

# **Spatial and Temporal Change in the Caste System: The Punjab to Bradford**

By

**Dominic Jon Medway**

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

The University of Leeds  
School of Geography  
July 1998

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

*for Laura*



**South Asian Bradford, Summer 1996**

# Acknowledgements

A number of people must be thanked for their help with this study:

First, and most importantly, my partner Laura. She has been a constant source of encouragement, and has always been willing to discuss ideas and concepts about my work. I am also indebted to my parents (Ann and Eric) for their intellectual contribution, and both them and my grandmother for their unerring financial support throughout my studies. Considerable thanks must also be extended to my supervisors Debbie Phillips and Phil Rees. Their assistance with this study has been absolutely invaluable.

Technical support has been received from the drawing office team in the Department of Geography at Leeds University, and I am grateful for this. My current employer (The Manchester Metropolitan University) and my current 'boss' (Dr. David Bennison) should also be acknowledged for allowing me time to complete this study.

Undertaking a PhD would have been a lonely experience without the presence of fellow PhDers: namely, Mark Wanstall, Tony Hernandez, David Corominas, Sally Kendall, Richard White, Darren Smith and Jim Marshall. Thanks guys!

Finally, I am forever indebted to the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford who were so willing to help out in my research, and particularly to Pushpa Prabhakar, for teaching me Hindi for two years and for never failing to provide answers to my endless barrage of research questions.

# Abstract

The principal focus of this study is the caste system. The study begins by producing a 'skeletal' definition of the term 'caste', which breaks out of the 'theoretical stagnation' imposed on Indology by the work of Louis Dumont (1970). Using this definition, a simple framework for conceptualising Indian society is constructed which illustrates the nature of the caste system. The fortunes of the caste system are then explored in India's historical past and in Indian Hindu Diaspora, and from this exploration a common-sense view of the caste system as being immutable is confounded. Instead, it is established that the institution is adaptable and flexible, because it is constantly changing in response to forces affecting it over time and space. However, whilst some aspects of the caste system are open to change, it is argued that other aspects remain resolutely unchanging. Accordingly, it is suggested that the institution contains elements of both modernity and tradition, and that this may be the key to its survival through time and space.

The caste system is then examined with reference to Punjabi Hindus in Bradford. Through a detailed analysis of qualitative and quantitative data collected amongst this community during 1994 and 1995, a fascinating picture unfolds concerning the presence and operation of the caste system *desh pardesh* (at home abroad) for Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Spatial and temporal changes in the caste system are also identified as having occurred through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. The conclusions relate this back to the wider issue of spatial and temporal changes in the caste system occurring in other parts of Indian Hindu Diaspora, and consider implications for the future of the institution amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford.

# Contents

<b>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION, AIMS AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY</b>		
<b>1.1</b>	<b>Introduction to the study and aims</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1.2</b>	<b>Structure of the study and chapter contents</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>CHAPTER TWO: DEFINING CASTE AND THEORISING INDIAN SOCIETY</b>		
<b>2.0</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>2.1</b>	<b>Etymology of the term caste</b>	<b>8</b>
2.1.1	Portuguese applications of the term <i>casta</i> in the 16th Century	8
2.1.2	English and French applications of the term caste, 17th Century to date	10
<b>2.2</b>	<b>Conflicting definitions and translations of the term caste</b>	<b>11</b>
2.2.1	'Standard' versus 'Dumontian' definitions	11
2.2.2	'Cross-cultural' definitions	12
2.2.3	'Culturally rooted' definitions	13
2.2.4	Variation and inconsistency in culturally rooted definitions	15
2.2.5	The introduction of 'subcastes' into the culturally rooted approach	16
2.2.6	Summarising the culturally rooted approach	17
2.2.7	Conflicting translations of culturally rooted definitions	17
2.2.8	Dumont's definition of the term caste	18
2.2.9	The popularity of the Dumontian definition	19
2.2.10	Critique of the Dumontian definition	20
2.2.11	Redressing the balance	21
<b>2.3</b>	<b>Formulating a culturally rooted, working definition</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>2.4</b>	<b>Using the working definition to create a framework for Indian society: an overview</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>2.5</b>	<b>The <i>varnas</i></b>	<b>26</b>
2.5.1	Overview of the <i>varnas</i>	26
2.5.2	The <i>varnas</i> in 1950s and '60s rural India: were they castes?	27
<b>2.6</b>	<b>The <i>jatis</i></b>	<b>31</b>
2.6.1	Overview of the <i>jatis</i>	31
2.6.2	The <i>jatis</i> in 1950s and '60s rural India: were they castes?	34
<b>2.7</b>	<b>The <i>biradaris</i> and other small endogamous groups</b>	<b>38</b>
2.7.1	Overview of the <i>biradaris</i>	38
2.7.2	The <i>biradaris</i> in 1950s and '60s rural India: were they castes?	39
<b>2.8</b>	<b>Conceptualising Indian society</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>2.9</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>48</b>

### **CHAPTER THREE: TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL CHANGES IN THE CASTE SYSTEM**

<b>3.0</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>3.1</b>	<b>Common-sense approaches to the caste system: a critique</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>3.2</b>	<b>Changes in the caste system in British India</b>	<b>53</b>
3.2.1	Overview	53
3.2.2	Changes in the economic hierarchy of the caste system, 1858 to 1900	56
3.2.3	Changes in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system, 1858 to 1900	58
3.2.4	Changes in the political hierarchy of the caste system, 1858 to 1900	61
3.2.5	Summary of changes in the caste system in British India	61
<b>3.3</b>	<b>Changes in the caste system in independent India</b>	<b>62</b>
3.3.1	Overview	62
3.3.2	Changes resulting from constitutional reform	62
3.3.3	Changes resulting from non-agricultural industrialisation	63
3.3.4	Changes resulting from urbanisation	65
3.3.5	Appraisal of the changes in the caste system in independent India	66
3.3.6	Summary of the changes in the caste system in India, and the future	67
<b>3.4</b>	<b>Introduction to Diaspora</b>	<b>68</b>
3.4.1	Overview	68
3.4.2	Development of South Asian Diaspora	71
<b>3.5</b>	<b>Changes in the caste system in non-British Diaspora</b>	<b>73</b>
3.5.1	Overview	73
3.5.2	Changes resulting from stage one migration	74
3.5.3	Changes resulting from stage two migration	80
3.5.4	Summary of changes in the caste system in non-British Diaspora	83
<b>3.6</b>	<b>Changes in the caste system in British Diaspora</b>	<b>83</b>
3.6.1	Overview	83
3.6.2	Changes in the caste system amongst Britain's Gujarati Hindus	85
3.6.3	Changes in the caste system amongst Britain's Punjabi Hindus	89
<b>3.7</b>	<b>Conclusion: modernity and tradition</b>	<b>90</b>

### **CHAPTER FOUR: DATA TYPES EMPLOYED IN THE STUDY: COLLECTION, USE, MANIPULATION AND ANALYSIS**

<b>4.0</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>92</b>
<b>4.1</b>	<b>Data types employed in the study</b>	<b>92</b>
<b>4.2</b>	<b>Secondary data</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>4.3</b>	<b>Primary quantitative data generated from South Asian name analysis</b>	<b>94</b>
4.3.1	Overview	94
4.3.2	Reasons for the development of a South Asian name analysis methodology	95
4.3.3	South Asian name analysis in other studies	97
4.3.4	'Indians', 'Other South Asians' and 'Others'	104

4.3.5	Separating South Asians from Others	105
4.3.6	Separating Indians from Other South Asians	108
4.3.7	Separating Indian Muslims from Other South Asian Muslims	111
4.3.8	Separating non-Muslim Other South Asians from Indians	114
4.3.9	Identifying the religion of Indians	116
4.3.10	Problem names common to Sikhs and Indian Hindus	119
4.3.11	Identifying the origin region of Indians	120
4.3.12	Manipulation, use and analysis of quantitative name analysis data	127
4.3.13	Accuracy of name analysis data	128
<b>4.4</b>	<b>A note on the concept of generation</b>	<b>129</b>
4.4.1	Overview	129
4.4.2	First generation and generation 1.5 immigrants	130
4.4.3	The sending generation and second and third generation immigrants	131
<b>4.5</b>	<b>Primary qualitative data generated from interviews</b>	<b>132</b>
4.5.1	Type of interview used	133
4.5.2	Units of analysis	135
4.5.3	Need for a pilot interview study and key interview themes	137
4.5.4	Sampling for the pilot interviews	140
4.5.5	Findings from the pilot interviews	141
4.5.6	Sampling for the main interviews	143
4.5.7	Manipulation, analysis and use of qualitative interview data	149
<b>4.6</b>	<b>Primary quantitative data generated from interviews and questionnaires</b>	<b>150</b>
4.6.1	Categories of quantitative data in interviews	151
4.6.2	Type and design of household questionnaire	152
4.6.3	Sampling for the questionnaire	154
4.6.4	Manipulation, analysis and use of quantitative interview and questionnaire data	157
<b>4.7</b>	<b>Primary qualitative data generated from observation</b>	<b>159</b>
4.7.1	Qualitative ethnographic data from participant observation	159
4.7.2	Qualitative data from general fieldwork observations	162
<b>4.8</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>162</b>
<b>CHAPTER FIVE: SETTING THE STUDY IN CONTEXT: SOUTH ASIANS IN BRADFORD</b>		
<b>5.0</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>164</b>
<b>5.1</b>	<b>The settlement history of South Asians in Bradford</b>	<b>165</b>
5.1.1	The early pioneer phase	166
5.1.2	The lodging house era	166
5.1.3	Consolidation and family reunion	168
5.1.4	Suburbanisation and municipalisation	170
5.1.5	Summary	175

<b>5.2</b>	<b>Enumerating Bradford's South Asian population</b>	<b>176</b>
5.2.1	Size of Bradford's South Asian population according to the 1991 Census	176
5.2.2	The South Asian population: Bradford and Britain compared	178
5.2.3	Size of religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population	179
5.2.4	Religio-ethnic sub-groups: Bradford and Britain compared	183
5.2.5	Summary	186
<b>5.3</b>	<b>The geographies of religio-ethnic sub-groups in Bradford</b>	<b>186</b>
5.3.1	The current picture	186
5.3.2	Changing geographies of religio-ethnic sub-groups in Bradford, 1980 to 1991	192
5.3.3	Summary	198
<b>5.4</b>	<b>Conclusion: acknowledging difference</b>	<b>198</b>

## **CHAPTER SIX: THE CASTE SYSTEM AMONGST BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS AND SOME MIGRATORY CHANGES**

<b>6.0</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>201</b>
<b>6.1</b>	<b>Awareness of social units in the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus</b>	<b>202</b>
6.1.1	Overview	202
6.1.2	Non- <i>Brahminical</i> awareness of social units in the caste system	202
6.1.3	<i>Brahminical</i> awareness of social units in the caste system	204
6.1.4	Awareness of <i>jati</i> and <i>varna</i> affiliation at the individual level	206
<b>6.2</b>	<b>Marriage and the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus</b>	<b>207</b>
6.2.1	Marital situation in sample households	207
6.2.2	Endogamy and the caste system	209
6.2.3	Maintaining <i>jati</i> and <i>varna</i> endogamy	211
6.2.4	Parental attitudes to marriage	214
<b>6.3</b>	<b>The caste system and social and political 'control' amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus</b>	<b>219</b>
6.3.1	Overview	219
6.3.2	Patterns of worship in the Bradford sample	220
6.3.3	Centres of Punjabi Hindu worship in Bradford	221
6.3.4	Centres of worship as units of social and political 'control'	228
<b>6.4</b>	<b>The caste system and traditional occupations or <i>karmas</i> amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus</b>	<b>232</b>
6.4.1	Initial impressions on the maintenance of <i>karma</i>	232
6.4.2	Exploring <i>karma</i> maintenance in more detail	233
6.4.3	<i>Karma</i> as a cultural resource	237
<b>6.5</b>	<b>The geography of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus</b>	<b>238</b>
6.5.1	Determining the geography of the caste system	238
6.5.2	Explaining the geography of the caste system	241
<b>6.6</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>243</b>

**CHAPTER SEVEN: THE HIERARCHY OF THE CASTE SYSTEM AMONGST BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS**

<b>7.0</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>245</b>
<b>7.1</b>	<b>The ritual hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus</b>	<b>245</b>
7.1.1	Overview	245
7.1.2	Awareness of the ritual hierarchy amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus	246
7.1.3	Operation of the ritual hierarchy amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus	247
7.1.4	The ritual hierarchy and marriage practices	248
7.1.5	The ritual hierarchy and temple usage patterns	250
7.1.6	Summary	253
<b>7.2</b>	<b>The tripartite hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus</b>	<b>254</b>
7.2.1	Overview	254
7.2.2	Interviewees' perceptions of the tripartite hierarchy	254
<b>7.3</b>	<b>Economic characteristics of sample households by their <i>jati</i> affiliation</b>	<b>256</b>
7.3.1	Overview	256
7.3.2	Property values of sample households by <i>jati</i> affiliation	257
7.3.3	Central heating status of sample households by <i>jati</i> affiliation	260
7.3.4	Car ownership in sample households by <i>jati</i> affiliation	261
7.3.5	Car values in sample households by <i>jati</i> affiliation	262
7.3.6	Independent schooling in sample households by <i>jati</i> affiliation	264
7.3.7	Synthesis of findings from sample households	265
<b>7.4</b>	<b>Politico-economic characteristics of sample household heads by their <i>jati</i> affiliation</b>	<b>266</b>
7.4.1	Overview	266
7.4.2	Educational qualifications of sample household heads by <i>jati</i> affiliation	267
7.4.3	Occupations of sample household heads by <i>jati</i> affiliation	270
7.4.4	Social classes of sample household heads by <i>jati</i> affiliation	274
<b>7.5</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>276</b>

**CHAPTER EIGHT: MIGRATORY CHANGES IN THE HIERARCHY OF THE CASTE SYSTEM AMONGST BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS**

<b>8.0</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>279</b>
<b>8.1</b>	<b>Spatial and temporal shift in the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus</b>	<b>279</b>
8.1.1	The spatial origin of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus	279
8.1.2	The temporal origin of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus	282
8.1.3	Summary	284
<b>8.2</b>	<b>Changes in the ritual hierarchy</b>	<b>284</b>
8.2.1	Overview	284
8.2.2	Changes in marriage practices and the ritual hierarchy	285
8.2.3	Changes in temple usage patterns and the ritual hierarchy	285
8.2.4	Changes in commensality and the ritual hierarchy	288

8.2.5	Summary	290
<b>8.3</b>	<b>Changes in the tripartite hierarchy</b>	<b>291</b>
8.3.1	Overview	291
8.3.2	Identifying changes in the tripartite hierarchy	292
8.3.3	Conceptualising changes in the tripartite hierarchy	299
8.3.4	Reasons for changes in the tripartite hierarchy	304
8.3.5	Hybrid ethnic identities and the caste system	309
<b>8.4</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>311</b>

**CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS: SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL CHANGE IN  
THE CASTE SYSTEM**

9.1	Aims and their fulfilment	314
9.2	Contributions of this study	318
9.3	Appraisal of research	320
9.4	Future research possibilities	321
9.5	Future of the caste system for Bradford's Punjabi Hindus	322

<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>325</b>
---------------------	------------

<b>APPENDICES</b>	<b>346</b>
-------------------	------------

# Tables

## CHAPTER TWO

2.1	Cases brought before <i>biradari</i> councils by residents of Ramkheri village	43
2.2	Social segmentation amongst <i>Brahmins</i> in Sripuram	46

## CHAPTER THREE

3.1	South Asian Diaspora by country and major area, 1987	69
-----	--	----

## CHAPTER FOUR

4.1	Names of a family of Pakistani Muslim electors living under one address, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register	109
4.2	Personal names commonly used by Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims	110
4.3	Names of a family of Indian Muslim electors living under one address, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register	113
4.4	Names used by Sri Lankan electors as forenames and surnames, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register	115
4.5	Names used by Nepalese electors as forenames and surnames, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register	115
4.6	Personal names used by Sikh electors, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register	117
4.7	Personal names used by female Indian Hindu electors, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register	118
4.8	Gujarati Hindu family and <i>jati</i> names which are used in a surname position	122
4.9	Selected Hindu forenames and their spelling differences between the Punjab and Gujarat regions	124
4.10	Hindu surnames from 'other regions of India', as identified by Ram	125
4.11	Generational combinations of parents which define second and third generation immigrants in this study	132
4.12	Ethnic compositions of the mixed marriages which defined the 36 mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford	136
4.13	Eight ward level socio-economic variables constructed for the 32 study wards	143
4.14	The four clusters, their component wards, and the number of Punjabi Hindu households in each cluster and ward	144
4.15	Response and refusal rates in Punjabi Hindu households sampled and contacted for interviews	147
4.16	Alternative calculation of interview response rates	148
4.17	Response and refusal rates in Punjabi Hindu households sampled and contacted for questionnaires	155
4.18	Alternative calculation of questionnaire response rates	156

**CHAPTER FIVE**

5.1	Resident population in Bradford by ethnic group, 1991 Census	176
5.2	Location quotients for ethnic groups in Bradford relative to Britain as a whole, 1991 Census	178
5.3	Name analysis results from the 1992 electoral register, showing the numbers of Indians in various religio-ethnic sub-groups across the 32 study wards	180
5.4	Estimated current population sizes of religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population	182
5.5	Estimated current population sizes of religio-ethnic sub-groups within Britain's Indian population	184
5.6	Location quotients for religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population relative to Indians in Britain as a whole	185
5.7	Ward counts for four religio-ethnic sub-groups as percentages of total name analysis count of persons belonging to the relevant sub-group in all 32 study wards	187
5.8	Changes in the numbers of Punjabi Sikhs, Gujarati Hindus and Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford's 30 wards, 1980 to 1991	193

**CHAPTER SIX**

6.1	<i>Jatis</i> represented amongst non- <i>Brahminical</i> Punjabi Hindus in the Bradford sample	202
6.2	Marital situation of the 123 households in the Bradford sample	207
6.3	<i>Jati</i> or <i>varna</i> affiliation of the 123 sample households	209
6.4	Centres of worship to which 113 sample households are affiliated by their <i>jati</i> or <i>varna</i> affiliations	221

**CHAPTER SEVEN**

7.1	Position of <i>jatis</i> and <i>varnas</i> in the Bradford sample in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system	246
7.2	Estimated property values of 123 sample households by household <i>jati</i> affiliation	258
7.3	Central heating status of 123 sample households by household <i>jati</i> affiliation	260
7.4	Number of cars owned by 121 sample households by household <i>jati</i> affiliation	261
7.5	Values of the cars owned by 99 sample households by household <i>jati</i> affiliation	263
7.6	Type of school attended by children in 107 sample households by household <i>jati</i> affiliation	265
7.7	Highest educational qualifications of 119 male sample household heads by their <i>jati</i> affiliation	269
7.8	Highest educational qualifications of 112 female sample household heads by their <i>jati</i> affiliation	269
7.9	SOC major occupational groups into which the job titles of sample household heads were collapsed	271
7.10	SOC major occupational groups of 98 male sample household heads by their <i>jati</i> affiliation	272
7.11	SOC major occupational groups of 65 female sample household heads by their <i>jati</i> affiliation	272
7.12	Broad occupational categories of 98 male sample household heads by their <i>jati</i> affiliation	274
7.13	Broad occupational categories of 65 female sample household heads by their <i>jati</i> affiliation	274
7.14	Five social classes into which SOC occupational unit groups are collapsed for the British Census	275

7.15	Social classes of 98 male sample household heads by their <i>jati</i> affiliation	276
7.16	Social classes of 65 female sample household heads by their <i>jati</i> affiliation	276
7.17	Discrepancies between the ritual and economic & political hierarchies of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community	277

#### **CHAPTER EIGHT**

8.1	Numbers of Punjabi Hindus entered in the longitudinal database for each generation	292
8.2	Numerical breakdown of Punjabi Hindu males in the longitudinal database by social class category and <i>jati</i> affiliation, across stages of employment in each generational group	295
8.3	Percentages of economically active Punjabi Hindu males in the longitudinal database belonging to social class categories, as calculated for each stage of employment in every generational group within a given <i>jati</i>	296

#### **CHAPTER NINE**

9.1	Percentages of 17 to 21 year olds in the 'under 21s database' who are in further education or working/unemployed	323
-----	--	-----

# Figures

## CHAPTER TWO

- |     |   |    |
|-----|---|----|
| 2.1 | Framework for conceptualising society in 1950s and '60s rural India                               | 45 |
| 2.2 | Gough's map of Kumbapettai village in the Tanjore District of Tamil Nadu State, <i>circa</i> 1952 | 48 |

## CHAPTER THREE

- |     |   |    |
|-----|---|----|
| 3.1 | The hierarchy of the caste system at <i>jati</i> and caste level, and its reformulation under sovereign British rule for a given locality | 58 |
| 3.2 | Geographical distribution of South Asian Diaspora by countries with South Asian immigrant populations greater than 3000 persons           | 70 |

## CHAPTER FOUR

- |     |  |     |
|-----|--|-----|
| 4.1 | Selected entries from Smith's computerised dictionary of South Asian names   | 99  |
| 4.2 | Three stages of the South Asian name analysis methodology devised and employed in this study   | 104 |
| 4.3 | A page from Bradford's 1992 electoral register, illustrating how the names of South Asian electors were separated from those of Others   | 106 |
| 4.4 | Three stages of the South Asian name analysis methodology devised and employed in this study (revised)   | 127 |
| 4.5 | Regression for ward level 1991 Census count of Indians aged 18+ versus ward level name analysis count of Indians aged $\geq 16$ years and eight months from Bradford's 1992 electoral register | 129 |
| 4.6 | Location of clusters across the 32 study wards   | 145 |

## CHAPTER FIVE

- |      |   |     |
|------|---|-----|
| 5.1  | Base map of the study area  | 165 |
| 5.2  | Percentage distribution of Pakistanis in Bradford, 1991 Census                                      | 171 |
| 5.3  | Percentage distribution of Bangladeshis in Bradford, 1991 Census                                    | 171 |
| 5.4  | Housing occupied by Bangladeshis in the inner-city ward of Undercliffe                              | 172 |
| 5.5  | Percentage distribution of Indians in Bradford, 1991 Census   | 172 |
| 5.6  | Housing occupied by Indians in the suburban ward of Bolton  | 173 |
| 5.7  | Changes in the distribution of Bradford's Indian population, 1981 to 1991                           | 174 |
| 5.8  | Percentage contributions of non-White ethnic groups to Bradford's non-White population, 1991 Census | 177 |
| 5.9  | Current percentage contributions of religio-ethnic sub-groups to Bradford's Indian population       | 183 |
| 5.10 | Current percentage contributions of religio-ethnic sub-groups to Britain's Indian population        | 184 |
| 5.11 | Percentage distribution of Punjabi Sikhs in Bradford, 1991  | 188 |
| 5.12 | Percentage distribution of Gujarati Hindus in Bradford, 1991  | 189 |
| 5.13 | Percentage distribution of Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, 1991   | 190 |
| 5.14 | Percentage distribution of Gujarati Muslims in Bradford, 1991                                       | 191 |

5.15	Changes in the distribution of Bradford's Punjabi Sikh population, 1980 to 1991	195
5.16	Changes in the distribution of Bradford's Gujarati Hindu population, 1980 to 1991	196
5.17	Changes in the distribution of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu population, 1980 to 1991	197

## CHAPTER SIX

6.1	Asian marriage bureaux advertisements in Britain's South Asian press	212
6.2	Private matrimonial advertisements in Britain's South Asian press	213
6.3	The Hindu Cultural Society, 321 Leeds Road	222
6.4	The <i>mandir</i> or worship hall at the Hindu Cultural Society	223
6.5	The <i>Ravi Dass Bhawan</i> , Brearton Street	226
6.6	The <i>Sant Nirankari Mandal</i> , Napier Street	227
6.7	South Asian jewellers shop owned by a <i>Sunari</i> sample household head	234
6.8	Mini-market owned by a <i>Khatti</i> sample household head	234
6.9	Geographical distribution of 121 sample households by their <i>jati</i> or <i>varna</i> affiliation	239

## CHAPTER EIGHT

8.1	Position of the Punjab in the subcontinent	281
8.2	Location of Hoshiarpur, Jullundur and Ludhiana (the three main urban centres of the Doab region) within the Punjab	281
8.3	Percentages of first generation Punjabi Hindus entered in the longitudinal database by quinquennial period of arrival in Britain	282
8.4	Percentages of economically active Punjabi Hindu males in social classes I and II across stages of employment in each generational group	297
8.5	Percentages of economically active Punjabi Hindu males in social classes IV and V across stages of employment in each generational group	297
8.6	A typology of status security in the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's current Punjabi Hindu community	300

# Chapter One

## *Introduction, aims and structure of the study*

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND AIMS

Throughout its history Britain has been the recipient of immigrants. The distant past witnessed the arrival and settlement of several different peoples, including Celts, Anglo-Saxons and Normans. More recently, the 19th Century saw Irish, Jewish and Eastern European migrants coming to Britain, largely as refugees fleeing famine or persecution. In this century, the largest and most important influx has undoubtedly been that of migrant workers from South Asian countries and the Caribbean islands, who were invited to Britain in the 1950s and '60s to fill substantial gaps in the lower end of the labour market.

We now know that however temporarily these migrant workers may have planned their stay in this country on arrival, the vast majority settled permanently to form a significant part of the British population. People of South Asian origins in particular now represent the largest non-White faction living in Britain, numbering approximately 1.7 million persons or 3.1% of the British population. This South Asian grouping is comprised of socially and culturally distinctive ethnic groups of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians. Indians are the largest non-White ethnic group in Britain at approximately 840,000 persons or 1.5 % of the British population. Pakistanis, meanwhile, are Britain's third largest non-White ethnic group at around 477,000 persons (0.9% of the British population), and are only just pushed into this third place by Black Caribbeans, who have a British population of approximately 500,000 (Teague: 1993: 13).

Since its post war influx, Britain's South Asian population has attracted considerable interest from geographers. Much of this early focus was on determining some of the key characteristics of this population in terms of its size, geography and socio-economic position in British society (see, for example, Kearsley & Srivastava, 1974; Jones & McEvoy, 1978; Cater & Jones, 1979; Robinson, 1980a; 1980b). However, an equally important and interesting aspect of the Britain's South Asian settlers is their culture, and the cultural transformations that have occurred over the time/space shift embodied in their migration and settlement. In short, when South Asians came to this country they brought with them their own 'cultural baggage', and gradually, as they put down roots on British soil, this 'baggage' began to be unpacked.

During the early 1980s, my journey to and from school used to take me through the inner-city neighbourhood of Leeds Six. Then, as now, this was an area of substantial and concentrated South Asian population, and the clearly visible aspects of South Asian culture always caught my attention on that daily school run: a back-to-back terraced house painted white and converted into a South Asian place of worship; shops with indecipherable signs selling strange looking groceries and clothing; the traditional dress which South Asians wore as they went about their daily business. At that time, of course, I did not have much understanding of these things which I was witnessing, but they were interesting simply because they were different.

Increasingly, academics too have taken an interest in the cultural difference of Britain's South Asian community. This has been especially the case since the mid-1980s with the 'cultural turn' in the social sciences, as exemplified by writers like Gilroy (1987), Hall (1990; 1992a; 1992b) and Jackson (1987), who have encouraged an exploration of the interplay and overlap between the cultures of different ethnic groups and sub-groups. Inevitably, perhaps, it is the most visible elements of culture which have provided the main target for academic inquiry. Thus, things such as dress, religion, language and marriage practices have typically been the focus for studies of South Asian culture in this country. Indeed, a recent Policy Studies Institute (PSI) publication looks at all these highly visible cultural elements amongst South Asians living in Britain, as well as covering some which are less visible, such as South Asians' 'identification with Britishness' (Modood, 1997). However, amongst those studying the Indian Hindu sub-group of Britain's South Asian community, a less visible cultural element which has invariably been overlooked or sidelined is the caste system.

My interest in the caste system was triggered in a most unacademic fashion when I stumbled across an article whilst flicking through a friend's *Marie Claire* magazine. The story in question described the horrendous plight of low caste Hindu girls in India whose virginity was being sold by high caste Hindu priests. This was explained as part of the "inevitable sexual and economic exploitation of lower caste women by the upper castes" in the Indian subcontinent (Aziz, 1992). On the one hand, I was wary of this article, because it was portraying Indian social organisation, or the caste system, as being based principally on oppression. Such notions, especially when gleaned from 'coffee table' publications like *Marie Claire*, can be dangerous. This is because they can be used negatively to emphasise an alleged superiority of white British peoples and their social organisation over that of Indians (Inden, 1990); a supposed contrast of the civilised against the uncivilised and the humanitarian against the barbaric. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the article did set me thinking along the lines of: 'If the caste system can form the basis of social organisation for Hindus living in India, at least for

these low caste girls, then how does it manifest itself as a cultural and sociological trait amongst Indian Hindus living in Britain?'.

I was interested to know what exactly the caste system meant for Britain's Indian Hindus, and how this might have changed through the spatial and temporal shift embodied in this community's migration and settlement. When the opportunity arose to undertake a PhD, these fascinating questions seemed an obvious topic for research. This was further confirmed when a precursory analysis of academic literature (across all disciplines of social science) revealed that there had been very little investigation of the caste system amongst Britain's Indian Hindu community. Indeed, those who had dealt with the subject had usually done so as a passing observation, typically constituting a few lines or paragraphs of text (Lyon, 1972; Bowen, 1987; Jackson, 1981; Dwyer, 1994; Warriar, 1994; Michaelson, 1987; Knott, 1986; Vertovec, 1992; Shukra, 1994; Nesbitt, 1990; 1994). Only a handful of studies had purposely set out to examine the caste system amongst Britain's Indian Hindus in more detail (Michaelson, 1979; 1983; Knott, n.d; 1994; Tambs-Lyche, 1975).

For research to be manageable, its remit needed be narrowed down from looking at migratory changes in the caste system amongst Britain's whole Indian Hindu community. Consequently, the focus of this study was limited to Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the small amount of literature examining the caste system amongst Indians living in Britain (see above) focuses almost exclusively on the Gujarati Hindu community. By contrast, the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus remains an uncharted area of research<sup>1</sup>. Investigation into the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus would therefore deliver originality and develop genuinely new academic knowledge.

This leads to the question of why the caste system was studied in Bradford. Bradford itself is a medium sized city found in West Yorkshire in the north of England. It has a population of 457,344 (OPCS, 1993a: 890-1), 15.6% (71,319) of which is composed of non-White ethnic groups. Pakistanis account for 63.5% (45,280) of this non-White population and 9.9% of the city's total population, giving Bradford the highest concentration of Pakistanis out of all districts in Britain (Teague, 1993: 14). By contrast, Indians represent only 16.4% (11,713) of Bradford's non-White population, and a mere 2.6% of the city's population as a whole. This is a much smaller percentage than that seen in other local authority districts of Britain, such as Leicester and Brent, where Indians respectively account for 22.3% and 17.2% of the population (Teague, 1983: 14).

---

<sup>1</sup>The reasons for this are probably due to the much smaller size of the Punjabi Hindu population in Britain relative to that of Gujarati Hindus; a difference which is illustrated in Section 5.2.4.

There were two important reasons for choosing Bradford as the research location. The first of these was the fact that extensive background knowledge about Bradford's South Asian community could be quickly built up from a wealth of other studies which had been carried out there (e.g. Cater & Jones 1979; Ram, 1983; 1984; 1989; Ram & Phillips, 1985; Ram & Rees, 1985; Rees & Ram, 1987; Rees & Birkin, 1984; Singh, 1980; 1986; 1992; Singh & Ram, 1986; Kalsi, 1992; Bowen, 1988). Second, as noted above, the Indian population is relatively small in Bradford, and Ram suggested (1983; 1989) that Punjabi Hindus only accounted for a mere 9.2% of it, as compared to the larger sub-groups of Gujarati Hindus (41%) and Punjabi Sikhs (47%). Accordingly, it was felt that Bradford's Punjabi Hindu population would be an ideal size for the purposes of this research. It was large enough to warrant investigation, but small enough for any research project to hope to encompass the whole of the community, or at least a substantial proportion of it. In addition, the adoption of Bradford as a research location was pragmatic. It is a city close to Leeds which was highly convenient for regular fieldwork visits.

This study has a number of aims. The first of these is to provide a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the caste system, in terms of the types of social units from which it is composed, their historical origins, characteristics, and the ways in which they interact with each other to produce the 'system' itself.

The second aim is to show how different aspects of the caste system have changed over time and space, both in India, and in Indian Hindu Diaspora - which ranges from ex-colonies and protectorates (where Indian Hindus were originally transported as indentured workers) to Britain itself (where they were invited as migrant workers).

The third and fourth aims are closely related and represent the most important part of this study. Both focus on the Punjabi Hindu Diaspora in Bradford. The objective of the third aim is to determine the degree to which the caste system is present and operational amongst this community. The fourth aim is to assess how and why the caste system has changed for Bradford's Punjabi Hindus through the spatial and temporal transition embodied in their migration and settlement from the Punjab to Bradford.

As a piece of research grounded in the academic discipline of geography, it will become clear throughout this study that the above four aims are inherently geographical in their nature. Thus, discussion related to the first and third aims respectively deals with the caste system in the spatial context of India and Bradford. Equally, the second and fourth aims are especially concerned with change in the caste system from one spatial context to another. This may be within India and from India to various Diaspora contexts, as in the second aim, or from India to Bradford, as in the fourth.

## 1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY AND CHAPTER CONTENTS

The structure of this study closely follows its four main aims, as outlined in Section 1.1. Chapter Two presents a brief review of the etymology and applications of the term 'caste', as well as a detailed and critical appraisal of the various definitions of the term suggested by Indologists over the last century. On the basis of this discussion, a working definition of the term caste is created. This definition is then used to develop a simple framework for conceptualising Indian society. In line with the first aim of the study, the construction of this framework will be seen to reveal all aspects of the caste system; in terms of the types of social units from which it is composed, their historical origins, characteristics, and the ways in which these units interact with each other to produce the 'system' itself.

In Chapter Three, attention turns to the second study aim. Thus, it is shown how the caste system has changed in response to forces affecting it over time and space, both in India, and in the Indian Hindu Diaspora. Such an exercise provides an essential insight into the dynamics of the caste system, against which changes in the institution seen amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community (in later chapters) can be contextualised. The discussion begins by identifying how the caste system changed in India's historical past, with particular attention being paid to the era of the British Raj. Following this India based discussion, the focus turns to examining changes the caste system has undergone within the Indian Hindu Diaspora found in various countries across the world, including Britain.

In many ways, Chapters Two and Three could be considered literature reviews. However, it will be seen that they both go beyond a straightforward synthesis of the relevant literature. Instead, they use this literature to develop concepts and theories which improve understanding of Indian society and the caste system, and in doing so provide a contribution to the literature in themselves.

Chapter Four focuses on the various data types employed in Chapters Five to Nine of this study and explains how these were collected or generated, manipulated and analysed. It will be seen that a wide variety of data types have been used. Some of the most important include secondary data collected from the 1991 Census and primary data generated from questionnaires and interviews carried out on Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford. Data were also generated from participant observation amongst the city's Punjabi Hindu community and South Asian name analysis of Bradford's 1992 electoral register. Essentially, therefore, Chapter Four presents the methodologies employed in this study. Whilst many of these methodological approaches are quite traditional, in respect of the fact they have been used by other social scientists, some approaches could also be considered groundbreaking. This is particularly the case with the South Asian

name analysis technique devised to generate data from Bradford's electoral register. This methodology should be of considerable use to social scientists wishing to study ethnic groups, and represents one of the substantive academic contributions made by this study.

The subject of Chapter Five is the South Asian community, those ethnic groups within it (i.e. Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis), and religio-ethnic sub-groups within the Indian community itself. The task of this chapter is to provide an overview of these different groups and sub-groups in terms of their settlement history, population size and geography within Bradford. This provides an essential backdrop of information against which data relating to Punjabi Hindus in the city (the main religio-ethnic sub-group under scrutiny in the study) can be contextualised.

In line with the third study aim, Chapter Six uses qualitative and quantitative data to examine the presence and operation of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, both in terms of the social units from which it is composed, and its significance and role in the marriage practices, temple usage, traditional occupations and residential geography of this community. In line with the fourth study aim, some suggestions are also offered as to how and why the caste system has changed in these areas through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus.

Chapter Seven uses qualitative and quantitative data to assess whether the hierarchy of the caste system is present and operational amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford and, if so, to what degree. This fulfils the third aim of the study. In accordance with the fourth aim, Chapter Eight again draws on these qualitative and quantitative data to identify changes in the hierarchy of the caste system, brought about by the spatial and temporal shift embodied in the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Reasons are also suggested for these changes.

Conclusions are drawn in Chapter Nine. This begins by summarising and synthesising the study's findings. The spatial and temporal changes in the caste system, which are identified as having occurred through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, are related back to the wider issue of changes in the caste system occurring in other parts of Indian Hindu Diaspora, as presented in Chapter Three. Following this, the academic contribution of the study is considered. An appraisal of the study is also presented, along with suggestions for future research. Chapter Nine ends by assessing the future of the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford.

## Chapter Two

### *Defining caste and theorising Indian society*

*'It is much easier to say what caste is not than what caste is.'*

Taya Zinkin (1962)  
*Caste Today*

#### 2.0 INTRODUCTION

From early times there have been large movements of population into the Indian subcontinent. With these came new cultures, customs and religions. Today, few of these have lost their identity, all have had their influence, and many have found a permanent place in the mosaic of Indian life.

With such heterogeneity it is not surprising that India has evolved a complex social system comprising various types of demarcated, hierarchical units, which are unlike anything to which the West is accustomed. These social units have attracted various labels from the Indian peoples, such as *varnas*, *jatis* and *biradaris*; but most commonly, in English and other European languages, they have been termed 'castes'. Collectively, they have become known as the 'caste system'. In line with the first study aim (see Section 1.1), this chapter provides a comprehensive and accurate understanding of this caste system, in terms of the social units from which it is composed, their historical origins, characteristics and the ways in which they interact to produce the 'system' itself.

The chapter is divided into nine sections. Section 2.1 presents an etymology of the European term caste, whilst 2.2 provides a detailed critique of the various definitions of the word that have arisen over the past century. In Section 2.3, a working definition of the term caste is formulated for use in the rest of the study. Sections 2.4 to 2.7 focus on the Indian named social units of *varna*, *jati* and *biradari*. The origins and characteristics of these units are discussed, and it is determined which of them can be termed a 'caste' according to the definition laid out in Section 2.3. Section 2.8 synthesises the issues and themes discussed throughout the chapter into a simple framework for conceptualising Indian society, which is applied in the rest of the study. Conclusions are drawn in Section 2.9.

Much of the ensuing discussion about society in India draws on the work of white, Western Indologists - although work by natives of the subcontinent is not entirely ignored. This Western perspective is necessary because, as will be seen below, the term

caste originated in the West, and much of the available literature on society in India has European or American authorship. However, it is also recognised that some of this literature has inherent weaknesses. For example, Inden (1990) presents an extensive critique of Western studies that are focused on India and its peoples. He argues that much of this 'orientalist discourse' is unreliable because it describes an 'imaginary India', which is constructed intentionally by European and American scholars to emphasise the supposed superiority of the West.

This study avoids supporting Westerncentric works of this type. Furthermore, it strives not to replicate such colonial excesses in itself. Nevertheless, it must be accepted that any study of Indian society from a non-Indian perspective will inevitably be biased in some way. As regards using the literature of other Western Indologists, the best approach is to show a critical awareness of this bias and to compensate for it wherever possible. An example of this compensation can be seen in Chapter Three, where a significant amount of the literature cited in the analysis of Indian society in Diaspora is written by 'Westerners' with ethnic Indian as opposed to white origins, who are often part of that Diaspora itself.

The problems of being a white British researcher studying another culture - whether in India or Diaspora - must also be acknowledged, but it is hoped they can be tempered through the adoption of a sensitive ethnographic approach. In addition, there may be certain situations in which it is possible to capitalise on the bias of a Western perspective. As outsiders, Western scholars have a fortuitous objectivity, enabling them to develop a unique and alternative perspective on Indian society, which may in turn improve understanding of that society for all.

## **2.1 ETYMOLOGY OF THE TERM CASTE**

This section briefly reviews the etymology of the term caste. This provides a necessary and logical beginning to a chapter which is especially concerned with defining this one word.

### **2.1.1 Portuguese applications of the term *casta* in the 16th Century**

Apart from a few classical references (Arrian, Bk. VII. Chpt. 11-12. In: Robson, 1933: 335-41; Diadorus Siculus, Bk. XVII. Chpt. 102. 4-7. In: Welles, 1963: 412-15), Western knowledge of social organisation in India began in the 16th Century when Portuguese seafarers, trading on the west coast of India, named the units they perceived in Indian society *casta* (Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia, 1974, s.v. 'caste'). There is universal agreement that the English and French word caste is derived from *casta* (Dumont, 1970: 21; Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia, 1974 s.v. 'caste'; O.E.D.,

1989, s.v. 'caste'). At this stage, it should be noted that the term 'caste', and indeed *casta*, does not exist in any Indian language, and does not, therefore, denote any form of social unit to the peoples of the subcontinent.

In its traditional, **non-Indian** application the Portuguese term *casta* has always referred to 'tribes', 'races' or 'lineages' amongst men, as well as 'breeds', 'species' and 'types' of animals (Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia, 1974 s.v. 'caste'; Kalsi, 1992: 16; Killingley, 1991: 17; O.E.D., 1989, s.v. 'caste'; Pitt-Rivers, 1971: 234; Yule & Burnell, 1968, s.v. 'caste'). Thus, as Pitt-Rivers (1971: 234) suggests, the word has always conveyed the notion of "purity of blood". Accordingly, in using the term *casta*, Portuguese seafarers were "indicating what struck them most forcibly" about the social units they observed in 16th Century India (Klass, 1980: 27). Presumably, therefore, the Indian peoples were:

...concerned about maintaining "purity": that is, by forbidding sexual relations and marriage between men and women of different social divisions, (Klass, 1980: 27).

Further insight into what the Portuguese meant by *casta* in its 16th Century **Indian** application can be gleaned from manuscripts of the time. For example, Garcia de Orta's writings of 1563 show that *casta* was used to denote groups in Indian society characterised by hereditary occupational specialisation:

One thing is to be noted... that no one changes from his father's trade, and all those of the same caste (*casta*) of shoemakers are the same. (Garcia de Orta, 1563. Cited in Yule & Burnell, 1968, s.v. 'caste').

A decree of 1567 from the Portuguese Council of Goa also talks of commensal restrictions between the Indian *castas*:

In some parts of this Province (of Goa) the Gentoos [Hindus] divide themselves into distinct races or castes (*castas*) of greater or less dignity... and keep these so superstitiously that no one of a higher caste [*casta*] can eat or drink with those of a lower... (2nd decree of the Sacred Council of Goa, 1567. Cited in Yule & Burnell, 1968, s.v. 'Caste'. ).

Thus, when the Portuguese talked of *castas* in India, it would appear they were referring to social units characterised by purity of descent through endogamy, hereditary occupational specialisation and commensality. It will be seen below that these are characteristics which might be broadly associated with the social units the Indian peoples term *varnas*, *jatis* etc. Whether what the Portuguese had observed were actually *varnas*, or *jatis*, or indeed something else, is not clear. However, it can be said that a social unit characterised by endogamy, occupational specialisation and commensality was the earliest definition of the term *casta* in its Indian sense, and its later incarnation 'caste'.

### 2.1.2 English and French applications of the term caste, 17th Century to date

By the beginning of the 17th Century the term *cast* had entered the English language as a derivation of the Portuguese term *casta* in its **Indian** application (Dumont, 1970: 21). The current English spelling 'caste', which was rarely used before 1800, came from the French (Dumont, 1970: 21; O.E.D., 1989, s.v. 'caste'; Pitt-Rivers, 1971: 251), who were also using the word in an Indian sense by that time. After 1800 the term caste was regularly applied to Indian society in both the English and French languages<sup>1</sup>. Increasingly, however, this usage has been beset with problems surrounding the definition of the term and its translation into one of the Indian named social units.

These problems began with the French scholar Abbé Dubois, who in the early 19th Century made one of the first detailed studies of Indian society. Like other Europeans before him he recognised the Hindu peoples of India as being divided into a number of units, defined by the sociological criteria of endogamy, hereditary membership and occupational specialisation. He called these units castes. However, the Abbé's work set itself apart from earlier commentaries when he suggested that these Indian castes could be collapsed into four main castes known as *varnas* (Dubois, 1906). Unwittingly, the Abbé set in motion what was to be a growing wave of confusion in anthropological thought. By effectively translating caste as *varna*, he raised the question as to whether what all Indians understood by *varna* was what he (and other Europeans) understood by *caste*. Did, for example, the social unit *varna* equate with ideas about endogamy and occupational specialisation in the psyche of all Indian peoples? Semantic puzzles such as these were nothing compared to those which followed.

Since the work of the Abbé, there has been a rapid increase in detailed studies of Indian society, most of which have been published in English or French, irrespective of the nationality of their authors<sup>2</sup>. By 1946, therefore, Hutton suggested that 5000 published works discussing castes in an Indian sense already existed (Hutton, 1963: XV). Since then, it seems likely that this number may have increased several fold. Unfortunately, there has been little co-operative thinking to underpin this wealth of scholarship. As a result, there are no universally agreed definitions of the word caste, or translations of the term into one of the Indian named social units. This creates confusion.

The situation has been further complicated by the growth of neo-Indian applications of the term, which have been used to describe a variety of social groups and structures which are supposedly similar to those found in India. One of the first to do this

<sup>1</sup>The term became so well established in this sense that many Indians used it themselves; so much so, that Hamilton (1820) suggested that the word was native to India itself (see Hamilton, 1820. In: Yule & Burnell, 1968, s.v. 'caste').

<sup>2</sup>For instance, many native Indian scholars publish in English; see for example the citations of Srinivas, Majumdar etc. in this study.

was the 1920s Chicago ethnographer Robert Park. He applied the term caste to Negroes and whites in urban North America, where colour-bar and the absence of intermarriage between these two ethnic groups appeared analogous to the endogamy and hierarchical differentiation exhibited in Indian society (e.g. Park & Burgess, 1969: 722-3).

Subsequently, the term has been adopted by many comparative sociologists and applied in a similar analogous sense to describe social units in a number of countries, including the North American Deep South (Dollard, 1957; Warner, 1936; Berreman, 1960; 1979), Latin America (Reed, 1964; Rosenblat, 1954; Tumin, 1952), Japan (Donoghue, 1957; Ninomiya, 1933, Cornell, 1961; Wagatsuma, 1967; Smythe, 1952), Polynesia (Hocart, 1968: 74-126) and even Ancient Rome (Hocart, 1968: 127-31).

The above discussion has presented a brief etymology of the term caste. The following section examines the conflicting definitions and translations of the term which arose out of its Indian and analogous applications in mainly Anglo-French scholarship.

## 2.2 CONFLICTING DEFINITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS OF THE TERM CASTE

### 2.2.1 'Standard' versus 'Dumontian' definitions

Amongst the work of those Indologists and comparative sociologists who have defined the term caste in anyway at all<sup>3</sup>, a few key approaches can be picked out. At the broadest level, it is possible to draw a distinction between 'standard' definitions and 'Dumontian' or 'neo-Dumontian' types, which are influenced generally by the work of the French anthropologist Louis Dumont, and specifically by his seminal book "Homo Hierarchicus" (1970). The Dumontian approach represents a special case, because it avoids seeing caste as a term describing an identifiable social unit, preferring instead to view the word as conveying a more abstract concept. Dumontian definitions are dealt with later in Sections 2.2.8 to 2.2.11. For the moment the discussion concentrates on standard definitions, in which caste refers to a more 'concrete' and visible social unit.

It will be seen that standard definitions further subdivide into 'cross-cultural' (after Berreman, 1960: 120) and 'culturally-rooted' categories. This subdivision is a simplification designed to aid understanding and should not be viewed as exhaustive. Thus, there might be several standard definitions of the term caste which do not fit neatly into either two categories. In addition, this subdivision must not detract from the general lack of consensus over definitions of caste. Consequently, even within the two categories suggested below, there are unlikely to be two definitions which are exactly the same.

---

<sup>3</sup>Even if it is not laid out in a formal sense, some form of definition can usually be gleaned or implied from the work of those using the term caste.

The easiest way to understand the vast number of standard definitions which have arisen over the word caste is to envisage a number of available sociological criteria, such as endogamy, commensality, occupational specialisation, hereditary membership, political autonomy and hierarchy. Indologists and comparative sociologists appear to choose any number or combination of these criteria in the construction of their definition. Some criteria, such as endogamy, are usually taken first and more often, whilst others, such as commensality, are often left until last.

### 2.2.2 'Cross-cultural' definitions

The first category of standard definitions is taken up by comparative sociologists like Hocart (1968), Kroeber (1930; 1948) and Berreman (1960). These definitions typically rely on just one or two defining criteria, which are usually, though not always, endogamy and hereditary membership. Thus Hocart comes to the conclusion that:

...castes are merely families to whom various offices in ritual are assigned by heredity. (Hocart, 1968: 20).

Kroeber also adds endogamy to his definition, saying that:

A caste may be defined as an endogamous and hereditary subdivision of an ethnic unit...<sup>4</sup> (Kroeber, 1930: 254).

Although elsewhere Kroeber is even more perfunctory when he notes that:

A particular kind of class is caste. Castes are closed classes. (Kroeber, 1948: 276).

Berreman (1960: 120) mirrors Kroeber's 1930 definition when he implies<sup>5</sup> that a caste is "an endogamous division in which membership is hereditary and permanent".

Definitions of caste such as these, which are built upon one or two sociological criteria, might best be termed cross-cultural, because they are favoured by comparative sociologists who wish to use the word in its widest sense by applying it to societies other than just India (see Section 2.1.2). This might be viewed as the 'lowest common denominator approach', for by limiting the number of sociological criteria by which the term is defined, the social scientist maximises its potential applications. Consequently, caste becomes less of an ethnographic term referring exclusively to social groups in Hindu India, and more of a sociological and analytical one, which because of its simplicity and cultural abstraction can be applied to identifiable social units in areas as diverse as Ancient Rome (Hocart, 1968: 127-31) and 20th Century North America

<sup>4</sup>Kroeber continues by explaining how a caste occupies a position in relation to other castes, which is not taken here to be part of his definition of caste *per se*.

<sup>5</sup>It says 'implies' here, because Berreman's quote defines a 'caste system' in which these 'endogamous divisions' are clearly the 'castes' making up that 'system'.

(Berreman, 1960; 1979; Dollard, 1957; Warner, 1936; Park & Burgess, 1969: 722-3), as well as India itself. Berreman sums up the situation succinctly:

Cross-cultural definitions of caste are necessarily highly abstract, for the term may be expected to apply to situations as different as India and the United States, and to groups as diverse as the Burakumin of Japan and the blacksmiths of East Africa. (Berreman, 1967: 47).

This view is also supported by other social scientists (Bailey, 1959: 97; Barth, 1960: 145).

The use of the term caste in a comparative and cross-cultural sense is denied here. This is because it is untenable to see the social structures of diverse societies as being directly related. For instance, the social system of India and the Negro/white colour bar of the North American Deep South do not constitute the same thing, as some cross-culturalists believe (Dollard, 1957; Berreman, 1960; 1979; Warner, 1936). Whilst the former has a long tradition of social descent grounded in a religious and occupational heritage, the latter is born out of the identification of a phenotypically distinct ethnic group, and its subsequent oppression and exploitation by a dominant white majority (see also Pitt-Rivers, 1971: 242-3). It is, therefore, erroneous to conflate these two social systems by calling the recognisable social units in both of them castes, as though it were some all embracing cross-cultural term<sup>6</sup>.

The term might be applied to societies such as those in the American South if it was made clear that it referred to social units in these situations alone. However, this would require adjectival qualifiers such as 'North American castes' or 'Japanese castes', and would be an uneasy compromise. This aside, it is suggested that the use of the word caste on its own, without any qualifier, should be assumed to refer only to groups in Indian society, as this has become the 'common-sense' application of the term.

### 2.2.3 'Culturally rooted' definitions

The other category of standard definitions is culturally rooted in Indian (and usually Indian Hindu) society. Such definitions are favoured by Indologists who oppose the views of the cross-culturalists, and maintain that the term caste refers to an exclusively Indian social unit. This study is sympathetic towards such definitions because of the unsatisfactory nature of cross-cultural (see Section 2.2.2) and Dumontian types (see Sections 2.2.10 and 2.2.11). The culturally rooted approach therefore provides the focus for many of the remaining sections in this chapter, and as a result it receives special attention here.

---

<sup>6</sup>For other detailed criticisms of the Negro versus white caste analogy in the USA, see Simpson & Yinger (1965: 244-5) and Cox (1948: Chpt. 22).

Those supporting a culturally rooted approach usually make their claim for an India based definition of the term caste explicitly, either within their general writings or their definition of the term itself. Leach (1967), for example, explicitly lays out his beliefs in a culturally rooted definition of caste within the general text of his work:

I myself consider that, as sociologists, we shall be well advised to restrict the use of the term caste to the Indian phenomenon only. In what follows I shall therefore ignore the fact that some writers mean by caste only a special form of class hierarchy. (Leach, 1967: 9).

Bharati (1967), on the other hand, ties the 'indianess' of the caste into his actual definition of the term, when he notes that the matrix of caste:

...is part of the structure of Indian society; endogamy, commensality, and trade exclusiveness are the fundamental configuration of the structure irrespective of the proportionate strength or weakness of any of these three parts. (Bharati, 1967: 284).

The India connection in culturally rooted definitions is often made implicitly as well. First, because definitions of this type usually rely on three or more sociological criteria. This produces an opposite situation to that of cross-cultural definitions, because by increasing the number of sociological criteria from which a definition of caste is composed the social scientist minimises the potential applications of the term, and in most cases confines it to India alone. In addition, the nature of some of the sociological criteria that are used to define the term often have a strong Indian connection. For example, Benedict (1967) says that:

Taken as a strictly Indian phenomenon, caste possesses a number of characteristic features. These are:

Membership by birth.

Endogamy.

A Hierarchical ordering of castes.

Occupational specialisation.

An ideological religious basis involving restrictions on social intercourse and commensality.

Some corporateness of the caste group at least on a local level. (Benedict, 1967: 21).

It can be seen that Benedict begins by telling the reader explicitly that the term caste is culturally rooted in India, but this is also implicit in his definition. First, because the six sociological criteria which have to be met before a social unit can be called a caste narrow the applications of the term anyway; and second, because some of these sociological criteria are strongly connected to Indian culture. For example, commensal restrictions based on religious precedent are, according to the work of Indologists highlighted above and below, typically and sometimes exclusively Indian. As most culturally rooted definitions are similar in structure and content to Benedict's (see Ghurye, 1950; Dutt, 1931: 3; Niehoff, 1967: 151), the above argument can be applied to the general rather than the specific.

### 2.2.4 Variation and inconsistency in culturally rooted definitions

Although most culturally rooted definitions are similar, they are by no means identical. For example, Niehoff (1967: 151) includes ritual cleanliness amongst the sociological criteria which make up a caste, whilst Ghurye (1950) and Benedict (1967: 21) do not. This lack of consensus creates difficulties, for whilst there is little doubt over what a culturally rooted definition of caste is, there appears to be confusion over what combination of sociological criteria should make up that definition. Some have attempted to bypass this problem by producing a culturally rooted definition based on a 'checklist' of criteria to which a caste may or may not conform. An oft cited example of this is that of Hutton (1946). He claims that a caste **normally** conforms to the following:

- (1) A caste is endogamous.
- (2) There are restrictions on commensality between members of different castes.
- (3) There is a hierarchical grading of castes, the best-recognised position being that of the Brahman at the top.
- (4) In various kinds of context, especially those concerned with food, sex and ritual, a member of a high 'caste' is liable to be 'polluted' by either direct or indirect contact with a member of a 'low' caste.
- (5) Castes are very commonly associated with traditional occupations.
- (6) A man's [and a woman's!] caste status is finally determined by the circumstances of his birth, unless he comes to be expelled from his caste for some ritual offence.
- (7) The system as a whole is always focused around the prestige accorded to the Brahmans. (Hutton, 1946: 49 and Chpt. VI. Cited in Leach, 1960: 2-3 and Kalsi, 1992: 16-17).

Hutton's 'definition' appears to suggest that a degree of fluidity and choice is possible in the nature and number of sociological criteria that can be used to define the term caste, and that an exact combination of specific criteria is unimportant. However, a useful definition necessarily requires a fixed number of qualifying criteria with set characteristics. Optional criteria, such as those used by Hutton, are invalid, because they blur the core meaning of that which is being defined.

An additional problem with Hutton's definition is that criteria two, three, four and seven are not defining a caste *per se*, but are more concerned with describing the actual interactions between castes within a social system. Castes (whatever they are) and the interrelationships between them should be seen as separate phenomena. Consequently, the inclusion of sociological criteria such as hierarchy within a definition of caste becomes questionable. Hierarchy describes the interactions of one social unit with another, not the internal workings of a social unit itself.

The problem of varied and conflicting culturally rooted definitions would be easier to deal with if Indologists were at least consistent within the scope of their own work, yet even those who set out with a formal and rigid definition of caste often nullify their good intentions. For example, in his book "Caste, Class and Power", Beteille (1965) provides the reader with a clear definition of the term at an early stage:

To begin with, caste may be defined as a small and named group of persons characterised by endogamy, hereditary membership, and a specific style of life which sometimes includes the pursuit by tradition of a particular occupation and is usually associated with a more or less distinct ritual status in a hierarchical system. (Béteille, 1965: 46).

This definition is simple enough. Béteille is saying that a caste is characterised by four sociological criteria: i) endogamy, ii) hereditary membership, iii) occupational specialisation and iv) ritual status. Later on, however, Béteille suggests that Indian society is divided into a number of ordered segments, and that:

Since caste refers to a multiplicity of things, and not one single thing to the exclusion of others, it is legitimate to use the word "caste"... for each order of segmentation. (*Ibid*: 76).

It seems, therefore, that he is no longer defining caste simply as a social unit with the four criteria mentioned above, but has widened his definition beyond this level so that it can include a multiplicity of sociological characteristics, and thus refer to any level of social unit within Indian society, such that:

A caste may be seen as a segment [and presumably any segment] occupying a more or less specific position within a system of segments. (*Ibid*: 47).

Clearly, whilst Béteille's definition of caste is lucid at the start of his book, it later becomes unclear, ambiguous and confusing. This is another reminder that to be of any value in a piece or body of an individual's work, definitions must be rigidly adhered to throughout as well as strictly defined.

### **2.2.5 Introduction of 'subcastes' into the culturally rooted approach**

The problem of conflicting and inconsistent culturally rooted definitions of the term caste has been further complicated by the introduction of additional terms into the research field. For instance, many Indologists favouring a culturally rooted approach refer to 'subcastes' in their work (e.g. Morris, 1968, Chpt. 4; Ghurye, 1950; Srinivas, 1952: 24; 1955: 24; 1962: 3; Dube, 1955; Gough, 1960: 16; 1956: 826-9). However, there is even less consensus in defining the term subcaste than there is over caste.

First, there is an argument over whether it needs defining at all. Supporting such a viewpoint are those whom Mayer (1960: 6) calls the 'relativists', who see the terms caste and subcaste as size distinctions of what is essentially the same type of social unit. As Ketkar explains:

The words "caste" and "subcaste" are not absolute but comparative in signification. The larger group will be called a caste while the smaller group will be called a subcaste. (Ketkar, 1909: 15).

On the other hand, there are those who would maintain that caste and subcaste refer to different kinds of social unit with different sociological characteristics, each of which therefore requires a separate definition (Blunt, 1931).

Amongst those supporting culturally rooted definitions of caste there has been a lack of consistency regarding which of these approaches are favoured. This has occurred between writers on India, but also within a work (or the works) of a given individual. For example, Mayer criticises the works of Srinivas because they seem to swing from a non-relativist to a relativist understanding of the terms caste and subcaste. Thus, at certain stages Srinivas uses subcaste in a non-relativist way to refer to a "real unit" which is "endogamous" and, to some extent, "ritually and juridically autonomous" (Srinivas, 1952: 24. Paraphrased in Mayer, 1960: 8). Elsewhere, he adopts a more relativist approach, using caste and subcaste interchangeably to refer to the same type of social unit (Srinivas, 1955).

Even amongst those Indologists who appear to stick to a non-relativist stance, there is usually little evidence of a formalised definition of the term subcaste, or even a consistent understanding of the characteristics of this social unit (see, for example, Gough, 1956; 1960). Only a handful of Indologists present a clear definition of a subcaste which distinguishes it from a caste (see Mayer, 1960: 152). Finally, the problems surrounding the term subcaste equally relate to a number of other terms that have been applied to Indian society, such as 'marriage-circles', 'marriage groups' and 'endogamous kindreds' (see Section 2.7.1).

### **2.2.6 Summarising the culturally rooted approach**

In summary, it may be argued that it is not so much what terms are applied to Indian society (e.g. caste, subcaste, marriage circle, etc.), nor does it necessarily matter how many of these are employed by each researcher. What is important is that any terms that are used are clearly defined by the individual researcher and then applied in a consistent and rigorous manner. In this respect, much of the literature discussed above is weak. In addition, an agreement upon definitions is necessary between individual researchers. Until this "universal meaning and applicability of terms" (Klass, 1980: 88) is achieved, it is questionable whether scholarly opinions about Indian society can be exchanged with maximum clarity and understanding.

### **2.2.7 Conflicting translations of culturally rooted definitions**

As if the problems over culturally rooted definitions were not confusing enough, many Indologists have gone on to suggest that terms like caste and subcaste (however they have defined them) are directly translatable into the terms which native Indians

themselves use for the units they perceive in Indian society. Again, there has been little consistency in this. Killingley (1991: 8) and Gough (1960: 16) appear to favour translating the term caste to mean *jati*, whilst Morris (1967: 270) prefers to translate caste as *varna*. Conversely, Bühler (1886) regularly translates both *varna* and *jati* as caste, and it seems Bêteille (1965: 46) would support this approach. Equally, Mayer (1960: 152) appears to favour the translation of the term subcaste to mean *biradari*, whilst Morris (1967: 270-71) prefers it to mean *jati*. Clearly, there is as little agreement as to how these terms should be translated as there is over their meaning. Meillassoux sums up this problem succinctly:

We know that the term 'caste', which is of Portuguese origin, has no equivalent in any of the Indian languages. It refers at one time, only to the *varna*, at another, according to different authors, or even sometimes to the same authors, to the groups known in the vernacular as *jati*. (Meillassoux, 1973: 90; see also Pitt-Rivers, 1971: 236).

What is proposed here, is that terms such as caste and subcaste should denote a specific type of Indian Hindu social group in English and should therefore have only one equivalent in any Indian language, be it *varna*, *jati*, or *biradari*. In short, the current confusion over terms like caste in Indology would be linguistically negotiable if they had a consistent, culturally rooted, English language definition and a standardised translation. Most importantly, this translation should endeavour to equate meanings. Much of this chapter now devotes itself to this task. The first job is to establish a culturally rooted, working definition of a caste. However, before doing this it is necessary to look at Dumontian definitions of the term, which raise the question of whether it is valid to view the word caste as describing a visibly identifiable social unit at all.

### 2.2.8 Dumont's definition of the term caste

The publication of the English translation of "Homo Hierarchicus" by Louis Dumont in 1970 represented a watershed where definitions of caste were concerned. Initially, his approach appears to fit in with culturally rooted definitions because he supports the view that caste is an exclusively Indian phenomenon (Dumont, 1970: 215-16). In reality his proposals are more complex.

The main difference between Dumontian and culturally rooted definitions is his movement away from defining caste as an identifiable group of people with certain sociological characteristics. Instead, Dumont advocated a more holistic approach, which focuses on the observable social relationships and oppositions in Indian society in order to define caste. Thus he states:

...far more than a 'group' in the ordinary sense, the caste is a *state of mind* which is expressed by the emergence, in various situations, of groups of various orders generally called 'castes'. This is why the whole should not be seen by starting from the notion of the 'element', in terms of which it would be known through the number and

nature of the constituent 'elements', but by starting from the notion of the 'system' in terms of which certain fixed principles govern the arrangement of fluid and fluctuating 'elements'. (Dumont, 1970: 34).

Dumont was therefore suggesting that caste might be best understood as an ideological construct, based upon dual subordinations of spiritual impurity by purity and secular power by ritual status, which in turn gave rise to a hierarchical system of social groups. In short, he defined caste as something people 'do' rather than something they 'are' or 'belong to' (Searle-Chatterjee & Sharma, 1994: 9).

By adopting this stance Dumont was laying down the academic gauntlet; challenging Western Indologists to dispense with their "atomistic conception" (Dumont, 1970: 35) of Indian society because it was causing castes to be viewed as identifiable groups and, therefore, mistakenly converting "processes into things with essences" (Searle-Chatterjee & Sharma, 1994: 4). Instead, he was advocating a holistic and non-ethnocentric approach to the study of Indian society, whereby, in order to understand caste, the social scientist must leave the shelter of his/her own values so as to minimise the danger of projecting his/her prejudices onto the phenomenon s/he was studying (Dumont, 1970: 2, 33).

### 2.2.9 The popularity of the Dumontian definition

On its 1970 publication, Dumont's thesis was in tune with the times. Social scientists of that generation were keen to exorcise themselves of their own Westerncentric understanding of distant cultures and societies, and thus ward off accusations of 'intellectual colonialism'. This factor, coupled with the simplicity of the ideological reductionism in Dumont's approach to Indian society, ensured the considerable influence of his work in the field of India based sociology. As Quigley notes:

There is widespread agreement that the most important theoretical statement on the subject [of caste] in recent times has been Louis Dumont's *Homo Hierarchicus*... and a glance at any bibliography on caste will immediately reveal that the influence of this book has been unparalleled. (Quigley, 1994: 28).

Dumont's influence has often been evident when it comes to formulating a definition of caste. Thus, a significant number of researchers have adopted a Dumontian or neo-Dumontian approach by rejecting the concept of caste as a definable social unit. A good example of this is found in Michaelson's seminal thesis on caste amongst the Gujarati community in Great Britain. From the quote below it is almost undeniable that she is influenced by Dumont's work, even though she never admits it:

Rather than trying to define caste as a particular type of named or substantive entity, it is argued that we should look at the inherently processual aspects in the system of caste ranking and status group formation. The implicit theoretical basis of the argument presented here rests on the view that the relative rank of units in the caste system is

both expressed through, and defined by, the interactional relations and exchanges...The contention is that by focusing on the processes concerned... we are closer to an understanding of caste society than in trying to find an elusive catch-all definition. (Michaelson, 1983: 116-17).

Others have been similarly influenced by Dumont's thesis. Hence, Michaelson equates her view of caste with that of Pocock (1972), Khare (1970), Van der Veen (1972) and Parry (1979).

### **2.2.10 Critique of the Dumontian definition**

Despite the popularity of the Dumontian definition, and his approach to caste in general, many have also criticised it. Much of this criticism centres on the two oppositions which Dumont claimed were the basis of the ideological concept of caste; the subordination of spiritual impurity by purity, and secular power by ritual status. As Quigley (1994: 33-4) notes, the first of these oppositions has been shown to be less straightforward than Dumont would have others believe. For instance, whilst Dumont would argue that the utmost spiritual purity lies with high caste Hindu priests because they are closest to God, others would dispute this, saying that the priesthood is a defiling and polluting activity as it absorbs sin from others, and it is, therefore, those high castes who are not priests who hold the utmost spiritual purity (Fuller, 1979, 1984; Raheja, 1988a; Parry, 1980). Thus, it is not the superiority of spiritual purity over impurity in Dumont's definition of caste which is being questioned, but who possesses that purity.

However, it is the second of Dumont's oppositions - the subordination of secular power to ritual status - that has attracted most criticism (Burghart, 1978; Quigley, 1994; Raheja, 1988b). There is significant evidence to dispute his thesis in this respect. Dumont would claim that persons of low ritual status would always be subordinate to those of high ritual status, even if they had much greater secular power. In reality this is not the case. A number ethnographic studies have demonstrated that those with the greatest secular power can often maintain hierarchical dominance over others in certain situations, irrespective of their ritual status (Raheja, 1988a; Srinivas, 1959; 1962: 68-9; see also Section 3.2.2).

If both the dual oppositions upon which Dumont's definition of caste is based are as flawed as the above criticisms would suggest, then there is little to recommend it. Yet no matter how well founded the above arguments may be, the fact remains that they amount to criticisms of content within the Dumontian definition. The argument put forward by this study is that the whole structure of his definition is flawed because it denies the existence of human agency, and because it is inadequately constructed for the purposes of theorising Indian society.

First, Dumont's style of definition, and those similar to it (Michaelson, 1983), admit no human agency on the part of Indians who individually belong to castes, think and talk in terms of castes, and collectively act in the name of caste (Searle-Chatterjee & Sharma, 1994: 6. After Inden, 1990). The structure of his definition is therefore rejected, as it is argued that caste should not be seen as a nebulous, ideological concept. Instead, a caste should be viewed as an empirically observable social unit, the boundaries of which are demarcated by the interplay of its human agents. The researcher's task is to define that caste in terms of the sociological criteria s/he sees its human agents exhibiting within these boundaries, and not the boundaries themselves.

Second, the structure of Dumont's definition is inadequate for the purposes of theorising Indian society, which is its main purpose if it is to be of any use at all. It could be argued that a successful theorisation of this kind is best achieved with a 'bottom up' approach, starting with fairly straightforward definitions of social phenomena like caste (as in a culturally rooted definition) and building complex models and representations of Indian society from these simple beginnings. Dumont appears to be opposed to this, because he adopts a 'top down' approach. He opts for an all encompassing definition of caste which attempts to capture the full essence and complexity of Indian society in a few lines. He does not succeed, and this is because his task is impossible.

In short, Dumont and his imitators are actually trying to find that "catch-all definition" which Michaelson ironically admitted was "elusive" (Michaelson, 1983: 117). What Dumont develops is not a "catch-all definition", in fact it is barely a definition at all, just a series of statements (which many argue are flawed) about some of the abstract social processes, interactions and oppositions (such as secular power versus ritual status) which operate within Indian society. Clearly, these processes are important because they can affect the structure and configuration of this society, but they do not physically and visibly constitute this society or any of the social units within it.

### **2.2.11 Redressing the balance**

In contrast to the above, this study presents a culturally rooted definition which views a caste as an identifiable Indian social unit with a number of sociological criteria. Like most culturally rooted definitions it will not deny the existence of human agency, and will not conflate the processes and oppositions which occur between the units in Indian society (such as the secular versus the ritual) with the units themselves.

Such a definition might be criticised as being over atomistic. However, it is not intended to be all encompassing; Dumont has already shown the futility of that approach. It is merely a 'skeletal' definition of caste; a simplistic representation of reality, which,

unlike the Dumontian definition, is adequate for the purposes of theorising Indian society. Thus, it will be seen in the rest of this study that such a simple definition does not necessarily deny complexity, either in the social configuration of individual castes or the interactions between them. Indeed, it will be seen to provide the key to unlocking the real complexities of Hindu Indian society, both in India and, more importantly, in British Diaspora, where the social theorisation of this study is centred.

This study's approach to defining caste would not have been unusual before the publication of "Homo Hierarchicus". This can be seen from the large number of pre-1970 culturally rooted definitions outlined above, all of which view caste as an identifiable social unit. However, since the publication of Dumont's book such definitions have become scarce. There are three possible reasons for this:

First, as shown above, several Indologists (e.g. Michaelson, 1983) have adopted Dumont's approach themselves. Second, those who might have supported the view that caste should be defined as an identifiable social group may have shied away from presenting any definition or theorisation of caste at all, due to the added complexities that Dumont's work has introduced into this field. As Quigley explains:

Dumont's analysis raises so many problems that some have attempted to retreat from theory and restrict their studies to ethnographic description. (Quigley, 1994, p25).

There is something to be said for this idea of proceeding with ethnographic research and forgetting about definition and theorisation. There are, for example, a few excellent studies which examine the institution of caste amongst Indian Hindus in British Diaspora, but which divorce themselves from any extensive definitions and theorisations of a caste *per se* (see for example Kanitkar, 1972; Nesbitt<sup>7</sup>, 1994; Shukra, 1994; Dwyer, 1994; Knott, 1994<sup>8</sup>.) Nevertheless, if intellectual advances are to be made into understanding what castes are and how they operate, then both their ethnographic description and their theoretical abstraction and definition must be tackled together.

A final reason for the current paucity of definitions viewing a caste as an identifiable social unit may be that advocates of Dumont have discredited and 'scared off' any who might oppose his approach. For instance, Michaelson argues that definitions which view caste as a "supposedly closed and bounded structural unit..." are responsible for a "theoretical impasse" (Michaelson, 1983: 117). It is argued here that it is in fact Michaelson, other followers of Dumont, and ultimately Dumont himself who are really

---

<sup>7</sup>Nesbitt's work here concerns the *Valmiki* community, who are often viewed as Sikh as well as (or instead of) Hindu.

<sup>8</sup>The fact these works do not define caste firmly should not be taken to imply that the authors do not define it elsewhere, nor should it detract from the sound quality of the ethnographic data that these works present.

responsible for a "theoretical impasse", or indeed a "theoretical stagnation". This is due to 25 years of uninterrupted hegemony, in which Dumontian and neo-Dumontian approaches have pervaded most areas of Indology<sup>9</sup>. Such hegemony cannot be beneficial to any field of social science as it restricts access to a forum for alternative ideas.

### 2.3 FORMULATING A CULTURALLY ROOTED, WORKING DEFINITION

This section formulates a culturally rooted, working definition of the term caste. This definition will then be used in the following five sections of this chapter as a guide to establishing a meaningful translation of the term in the Indian languages. To begin, attention turns to the work of N.K. Dutt, a native Indian anthropologist of the 1930s. In his book "The Origin and Growth of Caste in India", Dutt produces a quasi-definition of the term caste (Dutt, 1931: 3).

Like other Indological works (Klass, 1980: 33; Hutton, 1963: 49), this study is attracted to Dutt's definition as it encapsulates the five sociological criteria most commonly associated with caste by those writing about it from a culturally rooted perspective. First, Dutt notes that, "castes can not have matrimonial connections with any but persons of their own caste"; i.e. a caste is endogamous. Second, he claims each caste has restrictions on eating and drinking with others; i.e. a caste is commensal. Third, he says that in many cases, "there are fixed occupations for different castes"; i.e. a caste is characterised by occupational specialisation. Fourth, he states that, "birth alone decides a man's connection with his caste for life"; i.e. a caste is an hereditary institution. Finally, he claims that a man can be expelled from a caste for the violation of its rules. This is to say that a caste has social and political control over its members.

Dutt also provides information regarding the hierarchical organisation of castes. However, this is concerned with highlighting inter-caste relations (not the characteristics of a caste itself) and such issues are dealt with in Chapter Three. As for his five caste criteria, this study is in agreement with these. Thus, a caste is a social unit in Indian society characterised by the following:

- i) Social and political control over its members.
- ii) Endogamy.
- iii) Hereditary membership.
- iv) Occupational specialisation.
- v) Commensality.

---

<sup>9</sup>Searle-Chatterjee & Sharma make the incisive point that "Dumont's ideas have exercised less hegemony among social scientists in India itself." (Searle-Chatterjee & Sharma, 1994: 2). Perhaps the fact that Dumont's ideas have been less well accepted by native Indian sociologists raises further doubts as to the validity of his approach.

This is the working definition of the term caste adopted in this study. A social unit must therefore conform to **all** five of these sociological criteria to be called a caste. The relative ordering of these criteria should be seen as fixed, reflecting the fact that criterion one is the principal determinant of a caste and criterion five is of least importance.

The proposed working definition of caste raises some questions and uncertainties. For example, it could be asked what makes its five defining elements so special? After all, their summation by Dutt and subsequent selection in this study is just another example of arbitrary choice from a wide number of possible sociological criteria (see Section 2.2.1). However, as noted above, Dutt introduces the five most salient criteria associated with the social unit and term caste by all those working from a culturally rooted perspective. Thus, many other Indological studies demonstrate an undeniable agreement with Dutt's summation (either in part or in total), giving it a universal appeal, and arguably making it "applicable to India as a whole" (Hutton, 1963: 49). For these reasons his five criteria are used here.

It might also be asked what justification there is for placing the five criteria in the order of importance outlined above. This is a decision based on the findings of other ethnographic studies of Indian society. The logic of this decision will become clearer throughout this chapter.

Finally, the working definition of caste might be criticised for basing itself on the work of a 1930s Indologist. For example, this study will show that some of the individual sociological criteria which Dutt attributes to caste have changed considerably for Indian Hindus living in the subcontinent and Diaspora. However, it is argued that such changes are probably best analysed using Dutt's 1930s summation of caste as it highlights differences over time.

## **2.4 USING THE WORKING DEFINITION TO CREATE A FRAMEWORK FOR INDIAN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW**

Having provided a definition of the term caste, the next task is to use this to establish some terms for the units in Indian society as recognised by the Indian peoples. The aim is to create a framework to aid understanding of that society. It should be pointed out that the terms 'Indian society' and 'Indian' are used specifically in the rest of this chapter to refer to those ethnic Indian Hindus living in India. Consideration of social organisation amongst ethnic Indian Hindus in Diaspora does not begin until Chapter Three.

In any investigation into the structure of an alien society, an obvious first step should be to inquire into the observations offered by the native people under scrutiny. Thus, as noted in Section 2.0, the Indian peoples usually recognise three different types of social unit amongst themselves, which they call *varnas*, *jatis* and *biradaris*. In Sections 2.5 to 2.7, the historical origins and sociological characteristics of these social units are explored in detail. At the same time, information from the latter of these exercises is used to establish the extent to which each of these units matches up to the working definition of caste elucidated above.

Essentially, therefore, this working definition is being used as a guide. Thus, the extent to which any Indian named social unit conforms to the five key criteria of a caste helps towards the proposal of a rigid definition and a standard term for this social unit itself, both of which can be used throughout the rest of the study. Once each type of Indian named social unit has been defined and named in this way, the results of this exercise can be drawn together to produce a simple framework for conceptualising Indian society (see Section 2.8).

It will be seen that most of the Indological literature which is used to examine the sociological characteristics of the different Indian named social units is derived from 1950s and '60s ethnographic and anthropological studies of rural India. Accordingly, the definitions of these social units which are developed in this chapter, as well as the final conceptual framework, are retrospectively grounded in this time/space context. However, there is good reason for this approach.

First, most Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford (the main focus of this study) came from a rural background in India, and began to emigrate to Britain in the 1950s and '60s (see Section 8.1). Setting the initial understanding of the Indian social units in the same time/space context therefore provides the maximum opportunity for analysing their sociological changes in the rest of this study. Thus, it can be seen how these units have altered in their social meaning and significance since the 1950s and '60s, both for Bradford's Punjabi Hindus (see Chapter Six), and, more generally, for Hindus in India and Diaspora (see Chapter Three).

Second, the majority of relevant and detailed information on the different units in Indian society derives from studies of the 1950s and '60s. Since that time, researchers in Indology have turned their attention away from this kind of enquiry, preferring instead to focus on the interactions within Indian society, along with other fields of interest such as Indian politics.

## 2.5 THE *VARNAS*

### 2.5.1 Overview of the *varnas*

The Indian Hindu peoples generally recognise the division of their society into four endogamous, hereditary social units or *varnas*. According to tradition, these *varnas* have a fixed hierarchy in accordance with their relative spiritual purity and consequent ritual status, or closeness to God. Each *varna* is also endowed with a traditional occupation or *karma* which reflects this purity and status. Thus, at the top of the *varna* hierarchy are *Brahmins* (with a *karma* as priests or teachers), followed by *Kshatriyas* (warriors/leaders), *Vaishyas* (merchants/traders) and *Shudras* (labourers/artisans).

Outside this fourfold social order is a fifth group of lower ranking persons, often called 'Outcastes' or 'Untouchables'. These people are too spiritually polluted to be included in the *varna* scheme. Their pollution stems primarily from the nature of the traditional occupation or *karma* which God has supposedly chosen for them. Typically, this would be a defiling activity such as cleaning latrines or tanning cow leather. The *karmas* and relative hierarchical positions of the four *varnas* and the Untouchables are set out in ancient Hindu scriptures like the *Rig-Veda* and *Manu Smṛti* (Law Book of *Manu*), emphasising the close association between the Hindu religious tradition and the *varna* scheme

Many conflicting theories have been put forward as to the origin of the *varnas* and their hierarchical ordering. Some suggest that they were present in the prehistoric 'Indus Valley Civilisation' or 'Harappa Culture' of northern India (Malik, 1987: 107; 1975: 76; Karve, 1961). A few favour the idea that the *varnas* were brought to India by Aryan peoples from southern Russia, who invaded the valley of the Indus in around 1500 BC and established a Vedic society lasting for the next 1000 years (Dumézil, 1958). Other Indologists adopt a compromise, and view the *varna* scheme as developing from the social interaction of Aryans and Harappans together in ancient India. The earliest theories of this type have been termed 'racialist' (Klass, 1980: 80; based on Senart, 1930: 169-74). Those proposing such theories (Risley, 1908; Dutt, 1931) maintain that the *varnas* arose from differing racial intermixes of white Aryan invaders and darker skinned, conquered Harappan peoples (or Dasas), who eventually closed ranks to form distinct endogamous groups (or *jus connubi*) and maintain racial pride.

Racialist theories have now been largely discounted, primarily because their implication that the human species was divided into biologically distinctive races - which remained intact until intermixing took place - rests on an unfounded pseudo biological notion of 19th Century anthropology. Second, it seems an untenable idea that a group of white Aryans could practice one way hypergamy with black Harappans, and then suddenly close ranks and become endogamous to effectively form a *varna* or 'class of

half breeds' (Risley, 1908: 263) with a distinctive skin colouring. Accordingly, many contemporary Indologists are looking towards alternative theorisations for the origin of the *varna* scheme. These theories still envisage the *varnas* as arising from the interaction of the Aryans and Harappans, but set this within the context of economic and socio-political developments in Vedic history (see for example Jha, 1991; Jaiswal, 1991). Yet whatever the origin of the *varnas*, the key point is that they are long established phenomenon in Indian society. Furthermore, their integral relationship with Hinduism, the oldest known religion, means they must have emerged many centuries before the birth of Christ.

### 2.5.2 The *varnas* in 1950s and '60s rural India: were they castes?

As noted in Section 2.1.2, the Abbé Dubois was the first to view *varnas* as castes. He was by no means the last. The Western stereotype of caste has usually been based on the classic Hindu description of the four *varnas* highlighted above (Srinivas, 1962: 69). However, most informed observers of Indian society agree that whatever their origin, the *varnas* have never been castes. Indeed, the whole *varna* model has produced a "wrong and distorted image of caste" (Srinivas, 1962: 66). To confirm this contention it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the *varnas* in 1950s and '60s rural India (the time and place under scrutiny, see Section 2.4) and see how closely they conform to the five sociological criteria of a caste outlined in Section 2.3.

Starting with criteria two and five, many 1950s and '60s accounts of rural Indian society noted that the four *varnas* exhibited endogamous and commensal restrictions, for it seemed that no two *varnas* would intermarry or eat together. Yet taking the first of these criteria, it could be argued that the *varnas* themselves were not truly endogamous bodies. Admittedly two *varnas* were unlikely to intermarry, but within individual *varnas* further endogamous subdivisions were observable. As Hutton explained:

All Brahmans do not intermarry [with other *varnas*], but there are many endogamous Brahman [units]. (Hutton, 1963: 66).

A similar scenario applied to the fifth caste criterion of commensality, since the members of two *varnas* were unlikely to interact in a commensal way. Internally, however, the members of one *varna* were likely to further subdivide into commensally restrictive social groups. Thus, Bêteille argued that:

In examining the rules of commensality we find that the whole of society is broken up into segments... In the broadest sense, the Brahmans together constitute such a segment, since commensality is by and large confined within it so far as the individual member is concerned. (Bêteille, 1965: 59).

But he then went on to explain that where commensality was concerned:

The broad Brahmin category is further segmented into Smarthas and Shri Vaishnavas... (*Ibid*).

It could therefore be argued that the four *varnas* did not truly conform to the second and fifth criteria of a caste because they were not internally endogamous or commensal.

The fourth criterion of a caste is occupational specialisation. As noted above, each *varna* has always had a degree of occupational specialisation which is related to the traditional occupation or *karma* laid down for it in religious scripture. A 'common-sense' view of Indian society might imply that these traditional occupations are always translated into reality, in which case all *Brahmins* would be priests. However, by the 1950s and '60s Indologists were recognising that the link between a *varna's karma* and the actual occupations of its members had become weaker. This seemed especially true for those *varnas* whose *karma* was narrowly defined, like the *Brahmins* and *Kshatriyas*. Thus, in his 1965 study of the rural Indian village of Sripuram, B eteille pointed out that:

The image of the Brahmin in the popular mind is of a person who lives by ministering to the religious needs of the people. This image, as we have seen, is rather divorced from the real position of Brahmins in Sripuram. In the village today there is only one Brahmin who acts as a *purohit* [priest]. (*Ibid*: 63).

Equally, other studies implied that members of the *Kshatriya varna* were highly unlikely to be warriors by this time.

In some (but not all) cases, therefore, *varna* members had involved themselves in new forms of occupation which were divorced from their *karma*. There may have been several reasons for the emergence of this rift. For example, Srinivas suggests that the Indian economic depression of the 1930s and '40s may have driven many members of the *Brahminical varna* into new professions (Srinivas, 1962: 54). Presumably, priestly activities could not provide an adequate level of subsistence for all *Brahmins* at this time. Equally, it seems likely that the opportunity for members of the *Kshatriya varna* to follow their *karma* as warriors and leaders would have declined sharply after the onset of British colonialism. Undoubtedly, these, and other reasons, could all be linked to growing Westernisation in the subcontinent (Srinivas, 1962: 51-5).

Despite the emergent disparities shown above, a few Indologists of the 1950s and '60s suggested that some of the new occupations being taken up by *varna* members could still be partly related to their *karma*. Hence, B eteille noted that:

Today many Brahmins in the *agraharam* have taken up what may be considered new occupations. There are several clerks and schoolteachers among them. But one can easily see that in the choice of new occupations they have retained a certain continuity with the past and have not departed significantly from it. By and large, the most important element in their style of living has been preserved in their new occupations.

No Brahmin has ever taken to any manual work in the real sense of the term. (Béteille, 1965: 64).

Many Indological texts of this period offer similar messages about the other *varnas*. Thus, *Kshatriyas*, whilst no longer warriors and leaders, were often shown as being involved in armed services employment, or assuming leadership roles in other occupational areas, all of which could be partly related to their *karma*. *Vaishyas* and *Shudras* were seen to fulfil the requirements of their *karma* even more often. This is undoubtedly because their traditional occupations, unlike those of *Brahmins* and *Kshatriyas*, are broadly defined; being merchant/trader and labourer respectively. For example, even if many members of the *Shudra varna* had effected a major job change, the chances are they would still have been involved in some form of manual work.

Thus, in 1950s and '60s rural India the *varnas* did have a degree of occupational specialisation. Most obviously this was in theoretical terms, in the sense that each *varna* was associated with a specific *karma*. In reality, however, only some *varna* members carried out their *karma* or had occupations partly related to it, whilst many others may have had occupations which were totally unrelated.

The third sociological criterion of a caste, as defined in this study, is hereditary membership. Thus, if *varnas* are castes, then any *varna* member, such as a *Brahmin* or *Kshatriya*, would always be able to trace his/her lineage through a long line of *Brahminical* or *Kshatriyan* ancestors. This has not always been the case, as Hutton clearly illustrates:

...the whole of the *Kshatriya varna* is claimed to have been extirpated by Parasuma, but if so it has been replaced by manufactured *Kshatriyas*, and in any case *Kshatriya* rank is claimed by many whose title is one of function or of creation rather than of inheritance. (Hutton, 1963: 67).

Similarly, Srinivas noted that numbers of people claiming and often accepted as having *Kshatriya varna* status actually had *Shudra varna* origins (Srinivas, 1962: 65-6; see also Majumdar, 1926: 156). He also reported that those persons in southern India calling themselves *Vishvakarma Brahmins*, and claiming *Brahminical varna* ancestry, were actually Smiths (*Acharis*) of the *Shudra varna* who had asserted their current *varna* status in pre-British India (Srinivas, 1962: 43, 67-9).

Clearly, by the 1950s and '60s *varnas* did not fully conform to the third caste criterion. Indeed, Srinivas went as far as saying that there were no genuine *Kshatriyas* or *Vaishyas* in peninsular India by this time, implying that these were both manufactured social categories. He argued that those claiming membership of such *varnas* had in reality more lowly (and usually *Shudra varna*) origins, but having bolstered their secular

power in the past, now sought similar aggrandisement of their ritual status through the *varna* idiom (Srinivas, 1962: 66). Such processes are explored more fully in Section 3.2.3.

Thus far, it has been shown that in 1950s and '60s rural India the *varnas* did not fully conform to the second, third or fifth sociological criteria of a caste, as outlined in Section 2.3. They were not truly endogamous or commensal (due to further internal subdivisions) and their membership was not entirely hereditary (as certain groups or individuals had no genuinely traceable ancestry in their supposed *varna*). They did, however, display a degree of occupational specialisation, both in theory and reality.

The final and most important sociological criterion of a caste is that of social and political control over its members. Indologists have had little disagreement as to the relationship between this phenomena and the *varna* scheme. Klass sums the consensus succinctly:

The *varna* itself, however, has no unity, no formal organisation, no leadership, and - most important - no control over its members. (Klass, 1980: 90).

This view is not surprising when it is considered that the membership of each *varna* runs into millions and spreads across the whole subcontinent. Indeed in the 1960s, even the *Brahmins*, the smallest of the *varnas*, would still have constituted 6.4% (Lamb, 1975: 148) of an approximate Indian Hindu population of 367 million (Government of India, 1967). Clearly, it would have been difficult for such a large and spatially diverse social unit to exercise any effective control over its members.

In summary, a *varna* did not equate to a caste in 1950s and '60s rural India, at least not when using the working definition formulated in Section 2.3. It is, therefore, necessary to provide a sociological term in this study, other than caste, for the social unit the Indian peoples call *varna*. It then remains to provide a rigid definition of this term, which should, of course, parallel any rural Indian understanding of a *varna* in the 1950s and '60s.

For simplicity, it is proposed that the term *varna* be used here as well. An informed definition of this term can be formulated by taking into account the detailed sociological characteristics of the *varnas* outlined above. However, it must also be recognised that the Indian peoples are unlikely to view *varnas* as concrete and visible social groups on the ground, for amongst other things they are (as mentioned above) too large for this. Indeed, many Indologists have suggested that for Indians, the *varna* scheme is more of a theoretical and abstracted way of viewing their society, rather than

an observable reality of everyday life. Thus, in 1955, the Indologist K.M. Panikkar suggested that the *varnas* were merely "sociological fiction" (Panikkar, 1955: 10).

Bearing these points in mind, a *varna* might be best defined as follows: 'A *varna* is one of the four theoretical and abstracted divisions of Indian society, which are hierarchically arranged and closely connected with the Hindu religious tradition. Each *varna* has a chosen occupation or *karma*, which may in some cases be fulfilled by its members. Although the members of two different *varnas* are likely to maintain endogamous and commensal restrictions with each other, the members of one individual *varna* may also maintain such restrictions between themselves'.

Henceforth, the term *varna* will be used in the sense outlined above. Because this definition has been formulated using evidence from 1950s and '60s ethnographic studies of rural India, it seems reasonable to suggest that it is an understanding of *varna* which most Indians would have subscribed to in this time/space context. As explained in Section 2.5.1, this retrospective approach to definition provides a platform for analysing sociological changes in the *varna* unit in the rest of this study. Thus, it will be seen how *varnas* have altered in their social meaning and significance since 1950s and '60s rural India, both for Bradford's Punjabi Hindus (see Chapter Six), and for Hindus in India and Diaspora (see Chapter Three).

## 2.6 THE *JATIS*

### 2.6.1 Overview of the *jatis*

If *varnas* are not castes, attention turns to the next level of social unit in Indian society, namely *jatis*<sup>10</sup>. Importantly, some of the literature cited in this section refers to *jatis* by another term, and typically this is 'castes'. However, the use of this literature in discussions about *jatis* is legitimate, as the authors in question often point out explicitly, or implicitly, that when they refer to castes they actually mean *jatis*.

There are many *jatis* in India. The exact number is not clear, but Kuper suggests 3000 may exist (Kuper, 1967: 238; see also Lamb, 1975: 140-3). Bearing in mind that a 1981 Census enumeration of India's Hindu population placed it at approximately 550 million persons (CSO, 1992: 33), it is easy to see that a *jati's* membership can run into thousands or millions. A *jati* may cover the whole of the subcontinent, a few regions, or a specific area with a common language, such as a state.

<sup>10</sup>These social units are also reported as being called *gnatis* in the Gujarat (c.g. see Michaelson, 1979; 1983).

Like the *varnas*, the *jatis* are often viewed as endogamous groups with a traditional hierarchical ranking in accordance with their relative spiritual purity and consequent ritual status, or closeness to God. Each *jati* is also endowed with a traditional occupation or *karma* which reflects this purity and status, although such occupations are more specifically defined than those of the *varnas*. The Indian names of many *jatis* describe their *karma*<sup>11</sup>. Thus, at the top of the *jati* hierarchy there are *Saraswats* (Family Priests) and *Anavils* (Landowners). Further down come *jatis* like *Khedaytas* and *Kapods* (Traders), and further down still there are many artisanal and labouring *jatis*, such as *Nais* (Barbers) and *Darjis* (Tailors).

These *jatis* are often viewed against the framework of the *varna* scheme. Thus, *Saraswats* and *Anavils* would be considered *Brahmins*, *Khedaytas* and *Kapods*, *Vaishyas*, and *Nais* and *Darjis*, *Shudras* (Michaelson, 1979: 351; 1983: 34-5). This is acceptable, because at one level the *jatis* can be seen as belonging to part of a larger *varna*. However, it is important not to be misled by viewing the *jatis* as rigidly fixed within the *varna* framework.

First, the *jatis* stand as a social hierarchy in their own right, and that hierarchy reaches beyond the limitations of the *varna* scheme to encompass the whole of Indian Hindu society. Thus, even the Untouchables, who are often regarded as a single and undifferentiated social unit, are actually divided into a number of hierarchical *jatis*, such as *Chamars* (Leather Tanners) and *Bhangis* (Sweepers). Again, it can be seen that the polluting nature of these *jatis*' traditional occupations or *karmas* reflects their lowly, 'Untouchable' position in society.

Second, and more importantly, the hierarchy of the *jatis* is dynamic and flexible, unlike the more rigid arrangement of the *varnas*. Here lies one of the dangers in concentrating exclusively on the *varna* scheme when trying to understand Indian society, for it gives a 'Dumontianesque' impression that all India is characterised by a traditional and fixed social hierarchy, which is determined by the ritual status of groups and individuals over and above their secular power. At the *jati* level, however, the secular is not necessarily subordinate to the ritual in considerations of hierarchy. In fact, the relative importance of the secular and ritual in determining social hierarchy can vary over time and space, and consequently the hierarchy of the *jatis* can too. This hierarchical fluidity is examined in Section 3.2.

The origin of the *jatis* is a subject of even more disagreement amongst Indologists than that of the *varnas*. This is partly due to a paucity of historical

---

<sup>11</sup> Although the name of the same *jati* may change from one linguistic region to another (Kuper, 1967: 238).

information about *jatis* in ancient Hindu scripture, as compared to *varnas*. Theories of *jati* origin can be categorised into three groups. First, there are those which are termed 'traditionalist' (Senart, 1930: 148-55; see also Klass, 1980: 80). Such theories suggest that the *jatis* are the products of mixed marriages between the four *varnas* which came to be regarded as new social groups. This equates to the traditional Hindu explanation for the origins of the *jatis* as found in some ancient religious texts (e.g. see *Vajnavalkya Smṛti*. 1. 90-6. In: Embree, 1988: 223). By and large, traditionalist theories have been treated with scepticism by Indologists (Lamb, 1975: 142). This is due to the naively simple account they provide of the formation of modern Indian society.

A second group of theories are those termed 'occupationalist' (Klass, 1980: 80; based on Senart, 1930: 156-68) or 'functional' (Majumdar, 1961). The earliest proponents of such theories were Ibbetson (1883; 1916: 2-4) and Nesfield (1885), who maintained that the *jatis* arose out of the gradual organisation of Vedic society into monopolistic guilds (see also Maine, 1887: 57, 219; Dahmann, 1899). Despite its popularity, the occupationalist approach has come under considerable criticism. For example, Senart (1930: 156-68) presents a detailed critique of the Ibbetson/Nesfield formulation. He argues first, that the members of a *jati* may be involved in a variety of occupations rather than just one, but that this does not detract from the hereditary cohesion of the *jati* group itself (Senart, 1930: 164), and second, that the members of many different *jatis* are quite likely to follow identical occupations without any movement towards forming a larger hereditary social unit (Senart, 1930: 165-6). Similar criticisms of the occupationalist approach have been voiced by Majumdar (1961: 291, 296), although some more recent Indologists still appear to favour the idea that occupational differentiation was the root of *jati* formation (Weber, 1964; Gould, 1971).

A third group of theories as to the origins of the *jatis* can be termed 'racialist' (Klass, 1980: 80; based on Senart, 1930: 169-74). These are an extrapolation of the ideas which view the four *varnas* as developing from the desire to maintain 'racial purity' throughout the Vedic era (Risley, 1908; Dutt, 1931. See Section 2.5.1). The *jatis* are seen to represent new *jus connubis*, which emerged as social groups broke off from the existing *varnas* to form further racial intermixes. The criticisms surrounding such theories are the same as those concerning the *varnas* and do not need reiterating here.

Three main approaches to explaining *jatis*' origins have therefore been identified. Most Indologists have ignored traditionalist ideas in preference for occupationalist or racialist ones, or, indeed, combinations of these two (e.g. Slater, 1924; Blunt, 1912; Chanda, 1916). However, in view of the many criticisms they face, it could be argued that none of these theories are valid. Indeed, this might explain why since Hutton's (1946) work - apart from a few exceptions (e.g. Klass, 1980; Gould, 1971) - there has

been little theorisation on this topic. Presumably, on seeing that all previous explanations of *jatis*' origins had been discredited, most Indologists have avoided the subject entirely and devoted attention to more profitable lines of enquiry (Klass, 1980: 83; see also Dumont, 1970: 30). Such a view is also taken here, as it is felt that further investigation into the origin of the *jatis* would not contribute to the core objectives of this study.

### 2.6.2 The *jatis* in 1950s and '60s rural India: were they castes?

In 1950s and '60s rural India, *jatis* (like the *varnas*) initially appeared to conform to the second caste criterion of endogamy, for they were often viewed by outsiders (those of other *jatis* as well as foreign observers) as indivisible marriage units. However, for the *varnas* it was pointed out that true endogamy was not present because of further endogamous divisions within them. The same rule applies to *jatis*, as Mayer (1960) illustrates in the quote below. Importantly, although Mayer talks of castes in this quote, he implies elsewhere that he is referring to what Indians call *jatis* (Mayer, 1960: 152-3). Thus, discussing a 'caste' (*jati*) as a social unit in the village of Ramkheri, Mayer observed:

In some ways this is nothing but a category composed of subcastes, rather than a group in its own right. For, though the caste [*jati*] is endogamous, the smallest endogamous units are the subcastes. (Mayer, 1960: 5).

Like the *varnas*, therefore, it can be argued that *jatis* were not truly endogamous, because they did not have internal endogamy.

The 1950s and '60s saw considerable interest in the commensal practices of *jatis* (e.g. see Mayer, 1960: 33-60; Hutton, 1963: 71-8). Attention focused on the rules *jati* members observed over the acceptance of food from those in other *jatis*. These rules were recognised as a physical manifestation of the hierarchical position different *jatis* held in terms of their spiritual purity and consequent ritual status. Thus, those of high ritual status (e.g. *Brahminical jatis*) were most unlikely to accept food from other *jatis*, whilst those of lowest status (e.g. Untouchable *jatis*) were more likely to accept food from anyone. Similar rules were shown to apply to the acceptance of drinking water or the sharing of a smoking pipe or *huqqa*.

In addition to commensal practices, the dietary restrictions of different *jatis* also received attention (Mayer, 1960: 44-5; Hutton, 1963: 77). Again, these were shown to be related in part<sup>12</sup> to the hierarchical position of a *jati* in terms of its ritual status. Those of higher status typically had more dietary restrictions, ranging from veganism and

---

<sup>12</sup>Dietary restrictions were not always shown to be related to ritual status in studies of this period (see Bêteille, 1965: 60).

teetotalism through to vegetarianism<sup>13</sup>. Conversely, the lowest *jatis* often had few restrictions, and would eat pork or even beef.

For the sake of brevity, the above discussion presents a very simplified account of the findings of 1950s and '60s Indologists in area of commensal practices<sup>14</sup>. The reality was more complex. For example, a given *jati's* rules for the acceptance of food varied according to the type of food being offered, whilst those governing the acceptance of drinking water, tobacco or pipes often differed again (see, for example, Mayer, 1960: 37-40; Hutton, 1963: 75-7). In short, each *jati* was characterised by a unique set of commensal practices which were principally manifest in the way it interacted with others.

However, as noted above, Mayer (in his 1960 study of Ramkheri village) recognised further endogamous subdivisions within *jatis* which he termed 'subcastes'. He pointed out that in terms of commensal practices, the persons from one *jati* took no notice of these subcaste divisions in another. In other words, different *jatis* would interact commensally with each other as a whole (Mayer, 1960: 157). Within each *jati*, however, he argued that nearly all the subcastes had their own individual commensal practices which restricted their interactions with each other (Mayer, 1960: 155-6). In view of this, it can be argued that the *jatis* did not have true commensality, because of their further, internal, commensal subdivisions

It has already been noted that each *jati* is endowed with a traditional occupation or *karma*; or at least there are a number of prescribed occupations which a *jati's* members ought to follow, and others which they should not practice (Harper, 1959: 760). Many ethnographic studies carried out in India in the 1950s, and earlier, described situations in which these traditional occupations were being exercised in reality, particularly in rural areas.

Typically these studies placed their observations within the framework of the Indian *jajmani* system, whereby a *jati's* members carried out their *karma* in practice, and in doing so were maintaining an historic and complex network of alliances and interdependencies with the members of other *jatis* which were based on the reciprocal exchange of goods and services in preference to money (see for example Wiser, 1936; Opler & Singh, 1948: 480; Lewis & Barnouw, 1956: 67). Thus, a member of the Barber *jati* might have cut the hair of clients in the Potter *jati* for free. These Potters would in turn be indebted to him for this service and would return gifts of pots.

<sup>13</sup>For the Hindu, abstinent practices such as vegetarianism and veganism engender greater ritual purity because they do not involve the taking of life. (For more detailed information see Mayer, 1960: 45).

<sup>14</sup>An analysis of the literature will also show that some Indologists have also tried to simplify the commensal practices of the *jatis* (Blunt, 1931: 90; see also Mayer's simplified commensal hierarchy, Mayer, 1960: 36).

The literature cited above might give the impression that this *jajmani* system applied to the whole of society in 1950s and '60s rural India, which would have meant that most *jati* members were carrying out their *karma* in practice. Yet in reality, the transition from subsistence to cash crop farming in the subcontinent (especially after the Green Revolution of the 1950s) resulted in the shift of many rural Indians away from their traditional occupations or *karmas* into cash crop cultivation (see Dumont, 1970: 96; and references to Orenstein, n.d; 1956. In: Harper, 1959: 776). Because of this there has been an increasing trend of *jati* members not carrying out their *karma* in practice. This would help explain why by 1960, Mayer was claiming in his village study that:

...only slightly more than half the populace are carrying on their traditional caste [*jati*] occupations, either part- or full-time... (Mayer, 1960: 76).

And that the main *jatis* still traditionally occupied were those connected with agriculture, whilst at the same time:

...agriculture has been the main outlet for... those who wish to leave less highly regarded traditional work. (*Ibid*: 78).

Thus, in 1950s and '60s rural India the *jatis*, like the *varnas*, had a degree of occupational specialisation. However, this was primarily in theoretical terms, in the sense that each *jati* was associated with a specific *karma*. The reality was less convincing, for whilst some individuals carried out their *jati's karma* in practice, others did not. This was particularly true in the case of non-farming, artisanal *jatis* in rural areas, whose members increasingly turned away from practising their traditional occupations to take up cultivation work on cash crops. Such developments weakened the *jajmani* system, because *jati* members newly recruited as agricultural labourers were less able to offer their traditional goods and services to others, whilst those who did still practise their traditional occupation needed to accept cash from such individuals rather than reciprocal goods and services. In such cases, *jajmani* interdependency would have been replaced by a more capitalist system of monetary exchange.

Even though many individuals strayed from practising their *jati's* traditional occupation in 1950s and '60s rural India, they could still fulfil the *karma* of their encompassing *varna*, provided it was broadly defined. Thus, an artisanal *jati* member who moved from traditional work into farm labour would still be fulfilling the *karma* of the *Shudra varna*. However, for those *jati* members whose encompassing *varna's karma* was more narrowly defined (e.g. those in *Brahminical* and *Kshatriyan jatis*), a move from their traditional *jati* occupation into agriculture would entail a move away from their *varna's karma* as well.

For the members of many *jatis*, the process of non-agricultural industrialisation in India has engendered further shifts away from *karma* related employment. However, such shifts were more likely to occur after the 1970s (as India entered a phase of rapid socio-economic development) and in urban areas. This issue is discussed in Section 3.3.3.

The third sociological criterion of a caste is hereditary membership. Unlike the *varnas* (see Section 2.5.2), there is no evidence in the literature to suggest that *jati* membership was anything other than internally derived and hereditary in 1950s and '60s rural India. In short, all a *jati's* members had a genuinely traceable ancestry within that *jati*. Nevertheless, this did not stop some individuals trying to claim ancestry in a *jati* of higher ritual ranking as a strategy for improving personal status, although Beteille (1965: 81) has demonstrated how attempts to do this were invariably unsuccessful. However, this should not detract from the fact that a whole *jati* could falsely claim hereditary membership of a *varna* of higher ritual ranking as a means of improving its overall ritual status in society (see Section 2.5.2).

The most important criterion of a caste is that of social and political control over its members. This was not a feature of the *jatis* in 1950s and '60s rural India. As Mayer points out:

...the caste [*jati*] has no mechanism for settling disputes, for adjusting the status of its members and so forth. (Mayer, 1960: 5).

This is hardly surprising, because as noted above (see Section 2.6.1), an individual *jati* may have a membership running into millions which covers a considerable area. As with the *varnas*, it would have been difficult for such a large and spatially diverse social unit to exercise effective control over all its members.

In 1950s and '60s rural India, therefore, a *jati* did not equate to a caste (at least not when using the working definition formulated in Section 2.3), because it fully conformed to only two of its criteria; namely, hereditary membership and occupational specialisation. Accordingly, it is necessary to provide a sociological term in this study, other than caste, for the social unit that the Indian peoples call *jati*. It then remains to provide a rigid definition of that term, which should parallel any rural Indian understanding of a *jati* in the 1950s and '60s.

For simplicity, it is proposed that the term *jati* be used here as well, and that it be defined thus: 'A *jati* is one of the thousands of hereditary and hierarchically arranged social units in Indian society. Each *jati* has a theoretical occupation or *karma*, which may in some cases be fulfilled by its members. Although the members of two different *jatis*

are likely to maintain endogamous and commensal restrictions with each other, the members of one individual *jati* may also maintain such restrictions between themselves.'

Henceforth, *jatis* are referred to in the sense outlined above. As with the term *varna*, the above definition of a *jati* has been formulated using evidence from 1950s and '60s studies of rural India. It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that this is an understanding of *jati* which most Indians in this time/space context would have subscribed to. Again, this retrospective approach to definition allows for an analysis of sociological changes in the *jati* unit in the rest of this study.

## 2.7 THE BIRADARIS AND OTHER SMALL ENDOGAMOUS GROUPS

### 2.7.1 Overview of the *biradaris*

In the search for real castes, attention turns to the smallest endogamous units in Indian society as recognised by the native peoples. No single term is used by Indians to describe these groups. Mayer (1960: 152) reports the use of the term *biradari* in Madhya Pradesh. Klass (1980: 92) claims the words *somaj* and *moljis* are used in Bengal (see also Klass, 1966; 1978), whilst *gol* (or *ghola*), *ekada* and *dhara* are reported as Gujarati terms (Michaelson, 1983: 153). In Sri Lanka, Yalman draws attention to similar groups called *pavula* (Yalman, 1962: 549; see also Yalman, 1960: 91-3). Given this variation, it is not surprising that Western Indologists have chosen to translate these terms in a number of ways. Some refer to 'subcastes' (Mayer, 1960<sup>15</sup>), others to 'marriage circles' (Michaelson, 1979: 354-9; 1983: 152-6<sup>16</sup>; Klass, 1980: 93; 1966: 954) or 'marriage groups' (Enthoven, 1922: 414), whilst in Sri Lanka, Yalman refers to *pavula* as 'endogamous kindreds' (Yalman, 1962: 548; see also Yalman, 1960: 91). For the moment, this study adopts the Indian term *biradari* to collectively refer to all of these Indian named endogamous groups, even where other terms have been used by the authors under discussion. This avoids confusion and makes particular sense, as *biradari* is a word used by Punjabi Hindus; the ethnic group under scrutiny in this study.

Most simply, *biradaris* are parochial subdivisions of a *jati* and for this reason they are numerous. However, more detailed observations show considerable variation here. For example, the literature demonstrates that *jatis* differ in terms of the number of *biradaris* they contain. It might be three (Béteille, 1965: 86<sup>17</sup>), four (Michaelson, 1979: 356) or more, whilst in a few cases a *jati* may only contain one *biradari*, making these two social units coterminous. This can occur when the *biradari* becomes so well

<sup>15</sup> Mayer also claims that 'subcaste' can refer to a *jati* or *jat* (Mayer, 1960: 152), but within his 1960 work he then uses the term 'subcaste' to refer exclusively to the *biradari* unit.

<sup>16</sup> Michaelson also talks of 'endogamous circles' (1983: 153) and 'endogamous sections' or 'subcastes' (Michaelson, 1979: 357).

<sup>17</sup> Béteille variously refers to what are clearly *biradari* type groups as: 'endogamous units', 'subcastes', 'endogamous divisions' and even 'castes' and *jatis* (*Ibid*: 73).

established that it is recognised as a *jati* in its own right (see Michaelson's reference to *Visa Halari Oshwals*, 1983: 154). The membership of the *biradari* also varies considerably from one to another, although obviously, it is generally smaller than that of its encompassing *jati*. Gough (1956: 829) suggests a membership of five to six thousand persons for a *Brahminical biradari*-like unit, and this seems to be a typical figure.

Most *biradaris* are hierarchically ranked within their *jati*. Like the *jatis*, however, this hierarchy can be based on the secular power of the *biradaris* as well as their traditional ritual status. Moreover, the secular and ritual can vary in their relative importance, giving rise to a flexible and dynamic hierarchy. This is examined in Chapter Three.

The origins of *biradaris* has attracted little discussion in the literature, although Enthoven suggests that they arose amongst certain *jatis* in the Gujarat as a practical protest by rural families against the hypergamous practices of town families:

The [town families] naturally did not care to give their girls who were used to the luxury of a city life to husbands who lived in the country, but they had no objection to brides taken from rural surroundings; and for a time the attractions of a city home made all families established in cities truly hypergamous to those who retained a rural domicile. But it was soon found that brides were scarce for rural husbands, and the revolt led to the formation of these marriage groups which are now in general in many castes [*jatis*] throughout the Gujarat. (Enthoven, 1922: 414).

Similarly, Michaelson (1983: 153) suggests that hypergamous relations within certain Gujarati *jatis* encouraged higher status families to demand exorbitant dowries for the acceptance of brides from those of lower status. The development of endogamous *biradari*-like units amongst these lower status families in the *jati* was therefore a means of tackling this problem, as it avoided interaction with superiors. (See also Pocock, 1954: 198-9; Van der Veen, 1972: 173-5; Parry, 1979: 262).

### 2.7.2 The *biradaris* in 1950s and '60s rural India: were they castes?

It has been established that *biradaris* conform to the second sociological criterion of a caste, namely endogamy. Like *jatis* and *varnas*, they are usually externally endogamous because persons from two different *biradaris* would not intermarry<sup>18</sup>. But unlike *varnas* and *jatis*, they do not contain further endogamous subdivisions. Consequently, the *biradari* can be viewed as exhibiting true endogamy, for it is a single and indivisible unit for the purposes of marriage.

<sup>18</sup>Sometimes, marriage unions do occur between *biradaris*, but if so these usually follow a well established hypergamous arrangement between two of them (e.g. Mayer, 1960: 156). Such an arrangement can of course break down (e.g. see Michaelson, 1983: 155).

However, just as the name of these small endogamous units differs from region to region in India, so too do the conditions of marital organisation on which they are based (Klass, 1980: 93). In the 1950s and '60s Indologists recognised two basic types of *biradari* marital organisation. The first of these was what Mayer (1960) called the "kindred of recognition". This was a unit in which:

...marriages are made and/or kin links can be traced through mutual kin. These two features tend to go together, for people will not make marriages with families about which they know nothing, and the information runs along kinship channels... The kindred of recognition is, in the instances I have recorded, a *de facto* endogamous body, for it contains enough people to satisfy the search for partners... (Mayer, 1960: 4).

He contrasted this with an endogamous unit described by Gough (1956) for the Tanjore district in southern India:

...where the definite number of eighteen villages forms an apparently *de jure* endogamous unit. (Gough, 1956: 829).

The *de jure biradari* therefore had quite strictly defined boundaries. It was composed of a select set of families of the same *jati*, residing in a specified number of villages in a given geographic area. The *de facto biradari* was more loosely defined. It constituted a network of families of the same *jati*, and radiating outwards from any given component family in that *jati*, who lay within a manageable distance of each other in terms of travel and monitoring (Klass, 1980: 93-5). Although these two types of *biradari* both involve aspects of territoriality and kinship in their organisation, there is no doubt that the *de jure* type is more associated with the former of these characteristics and the *de facto* the latter.

Many 1950s and '60s accounts of *biradaris* show them adhering to one of the above. Thus, Gough (1956: 829; 1960: 45) and Klass (1966) described *biradari*-like units which were more territorially based, and of a *de jure* type. Conversely, Srinivas (1954) and Yalman (1962: 552; 1960: 91-3) referred to more kinship oriented, *de facto* groups. However, it should be remembered that *de jure* and *de facto biradaris* were ideals, between which areas of middle ground could be found, resulting in more varied forms of marital organisation at the *biradari* level. Such differences were further complicated by the intricate variations in the internal marital regulations of *biradaris*. These regulations concerned the exogamy of the many types of sub-unit within them, such as *gotras*<sup>19</sup> (often referred to as 'clans'; see, for example, Mayer, 1960: 161), as well

<sup>19</sup>Within the endogamous *biradari*-type unit many Indian named, exogamous 'clanlike' units have been shown to exist, such as *nukhs* (e.g. Michaelson, 1983: 218) and *ataks* (*Ibid*; Barot, 1974). Within these, further exogamous and lineage related groups may occur, such as *kutumbs* and *kuls* (e.g. Mayer, 1960: 167; Michaelson, 1983: 262-3). However, the complex interactions between all these social units is not under scrutiny in this study, for detailed information on the subject see Mayer (1960: 161-83) and Michaelson (1983).

as specific rules concerning village exogamy, repeated intermarriage between families and widow remarriage. In short, both the *de jure/de facto* dichotomy, as well as variations in internal nuptial regulations, provided the scope for many subtle differences in the marital organisation of *biradaris*, both at the inter- and intra-regional level, and between and within *jatis*.

The *biradari* also conformed to the fifth caste criterion of commensality. Thus, Mayer (1960) demonstrated that most of the *biradaris* living in his study village had no (or only limited) commensal relations with each other<sup>20</sup>, and had no further commensal subdivisions within them (Mayer, 1960: 155-7). In many ways the commensal practices of *biradaris* were similar to *jatis*. Certainly, their individual regulations concerning the acceptance of food, dietary restrictions etc. were as diverse and complex. Similarly, where there was some form of hierarchical ritual status between the *biradaris* in a *jati*, the commensal interactions between them may have reflected this (Mayer, 1960: 156-7).

The fourth criterion of a caste is that of occupational specialisation. In 1950s and '60s rural India the *biradaris*, like the *varnas* and *jatis*, had a traditional occupation or *karma*. As with the *jatis*, the colloquial Indian name of a *biradari* often described this *karma*. However, this name was usually a prefixed version of the *jati*'s name, of which the *biradari* in question considered itself an endogamous subdivision, thus demonstrating that a *biradari*'s *karma* was often identical or similar to that of its encompassing *jati*.

These prefixed names served to distinguish between the different *biradaris*, and as such they often denoted their region of origin. Thus, Mayer (1960) refers to *Malwi Balai* (Malwi Weavers) and *Gujarati Balai* (Gujarati Weavers) (Mayer, 1960: 152), as well as other *biradaris* (Mayer, 1960: 156) whose prefixes all indicate a place of origin. On the other hand, prefixes sometimes described the *karma* of the *biradari* with greater specificity. For example, Beteille (1965: 85-6) referred to *Chozia Vellala* and *Kodikkal Vellala* as *biradari*-like groups within the *Vellala jati* of cultivators. Whilst the prefixed version *Chozia Vellala* indicated a cultivating group from the Chola region, *Kodikkal Vellala* literally meant 'Betel Vine Cultivators', and consequently this group's prefix defined its *karma* more specifically.

In theory, therefore, the *biradaris* had occupational specialisation in the form of their *karma*, which was either the same as, or a specialised version of, the one associated with their encompassing *jati*. But it was less likely that a *biradari*'s members all carried out this *karma* in practice. In Section 2.6.2, it was noted that by the 1950s and '60s many *jati* members in rural India had deviated from their traditional occupations, and had

<sup>20</sup>Commensal relations between two *biradaris* did sometimes occur (Mayer, 1960: 155), but as with inter-*biradari* hypergamy, such relations probably adhered to a well established arrangement.

subsequently turned to other work related to cash crop cultivation. As the membership of these *jatis* was necessarily composed of *biradaris* with similar *karmas* to those of their encompassing *jatis*, it is likely that *biradaris* underwent the same occupational upheavals. Thus, in 1950s and '60s rural India, the *biradaris* had a degree of occupational specialisation, but this was more in theory than reality.

The *biradaris* also conformed to the third caste criterion of hereditary membership. It has already been demonstrated that *biradaris* were often geographically circumscribed, in that they covered a specific area or number of villages; and socially circumscribed, in that they often contained a body of people known to each other. Beyond this lay those regarded as unacceptable for marriage relations by members of the endogamous unit. With these strictly defined boundaries it was practically impossible for any one group or individual from outside the *biradari* to claim membership without being noticed or challenged. In short, the only legitimate source of membership was internal or hereditary.

Finally, attention turns to a caste's most important criterion of social and political control over its members. Some 1950s and '60s studies of rural India describe the *biradaris* as having assemblies or councils<sup>21</sup>. Mayer (1960: 251-6) claims that these councils operated at various levels. The smallest was the 'village council', which was made up of all a *biradari's* members in a given village. This was followed by the 'kindred council' (which formed when large numbers of a *biradari's* members gathered together for a wedding or funeral) or the '*pankhera* council' (which was made up of a *biradari's* members from a number of villages). Finally, there was the 'provincial council'. These three different levels of *biradari* council were always headed by *biradari* leaders.

As noted above, each *biradari* had a complex code of marital, commensal, dietary and occupational rules in 1950s and '60s rural India. The key point here is that a given *biradari* was able to define and modify these rules meticulously through its different levels of *biradari* council (Klass, 1980: 101). In doing this, the *biradari* was effectively exercising control over the way its members conducted their day to day lives. Moreover, if a given *biradari* member failed to adhere to this control and violated *biradari* rules, then judgement, and where necessary punishment, was served upon him/her by these councils.

The three levels of *biradari* council usually dealt with different types of violation. This can be seen in Table 2.1, in which Mayer (1960) gives details on 45 cases involving

<sup>21</sup>These *biradari* assemblies or councils are actually called 'subcaste councils' by Mayer (1960: 251). They are not to be confused with official village councils (*panchayats*) with government jurisdiction, or unofficial, 'traditional' ones (Srinivas, 1959: 6); all of which have been described in detail (Mayer, 1960: Chpt. VI; Bêteille, 1965: 147-74).

individuals from his study village of Ramkheri in deliberations with their respective *biradari* councils. Mayer places these cases into nine categories, some representing violations of a *biradari's* rules, others more general *biradari* disputes. It can be seen that the village councils were more likely to deal with less serious things, such as breaches of a *biradari's* commensal rules. In this situation the punishment, if found guilty, might be a nominal fine (Mayer, 1960: 262). More serious cases, such as extra-*biradari* sex liaisons, carried greater penalties and were most likely to be dealt with by a kindred council. Klass (1980: 98-9) implies that the most serious punishment would occur when the rules of *biradari* endogamy were broken. Individuals contracting unacceptable marriages would face the punishment of 'outcasting' or expulsion from the *biradari*. This is particularly serious, because in a society where everyone belongs to an endogamous unit, expulsion places the individual in social isolation, because s/he is effectively barred from entering any pool of prospective spouses and finding a marriage partner. In such a situation the *biradari* would be effectively exercising control over its membership as well as its members.

**Table 2.1: Cases brought before *biradari*<sup>①</sup> councils by residents of Ramkheri village**

Subject of case brought before the <i>biradari</i> council	Village council	Decided by:	
		Pankhera/Kindred Council	Provincial Council
Cow-killing	-	3	-
Extra- <i>biradari</i> sex liaison	2	7	-
Intra- <i>biradari</i> sex liaison and prohibited degree of marriage	1	2	-
Purification of house	1	2	-
Prohibited commensal relations	7	1	-
Disputes between affines	4	2	-
Economic matters	2	3	2
Wider <i>biradari</i> policies	-	-	2
Others	2	2	-
<b>Total:</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>4</b>

①Again, Mayer would typically use the term 'subcaste' here instead of *biradari*.

Source: Adapted from Mayer (1960: 261).

In view of the above observations, it seems reasonable to suggest that in 1950s and '60s rural India *biradaris* conformed to the first and most important caste criterion of social and political control over members. Undoubtedly, this was because these units - unlike *varnas* and *jatis* - were relatively small in membership and spatially concentrated, thus allowing for a more effective implementation of self-regulation. Most importantly, however, if the English term caste pertains to a social unit defined by the five sociological criteria outlined in Section 2.3, then according to 1950s and '60s Indological literature the smallest units in Indian society - be they *biradaris*, *somaj*, *moljis* or

whatever - were surely castes as well, because they too have been shown to conform to all these criteria in the above discussion.

Adopting the word caste to describe *biradari*-like units in Indian society is a radical step, because it dispenses with all the other terms that have been employed by Indologists (Section 2.7.1). It may be radical, but it is probably sensible. Evidence above suggests that the kinship networks, endogamy and commensality encompassed within a *biradari*-type unit encapsulated the 'lifeworld' of any Hindu living in 1950s and '60s rural India. Thus, the *biradari* was the social unit in which all life was effectively played out, and as such represented the driving force of rural Indian society. It therefore makes more sense to apply the term caste to the *biradari* rather than to the *varna* or *jati*, as this was the level at which things really happened and mattered.


It might be asked why caste has been used to refer to *biradari*-like units at all, instead of employing Indian terms as with the *varnas* and *jatis*. In reply, there are firstly so many Indian terms for *biradari*-like units that the use of one of them would be confusing. Second, the use of the term caste, however defined, has always been a fundamental aspect of Indological literature. Its use here, albeit in a different sense to the norm, makes a positive contribution to this literature.

## 2.8 CONCEPTUALISING INDIAN SOCIETY

The above discussion can now be employed to create a framework for conceptualising society in 1950s and '60s rural India (see Figure 2.1).

For Hindus, this framework has three levels and types of social unit - namely the *varna*, *jati* and caste - which, it is argued, collectively constitute the 'caste system'. Within this framework or caste system the three levels of social unit are interlinked to create a 'sociological palimpsest'. Thus, an individual is at one and the same time a member of a caste, *jati* and *varna*; the former being the most visible and 'concrete' social unit, the latter the most abstract. These three types of social unit assume varying degrees of importance according to the situation in which an individual finds him/herself. In 1950s and '60s rural India the caste has been shown to be the most important unit in questions of marriage and commensality. But in a regional or national political context, the *jatis* and *varnas*, with their large membership and solidarity, may have been the salient social units of any power struggle. In later chapters it will be seen how these units have altered in their importance and function over time (since the 1960s) and space (through emigration).

Figure 2.1: Framework for conceptualising society in 1950s and '60s rural India



Obviously, the framework shown in Figure 2.1 is a simplification of reality, and is therefore subject to exceptions. By way of illustration, three such exceptions are highlighted here. The first involves the *jati* of *Kayasthas*, who according to Chelluri (1968):

...are regarded as Kshatriyas in states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh but Sudras in West Bengal... (Chelluri, 1968: 148).

In situations like this, the *jati* in question would have to occupy two different positions in the framework, each position pertaining to a specific region or area.

A second exception is highlighted by Bêteille (1965). In his study village of Sripuram in Tanjore he notes various levels of social segmentation amongst peoples of overall *Brahminical* status. Thus, in Table 2.2 it can be seen that the *jati* of *Smartha Brahmins* is subdivided into Telugu-speaking *Smarthas* and Tamil-speaking *Smarthas*. The Tamil-speaking *Smarthas* are then further divided into the social units *Vadama* and *Brihacharnam*, and these two are divided again into what Bêteille recognises as four small endogamous *biradari*-like units, or castes<sup>22</sup>; namely, *Mazhanattu Brihacharanam*, *Kandramanickya Brihacharanam*, *Chozhadesha* and *Astasahashram*.

**Table 2.2: Social segmentation amongst *Brahmins* in Sripuram**

Colloquial name of social unit	Number of Households	Number of Persons
Kannada-speaking <i>Madhva</i>	1	4
Telugu-speaking <i>Smartha</i> :		
<i>Konaseemadravida</i>	7	19
<i>Velnadu</i>	4	18
<i>Mulahanadu</i>	3	10
Tamil-speaking <i>Smartha</i> :		
<i>Brihacharnam</i> :		
<i>Mazhanattu Brihacharanam</i>	9	42
<i>Kandramanickya Brihacharanam</i>	5	13
<i>Vadama</i> :		
<i>Chozhadesha</i>	3	20
<i>Astasahashram</i>	1	2
Tamil-speaking <i>Shri Vaishnava</i> :		
<i>Vadagalai</i>	55	197
<i>Thengalai</i>	2	9
Temple Priests:		
<i>Bhattachar (Thengalai)</i>	1	2
<i>Kurukkal</i>	1	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>341</b>

Source: Bêteille (1965: 73).

<sup>22</sup>At one point, Bêteille also calls these small endogamous units 'castes', but then mistakenly refers to them as *jatis* as well (Bêteille, 1965: 73).

It is difficult to see how the multiple levels of *Brahminical* social unit in Table 2.2 can conform to the three levels in the framework for Indian society shown in Figure 2.1. The fact is they cannot. However, a given individual can only belong to one caste (e.g. *Chozhadesha*, *Astasahashram* etc.). Similarly, they can only belong to one *varna*, which in this case is *Brahmin*. All levels of social unit left in between must therefore be *jatis*. Thus, in some cases an individual may belong to a subdivision of a *jati* (e.g. Tamil-speaking *Smarthas*), and even a sub-subdivision (e.g. *Vadamas*). In such situations it would be necessary to add additional levels to the '*jati* part' of the framework.

Finally, the framework in Figure 2.1 implies that the hierarchical ordering in all three types of social unit, and hence the caste system in general, is based exclusively on ritual status. But it has already been noted (see Sections 2.6.1 and 2.7.1) that the hierarchical ordering of the *jatis* and castes may be affected by secular as well as ritual considerations. This issue is investigated further in Section 3.2.


Despite these exceptions, the importance of the above framework (or the caste system) for Indian society in 1950s and '60s rural India was visibly manifest through its spatiality. A number of Indologists carrying out research during this period noted that the social geography of rural Indian villages was often organised in terms of broad *varna* divisions, and within these, along the lines of *jatis* and sometimes even castes. For example, Gough (1960) produced a map of Kumbapettai village in Tamil Nadu State, showing the location of houses belonging to the different *varnas* and *jatis* in 1952 (the time of her fieldwork).

Gough's map (see Figure 2.2) shows that those houses occupied by persons from the *Brahmin varna* in the 'Brahman street' are clearly separated off from all other houses, which represent those affiliated to non-*Brahmin varnas*. Of these non-*Brahmin* houses, Gough has endeavoured to map their geographical distribution primarily in terms of their *jati* rather than their *varna*. Thus, the numbers next to dwellings (marked by the small squares) equate to those of different *jatis*. For example, houses marked '7' are those occupied by persons from the *jati* of *Konans* (Cowherds), whilst those numbered '15' are inhabited by *Ambalakkarans* (Fishermen). It can be seen that amongst all the houses affiliated to non-*Brahminical jatis*, there is a tendency towards the clustering of households belonging to the same *jati*.

Importantly, the geography of Kumbapettai village is also a physical representation of the position different *varnas* and *jatis* hold in terms of their ritual status in the caste system. For example, Figure 2.2 shows that those persons affiliated to the *Brahmin varna*, with a high position in the ritual hierarchy, live in a street at the very centre of the village where they inhabit "large, brick-and-tile houses". Conversely, those

affiliated to the *Devendra Pallan jati* (Landless Labourers), who would traditionally be considered Untouchables and would therefore occupy the lowest regions of the ritual hierarchy, are found living in "small mud-and-thatch shacks" on the southern periphery of the village, far away from the *Brahmins*. In short, the variations in ritual ranking between persons from different *varnas* and *jatis* who live in Kumbapettai are reflected spatially in terms of their residential location, and economically in respect of their differing qualities of housing (Gough, 1960: 18-19).

Figure 2.2: Gough's map of Kumbapettai village in the Tanjore District of Tamil Nadu State, circa 1952



Source: Gough (1960: 19).

## 2.9 CONCLUSION

After reviewing the etymology of the word 'caste' in Section 2.1, this chapter presented a detailed critique of the various definitions of the term which have arisen over the last century in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, a working definition of the term caste was formulated. Sections 2.5 to 2.7 focused on the Indian named social units of *varna*, *jati* and *biradari*. The origins and characteristics of these units were discussed in detail, and it was argued that *biradaris* would be best termed castes. Consequently, the term caste is now used to refer to *biradari* units throughout the study. In Section 2.8, the issues discussed in the rest of the chapter were drawn together to create a simplified framework for conceptualising societal structure in 1950s and '60s rural India. Since that time, the

nature and organisation of Hindu society and the caste system has altered, both in India and especially in Diaspora. Because the framework for conceptualising Indian society has been constructed retrospectively, it will be seen to provide an invaluable reference point for analysing these changes in following chapters, while at the same time, it be will open to reformulation and reconstruction in the light of them.

## Chapter Three

### *Temporal and spatial changes in the caste system*

*'Institutions do not die so long as they continue to meet important needs. And they do not last for centuries without developing great resourcefulness and powers of adaptation. The recent history of the caste system amply confirms these observations.'*

Bikhu Parekh (1991)  
*Times Higher Educational Supplement*

#### 3.0 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter Two, a framework for understanding rural Indian society in the 1950s and '60s was presented. It was suggested that this framework could be colloquially termed the 'caste system'. Chapter Three rejects a 'common-sense' view of this caste system which, it is argued, would typically view it as an immutable and inflexible institution. Instead, it is shown that the caste system is dynamic and adaptable because of the way it changes in response to different forces. It is this dynamism and adaptability which has allowed the caste system to remain a feature of Indian society over time and, most importantly, over space.

The chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 3.1 presents a critique of the 'common-sense' approach to the caste system. In line with the second study aim (see Section 1.1), Sections 3.2 to 3.7 then assess how the institution has changed in response to forces affecting it over time and space. This exercise provides an essential insight into the dynamics of the caste system, against which changes in the institution seen amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community (in later chapters) can be contextualised. Section 3.2 documents changes resulting from the British presence in the subcontinent, whilst Section 3.3 examines changes brought about in India's independence. Sections 3.4 to 3.6 examine how the caste system has adapted to forces in the non-British and British parts of Indian Hindu Diaspora. Conclusions are drawn in Section 3.7.

The chapter includes discussion on *varnas*, *jatis* and castes, the three social units of the caste system defined and named in Chapter Two. The literature cited to illustrate this discussion often refers to these units by alternative terms, most typically using the word 'caste' to mean '*jati*' (see also Sections 2.2.7 and 2.6). This literature is only used when the author in question makes it clear what type of social unit (as identified in Chapter Two) s/he is referring to when using these alternative terms.

### 3.1 COMMON-SENSE APPROACHES TO THE CASTE SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE

Popular or 'common-sense' accounts of the caste system typically consider it to be a Hindu institution constituting different types of social unit, such as *jatis*, *varnas* and *biradari* like units (i.e. castes), each with specific sociological characteristics like endogamy and/or occupational specialisation. Such accounts also view this caste system as having a rigid social structure, in which first: these different types of unit are arranged in a fixed ritual hierarchy, based exclusively on the relative spiritual purity and consequent ritual status of each individual *varna*, *jati* and caste in the Hindu religious tradition, irrespective of any secular power they might have; and second, in which smaller types of unit, like *jatis*, are ensconced within larger ones such as the *varnas*. Most importantly, the common-sense approach assumes that the caste system is an immutable and inflexible institution. Mitra (1994: 49-71) identifies most of the ideas connected with this common-sense approach, but prefers to see these as constituting an 'essentialist' account of the caste system. Nevertheless, the term 'common-sense' is adopted here, as 'essentialist' is generally understood to have a wider sociological meaning than that implied by Mitra.

A common-sense approach to the caste system is not simply attributable to the uninformed. Mitra (1994: 52) indicates that some of the ideas connected with it have been promoted by leading Indologists like Dumont (1970). Thus, the common-sense view that secular power is subordinate to ritual status in the caste system's hierarchy is very 'Dumontianesque' (see Section 2.2.10). Furthermore, both Mitra (1994: 53) and Parekh (1991) suggest that the common-sense conception of an immutable and inflexible caste system provided a focus of debate for competing political lines in India's freedom movement. Modernists like Nehru<sup>1</sup> saw the caste system as an unchanging institution, responsible for persistent social divisions in India. This was not conducive to creating the nationalistic unity necessary to further the cause of independence, and consequently modernists "declared war" on the caste system (Parekh, 1991). Critical traditionalists, such as Tilak<sup>2</sup> and Gandhi<sup>3</sup>, also took a common-sense view of the caste system, by accepting that it was immutable and had degraded the Indian population. By contrast, however, they argued that it had also held Hindu society together by creating a sense of unity. Thus, they believed that if the caste system could be purged of its more ugly features, such as ritual inequality, it could form the basis of a modern, independent and secular Indian society.

---

<sup>1</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) - Indian nationalist and first Indian prime minister from 1947-64.

<sup>2</sup>Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) - leader of India's nationalist movement in its early days.

<sup>3</sup>Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948) - key nationalist campaigner and principal negotiator with the British in the fight for Indian independence.

The above discussion demonstrates that the linchpin of the common-sense approach is the concept of an immutable and inflexible caste system. It is on this point that the conceptualisation of the caste system adopted in this study differs, because it is argued that the institution changes in response to forces born out of its surrounding historical context.

An historical period generates forces which affect the caste system. These might arise from religious movements; political, social and economic measures; technological innovations and general modernising influences such as industrialisation and urbanisation. Such forces may be internally generated (i.e. by the Indians themselves) or externally generated (i.e. by non-Indians, such as the British Raj), and they may also be intentionally or unintentionally designed to affect the caste system.

When confronted with these forces, the caste system has been seen to respond in either (or both) of the following ways. First, the whole institution, or more often an element of it, has either weakened or strengthened. Second, the caste system, or again a certain element of it, has adapted or reformulated itself. It may be argued, therefore, that the many aspects of the caste system which a common-sense approach presents as immutable and inflexible (such as the sociological characteristics of its constituent social units and the fixed ritual hierarchy of those units) are actually dynamic and adaptable.

Nevertheless, the process of change is highly complex, because the forces affecting the caste system alter both diachronically and spatially. A given aspect of the caste system can also weaken or strengthen in response to opposing forces arising from the same time/space period, whilst other aspects of the institution can remain unaffected. Furthermore, certain aspects of the caste system may regularly weaken/strengthen/adapt, whilst others may remain unchanged over long periods of history. Consequently, the caste system can be seen to encompass elements of both modernity and tradition at any one point in time (see Section 3.7).

Some of the earliest examples of change in the caste system are seen in the way it responded to various religious movements emerging during the 2000 years prior to British India; most notably, Buddhism, Islam, Sikhism and Christianity. These religions were opposed to the ritual hierarchy of the caste system. For example, the Islamic notion that all people are equal in the eyes of God does not fit in with notions of hierarchy, be they ritually based or otherwise. Consequently, at the high point of Islamic influence in the subcontinent, during the Turkish and Afghan invasions at the turn of the 12th Century, the ritual hierarchy of the caste system was weakened. A similar picture is likely to have emerged at the high points of Buddhism (under the third Mauryan Emperor *Asoka* - c. 272/3-232 BC), Sikhism (around the time of Guru Nanak, the founder of

Sikhism - 1469-1539) and Christianity (during the substantial European missionary activity of the 18th Century).

However, despite an initial weakening in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system at the peak of these religious movements, hierarchical notions always returned as strong as ever within the Hindu community. In fact, the caste system gradually adapted to these religions to the extent that it became synthesised within them. Hence, Gokhale (1976: 57, 129) indicates the existence of the caste system amongst Buddhist communities in Maharashtra as early as the first Century AD, and even today Sri Lankan Buddhists exhibit a fairly robust caste system (Harvey, 1990: 227-8). Equally, systems of social organisation similar to the caste system have been observed amongst Muslim (Barth, 1960) and Christian communities (Mitra, 1994: 56) in the subcontinent, and Sikh communities in India and Diaspora (Kalsi, 1992; Ballard, 1994a, Bhachu, 1985). This is not surprising when it is considered that many South Asians belonging to these religions were originally recruited from Hindus. Nevertheless, the fact that the caste system has transcended religious boundaries demonstrates the inherent pervasiveness and adaptability of the institution from an early stage in history. However, more significant changes in the caste system were brought about by forces unleashed in British India.

## **3.2 CHANGES IN THE CASTE SYSTEM IN BRITISH INDIA**

### **3.2.1 Overview**

The onset of British rule in India gave rise to a number of forces which changed the caste system substantially. An understanding of these changes, particularly in respect of the caste system's hierarchy, lays essential foundations for later chapters in this study. It would be a lengthy task to elucidate all the forces acting upon the caste system in British India, let alone all the changes which resulted from them. Accordingly, the focus is limited to the period 1858 to 1900. This represents the era of most effective imperial domination over the subcontinent, and a time in which the caste system was most affected by the British presence.

Despite the increasing control over India by The English East India Company from 1765 onwards, sovereign British rule did not begin until 1858. It was the Indian mutiny of 1857 which precipitated the end of the East India Company's control over India, as it had become clear that the success of the dominion lay with firmer rule. Power was thus transferred to the British Crown on the 2nd of August 1858. The new sovereign administration took steps to avoid the recurrence of mutiny. For example, there was a deliberate ethnic reorganisation of the Indian Army. A 'safer' ratio of white British to sepoys was fixed at 1:2, instead of the previous 1:5 (Spear, 1965: 146). Most

significantly, however, the British became more concerned about managing the caste system.

It became clear that much of the nationalist sentiment which had led to the 1857 mutiny had come from soldiers of *Brahminical* and *Kshatriyan varnas*, who made up the bulk of the Indian army. This element was therefore reduced, and individuals from more lowly *jatis* and castes were recruited to fill the resulting void. The aim was that no single *varna* or *jati* should again dominate the British garrison, thus avoiding any potential re-emergence of nationalist sentiment through intra-*varna* or intra-*jati* unity (Srinivas, 1962: 19; Ghurye, 1950: 175-6). This 'divide and rule' policy acted as a strengthening force on the ritual hierarchy of the caste system, because the mixing together of *jatis* and castes in the army brought them into closer contact with each other, and it is likely this served only to intensify their hierarchical antagonisms.

Aside from the deliberate policies outlined above, other forces set in motion by the British from 1858 to 1900 unintentionally brought about change in the caste system. One such force resulted from technological innovations introduced by the British. The latter half of the 19th Century saw the rapid growth of railroads, roads, canals, the telegraph, cheap printing presses and an efficient postal service. (Srinivas, 1962: 16; 1966: 46). These developments acted as a strengthening force on the whole caste system. For example, improvements in transport and communication promoted a horizontal consolidation of *intra-jati*/caste ties. As Srinivas explains:

A postcard carried news of a caste meeting, and the railway enabled members scattered in far-flung villages to come together when necessary, while the availability of cheap newsprint facilitated the founding of caste journals, whose aim was to promote the interests of their respective castes. (Srinivas, 1962: 16).

In addition, it is conceivable that these developments heightened *inter-jati*/caste awareness, thus encouraging antipathy and competition between castes and *jatis*, and strengthening the caste system vertically in terms of its ritual hierarchy as well as horizontally.

The 1858-1900 period also saw the growth of plantation agriculture. This demanded considerable labour which could not be fully provided by cultivating *jatis* or castes. Consequently, rural Indians practising non-agricultural *jati*/caste occupations or *karmas* often relinquished these following recruitment or indenture into cultivation work. This marked the beginning of the process outlined in Section 2.6.2, whereby rural *jajmani* relations have been weakened through the 'monetisation of rural services' (Mahapatra, 1962: 256). Thus, the development of the Indian agricultural economy in the later half of the 19th Century acted as a force which weakened the characteristic of occupational specialisation amongst social units in the rural caste system.

The most important changes in the caste system during the 1858 to 1900 period relate to the adaptation and reformulation of its hierarchical structure. These developments are now analysed in detail, as a full understanding of the hierarchy of the caste system is essential for comprehending discussion in Chapters Seven and Eight.

Section 3.1 established that a common-sense understanding of the caste system would view its constituent social units of *varna*, *jati* and caste as having a fixed ritual hierarchy, based exclusively on the relative spiritual purity and consequent ritual status of each individual *varna*, *jati* and caste in the Hindu religious tradition, irrespective of any secular power they might have. Thus, a *Brahminical jati* or caste would usually be considered to come at the top of this hierarchy, and an Untouchable *jati* or caste at the bottom<sup>4</sup>. This equates to the simplified hierarchical picture of the caste system given in the conceptual framework at the end of Chapter Two.

For the four *varnas* the above picture is relatively accurate, because in India their hierarchy has always been based on exclusively ritual considerations and more or less fixed (see Section 2.5.1). At the *jati* and caste level, the hierarchy of the caste system has always operated in this ritual sphere as well, but it has been equally based on secular power, which operates in the economic sphere (where the capital wealth of each *jati*/caste determines its hierarchical position) and the political sphere (where the hierarchy is based on the degree of political power each *jati*/caste wields). In short, the caste system has always had a tripartite, ritual, economic and political hierarchy at the *jati* and caste level<sup>5</sup>.

It is suggested that **prior** to sovereign British India, these three hierarchies were largely fixed and coterminous; that is, a *jati* or caste consistently occupied the same position relative to other *jatis*/castes in all three hierarchies. This was because those *jatis* and castes of higher spiritual purity used their superior hierarchical position in the ritual sphere to maintain a similar position in the other two. However, economic opportunities instigated by the British from 1858 to 1900 represented a force which triggered off an extensive sociological process, the outcome of which was adaptation and reformulation of the tripartite hierarchy in various selected localities across India. This process was complex, and consequently it now receives close analysis.

---

<sup>4</sup>Although some argue that individuals of *Brahminical* background who practise their *karma* as priests do not hold the utmost spiritual purity, because they absorb sin from others (Fuller, 1979, 1984; Raheja, 1988a; Parry, 1980; see Section 2.2.10).

<sup>5</sup>Srinivas (1962: 45) is the only Indologist who has come close to this concept of a tripartite hierarchy.

### 3.2.2 Changes in the economic hierarchy of the caste system, 1858 to 1900

A good starting point in this task is the work of Bailey (1957). In his study of the Biaspara area in Orissa, he documents a process whereby the fixed economic hierarchy of the caste system altered at *jati*<sup>6</sup> level due to economic opportunities set in motion by the British during the 1858 to 1900 period (see Bailey, 1957: 186-210).

Until 1870, persons from a number of *jatis* in and around Biaspara produced their own liquor in private home-stills. This created a low demand for liquor on the official market and rendered commercial distilling unprofitable. Consequently, those *jatis* in the locality who practised commercial distilling as their official *karma*, such as the *Boad* and *Ganjam* Distillers, had little capital wealth and a low position in the economic hierarchy of the caste system. They also occupied a necessarily low position in its ritual hierarchy, since their *karma* represented a polluting activity. It is likely that they also had little political power. Thus, the position of these distilling *jatis* (and indeed all other *jatis* in Biaspara) was fixed and coterminous across all three hierarchies.

However, in 1870, in its desire to increase excise revenue, the British administration made the production of liquor in home-stills illegal. Consequently, people were forced to patronise out-stills run by *Boad* and *Ganjam* Distillers. These Distillers soon operated a near monopoly in the liquor trade. This was due to an absence of competition, resulting from the fact that persons from other *jatis* were unwilling to engage publicly and commercially in the production and sale of liquor, since it was a polluting occupation (Srinivas, 1962: 18) - even though they might have once operated a private home-still.

Unsurprisingly, the distilling *jatis* made spectacular profits from their liquor sales. By 1910 they had already become the principal capital wealth holders in Biaspara. Accordingly, they raised their position in the economic hierarchy of the caste system. Meanwhile, their ritual status and political power initially remained unchanged. *Jatis* and castes in other localities of India, outside Biaspara, were similarly affected during the 1858 to 1900 period<sup>7</sup>. Such developments triggered a rearrangement of the economic hierarchy of the caste system in these localities, effectively making it fluid rather than fixed. Even *jatis* and castes which had been unaffected by economic opportunities often

---

<sup>6</sup>Bailey refers to 'castes' here, but it is clear that he means *jatis* when he refers to 'castes', and castes when he refers to 'subcastes'.

<sup>7</sup>Examples of *jatis* in other localities benefiting from economic opportunities afforded by the British include: the *Telis* (Oilmen) of eastern India, the *Noniyas* (Salt Makers) of Uttar Pradesh, the *Kolis* of coastal Gujarat and the *Kharwas* of Saurashtra (Srinivas, 1966: 90). Even some Untouchable *jatis* ameliorated their economic position in this way. Thus, Bailey describes how the *Ganjam* Untouchables of Biaspara became wealthy through the monopolisation of their polluting *karma* of hide trading, which became a more profitable activity because improvements in communications, instigated by the British from 1858 to 1900, provided them with a wider market than would have been available traditionally (Bailey, 1957: 159, 163).

changed their position in the economic hierarchy, as they were usurped or relegated into a lower position by those which had. This weakened the coterminous nature of the caste system's tripartite hierarchy at parochial levels, because for various given localities there was now disparity between the position of *jatis* and castes in the rearranged and now fluid economic hierarchy, and the fixed political and ritual ones.

As well as making the tripartite hierarchy more complex, such disparity also introduced flexibility into it. This latter point is illustrated by Srinivas (1962) from his studies of the Rampura area in Mysore<sup>8</sup>. Srinivas described hierarchical disparity within the caste system of Rampura, for whilst the ritual hierarchy was dominated by a *Brahminical jati*, the economic hierarchy was dominated by the *Okkilaga (Peasant) jati* of low ritual status. He indicates that in a ritual social context (e.g. conducting a religious ceremony), persons from the *Brahminical jati* occupied the highest hierarchical position in the caste system, because the ritual hierarchy was most relevant in such a situation. Conversely, in a more secular economic context (e.g. a money lending situation), those from the *Okkilaga jati* occupied the superior position, because the economic hierarchy came to the fore (Srinivas, 1962: 68). Thus, the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system became flexible, because the appropriate hierarchy - and hence the relative hierarchical position between *jatis* and castes - changed according to social context, and this social context altered over time and space.


In summary, economic opportunities instigated by the British during the 1858 to 1900 period were a force which encouraged the hierarchy of the caste system to reformulate and adapt at *jati* and caste level in various localities across India. Such reformulation involved the caste system's hierarchy moving from a simple, fixed structure to a complex, flexible and partly fluid one. This concept is easier to grasp in diagrammatic form (see Figure 3.1).

The impression given above is that only whole *jatis* and castes within a given locality were able to capitalise on the economic opportunities afforded by the British. But it is equally possible that these opportunities would have benefited only certain individuals in a *jati* or caste, rather than all its members. This would allow these individuals to raise their own personal position in the economic hierarchy, thus generating disparity and flexibility in the tripartite hierarchy at an individual level. However, it will be seen below that these individual improvements in economic standing were not as significant as those involving a whole *jati* or caste, as they did not possess the ability to engender subsequent positional changes in the ritual hierarchy.

---

<sup>8</sup>Although Srinivas' studies of Rampura were carried out in the 1950s, his observations still illustrate the point here admirably, and could easily be applied to events in the 1858 to 1900 period.

**Figure 3.1: The hierarchy of the caste system at *jati* and caste level, and its reformulation under sovereign British rule for a given locality**



### 3.2.3 Changes in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system, 1858 to 1900

The improved position of a *jati* or caste in the economic hierarchy of the caste system often resulted in it trying to raise its hierarchical position in the ritual sphere to the same level. This was attempted through a process called sanskritisation (after Srinivas, 1952: 30), which can be divided into two stages.

The first is where a *jati* or caste with a low position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system emulates the behaviour of one which is ritually superior. This mimicry is often based on that of a *Brahminical jati* or caste, although in theory the behaviour of any *jati* or caste which is ritually superior to the one seeking ritual aggrandisement may provide a model for approximation (see Srinivas, 1966: 7-8; Singer, 1964).

The term 'behaviour' is used in a broad sense, and consequently the action of 'emulating or approximating behaviour' encompasses a number of possible measures. For example, it might involve the adoption of customs, such as dietary restrictions and dress. Thus, Bailey (1957: 189) reports how the *Boad* Distillers in Biaspara adopted the dietary restrictions of *Brahminical jatis*, such as teetotalism and vegetarianism<sup>9</sup>, in an effort to enhance their spiritual purity and improve their position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system. Equally, Srinivas (1962: 43) describes how the *jati* of Smiths from southern India started wearing the 'sacred thread' to try to improve their ritual status. This was meant to be worn only by 'twice-born'<sup>10</sup> Hindus of higher ritual ranking. Other examples of how dress codes can be embraced in an attempt to improve ritual status can be found in Pocock (1957a: 26), Hutton (1963: 205-6) and the Census of India Report (1921: 231-2). In addition to approximating behaviour, a *jati* or caste which has a polluting *karma*, and which is attempting to improve its ritual ranking, may cease practising this traditional occupation wherever possible<sup>11</sup>.

Approximation of behaviour is only the first step in the sanskritisation process. The next stage involves the assertion of a *jati* or caste's ritual aspirations. This might be carried out overtly, where the *jati* or caste publicly claims ritual superiority over others which were previously equal or superior to it. It can also be done more covertly (and typically) through a modification of commensal restrictions. Thus, in Biaspara, Bailey (1957: 189-90) reports how the *Boad* Distillers asserted their aspired ritual ranking by refusing to accept certain foods and water from other *jatis* with whom they had previously enjoyed free commensal relations.

---

<sup>9</sup>Bailey (1957) usefully points out that in private the *Brahmin* may eat meat, and so too might the *Boad* Distiller, but this does not necessarily matter. "The point is that the new stereotype of the good *Boad* Distiller... like the stereotype *Brahmin*, is a vegetarian." (Bailey, 1957: 189).

<sup>10</sup>*Jatis* and castes belonging to the first three *varnas* of *Brahmin*, *Kshatriya* and *Vaishya* are called '*dvija*' or 'twice-born'. Only they are entitled to wear the sacred thread at the ceremony of *upanayana*, which is interpreted as a second birth (Srinivas, 1966: 8). The Smiths of southern India were considered to be *Shudras*, and consequently the wearing of the sacred thread was theoretically forbidden to them.

<sup>11</sup>In the case of the *Boad* Distillers in Biaspara, the move to stop practising their polluting *karma* was made particularly easy, as distilling was completely banned by the British administration in 1910 (see Bailey, 1957: 186-210). In other cases, the move by a *jati* or caste to discard its traditional occupation as a means of improving its ritual standing was sometimes met with opposition from other *jatis* and castes in the local community. See, for example, the case of the *Gauras* (Palanquin Bearers) in the Bihar and Orissa Census Report (1931: 267-8).

Another covert method of reinforcing superior ritual standing is through a change of name to one associated with a higher position in the ritual hierarchy. This only usually occurs with *jatis*, in which case the new name is invariably couched in *varna* terms rather than being based on the name of an existing *jati*. This represents the path of least resistance, because whilst a *jati* would face opposition if it tried to appropriate or modify the name of one which was ritually superior, it does not find it as difficult to rename itself using the more universal terms of *Brahmin*, *Kshatriya* etc. However, it can still distinguish itself from other *jatis* through the use of a prefix. Thus, Srinivas (1962: 69) reports how the *Bedas* of Mysore (Hunters) and the Smiths of southern India, who were both *jatis* of *Shudra varna*, changed their names to *Valmiki Brahmins* and *Vishwarkarma Brahmins* respectively. Significant name changes such as these are unlikely to occur with castes, as their ritual mobility is usually confined within the boundaries of their encompassing *jati*.

If the two stage process of approximating behaviour and asserting superiority over others is successful, then the *jati* or caste in question effectively raises or sanskritises its position in the ritual hierarchy. However, this can be difficult, because other *jati* and caste groups are likely to "reject the pretensions of any aspirant group or mock at them" (Bailey, 1957: 189). Accordingly, Srinivas suggests that a generation or two must usually pass before a claim to higher ritual ranking becomes accepted, because the people who first hear the claim know that the *jati* or caste in question is trying to pass for something it is not. Thus, the sanskritisation process is usually desperately slow and, if completed at all, it is typically the children or grandchildren of those who initiated it who first benefit (Srinivas, 1962: 57).

However, the main point here is that the economic opportunities which allowed ritually low status *jatis* and castes in given localities to improve their position in the economic hierarchy of the caste system during the 1858-1900 period, often had the knock on effect of engendering their sanskritisation, resulting in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system becoming more fluid in these localities. Thus, Bailey (1957: 190) demonstrates how the *Boad* Distillers in Biaspara eventually sanskritised their position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system, following their promotion in its economic hierarchy.

Unlike upward mobility in the economic hierarchy of the caste system, which could affect individuals as well as a whole *jatis* or castes, it is suggested that similar movements in the ritual hierarchy could only involve a whole *jati* or caste, as only a social unit of this type possessed a large enough number of persons to attempt the sanskritisation process.

### 3.2.4 Changes in the political hierarchy of the caste system, 1858 to 1900

Whilst economic opportunities afforded by the British allowed some *jatis* and castes to raise their position in the economic and subsequently the ritual hierarchy of the caste system, such moves were often accompanied by a rise in the political hierarchy. Thus, Bailey suggested that the *jati* of *Boad* Distillers increased their political standing, and that this was reflected in their greater involvement and influence in the village council or *panchayat*, a body with juridical, legislative and executive functions (Bailey, 1957: 191-7). In their case, Bailey implies that upward mobility in the economic hierarchy of the caste system was followed by similar mobility in the political and then ritual spheres:

Their increased wealth makes them politically more effective, and this enables them to enhance their ritual standing... (Bailey, 1957: 197).

This could be misinterpreted as meaning that upward mobility in the caste system follows a set sequence, with increases in the economic hierarchy always leading to subsequent improvements in political and then ritual ranking. This is not necessarily true. Indeed, an initial rise in the political hierarchy could be followed by economic improvement. Alternatively, a rise in the economic hierarchy need not lead to any political advancement, and vice versa.

However, it can be said that the positional improvement of a caste or *jati* in either/both the economic or political hierarchies (i.e. the secular sphere) has often led to an attempt to improve its position in the ritual hierarchy through sanskritisation. Only in recent years has this situation begun to change, where the overall importance of the ritual hierarchy has declined in importance relative to the economic and political. Such a decline will be seen to be a particularly important development where the caste system is found in Diaspora (see Sections 3.5.2, 3.5.3 and 8.3.4). It also follows, that in those cases where a *jati* or caste's ritual ranking is high, and its position in the economic and/or political hierarchy is low, it will attempt to improve its economic and/or political standing.

A final point is that like mobility in the economic sphere, improvements in the political hierarchy during the 1858 to 1900 period could affect the individual as well as the whole *jati* or caste. Indeed, it will be seen that individual movements such as these have become particularly important in both the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system in modern India and Diaspora.

### 3.2.5 Summary of the changes in the caste system in British India

In summary, between 1858 and 1900 British rule over India generated a number of forces which brought about significant change in the caste system. For example,

technological innovations introduced by the British during this period had a strengthening influence on the caste system and its ritual hierarchy, by increasing human contact at both the intra- and inter-*jati*/caste level. Equally, the growth of British run plantations weakened the sociological characteristic of occupational specialisation or *karma* amongst non-agricultural *jatis* and castes. At the same time, forces emanating from the economic opportunities bestowed on certain Indians by the British engendered localised reformulation and adaptation of the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system.

Most of these forces brought about by the British were unintentional. Only once did the Raj administration purposefully set out to strengthen the ritual hierarchy of the caste system through a reorganisation of the Indian army after the 1857 mutiny. However, whether intentional or unintentional, the important point is that these forces themselves all generated some form of change in the institution, and in doing so demonstrated that it was a dynamic and adaptable entity. Clearly, the common-sense view of the caste system as being immutable and inflexible did not hold in British India.

### **3.3 CHANGES IN THE CASTE SYSTEM IN INDEPENDENT INDIA**

#### **3.3.1 Overview**

Since the granting of Indian independence in 1947, there have been a number of changes in the caste system. Many of the forces affecting the institution in previous periods, such as the growth of technological innovations and the continuing rise of plantation agriculture, were still gaining in importance at this time, and consequently the changes resulting from these developments were still occurring. At the same time, several new forces began to emerge. These were principally generated from within India, rather than by an external body like the British. Some of these forces, such as those arising from India's constitutional reform, were intentionally designed to bring about change in the caste system, but others were not.

#### **3.3.2 Changes resulting from constitutional reform**

A major force affecting the caste system in the independence years arrived with the new Indian constitution of 1950. This abolished Untouchability (Article 17) and prohibited all forms of discrimination against Untouchables (Articles 15 and 29). In 1955 these reforms were given teeth when an Untouchability Offences Act was passed. In theory, this provided severe penalties for those found guilty of discrimination (Lamb, 1975: 151; Srinivas, 1962: 39).

These constitutional reforms encouraged further adaptation and reformulation of the caste system's tripartite hierarchy. For example, Article 15 expressly forbade the exclusion of Untouchables from places of religious worship. This helped introduce

greater fluidity into the ritual hierarchy of the caste system as Untouchables now had (in theory) equal access to God. In reality, however, it was still extremely difficult for an Untouchable *jati* or caste to sanskritise its ritual ranking.

Article 29 of the Indian constitution also forbade the widespread practice of excluding Untouchables from educational institutions (Lamb, 1975: 151). As a result, funds were set aside to provide higher education scholarships for Untouchables (Lamb, 1975: 152). This widening of educational opportunities, coupled with the abolition of discriminatory employment practices, increased the possibilities for ritually low ranking Untouchables to improve their position in the economic hierarchy. Again, such developments helped stimulate further reformulation of the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system.

Other constitutional reforms included the enfranchisement of adult Untouchables and special representations for them in government. Thus, 77 out of 521 seats in the lower Parliament (*Lok Sabha*) were reserved for Untouchables (Srinivas, 1962: 39; Lamb, 1975: 151). These reforms introduced greater fluidity into the political hierarchy of the caste system, by making it possible for persons from Untouchable *jatis* or castes to obtain high political standing. Hence, in 1962, the Untouchable politician D. Sanjivayya was chosen as president of the Congress Party (Lamb, 1975: 151-2).

In summary, constitutional reforms were the outcome of persistent campaigning for the equal rights of Untouchables by leaders like Ambedkar<sup>12</sup>. However, the degree of change which these reforms engendered in the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system must be interpreted with caution. It will be seen below that Untouchables can still face severe discrimination today, and that reforms have been slow to take hold in more rural areas (see Section 3.3.5). Accordingly, the tripartite hierarchy remains in a fixed and coterminous form for large numbers of Indians, with Untouchables often maintaining their traditionally low, ritual, economic and political positions in many localities.

### **3.3.3 Changes resulting from non-agricultural industrialisation**

Following independence, the Indian Government put in place a series of five year plans to modernise the country and raise living standards. This brought investment in agricultural production, infrastructural development, health care and educational change (see Lamb, 1975: Chpt. 15).

One of the most important investments was in non-agricultural industrialisation. Between 1951 and 1990 there was a rapid expansion of production in primary and

---

<sup>12</sup>Dr. Ambedkar - Untouchable leader who rose to cabinet rank in the 1930s.

secondary non-agricultural industries, particularly after the 1970s (Lamb, 1975: 306; CSO 1994: 118-29). This growth has been complemented by the development of tertiary and, most recently, quaternary industry. The expansion of these industrial sectors has meant that a growing proportion of India's work force has become employed in non-agricultural activity since independence (CSO, 1994: 29-30; 1992: 29-30; Bose, 1978: 381, 389).

India's non-agricultural industrialisation has undoubtedly brought about changes in the caste system. For example, occupational specialisation amongst *jatis* and castes has been weakened, because many persons taking up the new forms of employment associated with non-agricultural industry have turned away from practising their traditional occupation or *karma*. Counter to this, however, some of those taking up such new forms of employment have continued working in areas broadly consistent with their *karma*. Thus, persons from the *Suthar jati*, which has the *karma* of carpentry, have:

...entered mainly into the building industry in various capacities, and work as construction engineers, joiners, or general handymen. Other Suthars have opened furniture manufacturing and retailing concerns. (Michaelson, 1979: 352).

Many Indologists argue that non-agricultural industrialisation has also opened up the same economic and political opportunities to all *jatis* and castes in localities with a high proportion of non-agricultural industry<sup>13</sup>. Thus, they show that persons from both *Brahminical* and Untouchable *jatis* and castes have had an equal likelihood of being employed in professional and managerial posts arising from India's non-agricultural industrialisation; posts which typically lead to high economic and political standing (see Sharma, 1969: 168; Anant, 1972: 38-41; Morris, 1960: 130; Lambert, 1963: 34-6). Clearly, in areas characterised by non-agricultural industry, this situation would have increased the possibility of disparities occurring between the ritual and economic & political hierarchies of the caste system at *jati* and caste level. In turn, this would have encouraged localised reformulation of the tripartite hierarchy, similar to the kind outlined in Section 3.2.

However, it is suggested that it is only individuals of low ritual ranking, rather than whole *jatis* and castes (as was the case with the *Boad* Distillers under British rule), who have actually managed to raise their position in the economic and political hierarchies through obtaining better jobs in India's non-agricultural industrialisation. Unlike whole *jatis* and castes, these individuals have subsequently found it difficult to ameliorate their position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system through sanskritisation, for reasons discussed at the end of Section 3.2.3. It is suggested that this may have encouraged such individuals to ignore the ritual hierarchy altogether, and base

<sup>13</sup>A few would oppose this view. See, for example, Pillai (1968), Ornati (1955) and Sheth (1968).

their personal goals and achievements entirely on their mobility in the political and economic spheres<sup>14</sup>. This phenomenon will be seen to be an important aspect of the hierarchy of the caste system in Diaspora.

### 3.3.4 Changes resulting from urbanisation

A majority of India's new non-agricultural industry is located in cities and towns. The gradual shift of India's work force from agricultural employment into this growing industrial sector has therefore been marked by rising urbanisation. Thus, whilst 17.3% of India's population lived in urban areas in 1961, this figure had risen to 30.8% by 1991 (MIB, 1971: 13; CSO, 1992: 3; 1994: 2).

The overall changes which this urbanisation process has engendered in the caste system are complex. On the one hand, the cosmopolitan nature of the urban environment has encouraged intermixing between *jatis* and castes of different ritual ranking (Lamb, 1975: 156). This development is likely to have acted as a weakening force on the ritual hierarchy in urban localities, by diffusing some of the inequality embodied in inter-*jati* and inter-caste tensions. Similarly, this intermixing may have weakened the sociological characteristic of commensality amongst *jatis* and castes, as they find it more and more difficult to avoid coming into contact with each other.

In addition, strictly endogamous, yet relatively cognate castes of the same *jati* have sometimes fused together to form a larger endogamous unit, so as to help preserve their identity in the confusion and anonymity of the urban milieu. In such cases, the relevant unit of endogamy has often become the encompassing *jati* of these castes (Mahapatra, 1962: 256). However, this does not represent a reformulation or adaptation in the way the caste system is organised, as *jatis* have always been endogamous in an external sense (see Section 2.6.2). Rather, it is a reinterpretation of endogamy at the *jati* level, and it is a change that will also be seen in the caste system in Diaspora (see Sections 3.5, 3.6 and 6.2).

On the other hand, some Indologists do not recognise urbanisation as bringing about any of the above changes in the caste system. Thus, Ishwaran (1965: 91-3) noted that strict endogamy at the caste<sup>15</sup> level is still highly relevant in the city of Dharwar in Mysore State. Moreover, inter-caste and inter-*jati* awareness was still strong enough amongst Dharwar's inhabitants to bring about the spatial agglomeration of different *jatis* in separate city suburbs, and of different castes within these suburbs. This gives the caste

<sup>14</sup>Although this must not detract from the fact that persons from other *jatis* and castes may still see the ritual ranking of these individuals as being important.

<sup>15</sup>Ishwaran (1965) refers to the caste as a 'subcaste'.

system an urban geography which is similar to that noted for rural areas in 1950s and '60s village studies (see Bailey, 1957: 38-42; Gough, 1960: 18-19; see also Section 2.8).

This study suggests that the actual situation in urban India has been somewhere between the above two scenarios. Certainly, in the earlier stages of urbanisation in the 1950s and '60s, it is possible that the latter of these two situations, as highlighted by Ishwaran (1965), was the norm. However, as Indian urban areas have continued to expand through the 1970s and '80s to create the full kaleidoscope and anonymity of urban living, the former scenario may have become more prevalent.

### 3.3.5 Appraisal of changes in the caste system in independent India

In 1991, 69.2% of India's population was still rural (CSO, 1994: 2), and most of that rural population would have been employed in agriculture. Consequently, the forces of non-agricultural industrialisation and urbanisation, which brought about significant changes in the caste system in large towns and cities in the post-independence era, are likely to have been a lot slower in filtering through to the vast majority of India's agricultural workers living in rural areas.

Equally, changes in the caste system resulting from constitutional reform have also been slow to reach remote rural 'backwaters', especially where the constitutional laws over the treatment of Untouchables are concerned. This is confirmed regularly in journalistic reports from the subcontinent<sup>16</sup>. Thus, in 1994 the Guardian reported how in a rural village in Uttar Pradesh, an Untouchable man (Rajesh):

...slapped Azad, a man of higher caste, who had stolen some peas from his field... The outrage committed by Rajesh... had to be punished. His middle-aged mother Shivpatia, was stripped and paraded through the village at gunpoint for an hour. No one tried to stop this. (Rettie, 1994).

Similarly, the Times Educational Supplement recently reported that in rural southern India, an Untouchable schoolgirl (Dhanam) was blinded in one eye after a beating by her teacher, who was punishing her for drinking water from a cup intended for students of a higher position in the caste system. It also appears that discrimination towards Untouchables in such Rural areas is institutionalised, because:

...Dhanam's upper caste teacher who punished her was not charged despite the medical evidence. He has denied beating the girl and is backed by his local teachers' union. (Lees, 1995).

---

<sup>16</sup>For a brief, but useful, overview of the continued plight of the Untouchables in modern India, see McDonald, 1994a.

Clearly, changes occurring in the caste system within India's minority urban population have been less evident amongst rural peoples. Indeed, the caste system within India's remotest rural populations of today may have altered little from its situation in 1950s and '60s rural India, an overview of which was provided in Chapter Two.

### 3.3.6 Summary of changes in the caste system in India, and the future

Section 3.1 established that a common-sense view of the caste system would view it as an immutable and inflexible institution. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, it has been shown that the caste system is in fact dynamic and adaptable, because it has continued to change in response to forces born out of historical context. This has been the case irrespective of whether these forces are internally generated (i.e. from the Indian peoples) or externally generated (i.e. from non-Indian outsiders like the British); whether or not they are intentionally designed to bring about change in the caste system; or whether they emanate from the Buddhist era, some 2500 years ago, or from India's recent history of independence. It is this dynamism and adaptability, rather than an inherent immutability, that has allowed the caste system to remain a feature of Hindu society in India from the late Vedic period to the present day.

Future changes in the caste system in India are difficult to assess. Since independence, there has been an increasing trend for suggesting that the institution may be "on the way out" (Lamb, 1975: 139), yet judging from its survival through many centuries this seems unrealistic. Embodied within the dynamism and adaptability of the caste system has been its ability to find new areas of expression, be these within the boundaries of a religion such as Sikhism, or in the occupational structure of a modern industrial economy. It is likely that a key area of future expression is in the realm of party politics.

Following the introduction of universal suffrage in 1952, it became important for political parties to drum up support amongst the newly enfranchised masses of Untouchables and persons from *jatis* of low ritual ranking (Lamb, 1975: 246). Initially, this was achieved through a vertical mobilisation of the electorate. Political leaders built up popular support on the basis of localised hierarchies of the caste system. Typically, the dominant *jati* in an area would encourage all those *jatis* and castes below it into giving their allegiances to one particular party or leader, so as to provide a vote bank (Mitra, 1994: 61; Lamb, 1975: 246).

By the 1960s, however, political leaders started to realise the power of the caste system in creating votes. Consequently, a horizontal mobilisation of the electorate began to emerge, whereby people organised themselves into voting blocks based on caste or

*jati* affiliation (Mitra, 1994: 61). Since then, several new political parties have emerged which rely on this system of block vote support. Examples are: the *Bahujan Samaj Party* (BSP), which draws support from Untouchable *jatis*; the *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP), which is dominated by Hindus from upper *jatis* and castes; and the *Samajwadi Party* (SP), which draws support from the *Shudra varna*, and particularly the *Yadav jati* (Cowherds). Such developments have meant that recent elections have seen Indians more concerned about voting their caste, rather than casting their vote (Roy, 1995).

These new parties have created instability in Indian politics as they have siphoned off support from the mainstream Congress party (McDonald, 1994b: 28; McGirk, 1993; Rettie, 1995). As the parties have begun to fight with each other over the procurement of resources, they have intensified inter-*jati* and inter-*varna* antagonisms in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system. In certain states these antagonisms have escalated into an intense round of inter-*jati* violence and killings (Rettie, 1994; McDonald, 1994c: 28; Rettie, 1995), which have been dubbed as 'caste war' by the Calcutta Telegraph (Rettie, 1994).

Clearly, the caste system has found new channels of expression in Indian politics. Indeed if anything it is becoming stronger, because ironically, those individuals of a lowly position in the institution (e.g. Untouchables), who once tried to ignore it because of the suffering it caused them, are now invoking their *jati* identities in order to ameliorate their political power (McDonald, 1994b: 28). While this situation continues, the future of the caste system in India seems guaranteed. As the Indian sociologist Rajni Kothari explains:

Caste is always going to be stronger than an Indian identity... It gets transformed in the process of democratic politics, but you can't beat it." (Rajni Kothari, quoted in: Rettie, 1994).

### 3.4 INTRODUCTION TO DIASPORA

#### 3.4.1 Overview

Sections 3.5 to 3.6 examine the various changes which the caste system has undergone through the emigration of Indian Hindu communities from the subcontinent to their settlement in other countries. This is necessary for understanding and contextualising the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford. In the final chapter, the characteristics of the institution within this Bradford community will be related back to those presented for Indian Hindu communities in other Diaspora contexts in this chapter. This will lead to a clearer overview of the importance of space in engendering change in the caste system.

To examine changes in caste system in Indian Hindu Diaspora, it necessary to start by discussing the South Asian Diaspora in general. This is because the emergence of

Diaspora amongst Indian Hindus is necessarily linked to the development of the whole South Asian experience overseas.

The current number of South Asians living outside India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh is approximately 8.7 million, which accounts for less than one per cent of the combined population of these South Asian countries (Clarke *et al.*, 1990: 1). The geographical distribution of this South Asian Diaspora by country is shown in Table 3.1 and mapped in Figure 3.2.

**Table 3.1: South Asian Diaspora by country and major area, 1987**

Country/Area	South Asian Pop <sup>n</sup>	Country/Area	South Asian Pop <sup>n</sup>	Country/Area	South Asian Pop <sup>n</sup>
UK.	1,260,000	Malaysia	1,170,000	Trinidad	430,000
Netherlands	102,800	Burma	330,000	Guyana	300,350
France	42,000	Singapore	169,100	Surinam	140,000
Germany (FRG)	32,335	Bhutan	70,037	Jamaica	33,600
Spain	10,000	Afghanistan	45,600	Guadeloupe	23,000
Portugal	7,300	Indonesia	30,000	Martinique	10,000
Sweden	7,046	Hong Kong	20,180	St Vincent	6,000
Austria	3,131	Philippines	12,100	Grenada	4,000
Norway	2,900	Thailand	6,082	St Lucia	3,840
Switzerland	2,863	Brunei	5,500	Panama	2,100
Denmark	2,552	Japan	2,685	Other	4,440
Other	9,107	Other	752	<b>Total Caribbean &amp; Latin America</b>	<b>957,330</b>
<b>Total Europe</b>	<b>1,482,034</b>	<b>Total Asia</b>	<b>1,862,036</b>		
Mauritius	700,712	United Arab Emirates	382,302	Fiji	839,340
South Africa	350,000	Oman	190,000	Australia	99,200
Kenya	70,000	Kuwait <sup>Ⓛ</sup>	355,947	New Zealand	15,000
Reunion	65,000	Yemen (PDR)	103,230	Other	569
Tanzania	40,000	Iraq	85,000	<b>Total Pacific</b>	<b>954,109</b>
Libya	35,000	Saudi Arabia	79,987		
Malagasy	21,250	Qatar	51,500		
Zambia	20,900	Bahrain	48,050	USA	500,000
Mozambique	20,850	Lebanon	15,000	Canada	228,500
Zimbabwe	16,000	Yemen	14,000	<b>Total North America</b>	<b>728,500</b>
Nigeria	14,000	Iran	6,300		
Seychelles	5,200	Jordan	4,506		
Malawi	5,000	Other	319		
Liberia	3,066	<b>Total Middle East</b>	<b>1,336,141</b>	<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>8,709,102</b>
Algeria	3,003				
Ethiopia	3,000				
Zaire	2,711				
Other	13,260				
<b>Total Africa</b>	<b>1,388,952</b>				

Ⓛ1985 figure.

Source: Adapted from Clarke *et al.* (1990: 2).



### 3.4.2 Development of South Asian Diaspora

The size and areal dispersal of today's South Asian Diaspora (see Table 3.1) derives from four distinct phases of migration. The first involved the transportation of South Asians overseas by the British, French and Dutch to work in their colonies and protectorates. Much of this transportation was undertaken under indenture, which functioned principally between 1834<sup>17</sup> and 1917<sup>18</sup>. Under the indenture process South Asian labourers or *coolies* were contracted to work for three or five years. Typically, this work was on sugar cane plantations in colonies like the British administered Trinidad, Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius and South Africa (Natal); the French départements of Reunion, Martinique and Guadeloupe and Dutch Surinam. Indentured work also involved railroad construction in South Africa (Natal) and British East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar)<sup>19</sup>. In total, indenture witnessed the emigration of approximately 1.4 million South Asians to 15 colonies - 11 British, three French and one Dutch (see Clarke *et al.*, 1990: 9).

Approximately three quarters of indentured emigrants were Hindus<sup>20</sup> (Parekh, 1994: 605), and the majority came from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. When indenture contracts ended, emigrants were free to return to the subcontinent, but many carried on working on the plantations or moved into rural communities and remained part of the South Asian Diaspora<sup>21</sup>. Their descendants form the large resident communities of South Asians in many ex-colonies today (see Table 3.1), which in some cases account for the majority of an ex-colony's population (e.g. Mauritius 70%, Guyana 50%, Fiji 48%; see Parekh, 1994: 607; also Jayawardena, 1968: 429).

The rest of the transportation was undertaken under the *kangani* system, whereby labourers were contracted by a headman known as a *kangani*, who recruited a score or more of men belonging to his own caste or *jati* group (Jayawardena, 1968: 433; Lemon, 1980: 106). Most South Asian emigrants recruited under *kangani* were transported to Sri Lanka to pick tea, and to Malaysia and Singapore to tap rubber. A

<sup>17</sup>Indenture actually began in 1829 in French Reunion, but it did not become a properly established practice until 1834, when it was introduced on a large scale by the British as a new source of cheap labour following the abolition of slavery under the Act of Emancipation in the same year (Clarke *et al.*, 1990: 8).

<sup>18</sup>Following an embargo being placed on indenture by the government of India in 1917 (Jayawardena, 1968: 430; Lemon, 1980: 105), the process was stopped in all colonies apart from the French governed Reunion, where it continued until 1924 (Parekh, 1994: 605; Clarke *et al.*, 1990: 9).

<sup>19</sup>There is much literature providing a detailed account of the indenture process: see British Parliamentary Papers (1910), Tinker (1974), Roberts & Byrne (1966), Saha (1970), Cumpston (1953; 1956) and Beall (1990).

<sup>20</sup>Except for East Africa, where most indentured labourers arriving between 1895 and 1901 were Muslims and Sikhs (Parekh, 1994: 605).

<sup>21</sup>There were some exceptions here. For instance, 90% of those South Asians taken to East Africa under indenture to build railroads returned to India (Morris, 1956: 195; 1967: 268), and a high percentage of indentured workers in the three French colonies were repatriated (Singaravelou, 1990: 76).

similar system of recruitment known as *maistry* was also used to serve plantations in Burma<sup>22</sup>. Both *kangani* and *maistry* operated between 1832 and 1937, recruiting mainly Tamils and Telugus (Parekh, 1994: 605). During this time it is estimated that 2.5 million South Asians went to work in Burma under *maistry*, whilst two million went to Malaysia and Singapore and 1.5 million to Sri Lanka under *kangani* (Davis, 1951). However, the short term nature of *kangani* and *maistry* contracts, and the proximity of these territories to the subcontinent, meant that the vast majority of emigrants returned home, rather than settling abroad like those under indenture. Nevertheless, a number did remain in these countries to give their sizeable South Asian populations of today (see Table 3.1).

A second, more voluntary phase of migration began in the late 19th Century, as persons started to emigrate from the subcontinent of their own accord to some of the post-indentured/*kangani* colonies discussed above. These emigrants were typically merchants, who were attempting to extend business in these colonies; or they were white collar workers filling administrative jobs. They came mainly from the Gujarat and the Punjab, and included a large number of Hindus, as well as Sikhs and Muslims (Parekh, 1994: 605). A major destination for this kind of emigration was East Africa (see Twaddle, 1990; Gregory, 1971), which was one of the few colonies where almost all the post-indentured community had returned home (see Footnote 21). Fiji, Mauritius, South Africa (Natal) and South East Asia also received some immigration of this type (Clarke *et al.*, 1990: 9). This pattern of emigration from the subcontinent grew steadily throughout the first half of the 20th Century.

Following World War II, a third phase of migration began. This involved an exodus of South Asians from the subcontinent to destinations such as Britain<sup>23</sup>, where they arrived in the 1950s and '60s to fill gaps in the lower end of the labour market (Robinson, 1980a; 1990). After the oil boom of the mid-1970s, a similar emigration of South Asians to the Middle East and Gulf states also started (Knerr, 1990), and from the early 1960s a rapidly increasing number of mainly professional and affluent emigrants left South Asia for the USA (Bhardwaj & Rao, 1990), Canada (Buchignani & Indra, 1985) and Australia (Hassan & Tan, 1990). Large numbers of Hindus and Sikhs from independent India's Gujarat and Punjab regions accounted for much of this new South Asian Diaspora, although Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims also represented an important element. However, the early 1980s world recession provided a context in which racism became more overt, and this resulted in a clamp down on the immigration of South Asians in many Western countries (Clarke *et al.*, 1990: 17-18).

<sup>22</sup>For detailed information on the *kangani* system see Arasaratnam (1970) and Kondapi (1951). For information on *maistry* see Chakravarti (1971).

<sup>23</sup>Destinations like Britain were not entirely 'new' for South Asians (see Visram, 1986), but prior to the 1950s the number of emigrants from the subcontinent reaching such destinations had been very small.

The late 1960s and early '70s witnessed a fourth and final phase of migration. This involved the movement of South Asians already in Diaspora to other countries, effectively making them 'twice migrants' (Bhachu, 1985). The majority of these 'twice migrants' were derived from South Asians already living in Uganda and Kenya, who had initially established themselves in these ex-colonies during the second phase of migration from the subcontinent (see above). These individuals were expelled by East African governments under Africanisation policies of the 1960s and '70s (Twaddle, 1975), and most of them re-located to Britain (Michaelson, 1983: 21-9).

At the same time, some South Asians living in other ex-colonies, whose migration history could be linked to the first phase of 19th Century indenture, also became 'twice migrants'. This was because they began to migrate to new destinations in the West for economic reasons: especially to Canada, from the West Indies (Ramcharan, 1983) and Fiji (Buchignani, 1983); to the Netherlands from Surinam (Van Amersfoort, 1970) and also to Britain from the West Indies (Vertovec, 1992: 260-2; 1994). This fourth phase of migratory movements did not add to the size of South Asian Diaspora, but rearranged its dispersal.

### 3.5 CHANGES IN THE CASTE SYSTEM IN NON-BRITISH DIASPORA

#### 3.5.1 Overview

The following discussion concentrates on the Indian Hindu element<sup>24</sup> of non-British, South Asian Diaspora, as this is the nationality and religion principally associated with the caste system. The discussion begins by outlining changes in the caste system occurring in the part of this Diaspora developed from the first stage of migration under indenture, *kangani* and *maistry*. There follows a summary of changes in the caste system occurring in that part of non-British Diaspora resulting from the second stage of migration, involving the more voluntary movement of Indian Hindus to the post-indentured colonies of East Africa.

It will be seen that the forces bringing about change in the caste system in these two non-British Diaspora contexts have not been intentionally designed to do so. These forces have also been generated externally, in the sense that they have usually been set in motion by non-Indians. Such external forces may have a fairly direct source, as in the case of those affecting the caste system which were brought about by British colonialists encouraging large numbers of Indian emigrants to new locations under

---

<sup>24</sup>The Indian Hindu element is usually the largest faction of the non-British, South Asian Diaspora in those countries in which it occurs. Thus, Vertovec (1990: 229) estimates Indian Hindus to be around 60% of the total South Asian population in Trinidad, whilst Jayawardena (1966: 211) suggests they represent 70% of South Asians in Guyana. Equally, Morris (1967: 267) estimated that Indian Hindus represented around 57% of East Africa's South Asian population in 1950.

indenture/*kangani/maistry*. Alternatively, their source may be more indirect, as in the case of those forces affecting the caste system which emanate from the new societal contexts in which Indian Hindus find themselves in Diaspora, be this in Singapore or East Africa.

Changes in the caste system in that part of non-British Diaspora resulting from stages three and four of migration are not addressed due to a lack of available literature. For example, there are only a handful of studies which deal with the non-British, South Asian Diaspora developed from the third stage of subcontinental emigration to countries of the West and Middle East (e.g. Callan, 1983; Hassan & Tan, 1990 for Australia; La Brack, 1983; Bhardwaj & Rao, 1990, for the USA; Ghosh, 1983; Henry, 1983; Buchignani & Indra, 1985 for Canada; Knerr, 1990 for the Middle East), and none of these works pay any specific attention to Indian Hindus and the caste system. Similarly, such issues are not addressed in those few studies dealing with the non-British, South Asian Diaspora developed under the fourth stage of migration, involving relocation from former colonies to Western countries during the late 1960s and early '70s (e.g. Ramcharan, 1983; Buchignani, 1983; Van Amersfoort, 1970).

### 3.5.2 Changes resulting from stage one migration

There is much literature focusing on that part of today's non-British, South Asian Diaspora which was established in former colonies under indenture and *kangani*. Many of these studies have concentrated on the large Indian Hindu faction within this Diaspora, and have made rudimentary observations on the caste system. Examples include: Smith (1960), Jayawardena (1960; 1966) and Smith & Jayawardena (1958; 1959) for British Guyana; Kelly (1988), Gillion (1956) and Mayer (1953) for Fiji; Van der Burg & Van der Veer (1986) for Surinam; Benedict (1957) for Mauritius; Nevadomsky (1983) for Trinidad; Singaravelou (1990) for the French departements and Jayawardena (1968) for all the above. Other studies deal with the subject of the caste system amongst Indian Hindus in this post-indentured/*kangani* Diaspora in greater detail. Examples include: Singer (1967) and Smith & Jayawardena (1967) for Guyana; Schwartz (1967a) for Fiji; Schwartz (1964; 1967b), Clarke (1967) and Niehoff (1967) for Trinidad; Speckman (1967) for Surinam; Benedict (1967) for Mauritius; Kuper (1967) and Rambiritch & Van den Berghe (1961) for South Africa and Arasaratnam (1970), Mani (1983) and Jain (1988) for Malaysia and Singapore.

Amongst Indian Hindus living in post-indentured Diaspora, the above studies report radical changes in the caste system. Rather than elucidating such changes for each ex-colony, it is best to summarise them for all post-indentured environments as follows:

First, for many Indian Hindus living in post-indentured Diaspora today, the concept of a caste as a social unit appears to have disappeared. This is because emigration under indenture acted as a weakening force on the demographic basis of caste group structure. In short, many castes were represented by too few persons to persist as viable social units (Smith & Jayawardena, 1967: 49-50). Because of this, endogamy and commensality at the caste level has been absent in post-indentured Diaspora (see below), and there has been no system of self-regulation within the caste system which, in India, had been manifest in the social and political control castes held over their members (see Section 2.7.2).

For the same demographic reasons, the concept of *jati* appears to have weakened as well. Consequently, several studies in the 1960s demonstrated that some Indian Hindus living in post-indentured Diaspora could not even name their *jati* (Clarke 1967: 172; Schwartz (1967a: 221; Kuper, 1967: 260). Indeed, such persons tended to think mainly in terms of *varnas*, or at least '*varna*-like' groups of *jatis*, when talking and thinking about social units within the caste system (Clarke, 1967: 174).

Second, many Indian Hindus have strayed away from practising the traditional occupation or *karma* of their *jati* or *varna* in post-indentured Diaspora, thus destroying the *jajmani* system (Benedict, 1967: 40; Smith & Jayawardena, 1967: 51; Kuper 1967: 256). Indenture work practices acted as a weakening force on the sociological characteristic of occupational specialisation amongst *jatis* and *varnas* from the outset, by placing everyone in plantation work, irrespective of their *karma*. This legacy lived on after indenture had ceased. As Niehoff explains for Trinidad:

Traditional caste [*jati*<sup>25</sup>] occupations found no place in the commercial farming economy of Trinidad. [Because] all men started out on an equal basis as plantation labourers. (Niehoff, 1967: 153).

The handful of Indian Hindus in post-indentured Diaspora who still practice their traditional occupation are usually from *jatis* with a highly specialised, artisanal *karma*, such as the *Sonis* (Goldsmiths) (Smith & Jayawardena, 1967: 80; Kuper, 1967: 256).

Third, the hierarchy of the caste system has been reformulated in post-indentured Diaspora due to forces resulting from the indenture process. This was initially because the same minimal economic and political opportunities were imposed on all indentured labourers by plantation managers (Smith & Jayawardena, 1967: 52; Speckmann, 1967: 208). From the outset, this gave no support to the fixed and coterminous tripartite hierarchy, in which persons from *jatis* of a higher position in the ritual hierarchy have an equally elevated economic and political standing.

---

<sup>25</sup>Niehoff talks of 'castes' here, but it is clear that he is actually referring to *jatis*.

More importantly, since the end of indenture, all Indian Hindus in post-indentured Diaspora, irrespective of their *jati*'s ritual ranking, have in theory had an equal chance of improving their positions in the economic and political spheres. This has allowed persons from *jatis* of low ritual ranking to better their economic and political standing, thus introducing disparities into the tripartite hierarchy which are similar to those described in Section 3.2<sup>26</sup> (see Smith & Jayawardena, 1967: 67-9; Schwartz, 1967b: 135).

However, it must be stressed that it is only individuals from *jatis* of low ritual ranking, rather than whole *jatis* themselves, who have managed to raise their position in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system in this way. Unlike whole *jatis* and castes, these individuals were subsequently unable to improve their position in the ritual hierarchy of the institution through sanskritisation, for reasons explained at the end of Section 3.2.3. As a result, such individuals have often ignored the ritual hierarchy altogether, and based their personal goals solely on mobility in the economic and political spheres. Such a development has been assisted by a decline in the general importance of the ritual hierarchy, following its weakening by forces resulting from indenture.

The forces which have weakened the ritual hierarchy have first come from the emigration process itself, in terms of the voyage by ship<sup>27</sup>. On ship, indentured labourers from all *jatis* and *varnas* were crammed together, each being given a tiny amount of space (72 ft.<sup>3</sup> on the passage to South Africa; see Kuper, 1965: 246). Such conditions meant that persons from ritually high ranking *jatis* and *varnas* were subjected to constant pollution by those of lower ritual ranking (Kuper, 1967: 246-7; Smith & Jayawardena, 1967: 50; Benedict, 1967: 29; Speckmann, 1967: 204). Significant in this respect is the statement of an ex-indentured emigrant to Fiji, as recorded by Mayer:

One old woman told how she had set sail from Calcutta, and all on board had started to cook dinner, each caste [*jati*] with its own hearth. Suddenly a wave rocked the ship, and all the cauldrons of food overturned on to the deck together. It was a choice of eating food which had been mixed and so polluted, or going hungry. (Mayer, 1961: 157-8)<sup>28</sup>.

Once working under indenture in the plantations, the conditions were not much better than those at sea. Thus Speckmann, quoting Jayawardena, notes that in Guyana:

---

<sup>26</sup>This may not always be the case in post-indentured Diaspora. For example, in San Fernando in Trinidad there appears to have been some resurgence of the tripartite hierarchy in a fixed and coterminous form. Hence, Clarke (1967: 179) notices a degree of correlation between the position of an individual's *jati* in the ritual hierarchy and their socio-economic and political status. This is also suggested by Kuper (1967: 257) for South Africa.

<sup>27</sup>The process of travelling across the sea or 'black waters' (*kala pani*) is considered polluting in itself for the Hindu (Jayawardena, 1968: 428; Clarke, 1967: 169).

<sup>28</sup>Mayer talks of 'castes' here, but as in the rest of his work, he actually means *jatis*.

Coolies were housed cheek by jowl, in long barracks... They shared the same water supply, bathed in the same canal, and used the same latrine. (Speckmann, 1967: 207; similarly see Kuper, 1967: 247 on indenture in South Africa).

The cumulative affect of both of the above rendered the concepts of spiritual purity and pollution, on which the ritual hierarchy is based, unworkable. As a result, it often weakened in post-indentured colonies to reach a level of relative unimportance today. The only remaining distinctions in the ritual hierarchy are those between the *Brahminical* and Untouchable ends of the spectrum (Niehoff, 1967: 154; Benedict, 1967: 40).

Fourth (and principally as a result of the weakened ritual hierarchy of the caste system), most of the commensal restrictions between *jatis* and *varnas*, which could be regarded as a physical manifestation of their ritual ranking (see Section 2.6.2), have become largely irrelevant in post-indentured communities (Kuper, 1967: 255-6; Smith & Jayawardena, 1967: 62). Only on key ritual occasions, such as weddings, are commensal restrictions sometimes observed (Clarke, 1967: 192; Benedict, 1967: 37).

Fifth, endogamy at the level of the caste unit is absent amongst Indian Hindus in post-indentured Diaspora. This is because the caste itself has largely disappeared as a recognisable social unit, for reasons already outlined. In many cases, therefore, the unit of endogamy has become the *jati* or even the *varna*. However, endogamy is by no means strong within such social units. Thus, in Trinidad, Clarke (1967: 183-91) found that out of the 96 Hindu marriages he studied, 51% were *jati* exogamous, and 27% were *varna* exogamous. Similar findings are revealed by Schwartz (1967a: 221) for Fiji and Kuper (1967: 247) for South Africa.

A key reason for the low rate of *jati* and *varna* endogamy in these post-indentured environments stemmed from its initial weakening during the emigration and indenture process. Indenture acted as a weakening force on endogamy because in many cases the number of indentured women was less than half that of men. This resulted in intense competition for the few women available, irrespective of their *jati* or *varna* affiliation. Hence, inter-*jati* and inter-*varna* marriages became common, with the offspring of such unions being ascribed their father's *jati* or *varna* status (Smith & Jayawardena, 1967: 50; Speckmann, 1967: 205; Kuper, 1967: 247; Jayawardena, 1968: 442). When the number of men and women began to even out in post-indentured colonies, the importance of endogamy remained diminished in view of earlier experiences, and this has facilitated the continuation of high *jati* and *varna* exogamy up to the present day.

To summarise, the process of emigration and indenture produced forces which generated substantive changes in the caste system amongst Indian Hindus in post-indentured Diaspora. Again, these changes show the caste system is dynamic rather than immutable and inflexible. This is demonstrated in the ability of certain aspects of the institution (e.g. ritual hierarchy, occupational specialisation, commensality, social and political control and endogamy), as well as the caste units themselves, to weaken through forces arising from emigration and indenture, sometimes to the point of eradication. At the same time, the caste system is also adaptable, and this is seen in the ability of its tripartite hierarchy to reformulate in response to these forces.

By contrast, the caste system amongst Indian Hindus living in post-*kangani* and *maistry* Diaspora has undergone less change. This is demonstrated by Mani (1983) in his analysis of Singapore's Indian Hindu community, which descended from *kangani* migrants. Unlike post-indentured Hindus, Mani shows that many of those in Singapore understand the concept of a caste<sup>29</sup> as a social unit and usually know which one they belong to (Mani, 1983: 283). All are also aware of what their *jati* is.

As in post-indentured contexts, however, the emigration process under *kangani* weakened the demographic basis of caste group structure. Accordingly, the relatively small number of persons from each caste in post-*kangani* Diaspora means it is not usually a viable social unit in practice. Thus, endogamy and commensality at the caste level has more or less disappeared, and it will be seen below that the *jati* has become the unit of endogamy and commensality instead. Similarly, social and political control through the caste unit has also been dissolved. Nevertheless, Indian Hindus in Singapore have partly responded to this by making the *jati* a unit for social and political control within the caste system. This has been achieved through the development of *jati* associations or extensive intra-*jati* friendships, which although lacking judicial powers, do appear to exercise control and influence over their members (Mani, 1983: 285-7). In this respect, the *jati* has effectively become the caste in Singapore.

As with Indian Hindus in post-indentured environments, most of those in Singapore appear to have strayed away from practising the traditional occupations of their *jati* or *varna* (Mani, 1983: 286), apart from a few who perform specialised *karmas* involving a distinctive trade, such as *Sonis* (Goldsmiths). This is because the *kangani* system, like indenture, weakened occupational specialisation, by placing all individuals in plantation work irrespective of their *karma*. The legacy of this has lived on to the present day.

---

<sup>29</sup>Mani clearly refers to castes as 'subcastes' or 'endogamous divisions'.

Unlike the experiences of post-indentured Hindus, the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system has remained relatively unchanged in Singapore from a fixed and coterminous form. This is because members of *jatis* with a high position in the ritual hierarchy tend to occupy the superior economic and political positions in Singaporean society. Meanwhile, for those from *jatis* of low ritual ranking the reverse is often the case (Mani, 1983: 284). The ritual hierarchy itself has also remained reasonably intact, and this is reflected in strong concepts of spiritual purity and pollution amongst Indian Hindus in Singapore (Mani, 1983: 278-83). As a result, many are still aware of commensal restrictions between *jatis*, although they only practice these in earnest when visiting India (Mani, 1983: 279).

As explained above, caste level endogamy has largely disappeared in Singapore. Nevertheless, the majority of Indian Hindus continue to maintain *jati* endogamy, unlike those living in post-indentured contexts. Thus, after questioning 65 Indian Hindus in Singapore with married offspring, Mani found that 79% of them had married off their children to members of the same *jati* (Mani, 1983: 285). The maintenance of this high level of *jati* endogamy has undoubtedly been facilitated by Singapore's proximity to the subcontinent, which has acted as a supplementary source for spouses of the correct *jati*.

In summary, a number of changes in the caste system have occurred amongst Indian Hindus living in the post-*kangani* Diaspora of Singapore, and these are likely to bear similarities to those seen in other post-*kangani* and *maistry* communities in Malaysia and Burma. These changes in the caste system have been generated by forces resulting from emigration and *kangani* and *maistry* work systems, and they again demonstrate the dynamic and adaptable nature of the institution.

Significantly, however, changes in the caste system occurring in post-*kangani* and *maistry* contexts are less far reaching than those witnessed in post-indentured environments. A key reason for this is that the *kangani* and *maistry* systems respected and accommodated the institution to a greater degree (Jain, 1988: 128; Jayawardena, 1968: 443). Thus, as already noted, a *kangani* or *maistry* team was recruited and built up from Indian Hindus of a distinct *jati* or caste (Jayawardena, 1968: 433; Lemon, 1980: 106). Furthermore, the social distance between such social units was maintained by housing *kangani* or *maistry* teams from different *jatis* and *varnas* in separate barracks (Mani, 1983: 176; Jayawardena, 1968: 433). The short nature of *kangani* and *maistry* contracts, coupled with the proximity of the subcontinent, also meant there was a steady flow of migrants between India and South East Asian colonies. This generated continued cultural input from the mother country as well as a reservoir of potential spouses, which in turn helped preserve the caste system. This contrasts sharply with the experiences of Indian Hindus in post-indentured Diaspora, who were typically too far away from their

homeland to maintain any realistic contact, and who had been subjected to labour practices which gave little or no support to the caste system .

### 3.5.3 Changes resulting from stage two migration

There is some literature on that part of non-British, South Asian Diaspora developed from the second stage of migration, involving the voluntary emigration of South Asians from the subcontinent to post-indentured/*kangani/maistry* colonies in the first half of the 20th Century. Much of this literature focuses on the Indian Hindu community and the caste system within this part of Diaspora. The majority of these studies also concentrate on 1960s East Africa, prior to the expulsion of most South Asians. Such studies include Morris (1959; 1967; 1968, Chpt. 4), Ghai (1965), Bharati (1967; 1972), Pocock (1957b) and Barot (1974). Useful, but retrospective commentary on the East African, Indian Hindu Diaspora (made after its expulsion) can also be found in Michaelson (1979; 1983). These studies make the following observations about the caste system in East Africa:

First, they indicate that the caste was initially a recognisable social unit amongst most Indian Hindus living there. This is because at first, practically all of them appeared to marry within their caste (Michaelson, 1979: 355-7<sup>30</sup>). This was done so that on permanent return to India (a hope cherished by many but achieved by few), they could still assume a place in their local caste system, having observed the correct degree of endogamy (Morris, 1967: 276; Morris, 1959: 780; 1968: 61; Jayawardena, 1968: 436). However, as in other Diaspora contexts, emigration had weakened the demographic basis of caste group structure. As a result, caste endogamy could only be maintained by using the subcontinent as a source of prospective spouses (Jayawardena, 1968: 443). Hence, there was regular temporary migration between East Africa and the Gujarat (the origin of most East African Hindus) in order to arrange marriages.

However, by the mid-1950s many Indian Hindus in East Africa had become more wealthy and educated than their compatriots back home. Marriage ties between East Africa and India therefore became increasingly incongruous and started to decline, whilst those between Hindus living in East Africa grew. This made the endogamy of castes unfeasible, because their weakened demographic basis meant there was not enough people from each individual caste to form an adequate spousal pool. As a result, the principal unit of endogamy for many East African Hindus moved from being the caste to the *jati* (see for example Michaelson, 1979: 357).

---

<sup>30</sup>Michaelson uses the terms 'marriage circle', 'endogamous section' and 'subcaste' to refer to castes in this paper.

In line with the demographic weakening of castes through emigration, it also became increasingly difficult for them to operate as units of social and political control in East African Hindu society. As in post-*kangani/maistry* contexts like Singapore, therefore, the *jati* became such a unit with the formation of *jati* associations (Morris, 1967: 272-7; Morris, 1959: 780<sup>31</sup>) These associations represented a distinctive co-operative group. Even though they had no judicial powers, they acted in the interests of their members in the wider East African context to procure resources, and exercised a certain level of control over their members. Occasionally, several *jatis* (as in the case of the *Brahminical jatis* in Uganda) joined forces to form a larger *varna* association (Morris, 1967: 277). Whilst it could be argued that *jati* associations also exist in the subcontinent (Morris, 1967: 277), they have not demonstrated the same level of social and political control as those seen in East Africa and Singapore.

There were exceptions to the above. For example, Michaelson (1979: 355) noted that the Gujarati *jati* of *Patidars* (Farmers and Landowners) always maintained intra-caste endogamy in East Africa, and never relinquished their links with India as a spousal source. Unsurprisingly, castes also continued to operate as units of social and political control amongst these *Patidars*, and as a result they developed no *jati* association in East Africa.

The sociological characteristic of occupational specialisation declined amongst Indian Hindus living in East Africa, because many did not practise the *karma* of their *jati* or *varna* (Bharati, 1967: 288; Ghai, 1965: 18; Morris, 1967: 275-6; 1968: 48). This decline was due to the weakening force of the surrounding East African economy, which did not provide a suitable context for the reproduction of *jajmani* relations (Morris, 1967: 275; 1968: 60). However, there is debate over the amount of occupational weakening which occurred. It is said that persons from *jatis* with a highly specialised *karma*, such as the *Sonis* (Goldsmiths), *Darjis* (Tailors) and *Brahminical* priestly *jatis*, often continued to perform their traditional occupations (Ghai, 1965: 18; Bharati, 1967: 295; 1972: 35, 64). Equally, Michaelson suggests that those from the Gujarati *jati* of *Suthars* (Carpenters) commonly entered into work related to their *karma*, such as furniture manufacturing and joinery (Michaelson, 1979: 352; 1983: 41).

It is likely that the East African economy also encouraged reformulation of the caste system's tripartite hierarchy. For example, Bharati (1967: 289) suggested that Indian Hindus from artisanal *jatis* (of the *Shudra varna*) and Untouchable *jatis*, of low

---

<sup>31</sup>Morris refers to 'castes' and 'caste associations' in these contexts, although it is clear he is actually referring to *jatis*, even though he contradicts his own views on the use of these terms (see Morris, 1967: 269-71). This aside, the development of these *jati* associations, whilst put down to a general reduction of caste consciousness here, was also due to a rising tide of 'communalism' amongst East African Hindus (see Morris, 1968: 34-44; Michaelson, 1983: 12-15).

ritual ranking, were just as likely to obtain well paid and prestigious white collar posts in East Africa (which would typically lead to a high position in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system) as those from *jatis* of higher ritual ranking. This would have generated disparities in the tripartite hierarchy of the kind described in Section 3.2.

Again, however, it would only be individuals of low ritual ranking, rather than whole *jatis*, who would have actually managed to raise their position in the economic and political hierarchies in this way. For reasons already outlined, these persons would have been unable to improve their ritual position through sanskritisation (see Section 3.2.3). Accordingly, it is likely that they would have based their personal goals on mobility in the economic and political spheres in East Africa, and ignored the ritual hierarchy altogether. This development would have been assisted by the decline in the importance of ritual considerations in the East African context.

The weakening of the ritual hierarchy in East Africa stemmed from the regular contact of Indian Hindus with Black Africans, who were considered highly polluting. This rendered the concepts of spiritual purity and pollution, on which the ritual hierarchy is based, somewhat irrelevant. Because of this, there was also a degeneration of ritually based commensal restrictions at all levels. As Bharati explained:

In East Africa, the commensal... aspects of the Indian caste system have disappeared almost entirely. Transcaste commensality is virtually complete - the cooks in wealthier houses are almost all Africans, who would rank lower than the lowest in an Indian caste-culinary setting. (Bharati, 1967: 288-9).

Nevertheless, commensality was still maintained for *jatis* and *varnas* with either very high or very low ritual rankings. Thus, Bharati (1967: 289) noted that Punjabi Untouchables in East Africa were still forced to maintain commensal restrictions, because they were not usually invited to share their meal with other Punjabis. Similarly, some individuals from *Brahminical jatis* may have refused to accept food from those of more lowly ritual status.

In summary, many changes in the caste system occurred amongst Indian Hindus living in the East African Diaspora (and probably other parts of the Indian Hindu Diaspora developed under the second stage of migration). These changes were largely generated by unintentional forces resulting from emigration, and the external influence of the East African economy and Black African society on a minority Indian Hindu community. Again, such changes demonstrate that the caste system is dynamic, and this is shown in the ability of sociological characteristics like occupational specialisation, commensality and the ritual hierarchy to weaken under these forces. The changes also demonstrate that the caste system is an adaptable institution, and this is manifest in a

reformulation of the tripartite hierarchy in East Africa, as well as the shift of social and political control in the caste system from the caste to the *jati* level.

It is interesting to note that although Indian Hindus in East Africa initially had the same high levels of contact with the subcontinent as those living in post-*kangani* environments, the types of change occurring in the caste system in these two areas have been different. In Singapore endogamy always operated at the *jati* level, whilst in East Africa the endogamous unit was initially the caste and only later became the *jati*, and even then this was not in all cases. Meanwhile, the ritual hierarchy and commensality remained much more intact in Singapore than in the East African context.

### 3.5.4 Summary of changes in the caste system in non-British Diaspora

In summary, there have been many changes in the caste system in non-British based, Indian Hindu Diaspora. These demonstrate that it is a dynamic and adaptable institution, rather than immutable and inflexible as a common-sense view would maintain. However, the degree of change in the caste system has been greatest amongst Indian Hindus living in post-indentured contexts, whilst the change experienced by those living in East Africa has probably been more significant than that seen in the post-*kangani* Diaspora of Singapore. Similarly, the actual nature of the change between these three areas has been very different. This shows that the caste system is dynamic and adaptable over space as well as time. Clearly, the forces engendering change are born out of spatial as well as historical context.

## 3.6 CHANGES IN THE CASTE SYSTEM IN BRITISH DIASPORA

### 3.6.1 Overview

Above, it was noted that Indian Hindus usually constitute the largest national and religious group in non-British, South Asian Diaspora (see Footnote 24). By contrast, Knott & Toon (1980: 20) estimated that Indian<sup>32</sup> Hindus represented only 29.7% of Britain's South Asian<sup>33</sup> population, along with 29.5% Indian Sikhs and 34.2% Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian Muslims (see also Knott, 1981a). More recent publications support their estimates (King, 1984: 3-4; Singh, 1992: 4-5), although some appear to disagree (Brown, 1984: 24<sup>34</sup>).

<sup>32</sup>Knott & Toon determined the national origins of Britain's South Asians by their country of birth, or their parents' country of birth. Consequently, the small number of Hindus and Sikhs living in Britain who originated from that part of the Punjab which was placed in Pakistan after the 1947 partition were classed as 'Pakistani' by Knott & Toon. However, in the above percentage calculations from Knott & Toon's work, such individuals have been identified as Indians, and not Pakistanis.

<sup>33</sup>Knott and Toon's definition of 'South Asian' appears to include only those persons originating from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

<sup>34</sup>Brown (1984) suggested that Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims respectively represented 27%, 20% and 46% of the UK's 1980 South Asian population. But it is likely he overestimates the size of the Muslim population and underestimates the Hindu and Sikh ones (Singh, 1992: 4).

Knott & Toon's figures are supported in this study. This is because the major influx of South Asian immigration to Britain had ended before 1977, the year on which Knott & Toon based their statistics. Consequently, aside from differential birth and death rates between Britain's broad religio-ethnic groups of Indian Hindus, Indian Sikhs etc. since 1977, Knott and Toon's percentage estimates should still be quite accurate today. If so, then Britain's Indian Hindu population might now number somewhere in the region of 498,366<sup>35</sup>. Using Knott & Toon's figures, it is suggested that 46.6% of this population were born in East Africa, or have parents who were born there, and can therefore be connected with the fourth stage of 'twice migration'. The rest of Britain's Indian Hindus can be linked to the third stage of direct migration from India. In addition, 69.8% of Britain's Indian Hindu population are believed to have Gujarati origins, and 14.6% Punjabi origins, with the remaining 15.6% originating from other Indian states (Knott & Toon, 1980: 20-21).

Several studies have concerned themselves with the caste system amongst the Indian Hindu community in Britain. However, this work has tended to concentrate on Indian Hindus in terms of their origin region, rather than their migrational status. Indeed, most studies of Britain's Indian Hindu community (whether concerned with the caste system or not) usually focus on its large Gujarati Hindu element, or, less regularly, on its smaller Punjabi Hindu faction, despite the fact that these two religio-ethnic sub groups have been built up through both the third and fourth stages of migration. By contrast, few studies deal exclusively with that part of British based, Indian Hindu Diaspora developed exclusively through the third stage of migration from the subcontinent in the 1950s and '60s, or that part composed of fourth stage 'twice migrants'<sup>36</sup>.

Following these trends in the literature, this section also focuses on Britain's Indian Hindus in terms of their origin region rather than their migrational status. Thus, Section 3.6.2 concentrates on changes in the caste system amongst Gujarati Hindus living in Britain, whilst Section 3.6.3 discusses such changes amongst Britain's Punjabi Hindus. However, to a certain extent these two origin region categories can be seen as a surrogate for migrational status, because according to Knott & Toon's figures, 63.6% of Britain's Gujarati Hindus are part of the 'twice migrant' community from East Africa, whilst only 36.4% can be linked to third stage of migration directly from India. Conversely, only 15.2% of Punjabi Hindus living in Britain have an East African

---

<sup>35</sup>Figure calculated by applying Knott & Toon's (1980) estimated percentage of Indian Hindus in Britain's South Asian community (29.7%) to the rounded 1991 Census count of South Asians living in Britain (1,678,000), which includes Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Other Asians (Teague, 1993: 13). Significantly, the resulting figure for the number of Indian Hindus in Britain represents 0.9% of the rounded 1991 Census count for Britain's total population of 54,889,000 persons (Teague, 1993: 13).

<sup>36</sup>There are a few exceptions here. For instance, Michaelson's work clearly focuses on Gujarati Hindus who are 'twice migrants' from East Africa (Michaelson, 1979; 1983).

migration history, whilst 84.8% have direct migratory links with the subcontinent (Knott & Toon, 1980: 20).

It was noted earlier that the caste system has infiltrated the Islamic and Sikh religions in South Asia (see Section 3.1). Although there appears to be no literature on the caste system (or anything approximating the institution) amongst South Asian Muslims in Britain, there have been several studies which have highlighted the relevance of the institution amongst Indian Sikhs in this country; most briefly (Thompson, 1974; Singh, 1992: 12-14; Bhachu, 1984: 291-3; Ballard, 1994a: 109-12; Bhachu, 1985; Ballard & Ballard, 1977), and a few in detail (Kalsi, 1992). However, the caste system amongst such religious factions is not under scrutiny in this study.

### 3.6.2 Changes in the caste system amongst Britain's Gujarati Hindus

A number of works focusing on the Gujarati Hindu community in Britain make rudimentary observations on the caste system within this religio-ethnic sub-group (Lyon, 1972; Bowen, 1987; Jackson, 1981; Dwyer, 1994; Warriar, 1994; Michaelson, 1987), whilst a few studies examine the institution amongst Gujarati Hindus in greater detail (Michaelson, 1979; 1983; Knott, n.d; 1994; Tambs-Lyche, 1975). Some works dealing more generally with Britain's Indian Hindu community also touch on the relevance of the caste system for those of Gujarati origin (Knott, 1981b; Knott, 1986: Chpt. 1). Collectively, these studies make the following observations about the caste system amongst Gujarati Hindus in Britain:

First, they demonstrate that for most Gujarati Hindus in this country, the *jati* is the social unit within the caste system with which they still identify, whereas the notion of the caste as a social unit seems to have largely disappeared. Observation of marriage practices amongst Britain's Gujarati Hindus illustrates this point, because whilst intra-*jati* endogamy appears to be strictly observed by most, intra-caste endogamy has been largely eradicated. Intra-*jati* endogamy is generally maintained by using Britain as the pool for prospective spouses, although amongst 'twice migrants' brides and grooms may still be recruited from those few Gujarati Hindus remaining in East Africa. However, spousal recruitment from India is more or less unheard of, as substantiated in Michaelson's account of the Gujarati *Lohana jati* (Traders) in Britain (Michaelson, 1979: 356-7).

In line with the above, the unit of social and political control within the caste system is typically the *jati* rather than the caste. This is demonstrated by the strong *jati* associations which have been formed amongst Gujarati Hindus in Britain, and which are similar to those seen in East Africa. These *jati* associations are organised on a national basis and have an elected president and committee. Although they have no judicial

powers, they act to uphold *jati* unity and identity by maintaining lists of *jati* members in the country, organising annual gatherings, and preserving intra-*jati* endogamy. Local branches of *jati* associations help ensure that this is efficiently achieved at the provincial level (Michaelson, 1983: 33-4; 1979: 354). Examples of such *jati* associations include the *Shree Prajapati Samaj* UK, which was established in 1975 to serve the members of the *Prajapati jati* (Potters) in Britain, and which now has 12 local branches in towns and cities outside London (Warrier, 1994: 208-10; Bowen, 1987: 23).

The only notable exception to the above is the Gujarati *jati* of *Patidars* (Farmers and Landowners), who, with a British population of around 100,000 (Dwyer, 1994: 184), represent this country's largest Gujarati *jati*. This substantial number of *Patidars* has helped preserve the demographic basis of caste group structure amongst them (Michaelson, 1979: 354-6; 1983: 36-7; Dwyer, 1994: 184; Tambs-Lyche, 1975: 350). As in East Africa, therefore, individuals from this *jati* have continued to maintain intra-caste endogamy in Britain, and this situation has been further aided by the continuing use of India as a spousal pool. In turn, this has helped the persistence of caste as a unit of social and political control amongst Britain's *Patidars*, and as a result of this they have developed no *jati* association in this country.

Turning to occupational specialisation, several studies have noted that although some of Britain's Gujarati Hindus have moved away from practising the *karma* of their *jati*<sup>37</sup>, others have continued in areas of employment fully or partly consistent with it, particularly those in artisanal *jatis*. In Coventry, for example, Jackson noted that six of the 15 families affiliated to the Gujarati *Soni jati* (Goldsmiths) were still involved in the jewellery trade (Jackson, 1981: 64; see also Michaelson, 1979: 352; 1983: 41). Similarly, in Leeds, Knott noted that some individuals from the Gujarati *Mochi jati* (Shoemakers) had obtained *karma* related employment in boot and shoe manufacture (Knott, 1994: 220-7; 1986: 45-7; 1981b: 11; n.d.: 8-15; see also Chavda, 1983 for Bradford; Foulkes, 1995 for Camden, London). Clearly, in these cases, Gujarati *jatis* are still characterised by a degree of occupational specialisation.

Few studies of Gujarati Hindus in Britain have provided information comparing the *jati* membership of individuals to surrogate measures for their economic and political standing. Consequently, it is difficult to draw any reliable conclusions on the state of the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system amongst this community. A sole researcher providing insight into this area has been Knott. In her studies of the Leeds Gujarati Hindu community, she claimed that persons from the *Mochi jati* (of low ritual ranking) controlled less financial and housing resources and wielded less power than those from the *Patidar* or *Lohana jatis* (of higher ritual ranking). This was because the *Mochis* were

<sup>37</sup>Such as the *Patidars*, who are clearly not farmers any more.

predominantly employed in blue collar factory work with low pay and prestige, whilst the *Patidars* and *Lohanas* were more likely to have built up lucrative small businesses or obtained professional and managerial posts (Knott, n.d: 11-15; 1994: 223-7; Knott, 1986: 45). Knott puts the slow progress of the *Mochis* down to their "social and occupational heritage as a poor artisan group" (Knott, 1994: 223; n.d: 12), and such observations appear to have led her to the conclusion that amongst Gujarati Hindus in Britain:

...those from low castes are lower on the social scale in occupational and economic terms than their high caste peers. (Knott, 1986: 48).

This situation would help preserve the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system in a fixed and coterminous form. However, without further research it is difficult to determine the extent to which Knott's observations can be applied to Britain's whole Gujarati Hindu community.

Amongst those Indian Hindus living in East Africa, the literature suggested that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system was considerably weakened, and that this was reflected in a degeneration of commensal restrictions between social units like *jatis* and *varnas*. For Gujarati Hindus in Britain the situation initially appears to be the same. In Leeds, for example, Knott indicates that the concepts of spiritual purity and pollution, on which the ritual hierarchy is based, have disappeared amongst Gujarati Hindus, and that commensality is complete at all levels. Thus, the *Mochis* of low ritual status "routinely eat alongside members of higher castes." (Knott, 1994: 228).

By contrast, Michaelson argues that the above scenario represents an inaccurate picture, which is projected at the public level by Britain's Gujarati Hindu community, both in their quest to "appear modern", and through the fear of "disapprobation by the wider (non-Hindu English) society" (Michaelson, 1983: 38). She argues that in reality, Britain's Gujarati Hindus have maintained the concepts of spiritual purity, pollution and the ritual hierarchy. Accordingly, she notes that commensal restrictions can be observed operating at the *varna* level in public places like a temple. An example of this is when *Brahminical* Gujarati Hindus refuse to take *prasad* (sanctified food) at temples, because individuals from *varnas* of lower ritual ranking are allowed into the temple and thus present a source of pollution (Michaelson, 1983: 38-9). At the private, domestic level meanwhile, Michaelson claims that finer distinctions in ritual status can be observed amongst Britain's Gujarati Hindus. Thus, even individuals from different *jatis* of the same *varna* may avoid inter-dining and eating in each others' homes for fear of pollution (Michaelson, 1983: 39).

As Michaelson's account focuses on Gujarati Hindus who are 'twice migrants' from East Africa, it puts question marks over the observations made in various studies about the ritual hierarchy and commensality amongst this community when it was living there. As seen above (Section 3.5.3), such studies generally support the idea that the ritual hierarchy and commensal restrictions were weakened to a point of near eradication in the East African context. Perhaps these studies had only captured a publicly acceptable (yet inaccurate) picture of these phenomena, as disseminated by those Gujarati Hindus who were living in East African Diaspora .

From the above accounts it is evident that the caste system has remained important for Gujarati Hindus living in Britain. However, the emphasis here is on changes in the institution, and in this respect it is difficult to establish how much change these accounts embody. On the one hand, the picture of the caste system provided above, especially in terms of the endogamy and social organisation within the institution, is similar to that seen in East Africa following the various changes it endured there. As the majority of Gujarati Hindus in this country have migrated through East Africa, it would appear that there has been very little change occurring in the caste system in Britain from its earlier East African context.

However, it should be noted that most of the studies focusing on the caste system amongst Britain's Gujarati Hindus were only carried out a short time after their arrival from East Africa in the early to mid-1970s. Thus, Michaelson carried out her field work between 1974 and 1976 (Michaelson, 1979: 359, note 1), whilst Knott began her research in 1978 (Knott, n.d: 1). The short period between the arrival of Gujaratis and their subsequent investigation by British academics would have allowed little time for the occurrence of any significant changes in the caste system in Britain. New research is therefore required on the caste system amongst Britain's Gujarati Hindu community, some 20 to 25 years after immigration and settlement, when it could be assumed that a suitable time period had elapsed for significant changes to occur.

Naturally, if the picture of the caste system presented above also applies to those Gujarati Hindus who migrated directly from India to Britain in the 1950s and '60s, then it would represent a considerable change in the institution for such individuals from the Indian to the British context. However, no studies of Gujarati Hindus in Britain make any serious attempt to disaggregate data pertaining to persons connected with the third stage of migration, and 'twice migrants' of the fourth stage<sup>38</sup>. Consequently, determining the amount of change in the caste system exclusively within the former of these migratory groups is practically impossible. Thus, up to date studies of the caste system amongst Britain's Gujarati Hindus also need to distinguish between third and fourth stage

---

<sup>38</sup>Apart from Michaelson (1979; 1983 - see Footnote 36).

migrants, as the caste system may have been subjected to different rates and degrees of change amongst them.

### 3.6.3 Changes in the caste system amongst Britain's Punjabi Hindus

Whilst studies of the caste system amongst Gujarati Hindus in Britain are outdated, those focusing on Britain's Punjabi Hindu community, let alone the caste system within it, are more or less non-existent. Indeed Law (1991) appears to be the only available work which concentrates primarily on Punjabi Hindus living in this country, although this study (which concerns itself with Derby's Punjabi Hindu community) presents no information on the caste system.

Other studies have included passing references to Britain's Punjabi Hindus within their general analysis of the wider Indian Hindu community in specific towns and cities (Knott 1986; 1981b; Vertovec 1992: 258-60). A few studies also focus on the Untouchable *jati* of *Chamars* (Leather Tanners), who are often referred to as *Ravidasis*<sup>39</sup> (e.g. Shukra, 1994), or their close compatriots the *Valmikis*<sup>40</sup>, who are also derived from an Untouchable *jati* of Leather Tanners (Nesbitt, 1990; 1994). Persons from these two social groups are from the Punjab and may often regard themselves as Hindus<sup>41</sup>.

These studies provide 'snippets' of information about the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus living in Britain, but much of this appears unclear or contradictory. For example, Vertovec (1992: 259) notes that "caste sentiments continue to determine many marriages" amongst Britain's Punjabi Hindus, but it is unclear what he really means by this. Is he suggesting that intra-caste marriages still occur, or perhaps that intra-*jati* or even intra-*varna* marriages have become the norm?

On another front, Knott (1981b: 7) implies that because of the small size of the Punjabi Hindu population in Britain, their unit of social and political control is not the caste, *jati* or *varna*, but Punjabi *mandals* or *sabhas*; associations which serve the whole Punjabi Hindu community irrespective of *jati* affiliations. However, in contrast to this, it appears that Punjabi Hindu *jatis* of low ritual ranking in Britain, such as the *Chamars* (*Ravidasis*), operate independently from other Punjabi Hindus as self-contained social and political units, and this may extend as far as running their own temples (Vertovec, 1992: 259; Nesbitt, 1990; 1994).

<sup>39</sup>Named after the 14th Century mystic *Guru Ravi Dass*, a *Chamar* who came to be revered as one of the greatest north Indian saints.

<sup>40</sup>Named after *Maharishi Valmik*, the composer of the Hindu epic *Ramayana*. See Saberwal (1976) for an explanation of the association between *Valmik* and the *Valmikis*.

<sup>41</sup>Although the *Valmikis* and *Ravidasis* may also consider themselves to be Sikhs, because the division between these two religions is not clear cut amongst them. For further details see Nesbitt (1994: 123-4, 137; 1990: 265, 268-9; 1991) and Section 4.3.10.

Clearly, no detailed research has been done which provides a full picture of the caste system amongst Britain's Punjabi Hindus, either across the country as a whole, or even in a given town or city. Discussion about the caste system amongst this community, let alone any analysis of changes which may have occurred in the institution since the bulk of Punjabi Hindus arrived in Britain, is therefore impossible. This study fills this gap in the literature by providing a detailed account of all aspects of the caste system amongst Bradford's current Punjabi Hindu community, which was largely established through the third stage of direct migration from India in the 1950s and '60s (see Section 8.1). Such information will also allow for an analysis of changes that have occurred in the caste system amongst this community since its emigration from India, and during its 30 to 40 year residence in Bradford.

### **3.7 CONCLUSION: MODERNITY AND TRADITION**

This chapter has rejected a common-sense view of the caste system as an immutable and inflexible institution. Instead, it has been demonstrated that the caste system is dynamic and adaptable, because it has constantly changed in response to forces. Some key points can be made in connection with this.

First, the forces engendering change in the caste system have been shown to vary in their nature, both diachronically and spatially. For example, the forces which brought about change in the institution in the time/space context of independent India (see Section 3.3) have been shown to be largely internally generated by the Indians themselves. Conversely, forces engendering change in the caste system at the height of the Raj period during the 19th Century, and in the spatial context of imperial India (see Section 3.2) or other colonies housing Indian Hindu Diaspora (see Section 3.5.2), were generated externally by the British. In addition, the forces for change in any one historical period or spatial context might be unintentional or intentional in their nature.

Furthermore, diachronic and spatial variation in the nature of forces engendering change in the caste system has resulted in differences in the nature of that change itself. Thus, varying historical periods and spatial contexts have seen different aspects of the caste system (ranging from the sociological characteristics of its constituent social units to its hierarchical structure) either weakening, strengthening or adapting in response to forces. It has also been seen that an aspect of the caste system which weakens in one temporal and spatial context can strengthen in another, or vice versa, throwing the institution into a constant state of flux.

However, whilst different aspects of the caste system regularly weaken/strengthen/adapt over time and space, there are some elements which remain

resolutely unchanging. For example, although the ritual hierarchy has weakened considerably in the time/space context of many post-indentured ex-colonies, it was noted that within these ex-colonies there still exists some understanding that *Brahmins* and Untouchables are of high and low ritual ranking respectively (see Section 3.5.2). The most basic and fundamental oppositions within the ritual hierarchy have therefore remained in place, even when subjected to powerful forces for change. Thus, the caste system, irrespective of the time/space context under study, encompasses elements of both modernity and tradition. Within post-indentured ex-colonies, modernity is embodied in the fact that the intricate levels of ritual ranking between individual *jatis* and castes have disappeared, due to weakening changes brought about by the indenture process. The traditional, however, lies with the realisation that despite such change, there still remains a deep seated notion of the spiritually pure superseding the polluted, with the ongoing distinction between *Brahmins* and Untouchables being the clearest evidence for this.

This concept of modernity and tradition is a useful tool for grasping the nature of change within the caste system, and one which is expounded by Rudolph & Rudolph (1967) in their seminal text on Indian political development. They argue that theorists of social change have often identified a dichotomy between the modern and the traditional, such that modernity in social institutions will only be realised when the traditional has been fully eradicated. The Rudolphs coherently argue that the identification of such a dichotomy rests on a:

...misunderstanding of modern society that excludes its traditional features [and] a misdiagnosis of traditional society that underestimates its modern potentialities. (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1967: 5).

In contradistinction to this, the Rudolphs suggest that social structures like the caste system always (and necessarily) accommodate elements of modernity and tradition together, and they imply that it is this quality which has been the key to the adaptability and resultant survival of such social structures over long periods of time, and between different spatial contexts. On the basis of this chapter's findings, their thesis is supported in this study.

## Chapter Four

### *Data types employed in the study: collection, use, manipulation and analysis*

#### 4.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter has three aims. First, to identify the types of data employed in this study and to indicate in which chapters they are found. This provides the focus of Section 4.1. The second aim is to explain how these data types were collected or generated, and the third is to identify the purpose for which these data are used in the study, as well as describing how they were manipulated (where relevant) and analysed to achieve this. These second and third aims provide the foci of Sections 4.2 to 4.7. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.8. In short, this chapter amounts to a discussion of research methodologies.

#### 4.1 DATA TYPES EMPLOYED IN THE STUDY

The data employed can be broadly categorised as either secondary or primary in nature. Secondary data were those which had already been generated elsewhere, and which were available for immediate use. Primary data were those which did not already exist, and which therefore had to be generated especially for the study in hand.

These two broad data categories can be further subdivided into a number of different types. These are defined by the origin of the data, in terms of the source from which they were collected or generated, the population or group of persons to whom the data apply, and whether the data are quantitative or qualitative in nature. On this basis the secondary data employed in this study can be split into three types:

- i) Quantitative data collected from the 1991 Census. These data apply to the whole South Asian population in Bradford, and those major ethnic groups within it, such as Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. They are found in Chapter Five.
- ii) Quantitative data collected from Ram's (1983; 1989) South Asian name analysis of Bradford's 1981 electoral register. These data apply to religio-ethnic sub-groups in Bradford's Indian population. They are also found in Chapter Five.
- iii) Qualitative data collected from newspapers published for (and by) this country's South Asian community. These data apply to the Punjabi Hindu community in the whole of Britain. They are found in Chapter Six.

The primary data used in this study can be spilt into four types:

- i) Quantitative data generated from South Asian name analysis of Bradford's 1992 electoral register. These data apply to the population sizes of religio-ethnic sub-groups in Bradford's Indian community and are found in Chapter Five.
- ii) Qualitative data generated from interviews with 50 Punjabi Hindu sample households in Bradford. These data apply to the Punjabi Hindus living in these households, although it will be seen that they are eventually taken as applicable to the whole of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. They are found in Chapters Six to Nine.
- iii) Quantitative data generated from the 50 interviews and also 73 questionnaires, which together surveyed a combined total of 123 Punjabi Hindu sample households in Bradford. These data apply to Punjabi Hindus living in these households, although again, they are eventually taken as applicable to the whole of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. They are also found in Chapters Six to Nine.
- iv) Qualitative data generated from observation. These subdivide into:
  - Ethnographic data generated from participant observation amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. These data apply to this community and are found in Chapters Six to Eight.
  - Data generated from more general fieldwork observations. These data apply to major ethnic groups within Bradford's South Asian population (i.e. Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis), as well as religio-ethnic sub-groups within the city's Indian population. They are found in Chapter Five.

## 4.2 SECONDARY DATA

This section is concerned with the three types of secondary data employed in the study. It briefly identifies what these data types were used for, and how they were collected, manipulated (where relevant) and analysed.

Quantitative secondary data from the 1991 Census are used in Chapter Five to demonstrate the size of Bradford's South Asian population, as well as those major ethnic group populations within it (e.g. Indians, Pakistanis etc.). The relevant data are collected from statistical publications of the 1991 Census, as produced by OPCS (The Office of Population Censuses and Surveys). Manipulation of these data is carried out by presenting them in tabular and graphical form. Analysis is achieved by discussing the patterns and trends which these tables and graphs demonstrate. This becomes clearer in Section 5.2.

Quantitative, numeric data resulting from Ram's South Asian name analysis of Bradford's 1981 electoral register are collected from tables found in Ram (1989: 184-6). These data are used in Chapter Five, where they are manipulated and analysed by comparing them with corresponding data generated from name analysis of Bradford's 1992 register in this study. This is explained in more detail in Section 4.3.12.

The third type of secondary data employed in the study is from South Asian newspapers published in this country. The South Asian press has grown rapidly in Britain since the early 1970s, when various publications began to spring up. Some of these publications are written in the script of a South Asian language, such as Hindi; an example being the Punjabi publication *Amar Deep*<sup>1</sup>. Others, such as the India Mail, are in English. All provide a valuable source of information about the life, culture and behaviour of Britain's South Asian community and the various ethnic sub-groups within it. English language cuttings have been collected from this South Asian press. These are presented and analysed in Chapter Six, where they are used to illustrate discussion about marriage practices amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community (see Section 6.2.3).

Additional secondary data from other authorial sources are also used in following chapters, but have not been mentioned above. For example, qualitative observational data collected by other researchers on Punjabi Hindu communities resident in cities outside Bradford are used in Chapter Six. However, unlike the above, these data are not undergoing any further manipulation and analysis in this study. Their use, therefore, amounts to literature review, and as such has not been discussed here.

### **4.3 PRIMARY QUANTITATIVE DATA GENERATED FROM SOUTH ASIAN NAME ANALYSIS**

#### **4.3.1 Overview**

Quantitative data generated from South Asian name analysis of Bradford's 1992 electoral register, and relating to the population sizes of religio-ethnic sub-groups in the city's Indian population, is one of the four primary data types employed in this study. Before outlining the name analysis methodology which was used to generate these data, it is important to understand that this methodology itself largely came about through accident rather than design, when trying to find a way of identifying Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford for the purposes of sampling. This is explained in Section 4.3.2.

Section 4.3.3 focuses on South Asian name analysis methodologies in other works, whilst Sections 4.3.4 to 4.3.11 provide a detailed account of that devised and

---

<sup>1</sup>*Amar Deep* was Britain's first Hindi newspaper. It was established in 1971 and is issued weekly. Its principal readership is Britain's Punjabi Hindu community.

employed in this study. This account represents one of the major research contributions of this study. Section 4.3.12 explains how the quantitative data generated from this South Asian name analysis were used, manipulated and analysed. Finally, Section 4.3.13 examines the accuracy of these data.

#### **4.3.2 Reasons for the development of a South Asian name analysis methodology**

As mentioned in Section 4.1, this study involves the presentation of primary data generated from interviews carried out on a sample of Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford. The creation of this sample represented a substantial task. First, because it was necessary to identify **all** Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford. This would allow a random sample of them to have a better chance of being representative of the city's whole Punjabi Hindu community. Second, because the geographical location of Punjabi Hindu households had to be located so that those eventually sampled could actually be found for the delivery of interviews. In short, before sampling could begin, all Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford had to be enumerated and located.

This could not be done using the 1991 Census, because this yields no information on religio-ethnic sub-groups within the Indian community, such as Punjabi Hindus. The next most obvious approach was to ask leaders of the major Punjabi Hindu centres of worship in Bradford for lists of the names and addresses of their members. Punjabi Hindu households could then be sampled from these lists for interviews. However, these leaders refused to provide such information, and even if they had there was no guarantee that these lists would have included all Punjabi Hindu households in the city. Instead, they would have only identified the names and addresses of Punjabi Hindus who regularly used the centres of worship from which the lists had been obtained. This would have provided a biased cross-section of Punjabi Hindu addresses before any sampling of households began.

The remaining solution was to use Bradford's electoral register for enumerating and locating Punjabi Hindu households, and sampling from this. The electoral register is prepared annually for over four hundred areas throughout Britain. For each of these areas it provides the name and address of each individual elector. Importantly, the electors listed in the register are only those persons who have an age  $\geq 16$  years and eight months on the qualifying date of registration. This represents the minimum age at which the right to vote would occur during the annual period following this qualifying date.

An advantage of the electoral register over other data sources like the British Census is that the religio-ethnic sub-groups to which individual Indian electors belong

can be determined from their distinctive forenames and surnames. Consequently, the size of a specific Indian religio-ethnic sub-group population (aged  $\geq 16$  years and eight months) can be established for a given area by analysing all the names entered in the register for that area. Furthermore, because the register provides information on the addresses of electors, all the households affiliated to this specific sub-group population can also be enumerated and located in this given area. In view of these possibilities, it was decided that this type of name analysis would be carried out on the electoral register for Bradford, to determine the number of Punjabi Hindus resident in the city (aged  $\leq 16$  years and eight months), and to enumerate and locate Punjabi Hindu households for sampling.

To undertake this name analysis search, the first task was to obtain a copy of the Bradford electoral register. A 1992 copy was purchased from Bradford Metropolitan District Council (MDC). This register was bound in 30 volumes, each one corresponding to an electoral ward. Within these volumes electors were divided into their respective polling districts. In each polling district they were sequentially numbered and their names and addresses were provided.

The register was also purchased from Leeds City Council for the two Leeds wards of Pudsey North and South, which abut onto the eastern side of Bradford. It was decided to include these wards in the name analysis search for Punjabi Hindus. The reason for this stemmed from two factors. First, 1991 Census counts revealed that these two wards had large Indian populations<sup>2</sup>. Second, casual conversations with Indians living in these two Leeds wards (carried out prior to name analysis) revealed that most of them had only recently migrated out of Bradford in a process of suburbanisation<sup>3</sup>. Thus, they still considered themselves to belong to Bradford's Indian community, or to be part of the 'Bradford scene' as one Indian shopkeeper put it.

As a result of these factors, it was felt that the Pudsey wards should be included in the name analysis procedure. This was because they could have contained significant numbers of Punjabi Hindu electors who considered themselves to be living in Bradford, and who would have been omitted from any potential sample of Punjabi Hindu households for interview if these two wards were ignored. Thus, 32 volumes of the electoral register - defining a study area of all 30 electoral wards in Bradford and two in Leeds - required name analysis. This amounted to approximately 400,000 names which needed to be analysed in order to pick out the Punjabi Hindu electors and households.

---

<sup>2</sup>For evidence of this see table L06 of the 1991 Census, Local Base Statistics (OPCS/GRO(S), 1993).

<sup>3</sup>This suburbanisation of Indians from Bradford to these two Leeds wards is confirmed in Rees *et al.* (1995: 568-9).

For the sake of simplicity, the discussion below will use the terms 'Bradford wards', 'study wards' or 'Bradford register' to refer collectively to all 32 wards of the study area.

Inevitably, the identification of Punjabi Hindu names on the Bradford register involved distinguishing them from those of electors belonging to other religio-ethnic sub-groups (e.g. Gujarati Hindus, Punjabi Sikhs), as well as the names of Pakistani, Bangladeshi and non-South Asian electors. As a result, a detailed methodology for analysing South Asian names had to be devised and employed. This methodology is of major benefit to future researchers, and for this reason it is now discussed in detail. Quantitative data resulting from this name analysis, and relating to the number of persons belonging to different religio-ethnic sub-groups in the city's Indian community, is only discussed after this methodology has been fully explained.

### **4.3.3 South Asian name analysis in other studies**

To fully appreciate and understand the South Asian name analysis methodology developed in this study, it is necessary to set it in context. This is achieved by giving a brief account - and where possible a critique - of the South Asian name analysis methodologies employed in other studies.

Among the few published works which make use of South Asian name analysis, the paper "Colour and Community" by Israel (1964) appears to be the first. Israel used the electoral register to identify the names of South Asian individuals for interview in a sample survey, the aim of which was to assess their interest in the political activities of this country. Unfortunately, he did not explain his methodology for the identification of South Asian names.

In 1974 Kearsley & Srivastava carried out South Asian name analysis on the Glasgow electoral registers of 1951, '61 and '71. Their aim was to identify the spatial and temporal changes in the distribution of South Asian electors in the city. However, their name analysis methodology was not revealed. Similarly, Cater & Jones (1979), in their study of the social geography of South Asians in Bradford, relied on name analysis of the 1976 electoral register to identify and locate members of this community. Yet they too failed to describe their name analysis technique. Singh (1980) also used South Asian name analysis on Bradford's 1977 electoral register to enumerate and locate households of the Indian Sikh community. Again, however, there was no explanation of the methodology he employed to do this.

Many early studies utilising South Asian name analysis therefore failed to give any detailed insights into the methodological techniques behind it. More recently,

however, the situation has improved. Phillips (1983), for example, carried out name analysis on seven of Leicester's electoral registers, for the years 1951 to 1978, as a means of monitoring the spatial configuration of the South Asian community over time. To do this she used a basic dictionary of South Asian names compiled by the Leicester Council for Community Relations (LCCR, 1978). This was a locally adapted version of a similarly entitled nation-wide document produced by the Community Relations Commission (CRC, 1978).

Phillips found the Leicester dictionary adequate for her research, as she only needed to identify broad religious categories within the South Asian community. For the purposes of this study, however, neither the Leicester nor CRC dictionaries are particularly useful. They are not very extensive<sup>4</sup>, and they fail to explain how to categorise Indian names by origin region (e.g. Punjabi or Gujarati). Their simplicity lies with the fact that they are designed primarily as guides for teachers in multi-ethnic schools (see CRC, 1978: iii). Consequently, they are not ideally suited for detailed research use.

A more comprehensive dictionary of South Asian names was compiled by Smith (1982a; 1982b) for use on the Coventry electoral register, as part of the Linguistic Minorities Project (LMP). This dictionary is an integral part of a computer program, which is designed to scan machine readable electoral register data and identify South Asian names by religious and language origins. It comprises 2995 South Asian names, and this figure includes both surnames, forenames and name stems. These 'stems' are usually the first five letters of a South Asian name. They allow South Asian names on the electoral register to be matched to their stem, even if the full name is not in the dictionary. Each forename, surname and name stem is assigned a code to indicate both its language and religious origin (see Figure 4.1).

Shortly after its development for Coventry, Bradford Metropolitan District Council (MDC) decided to test the accuracy of Smith's name analysis program by running it on the surnames and forenames of children in some of the city's First and Middle Schools, whose actual religious/language status was already known. The program identified 99.5% of names with a South Asian origin. Within this broad category, 95% of names were accurately identified by religion (either Sikh, Muslim or Hindu), and 81% of names were correctly associated with one particular language, namely Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Urdu or Punjabi (Bradford MDC, 1985; Simpson, 1983).

---

<sup>4</sup>For instance, Ram notes that the CRC dictionary "...includes only a few of the many common Hindu, Sikh and Muslim names..." (Ram, 1989: 163).

**Figure 4.1: Selected entries from Smith's computerised dictionary of South Asian names**

44UMGUL	55HHGARALA	55UMHANFI	67UMHASSAN
55UMGAFOORAN	57HHGANGAN	44BMHOQUE	55UMHAYAT
66PSGURBACHAN	44HHGOHEL	55UMHOSSIEN	66PSHARMISH
66PSGURMEJ	24HHGHELANI	66UMHANNAN	66PSHARBIAS
44PSGOLHAR	44GOGIVA	44UMHAKIM	66HHHEMALATHA
45PSGAHIA	55HHGOVINDGI	55UMHANIF	66HHHIRANI
26PSGHANDU	55HHGOVINDER	55UMHANIF	55GHHAYA

**INTERPRETATION OF CODES**

<b>Language codes</b>		<b>Religion codes</b>
<b>B</b> = Bengali	<b>R</b> = Hindi/Punjabi	<b>H</b> = Hindu
<b>C</b> = Bengali/Urdu	<b>S</b> = Hindi/Gujarati	<b>M</b> = Muslim
<b>G</b> = Gujarati	<b>T</b> = Gujarati/ Punjabi	<b>S</b> = Sikh
<b>H</b> = Hindi	<b>X</b> = Gujarati/ Urdu	<b>N</b> = Sikh/Hindu
<b>P</b> = Punjabi	<b>Y</b> = Punjabi/Urdu	<b>O</b> = Hindu/Muslim
<b>U</b> = Urdu	<b>O</b> = Others	<b>Q</b> = Muslim/Sikh

**Prefixes**

Each name is prefixed by four characters:

1st = A single digit (ignore it)  
 2nd = A single digit (ignore it)  
 3rd = The language code  
 4th = The religion code

Source: Adapted from Ram (1989: 650), after Smith (1982a; 1982b).

Despite this success, Bradford MDC have been keen to emphasise some of the drawbacks of Smith's program. They claim that it ignores South Asian names or name stems which are not included in its dictionary. These names can often be quite common, such as the Punjabi Sikh forenames 'Jaswinder', 'Jatinder' and 'Ranjit', or the Pakistani Muslim name 'Mahboob' (Simpson, 1983: 2). In addition, Bradford MDC criticise the program for 'picking out' English surnames which are identical to South Asian ones, even if their corresponding forename is of an English origin. Examples of these might be the surnames 'Gill', which is common amongst Punjabi Sikhs, and 'Lad' or 'Ladd', which often occurs in the Gujarati Hindu community. Both these surnames can also occur amongst white British citizens (Bradford MDC, 1985: 2; Simpson, 1983: 2).

Another criticism of Smith's program comes from Ram, who claims that it:

...does not always give accurate information in some of the situations, particularly with respect to codes for religion. (Ram, 1989: 162).

Ram suggests the forename 'Gurbachan' as an example of this. Whilst this name is always coded as Punjabi Sikh by the program, he argues it is also "a common name among Hindus" (Ram, 1989: 162-3). Unfortunately, however, two of the most important

drawbacks to Smith's name analysis program have been overlooked by both Bradford MDC and Ram. The first of these concerns the spelling of South Asian names.

It is often forgotten by those researching Britain's South Asian community, that the spelling of a Pakistani, Indian or Bangladeshi forename using the Roman alphabet is merely a phonetic representation of that said forename in its original *matra* form (i.e. its spelling in the script of a South Asian language). Furthermore, the precise spelling of this phonetic representation is usually, in the case of 'first generation' immigrants, the decision of the individual; or where 'second' and 'third generation' immigrants are concerned, the individual's parents<sup>5</sup>. Accordingly, there are often many variations on the same basic South Asian forename, which can be phonetically identical, or at least very similar, and yet spelt differently.

The number of these variations has tended to increase as more second and third generation immigrants have been born into Britain's South Asian community, and have been given newly spelt (but phonetically identical or similar) versions of a given South Asian forename by their parents. Examples of the phonetically identical would be the Hindu female forenames 'Veena' and 'Vina', and the Hindu male forenames 'Deepak' and 'Dipak'. An example of the phonetically similar would be the Hindu male forenames 'Anupam' and 'Anupom'. As the second and third generations reach voting age, these minor variations in the spelling of their names effectively result in new South Asian forenames being included on the electoral register with each consecutive year.

This situation is complicated still further, because many individuals appear to have changed the spelling of their forenames over time. Discussion with members of Bradford's South Asian community during a period of detailed name analysis research in the city (involving around 2000 household visits) suggested two reasons for this. First, it was apparent that some older members of this community, whose grasp of writing in Roman script was minimal, were likely to spell their forename slightly differently from time to time. It seemed this was not done as part of a conscious effort to change its spelling, but simply because they wrote it down so rarely in Roman script that they were unable to remember how they had spelt it on previous occasions. Consequently, if the spelling of their forename was different on each annual electoral registration form, so too would be their entry in the electoral register. Second, a few of the younger members of Bradford's South Asian community claimed they had made slight alterations to the spelling of their forenames simply because they preferred it.

Clearly, there is considerable dynamism in the naming system of the Britain's South Asians, with newly spelt variations of the same basic forenames appearing on the

---

<sup>5</sup>The concept of 'generation' will be fully defined in Section 4.4.

electoral register every year. Some of these newly spelt forenames will represent genuinely new electors who have not previously been old enough to be included on the register. Others will represent electors who have been on the register before, but now appear on it with a new, slightly different spelling of their forename.

As well as forenames, surnames - or the names Britain's South Asians use as surnames - are also open to considerable spelling variations. Again, these variations stem primarily from differing phonetic representations of the surnames from their original *matra* forms. Examples of this might be the Sikh surnames 'Dosanj' and 'Dosanjh', or 'Sagu' and 'Saggu'. However, a South Asian family living in a given household is likely to keep to one particular spelling of their surname. Consequently, slight spelling variations of the same basic surname generally occur between families living in separate households, who may or may not be related. This situation differs from that seen for forenames, where spelling variations occurred between individuals.

Like forenames, newly spelt but phonetically identical or similar variations of surnames can still emerge over time amongst Britain's South Asians. Such changes are usually inter-generational, and occur when a son adapts the spelling of his family name or surname and passes that adaptation on to his immediate family. In Bradford, an ideal example of this was the Hindu family name 'Kaushal' or 'Koshal', which was found to have recently emerged in the form of 'Kaushel' within one young family in the city. This had occurred when the male head of this family had married, and had decided to change the spelling of his family name from 'Kaushal' to 'Kaushel', so as to stop people confusing his family with his father's. Developments such as these are likely to result in the rapid emergence of what appear to be new South Asian surnames on the electoral register.

With such a wealth of variations appearing in the way Britain's South Asians spell their forenames and surnames, the use of Smith's name analysis program becomes highly problematic. Constant updating of the names dictionary within the program would be required for it to be able to keep pace with new spelling variations appearing on the electoral register. This has not been done. In fact, Smith's dictionary has not been revised since its development in the early 1980s.

It could be argued that new variations in the spelling of South Asian names on the electoral register will make little difference to the efficacy of Smith's program in analysing them by their religion and language. In theory, this is because the program's flexibility means that if it does not recognise one part of a name, then there is usually a second name or a name stem which will still allow it to analyse the name correctly. However, this proposed flexibility is of no real use. Certainly, if a particular surname was not recognised by the program, then reliance on the forename for an accurate

classification would be unwise. This is because South Asian forenames, unlike surnames or family names, are often shared by different religious and language groups. It is the surname, therefore, which usually provides the key to accurately classifying a full South Asian name by religion, language etc. Hence, Bradford MDC have gone so far as to suggest that where Smith's program is concerned:

Forenames may not add enough information to bother using them. (Simpson, 1983: 2).

Reliance on South Asian name stems for classification can be equally problematic. Like forenames, many name stems, even those relating to surnames, may be shared by more than one religious or language group within the South Asian community. More importantly, there is increasing evidence that a few South Asians in Britain may be starting to change the spelling of their forenames and surnames to such an extent that even their phonetic representation is being altered. The resultant addition, subtraction or substitution of vowels and/or consonants at the beginning of a name would undoubtedly affect its identification by Smith's name stem recognition procedure. In Bradford, for instance, a handful of new spelling variations were observed amongst South Asians who have altered the overall phonetic representation of their names, and consequently their name stems as well. An example is the Punjabi Sikh surname 'Bassan', which has recently occurred in the form 'Bussan' in Bradford.

In summary, the idea of a computerised name analysis technique is an attractive one, but the software on which it is based needs to be more sophisticated than that offered by Smith. Ideally, such software would be built around some form of self-learning neural database and would be capable of:

- i) Capturing a large proportion of those South Asian names or name stems on a given electoral register which were not already in its existing dictionary of names.
- ii) Accurately classifying these names by religion, language etc., irrespective of whether they were phonetically similar or dissimilar to those already existing in its dictionary.
- iii) Adding these newly classified names and name stems to its existing dictionary for the purposes of future recognition.

So far, in analysing the drawbacks of Smith's name analysis program, the focus has been on its limitations in identifying the spelling complexities behind South Asian names. An additional pitfall stems from the data on which the program is run. Electoral registers, both paper and machine readable copies, are notoriously inaccurate. Surnames are often entered in the register as forenames and vice versa. Similarly, many electors' names are also misspelt on entry. This is particularly the case where South Asian electors

are being entered in the register by white British persons with a poor knowledge of South Asian names. Another problem concerns the double entry of individuals or families on the register. This phenomenon occurs where electors have moved house during the registration period and are asked to fill in registration forms at both addresses. Unfortunately, Smith's name analysis program does not incorporate strategies for coping with any of these problems. Again, however, it is suggested that such data unreliability may be overcome with the development of more sophisticated software for analysing South Asian names, of the kind suggested above.

Despite its many drawbacks, Smith's program was still considered for name analysis of the Bradford register in this study. In the end it suffered from three further insurmountable problems which warranted its rejection as a research tool. First, it failed to identify South Asians by origin region. This was particularly important, as Hindus from the Indian Punjab needed to be identified for the purposes of drawing up a random sample of their households for interview. The language classification of names which Smith's program does provide was not considered a good enough surrogate for origin region status. For instance, two different individuals whose names were classified under the Hindi and Punjabi language respectively might both be of Punjabi origin. Alternatively, the individual with the name classified under the Hindi language, though possibly Punjabi, could be from any other region of India.

A second reason for the rejection of Smith's program concerned its spatial inflexibility. Output from any register analysis is only provided at polling district or ward level. This renders the program unsuitable for the current study, where Punjabi Hindu households need to be identified and located individually for sampling purposes. A final deterrent lay with the high price of software materials. The cost of the electoral register in machine readable form and the program itself would have amounted to several thousand pounds. In view of all these factors it was decided that name analysis of Bradford's 1992 register in this study needed to be carried out manually.

Attention therefore turned to the work of Ram (1983; 1989), who carried out a manual analysis of South Asian names on Bradford's 1981 register. Drawing on extensive personal knowledge, Ram was able to identify all South Asian electors by their names in this register. Within this broad group he was able to further distinguish between the names of Indian and other South Asian electors. Finally, Ram used the names of Indian electors to subdivide them into their religio-ethnic sub-groups.


Ram provided an overview of the methodological techniques used to identify these various categories of South Asian names. His methodology was particularly detailed where the names of Indians were concerned. He gave a comprehensive account

of how these could be classified into different religio-ethnic sub-groups, and this was complemented by a dictionary of Indian names (see Ram, 1989: 448-92). This aspect of Ram's methodology was particularly relevant to this study, which was especially concerned with identifying Punjabi Hindu electors from their names on Bradford's 1992 register. Consequently, Ram's work provided the initial framework for the South Asian name analysis methodology devised and employed below. However, this methodology culminates in more detailed and comprehensive analysis than that provided by Ram.

#### 4.3.4 'Indians', 'Other South Asians' and 'Others'

There were three basic stages to the South Asian name analysis methodology devised and employed in this study. First, 'South Asian' electors in Bradford's 1992 electoral register were distinguished from 'Others' on the basis of their names. Then, within this broad category of 'South Asians', the names of 'Other South Asian' electors were differentiated from those of 'Indians'. Finally, 'Indian' electors were sub-divided into their respective religio-ethnic sub-groups on the basis of their names. These three stages are best understood when represented diagrammatically in Figure 4.2.

**Figure 4.2: Three stages of the South Asian name analysis methodology devised and employed in this study**



The term 'South Asians' refers to any elector of South Asian ethnicity, irrespective of his/her religion. 'South Asia' denotes an area which includes the countries of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The term 'Others' represents the total of electors in Bradford excluding 'South Asians'. The term 'Indians' refers exclusively to those electors of 'South Asian' ethnicity who are of Indian origin or ancestry, irrespective of their religion. An Indian origin or ancestry is not affected by birthplace. Thus, those ethnic Indians who have been born in Britain, East Africa, and the Caribbean or other ex-indentured colonies, are still 'Indians'. The term 'Other South Asians' refers to those electors of South Asian ethnicity who originate from countries in

South Asia other than India. It will be seen below that the vast majority of 'Other South Asians' in Bradford were Muslims of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin.

#### 4.3.5 Separating South Asians from Others

As seen in Figure 4.2, the first stage of South Asian name analysis involved the differentiation of South Asian electors from Others on Bradford's 1992 electoral register. This was carried out on one polling district at a time in this register. All the 'South Asian looking' names within a given polling district were underlined as a means of separating South Asian electors from Others. This was not difficult. South Asian names can be easily recognised and distinguished, not only from those of English origin, but also from many other types such as Chinese or Italian names.

To illustrate this point, Figure 4.3 presents a page from Bradford's 1992 electoral register. In this figure, South Asian names have been underlined in the way described above. The names of the remaining non-South Asian electors (or Others) which are not underlined are mainly English, which usually indicates white ethnicity<sup>6</sup>. However, a few of these non-South Asian names also indicate electors of Chinese, Polish, Italian and Vietnamese ethnicities. Such names are clearly marked in the figure. Although Figure 4.3 is specific to Bradford's 1992 register, it is intended to illustrate how South Asian names would be easily recognisable on a register produced in any year and for any other area of Britain.

For a handful of electors it was difficult to decide whether their names were those of South Asians or Others. These names had to be verified with personal visits to the electors in question. The results of these visits revealed that all of these 'problem names' did actually belong to persons in the Others category. Nevertheless, the findings of these visits still merit discussion, because they help to improve the future accuracy of name analysis as a research tool for identifying different ethnic groups.

The first area of confusion lay with Muslim names from Arabian and Persian countries, which had been in danger of being conflated with those of South Asian Muslims. It was Iranians who presented the greatest problem here, as they represent a significant community in Bradford. Unfortunately, this community was not large enough to establish any comprehensive method to identifying their names, although it was felt this could be achieved if a greater number of persons were under study. What can be said is that Iranian names are distinctly different to those of South Asian Muslims. In fact, it was this difference which had caused them to be checked out in the first place.

---

<sup>6</sup>This is not always the case. For example, Afro-Caribbeans generally have English names.



Typically, therefore, Iranians in Bradford exhibit family names like 'Asvandi', 'Baghepour', 'Bagherian', 'Bhandara', 'Golshekan', 'Kamijanibarchloi' and 'Sadeghnejad'. Unlike many South Asian Muslims (particularly Bangladeshis and Pakistanis), these family names are usually carried in a surname position by all members of an Iranian family living under one address in the electoral register. This characteristic in itself provides another basis for future identification. The names which Iranian Muslims use as first or forenames are often distinct from those of South Asian Muslims as well<sup>7</sup>. Typical names might be 'Asadullah', 'Fali', 'Farajollah', 'Gholamreza', 'Laya', 'Mehرداد' and 'Moloud'.

A second area of confusion in distinguishing South Asian electors from Others involved a wide variety (yet small number) of 'problem names' originating from different non-South Asian countries. Almost all of these names had elements which suggested they might be Hindu and of South Asian origin. However, personal visits to electors verified that none of these names fulfilled such criteria. It became clear that any name analysis which attempts to identify South Asians must be particularly aware of these 'red herrings'. Surnames like the Japanese name 'Shiraishi', the Swiss name 'Bruppacher', the Turkish name 'Menebhi' and the Yemeni name 'Subrati' can be particularly misleading. Special attention must also be paid to some Eastern European names, especially those from Hungary and the Baltic states. Hungarian surnames like 'Nagyvaradi', 'Papai' and 'Baranyai' look and sound like Indian Hindu names. Similar problems occur with the Ukrainian names 'Kushnir' and 'Kupse', whilst the Belorussian name 'Janka Kalbasa' could be mistaken for that of an Indian Sikh.

Having overcome these two problem areas it was felt that all electors on Bradford's electoral register had been successfully separated into South Asians and Others on the basis of their names. In addition, it became clear that name analysis was much more useful than has often been implied. For instance, Cater & Jones argue that name analysis research using the electoral register:

...is restricted to groups such as Indians and Pakistanis who can easily be identified by name. (Cater & Jones, 1979: 88).

By contrast, it is argued here that name analysis is anything but 'restricted'. Whilst it may be difficult to determine the nationality and ethnicity of persons from the English speaking world (such as Afro-Caribbeans) simply by looking at their names, there are still numerous possibilities for applying the technique. Certainly, analysis of the Bradford register indicated that many ethnic groups, such as Vietnamese, Chinese, Greeks, Poles, Italians etc., could be easily identified by their names. Moreover, with refinements there

<sup>7</sup>They are often distinct, but not always. For example, the names which some Iranians carry as forenames, such as 'Hamid' and 'Jamshid', are also common to South Asian Muslims.

is no reason to suggest why name analysis could not be successful in distinguishing between the names of persons originating from different Eastern European, African and Persian countries. The use of name analysis would therefore appear unbounded rather than 'restricted'.

#### 4.3.6 Separating Indians from Other South Asians

Figure 4.2 shows that the second stage of the South Asian name analysis methodology devised and employed in this study was designed to distinguish Indian electors from Other South Asians. To achieve this, all the South Asian names which had been underlined on the register in the first stage of name analysis (see Figure 4.3) were run through again from the beginning. Those South Asian names which obviously indicated electors of Other South Asian ethnicity, rather than Indian, were marked so as to distinguish between them.

This procedure is not as difficult as it sounds, because almost all Other South Asian names on Bradford's 1992 register were those of Pakistani or Bangladeshi Muslim electors<sup>8</sup>. These names have a number of important and shared characteristics which allowed them to be easily identified, and which are now discussed. This discussion will benefit future researchers wishing to carry out South Asian name analysis on any other electoral register.

First, most Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims have a personal name and then two, three, or even four title names. They are generally addressed by their personal name<sup>9</sup>, and title names are rarely used as personal names<sup>10</sup>. These two types of name do not usually assume any particular order, consequently their respective position changes from person to person and family to family<sup>11</sup>. Most importantly, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims do not usually possess a family name which can be used like a surname. Thus, it is usual for the members of a Pakistani or Bangladeshi Muslim family

<sup>8</sup>A few Other South Asian names on the Bradford register were those belonging to electors of Sri Lankan and Nepalese ethnicity, these are discussed in Section 4.3.8.

<sup>9</sup>Sometimes, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims are addressed by their personal and title names together. This generally occurs with title names like 'Allah' and 'Ullah'. Good examples are the names 'Allah Ditta' or 'Hafeez Ullah', where 'Ditta' and 'Hafeez' are the personal component to the 'double-barrelled' name. If a personal name ends with the suffix 'ul', 'ud' or 'ur', then it is also pronounced together with the title name, as in 'Zia-ul-Haq', 'Noor-ud-Din' and 'Muzceb-ur-Rehman', where 'Haq', 'Din' and 'Rehman' are the title component to the 'double-barrelled' name in question.

<sup>10</sup>There are exceptions to this rule. For instance, the names 'Ahmed' (or 'Ahmad') and 'Rehman' (or 'Rahman') are normally Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim titles. However, they can sometimes be personal names, especially when they are only combined with other title names. For example, in the name 'Abdul Syed Rahman' all the names are recognised as being title names, thus 'Rahman' automatically becomes the personal name by which the individual should be addressed.

<sup>11</sup>There are exceptions here. For instance, the title name 'Allah' is generally used as a first name, whilst the title name 'Ullah' is usually a second name. Meanwhile, the personal name 'Ali' is usually a second name, as in 'Mohammed Ali'.

who are living under one address in an electoral register to have names which share no common element. For example, Table 4.1 shows a selected entry from Bradford's 1992 register. Here, a family of five related Pakistani Muslim electors are living at one address, yet their individual names are entirely different and share nothing resembling a surname. This phenomenon does not actually aid identification of the individual Pakistani or Bangladeshi Muslim elector by their name. However, it shows that if the addresses of all electors on a register are taken into account, and their names are consequently viewed at the household level, then those names of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim electors will tend to stand out. This is because of their mixed nature, and the absence of anything resembling a surname within single family households.

**Table 4.1: Names of a family of Pakistani Muslim electors living under one address, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register**

Electors No.	Name	House No.
1775	Akhtar, Mahmood	23
1776	Begum, Manzoor	23
1777	Hussain, Mahboob	23
1778	Yaqub, Mohammed	23
1779	Dad, Karam	23

Source: 1992 Bradford register. (Bradford MDC, 1992, Bradford Moor ward, polling district 6a, p8).

Second, there are only a small number of title names used by Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims<sup>12</sup>. These divide into two categories. There are those title names which are male, examples being:

Abdul	Mohammed, (Muhammed etc.)
Ahmed	Quraishi, (Qureshi etc.)
Allah	Rehman, (Rahman etc.)
Choudhari, (Chaudhry, Chaudhary etc.)	Saeed
Din	Shah
Haq	Syed, (Seyyed etc.)
Khan	Ullah
Mehmood (Mahmood etc.)	

There are also those title names which are exclusively female, such as:

Bano  
Begum  
Bi  
Bibi  
Khatoon

<sup>12</sup>These title names are also used by Muslims from many other countries.

Most Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims would have at least one of these title names, or a phonetic version of one. This allows individual Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim electors to be easily recognised from their name on a register.

If the above two characteristics of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim names are not sufficient to identify them, which is unlikely, then attention can turn to personal names. Most personal names used by Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims have their origin in the *Koran* (the Islamic holy book). This means that the same few personal names tend to crop up time after time. This also allows individual Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim electors to be easily recognised. Some of the most commonly used personal names are listed in Table 4.2.

**Table 4.2: Personal names commonly used by Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims<sup>13</sup>**

Male names			Female names
Afzal	Hanif	Qasim	Asmat
Akbar	Hasan	Rafiq	Azara
Akhtar	Hussain	Raja	Fatima
Akram	Hashim	Rashid	Ayesha
Alam	Ibrahim	Sadiq	Ismat
Ali	Iftikhar	Salim	Jameela
Araf	Iqbal	Shabir	Kulsum
Ashraf	Ismael	Shamim	Najma
Aslam	Jafar	Sharif	Nascema
Azam	Khaliq	Sulaiman	Nasreen
Aziz	Latif	Sultan	Nasrat
Badar	Mahoud	Tariq	Nessa
Badhur	Majid	Umar	Parveen
Bashir	Malik	Usman	Rabia
Farooq	Miah	Yaqub	Razia
Ghafar	Mir	Younas	Razwana
Ghulam	Mirza	Yousaf	Sabera
Gondal	Mukhtar	Zahid	Sadaqat
Gulab	Munir	Zaman	Salma
Habib	Nazir	Zeb	Surriya
Halim	Noor	Zubaida	Walayat

For the future researcher, the various characteristics of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim names outlined above should be sufficient to identify them on any electoral register.

Thus far, discussion has focused on the shared characteristics of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim names. Distinguishing between Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims by their names is more difficult and was not attempted in this study, especially as the

<sup>13</sup>It should be noted that these names are only phonetic representations and are therefore open to considerable variations in spelling (see Section 4.3.3).

main emphasis was on using name analysis to differentiate between Indian electors from various religio-ethnic sub-groups so as to isolate Punjabi Hindu households for sampling. Despite this, many observations were still made about the differences between Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim names as a result of personal visits to electors carried out during the name analysis procedure. The most notable of these was that Bangladeshi names are often identifiable by the common use of the female title name 'Khatoon' or 'Khatun', and the frequent use of the personal names 'Ali', 'Nessa' and 'Miah' (or 'Meah') in a surname position. Many other more detailed observations were also made, although these are not under scrutiny in this study. Nevertheless, it was felt that if necessary, a name analysis methodology could probably be devised which would successfully distinguish between Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims.

#### **4.3.7 Separating Indian Muslims from Other South Asian Muslims**

One problem encountered during stage two of the South Asian name analysis involved trying to distinguish between Indian Muslim electors and Other South Asian Muslims (i.e. Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim electors). This was because the names of these two groups are quite similar. At this stage it seemed wise to turn to the work of Ram (1989). Following his name analysis of Bradford's 1981 register Ram also acknowledged that it was "difficult to distinguish" between Indian and Other South Asian Muslims by their names, but went on to reassure the reader that:

After a number of concentrated efforts it was concluded (this was verified later on by personal visits) that those Muslims are Indian who have Indian surnames. For example, most of the Patels are Gujaratis. A Patel with a Hindu name is classed as Hindu, but if instead of a Hindu name, a Muslim name is attached, this indicates that the person is an Indian Muslim. (Ram, 1989: 176).

Ram therefore presents a handful of names which are always used in a surname position, and which are characteristic of Indian Hindus if they have Hindu names attached to them, and Indian Muslims if they have Muslim names attached. Examples of such names include 'Desai', 'Pandoor' and 'Patel', and they are all found in the dictionary of Indian names produced by Ram (1989: 448-92). In addition, Ram also identifies a small number of names in this dictionary which are used exclusively by Indian Muslims in a surname position, and not by Indian Hindus or Other South Asian Muslims. Examples of these names are 'Mussa' and 'Khalifa'.

The names which Ram suggests Indian Muslims can use as surnames were initially used to distinguish Indian Muslim electors from Other South Asian Muslims in the name analysis of Bradford's 1992 register. All these names were found to be open to considerable variations in their spelling or phonetic representation during this analysis. For example, 'Mussa' occurred in the forms 'Moosa' or 'Musa', and 'Khalifa' as 'Khelifa' or

'Khalifah'. These spelling variations of Ram's suggested Indian Muslim names have been compiled under the Indian Muslim section of a dictionary of Indian names produced for this study. The dictionary is found in Appendix One. It is on a computer disk in text file format. This will allow easy manipulation for future researchers wishing to use it to carry out South Asian name analysis.

Importantly, a period of detailed fieldwork, involving personal visits to suspected Indian Muslim electors who had not been identified using the above methods, proved that the use of Ram's dictionary to identify Indian Muslims was somewhat ineffective. In short, these visits revealed a large number of Indian Muslim electors on Bradford's 1992 register whose names had been overlooked by Ram. This suggests that Ram's claim that there were 142 Indian Muslims living in Bradford (following his analysis of the city's 1981 register) was a substantial under estimate (see Ram, 1989: 186). The findings from the personal visits carried out on Indian Muslim electors in this study can now be used to create a workable name analysis methodology for distinguishing more accurately between Indian Muslim names and those of Other South Asian Muslims. Again, this methodology should be of use to future researchers wishing to carry out South Asian name analysis.

There are many names which are exclusive to Indian Muslims, making them easily distinguishable from those of Other South Asian Muslims. Such names divide into three types:

First, there is a large number of family names exclusive to Indian Muslims which they always use in a surname position. Typical examples of these include the names 'Bilimoria' (or 'Bilmoria'), 'Collector', 'Jasdanwalla', 'Mayat' (or 'Mayet'), 'Momoniat' and 'Sankriwala'. The exclusivity of these family names would mean that any Indian Muslim electors carrying them could be easily distinguished from Other South Asian Muslims (i.e. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) in the name analysis of an electoral register.

In addition, the use of name analysis to distinguish between Indian Muslim electors and Other South Asian Muslims would be made even easier by the general naming practices of the Indian Muslim community. For example, the above family names would always be carried in a surname position by all the members of an Indian Muslim family living under one address in an electoral register. This would provide a sharp contrast to Other South Asian Muslim families living under one address, whose names would usually have no common element resembling a surname (see Section 4.3.6). By way of illustration, Table 4.3 shows the names for a family of Indian Muslim electors living under one address in Bradford's 1992 register. It can be seen that they all carry the exclusively Indian Muslim family name 'Bilimoria' as a surname.

The second type of name exclusive to Indian Muslims involves the adaptation of a standard South Asian Muslim, male personal name (typical of Pakistanis or Bangladeshis) by the addition of a regional Gujarati suffix such as 'bhai'. Examples of this would be the names 'Alibhai' and 'Husseinhai'. Again, these names would always be carried in a surname position by all the members of an Indian Muslim family living under one address in an electoral register. As above, this factor, coupled with the exclusivity of these names, would make them easy to distinguish from those of Other South Asian Muslims in any name analysis operation.

**Table 4.3: Names of a family of Indian Muslim electors living under one address, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register**

<b>Elector No.</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>House No.</b>
1652	Bilimoria, Yusuf	191
1653	Bilimoria, Rabia	191
1654	Bilimoria, Najmunnisa	191
1655	Bilimoria, Mohamed I.	191
1656	Bilimoria, Shaenaz.	191
1657	Bilimoria, Naseem	191
1658	Bilimoria, Farhana	191

Source: 1992 Bradford register. (Bradford MDC, 1992, Bowling ward, polling district 5a, p7).

The third type of name exclusive to Indian Muslims involves the corruption of a standard South Asian Muslim, male personal name (again typical of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis). Examples of this would be 'Ebrahim', 'Esmail' and 'Jamal', which are versions of the standard South Asian Muslim, male personal names 'Ibrahim', 'Ismail' and 'Jamil'. These corrupted personal names are often used by Indian Muslims in a surname position, and would again be shared by all members of an Indian Muslim family living under one address.

On a few occasions, rather than carrying the exclusive names outlined above, Indian Muslims carry personal names like 'Sheikh' (or 'Shaikh'), 'Ismail', 'Yakub', 'Ibrahim' and 'Suleiman' in a surname position, which are equally usable by Other South Asian Muslims such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. During name analysis, the fact that these personal names would be carried in a surname position by all the members of an Indian Muslim family living under one address in a given electoral register would usually provide the initial evidence that they represented those of Indian Muslim electors, rather than Other South Asian Muslims. However, if Indian Muslim electors lived alone this evidence would not be present. In these difficult situations the personal names which electors use as forenames need to be studied in order to try and determine whether they are Indian Muslim or Other South Asian Muslim.

The personal names Indian Muslims use as forenames are usually distinguishable from those used by Other South Asian Muslims, and they can be loosely divided into three types:

First, some of the personal names Indian Muslims use as forenames have the suffixes 'bai' (or 'bhai'), 'banu' (or 'bana'), 'nisa' (or nisha) and 'uddin', as in 'Jehrabai', 'Faridabanu', 'Zebunnisha' and 'Salamuddin'. These suffixes can be used by Other South Asian Muslims, but their use is much more common amongst those of Indian origin.

Second, some of the personal names Indian Muslims use as forenames are exclusive to them as an ethnic group. Many of these exclusive personal names are those that they can also use in a surname position, examples being the male personal names 'Ebrahim', 'Esmail' and 'Moosa' (or 'Musa' and 'Mussa').

Third, some of the personal names Indian Muslims adopt as forenames are used by Other South Asian Muslims as well, but Indian Muslims tend to stick to a few firm favourites. Favoured male personal names are 'Ismail', 'Khatija', 'Younus' and 'Yousuf', or variations thereof, whilst favoured female personal names include 'Aysha', 'Fatima' and 'Mariam'.

All the different names Indian Muslim electors in Bradford were found to use as forenames and surnames during analysis of the city's 1992 register have been compiled under the Muslim section of the Indian names dictionary produced in this study (see Appendix One). This dictionary is far more comprehensive than Ram's (1989), which included only a handful of Indian Muslim names.

#### **4.3.8 Separating non-Muslim Other South Asians from Indians**

Thus far, attention has focused on describing how the Muslim names of Other South Asian electors on Bradford's 1992 register were distinguished from the names of Indians. However, there was also a need to distinguish between the names of non-Muslim Other South Asian electors and Indians. This was not difficult, because the names of most non-Muslim Other South Asians were those of Sri Lankans, who are usually either Hindu or Christian. Sri Lankan names have two important characteristics which allowed them to be distinguished from those of Indian electors, and which are outlined here for the benefit of future researchers.

First, Sri Lankan names are very long. For example, the names 'Kumaranayagam' and 'Thavamokankanthi', which Sri Lankans use in forename and surname positions respectively, are far longer than most of the names used by Indians. Second, the names

which Sri Lankans use as surnames and forenames<sup>14</sup> commonly end with the suffixes 'am', 'an' or 'rajah' (or 'raja'). This also makes them easy to distinguish from most Indian names. Table 4.4 identifies some of the names which were found to be used by Sri Lankan electors as forenames and surnames during analysis of Bradford's 1992 register. The table illustrates the two characteristics of Sri Lankan names discussed here.

**Table 4.4: Names used by Sri Lankan electors as forenames and surnames, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register**

Names Sri Lankan electors carried in a surname position	Names Sri Lankan electors carried in a forename position
Thirugnanasothy	Thanaluxumy
Mukanthan	Thangarajah
Shanmugabavan	Kumaranayagam
Sabanathan	Sabaratnam
Rajaratnam	Giridharan
Thavamokankanthi	Arunugam
Senathirajah	Dushyanthan
Chitsabesan	Pamawathice
Sivananthan	Satkunam
Balakrishnan	Samykkurukkal
Sumanoharan	Thiyagaraja

Source: 1992 Bradford register. (Bradford MDC, 1992).

The only other non-Muslim Other South Asian electors on Bradford's 1992 register who needed to be distinguished from Indians were Nepalese, who were typically Hindus or Buddhists. It is difficult to devise a strict methodology for separating the names of Nepalese from Indians which will be of benefit to other researchers. What can be said is that Nepalese names appear noticeably different to those of Indians. To illustrate this, Table 4.5 shows the names which Nepalese electors were found to use in a forename and surname position during analysis of Bradford's 1992 register.

**Table 4.5: Names used by Nepalese electors as forenames and surnames, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register**

Names Nepalese electors carried in a surname position	Names Nepalese electors carried in a forename position
Gurung	Tekbahdur
Adhi-Kari	Sheel
Nishapati	Antonio

Source: 1992 Bradford register. (Bradford MDC, 1992).

At this point, the reader may have noted that the names of Other South Asian electors of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity were distinguished from those of Indians

<sup>14</sup>Some Sri Lankan names, such as 'Sabanathan', are interchangeable between the forename and surname position.

primarily on the basis of naming traits defined by the Islamic religion. By contrast, it is the national naming traits of Other South Asians from Sri Lanka and Nepal which allowed them to be distinguished from Indian electors.

Those underlined South Asian names on Bradford's 1992 register which indicated electors of Sri Lankan or Nepalese ethnicity were clearly marked, along with those of Other South Asian Muslim electors from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Accordingly, the remaining South Asian names (which were underlined but still unmarked) were those of Indian electors. The second stage of the South Asian name analysis operation, which had been concerned with distinguishing between Indian and Other South Asian electors, was therefore complete.

#### **4.3.9 Identifying the religion of Indians**

The third stage of the South Asian name analysis methodology devised and employed in this study concerned the classification of those electors identified as Indians on Bradford's 1992 register into their respective religio-ethnic sub-groups. This involved a detailed analysis of the names of Indian electors as a means of classifying them by their religion and origin region (or state) in India. Although these tasks were carried out simultaneously, they are tackled separately here. This section therefore explains how the religion of Indian electors was identified by their names, whilst Section 4.3.10 identifies an important problem encountered in this process. Section 4.3.11 details how the names of Indian electors were used to identify their origin region in India.

As already noted, Ram (1989) produced a dictionary of Indian names following his analysis of Bradford's 1981 register. This dictionary categorised Indian names into four religions, these being Sikhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. For this study, Ram's dictionary was initially used to build up a basic background knowledge about the types of name which are characteristic of Indians belonging to these four religions. From this knowledge some key rules about the naming systems of Indians belonging to each of these religions were devised. These rules were then used to identify the religion of Indian electors by their names on Bradford's 1992 register. Importantly, this was a reciprocal process, because the rules were constantly being refined through the name analysis process itself and as new names were identified.

The finalised rules concerning the naming systems of Indians belonging to different religions are now explained. The discussion begins by outlining the rules relating to the naming system of Indians from the Sikh religion. This discussion will simply refer to 'Sikh' rather than 'Indian Sikh' names. This is because Sikhs (unlike Hindus, Muslims and Christians) can only be of Indian ethnicity.

There are three basic elements to the Sikh naming system. The first and most important of these is the title name, which is always 'Singh' in the case of males, meaning 'lion', and 'Kaur' in the case of females, meaning 'princess'. This title name can be used in a surname position, as in the names 'Ranjit Singh', 'Mohinder Singh' and 'Gurvinder Kaur'.

The second element of the Sikh naming system is the family name, such as 'Gill' or 'Saggu', or village name, such as 'Gossal' (this corresponds to the name of the family's native village in India). Most Sikhs have a family or village name, although not all choose to include it in their full name. However, if these types of name are used then they usually take the position of a surname, in which case the title names 'Kaur' and 'Singh' take the position of second names, as in 'Ranjit Singh Gill', 'Mohinder Singh Saggu' or 'Gurvinder Kaur Gossal'<sup>15</sup>. Importantly, title names will usually be abbreviated to 'S' for Singh and 'K' for Kaur on the electoral register if they occupy this second name position. Sometimes the title names may be dropped altogether, as in 'Ranjit Gill' or 'Gurvinder Gossal', but this is less common.

On marriage, a Sikh woman would only take her husband's family or village name if he used it in a surname position. If, however, her husband used his title name 'Singh' in a surname position, then she would call herself Mrs Kaur, even if she had used her own family or village name as a surname before marriage. In short, Sikhs should generally be addressed by the name which they use in a surname position, be it Mr Singh and Mrs Kaur, or Mr Gill and Mrs Gossal.

**Table 4.6: Personal names used by Sikh electors, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register**

Sikh names with the suffix 'bir'	Sikh names with the suffix 'inder'	Sikh names with the suffix 'jit' (or 'jeet')	Sikh names with the suffix 'dip' (or 'deep')
<i>Amarbir</i>	<i>Arvinder</i>	<i>Amarjit</i>	<i>Amardeep</i>
<i>Balbir</i>	<i>Baljinder</i>	<i>Beebajeet</i>	<i>Gurdip</i>
<i>Dalbir</i>	<i>Dalwinder</i>	<i>Daljit</i>	<i>Hardeep</i>
<i>Jasbir</i>	<i>Gurbinder</i>	<i>Gurjeet</i>	<i>Kuldip</i>

Source: 1992 Bradford register. (Bradford MDC, 1992).

The third and final element to the Sikh naming system is the personal name, which would always be used in a forename position. There are many personal names in the Sikh religion. Most of them can be applied equally to both women and men because it is the title name which denotes gender<sup>16</sup>. Sikh personal names are often recognisable by

<sup>15</sup>This is not always the case. Some Sikhs prefer to use their title name as a surname and put their family or village name second, as in 'Ranjit Gill Singh'.

<sup>16</sup>This is not always the case. Some Sikh personal names are gender specific. For example, the personal name 'Pushbinder' is female, whilst 'Rajinder' is male.

their distinctive suffixes, such as 'bir', 'inder', 'jit' (or 'jeet') and 'dip' (or 'deep'). By way of illustration, Table 4.6 shows selected examples of Sikh personal names found during name analysis of Bradford's 1992 register.

Attention now turns to rules relating to the naming system of Indians from the Hindu religion. This system is fairly straightforward. It has similarities with both the British and Sikh naming systems. First, Indian Hindus have one or two personal names followed by a family name or *jati* name, which is usually borne by the whole family in a surname position. Examples of this might be 'Ramesh Agarwal', where 'Agarwal' is a *jati* name meaning 'Merchant' or 'Trader', or 'Bimla Dhir', where 'Dhir' is a family name.

Often however, Indian Hindus, like Sikhs, have title names. For males the commonest of these are the names 'Bhai', 'Das', 'Chand', 'Kumar', 'Lal', 'Paul', 'Raj', 'Ji' and 'Ram'. For females title names like 'Ben' (or 'Behn'), 'Devi', 'Kaur', 'Kumari', 'Wati' (or 'Vati') and 'Mati' are common. It should be noted that many of these female title names are recognisable by their 'i' suffix. These title names are usually used as second names, as in 'Bimla Devi Dhir' or 'Ramesh Kumar Agarwal'. However, some Hindus choose not to use their surnames or *jati* names, and as a consequence their title names become their surnames, as in 'Bimla Devi' or 'Ramesh Kumar'.

The Indian Hindu naming system follows much the same rules as that of Sikhs in terms of marriage. Thus, a woman would usually adopt her husband's family or *jati* name as a surname, if he too uses it in a surname position. But if her husband uses a male title name as his surname, then she would usually adopt her title name as a surname as well. Accordingly, Indian Hindus should usually be addressed by the name which they choose to use as a surname, be it Mr Agarwal and Mrs Dhir, or Mr Kumar and Mrs Devi.

**Table 4.7: Personal names used by female Indian Hindu electors, as entered in Bradford's 1992 electoral register**

Hindu female names with the suffix 'a'	Hindu female names with the suffix 'ben'	Hindu female names with the suffix 'i'	Hindu female names with the suffix 'o'
Amba	Ajitaben	Anjali	Amro
Bhadra	Bakulaben	Babi	Baksho
Champa	Chandanben	Charni	Charno
Daksha	Dahanben	Damyanti	Devo

Source: 1992 Bradford register. (Bradford MDC, 1992).

Indian Hindu personal names or first names are more gender specific than those of Sikhs. Typically, female first names can be distinguished from male ones by the suffixes 'a', 'ben', 'i' or 'o', although this method is by no means foolproof. Table 4.7

shows some selected examples of these Hindu female personal names which were found during name analysis of Bradford's 1992 register.

The rules relating to the naming system of Indian Muslims have already been fully explained (see Section 4.3.7). The naming system for those few Indians who follow the Christian religion is identical to that for most English names. For example, the only Indian Christian name found during name analysis of the 1992 register for Bradford was the surname 'Pereira', preceded by the forenames 'Robert' and 'Sebastian'. Importantly, Ram (1989: 178) suggests that 'Pillai' is a name used by Indian Christians in a surname position. However, personal visits to electors for this study revealed that 'Pillai' is actually a name used by Indian Hindus in a surname position. The fact that a number of Indians in Bradford carry the name 'Pillai' probably resulted in Ram's overestimation of the numbers of Indian Christians living in the city in his 1981 analysis.

#### **4.3.10 Problem names common to Sikhs and Indian Hindus**

On the basis of the rules outlined above, the names of Indian electors on Bradford's 1992 register were used to classify these electors by their religion. One problem encountered during this process concerned a handful of names which are shared by both Sikhs and Indian Hindus. These are family names like 'Raju', 'Bhatoa', 'Samplay' and 'Virdee' (or 'Virdee'), or title names like 'Kaur', 'Ram', 'Pal' and 'Chand', and personal names such as 'Bhupinder', 'Jagdish' and 'Kuldip'.

Usually, these 'shared names' were not a problem during name analysis, because the religion of an elector with one or even two of them could still be established by reference to a second or third name. For example, if an elector had the family name 'Raju' and the personal name 'Pardip', both of which are usable by Indian Hindus and Sikhs, then the religion of this elector could still often be identified by the title name. Thus, if this elector was called 'Pardip Kumar Raju' he would be a male Hindu, whilst the name 'Pardip Singh Raju' would indicate a male belonging to the Sikh religion. Sometimes, however, all the names of an elector were common to both Sikhs and Indian Hindus, as in the name 'Pardip Chand Raju'. In such instances, personal visits to the electors had to be made in order to identify their religion.

During these visits it was established that all these electors belonged to the Untouchable *jati* of *Chamars* (Leather Tanners) who, as noted in Section 3.6.3, are often referred to as *Ravidasis*. Amongst these *Chamars* the division between Sikhism and Hinduism is not clear cut. Thus, whilst some may consider themselves Hindus, others think of themselves as Sikhs. This blurring of religious identity amongst *Chamars* may result from the fact that as Untouchables they are not particularly well accepted by either

the Hindu or Sikh religions (see Nesbitt, 1994: 123-4, 137; 1990: 265, 268-9). Clearly, their use of names which are common to both these religions is a reflection of this.

In this study it was decided that the best way to identify the religion of these *Chamar* electors was to ask them what they considered it to be during personal visits. Most *Chamar* electors found this self-definition easy, and the ratio of those considering themselves Sikh against those claiming to be Hindu was approximately 50/50. Importantly, all the *Chamar* electors living as a family under a given address in the register usually identified themselves with one religion. Only in a few cases were families found in which certain *Chamar* electors described their religion as Hindu and others as Sikh. It is suggested that future researchers undertaking South Asian name analysis would also have to rely on this procedure of personal visits and self-definition in order to determine the religion of *Chamar* electors with ambiguous names

#### **4.3.11 Identifying the origin region of Indians**

Once the religion of Indian electors on Bradford's 1992 register had been identified, the only remaining task was to further subdivide them by their origin region in the subcontinent. Again, this was achieved by analysing their names. Ram (1989: 178-87) provided rudimentary guidelines as to how this could be achieved. Initially, these guidelines were used to identify the origin region of Indian electors by their names on Bradford's 1992 register. However, research findings during the early stages of this analysis soon led to the construction of a more detailed methodology for determining the origin region of Indians by their names, and this was then used for the remaining analysis. This methodology is more comprehensive than anything previously produced by Ram (1989) or anyone else, and it is now explained for the benefit of future researchers. Before embarking on this, it is necessary to define some of the terms which will be used.

For this study, the term 'Punjab region' does not refer solely to those areas within the administrative boundaries of the present Punjab. It refers to the 'old Punjab' of pre-1966 India. Thus, it includes the old Union Territories of Chandigarh and Delhi, as well as some of the adjacent areas of the states which adjoin the present Punjab region. Similarly, the term 'Gujarat region' refers to much of the old Bombay State of India, which was subsequently divided into the two states of Gujarat and Maharashtra. It also includes some southern areas of Rajasthan State. However, the city of Bombay itself (including its hinterlands) is referred to as the 'Bombay region', which is effectively that remaining part of the modern state of Maharashtra which does not come under the 'Gujarat region'. Other states mentioned correspond to their present day areal definition. The 'origin region' of an elector's name does not necessarily mean that they themselves

were born there. Instead, it can indicate the place of birth of that individual, or his/her parents, grandparents, or even more distant ancestors.

To begin discussion as to how the origin region of Indians can be identified by their names, it is necessary to refer to Ram. He suggests:

- i) that all Sikhs are from the Punjab region,
- ii) that all Indian Muslims come from the Gujarat region, and
- iii) that most Indian Christians come from Kerala (see Ram, 1989: 179).

The first and third of these statements was found to be true during the course of name analysis carried out for this study. Accordingly, those Indians identified as either Sikh or Christian were respectively ascribed to the Punjab and Kerala origin regions. However, the second statement needs revision, because although a majority of Indian Muslims originate from the Gujarat region, name analysis of the Bradford register indicated that there are exceptions.

A few Indian Muslims originate from the 'Bombay region'. Research revealed that such individuals can usually be recognised from their names. This is because they follow the Indian Muslim naming procedure outlined above, but the names which they use as surnames usually have the ending 'kar' or 'ker'. Examples of this found in Bradford were the names 'Pantankar' (or 'Pantanker') and 'Karbelkar'. Other names which Bombay Muslims use as surnames include 'Kapree' and 'Kapdi'. The forenames of Bombay Muslims are typical of those common to all Indian Muslims (see Section 4.3.7).

A handful of Indian Muslim 'surnames' from other regions were also found in Bradford, but not in suitable enough numbers for any detailed methodology to be established for identifying them. These 'surnames' included 'Nijamudeen' from the state of Tamil Nadu, the Assamese Muslim name 'Haque', and the Punjabi Muslim name 'Chohan'. The name 'Chohan' can also be used by Punjabi Sikhs and Gujarati Hindus<sup>17</sup>, but if preceded by a Muslim forename then it is obviously Punjabi Muslim. Electors with these names were paid a personal visit during the name analysis. They revealed that as Muslims with these respective origin regions they were unusual. The fact that a rigid methodology could not be established for identifying their names should not, therefore, be seen as a significant problem.

---

<sup>17</sup>The Indian Muslim name 'Chohan' is held by several Muslims, both in Britain and India. The Muslim 'Chohan' family were originally Sikhs, hence the use of the Sikh family name 'Chohan'. Many of the Chohans converted to the Islamic religion several centuries ago when Muslim rulers dominated the northern half of the subcontinent. Only some maintained their Sikh religion.

These names and their corresponding forenames, along with those of Indian Muslims from the Bombay and Gujarat regions, were entered into the dictionary of Indian names (see Appendix One), which classifies Indian Muslim names into their respective regional origins. In summary, Ram's second assumption that all Indian Muslims come from the Gujarat region can be revised. Instead, most Indian Muslims come from the Gujarat and a few from the Bombay region, whilst a very small number originate from other parts of India.

Most Indian Hindus in Britain hail from the Punjab or Gujarat regions, whilst the remainder come from a large number of other Indian states. Because of this variety, the identification of the origin region of Indian Hindus by their name requires specific attention.

It is Hindus from the Gujarat who are most identifiable by their names. This is because many of the *jati* or family names which they carry in a surname position are exclusive to them as a religio-ethnic sub-group and are easily recognised. Examples of these exclusive 'surnames' are given in Table 4.8. Those names marked in bold represent some of the most commonly used.

**Table 4.8: Gujarati Hindu family and *jati* names which are used in a surname position**

Amarasinghe	Gohri	Madhav	<b>Patel</b>
Ansari	Gopal (or Gopalka)	Madhukar	Pema
Baidya	Jadav	<b>Maisuria</b>	<b>Prajapati</b>
Bhikha	Jaganathan	Majumdar	Rajwadi
Billoo	Jeram	<b>Mistry</b>	Rana
Champaneria	Jethwa	Modi	Rathod
Chavan	Karsan	Morker	Singadia
<b>Chauhan (Chouhan etc.)</b>	Kasbia	Nar	Solanki
Desai	Keshav (Keshani)	Niccha	Tailor (or Taylor)
Dhokia	Koyani	Panchal	Thakor (or Thaker)
Doshi	<b>Lad (or Ladd)</b>	Parekh	Tyagi
Gohil	Limbachia	<b>Parmar</b>	Vadher

Alternatively, the names which Gujarati Hindus use as surnames are often merged with the Hindu male title names 'Bhai' or 'Ji' as a suffix, even if they are being used by women. This also makes them easily recognisable. Examples include the 'surnames' 'Kalyan**bhai**', 'Durlab**bhai**' and 'Bhikhab**hai**', or 'Dev**ji**', 'Dayal**ji**' and 'Kunver**ji**'.

During the course of the name analysis in Bradford, many Gujarati Hindu 'surnames' were found which were additional to those outlined by Ram (1989) following his analysis of Bradford's 1981 register. These included names like 'Doshi', 'Jadav', 'Keshani', 'Morker', 'Pema' and 'Vadher'. Fieldwork visits also ascertained that some

surnames which Ram had classified as Gujarati Hindu, such as 'Biswas', 'Sah' and 'Basu', were not Gujarati at all, and were in fact characteristic of some other Indian region (see below).

The family names and *jati* names which Indian Hindus from the Punjab use as surnames are not as easily recognisable as those of Gujarati Hindus, but they are still usually exclusive to them as a religio-ethnic sub-group and therefore allow them to be identified. Examples include the names 'Prabhakar', 'Bhardwaj', 'Kapoor', 'Lamba' and 'Talwar'. As with Gujarati Hindus, many Punjabi Hindu 'surnames' were found during name analysis of Bradford's 1992 register which were additional to those outlined by Ram (1989). These included the names 'Abrol', 'Dahya', 'Johar', 'Triakha', 'Mittal', 'Devesher' and 'Puri'.

A handful of the names which Gujarati and Punjabi Hindus use as surnames are shared. This point was recognised by Ram in his Indian names dictionary, although he failed to highlight all the 'surnames' which can be used by both these religio-ethnic sub-groups. Thus, although he talked of 'surnames' like 'Joshi' and 'Soni' being shared by both Punjabi and Gujarati Hindus (Ram, 1989: 182), there are others, such as 'Ahir' and 'Verma', which he did not mention. Indian electors with these ambiguous 'surnames' can usually be distinguished as either Gujarati or Punjabi by referring to their forenames. Name analysis research carried out for this study revealed that Gujarati Hindu forenames usually have one of the following three characteristics, making them easy to distinguish from those of Punjabi Hindus:

First, as with some Gujarati 'surnames' (see above), most Gujarati Hindu male forenames combine a basic Hindu male forename with a Hindu male title name - such as 'Bhai', 'Chand', 'Ji', 'Kumar', 'Lal' or 'Ram' - as a suffix. Examples of this are the Gujarati Hindu male forenames '*Madhubhai*', '*Karamchand*', '*Ratanji*', '*Kirankumar*', '*Chhaganlal*' and '*Dalpatram*', which are respective adaptations of the basic Hindu male forenames 'Madhu', 'Karam', 'Ratan', 'Kiran', 'Chhagan' and 'Dalpat'.

Similarly, most Gujarati Hindu female forenames usually merge a basic Hindu female forename with a Hindu female title name - such as 'Ben' (or 'Behn'), 'Mati' or 'Wati' (or 'Vati') - as a suffix. Examples of this are the Gujarati Hindu female forenames '*Bhartiben*', '*Hansumati*' and '*Kalawati*', which are respective adaptations of the basic Hindu female forenames 'Bharti', 'Hansu' and 'Kala'. Clearly, the practice of merging title names with both 'surnames' and forenames is a Gujarati trait, and can in itself be used to identify Gujarati Hindus.

Second, there is a number of spelling practices which allow certain basic Hindu forenames to be identified as Gujarati in origin. Ram (1989: 182) also noted this phenomenon and provided excellent examples of the spelling variations in selected Hindu forenames between the Gujarat and Punjab regions. These examples are shown in Table 4.9, as they also represent some of the best instances of these spelling differences found during name analysis in this study.

**Table 4.9: Selected Hindu forenames and their spelling differences between the Punjab and Gujarat regions**

Punjab region	Gujarat region
Ashwani	→ Ashwain Ashwin Ashivani Ashoni
Chaman	→ Chaiman
Ranjit	→ Ranjith
Prabhu	→ Parbhu

Source: Ram (1989: 186).

Third, there are some basic Hindu forenames, such as 'Champak', 'Hasmukh', 'Hansa', 'Hemant' and 'Kamla', which are exclusively Gujarati.

Most Gujarati Hindus carry forenames with one of these three characteristics. This makes them easily distinguishable from Punjabi Hindus if their 'surname' is not enough to categorise them confidently by their origin region. In the rare cases where both the 'surname' and the forename of an individual on an electoral register are ambiguous, and it is impossible to decide whether the elector in question is a Gujarati or Punjabi Hindu, then the names of the other electors under that address should be taken into account. The existence of at least one individual with an identifiably Gujarati Hindu name would usually indicate that all electors at this address are Gujarati rather than Punjabi Hindus. This is because mixed households between these two religio-ethnic sub-groups are extremely rare, both in Bradford and other regions of Britain. As Ram noted:

...the tradition of joint or shared households, particularly among the persons from the two regions [the Gujarat and the Punjab] has totally disappeared by now; and... there is a very low degree of social inter-mixing between the persons from the two regions. (Ram. 1989: 183).

On the basis of their characteristics discussed above, the names of Gujarati Hindu electors were distinguished from those of Punjabi Hindus on Bradford's 1992 register. The large variety of names which Gujarati and Punjabi Hindu electors were found to use as forenames and surnames during name analysis have been respectively compiled in the

Gujarati and Punjabi Hindu sections of the Indian names dictionary (see Appendix One). This dictionary includes many more names than that produced by Ram (1989).

Ram (1989: 183) highlights a number of Hindu 'surnames' which he loosely identifies as originating from 'other Indian regions', by which he means all areas apart from the Punjab and Gujarat. Some of these names are outlined in Table 4.10. Many of these names are not Indian Hindu. For example, the names 'Jagapragasan', 'Vijayaraghavan' and 'Balakrishnan' are clearly those of Sri Lankan Hindus (see Section 4.3.8). Other names, such as 'Mukherji' and 'Baruah', can be identified as belonging to Hindus from a specific Indian region (in both these cases Bengal); Ram, however, makes no attempt to do this. These mistakes in Ram's name analysis methodology are not particularly serious, because the number of names involved is very small. For example, the former of the above problems would have only resulted in a slight over-enumeration of Indian Hindus during Ram's analysis of Bradford's 1981 register.

**Table 4.10 Hindu surnames from 'other regions of India', as identified by Ram**

Balakrishnan	Premawardhana
Baruah	Rajasundram
Bose	Ramakrishnan
Ghosh	Sikdar
Jagapragasan	Sivakumar
Mandal	Sumathipala
Mukherji	Vijayaraghavan

Source: Adapted from Ram (1989: 183).

More worrying is Ram's misclassification of 'surnames' like 'Basu', 'Biswas', 'Dey', 'Dutta', 'Karandikar' and 'Sah' as Gujarati Hindu, when they are actually from other regions. This suggests Ram may have slightly over-enumerated Gujarati Hindus in his analysis of Bradford's 1981 register. Another error is that many names indicative of regions of India other than the Punjab and Gujarat have been omitted from Ram's Indian names dictionary. This would cause a general under-enumeration of Indian Hindus if Ram's dictionary was used elsewhere.

To alleviate these problems, particular attention was paid to creating additional regional categories for Indian Hindu names during the name analysis for this study. The aim was to go beyond Ram's simplified threefold classification of Indian Hindu names into those from the Gujarat, Punjab and 'other Indian regions'. To achieve this, a large number of personal visits were made to Indian Hindu electors whose origin region was clearly neither Gujarati nor Punjabi. The result was to produce a classification of all non-Punjabi/Gujarati Hindu names by origin region (or origin state) in India.

Hindus from Bengal and Bombay were found in large enough numbers in Bradford to establish a methodology for recognising the family and *jati* names they use as surnames. Thus, Hindus from Bengal usually have short 'surnames' such as 'Das', 'Deb', 'Dey', 'Dutt' and 'Sen', or they have 'surnames' with the suffix 'jee' on the end, as in 'Banerjee', 'Chatterjee' and 'Mukherjee'. Other exclusively Bengali Hindu 'surnames' include 'Bhattachayya', 'Baruah' (or 'Barua'), 'Basu', 'Biswas', 'Bose' and 'Debnath'.

Like Bombay Muslims, the names most Hindus from the Bombay region use as surnames are recognisable by the suffix 'kar' (or 'ker'), as in 'Alurkar', 'Karandikar' and 'Nerurkar'. These 'surnames' are preceded by a Hindu forename, making them easy to distinguish from those of Bombay Muslims (see above).


Other Hindu electors were found in Bradford whose origin regions included the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, Kashmir, Kerala, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. Unfortunately, they were not found in large enough numbers to establish a detailed methodology for identifying their origin region by their names, which might be used by future researchers. Nevertheless, the names these electors were found to use as forenames and surnames have still been entered in the Indian names dictionary under their relevant sections, along with those of Bengali and Bombay Hindus (see Appendix One).

This explains the final stage of the South Asian name analysis procedure. When completed, almost all Indian electors in the study area had been classified into one of the following religio-ethnic sub-groups:

- i) Hindus from the Gujarat, the Punjab, or one of the other Indian regions mentioned above.
- ii) Sikhs from the Punjab.
- iii) Muslims from the Gujarat, Bombay, the Punjab, Assam and Tamil Nadu.
- iv) Christians from Kerala.

There was also a small number electors who were clearly Indian, but whose religion and origin region in India remained unclassified. This was because their names were unfamiliar, and because personal visits to these electors to determine their religion and origin region proved unhelpful, either because they had moved, or because they were unwilling to provide the necessary information. By way of a summary, the original diagrammatic representation of the three stages of South Asian name analysis devised and employed in this study, which was seen in Figure 4.2, is drawn in more detail in Figure 4.4.

**Figure 4.4: Three stages of the South Asian name analysis methodology devised and employed in this study (revised)**



#### 4.3.12 Manipulation, use and analysis of quantitative name analysis data

Having completed the South Asian name analysis, it was possible to identify all Punjabi Hindu electors and their addresses from Bradford's 1992 register. This meant that a sample of Punjabi Hindu households could be drawn up for interviews (see Section 4.5). As noted in Section 4.3.2, this had been the original reason for carrying out the name analysis. However, the name analysis results could be made to do more than this, because it was now possible to enumerate the population of each Indian religio-ethnic sub-group (aged  $\geq 16$  years and eight months) across the 32 wards of the study area. Of course, the name analysis results could also be used to determine the number of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in these wards, but there would have been little point in this as the 1991 Census already provides such information. Conversely, this census provides no data on religio-ethnic sub-group populations within the Indian community.

During the name analysis each Indian elector was given a code relating to their religion and origin region status. To determine the number of persons belonging to each religio-ethnic sub-group in each ward, this coded data was entered into 32 SPSS data files, each corresponding to one ward of the study area. The size of the data files varied considerably according to the differing numbers of Indian electors identified in each of the 32 wards. Hence, the largest file had 1467 Indian electors entered, and the smallest only nine.

Once Indian electors had been entered into their given SPSS data file, their religious and origin region codes were crosstabulated to determine the number belonging to different religio-ethnic sub-groups in each ward. The results of this procedure are found in Table 5.3 of Chapter Five. It will be seen that the quantitative name analysis data from Table 5.3 are further manipulated in Chapter Five, and used in a number of ways. First, the sizes of religio-ethnic sub-group populations (aged  $\geq 16$  years and eight months) in Bradford are presented in graphical form (see Section 5.2.3). Second, the percentage distributions of a number of key sub-group populations (e.g. Punjabi Sikhs, Gujarati Hindus etc.) across the 32 wards of the study area are calculated. These percentage figures are then mapped to show ward level sub-group geographies in Bradford (see Section 5.3.1). Third, the population counts of key sub-groups in the 30 Bradford wards, as enumerated by Ram from his analysis of Bradford's 1981 register, are compared with corresponding counts from analysis of the 1992 register in this study. This comparison yields figures which illustrate changes in the absolute population sizes of these key sub-groups across the 30 Bradford wards over an 11 year period. These figures are presented in tabular form, and the ward level changes in the population sizes of the key sub-groups are subsequently mapped (see Section 5.3.2). Analysis is carried out through the discussion surrounding the tables, graphs and maps described above.

#### 4.3.13 Accuracy of name analysis data

The accuracy of the quantitative name analysis data generated in this study was tested by comparing them with data from the 1991 Census. To do this, the total number of Indians identified in each of the 32 study wards through name analysis was correlated and regressed with the 1991 Census total of Indian persons aged 18+ in each of these wards<sup>18</sup>. Importantly, electoral registration for Bradford's 1992 register and the 1991 Census were carried out some ten months apart. Furthermore, the qualifying age for electoral registration was 16 years and eight months of age, and not 18. Nevertheless, it was still felt that these two totals would be approximately comparable, especially as the under 18 population are notoriously under enumerated on the electoral register (Butcher & Dodd, 1983).


The census data and the name analysis data had a very high positive correlation of 0.9989 across the 32 study wards. A near perfect regression was also witnessed between them, as Figure 4.5 demonstrates. Assuming that the census data are accurate, and taking into account some of the difficulties of comparing the name analysis data and census data described above, this correlation and regression suggests that the name analysis methodology employed and devised in this study is highly efficient and

---

<sup>18</sup>These census data were retrieved from Table L06 of the Local Base Statistics using SASPAC (see LRR, 1992a; 1992b for further details).

successful, at least in identifying Indian electors by their names. This is encouraging for other researchers wishing to apply this methodology and the dictionary of Indian names elsewhere.

**Figure 4.5: Regression for ward level 1991 Census count of Indians aged 18+ versus ward level name analysis count of Indians aged  $\geq 16$  years and eight months from Bradford's 1992 electoral register**



The regression equation is:  $\text{Census} = 2.91 + 0.969 \text{ Name-anl}$ . ( $R\text{-sq} = 99.8\%$ ).

## 4.4 A NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF GENERATION

### 4.4.1 Overview

Before discussing other primary data, attention must be paid to the concept of generation employed in this study. Clarification of this is important to understanding discussion in this and following chapters.

Studies discussing black<sup>19</sup> ethnic group populations in Britain often refer to 'first', 'second' and 'third' generation immigrants. In such studies these generational categories are understood to consist of certain types of person. For example, if ethnic Indians are under scrutiny then the term 'first generation immigrants' would typically refer to those individuals who had been born in India and had subsequently emigrated from the subcontinent to live in Britain. The term 'second generation immigrants' would normally be applied to those Indians who had been born in this country of first generation parents, whilst 'third generation immigrants' would generally be used to describe Indians of second generation parentage.

<sup>19</sup>The term 'black' is used in this study in an all encompassing and descriptive sense to refer to any persons of non-White ethnicity. The term 'Black' is used to refer more specifically to persons of African and Afro-Caribbean ethnicity.

It could be argued that the application of term 'immigrant' to anybody from a black ethnic group living in Britain is a linguistic denial of the status that individual would usually hold as a British citizen. Whilst this point is accepted, terms like 'first' and 'second generation immigrant' are still used in this study when talking about persons from broadly based black ethnic groups such as South Asians, or more specific groups such as Indians, Pakistanis and religio-ethnic sub-groups like Punjabi Hindus. This is not to deny such persons British citizenship, which the majority of them hold, it is merely a pragmatic use of terminology in lieu of anything more appropriate.

Importantly, however, terms like 'first', 'second' and 'third generation' immigrant are more accurately defined in this study than they have been in previous works. In addition, the terms 'generation 1.5 immigrant' and 'sending generation' are introduced, particularly where Punjabi Hindus in Bradford are concerned. It is necessary to start by explaining what is meant by 'first generation' and 'generation 1.5' immigrants, as these two terms are closely related.

#### **4.4.2 First generation and generation 1.5 immigrants**

The term 'first generation immigrants' is used in this study to describe blacks currently living in this country who were born overseas, and who emigrated from their country of birth to arrive in Britain  $\geq 16$  years of age. By contrast, 'generation 1.5 immigrants' refers to those who arrived in Britain  $\leq 15$  years of age. In all other studies to date, these two categories have been lumped together as first generation immigrants. This is not accepted here, because it is argued that the cultural grounding of first generation and generation 1.5 immigrants is diverse enough to require them to be treated separately; a point which only a few are now beginning to recognise (Modood, 1997: 335).

For example, the term 'first generation immigrants' is regularly used in this study to refer to Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford who were born in the Punjab, and who have subsequently migrated to Britain from this subcontinental region. Typically, these first generation Punjabi Hindu immigrants would have arrived in this country as married adults. The male partner in the marriage would often have arrived first to seek work, only to be joined by his wife at a later date<sup>20</sup>. But whatever the circumstances of their arrival, the most important point is that these first generation Punjabi Hindus were  $\geq 16$  years of age when they got here. This means that they would have lived long enough in the Indian Punjab to be substantially influenced by the cultural norms of their native region. Indeed, it would be expected that this influence would have been more deeply

---

<sup>20</sup>Sometimes, a first generation Punjabi Hindu married couple may have arrived in this country together. Alternatively, first generation Punjabi Hindus may have arrived in this country unmarried. If this were the case, they could have either come on their own (usually if they were single males seeking work) or, if they were of a young age (say 18), with other first generation relatives such as their parents.

engrained as the age of first generation immigrants on arrival in this country increased. Undoubtedly, this cultural grounding of first generation Punjabi Hindus would have affected their views on white British culture and their interaction with it.

By contrast, generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindu immigrants came to this country with their first generation parents, or possibly with other adult relatives (e.g. first generation grandparents, elderly brothers, uncles etc.). Because of their young age on arrival ( $\leq 15$  years) and the short time they had spent living in the subcontinent, these generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindus would have been less likely to be influenced by the cultural norms of their native region, as compared to their first generation counterparts. Furthermore, the age of these generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindu immigrants on arrival meant that they would have had some compulsory British education<sup>21</sup>. It is likely that any 'cultural baggage' which they had appropriated from their subcontinental origins would have been substantially weakened or adapted by this British schooling experience. Moreover, as the arrival age of these generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindus decreased, their appropriation of cultural norms from the Indian Punjab would be less, and their exposure to British schooling greater. In short, the young age of the generation 1.5 immigrants on entry into this country provided them with a cultural grounding which was likely to be closer to the norms of the white host society than that seen amongst the first generation.

The distinction between generation 1.5 and first generation immigrants is therefore a vital one, because their different cultural backgrounds are likely to lead to differing outlooks on life in Britain and experiences of it. In support of this, it will be seen in Chapter Eight that the experience of generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindu males, in terms of their occupationally derived social class, has been distinct from that of Punjabi Hindus from the first generation (see Section 8.3.2).

#### **4.4.3 The sending generation and second and third generation immigrants**

In this study, the term 'sending generation' is used to refer to those individuals who are the parents of first generation immigrants now living in Britain. Thus, the sending generation is represented by persons who remain (or if deceased, remained) in their country of birth rather than migrating to Britain like their offspring. Many members of the sending generation for Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community have passed away due to old age.

As noted above, the term 'second generation immigrant' would normally be applied to persons who had been born in this country to first generation parents, whilst

---

<sup>21</sup>In fact, the age divide between first generation and generation 1.5 immigrants has been drawn up on the basis of the age group eligible for compulsory education in Britain.

'third generation immigrant' would typically apply to individuals born of second generation parentage. These definitions are accepted in this study, but they need to be widened. This is because they assume that the parents of these immigrants are all of the same generation. This is not the case.

For example, within Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community it was normal to find individuals with one first generation parent and one second generation one, or a first generation parent and a generation 1.5 one, or some other combination. It can be difficult to decide whether the individuals with these types of mixed generational parentage are second or third generation immigrants. For this study, it was decided that the terms 'second' and 'third generation' immigrant would be defined as applying to an individual (or individuals) with the following generational combinations of parents (see Table 4.11).

**Table 4.11: Generational combinations of parents which define second and third generation immigrants in this study**

<b>Immigrant generation of individual</b>	<b>Generation of first parent</b>	<b>Generation of second parent</b>
2nd	1st generation	1st generation
2nd	1st generation	Generation 1.5
2nd	1st generation	2nd generation
2nd	Generation 1.5	Generation 1.5
3rd	2nd generation	2nd generation
3rd	2nd generation	Generation 1.5

There is no mention of fourth generation immigrants in Table 4.11, for whom at least one parent would need to be third generation. This is because third generation persons within Britain's black immigrant communities are likely to be young children and teenagers, and are therefore unlikely (as yet) to have their own fourth generation offspring. This was certainly the case amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, where most third generation immigrants appeared to be under the age of 21.

#### **4.5 PRIMARY QUALITATIVE DATA GENERATED FROM INTERVIEWS**

Following name analysis data, the second of the four primary data types employed in this study is qualitative data from interviews carried out on Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford. This section details how these interviews were conducted, and describes how the data generated from them were manipulated, analysed and used.

#### 4.5.1 Type of interview used

In line with the third and fourth aims of this study (see Section 1.1), the main objective of carrying out interviews on Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford was to collect qualitative data on the degree to which the caste system is present and operational for the city's Punjabi Hindu community, and also on any changes which the institution might have undergone in the migration and settlement of this community from the Punjab to Bradford.

There are many types of interview which can be used by the social scientist to collect qualitative data. On the one hand there is the 'structured' type. This approach is little different from that of a questionnaire, as it usually involves every respondent being asked identical questions in a set order. On the other hand there is the 'unstructured' approach, which has more affinity with a psychoanalyst's techniques than with the usual survey interview. In this instance, the informant would be encouraged to talk about the subject under investigation and would guide and control the interview him/herself. There is no set order of questions, no pre-determined framework for recording answers, and the interviewer:

...confines himself to elucidating points, to rephrasing the respondent's answers and to probing generally. (Moser & Kalton, 1971: 297).

Between these two extremes lie a number of interview types, all of which involve varying combinations of the structured and unstructured approaches. As Gardner explains:

...there can be gradations of formality and informality; that is, the differences form a continuum and not a dichotomy. Some interviews may be a mixture of two types, beginning in an informal style and finishing more formally (or vice versa). (Gardner, 1978: 56).

Most commonly, this middle ground is identified with the 'semi-structured' interview. Like the unstructured approach the semi-structured interview does not involve a strict schedule of pre-determined questions. Instead, most enquiries are open and flexible so as to encourage the respondent to talk freely about the issue in hand. However, these questions are still centred around a set framework of key themes, and in this respect the semi-structured interview has more affinity with the structured approach.

The 'middle ground' which the semi-structured interview occupies has caused it to gain popularity amongst social scientists over the last decade or so (e.g. Cornwell, 1984; Whatmore 1991). This is because it gets away from the inflexibility of the fully structured interview and thus encourages the collection of more complex and meaningful qualitative interview data, yet at the same time it still has a structured enough format to ensure that all the relevant topics are discussed. Thus:

The respondents are all asked for certain information, yet have plenty of opportunity to develop their views at length. Interviewers, on their side, are free to choose when and how to put their questions and how much to explore and probe, all the time keeping within the framework imposed by the topics to be covered. (Moser & Kalton, 1971: 298).

For similar reasons it was felt that the semi-structured interview would be appropriate for this study, because:

- i) It has a flexibility which would allow unanticipated routes of conversation with Punjabi Hindu interviewees. This would be valuable in uncovering the complexities of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, by enabling the interviewer to delve more deeply into specific areas of interest.
- ii) It gives considerable control to the interviewer. This would mean that questions on the caste system, or any other relevant topic, could be elaborated in a different way if Punjabi Hindu interviewees did not understand them. It would also allow potentially sensitive questions on the caste system to be fielded with a level of diplomacy which befitted the willingness of a given interviewee to talk about the institution.
- iii) To the interviewee the semi-structured interview may often seem like a natural conversation, in which they are unaware of being steered into certain areas and topics of discussion. This quality would hopefully put Punjabi Hindu interviewees at their ease, encouraging them to talk about the caste system with greater candour.
- iv) Finally, despite its flexibility, the semi-structured interview is a technique which embodies a requisite amount of structure. This would help ensure that all the pertinent issues relating to Punjabi Hindus in Bradford were addressed in the interviews, and that there was some degree of comparability between interview responses. This comparability would be particularly useful when more quantifiable data needed to be extracted from the interviews (see Section 4.6).

Thus, a semi-structured interview, composed of open and flexible questions based around a set framework of key themes, was adopted as a suitable method for investigation into the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. It was felt this was an interview approach which would be most likely to deliver some meaningful 'private' accounts of what the caste system means to Punjabi Hindus in the city, as opposed to rather sanitised 'public' accounts (Cornwell, 1988: 228).

#### 4.5.2 Units of analysis

Having established that a semi-structured interview should be used, attention turned to identifying the appropriate units of analysis for this interview, as well as determining the key themes around which the interview's questions should be based.

It was felt that a useful unit of analysis would be the Punjabi Hindu household, which was defined as one of the following:

- a) Where two or more persons of Punjabi Hindu ethnicity are related by blood or by marriage (or partnership<sup>22</sup>) and live as a family unit under the same address in the electoral register. Typical examples of this might be where:
  - A Punjabi Hindu married couple (or partners), with or without children, live under one address in the register.
  - A single Punjabi Hindu parent lives with her/his children under one address in the register.
  - Punjabi Hindu siblings (e.g. two sisters) live under the same address in the register.
  - Some other kind of Punjabi Hindu extended family unit is found under one address in the register, such as a Punjabi Hindu married couple (or partners) living with their grand/parent/s and children.
  
- b) Where two or more persons of Punjabi Hindu ethnicity and non-Punjabi Hindu ethnicity are related by marriage (or partnership) and live as a family unit under the same address in the register. An example of this would be where:
  - A Punjabi Hindu was married (or partnered) to a Punjabi Sikh and lived with them, with or without children, under one address. For want of a better term, such a situation is referred to as a 'mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu household' in this study.
  
- c) Where an individual of Punjabi Hindu ethnicity lives alone under one address in the electoral register (e.g. a Punjabi Hindu widow/er, divorcee or young professional).

It was decided that 'Punjabi Hindu household' was a term which could not be applied to a situation in which someone of Punjabi Hindu ethnicity lived under the same address as other individuals of non-Punjabi Hindu or Punjabi Hindu ethnicity, and yet in which none of these persons were related by blood or marriage. Examples of this were non-familial living arrangements, such as student households, halls of residence and nursing homes. Thus, the definition of a 'Punjabi Hindu household' largely rests on the

---

<sup>22</sup>In this study, 'partnership' refers to situations like a 'common law marriage'.

concept of a Punjabi Hindu family unit living under one address in the electoral register. Admittedly, this concept is a little strained where a single Punjabi Hindu lives under one address on their own, as they could hardly be said to constitute a family. However, such cases were rare, as will be seen below.

Quantitative data generated from name analysis of Bradford's 1992 electoral register demonstrated that there were 728 Punjabi Hindus (aged  $\geq 16$  years and eight months) living in 301 Punjabi Hindu households across the 32 wards of the study area. 243 of these 301 households (approx. 81%) were those identified above as type 'a', whilst 22 (approx. 7%) were type 'c'. The remaining 36 households (approx. 12%) were mixed ethnicity or type 'b'. The ethnic compositions of the mixed marriages which defined these 36 mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households are shown in Table 4.12.

**Table 4.12: Ethnic compositions of the mixed marriages which defined the 36 mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford**

Ethnic composition of mixed marriage defining the mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu household	Number of mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households	As % of all mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households	As % of all 301 Punjabi Hindu households in the 32 study wards
	a	$(100/b) \times a$	$(100/301) \times a$
Punjabi Hindu/Punjabi Sikh	21	58	7.0
Punjabi Hindu/White	13	36	4.3
Punjabi Hindu/Gujarati Hindu	1	3	0.3
Punjabi Hindu/Bengali Hindu	1	3	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>36 (b)</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>12%</b>

The numbers of mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households defined by the various types of mixed marriage is an interesting reflection of the social distance between Punjabi Hindus and other ethnic groups and sub-groups. For example, Punjabi Hindus and Punjabi Sikhs have some common elements in terms of their cultural background; indeed in Section 6.3 it can be seen how this may extend to persons from these two sub-groups using the same centres of worship. In Table 4.12, this cultural similarity between Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs is reflected in the fact that Punjabi Hindu/Sikh marriages define the largest percentage of mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford.

Conversely, the cultural distance between Punjabi Hindus and Hindus from other Indian regions is greater than that seen between Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs. This may explain the comparatively low percentage of mixed ethnicity households which are defined by marriages between Punjabi Hindus and those from other Indian regions. In fact, Table 4.12 shows that mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households defined by marriages of this kind are far outstripped by those between Punjabi Hindus and Whites. Importantly, there are no mixed marriages between Punjabi Hindus and Pakistani Muslims. This indicates the substantial cultural differences between these two groups, which reveal themselves more clearly in Section 6.2.4.

Having determined that the unit of analysis was to be the Punjabi Hindu household, the question remained as to who should be interviewed within it. Should it be the head of the household (a concept fraught with definition), or another household member? There were several considerations at stake here, most particularly the age and gender of any individual interviewee, which might affect their perceptions of the caste system.

It was decided a pragmatic approach should be taken, in which the interview was directed towards any persons in a Punjabi Hindu household who were willing to respond. Ideally then, all members of the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household would be encouraged to take part in an interview. This would help dispel some of the problems of gender and age bias, which would be more likely to occur if the interview was directed at one particular household member. Of course, if the interview was to involve all willing respondents in a Punjabi Hindu household, this could include non-Punjabi Hindus who were part of the family unit in mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households. This was not seen as a problem, because such individuals might have a unique perspective on issues like the caste system which would enrich interview data.

#### **4.5.3 Need for a pilot interview study and key interview themes**

It was felt that a handful of pilot interviews should be conducted to try out the idea of interviewing all willing members of a Punjabi Hindu household, and to test a semi-structured interview schedule for use in the main interview study. A prototype interview schedule was therefore drawn up for piloting. In the line with the semi-structured interview approach, a set framework of key themes were chosen around which questions in this prototype interview schedule could be based. These five themes were as follows:

- i) General family details** - The aim of this theme was to obtain data on the number of people living in an interview household and their ages, genders, etc.
- ii) Migration histories** - This theme aimed to obtain data on the migration histories of first generation and generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindus related to the family unit living in an interview household.

Importantly, this investigation of migration histories only concerned the immediate relations of a family unit. For example, if an interview household was occupied by a family unit made up of a second generation Punjabi Hindu couple living with their grown up children, then information would be gathered on the migration histories of this couple's first generation parents (who did not live in the household).

**iii) Education histories** - This theme aimed to obtain data on the education histories of Punjabi Hindus through successive generations; these being first, generation 1.5, second and third generation Punjabi Hindus related to the family unit living in an interview household, as well as the sending generation of this family unit back in India.

As above, this cross-generational investigation of education only concerned the immediate relations of a family unit. Again, therefore, if a Punjabi Hindu household was occupied by a family unit made up of a second generation Punjabi Hindu couple living with their grown up children, then information would be gathered on the education histories of this couple, their third generation children, their first generation parents (who did not live in the household), and their four sets of grandparents, who represented the sending generation who had never come to Britain.

**iv) Employment histories** - This theme aimed to obtain data on the employment histories of Punjabi Hindus through successive generations. Again, these were first, generation 1.5, second and third generation Punjabi Hindus related to the family unit living in a household, as well as the sending generation back in India. As with 'education histories', this cross-generational investigation of employment only concerned the immediate relations of a family unit.

**v) The Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford and the caste system** - The aim of this theme was to obtain data on the caste system and Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

The prototype interview schedule for the pilot study, incorporating the five key themes outlined above, can be found in Appendix 2A. It can be seen that this schedule presents a series of questions based around these five themes. It should be stressed that these were 'model questions'. In other words, they were not intended to be asked outright, but were merely guides to the types of questions which should be asked during the course of the pilot interview. A number of points need to be made about this prototype interview schedule:

- i) Although the questions were designed to be directed at (and answered by) any member of the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household, those questions under certain themes would only actually apply to persons of Punjabi Hindu ethnicity in a mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu household. Appendix 2A includes introductory notes which help clarify this situation in more detail.
- ii) Questions relating to migration, education and employment histories (under themes two, three and four respectively) necessarily required information on specific

individuals from different generations. However, some of these persons may have been absent from the pilot interview, or unwilling to take part. Information concerning such individuals therefore had to be gained from those household members who were present at the interview. It will be seen that the questions under the second, third and fourth themes are designed to take account of this.

- iii) It can be seen that most questions in the prototype interview schedule are accompanied by an extensive sub-text of notes. These notes were designed for the interviewer's referral. Their aim was to remind the interviewer of the information he was attempting to obtain with any particular line of questioning.
- iv) The first four of the five key themes in the prototype interview schedule have no questions on the caste system. However, many of the questions based around these first four themes were designed to gather vital socio-economic data. This could be extracted from the interviews in a quantitative form and related back to information on the caste system collected under the fifth theme (see Section 4.6).
- v) Only the fifth and final theme of the prototype interview schedule includes a question on the caste system, because of possible sensitivity to this subject. This practice of ending a line of inquiry with the most sensitive questions is a well known technique in social research for building up the trust of interviewees. It can be termed the 'funnel sequence' of questions (after Kahn & Cannell, 1957).
- vi) The fifth theme of the prototype interview schedule only includes one question about the caste system. Again, this was because nothing was known at the pilot stage about the levels of sensitivity to this topic. The idea was that one broad question on the caste system would lead into general conversation about the institution with pilot interviewees. On the basis of their responses, it was hoped that the level of sensitivity to the issue of caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community could be fully assessed. If pilot interviewees seemed generally unperturbed by the subject, then more searching questions about the institution could be presented in the main interview study. If the opposite was the case, then an alternative approach might have to be devised.

In short, it was felt important not to launch headlong into a discussion about the caste system with pilot interviewees. Had it been a very emotive issue, such an approach could have caused offence, and news of this may have spread around the community and endangered the success of later research. Ironically, as will be seen below, this level of caution was probably unnecessary.

#### 4.5.4 Sampling for the pilot interviews

It was decided that four pilot interviews would be adequate to troubleshoot the design of the prototype interview schedule, and assess whether the idea of interviewing all members of a household was workable.

The 301 Punjabi Hindu households within the 32 study wards were listed and sequentially numbered. Four households were randomly sampled from this list. A letter was then sent to these households explaining that they had been identified as Punjabi Hindu through name analysis of the electoral register (see Appendix 3A). The letter requested a 'short chat' about 'various aspects of Punjabi Hindu culture and family life', and promised a follow-up phone call in a few days time to arrange this. No mention of the caste system was made, and the letter itself was signed in Hindi; it was hoped that these small details might improve the chance of obtaining a pilot interview.

In attempting follow-up phone calls, it was revealed that many Punjabi Hindus in Bradford are ex-directory and cannot be easily contacted by phone. This problem eliminated two out of the four households which had been sampled for the pilot interviews. Of the remaining two which could be contacted, convincing their occupants over the phone that they should allow someone to come and interview them for an hour was not easy, but after some persuasion one household did agree to a pilot interview.

To reach the allotted target of four pilot interviews, another three Punjabi Hindu households were randomly sampled from the listed 301. A letter was again sent out, but following the problems of contacting Punjabi Hindu households by phone, the letter now promised a personal visit to the household in question in a few days time, at which an attempt would be made to arrange a time for an interview. (This revised letter can be found in Appendix 3B). This approach proved more successful than the telephone method, because all three households which were sampled for a pilot interview the second time around agreed to take part. It became clear that Punjabi Hindu households responded more positively to a doorstep visit as the follow up to an initial contact letter, rather than a phone call. Such a visit gave the researcher a better chance of 'selling his case', and it encouraged householders to be helpful as the researcher had made the effort to come to them. Consequently, it will be seen that the revised letter, coupled with follow-up doorstep visits, was also the technique used in capturing households for the main interview study.

Before turning to the findings from the pilot interviews, it is necessary to explain how they were conducted. First, all four pilot interviews were recorded. This was done to assess the viability of recording the main interviews, and the pilot study findings on

this are discussed in the next section. Second, special attention was paid to interview technique. It is generally accepted that in any kind of social survey work:

The interviewer's presence should affect neither a respondent's perception of a question nor the answer given. The interviewer, then, should be a neutral medium through which questions and answers are transmitted. (Babbie, 1990: 188).

Clearly, this is an ideal situation which cannot be realistically fulfilled, as the interviewer's presence will always affect the interviewee in some way. Nevertheless, it is still important to try and achieve interviewer neutrality if qualitative interview data are to be treated with confidence. With this in mind, particular attention was paid to avoiding two types of biased questioning during the pilot interviews. These were 'leading' and 'presuming' questions (after Moser & Kalton, 1971: 323-6).

Leading questions, such as, "Would you say the caste system is unfair?" were avoided, because they obviously provoke a certain type of response. In this case that response would probably be "Yes" rather than "No", because the interviewee may not wish to differ with the interviewer's implied suggestion that the caste system was unfair. Presuming questions, such as, "How many times a week do you go to the temple?" were also avoided, because they imply something about the respondent that the interviewer is not entitled to assume. These questions are dangerous because they make it hard for an interviewee to deny the assumption. Thus, in this particular case, the result might be to exaggerate the number of temple goers.

#### **4.5.5 Findings from the pilot interviews**

In terms of operational procedure, the pilot study indicated that the tape-recording of interviews was workable. No pilot interviewees were averse to having their conversations recorded and this confirmed that the main interviews could also be taped. In addition, the technique of interviewing all members of the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household was found to be successful. All four pilot interviews lasted over one hour. In each of them one young English speaking adult householder usually took the lead in answering questions, but in all cases these answers were subsequently annotated by other household members, irrespective of whether they were adults or children. Even older householders, who often spoke poor English, took part. This was because younger individuals were constantly translating back and forth for them, and almost seamlessly incorporating the comments of these elders into the recorded interview.

Turning to the actual responses received from pilot interviews, three points came to the fore. First, when the question on the caste system was posed to pilot interviewees it became apparent that they were keen to talk about the institution, and that there was no obvious sensitivity to the subject. In fact, some pilot interviewees said that discussion

about the caste system was the part of the interview they had most enjoyed. Accordingly, a revised interview schedule was drawn up for use in the main interview study which included many additional questions on the caste system under the fifth key theme (see Appendix 2B). These questions were more incisive, searching and provocative than the rather bland one which had been included in the prototype interview schedule.

Second, responses from the pilot study revealed that terms like *jati*, *varna* and caste were used by Punjabi Hindu interviewees in different ways according to context. For example, when talking in their own language (i.e. Punjabi or Hindi), and amongst themselves, the pilot interviewees were clearly heard to use terms like *jati* and *varna* to refer to the same types of social unit in the caste system as has been suggested in this study (see Chapter Two). By contrast, when talking in English to the white interviewer, pilot interviewees preferred to use the term 'caste' to refer to any type of social unit within the caste system; in the same ambiguous sense as has been employed by many indologists (see Chapter Two). Pilot interviewees appeared to be more comfortable using this one word in such situations, rather than their own more specific native terms. Indeed, they became uneasy when terms *jati* and *varna* were introduced by the interviewer into any conversation being conducted in English. As one pilot interviewee explained:

Sorry to say this, but it sounds really funny coming from you, you know the word *jati*, it sounds really strange. (Adult male interviewee. Pilot interview 3).

Perhaps this unease was because pilot interviewees saw the use of such native terms by the interviewer as pressurising them into providing more complex answers about the caste system, because the interviewer appeared to know more about the institution than might typically be expected of a white non-Indian.

As a result of these findings, the questions on the caste system found under theme five of the revised interview schedule were designed to keep the use of native terms to a minimum. Thus, these questions asked interviewees to discuss 'castes' rather than *jatis* or *varnas*, even if it was *jatis* or *varnas* which were actually being referred to. Consequently, when analysing qualitative data from the main interviews, it was necessary to clarify what type of social unit interviewees were referring to when using the term 'caste'; i.e. they might be referring to *jatis*, *varnas* or castes themselves. In Chapter Six it will be seen that this task is not as difficult as it sounds.

Finally, it was realised that the responses to the pilot interviews did not provide enough useful socio-economic data which might be related back to information on the caste system. Accordingly, extra questions were incorporated under the first theme of 'general family details' in the revised interview schedule. These additional enquiries were

designed to collect socio-economic data in the main interview study on tenure, house values, car ownership, car values and central heating status.

#### 4.5.6 Sampling for the main interviews

It was decided that the main interviews should be conducted with around 50 randomly sampled Punjabi Hindu households. As seven households had been approached for the pilot study, this left 294 out of the total of 301 Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford which could be sampled for the main interviews.

It was felt important to try and obtain a socio-economic cross-section of Punjabi Hindu sample households across the 32 wards of the study area. This would maximise the possibility of picking up any variation in interview responses or findings relating to the caste system which were influenced by socio-economic factors. The best way to achieve this was to combine wards of a similar socio-economic profile into groups or clusters, and to randomly sample a given number of Punjabi Hindu households for interview from each of these, thus producing a stratified random sample. The construction of clusters containing wards of a similar socio-economic profile was achieved as follows:

First, eight ward level socio-economic variables were constructed for the 32 study wards (see Table 4.13). It can be seen that these variables relate to persons of Indian ethnicity and are derived from the Local Base Statistics of the 1991 Census data (see LRR, 1992a; 1992b for further details). As it was Punjabi Hindu households which were to be sampled from the different clusters, it would have been best if the eight variables on which the clusters themselves were to be based had been related solely to Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. However, this was not possible, because data on Punjabi Hindus is not available in the 1991 Census. Consequently, ward level socio-economic variables relating to persons of Indian ethnicity had to be used as the 'next best' solution.

**Table 4.13: Eight ward level socio-economic variables constructed for the 32 study wards**

No.	Variable	1991 Census LBS table
1	% of Indian households in ward with no car	L49
2	% of Indian households in ward with no central heating	L49
3	% of Indian households in ward which are owner occupied	L49
4	% of Indian households in ward which are public rented	L49
5	% of economically active Indians in ward registered unemployed	L09
6	% of economically active Indians in ward in social classes I and II	L93
7	% of economically active Indians in ward in social classes IV and V	L93
8	% of Indians in ward aged 18+ qualified at degree or diploma level	L85

Using SPSS, a hierarchical cluster analysis was undertaken which combined the 32 study wards into groups or clusters on the basis of their similarities in terms of the eight socio-economic variables under study. As with all cluster analysis a suite of solutions was produced, from one overall cluster in which all wards had been grouped together, to 32 clusters in which all wards were separate. The similarity of wards within individual clusters, in terms of their performance across the eight socio-economic variables, could be determined for the different cluster solutions by referring to the agglomeration schedule of the cluster analysis.

It was decided that somewhere between three and six clusters of the 32 study wards would be ideal for the purposes of the stratified random sample. The eventual number chosen was four, because the agglomeration schedule indicated that four clusters (rather than three, five or six) was the level at which the wards within each individual cluster were most alike in terms of the eight socio-economic variables under study. The four clusters, their component wards, and the total number of Punjabi Hindu households lying in each cluster and ward are shown in Table 4.14.

**Table 4.14: The four clusters, their component wards, and the number of Punjabi Hindu households in each cluster and ward**

Cluster No.	Names of wards in cluster	No. of Punjabi Hindu households in clusters & wards	Cluster No.	Names of wards in cluster	No. of Punjabi Hindu households in clusters & wards
<i>Cluster 1</i>		<u>19</u>	<i>Cluster 4</i>		<u>36</u>
	University	19		Baildon	3
				Bingley	0
				Bingley Rural	0
				Craven	2
<i>Cluster 2</i>		<u>80</u>		Eccleshill	0
	Bowling	24		Idle	1
	Bradford Moor	51		Ilkley	0
	Great Horton	5		Keighley North	0
				Keighley South	0
				Keighley West	0
<i>Cluster 3</i>		<u>166</u>		Queensbury	1
	Bolton	21		Rombalds	1
	Clayton	10		Shipley West	13
	Heaton	17		Thornton	4
	Little Horton	16		Tong	2
	Odsal	21		Wibsey	0
	Pudsey North	29		Worth Valley	2
	Toller	41		Wyke	0
	Undercliffe	11		Pudsey South	7


Table 4.14 shows that the four clusters contain unequal numbers of wards and Punjabi Hindu households. The smallest in all senses was Cluster One, with only one

ward and 19 households. Cluster Three had the most households (166), whilst the greatest number of wards was seen in Cluster Four (19).

Once the four clusters had been established, SPSS was used to provide descriptions of their sub-populations in terms of the eight variables under scrutiny. This exercise indicated that Cluster One had the most deprived socio-economic position, followed by Clusters Two, Three and Four. For example, Cluster One had the highest percentage of Indian households with no central heating and no car, and the lowest percentage of economically active Indians in social classes I and II, as compared to the other three clusters. Conversely, Cluster Four had the lowest percentages of Indian households with no central heating and no car, and the highest percentage of economically active Indians in social classes I and II.

The geography of the four clusters is shown in Figure 4.6. The most socio-economically deprived cluster (Cluster One) lies at the centre of Bradford in University ward, whilst the least deprived (Cluster Four) is made up of rural wards on the periphery of the Bradford district. This pattern conforms to the classic socio-economic geography of the city, and is particularly encouraging as no areal indicator was used in the original cluster analysis procedure.

**Figure 4.6: Location of clusters across the 32 study wards<sup>Ⓞ</sup>**



<sup>Ⓞ</sup> Figure 5.1 provides a full base map of the study area, showing the names and locations of the 32 wards.

The planned target of 50 main interviews meant that 12 to 13 households needed to be sampled for interview from each cluster if a reasonably even socio-economic cross-section of interview households was to be obtained. To begin, 13 Punjabi Hindu households were randomly sampled from Cluster One. A letter was sent to these households which (on the basis of pilot study findings) promised a personal visit to arrange a time for an interview (see Appendix 3B).

When these personal visits were made, two problems arose which had not been encountered in the pilot study. The first of these was where the Punjabi Hindus living in a sampled household had moved, and the household had been subsequently occupied by persons of non-Punjabi Hindu ethnicity, making it ineligible for interview. The second problem was where the residents of a sampled household were not at home on three consecutive visits, at which point no further attempt was made to arrange an interview due to the time constraints of fieldwork. In addition to these two problems, the residents of some households simply refused to be interviewed, as had been the case when trying to arrange interviews by phone in the pilot study.

Because of these difficulties, all 19 Punjabi Hindu households in Cluster One were eventually sampled for interview and circulated with a letter. From these 19 households only two interviews were arranged. This meant that 48 interviews had to be arranged in Clusters Two, Three and Four to meet the target of 50. In view of the fact that the socio-economic clusters had been set up with the aim of obtaining an equal number of interviews from each of them, this situation was not ideal; it was, however, unavoidable. In these other three clusters, problems were again encountered with Punjabi Hindu householders who were not at home after three visits, had moved, or who simply refused to be interviewed. Eventually, therefore, 149 households had to be sampled and circulated with a letter in order to obtain the requisite 50 interviews. A detailed break down of figures relating to this sampling process are presented in Table 4.15 .

Three key points can be drawn from Table 4.15. First, it can be seen that the number of interviews conducted in each cluster varies. Again, in terms of providing an ideal stratified random sample, it would have been best if an equal number of households had been sampled from each cluster. It has already been seen that this was not possible in Cluster One. However, of the 48 households sampled in the remaining three clusters, it would have been preferable if an equal number of 16 had been interviewed in each. It was Cluster Four which provided the main difficulty here. Arranging interviews in this cluster required many journeys to outlying areas of Bradford, such as Keighley. These journeys were often unsuccessful. After arranging 13 interviews in Cluster Four, it was felt necessary to 'cut losses' and arrange an extra three in Cluster Two, which was nearer to hand. As a result, the number of interviews carried out in Clusters Two, Three and

Table 4.15: Response and refusal rates in Punjabi Hindu households sampled and contacted for interviews

Cluster No.	Total No. Punjabi Hindu households sampled for interview	No. sampled households occupants moved	No. sampled households occupants moved as % of total households sampled for interview	No. sampled households occupants not in on three visits	No. sampled households occupants not in on three visits as % of total households sampled for interview	No. sampled households refused interview	No. sampled households refused interview as % of total households sampled for interview	No. sampled households interviewed	No. sampled households interviewed as % of total households sampled for interview	Total Percentages <sup>ⓐ</sup>
	<b>a</b>	<b>b</b>	$(100/a) \times b$	<b>c</b>	$(100/a) \times c$	<b>d</b>	$(100/a) \times d$	<b>e</b>	$(100/a) \times e$	
1	19	12	63%	2	11%	3	16%	2	11%	100%
2	57	6	11%	9	16%	23	40%	19	33%	100%
3	41	3	7%	8	20%	14	34%	16	39%	100%
4	32	1	3%	6	19%	12	38%	13	41%	100%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>34%</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>ⓐ</sup> Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding error.

Four was unequal. This was not ideal, but it represented a pragmatic approach to the problem in hand.

A second consideration concerns the variation in the percentage of Punjabi Hindu households which have moved across the four clusters. These figures are found in the fourth column of Table 4.15. It is interesting to note that the percentage of moves is by far the greatest (63%) in Cluster One, which is located at the heart of Bradford's inner city. The percentage of moves then declines steadily through Clusters Two, Three and Four. This trend is in line with the increasing peripherality of these clusters, or their distance from the city centre. Such a decline reflects the greater transience of inner-city populations as opposed to more suburban ones. It also shows how the electoral register, from which Punjabi Hindu sample households were identified and located, decays faster for inner city areas than for more suburban ones; a point also noted by Butcher & Dodd (1983).

Finally, attention needs to be paid to the response rates for interviews, which are indicated in the penultimate column of Table 4.15. These rates are calculated by taking the number of households interviewed in a given cluster as a percentage of all households sampled for interview in that cluster. The response rates for Clusters Two, Three and Four are all much higher than those seen in Cluster One. However, Cluster One can be considered an anomaly here, because its response rate is rendered low by the abnormally high percentage of Punjabi Hindu households which have moved.

Table 4.16 shows an alternative calculation of interview response rates. This takes the number of households in which interviews were successfully carried out in a given cluster, as a percentage of the total number of households which both refused and undertook interviews in that cluster. This eliminates from the calculation of response rates those households that had moved, and those in which householders were not at home on three consecutive visits, on the grounds that they never had the opportunity to undertake an interview in the first place.

**Table 4.16: Alternative calculation of interview response rates**

Cluster No.	No. sampled households refused interview	No. sampled households interviewed	Response rate = No. sampled households interviewed as % of total households which were interviewed and refused interview
	a	b	$(100/a+b) \times b$
1	3	2	40
2	23	19	45
3	14	16	53
4	12	13	52
<b>Totals</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>49%</b>

Across all four clusters, this alternative calculation gives higher response rates to interviews than was seen in Table 4.15. This is especially the case in Cluster One, which according to this method of calculation has a response rate more comparable with the other three clusters. Interestingly, the response rates in Table 4.16 are notably higher in Clusters Three and Four (which lie in the peripheral and more affluent wards of Bradford) than in Clusters One and Two (which show greater socio-economic deprivation and are nearer Bradford's centre).

Hedges suggests that in a typical household interview survey:

...the level of response is likely to be around 80 per cent, and non-response therefore around 20 per cent. (Hedges, 1978: 71).

Clearly, interview response rates of between 40% and 53% in Table 4.16 are nowhere near these levels. But this is not surprising considering the demands which were being placed on Punjabi Hindu interviewees, in asking them to allow a white stranger to enter their home and usually take up over an hour of their time. Indeed, bearing this in mind, the response rates calculated in the above table, or even those seen in Table 4.15, seem remarkably good.

In line with the findings from the pilot interviews, those of the main study were conducted in much the same way. Thus, all willing members of the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household were interviewed, and the interviews themselves were taped. Again, presuming and leading questions were avoided. In fact, the only real difference between these main interviews and those of the pilot study involved the use of the revised interview schedule discussed earlier (see Appendix 2B). The interviews themselves were conducted during the autumn of 1994.

#### **4.5.7 Manipulation, analysis and use of qualitative interview data**

The 50 taped interviews resulting from the main study ranged between three quarters of an hour and four and a half hours in length. The first task was to transcribe these interviews word for word. This transcription process provided an opportunity to listen through all the interview tapes, so giving an overall impression of the kind of information which might eventually be drawn out of the qualitative interview data. Once the transcriptions were completed, over 500 A4 sheets of interview dialogue were ready for analysis.

To begin analysis, the transcripts were read through to identify key ideas and themes which could be usefully drawn out of them. These themes included things like marriage and the caste system, or socio-economic status and the caste system, amongst

Punjabi Hindus in Bradford. Following this, a more systematic content analysis of the interviews was carried out along the lines of each identified theme. Thus, for the theme concerning marriage and the caste system, all the interview transcripts were read through, and all references to the caste system and marriage by interviewees were highlighted. This systematic content analysis illustrated the range of experiences of interviewees for each identified theme. In turn, this facilitated the construction of lines of argument about the experiences of all Punjabi Hindus in Bradford in terms of these themes.

These lines of argument developed from the theme and content analysis described above are used in Chapters Six to Nine, and are illustrated with quotations from the interviewees. The interview data are of such high quality that analysis of them rarely needed to go beyond theme and content techniques towards a more detailed investigation into the significance of individual words used by interviewees. On a few occasions, however, whole sections of discourse, rather than individual words, have undergone examination for their deeper meaning.

In the chapters which present qualitative interview data, it will be seen that whilst the findings from these data may initially be considered in isolation, they are often eventually taken as indicative of trends within the whole of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. A number of points lend credence to this assumption. First, it will be seen in the quotations of interviewees that they often talk about their own experiences as being an integral part of those of Bradford's whole Punjabi Hindu population, rather than isolating them as different or separate. Second, participant observation amongst the city's Punjabi Hindu community suggested that there was no significant difference between the experiences of interviewees and all Punjabi Hindus living in the city. Third, the interview sample of 50 Punjabi Hindu households is a significant proportion of the 301 in the study area (17%). Furthermore, these 50 households were randomly sampled across clusters so as to obtain a representative cross-section of them for Bradford in terms of their socio-economic status. It is argued that all these factors add eligibility to the idea of taking interview findings as indicative of trends within the whole of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

#### **4.6 PRIMARY QUANTITATIVE DATA GENERATED FROM INTERVIEWS AND QUESTIONNAIRES**

To support arguments about the caste system developed from qualitative data relating to the 50 household interviews, it was decided that primary quantitative data on the institution should also be generated. These quantitative data came from two sources. The first of these was from the 50 interviews themselves. The second was from 73

questionnaires which were circulated to Punjabi Hindu households in the study area. This section explains the methodological approaches employed in the generation, manipulation, analysis and use of these data.

#### 4.6.1 Categories of quantitative data in interviews

The preliminary read through of the 50 interview transcripts revealed that a substantial amount of interview data were unsuitable for the qualitative techniques of theme and content analysis. Instead, it appeared these data would benefit from being extracted from the transcripts in a quantitative form. The data from the interviews which could be treated in this way were divided into four distinct categories.

First, there were quantitative data relating to the whole Punjabi Hindu interview household. These data covered general sociological areas like the marital situation within a household, the centre of worship to which a household was affiliated, or the geography of an interview household in terms of its postcode and street location in Bradford. In addition, these quantitative household data related to more economic considerations, such as the number and types of cars owned by an interview household, or the value of the property occupied by its members.

Second, there were quantitative data relating to the household heads in Punjabi Hindu interview households. At this stage, it was decided that the 'household head' referred to the persons (or person) who actually owned or rented the property in which a household's members resided. In most cases, therefore, the interview household had two heads, who were typically a husband and wife of Punjabi Hindu ethnicity with joint ownership of the property in question. Quantitative data relating to these persons concerned things like their generation (e.g. first, second, etc.), their current job (if they had one), their highest educational qualification, their age, and so on. Importantly, it was noted that no household heads were under the age of 22. The significance of this becomes clearer below.

Third, there were quantitative data relating to information collected in the interviews on the cross-generational education, employment and (where relevant<sup>23</sup>) migration histories of Punjabi Hindu individuals, who were living in (or related to) the family unit in an interview household, and who were  $\geq 22$  years of age. Obviously, some of these individuals would now be deceased, particularly those who represented the sending generation.

---

<sup>23</sup>It should be remembered that migration histories only applied to first and generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindus (see Section 4.5.3).

Fourth, there were quantitative data which related to the education and employment histories (where relevant) of young Punjabi Hindu individuals who were living in (or related to) the family unit in an interview household, and who were  $\leq 21$  years of age. This cut off point of 21 was chosen because it was felt that beyond this age most young persons are fully independent adults, whereas up to this age many are still dependent on their parents, especially if they are going to college or university. Importantly, all these data on young Punjabi Hindus referred to the offspring of interview household heads. Such individuals usually lived in the same property as the heads of the interview household under study, although on a few occasions they might live elsewhere. Importantly, as interview household heads were all  $\geq 22$  years of age, there were none included in these data relating to young Punjabi Hindus.

The most important aspect of the above four categories of data is that they could all be related back to the *jati* or *varna* status of either the household (as in the first category) or the Punjabi Hindu individuals (as in the second, third and fourth categories) under scrutiny, because such information had also been collected in a quantifiable form during the interviews. This would allow for an investigation into any possible relationships between the *jati* or *varna* status of these households or Punjabi Hindu individuals, and some of their socio-economic characteristics as revealed in the four data categories. In short, this meant that quantitative data from the interviews would be valuable for investigating the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

Before manipulating and analysing these data, it was felt that it would be advantageous to try and obtain more from other Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford. This would create a larger sample where these quantitative data were concerned, and would hopefully strengthen the nature of any relationships which were to be drawn out of them. Due to time constraints, these extra data needed to be generated quickly and with the minimum of effort. Another round of interviews would not have been a suitable way of achieving this. Instead, it was decided that a short household questionnaire would be the best way of acquiring the necessary data rapidly.

#### **4.6.2 Type and design of household questionnaire**

Having established that a questionnaire would be the most suitable tool for generating quantitative data from additional Punjabi Hindu households, attention turned to the exact type of questionnaire which should be used. On the one hand, an intensive approach could have been taken. This would have involved the questionnaire being conducted through visits to households, at which the questions themselves could be posed by the researcher. The advantage of this approach is that it would have probably ensured a

reasonable response rate. Its disadvantage is that it would have been time consuming for the researcher to administer.

An alternative and more extensive approach was a mail questionnaire. The advantage of this is that it would have taken up much less time, because the questionnaire would be filled in by the respondent rather than the researcher. The disadvantage would stem from the potentially poor response rate. Many have highlighted the problem of disappointing rates of return from mail questionnaires (see, for example, Moser & Kalton, 1971: 262-9; Saunders *et al.*, 1997).

Because of reservations concerning the two types of questionnaire outlined above, it was felt that a compromise would be advantageous, in which the time efficient aspects of the extensive mail questionnaire could be combined with the potentially better response rates of the intensive approach. It was decided that this compromise would be best met by delivering the questionnaire personally to a given Punjabi Hindu household, explaining the importance of the questionnaire to this household's members, and then leaving it for them to fill in before collection a few days later. This 'delivery/collection' approach (Saunders *et al.*, 1997) would not be too time consuming, because respondents were being asked to fill out the questionnaire themselves. At the same time, it was felt that it would yield a higher response rate than a mail based approach, because respondents might feel more obliged to complete the questionnaire if they knew the researcher was returning to collect it in a few days time.

Having decided on the type of questionnaire to be used, attention turned to its design. As noted above, the aim of the questionnaire was to gather quantitative data which could be combined with that gathered in the household interviews. As a result, most of the enquiries in the questionnaire were quite similar to those found in the revised interview schedule (see Appendix 2B). Thus, there were 14 questions on a number of topics. These ranged from general details on the individuals making up the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household, to the cross-generational education and employment histories of persons living in (or related to) this family unit, as well as socio-economic data relating to the whole household itself.

It was felt unnecessary to troubleshoot the questionnaire with a pilot study. This was because the 50 interviews had already provided substantial insight into the kind of enquiries which would be acceptable to Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community in a questionnaire format. The questionnaire itself can be found in Appendix Four, along with a covering letter. A number of other points should be noted about the questionnaire's design:

- i) The questionnaire was designed to be answered by one person in a Punjabi Hindu household, and it was stressed in the covering letter that this should preferably be an adult. In most cases, therefore, it was either the male or female household head who filled it in.
- ii) In order to maintain respondents' interest and maximise response rates, the questionnaire was made as short as possible (Courtenay, 1978: 29). This strategy appeared to work, because no returned questionnaires were left uncompleted, and nobody refused to do the questionnaire on the grounds that it was too long.
- iii) Attention was paid to keeping the questions as simple as possible, so that respondents did not have trouble answering them without the researcher's help. Thus, questions were simply structured and used no complex jargon or vocabulary which might put the respondent off (Courtenay, 1978: 28). This also seemed to work, because no questionnaires were returned in which questions had been ambiguously or wrongly answered, or not answered at all.
- iv) In line with the findings from the pilot interviews (see Section 4.5.5), the questionnaire asked respondents to identify what 'caste' they and their spouse (if relevant) were, rather than asking their *jati* or *varna*. All respondents replied to this by writing down their *jati* or *varna's* name (see Section 6.1).
- v) The questionnaire was not coded for data entry. This was because of the open ended nature of many of the questions.

#### 4.6.3 Sampling for the questionnaire

It was decided that the questionnaire would be circulated to the remainder of the 301 Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford which had not been sampled for either the seven pilot interviews or the 149 main ones. As all the households in Cluster One had been sampled for interview, this left 145 households in Clusters Two, Three and Four of the study area which were still available for questionnaire submission. All of these 145 households were visited during the spring of 1995. If the householders were at home, they were given the questionnaire with the covering letter and told to expect its collection in a few days time.

As with interviews, problems occurred when the residents of a Punjabi Hindu household had moved, or if they were not at home on three consecutive visits, or where they simply refused to take part in the questionnaire. Eventually, therefore, only 73 questionnaires were completed and returned from the 145 households which had been approached. Table 4.17 presents a full breakdown of the number of households which

Table 4.17: Response and refusal rates in Punjabi Hindu households sampled and contacted for questionnaires

Cluster No.	Total No. Punjabi Hindu households sampled for questionnaire	No. sampled households occupants moved	No. sampled households occupants moved as % of total households sampled for questionnaire	No. sampled households occupants not in on three visits	No. sampled households occupants not in on three visits as % of total households sampled for questionnaire	No. sampled households refused questionnaire	No. sampled households refused questionnaire as % of total households sampled for questionnaire	No. sampled households completed questionnaire	No. sampled households completed questionnaire as % of total households sampled for questionnaire	Total Percentages <sup>ⓐ</sup>
	a	b	$(100/a) \times b$	c	$(100/a) \times c$	d	$(100/a) \times d$	e	$(100/a) \times e$	
1	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	21	2	10%	4	19%	5	24%	10	48%	100%
3	121	8	7%	23	19%	28	23%	62	51%	100%
4	3	0	0%	1	33%	1	33%	1	33%	100%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>ⓐ</sup> Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding error.

were targeted with the questionnaire across the clusters, and the response and refusal rates witnessed.

As with Table 4.15, Table 4.17 shows that the number of Punjabi Hindu households which have moved declines through Clusters Two, Three and Four, in line with their increasing peripherality or distance from the city centre. Again, this reflects the greater transience of inner-city populations as opposed to more suburban ones. The response rates for questionnaires are indicated in the penultimate column of Table 4.17. These rates are calculated by taking the number of households which completed a questionnaire in a given cluster as a percentage of all households sampled for questionnaire in that cluster.

In Table 4.18 an alternative calculation of questionnaire response rates is shown. This takes the number of households which completed the questionnaire in a given cluster, as a percentage of the total number of households which both refused and undertook the questionnaire in that cluster. This eliminates from the calculation of response rates those households that have moved, and those in which householders were not in on three consecutive visits, on the grounds that they never had the opportunity to undertake the questionnaire in the first place.

**Table 4.18: Alternative calculation of questionnaire response rates**

Cluster No.	No. sampled households refused questionnaire	No. sampled households completed questionnaire	Response rate = No. sampled households completed questionnaire as % of total households which completed and refused questionnaire
	a	b	$(100/a+b) \times b$
1	-	-	-
2	5	10	67%
3	28	62	69%
4	1	1	50%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>68%</b>

Table 4.18 shows that the questionnaire response rates are high. In fact, they are significantly higher than those seen for the interviews in Table 4.16. This goes against the grain of mainstream thinking in the social sciences, which typically suggests that questionnaires yield much lower levels of response compared to interviews. For example, Gardner claims that:

The low response rate from questionnaires is notorious; it ranges from 15-50 per cent as against 70-98 percent for interviews. (Gardner, 1978: 84).

How Gardner arrives at such precise figures is unclear, but his basic point that questionnaires generally receive a poorer response rate compared to interviews is clear enough. The fact that this was not the case in this study may be because those

households which had been given questionnaires were called on several times in order to make sure they were completed and returned. Indeed, Gardner also admits that the poor response rates to questionnaires can often be improved:

...by having collectors call back, more than once if necessary, until time runs out.  
(Gardner, 1978: 84)

#### **4.6.4 Manipulation, analysis and use of quantitative interview and questionnaire data**

To begin manipulation of the quantitative data from the interviews and questionnaires, four databases were established in SPSS. These related to the four categories of quantitative data which have already been outlined above for the 50 interviews, and which were also present in the 73 questionnaire returns. First, there was a 'household database' to hold quantitative data on the combined interview and questionnaire total of 123 Punjabi Hindu sample households. Second, there was a 'household head database', which held data on heads of these 123 households. Third, a 'longitudinal database' was established to hold the cross-generational data on the migration, education and employment histories of persons  $\geq 22$  years of age, who were living in (or related to) the family unit in one of these 123 households. Finally, an 'under 21s database' was established. This held the data on the education and employment histories (where relevant) of young Punjabi Hindus  $\leq 21$  years of age, who were living in (or related to) the family units in the 123 households. The latter three databases, which held information on individuals, were subdivided by gender.

Data from the questionnaires were entered directly into the relevant databases. Interview data were first extracted from the interview transcripts with the aid of a data capture sheet, before they too were entered into the relevant databases. Neither the interview nor questionnaire responses had been coded in any way, and as a result the data from them were placed into their respective databases in a 'raw' form. For example, if it had been established that the male head of a Punjabi Hindu household currently held a job as a 'textile mill machine operator', then this is exactly what would be entered under the 'occupation of male head' section in the 'household head database'.

From these raw data, new and more sensible data categories could be derived by collapsing them. Sometimes this procedure of collapsing variables was quite straightforward. In the 'household database', for example, data on the number of cars owned by the household, which had been entered in their raw numeric form, were easily collapsed into three sensible categories; these being no car, one car, and two or more cars. More often, however, the collapsing of raw data into various categories was a complex procedure. For example, the full job titles of Punjabi Hindu individuals were

entered into the 'household head database', as well as the 'longitudinal' and 'under 21s' database. In each of these, the large number of job titles were then collapsed into nine different numeric codes, relating to occupational categories from the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). From these numeric codes other variables could be generated, such as the occupationally derived social class of the individuals to whom the codes applied. In short, at the end of the process of data entry and manipulation, all the databases were filled with a large number of variables; some numeric, some alphanumeric, some 'raw', and some collapsed into categories.

Following this data manipulation, the analysis of variables in the four databases was undertaken using SPSS. The unit of analysis was the whole household in the case of the 'household database', the male or female household head in the case of the 'household head database', the generational group in the case of the 'longitudinal database' (e.g. generation 1.5, 1st generation, 2nd generation etc.), or age categories in the case of the 'under 21s database' (e.g. 19 to 21 or 16 to 18 year olds). Analysis involved the crosstabulation of collapsed variables relating to these units of analysis with their *jati* or *varna* affiliations. As might be expected, many of the crosstabulations did not produce any meaningful trends or relationships. In many cases this was simply due to the inadequacy of data. For example, cross-generational data on education histories from the 'longitudinal database' were not used because they tended to be extremely incomplete, especially for the sending generation. This was because interviewees and questionnaire respondents appeared to have little knowledge about the educational qualifications of persons related to their family unit who were from this generational background.

The most meaningful crosstabulations were eventually selected. These are used to illustrate discussion about the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community in Chapters Six to Nine. In most cases, the crosstabulations themselves are presented, although in a few instances graphs derived from them will also be seen. Explanations of how the selected variables used within these crosstabulations were collapsed and derived from the raw data of the questionnaires and interviews will be explained in more detail in the chapters in which the crosstabulations occur. It is felt that this approach improves the general 'flow' of the study.

It will be noted that the crosstabulations found in Chapters Six to Nine do not include any statistical testing of the relationships they show. Unfortunately, the small sample sizes which are involved in many of crosstabulations make them unsuitable for statistical tests such as Chi-squared. Analysis of these crosstabulations is therefore subjective rather than statistical. However, there is no problem with this, as most of the relationships and trends drawn out of the crosstabulations are clearly visible.

If this study relied on quantitative data alone, then this subjective approach towards its analysis might be open to criticism. However, in many instances crosstabulations are backed up by qualitative data from the 50 interviews, as well as that from participant observation amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. In view of this, the crosstabulations and other forms of quantitative data analysis are only contributing one element to the story of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, and as such, they should only be seen as complementing the other forms of qualitative data outlined above, rather than leading the enquiry.

Finally, in those chapters which present quantitative data, it will be seen that whilst the findings from these data may initially be viewed in relation to the sample population to whom they apply, they are often eventually taken as indicative of trends within the whole of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. A number of points lend credence to this assumption. First, participant observation amongst the city's Punjabi Hindu community suggested that there was no significant difference between the general experiences of Punjabi Hindu interviewees and questionnaire respondents, and those of all Punjabi Hindus living in the city. Second, the 123 Punjabi Hindu households from which quantitative data are derived represent a significant proportion of the 301 in the study area (41%). Third, these households were randomly sampled across clusters so as to obtain a representative socio-economic cross-section of them from Bradford's Punjabi Hindu population. Moreover, this sample represents the maximum possible size, as all 301 households were eventually approached for either an interview or a questionnaire. All these factors add eligibility to the idea of taking quantitative data from the 50 interviews and 73 questionnaires as indicative of trends within the whole of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

#### **4.7 PRIMARY QUALITATIVE DATA GENERATED FROM OBSERVATION**

The fourth and final primary data source employed in this study is qualitative data generated from observation. This divides into ethnographic data on Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, derived from participant observation, and more general fieldwork observations on the city's whole South Asian population and those ethnic groups and religio-ethnic sub-groups within it. This section is concerned with the methodological approaches employed in the generation of these qualitative observational data, and the way in which these data have been used in this study.

##### **4.7.1 Qualitative ethnographic data from participant observation**

Participant observation is a technique whereby the researcher attempts to participate (or is already a participant) in the community under study, typically through becoming an active member of its social institutions and organisations. By being involved with the

community in this way the researcher is not immediately conspicuous to its members, and is therefore more able to collect and record observations on the community's behaviour without actually influencing that behaviour through the research process. This is the main advantage of participant observation as a research technique. The principal disadvantage is that the researcher may become too closely involved with the community under study, and lose his/her objectivity. Thus:

The participant observer then joins sides with his [her] informants and sees things only from their point of view. It then becomes difficult for him [her] to remain objective and to observe events without influencing them. (Gardner, 1978: 30).

These advantages and disadvantages of participant observation constitute a paradox in its use as a research methodology. To circumvent this the researcher must maintain a balance between involvement with the community under study, which is likely to yield observational data that accurately reflect the true experiences of this community, yet also remain aloof enough from this community to collect and interpret these observations with the objectivity of the outsider. In this study it will be seen that this balance was maintained with greater ease than might be expected. This is because participation in Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community was achieved, but aloofness from it was also present, because the researcher was white and participating in a black community with a fundamentally different cultural heritage.

Participant observation amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community was set in motion by contacting the three main centres of Punjabi Hindu worship in Bradford and arranging a visit to each of them. These three religious institutions are the Hindu Cultural Society, the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* and the *Sant Nirankari Mandal*. They are discussed in detail in Section 6.3.3. Members of these three centres of worship were particularly welcoming on the first visit, and it was only a short time before impromptu visits could be made to any of these three institutions, and participation in their religious ceremonies could occur without their members appearing to be surprised at the interviewer's presence.

At the Hindu Cultural Society, an even closer involvement with the Punjabi Hindu community was achieved by joining the Sunday afternoon Hindi class for children and teenagers. Regular attendance at this class continued over a period of two years (January 1994 to December 1995), and this provided many opportunities to socialise with the class's members through events like end of term parties, table tennis and football. Furthermore, this participation with the Hindi class made it easier to intermingle and chat with many adult members of the Hindu Cultural Society.

The degree of participation engendered at the Hindu Cultural Society would have been ideally achieved at the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* and *Sant Nirankari Mandal*. Unfortunately, the time constraints of the study meant only one of these institutions could realistically receive this high level of research attention, and the Hindu Cultural Society seemed to provide the best target for this because it had the largest membership of Punjabi Hindus. Accordingly, participation at the other two centres of worship was not as comprehensive, and only occasional visits were made to them.

Gardner notes that data from participant observation can be obtained systematically or unsystematically. The unsystematic method is where the researcher allows the life of the community under study to carry him/herself along, and makes observational notes on things that strike him/her as being interesting. Hence, the researcher:

...does not keep count of anything in particular. He [she] just lives the life. A detailed diary, full of illustrative descriptions and accounts of his [her] own and other people's reactions, would be the main record kept. (Gardner, 1978: 29).

Alternatively, a systematic approach involves the researcher seeking and recording information on particular forms of behaviour or events within the community under study.

Gardner also notes that observational data can be obtained in a concealed or open fashion. An open approach is where the participant observer makes it known to the community under study that they are being researched, whereas concealed observation adopts a 'fly on the wall' stance, in which the researcher does not reveal his/her intentions to this community.

In summary, four different strategies can be used for obtaining data from participant observation:

	Concealed	Open
Systematic	1	2
Unsystematic	3	4

This study adopted the fourth of these strategies. Thus, random or unsystematic notes were taken on any seemingly interesting behaviour or events taking place amongst members of the three centres of worship under scrutiny. 'Interesting behaviour or events' were those which it was felt would help demonstrate some particular point about the caste system within Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. The collection of participant observational data was also open, because it was made known to members of the three religious institutions that they were under study; although it was not pointed out to them

that it was the caste system which was of particular interest in the research. However, many members may have eventually realised this importance, because they took part in the 50 interviews at which questions on the caste system were forwarded.

The qualitative ethnographic data from participant observation are presented in Chapters Six to Eight. These data are usually used directly in these chapters. Thus, a particular point about the caste system might be illustrated by an event or instance of behaviour observed amongst Punjabi Hindus at the centres of worship. Events and behaviour relating to Punjabi Hindus at the Hindu Cultural society, where the most detailed observation was undertaken, will be seen to be particularly important in this respect. Alternatively, the data from participant observation are used more indirectly in these chapters to inform decisions about how the interview and questionnaire data should be analysed. This usage will not be apparent to the reader.

#### **4.7.2 Qualitative data from general fieldwork observations**

In addition to the above, primary qualitative observational data were also obtained on those ethnic sub-divisions within the city's South Asian community. These sub-divisions included Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, and, amongst Indians, religio-ethnic sub-groups such as Punjabi Sikhs, Gujarati Hindus, etc. These observational data were not generated through participation. Instead, they resulted from more general fieldwork observations assimilated during the many hours spent walking around the streets of the Bradford, particularly during the 2000 household visits undertaken for the name analysis. These general observational data were recorded in a notebook and with a camera. They are mostly used to support arguments in Chapter Five, which are concerned with Bradford's South Asian geographies.

#### **4.8 CONCLUSION**

This chapter has provided a comprehensive account of the types of data employed in this study, and a full explanation of how they were collected (in the case of secondary data) or generated (in the case of primary data). It has also been established how these data types are used in this study, and how they have been manipulated and analysed to achieve this.

For the reader, the overriding impression should be of the eclecticism in the wide variety of data types employed and the techniques which have been used to manipulate and analyse them. This demonstrates how social science research often needs to combine several different methodological strategies in order to gain a full picture of the sociological phenomena which are being investigated. Nowhere is this more true than in the study of a complex social institution like the caste system. For example, it is unlikely

that either the 50 interviews or the 73 questionnaires would, on their own, have provided sufficient insight into the presence and operation of the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford. However, the combined force of these two data types, supplemented by data from other primary and secondary sources (e.g. primary data from participant observation or secondary data from Britain's South Asian Press), do undoubtedly provide a full picture of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. This picture will reveal itself in subsequent chapters.

Another key point is the substantial contribution this chapter makes towards research into ethnic groups in Britain, through the development of a detailed name analysis methodology and a dictionary of Indian names. This methodology holds much future potential. In particular, it could be developed into a sophisticated computer program designed to carry out South Asian name analysis on machine readable electoral register data. This would provide an invaluable resource to local authorities wishing to identify small religio-ethnic sub-groups populations in their area for the purposes of welfare and resource provision.

## Chapter Five

### *Setting the Study in Context: South Asians in Bradford*

#### 5.0 INTRODUCTION

The subject of this chapter is the whole South Asian community, those ethnic groups within it (such as Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis), and religio-ethnic sub-groups within the Indian community itself. The task of the chapter is to provide an overview of these different groups and sub-groups in terms of their settlement history, population size and geography in Bradford. This will provide an essential backdrop of information against which data relating to Punjabi Hindus in the city (the main religio-ethnic sub-group under scrutiny in this study) can be contextualised. In short, to properly investigate Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, it is necessary to understand the characteristics of the wider Indian and South Asian communities of which it is part.

A wide variety of data sources will be drawn on. These include secondary data from the British Census and various authorial sources, as well as primary data generated from research carried out in this study - particularly name analysis data, which is used to identify religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 5.1 presents the settlement history of South Asians in Bradford. Section 5.2 focuses on the size of this South Asian population and those ethnic groups and sub-groups within it, whilst Section 5.3 turns its attention to the geographies of Indian religio-ethnic sub-groups in the city. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.4. In all these sections the characteristics of South Asians in Bradford will be compared to those seen for the whole country. This will demonstrate that Bradford's South Asian community can be both typical and unique when compared to the wider context of South Asians in Britain.

Throughout this chapter, various references are made to the 30 wards of Bradford and the two Leeds wards of Pudsey North and South. A base map of the study area, showing the location of these 32 wards, is provided in Figure 5.1. To aid interpretation, it is useful to note that Bradford's city centre lies in the northern half of ward 27 or University ward.

Figure 5.1: Base map of the study area



### 5.1 THE SETTLEMENT HISTORY OF SOUTH ASIANS IN BRADFORD

The pattern and chronology of immigration and settlement for Bradford's South Asian community can be conceptualised into four distinct phases, previously identified for the whole of Britain's South Asian population by Ballard & Ballard (1977) and Robinson (1981). These are the 'early pioneer phase', the 'lodging house era', the phase of 'consolidation and family reunion', and the period of 'suburbanisation and municipalisation'

### 5.1.1 The early pioneer phase

The early pioneer phase covers South Asian settlement in Britain prior to 1950. Thus, Visram (1986) suggests that some of the earliest South Asian immigrants arrived in this country during the 19th Century as galley hands on cargo ships from the Indian subcontinent. Unsurprisingly, many of these individuals settled in the major ports in which they had arrived, such as London and Liverpool (Ballard, 1994b: 5-6; Ballard & Ballard, 1977: 22; Fryer, 1984; Visram, 1986; Salter, 1893). Moving into the early 20th Century, small numbers of South Asian immigrants continued to arrive and settle in Britain, often as students, professionals, businessmen or politicians (Desai, 1963: 2-3).

Despite these arrivals of the early pioneer phase, Bradford's South Asian population was still extremely low at the end of the 1940s (Montgomery, 1997). Indeed, for the whole of Britain, Kondapi (1949: 360) noted that there were only 5000 Indians present by 1949. Thus, British society was still characterised by a high degree of racial<sup>1</sup> homogeneity in the immediate post-war period. Apart from a few major ports, the black population (be it South Asian or otherwise) was relatively unknown, and would have been practically invisible in Bradford and most other areas of Britain too.

### 5.1.2 The lodging house era

The lodging house era spans a period from the 1950s through to the mid-1960s. For Bradford, and many other British towns and cities, the scale and nature of South Asian immigration and settlement changed radically during this time. This was due to a unique combination of push and pull factors which stimulated South Asian migration to Britain.

The main pull factor was embodied in Britain's post-war recovery and boom, which created gaps in the lower end of the British labour market. The 1950s therefore saw the recruitment of large numbers of immigrants from the newly independent countries of India and West and East Pakistan (now Pakistan and Bangladesh) to fill these labour shortages<sup>2</sup>.

The principal push factor was that many families in the newly independent countries of the Indian subcontinent needed to find new and alternative sources of income in order to maintain land holdings (Desai, 1963; John, 1969; Brooks & Singh, 1979; Robinson, 1981), the loss of which would have resulted in diminution of a family's honour (*izzet*) (Pettigrew, 1972; Aurora, 1967). Temporary migration to Britain to earn

---

<sup>1</sup>This is not to say that British society was not ethnically heterogeneous. Indeed, prior to 1950 many foreign born migrant groups had settled in Britain in substantial numbers, including Eastern European Jews, Irish and Italians. However, whilst these groups were ethnically distinct, they were indistinguishable from the rest of the white population in terms of race and skin colour.

<sup>2</sup>Immigrants were also recruited from other New Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean to fill labour shortages.

money was one way of achieving this. There were, however, many other more parochial push factors which helped attract South Asians towards this country. In Bradford, for example, Montgomery (1997: 103) notes that a large number of South Asian settlers are from the Mirpur district of Pakistan. The migration of this community to Bradford was undoubtedly catalysed by the building of the Mangla dam. This flooded the villages and homes of Mirpuris, and with their resultant compensation packages many decided to make a new start in Britain.

On arrival in Britain in the 1950s and early 60s, most South Asian immigrants, irrespective of their skills or qualifications, found themselves in work which white British people were unwilling to do. However, the nature of this employment varied geographically, reflecting regional and local labour markets. In Bradford, therefore, a majority of South Asian immigrants filled labour shortages in the city's then extensive wool and worsted industry (Butterworth, 1967: 31; Firth, 1997, 137; Montgomery, 1997: 103; Singh, 1997: 96). As with many textile towns in Yorkshire and Lancashire, this labour demand had been created with the establishment of a new night shift in the mills - a measure that had been introduced to combat growing global competition in textile products<sup>3</sup>. Some South Asian immigrants also found work on the buses or in the foundries (Butterworth, 1967: 31; Singh, 1997: 96; 1994)

Most of the South Asians arriving in Bradford in the 1950s and early '60s came from one of four distinct areas in the Indian subcontinent. These were the Punjab, straddling the border between India and Pakistan; the coastal areas of the Gujarat north of Bombay; the Sylhet district in northeastern Bangladesh and, as noted above, the Mirpur district of Sind province in Pakistan (Singh, 1997: 96). Significantly, Ballard (1994b: 10) has identified three of these areas (namely the Punjab, coastal Gujarat and Sylhet district) as being the principal origins of Britain's whole South Asian community.

As elsewhere in Britain (see Ballard, 1994b), the vast majority of South Asian immigrants who came to Bradford in the lodging house era were young married men with a rural, peasant background (Firth, 1997: 137; Ahmed, 1997: 85). A large number of these men had left their families behind in the subcontinent. Consequently, by the early 1960s there were around 30 to 40 South Asian males in Bradford to every South Asian female (Montgomery, 1997: 103). Almost all of these men intended to work for a few years and accumulate capital before returning home (Ahmed, 1997: 86; Montgomery, 1997: 103). For the majority, the initial objective was to improve the socio-economic position of their families in South Asia. Many therefore began to send a proportion of their wages back home as soon as they had found employment (Firth, 1997: 138).

---

<sup>3</sup>Ironically, much of this global competition in textiles came from South Asia.

These remittances, coupled with the goal of return, meant that most of these South Asian, lone male migrants sought to minimise their expenditure in this country. Accordingly, in Bradford, they found single room lodgings in central areas of the city like Lumb Lane in Manningham (Butterworth, 1967; Dahya, 1974; Firth, 1997). An added attraction of living in such areas was that they were within walking distance of the textile factories (e.g. Lister Mills and Drummonds plc) where many of these migrants worked. This demand for lodging house accommodation amongst South Asians arriving in Bradford in the 1950s and '60s reflected a trend witnessed in many other British towns and cities at that time (Robinson, 1981).

### 5.1.3 Consolidation and family reunion

As noted above, few of the lone male, South Asian migrants arriving in Bradford in the 1950s and '60s envisaged becoming permanent settlers there. However, their planned quick return was not to be. Whilst some remained in Bradford for only a few years, earning and saving as much money as possible before returning home, the majority were forced to extend their stay to earn more money, because their incomes had ensured only basic survival and marginal savings (Ahmed, 1997: 86). From this point onwards these immigrants gradually made the transition from sojourners to permanent settlers in the city. This transition was similarly occurring within other centres of South Asian population across the country (see Ballard, 1994b), and was largely manifest in the reunion and consolidation of South Asian families in the British context, the reasons for which were as follows:

First, as the number of South Asian immigrants increased, many of the initial migrants began to reconstitute former kinship networks through chain migration. Consequently, in centres like Bradford, lone male migrants from the same villages and districts in the subcontinent could be found working alongside each other in textile mills and living close together in central wards of the city like Manningham, Little Horton, and in the Leeds Road area of Bradford Moor (Butterworth, 1967).

Gradually, as these kinship networks strengthened and centres of South Asian population grew, many lone, male migrants began to feel that the British city might be a suitable environment for the resumption of family life. Accordingly, they sent for their wives and children to join them in Britain. Thus, in places like Bradford, a period of South Asian family reunion began, and this gathered momentum to reach a peak during the late 1960s and early '70s (Robinson, 1981: 152).

Crucially, in Bradford, as elsewhere, this desire for family reunion was also catalysed by the introduction of the 1962 immigration bill. This gave rise to a "beat the

ban" rush, as many feared they would not get their dependents in after this (Singh, 1997: 95; Firth, 1997: 137). In addition, Bradford, like other British towns and cities, had its South Asian influx further boosted during the period of family reunion by the arrival of 'twice migrant' South Asians from East Africa (Singh, 1997: 95). These immigrants came as refugees during the late 1960s and early '70s, following the introduction of Africanisation policies (Twaddle, 1975) in the East African countries of Kenya and Uganda.

Even with their families here, many of Bradford's South Asians still intended returning home. But gradually, almost unbeknown to them, they were putting down 'roots' and making the transition from 'immigrants to citizens' (Singh, 1992). There were many reasons for this. First, the increasing commitment of South Asians to Bradford was partly due to an emergent sense of community amongst them, which developed as chain migration and family reunion continued to bring kinsmen and fellow villagers together. Undoubtedly, this community spirit was further strengthened with the birth of South Asian children in the city, as well as the early establishment of South Asian centres of worship and specialist South Asian shops and businesses (Butterworth, 1967; Singh, 1994). Indeed, Bradford's first centre of South Asian worship (a Sikh temple) was established as early as 1964 on Garnett Street (Singh, 1992).

Second, once their families had arrived during the period of family reunion, Bradford's South Asians were quick to purchase cheap, Victorian built, inner-city housing, in wards like Manningham, Little Horton and Bradford Moor (Firth, 1997: 137). As in other urban centres of Britain, such a development would have further 'cemented' the 'roots' of South Asians in the city. At the same time, it would have continued to weaken their links with the homeland. This was because the cost of property purchases meant that any remittances which were still being sent to family members remaining in South Asia began to drop sharply (Ballard, 1994b: 17). The purchase of inner-city housing also gave South Asians a distinctive clustering and urban geography in Bradford (see Section 5.1.4).

Third, the rapidly decreasing cost of air travel from the 1960s onwards meant that a visit or holiday to the Indian subcontinent was reduced to a day's flight away for many South Asians living in Britain (Ballard, 1994b: 12). Undoubtedly, this would have helped make Bradford a more bearable environment for the South Asians living there, further encouraging them to 'cement' their 'roots' in the city.

By the late 1970s, the third phase of consolidation and family reunion in the South Asian settlement process was largely complete - although in many ways this completion had been enforced with the progressive tightening of national immigration

policy throughout the 1960s and '70s<sup>4</sup>. As a result, the South Asian community was firmly established in Bradford and many other urban centres across Britain. Moreover, for the vast majority of this community, permanent return to the subcontinent had descended from a possible reality to the level of mere myth (Anwar, 1979).

#### 5.1.4 Suburbanisation and municipalisation

The fourth phase of settlement for South Asians living in urban centres across Britain has been identified as involving the suburbanisation of this community from approximately the mid-1970s onwards. Early on, this movement was characterised by the relocation of a South Asian petty bourgeoisie who had succeeded in small business ventures, from poor, sub-standard inner city housing to higher quality suburban residential areas (Nowikowski & Ward, 1978; Werbner, 1980; Hussain, 1975). More recently, however, this suburbanisation trend has been characterised by a growing South Asian middle class element of managers and professionals (Phillips & Sarre, 1995). This purchase of better quality suburban housing by South Asians represents an even greater commitment to permanent British settlement because it typically requires a substantial mortgage. Nevertheless, such suburbanisation does not necessarily indicate a lack of commitment amongst South Asians to their city based communities. It is instead a relocation of sections of the South Asian community to more peripheral urban areas, in which they may often be equally as concentrated and clustered as they were in the inner-city (Phillips, 1983).

Using 1991 Census data, Rees *et al.* (1995) have demonstrated that Bradford's Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations have not properly entered this fourth settlement phase of suburbanisation. Thus, they show that within the Bradford district, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are still heavily concentrated in the inner-city wards of Bradford itself, and also those of Keighley - a textile town in the district which is about eight miles northwest of Bradford's centre (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3).


Bangladeshis, in particular, appear to be the most concentrated of these two ethnic groups, with very high percentages of their population in Bradford's innermost wards of extremely decayed housing stock. Indeed, fieldwork observations revealed that the greatest concentration of Bradford's Bangladeshi population lay at the northern edge of University ward and the western edge of Undercliffe, at a very high percentage level in a few streets. This area is characterised by Bradford's worst housing. Essentially, this constitutes Victorian back-to-back terraces of owner occupied tenure. Much of this housing is in a very poor state of repair (see Figure 5.4), and this is reflected in the fact

---

<sup>4</sup>There have been numerous studies of the major immigration controls imposed by British governments during the 1960s and '70s. For succinct summaries see Ram (1989: 288-99) and Rex & Tomlinson (1979: 39-47).


that many of these properties could easily be purchased for under £20,000 in 1996. The concentration of Bangladeshis in this type of housing reflects their position as the most socio-economically deprived ethnic group in Bradford; a point which has been well illustrated by Rees *et al.* (1995).

**Figure 5.2: Percentage distribution of Pakistanis in Bradford, 1991 Census**



Adapted from Rees *et al.* (1995: 569).

**Figure 5.3: Percentage distribution of Bangladeshis in Bradford, 1991 Census**




Adapted from Rees *et al.* (1995: 570).

Figure 5.4: Housing occupied by Bangladeshis in the inner-city ward of Undercliffe



Figure 5.5: Percentage distribution of Indians in Bradford, 1991 Census



Adapted from Rees *et al.* (1995: 568).

In contrast to the above, Rees *et al.* (1995) note that although Indians in Bradford have high concentrations in Bradford's inner-city wards, they are also beginning to show significant concentrations in a number of more suburban wards, such as Bolton, Wyke, Wibsey and Queensbury (see Figure 5.5). These wards are all characterised by semi-detached and detached housing, which is of a much higher quality than that observed in Bradford's inner-city areas (see Figure 5.6).

**Figure 5.6: Housing occupied by Indians in the suburban ward of Bolton**




This evidence suggests that Bradford's Indian population has undergone significant suburbanisation from its original area of concentration and settlement in the inner-city. In turn, this suggests that Indians in Bradford, unlike Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, have entered the fourth phase of South Asian settlement. This contention is supported in Figure 5.7, which shows a map of changes in the distribution of the Indian population across Bradford between 1981 and 1991. In this figure it can be seen that there have been substantial losses of Indians from the inner-city wards of Bradford Moor, University and Bowling, coupled with high gains in a number of suburban wards, particularly Bolton.

Fieldwork observations indicated that this suburbanisation of Bradford's Indians has arisen for two very distinct reasons. First, it appears to reflect their desire to live in better quality housing than they had previously occupied in the inner-city. Importantly, many Indians have also been in the economic position to make such a move, as compared to those in other South Asian ethnic groups. This is confirmed in the work of Rees *et al.*

(1995), who demonstrate the superior socio-economic position of Indians over Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Bradford.

**Figure 5.7: Changes in the distribution of Bradford's Indian population, 1981 to 1991**



Adapted from Rees *et al.* (1995: 568).

Second, fieldwork observations revealed that there is a general feeling of mutual animosity between Bradford's Indian and Pakistani communities. This appears to have encouraged some Indian families, specifically those with adequate financial resources, to move away from the inner-city wards which they shared with this ethnic group and suburbanise; thus translating their social differences with Pakistanis into spatial ones.

The importance of the above two types of decision in influencing the suburbanisation of Indians is encapsulated in a comment made by one of the Punjabi Hindu sample interviewees who lived in the suburban ward of Pudsey North:

Well, we used to live in a back-to-back in Bradford Moor, but we hated it there because the house was too small for us and it was really cold and dark because it faced north. There were lots of Pakis' there as well, and we didn't get on too well with them. They were always smashing our windows, putting fireworks through the letterbox and stuff like that you know. So as soon as my dad had decided we were going to stay here and had enough money, we moved out here to Pudsey, because we wanted to live in a better area and get away from all that. (Punjabi Hindu woman. Interview 10).

Thus, the desire to live in better quality housing and the wish to separate themselves from Pakistani Muslims, coupled with adequate financial resources, has

influenced the residential redistribution of many Indians in Bradford. Whilst this suggests that their current residential patterning might be more influenced by choice rather than external constraints, it is not denied that some Indians are still confined to inner-city housing areas in Bradford through poverty and managerial 'gatekeeping'. Indeed, even the geography of those Indians in suburbia may have been partly influenced by the 'gatekeeping' of private institutions such as estate agents. However, the fact that many estate agencies in Bradford are actually Indian owned and run highlights the complexities, and possible inadequacies, of the choice/constraint dialectic in explaining the geography of Bradford's Indian community.

Another movement embodied within the fourth phase of South Asian settlement in Britain has been towards municipalisation through the public rented sector (Robinson, 1980b). Rees *et al.* (1995: 583) have shown that this process involves a relatively small number of South Asians in Bradford (as in the rest of Britain), particularly where those of Indian and Pakistani ethnicity are concerned. This trend might reflect the desire of these South Asian ethnic groups to avoid this particular tenure because of a perceived humiliation in the renting of property (see, Ballard, 1994b: 17). It could also indicate that these groups are facing (or have faced) discrimination from the institutions which allocate public housing (Phillips, 1987a; 1987b; Sarre *et al.*, 1989; Henderson & Karn, 1984; 1987).

### 5.1.5 Summary

In summary, up to the end of the 1940s, very few South Asians had arrived and settled in Bradford as part of the early pioneer phase. It was only from the 1950s onwards, during the post war boom, that the South Asian presence in Bradford began to take off, reflecting a development which was also being seen in other British towns and cities at that time. This development embodied a transition between the second and third phases of settlement, in which the apparently temporary, lone, male migrants of the lodging house era gradually became permanently settled as their families joined them.

An essential aspect of the transition between these two phases of settlement was the reorientation of expenditure and investment patterns away from the sending society towards the receiving one. This reorientation is likely to have become even more pronounced in the current fourth phase of suburbanisation, as South Asian families acquire larger mortgages to satisfy their suburban housing desires. Such financial reorientation reflects the increasing permanence of the South Asian community in Bradford, coupled with its slowly diminishing connections with the subcontinent. This has been a theme running throughout the temporal development of South Asian

settlement across Britain and it represents the backdrop against which social and cultural changes have occurred for this community.

Clearly, the history of South Asian settlement in Bradford is a typical one, which is little different from that of any other city or town in Britain, especially one in the textile areas of Yorkshire and the North West. The development of this settlement is manifest in the size of Bradford's South Asian population today. This is discussed in the following section.

## 5.2 ENUMERATING BRADFORD'S SOUTH ASIAN POPULATION

### 5.2.1 Size of Bradford's South Asian population according to the 1991 Census

Prior to the 1991 Census, the enumeration of ethnic group populations could only be achieved by using country of birth statistics as a surrogate for ethnicity. This statistical device had several drawbacks, the most pertinent of these was that British born, second and third generation South Asian or Afro-Caribbean immigrants were misclassified as Whites (see Rees *et al.*, 1995: 559-60). By contrast, the 1991 Census was the first to ask a direct question on ethnicity, and it can therefore be used to accurately enumerate the current size of Bradford's South Asian population.

**Table 5.1: Resident population in Bradford by ethnic group, 1991 Census**

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percentage of Bradford's total population</b>	<b>Percentage of Bradford's population in non-White ethnic groups</b>
<b>All groups</b>	457,344	100.0	
<b>Whites</b>	386,025	84.4	
<b>Non-Whites</b>	71,319	15.6	100.0
Indians	11,713	2.6	16.4
Pakistanis	45,280	9.9	63.5
Bangladeshis	3,653	0.8	5.1
Other Asians	1,597	0.4	2.2
<b>Total South Asians<sup>ⓐ</sup></b>	62,243	13.6	87.3
Black Caribbeans	3,323	0.7	4.7
Black Africans	610	0.1	0.9
Black Others	1,403	0.3	2.0
<b>Total Blacks<sup>ⓐ</sup></b>	5,336	1.2	7.5
Chinese	720	0.2	1.0
Others (non-Asian)	3,020	0.7	4.2


<sup>ⓐ</sup> Percentages for these categories do not equate to summation of percentage values due to rounding errors.

Data source: OPCS (1993a: 890-1).

Table 5.1 shows the 1991 Census figures for the number of persons living in the Bradford district, classified according to the census defined ethnic groups<sup>5</sup>. These figures are also represented in terms of the percentage contribution of each of ethnic group to Bradford's whole population, and each non-White ethnic group to Bradford's total non-White population.

According to the 1991 Census, 84.4% of Bradford's population belonged to the White ethnic group, whilst 71,319 persons, or 15.6% of the district's population, were non-Whites. Table 5.1 shows that South Asians as a whole (i.e. Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Other Asians) constitute 87.3% of Bradford's non-White ethnic population. Amongst these South Asians, the overall dominance of the Pakistani ethnic group is clear; indeed Pakistanis alone account for 63.5% of Bradford's non-White population. Indians constitute the second largest ethnic group within Bradford's South Asian community, as well as the second largest element in the city's non-White population at 16.4%. Although this figure for Indians is much lower than that for Pakistanis, it is still more than double the combined percentage contribution of all three Black ethnic groups to Bradford's non-White population. Even the third largest South Asian ethnic group of Bangladeshis, which represents only 5.1% of the city's non-White population, is still larger than any other single non-White ethnic group in Bradford, other than Pakistanis and Indians. The relative contribution of each of the nine non-White ethnic groups to Bradford's total non-White population is easier to visualise in graphical format (see Figure 5.8).

**Figure 5.8: Percentage contributions of non-White ethnic groups to Bradford's non-White population, 1991 Census**



Data source: Table 5.1.

<sup>5</sup> For further details on these census defined ethnic groups see Teague (1993: 13).

### 5.2.2 The South Asian population: Bradford and Britain compared

The ethnic composition of Bradford's population (as seen above) shows marked differences compared to that for Britain as a whole. These differences are illustrated in Table 5.2. In this table, the 1991 Census figures for the percentage contributions of all ten standard ethnic groups to Bradford's total population are divided by corresponding percentages for Britain. This procedure produces location quotients (LQs<sup>6</sup>), which indicate the concentration of ethnic groups in Bradford relative to the whole country.

**Table 5.2: Location quotients for ethnic groups in Bradford relative to Britain as a whole, 1991 Census**

Ethnic group	% contribution of ethnic group to Britain's population <sup>①</sup>	% contribution of ethnic group to Bradford's population <sup>②</sup>	LQ to indicate concentration of ethnic group in Bradford relative to Britain (b/a)
<b>Whites</b>	94.5	84.4	0.89
<b>Non-Whites</b>	5.5	15.6	2.84
Indians	1.5	2.6	1.73
Pakistanis	0.9	9.9	11.0
Bangladeshis	0.3	0.8	2.66
Other Asians	0.4	0.4	1.00
<b>Total South Asians<sup>③</sup></b>	3.1	13.6	4.39
Black Caribbeans	0.9	0.7	0.77
Black Africans	0.4	0.1	0.25
Black Others	0.3	0.3	1.00
<b>Total Blacks<sup>③</sup></b>	1.6	1.2	0.75
Chinese	0.3	0.2	0.66
Others (non-Asian)	0.5	0.7	1.40

① Data source: Teague (1993: 13).

② Data source: Table 5.1.

③ Percentages for these categories may not equate to summation of percentage values due to rounding errors.

A LQ of 2.84 for all non-White ethnic groups in Bradford demonstrates that they are almost three times more strongly represented in this city than in Britain as a whole. Conversely, LQs of less than 1.0 for all non-South Asian groups - apart from Others (non-Asian) and Black Others - indicate their under-representation in Bradford relative to the whole country. The over-representation of non-Whites in the city is therefore generated by the three South Asian ethnic groups of Indians, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis. Hence, a LQ of 1.73 for Indians indicates that they are almost twice as strongly represented in Bradford than in Britain as a whole, whilst a LQ of 2.66 for

<sup>6</sup>The 'location quotient' (LQ) represents the relative concentration of a quantifiable entity, such as a population or activity, within a given area. Here, it is simply calculated as the ratio of the percentage of the population in Bradford represented by persons from ethnic group *x* to the percentage of the population in Britain accounted for by ethnic group *x*. Thus, a LQ of 2 would indicate that the ethnic group *x* was twice as strongly represented in Bradford than in Britain as a whole.

Bangladeshis shows a two and a half times over-representation. Most significantly, the LQ for Pakistanis demonstrates they are 11 times better represented in Bradford than in the whole of Britain.

In summary, Bradford is an important area for the non-White population in Britain today. Despite this, there are still 26 local authority districts in the country with higher proportions of non-Whites than the 15.6% seen in Bradford. For example, 44.8% of the London borough of Brent's population can be classified as belonging to non-White ethnic groups, representing the largest percentage for a local authority district in Britain. Many other London boroughs also have higher percentages of non-Whites living within their boundaries than the 15.6% seen in Bradford, along with some provincial districts such as Leicester, where non-Whites account for 28.5% of the population (Forrest & Gordon, 1993: 63). This contradicts the stereotype of Bradford as one of the foremost centres of black settlement in Britain. What does make Bradford stand out, however, is its large South Asian population, and, in particular, its strong Pakistani presence, which makes up 9.9% of the city's population and represents the largest concentration of Pakistanis in the country (Teague, 1993: 14).

### **5.2.3 Size of religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population**

As indicated in Section 4.3.2, the 1991 Census fails to enumerate the size of religio-ethnic sub-groups within the Indian population, either at a national or local scale. However, results generated from South Asian name analysis of Bradford's 1992 electoral register (see Section 4.3) can be used to estimate the approximate size of these religio-ethnic sub-groups in Bradford today. A full break down of these name analysis results for all 30 Bradford wards, and the two Leeds wards of Pudsey North and South, can be seen in Table 5.3. This table shows the absolute counts of Indians in a variety of religio-ethnic sub-groups across these 32 study wards. It can be seen that the figures in Table 5.3 only refer to those Indians  $\geq 16$  years and eight months of age in October 1991; the time at which the 1992 electoral registers for Bradford and Leeds were compiled.

To establish the size of religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population, the following procedure is undertaken. First, in Table 5.3, the figures for the Leeds wards of Pudsey North and South are subtracted from the column totals of Indians in various religio-ethnic sub-groups in all 32 study wards. This yields the total persons in each of these sub-groups (aged  $\geq 16$  years and eight months) for the 30 Bradford wards alone.

These totals are then calculated as a percentage of all Indians enumerated for the 30 Bradford wards during name analysis. These percentages are then applied to the 1991

Table 5.3: Name analysis results from the 1992 electoral register, showing the numbers of Indians<sup>①</sup> in various religio-ethnic sub-groups across the 32 study wards

No.	WARD	HINDUS														Total Other Regions	Total Hindus
		Gujarat	Punjab	Andhra Pradesh	Assam	Bengal	Bihar	Bombay	Karnataka	Kashmir	Kerala	Orissa	Rajasthan	Tamil Nadu	Uttar Pradesh		
1	Baildon	7	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	Bingley	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	Bingley Rural	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
4	Bolton	25	55	-	2	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-
5	Bowling	46	53	2	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-
6	Bradford Moor	31	113	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	-
7	Clayton	144	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	Craven	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	Eccleshill	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	Great Horton	664	11	4	-	3	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	15	-
11	Heaton	70	46	-	-	7	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	3	5	17	-
12	Idle	14	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
13	Ilkley	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	Keighley North	8	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
15	Keighley South	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	Keighley West	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
17	Little Horton	201	32	2	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	29	-
18	Odsal	58	52	2	-	7	1	-	-	5	-	-	-	2	-	17	-
19	Queensbury	73	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
20	Rombalds	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
21	Shipley East	16	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
22	Shipley West	5	27	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	6	-
23	Thornton	21	7	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
24	Toller	63	114	-	1	12	-	-	-	1	-	3	2	-	-	19	-
25	Tong	32	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26	Undercliffe	5	33	5	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	10	-
27	University	811	35	-	-	7	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	14	-
28	Wibsey	62	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29	Worth Valley	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
30	Wyke	28	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
31	Pudsey North	25	69	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-
32	Pudsey South	37	19	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	<b>Total</b>	<b>2523</b>	<b>728</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>3421</b>

Table 5.3: (continued)

NO.	WARD	SIKHS Punjab	MUSLIMS					CHRISTIANS Kerala	UNCLASSIFIED Unclassified	ALL RELIGIONS All Regions All Indians	
			Gujarat	Total Other Regions							Total Muslims
				Assam	Bombay	Punjab	Tamil Nadu				
1	Baildon	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	25		
2	Bingley	11	3	-	-	-	3	-	21		
3	Bingley Rural	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	20		
4	Bolton	443	2	-	-	-	2	-	535		
5	Bowling	489	122	-	-	-	122	-	719		
6	Bradford Moor	786	55	-	-	5	60	1	996		
7	Clayton	100	14	-	-	-	14	-	295		
8	Craven	6	2	-	7	-	9	-	21		
9	Eccleshill	41	6	-	-	-	6	-	77		
10	Great Horton	189	50	-	-	-	50	1	930		
11	Heaton	128	141	-	-	2	143	-	404		
12	Idle	22	1	-	-	-	1	-	39		
13	Ilkley	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	9		
14	Keighley North	3	2	-	-	-	2	-	19		
15	Keighley South	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	25		
16	Keighley West	25	4	-	2	-	6	-	41		
17	Little Horton	192	13	-	7	5	27	12	493		
18	Odsal	146	6	-	20	-	26	2	301		
19	Queensbury	17	2	-	-	-	2	-	94		
20	Rombalds	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	11		
21	Shipley East	30	4	-	-	-	4	-	52		
22	Shipley West	104	7	-	-	-	7	-	149		
23	Thornton	55	-	-	-	-	-	-	84		
24	Toller	129	101	-	2	-	103	10	438		
25	Tong	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	59		
26	Undercliffe	168	17	2	-	-	19	-	235		
27	University	134	467	-	-	-	467	6	1467		
28	Wibsey	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	96		
29	Worth Valley	1	4	-	-	-	4	-	12		
30	Wyke	58	-	-	-	-	-	-	87		
31	Pudsey North	355	-	-	-	-	-	1	452		
32	Pudsey South	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	158		
	<b>Total</b>	<b>3832</b>	<b>1023</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>1077</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>8364</b>

① Figures only apply to persons aged ≥ 16 years and eight months at the time of electoral registration in October 1991.

(-) = value of zero.

Census total of Indians of all ages who live in Bradford (see Table 5.1), thus producing an approximate estimate of the current population sizes of the religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's total Indian population. This final stage of the estimation process can be justified on the basis that the 1991 Census count of Indians living in Bradford who are  $\geq 18$  years of age, and the name analysis count of Indians  $\geq 16$  years and eight months, have already been shown to have a high level of correlation (see Section 4.3.13). It seems reasonable, therefore, to apply the name analysis percentages of persons in religio-ethnic sub-groups to the 1991 Census count for Bradford's whole Indian population. The only problem lies with the varying percentages of persons in each of these different sub-groups who are under the age of 16 years and eight months.

The results of the above procedure are given in Table 5.4. In this table, it should be noted that Hindus from regions other than the Punjab or Gujarat, and all Muslims apart from those from the Gujarat, have been respectively amalgamated into the religio-ethnic sub-groups of 'Hindus' and 'Muslims from other Indian regions'. This is because of the very small numbers of Hindu and Muslim persons from all these different regions (see Table 5.3). Importantly, it can be seen that there are no Indian Christians in the 30 Bradford wards.

**Table 5.4: Estimated current population sizes of religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population**

Religio-ethnic sub-group	Total nos. enumerated for religio-ethnic sub-group (aged $\geq 16$ years and 8 months) for the 30 wards of Bradford, following name analysis of the 1992 electoral register	As % of all Indians (aged $\geq 16$ years and 8 months) enumerated for the 30 wards of Bradford, following name analysis of the 1992 electoral register. (100/b) $\times$ a	Estimated current population size of religio-ethnic sub-group (d/100) $\times$ c
	a	c	
<b>Hindus</b>	<b>3,268</b>	<b>42.2</b>	<b>4,943</b>
Gujarati	2,461	31.7	3,713
Punjabi	640	8.3	972
Other Indian regions	167	2.2	258
<b>Sikhs (Punjabi)</b>	<b>3,377</b>	<b>43.6</b>	<b>5,107</b>
<b>Muslims</b>	<b>1,077</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>1,628</b>
Gujarati	1,023	13.2	1,546
Other Indian regions	54	0.7	82
<b>Unclassified</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>All Indians</b>	<b>7,754 (b)</b>	<b>100%<sup>①</sup></b>	<b>11,713 (d)<sup>②</sup></b>


① Percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

② Figure 'd' = 1991 Census count of Indians of living in Bradford (see Table 5.1). Column data do not sum to this figure exactly due to rounding errors.

Table 5.4 indicates that the Punjabi Sikhs are the largest religio-ethnic sub-group within Bradford's Indian population at an estimated 5,107 persons. Moreover, at 43.6% of this population they account for approximately the same proportion as all Hindu sub-groups combined (42.2% or an estimated 4,943 persons). The Gujarati Hindu sub-group is the second largest, comprising an estimated 3,713 persons and 31.7% of Bradford's Indian population. Gujarati Muslims are also fairly well represented at 1,546 persons or

13.2% of this population. Each of the remaining religio-ethnic sub-groups account for less than 10% of Bradford's Indian population. However, Punjabi Hindus are the largest of these remaining sub-groups at an estimated 972 persons or 8.3%. For maximum comprehension, the relative percentage contributions of religio-ethnic sub-groups to Bradford's Indian population are illustrated graphically in Figure 5.9.

**Figure 5.9: Current percentage contributions of religio-ethnic sub-groups to Bradford's Indian population**



Data source: Table 5.4.

#### 5.2.4 Religio-ethnic sub-groups: Bradford and Britain compared

Despite the failure of the 1991 Census to enumerate the size of Indian religio-ethnic sub-groups, Knott & Toon (1980: 21) estimated the percentages of persons within Britain's total Indian population who were affiliated to these sub-groups (see also Knott, 1981a: 16). Their estimates are supported here. This is because the major influx of Indian immigration to Britain had ended before 1977; the year on which Knott & Toon based their statistics. Consequently, apart from differential birth and death rates between religio-ethnic sub-groups since 1977, there is little reason to believe that their current percentage contribution to Britain's Indian population would be any different to that suggested by Knott & Toon. Accordingly, Table 5.5 takes Knott & Toon's (1980) estimates of the percentage contribution of religio-ethnic sub-groups to Britain's Indian population, and applies these to the 1991 Census count of Indians in Britain (840,255). This produces an approximate estimate of the current population sizes of these religio-ethnic sub-groups living in the country.

**Table 5.5: Estimated current population sizes of religio-ethnic sub-groups within Britain's Indian population**


Religio-ethnic sub-group	As % of 1977 Indian population in Britain (Knott & Toon, 1980) <sup>①</sup>	Current population size of religio-ethnic sub-group (b/100)×a
<b>a</b>		
<b>Hindus</b>	<b>40.5</b>	<b>340,303</b>
Gujarati	28.3	237,792
Punjabi	5.9	49,575
Other Indian regions	6.3	52,936
<b>Sikhs (Punjabi)</b>	<b>40.2</b>	<b>337,783</b>
<b>Muslims</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>85,706</b>
Gujarati	6.3	52,936
Other Indian regions	4.0	33,610
<b>Christians and Others (Other Indian regions)</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>76,463</b>
<b>All Indians</b>	<b>100%<sup>②</sup></b>	<b>840,255 (b)<sup>③</sup></b>

① Calculated from Knott & Toon (1980: 21).

② Percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

③ Figure 'b' = 1991 Census count of Indians living in Britain (OPCS, 1993b: 2). Column data do not sum to this figure exactly due to rounding errors.

**Figure 5.10: Current percentage contributions of religio-ethnic sub-groups to Britain's Indian population**



Data source: Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 indicates that the Punjabi Sikhs are the largest religio-ethnic sub-group within Britain's Indian population at an estimated 337,783 persons. Moreover, at 40.2% of this population they account for approximately the same proportion as all Hindu sub-groups combined (40.5% or an estimated 340,303 persons). The only other religio-ethnic sub-group which is significantly larger than the rest is that of Gujarati Hindus, at an estimated 237,792 persons and 28.3% of Britain's Indian population. All other sub-groups account for less than 10% of this population. In fact, the small sub-groups of

Hindus, Muslims and Christians and Others from 'other Indian regions' are actually made up of several religio-ethnic sub-groups, which themselves represent even smaller proportions of Britain's Indian population. The relative percentage contributions of religio-ethnic sub-groups to Britain's Indian population are clearer when represented graphically in Figure 5.10.

Figure 5.10 is slightly different from Figure 5.9, which showed the current percentage contributions of religio-ethnic sub-groups to Bradford's Indian population. These differences are illustrated in Table 5.6. Here, the percentage contributions of sub-groups to Bradford's Indian population, as shown in Table 5.4, are compared with corresponding percentages for Britain from Table 5.5. This produces location quotients (LQs) indicating the concentration of religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population relative to Indians in the whole country.

**Table 5.6: Location quotients for religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population relative to Indians in Britain as a whole**

Religio-ethnic sub-group	% contribution of religio-ethnic sub-group to Britain's Indian population <sup>①</sup>	% contribution of religio-ethnic sub-group to Bradford's Indian population <sup>②</sup>	LQ to indicate concentration of religio-ethnic sub-group in Bradford relative Britain
	a	b	(b/a)
<b>Hindus</b>	<b>40.5</b>	<b>42.2</b>	<b>1.04</b>
Gujarati	28.3	31.7	1.12
Punjabi	5.9	8.3	1.41
Other Indian regions	6.3	2.2	0.35
<b>Sikhs (Punjabi)</b>	<b>40.2</b>	<b>43.6</b>	<b>1.08</b>
<b>Muslims</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>1.36</b>
Gujarati	6.3	13.2	2.10
Other Indian regions	4.0	0.7	0.18
<b>Christians and Others (Other Indian regions)</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.00</b>
<b>Unclassified</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>-</b>

① Data source: Table 5.5.

② Data source: Table 5.4.

Table 5.6 shows that all Hindu and Sikh religio-ethnic sub-groups, apart from 'Hindus from other Indian regions', are slightly over-represented in Bradford's Indian population when compared to Indians in Britain as a whole. This over-representation is greatest amongst Punjabi Hindus, who have a LQ of 1.41. Gujarati Muslims have an even higher LQ of 2.10, indicating that they are more than two times over-represented in Bradford's Indian population relative to Indians in the whole country. Conversely, those Muslims from other Indian regions are considerably under-represented in the city, with a LQ of only 0.18. The largest under-representation is for 'Christians and Others from other Indian regions', who make up 9.1% of Britain's Indian population but none of Bradford's.

### 5.2.5 Summary

This section has provided a comprehensive account of the size Bradford's South Asian population and those ethnic groups and sub-groups within it. The emergent picture appears unique when compared to the South Asian population in Britain as a whole. For example, South Asians have been shown to be over-represented in Bradford relative to Britain, and it has been seen that much of this over-representation is generated by the Pakistani ethnic group, who at 9.9% of Bradford's total population, represent the largest concentration of Pakistanis in the country (Teague, 1993: 14). However, like Bradford, the populations of all local authority districts in Britain have their own unique ethnic composition. Examples might be the large Bangladeshi element (22.3%) in the population of Tower Hamlets, or even the 100% White population in the Isles of Scilly (Teague, 1993: 14). In other words, a given ethnic group in Britain (be it South Asian or otherwise) is concentrated in a distinctive set of local authority districts which, in turn, serves to create that group's inimitable national geography<sup>7</sup>.

Turning to Bradford's Indian population, certain religio-ethnic sub-groups have also been shown to be over- or under-represented when compared to the Indian population in Britain as a whole. Similar to above, however, it should be noted that other centres of Indian population also have their own unique religio-ethnic mix. Thus, work by Phillips (1981; 1983) indicates that the Indian community in Leicester is dominated by Gujarati Hindus. By contrast, the Ballards (1977) and Helweg (1979) note that those Indians in the London district of Southall are mainly Punjabi Sikhs. Again, when unique compositions of this kind are viewed together, they reveal distinctive geographies of Indian religio-ethnicity across the nation.

## 5.3 THE GEOGRAPHIES OF RELIGIO-ETHNIC SUB-GROUPS IN BRADFORD

### 5.3.1 The current picture

This section uses results generated from name analysis of the 1992 electoral register in this study to map and discuss the current (1991<sup>8</sup>) geographies of Indian religio-ethnic sub-groups across the 30 wards of Bradford and the Leeds wards of Pudsey North and South. Such an exercise helps to highlight the distinctive nature of the Punjabi Hindu sub-group within Bradford's Indian community. The following section (5.3.2) continues by comparing the name analysis results from this study with those from Ram's study of the 1981 electoral register. This will demonstrate changes in the spatial distribution of Indian religio-ethnic sub-groups across Bradford during the last decade.

<sup>7</sup>For a review of the differing national geographies of major ethnic groups in the 1991 Census see Owen (1994)

<sup>8</sup>1991 geographies, because October 1991 was the time of qualification for the 1992 electoral register.

To establish the geographies of religio-ethnic sub-groups in Bradford, it is necessary to start by referring back to Table 5.3, which presented the name analysis results from the 1992 electoral register. First, the name analysis counts for the numbers of persons belonging to the Punjabi Sikh, Gujarati Hindu, Punjabi Hindu and Gujarati Muslim sub-groups in each of the 32 study wards are taken from this table. (It should be remembered that these counts only apply to those persons  $\geq 16$  years and eight months of age). Second, in Table 5.7, the 32 individual ward counts for each of these four sub-groups are calculated as percentages of the total name analysis count for all persons belonging to the relevant sub-group in all 32 study wards.

**Table 5.7: Ward counts<sup>①</sup> for four religio-ethnic sub-groups as percentages of total name analysis count of persons belonging to the relevant sub-group in all 32 study wards**

Ward name	Punjabi Sikhs		Gujarati Hindus		Punjabi Hindus		Gujarati Muslims	
	Nos. enumerated for ward from name analysis of 1992 electoral register	Nos. enumerated for ward as % of total Punjabi Sikhs enumerated for all 32 wards (100/h) × a	Nos. enumerated for ward from name analysis of 1992 electoral register	Nos. enumerated for ward as % of total Gujarati Hindus enumerated for all 32 wards (100/d) × c	Nos. enumerated for ward from name analysis of 1992 electoral register	Nos. enumerated for ward as % of total Punjabi Hindus enumerated for all 32 wards (100/f) × e	Nos. enumerated for ward from name analysis of 1992 electoral register	Nos. enumerated for ward as % of total Gujarati Muslims enumerated for all 32 wards (100/h) × g
	a		c		e		g	
Baildon	10	0.26	7	0.28	8	1.10	0	0.00
Bingley	11	0.29	7	0.28	0	0.00	3	0.29
Bingley Rural	14	0.37	5	0.20	0	0.00	0	0.00
Bolton	443	11.56	25	0.99	55	7.55	2	0.20
Bowling	489	12.76	46	1.82	53	7.28	122	11.93
Bradford Moor	786	20.51	31	1.23	113	15.52	55	5.38
Clayton	100	2.61	144	5.71	37	5.08	14	1.37
Craven	6	0.16	3	0.12	3	0.41	2	0.20
Eccleshill	41	1.07	30	1.19	0	0.00	6	0.59
Great Horton	189	4.93	664	26.32	11	1.51	50	4.89
Heaton	128	3.34	70	2.77	46	6.32	141	13.78
Idle	22	0.57	14	0.55	1	0.14	1	0.10
Ilkley	5	0.13	4	0.16	0	0.00	0	0.00
Keighley North	3	0.08	8	0.32	0	0.00	2	0.20
Keighley South	6	0.16	19	0.75	0	0.00	0	0.00
Keighley West	25	0.65	8	0.32	0	0.00	4	0.39
Little Horton	192	5.01	201	7.97	32	4.40	13	1.27
Odsal	146	3.81	58	2.30	52	7.14	6	0.59
Queensbury	17	0.44	73	2.90	1	0.14	2	0.20
Rombalds	7	0.18	0	0.00	1	0.14	0	0.00
Shipley East	30	0.78	16	0.63	2	0.27	4	0.39
Shipley West	104	2.71	5	0.20	27	3.71	7	0.68
Thornton	55	1.44	21	0.83	7	0.96	0	0.00
Toller	129	3.37	63	2.50	114	15.66	101	9.87
Tong	24	0.63	32	1.27	3	0.41	0	0.00
Undercliffe	168	4.38	5	0.20	33	4.53	17	1.66
University	134	3.50	811	32.14	35	4.81	467	45.65
Wibsey	34	0.89	62	2.46	0	0.00	0	0.00
Worth Valley	1	0.03	1	0.04	6	0.82	4	0.39
Wyke	58	1.51	28	1.11	0	0.00	0	0.00
Pudsey North	355	9.26	25	0.99	69	9.48	0	0.00
Pudsey South	100	2.61	37	1.47	19	2.61	0	0.00
<b>Totals<sup>②</sup></b>	<b>3,832 (b)</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>2,523 (d)</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>728 (f)</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1,023 (h)</b>	<b>100%</b>


① Data sourced from Table 5.3. Figures only apply to persons aged  $\geq 16$  years and eight months, for reasons explained above.

② Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

Data from Table 5.7 are now used to determine the geography of Punjabi Sikhs, Gujarati Hindus, Punjabi Hindus and Gujarati Muslims in Bradford, by mapping the percentage distribution of each of their populations across the 32 study wards. The resultant four maps are displayed in Figures 5.11 to 5.14. It should be noted that the class intervals on these maps have been determined by analysing the 32 percentage values of all four sub-groups together. This means that the shading categories on the four maps are fully comparable. Only these four religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population are considered to be worth mapping. Other sub-groups, such as 'Hindus from other regions of India', have populations which are too small in Bradford for any meaningful geographies to be established (see Table 5.4); and this fact applies both in this section and the one following (Section 5.3.2) which concerns changing geographies.

According to the name analysis, Punjabi Sikhs comprise the largest religio-ethnic sub-group within Bradford's Indian population, accounting for 3,832 persons (aged  $\geq 16$  years and eight months) living in the 32 study wards (see Table 5.7). Figure 5.11 maps the percentage distribution of this population across these wards.

**Figure 5.11: Percentage distribution of Punjabi Sikhs in Bradford, 1991**




Data source: Table 5.7.

It can be seen that Punjabi Sikhs are highly concentrated in the two inner-city wards of Bradford Moor and Bowling, and also in the more suburban wards of Bolton and in the Leeds district, Pudsey North. These four wards all lie to the east of Bradford's

centre, and respectively hold around 21%, 13%, 12% and 9% of the total Punjabi Sikh population enumerated for all 32 study wards (see Table 5.7). Lesser, but still significant percentage concentrations of this population are also found in other inner-city and suburban wards, predominantly on the eastern side of Bradford. Those suburban wards towards the western edge of the city generally house lower percentages of Punjabi Sikhs, whilst all the more rural wards to the north have minimal representations of less than one percent. The overall geography of Punjabi Sikhs in the Bradford district is therefore one of concentration in urban and suburban wards to the east of the city centre.

The geography of Punjabi Sikhs is different from that seen in Figure 5.12. This maps the percentage distribution of Gujarati Hindus in Bradford, who constitute the second largest religio-ethnic sub-group within the city's Indian population, accounting for 2,523 persons (aged  $\geq 16$  years and eight months) in the 32 study wards (see Table 5.7).

**Figure 5.12: Percentage distribution of Gujarati Hindus in Bradford, 1991**




Data source: Table 5.7.

It can be seen that Gujarati Hindus are highly concentrated in the inner-city wards of University, Great Horton and Little Horton, which lie towards the western side of Bradford, and respectively hold around 32%, 26% and 8% of the total Gujarati Hindu population enumerated for all 32 study wards (see Table 5.7). Lesser, but still significant percentage concentrations of this population are also found in a number of more suburban wards, which again occupy the western edges of Bradford. Those wards on the

eastern side of the city house lower percentages of Gujarati Hindus, whilst all the more rural wards to the north have minimal representations of less than one percent. The overall geography of Gujarati Hindus in the Bradford district is therefore one of concentration in urban and suburban wards to the west of the city.

Figure 5.13 shows that the geography of the smaller sub-group of Punjabi Hindus (728 persons in Table 5.7) in Bradford. It can be seen that Punjabi Hindus are highly concentrated in the inner-city wards of Bradford Moor and Bowling, which respectively hold around 16% and 7% of the Punjabi Hindu population enumerated for the 32 study wards (see Table 5.7). In addition, high percentage concentrations of Punjabi Hindus are found in a ring of suburban wards surrounding Bradford's centre. These include Odsal to the south of the city, which holds around 7% of the enumerated Punjabi Hindu population; Pudsey North and Bolton to the east of the city centre, which respectively hold around 9% and 8% of this population; and finally Toller to the north with approximately 16% (see Table 5.7). Lesser, but still significant percentage concentrations of Punjabi Hindus are also found in many other suburban wards as well as a couple in the inner-city. The remaining wards in Bradford all have low or minimal percentages of the Punjabi Hindu population, or none at all. Significantly, Punjabi Hindus have made slightly more successful inroads into some of the more rural wards (such as Worth Valley and Baildon) than the other two sub-groups discussed above.

**Figure 5.13: Percentage distribution of Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, 1991**




Data source: Table 5.7.

The overall geography of Punjabi Hindus in the Bradford is therefore different from that of Punjabi Sikhs and Gujarati Hindus. Punjabi Hindus first appear to have a more even and dispersed distribution, because they are not heavily concentrated into one or two wards on the eastern or western sides of the city. Rather, their numbers are spread across wards lying in different areas of Bradford. Most importantly, Punjabi Hindus appear to be even more suburbanised than Punjabi Sikhs and Gujarati Hindus, so much so in fact, that they are pushing out into Bradford's more rural areas.

If Punjabi Hindus had to be paired with one of the above two sub-groups in terms of their spatial distribution, then it would be Punjabi Sikhs. This is because Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs have high concentrations in some of the same wards. This may reflect the social proximity of these two sub-groups in terms of their origin region in India. On the other hand, the fact that the Punjabi Hindu distribution is still noticeably different from that of Punjabi Sikhs illustrates the importance of both origin region and religion together in creating social and geographical differences between Indians.

**Figure 5.14: Percentage distribution of Gujarati Muslims in Bradford, 1991**



Data source: Table 5.7.

If Punjabi Hindus represent the religio-ethnic sub-group with the most suburbanised geography in Bradford, then the city's Gujarati Muslims (1,023 persons in Table 5.7) have the lowest levels of suburbanisation. Thus, Figure 5.14 shows that they are heavily concentrated into inner-city wards of Bradford such as Bowling, housing

around 12% of the Gujarati Muslim population enumerated for the 32 study wards, and especially University ward, with 46% of this population (see Table 5.7). The more suburban wards of Toller and Heaton also house high percentages of Gujarati Muslims. However, fieldwork observations revealed that they are concentrated into the extreme eastern tips of these two wards, which border the northern edge of University ward. These areas are characterised by sub-standard, inner-city housing stock rather than the more suburban residences found in the rest of Toller and Heaton.

All the other suburban wards, in which at least one of the other religio-ethnic sub-groups has been shown to have a reasonably high percentage representation, are characterised by very low percentages of Gujarati Muslims. Most of the rural wards to the north of the city have none at all. The overall geography of Gujarati Muslims in Bradford is therefore much more concentrated into inner-city areas than the other sub-groups discussed above. Consequently, it appears that Gujarati Muslims are characterised by lower levels of suburbanisation than these other non-Muslim sub-groups. This difference in levels of suburbanisation equates to that seen between Pakistanis & Bangladeshis and Indians in Section 5.1.4. The similar geographies of Gujarati Muslims and Pakistanis & Bangladeshis may again reflect their comparative social proximity as South Asian Muslims with a common cultural and religious heritage.

### **5.3.2 Changing geographies of religio-ethnic sub-groups in Bradford, 1980 to 1991**

To illustrate changes in the geographies of religio-ethnic sub-groups in Bradford, the individual ward level population counts for a given sub-group, from Ram's name analysis of the 1981 electoral register, are subtracted from corresponding counts generated in this study from the 1992 register. This produces figures for absolute change in the population of each sub-group in each ward between October 1980 and 1991 (the qualifying dates for the two electoral registers under scrutiny). These figures are presented in Table 5.8, and are then mapped across the Bradford wards in Figures 5.15 to 5.17 to show changes in the spatial distribution of sub-groups for the 11 year period under scrutiny.

Three important points should be noted. First, ward level changes in population are only tabulated and mapped for Punjabi Sikhs, Gujarati Hindus and Punjabi Hindus. Changes in the Gujarati Muslim population are not considered. This is because Ram's name analysis substantially under-enumerated this sub-group (see Section 4.3.7). Consequently, any comparisons of his data and those produced in this study will not produce an accurate picture of population changes for Gujarati Muslims. Second, both Table 5.8 and Figures 5.15 to 5.17 observe changes only for the 30 wards of Bradford. The two Leeds wards of Pudsey North and South are not considered. This is because Ram did not undertake name analysis for these wards, and hence data comparisons

Table 5.8: Changes in the numbers of Punjabi Sikhs, Gujarati Hindus and Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford's 30 wards, 1980 to 1991<sup>①</sup>

Ward name	Punjabi Sikhs						Gujarati Hindus					
	Nos. enumerated for ward from Ram's name analysis of 1981 register	Nos. enumerated for ward from name analysis of 1992 register in this study	Absolute change in population numbers between 1980 and 1991	Nos. enumerated for ward by Ram as % of total Punjabi Sikhs enumerated for all 30 wards by Ram	Nos. enumerated for ward in this study as % of total Punjabi Sikhs enumerated for all 30 wards in this study	Change in percentage distribution of Punjabi Sikhs by ward	Nos. enumerated for ward from Ram's name analysis of 1981 register	Nos. enumerated for ward from name analysis of 1992 register in this study	Absolute change in population numbers between 1980 and 1991	Nos. enumerated for ward by Ram as % of total Gujarati Hindus enumerated for all 30 wards by Ram	Nos. enumerated for ward in this study as % of total Gujarati Hindus enumerated for all 30 wards in this study	Change in percentage distribution of Gujarati Hindus by ward
	a	c	c-a	(100/h) × a	(100/d) × c	f-e	g	i	l-g	(100/h) × g	(100/j) × i	l-k
Baildon	2	10	8	0.07	0.30	0.23	0	7	7	0.00	0.28	0.28
Bingley	5	11	6	0.17	0.33	0.16	0	7	7	0.00	0.28	0.28
Bingley Rural	0	14	14	0.00	0.41	0.41	0	5	5	0.00	0.20	0.20
Bolton	209	443	234	7.21	13.12	5.91	13	25	12	0.51	1.02	0.51
Bowling	362	489	127	12.49	14.48	1.99	32	46	14	1.26	1.87	0.61
Bradford Moor	1003	786	-217	34.61	23.28	-11.33	41	31	-10	1.62	1.26	-0.36
Clayton	11	100	89	0.38	2.96	2.58	29	144	115	1.14	5.85	4.71
Craven	5	6	1	0.17	0.18	0.01	6	3	-3	0.24	0.12	-0.12
Eccleshill	7	41	34	0.24	1.21	0.97	21	30	9	0.83	1.22	0.39
Great Horton	132	189	57	4.55	5.60	1.05	400	664	264	15.77	26.98	11.21
Heaton	81	128	47	2.80	3.79	0.99	23	70	47	0.91	2.84	1.93
Idle	6	22	16	0.21	0.65	0.44	5	14	9	0.20	0.57	0.37
Ilkley	0	5	5	0.00	0.15	0.15	0	4	4	0.00	0.16	0.16
Keighley North	0	3	3	0.00	0.09	0.09	2	8	6	0.08	0.33	0.25
Keighley South	2	6	4	0.07	0.18	0.11	8	19	11	0.32	0.77	0.45
Keighley West	8	25	17	0.28	0.74	0.46	2	8	6	0.08	0.33	0.25
Little Horton	290	192	-98	10.01	5.69	-4.32	288	201	-87	11.36	8.17	-3.19
Odsal	115	146	31	3.97	4.32	0.35	26	58	32	1.03	2.36	1.33
Queensbury	2	17	15	0.07	0.50	0.43	25	73	48	0.99	2.97	1.98
Rombalds	0	7	7	0.00	0.21	0.21	4	0	-4	0.16	0.00	-0.16
Shipley East	11	30	19	0.38	0.89	0.51	12	16	4	0.47	0.65	0.18
Shipley West	75	104	29	2.59	3.08	0.49	4	5	1	0.16	0.20	0.04
Thornton	4	55	51	0.14	1.63	1.49	11	21	10	0.43	0.85	0.42
Toller	115	129	14	3.97	3.82	-0.15	72	63	-9	2.84	2.56	-0.28
Tong	20	24	4	0.69	0.71	0.02	29	32	3	1.14	1.30	0.16
Undercliffe	193	168	-25	6.66	4.97	-1.69	23	5	-18	0.91	0.20	-0.71
University	205	134	-71	7.07	3.97	-3.1	1422	811	-611	56.07	32.95	-23.12
Wibsey	12	34	22	0.41	1.01	0.6	29	62	33	1.14	2.52	1.38
Worth Valley	0	1	1	0.00	0.03	0.03	0	1	1	0.00	0.04	0.04
Wyke	23	58	35	0.79	1.72	0.93	9	28	19	0.35	1.14	0.79
<b>Totals<sup>②</sup></b>	<b>2,898 (b)</b>	<b>3,377 (d)</b>	<b>479</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2,536 (h)</b>	<b>2,461 (j)</b>	<b>-75</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-</b>

Table 5.8: (continued)

Ward name	Punjabi Hindus					
	Nos. enumerated for ward from Ram's name analysis of 1981 register	Nos. enumerated for ward from name analysis of 1992 register in this study	Absolute change in population numbers between 1980 and 1991	Nos. enumerated for ward by Ram as % of total Punjabi Hindus enumerated for all 30 wards by Ram	Nos. enumerated for ward in this study as % of total Punjabi Hindus enumerated for all 30 wards in this study	Change in percentage distribution of Punjabi Hindus by ward
	m	o	o-m	(100/n) × m	(100/p) × o	r-q
Baildon	0	8	8	0.00	1.25	1.25
Bingley	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bingley Rural	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bolton	14	55	41	2.47	8.59	6.12
Bowling	59	53	-6	10.42	8.28	-2.14
Bradford Moor	188	113	-75	33.22	17.66	-15.56
Clayton	2	37	35	0.35	5.78	5.43
Craven	0	3	3	0.00	0.47	0.47
Eccleshill	6	0	-6	1.05	0.00	-1.05
Great Horton	17	11	-6	3.00	1.72	-1.28
Heaton	41	46	5	7.24	7.19	-0.05
Idle	0	1	1	0.00	0.16	0.16
Ilkley	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
Keighley North	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
Keighley South	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
Keighley West	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
Little Horton	26	32	6	4.59	5.00	0.41
Odsal	13	52	39	2.30	8.13	5.83
Queensbury	0	1	1	0.00	0.16	0.16
Rombalds	3	1	-2	0.53	0.16	-0.37
Shipley East	0	2	2	0.00	0.31	0.31
Shipley West	11	27	16	1.94	4.22	2.28
Thornton	0	7	7	0.00	1.09	1.09
Toller	105	114	9	18.55	17.81	-0.74
Tong	0	3	3	0.00	0.47	0.47
Undercliffe	16	33	17	2.83	5.16	2.33
University	60	35	-25	10.60	5.47	-5.13
Wibsey	1	0	-1	0.18	0.00	-0.18
Worth Valley	1	6	5	0.18	0.94	0.76
Wyke	3	0	-3	0.53	0.00	-0.53
<b>Totals<sup>ⓐ</sup></b>	<b>566 (n)</b>	<b>640 (p)</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-</b>


ⓐ 1980 figures from Ram (1989: 184-6). 1991 figures from Table 5.3. Figures only apply to persons aged ≥ 16 years and eight months of age, for reasons explained above.

ⓑ Percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

illustrating changes in their sub-group population sizes are not possible. Third, it should again be noted that both Table 5.8 and Figures 5.15 to 5.17 are only illustrating changes for persons  $\geq 16$  years and eight months of age.

In addition to absolute changes, Table 5.8 also presents the changes in the percentage distribution of Punjabi Sikhs, Gujarati Hindus and Punjabi Hindus across the 30 Bradford wards. This is achieved by taking the individual ward counts for a given one of these sub-groups - as enumerated through name analysis of the 1992 electoral register in this study - and calculating these as a percentage of the total name analysis count for persons belonging to that sub-group in all 30 wards. (Importantly, these percentages are slightly different from those produced in Table 5.7, because the counts for Pudsey North and South have been removed from the calculation). This procedure is then undertaken for the same given sub-group using the results from Ram's name analysis of the 1981 register. The calculated percentages from Ram's work are then subtracted from those relating to the 1992 register to produce changes in percentage distribution. In Table 5.8, it can be seen that the resultant figures from this procedure generally equate to the absolute changes in population numbers shown for each of the three sub-groups.

**Figure 5.15: Changes in the distribution of Bradford's Punjabi Sikh population, 1980 to 1991**




Data source: Table 5.8.

Figure 5.15 shows absolute changes in the Punjabi Sikh population between October 1980 and 1991 across the 30 Bradford wards. It can be seen that during this 11 year period, inner-city wards such as Bradford Moor, Little Horton, University and

Undercliffe had above average losses in their Punjabi Sikh population. Conversely, there were above average gains in a few of the more suburban wards. This indicates a suburbanisation of the Punjabi Sikh population between 1980 and 1991. This fact is confirmed by looking at Table 5.8, and witnessing the way in which the figures for changes in the percentage distribution of the Punjabi Sikh community across the 30 wards tally closely with those relating to absolute population changes. Furthermore, fieldwork observations revealed that even in the few predominantly inner-city wards which have made above average gains in their Punjabi Sikh population (such as Bowling), the Sikhs have mostly taken up residence on their outer edges, which tend towards a more suburban environment rather than one of the inner-city.

Most significantly, the wards which have made the greatest gains in Punjabi Sikhs, and which might therefore be seen as the principal destinations in the suburbanisation of this sub-group, are those on the eastern side of the city, such as Bolton. This equates with the eastern bias in the current geography of Punjabi Sikhs in Bradford, as witnessed in Section 5.3.1. Some Sikhs will, of course, have moved further east and out of Bradford into the two suburban wards of Pudsey North and South.

**Figure 5.16: Changes in the distribution of Bradford's Gujarati Hindu population, 1980 to 1991**




Data source: Table 5.8.

Figure 5.16 shows the absolute changes in the Gujarati Hindu population between October 1980 and 1991. It can be seen that inner-city wards, such as University and Little Horton, suffered above average losses in their Gujarati Hindu population,

whilst there were higher than average gains in a few of the city's more suburban wards. As with Sikhs, this indicates a suburbanisation of Gujarati Hindus during the 11 year period under study, and again, this trend is confirmed by referring to figures for changes in the percentage distribution of Gujarati Hindus in Table 5.8. Fieldwork observations also revealed that even though the largest gain of Gujarati Hindus was made in the predominantly inner-city ward of Great Horton, those who have taken up residence there generally occupy its outer edges, which tend to be more suburban in their environment rather than inner-city. Most importantly, the suburban wards which have made the greatest gains in Gujarati Hindus lie to the west of Bradford's centre. This accords with the western bias in the current geography of Gujarati Hindus in the city (see Section 5.3.1).

**Figure 5.17: Changes in the distribution of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu population, 1980 to 1991**



Data source: Table 5.8.

Figure 5.17 shows that the inner-city wards of Bradford Moor and University suffered above average losses in their Punjabi Hindu population between 1980 and 1991. By contrast, above average gains were made in a number of more suburban wards, including Bolton, Odsal and Clayton. As with Sikhs and Gujarati Hindus, this suggests a suburbanisation of Punjabi Hindus during the 11 year period under scrutiny; a fact which is again confirmed by looking at the figures for changes in percentage distribution in Table 5.8. However, the suburban wards which have made greater than average gains in Punjabi Hindus are in different areas of the city: Bolton lies to the west, Clayton to the east, and Odsal to the south. This reflects the current geography of Bradford's Punjabi

Hindu population, which has been shown to be more dispersed than that of Sikhs and Gujarati Hindus with their respectively eastern and western biases (see Section 5.3.1).

### 5.3.3 Summary

Presentation of the percentage distributions of Bradford's Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian populations in Section 5.1.4 indicated that Indians have a far more suburbanised geography in the city than the former two ethnic groups. However, this section has shown that the degree of this suburbanisation, and the areas to which it is directed, differ noticeably between religio-ethnic sub-groups within Bradford's Indian population. Thus, it has been shown that Gujarati Muslims have a geography in Bradford which is far less suburbanised than that of Punjabi Sikhs and Gujarati and Punjabi Hindus. Equally, it has been seen that as Punjabi Sikhs and Gujarati Hindus suburbanise in Bradford, their respective geographies are becoming increasingly polarised in an east versus west direction. By contrast, the geography of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus continues to be characterised by more even dispersal, because this sub-group has suburbanised to wards in many different areas of the city.

The finer the spatial scale, the more concentrated and distinctive the geographies of Bradford's South Asian ethnic groups and religio-ethnic sub-groups become. Thus, whilst Indians and Pakistanis, or Punjabi Sikhs and Gujarati Hindus, may occupy the same ward in Bradford, within that ward they are likely to show increasingly high levels of segregation from enumeration district down to street level, both from the white population and between each other. These 'street level geographies' were seen on many occasions during name analysis of the 1992 electoral register. However, whilst accepting that these distinctive micro-geographies of South Asian ethnicity exist in Bradford, there is no further discussion of them here. To do so would be revisiting ground already covered by geographers in the 1970s (e.g. Cater & Jones, 1979; see also Jones & McEvoy, 1974; 1978; Cater *et al.*, 1977).

## 5.4 CONCLUSION: ACKNOWLEDGING DIFFERENCE

This chapter has focused on Bradford's South Asian community, the main ethnic groups within it (such as Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis), and religio-ethnic sub-groups within the Indian community itself. A comprehensive account of these different groups and sub-groups has been provided in terms of their settlement history, population size and intra-urban geography, and much of this information has been related back to a wider British perspective. Overall, this exercise has provided a backdrop against which the study of the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford can be contextualised.

Despite similarities in the conditions of South Asian settlement in this country, it is clear that South Asians do not interact spatially as one homogenous group. Thus, at the intra-urban level, this chapter has shown that within Bradford's South Asian community the ethnic groups of Pakistanis, Indians and Bangladeshis have diverse geographies (see Section 5.1.4), as do religio-ethnic sub-groups within the city's Indian community (see Section 5.3). Furthermore, it has been indicated that such geographical diversity may also occur at a national level, with each given South Asian ethnic group and sub-group being concentrated in a distinctive set of local authority districts across the country.

On the surface, this geographical diversity reflects the social differences between South Asian ethnic groups and sub-groups in terms of nationality, religion and origin region in the subcontinent. However, these differences are further underpinned by key socio-economic factors. For example, using 1991 Census data, Rees *et al.* (1995) demonstrate that Indians have a socio-economic position in both Bradford and the rest of Britain which indicates an increasingly middle class element amongst them. Conversely, Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations in these areas (and particularly the latter) find themselves in very difficult circumstances, often occupying a submerged and disadvantaged position in society in terms of their socio-economic status. Accordingly, the diverse national and intra-urban geographies of South Asian ethnicity are not only geographies which reflect differences in nationality, religion and origin region. They are also geographies of relative wealth versus poverty and deprivation.

Clearly, although many South Asians arrived in Britain at the same time and encountered similar initial problems in terms of institutional discrimination and economic marginalisation, they have not evolved as a homogeneous socio-economic unit. Instead, they have displayed socio-economic fragmentation along the lines of many competing affiliations. Ballard (1994b) suggests that this phenomenon may have begun to develop during the migration process. He argues that whilst chain migration facilitated ethnic colonisation, by bringing kinsmen together in specific neighbourhoods, it also helped maintain South Asian differentiation in terms of nationality, religion, origin region and (for Hindus) *jati* affiliation. This was because:

...each cascading stream brought migrants from a specific region, caste and community to an equally specific location in Britain. (Ballard, 1994b: 19).

It is likely that the unique 'cultural resources' of each of these various 'chain migrant communities', in terms of their skills, language ability, etc., ensured that the differences between them widened still further to encompass socio-economic factors. In short, as South Asians began to employ survival strategies in an alien milieu, the linguistic abilities and skills of some communities may have put them on a faster socio-

economic 'track' than others who were not as 'resource wealthy'. Geography mattered in all of this, because the utility of the cultural resources which these communities harboured was likely to vary according to the unique spatial context in which they found themselves in Britain. This theme will be explored further with reference to *jati* based communities in Bradford in Section 6.4.

It is fitting to leave the last word to Ballard, who succinctly captures the essence of difference in Britain's South Asian community with the following quotation:

...to talk of an "Asian" community - or even of "Indian", "Pakistani" or "Bangladeshi" ones - is to reinforce a fiction. Real communities are much more parochially organised, and have each generated specific skills, understandings and loyalties which each little network makes available to its members. *Desh Pardesh* - the embodiment of the self-created worlds of Britain's South Asian settlers - is therefore anything but homogeneous. (Ballard, 1994b: 29).

## Chapter Six

### *The caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus and some migratory changes*

#### 6.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with identifying the degree to which the caste system is present and operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, thus fulfilling the third aim of the study (see Section 1.1). Some suggestions are also offered as to how and why the caste system has changed for Bradford's Punjabi Hindus through their migration and settlement, which corresponds with the fourth study aim.

The findings rest mainly on two primary data types discussed in Chapter Four. These are quantitative data relating to 123 sample households, which were generated from the 50 household interviews and 73 questionnaires, and qualitative data from the 50 interviews alone. For reasons justified in Chapter Four, it will be seen that whilst the findings from these data relate to Punjabi Hindus in the 'Bradford sample'<sup>1</sup>, they are often taken as indicative of trends within the whole of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community (see Sections 4.5.7 and 4.6.4). In addition to the above two data types, primary background ethnographic data generated from participant observation amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community are also used in this chapter (see Section 4.7.1), along with secondary data from the British based South Asian press (see Section 4.2).

The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 6.1 determines the degree to which the caste system is present amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus by examining their awareness of the different types of social unit within the institution. Sections 6.2 to 6.5 focus on the operation of the caste system amongst this community through an investigation of the role the institution plays in a number of key areas. Thus, Section 6.2 explores the relationship between marriage and the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, whilst Section 6.3 focuses on centres of worship as units of social and political 'control' within this community, and discusses how this phenomenon is linked into the caste system. Section 6.4 explores the relevance of traditional occupations or *karmas* within the caste system for Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, and Section 6.5 examines the geography of the caste system for this community. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.6. The hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus is discussed in Chapter Seven.

---

<sup>1</sup>The terms 'Bradford sample' and 'sample community' will be used in this chapter, and those following, to refer to Punjabi Hindus who undertook interviews and questionnaires.

## 6.1 AWARENESS OF SOCIAL UNITS IN THE CASTE SYSTEM AMONGST BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS

### 6.1.1 Overview

To determine awareness of social units in the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, interviewees and questionnaire respondents from the Bradford sample were initially asked which 'caste' they were from. It was then necessary to establish what type of social unit this might be; i.e. whether when talking about 'caste' these respondents were referring to *jatis*, *varnas* or castes themselves. An attempt was then made to determine their awareness of other types of social unit, although only interviews provided the opportunity for this further inquiry. Thus, if an interviewee clearly referred to his/her *jati* when asked what 'caste' s/he was, then an attempt was made to discover how aware s/he was of the other two social units of *varna* and caste. This was usually achieved by asking about the "four large castes" when referring to the *varnas*, or the "little castes within castes" when referring to the caste unit itself. The use of native terms was kept to a minimum in such enquiries for reasons explained in Section 4.5.5.

In presenting the results of the above procedure, the Bradford sample has been divided into non-*Brahminical* and *Brahminical* Hindus. This is because these two groups had a notably different awareness of the types of social unit in the caste system.

### 6.1.2 Non-*Brahminical* awareness of social units in the caste system

For non-*Brahminical* Hindus in the Bradford sample the social unit in the caste system which they were most aware of amongst themselves was the *jati*. Thus, when asked what caste they were, all non-*Brahminical* respondents provided the name of their *jati*. The main reason for such heightened awareness of the *jati* within this section of the sample community was undoubtedly because of its importance as a social unit in marriage (see Section 6.2). In all, findings indicated that six different *jatis* were represented amongst non-*Brahmins* in the Bradford sample (see Table 6.1).

**Table 6.1: *Jatis* represented amongst non-*Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus in the Bradford sample**

Traditional <i>jati</i> name	Traditional <i>karma</i> of this <i>jati</i>	Traditional <i>varna</i> affiliation of this <i>jati</i>
<i>Khattris</i>	Merchants and Traders	<i>Kshatriya</i>
<i>Agarwals</i>	Merchants and Traders	<i>Vaishya</i>
<i>Sunaris</i>	Goldsmiths	<i>Vaishya</i>
<i>Darjis</i>	Tailors	<i>Shudra</i>
<i>Nais</i>	Barbers	<i>Shudra</i>
<i>Chamars</i>	Leather Tanners	<i>Untouchable</i>

Further questioning of interviewees revealed that these non-*Brahmins* were also aware of their wider *varna* affiliations, as well as being conscious of the fact that there were other *jatis* within that *varna*. Hence, when asked if there were any other types of 'caste' similar to his own, a *Khattari* man commented:

Yes well I'm *Khattari*, and there are also *Aroras*, but we're all part of the larger Warrior caste by tradition. (*Khattari* man, 46 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 47).

Similarly, a *Chamar* noted:

We're *Chamar* caste you know. Then there's Weaver caste and Sweeper caste, and they are all classed as the same these different groups. They are all classed as low caste Untouchables. (*Chamar* man, 41 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 42).

These statements show that these *Khattari* and *Chamar* men understood that their *jatis* belonged to the *Kshatriya varna* of warriors and the larger group of Untouchables respectively. They also demonstrate that both these individuals were aware of other *jatis* within their *varna* or Untouchable group, such as *Aroras* (Traders and Merchants) in the case of the *Khattari* man, and Weavers and Sweepers in the case of the *Chamar*. Finally, the quotes show the typically ambiguous use of the term 'caste' by respondents to refer to different types of social unit within the caste system, although it can also be seen how these varying usages and meanings of the term can be quite easily disentangled.

None of the non-*Brahminical* interviewees in the sample community were aware of the caste as a social unit amongst their number in Bradford today. Indeed, most had little or no recollection of there ever being any further social divisions within their *jati* in the past either, and they were not familiar with the idea of endogamous marriage circles within their *jati*. Typically, when questioned on such ideas, these individuals would comment:

To me a *Khattari* is just a *Khattari*, that's the way it's always been. (*Khattari* man, 38 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 7).

Or:

We're just *Nais*, Barbers, there aren't any smaller groups within us. (*Nais* man, 33 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 14).

However, evidence collected from a few older non-*Brahminical* interviewees, typically those over the age of 60, demonstrated that castes or endogamous marriage circles had existed within *jatis* back in the Indian Punjab during the 1950s and '60s. As a 62 year old *Khattari* lady explained:

In *Khattaris* there are also castes, divisions where you belong, and we are higher caste *Khattaris*. Because there are three or four castes in *Khattaris* you know... like when I got married in India in 1954, somebody came from another *Khattari* family, and my mother said, "No, they are too low"... but in this country people have forgotten about those divisions, it was all long ago. (*Khattari* lady, 62 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 29).

In view of such statements, it appears that although the social unit of caste was present amongst non-*Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus living in India in the 1950s and '60s, it has not been present amongst those living in Bradford. As with the absence of the caste in other Diaspora contexts (see Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3), it is suggested that this is because the demographic basis of caste group structure was destroyed during the migration and settlement process. In short, the immigrant Punjabi Hindu community throughout Britain has never been populous enough to support endogamous social units (i.e. castes) within *jatis*.

The reason why most non-*Brahmins* under the age of 60 had little or no recollection of castes back in the Punjab is because many of them had either never lived there, or had left at too young an age to remember these units effectively. In the sample community, for example, 73% of first generation Punjabi Hindus under 60 years of age (both non-*Brahminical* and *Brahminical*, and male and female) had emigrated between the ages of 15 and 24.

In summary, non-*Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus in the Bradford sample had no current awareness of castes amongst their number. This was because this type of social unit has never been present in Bradford or Britain, following its demographic destruction in the migration and settlement process. However, these sampled non-*Brahmins* were fully aware of the concept of a *jati*, which for them represents the smallest social unit of the caste system. They were also aware of the concept of the *varna*, although this seemed less important. Assuming these sample findings are representative of all non-*Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford, they indicate that the caste system is currently present amongst members of this community.

### 6.1.3 *Brahminical* awareness of social units in the caste system

Findings from the Bradford sample demonstrated that the social unit in the caste system which *Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus were most aware of amongst themselves was the *varna*. Thus, in both questionnaires and interviews, all *Brahminical* respondents simply said they were *Brahmins* when asked what 'caste' they were. The main reason for their heightened awareness of the *varna* was probably due to its importance as an endogamous unit in marriage (see Section 6.2).

*Brahminical* interviewees were not aware of either castes or *jatis* as social units amongst their number in Bradford. Typically, therefore, when questioned about the possibility of smaller social units within their broad *Brahmin* group, these interviewees would comment:

Well here a *Brahmin's* just a *Brahmin* as far as I know. (*Brahmin* man, 44 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 3).

Equally, few *Brahminical* interviewees appeared to have any recollection or knowledge of castes or *jatis* amongst *Brahmins* back in India, although this may have been exacerbated by the fact that no elderly *Brahmins* over the age of 60, with clear historical memories of India, were effectively interviewed<sup>2</sup>. However, one young woman, drawing on conversations she had had with her now elderly mother, indicated that smaller social units, which possibly could have been castes or *jatis*, had existed back in the Punjab of the 1950s and '60s:

Well I know my mum told me there used be different types of *Brahmin* back home in India, but we've never gone that deep here. I don't know what type we are. (*Brahmin* woman, 26 yrs, 2nd generation. Interview 36).

Clearly, although castes and *jatis* may have been present amongst *Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus living in India before emigration, this has not been the case amongst those living in Bradford. As with non-*Brahmins*, it is suggested that this is because the demographic basis of caste group structure was destroyed during the migration process. Similarly, the absence of *jatis* amongst *Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus in Bradford is probably because no one *Brahmin jati* is particularly well represented in Britain.

In summary, *Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus in the Bradford sample had no current awareness of castes or *jatis* amongst their number, and this was because these types of social unit have never been present amongst *Brahmins* in Bradford or Britain. However, these sampled *Brahmins* were aware of the concept of a *varna*, which for them represents the smallest social unit of the caste system. Assuming these sample findings are representative of all *Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford, they indicate that the caste system is also present amongst members of this community.

Importantly, although *Brahmins* in the Bradford sample did not perceive *jatis* amongst their own community, they did recognise those outside their own *varna*, and indeed the other *varnas* themselves, both in the city and elsewhere. Similarly, non-*Brahmins* were also aware of *jatis* and *varnas* other than their own. These levels of inter-unit awareness within the sample population are illustrated in this and following chapters, where quotes are presented in which respondents talk freely about different *jatis* and *varnas*. Again, it is suggested that these levels of awareness could be witnessed throughout Bradford's whole Punjabi Hindu population.

---

<sup>2</sup>One *Brahmin* man was interviewed aged 65, but he had recently suffered a stroke which had affected his speech, consequently the data collected from this interview was poor.

#### 6.1.4 Awareness of *jati* and *varna* affiliation at the individual level

Clearly, awareness of *jatis* and *varnas* is considerable amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Indeed, it is so heightened that a large number of the sample interviewees felt they were able to classify Punjabi Hindu strangers in terms of their *jati* and/or *varna* affiliation without even asking them. The most popular method of achieving this appeared to be in the identification of an individual's surname as being indicative that s/he belonged to a certain *jati* or *varna*. As one *Brahmin* woman explained:

We're all very educated on names; like all 'Sharmas', 'Bhardwaj', 'Prabhakars', 'Kaushals', they're *Brahmins*. 'Guptas' are *Agarwal*. And like if I knew someone was called 'Sood', I'd know they were Untouchables. We can tell from surnames. (*Brahmin* woman, 24 yrs, 2nd generation. Interview 20).

Some interviewees felt less certain that they would be able to identify an individual's *jati* or *varna* by their surname, and others suggested that this uncertainty would typically apply to younger members of the community:

The older generation, they can definitely tell what caste you're from by your surname, but the younger generation and the kids, they don't know because they aren't that bothered. (*Khatttri* man, 38 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 7).

Certainly, a significant number of interviewees who felt they were unable to classify surnames by *jati* or *varna* appeared to be young and in their 20s, although judging from the statement from the young, second generation *Brahmin* woman above, this may not always hold true.

Some interviewees claimed there were other ways they could identify the *jati* and *varna* affiliation of individuals; typically this was through characteristics such as skin colour. Thus, *Chamar* interviewees often said that *Brahmins* and *Khatttris* had paler skin than them. Equally, *Brahmins* and *Khatttris* claimed that *Chamars* could be recognised by their darker skin shade, although their reasons as to why this might be were sometimes spurious:

You can pick out the *Chamars* by their skin colour, they're a lot darker; it's probably because they used to work outside in the sunshine a lot when they were back in India. (*Khatttri* woman, 43 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 10).

On the basis of findings from the Bradford sample, it seems that awareness of *jati* and *varna* units is so strong within the city's Punjabi Hindu community that it filters right down to the level of identifying the individual in terms of their *jati* and/or *varna* affiliation. Again, this suggests that these two types of social unit, and the caste system of which they are part, are very much present amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, and play an important part in the 'lifeworld' of this community. Nowhere is this importance more apparent than in the institution of marriage.

## 6.2 MARRIAGE AND THE CASTE SYSTEM AMONGST BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS

### 6.2.1 Marital situation in sample households

An investigation into marriage practices amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus provides insight into the operation of the caste system for this community. It is helpful to begin by discussing the marital situation in the 123 sample households.

**Table 6.2: Marital situation of the 123 households in the Bradford sample**

<b>1A. SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS HEADED BY MARRIED COUPLES IN WHICH BOTH PARTNERS ARE PUNJABI HINDUS OF THE SAME VARNNA OR JATI (OR 'FULL PUNJABI HINDU' MARRIAGES)</b>				
<i>Varna or jati of male partner</i>	<i>Varna or jati female partner</i>	Number of marriages performed in India	Number of marriages performed in Britain	Total households with this marital situation
<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Brahmin</i>	5	23	28
<i>Khatttri</i>	<i>Khatttri</i>	8	15	23
<i>Agarwal</i>	<i>Agarwal</i>	3	1	4
<i>Sunari</i>	<i>Sunari</i>	0	5	5
<i>Nais</i>	<i>Nais</i>	1	7	8
<i>Darji</i>	<i>Darji</i>	0	1	1
<i>Chamar</i>	<i>Chamar</i>	6	32	38
<b>Sub Totals</b>		<b>23</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>1B. SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS HEADED BY MARRIED COUPLES IN WHICH ONLY ONE OF THE PARTNERS IS PUNJABI HINDU</b>				
<i>Jati of Punjabi Hindu partner</i>	Gender of Punjabi Hindu partner	Ethnicity of non-Punjabi Hindu partner		
<i>Khatttri</i>	Male	White		1
<i>Khatttri</i>	Female	White		1
<i>Nais</i>	Male	White		1
<i>Chamar</i>	Male	White		1
<i>Nais</i>	Male	Punjabi Sikh		1
<i>Chamar</i>	Male	Punjabi Sikh		1
<b>Sub Total</b>				<b>6</b>
<b>2. SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS HEADED BY PUNJABI HINDU DIVORCEES</b>				
<i>Jati of Punjabi Hindu divorcee</i>	Gender of Punjabi Hindu divorcee	Ethnicity of estranged partner	<i>Jati of estranged partner (where applicable)</i>	
<i>Khatttri</i>	Female	Punjabi Hindu	<i>Khatttri</i>	2
<i>Khatttri</i>	Male	White	NA	1
<b>Sub Total</b>				<b>3</b>
<b>3. SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS HEADED BY SINGLE PUNJABI HINDUS</b>				
<i>Jati or varna of single Punjabi Hindu</i>	Gender of single Punjabi Hindu			
<i>Brahmin</i>	Male			2
<i>Chamar</i>	Male			2
<i>Chamar</i>	Female			2
<b>Sub Total</b>				<b>6</b>
<b>4. SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS HEADED BY WIDOWED PUNJABI HINDUS</b>				
<i>Jati or varna of widowed Punjabi Hindu</i>	<i>Jati or varna of deceased partner</i>			
<i>Chamar</i>	<i>Chamar</i>			1
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>				<b>123</b>

Table 6.2 shows that three of the sample households were headed<sup>3</sup> by Punjabi Hindu divorcees. Two of these cases involved divorced *Khattri* women, one of whom was living alone, and the other with her school aged children. The remaining case involved a household headed by a divorced *Khattri* man living with his elderly, dependent mother. The two divorced *Khattri* women had both been married to *Khattri* men, and the divorced *Khattri* man to a white woman. Although it was interesting that all divorcees were from the *Khattri jati*, a sample size of three was too small for any significance to be attached to this phenomenon.

Table 6.2 also reveals that six sample households were headed by single persons, four of whom were young men in their 20s living alone. Two of these men were from the *Chamar jati*, and two from the *Brahmin varna*. The other two single persons were women. Both of these women were in their 20s and from the *Chamar jati*; one of them was living alone, while the other was a single mother living with her young child. One sample household was headed by an elderly widow from the *Chamar jati* who was also living alone.

Table 6.2 shows that the remaining 113 sample households were headed by married couples. In 107 of these marriages both partners were Punjabi Hindu and from the same *varna* (in the case of *Brahmins*) or the same *jati* (in the case of non-*Brahmins*). 84 of these 107 'full Punjabi Hindu' marriages had been conducted in Britain (and almost all of these in Bradford), and 23 of them in India.

In the remaining six households of the 113 headed by a married couple, the marriages were of mixed ethnicity and had all been conducted in this country. Table 6.2 reveals that in four of these mixed marriages a Punjabi Hindu was married to a white partner. These four marriages included a *Khattri*, *Nais* and *Chamar* man, each married to a white woman, and a *Khattri* woman married to a white man. In the remaining two mixed marriages a *Nais* and a *Chamar* man were each married to a Sikh woman. Interestingly, the Sikh women in both of these marriages were from the equivalent Sikh *jati* to that of their Punjabi Hindu husband.

None of the sample households contained Punjabi Hindus of more than one *jati* (in the case of non-*Brahmins*) or *varna* (in the case of *Brahmins*), so all 123 of them can be attributed a *jati* or *varna* affiliation relating to their Punjabi Hindu 'element'; irrespective of whether this 'element' is a Punjabi Hindu married couple, a Punjabi Hindu living alone, or a sole Punjabi Hindu in a mixed ethnicity marriage (see Table 6.3).

---

<sup>3</sup>For a definition of the 'household head' see Section 4.6.1.

**Table 6.3: *Jati* or *varna* affiliation of the 123 sample households**

<i>Varna</i> or <i>jati</i> affiliation of household	Number of sample households
<i>Brahmin</i>	30
<i>Khattri</i>	28
<i>Agarwal</i>	4
<i>Sunari</i>	5
<i>Darji</i>	1
<i>Nais</i>	10
<i>Chamar</i>	45
<b>Total sample households</b>	<b>123</b>

In Table 6.3, *jati/varna* affiliated sample households have been arranged in accordance with their traditional positions in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system. Thus, those affiliated to the *Brahmin varna* are at the top and those from the *Chamar jati* at the bottom. This hierarchical ordering, as well as the overall classification of sample households by *varna* or *jati* affiliation, will aid analysis of quantitative data in later sections of this chapter, and in Chapter Seven. As the sample households were randomly selected, it is suggested that the differing numbers affiliated to each *jati* or *varna* may also reflect the approximate, proportional contribution of these *jatis* and *varnas* to Bradford's whole Punjabi Hindu population.

### 6.2.2 Endogamy and the caste system

Sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 argued that the caste is not present as a social unit amongst Punjabi Hindus in Britain due to its demographic destruction in the migration process. Accordingly, the opportunity for caste endogamous marriages has been removed for Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford. In East African Hindu Diaspora it was seen that large scale spousal recruitment from India was temporarily adopted as a strategy for maintaining caste endogamy (see Section 3.5.3). This, however, has not been possible in Bradford, because substantive spousal recruitment from India has been hindered by national immigration restrictions<sup>4</sup>. In addition, as Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community has become more settled it seems increasingly questionable whether its members would wish to recruit Indian spouses<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>4</sup>This is not to say that spousal recruitment has not occurred. For example, in the sample community 43 of the 84 full Punjabi Hindu marriages performed in Britain (see Table 6.2) had recruited one partner directly from the Punjab. However, spousal recruitment was by no means universal in Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

<sup>5</sup> Interviews established that most spousal recruitment in the community had occurred in the 1970s, primarily as a strategy adopted by first generation parents for preserving Punjabi Hindu culture in the arranged marriages of their generation 1.5 offspring. Since this time there appears to have been a growing view (amongst both parents and their eligible offspring) that such "telephone marriages" are a step backwards, steering Bradford's Punjabi Hindus away from their dual progress in outward social integration with the white community and internal cultural preservation.

Despite the absence of caste endogamy amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, participant observation amongst the whole of this community suggested that endogamy is currently operating at the level of the next most relevant social unit to caste. Thus, amongst Bradford's non-*Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus, where such a social unit is the *jati*, those marriages performed in this country have been mainly *jati* endogamous. Equally, amongst *Brahmins*, marriages have been principally *varna* endogamous. This phenomenon is best illustrated by examining Table 6.2. This shows that the 84 full Punjabi Hindu marriages in the Bradford sample which have been performed in Britain all involve partners from the same *jati* or (in the case of *Brahmins*) *varna*.

Further analysis of Table 6.2 indicates that the 23 full Punjabi Hindu marriages in the Bradford sample which were performed in India are also *jati* or *varna* endogamous. However, these India based marriages were found exclusively amongst first generation immigrants, and consequently the majority were performed in 1950s and '60s India, prior to emigration. As the quote from the 62 year old *Khattri* lady in Section 6.1.2 suggests, it is highly likely that these marriages were originally caste endogamous, but that this has been forgotten by the couples in question due to its irrelevance in the Bradford context.

Interview data demonstrated that many individuals in the sample community felt that *jati* or (for *Brahmins*) *varna* endogamy was a characteristic which could also be applied to those full Punjabi Hindu marriages being performed outside Bradford, in other parts of Britain. One young *Brahmin* interviewee succinctly captured this widely held view:

We never go out of caste in marriage. It doesn't matter whether it's in Bradford or in Leicester, a *Chamar* wouldn't want to marry a *Brahmin* or a *Khattri*, and we wouldn't want to marry a *Chamar* or *Khattri*, and a *Khattri* wouldn't want to marry us or the *Chamars* either. We might associate with each other, but we would never marry. It's the same everywhere in Britain. (*Brahmin* man, 23 yrs, 2nd generation. Interview 26).

Another *Khattri* man noted:

In this country it still exists you know, like the *Khattris* will not marry a *Chamar*. Parents wouldn't even let their son or daughter go out with somebody from a different caste, they will not play any part in it. (*Khattri* man, 42 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 12)

The above discussion demonstrates the existence of *jati* or *varna* endogamy for Punjabi Hindus in the Bradford sample, and those outside this sample community, both in Bradford and other parts of Britain. This is clear evidence that the caste system is operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, at least where nuptial practices are concerned.

### 6.2.3 Maintaining *jati* and *varna* endogamy

Conversations with interviewees revealed that the 100% level of *jati* and (for *Brahmins*) *varna* endogamy seen amongst the 84 British based, full Punjabi Hindu marriages in the Bradford sample, could be attributed to the presence of what, in this study, are termed 'endogamous marriage circles'. Each circle constitutes the social network of all the relatives and friends belonging to a specific Punjabi Hindu *varna* or *jati* in Britain, spread across the various towns and cities in which they are resident. The marriage of two Punjabi Hindus living in Britain is usually arranged within this circle by their parents. These parents are typically brought into contact with each other formally, through the circle's social network of relatives and friends. One recently married *Brahmin* interviewee explained how this process worked:

Punjabi Hindus in this country are all the same in marriage. What happens is that a relative or friend maybe knows someone in their caste with an eligible bachelor, say in Leicester, and that person checks out their background, and then tips off another relative or friend from their caste with a suitably eligible girl, in say Bradford, or vice versa. The girl's and boy's parents make contact and find out about each other, and the girl and the boy are introduced formally to each other. (*Brahmin* man, 29 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 50).

Sometimes, however, an arranged marriage may be initiated more informally. For example, two parents with children of marriageable age may come into contact with each other accidentally at a gathering of part of the marriage circle's social network, such as a wedding. A young *Nais* man described such a situation:

What happened was my dad went to this wedding in Wolverhampton, it was a *Nais* wedding, and her [his wife's] dad was there, and they sort of got to know each other, and they just started talking about how many children they had, and her dad started saying that he'd like to come up to Bradford and meet my dad's family. Anyway he came up, and he checked me out you know, and then they started talking about a wedding and things and taking it further, and saying, "Oh, how would you like it if my daughter married your son," and so on. And then they decided that it was a good idea. (*Nais* man, 33 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 14).

In a few cases, the Punjabi Hindu parents trying to arrange a marriage may not be particularly well connected into their marriage circle's network. It is, therefore, difficult for them to make contact with other parents in the circle who may have a suitable partner for their son or daughter. This may occur if the parents in question have few relatives in this country, or if they are geographically isolated from other members of their *jati* or *varna* living in Britain. In such cases, these parents may resort to using Asian marriage bureaux as a means of 'tapping into' their circle, making suitable contacts, and arranging marriages. Marriage bureaux advertise regularly in Britain's South Asian press, usually dealing with potential partners of different religion, *jati* or *varna* and socio-economic standing, for whom they endeavour to make appropriate matches (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1: Asian marriage bureaux advertisements in Britain's South Asian press

## SUMAN MARRIAGE BUREAU



INTERNATIONAL

EUROPE'S FIRST ASIAN MARRIAGE BUREAU

● ESTABLISHED 1972 ●

NATIONAL PRESS, RADIO & TELEVISION FAME



83 SOUTH ROAD, SOUTHALL, MIDDLESEX UB1 1SQ (England)  
 Telephone: 081-574 4867 or 081-571 5145 Office  
 Fax: 081-893 5411. Residence: 081-579 2732

Beware of the cowboy's bureau. Trust the first and foremost Asian Marriage Bureau recognised by Press, Radio and Television. We do have clients of all religion, caste, age, height, education and financial status. We do have a proven record of arranging over 5,000 most successful wedlocks throughout the world. (Evidence can be seen at the Bureau). We give you or your children the choice they need for happy marriage. Finally, we also provide SPECIAL PERSONAL SERVICE to professional and business people.

**TELEPHONE NOW**

## ASIAN MARRIAGE BUREAU

**The First Step to a Happy Future!!**

We're not just a business dedicated to finding you a life long partner. We care about your future.

- ◆ Affordable and prompt matchmaking
- ◆ Professionally run with courteous staff
- ◆ For people of all castes, ages and walks of life
- ◆ Specialists in Punjabi marriages
- ◆ Flexible business hours to suit your needs
- ◆ Confidential service.

We will put in the extra effort required to guarantee you satisfaction.

For more details ring Mr Sharma or write:

**ASIAN MARRIAGE BUREAU**

IPD House, 17 London Rd, Slough SL3 7RL  
 Tel: 01753 674886 Fax: 01753 539731  
 Hours of Business: 7 days 9am-9pm



Source: India Mail (June 15th , 1995: 36).

Some parents not particularly well connected into their marriage circle's network, but meticulous in seeking the very best possible partner for their son and daughter within this circle, may resort to advertising privately in the press, in order to contact other parents and arrange marriages with them. Thus, Figure 6.2 shows advertisements from a British based South Asian newspaper, in which *Agarwal*, *Arora* and *Khattari* parents are seeking matches for their sons and daughters within the marriage circle of their *jati*.

Figure 6.2: Private matrimonial advertisements in Britain's South Asian press

<p><b>HINDU PUNJABI AGGARWAL</b> Parents seek suitable match for their 27-years-old, UK born professional son, 5'8", handsome, fair, slim and smart. Young lady must be slim, beautiful and graduate.  Please reply to Box No <b>IMG 232</b></p>	<p><b>AFFLUENT PUNJABI ARORA</b> Parents of highly placed executive, brilliant, highly educated, gentle, handsome, fair son, 33, 5'9". look for pretty and qualified girl of status family. Reply with photo to Indiamail.  <b>IMG 231</b></p>
<p><b>PUNJABI HINDU KHATRI PARENTS</b> seek a suitable match for their daughter 24 years, 5'6", vegetarian, final year B.S.C. student in applied biology. Boy should be well settled.  <b>IMB 220</b></p>	<p><b>PARENTS</b> Seeking a well educated, homely Aggarwal girl (preferably) for 29 year old, Aggarwal, 5'8" tall, good-looking son, qualified to BTEC National Diploma in Business and Finance, working in Local Government.  <b>IMG 267</b></p>

Source: India Mail (June 15th, 1995: 37).

The above discussion demonstrates three important points. First, endogamous marriage circles have been fundamental to the maintenance of *jati* and *varna* endogamy in the British based marriages of Punjabi Hindus. Second, the *varna* (in the case of *Brahmins*) or the *jati* (for non-*Brahmins*), having acquired the attributes of an endogamous marriage circle in this country, is acting as a caste unit might have done back in India, albeit less parochially.

Third, arranged marriages are also important in maintaining *jati* and *varna* endogamy in the British based marriages of Punjabi Hindus. This is simply because this endogamy is one of the things Punjabi Hindu parents appear to favour in the arranged marriages of their children. If this were not the case, then although endogamous marriage circles might still exist to facilitate socio-economic and educational compatibility in arranged marriages, they might not be based on the *varna* or *jati* unit, as there would be no need to preserve endogamy at this level. On the other hand, endogamous marriage circles, with their network of relatives and friends, seem fundamental to the existence of the arranged marriage system itself. Accordingly, even if Punjabi Hindu parents became solely concerned about socio-economic and educational compatibility in arranged marriages, and indifferent to *jati* and *varna* endogamy, they would still be likely to rely on *jati* and *varna* based marriage circles. In such a situation *jati* and *varna* endogamy would effectively continue by 'default' in arranged marriages.

In summary, the relationship between *jati* and *varna* endogamy, arranged marriages and endogamous marriage circles is complex and inter-dependent. What can be said, however, is that arranged marriages and endogamous marriage circles are key factors in the preservation of *jati* and *varna* endogamy amongst Punjabi Hindus in the Bradford sample, and those outside this sample community, both in Bradford and other parts of Britain too. Hence, as the *Brahmin* interviewee in the first quotation of this section notes, "Punjabi Hindus in this country are all the same in marriage".

#### 6.2.4 Parental attitudes to marriage

In the above discussion, the importance of *jati* and *varna* endogamy and arranged marriages for Punjabi Hindus in Bradford has been clearly demonstrated. However, it is interesting to analyse the attitudes of interviewed parents in the Bradford sample to these issues, in respect of their own offspring. For the purposes of such analysis these parents can be divided into two broad groups. First, older parents with at least one married child. These parents are typically from the first generation and in their late 40s or over, and their children are mostly over the age of 21. The second group comprises younger parents whose children are, as yet, unmarried. Typically, these are parents in their 30s and early 40s, with children under the age of 21, and usually of school age.

It was interesting that whilst both these groups of parents openly discussed the continuation of *jati* and *varna* endogamy and arranged marriages in Britain, both amongst other Punjabi Hindus as well as within their own marriage, they appeared to take a different attitude when discussing either the past or future marriages of their own offspring. Thus, older, first generation parents in the Bradford sample, with children who had married, usually admitted that they had arranged these marriages, but denied that *jati* or *varna* endogamy had been of any consideration in this process. For example, one such parent was asked on what basis he had arranged the recent marriages of his son and daughter:

Well, I was ideally looking for another Punjabi Hindu when my son and daughter got married, someone of the same education, same class background, same ambitions and interests; but caste did not matter, I gave them full freedom on that (*Khattri* man, 61 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 35).

Whilst this *Khattri* man freely admitted that ethnic, religious, socio-economic and educational compatibility had been important in the arrangement of his children's marriages, he was claiming that *jati* endogamy had not been a consideration, and that his children had been given "full freedom" where the *jati* of their spouse was concerned. This statement was typical of most older parents in the Bradford sample with married children, irrespective of which *jati* they themselves came from.

However, further investigation revealed that this particular man's son and daughter had still married partners from the same *jati*. Indeed, this was the case with nearly all of the married offspring of older parents in the sample community. When asked to explain why his children's marriages were still *jati* endogamous, this *Khatttri* man simply commented:

My children are good and they listened to my views. (*Khatttri* man, 61 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 35).

This statement suggests that despite his initial air of indifference, this *Khatttri* respondent may have been more concerned about *jati* endogamy in the arrangement of his children's marriages than he would have had the interviewer believe.

This confusing and contradictory picture was clarified in a separate conversation with this *Khatttri* man's married son himself. When it was put to him that his father had denied *jati* endogamy as having any relevance in the arrangement of his marriage, he said:

I know lots of Punjabi Hindu parents like my father claim that they don't care about caste, and that they don't put any pressure on us in this respect. No! It's much more subtle than that. It's more that when their trying to arrange a marriage, they make sure you only get introduced to certain girls, and these girls are all from your caste. Therefore you stay within your caste automatically. (*Khatttri* man, 29 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 35).

Thus, although many older Punjabi Hindu parents in the Bradford sample claimed that only socio-economic considerations had mattered in the arrangement of their children's marriages, and that *jati* or *varna* endogamy had been irrelevant, it is suggested here that for most of them *jati* or *varna* endogamy had been an important (and in some cases possibly **the** most important) consideration. As one young *Khatttri* woman recently married to a white man explained:

Look! Most of these older parents who are like my mum and dad's age [in this case mid-50s], they do care about caste when they're arranging these marriages, believe you me. A girl might be pretty or wealthy, that's obviously important for these people, but the caste has to be right too, she has to be *Khatttri* or whatever, for these parents that's the most important thing, the bottom line if you like. You can believe me on this one because I've got no axe to grind, I managed to avoid all this so I don't feel bitter about it or anything. (*Khatttri* woman, 31 yrs, 2nd generation. Interview 25).

Moreover, even if *jati* or *varna* endogamy was not considered important in an arranged marriage by these parents, it would have inevitably occurred. This is because Punjabi Hindu arranged marriages in Britain have been (and still are) organised through a *jati* or *varna* based endogamous marriage circle. As noted above, while ever this is the case, *jati* and *varna* endogamous marriages will occur by 'default' (see Section 6.2.3).

In summary, despite the willingness of most older parents in the Bradford sample to discuss the continuation of arranged marriages and *jati* and *varna* endogamy in this country, they usually denied that they had enforced the latter of these phenomena onto the marriages of their own sons and daughters. However, further questioning of these sons and daughters themselves revealed that they usually had *jati* and *varna* endogamous marriages, and that they had been steered into these in some way by their parents. The desire of these parents to deny the importance of *jati* or *varna* endogamy in their children's arranged marriages may stem from a fear of being branded old fashioned in their social outlook.

Younger parental interviewees in the Bradford sample, with children who had not yet married, were also happy to discuss the continuation of arranged marriages and *jati* and *varna* endogamy in Britain. However, all of them initially denied that they would enforce either of these things onto the future marriages of their offspring, or that they would interfere with their children's marriages in any way whatsoever. Typically, therefore, they would make statements like:

I wouldn't mind who my children married, it will be their decision. I wouldn't force them to have an arranged marriage or marry the same caste or anything. (*Brahmin* man, 39 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 26).

Or:

I would give my kids complete freedom in marriage; as long as they were happy and had a roof over their heads. Arranged marriages within the caste don't bother me. (*Nais* woman, 37 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 16).

Until the children of these parents become married it is difficult to assess how realistic or unrealistic such statements are. Nevertheless, it is argued that many younger parents in the sample community would be more willing to enforce arranged marriages and *jati* or *varna* endogamy onto their offspring than they would have the interviewer believe. Support for this argument was gained from observing their reactions to a number of hypothetical marriage situations, proposed for their children by the interviewer.

First, these parents were asked what they might do if one of their children wished to marry a Pakistani Muslim. Without exception, all were strongly opposed to this and said they would prevent it happening. As one *Brahmin* woman explained:

I won't let my kids marry a Pakistani Muslim, or any kind of Muslim come to that. That's a completely different story you see. It's a different culture; they are more strict and we Hindus are very liberal. I mean if my daughter got married into that culture she'd be really sorry, she'd have to cover her legs and face and this and that, it would be terrible, I wouldn't let her. (*Brahmin* woman, 34 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 26).

Similarly a *Nais* woman noted:

Well my kids can marry who they want, but no way would I let them marry a Paki', I'd stop it... they'd get tarred with the same brush. (*Nais* woman, 25 yrs, 2nd generation. Interview 43).

Second, these younger parents were asked what they might do if a child of theirs wished to marry a white British person. Most seemed dubious that this would be a good idea, and many said they would discourage it. Interestingly, reactions against such a union were not usually as strong as those given in opposition to the idea of marrying a Pakistani; although it is possible that respondents may have muted their dislike of a potential Punjabi Hindu/white British marriage so as not to seem unduly hostile towards the white interviewer.

Putting the above discussion in context, it would appear that despite initial denials that they would interfere in the future marriages of their offspring, most younger parents in the Bradford sample would still be keen to regulate their children's marriages in some way. In fact, many eventually came to admit, usually implicitly, that any potential partner for their child would have to be Punjabi Hindu. This is undoubtedly the hidden message in the following statement:

I don't really mind who my kids marry or anything like that. I mean I'm not going to tell them or anything, it's their decision. But obviously it would be best for them if they married another Punjabi Hindu, and I'll always make sure my children do what's best for them. That's my duty as their father. (*Khatti* man, 36 years, generation 1.5. Interview 46).

If these younger parents are likely to encourage or enforce full Punjabi Hindu marriages onto their children in the future, as the above quote implies, then it seems likely that these would be arranged. Certainly, if all full Punjabi Hindu marriages in the Bradford sample have been arranged by parents up to now, then it seems fairly reasonable that this will still be the case in ten to 15 years time.

Finally, younger parents in the sample community were asked what they might do if one of their children married someone from a different *jati* or *varna*. Reaction to this question revealed that although many had initially said they would not enforce *jati* or *varna* endogamy onto their offspring, this was primarily because they felt they would be unable to do so. As one *Brahmin* woman noted:

I would obviously like it if my son married another *Brahmin*, but by the time he is old enough to get married I won't be able to stop him from choosing somebody from another caste. (*Brahmin* woman, 26 yrs, 2nd generation. Interview 36).

Similarly, a *Chamar* man commented:

Yes, I would prefer it if my daughter married a *Chamar*, you know, stuck to the mainstream. But she might bring a boy from a different caste home, what can I do then? (*Chamar* man, 41 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 42).

In short, younger parental interviewees seemed to be suggesting that they would be unable to enforce *jati* or *varna* endogamy onto their offspring in the future, due to a predicted usurpation of decision making power from themselves to their children where such choices were concerned. This seems rather spurious for two reasons.

First, all British based, full Punjabi Hindu marriages which have been conducted in the Bradford sample up to now (i.e. those heading 84 of the sample households, or observed elsewhere in the sample community) have been *jati* or *varna* endogamous. This even applies to the most recent marriages in the sample community at the time of data collection, some of which had been conducted in 1994. It is difficult to believe, therefore, that younger parents in the Bradford sample will stop enforcing *jati* and *varna* endogamy onto their offspring in a few years time, as their children suddenly begin to take matters into their own hands. Moreover, even if this did occur, it has been suggested above that these parents would still endeavour to arrange the marriages of their children to another Punjabi Hindu. The likelihood is that this would be enacted through the *jati* or *varna* based marriage circle, thereby allowing *jati* and *varna* endogamy to continue to occur by 'default' (see Section 6.2.3).

Second, even if children in the Bradford sample do usurp the decision making powers of their parents in the future, and begin to make their own marriage decisions, this does not mean that these children themselves might not independently seek partners from their own *jati* or *varna*. This seems a particularly salient point when taking into account the relatively positive views which some children in the sample community hold on the caste system and *jati* and *varna* endogamy (see Section 9.5).

In summary, although many younger parents in the Bradford sample willingly discussed the continuation of arranged marriages and *jati* and *varna* endogamy in Britain, they usually denied that they would enforce either of these things onto their offspring. However, the reactions of these parents to a number of hypothetical marriage situations suggested the opposite to be the case. Their desire to deny the importance of arranged marriages and *jati* and *varna* endogamy in the future marriages of their children is again, perhaps, due to a fear of being branded old fashioned in social outlook.

Concluding this section, it has been established that both arranged marriages and *jati* and (for *Brahmins*) *varna* endogamy have been performed amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus since their arrival as immigrants in the 1950s and '60s. Caste endogamy, on the other hand, has disappeared for Punjabi Hindus in Bradford and the rest of Britain, due to the demographic destruction of the caste as social unit in the migration and settlement process. Evidence from interviews with younger parents in the Bradford sample on the future marriages of their children suggests that arranged marriages and *jati*

and *varna* endogamy may continue for some years to come amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Clearly, where marriage is concerned, the caste system is very much alive and operational for this community.

### 6.3 THE CASTE SYSTEM AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 'CONTROL' AMONGST BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS

#### 6.3.1 Overview

The demographic destruction of the caste as a social unit amongst Punjabi Hindus in Britain means that the traditional system of self-regulation within the caste system - which in India would have been manifest in the social and political control castes held over their members - has disappeared amongst Britain's Punjabi Hindu population and, therefore, Bradford's as well.

Section 3.6.2 noted that for the Gujarati Hindu community in Britain, where the demographic basis of caste group structure has also been destroyed, the *jati* has replaced the caste as the unit of social and political control. This has occurred with the formation of strong, nationally based *jati* associations like the *Shree Prajapati Samaj* UK, established in 1975 to serve the *Prajapati jati* (Potters) in Britain (Warrier, 1994: 208-10; Bowen, 1987: 23). Although lacking judicial powers, such bodies do appear to hold some degree of social control over their members and membership, and this is maintained through annual gatherings and the production of lists of *jati* members living in Britain, as well as an active network of provincial branches. These *jati* associations also have a certain level of political control and power, in the sense that they can act as pressure groups on behalf of their members at the provincial or national level. At the same time, a Gujarati *jati* association appears to fulfil the role of a *jati* based endogamous marriage circle, because it serves as a nation-wide network of contacts for the arrangement of marriages (see Section 3.6.2).

In contrast to this, respondents in the Bradford sample were emphatic that no nationally based bodies resembling *jati* associations had grown out of the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Britain. However, because the *jati* associations of Gujaratis act as endogamous marriage circles as well as units of social and political control across Britain, then it seems possible that those marriage circles operating within Britain's Punjabi Hindu community (see Section 6.2.3) might also perform a similar dual function and, therefore, have an underlying social and political dimension. This, however, is not the case, because a Punjabi Hindu marriage circle is a nebulous and informal network of friendships and kinships. Unlike a Gujarati *jati* association, it is not a body known by a particular name, and it does not have the formalised organisational framework or channels of command which would be necessary to effectively implement social and

political control over its members. In short, although a Gujarati *jati* association can perform both a marital **and** socio-political function in Britain, a Punjabi Hindu marriage circle can still only perform a marital role.

Although there is no national unit of social or political control amongst Punjabi Hindus which is based on the caste system, research indicated that the main centres of worship used by Punjabi Hindus in Bradford do exercise a certain degree of 'control' or influence over their attendees, as well as having a political dimension. Furthermore, each of these centres is used only by those from certain *jatis* or (in the case of *Brahmins*) *varnas* and, as such, they might be viewed as units of social and political 'control' which are based on the caste system.

To investigate this, Section 6.3.2 observes the broad patterns of worship amongst Punjabi Hindus in the Bradford sample. The findings from this are used to support discussion in Section 6.3.3, which widens the focus across the whole of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu population, examining both the centres of worship attended by members of this community, and the *jati* or *varna* affiliations of these attendees. Finally, Section 6.3.4 reveals how these centres of worship act as units of social and political 'control' based on the caste system, again indicating that the institution is operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

### 6.3.2 Patterns of worship in the Bradford sample

In the combined total of 123 questionnaires and interviews, respondents were asked which centres of worship, if any, Punjabi Hindu members of their household visited. The responses first demonstrated that in only ten out of the 123 sample households did none of the Punjabi Hindu householders attend a centre of worship. Typically, such households were those inhabited by young Punjabi Hindu couples or single persons. These individuals claimed they could not afford the time to visit a centre of worship. A *Brahmin* man with his own food processing business explained:

Me and my wife never go to the Hindu temple, we just don't have the time. I mean you look at the time now, it's about quarter to eight and we've just got home from work, and we're back tomorrow at six. It's the same seven days a week, 365 days a year. If you're going to run a business well in our line of work, you have to devote all your time to it. I can't be swanning off to the temple every Sunday can I? (*Brahmin* man, 32 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 1).

In the remaining 113 sample households, respondents claimed that every Punjabi Hindu household member attended an Indian centre of worship. This was either a temple associated solely with the Hindu religion, or one associated with both Hindu and Sikh religions together (this apparent paradox is clarified in Section 6.3.3). Occasionally, attendance might be at a *gurdwara* (Sikh temple), associated solely with the Sikh

religion. In each of these 113 sample households, respondents made it clear that Punjabi Hindu occupants usually attended only one specific centre of worship. In short, individual households had no sectarian divisions between their members, and consequently they could each be affiliated to one particular temple in Bradford.

Within and between these 113 sample households, respondents indicated that there was a variation in the frequency with which different Punjabi Hindu individuals attended the centre of worship to which their household was affiliated. Older adult members from these sample households, typically over the age of 40, appeared to visit their centre of worship quite regularly; which usually meant at least once a month and often once a week. Many younger adult members from these households seemed to attend their centre of worship less often; perhaps only a few times a year, and usually on special occasions like weddings or *Diwali*<sup>6</sup>. This occasional attendance was again blamed on a lack of time due to work commitments.

The relationship between the centres of worship to which the 113 sample households are affiliated and their *jati* or *varna* affiliations (as determined at the end of Section 6.2.1) is demonstrated in Table 6.5. This shows that these different centres of Punjabi Hindu worship in Bradford draw their attendees from sample households affiliated to a distinct *jati*, or at least a distinctive group of *jatis* and *varnas*. This phenomenon is fully explored in the following section.

**Table 6.4: Centres of worship to which 113<sup>①</sup> sample households are affiliated by their *jati* or *varna* affiliations**

Name of centre of worship	<i>Jati</i> or <i>varna</i> affiliation of sample households							Nos. sample households affiliated to centre of worship
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khattri</i>	<i>Agarwal</i>	<i>Sunari</i>	<i>Darji</i>	<i>Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>	
Hindu Cultural Society	30	24	4	4	-	2	3	67
<i>Sant Nirankari Mandal</i>	-	-	-	1	1	4	9	15
A Sikh <i>gurdwara</i> <sup>②</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
<i>Ravi Dass Bhawan</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	29
Number of sample households	30	24	4	5	1	8	41	113

N = 113.

① Ten sample households are not included in this table for reasons outlined above.

② This could refer to any of the several Sikh *gurdwaras* in Bradford.

### 6.3.3 Centres of Punjabi Hindu worship in Bradford

Table 6.5 shows that out of the 113 Punjabi Hindu households in the Bradford sample which frequent a centre of worship, a majority of 67 (59%) are affiliated to the Hindu Cultural Society. 29 (26%) and 15 (13%) are affiliated to the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* and *Sant Nirankari Mandal* respectively. Only 2 (2%) are affiliated to a Sikh *gurdwara*.

<sup>6</sup>*Diwali* is the Hindu festival of lights held in October.

Clearly, therefore, it is the Hindu Cultural Society, the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* and the *Sant Nirankari Mandal* which are the principal centres of worship for the sample community. Furthermore, conversations with sample interviewees revealed that this finding applied to all Punjabi Hindus in Bradford. Consequently, these three temples now provide the focus of discussion.

In this section, qualitative data generated from participant observation amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community are used to describe the Hindu Cultural Society, *Ravi Dass Bhawan* and *Sant Nirankari Mandal* in terms of their characteristics, location, and the *jati* or *varna* affiliations of their members. There is no discussion about any of the numerous Sikh *gurdwaras* in Bradford, since very few Punjabi Hindus or Punjabi Hindu households frequent these. The two sample households affiliated to a Sikh *gurdwara* in Table 6.5 can be considered anomalies, because they are both headed by a mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu/Punjabi Sikh couple.

The Hindu Cultural Society is one of the two largest centres of solely Hindu worship in Bradford, the other being the *Shree Prajapati Mandir*. It was established in 1968 by K.K. Mittal and Mr R.P. Johar, two leading members of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. At first, the Society was based at a house in St. Margaret's Terrace in Bradford Seven. However, in 1974 the larger premises of what had been a club at 321 Leeds Road were purchased by the Society for £16,000. This building officially opened as the Hindu Cultural Society on July 28th of that year and has remained the Society's home to the present day (see Figure 6.3; for location see Figure 6.9).

**Figure 6.3: The Hindu Cultural Society, 321 Leeds Road**



The Building in which the Society is based is divided into three floors. On the second floor there is a large school room (which is also used for functions) and the *mandir* or worship hall itself, which contains a shrine with *murtis* (sacred figures) of Radha and Krishna (the deities to whom the *mandir* is dedicated), as well as smaller representations of other Hindu deities and various ritual objects including a *linga* (the symbol of Shiva) and a large bell (see Figure 6.4). The first floor of the Society's building houses a large kitchen and a dining hall, which also doubles as a games room-cum-youth club. On the ground floor a large room, which houses an extensive library of Hindi and Punjabi books, also serves as an elderly day care and 'drop-in' centre.

**Figure 6.4: The *mandir* or worship hall at the Hindu Cultural Society**



The principal weekly worship at the Society is held on Sundays between the hours of four and six p.m. The pattern of service is typically Hindu, incorporating the chanting and singing of hymns and prayers (*bhajan*), public readings from Hindu scriptures (typically the *Ramayana*), followed by an *arati*<sup>7</sup> ceremony and the distribution of *prashad*<sup>8</sup>. There is no particular Sabbath for Hindus and consequently, as in all Hindu temples, the use of Sunday as the principal day of worship is merely an accommodation to the British week-end. However, the temple is open for two hours from 5.30 p.m. on all other weekdays for those who may wish to conduct their worship at other times, or

<sup>7</sup>*Arati* is a sacred ritual involving the circulation of a tray on which lighted candles or camphor lamps have been placed, first towards a divine image and then towards worshippers.

<sup>8</sup>*Prashad* is consecrated food which is distributed to a congregation after being offered to a deity during worship.

more regularly than once every Sunday. (For more information on the Hindu Cultural Society see Bowen, 1981: 40-51).

Today, the Society draws its support almost exclusively from the Punjabi Hindu community, with only the odd one or two Punjabi Sikhs and Gujarati Hindus frequenting it. By contrast, the *Shree Prajapati Mandir*, which was opened in 1980, draws its support entirely from Gujarati Hindus. This Gujarati/Punjabi split reflects the social distance between these two religio-ethnic sub-groups in terms of cultural and language differences, and their desire to preserve such regional identities.

In addition, the social geography of Bradford's entire Hindu community has itself played an active role in creating this division between these two sub-groups in terms of their temple affiliations. Thus, when the Hindu Cultural Society was based in St. Margaret's Terrace in Bradford Seven, which was nearer the heart of the city's major concentration of Gujarati Hindus, it attracted much more support from the Gujarati Hindu community. However, the movement of the Society in 1974 to its current premises on Leeds Road in Bradford Three, a district in which Punjabi Hindus were then highly concentrated, undoubtedly reduced the active involvement of Gujaratis in the Society and increased the Punjabi Hindu domination. In view of this, it is not surprising that when the *Shree Prajapati Mandir* opened in 1980 it was located at the very centre of the Bradford's Gujarati Hindu area in Great Horton Road.

Punjabi Hindu members of the Hindu Cultural Society belong almost exclusively to 'twice-born'<sup>9</sup> *varnas* or *jatis*, such as *Brahmins*, *Khattris*, *Agarwals* and *Sunaris*. This is reflected in the high proportion of sample households belonging to these *jatis* (*varna* in the case of *Brahmins*) which are affiliated to the Hindu Cultural Society, as compared to the low proportion of those belonging to the non twice-born *jatis* of *Darjis*, *Nais* and *Chamars* (see Table 6.5). As suggested at the end of Section 6.2.1, *Brahmins* and *Khattris* are some of largest factions amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, whilst *Agarwals* and *Sunaris* have a relatively minor presence. Understandably, therefore, *Brahmins* and *Khattris* constitute the bulk of the Hindu Cultural Society's membership, and *Agarwals* and *Sunaris* are less well represented. This is again reflected in the Bradford sample, where *Brahmin* and *Khatttri* sample households together account for approximately 81% (54) of all those affiliated to the Hindu Cultural Society (see Table 6.5).

The Hindu Cultural Society has membership of a nation-wide organisation known as the National Council of Hindu Temples UK. However, this body should not be seen as

---

<sup>9</sup>See explanation of 'twice-born' in Footnote Ten of Chapter Three, Section 3.2.3.

anything like a nationally based Gujarati *jati* association, as the temples affiliated to it act independently of each other and have little regular contact.

The *Ravidasis* are a religious sect made up of persons from the *Chamar jati* and named after the 14th Century mystic *Guru*<sup>10</sup> *Ravi Dass*, who was also a *Chamar*. The *Ravi Dass Bhawan*<sup>11</sup> in Bradford is a centre used exclusively by *Chamars* in the city, some of whom consider themselves Punjabi Hindus and others Punjabi Sikhs, for reasons explained in Section 4.3.10. This exclusive use of the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* by *Chamars* is reflected in Table 6.5, where it can be seen that it is only *Chamar* households in the Bradford sample which are actually affiliated to this temple. Although the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* is used only by *Chamars*, this does not mean to say that *Chamars* themselves do not use other centres of worship in the city. This point is again illustrated in Table 6.5, where it can be seen that only 29 (71%) *Chamar* households in the Bradford sample are affiliated to the *Ravi Dass Bhawan*, whilst the remaining 12 (29%) frequent other temples.

The teachings of the *Ravidasi* tradition, as laid down by *Guru Ravi Dass*, are vehemently opposed to the caste system. Kalsi has shown that *Chamars* at the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* in Bradford are well aware of such teachings and that this is reflected in their veneration of Dr. Ambedkar, the 1930s leader of the Untouchables who strove to abolish the caste system (Kalsi, 1992: 143). It is ironic, therefore, that the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* is (like other *Ravidasi* centres in Britain) still undeniably linked to the caste system, by virtue of the fact that its devotees are all persons from a distinct *jati*.

Following its purchase by Bradford's *Ravidas Sabha*<sup>12</sup> for £27,000, the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* was opened during 1982 in the premises of a disused textile factory on Brearton Street in Bradford One (see Figure 6.5; for location see Figure 6.9). The *Bhawan* has four floors. The third floor has been converted into the worship hall or temple, the second floor is a kitchen, and the first and ground floors are used for other purposes. The principal weekly worship is held on Sunday morning. As mentioned previously (see Section 4.3.10), *Chamars* following the *Ravidasi* tradition lie on the boundaries of the Sikh and Hindu faith, with some identifying themselves as Hindus (e.g. those in the Bradford sample) and some as Sikhs. This means that *Ravidasi* temples often incorporate a syncretic mix of both Sikh and Hindu traditions in their appearance and liturgy (Nesbitt, 1994: 123). However, Kalsi (1992: Chpt. 6) argues that the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* in Bradford appears more oriented towards Sikhism. Thus, the Sunday service follows the general pattern of Sikh worship, and the *Guru Granth Sahib* or Sikh holy

<sup>10</sup>A *guru* is a religious teacher, or someone who delivers others from ignorance.

<sup>11</sup>A *bhawan* is an important building, like a temple or palace.

<sup>12</sup>A *sabha* is an association or organisation.

book is a focal point within the worship hall (Kalsi, 1992: 134-5). Moreover, the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* is part of the Federation of Bradford Sikh Organisations, an 'umbrella body' founded in 1984 (Singh and Ram, 1986: 25).

**Figure 6.5: The *Ravi Dass Bhawan*, Brearton Street**



Along with other *Ravidasi* centres of worship in Britain, the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* in Bradford has membership of a national organisation known as the *Ravidasi Sabha* UK. However, this body should not be seen as anything like a nationally based Gujarati *jati* association, as the centres of worship affiliated to it act autonomously and have little contact with each other.

The *Sant*<sup>13</sup> *Nirankari Mandal*<sup>14</sup> in Bradford occupies a building on Napier Street in Bradford Three (see Figure 6.6; for location see Figure 6.9). The *Nirankari* movement itself was founded in India by *Baba*<sup>15</sup> Dayal (1783-1857). It attracts both Hindus and

<sup>13</sup>*Sant* is a word often used to refer to a saint or saintly person.

<sup>14</sup>A *mandal* is a religious association.

<sup>15</sup>*Baba* is a term of respect often applied to holy men, although it literally means 'grandfather'.

Sikhs and its followers believe in a living *Guru*. *Nirankari* teachings reject idolatry and ritualistic practices and preach the oneness of God. They are strongly opposed to the caste system and any oppression which may be born out of it. For this reason the *Nirankari* movement draws the bulk of its followers from non twice-born *jatis* and *varnas* with a traditionally low position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system, who, being the usual recipients of ritually based oppression, are the most likely to be sympathetic towards such a movement.

**Figure 6.6: The *Sant Nirankari Mandal*, Napier Street**



In view of this, it came as no surprise to discover that the membership of the *Sant Nirankari Mandal* in Bradford is derived almost exclusively from Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs affiliated to non twice-born *jatis* with a low position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system. This is illustrated in Table 6.5, where it can be seen that within the Bradford sample most households affiliated to the *Sant Nirankari Mandal* are *Chamar* and *Nais*. As with the *Ravidasis*, it is perhaps ironic that a religious tradition which is vehemently opposed to the caste system has followers so strongly aligned to particular *jatis*.

The *Sant Nirankari Mandal* on Napier Street has membership of a nation-wide organisation known as the *Sant Nirankari Mandal UK*. But again, this body should not be seen to resemble a Gujarati *jati* association, as the centres of worship affiliated to it act independently of each other.

The above discussion has clearly established that the Hindu Cultural Society, the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* and the *Sant Nirankari Mandal* all draw their support from specific *jatis* and *varnas* within Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community and, in the case of the latter two of these institutions, from its Punjabi Sikh community too. The reasons for this factionalisation of different *jatis* and *varnas* in the use of these three temples can be linked to the operation of the caste system's ritual hierarchy. This issue will be explored in Section 7.1.5.

#### 6.3.4 Centres of worship as units of social and political 'control'

Using data from participant observation and interviews, this section argues that the Hindu Cultural Society, *Ravi Dass Bhawan* and *Sant Nirankari Mandal* each exercise a degree of social 'control' or influence over their Punjabi Hindu attendees, as well as having a political dimension. Moreover, because the membership of these three centres of worship is drawn up along *jati* lines, it is suggested that they are units of social and political 'control' which are based on the caste system. Accordingly, it is suggested that these three temples are performing a social and political function amongst Bradford Punjabi Hindus which is similar to that carried out nationally by a Gujarati *jati* association and in doing so, are fulfilling some of the roles effected by the caste unit back in India.

It would require some time to elaborate this social and political function as performed by all three institutions under scrutiny. Consequently, the Hindu Cultural Society will be taken as an example case, because it is the most widely used centre of worship amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, and because it was also the location where most participant observation was carried out (see Section 4.7.1). It is suggested that what is demonstrated for this institution may also apply to the other two.

Research findings indicated that although the Hindu Cultural Society has no judicial powers, it does exercise a degree of 'control' or influence over its members. First, this is subtly imparted within the confines of the Society's premises as the priest, or other leading figures in the institution, may affect the way its attendees approach life outside the temple by constantly setting out a code of moral conduct to which they, as 'good Hindus', might be expected to adhere. Such a message may be delivered either through preaching or making speeches. One *Khattri* interviewee explained:

These temple leaders, they're very vocal you know, always making speeches and that, telling everybody what they should be doing and how they should be behaving. They hold a lot of sway on the community side of things as well... because they're the 'top whacks', people tend to look up to them, trying to follow what they say and do the right thing. It's very political really. (Khattri man, 36 years, generation 1.5. Interview 46).

The Society's weekly calendar ensures that members of all ages are included in this process. For most adults, the Sunday temple service between four and six p.m. (see Section 6.3.3) is the main time when they might be subject to these subtle forms of social manipulation. For children, this social regulation may be imparted through the Sunday Hindi classes, which are operated by prominent adult members of the Society. For instance, the children from these classes are regularly made to present their own self-created mini-dramas to the Society's adult members. These typically take an everyday situation and dramatise it to illustrate what is a socially acceptable way to behave and what is not. A good example of this was a drama in which the class's children played out a scene where a school playground bully eventually received his comeuppance. The lesson which these children learnt from this was that bullying was wrong. Their enthusiastic discussion about the drama indicated that this lesson might well influence the way in which they conducted their lives outside the temple and, on the admission of one of the Society's leaders, this was the whole idea:

We want our children to do well, and those kids who go to the Hindi class, they don't realise it, but we're teaching them what is right and what is wrong. They're not just learning Hindi, it's a moral education as well. We're showing them how they must behave in everyday life; and when they're at school or at home or whatever, they'll be constantly drawing on these lessons they've learnt to influence the way they do things. They'll end up better human beings for this. (*Khattari* man, 61 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 35).

Second, for adults the Society is more than just a centre of worship, it is a place to chat and swap stories, almost a social club. This creates a sense of community within the society, but also a competitive atmosphere as everybody is always finding out what others are doing. As one *Brahmin* interviewee explained:

To tell you the truth, the Leeds road temple is more like a social club really. People are always gossiping there, like everybody you meet in the temple is saying, "Oh we've just moved here," or, "We've just bought this type of car," or, "My son's dentist, accountant," or whatever. It's very competitive, everybody's watching what everyone else is doing and trying to do better than them. I'm not sure it's a good thing really, I mean it's supposed to be a place of worship isn't it? (*Brahmin* woman, 26 years, 2nd generation. Interview 36).

This reported sense of competitive community within the temple environment might be seen as another way in which the Hindu Cultural Society subtly exercises a degree of social 'control' or influence over its members. Certainly, it appears that the Society's competitive atmosphere instils its members with high expectations and ambitions, and that this, in turn, encourages them to conduct their lives in a 'keeping up with the Joneses' fashion; or in this case, 'keeping up with the Sharmas'.

The Hindu Cultural Society also operates as a political unit, because it has a democratically elected committee which acts on behalf of (and in the interests of) all the

Society's members within the wider arena of local politics. This was exemplified by a recent instance in which this committee involved itself in a political struggle with Bradford Council over the securing of funding for street lights to celebrate *Diwali*.

It is suggested that these social and political functions performed by the Hindu Cultural Society may also be carried out by the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* and the *Sant Nirankari Mandal*, thus giving these temples a similarly influential hold over their attendees. Furthermore, because these three centres of worship have a membership drawn up along *jati* or *varna* lines, they can be realistically viewed as units of social and political 'control' which are based on the caste system.

It is possible that the situation described for Bradford above may also apply to centres of worship found in other major concentrations of Punjabi Hindu population in Britain. To investigate this, attention briefly turns to Southall, home to one of Britain's largest Punjabi Hindu communities. Vertovec (1992: 258-60) has implied that various centres of Punjabi Hindu worship in Southall also have memberships drawn up along *jati* lines. Thus, he notes that the Punjabi Hindu *Chamars* and *Chuhras* (Sweepers) each have their own temples in the area, which are respectively devoted to the *Ravidasi* and *Valmiki* traditions. Similarly, it appears that Southall's other main Punjabi Hindu temples, namely the *Shri Ram Mandir* and the *Vishwa Hindu Kendra*, are more likely to be used by Punjabi Hindus from twice-born *jatis*, especially when it is considered that in these institutions the "higher castes seem to maintain sway in the management of temple affairs" (Vertovec, 1992: 259).

The social calendar which Vertovec describes for the *Shri Ram Mandir* and the *Vishwa Hindu Kendra* seem similar to that seen for the Hindu Cultural Society in Bradford. Thus, these temples provide Hindi language classes for children and weekly Sunday services (Vertovec, 1992: 259). Such social calendars are likely to provide a framework in which these centres of Punjabi Hindu worship in Southall can act as units of social and political 'control', in the same way as was seen with the Hindu Cultural Society in Bradford. Furthermore, because these centres of worship appear to have a membership composed of certain *jatis* or groups of *jatis*, it would again seem feasible to view them as social and political units based on the caste system.

However, for smaller concentrations of Punjabi Hindu population in Britain it is less likely that the scenario witnessed in Bradford or Southall would apply. This is because the Punjabi Hindu population may not be of an adequate size to set up various temples in its local area and affiliate itself to these institutions along *jati* and *varna* lines. Indeed, smaller concentrations of Punjabi Hindu population in Britain may not even be large enough to warrant a single centre of worship for their own religio-ethnic sub-

group. In such situations, Punjabi Hindus may join forces with their Gujarati Hindu counterparts and establish a joint temple. This has been observed in Edinburgh by Nye (1993), where the combined population of both Punjabi and Gujarati Hindus, as well as those from other states in India, is estimated at a mere 1000 persons (Nye, 1993: 201). This small number of Hindus has allowed for the establishment of only one temple in Edinburgh, for which the membership is not drawn up along regional lines, let alone *jati* or *varna* affiliations. As Nye explains:

...although regionalism and particularism is the most important principle in the make up of most British *Mandirs* [temples], in Edinburgh the emphasis is far more upon pan-Hindu inclusivism... the Hindu community in Edinburgh is a patchwork of smaller groups which usually only come together as a community through the temple, and so in many ways it would be quite reasonable for each of these separate groups to have formed separate religious projects. (Nye, 1993: 206).

Knott (1986) describes a similar situation in Leeds, where a Hindu population of approximately 4000 (which is still relatively small compared to many elsewhere in Britain) has led to the establishment of a temple which draws its membership from Hindus of varied regional backgrounds and *jati* and *varna* affiliations.

The key point here, is that even if Hindu centres of worship such as those seen in Edinburgh and Leeds do exercise a degree of social 'control' and influence over their attendees, and wield political power on their behalf, it may be unfeasible to see them as social and political units which are based on the caste system. This is because their membership is so heterogeneous in terms of *jati* and *varna* affiliations and regional origins in India.

In summary, it is suggested that in larger concentrations of Punjabi Hindu population in Britain, Punjabi Hindu centres of worship or temples may act as units of social and political 'control' which are based on the caste system, thus fulfilling some of the functions performed by a caste unit back in India, and by a *jati* association amongst Britain's Gujarati Hindus. Certainly, this has been found to be the case amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, thus providing further evidence that the caste system is operational for this community.

However, in smaller concentrations of Punjabi Hindu population, and Hindu population generally, this phenomenon may be less likely to emerge. Clearly, the experiences of British based Punjabi Hindus in this area depend very much on the demographic and social context in which they find themselves, and this context changes from one city or town to another. Moreover, the contrast between the experiences of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community in this area (as shown in this section) and the

experiences of those in Leeds (as reported in Knott's studies) demonstrate that this social and demographic context can change radically over a very short distance.

## 6.4 THE CASTE SYSTEM AND TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS OR *KARMAS* AMONGST BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS

### 6.4.1 Initial impressions on the maintenance of *karma*

One possible indication that the caste system is operational is in the continued maintenance of the traditional occupations or *karmas* of *varna* and *jati* units. Chapter Three established that the traditional occupation or *karma* of a given *jati* or *varna* often ceased to be practised by its members following migration to various Diaspora contexts. This section examines to what extent this is the case amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford.

In the household interviews, respondents were asked questions to try and determine how much they felt Punjabi Hindus in Bradford still practised the *karma* of their *jati* or *varna*. The general reaction of interviewees was that although Punjabi Hindus had practised their *karma* back in India, none had continued to do so in Bradford, and they often used their own situation to illustrate this point. As a *Brahmin* man explained:

Back in India, a *Brahmin* was a fellow who teaches, like a guru. But all that's changed in Bradford you see. I mean I don't do the things a Brahmin's supposed to do, you know like giving marriages or things like that. (*Brahmin* man, 44 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 3).

Similarly, a *Chamar* interviewee noted:

My dad was a *Chamar* obviously, and he followed the traditional job as a leather tanner all his life in India. But that's all in the past. Me, I've never worked with leather at all. My first ever job was as a bus driver when I arrived in Bradford aged 18, that's all I've ever done. Nobody does these old occupations now. (*Chamar* man, 53 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 30).

Clearly, these individuals felt that traditional occupations or *karmas* have disappeared amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community since its migration from India. Such views appear to be confirmed by quantitative data from some of the 123 sample households. For example, none of the persons living in *Chamar* affiliated households (be they household heads or otherwise) were involved in any kind of leather work, nor had they ever been in the Bradford context. Similarly, none of those living in *Brahmin* households were priests or teachers; although one *Brahmin* female household head was an educational adviser to Bradford council and had once been a teacher, whilst the priest at the Hindu Cultural Society, though not part of the sample community, was known to be *Brahmin*. Equally, none of the *Nais* sample households had members who

worked as barbers, though one *Nais* interviewee claimed to have relatives who were still working as barbers elsewhere in Britain.

The above evidence suggests that where traditional occupations or *karmas* are concerned, the caste system is no longer operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Many interviewees put this absence of *karma* related work down to a lack of opportunities for practising traditional occupations in the city's employment market. One *Agarwal* man highlighted this problem:

Some people have tried to follow their traditional occupations in Bradford, but there are no outlets for these sort of jobs here. (*Agarwal* man, 61 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 32).

Similarly, a *Chamar* man commented:

In Bradford there isn't really much opportunity for the observation of traditional caste occupations; I mean a *Brahmin* has to work in textiles or drive a bus to earn a living, rather than be a priest. (*Chamar* man, 46 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 19).

In short, these interviewees were saying that there had never been any demand in Bradford for labour in *karma* related work, such as leather tanning for *Chamars* and the priesthood for *Brahmins*. An important question is whether this situation would have developed differently if these employment opportunities had been present in the city. Evidence from Knott's work on the Gujarati Hindu community in Leeds suggests it might have done. She noted that several Gujaratis from the *Mochi jati* in Leeds, whose traditional occupation was shoemaking, became employees of a local surgical footwear manufacturer (H.W. Poole), and in doing so largely fulfilled their *karma* (Knott, 1994: 220; n.d: 8; 1986: 45; see also Section 3.6.2). Perhaps the presence of a leather tanning factory in Bradford would have similarly attracted *Chamars*.

#### 6.4.2 Exploring *karma* maintenance in more detail

In contrast to the above observations, other quantitative data generated from Punjabi Hindus in the Bradford sample demonstrated that some of them did still practise their *karma*, at least in a modified form. For example, in four out of the five sample households affiliated to the *Sunari jati*, the male head of the household was still working as a goldsmith, and in three of these cases this male head was also selling his handmade gold jewellery (and that bought in from elsewhere) to the South Asian community through his own retail outlet, of the kind shown in Figure 6.7.

Similarly, in a number of sample households affiliated to the *Khattari jati*, the male household head was still partly fulfilling his traditional *karma* of trading. Thus, 13

*Khattri* male household heads out of a sample total of 25<sup>16</sup> (52%) had their own retailing businesses. Five of these 13 male heads were owner managers of 'mini-markets', which typically sold a range of groceries, as well as alcohol and newspapers (see Figure 6.8).

**Figure 6.7: South Asian jewellers shop owned by a *Sunari* sample household head**



**Figure 6.8: Mini-market owned by a *Khattri* sample household head**



<sup>16</sup>It should be remembered that although there are 28 *Khattri* affiliated sample households, two of these contain a female divorcee, and another a *Khattri* female married to a white man (see Table 6.2). Consequently, there are only 25 *Khattri* male household heads, rather than 28.

Other retailing concerns amongst these 13 *Khattri* male household heads included a chain of pharmacy shops, an electrical goods store, and a sub-post office-cum-newsagents. Four of them owned large textile importation and wholesaling businesses, whilst one managed his own regionally based plumbing merchants.

One of the male heads from the four *Agarwal* affiliated sample households also ran a string of pharmacy shops, which was again reasonably in line with his *karma* as a trader; although like the *Khattri* household head with pharmacy stores, this person was obviously working as a qualified pharmacist as well as a retailer. Finally, the male head of the one *Darji* household in the sample community was working in garment manufacture, in line with his *jati's* traditional occupation of tailoring. However, the degree to which any of these cases reflect the maintenance of *karma*, either amongst the sample community or Punjabi Hindus in Bradford as a whole, is debatable.

First, within the sample community itself, there were many male heads from households affiliated to one of the above *jatis* who were not following their traditional occupation. For example, the 12 (48%) male heads from *Khattri* affiliated sample households who were not involved in retailing concerns undertook employment far removed from their *karma*. This ranged from the professional occupations of school teacher and GP, to skilled manual jobs such as bus driving and carpet weaving. Similarly, one of the five male heads from the *Sunari* affiliated sample households was a foundry worker, rather than a goldsmith.

Second, amongst female heads from sample households affiliated to the above *jatis* (or indeed any other *jati* or *varna*), the pattern of occupation was even more diverse. Admittedly, a few female heads from *Khattri* affiliated households co-managed retailing and wholesaling concerns with the male household head (i.e. their husband), which was in line with their *karma*. Similarly, some of the female heads from *Sunari* households managed the jewellery shops mentioned above, whilst their husband concentrated on making gold items. In most cases, however, female heads in paid employment undertook a wide range of jobs, from professional through to blue collar, which generally bore no relation to their *jati* or *varna's karma*.

Thus, despite the fact that some male heads from *Khattri*, *Agarwal* and *Sunari* affiliated households in the Bradford sample appeared to follow their *karma*, there were many male heads from sample households belonging to these *jatis*, and even more female heads, who did not. Furthermore, even amongst those who did appear to observe their *karma*, it is worth asking to what extent this was actually due to a desire to preserve traditional *jati* based occupations. As one *Khattri* interviewee explained:

I think some *Khattris* have kept to their traditional occupations over here, but not because of caste really. I mean we're *Khattris* and we're traditionally traders, business men, whatever you want to call it, and often our grandparents and parents were in business and so we've grown up with that. And there might be something there saying we'll do this as well because it's the tradition and all that. But to be honest I think *Khattris* with shops and retail businesses are doing it because it's a good way to make money, not because of tradition or anything... most of them would do any sort of work, provided it was honest and supported their family. (*Khatttri* man, aged 57, 1st generation. Interview 29).

It is likely, therefore, that many of the *Khatttri* male households heads in the sample community were involved in retailing, not because of some inherent desire to preserve their *karma*, but simply because it was a 'good business to be in'. Indeed for all South Asians, self-employment in retailing has been a reasonably successful strategy for making a living, yet avoiding the institutional discrimination from the white community which might be experienced if they were employee rather than employer (Aldrich *et al.*, 1981). This may explain why a number of male heads from *Brahmin* affiliated sample households were also involved in some kind of retailing concern, which, in their case, is obviously not *karma* related.

Similar to the above, the *Darji* male household head who was involved in garment manufacture may not necessarily have been doing this because of some in-built desire to preserve his *karma*. It is more likely that he (along with many other South Asians) is involved in the garment industry simply because it is one of the major employers in Bradford. As the wife of this *Darji* household head noted:

We're tailors, *Darjis* you know, and in the past we've always worked in tailoring and I suppose my husband's job is still connected with that because he works as a supervisor in garment production. But it's just a job to him, he'd just as well be doing something else, it's just that textiles and clothing and stuff is all there really is here. (*Darji* woman, 29 yrs, generation I.5. Interview 9).

Even those male head householders from *Sunari jati*, who by continuing to practise as goldsmiths might be considered the best example of *karma* loyalty in the sample community, were of the opinion that their observance of this occupation had little to do with the caste system; rather, it was due to the practical sense in making money from a skill which they had been fortunate enough to inherit. As one *Sunari* male household head commented:

I'm still a goldsmith, yes, but that's because I've got that art in my hands. I'm not bothered about it from a caste point of view, it's just a damn good skill to have and I can make a living from it... I mean I probably wouldn't pass it on to my kids unless they wanted to learn about it, but back in India my father was insistent I learnt this family trade and carried on the tradition and all that. These days nobody thinks like this. (*Sunari* man, 36 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 33).

### 6.4.3 *Karma* as a cultural resource

The above evidence from the Bradford sample provides a contradictory picture on the preservation of *karma*. Quantitative data suggest that *karma* related work has been maintained amongst some individuals from *Sunari*, *Khatttri*, *Agarwal* and *Darji jatis*, but not others. These data also indicate that no *Chamar*, *Brahmin* and *Nais* individuals in the sample community actually undertake occupations strongly related to their *karma*. Finally, qualitative statements from interviewees strongly deny that the maintenance of *karma* is an issue amongst the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford, even when they appear to be practising their *karma* themselves.

If this evidence from the sample community is applied to all Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford, then the following conclusions might be drawn. First, for Punjabi Hindus belonging to some *jatis* or *varnas*, the observance of *karma* has completely disappeared since migration from India. Typically, this occurs where the *karma* of a given *jati* or *varna* has had little opportunity of being practised in Bradford, as with those traditional occupations for *Chamars* and *Brahmins*. Second, amongst Punjabi Hindus belonging to other *jatis*, such as *Khattris* and *Sunaris*, some individuals may still practise their traditional *karma*, but many others, particularly women, do not. Most importantly, where *karmas* are being practised amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, it seems unlikely that this is due to the operation of the caste system. This is because those practising their *karma* rarely seem to do it out of any desire to maintain *jati* or *varna* traditions. Instead, they are taking some existing practical skill (in the case of *Sunaris*) or business acumen (in the case of *Khattris*), learnt in a traditional Indian context, or passed on through family lines, which can be used in Bradford to their economic advantage.

It appears, therefore, that the *karmas* of all *jatis* involve a 'package' of skills and knowledge which can be seen as a 'cultural resource'. This resource can be transferred from one specific locality and applied in another. However, its applicability depends on the appropriateness of the spatial context to which it is being transferred, in terms of the opportunities that locality may provide for exercising the skills and knowledge embodied in the cultural resource itself. In the above discussion, for example, it has been seen that *Sunari* and *Khatttri* individuals hold a number of *karma* related skills which fare well in the Bradford context. Conversely, *Brahmins* and *Chamars* have found fewer opportunities to use their *karma* related skills and knowledge in the city. However, this might have been different if the members of these *jatis* had found themselves in a different spatial context of Diaspora. For instance, it seems possible that *Chamars* in Bradford may have utilised their traditional leather working skills if they had settled in Leeds, where there is a leather industry in surgical footwear production (see Section 6.4.1). Bradford's unique spatial environment clearly plays a more fundamental role than

the traditions of the caste system in the fortunes of *jati* and *varna* occupations and the maintenance of *karma* amongst the city's Punjabi Hindu community.

## 6.5 THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE CASTE SYSTEM AMONGST BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS

### 6.5.1 Determining the geography of the caste system


One indication that the caste system is active and operational is if it is able to manifest itself through human geographies. For example, Section 2.8 established that the caste system was reflected in the human geographies of 1950s and '60s rural India. This was because households affiliated to different *jatis*, *varnas* and castes were shown to be clustered together within villages studied by Indologists. This section examines the geography of the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford, even though this community is quite dispersed across the different wards of the city (see Section 5.3.1).

To determine this geography, respondents in the 50 household interviews were asked whether they felt Punjabi Hindus from different 'castes' (i.e. *jatis*, or in the case of *Brahmins*, *varnas*) were living in clusters in certain parts of Bradford. Most were emphatic that this was not the case. Indeed, only two interviewees suggested otherwise, saying that in their opinion there was a cluster of Punjabi Hindus from the *Brahmin varna* living in Bolton ward. Interestingly, this is one of the areas in which Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community has been shown to be quite heavily concentrated (see Section 5.3.1).

Since the interviews proved an inconclusive source of evidence for establishing a geographical dimension to the caste system, another technique was needed to reveal any relevant spatial pattern. This was achieved by mapping and observing the city-wide distribution of sample households in terms of their *jati* or *varna* affiliation. This map is shown in Figure 6.9. It should be noted that the map only features 121 out of the 123 sample households. The two missing households are both *Khatti* affiliated, and lie close to Keighley, an outlying town in the Bradford district. They are not included on the map because their anomalous location adds little to any understanding of the geography of the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in the city.

Figure 6.9 shows that the sample households are widely distributed across Bradford, reflecting the dispersed nature of the city's whole Punjabi Hindu population. However, the key feature of Figure 6.9 concerns the distribution of sample households in terms of their *jati* or *varna* affiliation. First, if an imaginary line is drawn on Figure 6.9, stretching from the northwest of Bradford through its city centre to the southeast, then it

Figure 6.9: Geographical distribution of 121<sup>Ⓢ</sup> sample households by their *jati* or *varna* affiliation



Ⓢ Two sample households not on map for reasons explained above.

can be seen that a greater percentage of sample households lying on the westerly side of this line are those affiliated to the *Chamar jati* (represented by the blue dots). Conversely, a greater percentage of those lying to the east of this imaginary line are from non-Untouchable *jatis or varnas* (i.e. those other than the *Chamars*).

More importantly, Figure 6.9 shows distinct clusters of sample households affiliated to certain *jatis* or *varnas* in various parts of Bradford. For example, a cluster of *Brahmin* households can be seen in Bolton ward, as recognised by the two interviewees discussed above. Similarly, a cluster of *Chamar* households is seen to the west of the city, on the boundaries of Clayton and Toller wards. It is interesting that these two largest and most obvious clusters of 'same *jati* households' (or 'same *varna* households' in the case of *Brahmins*) are *Chamar* and *Brahmin* affiliated and, therefore, traditionally lie at opposite ends of the ritual hierarchy of the caste system.

There are other smaller clusters of sample households affiliated to the same *jati* or *varna*. For example, a cluster of *Khattri* households can be identified in Pudsey North ward and to the north of Bowling ward. Similarly, another small cluster of *Chamar* households can be identified on the boundaries of Little Horton, Bowling and Odsal wards. Even the *Nais* and *Sunari* sample households, which initially appear quite dispersed in Figure 6.9, are still found within a fairly limited area. Thus, most of the *Nais* households are situated in the wards of Bradford Moor and Undercliffe, and the *Sunari* households are found along a short stretch of the Leeds/Bradford road, running from Bradford Moor to Pudsey North ward.

Clearly, the location of the 121 sample households shown in Figure 6.9 indicates that the caste system does have a geographical dimension in Bradford, at least where the sample community is concerned. Indeed, it is suggested that this spatial pattern reflects one which might be witnessed amongst the whole of the city's Punjabi Hindu community, both in and outside the Bradford sample. This was supported by observations made during name analysis of Bradford's 1992 electoral register (see Section 4.3). As noted in Section 6.1.4, the *jati* or *varna* affiliation of Punjabi Hindu individuals can often be identified from the name they use as a surname. On the basis of such name identification, it was noted that sample households and non-sampled households affiliated to a given *jati* or *varna* were often found close together in the electoral register, sometimes even on the same page. This usually indicated that these households occupied the same streets or immediate area. This would suggest that the geography of sample households in Figure 6.9 reflected that of Bradford's wider Punjabi Hindu community.

### 6.5.2 Explaining the geography of the caste system

To explain the geography of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, a handful of respondents in the last few interviews (most of whom had initially suggested there was no geography of the caste system in Bradford) were asked to try and explain the broad pattern seen in Figure 6.9, the essence of which had already emerged by the time these final interviews were being carried out. The majority of these respondents admitted, on reflection, that clustering of households affiliated to the same *jati* or *varna* did occur in Bradford. However, they usually claimed that this was nothing to do with the caste system itself, and that it was merely the outcome of friends wishing to live together. As one *Khattri* woman explained:

When I think about it, there probably are clusters of people from the same caste. Like you say there are a lot of *Brahmins* living up on King's Park estate in Bolton, well that's true, I mean come to think of it I know most of them. But it's not caste that's made them stick together, it's just because they're friends. (*Khattri* woman, 43 years, generation 1.5. Interview 10).

Similarly, a *Chamar* interviewee commented:

You might be right about this geography thing, because a lot of *Chamars* live round here in Odsal. But we're just friends really, that's why we've stuck together. I mean a lot of the *Chamar* families round here knew each other back in the Punjab, so it made sense to stay together and live near each other here, I mean we can help each other out and that. (*Chamar* man, 41 years, generation 1.5. Interview 42).

These interviewees were clearly convinced that the *jati* or *varna* affiliations of Punjabi Hindu households had not influenced their spatial distribution in the city. It is argued that this is not really the case, because the friendship networks which these interviewees claim are the basis of household clustering are themselves grounded in the caste system and *jati* or *varna* affiliations. This was made much clearer by another two respondents from these later interviews. First, a *Khattri* man noted:

This geography you're on about, well I suppose you're right, but it's not intentional or anything. You see what happened is that people from the same caste were often friends when they arrived in Bradford. So as soon as one of these people moved into an area, then the friends from his caste would think, "Oh that's a nice place," and they'll follow. Like when we moved here quite a few *Khattri* families who we knew followed us. I expect you can see this from your electoral register with the names, I mean there are quite a few *Brahmins* - you know, 'Bhardwaj' and 'Sharmas' - in the Sycamore area, and I think there are a few *Chamars* in Bradford Three; although I'm not so sure about that one because I don't really know any. (*Khattri* man, 23 yrs, 2nd generation. Interview 37).

Similarly a *Khattri* woman explained:

Punjabi Hindus are like a wind blown seed, a person from a caste settles down in an area and they become a contact point, and then a friend from their caste moves there because they think it will be nice to be close to them. (*Khattri* woman, 47 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 48).

In view of the above statements, it seems that the caste system and *jati* or *varna* affiliations have made way for friendship networks in Bradford. In turn, these friendship networks help to generate a geography, which then feeds back into the caste system and reinforces intra-*jati* and intra-*varna* friendships still further.

The clustering of households from various *jatis* or *varnas* might also be connected with the fact that persons of the same *jati* or *varna* often have similar levels of economic prosperity, which consequently places them in a market for the same types of housing and, therefore, similar kinds of residential areas. This contention is supported in Section 7.3.2, where it can be seen that there is a positive relationship between the *jati* or *varna* affiliation of sample households and the value of the property in which their occupants live.

Finally, the broad split of Punjabi Hindus from the *Chamar jati* and those from non-Untouchable *jatis* or *varnas*, across a northwest to southeast line in Bradford, may reflect the location of temples within the city. Thus, Figure 6.9 shows that the westerly side of this line, which is home to a large number of *Chamar* households, is also the side occupied by the *Ravi Dass Bhawan*, the temple to which many of these *Chamar* households are affiliated. Similarly, the Hindu Cultural Society can be seen to lie on the easterly side of this line, where many of the non-Untouchable households attending this particular institution are situated.

In short, temples have been shown to mark concentrations of Hindu settlement in other Diaspora contexts (Clarke, 1967), and as those in Bradford are affiliated to certain *varnas* and/or *jatis* it seems logical that the concentrations of population which build up around them might also be from these *varnas* and *jatis* too. This raises the question of whether the location of temples has influenced Bradford's geographical distribution of Punjabi Hindu households in terms of their *varna* or *jati* affiliations, or whether this residential distribution already existed and influenced the temple locations themselves. Evidence from earlier studies into the geography of the caste system in Bradford are required to answer this question. Unfortunately, no such studies exist.

In summary, despite the view of many sample interviewees that there was no geography of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, this has been shown not to be the case, because clusters of sample households from the same *jati* or *varna* are very distinctive in the city. An analysis of the comments from respondents in later interviews suggests that this geography has not occurred by chance, and that it is indeed based on *jati* and *varna* affiliations and the caste system. The ability of Punjabi Hindu individuals to afford houses in certain areas and the location of Punjabi Hindu centres of worship may also influence this distinctive geography, but it is the caste

system which appears to lie behind these locational factors. Clearly, social distance between *jatis* and *varnas* is reflected spatially in Bradford. This suggests that the caste system is still very much operational within the city's Punjabi Hindu community.

## 6.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has investigated a number of important sociological characteristics amongst the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford, including endogamy, social and political 'control' and traditional occupational specialisation. In Chapter Two, it was demonstrated that these were some of the traits of a caste unit in 1950s and '60s rural India. However, amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, caste has been shown to have been eradicated as a social unit due to its demographic destruction in the migration and settlement process. Despite this, *jatis* (or *varnas* in the case of *Brahmins*) have become the principal endogamous units of the caste system for Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, and interview evidence has suggested that the members of this community are fully aware of these units. Meanwhile, the unit of social and political 'control' amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus has become focused around their temples, which draw their attendees from distinctive groups of *jatis* and *varnas*.

It has been argued that these findings indicate the caste system is both present and operational amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, and the observance of a distinctive residential geography of the caste system for this community would appear to support this contention. Nevertheless, the social units from which the caste system is composed amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, and the functions these units perform, are clearly very different from the account of the institution which was set out in Chapter Two, for rural India in the 1950s and '60s.

In Section 8.1 it will be seen that this is the pre-migratory space/time context from which Bradford's Punjabi Hindus originate. In turn, this suggests that substantial change in the caste system has occurred amongst this community through its migration and settlement. Furthermore, the destruction of the caste as a social unit amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, and the minimal practice of the traditional occupations or *karmas* of *jatis* and *varnas* by members of this community, indicate that much of this migratory change has been weakening and degenerative. At the same time, however, the caste system appears to have shown remarkable resilience in the face of such upheavals. For example, the demographic destruction of caste as a social unit in the migration of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community has merely seen the transference of endogamous practices to the *jati* or *varna*, and social and political 'control' in the caste system to temples. Such developments provide further evidence that the caste system is a dynamic

and adaptable institution, rather than being immutable and inflexible as the common-sense approach would maintain (see Section 3.1).

# Chapter Seven

## *The hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus*

### 7.0 INTRODUCTION

The objective of Chapter Seven is to examine the degree to which the hierarchy of the caste system is present and operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, thus fulfilling the third aim of the study (see Section 1.1). Detailed discussion as to how and why this hierarchy has changed through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu population takes place in Chapter Eight.

As in Chapter Six, investigation in this chapter is based on quantitative data relating to 123 sample households, which were generated from the 50 household interviews and 73 questionnaires, and qualitative data from the 50 interviews alone. For reasons outlined in Chapter Four, the findings from these sample data are taken as indicative of trends within the whole of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community (see Sections 4.5.7 and 4.6.4).

The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 7.1 examines the relevance of the ritual hierarchy of the caste system for Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford. Sections 7.2 to 7.4 focus on the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system within this community, investigating the relationship between its ritual, economic and political elements. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.5.

### 7.1 THE RITUAL HIERARCHY OF THE CASTE SYSTEM AMONGST BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS

#### 7.1.1 Overview

Chapter Three established that the hierarchy of the caste system has a tripartite structure at the *jati* and caste level, based on ritual, economic and political considerations. One element of this tripartite structure, namely the ritual hierarchy, also encompasses the *varna* level of social unit (see Section 2.5.1). This ritual hierarchy therefore applies to all types of social unit in the caste system, and is based on the relative spiritual purity and consequent ritual status of each individual *varna*, *jati* or caste within the Hindu religious tradition. This section examines the degree to which this hierarchy is present and operational amongst Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford.

### 7.1.2 Awareness of the ritual hierarchy amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus

Assuming that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system was in its traditional form in the Bradford sample, then, as noted in Section 6.2.1, the *jatis* and *varnas* present in this sample community could be arranged in the order seen in Table 7.1.

**Table 7.1: Position of *jatis* and *varnas* in the Bradford sample in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system**

Position in the ritual hierarchy	Name of <i>varna</i> or <i>jati</i>
Highest position in the ritual hierarchy	<i>Brahmin</i>
↑	<i>Khattri</i>
	<i>Agarwal</i>
	<i>Sunari</i>
	<i>Darji</i>
↓	<i>Nais</i>
Lowest position in the ritual hierarchy	<i>Chamar</i>

Conversations with the 50 interviewees revealed that they had a high awareness of this traditional ritual hierarchy and their position within it. Thus, many of those from the *Brahmin varna* made comments like:

We're *Brahmins*, that's the highest caste of all you know. (*Brahmin* woman, 26 yrs, 2nd generation. Interview 36).

Similarly, interviewees from the *Khattri jati* often provided statements like:

I'm from the *Khattri* caste, that's one of the top whack ones. (*Khattri* man, 42 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 12).

Equally, most interviewees from the *Chamar jati* were well aware of their low ritual ranking, although they often referred to this as something imposed upon them by others rather than their self-perception. As one *Chamar* interviewee explained:

We're *Chamars*, one of the scheduled castes you know; as far as everybody else is concerned we are the lowest of the low. (*Chamar* man, 22 yrs, generation 2nd. Interview 38).

It is suggested that this level of awareness amongst sample interviewees, of the position of their *jati* or (in the case of *Brahmins*) *varna* in the traditional ritual hierarchy of the caste system, is reflected throughout the majority of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu population. Certainly, participant observation within this community, which included conversations with individuals who were outside the sample population, indicated that all Punjabi Hindus in the city knew which *jati* or *varna* they were from and its ritual position. These findings suggest that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is present amongst members of this community.

### 7.1.3 Operation of the ritual hierarchy amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus

Having established that Punjabi Hindus in Bradford are aware of the ritual hierarchy of the caste system and their position within it, the next task is to determine whether this hierarchy is actually operational within this community. Responses from *Chamar* interviewees indicate this to be the case, because most claimed that *Chamars* in Bradford are subject to disdainful treatment by Punjabi Hindus from *jatis* and *varnas* of higher ritual ranking, particularly *Brahmins* and *Khattris*. Most *Chamar* interviewees felt that this treatment results from their *jati's* relatively low position in the ritual hierarchy. As a *Chamar* man noted:

Even now, the *Brahmins* and higher castes in Bradford, they look down on us. They will deny it of course, but in the end they think they're better than us, so if a *Chamar* says anything they just want to degrade him, just by his caste... It's very common here, they want to show their egoism and that's the only way... (*Chamar* man, aged 39, 1st generation. Interview 21).

Some *Chamar* interviewees felt that this disdainful treatment, which they suffer from those of higher ritual ranking, is quite covert in its nature, as it often goes on 'behind the backs' of *Chamars* living in Bradford:

Obviously, when it comes down to the nitty-gritty, it's always there isn't it? It's like anything, its like black people and white people. When we chat with them [Punjabi Hindus from *Brahmin* and *Khattri jatis*] face to face it's OK, but anybody who was recording them having a conversation amongst themselves would hear them saying, "Oh ignore that person, he's a *Chamar*". So *Chamars* in Bradford are slagged off behind their backs you see. (*Chamar* man, 22 yrs, 2nd generation. Interview 30).

Other *Chamar* interviewees felt that their disdainful treatment is more overt, and used personal or family experiences to illustrate this point. Thus, a *Chamar* lady noted:

My husband works with some of these high caste Hindus, and of course we're supposed to be very low compared to them. He comes home really depressed sometimes, he tells me that they've been abusing him, you know saying things about his caste and that. (*Chamar* woman, 46 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 5).

However, the claims of these *Chamars* were put to interviewees from *jatis* and *varnas* with a higher position in the ritual hierarchy. These individuals all denied that they would subject *Chamars* to any form of disdainful treatment, rather as the *Chamar* man in the first of the above three quotes had predicted. Many of them put the comments of *Chamar* interviewees down to an unfounded inferiority complex. As one *Khattri* man explained:

If you're fat, you'll automatically assume that people are thinking you're fat. It's the same with the *Chamars* in Bradford. They're aware that they're from the bottom of the caste system originally, and they are so hung up about this that they think people from the high castes are treating them badly. Nobody cares about their caste here, those *Chamars* that say that are their own worst enemy. (*Khattri* man, 29 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 35).

Taking into account the comments of the *Chamar* interviewees above, it appears that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. However, interviewees from *jatis* and *varnas* of higher ritual ranking would seem to refute this. With such opposed views, more substantial evidence is needed to clarify this issue.

#### 7.1.4 The ritual hierarchy and marriage practices

In presenting hard evidence that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, it is first necessary to refer back to Section 6.2.3. Here, it was established that this community has a complex marital system, involving endogamous marriage circles and arranged marriages. On the basis of qualitative interview data, this section argues that the presence of this marital system is due to the operation of the ritual hierarchy.

In the three statements below, sample interviewees claim that Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, belonging to *jatis* or *varnas* with a high position in the ritual hierarchy, do not marry out of these social units to persons from *jatis* of lower ritual ranking. These statements show that this is principally due to negative stereotyping and discriminatory behaviour based on the ritual hierarchy of the caste system. First, a *Khattri* interviewee noted:

A *Khattri* wouldn't like his son or daughter to marry a low caste in Bradford, he would think it was a terribly degrading thing to do. Even if a son just went out with a *Chamar* girl, his parents they might say, you know, "You might as well be dead!" or, "Get out of the house!". They will not play any part in it, although I wouldn't do this myself. (*Khattri* man, 42 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 12).

Similarly a *Khattri* woman commented:

*Khattri* parents, they won't let their daughter marry a low caste boy, because they say they [*Khattri* parents] are respectable, not like unclean *Chamar* or *Chura*, or this, or that. They're very fussy about these things. That's why the whole marriage thing carries on in Bradford... it doesn't bother me mind. (*Khattri* woman, 47 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 4).

A *Brahmin* man also noted:

A lot of *Brahmins* in Bradford, they say they aren't bothered about caste, but if their son married a low caste like *Chamar*, then they would have real problems, because all other *Brahmins*, they'd be saying, "Look at their son, he married these dirty *Chamars*", you know, and it would all backfire on them because other *Brahmins* wouldn't talk to them, and they wouldn't be able to marry the rest of their children off to *Brahmin* families because they'd be polluted. It's bad, but I think I would stand up for my kids, you know, let them marry whoever they want. (*Brahmin* man, 39 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 6).

All three of the above statements indicate that in Bradford, Punjabi Hindus from *jatis* of high ritual ranking often stereotype those from *jatis* of lower ritual ranking, such as *Chamars*, as 'dirty' or 'unclean'. Undoubtedly, these terms are being used metaphorically here to refer to spiritual impurity. The above three statements also suggest that these negative stereotypical images lead to discriminatory marriage practices amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Thus, it is implied that those from *jatis* of high ritual ranking avoid marriage unions with those from *jatis* of a lower position in the ritual hierarchy on the grounds that their spiritual 'uncleanliness' would be polluting, not only to any potential spouse of high ritual ranking, but also, according to the latter of the above statements, to his or her whole family.

To summarise, the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford has a complex marital system involving endogamous marriage circles and arranged marriages. However, the root cause of this is the ritual hierarchy of the caste system. This is because it provides a framework which enables and encourages those from *jatis* of high ritual ranking to produce negative stereotypes of individuals from *jatis* with a low position in the ritual hierarchy. In turn, these stereotypes provide a supposed justifiable basis for the discriminatory avoidance of marriages with such low ranking individuals. This obviously creates a need for *jati* or (for *Brahmins*) *varna* endogamy, which in turn necessitates the existence of the marriage circles and arranged marriages which allow such endogamy to be preserved.

The existence of ritually based stereotyping and discriminatory marriage practices amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus might be less believable if the interviewees making such claims were only those from ritually low ranking *jatis*, who appear to suffer such discriminatory behaviour. However, all three of the above interviewees are affiliated to *jatis* or *varnas* of high ritual ranking, and might therefore be seen as the architects of such discriminatory behaviour rather than its victims. Nevertheless, it can also be seen that these three interviewees are keen to dissociate themselves from such behaviour, by claiming that they themselves would not discriminate against partners from *jatis* of low ritual ranking in the marriages of their own children. In view of comments already made about the disparity between what Punjabi Hindu parents say about the marriages of their offspring and what they actually do (see Section 6.2.4), it is wise to treat such comments with caution.

If interviewees from *jatis* and *varnas* of high ritual ranking were willing to admit that it is they who instigate ritually based stereotyping and discriminatory marriage practices, it is not surprising that those from *jatis* of lower ritual ranking were equally keen to establish that they are on the receiving end of such behaviour. For example, two *Chamar* interviewees made the following statements:

If a low caste boy gets a *Brahmin* girl in the next street, these *Brahmins*, they will do their best to kill the boy or his parents. Even here in Bradford, I've seen it. These high castes, they do their best to keep their kids away from us low castes, because they think we're dirty and polluting. That's why *Chamars* and that often end up marrying their own. I mean we're *Chamars* and we probably wouldn't mind marrying a *Brahmin*, although that's easier for us to say because we're so low anyway; but for *Brahmins*, any move outside their caste is a step down, because they hold themselves in such high esteem, so all low castes keep to themselves. (*Chamar* man, 41 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 42).

Low castes in Bradford usually end up marrying other low castes in the end, not because they're bothered about the caste thing itself, but because they're avoiding the hassle and abuse from high castes. Like if you look at most *Chamar* mums and dads here, they don't really mind if their kids marry a *Brahmin* or other high castes, deep down like. They don't have that inner prejudice. But they know that if they did that, their family will be left out, because that higher caste family think they are low, and dirty, and stupid, and all that, and they'll suffer for it. So *Chamars* keep to the mainstream and their own kind, keep out of trouble. It's the same for all Untouchables and low castes here. (*Chamar* woman, 46 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 5).

According to the above two interviewees, Punjabi Hindus in Bradford from *jatis* of low ritual ranking are fully aware of the negative stereotypical image that those from ritually higher ranking *jatis* or *varnas* may attribute to them as 'dirty' or spiritually 'impure' potential marriage partners. Consequently, these interviewees claim that *Chamars*, and others from *jatis* of low ritual ranking, are just as keen to avoid marriages to individuals from ritually high ranking *jatis*. By keeping to themselves in this way, low ranking Punjabi Hindus are preserving their *jati* endogamy. This helps them to avoid the degrading and demoralising nature of ritually based discrimination, which they might experience if they attempted exogamous unions with persons from *jatis* of higher ritual ranking. This amounts to a form of voluntary social closure (Parkin, 1979).

In summary, it appears that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is definitely operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. This is manifest in the current existence of a complex marital system for this community, in which the ritual hierarchy has been shown to play a fundamental role.

### 7.1.5 The ritual hierarchy and temple usage patterns

Further evidence that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is operational amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford can be gained from investigating why different Punjabi Hindu centres of worship in the city are frequented by persons from certain *jatis*. Before embarking on this, it is necessary to turn attention briefly away from Bradford to India, and provide background information on Hindu temple usage there.

Studies of Indian society in the 1950s and '60s showed that Hindu temples were typically frequented by persons from a group of *jatis* (or a single *jati*) with similar ritual ranking in the caste system (Gough, 1960; Bailey, 1957). This situation continues to the

present day in India, and it has again been created and maintained as a result of negative stereotyping and discriminatory behaviour based on the ritual hierarchy. Thus, persons from *jatis* of high ritual ranking stereotype those from ritually low ranking *jatis* as 'dirty' or spiritually 'impure'. They then use this as a basis for discouraging these low ranking individuals from using their ritually high status temples, fearing the spiritual pollution such persons might introduce into these places of worship (Fuller, 1979; Derrett, 1968: 454; Kane, 1953: 320).

In India's past, this discouragement was usually in the form of overt discrimination, and involved persons from *jatis* of high ritual ranking placing a ban on those from ritually low ranking *jatis* entering their temples. However, the constitutional reforms of the 1950s outlawed such practices (Lamb, 1975: 151). As a result, discrimination in temple usage often became less visible; yet it rarely disappeared, developing instead into something more covert. Typically, therefore, this discrimination became manifest in the ritually high ranking members of a temple adopting more subtle tactics of social exclusion against individuals from *jatis* of lower ritual ranking who were trying to use their place of worship. For those individuals affiliated to lower ranking *jatis*, an obvious solution to both these overt and covert discriminatory practices has been to have their own separate places of worship. This explains why temples in India have become frequented by certain groups of *jatis* with a similar position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system.

The search for evidence substantiating the operation of the ritual hierarchy in Bradford must also turn to temple usage in the city. It was noted in Section 6.3 that Punjabi Hindu temples in Bradford, as in India, are frequented by persons from certain *jatis*, or groups of *jatis* and *varnas*, with similar positions in the ritual hierarchy. Thus, the membership of the Hindu Cultural Society was shown to be mainly composed of persons from twice-born *jatis* and *varnas* with an elevated ritual ranking. Conversely, the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* is frequented by individuals from the *Chamar jati* of low ritual ranking. It is argued that this situation in Bradford is, as in India, a result of negative stereotyping and discriminatory behaviour based on the ritual hierarchy of the caste system.

For example, many sample interviewees belonging to the *Chamar jati* acknowledged that *Chamars* in Bradford nearly always attend the *Ravi Dass Bhawan* rather than the Hindu Cultural Society. This is due to discriminatory practices which discourage them from using the latter of these institutions, and which are practised by Punjabi Hindus belonging to *jatis* or (for *Brahmins*) *varnas* of higher ritual ranking who are the regular users of the Society. Most *Chamar* interviewees also implied that this discrimination results from the negative stereotypical image which these higher ranking

individuals hold of them, coupled with their fear of the supposed 'impurity' that would threaten the Hindu Cultural Society if *Chamars* were allowed to become regular attendees. These views are captured in the two statements below.

*Chamars* in Bradford use the *Ravi Dass Bhawan*, that's our temple you see. You won't find many going to that Cultural Society on Leeds road, because there's lots of high castes there and they're not too friendly. They won't throw us out of that temple, I mean we can go there if we want, but as far as joining up their Society full time, they keep it to themselves. It's because they think we're dirty and all that stuff, they see it as a real threat to their little club. They don't turn us away outright or anything, but they still abuse you behind your back if you go there. They don't want you to feel welcome you see, because they know that'll stop you going again. (*Chamar* man, 41 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 42).

Similarly, another *Chamar* interviewee said:

*Chamars* are accepted at the Hindu Cultural Society, but only up to a certain extent. Like, if I went there and said I wanted to become trustee of their temple, they wouldn't let me, because these *Brahmins* and *Khattris* who go there, they'd think, "Oh he's a dirty *Chamar*, we don't want him getting involved in temple affairs". Because a lot of them still believe in all this pollution rubbish, and they think we're going to bring them all down. It's like their own clique, and we're not allowed in. That's why we all stick to the *Ravi Dass* temple you see. (*Chamar* man, 53 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 30).

The above two statements indicate that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is operational amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, because they both imply that it provides the very basis of the discriminatory and exclusionary behaviour which influences temple usage patterns within this community. These two statements also show that the discrimination, which *Chamars* claim to suffer from persons belonging to *jatis* of high ritual ranking at the Hindu Cultural Society, mainly involves subtle forms of social exclusion, and is therefore covert rather than overt. This is similar to the discrimination which has been described as influencing the temple affiliations of *jatis* in India, once constitutional reforms began to take effect.

Importantly, the two *Chamar* interviewees quoted above are only telling one side of the story. A trustee of the Hindu Cultural Society, belonging to the *Agarwal jati* of higher ritual ranking, was keen to provide a different viewpoint when asked why *Chamars* do not regularly attend this institution:

These *Chamars* don't come to the Hindu Cultural Society because they don't want to, and we're not going to go around and say to them, "Why don't you come to our temple?" I mean why should we encourage them? They'll only say, "We have our *Ravi Dass Bhawan*, we will go there thank you". They just want to stick to their traditions. There is no discrimination against *Chamars* at the Society, none at all. I mean we will allow *Chamars* to worship at our temple if they want to. (*Agarwal* man, 61 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 32).

On balance, it is suggested that the comments of the two *Chamar* interviewees are more representative of the truth than those of the *Agarwal* man above. Although the statement of this man denies any discriminatory or exclusionary behaviour against *Chamars* visiting the Hindu Cultural Society, a closer look at the specific language he uses suggests otherwise. The term, 'our temple', and the phrase, 'we will allow *Chamars* to worship at our temple if they want to', seem exclusionary in themselves. Indeed, such discourse implies that the Society is not a body which can collectively belong to *Chamars*, as it does to members from *jatis* of higher ritual ranking; rather, it is place of worship in which *Chamars* will only ever hold the status of visitors.

It appears, therefore, that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is operational within Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. This is manifest in the way Punjabi Hindu centres of worship in the city are only frequented by persons from certain *jatis* or groups of *jatis* and *varnas*; a phenomenon in which the ritual hierarchy has been shown to play a fundamental role.

#### 7.1.6 Summary

This section began by using sample interview data to show that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is present amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, and that members of this community are fully aware of their *jati* or *varna's* position within this hierarchy. Further analysis of interview data suggested that this ritual hierarchy is still operational for Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, because it provides the basis of negative stereotyping and consequent discriminatory behaviour which, in turn, influences the marriage practices and temple usage patterns of Punjabi Hindus in the city.

However, the above discussion also shows that much of this ritually based discrimination in Bradford is quite covert. Certainly, no Punjabi Hindus appear to be outrightly banned from any particular centres of worship in the city on the basis of low ritual ranking. Equally, *Chamar* interviewees who claimed to have suffered personal abuse because of their *jati's* low ritual status said that this usually involved subtle verbal attacks behind their backs. This gives an overall impression that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system, though present and operational amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, is not particularly strong or visible within this community. This idea is developed further in Chapter Eight, where changes in this hierarchy, resulting from the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, will be analysed. It will be seen that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system has weakened considerably in this migration process.

## 7.2 THE TRIPARTITE HIERARCHY OF THE CASTE SYSTEM AMONGST BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS

### 7.2.1 Overview

The remainder of this chapter investigates the degree to which the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system is present and operational in a fixed and coterminous form amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus (see Section 3.2.1). If it did exist and operate in this arrangement, then those Punjabi Hindus belonging to *jatis* with a high position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system (e.g. *Khatris*) should have equally elevated positions in its economic and political hierarchies. Similarly, those from *jatis* of low ritual ranking (e.g. *Chamars*) would be expected to have a correspondingly low degree of economic and political power. This and following sections try to establish if this holds true, or whether there is no relationship between the *jati* and *varna* affiliation of Punjabi Hindus in Bradford and their economic and political standing, or whether the reality lies somewhere between these two extremes.

To achieve this, qualitative and quantitative research findings are used. Qualitative data are presented in this section, which examines interviewees' perceptions of the relationships between the ritual, economic and political hierarchies of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Quantitative data are used in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 to further investigate relationships within this tripartite hierarchy amongst the Bradford sample.

It is important to remember that the tripartite hierarchy only applies to the social units of *jati* and caste within the caste system, and not the *varnas* (see Section 3.2.1). However, in the rest of this chapter (and Chapter Eight) the *Brahmin varna* is discussed along with other *jatis* where the tripartite hierarchy is concerned. This is because the *jati* is not present amongst *Brahminical* Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford (see Section 6.1.3). Consequently, the *Brahmin varna* must be used as a surrogate for *jati* in discussions about hierarchy.

### 7.2.2 Interviewees' perceptions of the tripartite hierarchy

In the 50 sample interviews, respondents were asked three types of question to try to determine the extent to which the tripartite hierarchy operates in a fixed and coterminous form amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. To establish the relationship between the ritual and economic hierarchies, interviewees were asked a question like:

Amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, is there any relationship between people's caste and how well off/wealthy they are?

Equally, as regards the relationship between the ritual and political hierarchies, they were asked a question such as:

Do any particular castes, or persons from any particular castes, appear to lead or dominate the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford?

Interviewees were also asked:

Is there a relationship between the caste of Punjabi Hindus in Bradford and the type of job they do?

This last question encapsulated dual inquiry about the position of Punjabi Hindus in the political hierarchy, in terms of the status and political prestige of the different jobs they hold, and the economic hierarchy, in terms of the varied wealth creation potential of these different jobs. As with the other questions, this information was related back to the ritual hierarchy in terms of the *jati* affiliations of Punjabi Hindus. For reasons explained in Section 4.5.5, it can be seen that the term 'caste' was used in all these inquiries.

The majority of responses received to these three types of question indicated that the interviewees considered the tripartite hierarchy not be operational in a fixed and coterminous form amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. For example, when replying to the first question, regarding the relationship between the ritual and economic hierarchies, all interviewees, irrespective of their *jati* affiliation, forwarded responses such as:

I don't think higher castes are better off than low castes here in Bradford. I mean I've seen poor *Brahmins* and rich *Brahmins*. Caste doesn't make any difference here when it comes to money. (*Chamar* man, 41 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 42).

Or:

The wealth of Punjabi Hindus in Bradford depends on them as individuals, and on their education, it's got nothing to do with caste. The opportunities for education and making money are open here to everybody if they're hard working. I've seen *Chamars* progressing well financially and *Brahmins* on the bread line. It depends on personal initiative. (*Khatti* man, 61 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 35).

Similarly, for the second type of question, concerning the relationship between the ritual and political hierarchies, all interviewees also felt there to be no relationship between the *jati* affiliation of different Punjabi Hindus in Bradford and their political power and status.

The third type of question, regarding the sort of jobs people of different *jati* affiliation tend to do, again received a large number of responses suggesting there is no relationship between these two factors. However, some *Brahmin* and *Khatti* interviewees provided more thought provoking answers. Such responses implied that *Brahmin* and *Khatti* Punjabi Hindus in Bradford are well educated and have jobs of high political status and wealth-creating potential, as compared to *Chamars* who, according to these interviewees, have poor education and jobs of low political prestige and remuneration. The following two interview extracts are typical of this viewpoint:

**Interviewee:** When it comes to jobs, all *Brahmins* and *Khattris*, you look at them, the majority are either doctors, or they're pharmacists, dentists, or whatever. And they're more educated. I know it's wrong though.

**Interviewer:** Do you think lower castes have good jobs as well?

**Interviewee:** Not as much no. A lot of *Chamars* are factory workers in Bradford, and they're not as well educated. (*Brahmin* man, 22 yrs, 2nd generation. Interview 49).

These *Chamars* they live in terraced houses and they work in factories, but there are more *Khattris* and *Brahmins* with top jobs. (*Khattri* man, 42 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 12).

In summary, the majority of responses from sample interviewees, to the three types of question outlined above, suggested no positive relationship between the ritual hierarchy of the caste system and its economic and political hierarchies amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. This implies that the tripartite hierarchy is not present and operational in a fixed and coterminous form within this community. However, when responding to the third type of question, a handful of *Brahmin* and *Khattri* interviewees (such as the two above) contradicted this view. Such responses suggested there is a positive relationship between the position Bradford's Punjabi Hindus hold in the ritual hierarchy (in terms of their *jati* affiliation) and the economic and political hierarchies (as determined by the political prestige and wealth-creating potential of their occupations).

It might be the case that this handful of *Brahmin* and *Khattri* interviewees were knowingly providing inaccurate information, so as to instil a false perception in the interviewer that they are economically and politically more successful than Punjabi Hindus from *jatis* of lower ritual ranking in Bradford. However, quantitative study findings suggest that such a cynical interpretation of interview evidence may be unfounded. Certainly, much of the quantitative sample data presented in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 indicates that in Bradford, Punjabi Hindus from *jatis* of high ritual ranking often have similarly elevated positions in the economic and political spheres, thus supporting the statements of the two *Brahmin* and *Khattri* interviewees above. This would suggest that the tripartite hierarchy **has** maintained a fixed and coterminous form amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, at least to a certain extent.

## 7.3 ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS BY THEIR *JATI* AFFILIATION

### 7.3.1 Overview

In this section, five key economic variables relating to all, or some, of the 123 sample households are compared with these households' *jati* affiliations, as determined in Section 6.2.1. This procedure allows for an evaluation of the relationship between the economic and ritual hierarchies of the caste system at household level within the Bradford sample. In turn, this will facilitate enquiry concerning the extent to which these two elements of the caste system's tripartite hierarchy are present and operational in a

fixed and coterminous form amongst this sample community. The five key household economic variables discussed are property values, central heating, car ownership, car values and independent schooling.

In this comparative analysis, sample households affiliated to the *Agarwal* and *Sunari jatis* are grouped together, as are those belonging to the *Darji* and *Nais jatis*. This is because of the small numbers of sample households affiliated to these particular *jatis*, which in the case of the *Agarwals* and *Sunaris* is four and five respectively, and for the *Nais* and *Darjis*, ten and one. The grouping together of these households therefore simplifies analysis. It can also be considered appropriate, because each of these two pairs of *jatis* are part of one specific *varna*. In the case of the *Agarwals* and *Sunaris* this is the *Vaishya varna*, and for the *Nais* and *Darjis*, the *Shudras*.

### 7.3.2 Property values of sample households by *jati* affiliation

Before discussing the property values of the 123 sample households, it is worth noting that they were all owner occupied. Interestingly, this 100% level of owner occupation in the sample community is somewhat higher than the 1991 Census figure of 88% owner occupation<sup>1</sup> for all Indians living in Bradford<sup>2</sup> (see Rees *et al.*, 1995: 583).

It is suggested that a positive relationship would occur between the market value of a house and the *jati* affiliation of those living in it if the economic and ritual elements of the tripartite hierarchy operated in a fixed and coterminous form. Sample households affiliated to *jatis* with a high position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system would, therefore, be expected to be better represented in properties of high market value - indicating a high position in the economic hierarchy - as compared to those affiliated to *jatis* of lower ritual ranking. Equally, households affiliated to *jatis* of low ritual ranking would be expected to be better represented in properties of low market value.

Questionnaire and interview respondents in the 123 sample households were asked to make a self-assessment of the value of the property in which they lived<sup>3</sup>. Property bulletins were then obtained from estate agents in Bradford, and the estimates given by respondents for their properties' values were cross-checked against those of similar properties in the bulletins. This procedure ensured that all estimates of property value were being made by respondents for the same point in time, and that they were not outdated. Checking the property estimates in this way also protected against respondents

<sup>1</sup> This figure includes the 1991 Census totals of 'owner occupied outright' and 'owner occupied buying'.

<sup>2</sup> It should be remembered that the Bradford sample includes households in the two Leeds based census wards of Pudsey North and South. Consequently, the comparison of sample data with the 1991 Census figures for Bradford is only approximate.

<sup>3</sup> The small number of respondents living in properties which double as business premises were asked not to include 'business goodwill' into estimates of their property's value.

substantially over or undervaluing their property. Most, however, had a good idea of their property's current market value and did not significantly over or underestimate it. Therefore, only a few, minor revisions to the property values given by respondents had to be made. This checking process was undertaken during the summer of 1995 and consequently, the final revised estimates of property value are representative of this time.

To investigate the relationship between the estimated property values of the 123 sample households and their *jati* affiliation, these two variables are crosstabulated in Table 7.2. The property values have been collapsed into three categories in this table to aid data analysis.

**Table 7.2: Estimated property values<sup>①</sup> of 123 sample households by household *jati* affiliation**

Estimated property value of sample household	Percentage of sample households				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khatttri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
≤ £49,000	20	21	33	55	49
£50 - 74,000	50	32	33	27	44
≥ £75,000	30	46	33	18	7
<b>Total percentage<sup>②</sup></b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Total number of sample households</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>45</b>

N = 123.

① Values are all summer 1995 estimates.

② Percentages may not sum to exactly 100% due to rounding errors.

In Table 7.2, the observed relationship between the *jati* affiliation of sample households and their associated property values shows a basic two-fold division. Those affiliated to twice-born<sup>4</sup> *jatis* with a high position in the ritual hierarchy - namely, *Brahmin*, *Khatttri* and *Agarwal & Sunari* households - are better represented in properties of higher value (i.e. ≥ £75,000) than those affiliated to non twice-born *jatis* of lower ritual ranking - namely, *Darji & Nais* and *Chamar* households. Equally, these ritually low ranking sample households are better represented in the properties of low value (i.e. ≤ £49,000) than those affiliated to twice-born *jatis*.

Assuming that a high property value indicates the high position of a household in the economic hierarchy, then the relationship between the property values of the 123 sample households and their *jati* affiliation implies a broad degree of parity between the economic and ritual hierarchies of the caste system. In turn, this indicates that these two elements of the tripartite hierarchy operate in a fixed and coterminous form within the Bradford sample. However, these initial findings must be approached with caution, because although sample households affiliated to twice-born *jatis* are, *en masse*, better

<sup>4</sup>Again, for an explanation of the term 'twice-born', see Footnote Ten in Section 3.2.3 of Chapter Three.

represented in higher value properties than those affiliated to non twice-born *jatis*, there are some important variations within these two groups.

If the economic and ritual elements of the tripartite hierarchy were operating in a fully fixed and coterminous fashion then, amongst sample households affiliated to twice-born *jatis*, it would be expected that property values would mirror *jati* position in the ritual hierarchy. Thus, *Brahmin* households, with the highest ritual ranking, would be expected to fare best in terms of their property value, followed by *Khatti* and *Agarwal & Sunari* households, which have progressively lower ritual ranking. Similarly, amongst sample households affiliated to non twice-born *jatis*, it would be expected that the *Chamar* households, of lowest ritual ranking, would fare worst in terms of their property values.

Table 7.2 shows that these expectations do not apply in practice. For example, amongst those households affiliated to twice-born *jatis*, it is *Khatti* households which appear to fare best in terms of property values<sup>5</sup>. Those affiliated to the *Brahmin* and *Agarwal & Sunari jatis* fare less well, although between these two types of sample household it is difficult to distinguish which holds the superior position in terms of property values. Similarly, amongst sample households affiliated to non twice-born *jatis*, the *Chamar* households do not appear to fare any worse in terms of their property values than those affiliated to *Darji & Nais jatis*.

In summary, the relationship between the estimated property values for the 123 sample households and their *jati* affiliation implies a broad degree of parity between the economic and ritual hierarchies of the caste system; at least at the wider level of sample households affiliated to twice-born and non twice-born *jatis*. In turn, this suggests that these two elements of the tripartite hierarchy are present and operational in a fixed and coterminous form within the Bradford sample. However, at finer levels of distinction than twice-born and non twice-born, these economic and ritual elements of the tripartite hierarchy do not always operate in this fixed and coterminous fashion. In short, **within** twice-born or non twice-born groups, the position of sample households in the ritual hierarchy, as determined by their *jati* affiliation, is not always fully in line with their position in the economic hierarchy, as determined by the value of their property.

---

<sup>5</sup> Indeed as well as having the largest representation in the high property values category ( $\geq$  £75,000), nine out of the 13 (69%) *Khatti* households in this category actually had property values  $\geq$  £125,000, with the highest of these reaching £200,000; as compared with only one of the three (33%) *Agarwal & Sunari* affiliated households in this category, and two out of the nine (22%) *Brahmin* households.

### 7.3.3 Central heating status of sample households by *jati* affiliation

The presence of central heating in a household is a useful indicator of that household's disposable income and economic strength. A positive relationship between the central heating status of sample households and their *jati* affiliation would therefore be expected if the economic and ritual elements of the tripartite hierarchy operated in a fixed and coterminous form within the Bradford sample.

**Table 7.3: Central heating status of 123 sample households by household *jati* affiliation**

Central heating status of sample households	Percentage of sample households				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khattri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
Households with central heating	83	82	100	55	73
Households without central heating	17	18	0	46	27
Total percentage <sup>①</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of sample households	30	28	9	11	45

N = 123.

① Percentages may not sum to exactly 100% due to rounding errors.

In Table 7.3, the observed relationship between the *jati* affiliation of sample households and their associated central heating status shows a basic two-fold division, similar to that seen with property values. Thus, households affiliated to twice-born *jatis* are more likely to have central heating than those belonging to non twice-born *jatis*. Again, such a division implies a broad degree of parity between the ritual and economic hierarchies of the caste system, and this suggests that these two elements of the tripartite hierarchy are present and operational in a fixed and coterminous form amongst Punjabi Hindus in the Bradford sample. However, as with the relationship between the property values of sample households and their *jati* affiliation, closer analysis reveals hierarchical discrepancies.

Admittedly, amongst sample households affiliated to twice-born *jatis*, a slightly higher percentage of *Brahmin* households (83%) have central heating compared to those belonging to the *Khattri jati* (82%). However, households affiliated to the *Agarwal & Sunari jatis*, which are of the lowest ritual ranking in this twice-born group, have the highest level of central heating of all (100%). Similarly, amongst non twice-born households, it is those of the *Darji & Nais jatis* which have the lowest percentages of central heating (55%), whilst *Chamar* households have a higher percentage level (73%), even though they hold the lowest ritual ranking.

It is interesting to note that all sample households, apart from those affiliated to *Agarwal & Sunari jatis*, have a significantly lower percentage level of central heating

than the 1991 Census figure of approximately 96%, given for all Indian households in Bradford (see Rees *et al.*, 1995: 586).

### 7.3.4 Car ownership in sample households by *jati* affiliation

Car ownership is another useful indicator of a household's disposable income and economic strength. A positive relationship between the number of cars owned by sample households and their *jati* affiliation might therefore be expected if the economic and ritual elements of the tripartite hierarchy operated in a fixed and coterminous form within the Bradford sample.

To investigate this, questionnaire and interview respondents were asked how many cars their household owned<sup>6</sup>. Responses to this enquiry were only gained from 121 of the 123 sample households, as two refused to provide the relevant information. The number of cars owned by these 121 households is crosstabulated with their *jati* affiliation in Table 7.4. The number of cars owned per household is collapsed into three categories in this table, these being none, one, and two or more. This maintains simplicity, especially as there were only four sample households with more than two cars.

**Table 7.4: Number of cars owned by 121<sup>①</sup> sample households by household *jati* affiliation**

Number of cars owned by sample households	Percentage of sample households				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khatttri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
Households with: no car	7	15	11	0	33
one car	59	48	77	91	62
two or more cars	35	37	11	9	4
Total percentage <sup>②</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of sample households	29	27	9	11	45

N = 121.

① Two sample households not included because no data were given by respondents.

② Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

In Table 7.4, the relationship between the *jati* affiliation of sample households and the number of cars they own shows that *Brahmin* and *Khatttri* households are more likely to have a greater number of cars than the rest. Although this relationship does not demonstrate the two-fold split between twice-born and non twice-born households, witnessed in Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3, it still implies a broad degree of parity between the ritual and economic hierarchies of the caste system. Again, this suggests that these elements of the tripartite hierarchy are present and operational in a fixed and coterminous form within the sample community.

<sup>6</sup> Company cars were counted, but respondents were asked not to include cars that were used solely for business. Also, other vehicles such as vans, motorbikes etc. were not considered.

As above, however, closer analysis reveals hierarchical discrepancies. For example, *Brahmin* and *Khattri* households show a similar performance for the car ownership variable, even though *Brahmins* are of higher ritual ranking, and might therefore be expected to do better than *Khattris* in terms of car ownership. Such discrepancies also exist amongst households belonging to the other *jatis*. Thus, *Agarwal & Sunari* and *Darji & Nais* households are fairly evenly matched in terms of their car ownership status, even though the former occupy a superior ritual position to the latter. Nevertheless, *Chamar* households of lowest ritual ranking still fare worst in terms of car ownership, with only 4% of them having two or more cars, and 33% having none.

Interestingly, all sample households, apart from those that are *Chamar* affiliated, have notably lower percentages with no car than the 1991 Census figure of approximately 30% for all Indian households in Bradford (see Rees *et al.*, 1995: 586).

### 7.3.5 Car values in sample households by *jati* affiliation

Using ownership statistics as surrogate indicators for disposable income and economic strength can be misleading. For example, in terms of the car ownership statistics above, a household with two or more cars may not necessarily have more disposable income than a household with one. One problem here is that a household with two cars might be spending a greater proportion of its disposable income on cars, whilst the household with one might be spending more of it on something else. A second problem is that the number of cars owned does not reflect their quality or value, yet this is an important consideration, because in a two car household the cars in question might be of collectively much lower value than the single vehicle in a one car household.

The first of these problems is difficult to resolve without a comprehensive audit of a household's income and expenditure patterns, and consequently is not undertaken here. However, the second problem is easily overcome if the values of all the cars owned by a household can be determined and summated. Such an exercise would provide a statistic which may be even more useful than car ownership as an indicator of a household's disposable income and economic strength.

Accordingly, the values of all cars in the 99 sample households which owned them were calculated. To do this, questionnaire and interview respondents were asked the make, model and registration year of the car, or cars, their household owned. Using this information, the values of these cars were estimated to the nearest £100 using Glass's Guide (Glass's Information Services Ltd., 1995); a trade publication which provides estimates of car values. For very old cars not contained in this guide, the Yorkshire Auto Trader newspaper was used to establish car values. Once all car values had been

estimated, they were summated for each household. Thus, each of the 99 car owning sample households had a single car value attached to it. This was an aggregate value if that household had two or more cars, or a single value where it had only one.

The car values attributed to the 99 relevant households have been crosstabulated with their *jati* affiliations in Table 7.5. Household car values range from £400 to £51,300. The lower values tend to be those where the household has just one car, whereas the larger values tend to be the aggregates, representing households with two or more cars. Hence, the £51,300 figure referred to a wealthy *Khattri* household with two Mercedes. Because of this substantial range of values, they have been collapsed into three categories in Table 7.5. As the process of estimating car values was undertaken using a June 1995 copy of Glass's Guide, then the car values can be seen as representative of this time.

**Table 7.5: Values<sup>①</sup> of the cars owned by 99<sup>②</sup> sample households by household *jati* affiliation**

Value of cars owned by sample households	Percentage of sample households				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khattri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
≤ £3,900	33	26	38	82	57
£4,000-9,900	37	26	38	0	37
≥ £10,000	30	48	25	18	7
<b>Total percentage<sup>③</sup></b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Total number of sample households</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>30</b>

N = 99.

① Values are all summer 1995 estimates.

② 22 sample households not included because they owned no cars, and two not included because no data on car ownership were provided by respondents (see Section 7.3.4).

③ Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

In Table 7.5, the relationship between the *jati* affiliation of the 99 sample households and their associated car values shows a basic two-fold division similar to that seen for property values and central heating status. Thus, households affiliated to twice-born *jatis* appear likely to own cars amounting to greater values than those affiliated to non twice-born *jatis* of lower ritual ranking.

Again, however, there are hierarchical discrepancies at finer *jati* distinction. For example, amongst twice-born sample households, those affiliated to the *Khattri jati* fare better in terms of their car values than *Brahmin* households of higher ritual ranking. Similarly, amongst non twice-born households, it can be seen that their car values are not fully in line with their respective positions in the ritual hierarchy either. Thus, *Chamar* households appear to perform slightly better in terms of this economic variable than those belonging to *Darji & Nais jatis*.

### 7.3.6 Independent schooling in sample households by *jati* affiliation

In this study, parents' use of fee paying independent education for their children is used as another indicator of a household's disposable income and economic strength. It could be argued that independent education has a political dimension which may discourage wealthy parents from using it out of principle, thus making it unsuitable as an economic indicator. On the other hand, independent education is expensive, and it is still usually the domain of wealthy rather than poor parents, especially since the abolition of the Assisted Places Scheme. In this respect, this study considers it to be an appropriate indicator of economic strength at the household level. Accordingly, a positive relationship between a household's *jati* affiliation, and the use of fee paying independent education by the offspring living in that household, might be expected if the economic and ritual elements of the tripartite hierarchy existed in a fixed and coterminous form within the sample community.

To investigate this, parents with children of school age were asked the name of the school their child attended, or sometimes the children themselves may have been asked this question. Older parents whose children had left school were asked the name of the school their children **had** attended. In only one sample household did parents fail to provide information on the schooling of their children. Of the remaining 122 sample households, data on the schooling of children were only relevant to 107 of them, because 15 contained families with no children, or children that were below school age. For these 107 households providing data on schooling, the names of schools were checked out to determine whether they were fee paying or state administered. This was achieved using a list of LEA schools provided by Bradford Metropolitan Council, and through contacts with an HMC<sup>7</sup> representative who had knowledge of independent schools in the Bradford district.

It was established that different children in individual sample households did not always go (or had not always gone) to the same school. However, there were no cases in which one child from a given household only attended (or had only attended) a state school, whilst another child from that same household attended (or had attended) an independent one<sup>8</sup>. Consequently, the 107 households could be divided into those in which the children attended (or had attended) state schools, and those in which the children used (or had used) fee paying independent establishments. This information is crosstabulated against the *jati* affiliation of these sample households in Table 7.6.

---

<sup>7</sup> The HMC or Head Masters' Conference is the body to which most fee paying independent schools belong.

<sup>8</sup> Although respondents with children/a child attending (who had attended) an independent school often revealed that these children/this child had at some point attended a state school, usually at primary level.

In Table 7.6, the relationship between the *jati* affiliation of sample households and the type of school the children from them attend (or attended), shows that those belonging to the *Brahmin* and *Khattri jatis* are more likely to have their children at a fee paying school than households affiliated to *jatis* of lower ritual ranking. Although this relationship does not demonstrate the two-fold split between twice-born and non twice-born households, it still implies a broad degree of parity between the ritual and economic hierarchies of the caste system, again suggesting that these elements of the tripartite hierarchy are fixed and coterminous within the sample community.

**Table 7.6: Type of school attended by children in 107<sup>①</sup> sample households by household *jati* affiliation**

Type of school attended by children in sample households	Percentage of sample households				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khattri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
Fee paying independent schools	21	41	13	13	5
State schools only	79	59	88	88	95
Total percentage <sup>②</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of sample households	24	27	8	8	40

N = 107.

① 16 sample households not included for reasons outlined above.

② Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

However, as with other economic indicators, there are hierarchical discrepancies at the finer level. Thus, a considerably higher percentage of *Khattri* households (41%) have children who attend (or have attended) fee paying independent schools, as compared to the 21% of ritually higher ranking *Brahmin* households. Similarly, amongst households belonging to the *Agarwal & Sunari* and *Darji & Nais jatis* the take up of fee paying education for their children does not follow the sequence of the ritual hierarchy either, because the percentage of households from these two groups whose children attend (or have attended) fee paying schools is an identical 13%.

### 7.3.7 Synthesis of findings from sample households

This section has provided a detailed analysis of the relationship between five key economic variables relating to all, or some, of the 123 sample households and these households' *jati* affiliations. This has demonstrated that, at the broadest level of analysis, a positive relationship exists between the ritual and economic hierarchies of the caste system within the Bradford sample. Thus, households affiliated to twice-born *jatis*, with a traditionally higher position in the ritual hierarchy, often perform better in terms of the economic variables under scrutiny than those affiliated to non twice-born *jatis* of lower ritual ranking. Such observations indicate that the economic and ritual elements of the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system are present and operational in a fixed and

coterminous form within the Bradford sample, at least at this broad, two-fold level of analysis.

However, closer analysis at finer levels of *jati* distinction has revealed that these ritual and economic elements of the tripartite hierarchy do not **always** operate in a fully fixed and coterminous fashion. Thus, amongst those households affiliated to *jatis* which would be considered twice-born or non twice-born, their position in the ritual hierarchy, as determined by their *jati* affiliation, is not always commensurate with their position in the economic hierarchy, as determined by their performance in terms of the economic variable under scrutiny.

Nevertheless, despite the apparent confusion at this finer level of analysis, one distinct pattern is beginning to emerge. Amongst all sample households, it is the those of *Khattri* affiliation which often seem to fare best in terms of the economic variable under study, and which consequently hold the highest position in the economic hierarchy of the caste system, even though they do not occupy the superior position in the ritual hierarchy. This is certainly the case with economic variables of house value, car value and independent schooling. Amongst the twice-born *Brahmin* and *Agarwal & Sunari* households, or the non twice-born *Darji & Nais* and *Chamar* households, there is, as yet, no distinctive pattern emerging at this finer level of analysis. Hence, the households affiliated to the different *jatis* within these two groups appear fairly equal in terms of their composite performance across all five economic indicators.

The next section compares the *jati* affiliations of sample household heads with some key politico-economic variables. This allows for an examination of all three elements of the tripartite hierarchy within the Bradford sample. The findings from this will be seen to both support and develop the patterns observed in this section.

## **7.4 POLITICO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY THEIR *JATI* AFFILIATION**

### **7.4.1 Overview**

In this section three politico-economic variables relating to the male and female heads of the sample households are compared with their *jati* affiliations. (For a definition of the household head see Section 4.6.1). This allows for an evaluation of the relationship between the political, economic and ritual hierarchies of the caste system at the level of the individual within the sample population. Such a procedure will facilitate further investigation into whether the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system is present and operational in a fixed and coterminous form within the Bradford sample.

The three politico-economic variables under scrutiny are the educational qualifications, occupations and class affiliations of male and female household heads. These variables are 'politico-economic' because they reflect the economic strength of a household head in terms of their earning capacity or potential earning capacity, but also their political standing in terms of the power, status and prestige which can be attached to their particular educational qualification, occupation or class.

The data relating to male and female household heads are dealt with separately. This is because the experiences of males and females in terms of the three politico-economic variables under scrutiny are often dissimilar. This may be due to different ambitions and expectations which men and women hold as regards their education and employment, but it is also a result of the unequal opportunities and life chances which are open to women and men in these areas, with those for women in particular often being restricted due to discriminatory practices born out of patriarchy.

For reasons explained earlier, the household heads belonging to the *Agarwal & Sunari jatis* are grouped together for analysis in this section, as are those from the *Darji & Nais jatis* (see Section 7.3.1).

#### **7.4.2 Educational qualifications of sample household heads by *jati* affiliation**

An individual's educational qualifications are a measure of his/her political status and prestige in society, as well as economic potential, because higher educational qualifications increase the chances of securing employment with an above average wage. For a Punjabi Hindu, the level of educational qualification attained could therefore be taken as one of several possible indicators of that individual's position in the political and economic hierarchies of the caste system. Thus, if the tripartite hierarchy operated in a fixed and coterminous form within the Bradford sample, then a positive relationship would be expected between the educational qualifications of sample household heads and their *jati* affiliation.

To investigate this, details were obtained from questionnaire and interview respondents on the highest educational qualifications gained by sample household heads. This revealed different types of 'highest qualification'. For the purposes of data analysis it was necessary to collapse these different types into three basic categories; these being, 'degree level qualifications', 'school age qualifications' and 'no qualifications'.

Sample household heads falling into the category of 'degree level qualifications' included those with a degree or HND from Britain, or an equivalent qualification from

India.<sup>9</sup> The category of 'school age qualifications' included those whose highest educational attainment was awarded at 16+ or 18+, after passing standard public examinations such as GCSEs (or O-levels) and A-levels in Britain, or Matriculation and Higher Matriculation in India. This category also included those sample household heads whose highest qualification was a vocational based NVQ (National Vocational Qualification) or City and Guilds, both of which are usually taken at school age. Those with no qualifications obviously fitted into the 'no qualifications' category.

The categorised data on educational qualifications were subdivided into those relating to male and female heads of sample households. These two data sets were then crosstabulated with the *jati* affiliation of these male and female heads. The crosstabulation for males is shown in Table 7.7, and that for females in Table 7.8.

Although there was a total of 123 sample households, Table 7.7 only deals with 119 male sample household heads. This is because three sample households had no male head. One of these cases involved the *Chamar* household headed by a widow, and the other two cases were those *Chamar* households headed by a single female. Two other sample households also had no male head, because they were headed by lone female *Khattri* divorcees. However, data relating to the educational qualifications of their estranged Punjabi Hindu husbands were still made available. These data are therefore included in Table 7.7, as the estranged husbands were once male heads within these two sample households. Finally, the male head of one sample household was white, and was therefore not included in Table 7.7, which refers exclusively to Punjabi Hindus.

In Table 7.8 there are only 112 female sample household heads accounted for, rather than 123. This is because the female heads of five sample households were not Punjabi Hindu, three being white and two Sikh. Five sample households also had no female head, four being occupied by single males and one by a divorced *Khattri* man<sup>10</sup>. One female household head also chose not to provide data on her qualifications.

In Tables 7.7 and 7.8, the relationship between the *jati* affiliation of sample household heads and their highest educational qualification shows a two-fold division similar to that seen with many household economic variables in the Section 7.3. Thus, householders affiliated to twice-born *jatis* have notably higher levels of qualification than those affiliated to non twice-born *jatis*. If educational qualifications can be taken as a measure of a Punjabi Hindu's political and economic standing, as has been suggested above, then such a relationship implies a broad degree of parity between the ritual,

<sup>9</sup>The comparative value of Indian and British qualifications was assessed using the British Council's 'International Guide to Qualifications in Education' (British Council, 1991).

<sup>10</sup>For further details on the familial, marital and ethnic structures of sample households refer to Section 6.2.1.

political and economic hierarchies of the caste system. In turn, this suggests that the tripartite hierarchy is present and operational in a fixed and coterminous form within the Bradford sample.

**Table 7.7: Highest educational qualifications of 119<sup>①</sup> male sample household heads by their *jati* affiliation**

Highest qualification of the male household head	Percentage of male household heads				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khatttri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
Degree level qualification	40	56	44	18	29
School age qualification	27	33	33	36	29
No qualification	33	11	22	45	43
Total percentage <sup>②</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of male household heads	30	27	9	11	42

N = 119.

① Some male head householders not included for reasons outlined above.

② Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

**Table 7.8: Highest educational qualifications of 112<sup>①</sup> female sample household heads by their *jati* affiliation**

Highest qualification of the female household head	Percentage of female household heads				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khatttri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
Degree level qualification	30	50	44	11	17
School age qualification	30	35	11	22	29
No qualification	41	15	44	67	54
Total percentage <sup>②</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of female household heads	27	26	9	9	41

N = 112.

① Some female head householders not included for reasons outlined above.

② Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

However, as with the relationships observed in Section 7.3, these initial findings must be treated with caution, because closer inspection of Tables 7.7 and 7.8 reveals hierarchical discrepancies amongst sample household heads belonging to twice-born and non twice-born *jatis*. For example, amongst twice-born male and female household heads, *Khatttris*, followed by *Agarwals & Sunaris*, perform better in terms of their educational qualifications than *Brahmins* of highest ritual ranking. Equally, amongst non twice-born male and female household heads, those affiliated to *Darji & Nais jatis* do less well than ritually lower ranking *Chamars* in terms of their qualifications.

Female sample household heads affiliated to all *jatis*, apart from *Khatttris*, are under-represented in 'degree level qualifications' and over-represented in the 'no qualifications' category, as compared to male head householders. This probably reflects inequality in the educational opportunities open to men and women. Such inequality may

have been particularly important amongst first generation household heads who undertook their education in India some years ago, when women's educational opportunities and expectations were often likely to be lower than those of men.

Another point of interest is the proportion of sample household heads with degrees. The 1991 Census indicates that the percentage of Indians  $\geq 18$  years of age with degree level qualifications in Bradford and Great Britain is 10% and 15% respectively (see Rees *et al.*, 1995: 579). Tables 7.7 and 7.8 demonstrate that the percentages of sample household heads with degrees (from both genders and all *jatis*, apart from females affiliated to *Darji*, *Nais* and *Chamar jatis*) are considerably higher than either of these census figures. Whilst this phenomenon might be due partly to the non-recognition by census enumerators of Indian degrees (which account for a significant proportion of those amongst sample household heads), it is possible that it also reflects a generally higher level of educational attainment amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus as compared to the wider Indian population in the city.

#### 7.4.3 Occupations of sample household heads by *jati* affiliation

An individual's job is a measure of their political status, in terms of the prestige this type of job holds in society, as well as their economic power, in terms of the kind of wage which might typically be expected from it. A positive relationship between the *jati* affiliation of sample household heads and their type of job might therefore be expected if the tripartite hierarchy operated in a fixed and coterminous form in the sample community.

Data were obtained on the types of job currently undertaken by sample household heads. Many different job titles were given and it was therefore necessary to collapse these into a number of occupational categories. This was achieved using the Standard Occupational Classification or SOC<sup>11</sup>. At the most detailed level of classification the SOC recognises 371 types of job or 'occupational unit groups'. Each of these can be collapsed into a 'minor occupational group', of which there are 77, and a 'major occupational group', of which there are nine. The SOC provides a coding index (see OPCS, 1990b) from which thousands of different job titles can be classified into one of these 371, 77 and nine groups. This index was used to collapse the job titles of male and female sample household heads into the nine major occupational groups of the SOC. These are shown in Table 7.9.

---

<sup>11</sup>For information on the development of the SOC see: Thomas & Elias (1989); OPCS (1990a: 1; 1991: 3-4).

**Table 7.9: SOC major occupational groups into which the job titles of sample household heads were collapsed**

SOC major group number	SOC major group description
1	Managers and administrators
2	Professional occupations
3	Associate professional and technical occupations
4	Clerical and secretarial occupations
5	Craft and related occupations
6	Personal and protective service occupations
7	Sales occupations
8	Plant and machine operatives
9	Other occupations

Source: Adapted from OPCS (1990a: 13).

Further information on the types of job contained within the SOC major occupational groups shown in Table 7.9 can be found in OPCS (1990a). By referring to this publication it is easy to see that the ordering of these groups, from one through to nine, reflects the descending political prestige and earning potential of the types of job which would be categorised as belonging to them. Thus, major groups one and two are respectively characterised by a variety of managerial and professional job types, all of which would typically be regarded as prestigious and well paid, and would be usually undertaken by persons with above average levels of qualification. Conversely, major groups eight and nine encompass job types which are typically blue collar manual occupations of low prestige and remuneration, and which are usually undertaken by persons with below average levels of qualification.

In Table 7.10, the SOC major occupational groups into which the jobs of male sample household heads fall are crosstabulated with these householders' *jati* affiliations. Table 7.11 presents the corresponding crosstabulation for female heads. Data for males and females are tackled separately because their experiences of employment can be very different. To simplify crosstabulations, those household heads with job types falling into major occupational groups three and four are placed together, as are those with job types belonging to major groups eight and nine. This is because these two pairs of groups are quite similar. Thus, major groups three and four are each characterised by white collar occupations, which would typically be associated with middling levels of political prestige and economic strength. Similarly, major groups eight and nine both represent blue collar occupations, which might be considered as having low levels of political prestige and economic potential.

Table 7.10 provides statistics for only 98 male household heads, rather than 123. As noted in the previous section, this is because five sample households had no male head, whilst one male head householder was white. In addition, eight male household

heads were economically inactive (seven being retired and one a student), whilst another 11 were unemployed<sup>12</sup>. As these 19 male household heads had no job, they could not be included in Table 7.10.

**Table 7.10: SOC major occupational groups of 98<sup>①</sup> male sample household heads by their *jati* affiliation**

SOC major group into which job of male household head falls <sup>②</sup>	Percentage of male household heads				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khattri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
Major group 1	25	50	43	-	19
Major group 2	8	29	14	18	9
Major groups 3 & 4	25	-	14	9	3
Major group 5	8	4	14	9	13
Major group 7	4	8	-	-	6
Major groups 8 & 9	29	8	14	64	50
Total percentage <sup>③</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of male household heads	24	24	7	11	32

N = 98. (-) = 0%.

① Some male head householders not included for reasons explained above.

② There are no male head householders in SOC major group six.

③ Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

**Table 7.11: SOC major occupational groups of 65<sup>①</sup> female household heads by their *jati* affiliation**

SOC major group into which job of female household head falls	Percentage female household heads				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khattri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
Major group 1	6	17	20	-	5
Major group 2	19	28	20	-	-
Major groups 3 & 4	31	28	-	40	19
Major group 5	6	-	-	20	14
Major group 6	13	6	20	20	5
Major group 7	6	17	40	-	5
Major groups 8 & 9	19	6	-	20	52
Total percentage <sup>②</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of female household heads	16	18	5	5	21

N = 65. (-) = 0%.

① Some female head householders not included for reasons explained above.

② Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

Similarly, Table 7.11 only provides statistics for 65 female household heads. Again, as noted in the previous section, this is because three female heads of sample household were white, two were Sikh, and five sample households were headed by single or divorced males living alone. In addition, 41 female heads from the sample households were economically inactive (36 being housewives and five retired), whilst another five

<sup>12</sup>Of the 11 male household heads who were unemployed, eight were *Chamars*, two were *Brahmins*, and one was a *Khattri*.

considered themselves unemployed<sup>13</sup>. As none of these 46 female heads undertook a form of work recognised by the SOC they could not be included in Table 7.11. Finally, two female household heads did not reveal their occupation.

In both the above tables, the relationship between the *jati* affiliation of sample household heads and the SOC major occupational group into which their job falls again shows a two-fold division between twice-born and non twice-born. For example, twice born *Brahmin*, *Khatti* and *Agarwal & Sunari* head householders have higher percentages of their number with jobs in SOC major group one, in comparison to those from non twice-born *Darji & Nais* and *Chamar jatis* of lower ritual ranking. Equally, these lower ranking, non twice-born household heads generally have higher percentages of their number with jobs in SOC major groups eight and nine. It should be noted that these identified relationships are more obvious amongst male householders in Table 7.10 than amongst females in Table 7.11.

If the type of job or occupation a Punjabi Hindu undertakes can be taken as an indication of his/her position in the political and economic hierarchies of the caste system, then the relationships identified in Tables 7.10 and 7.11 would indicate that the tripartite hierarchy of the institution is present and operational in a fixed and coterminous form within the sample community, at least at the level of the twice-born and non twice-born. Having said this, the drawing of any such conclusions from Tables 7.10 and 7.11 should be viewed with caution, because of the small number of household heads which are contained in various cell counts.

A more helpful analysis might come from collapsing the job types of sample household heads into fewer occupational categories, such as blue versus white collar employment. These two categories could then be taken as crude indicators of the economic strength and political power wielded by these individuals. To investigate this, sample household heads with jobs falling into SOC major groups one, two, three, four and seven have been collapsed into the white collar category, and those with jobs in groups five, six, eight and nine into the blue collar category. The percentage of sample householders' jobs which fall into these two broad occupational categories is then crosstabulated with their *jati* affiliation in Tables 7.12 and 7.13. The former of these tables presents the results for males, the latter those for females.

Tables 7.12 and 7.13 demonstrate that the relationship between the *jati* affiliation of sample household heads and their broad occupational category is clearer than that

---

<sup>13</sup>All those female household heads who considered themselves unemployed were *Chamars*. It seems a further indication of their low economic status (self-perceived too) that these *Chamar* ladies felt they needed to seek paid work.

seen using the SOC major groups in Tables 7.10 and 7.11. Thus, head householders affiliated to twice-born *jatis* have a considerably higher percentage of white collar jobs, and a lower percentage of blue collar occupations, compared to those belonging to non twice-born *jatis*. Assuming that white collar occupations signify an elevated position of Punjabi Hindus in the political and economic hierarchies of the caste system, and blue collar occupations a lower position, then this relationship implies a broad degree of parity between the ritual, political and economic hierarchies of the institution. This provides further evidence that the tripartite hierarchy operates in a fixed and coterminous form within the Bradford sample. Again, however, Tables 7.12 and 7.13 show hierarchical discrepancies amongst sample household heads belonging to twice-born and non twice-born *jatis*. These discrepancies are identical to those seen with educational qualifications in Section 7.4.2.

**Table 7.12: Broad occupational categories of 98<sup>①</sup> male sample household heads by their *jati* affiliation**

Broad occupational category of male household head	Percentage of male household heads				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khatttri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
White collar	63	88	71	27	38
Blue collar	38	13	29	73	63
Total percentage <sup>②</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of male household heads	24	24	7	11	32

N = 98.

① Some male head householders not included for reasons identified in Table 7.10.

② Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

**Table 7.13: Broad occupational categories of 65<sup>①</sup> female sample household heads by their *jati* affiliation**

Broad occupational category of the female household head	Percentage of female household heads				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khatttri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
White collar	63	89	80	40	29
Blue collar	38	11	20	60	72
Total percentage <sup>②</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of female household heads	16	18	5	5	21

N = 65.

① Some female head householders not included for reasons identified in Table 7.11.

② Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

#### 7.4.4 Social classes of sample household heads by *jati* affiliation

In this study, social class is used as another measure of political status and economic power in society. Accordingly, if the tripartite hierarchy is fixed and coterminous, then a positive relationship would be expected between the social class and *jati* affiliation of Punjabi Hindu individuals.

The social class categories used in the British Census were applied to sample household heads. This was made possible by the fact that these categories are based on the SOC. They are arrived at by collapsing the 371 SOC occupational unit groups - which are used to classify the job titles of census returnees - into five social classes<sup>14</sup> (see Table 7.14).

**Table 7.14: Five social classes into which SOC occupational unit groups are collapsed for the British Census**

Social Class	Description
I	Professional, etc. occupations
II	Managerial and Technical occupations.
III	Skilled Occupations (N) non-manual (M) manual
IV	Partly skilled occupations
V	Unskilled occupations

Source: Adapted from OPCS (1991: 12).

Taking a Weberian stance, it could be argued that an individual's social class is a complex phenomenon, of which occupation is only one important element. Accordingly, the above method of determining social class through the SOC might be seen as inadequate, as it is solely based on occupation. On the other hand, the use of the SOC to determine social class is pragmatic, because it avoids the lengthy and difficult task of obtaining and processing the more ephemeral and subjective data from which the social class of an individual might also be derived.

In Tables 7.15 and 7.16 the SOC derived social classes of sample household heads are crosstabulated with their *jati* affiliations. The crosstabulation for male head householders is presented in Table 7.15, and that for females in 7.16. As social class is being based on occupation here, it will be seen that these tables involve identical numbers of male and female household heads to those seen in Tables 7.10 to 7.13. To aid analysis, social classes I and II have been combined, as have social classes III (manual and non-manual), and IV and V.

The relationship between the *jati* affiliation of sample household heads and their social class is similar to that seen with educational qualifications and occupations. Thus, male and female head householders affiliated to twice-born *jatis* are likely to occupy more superior class positions than those affiliated to non twice-born *jatis* of lower ritual ranking. Amongst twice-born male and female head householders, however, it is *Khattris*

<sup>14</sup>A full tabular summary of SOC occupational unit groups and their class allocation can be found in SOC Manual Volume Three (OPCS, 1991: 38-53).

who fare best in terms of their overall class position, followed by *Agarwals & Sunaris*, and then *Brahmins*. Equally, amongst non twice-born household heads, those affiliated to *Darji & Nais jatis* do less well than the *Chamars* in terms of their social class positions.

**Table 7.15: Social classes of 98<sup>①</sup> male sample household heads by their *jati* affiliation**

Social class of male household head	Percentage of male household heads				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khatttri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
Social classes I & II	46	79	71	18	31
Social class III	42	4	14	46	34
Social classes IV & V	13	16	14	36	34
Total percentage <sup>②</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number male household heads	24	24	7	11	32

N = 98.

① Some male head householders not included for reasons explained in Section 7.4.3.

② Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

**Table 7.16: Social classes of 65<sup>①</sup> female sample household heads by their *jati* affiliation**

Social class of female household head	Percentage of female household heads				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khatttri</i>	<i>Agarwal &amp; Sunari</i>	<i>Darji &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamar</i>
Social classes I & II	38	61	40	0	5
Social class III	38	16	40	80	29
Social classes IV & V	25	22	20	20	67
Total percentage <sup>②</sup>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total number of female household heads	16	18	5	5	21

N = 65.

① Some female head householders not included for reasons explained in Section 7.4.3.

② Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

## 7.5 CONCLUSION

In line with the third study aim, this chapter has examined the degree to which the hierarchy of the caste system is present and operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Qualitative interview data provided substantial evidence that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is present within this community, and that Punjabi Hindus in Bradford are aware of it. These data also demonstrated that this ritual hierarchy is operational, because it provides the basis for negative stereotyping and subsequent discriminatory practices which, in turn, influence marriage practices and temple usage patterns amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. However, it has also been suggested that this ritual hierarchy may not be particularly strong or visible amongst Punjabi Hindus in the city, because the discrimination born out of it is quite covert in nature. This idea is developed further in

Chapter Eight, where it will be shown that the ritual hierarchy has weakened amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu population through the migration and settlement process.

The presence and operation of the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford has been investigated through both qualitative interview data and quantitative data generated from interviews and questionnaires. The qualitative data provided somewhat contradictory evidence as to whether this tripartite hierarchy functions in a fixed and coterminous form within this community. However, the quantitative data, which were explored through a series of crosstabulations relating to the sample households and their male and female heads, provided more conclusive evidence that this tripartite hierarchy does indeed operate in such a form, at least at the level of households and household heads affiliated to twice-born and non twice-born *jatis* in the Bradford sample.

Within these two twice-born and non twice-born groups, however, it was shown that the coterminous nature of the tripartite hierarchy begins to break down. This is because the position of sample households and household heads in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system, as determined by their performance across the variables under scrutiny, is not always fully commensurate with their position in the ritual hierarchy, as determined by their *jati* affiliation. Nevertheless, from this apparent confusion distinct patterns have begun to emerge. Thus, amongst twice-born sample households and household heads, it is those belonging to the *Khattri jati* which typically hold the highest position in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system, followed by *Agarwal & Sunari*, and then *Brahmin* affiliated households and household heads. Equally, amongst non twice-born sample households and household heads, those from the *Chamar jati* often seem to hold a superior position over those affiliated to the *Darji & Nais jatis*, in terms of their economic and political standing.

**Table 7.17: Discrepancies between the ritual and economic & political hierarchies of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community**

	Ritual ranking of <i>jatis</i> or <i>varnas</i>	Observed ranking of <i>jatis</i> or <i>varnas</i> in the economic & political hierarchies
Twice-born	<i>Brahmins</i> <i>Khattris</i> <i>Agarwals &amp; Sunaris</i>	<i>Khattris</i> <i>Agarwals &amp; Sunaris</i> <i>Brahmins</i>
Non twice-born	<i>Darjis &amp; Nais</i> <i>Chamars</i>	<i>Chamars</i> <i>Darjis &amp; Nais</i>

In conclusion, it is suggested these observed discrepancies between the ritual and economic & political hierarchies of the caste system within the sample community could (for reasons justified in Sections 4.5.7 and 4.6.4) be applied to Bradford's whole Punjabi

Hindu population, as is demonstrated in Table 7.17. The remaining task, therefore, is to explore the reasons for these discrepancies in the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. This provides the focus of the following chapter.

## Chapter Eight

### *Migratory changes in the hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus*

#### **8.0 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter has two objectives. The first is to identify changes which the hierarchy of the caste system has undergone through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. The second is to suggest reasons for these changes. These objectives are in line with the fourth aim of this study, as laid out in Section 1.1. To achieve them, findings concerning the operation of the caste system's hierarchy amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford today are taken from Chapter Seven. These findings are then compared with retrospective evidence, which shows how this hierarchy operated in the pre-migratory space/time context from which Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community originated. This retrospective evidence is drawn from qualitative data from the 50 interviews and quantitative data from these interviews and the 73 questionnaires.

The chapter begins in Section 8.1 by identifying the space/time context from which Bradford's Punjabi Hindus originated immediately prior to migration. This is compared with their current space/time position of Bradford in the 1990s. Such a comparison highlights the degree of spatial and temporal shift embodied in the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. In turn, this shift represents a contextual backdrop, against which changes in the hierarchy of the caste system for this community are to be analysed. Importantly, this spatial and temporal shift is not being presented as a force which changed the hierarchy of the caste system itself. Instead, it merely provided the necessary conditions and opportunities for forces of change to successfully operate.

Section 8.2 identifies changes in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus which have developed through their migration and settlement. Reasons are then suggested for these changes. Section 8.3 analyses changes in the tripartite hierarchy of the institution in a similar way. The chapter concludes in Section 8.4.

#### **8.1 SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL SHIFT IN THE MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT OF BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS**

##### **8.1.1 Spatial origin of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus**

To investigate the spatial origin of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community it is necessary to refer to the longitudinal database, in which quantitative data from the interviews and

questionnaires were disaggregated by generation (see Section 4.6.4). This database included information on 325 first generation Punjabi Hindus (166 males and 159 females) and 180 from generation 1.5 (92 males and 88 females). Some of these persons were household heads or other Punjabi Hindu individuals living in the family unit of one of the 123 sample households under study. Others were persons who did not live in these family units but were still related to them.

For all first generation and generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindus in the longitudinal database, their exact area of origin was recorded as the Doab region of the Punjab. This was the area in which all these individuals had been born and had lived prior to their migration to Britain. The Doab region is a rich agricultural belt situated in the northern part of India's Punjab State. The three major urban centres of the region are Hoshiarpur, Jullundur and Ludhiana. The position of the Punjab in the subcontinent<sup>1</sup>, and the location of these three urban centres of the Doab region within it, can be seen in Figures 8.1 and 8.2.

Almost all first generation and generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindus entered in the longitudinal database were from small villages found in the rural hinterlands of the Doab's three urban centres<sup>2</sup>. Indeed, the comments of interviewees indicated that this spatial origin could be attributed to most of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, both in and outside the sample community. As one interviewee explained:

You ask any Punjabi Hindu in Bradford where they or their parents are from and they'll tell you it's this area [the Doab region]. Most of them come from little villages in the countryside around these towns here [pointing to Hoshiarpur and Jullundur on a map of the Punjab], so a lot of them knew each other before they even came out here. Even those who've come through Singapore and East Africa usually came from these places originally. (*Khatti* man, 60 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 45).

The above quote suggests that a majority of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community originates from the rural Doab, including 'twice migrants' who have spent time living in East Africa or Singapore. Significantly, none of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus on whom data were collected for this study were identified as having these 'twice migrant' origins. This suggests that 'twice migrants' account for only a small minority of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, unlike the city's Gujarati Hindu population, in which immigrants from East Africa are reportedly much more common (Ram, 1989: 279-88).

<sup>1</sup>The Punjab straddles the Indian/Pakistani border and consequently Pakistan also has a state known as 'The Punjab'.

<sup>2</sup>In fact, longitudinal data indicated that only one first generation woman and two first generation men had originated from the Doab's urban centres themselves.

**Figure 8.1: Position of the Punjab in the subcontinent**



Source: Adapted from Ballard, 1994c: XVI.

**Figure 8.2: Location of Hoshiarpur, Jullundur and Ludhiana (the three main urban centres of the Doab region) within the Punjab**




Source: Ballard, 1994c: XVI.

### 8.1.2 Temporal origin of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus

Having established the spatial origin of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, attention turns to its temporal origin. Here the term 'temporal origin' is used to refer to the time at which this community emigrated from the Doab region and arrived in Britain. To investigate this, it is again necessary to refer to the longitudinal database. As noted above, this database includes information on 325 first generation Punjabi Hindu immigrants. For each of these individuals, their year of arrival in Britain was (wherever possible) obtained and entered into the database.

To give some indication of the temporal context from which Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community originated, the following procedure is undertaken. First, longitudinal data on the year of arrival of first generation immigrants are divided into quinquennial periods. Second, the number of first generation immigrants entered in the longitudinal database as arriving in a given quinquennial period is calculated as a percentage of all first generation immigrants in this database for whom data on the year of arrival are available. Third, the percentage distribution of first generation immigrants across the various quinquennial periods of arrival is plotted as a bar chart in Figure 8.3, with the data for males and females being represented separately. It will be noted that Figure 8.3 does not account for the full quota of 166 first generation males or 159 first generation females who are entered in the longitudinal database. This is because of missing data on the year of arrival for some of these individuals.

**Figure 8.3: Percentages of first generation Punjabi Hindus entered in the longitudinal database by quinquennial period of arrival in Britain**



Number of first generation females represented in chart = 139.

Number of first generation males represented in chart = 120.

∴ there are missing values on the year of arrival for 20 first generation females and 46 males in the longitudinal database.

Figure 8.3 shows that the peak quinquennial period of arrival in Britain for first generation Punjabi Hindu males was 1960-64, whilst that for females was the later period of 1965-69. This is because those first generation women in Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, who had been married in India, usually arrived in Britain a few years after their husbands. The key point which needs to be drawn out of Figure 8.3 is that it shows the majority of male and female first generation immigrants entered in the longitudinal database arrived in Britain prior to 1970<sup>3</sup>. Furthermore, discussion during the 50 household interviews suggested that this finding could be applied to first generation immigrants in the whole of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. As one second generation interviewee explained when talking about her first generation parents:

**Interviewee:** My dad came here in 1961 with some other men from back home to earn money. They were all pretty young, you know in their 20s, and they were all friends, so they could help each other out... Most of them were married as well, but they left their wives back in the Punjab because they weren't going to be here too long. But they all ended up staying in the end, so the wives did come out eventually. Like my mum arrived here with me and my sister in 1965. I was only six at the time.

**Interviewer:** So the time your dad arrived here, would that have been typical for Punjabi Hindus in Bradford?

**Interviewee:** Oh definitely yes, most of the men came out here in the late 1950s and 1960s, and if they were married their wives usually came out a little bit later with the kids. Just like my family really, I mean we're a good example of that.

**Interviewer:** So why didn't people come here as much after this time?

**Interviewee:** Well it was the government wasn't it. I mean they said there were too many taking up jobs and everything, so they stopped people coming in. If it hadn't been for that we would have probably carried on coming here, but it just got too hard. (*Chamar* woman, 37 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 15).

Combining the information in this quote with longitudinal data relating to the arrival of first generation immigrants, it would seem reasonable to suggest that the temporal origin of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community was the 1960s and late '50s, because this was the period in which most of the first generation immigrants in this community left India and arrived in Britain.

The above quote also provides other useful 'snippets' of information regarding the migration histories of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. First, it suggests that most first generation males within this community were of a young age when they arrived in Britain, indicating that they came here as economic migrants in search of work. Second, it implies that many of these first generation males had some kind of friendship network in operation between them when they arrived in this country, which may have been important in assisting their settlement and survival in an alien environment. Third, the quote indicates that many generation 1.5 immigrants in Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community would have arrived in this country when their first generation mothers joined their husbands, who had usually arrived at an earlier date. Finally, the quote suggests that

<sup>3</sup>79% of first generation male Punjabi Hindus in the longitudinal database and 78% of females arrived in Britain before 1970.

immigration controls had a debilitating effect on the growth of the Punjabi Hindu population in Bradford from the late 1960s onwards.

During the course of research, a wealth of qualitative and quantitative data were collected on the migration history of Punjabi Hindus in the city. These data could be used to substantiate the information gleaned from the above quote. However, this study is principally concerned with the subject of the caste system and, as a result, these data on migration histories do not warrant further discussion, although they could be employed in future research. What can be said, however, is that the initial picture presented by this qualitative and quantitative data suggests that the story of migration for Bradford's Punjabi Hindus bears close relation to that for other South Asian ethnic communities in Britain, as demonstrated by a variety of researchers (e.g. see Ram, 1989: Chpt. 7, for Indians in Bradford; Ballard, 1994a: 95-6 for Punjabi Sikhs in Britain).

### 8.1.3 Summary

Section 8.1.1 established that the spatial context from which Punjabi Hindus in Bradford originated, immediately prior to migration, was rural parts of the Doab region. Section 8.1.2 demonstrated that the pre-migratory temporal context of this community was the 1960s and late '50s. The migration and settlement of Bradford's current Punjabi Hindu population therefore represents a substantial spatial shift between a rural Indian environment and an urban British one, and a temporal shift spanning a period of 30 to 40 years. These spatial and temporal shifts are the contextual backdrop against which changes in the hierarchy of the caste system, occurring through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, will now be analysed.

## 8.2 CHANGES IN THE RITUAL HIERARCHY

### 8.2.1 Overview

This section concerns itself with migratory changes in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system. Sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 begin by restating how the ritual hierarchy operates to influence marriage practices and temple usage patterns amongst Bradford's current Punjabi Hindu community (see Section 7.1). This information is compared with retrospective, qualitative interview evidence on the operation of the ritual hierarchy in marriages and temple usage in the rural Doab of the 1950s and '60s. Such a comparison highlights changes in this hierarchy brought about through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Section 8.2.4 further examines migratory changes in the ritual hierarchy, by comparing the *jati* and *varna* commensality of Punjabi Hindus in the 1950s and '60s Doab with that of Punjabi Hindus in Bradford in the 1990s. Findings on changes in the ritual hierarchy are summarised in Section 8.2.5.

### 8.2.2 Changes in marriage practices and the ritual hierarchy

Section 7.1.4 argued that the ritual hierarchy is operational amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, because it provides a framework which enables and encourages individuals from *jatis* of high ritual ranking to stereotype those from low ranking *jatis* as spiritually 'dirty' or 'unclean'. In turn, such negative stereotypes provide ritually high ranking Punjabi Hindus in Bradford with a supposed justifiable basis for the discriminatory avoidance of marriages with those affiliated to *jatis* of lower ritual ranking. This creates a need for *jati* or *varna* endogamy, and necessitates the existence of marriage circles and arranged marriages which enable such endogamy to be preserved.

Despite attempts to encourage interviewees to talk about marriage practices in the 1950s and '60s Doab, only one woman responded. This paucity of data is probably because many Punjabi Hindus in Bradford have been married in Britain rather than India<sup>4</sup> and do not, therefore, have much knowledge of marriage in this pre-migratory space/time context. However, one woman who did talk about marriage practices in the 1950s and '60s Doab noted the following:

When I got married back home in the '50s, things were a lot stricter then. You know, parents and family they were much more picky. I mean, even if someone had just been a bit lower than me, I probably wouldn't have married them because they would have been dirty, you know, like polluted. You see, if I'd married anybody lower then it could have had bad consequences. Other *Khattris* wouldn't have talked to you in the village anymore. It was all very black and white. (*Khattri* woman, 64 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 8).

This quote suggests that the ritual hierarchy may have been important in maintaining negative stereotyping and discriminatory marriage practices in the 1950s and '60s Doab. Furthermore, the presence of phrases like, 'it used to be a lot stricter then' and, 'they were much more picky', could point towards some kind of weakening in the importance of the ritual hierarchy, and its influence over marriage practices, between this pre-migratory space/time context and urban Bradford in the 1990s. However, further evidence is obviously needed to investigate the possibility of such a weakening change more closely. This reveals itself by comparing the role of the ritual hierarchy in the temple usage patterns and commensal practices of Punjabi Hindus across the two space/time contexts under scrutiny.

### 8.2.3 Changes in temple usage patterns and the ritual hierarchy

Section 7.1.5 demonstrated that the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is also operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus through its influence over temple usage patterns in this community. It was argued that this occurs when individuals from *jatis* of

---

<sup>4</sup>See, for example, the large number of sample household heads who have been married in Britain (see Table 6.2).

high ritual ranking stereotype those affiliated to low ranking *jatis* as spiritually 'unclean'. These ritually high status individuals then use this stereotype as a supposed justifiable basis for discouraging those from *jatis* of low ritual ranking from using certain temples in Bradford (e.g. the Hindu Cultural Society), on the grounds that they might spiritually pollute these centres of worship. Equally, Punjabi Hindus from *jatis* of low ritual ranking were seen to respond to this discriminatory behaviour by frequenting their own temples in the city (e.g. the *Ravi Dass Bhawan*).

It was established that this form of ritually based discrimination is quite covert in its nature. Thus, individuals belonging to *jatis* of low ritual ranking are not barred outrightly from entering temples like the Hindu Cultural Society. Instead, the ritually high ranking Punjabi Hindus who regularly attend this particular centre of worship adopt subtle forms of social exclusion which dissuade those of lower ranking *jatis* from frequenting this institution.

A number of sample interviewees described how ritually based discrimination had also influenced temple usage in the rural villages of the Doab during the 1950s and '60s. They revealed, however, that this discrimination had been much more overt than that seen in Bradford, even though the negative stereotyping on which it was based had been largely the same. Thus, one *Khatti* man explained:

**Interviewee:** When I was a kid in India, people from low castes - you know like Untouchables and Barbers - they were banned from coming into our high caste temple, because they were dirty and everything. I mean, it didn't usually bother them, because they had a temple of their own on the other side of our village but sometimes if we were giving food out at our temple, they used to sit outside the gates, you know, waiting for us to throw it out to them. I mean if any of them had come in [to the temple] by mistake, they'd have been punished, I've seen it with my own eyes. You could never actually be banned from a temple like that in Bradford, because there are laws in Britain that are against discrimination. I mean, there were laws there as well, but I don't think high castes took much notice of them in our little village.

**Interviewer:** ...but going back to the punishments that low 'castes' would get if they went into this temple, what sort of punishments do you mean?

**Interviewee:** Well usually a beating or something like that... But I remember this amazing thing, right, because one time there was this widow. Her husband had just died, and she was really low caste, like a Sweeper or something. Anyway this high caste man, he owned the land her family farmed, but because her husband had died he said she couldn't farm there anymore and he threw her off, with her young kids and everything. Anyway, she went a bit mad because she was really upset, and all that, and one day she runs into the high caste temple and throws a bucket of urine at this man. But she missed and this stuff goes all over the figures and deities, you know. Anyway she got a real beating for that, because she'd polluted the temple you see. I mean it was a silly thing to do really. But the worse thing was a few days later someone found this woman outside the village with one of her breasts cut off. That was probably the real punishment you see, but nobody ever found out who did it... That's terrible isn't it?

**Interviewer:** When would this have happened?

**Interviewee:** Well I was probably about six or seven at the time, so it must have been around '58, '59. (*Khatti* man, aged 44 yrs, 1st generation. Interview 11).

A *Chamar* woman also recalled her experiences back in the Punjab during the early sixties:

When I was a little girl, *Chamars* weren't allowed in the *mandir* in our village because the *Brahmins* who ran the place said we would pollute it. I remember this *mandir* needed something doing to it inside, some job or something. So my Uncle - he was a leather worker a lot of the time but he used to fill in with odd jobs, you know, joinery and that, because he was good with his hands - anyway, he said he'd do this job at the *mandir*. But the *Brahmins* there, they said he could only do it if he tied a tree branch to his shirt, so his footsteps were wiped out behind him where he'd walked, and he said he wouldn't at first, but in the end he did because he needed money from this job. So he walked round with this branch behind him. That's how bad it was then. I mean they can't keep people out of temples like that in Bradford now, although they might try to stop you in other ways. Anyway, I don't think anybody would want to do anything as bad as what went on back in India. I mean most people who came here were probably a bit more progressive and wanted to get away from that sort of thing. (*Chamar* woman, 46 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 5).

These statements indicate that the ritual hierarchy was stronger and more influential for Punjabi Hindus living in rural villages of the Doab region during 1950s and '60s than it is for those in Bradford today. Certainly, the ritually based discrimination which is revealed as determining temple usage patterns in the Doab at this time appears much more overt and dehumanising than anything witnessed amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford today. This leads to the conclusion that the ritual hierarchy has weakened in its importance for Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community through the spatial and temporal shift embodied in its migration and settlement.

This weakening might be due to the fact that 1990s Bradford, as compared to the 1950s and '60s Doab, is an environment in which it is more difficult for Punjabi Hindus of high ritual ranking to perpetuate the ritual hierarchy by affirming their superiority over those of lower ritual ranking through overt discriminatory practices. For example, the *Khattari* interviewee in the first of the above statements points out that there are 'laws in Britain', which he obviously feels have been effective in stemming the process of ritually based discrimination amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford. On the other hand, it seems questionable whether these essentially 'white British laws' would have been effective in regulating discrimination occurring within any non-white minority ethnic group in Bradford (or anywhere else in Britain), especially when that discrimination is born out of this ethnic group's own complex social system, as is the case here.

The *Chamar* interviewee in the second of the above statements implies that most Punjabi Hindus who migrated to Bradford were quite 'progressive' in their social outlook. She implies that they wished to get away from the worst excesses of the ritual hierarchy, such as overt discriminatory practices in temple usage. This may be a more likely explanation as to why this hierarchy has weakened through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

### 8.2.4 Changes in commensality and the ritual hierarchy

Further evidence of migratory weakening in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system, becomes apparent when looking beyond marriage practices and temple usage patterns to commensality. This is a sociological characteristic which, as yet, has not been discussed in relation to Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

Section 2.6.2 indicated that commensality was a physical and visible manifestation of the ritual hierarchy's operation in 1950s and '60s rural India. Thus, it was shown how the ritual divisions between castes, *jatis* and *varnas* were typically reflected in complex patterns of food acceptance and exchange between these social units. For example, persons from ritually high ranking *jatis* (e.g. *Brahminical jatis*) were unlikely to accept food or water from individuals belonging to *jatis* of lower ritual ranking (e.g. Untouchable *jatis*), on the grounds that it would be spiritually polluted. A *Chamar* interviewee indicated the importance of these commensal restrictions in the rural Doab during the 1960s:

I remember back in the '60s sometime, in our village school, there was this one lad in my class, he was from the Barber caste, you know *Nais*. Anyway, he was a bit slow, and I was really bright at maths, so his mother asked if I could take him home to my house and teach him some maths, and she was really nice and friendly, so I said, "Alright"... So I took him home and taught him, and then my gran gives us each some chapatis and rice. A bit later on his mum comes round, and she suddenly gets into a right flap because she sees these plates with a bit of rice left on and finds out her son has been eating food with me... She started shouting, "You accept food from these dirty *Chamars*," and all this, and then my gran got really angry, and she chases this woman out of the house with a knife, and the next thing is, this lady, she's making her boy be sick in the street, you know making him stick his fingers down his throat, because she thinks he's been eating this polluted food and stuff. I thought that was really cheeky, because she thought it was alright for me to teach her boy, you know work for her, but she didn't want him eating with us. I've never forgotten this... (*Chamar* woman, 47 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 18).

Within Bradford's current Punjabi Hindu community, by contrast, there was no evidence of these kinds of commensal restrictions between the social units of the caste system. Hence, it was claimed by several interviewees that all Punjabi Hindus in the city accepted food from one another and ate together, regardless of the position of their *jati* or *varna* in the ritual hierarchy. Some interviewees were also keen to emphasise that this situation was unaffected by the spatial context in which food was being exchanged. In other words, it was claimed that ritually based commensal restrictions between *jatis* would be as equally absent at the temple as they are in somebody's private home. As one *Brahmin* interviewee explained:

In Bradford now, I mean if you go to a gathering or whatever, you know, at somebody's house or at the temple, everybody eats together and drinks together, it doesn't matter what caste they are. I mean at the temple people don't worry who has cooked or prepared food like they used to back in the Punjab. (*Brahmin* man, 44 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 3).

This absence of commensal restrictions amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford was substantiated by participant observation at an end of term party for the children taking Hindi classes at the Hindu Cultural Society. For this party, the children decided they wanted to make their own traditional Indian food, which included *samosas* and *paratha* bread<sup>5</sup>. The class included children from the *Brahmin varna*, the *Khattri* and *Agarwal jatis* and, most importantly, two *Chamar* girls who were members of one of the very few *Chamar* households which seemed to have gained some acceptance at the Society (see Section 6.3).

All the children were involved in the preparation of the party food, which involved stuffing handfuls of parcooked vegetables into home-made *samosa* pastry. Significantly, the *Chamar* girls were not stopped from doing this on the grounds that they might pollute food to be eaten by others. When the children sat down to eat they did not divide themselves into *jati* or *varna* lines or eat separately. In fact, the older of the *Chamar* girls went around the table offering the *samosas* and Coca-Cola to every child and the adult *Brahmin* class teacher, all of whom willingly accepted. Clearly, there was no evidence of any kind of commensal restriction in operation here.

Comparing the absence of commensal practices amongst Punjabi Hindus in 1990s Bradford with the experiences of the above *Chamar* interviewee in the rural Doab during the 1960s, the overriding impression is that the ritual hierarchy has weakened for Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community through its migration and settlement. Indeed as far as commensality is concerned, it would seem that it has weakened to the point of eradication. However, a note of caution must be added to any such assumption, because it is possible that the ritual hierarchy is not operational through commensal restrictions amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus because it does not need to be, rather than the fact that this hierarchy is in itself insignificant.

To elaborate, commensal restrictions between persons from *jatis* or *varnas* with differing positions in the ritual hierarchy are rarely required to operate in Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. This is because these individuals seldom interact with each other socially. For example, as already noted, those from different *jatis* or *varnas* tend to frequent certain temples in the city, so they do not often meet with each other publicly. Similarly, they rarely come into contact in a more private or informal context. This is because Bradford's Punjabi Hindus have friendship networks based around *jati* or *varna* affiliations (see Section 6.5.2). As one *Khattri* interviewee explained:

If I have a dinner party I'm usually going to invite *Khattris*, because I don't really know anybody from other castes in Bradford. All our best friends are either *Khattri*, or a few white professionals my husband works with... They like to come round for

<sup>5</sup>A traditional Indian bread made out of flour and water and fried in oil.

curries and we put on the full act, you know, I'll wear a sari, and we'll put some Indian music on, and my husband will wear a prince coat or something. It's quite funny really. (*Khattri* woman, 43 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 10).

In short, the lack of social interaction between *jatis* and *varnas* of different ritual ranking, in both public and private spheres, means the need for commensal restrictions would rarely arise, either in a temple or elsewhere.

Most importantly, Bradford is a large city in which Punjabi Hindus from different *jatis* or *varnas* have the opportunity to distance themselves spatially from each other. This was demonstrated in Section 6.5, which highlighted observable spatial dissimilarities in the location of sample households affiliated to certain *jatis* or *varnas* across the city. With such spatial patterning the likelihood of contact and interaction between persons from different *jatis* or *varnas* is again decreased, thus reducing the need for any form of commensality still further. This contrasts sharply with the rural Doab of the 1950s and '60s, where the spatially compact nature of village life would have brought Punjabi Hindus from *jatis* and *varnas* of differing ritual rank into regular social contact, thus increasing the need for the observance of commensal restrictions.

### 8.2.5 Summary

This section has provided a reminder of how the ritual hierarchy of the caste system operates to influence marriage practices and temple usage patterns amongst Bradford's current Punjabi Hindu community, as demonstrated in Chapter Seven. This situation has been compared with the operation of the ritual hierarchy in these practices and patterns in this community's pre-migratory space/time context of the 1950s and '60s rural Doab, as witnessed through retrospective, qualitative interview data. The conclusions drawn are that the ritual hierarchy has weakened substantially in the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. Such weakening is most visible in the degeneration of the ritually based discrimination determining temple usage, from a highly overt form in the rural Doab of the 1950s and '60s, to the subtle form of discouragement seen in Bradford today. The migratory weakening of the ritual hierarchy has been further emphasised in the apparent disappearance of ritually based commensal restrictions between the two space/time contexts under scrutiny.

Various reasons have come to the fore when trying to explain why the ritual hierarchy has weakened in the way described. The most important of these may be the fact that many Punjabi Hindus who came to Bradford were more progressive in their outlook and wished to get away from the worst excesses of discrimination born out of this hierarchy. This is certainly the view of one of the interviewees. Another reason might be the fact that British law has not supported such ritually based discrimination. However, it has been suggested that this is probably less likely, because of the

ineffectiveness of such law in regulating the social and cultural practices of minority non-white ethnic groups. The migratory weakening of the ritual hierarchy in terms of commensal restrictions may result from the fact that Punjabi Hindus from different *jatis* and *varnas* in Bradford do not come into enough social and spatial contact with each other to necessitate the operation of commensal practices. This contrasts sharply with the rural Doab of the 1950s and '60s, where the social and spatial interaction between Punjabi Hindus, and the consequent need for commensality, would have been much greater.

### 8.3 CHANGES IN THE TRIPARTITE HIERARCHY

#### 8.3.1 Overview

In Chapter Seven, an analysis of quantitative sample data indicated that the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system is present and operational in a fixed and coterminous form amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, but only at the level of sample households and head householders affiliated to twice-born and non twice-born *jatis*. Within these two groups, however, it was demonstrated that the fixed and coterminous operation of the tripartite hierarchy begins to break down. Thus, amongst Punjabi Hindu households and head householders affiliated to twice-born *jatis*, their position in the political and economic hierarchies of the caste system - as determined by key variables scrutinised in Chapter Seven - was not always fully commensurate with their position in the ritual hierarchy - as determined by their *jati* affiliation.

Nevertheless, from this apparent hierarchical confusion a distinct pattern was shown to emerge. Amongst twice-born sample households and head householders, it was noted that it was typically those belonging to the *Khatti jati* which held the highest position in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system, followed by *Agarwals & Sunaris* and then *Brahmins*. Equally, amongst non twice-born households and head householders, those belonging to the *Chamar jati* usually held a superior position in the economic and political hierarchies over *Darjis & Nais*.

This section addresses two key questions arising from these findings. First, to what extent have these hierarchical discrepancies in operation of the tripartite hierarchy developed through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community? Second, what has caused these discrepancies to occur?

To answer the first of these questions, Section 8.3.2 identifies changes in the operation of the tripartite hierarchy which have developed amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community through its migration and settlement. This is achieved by analysis of quantitative data from the longitudinal database. In Section 8.3.3, the types of change

identified in the tripartite hierarchy's operation are conceptualised through a typology of status security and case study exemplars. In answer to the second of the above questions, Section 8.3.4 suggests reasons for these migratory changes by analysing qualitative interview data, whilst Section 8.3.5 relates such changes to the wider issue of hybrid ethnic identities.

### 8.3.2 Identifying changes in the tripartite hierarchy

To begin the discussion in this section, attention must again turn to the longitudinal database, in which quantitative data from interviews and questionnaires was disaggregated by generation (see Section 4.6.4). This database includes information on varying numbers of males and females from each generation (see Table 8.1).

**Table 8.1: Numbers of Punjabi Hindus entered in the longitudinal database by generation**

Generation	Males	Females
Sending generation	192	193
1st generation	166	159
Generation 1.5	92	88
2nd generation	54	45

It should be remembered that some of the persons in the longitudinal database are household heads or other Punjabi Hindus living in the family unit of one of the 123 sample households under study. Others are persons who did not live in these family units but are still related to them. This would typically apply to individuals entered as the sending generation in this database. In addition, many of the sending generation included in the database, and a number of the first generation, had deceased. The longitudinal database does not include information on anyone  $\leq 21$  years of age, as such data were dealt with separately (see Section 4.6.4). This is an important consideration for second generation individuals, many of whom would have been under 22 years old.

To identify migratory changes in the operation of the tripartite hierarchy amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, it was decided to look at changes in the relationship between the social class of Punjabi Hindu individuals in the longitudinal database (i.e. their position in the political and economic hierarchies of the caste system) and their *jati* affiliation (i.e. their position in the ritual hierarchy), from sending generation through to the second generation. To do this it was first necessary to determine the social class of each Punjabi Hindu represented in this database. This was possible because the different job titles a given Punjabi Hindu individual had undertaken were entered into this database as part of his/her employment history. Using the method outlined in Section 7.4.3, it was possible to categorise these job titles into one of the 371

'occupational unit groups' of the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC)<sup>6</sup>. Then, following the procedure adopted in Section 7.4.4, these 371 groups were further collapsed into one of five standard social classes (see Table 7.14).

Thus, for each individual entered under a given generation in the longitudinal database, a social class could be derived for every single job title which had been collected as part of that individual's employment history. Consequently, if someone had had three different jobs, they would also have had three job titles. These job titles would have fallen into three different occupational unit groups, which, in turn, could all be categorised by social class. The eventual social classes into which these three occupational unit groups fell might all be identical. Alternatively, they might be different, indicating a general rise in social class through an individual's employment history, a fall, or simply a fluctuation.

The original intention was to derive social classes from the job titles of all Punjabi Hindu individuals entered in the longitudinal database, irrespective of their gender. However, much data on the employment histories of females, especially those in the first and sending generations, indicated that they had always worked as 'housewives'. Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine a social class for this job title using the above methodology. This rendered the longitudinal data on the social classes of female Punjabi Hindus across the various generations incomplete and poor. As a result, these data were eliminated from any further analysis, and attention was focused solely on the data for males.

To rationalise analysis of longitudinal data, it was decided that attention would only be paid to those social classes which had been derived from job titles attributable to specific stages in the employment histories of Punjabi Hindu males belonging to the various generations. These were as follows:

- The main job of males in the sending generation. (Interviewees were left to interpret the term 'main job' as they wished here).
- The last job in India of first generation males.
- The first job in Britain of first generation males.
- The current job in the Britain of first generation males (or last job if they were retired or had died).

<sup>6</sup>This was difficult for a handful of job titles relating to the Indian sending generation, or the last job of first generation immigrants in India before they migrated to Britain. For example, the job type of 'subsistence farmer' does not have a SOC occupational unit group into which it conveniently falls. These classification problems were rare and were all solved pragmatically. For example, the job type 'subsistence farmer' was classified under the 'farm labourer' in the SOC, for which an occupational unit group code is provided.

- The current job of generation 1.5 males.
- The current job of second generation males (if  $\geq 22$  years of age).

To identify migratory changes in the operation of the tripartite hierarchy amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, three further tasks were undertaken:

First, the number of Punjabi Hindu males which had been determined as belonging to social classes I and II, III and IV and V, were summated for the specific stages of employment in each generational group (as outlined immediately above). These totals were then aligned with the *jati* affiliations of these Punjabi Hindu males. The results of this procedure are presented in Table 8.2.

Second, the number of Punjabi Hindu males belonging to one of three social class categories in Table 8.2, and affiliated to specific *jati*, was taken for a given stage of employment in a generational group. This number was calculated as a percentage of all economically active males affiliated to that *jati* for this stage of employment in that group. The results of this can be seen in Table 8.3.

Third, in Figures 8.4 and 8.5, the calculated percentages of economically active Punjabi Hindu males who were affiliated to a given *jati*, and who fell into social classes I and II or IV and V (see data marked *a* and *b* in Table 8.3), have been plotted across the various stages of employment in each generational group.

Figures 8.4 and 8.5 indicate that migratory change in the operation of the tripartite hierarchy has occurred for Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. To understand this, it is first necessary to look at the two stages of employment which are presented in these graphs as the 'last job in India of first generation males', and the 'main job of males in the sending generation'. The former of these represents the immediate pre-migratory space/time context of first generation Punjabi Hindus in Bradford; namely, the rural Doab in the 1950s and '60s. The latter of these stages of employment would typically represent an earlier time period in the Doab region, prior to the 1950s.

The graphs show that for all Punjabi Hindu males in these two pre-migratory stages of employment, their positions in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system, as determined by social class, appear fully commensurate with their positions in the ritual hierarchy of the institution, as determined by *jati* or *varna* affiliations. Thus, *Brahmin* males of highest ritual ranking also hold the most favourable social class distribution, having higher percentages of their number in social classes I and II than those affiliated to other *jatis* (see Figure 8.4). Equally, they have none of their number in social classes IV and V (see Figure 8.5). The next most favourable social class

**Table 8.2: Numerical breakdown of Punjabi Hindu males in the longitudinal database by social class category and *jati* affiliation, across stages of employment in each generational group**

	Generational group and stage of employment from which social classes of Punjabi Hindu males are derived					
	Sending generation	First generation			Generation 1.5	Second generation
	Main Job	Last Job in India	First Job in Britain	Current Job (or last Job if died/retired)	Current Job	Current Job (if > 22 years in age)
<b>Nos. of Brahmins:-</b>						
Social classes I and II	31	11	1	14	10	4
Social class III	5	2	2	9	2	4
Social classes IV and V	0	0	10	7	2	1
Armed services <sup>①</sup>	1	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	0	2	1
<b>Total economically active</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>10</b>
Not applicable (student) <sup>②</sup>	0	7	0	0	0	3
No data <sup>③</sup>	9	17	24	7	0	0
<b>Total Brahmins</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Nos. of Khattris:-</b>						
Social classes I and II	31	9	5	19	14	9
Social class III	8	3	5	7	0	0
Social classes IV and V	0	0	13	6	0	0
Armed services	2	1	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	1	0	0
<b>Total economically active</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>9</b>
Not applicable (student)	0	7	0	0	0	1
No data	15	18	15	5	1	0
<b>Total Khattris</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Nos. of Agarwals &amp; Sunaris:-</b>						
Social classes I and II	6	5	1	7	8	4
Social class III	7	3	0	3	2	1
Social classes IV and V	0	0	5	2	0	0
Armed services	1	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Economically active</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>
Not applicable (student)	0	1	0	0	2	0
No data	2	5	8	2	0	0
<b>Total Agarwals and Sunaris</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Nos. of Darjis &amp; Nais:-</b>						
Social classes I and II	4	2	1	2	2	1
Social class III	6	4	2	3	6	3
Social classes IV and V	5	2	6	7	4	2
Armed services	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Total economically active</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>
Not applicable (student)	0	1	0	0	0	0
No data	5	2	3	0	0	0
<b>Total Darjis and Nais</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Nos. of Chamars:-</b>						
Social classes I and II	3	1	2	8	10	4
Social class III	17	13	3	6	12	9
Social classes IV and V	21	13	16	32	10	4
Armed services	1	2	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	8	2	1
<b>Total Economically active</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>18</b>
Not applicable (student)	0	8	0	0	0	0
No data	12	28	44	11	3	2
<b>Total Chamars</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Total Punjabi Hindu males in generation</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>54</b>

① Social classes could not be derived from job titles indicating employment in the armed services.

② Some individuals entered in the longitudinal database under the various stages of employment in each generational group were students and, therefore, their social class could not be determined.


③ In some cases employment data on individuals in the longitudinal database were not present or complete.

**Table 8.3: Percentages of economically active Punjabi Hindu males in the longitudinal database belonging to social class categories, as calculated for each stage of employment in every generational group within a given *jati***

	Generational group and stage of employment from which social classes of Punjabi Hindu males are derived					
	Sending generation	First generation			Generation 1.5	Second generation
	Main Job	Last Job in India	First job in Britain	Current Job (or last job if died/retired)	Current Job	Current Job (if ≥ 22 years in age)
<b>% of economically active <i>Brahmins</i>:-</b>						
Social classes I and II (a)	84	85	8	47	63	40
Social class III	14	15	15	30	13	40
Social classes IV and V (b)	0	0	77	23	13	10
Armed services	3	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	0	13	10
<b>Total percentage</b> ⊙	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Total economically active <i>Brahmins</i></b>	<b>37</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>% of economically active <i>Khattris</i>:-</b>						
Social classes I and II (a)	76	69	22	58	100	100
Social class III	20	23	22	21	0	0
Social classes IV and V (b)	0	0	57	18	0	0
Armed services	5	8	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	3	0	0
<b>Total percentage</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Total economically active <i>Khattris</i></b>	<b>41</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>% of economically active <i>Agarwals &amp; Sunaris</i>:-</b>						
Social classes I and II (a)	43	63	17	58	80	80
Social class III	50	38	0	25	20	20
Social classes IV and V (b)	0	0	83	17	0	0
Armed services	7	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total percentage</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Total economically active <i>Agarwals and Sunaris</i></b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>% of economically active <i>Darjis &amp; Nais</i>:-</b>						
Social classes I and II (a)	27	22	11	17	17	17
Social class III	40	44	22	25	50	50
Social classes IV and V (b)	33	22	66	58	33	33
Armed services	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	11	0	0	0	0
<b>Total percentage</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Total economically active <i>Darjis and Nais</i></b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>% of economically active <i>Chamars</i>:-</b>						
Social classes I and II (a)	7	3	10	15	29	22
Social class III	40	45	14	11	35	50
Social classes IV and V (b)	50	45	76	59	29	22
Armed services	2	7	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	15	6	6
<b>Total percentage</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Total economically active <i>Chamars</i></b>	<b>42</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>Total economically active Punjabi Hindu males in generation</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>48</b>


⊙ Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.

**Figure 8.4: Percentages of economically active Punjabi Hindu males in social classes I and II across stages of employment in each generational group**



Data source: Table 8.3 (data marked 'a').

**Figure 8.5: Percentages of economically active Punjabi Hindu males in social classes IV and V across stages of employment in each generational group**



Data source: Table 8.3 (data marked 'b').

positions are held by those affiliated to the *Khatti jati*, then *Agarwals & Sunaris*, *Darjis & Nais*, and finally *Chamars*. This is in line with the descending positions of these *jatis* in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system. This evidence suggests that the tripartite hierarchy was present and operational in a fully fixed and coterminous form amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community prior to migration.

Turning attention to the stage of employment presented in Figures 8.4 and 8.5 as the 'first job in Britain of first generation males', a dramatic rearrangement in the tripartite hierarchy can be seen. Thus, all Punjabi Hindu males at this stage of employment, irrespective of their *jati* affiliation, have similarly unfavourable social class positions, indicating low positions in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system. The key reason for this 'migratory degeneration' of the tripartite hierarchy in Bradford, from a fixed and coterminous operation in the Doab, undoubtedly results from the fact that many first generation immigrants were faced with similar levels of discrimination from the host society when they first arrived in the city. This precluded them from obtaining jobs of high political prestige and remuneration. Meanwhile, their own social networks were not well enough established in the early stages of settlement to obtain such jobs through their own community. Accordingly, on arrival in Bradford, most Punjabi Hindu males initially found themselves working as unskilled textile labourers of low political prestige and remuneration, irrespective of skills, qualifications or *jati* affiliation. As one *Khatti* interviewee explained:

When Punjabi Hindus first arrived here they were all in the same boat, everybody just took what work there was on offer, they had no real choice. For most of us that meant textile jobs in one of the mills, or work at that foundry in Shipley [satellite town approximately four miles north of Bradford centre]. (*Khatti* man, aged 57, 1st generation. Interview 29).

This situation obviously affected Punjabi Hindus affiliated to *jatis* and *varnas* of higher ritual ranking particularly badly, as by taking such jobs they immediately lost the elevated position in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system which they had held in India. As a result, their economic and political standing was reduced to the same level as those from *jatis* of lower ritual ranking. It was this development which caused the tripartite hierarchy to degenerate from a fixed and coterminous operation so rapidly in the initial migration and settlement of Bradford's first generation Punjabi Hindu males.

However, Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show that this degeneration was only a short term change. Thus, it can be clearly seen that in the move through the latter stages of employment, i.e. from the current job of first generation immigrants to that of second generation individuals (which can also be seen as a crude indicator of movement through time), the tripartite hierarchy starts to re-assert itself in a fixed and coterminous fashion.

Significantly, however, the graphs show that this re-assertion follows a pattern observed in Chapter Seven. In other words, the operation of the tripartite hierarchy is only fixed and coterminous at the level of Punjabi Hindu males belonging to twice-born and non twice-born *jatis*, but within these two groups there are hierarchical discrepancies. Thus, it is Punjabi Hindu males from the *Khatti jati* who emerge with the most favourable position in terms of social class, followed by *Agarwals & Sunaris* and then *Brahmins*; positions which clearly contrast with ritual ranking. Equally, amongst non twice-born Punjabi Hindu males, it is *Chamars* who hold the superior class position over *Darjis & Nais*, despite their lower ritual ranking.

When this current operation of the tripartite hierarchy amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu males is compared with the fully fixed and coterminous operation demonstrated for their pre-migratory space/time context, then the long term change in this hierarchy, occurring through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, is revealed. Such change has clearly been weakening or degenerative in its nature, but not fully destructive, because the tripartite hierarchy has managed to gradually re-emerge in Bradford to operate in a fixed and coterminous form at the level of twice-born and non twice-born Punjabi Hindus.


### 8.3.3 Conceptualising changes in the tripartite hierarchy

A fuller understanding of the changes discussed above can be developed through the typology of status security shown in Figure 8.6. This draws on the work of Acland & Siriwardena (1989). According to this typology, migratory changes in the tripartite hierarchy's operation have brought about four possible outcomes for Punjabi Hindus living in Bradford today. Two of these outcomes are status **insecure**, because they involve discrepancies in the position Punjabi Hindus hold across the three hierarchies of the caste system. Accordingly, these two outcomes indicate substantial migratory change in the tripartite hierarchy, because they do not show it to be operating in a fixed and coterminous form in Bradford. The other two outcomes are status **secure**, in that Punjabi Hindus would hold similar positions in all three hierarchies. These two outcomes show the tripartite hierarchy operating in a more fixed and coterminous fashion in Bradford, and, as such, they indicate minimum migratory change.

The first outcome arising from migratory changes in the tripartite hierarchy's operation amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus is outcome 'A', or 'insecure and deprived status'. This represents those from *jatis* of a high position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system who, following their migration and settlement, have slumped from a similarly elevated position in the economic and political hierarchies of the institution in the rural Doab of the 1950s and '60s, to a low position in Bradford today. From Figures

8.4 and 8.5, it can be seen that these persons are typically Punjabi Hindus affiliated to the *Brahmin varna*.

**Figure 8.6: A typology of status security in the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's current Punjabi Hindu community**



Based on an idea from Acland & Siriwardena (1989: 570).

Outcome 'B', or 'secure low status', is characterised by Punjabi Hindus from *jatis* of a low position in the ritual hierarchy who, following migration from the Doab to Bradford, have remained in an equally submerged position in the economic and political hierarchies. Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show that these persons are most likely to be affiliated to the *Darji & Nais* and *Chamar jatis*.

Outcome 'C' represents Punjabi Hindus belonging to *jatis* of high ritual ranking who have retained a similarly elevated position in the economic and political hierarchies following migration, despite a short term loss of such economic and political standing on initial arrival in Bradford. In Figures 8.4 and 8.5 it can be seen that these persons are most likely to be affiliated to the *Khattri* and *Agarwal & Sunari jatis*.

Finally, outcome 'D' is characterised by Punjabi Hindus from *jatis* of low ritual ranking, who have risen from an equally low position in the economic and political hierarchies in the 1950s and 60s Doab to a more elevated position in Bradford today. This typically applies to those persons from the *Chamar jati* who do not fall into outcome 'B'.

It is accepted that the outcomes in the typology of status security are typical but not exhaustive. There may, for example, be *Brahmins* who have retained their high position in the economic and political hierarchies following migration and settlement, and therefore find themselves in position 'C' rather than 'A'. Nevertheless, the four outcomes in the typology, and the persons they typically represent in Bradford's current Punjabi Hindu community, can now be illustrated by referring to the 50 sample interviews and providing case studies of four selected individual respondents and their families<sup>7</sup>.

### **Outcome A: Insecure and deprived status, Mr A's story**

In 1995 Mr A was 55 years of age and had lived in Bradford for 31 years. He is a *Brahmin*. Before coming to Britain he had been a landowner in the Punjab but, in line with his *Brahminical karma*, he had also run his village temple. The combined effect of these two activities had favoured Mr A with a lot of money and much influence over the local rural community. In 1964 Mr A sold off his land and decided to come to Britain with his wife and three daughters in the hope of "earning his fortune".

Mr A arrived in London first, but after a few weeks he came to Bradford because he had heard there was work there. The only employment he could obtain in Bradford was in a poorly paid textile job. Mr A said that he had not liked this type of work but that he had always felt something better would come along. In 1975, however, he was still working in the same textile mill and in the same poorly paid job. Mr A said that around this time, other Punjabi Hindus who had worked alongside him in the mill started to open up shops and move into better houses as they earned more money. He claimed that as these people became more economically successful, they became influential members of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. It appeared that Mr A had been down-hearted at this, because his own hardships and the relative successes of other Punjabi Hindus had combined to reveal the decline in his economic and political power since emigrating from India. To try to improve his political and economic standing, Mr A took the job of supervisor at Bradford's bus depot in November 1975, but he said that in the end, this had not been much better than his previous textile job. In retrospect, it seemed that Mr A felt that he had done too little too late in this country to maintain the high economic and political status which might be expected of a *Brahmin*. As he explained:

When I came here I thought, "I'm a *Brahmin*, I'm a somebody, people will listen to me." But people didn't care. I was nobody here, and by the time I realised this everyone else was ahead.

Despite the loss of economic and political status Mr A perceived in himself, he clearly felt he had regained some political prestige in Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community through the successes of his three daughters. They had all obtained degrees and were now working in well paid professional jobs. "Thanks to my daughters," said Mr A, "I can hold my head up high".

### **Outcome B: Secure low status, Mr B's story**

In 1995 Mr B was 57 years of age and had lived in Bradford for 35 years. He is a *Nais*. Before coming to Britain he had worked with his father as a barber in the rural Doab region, in line with his *jati's karma*. Mr B said that this job had not been very respectable, but it brought in money and it was what the men in his family had always done. In 1960 Mr B received a letter from a friend who had gone to Britain a few months earlier. In the letter the friend said that he had earned a lot of money working in a textile mill in a place called Bradford and that he could get Mr B a job if he too came to Britain.

Mr B decided to go to Bradford and work there for a couple of years. His aim was to send most of the money he earned back home to his wife and two children, so they could use it to build a new family home. Mr B arrived in Bradford on Christmas Eve 1960 and linked-up with his friend who, as promised, got him a job as a wool carder in the New Year of '61. Mr B lived with his friend in a single bedsit for two years. His friend worked a day shift and used the bed at night, whilst Mr B worked the

<sup>7</sup> It is regrettable that none of these four individual respondents are women. This reflects the quality of data collected rather than any bias in the way it is being analysed.

night shift and slept in the day. This dual living system had allowed Mr B to save a lot of money which he had sent back home to his wife. Mr B said that by 1965, he and his friend were missing the company of their wives and children, so they sent for them.

When Mr B's wife arrived in Bradford, he moved his family into a small rented back-to-back house. Even then, Mr B's intentions were that he would only stay in Bradford another year or two and earn a bit more money before returning to his newly built home in India. However, the longer Mr B stayed here the more the idea of returning to the subcontinent became less attractive, especially as his children had started to grow up and had made it clear that they did not want to go back themselves. Eventually, Mr B saved enough money to buy a terraced house in the inner-city neighbourhood of Bradford Three. Mr B said that from that point on, he knew he was going to be in Bradford for a long time.

Today, Mr B still lives in the same house and still works in textiles as a machine operator, although at the time of the interview he was off sick due to an industrial injury. Mr B was aware that 34 years in the textile industry had not made him particularly wealthy, or delivered him much prestige as a member of the city's Punjabi Hindu community. However, such considerations did not seem important as far as he was concerned, and he certainly had no regrets about his own lack of economic and political advancement:

A lot of people will say, "Oh a factory job, that's not very good is it". But it's just an ego thing with them. I mean a job's a job isn't it? It's not there to make you important or anything; I don't go for that. Okay, maybe textiles isn't as much money as jobs others do, but I know when I get home that's it. It's not like all these people who've opened up their own business, you know, working all hours to try and earn more money and worrying about it all the time.

Mr B's two eldest sons, who had been born in India, had left school at 16 without any qualifications. They now worked in the same textile factory as Mr B himself. Mr B's daughter, who had been born in Bradford, had left school with one CSE. She now works as a care assistant in a local old people's home. All three of these children have married and now live away from home. Even though it appeared that Mr B's own lack of economic and political advancement had fed through to his children, he was nevertheless proud of their achievements:

I'm very pleased really. I know my kids didn't do to well at school but that doesn't matter does it? I mean they're all married and they've all got jobs and cars and a roof over their heads, you know, the essential things that people look at. They've never been in any trouble, I mean none of them have ever been to prison or anything.

### **Outcome C: Secure high status, Mr C's story**

In 1995 Mr C was 60 years of age and had lived in Bradford for 28 years. He is a *Khatti*. Back in the Doab region Mr C had run a large and successful drapery business with his wife. This had brought him much wealth. He had also been a prominent member of his local rural community, acting as the Indian equivalent of a Justice of the Peace. Mr C decided to come to Britain in 1967 because he thought it would offer even better financial prospects for himself and his wife, and, most importantly, a bright educational future for his children. His intention had been to live in Britain for around 20 years and see his children through university before returning home.

Mr C initially arrived in Britain on his own and was met at Heathrow by his sister-in-law's husband, who had come to Britain a few years earlier and had secured himself the position of head foreman at a foundry in Shipley. This relative found Mr C a job at the foundry, and, for a short while, Mr C lived with his sister-in-law and her husband. Soon after his arrival, Mr C was taken to a pub by one of the foundry workers. Mr C recalls how there were lots of Punjabi Sikh men there who were all trying to find jobs in the local paper, but they could not read English. Mr C, however, had received an English BA from the University of Chandigarh. Consequently, he found himself translating jobs in the paper into Punjabi for these Sikh men. Mr C explained how word got around about this, and he was soon running a service for the local Punjabi community which involved the translation of things like legal documents from English to Punjabi or Hindi, and job applications from Punjabi or Hindi to English. The work became so lucrative that Mr C was able to stop work in the foundry after only a few weeks and concentrate entirely on his new found occupation, as well as renting himself his own bedsit.

Mr C carried on doing this work for the next two years. At the same time, he managed to get a place to study on a 15 month course at Bradford University, which was designed to enable foreign degree students with the requisite qualifications to teach in British schools. Mr C realised this would be a valuable asset, because, as Asian children began to go to school in this country, he knew there would be a desperate need for teachers who were bi-lingual in English and a South Asian language, as he was himself.

In 1969, after living in Bradford for only two years, Mr C finished his teaching course, stopped his translation service, and immediately got a job teaching at a Primary school in Bradford. At this point he decided it was time to bring over his family, consisting of his wife and two young sons. When they arrived, Mr C obtained a mortgage and bought himself a small semi-detached house in the neighbourhood of Bradford Four.

Mr C's career path was a successful one. After teaching in various primary schools he became RE advisory teacher for Bradford LEA and helped found the Interfaith Education Centre in the city. This was a resource library to which teachers from schools all over the district could go to borrow books and artefacts which would assist them in teaching different religions. Following this, Mr C became head teacher of a large primary school. At the same time he had helped his wife to re-establish her own drapery business in Bradford and had opened two shops with her. Mr C had also been one of the founder members of the Hindu Cultural Society and was now one of its leaders. The combined effect of all these developments appeared to have made Mr C and his wife even more wealthy than they had been in the Punjab, and had provided them with the same levels of prestige and power within the local Punjabi Hindu community. Mr C's career in education had also brought him into regular contact with many white professionals in Bradford, and he claimed to have formed strong associations and friendships with a large number of these persons.

In line with his original aims of coming to Britain, Mr C had made sure that his own economic success and political prestige had rubbed off on to his children. They had all gone to Bradford Grammar School (fee paying) and then on to university. Mr C's eldest son was now a manager with ICI. His younger son was a financial consultant, and his daughter (born in Britain) was a pharmacist. The recent marriage of Mr C's younger son provided a perfect illustration of his (and his family's) economic success, political prestige and power within the local Punjabi Hindu community. The reception had taken place at the four star Norfolk Gardens Hotel in Bradford. Over 2000 guests attended the wedding, several of them having flown out from India. Mr and Mrs C's wedding gift to their son and daughter-in-law had been a new car and a £100,000 house directly opposite their own. Having his son living so near him did have some advantages. As Mr C pointed out, "We can always share the lawnmower!"

### **Outcome D: Insecure and improved status, Mr D's story**

In 1995 Mr D was 40 years of age and had lived in Bradford for 32 years. He is a *Chamar*. Back in the rural Doab Mr D's father had been a leather tanner, in line with his *jati's karma*. Mr D recalled that his family had been very poor at this time and that they had had a very low level of prestige within the local community. When Mr D's mother died in 1963, his father decided to come to England with him and his brother and make a new start. Mr D was eight when he arrived in Bradford and his brother was six. His father got a job as a cooper and had worked hard to support Mr D and his brother during their years of compulsory schooling. Mr D said that when they turned 16, his father had made them leave school and go out to work. "My father didn't really see any point in education," said Mr D, "because he had never had any himself."

Thus, at the age of 16, Mr D started working in a textile mill. However, by the time he was 17 he had secretly started going to night school (against his father's wishes) to do A-levels in English and History. "I was determined I would not end up at the bottom of the pile like my father had been," said Mr D. "I saw that getting some better qualifications might be a way out." After obtaining good A-level grades, Mr D got a place to study law at university. "My father had found out by then," said Mr D, "I think he was secretly quite pleased about what I did."

On leaving university Mr D worked as a solicitor for a firm in Nottingham for two years, before setting up his own partnership in Bradford. Today, Mr D has clearly done well for himself. His legal business has made him a wealthy man, and he holds a prestigious position in the local Punjabi Hindu community, as he deals with the legal affairs of many of its members. However, despite his high economic and

political standing in the community, Mr D has increasingly alienated himself from the religious and ritual aspects of his Punjabi Hindu culture. As he put it:

I have very little involvement in the religious life these days. I reject all that now, I really do. You see the Hindu religion, it's so tied up in the caste system and subjugation, and that's what's kept our family down for years. I've broken out of that now, I'm not poor and oppressed like we were back in India. People have to respect me here because they know I'm pretty well off and I've got a lot of clout. I'm not going to involve myself in any religious thing that'll let them bring me down in some other way.

The typology of status security has summarised migratory changes in the operation of the tripartite hierarchy amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus into four possible outcomes. It has been suggested that these outcomes would be characteristic of persons from certain *jatis* or *varnas* in Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, and this has been reinforced through the presentation of four case studies. The next section discusses these four outcomes of change with a view to determining how they have been generated through the migration and settlement process.

### 8.3.4 Reasons for changes in the tripartite hierarchy

In attempting to explain the migratory changes in the operation of the tripartite hierarchy, attention first turns to the two status secure outcomes. These are 'B' and 'C' in the typology of status security and, as noted earlier, they are outcomes which represent minimum change from this hierarchy's pre-migratory fixed and coterminous operation.

Outcome 'B' has been seen to be characterised by those Punjabi Hindus in Bradford who are affiliated to *jatis* of low ritual ranking, and who have remained in an equally submerged position in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system following their migration from the 1950s and '60s rural Doab to 1990s Bradford. As noted above, this would typically apply to persons affiliated to the *Darjis & Nais* and *Chamar jatis*. Outcome 'C' has been seen to represent those Punjabi Hindus affiliated to *jatis* of high ritual ranking, who have maintained a similarly elevated position in the economic and political hierarchies, despite a temporary loss of their economic and political standing on initial settlement in Britain. It has been suggested that this outcome would typically apply to *Khattris* and *Agarwals & Sunaris*.

During the later interviews, a number of interviewees were presented with the emerging findings concerning the low economic and political standing of *Darjis & Nais* and *Chamars* in Bradford, and the high economic and political position of *Khattris* and *Agarwals & Sunaris*. These interviewees were asked to try and explain these findings. Significantly, *Darji*, *Nais* and *Chamar* interviewees refused to accept that they as a group had a relatively submerged economic and political standing in Bradford, as

compared to Punjabi Hindus from *jatis* of higher ritual ranking. Consequently, they were unwilling to offer any suggestions as to why this might be.

However, several Punjabi Hindu interviewees affiliated to *jatis* of higher ritual ranking (i.e. *Khattris* and *Agarwals & Sunaris*) were more willing to accept the interviewer's observations that *Nais & Darjis* and *Chamars* might occupy a submerged economic and political position. The reasons these interviewees put forward for this were all essentially the same. Typically, therefore, they suggested that the low economic and political standing of many from *jatis* like the *Nais* and *Chamars* stemmed from an indelible culture of low ambition and expectation amongst such individuals, which was passed on from one generation to another. These interviewees usually contrasted this with a converse culture of ambition seen amongst Punjabi Hindus from *jatis* of high ritual ranking such as themselves, which they used to account for their own economic and political success. As one *Agarwal* man explained:

Most *Nais* and *Chamars* and that, they've got very narrow expectations. It's a cultural thing you see, because they'll always make do with what they've got. They've carried on working in factories and on buses and their kids will do the same. Whereas higher castes in Bradford, like *Agarwals* - like myself - and *Khattris*, they may have been doing this when they arrived here but they've moved on, got better paid jobs and the qualifications if they needed them, bigger houses, you name it. Some have even got on Bradford council. They're quite powerful in political circles. (*Agarwal* man, 61 yrs., 1st generation. Interview 32).

Similarly, a *Khattri* man commented:

Lower caste Punjabi Hindus, like *Nais* and that, well they would be satisfied with an ordinary terraced house. They would never want to buy a £300,000 one. Like *Khattris*, they'll never live in a terraced house, they'll always go higher because they've got higher visions, higher goals and expectations. They want to get on, you know, get a good job, earn more money, send their kids to a better school. They've not got this dead end 'terraced house vision' like low castes. You see for them, second best will do, they don't have the desire to do better. They'll stay in the same old mill job and then their kids will leave school at 16, and then their kids' kids. It's a vicious circle isn't it? No, it doesn't matter what sort of opportunities you give them, these lower castes are happier with less, the slum is within them you see. (*Khattri* man, 36 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 46).

Another *Khattri* man noted:

Low castes in Bradford, they've no ambition. Like I know this *Nais* man, he's alright really, but we're sitting around having this conversation and he says, "Well as soon as a girl is 16 bloody well get her married and send her out of the home," and I said, "No, let her get a degree and an education." And he just said, "Don't be so bloody stupid you sound like an English man." But that's how *Khattris* act you see, we always want to do better, not stick in this damn rut. (*Khattri* man, 42 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 12).

The biased nature of these responses, in respect of the fact that they all emanate from interviewees belonging to the *Khattri* or *Agarwal jatis*, suggests that the reasons they provide for the low economic and political standing of many *Nais*, *Darjis* and

*Chamars* in Bradford, and the high economic and political standing of *Agarwals*, *Sunaris* and *Khattris*, should be treated with caution. However, when observing the family units resident in many of the sample households, as well as the individual case studies outlined in Section 8.3.3, the need for such caution becomes less clear cut.

Certainly, persons belonging to a number of *Nais* and *Chamar* interview households appeared to have the low expectations eluded to by the *Khattri* and *Agarwal* interviewees above. This is especially well demonstrated in case study 'B'. It was seen that Mr B's expectations and levels of ambition as a *Nais* were extremely modest compared to those of Mr C as a *Khattri*. Thus, Mr B indicated that he had no desire to go beyond blue collar work in textiles because it was too stressful. Similarly, he judged his children's success on the basis of whether they were married and had basic material possessions such as a job, a car, and a house. Equally, he appeared to place little value in education as a means of betterment.

This contrasts sharply with Mr C, whose expectations and ambitions appear to have been set much higher since his initial arrival in this country. It is these that have driven Mr C to preserve his high economic and political standing in Bradford from the pre-migratory space/time context from which he originated, despite his short term loss of such status when he first arrived in the city and had to work in low paid foundry work. Thus, it can be seen that Mr C has always been attempting to improve his political prestige within Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, either through his founding of the Hindu Cultural Society and the city's Interfaith Education Centre, or in his motivation to educate himself and his children. Mr C was also shown to be ambitious in maintaining and improving his economic position. This is visible in the high level of entrepreneurship shown by Mr C with his translation service when he first arrived in Britain, and in his assistance in the establishment of his wife's business. It seemed that Mr C had used an event like his son's wedding as a showcase for his high political and economic standing. Through such an event he seemed to be communicating the message to other Punjabi Hindus in Bradford that he was an important member of the community.

In explaining the migratory changes occurring in the operation of the tripartite hierarchy, attention now turns to the two status insecure outcomes. These are 'A' and 'D' in the typology of status security and, as noted earlier, they are outcomes which represent substantial change in the tripartite hierarchy from its pre-migratory fixed and coterminous operation.

Outcome 'A' has been seen to be characterised by those Punjabi Hindus in Bradford who are affiliated to *jatis* of high ritual ranking, and who have lost their similarly elevated position in the economic and political hierarchies following their

migration and settlement from the 1950s and '60s Doab to 1990s Bradford. As noted above, this would typically apply to persons affiliated to the *Brahmin varna*. Outcome 'D' involves Punjabi Hindus belonging to *jatis* of low ritual ranking, who have improved their position in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system following migration and settlement. It has been suggested that this would typically apply to those *Chamars* who do not fall into outcome 'B'.

As regards outcome 'D', it would seem that those *Chamars* who have improved their position in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system in Bradford have done so through a recognition of the culture of low ambition which supposedly characterises many *Chamar* individuals and families in the city, and through a personal desire to break out of this cycle of economic and political marginalisation. Accordingly, Mr D noted, "I was determined I would not end up at the bottom of the pile like my father had been... I saw that getting some better qualifications might be a way out." Thus, against the wishes of his father, who appeared to hold the low levels of ambition and expectation typified by *Chamars* in outcome 'B', Mr D had gone to university and obtained a job as a solicitor. In doing this he had secured himself a higher position in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system.

Significant in these developments was Mr D's rejection of the Hindu religious tradition, out of which the ritual aspects of the caste system are born. This was an interesting strategy, because Mr D appeared to be rejecting his low position in the ritual hierarchy by shunning the spiritual side of his culture, rather than trying to enhance his position in this hierarchy through sanskritisation strategies, as might have been witnessed in 1950s and '60s India. Perhaps this was Mr D's way of saying to the Punjabi Hindu community, 'If you look down on my low position in the ritual hierarchy as a *Chamar*, I will reject the Hindu religious tradition out of which that ritual hierarchy is born.'

In terms of outcome 'A', a number of respondents in the later interviews were presented with the emerging findings concerning the low economic and political standing of most Punjabi Hindus from the *Brahmin varna* in Bradford. Several offered suggestions as to why *Brahmins* appeared not to have regained the political and economic status they had had in the Punjab, following migration and settlement. Most outspoken of these interviewees was a young *Khattri* man:

A lot of these *Brahmins* haven't done too well here compared to back home because they're lazy, it's true, they think that because they're *Brahmins* they're really special and they'll get things their own way. But they've had a bit of a shock here because things don't work like that do they? I mean everyone has to make their way, they can't use their caste to give them a leg up. But that's why *Brahmins* are all fat, it's because they sit around all the time. You look at them. You can bloody mark them out anywhere. They're all fat bastards. (*Khattri* man, 29 yrs, generation 1.5. Interview 35).

This statement suggests that *Brahmins* have not regained the high political and economic standing many of them had in India because they have not worked as hard as those from other *jatis*. It is also implied that this is because many *Brahmins* thought that they did not need to work too hard, as they felt their high position in the ritual hierarchy would serve them well in the Bradford context, and secure their economic and political advancement as it had done in India. The biased nature of this statement, bearing in mind that it comes from a respondent belonging to another *jati* who shows obvious antipathy towards *Brahmins*, suggests that it might be treated with scepticism.

On the other hand, some of the conclusions drawn from the above quote seem to ring true when looking at the experiences of Mr A in the above case studies. He felt that because he was a *Brahmin*, people would 'listen to him'. For Mr A, the reality was that his ritual position did not help him at all in terms of his economic and political fortunes in Bradford. By the time Mr A realised this, he claims that those from other *jatis* were already ahead. Similarly, a frank interview with one *Brahmin* lady appeared to lend support to the conclusions drawn from the statement of the *Khattri* interviewee above:

I think when a lot us [*Brahmins*] arrived here we expected everything to happen for us. You know, we had been really important back in India, and we thought we could use that here. So we probably all sat back a bit and said, "Oh we don't need to work too hard, things will come to us." Other castes were working really hard then and making their life good here. I think it was a while before we all realised that it doesn't matter if you're *Brahmin*, you still have to do the same as everyone else. (*Brahmin* woman, 34 years, 1st generation. Interview 26).

In summary, the above discussion has examined some possible reasons for the migratory changes occurring in the operation of the tripartite hierarchy, by presenting the four outcomes of change in the typology of status security to some of the later interview respondents. In terms of outcomes 'B' and 'C', interviewees were seen to attribute the contrasting high economic and political standing of *Agarwals*, *Sunaris* and *Khattris*, and the low economic and political position of *Darjis*, *Nais* and *Chamars*, to respective cultures of high and low ambition and expectation. As regards outcome 'D', the high economic and political standing of some *Chamars* appears to occur for those who have broken out of the cycle of low ambition, characterised by those under outcome 'B'. For outcome 'A', the loss of economic and political status for *Brahmins*, following their migration and settlement, has been attributed to their initial belief that they could 'sit back' and let their high ritual ranking carry them along in the economic and political spheres. It appears that this strategy was unsuccessful, and they ended up falling behind other Punjabi Hindus in this country in terms of their economic and political standing.

### 8.3.5 Hybrid ethnic identities and the caste system

The different outcomes of migratory change in the operation of the tripartite hierarchy, as conceptualised through the typology of status security, are interesting in themselves. However, they also support the idea that hybrid ethnic identities are being forged amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. Over recent years, concepts of hybrid ethnic identity have been presented by academics such as Gilroy (1987), Hall (1990; 1992a; 1992b) and Modood (1997). These writers argue that post-colonial migrations have produced Diaspora communities of the Black Caribbean and South Asian populations for whom ethnic identities are not 'pure', fixed or static, but poised between the culture of the Diaspora community's place of origin and that of the host society, thus producing 'creative and promiscuous routeways' of ethnic identification (Back, 1996: 7).

Such a phenomenon has been particularly recognised for South Asians living in Britain, who show signs of newly emerging ethnic identities based on 'hybridic Asianess' Modood (1997). On the one hand, this may involve South Asians living in this country selectively appropriating elements of British culture, such as a strong regional affiliation and accent, or a distinctive position in the British class system. On the other hand, a recent study by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) indicates that this hybridic Asianess also entails South Asians drawing just as selectively on elements of their own traditional culture, such as the wearing of South Asian dress, the use of a South Asian language and the modified practice of a South Asian religion (Modood, 1997). Furthermore, this PSI study demonstrates that the decisions regarding which particular elements of British and South Asian culture are adopted and bypassed may vary between South Asian sub-groups, such as Muslims versus non-Muslims, Hindus versus Sikhs, or Pakistanis versus Indians. Gender, age and the generational status of South Asians may also be important variables in influencing which elements of British and South Asian culture are adopted or bypassed. In other words, identities of hybridic Asianess may not just vary from one South Asian sub-group to another, but from one South Asian individual to another.

One finding from the research in Bradford is that in Britain, *jati* affiliations (or *varna* for *Brahmins*) are another component of South Asian culture which can be accepted or rejected by those to whom they apply (i.e. Indian Hindus). Within Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community, for example, it has been seen that a majority of individuals accept and invoke their *jati* affiliation, even if it is to a *jati* with a low position in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system. This is undoubtedly because of the importance *jati* affiliation still plays in areas like marriage (see Section 6.2). Nevertheless, some Punjabi Hindus in Bradford are attempting to reject their *jati* affiliation. Those doing this might typically be individuals from *jatis* of low position in the ritual hierarchy, such as *Chamars*, who have steered themselves into a strong socio-economic position in this country, with Mr D in the above case studies being an example of this. It appears these

individuals wish to throw off the label of low ritual status which comes with their *jati* affiliation. However, if Mr D's experiences are anything to go by, then such a move seems also to entail a rejection of those elements of Punjabi Hindu culture which are tied in with *jati* affiliation and the caste system, such as the Hindu religion.

A key finding of this study, as regards the outcomes of migratory change in the tripartite hierarchy's operation, is that the invoking of a particular *jati* affiliation is often accompanied by the adoption of elements of British culture. This produces distinctive types of hybrid ethnic identity amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. For example, those individuals accepting and invoking their *jati* affiliation as *Khattris* and *Agarwals & Sunaris* often seem to appropriate the trappings of middle class British culture as well. The above case study of Mr C, with his professional occupation, comfortable economic position, suburban living and university education for himself and his children seems to be good example of this. Conversely, many of those accepting and invoking their *jati* affiliation as *Darjis*, *Nais* or *Chamars* appear more likely to align themselves with a British working class culture. This is exemplified through the Mr B's experiences in the above case studies. Punjabi Hindus in Bradford who invoke their *Brahmin* affiliation, such as Mr A, seem to face a difficult position, for it appears they would like to consider themselves part of a British middle class culture, but are not always in a strong enough socio-economic position to do this.

This study also indicates that the cultural components making up the hybrid ethnic identities of individuals and communities, and therefore these identities themselves, are flexible over time and space. In Bradford, for example, Chapter Six demonstrated that *jati* affiliations are most strongly invoked by Punjabi Hindus at times of marriage, or in the spatial context of temple usage. More intriguingly, perhaps, it was seen earlier in this chapter how a couple invoking their affiliation to the *Khatti jati* were also willing to appropriate the South Asian cultural trait of traditional Indian dress. However, this only occurred when entertaining white middle class dinner guests in their home. In essence, a traditional South Asian cultural trait was being temporarily invoked and performed in a specific time/space context to strengthen another more British cultural component, namely that of being part of Bradford's middle class community.

This flexibility of hybrid identities may also manifest itself between different Diaspora communities in different time/space contexts. For example, the hybrid identities of Punjabi Hindus in Bradford are likely to differ from those of Punjabi Hindus in Leicester or Southall. In short, the process of forming hybrid identities not only involves the acquisition of cultural resources from a Diaspora community's place of origin, "but also their recombination within particular local circumstances. The result is a complex composite of local and diasporic elements." (Solomos & Back, 1996: 143).

As well as elements of British culture being appropriated by South Asians, theories of hybrid ethnic identity acknowledge that aspects of South Asian culture may filter through to white Britons. An obvious example of this might be in the growth of mainly Bangladeshi and Pakistani run curry houses in Britain, which reflect a widespread adoption of a South Asian gastronomic culture by the dominant white society. As the work of others has demonstrated (Jones, 1988), youth music also represents an area of intense cultural crossover in any discussion about ethnic hybridity. On the one hand, Britain's South Asian youth has undoubtedly adopted elements of the music culture of white British youth in contemporary adaptations of the *bhangra* sound (Baumann, 1990). Equally, however, the music of white British youth has begun to incorporate aspects of traditional South Asian music. This is manifest in the white British guitar band Kula Shaker, which has developed a musical genre known as 'Sanskrit pop', involving the lyrical projection of Hindu imagery and intermittent singing in the Hindi language. As elements of South Asian culture cross over into white British culture in this way, they inevitably challenge existing concepts of Britishness. As Modood explains:

...if ethnic minority identities are not simply products of cultures of extra-British origin, but owe something to the stream of British life, then they too contribute to that stream, and so their existence belies the dichotomy of 'essentially black' and 'essentially British'. (Modood, 1997: 290-1).

In Bradford, therefore, notions of British class culture may need to incorporate the concepts of the caste system and *jati* affiliation, certainly if the above findings relating to the city's Punjabi Hindu community are anything to go by. In such cases, hybrid ethnic identities need to be understood as two way traffic; in other words, it may be as viable to talk about 'hybridic Britishness' as it is to talk about 'hybridic Asianess'.

#### 8.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter began by identifying the degree of spatial and temporal shift embodied in the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. The spatial shift involved the move from an essentially rural environment in the Doab region of the Punjab, to an urban context in Bradford. The temporal shift was a period of 30 to 40 years, representing the time between Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community leaving the Doab in the 1950s and '60s and the present day.

Substantial migratory changes were shown to have occurred in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. These changes have all weakened the operational influence of this hierarchy. This is most clearly seen in the ritual discrimination influencing temple usage patterns, which has been shown to be much less overt in Bradford today than it was in the 1950s and '60s Doab. Weakening in the operation of the ritual hierarchy is also evident in commensal

restrictions, which have been more or less eradicated in the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Various possible reasons were identified for these weakening changes in the ritual hierarchy's operation, and it was suggested that the most likely of these may have been the fact that Punjabi Hindus who came to Bradford were quite progressive in their social outlook, and wished to get away from the worst excesses of ritual discrimination.

The tripartite hierarchy of the caste system was also shown to have degenerated in the migration of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus from the 1950s and 60s Doab, where it operated in a fully fixed and coterminous form. However, this degeneration does not appear to have been entirely destructive, as the tripartite hierarchy does still operate in a fixed and coterminous fashion at the broad level of twice-born and non twice-born *jatis* within Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. Accordingly, the migratory changes in the tripartite hierarchy's operation have been shown to relate to hierarchical discrepancies within these two broad groups, as already seen in Chapter Seven.

A typology of status security has been used to summarise these hierarchical discrepancies or migratory changes into four possible outcomes. Two of these outcomes are **status insecure**, as they involve Bradford's Punjabi Hindus holding disparate positions in the three hierarchies of the caste system. Such outcomes indicate substantial migratory change in the tripartite hierarchy from a fixed and coterminous operation in the rural Doab of the 1950s and '60s. Findings demonstrated that in Bradford, these status insecure outcomes are typified by Punjabi Hindus from the *Brahmin varna* and *Chamar jati*.

The other two outcomes of migratory change are **status secure**, and involve Bradford's Punjabi Hindus holding similar positions in all three hierarchies of the caste system. Status secure outcomes therefore indicate minimum change in the tripartite hierarchy from its pre-migratory fixed and coterminous operation. Again, research findings indicated that in Bradford, these status secure outcomes are most likely to involve Punjabi Hindus from the *Agarwal*, *Sunari* and *Khatti jatis*, or the *Darji*, *Nais* and *Chamar jatis*.

Further analysis of case studies, and the comments of sample interviewees, has suggested differing reasons for the status secure and insecure outcomes of migratory change in the tripartite hierarchy's operation. For example, the status secure positions of most *Agarwals*, *Sunaris* and *Khattis* has been put down to their culture of high expectation and ambition, whilst the status secure position of *Darjis*, *Nais* and *Chamars* has been explained as the result of a converse culture of low ambition and expectation. By contrast, the status insecure position of other *Chamars* is put down to a desire to

break out of this tradition of low attainment, whilst that of *Brahmins* is explained in terms of their complacency.

Overall, therefore, this chapter has demonstrated that the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus engendered weakening changes in the operation of the ritual and tripartite hierarchies of the caste system amongst this community. Moreover, it has been shown that where the tripartite hierarchy is concerned, these changes may have been at their greatest on the initial arrival of Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, when most were confined to work in textiles, irrespective of their *jati* affiliations. Despite this, the operation of the ritual and tripartite hierarchies has by no means been eradicated in Bradford, and the findings from Chapter Seven provide the clearest evidence of this. Again, this demonstrates the resilience of the caste system in its ability to survive the upheavals affecting it over time and space, and shows the adaptability of the institution in the face of change.

## Chapter Nine

### *Conclusions: spatial and temporal change in the caste system*

#### 9.1 AIMS AND THEIR FULFILMENT

In Chapter One, this study was outlined as having four principal aims. The first of these was to provide a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the caste system. This task was taken up in Chapter Two. Through a detailed critique and analysis of anthropological and Indological literature, a working definition of the term 'caste' was created. This definition was used to develop a simple framework for conceptualising Indian society. The construction of this framework revealed all aspects of the caste system, in terms of the types of social units from which it is composed, their historical origins, characteristics, and the ways in which these units interact with each other to produce the 'system' itself. The first aim of the study was therefore fulfilled.

The second aim was to show how different aspects of the caste system have changed over time and space. This task was taken up in Chapter Three. It was first shown how the caste system changed in India's historical past, with particular attention being paid to the era of the British Raj. Following this, consideration was given to changes the caste system has undergone in Indian Hindu Diaspora. The ability of the caste system to change illustrated that it was a dynamic and adaptable institution, rather than being immutable and inflexible as a common-sense approach would maintain.

It was seen that the forces which engender change in the caste system vary in their nature, both diachronically and spatially. Thus, forces which brought about change in the institution in the time/space context of independent India were shown to be largely internally generated by the Indians themselves. Conversely, forces engendering change in the caste system at the height of the Raj period during the 19th Century, and in the spatial context of imperial India or other colonies housing Indian Hindu Diaspora, were generated externally by the British. Another variable was intent. For example, most forces set in motion by the British were rarely intended to bring about change in the caste system. Conversely, those arising from India's post-independence constitutional reform were expressly designed to alter the institution.

The fundamental point arising from this discussion was that diachronic and spatial variation in the nature of forces engendering change in the caste system has resulted in differences in the nature of that change itself. Thus, varying historical periods and spatial contexts have seen different aspects of the institution (ranging from the sociological characteristics of its constituent social units to its hierarchical structure) either

weakening, strengthening or adapting in response to forces. It was also seen that an aspect of the caste system which weakens in one temporal and spatial context can strengthen in another, throwing the institution into a constant state of flux.

However, whilst different aspects of the caste system were shown to regularly weaken/strengthen/adapt over time and space, there are other elements which, it was argued, remain resolutely unchanging. It was suggested that this reflects the caste system's ability to preserve elements of modernity and tradition together, and that such a quality has been the key to its adaptability and resultant survival over long periods of time and between different spatial contexts.

The third aim of the study was to identify the degree to which the caste system is present and operational amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford. In terms of presence, Chapter Six demonstrated that there is a high level of awareness of the caste system within this community. Thus, Bradford's Punjabi Hindus are all able to identify with their *jati* or (in the case of *Brahmins*) *varna* affiliation. Equally, Chapter Seven noted that members of this community are also aware of the position of their *jati* or *varna* in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system, indicating that this too is present.

In terms of the caste system's operation, Chapter Six demonstrated that Punjabi Hindus in Bradford still conduct marriages within their own *jati* or *varna*, and that Bradford's Punjabi Hindu centres of worship, or temples, act as units of social and political 'control' which are based on the caste system. Moreover, Chapter Seven showed that marriage practices and temple usage patterns are themselves driven by negative stereotyping and discrimination born out of the operation of the caste system's ritual hierarchy. Chapter Seven also revealed that the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system is present and operational in a fixed and coterminous form at the level of twice-born and non twice-born *jatis* amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Thus, those belonging to twice-born *jatis* of higher ritual ranking typically have a higher position in the economic and political hierarchies of the caste system, as compared to those of lower ritual ranking. The third aim of the study has therefore been fulfilled, as it has clearly been shown how the caste system is both present and operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus.

The fourth aim of the study was to assess how and why the caste system has changed for Bradford's Punjabi Hindus through the spatial and temporal transition embodied in their migration and settlement from the Punjab to Bradford. Analysis of qualitative interview data in Chapter Six indicated that the caste unit was demographically destroyed in this migration and settlement process. Consequently, endogamy within the caste system, which in India had been based on the caste unit, has become based on the *jati* for most of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, except for the

*Brahmins*, where marriage is confined within the *varna*. The demographic destruction of caste has also meant that the unit of social and political control within the caste system, which in India would have been the caste itself, has become centres of Punjabi Hindu worship or temples in Bradford, which often have memberships made up of persons from several *jatis* or *varnas* of similar ritual ranking.

Substantial migratory changes were also noted in the traditional occupations or *karmas* of various *jatis* or (for *Brahmins*) *varnas* amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. In many cases these have disappeared entirely in the migration and settlement process. In those few instances where *karmas* are being practised, this seems to be because of their economic utility as a 'cultural resource', rather than a desire to maintain the traditions of the caste system. In turn, it was argued that such utility was dependent on the appropriateness of Bradford's spatial context for exercising the skills and knowledge embodied in the 'cultural resource' of a given *karma*.

In Chapter Eight, the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus was shown to have brought about changes in the operational influence of the caste system's ritual hierarchy. These changes were principally weakening and degenerative, and were most evident in the disappearance of the more overt ritual discrimination influencing temple usage patterns amongst this community, and in the decline of commensal restrictions between Punjabi Hindus from different *jatis* and *varnas*. Such migratory weakening in the ritual hierarchy was put down to a generally progressive social outlook amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu immigrants.

The tripartite hierarchy of the caste system was also shown to have degenerated from a fully fixed and coterminous operation in the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. However, this degeneration does not appear to have been entirely destructive, as the tripartite hierarchy does still operate in a fixed and coterminous form for this community at the level of twice-born and non-twice-born *jatis*. Accordingly, migratory changes in the tripartite hierarchy's operation were shown to relate to hierarchical discrepancies within these two broad groups. Such changes were shown to be at a maximum amongst ritually high ranking *Brahmins*, many of whom had lost their equivalent high positions in the economic and political hierarchies following migration and settlement. It was argued that maximum migratory change was also present amongst some *Chamars*, who had gained political and economic status through the migration process. Conversely, *Khattris*, *Agarwals* & *Sunaris*, *Darjis* & *Nais* and other *Chamars* appeared to have maintained their positions in the economic and political hierarchies following migration. For these persons, therefore, the level of change in the tripartite hierarchy from its pre-migratory fixed and coterminous operation was minimal. A number of reasons were suggested for these different types of change, all of which

were closely tied to divergent cultural attitudes amongst the different *jatis* and *varnas* involved.

In summary, the spatial and temporal changes in the caste system occurring through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus have been clearly identified and, as such, the fourth aim of the study has been fulfilled. But how do these changes relate to those seen in other parts of Indian Hindu Diaspora?

In Chapter Three, the pattern of change in the caste system for Indian Hindus in the post-indentured Diaspora of the Caribbean was shown to be largely degenerative. For example, it was seen that the ritual hierarchy had been substantially weakened through the forced proximity and commensality of persons from different *jatis* and *varnas* in estate barracks during indenture. Similarly, the dictates of plantation labour had brought traditional occupations or *karmas* to an end. Gross inequalities in the gender ratio of early indentured immigrants also destroyed *jati* and *varna* endogamy in post indentured environments.

For Indian Hindus in East Africa, the story was seen to be different. Here, the ritual hierarchy was destroyed by the presence of the surrounding Black African population, who were considered highly polluting. However, endogamous marriage practices within the caste system were better maintained than in other post-indentured colonies. This was because of East Africa's relative proximity to the subcontinent, which could be used as a 'spousal pool'. Nevertheless, marriage practices still eventually declined from the level of caste to *jati* endogamy, as the caste unit had been demographically destroyed in the migration process. Because of this destruction of the caste, the *jati* also became the unit of social and political control in East Africa. There was also a significant decline in traditional occupations or *karmas*, because the East African economy did not provide a suitable economic context for the reproduction of *jajmani* relations.

For Singapore's post-*kangani* Diaspora of Indian Hindus, the story was in many ways similar to that seen amongst those in East Africa. For example, caste was demographically destroyed as a social unit during the initial migration process under *kangani*. Accordingly, endogamy and social and political control within the caste system declined to the level of the *jati*. Unlike East Africa, however, the ritual hierarchy has remained reasonably strong amongst Indian Hindus in Singapore. It was suggested in Chapter Three that this was because *kangani* work systems helped preserve social distance and commensal restrictions between *jatis* and *varnas*.

Clearly, the degree of change occurring in the caste system through the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus is different from that seen for Indian Hindus in other Diaspora contexts. For example, the weakening changes in the caste system seen amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford are less severe than those witnessed amongst Indian Hindus in the post-indentured Caribbean. However, these Bradford based changes in the caste system are still probably greater than those identified for the post-*kangani* Diaspora of Singapore.

The actual nature of the migratory change in the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus also differs from that seen in other parts of Indian Hindu Diaspora. For example, amongst Indian Hindus in Singapore and East Africa, it was seen that social and political control in the caste system is implemented through *jati* associations. By contrast, this 'control' is exercised through Punjabi Hindu centres of worship in Bradford. On the other hand, the marriages seen amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus are, like those for Indian Hindus in Singapore and East Africa, *jati* based. This demonstrates that there are also similarities in the nature of change in the caste system between these three Diaspora contexts.

In summary, different parts of Indian Hindu Diaspora have seen changes in the caste system varying in both their degree and nature. This indicates that any particular Diaspora context provides its own unique framework for change. This framework is strongly influenced by the interaction of the Indian Hindu community under scrutiny with the spatial environment in which it finds itself. Additionally, the spatial origins of this community may also be important. For example, in the Diaspora context of Britain, the caste system has been shown to have changed differently for Gujarati as opposed to Punjabi Hindus. Gujaratis Hindus have *jati* associations in this country which act as units of social and political control within the caste system, whilst for Punjabi Hindus this 'control' is exercised through local centres of worship. This may reflect the differing practices of these two origin region groups. It might also indicate their unique position in British Diaspora, with the former being a much larger group than the latter, and therefore having the opportunity for a more nationally based and structured level of organisation within the caste system. From whatever perspective the caste system is viewed, the spatial dimension obviously matters.

## 9.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY

This study has made a number of valuable contributions to several areas of the social sciences and humanities, reflecting diversity in terms of its span across a number of academic disciplines.

For the anthropologist and Indologist, Chapter Two provides a rigorous definition of the term caste. This is a refreshing alternative to the nebulous concept of caste as proposed by Dumont (1970), which has dominated anthropological and Indological thought for the past 25 years, and caused a "theoretical stagnation" by restricting access to a forum for alternative ideas. The simple framework for conceptualising Indian society, which has been constructed around this definition, may also be of use to those wishing to understand the caste system in the future.

The concept of the tripartite hierarchy developed in Chapter Three is another contribution made by this study to the field of anthropology and Indology. Although the idea of a ritual, economic and political hierarchy within the caste system has been touched upon by Srinivas (1962: 45), it has never properly been explained and built upon before.

For all social scientists, the South Asian name analysis methodology devised and employed in this study, and the machine readable dictionary of Indian names, represent a substantial resource for future researchers wishing to identify small religio-ethnic sub-groups in the Indian population.

For the geographer and social scientist, Chapter Five provides new data on the geographies of religio-ethnic sub-groups in Bradford at ward level, and shows how these are changing. This provides evidence that the South Asian community in Britain is fragmented to highly parochial levels in terms of social and spatial distance, and further helps to dispel the notion that Britain's South Asian community is one indistinguishable, homogenous group.

Most importantly, this study looks at the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford. For the geographer, the illustration of how the caste system has changed through the spatial and temporal shifts embodied in the migration and settlement of this community provides further evidence that the dimension of space is all important in the evolution and development of societies. For the social scientist, Chapter Eight demonstrates that the *jati* affiliations of Indian Hindus may be another important cultural component in the diasporic construction of identities of 'hybridic Asianess'. For the anthropologist, meanwhile, the study of Punjabi Hindus in Bradford provides a fascinating insight into a South Asian community *desh pardesh* (at home abroad), and their maintenance of an age old, yet adaptable social system.

### 9.3 APPRAISAL OF RESEARCH

Some criticisms might be made of the way in which the research for this study was carried out, but in each case the methods employed were the pragmatic solution to a real problem.

First, it could be argued that a white British researcher's understanding of an institution like the caste system may be very different from that of those Indian Hindus to whom it applies. This issue of the 'different frames of reference' which may be held by researched and researcher is one of the problems of social science enquiry. In this study it is hoped that it has been tempered by presenting much data in the words of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus themselves. Taking into account the bias of the white interviewer's presence, what interviewees actually said about the caste system must surely be close to how they understand the institution. Of course, the 'different frames of reference' of researched and researcher are just as much an issue in the interpretation of data, no matter how carefully it has been collected. However, in this study every attempt has been made to derive understanding about the caste system in Bradford directly from the comments of interviewees and build up explanations from these, rather than building theories and then using the comments of interviewees to support them. As such, this study hopes it has provided a close approximation of what the caste system means to Punjabi Hindus in Bradford.

A second criticism might be that this study has tried to cover too much ground. In particular, the development of a detailed name analysis methodology was a time consuming affair which took almost a year to complete. However, a rigid name analysis methodology was absolutely essential for the identification of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Without it, research into the caste system amongst this community could not have been undertaken successfully.

In Chapter Four, it can be seen that every attempt was made to randomly select Punjabi Hindu households for the interviews and questionnaires. Unfortunately, a number of households refused to be involved in either of these. This situation might have biased responses, especially if those willing to undertake interviews and questionnaires had a particular view on the caste system which was different from that of those unwilling to respond. However, as noted in many parts of this study, participant observation within Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community led to the conclusion that the views of the sample interviewees and questionnaire respondents were typical of most Punjabi Hindus in the city.

Finally, criticism might be levelled at the way in which change in the caste system between the 1950s and '60s Doab and Bradford in the 1990s was identified. It has been

seen that much of this relied on the comparison of findings on the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford today with retrospective qualitative data from interviewees. Such retrospective evidence can be problematic, because as Moser & Kalton note:

...for events not forgotten in their entirety, memory acts selectively, retaining some aspects and losing others, thus producing distorted images. For questions dealing with the past, serious attention must therefore be given to the respondents' abilities to recall the required information accurately. (Moser & Kalton, 1971: 331)

This problem of distorted images of the past and selective memory recall must be taken into account when viewing the retrospective comments of Punjabi Hindu interviewees about their experiences in the Doab prior to migration, and the way in which these comments have been used to illustrate change in the caste system through the migration and settlement process. One way of circumventing this problem might have been to carry out a 'panel study' (Babbie, 1990), involving return interviews to the same respondents. With this approach, the repeat reporting of particular past events back in the Punjab by an interviewee would have added verification of their validity, and greater confidence in their use as retrospective data. However, with the time limitations of this study it was felt that it would still be more advantageous to carry out 50 single interviews with different respondents rather than 25 return interviews.

#### 9.4 FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES

This study suggests a number of clear opportunities for future research. The first of these concerns the possible 'relative lack of change' occurring in the caste system since the migration and settlement of Punjabi Hindus to Bradford. For example, in one of the interviews, an elderly *Agarwal* couple, who had recently returned from a visit to Chandigarh city in the Punjab, provided an interesting 'hint' as to how the caste system may have changed in India since Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community left:

The people in cities in India are a lot more modernised and Westernised than those living here. Some of my friends in India who've met Indians living in Britain make fun of them... You'd think that people living here would be more broad minded or advanced, but that's not really the case. Like the way they carry on with these caste marriages here and the way they go on at the temple. You see the people in Bradford are locked in a time capsule from when they left India. (*Agarwal* woman, aged 51, 1st generation. Interview 45).

This statement suggests that the caste system has effectively 'fossilised' in Bradford since the city's Punjabi Hindu community unpacked it as part of their 'cultural baggage' some 30 to 40 years ago. In the Punjab, meanwhile, things have moved on. Admittedly, this woman is talking about urban centres and cities in the Punjab region, and the change she alludes to may not have been occurring apace in rural areas like the Doab. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to know whether the caste system has

changed at differing rates in Bradford and the Punjab over the last 30 to 40 years, and if so why.

A second area for future research concerns the interaction between the caste system and the British class system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. To what extent do members of this community see themselves as fitting into this class system? Do they see the class and caste system as different, or one and the same thing? As Chapter Eight has demonstrated, the boundaries between these two systems may be becoming increasingly blurred, with, for example, *Khattris* appropriating elements of British middle class culture. Certainly, a number of Punjabi Hindu interviewees were heard to say that 'their caste system' was just like 'our class system'. If the ritual hierarchy of the caste system disappears completely in Bradford, leaving only the economic and political hierarchies of the institution, they may well be right.

Another area for future research concerns the operation of the caste system in Punjabi Hindu communities elsewhere in Britain. This study is the first to deal with the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus living in this country to any depth. It would be interesting to see how the experiences of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus compare with those in other centres of Punjabi Hindu population, such as Southall and Wolverhampton. Perhaps the larger sizes of these communities has brought greater distinctions between *jati* groups than those seen in Bradford. For example, *Darjis* and *Agarwals* might be present in large enough numbers in other communities to separate themselves more clearly from other *jatis*. Further research into differences in the operation of the caste system for Punjabi Hindus in this country, as compared to Gujarati Hindus, on whom some work has already been done, would also be of interest.

A final area for future research concerns the South Asian name analysis methodology devised in this study. It was noted in the conclusion to Chapter Four that this holds much potential for future research, especially if it were to be developed into a software form to carry out name analysis on machine readable electoral register data. This would provide an invaluable resource to local authorities and other institutions wishing to identify small religio-ethnic sub-group populations in their area for the purposes of welfare and resource provision.

## 9.5 FUTURE OF THE CASTE SYSTEM FOR BRADFORD'S PUNJABI HINDUS

It has been seen that many aspects of the caste system have weakened in the migration and settlement of Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. Yet despite this weakening, the institution is still present and operational for this community. But how will it fare in the future? Evidence in the form of quantitative data from the 'under 21s database' (see Section

4.6.4) suggests that the tripartite hierarchy of the institution may soon completely degenerate from a fixed and coterminous operation. This is because young Punjabi Hindus in Bradford from all *jatis* and *varnas* appear to be securing themselves with equal chances of raising their future economic and political status, by acquiring similar levels of post-16 further education. Hence, Table 9.1 shows that the percentages of 17 to 21 year olds in the 'under 21s database' who are involved in further education are both remarkably and similarly high across all *jatis* and *varnas*.

**Table 9.1: Percentages of 17 to 21 year olds in the 'under 21s database' who are in further education or working/unemployed**

	Percentage of 17 to 21 year olds				
	<i>Brahmin</i>	<i>Khattris</i>	<i>Agarwals &amp; Sunaris</i>	<i>Darjis &amp; Nais</i>	<i>Chamars</i>
<b>In further education</b>	83	86	100	100	83
<b>Working/unemployed</b>	17	14	0	0	17
<b>Total percentage</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Total number</b>	18	22	2	5	29

The figures in Table 9.1 suggest that the members of all *jatis* and *varnas* are receiving similar opportunities from British education (even though such opportunities may not be on a par with those offered to whites), and are securing equal futures in the economic and political spheres. This indicates that the caste system may soon disappear amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus, certainly in terms of the tripartite hierarchy, which is currently maintained through political and economic disparities between *jatis* and *varnas* of differing ritual ranking.

On the other hand, general awareness of the caste system and its ritual hierarchy is still high amongst Bradford's young Punjabi Hindu population, as the quote from this 13 year old *Sunari* girl illustrates:

It doesn't matter what caste you are, if there's somebody lower than you you feel really good about it... At school there's a girl who's the same caste as us. She never used to talk to us before, and then she found out that we were the same caste, and she started saying, "Oh you're a Goldsmith, I'm a Goldsmith, pleased to meet you," she said, "I don't know many Goldsmiths around here." But she used to hate us so much, and then she found out we were from the same caste and she thought I was alright. (*Sunari* girl, 13yrs, generation 3. Interview 17).

Clearly, for this girl the caste system continues to be present and operational, as it seems to be influencing some of her friendship networks.

Similarly, a *Chamar* teenager pointed out that negative stereotyping based on the ritual hierarchy of the caste system was still operational amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu youth:

If I'm talking to someone of *Brahmin* caste; like there are some kids, even of my own age group, and we got into some discussion about the caste system, and I said "Well justify it!" Some of the reasons they come out with are unbelievable, you know, saying that we're dirty because our job's to clear shit off the streets. And I think, "Are you pulling my leg? Are you being serious?" And they're being dead serious. You know I just can't believe the audacity of them, and some of the reasons they use to justify it. You think, "What? Just listen to yourself." And I'll repeat it to them and say, "So this is what you're saying to me?", and they'll say, "Yes." (*Chamar* teenager, 17 yrs, generation 2. Interview 27).

A young *Brahmin* boy indicated that this ritually based negative stereotyping may well influence future discrimination in marriage practices and temple usage patterns in the city, as it has done up to now:

**Interviewer:** So would you marry a *Chamar* then?

**Interviewee:** What! You're joking aren't you. That's an insult [laughing]. Look we're *Brahmins*, we're the best. No, we've got some *Chamars* who go to our school and we call them names and stuff. I mean it's just a joke really. But I wouldn't marry a *Chamar* lass, no way man. I'm a *Brahmin*, I'm not going to lose that. Anyway, my dad would kill me. (*Brahmin* boy, 15 years, 3rd generation. Interview 31).

It seems, therefore, that certain aspects of the caste system have a future amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community. Ritual discrimination may be around for some time yet.

## Bibliography

- Acland, T. and Siriwardena, S. (1989)** "Integration and segregation in an Asian community", *New Community* 15 (4), 565-576.
- Ahmed, I. (1997)** "The quest for racial justice in Bradford." In: Rank, C. (Ed.) *City of Peace: Bradford's Story*. pp. 85-94. Bradford Libraries: Bradford.
- Aldrich, H., Cater, J., Jones, T. and McEvoy, D. (1981)** "Business development and self-segregation: Asian enterprise in three British cities." In: Peach, C., Robinson, V. and Smith, S. (Eds.) *Ethnic Segregation in Cities*. pp. 170-90. Croom Helm: London.
- Anant, S.S. (1972)** *The Changing Concept of Caste in India*. Vikas Publications: Delhi.
- Anwar, M (1979)** *The Myth of Return: Pakistanis in Britain*. Heinemann: London.
- Arasaratnam, S. (1970)** *Indians in Malaysia and Singapore*. Oxford University Press: Bombay.
- Aurora, G.S. (1967)** *The New Frontiersmen*. Popular Prakastan: Bombay.
- Aziz, C. (1992)** "Girls for sale: Indian priests and their child prostitutes." In: *Marie Claire* 50, 88-91.
- Babbie, E. (1990)** *Survey Research Methods*. 2nd Edtn. Wadsworth Publishing Company: California.
- Back, L. (1996)** *New Ethnicities and Urban Culture: Racisms and Multiculture in Young Lives*. UCL Press: London.
- Bailey, F.G. (1957)** *Caste and the Economic Frontier: A Village in Highland Orissa*. Manchester University Press: Manchester.
- Bailey, F.G. (1959)** "For a sociology of India?", *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 3, 88-101.
- Ballard, R. (1994a)** "Differentiation and disjunction among the Sikhs." In: Ballard, R. (Ed.) *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain*. pp. 88-116. Hurst and Company: London.
- Ballard, R. (1994b)** "The emergence of Desh Pardesh." In: Ballard, R. (Ed.) *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain*. pp. 1-34. Hurst and Company: London.
- Ballard, R. (1994c)** *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain*. Hurst and Company: London.
- Ballard, R. and Ballard, C. (1977)** "The Sikhs: The development of South Asian settlement in Britain." In: Watson, J.L. (Ed.) *Between Two Cultures*. pp. 21-56. Basil Blackwell: Oxford.

- Barot, R. (1974)** "*Varna, Nat-jat and Atak among Kampala Hindus*", *New Community* 3 (1-2), 59-66.
- Barth, F. (1960)** "The system of social stratification in Swat, North Pakistan." In: Leach, E.R. (Ed.) *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North West Pakistan*. pp. 113-146. Cambridge University Press: London.
- Baumann, G. (1990)** "The re-invention of bhangra: social change and aesthetic shifts in a Punjabi music in Britain", *The World of Music: Journal of the International Institute for Comparative Music Studies and Documentation* XXXII (2), 81-97.
- Beall, J. (1990)** "Women under indenture in colonial Natal 1860-1911." In: Clarke, C., Peach, C. and Vertovec, S. (Eds.) *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*. pp. 57-74. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Benedict, B. (1957)** "Factionalism in Mauritian villages", *The British Journal of Sociology* 8, 328-342.
- Benedict, B. (1967)** "Caste in Mauritius." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 21-42. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.
- Berreman G.D. (1979)** *Caste and other Inequities. Essays on Inequality*. Folklore Institute: Meerut.
- Berreman, G.D. (1960)** "Caste in India and the United States", *The American Journal of Sociology* 66, 120-127.
- Berreman, G.D. (1967)** "Stratification, pluralism and interaction: a comparative analysis of caste." In: de Reuck, A. and Knight, J. (Eds.) *Caste and Race: Comparative Approaches*. pp. 45-73. J. and A. Churchill Ltd.: London.
- Béteille, A. (1965)** *Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village*. University of California Press: Berkeley.
- Bhachu, P. (1984)** "East African Sikhs in Britain: experienced settlers with traditionalistic values", *Immigrants and Minorities* 3 (3), 276-296.
- Bhachu, P. (1985)** *Twice Migrants: East African Sikh Settlers in Britain*. Tavistock: London.
- Bharati, A. (1967)** "Ideology and content of caste among Indians in East Africa." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 283-320. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.
- Bharati, A. (1972)** *The Asians in East Africa*. Nelson-Hall: Chicago.
- Bhardwaj, S.M. and Rao, M.N. (1990)** "Asian Indians in the United States: a geographic appraisal." In: Clarke, C., Peach, C., and Vertovec, S. (Eds.) *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*. pp. 197-217. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

*Bihar and Orissa Census Report.* (1931).

**Blunt, E.A.H. (1912)** "Report on the census of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, 1911." In: *The Census of India 1911*. Vol.15 Pt.I. Allahabad.

**Blunt, E.A.H. (1931)** *The Caste System of Northern India*. Oxford.

**Bose, A. (1978)** *India's Urbanization: 1901-2001*. 2nd. Edtn. Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Ltd.: New Delhi.

**Bowen, D. (1981)** "The Hindu community in Bradford." In: Bowen, D. (Ed.) *Hinduism in England*. pp. 33-60. Faculty of Contemporary Studies, Bradford College: Bradford.

**Bowen, D. (1987)** "The evolution of Gujarati Hindu organisations in Bradford." In: Burghart, R. (Ed.) *Hinduism in Great Britain: The Perpetuation of Religion in an Alien Cultural Milieu*. pp. 15-31. Tavistock Publications: London.

**Bowen, D. (1988)** *The Sathya Sai Baba Community in Bradford*. Monograph Series, Community Religions Project. Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Leeds: Leeds.

**Bradford MDC. (1985)** *Asian Name Analysis*. City of Bradford Metropolitan Council, Technical Section: Bradford.

**Bradford MDC. (1992)** *Register of Electors 1992*. City Hall: Bradford.

**British Council. (1991)** *International Guide to Qualifications in Education*. 3rd Edtn. Mansell Publishing Ltd: London.

**British Parliamentary Papers. (1910)** *Report of the Committee in Emigration from India to the Crown Colonies and Protectorates 27* (c.5194).

**Brooks, D. and Singh, K. (1979)** "Ethnic commitment versus structural reality: South Asian immigrant workers in Britain", *New Community* 7, 19-31.

**Brown, C. (1984)** *Black and White Britain: The Third PSI Survey*. Heinemann: London.

**Buchignani, N. (1983)** "Determinants of Fijian Indian social organization in Canada." In: Kurian, G. and Srivastava, R.P. (Eds.) *Overseas Indians: A Study in Adaptation*. pp. 68-89. Vikas Publishing House: New Delhi.

**Buchignani, N. and Indra, D.M. (1985)** *Continuous Journey: A Social History of South Asians in Canada*. MacLelland and Steward: Toronto.

**Bühler, G. (1886)** *The Laws of Manu: Translated with Extracts from Seven Commentaries*. Clarendon Press: Oxford.

**Burghart, R. (1978)** "Hierarchical models of the Hindu social system", *Man* 13, 519-536.

- Butcher, B. and Dodd, P. (1983)** "The electoral register: two surveys", *Population Trends* 31, 15-19.
- Butterworth, E. (1967)** (Ed.) *Immigrants in West Yorkshire: Social Conditions and the Lives of Pakistanis, Indians and West Indians*. Institute of Race Relations: London.
- Callan, V.J. (1983)** "The attitudes of Indian immigrants in Australia to marriage, sex roles and tradition." In: Kurian, G. and Srivastava, R.P. (Eds.) *Overseas Indians: A Study in Adaptation*. pp. 294-306. Vikas Publishing House: New Delhi.
- Cater, J. and Jones, T. (1979)** "Ethnic residential space: the case of Asians in Bradford", *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 70 (2), 86-97.
- Cater, J., Jones, T. and McEvoy, D. (1977)** "Commentary: Ethnic Segregation in British Cities", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 67 (2), 305-306.
- Census of India Report. (1921)*
- Chakravarti, N.R. (1971)** *The Indian Minority in Burma*. Oxford University Press: London.
- Chanda, R. (1916)** *The Indo-Aryan Races. A Study of the Origin of Indo-Aryan People and Institutions*. Rajshahi.
- Chavda, D.C. (1983)** *Directory 1983*. Kshatriya Sudharak Mandal: Bradford.
- Chelluri, R. (1968)** "Caste dominance as a leadership factor in India", *The Bulletin of the Cultural Research Institute* 7 (1-2), 148-153.
- Clarke, C. (1967)** "Caste among Hindus in a town in Trinidad: San Fernando." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 165-199. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.
- Clarke, C., Peach, C. and Vertovec, S. (1990)** "Introduction: themes in the study of the South Asian Diaspora." In: Clarke, C., Peach, C. and Vertovec, S. (Eds.) *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*. pp. 1-29. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Cornell, J.B. (1961)** "Outcaste relations in a Japanese village", *American Anthropologist* 63, 282-296.
- Cornwell, J.A. (1984)** *Hard-Earned Lives*. Tavistock: London.
- Cornwell, J.A. (1988)** "A case-study approach to lay health beliefs: reconsidering the research process." In: Eyles, J. and Smith, D.M. (Eds.) *Qualitative Methods in Human Geography*. pp. 219-232. Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Courtenay, G. (1978)** "Questionnaire construction." In: Hoinville, G., Jowell, R. and Associates. *Survey Research Practice*. pp. 27-54. Heinemann Educational Books: London.

- Cox, O.C. (1948)** *Caste Class and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics*. Doubleday and Co. Inc.: Garden City, New York.
- CRC (Community Relations Commission). (1978)** *A Guide to Asian Names*. CRC: London.
- CSO. (1992)** *Statistical Abstract: India 1990*. Central Statistical Organisation, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India: New Delhi.
- CSO. (1994)** *Statistical Abstract: India 1992*. Central Statistical Organisation, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India: New Delhi.
- Cumpston, I.M. (1953)** *Indians Overseas in British Territories 1834-1865*. Oxford University Press: London.
- Cumpston, I.M. (1956)** "A survey of Indian immigration to British tropical colonies to 1910", *Population Studies* 10 (2), 158-165.
- Dahlmann, J. (1899)** *Das Altindische Volkstum und seine Bedeutung für die Gesellschaftskunde*. Köln.
- Dahya, B. (1974)** "The nature of Pakistani ethnicity in industrial cities in Britain" In: Cohen, A. (Ed.) *Urban Ethnicity*. pp. 77-118. Tavistock: London.
- Davis, K. (1951)** *The Population of India and Pakistan*. Princeton University Press.
- Derret, J.D.M. (1968)** *Religion, Law and the State in India*. Faber & Faber: London.
- Desai, R. (1963)** *Indian Immigrants in Britain*. Oxford University Press: London.
- Dollard, J. (1957)** *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*. 3rd Edtn. Doubleday: New York.
- Donaghue, J.D. (1957)** "An Eta community in Japan: the social persistence of outcaste groups", *American Anthropologist* 59, 1000-1017.
- Dube, S.C. (1955)** *Indian Village*. London.
- Dubois, Abbé J.A. (1906)** *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*. 3rd Edtn. Translated by H.K. Beauchamp. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- Dumézil, G. (1958)** "L'idéologie tripartite des Indo-Européens." In: *Collection Latomus*. Vol. 31. Bruxelles.
- Dumont, L. (1970)** *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications*. Translated by Mark Sainsbury. Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London.
- Dutt, N.K. (1931)** *The Origin and Growth of Caste in India*. Vol.1. Kegan Paul, Trench, and Trubner: London.

- Dwyer, R. (1994)** "Caste, religion and sect in Gujarat: followers of Vallabhacharya and Swaminarayan." In: Ballard, R. (Ed.) *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain*. pp. 165-190. Hurst and Company: London.
- Embree, A.T. (Ed.) (1988)** *Sources of Indian Tradition: Vol.1, From the Beginning to 1800*. 2nd. Edtn. Columbia University Press: New York.
- Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia*. (1974) 15th Edtn. Vol.3. s.v. 'Caste.' Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.: Chicago.
- Enthoven, R.E. (1922)** *The Tribes and Castes of Bombay*. Vol.3. Government Central Press: Bombay.
- Firth, G. (1997)** *A History of Bradford*. Phillimore: West Sussex.
- Forrest, R. and Gordon, D. (1993)** *People and Places: A 1991 Census Atlas of England*. Saus Publications: Bristol.
- Foulkes, N. (1995)** "Sole Man", *Evening Standard*, 24th February, 18-19.
- Fryer, P. (1984)** *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain*. Pluto: London.
- Fuller, C.J. (1979)** "Gods, priests and purity: on the relation between Hinduism and the caste system", *Man* 14 (3), 459-476.
- Fuller, C.J. (1984)** *Servants of the Goddess: The Priests of a South Indian Temple*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Gardner, G. (1978)** *Social Surveys for Social Planners*. The Open University Press: Milton Keynes.
- Ghai, D.P. (Ed.) (1965)** *Portrait of a Minority: Asians in East Africa*. Oxford University Press: Nairobi.
- Ghosh, R. (1983)** "Sarees and the maple leaf: Indian women in Canada." In: Kurian G and Srivastava, R.P. (Eds.) *Overseas Indians: A Study in Adaptation*. pp. 90-99. Vikas Publishing House: New Delhi.
- Ghurye, G.S. (1950)** *Caste and Class in India*. Popular Book Depot: Bombay.
- Gillion, K.L. (1956)** "The sources of Indian emigration to Fiji", *Population Studies* 10 (2), 139-157.
- Gilroy, P. (1987)** *There ain't no Black in the Union Jack*. Hutchinson: London.
- Glass's Information Services Ltd. (1995)** *Glass's Guide to Car Values*. June 1995 Edition. Audit Bureau of Circulations Business Press.
- Gokhale, B.G. (1976)** *Buddhism in Maharashtra: A History*. Popular Prakashan: Bombay.

- Gough, K.E. (1956)** "Brahman kinship in a Tamil village", *American Anthropologist* 58 (5), 826-853.
- Gough, K.E. (1960)** "Caste in a Tanjore village." In: Leach, E.R. (Ed.) *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North-West Pakistan*. pp. 11-60. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Gould, H.A. (1971)** "Caste and class: a comparative view." In: *Module 11*. Addison-Wesley Modular Publications.
- Government of India (1967)** *India: A Reference Annual 1967*. Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India: Delhi.
- Gregory, R.G. (1971)** *India and East Africa*. Clarendon: Oxford.
- Hall, S. (1990)** "Cultural identity and Diaspora." In: Rutherford, J. (Ed.) *Identity*. Lawrence and Wishart: London.
- Hall, S. (1992a)** "New ethnicities." In: Donald, J. and Rattansi, A. (Eds.) *Race Culture and Difference*. pp. 252-9. Sage Publications: London.
- Hall, S. (1992b)** "The question of cultural identity." In: Hall, S., Held, D. and McGrew, T. (Eds.) *Modernity and its Futures*. pp. 273-326. Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Harper, E.B. (1959)** "Two systems of economic exchange in village India", *American Anthropologist* 61, 760-778.
- Harvey, P. (1990)** *An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Hassan, R. and Tan, G. (1990)** "Asian migrants in Australia: a socio-economic study", *Immigrants and Minorities* 9 (1), 21-45.
- Hedges, B. (1978)** "Sampling." In: Hoinville, G., Jowell, R. and Associates. *Survey Research Practice*. pp. 55-89. Heinemann Educational Books: London.
- Helweg, A.W. (1979)** *Sikhs in England: The Development of a Migrant Community*. Oxford University Press: Delhi.
- Henderson, J and Karn, V. (1987)** *Race, Class and State Housing: Inequality and the Allocation of Public Housing in Britain*. Gower Publications: Aldershot.
- Henderson, J. and Karn, V. (1984)** "Race, class and the allocation of public housing in Britain", *Urban Studies* 21, 115-128.
- Henry, F. (1983)** "Some problems of South Asian adaptation in Toronto." In: Kurian, G. and Srivastava, R.P. (Eds.) *Overseas Indians: A Study in Adaptation*. pp. 41-50. Vikas Publishing House: New Delhi.
- Hocart, A.M. (1968)** *Caste: A Comparative Study*. Russell and Russell: New York.

- Hussain, M.S. (1975)** "The increase and distribution of New Commonwealth immigrants in Greater Nottingham", *East Midlands Geographer* 6, 105-129.
- Hutton, J.H. (1946)** *Caste in India: Its Nature, Function, and Origins*. 1st Edtn. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Hutton, J.H. (1963)** *Caste in India: Its Nature, Function, and Origins*. 4th Edtn. Oxford University Press: Bombay.
- Ibbetson, D.C.J. (1883)** *Report on the Census of the Panjáb*. Superintendent of the Central Gaol Press: Lahore.
- Ibbetson, D.C.J. (1916)** *Panjab Castes*. Superintendent, Government Printing, Punjab: Lahore.
- Inden, R. (1990)** *Imagining India*. Blackwell: Oxford
- India Mail*. (1995) No. 262 June 15th - 21st.
- Ishwaran, K. (1965)** "Kinship and distance in rural India", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 6, 81-94.
- Israel, W.H. (1964)** *Colour and Community*. The Slough Council of Social Service: Slough.
- Jackson, P. (Ed.) (1987)** *Race and Racism: Essays in Social Geography*. Allen and Unwin: London.
- Jackson, R. (1981)** "The Shree Krishna temple and the Gujarati Hindu community in Coventry." In: Bowen, D. (Ed.) *Hinduism in England*. pp. 61-85. The Faculty of Contemporary Studies, Bradford College: Bradford.
- Jain, R.K. (1988)** "Overseas Indians in Malaysia and the Caribbean: comparative notes", *Immigrants and Minorities* 7 (1), 123-143.
- Jaiswal, S. (1991)** "Varna ideology and social change", *Social Scientist* 19 (3-4), 41-48.
- Jayawardena, C. (1960)** "Marital stability in two Guianese sugar estate communities", *Social and Economic Studies* 9 (1), 76-100.
- Jayawardena, C. (1966)** "Religious belief and social change: aspects of the development of Hinduism in British Guiana", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 8 (2), 211-240.
- Jayawardena, C. (1968)** "Migration and social change: a survey of Indian communities overseas", *The Geographical Review* 58, 426-449.
- Jha, V. (1991)** "Social stratification in ancient India: some reflections", *Social Scientist* 19 (3-4), 19-40.

- John, D.W. (1969)** *Indian Workers' Associations in Great Britain*. Oxford University Press: London.
- Jones, S. (1988)** *Black Culture, White Youth: The Reggae Tradition from JA to UK*. Macmillan: London.
- Jones, T.P. and McEvoy, D. (1974)** *Residential Segregation of Asian Immigrants in Huddersfield*. Unpublished paper presented at the Institute of British Geographers' annual conference in Norwich.
- Jones, T.P. and McEvoy, D. (1978)** "Race and space in cloud-cuckoo land", *Area* 10 (3), 162-166.
- Kahn, R.L. and Cannell, C.F. (1957)** *The Dynamics of Interviewing; Theory, Technique, and Cases*. Wiley: New York.
- Kalsi, S.S. (1992)** *The Evolution of a Sikh Community in Britain: Religious and Social Change among the Sikhs of Leeds and Bradford*. Monograph Series, Community Religions Project. Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- Kane, P.V. (1953)** *History of Dharmasastra*. 4. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute: Poona.
- Kanitkar, H.A. (1972)** "An Indian elite in Britain", *New Community* 1 (5), 378-383.
- Karve, I. (1961)** *Hindu Society-An Interpretation*. 2nd Edtn. Deshmukh Prakashan: Poona.
- Kearsley, G. and Srivastava, S.R. (1974)** "The spatial evolution of Glasgow's Asian community", *Scottish Geographical Magazine* 90, 110-124.
- Kelly, J.D. (1988)** "From Holi Diwali in Fiji: an essay on ritual and history", *Man* 23, 40-55.
- Ketkar, S.V. (1909)** *History of Caste in India*. Ithaca.
- Khare, R.S. (1970)** *The Changing Brahmans: Associations and Elites among the Kanya-Kubjas of North India*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- Killingley, D. (1991)** "Varna and caste in Hindu apologetic." In: *Hindu Ritual and Society*. By: Killingley, D., Menski, W. and Firth, S. S.Y. Killingley: Newcastle upon Tyne.
- King, U. (1984)** "A report on Hinduism in Britain." In: *Community Religions Project Research Papers (New Series) No.2*. Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- Klass, M. (1966)** "Marriage rules in Bengal", *American Anthropologist* 68, 951-970.

- Klass, M. (1980)** *Caste: the Emergence of the South Asian Social System*. Institute for the Study of Human Issues. Philadelphia.
- Knerr, B. (1990)** "South Asian countries as competitors on the world labour market." In: Clarke, C., Peach, C. and Vertovec, S. (Eds.) *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*. pp. 173-196. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Knott, K. (1981a)** "A statistical analysis of South Asians in the UK by religion and ethnicity." *Community Religions Project Research Paper 8*. Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- Knott, K. (1981b)** "Hinduism in England: the Hindu population in Leeds." *Religious Research Paper 4*. Department of Sociology, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- Knott, K. (1986)** *Hinduism in Leeds: A Study of Religious Practice in the Indian Hindu Community and in Hindu-Related Groups*. Community Religions Project, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- Knott, K. (1994)** "The Gujarati Mochis in Leeds: from leather stockings to surgical boots and beyond." In: Ballard, R. (Ed.) *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain*. pp. 213-230. Hurst and Company: London.
- Knott, K. (n.d.)** *From Leather Stockings to Surgical Boots and Beyond: The Gujarati Mochis in Leeds*. Draft Copy of Chapter for R. Ballard's *Desh Pardesh*.
- Knott, K. and Toon, R. (1980)** "Considering religious statistics: Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims in the UK of South Asian ethnic origin." *Community Religions Project Research Paper 7*. Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- Kondapi, C. (1949)** *Indians Overseas, 1838-1949*. Indian Council of World Affairs: New Delhi.
- Kondapi, C. (1951)** *Indians Overseas 1838-1949*. Oxford University Press: Bombay.
- Kroeber, A.L. (1930)** "Caste." In: *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. pp. 254-257. Macmillan: New York.
- Kroeber, A.L. (1948)** *Anthropology*. 2nd Edtn. George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd.: London.
- Kuper, H. (1967)** "Changes in caste of the South African Indian." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 237-265. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.
- La Brack, B. (1983)** "The reconstitution of Sikh society in rural California." In: Kurian, G. and Srivastava, R.P. (Eds.) *Overseas Indians a Study in Adaptation*. pp. 215-240. Vikas Publishing House: New Delhi.
- Lamb, B. P. (1975)** *India: A World in Transition*. 4th. Edtn. Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York.

- Lambert, R.D. (1963)** *Workers, Factories and Social Change in India*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.
- Law, J. (1991)** "The religious beliefs and practices of Hindus in Derby." *Community Religions Project Research Paper (New Series)*. Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- LCCR (Leicester Council for Community Relations) (1978)** *A Guide to Asian Names*. LCCR: Leicester.
- Leach, E.R. (1960)** "What should we mean by caste?" In: Leach, E.R. (Ed.) *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North-West Pakistan*. pp. 1-10. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Leach, E.R. (1967)** "Caste, class and slavery: the taxonomic problem." In: de Reuck, A. and Knight, J. (Eds.) *Caste and Race: Comparative Approaches*. pp. 5-16. J. and A. Churchill Ltd.: London.
- Lees, C. (1995)** "Untouchable child is blinded by teacher", *Times Educational Supplement*, September 8th, 20.
- Lemon, A. (1980)** "Asian overseas settlement in the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries." In: Lemon, A. and Pollock, N. (Eds.) *Studies in Overseas Settlement and Population*. pp. 103-125. Longman: London and New York.
- Lewis, O. and Barnouw, V. (1956)** "Caste and the Jajmani system in a north Indian village", *The Scientific Monthly* **83**, 66-81.
- LRR (1992a)** *SASPAC User Manual: Part 1*. Manchester Computing Centre: Manchester.
- LRR (1992b)** *SASPAC User Manual: Part 2*. Manchester Computing Centre: Manchester.
- Lyon, M.H. (1972)** "Ethnicity in Britain: the Gujarati tradition", *New Community* **2**, 1-11.
- Mahapatra, L.K. (1962)** "Socio-cultural changes in rural and tribal India", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* **3**, 254-261.
- Maine, H.S. (1887)** *Village Communities in the East and West*. 5th. Edtn. John Murray: London.
- Majumdar, D.N. (1926)** "Pseudo-Rajputs", *Man in India* **6**, (3)
- Majumdar, D.N. (1961)** *Races and Cultures in India*. Asia Publishing House: New York.
- Malik, S.C. (1975)** *Understanding Indian Civilisation: A Framework of Enquiry*. Indian Institute of Advanced Study: Shimla.

- Malik, S.C. (1987)** *Indian Civilisation: The Formative Period - A Study of Archaeology as Anthropology*. Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.
- Mani, A. (1983)** "The symbolism of an ancient tradition: two migrant communities in Southeast Asia." In: Kurian, G. and Srivastava, R.P. (Eds.) *Overseas Indians: A Study in Adaptation*. pp. 274-293. Vikas Publishing House: New Delhi.
- Mayer, A.C. (1953)** "The organization of Indian settlement in Fiji", *Man* 53, (Art.284) 182-185.
- Mayer, A.C. (1960)** *Caste and Kinship in Central India: A Village and its Region*. Routledge, Kegan and Paul: London.
- Mayer, A.C. (1961)** *Peasants in the Pacific*. Routledge, Kegan and Paul: London.
- McDonald, H. (1994a)** "Born in chains: Untouchables still struggle to break bonds of caste", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 3rd, 32.
- McDonald, H. (1994b)** "Pride and prejudice", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 3rd, 24-28.
- McDonald, H. (1994c)** "Change in the heartland: lower castes reshape Uttar Pradesh's politics", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 3rd, 28-29.
- McGirk, T. (1993)** "India's Untouchables reach for power and change", *The Independent*, 3rd December, 17.
- Meillassoux, C. (1973)** "Are there castes in India?", *Economy and Society* 2, 89-111.
- MIB (1971)** *India: A Reference Annual 1971-72*. Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India: New Delhi.
- Michaelson, M. (1979)** "The relevance of caste among East African Gujaratis in Britain", *New Community* 7 (3), 350-360.
- Michaelson, M. (1983)** *Caste, Kinship and Marriage: A Study of Two Gujarati Trading Castes in England*. (Unpublished PhD. Thesis). School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
- Michaelson, M. (1987)** "Domestic Hinduism in a Gujarati trading caste." In: Burghart, R. (Ed.) *Hinduism in Great Britain: The Perpetuation of Religion in an Alien Cultural Milieu*. pp. 32-49. Tavistock Publications: London.
- Mitra, S.K. (1994)** "Caste, democracy and the politics of community formation in India." In: Searle, M. and Sharma, U. (Eds.) *Contextualising Caste: Post -Dumontian Approaches*. pp. 49-71. Blackwell Publishers; Oxford.
- Modood, T. (1997)** "Culture and identity." In: Modood, T. and Berthoud, R. (Eds.) *Ethnic Minorities in Britain*. pp. 290-338. PSI: London.

- Montgomery, T. (1997)** *Bradford: A Centenary City*. City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council: Bradford.
- Morris, H.S. (1959)** "The Indian family in Uganda", *American Anthropologist* **61**, 779-789.
- Morris, H.S. (1967)** "Caste among the Indians of Uganda." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 267-282. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.
- Morris, H.S. (1968)** *The Indians in Uganda*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London.
- Morris, M.D. (1960)** "Caste and the evolution of the industrial workforce in India", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* **104** (2), 124-133.
- Morris, S. (1956)** "Indians in East Africa: a study in a plural society", *The British Journal of Sociology* **7**, 194-211.
- Moser, C. and Kalton, G. (1971)** *Survey Methods in Social Investigation*. 2nd Edtn. Heinemann Educational Books: London.
- Nesbitt, E. (1990)** "Religion and identity: the Valmiki community in Coventry", *New Community* **16** (2), 261-274.
- Nesbitt, E. (1991)** *My Dad's a Hindu, My Mum's Side are Sikh: Issues in Religious Identity*. National Foundation for Arts Education: Charlbury.
- Nesbitt, E. (1994)** "Valmikis in Coventry: the revival and reconstruction of a community." In: Ballard, R. (Ed.) *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain*. pp. 117-141. Hurst and Company: London.
- Nesfield, J.C. (1885)** *Brief View of the Caste System of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, Together With an Examination of the Names and Figures Shown in the Census Report, 1885*. North-Western Provinces and Oudh Press: Allahabad.
- Nevadomsky, J. (1983)** "Changes over time and space in the East Indian family in rural Trinidad." In: Kurian, G. and Srivastava, R.P. (Eds.) *Overseas Indians: A Study in Adaptation*. pp. 180-214. Vikas Publishing House: New Delhi.
- Niehoff, A. (1967)** "The function of caste among the Indians of the Oropuche Lagoon, Trinidad." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 149-163. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.
- Ninomiya, S. (1933)** "An inquiry concerning the origin, development and present situation of the Eta in relation to the history of social classes in Japan", *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* **10**, (2nd. series), 47-154.
- Nowikowski, S. and Ward, R. (1978)** "Middle class and British?: an analysis of South Asians in Suburbia", *New Community* **7**, 1-11.

- Nye, M (1993) "Temple congregations and communities: Hindu constructions in Edinburgh", *New Community* 19 (2), 201-215.
- O.E.D. [Oxford English Dictionary] (1989) 2nd Edtn. Vol.2 s.v. 'Caste.' Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- OPCS (1993a) "1991 Census: ethnic group and country of birth Great Britain." In: *Report*, Volume 2 of 2. HMSO: London.
- OPCS (1993b) "1991 Census: ethnic group and country of birth Great Britain." In: *Topic Monitor*. CEN 91 TM EGCB HMSO: London.
- OPCS, Employment Department Group. (1990a) *Standard Occupational Classification, Volume 1: Structure and Definition of Major, Minor and Unit Groups*. 1st Edtn. HMSO: London.
- OPCS, Employment Department Group. (1990b) *Standard Occupational Classification, Volume 2: Coding Index*. 1st Edtn. HMSO: London.
- OPCS, Employment Department Group. (1991) *Standard Occupational Classification, Volume 3: Social Classifications and Coding Methodology*. HMSO: London.
- OPCS/GRO(S) (1993) *Census, Local Base Statistics*. Office of Population Censuses and Surveys and General Register Office for Scotland. HMSO: London.
- Opler, M. and Singh, R.D. (1948) "The division of labour in an Indian village." In: Carleton, S. Coon (Ed.) *A Reader in General Anthropology*. Henry Holt and Co.: New York.
- Ornati, O.A. (1955) *Jobs and Workers in India*. The Institute of International Industrial and Labour Relations, Cornell University: New York.
- Owen, D. (1994) "Spatial variations in ethnic minority group populations in Great Britain", *Population Trends* 78, 23-33.
- Panikkar, K.M. (1955) *Hindu Society at the Crossroads*. Asia Publishing House: Bombay.
- Parekh, B. (1991) "Caste wars", *The Times Higher Educational Supplement*, 15th February, 13-14.
- Parekh, B. (1994) "Some reflections on the Hindu Diaspora" *New Community* 20 (4), 603-620.
- Park, R.E. and Burgess, E.W. (1969) *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Parkin, F. (1979) *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*. Tavistock: London.

- Parry, J.P. (1979) *Caste and Kinship in Kangra*. Routledge, Kegan and Paul: London.
- Parry, J.P. (1980) "Ghosts, greed and sin: the occupational identity of the Benares funeral priests", *Man* 21, 453-73.
- Pettigrew, J. (1972) "Some observations on the social system of the Sikh Jats", *New Community* 1, 354-364.
- Phillips, D.A. (1981) "The social and spatial segregation of Asians in Leicester." In: Jackson, P. and Smith, S.J. (Eds.) *Social Interaction and Ethnic Segregation*. pp. 101-121. Academic Press: London.
- Phillips, D.A. (1983) *The Socio-Cultural Implications of Asian Patterns of Settlement*. (Unpublished PhD Thesis). Department of Geography, University of Cambridge.
- Phillips, D.A. (1987a) "Searching for a decent home: ethnic minority progress in the post-war housing market", *New Community* 14, 105-117.
- Phillips, D.A. (1987b) "The institutionalisation of racism in housing: towards an explanation." In: Smith, S. and Mercer, J. (Eds.) *New Perspectives in Race and Housing*. University of Glasgow: Glasgow.
- Phillips, D.A. and Sarre, P. (1995) "Black middle class formation in contemporary Britain." In: Butler, T. and Savage, M. (Eds.) *Social Change and the Middle Classes*. pp. 76-94. UCL Press: London.
- Pillai, S.D. (1968) *Men and Machines*. Popular Prakashan: Bombay.
- Pitt-Rivers, J. (1971) "On the word 'caste.'" In: Beidelman, T.O. (Ed.) *The Translation of Culture: Essays to E.E. Evans-Pritchard*. pp. 231-256. Tavistock Publications: London.
- Pocock, D.F. (1954) "The hypergamy of the Patidars." In: K.M. Kapadia (Ed.) *Professor Ghurye Felicitation Volume*. pp. 195-204. Popular Book Depot: Bombay.
- Pocock, D.F. (1957a) "Inclusion and exclusion: a process in the caste system of the Gujarat", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 13 (1), 19-31.
- Pocock, D.F. (1957b) "A study of caste and religion in modern Indian society", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 13, 289-300.
- Pocock, D.F. (1972) *Kanbi and Patidar: A Study of the Patidar Community of Gujarat*. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- Quigley, D. (1994) "Is a theory of caste still possible?" In: Searle-Chatterjee, M. and Sharma, U. (Eds.) *Contextualising Caste: Post-Dumontian Approaches*. pp. 25-48. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford.
- Raheja, G.G. (1988a) *The Poison in the Gift: Ritual, Prestation, and the Dominant Caste in a North Indian Village*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

- Raheja, G.G. (1988b)** "India: caste, kingship and dominance reconsidered", *Annual Review of Anthropology* 17, 497-522.
- Ram, R. and Rees, P. (1985)** "A spatial demographic analysis of the Indian population in Bradford." *Working Paper 434*. School of Geography, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- Ram, S. (1983)** "A geographical analysis of Indians in Bradford: methods used in classifying names on the electoral register." *Working Paper 373*. School of Geography, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- Ram, S. (1984)** "A geographical analysis of Indians in Bradford: spatial distribution and temporal trends, 1971-81." *Working Paper 384*. School of Geography, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- Ram, S. (1989)** *Indian Immigrants in Great Britain*. M.C. Mittal: New Delhi.
- Ram, S. and Phillips, D. (1985)** "Indians in Bradford: socio-economic profile and housing characteristics, 1971-84." *Working Paper 433*. School of Geography, University of Leeds: Leeds.
- Rambiritch, B. and Van den Berghe, P.L. (1961)** "Caste in a Natal Hindu community", *African Studies* 20, 217-225.
- Ramcharan, S. (1983)** "The social, economic and cultural adaptations of East Indians from The British Caribbean and Guyana to Canada." In: Kurian, G. and Srivastava, R.P. (Eds.) *Overseas Indians: A Study in Adaptation*. pp. 51-67. Vikas Publishing House: New Delhi.
- Reed, N. (1964)** *The Caste War of Yucatan*. Stanford University Press: Stanford.
- Rees, P. and Birkin, M. (1984)** "Census-based information systems for ethnic groups: a study of Leeds and Bradford", *Environment and Planning A* 16, 1551-1571.
- Rees, P. and Ram, S. (1987)** "Projections of the residential distribution of an ethnic group: Indians in Bradford", *Environment and Planning A* 19, 1323-1358.
- Rees, P., Phillips, D. and Medway, D. (1995)** "The socioeconomic geography of ethnic groups in two northern British cities", *Environment and Planning A* 27, 557-591.
- Rettie, J. (1994)** "India's oppressed millions awaken", *The Guardian*, March 5th, 12.
- Rettie, J. (1995)** "Slow stirrings of a million mutinies", *The Guardian*, February 25th, 15.
- Rex, J. and Tomlinson, S. (1979)** *Colonial Immigrants in a British City: A Class Analysis*. Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Risley, H.H. (1908)** *The People of India*. Thacker, Spink and Co.: Calcutta.
- Roberts, G.W. and Byrne, J. (1966)** "Summary statistics on indenture and associated migration affecting the West Indies, 1834-1918", *Population Studies* 20 (1), 125-134.

- Robinson, V. (1980a)** "Correlates of Asian immigration to Britain", *New Community* 8, 115-123.
- Robinson, V. (1980b)** "Asians and council housing", *Urban Studies* 17, 323-331.
- Robinson, V. (1981)** "The development of South Asian settlement in Britain and the myth of return." In: Peach, C., Robinson, V. and Smith, S. (Eds.) *Ethnic Segregation in Cities*. pp. 149-169. Croom Helm: London.
- Robinson, V. (1990)** "Boom and gloom: the success and failure of South Asians in Britain." In: Clarke, C., Peach, C. and Vertovec, S. (Eds.) *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*. pp. 269-296. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Robson, E.I. (1933)** 2nd volume (Bks. V-VIII) of the translation of: *Arrian: Anabasis Alexandri and Indica*. William Heinemann Ltd.: London.
- Rosenblat, A. (1954)** *La Población Indígena y el Mestizaje en América*. Vol.2. Editorial Nova: Buenos Aires.
- Roy, A. (1995)** "Barbers show how to cut through the caste system", *The Daily Telegraph*, 4th July, 34.
- Rudolph, L. I. and Rudolph, S.H. (1967)** *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London.
- Saberwal, S. (1976)** *Mobile Men: Limits to Social Change in Urban Punjab*. Vikas Publishing House: New Delhi.
- Saha, P. (1970)** *Emigration of Indian Labour 1834-1900*. People's Publishers: Delhi.
- Salter, J. (1873)** *The Asiatic in London*. Seely: London.
- Sarre, P., Phillips, D.A. and Skellington, R. (1989)** *Ethnic Minority Housing: Explanations and Policies*. Gower Publishing: Aldershot.
- Saunders, M. Lewis, P. and Thronhill, A. (1997)** *Research Methods for Business Students*. Pitman Publishing: London.
- Schwartz, B.M. (1964)** "Caste and endogamy in Trinidad", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 20 (1), 58-66.
- Schwartz, B.M. (1967a)** "Caste and endogamy in Fiji." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 213-236. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.
- Schwartz, B.M. (1967b)** "The failure of caste in Trinidad." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 117-147. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.

- Searle-Chatterjee, M. and Sharma, U. (1994)** "Introduction." In: Searle-Chatterjee, M. and Sharma, U. (Eds.) *Contextualising Caste: Post-Dumontian Approaches*. pp. 1-24. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford.
- Senart, É. (1930)** *Caste in India: The Facts and the System*. Translated by Sir E. Denison Ross. Methuen and Co. Ltd.: London.
- Sharma, B.R. (1969)** "The Indian industrial worker", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 10, 161-177.
- Sheth, N.R. (1968)** *Social Framework of an Indian Factory*. Manchester University Press: Manchester.
- Shukra, A. (Pseudonym) (1994)** "Caste - a personal perspective." In: Searle-Chatterjee, M. and Sharma, U. (Eds.) *Contextualising Caste: Post-Dumontian Approaches*. pp. 169-178. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford.
- Simpson, G.E. and Yinger, J.M. (1965)** *Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination*. 3rd. Edtn. Harper and Row: New York.
- Simpson, L. (1983)** *Using Asian Names Directory to Find Language and Religion*. City of Bradford Metropolitan Council, Directorate of Educational Services: Bradford.
- Singaravélou. (1990)** "Indians in the French overseas départements: Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion." In: Clarke, C., Peach, C. and Vertovec, S. (Eds.) *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*. pp. 75-87. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Singer, M. (1964)** "The social organization of Indan civilization", *Diogenes* 45, 84-119.
- Singer, P. (1967)** "Caste and identity in Guyana." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 93-116. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.
- Singh, R. (1980)** *The Sikh Community in Bradford*. Bradford College: Bradford.
- Singh, R. (1992)** *Immigrants to Citizens: The Sikh Community in Bradford*. The Race Relations Research Unit: 1 Mannville Terrace, Bradford.
- Singh, R. (1994)** Introduction in: *Here to Stay: Bradford's South Asian Communities*. Bradford Heritage Recording Unit: Bradford.
- Singh, R. (1997)** "Understanding Bradford's South Asian community." In: Rank, C. (Ed.) *City of Peace: Bradford's Story*. pp. 95-103. Bradford Libraries: Bradford.
- Singh, R. (Ed.) (1986)** *The Education of Sikh Children and Youth in Bradford*. Bradford Sikh Parents' Association: Bradford.
- Singh, R. and Ram, S. (1986)** *Indians in Bradford: The Development of a Community*. Bradford and Ilkley College: Bradford.
- Slater, G. (1924)** *The Dravidian Element in Indian Culture*. Ernest Benn: London.

- Smith, G. (1982a)** *Locating Populations of Minority Language Speakers*. Working Paper 1. Linguistic Minorities Project: London.
- Smith, G. (1982b)** *The Geography and Demography of South Asian Languages in England: Some Methodological Problems*. Working Paper 2. Linguistic Minorities Project: London.
- Smith, R.T. (1960)** "Some social characteristics of Indian immigrants to British Guiana", *Population Studies* 8 (1), 34-39.
- Smith, R.T. and Jayawardena, C. (1958)** "Hindu marriage customs in British Guiana", *Social and Economic Studies* 7 (2), 178-194.
- Smith, R.T. and Jayawardena, C. (1959)** "Marriage and family amongst East Indians in British Guiana", *Social and Economic Studies* 8 (4), 321-376.
- Smith, R.T. and Jayawardena, C. (1967)** "Caste and social status among the Indians of Guyana." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 43-92. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.
- Smythe, H.H. (1952)** "The Eta: a marginal Japanese caste", *American Journal of Sociology* 58, 194-196.
- Solomos, J. and Back, L. (1996)** *Racism and Society*. Macmillan Press: Basingstoke.
- Spear, P. (1965)** *A History of India: Volume Two*. Penguin Books: Middlesex.
- Speckmann, J.D. (1967)** "The caste system and the Hindustani group in Surinam." In: Schwartz, B.M. (Ed.) *Caste in Overseas Indian Communities*. pp. 201-212. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco.
- Srinivas, M.N. (1952)** *Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of Southern India*. Oxford.
- Srinivas, M.N. (1954)** "A caste dispute among the Washermen of Mysore", *Eastern Anthropologist* 7, 149-168.
- Srinivas, M.N. (1955)** "The social structure of a Mysore village." In: Srinivas, M.N. (Ed.) *India's Villages*. pp. 19-32. Calcutta.
- Srinivas, M.N. (1959)** "The dominant caste in Rampura", *American Anthropologist* 61, 1-16.
- Srinivas, M.N. (1962)** *Caste in Modern India and Other Essays*. Asia Publishing House: London.
- Srinivas, M.N. (1966)** *Social Change in Modern India*. University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Tambs-Lyche, H. (1975)** "A comparison of Gujarati communities in London and the Midlands", *New Community* 4 (3), 349-355.

- Teague, A. (1993)** "Ethnic group: first results from the 1991 Census", *Population Trends* 72, 12-17.
- Thomas, R. and Elias, P. (1989)** "Development of the Standard Occupational Classification", *Population Trends* 55.
- Thompson, M. (1974)** "The second generation - Punjabi or English", *New Community* 3 (3), 242-248.
- Tinker, H. (1974)** *A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas 1830-1920*. Oxford University Press: London.
- Tumin, M.M. (1952)** *Caste in a Peasant Society: A Case Study in the Dynamics of Caste*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.
- Twaddle, M. (1975) (Ed.)** *Expulsion of a Minority*. Athlone: London.
- Twaddle, M. (1990)** "East African traders through a hundred years." In: Clarke, C., Peach, C. and Vertovec, S. (Eds.) *South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity*. pp. 149-163. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Van Amersfoort, J.M.M. (1970)** "Hindostaanse Surinamers in Amsterdam", *Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* 47 (2), 109-138.
- Van der Burg, C. and Van der Veer, P. (1986)** "Pandits, power and profit: religious organization and the construction of identity among Surinamese Hindus", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 9 (4), 514-528.
- Van der Veen, K.W. (1972)** *I Give Thee My Daughter: A Study of Marriage and Hierarchy Among the Anavil Brahmans of South Gujarat*. Van Gorcum: Assen.
- Vertovec, S. (1990)** "Religion and ethnic ideology: the Hindu youth movement in Trinidad", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13 (2), 225-249.
- Vertovec, S. (1992)** "Community and congregation in London Hindu temples: divergent trends", *New Community* 18 (2), 251-264.
- Vertovec, S. (1994)** "Caught in an ethnic quandary: Indo-Caribbean Hindus in London." In: Ballard, R. (Ed.) *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain*. pp. 272-290. Hurst and Company: London.
- Visram, R. (1986)** *Ayahs, Lascars and Princes: The Story of Indians in Britain 1700-1947*. Pluto: London.
- Wagatsuma, H. (1967)** "The pariah caste in Japan: history and present self-image." In: de Reuck, A. and Knight, J. (Eds.) *Caste and Race: Comparative Approaches*. pp. 118-140. J. and A. Churchill Ltd.: London.
- Warner, W.L. (1936)** "American caste and class", *American Journal of Sociology* 42, 234-237.

- Warrier, S. (1994)** "Gujarati Prajapatis in London: family roles and sociability networks." In: Ballard, R. (Ed.) *Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain*. pp. 191-212. Hurst and Company: London.
- Weber, M. (1964)** *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*. Free Press: Glencoe, New York.
- Welles, C.B. (1963)** 8th volume (Bks. XVI-XVII) of the translation of: *Diodorus Siculus*. William Heinemann Ltd.: London.
- Werbner, P. (1980)** "From rags to riches: Manchester Pakistanis in the textile trade", *New Community* 8, 84-96.
- Whatmore, S. (1991)** *Farming Women: Gender Work and Family Enterprise*. Macmillan: London.
- Wiser, W.H.** *The Hindu Jajmani System: A Socio-Economic System Interrelating Members of a Hindu Village Community in Services*. Lucknow Publishing House: Lucknow.
- Yalman, N. (1960)** "The flexibility of caste principles in a Kandyan community." In: Leach, E.R. (Ed.) *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North-West Pakistan*. pp. 78-112. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Yalman, N. (1962)** "The structure of the Sinhalese kindred: a re-examination of the Dravidian terminology", *American Anthropologist* 64, 548-575.
- Yorkshire Auto Trader*. (1995) June Edition. Hurst Publishing: Leeds.
- Yule, H. and Burnell, A.C. (1968)** New Edtn. *Hobson-Jobson: A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases, and of Kindred Terms, Etymological, Historical, Geographical and Discursive*. (Ed.) William Crooke. Routledge, Kegan and Paul: London.
- Zinkin, T. (1962)** *Caste Today*. Oxford University Press: London.

## Appendix One

- A dictionary of Indian names

File Name: INDIANAM.TXT  
Format: MS-DOS unformatted text



## Appendix 2A

- Introductory notes
- Prototype interview schedule

## Introductory notes

A few introductory points must be made about the prototype interview schedule used for the pilot study (see below), and the revised interview schedule used for the main study (see Appendix 2B).

1) The two interview schedules both involve a series of 'model questions' based around five key themes. These are:

- General family details
- Migration histories
- Education histories
- Employment histories
- The Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford and the caste system

2) Although the questions based around the five themes can be directed at any members of the family unit who are willing to respond to them, they may not actually apply to all these members. Such a situation arises if some of the members of this family unit are of non-Punjabi Hindu ethnicity, as in a 'mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu household'. For example, questions based on the second, third and fourth themes of migration, education and employment histories, only apply to persons of Punjabi Hindu ethnicity who are related to the family unit in a sample household. Conversely, questions under the first theme of general family details are attempting to capture data on all members of the family unit, even if some of these family members are non-Punjabi Hindus in a mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu household. Similarly, those questions based around the fifth theme (the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford and the caste system) are also attempting to capture the views of all members of the family unit in a sample household, irrespective of their ethnicity. This is because these individuals might have an interesting perspective on the caste system.

3) The questions in the two interview schedules are all nominally addressed in the second person. Those questions based around the second, third and fourth themes would often be answered individually by those household members to whom they applied. Thus, these questions can be seen as being directed towards the second person singular. In contrast, the questions under the first and fifth themes might often be answered by all household members present at an interview together. These questions can be seen as being addressed to the second person plural.

4) The questions relating to migration, education and employment histories (under themes two, three and four respectively) require information on members of the family unit making up a Punjabi Hindu household who may not be present at the interview, either because of absence, or simply because they do not wish to take part. In such cases, the migration, education and employment histories of these individuals must be gained from those household members who are present at the interview and willing to answer questions on their behalf. It will be seen that the questions related to the second, third and fourth themes are all designed to take account of this.

5) It will be noted that the questions in the two interview schedules are accompanied by an extensive sub-text of notes. These are designed for the interviewer's referral before the interview. Their aim is to remind the interviewer of the information he is aiming to obtain with the line of questioning under a specific theme. In addition, these comments also represent an expansion of some of the introductory points made above, whilst on two occasions they remind the interviewer to introduce a particular 'prop' into the course of the interview to stimulate discussion. The first of these props, which is introduced under the second theme of the interview schedules (migration histories), is a map of India. The second prop is a newspaper article about the caste system in India today (see Rettie, 1994). This is introduced under the fifth theme (the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford and the caste system).

## Prototype interview schedule

### Starting the pilot interview

[At the start of the pilot interview I will begin with an introduction of myself and the study.]

**"Before starting the interview I think I should explain in a bit more detail what I'm actually doing. I'm a PhD student at the University of Leeds, and I'm doing a three year research project on life within the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford.**

**I've specially selected your household as one of a small set for initial interview. It would be very helpful if I could tape the interview because I can't write everything down. I wonder if this would be OK? "**

### Theme 1: General family details

[The model questions under this first theme are aimed at capturing data on all the members of the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household, even if some of these family members are non-Punjabi Hindus in a mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu household.]

#### **1. Could you tell me how many people live in this house?**

**1a. Who are they, and are they all Punjabi Hindus?** [This dual question would usually be split into two. The first part of the question aims to uncover the consanguineous position of all the members of a family unit living in a Punjabi Hindu household; i.e. who is the father, mother, daughter etc. This information can then be used to determine the structure of this family unit; e.g. is it extended, single parent etc. The second part of the question, concerning Punjabi Hindu ethnicity, should identify those mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households in which certain members of the family unit may be of non-Punjabi Hindu ethnicity, as in a Punjabi Hindu/white mixed marriage.]

**1b. How old are they?** [This question aims to gather information on the ages of all the persons belonging to the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household.]

**2. Do you have relatives living in other parts of Bradford?** [In all instances where the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household is represented by any form of married or cohabiting partners, rather than a single person or single parent family (i.e. in most cases), this question must gather information about the relatives of both these partners.]

**2a. Who are they and where do they live?**

**3. Do you have relatives living in other parts of Britain?** [See comments for question two.]

**3a. Who are they and where do they live?**

## **Theme 2: Migration histories**

[The questions under this theme aim to obtain data relating to the migration histories of first generation and generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindus related to the family unit in an interview household. Such individuals may not actually live in this household. For example, if an interview household was occupied by a family unit made up of a second generation Punjabi Hindu couple, then information would need to be gathered on the migration histories of this couple's first generation parents.

The initial phrasing of the questions below makes them only suitable for address to first generation immigrants. An alternative suggestion as to how these questions could be rephrased if they were being directed towards second or third generation immigrants is found in brackets.]

**1. From what part of India do you (or your parents/grandparents if second and third generation) originate from?** [I should be prepared here for different interviewees to indicate that they have different origins. For instance, a first generation Punjabi Hindu husband and wife might have originally come from different areas of the Punjab.]

**1a. Whereabouts is that exactly?** [A map of India will be produced at this point, and interviewees should be asked to point to their respective origin area/s. I think this would help to demonstrate that I am genuinely interested in what respondents are saying. A map will also provide a point of interest for interviewees, and perhaps stimulate anecdotal or reminiscent conversation about the area they are referring to.]

**2. Do you have any relatives still living in India?**

**2a. Who are they?**

**2b. Whereabouts do they live in India?** [I should be prepared for more than one location here.]

**3. When did you (your parents/grandparents) arrive in Britain?** [This question has to identify those situations where different members of a household arrived in Britain at different times.]

**4. Did you (your parents/grandparents) all come directly to Britain from India, or did you spend time somewhere else first?** [This question is trying to identify two stage migration histories or twice-migrants (Bhachu, 1985).]

**5. What were your (your parents'/grandparents') reasons for leaving India at the time?** [This is a very open ended question which attempts to get to the reasons for initial migration, such as the desire to educate young children in Britain, or the perceived employment prospects offered in this country. It might need following up with a question like:]

**6. What were your (your parents'/grandparents') reasons for coming to Bradford (and also any other British city which was a place of residence before Bradford)?**

## 7. Do you have any relatives living in other parts of Bradford?

### 7a. Who are they and where do they live?

## 8. What about relatives in the rest of Britain?

### 8a Who are they and where do they live?

## Theme 3: Education histories

[The questions under this theme aim to obtain longitudinal data on the education histories of Punjabi Hindus of both genders through successive generations; these being first, 1.5, second and third generation Punjabi Hindus related to a family unit living in an interview household, as well as the sending generation of this family unit in India.

Importantly, this generational investigation of education histories only concerns immediate relations of the family unit in a household. For example, if a Punjabi Hindu interview household is occupied by a family unit made up of a second generation Punjabi Hindu couple living with their grown-up children, then information must be gathered on the education histories of this second generation couple, their third generation children, their first generation parents (who do not live in the household), and their four sets of grandparents, who would represent the Indian sending generation who had never come to Britain. This longitudinal data on education histories may prove useful in examining the fortunes of the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system through the migration process.

The individuals for whom these cross-generational education histories need to be collected will not all be present at a household interview. Certainly, those persons representing the sending generation could not possibly be present in any of the interviews, indeed they may have died long ago back in India. If the family unit in an interview household is made up of a second generation Punjabi Hindu married couple, then the first generation parents of this couple are often likely to live elsewhere, or again they may have died. Finally, some of those Punjabi Hindu individuals for whom education histories need to be obtained may actually live as part of the family unit in the interview household, but may be either unwilling to respond to the interview, or simply absent at the time it was carried out. In all these cases, the principal task is to obtain all the necessary information on cross-generational education histories from those members of the Punjabi Hindu family unit who are present at the interview, and who are willing to respond. Consequently, the questions below have a compressed structure, and are designed to be opened out into a whole series of enquiries, which would capture all the longitudinal education data on the relevant individuals related to the family unit across the various generational cohorts.]

**1. At what age did you/your parents/your grandparents/your children leave school (only ask about children if applicable)?** [It is worth remembering that many Punjabi Hindu children related to the family unit living in a given interview household are likely to be still living in this household and going to school. Others may have left school or college, and may have even moved out of the interview household to live elsewhere. The questions under this theme are designed to take account of this. In some cases of course, the family unit in the Punjabi Hindu interview household may not have produced children, in which case the references to children in the questions below would be redundant.]

**2. Where was the school you/your parents/your grandparents/your children went to, (or where is the school you/your children go to, if addressing or asking about children who still go to school)?** [This question helps to separate those Punjabi Hindus who only

went to school in India, those who only went/go to school in Britain, and those who went to school in both places.]

**3. What was the name of the school you/your parents/your grandparents/your children went to (or what is the name of the school you/your children go to, if addressing or asking about children who still go to school)?** [This question is particularly useful in identifying whether the Punjabi Hindu children related to the family unit in an interview household have been sent (or are being sent) to an independent or state school by their parents. This could be identified by the name of the school. This information may prove useful in examining the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system, if related back to information on the *jati* of the Punjabi Hindu family unit under scrutiny.]

**4. Did you/your parents/your grandparents/your children go to college (only ask about children if applicable)?** [College is an all embracing term here. Respondents will be asked to elaborate whether it is a university, polytechnic, FE college etc.]

**5. Where was the college you/your parents/your grandparents/your children went to (or where is the college you/your children go to, if addressing or asking about children who still go to college)?** [This question helps separate out those Punjabi Hindus who went to college in India and those who went/go to college in Britain.]

**6. What subject did you/your parents/your grandparents/your children study at college (or what subject do you/your children study at college, if addressing or asking about children who still go to college)?** [This is an interesting question, because the courses and subjects studied can represent personal aspirations and an individual's perception of their self-potential. The important point here is to identify those family members who are drawing away from the perhaps more traditional aspirations of their parents (which might be linked to their *jati* status) by expanding into new areas of training and education.]

**7. What are your/your parents'/your grandparents'/your children's highest qualifications?** [Data on highest qualifications will prove useful in examining the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, especially if the qualification attainments are related to *jati* status. It is important to clarify the exact level of qualification attained; e.g. B-Tec, O-level, A-level, British first degree, British second degree, Indian Schools Matriculation, Indian first degree, etc. ]

#### **Theme 4: Employment histories**

[The questions here aim to obtain longitudinal data on the employment histories of Punjabi Hindus of both genders through successive generations; these being first, 1.5, second and third generation Punjabi Hindus related to the family unit living in an interview household, as well as the sending generation of this family unit in India.

As with the previous theme, many individuals for whom these cross-generational employment histories need to be collected will not all be present at a household interview. Again, for example, those persons representing the Indian sending generation could not possibly be present. Meanwhile, some Punjabi Hindu individuals who actually live in the family unit within an interview household may be unwilling to respond, or absent from the interview. Thus, the main task here is to obtain all the necessary

longitudinal employment data from those members of the Punjabi Hindu family unit who are present at the interview, and who are willing to respond. Consequently, the questions below have a compressed structure, and are designed to be opened out into a whole series of enquiries, which would capture all the employment data on the relevant individuals related to the family unit across the various generational cohorts.]

**1. What type of job did you/your parents/your grandparents have in India?** [This compressed question would provide information on the employment histories of the Indian sending generation of a given Punjabi Hindu family, as well as the Indian employment histories of first generation immigrants from this family. Such data will provide a degree of insight into the economic and social status of a Punjabi Hindu family in Indian society prior to migration.]

**2. What type of jobs have you/your parents/your grandparents/your children had in/since arrival in Britain?** [This compressed question is very open ended and may take the respondent/s some time to answer. Something that must be looked out for is improvements or falls in the occupational status of the interviewee/s during their employment history, especially through migration from India to Britain if they are first generation immigrants. Evaluations such as these will probably be easier to make with some non-biased interjections. For instance, if the respondent recounts a move from one form of employment to another, one might say:]

**2a. And how did this new job compare with the old one?** [Of particular importance in all these employment questions are responses which indicate a gradual emancipation of Indian women through their ability to take on non-domestic employment. Also, responses which indicate an inter-generational rise in socio-economic progress through the improved occupational status of children over their parents will be of interest. Some other important questions which can be asked about all employed children, parents, partners, etc. might be:]

**3. Are you (is he/she) happy with the job you (he/she) have (has) now?** [This question attempts to discover whether the actual occupational status of a Punjabi Hindu individual is in line with their expectations. In situations where a degree of dissatisfaction with present occupational status is expressed, it will be useful to follow up with these questions:]

**3a. Why is this, is it to do with hours/conditions/income or job status?** [This again helps to determine the way in which the actual occupational status of a Punjabi Hindu individual is falling short of his/her expected occupational status.]

**3b. What would you (he/she) ideally like to be doing as a job right now?** [This question helps reveal the occupational status to which a Punjabi Hindu individual feels he/she has a right to aspire. It may have interesting links with questions about the caste system under the next theme. For instance, is the ideal occupational status of a family member in anyway related to their *jati/varna* status? This could lead on to the next question:]

**3c. Why are you (is he/she) not doing this job?** [This question obviously needs to be put forward with a degree of tact. Of interest here are responses which indicate that the lack of ability to obtain a particular job is due to discrimination in the job market (from any quarter), or lack of qualifications.]

**4. Are there any jobs that you (he/she) wouldn't do?** [This question is interested in any responses which indicate that Punjabi Hindu individuals feel there are jobs which are below their ranking in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system.]

## **Theme 5: The Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford and the caste system**

[The aim of the questions under this theme is to obtain information and opinions about the caste system and Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community from all members of the family unit living in a Punjabi Hindu household. Thus, these questions even apply to those non-Punjabi Hindu individuals found in mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households.]

**1. Do you know many other Punjabi Hindu families in Bradford?**

**2. Do the members of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community ever meet together?**

**3. What centres of worship do your family go to?** [It is important to find out the different centres of worship if there are more than one.]

**4. Does the community concern itself with events back in the Punjab at all?** [This could be followed up with a qualifier such as:]

**4a. What about some of the more sensitive religious issues that have occurred in the Punjab recently?** [If the interviewee/s ask/s what I mean by this, I could follow up with a statement like:]

**"Well, for instance, the Hindu/Sikh tensions in Amritsar".**

[At this point, a newspaper article from the Guardian, about problems being caused by the caste system in India today (Rettie, 1994), can be shown to the interviewees to try and encourage them to talk about the institution in either India or Bradford. In conjunction with this, a fairly open ended question similar to the one following could be asked:]

**5. There have been a lot of reports in the British press lately about the caste system in India, like this recent one in the Guardian newspaper here. This is something that I find particularly interesting, I wonder if you can tell me anything about it?**

[From here the pilot interview should hopefully continue for some time in discussion about the caste system.]

### **Wind up the pilot interview**

**"Thank you for your time and co-operation. Your help is much appreciated."**

## Appendix 2B

- Revised interview schedule

## Revised interview schedule

### Starting the main interview

[At the start of the pilot interview I will begin with an introduction of myself and the study.]

**"Before starting the interview I think I should explain in a bit more detail what I'm actually doing. I'm a PhD student at the University of Leeds, and I'm doing a three year research project on life within the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford.**

**I've specially selected your household for interview. It would be very helpful if I could tape the interview because I can't write everything down. I wonder if this would be OK? "**

### Theme 1: General family details

[The model questions under this first theme are aimed at capturing data on all the members of the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household, even if some of these family members are non-Punjabi Hindus in a mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu household.]

#### **1. Could you tell me how many people live in this house?**

**1a. Who are they, and are they all Punjabi Hindus?** [This dual question would usually be split into two. The first part of the question aims to uncover the consanguineous position of all the members of a family unit living in a Punjabi Hindu household; i.e. who is the father, mother, daughter etc. This information can then be used to determine the structure of this family unit; e.g. is it extended, single parent etc. The second part of the question, concerning Punjabi Hindu ethnicity, should identify those mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households in which certain members of the family unit may be of non-Punjabi Hindu ethnicity, as in a Punjabi Hindu/white mixed marriage.]

**1b. How old are they?** [This question aims to gather information on the ages of all the persons belonging to the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household.]

**2. Do you have relatives living in other parts of Bradford?** [In all instances where the family unit in a Punjabi Hindu household is represented by any form of married or cohabiting partners, rather than a single person or single parent family (i.e. in most cases), this question must gather information about the relatives of both these partners.]

**2a. Who are they and where do they live?**

**3. Do you have relatives living in other parts of Britain?** [See comments for question two.]

**3a. Who are they and where do they live?**

**4. Do you own or rent your house?**

**5. How much do you think your house is worth?**

**6. How many cars do you have?**

**6a. What model/s of car/s do you have?**

**6b. What is the registration year of your car/s?**

**7. Does your household have central heating?**

[The aim of questions four to seven is to obtain socio-economic data which might be related back to information on the caste system].

## **Theme 2: Migration histories**

[The questions under this theme aim to obtain data relating to the migration histories of first generation and generation 1.5 Punjabi Hindus related to the family unit in an interview household. Such individuals may not actually live in this household. For example, if an interview household was occupied by a family unit made up of a second generation Punjabi Hindu couple, then information would need to be gathered on the migration histories of this couple's first generation parents.

The initial phrasing of the questions below makes them only suitable for address to first generation immigrants. An alternative suggestion as to how these questions could be rephrased if they were being directed towards second or third generation immigrants is found in brackets.]

**1. From what part of India do you (or your parents/grandparents if second and third generation) originate from?** [I should be prepared here for different interviewees to indicate that they have different origins. For instance, a first generation Punjabi Hindu husband and wife might have originally come from different areas of the Punjab.]

**1a. Whereabouts is that exactly?** [A map of India will be produced at this point, and interviewees should be asked to point to their respective origin area/s. I think this would help to demonstrate that I am genuinely interested in what respondents are saying. A map will also provide a point of interest for interviewees, and perhaps stimulate anecdotal or reminiscent conversation about the area they are referring to.]

**2. Do you have any relatives still living in India?**

**2a. Who are they?**

**2b. Whereabouts do they live in India?** [I should be prepared for more than one location here.]

**3. When did you (your parents/grandparents) arrive in Britain?** [This question has to identify those situations where different members of a household arrived in Britain at different times.]

**4. Did you (your parents/grandparents) all come directly to Britain from India, or did you spend time somewhere else first?** [This question is trying to identify two stage migration histories or twice-migrants (Bhachu, 1985).]

**5. What were your (your parents'/grandparents') reasons for leaving India at the time?** [This is a very open ended question which attempts to get to the reasons for initial migration, such as the desire to educate young children in Britain, or the perceived employment prospects offered in this country. It might need following up with a question like:]

**6. What were your (your parents'/grandparents') reasons for coming to Bradford (and also any other British city which was a place of residence before Bradford)?**

**7. Do you have any relatives living in other parts of Bradford?**

**7a. Who are they and where do they live?**

**8. What about relatives in the rest of Britain?**

**8a Who are they and where do they live?**

### **Theme 3: Education histories**

[The questions under this theme aim to obtain longitudinal data on the education histories of Punjabi Hindus of both genders through successive generations; these being first, 1.5, second and third generation Punjabi Hindus related to a family unit living in an interview household, as well as the sending generation of this family unit in India.

Importantly, this generational investigation of education histories only concerns immediate relations of the family unit in a household. For example, if a Punjabi Hindu interview household is occupied by a family unit made up of a second generation Punjabi Hindu couple living with their grown-up children, then information must be gathered on the education histories of this second generation couple, their third generation children, their first generation parents (who do not live in the household), and their four sets of grandparents, who would represent the Indian sending generation who had never come to Britain. This longitudinal data on education histories may prove useful in examining the fortunes of the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system through the migration process.

The individuals for whom these cross-generational education histories need to be collected will not all be present at a household interview. Certainly, those persons representing the sending generation could not possibly be present in any of the interviews, indeed they may have died long ago back in India. If the family unit in an interview household is made up of a second generation Punjabi Hindu married couple, then the first generation parents of this couple are often likely to live elsewhere, or again they may have died. Finally, some of those Punjabi Hindu individuals for whom education histories need to be obtained may actually live as part of the family unit in the interview household, but may be either unwilling to respond to the interview, or simply absent at the time it was carried out. In all these cases, the principal task is to obtain all the necessary information on cross-generational education histories from those

members of the Punjabi Hindu family unit who are present at the interview, and who are willing to respond. Consequently, the questions below have a compressed structure, and are designed to be opened out into a whole series of enquiries, which would capture all the longitudinal education data on the relevant individuals related to the family unit across the various generational cohorts.]

**1. At what age did you/your parents/your grandparents/your children leave school (only ask about children if applicable)?** [It is worth remembering that many Punjabi Hindu children related to the family unit living in a given interview household are likely to be still living in this household and going to school. Others may have left school or college, and may have even moved out of the interview household to live elsewhere. The questions under this theme are designed to take account of this. In some cases of course, the family unit in the Punjabi Hindu interview household may not have produced children, in which case the references to children in the questions below would be redundant.]

**2. Where was the school you/your parents/your grandparents/your children went to, (or where is the school you/your children go to, if addressing or asking about children who still go to school)?** [This question helps to separate those Punjabi Hindus who only went to school in India, those who only went/go to school in Britain, and those who went to school in both places.]

**3. What was the name of the school you/your parents/your grandparents/your children went to (or what is the name of the school you/your children go to, if addressing or asking about children who still go to school)?** [This question is particularly useful in identifying whether the Punjabi Hindu children related to the family unit in an interview household have been sent (or are being sent) to an independent or state school by their parents. This could be identified by the name of the school. This information may prove useful in examining the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system, if related back to information on the *jati* of the Punjabi Hindu family unit under scrutiny.]

**4. Did you/your parents/your grandparents/your children go to college (only ask about children if applicable)?** [College is an all embracing term here. Respondents will be asked to elaborate whether it is a university, polytechnic, FE college etc.]

**5. Where was the college you/your parents/your grandparents/your children went to (or where is the college you/your children go to, if addressing or asking about children who still go to college)?** [This question helps separate out those Punjabi Hindus who went to college in India and those who went/go to college in Britain.]

**6. What subject did you/your parents/your grandparents/your children study at college (or what subject do you/your children study at college, if addressing or asking about children who still go to college)?** [This is an interesting question, because the courses and subjects studied can represent personal aspirations and an individual's perception of their self-potential. The important point here is to identify those family members who are drawing away from the perhaps more traditional aspirations of their parents (which might be linked to their *jati* status) by expanding into new areas of training and education.]

**7. What are your/your parents'/your grandparents'/your children's highest qualifications?** [Data on highest qualifications will prove useful in examining the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, especially if the qualification attainments are related to *jati* status. It is important to clarify the exact level of qualification attained; e.g. B-Tec, O-level, A-level, British first degree, British second degree, Indian Schools Matriculation, Indian first degree, etc. ]

#### **Theme 4: Employment histories**

[The questions here aim to obtain longitudinal data on the employment histories of Punjabi Hindus of both genders through successive generations; these being first, 1.5, second and third generation Punjabi Hindus related to the family unit living in an interview household, as well as the sending generation of this family unit in India.

As with the previous theme, many individuals for whom these cross-generational employment histories need to be collected will not all be present at a household interview. Again, for example, those persons representing the Indian sending generation could not possibly be present. Meanwhile, some Punjabi Hindu individuals who actually live in the family unit within an interview household may be unwilling to respond, or absent from the interview. Thus, the main task here is to obtain all the necessary longitudinal employment data from those members of the Punjabi Hindu family unit who are present at the interview, and who are willing to respond. Consequently, the questions below have a compressed structure, and are designed to be opened out into a whole series of enquiries, which would capture all the employment data on the relevant individuals related to the family unit across the various generational cohorts.]

**1. What type of job did you/your parents/your grandparents have in India?** [This compressed question would provide information on the employment histories of the Indian sending generation of a given Punjabi Hindu family, as well as the Indian employment histories of first generation immigrants from this family. Such data will provide a degree of insight into the economic and social status of a Punjabi Hindu family in Indian society prior to migration.]

**2. What type of jobs have you/your parents/your grandparents/your children had in/since arrival in Britain?** [This compressed question is very open ended and may take the respondent/s some time to answer. Something that must be looked out for is improvements or falls in the occupational status of the interviewee/s during their employment history, especially through migration from India to Britain if they are first generation immigrants. Evaluations such as these will probably be easier to make with some non-biased interjections. For instance, if the respondent recounts a move from one form of employment to another, one might say:]

**2a. And how did this new job compare with the old one?** [Of particular importance in all these employment questions are responses which indicate a gradual emancipation of Indian women through their ability to take on non-domestic employment. Also, responses which indicate an inter-generational rise in socio-economic progress through the improved occupational status of children over their parents will be of interest. Some other important questions which can be asked about all employed children, parents, partners, etc. might be:]

**3. Are you (is he/she) happy with the job you (he/she) have (has) now?** [This question attempts to discover whether the actual occupational status of a Punjabi Hindu individual is in line with their expectations. In situations where a degree of dissatisfaction with present occupational status is expressed, it will be useful to follow up with these questions:]

**3a. Why is this, is it to do with hours/conditions/income or job status?** [This again helps to determine the way in which the actual occupational status of a Punjabi Hindu individual is falling short of his/her expected occupational status.]

**3b. What would you (he/she) ideally like to be doing as a job right now?** [This question helps reveal the occupational status to which a Punjabi Hindu individual feels he/she has a right to aspire. It may have interesting links with questions about the caste system under the next theme. For instance, is the ideal occupational status of a family member in anyway related to their *jati/varna* status? This could lead on to the next question:]

**3c. Why are you (is he/she) not doing this job?** [This question obviously needs to be put forward with a degree of tact. Of interest here are responses which indicate that the lack of ability to obtain a particular job is due to discrimination in the job market (from any quarter), or lack of qualifications.]

**4. Are there any jobs that you (he/she) wouldn't do?** [This question is interested in any responses which indicate that Punjabi Hindu individuals feel there are jobs which are below their ranking in the ritual hierarchy of the caste system.]

## **Theme 5: The Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford and the caste system**

[The aim of the questions under this theme is to obtain information and opinions about the caste system and Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community from **all** members of the family unit living in a Punjabi Hindu household. Thus, these questions even apply to those non-Punjabi Hindu individuals found in mixed ethnicity Punjabi Hindu households.]

**1. Do you know many other Punjabi Hindu families in Bradford?**

**2. Do the members of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community ever meet together?**

**3. What centres of worship do your family go to?** [It is important to find out the different centres of worship if there are more than one.]

**4. Does the community concern itself with events back in the Punjab at all?** [This could be followed up with a qualifier such as:]

**4a. What about some of the more sensitive religious issues that have occurred in the Punjab recently?** [If the interviewee/s ask/s what I mean by this, I could follow up with a statement like:]

**"Well, for instance, the Hindu/Sikh tensions in Amritsar".**

[At this point, a newspaper article from the Guardian, about problems being caused by the caste system in India today (Rettie, 1994), can be shown to the interviewees to try and encourage them to talk about the institution in either India or Bradford. In conjunction with this, a fairly open ended question similar to the one following could be asked:]

5. There have been a lot of reports in the British press lately about the caste tensions in India. For instance this report in the Guardian here talks about some of the tensions between the Dalits, or scheduled castes, and the higher status castes. This is something that I find particularly interesting, I wonder what you feel about this?

6. Also in this particular newspaper article an Indian sociologist, Rajni Kothari, claims that caste "*is such a prominent part of Indian life that it will always be stronger than an Indian identity.*" What do you feel about that statement?

[From here on, the interview should hopefully continue for some time in discussion about the caste system. The following questions would allow for further investigation into the caste system where the respondent/s appear/s willing.]

7. Do you see any evidence of the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford? [If the answer to this question is yes, then the respondent/s can be asked:]

7a. If so how does it show itself?

[Irrespective of whether the respondent/s think the caste system is in evidence in Britain, the following questions can still be asked.]

8. Does the caste system show itself in arranged marriages amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford?

9. Amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, is there any relationship between people's 'caste' and how well off/wealthy they are? [This question may need to be expanded and explained to the respondent/s according to their level of understanding. This is an important question which is attempting to uncover some form of relationship between the caste system and socio-economic status. If the answer to this question is yes, it can be followed up with:]

9a. Can you give some examples of 'castes' which are better/worse off? [The responses to these two parts of question nine may be useful for examining the maintenance of the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford.]

10. Amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, do you think that some 'castes' consider themselves above others? [This question is attempting to find out whether the ritual hierarchy of the caste system is present amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford. If the answer to this question is yes, it can be followed up with:]

10a. Can you give some examples of 'castes' who consider themselves above others?

and

10b. Would this only happen at certain times or in certain places? [Here I will be pressing the respondent/s to try and find out whether the ritual hierarchy of the caste system only displays itself in certain time/space situations.]

**11. Do any particular 'castes', or persons from any particular 'castes', appear to lead or dominate the Punjabi Hindu community in Bradford?**

**12. In India there are said to be relationships between people's caste and the type of job they have. Is there a relationship between the 'caste' of Punjabi Hindus in Bradford and the type of job they do?** [This is a question on two levels. On one level it is looking for relationships between general occupational status and the caste system, which may again be useful in examining the presence and operation of the tripartite hierarchy of the caste system amongst Bradford's Punjabi Hindus. On another level, the question is looking for evidence of the maintenance of *karma*. For instance, Punjabi Hindus in Bradford from certain 'castes', such as *Sunaris* (Goldsmiths), may actually be closely involved with their given *karma*, which in Bradford might take the form of the jewellery trade.]

**13. Amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, do you think certain 'castes', or certain groups of 'castes', tend to live in certain areas of the city (or even Britain)?** [This question is attempting to find out whether there is a geographical dimension to the caste system in Bradford.]

**14. Amongst Punjabi Hindus, do you think the caste system in Bradford and India differs?** [This is a broad question which aims to identify people's perceived differences between the caste system in India and Britain. These perceived differences may not actually be the reality. It will be important to gather the varied responses on this particular question, and see if there is any difference in the replies from young and old, and more importantly those who have had much as opposed to little contact with the subcontinent recently.]

**15. Do you mind me asking what 'caste' you were yourselves originally? (Qualify exact position in the caste system if possible!)** [This question is included towards the end of the interview, as it may be seen by certain respondent/s as being particularly personal. It is couched in retrospective terms so as to take the edge off it. The information required by this question may of course have already been volunteered by the respondent/s, in which case it need not be asked.]

**16. Amongst Punjabi Hindus in Bradford, do you think the caste system is getting weaker or stronger?** [This question is a broad one, allowing the respondent/s free reign. Nevertheless, I will be searching for replies which explain how, why, and how fast or slow the caste system is getting weaker or stronger.]

### Wind up the main interview

**"Thank you for your time and co-operation. Your help is much appreciated."**

## Appendix 3A

- Letter circulated to the first four households sampled for pilot interviews

To: To Mr R.K. Sharma,  
1 Any Street,  
Bradford,  
West Yorkshire,  
BD1 1XX.

### *Punjabi Hindu Community Project*

Dear Mr Sharma,

I am a student in the School of Geography at the University of Leeds. I am currently working on a *Punjabi Hindu Community Project* in Bradford, for the purposes of a doctoral degree. The main aim of this project is to provide an insight into the cultural, religious and family life of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

To achieve this task, I have carefully identified all the Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford by picking out their distinctive Punjabi Hindu names from the Bradford electoral register. In order to help me with my research, I am now hoping to talk to the members of a few of these households. Consequently, I would be extremely grateful if you could allow me a short chat with anyone in your household about various aspects of Punjabi Hindu culture and family life.

I do hope that you will be able to help me with this very important piece of work. I expect to telephone you in a few days time to try and arrange a possible interview. In the meantime, if you wish to know more about the research and what it involves, please do not hesitate to contact either Dr. Deborah Phillips (0113-2333341), Professor Phillip Rees (0113-2333319), or myself (0113-2333328) at the School of Geography. We would all be more than happy to explain the project in detail. I look forward to meeting you.

धन्यवाद

←Thanking you

आपका

←Yours

*Dominic Medway*  
Dominic Medway.

## Appendix 3B

- Revised letter circulated to the last three households sampled for pilot interviews, and the 149 households sampled for main interviews

To: Mr A. Kumar,  
1 Any Road,  
Bradford,  
West Yorkshire,  
BD1 1XX.

### *Punjabi Hindu Community Project*

Dear Mr Kumar,

I am a student in the School of Geography at the University of Leeds. I am currently working on a *Punjabi Hindu Community Project* in Bradford, for the purposes of a doctoral degree. The main aim of this project is to provide an insight into the cultural, religious and family life of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

To achieve this task, I have carefully identified all the Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford by picking out their distinctive Punjabi Hindu names from the Bradford electoral register. In order to help me with my research, I am now hoping to talk to the members of a few of these households. Consequently, I would be extremely grateful if you could allow me a short chat with anyone in your household about various aspects of Punjabi Hindu culture and family life. It does not really matter which particular members of the household I talk to, because everybody usually has something to contribute. In fact, the more persons taking part in the talk the better.

Those Punjabi Hindu families who have already been involved in this project have certainly found it interesting. I do hope that you too will be able to help me with this very important piece of work. I expect to visit you personally in a few days time to try and arrange a time for a talk. In the meantime, if you wish to know more about the research and what it involves, please do not hesitate to contact either Dr. Deborah Phillips (0113-2333319), Professor Philip Rees (0113-2333341), or myself (0113-2333328) at the School of Geography. We would all be more than happy to explain the project in detail. I look forward to meeting you.

धन्यवाद

←Thanking you

आपका

←Yours

*Dominic Medway*

Dominic Medway.

## Appendix Four

- Covering letter introducing questionnaire
- Questionnaire circulated to 145 households

## *Punjabi Hindu Community Project*


Dear Householder,

I am a student in the School of Geography at the University of Leeds. I am currently working on a *Punjabi Hindu Community Project* in Bradford, for the purposes of a doctoral degree. The main aim of this project is to provide an insight into the cultural, religious and family life of Bradford's Punjabi Hindu community.

To achieve this task, I have carefully identified all the Punjabi Hindu households in Bradford by picking out their distinctive Punjabi Hindu names from the Bradford electoral register. In order to continue with this research, I am now circulating a questionnaire to these households. In short, I would be extremely grateful if you could spare ten minutes to fill in the questionnaire I have given you. Ideally, this questionnaire should be completed by an adult member of your household. The responses will of course be treated in the strictest confidence.

Those Punjabi Hindu families who have already been involved in this project have certainly found it interesting. I do hope that you too will be able to help me with this very important piece of work by filling in the questionnaire. There is no need to send it back to me, I will collect it personally in a few days time. In the meantime, if you have any problems with the questionnaire, or if you wish to know more about the research and what it involves, please do not hesitate to contact me at the School of Geography on 0113-2333328. I would be more than happy to explain the project in detail.

Many Thanks,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Dominic Medway". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Dominic Medway.

## Punjabi Hindu Community Project Household Questionnaire

*Please answer all the questions that are relevant to you and your household. If any questions are **not applicable**, please put N/A in the space available.  
Your answers will be treated in the strictest confidence.*

**Q1**

What is your current address and postcode?

---

---

**Q2**

Are you Punjabi Hindu? (yes/no) \_\_\_\_\_

If not, how would you describe your ethnic and religious origin? (e.g. *Punjabi Sikh, Gujarati Hindu*)

---

**Q3**

Full name \_\_\_\_\_

Age \_\_\_\_\_

Gender (M/F) \_\_\_\_\_

Current occupation \_\_\_\_\_

**Q4**

What is your highest educational qualification? (e.g. *A-levels, O-levels, British university degree, Indian university degree, left school at 16 etc.*)

---

If you have a university degree, what subject is it in? \_\_\_\_\_

---

**Q5a**

Were you born in Britain, India or elsewhere? \_\_\_\_\_

*(If your answer is 'India' or 'elsewhere', then go to question 5b. If your answer is 'Britain', then go straight to question 6).*

**Q5b**

What year did you arrive in this country? \_\_\_\_\_

What were your reasons for coming to Britain? (e.g. work/education/arrived with parents etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_

**Q6**

Please fill in the boxes below to explain what the main occupations of your father and mother were/are in India, and Britain as well if applicable.

	Main occupation in India	Main occupation in Britain
Father		
Mother		

**Q7**

What is your marital status? (e.g. married/single/divorced) \_\_\_\_\_

*(If you are married go to question 8a, if not go straight to question 9a).*

**Q8a**

Is your spouse Punjabi Hindu? (yes/no) \_\_\_\_\_

If not, what is he/she? (e.g. Punjabi Sikh) \_\_\_\_\_

What is the age of your spouse? \_\_\_\_\_

What is the current occupation of your spouse? \_\_\_\_\_

**Q8b**

What is the highest educational qualification attained by your spouse? (e.g. A-levels, O-levels, British university degree, Indian university degree, left school at 16 etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_

If your spouse has a university degree, what subject is it in? \_\_\_\_\_

**Q8c**

Was your spouse born in Britain, India or elsewhere? \_\_\_\_\_

(If the answer is 'India' or 'elsewhere', then go to question 8d. If the answer is 'Britain', then go straight to question 8e).

**Q8d**

What year did your spouse arrive in this country? \_\_\_\_\_

What were your spouse's reasons for coming to Britain? (e.g. work/education/arrived with parents etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_

**Q8e**

Please fill in the boxes below to explain what the main occupations of your spouse's father and mother were/are in India, and Britain as well if applicable.

	Main occupation in India	Main occupation in Britain
Spouse's father		
Spouse's mother		

**Q9a**

Do you have any children? (yes/no) \_\_\_\_\_

(If the answer is 'yes', go to question 9b below. If the answer is 'no', then go straight to question 10).

**Q9b**

Please write down the names of your sons and daughters, their ages, and the name of the school they attend/attended in the boxes below.

<b>Name of son/daughter</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Name of school they attend/ed</b>
<i>E.g. Rakesh Kumar</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>St. John's High School</i>

**Q9c**

If any of your sons or daughters are over 16 and have continued their education, please write down their names and the highest qualification they have achieved, (*e.g. A-levels, degree etc.*)

<b>Name of son/daughter</b>	<b>Highest qualification attained</b>
<i>E.g. Mindra Kumari</i>	<i>Chemistry BSc (Bradford Uni.)</i>

**Q9d**

If any of your sons or daughters are over 16 and are now in full time employment, please write down their names and the type of occupation they have.

<b>Name of son/daughter</b>	<b>Type of occupation</b>
<i>E.g. Keshav Sharma</i>	<i>Factory worker</i>

**Q10**

Please list the cars you own and their make, model and registration year in the boxes below. Do not include those vehicles which are used solely for business, or those vehicles which belong to sons and daughters who still live with you at home.

Make of car	Model	Registration year

**Q11**

Does your household have central heating? (*yes/no*) \_\_\_\_\_

**Q12**

What is your estimate of the value of your house? \_\_\_\_\_

**Q13**

Do any members of your household attend a place of worship? (*yes/no*) \_\_\_\_\_

*(If the answer is 'yes', go to question 13a. If the answer is 'no', then go straight to question 14).*

**Q13a**

In the boxes below please indicate those persons who attend a centre of worship in your household, the names of the centre/s of worship these persons attend, and how regularly they attend them.

Name of householder	Centre/s of worship they attend	How often does householder attend place/s of worship
<i>E.g. Usha Gupta</i>	<i>Hindu Cultural Society</i>	<i>Once a week</i>

**Q14**

Finally, if someone was to ask you what 'caste' you are (*e.g. Brahmin, Chamar*) what would you say it was?

\_\_\_\_\_

What 'caste' would you say your spouse is?

\_\_\_\_\_

**End of the questionnaire**  
**Many thanks for your time and co-operation**

Office use only	
Cluster No.	
Reference No.	