, 1868-81), 2, pp. 6-7 and 329-31. As administrator-general of the *Bibliothèque nationale*, 1874-1905, it was Delisle who had ultimate oversight over the production of the *Catalogue* published by Omont and others in 1895-96. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. *A-B* 45 (1908), p. 98. It was common in these years for prominent men in the Société de l’Histoire to hold key positions at the Ecole des Chartes. Thus, in 1911, Paul Guilhiermoz was *vice-président* at the Ecole, and Noël Valois was on the *commission de publication*; both men were on the *commission des ‘Mémoires et documents’*. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. A fluent writer in Latin as well as French, and a contributor, from 1903, to the *Histoire littéraire de la France*, Noël Valois was first and foremost an eminent historian. He died in 1915 at the age of sixty. Later, Charles-Victor Langlois would remind an audience at the *Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres* of ‘cette vie grave et unie... dont on ne peut que s’étonner qu’ayant été relativement si courte, elle ait suffi à tant d’œuvres’ – Charles-Victor Langlois, ‘Notice sur la vie et les travaux de M. Noël Valois’, in *Comptes-rendus des séances de l’année – Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres* (Paris, 1918), p. 74. After receiving a doctorate for his work on Guillaume d’Auvergne, Valois joined the *Archives nationales* in 1881 and there studied the sixteen thousand or so decisions made by the council of Henri IV. It was a project that had been launched in 1857 but never brought to completion. Valois received the prestigious *prix Gobert* in 1889 for the first part of this work – the *Inventaire des Arrêts du Conseil d’Etat* – in a volume which included what the comte de Lasteyrie would later call ‘[une] magistrale introduction’ to the subject – *Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des chartes* (Paris, 1915), 76, p. 596. In 1896 Valois won the prize a second time for his studies on France and the Great Schism, and it was the completion of this huge undertaking that secured his admission to the *Institut de France* in 1902. Valois not only wrote a great deal, he succeeded where others had failed. In an *avant-propos* to the first volume of the *Inventaire*, Alfred Maury set Valois apart: ‘Aucun archiviste avant lui n’a fait une étude si méthodique et si approfondie des documents dont il a dû dresser l’inventaire’, and he made special mention of the introductory chapters where ‘se trouvent résolues la plupart des difficultés qui avaient embarrassé ses devanciers’ – Noël Valois, *Inventaire des Arrêts du Conseil d’Etat (Règne de Henri IV)* (Paris, 1886), 1, pp. iii-iv. For Lasteyrie, the royal council was a subject whose ‘complexité avait toujours effrayé les érudits’ *Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des chartes* (Paris, 1915), 76, p. 596. Alfred Coville was similarly complimentary about Valois’ ‘redoutable histoire du Schisme’ – a topic which ‘avait depuis bien longtemps découragé les historiens’ *Ibid*., 76, p. 599. By 1913 Valois was immersed in a fresh project – the study of religious conflict in sixteenth-century France – and at his death he left the manuscript of an almost complete study of the struggles in the reign of Charles IX – Langlois, ‘Notice sur la vie’, pp. 65-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. As well as holding the decisive role in the *Société de l’Histoire de France*, Noël Valois was at various times president of the *Ecole des chartes* (while Charles was a student there), of the *Société de l’histoire de Paris et de l’Ile-de-France*, and of the *Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Edouard Chavannes, in *Bibliothèque*, 76, p. 594. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Langlois, ‘Notice sur la vie’, p. 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Ibid*., p. 66. Others added to the pressure. ‘Le nom de Valois... reste vivant parmi nous,’ wrote Alfred Coville; ‘Notre confrère Charles Valois le représente dignement...’ – *Bibliothèque*, 76, p. 601. Edouard Chavannes added to the pressure: ‘Il est digne d’envie, l’homme qui, après une vie de labeur fécond, a pu voir que les vertus familiales dont il avait reçu le dépôt s’étaient transmises, ardentes et généreuses, à ses descendants’ – *Ibid*., 76, p. 595. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *A-B* 45 (1908), p. 128. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. For two reasons we have chosen not yet to call the writer of the seventeenth-century text ‘historian’. First, in a chapter devoted mostly to the work of Charles Valois, it may minimise uncertainty to reserve the title for him alone; secondly, we have yet to assure ourselves that the seventeenth-century work was truly historical in nature for, as we will soon see, it has also been known as a *journal* and as a *recueil*. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. *A-B* 45 (1908), p. 128. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *A-B* 47 (1910), p. 223, my emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Jean-Marie Constant, *La Ligue* (Paris, 1996), p. 467. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Alfred Cobban, *A History of Modern France* 3 vols (Harmondsworth, 1965), 3, p. 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Ibid*., p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *A-B* 45 (1908), pp. 189-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *Bibliothéque de l’Ecole des chartes* 64 (1903), p. 753; 65 (1904), p. 460; 66 (1905), p. 469; 67 (1906), p. 327; 69 (1908), p. 259. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. We can only speculate on what had brought the still-young man’s historical output to a premature end. Is it that, as for so many of his generation, the First World War had turned into a life-changing experience for Valois? Or had the death of his father in 1915 liberated him from an obligation, entailed perhaps by filial loyalty, to be a research-led early-modern historian? The silence in the historical journals was broken only by notifications of his death. These did not amount to obituaries. The *Bibliothèque* barely marked the historian’s passing. Elsewhere, in a list of five recently deceased, ‘Charles Valois’ appeared with scant detail (‘mai 1948’) whereas for the four other deaths, exact date and place were given – *Chronique de l’Ecole des chartes et des archivistes-paléographes* 107 (1948), p. 343. Apparently, the link with Valois had become tenuous. The *Annuaire-Bulletin* was hardly more expansive. President of the Society Charles-H. Pouthas referred briefly to Valois’ interest in the sixteenth century, before concluding – evasively? – that ‘les nécessités de la vie quotidienne’ had turned him from historical studies – *A-B* 84 (1950), p. 17. By reminding his audience that Valois was ‘fils du grand érudit Noël...’, Pouthas was able to indulge them: the Society was ‘pas seulement une liste d’individus, mais... un des lieux où s’affirme la continuité française’ – *A-B* 84 (1950), p. 18. Explained in that way, Valois’ death was peripheral to a larger picture. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Early reviewers were nonetheless positive; they of course did not know that there would be no second volume. Paul Fournier, who had studied alongside Charles’s father in the 1870s, saw Valois’ good sense in not editing the whole manuscript. He was impressed by both the selection and the ‘abondante et érudite annotation’ of the key passages, and he found the summaries of omitted sections to be ‘clairs et substantiels’ – *Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des chartes* 76 (1915), p. 169. ‘Puisse M. Charles Valois ne pas tarder à mener son œuvre à bonne fin!’, he concluded *– Ibid*., p. 171. At the close of a less comprehensive review, Maurice Rousset concurred: ‘Remercions-le de son bon travail, et espérons qu’il nous donnera prochainement le tome second’ – *Revue d’histoire de l’Eglise de France* 6 (1920), p. 506. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. *A-B* 45 (1908), p. 193. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. *A-B* 45 (1908), p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. *A-B* (1911), p. 221, my emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. *A-B* (1908), pp. 191-93. In the event, three of the four accounts saw publication in 1914. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *A-B* (1908), p. 193. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *A-B* (1908), p. 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Charles Valois, ‘Un des chefs de la Ligue à Paris: Jacques de Cueilly, curé de Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois’, in *Mémoires de la Société de l’Histoire de Paris et de l’Ile-de-France* 36(Paris, 1909), p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. *Ibid*., p. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. *A-B* (1910), p. 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. *A-B* (1910), pp. 222-23. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. *A-B* (1910), p. 227. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. *A-B* (1908), p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. *A-B* (1908), p. 199. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. *A-B* (1908), p. 204. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. *A-B* (1908), p. 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. *A-B* (1908), p. 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Valois, ‘Un des chefs...’, p. 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *A-B* (1910), p. 229. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. *A-B* (1910), p. 229. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. *A-B* (1910), p. 230. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. *A-B* (1910), p. 233. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *A-B* (1911), p. 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. *A-B* (1911), p. 232. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. *A-B* (1911), pp. 218-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. *A-B* (1908), p. 202. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. *A-B* (1910), p. 225. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. *A-B* (1908), p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Valois, ‘Un des chefs...’, p. 17. Valois’ argument (inadvertently?) raises the question of whether Cueilly’s alleged moderation was any more than temporary artifice. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. *A-B* (1908), p. 196, n. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Valois, p. i. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Valois, p. xlv. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Descimon (1983), p. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Louis Maimbourg, *Histoire de la Ligue* (Paris, 1683), Epitre au Roy, n.p., and Avertissement, n.p. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Paul Philippe Hardouin de Péréfixe, *Histoire du roy Henry le grand* (Amsterdam, 1661), pp. 112, 180, 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Constant, *La Ligue*, p. 467. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Cited by Elie Barnavi, *Le Parti de Dieu. Etude sociale et politique de la Ligue parisienne* (Louvain, 1980), p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Descimon (1983), p. 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Louis-Pierre Anquetil, *L’esprit de la Ligue, ou histoire politique des troubles de France, pendant les XVIe et XVIIe siècles*, 2 vols (‘Nouv. éd.’, Paris, 1818) 1, p. xvij. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Constant, *La Ligue*, p. 467. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. E.-A. Segretain, *Sixte-Quint et Henri IV* (Paris, 1861), p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Salmon (1972), pp. 541-42. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Constant, *La Ligue*, p. 467. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Mariéjol, pp. 293 and 336-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Gérard, pp. 71, 86 and 97. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. *Ibid*., p. 99, n. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Descimon (1983), p. 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. On the ‘close association between the professions of the law and the Catholic Church’, see Mark Greengrass, *France in the age of Henry IV* (London, 1984), pp. 141-42, quotation, p. 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Valois, p. xlv. Valois was particularly fascinated by the writer’s use, for the period straight after the regicide, of ‘une documentation intéressante’ (which he did not unpack) – p. xlv, n. 4; he intended to explore this in his second volume. Alas, that book was never to appear. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Valois, pp. xxvii-xxviii. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Valois, p. xxvii. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. *H2*, pp. 390-91. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Valois, p. xxxviii. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Valois, pp. vi-viii. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Footnotes are used, for example, to provide the exact dates of turning points such as the Tumult of Amboise, or to give the biographical details of key figures such as Blaise de Monluc. To discover more about Jean d’Albon de Saint-André we should read a 1909 work by Lucien Romier; for Amiens, we are directed toAlbéric de Calonne’s three-volume *Histoire de la ville d’Amiens*, and so on. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Valois, p. 4, n 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Valois, pp. 71, n. 1 and 74, n. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Valois, p. 109 fn1. Elsewhere Valois claimed that the historian told only half the story of the execution of Mary, queen of Scots: ‘L’auteur tait les fautes de l’infortunée, rend les protestants d’Ecosse et d’Angleterre responsables de sa mésintelligence avec Henri Darnley, et ne se prononce pas nettement sur les instigateurs du meurtre de celui-ci’ – *Ibid*., p. 129, n. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Valois, p. i. Whilst some of the excluded content might be ‘consulté avec fruit’, he conceded, elsewhere ‘le texte manque absolument de valeur’ – Valois, p. i. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Valois, p. ii. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Valois, p. ii, n 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. In the three largest gaps, Valois omitted fifty-two, then seventy-five, and finally forty-four pages of the manuscript, and in seven other places he left gaps of between ten and twenty pages. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. *H1*, pp. 15, 61, 73-4, and 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. *H1*, p. 403. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. In many cases, only a few words are missing. Where the omission is of several lines’ length it is often to spare the reader a repetition of a previously-made point or a further statement of proof where no more is needed. Valois’ occasional footnote references to these omissions enhance our confidence in the way he is working – see for example Valois, pp. 138, n. 2, 139, n. 1, and 160, n. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Henri Omont and C. Couderc, eds, Catalogue général des manuscrits français / Bibliothèque nationale. *A*ncien supplément français, 3 vols (Paris, 1895-1896), 2, p. 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Valois, p. ii. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. It is likely that this wording originated with the author, for the same four words are referred to in the opening sentence of the work – but we cannot know for sure because the original of the first part of the text has not survived. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Descimon (1983), p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Philip Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 179, n. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Salmon (1972), pp. 542-43; Pallier – see, for example, p. 74, n. 86, p. 77, n. 101 and p. 89, n. 177; Benedict, *Rouen*, p. 179; Descimon (1983),pp. 99 and 214; Pierre Chevallier, *Les Régicides. Clément, Ravaillac, Damiens* (Paris, 1989), p. 49. Chevallier considered the relevant pages from Rozée important enough to be included in full as one of the *Annexes* to his study. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Valois, p. iii. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. The sheets now bear numbers 1-152 in red ink. As Valois made no mention of this re-pagination I presume that this was a post-1914 addition. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Valois, p. iii. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Valois, p. v. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Valois probably had in mind Jacques Joseph Champollion-Figeac (1778-1867) who had been keeper of manuscripts at the Bibliothèque nationale and professor of palaeography at the Ecole des Chartes. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Valois, pp. xi-xiv. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Valois, p. iv. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. *H2*, pp. 120 and 208. In passing, we note that here and in two other places (*H1*, p. 389 and *H2*, pp. 120-21) the reader is invited to consult documents ‘which follow’, only to be disappointed by their absence. This is not sinister: all the documents in question had been published by the time the *Histoire* was written and, in any case, there would be no point in mentioning them if the intention was to suppress them. We assume authorial oversight. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Valois, p. iii, n. 3. A strong argument for just two notebooks arises from the sheet numbering: as sheets 27, 48 and 49 of the original connect with points in the third quarter of the whole work, there seems little doubt that re-numbering from page 1 had started after the end of the section we know as ms. 10270, thus at the point where ms. 23296 begins. Two sets of numbers – each from 1 to c. 125, possibly more – suggests two notebooks. Admittedly, the stand-alone survival of the fragment – ms. 10270, a quarter of the whole work – suggests a four-volume original, for if there were only two volumes we would need to explain the separation of the first into two parts. Furthermore, the case for a set of four original notebooks is strengthened by the opening words of ms. 10270 which seem to offer a new point of departure in the narrative: ‘Or pour ce que nous avons dit… que les predicateurs catholiques avoient beaucoup servy a l'establissement de la ligue catholique, … ie rapporteray icy ce qui se passa, en deux ou trois diverses occu­rences sur ce suiet’ – *H1*, p. 279. However the page number 75 at the beginning of ms. 10270 is problematic. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Lara Jennifer Moore explained that, contrary to earlier perceptions, organisation of archives in post-Revolutionary France was ‘neither steady nor progressive’. Well into the nineteenth century archives remained in storage, ‘where they were often subject to theft, destruction, and neglect’. It was a state of affairs that lasted at least until 1828: Lara Jennifer Moore, *Restoring Order. The Ecole des Chartes and the Organization of Archives and Libraries in France, 1820-1870* (Duluth, 2008), pp. 2-3, 10, 23 and 62-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. *H1*, pp. 1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Valois, p. xvi, n. 4. Valois’ judgement rested upon an admittedly uninspiring but stray remark (concerning the mid-1580s) by our historian : ‘Ne s’étant pendant ces dernières années fait aucuns exploits de guerre, il nous faut raconter ce qui s’est passé dans les cabinets des princes’ – *H1*, p. 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. *H2*, p. 435. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. *H2*, pp. 94 and 102. The aphorisms were sometimes proverbial. Thus, ‘on dit qu’en la guerre, il est défendu à un homme de pied de suivre un homme à cheval’ and, citing words spoken by the duc de Parme, ‘le dire commun estoit bien véritable; qu’en la guerre civile les grands se jouent et les vilains se battent’ – *H2*, pp. 454 and 492. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Valois, pp. xvi-xvii. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. *H1*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. *H1*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. The term *Sainte Union* meant more than the affiliation of like-minded towns with Paris. Even before the urban movement spread beyond the capital, *Ligueurs* liked to refer to a *Sainte Union* because the term implied ‘une légitimité conférée à la fois par l’inspiration divine et la volonté commune’, légitimité à laquelle ne saurait prétendre une quelconque “ligue” – Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 64. Cf. Robert Descimon, ‘La Ligue à Paris (1585-1594) : une révision’, *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 37 (1982), p. 74, where we read ‘la seconde Ligue fut une *rencontre*… [des] dimensions cléricale, noble et bourgeoise’. Cf. also Stéphane Gal, *Grenoble au temps de la Ligue. Etude politique, sociale et religieuse d’une cité en crise (vers 1562 – vers 1598)* (Grenoble, 2000),p. 266: ‘Une “union horizontale” donc, qui liait entre eux les hommes, mais aussi une “union verticale”, entre les hommes et Dieu. Cette double dimension était aussi celle de l’Eglise et celle de la croix….’ [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. *H1*, pp. 121 and 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. *H1*, p. 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. *H1*, p. 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. *H1*, p. 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. *H1*, p. 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Emile Littré, *Dictionnaire de la langue française*,4 vols (Paris, 1874), 3, p. 124. Importantly, for Rozée the term ‘le vice’ comprehended anything which damaged the single-mindedness of the true believer; hence, his pride that *Ligueurs*, ‘ne se donnant pas beaucoup de peine des considerations de l’estat ou de l’interest des princes, croioient que rien ne pouvoit mal aller pourveu que la religion fut asseuré’ – *H2*, p. 353. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. *H2*, pp. 3-4, my emphasis; *Mémoires et instructions, A Messieurs le Commandeur de Diou, Coquelei, Conseiller en la Cour de Parlement de Paris, de Pilles, Abbé d’Orbais, & Frison, Doyen de l’Eglise de Reims, députés à notre saint Père, de la part de Monseigneur le Duc de Mayenne, Lieutenant général de l’Etat royal & Couronne de France, & par le Conseil général de l’Union des Catholiques, établi à Paris*, in *ML*, 3, pp. 315-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. *H2*, pp. 539-40, my emphasis; Palma-Cayet, pp. 432-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. *H1*, p. 205. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Mark Greengrass, *France in the age of Henri IV* (London, 1984), p. 205. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. For the view that the religious wars were not over until 1629 see Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629* (Cambridge, C.U.P.,1995), pp. 1-7. The continuing intransigence of some of the *Ligue* leaders is explained in Jean-Marie Constant, *La Ligue* (Paris, 1996) pp. 434-39. In addition it has been argued that the spirit of the *Ligue* lived on in the Catholic renewal of the early seventeenth century – see Denis Richet, ‘Aspects socio-culturels des conflits religieux à Paris dans la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle’, *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 32 (1977), pp. 781-83. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Mark Greengrass, ‘Clio et le passé récent : les fonctions et motivations historiennes aux lendemains des guerres de Religion françaises’ (unpublished article), p. 1. ‘Pour beaucoup… [de Français], ....[Henri IV] demeure un apostat et un tyran d’usurpation, ce dont témoignent son assassinat et les nombreuses tentatives qui le précèdent’ – *Ibid*., p. 23. Rozée himself chose to trust in the genuineness of the king’s conversion, and had no desire for more conflict. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Valois, pp. xx-xxii, quotation, p. xx. In *H1*, digressions from a strict chronological order allowed the historian to dwell on the duc d’Anjou in the Netherlands (and the Salcedo affair) ‘encores que ce soit hors de l’année dela qu’elle ie raconte icy les evenemens’ (*H1*, p. 133), and later to describe the swathe of municipal defections to the *Ligue* after the Blois assassinations, ‘laquelle nous ne rapportons pas icy selon l’ordre du temps, mais coniointement pour servir a l’intelligence de l’histoire’ (*H1*, pp. 481-82). Digressions and issues of chronology that arise in *H2* are discussed in chapter 9 below. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Descimon (1983), p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Claude-Gilbert Dubois, *La Conception de l’Histoire en France au XVIe siècle (1560-1610)*, (Paris, 1977), p. 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. *H1*, pp. 157, 161 and 225. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. *H2*, pp. 323, 324 and 326. Valois considered the ‘titres marginaux’ to be ‘très capricieusement espacés et parfois inexacts’ (p. iv) but he had seen worse: ‘la confusion qui en résulte est infiniment moins embarrassante que dans certains livres du temps, notamment dans l’*Histoire des derniers troubles de France*’ (Valois, p. iv, n. 2). We note too that Palma-Cayet’s *Chronologie novenaire*, devoid of headings, presents bigger navigational problems than the *Histoire*. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Dubois noted the difficulty for the historian using the *Annales* method: ‘Bien souvent le cadre chronologique n’est qu’une forme débordée par la matière qui s’organise suivant des séquences qui lui sont propres.’ – *La Conception*, p. 164. Because it was the significance of events that gave the work its shape, years are accorded varying space in the *Histoire*. The first half of the work covers almost three decades. The second half touches five years – and ‘loses steam’ progressively:

     May 1589 – April 1590 : 230 pages

     May 1590 – April 1591 : 190 pages

     May 1591 – April 1592 : 85 pages

     May 1592 – April 1593 : 35 pages

     May 1593 – April 1594 : 1 page

     541 pages

     The calendar years 1589 and 1590 take up 479 pages, 43% of the whole work. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. *H1*, pp. 557-568: *Accord et capitulation entre le Roy de Navarre, et le duc de Cazimir pour la levee de l’armée des Reistres venus en France en l’année 1587* (Strasbourg, 1587); *H1*, pp. 568-74: *La* *Harangue faicte par le Roi Henri III, Roi de France & de Pologne, à l’ouverture de l’Assemblée des trois Estats généraux de son Roïaume, en sa Ville de Blois. Le seizieme jourd’Octobre 1588* (Paris, 1588). [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. *H1*, pp. 250 and 417. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Elsewhere in both the mss 23295-96 a handful of documents that were promised failed to materialise – Valois, p. iii, n. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Valois, p. xviii. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Valois, pp. xviii-xx. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Sincerity mattered more than style. Cf. Dubois: ‘... il s’agit pour l’historien de faire connaître, et non de se faire admirer.’ – Dubois, p. 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. *H2*, p. 474; Valois, p. xix. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. *H1*, p. 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. *H1*, p. 546. The historian was skilled too in extended metaphor: of all contemporary writers about the religious wars, ‘ceux qui firent plus de fumée, furent les pretendus reformez et leurs ministres; car ces gens… estoient eclos d'un œuf couvé par la desobeissance, engendrez par le mespris de toute superiorité, …naiz dedans la fange de la rebellion, [et] eslevez par le vent de sedition’– *H1*, p. 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. *H1*, pp. 457-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. *H1*, p. 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. *H1*, p. 439; *H2*, p. 176, my emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. *H1*, pp. 265-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. *H1*, p. 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. *H1*, p. 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. *H1*, p. 64. For similar examples see *H1*, pp. 121, 132, 148, 159, 162 and 374; also *H2*, pp. 61, 174 and 277. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. George Huppert has explained that it was Henri Lancelot sieur de La Popelinière (1541-1608) who broke new ground in awarding to the historian, not to the sources, the leading role in determining the nature of the history that was written. The historian was in charge, and his questions set the agenda. ‘Here we have it at last,’ wrote Huppert, engagingly. ‘The most distinct characteristic of general history will be its philosophical emancipation from the chaos of events’ – George Huppert, *The idea of perfect history* (Urbana, 1970), p. 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. ‘Il est bien hazardeux de dire à quel genre elle appartient’ was a recent comment on Baptiste Legrain’s 1614 work, *La Decade contenant la vie et gestes de Henry le Grand*: Marie-Madeleine Fragonard, ‘Une mémoire individualisée. Editions et rééditions des acteurs et témoins des guerres’, in *La Mémoire des Guerres de Religion. La concurrence des genres historiques (XVIe – XVIIIe siècles)*, Etudes réunies par Jacques Berchtold and Marie-Madeleine Fragonard (Geneva, 2007), p. 43, n. 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. Dubois, *La Conception*, p. 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. *Ibid*., pp. 19-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Fragonard, ‘Une mémoire individualisée’, p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. *Ibid*., pp. 42-43; Dubois, *La Conception*, pp. 167-68. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Dubois has suggested that in sixteenth-century France the individualism characteristic of memoirists increased in correlation with the breakdown of order in society – Dubois, *La Conception*, p. 168. We have found nothing to suggest that either trend would have attracted the historian. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. *Ibid*., p. 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. *Ibid*., pp.162-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. Charles de la Ruelle, cited in Huppert, *The idea*, p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Dubois, *La Conception*, p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. Amy C. Graves, ‘Propagande, pratiques d’histoire et protojournalisme: l’historiographie engagée de Simon Goulart (1543-1628)’ (University of Chicago, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 2004), pp. 103-04. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Antoinette Gimaret, ‘La Mémoire du corps souffrant ou la question de l’horreur. Les récits du siège de Paris de Goulart à Maimbourg’, in *La Mémoire des Guerres de Religion*, Etudes réunies par Jacques Berchtold and Marie-Madeleine Fragonard (Geneva, 2007), p. 194. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Donald R. Kelley, *Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship* (New York, 1970),p. 6. Gabriel Monod, one of the few dissenters, wrote regarding the same century: ‘… nous voyons naître une série de travaux qui, sans prétentions littéraires, rendent à l’histoire les plus sérieux services’ – ‘Du progrès des études historiques en France depuis le XVIe siècle’, *Revue historique* 1 (1876), p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. Dubois gave a memorable description of the typical process: ‘Les faits mis en tiroir, catalogués et datés, l’histoire par casiers’ – *La Conception*, p. 29. The author’s argument was that because medieval society knew little change it asked few questions. Its historian’s role was thus little more than that of ‘un greffier’. R.G. Collingwood colourfully called medieval works ‘scissors-and-paste history’ – cited in Kelley, *Foundations*, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. Cf. Dubois: ‘La manière de rechercher la vérité n’est pas simple. Elle comporte une règle de prudence (éviter l’erreur et le mensonge) et un devoir de révélation (ne rien cacher de la vérité) ...’ – p. 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. Anthony Grafton, *The Footnote. A Curious History* (London, 1997), p. 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. Thus, writing about the morning of 14 March 1590 (the battle of Ivry) Rozée avoided the temptation to provide detail about the prayers: ‘… puisque je ne puis reporter comme elles ont esté faites et que le lendemain de la bataille aparament l’un ni l’autre des chefs ne s’en fut pas souvenu, le lecteur l’a prendroit pour la declamation d’un Rethoricien’ – *H2*, p. 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. Occasional exceptions are addresses delivered by those senior judges whom the historian admired, such as Barnabé Brisson and Guillaume du Vair. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. Cited in Huppert, *The idea*, p. 173. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. Huppert, *The idea*, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. ‘L’histoire d’inspiration théologique n’a aucune vocation à l’universalité’ – Dubois, *La Conception*, p. 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. The influence of *écrivains-juristes* is visited in chapter 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Dubois, *La Conception*, p. 23. The point is made with greater force a little later: ‘L’idée d’une histoire universelle suppose une unité de pensée fondée sur la cohérence dune idéologie’ – *Ibid*., p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. *H1*, p. 473. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. *H2*, p. 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. *H1*, p. 152; *H2*, p. 432. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. *H2*, p. 541. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. This is explicit at *H1*, pp. 170 and 498; it is implied at *H2*, pp. 127 and 541. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. *H2*, p. 452. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. *H1*, p. 507. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. *H2*, pp. 356, 400 and 488. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. *H2*, p. 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. *H2*, p. 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. *H1*, p. 1. The quotation marks suggest that the historian borrowed this phrase; I have not discovered its origin. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. *H1*, pp. 14, 159 and 265. Certainly in the nineteenth century, ‘déduction’meant not only ‘Conséquence tirée d’un raisonnement’ but also ‘Récit détaillé, exposition minutieuse’ – Littré, *Dictionnaire*,2, p. 1004. When the historian wrote later about the execution of Mary Queen of Scots he observed that ‘les particularitez et les circonstances de ce dernier acte (si tragique qu’il a esté mis entre les plus cruels) ont esté **deduits** par tant d’escrivains…’ – *H1*, p. 265, my emphasis. In English translation, ‘déduit’ would here have to be rendered as ‘explained’, not ‘deduced’. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. ‘En décrivant parfois les événements tel qu’ils se sont imposés à leur vie et selon leurs objectifs présents, les historiens compromettent la politique d’*oubliance* d’Henri IV’ – Greengrass, ‘Clio et le passé récent’, p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. *H1*, pp. 1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. *H1*, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. *H1*, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. *H2*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. *H2*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. *H1*, p. 1. And much later: ‘Je ne veux point composer icy la forme de leurs prières,’ (this on the morning of Ivry) ‘puisque je ne puis reporter comme elles ont esté faites et que le lendemain de la bataille aparament l’un ni l’autre des chefs ne s’en fut pas souvenu; le lecteur la prendroit pour la declamation d’un Rhétoricien.’ – *H2*, p. 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. *H1*, p. 2. ‘Il n'appartient qu'a Cesar d'escrire ses intentions’, continued the historian – p. 2, and later: ‘[je] suis resolu de ne point juger les actions des grands, desquels nous ignorons les conceptions’ – p. 267. On the Protestant theologian Antoine Chandieu, the historian commented, ‘il se rendit ridicule par son ignorance’ – p. 225. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. *H2*, p. 350. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. *H2*, p. 228. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. *H1*, p. 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. Nonetheless his home in the village of Estampes, close to Château-Thierry, was fine enough to receive la Reine Mère, Catherine de Medici, in 1585 – *H1*, p. 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. Valois, p. xvi. [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. Valois, pp. xv-xviii. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. Evidence that the *Histoire* had long lain unread, the possibility of L’Estoile’s authorship was being credited almost into the twentieth century –Henri Omont and C. Couderc, eds, Catalogue général des manuscrits français / Bibliothèque nationale. *A*ncien supplément français, 3 vols (Paris, 1895-1896), 2, p. ix. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. Valois, p. xii. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. Valois, pp. vi-viii. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. Valois, pp. v and ix-x. The name Ro**s**ée usually took the alternative spelling Ro**z**ée – see, for example, *RDBVP*, 10, pp. 123, 130, 151, 232 and 313. Accordingly, unless it is spelled with an ‘s’ in a quotation, I will hereafter use the ‘z’-version. [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. *H1*, p. 198; Valois, p. 92, n. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. Valois, pp. x-xi, my emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. Descimon (1983).Perhaps it was this work that led Jean-Marie Constant to judge Descimon to be ‘sans doute le meilleur connaisseur de la société parisienne et de la vie municipale de la capitale à l’époque moderne’ – *La Ligue*, p. 470. [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. Descimon (1983), p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. I am grateful to Mark Greengrass for sharing with me the unpublished findings presented by Robert Descimon in a seminar of 17 March 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. Valois, p. iii. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. *H2*, p. 541. Given Rozée’s customary readiness to honour or scorn individuals, the penultimate paragraph of the whole work is somewhat shocking. He provided the names of most of the delegates at Suresnes, but not a single judgement on any of them; thus, not a word about the royalist Nicolas d’Angennes, seigneur de Rambouillet whose alleged implication in the planning of the Blois murders was a stumbling block to the *Ligue* delegation (Palma-Cayet, p. 447); no comment either on André de Brancas, seigneur de Villars, *Ligue* deputy at Suresnes who in the winter of 1591-92 had led the reistance of Rouen against Henri of Navarre. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. Pope Clement VIII is given scant attention in the memoirs, with no reference at all to his eventual absolution of Henry IV. The abjuration is touched lightly, at a time when other *Ligueurs* were insisting that abjuration must be highly public and enacted, not merely a matter of private conscience. On private and public aspects of abjuration, see especially Mark Greengrass, ‘The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henri IV’, in K. Cameron (ed), *From Valois to Bourbon* (Exeter, 1989). [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. *H2*, pp. 452, 529 and 537. See also *H1*, pp. 150 and 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. *H2*, p. 531. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. *H2*, p. 532. [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. *H2*, pp. 533 and 538. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. *H2*, p. 541 – the closing words of the *Histoire*. To ascribe honour to the king was, of course, a sensible line to adopt by a writer in the early 1620s. But whilst the hyperbole was unusual, the sentiment was entirely consistent with the respect the historian had shown throughout the work. Thus, for example, as he began his narrative of the long siege of Paris, he committed himself to writing ‘sans nous ingerer de juger ce que le roy devoit faire, ou a remarquer ses fautes; car a la verité , il estoit plus sage que ceux qui ont controlé ses actions vingt ans apres’ – H2, p. 190. And at the siege of Rouen, the king would acquit himself well, demonstrating ‘cete mesme valeur et vigueur d’esprit qu’il avoit eüe en 1590 devant Lagny’, and ‘sa diligence accoustumée’ – *H2*, pp. 485 and 488. We note too that, unlike some *Ligueurs*, the historian considered conversion to be a sufficient reason for Navarre to be acknowledged King of France. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. Among Pierre’s relatives were a son, Guillaume (*avocat)* and grandchildren – information taken from a family tree presented by Robert Descimon in a seminar of 17 March 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. Valois, p. v. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. Elie Barnavi identified three particular reasons why people joined movements such as the *Ligue*, of which the cause itself (in this case, fear for religion) was one, but he acknowledged that for most *Ligueurs*, ‘idéologie et intérêts personnels, crainte sincère pour la religion et désir de promotion sociale, esprit de résistance à l’arbitraire de la couronne et impulsions intimes et irrationelles, vont de pair’; he warned too that ‘la psychanalyse à distance donne de très mauvais résultats en Histoire’ – Barnavi, *La Ligue*, p. 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. Valois, p. xv; *H1*, pp. 123 and 358. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. Antoine Loisel, *Pasquier, ou Dialogue des Advocats du Parlement de Paris*, ed. Dupin (Paris, 1844), pp. 3-5, quotation, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. *Ibid*., p. 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. *Ibid*., pages 99 and 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. J. H. Shennan, *The Parlement of Paris* (Stroud, 1998), p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. Colin Kaiser, ‘Les cours souveraines au XVIe siècle: morale et Contre-Réforme’, *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 37 (1982). [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. *Ibid*., p.25. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. *Ibid*., p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. George Huppert, *The idea of perfect history* (Urbana, 1970), pp. 185-93. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. Pallier, p. 43. For the general closeness in values of clerics and lawyers, see Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV* (London, 1984), pp. 141-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. Donald R. Kelley, *Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship. Language, Law, and History in the French Renaissance* (New York, 1970), p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. Claude-Gilbert Dubois, *La Conception de l’Histoire en France au XVIe siècle (1560-1610)* (Paris, 1977),p. 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. This expression of Goulart’s antipathy for Paris lawyers is quoted in Amy C. Graves, ‘Propagande, pratiques d’histoire et protojournalisme: l’historiographie engagée de Simon Goulart (1543-1628)’, unpublished doctoral thesis (University of Chicago, 2004), pp. 4-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. *H2*, p. 541. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. *H2*, pp. 108-09. [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. *H1*, p. 504. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. *H2*, p. 465. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. *H2*, p. 516. [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. Marco Penzi, ‘Un schisme gallican en 1591? Historiographie, politique et utilisation de l’imprimé’, in R.G. Păun (ed), *Imprimé et Pouvoir: France, Russie, Principautés Roumaines (XVIe-XIXe siècles)* (Bucharest, 2008), p. 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. The ‘schism’ was a jurisdictional problem with many potential ramifications. From a lawyer’s viewpoint the regicide was a crime solved within a minute; in terms of the constitution it ‘merely’ realised a problem that had threatened since June 1584. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. *H2*, pp. 113-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. *H2*, p. 114. Cf. Pierre Chevallier, *Les Régicides. Clément, Ravaillac, Damiens* (Paris, 1989), pp. 65-84. Pierre Chevallier’s account of Bourgoing’s trial was based on the original prosecution records. Rozée naturally had no access to these – nor indeed did any later historian until Chevallier found them in ms. fr. 21306, entitled *Arrests donnés au Parlement de Paris transféré à Tours concernant les affaires publiques….* The records validate the main lines of Rozée’s story. Bourgoing’s complaints are spelled out in detail: the witnesses were plainly dull, for their testimonies did not agree even though they had been able to collude before the hearing. Regarding his denial of any foreknowledge of the regicide we now learn the lines of the prior’s defence: if even a father in a family of seven or eight could not always know what each family member was up to, how much could be known by a prior in a convent of four to five hundred monks? And why, if he had known Clément’s plans, would he have proceeded to put his whole monastery at risk?

     Surveying other contemporary histories, Chevallier has painted a different picture. Pierre Pithou, Estienne Pasquier, Agrippa d’Aubigné and Pierre Victor Palma-Cayet all argued Bourgoing’s complicity in the regicide. Even though all four had reason to implicate Bourgoing, it is obvious that the *ligueur* Rozée had good reason not to. Chevallier attempted to steer us out of this impasse by introducing a further source: Bernardino de Mendoza’s *Relation du succès de la mort du Roy … Henri troisième du nom …*. Without singling out Bourgoing by name, this ‘partisan déclaré de la Sainte Union – personnage officiel en qui les ligueurs avaient confiance’ – claimed that Clément consulted his superiors – Chevallier, *Les Régicides*, p. 81. All the same, it remains unproved that these superiors included Bourgoing, and there is the possibility that the prior was not ‘in the loop’, if we are to believe a claim (which would have been easy to check) made by the prior at his trial, namely that there was not unity of observance across the inmates of the *couvent* Saint-Jacques, and that ‘Clément était de la province non réformée [...], et ceux non réformés se cachent du prieur et ont l’un d’entre eux auquel ils disent leurs pensées, ce que l’on apprendra par ceux de cette ville [Tours].’ – Cited in Chevallier, *Les Régicides*, p. 69. The truth remains elusive. Rozée rarely mentioned Mendoza, and made no reference at all to his reports to the Catholic King. He might not have agreed with the claim in the *Relation du succès*; much more likely is that he never read it. He was probably unaware of its existence – I have found no record of it being published in Paris. In the circumstances, our author’s credibility as a historian rests secure – and we have shown that this is a lawyer-historian. [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. Alexandre Gady, <http://oratoiredulouvre.fr/patrimoine/oratoire-du-louvre-17e-fondation-royale.php> [accessed 7 April 2014]; Adolphe Berty, *et al*, *Topographie historique du vieux Paris* (Paris, 1897), p. 492; Orest Ranum, *Paris in the Age of Absolutism* (New York, 1968), p. 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. The contribution of Barbe Acarie and of other women to the Catholic renewal of early seventeenth-century Paris is exquisitely portrayed in Barbara B. Diefendorf, *From Penitence to Charity. Pious Women and the Catholic Reformation in Paris* (Oxford, 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. Paul Lallemand, *Essai sur l’histoire de l’éducation dans l’ancien Oratoire de France* (Paris, 1888), pp. 395-96. Lallemand’s essay begins with a description of the attempts made by Henry IV to revive the credibility of the Sorbonne after the religious wars; the early pages show how even a revived Faculty of Theology left gaps in the provision of Catholic education that the Oratoire went on to fill (pp. 1-14). [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. William M. Thompson, ed., *Bérulle and the French School. Selected Writings* (New York, 1989), pp. 12-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. *Œuvres complètes de de Bérulle*, ed. J.-P. Migne(Paris, 1856), p. 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. *Ibid*., pp. 27-28. [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. *Mémorial de quelques points servant à la direction des supérieurs en la congrégation de l’Oraoire de Jésus*, in *Œuvres complètes*, pp. 808-836, quotation, p. 813. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. The words are from a letter dated 2 October, 1629, published in translation in Thompson, *Bérulle*, pp. 192-95, quotations, p. 193. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. A candidate had to be at least seventeen to join, but ‘au dessus de trente ans, l’admission devenait plus difficile’: Lallemand, *Essai*, pp. 209-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. *H1*, p. 116. Elsewhere: Henri III’s *mignons* ‘remplissoient leurs desirs et appetits insatiables de la substance du pauvre peuple’ (*H1*, p. 182); and toward the end August, 1590, ‘Ce pauvre peuple [de Paris] stoit bien à plaindre ayant tant de suiets d’afflictions et de miseres à supporter’ (*H2*, p. 322). [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. *H1*, p. 505. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. Daniel-Odon Hurel, *Guide pour l’histoire des ordres et des congrégations religieuses* (Turnhout, 2001), p. 202; François Bluche, *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle* (Paris, 1990), p. 1121. Bérulle’s reasons for honouring both Jesus and his mother in the foundation of the Oratoire is explained by Stéphane-Marie Morgain in *La Théologie Politique de Pierre de Bérulle* (Paris, 2001), pp. 187-200. [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. Thompson, *Bérulle*,pp. 14-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. *H1*, p. 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. *H1*, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. *H1*,p. 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. Robert Descimon, in his *Préface* to Morgain, *La Théologie Politique*, p .13. [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. *Œuvres complètes*, p. 640. [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. Morgain, *La Théologie Politique*, p. 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. *Ibid*., p. 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. Thus, Rozée: ‘[L]es ligueurs faisoient Estat de la souveraine puissance du pape, en ce qui concerne la religion, et les autres maintenoient l’authorité Royalle, sur toutes les choses qui se trouvent dedans l’estat: les ligueurs disoient que la prosperité de l’Estat estoit en la conservation dela religion; et les autres que la seureté dela religion estoit en la conservation de l’Estat, qui comprenoit la religion: les ligueurs disoient que l’Estat est en la religion, et les autres que la religion est en l’Estat… - *H1*, p. 298. Bérulle’s conviction that the fortunes of the state were dependent upon its religious unity can be seen in a letter to Louis XIII in 1622, where the priest wrote, concerning the presence of heresy in the kingdom, ‘Il est temps de pourvoir à un mal si grand et si furieux qui jette son venin et sa fureur sur toutes les parties nobles de cet Etat menacé de ruine’ – cited in Morgain, *La Théologie Politique*, p. 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. It is not just that he polled badly (receiving only one vote); we can imagine his further dismay when three hours after the votes were counted, Mayenne overturned the results in favour of his own nominees – *RDBVP*, 10, p. 232. [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. Pierre de L’Estoile, *Mémoires-journaux*, ed. G. Brunet et al (Paris, 1879), 6, pp. 176-77. In all the histories and memoirs published in Rozée’s lifetime, this appears to be the only reference to Rozée. A ‘faciendaire’ was one who dealt in intrigue. Cf. Littré, 2, p. 1587: ‘FACIENDE, *s.f.* Terme vieilli. Cabale, intrigue’. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. Descimon, in Morgain, *La Théologie Politique*, p. 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. Dubois, *La conception*, p. 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. Huppert, *The idea*, p. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. *Ibid*., p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. Corrado Vivanti, ‘Paulus Aemilius Gallis condidit historias?’, *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 19 (1964), pp. 1117-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. Cited in Huppert, *The idea*, p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. Mark Greengrass, ‘Clio et le passé récent : les fonctions et motivations historiennes aux lendemains des guerres de Religion françaises’, (unpublished article). [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. *H1*, p. 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. *H1*, pp. 307-08. [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. *H2*, p. 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. *H1*, p. 379. Cf. Goulart, 2, pp. 312-15, 334-37 and 339-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. Cited in Antoinette Gimaret, ‘La mémoire du corps souffrant ou la question de l’horreur. Les récits du siège de Paris de Goulart à Maimbourg’, in J. Berchtold and M.-M. Fragonard (eds), *La mémoire des guerres de religion* (Geneva, 2007), p. 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. Descimon (1983), p. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. Mark Greengrass, ‘The Sixteen, Radical Politics in Paris during the League’, *History* 69 (1984), p. 432. [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. Descimon (1983), p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. Descimon (1983), p. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. *H1*, pp. 498-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. This though many *Ligueurs* at the time saw their loss of Paris as only a temporary setback – Barbara Diefendorf, ‘Henry IV, the Dévots, and the Making of a French Catholic Reformation’, in A. Forrestal and E. Nelson (eds), *Politics and Religion in Early Bourbon France* (Houndsmills, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. Jean-Marie Constant, *La Ligue* (Paris, 1996), pp 434-39. [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. Denis Richet, ‘Aspects socio-culturels des conflits religieux à Paris dans la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle’, *Annales. Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 32 (1977) p. 778. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. *Ibid*., p 769. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. Denis Richet has noted the frequent use of the word *commune* by the Catholic writersof this period when referring to the people of Paris (*Ibid*., p. 769 and n. 43). [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. *Ibid*., p 782. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. William McCuaig, ‘Paris/Jérusalem in L’Estoile, la Satyre Ménippée,Louis Dorléans’, *Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance* 64 (2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. Cited in Richet, ‘Aspects’, p. 783. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. In referring to the scenes of 10 January Rozée exercised caution. Making no mention of the symbolic stamping-out of candles, he focused rather on the cries of ‘misericorde’ that the children made three times before the crucifix within the church – *H1*, p. 499. [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. Amy C. Graves, ‘Propagande’, pp. 232-41. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. *ML*, p. 328. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. *H1*, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. *H2*, p. 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. *H2*, p. 442. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. Valois, pp. xiv-xv. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. *H2*, p. 441; François de Clary, *Philippiques*, *contre les bulles, et autres pratiques de la faction d’Espagne* (Tours, 1611). [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. Earlier in the manuscript, ‘licence’ – the abandonment of conventions, the abuse of liberty – had been the preserve of soldiers and the Politiques. See *H2*, pp. 32 and 304. [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. *H2*, p. 452. Henry III died in August 1589. At the end of August 1590 the siege of Paris was lifted. The young duc de Guise escaped from imprisonment in Tours in August 1591. [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. *H2*, p. 529. *La fleur de lys*, written by either Antoine Arnauld or Pierre Du Fresne-Forget, was published (n.pl.) in 1593, in response to Mayenne’s *Déclaration faicte…pour la reunion de tous les catholiques de ce royaume* (Paris, 1592). [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. See Pallier, pp. 88-92. [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. *H2*, p. 515. [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. Christophe Angebault, ‘L’historiographie officielle des guerres de religion sous Richelieu entre censure et droit d’inventaire’, in J. Berchtold and M.-M. Fragonard (eds), *La mémoire des guerres de religion* (Geneva, 2007), pp. 153-54; George Huppert, *The idea*, pp. 170-75. [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. I have assumed that Rozée wished to be read. He showed attentiveness to the ‘lecteur’ at least twelve times: *H1*, pp. 308, 353, 444, 466, 487 and 532; *H2*, pp159, 172, 174 274, 280 and 503. Of several possible reasons why he wrote in French, not Latin, one may be that he wished to reach a wide and French audience. Cf. Dubois: ‘le choix du latin effectué par de Thou correspond-il à une volonté de diffusion internationale, ou à une volonté de ne s’adresser qu’aux *happy few* de l’élite nationale?’ – Dubois, *La conception*, p. 161. Etienne Pasquier, preparing his *Les Recherches de la France*, translated Latin sources into French, ‘Autrement celuy qui n’eust sceu le latin, lisant ces anciennetez eust esté un autre Tantale, au meilieu des eauës sans en pouvoir boire’ – cited in Anthony Grafton, *The Footnote. A curious history* (London, 1977), pp. 143-44, n. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. Angebault, ‘L’historiographie officielle’, pp. 155-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. Marie-Madeleine Fragonard, ‘Une mémoire individualisée. Editions et rééditions des acteurs et témoins des guerres’, in J. Berchtold and M.-M. Fragonard (eds), *La mémoire des guerres de religion* (Geneva, 2007), pp. 60-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. Robert J. Knecht, *Richelieu* (Harlow, 1991), p. 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. Barbara Diefendorf, ‘Henry IV, the Dévots, and the Making of a French Catholic Reformation’, in A. Forrestal and E. Nelson (eds), *Politics and Religion in Early Bourbon France*, (Basingstoke, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. Henri-Jean Martin discovered that thirty per cent of books published in Paris, 1600-09, were histories – cited in Christophe Angebault, ‘L’historiographie officielle’, p. 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. Marie-Madeleine Fragonard, ‘Une mémoire individualisée. Annexe. Chronologie des parutions de mémoires particuliers’, in J. Berchtold and M.-M. Fragonard (eds), *La mémoire des guerres de religion* (Geneva, 2007), pp. 68-69. [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. Dubois has noted that ‘les années 1605-1620 voient une floraison d’œuvres, où s’expriment des jugements rétrospectifs sur l’époque écoulée.’ – *La Conception*, p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. Marie-Madeleine Fragonard, ‘Une mémoire individualisée’, pp. 29-41. [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. Antoinette Gimaret, ‘La mémoire du corps souffrant’, pp. 205-06. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. *H2*, p. 386. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. *H2*, p. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. *H2*, pp. 77 and 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. *H2*, p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History. Les Lieux de Mémoire’, *Representations* 26 (1989). [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. *Ibid*., p. 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. *Ibid*., p. 12 [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. *Ibid*., p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. I have borrowed the metaphor from Dubois, *La Conception*, p. 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, p. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. ‘Chicot’ was Jean-Antoine d’Anglerais (1540-92); his opponent was Henri de Lorraine, comte de Chaligny and marquis de Moy (1570-1600). [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. *H2*, p. 488. [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. De Thou, 11, p. 468. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. *H2*, p. 488. [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. Rozée followed de Thou in making the Lorraine connection. Henri de Lorraine, comte de Chaligny (1570-1600) was brother to Philippe-Emanuelle de Lorraine, duc de Mercœur – see Louis Moréri, *Le grand dictionnaire historique*, 10 vols (Geneva, 1995), 3, p. 434. He was the son of Nicolas de Lorraine, duc de Mercœur and Catherine de Lorraine. [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. Cf. re Château-Thierry, *H2*, p. 407: ‘… elle [la reine-mère] alla loger au village d’estampes en la maison d’un parisien nommé Rozée advocat, distant de la ville [Château-Thierry] de huit ou neuf cens pas’. [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. *H2*, p. 50. That such portraits were in circulation is confirmed by Pierre de L’Estoile, *Les belles figures et drolleries de la Ligue (1589-1600)*, in *Mémoires-journaux*, ed. G. Brunet et al (Paris, 1877), 4, pp. 97, 103 and 113-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. *H2*, p. 270. [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. *H2*, p. 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. *H2*, p. 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. *H2*, pp. 86 and 101. Henri IV is credited with having made a similar comment upon his entry into Paris in March 1594: ‘Le jour de son entrée dans Paris, le Roi fit venir à son couvert Nicolas, secrétaire de la Cour sous Charles IX, et de Mayenne pendant les troubles : “Monsieur Nicolas, lui dit ce prince, quel parti suiviez-vous dans ces derniers tems? – A la vérité, Sire, j’avais quitté le soleil pour suivre la lune. – Mais que veux-tu dire de me voir à Paris comme j’y suis? – Je dit, Sire, qu’on a rendu à César ce qui appartenait à César, comme il faut rendre à Dieu ce qui appartient à Dieu. – *Ventre-saint-gris! On ne me l’a pas rendu, on me l’a bien vendu*”. Cela fut dit en présence du comte de Brissac et de quelques autres qui avaient bien stipulé leurs intérêts avant de rendre à César ce qui lui appartenait’ – Charles Desrosiers, *Henri IV. La vie, les amours, et les bon mots de ce grand roi* (Paris, 1814), p. 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. André de Brancas, seigneur de Villars, d. 1595; Robert Devereux, 2nd earl of Essex (1565-1601). [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. *H2*, p. 465. [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. *H1*, p. 455. [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. Writing about *Ligueur* Laon, Mark Greengrass has shown how both rumour and disinformation could flourish in an urban society fractured by religious and political conflict; for Antoine Richart, an office-holder in Laon at the time of the troubles, ‘opinion’ had the capacity to devalue truth, particularly if that opinion originated from the lower levels of society. Cf. Mark Greengrass, *Rumeur et Bien Public dans les Ligues Provinciales Catholiques (1589-1593) : l’exemple de Laon* [Communication au colloque international à l’université de Montpellier (avril 2008) sur ‘Les Ligues et leurs alliés dans la France des guerres de religion, 1576-1594, organisé par l’université de Murcia sous l’égide du projet ‘Red Columnaria’.]. Rozée was discerning about the reliability of rumour, but took care to avoid linking his judgements to the question of social degree. [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. Emile Littré, *Dictionnaire de la Langue Française*, 4 vols(Paris, 1874), 2, p. 1171. [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. *H2*, p. 281 (referring back to p. 253), and p. 152 (*sic*) 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. J.H. Shennan, *The Parlement of Paris* (Stroud, 1998), pp. 31-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
340. Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Nouvelle Histoire de Paris. Paris au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1986), p. 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
341. Adolphe Berty, *Topographie historique du vieux Paris* (Paris, 1897), pp. 17 and 350. [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
342. The area around the Palais was a particular spot where crowds regularly congregated for gossip – Dália M. Leonardo, ‘“Cut off this rotten member”: The Rhetoric of Heresy, Sin, and Disease in the Ideology of the French Catholic League’, in *The Catholic Historical Review* 88 (2002), p. 249. [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
343. Renouard’s calculation is cited in Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Nouvelle histoire de Paris. Paris au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1986), p. 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
344. Evidence regarding these eleven has been drawn from Descimon (1983). Roland Hacte, a notary at the Châtelet, served the *Ligue*  as a militia captain ; he died in 1590 – Descimon (1983), p. 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
345. *H2*, p. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
346. *H2*, p. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
347. *H2*, p. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
348. *H2*, p. 106. One definition of *discours* is ‘propos de conversation, d’entretien’ – see Emile Littré, *Dictionnaire de la langue française*,4 vols (Paris, 1873-74), 2, p. 1178. [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
349. *H2*, p. 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
350. *H2*, pp. 280-81. The content of the three stories features in chapter 6 below. [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
351. *H2*, pp. 432-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
352. *H2*, p. 423. [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
353. *H2*, pp. 472-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
354. Valois, pp. xxxix-xlv. [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
355. Rozée singled out one of his sources for praise:‘celuy qui a le mieux escrit les choses qui se sont passées en ces années dedans les affaires du Roy, quand il ny a point apporté de passion’ – H2, p. 403. Valois believed this to be a reference to de Thou – Valois, pp. xlii-xliii. [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
356. It is in *H2* that we encounter a particularly engaging dialogue across the walls of the Paris siege. *Un bourgeois de Paris* presents the *Ligueur* case to François de Saint-Luc. The origin of the pamphlet is unknown; Valois suggested that such dialogues, ‘discussions pleines de couleur locale et de vérité, …purent être prises sur le vif par un témoin, puis publiées par un polémiste’ – Valois, p. xliv; *H2*, pp. 300-04. Rozée’s inclusion of the dialogue across the walls reminds us that he must have been very conscious of loyalties being stretched in all sorts of ways in *Ligueur* Paris. [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
357. A comparison of the accounts by Rozée and de Thou of the early stages of the siege of Rouen shows the difficulty of identifying plagiarism. Both authors devoted around six thousand words to the opening developments. As de Thou’s narrative (*Histoire universelle*, 11, pp. 452-67) had appeared in 1614, it was Rozée who could copy, if he would. Comparison leaves little doubt that Rozée’s account (*H2*, pp. 477-88) was shaped by de Thou’s, but there was no word-for-word copying. Not even when the historians could legitimately use the same words – as, for example, in describing the content of the *Arrêt* of the Rouen Parlement, 7 January 1592 – do we find the same words used. Both authors refer in detail to the *Arrêt* but neither quoted its exact words. Consequently, common content is worded differently. De Thou dated the ruling as ‘trois jours après’ hangings that took place on 4 January; Rozée refers to ‘un arrest qui fut publié le septiesme de janvier’. Both writers noted the requirement that the Oath of the Union be regularly confirmed, but again the wording is different. Thus Rozée’s ‘que le serment de l’union fait le 22 de janvier 1589... seroit renouvelé de mois en mois en l’assemblée générale’ bears only a semantic similarity to de Thou’s ‘On ordonna même qu’on renouvelleroit tous les mois le serment de l’Union’.

     Moreover, there are subtle differences of content between the two accounts: Rozée put his own spin on the information he gleaned from de Thou. Regarding the *Arrêt* of 7 January 1592, he alone observed that the regular re-swearing of the oath would take place in the ‘abbaye de St. Orcin’ – where better than a place of worship? And it is Rozée who, referring to Rouen’s governor, reminded his readers that Villars was none other than the ‘lieutenant de henry de lorraine (fils aisné du duc de Mayenne)’ – important detail for a *Ligueur*.

     In other places too, Rozée inserted detail omitted by de Thou. An example is his account of the hanging of Brossin, a Dominican monk hanged on Biron’s orders after the surrender of Gournay to the royalists. Brossin was no Jacques Clément. According to Rozée, his offence was merely his refusal to acknowledge Navarre as King of France. Rozée noted that such savagery was not ‘un bon moyen pour persuader ceux de Rouen à se réduire sous son obéisance’. A few pages later Rozée told the story of the defection of the château Flanchon to *Ligue* forces – *H2*, p. 485. It may be because Flanchon was not highly strategic, and was at some distance from Rouen, that de Thou omitted the story. Rozée sensed the need to chalk up every *Ligue* victory.

     If Rozée’s inclusion of material that had not come from de Thou reminds us that Rozée was acquainted with several sources of information, it is his omission of some of de Thou’s material which confirms his partiality. For example, de Thou dwelt at length on the threat of growing Spanish infringement on French sovereignty – De Thou, 11, pp. 460-63; on this sensitive point, Rozée stayed silent.

     We conclude that the example considered reveals skilful handling of material rather than plagiarism. [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
358. The literature came in several genres: ‘Placards, pamphlets, broadsheets, and woodcuts began to circulate everywhere in Paris…’ – Leonardo, ‘“Cut off this rotten member”’, pp. 248-49. [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
359. *H1*, p. 298. [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
360. *H1*, p. 299. [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
361. *H1*, p. 503. [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
362. *H2*, pp. 62, 61 and 49 respectively. The other two co-authors of the *Ad assertionem… responsio* were René Benoist and Jean Lommedé; the work has also been attributed to Charles Faye as sole author. See Pallier, p. 71, n. 70 and p. 314. [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
363. *H2*, p. 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
364. *H1*, p. 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
365. Jean-Marie Constant, *La Ligue* (Paris, 1996), p. 436. [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
366. Labitte, p. 258. [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
367. *H2*, p. 443. [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
368. *H2*, p. 453; Christophe Angebault, ‘L’historiographie officielle des guerres de religion sous Richelieu entre censure et droit d’inventaire’, in J. Berchtold and M.-M. Fragonard (eds), *La Mémoire des Guerres de Religion. La concurrence des genres historiques XVIe-XVIIIe siècles* (Geneva, 2007), p. 161. [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
369. *H1*, p. 300. [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
370. *H1*, p. 503. [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
371. *H2*, pp. 35-59. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
372. *H2*, pp. 117-126. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
373. *H2*, pp. 435-50. [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
374. *H2*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
375. *H2*, p. 364. [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
376. *H2*, pp. 416-23. Cf. **Marco** Penzi, ‘L'histoire tragique et mémorable de Claude de Sainctes évêque d'Évreux’, Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques 44 (2009).  [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
377. *H1*, p. 456. [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. *H1*, pp. 77 and 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. *H1*, p. 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. *H1*, p. 379. Rozée had come across the supposed letters in *ML*, 2, pp. 312-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. *H1*, pp. 60, 189. See also, in the singular, ‘un mauvais mémoire’, p. 436. [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. *H1*, p. 434. [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. *H1*, p. 368. [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. *H1*, p. 460. [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. *H2*, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. *H2*, pp. 337-39. *H2*, p. 380. Goulart seems keen to disgust his readers, and thus to taint the chevalier’s reputation. He writes that one of the rodents had to be tugged out of a wound on which it was feeding, and he quotes a popular verse that suggested that if the rats and mice had been taken to Paris with the body, then *les zélés* could have enjoyed a meal. See *ML*, 4, p. 339. Some of these details are also recorded in L’Estoile, 5, pp. 293-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. *H2*, p. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. *H2*, pp. 58-59. After such invective, Rozée’s later criticism of an injudicious Huguenot who with one stroke of the pen gave insult to the royal council seems mild - *H2*, p. 453 (Jean de Serres had suggested that the council had engineered the young duc de Guise’s escape from prison in order to cause division in the *Ligue* camp). [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. *H2*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. At the start of the *Conseil salutaire* the anonymous author asserted that he was French and Catholic but toward the end he alleged that *Ligue* soldiers had committed atrocities and acts of sacrilege; Rozée considered the allegation to be impossible, and claimed that ‘les plus judicieux’ agreed with him – *H2*, p. 1; *Conseil salutaire d’un bon françoys aux Parisiens* (Paris, 1589), pp. 3 and 92-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. *H2*, p. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. *H2*, p. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. *H2*, pp. 48-49. [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. Julien Peleus, *Histoire des faicts de la vie de Henry le Grand* (Paris, 1616), p. 660. [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. *H2*, pp. 48-49; Palma-Cayet, p. 151; Jean de Serres, *Inventaire général de l’Histoire de France* (Geneva, 1619), p. 604; Jean Taffin, *L’Estat de l’Eglise* (Bergen op Zoom, 1605), p. 693. I have not found the passage in Goulart. It was not long before the house changed hands again: it was sold to Hierosme de Gondi). [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. I have not been able to check Rozée’s allegation through to Michel Hurault’s *La fleur de lys* (Paris, 1593). On the other hand, there is no doubt that he had read the *Déclaration faicte par monseigneur le duc de Mayenne* (Paris, 1592) – he quoted several sections of it with accuracy – see *H2*, pp. 527-28. [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. *H2*, p. 117. The offender was de Thou – 11, p. 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. *H2*, p. 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. *H2*, p. 273. [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. *H2*, p. 359. [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. *H2*, pp. 424-50. [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. Denis Godefroy, *Maintenue et défense des princes souverains* (1592), Preface, n.p. [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. *Ibid*., pp. 72-74. [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. *H2*, p. 441. I have not identified the author of the riposte. [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. François de Clary, *Philippiques*, *contre les bulles, et autres pratiques de la faction d’Espagne* (Tours, 1592), pp. 1r and 73v. [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. *H2*, p. 441. [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. De Thou, 11, p. 376. [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. Matteo Zampini, cited in *H2*, p. 446. [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. *H2*, p. 472. [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. *H1*, p. 147. [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. *H1*, p. 350. The unnamed *discours*  was the *Histoire tragique des cruautés & mechancetés horribles commises en la Comté de Montbelliard…* published by Goulart – *ML*, 3, pp. 667-692. As an allegation of *Ligueur* atrocities the *discours* was not unique. *Ligueurs* should behave well. This cherished view led Rozée into firm denial of allegations made in the *Conseil Salutaire*. The *bon françoys* had asked the people of Paris, ‘Sçavez vous pas que vos soldats dont il y a grande partie de Prestres, et de Moines tout du long du Caresme ont mangé de la chair...?’ – and he had gone on to accuse the soldiers of mocking the sacrament of baptism (by baptising animals), violating women and girls of all ages, and desecrating altars, before concluding the passage, ‘C’est une forme essentielle d’un bon *Ligueur*’ – *Conseil Salutaire d’un bon françoys aux Parisiens* (n.pl., 1589), pp. 92-94, quotations, pp. 92 and 94. Somewhere between Rozée’s writing and the *Conseil Salutaire* lies the truth. Fayet – neither anti-*Ligue* nor, apparently, strongly *Ligueur* – was closer to the *bon françoys* than to Rozée on the issue of behaviour. He was scandalised in particular by the Catholic soldiers under the command of Rosne and Labourdesière at Montmorency in October 1589: ‘Ils entrèrent de force; laquelle ville fut pillée, les filles violées et femmes forcées’; elsewhere, ‘Ils commirent es dicts lieux telles cruaultés, que le Turc n’en eust sceu faire davantage’ – *Journal historique de Pierre Fayet sue les troubles de la Ligue*, ed. Victor Luzarche (Tours, 1852), pp. 74-75. [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. *H1*, p. 350. [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. *H1*, p. 444; *Les Cruautez execrables commises par les hérétiques, à l’endroit des catholiques de la ville de Nyort en Poictou* (Paris, 1589). [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. *H1*, p. 444. The charges were denied by both d’Aubigné and de Thou – see Pallier, p. 298. [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. *H1*, pp. 170-78 and 189-94. The two texts were entitled, respectively, *Advertissement au Roy de Navarre de se réunir avec le Roy et la foy catholique* (1585) and *Déclaration des causes qui ont meu Monseigneur le cardinal de Bourbon* (1585). [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. The document is presented as *Memoires dressez par les deputez des villes entrez en la ligue catholique* – *H1*, pp. 256-62. I have not been able to trace an original version. [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. Palma-Cayet, p. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. *H1*, p. 262. [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. Charles Labitte considered dom Bernard’s response to be insolent – and noted that the king had written *de sa main* – see Labitte, p. 89. [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. The *Response de dom Bernard…* was published by Guillaume Bichon and by Nicolas Nivelle and Rolin Thierry – see Pallier, p. 325. [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. *H2*, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. *H2*, p. 10; *Response*, pp. 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. *H2*, p. 10; *Response*, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. *H2*, p. 10; *Response*, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. *H2*, p. 11; *Response*, p. 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. *H2*, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. Apart from a break of five or six months, du Vair served as *garde des Sceaux* from May 1616 through to his death in August 1621 – Jouanna, p. 868. [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. *H1*, p. 381. [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. *H1*, p. 383. [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. *H1*, p. 385. [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. *H1*, p. 386. [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. *H1*, pp. 494-98. [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. Sylvie Daubresse, *Le Parlement de Paris ou la Voix de la Raison (1559-1589)* (Geneva, 2005), p 440. [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. *H1*, pp. 397-402. Daubresse, *Le Parlement de Paris*, pp. 440-41. [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. *H1*, p. 402. [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. *H1*, p. 397. [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. *H1*, p. 73. It is likely that, writing many years later, Rozée was aware of Bodin’s interest in witch-craft, revealed for example in his *Démonomanie* (1581). It was an interest which might have led some to wonder if an expert on such matters might himself be a practitioner. In the nineteenth century Antoine Richart wrote of an occasion, in January 1590, when Bodin had been arrested for being in possession of censored books, including texts on magic. The books were burnt, and Bodin was released with a warning. See, *Mémoires sur la ligue dans le laonnais*, ed. Antoine Richart (Laon, 1869), pp. 228-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. Paul Lawrence Rose, ‘The *Politique* and the Prophet: Bodin and the Catholic League 1589-1594’, *The Historical Journal* 21 (1978), pp. 783- 808. [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. Although Rozée was more cautious than Bodin on the relationship between divine providence and the regicide, both men believed in a God who intervened. ‘Bodin évince un sens très puissant de vivre sous le jugement de Dieu, et son intervention active dans les affaires humaines’ – Mark Greengrass, *Rumeur et Bien Public dans les Ligues Provinciales Catholiques (1589-1593) : l’exemple de Laon*, communication au colloque international à l’université de Montpellier (avril 2008) sur ‘Les Ligues et leurs alliés dans la France des guerres de religion, 1576-1594, organisé par l’université de Murcia sous l’égide du projet ‘Red Columnaria’, p. 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. *Ibid*., pp. 789 and 807-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. *Ibid*., pp. 792 and 798. According to Frederic J. Baumgartner, Bodin recognised as fundamental only the Salic law and the inalienability of the royal domain – see ‘The Case for Charles X’, *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 4 (1973), p. 89, n. 4. Confusingly, Baumgartner was to write two years later: ‘It is clear that Bodin was persuaded to join the League largely on the basis of the fundamental law of Catholicity’ – Frederic J. Baumgartner, *Radical Reactionaries* (Geneva, 1975), p. 166. This later view was subsequently called into question by Paul Lawrence Rose in ‘Bodin and the Bourbon Succession to the French Throne, 1583-1594’, *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 9 (1978), p. 92, n. 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. Antoine Richart saw it differently. This royalist account has the town’s *Ligueurs* plotting by late January and finally ‘going public’ on 21 March. Richart’s narrative suggests several reasons for the delay; none of these redound to the credit of Laon’s royalists, whom Richart considered to be very lily-livered. The problem lay with the *Ligueurs*. Initially, theywere unsure if they had enough support, and they were unarmed. They also lacked nerve. At one stage they took the decision to seize the town’s governor, only to find that none of them had the courage to carry it out. Later they chose *mardi gras* to stage their coup, but then postponed it for fear that the townspeople would be drunk and of unpredictable mood on that day. Awareness that the royalist duc de Longueville was in the vicinity, and disagreement amongst themselves on how best to proceed, both made the *Ligueurs* hesitant. When adherence to the *Sainte Union* was finally publicly recommended, it was only after a staged prison ‘break-out’ had demonstrated that the town’s mood could be trusted – *Mémoires*, ed. Richart, pp. 8-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. *H1*, p. 481. [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. The proximity and intentions of Captain Bourg are mentioned by Rozée (*H1*, p. 481) – but not, surprisingly, by Richart. [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. Nor did Rozée doubt Bodin’s authorship. The suggestion by some historians that the *Lettre de Laon* is a *ligueur* forgery has been based on the divergence between the views it expresses and those in the *Republic*. On this, see Baumgartner, *Radical Reactionaries*, pp. 165-66, n. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. *H2*, pp. 127-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. *H2*, p. 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. Jean Bodin, *Lettre de Monsieur Bodin (Laon 20 janvier 1590)* (Lyon, 1590), p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. *Ibid*., p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. *Ibid*., pp. 8 and 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. As a collective term to describe fervent and politically inclined Catholics in Paris, the name ‘*Seize*’ derives from the existence of sixteen *quartiers* in the city in early-modern times; it was in use as early as 1587. In this chapter and the next, I use the term in two ways: first, as Rozée himself used it, to denote the small leadership group of varying number that was known also as the *conseil de la Ligue*; secondly, to refer to that wider cohort of fervent Catholic individuals whose commitment to the cause was recorded in primary historical sources and whose identities were disclosed in a corpus of 225 *Ligueurs* constituted by Robert Descimon in Descimon (1983). [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. *H1*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. Thus, for Rozée, a Catholic league was a ‘contre-ligue’ – *H1*, pp. 2, 86, and elsewhere. See Jean-Marie Constant, *La Ligue* (Paris, 1996), pp. 55-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. *H1*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. *H1*, pp. 4-9 and 57-74; Elie Barnavi, *Le Parti de Dieu. Etude sociale et politique de la Ligue parisienne* (Louvain, 1980) p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. A result of Rozée’s purposes was that Jacques d’Humières was all but written out of his story. In truth, Henri III asserted his leadership of the *Ligue* only once he realised that to do so would bolster his authority. It has been asserted that Guise was head of the 1576 *Ligue* – Ascoli, p. 13. By contrast Constant, echoing Rozée’s assessment, ascribed to the duke a more marginal role – Jean-Marie Constant, *Les Guise* (Paris, 1984), pp. 81-82 and *La Ligue*, pp. 70-76). [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. *H1*, pp. 59 and 86-88. The 1576 resistance of senior judges to radically minded legal practitioners below them may be seen as prefiguring the crisis that led to the Brisson affair in 1591. [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. *H1*, p. 158. The consternation caused by Anjou’s death took France into uncharted waters. ‘No one had written the script for a unitary dynastic state with a sacral kingship where the succession lay in the hands of a Protestant prince, the Bourbon Henry, king of Navarre’ – Mark Greengrass, *Christendom Destroyed. Europe 1517-1648* (London, 2014), p. 426. [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. *H1*, pp. 181-85. The historianproceeded to give the text of the princes’ manifesto (31 March, 1585) – *H1*, pp. 189-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. Unlike in 1576, the 1584 Paris *Ligue* seems to have emerged spontaneously; it was not ‘télécommandée de l’extérieur’ – Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p .20. [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. Ascoli, p. 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. For an excellent analysis of the royal policies that were so resented in the 1580s (the fiscal exactions, the famine, the king’s folly); the plots that the Paris *Ligue* hatched against the king; the varied forms of propaganda that drew thousands of Parisians into the *Ligue* ranks; and the several plans (whose effect would have been to diminish royal power) that were discussed, see Ascoli, pp. 69-136. [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. Already in the 1560s judgements on governance that were steered more by pragmatism than by religion had been described with the adjective ‘Politique’. Valuing expediency over conscience, those of Politiquepersuasionwere inclined to be accommodating in religious matters. As this stance suggested religious indifference it is unsurprising that from early on ‘Politique’ was used pejoratively by *Ligueurs*. After the St Bartholomew’s Day massacre it seemed obvious to many – both Catholics and Protestants – that peace was preferable to conflict, even if it meant co-existence of religion. In the 1570s those who thought in that way were liable to be referred to collectively as ‘les Politiques’; Rozée had this understanding when he referred to Henri de Montmorency-Damville as representative of ‘la faction des politiques’ and of ‘le corps des politiques de France’ – *H1*, pp. 66-67. But for *Ligueurs* it could not be peace at any price. After 1584, many Politiquesrejected proposals to tamper with the royal succession and thus found themselves in conflict with those Paris *Ligueurs* for whom the Protestant Henri of Navarre was inadmissible – Jouanna, pp. 1210-13.In the *Histoire*, Rozée’s first use of the noun Politique denoted those Catholics who had pulled back from *Ligue* commitment – *H1*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. *H1*, p. 188. Despite being viewed collectively by contemporaries, it is doubtful that the Politiques were ever a definable group, a ‘party’ – for discussion of this, see Christopher Bettinson, ‘The Politiques and the Politique Party: a Reappraisal’, in K. Cameron (ed), *From Valois to Bourbon: Dynasty, State and Society in Early Modern France* (Exeter, 1989), pp. 42-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. The Politiques‘ne se servent de la religion que pour leurs commodités temporelles’ – *H1*, p. 92. [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
467. Cf. ‘The term [Politiques] referred to a variety of persons who were frustrated at the failure of war to solve France’s religious problem’ - Dalia M. Leonardo, ‘“Cut off this rotten member”: The Rhetoric of Heresy, Sin, and Disease in the Ideology of the French Catholic League’, in *The Catholic Historical Review* 88 (2002), p. 250. [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
468. *H1*, pp. 272-78. [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
469. On some of these pamphlets, see Bettinson, ‘The Politiques’, pp. 47-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
470. *H1*, p. 490. [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
471. When, in early summer, measures were being taken to defend the city against assault by the combined armies of two kings, it was deemed expedient to incarcerate prominent royalists. In the event, the operation ‘engendra beaucoup de mecontentement, tant pour la qualité d’aucuns qui furent emprisonnez ou des-armez, que pour ce que le choix avoit esté mal fait en plusieurs personnes, car cette iniure les aliena de la bonne affection qu’ils portoient à leur party, et les rendit politiques’ – *H2*, pp. 31-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
472. *H1*, pp. 188 and 255. Barnavi has explained how the mid-1580s Paris *Ligue* can be conceived as operating at two levels: ‘Il s’agit en fait … de deux phénomènes distincts: d’une part, le groupe de conspirateurs, les chefs et promoteurs de la rébellion ligueuse; de l’autre, l’ensemble des adhérents, militants obscurs ou simples exécutants et hommes de main, qui s’identifient aux principes généraux définis au sommet et en suivent les consignes, sans participer en aucune manière à l’élaboration des décisions’ – Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 64. If already a member at this early stage, Rozée belonged in the second group. [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
473. *H1*, p. 256. These details are carried uniquely by the *Histoire anonyme*. [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
474. Most conspicuously, the historian largely avoided naming the early *Ligueurs*. Matthieu de Launoy is described in passing as ‘[un] grand ligueur’ (in 1585), and Nicolas Ameline’s rallying missions beyond the Loire and later in the north are touched upon – *H1*, pp. 216 and 262. Roland Hacte was active on the *journée de St Séverin* – *H1*, pp. 300-01, as were the clerics Jean Boucher and René Benoît. As for infiltrators, the historiannever mentioned Nicolas Poulain, but he was aware of the problem: ‘Toutes ces assemblées, ces conseils… ne se faisoient point avec tant de discretion que le Roy n’en fut averty… car aucuns s’estoient fourrez dans ces conseils pour en donner advis à S. M.’ – *H1*, p. 262. [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
475. *H1*, p. 256. [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
476. *H1*, pp. 256-62. The statement, published in 1587, later appeared in Palma-Cayet, pp. 34-38. The royalist historian considered the document to be clear evidence of the *Ligueurs*’ ‘mauvaise intention, et… leurs calomnies et practiques contre le Roy’; they were using ‘le prétexte de la religion’ to achieve their own ends – pp. 34 and 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
477. *H1*, p. 262. Ascoli observed : ‘… the Sixteen, formed independently of any noble or group, wished to remain consciously independent’; with regard to Spanish influence, he noted that none of Mendoza’s dispatches mentioned the Sixteen, either collectively or in person – ‘“The Sixteen”’, pp. 3 and 65-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
478. We devote part of chapter 8 to the preachers. [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
479. *H1*, pp. 279-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
480. Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 72. For a discussion of the origins of the conversation, see Valois, p. 154, n. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
481. *H1*, pp. 300-01. [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
482. Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
483. Ascoli, p. 143. See *H1*, pp. 360-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
484. Ascoli, pp. 151-58. Rozée observed that the erection of barricades had immediately created ‘cinq[uan]te mil ligueurs dedans Paris qui n’y avoient iamais pensé… chacun se rangea au gros, et se mit du costé des plus forts’ – *H1*, p. 366. [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
485. Rozée tells us that the *Ligueurs* were snubbed (not seized) at the Hôtel de Villewhen they inquired what was going on– *H1*, p. 365. [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
486. Rozée emphasised the innocence of the duc de Guise – in bed when the ‘[le] dessein du roy’ began to unfold – *H1*, p. 365. [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
487. Ascoli, pp. 159-65. H.G. Koenigsberger had earlier identified weak government as one of several pre-requisites of sixteenth-century revolutionary opposition movements, one of which – increased state power – had been evident when troops were brought into Paris on 12 May – H.G. Koenigsberger, ‘The Organisation of Revolutionary Parties in France and the Netherlands during the Sixteenth Century, *Journal of Modern History* 27 (1955), p. 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
488. It had been ‘[un] accident inesperé de tous les hommes, non preveu par aucun… une entreprise delaquelle, il n’a jamais paru autre progrez, que ces gens de guerre qu’on vit entrer dans paris…’ – *H1*, p. 373. Should the strength of Rozée’s denial of any prior planning make us wonder if he knew more than he dared admit? In any case, Barnavi has made it clear that 12 May has to be seen in the context of planning that stretched back several weeks among the *Seize*, and even of machinations in Madrid – Barnavi, *Le Parti*, pp. 119-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
489. *H1*, p. 375. Ascoli, pp. 171-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
490. *H1*, p. 375. [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
491. *H1*, p. 379. [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
492. Ascoli, pp. 175-78. Rozée denied that this strategy was used – *H1*, p. 379. Perhaps he considered any suggestion of a league of cities, with obvious connotations of urban autonomy, to be better kept separate from the narrative of May 1588. [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
493. *H1*, p. 374. [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
494. *H1*, p. 375. [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
495. *H1*, p. 374. [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
496. *H1*, p. 373. [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
497. *H1*, p. 373. In fact, Rozée knew that some of the king’s soldiers had died (p. 369). [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
498. *H1*, p. 373. In fact, the Day was a demonstration of a division between Politiquesand *Ligueurs* that had been hardening since 1584. At this point, we see Rozée wavering a little. Perhaps he wondered if the Day had been, on balance, an adverse turning point: ‘Dieu pardonne à ceux qui en ont esté cause, car les hommes ne leur pardonneront pas volontiers’ (p. 373). [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
499. Rozée was particularly impressed by Du Vair’s speech – *H1*, pp. 381-86. [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
500. The Parlement’s failed attempt at this juncture to halt the elections of new militia officers was an early manifestation of an institutional conflict which eventuated in the death of Barnabé Brisson. [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
501. Rozée was satisfied with this – see *H1*, pp. 402-04. [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
502. Ascoli, pp. 178-202. [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
503. *Ibid*., pp. 203-226. Ascoli considered Roland’s work to be ‘[t]he most important and interesting’ of the *Ligueur* pamphlets published in the months before the Estates-General, and claimed that the reforms it suggested ‘show that the Sixteen were not simply a group of carping critics, of rebels without a plan…’ – Ascoli, pp. 209 and 210. It is surprising that Rozée made no mention of the *Humble remonstrance*. See also footnotes 73 and 75 below. [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
504. *H1*, pp. 416-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
505. *H1*, p. 421. [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
506. *H1*, p. 415. Both men had led Protestants into battle during the civil wars. [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
507. Ascoli, pp. 236-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
508. *Ibid*., p. 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
509. Cited in Ascoli, pp. 244-50. [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
510. In autumn 1588 Charles-Emmanuel of Savoy took advantage of France’s internal problems to invade the French-held marquisat de Saluces in northern Italy. [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
511. *H1*, p. 386. [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
512. *H1*, pp. 360ff. Be that as it may, the fact remains that Guise’s presence greatly influenced the day’s events: ‘Une chose est certaine: l’arrivée du duc galvanise les Parisiens, emporte les derniers scrupules, les dernières hésitations, fait de chaque opposant un insurgé en puissance, offre à tout ce monde le sentiment sécurisant de la présence d’un père’ – Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
513. *H1*, p. 375. The historian’s assertion not only exculpated Guise but also served as a reminder that the Paris *Ligue* considered itself to be beholden to none. [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
514. *H1*, p. 394. [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
515. *H1*, pp. 421-23. [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
516. *H1*, p. 183. [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
517. *H1*, p. 431. [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
518. We have already noted that Valois’ 1914 publication ended with the Blois murders. It was perhaps the decision of a manuscript-binder to divide Rozée’s long work into two volumes of roughly equal length. This had the effect of making a break – illogically – mid-way through a line of argument concerning the behaviour of *Ligueur* soldiers at Tours in May 1589. [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
519. *H1*, p. 432. [↑](#footnote-ref-519)
520. *H1*, p. 432. The historianhad in mind two *artifices* designed to turn the king against the duc de Guise. One was ‘la lecture continuelle qu’il faisoit de ce discours intitulé, excellent et libre discours sur l’estat present de la france, que ceux du party protestant avoient artificieusemnt ietté dans les Estats et aux propres mains du Roy pour y servir d’ardente allumette qui eschauferoit l’esprit de S.M. à l’exécution de son dessein car par la comparaison des trois partis qu’il formoit en france, separant celuy du duc de guise d’avec celuy du roy, qu’il figuroit le plus foible, aprez avoir fait admirer la vertu et la vaillance du duc de guise et craindre son ambition, il mettoit le salut du Roy en la ruine du duc de guise, ayant posé pour fondement que le dessein du duc de guise n’estoit autre que l’usurpation de la couronne’ – *H1*, pp. 432-33. Michel Hurault’s first *Discours sur l’Estat de la France* (1588), whose main points Rozée has summarised fairly, appeared anonymously in 1588. The second *artifice* was the repeated warning (from advisers who claimed to have evidence) that if the king did not hasten to take action against Guise, then Guise would launch some kind of pre-emptive strike – *H1*, pp. 432-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-520)
521. François noted popular grief and clerical anger: ‘Incontinent les dites nouvelles venues, tout le peuple de Paris fond en pleurs et depuys le petit jusques au plus grand. Les prédicateurs de la dite Ville se mettent à deschirer la malheureuse vye de ce tirand de roy d’avoir exercé une telle cruaulté envers ung tel prince que en la chrestienté il ne s’en sçauroit trouvé ung pareil…’ – p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-521)
522. Ascoli, p. 267. [↑](#footnote-ref-522)
523. *Ibid*., p. 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-523)
524. *H1*, p. 450; Ascoli, p. 269. [↑](#footnote-ref-524)
525. *H1*, p. 450. It was apparently at this meeting that the decision was taken to make the dramatic announcements that followed the next morning – see p. 451. [↑](#footnote-ref-525)
526. *H1*, p. 450. François observed: ‘Incontinent les dites nouvelles venues, tout le peuple de Paris fond en pleurs et depuys le petit jusques au plus grand’ - *Journal de François bourgeois de Paris*, ed.Eugène Saulnier(Paris, 1913), p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-526)
527. The others – La Chapelle-Marteau, Compans and Costeblanche – were imprisoned at Blois – Ascoli, pp. 259-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-527)
528. *H1*, p. 450. [↑](#footnote-ref-528)
529. *H1*, p. 451. [↑](#footnote-ref-529)
530. *H1*, p. 451. [↑](#footnote-ref-530)
531. *H1*, p. 451. [↑](#footnote-ref-531)
532. *H1*, p. 451. Rozée was not impressed by Roland. He noted the *échevin*’s lack of ‘résolution’, and observed that he had not been invited to the meeting on the 24th when the *conseil* had devised its strategy. [↑](#footnote-ref-532)
533. John H. M. Salmon, *Society in Crisis. France in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1975), p. 251. [↑](#footnote-ref-533)
534. *H1*, p. 452. This further criticism of Nicolas Roland would suggest that any family connection Rozée may have had with him through his mother Anne ‘Raolland’ – see Descimon (1983) p. 214 – was distant. [↑](#footnote-ref-534)
535. *H1*, p. 452. [↑](#footnote-ref-535)
536. Ascoli, pp. 269-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-536)
537. *H1*, pp. 451-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-537)
538. Ascoli, p. 272. See n. 16 above. An anonymous writer of the time, horrified to see the good leaders of Paris being replaced by lesser men, wondered how long God would allow ‘ces sangliers dans… [sa] vigne’. The same metaphor was later used by Rozée to describe the damage done by heresy; ‘le sanglier n'entre point dedans la vigne, qu'il n'y laisse de ses fumées’ – *Conseil salutaire d’un bon françoys aux Parisiens* (Paris, 1589), pp. 21-24, quotation, p. 24; *H1*, p. 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-538)
539. *H1*, pp. 188, 256 and 262. [↑](#footnote-ref-539)
540. *H1*, p. 491. This passage contains Rozée’s first significant reference to the *Seize* and it suggests that the title only became current after the February 1589. In fact, the name was in use by 1587 – Ascoli, p. 274, n. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-540)
541. Rozée remembered the *Seize* as ‘un fort grand nombre’, ‘une grande compagnie’ – *H2*, pp. 192 and 307. [↑](#footnote-ref-541)
542. Ascoli, pp. 273-76. [↑](#footnote-ref-542)
543. *H1*, p. 490. [↑](#footnote-ref-543)
544. Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, p. 260. [↑](#footnote-ref-544)
545. Ascoli, p. 273. [↑](#footnote-ref-545)
546. *Ibid*., p. 272. [↑](#footnote-ref-546)
547. *H1*, pp. 491-98. It is impossible to determine Rozée’s opinion of the purge of the Parlement; his account is completely bland, neither triumphalist nor judgemental. Another contemporary, François, robustly and unashamedly *Ligueur*, wrote a more vivid account of the event, but he too stopped short of celebration and remarked that what happened on 16 January was quite unprecedented – *Journal de François*, pp. 32-33. Writing from a *Ligueur* standpoint, both François and Rozée had in common a commitment to accuracy and a marked reticence regarding their own stories. Both also gave substance to their work by drawing upon other writings. Unlike Rozée, François lacked erudition and wrote in a dry and tedious style; he was almost certainly from a humbler station in life. Cf. Saulnier’s comments, *Journal de François*, pp. 1-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-547)
548. *H1*, pp. 491-98 and 506. Ascoli, pp. 279-93. All Paris judges had had to make difficult decisions. There was clearly a considerable amount of soul-searching, and many judges decided that they might better control *Ligueur* radicalism by staying put – a choice that became even easier after the regicide. Some defended staying in Paris by the nicety that between May 1589 (when Henri III was excommunicated) and July 1595 (when Henri IV’s excommunication was lifted) the king was no longer sacred; in such circumstances a true Catholic could be loyal to the monarchy but not follow the king. See Michel de Waele, ‘De Paris à Tours : la crise d’identité des magistrats parisiens de 1589 à 1594’, *Revue Historique* 607 (1998), and Michael Wolfe, *The Conversion of Henry IV. Politics, Power and Religious Belief in Early Modern France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), pp. 80-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-548)
549. *H1*, pp. 494-98; *Les œuvres de messire Guillaume du Vair* (Paris, 1641), pp. 568-572. [↑](#footnote-ref-549)
550. Pallier, p. 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-550)
551. *H1*, p. 458 . [↑](#footnote-ref-551)
552. These titles, and thirty-four more known *Ligueur* responses to the news from Blois, are listed in Pallier, pp. 281-88. [↑](#footnote-ref-552)
553. *H2*, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-553)
554. *H1*, p. 503. [↑](#footnote-ref-554)
555. *H2*, pp. 61-64; *Déclaration dernière de feu F. Thomas Beaux-Amis, docteur en Théologie, carme parisien, sur le livre par luy jadis mis en lumière souz ce titre : Remonstrance au peuple françois qi’il n’est permis à aucun subjet, souz quelque prétexte que ce soit, prendre les armes contre son prince* (Paris, 1589). Baumgartner has noted that *Ligueur* political pamphlets become particularly interesting after 1584: from then on, *Ligueurs* were contributing significantly to what has become known as resistance theory. First they opposed the right of a heretic to succeed; from May 1588 it was a Catholic king who became the target; and after December 1588 the interest moves to the sovereignty of the people, the supremacy of the Estates-General, and the justification for regicide. We would argue that Rozée believed in monarchy and never questioned Henri III’s right to reign. Therefore he shared only the first of the positions identified by Baumgartner. [↑](#footnote-ref-555)
556. *H1*, p. 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-556)
557. *H1*, p. 451. Just how widespread republican tendencies were in the *Ligue* is difficult to assess, partly because the ‘enemy’ was the legitimate king – which had the tendency of making the *Ligue* appear ‘more anti-monarchical than they really were’ – Greengrass, *Christendom Destroyed*, p. 429. [↑](#footnote-ref-557)
558. *H1*, p. 499. [↑](#footnote-ref-558)
559. *H1*, p. 500; Ascoli, pp. 315-16. François, who wrote with an appealing naivety, was deeply impressed by what he saw or heard about: ‘toute l’église de Notre-Dame-de-Paris fut tendue de deuil de serge noyre et de velours noyr par dessus, avec les armoryies des dits deffunctz cardinal et duc de Guyse. Tout alentour de la dite église estoient cierges ardans de cire jaulnes…’ – p. 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-559)
560. Ascoli, p. 317; *H1*, pp. 453-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-560)
561. *Ibid*., p. 312. [↑](#footnote-ref-561)
562. For François processions and other religious practices were the dominant features of the first four months of 1589. It is perhaps because the religious fervour waned in spring that François ceased to keep his journal after 30 April. ‘[L] e grand frisson populaire, né du crime de Blois, s’était apaisé,’ wrote Saulnier, *Journal de François*, p. 10. François’ twentieth-century editor went on to suggest that the loss of the people’s fervour was the fatal blow that eventually killed the *Ligue. Rozée’s* very different and more sophisticated analysis led him to blame Mayenne. [↑](#footnote-ref-562)
563. *H1*, p. 499. [↑](#footnote-ref-563)
564. Ascoli, pp. 295-300. [↑](#footnote-ref-564)
565. *Ibid*., pp. 306-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-565)
566. For H.G. Koenigsberger, it was a ‘revolutionary reign of terror’ that the *Seize* established – ‘The Organisation of Revolutionary Parties’, p. 349. [↑](#footnote-ref-566)
567. *H1*, p. 506. By the 1585 Edict of Union, all were supposed to have sworn to catholicity. [↑](#footnote-ref-567)
568. *H1*, pp. 506 and 551. [↑](#footnote-ref-568)
569. *H1*, p. 507. With an evidently untroubled mind, Rozée noted that the subsequent ravaging by Mayenne’s troops of Molan’s properties in the Touraine shows how ‘une mauvaise fortune ne vient jamais toute seule’ – p. 507. [↑](#footnote-ref-569)
570. Ascoli, pp. 306-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-570)
571. *H1*, p. 513. *Reglement fait par monseigneur le duc de Mayenne, lieutenant général de l’Estat et couronne de France, et le conseil général de l’union des catholiques estably à Paris, pour pourveoir et remedier aux desordres advenus à l’occasion des troubles présents…* (Paris, 1589). Denis Pallier summarised it: ‘Règlement concernant le serment d’union, la saisie des biens des hérétiques et des absents, les nouvelles lettres de provision d’office nécessaires, la levée des tailles’ – Pallier, p. 315. [↑](#footnote-ref-571)
572. Testimony to the complexity of the *Ligue* phenomenon, the *Seize* have been viewed by some as revolutionary, by others as reactionary. Whilst acknowledging that the attacks on Politiques(and their property) during the early weeks of 1589 were ‘the closest that Paris came in the League period to a class war’, Peter Ascoli has explained why the ‘revolutionary’ analysis has severe limitations (Ascoli, p. 309). It ‘was not really a class war because Leaguers and Politiques could be found in all social classes’, and nobles were untouched (*Ibid*., pp. 309-10). The view that the Paris movement was ‘truly revolutionary in the sense that it embodied conscious social antagonisms’ – Salmon (1972), p. 540 – has been questioned by Mark Greengrass, who, in turn, has claimed that ‘[s]ocial antagonisms in the League were more clearly in evidence in the peasant revolts of the countryside than in Paris – Greengrass, ‘The Sixteen, Radical Politics in Paris during the League’, *History* 69 (1984), p. 436. We know that in the sixteenth century the word ‘revolution’ was rarely used to mean the total overthrow of a system of government, as in 1792 or 1917 (Jouanna, pp. 359-60). Rozée’s text provides no evidence to support the view that the *Seize* envisaged such transformation. Suggestions that their behaviour might be characterised by reference to the terror of 1793-94 (Alfred Maury, Roland Mousnier) or that Mayenne launched a Thermidorian Reaction in December 1591 (Elie Barnavi) are misleading (Alfred Maury, ‘La commune de Paris de 1588’, *Revue des Deux Mondes* 95 (1871), pp. 132-75; Roland Mousnier, as cited in Constant, *La Ligue*, p. 468; Barnavi, *Le Parti*, pp. 212-14). Nor should the *Seize* be viewed as a modern totalitarian political party. Greengrass has reminded us of the ‘heavily compartmentalised and segmented nature of… political and social life’ in sixteenth-century Paris, and has observed that ‘it is difficult to conceive of any group possessing the means – even if it had the pretensions – to totality within its walls’ (Greengrass, ‘The Sixteen’, p. 433). We know that the *Seize* had little impact in several parishes, and that only one third of the thirty-three *curés* were *Ligueur* (Constant, *La Ligue*, p. 471). After the *journée des barricades* – when the spectacle of uniquely massive support for the *Ligue* is best explained by the introduction of foreign troops within the city walls – and especially after Mayenne’s arrival in Paris in February 1589, the *Seize* were facing an uphill struggle to win hearts and minds. It is not that the *Ligue* lacked innovative ideas, only that ‘ces virtualités n’ont pas eu le temps de devenir réalités’; in Paris, ‘les *Seize* sont mal assurés de la milice bourgeoise; les nobles, effrayés, se détournent d’eux; les membres des cours souveraines renâclent à suivre leurs exigences de justice’ (Jouanna, p. 367). Dreams of limited royal power, an elected monarch and a permanent Estates-General may have filled some minds but they came to nought(*Ibid*., pp. 365-66). As stated above, Rozée believed in hereditary monarchy subject only to the higher law of Catholicity. Nowhere in the *Histoire* did he show support for elective monarchy – though of course, in the 1620s, such views were unlikely to be committed to paper in any case. Writing about events immediately after the first regicide, the historian blandly stated, ‘Il fut donc resolu en… [une] assemblée [of Navarre and his main supporters] que le Roy de Navarre seroit reconnu pour Roy de france, et ainsy l’appellerons nous doresnavant’ – *H2*, p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-572)
573. Six of the *conseil*’s nine clerical members were from the *Seize* while a seventh, the bishop Guillaume Rose, was a firm sympathiser. All seven members from the sword nobility had commanded *Ligue* troops. Of the remaining twenty-four council seats, eight were held by men who had been amongst the founding members of the *Seize*. [↑](#footnote-ref-573)
574. Greengrass, ‘The Sixteen’, p. 434. [↑](#footnote-ref-574)
575. An area of government that did not carry on as usual was the nomination to senior ecclesiastical posts in bishoprics and abbeys. Neither the *conseil général* nor Mayenne continued this practice; they thereby denied the *Ligue* an important source of patronage power – as well as hampering (administratively) an important support base, the Catholic church. [↑](#footnote-ref-575)
576. Salmon (1972), p. 556. In 1980 Barnavi offered a nuanced analysis that supposed maintenance by the *Seize* of existing systems of government at the same time as control over those systems through the *conseil des quarante* – *Le Parti*, pp. 129-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-576)
577. Greengrass, ‘The Sixteen’, p. 434. [↑](#footnote-ref-577)
578. Back in 1588 the importance of cleansing and purifying the realm had been a theme in the preamble of the Paris third estate’s *cahier de doléances* to be presented at the Blois Estates-General – see Greengrass, ‘The Sixteen’, p. 435. [↑](#footnote-ref-578)
579. *H1*, pp. 509-10. François, less fearful than Roze, merely noted the terms under which the releases took place – *Journal de François*, p. 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-579)
580. *H1*, pp. 508-09; *H2*, p. 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-580)
581. *H2*, pp. 14, 19 and 22; Palma-Cayet, pp. 139-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-581)
582. *H2*, pp. 19-20 and 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-582)
583. Gérard, p. 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-583)
584. *H2*, p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-584)
585. *H2*, pp. 31-32. It is possible that Rozée imported this passage; I have not found his source. Regarding the funding of soldiers’ pay, Rozée remarked, ‘… il n’y eust rien de si mal menagé que l’argent de la ligue.’ – *H2*, p. 32. Evidence from the Hôtel de Ville supports the view that collection of funds was becoming critically problematic in early summer 1589, and could indicate that the situation had previously been mis-managed. Local tax collectors were told on 13 June to deliver the revenues they had collected for January, February and March to the *receveur général* within twenty-four hours. Three days later they were instructed to bring in the taxes for April and May at once – *Mandement aux recepveurs… Janvier, Febvrier et Mars* and *Ordonnance pour cueillir les deniers de Mois…* in *RDBVP*, 9, pp. 377-78 and 381. In July instructions required punishment of tax-avoiders by billeting of troops and confiscations – *Ordonnance pour mettre garnison d’archers…* and *Ordonnance pour faire lever promptement les deniers…* in *RDBVP*, 9, pp. 399 and 411. [↑](#footnote-ref-585)
586. *H2*, pp. 33-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-586)
587. Rozée was not impressed that, before the long siege of Paris in 1590, there were ‘des ligueurs qui n’attendoient point de Dieu des miracles pour leur conservation, ainsi regardoient aux moyens humains et ordinaires’ – *H2*, p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-587)
588. Rozée quoted the pope’s verdict that God had stepped into human history: ‘de toutes costez, il est plein de merveilles; his own recollection was that ‘chacun admiroit les jugements de dieu, si contraires a ces des hommes ...’ – *H2*, p. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-588)
589. *H2*, p. 35. Most of the regicide narrative falls in pages 35-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-589)
590. *H2*, p. 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-590)
591. Jean de La Fosse showed less caution, declaring himself glad of the elimination of the last Valois, who had been ‘fort cruel et vindicatif, ne repirant aultre chose en son cœur que mauvaiseté’ – Jean de La Fosse, *Journal d’un curé Ligueur de Paris sous les trois derniers Valois*, ed. E. de Barthélemy (Paris, 1865), p. 225. [↑](#footnote-ref-591)
592. Even the more radical La Fosse was cautious on the question of divine will, going no further than to claim that the regicide was ‘par permission divine’ – *Ibid*., p. 225. What was in Clément’s mind, and what prompted him to act are, of course, unknowable. Even if he was much of a reader (which appears unlikely) the fact is that in the large amount of written material circulating in Paris in the months before August 1589 it is very difficult to find any invocation to kill the king. As far as we know, preachers (understandably) rarely ran the risk of inciting regicide. Most likely, Clément, apparently a simple soul, listened to table-talk, was moved by the feverish atmosphere of post-Blois Paris, and in his own mystical thought-world somehow made his way to St Cloud – see Mark Greengrass, ‘Regicide, Martyrs and Monarchical Authority in France in the Wars of Religion’, in R.. v. Friedeburg (ed), *Murder and Monarchy. Regicide in European History, 1300-1800* (Basingstoke, 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-592)
593. Boucher’s famous treatise was half-way through being printed when Jacques Clément struck – to all appearances rendering the book obsolete. Undeterred, and realising the text’s application to Henri IV, Boucher swiftly brought the work to the public. The *De justa abdicatione* made four key assertions. First, both the church and the people had the right to depose kings; secondly the church, and thirdly, in any case, the people had just cause to depose Henri III; last, there was no time to have recourse to a meeting of the Estates-General, so action should be taken at once – Labitte, pp. 91-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-593)
594. *H2*, pp. 47-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-594)
595. ‘Cette nouvelle qui fut depuis confirmée de plusieurs endroits, causa autant d’allegresse dans paris, comme il y avoit d’estonnement an l’armée Royalle, car ceux qui avoient eu le plus de peur a paris, en furent les plus joyeux; puis comme l’on croit facillement ce que l’on desire, on pensa que de lors en avant, chacun prendroit party selon sa religion, et que pour ce son successeur n’executeroit point le dessein qui avoit esté pris, de forcer la ville…’ – *H2*, p. 39. Also, ‘A paris on fit demonstration de grande joye, avec des action de grace envers dieu par des processions solemnelles et des prieres en plusieres esglises; les uns les blasmoient, comme si le peuple se fut reioüy de l’assassinat de son prince; les autres l’excusoient, disant qu’il est naturel de se reioüir, quand on se voit inopinement deslivré d’un grand et imminent peril; laissant au jugement de dieu la forme de cette delivrance’ – *H2*, p. 50. A medal was struck, and prisoners were freed. Rozée noted (carefully) that the rejoicing was over the safety of Paris, not the death of the king. [↑](#footnote-ref-595)
596. As late as 1929, the judgement was made that ‘the general moral tone of the League was very low’ – Maurice Wilkinson, *A History of the League or Sainte Union, 1576-1595* (Glasgow, 1929), p. 92. [↑](#footnote-ref-596)
597. Henri Drouot, *Mayenne et la Bourgogne 1587-1596,* 2 vols(Paris, 1937). ‘Le pas décisif fut franchi avec Henri Drouot,’ wrote Descimon – Descimon (1983), p. 20. Constant later concurred: ‘Il fallut attendre 1937 pour sortir… [du] carcan explicatif du XIXe siècle’ – *La Ligue*, p. 468. Drouot studied the *Ligue* in Dijon with a commitment to understanding its socio-economic background – an approach which the positivist school (Labitte, Poirson, and others ) might have envisaged but had not realised. The historian used mss 10270 and 23295-96, as well as Charles Valois’ work, but only ‘in passing’; his main focus was on Burgundy. All had appeared well there in 1588: no food shortages (‘ce stimulant essential des révoltes populaires)’, no ‘furie révolutionnaire’ (Drouot, *Mayenne*, 1, p. 178). ‘Garder la paix sur la voie du cheminement social: on reconnaissait bien à ce souci l’esprit communal bourguignon’ (*Ibid*., 1, p. 179).Dijon had appeared to have no trouble-makers, ‘pas de “caboches”’ (*Ibid*., 1, p. 179). Yet by spring 1589, there was ‘un désordre social… [u]ne guerre sociale’; and ‘quant à l’hostilité des “ligueux” de mairie contre les gentilshommes, tous les gentilshommes, et contre les officiers, c’est là fait certain’ (*Ibid*., 1, pp. 334-35). In essence, Drouot discerned – in Burgundy – serious conflict within the *bourgeoisie*. The lower ranks – ‘les bourgeoisies mineurs’, later more felicitously called ‘la bourgeoisie seconde’ – found themselves unable to rise to join the privileged few who constituted ‘les grands bourgeois’ – Descimon (1983), p. 21. For them the way forward seemed to lie in espousing the *Ligue* cause. [↑](#footnote-ref-597)
598. Drouot, *Mayenne*, 1, p. 178. [↑](#footnote-ref-598)
599. *Ibid*., 1, p. 179. [↑](#footnote-ref-599)
600. *Ibid*., 1, p. 179. [↑](#footnote-ref-600)
601. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 334-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-601)
602. Descimon (1983), p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-602)
603. Maury, ‘La commune de Paris’, p. 134. In 1904, Jean-Hippolyte Mariéjol characterised the initial Paris leadership as ‘[une] bourgeoisie moyenne’, and in her introduction to a modern re- print of his work (2011), Arlette Jouanna has noted this historian’s perspicacity regarding the *Ligueurs*: ‘[Il] décèle dans leurs revendications la jalousie dressant contre l’aristocratie parlementaire ce qu’il appelle la “petite bourgeoisie” des avocats et des notaires’ – J.-H. Mariéjol, p. 242 and the Prefaceby Arlette Jouanna (2011 reprint), p. v. [↑](#footnote-ref-603)
604. Constant, *La Ligue*, p. 468; Descimon (1983), p. 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-604)
605. M.P. Holt, ‘The League in Burgundy: A “Bourgeoisie Seconde”?’, *French History* 17 (2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-605)
606. Salmon (1972), p. 542; Descimon (1983), p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-606)
607. Sara Beam, ‘The “Basoche” and the “Bourgeoisie Seconde”: Careerists at the Parlement of Paris during the League’, *French History* 17, No. 4, (2004), pp. 367-87. Historians have differed in how they have used the word *basoche*. J.H.M. Salmon and Sara Beam have understood it (as it was used in the sixteenth century) to denote only those officials in the law below the level of *procureur*. Robert Descimon and Colin Kaiser have used it to embrace all below the rank of judge – Descimon (1983) and Colin Kaiser, ‘Les cours souveraines au XVIe siècle ; morale et Contre-Réforme’, *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 37 (1982). Resultant discrepancies are apparent, not real. [↑](#footnote-ref-607)
608. Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-608)
609. Salmon (1972), p. 566. [↑](#footnote-ref-609)
610. Descimon (1983), p. 87. [↑](#footnote-ref-610)
611. *H2*, p. 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-611)
612. Salmon (1972), Barnavi, *Le Parti*, and Descimon (1983)*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-612)
613. *H2*, p. 353. [↑](#footnote-ref-613)
614. In 1591 progressive radicalisation damaged the *Seize*; it is certain that the Brisson affair broke them. Rather than offer an analysis of the falling social status of the *Ligue* leadership over time, Rozée concentrated on the failings of Mayenne. [↑](#footnote-ref-614)
615. Cf. Constant: ‘[L]es élections à l’hôtel de ville représentaient la base de leur influence et de leur pouvoir’ – *La Ligue*, p. 366. The Hôtel de Ville was a critical locus of political power in Paris; it was also the only one in which the *Seize* could win power by popular vote, as distinct from earning it by excellence in law or through purchase of office. Although the twenty-four *conseillers de ville* held their offices for life and could pass them on to their heirs, the leadership group above them needed regular renewal of their mandates by elections. In the case of the *prévôt des marchands* the election was biennial. Of the four *échevins*, two stood for re-election each year. Voting took place in the general assembly, normally in August, when the *Bureau de la Ville* were joined by the sixteen *quarteniers* and by two *bourgeois* from each *quartier*. As suggested above, the *Seize* established their *conseils des neuf* precisely in order to influence the composition of this electoral college. [↑](#footnote-ref-615)
616. ‘[L]e prevost des marchands et les echevins avoient abandonnez leurs charges, on en mit d’autres en leurs places’ – *H1*, p. 375. [↑](#footnote-ref-616)
617. Three reasons for this silence suggest themselves. First, Rozée was no doubt aware that the election results exposed the *Seize* as a minority influence on the city. In the August 1589 election, they flouted the rules in order to have 128 bourgeois voters from the *quartiers*, instead of the normal thirty-two, yet still failed to place any of their favoured candidates. In August 1591, they managed to wring permission from Mayenne for a second assembly, having been dissatisfied with the results from the first, yet second-time round they still commanded only about a quarter of the total vote. Clearly, Pierre Rozée had reason not to record these indicators of impotence. Secondly, Rozée’s silence might ensue from his conviction that setbacks in elections were dwarfed by the damage done by Mayenne in other arenas – for example, his dismissal of the *conseil-général* and his obstinate refusal to recall it. Thirdly, might it be that the historian, himself humiliated in the November 1592 elections, had more or less deleted all such contests from his memory? [↑](#footnote-ref-617)
618. In the case of Luillier, we are told merely that he was a *colonel* and *maître des comptes*; his rise to become *prévôt des marchands* is not mentioned – *H2*, p. 196. Of Langlois, we learn only that he replaced Antoine Hotman as *échevin* – *H2*, p. 470. Costeblanche was the *colonel* committed to the protection of the *quartier* Delambert; his replacement there in November 1591 by Jehan-Baptiste de Machault receives mention, but there is no recognition that Costeblanche had fallen out of favour – *H2*, p. 196;cf. Descimon (1983), pp. 123 and 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-618)
619. *H2*, pp. 297 and 299. [↑](#footnote-ref-619)
620. *H2*, p. 346. [↑](#footnote-ref-620)
621. *H2*, p. 464. [↑](#footnote-ref-621)
622. Descimon (1983): for Compans, see p. 121; Crucé, pp. 124-25; Luillier, p. 183; Roland, pp. 212-13; La Chapelle-Marteau, pp. 188-89. [↑](#footnote-ref-622)
623. The individuals are drawn from Rozée’s text between his first mention of the 1584 Paris *Ligue* and the end of the *Histoire*. They are all *Ligueurs* from the third estate. The forty-eight men amount to two for every nine of those identified thirty years ago by Descimon. Their names appear infrequently in the *Histoire*. On average, Rozée named one or more of them on just one in every eleven (84/909) sides of writing. [↑](#footnote-ref-623)
624. The nine names appear in a list that Rozée copied from elsewhere in order to inform us of the ‘maréchaux de camp’ who would be helping administer protection of the city in spring 1590 – *H2*, pp. 195-96. The nine are Dufresnoy, Feuillet, Granrue, Luillier, Machault, Midorge, Passart, Tronson and Turquet. Machault was included because he later replaced Costeblanche. A tenth *colonel*, Pigneron, featured in the same list and was mentioned in passing just once more in the manuscript – *H2*,p. 321. I have not been able to trace the historian’s source. [↑](#footnote-ref-624)
625. *H1*, pp. 451-52, *H2*, p. 464. See also Descimon (1983), pp. 212-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-625)
626. *H1*, p. 198; *H2*, p. 407. [↑](#footnote-ref-626)
627. Lemaître’s part in provoking the purge of the Parlement (January 1589) was too important to omit, despite Rozée’s dismay at this magistrate’s later leanings towards Mayenne – *H1*, pp. 491-92; *H2*, pp. 163 and 517.La Chapelle-Marteau’s prominence arose from office: he was leader of the *Seize* after Hotman’s death, and *prévôt des marchands* for nearly thirty months (barring a short spell in prison) – see for example *H1*, pp. 306, 406 and 514. Nully had not only a glittering legal career; leader of the *Bureau de la Ville*, 1582-86, he went on to serve the *Ligue* by representing their views to the king after the *journée des barricades* and by investigating Brigard in summer 1591 – *H1*, pp. 398; *H2*, p. 463. [↑](#footnote-ref-627)
628. *H2*, pp. 197, 241, 252, 280-81 and 346. [↑](#footnote-ref-628)
629. *H1*, pp. 262, 490 and 506; *H2*, pp. 297-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-629)
630. *H2*, p. 351. [↑](#footnote-ref-630)
631. *H1*, pp. 300-01. [↑](#footnote-ref-631)
632. *RDBVP*, 10, p. 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-632)
633. Descimon (1983), p. 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-633)
634. *H2*, p. 297. [↑](#footnote-ref-634)
635. ‘Seven in every nine’ is of course a modern construct; neither Rozée nor any other contemporary could have known who on the broad fringes of the movement at any given moment was ‘in’ or ‘out’. [↑](#footnote-ref-635)
636. Descimon (1983), pp. 77-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-636)
637. *H2*, pp. 231-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-637)
638. *H2*, p. 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-638)
639. Quotation, *H2*, p. 232. With the outbreak of the religious troubles in 1562 there had been a revival of the military role of the Parisian bourgeoisie (all whose habitual residence was in Paris). The defence of Paris, still a matter of security, now also had the aura of a holy war. While others fled to country residences, the ‘good’ among the bourgeoisie remained in the city and shared in defensive duties. Avoidance of this role was frowned upon (and was difficult to achieve). There can be little doubt that the revival of the militia in this period greatly strengthened the confidence and resolveof the *Ligue*, as well as boosting the morale of the wider Paris population during the rigours of summer 1590. See Robert Descimon, ‘Milice bourgeoise et identité citadine à Paris au temps de la Ligue’, *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 48 (1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-639)
640. *H2*, p. 233. [↑](#footnote-ref-640)
641. Rozée proceeded to include reference by one of the advisers to the Vigny affair (discussed in chapter 1). It was with an eye to *Seize* sensibilities that the duc de Nemours had banished the *receveur* from Paris (cf. Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 186). Vigny’s fate showed that Politiquesin the capital were both corrupt and powerless. The adviser went on to warn that any plans to take the capital could only fail, ‘a cause de la perpetuelle vigilance, diligence et exacte recherche de ces Seize, lesquels estoient ordinairement avertis comme a point nommé de tout ce qui se passoit dans la ville…’ (*H2*, p. 234). We are assured that this advice was given by ‘un homme fort instruit de l’estat dela ville’ (*H2*, p. 234). After noting the king’s contempt for the warning – his opponents were ‘Seize coquins de peu de moyens et de crédit’ – Rozée added the unnamed adviser’s reply: the *Seize* counted amongst their number ‘quelque nombre d’esclesiastiques, de juges entre lesquels il y avoit des conseillers de la cour, des maistres des comptes, et officiers principaux du Chastelet, ad[voc]ats, marchands honorables, et autres notables bourgeois’; furthermore they were trusted by both Nemours and the papal legate (*H2*, p. 234). At the Châtelet, François Oudineau was the new *grand prévot* (‘soy-disant grand-prévost’, noted Fayet), whilst the *lieutenants* *civil et criminel* were respectively Mathias Labruyère and Claude Lamorlière – Salmon (1972) p. 554. Pierre Fayet, *Journal historique de Pierre Fayet sur les troubles de la Ligue*, ed. V. Luzarche (Tours, 1852), p. 103. For Rozée – ironically – one mark of the quality of some of the *Seize*  was that they knew people of substance like Donon and Vigny – *H2*, pp. 71 and 233-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-641)
642. *H2*, p. 117. Cf. Barnavi: ‘“[C]ompagnie”… qui désigne couramment les assemblées augustes, notamment les cours souveraines, implique la supériorité des détenteurs de la vérité par rapport à ceux qui n’en sont point illuminés’ \_ Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 64. Thus when Rozée called the *Seize* une ‘compagnie’ he had in mind authority as well as companionship. [↑](#footnote-ref-642)
643. *Zèle* was a word Rozée frequently used to describe *Ligueur* commitment. In 1576 Henri III had been able to assume leadership of the *Ligue* confident that ‘chacun y apporteroit le zèle et l’affection qu’ordinairement les ligueurs apportent à une afaire commune’ – *H1*, p. 72. In response to the Huguenot threat, true Catholics had had to form a league ‘afin qu[‘]… on trouve des gens qui craignans de vivre plustost sans messe que sans pain, apportent autant de zèle à conserver la religion chrestienne que les autres ont de ferveur à la destruire’ – *H1*, p. 78. Guincestre became a disappointment because, having preached so persuasively at the close of 1588, ‘ce zèle ne continua pas’ – *H1*, p. 453. Rozée was well aware that with time the *zélés* had come to be held in contempt: ‘ce mot [*zèle*] fut depuis tiré à mespris’ – *H1*, pp. 59-60. Later, he noted that, post-Brisson, Politiquesand *Mayennistes* had colluded ‘pour ruiner ceux qui avec passion qu’ils appelloient zele ala religion estoient dela ligue’ – *H2*, p. 506. Writing about responses to Louis Dorléans’ *Avertissement des catholiques anglais…* (1586), he observed with dismay that whilst Politique pamphleteers could write what they liked in the safety of anonymity, *Ligueur* preachers, ‘lesquels parlant en public, et continuant en leur liberté excusée de leur zéle à la conservation de la religion catholique, on blasmoit souvent devant le Roy’ – *H1*, p. 300. [↑](#footnote-ref-643)
644. *H1*, p. 74. Needless, perhaps, to say, Rozée betrayed no awareness of the uncomplimentary nicknames that had been given to prominent Paris *Ligueurs*. Cf. *Dialogue*, p. 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-644)
645. ‘En ce grand soulevement qui se fit au commencement de l’année 1589 plusieurs entrerent au parti de l’Union des Catholiques sous diverses considerations, les uns y entrerent pour employer corps et biens a la conservation de la religion Catholique; autres pour tenir des premiers rangs et avoir des principales charges en ce nouvel etat a l’exclusion de ceux qui estoient demeurez au service du roy; autres y estant conduict par la proximité des villes qui estoient de l’union; autres pour y faire leurs afaires et leur profit particulier; autres pour voir comme les afaires tourneroient et se metre du côté des plus forts; les autres pour y chercher occasion de faire souz main quelque bon service au Roy quand ils auroient acquis du credit dans ce parti’ – *H2*, p. 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-645)
646. Rozée: ‘Il protesta qu’il l’avoit fait pour le seul respect de la religion, mais on dit deslors, que quatre mil escus comptans qu’il receut de l’argent des parisiens et l’asseurance d’une compagnie de chavaux legers entretenue et bien payee, pour le party de la garnison de paris, le firent entrer en la ligue, ou depuis il a fait sa fortune’ – *H2*, p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-646)
647. *H2*, p. 13. And later, ‘on disait avec verité que ceux qui avoient le plus avancé les affaires du Roy estoient ceux lesquels affectionnez à son service estoient demeurez dans la ligue pour ruiner cette mesme Ligue’ – *H2*, p. 107. We recall too that the historian may have suspected some of Mayenne’s *supernuméraires* to have been covert royalists. [↑](#footnote-ref-647)
648. *H2*, p. 394. A little later the *Histoire* reveals the mysterious existence of ‘[un] papier rouge’ – a list of trouble-makers’ names – sadly lost – *H2*, p. 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-648)
649. *H1*, p. 188. [↑](#footnote-ref-649)
650. See especially Jouanna, pp. 368-69, where a helpful map shows not only the apparent impact of Guisard influence with regard to *Ligue* affiliation, but also which towns in Guise provinces held out for the crown (e.g. Langres, Châlons-sur-Marne, Caen) and which opted for the *Ligue* from well outside Guise areas (e.g Poitiers, Agen). [↑](#footnote-ref-650)
651. At this foundational level, historians have recognised that there is no simple explanation, for clearly local particularities always played a part. The picture can look so complex as to suggest a mosaic of unique *Ligue* towns, all different. Robert Descimon has argued that such a conception would be inadequate: there had to be some key to the *Ligue* phenomenon, otherwise ‘il faudrait admettre que des causes différentes produisent partout les mêmes effets’ – Descimon (1983), p. 24. Olivia Carpi has agreed: the mosaic-model would amount to ‘l’excès … qui consisterait en une sorte de pulvérisation du mouvement ligueur’; she has argued that, despite all the different facets of the urban *Ligue*, there was more holding it together than breaking it asunder (a less restrictive conclusion than Descimon’s) – Olivia Carpi, *‘Une République imaginaire’ (Amiens, 1559-1597)* (Paris, 2005), p.230. [↑](#footnote-ref-651)
652. Acknowledging especially the work of Bernard Chevalier, Descimon has noted that in medieval times a town’s leadership group had incorporated three elements: ‘officiers royaux, gens de justice et “bons” marchands’ – Chevalier, cited in Descimon (1983), p. 26.In the sixteenth century, so the argument runs, this tripartite arrangement came under threat from growing royal power. Support for the *Ligue* seemed to offer a way of stopping that process. Descimon’s analysis has the advantage of sharp clarity. In the light of both his own work and that of Barnavi, it has also the merit of evidently explaining *Ligueur* Paris. Nonetheless, we need to be wary of replacing one fallacy (no two defecting towns had the same motives) with another (all *Ligueur* towns were fundamentally motivated by the same resentment). It is not at all surprising that in differing towns subject to varying local political, social and economic trends, the journeys from royalist loyalty to *Ligue* commitment were inspired by a variety of dominant motives. [↑](#footnote-ref-652)
653. Jouanna, pp. 374-75. Amiens is an interesting case. There Henri III’s relentless tax demands were a bitter pill to swallow for a municipal leadership which not only had to pay for substantial defence-works (Amiens was a frontier-town) but which had also been allowed to gain far more control over the economic life of the town and its environs than was usual. It was the perceived royal assault upon this combination of responsibility and favour that underlay the city’s defection to the *Ligue* (shortly after the *journée des barricades*). The coup was trouble-free: the minority of royalists within the municipal leadership fled – Carpi, *‘Une République imaginaire’*. [↑](#footnote-ref-653)
654. See Philip Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge, 1981) and Robert Harding, ‘Revolution and Reform in the Holy League: Angers, Rennes, Nantes’, *Journal of Modern History* 53, No. 3 (1981). [↑](#footnote-ref-654)
655. Hilary Bernstein, *Between crown and community: politics and civic culture in sixteenth-century Poitiers* (New York, 2004), pp. 1-17 . Rozée’s understanding was that the leaders of Poitiers went *Ligueur* in disgust at the king’s decision to move his Parlementto Tours rather than to their city – *H1*, p. 482. [↑](#footnote-ref-655)
656. Chàteau-Thierry was an interesting case. Rozée tells us that within the castle there was one who would, for due payment, deliver the place to the *Ligue*. This individual made the offer, in writing, to his brother-in-law in Paris, ‘qui avoit crédit entre les Ligueurs’ (*H1*, p. 485). No names are given – but we know that Pierre Rozée’s wife was from Chàteau-Thierry… In the event, the *Seize* turned the offer down. [↑](#footnote-ref-656)
657. Jouanna, pp. 368-76. [↑](#footnote-ref-657)
658. Constant, *La Ligue*, p. 308. Also, ‘Le Sable, Mayenne, Laval and La Ferté fell to the Leaguers because the League nobles there were stronger in the countryside than the royalists.’ – Ascoli, p. 326. [↑](#footnote-ref-658)
659. Ascoli, p. 328. [↑](#footnote-ref-659)
660. Constant, *La Ligue*, p. 309. [↑](#footnote-ref-660)
661. Ascoli, p. 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-661)
662. *H1*, pp. 259-60, quotation p. 259; Ascoli, pp. 110-114. [↑](#footnote-ref-662)
663. Take, for example, the first few days of January. On 2 January 1589 a letter was sent to the ‘officiers municipaux d’une ville non denommée’, inviting support; the same message went to another unnamed town on the 4th, and a longer one went to Estampes on the 6th. The letters show Paris taking a lead but also looking for support, as if wishing not to be alone in the line they have taken. By 8 January, however, there was a stronger line, as the municipalitycontacted several towns, warning them not to heed rumours that the duc de Guise had behaved in a way that merited death. See *RDBVP*, 9, pp. 221-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-663)
664. Above all, they must remain in union: ‘Unissons nous donc plus estroittement que nous ne fusmes oncques… Secourons ceulx qui nous veulle[nt] secourir. Continuons nostre commerce, et nous maintenons la foy mutuelle, nous donnant, s’il vous plaist, sur ce vostre response et asseurance, nous faisant sçavoir souvent de voz nouvelles…’ – cited (in translation) in Ascoli, p. 306. [↑](#footnote-ref-664)
665. All towns joining the Unionhad – at the insistence of the *Seize* – to swear the Union oath. Other initiation ceremonies might be a procession, a Te Deum, and, after 1588, a memorial service in honour of the murdered Guises. Cf. Ariane Boltanski, ‘Les solidarités entre les villes Ligueuses du bassin parisien (1585-1594)’, (Université de Paris I, unpublished *mémoire de* *maîtrise*, 1991), pp. 15-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-665)
666. Ascoli, pp. 328-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-666)
667. When Châlons chased out its *Ligue* leaders, Paris threatened to cut commercial ties – Elie Barnavi, ‘Centralisation ou Fédéralisme’, *Revue Historique* 526 (1978), pp. 341-42. Military threats were made against another town, possibly Corbeil – *Ibid*., p. 342). [↑](#footnote-ref-667)
668. *Ibid*., p. 342. [↑](#footnote-ref-668)
669. *Ibid*., p. 340. A crucial distinction between royal absolutism and the Paris leadership of the *Ligue* can be seen in the area of finance. Kings always imposed taxation; Paris placed no financial burdens, indeed no burdens at all beyond the swearing of religious and political allegiance. [↑](#footnote-ref-669)
670. Using a similar model, Ariane Boltanski has written of a network of towns within which various kinds of relationship developed. Some of these were between equals, whilst others became more hierarchical. For example, Amiens was keen to exert control over the decision of the smaller towns around it, not least in order to prevent royalist strongholds developing on its doorstep – Ariane Boltanski, ‘Les solidarités’. [↑](#footnote-ref-670)
671. Ariane Boltanski’s thesis closes with a *Union* in disarray and defeat. It had failed to develop a central body to which delegates from all *Ligueur* towns might be invited and its attempt to manipulate the Estates-General of 1593 had been woeful – Boltanski, ‘Les solidarités’, pp. 105-23. [↑](#footnote-ref-671)
672. *H1*, p. 455. It worked both ways: following the example of Châlons, Epernay stayed with the king – *H1*, p. 485. [↑](#footnote-ref-672)
673. *H1*, p. 468. [↑](#footnote-ref-673)
674. *H1*, p. 476. [↑](#footnote-ref-674)
675. *H1*, p. 468. [↑](#footnote-ref-675)
676. *H1*, p. 499. [↑](#footnote-ref-676)
677. *H1*, pp. 456 and 468. [↑](#footnote-ref-677)
678. *H1*, p. 454. [↑](#footnote-ref-678)
679. *H1*, p. 475. [↑](#footnote-ref-679)
680. *H1*, p. 490. [↑](#footnote-ref-680)
681. *H1*, p. 448. [↑](#footnote-ref-681)
682. *H1*, pp. 452-53. Another courier, the *avocat* François Oudineau, made an ill-fated trip to Chàlons – *H1*, p. 452. [↑](#footnote-ref-682)
683. *H1*, p. 478. [↑](#footnote-ref-683)
684. *H1*, p. 480. [↑](#footnote-ref-684)
685. *H1*, pp. 481 and 508-09. [↑](#footnote-ref-685)
686. *H1*, p. 483. [↑](#footnote-ref-686)
687. Cf. Jean Bossuet: ‘De même que pour aider sa mémoire dans la connaissance des lieux, on retient certaines villes principales autour desquelles on place les autres, chacune selon sa distance; ainsi, dans l’ordre des siècles, il faut avoir certains temps marqués par quelque grand événement auquel on rapporte tout le reste.’ – cited in Claude-Gilbert Dubois, *La Conception de l’Histoire en France au XVIe siècle (1560-1610)* (Paris, 1977), pp. 18-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-687)
688. Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henry IV* (2nd edn, London, 1995), p.62. [↑](#footnote-ref-688)
689. Rozée noted the accretion in the duke’s power but expressed no opinion – *H2*, p. 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-689)
690. Salmon (1972), p. 557. [↑](#footnote-ref-690)
691. The *Seize* were never again to secure the election of even one of their candidates of choice to any of the five available posts in the municipality. [↑](#footnote-ref-691)
692. In a story that we know from the *Histoire* alone, Médéric de Donon, *contrôleur des bâtiments du roi*, attracted attention by refusing to pay taxes; he was besieged in his home in the rue Elzévir, then led to the Bastille – *H2*, pp. 70-71 (the rue Elzévir was out of Rozée’s *quartier* and over the river; we do not know why he alone has this story). Next came physical assaults. Favier, a *conseiller* at the Parlement, was beaten up. Oudin Crucé mounted a campaign at the Châtelet that claimed nearly fifty lives. The *président* Blancmesnil was stripped of his colonelcy and imprisoned – See Gérard, pp. 135, 137,146; Salmon (1972) p. 558; J.H.M. Salmon, *Society in Crisis. France in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1975), p. 260. Favier’s first name may have been Raoul – see Elie Barnavi and Robert Descimon, *La Sainte Ligue le Juge et la Potence. L’Assassinat du président Brisson (15 novembre 1591)* (Paris, 1985), p. 321. [↑](#footnote-ref-692)
693. The historian made no mention of the ill-treatment of Favier or of Crucé’s purge at the Châtelet; he voiced no protest over the treatment of Donon, nor sympathy for Blancmesnil or for those less fortunate than him, Tholet and Blanchet (both executed) – *H2*, pp. 83 and 95. Was this, then, the historian feeling the resentment experienced by the *bourgeoisie seconde*? [↑](#footnote-ref-693)
694. Cited in Jouanna, p. 367. [↑](#footnote-ref-694)
695. Cf. *H2*, pp. 107-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-695)
696. Conversely, Mayenne’s power increased. ‘Le plus grand traict d’Estat exercé par le Duc de Mayenne que jamais il ait fait’, observed the *Maheustre* – see *Dialogue*, p. 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-696)
697. *H2*, p. 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-697)
698. Frederic J. Baumgartner, *Radical Reactionaries* (Geneva, 1975), pp. 173-74.; *Dialogue*, pp. 125-26, n. 178; Henri Drouot, *Mayenne et la Bourgogne 1587-1596* 2 vols (Paris, 1937), 1, pp. 266-68. Rozée expressed dismay. It was galling that they who had taken a stand at the outset – ‘quand le pavé de Paris estoit bien chaud pour les ligueurs’ – should now be shunted to one side – *H2*, pp. 109-10. He added, carefully: ‘on n’a point reconnu que ce changement ait profité aux afaires de l’union et aussi a celles de ceux qui en avoient esté cause’ (*H2*, p. 110). [↑](#footnote-ref-698)
699. Jouanna, p. 367. [↑](#footnote-ref-699)
700. Gérard, p. 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-700)
701. *H2*, p. 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-701)
702. *H2*, pp. 166 and 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-702)
703. Describing the watchfulness of the *Seize*,Rozée often employed the verb *veiller*. Before *Toussaint* 1589 ‘les Seize excitèrent les bourgeois, chacun en son quartier, à se préparer et veiller sur les actions des politiques’ – *H2*, p. 82. A few weeks later ‘les Seize … veillèrent et découvrirent certaines assemblées de personnes qui tenoient des premiers rangs’ – *H2*, p. 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-703)
704. *H2*, pp. 233-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-704)
705. *H2*, p. 234. For Rozée, vigilance was vital because royalists dealt in *pratiques* and *menées* (pejorative terms that the historian refrained from using in connection with the *Seize*). [↑](#footnote-ref-705)
706. Jean-Marie Constant, *La Ligue* (Paris, 1996), p. 250. [↑](#footnote-ref-706)
707. Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV* (London, 1984), p. 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-707)
708. It was ‘as much a struggle for people’s minds as a struggle for the city’s walls’, marked by a ‘barrage of pamphlets from both sides’ – Michael Wolfe, *The Conversion of Henri IV. Politics, Power and Religious Belief in Early Modern France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), p. 98. Prominent in Wolfe’s account are the Sorbonne’s ruling on 7 May that the *Béarnais* could never accede to the throne, even if he converted, and the contrasting concerns of the king’s Catholic supporters that victory over Paris might reduce the chances of his conversion – *Résolution des MM de la faculté de théologie de Paris sur les articles touchant la paix ou capitulation avec l’hérétique*, in *ML*, 4, pp. 264-71. The assembled doctors took the view that even an absolved Henri would not be acceptable because of the ‘danger évident de feintise & perfidie’; it followed that peace with Henri de Bourbon was not to be considered even if ‘tout autre légitime successeur de la Couronne viendroit à décéder ou quitter de son droit’. The significant passages of the ruling appear with minor alterations in *H2*, pp. 332-33. Rozée noted that the Sorbonne’s decision was in line with canon law but stopped short of agreeing that Navarre, even if converted, could never rule. We learn that the ruling was not immediately made public in Paris because it was anticipated that, once notified of its content, the Pope would himself be moved to reject any prospect of Henri becoming king. Palma-Cayet’s claim that the ruling was prompted by the death of Charles X (8 May) but then pre-dated to the seventh was dismissed in 1912 by Eugène Saulnier – see Pallier, p. 379. [↑](#footnote-ref-708)
709. We learn of the king’s inability to comprehend fanaticism, his tactical understanding that it was above all *la rive droite* that must be secured, and his tenderness for his people – ‘J’aime la ville de Paris comme ma fille aînée’ – Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Henri IV* (Paris, 1982), p. 496. The words were spoken by the king at the peace conference at Saint-Antoine-des-Champs in early August. For a full account of this meeting see *Recueil de ce qui s’est passé en la Conférence des sieurs Cardinal de Gondy & Archevesque de Lyon avec le Roy* (n.pl., 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-709)
710. Dogs and cats, even rats and mice, became food, and some people were dying after consuming *le pain de Mme de Montpensier*. Resistance was spearheaded by the *Seize*: they were swift to raid the jealously guarded pantries of the religious houses, and to organise a food-distribution programme. *Ligue* preachers were active, and not only from the pulpit: Pierre Christin accompanied the men to the fortifications. Religious processions abounded. ‘Traitors’ – Moret, Philippe Noiret, Renard and a few others – were executed amid a new wave of terror – Constant, *La Ligue*, pp. 248-56. There is a strong sense in Lebigre’s account that, under the authority of the duc de Nemours, the *Seize* were active and uncompromising in orchestrating the defence of Paris. The Italian bishop Francesco Panigarola came under scrutiny because some of his sermons were too defeatist. The guard duties placed on men aged 17 to 60 became irksome: ‘Qu’il est donc pénible, diront les auteurs de la *Satyre Ménippée*, d’être “sujets aux gardes et sentinelles où nous perdons la moitié de notre temps, consummons notre meilleur âge et acquérons des catarres et maladies qui ruinent notre santé”’ – Arlette Lebigre, *La révolution des curés* (Paris, 1980), pp. 202-13, quotation, pp. 203-04. [↑](#footnote-ref-710)
711. Ramsey has argued that a liturgical culture bound Paris *Ligueurs* together despite social and factional diversity, and, partly through civic processions, created a sense of civic immanence – ‘the sacrality of the enclosed space of the city walls’ – Ann W. Ramsey, *Liturgy, politics, and salvation: the Catholic League in Paris and the nature of Catholic reform, 1540-1630* (Rochester NY, 1999), p. 3. Using testamentary evidence, Ramsey identified a population traumatised by confessional strife and seeking assurance of salvation. Listening to preachers and taking Holy Communion were, of course, fundamental. Salvific benefits were sought from a wide variety of funeral prescriptions, such as for large numbers of candles, aspersions with holy water, and bequests. Being well buried was viewed by some as propitiatory. Ramsey’s findings show that 3.4 per cent of Paris testators in 1590 requested burial at mendicant houses, compared with figures of only 1.2 per cent for 1540 and 1.4 per cent for 1630 – *Ibid.*, table 6.2 on p. 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-711)
712. ‘The Sixteen played a vital role,’ wrote Ascoli, ‘in the defense of Paris, encouraging the besieged, finding food, and warning their fellow citizens of the spiritual and physical horrors that they believed would accompany surrender’ Peter M. Ascoli, ‘“The Sixteen” and the Paris League, 1585-1591’, unpublished doctoral thesis (University of California, 1971), p. 432. It was they who urged Mayenne to appoint a good governor, and they too who at the outset identified policies that must be implemented if the city was to avoid defeat. They lent money to Nemours at critical moments, and made use of their network of informants to issue early warnings of Politique plots. One of their number, Mathias Delabruyère, took charge of food supplies. The *Ligueur* Parlement’s pronouncement in mid-June of the death-sentence against would-be peace-mongers was a concession to pressure from the *Seize*. [↑](#footnote-ref-712)
713. Ascoli, p. 502, n. 95. A century earlier, Alphonse Dufour (1827-1914), who had probably not read the *Histoire*, had considered both Pigafetta’s and Corneio’s work to be better than any of the standard contemporary histories that included the siege – though he also found Corneio to be rather immoderate – Filippo Pigafetta, *Relation du siège de Paris*, ed. A. Dufour (Paris, 1876), pp. 1-10. Dufour was the first to publish a French translation from the Italian of Pigafetta’s account. In his introduction, he noted that neither de Thou nor Villeroy rated Corneio highly. De Thou considered Corneio ‘[un] écrivain...peu exact’ but he willingly included detail borrowed from Pigafetta – De Thou, 11, p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-713)
714. Filippo Pigafetta (1533-1604) was Italian, a devout Catholic, and variously soldier, engineer, and diplomat. Well-informed – he was attached to Caetani – and observant, he lived through the siege, and later published his account in Rome in April 1591. Dufour considered it to be well-balanced and largely impartial. Pedro Corneio (1536-1618), a Spanish Carmelite scholar writing in French, was in Paris to offer moral support to the *Ligue*. [↑](#footnote-ref-714)
715. Pedro Corneio, *Bref discours et véritable des choses plus notables arrivées au Siège mémorable de la renommée Ville de Paris & défense d’icelle, par Monseigneur le Duc de Nemours contre le Roi de Navarre* (Paris, 1590), in *ML*, 4, pp. 276-303. [↑](#footnote-ref-715)
716. *ML*, 4, p. 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-716)
717. *ML*, 4, p. 303. [↑](#footnote-ref-717)
718. *H2*, p. 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-718)
719. *RDBVP*, 10. The work is an annotated compilation of extant minutes for the period 30 March 1590 through 16 March 1594. If there ever was an original register, it had been lost by 1607 – *Ibid*., 10, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-719)
720. *RDBVP*, 10, pp. 2, 4-5 and 7. And even before the siege began orders were given that food supplies into Paris must be given armed escort – *RDBVP*, 10, p. 11. Food security, finance and defences are the dominant features of these pages. [↑](#footnote-ref-720)
721. *Discours véritable de tout ce qui s’est passé en la Ville de Paris, & ès environs, tant de la part du Roi de Navarre & de son Armée que de la part de Monseigneur le Duc de Nemours & les Habitans de Paris depuis la retraite dudit Roi de Navarre de devant Sens jusqu’au douze Juin 1590* (n.pl., 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-721)
722. *Response aux lettres de Henry de Bourbon envoyées aux manans et habitans de Paris, du camp d’Aubervilliers, le 16. de iuin 1590*  (Paris, 1590), p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-722)
723. *Discours véritable de la deffence de messieurs les habitans de Paris, conduits avec leurs garnisons par monseigneur le duc de Nemours, contre le roy de Navarre qui vouloit loger son armée aux faulxbourgs S. Martin, pour battre la ville, où fut blessé à mort le sieur de La Noüe; ledict discours faict mention de la deffaitte du Prince de Dombes par monseigneur le duc de Mercœure* (Paris, 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-723)
724. *Brief traité des Misères de la Ville de Paris* (original publication details unknown), in *ML*, 4, pp. 304-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-724)
725. ‘Autre discours sur le sujet précédent’, in *ML*, 4, pp. 314-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-725)
726. Agrippa d’Aubigné, *Histoire Universelle* (Geneva, 1994), 8, pp. 174-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-726)
727. *Ibid*., p. 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-727)
728. *Lettre d’un gentilhomme déclarant les raisons pour lesquelles il s’est depuis le douziesme de may, départy de l’armée du Navarrois* (Paris, 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-728)
729. *Ibid*., p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-729)
730. *Ibid*., p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-730)
731. *Ibid*., p. 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-731)
732. ‘Rapporter icy particulierement tant de divers accidens que la famine a fait souffrir, non seulement aux pauvres qui estoient en grand nombre et tout le monde se pouvant dire tels, mais a plusieurs qui n’estoient naiz pour avoir aucune disette n’y remede; dire les exemples de leur patience, et la douleur d’onc(*sic*) d’une lente mort qui les a emportés, ne feroit que chagriner le lecteur, et possible ne le pourroit on pas croire; ceux qui viendront apres en considerans la longueur du siege, la grandeur de la ville, le nombre du peuple, le delay du secours et ce que i’ay dit, en jugeront ce qu’il leur plaira, et selon qu’ils seront conduits par leur affection ; ils auront possible pitié de ceux qui ont tant enduré, en une querelle où ils n’avoient point d’interest que la conservation de leur Religion; puisque comme a dit un déclamateur la peste est chose heureuse pour sa brievete, le carnage d’une bataille qui se perd en une heure ou deux est chose heureuse; bref toute sorte de mort est aisée; mais la cruelle faim espuise la vie, saisit les entrailles, tourmente l’esprit, desseiche le corps, est maistresse de transgression; la plus dure de toutes les necessites, la plus defforme de tous le maux, la peine la plus dure et la plus intollerable qui soit aux enfers.’ – *H2*, pp. 273-74, underlining as in ms. 23296. Around 30,000 died of starvation. [↑](#footnote-ref-732)
733. *H2*, p. 279. [↑](#footnote-ref-733)
734. *H2*, p. 346. [↑](#footnote-ref-734)
735. *H2*, pp. 197 and 241. Delabruyère’s contribution was critical, for on the eve of the great siege, according to Rozée, the *Ligue* leadership had not been well enough prepared: ‘il y avoit eust de la faute en ceux du party de l’union pour n’avoir pas pourveu la ville de paris suffisament de vivres’ – *H2*, p. 245. It is difficult to judge how far a municipal leadership under siege can be blamed for food shortages, but the fact that within four weeks of the start of the siege the municipality was desperate enough to require (without means of enforcement) the expulsion of the city’s poorest people (morally indefensible) may support Rozée’s criticism. Cf. *Injonction à tous villageois et paysans de sortir de cest Ville et de se retirer chez eux; ensemble à tous vagabonds d’en sortir* *– RDBVP*, 10, pp. 19-20 [↑](#footnote-ref-735)
736. Rozée noted that the duke’s exhortations from afar helped the Sixteen to support morale in the capital, but that the impact would wear off if promises took too long to materialise – *H2*, pp. 227-28, 240-41 and 286. [↑](#footnote-ref-736)
737. *H2*, p. 192. Rozée thought it was partly because of Mayenne’s trust in the *Seize* that Nemours was willing to seek their advice. He noted too that the *Seize* had considerable popular support; he believed it was causing concern in the king’s camp in spring 1590 that the *Seize* enjoyed ‘toute la créance du peuple’ – *H2*, pp. 233-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-737)
738. *H2*, p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-738)
739. *H2*, p. 305. [↑](#footnote-ref-739)
740. *H2*, pp. 167 and 310. [↑](#footnote-ref-740)
741. *H2*, p. 273. [↑](#footnote-ref-741)
742. *H2*, p. 272. [↑](#footnote-ref-742)
743. *H2*, p. 200. [↑](#footnote-ref-743)
744. *H2*, p. 274. [↑](#footnote-ref-744)
745. *H2*, p. 351. [↑](#footnote-ref-745)
746. *H2*, p. 197. [↑](#footnote-ref-746)
747. *H2*, p. 310. [↑](#footnote-ref-747)
748. *H2*, p. 236. [↑](#footnote-ref-748)
749. *H2*, p. 315. Pierre de L’Estoile concurred: ‘Ce jour de vendredi 27e juillet, M. de Nemoux, qui ne dormoit ne nuit ne jour, et qui souventefois mettoit lui-même la main à l’œuvre, fist terrasser la porte Saint-Honoré...’ – L’Estoile, 5, p. 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-749)
750. *H2*, p. 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-750)
751. *H2*, p. 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-751)
752. *H2*, p. 298. [↑](#footnote-ref-752)
753. It was to relate another tale of exemplary courage and resourcefulness, this time just outside Paris, that Rozée at one point interrupted his long siege narrative. The digression dealt with the holding for the *Ligue* of the besieged Château du Bois de Vincennes by Beaulieu, in summer 1590. Beaulieu refused to talk of surrender, treated prisoners well, brushed aside discouragements and restored order when all seemed lost. He used every possible trick to outwit the enemy (‘ce poitevin montra qu’il n’avoit pas laissé toute sa finesse en son pays’) and, above all, ‘[il] garda cette place avec beaucoup de valeur et de jugement’ – *H2*, p. 264. Posted to the castle ‘sans la pourvoir de ce qui estoit necessaire pour la garder’, Beaulieu had requested help from Paris – itself under siege – to no avail – *H2*, p. 259. Consequently ‘il fut contraint de faire nettoyer et restablir la breche a ses depens, pourvoir aux necessites de la place tant pour les armes que pour les vivres le tout a ses propres despens’ – *H2*, p.259. (Rozée himself tells us that the hero at the Château was ‘ungentilhomme de poitou nommé de beaulieu, qui estoit un cadet dela maison de beaulieu de persac en poitou eslevé chez le deffunct duc de Montpensier et qui avoit aux guerres de poitou porté sa cornette blanche’ – *H2*, p. 259. We have not managed to trace his identity further).  [↑](#footnote-ref-753)
754. Ascoli, p. 502, n. 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-754)
755. Wolfe, *The Conversion* , p. 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-755)
756. *H2*, pp. 192 and 239. [↑](#footnote-ref-756)
757. *H2*, p. 240. [↑](#footnote-ref-757)
758. *H2*, p. 254. [↑](#footnote-ref-758)
759. It was an uncharacteristic light excursion. After just three paragraphs, the historian – never fond of tittle-tattle – resumed his customary serious tone: ‘... retournons a l’histoire du siege’ – *H2*, p. 281. [↑](#footnote-ref-759)
760. *H2*, pp. 280-81. [↑](#footnote-ref-760)
761. *H2*, p. 280; the reference is from the *Brief Traité des Misères*, in *ML*, 4, pp. 310-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-761)
762. *H2*, pp. 323-24. ‘[Q]uoyqu’il fust inutil de recommander le jeune parcequ on le faisoit asses malgré soy, il y avoit cepandant des gens tant de l’un que de l’autre sexe qui s’abstenoient de manger pendant un iour ou deux qu’ils passient en prieres et oraisons.’ – *H2*, p. 324. [↑](#footnote-ref-762)
763. *H2*, p. 324. [↑](#footnote-ref-763)
764. Rozée’s agreement with the points being made by the *Seize* seems evident from his inclusion of the full text of their memoir – *H2*, pp. 353-56. [↑](#footnote-ref-764)
765. *H2*, p. 356. [↑](#footnote-ref-765)
766. *H2*, p. 356. At least three variants of tri-partite division were current in Rozée’s time. His own made distinctions among Catholics in Paris. Panigarola gave a broader picture: Catholics, Protestants and Politiques. Etienne Pasquier categorised *Ligueurs* as *zélés*, *espagnolisés*, or *clos et couverts*. See Labitte,pp. 100-103; Etienne Pasquier, *Les recherches de la France* (Paris, 1621), p. 771. Rozée surely belonged with the *clos et couverts*. [↑](#footnote-ref-766)
767. *H2*, pp. 356, 396, 462 and 506. [↑](#footnote-ref-767)
768. Unlike Pierre Fayet, who hoped that God would prevent Mayenne from meddling in the October 1590 elections, Rozée forebore to mention the duke’s tendency to over-ride voters’ wishes – Pierre Fayet, *Journal historique de Pierre Fayet sur les troubles de la Ligue*, ed. V. Luzarche Tours, 1852), pp. 99-100. [↑](#footnote-ref-768)
769. Salmon (1972), pp. 558-561; Salmon, *Society in Crisis*, pp. 265-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-769)
770. Claude, chevalier d’Aumale (1536-91) was killed on 3 January 1591 during an attempt to recover St Denis for the *Ligue*. In the *journée des farines* a Politiqueplot to introduce into Paris a small group of royalist soldiers dressed as peasants delivering flour came to nothing. [↑](#footnote-ref-770)
771. Salmon (1972), p. 561. Rozée made no mention of this episode of terror. [↑](#footnote-ref-771)
772. *H2*, pp. 391-96; the episode appears again in a passage introducing the Brisson affair – pp. 461-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-772)
773. *H2*, p. 396. The analysis is repeated on p. 462. The expression ‘plein de confusion’ may serve as a reminder that Rozée’s tri-partite analysis of Paris masked considerable fluidity. The parties were not static: when Delarue and Dorléans later quit the *Ligue*, how many others followed their example? Nor can we be sure how firmly even leading individuals considered themselves to be attached to a party: Prévost, a co-founder of the *Seize*, spoke as a friend with Brisson hours before the judge was hanged. And what of those who fell between parties? Rozée himself appears to have been one of these: although clearly no Mayennist, he found himself unable to condone or even describe the attitudes adopted by Bussy le Clerc and Choulier after mid- November, and, as we will see, he expressed his relief that the blood-letting did not continue. [↑](#footnote-ref-773)
774. *H2*, pp. 397-98. [↑](#footnote-ref-774)
775. The encouraging reply from Rome (in May) had propaganda value that the Paris *Ligueurs* were quick to use – see chapter 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-775)
776. Barnabé Brisson’s words were recorded by L’Estoile: ‘Je ressemble à ces chiens qui sont entrés bien avant dans l’eau et sentant qu’ils se noient, s’en voudroient bien tirer ou gagner quelque bord s’ils pouvoient, mais ils ne peuvent, car le fort de l’eau les emporte: si bien qu’en nageant toujours, à la fin ils se noient. Aussi bien, pour vous en dire franchement, je fais ce que je puis en ceste tempeste et ai fait toujours ce que j’ai pu pour me tirer à bord, et y mettre les autres, mais nous y sommes entrés trop avant pour en sortir; au moins moi, qui sens bien que je me noie et ne m’en puis sauver, sinon par une spéciale grâce et miracle de Dieu’ – cited in Barnavi and Descimon, *La Sainte Ligue*, p. 211. [↑](#footnote-ref-776)
777. *The Paris of Henry of Navarre – as seen by Pierre de l’Estoile*, ed. N.L. Roelker, (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 14-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-777)
778. An example of this is his account of the conversations which took place between his father-in-law, M. Coton, and two *Ligueurs*, Mathieu de Launay and François de Cromé, in early November 1591. In quoting Cromé’s claim that it was time France had another Saint Bartholomew’s Day, L’Estoile hoped to horrify his readers and to discredit the *Seize* – L’Estoile, 5,pp. 115-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-778)
779. *H2*, p. 460. In terrifying the Parlement the murderers had expected to accrue power; in the event they inflicted damage upon themselves by losing the favour of Mayenne. [↑](#footnote-ref-779)
780. Cited in Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 183. [↑](#footnote-ref-780)
781. Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-781)
782. *Ibid*., p. 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-782)
783. ‘…[A] present on n’oserait ouvrir la bouche à peine de hazarder sa vie’, remarked Brisson in January 1589 – cited in Barnavi, *Le Parti de Dieu*, p.184. Jules Michelet believed that the judge joined the *Ligue* out of fear – cited in Paul Gambier, *Le Président Barnabé Brisson, ligueur 1531-1591* (Paris, 1957), p. 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-783)
784. First, on 16 January 1589, Brisson kept clear of the Parlementwhile his friend from student days, Achille de Harlay, aware of his impending fate, nonetheless attended the court and lost his liberty and his job. Harlay was later to make a play of words on the Latin form of ‘Barnabé’, changing it to Barabbas – Gambier, *Le Président*, p. 67, n. 17. Secondly, Gambier saw Brisson as a traitor in broader terms: despite climbing the ranks through royal favour he had joined the *Ligue* once Henri III had been dispatched; he then betrayed the *Ligue* by trying to smooth the way for the coming of Henri IV – Gambier, *Le Président*, p. 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-784)
785. When after the death of Henry III a conspiracy led by Potier de Blancmesnil intended to facilitate the entry of Henry IV into the capital, discovery of the plot led to severe punishment; probably between thirty and forty conspirators died – Barnavi, *Le Parti de Dieu*, pp. 184-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-785)
786. See chapter 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-786)
787. ‘Les relations entre les *Seize* et le parlement, entre justice révolutionnaire et justice traditionnelle, deviennent plus mauvaises que jamais’ – Barnavi, *Le Parti de Dieu*, p. 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-787)
788. Cited in Barnavi, *Le Parti de Dieu*, p. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-788)
789. Barnavi, *Le Parti de Dieu*, p.208. [↑](#footnote-ref-789)
790. Born in the Bas-Poitou in 1531, Brisson had soon shown academic excellence, and was admired for this quality by friend and foe alike. Agrippa d’Aubigné called him ‘un des joyaux de la France’; for the *conseiller* Guillaume du Vair he was ‘la Merveille des Lettres’; Jean Boucher wrote that ‘son esprit estoit grand, sa doctrine consommée et sa qualité honorable’. As a young man Brisson studied alongside Achille de Harlay. By the time he had become a judge, Brisson knew that he could not merely enjoy intellectual activity but would have to serve his political masters. His most famous obligation to do this came in 1587 when, as a President in the *Grand’ chambre*,he was called upon by Henry III to assemble for the first time the royal decrees: the result was the *Code Henri*, a precursor of the *Code Michaud* of 1629 and of the later work of Colbert for Louis XIV. See Barnavi and Descimon, *La Sainte Ligue*, pp. 72-82. [↑](#footnote-ref-790)
791. *Ibid*., p.93. [↑](#footnote-ref-791)
792. Greengrass, *France* (1995), p.68. [↑](#footnote-ref-792)
793. Barnavi and Descimon, *La Sainte Ligue*, p. 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-793)
794. Greengrass, *France* (1995), p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-794)
795. During the religious wars the sale of high judicial office had come to be seen by many as linked to simony and to heresy. In a practice not dropped until 1596 a new judge had to swear by solemn oath that he had not purchased his job: ‘Ce parjure inaugural ne résumait-il pas l’irréligion de la justice?’ – Barnavi and Descimon, *La Sainte Ligue*, p. 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-795)
796. Barnavi and Descimon, *La Sainte Ligue*, pp. 126-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-796)
797. *Ibid*., p.71. [↑](#footnote-ref-797)
798. Descimon (1983), pp. 113-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-798)
799. Barnavi, *Le Parti*, p. 205. [↑](#footnote-ref-799)
800. *H2*, p. 463. Other observers too were dismayed. Mathieu de Launay, canon at Soissons, called the outcome ‘une scélérate injustice’ and François Morin de Cromé set about publishing a pamphlet to expose the failings of the judges – Barnavi, *Le Parti de Dieu*, p. 205. [↑](#footnote-ref-800)
801. Descimon (1983), p. 114. [↑](#footnote-ref-801)
802. L’Estoile, 5, p. 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-802)
803. L’Estoile noted the judgement of some people that both ought to hang – L’Estoile, 5, p. 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-803)
804. The Brigard-Brisson connection is evident too in *Assemblée secrette de plusieurs bourgeois de la ville de Paris*, in *Archives curieuses de l’histoire de France*, eds Louis Cimber and Félix Danjou, 15 vols (1st series, Paris, 1834-37), 13, pp. 309-18. Thus, in a meeting of 2 November, and in response to a suggestion that tax issues be addressed, ‘Le sieur Cromé… dit qu’il ne falloit point s’arrester à choses si légères… mais qu’il se presentoit des choses de plus grande importance auxquelles il estoit besoin de remédier sçavoir à l’injustice qui avoit esté faite au procez de Brigard… que messieurs de la cour l’avoient absous en haine de la compagnie…’ – *Ibid*., p. 309. [↑](#footnote-ref-804)
805. Barnavi and Descimon, *La Sainte Ligue*, p. 202. [↑](#footnote-ref-805)
806. *H2*, p. 468. [↑](#footnote-ref-806)
807. Drouot, *Mayenne*, 2, p. 152, n. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-807)
808. Remarking on the effectiveness of central government in 1591 Jules Gassot observed Mayenne ‘faire comme la charge de roy mesme’ - *Sommaire Mémorial* *(souvenirs) de Jules Gassot : secrétaire du roi (1555-1623)*, ed. Pierre Champion(Paris, 1934), p. 212. Rozée noted an occasion when the duke lodged outside the city at the Bois deVincennes, ‘espérant que là il éviteroit beaucoup d’importunités, qu’il eust reçeu estant a paris’ – *H2*, p. 392. [↑](#footnote-ref-808)
809. Cited in Louis-Pierre Anquetil, *L’esprit de la Ligue, ou histoire politique des troubles de France, pendant les XVIe et XVIIe siècles*, 2 vols (‘nouvelle édition’, Paris, 1818), 1, p. 293. Pelletier, priest at Saint-Jacques-de-la-Boucherie, was ‘[u]n des plus ardents ligueurs’, a member of the *conseil des Seize* in 1585 and the *conseil des quarante* in 1589, and was implicated in the Brisson affair – Vladimir Angelo, *Les curés de Paris au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 2005), p. 803. [↑](#footnote-ref-809)
810. Greengrass, *France* (1995), p. 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-810)
811. L’Estoile, 5, p. 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-811)
812. *Ibid*., pp. 113-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-812)
813. *Ibid*., p. 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-813)
814. *Ibid*., pp. 117-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-814)
815. *Ibid*., p.121. [↑](#footnote-ref-815)
816. *Ibid.*, p. 122. Brisson continued: ‘Et, au surplus, il leur [à la *Seize*] a baillé la force en main, et en a desnué la Justice, qui la doit avoir: si qu’il nous a rendus comme esclaves d’une meschante et vile populasse, armée d’une publique auctorité’ – *Ibid*., p. 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-816)
817. *Ibid*., p. 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-817)
818. *Ibid*., p. 135. Cf. Rozée: ‘le duc de Mayenne, que nous avons esleve sur nos espaules’ – *H2*, p. 516. Across the whole of the *Histoire* this is perhaps the strongest reference to the suspicion that Mayenne had used the *Seize* merely to launch himself into prominence. [↑](#footnote-ref-818)
819. L’Estoile, 5, pp. 126 and 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-819)
820. *Ibid*., p.127 [↑](#footnote-ref-820)
821. On the day of the hangings, Senault and Boucher had contrived to be away from Paris. Those who fled from the city included Cromé and Adrien Cochéry. [↑](#footnote-ref-821)
822. L’Estoile, 5, p. 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-822)
823. This was not merely a cover-up: his thin account of the thirteen days emerged from self-examination; at a loss to explain the initial slaughter, he thanked God that it had not continued beyond the first day – *H2*, p. 466. [↑](#footnote-ref-823)
824. ‘Cela le piqua tellement, qu’il resolut en soy mesme de differer et empescher la teneure des Estats, l’eslection d’aucun Roy autre que luy, et iura la ruine et extermination de ceux qu’on appelloit les seize a paris’ – *H2*, p. 464. [↑](#footnote-ref-824)
825. ‘Il ne se trouveroit plus personne pour promouvoir l’assemblée des Estats, sans laquelle il demeureroit en son authorité dedans sa qualité continuée; que par sucession de temps, le peuple tomberoit en telle extremité, que par desespoir de tant de fatiques, il seroit contraint de se ietter entre ses bras, et par la forme qu’il auroit esté declaré lieutenant general du vivant du feu cardinal de bourbon, luy donner la qualité de Roy de france sans aucune assemblée d’Estats, laqu’elle mesme necessité induiroit le pape d’y consentir, et contraindroit le Roy D’Espagne de l’accorder’ – *H2*, p. 466. [↑](#footnote-ref-825)
826. Wolfe, *The Conversion*, p. 108. In fact, the duke had made reasonably good time. If his first reliable knowledge of the hangings was brought by the Rolands, who left Paris for Lâon on the seventeenth, and if we allow a day’s journey for them and for Mayenne, we are left with a period of nine days in which Mayenne, knowing he had to confront the *Seize* in a show of force, had to assess the situation and assemble troops. Rozée tells us that the troops were collected from several locations en route, in particular Château-Thierry and Meaux. It took time. [↑](#footnote-ref-826)
827. L’Estoile, 5, p. 136. [↑](#footnote-ref-827)
828. The exact composition is unclear: Rozée says there were four deputies, including Boucher who did most of the speaking, while L’Estoile gives no number, makes no mention of Boucher, but does specify Jehan Louchart and Pierre Senault. [↑](#footnote-ref-828)
829. *H2*, pp. 466-67. [↑](#footnote-ref-829)
830. L’Estoile, 5, p. 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-830)
831. *H2*, p. 467. [↑](#footnote-ref-831)
832. *H2*, p. 468. [↑](#footnote-ref-832)
833. L’Estoile, 5, p. 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-833)
834. *H2*, p. 468. [↑](#footnote-ref-834)
835. *H2*, p. 469. [↑](#footnote-ref-835)
836. *H2*, p. 469. [↑](#footnote-ref-836)
837. *H2*, pp. 469-70. Rozée’s intimate account of this meeting suggests that it was widely discussed in *Ligue* circles. We know from L’Estoile that up to three hundred of the *Seize* assembled ‘dans les Cordeliers’ on 2 December – perhaps the historian was among them – L’Estoile, 5, p. 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-837)
838. Villeroy remarked to the Italian banker Sébastien Zamet, ‘Mon ami, ie vous apprens que dedans peu d’heures le duc de Mayenne fera quatre bons effets pour le service du Roy quoy qu’il pense faire pour luy dont il se trompe; en premier lieu il fera mourir les plus mutins des seize; il contraindra les predicateurs, docteurs et curez de se taire; il trompera et bravera les espagnols; et mettra en credit les serviteurs du Roy; reiouissons nous, car il est certain que le duc de Mayenne faisant ces choses ruinera la ligue et soy mesme’ – *H2*, p. 471. [↑](#footnote-ref-838)
839. Barnavi and Descimon, *La Sainte Ligue,* p. 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-839)
840. *H2*, p. 471. [↑](#footnote-ref-840)
841. Cited in Descimon (1983), p. 125. Crucé and Bussy le Clerc were later expelled from the capital. [↑](#footnote-ref-841)
842. Ascoli, pp. 615-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-842)
843. *H2*, p. 472. Evasive? The historian’s reason was valid in so far as the detail of the hangings was inconsequential. He reminded the reader that he had also omitted details of Brisson’s hanging. He added that other writings about such events had been of poor quality; he did not wish to fall into the same trap. Perhaps on these sensitive matters he chose too to recall that the Edict of Nantes required all the events of the civil wars to be ‘forgotten’. [↑](#footnote-ref-843)
844. L’Estoile, 5, pp. 142-44. Louchart, a scoundrel, was defiant until very near the end; Ameline had been instrumental in so many towns joining the Catholic Union; Emonnot had earlier murdered an innocent man; as for Anroux, ‘on tient qu’il eust surpassé tous les autresen cruauté et meschanceté’ – p. 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-844)
845. L’Estoile, 5, p. 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-845)
846. *H2*, p. 472. [↑](#footnote-ref-846)
847. L’Estoile, 5, p. 147. These men never returned to trouble the capital – Ascoli, p. 625. [↑](#footnote-ref-847)
848. *H2*, p. 473. [↑](#footnote-ref-848)
849. Ascoli, p. 623. [↑](#footnote-ref-849)
850. Ascoli, p. 622. Antoine de Nervèze praised the duke’s intervention in defence of ‘la majesté de la justice’ – Antoine de Nervèze, *Histoire de la vie et trespas de très illustre et excellent prince Charles de Lorraine, duc de Mayenne* (Paris, 1613) in Cimber et Danjou, *Archives curieuses*, 15, p. 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-850)
851. Pierre-Victor Palma-Cayet gave some examples which included: *Seize*, Montfaucon vous appelle; / A demain, crient les corbeaux: / Seize piliers de sa chapelle / Vous seront autant de tombeaux – Palma-Cayet, p. 333. [↑](#footnote-ref-851)
852. *Sommaire Mémorial*, p. 221. [↑](#footnote-ref-852)
853. *H2*, pp. 472-73. Later, Rozée wrote, ‘depuis le depart du duc de Mayanne, l’on n’avoit fait a paris aucune expedition de justice criminal, que contre ceux de l’union’ – *H2*, p. 516. [↑](#footnote-ref-853)
854. The inclusion of a letter (dated 15 January 1592) from Parma to Philip II allowed Rozée to maintain his assault on Mayenne’s reputation. Parma noted the dissatisfaction with Mayenne’s actions felt by the widow and son of the late duc de Guise. He went on to explain why dom Diego d’Ibarra had felt it necessary to speak up against the punishment of Brisson’s assassins the previous December, and then revealed how fearful of Spanish influence Mayenne appeared to be. Mayenne’s reluctance to proceed soon to an Estates-General was placed in the context of his determination to maintain his pre-eminent position: in a key passage, Parma wrote, of Mayenne, ‘il me semble qu’il prend le chemin de reculer ce qu’il poura cete afffaire; de quoy les umbrages et jalousies qu’il a comme l’on peut voir plus que jamais, il faut bien entendre qu’il a toujours son but, pour tenir le premier lieu…’ – *H2*, pp. 507-14, quotation, p. 509. It is easy to sense our writer nodding in agreement. [↑](#footnote-ref-854)
855. ‘Cela le piqua tellement, qu’il resolut en soy mesme de differer et empescher la teneure des Estats, l’eslection d’aucun Roy autre que luy, et iura la ruine et extermination de ceux qu’on appelloit les seize a Paris’ – *H2*, p. 464. The historian showed no awareness that the letters to Spain and Rome might be construed as subverting a government they had helped to make, and offending against national pride and gallican principles. [↑](#footnote-ref-855)
856. *H2*, p. 473. Similarly, the royalists had gained more than they would have from three victories on the battlefield – *H2*, p. 474. [↑](#footnote-ref-856)
857. Later the historian remarked bitterly that ‘la resolution qu’il [Mayenne] avoit prise d’abaisser les Seize avoit reussy), and he noted what he judged to be Mayenne’s naievete: ‘il pensoit que tous ceux qui ne seroient point du parti des Seize, seroient du sien, mais il en arriva autrement; car chacun scavoit bien que le duc de Mayenne n’estoit pas assez puissant pour former un party en ce Royaume, contre le Roy’ – *H2*, p. 524. Mayenne’s capacity to bring ruin to the *Ligue* was well understood by the royalists who argued ‘qu’il estoit expedient pour ruiner la ligue de laisser faire le duc de Mayenne, et l’entretenir dans ces esperances de grandeur, que dele traverser; par ce qu’avec son authorite, il la ruineroit plus en un mois, que tous les serviteurs du Roy, ne pouroint faire en un an’ – *H2*, p. 526. [↑](#footnote-ref-857)
858. In May 1591 the duke had written, ‘Il n’y a de jalousie qui touche si avant au cœur du françoys… que l’appréhension d’un Estat populaire et tumultueux.’ – cited in Barnavi and Descimon, *La Sainte Ligue*, p. 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-858)
859. Mayenne had expressed these and other fears on 29 November: ‘il se plaignit du mespris qu’ils [les Seize] avoient fait de son authorité, disant, que quoy qu’il eust beaucoup travaillé pour le party, consommé une grande partie de ses biens, et mis sa personne au hazard pour le salut commun du peuple, toutesfouis qu’il ne voioit qu’ ingratitude au lieu de reconnoisance, d’autant que l’on ne tenoit conte de luy, et qu’on luy preferoit son neveu et l’infante D’Espagne à ses mérites’ – *H2*, p. 467. [↑](#footnote-ref-859)
860. Barnavi and Descimon, *La Sainte Ligue,* p.218. [↑](#footnote-ref-860)
861. Historians have generally sympathised with Mayenne. Joseph de Croze noted how the duke’s ‘énergique répression’ of the rebels enabled him to consolidate his support-base within the wider *Ligue* movement – Joseph de Croze, *Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe*, 2 vols (Paris, 1866), 2, pp. 214-15, quotation, p. 214. Jean-Hippolyte Mariéjol emphasiseded how carefully Mayenne gauged the meting out of punishment, sparing the clerics – Mariéjol, p. 347. Charles Labitte had regarded the leniency toward the clerics as sensible but also weak: ‘Il semblait que l’affection populaire les mît à couvert, et Mayenne, qui n’avait pas reculé devant les armes des conjurés, recula devant la parole vengeresse de la chaire’ – Labitte, p. 144. Ascoli rightly rejected the *manant*’s unfounded claim that the *Seize* had had the duke’s blessing when they killed Brisson – *Dialogue*, pp. 117-18, including notes 161-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-861)
862. *Not even allowed to speak!* was how the *Manant* characterised their condition – *Dialogue*, p. 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-862)
863. *Ibid*., p. 148, n. 225. [↑](#footnote-ref-863)
864. *Ibid*., p. 132, n. 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-864)
865. *H2*, p. 506. It is at this point that Rozée gave his last description of the divisions among Paris Catholics. By the 1620s it was plain to Rozée that the royalists and the Mayennists had colluded at the *Ligue*’s expense. The historian may have gained some comfort from the thought that Mayenne was being duped: ‘[P]our ceque les desseins du Roy ne se rapportoient pas aux pretentions du duc de Mayenne, les premiers sceurent bien faire entendre aux derniers que l’ennemy de mon ennemy n’est pas pourtant mon amy’ – *H2*, p. 506. [↑](#footnote-ref-865)
866. Rozée knew about the peace talks. It angered him that Mayenne was on a course whereby, lost in dreams of grandeur, he was doing more damage to the Catholic cause by the month than the king could in a year. Blinded by his resentment toward the duke, he saw only the progressive ruination of the *Seize*, not the gradual progress towards the king’s conversion that for many would render the *Ligue* obsolete – *H2*, pp. 517-26. [↑](#footnote-ref-866)
867. Since the death of ‘Charles X’ in May 1590, Mayenne had been ‘lieutenant-général sans roi, en attendant que les Etats en élussent un’ – Drouot, *Mayenne*, 2, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-867)
868. *H2*, pp 515-16. The following extract captures the flavour of the whole: ‘ceux qui avoient enduré la tourmente, seulement pourcequ’ils s’estoient trouvez embarquez dedans le vaisseau, oublierent et la ligue et leurs sermens si souvent reiterés; et un grand nombre de gens de peu, qui se souvenoient d’avoir executé ceque l’on appelloit les violences des seize, se resolurent de faire encore pis contre les seize, pour donner de la consolation aux autres, persuades qu’ils furent, que les vieilles iniures s’effacent par nouveaux bienfaits…’ – *H2*, p. 515. [↑](#footnote-ref-868)
869. Rozée noted the strong royalist objection that only the king could convoke the estates, but adeptly included the obvious retort that that was the whole point – to determine who the king was – or should be – *H2*, p. 528. [↑](#footnote-ref-869)
870. Rozée put on a brave face, noting ‘une notable compagnie de deputez des provinces et plus grande que l’on n’avoit esperé en cete saison’ – *H2*, p. 531. [↑](#footnote-ref-870)
871. Cf. Rozée: ‘…[A]utres [royalistes] disoient que la tenure de ces Estats seroit une comedie, ausquels les plus sages respondoient qu’il faloit prendre garde (que si dieu n’y mettoit la main) ce ne fust une tragedie’ – *H2*, p. 528. [↑](#footnote-ref-871)
872. Salmon (1972), p. 572. [↑](#footnote-ref-872)
873. By contrast, Agrippa d’Aubigné was in the entourage of Henri of Navarre from the early 1570s, and sat in his council meetings in the 1580s – Jouanna, p. 682. In his *Histoire* he told the story of an occasion when he and a fellow *écuyer du roi*  were overheard engaged in impolite conversation by Henri IV whom they had thought to be asleep – Agrippa d’Aubigné, *Histoire Universelle*, ed. André Thierry, 11 vols (Geneva, 1981-2000), 8, pp. 287-88. In all, d’Aubigné spent fifty-four years alongside Navarre – Mark Greengrass, ‘Clio et le passé récent : les fonctions et motivations historiennes aux lendemains des guerres de Religion françaises’, unpublished article. Pierre Victor Palma-Cayet was a private tutor to the young Henri of Navarre, and in 1596 he was appointed *chronographe* by the king – Jouanna, p. 1178. Jacques-Auguste de Thou was shown round the gardens at Nérac, and met both the duc d’Anjou and the duc de Mercœur; later he served in Henry IV’s *conseil d’état* – Jouanna, pp. 1330-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-873)
874. Valois, p. xxiii. [↑](#footnote-ref-874)
875. *La satyre ménippée*, in *ML*, 5, p. 496. [↑](#footnote-ref-875)
876. *Ibid*., in *ML*, 5, p. 500. [↑](#footnote-ref-876)
877. De Lamar Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism. Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. 202-03. [↑](#footnote-ref-877)
878. Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*, p. 182. When Philip II offered to take France under his protection, Mayenne, unlike some in the *Seize*, would have none of it – Mariéjol, p. 329. [↑](#footnote-ref-878)
879. Anjou’s activities were one of the reasons why a later Spanish visitor to Paris believed that Philip II had long had just cause to send troops into France, but that ‘[il] a volontairement oublié ses justes griefs et renoncé à exiger réparation’ – Ivan Cloulas, ‘Un témoignage espagnol sur la Ligue: Los Tres libros de la guerra de Francia de Damián de Armenta y Córdoba (1596)’, *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 2 (1966), p. 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-879)
880. Gustave Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘La politique de Philippe II dans les affaires de France, 1559-1598’, *Revue des Questions Historiques* 25 (1879). In being sharply critical of Spanish involvement in French affairs Baguenault de Puchesse was perhaps responding to the allegation that had been made by Jules Michelet a generation earlier that the *Ligue* was above all ‘l’alliance du clergé et de l’Espagne, l’or, l’intrigue et la menace, l’insolence de l’étranger’ – cited in Elie Barnavi, *Le Parti de Dieu: étude sociale et politique des chefs de la Ligue parisienne 1585-1594* (Bruxelles, 1980), p. 6. Baguenault de Puchesse and other contributors to the *Revue* were keen to emphasise the unity ‘entre la nation et la religion’ – Jean-Marie Constant, *La Ligue* (Paris, 1996), p. 468; an avowed aim of the journal was to salvage the truth of the history of the Catholic church from accounts written by its detractors – Gaston du Fresne de Beaucourt, ‘Introduction’, *Revue des Questions Historiques* 1 (1866), p. 7.  [↑](#footnote-ref-880)
881. Cited in Jouanna,p. 357. Denis Pallier has characterised the pro-Spanish party as small, sustained by sermons, and unable to make a significant contribution to the pamphlet literature of the time – Pallier, pp. 63 and 107-08. Some *Ligue* opponents were apt to regard all *Ligueurs* as hispanophile. Thus, the *Conseil salutaire* begins, ‘C’est a vous Catholiques de Paris, Catholiques rebelles, Catholiques zelez, Catholiques qui marchez sous la banière de Lorraine & d’Espagne, ausquels ce paquet s’adresse…’ – *Conseil salutaire d’un bon françoys aux Parisiens* (Paris, 1589), p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-881)
882. Three hundred thousand *écus* brought by Spanish agents was ‘fort à propos’ – *H2*, p. 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-882)
883. In his analysis of *Ligueurs*, Etienne Pasquier’s *clos et couverts* sought ‘l’extirpation de la nouvelle Religion, mais non la ruine ou mutation de l’Estat’ – Etienne Pasquier, *Les recherches de la France* (Paris, 1621), p. 771. This was Rozée’s position. [↑](#footnote-ref-883)
884. *H2*, p. 372. In a similar vein, Rozée offered no defence to the charge made in *Lettres patentes* dated 7 July 1591 that by inviting foreign invaders the *Ligue* had shown itself to be no more than a power-seeking faction – *H2*, pp. 435-39. Nor did he challenge Mayenne’s allegation that Bussy le Clerc ‘tenoit le party des Espagnols’ – *H2*, p. 468. [↑](#footnote-ref-884)
885. *H2*, p. 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-885)
886. Later, referring to *Ligueur* pleas that the duc de Mayenne act more decisively on their behalf, the historian observed: ‘ces plaintes et remonstrances tout (*sic*) ensemble estoient conformes aux demandes continuelles que faisoient le legat de S.S. et les ministres du Roy d’Espagne et les autres princes catholiques **et tous les bons catholiques**’ – *H2*, p. 392, my emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-886)
887. *H2*, p. 112. The reasonableness of Spanish demands that this passage seeks to demonstrate, and some of the wording, both suggest that Rozée knew about and probably had read the *Extraict de la déclaration faicte par le Roy catholique aux princes de France catholiques, et autres tenants le party de la religion catholique à l’encontre des héréticques de ce royaume, leurs fauteurs et adherans. Ensemble les articles accordez par sa Majesté ausdicts princes catholiques* (Paris, 1590). The Spanish requirement that Philip II be recognised ‘protecteur en france de la religion et de l’etat’ was rejected by Caetani when he arrived at Paris in January 1590, and Mendoza was unable to change his mind – see Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*, p. 203. [↑](#footnote-ref-887)
888. *H2*, p. 112. The historian’s reference to the ordinary people of Paris is a device whereby he commonly disclosed his own views. [↑](#footnote-ref-888)
889. *H2*, p. 358. [↑](#footnote-ref-889)
890. *H2*, p. 391. [↑](#footnote-ref-890)
891. *H2*, p. 464. [↑](#footnote-ref-891)
892. Mariéjol, pp. 329-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-892)
893. The Spanish diplomat brought a wealth of experience to his new office. One of nineteen children born to the same parents, Mendoza had been a scholar at Alcalá before embarking on a military career that took him to North Africa, Malta and the Netherlands. It was in the Netherlands that his talents as a diplomat were noticed, and before long he was appointed resident ambassador in England. There, his entanglement in the Throckmorton plot brought about his hasty flight to France in 1584.For a comprehensive and sympathetic biography of Mendoza, along with a survey of his writings, see Alfred Morel-Fatio, ‘Don Bernardino de Mendoza’, *Bulletin Hispanique* 8 (1906). [↑](#footnote-ref-893)
894. In the event, the negotiations were conducted by two assistants, Jean Baptiste de Tassis and Juan de Moreo – Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*, p. 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-894)
895. *H1*, p. 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-895)
896. For Baguenault de Puchesse, Mendoza’s interference was ‘une … singulière insolence’ – ‘La Politique de Philip II’, p. 32. In a similar vein, the nineteenth-century historian decried the ambassador’s audacity in appearing to demand French compliance with Spanish policy against England in 1588 – *Ibid*., pp. 38-39; Mendoza’s peremptory tone on this occasion is apparent especially on pages 5-6 of the *Harangue au Roy très-chrestien, faitte à Chartres, par Monseigneur Don Bernardin de Mendoça, ambassadeur pour le Roy d’Espagne vers Sa Majesté* (Lyon, 1588). [↑](#footnote-ref-896)
897. *H1*, pp. 160-61. There is no clue to the historian’s source. It is not Palma-Cayet. [↑](#footnote-ref-897)
898. Morel-Fatio considered Mendoza to be ‘l’âme de la résistance, … faisant avorter l’attaque qui sans lui eût probablement réussi’ (‘Don Bernardino de Mendoza’, p. 56), but his evidence – Mendoza’s account of the incident in a letter to Philip II, and a *Ligueur* pamphlet about the same event – lacks impartiality. If Rozée read this pamphlet – *La Téméraire entreprinse du prince de Béarn sur la ville de Paris, avec l’heureux secours de Monseigneur le duc du Mayne et courageuse défence des habitans de laditte ville. Ensemble la vendition qu’il a faicte des villes à l’Angloys* (Paris, 1589) – his account of *Toussaint* bears no resemblance to it. For him, the saviour of the day was not Mayenne but Nemours, whose arrival ‘releva fort le courage du peuple’ – *H2*, p. 85. L’Estoile’s account of *Toussaint* 1589 carries no reference to Mendoza. [↑](#footnote-ref-898)
899. Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*. This remarkable book was based largely on previously unused sources: the copious writings of Mendoza, some of which Jensen himself deciphered. [↑](#footnote-ref-899)
900. *Ibid*., pp. 110 and 135. In these years, claimed Baguenault de Puchesse, Mendoza acted as ambassador more to the Guises than to the Valois court – ‘La Politique de Philippe II’, p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-900)
901. Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*, pp. 136-44. Baguenault de Puchesse called Mendoza ‘l’âme véritable du complot’ – ‘La Politique de Philippe II’, p. 38 – but he offered no supporting evidence. [↑](#footnote-ref-901)
902. None of Nicolas Poulain, Pierre de L’Estoile or Pierre Victor Palma-Cayet mentioned Mendoza in connection with the *journée des barricades*. [↑](#footnote-ref-902)
903. Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV* (2nd edn, London, 1995), pp. 53-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-903)
904. Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*, pp. 147-50. Philip II stood by his man, Henry III backed down, and Mendoza remained at his post. [↑](#footnote-ref-904)
905. Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘La Politique de Philippe II’, p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-905)
906. Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*, p. 184. The claim was not new. Assessing matters as they stood in August 1589, Albert Gérard concluded three centuries later: ‘en ce moment, Mendoça était le vrai maître de Paris et de la Ligue.’ – Gérard, pp. 126-27. Neither author produced strong evidence. L’Estoile’s entries for spring1589 made no mention of Mendoza. [↑](#footnote-ref-906)
907. Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*, p. 198. Nonetheless, Palma-Cayet portrayed an ambassador who was by no means inactive in the later months of 1589 – Palma-Cayet, pp. 188-191. [↑](#footnote-ref-907)
908. *H2*, p. 273. After considering several early accounts, Morel-Fatio concluded that the whole story was far-fetched. [↑](#footnote-ref-908)
909. *H2*, pp. 170-71 and 277-78. [↑](#footnote-ref-909)
910. *H2*, p. 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-910)
911. Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*, pp. 153-214. One of the ambassador’s last achievements in Paris was to secure the arrival in the capital (in February 1591) of Spanish troops to defend the city. Referring to this event (*H2*, p. 391), Rozée made no mention of Mendoza. [↑](#footnote-ref-911)
912. Henri Drouot, ‘La mission du légat Caetano et sa traversée de la Bourgogne (nov. 1589-janv. 1590)’, *Revue d’Histoire Moderne* 3 (1928). Religious unity was the ultimate goal, but first Caetani had to address the situation as he found it. Thus, Jensen: ‘Cajetan was sent to Paris to meet with the League, determine the rights and suitability of the cardinal of Bourbon to become king of France, establish a favorable relationship between the new monarchy and Rome, and look into the League request for financial aid.’ – *Diplomacy and Dogmatism*, p. 199. Also useful on the exact terms of this mission is Henri de l’Epinois, ‘La Légation du Cardinal Caetani en France’, *Revue des Questions Historiques* 30 (1881); the article exposes the uneasy relationship between Caetani and Sixtus V and argues that the legate was at fault in being too partisan (in favour of the *Ligue*). [↑](#footnote-ref-912)
913. Drouot, ‘La Mission’, p. 388. In fairness, Drouot observed that it was not Caetani’s fault that at one stage the duc de Nevers would not condescend to journey to Lyon to meet him. In addition there were security reasons for travelling through Burgundy, and the hold-up in Dijon was caused partly by a breakdown in the arrangements for escorting Caetani and his party to Paris. [↑](#footnote-ref-913)
914. From Palma-Cayet we have other details: Caetani ‘fut peu heureux en son voyage. Dez son entrée [en France] il perdit tout son bagage en venant de Lyon à Paris; arrivé à Sens, le plancher de la grand sale de l’archevesché où il estoit logé tomba…’ – Palma-Cayet, p. 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-914)
915. Palma-Cayet believed that Caetani left ‘pour ne tomber plus aux fatigues qu’il avoit euēs depuis qu’il estoit venu en France…’ – Palma-Cayet, p. 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-915)
916. L’Epinois, ‘La légation’; Michel de Bouard, ‘Sixte-Quint, Henri IV et la Ligue: la légation du Cardinal Caetani en France’, *Revue des Questions Historiques* 20(1932). [↑](#footnote-ref-916)
917. Cited in Bouard, ‘Sixte-Quint’, p. 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-917)
918. *L’Ordre et magnificence faicte à la réception du légat : par messieurs de Paris, le samedy et dimanche vingtiesme et vingt-uniesme iour de ianvier 1590* (Paris, 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-918)
919. Pallier, p. 369. [↑](#footnote-ref-919)
920. L’Epinois, ‘La légation’, p. 480. [↑](#footnote-ref-920)
921. *H2*, p. 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-921)
922. The pope’s decree appeared in full in the capital under the title *Bulle de Nostre S.-Père le pape Sixte V, contenant les facultez données à monseigneur l’illustrissime et révérendissime cardinal Caietan, légat apostolique au royaume de France* (Paris, 1590). It is likely that Rozée read the bull as presented in this pamphlet. Although he did not quote from it directly, he used the closing words (‘… pour en user par ledict sieur Cardinal …’ – *H2*, p. 118) added by the publisher on p. 28 of the pamphlet, and he noted that ‘selon le narré de cette bulle apostolique, le legat avoit d’autres lettres’ (*H2*, p. 118) – these letters are indeed mentioned on page 4 of the *Bulle de Nostre S.-Père*. There followed a second pamphlet – a summary of the faculties granted by the pope; this appeared in Paris and Lyon under the title *Les Articles de la puissance donnée par Nostre S.-Père à monseigneur l’illustrissime et révérendissime cardinal Caietan, légat de Sa Saincteté au royaume de France, en latin et en françois* (Paris, 1590). Meanwhile, the legate’s mandate was published under the title *Le pouvoir et commission de monseigneur l’illustrissime et révérendissime cardinal Caietan, légat député par le S. Siège apostolique au royaume de France, en latin et en françois* (Paris, 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-922)
923. *H2*, p. 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-923)
924. *H2*, p. 118. Rozée had probably read *La Lettre de N.S.-Père le pape a messieurs de la cour de parlement de Paris* (Paris, 1589) which promised that the legate was ‘doüé dune tres exquise prudence et experience à la conduitte & maniement des plus grandes affaires...’, *La Lettre*, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-924)
925. *H2*, p. 118. Was Rozée listening? [↑](#footnote-ref-925)
926. De Thou, 11, pp. 103-04. [↑](#footnote-ref-926)
927. *H2*, pp. 118-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-927)
928. Labitte, pp. 76, 85-88. The work made only scant reference to Caetani’s mission. [↑](#footnote-ref-928)
929. *H2*, pp.118-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-929)
930. *Articles accordez et iurez, en l’assemblée des Estats du païs de Languedoc : faicte dans la ville de Lavaur, pour l’Union des habitans Catholiques dudict païs. Ensemble l’Arrest de la Cour du Parlement de Tolose, portant confirmation, et authorisation desdicts Articles* (Paris, 1589); *H2*, pp. 119-120. [↑](#footnote-ref-930)
931. *Déclaration du Roy, sur les advertissemens donnez à sa Majesté, d’un Cardinal envoyé légat en France (Camp devant Falaise, 5 janv. 1590)* (Tours, 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-931)
932. *H2*, pp. 121-24. Notice of the registration of the declaration was printed as an appendix to the *Déclaration du Roy*; curiously, the reference to ‘la personne du Legat’ in this part of the *Déclaration* appears in *H2* (p. 123) as ‘la personne du **pretendu** legat’, my emphasis. The ruling from Paris was published as *Arrest de la cour de Parlement, par lequel est enioinct à toutes personnes de recognoistre le S. Siège et légat apostolique, contre les prétendus arretz du soy-disant parlement de Tours* (Paris, 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-932)
933. L’Epinois, ‘La légation’, p. 493. The nineteenth-century historianwas summarising what was almost certainly the ruling of 26 January; I have not been able to track down the original. [↑](#footnote-ref-933)
934. *H2*, pp. 125-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-934)
935. Letters from Vendôme and Lenoncourt, dated 10 February, were sent to several prelates including the archbishop of Lyon and the bishops of Fréjus, Rennes and Senlis. I have found no record of a contemporary published version. [↑](#footnote-ref-935)
936. *Responce aux lettres envoyées par messieurs les cardinaux de Vendosme et de Lenoncourt, à monseigneur l’illustrissime légat Caetan et messieurs le cardinal de Gondy, l’archevesque de Lyon et les evesques de Fréjus, de Rennes, de Senlis et autres, en datte du 10 février 1590* (Paris, 1590). See also L’Epinois, ‘La légation’, pp. 494-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-936)
937. *Coppie des lettres de l’illustriss. et reverendiss. Cardinal Caetan…légat de Nostre S.P. et du S. Siège apostolique en ce royaume de France, envoyée aux prélats et à la noblesse d’iceluy, ce mois de mars dernier* (Paris, 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-937)
938. *H2*, p. 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-938)
939. *H2*, p. 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-939)
940. *H2*, p. 120. The two letters from Rome – one penned by the pope, the other by cardinal Montealto – and the Sorbonne’s statement were published together as *Acte de ce qui s’est passé au college de Sorbonne en l’assemblée de la faculté de Théologie, le diziesme de febvrier et iours consécutifs, pour confirmer l’Union. Avec la traduction de deux missives envoyées de Rome à la mesme Faculté* (Paris, 1590). See also de Thou, 11, pp. 105-08, and L’Estoile, 5, pp. 17 and 264-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-940)
941. Rozée’s references to letters from Rome to the cardinal de Vendôme (*H2*, pp. 120 and 124-25) are vague but it is likely that one of the letters is the one which was published (with others) by Guillaume Bichon in *Lettres escritte par les princes et noblesse de France à monseigneur le cardinal de Mont’alto, par le duc de Pinay, dit de Luxembourg, envoyée par lesdits princes et noblesse à N.S.-Père le pape sur les affaires et occurences de ce temps. Avec la response de Sa Saincteté ausdictz princes et noblesse, et à monseigneur le cardinal de Vendosme. Pour monstrer l'impudence et artifices que faussement ont esté semées ces jours passez par les politiques* (Paris, 1590). Here (fo 5v – fo 6r) the pope acknowledged Vendôme’s commitment to the Catholic faith and commended to him the legate that he was sending, assuring him that Caetani’s and his (Vendôme’s) aims were the same. They were not. [↑](#footnote-ref-941)
942. Cited in de Thou, 11, p. 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-942)
943. *H2*, p. 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-943)
944. *H2*, p. 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-944)
945. *H2*, p. 136. Rozée includes a complete text (*H2*, p. 137) which he dates 15 February and whose origin is probably the *Mandement iteratif du Roy pour la convocation des estats en la ville de Melun* (Paris, 1590). The earlier order had been published on 29 November: *Arrest de la cour de Parlement, pour la convocation et assemblée générale des trois estats de ce royaume assignee en la ville de Melun* (Paris, 1589); Rozée promised inclusion of its text in his work – but it is missing – *H2*, p. 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-945)
946. *H2*, p. 170. The willingness of civic leaders to engage in this show of unity was questioned by advisers to the king in a later passage (*H2*, pp. 232-33). It was in Rozée’s interests not to excise this passage, showing as it did the authority exercised by the *Seize*. [↑](#footnote-ref-946)
947. It has been suggested that *Ligueur* disappointment with Mayenne (even before Ivry) may be the reason why the renewal of the oath took place before the legate, not the duke. See Arlette Lebigre, *La Révolution des Curés* (Paris, 1980), p. 201. Neither man had been in Paris at the time of the first swearing of the oath. That ceremony had been conducted in the presence of the duc d’Aumale and the bishops of Rennes, Fréjus and Agen – see Sylvie Daubresse, *Le Parlement de Paris ou La Voix de la Raison (1559-1589)* (Geneva, 2005), p. 449. [↑](#footnote-ref-947)
948. *La forme du serment de l’Union que doivent faire et répéter tous les bons catholiques, unis pour la deffence de l’Eglise catholique, apostolique et romaine, et conservation de l’Estat royal et couronne de France, selon qu’il a esté fait solennellement et publiquement en la ville de Paris, le dimenche 11 iour de mars 1590, en l’église et monastère des Augustins, entre les mains de monseigneur l’illustrissime cardinal Caietan, légat du S. Siège apostolique, assisté de plusieurs prélatz, par messieurs les prévost des marchans, eschevins, colllonnels, capitaines, lieutenans et enseignes des quartiers et dizaines de ladite ville de Paris* (Paris, 1590).The oath required obedience not only to Mayenne, but also to Charles cardinal of Bourbon who had been made king just a few days earlier. [↑](#footnote-ref-948)
949. De Thou, 11, p. 110. [↑](#footnote-ref-949)
950. *H2*, pp. 166-69 (the pages are numbered 166, 167 and 169; it appears that there never was a page numbered 168). The anonymous account, written in Italian, was first published as *Relatione fidelissima dell’assiedo di Parigi et sua liberatione* in Turin in 1590. It was at once translated into French but remained in manuscript form until the mid-1630s. My assumption is that Rozée read the Italian version (we know he read Italian – see *H2*, p. 172). I have used Alfred Franklin’s edition: *Journal du Siège de Paris en 1590* (Paris, 1876), pp. 132-141. [↑](#footnote-ref-950)
951. *H2*, p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-951)
952. *H2*, p. 169. [↑](#footnote-ref-952)
953. *H2*, p. 171. Filippo Pigafetta judged Caetani’s decision to remain in besieged Paris to be critical, both in transforming the people’s mood, and, in due course, contributing to the city’s survival – *Relation du siège de Paris*, ed. A. Dufour (Paris, 1876), pp. 14-15 and 99-100. [↑](#footnote-ref-953)
954. *H2*, p. 277. On the del Bene family, see Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Nouvelle histoire de Paris. Paris au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1986), p. 180. [↑](#footnote-ref-954)
955. *H2*, p. 283. [↑](#footnote-ref-955)
956. *H2*, pp. 171, 190-91 and 195. [↑](#footnote-ref-956)
957. *H2*, pp. 252 and 323. [↑](#footnote-ref-957)
958. ‘[I]l ne fit rien de tout ce qu’il s’estoit proposé… toute sa legation ne fut que confusion’ – Palma-Cayet, pp. 247-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-958)
959. *H2*, pp. 352-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-959)
960. *H2*, pp. 284, 317 and 336. [↑](#footnote-ref-960)
961. Cited in Léon Van der Essen, *Alexandre Farnèse, prince de Parme, gouverneur général des Pays-Bas (1545-1592)*, 5 vols (Brussels, 1937), 5, p. 384. [↑](#footnote-ref-961)
962. *H2*, pp. 501-02. The contemporary Spanish visitor, Damián de Armenta y Córdoba, considered Parma to be equal to Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar – Cloulas, ‘Un témoignage espagnol’, p. 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-962)
963. Agrippa d’Aubigné, *Histoire Universelle*, ed. André Thierry, 11 vols (Geneva, 1981-2000), 8, p. 355. [↑](#footnote-ref-963)
964. De Thou, 11, pp. 569-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-964)
965. L’Estoile, 5, pp. 194 and 342. [↑](#footnote-ref-965)
966. Palma-Cayet, p. 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-966)
967. Van der Essen, *Alexandre Farnèse*, 5, pp. 250-310. The Belgian historian worked principally from the correspondence between Parma and Philip II. [↑](#footnote-ref-967)
968. Parma to Philip II, 18 January 1591, cited in Van der Essen, *Alexandre Farnèse*, 5, p. 341. [↑](#footnote-ref-968)
969. Van der Essen, *Alexandre Farnèse*, 5, pp. 323-55 and 376-84. Howell Lloyd saw Parma’s death as critical in weakening Spain’s ability to wield influence at the imminent *Ligueur* Estates-General – Howell A. Lloyd, *The Rouen campaign, 1590-1592: politics, warfare and the early-modern state* (Oxford, 1973), p. 194. [↑](#footnote-ref-969)
970. A lesson learnt at Ivry had been that a small Spanish contingent would not survive confrontation with Navarre’s forces – Van der Essen, *Alexandre Farnèse*, 5, pp. 278-79 and 283-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-970)
971. *Ibid*., pp. 308-10; *H2*, p. 359. Navarre’s version differed: he had hunted Parma and his army out of the kingdom – cited in Lloyd, *The Rouen campaign*, p. 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-971)
972. Navarre was wounded when he drew too close – Van der Essen, *Alexandre Farnèse*, 5, pp. 341-42. [↑](#footnote-ref-972)
973. *Ibid*., pp. 351-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-973)
974. On his return to Brussels, 4 December, he found the situation in the Netherlands to have deteriorated just as he had predicted – *Ibid*., p. 310. His departure from France in late 1590 was, incidentally, a rare example of disobedience by Parma: instructions from Madrid were that he should stay – *Ibid*., p. 307. Parma’s defence was that he had relieved Paris, his resources were depleted and the Netherlands situation needed him – Lloyd, *The Rouen campaign*, p. 9; *H2*, pp. 357-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-974)
975. Offered French towns along the Flemish frontier, Parma refused, aware that Spanish involvement in France would not be welcome in the long term. He also forecast that the *Ligue* would tire of Mayenne if the duke carried on calling on Spain – Van der Essen, *Alexandre Farnèse*, 5, pp. 302-03. [↑](#footnote-ref-975)
976. *Ibid*., pp. 344-45. Parma’s judgement was vindicated. Navarre resumed the siege, leaving the general no option but to order a six-day march back to Rouen – *Ibid*., pp. 346-47. [↑](#footnote-ref-976)
977. Having lifted the siege, Navarre had retreated to Les Andelys. The political reality governing Parma’s deference on this occasion was Madrid’s insistence that the duke be persuaded to call an Estates-General at the earliest opportunity, in order for the Infanta’s dynastic claims to be publicised – *Ibid*., p. 349. Howell Lloyd interpreted the decision-making in late-April as evidence of Mayenne’s tactical thinking in conflict with the broader strategy of Parma. Mayenne saw the short-term advantage of taking Caudebec and thereby re-opening the Seine between Rouen and Le Havre; by contrast he sensed danger in pursuit of the retiring royalists. Lloyd: ‘Tactically it did not seem an unreasonable view… Strategically it was absurd. To force such a retirement would in itself constitute a political victory of the first importance for the League…’ – *The Rouen Campaign*, pp. 183-84, quotation, p. 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-977)
978. No doubt the historian also recalled snatches of conversation from the *Ligue* days. Nothing suggests that he came even close to meeting the prince; not even *Seize* deputies to Corbeil had been accorded that privilege. [↑](#footnote-ref-978)
979. *H2*, pp. 267 and 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-979)
980. *H2*, p. 341. [↑](#footnote-ref-980)
981. *H2*, pp. 341 and 499. The historian was in awe of Parma’s skill at Lagny: ‘la ville fut investie, les batteries faite pour mettre le canon avec une telle diligence, que nos françois en estoient estonnés… cete disposition d’armée estoit si belle, que le duc de Mayenne dit a ceux qui estoient aupres de luy, qu’il n’avoit jamais rien vu de si bien dressé’ – *H2*, p. 341. [↑](#footnote-ref-981)
982. *H2*, p. 318. Cf. Parma’s later words to a royalist herald: ‘[D]ites a Vostre Maistre que ie suis venus en france par le commandement du Roy mon maistre, pour extirper et mettre fin aux heresies de ce Royaume, ce que j’espere faire, avec la grace de dieu avant que d’en sortir…’ – *H2*, p. 340. [↑](#footnote-ref-982)
983. *H2*, p. 499. [↑](#footnote-ref-983)
984. Mariéjol, pp. 350-51; *H2*, p. 486. [↑](#footnote-ref-984)
985. *H2*, pp. 340 and 492. [↑](#footnote-ref-985)
986. *H2*, p. 459; ‘faute que le feu duc de guise son frere n’eust voulu commettre’, Rozée added. [↑](#footnote-ref-986)
987. *H2*, p. 356. [↑](#footnote-ref-987)
988. *H2*, p. 492. [↑](#footnote-ref-988)
989. *H2*, p. 492. [↑](#footnote-ref-989)
990. *H2*, p. 501. [↑](#footnote-ref-990)
991. *H2*, pp. 507-14. Parma’s letter to Philip II, dated 15 January 1592, was translated and in circulation in Paris soon after it was written – *H2*, p. 507. Having met Mayenne recently, Parma had found him ‘plus retenu en ses paroles et avec plus d’ambages et de soupçon qu’il avoit accoustumé’ – *H2*, p. 508. [↑](#footnote-ref-991)
992. Pierre Matthieu noted that Mayenne saw the death of Parma as an opportunity to recover his authority – *Histoire des derniers troubles de France* (n.pl., 1606), p. 37v. According to Palma-Cayet, several contemporaries believed that the duke was glad to be in sole charge and thus unhindered – Palma-Cayet, p. 405. [↑](#footnote-ref-992)
993. *H2*, p. 353. [↑](#footnote-ref-993)
994. *H2*, pp. 464 and 466. [↑](#footnote-ref-994)
995. Marie-Madeleine Fragonard, ‘Une mémoire individualisée. Editions et rééditions des acteurs et témoins des guerres’, in J. Berchtold and M.-M. Fragonard (eds), *La Mémoire des Guerres de Religion. La concurrence des genres historiques (XVIe – XVIIIe siècles)* (Geneva, 2007), p. 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-995)
996. Drouot, *Mayenne*, 1, 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-996)
997. Since his early twenties Mayenne had been leading *Ligue* forces against Huguenot troops, and in the Edict of Union (July 1588) the *Ligue* had called on the king to place troops under Mayenne’s command once again – Frederic J. Baumgartner, *Radical Reactionaries* (Geneva, 1975), pp. 36, 43 and 86. [↑](#footnote-ref-997)
998. ‘[I]l ne luy monta jamais en l’esprit de se renfermer seul et desarmé dedans la ville de lyon, qui est en une des extremitez du royaume, pour se fier ala faveur incertaine du peuple de lyon, abandonnant tous ceux de son party, qui estoient espars par le Roïaume ; et ne consulta jamais ses amis la dessus.

     [I]l dit depuis, qu’il avoit creu que la pointe de son espée luy estoit une meilleure asseurance, qu’une honteuse submission, non au Roy, car ce n’estoit que son devoir, mais a ses ennemis qui le possedoient ; que ceux la n’estoient pas morts (il vouloit parler du Roy de Navarre et du mareschal de Montmorency) qui luy en avoient monstré le chemin’ – *H1*, p. 454. [↑](#footnote-ref-998)
999. Drouot, *Mayenne*, 1, p. 244. [↑](#footnote-ref-999)
1000. Drouot, *Mayenne*, 1, pp. 244-50. Not the darling of Paris that his older brother had been, Mayenne had initially bided his time. It is likely that since late December 1588 many *Ligueurs* had seen him as their only hope. In a letter of 27 December, Mendoza had judged that he was essential to the *Ligueurs*’ survival – cited in Baguenault de Puchesse, ‘La politique de Philippe II’, p. 42.

      Like Paris, Rozée greatly admired the older brother. Doubtless his portrayal of Guise was coloured by his need to find a *Ligueur* hero, his judgement affected by the circumstances of his death. For the historian, Guise was a model of *Ligueur* integrity. In battle he made time for prayer – *H1*, p. 339. He had the courage – and compassion – to order a retreat rather than pursue unnecessary conflict – *H1*, p. 318. During the *journée des barricades*, on behalf of the people, ‘il se resolut… de participer a leur affliction et au hazard qu’ils luy representoient, et courir à leurs secours, non avec main armée, mais de sa seule personne et de l’esperance qu’il avoit de vaincre l’aigreur de S[a] M[ajesté] par humbles supplications et prières’ – *H1*, p. 362. Shortly after, he spurned body armour, saying that ‘son innocence et la parolle du Roy valoient mieux qu’une cotte de maille’ – *H1*, p. 394. Most strikingly, the duke’s integrity stood out against the sordidness of the royal court: ‘[L]a valeur et les perfections du duc de guise, confessées mesmes par ses ennemis, lesquelles lui avoient acquis la bienveillance d'un chacun, estoient suivies de l’envie de ceux qui le tenoient pour un obstacle a leur avancement et de la mauvaise grace de celuy qui les devoit honnorer et conserver pour son service et pour le public; les vices et dissolutions du temps et du regne estant opposez a sa vertu hereditaire lui causoient une défaveur apparente et telle qu'il estoit, avec mespris du Roy, esloigné de toutes affaires, qui estoient a l'abandon traitées dans un cabinet parmy les voluptés, au plaisir et volonté absolüe de trois ou quatre mignons qui, abusant de la bonté de S[a] M[ajesté], remplissoient leurs desirs et appetits insatiables de la substance du pauvre peuple...’ – *H1*, p. 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-1000)
1001. *Journal de François*, p. 55. By this time, the duke had already made plain his authority by sending ambassadors to Rome and Madrid – ‘actes véritables de chef de gouvernement’ – Drouot, *Mayenne*, 1, 249. [↑](#footnote-ref-1001)
1002. *H1*, pp. 503-04. [↑](#footnote-ref-1002)
1003. It was a position that the duke was doubtless pleased to hold. Cromé’s *maheustre* drew this conclusion from the frequent postponements of the convocation of an Estates-General – Ascoli, p. 86. Toward the end of the *Histoire*,Rozée observed that whilst claiming to have Catholic interests at heart, Mayenne had actually been seeking his own aggrandisement – *H2*, pp. 473-74. [↑](#footnote-ref-1003)
1004. *H1*, p. 510. He recalled too that *some people* said ‘cette diversité produiroit des effets divers a l’heureux succez qu’on avoit veu jusques alors aux affaires dela Ste Union des catholiques’ – *H1*, p. 510. The *manant* was more direct: ‘… si le Conseil general de l’Union s’est fourvoyé, ç’a esté par l’introduction des grands que l’on y a mis…’ – Ascoli, p. 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-1004)
1005. *H2*, p. 13. Mayenne’s addition of fourteen *conseillers*  was a move to give back ‘aux éléments conservateurs la prépondérance qui avait toujours été la leur’ – Barnavi, *Le Parti de Dieu*, p. 195. Rozée observed (perhaps caustically) of one of them, Villeroy (Nicolas IV de Neufville), that ‘ne pouvant esperer seureté ny protection de ce costé là [du roi], il estoit obligé de se jeter dans le party ou estoit son père, son fils, sa femme, sa famille et ses biens’ – *H1*, p. 507. Modern historians have explained the appointment of the *supernuméraires* as born of the duke’s mistrust of the Paris *Ligue* leadership – Jouanna, *Dictionnaire*, p. 349; Constant, *La Ligue*, p. 235. Mariéjol nicely observed the reaction of the *Seize*: ‘En ce moment où l’union était plus que nécessaire entre tous les partisans de la résistance, les purs ne songèrent pas à protester contre les additions de Mayenne, mais plus tard, quand le parti se divisa, ils attribueront les échecs da la Ligue à ces “supernuméraires”’ – Mariéjol, p. 295. [↑](#footnote-ref-1005)
1006. In March 1591 deputies from the *Seize* moaned to Mayenne that ‘par l’ambition de ceux qui avoient eus mesme dressé un autre conseil aupres de sa personne, dedans lequel ils n’avoient presque retenu aucun de ceux qui conduisoient les affaires lors qu’elles estoient pleines de peril, les affaires estoient touiours allées en decadence’ – *H2*, p. 393. [↑](#footnote-ref-1006)
1007. Rozée knew that the axe could have fallen earlier. Pressure had been placed upon Mayenne (probably in February) by ‘les plus grands de la ville’ (unspecified; senior *parlementaires*?) to jettison the *conseil* and rule instead from his own council; ‘pour lors’, the duke had not given in to their requests – *H1*, pp. 509-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-1007)
1008. Arques was dismissed so adroitly by Antoine de Nervèze that the reader is almost at a loss to determine which side won; as for Ivry, yes it was a defeat, but only because the duke had been persuaded against his better judgement to engage (Nervèze, *Histoire de la vie*,pp. 213-16). It is safe to say that Arques would have been less embarrassing if the duke had not talked of driving the *béarnais* into the sea or of bringing him in chains to Paris, and if he had not contributed to the misinformation relayed back to the capital. [↑](#footnote-ref-1008)
1009. Rozée believed that Mayenne should have avoided confrontation at Ivry - ‘Les uns et les plus prudents estoient d’avis qu’il ne devoit passer la riviere ni donner bataille’ – *H2*, p. 154. It was a worse defeat than Arques: the *Ligue* army took very heavy losses and the road to Paris was thrown open. Yet the truth remained for the royalists that countryside victories meant little if towns could not be taken. In warfare dominated by sieges the two biggest prizes – Paris and Rouen – remained beyond the king’s reach throughout the Mayenne years. In 1592-93 most fighting took place on the periphery of France where it had to do with defence of French sovereignty in Brittany, Navarre and Provence. Mayenne’s failure to free up supply routes into the capital on the two occasions when he had troops available (after the sieges of Paris and Rouen) has been explained by Peter Ascoli: in 1590 Parma would not; in 1592, injured, he could not – *Dialogue*, p. 143, n. 213 and n. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-1009)
1010. Royalists in the city were less patient. Jean de Serres noted: ‘le peuple, qui ne vivoit de papier ny du vent des promesses du Duc de Mayenne... vint en foule au Palais demander la paix...’ – Jean de Serres, *Histoire des Choses Mémorables* *avenues en France…* (1599), p. 727. For his part, Rozée considered that Mayenne was too dilatory in 1589-90. He noted that while, after Arques, the Politiques were inviting the king to regain Paris, the duke was resting at Amiens ‘d’où il ne partirot qu’il n’eut prit quelque rafrechissement des travaux passez’ – *H2*, p. 82. The historian was unimpressed with the duke’s winter-break in Paris (November 1589 through January 1590) while the king continued to campaign, and with delays in the arrival of his assistance to the besieged capital in the following summer – *H2*, pp. 106 and 299. Nonetheless it was in the end the duke’s swift march to Paris that put an end to royalist aggression there (*Toussaint* 1589) – Mariéjol, p. 309. As for the delays during the siege, these were on the Spanish side, for although Parma had already received marching orders from Madrid before he discussed the operation with Mayenne at Condé on 20 May, it was not until 15 August that he crossed the French border – Van der Essen, *Alexandre* Farnèse, 5, pp. 282-93. Nor was Mayenne alone in taking rest! Paris gained valuable time to prepare for the siege when the king decided to stop off at Mantes for a fortnight after Ivry. [↑](#footnote-ref-1010)
1011. *H2*, p. 493. [↑](#footnote-ref-1011)
1012. Nervèze, *Histoire de la vie*, pp. 237-38. Drouot considered Nervèze’s work to be a ‘panégyrique de peu de valeur historique’ – *Mayenne*, 1, p. lx. Rozée read Nervèze, quoted him briefly on a small point of detail (*H1*, p. 556), and probably had the text in front of him when he noted a grievance that the duke had against Spain – *H2*, p. 358. [↑](#footnote-ref-1012)
1013. Croze, *Les Guises*, 2, p. 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-1013)
1014. By late 1590, the long siege was over but Paris was still surrounded by royalists. The *Ligue* drew strength from the election of Pope Gregory XIV, but 1591 brought new set-backs – the death of the chevalier d’Aumale, the *journée des farines* and the loss of Chartres. [↑](#footnote-ref-1014)
1015. Charles de Lorraine, duc de Mayenne, *Correspondance du duc de Mayenne*, eds E. Henry and Ch. Loriquet, 2 vols (Reims, 1860). It is not known who originally compiled the collection, or if the compilation was a selection from a larger body of writings The collection of letters was discovered in the library at Reims. Henry and Loriquet speculated about the compilers: ‘quelques chanoines de Reims, entre autres J. de Pilles et Pierre Frison, agents des princes lorrains archevèques de Reims, recueillirent sans doutes les documents contemporains...’ – Mayenne, *Correspondance*, 1, p. ix. [↑](#footnote-ref-1015)
1016. Above all, soldiers must be paid. They also required food and rest. In mid-November 1590, Mayenne advised the governor of Paris, the comte de Belin, to ensure that the soldiers in the capital were well-fed, so that they would not become unruly. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 27-28. Rozée listed newly arrived troops in Paris as ‘quinze cens lansquenets du Regiment du comte de Colatte, huit cens soldats françois, des regiments du marquis de Menelay et de Tremblecourt et deux cens chevaux sous la conduite de Maroles.’ – *H2*, p. 358. Writing on Christmas Day 1590, after money destined for the soldiers had been diverted to other causes, Mayenne chided the *prévôt des marchands* for not grasping how seditious unpaid troops could become – Mayenne, *Correspondance*, 1, pp. 209-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-1016)
1017. Mayenne, *Correspondance*,1, pp. 102-04 and 317-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-1017)
1018. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 105-07 and 90-91. [↑](#footnote-ref-1018)
1019. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 27-38 and 105-07. Counting vegetables in with grain, Rozée calculated that Paris in normal circumstances consumed more than 1,500 *muids* per month – *H2*, p. 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-1019)
1020. Mayenne, *Correspondance*, 1, p. 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-1020)
1021. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 272-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-1021)
1022. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 117-18, 159-60 and 234-35, and 2, pp. 39-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-1022)
1023. *Ibid*., 2, p. 64. There is more to Balbany than meets the eye. Rozée tells us that ‘Scipion Béalbani Lucquois’ was working for the *tiers parti*, and that he both wrote and delivered before the Pope the request from the cardinal de Bourbon-Vendôme to be considered a candidate for the throne of France. Furthermore, one of Mayenne’s messengers to Rome managed to wheedle the story out of Balbany before they reached their destination, and relayed it back to the duke who, in turn, relayed it to the king. See *H2*, pp. 404-06. [↑](#footnote-ref-1023)
1024. Mayenne, *Correspondance*, 1, pp. 208-09 and 311-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-1024)
1025. The duke’s several letters calling for an Estates-General at Orléans were uncontroversial (though fruitless), and his request that the civic leaders of Paris organise a service of thanksgiving after the election of Gregory XIV could hardly offend – *Ibid*., 1, pp. 38-39, 55-59 and 184-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-1025)
1026. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 69-70, 83-84 and 101. [↑](#footnote-ref-1026)
1027. *Ibid*., 2, p. 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-1027)
1028. *Ibid*., 2, p. 207. [↑](#footnote-ref-1028)
1029. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 27-28, 42-5, 47-50 and 64-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-1029)
1030. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 319-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-1030)
1031. *Ibid*., 2, pp. 77-79 and 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-1031)
1032. *Ibid*., 2, p. 96. [↑](#footnote-ref-1032)
1033. *Ibid*., 1, p. 181. Like his supporters, Mayenne had been unimpressed with ‘la froideur et irrésolution du feu pappe [Sixte V] – *Ibid*., 1, p 292. [↑](#footnote-ref-1033)
1034. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 292-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-1034)
1035. *Ibid*., 1, p. 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-1035)
1036. *Ibid*., 1, p. 312. [↑](#footnote-ref-1036)
1037. We recall that this collection of letters may have resulted from a process of selection. [↑](#footnote-ref-1037)
1038. *Ibid*., 1, p. 203. [↑](#footnote-ref-1038)
1039. *Ibid*., 1, p. 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-1039)
1040. *Ibid*., 1, p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-1040)
1041. *Ibid*., 1, p. 258. [↑](#footnote-ref-1041)
1042. *Ibid*., 1, pp. 14-19 and 2, pp. 26-28. [↑](#footnote-ref-1042)
1043. *Ibid*., 1, pp. x-xiv. [↑](#footnote-ref-1043)
1044. *Ibid*., 1, p. vii. [↑](#footnote-ref-1044)
1045. Valois, p. xxvii. [↑](#footnote-ref-1045)
1046. On 4 April 1589, and in light of the king’s inevitable excommunication, the Sorbonne addressed the question whether during mass the presiding priest should pray ‘pro rege nostro henrico’, or even ‘pro rege nostro’. The doctors decided against both, and at the same time instituted new prayers for the Catholic princes. In recording the incident with no explicit judgement, the historian evidently was at ease with the changes. See *H1*, pp. 511-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-1046)
1047. Whilst Protestantism remained abhorrent to Rozée, the fact is that, at the time he wrote, the St Bartholomew’s Day massacre was already half a century in the past and the new faith had long since ceased to be a threat in the north. [↑](#footnote-ref-1047)
1048. *H1*, p. 83. In this densely argued passage (pp. 77-85), Rozée acknowledged that he was supplementing the work of an earlier historian who, he noted ironically, had forgotten to include potential responses to a series of conciliatory points he had listed. Valois identified the earlier historian as Pierre Matthieu – see *Histoire des derniers troubles de France* (n.pl., 1606), pp. 10v-13r. Cf. *H1*, pp. 199-203 for a further list of *Ligueur* ripostes to Protestant charges. [↑](#footnote-ref-1048)
1049. *H1*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1049)
1050. *H1*, p. 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-1050)
1051. *H1*, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-1051)
1052. *H1*, p. 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-1052)
1053. *H1*, pp. 98 and 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-1053)
1054. *H1*, p. 100 (underlining original). Valois observed that the historian showed little concern over Catholic atrocities… ‘les cruautés, les perfidies, les massacres savamment organisés, qui n’y furent, hélas, pas plus rares’ – Valois, pp. xxix-xxx. [↑](#footnote-ref-1054)
1055. Natalie Zemon Davis, *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, 1975), p. 158. [↑](#footnote-ref-1055)
1056. Throughout the *Histoire* Rozée used the terms ‘Protestant’, ‘Huguenot’ and ‘hérétique’ indiscriminately. As for distribution, the terms appeared in volume 1 over three times more often than in volume 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-1056)
1057. *H2*, p.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1057)
1058. *H2*, pp. 15-19, quotation, p. 15. With example after example, Rozée exposed Huguenot sacrilege. Horror at how their soldiers behaved at Nonancourt early in 1590 helped him understand why the citizens of Dreux were so resolute in the defence of their town. They feared the violation of their wives and daughters, and also the pollution of their town by heretical teachings, resolving rather to burn down the town ‘que de subir le joug d’un heretique’ – *H2*, p. 165. As at Nonancourt, so at Issoire the Huguenots did not know right from wrong. For them, ‘toutes choses... sont permises’ in the interests of building the kingdom of Christ – *H2*, p. 175. [↑](#footnote-ref-1058)
1059. *H1*, p. 411. [↑](#footnote-ref-1059)
1060. *H1*, p. 503. [↑](#footnote-ref-1060)
1061. *H1*, p. 374. [↑](#footnote-ref-1061)
1062. Mark Greengrass, *France in the age of Henry IV* (London, 1984), pp. 141-43, quotation, p. 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-1062)
1063. Rozée supported ratification of the Tridentine decrees. He was disturbed by calls made in 1575 by the duc d’Alençon for a ‘saint et libre concile’, pointing out that the Council of Trent had been exactly that and had already stated a definitive position on ‘l’heresie des protestants’ – *H1*, pp. 44-45. The failure of the Estates-General at Blois (1576) to ratify the Tridentine decrees amounted to ‘une occasion qui ne se recouvrira pas bien tost’ – *H1*, p. 69. In fact, twelve years later the subject was re-addressed – again at Blois. Rozée was disappointed by the outcome: ‘[I]l y eust en cete conference beaucoup d’aigreur, on y fit beaucoup de bruit qui engendra un grand scandalle, sans prendre aucune resolution en une chose si necessaire que la reception du Concile; laquelle, les meilleurs françois disoient pouvoir estre prise sans afaire aucuns preieudices aux libertez de l’Esglise gallicane et aux privileges dela couronne de nos Roys – *H1*, p. 428. ‘[C]e qui se passa depuis fut cause qu’on ne parla plus du Concile’ – *H1*, p. 428; after the account of the events in late December 1588, the *Histoire* barely mentions Trent.

      Charles Labitte’s judgement that the Jesuits supported the *Ligue* with ‘une violence inouie’ (Charles Labitte, *De la démocratie chez les prédicateurs de la Ligue* [Paris, 1841], p. 20) seems to have been an over-generalisation in the light of the more recent assertion that they were divided in attitudes to the movement – J.H.M. Salmon, *Society in Crisis. France in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1975), p. 237. Although Rozée mentioned the Jesuits infrequently and only neutrally, his evidence suggests that he viewed them positively. He noted that even though the Jesuits were expelled from Bordeaux the townspeople remained true Catholics, that Jesuits assisted the people of Paris before the anticipated siege of summer 1589, and that two prominent Jesuits, Bellarminus (Robert Bellarmine) and Tyrius (James Tyrie), were amongst the dignitaries who arrived with Caetani in December 1590 – *H1*, p. 485; *H2*, pp. 32, 117 and 367. It is likely that Jesuit priests were active defending the walls of Paris during the *escalade* of 10 September 1590: Palma-Cayet believed so, as did Filippo Pigafetta who was there; Rozée referred only to ‘quelques ecclesiastiques’ – Palma-Cayet, p. 246; Filippo Pigafetta, *Relation du siège de Paris*, ed. A. Dufour (Paris, 1876), p. 100; *H2*, p. 346. [↑](#footnote-ref-1063)
1064. Six popes served in the years 1584-94. Gregory XIII, elected 15 May 1572, died 10 April 1585; Sixtus V, el. 24 April 1585, d. 27 August 1590; Urban VII, el. 15 September 1590, d. 27 September 1590; Gregory XIV, el. 5 December 1590, d. 15 October 1591; Innocent IX, el. 29 October 1591, d. 30 December 1591; Clement VIII, el. 30 January 1592, d. 5 March 1605. Rozée referred to Clement VIII as ‘le septiesme pape qui avoit esté de la Ligue catholique’ (*H2*, p. 521). Inclusion of two of Sixtus V’s predecessors – Gregory XIII and, before him, Pius V – completes a series of seven, but begs the question, ‘Which “Ligue catholique”?’, for Pius V died before the formation of the noble *Ligue* in Picardy in 1576, but was crowned five years after the formation of the Triumvirate (1561), which Rozée called ‘la premiere Ligue’ (*H1*, p. 4) and which occurred during the pontificate of Pius IV. It may be that Rozée had Pius IV in mind and, intentionally or otherwise, omitted Urban VII who fell ill days after his election and died before he could be crowned. [↑](#footnote-ref-1064)
1065. *H1*, pp.217-20; *Copie de l’opposition faite par le roi de Navarre & monseigneur le prince de Condé, contre l'excommunication du pape Sixte V, à lui envoyée & affichée par les cantons de la ville de Rome*, in *ML*, 1, pp. 243-44. The historian did not include the text of the bull of 9 September 1585, perhaps because in Paris the selling of early copies, printed without permission, was swiftly prohibited and the printer imprisoned. The *Ligue* published the bull again in 1589, this time legally – see Pallier, pp. 59-60 and 361. [↑](#footnote-ref-1065)
1066. *H1*, pp. 217 and 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-1066)
1067. Cf. Acts 5: 1-11 and 8: 9-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-1067)
1068. *H1*, p. 220; Florimond de Raemond, *L’Histoire de la naissance, progrez et decadence de l’heresie de ce siècle* (Paris, 1610), p. 861. [↑](#footnote-ref-1068)
1069. *Proposition faicte par nostre sainct père le Pape au consistoire tenu à Rome le vingt septiesme janvier 1589, sur le sacrilège et assassinat commis en la personne de deffunct illustrissime et révérendissime cardinal de Guyse, archevesque et duc de Reims, légat nay du sainct Siège, et premier pair de France* (n.pl., 1589); see also *H1*, pp. 487-89 (where the *Proposition* is dated in error 27 February). [↑](#footnote-ref-1069)
1070. The *Proposition* marked a u-turn in Sixtus’s thinking, for on first hearing of the Blois assassinations he had observed that the Guise rebels deserved their fate. What changed his mind was the Sorbonne’s decision on 7 January to release France from obedience to the king, followed by discussions in Rome with two of the *Seize*, Nicolas Anroux and Nicolas Nivelle – Gérard, pp. 105-06; *H1*, pp. 490 and 548. [↑](#footnote-ref-1070)
1071. The historian asserted that he was including the text ‘sans entrer en consideration s’il estoit preiudiciable a la reputation du pape de la publier’ – *H1*, p. 487. [↑](#footnote-ref-1071)
1072. *Advis de Rome tiré des lettres de l’evesque du Mans, escrites le quinziesme de mars à Henry iadis roy de France* (Paris, 1589); *H1*, pp. 548-50. [↑](#footnote-ref-1072)
1073. *H1*, p. 550. [↑](#footnote-ref-1073)
1074. *H1*, p. 549. [↑](#footnote-ref-1074)
1075. *Bulle de N.S.P. pape Sixte. V. contre Henry de Valois* (Paris, 1589); *H2*, pp. 23-29. The bull was not made public in Rome until 24 May, nor published in Paris until 23 June. The initial secrecy probably derived from the pope’s hope that Henry would release the cardinal de Bourbon and the archbishop of Lyon from prison and would travel to Rome; the censure might then have been lifted. See de Thou, 10, pp. 607-09. [↑](#footnote-ref-1075)
1076. *H1*, pp. 550-51. The historian’s confidence in Sixtus at this time is revealed by his inclusion of the text of the instructions given later that month by Mayenne and the *conseil général* to a delegation to Rome: *Mémoires et instructions, A Messieurs le Commandeur de Diou, Coquelei, Conseiller en la Cour de Parlement de Paris, de Pilles. Abbé d’Orbais. & Frison, Doyen de l’Eglise de Reims, députés à notre Saint Pere, de la part de Monseigneur le Duc de Mayenne, Lieutenant général de l’Etat royal et Couronne de France, & par le Conseil général de l’Union des Catholiques, établi à Paris*, in *ML*, 3, pp. 315-25; *H2*, pp. 2-8. The *Ligue* hailed the pope as ‘leur ancre sacré parmy ces grands orages et tempestes’, and asked for assistance in driving heresy out of France – *H2*, p. 6. The *Mémoires et instructions* were accompanied by a covering letter dated 24 May from Mayenne, the *Copie du pouvoir des députés* – *ML*, 3, pp. 314-15; *H2*, p. 9. Here, the duke asked for excommunication of the king. Rozée noted the curiosity: news of the excommunication on 5 May had not yet reached Paris. [↑](#footnote-ref-1076)
1077. *H2*, p. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-1077)
1078. *H2*, p. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-1078)
1079. ‘[M]e remettant devant les yeux, les choses qui depuis peu de temps sont advenuës par la volonté de Dieu, il me semble que ie puis avec verité usurper ce mot du Prophete Abacuch : *Qu’un œuvre a esté faict en vos iours, que personne ne croira quand on le racontera.*’ – *Harangue prononcée par N.S.-Père en plein consistoire et assemblée des cardinaux, le 11. de septembre 1589, contenant le jugement de sa saincteté touchant la mort de feu Henry de Valois, et l’acte de F. Jaques Clément* (Paris, 1589), p. 15. See also *H2*, p. 48. The Pope quoted Habakkuk 1: 5. Rozée’s alertness to biblical references might be a small clue to his inner life. As well as quoting the Pope’s reference to the prophet’s words, he took the trouble to state the biblical passage from which Jean Boucher had been preaching – the story of Peter’s miraculous release from prison (Acts 5: 17-19) – on the day that Clément struck – *H2*, p. 40; the allusion to the miraculous deliverance of France was obvious. Later, describing the courage of the Parisians in the face of famine in summer 1590, the historian introduced his own biblical knowledge: ‘Quelq’un a escrit qu’un peuple assiegé, ne craint aucune chose, tant que la faim; et nous avons monstrer que nous craignons advantage la perte de nostre religion que la faim; le prophete qui a parlé du 1er siege de Jerusalem, a dit que le peuple donneroit tous ce qu’il a de plus beau pour avoir de quoy se nourir, et nous avons souffert la faim, pour ne point perdre la religion; le diable disoit de Job, qu’il donneroit tout ce qu’il avoit, afin d’avoir a vivre, Job l’a fait mentir; paris a fait aussy mentir le diable, car la religion luy a esté plus precieuse... ’ – *H2*, p. 277 (cf. Job 2: 4). The problems brought by the famine led some observers to draw upon further biblical texts, and in quoting them, Rozée seems to show his approval. He recorded that these observers reminded their listeners that the first duty of the good Christian was not to seek food but to seek the kingdom of God (cf. Matthew 4: 4 and 6: 33), and that having put their hand to the plough they should not look back (Luke 9: 62 and 17: 32), as did the wife of Lot (Genesis 19: 26) – *H2*, pp. 282-83. [↑](#footnote-ref-1079)
1080. *H2*, pp. 44-47; *Lettres escritte par les princes et noblesse de France à monseigneur le cardinal de Mont’alto, par le duc de Pinay, dit de Luxembourg, envoyée par lesdits princes et noblesse à N.S.-Père le pape sur les affaires et occurences de ce temps. Avec la response de Sa Saincteté ausdictz princes et noblesse, et à monseigneur le cardinal de Vendosme. Pour monstrer l'impudence et artifices que faussement ont esté semées ces jours passez par les politiques* (Paris, 1590). That publication did not take place before 1590 suggests that the pamphlet’s purpose was to discredit a pope whose support the *Ligue* could no longer rely on – Pallier, p. 385. Rozée wrote that the *response de Sa Saincteté* was circulating in Paris in 1589 (*H2*, p. 47) – I have found no corroboration of this claim. [↑](#footnote-ref-1080)
1081. *H2*, p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-1081)
1082. *H2*, p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-1082)
1083. Arlette Lebigre, *La révolution des curés* (Paris, 1980), p. 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-1083)
1084. *H2*, pp. 111 and 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-1084)
1085. *H2*, pp. 171-72. We are given ‘la copie de cette lettre’ (actually, a summary of its content) ‘traduite du texte italien, le plus juste qu’il m’a esté possible’. The letter was written in late March – *H2*, p. 328. I have not found an original. [↑](#footnote-ref-1085)
1086. *H2*, p. 172. In 1585, the papal exchequer had been empty; despite massive expenditure on public buildings, Sixtus V had replenished it, eventually creating a considerable treasury in the Castello di Sant’ Angelo – Michael Ott, The Catholic Encyclopedia, Pope Sixtus V, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14033a.htm [accessed 9 June 2008] para. 3 of 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-1086)
1087. *H2*, p. 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-1087)
1088. *H2*, p. 328. [↑](#footnote-ref-1088)
1089. *H2*, pp. 328-32. The passage gives some prominence to the role played by the Sorbonne *syndic* de Creil – the only occasions across the whole work when Sorbonne *syndics* are mentioned or de Creil is named. In his transcript of the *Histoire*, Marco Penzi noted that whilst this passage in ms. 23296 was almost illegible because of poor handwriting, the name ‘de Creil’ stood out as clearly marked. The ‘de Creil’ in question was perhaps Louis de Creil, *docteur* at the Sorbonne (*Dialogue*, pp. 92 and 218), half-brother of Nicolas de Creil, one of the *Seize* – cf. Descimon (1983), p. 124 and Etienne Pattou, Famille de Creil, <http://racineshistoire.free.fr/LGN/PDF/Creil.pdf> [accessed 21 May 2014] p. 5. I have not discovered why Rozée accorded de Creil prominence. [↑](#footnote-ref-1089)
1090. *H2*, pp. 332-33. The *Seize* never undertook a major decision without the backing of the Sorbonne – Descimon (1983), p. 46. The *Histoire* reveals Rozée’s satisfaction with the faculty on all but one of its rulings: if he had ever believed that Navarre might never accede to the throne, it was a view he chose to suppress when he wrote. [↑](#footnote-ref-1090)
1091. *Résolution de messieurs de la faculté de Théologie de Paris, sur les articles à eux proposez par les catholiques habitans de la ville de Paris, touchant la paix ou capitulation avec l'heretique, & admission de Henry de Bourbon à la couronne de France. Avec une lettre aux habitans catholiques des villes de la France qui ont iuré la Saincte Union* (Paris, 1590); cf. L’Estoile, 5, pp. 270-72, Palma-Cayet, p. 233 and de Thou, 11, pp. 158-60. [↑](#footnote-ref-1091)
1092. *H2*, p. 333. Cf. Labitte, p. 85: ‘Ce fut, au-delà des Pyrénées, un déchainement universel contre Sixte-Quint.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-1092)
1093. *H2*, p. 334. [↑](#footnote-ref-1093)
1094. Apprised of the Sorbonne’s ruling, Sixtus threatened to eliminate both the Sorbonne and the Jesuits, only to find that key cardinals would resist him; ‘Son couroux s’augmenta si fort par cete resistance, que sa fievre devint continüe, et l’emporta en neuf jours’ – *H2*, p. 335.  [↑](#footnote-ref-1094)
1095. *H2*, p. 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-1095)
1096. *H2*, pp. 334-35, quotation, p. 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-1096)
1097. During the conclave – ‘long et ourageux’ – Luxembourg wrote to the cardinals warning them not to listen to Philip II – Louis-Pierre Anquetil, *L’Esprit de la Ligue*, 2 vols (Paris, 1818), 2, p. 275. Rozée was well aware of the royalist view that the considerable time taken to elect Gregory had resulted from the machinations of Spanish diplomats; he had read it in the pages of a gallican treatise whose arguments he proceeded to summarise: *Discours des raisons et moyens, pour lesquels Messieurs du Clergé, assemblez en la ville de Chartres, ont declare les Bulles Monitoriales, decernees par Gregoire XIIII. contres les Ecclesiastiques & autres, tant de la Noblesse que du tiers Estat, qui sont demeurez en la fidelité du Roy, nulles & injustes* (Tours, 1591); *H2*, pp. 433-34.It was a view that *Ligueurs* rejected on the grounds that it failed to take into consideration divine intervention in elections to the papacy – a point which, Rozée noted, had support too from a pro-*Ligue* jurist – *H2*, p. 445; Matteo Zampini, *Défence pour les bulles monitoires de N.S.-P. le pape envoyées aux ecclésiastiques, princes et nobles, suivans le Navarrois, contre les perverses intentions et pestifères vomissemens des imposteurs politiques, qui faulsement se disent juges & parlement de Chaalon* (Paris, 1591). [↑](#footnote-ref-1097)
1098. *H2*, p. 336. There was joy too in *Ligueur* Paris. The *prévôt des marchands* called for thanksgiving processions to be held in each parish, to be followed by a general procession soon afterwards (Sunday, 20 January 1591 – *H2*, p. 387). [↑](#footnote-ref-1098)
1099. On 16 December, Mayenne’s envoy Jacques deDiou, already in Rome, requested both financial assistance for military operations and a monitory threatening to excommunicate Navarre’s supporters. Shortly after, the pro-*Ligue* papal vice-legate in France, Filippo Sega, wrote with the same requests and, to emphasise the urgency, informed Gregory of *Ligue* defeats at Corbeil, Lagny, and Saint-Cloud, and of the recent failed attempt to recover St Denis – Henri de L’Epinois, *La Ligue et les papes* (Paris, 1886), pp. 444 and 448; Marco Penzi, ‘Un schisme gallican en 1591? Historiographie, politique et utilisation de l’imprimé’, in R. G. Păun, (ed), *Imprimé et Pouvoir: France, Russie, Principautés Roumaines (XVIe-XIXe siècles)* (Bucharest, 2008), pp. 96-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-1099)
1100. Penzi, ‘Un schisme’, p. 96. Overall, during the *Ligue* period, the diplomatic traffic between Paris and Rome was busy, and De Lamar Jensen has questioned Garrett Mattingly’s suggestion that the religious wars nearly wrecked Europe’s diplomatic institutions. See De Lamar Jensen, ‘French Diplomacy and the Wars of Religion’, *Sixteenth Century Journal* 5 (1974), pp. 24-25 and Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), p. 195. [↑](#footnote-ref-1100)
1101. Penzi, ‘Un schisme’, pp. 97-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-1101)
1102. *Ibid*., pp. 98-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-1102)
1103. *Ibid*., pp. 101-02. In one of these publications, the *Lettre escrite de Paris à Tours* (Paris, 1591), we learn of a supposed private conversation in which a devoutCatholic managed to win over François de Coligny, seigneur de Châtillon, to the *Ligue* cause. The author had explained why Catholicism would certainly suffer if Navarre became king (*Lettre escrite*, p. 8). God had preserved (*Ligueur*) Paris in summer 1589, and at Toussaint ‘Vous entrastes dans noz faubourgs… un monde de gĕs du guerre, força une poignée de bourgeois: Ie vos veux ici monstrer combien Dieu vous aveugla…’ (*Lettre escrite*, p. 16) A few weeks later came the written testimony of ‘another’ *Ligue* convert: *Lettres du sieur de Lamet, gouverneur de Coucy, contenant sa réunion au party catholique, escrite à un gentil-homme de la suitte du roi de Navarre* (Paris, 1591). ‘Ce n’est pas deshonneur’, he wrote, ‘de se departir d’une dangereuse société & compagnie [the royalist camp], de n’adherer point à de pernicieux desseings: mais plustost honte d’y participer…’(*Lettres du sieur de Lamet*, p. 10). [↑](#footnote-ref-1103)
1104. *H2*, pp. 397-98. Rozée gave the date as 24 February. [↑](#footnote-ref-1104)
1105. *H2*, pp. 398-400. The reply was ‘un éloge des Seize’ – Pallier, p. 396. The letters were published together in June under the title *Bref de N.S.-Père le pape Grégoire XIIII au conseil des seize quartiers de la ville de Paris, pour response à une lettre qu’ils luy avoient écrite…* (Paris, 1591). [↑](#footnote-ref-1105)
1106. *H2*, p. 400. [↑](#footnote-ref-1106)
1107. Each camp kept up with the writings of the other, whether printed or in manuscript – Penzi, ‘Un schisme’, pp. 103-05. [↑](#footnote-ref-1107)
1108. Cited in Penzi, ‘Un schisme’, p. 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-1108)
1109. *Ibid*., pp. 102-03. [↑](#footnote-ref-1109)
1110. L’Epinois, *La Ligue*, p. 464; *H2*, p. 391. [↑](#footnote-ref-1110)
1111. In mid-March the Pope proposed that 500,000 *écus* from the treasury in the Castello di Sant’ Angelo be allocated jointly to assisting the French Catholic *Ligue* and to relieving the famine then besetting Rome. The cardinals agreed. In the event the sum amounted to 300,000 *écus*.Rozée believed 200,000 *écus* reached France – *H2*, p. 415. [↑](#footnote-ref-1111)
1112. L’Epinois, *La Ligue*, pp. 464-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-1112)
1113. *Ibid*., p. 465. [↑](#footnote-ref-1113)
1114. *H2*, p. 390. [↑](#footnote-ref-1114)
1115. *Coppie d’une lettre escripte et d’une supplication faicte à Henry de Bourbon, prince de Byart* (*sic*) *et duc de Vendosme, roy prétendu de France et de Navarre, ensemble les responces que sa prétendue Majesté a faict auxdictes lettres et requeste à luy présantée par ses adhérans politiques et prétendus catholiques, P.F.I.B. Imprimé jouxte la vérité contenue es originaux et à ceste fin que les catholiques François, enfans de l’Eglise apostolique et romaine, sachent quelle est l’opinion et volonté dudict prétendu Roy, en ce qui concerne l’entretien de nostre saincte foy et loy catholique apostolique et romaine* (Paris, 1591). For authorship and publication history, see Pallier, p. 403. [↑](#footnote-ref-1115)
1116. *H2*, p. 428. [↑](#footnote-ref-1116)
1117. *H2*, pp. 425-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-1117)
1118. Penzi, ‘Un schisme’, pp. 106-07. [↑](#footnote-ref-1118)
1119. The *appel comme d’abus* was an appeal in the civil courts against the usurpation by an ecclesiastical authority of the rights of civil jurisdiction – <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal_as_from_an-abuse> [accessed 22 February 2010] para. 1 of 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-1119)
1120. Penzi, ‘Un schisme’, p. 109. [↑](#footnote-ref-1120)
1121. Properly authorised spiritual ministry mattered to Rozée. Much earlier in his work he had noted that pluralism and consequent absenteeism were ‘deux grandes ulceres… au corps de l’esglise de france’ – *H1*, p. 149. He shared the view expressed by Nicolas Fumée, bishop of Beauvais, that ‘[la] prodigieuse quantité d’oeconomes spirituels introduite en ce Royaume’ was harmful, later himself calling the device ‘miserable’ – *H2*, p. 518. The use of ‘oeconomes spirituels’ – stand-in senior clergy – was a product of times of tension between Rome and the French court – No names, no titles, <http://www.xn--encyclopdie-ibb.eu/index.php?option=com_content&id=885727857> [accessed 16 June 2014] para. 5 of 5. The *Histoire* carries the text of a ruling that ‘resolved’ the issue (through to the king’s conversion) by providing for crown preferments where necessary – *H2*, pp. 518-20; de Thou, 11, pp. 497-500. Rozée was not impressed by the royalist view that it was better to have a new discipline than none; all that was needed was ‘l’antienne discipline de l’esglise chrestienne et catholique’ – *H2*, p. 520. [↑](#footnote-ref-1121)
1122. Penzi, ‘Un schisme’, pp. 95-96. [↑](#footnote-ref-1122)
1123. *Discours des raisons et moyens, pour lesquels Messieurs du Clergé, assemblez en la ville de Chartres, ont declaré les Bulles Monitoriales... contre les Ecclesiastiques... nulles et iniustes* (Tours, 1591). [↑](#footnote-ref-1123)
1124. *H2*, pp. 443-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-1124)
1125. Cited in L’Epinois, *La Ligue*, p. 510. [↑](#footnote-ref-1125)
1126. *Ibid*., p. 510. [↑](#footnote-ref-1126)
1127. *Ibid*., p. 511, fn. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1127)
1128. Neither *ultra-montanisme* nor any word in the same family appears in the *Histoire*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1128)
1129. Valois put it a little differently: ‘Il [l’historien] est donc catholique par conviction plus que par attachement à la cour romaine ou à la persoone d’un pontif : plein de respect pour le chef de l’Eglise, il ne se piquera pourtant pas de justifier tous ses actes’ – Valois, p. xxviii. [↑](#footnote-ref-1129)
1130. *Bulle de N. S. le Pape Clement VIII contenant les facultez donnees à Monsigneur l’Illustrisssime et Reverendissime Cardinal de Plaisance* (Paris, 1592); *H2*, pp. 521-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-1130)
1131. The extent of Gondi’s influence in the diocese of Paris is discussed in Vladimir Angelo, *Les curés de Paris au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 2005), pp. 23-49. Other French cardinals named in the *Histoire* need not detain us long. François de Joyeuse, who turned *Ligueur* after the regicide, barely features. Nicolas de Pellevé’s participation in the *Ligueur* Estates-General was noted without comment. Philippe de Lenoncourt’s devotion to the King of Navarre was treated more fully, but again the historian passed no judgement (See *H2*, pp. 532-35 for Pellevé, and pp. 73, 94, 125, 191, 406 and 409 for Lenoncourt). Rozée felt sympathy for the *Ligue*’s ‘Charles X’, cardinal Charles de Bourbon-Vendôme. He lamented the old man’s imprisonment, writing in defence of his reputation: ‘la medisance fut grande contre ce prince, selon ce qu’en ont escrit apres sa mort quelques malins escrivains, quoy qu’ils ne le deussent pas faire’ – *H2*, p. 255. The historian believed that the cardinal should be crowned, if only to ward off Spanish pretensions, and quoted with approval the duc de Nemours’ assessment of the man who had ‘servi de père’ for Navarre: ‘un grand prince [qui] craint Dieu’ – *H2*, p. 139. The younger cardinal Charles de Bourbon-Vendôme, Navarre’s cousin and a man with serious political ambitions, features significantly in the *Histoire*, notably during the historian’s narrative of the *tiers parti*. Mark Greengrass has explained that the conspiracy failed, largely because of incompetent leadership – ‘The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henri IV’, in K. Cameron (ed), *From Valois to Bourbon. Dynasty, State and Society in Early Modern France* (Exeter, 1989), pp. 123-26. Such was Rozée’s view. Clumsy and ineffectual attempts were made to secure the support of Paris priests. Papal blessing was sought so carelessly that Gregory XIV knew the request before the messenger arrived, and Navarre was kept informed throughout. Rozée refrained from passing judgement – perhaps because the cardinal was a prince of the blood, or merely because the sorry story spoke for itself – See *H2*, pp. 403-07. [↑](#footnote-ref-1131)
1132. Parish priests had become concerned that Gondi must be in a state of ‘excommunication maieure’ – *H2*, p. 59. Asked to adjudicate, the Sorbonne confirmed that Gondi should seek papal absolution. Rozée noted, caustically: ‘Cette resolution qui admonestoit beaucoup de gens de penser a leur conscience ne fut pas du tout approuvé par ceux qui ne se voulant pas engager d’aller chercher leur absolution ailleurs qu’au pouvoir de leur confeseur ordinaire ne vouloient point estre instruit de ce qui estoit de leur devoir’ – *H2*, p. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-1132)
1133. *H2*, p. 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-1133)
1134. Descimon (1983), p. 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-1134)
1135. *Ibid*., p. 46. Priests were at the heart of the *Seize* both in person, having members within the leadership (especially in the *conseil des Seize*), and because they carried moral authority, particularly that of the Sorbonne without whose backing the *Seize* never undertook a major decision – *Ibid*., p. 46. Jesuits risked their lives during the ‘escalade’, 10 September 1590, *Ibid*., p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-1135)
1136. Cited in Labitte, p. viii. The historian was quoting from L’Estoile, 3, p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-1136)
1137. *Conseil salutaire d’un bon françoys aux Parisiens* (Paris, 1589), p. 11. Pierre Fayet concurred: ‘Paris preachers ‘ne preschoient que glaive et cousteau, au lieu de prescher et porter le peuple à se comporter doulcement...’ – Pierre Fayet, *Journal historique de Pierre Fayet sur les troubles de la Ligue*, ed. V. Luzarche (Tours, 1852), pp. 52-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-1137)
1138. Cited in Labitte, p. viii. The quotation had been included in a letter written by Francesco Panigarola to the duc de Savoie – see Labitte, p. 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-1138)
1139. *Journal de François Bourgeois de Paris*,ed. Eugène Saulnier (Paris, 1913), pp 82-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-1139)
1140. Pierre Matthieu, *Histoire*, p. 21r. [↑](#footnote-ref-1140)
1141. ‘Les églises s’étaient pour ainsi dire, transformées en *clubs*, la chaire était devenue une *tribune*’ – Labitte, pp. ix-x. In front of the judges in February 1590, the Dominican prior Edmé Bourgoing defended his preaching with the claim that ‘en chaire le prédicateur a le droit et le devoir de réprimander les fautes des grands, et que, ce faisant, il n’est pas plus répréhensible qu’un magistrat reprenant un délinquant ou un criminel’ – cited in Pierre Chevallier, *Les Régicides* (Paris, 1989), p. 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-1141)
1142. Of the fifty or so priests who served in the thirty-nine Paris parishes between 1589 and 1594, Jean Boucher was mentioned regularly; Jean Prévost appeared three times, Benoît, Guincestre and Pigenat each featured once. This sparse treatment accords with Vladimir Angelo’s assessment that ‘il n’est... pas possible de faire des curés de Paris les animateurs de la Ligue’ – *Les curés de Paris*, pp. 485-96. Angelo refuted the claim made by Charles Labitte and others that only three priests in Paris kept their distance from the *Ligue*. Angelo named five confirmed Politique priests, and a further seventeen who were neutral. Only thirteen priests could be identified as dedicated *Ligueurs*, and of these only six left Paris in 1594, the others choosing re-alignment with a king still unabsolved by the Pope. Angelo quoted Robert Descimon: ‘le tissu paroissial comportait de larges plages neutres qui freinèrent la Ligue après l’avoir suivie en 1588-1589’ – Angelo, *Les curés de Paris*, p. 494; Descimon, ‘La Ligue à Paris (1585-1594) : une révision’, *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 37 (1982), p. 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-1142)
1143. *H1*, p. 453; *H2*, pp. 118-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-1143)
1144. *H2*, p. 516. [↑](#footnote-ref-1144)
1145. Descimon(1983), pp. 45-50, quotations, pp. 46 and 49. We recall too that several parishes in Paris were largely untouched by the *Ligue*, and that only one in three of the *curés* were *Ligueur* – Constant, *La Ligue*, p. 471. [↑](#footnote-ref-1145)
1146. *H1*, p. 297. [↑](#footnote-ref-1146)
1147. *H1*, p. 297. [↑](#footnote-ref-1147)
1148. *H1*, p. 453; *H2*, p. 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-1148)
1149. *H2*, pp. 33 and 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-1149)
1150. *H2*, p. 325. Beyond Paris, too, Rozée found priests whose constancy he could admire. As the *Cordelier* priest Robert Chessé prepared to die (at Vendôme, November 1589), ‘voyant ses religieux pleurer auprez de luy il les consola leur disant, serons nous les premiers endurant pour Jesus Christ...’; by his preaching this man had ‘fort maintenu le peuple au parti de l’Union’, acquiring a great reputation in the region – *H2*, pp. 92-93.

      Rozée was similarly sympathetic to Edmé Bourgoin, tried at Tours before a tribunal unable to believe that Jacques Clément could have acted independently; Bourgoing was ignominiously executed, yet ‘fort regretté à Paris’ – where his memory was greatly honoured – *H2*, p. 114. Like our historian, Jacques-Auguste de Thou was unconvinced of the prior’s guilt, noting his constancy of spirit and his insistence to the very end that he was a victim of false witnesses. (De Thou, 11, pp. 112-14).

      Another martyr, the Dominican monk Charles Brossin, died rather than acknowledge a heretic as King of France – this at Gournay in October 1591 – *H2*, p. 479. The story originated in a *Discours*, written by Guillaume Valdory and in print within weeks of the ending of the siege of Rouen in spring 1592. Valdory blamed Biron for the atrocity. That Rozée had access to this account is further suggested by the inclusion by both authors of identical copies of correspondence between the Earl of Essex and Villars, governor of Rouen – Guillaume Valdory, *Discours du siège de la ville de Rouen* (Rouen, 1592), in L. R. Delsalle, *Devant Sainte-Catherine, les Rouennais défient Henri IV* (Luneray, 1992); *H2*, pp. 479-81. A nineteenth-century historian dismissed Valdory’s censure of Biron as a partisan invention, though his claim that if Biron had ordered the execution he would have mentioned it in his letters is hardly convincing – Robert Langlois comte d’Estaintot, *La Ligue en Normandie, 1588-1594…* (Paris, 1862), p. 203, n. 2.

      Most strikingly of all, Rozée respected Claude de Sainctes, Bishop of Evreux, murdered in prison for political reasons, a man ‘[qui] faisoit rien que d’exercer ses fonctions episcopales... qui avoit si utilement servy l’esglise chrestienne, et tant doctement escrit contre les erreurs du calvinisme’; a saintly man who had resisted his friends’ advice to flee to safety in Rouen or Paris, ‘pour ne pas abandonner son troupeau’, and whose constancy before his judges left even his enemies confounded – *H2*, pp. 416-23, quotations, p. 423. [↑](#footnote-ref-1150)
1151. Denis Crouzet, *Les guerriers de Dieu. La violence au temps des troubles de religion*, 2 vols (Seyssel, 1990), 2, p. 369. [↑](#footnote-ref-1151)
1152. *H1*, p. 498. [↑](#footnote-ref-1152)
1153. *H1*, p. 499. [↑](#footnote-ref-1153)
1154. *Journal de François*, p.19. [↑](#footnote-ref-1154)
1155. Crouzet, *Les guerriers*, 2, p. 382. [↑](#footnote-ref-1155)
1156. *Mandement pour le reglement des processions et prières publiques, pour chacun jour de la sepmaine, durant ce sainct temps de Karesme* *afin que par les prières... des gens de bien nous puissions avoir victoire sur noz ennemis, et pour la délivrance des princes catholiques* (Paris, 1589). Crouzet noted ‘[une] méfiance de l’autorité ecclésiastique à l’égard d’une piété qui procédait d’un enchantement collectif’ – *Les guerriers*, p. 383. [↑](#footnote-ref-1156)
1157. Crouzet, *Les guerriers* 2, p. 383. It seems that the instructions were not readily heeded: toward the end of the month street piety was still very evident, according to François’ entry for 23 February: ‘Le dict jour de jeudy, de fort belles et grandes processions parmy les parroisses de la dite Ville, comme ès jours précédens’ – *Journal de* *François*, p. 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-1157)
1158. Ann Ramsey, *Liturgy, Politics and Salvation* (Rochester [NY], 1999), pp. 1-4. Ramsey has drawn attention to the strong liturgical culture which bridged the social and factional divisions of *Ligueur* politics, binding the *Ligue* into a powerful political force. Notably, her study of over seven hundred Paris wills from the year 1590 revealed that *Ligueurs* were nearly twice as likely as non-*Ligueurs* to show an interest in religious ritual in their wills. [↑](#footnote-ref-1158)
1159. On the importance of legitimacy see Davis, *Society and Culture*,pp. 164-69. Davis noted that people who engaged in religious riots rarely showed remorse, because they believed their actions to be legitimate. This belief arose partly from the attendance of senior lay and clerical figures. Where public demonstrations were not only attended but also arranged and led by society’s natural leaders, they tended to materialise as dignified processions, not riots. It is to this kind of demonstration that Rozée lent his approval. Thus a procession to mark the failure of the *escalade* in September 1590 attracted ‘le corps de l’université et presque toute la ville’; the discovery of the royalist plot on the *journée des farines* was celebrated by a procession ‘où assistèrent ‘les cours souveraines avec le gouverneur et une grande quantité de peuple’ – *H2*, pp. 348 and 389. [↑](#footnote-ref-1159)
1160. Descimon (1983), pp. 45-46. [↑](#footnote-ref-1160)
1161. *Ibid*., p. 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-1161)
1162. Robert R. Harding, ‘The Mobilisation of Confraternities against the Reformation in France’, *Sixteenth Century Journal* 11 (1980). [↑](#footnote-ref-1162)
1163. *Articles accordez et jurez entre les confrères de la Confrairie du sainct nom de Jésus...* (Lyon, Jean Pillehotte, 1590), title page. [↑](#footnote-ref-1163)
1164. *Ibid*., p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-1164)
1165. Harding, ‘The Mobilisation of Confraternities’, p. 101. [↑](#footnote-ref-1165)
1166. Denis Lottin, *Recherches historiques sur la ville d’Orléans*, 8 vols (Orléans, 1836-1845), 2, p. 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-1166)
1167. François Hauchecorne, ‘Orléans au temps de la League’, *Bulletin de la Société Archéologique et de l’Histoire du Orléanais* 5 (New Series) (1970), p. 268. [↑](#footnote-ref-1167)
1168. *H2*, p. 365. [↑](#footnote-ref-1168)
1169. Andrew Spicer, ‘(Re)building the sacred landscape: Orléans, 1560-1610’, *French History* 21 (2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-1169)
1170. Davis asserted that over the course of the religious wars, whilst the Protestants destroyed more religious property than the Catholics, the Catholics were the champions in bloodshed – *Society and Culture*, p. 174. Perhaps not surprisingly, the balance struck in this assertion is not apparent in the *Histoire*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1170)
1171. Spicer, ‘(Re)building’, p. 253. [↑](#footnote-ref-1171)
1172. *H2*, p. 84. De Thou placed the killings in the rue de Tournon, making no mention of St-Sulpice. He added that, though the *faubourgs* were pillaged, ‘le Roi eut soin qu’on ne touchât point aux Eglises’ – De Thou, 11, p. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-1172)
1173. *H2*, pp. 238, 246, 248 and 251. Shortly after lifting the siege of Paris the King directed his attention to Troyes. There his troops seized two churches – Notre-Dame and St Urbain – because they offered strategic advantage. When the fighting turned against them, the soldiers tried to use the sacred ground as a place of sanctuary. It was in vain: they were dragged out and punished. Neither the initial seizure of the churches nor the unholy denial of sanctuary attracted Rozée’s censure – *H2*, pp. 375-76. [↑](#footnote-ref-1173)
1174. *H2*, p. 457. [↑](#footnote-ref-1174)
1175. In his *Discours* Guillaume Valdory was similarly anglophobic: he reported the English setting fire to the church at Pavilly, ‘comme aussi ils ont depuis fait en plusieurs autres & divers endroicts’. I have used the Valdory text included in full (but with no page numbers) in L. R. Delsalle, *Devant Sainte-Catherine*. The militia captain Guillaume Valdory was a moderate *Ligueur* of similar persuasion to Rozée, and shared a similar legal background, having worked as a *procureur* in the Rouen Parlement. He claimed that he wrote his *Discours* so that everyone ‘puisse connaître combien est grande la puissance de Dieu’ – Delsalle, *Devant Sainte-Catherine*, p. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-1175)
1176. *H2*, pp. 29 and 505. [↑](#footnote-ref-1176)
1177. When royalists overran the Abbeyof Pré on the outskirts of Le Mans (1589) Rozée’s only criticism was of the defending captain, de Villeres: he lacked ‘cœur et bonne volonté’ – *H2*, p. 97. (Again, de Thou differed. He made no mention of the Abbey of Pré but did record that, once the town had surrendered, Biron was sent in with troops to ensure that pillaging did not occur. A soldier subsequently caught red-handed stealing a chalice was hanged as an example to the rest – De Thou, 11, p. 69). In 1591 the deliberate burning down of a Cordelier convent at Château-Thierry was lamentable because the building had been the ‘témoignage de la pitié (*sic*, ‘piété?) d’un bastard de bourgogne’ and because its destruction was not a military necessity – *H2*, pp. 407-08. (Did the historian know personal sadness over this arson attack? It took place near the family home of ‘un ad[voc]at nommé Rozée’). [↑](#footnote-ref-1177)
1178. Spicer, ‘(Re)building the sacred landscape’, pp. 248 and 259. [↑](#footnote-ref-1178)
1179. The claim was made by Jean de Serres: ‘La licence des gens de guerre y corrompit les mœurs, & fouilla la pudicité de maintes familles. Les principaux de la Ligue enlevèrent & s’approprièrent les réliques de leurs temples...’ – Jean de Serres, *Histoire des Choses Mémorables avenues en France...* (1599), pp. 715-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-1179)
1180. *H2*, pp.194-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-1180)
1181. *H2*, pp. 1 and 34-35 on armed priests; pp. 273-77 for the allegation of cannibalism. De Thou was one of the contemporaries making such claims: ‘Enfin on vit se renouveller... ce qu’on raconte de plus tragique du siège de Jérusalem; la chaire humaine devenir la nourriture de ces affamés; & des mères se nourrir des cadavres de leurs enfants’ – De Thou, 11, p. 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-1181)
1182. Myriam Yardeni, ‘Le Mythe de Paris’, *Mémoires de la Société d’Histoire de Paris et de l’Ile de France*, 20 (1969). Cf. also Orest Ranum, *Paris in the Age of Absolutism* (New York, 1968), pp. 3-24: Paris was not just the administrative capital of France, it was a centre of trade and manufacture, it was large and full of beautiful buildings, and it was the religious and intellectual nerve-centre of France. [↑](#footnote-ref-1182)
1183. Royalist propaganda offered a different interpretaion: rejection of the king displeased God and threatened the future status of Paris. To this, the *Ligue* rejoinder was straightforward: the greatness of the city rested ultimately on loyalty not to its kings but to the Catholic faith. [↑](#footnote-ref-1183)
1184. *H2*, pp. 167 and 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-1184)
1185. *H1*, pp. 453 and 455; *H2*, p. 211. Cf. Ascoli, p. 328: ‘Paris, Parisians, or people who had close connections with Paris were instrumental in inciting the people [of other towns] to rebellion.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-1185)
1186. *H1*, p. 483. [↑](#footnote-ref-1186)
1187. William McCuaig, ‘Paris/Jérusalem in L’Estoile, la Satyre Ménippée, Louis Dorléans’, *Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance*, 64 (2002). McCuaig also noted a second way in which the two cities were popularly linked. By an eschatological association of Paris to the heavenly Jerusalem, ‘the mental state of the *Ligueurs* [could be portrayed] as one of apocalyptic exaltation’ – McCuaig, ‘Paris/Jérusalem’, p. 315. Rozée’s omission of this appealing connection is a little surprising given that he admired the purity of *Ligueur* purposes and believed that he was living through a time of God’s judgement. We recall that he was diffident, no theologian, a barrister accustomed to working with firm evidence, and not given to speculation. [↑](#footnote-ref-1187)
1188. Valois noted the historian’s ‘attitude craintive devant l’ombre de presque tous les grands personnages’ – Valois, p. xxv. [↑](#footnote-ref-1188)
1189. Dominique Vinay, ‘La France, Nouvel Israël, dans les pamphlets au temps de la League’, *Journal de la Renaissance*, 2 (2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-1189)
1190. Politiquesquickly pointed out that David had later eschewed opportunities to eliminate King Saul. [↑](#footnote-ref-1190)
1191. The *Histoire* carries a summary of the 1577 version of the *Remonstrance au peuple françois* in which Thomas Beaux-Amis cited among his arguments against regicide David’s refusal to kill Saul. Alert as ever, Rozée went on to give a detailed account of the 1589 version, which clarified that Beaux-Amis’ arguments had never been intended to limit the freedom of action of Catholics. Did Rozée sense that this was rather too convenient? – ‘les uns et les autres ayant divers desseins tous ces discours demeuroient inutiles’ – *H2*, pp. 62-64, quotation, p. 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-1191)
1192. Ramsey, *Liturgy*, pp. 1-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-1192)
1193. The cult of Sainte Geneviève was celebrated in the fifteenth century with eleven processions of the saint’s relics, and in the seventeenth with seven. The sixteenth century witnessed forty-six such occasions, eight of them in the final two decades, the *Ligue* period – Barbara B. Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross* (Oxford, 1991), p. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-1193)
1194. Moshe Sluhovsky, *Patroness of Paris. Rituals of devotion in early modern France* (Leiden, 1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-1194)
1195. It was very much as a sympathetic observer that Rozée described the dedication of the many who prayed in Paris during the tumultuous weeks of early 1589. The devout often walked barefoot to their place of prayer, despite the harshness of the winter. The historian described as ‘calumnieuses mesdisances’ the writings of those who, twenty years later, questioned the sincere devotion of the people – *H1*, p. 499. [↑](#footnote-ref-1195)
1196. Sluhovsky, *Patroness of Paris*, p. 108. Far from contributing to a sense of community in the city, maintained Sluhovsky, the public cult became partisan and divisive. Sainte Geneviève was, in effect, being called upon at various times to protect the city from the Protestant heresy, to protect its urban liberties against encroaching absolutism (a theme dear to the *Ligue*), and even to defend the city against Politique machinations (thus Catholic against Catholic). An event that must have caused much soul-searching was the death of the duc d’Aumale, killed while leading an attack against royalist forces at St. Denis on the *veille de Sainte Geneviève*, the night of 2-3 January 1591. L’Estoile tells us that special prayers were said at the shrine of Sainte Geneviève during the attack. Sluhovsky quotes Jacques-Auguste de Thou’s claim that the *Ligueurs* deluded themselves that the saint would make the enterprise succeed because she was the patroness of Paris (Sluhovsky, *Patroness of Paris*,p. 122). If, as L’Estoile suggests, the action had been intended to unleash a new ‘St. Bartholomew’s massacre’, this time against Politiques, then the attempt not only failed in military terms, it also called into question the concept of ‘ownership’ of the saint: could one group of Catholics really hope to invoke her against another group? De Thou noted the doubts of those who had believed; he claims that they now felt abandoned, and that they believed Sainte Geneviève had crossed over to the royalist side (Sluhovsky, *Patroness of Paris*, pp. 122-24). [↑](#footnote-ref-1196)
1197. Rozée’s account of the death of Aumale, whilst perhaps not evasive, focused on the details of the combat at St. Denis and on the subsequent laying to rest, ‘avec beaucoup de solemnité’ of the body of the *chevalier* (*H2*, pp. 379-81). [↑](#footnote-ref-1197)
1198. After deducting ninety or so pages of imported text, we have in the second volume of the *Histoire* 450 pages of Rozée’s own composition. Over half of these deal with developments beyond Paris after the defections of 1588-89. [↑](#footnote-ref-1198)
1199. *H2*, p. 435. [↑](#footnote-ref-1199)
1200. Thus, for example, Rozée recalled that as the long siege of Paris was ending, ‘[L]es chefs de l’armée de l’union resolurent entre eux que, pour delivrer paris, il faloit prendre lagny, qui est une petite ville asses bonne sur la Riviere de Marne’ – *H2*, p. 340. As late as 1592, the fear remained: ‘[L]e Roy adverty que rien ne pouvoit tant affliger les parisiens que la disette des vivres, qui venoient principalement de la riviere de Marne (car il tenoit meleun et Corbeil sur la riviere de Seine, et au dessous dela ville Mante et autres passages) il resolut d’empescher les vivres qui venoient de Meaux et de Chasteauthierry’ – *H2*, p. 505; De Thou, 11, p. 494. [↑](#footnote-ref-1200)
1201. Pallier, p. 78. Comparison of texts shows that Rozée used at the very least the following pamphlets: *Discours ample et véritable, de la defaite obtenüe aux faux-bourgs de Tours, sur les trouppes de Henry de Valois, par monseigneur le duc de Mayenne, pair, et lieutenant général de l’Estat royal et couronne de France* (Paris, 1589) – cf. *H1*, pp. 554-56 and *H2*, pp. 1-2; *La Résolution des trois estats du bas païs d’Auvergne. Avec la prise de la ville d’Issoire. Par monsieur le compte de Randan, gouverneur du pays* (Paris, 1589) – cf. *H1*, pp. 477-78 and *H2*, p. 174; *La Deffaicte des ennemis en Champagne par le sieur de Saint Paul. Avec le discours de tout ce qui s’y est passé, ainsi que ledit sieur l’a escrit à madame la duchesse de Guyse, le XIJ du présent mois d’octobre, avec le nombre des morts et blessez* (Paris, 1589) – cf. *H2*, pp. 188-90; and *Discours au vray de l’entreprise faicte par les hérétiques sur la ville de Troye le 17 septembre dernier. Avec les noms de plusieurs gentils-hommes et capitaines qui sont demeurez morts en ladicte entreprinse* (Paris, 1590) – cf. *H2*, pp. 374-77. [↑](#footnote-ref-1201)
1202. For a balanced, modern account I have used Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Henri IV* (Paris, 1982), pp. 466-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-1202)
1203. Palma-Cayet, 174-78. The most informative primary sources for the battle are the memoirs of two eye-witnesses, Sully and Charles de Valois, but both were published after our historian wrote. [↑](#footnote-ref-1203)
1204. Palma-Cayet, p. 175 and *H2*, p. 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-1204)
1205. Palma-Cayet noted that the dedication of the workers on the fortifications at Arques allowed the task to be largely completed ‘en moins de trois jours’; as a result, ‘l’industrie du Roy luy revalut l’advantage que ses ennemis pouvoient avoir sur luy en nombre d’hommes’. At Le Polet (a suburb of Arques) the work was carried out by townsfolk ‘de tous aages et de tous sexes’ and ‘de telle affection qu’il n’y failloit aucune contrainte’. None of this detail was included by Rozée. [↑](#footnote-ref-1205)
1206. Thus, ‘il y eut pertes de part et d’autre, il est bien dificile de reporter les particularitez de ce qui sy passa, car

      comme il est facile de se flater de part et d’autre quand les armées demeurent en corps chacun racontant ce qui s’est passé a son avantage Les uns disoient qu’il n’y avoit pas assez de prisons a Dieppe pour metre les ligueurs qu’on avoit pris en ces escarmouches et discouroient de ces afaires mesme contre la probabilité, comme ont fait les vieux Romains; et d’autre coté on porta a paris vint deux enseignes, tant de françois que de lansquenets qui ne paroissoient pas avoir esté faites en la rüe des lombards et qu’on tenoit avoir esté conquises en ces diverses escarmouches ou l’on faisoit le coup beaucoup plus grand qu’il n’estoit’ – *H2*, pp 75-76. The rue des Lombards was noted for its tailors and haberdashers - see J.-P. Babelon, *Nouvelle histoire de Paris. Paris au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1986), p. 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-1206)
1207. The role of Guitry in the defence of Le Polet, recorded by Rozée but not by Palma-Cayet, appears in de Thou – 11, p. 25. The exact number of soldiers (‘huit cens’) instructed by the king to take up defensive positions in ‘une maladrerie’ is in Matthieu and de Serres – Pierre Matthieu, *Histoire des Derniers Troubles de France* (n.pl., 1606), p. 11v. For Jean de Serres, I have here used an English translation – Jean de Serres, *et al*, *generall historie of France / written by Iohn de Serres vnto the yeare 1598; contynued by Peter Mathew to the death of King Henry the Fourth in the yeare 1610; and againe continued unto the peace concluded before Montpellier in the yeare 1622 by Edward Grimston...* (London, 1624), p. 839. Mayenne’s manner of crossing the river Bethune (‘sur quelques ponts qu’il y fit faire’ – *H2*, p. 75) appeared in none of these sources, nor in d’Aubigné’s *Histoire universelle*. Further, neither Sully nor Charles de Valois mentioned the bridges. [↑](#footnote-ref-1207)
1208. Valois, p. xxxix. [↑](#footnote-ref-1208)
1209. Gérard, pp. 131-34; Auguste Poirson, *Histoire du règne de Henri IV*, 2 vols (Paris, 1856), 1, pp. 43-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-1209)
1210. L’Estoile, 5, p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-1210)
1211. *H2*, p. 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-1211)
1212. Albert Gérard believed so as he referred to the ‘trahison’ of the *lansquenets* – Gérard, p. 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-1212)
1213. Palma-Cayet, p. 177; Matthieu, *Histoire des Derniers Troubles*, p. 12r; de Serres, *et al*, *generall historie of France*, pp 839-40; de Thou, *Histoire Universelle*, 11, pp. 28-29. Agrippa d’Aubigné was more circumspect. Refraining from speculation on the initial motives of the *lansquenets*,he avoided the idea of treachery, putting the whole incident down, somewhat implausibly, to a ‘malentendu’ over who was surrendering to whom - *Histoire Universelle*, ed. André Thierry, 11 vols (Geneva, 1981-2000), 8, p. 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-1213)
1214. *H2*, p. 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-1214)
1215. For a good modern account of the battle of Ivry see Babelon, *Henri IV*, (Paris, 1982), pp. 481-87. [↑](#footnote-ref-1215)
1216. *H2*, pp. 158-162 and Palma-Cayet pp. 215-19. The exception, for which I can offer no explanation, is the baron d’Hurem. [↑](#footnote-ref-1216)
1217. Drawing attention to the lack of ‘un gros de reserve, vers lequel ceux qui seroit rompus se recueillissent’, he observed that twenty-eight years earlier at Dreux the duke’s father François duc de Guise had been better prepared. *H2*, p. 159. Rozée was stretching a point. It is true that Guise made a late and significant intervention at Dreux, but it could be argued that by that stage the Huguenots were already staring defeat in the face – R. J. Knecht, *The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France* (London, 1996), pp. 359-61. This is not the only place in the *Histoire* where Rozée compared Mayenne unfavourably with other Guises. Hiding behind what ‘ceux de l’union disoient’, he later suggested that had the duke’s older brother lived he would not have allowed the great siege of Paris to go so long unchallenged; also he suggested that Egmont would not have died at Ivry if he had been better supported – *H2*, p. 459. [↑](#footnote-ref-1217)
1218. *H2*, pp. 159-60, my emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-1218)
1219. *H2*, pp. 161-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-1219)
1220. *H2*, p. 161. [↑](#footnote-ref-1220)
1221. *Estienne Pasquier.* *Lettres historiques* *pour les années 1556-1594* ed. Dorothy Thickett, (Geneva, 1966), p. 452. [↑](#footnote-ref-1221)
1222. Guillaume de Salluste seigneur du Bartas, *Cantique sur la victoire d’Yvry, obtenue par le Roy (cantique pour Coutras)* (Lyon, 1594), p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1222)
1223. *H2*, p. 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-1223)
1224. *H2*, p. 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-1224)
1225. *H2*, p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-1225)
1226. *H2*, p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-1226)
1227. *H2*, pp. 95-99 (Le Mans); pp. 144-53 (Dreux); pp. 201-08 (Melun); pp. 209 -26 (Sens); and pp. 374-77 (Troyes). We include Troyes, even though there the royalists found the city walls in such bad repair and so poorly guarded that an immediate assault was possible – cf. *Discours de l’entreprise des heretiques et huguenots sur la ville de Troyes* (Lyon, 1590), pp. 8-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-1227)
1228. The royalists took Le Mans and Melun; they abandoned the sieges of Dreux (for the battle of Ivry) and Sens (for the siege of Paris). [↑](#footnote-ref-1228)
1229. I have not discovered Phalandre’s full name (in de Thou, ‘Falandre’). None of the accounts of our five sieges in d’Aubigné, Palma-Cayet or de Thou mentions Jaulges. Christofle de Beaujeu, baron de Beaujeu, seigneur de Jeaulges followed his civil war career with retirement, some time in the 1590s, to Switzerland – *Biographie universelle* (Paris, 1838), 1, p. 405. I have retained Rozée’s spelling: ‘Jaulges’. [↑](#footnote-ref-1229)
1230. Ellery Schalk, *From Valor to Pedigree* (New Jersey, 1986), p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-1230)
1231. *H2*, p. 96. [↑](#footnote-ref-1231)
1232. *H2*, p. 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-1232)
1233. *H2*, p. 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-1233)
1234. *H2*, pp. 148-49, my emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-1234)
1235. Phalandre’s words suggest a strong link between honour and the preservation of the Catholic faith. By the end of the sixteenth century there were those who believed that *la vertu* necessarily implied Catholicism; Rozée seems, at least by default, to have shared this view. He had no Protestant heroes. See Schalk, *From Valor to Pedigree*, pp. 96-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-1235)
1236. *H2*, pp. 149-50. Cf. Luke 9: 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-1236)
1237. *H2*, p. 204. [↑](#footnote-ref-1237)
1238. *H2*, p. 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-1238)
1239. *H2*, p. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-1239)
1240. In his enthusiasm did Rozée exaggerate royalist atrocities? That he was aware of the temptation to do so seems likely from his hesitation when writing about the ill-treatment of *Ligueur* defenders at Melun: ‘le reste qui fut surpris fut traité hostillement, il y a de la peine a particulariser ce qui arriva en ces accidens’ – *H2*, p. 205. Pinning down Rozée’s siege-sources is another challenge. Some of his accounts provide extraordinary detail. His Dreux episode – at almost 3,000 words – dwarfs de Thou’s (fewer than 300 words) and both d’Aubigné’s and Palma-Cayet’s (even fewer). Nothing suggests that he consulted the anonymous *Discours du Siege de Dreux, ensemble tout ce qu’il cest passé tant dehors que dedans, et de braues exploits de guerre conduicts par Monsieur de Fallandres gouuerneur de la Ville* (Paris, 1590). Another pamphlet he wisely left alone (if he even read it), for it contrived to provide very little information about the siege except to claim (in error) the death there of Armand de Gontaut, baron de Biron – *Defaicte veritable sur les troupes du Roy de Navarre, le lundy cinquième mars 1590. Par les Catholiques de la ville de Dreux* (Lyon, 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-1240)
1241. *H2*, p. 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-1241)
1242. *H2*, p. 408. The historian recalled a salutary tale from Château Thierry in Holy Week 1591. The defending Huguenots exulted in their liberty to ignore the fast – to their cost. *Ligue* forces chose mealtime to begin their assault, found the town undefended, and took it. Guillaume Valdory (whom Rozée read), equally sensitive to infringement of holy days, noted that on Easter Sunday 1592 those besieging Rouen were working on their fortifications, ‘nonobstant que ce fust un iour tres-solennel’ – Guillaume Valdory, *1591-1592: devant Sainte-Catherine, les Rouennais défient Henri IV* *Discours*, ed. L.-R. Delsalle (Luneray, 1992), n.p. [↑](#footnote-ref-1242)
1243. *H2*, p. 494. [↑](#footnote-ref-1243)
1244. *H2*, pp. 93 and 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-1244)
1245. *H2*, p. 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-1245)
1246. *H2*, p. 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-1246)
1247. *H2*, p. 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-1247)
1248. Penny Roberts, *A City in Conflict. Troyes during the French Wars of Religion* (Manchester, 1996), p. 178. [↑](#footnote-ref-1248)
1249. *H2*, p. 375. [↑](#footnote-ref-1249)
1250. Philip Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 188-89. [↑](#footnote-ref-1250)
1251. The story of the negotiations that led to this agreement can be traced in detail in the first four chapters of Howell A. Lloyd, *The Rouen Campaign, 1590-1592* (Oxford, 1973). [↑](#footnote-ref-1251)
1252. *Ibid*., p. 220. A measure of the failure was that one contemporary *Rouennais* was able to state that he had not heard of a single death from starvation throughout the siege. See Guillaume Valdory, *Devant Sainte-Catherine*. According to Lloyd, the king was unable to blockade Rouen fully. Lack of equipment meant that control of the Seine was not achieved until March 1592, and it never proved possible to close all the land routes into the city – Lloyd, *The Rouen Campaign*, pp. 149-50. [↑](#footnote-ref-1252)
1253. In fairness, it was largely due to Villars that Rouen had lasted so long against an enormous besieging army; he had worked tirelessly to bring food and ammunition into the city, and to build up its fortifications. See Robert d’Estaintot, *La Ligue en Normandie* (Paris, 1862), p. 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-1253)
1254. *H2*, p. 481. A little later he affirms this principle by explaining that a plot hatched by the comte de Soissons to win the city was but one of several, and that a sortie effected by the Rouennais on 26 January 1591 was, though one of many, ‘une plus remarquable que les autres’ – *H2*, pp. 483-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-1254)
1255. The historian hoped not to confuse the reader. The words of guidance,‘Nous avons laissé le Roy logé a Darnetal a la fin du mois de Novembre 1591’, and ‘nous irons querir l’armée de l’union que nous avons laissé en ponthieu’, are typical instances of his courtesy – *H2*, pp. 482 and 497. [↑](#footnote-ref-1255)
1256. *H2*, p. 485. [↑](#footnote-ref-1256)
1257. The king’s forces included English and German troops, whilst Mayenne had not only Parma’s Spanish help but also the men funded by the Pope and led by Hercule Sfondrato. [↑](#footnote-ref-1257)
1258. *H2*, pp. 479, 483 and 495. [↑](#footnote-ref-1258)
1259. Injuries were sustained by the king at Aumale, by Parma at Caudebec, and by Anne d’Anglure, seigneur de Givry at Rouen. Fatalities included the comte de Dreux, and, a little later at Epernay, Armand de Gontaut, baron de Biron. Additionally, within the year, Parma died from his injury. [↑](#footnote-ref-1259)
1260. *H2*, pp. 480-81. [↑](#footnote-ref-1260)
1261. *H2*, p. 478. [↑](#footnote-ref-1261)
1262. *H2*, p. 481. [↑](#footnote-ref-1262)
1263. *H2*, p. 481. Rozée appears to have taken Rouen’s reply from the *Brief discours Des Choses plus mémorables advenues en la ville de Rouen…* included in *ML*, 5, pp. 100-15. He did not include the king’s response to the rebuff. According to the writer of the *Discours*, the king was angered, ‘car il s’en attendoit toute autre chose, & pĕsoit emporter la ville sans grande resistance’ – *ML*, 5,p. 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-1263)
1264. Describing the same incident, Guillaume Valdory concluded, ‘Enquoy lon peut juger le soin que Dieu a de nous’ – *Devant Sainte-Catherine*, n.p. [↑](#footnote-ref-1264)
1265. *H2*, p. 490. [↑](#footnote-ref-1265)
1266. *H2*, p. 500. [↑](#footnote-ref-1266)
1267. *H2*, p. 479. [↑](#footnote-ref-1267)
1268. *H2*, p. 503. [↑](#footnote-ref-1268)
1269. On 26 January, men in the company of *capitaine* Jacques distinguished themselves: ‘[ils] sortirent des capucins, pour aller escarmoucher l’ennemy, jusques aux tranchéées et barricades vers les chartreux, ou ayant fait leur devoir, ils se trouverent chargez de plus de quatre cens hommes de pied, contre lesquels ils firent teste’ – *H2*, p. 484. Even more glorious was the sortie of 25 February which claimed the lives of seven to eight hundred *assiégeants*: ‘les assiegez rentrerent dans la ville chargez de butin et couverts de gloire’ *H2*, p. 492. Rozée was exultant: ‘le Roy ne recouvriroit point en six semaines, ce qu’il avoit perdu en deux heures’ – *H2*, p. 492. [↑](#footnote-ref-1269)
1270. *H2*, pp. 504-05, my emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-1270)
1271. *H2*, p. 477. [↑](#footnote-ref-1271)
1272. *H2*, p. 479. [↑](#footnote-ref-1272)
1273. *H2*, p. 477. [↑](#footnote-ref-1273)
1274. A notable exception is a reference to ‘l’ honnesteté de Villars’ after the governor had returned a royalist prisoner without insisting on the payment of a ransom – *H2*, p. 497. According to Schalk, *honnestie*, with connotations of educational and cultural achievement, began to displace the word *vertu* in the seventeenth-century, as a means of defining noble characteristics – Schalk, *From Valor to Pedigree*, p. 129. As a rule, Rozée, although writing around 1620, seems to have been impervious to the change. His heroes reflect the values of *vertu* which were current in his formative years. [↑](#footnote-ref-1274)
1275. In Howell Lloyd’s opinion, Mayenne was a mere tactician, whilst Parma was a strategist – Lloyd, *The Rouen Campaign*, pp. 183-85. For allegations that Mayenne actually kept information back from Parma, see Lloyd, *Ibid*., p. 179. [↑](#footnote-ref-1275)
1276. *H2*, pp. 494 and 501-02. [↑](#footnote-ref-1276)
1277. *H2*, p.202. [↑](#footnote-ref-1277)
1278. *H2*, p. 72. [↑](#footnote-ref-1278)
1279. *H2*, pp. 95-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-1279)
1280. Chanvalon despaired. Rozée wrote: ‘il avoit envoyé vers le duc de Mayenne pour luy faire entendre que l’ennemy les approchoit, il avoit aussy escrit a Troies et a Montargis, d’ou il n’avoit put tirer aucune esperance de secours; …particulierement il avoit escrit a Vitry Coubert lequel estoit avec troupes ez environs de Montargis et de Nemours, mais qu’il n’en avoit put tirer autre chose, sinon qu’il avoit promis de mener ses troupes a paris; … voyant donc les choses ainsy desesperées, … il avoit convoqué… [une] notable compagnie pour luy faire entendre la crainte qu’il avoit du sac et ruine totale de la ville’ – *H2*, p. 214. At the Château du Bois de Vincennes in summer 1590, Beaulieu found he had been posted to the place ‘sans la pourvoir de ce qui estoit necessaire pour la garder’. His request for help from Paris – itself under siege – brought the inevitable denial, leaving him little option but to put his hand in his pocket: ‘il fut contraint de faire nettoyer et restablir la breche a ses depens, pourvoir aux necessites de la place tant pour les armes que pour les vivres le tout a ses propres despens’ – *H2*, p. 259. By 20 July, Beaulieu was ‘presque au desespoir de ce que toutes choses luy manquoient, qu’on ne luy donnoit aucun secours’ – *H2*, p. 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-1280)
1281. Encores que le duc de Mayenne eust avec luy les troupes que le prince de parme luy avoit laissées quand il s’en retourna au pais bas, il ne se trouva pas asses fort, pour aller faire lever le siege de Chartres, quoy qu’il en fut sollicité de toutes parts; cela fut cause qu’il se resolut d’aller assieger la ville de Chasteauthierry … pour essayer en tout evenement, si par une diversion il pouroit faire lever le siege de Chartres, ou pour le moins afin que le Roy emmenant avec luy les principales forces de son armée, pour venir au secours de Chasteauthierry; la Chasre et ceux de l’union qui estoient en la province, eussent moyen de secourir la ville de Chartres… - *H2*, pp. 406-07. [↑](#footnote-ref-1281)
1282. *H2*, p. 72. [↑](#footnote-ref-1282)
1283. *H2*, pp. 145 and 147. [↑](#footnote-ref-1283)
1284. *H2*, p. 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-1284)
1285. *H2*, p. 202. [↑](#footnote-ref-1285)
1286. *H2*, p. 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-1286)
1287. *H2*, p. 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-1287)
1288. *H2*, p. 370. [↑](#footnote-ref-1288)
1289. The digressions are in *H2*, pp. 174-90 and 365-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-1289)
1290. *H2*, p. 183 [↑](#footnote-ref-1290)
1291. *H2*, p. 174. [↑](#footnote-ref-1291)
1292. *H2*, p. 174. [↑](#footnote-ref-1292)
1293. *H2*, pp. 368 and 372. That Rozée had his reservations about the duc de Savoie is obvious from a passage toward the end of the first digression where he accused him of sliding from religious motives into reasons of state – *H2*, p. 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-1293)
1294. Lansac is a shadowy figure in *H2*, and one whose integrity Rozée apparently doubted. [↑](#footnote-ref-1294)
1295. *H2*, p. 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-1295)
1296. *H2*, p. 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-1296)
1297. It was dispensed with in a couple of sentences by J.-H. Mariéjol, and though identified as a ‘major battle’ it was accorded fewer than ten words by J.H.M. Salmon in 1975 – Mariéjol, pp. 315-16; J.H.M. Salmon, *Society in Crisis. France in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1975), pp. 256 and 259. Mack P. Holt made no mention of the battle in *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629* (Cambridge, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-1297)
1298. *H2*, p. 174. Rozée was dependent here on a *Ligueur* pamphlet that he came across in Goulart – *La prise de la ville d’Issoire par Monsieur le Comte de Randan* (Lyon, 1589); *ML*, 4, pp. 37-43. The pamphlet was published in Paris under a different name – Pallier, p. 340. [↑](#footnote-ref-1298)
1299. *H2*, p. 175. [↑](#footnote-ref-1299)
1300. *H2*, pp. 174-75. [↑](#footnote-ref-1300)
1301. *H2*, p. 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-1301)
1302. *H2*, p. 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-1302)
1303. Mark Greengrass has explained that whereas in the second half of the sixteenth century martyrology was much written about by Catholics in Spain, Italy and the Rhineland, in French writing the theme had been quenched by the requirement of successive edicts of pacification that previous events be relegated to ‘oblivion’ – Mark Greengrass, ‘Regicide, Martyrs and Monarchical Authority in France in the Wars of Religion’, in R.. v. Friedeburg (ed), *Murder and Monarchy. Regicide in European History, 1300-1800* (Basingstoke, 2004), pp. 178-79. [↑](#footnote-ref-1303)
1304. *H2*, p. 333. [↑](#footnote-ref-1304)
1305. *H1*, p. 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-1305)
1306. *H2*, pp. 93-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-1306)
1307. That the historian had felt hurt by the contemptuous words of royalist writers is nowhere better suggested than in his comment on a letter sent to the *Seize* by Pope Gregory XIV in May 1591: ‘les Seize qui estoient des sentinelles perpetuelles, mises sur une tour par le party general de la Ligue, disoient que le pape, leur faisant l’honneur de leur escrire en cette sorte, …ne les tenoit ny pour des coquins, ny pour des larrons ou voleurs, ny pour des perturbateurs du repos publique…’ – *H2*, p. 400. [↑](#footnote-ref-1307)
1308. ‘La violence demeure essentiellement mythique, de l’ordre de la parole, de la prédication, de la rumeur et du bruit, de la menace…, ou encore de l’écrit, des pamphlets et pasquils’ – Denis Crouzet, ‘La représentation du temps à l’époque de la Ligue’, *Revue historique* 270 (1983), p. 301. [↑](#footnote-ref-1308)
1309. *Ibid*., pp. 306-28. [↑](#footnote-ref-1309)
1310. Both streets were a short walk from Rozée’s home – *Ibid*., p. 341; Pallier, pp. 491 and 523. [↑](#footnote-ref-1310)
1311. *H1*, p. 348. [↑](#footnote-ref-1311)
1312. *H1*, p. 348. [↑](#footnote-ref-1312)
1313. ‘[L]es politiques qui ne pouvoient celer le contentement qu’ils avoient de voir prosperer les affaires du Roy… et avec eux une partie des ligueurs, qui n’atendoient point de Dieu des miracles pour leur conservation, ainsi regardoient aux moyens humains et ordinaires, remontroient l’impossibilité de defendre cette ville…’ – *H2*, pp. 166-67. [↑](#footnote-ref-1313)
1314. *H2*, p. 249. Frustratingly, Rozée did not state that he himself saw it, and he refused to suggest an interpretation, merely noting that ‘chacun en discourut ainsy que sa passion le conduissoit’ – *H2*, p. 249. [↑](#footnote-ref-1314)
1315. Cf. Myriam Yardeni: ‘Ainsi, écrire l’histoire contemporaine pour Palma-Cayet est… avant tout un déchiffrement des signes et des symboles mystiques et intemporels dans le temps, une tentative de réunir de nouveau et dans le temps religion et histoire’ – Myriam Yardeni, ‘Esotérisme, religion et histoire dans l’œuvre de Palma-Cayet’, *Revue de l’histoire des religions* 198 (1981), p. 306. Even the titles *Chronologie septenaire* (seven, the holy number) and *Chronologie novenaire* (seven times nine: sixty-three, year of the grand climacteric) had significance. Among his extracts from the Letter from Laon, Rozée noted that Bodin had said, ‘a la fin de cette letre, qu’aprez la mort des duc et cardinal de Guise , il avoit dit en grande compagnie , que le Roy Henry trois ne passeroit pas l’année lors courante, et qu’en sa republique il avoit observé qu’a compter depuis Faramond le roy Henry Trois estoit le soixante troisiesme , nombre climatique (*sic*, ‘climaterique’ in the Letter) aux etats et royaumes comme aux personnes…’ – *H2*, p. 131 (cf. also *H1*, p. 481); Jean Bodin, *Lettre de monsieur Bodin (Laon 20 janvier 1590)* (Lyon, 1590), p. 22.   [↑](#footnote-ref-1315)
1316. *H1*, p. 438. [↑](#footnote-ref-1316)
1317. Crouzet, ‘La représentation’, p. 372. [↑](#footnote-ref-1317)
1318. The phrase comes from the book title: Barbara Diefendorf, *From Penitence to Charity. Pious Women and the Catholic Reformation in Paris* (Oxford, 2004). Diefendorf considered that ‘[t]he penitential asceticism that surged with the League’ gave place to charitable outreach particularly as a result of the socio-economic stresses of Paris in the 1630s – *Ibid*., p. 49 (quotation) and p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-1318)
1319. *H2*, p. 39. We recall that he had polled badly in elections for the *échevinage* in November 1592. [↑](#footnote-ref-1319)
1320. *H2*, p. 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-1320)
1321. *H1*, pp. 263 and 434. [↑](#footnote-ref-1321)
1322. *H1*, p. 220; *H2*, p. 525. [↑](#footnote-ref-1322)
1323. *H1*, p. 152; *H2*, pp. 58 and 432. [↑](#footnote-ref-1323)
1324. *H2*, p. 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-1324)
1325. *H1*, p. 483. [↑](#footnote-ref-1325)
1326. *H2*, pp. 522 and 519. [↑](#footnote-ref-1326)
1327. *H2*, pp. 400, 451-53 and 488. Royalist historians had gone further. Chosen by God, Navarre was ‘l’homme providentiel… choisi par Dieu pour pacifier et réconcilier la France’ – Mark Greengrass, ‘Clio et le passé récent : les fonctions et motivations historiennes aux lendemains des guerres de Religion françaises’ (unpublished article), p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-1327)
1328. Lucien Goldmann, *The Hidden God: A Study of Tragic Vision in the Pensées of Pascal and the Tragedies of Racine*, trans. P. Thody (London, 1977), p. 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-1328)
1329. The *Ligue* and the *Seize* are introduced always in the third person. At various points the references to the steering group become are remote: the *Seize* become ‘ceux qu'on apelloit les Seize’ – as if Rozée knew of them only by their reputation(*H2*, pp. 31, 116, 192, 228, 460, and 464). This device might help the reader encountering first mention of the Paris *Ligue* leadership, but its repetition at intervals suggests design. If Rozée was distancing himself in the hope of achieving a degree of impartiality, the effect was more successfully achieved by his acknowledgement, albeit infrequent, that the *Seize* had faults (particularly in not being well enough prepared for the anticipated siege of summer 1589 and the long siege of 1590). [↑](#footnote-ref-1329)
1330. Mark Greengrass, ‘“Larvatus Prodeo” [“I go about masked”] – Descartes. Cultures of discretion in early seventeenth-century France’ (unpublished paper). [↑](#footnote-ref-1330)
1331. *Ibid*., p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-1331)