**EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS:**

**TOWARDS A MULTI-LEVEL POLITY?**

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

**ALİ ONUR ÖZÇELİK**

Department Of Politics



FEBRUARY 2014

*‘ANNEM VE BABAM İÇİN’*

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

This Ph.D. has been a journey which I could not have completed without the help and support of the kind people around me, and I take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude and deep regard for those people. First of all, to my primary supervisor, Professor Ian Bache, for his exemplary guidance, monitoring and constant encouragement throughout the course of this thesis. His help and guidance will no doubt serve me well throughout the academic and professional journey on which I am about to embark. I would also take this opportunity to thank my second supervisor, Professor Simon Bulmer, whose sound advice contributed immensely to earlier versions of my thesis. I am also grateful to Sarah Cooke for her kindness and help whenever I needed any technical or departmental support.

I am extremely lucky to have the friendship of Dr. Alaaddin Paksoy, Alharith Baban, Asa Cusack, Dr. Kaan Renda, Dr. Darlington Ashamole and Dr. Mehmet İtik. When I reached a point at which I was not sure if I wanted to continue with my Ph.D., they helped me take a step back from the trees in order to see the wood, and have also kept my ego in check. It would have been difficult to focus on my research without their friendship and encouragement. In this respect, I would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Education. I certainly could not have completed my higher education in the UK without this generous financial support.

I am also indebted to several friends for their support at different stages of the Ph.D. process. These include Murat İnan, Zafer Özkan, Dr. Defne Günay, Hilal Gezmiş, Bilge Utkan Mersin, Erhan Kılınç, Emma Lucy Cole, Klaudia Kotowska, Özgür Tüfekçi, Rıdvan Ata, Dr. Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ, Dr. Masahiro Mogaki, Maria Zosimidou, Nuray Arıdıcı Turner, Joe Turner, Faig Abbasov, Dr. Joao MDD Carvalho, Paniel Reyes Cardenas, Wei Kai, Michael Tudorowski, Dr. Daniel Wunderlich and Alice Palmer.

But the final and most profound thanks must go to my family. Words cannot express how grateful I am to my mother (Saadet), father (Muhsin), brothers (Uğur and Özgür), sisters (Serpil and Serap), brothers-in-law (Selçuk and Cahit), sisters-in-law (Zehra and Hanife), nephews (Onurcan, Kerem and Yusuf Umut) and nieces (Doğa and İpek). I fully appreciate all of the sacrifices that they have made on my behalf. Without their constant encouragement, this Ph.D. would never have been possible.

For any errors on inadequacies that may remain in this work, of course, the responsibility is entirely my own.

**ABSTRACT**

The pace and scope of change in territorial relations in the European Union has gone hand in hand with rapidly expanding bodies of theoretical research that seek to explain the forces of change and their direction. Although theoretical perspectives on such issues draw on a variety of disciplines ranging from urban studies, economic geography, comparative regionalism, and so forth, this research restricts itself to the political science perspective. From such a perspective, the research is best read as empirically grounded; making comparative conclusion to the ongoing debates about the direct and indirect impact of Europeanization across different cities and subnational administrations in an applicant state, Turkey. The core objective of the thesis is to bring the Europeanization of Turkish subnational administrations (SNAs), in the sense of municipalities and regional development agencies, into perspective with the changes in territorial relations in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of 1999— where Turkey gained candidate status from the European Union.

Focusing on the Turkish subnational administrations provides fertile ground to analyze the claims of Europeanization, multi-level governance and domestic politics approaches. In agreement with the new institutionalist theoretical background, these approaches facilitate a better understanding of the linkages between the process of Europeanization and the creation of multi-level modality in Turkey. Empirically, by focusing on regional policy and its related financial incentives, the main question guiding this research is as follows: How has Europeanization (via regional policy and related financial incentives) produced an impact that has brought about mobilisation of Turkish subnational administrations across the EU arena? The main question is also supplemented with the sub-questions: what has changed at subnational level to demonstrate the response of SNAs to the impact of Europeanization and under what conditions does the impact of Europeanization make SNAs mobilize across the EU arena? To answer these questions, the research adapts a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization as its research design. This combines the pull factor of the opportunity structures, voluntary mechanisms and the push factors of resource capabilities (i.e. organizational capacity and leadership) with the domestic intermediating variables (constitutional-legal framework, the historical legacy, regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relationship and the pre-existing territorial network).

The empirical findings derived from the original data provide evidence and insight into the direct and indirect Europeanization of Turkish subnational administrations. Accordingly, the research findings suggest that there has been a clear increase in EU activities after the Helsinki Summit of 1999. These have supported the idea that the process of Europeanization at subnational level has altered the preferences, practices and policies of municipalities and regional development agencies and led them to mobilize across the EU arena. However, the research claims that the political effect of Europeanization (via the EU’s pre-accession funds) does not necessarily increase the power of SNAs vis-à-vis the central institutions. Given the limited scope of subnational engagement with the EU fund management and the role of national governments as powerful gatekeepers, the empirical findings have suggested that the mobilisation of Turkish subnational administrations has achieved modest success in shifting towards the EU’s multi-level modality. This shift, however, has mainly derived from the success of SNAs’ organizational capacity, which has largely been mediated by subnational factors, regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relationships and the pre-existing territorial network. Whereas the regional distinctiveness (for the case city of Diyarbakır) plays a negative role for SNAs’ involvement with the EU multi-level polity, the pre-existing territorial network has positive consequences for two case cities, Izmir and Samsun. As for the quality of intergovernmental relations, SNAs from different political party orientation have followed three distinct strategies: cooperation, competition and confrontation. Of these, the cooperative strategy has best paid off. Consequently, the main argument of the research is close to those scholars who put more emphasis on the subnational dynamics in explaining mobilization rather than national and EU contexts.

Contents

[LIST OF TABLES i](#_Toc380669391)

[LIST OF FIGURES ii](#_Toc380669392)

[LIST OF MAPS ii](#_Toc380669393)

[ABBREVIATIONS iii](#_Toc380669394)

[INTRODUCTION 1](#_Toc380669395)

[THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RATIONALE 3](#_Toc380669396)

[SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH INTERESTS AND QUESTIONS FOR THE THESIS 7](#_Toc380669397)

[THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 9](#_Toc380669398)

[CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: EUROPEANIZATION 12](#_Toc380669399)

[1.1. INTRODUCTION 12](#_Toc380669400)

[1.2. ORIGINS AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENTS 12](#_Toc380669401)

[1.3. DETERMINING THE USAGE OF EUROPEANIZATION 20](#_Toc380669402)

[1.4. EUROPEANIZATION RESEARCH IN CANDIDATE STATES 27](#_Toc380669403)

[1.5. A NEW RESEARCH GENERATION FOR TURKISH-EU RELATIONS 31](#_Toc380669404)

[1.6. CONCLUSION 36](#_Toc380669405)

[CHAPTER 2 MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND DOMESTIC POLITICS APPROACHES 39](#_Toc380669406)

[2.1. INTRODUCTION 39](#_Toc380669407)

[2.2. EUROPE DES PATRIES VS EUROPE DES RÉGIONS: TOWARDS A MULTI-LEVEL MODALITY? 40](#_Toc380669408)

[2.3. MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AS AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH 43](#_Toc380669409)

[2.4. THE DOMESTIC POLITICS APPROACH 49](#_Toc380669410)

[2.6. CONCLUSION 57](#_Toc380669411)

[CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 59](#_Toc380669412)

[3.1. INTRODUCTION 59](#_Toc380669413)

[3.2. METHODS IN THE FIELD OF EUROPEANIZATION STUDIES 60](#_Toc380669414)

[3.3. THE METHODS OF THE RESEARCH 65](#_Toc380669415)

[3.4. CONCLUSION 78](#_Toc380669416)

[CHAPTER 4 AN EMPIRICAL BASIS OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: SUBNATIONAL MOBILISATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ARENA 80](#_Toc380669417)

[4.1. INTRODUCTION 80](#_Toc380669418)

[4.2. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 81](#_Toc380669419)

[4.3. EU FUNDING MECHANISMS UNDER THE COHESION POLICY 84](#_Toc380669420)

[4.4. EUROPEAN ACTIVITIES OF SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS 90](#_Toc380669421)

[4.5. FOUR STAGES OF SUBNATIONAL MOBILISATION 97](#_Toc380669422)

[4.5. CONCLUSION 103](#_Toc380669423)

[CHAPTER 5 DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN TURKEY 105](#_Toc380669424)

[5.1. INTRODUCTION 105](#_Toc380669425)

[5.2. NATIONAL CONTEXT 106](#_Toc380669426)

[5.3. SUBNATIONAL CONTEXT AND POLITICS 117](#_Toc380669427)

[5.4. CONCLUSION 125](#_Toc380669428)

[CHAPTER 6 THE IMPACT OF EUROPEANIZATION ON TERRITORIAL RELATIONS IN TURKEY IN THE POST-HELSINKI ERA 127](#_Toc380669429)

[6.1. INTRODUCTION 127](#_Toc380669430)

[6.2. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES 128](#_Toc380669431)

[6.3. THE CREATION OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES AND RELEVANT ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 133](#_Toc380669432)

[6.4. LIMITS ON MULTI-LEVEL MODALITY IN TURKEY 137](#_Toc380669433)

[6.5. CONCLUSION 152](#_Toc380669434)

[CHAPTER 7 SUBNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS 155](#_Toc380669435)

[7.1. INTRODUCTION 155](#_Toc380669436)

[7.2. GROWING AWARENESS AND SIGNS OF ADAPTATION TO THE EU 156](#_Toc380669437)

[7.3. CHANGES IN ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 165](#_Toc380669438)

[7.4. CONCLUSION 180](#_Toc380669439)

[CHAPTER 8 THE MOBILISATION OF TURKISH SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE EU ARENA 183](#_Toc380669440)

[8.1. INTRODUCTION 183](#_Toc380669441)

[8.2. TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES THROUGH HORIZONTAL NETWORKS 183](#_Toc380669442)

[8.3. MOBILIZING IN BRUSSELS 191](#_Toc380669443)

[8.4. REASONS FOR SUBNATIONAL MOBILISATION ACROSS THE EU ARENA 214](#_Toc380669444)

[8.5. CONCLUSION 217](#_Toc380669445)

[CHAPTER 9 EURO-ENGAGEMENT OF SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS: SOME CASE STUDY EVIDENCE 220](#_Toc380669446)

[9.1. INTRODUCTION 220](#_Toc380669447)

[9.2. SUBNATIONAL CONTEXT AND EFFECTS OF POTENTIAL INTERMEDIATING FACTORS 221](#_Toc380669448)

[9.3. FOUR STAGES OF EUROPEANIZATION: CONTRASTS AND SIMILARITIES 239](#_Toc380669449)

[9.4. CONCLUSION 257](#_Toc380669450)

[CONCLUSION 260](#_Toc380669451)

[INTRODUCTION 260](#_Toc380669452)

[EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 261](#_Toc380669453)

[CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RESEARCH FIELD AND THE LIMITATIONS 277](#_Toc380669454)

[VENUES FOR FUTURE STUDIES 283](#_Toc380669455)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY 285](#_Toc380669456)

[APPENDIX 1: THE INVENTORY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL SURVEY 307](#_Toc380669457)

[APPENDIX 2: SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 311](#_Toc380669458)

[APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 312](#_Toc380669459)

[THE LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 314](#_Toc380669460)

# LIST OF TABLES

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Table 1.1** Two Generations of Europeanization | 21 |
| **Table 2.1** Types of Multi-Level Governance | 45 |
| **Table 3.1** The position survey participants held in the organization | 67 |
| **Table 3.2** Statistics about the Survey Population for Three Types of SNAs | 68 |
| **Table 3.3** Composition of Interviews | 72 |
| **Table 3.4** The Selection Criteria of Sample Cities | 78 |
| **Table 4.1** Number of offices in Brussels established by some member states | 95 |
| **Table 6.1** The Distribution of EU funds in 12 NUTS II Regions | 132 |
| **Table 7.1** Is it difficult for your organization to obtain information regarding the EU issues? | 158 |
| **Table 7.2** Regarding the EU’s regional policy, which national institutions do you usually contact with? | 159 |
| **Table 7.3** Duration of staff both in the organization and in the current position | 167 |
| **Table 8.1** Have you ever applied for an EU-funded project with the equivalent partner in the EU? | 185 |
| **Table 8.2** What sorts of transnational activities have your organization conducted in the EU arena? | 185 |
| **Table 8.3** Number of sister city agreements of Turkish cities | 187 |
| **Table 8.4** Does your organization maintain contact with the interregional organization in Brussels? | 202 |
| **Table 8.5** National Interest Organizations in Brussels | 211 |
| **Table 9.1** URAK 2009-2010 Cities Competitiveness Index (out of 81 cities) | 233 |
| **Table 9.2** Number of EU Projects Implemented in the Selected Cities since 2003 | 240 |
| **Table 9.3** Educational Background of Personnel in the Selected SNAs (2012) | 244 |
| **Table 9.4** 2012 Income and Expense Account for the Selected SNAs (million €) | 246 |
| **Table 9.5** Membership to some European-wide Interregional Organizations | 253 |
| **Table 9.6** Summary of Four Stages of Subnational Mobilisation | 256 |

# LIST OF FIGURES

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Figure 4.1** Ladder Model for Europeanization of Subnational Governance | 99 |
| **Figure 7.1** Does your organization circulate special procedure and EU directives inside the organization? | 161 |
| **Figure 7.2** Does your organization subscribe to journals and specialist papers and magazines regarding EU matters? | 161 |
| **Figure 7.3** Does your organization have staff trained and educated about the EU-related Issues? | 166 |
| **Figure 7.4** Does your organization have staff whose main duty is responsibility for EU affairs? | 168 |
| **Figure 7.5** Does your organization have a specific office for the coordination of EU affairs? | 170 |
| **Figure 8.1** IPA Structure 2007-2013 | 194 |
| **Figure 8.2** Does your organization consider establishing a liaison office in Brussels? | 207 |

# LIST OF MAPS

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Map 3.1** Development Index of Turkish Provinces | 77 |
| **Map 6.1** The EU-funded regional development and cross-regional partnership programmes (2004-2006) | 129 |
| **Map 6.2** Regions Supported by the Regional Competitiveness Operational Programmes (RCOP) | 131 |
| **Map 8.1** The EU Member States and Turkey’s Neighbours | 190 |
| **Map 9.1** The 2011 General Election Map of Turkey | 223 |

# ABBREVIATIONS

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Acronym** | **Description** |
| **AEBR** | Association of European Border Regions |
| **AER** | Assembly of European Regions |
| **AKP** | Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) |
| **BDP** | Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party) |
| **CCRLA** | Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities |
| **CEECs** | Central and Eastern European Countries |
| **CEMR** | Council of European Municipalities and Regions |
| **CFCU** | Central Financing and Contracting Unit |
| **CHP** | Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) |
| **CMs** | City Municipalities |
| **CoR** | The Committee of the Regions |
| **CPMR** | Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions of Europe |
| **DAP** | Doğu Anadolu Projesi (Eastern Anatolia Project) |
| **DIS** | Decentralized Implementation System |
| **DOKAP** | Doğu Karadeniz Kalkınma Projesi (Eastern Black Sea Development Project) |
| **EBKA** | Ege Bölgesi Kalkınma Ajansı (Aegean Region Development Agency) |
| **EESC** | European Economic and Social Committee |
| **EGEV** | Ege Ekonomiyi Geliştirme Vakfı (Aegean Economic Development Association) |
| **EU** | European Union |
| **EURADA** | European Association of Regional Development Agencies |
| **FCC** | Financial Co-operation Committee |
| **GAP** | Güney Doğu Anadolu Projesi (South Eastern Anatolian Project) |
| **IMF** | International Monetary Fund |
| **IPA** | Instrument for Pre-Accession |
| **ISPA** | Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession |
| **JCC** | Joint Consultative Committee (the CoR) |
| **JMC** | Joint Monitoring Committee |
| **KOSGEB** | Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli İşletmeleri Geliştirme ve Destekleme İdaresi (Small and Medium-Sized Industry Development  Organization) |
| **LA 21** | Local Agenda 21 |
| **MEDA** | Euro-Mediterranean Partnership |
| **MIPD** | Multi Indicative Programming Document |
| **MLG** | Multi-Level Governance |
| **MMs** | Metropolitan Municipalities |
| **MoD** | Ministry of Development |
| **NAC** | National Aid Co-ordinator |
| **NAO** | National Authorising Officer |
| **NF** | National Fund |
| **NIPAC** | National IPA Coordinator |
| **NPAA** | National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis |
| **NUTS** | The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics |
| **OECD** | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| **OP** | Operational Programme |
| **PES** | Party of European Socialists |
| **PHARE** | Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies |
| **PIU** | Plan and Implementation Units |
| **Pndp** | Preliminary National Development Programme |
| **PRD** | Priority Regions for Development |
| **RCOP** | Regional Competitiveness Operational Programme |
| **RDA** | Regional Development Agency |
| **RELEX** | Commission for External Relations (the CoR) |
| **SABEK** | Samsun Bölgesel Ekonomik Kalkınma (Samsun Regional Development Council) |
| **SAPARD** | Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development |
| **SEA** | Single European Act |
| **SMC** | Sectoral Monitoring Committee |
| **SNA** | Subnational Administration |
| **SODEM** | Sosyal Demokrat Belediyeler Derneği (Union of Social Democratic Municipalities) |
| **SPO** | State Planning Organization (Ministry of Development since 2011) |
| **SPSS** | Statistical Package for the Social Sciences |
| **TAIEX** | Technical Assistance and Information Exchange |
| **TEPAV** | Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı (Economic Policy and Research Foundation) |
| **TUSIAD** | Türkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) |
| **TUSKON** | Türkiye İş Adamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey) |
| **TUIK** | Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Statistical Institute) |
| **UNDP** | United Nations Development Programme |
| **UTM** | Türkiye Belediyeler Birliği (Union of Turkish Municipalities) |

# INTRODUCTION

This research seeks to examine the political effects of Europeanization in Turkey with special reference to changing territorial relations between three administrative levels: supranational, national and subnational. This is analytically captured by the students of *multi-level* governance. In examining the EU’s regional and structural fund policies, particularly through its principle of ‘partnership’, the MLG scholars have offered a multi-level and multi-actor paradigm including both vertical and horizontal dimensions on the system of EU governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Bache, 2008). While the vertical dimension highlights the importance of interactions across different levels of actors or institutions, the horizontal dimension refers to the participation of public authorities, private actors and third sectors to problem-solving mechanisms (Benz & Eberlein, 1999). Given its official candidate status to the EU since the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey has unsurprisingly been exposed to the impact of Europeanization in the context of regional policy and structural funds. This impact has challenged the long-established centralized system of Turkish governance and led to the need for a set of reforms in order to adapt its regional policy in line with EU standards (e.g. the adoption of the NUTS system and the creation of regional development agencies).

Although several reforms adopted in Turkey have brought about horizontal change in administrative space as well as vertical change through different territorial tiers since it met with the EU adaptation process in 1999, this research is less concerned with the change in the horizontal dimension than it is in explaining the change in the vertical dimension. With regard to change in the vertical dimension, the research proposes a distinction between changes *‘within’* and *‘beyond’* the national jurisdiction. For the former case, given the EU’s redistributive and regulative nature, there is a direct and top-down effect of Europeanization: providing resources, a new set of rules, and procedures for the formulation and implementation of regional development policies and structural funds (Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004: 316). Here, EU norms and conditionality play a significant role in the very emergence of regions as functional units of territorial self-governance within applicant states, in some instances acting as a catalyst for the domestic reform process (Brusis, 2002: 553). As for the latter case, beyond conditionality, the pressure to establish effective institutional frameworks and strategic objectives that facilitate engagement in the EU has shaped territorial groups’ behaviour both during the accession process and since their respective nation states have become members of the EU (Moore, 2008b: 213). At this point, the effect of Europeanization is rather indirect because the EU only creates opportunity structures in terms of informational, strategic and ideational spheres and provides passive leverage for subnational administrations (SNAs). It is entirely dependent on the organizational capacity (i.e. finance, experts and leadership) of a given SNA to exploit these opportunities.

A vertical change beyond the national jurisdiction is, however, centrally important for this research in order to examine the interplay between the process of Europeanization and mobilisation of SNAs from Turkey. By making such a distinction, this research addresses its main question of *how* the process of Europeanization has changed the behaviour of SNAs in Turkey and mobilized their interests within a broader political game across the EU arena. The main reason for choosing Turkey as an empirical focus is to demonstrate the extent to which direct and indirect effects of Europeanization can lead a candidate country with long-standing centralization, weak subnational administrations, no history of regional governance and comparatively low EU membership credibility to shift towards a multi-level modality. More importantly, there is little research into the impact of Europeanization on SNAs in Turkey and their activities vis-à-vis EU matters (discussed below).

To explore EU activities at subnational level, a burgeoning literature has emerged around what has been termed ‘subnational mobilisation’ (Hooghe, 1995), ‘territorial representations’ (Moore, 2008a), ‘third-level politics’ (Bullmann, 1997), and ‘the growing engagement of subnational governmental actors with the institutions and process of EU policymaking’ (Jeffrey, 2000). Despite these apparent differences in language, the analytical frameworks that such studies draw on are generally similar. All of these refer to the growing number of contacts established between subnational actors in Europe and the European institutions in order to pursue economic, political and cultural activities through using different ‘extra-state channels’ in Brussels (Hooghe, 1995; Jeffrey, 2000). The research, nonetheless, prefers to use the term ‘subnational mobilisation’ in order to hold consistency throughout the thesis.

Before outlining in more detail the basic ideas and arguments to come in the following chapters, a brief conceptual clarification is necessary. To begin with, the research sticks to the narrow definition of a subnational administration as a politico-administrative unit below the central level. By the concept of subnational mobilisation, a collection of processes is meant which progress from greater awareness of European legislation, growing willingness to search for European finance, networking with other European local authorities and experts, direct lobbying of Brussels institutions, and the influence of EU ideas on subnational policy making (John, 2000). The research describes these processes from four stages of subnational mobilisation (discussed below). The usages of subnational mobilisation here by no means refer to any ethnic or ethno-cultural activity beyond the national jurisdictions.

Although a number of articles and books on Europeanization and multi-level governance with reference to subnational mobilisation in EU member (and candidate) states have been published, the wider analysis of the secondary literature illustrates that there are still important aspects of analysis that need further investigation, particularly for the applicant states. Accordingly, the analytical interest of this research is triggered by the following theoretical and empirical observations.

## THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RATIONALE

The research employs Europeanization as an analytical framework. It has become a fertile analytical ground to explain the domestic changes in member (and candidate) states (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Graziano & Vink, 2007). Yet theoretical development and definitional contestation in the literature has run far ahead of detailed empirical testing (Bache & George, 2006). This empirical-driven research focusing on the adaptation of one candidate state to EU regional policy is a good example for examining the *direct* and *indirect* effects of Europeanization (Grabbe, 2001; 2003; Hughes *et al.*, 2004). This is because the adaptation to the EU’s regional policy is one of those areas where Europeanization not only affects the domestic system of intergovernmental relations (Jeffrey, 1997a; 2000; Bullmann, 1997; Börzel, 2002; Bursens, 2007); it also promotes particularly unitary states to shift towards more compound polities by promoting multi-level governance (Bache, 2008). Furthermore, as detailed in the following chapters, it does have consequences for domestic processes of societal interest formation, aggregation and representation as well as affecting SNAs in order to strive to channel their interests into the European policy-making process (Marks & McAdam, 1996).

Within the perspective sketched above, one needs to elucidate the direct and indirect aspects of the impact of EU regional policy in order to make an accurate judgment on the creation of multi-level modality in member (and candidate) states. Studies on EU-Turkish relations have so far touched upon the changing intergovernmental relations in Turkey with specific reference to its regionalization process in terms of the polity and policy dimension of Europeanization (Dulupçu, 2005; Ertugal, 2005; 2011; Okçu *et al.,* 2006; Lagendijk *et al.*, 2009). Given that the mobilisation of SNAs and their increasing significance within the EU polity is one of the fundamental aspects of MLG (Marks, 1993; Hooghe, 1996), the effects on the behaviour of Turkish SNAs towards the EU accession process have been largely neglected. On the other hand, a number of scholars have mostly chosen their empirical case selection from the EU-15 countries (Keating & Jones, 1995; Jeffrey, 1997b; 2000; Moore, 2008a, 2011; Tatham, 2008; 2010), and later from CEECs (Kungla & Kettunen, 2005; Scherpereel, 2007; Sapala, 2008; Moore, 2008b; Tatar, 2009; Brusis, 2010) to analyse the extent to which SNAs from these states have adapted themselves to exploit the EU opportunities or engaged with the EU politics. Yet again there is no work on the situation of SNAs from the current candidates, viz. Croatia[[1]](#footnote-1) and Turkey. This empirical hiatus, particularly for the Turkish case, suggests a lack of systematic information to bring to bear on what has been changing at a subnational level as a response to the country’s Europeanization process.

A second observation drives us a little further into the research design because there is a dominance of the top-down research design in the extant literature (Bursens & Deforche, 2008). By way of contrast, a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization has recently gained more credit from scholars (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009; 2010; McCauley, 2011). What Radaelli (2004) proposes is that Europeanization should not be constructed as ‘something that explains (*explanans*) but rather something to be explained (*explanandum*) by mainstream social science. The approach taken here puts more emphasis on the latter, which conceives Europeanization as an action framework, a confining and influencing context, rather than a phenomenon that may be singled out, operationalized and explained (Bolgherini, 2007). By utilizing such an approach, Europeanization of territorial organizations in this research is defined as ‘*redirection and reorientation of SNAs’ activities, not only towards national institutions but also towards supranational institutions, politics, and/or the policy-making process’*[[2]](#footnote-2).

The bottom-up perspective on Europeanization provides several advantages for students of EU politics. Primarily, instead of analysing ‘effects of causes’, and attributing them to EU level developments, one may examine ‘causes of effects’, which lead, facilitate or obscure subnational mobilisation. This is because the bottom-up research design reverses the process, and therefore researchers are able to start with domestic changes and trace back causal chains to identify the underlying triggers (McCauley, 2011). This allows one to investigate the possible causes of observed domestic change, that is, ‘causes of effects’. In other words, it may offer a chance to examine potential explanatory (independent) factors and potential intermediating variables at the domestic level, which are critical for subnational mobilisation beyond the national setting.

The research identifies three sets of variables, i.e. dependent, independent and intermediating, in order to appreciate fully how Europeanization takes place as well as to model the *bottom-up* perspective on subnational mobilisation towards the EU arena. The dependent variable is the mobilisation of Turkish SNAs towards the EU arena. Independent variables consist of the pull factors of the opportunity structures (e.g. multiple access points and receptiveness to SNAs’ claims) and voluntary mechanisms (e.g. learning, lesson-drawing) as well as the push factors of resource capabilities (e.g. organizational capacity and leadership). Finally, there are intermediating variables at domestic, national and subnational levels through which independent variables (resource pull, resource push and learning) are shaped, obstructed or facilitated. It is because the national context and to some extent EU level developments define an opportunity structure but they do not determine the ultimate outcome.

The third point is related to the Europeanization study for the candidate states. Studies have generally focused on macro level changes in accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria, and been confined to the conditionality/compliance dichotomy under asymmetrical relations (Hughes *et al.,* 2004). The Turkish case was not an exception as it has been usually evaluated within the context of EU conditionality and characterized in a normative and legalistic manner. The research considers this trend within the first generation Europeanization research, which has a top-down characteristic and seeks to explain domestic change from EU pressures. Some scholars on the other hand suggest that conditionality is not sufficient to conceptualize the depth of European impact on the Turkish domestic arena as this has just linked with Turkey’s democratization and modernization processes (Tocci, 2005; Ertugal, 2010; Bölükbaşı *et al.*, 2010). Accordingly, the research finds the second generation Europeanization research valuable to account for the domestic change in a given policy domain (for further discussion about first and second generation Europeanization research see Chapter 1). Within this generation, one needs to pay considerable attention to changes in the behaviour of societal actors and ways of doing things as the asymmetric nature of the EU conditionality only helps to understand formal and normative changes, but may miss other factors, such as *voluntary mechanisms* and *bottom-up* *dynamics*, involved in this process. This research argues that changing territorial relations in Turkey may be a fertile ground to unveil these less formal and less observable changes in the applicant state as well as be able to reflect the changing behaviour of societal actors (SNAs for this research) through Turkey’s Europeanization process.

Related to the third point, the research also underlines the importance of temporality because it is generally overlooked in the extant literature. It is particularly important for a country like Turkey. Because of the inconsistent relations with the EU, the accession process in Turkey is always fluid and dynamic, sometimes progressive and other times regressive depending on the political atmosphere in the relations with the EU. This not only has consequences for national actors but also affects wider society in Turkey. As a result, the research offers a periodization about the impact of Europeanization on Turkey since the Helsinki Summit of 1999. These periods are *Europeanization as Democratization, Proto-Europeanization* and *Alaturka Europeanization*. Such a periodization is essential to reveal how continuity and change has developed for the subject under examination. Furthermore, it may illustrate that while the pull effect of Europeanization has gradually declined, the push factors coming from the organizational capacity and leadership have become prominent, particularly during the Alaturka Europeanization period.

The final point, yet no less important, is about the subnational mobilisation literature, which generally tends to focus on the activities beyond the national context, particularly the activities of SNAs in Brussels through their established liaison offices, to demonstrate subnational mobilisation. The research does not restrict itself to the liaison offices in Brussels to reveal whether there is subnational mobilisation or not. It conversely includes other EU-related activities, which may support the mobilisation of SNAs (e.g. applying EU fund programs, changes in organizational arrangements, transnational activities and vertical channels). Drawing insights from Peter John’s (2001) ‘Ladder Model for Europeanization of Governance’ (see Chapter 4), the four stages for subnational mobilisation are proposed. According to this, what happens in an SNA between the input of an EU stimulus and an output that encourages mobilisation may be described in four stages: growing awareness at local level; changes in organizational arrangements; engagement with transnational activities with their equivalent in the EU; and conducting EU level activities through vertical mobilization. These stages are evaluated throughout the empirical chapters in order to capture the degree of Europeanization on Turkish SNAs.

To summarise, the two main criteria for selecting our research topic and research questions are related to (1) understanding real world phenomena such as the Europeanization of territorial relations in one candidate country and the mobilisation of SNAs from that candidate country towards the EU arena; and (2) seeking to contribute to scholarly literature that deals with the aforesaid phenomena. The presentation of an initial contact with the literature and the justification of the topic selection have brought us to exposing our research interest. In the remainder of this chapter, a short overview of the research objectives and main (and sub-) questions will be given, before finishing with the description of the research plan by chapters.

## SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH INTERESTS AND QUESTIONS FOR THE THESIS


The essence of this research is to explore the interplay between the process of Europeanization and the mobilisation of SNAs from the applicant states during their accession period. The bulk of the research data for the assessment of the subject matter is derived from the analysis of: official documents; a cross-sectional survey analysis of 85 SNAs; 67 semi-structured interviews with relevant actors in Brussels and in Turkey; and of relevant secondary sources. These are also supplemented by in-depth case studies within three selected cities (Samsun, Diyarbakir and Izmir). By employing mixed method strategies in a single thesis offers wide-ranging approach in terms of its methodology and theoretical assessment to examine the formal and informal effects of Europeanization.

The dependent variable of the research is as follows: s*ubnational* mobilisation *across the EU arena (the euro-engagement of subnational administrations).*

Based on a comparative analysis across cities and organizations, the main inquiry under scrutiny in this research is: *How has Europeanization (via regional policy and related financial incentives) produced an impact bringing about* mobilisation *of Turkish subnational administrations across the EU arena after the Helsinki Summit of 1999?*

Empirically, focusing on the EU’s regional policy and its financial instruments, the research aims to reveal many examples of how SNAs have responded to the EU accession process. The research utilizes three different bodies of literature: Europeanization, multi-level governance and the domestic politics approach. In this regard, it first investigates the extent to which Europeanization has changed the dynamics of intergovernmental relations in Turkey (Chapter 6). Secondly, focusing on the subnational level, the research analyses how SNAs have responded to the perceived impact of Europeanization (Chapter 7). Thirdly, whether or not changes have provided opportunity structures for Turkish SNAs in order to mobilize across the EU arena by engaging with horizontal (e.g. transnational links) and vertical channels (e.g., the EU institutions, interregional organizations, and liaison offices in Brussels) (Chapter 8). Finally, concentrating on the selected three cities, the research examines under what conditions Europeanization contributes to the mobilisation efforts of some SNAs. In so doing, it seeks to reveal the importance of potential intermediating factors at subnational level (Chapter 9).

The approach taken here suits a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization, suggesting a new research agenda in Turkish-EU relations. It combines the pull factors of the opportunity structures and voluntary mechanisms and the push factors of resource capabilities (i.e. organizational capacity and leadership) with the domestic intermediating variables (constitutional-legal framework, the historical legacy, regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relationship and the pre-existing territorial network).



The research also has some sub-questions to guide its main goal. These are as follows:

1. What kind of changes have Turkish SNAs gone through in order to adapt themselves to the effects of Europeanization?
2. Under what conditions do the effects of Europeanization make SNAs mobilize across the EU arena?

Overall, the main argument is that the level of subnational mobilisation is mainly determined by specific independent variables (resource pull, resource push and voluntary mechanisms), while it is facilitated and/or restricted by specific intermediating variables at national and subnational levels. The findings suggest a weak pull effect of the EU accompanied by strong gatekeeping of the Turkish national government. As a result, push factors deriving from organizational capacity as well as voluntary mechanisms (learning and lesson-drawing) have played a significant role in the mobilisation of Turkish SNAs across the EU arena. The main finding of this research is therefore close to those scholars who put more emphasis on subnational dynamics rather than national and EU contexts. Yet an assessment of motivation for subnational mobilisation from a domestic perspective (bottom-up) is lacking in extant studies. This research therefore seeks to provide a more accurate account of the nature of subnational mobilisation in Brussels through an analysis of a *bottom-up* perspective within the context of the Europeanization of Turkish SNAs. The time span considered covers the first programming cycles of pre-accession funds (2000-2006) and the first phase of the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) (2007-2013).

## 

## THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis consists of eleven chapters including introduction and conclusion. The introduction offers an overall framework for the research; outlines the content, empirical and theoretical rationales of the research and presents the main (and sub-) questions of the research. The introductory part also presents some definitions to provide coherence throughout the research.

The first chapter presents the analytical framework of the thesis. It starts with broadly defining Europeanization in terms of its origin, evolution and usages, and then attempts to find out which usage of Europeanization best understands the subject matter. After defining the analytical framework, the chapter puts the Europeanization research into a Turkish context and concludes with the research implications of the chosen model.

The second chapter presents the main argument of integration theories on the issue of subnational mobilisation in the EU arena and presents multi-level governance and domestic politics approaches, which also inform the theoretical discussion for the research.

The third chapter is the methodology part of the thesis. It outlines the methods in Europeanization literature and elaborates a *bottom-up* perspective on Europeanization as a research design of the thesis. It finally turns to define the research methodology and research methods: document analysis, cross-sectional survey analysis, semi-structured interviews and in-depth case studies.

The fourth chapter reviews the literature on MLG and its applicability to subnational mobilisation and (functional) territorial interest representations at the EU level. The chapter begins with a brief review of the literature in order to place this study in its proper perspective. The chapter then presents the EU activities of SNAs by giving examples of the channels for SNAs on the EU level. Finally, it proffers the four stages of subnational mobilisation.

The fifth chapter examines the domestic context of SNAs in Turkey to find out whether it constructs necessary opportunity structures for them to mobilize across the EU arena. Therefore, it seeks to understand the scope, nature and evolution of the subnational level in Turkey by introducing its administrative system and legal context, and presenting key historical developments and actors/institutions that are involved in the regional/local governance system in Turkey. It then sheds light on the potential intermediating variables at subnational level and seeks to find out how these variables affect the mobilisation efforts of SNAs.

The sixth chapter turns its attention to the formal and direct effect of Europeanization in Turkey with special reference to regional and structural fund policies. In so doing, the chapter outlines the manner in which EU conditionality on accession helped to shape the regional process, change territorial relations between national and subnational levels and create new opportunity structures for SNAs. This is essential to unveil the impact of the formal realms of Europeanization on Turkish governance. In the final section, the limits for *multi-level* modality in Turkey are analyzed since these limits are considered as the main obstacles for subnational mobilisation in Brussels.

The seventh chapter presents the empirical findings from the cross-sectional survey analysis to demonstrate the extent to which EU regional policy (via pre-accession funds) has contributed to the changes in internal arrangements of SNAs. The chapter analyses the first two stages of subnational mobilisation: growing awareness and changes in organizational arrangements. It also examines the importance of leadership and shows the types of leadership in Turkish SNAs.

The eighth chapter takes the issue from the internal reorganization of SNAs for dealing with EU matters to their EU-wide activities through horizontal and vertical channels. These are the last two stages of subnational mobilisation. As well as reflecting on the findings from interviews, the chapter continues to report the findings of the survey. It therefore outlines the horizontal activities of SNAs with their opposite numbers in other member or candidate countries and examines vertical mobilisation through EU and non-EU channels.

The ninth chapter explores how subnational intermediating factors play a role during the mobilisation of some selected SNAs from Samsun, Diyarbakir and Izmir. It then analyses the contrasts and similarities among these SNAs in regard to the four stages of subnational mobilisation.

The conclusion summarizes the main argument, answers the research questions, explains the contribution of this thesis to the wider literature and finally makes suggestions for future studies. Overall, the research aims to contribute to the three different literatures, Europeanization, multi-level governance and domestic politics by analyzing the transformation of state with a specific reference to the issue of subnational mobilization. In so doing, it contributes to our empirical and theoretical understandings by ‘bringing the subnational politics’ back in by emphasising region-specific factors in shaping the nature and extent of mobilisation.

# CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: EUROPEANIZATION

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the key theoretical and conceptual contributions for the research inquiry and reveals how Europeanization is utilized throughout the research. It therefore attempts to provide an overview of this literature and its contribution to the research objectives. The primary aim is to investigate the extent to which Europeanization has changed the behaviour of subnational, local and regional administrations (hereafter, collectively, SNAs) in member (and candidate) states and mobilized their territorial interests within a broader political game across the EU arena. The concern is not to find out *why* Europeanization matters but instead to explore *how* and *under what conditions* it matters, focusing on the impact of Europeanization on the issue of subnational mobilisation in one applicant state.

The chapter proceeds in the following way; the first part sets out the major elements and background of the Europeanization literature as well as explaining the institutionalist sources of Europeanization. The second part determines the usage of Europeanization and considers both the formal and informal realm of EU governance with special reference to first and second generation Europeanization. The third part analyses the Europeanization in accession context in reference to the changing territorial politics. Finally, the chapter introduces the new research generation of Europeanization in Turkey and presents a periodization since the Helsinki Summit of 1999.

## ORIGINS AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENTS

From a political science perspective, Ladrech’s (1994) work may be seen as a reference point for the Europeanization studies. After him, the literature has extended the scope and usage, thus it has become ‘an academic growth industry’ (Olsen, 2007: 68). Its meanings vary according to the theoretical perspective adopted and the subject area chosen (Quaglia *et al.*, 2007: 406). Yet the plurality in the use of different approaches and methods leaves the field looking somewhat disorderly; it also casts doubt on the extent to which the term has genuinely added value to better-established approaches to understanding the construction and operation of the EU (Olsen, 2002; Bache & Jordan, 2006: 17).

In addressing the complexity in the field, Mair (2004: 338) observes that the concept of Europeanization remains poorly and confusingly defined. His observation is essential but, as Olsen (2002) reminds us, it does not really matter what Europeanization is, but whether and how it can be useful for appreciating the dynamics of the evolving European polity. By tracing different definitions and their usage in the respective research from 1981 to 2001, Featherstone (2003: 5) identified four broad classifications of areas covered: as an historical process; as a matter of cultural diffusion; as a process of institutional adaptation; and as the adaptation of policy and politics. For Bulmer (2007: 48), these areas suggest competing (temporal, sociological and institutional) research agendas. Bulmer and Burch (2000) as well as Bulmer and Lequesne (2005: 13) prefer a relatively straightforward classification for the impact of Europeanization, namely upon policy, polity and politics. Although the analytical separation among the three dimensions of domestic adaptation is worth emphasizing, in reality, European policies, processes and institutions tend to affect not only one but two or all three dimensions at the same time (Börzel, 2005: 49).

Regardless of which dimensions are taken and how Europeanization is defined, scholars generally agree on several points. These are crucial for this research in order to reflect the general understanding on the literature. At first, Europeanization impacts on member (and candidate) states and domestic change is brought about by EU membership (or the prospect of membership) (Bache, 2008: 15). In the context of EU enlargement, conditionality is considered the primary mechanism of Europeanization (Hughes *et al.*, 2004: 164) and highlights ‘the asymmetrical relations between the EU and the applicant states’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). This underlines that candidate states are not able to upload their preferences or interests to shape EU policy-making (Sedelmeier, 2011). Considering Turkey’s candidacy status, it is difficult, albeit not impossible, to assess bottom-up (uploading) Europeanization[[3]](#footnote-3).

Second, the degree and direction of change is differential and so is the domestic impact of Europeanization (Cowles *et al.*, 2001, Heritier & Knill, 2001; Knill & Lehmkul, 2002). Such a differential impact may be explained in terms of factors at both EU and national level (Kassim, 2005: 286). At the European level, developments do not always prescribe specific forms of institutional adaptation but leave considerable leeway to domestic actors and institutions. For the national level, European signals are interpreted and modified through domestic traditions, institutions, identities and resources in ways that limit the degree of convergence and homogenization (Olsen, 2002). In other words, pre-existing domestic structures and internal developments as intermediating variables are likely to have an important intermediating effect on external pressures (Bache & Marshall, 2004). This will be taken up in the next chapter.

Empirical cases justify the differential impact of European requirements on domestic policies (Heritier & Knill*,* 2001), polities (Bache *et al.*, 2011) and politics (Ladrech, 2010). Cowles *et al.* (2001:1) conclude that Europeanization affects every country but domestic adaptation with national colours and national features continues to play a role in shaping outcomes[[4]](#footnote-4). As a result of a differential impact on the domestic arena, the responses and outcomes to the Europeanization process do not lead to any ‘harmonization’ but to ‘clustered convergence’ (Radaelli, 2004). The presence of intermediating factors explains the variations among member (and candidate) states. One may predictably expect responses to the effects or the outcomes of the Europeanization process to vary across member (and candidate) states[[5]](#footnote-5).

The differential impact is particularly the case in the context of the changing role and scope of SNAs in intergovernmental relations in the EU. EU cohesion policy is one of the biggest avenues for development funding and is seen as the major policy sphere because of its significant implications for the regional economic development of the member (and candidate) states (see Chapter 4). However, there is no prescription or template to implement the domains of regional policy and structural funds in a given national setting (discussed below). Accordingly, even if the EU triggers a process of regionalisation in general and subnational mobilisation in particular, the outcomes have been limited, shaped and/or designed by the intermediating factors at domestic—national and subnational—level.

The final consensus lies in the epistemological dimension. Given the lack of a single grand theory, the value of new institutionalism is essential in Europeanization research (Olsen, 2002). Scholars generally agree that the Europeanization literature is institutionalist by nature[[6]](#footnote-6). Bulmer (2007: 51) even went so far as to state that ‘an awareness of the new institutionalism is indispensable for understanding how Europeanization is theorized’. A brief description of the major approaches in new institutionalism is required at this point in order to make the rest of the discussion more comprehensible.

**The Institutionalist Sources of Europeanization**

Three variants of the new institutionalism, rational-choice, sociological and historical institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Hay, 2002: 12), are usually employed by the students of EU studies. The analytical tools of new institutionalism are important for analysing the impact of Europeanization on domestic politics in general and the creation of multi-level governance structure in particular. The foremost reason is that an institution-focused approach may provide a better understanding of the independent and intermediating variables of this research. As Checkel informs us (2001:20-21), institutions can be both intermediating and independent variables as in the case of sociological and historical institutionalism, or solely be an intermediating variable as in the case of rational choice institutionalism. Institutionalism is crucial when it comes to identifying the intermediating variables that constrain and facilitate the actors’ behaviour (Dobre, 2007:47). Yet this research holds the view that they not only shape the process and outcomes of political strategies but also exert an independent or intermediating influence on political outcomes (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 7).

For the rationalist strand, Europeanization is conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure offering some actors additional economic, legal and political resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals (Börzel, 2002; Sedelmeier, 2011). Actors are rational, goal-oriented and purposeful and thus they follow the cost-benefit calculation (i.e. the logic of consequentialism). Given that institutions are regarded as opportunity structures or veto points, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005:11-12) examine whether conditionality changes the domestic opportunity structure in favour of the domestic actors in candidate states. This is a good point, yet requires further explanations— specifically for the role of SNAs in this emerging opportunity structure and their relationships with the national and supranational levels.

The triad of integration theories, liberal/intergovernmentalist, supranationalist and MLG, what Börzel (2002:20-22) identifies as resource-dependency approaches, conceive of the EU as a new political opportunity structure. Each integration theory came up with diverse outcomes with regard to the role and state of SNAs in the EU integration process (Anderson, 1990; Bache, 1998). In the case of the liberal intergovernmentalist argument, Europeanization underpins the power of national governments vis-à-vis other domestic actors. Supranationalist claims exactly the opposite view that the EU opportunity structure weakens the role of member (and candidate) states and therefore domestic actors, namely SNAs, are able to bypass their respective governments by establishing direct relations with European institutions. In contending the long-established national versus supranational debate, multi-level governance literature does not expect either a withering away of the state, or its obstinate resilience (see Chapter 2).

In light of the above disagreements, Börzel (2002) maintains the idea that the rational-institutionalist or resource dependency approach by itself appears to be indeterminate as to which actors benefit most from the EU-induced redistribution of power resources. Some scholars therefore considered that how far domestic actors are able to exploit new opportunities depends on their previous resources and identities provided by domestic institutions (Cowles *et al.*, 2001: 11). This leads one to add the organizational capacity of SNAs as an independent factor with origins in the ‘logic of consequentiality’ within the rational institutionalist strand (Bursens & Deforche, 2008). In attributing the organizational capacity as an independent variable, the research holds the view that the rational institutionalism in the sense of the pull effect of the EU opportunity structures are vital for designing the independent variables. However, considering the dependent variable of this research, that is, the mobilisation of Turkish SNAs across the EU arena, two important aspects of opportunity structures need to be emphasized.

For Princen and Kerremans (2008), the first is a structural aspect. This relates to the openness of a political system and the ease of access for political actors. The second concerns the receptivity of the political system to the claims of those political actors. Some scholars additionally examine that shifts to the EU are to be expected when political opportunities at the EU level are more favourable than those domestically (Della Porta & Kriesi, 1999: 17). As seen in the empirical analysis, the EU has indeed created opportunity structures and multiple-entry points for the mobilisation of Turkish SNAs (see Chapter 8). The key point here is that the use of opportunity structures depends on the organizational resources and capabilities that those groups have (Marks & McAdam, 1996: 112). These resources and capabilities determined in this research as *push factors* include the organizational capacity (i.e., financial capability, experts) and leadership (see Chapter 7). The creative and resourceful SNAs have had a chance to exploit these opportunities presented by the EU, as long as their organizational capacity permits them to do so. In short, opportunity structures are necessary but not a sufficient condition (Princen & Kerremans, 2008:1133). It should be weighted with the actors’ capacities to exploit the opportunities presented by the process of Europeanization.

Sociological variance conversely emphasizes that the response of domestic actors follows a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Sedelmeier, 2011). This logic implies that choices are made according to what is regarded as socially valuable and acceptable rather than a rational logic of consequence (March & Olsen, 1996:252; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 949). Socialization and learning are therefore significantly relevant for the EU cadre in domestic administrative systems because they are concerned with the realm of norms, ideas, discourse, organizational culture and the psychology of politics (Bulmer, 2007: 53). True, institutions may provide opportunities or incentives to actors or even affect their preferences and identities thus facilitating or inhibiting structural change. They, however, cannot bring about change on their own. This is done by actors and in that sense the crucial actor-related process is learning (Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004:318-320).

The impact of Europeanization on the subnational level is most visible in increased learning; either from their own experiences in the past or from the similar experiences of other SNAs[[7]](#footnote-7). The research argues that both (learning through time and space) are cases for Turkish SNAs. The pre-existing territorial network has a considerable impact on the transmission of institutional memory during the creation of RDAs (for the cases of Samsun and Izmir see Chapter 9). The greater cooperation with each other and the mushrooming of transnational networks and community initiatives in the international context have also led many SNAs to learn from the experience of other SNAs on the EU level (see Chapter 8). Besides, SNAs and European institutions have been increasingly interacting, and therefore the former have adopted new practices, rules, resources through a process of experimental learning, imitation, and diffusion (Olsen, 2001). In such circumstances, one may need to stress that the EU occasionally may be involved in this learning process but in other cases actors may share knowledge, experiences and best practices through international networks without any influence from the EU institutions. As Checkel (2001:26) remarks, social learning is more likely a case where there is a high density of interaction among actors. All in all, learning along with the pull effect of the EU opportunity structures and the push effect of certain organizational capacities, are seen as another independent variable for this research. It has also an impact on actors’ behaviour for the issue of subnational mobilisation. Yet learning, imitating and lesson-drawing have been largely neglected in the subnational mobilisation literature (see Chapter 4).

Bache (2008: 13-14) discusses that for each account (rational choice and sociological institutionalism) learning is seen to be a feature of change, but has a different meaning in each. Radaelli (2003:52) discerns between thin and thick forms of learning. While the former refers to the readjustment of actor strategies to allow them to achieve unchanged goals in a new context or ‘how to get around an obstacle by using a menu of well-known responses in various ingenious ways’, thick learning involves a modification of actors’ values and thus a reshaping of their preferences and goals (ibid: 38). As an example, Ertugal (2010: 106) observes that both thin and thick learning processes occurred during the creation of regional development agencies in Turkey. For her, thin learning based on rational calculations on the part of politicians in power has been accompanied by an ongoing process of thick learning from the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Development[[8]](#footnote-8). The empirical analysis also evidently confirms that learning in both a rational and sociological sense is a case for explaining the mobilisation of some Turkish SNAs towards the EU arena (see Chapters 7, 8 and 9).

Historical institutionalism seems to be an eclectic approach by utilizing both rational and sociological accounts in order to specify the relationship between institutions and actors (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Historical institutionalists are first interested in explaining outcome and then they proceed to explore alternative explanations for the outcomes they observed (Steinmo, 2001). The idea of path dependency is the central explanatory principle for the historical institutionalists, though they are also interested in the ideas that help to shape and to sustain the directions of policy (Peters, 2000:3). Historical institutionalism highlights that institutions over time become path dependent. They are also characterized by the stickiness of both institutional and policy arrangements where one may observe broad patterns of incremental change. This may be interrupted very occasionally by seismic events that trigger a critical juncture or punctuate the pre-existing equilibrium (Bulmer, 2007: 53). Accordingly, political developments and policy outcomes are regarded as being path dependent.

The path dependency here implies that SNAs in different national settings have faced diverse sets of opportunities and constraints because of the variety of institutional cultures (e.g., federal, devolved and centralized systems). Such differences clearly affect their behaviours across the EU arena and their engagement with the supranational institutions. Therefore, the EU activities of SNAs largely depend on the domestic institutions in which they are embedded. Although the EU offers similar political opportunity structures, powerful domestic actors in powerful states are more capable of exploring new European opportunities and avoiding additional constraints (Börzel, 2002: 4). For instance, constitutionally and administratively strong SNAs (i.e., German Länder) have better conditions than those SNAs entrenched in long statist state tradition such as Greece or Portugal.

Historical institutional scholars additionally point more directly at the temporal dynamics of change. This usage of historical institutionalism, however, does not target a counterpoint to the other two strands of new institutionalism, but highlights the potential significance of the temporal dimension in understanding institutional responses to the EU (Bache, 2008). In particular for the regional policy and structural fund regulations (management, appraisal, evaluation and monitoring), one may claim that there is a dynamic process involved. This suggests that not only does national context evolve, but also what is coming down from the EU level over the course of time (i.e. partnership principle, see Chapter 4). Accordingly, if Turkey were in this situation 20 years ago, it would have had different experiences. Similarly, if Turkey was the same, the EU would be different or EU policies, requirements and experiences dissimilar. One direct result is that the timing of accession states intersecting with the EU’s policies is crucial in explaining outcomes. This underlines the prominence of temporality (e.g. timing and tempo). Therefore, the research finds it useful to make a periodization about the impact of Europeanization on Turkey since the Helsinki Summit of 1999, in order to reveal how continuity and change has developed for the subject under examination (discussed below).

Summing up, this is not a study to theorize about institutions, which has been done successfully elsewhere[[9]](#footnote-9). The need is basically to reveal how to combine the theoretical concerns with the empirical analysis, which is what this thesis is aiming for. Accordingly, the research draws insights from both rationalist (opportunity structure) and sociological logics (social learning), and refers to the historical dimension when it is relevant. As Bache (2008:13) highlights, an appreciation of the new institutionalism is helpful in understanding the relationship between Europeanization and multi-level governance through EU cohesion policy. Likewise, a number of theoretically-informed studies of the Europeanization of candidate countries are generally set within the framework of institutionalist theory (Grabbe, 2001; 2003; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). As far as Europeanization is concerned in any empirical study, it is mostly employed with some type of institutional analysis. Scholars usually distinguish two institutional logics, the logic of consequentiality and of appropriateness, whilst applying an institutional account to Europeanization research (Cowles *et al.,* 2001). The two logics need not be mutually exclusive, they may be seen as part of a synthetic theoretical framework for Europeanization (Börzel & Risse, 2003).

## DETERMINING THE USAGE OF EUROPEANIZATION

The discussion to this point has concentrated on the common issues within the Europeanization literature and on the value of new institutionalism for the subject matter. There are still several conceptual and methodological challenges for the students of Europeanization seeking to analyse the EU-induced change on a given national setting (for the methodological challenges see Chapter 3). Despite the impact of the EU on the domestic change in member (and candidate) states, there is a risk of exaggerating the significance of Europeanization. This highlights the importance of definition and conceptual precision. The problem of concept stretching in Europeanization studies therefore runs some risks. To avoid this, Radaelli (2003) precisely suggests that Europeanization should not be confused with convergence, harmonization and/or political integration. While harmonization is an overt goal of European integration, convergence is one possible consequence of it. At this point, one may need to consider that convergence is not used synonymously with Europeanization because there is a distinction between a process and its consequences. While it is possible to observe convergence in various policy domains (or cases), there are, on the other hand, some other issues such as interest representation, subnational governance, subnational mobilisation; as Eising (2009) argues, the responses to European integration may be thoroughly differential.

The second challenge arises whether the selected scope of Europeanization is so broad as to stretch the concept of Europeanization beyond the limit of what is acceptable in the social sciences (Radaelli 2003: 28). In the literature, there is a tendency to separate the distinct usage of Europeanization. The most well-known separation breaks the literature into three traditional dimensions: top-down, bottom-up and two way relations. While top-down Europeanization examines the EU-induced change in member (and candidate) states, the bottom-up (uploading or shaping) approach shows that states are not passive downloaders, but also actively seek to upload their domestic preferences to the EU level. The integrated approach (two-way interactions) synthesizes the merits of top-down and bottom-up Europeanization (Börzel & Panke, 2010: 407). Some scholars tried to break down the literature into more than three traditional usages[[10]](#footnote-10). Despite these apparent differences in language, as Dyson and Goetz (2003: 14) put it, this is not evidence for the emergence of rival schools of thought but it could be useful to keep them in mind while seeking to map the field.

The research finds the categorization between first-generation and second-generation Europeanization studies made by Dyson and Goetz reasonably straightforward (cited in Bache & Jordan, 2006: 25). Within this categorization, the former emphasizes the more formal, observable consequences of membership (or prospect of membership), whereas the latter focuses on less formal and less observable changes. This rather points out the common distinction between formal (technical) adoption and informal (cognitive) adoption of conditionality for candidates (Hughes *et al.*, 2004). By taking this categorization, Bache and George (2006) systematize two generations of Europeanization research as follows:


**Table 1.1.**  Two Generations of Europeanization

Table 1.1 summarizes the discussions which have been covered so far. Yet, as a primary concern of this research, one still needs to determine in which cases one observes elements from first generation or second or both. To find a proper answer to this, the scope and content of policy (i.e. direct or indirect mechanisms) that is under scrutiny should be included. A policy domain is consequently another key point. It may not only help to distinguish the EU influence from other exogenous and endogenous factors but also observe the mechanisms of domestic change for the given national setting (i.e. opportunity structures; learning, and the like). The next section outlines the direct and indirect effect of Europeanization to examine the interplay between the multi-level governance and subnational mobilisation across the EU arena.

**Direct and Indirect Effect of Europeanization**

A clarification on whether the scope of research intersects with the direct or indirect policy of the EU is important in order to analyse the impact of Europeanization on the domestic arena. By the direct effect of EU policies, it is simply meant that the EU constructs a policy template derived from intergovernmental negotiation and the involvement of the Commission and the Parliament (Ladrech, 2010: 30). In line with this suggested template or prescription, member (and applicant) states are compelled to download resulting legislation(s). This is the general perspective of top-down Europeanization that the outcomes of domestic level developments in member (and candidate) states are affected by the EU level development. Such an understanding implies that if the EU were to be absent that a particular outcome would not occur (Haverland, 2006).

The top-down understanding of Europeanization has remained one of the influential research agendas to unveil the domestic effects of Europeanization (Ladrech 1994; 2010; Cowles *et al.*, 2001; Börzel & Risse, 2003). In this usage, Europeanization denotes the process and mechanisms by which European institution-building may cause change at the domestic level (Börzel & Risse, 2000:2). Consistent with the top-down tradition, other scholars define Europeanization as the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance associated with problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of European rules (Cowles *et al.,* 2001:3). Here, Europeanization is taken as an independent variable and emphasis is given on both the processes by which European integration is effected and the outcome of this change[[11]](#footnote-11).

Top-down Europeanization throws light on the conditions and casual mechanisms through which the EU triggers domestic change in its member states and in third countries (Börzel & Panke, 2010: 409). In examining the domestic impact of European policy making, Knill and Lehmkul (2002) present an analytical distinction between three mechanisms of Europeanization: institutional compliance, where the EU prescribes a particular model which is imposed on member states; changing opportunity structures, which leads to a redistribution of resources between domestic actors; and framing domestic beliefs and expectations, which alters the beliefs of domestic actors (on framing also see Radaelli, 2000). This model defined by Knill and Lehmkul is one of the most adopted mechanisms by Turkish scholars to their research designs (Bölükbaşı *et al.*, 2010: 469). Based on the new institutionalist account, the mechanism involves positive and negative integration and framing integration in terms of socialization and social learning.

While Knill and Lehmkul’s model continues to dominate the agenda among Turkish scholars, the single most approved model was developed by Cowles *et al.* (2001). As leading exponents of top-down Europeanization, they argue that different casual mechanisms can be channelled into two logics of domestic change. They introduced one of the most prominent models to account for domestic change: ‘goodness of fit’. It explains the divergence between European and national policies, institutions and processes on the one hand, and the existence of mediating factors or intermediating variables that filter the domestic impact of Europe on the other (Börzel, 2005: 50).

Börzel and Risse (2000:1) maintain that ‘misfit’ and ‘facilitating factors’ are two major conditions for expecting domestic changes in response to Europeanization. At one with two institutional logics, scholars mention two types of misfits by which Europe exerts adaptational pressure on the member (and candidate) states: ‘policy misfit’ and ‘institutional misfit’ (Cowles *et al.,* 2001; Börzel & Risse, 2003). The latter suits the purpose of this research as it suggests misfits in system-wide domestic structures, challenging domestic rules and procedures and the collective understanding attached to them (Börzel, 2005: 50). It is worth noting that even if institutional misfit may result in substantial adaptational pressure, it is less direct than policy misfit and its effects more likely to be long-term and incremental (Börzel & Risse, 2000: 7).

Scholars conceptualizing the goodness of fit approach operationalize their model in three steps. While the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance refers to the first step, the goodness of fit with domestic politics is assessed in the second step. In the third step, they use two ontologically distinct perspectives, the logic of consequentialism and of appropriateness, in order to conceptualize the adaptational process in response to Europeanization. The findings of Cowles *et al.* (2001) justify the importance of national factors as intermediating variables, which were firstly emphasized by Ladrech (1994). Cowles *et al.* (2001) designate five intermediating variables: multiple veto points in the domestic structure; facilitating formal institutions; a country’s organizational and policy making cultures; the differential empowerment of domestic actors and learning. They are supposed to interact with the so-called adaptational pressure.

The concept of fit/misfit can be generalized through many cases. Yet what some scholars disagree on is how can one apply the goodness of fit in the absence of adaptational pressure? Or how can one observe the goodness of fit, if there is a voluntary mechanism at work? As Radaelli (2003) argues, adaptational pressure is not the best predictor of how a country responds to Europeanization. He criticizes that the ‘goodness of fit’ framework is excessively structural and claims that there is not enough room for agency. True, actors are not completely neglected, but they act only in response to pressure. Instead, actors may alternatively choose and learn from Europe outside adaptational pressures (Radaelli, 2004). By indicating the sociological turn in EU studies, Woll and Jacquot (2010:113) suggest that to move beyond the misfit model to study not just institutional constraints, but also informal politics and the cognitive dimension of multi-level policy making, allows for an understanding of the instances of deliberative policy changes in the absence of adaptative pressures.

Other scholars have followed suit regarding the discussion of how valid misfit is as an explanatory factor (Knill & Lehmkul, 2002; Heritier & Knill, 2001). Heritier and Knill (2001: 288) found that Europeanization could occur without there being misfit. Bulmer (2007: 52) points out that the goodness of fit precondition itself better fits policy areas where the EU sets a policy template that has to be applied in the member states. However, the indirect policy, or what some other scholars name ‘policy coordination’ (Wallace, 2003) or ‘facilitated coordination’ (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005) reveals that there is no template or prescription to implement in a given national setting. While the mechanism of adaptation is clearer in the case of direct effects (e.g. environmental policy), indirect effects (e.g. the Open Method of Coordination) may introduce new mechanisms such as policy transfer, diffusion or lesson-drawing that are more difficult to detect (Graziano & Vink, 2007: 8-10).

The indirect mechanisms of Europeanization have indeed gained importance to achieve sustainable compliance processes and internationalization of norms. This is because the cross-national learning process is almost as important as the finance that SNAs receive. This process brings about the exchange of values and ideas about how politics works, challenging established orders and practices (Goldsmith, 2003: 128). For instance, as Keating (1995:16) argues, regions learn from each other about problems and policies, about how to organize for development and about the preparation of effective intelligence. After a period of rather naïve imitation, they may learn how to adapt each other’s experiences to their own cultures, institutions, traditions and problems (ibid). Accordingly, the process of spreading European institutions and principles outside Europe is experienced with ‘logic of the attractiveness of European prescriptions and normative standards and exposure to European reforms’ (Olsen, 2001).

In the recent tradition, the attractiveness of European normative standards is reflected in the accession strategies of the candidate countries and to some extent in certain non-member countries of the EU. Such changes in these countries have been captured by two different research agendas: the ‘external governance model’ (Lavenex, 2004, Lavenex *et al.*, 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelpfening, 2011) and the ‘transformative power of EU’ (Börzel & Risse, 2009). The former suggests that governance extends beyond EU member states, attributing a new perspective on the EU’s international role. The crucial criterion for external governance is the extension of the legal boundary of authority beyond institutional integration. In contrast to co-operation under an international agreement or convention, external governance takes place when parts of the acquis communautaire are extended to non-member states (Lavenex, 2004: 683).

Although the external governance approach has focused on the insufficiency of conditionality principles, it diverges from the aims of this thesis’ for two reasons. First of all, the external governance model has more merits in analyses of the EU’s immediate neighbour countries. This is because beyond membership or the prospect of membership, these countries are subject to other mechanisms which lead them to adapt their systems to EU standards (such as the European Economic Area, Swiss-EU bilateralism or European Union Neighbour Programs) (Lavenex *et al,*, 2009). Secondly, its empirical focus is usually on soft security politics which are the centre of national politics, such as the environment, internal affairs and energy politics (Lavenex, 2004) The external governance model is also more commonly applied to models of EU’s democracy promotion in the EU’s neighbourhood (Lavenex & Schimmelpfening, 2011). Moreover, there is no emphasis on the situations of changing territorial relations in the candidate or non-candidate countries, which is the focus of this research. As such, the interconnection of the Europeanization and multi-level governance literatures provides a more appropriate starting point for this thesis.

On the other hand, theories of the transformative power of the EU overlap with the second generation of Europeanization literature described in this thesis because of their emphasis on the diffusion of the EU’s ideas into member and candidate countries. In distinguishing cognitive and normative dimensions of ideas, Börzel and Risse (2009) define the different mechanisms of diffusion, such as instrumental rationality, normative rationality and communicative rationality. This research has placed a similar emphasis on the issue of diffusion of ideas, norms and policies by adapting the two mechanisms of learning: thin (instrumental logic) and thick (normative logic). However, the issue of learning in this research is but one of the various independent variables considered in this thesis (as in the context of ‘pulling effects’, incentivising subnational mobilization). However, there are also important push factors motivating subnational mobilizations. This is the main reason that the research argues that the impact of Europeanization on the behaviour of SNAs and their mobilization across the EU arena is explained by complex mechanisms that are top-down, horizontal and bottom-up, all suitably framed by the second generation Europeanization literature.

Overall, the external governance model and the transformative power of the EU support the idea that there is a need for a shift from first- to second-generation Europeanization within the wider EU context. In this respect, this research considers that the Europeanization of SNAs from a candidate state context provides the most appropriate framework to demonstrate this shift. As will be seen in the empirical analysis, according to many interview participants in Turkey, if there is dissatisfaction in certain existing policy areas, the EU does not need to exert influence on these policy domains because actors at both national and subnational levels will seek best practices from the EU context. Europeanization is therefore possible when no explicit EU guidelines exist since the EU is used as a platform for policy transfer (Bomberg & Peterson, 2000) or lesson-drawing (Rose, 1993; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Consequently, although actors are purposeful, they do not always have cost-benefit calculation in mind. As for the main purpose of this research, the scope includes both direct effects (implementation of European legislation) as well as indirect effects (horizontal effects of European integration). The next section outlines the Europeanization research in candidate states.

## EUROPEANIZATION RESEARCH IN CANDIDATE STATES

The impact of Europeanization on applicant states has become a vibrant developing field of study[[12]](#footnote-12). Several empirical studies have revealed that through the accession process, the EU has started to govern beyond its territory in accordance with the compliance for the EU requirements in terms of political, legal and administrative domains[[13]](#footnote-13) (Grabbe, 2001; Brusis, 2002; Bruzst, 2005; 2008; O’Dwyer, 2006). A number of studies have traditionally utilized the conditionality literature (coercive mechanism) to examine the direct and indirect effects of Europeanization, though some criticize the insufficient nature of the conditionality principles (Hughes *et al*., 2004).

Those researchers have exclusively concentrated on downward causation for two main reasons. Firstly, the asymmetrical nature of conditionality provides the EU more coercive routes of influence in the domestic policy-making processes of applicant states than in the EU-15 members. Secondly, but closely related to the first point, the applicant states have little impact on uploading capacity and therefore downloading is a common practice during the adaptation process (Sedelmeier, 2011). As Börzel (2010) posits, process and outcomes of Europeanization in applicant states (now the incumbent members) are different compared to the EU-15 because candidates must be Europeanized as a condition not a consequence of membership. This not only mitigates the domestic impact of the EU but also highlights the importance of historical trajectories and the peculiarity of the accession process.

The principle of conditionality is usually associated with a rational-choice institutionalism. As Bruzst (2008: 615) states, the EU sets the rules governing its structural fund policies, attaches positive and negative sanctions to these rules, and plays an active role in creating conditions that could improve the chances of participating regional and national players to successfully play a role in the framework of the structural fund programmes. The candidate states are therefore required to comply with the acquis on regional policy. While the members play a critical role at the beginning of the policy-making process and have a chance to intervene in every possible stage of this process, it is an irreversible and non-negotiable process for candidates because of the nature of asymmetrical relations (Diez *et al*., 2005). Therefore, Turkey, like other accession countries, has to download the EU’s demands.

Evidence from the experiences of previous applicant states has suggested that financial assistance, institutional ties and the membership prospect are major incentives for the EU to induce reforms in the candidate states. There is also rich literature identifying different causal mechanisms by which the EU instigates changes to the territorial structures and relations in candidate states. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005: 8-10) mainly focus on three mechanisms: external incentives, social learning and lesson-drawing. These mechanisms may be seen as the pull effect of the EU, which are associated with both a rationalist and sociological logic of institutionalism. Grabbe (2003: 312-317) alternatively offers an encompassing example of the Europeanization mechanisms by identifying five conditionality instruments: gatekeeping; benchmarking and monitoring; provision of legislative and institutional templates; aid and technical assistance; and advice and twinning. Not surprisingly, those approaches for analysing the causality between the Europeanization process and changes in candidate states differ with regard to the theoretical perspectives on which they are based, but also with regard to the type of domestic change they are focusing on. Such mechanisms range from conditionality based on a rational choice institutionalism to learning and lesson-drawing based on sociological assumptions.

**Europeanization of Territorial Politics in Candidate States**

For regional policy and institutional change on subnational levels of the candidate states, the analysis of the possible factors usually begins with the role played by EU regional policy and its financial incentives (Baun & Marek, 2008; Bache *et al*., 2011). Europeanization is usually conceived as an independent variable in regional policy relating to financial instruments. This means that the EU regional policy affects and challenges well-established structures within the domestic systems of governance. It additionally plays an important role in the administrative reform and devolution processes as well as improves the institutional capacity at the subnational levels within the candidate states[[14]](#footnote-14). In this context, some scholars have evaluated the entire transformation in territorial politics and relations in applicant states under the heading of multi-level governance (see Chapter 2). This has been largely seen as an outcome of the Europeanized regional policy process (Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004; Baun & Marek, 2008; Brusis, 2010; Bache *et al.*, 2011).

The connection between Europeanization and the creation of multi-level governance has become more apparent in the accession rounds of CEECs. To conform to EU regional policy, they have reconstructed their regional levels in conformity with the EU’s statistical standard for administrative units (NUTS)[[15]](#footnote-15) and created Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) corresponding to each NUTS II level (Bailey & De Propis, 2004; Brusis, 2002). In seeing these developments within the new entrants and applicant states, a burgeoning literature has clustered around a general explanation of the transformative powers of EU membership conditionality and on examination of what has been changing in the regional policy of accession countries as a result of Europeanization (Grabbe, 2001; 2003; Hughes *et al.,* 2004; Brusis, 2010). Consequently, the creation of the multi-level governance structure in member as well as in candidate states is largely derived from the domestic effects of Europeanization (Gualini, 2004; Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004).

Scholars have analysed two different aspects of Europeanization of polity dimensions (or domestic change) exclusively within the context of EU regional policy: the changing dynamics of intergovernmental relations between regional and national level through economic, social and political actors (Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004; Bache *et al.*, 2011); and the interplay between subnational and supranational actors in the form of subnational mobilisation (Hooghe, 1996). Both aspects are the complementary features of the MLG thesis in a given territorial context (see Chapter 2). What the notion of MLG in this research implies is that subnational, national and supranational authorities interact with each other in two ways: first, across different levels of government (vertical dimension); and second, with other relevant actors within the same level (horizontal dimension) (Benz & Eberlein, 1999; Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004).

The recent agenda of reforms in Turkish governance includes horizontal change in administrative space as well as vertical change (for instance see Okçu *et al.,* 2006; 2008; Ertugal, 2010; Bafoil & Kaya, 2009). Although the horizontal dimension is a complementary feature of the MLG thesis, this research is less concerned with the change in the ‘horizontal dimension’[[16]](#footnote-16) than it is in explaining the change in the vertical dimension. On the vertical dimension of MLG, a distinction between *‘vertical changes within the national jurisdiction’* and *‘vertical changes beyond the national jurisdiction’* may be proposed. This is a key aspect of this doctoral research and thus the understanding of Europeanization on the ‘redirection and reorientation of SNAs’ activities not only towards national institutions but also towards supranational institutions, politics and/or policy-making’ (McCauley, 2011:1020).

***Vertical changes within the national jurisdiction***

This dimension suggests a shift from the top-down hierarchical model to a mode of interactive decision-making process involving different actors from the horizontal and vertical levels, including non-state actors. The creation of RDAs and a shift from a traditional sectoralist and centralized regional policy to implementation of modern Western approaches of multi-level governance and endogenous regional development seemed to be a consequence of the Europeanization process (see Chapter 6). Needless to say that there is no specific template for regional governance in the EU. It only provides increased resources through redistribution and a new set of rules and procedures for the formulation and implementation of development policies. This offers much more flexibility in the practice of regional governance than the Europeanization hypothesis’s assumption of convergence would suggest. As a result of the template-free characteristic, a differentiated effect of Europeanization on this specific policy sphere depends strongly on the domestic context.

In addition to institutional changes at the subnational level, funds, a new set of rules, and procedures for the formulation and implementation of regional development policies are redistributed through the lower territorial level by the EU’s pre-accession fund programs. The redistributive policy of the EU has not only brought about a growing awareness through the EU projects, but it has also caused a number of SNAs to adjust their organizational settings (e.g. creating an EU unit or recruiting EU experts) in order to exploit EU opportunities (see Chapter 7).

***Vertical changes beyond the national jurisdictions***

Beyond conditionality, the pressure to establish effective institutional frameworks and strategic objectives that facilitate engagement in the EU has shaped the behaviour of SNAs both during the accession process and after their respective nation states have become members of the EU (Moore, 2008b: 213). It is because the adaption to the EU’s regional policy and its related structural funds presents new opportunities and access points for SNAs to interact directly with the EU institutions. This comes close to ‘subnational mobilisation’ at the European level (Hooghe, 1996). Here, the effect of Europeanization is rather indirect because the EU only creates opportunity structures in terms of informational, strategic and ideational spheres. It is entirely dependent on the organizational capacity (i.e. finance, experts and leadership) of a given SNA to exploit these opportunities. There are also several national/subnational intermediating factors, which facilitate or obstruct subnational mobilisation (see Chapter 2).

Taken together, the focus on the direct and indirect effect of Europeanization is observable at subnational level. While the *vertical changes within the national jurisdiction* suits first generation Europeanization (see Chapters 6 and 7), *vertical changes beyond the national jurisdiction* may be considered within the second generation Europeanization (see Chapters 8 and 9). However, each change within or beyond the national jurisdiction has usually resulted from EU requirements under regional policy and structural fund regulations, bringing about changes in territorial politics in many member (and candidate) states. The new territorial politics is captured by the proponents of the multi-level governance approach, which forms the discussion in the next chapter.

## A NEW RESEARCH GENERATION FOR TURKISH-EU RELATIONS

The Turkish case has generally been evaluated within the context of EU conditionality, which is characterized by a normative and legalistic manner (Bölükbaşı *et al*., 2010). Some scholars alternatively suggest that conditionality is not sufficient to pinpoint the depth of European impact on the Turkish domestic arena as it has just coupled with Turkey’s democratization process (Tocci, 2005; Müftüler-Baç, 2005). Ulusoy (2005) believes that ‘the European impact on Turkish politics is much more profound than the framework of conditionality and it goes to the core of the political structure in Turkey’. It may be the reason that Kaliber (2008) calls attention to a distinction between EU-ization as a formal alignment with the EU’s institutions, policies and legal structure and Europeanization in a wider context. In such a distinction, the latter makes references to other Europe-wide institutions and different societies’ diverse perceptions of and experiences with Europe. Therefore, there seems to be a new research generation regarding Turkish-EU relations to explain the domestic change in a given policy domain. Within this generation, one needs to pay considerable attention to changes in the behaviour of societal actors and ways of doing things. Since the asymmetric nature of EU conditionality only helps to understand formal and to a lesser extent normative changes, it may miss bottom-up dynamics involved in this process.

Bölükbaşı *et al.* (2010: 465) point out that political science in general and European studies in particular are relatively new fields of study in Turkey and that research in these fields has a tendency to be normative and legalistic rather than empirical. What they suggest is that an emerging sub-field of Europeanization can be the launch pad of less normative and more empirical and comparative case-study research on Turkey. This suggestion may be evaluated within the second generation Europeanization research. Another necessity for scholars within this so-called new generation of Europeanization studies is to focus on other societal actors whose interests have been disregarded throughout Turkish-EU relations. Some scholars, for instance, consider that Turkey’s aspiration for the EU was a top-down and elite driven project in which other societal actors have been excluded (Müftüler-Baç, 2005: 17; Tocci, 2005; Öniş, 2009). In seeing this, Diez *et al.* (2005) proffer four distinct types of Europeanization (policy-, political-, societal- and discursive-Europeanization). They argue that so far studies for the Turkish case have been largely confined to a policy and political Europeanization. There is nonetheless a need to discuss the impact of Europeanization on civil development and the role of civil society organizations in furthering other types of Europeanization.

Although Europeanization of regional policy in Turkey has been a subject of considerable academic attention since 2002, there is still a gap in analysing the preferences and behaviour of SNAs in these processes. Addressing this lacuna, the research argues that changing territorial relations and politics in Turkey may be a fertile ground to unveil this less formal and less observable change in one applicant state. It may also reflect the changing behaviour of societal actors, namely SNAs, through Turkey’s accession process. Against this background, the research focuses empirically on the EU’s regional policy and related pre-accession instruments and chooses Turkey as a case study whose political system contains elements of multi-level governance derived from the Europeanization effect. However, the caveat here is that the rhythm and impact of Europeanization on the Turkish domestic arena has not always been progressive but at times regressive. This highlights the importance of temporality. In order to account for the Europeanization of Turkish SNAs and their mobilisation across the EU arena, the next section discusses this caveat and offers a periodization regarding the trajectory of Turkish-EU relations since the Helsinki Summit of 1999.

**The Limits of Europeanization: A Need for Periodization?**

The domestic impact of Europeanization on Turkey has gradually evolved over the course of time. This has often resulted in the limitations of Europeanization in actual practice in Turkey. Such a gradual change may be analysed under three distinct periods after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 due to the nature of sources of changes and of the relations with the EU. These periods are as follows: *Europeanization as Democratization; Proto-Europeanization;* and *‘Alaturka’[[17]](#footnote-17) Europeanization*. Such periodization neither seeks to simplify the complex process of historical evolutions, nor aims to create artificial periods against continuity and change. The intention is simply to present how continuity and change in terms of territorial relations have developed after the Helsinki Summit of 1999.

Europeanization as Democratization is the period between the Helsinki Summit of 1999 to the first landslide election victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Turkish acronym) government in 2002. The main characteristic of this period covers the fragile coalition government, the economic crisis of 2001 and Turkey’s intensive democratization process in terms of human rights and the Kurdish issue. Although the impact of the EU on Turkish politics has been intensified by the early years in the post-Helsinki era, reforms mainly targeted the democratic improvement and human right issues rather than any direct (or explicit) changes to the role and functions of SNAs in the traditional Turkish governance structure. This suggests that the EU’s major concern was whether Turkey could fulfil the community’s political standards in line with the Copenhagen Criteria. Besides, in this period, the coalition government was highly fragmented with their perceptions regarding the EU-induced reforms. It is more likely that faced with Euro-sceptic and highly nationalist right-wing coalition partners, the Nationalist Action Party, in government, the Commission preferred to emphasize urgent radical political reform in areas such as democracy and human rights at the beginning of the process. Consequently, the period of 1999-2002 was largely one of ‘Europeanization as Democratization’[[18]](#footnote-18), or in the words of Diez *et al.* (2005), of ‘the political Europeanization’.

With the landslide victory of the AKP, Ankara’s strong commitment to implementing the Copenhagen criteria both in the political and economic realms after two years of bargaining opened a new era in bilateral relations (between 2002 and 2005). By this new era, the EU had become a major international source of change and had greater impact on domestic change. While the incumbent government, as a single ruling party, had the necessary power to adopt EU regulations and/or comply with the EU’s expectation, the former president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer along with the main opposition party (CHP, Republican People’s Party) were strong veto players. This period is seen as one of proto-Europeanization or what Öniş (2009) describes as the ‘golden age of Europeanization’, despite the powerful veto players. During this period, many reform processes such as the implementation of the NUTS system, the creation of national and regional institutions for distributing EU funds, the draft law for RDAs and the public administrative reforms, were launched by the Turkish Parliament (see Chapter 6). Nevertheless, the EU was not the single international source of change. There were other international organizations, i.e., International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (through Sigma Report) and the Council of Europe (through Local Self-Government Charter), targeting the cumbersome structure of the Turkish administrative system characterized by the statist tradition.

All these international effects not only introduced the governance principles to a Turkish audience in terms of openness, accountability, responsiveness, participation, but also initiated a reform process in the ensuing years whereby national-subnational relations have gone through a more decentralized model. A large number of local authorities and their leaders have responded to these developments by applying a number of community programmes, establishing EU units inside their respective organization, recruiting experts for EU matters and interacting with their opposite numbers in the EU arena (see Chapters 7 and 8). In this period, the main priorities of EU financial incentives were to enhance civil society dialogue and state-society relations, which would enable societal actors to have more policy spaces (Interviews 7, 11, 13).

While Turkey appeared to be on the right track and started to progress ardently towards the accession negotiations between 2002 and 2005, a rather different picture started to emerge in the ensuing years. Due to the problems that emerged both in Turkey (e.g. the evasion of signing the additional protocol with Cyprus[[19]](#footnote-19); shift in Turkish foreign policy dimension towards the neighbouring countries) and in the EU (e.g. political behaviour of Germany and France on Turkey-EU relations; the enlargement fatigue of the EU, and more recently Euro-zone crisis), the accession negotiations proceeded slower than expected (Eralp, 2008; Börzel & Soyaltın, 2012). Furthermore, the politicization of conditionality and de-facto conditions together with an overemphasis on open-endedness not only has disturbed the Turkish audience and aroused suspicions of a hidden agenda (Aydın & Esen, 2007:129), it has also caused a cleavage within the political elites between reform-oriented and pro-European forces and hard-liner Republicianists holding a veto position against structural changes (Schimmelfennig *et al.,* 2003: 507).

As a reaction to such tension in the accession process, ‘public support for EU membership appears to have declined by a considerable margin’[[20]](#footnote-20) and the present government appears to have lost some of its enthusiasm and its initial reformist zeal (Öniş, 2006). The credibility and intensity of the EU accession process has subsequently seen a considerable decrease (Eralp, 2008; Saatçioğlu, 2010; Börzel & Soyaltın, 2012). More importantly, a great number of technical issues and standards relating to local administrations have not yet disseminated to the lower levels due to reservations on many accession chapters[[21]](#footnote-21). The speech addressed by PM Erdoğan in the Azerbaijani Parliament in 2005 has indeed signalled this new period, which has been coined **‘Alaturka Europeanization’**. In that speech, Erdoğan publicly announced that:

‘Turkey should be accepted into the EU. If not, we will change the name of the Copenhagen criteria to the Ankara criteria and continue with the reforms. [...] no turning back on the road that Turkey has been taking to integrate with Europe, and there are no other alternatives’[[22]](#footnote-22).

Apart from the low credibility of the EU accession process and the incomplete accession chapters, the centralization of the EU fund mechanism has also considerably reduced the pulling effect of Europeanization. This has correspondingly hampered any genuine shifts towards the creation of multi-level modality in Turkey. More importantly, Turkey, especially since 2005, has been going through a different foreign policy orientation. This has signalled a shift from one-dimensional foreign policy (relations with the West) to a more multi-dimensional one. This new foreign policy approach has not only reduced the interest of SNAs in EU matters but also impacted on the direction of mobilisation (see Chapters 8 and 9). Overall, the periodization is essential because it shows that both the process of Europeanization and the national context in Turkey has been evolving in relation to each other. This of course may have impacted on the behaviour of SNAs and their engagement with the EU. One may therefore find different dynamics and sources for subnational mobilisation in these three different periods.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has introduced the origins and conceptual developments in the Europeanization literature and its relevance for the objectives of the thesis. The differentiated domestic impact and the institutionalist sources of Europeanization seem to be common features in the literature. Particularly, the impact of EU rules and policies has not always led to convergence but usually brought about a limited and differentiated impact on intergovernmental relations in member (and candidate) states. Given the lack of institutional prescriptions and of adaptational pressure in the regional acquis, such divergences among states, and to a certain degree within states, are remarkable. This indicates the importance of the domestic context, while explaining the outcomes. The epistemological contribution of the new institutionalist account is therefore helpful for explaining the degree and direction of change in different national settings. The new institutionalism is also useful for determining the independent and intermediating variables of the research.

There have been, however, disputes over the definitions, usages and mechanisms of Europeanization. Determining the usage and scope of Europeanization largely depends on the chosen policy areas. The focus of this research is on regional policy and structural funds in candidate states— encompassing the direct and indirect effects of Europeanization. On the whole, the main focus in the accession literature has concentrated on a general explanation of the transformative powers of the EU membership conditionality and on examination of what has been changing in the regional policy of accession countries as a result of Europeanization. This largely intersects with the so-called first generation Europeanization literature. In a similar fashion, the impact of EU on Turkey has been examined within the first generation and the research is mainly confined to positivist, normative and legalistic agendas. Given the asymmetric relations between the EU and Turkey, top-down Europeanization has been applied to explain domestic change in the Turkish domestic arena. The second generation agenda, however, emphasizes more complex interactions (top-down, bottom-up and horizontal) in which Europeanization is not limited to changes in political-administrative structures and the formal content of national policy because European values and policy paradigms are also to some (varying) degree internalized at the domestic level, shaping the discourses and identities.

Even if the applicant status of Turkey allows one to focus solely on downward causation primarily due to the asymmetric nature of conditionality, this chapter has claimed that it is insufficiently understood within a narrowly positivist framework whereby EU conditionality is seen as a formal instrument for the transposition of the EU’s rules, norms and institutional templates to the candidate states (Hughes *et al.*, 2004). The research therefore embraces the idea of EU conditionality that includes not only the formal technical requirements on candidates but also the informal pressures arising from the behaviour and perceptions of actors engaged in the political process. This offers a deeper understanding of the enlargement process as a dynamic interaction between international incentives and rules and domestic transition factors (ibid).

Consistent with the approaches outlined above, the research not only situates Europeanization in a top-down (coercive) fashion where domestic change is traced back to EU sources, but also evaluates the indirect and horizontal effects of Europeanization where one may additionally observe the voluntary mechanisms such as lesson-drawing, learning and policy transfer. Yet considering formal (technical) and informal (cognitive) effects of Europeanization in isolation from domestic dynamics (national and subnational level) also misses the empirical reality in any attempt to generalize. This suggests a new research agenda in Turkish-EU relations, which combines the institutional variants of Europeanization (such as opportunity structures and learning) with domestic intermediating factors at national and subnational levels. Such an understanding also suits the bottom-up research design (see Chapter 3). The chapter has also proposed a periodization to unveil the dynamic features of EU influence on the Turkish domestic arena since the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Given that the empirical findings deriving from interviews and survey analysis were obtained between April 2011 and June 2012, the main focus for the rest of the thesis is generally on the last period, which is the period of Alaturka Europeanization. While the first generation of Europeanization is largely a case during the Europeanization as Democratization period, the second generation Europeanization has taken its roots during the Alaturka Europeanization and to some extent the Proto-Europeanization period.

Overall, the domestic impact of Europeanization has changed the relationship between national and subnational levels in applicant states towards the creation of triadic governance including the supranational level. Although there are certain constraints derived from the membership or prospect of membership, Europeanization has created new opportunity structures and a new political space for SNAs for their political action and (functional) territorial interests above and beyond the national level (Kassim, 2005: 286). This is generally captured by the multi-level governance approach. The key policy area initiating the creation of multi-level modality in member (and applicant) states is the regional policy and its relevant financial instruments. The following chapter moves on to explaining the multi-level governance and the domestic politics approach to shed light on the creation of multi-level modality in Turkey with specific reference to mobilisation of SNAs across the EU arena.

# CHAPTER 2 MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND DOMESTIC POLITICS APPROACHES

## 2.1. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter has analysed the evidence to determine the scope and extent of Europeanization and its application to the member (and candidate) states. It has subsequently discussed the different interpretations of Europeanization in the context of changing territorial relations in the wider EU arena. What has become clear is that Europeanization makes domestic policy areas increasingly subject to EU decision-making. Nevertheless, the domestic impact of Europeanization embraces certain resource dependency approaches (i.e. intergovernmentalist, supranationalist and multi-level governance) (Börzel, 2002: 211). These approaches generally conceive of the EU as a structure with new political opportunities that provides some domestic actors with new resources whilst depriving others. The research does not consider the emerging opportunity structure in a zero-sum game. Rather, it seeks to examine how the process of Europeanization shapes, affects, constrains or opens opportunities for the behaviour of SNAs and their engagement with the EU level institutions.

To grasp the extent to which subnational actors utilize the changing political opportunity structure in the EU, MLG has been applied in many empirical studies exclusively with regard to Europeanization and in the context of EU regional and cohesion policy. The authors who developed the concept of MLG use it to explain the subnational mobilisation at the EU level by investigating and measuring the sources of regional representation in Brussels (Marks *et al*., 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Their scope of investigation particularly focuses on explaining subnational mobilisation at the EU level through the creation of channels of communication and influence. The approach has been applied by a number of case studies regarding the subnational mobilisation and the foreign activities of SNAs (see Chapter 4). In this respect, this chapter turns its attention to the multi-level governance and the domestic politics approaches in order to illustrate their usefulness particularly for the issue of subnational mobilisation. It is organized in three parts. The first part analyses the stance of two early integration theories on the subject matter. The second part introduces the multi-level governance approach. The final part explains why it is useful to weight the MLG approach with the domestic politics approach. This part also presents the potential domestic intermediating variables of the thesis.

## 2.2. EUROPE DES PATRIES VS EUROPE DES RÉGIONS: TOWARDS A MULTI-LEVEL MODALITY?

The concept of subnational mobilisation in the EU went hand in hand with the speculation regarding the role of states in the integration process. The speculation is what happens if states find themselves in a position in which their role as gatekeepers is in decline and they are not any longer able to resist the presence of SNAs in the European arena. In addressing this, Anderson (1990: 419-420) conjectured three possible outcomes. One involves the maintenance of the status quo; a second increasingly popular scenario envisions a Europe of Regions emerging from the eroded position of member governments; and the third points out that changes in gatekeeping capacities of nations will be non-existent in some countries, modest in others and quite substantial in still others. One may argue that the variations described by Anderson are reasonably convincing and can be interpreted through the triad of integration theories; intergovernmentalist, supranationalism and multi-level governance.

Two rival IR-dominated integration theories, liberal/intergovernmentalist and supranationalism, have analysed the impact of European integration on the member states; the mushrooming of SNAs on the European arena; and the state of SNAs in the EU integration process[[23]](#footnote-23). While the former puts the states at the centre of EU policy making, the latter, on the other hand, emphasizes the increased role of supranational and domestic groups. This contradictory picture between intergovernmentalist and supranationalist suggests two extreme sides of the story: the nation state triumphant represented by the ‘Europe des Patries’ (expressed by Charles de Gaulle), and the withering away of the nation-state characterized by Europe des Régions (expressed by Jacques Delors).

For the liberal/intergovernmentalist, European integration strengthens the national governments against other domestic actors and supranational developments and therefore national governments monopolize and ‘gatekeep’ the access of domestic actors to the European level (Moravcsik, 1995; Pollack, 1995). Moravcsik (1995) considers that SNAs need to rely entirely on their national government if they want to pursue their interests in the European arena. By giving limited room for a direct territorial representation, the state-centric tradition maintains the idea that national institutions and practices determine the degree and nature of subnational mobilisation (Hooghe, 1995:177; Marks *et al.*, 1996), not top-down (supranational) or bottom-up (subnational) pressure. This understanding also approximates to the notion of path dependency proposed by the historical institutionalist (see Chapter 1). It is indeed a common case for many SNAs particularly from unitary states because they usually avoid challenging their respective national governments during their presence in Brussels. This correspondingly reveals the hierarchy between SNAs and the member states, in which selected national officials have a say on behalf of SNAs rather than broader political and social actors.

For supranationalists (Sandoltz & Sweet 1998), the supranational level and SNAs would become increasingly influential since each integrative step caused governments to challenge the pressures of integration (Bache, 1998:17). For instance, Haas (1958) argued that ‘... erstwhile ties with national friends undergo deterioration’. The new ties between subnational and supranational levels have led to ‘a Europe of the regions’ (Loughlin, 1996) in which the former can challenge the states over territorial interests and representations (Goldsmith, 2003:115). As Hooghe (1995:177) described, in this model, the relationship is an example of the contested hierarchy, in which the supranational arena is expected to be on the side of the subnational level. Several SNAs thus gather around the supranational institutions in Europe to gradually develop an uninterrupted and uniform subnational political tier. This gradual process finally demolishes the uneven pattern of subnational mobilisation where other SNAs from the unitary states become stronger vis-à-vis national constraints (ibid: 178).

Taking both integration theories together, despite their significance in terms of grasping the fundamental changes in the EU integration process, they still lack conceptualizing the current situations of SNAs in the multi-level system of the EU. To begin with, they generally explain the process of European integration rather than policy-making. However, in the context of exploring the differential impact of European integration on member (and candidate) states, which is closely related to this research, IR-centric integration theories are insufficient for in-depth analysis of daily politics in the EU. As Börzel (2002) remarks, the main puzzle for integration theories is the explanation of dynamics and outcomes of European integration rather than domestic effects. Bache (2008:28) furthers this claim by discussing that the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 could be seen as a turning point regarding mounting regional initiatives and changing policy-making processes within the EU and members of the EU (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, he considers that both theories ignore the implementation process, which is where SNAs usually engage in the policy-making process[[24]](#footnote-24).

The effects of the SEA on the process of integration and, in turn, on the nature of the EU as a political system prompted a new wave of theories challenging the dominant intergovernmental versus supranational debate. As Hix (1994) suggests, tools and approaches from the study of domestic and comparative politics could be utilized in order to fill the gap left by the early integration theories. Hooghe (1996: 1) adds that member states have distinctively different institutions, practices and patterns of interest mediation moulded by distinct trajectories of state-building that present a formidable challenge for integration theories. Accordingly, studying and theorizing the domestic impact of the EU integration process on member (and candidate) states have shifted from IR dominated integration theories and comparative politics approaches[[25]](#footnote-25), towards modes of analysis that are rooted in policy study approaches focusing on multi-level governance (Marks *et al.*, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001) and the Europeanization of subnational governance (John, 2000; 2001; Goldsmith, 2003).

In surveying the decentralization and regionalization research on the new Eastern European member states of the EU (EU-10) between 1997 and 2007, Pitschell and Bauer (2009) highlight the importance of the subnational governance approach. For them, scholarly interest in regionalization and decentralization as indicators and outcomes of state transformation and (less so) EU conditionality is waning. What they observe, instead, is the emergence of a subnational governance approach rooted in a policy-analytical perspective. True, the governance approach aims to study the daily governance structures of the EU and how it works as a decision-making system. These have been largely neglected by traditional conceptions of the European polity as they (i.e. intergovernmentalist and supranationalist) focus mainly on the role of member states and supranational institutions. Seen this way, the relationship between Europeanization and multi-level governance (Bache, 2008) may help one understand the changing governance structure in member (and candidate) states as well as unveil the subnational mobilisation derived from the domestic impact of Europeanization on a given national jurisdiction.

To put it briefly, the shift in theorizing the subnational level in the EU through the Europeanization and domestic politics lenses mainly derived from the following points. Initially, there have been ongoing efforts to study the connections between developments within member states and those at the EU level (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2005: 2). Secondly, the institutional configuration of the EU, especially the traditional first pillar, started to be treated as a ‘sui generis’ political system (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999:3) in which domestic politics lenses draw insights both from IR theories as well as comparative and/or domestic politics approaches. Finally, the EU governance has mostly been acknowledged as a multi-level polity (Gualini, 2004; Caporaso, 2007: 27) thereby the multi-level governance approach has become useful to identify connections between regional and other actors within states and the dynamics of the EU (Marks *et al.* 1996; Kohler-Koch, 1996; Eising, 2007). The research therefore argues that the most promising way forward is to link the notion of MLG with the concept of subnational mobilisation and (functional) territorial interest representation in the EU.

## 

## 2.3. MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AS AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH

MLG is not a theory that seeks to clarify complex decision-making processes; rather, a key analytical approach to discuss the activities at the subnational level in the EU and the interplay between supranational institutions and subnational actors[[26]](#footnote-26). Historically, the starting point of the MLG approach was the EU’s cohesion policy, where in 1988 a reform of the structural funds had given the regions a real voice in EU policy-making for the first time (see Chapter 4). The structural policy provided incentives, politically and economically, to SNAs to advance their interests both in the domestic arena and the EU level. Of the principles of structural funds, the partnership has particularly provided the Commission with a powerful tool to establish bilateral relations between the national governments and their regions at the domestic level. This makes the EU’s fund management a process of multi-level cooperative policy making (Hooghe, 1996; Bache, 1998). In considering the new emerging Euro-polity, Marks (1993:392) defines the MLG approach as:

‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional and local—as a result of the broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level’.


From the rational-institutionalist perspective, one may consider this as a process of redistribution of resources and power within different territorial tiers. In this process, the MLG holds a middle-ground between the supranationalist and state-centric traditions by not overstating or downgrading the role that SNAs play within the day-to-day European politics. What it suggests is the transformation of states because of the independent role of EU level institutions and the participation of SNAs in the implementation and monitoring stage of the regional policy-making process. The interplay between subnational and supranational actors does not address the sovereignty of states directly. Instead, it simply argues that a multi-level structure is being created by various actors at various levels. MLG acknowledges that there is a change in the mode of EU governance without assuming that the power of member states is in terminal decline. Hooghe and Marks (2001:3) even acknowledge that national governments are the most important players in EU governance.

More specifically, as Bache (2008) posits, MLG crosses the traditionally separate domains of domestic and international politics to highlight the increasingly blurred distinction between these domains in the context of European integration. In identifying the applications of the MLG approach in EU governance, Bache and Flinders (2004:197) classify four different strands:

‘that decision making at various levels is characterized by the increased participation of non-state actors; that the identification of discrete or nested territorial levels of decision making is becoming more difficult in the context of complex overlapping networks; that in this changing context the role of the state is being transformed as state actors develop new strategies of coordination, steering and networking to protect and in some cases, enhance state autonomy; and that the nature of democratic accountability has been challenged and needs to be rethought or at least reviewed’.

On the basis of jurisdictional features, the MLG approach has recently been refined to incorporate a non-territorial dimension. Marks and Hooghe (2004: 17) discern the two types of MLG as Type I and Type II. The former mainly refers to the dispersion of decision-making authority among different levels of government. The latter refers to a flexible design within which the exercise of public-authority involves task-specific jurisdictions with intersecting memberships at a number of jurisdictional levels (see Table 2.1). Baun and Marek (2008:6) discuss that Type I concerns the vertical redistribution of power between different governmental levels, while Type II deals with the horizontal transfer of state authority to functional governmental arrangements involving non-governmental or private sectors. Considering Type I and Type II in relation to Vivien Schmidt’s categories of simple and compound polities, Bache (2008: 27) argues that the former relates to the dimension of state structures, while the latter concerns the nature of policy-making processes (pluralist or statist).

Table 2.1 Types of Multi-Level Governance



In view of the structural funds and their underlying principles on the issue of regional representation, Fargion *et al.* (2006) suggest that two impacts of partnership principles within the structural funds could be distinguished, ‘region as actor’ (or MLG Type I) and ‘region as arena’ (or MLG Type II). In the former case, the vertical dimension of the partnership allows SNAs to participate actively in the decision and policy-making process. The EU Commission has also promoted community initiatives such as Interreg, which encourage interregional cooperation and regional activation across the national boundaries. Region as an arena on the other hand refers to the emergence and structuring of a set of recurrent patterns of relations among actors, private and public within each region (ibid: 758-759). The latter case relates to the fact that the horizontal dimension of partnership, though it has changed over the years (see Chapter 4), has driven interest organizations and associations to participate actively in the planning and implementation process.

In summary, MLG shows the way in which certain competences are transferred from the portfolio of national states to the supranational level, and to the subnational, public and private authorities (Ivan & Cuglesan, 2009). Thus, it refers to a ‘multi-level’ and a ‘multi-actor’ paradigm, improving the EU’s legitimacy and encompasses both vertical and horizontal dimensions. Nevertheless, the above distinction regarding the jurisdictional features of the MLG is essential for the purpose of this study. As will be seen in the empirical analysis, the adoption of the NUTS system and the subsequent creation of RDAs in Turkey have included elements of both vertical and horizontal dimensions (Type I and Type II). Given the main focus is on ‘region as actor’ within the vertical dimension of MLG, it is aimed in this thesis to examine the extent to which the EU has been identified and perceived as an opportunity structure by Turkish SNAs in order to mobilize their (functional) territorial interests within a broader political game across the EU arena.

**Critiques on the Multi-level Governance Approach**

Some scholars consider that two different aspects of multi-level governance derived from the Europeanization process, have appeared at one and the same time to both empower and disempower regions and localities (Bache & Marshall, 2004; Carter & Pasquier, 2010). Carter and Pasquier (2010) called these two distinct impacts ‘de-centralization of power’ and ‘centralization of power’ narratives. The former suggests that the integration process provides new political and financial opportunities to the regions and strengthens their position vis-à-vis the central state administrations (Bache & Marshall, 2004; Carter & Pasquier, 2010). According to Carter and Pasquier (2010: 298), this has to date driven research in specific ways and in particular towards the study of four empirical phenomena: the strategy of the European Commission in regional policy design; the implementation of the EU structural funds policy; the institutionalization of regional representation at EU level; and the transnational activity of the regions. Given the primary empirical aim of this research, the third and fourth accounts will be analysed in the following chapters.

The second narrative claims the opposite. European integration, for this narrative, has created different types of ‘regional deficit’ such as *competence* and *access* problem which are the object of extensive study (Carter & Pasquier, 2010: 300, emphasis added). Initially, European integration leads to a disempowerment of regions and thus to a re-centralisation of power, since a number of internal regional competences are transferred upwards to the EU level, where the main actors of decision-making are the national executives (Bache & Marshall, 2004). The thinness of regional policy acquis makes this narrative more salient especially for the case of SNAs from applicant states. This carries two additional problems for an effective subnational level. At the outset, the degree and substance of change in subnational arrangements largely depend on the behaviour of state and political elites and their willingness to share the responsibility with SNAs. Particularly for the partnership principle, the historical legacy and governmental and administrative traditions imprint on the possible outcomes, which may (or may not) provide political spaces for the mobilisation of SNAs (discussed below). This is echoed in the historical institutionalist terminology of path dependency.

Secondly, the centralization narrative not only reinforces the gatekeeping role of national governments on the implementation of structural funds and regional policies, but also impedes the direct relations of SNAs with the EU institutions and their ability to influence policy outcomes (Bache, 1998). Hence, national channels, as intergovernmentalists argue, may become an important arena for SNAs to represent their interests and fulfil their demands. This view has lately gained more credit from scholars because the Commission after 2000 abandoned its previous emphasis on decentralization and instead encouraged the centralized administration of EU assistance by the CEECs in order to ensure the efficient utilization of allocated funds (Baun & Marek, 2008:7; Bauer & Börzel, 2010: 256). Even if a certain level of regionalization was promoted in the CEECs from the beginning, the Commission has paradoxically promoted centralization during the accession stages and for the first couple of years after the accession process (see Chapter 4).

Bailey and De Propis (2004) aptly consider that whilst the Commission used pre-accession funds to shift candidate countries towards a system of MLG in relation to EU structural policy, it also sent mixed signals and thus national governments quickly learned their gatekeeping role. As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, the success of the Turkish national institutions as gatekeepers owes much to the extreme resource dependency of SNAs. It is also because at the interface between the European and subnational arenas, central institutions have continued to play an important role and perform crucial coordinating functions in the management of pre-accession funds. In fact, many interview participants at the subnational level seemed to accept the leading role of national institutions due to their lack of organizational capacity, though this was mostly the case in less-developed cities and/or regions (see Chapter 7).

The gatekeeping role, however, has already become more difficult, and not been as effective as government controlling the channels to the EU arena (Bache, 1998). Governments, especially those in centralized states, like the UK, therefore, tried to ‘extend the gatekeeping’ to the implementation stage rather than seeking to gatekeep the channels of communication as it is increasingly difficult if not impossible to do so (ibid: 142). Suffice it to say, the national government in Turkey has usually seemed to be the old style of gatekeeper because of their prime concerns on the access or direct relations of SNAs with the EU institutions as well as on the central coordination for EU matters. However, the national government has recently tried to monitor and regulate the international funds that some SNAs gained from different international donors (see Chapters 6 and 8). This suggests that the government has started to extend its gatekeeping role during the implementation stage.

As for the second deficit (i.e. access problem), the transfer of competences to the EU level may exacerbate the centralist character of the EU’s organizational architecture undermining the access of SNAs to the EU decision-making process (Carter & Pasquier, 2010:300). The mobilisation of SNAs thus remains ultimately constrained by state-centric organizational structures. Here, Bache (1998) challenges the MLG approach by stating that the problem of MLG was in justifying the importance of subnational actors. As he conceives, while structural fund partnerships challenged existing territorial relations with member states, this challenge was met with different degrees of resistance and with diverse outcomes (ibid:141). In some member states, SNAs were mobilized, but not necessarily empowered. As a prominent scholar of the second narrative, Jeffrey (2000:3) also argues that MLG overplays the significance of central state—EU interactions in catalysing subnational mobilisation. For him, MLG needs to be developed to be capable of presenting an additional domestic politics perspective focused on those arguably rather more significant intra-state factors which support and catalyse subnational mobilisation.

Both narratives on multi-level governance, albeit contradictory in their conclusions and in their interpretation of empirical developments, display the same research focus: the influence of the SNAs on the EU integration process and the empowerment or disempowerment of the regions through European integration (Bache & Marshall, 2004). Consequently, while the former may be considered Europeanization of subnational affairs (Marks & McAdam, 1996: 109), the latter may be seen as the domestication of European affairs (Jeffrey, 1997a:56). In considering the potential and limitations of the MLG concept, Bache and Flinders (2004: 204) postulate that empirical studies in a number of fields have shown that a range of actors have mobilised and can play a role in the EU policy system, but they argue that MLG needs to generate clearer expectations in relation to the influence of subnational and non‐state actors as well as highlighting their mobilisation and participation.

MLG has in fact been unable to fully explain why and under what conditions this mobilisation may take place (Jeffrey, 2000; Moore, 2011). Jeffrey (2000:8), for instance, argues that subnational mobilisation is not an incidental by-product of central state-EU interplay, which is providing opportunity structures for SNAs to exploit for the sake of mobilisation. Hix and Hoyland (2011:177) similarly consider that the existence of EU competences in the area of regional policy, and the deliberate funding and promotion of regional representation by the Commission, are not the only explanations for the different levels of subnational mobilisation in the EU arena. Another important factor is whether the member state of which a region is a part has a tradition of private/pluralist/or state funded/corporatist interest representation (Jeffrey, 2000). In other words, SNAs tend to mobilize across the EU arena not because of the competences of the EU (i.e. pulling effect), but because of their own competences and incentives vis-à-vis national governments (i.e. pushing effect of organizational capacity). Accordingly, a top-down understanding may miss the empirical reality because SNAs may themselves, and from the bottom-up, actively seek to change and succeed in changing those dynamics in ways which facilitate mobilisation (ibid). As a result, this research argues that the multi-level governance approach will be more valuable if it is weighted with the domestic politics lens.

## 

## 2.4. THE DOMESTIC POLITICS APPROACH

The EU has extended its scope and influence in some policy areas, e.g. regional and environmental policy, that have overlapped with the interests of SNAs. The extension of Europeanization towards the subnational level has correspondingly necessitated a growing level of subnational engagement with the EU polity. This process, defined as Europeanization of subnational governance (John, 1996; 2001), has also reached beyond the border of applicant states (Scherpereel, 2007; Bache *et al.,* 2011). Although the EU has helped to shape the subnational level in candidate states, the response of the SNAs from these states to the impact of Europeanization has not formed any part of the EU conditionality. Accordingly, how SNAs make use of EU-wide institutions (rules, norms and ideas) largely depends on their organizational capacity (i.e. pushing effect). In examining the mushrooming of regional offices in Brussels, Moore (2008b: 219) for instance argues that:

‘No top-down opinion on the necessity or even value of a permanent regional office in the EU centre was ever issued throughout the accession process, precisely because regional representations fall into the informal realm of governance in the EU, adding to capacities in areas beyond the strictest interpretation of effective management of EU regional aid programmes’.

Further to this, European policy has been considered an area of foreign policy that has traditionally fallen under the prerogatives of the central government (Jeffrey, 1997b). Such an acceptance has in turn led many national governments to decide the extent to which they should have shared the competences with their subordinates at home. In this respect, domestic territorial state organization lies within the key responsibilities of the member and candidate states, and not part of the conditions of participating in structural fund programmes (Bruzst, 2008). One may therefore claim that the motivations for responding to the impact of Europeanization with regard to regional and structural fund policies came entirely from the bottom-up level, which necessitates the understanding of domestic politics.

The domestic politics approach is not a new concept for EU studies (Bulmer, 1983; John, 1997; Jeffrey, 1997a; Moore, 2011). It is used as a tool to identify the intermediating factors that shape, obstruct or facilitate the outcomes of an observed policy or political change. This is because a growing awareness of the importance of domestic politics has led many scholars to identify the key domestic intermediating factors that allegedly intervene to shape or affect the patterns of domestic change. Consequently, the diverse outcomes of territorial politics and relations may be attributed to the different domestic institutions, traditions and interests.

In considering the situation for the EU-15, John (1996: 131), for instance, observed that the operation of multi-level governance is naturally affected by the constitutional context of each nation-state. In other words, if there are 15 different constitutional frameworks and political constraints, so there are 15 MLGs. As in the case of new members and candidate states, Bruzst (2008) reached a similar conclusion to John. For him, there are various emerging versions of multi-level governance and different configurations of regionalism. He also claims that in all new member countries one can find some contestation of the rules of governance and/or temporary compromises between central state and regional actors that might lead to what historical institutionalists would call ‘layering’[[27]](#footnote-27), or ‘a change in continuity’ (ibid: 620).

Neither finding contradicts the argument that it is ‘domestic adaptation with national colours’ (Cowles *et al.*, 2001:1). In order for a better understanding of the implementation of regional policy in general, and structural funds in particular, in targeted countries it is necessary to look at the extent to which national institutions, practices and preferences comply with the EU requirements and expectations. A common concern of scholars is therefore to find out how the impact of Europeanization is mediated by domestic circumstances (see Chapter 1). With reference to the issue of subnational mobilisation, scholars have usually methodologically focused on cross-country case selections by giving a particular emphasis on the differences in the national context, i.e. party politics and partisan contestation, constitutional differences, the devolution of competences to the lower level, and in the region specific dimensions, i.e. associational culture (or social capital), regional distinctiveness, the level of legitimacy, the entrepreneurial capacity of regions, size and financial sources of SNAs[[28]](#footnote-28). Keeping these potential intermediating factors in mind, the next section proposes the potential intermediating factors at domestic level for the situation of SNAs in Turkey.

**Identifying Intermediating Factors at Domestic Level**

The substance of changes in subnational governance as well as in the empowerment and mobilisation of SNAs varies within and across the new member and candidate states in ways that illustrate the limits of Europeanization and throw domestic politics into sharp relief (Sturm & Dieringer, 2005; O’Dwyer, 2006; Scherpereel, 2007). Grabbe (2001) asserts that the accession conditions apply to all the candidates, regardless of how far they are from membership. For her, differences between the candidates stem from their domestic political dynamics more than their distance from the EU, although there is a two-way causal link between domestic politics and closeness to accession.

By the fifth round of EU enlargement, conditionality was thought to explain the creation of multi-level modality in those states. However, as Pitschel and Bauer (2009:336) discuss, once the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 were completed, the conditionality theory understandably lost some of its appeal for explaining subnational processes in these new member states (also see Hughes *et al.*, 2004). The centralization of EU fund management and the low credibility of EU membership for Turkey during the so-called Alaturka Europeanization period have further reduced the attractiveness and the pulling effect of Europeanization. Therefore, the domestic context has become more important in explaining the implications of subnational involvement in the multi-level system of EU governance, particularly within the applicant states’ context.

To account for the variation of effective subnational governance in the new member (to some extent applicant) states, Hughes *et al.* (2004) enumerate the historical legacy of extreme centralization, vertical-top-down hierarchies, weak horizontal networks and a lack of capacity in terms of resources at subnational level. Brusis (2010) adds organized political actors rooted in regional communities and broader pro-regional advocacy coalitions with other political actors and participation in government as other potential intermediating variables. Drawing insights from these (and the above) studies, this research identifies several potential domestic intermediating factors that may shape, accelerate or impede the behaviour of Turkish SNAs for the mobilisation across the EU arena. It is useful to analyse these factors both in national and subnational contexts.

**The National Context**

The national context demonstrates the general opportunities and constraints for all SNAs. Within this context, the more competences SNAs have the more they are affected by EU regulation and therefore, the higher should be their interest in participating in the policy-making process (Marks *et al.*, 1996). This is particularly the case for SNAs having a federal state tradition, e.g. German Länder (Jeffrey, 1997a; Börzel, 2002; Moore, 2011). In comparison with the federalized or decentralized member states, where SNAs are constitutionally and administratively strong, SNAs from unitary states may not be extensively discretionary in terms of political, economic and cultural activities.

Consistent with the above arguments, two intermediating factors at national level are worth emphasizing: 1) an established constitutional and legal structure of the administrative system and 2) the historical legacy of the administrative tradition. Taken together, Turkey represents a good example of a unitary state, which has its roots in the Napoleonic state tradition (see Chapter 5). The centralized national tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic affected immensely the local units not having the necessary competencies and political power at their disposal (Ertugal, 2005; Dulupçu, 2005; Keyman & Koyuncu; 2005). More importantly, since the Ottoman era, the periphery has been under the tutelage of the centre impeding the creation of free cities like those in some parts of Europe (Göymen, 1999: 68). With the exception of the authority for the development for the south eastern Anatolian region, there are no implementing structures outside Ankara. Territorial administrative units have very limited powers. Their functions have been up to now essentially executive and based on the principle of deconcentration (Ertugal, 2005: 25; Okçu *et al.*, 2006). Due to the lack of experience, administrative and institutional insufficiency together with the reluctance of the centre as a gatekeeper, SNAs have faced difficulties in playing a large role in regional policy or acting as autonomous entities (see Chapters 5 and 6).

Consistent with the traditional Turkish governance outlined above, one may argue that it neither presents a fertile ground for the utilization of multi-level governance nor provides an opportunity structure encouraging SNAs to mobilize their functional territorial interests across the EU arena. Yet the hype rarely matches the reality. Today, a number of SNAs are actively engaging with the facilities of Brussels-based interregional organizations, i.e., Assembly of European Regions (AER), Eurocities, and European Association of Regional Development Agencies (EURADA). Besides, two regional offices were established, though both of them closed after a short while. Opening up a regional office in Brussels is also on the agenda of two municipal cities, two metropolitan cities and two RDAs. Besides, a small number of SNAs have already contacted the formal EU institutions, such as the EU Commission, EU Parliament and the Committee of Regions (the CoR). Of these EU institutions, official relations with the CoR started in 2006. Today, there are a certain number of local and regional actors that participate in the CoR’s activities[[29]](#footnote-29).

With regard to organizational level, many SNAs have shown the initial steps of subnational mobilisation, such as creating a special post for EU affairs in their internal organization structures, training and educating staff regarding EU-related issues and circulating EU directives and/or procedures inside the organization. A number of them have applied EU funds with their equivalent in other EU countries and/or engaged with some horizontal activities in terms of sister city agreements and the participation of EU-wide fairs/conferences (see Chapters 7 and 8). All of those activities suggest that engagement with the EU institutions and having a presence in the Brussels area emerged as a new area of mobilisation and activism for SNAs. Such developments collectively point, on the surface at least, to a quite radical departure from the *status quo ante* of the pre-1999 period.

It may be naïve to consider that SNAs benefit unvaryingly from the opportunities presented by the EU accession process. Opportunity structures in terms of openness and receptiveness for SNAs’ claims are a necessary but not sufficient condition (Princen & Kerremans, 2008: 1132). Organizational resources and capabilities should allow them to take advantage of those opportunities. Yet as seen in the empirical analysis, although some SNAs have the required organizational capacities, they still do not take the necessary steps to further mobilisation because they obtain sufficient material or non-material benefits from the central level. This comes closer to what Beyers and Kerremans (2007) discuss, that interest groups may be absent from the EU level not because they do not have resources, are weak, or EU institutions discriminate against them or they do not appreciate potential European benefits, but simply because they are able to realize their political goals at the domestic level. Keating (1998) similarly argues, the most important avenue to the EU has almost invariably been through the national government. By way of contrast, some SNAs with weak organizational competences have already engaged in EU matters. In this respect, one may argue that variations among SNAs largely depend on the subnational settings in which they are embedded. Such settings may facilitate, obstruct or shape the behaviour of SNAs. This supports the idea that an analysis is required from the perspective of the subnational level (Smyrl, 1997).

**Subnational Context**

Subnational mobilisation at the EU level has been developed in accordance with the traditions of individual nation-states. State traditions, i.e. federal or unitary, have a great deal of impact on the behaviour of SNAs. Given the strong unitary state tradition in Turkey, the existing national opportunity structure seems to be unfavourable for SNAs. Yet the national context by itself may not explain the variation in the level of mobilisation among regions and cities in member (and candidate) states and the substantial divergence in their agendas on EU matters. Given the fact that SNAs in Turkey are embedded in different regional characteristics, the research adds three potential intermediating factors at the subnational level: 1) regional distinctiveness; 2) the quality of intergovernmental relations; and 3) the pre-existing territorial networks.

***Regional Distinctiveness***

Regional distinctiveness is an inducement to organize autonomously at the European level. It is facilitated by the existence of ethnic historical, linguistic or religious ties distinguishing a local community (Brusis, 2010: 77). Regions having a distinctive culture or longstanding political differences with their respective national governments are likely to foster autonomous channels for informational exchange because they do not want to rely exclusively on national channels (Marks & McAdam, 1996: 109). Keating (1995: 12) emphasizes that in centralized states, without regional institutions, it is extremely difficult for regional interests to articulate their demands. He also argues that the conflict between regions and cities in some member states such as England and France undermine regional identity and cooperation among regional and local actors (ibid: 14). If there are no distinctive regional identities rooted in ethnicity or history, mobilisation may nevertheless occur, being based on socio-economic interests and issues such as agriculture (Brusis, 2010: 77).

Another point that requires further explanation is that the relationship between cohesion policy and regionalism is potentially problematic in the EU. With regional identity increasingly challenging the nature and existence of the member states, the aspiration to create a ‘Europe of the Regions’ may not always be shared by member (and candidate) states as they are anxious to preserve their current national identity (Allen, 2008:33). The EU and its enthusiasm for partnerships with SNAs in the pursuit of eliminating regional disparities increasingly serve to give meaning and an alternative potential framework to those who aspire to detach from their own nations (ibid). This is particularly a case for the new member states coming from the Communist legacy and those that have a threat of irredentism and separatism. In that regard, regionalist claims may induce national-decision makers to limit or reject regional interest representation if it is perceived as jeopardising national interests or leading to the disintegration of the state (Dobre, 2005 cited in Brusis 2010: 78). As a result, one may conclude that regional distinctiveness has both positive and negative effects in the context of subnational mobilisation. Suffice it to state that it has a negative effect for the Turkish case (see Chapter 9).

***The Quality of Intergovernmental Relations***

The level of friction and tug-of-war between the central governments and the opposition-led peripheries may alter the behaviour of SNAs. Therefore, the level of satisfaction with the national governments, or what Jeffrey (2000) calls ‘the quality of intergovernmental relations’ between SNAs and the central state, may become a critical factor in explaining the mobilisation of SNAs in the EU arena (also see Loughlin, 1997:151). More clearly, it has been suggested that in situations where poor working relationships between the central government and regional/local government exists, the latter may be tempted to bypass the former and develop an independent relationship with the EU institutions (Hooghe & Marks, 2001:87). Similarly, Eising (2006:171) found a negative relation among domestic embedding and European activities: the closer their relations with the domestic institutions, the fewer the interest groups aspiring to become involved in EU politics. The receptiveness of certain EU institutions, e.g. Parliament, the Committee of Regions and to some extent the EU Commission, may also fuel the enthusiasm of SNAs whose behaviour contrasts sharply with that of the central government (see Chapter 8).

A direct relation with the EU institutions is a significant case for justifying the shift towards multi-level modality. Nevertheless, in some cases, the interplay between SNAs and supranational institutions does not target at weakening the state. Instead, those SNAs mobilizing in Brussels usually seek alternative material sources to reduce their dependency on the national government. Even, in some other cases, despite the importance of direct relations with the EU institutions, they serve as complementary to, rather than a substitute for, cooperation with the central state. In comparing the two constitutionally different countries, Germany and Spain, with regard to institutional adaptation to Europeanization, Börzel (2002: 212) concludes that the central state is the major channel of influence in European-policy making for both the Länder and the Comunidad Autónomas. For her, the national governments do not monopolize access to the European policy arena, but they remain important gatekeepers. In this respect, the intergovernmental relations between national and subnational levels, particularly in the context of the EU regional policy making process, do not necessarily transform states towards a multi-level modality. Depending on the quality of intergovernmental relations, as Börzel (2002) argues, SNAs opt for two strategies in order to redress the balance of power which has been impacted by the process of Europeanization: a cooperative strategy of sharing the adaptational costs with other domestic actors; and a non-cooperative strategy of shifting the costs of adaptation onto others.

Given the one voice tradition stemming from the indivisibility principles of the administrative system in Turkey, one may expect to see a cooperative strategy between central and subnational actors. However, Daoudov (2012) observes different strategies (such as cooperation, competition and confrontation) which have been taken by certain SNAs. Consistent with his observation, the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies illustrated above may be adapted in this research as cooperation, competition and confrontation in order to demonstrate the strategies of some selected SNAs towards engagement with the EU polity (see Chapter 9). Needless to say, cooperation rather than competition or confrontation with the national governments has better compensation.

***The Pre-Existing Territorial Networks***

In analysing the differences between the south and the north regions in Italy, Putnam (1993) once argued that the efficiency of the region is linked to the strength and the historical tradition of civicness, which has an uneven dispersal in the peninsula. He contends that the civic culture of regional societies is a determinant for understanding the success or failure of a political institution. Herrschel and Newman (2002) also suggest that the forming of associational culture in given regions may be stimulated by particular events or challenges. This is because such event(s) reinforce local-regional identity, but it may alternatively be facilitated by the central state encouraging nationally relevant initiatives/projects.

In Turkey, conditions are akin to those unitary states of the EU, where weak regional tradition encourages top-down policy implementation for the creation of regional/local networks. As will be seen in chapter five, top-down initiatives are a more likely case for Turkey, although there are a number of bottom-up endeavours mostly derived from the developed western cities (e.g. Izmir, Mersin). The research argues that no matter how these territorial networks have been created, either in a top-down or bottom-up fashion, they may facilitate the mobilisation efforts of a given SNA in that subnational setting. However, one must be aware of different types of territorial network. Within the general universe of policy networks, Marsh and Rhodes (1992) distinguish five types of policy networks between loosely structured issue networks and denser and more robust policy communities. In this respect, the criterion here was to check whether those regions had any types of territorial network before the Helsinki Summit of 1999 or not. It may be a policy community in the case of the Aegean Economic Development Association (EGEV) or issue networks in the case of the Yeşilırmak Basin Development Union, or top-down creation of multi-functional development programs in the case of the Southeast Development Project (GAP, Turkish Acronym) (see Chapters 5 and 9).

## 2.6. CONCLUSION

The debate regarding the issue of subnational mobilisation is closely linked to EU integration theories. As argued in chapter one, the impact of Europeanization has changed the relationship between central and subnational administrations towards the creation of triadic governance including the supranational level. In that regard, the present chapter has outlined the perspectives of integration theories on the role of SNAs in the EU polity. While liberal/intergovernmentalists argue about the strengthening of central governments, supranationalists, on the other hand, claim that the process of EU integration weakens the central level vis-à-vis the subnational level. The chapter was not concerned with the rationalist assumption of zero-sum game in terms of whether states are losers or winners. The focus is on how and the extent to which the process of Europeanization shapes, influences, constrains and provides new opportunities for SNAs.

The reasonably convincing explanation is stated by the proponents of the MLG scholars, as they neither argue for the strengthening of the state vis-à-vis both supranational and subnational levels, nor expect the withering away of the state. What they put forward is the transformation of state within the creation of new emerging Euro-polity. On the jurisdictional level, the new emerging polity has multi-level and multi-actor dimensions across the vertical and horizontal levels, which is described by MLG Type I and MLG Type II. Both types of MLG are also distinguished as ‘region as arena’ and ‘region as actor’. In focusing on the latter, the chapter has argued that the EU structural policy through its principle of partnership has provided new opportunity structures for SNAs in their direct engagement with the supranational institutions.

However, the chapter has entered a caveat, which is the risk of overestimating the EU impact, while undermining the domestic intermediating factors at both national and subnational levels. In other words, the MLG approach has been unable to fully explain why and under what conditions subnational mobilisation occurs. Keeping this caveat in mind, the chapter has set a framework for approaching MLG through the domestic politics lens. This also gives us a chance to determine the potential intermediating variables that play a role for any genuine shift towards the creation of multi-level modality in member (and candidate) states. This outlook supports the second generation Europeanization. Yet more importantly, it also approximates to a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization, which is proposed as a research design of the thesis (see Chapter 3).

To recap, a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization incorporates the relative weight of the rational consideration of opportunity structures and the cultural consideration of learning with the push factors of resource capabilities (organizational capacity and leadership). These show the independent variables of the research. Yet without including the internal dynamics deriving from the national and subnational contexts, one may only grasp a limited understanding of Europeanization in the subnational mobilisation rhetoric. It is therefore important to cover potential intermediating variables both at national and subnational levels. These variables at national level include political and administrative culture and historical legacy, which are important to show the variation for the cross-country analysis. Next to that, the variation among SNAs within the same country also entails a closer inspection to the characteristics of subnational contexts in which SNAs are embedded. In this respect, the potential intermediating variables on a subnational level encompass regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relationship and the existing regional networks. Consequently, combining different intermediating variables at the domestic—national and subnational—level and embarking on such a rich dialogue between scholarly contributions represents a valuable opportunity for presenting the research design of the thesis. The next chapter builds on this and explains the research methods of the thesis.

# CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

## 3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the research design and research methods of the thesis. Taking the Europeanization literature as a main explanatory framework and drawing insights from the multi-level governance and the domestic politics approaches, the research seeks to explain the changing territorial politics in Turkey, leading to subnational mobilisation towards the EU arena. The general acceptance in the literature is to draw insights from two distinct ontologies, rationalism and constructivism as the methodological approaches. However, irrespective of which ontological stance is taken, designing research and shaping the strategies for data collection in social science should be based on utmost reliability and validity given a specific research question and theoretical framework. Research questions rather than hypothesis are preferred in this research. This is because qualitative approaches usually entail formulating questions to be explored and developed in the research process, rather than hypotheses to be tested by or against empirical research (Mason, 2002: 19). But also, the concept of research question fits more generally with a wider range of ontological and epistemological positions than do these other terms.

The selection of a research design and data collection should also be consistent with the chosen methodological approaches and techniques. Unlike other disciplines, political science as a function discipline is not associated with a particular research method, and so its practitioners use a wide variety of methods and research strategies (Burnham *et al.*, 2008: 45). Although the theoretical debate surrounding Europeanization deepens the understanding of the inherent challenges of conducting research in this field, attention has not been given to methodological considerations[[30]](#footnote-30). Further to the lack of methodological precision, Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009; 2010) analysed the Europeanization literature and could not find any specific research design. What they observed was that a vast majority of scholarly endeavour prefers implicit traditional top-down research designs. Europeanization is not always a linear process, but rather a circular movement (Dyson & Goetz, 2003; Anderson, 2003; Saurugger, 2005). Because of this circular movement, the distinction between dependent and independent variables, cause of effects versus effects of causes, qualitative and quantitative are not clearly determined (Saurugger, 2005: 292; Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009; 2010). This is especially a problem when seeking to specify causal mechanisms or identify the indirect effect of EU in the process of domestic change.

To attain the research aims and answer the main (and sub-) questions, the chapter presents a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization as the research design of the thesis. Such a design makes it possible to approach the research questions from as many angles as possible. Against this backdrop, the chapter illustrates an eclectic research technique utilizing both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The chapter is organized in three broad parts. The first part outlines the methods in EU studies, the research design of the thesis and the unit of analysis and conceptual clarifications. The second part explains the methods of the research and then introduces the methodological strategies: document analysis, survey, interviews and case study. The final part provides a conclusion on the chosen research design and methods.

## 3.2. METHODS IN THE FIELD OF EUROPEANIZATION STUDIES

The Europeanization literature has been expanding its reach in terms of theoretical and empirical implications. Yet a limited amount of research has addressed methodological considerations. The major challenge is how to isolate the net effect of Europeanization and to disentangle it from other sources of domestic change, not only in terms of the influence of globalization (Anderson 2003; Hay & Rosamond, 2002) but also other sources of change at domestic levels (Hix & Goetz, 2000; Radaelli, 2003; Anderson, 2003). Bache (2008: 25) suggests, ‘focusing on a single state is important in facilitating in-depth investigation of the effects of domestic processes as well as EU and other international processes over a significant period of time’.

Saurugger (2005: 292) alternatively suggests two methodological strategies, long-term comparison and testing variables, to disentangle the domestic change induced by the EU from other international and domestic factors. For the former case, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2007:100) argue that a comparative design is paramount in studying the relevance of conditionality and accession for Europeanization. Although such a comparative design can be organized in different ways, for them, one may compare candidates from the different enlargement rounds. In doing so, one may learn more about how domestic and/or region-specific conditions account for variation in accession Europeanization.

The latter case, that is to say testing variables, is more closely associated with counterfactual analysis, which either conjectures what would happen without the EU[[31]](#footnote-31), or compares states within and outside the EU (Haverland, 2006). Although it is nearly impossible to address the counterfactual question of the degree to which territorial relations in Turkey would have changed in the absence of the EU’s impact, one may claim that there is a considerable impact on the timing and tempo of the reform process. Europeanization has not only provided the material benefits for national and subnational actors, but has also provided the source of legitimacy in which the governmental actors, for instance, could use this vis-à-vis the powerful veto players in Turkey, i.e. the President, main opposition parties and the constitutional courts (see Chapter 6). In this regard, it is worth remarking here that instead of asking *to what extent* or *why* Europeanization is important in the changing territorial politics in Turkey, the research seeks to question how it plays a role in that issue, which leads to subnational mobilisation across the EU arena. Overall, given the importance of alternative methods, the research prefers to utilize a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization and a historical analysis in one single country with different selected cities as the main focus in order to answer its main (and sub-) questions laid out in the introductory part of the thesis.

**A Bottom-Up Research Design**

There is a dominance of the top-down research design in the extant literature (Bursens & Deforche, 2008). It is a tradition in which scholars attribute observed outcomes to the effect of the EU and tend not to engage in a systematic search for identifying cause(s) of domestic change, which may or may not involve the EU (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009). By way of contrast, a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization has recently gained more credit from scholars (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009; 2010; McCauley, 2011). What Radaelli (2004; 2006) proposes is that Europeanization should not be constructed as ‘something that explains (*explanans*) but rather something to be explained (*explanandum*) by mainstream social science’. The approach taken here puts more emphasis on the latter, which conceives Europeanization as an action framework, a confining and influencing context, rather than a phenomenon that may be singled out, operationalized and explained (Bolgherini, 2007). By utilizing such an approach, Europeanization of territorial organizations is defined as ‘*redirection and reorientation of SNAs’ activities, not only towards national institutions but also towards supranational institutions, politics, and/or policy-making process’* (McCauley, 2011:1020). Europeanization here refers to a collection of processes which progress from greater awareness of European legislation, growing willingness to search for European finance, networking with other European local authorities and experts, direct lobbying of Brussels institutions, and the influence of EU ideas on subnational policy making (John, 2000). This will be described as the four stages of subnational mobilisation in the next chapter.

The bottom-up perspective on Europeanization provides several advantages. Primarily, instead of analysing ‘effects of causes’, and attributing them to EU level developments, one may examine ‘causes of effects’, which lead, facilitate or obscure subnational mobilisation. This is because the bottom-up research design reverses the process, and therefore researchers are able to start with domestic changes and trace back casual chains to identify the underlying triggers (McCauley, 2011). This allows one to investigate the possible causes of observed domestic change and offers a chance to investigate potential explanatory factors (i.e. resource pull, resource push and learning) (see Chapter 1) and potential intermediating variables at the domestic level, which are critical for subnational mobilisation beyond the national setting (see Chapter 2).

The bottom-up research design does seem intuitive to examine the process at the subnational level while seeking to explain why subnational mobilisation occurs. Otherwise it may be formidable to observe variation between different SNAs without considering the developments within each of them. Nonetheless, it has been prevailing in the study of subnational level politics for the focus to be placed elsewhere, whether on the European or on the national level. One possible way, albeit not the widespread one, for detecting whether subnational mobilisation occurs or not is to put the spotlight on the process taking place within the subnational level itself in order to elucidate the behaviour or attitudes of SNAs (McCauley, 2010). Furthermore, in focusing on subnational level developments, the bottom-up perspective also helps one to understand the following points: why some SNAs are more active in their engagement with Europe; why variations occur across different SNAs within Turkey; which factors one may ascertain to analyse the degree of subnational mobilisation or the euro-engagement of SNAs; which channels SNAs follow (national or direct contact with the EU institutions) to fulfil their territorial interests.

Summing up, the research takes the Europeanization literature as a main explanatory framework on the creation of multi-level modality in general and subnational mobilisation in particular. In so doing, it identifies three sets of variables, i.e. dependent, independent and intermediating, in order to appreciate fully how Europeanization takes place as well as to model the *bottom-up* perspective on subnational mobilisation towards the EU arena. The remainder of the chapter first elucidates the conceptual precision and unit of analysis and then explains the methods of the research.

**Conceptual Clarifications and Unit of Analysis**

Conceptual clarifications and determination of units of analysis not only define the boundaries of the research but also construct a crucial step towards the selection of case SNAs from different subnational settings in Turkey. The research defines subnational mobilisation towards the European arena in the context of ‘functional territorial interests’[[32]](#footnote-32) (Brusis, 2010), viz. obtaining funds, liaising, networking, state-bypassing, territorial branding and lobbying through creating regional offices, participating in inter-regional organizations, being an active member for the Committee of Regions, or engaging with EU institutions (e.g. the Commission and the EU Parliament) in Brussels. The issue of political and/or cultural mobilisation of territorial interests, what some new regionalists coined ‘paradiplomatic activities’, based on ethnic identity, separatist movements and regional party politics are subjects outside the scope of this thesis, though they are important motivators for subnational mobilisation (see Chapter 4).

Secondly, when applied to the Europeanization literature in general and the MLG approach in particular, the focus should be on the three levels of political power: the supranational institutions, the national governments and subnational administrations. This fundamentally contrasts with the classical conception of the state, as it is the only relevant political actor. However, subnational mobilisation towards the EU arena and the creation of multi-level modality are closely related to the concept of state transformation. Accordingly, the proponents of the MLG approach distinguish between the state as a set of institutional rules and the state as a reference to political actors (Marks, 1997). Such a distinction underlines the importance of internal characteristics, which are also known as the black box of the state. Following this, the definition of state here encompasses all political actors and institutions within a member state or a candidate country (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2005; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005).

In applying the broad definition of the state, the research aims to distinguish itself from the state-centric tradition, which mainly considers the state as a unitary actor and puts no emphasis on the subnational level. Treating the state in this way also suits the theoretical institutionalist background—that defines it as a set of institutions characterised by specific formal and informal rules and principles of organisation (March & Olsen, 1996). The state is thus comprised of a series of institutional components and administrative and territorial levels (national, regional and local) depending on the internal organisation of each state and their administrative tradition.

Within the state and its institutional levels of organisation, the research pays particular attention to the action of individual actors or groups of individuals who intervene in the process of institutional change and adaptation to enlargement (Marks *et al*., 1995). Such compartmentalization by no means targets the role of states—whether they are winners or losers of EU integration—and the empowerment of regional level vis-à-vis national governments in the European integration process (Dobre, 2007). What is essentially of concern is to analyse the way in which the process of Europeanization shapes, affects, constrains or opens opportunities for the behaviour of SNAs and their engagement with the EU level institutions. Consequently, it puts forward that SNAs not only use national channels but are also able to interact with EU institutions on their behalf due to the multi-level character of EU governance. Acknowledging SNA in this way refers to the ‘territory as an actor’ rather than ‘as arena’ (see Chapter 2).

There is, however, no agreement on the definition of region, province, county and municipality in EU studies (Keating & Jones, 1995, Fitjar, 2010). Each member (and candidate) states of the EU have their own territorial delineation. Given that the theoretical focus is on the characteristics of territorial units that are conducive to the emergence of collective action on a given region or city (Nielsen & Salk, 1998: 242), this research takes the pragmatic approach of defining units of analysis a priori as 26 NUTS II and 81 NUTS III level regions of Turkey. In this respect, the dependent variable must be interpreted as mobilisation of a territorial unit across the EU arena, either by a representation corresponding exclusively to that unit (e.g. Regional Development Agencies for the NUTS II level), or as a part of a representation defined on a larger territorial unit including NUTS III level units (e.g. metropolitan municipalities)[[33]](#footnote-33).

The research makes general use of the acronym of SNAs to describe the unit of analysis in order to be coherent in a subsequent part of the thesis. However, when it is necessary, there may be an explicit usage for the type of SNA to illustrate whether it refers to regional development agencies (RDAs), city municipalities (CMs) or metropolitan municipalities (MMs). The significant point here is that while city municipalities have been operating since the establishment of the Republic (in 1923) and so have the metropolitan municipalities since 1984, the RDAs are novel types of subnational administrations. Twenty-six RDAs were established in the period between 2006 and 2010. This highlights that the degree of institutional culture for each subnational administration is different and so is their response to the EU accession process.

## 3.3. THE METHODS OF THE RESEARCH

This research project is designed to yield both qualitative and quantitative results and will address its key questions through inductive[[34]](#footnote-34) analysis in order not only to focus on explanation but also to investigate general understanding. For Gray (2009:15), unlike deductive analysis, inductive research does not set out to corroborate or falsify a theory. Instead, through a process of gathering data, it attempts to establish patterns, consistencies and meanings. With this general distinction between deductive and inductive research in mind, the research presents the central debates and poses challenges to the conventional knowledge on the subject areas discussed in chapter one and two by focusing on the use of four methodological strategies; document analysis, a descriptive survey analysis, semi-structured interviewing and in-depth case studies.

**Document Analysis**

The document analysis is helpful for the preliminary stage of the thesis and for the historical analysis. The relevant information and literature on local governments, regional policy, regionalization and decentralization in Turkey and elsewhere broadened the research perspectives. After taking the appropriate approaches through timeline and content, document analysis including both primary and secondary sources is chosen in order to facilitate holistic coverage. A rich source of empirical data is used to analyse the following questions: what has changed in the territorial politics of the traditional Turkish governance in line with the EU’s standards? How have such changes occurred? What has changed? When did these changes occur? To find proper answers to these what, how and when questions, empirical data based on document analysis are largely obtained from national and EU official documents. Although documentary analysis has been utilized throughout the thesis, it has become a particularly important source of information while assessing the impact of EU regional policy and structural funds on the changing intergovernmental relations in chapters five and six. Yet there was no implicit or explicit information regarding the EU activities of SNAs. This led us to include another research method, survey analysis.

**A Cross-Sectional Survey**

The survey is one of the methodological strategies in the social science literature to describe, compare or explain knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of the analysed population (De Vaus, 2002: 218; Robson, 2002: 220). As long as the survey targets the appropriate population and provides a certain validity and reliability, the findings may generalize across similar case units. The survey conducted for this research is a descriptive, cross-sectional and self-administered one. In administering standardized questions to all of its population, this survey was undertaken simply to ascertain attributes, attitudes and actions of Turkish SNAs regarding EU matters and to provide information about the distribution of EU activities in their wide range of organizations in the current situation. In order for a better understanding of its research inquiry, the questions for the survey are designed with assistance from the relevant literature search[[35]](#footnote-35). The survey consists of 16 questions, divided into 3 thematic groups (see Appendix 1). These thematic groups are as follows:


* Perception of an impact; the difficulty of obtaining information regarding the EU’s regional policy; the choice for the sources of information;
* Formal structures of organization in terms of staff and its activities; admission of any special magazine or newsletter; allocation of budget for representation; application for EU funds.
* Form of their EU relations in terms of establishing an office; conducting relations with the EU institutions and interregional organizations in Brussels.

The inventory consists of 12 single-choice questions and four multiple-choice items. After designing the survey, it was piloted by six people in order to test the survey and make necessary amendments, particularly in terms of content and language.


*Survey Population and Participants*

Twenty-six Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) along with 65 City Municipalities (CMs) and 16 Metropolitan Municipalities (MMs) constitute the population for the survey. For the reliability and validity of the survey, the most relevant participants in the aforementioned institutions were determined[[36]](#footnote-36). By the determination of the most relevant persons in targeted institutions, the survey was explained to each participant on the phone between February and April 2011. Subsequently, the survey, cover letter and the permission letter were sent to those participants’ personal emails if the relevant participants on the phone agreed (Table 3.1). Although the names of organizations are included in survey questions, the information of each participant remains confidential and anonymous (for the list of SNAs that participated in the survey see Appendix 2). As a result, 51 out of 65 city municipalities (78.4%); 14 out of 16 metropolitan municipalities (87.5%) and 20 out of 26 RDAs (76.9%) equalling 85 SNAs (79.4%) took part in the survey (Table 3.2). While some SNAs for several reasons did not participate in the survey, only four RDAs sent a notification stating that they were just established and it was not possible for them to answer a number of questions on the survey. This showed that a number of RDAs are still in the process of institutionalization and learning, which may be seen as an early finding for the question of why some SNAs do not mobilize across the EU arena.

Table3.1 The position survey participants held in the organization



**Table 3.2** Statistics about the Survey Population for Three Types of SNAs



*Data Collection and Analysis*

The survey was conducted in a self-administered manner. The translated (Turkish) version of the survey was distributed to survey participants (via personal emails)[[37]](#footnote-37). After the completion of the survey, each participant sent their answers to the email address provided on the cover sheet during the data collection between March and May, 2011. The survey data is analysed with the help of Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 14 software programme. It was used in order to obtain the numerical results. In attaining the EU activities of each unit, CMs (City Municipalities), MMs (Metropolitan Municipalities) and RDAs (Regional Development Agencies), the cross-sectional analysis was conducted. While the percentage analysis was used for the single-choice question, the frequency analysis was utilized for the multiple choice questions. The survey findings are presented in chapters seven and eight. Nevertheless, the statistics and figures derived from the survey analysis did not reveal much about the content and scope of subnational mobilisation, but presented some descriptive information. For the in-depth analysis and conducting exploratory research, the research complementarily employed self-structured interviews in three different administrative levels.

**Interviews**

The empirical evidence presented in this research is also largely the product of a series of field studies conducted in several cities of Turkey and in Brussels. Interviews were carried out between April 2011 and June 2012. Most of them were gathered through face-to-face interviews with individuals, although some group discussions and phone interviews additionally provided important information. The interview is an effective and widely used research method of collecting information for several types of research questions in order to address a number of assumptions (Bryman, 2008). There are several situations in which the interview is the most logical research technique. For Gray (2009: 370), if the objective is largely exploratory in terms of the examination of feelings or attitudes, interviews may be the best approach. Rapley (2004:16) adds that interviews are, by their very nature, social encounters where speakers collaborate in producing retrospective (and prospective) accounts or versions of their past (or future) actions, experiences, feelings and thoughts.

Three types of interviews, structured, unstructured and semi-structured, are generally discerned by researchers depending on the situation and the research issue that they have (Berg, 2007; Gray, 2009). However, as Bryman (2008) suggests, if the researcher commences the investigation with a fairly clear focus or does multiple-case study research and needs some structure in order to ensure cross-case comparability, it is likely that the interviews will be semi-structured ones, so that the more specific issues can be addressed. The semi-structured interviews may thus provide more flexibility—in comparison with the structured interviews—and make the data more comparable—in comparison with the unstructured interviews. These two situations mainly led this author to conduct semi-structured interviews.

Semi-structured interviews provided much more flexibility and dynamism in comparison to structured interviews and survey analysis. Examples of this vary: during the interview with a representative from DG Regio, it was revealed that ‘the mayor of Antalya Metropolitan Municipality is going to visit the Commissioner of DG Regio next week’[[38]](#footnote-38). This led the author to probe extra questions, such as why is the mayor coming? With whom is he going to meet up? These questions had not been prepared before the interview commenced. Another interesting situation occurred during the field work in Samsun. One of the interview participants, the General Secretary of Middle Black Sea Development Agency, was elected as a member for the Executive Committee of one interregional organization four days before the interview took place[[39]](#footnote-39). Such serendipitous findings, during the field work, gave the thesis a dynamic structure. Otherwise, it would not have been possible to extract such information.

*The Preparation of Interview Questions and the Selection of Participants*

The issue of validity, particularly in the case of semi-structured interviews, can be directly addressed by attempting to ensure that the question content directly concentrates on the research objectives (Gray, 2009: 375). This was the main criteria for preparing the interview questions. Additionally, questions were carefully chosen to complement the survey questions in order to triangulate data between survey and interview findings. Although 8-10 questions were standardized for each interview participant, on several occasions, the interview questions mutated in relation to the specific person that the author was interviewing. It is also worth mentioning that in a multi-level governance system, each tier has its own logic of governance that needs to be assessed and looked at internally and externally (Magone, 2003: XIX). It is therefore crucial to differentiate what is happening at each tier in the MLG system. The best way to analyse this is to treat each tier distinctly. That is the key reason the interviews were carried out at three administrative levels: national, subnational and supranational levels (for the full list of interviews questions for the three administrative levels see Appendix 3).

*The selection of interviewees at national level*

For the national level (Ankara), the selection of officials came from the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Interior, Ministry for EU Affairs[[40]](#footnote-40), the Union of Turkish Municipalities (TBB), the EU Delegation in Ankara, the Economic Policy and Research Foundation (TEPAV) and Development Bank. The Ministry of Development, Ministry for the EU Affairs and the EU delegation in Ankara were targeted because they are the key institutions and responsible for Turkey’s adaptation to the EU’s regional policy and structural funds. The Ministry of Interior was chosen because it is the key national institution observing the international activities of SNAs. Other interviewees from several public and non-governmental bodies were chosen due to their interests in regional development policies and subnational governance[[41]](#footnote-41).

*The selection of interviewees at subnational level*

The selection of interviewees at subnational level and their representativeness are closely related to the chosen case regions in order to conduct in-depth analysis (discussed below). In focusing on selected regions, one may investigate how far the concept of subnational mobilisation has developed in Turkey, the extent to which SNAs follow the path taken by their counterparts inside and outside the country and the potential intermediating factors that cause variation among them. Semi-structured interviews with the informants from the sample SNAs may not be representative of the whole country, though they would be qualitative and indicative of the feelings of the selected SNAs. In this respect, wider repercussions regarding the independent and intermediating factors for subnational mobilisation for other SNAs in Europe may be extrapolated from the empirical findings presented in chapters six, seven, eight and nine.


After the determination of the sample regions, the aim was to ensure that informants from the selected cities work in different institutional structures at the subnational level. The composition within the executive body of regional development agencies was taken as an example[[42]](#footnote-42). The selection of individual interviewees was solely determined by their position in the aforementioned institutions. To be included as an interview participant, individuals had to hold management positions—including high-ranking officials and elected officials—usually as a head of unit. Yet, in some instances, due to the limitation on the duration of field work (four days per city), it was not easy to interview with only policymaking administrators and thus experts were selected as crucial informants. Choosing different cities and different organizations within each city served to reduce bias in the selection process of interviewees at subnational level.

*The selection of interviewees at EU level*

The final round for the interviews were held in Brussels, with the representatives from the EU institutions (DG Regio, DG Enlargement, and the Committee of Regions and the EU Parliament) and from interregional organizations as well as Turkish public and private national delegations in Brussels. The selection of EU channels was mainly determined by the secondary literature search. As for the non-EU channels (e.g. interregional organizations), the survey result was highly important for the selected interregional organizations. In this respect, the most popular organizations (e.g. Eurocities, EURADA, CPMR and AER) selected in the survey result were mainly targeted. During the field research in Brussels, the ‘snowball sampling model’[[43]](#footnote-43) was also utilized to determine whether Turkish SNAs visit other places when they are in Brussels.

Overall, the semi-structured interviews with almost 70[[44]](#footnote-44) key informants (see Table 3.3) were carried out during the field research in 9 cities between April 2011 and June 2012. However, three caveats need to be emphasized. Firstly, given that the field research was conducted during the era of Alaturka Europeanization, the interest towards EU matters was at the lowest level. Although there was a lively interest in the research topic, one may admit that some of the informants had already lost interest (particularly at central and subnational levels) to talk about EU matters. Secondly, in some cities (particularly in Izmir and Diyarbakir), it was really difficult to find interview participants from the municipalities. Given that these municipalities are associated with the opposition parties, the informants did not feel confident about expressing their ideas. The final caveat derived from a natural disaster. The city of Van was in fact selected as one of the case cities. However, a month before the field work, a tragic earthquake happened (on 23rd October 2011), which caused many deaths. Ethically, one could not interview with people who had suffered from the earthquake. Therefore, Diyarbakir was selected because of its similarity with the city of Van (in terms of party politics, regional distinctiveness and socio-economic conditions) (discussed below).

Table 3.3 Composition of Interviews



*Analysing the Interview Data*

There are no widely accepted rules about how qualitative data should be analysed (Bryman, 2008: 538), other than that the approach is generally inductive and involves the coding of data (Gray, 2009: 494). This section is concerned with how data was analysed by using the Nvivo programme[[45]](#footnote-45). The steps towards analysing the data are four-fold: transcribing, coding, reviewing codes and categorization and interpreting.

*Transcribing*

Although transcribing was an arduous and time-consuming process, it made the author become closer to the data and led him to identify key themes and to manage contrasts and similarities between different participants’ accounts. It was also helpful for the initial coding stage for the Nvivo analysis. After transcribing 67 interviews by using F4 programme, the files were imported into Nvivo.

*Coding*

Coding is the starting point for most forms of qualitative data analysis (Gray, 2009: 550). It is a key aspect of content analysis, grounded theory and computer assisted analysis of interview texts (Kvale 2009: 105). Almost all qualitative research involves some sort of coding (Richards, 2005:85). In order to reduce the sheer size of qualitative data, the researcher organizes the transcribed field notes thematically or chronologically (or both) (Mason, 2002:148). In so doing, s/he can retrieve the necessary information with minimum effort. The coding process also helps the researcher to develop some categorization and themes, with different ideas from primary and secondary sources being linked together.

Richards (2005:88) mentions three sorts of coding: descriptive, topic and analytical. Descriptive coding involves storing information about the cases being studied at (e.g. cities, municipalities or regional development agencies). Topic coding is labelling text according to its subject (e.g., activities of SNAs, Channels for subnational mobilization and so forth). Finally, analytical coding leads to theory emergence, theory affirmation or conceptual developments. The categories in the analytical coding schedule consist of several themes such as independent variables (e.g., pull effect, push effect and learning), intermediating factors at the domestic level (i.e., the legacy of history, the pre-existing territorial network or regional distinctiveness), or stages of subnational mobilization (e.g., growing awareness, organizational changes, horizontal mobilization and vertical mobilization). Thus, while descriptive and topic coding requires minimal interpretation, analytical coding refers to coding that comes from interpretation and reflection on meaning (ibid: 94). Although all three types of coding were utilized for this research, the main emphasis was on the analytical coding. It is however important to note that coding process was closely related to the research questions and objectives. Therefore, as new themes or issues emerged throughout the analysis, new codes were added to the existing categories until the final coding schedule was complete.

*Reviewing Codes and Categorization[[46]](#footnote-46)*

Coding and categorization were early approaches for the analysis of texts in the social sciences. The former involves attaching one or more keywords to a text segment in order to permit later identification of a statement; whereas the latter entails a more systematic conceptualization of a statement, open for quantification (Kvale, 2009: 105). In seeing the differences between categories and codes, the researcher should build on both of them. Given (2008: 71) advises the novice researcher that category development can be done either inductively or deductively. Following this advice, the qualitative data has been analysed by utilizing both inductive and deductive approaches by blending the two methods to fully examine the data. However, during the entire process of analysis, the question of what counted as data or evidence in relation to the research questions was constantly asked (Mason, 2002: 148). It is also important to emphasize that the research is more concerned with interpreting the data to build concepts and categories that can be brought together into theoretical frameworks, rather than theory building. The process of coding, reviewing the existing codes and categorizing continues until no new viewpoints emerge from the data and when it is clear that perspectives are being repeated. This shows that the data saturation level has been reached[[47]](#footnote-47). This leads the researcher to interpret the qualitative data.

*Interpreting*

The researcher started to generate some theoretical ideas derived from data in the final stage called interpreting. After finalizing the data analysis process, the findings and interpreted data are presented in the empirical chapters. In some instances, direct quotes from the informants are utilized. However, unlike the presentation of survey analysis, the interpretation of qualitative analysis seeks to learn more than what percentages or frequencies reveal (Richards, 2005:86). The selection of direct quotes is usually chosen in order to reflect the general understanding or the perspectives that converged around certain themes. Given the majority of interviews were carried out in Turkish, the translation of the direct quotes are as original as possible. Additionally, exemplary quotations and excerpts have remained in contact with the respective codings and categorizations described above. Overall, the qualitative analysis is tiresome and prolonged but has the potential to yield great insights into the theory development and concept building.

After the analysis of interviews and survey findings, it appeared that apart from the pull effect of the EU, and push effect of the organizational capacity and learning, there are three intermediating factors that have an impact on both dependent and independent variables. These include regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relations and the pre-existing regional network. In order to account for these factors on the creation of multi-level modality in Turkey, the thesis has also conducted in-depth case study analysis.

**Case Study and the Selection of Sample Cities for In-depth Analysis**


The research borrowed the techniques from the case study method in order to determine the sample case cities. The case study method is useful when an in-depth examination is needed. Yet it tends to be selective, focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental to understanding the system being examined. Yin (2003:13) defines the case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’. He suggests, the more that research questions seek to explain some present circumstance (e.g. how, why or under what conditions some social phenomena work), the more the case study method will be relevant (ibid: 4). However, as Gray (2009: 248) argues, the problem is how to generalize a specific case and to find enough time to analyse the volume of documentation. The challenge therefore is to select appropriate cases to reach generalizeable fact. In order to prevent these difficulties, at least produce a more reliable outcome, the research adopted the most different system design for its sample city selection.

Cities constitute a fairly general category of urban space, relatively original forms of compromise, and aggregation of interests and culture, bringing together local social groups, associations, organized interests, private firms and urban governments (Le Galès, 2002: 262). However, the research focuses on particular institutions within the city boundary, which are defined as municipalities and regional development agencies. Consistent with this and as a practical solution for choosing the case cities, the host cities of NUTS II regions were selected because in that level both RDAs and municipalities operate. As argued, there are 26 RDAs corresponding to each NUTS II level. Apart from the three largest cities (e.g. Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) that are located in a mono-centric region, the rest of the RDAs consist of polycentric regions ranging from two to six cities[[48]](#footnote-48). Izmir, as one of the sample cities, represents the mono-centric region. The rest of the sample cities are in the polycentric regions.

The difficulty is to establish a comparative framework among sample cities in order to evaluate similarities and contrasts. Drawing out from these potential differences and similarities, one may generate further information regarding the subnational mobilisation efforts of SNAs from selected cities. In order to come closer to the ideal of the most different system design, the sample cities with different fundamental structural characteristics were chosen depending on socio-economic development ranking, geographical location and their eligibility for EU fund programmes. More importantly, the potential intermediating factors at the subnational level, regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relationship and existing territorial networks mainly determined the selection of case cities.

For the criterion of socio-economic development, the research used the socio-economic development index prepared by the Ministry of Development in 2003. The said ministry conducted research (in 2003) to examine the development ranking of cities and statistical regional units (NUTS II) in order to collect regional data, analyse socio-economic differences and determine the framework for regional plans. According to that index[[49]](#footnote-49), cities are ranked as first, second, third, fourth and fifth grades. While the first grade refers to the most developed regions or cities, the fifth grade cities are in the least developed regions. With these explanations in mind, the selection of sample cities range from highly developed city (e.g. Izmir) to less developed city (e.g. Diyarbakir). The socio-economic conditions are important because they determine whether a city is eligible for EU fund programs. The eligibility also seems to be a main driver for organizational changes and EU activities (see Chapter 8). In this respect, there is a balance in the selection of case cities with regard to being eligible for the EU fund programs. While Izmir has not been included in any EU development program since 2004, Samsun and Diyarbakir have been located in the eligible areas for both of the EU fund programs. Finally, the research has sought to select cities from different geographical contexts, i.e. from west to east and north to south.

**Map 3.1** Development Index of Turkish Provinces

**Source**: (Dinçer *et al.,* 2003)

**Case 2**

**Case 3**


**Case 1**

Regional distinctiveness was a difficult condition as there is no agreed indicator for this (see Chapter 2). More importantly, there has been no reliable data in Turkey that defines cities or regions in terms of their ethnic, historical, cultural, linguistic or religious ties. For this reason, it was investigated whether there were any political parties operating with a regional interest, although the Turkish constitution forbids such a political organization. Apart from the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which is commonly seen as the defender of Kurdish interests in the southeast part of Turkey, there is no other political party that has regional political objectives. As a result, only Diyarbakir, as a bastion of the BDP party, seemed to be an appropriate case for the regional distinctiveness dimension.

As for the existing territorial network, the research borrowed the five policy network typologies of Marsh and Rhodes (see Chapter 2). The criterion here was to ensure whether those selected cities had a territorial network before the Helsinki Summit of 1999 or not. It may be a policy community as in the case of the Aegean Regional Development Foundation (EGEV, for Izmir) or issue network in the case of Yeşilırmak Basin Development Project (for Samsun) or top-down creation of multi-sectoral development programs in the case of Southeast Development Project (GAP, for Diyarbakir). Although Samsun and Diyarbakir are only one city of the existing territorial network in their respective regions, Izmir has its own territorial network.

For the quality of intergovernmental relations, the main condition was to determine the political orientation of the elected metropolitan mayor. Accordingly, as many different metropolitan municipalities as possible were included in terms of their political affiliations. Whereas the metropolitan municipality of Izmir (CHP) and of Diyarbakir (BDP) are associated with the opposition parties, that of Samsun is affiliated with the ruling party (AKP). All in all, Table 3.4 demonstrates the key factors of variation which made them a sample city for comparative analysis in this chapter. All values are indicative and reflect the national average.

Table 3.4 the Selection Criteria of Sample Cities



## 3.4. CONCLUSION

This chapter was designed to explain the main methodological strategies and techniques in order to answer the main (and sub-) questions of the thesis. The main argument was that a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization and utilizing the eclectic approaches, a combination of both qualitative and quantitative, may be the best option for achieving the reliable outcomes. In this respect, to approach the changing behaviour of SNAs in Turkey towards subnational mobilisation across the EU arena, four broad methodological strategies have been followed.

First, through the document analysis based on primary and secondary sources, the actual impact of EU regional policy and structural funds on the changing intergovernmental relations in Turkey has been documented (see Chapters 5 and 6). Second, the organizational response of SNAs, in the sense of regional development agencies and (city and metropolitan) municipalities, towards the EU arena was analysed through the descriptive cross-sectional survey analysis (see Chapters 7 and 8). Although the quantitative figures derived from the survey findings were interpreted with caution, they say nothing about the quality. For this reason, a complementary approach, interviews and in-depth case study analysis, was employed. However, given the difficulty in analysing the behaviour of every single SNA in the context of their subnational mobilisation efforts in one PhD thesis, the research chose several SNAs from the different subnational settings to conduct an in-depth analysis. The selection of these SNAs is important for two methodological reasons. First, in focusing on different subnational settings, one may analyse the variation among SNAs as well as explore the importance of subnational intermediating variables for subnational mobilisation efforts. Second, the selection of informants from the different subnational settings for the semi-structured interviews attempts to reduce the bias. As a result, the selection of the subnational units was guided by the consideration of including interviewees with distinct regional backgrounds. Whereas the findings of interviews have been used throughout the empirical chapters, the in-depth case study has only been used for chapter nine.

Overall, the chapter has argued that to reach any plausible conclusions and generalizations for one single case country, multiple data sources must be analysed and all data based on primary and secondary sources should be triangulated in order to enhance the validity and reliability of the research. The chapter has also explained how to handle the quantitative and qualitative data in the most meaningful way. Having explained the theoretical and methodological background of the thesis, the next chapter sheds light on the existing literature regarding subnational mobilisation in the EU arena. That is the empirical basis of multi-level governance.

# CHAPTER 4 AN EMPIRICAL BASIS OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: SUBNATIONAL MOBILISATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ARENA

## 4.1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of multi-level governance and its empirical implications to subnational mobilisation in the EU arena is a key subject of this chapter. The primary focus here is on the subnational level of analysis and its integration in and interaction with the EU multi-level polity. The obvious reason for writing this chapter is that the extent to which the interplay between supranational institutions and SNAs has affected intergovernmental relations and caused subnational mobilisation across the EU arena is an empirical matter. Empirically, the creation of MLG in applicant states and its impact over subnational mobilisation has been exclusively discussed within the context of EU regional policy and related financial incentives. In this respect, the chapter seeks to explain how the Europeanization of regional policy relates to theoretical concerns with multi-level governance and to find out the extent to which the process of Europeanization contributes to the creation of multi-level modality in member, and particularly, applicant states.

For a holistic coverage of the theoretical and empirical evolution of subnational mobilisation in a European context, the chapter is divided into four parts. The first part identifies the changes which have caused subnational mobilisation in the wider context of the role of regions in the EU. It then analyses the extent to which European integration has created opportunity structures for SNAs in the EU arena. The second part examines the outcomes of changing EU regional policy and funding regimes on the behaviour of SNAs in member and candidate states. Next to these main issues, the third part presents the European activities of SNAs and the channels that they use to engage with the EU polity. The fourth part presents the four stages of subnational mobilisation and explores how one may possibly explain the uneven pattern of mobilisation across and within the member (and candidate) states. Mainly focusing on empirical-driven literature on the mobilisation of SNAs in the EU, this part concludes with the implications of subnational mobilisation to the new members (especially CEECs) during their accession rounds.

## 

## 4.2. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

**Changing Opportunity Structures for SNAs in the European Arena**

Subnational mobilisation within a broader political game across Europe has become a centre of attention for several scholars from different disciplines[[50]](#footnote-50). Research on European regionalism[[51]](#footnote-51), studies within the Europeanization literature and the multi-level governance perspective generally provide insights into the content and scope of subnational activities and account for understanding the dynamics of changing intergovernmental relations in which SNAs from member (and candidate) states can exercise the functions of subnational mobilisation. Several accounts and concepts, particularly within the new regionalist literature, i.e., paradiplomacy, multi-layered diplomacy and the like, touch upon the concepts of subnational mobilisation and territorial representations outside national settings.

Scholars from the new regionalist tradition have delineated various structural reasons (both exogenous and endogenous) to account for the international activities of SNAs in the EU arena[[52]](#footnote-52). Three structural reasons, somewhat related to each other, predominantly appear to explain the extent to which SNAs have become the centre of attention in the system of EU governance through the 1980s and 1990s. The rising importance of regions in the globalized economy (so-called glocalization effect) (Keating & Loughlin, 1997; Amin, 1999; Goldsmith & Page, 2010); trends towards decentralization and devolution of competences to regions and localities in many states (Marks, 1997; Bullmann, 1997); and the transformations of EU regional policy over time (Jeffrey, 1997a; 2000) are deemed as central factors bringing about a great deal of new territorial groups in the international arena.

The rise of regions in the globalized economy and trends towards decentralization in many parts of Europe are closely related to the transformation of EU regional policy and governance particularly after the mid-1970s[[53]](#footnote-53). Along with the rise of regions in the global economy, or what Sharpe[[54]](#footnote-54) (1993) describes as the rise of meso-level governments, many members particularly from the EU-15 have gone through a process of administrative and political reorganization during the last three decades (Bullmann, 1997:4). Decentralizations and devolution of competences to regions and localities (Keating & Loughlin, 1997) in those states have increased the capacity of the subnational level (Moore, 2008a: 519). Even if such developments produced divergent outcomes in line with the specific structures and influences in each nation-state, a number of SNAs embarked on the institutionalization process by gaining more sources and powers at home. Subsequently, they have conducted activities outside their national border.

Although the majority of scholars have referred to the same phenomenon, that is the growing importance of regions in the global economy, two approaches have become dominant. Some scholars, on the one hand, have put more emphasis on exogenous factors, i.e. globalization and Europeanization (Marks *et al.,* 1996; Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999); other scholars, on the other hand, have placed a greater emphasis on endogenous factors producing more interdependent actors (Sharpe, 1993; Keating & Loughlin, 1997). The aim here is not to take issue with the broad notion of ‘state transformation’[[55]](#footnote-55) because a number of scholars have already done that (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; Ohmae, 1996; Sørensen, 2006). It is, however, sufficient to underline that many western industrialized states have increasingly felt under enormous pressure from above and below for the last three decades (Keating & Hooghe, 1996). In appreciating the idea that international and subnational pressure has simultaneously reduced the autonomy of the nation-state, some scholars from the traditions of comparative politics correspondingly describe this as ‘the hollowing out of the state’[[56]](#footnote-56) (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2005: 2).

In light of the above discussion, it is crucial to determine how one links the discussion of the transformations of local and regional administrations to the multi-level system of EU governance. In applying the new institutionalist account as a theoretical background, Dobre (2007) examines the contribution of the new regionalist tradition and Europeanization literature to domestic politics with regard to the institutional change at the regional levels in Spain and Romania. What she discusses is closely related to the main discussion in this research. For her, both strands of literature identify the conditions for change at the EU and domestic levels, which are conceptually defined as exogenous and endogenous explanatory variables. There is, nonetheless, a clear difference in their analytical approach to the research object. In this respect, she argues that while the impact of Europeanization on domestic change is only one explanatory independent variable among others, the literature on Europeanization treats the EU’s impact on national arenas as the main explanatory variable.

The research similarly maintains the idea that although new regionalist literature and Europeanization have similarities in identifying variables at the national and regional level in terms of enabling or inhibiting the activities of SNAs, there is a clear difference in their analytical approach to the research object. While scholars working on European regionalism (mainly from the new regionalist tradition) emphasize the multi-causal character of change and ethno-political activities of SNAs in the international arena, Europeanization mainly focuses on single or sometimes dual dimensions with regard to subnational mobilisation. As a main focus, it is sought here to explore the impact of Europeanization (independent variable) on the mobilisation of SNAs from one of the applicant states (dependent variable). Apart from dependent and independent variables, Chapter 2 has shown that the domestic context consists of several intermediating variables. These may facilitate or impede the emergence of possible outcomes. To analyse the extent to which the EU integration process has created necessary opportunities and access points for SNAs to involve in the EU multi-level modality, the next section outlines the historical evolution of EU regional policy and its financial incentives by putting particular emphasis on the partnership principle.

**Developments Underlying the Revival of Subnational Mobilisation in the EU Arena**

The developments throughout European integration correspondingly have served to enhance the importance of territorial politics within states but have had significantly different effects on the old and new members[[57]](#footnote-57) (Keating, 2006:145). Since the Treaty of Rome, as Keating (1995:17) observed, European regional policies have developed on three dimensions: 1) the co-ordination of national regional policy measures to ensure their conformity to the subsequent treaties, 2) the development of Community funds for regional development and 3) a slow series of moves towards a positive Community regional policy. The last dimension is inspired by the notion of cohesion policy. However, up until the creation of it, while intergovernmental bargaining over the size and distribution of the fund became crucial, SNAs played no role in Community-level discussions, despite being the main policy implementers (Bache, 1998: 40-47). That is, national governments remained the sole gatekeepers between supranational and subnational actors until the formation of the cohesion policy during the mid-1980s.

The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 have triggered the role of local and regional authorities both within national and European policy settings (McMaster, 2006; Ferry, 2007). As Huysseunne and Jans (2008) underline, while regional policy became an EU prerogative with the SEA, the Maastricht treaty reinforced the regional dimension of European integration by introducing the principles of partnership and subsidiarity, providing further increases in structural spending and the creation of a cohesion fund to support the most disadvantaged regions and creating the Committee of Regions (CoR) in 1994. Consequently, all these developments during the 1990s have underpinned the power shift towards Brussels, making many SNAs reorient their activity towards the EU through different extra-state channels (discussed below).

Among others, the Maastricht Treaty was evaluated as the turning point for SNA involvement because it was a solid recognition of the multi-layered structure of EU governance (Hooghe, 1996). Yet, despite the EU’s effort in creating a strong subnational level, the foremost problem was that local and regional administrative units in each member state vary in line with their administrative culture. By the discovery of a territorial dimension[[58]](#footnote-58) through the 1980s, the EU was able to identify the place where the policy was to be implemented, to propose the level at which the policy was to be implemented and to involve the institutions present in the territory (regional and local governments) in the definition of the policy priorities and objectives (Leonardi, 2005:6). This has been mainly exercised by EU cohesion policy.

## 

## 4.3. EU FUNDING MECHANISMS UNDER THE COHESION POLICY

Cohesion policy, according to the proponents of the MLG approach, is one of the biggest impetuses behind regional and local participation in European politics. It provides a clear empirical ground for the students of EU studies to examine the impact of the Europeanization of a policy on member (and candidate) states’ responses and behaviours. Cohesion policy briefly refers to the set of activities aimed at reducing regional and social disparities in the EU. Historically, it consists of three main financial incentives: the European Agricultural Fund for Guidance, the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund[[59]](#footnote-59) (Bache, 1998: 14). Through the overhaul of structural policy and doubling of financial allocations for the structural funds in 1989, all different financial incentives came together under the heading of cohesion policy. Apart from compensating for the negative impact of the SEA, Bache (1998) highlights that the enlargement of the Community to include Portugal and Spain was an important motivation for introducing structural funds.

The Commission was also aware of the fact that the new member states needed assistance in building institutional capacity to participate in regional policy and offered assistance via pre-accession funding (Bailey & De Propis, 2004). In the early years of the eastern enlargement process PHARE was used for funding individual projects and involved direct dealing between the Commission and the applicant central governments (Allen, 2008: 21). Because of its excessive bureaucracy and insufficiency in preparing the new members from the fifth enlargement for the structural funds, the PHARE was criticized (ibid). This led the Commission to introduce two new programmes to run alongside PHARE. These programmes are the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) and Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD).

The compliance of the new member states with the cohesion policy acquis effectively measured the ability of these states to engage in the type of multi-level and multi-actor governance that characterizes cohesion policy and the other territorialized policy area (i.e. rural development) within the EU (Leonardi, 2005: 141). In all of the new members from the fifth enlargement round, the first planning period of the structural funds (2004-06) began within a framework of centralized and hierarchical governance that gave regions and regional actors a limited role, if one at all (Bruzst, 2008:610). In the period 2004-2006, the EU-funded regional development programmes for the first time started being implemented in 12 regions in Turkey, which were designated by the Preliminary National Development Programme (pNDP 2003). Yet the key partners for the implementation of regional programmes under the Pre-accession Financial Assistance to Turkey were largely coming from the central institutions. This suggests a limited decentralization deriving from the EU structural programmes (see Chapter 6).

In 2007, a single instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) came into effect, which replaced the instruments introduced for the 2000-2006 period. IPA currently covers the candidate states (*Croatia*, F.Y.R. Macedonia and Turkey) and the potential candidate states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia— including Kosovo). With the introduction of IPA, the operational structures have been mostly centralized and thus the EU has gone through a more centralized fund management, undermining any genuine shifts towards the multi-level modality in applicant states. Apart from the Sectoral Monitoring Committee, there is no other institutional channel for those SNAs to participate in the implementation of regional programmes or to establish direct relations with the supranational institutions (for further details regarding the implementation of IPA in Turkey see Chapter 6).

Since the management of structural funds or pre-accession aids, as a main incentive for change in regional policy in member (and candidate) states, some principles have included an ‘integrated approach’ (using social, regional and agricultural mechanisms in a coherent way), ‘concentration’ (on target zones), ‘additionality’ (EU funding was to supplement as opposed to replace national development aid), ‘programming’ (pluriannual programmes instead of one-off projects) and ‘partnership’ (Bauer & Börzel, 2010: 255). In order to receive EU’s pre-accession funds, it is required from applicant states to meet these criteria for implementation.

Among others, the partnership principle provides the Commission with a powerful tool to initiate bilateral relations between the national governments and their regions at the domestic level. This makes the management of structural policy a process of multi-level cooperative policymaking (Hooghe, 1996; Bache, 1998). Bauer and Börzel (2010: 255) argue that it promised nothing more than the transformation of vertical relationships via functional policymaking. However, in the light of the EU’s requirements, most specifically for the management of structural funds, Brusis (2002:553) points out that EU conditionality played a significant role in the very emergence of regions as a functional unit of territorial governance within applicant states— in some instances acting as a catalyst of the domestic reform process. As seen in the empirical analysis, it is indeed the case for Turkey because the EU was the main catalyst behind the adoption of NUTS classification and to a certain extent the establishment of RDAs in Turkey. Consequently, from the very narrow perspective of cost-benefit calculations, the financial incentives seemed to be the strongest driver for regional institutional change as well as growing awareness and organizational change in SNAs in Turkey for the sake of benefitting from these funds. However, Bachtler and McMaster (2008) conclude that there is no guarantee that the Structural Funds (particularly the principles of subsidiarity and partnership) will necessarily promote regionalisation and the role of regional authorities in Central and Eastern Europe, at least in the short to medium terms.

**The Principle of Partnership**

Although the principles of subsidiarity and partnership are evaluated as a key test of Europeanization and in MLG theses in many relevant studies (Bache, 1998; 2008; Börzel, 1999; 2002), the central focus throughout the research is on the partnership principle. As remarked by Thielemann (2000), partnership can have strong mobilisation and legitimization effects on member states. He considers that partnership can empower SNAs, but with a caveat that at the same time partnerships have faced strong resistance, even within a federal system like Germany. One may therefore need to elucidate the concept of partnership and its relevant effect on the mobilisation of SNAs across the EU arena.

Retrospectively, the involvement of SNAs in the EU regional policy process has been increased through the adoption of the partnership principle. In the framework regulations from 1988[[60]](#footnote-60), partnership implied only vertical interaction by neglecting the horizontal dimensions and thus it came closer to multi-level government rather than multi-level governance (Sobzcak, 2007). The 1993 and 1999 revisions of European structural and cohesion policy subsequently extended partnership to the social partners. In so doing, the term acquired wider meaning including both private and third-parties, strengthening the horizontal dimensions. Extension towards the horizontal dimensions, however, undermined the privileged role of regional and local authorities (Bauer & Börzel, 2010: 256). This created a problem for a country having a statist tradition. Given that public policy is the aggregate of many different interests, values and identities, it is difficult for those countries having a statist tradition to bring economic, social, political and state actors together in a given territorial context as each of them has their own agenda (for the potential effect of this on Turkish SNAs, see Chapters 5 and 9). This situation was in fact remarkable for those states coming from the Communist regime as they had weak and immature local and regional administrative traditions.

During the CEECs’ enlargement process, as Bache (2010:65-6) claims, the Commission went back to its earlier partnership requirements which underline the cooperation between tiers of government instead of worrying about horizontal relations among economic, political and social partners for the CEECs. For him, the legacy of democratic centralism and the corresponding absence of local and regional self-government have provided important institutional barriers for those states. The Commission also tried to reduce political resistance in those states and to keep the enlargement process on schedule. It may be because with the introduction of the IPA fund system, instead of promoting regionalization of fund management, the EU made the allocation of financial incentives more centralized. The EU was worried about transparency in managing the structural funds through regional partners owing to the lack of their institutional and administrative capacity. Consequently, the Commission after 2000 abandoned its previous emphasis on decentralization and instead encouraged the centralized administration of EU assistance by the CEECs in order to ensure the efficient utilization of allocated funds (Baun & Marek, 2008:7; Bauer & Börzel, 2010: 256). Even if a certain level of regionalization was promoted in the CEECs from the beginning, the Commission has paradoxically promoted centralization during the accession stages and for the first couple of years after accession (Ertugal, 2007). As a direct result of this turn in fund management, RDAs in Turkey are not able to allocate EU’s development aid which reduces the interaction between the Commission and Turkish RDAs (see Chapters 6 and 8). This is also a good example for highlighting the importance of the temporality expressed by the historical institutionalist (see Chapter 1).

The creation of regional arrangements or reinvigoration of the existing SNAs in new member and applicant states does not mean that those SNAs are capable of absorbing a large amount of structural funds. The creation of institutional capability requires time and learning. As Allen (2008:24) reports, there was a question mark about both the capacity and the capability of the new member states to implement structural spending either under a system in which subnational partnerships with the Commission are encouraged or one that places more weight on the activities of the central governments of the member states. In questioning the existence of capacity on subnational levels in new member states, Bailey and De Propis (2004) similarly discuss that they are not in a position to properly participate in multi-level governance partnership schemes partly because the local and regional institutional capacity does not exist, and partly because of the conscious and effective gatekeeping of the new member state national governments. Irrespective of the reasons, what has become clear is that SNAs from new member states from the fifth enlargement round and the incumbent applicant states have a problem with direct access to the EU institutions because of the centralization of EU fund management. This naturally reduces the pulling effect of EU opportunities which had been the case for the old member states, particularly those SNAs from the UK (discussed below). In short, the evolution of partnership principles has reduced the possibility of direct relations between SNAs and supranational institutions. Besides, the national channels, as intergovernmentalists argue, have become more useful for the representation of subnational interests in new member and candidate states.

There is also diversity in the implications of the partnership principle within the old member states. Considering the impact of the partnership arrangements on territorial restructuring within eight members, what Hooghe (1996) found was that actors at different levels- national, subnational and supranational- controlled different resources in different member states, influencing their ability to shape policy implementation within the framework set by EU-level arrangements. Hooghe and Marks (2001: 78) also emphasize that cohesion policy has produced a highly uneven pattern of subnational mobilisation across the EU arena. Some scholars even went further to consider that the supposed influence of European regions through direct interest representation is a misperception and stress that greater influence can be achieved by regions via (rather than by passing) their member states (Le Galès & Lequesne 1998; Jeffrey 1997a; 2000:4-6). This situation is more visible in the centralized states such as the UK, Portugal, Greece and many CEECs because of the excessive gatekeeping role of central institutions. In more decentralized member states, SNAs were better at exploiting the opportunities provided by the partnership requirement (Bache & George, 2006:374-5).

Summing up, a meaningful regionalization is essential for strengthening the existing subnational level and/or creating new subnational actors in order to initiate subnational mobilisation on the EU level (Brusis, 2010: 72). However, considering the entire developments and events (not necessarily related to each other) since the mid-1980s that have been discussed so far, SNAs in many member states have enhanced their role in the European policy-making process. These developments not only enhanced the role SNAs play in several EU policies, such as environment, social policy and implementation of community’s funds, but also fortified the extra-state channels in which SNAs have established a direct contact with supranational institutions (Hooghe & Marks, 2001: 81-92). The next section turns its attention to the European activities of SNAs by outlining the channels in which they participate in the EU’s multi-level polity.

## 

## 4.4. EUROPEAN ACTIVITIES OF SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS

Throughout the integration process, new opportunities have been created for interest formulations of SNAs in EU politics. In particular, the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty and the principle of partnership marked a decisive step in the development of lobbying in Brussels by a number of SNAs. The 1990s therefore witnessed the multiplication of access points for the activities of SNAs in Brussels, ranging from information gathering to influencing the EU policy-making process. This section cannot take stock of the totality of subnational activities in Brussels. Rather it can present some categorizations around common activities, which are extensively studied by some scholars (Marks *et al.*, 2002; Husseyyune & Jans, 2008). For them, SNAs generally involved in influencing EU policy, lobbying, creating networks, gathering information, securing the EU funds and promoting the outward image of the cities or regions in which they are embedded. Although ‘the political influence of SNAs’[[61]](#footnote-61) is still being contested in academe, the presence of SNAs in Brussels justifies the reinforcement of third-level politics in the multi-layered system of European governance.

Scholars generally analyze six channels for SNAs to access European politics except for the national one (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Jeffrey, 1997a; 2000; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Tatham, 2008). These ‘extra-state’[[62]](#footnote-62) channels encompass the Council of Ministers, the Commission (especially via DG Regio and DG Enlargement), the European Parliament, the Committee of Regions (the CoR), interregional organizations and liaison offices. Without delving into the extent to which these channels are important for the effective engagement of SNAs to the European policy network [[63]](#footnote-63), the research tends to classify them as institutional EU channels (the Council of Ministers, the EU Parliament, the EU Commission and the Committee of Regions) and non-institutional EU channels (interregional organizations and liaison offices) (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998).

**Institutional EU Channels**

*The Council of Ministers*

The Council of Ministers is no longer the sanctuary of a pure intergovernmentalism. This is because under art. 146 (later changed as art.203) of the Maastricht treaty some member states had a chance to send subnational ministers to act as their delegates on the Council of Ministers (Bullmann, 1997:15; Greenwood, 2003). Only constitutionally and institutionally stronger SNAs (e.g. the German and Austria Länder, Belgian regions and Spanish Comunidad Autónomas and the UK devolved administrations) are currently able to access the Council meetings. As for the situation for the new member states, there is no demand from SNAs to attend the Council meetings (Scherpereel, 2007). This channel is also neglected in documenting the empirical findings for the Turkish case because of its candidate status.

*The European Commission*

Given its role and importance in the institutional framework of the EU, the Commission is one of the most targeted places for interest representation. On the one side, all sorts of interest groups raise their priorities; on the other side, the Commission receives expertise and assistance for doing its job. The Commission generally follows an open door policy not only for regional representatives but also for other non-state organizations due to the Treaty of Amsterdam[[64]](#footnote-64). However, it would be misleading to draw a conclusion that the open door policy of the Commission aims at weakening the member states and empowering regions.

*The European Parliament*

The European Parliament is also an effective channel for the promotion of subnational interests, especially when MEPs are elected on the basis of regional constituencies as in the case of the UK, France, Belgium, Ireland or Italy (Tatham, 2008). Although it is still ambiguous to what extent MEPs can be a carrier of regional or local authorities’ interests to the other institutions of the European Union, they can still be an efficient way for SNAs to promote their particular interests, bypass their member state’s auspices and gain direct access to the Commission’s hierarchy (Tatham, 2008).

*The Committee of Regions (the CoR)*

The creation of the CoR in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 seemed to be a strong justification of the Commission’s attitude towards inputs provided by SNAs[[65]](#footnote-65). This was echoed in the slogan ‘Europe of Regions’ (Knapp, 1994; Loughlin, 1997). However, the CoR is still a consultative body, predominantly for the regional and local policies[[66]](#footnote-66). SNAs from the candidate states can also participate in the CoR activities. As a main EU level institution for the representation of territorial interests in Brussels, many local and regional actors actively engage with EU politics through the CoR in an attempt to influence the EU decision-making process.

With regard to SNAs from non-member states, as Schönlau (2010) argues, the CoR has reached beyond the EU borders through the ongoing process of EU enlargement in order spread democratic ‘values’ to the accession countries. In 1997, the CoR made its first contact with SNAs in applicant states (Scherpereel, 2007). The enlargement-related activities are generally folded into the CoR’s Commission for External Relations (RELEX). Although its approach to SNAs in the applicant states has been inconsistent over time, those states used that chance to deepen their contacts with existing members (ibid). The CoR also organizes and promotes direct contacts between accession states inside and outside the Union, by establishing working groups or Joint Consultative Committee (as in the case of Turkey, see Chapter 8). Consequently, there is a relationship between the CoR and the applicant states but this was not densely institutionalized.

**Non-Institutional Channels**

*Interregional Organizations*

A growing number of interregional organizations[[67]](#footnote-67) have congregated several SNAs from different member (and candidate) states for the promotion and representation of territorial interests at the EU level, particularly for the last four decades. Hooghe and Marks (2001: 89) emphasize three different ways for the creation of interregional organizations: (1) Created by the Commission and are attached to a specific Community program or initiative (e.g. Leader, Rechar, Retex, Reneval and Recite); (2) Self-directed mobilisation among SNAs with common territorial features or policy problems (e.g. Eurocities, EURADA); and (3) Self-organization on the part of relatively successful regions (e.g. the Four Motors of Europe). Irrespective of how interregional organization has been established, they have initiated formal and informal mechanisms of deepening connections between members from old member states and members from new and applicant states (Scherpereel, 2007: 30). In this respect, they have established special committees and working groups and have sponsored conferences aiming to increase mutual understanding and networking among western and eastern members.

*Liaison Offices in Brussels*


The maintenance of a permanent base in Brussels can be regarded as the most explicit evidence suggesting the Europeanization of subnational governance (John, 1996; Moore, 2011). After the first regional offices were established in Brussels in 1984, territorial representation and subnational mobilisation in Europe have become a vigorous debate in the literature (Jeffrey 1997a; Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Marks *et al.*, 1996; 2002). Statistically, while there were 15 offices in 1988, the number of regional offices reached 54 by the end of 1993 (Marks *et al.*, 2002). In April 2007, 165 regions, 17 local or sub-regional authorities and 18 other entities (mainly representations of regional private-sector entities) were accredited by the Brussels capital region (Huysseunne & Jans, 2008). Although having a liaison office in Brussels is the most costly[[68]](#footnote-68) option for SNAs to engage with EU politics, the number and capacity of offices has still been increasing. While new members have rushed to establish offices in Brussels, old regions are expanding their capacity by recruiting more staff, deploying more resources and moving to larger and better-located premises (Moore, 2008a:517).

Those constitutionally strong and rich regions from EU-15 countries (German, Spanish Autonomous communities, the devolved administrations of the UK and French regions) are much more enthusiastic than other members. Territorial presence in Brussels, conversely, remains inadequate for Luxembourg and other highly centralized old member states, such as Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Regional and Local authorities of these countries are limited by only a small amount of capital and major cities (Huysseunne & Jans, 2008).

Greenwood (1997:229) remarks that although Greece, Portugal and Ireland (together with Spain) are the greatest recipients of the structural funds, they are the worst represented in Brussels. Marks *et al*. (1996) demonstrated that regions having representations in Brussels are not those that obtain the most funding from the EU or the poorest, most needy regions. What they found is that subnational mobilisation is positively associated with the degree of overlap between the competencies of a regional government and the EU as well as with the political distinctiveness of a region. In this respect, they concluded that there is no relation between money (gaining structural funds) and the presence of regional offices in Brussels, rather political factors—and less strongly regional factors— are important for the regional offices in Brussels.

As for situations of SNAs from the new members, the influxes of representations have emerged since 2002. Those in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia and Romania seem more attracted to the idea of a direct representation in Brussels (see Table 4.1). Of the new member states, the presence of SNAs from Poland is remarkable since 15 Polish regional offices have been operating in Brussels. SNAs especially from the new member states or candidates have usually followed the path drawn by the previous experiences of other regions from the EU 15 (Scherpereel, 2007). One may therefore assume that the fashion of a liaison office will continue when new members, candidates or non-member states establish their own regional offices on the basis of lesson-drawing from the existing regional offices in Brussels (Moore, 2008a). One Polish regional officer, for instance, comments that ‘it would be strange if we were not there’ (cited in Moore, 2008a: 520). This is a good case for the logic of appropriateness. The above hypothesis drawn by Marks *et al.* (1996) cannot fit into the Polish case. It is because not only does the cost-benefit calculation work but also the logic of appropriateness, as the Polish case justifies the social learning which leads to an institutional isomorphism within the SNAs in the EU (Scherpereel, 2007). It is also worth noting that even if some regional offices from new members have failed or do not exist anymore, recent years have witnessed the consolidation of regional offices from new member states and the establishment of representations from candidate states (Croatia) or from countries involved in the EU neighbourhood policy (Ukraine) (Huysseunne & Jans, 2008).

**Table 4.1** Number of offices in Brussels established by some member states



**Source** (Regional Office Contact Directory, 2009)

**General Considerations on the Extra-State Channels**

Multi-level governance is a system of decision making in which there are multiple access points and multiple opportunities to exercise influence and pressure, and multiple places at which decisions are made (Goldsmith, 2003: 115). In such a system, there is an extensive subnational mobilisation across all available access points. Yet decision making in this model is described by Hooghe (1996) as ‘pluralist with an elitist bias’, suggesting that only actors with valuable resources can participate. Furthermore, as explained in chapters one and two, SNAs from member (and candidate) states do not benefit equally from these channels due to the differences in institutional arrangements, legal structures, administrative framework and traditions in their domestic settings.

The variation in the level of mobilisation among regions and cities in member states and a substantial divergence in their agendas for the EU politics have in fact become a centre of attention for a number of scholars. Those scholars have listed a multitude of factors which mainly constrain or enable SNAs to pursue their activities on the EU level. The majority of studies have sought to explain the factors that motivate SNAs to establish their liaison offices in Brussels[[69]](#footnote-69). To analyze what causes this uneven pattern of mobilisation across the European arena and within the member states, various factors constraining or enabling SNAs to pursue their activities on the EU level have been listed. As argued in chapter two, scholars have pinpointed the domestic context as the key source of variation and highlighted the importance of the national and subnational conditions as the main explanatory variable which underpins subnational mobilisation towards the European arena. The domestic—national and subnational—context of a given SNA largely depends on their engagement with the EU institutions. In this respect, those SNAs operating in Brussels cannot benefit from EU opportunities equally.

Blatter *et al.* (2009: 192) concluded that a large budget in combination with strong regional competencies in foreign relations is the main pathway toward a strongly staffed regional office in Brussels in order to influence EU decision-making. However, Bomberg and Peterson (1998: 232) argue the strong constitutional and legal position at home can be a critical source for SNAs, but it does not guarantee access or influence in Brussels and Strasbourg. From a slightly different perspective, Tatham (2008) argues that regional authorities trying to promote their interests directly at the EU level hardly undermine the liberal/intergovernmentalist assumptions as interests’ representation and influence are different. Accordingly, one may argue that if interest representation and subnational mobilisation are not that influential, they could be background noise in the EU policy arena.

There is also some strong evidence suggesting that the image of regions as a third-level of EU multi-level governance has evaporated. Keating and Jones (1995: 10) argue that the scenario of the Europe of regions ignores the very real power of nation-states, the resilience of their political and bureaucratic elites and the powerful private interests which have invested in them. One may therefore argue that the nation-state may not have disappeared and it still holds the role of gatekeeping but it is being transformed, increasingly penetrated by supranational and subnational influences. Many SNAs cannot succeed in playing an important role in the EU decision-making process because they act as if they are extensions of their respective states or background noise in Brussels and in any other relevant venue for representation (Jeffrey, 2000; Tatham, 2008). Moreover, SNAs are largely confined to regional issues and are not able to extend their scope from regional policy issues to other policy sectors (Börzel, 2002).

Another important undermining factor is that the CoR has not been able to play an important role amongst other formal EU institutions throughout its evolution so it became a consultative body with no real decision-making power (Jeffrey, 1997a: 207; Bullmann, 1997; Tatham, 2008). This justifies the fact that regions and localities in the EU have many differences in terms of institutional structures, powers, strategies, and aspirations, showing the practical limits of a Europe of regions thesis (Bullmann, 1997; Tatham, 2008). For instance, as Jeffrey noted (1997a), German Länder participate more strongly and through more channels in European decision-making than Irish or even French regions because they can bring in more resources. As a result, a Europe of the regions is just an ill-defined idea for some authors and utopia for some regions which seek nationalist purposes (Greenwood, 2003). Some privileged regions, mainly from the federal states, could act as a third level in European policy. Other regions especially from the new member states or candidates could just follow the path drawn by previous experiences of other regions from the EU-15.

Hooghe and Marks (2001) accept the need for further concrete empirical studies on how multi-level governance works in practice. For instance, Marks *et al.* (1996:189) suggest:

‘Regional mobilisation does not empower regional governments in general but only a select subset of them. The picture of regional mobilisation we present here is one of wide divergence among regional governments, rather than convergence. There is little evidence of a Europe of the regions here; rather we have seen the emergence of a Europe with the regions, or more accurately, a Europe with some regions’.


Overall, it may be misleading to think of any homogenously constructed ‘Europe of the regions’ within the near future due to differences in subnational settings in the European member states in terms of structure, powers and resources (Bullmann, 1997: 4). Subnational mobilisation and the effective participation of regions in the EU policy network have become various and depend on the idiosyncrasies of national and subnational factors (see Chapter 2). The next section first presents the different stages for subnational mobilisation towards the EU arena and then puts its emphasis on the uneven pattern of subnational mobilisation within and across the member (and candidate) states.

## 4.5. FOUR STAGES OF SUBNATIONAL MOBILISATION

The early writing on subnational mobilisation mainly focused on the mushrooming of liaison offices created by SNAs in Brussels during the mid-1980s. Establishing an office, the clearest indication of subnational mobilisation, is just one way of demonstrating the euro-engagement of SNAs. The research argues that there are several stages in their engagement with the EU’s multi-level polity. In explaining the Europeanization of subnational governance, John (2000) describes Europeanization as ‘a collection of processes which progress from greater awareness of European legislation, growing willingness to search for European finance, networking with other European local authorities and experts, direct lobbying of Brussels institutions, and the influence of EU ideas on subnational policy making’. From this definition, one may see that the process of Europeanization necessitates some steps for subnational mobilisation. It starts from growing awareness of EU matters to actively involving with the EU politics by engaging with different EU access points and shaping EU politics.

The research finds the ladder model for Europeanization of governance of Peter John (2001: 72) reasonably convenient for the research purpose. According to this model, John suggests that Europeanization is a stepped set of activities with subnational authorities gradually ascending a ladder. He divides the steps into stages that reflect the degree of choice local bodies have over their activities. The more action the SNAs undertake, the greater the interplay with European ideas and practices and the higher they ascend the ladder (Figure 4.1). Some of these activities, such as responding to regulations, are compulsory and so are minimal in character (steps A-C); others are associated with the search for European funding, reflecting the financially oriented subnational authority (steps A-E). The next stage of networking (steps A-G), although closely associated with obtaining finance, can involve more exchanges of ideas. However, it is only when SNAs start to incorporate European ideas into their policies that they reach the final, fully Europeanized stage (steps A-I) (Ibid).

Whereas the lowest steps (i.e., minimal and financially orientated) of the ladder mean the absorption of Europeanization in a top-down manner, the next two steps are usually followed by bottom-up and horizontal activities. The highest level of subnational Europeanization is marked by the incorporation of European ideas and practices into the core of the local policy agenda. In sum, the more action an SNA takes, the greater the interaction with European ideas and practices and the higher they stand on the so-called ‘ladder metaphor’.

**Figure 4.1** Ladder Model for Europeanization of Governance

**Source:** John (2001:72)

The ladder for Europeanization of governance is a valuable metaphor. Yet it needs to contain some more insights in order to adapt for the state of Turkish SNAs. Initially, the metaphor should be time-sensitive. This is because the movement of SNAs on the ladder is not always progressive but at times may be regressive depending on developments at the national and supranational level. For instance, given the current affairs of Turkish-EU relations, while some SNAs have stepped back from their earlier position, some others have moved onto further steps. As will be seen in the empirical analysis, such an erratic engagement with the EU manifests itself in three different time spans: Europeanization as Democratization, Proto-Europeanization and Alaturka Europeanization. Secondly, SNAs do not always follow a particular pattern to move on the ladder. Sometimes they skip over the steps. SNAs may start with stage A but then skip a few steps and go to stage D. Furthermore, some SNAs may also move sideways. This may be considered a spill-over effect. As a concrete example, SNAs may recruit staff and create an EU unit but then staff in that unit may engage with other international or national projects if they perceive decreasing EU attractiveness or if they think it is not strategic to allocate time only for the EU matters. Finally, not all SNAs are strategically driven. They may become a member of certain interregional organizations or create EU units inside their respective organization as a consequence of imitating the movements of other SNAs.

Consistent with the above discussion, the research argues that what happens in an SNA between the input of an EU stimulus and an output that encourages mobilisation may be described in four stages: growing awareness at subnational level; adaptation in organizational settings; engagement with transnational activities and their equivalent in the EU; and conducting EU level activities through vertical mobilisation. These stages are time-sensitive and there is a possibility of spill-over within each stage.

***Growing awareness at subnational level:*** By this stage, SNAs have become aware of EU opportunities. They have sought to access EU funds and be involved in the EU projects. The main motivation is to obtain the EU’s financial incentives. Even though their organizational setting was not ready and the capacity of human sources inadequate, some SNAs used their existing staff (who at least could speak English) and/or worked with consultation firms which mainly specialized on the EU’s projects.

***Change in organizational arrangements:*** Several SNAs realized that fund opportunities have been increasing and their EU activities have been widening. Accordingly, those SNAs have started to create an EU unit and recruit staff or a group of experts for their respective organizations. As a result, with the encouragement of some visionary leaders and/or learning from other institutions, EU activities have become institutionalized, causing a change in organizational setting of SNAs.

***Transnational Activities:*** Apart from receiving EU monies, some SNAs have engaged with the transnational links through sister cities, twinning links and networking arrangements in order to involve in joint-projects and transfer innovative local practice. Their networking with the European counterparts led them to learn best practices and teach them how to exploit the EU opportunities. This is particularly important for horizontal Europeanization.

***Vertical Mobilisation:*** This is a stage where SNAs perceive their role in the wider EU politics and act accordingly. To reach this level, a strong organizational capacity and a proactive leadership are essential pushing factors to exploit the opportunities within the EU multi-level polity. Some Turkish SNAs have already started to participate in interregional networks or established liaison offices in Brussels. Some others have even interacted with the EU institutions. The crucial point here is that vertical mobilisation should be bottom-up, particularly in the absence of a clear pulling effect.

Overall, while the first two stages are compatible with the top-down Europeanization (as in the case of first generation Europeanization), stages three and four include both bottom-up and horizontal activities (as in the case of second generation Europeanization). In fact, the idea behind the ladder metaphor or four stages of subnational mobilisation is that SNAs are on different levels of a continuum, suggesting uneven patterns of subnational mobilisation among Turkish SNAs. The remainder of the section builds on this.

**The Attitude of SNAs towards Europeanization**

There is a differentiated adaptation to the Europeanization process depending on each country’s national characteristics. Many researchers have sought to understand the attitudes of central governments towards the impact of Europeanization (see Chapter 1). During the adaptation to the Europeanization process, Börzel (2001) identified three different attitudes of member states towards EU matters: pace-setting, foot-dragging and fence-sitting[[70]](#footnote-70). Like national governments, the strategies of SNAs towards the engagement with the EU institutions are various— largely determined by their preferences and their capacity to act. Goldsmith and Klausen (1997) sought to explore the attitudes of SNAs towards EU integration, with a particular reference to the institutional environment, administrative capacity and new organizational and institutional development in and between local governments. In analyzing the 12 old EU members, they developed a four-fold classification of responses—counteractive, passive, reactive and proactive—to classify the different kinds of SNAs, which is to some extent related to John’s ladder model. Irrespective of the differences in each national setting, what they discussed is that there are common features of response to Europeanization. The typology suggested by Goldsmith and Klausen is presented as follows:

**Counteractive:** Some SNAs are suspicious or sceptical about the Union, who remain isolated from Brussels, and for whom European matters are of little or no importance. This group lacks even the elementary internal coordination necessary to deal with the EU and its vast outpourings of matters relevant to subnational issues. In this group, leaders are likely to view the EU and its bureaucracy with suspicion and refuse to deal with them at any level above that which is required by law. This behaviour naturally inhibits both the politicians and paid officials from learning about the EU and adapting their behaviour accordingly.

**Passive:** This group is largely passive in their relations with the EU institutions. If they learn anything at all about the EU matters it is by accident rather than design and at best such SNAs will have put in place what is effectively a post-box for European matters. There is little or no official commitment or involvement with European matters beyond that required by law. In this respect, their adaptation to the EU is extremely incremental.

**Reactive:** A number of points distinguish them from the passive category. First, they demonstrate a positive interest in European matters, but they are followers rather than leaders. They are in the process of recruiting and/or training staff as European specialists, send both politicians and officers to Europe and recognize the value of twinning arrangements as a means by which they may be able to join the European game. They usually learn from others and leaders in this category are aware of the need to internationalize and to re-orientate themselves towards Europe, though they are a little unsure how to do it.

**Proactive:** This group has seen the potential of EU and has a strategic view of where they want their authority to be within the new Europe. Their success in EU matters is largely because of having large European units, with well-qualified staff and with good systems for coordinating and disseminating information about Europe. This group has established co-operative links with other authorities across Europe, with whom communication is frequent and who are regarded as ready partners in European ventures of all sorts.

This research finds these patterns reasonably valuable to show both the attitudes of leaders in SNAs and the types of behaviour among Turkish SNAs (see Chapters 7 and 8). Whereas counteractive and passive SNAs have usually remained within the first or second stage, reactive and to a large extent proactive SNAs have reached the third and fourth stages of subnational mobilisation (see Chapter 9).

## 

## 4.5. CONCLUSION

Of perhaps more immediate relevance for the purposes of this chapter, developments within the EU have been considered as a significant factor stimulating the interests of SNAs to establish direct relations with the EU institutions in Brussels. Recent years have witnessed an increased recognition of the importance of territorial politics in Europe, and also of the complexities of the subject (Keating, 2006: 153). What has commonly been agreed by a number of scholars is that developments throughout the integration process have advanced the changing nature and growing importance of SNAs’ activities in Europe over the last four decades. These developments supporting the state of SNAs in the EU member (and candidate) states include: the completion of the internal market; the revised treaties of the Single European Act and Maastricht; the subsequent reforms of cohesion policy and structural funds; the launch of the principles of partnership, additionality and subsidiarity; the creation of the Committee of Regions; and right to attend the Ministry of Council meetings for some privileged regions. These developments have presented new opportunities for SNAs and therefore they are generally deemed as a major driving force behind the promotion of multi-level governance (Hooghe & Keating, 2006).

The chapter has also explored the argument of whether the financial incentives and the principle of partnership have had a significant impact on the development of multi-level governance in member and applicant states. Despite the stimulation with the partnership principle since 1988, national governments have in fact remained effective gatekeepers and allowed public and private, regional and local interests to participate in the regional policy-making process but not more than that. In this respect, multi-level participation should not be confused with the multi-level governance (Bailey & DePropis, 2004; Bache, 2008; Allen, 2008). As regards the situation for the SNAs from the new member and candidate states, although the Commission has attempted to shift them towards a system of multi-level governance in relation to structural policy, the Commission (particularly after the IPA regulations) sent mixed signals and national governments quickly learned their gatekeeping role (Bailey & De Propis, 2004).

The form of subnational mobilisation and the channels where SNAs are able to contact the EU institutions and their activities in Brussels have also been outlined. As a result of these developments in the integration process, the multiplication of access points and the ongoing enlargement process, a large number of SNAs both from member and candidate states have sought to engage with the multi-level polity and to affect the EU-decision making process on their behalf. All of the channels illustrated above suggest that engagement with the supranational institutions and networks has gone hand in hand with SNAs’ integration with the Europeanization process. Even if some constitutionally and administratively strong SNAs have mobilized across the EU arena through different channels, they are no more effective individually in relation to influencing EU governance than they are collectively within the CoR or other relevant interregional organizations in Brussels.

What has been revealed from the literature search is that SNAs are not equally mobilized and there is a variation in their engagement with the EU institutions. While some SNAs have used the multiple channels and established large offices in Brussels, others have used comparatively limited channels. The research therefore proposed four stages of subnational mobilisation to reveal the different levels of subnational engagement with EU matters. True, subnational mobilisation is uneven across the member and candidate states and their participation in the multi-level system of EU governance. This raises the important question: What may explain the variation in their engagement with the EU institutions? Scholars again largely address the domestic—national and subnational—level as a source of variation.

All things considered, the broader debate regarding the EU’s regional policy initiatives and its related fund mechanisms offers both opportunities and challenges. It is not overstatement to suggest that cohesion policy and its main financial instruments (structural funds, IPA for Turkey) provide the most useful and appropriate ‘empirical lenses’ through which to observe the interplay between Europeanization and subnational mobilisation at the EU level. In the remainder of the thesis, the creation of multi-level governance in one of the applicant states, Turkey, will be discussed by giving a particular emphasis on the issue of subnational mobilisation. However, to understand the extent to which Turkish SNAs are able to exploit these opportunities and deal with the challenges, one should take a close look at the domestic context. The next chapter therefore turns its attention to the Turkish domestic context.

# CHAPTER 5 DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN TURKEY

## 5.1. INTRODUCTION

The message in the previous chapters is clear: Irrespective of the main motive(s) for changing territorial relations in any particular state—e.g. the pull factor of the EU opportunity structures, the push factors of the certain organizational capabilities or the sociological approach of learning—the nuance lies fundamentally in the domestic details. Therefore, the degree and nature of subnational mobilisation beyond the national jurisdictions are largely conditional on domestic institutions and practices (Hooghe, 1995: 177). For instance, motivations behind subnational mobilisation beyond the national setting should be first accommodated in national histories, political cultures, and institutional and legal contexts. Once the power balances and administrative cultures are institutionalized in a given domestic setting, they are difficult to change because of the path dependent character of such an administrative system.

The research does not simply take the domestic context for granted in a way that solely explains subnational mobilisation. Rather, it argues that national institutions and subnational contexts define important intermediating variables but still do not determine the ultimate outcome. An example of such an assertion may be observed in the establishment of liaison offices in Brussels. Despite the fact that there is no legislative right (unless they obtain permission from the national authorities) for SNAs to open their offices in different foreign countries, two offices (Istanbul and Yalova) were established in Brussels by circumventing the law (i.e. acting via their affiliate companies or NGOs). This suggests that as far as a proactive SNA is determined to embark on any kind of international activity, they may find the necessary means without waiting for the consent from the national government (see Chapter 8). This is a critical difference between intermediating factors and independent variables of the research. While the former may shape, obstruct or facilitate subnational mobilisation, the latter may determine the outcomes.

This chapter is designed to throw light on the intermediating factors in the domestic context in Turkey. The primary aim therefore is to examine the political, historical, legal and institutional culture of SNAs from a historical perspective before the detailed case studies of the thesis. This will furnish some clues to the present obstacles to and/or incentives for SNAs mobilizing in the European arena. To analyse the extent to which the domestic context shapes, facilitates or inhibits the mobilisation of SNAs outside the national jurisdiction, the chapter is organized in four parts. The first part outlines the territorial and constitutional framework. The second part presents key historical developments and actors/institutions that are involved in the regional/local governance system in Turkey. The third part examines the subnational context and politics and presents the three intermediating factors: regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relations and the existence of a territorial network. The final part concludes and summarizes the main discussion in the chapter.

## 

## 5.2. NATIONAL CONTEXT

**Territorial and Constitutional Framework**

The dominant state practice in Turkey since the late 19th century has been political, economic, and administrative centralization characterized by the logic of Napoleonic state tradition (Güney & Çelenk, 2010). Such a system is initially based on the principle of a strong central government over weak localities. The subnational level of the Turkish state organization is constituted by ‘provinces’ that come closest to what some scholars would label a ‘region’ (see Chapter 4). There are eighty-one[[71]](#footnote-71) provinces which vary in size and population. The boundaries of most provinces, except those politically established, are historically determined (Polat, 1978: 66). Provincial boundaries no longer conform to the territorial shape of actual socio-economic or infrastructural activities. Although there has been no drastic change in the number of provinces since the beginning of the Turkish Republic, the organization of provinces has become a considerable issue on the public administration agenda since the 1960s.

Although Turkey has lacked regional government (discussed below), there is no shortage of local administrations. The territorial administrative system consists of two tiers: national and local administrations. Whereas the national administration is the core of the administrative organization, both in structural and functional aspects, the local administrative system has three subnational units. Provincial Local Administrations (*İl Özel İdaresi*) under the appointed Governors represent the first level. Municipalities (*Belediye*) constitute the second level. Village administrations (*Köy*) form the third level. In addition to these basic types, in 1984 a new type of government confined to the most populated urban centres, called Metropolitan Municipality (*Büyük Şehir Belediyesi*), came into existence. By the creation of a new administrative arrangement, important powers were devolved to the metropolitan municipalities[[72]](#footnote-72). Today, local administrations in Turkey encompass 81 provinces, 16 large metropolitan municipalities and 2951 smaller municipalities (TUIK, 2009). All these local units exist alongside the field units of central government.

As a prime unit of provincial administration, the province (*vilayet*), is ruled by the governor, who has been appointed by the Turkish Council of Ministers after being nominated by the Ministry of Interior and upon the approval of the President of the Republic. The governor is the chief administrative and political officer in the province and is the representative of the Ministry of Interior, as well as of each ministry. In this capacity, the provincial governor (*Vali*) is responsible for directing and coordinating the work of the field units of the ministries and other central agencies in the province with the exception of judges, public prosecutors of the Republic, military units, plants and institutions (Polatoğlu, 2000: 104). Municipal administration is a proper local democratic unit, including an elected mayor and an elected municipal council, though the first direct election for the Mayor was not held until 1963. Village administration, ruled by a headman (*muhtar*), is a mixture of elected and nonelected members.

Of all of the paid and elected officials at subnational level, the position of provincial governor is especially significant. This leads one to consider that the republican arrangement of the local governmental units is based on the principal of delegation, in which local governmental units have a ‘completely subordinate status’ (Köker, 1995: 59). Unlike the role of the centrally appointed governors, municipal administrations’ roles, in reality, were confined to limited services such as, cleaning, transportation, housing and waste management. This was the case even after the municipality law of 1930 (Article 1580)[[73]](#footnote-73), which supposedly provided a wide range of responsibilities for the municipal administrations.

The 1982 Constitution, which is still in effect but has been subjected to many revisions during Turkey’s candidacy to the EU (see Chapter 6), introduced the concepts of centralization, decentralization and deconcentration with reference to the structuring of public administration. In Article 126, concerning the field units of the central administration, it is indicated that ‘the administration of the provinces is based on the principle of deconcentration’ (Polatoğlu, 2000: 78). In placing all government organizations under the hierarchical control of the centre, harmony among the central units is easily ensured. Local administrations are exercised through the power of tutelage, means through which the indivisibility of administration is guaranteed (ibid). In this sort of administrative tutelage, the central government approves or rejects decisions of local administrations, or postpones their implementation, but it cannot take a new decision itself.

In reality, if a country like Turkey does not have political and cultural integrity at home, enhancing the strong central tutelage over the local administrations is a natural process (Keleş, 2011:96). It is the main reason that constitutions (including the current Constitution of 1982) have reflected this centralist tendency and defined the administrative structure in a way that has consolidated and increased the central tutelage over local administration in order to emphasize the integrity and unity of the administrative structure (Çelenk, 2009). The indivisibility of administration is intentionally highlighted in the 1982 Constitution. Article 123, for instance, states that ‘the administration forms a whole (*indivisible*) with regard to its structure and functions, and shall be regulated by law’. Due to its unitary character, there can be no political or administrative entity with ‘reserved powers’ within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic (Aksoy & Polatoğlu, 2003:442). Although the departments and units of public administration may take diverse organizational forms, they all constitute the same body of administration. As a result, the harmony among the various parts of the administration is ensured and regulated by laws.

As appeared during the interviews with the representatives of national institutions, the harmony in the context of subnational mobilisation in Brussels clearly manifests itself in the importance of *the coordination of SNAs with Ankara* and of a *speak with one voice tradition in the outside world*. Ankara’s prime concern was to control the access points and ascertain the reason for an SNA that would like to operate internationally. As a senior expert in the Ministry of Development stated regarding the involvement of regional development agencies (RDAs) with different interregional organizations:

‘As long as RDAs coordinate with the centre, they can go wherever they want, even to outer space. As long as we [the Ministry of Development] know what they are aiming for and what they want from this activity, we support them. However, as a unitary state, we need to have one voice outside and we have a foreign ministry, which is responsible for foreign activities. Apart from diplomatic issues, they can do whatever they want’ (Interview 12).

Similar concerns are also applicable for municipalities. A senior official from the Ministry of Interior explained that:

‘when we [the Ministry of Interior Affairs] receive any request from municipalities regarding their foreign activities such as sister cities, twinning links or joining international organizations, the first action we do is to send this request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to obtain their consent and ensure that this action does not disturb our national position’ (Interview 9).

One may interpret such concerns that Ankara is not in principle against the international activities of SNAs, but they do exert their red lines if they perceive a threat to national integrity. Hence, Ankara desires to control the access points and offers moderate flexibility on SNAs’ relations with the outside world (particularly with the EU institutions). This is especially the case in SNAs’ interaction with the Committee of Regions (see Chapter 8). All these examples support the idea of the intergovernmentalist approach, which argues that the national government as an effective gatekeeper may limit and mediate the international activities of SNAs (see Chapter 2). Yet, as seen in the ensuing chapters, such control over the international activities has become extremely difficult, if not impossible. For this reason, national governments have extended their gatekeeping role during the implementation phase of what a given SNA has gained from the international networks (see also Bache, 1998, for the UK case).

The aspiration of Ankara for gatekeeping between SNAs and their relations with the outside world is legally enshrined[[74]](#footnote-74). An example of this legality may be found in the law of 3335 and of 1173 that regulates a provision for whole non-state actors (including SNAs) who wish to operate abroad. According to these laws, any networking with foreign domestic institutions is subject to the permission of the Turkish Council of Ministers. More specifically, for establishment of an office in foreign countries, the decree law of 189/3 states that local administrations are allowed to have their representations or offices abroad if their organic laws foresee such a possibility. However, neither the municipality law of 5393 nor the RDA law of 5449 have included any clause regarding external offices. This creates an ambiguity as to whether SNAs are allowed to establish an office in foreign countries or not.

In fact, obtaining such legal permission from the national institutions is not exclusive to Turkey. Many SNAs in other member states, such as Spain, France, Italy and England, had the same legal restrictions at the very beginning of creating networking or establishing overseas offices in Brussels (Keating, 2000). As Moore (2011:67-68) points out, the establishment of autonomous representations of regional interests in the EU provided many national authorities with something of a constitutional headache. It is in this context that Hooghe and Marks (2001: 87) define this situation as a ‘constitutional gray zone’. However, some proactive SNAs were able to circumvent the law by creating their liaison offices in Brussels. This is also the case for some Turkish SNAs as they circumvented legal constraint in order to establish their liaison offices in Brussels (see Chapter 8).

One may argue that the current obstacles in the experience of subnational mobilisation both through horizontal (public-private-societal actors) and vertical (through the different levels of governments) dimensions and certainly of the creation of the effective local or regional governance are not only confined to the legal and constitutional context. True, there is a weak constitutional position for Turkish SNAs. Yet some obstacles have their roots in the long and dynamic legacy of history and political cultures. This was pointed out by the majority of interview participants during the field work in Turkey. An example from a local politician in Izmir captured perfectly the extent to which the legacy of history has loomed over the activities of SNAs, which is shared by most of the interview participants both in Ankara and in different cities. For him:

‘There is no deficiency in Turkish legislations in terms of internal and external activities of SNAs, but a lack of intention among local and regional authorities. This is because we [Turkey] with respect of our history and political culture become accustomed to living in an extreme centralist state. Hence, neither Ankara wants to lose its sole control, nor subnational authorities, except for some developed cities, want to challenge it (Interview 35).

Another interview participant additionally observed that ‘there is no great structural obstacle for the mobilisation of SNAs beyond the national setting, but at the same time, there are no supporting mechanisms[[75]](#footnote-75) in the tradition of our [Turkish] administrative system’ (Interview 47). These statements evidently point to the legacy of history and the political cultures because of their structural effect on the behaviour of SNAs. One may therefore argue that history matters (Bulmer, 1993; 1998; Pierson, 1996) in order to understand how the present administrative system under examination has evolved from the past and to trace the legacies of that evolution.

**The Historical Legacy and Political Cultures**

No account of the current territorial relations in Turkey would be complete without first mentioning the heritage of the Ottoman Empire (Dodd, 1969:3). Even though this is not a study to discover the impact of the Ottoman heritage on the current situation of Turkish SNAs, certain landmarks need to be emphasized[[76]](#footnote-76). Heper (1989) perfectly summarizes the tradition of the local administration during the Ottoman period as follows: provincial groups were under the tutelage of the centre; the Ottoman system lacked free cities; and unlike the feudal heritage of localism in some parts of Europe, under Ottoman patrimonialism, or absolute rule by the Sultan, the local notables did not have extensive political-territorial rights. This consideration underlines that there was no rich history of local administrative tradition in the Ottoman system that modern Turkey could inherit.

From the institutionalist perspective, there is a clear continuity between the late Ottoman period and the early Republican time about the local administration understanding and the economic and political problems regarding the division of powers between central and local levels (Mardin, 1973). This is proved in the establishment of an administrative tutelage over the local government. The tutelage in question was exercised over their decisions, transactions, composition and personnel (Heper, 1989). Such an asymmetrical relationship between centre and periphery is not only a tradition that has been inherited from the late Ottoman Empire, but it has also been developed and enhanced by the bureaucratic and military elites within the republican administrations during the consolidation of the nation state after 1923.

A strong central control at the local level suited the political context of the time and issues like the modernization of local administration and development of local democracy were not major priorities for the state elites at the beginning of the creation of the Republic (Çelenk, 2008). By the 1940s, Turkey strove for an industrialization process under a central system. Both state norms and approaches to economic development in the new Republic resulted in a centralized governance system (Koçak, 2006:91). With the transition from a single party system to a multi-party era (in 1946) ‘the bureaucratic ruling tradition’ began losing their power and the party-dominated polity became paramount in Turkish governance’ (Göymen, 2007). This was, however, unstable as was evident in 1960, 1971 and 1980 military interventions. The military as an ardent guardian of ‘Kemalist ideology’[[77]](#footnote-77) and republican values, in corollary of the multi-party era, had filled a power vacuum left by the so-called bureaucratic elites (Heper, 1989). It is suffice to note that whenever political elites, irrespective of their ideology, embarked on undertaking substantial reforms in Turkey, i.e. democratization, regionalization, local administration reforms, and the like, they had to gauge the resistance exerted by certain segments of state and political elites (i.e. multi-level veto points) who embraced the Kemalist ideology and Republican values. Such issues have always been perceived as prime challenges to the Turkish Republic in the context of its integrity and security. The most recent example for the centralist reflection may be seen during the creation of regional development agencies and the comprehensive administrative reforms in the mid-2000s (see Chapter 6).

Although the transition to the multi-party era planted the seeds of democracy inside the country, it, conversely, triggered antagonism between the centre and the periphery characterized by extreme patron-client relations. Because of the complete discretion of the central government, the distribution of material benefits has usually been based on *partisan* consideration enhancing the clientelist channels of interest mediation. Thus, politics has not revolved essentially around the pros and cons of socio-economic policies; political patronage became the basic strategy for obtaining votes (Heper & Keyman, 1998; Ertugal, 2005). Özbudun (1981) remarks that since the creation of the modern Republic, such clientelism has resulted in individual voters or groups trying to fulfil their needs through recourse to powerful patrons who may intervene directly at the centre, rather than seeking to form organized channels for the promotion of more general demands. Because of the patron-client relation, any relaxation of the centralist grip clearly reduces the possibility of patronage opening to the governing party. National governments have therefore proved reluctant to decentralize, given the likely consequences for their own monopoly in power.

Given that the local organizations of political parties have served an important function in conveying local interests to the state structures (Şengül, 2003), local authorities, particularly municipalities, have become arenas of local partisan interest mediation. Moreover, they have functioned to distribute state resources to clients at the local level. If municipalities were controlled by opposition parties, this generally led to the withdrawal of financial resources from that municipality. More specifically, the centre-right parties in the coalition government were not even-handed in their allocation of national funds to some major cities, especially Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, where the mayors were elected from the left parties (Şengül, 2009; Güney & Çelenk, 2010; Keleş, 2011). Other political parties, including those on the left, also followed suit, when they were in power (Heper & Keyman, 1998).

Municipalities controlled by opposition parties often ran into conflict with the ruling parties and state officials. Personal and political antagonism shaped by interest group politics consequently obstructed local development initiatives, and thus local actors used political party connections to maximise the interests for their respective localities (Özcan & Turunç, 2008: 179). Although the exercise of political patronage in return for votes became paramount only with the multi-party system (Heper & Keyman, 1998; Ertugal, 2005; Altunışık & Tür, 2005), the issues of clientelism and patronage have become influential factors in the current Turkish politics[[78]](#footnote-78) (discussed below).

Another major point deserving particular emphasis in the historical evaluations of the Turkish subnational level is the emerging market economy in the post-1980s. In the wake of the politically and economically turbulent conjuncture in the world, the sweeping influence of neo-liberalism was proposed to be a viable response to the post-1970 crisis. By this new era, the reduction in control over the private sector, reducing protection from imports and enhancing export-oriented trade policy have opened the Turkish economy to the world market. Steps towards the neo-liberalization, democratization and modernization of administrative and political structures have been advanced by the ever-growing relations with various international organizations; inter alia, the EU, the Council of Europe, the IMF and the OECD. The impact of neoliberal policies in terms of its internal and external developments was profoundly felt at subnational level.

The external developments, particularly the impact of the EU on Turkish governance, are taken up later (Chapter 6). However, the impact of neoliberalization at subnational level, particularly for the large metropolitan municipalities (i.e. Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Bursa, Adana, Antalya, etc.), through the 1980s and 1990s are also important because of two-interrelated reasons. First of all, with the introduction of metropolitan municipalities[[79]](#footnote-79) and the related reforms, the scope of the responsibilities of local administrations in the provision of public services (housing, transportation, sewage treatment, and parking), along with the promotion of the social and economic development of the relevant communities have been expanded (Eliçin, 2011: 120). Such changes and increasing responsibilities, accordingly, have rendered many metropolitan municipalities to establish municipal enterprises. New municipal companies because of their monopoly positions on the distribution of water, gas or public transportation have generated substantial financial sources for the large municipalities (Bayraktar, 2007).

Although there has been a tendency towards the delegation of services to local administrations, and the municipalities have obtained some means to extract additional financial resources, it is a well-known issue that tax evasion is an important problem for Ankara. Within this context, the inadequacy of local finance creates a chronic problem for municipalities, suggesting that SNAs are not economically well entrenched to conduct certain activities in and outside the national setting. This is conceived in the context of the financial deficit for *resource push* in chapter six. Related to the first point, and because of the financial deficit, several large municipalities have started to borrow funds or financial support from the various different international sources (Özcan & Turunç, 2008: 182). The international interactions have not only taught them how to manage and execute international projects, but also necessitated qualified personnel to implement those projects supported by international donors. Moreover, many municipalities have become aware of the fact that SNAs can act internationally, instead of isolating themselves from the outside world. As Özcan (2000) rightly argued, because of the increasing use and influence of foreign credit and international institutions in local infrastructure project development and funding, there has been a significant expansion in foreign credit for urban projects starting from 1985. Accordingly, this marked a total shift in centre-periphery relations by allowing municipalities to bypass the centre through their direct links with international organisations and banks.

The wave of neoliberalization has certainly changed local economic development, city planning and decentralization in Turkey since the 1980s. Through the impetus of rapid urbanization and industrialization of *Anatolian cities*[[80]](#footnote-80), subnational politics have been transformed. This transformation brought about different dynamics of territorial relations within and beyond the national jurisdiction. The cities under rapid urbanization and industrialization are usually medium-size and they are commonly identified as *Anatolian tigers*[[81]](#footnote-81). In investigating the transformation of Turkish politics since the 1980s and conducting a thorough analysis on eleven Anatolian cities, Keyman and Lorosdağı (2010) argue that there is a need for examining a city level from the bottom-up perspective. It is because many studies in this area focused on the national level without giving sufficient credit to provincial level. The key point, they offer, is that the transformation of Turkish politics has gone hand in hand with the transformation of Anatolian cities. This transformation has gradually resulted in a new city model, which is multi-dimensional, multi-layered and multi-agential.

The research conducted by Keyman and Lorosdağı is highly important because of the lack of comparative research on Turkish cities from the bottom-up perspective. This research similarly underlines the importance of the subnational level in order to understand how and the extent to which the process of Europeanization has changed the behaviour of SNAs in Turkey with regard to their relations with the EU (see Chapter 9). However, despite the efforts coming from the subnational level, as Keyman and Lorosdağı stress, one should not underestimate the role that the national level plays in the transformation process of subnational politics. There is a need for national support of SNAs to have some financial and administrative means at their disposal. This may be achieved by public administration reforms.

Admittedly, since the creation of modern Turkey, various administrative reforms, and research projects have been conducted, in particular during the periods between 1950s and 1990s[[82]](#footnote-82) in order to improve and enhance administrative systems and local government and to tackle the problems that local administrations encounter. Besides, the five-year national plans that included local and regional development plans have been prepared by the Ministry of Development since 1960[[83]](#footnote-83). Due to the lack of political support, unstable coalition governments, economic crises (in 1994 and 2001) and three military interventions (in 1960, 1971, 1980), some of those programmes and reform packages were not able to bring about a considerable change. The common concern of such reforms was, nevertheless, to restructure central administrations rather than cope with the local administrative structures (Çelenk, 2008).

Prior to the Helsinki Summit of 1999, restructuring the administrative system was again on the agenda but the protection of national unity towards the rising face of political Islam and ethnic separatism (Heper, 1991) were the crucial aspects of Turkish political life. While both issues certainly hampered a move towards a new intergovernmental formulation, there was no strong external pressure to push Turkey to a greater decentralization. Moreover, the relations with the EC/EU in the 1980s declined sharply and Turkey was excluded from the list of potential members in the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 (Uğur, 1999). This process impeded the diffusion of new ideas and institutions in Turkish society within the process of integrating the EU’s governing mechanism (Özcan, 2000: 227). In this respect, it is highly difficult to see the pull effect of the EU in this period. The adaptational pressure in the context of decentralization and regionalization had to wait until the victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 (see Chapter 6).

What needs to be emphasized here is that the fear of separatism and political Islam led the governments and some veto players (President, Constitutional Court and Military) to be almost pathologically suspicious of anything involving popular participation during the 1990s. One result is that active participation of citizens in non-governmental political and social organizations has remained very low— reducing the associational culture in Turkey (Ertugal, 2005). Another result is that local administrations, a symbol of opposition forces for the leftist group and particularly the Kurdish local leaders, were kept as weak and ineffectual as possible (for the cases of Izmir and Diyarbakir see Chapter 9). According to interview findings, while the issue of political Islam has seemed to lose its merit as a source of threat to the unity of the Turkish Republic, the fear of separatism in some ethno-territorial areas (particularly the southeast part of Turkey where Kurds predominantly live) still dominates the insecurity agenda of Turkish politics. Because of such insecurity, whenever any local actor calls for more power and freedom, Ankara has constantly exerted its red lines on the issue of regionalization and/or decentralization.

In summary, one cannot challenge this view of a strong centralist tradition, but it does not explain the whole story. As seen in chapter four, the difficulties deriving from the national contexts were the case for other SNAs from the member states of the EU. From the beginning, their respective governments approached the issue of subnational mobilisation full of hesitation. Yet some proactive cities, particularly those from England and Germany, started interacting with the EU institutions by establishing their own liaison offices in Brussels from 1984 (Jeffrey, 1997b). There is also a need to focus on the subnational context in order to see what kind of intermediating factors may influence the behaviour of Turkish SNAs. Let us develop this in the next section.

## 

## 5.3. SUBNATIONAL CONTEXT AND POLITICS

**The Existence of Regional Distinctiveness**

Regions in the sense of European policies, i.e. those defined by economic and cultural aspects, did not exist in Turkey. With the exception of the authority for the development of the South Eastern Anatolian region (GAP, Turkish acronym) and branches of central units in some regions (e.g. General Directorate of Highways and of State Hydraulic Works), there were no regional structures outside Ankara for a long time. According to many civil servants interviewed in Ankara, the concepts of region, regionalism and regionalization are the most sensitive issues in Turkish political life[[84]](#footnote-84). These concepts have always been associated with the fear of separatism, which has its roots in the long Ottoman-Turkish history.

At this point, as Massicard (2009:18) aptly considered, the transition from the Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey was a tremendously violent and traumatic process. This consisted of wars, independent movements and irredentism often supported by foreign powers, especially in the Balkans and in the Arabic provinces, occupation by foreign powers, massive and often forced migration, and finally immense territorial losses. During this transition, political authorities perceived province and periphery to be potentially dangerous units. Such a fear of disintegration continued in the aftermath of the transition and throughout the new Republican regime. With this fear in mind, Republicanism has often been coupled with centralization and therefore the centrality of the State has been built directly against historically and culturally defined regions, which have been perceived to have potential ‘irredentism’.

Related to the fears of disintegration, Kymlica and Opalski (2002) suggest a useful distinction between the ways in which territorial claims have been responded to by the state in Western and Eastern Europe. While it is considered in the context of justice for the West, it is a security issue for the East. Here, *justice* requires self-government for Western Europe. On the contrary, it is conceived as a threat to the state in Eastern Europe. The lessons drawn by Kymlica and Opalski from Eastern and Central Europe may appropriately be linked to Turkey. It is because the issue of insecurity plays a critical role in the heart of the discussion of the multi-level modality in general and in the creation of regional arrangements in particular in Turkey (for other reasons see Chapter 6). The fear of insecurity has arisen from the ‘*Sevres Syndrome’*[[85]](#footnote-85) and has become an integral part of the governmental discourse and strategy of the republicianist regime throughout Turkish history. Ulusoy (2009:371) precisely examines that ‘out of wartime anarchy, external invasion, and the danger of disintegration, the Republic emerged as a Hobbesian state of security’. Such insecurity was clearly observable in the course of interviewing a variety of representatives from different national and local institutions in Turkey. By highlighting the sensitivity of the issue, an expert from a think tank organization in Ankara reported as follows:

‘The issues of decentralization and/or regionalization should be distinguished from the fear of separatism. Instead of discussing whether too much power on SNAs increase their effectiveness and efficiency in local administrations and their integration with the world or the EU, what is generally perceived is whether decentralization and/or regionalization has caused separatism in the southeast part of Turkey or federalism inside the country’ (Interview 10).

Quite the opposite, as argued, a meaningful regionalization is essential for strengthening the existing subnational level and/or creating new subnational actors in order to initiate subnational mobilisation on the EU level. It appears that there is no rational assessment on the issue of regionalization or decentralization inside Turkey (also see Uygun, 2012). What is more essential for the subject matter is that because of such insecurity, whenever there is an intention for networking between the EU institutions and SNAs in the southeast part of Turkey, such insecurity is raised again (Şengül, 2009; Keleş, 2010). The main reason here is that the national government approaches this relationship full of suspicion. This is particularly the case for the city of Diyarbakir (see Chapter 9). In short, regionalization has usually been reduced to the divisibility of the nation and the State (Bafoil & Kaya, 2009). Additionally, national identity has been based on the centrality of the State and shaped against the particular regional features. As a result, the trauma deriving from the fear of national dissolution has not provided fertile grounds for flourishing local and regional distinctiveness in terms of language, ethnicity and culture.

**The Quality of Intergovernmental Relations**

For historical as well as politico-structural reasons, politics in Turkey has long been focused on the provincial and national levels, with very little in between. The establishment of most of the provinces is based on traditions and historical evolution of the country, apart from those created by the political gestures. The centre has always kept SNAs under control and been reluctant to devolve political and economic responsibilities to the provincial groups throughout Ottoman-Turkish history. Because of the underprivileged history of local administrations, SNAs have thus become creatures of the central state. This situation not only makes them weak and vulnerable vis-à-vis the national governments, but also causes them to rely heavily on central institutions.

In such a statist tradition, the governors, as field agencies of the central government within and beyond the jurisdiction of the provincial administration, have become responsible for almost all decisions taken at the subnational level. As a direct result of their excessive roles in provincial politics, the governors are overwhelmed with routine and trivial obligations that impair their capacity to give administrative direction and leadership to their provinces (Polatoğlu, 1978:59). In the absence of governors as leaders, mayors have become important figures for the given province. Nevertheless, suffice it to say that the periodic strain between mayors and governors has expressed itself in the political struggles between the ruling party in Ankara and the political party that controls a particular provincial municipal government. Therefore, the recent tension over decentralization manifests itself in some places (e.g. Izmir and Diyarbakir, for more detail see Chapter 9) as a power struggle between the locally elected municipalities and the state controlled provincial administrative system. This sometimes mirrors an explicit tension between state ideology and political Islam (Özcan, 2000).

Beyond the conflict between the governors and mayors, the immediate problems in the context of intergovernmental relations derive from the asymmetrical relationship between central and local administrations. Municipalities have always been weak institutions with scarce sources in terms of labour and finance. Because of this heavy dependency and weak local administrations, it is not surprising to observe that the indigenous efforts at provincial development are often unsuccessful. Within this context, the lack of financial resources under the control of SNAs has been sharply pronounced by interview participants. Due to insufficient financial sources, many municipalities have opted for a direct relationship with central institutions (via the party political links) to materialize their local objectives. Such a relationship between centre and local levels has been considered in the context of party politics in general and patron-client relations in particular in the post multi-party era (see above).

Patron-client mode in subnational politicsis certainly on the way to forming horizontal relations. Starting from the Ottoman era, isolation was the mode of peripheral life and provincialism that of the towns (İnalcık, 1963; Kolars, 1973:186). Perhaps due to their having been completely subordinated and isolated for centuries, the provincial groups did not show any aspiration towards forming *horizontal links* that may have led to the emergence of a genuine civil society or ‘a polity of estates’ (Heper, 1985:32, emphasis added). They, therefore, opted for vertical links with the bureaucratic centre, but these vertical relations with the centre were merely on an individual basis. Such a tradition is reminiscent of Putnam’s (1993:181) consideration on the case of South Italy, where social and political relations have been vertically structured. In this sort of relationship, the parties in power look to ensure there are available resources to municipalities under their control in order to limit the success of municipalities at least some of whom are always in the opposition (Tekeli, 1983).

From the historical point of view, not all SNAs have been silent on the legacy of the patronage relationship. There was a reaction against the patron-clientele mode of governance in Turkish history during the 1970s (Finkel, 1990; Gedikli, 2009). The first systematic and strong reaction against this relationship and administrative tutelage formed between central and local administrations was directed by the mayors of the big cities, many of whom took part on the Republican Peoples’ Party side (Göymen, 2010:84). Those mayors began pressing for devolution instead of delegation. The motto at that time was ‘full participation of all social classes in the decision-making process’ (Heper, 1989:6). This movement led by the social democrat mayors was coined the ‘urbanist leftism’ (Şengül, 2009:133) or ‘social democrat local administration model’ (Göymen, 2010:85). The latter model suggests that local administrations must shift from being weak, unauthorized, financially and politically dependent on the centre to democratic, participative, productive, responsive, directive, regulative and integrative. The suggested model is not a desirable solution for the national institutions since SNAs that are too strong may eventually become a challenge to Ankara, and ipso facto, Ankara regards that it should keep an eye on the subnational level.

The aforementioned *real-politik* is quite important because such tension continues today and a similar reaction was given by the opposition municipalities (i.e. the Union of Social Democratic Municipalities, SODEM[[86]](#footnote-86) see Chapter 9). In the current atmosphere, owing to the welcoming atmosphere of the EU institutions (e.g. the Parliament, the CoR and the Commission), several opposition municipalities, either in an organized (e.g. SODEM) or unorganized (e.g. a single municipality) form, may display growing enthusiasm towards the international organizations, particularly towards the EU institutions. This is considered as a significant pull factor of the EU that motivates and facilitates the mobilisation of certain SNAs that are more likely associated with the opposition parties.

**The Presence of Pre-Existing Territorial Networks**

The existing territorial networks have a positive impact on subnational mobilisation (see Chapter 2). However, before going any further in explaining this, it is of interest to touch upon the regionalization efforts in Turkey in order to hold the integrity of the subject matter. To do so, one should first emphasize the distinction between regionalization and regionalism. According to Hughes *et al.* (2004: 4), while the former is concerned with the territorial and administrative configuration of the state, the latter involves the political mobilisation of regional identities and interests. If one understands regions as political institutions with a coercive power over a given territory (De Rynck, 1998:200), there is not such a territorial delineation in Turkey. Regionalist tendency should be seen in the context of planning, which has administrative and technocratic characteristics. No political regionalism has hitherto emerged in Turkey. Nonetheless, some regional arrangements (e.g. GAP) and plans (e.g. DOKAP and DAP) may be considered the outcomes of a top-down policy to facilitate local and regional economic development and to alleviate regional disparities.

Like many unitary states in the EU, Turkey has been facing a problem of regional inequalities[[87]](#footnote-87) in terms of socio-economic development, particularly between the east and the west part of the country (Dinçer *et al.*, 2003). To tackle the problem of uneven regional development across different regions, subnational efforts have been insufficient because of their constant weakness in terms of human and financial sources throughout history. Although some local actors, particularly in the more developed western regions (e.g. Istanbul, Izmir and Mersin), pressured the central government for more resources and decision-making powers, these demands never crystallised into any regionalisation movement. Therefore, one may hardly speak of a bottom-up regionalisation promoting the pre-existing policy networks at a subnational level in Turkish history. Any efforts towards regionalization, except for some cases (e.g. Izmir and Mersin), should be seen in the context of planning induced by top-down pressure that has administrative and technocratic components.

Prior to the EU accession process, the debate on regionalization and decentralization was in fact sporadic and ephemeral in the Turkish domestic context. In that period (particularly between the 1950s and the 1990s), several top-down initiatives and ‘regional plans’ [[88]](#footnote-88), in the sense of integrating sectoral priorities of development plans with spatial dimensions, were developed by the Ministry of Development on an ad hoc basis. However, Turkey did have a tradition of regional policy unlike most of the CEECs. Starting from the so-called planned era in 1960, regional development policies and targets based on a sectoralist approach and public incentives used to be determined under the five year national programmes, which were a central development model (Kayasu, 2006). In such a regional development model, certain sectors were encouraged without any spatial consideration of regional or sub-regional dimensions. Dulupçu (2005:109) argues that the regional issues in these plans reflect ‘one-size-fits-all atomistic understanding’ in that these regional plans were implemented by the traditional incentive programmes, especially in certain Priority Regions for Development (PRD), in order to attract capital and firms to the lagging regions.

The majority of these regional policy initiatives did not produce development or institutional thickness for regions or cities because of clientelist consideration for the selection of PRDs and insufficient use of public funds. Besides, the unstable economic and political environment in Turkey, as well as insufficient experts and data in regions, exacerbated the problem. For instance, the service in charge of regional policy had very few people (25 officials) and no representatives in the regions (CEC, 1998). A further complicating factor is that the power shifts towards a lower territorial tier were thwarted by poor administrative competencies at the local level, as well as bottlenecks in vertical coordination and control (Lagendijk *et al.*, 2009: 386). For officials from the Ministry of Development, the real problem was finding proper institutions to devolve this responsibility and to ensure that these institutions are able to control regional plans without politicization and to direct national funds free of corruption (Interviews 6, 8, 12 and 14). This highlights the *ownership/interlocutor* problem within the subnational level, i.e., who is going to control this process, and the extent to which these institutions become independent from the centre. To this end, the lack of institutional capacity together with the associational culture at subnational level are considered serious problems for regionalization in general and the creation of territorial networks in particular.

On the other hand, it transpired during the interviews with several public and private representatives of local institutions that some cities/regions had already been privileged with the pre-existing local/regional networks owing to top-down or bottom-up initiatives. Firstly, while Turkey had not attempted to establish systematic forms or regional governance before the EU candidacy, there were several stand-alone initiatives of regional support (Ertugal, 2005; Lagendijk *et al.,* 2009). Some of these top-down initiatives have indeed borne fruit for those regions such as the Eastern Anatolia Project, Eastern Black Sea Development Project and Southeast Anatolian Project[[89]](#footnote-89) (Interviews 14 and 18). Other top-down initiatives, particularly for bearing on regional development, include the establishment, in 1998, of the Regional Development Institute for Small and Medium-Sized Industry Development Organization (KOSGEB), with the aim of fostering regional development through supporting SMEs and investors (Lagendijk *et al.*, 2009). The common feature of such top-down initiatives manifests itself in the strong central hand in regional and provincial affairs. Alternatively, there were also some bottom-up dynamics in some developed cities (e.g. Izmir, Mersin and Antalya) through local cooperation in order to foster regional economic development and governance. Such bottom-up developments undoubtedly have fostered the regional dynamics and created policy networks in their respective territories (see Chapter 9 for the case of Izmir and Samsun).

At a provincial level, one should also mention the impact of Local Agenda 21 (LA 21)[[90]](#footnote-90) for the creation of territorial networks in different cities in Turkey. The very first aim of these local initiatives entails the establishment of City Councils, where a wide range of actors and institutions including NGOs, labour unions, academics, the representatives of public and private sectors, individuals and locally elected actors may establish a local consultative forum in order to discuss and find solutions for their respective local problems. As Göymen (2010:202-5) observes, with the participation in these initiatives, different types of co-operation and partnership are exhibited and experimented among different actors in Turkey, true to the essence of local governance. This program has helped to increase the level of participation of civil society organizations and private sectors in decision-making and enhanced the level of decentralization of governance. The LA 21 program has spread, largely spontaneously and through local initiatives, a locally adapted model of City Councils from nine pilot municipalities to more than 50 cities throughout the country (Özcan & Turunç, 2007: 188). The successful implementation and active participation in the programme has demonstrated its potential to trigger social transformation that accelerates the decentralization and democratization process in the country, as well as the process of integration with the European Union. Its achievements have been publicly recognized by one of the previous ministers as the ‘groundwork for Turkey’s EU Accession processes’[[91]](#footnote-91).

Overall, one may argue that the contributions of the existing territorial networks and regional project experiences, either designed in a top-down down fashion (e.g. GAP, DOKAP) or created by the bottom-up dynamics (e.g. EGEV, Yeşilırmak, BAGEV, and Mersin Development Council) or through LA 21 initiatives, for local/regional economic development and governance are directly relevant to this thesis and therefore worth emphasizing. To begin with, through these regional development communities and programmes, public-private and third sector have had a chance to start acting jointly, which is important for emerging horizontal relations within the given territory. This participation among different local institutions has enhanced the important steps towards regional governance, although the central government still holds financial, administrative and political instruments. Secondly, the implementation of EU programs and the participation in the EU multi-level polity is faster and more efficient in those cities that have a pre-existing territorial network such as Izmir and Samsun (see Chapter 9).

## 

## 5.4. CONCLUSION

The chapter has outlined the governance modality in Turkey in order to explore potential integral triggers or impediments for the mobilisation of SNAs in Brussels. Regarding the main (and sub-) questions of the thesis, it has presented a number of domestic (national and subnational) intermediating factors that may affect the mobilisation of Turkish SNAs in Brussels. Whereas most of the EU countries have engaged in a long process of decentralization (Goldsmith & Page, 2010), the Turkish administrative system has been increasingly centralized with power almost completely focused on Ankara. This process was a particular characteristic of the late Ottoman and the Early Republican Era practices. There were periods of significant reforms in the context of public and local administrations but the overall framework fundamentally remained in place.

The lack of a regional government tradition, an excessive central tutelage on local administrations, the indivisibility principle of administrations and the fear of irredentism may be considered as the main characteristics of traditional Turkish governance prior to the EU accession process during the 2000s. Such characteristics display close parallels with Napoleonic state tradition. They also contain various cultural elements of southern European societies in terms of clientelism, patronage and weak civil society, forming societal and institutional memory among SNAs. In that respect, most of the structural limits for SNAs in general and their relations through horizontal and vertical administrative levels in particular are to be found in the history of the local and regional problems in Turkey.

Prior to the Helsinki Summit of 1999, there seemed to be several reform efforts in the context of territorial relations in Turkey. Yet they were usually erratic and ephemeral due to the hesitancy of the national authorities to lose their tutelage at subnational level. Due to the centralization of power and influence at the national level, relations between SNAs and central government have been regulated through the mode of gatekeeping, which exercises financial, administrative, and technical controls over their affairs. In this respect, many SNAs have found it difficult to become path breakers by engaging such mobilisation across the European arena. They have opted for vertical relations based on individual links with the political and national elites, instead of forming horizontal relations through different stakeholders (public-private-third sectors) that may in turn foster the collective action of given territories. In this sense, the traditional Turkish administrative system represents an excellent case of unitary states that have been highly centralized, allowing little administrative decentralization. This seems to be an important obstacle for any genuine efforts towards subnational mobilisation.

The general acceptance of the chapter is that the ultimate subnational response is also mediated by certain subnational factors, such as regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relations, and pre-existing regional networks. It was argued that while the regional distinctiveness may play a negative role, the quality of intergovernmental relations and the pre-existing regional networks may stimulate the behaviour of SNAs. These factors will also be taken up in chapter nine in order to investigate their effects on three case cities, Samsun, Diyarbakir and Izmir.

Next to the domestic context, external developments have subsequently enforced necessary changes for the effective local administrations in Turkey. These changes have given more responsibility and space for SNAs to integrate with other local stakeholders in their territory and cooperate with their international counterparts especially in the EU area. For this reason, the next chapter demonstrates the extent to which external developments, particularly the EU, have impacted on centralist Turkish governance, and discusses whether or not any of the changes provide opportunity structures for SNAs to engage with EU politics. The important question to bear in mind for the chapters ahead is whether the pull effect of EU opportunity structures contributes to the mobilisation of SNAs, or it is a result of push factors deriving from the organizational capacity as well as subnational context of a given SNA.

# CHAPTER 6 THE IMPACT OF EUROPEANIZATION ON TERRITORIAL RELATIONS IN TURKEY IN THE POST-HELSINKI ERA

## 6.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the interplay between the impact of Europeanization and changing intergovernmental relations in Turkey to find out whether there is an emerging pattern of multi-level modality. The chapter specifically focuses on the assessment of the vertical change within the national jurisdiction to explore the extent to which Europeanization has changed the dynamics of territorial relations in Turkey by giving specific reference to the creation of new territorial arrangements at regional level (i.e. RDAs). It also aims to observe whether such changes have provided new opportunities for SNAs to mobilize across the EU arena. This chapter is important for two major reasons. First, it outlines the manner in which top-down Europeanization helped to shape the regional process, change territorial relations between national and subnational level, and create new opportunity structures for SNAs. This is also considered the formal effect (first generation) of Europeanization on Turkish governance. Secondly, it discusses whether the pull effect of the EU accession process has a role in the mobilisation of SNAs in Brussels.

The chapter unfolds in four broad parts. The first part outlines the financial incentives for Turkey in two budget periods (2000-2006 and 2007-2013). The second part examines the impact of the EU accession process on traditional Turkish governance, which has created new opportunities for SNAs to engage with EU politics. The third part analyses the limitations for multi-level modality in Turkey. These are also considered as the main obstacles for subnational mobilisation in Brussels. The final part provides a conclusion about whether there is any genuine shift towards a multi-level modality.

## 

## 6.2. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

Turkey has participated in three different fund programmes since 1996[[92]](#footnote-92). The actual instruments are related to cohesion policy which began to operate under the Pre-accession Financial Assistance to Turkey in 2001. By covering the period of 2001 and 2006, the main goal of the EU financial assistance is to enhance the institutional capacity, the quality of legislation and implementation of the legislation. By doing that, it is expected from Turkey to integrate easily into common policies (like social policies, development and rural policies) and to promote economic and social cohesion before the full membership of the EU takes place. During the period 2002 to 2006, the total amount of funds that Turkey received was € 126 million in 2002, € 144 million in 2003, €235.6 million in 2004, €277 million in 2005 and € 441.2 million in 2006[[93]](#footnote-93).

The implementation of these funds was carried out in the framework of PHARE rules (pNDP, 2003). Accordingly, the EU required from Turkey a ‘Decentralized Implementation System’ (DIS) to manage the Community assistance in the pre-accession phase. Circular No. 2001/41 of the Prime Ministry issued on 18 July 2001, established the main components of the DIS in Turkey, i.e. the National Aid Co-ordinator (NAC), the National Authorising Officer (NAO), the National Fund (NF), the Central Financing and Contracting Unit (CFCU)[[94]](#footnote-94), the Financial Co-operation Committee (FCC) and the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC). Programming has been carried out in compliance with the DIS since 2002; following the achievement of the self-assessment phase, European Commission accreditation was received in October 2003. It was stated in the pNDP document that this is the first step towards supporting economic and social cohesion in a structural funds framework with a strong emphasis on capacity building to enable implementation in a decentralised way. The responsibilities are to be shared between different institutions at central and regional level (pNDP, 2003).

The EU-funded regional programmes were established under the pre-accession scheme to harmonize regional development policy and practices with the EU and activate regional development potential and initiatives at identified priority regions; especially those regions with a GDP per capita income below 75% of Turkey’s average. In the period 2004-2006, the EU-funded regional development programmes for the first time began to be implemented in 12 regions, which were designated by the Preliminary National Development Programme (pNDP 2003)[[95]](#footnote-95) (see Map 6.1).

**Map 6.1** the EU-funded regional development and cross-regional partnership programmes (2004-2006) (White areas were outside the fund programmes).

**Case 2**

**Case 1**

**Case 3**

**Source:** (Ministry of Development, 2007)


The key partners for the implementation of regional programmes under pre-accession financial assistance largely came from the national institutions. Amongst others, the CFCU is founded as the agency responsible for the overall budgeting, tendering, contracting, payments, accounting and financial reporting aspects of all procurement in the context of the EU funded programmes in Turkey. This includes the regional development programmes. Along with the CFCU, the Ministry of Development established a specific department to deal with EU pre-accession regional development in late 2002 (CEC, 2004). The establishment of national institutions dealing with EU-funded projects continued with the creation of Service Unions, the forerunners of the regional development agencies— in some regions between the provinces that form a provisional NUTS II (CEC, 2004). Additionally, Plan and Implementation Units (PIUs) operated under ‘Service Unions’, which were composed of (centrally appointed) provincial governors and (locally elected) provincial assemblies with (locally elected) municipalities participating on a voluntary basis (Ertugal, 2011:261). Overall, the main actors who were involved in this process were in turn; the Ministry of Development as a managing authority; the CFCU as contracting authority, and the PIUs as co-partners with the Ministry of Development for monitoring.

By the launch of the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), the EU had shifted from its earlier focus on the partnership principle and so instead of supporting regionalization, it promoted central institutions in candidate states to distribute financial programmes on a sectoral basis (see Chapter 4). The IPA currently consists of five components: Transition Assistance and Institution Building, Cross Border Cooperation, Regional Development, Human Resources Development and Rural Development. For all components, the IPA has provided a total of € 497.2 million for 2007, € 538.7 for 2008, € 566.4 million for 2009, € 653.7 million for 2010, 781.9 for 2011, 899.4 for 2012, and 935.4 for 2013 (CEC 2007). Among others, Component III (regional development) is crucial to the aim of this thesis. It generally aims to develop the country’s internal economic and social cohesion as well as convergence with the EU. To achieve this overarching objective, Component III is divided into three sub-components: Environment (35-40%); Transport (30-35%); and Regional Competitiveness (25-35%). The allocation of total funds among five components naturally decreases the amount of money spent by the SNAs for regional development purposes[[96]](#footnote-96).

Operational Programmes are formed according to the Multi Indicative Programming Document (MIPD). The importance of the MIPD is three-fold: designating the geographical areas benefitting from financial aid; assigning the sector(s) within this geographical coverage; and describing the budget for the operational programmes. Therefore, EU funds in the IPA context have been implemented through calls for proposals and/or procurement contracts, whose geographical coverage is limited to 12 NUTS regions (encompassing 43 NUTS III provinces) with a GDP (per capita) income below 75% of Turkey’s average (see Map 6.2).

**Map 6.2** Regions Supported by the Regional Competitiveness Operational Programmes (RCOP)

**Case 1**



**Case 3**

**Case 2**

Regions with a GDP per capita income above 75% of Turkey’s average

Regions with a GDP per capita income below 75% of Turkey’s average

**Source** (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2007)

With regard to key partners in the implementation of IPA funds, the Ministry of Industry at the national level acts as an operating structure for the Regional Competitiveness Operational Programme (RCOP). The said ministry is responsible for the preparation and implementation of RCOP and for deciding individual project applications under the relevant OP call for project proposals. The Ministry of Development as a strategic coordinator between OPs devises a Strategic Coherence Framework document. The Sectoral Monitoring Committee (SMC) of each OP includes representatives from social and economic partners. As for the regional competitiveness of OPs, the SMC also includes provincial governors, chambers of industry/commerce and universities on a rotating basis. Ministers and SMCs jointly determine the criteria for project selection for the relevant OP call for project proposals. Table 6.1 compares the implementation structures of regional programmes (2004-2006 and IPA programmes) under the EU.

**Table 6.1** the Distribution of EU funds in 12 NUTS II Regions




Table 6.1 evidently illustrates that the institutional structure of the EU funds did not bring a radical change to the Turkish context with regard to the vertical dimension of MLG. In the monitoring stage, whereas the focus of the periods of 2004 and 2006 was based on the regional dimension, this has been changed by the launch of the IPA to a sectoral focus. By taking the limited role of SNAs during the implementation of EU funds, one may claim that the creation of opportunity structures does not enhance the power of SNAs, while undermining that of the national institutions. Furthermore, the re-centralization of the financial incentives with the IPA has reinforced the gatekeeping role of national governments on the implementation of structural funds and regional policies. It has impeded the direct relations of SNAs with the EU institutions or their ability to influence policy outcomes (discussed below).

Summing up, from the rationalist perspective, a misfit between the EU and Turkey has created an opportunity structure for a Europeanization effect via structural funds. This opportunity structure has not only provided spaces for SNAs to participate in the management of funds, but it has also provided a valuable experience for state bureaucrats in the Ministry of Development during the creation and operation of RDAs in Turkey. As seen below, RDAs have engaged in spreading national funds through the logic of EU principles. The section below outlines the changing dynamics of territorial relations after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 with special reference to the creation of RDAs and administrative reforms.

## 

## 6.3. THE CREATION OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES AND RELEVANT ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

This is not a study to rehearse the debate on how much change the EU has caused in the regionalization and decentralization process in Turkey as it has been done successfully elsewhere[[97]](#footnote-97). However, the point here is that the most recent administrative reforms and restructuring of the administrative system gained momentum through the EU accession process as it has provided an important stimuli and source of legitimacy to transform the Turkish administrative system. The move towards governance and institution building at subnational level was therefore accelerated after the Helsinki Summit of 1999. The majority of interview participants suggest that the EU, albeit the most dominant actor, was not exclusively responsible for the process of change in Turkish governance.

Interview findings revealed that several factors have facilitated this process and provided perfect timing and scope for change(s) in the dynamics of intergovernmental relations in Turkey[[98]](#footnote-98). These factors include the impact of other international organizations (IMF, OECD, World Bank, and the Council of Europe) and internal developments (dissatisfaction with existing policy, the success of single party government, the result of the economic crisis of 2001, and learning among state bureaucrats). It is, consequently, extremely difficult to address the counterfactual question of the degree to which territorial relations in Turkey would have changed in the absence of the EU impact. One may still argue that there is a considerable impact of Europeanization on the timing and tempo of the reform process by providing the necessary legitimization for the reformist Justice and Development Party (AKP) government (Interviews 6 and 28).

Principally, without suggesting any specific template, the EU has required Turkey to provide better territorial management. This would lead to the eventual empowering of local and regional administrations in order to distribute the EU’s financial incentives and implement its regional policies. The adoption of the NUTS system in 2002 and the gradual creation of RDAs corresponding to 26 NUTS II regions after 2006 may be seen as a clear sign of Europeanization affecting the traditional Turkish polity[[99]](#footnote-99). According to its organic law (Law No.5549), RDAs consist of a decision-making body, which is composed of representatives of local administrations in each province (provincial assemblies and municipalities) and chambers of commerce and/or industry, and headed by provincial governors. In the metropolitan regions, such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara, the decision body also includes representatives from non-governmental organizations and/or the private sector. Development Councils consist of 100 representatives from public and private sectors and civil society institutions. Their roles are simply consultative.

Given its role for bringing the representatives from public-private-third sectors together in one single administration, RDAs may be considered in the context of ‘region as arena’ (see Chapter 1). From this angle, at least in theory, each RDA is potentially a ‘unique’ structure where the appointed-elected, central-local and public-private-civilian actors may work together and define and implement public policies at a regional level (Sadioğlu & Dede, 2011). RDAs formulate regional programmes, through participation with stakeholders but subject to approval by the Ministry of Development. National funds for regional development are allocated to every region regularly on an annual basis for the first time. These are spent according to a grant scheme (implemented through call for proposals) administered by RDAs (Ertugal, 2011). Monitoring of the grant scheme is conducted jointly by the Ministry of Development and RDAs.

While the EU’s regional policy, in the sense of the implementation of regional policies and management of structural funds, has shifted towards the more centralized model in the post-Lisbon era (see Chapter 4), developments in these areas in Turkey have gone in the opposite direction; more accurately, through the more decentralized model. Regarding decentralization and devolution especially in terms of participation of SNAs into the regional policy-making process as well as into the management of distribution of national funds, SNAs have gained important access to the policy-making process. These changes, however, reflect the pre-Lisbon practices of EU regional policy and structural funds. This presents a good example of thick learning. This is because the learning process among bureaucrats at the Ministry of Development led them to implement the preferences of the EU, even if it has shifted towards a more centralized model (also see Ertugal, 2010). The transformation of national fund distributions resulting from the dissemination of EU practices also suggests that there is a trend towards the creation of multi-level modality in Turkey. Here, Ertugal (2010) argues that RDAs in Turkey fit imperfectly to the Type II MLG, although they have some features of Type I. For Ertugal, while RDAs are task specific, based on flexible design, and have intersecting memberships, in terms of jurisdictional level, each RDA corresponds neatly to one NUTS II region with no overlaps in their jurisdictional areas that is a feature of Type I MLG.

Irrespective of the discussion of whether RDAs fit into MLG Type I and/or Type II, they are expected to organize functional interests of the targeted regions to facilitate endogenous development (Law No. 5549). RDAs are expected to play a critical role in; income effect, growth effect, mobility effect, human capital effect, institutional capacity effect, synergy effect, and finally awareness effect (ibid). This is done by providing political insulation, transparency, accountability, participation, and dynamism for regional policy. These tasks rhetorically seem appropriate to the aim of EU’s regional policy. Yet, in practice, there are enormous doubts on the future trajectory of RDAs and their contribution to the regionalization process in Turkey and to subnational mobilisation in Brussels (discussed below).

One should also stress that whilst the AKP government provided support for the regionalization agenda, the kind of reforms they cherished most were in the realm of public administration. In the post-2002 era, a large vote differential combined with highly concentrated government was seen as a recipe for regional reform that maximizes political benefits for one dominant political actor. Besides, unlike the previous coalition government’s futile efforts, the AKP government declared itself as ‘a reform government’[[100]](#footnote-100) and explicitly stated its will in realizing a comprehensive reform package covering reforms on a broad range of issues and sectors (Okçu *et al.,* 2006). For instance, in the 58th, 59th and 60th government programmes, covering the period of 2002 to 2011, the AKP was adamantly arguing for comprehensive administrative reforms and decentralization.

As a solution to overcoming a centralist and solid hierarchical structure as well as empowering local administrations, both government programmes and the relevant reports prepared by the AKP elites have put considerable emphasis on the prominence of the ‘European Charter of Local Self-Government’ and ‘the principles of subsidiarity’. All these endeavours came into existence in a comprehensive reform package called ‘the Law on Basic Principles and Restructuring of Public Administration’. It aimed to apply the basic principles of ‘new public management’ such as participation, accountability, effectiveness and simplicity in bureaucratic transactions (Kapucu & Palabıyık, 2008: 196). Additionally, it aimed to introduce the principle of subsidiarity into the Turkish administrative system in order to redesign the powers and responsibilities of the central and local administrative structures and central and local relations by giving more weight to the latter (Güney & Çelenk, 2008: 255). Thus, the early signs of Europeanization of Turkish local government were already seen regarding the common principles of local government across the Union.

The draft law undoubtedly signalled a radical change and transformation in the administrative structure, offering the framework and the instruments for the achievement of better governance and constituting a major step towards Turkey’s EU accession process. However, unlike regional policy, the EU did not directly target the public administration system in Turkey, though through the OECD/SIGMA (Support for the Improvement of Governance in Management of Administration) programme one may see the subtle effect of the EU. As Koçak (2007: 114) mentions, the EU has played a more indirect role in Turkey’s administrative reform through the compatibility of its membership conditions. It has generally encouraged decentralization with those of the more detailed and precise conditions of the IMF and the World Bank in return for providing Turkey with credit. Furthermore, in the context of subsidiarity, the European Charter on Self-local Government was primarily employed during the preparation of reform packages in a benchmarking manner (Interviews 9 and 16).

The draft law was, however, vetoed by the former President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, on the condition that it was in breach of the constitution as it proposed limiting the powers and responsibilities of the centre and offering extended powers to the local administrations; weakening the organizational and functional features of the central administration, and violating deconcentration and administrative tutelage principles (Güney & Çelenk, 2008). As a tactical manoeuvre, rather than bringing the same draft Law to the Parliament, the AKP government divided it into different parts such as a law on Metropolitan Municipalities, a law on Municipalities and a law on the Special Provincial Administrations (Interview 19). These reforms attempted to strengthen the capacity of local administrations and devolve some competences to the lower territorial tiers. In summary, after the Helsinki Summit of 1999, there has been a meaningful change in traditional Turkish governance, though in the context of decentralization and regionalization, large ambiguities remain. The next section explores them as they have potential limits on the creation of multi-level modality in Turkey.

## 

## 6.4. LIMITS ON MULTI-LEVEL MODALITY IN TURKEY

Considering the power shifts towards the lower territorial tiers, Turkey represents an apparent paradox when one compares it to EU standards due to its long-lasting centralist history. Before turning our attention to the investigation of whether the recent changes in regional and local politics have created new opportunity structures for SNAs and affected their behaviour on EU matters, let us examine various restrictions on the way to decentralization and regionalization processes in Turkey and other obstacles derived from the EU context. Such hurdles, albeit to varying extents, have correspondingly impeded the mobilisation of Turkish SNAs in the EU arena. The first obstacle concerns the territorial organization of state and the nature of decentralization and regionalization. The second lies in the underachievement of the reform because of political reasons (i.e. presidential veto and the shift in AKP government’s stance) as well as the lack of financial capacity of SNAs. Finally, there are also structural changes in the EU context particularly during the era of Alaturka Europeanization. These changes have undoubtedly decreased the pull effect of the EU opportunity structures for SNAs.

**Limits Arising from the National Context**

*Regionalization without Regions and Provincialism versus Regionalism*

Prior to the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the tradition of regions had not been formed yet, and it has not become a determining point. Moreover, there was little or no sense of regional identity, no institutional focal point and thus no defined policy networks (apart from in highly developed cities particularly in the west part of the country) at subnational levels (see Chapter 5). Such an institutional lacuna on a subnational level constituted a major misfit for EU standards. The fact that ‘regions’ do not formally exist is probably one of the reasons why regionalization has been one of the most prolonged and intense debates in the history of the Turkish administrative system.

In fact, before the EU accession process, there were attempts to merge some provinces in order to create larger and manageable units for the revival of regional dynamics. These would have fostered local and regional governance, and revitalized associational culture in the respective territories. The common consideration, however, was that the enlargement of provinces may lead to a situation whereby a province is completely inhabited by ethnic groups, which would jeopardize the unity and security of the nation (Demiröz, 1990, also see Chapter 5 for the Sevres Syndrome). Besides, as Dodd (1969: 260) emphasized, ‘strong provincial governors are not a problem but an over mighty regional governor could become one’. To avoid this type of danger, it was suggested that there should not be a regional governor, but a committee of provincial governors in each region to act as a coordinating authority for the provinces in the region (ibid: 261). In the current situation, governors play a critical role in the executive committee of RDAs. One may interpret this as the centre desiring to keep at arm’s length the relationship with the newly formed regional arrangements by appointing governors in charge of the Executive Committees in RDAs.

Problems are not only confined to the administrative management of and decision-making process for RDAs. During the very creation of RDAs, neither the Ministry of Development nor the State Institute of Statistics consulted with any local/regional stakeholders on the design of the regional setting (Dulupçu, 2005: 105). The selection of the provinces to host the RDAs was not clear and the process was not sufficiently transparent (CEC, 2009). The problem of creating coordination and transparency at the very beginning of the establishment of RDAs has cast enormous doubts on their future trajectory and contribution to the regionalization process in Turkey. Furthermore, in considering the administrative and financial structure along with the decision-making procedure, the majority of interview participants consider RDAs as the decentralized arms of the state for several reasons. First, the governor, as a paid official, is the chairperson of the administrative board. Second, the appointment of Secretary General is subject to the decision of the Council of Ministers. Third, decisions for the regional development policy and distribution of the national funds taken by regional stakeholders must be approved by the Ministry of Development. Finally, RDAs substantially depend on the national budget. Regarding alternative financial sources, it is sufficient to note here that RDAs have not been accredited as an operational body for the distribution of EU financial incentives (see Chapter 8).

In light of the above and taking a comparative perspective, the creation and management of RDAs and the successive reforms that gave birth to it seemed to be the perfect example of what Keating (1998: 14) called ‘administrative and technocratic regionalization’. In this sort of regionalization, the process is depoliticized and there is no link to class interests. Hence, the regionalization process is linked to the development of planning, which may be considered a response to the EU accession process and the existing policy failure (also see Chapter 2 for the concept of ‘Layering’). This also represents an excellent example of regionalization *without* regions. Therefore, unlike several RDAs in the EU that are legally, administratively, historically, and financially well-entrenched in their respective domestic settings, RDAs have restricted abilities because of their bureaucratic and top-down nature. This does not allow them to be flexible and independent in their external activities abroad. Moreover, subnational mobilisation in the context of regional distinctiveness or party political conflicts may not be major motive(s) for the subnational mobilisation of RDAs across the EU arena (see Chapter 9).

Although the creation of RDAs may not revitalize regional distinctiveness in terms of ethno-territorial claims, it has definitely enhanced policy-networks through the collaboration of public-private-third sectors. As argued, before the creation of RDAs, there used to be a limited number of pre-existing territorial networks. With the creation of RDAs, the number of these networks has not only expanded throughout the country, but has also increased the potential application of the partnership principle as well as institutional thickness in each NUTS II region. Given that there is a distinction between institution building and institutional capability (Bailey & De Propis, 2004), a critical issue that springs to mind here is whether the creation of institutions and institutional capability, as distinct from capacity, may take place via a top-down imposition.

Many interview participants believed that the creation and adaptation of RDAs to traditional Turkish governance is a *dynamic process* seizing two distinct features. First, the process may not only be progressive, but may well be regressive. This is because national governments have a right to close RDAs (as in the case of the UK) if they are not happy with their progress or because of other political considerations. This creates a legitimacy problem for the future of RDAs (Interviews 3 and 19). Second, dynamism also entails a learning process. A number of interview participants commonly pointed out that the RDAs have advanced their functions in learning by doing manner (Interviews 21, 28 and 29). They, indeed, have often benchmarked from their equivalent in the EU arena[[101]](#footnote-101). This is a good point highlighting the horizontal dimension of Europeanization. It is because the EU in some cases acts as an agent of policy transfer encouraging the localities and regions to emulate best practices from foreign settings (Kettunen & Kungla, 2005: 358, also see Chapter 1). Given that Brussels has become a platform for those SNAs to exchange expertise, know-how, and best practices (particularly via interregional organizations and the CoR), one may consider this sort of mobilisation in the context of second generation Europeanization. However, as argued in the next chapter, this has not always advanced in a rationalistic manner. There is also an element of sociological variance in the logic of appropriateness (see Chapter 8).

RDAs are now at a formative stage of development and thus it is too early to speculate about their effectiveness and contribution to the regional development as well as to the creation of multi-level modality in Turkey. Apart from the two pilot RDAs, Izmir and Çukurova, which were established in 2006, the foundation of these regional institutions is a recent phenomenon as the remainder only started operating after 2008 and 2009. Once their institutionalization process has been accomplished, they are potentially expected to mediate different interests between national and local administrations in order for the latter’s favour. As will be seen from the experiences of Izmir and Middle Black Sea Development Agencies, those RDAs having a pre-existing territorial network in their respective regions are steps ahead of other RDAs (see Chapter 9).

Interview participants in different cities commonly considered that RDAs are not a panacea for the entire historical and chronic problems of SNAs in Turkey. These problems, such as the insufficiency of economic resources and human resources are at the local level: the low level of social capital in the regions (Dulupçu, 2005); the lack or partial experience of local governance (Köker, 1995); and mistrust among actors and/or institutions involved in the governance process (Keyman & Koyuncu, 2005). Here, one of the critical issues is to mediate overlapping local agendas among the stakeholders. Yet the management and implementation of regional policies and the division of responsibilities between state and non-state agencies have resulted in further complications at the subnational level as chambers of commerce, municipalities, governorships and special provincial administrations have vied for leading roles for the RDAs. To this complex institutional map at subnational level, one must also add the party political differences (in the case of Izmir and Diyarbakir see Chapter 9). As a result, RDAs may not immediately be a remedy for the chronic problems and it may be difficult for them to gather regional wherewithal for the political, cultural and economic aspirations on the EU level.

Another issue, particularly in the context of overlapping local agendas, is the importance of provincialism versus regionalism. This calls attention to the strong path dependency nature of Turkish governance inherited from the long Ottoman-Turkish tradition. For historical, political and institutional reasons, politics in Turkey has long been focused on the national and provincial levels, with very little in between (see Chapter 5). As a result, the strong path dependency for provincialism has been developed. Apart from RDAs in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, the rest is an example of ‘polycentric city regions’ ranging from two to six cities. The experiences of the CEECs suggest that the lack of equivalence between the majority of RDAs and the provinces will lead to incoherence in the articulation of common regional interests (Young-Hyman, 2009:389). This was highlighted numerous times in the interviews in Turkey. An example was given by an interview participant (Interview 3). For him:

‘[...] there is a role for RDAs to create regional awareness and provide competition for the regional development in their hinterland. However, there has been a provincial system for a long time. It is really difficult to change this. The competition among cities within the same RDA persists. There is no sense of a region. The adaptation of RDAs to the existing system is a dynamic one and we are still at the beginning of the institutionalization process. Unfortunately, we may not quite succeed in making cities think and act together’.

To sum up, while the purpose of the research is not to assess the general implications of regionalization or decentralization, the establishment of RDAs is an important part of the subnational mobilisation process. Therefore, by exploring the potential value of the agencies as organizing interests on subnational level, this research helps to understand the likely outcomes of a broader trend. Depending on the conditions of regions where RDAs operate, the institutionalization process takes a longer time. If there is a pre-existing territorial network (such as Izmir and Samsun), RDAs may operate effectively (see Chapter 9). Yet there is also a party political and economic consideration about their effectiveness. The next section briefly touches upon that.

*Party Politics and Economic Deficiency of SNAs*

The EU has constituted a source of legitimacy for the incumbent government to undertake the necessary reform in the field of public administration and regional policy. However, the reforms remained limited because of the Presidential veto as well as of the low credibility of the EU accession process. The rationales for the AKP government to comply with EU requirements with regard to regional reforms vary, particularly during the period of proto-Europeanization. As Ertugal (2005) argues, there are two key explanations. The first is the powerful incentive of EU membership, having access to the material and social benefits offered by the EU. The second is that the aims of EU induced reforms are compatible with the ideology of the AKP. The incumbent government, rooted in ‘a conservative democratic’[[102]](#footnote-102) background, does not share the same state ideology with the former President, the military and large sections of the bureaucracy. Given that several politicians within the AKP government have local administration experience (including the PM Erdoğan as he was the former mayor of the Istanbul metropolitan city), one may contemplate the incumbent government’s favouritism towards the local administrations.

More importantly, one may argue that the AKP does not share the same sensitivities as the state elites about the relationship between decentralization and threats to the territorial integrity of the country[[103]](#footnote-103). This is considered as the most significant setback for decentralization or regionalization (see Chapter 5). Accordingly, the EU accession process as a source of legitimacy may be used mainly by the political elites vis-à-vis the existing veto players in the Turkish political system (e.g. President and main opposition party) in order to fulfil the EU’s demand in terms of regional policy and structural funds. Above all else, for such sensitive issues like local administrations, democracy and human rights, as Börzel and Soyaltın (2012) mention, Europeanization appears to be the most effectual mechanism where domestic policy choices, e.g. to roll back the Kemalist legacy, align with the EU demands for change; and expressing dissatisfaction with previous policy failures drives domestic policy-makers to search for new policies that the EU may provide. Likewise, as Öniş (2006) emphasizes, the AKP considered the EU as a necessary safeguard to protect itself against the hard-core Kemalist or secularist establishment in the sphere of domestic politics.

Although there seemed to be a fertile ground for decentralization and regionalization in the aftermath of the disappearance of strong veto players in 2008, the AKP government has conducted a policy of deconcentration. It has accordingly created patronage by expanding institutional structures (e.g. the creation of RDAs) and redesigning local administrations (e.g. the reform for Special Provincial Administration), rather than fully decentralized local or regional administrations. A think-tank organization in Ankara questioned this erratic behaviour of the AKP by describing it as ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward in Decentralization’ (Koyuncu & Sertesen, 2012). Considering the shift in AKP’s policy on regionalization and decentralization, one may borrow the concept of policy opportunist to describe its position regarding the reforms in related policy areas. In distinguishing between ‘policy entrepreneurs’, who are actors with a long term perspective and ‘policy opportunists’, who are actors with a short time horizon, Uğur and Yankaya (2008) assert that the AKP is closer to the concept of policy opportunist[[104]](#footnote-104). This may summarize the AKP’s stance in the era of Alaturka Europeanization.

A number of interview participants during the fieldwork suggest two essential reasons for such a regressive shift in decentralization rhetoric of the incumbent government post-2005. The first and foremost reason lies in the legacy of history, particularly in the context of the antagonistic relations of centre-periphery and the enthusiasm of paid officials (i.e. governors or bureaucrats in central institutions) towards the administrative tutelage. Relating to the first point, the patron-client logic of the AKP government may not challenge some of the powerful opposition metropolitan municipalities (inter alia, Izmir, Antalya, Eskisehir, Adana and Diyarbakir), unless they re-centralize some of the devolved competences. In summary, since the Helsinki Summit of 1999, while there were periods of significant reforms in the context of public and local administrations, the overall Turkish administrative framework fundamentally remained in place.

Apart from the political drawbacks, the urgent issues dwell in the lack of financial capacity of SNAs. Certainly, the lack of financial resources under SNAs’ control has been frequently stated by interview participants. As an example, the budget of RDAs (average €20.8 million per each RDA)[[105]](#footnote-105) is not sufficient for fulfilling their objectives. This was largely highlighted by the various interview participants irrespective of their professional expertise. The lack of financial resources is in fact a chronic problem for local administrations in Turkey. In his legal appraisal based study on the local reforms in Turkey in 2005, Marcou (2006) noted that:

‘Local finance is the weak side of the administrative reform. At present, the share of own revenues in the budgets of municipalities and of Special Provincial Administrations (SPAs) is very low, and there is no local tax power. Local administration expenditure is in Turkey around 10% of consolidated budget and 4% of GDP, three quarters of which by municipalities, the rest by SPAs. This is rather low compared to other European countries, but not the lowest. This percentage has been stable for ten years, with peak close to 5% between 1999 and 2001’.

In comparison with SNAs from the developed EU member states, it is very challenging for Turkish SNAs to engage with the EU activities. In their comparative analysis of Turkey and OECD Countries between 1998 and 2004, Ulusoy and Akdemir (2009)[[106]](#footnote-106) revealed that the ratio of local administration revenue in the entire public revenue is 12.97%, while the similar ratio of the average OECD countries is 25.36%. Subnational mobilisation unsurprisingly requires a certain level of financial strength. Yet the allocated resources for representation are a rare case among SNAs. This may be considered one of the major obstacles for their EU activities in general and their presence in Brussels in particular, even though there are some rich municipalities (such as Istanbul and Izmir).

Restrictions on the process of regionalization on the whole and subnational mobilisation in particular are not only confined to the national context. Changes in the EU context certainly affect the motivations of SNAs and their interest in EU matters. During the fieldwork, it transpired that several caveats derived from the EU context have correspondingly undermined the creation of the multi-level modality in Turkey. These may have reduced the credibility of the Europeanization process as well as the pull effect for Turkish SNAs.

**The Limits of Europeanization in Actual Practice in Turkey**

The process of Europeanization may shape, affect, constrain and open opportunities for the behaviour of SNAs and their engagement with the EU institutions (see Chapter 1). In this respect, any changes in structural issues, i.e., the trajectory of Turkish-EU membership and/or the transformation of the cohesion funds, may affect the behaviour of SNAs negatively or positively. In the remainder of this chapter, these structural issues will be outlined in order to illustrate how such changes affect the behaviour of SNAs regarding their interests on EU matters.

*The Low Credibility of EU Membership and Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy*

The impact of Europeanization on the Turkish national context has gradually evolved over the course of time. This has often resulted in the limitations of Europeanization in actual practice in Turkey. Such a gradual change is analyzed under three distinct periods after the Helsinki Summit of 1999: Europeanization as Democratization; Proto-Europeanization; and Alaturka Europeanization (see Chapter 1). The main focus is on the period of Alaturka Europeanization, which is a period where the low credibility and moderation of the EU accession process along with the incomplete accession chapters have increasingly caused many SNAs to be aloof on EU matters.

In fact, one of the departure points for the multi-level governance approach as well as subnational mobilisation in Brussels is the existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of political actors across those levels (Marks *et al.*, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Because of several unopened and blocked chapters related to local and regional administrations, one may argue that the EU impact on SNAs has remained incomplete in a number of policy areas. This reduces the perceived impact of the EU on the daily activities of SNAs. Therefore, the cause of mobilisation deriving from the overlapping competences must be lower or non-existent for the case of Turkish SNAs. Furthermore, these impacts have become limited to the management of regional funds or horizontal policy transfers, rather than shifting towards a full Europeanization stage as suggested by John (see Chapter 4).

During the interview with Michele Huysseunne[[107]](#footnote-107), it appears that the greater the membership prospect, the more relevant it is to be in Brussels, except those cases that are integrated by other means, like Norway and Switzerland (Interview 62). This consideration heightens the importance of the resource pull hypotheses with regard to the possibility of EU membership as well as financial gains. As empirical evidence for the relevance of membership credibility, Moore (2008b) comments that during the accession process of Poland many Polish SNAs established their liaison offices to support their country’s EU bid. For the case of Turkish SNAs, it was generally reported by the interview participants from different SNAs that because of the low prospect of EU membership, neither did they want to prioritize the EU matters nor wish to make special efforts for the EU accession process.

Nevertheless, while the support of EU activities has been low during the period of *Alaturka Europeanization*, a number of SNAs have already distinguished two issues from each other: EU membership and the reaching of EU standards. For several local and regional actors, Turkey does not need to be a member of the EU but must reach the level of EU standards in every sphere of life. Such an understanding among local and regional actors has correspondingly increased particularly after the Euro-zone crisis in several EU economies in recent years. Even in some interviews in Turkey, it was considered that the EU has lost its attractiveness as a role model because of the steady growth of the Turkish economy since 2002 (Interviews 6, 23, 24 and 28). One remarkable comment on this issue was given by one interview participant. He reported that:

‘As long as Turkey complies with the EU’s standards and internalizes them to our daily life, one could name this process either as Europeanization or as Middle Easternization. What we are actually caring about is to catch up with the EU’s standards not to become a member of the club’ (Interview 23).

Taking the general inclination in the recent atmosphere, while the former (being a member of the EU) has been losing its attractiveness, the latter (reaching the EU standards) has found a great deal of supporters. Yet, as discussed in the next chapter, whereas the majority of SNAs belong to this category, there are different types of behaviours among the leaders of local and regional administrations (see Chapter 7).

Alongside the low EU membership credibility, Turkey, especially since 2005, has been going through a different foreign policy orientation. This signalled a shift from one-dimensional foreign policy (relations with the West) to a more multi-dimensional one. It is no exaggeration to assert that Turkish foreign policy is far more proactive and multi-dimensional than at any time in the history of the republic. The new foreign policy implications consist of three main pillars: maintaining ‘zero problem’ relations with the immediate neighbour countries; pursuing a proactive and multilateral foreign policy in the wider neighbourhood; and utilizing the Ottoman heritage as a foreign policy asset (Düzgit & Tocci, 2009).

Such multidimensional foreign policy initiatives (especially with immediate neighbours) determine the degree and direction of subnational mobilisation. It is partly because while at the central level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior are responsible for the coordination of SNAs’ international relations; at the subnational level, the governors are in charge of sustaining the integrity and appropriateness of SNA’s direct external relations. To illustrate, until 2011, Turkey had its reservations on several articles of the Charter of Local Self-Government. These articles included participating in international associations, and cooperating with local governments in foreign countries to defend their rights (Parlak *et al*., 2008 & Keleş, 2011). In this sort of governance mode, it is not surprising to observe that SNAs, unless they are on the opposition side, follow the trail of Ankara’s foreign policy preferences.

The majority of the interview participants underlined that there is an indirect but strong relation between the international activities of SNAs and their coordination with the central foreign policy implications. An interviewee stated that:

‘There are fewer SNAs which have pursued their own international relations strategies. It is because SNAs do not generally consider having their own foreign policy practices or they know that trans-localism is important. Nowadays, tourism, sustainable development, environment, social development, and so forth are not domestic issues as they have intercontinental dimensions because of several international agreements’ (Interview 47).

On the other hand, interviews in different cities revealed that the diversities of Turkish foreign policy alongside the zero-problem policies with neighbours have stimulated the interests of several SNAs towards the Black Sea, Middle East and Balkans. An expert from the Union of Turkish Municipalities reported that:

‘if the national government visits different countries in Central Asia, Black Sea, Middle East, or to some extent Africa, the centre told us that we opened the channels, now it is your turn to use these channels. Certainly, the central foreign policy affects our decisions and we advise our members to exploit these opportunities provided by the national government’ (Interview 5).

As seen in the empirical case cities, while Samsun has expanded its relations within the Black Sea area, Diyarbakir has conducted different economic, cultural and even political relations in North Iraq and Syria[[108]](#footnote-108) (see Chapter 9).

The discussion about the new foreign policy opportunities of Turkey’s immediate neighbours also underlines the importance of geography. The geographical position presents both advantages and disadvantages for SNAs. On the plus side, several SNAs may embark on relations with their immediate neighbours in Central Asia, Black Sea and Middle East environs for business, trade, tourism and cultural purposes. On the down side, apart from some cities in the West part of Turkey, there is not as much cross-border interaction with SNAs’ opposite numbers in the EU arena. This is a basic but important hindrance for the learning process of SNAs as well as their mobilisation in the EU arena. There are different opinions among interview participants. For instance, several interview participants stated that financial and economic opportunities in the immediate eastern and northern neighbours are more important than those counterparts in the EU borders. For that reason, it is not important to mobilize across the EU arena.

Although other interview participants share similar visions regarding the opportunities presented by the new multi-dimensional foreign policy and zero-problems with its neighbours, for them, local and regional administrations in those countries cannot be a good model for Turkish SNAs. It is mainly for this reason that the EU dimension in terms of learning best practices and know-how transfer remains crucial. As argued, the EU could be seen as a platform for policy transfer or learning best practices for SNAs (see Chapter 1). As one bureaucrat pointed out, ‘a number of RDAs joined the EURADA as soon as they started to operate in order to learn new practices and regional plans from elsewhere to emulate or transfer them to their own regions’ (Interview 14). Similarly, another informant has stated that ‘there is no need for the EU to promote SNAs in Turkey to mobilize towards the EU arena because whenever they need best practices, they look to the EU arena to draw a lesson’ (Interview 3). All these examples underline the prominence of horizontal and transnational links in the EU and thus they can be considered within second generation Europeanization.

At this point, one may draw a conclusion that the political environment and central political decisions for international relations affect and change the behaviour of SNAs. Because of the low EU membership credibility, although it is hard for one to speak about the importance of the pull effect stemming from the EU accession process, the EU arena is still a main address for a number of SNAs to cooperate with their relevant institutions, and to exchange ideas, practices and policies. More importantly, one of the main drivers for the SNAs in the EU is to seek available funds. This can be provided by EU institutions in Brussels. Although scholars could not find evidence on whether there is a link between subnational mobilisation in the EU arena (or having a presence in Brussels) and the pull factors of EU funds (Marks *et al.*, 1996; Goldsmith & Klausen, 1997), one cannot simply afford to neglect the importance of EU funds in the context of subnational mobilisation. The next section addresses the extent to which EU regional policy via financial incentives motivates SNAs to mobilize in Brussels.

*Problems with the EU Regional Policy and the Centralization of Pre-Accession Funds*

Scholars have distinguished two different aspects of multi-level governance derived from the Europeanization process: ‘de-centralization of power’ and ‘centralization of power’ narratives (see Chapter 2). With the launch of IPA, the Commission has followed the centralization of power narrative in order to ensure the efficient utilization of allocated funds in applicant states. By giving such a mixed signal, the national governments in applicant states have strengthened their gatekeeping role during the management of IPA funds. Besides, more recently, they have started to extend the gatekeeping role during the implementation of international funds that certain SNAs gained mainly from the EU level institutions.

Impressionistic evidence from the interviews during the field study both in Turkey and in Brussels revealed that some municipalities led by the opposition parties have used the EU channels to raise their demands and seek funds from other international donors for their constituency (such as Izmir, Diyarbakir and Antalya). Other relatively large municipalities followed suit. Ankara, therefore, has become suspicious of the relationship of certain municipalities with international donors or organizations. One significant example of this, the municipality of Diyarbakir, that is situated at the heart of the Kurdish-populated region, has been subject to various legal inquires for the ways in which it has allocated the resources it created from international donors in the last decade (Interview 33).

The immediate reaction of the centre was to control the funds that originated from the EU under the auspices of the Committee of Inspection under the Prime Ministry (Circular No. 2011/15). The incumbent government has become more concerned with the direct relation of opposition municipalities with the international organizations. This situation was mostly covered by the Turkish Media as the ‘German Foundation File’. PM Erdoğan publicly criticized activities by a German foundation, ‘without naming it, claiming it was signing business agreements with municipalities run by the main opposition Republican People’s Party and Peace and Democracy Party though it claimed to be a foundation’[[109]](#footnote-109). It was repeatedly reported during the interviews in Ankara that the EU deliberately subsidizes and visits the southeast part of Turkey because the majority of Kurds live there (Interviews 6 and 8). By denying such claims, the officials from DG Regio explained that ‘the basic logic behind the geographical coverage of the fund allocation is that the southeast regions satisfy the eligibility criteria of Objective 1 as they are under the 75 per cent threshold. This is the rule of the game and it is not specific for Turkey’ (Interviews 48 and 58). It is true that the objective 1 area and the places the majority of Kurds inhabit overlap (see Map 3.1 in Chapter 3).

With regard to the evolution of the partnership principle, it was explained that there is a practical reason behind such a transformation (see Chapter 4). However, as a direct result of this turn in fund management, Turkish RDAs, for instance, are not able to allocate the EU’s development aid reducing the direct interplay between the Commission and RDAs. Because of this direct relation, many SNAs in Europe started to have a presence in Brussels through liaison offices or interregional networks (Moore, 2011). In this respect, there is no institutionalized channel, or better to say access point, for subnational mobilisation for Turkish SNAs in Brussels and they are considered as an outsider to EU politics (for further detail see Chapter 8). While this reduces the pull factors of the EU’s opportunity structure, it requires a bottom-up push.

There is a further problem deriving from the changing nature of the partnership principle. To illustrate, in the 2004-2006 period, Plan and Implementation Units (PIUs) were composed of only (centrally appointed) provincial governors and (locally elected) provincial assemblies with (locally elected) municipalities. In the IPA regulation, this was replaced with a Sectoral Monitoring Committee (SMC) of each OP. These SMCs, which are the only institutional channels for SNAs to participate in EU fund management, include representatives not only from social and economic partners, but also from provincial governors, chambers of industry/commerce and universities on a rotating basis. The extension of the partnership horizontally through the other societal partners may undermine the privileged role of regional and local authorities. This is, indeed, one of the biggest problems in Turkey because of the overlapping local agendas at subnational levels. Such an overlapping local agenda is a particular obstacle for the RDAs to aggregate regional interests.

Interview findings in different cities, on the other hand, suggest that there are pros and cons for the centralization of the EU financial incentives. On the pros side, the majority of interview participants reported that they are contented with the centralization of EU fund mechanisms. Reasons for this are various. An interview participant from the city of Samsun reported as follows:

‘We may be more independent for applying the EU funds in Brussels and it may enhance our direct relations with the EU institutions, too. However, what we need is not to be independent. We need simple fund procedures that may only be realized by the help of national institutions. Besides, many local institutions do not have sufficient organizational capacity to follow the EU’s fund regulations’ (Interview 26).

Another interview participant called attention to the likely competition among SNAs for the sake of gaining EU funds. For him:

‘If there was no central mechanism for the fund allocation, the stronger institutions in more developed cities always would get the lion’s share. Therefore, it would not be fair for those cities or regions that do not have sufficient organizational capacity’ (Interview 31).

This consideration approximates to the metaphor of a galaxy of subnational authorities in Western Europe developed by Balme and Le Galès (1997) to describe variation in the EU-15[[110]](#footnote-110). Because of the lack of collective regional action or organized interests on a subnational level in Turkey, each territorial institution, such as RDAs, municipalities, and provincial assemblies, in a given region or city follows its own European interests and establish its own contact with the EU institutions. Accordingly, the major push factor deriving from the organizational capacity in the sense of human and financial sources as well as leadership is worth emphasizing. This will be taken up in the next chapter.

Some other interview participants similarly reported that if each SNA carved out its own extra-channels, there would be considerable complications for traceability, transparency and accountability. This is not desirable for either national or EU authorities (Interviews 20 and 28). Deriving from the interview findings from the fieldwork in different cities, the advantages of the centralization of financial incentives may be grouped as follows: increasing the coordination; reducing the fierce competition among SNAs; easing the EU fund procedures; providing fairness and equality in fund distribution; and protecting the rights of the neediest regions[[111]](#footnote-111). However, by this turn in fund management, Ankara rather than Brussels has become an important arena for SNAs to fulfil their financial interests. This comes closer to the intergovernmentalist argument.

On the down side, those interview participants who are mainly associated with the opposition parties do not believe that the current government is unbiased on the selection and distribution of the EU projects. An expert from Izmir argued: ‘we believe that there is a party-political factor in the selection and implementation of funds’. If we had a chance to obtain funds from the EU institutions, it would be much easier for us’ (Interview 37). In this regard, some SNAs (inter alia, the metropolitan municipalities of Antalya and Izmir) even paid a visit to the EU institutions in Brussels in order to complain about this situation by holding a high-rank meeting with the EU Commissioners (for more detail see Chapter 8). This presents an example of the quality of intergovernmental relations, which has emerged as a reaction to the patron-client mode of the current government (see Chapter 5).

The insufficient financial incentives provided by the EU were also repeatedly criticized by a number of civil servants in Ankara. They commonly reported that, given Turkey’s population and geographical size, the deeply rooted problems in economic and social cohesion, and its capacity to develop programmes and projects towards solving these problems, financial assistance by the EU is extremely limited[[112]](#footnote-112). As Ertugal (2011:263) argues, because of the fact that the budget for structural policies is not going to increase significantly in the next programming period of 2014-2020, the EU does not have enough incentive to exert informal pressure in this policy area[[113]](#footnote-113). This point was raised several times during the interviews with state and non-state elites in Ankara. For example, an expert from the Development Bank reported that: ‘the Commission is not willing to allocate massive resources to Turkey, given its size and population. It is for this reason that the EU takes things slower than other accession states, which undermines the on-going decentralization process in Turkey’ (Interview 4).

One may not challenge the view that Turkey has not received large amounts of structural funds compared to other candidate states in their accession rounds. With the relatively inadequate financial incentives, one may also not expect any radical transformation or macroeconomic change in those regions in which the EU funds have been implemented since 2004. However, according to interviews with local and regional representatives, there is a qualitative importance of the EU’s financial incentives in terms of partnership, transparency, subsidiarity, and programming. As seen in the next chapter, the qualitative importance of EU funds has increased the project generation capacity as well as organizational capacity of SNAs involved in the EU fund programmes.

## 

## 6.5. CONCLUSION

This chapter focused specifically on the interplay between the EU and Turkey with regard to regional policy and financial incentives. A link between the EU’s active (formal sphere of conditionality) and passive leverage and their impact on the Turkish domestic reform process may be captured by first generation Europeanization. It is largely true that a process of change in territorial relations in Turkey is fundamentally driven by endogenous factors, whose precise form and timing are intricately linked with the launch of Turkey’s accession process. While the adoption of the NUTS system in 2002 and the gradual creation of RDAs corresponding to 26 NUTS II regions after 2006 may be seen as clear examples of legal and institutional changes affecting traditional Turkish polity, national dynamics in terms of party politics and dissatisfaction for the existing policies, on the other hand, were significantly affected by the degree and outcome of this process. Particularly, during the Alaturka Europeanization period, although changes in the dynamics of traditional territorial relations as well as the transformation of national incentive mechanism for regional policy fit the traditional Turkish administrative system, changes remain a good example of thick learning mirroring the EU practices.

Much attention has been paid to the creation of formal structural fund partnerships but the emergence of regional arrangements should not be neglected. These arrangements now exist in 26 NUTS II regions in Turkey, despite their top-down and bureaucratic designs. The opportunity structures for SNAs changed after the creation of the RDAs and with the local reform process compliant to the EU’s regional policy. The creation of RDAs has predominantly provided an opportunity for formerly fragmented interests to combine with regionally based developments goals under a single organization. In a sense, it helps in creating new regional ownership on each NUTS II level (region as arena or MLG Type II). Their success in articulating regional interests towards the EU arena, however, remain to be seen.

RDAs are currently at the formative stage of institutionalization and need time to learn how to engage with EU politics. Furthermore, national actors have been to date playing the central role at the interface between subnational level in Turkey and the European level. In terms of the distribution of EU monies, state officials at both national and regional level are at the very heart of the process of formulating and implementing the structural funds. This proves the importance of the gatekeeping role exerted by the national authorities. During the period of Alaturka Europeanization, re-centralization of the financial incentives with the IPA has also reinforced the gatekeeping role of national governments on the implementation of structural funds and regional policies. Hence, taking into account the limited role of SNAs during the implementation of EU funds, the creation of opportunity structures does not enhance the power of SNAs, instead underpinning that of the national institutions. Such a re-centralization of power narratives gives much more credit to intergovernmentalists rather than MLG scholars.

It is also still premature to maintain that the change in the Turkish traditional governance may lead to a fully-fledged regionalization, and that the outcomes of this radical restructuring within the Turkish administrative system may instigate SNAs’ interests in the European arena. Because of certain restrictions derived from the national context and caveats dependent on the EU context, one may hardly speak of any genuine shift from a centralized/hierarchical structure to a multi-level modality. In the current situation, there is no institutionalized channel for subnational mobilisation in Brussels. This correspondingly reduces the pull factors of the EU’s opportunity structures, whilst it requires the push factor of organizational capacity and leadership. It has also impeded the direct relations of SNAs with the EU institutions or their ability to influence policy outcomes. In this respect, while one is able to reach conclusions about the impact of EU regional policy on the territorial relations in Turkey thus far, one also enters the caveat that the changes are recent and thus their long-term significance remains uncertain.

The constraints and opportunities identified in this chapter form a context within which actors at three different administrative levels are likely to transform their mode of action and their outlook. Therefore, the remainder of the thesis seeks to find out whether the changes affect the behaviour of Turkish SNAs on EU matters. Based on a survey analysis as well as reflecting on findings from interviews obtained at three administrative levels, the next chapter turns its attention to the organizational response of SNAs to the EU accession process after the Helsinki Summit of 1999. In so doing, it aims to show the extent to which SNAs, in the sense of municipalities and RDAs, adapted themselves to the multi-level governance structure of EU politics, particularly to the first two stages of subnational mobilisation: growing awareness and changes in organizational arrangements.

# 

# CHAPTER 7 SUBNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS

## 

## 7.1. INTRODUCTION

The formal implication of Europeanization in regards to a change in territorial relations in Turkey was discussed in the previous chapter. It concluded that there appears to be a modest but erratic shift towards a multi-level modality in the course of the accession process. However, what can be the stimuli for subnational mobilisation in economic laggard countries like Turkey with no history of regionalization, a long history of centralization, lack of social capacity and the fear of separatism? Do the EU funds boost the growing awareness at subnational level in regard to engaging with EU matters? Can the organizational capacity of SNAs create the necessary conditions to provide a bottom-up push for subnational mobilisation? By narrowing the focus to the first two stages of subnational mobilisation, growing awareness and organizational arrangement, the chapter demonstrates SNAs’ response to the Europeanization process.

The main aim here is to examine the extent to which SNAs have responded to the challenges and opportunities which have arisen from the EU accession process since 1999. SNAs’ response is crucial to this research for two main reasons. Firstly, an important feature of subnational mobilisation is that it appears in a bottom-up manner emanating from the initiative of subnational actors or institutions and local/regional leaders. It is neither imposed by higher levels of administration in Turkey nor promoted by any part of EU conditionality (see Chapter 2). In the absence of adaptational pressure, the push factors depending on organizational capacity in terms of finance, human resources, information and leadership can be a source of subnational mobilisation in Brussels. Secondly, the important role that SNAs play in the EU integration process has not yet been explored since they are relatively new to the European arena. Addressing this gap in the literature and employing a bottom-up perspective, the present chapter turns its focus to the subnational level to explore what has been done, planned or considered by SNAs, with respect to the policies of the EU and their effects at subnational level.

To examine what has changed at the subnational level, a survey covering eighty-five SNAs in Turkey was conducted during the period of February to April 2011, which generated a sufficient and satisfactory (79.4%) response rate (see Chapter 3). The survey did not seek to assess whether SNAs are capable of exerting influence over European policy-making or the extent to which they may participate in the regional policy making process. Rather, the scope of the survey was restricted to examining their interest in the EU by observing inter-organizational arrangements. The survey data has also been supplemented with insights obtained from interviews by the author, during the field work in Turkey and Brussels in the periods of April 2011 and July 2012. The chapter is organized into three main parts. The first part analyzes the perception of the EU impact on Turkish SNAs and illustrates the diversification of information channels concerning EU matters and the increase in project management capacity. The second part demonstrates the organizational arrangements in terms of staff and the creation of EU units. It then examines the importance of leadership and shows the types of leadership in SNAs. The final part concludes and presents the general state of affairs for Turkish SNAs.

## 7.2. GROWING AWARENESS AND SIGNS OF ADAPTATION TO THE EU

EU enlargement was widely perceived to be a national project by and for national governments and elites during the accession negotiations (Hughes *et al.*, 2004:172). It has been evaluated as a top-down and elite driven process, excluding other societal and non-state actors. This has been largely the case for SNAs. Relations with the EU were considered to be in the field of foreign policy and therefore falling under the reserved powers of the Turkish Government, National Assembly, and several lines of ministers; therefore, the rest of society—apart from some distinguished organizations (Business or Civil Society Organizations)—did not participate in any part of the EU integration process before the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Although certain SNAs have greater interest in the accession process, these endeavours are, in practice, not really involved in the process of planning and preparation of related reforms and/or legal adaptations. In an interview with the former foreign relations director of the Union of Marmara Municipalities, the oblivion of SNAs in the EU accession process is clearly indicated. The director stated that: ‘the accession issue affects local authorities very much in a *top-down* way. Even in the case of consultation with various sectors (public bodies, civil society, business world) in relation to some EU-oriented policies, local authorities are generally simply overlooked’ (Interview 46). Such a tradition, in fact, inherited from the past, is reflected in many fields, including the European harmonisation process.

The post-Helsinki period, nevertheless, has witnessed a breakthrough in terms of both societal and transnational interaction not only among the business elites, but also among a wide range of organizations, environmental groups, students and other segments of society (Eralp, 2009: 164). Because of this growing interaction, the EU has appeared on the agenda in every sphere of life, and is no longer treated solely as a foreign policy implication. Considering the EU as an important opportunity structure in terms of new political and economic resources, European activities have been expanded to the subnational level in Turkey. As argued, the intensification of the impact of the EU at subnational level was accelerated at the beginning of the 2000s by the impetus of the local and regional reform process (see Chapter 6). Although during the period of Alaturka Europeanization, the credibility and intensity of the EU accession process has witnessed a considerable decrease (Eralp, 2004; Saatçioğlu, 2010; Börzel & Soyaltın, 2012), according to the survey results, it appears that EU policies were generally having a significant impact on the majority of Turkish SNAs.


At the time the survey was conducted, more than two-thirds of respondents (83%) agreed that the accession process to the EU had impacted on their day-to-day activities. In the absence of any details as to which EU-related issues were being referenced, the individual responses to this question are too ambiguous to be useful. In the case of many member (and accession) states, however, the involvement of SNAs within EU affairs appears as a direct result of the development of the regional policy and structural funds (Balme & Gales, 1997: 153). As shown below, seeking EU funds is largely a case for SNAs. Before running through more details on their EU activities, it is essential to examine how SNAs collect information about EU matters and how this information is distributed.

**The Sources of Information**

Consultancy firms, holding excellent sources of information in their hands and recruiting competent experts regarding EU funds, became crucial sources of information for SNAs during Europeanization as Democratization period. EU-related activities have often been initiated from the consultation companies and these provided an initial push for SNAs to become involved in EU-related activities (Interview 47). Due to the large number of consultation companies, several SNAs did not have the chance to absorb the logic of EU funds and its principles, which usually undermined the constitution of organizational capacity in terms of EU matters. Therefore, from the beginning, SNAs were poorly informed about EU activities and tended not to recognize the potential benefits of the EU. They held only basic pragmatic understanding of what the EU stands for. This situation correspondingly affected the growing awareness among those SNAs during the initial years after the Helsinki period. Recent years, however, have witnessed the multiplication of EU information sources through different national as well as subnational channels.


Accessing information about the EU’s regional policies, directives and procedures as well as available funding options has a central role to boost awareness at subnational level. Such information may also stimulate SNAs’ interest in the European arena and mobilize their endeavours to conduct a number of transnational activities. These are the reasons why one needs to know about the difficulty of accessing information and to explore the channels from which SNAs derive the necessary information. The survey finding reveals that around 89% of SNAs did not find it difficult to obtain information regarding EU-related issues (Table 7.1). Given the role of RDAs in the regional policy process and their close consultation with the Ministry of Development that has long been in a position to conduct Turkey’s EU relations, RDAs are in a better position to acquire the necessary information regarding EU matters.

**Table 7.1** Is it difficult for your organization to obtain information regarding the EU issues? (%)



Alongside accessing information, the sources of information are necessary as they may offer a clue about whether SNAs are more likely to depend on national institutions or they derive information directly from the EU. In this respect, it was sought to discover the channels in which survey participants had been or were currently engaged for obtaining the information, identifying five national channels: the Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU); the Ministry for EU Affairs; the Ministry of Development; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and EU Coordination Offices under Governorship; as well as the direct EU channels. According to the survey results, national institutions are regarded as by far the most useful channels for necessary information (Table 7.2). It is remarkable that more than one-third of SNAs acquire such information from EU channels either using internet sources or through direct contact with the EU institutions. Another notable point is that only two SNAs (one from CMs and one from MMs) use none of these channels. This may be interpreted that awareness of the EU-related issues for SNAs is substantial.

**Table 7.2** Regarding the EU’s regional policy, which national institutions do you usually contact with?[[114]](#footnote-114)



Defining national institutions as a source of information may help one to understand the likely reason behind this interaction. As seen from table 7.2, the CFCU is the most popular national institution for supplying information. Given CFCU’s role (see Chapter 6), it is possible to observe that seeking funds is the main driver for many SNAs. Since much of the literature on European SNAs stresses the importance of resource pull hypotheses, it is not surprising to observe that the CFCU is perceived to be the most popular place for the source of information. This may lead one to anticipate that mobilisation depends on where the project is submitted. If this is national institutions, then SNAs are more likely to mobilize towards Ankara rather than Brussels.


Mobilizing towards the central institutions is considered reasonable, as one of the interviewees reported: ‘there is no point for SNAs being in Brussels to seek funds as they may obtain whatever they want from central institutions in Ankara if they have a good personal and party political connection’ (Interview 52). Similarly, an expert commented that: ‘there is no chance for Turkish SNAs to intervene in the distribution of financial resources in Brussels. Such resources are allocated via central institutions and therefore it is better for those SNAs to lobby in Ankara’ (Interview 10). As discussed, the more those domestic interest groups depend on resources exclusively provided by government agencies such as subsidies, the more these groups restrict their actions to the domestic political system (see Chapter 4). One may rightly avow that the centralization of pre-accession funds may change the direction of mobilisation.

The EU integration process cannot be reduced to only one dimension, which is learning about the rules of EU financial incentives. Various different policies, directives, rules and standards have been affecting the day-to-day activities of SNAs in the EU member and candidate states. For instance, EU directives and regulations have had significant impact on service areas such as personnel, trading standards and environmental health (Martin, 1997:55). As argued in chapter four, the range of affected policy areas has continued to grow and includes more diverse policy sectors. So long as EU regulative and redistributive power expands, this automatically has an impact on SNAs. Marks *et al*. (1996) asserted that the more competences SNAs have the more they are affected by European regulation and, therefore, the higher should be their interest in participating in the policy making process. In a slightly similar way, as Bache *et al*. (2011) argue, the regulatory power of the EU has become more extensive, therefore the incentive for those SNAs to lobby their national government and the Commission becomes greater. Such situations are more relevant for those SNAs from federal state traditions, like German Länder, which evokes the dynamics of bottom-up factors (Börzel, 2002; Moore, 2011). Despite the low EU membership credibility and the historically statist political culture, it may also be necessary for Turkish SNAs to have knowledge of the EU’s policies, directives and procedures because Europeanization has reached beyond its border. Hence, finding out what the EU is doing and what it produces for SNAs are major tasks in order to defend their interests. To know and acquire such information may also create or support awareness about EU matters in and around the organization.

Table 7.1 and 7.2 evidently confirm a substantial SNA interest in EU matters, but they largely reflect the formal interest of EU experts and some high ranking staff in the organizations that participated in the survey. What really matters is whether, how and to what extent, this information is distributed amongst the rank and file of SNAs. The best way for keeping up with developments in the EU is to circulate those directives/legislations inside an office to elevate awareness not only for the organization itself, but also for other institutions and individuals close to the organization. Given that many accession chapters are frozen in the current negotiation process, nearly half of SNAs (44%) circulate special procedures and/or EU directives inside their respective organizations (Figure 7.1). In as much as accession proceeds within regional policy and related chapters, the circulation of EU procedures and directives may be increased among SNAs. Subscription to a specialist periodical about the EU is another important source of information. However, by way of contrast, a large majority of SNAs (86%) do not purchase any periodicals (Figure 7.2). This low-level interest in specialist papers or magazines about the EU may reduce the learning process for SNAs and be a hindrance to the appreciation of EU opportunities.


**Figure 7.1** Does your organization circulate special procedure and

EU directives inside the organization?

****

**Figure 7.2** Does your organization subscribe to journals and specialist papers

and magazines regarding EU matters?

****

**The Increase in Project Generation Capacity**

EU financial incentives constitute the most tangible influence on the daily activities of SNAs, bringing about changes in their behaviour and encouraging them to become involved in the EU integration process. From the very narrow perspective of cost-benefit calculations, follow up interviews with representatives from the selected SNAs evidently reinforce the idea that financial incentives are the strongest driver for the adaption of SNAs to the EU-integration process, for the sake of benefitting from these funds. An interview participant from one of the RDAs commented that: ‘both Ankara and Brussels are doing what they have to do in terms of political relations. What is our priority is how our regions benefit from EU funds, as we do not have a part of IPA funds in the current situation’ (Interview 28). This is a general understanding for the majority of SNAs in Turkey, reflecting that the EU has often been treated as an alternative (or complementary) material resource to the national funds or subsidizes. While this constitutes an important pull effect of Europeanization, SNAs mostly mobilize towards the national institutions because of the transformation of EU financial incentives.

The insufficient financial incentives provided by the EU were criticized by almost all bureaucrats in central institutions (see Chapter 6). Yet, despite the limited amount of funds, the qualitative gains are far more important than the quantitative ones. This is because EU supported regional development programs have constituted an opportunity to increase horizontal networks and cooperation among SNAs. The EU provides incentives to the SNAs in a number of ways, including guidance, training and funding. It is also seen as a platform where a number of SNAs from different member and non-member states can share expertise and knowledge.

In the absence of membership prospects and financial incentives, the possible pull effects of the EU are confined to horizontal mechanisms in terms of policy transfers, networking and sharing information about future policies of the EU community. In several instances, apart from being a pot of money, the EU has turned out to be a model for local and regional governance. Therefore, it was generally considered that SNAs should be less concerned with acquiring money from the EU than learning EU practices and standards. Various interview participants suggested that, whether or not Turkey is going to be a part of the EU, it should nevertheless design its local system in tune with the EU standards. This underpins the idea that for many local and regional actors (and of course civil servants working in central level institutions), there is a sharp distinction between EU membership and the EU standards. While the latter have become more desirable, the former has lost its attractiveness. This must be seen as the key improvement towards second generation Europeanization.

It is a common (if not always accurate) perception that the internationalization of the EU’s norms, standards and common understanding with regard to subnational development has been diffused by the EU fund programs. SNAs involved in any EU-funded project experienced a process of practical learning on the topics of project preparation and management at the EU standards. An interview with an expert from the Union of Turkish Municipalities clearly indicates the diffusion of EU principles in terms of structural funds to SNAs. The said expert reported that:

‘The condition of EU projects contains some secret messages such as transparency, traceability, subsidiarity and partnership. Accordingly, if any SNAs involve in the EU-funded project as a beneficiary, these principles are instinctively diffused in that region in a learning-by-doing manner’ (Interview 5).

It is in fact difficult to measure whether such learning is thin (readjusting actors strategies) or thick (modifying actors’ values); in-depth case study analysis reveals that the thick form of learning is also widespread among SNAs as some of them have reshaped their preferences and goals through their engagement with the EU projects (see Chapter 9). Yet one thing is clear, EU projects have provided initial attachment with the Europeanization process and therefore they raise awareness at subnational level. This is particularly the case for a growing number of partnerships among local units. A senior bureaucrat from the Ministry for the EU affairs noted that:

‘Thanks to the EU’s financial incentives, now we can see that there is a growing awareness for the EU project and increase in the capacity of project making at subnational level. We should not consider the EU’s financial incentives as receiving money because qualitative gains are equally important in terms of spreading the culture of partnership’(Interview 13).

The effects of EU monies are also essential in the sense of project generation capacity and human sources. As Darvish (2007: 179) illustrates:

‘EU-supported regional development programs brought about a new process of learning in the regions. Approximately, 15,000 individuals attended the information days organized in each of the 33 provinces within the context of the programs. Moreover, approximately 8,000 persons attended the training programs for the project preparation and management. Training gave way to development in project preparation capacity at the local level’.

The common wisdom regarding the impact of the financial incentives is an increase in the project generation capacity of SNAs in Turkey. Such a capacity is predominantly higher in those less developed regions because of the specific focus of the EU-regional programs (Interviews 8 and 12). The majority of interview participants clarified that those SNAs eligible for EU fund programs have frequently interacted with EU standards, directives and procedures in their day-to-day activities[[115]](#footnote-115). As a result, their learning curve and readiness for EU opportunities are higher than other SNAs which are not covered by the EU fund programs. Forty-seven Turkish cities have been eligible for the utilization of EU-funded programs since 2001, though this number has decreased to the level of forty-three cities with the implementation of IPA for the period of 2007-2013. Statistically, while 1919 EU-funded projects have been to date implemented in forty-seven eligible cities (covering 14 NUTS II areas), this number was at 518 in thirty-four non-eligible cities (covering 12 NUTS II areas) between 2002 and 2010[[116]](#footnote-116).

It is possible to allege that project generation capacity may enhance the capability of joint action in a given region, which may later initiate subnational mobilisation within or beyond the national settings. This is also closely related to the advantages of pre-existing territorial networks (see Chapter 9 for Samsun and Izmir cases). Some interviewees, however, had a caveat on the advantages of the EU-led development programs; from the outset neither SNAs nor central institutions seemed to respond effectively to pre-accession funds during the initial years of EU development programs. This created a political and bureaucratic vacuum, which was filled rapidly by the private consultants. The mushrooming of private consultants on the management of EU funds resulted in them being charged with the task of drafting development plans (Interviews 7 and 15).

For some interview participants, although local institutions could work together for the sake of EU-funded projects, a large number of them became obsolete after the finalization of the project. These partnerships were based on an ad hoc - rather than institutionalized - form of networking. Several consultancy companies predominantly initiated these ad hoc partnerships throughout the project and they disappeared after the project completion (Interview 7). In various cases, not only were these short-lived partnerships but also EU-led paternalism has become accepted among the SNAs in return for the EU funds. For instance, while Samsun has benefitted most from the EU development programs to initiate further mobilisation across the EU arena, Diyarbakir, albeit for different reasons, seemed not to do so (see Chapter 9). This may be evidence to suggest that there is no direct correlation between being eligible for the EU funds and mobilizing across the EU arena.

The above examples are sufficient to demonstrate the first stage of subnational mobilisation, which is growing awareness. Yet they are not necessarily representing the whole picture. A range of organizational changes underline the adjustment of SNAs to the Europeanization process. These changes are found within the incremental adjustments and developments of organizational and/or administrative routines such as recruiting staff and creating EU offices inside the organization. It is suffice to remark that the changes, however, are not equally manifest in all SNAs. Whereas the adaptation process is high and swift in some SNAs, it may be low and incremental for others. Even, in some cases, it is non-existent. Such variation is largely determined by the organizational capacity and leadership and also is facilitated by certain intermediating factors at subnational level (e.g., the pre-existing territorial network).

## 

## 7.3. CHANGES IN ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

A number of intermediating factors at domestic—national and subnational—levels have been outlined in chapter five. It was also outlined in the beginning of this chapter that the majority of SNAs have perceived the impact of the EU accession process in their day to day politics and the majority of them showed their interest in EU matters. However, whether or not SNAs are mobilized during the EU accession process may largely depend on their organizational capacity. Such a capacity includes finance, experts, information and entrepreneurial leadership. These are important push factors for exploiting EU opportunities and taking on board several EU activities. The source of information has been mentioned. This section briefly touches upon the finance dimension and then illustrates the findings for personnel, EU units and leadership.

**Finance**

Financial resources are an essential ingredient of subnational mobilisation for the pursuit of collective goals (Nielsen & Salk, 1998: 239). Therefore, the more abundant resources should be generally associated with an enhanced propensity for collective action. One may expect the resource constraint to apply in the case of regional collective action, too. It is therefore argued that prosperous organizations would be more likely to engage in mobilisation activities across the EU arena. According to survey results, only one-quarter of SNAs (25%) have allocated resources for their representation to the EU arena. In fact, finance was overwhelmingly perceived to be the major hurdle impinging on EU activities. Like many unitary states, Turkish SNAs are heavily dependent on central government grants to finance their activities and their participation in a range of EU programs. Not only do the establishment of an office in Brussels and the participation of the interregional organizations require financial power, but also SNAs should contribute a certain amount of money as co-financers for EU-funded projects based on the additionality principle.


As interview participants suggested, because of the EU’s financial capability principle, municipalities were having difficulties in applying for EU pre-accession funds (Interviews, 5, 46 and 47). Although it is difficult to find reliable data to show the extent to which SNAs are financially weak, some news appearing in the national media illustrates that municipalities have largely remained in debt[[117]](#footnote-117). This is also particularly the case for the metropolitan municipalities of Diyarbakir and Samsun (see Chapter 9). As for RDAs, they are at the formative stage of institutionalization. This made them focus on their internal development rather than external activities.

**Personnel**

Personnel having certain levels of EU expertise are required for the appreciation of EU opportunities (Carter & Pasquier, 2010). Bearing this in mind, the survey findings reveal that while more than two-thirds of SNAs (80%) have at least one staff member with special knowledge and qualifications on EU matters, no organization has a negative view on having personnel educated or trained about EU-related issues (see Figure 7.3). This implies a positive attitude towards qualified and experienced staff in relation to EU issues for the appreciation of EU benefits. Even if SNAs do not have any staff qualified in EU issues, 20% of them are persuasive towards their staff having the necessary education or training.

**Figure 7.3** Does your organization have staff trained


and educated about the EU-related Issues?



The most likely explanation for the higher ratio of staff educated and trained about the EU is that the national authorities arrange seminars, workshops or courses to educate staff working in any local and regional organization (Interviews 5, 8 and 12). However, during the period of Alaturka Europeanization, the interest towards EU issues at subnational level has decreased to a minimum level[[118]](#footnote-118). Prior to the period of Alaturka Europeanization, the EU delegation in Ankara followed a remarkable information strategy to expand EU activities involving the wider societal actors at subnational level and to keep SNAs up with the EU accession process (Interview 15). Within this context, the delegation established an EU information centre under the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in selected cities just after the Custom Union Agreement of 1995. Twenty-one EU info-centres are presently working in different cities. These offices have undeniably produced a growing awareness about the principles, policies and standards of the EU at subnational level. These centres have arranged awareness-raising events designed to assist public, private and voluntary organizations at subnational level to prepare for the advent of Turkish-EU relations. The events include ‘Europe weeks’, exhibitions, conference and concerts as well as spreading information leaflets. The activities have also included training seminars, PCM (Project Cycle Management) certificates, and consultancy for local firms[[119]](#footnote-119). Therefore, the particular emphasis should go to the role performed by the chambers of commerce in the context of increasing human resource capacity as well as the mobilisation of SNAs in a given region.

Despite the large number of personnel educated and trained in EU matters, most of the established and relatively long-serving personnel often have come to EU issues from other areas of work, if not actually adding EU responsibilities to existing ones. Table 7.3 reveals that staff with EU expertise spent longer time in the organization than their present position. Besides, it was pointed out during the field work in several cities that the turnover for the EU posts is tremendously high and the selection of staff for this post principally depends on language ability rather than technical expertise.

**Table 7.3** Duration of staff both in the organization and in the current position



As for the staff whose main duty is exclusively on EU affairs, the ratio is comparatively lower, with around half of SNAs (51%). The number of personnel whose main duty is responsibility for EU affairs is once again higher in RDAs (and to lesser extent in MMs) than CMs. This suggests that the role of RDAs in EU-related issues makes a difference. As highlighted by the interview participants from different SNAs, while some of the larger and richer SNAs are considering the appointment of full-time staff for EU matters, many other SNAs did not feel that the present level of EU activities warranted such a position, particularly given current Turkish-EU relations. The fact that half of the SNAs had personnel with some degree of responsibility for EU matters is a positive development. Another positive development is that even if the organization does not have any special post for the EU, some of them (19%) have access to consultation companies. Only 15% of SNAs considered that they do not need any special post for the EU task. Overall, there is a positive attitude towards having educated and trained staff for EU-related issues (Figure 7.4). Yet many interview participants in Brussels commonly point out that not only is ability in a language necessary for SNAs, but also a good level of EU knowledge if they wish to operate in Brussels.

**Figure 7.4** Does your organization have staff whose main duty is responsibility for EU affairs?

In comparison to City Municipalities and Metropolitan Municipalities, the great majority of Regional Development Agencies have more than one staff that has the necessary knowledge of EU-related issues. Two main reasons may explain why RDAs have more qualified staff regarding the EU-related issues than CMs and MMs. First, many RDAs recruited some of their staff from the Plan and Implementation Units (PIUs) (Interview 8). At regional level, PIUs were responsible for effective programme implementation in compliance with EU procedures under the coordination of the Ministry of Development (see Chapter 6). PIUs organized information days and training about project preparation and management at local level and were responsible for the coordination of technical assistance and monitoring as well. Although a number of staff from PIUs were appointed by provincial administrations due to a lack of local human resources, the majority of PIU personnel went to work in RDAs (Interview 8). Secondly, the selection criteria for recruiting staff to the RDAs are highly competitive as staff receive a higher salary and have better work conditions than their equivalents in other state or non-state institutions (Interview 4). As a result, staff working for RDAs have usually graduated from prestigious universities, speak one or more foreign languages and have been involved in an intense vocational training regarding EU-related issues (Interview 28). Having qualified staff in RDAs not only offers them a chance to raise the entrepreneurial capacity of the organization, but is also important for the human resource capacity of the regions (for the comparison of educational background of those working in municipalities and those in RDAs, see Table 9.4 in Chapter 9).

During the interviews, representatives from SNAs clarified that EU matters are still largely a minor issue for them and they mainly engage with EU project management. It is one of the reasons that the selection of those staff for EU-related issues usually depends on their ability to speak foreign languages rather than their technical expertise in EU procedures or policies. What is generally required from those EU experts in the majority of SNAs is to search, conduct and implement the EU funds. Besides, EU sections or posts in administrative structure are usually located under the strategic planning, project department and/or R&D unit. This suggests that the EU is usually treated as an alternative material benefit. This is particularly the case for those SNAs eligible for EU development programs.

One expert reported that aside from any language difficulties, those working especially as middle or senior staff in SNAs could adapt themselves to the EU standards, once they have grasped the essential rules of the game (Interview 22). This is, indeed, particularly the case for those staff working in RDAs. The main reason for their easy adaptation to EU standards is that the current system of project management in RDAs has followed the identical procedures of the EU. As argued, the transformation of an incentive mechanism under the management of RDAs led many staff to learn the principles of EU financial incentives (see Chapter 6). Again, given the complexity of the EU environment and the competition among different SNAs in Brussels, the level of EU expertise is not satisfying.

More recently, however, a number of SNAs have sought to recruit staff with skills particularly relevant to EU matters such as having a second language; extensive experience in Brussels or Strasbourg; and links to networks or other SNAs in other countries. These are appreciated as essential features for the ‘EU campaigner’s toolkit’ (Goldsmith & Sperling, 1997). The best example of these skilled personnel could be seen in the Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality: the vice-general secretary of the Municipality worked for over 20 years in the Strasbourg and Brussels area, and can speak English and French fluently (Interview 67). The EU team working in that Municipality has many talented experts who can speak different languages such as Italian, English, German and French. Moreover, the voluntary representative of Gaziantep Municipality has been living in Brussels for about 40 years and engaged with EU-related issues on several occasions (Interview 60). Such competent and skilled experts and professionals are also found in more developed and richer cities such as Eskisehir, Bursa, Istanbul, Izmir, Yalova, Ankara, Kayseri and Antalya. As seen in chapter nine, these skilled personnel contribute significantly to the mobilisation of their organizations through transnational networks.

**Creation of an EU Unit inside the Organization**

The adaptation process at subnational level to the EU process was chiefly started by the creation of EU info-centres under the chambers of commerce in a number of cities. The idea of EU offices has gradually disseminated to other regional and local institutions. Several SNAs have embarked on the creation of departments for EU tasks in their respective organizations. Survey findings illustrate that 31% of SNAs have a specific EU office. While 15% have an office called either an international or foreign relations unit, 33% plan to have a specific EU office in the future. Only 18% do not have any office related to EU matters and they do not plan to have one in the future (Figure 7.5).

**Figure 7.5** Does your organization have a specific office for the coordination of EU affairs?

RDAs had no specific offices for the EU affairs, though nearly one-third of RDAs had a specific office for international relations. Twenty per cent of them are planning to establish their own EU offices in the near future. Given that there is a direct correlation between their existence and Turkey’s accession process, this low interest for RDAs in terms of having an EU unit suggests a paradox, and besides, they perceived the impact of the EU on their day-to-day activities as higher than that of municipalities (see above). One may expect that the RDAs have robust reasons to establish their own EU offices. Yet the obvious reason why few initiatives and activities may have been taken by RDAs is that they are the most recent administrative organizations. It takes time for them to understand and adapt to the new environment. It is, therefore, not realistic that those RDAs should have a specific office related to the EU affairs. Finally, one should also remember that the very creation of RDAs coincided with the low credibility of the EU accession process (during the so-called Alaturka Europeanization period).

Interestingly enough, nearly half of RDAs (45%) are not planning to open EU posts and/or offices in the near future. RDAs may have a chance to be involved in the management of EU pre-accession funds after 2014 if they are accredited as operational bodies both at the central level and at EU level for the implementation of EU funds. This accreditation process may necessitate a specific office inside the organization to ensure that the capacity of RDAs is sufficient to implement EU funds. What is meant by ‘sufficient capacity’ is not only in technical terms but also in terms of knowledge of procurement rules and environmental issues, which the experts in the agency should be adequately able to cover. An interviewee in DG Regio indicated that the capacity for the implementation of EU funds and the specific knowledge of the rules, particularly for the procurement rules, are indispensable for RDAs. Procurement rules are complex and require specific expertise. In this respect, the DG Regio keeps warning Ankara not to underestimate the risks involved in the accreditation process (Interview 58).

Another important issue requiring more explanation is that the creation of EU offices under different organizations, has, in several instances, caused a sense of competition rather than coordination (Interviews 22 and 43). This is a usual case among SNAs in Turkey and may be seen as an example of organizational chauvinism. It may be the reason that the establishment and creation of ‘EU Permanent Contact Points’ under governorships were designed to co-ordinate EU activities in all eighty-one cities in Turkey (Interview 20). Such permanent contact points were the most recent developments regarding the awareness-raising campaign at subnational level (Interviews 11 and 13). One may think that with these provincial contact offices, the centre would have thought of gatekeeping all EU-related activities in a single institution, under the paid officials working in the governorship, as well as controlling the EU access points of SNA. As one bureaucrat from the Ministry of Interior reported, the foremost expectation of central institutions is to be informed by SNAs about their activities (Interview 9). As argued, central and local administrations together form the Turkish administrative system and there is a ‘*speak with one voice in the outside world’* tradition (see Chapter 5). This expectation, indeed, suggests the old style of gatekeeping, which requires coordination among different administrative levels (see Chapter 2).

While in some cities (inter alia, Izmir, Antalya, Ankara and Istanbul) the governorships took their own bottom-up initiatives to create EU coordination offices, the rest have been created in a top-down manner by the Ministry for EU affairs and the Ministry of Interior. In 2010, with the Ministry of Interior Circular No. 2010/6, a provincial deputy governor was appointed in EU Permanent Contact Points as a municipal coordinator. In order to provide coordination for and promotion of the EU activities at city level, the coordination offices are working in all 81 provinces in Turkey. These offices held a meeting called the ‘EU Harmonization and Cooperation Board’ four times a year under the direction of provincial deputy governors. This board consisted of the representatives from public, private, NGOs, universities and media whose main responsibilities are the EU-related activities. These offices and boards are mainly responsible for the fulfilment of four principles: the promotion and dissemination of EU practices, norms, and policies; training; guidance and consultancy; and project development (Interview 39). The most famous projects launched by these coordination offices in all 81 provinces were called ‘Municipalities are preparing for the EU’ and ‘Cities are preparing for the EU’. In general, the very creation of such permanent offices as provincial coordinators for European Affairs not only shows the proactive behaviour of the centre towards EU projects and matters but also it addresses the decreasing popularity of the EU at subnational level during the period of Alaturka Europeanization.

Considering the above arguments, on the whole, the majority of interview participants generally perceive that the leading barriers to the implementation of EU activities within and beyond the national boundaries are the lack of qualified staff, information, coordination and finance. This also reinforces the argument set out in chapter four about an immature stock of social capital and no tradition of collective action at subnational level (Gedikli, 2009). On the other hand, during the fieldwork in Turkey, several experts working in those SNAs reported that although the organization in which they are working has sufficient organizational capacity, there is no political leadership to initiate further steps towards the EU integration process; such as applying for EU funds, sister-city agreements or other transnational activities. Irrespective of sufficient organizational capacity, the strong leaders or elites (if guided intensely by powerful organizations) may be an advantage for subnational mobilisation. The next section builds on this point.

**Leadership**

Leadership is crucial for success in engagement with the EU politics. This is because EU action requires political legitimacy and direction, as well as the approval of resources (John, 1994:15). In analysing the empowerment of selected regions in Italy and in France, Smyrl (1997) also asserts that only in those regions where leaders took on from the outset the role of policy entrepreneurs with respect to EU regional policy, was empowerment possible. The present section puts a similar emphasis on the vision and perceptions of the leaders as a significant determinant for the mobilisation process of a given SNA. Several interview participants in Brussels persistently underlined the importance of leadership. Examples vary. A free-lancer lobbyist reported that: ‘lobbying in Brussels requires managerial skills as well as a great deal of time until obtaining benefits. This can be done by leaders’ (Interview 59). A policy-adviser in the CoR explained that: ‘you should take the political decision first and then you will consider about how to implement this. If there is a political will, you can find the necessary means’ (Interview 49). In short, to seize and benefit from the political, informational and administrative resources of the given organization requires initiatives on the part of the leaders. In the absence of such action, as Smyrl (1997) claims, the resources in question would either go unused or be captured by others.

The elected and paid officials (governors, mayors and the head of provincial assemblies) generally represent the territorial interests of a given region or city. Taking the unit analysis for this research into account (see Chapter 3), the research argues that the leaders of RDAs and municipalities as the key local and regional actors may lead the organizations to participate in EU activities or mobilize in the EU arena. In fact, there is no satisfactory analysis and a lack of interest in Turkish political science literature with regard to the role of leadership in local/regional politics. As argued, Turkey has a tradition that allows the pre-eminence of paid officials over elected representatives at the local level. In this respect, of all the paid and elected officials at a provincial level, the status of governor is especially significant (see Chapter 5). Despite administrative reforms during the proto-Europeanization period, governors as local agents of a national institution still wield power and authority over local administrations (see Chapter 6). Governor(s)[[120]](#footnote-120), as chairperson(s) of the executive board have an important role in the management of RDAs, too. In its current form, RDAs preserve the traditional patterns adopted in the central-local relations throughout Turkish administrative history. The executive officer of RDA is the ‘general secretary’[[121]](#footnote-121) who is responsible before the executive board. Therefore, their visions and interests are of essence for the future trajectory of RDAs.

The majority of interview participants at subnational level argued that paid officials (i.e. governors, vice-governors and district governors) may not be suitable to be seen as leaders for a given city. Initially, their tenure in that city is around three or four years. Within such a short period, it is not easy for them to comprehend the needs and dynamics of the city and mobilize the necessary resources for territorial interest representation. Furthermore, some interview participants added that many governors have an excessive workload, which does not allow them to deal with further long-lasting activities. In 1969, ‘a study’[[122]](#footnote-122) on the external correspondence channels of the administrative organizations of the provinces clearly illustrated that governors spend much of their time signing documents. In the case of Ankara, the governor himself and each one of the six vice-governors had to examine and sign 203 documents (coming into and going out of the provincial organization) per person in one day. In other words, in an average workday, those paid officials signed a document every 1.9 minutes. As one district-governor stated:

‘There is no allocated financial resource for the international activities in our budget. If a governor wishes to conduct any EU activities, s/he needs to find the financial means from different local sources as well as necessary permissions from Ankara. This is not a desirable situation for many paid officials as they do not wish to add any extra responsibilities into their existing workload’ (Interview 39).

Through the creation of EU Permanent Contact Points in every province, a number of governors have delegated several responsibilities to the vice-governor who is appointed as an EU coordinator. It was, however, expressed by the interview participants in different cities that if the paid officials participate in any EU-related activities, these activities may be discontinued in their absence. The problem of discontinuity is a general drawback not only for paid-officials but also elected-officials due to the lack of institutionalization in external relations within a number of SNAs. For instance, a liaison office for Yalova in Brussels was closed down because of a leadership change in that municipality after the local election in 2010 (Interview 1). Nonetheless, in comparison to the governors, elected officials are still considered as important figures for their respective cities. Toprak (2011:308) argues that mayors, in the public psyche, have been seen as having ownership of the city and thus they can do whatever they want. Not surprisingly, many mayors have a myopic consideration leading them to be inclined to activities that may be rapidly implemented and have an immediate effect so that they may be seen to be delivering their electoral mandate. However, almost all interview participants in Brussels commonly pointed to the mobilisation of SNAs in Brussels producing benefits over a longer time period.

As is known now, SNAs are heavily dependent on the central government and they are subject to strict limitations in terms of field of authorities and activities. The power dependency of SNAs on the upper tiers may take different forms: political, financial, fiscal and administrative aspects. Fiscal dependency, particularly, remains a stringent limit to local leaders’ power in the multi-level governance system. Strong central tutelage along with clientelism has militated against the emergence of strong local leadership. As a result, the paternalistic and patron-client relations have become a mode of interest mediation in territorial relations throughout the Turkish-Ottoman history (see Chapter 5). Considering the traditional mode of interest mediation with the low credibility of EU membership as well as the centralization of EU financial incentives together, it is better for those leaders to mobilize in Ankara rather than in Brussels in order to fulfil their material interests. Yet too much clientelism may also increase the entrepreneurial capacity of certain mayors, who are on the opposition side. This is because those opposite municipalities may wish to diversify their material sources by using different international channels rather than depending on national sources (for the case of Diyarbakir and Izmir Metropolitan Municipalities see Chapter 9).

Another issue which needs to be underlined here is that national politics and policies dominate local leaders’ elections in Turkey. As Özcan (2000: 226) asserts, the undemocratic nature of party politics is based on a cult of leadership in Turkey that encourages centralist tendencies and narrows group favouritism in politics. From the definition of party policies to the preparation of local party candidates, the party leader and his/her team controls everything. In this respect, it is highly unlikely for a mayor who is on the ruling party side to encourage European activities, while there is clear tension in Turkish-EU relations. For instance, during the proto-Europeanization period, when the incumbent government had excellent relations with the EU, mayors, especially from the ruling party, organized visits in Brussels to support their respective party's vision. An interview participant from Brussels argued that these visits were prestigious and symbolic gestures. For him: ‘some mayors may have thought that if they ever come across the Prime Minister and/or any minister somewhere in Turkey, they want to show that they were also in Brussels to conduct relations with their equivalents’ (Interview 40, also see Chapter 8). However, by the Alaturka Europeanization period, mayors from the opposition side had started to mobilize in Brussels. For the opposition mayors, mobilisation across the EU arena was organized in a strategic manner (for the case of SODEM see Chapter 9).

To illustrate the international relations strategies of Turkish local leaders vis-à-vis the national governments, Dauodov (2012) employed a three-fold distinction: cooperative (as in the case of many cities close to the ruling party); competitive (as in the case of cities close to the opposition parties, mainly CHP); and conflictual (as in the case of Kurdish-dominated cities close to the BDP). Although the research appreciates the categorization employed by Dauodov, the next section presents the type and behaviour of local leaders with regard to the EU matters for this research.

*Types of Leadership in Turkish SNAs*

Among the cities under examination for this research, the choices and behaviours of political leaders (both elected and paid officials) vary considerably. Even though it was difficult to analyze the capacity and vision of leaders in SNAs for EU matters using the survey analysis, the field work conducted in different cities in Turkey helped to categorize the diversity of leadership affecting the behaviour of SNAs. To distinguish the types of leadership, the research utilized the four-fold classification - counteractive, passive, reactive and proactive - developed by Goldsmith and Klausen in 1997 (see Chapter 4). This research finds the aforesaid categorization appropriate for the analysis of the behaviour of leaders in Turkish SNAs.

**Counteractive:** Some leaders are sceptical about the value of EU activity, do not take any initiatives and have undergone little or no internal restructuring to cope with EU pressures. For this group, EU matters are in some instances considered in the narrow political debate in a very ideological way. It may be the conjectural effect since EU-support in the public mind has been fading away since its heyday around 2004 and 2005. This has been exacerbated by the vicissitudes of Turkish-EU relations, the political attitudes of some key politicians in the EU (i.e. Sarkozy and Merkel), the fatigue of the last enlargement rounds and the changing dynamics of Turkish foreign policy (see Chapter 6). Those counteractive SNAs neither find EU standards and policies as quintessential for the development of Turkey, nor believe that Turkey is going to be part of the EU in the future. This justifies their inaction towards EU-related activities. Hence, they are not bothered to cooperate with other stakeholders in their region on EU-matters. As one interviewee mentioned, ‘when we try to find a partner for the EU-supported programs, this is not deemed as attractive for the particular SNAs in our region because of their cynicisms towards the EU matters’ (Interview 37).

**Passive:** Impressionistic evidence from the fieldwork suggests that some leaders are not Euro-sceptic. By way of contrast, they think that the EU standards are essential for the country’s modernization process in terms of democracy, human rights and economic development. Yet they cannot take any initiatives on the EU matters for certain reasons. One of the major problems that they usually encounter is to find an expert and/or to compensate the necessary financial means because of the additionality principle. Several interview participants affirmed that they would like to be involved with the EU programs, but they do not know how to do it because of lack of knowledge and expertise. A further reason is that despite EU opportunities, they do not feel that the conducting of EU activities is their business. It was even expressed by interview participants that relations with the EU have a political dimension and so it is not their business to engage with any EU institutions. For those interview participants, if all SNAs have their own EU strategies, there would be disorganization and inefficiency. Treating the EU as primarily a matter for central government clearly reinforces the idea that some SNAs have not considered themselves a legitimate administrative tier. This also shows that some SNAs are not prepared for the system of MLG.

On the other hand, some others did not feel that they were involved in the EU integration process and thus they did not see the benefits and gains of EU activities. The structural effect relating to the conjecture of Turkish-EU relations is largely used for the justification of their inactivity for EU matters. A common expression is that the current political atmosphere in relation to the EU accession process does not provide a fertile ground to embark on EU-related activities. This leads us to think that some of those SNAs may have been active in a previous time and they are now inactive as a direct result of the current Turkish-EU relations. It is the reason that the ladder metaphor should be time-sensitive as SNAs may move up the ladder but at times they may revert back to the lower steps.

**Reactive:** The majority of local and regional leaders, to a certain extent, may be grouped in this category. They neither oppose EU membership nor will they wait for Turkey to become a member of the Union in future. Their preferences are to exploit the EU opportunities as much as they can. In this regard, their attitudes towards EU-related issues are largely instrumental. The major characteristic of this group is that they clearly distinguish EU membership from reaching EU standards (see Chapter 6). It was deemed that Turkey does not need to be a member of the EU, but must reach EU standards in every sphere of life. The common pattern for this situation echoes in the words of a general secretary of one special provincial administration. As he stated: ‘initially we started to apply the EU projects and tried to bring as much EU funds as we can to our city. Presently, we are more concerned with the fact of how we can reach EU standards in terms of local and regional development’ (Interview 23).

It is also relevant to discuss here that EU funds have not only changed the local agenda for those SNAs eligible for the EU development programs, but also changed the content of domestic actors’ activities. The President of the West Mediterranean Economic Development Council expressed that: ‘many SNAs in those areas eligible for EU funds are not looking for a financial resource for their existing or ongoing projects, but looking for a project according to available funds or call for proposals’[[123]](#footnote-123). It is for this reason that the initiatives taken by this group have hardly borne fruit and have become obsolete after the finalization of the project(s). A final note for describing this group is that learning and imitating are their core characteristics. As one expert reported: ‘during the zenith of EU accession process, there was an understanding that if you are a good and modern municipality, you should engage with EU matters by recruiting staff, creating EU units or participating in EU programs with equivalent partners from other EU members’ (Interview 47). This not only underlined the importance of the logic of appropriateness but also revealed that they are followers rather than forerunners as in the case of the next group.

**Proactive:** Leaders in this group have mostly shared a pro-European view and they are open to a range of international activities. The leaders are dynamic and initiate several internal arrangements such as recruiting experts, creating EU units, allocating resources for international activities and even actively participating in the activities of interregional organizations. SNAs having proactive leaders are usually the path-breakers. By seeing opportunities presented by the EU accession process, they have engaged with EU matters in a strategic manner. So far, the developed cities or regions within this group have been the most active in taking the initiative in EU affairs. It is because of their reputations in Europe, personal relations of elites live in that city or region, the capacity of their staff and economic openness of the city in terms of import and export. As will be presented in chapter nine, those leaders in Samsun and Izmir locate in this group.

This group of leaders also supports the notion of MLG being ‘pluralist with an elitist bias’ (Hooghe, 1995:179) meaning that only actors with valuable resources can participate— as evident from the strategies of bigger and financially more capable municipalities in Turkey where European affairs are part of everyday work. However, in some cases there are cities like Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa, where mayors use their entrepreneurial skills to drive the municipalities to join in different interregional organizations in Brussels and even conduct lobbying facilities in the international arena, though their cities are relatively less developed.

Overall, the above categorization is considered according to a select subset of cities in Turkey. Given the geographical diversity and idiosyncrasy of each city, a number of SNAs could be a mixture of types and/or they have been moving around different types, if one observes from a longitudinal point of view. For the elected officials or mayors, the main consideration is to satisfy their respective constituencies in order to ensure that they are going to be re-elected. This does not allow them to consider long-term strategic plans or engage in large-scale cooperation requiring a certain amount of managerial skill.

Irrespective of which groups those SNAs belong to, there are several points commonly highlighted by the interview participants. To begin with, coordination with central institutions regarding their external activities was mostly underlined during the fieldwork (except for some cases in Diyarbakir and Izmir). This confirms that the long tradition of statist political culture has an impact on the behaviour of SNAs. Because of such path dependency, the central institutions may easily exercise their gatekeeping role. In relation to the first point, if the EU vision of the incumbent government has changed, and the EU membership prospect for Turkey has increased, the majority of interview participants claimed that they may take more initiatives on EU matters. As a result, in the current situation, mobilisation efforts are confined to the activities of some creative SNAs.

## 

## 7.4. CONCLUSION

The first two stages of subnational mobilisation, growing awareness and changes in organizational arrangements, were the main themes for this chapter. These have been largely overlooked in the extant literature, though this research takes them as preliminary elements for a shift towards the multi-level modality. The obvious reason is that in the absence of a strong pull effect and adaptational pressures, the bottom-up mechanism (awareness about the EU opportunities as well as organizational capacity) and voluntary mechanism (horizontal Europeanization) may stimulate SNAs to move towards the third and fourth stage of subnational mobilisation. Nonetheless, a growing awareness and changes in organizational arrangements are usually a product of the EU’s financial incentives as these funds provide the initial attachment with the Europeanization process at subnational level. Consequently, the chapter has taken the redistributive policies and pre-accession funds as an empirical focus, which has a top-down effect as in the case of first generation Europeanization.

What the empirical findings have suggested is that the increasing recognition of the Europeanization at subnational level has been manifested in three main areas of subnational activity. First, there has been a growing awareness and recognition of the impact of the EU on the day-to-day politics of SNAs. Second, there has been a multiplicity in sources of information as well as an increase in project generation capacity on a subnational level. Third, a number of SNAs have become increasingly proactive in seeking to maximise the benefits, particularly the amount of EU financial incentives, accruing to their areas by recruiting staff and creating posts. Accordingly, the overall picture represented in these survey findings reveals that most SNAs become involved with EU matters by employing staff, creating EU offices and disseminating EU procedures and policies inside the organization. This suggests that a number of organizations have already started to climb the ladder that was argued by John. This indicates the financially orientated stage of Europeanization on the latter metaphor (see Chapter 4).

The Europeanization process not only advances redistributive programs, such as financial assistance, but also regulative policies, such as environmental policy. Whereas the regulative policies affect SNAs in a similar way, the impact of redistributive programs varies among SNAs. To exploit EU opportunities, SNAs, particularly those in the eligible areas, have adjusted their organizational logic with new departments, new personnel as well as programming capacity. Organizational changes, however, have not equally manifested in all SNAs. Whereas the adaptation process is high and swift in some SNAs, it may be low and incremental for others. Even in some cases, it is non-existent. However, it is still difficult to argue that EU issues were dealt with in an organized and systematic manner. Whilst several SNAs have been dealing with European matters in an organized fashion, most still operate in a reactive rather than a proactive way, with the result that there is still room for the development of activity on this front.

How active an SNA is likely to be is largely a result of its eligibility for European funding, its organizational structure and its political commitment to European involvement. Being eligible does not mean that those SNAs have adjusted themselves properly in line with the EU standards and that they are ready to absorb these funds and administer them efficiently. During the initial years, SNAs used consultant companies but then they have learned how to adapt themselves to the process of Europeanization. Yet this is generally a case of thin learning as they only want to benefit from these funds. Accordingly, their adjustment has not brought about a radical change to their organizational logic as the change was on the margin in order to benefit from the EU incentives. Furthermore, both in terms of general activity and of collecting information, SNAs are likely to be passive or reactive rather than proactive. They largely depend on official sources or government departments for information. This is a case for the top-down effect of Europeanization rather than bottom-up response to exploit the EU opportunities.

It has also become apparent that the perception of SNAs on EU matters may change over time in response to perceived opportunities for action in the EU arena, or other structural factors (e.g. the nature of EU-Turkish relations or change in foreign policy dynamics). Before the EU fund programs, while the EU issue was on the local agenda in some rich and culturally developed cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, by the impetus of EU financial incentives, the effects of Europeanization extended its reach to the more rural and less developed cities. Accordingly, the EU was no longer having an impact on a few high profile SNAs, rather the EU affairs appeared on the agenda of several low profile SNAs. However, the lower credibility of EU membership has caused a number of SNAs to feel that they are not part of EU politics and may not be in the near future. This correspondingly affects the shift of those SNAs from being active to passive or counteractive groups. For instance, during the proto-Europeanization period, a number of SNAs supported EU activities and underwent a rapid organizational change. By the Alaturka Europeanization period, they had reverted back to more sceptical positions. This confirms that EU adaptation is often tactical and symbolic, and that it largely depends on structural factors. Particularly, with the decreasing EU membership perspective during the Alaturka Europeanization period as well as the political and economic instability in the EU, the counteractive group has increasingly grown. In this respect, a number of counteractive SNAs have stepped back down on the ladder and therefore their adaptation to the Europeanization process has become minimal. This highlighted the importance of temporality for the Europeanization and multi-level governance research.

Overall, despite the incremental adjustments and the low credibility of EU membership, one may argue that organizational changes may result in driving SNAs to learn from the experiences of other institutions and follow their patterns in the future. It may be reductionist to claim that the organizational capacity in the sense of financial and human sources, information and leadership determines the success in mobilisation across the EU arena. Together with the intermediating factors at national and subnational levels, the organizational capacity may determine the degree and direction of subnational mobilisation. The next chapter puts more emphasis on the last two stages of subnational mobilisation, transnational activities and vertical mobilisation. These stages should have voluntary mechanisms as well as a bottom-up push, as suggested by second generation Europeanization.

# CHAPTER 8 THE MOBILISATION OF TURKISH SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE EU ARENA

## 8.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter takes the issue from the internal reorganization of SNAs for dealing with EU matters to their EU-wide activities through horizontal and vertical channels. As well as reflecting on the findings from interviews obtained at three administrative levels (national, subnational and supranational), the chapter continues to report the findings of the survey. The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, it seeks to analyze whether the Europeanization process provides a horizontal platform for SNAs to learn from their counterparts in the EU. Second, it aims to demonstrate whether the EU institutions are receptive to SNAs’ claims or interests and the channels through which those SNAs can engage with EU politics. With these general objectives in mind, the chapter unfolds in four broad parts. The first part outlines the horizontal activities of SNAs with their opposite numbers in other member or candidate countries; the second part examines the vertical mobilisation through institutional and non-institutional EU channels; the third part analyses the reasons behind their mobilisation across the EU arena, and finally the conclusion.

## 8.2. TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES THROUGH HORIZONTAL NETWORKS


Transnational activities not only create voluntary mechanisms for SNAs with regard to horizontal Europeanization (see Chapter 1), but they also encourage further steps for vertical interactions of SNAs at the EU level. By engaging with the horizontal networks, SNAs have developed various tools to facilitate the transfer of best practices. The EU is not necessarily involved with horizontal activities, but at times it encourages SNAs to create networks with each other by allowing funds for twinning and networking. Such transnational activities, particularly for the cases of reactive and to some extent passive SNAs, may be considered in the context of the pulling effect of the EU accession process. As argued in the literature for the situations of SNAs from new member states (particularly from CEECs), if there is a lack of a pull or push effect, learning and imitating may become important mechanisms for subnational mobilisation (see Chapter 4). The process of learning or imitation may best take place during transnational activities through horizontal channels.

Attempts to engage with transnational networks have become more prevalent since the Helsinki Summit of 1999. For the majority of interview participants in different cities in Turkey, the fundamental problem lies in the strong central control over the international activities of SNAs. A number of interview participants reported that although the legal constraints are not a big challenge for them to mobilize across the EU arena, at the same time, they think that there are not many facilitating factors or procedures encouraging SNAs to engage with EU politics. In this regard, one may simply attribute that many subnational actors find it challenging to become a path breaker by being involved in such mobilisation across the EU arena. For this reason, reactive and to a lesser extent passive SNAs wait for approval from the central level or other external push factors (i.e. encouragement from international partners or specific EU programmes) regarding their EU activities. Not surprisingly, this situation is highly remarkable for those elected leaders as well as paid officials who have an organic link with the national government. It is mainly because conducting relations particularly in Brussels is not as salient as in the era of proto-Europeanization.

Another issue in this respect is that the procedure for obtaining authorisation for SNAs’ involvement in any international project or joint transnational activity may entail several months[[124]](#footnote-124). Such an enduring process leads several proactive SNAs often not to request the formal authorisation for their projects or joint activities and thus they breach the law, especially in the case of using international funds (Interview 46). It is notorious that the EU’s calls for project proposals dictate a tight agenda for the development project and usually require partnership with actors from different countries. This means that applying for ministerial authorisation to implement joint projects may practically make them lose the opportunity to catch up with the funding agenda.


Although types of transnational activities are various, they are mainly based on projects funded by the EU and have a limited time span. When the project is due, presumably the majority of SNAs will not sustain a durable relationship with their partners in those specific projects. This hinders the process of learning and brings about discontinuity for the establishment of transnational partnerships. The survey findings demonstrate that half of SNAs have already applied for EU funds with their equivalent partner in the EU. Around 40% of SNAs are planning to apply for the EU funds with partners abroad if they ever have a chance to do so. Almost two-thirds of Metropolitan Municipalities (72%) have joined in EU-funded projects with their foreign counterparts. At the same time, this ratio is very low for regional development agencies but two-thirds of them are planning to partake in EU-led projects in future. Only a small amount of SNAs (5%) did not attempt to apply for joint projects with their partners from the EU countries and they do not think they will do so in future. Overall, Table 8.1 presents the general distribution of responses within the three types of subnational administrations.

**Table 8.1** Have you ever applied for an EU-funded project with the equivalent partner in the EU? (%)



Along with the EU-funded projects, there is transnational cooperation and networking of SNAs in varying degrees ranging from personal contacts to sister city agreements with their opposite numbers in the EU. Table 8.2 reveals seven different types of transnational activities for Turkish SNAs.

**Table 8.2** What sorts of transnational activities have your organization conducted in the EU arena?[[125]](#footnote-125) (%)




The prevalent activities among SNAs are *reciprocal visits* with their counterparts in the EU countries (52%), *the sister city agreements* (52%) and *partnerships* (51%). Due to having more economic and human resources, almost all Metropolitan Municipalities (MMs) (93%) have sister cities in the EU members or have established reciprocal visits with their European counterparts. Although their size, economic and human resources are relatively lower than those of MMs, City Municipalities (CMs) also conduct a wide range of international activities in the EU; likewise, the majority of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) — albeit comparatively recent organizations— are already involved in various different transnational activities. More specifically, for the sister city and partnership agreements, a senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Interior Affairs expressed that:

‘The applications from local administrations to our ministry regarding sister city or partnership agreements have increased steadily over the last decade. These agreements used to be subject to the decision of the Council of Ministers. Yet, after seeing the increasing demand in those activities, it is now enough to acquire permission from our ministry only’ (Interview 9)[[126]](#footnote-126).

With the impetus of the EU support for sister city agreements in return for the financial aid, municipalities have been more concerned to create links with their counterparts in the EU countries. For instance, in 2005, the EU-supported programme, called Civil Society Dialogue, was launched, linking Turkish municipalities with their counterpart in the EU (Interviews 11 and 13). Statistically, there was a sharp increase in the sister city agreements, particularly towards the EU-27 countries, after the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Table 8.3 illustrates that the sister city agreements within the EU-27 countries have been multiplied more than twelve times, whilst this ratio remained around six-fold for the rest of the world. The number of sister city agreements within the EU-27 was 39 before the Helsinki Summit, but it has now reached a level of 413.

**Table 8.3** Number of Sister City Agreements of Turkish Cities



In comparison with the reciprocal visits and sister city agreements, participation in international fairs (40%) and conferences (25%) is comparatively lower. They are not only important channels for SNAs to engage with their opposite numbers in the EU, but also essential for the learning and socialization process. By participating in these activities, SNAs may become aware of the interregional networks and liaison offices in Brussels. However, it was reported by an interview participant that some of these activities have remained a symbolic courtesy for the elected and paid officials of SNAs (Interview 10). Hence, such transnational activities are far from producing outcomes for further mobilisation efforts. Related to this point, SNAs hardly ever require assistance from the professional consultant companies (9%). Instead, they prefer to conduct their relations through personal and party political links (39%). While such individualistic interest mediation heightens the importance of leadership, it also reinforces the misfit between national and European logic of interest mediation as well as the lack of organized interest formation on subnational levels in Turkey. As argued, this sort of interest formation or mediation reflects the path dependency of Turkish administrative tradition (see Chapter 5).

Another important transnational activity is the cross-regional networks among frontier regions in the EU. There were, however, no cross-regional programmes selected by the survey participants. As one may concede, participation in cross-border regions is confined to the regions that Turkey shares borders with (i.e., Greece and Bulgaria). SNAs cannot implement a wide range of Euro-regions activities owing to the country’s geographic position. Euro-regions are organized forms of cross-border cooperation[[127]](#footnote-127). They are voluntary associations that bring together municipal and regional bodies of two or more countries to promote cooperation, trust and trans-border development in a number of spheres, namely: economic, social, cultural, spatial planning, the environment and transportation and communication infrastructures (Yoder, 2003:91). This kind of grouping seeks to ensure that their problems as a whole are taken into account by European institutions, and they are explicitly intended to conduct political, economic and cultural lobbying.

The EU has indeed encouraged cross-border relations as in the case of INTERREG programmes. Interviews in the Ministry of Development suggested that: ‘the cross-border programme with Greece was not thriving due to the long-lasting political problems on each side’[[128]](#footnote-128) (Interview 8). In the current situation, two ongoing Euro-region programmes among Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria (Euroregion Polis-TrakiaKent-RAM Trakia and Euroregion Evros-Marista-Meric) are seen as examples for the Euro-region activities. Both interregional programmes involve mainly exchanging information in the field of education, culture, or economic activity, transport, and more importantly for the applications for European programmes. While the Polis-TrakiaKent-RAM Trakia is more active and a full member to the AEBR, the Evros-Marista-Meric is relatively less active and partially a member of AEBR. For instance, the former organized the AEBR executive meeting, which was held in Istanbul on 17-18 May 2012. In that meeting, the main focus was on territorial cooperation in an extended Europe: the role of local authorities[[129]](#footnote-129). This meeting advocated the idea that SNAs should become more actively engaged in EU politics, which may be seen as a clear transmission of Europeanized ideas and norms towards some parts of Turkish regions.

In summary, the visible proliferation in transnational activities over the last decade illustrates that the volume of EU work at subnational level has increased. Additionally, even though 14% of SNAs have not been involved in any horizontal activities across the EU arena, the above figures may be interpreted as rising trends towards the foreign activities of SNAs. The horizontal activities are important initial steps for SNAs to become familiar with EU politics and its atmosphere in Brussels. Turkish SNAs are comparatively new and inexperienced in the EU arena and therefore have to understand the formal and informal sides of EU politics. These activities not only allow them to emulate or disseminate what they have gained from elsewhere, but also teach them how to be involved in the EU integration process. Representatives of local and regional administrations may be expected to travel abroad to develop such links and to join in general lobbying activities in Brussels. In the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, as Moore (2008b) points at, equivalent partners in the EU arena persuaded those regions to establish their own offices in Brussels in subsequent years.

Similarly, in many instances, existing twinning links, or sister city agreements may also provide ready-partners in the future. The interview findings evidently suggest that a number of SNAs have gained the experience and confidence to initiate the following steps in terms of joining interregional networks or even creating their own offices owing to their reciprocal visits or partnerships with their opposite numbers in the EU. Frontier regions are usually in a better position to cooperate than others because they have more incentive and legitimacy to do so (Balme & Le Galès, 1997: 164). There are not many frontier cities in Turkey. Only those in the north-western end of the country (such as Edirne, Tekirdağ, Çanakkale, and to a lesser extent Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa and Balıkesir) are in a better position to conduct relations with their immediate neighbouring cities in Bulgaria or in Greece (see Map 8.1). Needless to say, in comparison with the rest of the country, those cities sharing a border with Bulgaria and Greece have higher GDP per capita. For that reason, they became outside of the eligible areas for the EU funds for the IPA. Unless there is a special programme supporting the practices of cross-border cooperation, efforts for border region activities usually derive from bottom-up endeavours. This situation not only highlights the restriction of geography but it is also a clear confirmation of push factors regarding the transnational activities of SNAs.

**Map 8.1** The EU Member States and Turkey’s Neighbours



**Source:** http://www.eubusiness.com/europe

The geographical disadvantage, however, may disappear in the near future with the extension of the EU neighbouring policies through the Black Sea regions. As an interviewee from the CPMR reported:

‘[...] the Commission will get its neighbouring programme up and running for the Balkan and the Black Sea regions, whereby those regions within this area will be ready to utilize this opportunity. As a concrete example, on the neighbourhood side, DG Maritime Affairs, come with a maritime strategy for the Black Sea area for the end of 2012’ (Interview 56).

A number of EU-supported initiatives are targeted at linking SNAs from the EU’s neighbouring countries to each other as well as to EU governance, as in the case of maritime programmes. In one of the most recent meetings (on 22nd June 2012) in Sinop (a small coastal city situated on Black Sea), the General Assembly of the Balkan and Black Sea Commission of CMPR declared four main areas of activities: more support for the Black Sea Strategy; more activities in the Adriatic; more coherence between macro-regions and neighbourhood programmes; and more regional involvement at EU level[[130]](#footnote-130). Overall, it can be seen from the above examples, figures, and statistics that SNAs have been taking part in transnational activities intensifying the Europeanization process at the subnational level and disseminating the idea of multi-level governance despite the low credibility of EU membership. Therefore, in the absence of adaptational pressure or top-down impetus, the voluntary mechanism may be a carrier for the principles of Europeanization and MLG in some parts of Turkey. The establishment of transnational links with their opposite numbers in the EU may also constitute an important dimension of vertical mobilisation.

## 

## 8.3. MOBILIZING IN BRUSSELS

Although the complex interaction between subnational, national and supranational tiers of authority creates multiple arenas, venues and access points, there are no institutionalized channels for subnational mobilisation of Turkish SNAs. The institutionalization here simply implies a system of ‘insiders’ with associated privileges, and ‘outsiders’ with secondary status (Greenwood, 2003:3). Bearing the low credibility of EU membership and the restricted role of SNAs in the EU fund management in mind, SNAs may be best considered as outsiders of the multi-level system of EU governance. Being an outsider to the system reduces the pull factors of the EU opportunity structures, whilst it requires a certain level of push factors stemming from subnational level. As explained, SNAs have participated in EU policy-making and implementation processes (particularly for the regional development programmes), through various direct and indirect channels of communication at supranational levels (see Chapter 4). It is easier to describe these channels of communication than to evaluate their effectiveness because in many instances, Turkish SNAs are considered outside of the EU governance structure. The remainder of this part outlines the institutional and non-institutional channels of the EU.

**Institutional EU Channels**

According to the survey findings, in the current atmosphere, only the select subset of SNAs (17 out of 85) conducted direct relations with one of the formal EU institutions: seven of which were with the EU Commission; six of which were with the EU Parliament and seven with the Committee of Regions (CoR). It is clear that some of those SNAs contact more than one EU institution. In any case, their relationships with the selected EU institutions have mostly remained unofficial and unorganized. Most of the time they were symbolic and courtesy visits.

***Relations with the EU Commission***

The Commission has found it practical to use SNAs as sources of information to facilitate the development of policy proposals (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Such a resource dependency approach underlines the magnitude of the partnership between SNAs and the Commission in return for exchanging information. Given the shortage of experts, a welcoming atmosphere in the Commission for the input of SNAs from different member (and candidate) states is not surprising. Nonetheless, officials from the Commission warned that this welcoming atmosphere is based merely on technical and professional information exchanges rather than any regionalist or political expectations (Interviews 48, 55 and 58).

One of the most used mechanisms for the technical exchange offered by the Commission is TAIEX for the partner countries[[131]](#footnote-131). Upon the request of national governments, TAIEX is managed by the DG Enlargement. Between 2007 and 2012, 610 TAIEX meetings were conducted in 38 Turkish cities (including Ankara)[[132]](#footnote-132). Involvement of different cities for the TAIEX meetings is certainly important to put the EU issue at the subnational agenda particularly during the Alaturka Europeanization period. Strangely enough, none of these meetings involved any issues related to regional development policies or development programmes. The reservation on Chapter 22[[133]](#footnote-133) (Regional Policy and Structural Funds) may be the reason for Ankara not requesting TAIEX for regional policies. Apart from TAIEX, the Commission has actively encouraged SNAs to participate in the CoR’s events or other events organized by the interregional organizations in Brussels (Interview 58).

The significant point here is that the administrative staff (especially experts in DG Regio or DG Enlargement) make considerable efforts to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of a country. Keeping the strong centralist history of Turkey in mind, it is reasonable to expect EU officials to be more prudent when it comes to conducting relationships with Turkish SNAs. An example given by an expert in DG Regio demonstrates the extent to which national authorities in Ankara are firm about its gatekeeping role regarding the interplay between the Commission and SNAs. The said expert reported that: ‘[...] our secretary mistakenly sent the letter one administrative level below that which it should have been sent. It was not intentional but a big mistake. Yet, because of this, we were warned by the national authorities. We are now avoiding repeating this’ (Interview 48). This confirms that Ankara does not want to lose its gatekeeping role in the interactions between supranational and subnational levels. However, as seen below, in some exceptional cases, a number of SNAs associated with the opposition party paid a visit to hold a high-ranking meeting with Commissioners.

The strong links between the Commission and SNAs derive from cooperation on the implementation and delivery of the structural funds. It is the main reason that the proponents of the MLG thesis put their emphasis on the evolution of structural funds in the EU integration process. Yet the institutional structure of the EU funds has not resulted in a drastic change to the Turkish context with regard to the vertical dimension of MLG (see Chapter 6). In the monitoring stage, whereas the focus of the period of 2004 to 2006 was based on a regional dimension, this has been changed with the launch of IPA to a sectoral focus. In taking into account the restricted role of SNAs during the implementation of EU funds, one may assert that the creation of opportunity structures does not enhance the power of SNAs, while undermining that of the national institutions. Furthermore, the re-centralization of the financial incentives with the IPA has underpinned the gatekeeping role of national governments on the implementation of structural funds and regional policies. It has hindered the direct relations of SNAs with the EU institutions and their ability to influence policy outcomes. Under IPA regulation, Ankara has formulated five Operational Programmes (OPs), where national authorities are responsible for the preparation and implementation of OPs and for deciding individual project applications under the relevant OP call for project proposals (Ertugal, 2011: 261). Figure 8.1 schematizes the structure of IPA fund management.

**Figure 8.1** IPA Structure 2007-2013

**Source:** Adapted from Prime Ministry Circular No: 2011/15

Under the above structure, the only way for establishing formal and direct relations with the EU Commission (e.g. DG Regio, DG Employment and DG Enlargement) is through the Sectoral Monitoring Committees (SMCs) of the IPA fund management in Ankara. The Committees include representatives from IPA bodies, sectoral policy-making bodies (i.e. line ministers), and economic and social partners organized by the central and regional partners (Ertugal, 2010: 102). During the evaluation phase of regional competitiveness OP, local and regional actors on a rotating basis have the possibility to join the SMC meetings. The participation in the SMC meeting is provisional to bestow rights on each local and regional partner from 43 provinces in 12 NUTS II regions. In this regard, the SMC meetings have provided an opportunity for three administrative levels (supranational, national and subnational) to discuss and/or raise their problems and demands.

One may theoretically posit that the partnership has been established vertically through three different territorial tiers and horizontally through public, private and third sectors. As a result, the current state of affairs presents a change towards the creation of multi-level modality in a candidate state. In reality, on the contrary, several interview participants both in Turkey and in Brussels raised their concerns about the effectiveness of SMC meetings in general and the role of territorial and non-territorial actors in these meetings in particular. Concerns especially for the status of territorial actors in the SMC meetings are worth analyzing. Firstly, in the evaluation phase, national officials dominate the monitoring committee by appointing the participants, chairing the meetings and setting the agendas. The SMCs meet frequently once every six months. This indicates that the partnerships among the three administrative levels are weak and superficial. As an example, SMCs for the regional competitiveness operational programme (RCOP) are too large to be effective decision-making bodies, with a membership of over one hundred (Interview 48). Secondly, given the SMC meetings are generally held in Ankara[[134]](#footnote-134), it necessitates extra efforts for the representatives of SNAs to travel to there (Interview 55). Besides, in gathering with representatives from the central institutions, some local and regional representatives do not feel confident in raising their voice during the SMC meetings.

The third concern is about the duration of the meeting, which generally lasts half a day. Due to substantial and diverse participant features, particularly for the Regional and Competitiveness Operational Programme, the SMC meeting does not provide enough time and space for SNAs to express their problems (Interview 58). Finally, the rotation of local and regional actors for the SMC meetings does not allow sufficient time to solve issues consecutively and therefore there is no opportunity for the emergence of institutional memory. Along with the rotation, the turnover of officials at the governorates hampers the learning process and causes discontinuity. Ertugal (2010: 102) additionally argues that the influence of the regional actors has been limited and that they suffer from a lack of familiarity with the complicated EU funding procedures. For her, the fact that SMC meetings were conducted in English with no translation constituted an extra obstacle for exerting influence.

The general picture so far suggests that there is a systematic learning process between the Commission and SNAs (particularly those in eligible areas for EU funds) regarding the Community programmes. However, considering the concerns expressed by a number of interview participants, one may argue that there seems to be a pattern for multi-level participation or multi-level interaction rather than multi-level governance (see Chapter 4).

After the 2007-2013 periods, only if the fund management for the next structural fund period is altered and the RDAs complete their accreditation process, certain SNAs have more opportunities to establish a direct and formal link with EU institutions, especially with the Commission. Through the accreditation process, RDAs are meant to be delegated as an operational body for the distribution of EU funds. In this respect, the immediate problem for RDAs is to satisfy the accreditation process. According to a senior official in DG Regio, the accreditation is a two-step process (Interview 58). At the beginning, the national authority, i.e., Ministry of Development, implements its own accreditation procedure mirroring the Commission’s principles. Later, when the Commission is satisfied with the national accreditation process and considers RDAs as a sufficient and competent body to implement the EU fund management, it will give the green light for the completion of the accreditation procedure. Once the two-step accreditation process is finalized and the involvement of the subnational tier as an operational body to distribute financial incentives is allowed in the next structural fund period of 2014-2020, then one may expect the proliferation of direct relations between the Commission and RDAs.

The interplay between SNAs and the Commission may not be confined to the SMC meetings. As illustrated above, seven SNAs interacted directly with the Commission in Brussels. The follow up interviews clarified that relations with the Commission (particularly with the DG Regio) was mainly carried out by the opposition municipalities. As an example of this, two mayors (of Antalya and Izmir metropolitan municipalities) from the CHP party at different time periods (in 2009 and 2012) held meetings with DG Regio Commissioners, Pawel Samecki and Johannes Hahn, respectively (Interviews 57 and 58). These meetings were conducted through personal and party links. Furthermore, the most organized visit to the DG Regio was held by the mayors of the Union of Social Democrat Municipalities (SODEM) in 2011. The aim and substance of this meeting was explained by the Head of Unit for the Turkish desk in DG Regio as follows:

‘The association [SODEM] told us that they are at times not sufficiently informed by national authorities what is going on about the EU fund opportunities and that some of their projects are not taken into consideration. But, we [DG Regio] explained that if they have a concrete case or appeal for this, there is a procedure to follow. If there are apparent elements of unlegislated procedures, we consider them. If it is just a general observation then we always refer to the ministries that are responsible for that. Apart from this particular case, the rest of the visits to our section are all courtesy visits [...]’ (Interview 58).

The above quote seems to be a concrete example for a shift towards the multi-level modality deriving mainly from the quality of intergovernmental relations at home (see Chapters 5 and 9). It is because SNAs associated with the opposition parties felt the need to mobilize in Brussels to raise their problems related to EU funds. Nevertheless, an important question occurs here as to whether or not the meeting with the Commissioners or with the officials in DG Regio makes any difference to their interests at home. A free-lance lobbyist in Brussels argued that:

‘these visits may not have an instant effect or influence on any policy decision taken by the Commission and national government, but at some point, it is certainly crucial for the EU Commission to obtain the necessary feedback from those SNAs from Turkey. Thus, in the next programming period for the funds, the Commission may be more attentive about its fund management and may request Ankara to be more considerate for each municipality, notwithstanding their political affiliation (Interview 59).

Overall, given that the Commission is a primary target for SNAs to raise their concerns, they sometimes look to reach their targets by engaging with the EU Parliament and the CoR.

***The EU Parliament***

Like the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) is another supranational level destination for SNAs, though there is no formal and systematic way of reaching the members of the EU Parliament (MEPs). Due to the insufficiency in tracking the record of visits conducted by SNAs, it is highly difficult to remark on exactly how many of them visited the EP, with whom they held a meeting, what they discussed and what they gained from those visits. Initially, visits to the EU Parliament are confined to political groups (i.e. social democrats, or green party) or certain MEPs (particularly those MEPs having a Turkish background). A head of unit responsible for the Enlargement and European Economic Area reported that: ‘to my knowledge, Turkish SNAs have not interacted with the administrative staff of the EP, although we hosted a number of groups from NGOs and business organizations in the Parliament’ (Interview 61). Consequently, it may not be wrong to assume that visits organized by SNAs to the European Parliament largely depended on political party links or individual contacts with the MEPs.

Despite Ankara’s futile effort to gatekeep access to the EU institutions, the EU Parliament has been largely exploited by SNAs from the opposition parties as an alternative way of pressuring the national government at home. The opposition municipalities from the CHP and the BDP enjoy their relations with the EU institutions. The local representatives from the BDP generally use the Green Party and Nordic group to interact with the EU institutions and are heard through these links. The CHP municipalities, on the other hand, have their link with the social democratic group in the EU Parliament (Interview 59). In 2010, ‘the EU-Kurds Friendship Group’[[135]](#footnote-135) was established in Strasbourg, which provided an institutional link for SNAs from the Kurdish regions in Turkey. Needless to say, this group not only deals with the problems of Kurds in Turkey but also is in close consultation with the Kurds in Iran, Syria and Iraq. The major aim of the group is to monitor the political process in Turkey, especially in regard to the peaceful solution of the Kurdish issue. For the prospect of the future accession of Turkey to the EU, the Parliament fully supports the democratisation of the country and the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria.

The CHP in general and the SODEM in particular are also at an advantage in Brussels because of their organic and formal link with the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists (PES). One representative from a Turkish business organization in Brussels pointed out that since other mainstream political parties from Turkey do not have their equivalent party organizations in Brussels, cooperation with the PES has profoundly and positively affected the CHP municipalities and offered them a chance to conduct close relations with EU institutions, especially with the CoR and the EU Parliament (Interview 51). During the interviews in selected regions, it was also frequently reported that one of the common contact points in the EU Parliament is to visit three MEPs of Turkish origin, one from Netherlands, one from Germany, and one from Bulgaria[[136]](#footnote-136). These MEPs usually contact the SNAs and deal with their problems (interview 60).

As a general observation, one may state that there are certain patterns with regard to the interaction between SNAs and the EU Parliament. While the SNAs close to the CHP benefit from the social democrat links, those associated with the BDP generally meet with the MEPs from the Nordic groups, Green Parties and extreme leftist groups. If there is no political consideration in mind, the rest of the SNAs look to meet with one of the three MEPs of Turkish origin. Yet the relations of SNAs with formal EU institutions have heretofore remained limited and largely based on personal and party political consideration. In comparison to other enlargement countries during their accession round, an official from the EU Parliament reported that: ‘Turkish SNAs showed less interest from the beginning, though there has been a growing interest in recent years’ (Interview 61). The official also remarked that it would be nice to see different cities and regions from Turkey in the EU Parliament. This is because the function of raising awareness is important and MEPs or staff in the EU Parliament would be happy to see the representatives of different cities of Turkey, not only Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. As an example of such events, the city of Bursa organized ‘the Bursa Days in Brussels’[[137]](#footnote-137) with huge numbers of participants, though they were predominantly Turkish (Interviews 59 and 60).

***The Committee of Regions (CoR)***

In December 2006, the CoR Bureau gave its approval for the RELEX commission to establish a working group to monitor the enlargement process with Turkey, in accordance with Rule 35i of the Rules Procedure (CoR, 2007). The members are requested to decide on the objectives of working groups, mandate and working methods. The group has provided direct involvement for SNAs in EU politics since 2007 by gathering twice a year, once in Brussels and once in Turkey. Even though it is not compulsory, the CoR may arrange a meeting in any Turkish city upon the invitation of local or regional representatives (Interview 50). Four meetings have to date taken place in different cities (Istanbul, Gaziantep, Izmir and Muğla)[[138]](#footnote-138).

Apart from the working group, the CoR called for the creation of a Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) with Turkey. In fact, each candidate country that signed the accession negotiation has an option to include in that agreement a chapter or paragraph allowing the establishment of JCC between the CoR and the candidate countries (Interview 49). JCC members together follow the implementation of the chapters and acquis communautaire and the negotiations of the chapters with which they are concerned. During the interviews in the CoR, it was reported by both the political and administrative staff of the CoR that in the association agreement, there is a paragraph allowing for the establishment of the JCC for Turkey. Upon reading this paragraph, in 2009, the President of the CoR issued the Turkish government with a letter suggesting formal initiatives to allow the establishment of JCC (Interview 49).

The formation of the JCC is conditional upon an official request from the Turkish national government. In order to form it, the national government must appoint eleven elected local and/or regional members from different political affiliations and geographical areas. Ankara has not hitherto taken any further steps to create the JCC (Interview 50). It is a more formal platform of bilateral cooperation compared to a unilateral working group as local representatives would have co-presidency and voting rights in the JCC meeting. While the national parliament (through the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, established since 1965) and the civil society and business world (through Joint Consultative Committee with the EU Economic and Social Committee, established since 1995) interact officially with their European counterparts, SNAs have no such possibility (Dauodov, 2012). Unlike Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia established the JCC with the CoR. Although the aforementioned paragraph was missing in the association agreement of Croatia, the government demanded to create the JCC despite this (Interview 49).

Two dominant views elucidate the resistance towards forming the JCC with Turkey. The first considers that it is not a desirable situation for the Turkish national government to hear different voices in Brussels, apart from its official dictum and thus it thwarts all possible doors for the interaction of SNAs with the EU institutions. As a matter of fact, Ankara would not be pleased if the local representatives particularly from the BDP (Kurdish-dominated party) in the JCC meetings raised their concerns or targeted the political practices of the national government (also see Chapter 9).

By way of contrast, the second view closely associated with the official rhetoric is that the EU is not serious about Turkey’s participation in the Union and therefore often creates insignificant excuses to block full membership. Joint consultative committees, working groups or networks at any governmental level do not satisfy Ankara’s expectation. They prefer to see more concrete steps, i.e. full-membership. The common question for this group is that if there is no EU membership perspective, why should SNAs go to Brussels to engage with the EU institutions? This is a strong rationalist consideration ignoring the ideational benefits of mobilizing in Brussels such as learning the best practices, improving local and regional democracy or disseminating good governance principles. This statement also covertly underlines the importance of the membership prospect in the context of pulling factors. The majority of SNAs and paid officials close to the AKP government support the latter view, while those on the opposition side and some paid officials embrace the former view.

The relations of SNAs with the CoR entail a special emphasis because of two interrelated rationales. To begin with, it is a good example of the sensitivity of Ankara towards the relations between SNAs and the EU institutions. It furthermore reinforces the idea that regional distinctiveness has a negative impact on the mobilisation of certain SNAs, which are located mostly in Kurdish dominated areas. An interview participant, for instance, asserts that the objection against the establishment of JCC may be considered within two axes: politico-administrative and security-politics (Interview 46). The former accentuates the idea that SNAs are not capable enough to conduct international or EU activities because of the established statist culture in the country. The latter is related to the fear derived from an idea that SNAs from the southeast part of the country may conduct international activities harming the integrity and the indivisibility of the administrative system in Turkey. Irrespective of the reasons behind the establishment of JCC, it is a fact that SNAs have a limited and indirect role in the working groups meeting in the CoR. As mentioned already, the CoR is a consultative organ of the EU which makes it a vital EU level institution sharing its opinion on the issues related to the local and regional policies. It also expresses its opinions about the annual progress reports of Turkey. If there was an effective JCC for Turkey, SNAs would have a joint decision right and they would defend both Ankara’s and their respective regions’ interests in the EU arena.


Overall, as rational institutionalists argued in the context of opportunity structures (see Chapter 1), there are different access points for the relationship of SNAs with the formal EU institutions. This demonstrates the *openness* of the multi-level system of EU governance. Moreover, the EU institutions, albeit to different extents, are *receptive* to the input of SNAs. In comparison to technical and administrative issues, the receptiveness of separatist or regionalist claims is a less likely case. Particularly, in the case of the EU Commission, interview participants commonly mentioned that they avoid intervening in any domestic issues. On the other hand, the CoR and the EU Parliament may welcome political and ethnic claims or expectations. In addition to the direct channels of access presented by the EU institutions, SNAs may also be involved with non-institutional EU channels such as interregional organizations, liaison offices and the representative offices of Turkish national administrations in Brussels.

**Non-institutional EU Channels**

***Participation in Interregional Organizations***

There have been a growing number of interregional organizations bringing together a large number of SNAs from the EU member (and candidate) states in order to promote and represent their territorial interests at the EU level (Bullmann, 1997: 13). These organizations are chiefly, the Assembly of European Regions (AER), the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), the European Association of Regional Development Agencies (EURADA) and the Eurocities. At the time of the survey, while 33% of SNAs are engaged in at least one of these interregional organizations, 63% of them have not yet been involved in any activities or become a member of any interregional organizations (Table 8.4).

**Table 8.4** Does your organization maintain contact with the interregional organization in Brussels? (%)



The most salient point in Table 8.4 is that with an 80% participation rate RDAs brought dynamism to the engagement of SNAs with the interregional organizations. Given the correlation between their creation and the EU accession process, one may observe the direct impact of Europeanization on the mobilisation of RDAs in Brussels. During the interviews in the Ministry of Development, it appeared that national officials support the activities of RDAs in the EU arena, but with a caveat in mind. The caveat is that each RDA must coordinate with the national authorities for their international activities, though this is also the case for other local and regional administrations due to the indivisibility principle of the Turkish administrative system (see Chapter 5). RDAs predominantly engage with the European Association of Development Agencies (EURADA). It has indeed become a basis for them to be involved in wider European politics. They have subsequently developed further links with their counterparts in the EU and sought to be an active player of interregional organizations.

The high interest (16 out of 26 RDAs) towards the EURADA deserves a meticulous examination for two reasons. Firstly, it triggers the horizontal effect of Europeanization. In this respect, the EU may be conceptualized as a platform for policy transfer or learning best practices when no explicit EU guidelines exist (Bomberg & Peterson, 2000), viz. regional policy. As one bureaucrat stated in the Ministry of Development: ‘several RDAs joined the EURADA as soon as they started operating in order to learn how to prepare regional plans and to disseminate new practices to their respective regions’ (Interview 14).

Second, the EURADA case represents the contagion effects among SNAs. To be more precise, it is possible to state that when one municipality or RDA embarks on establishing relations with the EU through interregional networks, another municipality or RDA typically a neighbouring one, does the same after a while. In many instances, such activities have become socially accepted by other SNAs without having much consideration about its cost-effectiveness. This shows that mimicking as well as competition among regions is the usual case. To illustrate this with an example, an expert in the Ministry of Development commented: ‘after one RDA that I am responsible for joined the EURADA meeting in Brussels, we [experts in the Ministry of Development] all have become aware of their activities and been supportive of other RDAs to follow suit’ (Interview 18). Such statements underlined the importance of the voluntary mechanism as in the case of second generation Europeanization. These are largely neglected in the case of EU-15 members but are considered an important explanatory factor for SNAs of the new member states.

As for the provincial level, participation from the city and the metropolitan municipalities with the interregional organizations is relatively lower than those of RDAs. Eurocities[[139]](#footnote-139) as a hub of the major European cities is perceived to be a popular destination for Turkish municipalities. The survey finding reveals that two City Municipalities and three Metropolitan Municipalities are involved in the activities of Eurocities. Except for the municipality of Şanlıurfa, located in the southeast part of the country where the cities are relatively less developed, the metropolitan municipalities of Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa and the municipality of Yalova are situated in the mostly developed regions in Turkey. The case of Şanlıurfa is closely related with the capacity of leadership and with the pre-existing territorial network. Despite the immaturity of civic organizations and comparatively lower socio-economic development, as Gedikli (2009) examined, the city has succeeded in the participatory planning process and regional governance because of the strong leadership and the impact of the GAP.

Beyond the survey findings, the primary and secondary sources illustrated that the participation of SNAs in certain interregional organizations are conducted either through national organizations (e.g. the Union of Turkish Municipalities) or through special provincial administrations. The Union of Turkish Municipalities (TBB) became a member of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) in 2010 and it has been planning to establish an office in Brussels if the Ministry of Interior permits them to do so (Interviews 5 and 16). The UTM has concluded a number of bilateral agreements with partner associations in the EU. The CEMR membership is particularly important. As the foreign affairs expert from the UTM expressed: ‘this participation symbolises that Turkish local administrations have become part of the EU, even before the full membership of Turkey’ (Interview 5).

Regarding the relationship with the Assembly of European Regions (AER) and the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), the membership of both organizations is dependent on the participation of Special Provincial Administrations. As outlined, the local administrative system in Turkey has three subnational units: Special Provincial Administrations, Municipalities and Village (see Chapter 5). At present, fifteen provinces through their respective special provincial administrations have joined the Assembly of European Regions (AER)[[140]](#footnote-140). After the membership of Kahramanmaraş to the AER in 2006, fourteen cities have followed suit. During Michele Sabban’s tenure as the President of AER, they proposed to open a satellite office in Istanbul in April 2011[[141]](#footnote-141). Moreover, one of the four vice-presidents for the AER, Hande Bozatlı, is from the Turkish delegation. She acts as the President of Committee 3 (Culture, Education, Youth, and International Cooperation). Owing to her active involvement and encouragement, a number of cities from Turkey have shown their interest in the AER over the last two years (Interview 54).

The membership of the CPMR[[142]](#footnote-142) is contingent on provincial participation as well. Turkey is encircled by seas on three sides, the Aegean Sea to the West, the Black Sea to the North and the Mediterranean Sea to the South, and the Sea of Marmara in the northwest. Although 28 provinces have a coastal area, only seven of which (located on the coast of the Black Sea and part of the Aegean Sea: Çanakkale, Edirne, Kırklareli, Samsun, Sinop, Tekirdağ, and Trabzon) participated in this organization. As argued above, with the extension of the EU neighbouring policies through the Black Sea regions, cities sharing borders in that region have become more active in their engagement with the CPMR (Interview 56). The general assembly meeting of CPMR in Sinop in 2012 reinforces the idea that SNAs have been learning how to become active players in international organizations.

In summary, the majority of SNAs searching for an active involvement in interregional organizations are generally located in relatively more prosperous regions and they are more enthusiastic on subnational mobilisation than their counterparts in the country. To this end, one may contemplate that only actors with valuable resources participate in those international activities, as evidenced by the strategies of large and financially more competent municipalities in Turkey where European affairs are part of daily work. Yet, whereas Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Kocaeli, Eskisehir and Yalova represent the most developed cities in terms of ‘socio-economic development’[[143]](#footnote-143), financial and human resources, the participation of Şanlıurfa, Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep, Kırşehir, Samsun and Sinop may be evaluated as an example of entrepreneurial capacity of leadership and of the existing territorial networks. The latter cities which are eligible for EU funds are still searching for best practices and establishing European-wide networks and partnerships. This strengthens the idea that one should focus on second generation Europeanization as it has an over-arching meaning together with non-material benefits rather than a single top-down dimension.

Relationships with a number of interregional organizations in Brussels by and large began during the period of Alaturka Europeanization. Despite an apparent decline in the EU membership prospect in that era, the increase in the engagement with those organizations presents a slightly perplexing picture. Nevertheless, as discussed below, several interview participants considered that rather than indicating clear support for the EU accession process, the participation in the EU-wide networks helps their respective organizations engage with international politics.

Related to the above point, one may also underline the fact that SNAs have been going through a learning process in their interaction with the interregional organizations in Brussels. Recent years, for instance, have witnessed a number of SNAs actively engaging with the interregional organizations by hosting different activities in Turkey[[144]](#footnote-144). Furthermore, a number of local and regional actors have been involved on the executive board (e.g. general secretaries of Izmir and Samsun RDA for the EURADA) or have become senior officials (e.g. Mrs Hande Bozatlı for the AER). Such pro-active behaviour for active engagement with the interregional organizations, however, is not a common case for the majority of SNAs because of the language barrier or lack of experience in EU politics (Interviews 54 and 56). Another barrier is that for several interregional organizations, only those SNAs from the EU member states are privileged to be a member or chairperson for the executive organs (i.e. Eurocities) (Interview 53). Because of Turkey’s candidacy, SNAs are currently not eligible to undertake responsibilities in executive or administrative organs in certain interregional organizations.

***Liaison Offices in Brussels***

As regards the liaison offices in Brussels, there is low interest in comparison with the previous accession states, particularly Poland and Romania, prior to their accession round (see Chapter 4). Two offices were established by the municipalities of Istanbul and Yalova in 2008, respectively. The municipality of Yalova closed down its office because of political and economic problems (Interview 1). The metropolitan municipality of Istanbul opened up an office in 2008, though this was only staffed by one person. Compared to an average of 1.6[[145]](#footnote-145) members of staff from new member states, having one person in Brussels is not sufficient for Istanbul. With a population of over 14 million, it is one of the major megacities in Europe and larger than 17 EU member states in terms of demographical aspect. Besides, with a budget of 11 billion U.S. dollars in 2011, the metropolitan municipality of Istanbul has more financial resources than the combined budget of several ministries in Turkey (İzci, 2011: 119). From 2009 and 2011, the Istanbul office was active in promoting its territorial interests in cultural and economic spheres. This is because Istanbul became the cultural capital of Europe in 2010. Afterwards, the metropolitan municipality of Istanbul relinquished its office to the institute of Yunus Emre in 2011 (Interview 60). One interview participant in Brussels conveyed that the reason for closing down the office may have been the fact that it did its job during Istanbul’s cultural capital year (Interview 51). Nonetheless, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that having a presence in Brussels (the second biggest lobby capital in the world) is highly important for Istanbul for its international reputation.

Although other municipalities, such as Tuzla (the district municipality of Istanbul), Kayseri metropolitan municipality, Osmangazi (the district municipality of Bursa), Gebze (the district municipality of Kocaeli), and ‘a number of district municipalities in Izmir under the name of the house of Izmir’ (Interview 35), tried to establish offices, their efforts have not borne fruit largely because of political, legal and economic reasons (Daoudov, 2008). At the time of the survey, it appeared that establishing an office in Brussels is on the agenda of two municipal cities, two metropolitan city municipalities and two RDAs. While nearly half of SNAs (49%) did not consider having a presence in Brussels, almost one-third of respondents (30%) had no idea about liaison offices in Brussels (Figure 8.2).

**Figure 8.2** Does your organization consider establishing a liaison office in Brussels?

A liaison office in Brussels is the most costly option for SNAs to engage in EU politics. Moore (2011: 6) therefore claims that the decision to launch an office will be based on evidence of significant benefits from a Brussels ‘showcase’ for the region which outweigh the substantial costs involved in supporting that presence. If such an economic determinism holds true, the most straightforward answer to the question of why Turkish SNAs do not have any offices is the reason that they do not gain as much financial incentive as the other cities and regions in the EU to compensate for its presence in Brussels. In other words, the pulling effect of Europeanization based on material benefits has no significant role in mobilizing Turkish SNAs towards Brussels.

Given the unavailability of obtaining structural funds directly from the EU institutions along with the restricted financial capacity of SNAs, a presence in Brussels may not be a strategic decision for SNAs. Even if Marks *et al.* (1996) found no correlation between receiving structural funds and establishing liaison offices in Brussels, there are also no alternative motivators such as overlapping competences, regional distinctiveness or the prospect of EU membership for Turkey to *pull* or *push* the interests of SNAs to have a presence in Brussels. Besides, an interview participant reported: ‘in an advanced technological era, we can find our partners, establish networks and join in international projects on the internet without having a physical presence in Brussels. In so doing, we do not need to waste our limited financial resources’ (Interview 67). Instead of having presence in Brussels, what is currently cherished by the majority of SNAs is to be part of an international organization or to conduct their international relations on the internet. In fact, the advantage of the internet for the mobilisation activities has been largely neglected by the existing studies, which will be a promising research inquiry for future studies[[146]](#footnote-146).

Beyond the economic rationale, political and socio-cultural problems may correspondingly determine the behaviour of a given SNA before it embarks on the creation of liaison offices in Brussels. The most obvious political issue lies in the nature and current states of Turkish-EU relations. It is because one may not expect that full membership is on the immediate horizon. By pointing at the low credibility of EU membership, the greater part of the interview participants in Turkey raised a similar concern that: *‘there is no point in having a presence in Brussels if we are not going to be part of the EU’*. Such a thought made it clear that membership carries a great weight for actors’ decision, though there are examples of regional offices from non-member countries (such as Norway and Switzerland). Moreover, the changing dynamics of national foreign policy during the Alaturka Europeanization period also influences the behaviour of local and regional decision-makers as well as alters the direction of subnational mobilisation (for the cases of Diyarbakir and Samsun, see Chapter 9).

As for the socio-cultural dimension, problems are associated with the issues of provincialism versus regionalism and the lack of an organized interest (or collective action) tradition, which were examined during the historical analysis in chapter four. Pertaining to the former issue, as Huysseunne and Jans (2008) demonstrated, the majority of liaison offices (56%) were formed by regional authorities, whilst 12% were formed by public authorities and 14% were run by public/private authorities. The rest (18%) were organized by other public representations[[147]](#footnote-147). Because of a strong path dependency in terms of provincialism, the dominance of regional authorities in the Brussels arena seemed, on the surface, contradictory to the Turkish administrative tradition. Such a tradition may be altered once RDAs have completed their institutionalization process. Having said that, according to general observation from the field work and findings from the interviews in Turkey, there is no clear indication to support the idea that local administrations (particularly municipalities) collaborate with RDAs in order to establish their joint offices for their respective regions or that RDAs are well-equipped in terms of organizational capacity to establish their own offices. Regarding the lack of organized interest tradition, one may put forward that operating as a single local or regional administration in Brussels is not effective or rational because cities or regions consist of different public-private and third sectors, which should be represented in a collective manner. Given the problems of overlapping local agendas and of the interlocutors at subnational levels, it seems rather difficult for Turkish SNAs to organize collective action for the creation of a liaison office. Apart from SODEM and the House of Izmir Project (see Chapter 9), attempts at creating an office in Brussels were in fact organized by a single administration (mostly a single municipality).

Next to the economic, political, and socio-cultural problems, a further intricacy derives from constitutional and legal problems (see Chapter 5). Because of a legal constraint, a small number of local authorities (especially proactive SNAs) determined to establish an office in Brussels by circumventing the law or acting via their affiliate companies or NGOs (Interview 46). The methods used by municipalities vary: in the case of the metropolitan municipality of Istanbul through its affiliate organization (Istanbul Culture ltd.); the municipalities of Yalova through one non-governmental organization and of Tuzla through one non-governmental organization and private company partnership. This indirect approach decreases the transparency and accountability in the management of these offices. In the current situation, there is one voluntary representative of Gaziantep municipality working as a listening post without any physical place in Brussels (Interview 60). The province of Bursa has also considered having a bureau in the representation of the Hessen Land because of their close sister city link. It is important to note here that the offer for having a presence in the said representation came from the President of the Hessen Land (Interview 45). Here, the existing transnational link has played an important role in the further mobilisation in Brussels.

The Union of Turkish Municipalities also took a decision in their General Assembly on 21st May 2008 to establish offices both in Strasbourg and Brussels in order to conduct lobbying on behalf of its members (Interview 16). Due to the legal constraints mentioned above, the decision has not been implemented yet. During the interviews in the Union of Turkish Municipalities, it became apparent that they are not encouraged about the individual presence of SNAs in Brussels. It was stated by the General Secretary of the organization that:

'You must be familiar with the EU politics and know how to lobby in Brussels. Turkish municipalities, except for a few major metropolitan municipals, such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir do not need to be there as they are not big enough to conduct international activities in Brussels’ (Interview 16).


A similar statement was indeed made by the officials from the Ministry of Development as they prefer the group of RDAs in Brussels because it is much more effective and efficient than acting as a single region. Both statements underline one of the leading problems for Turkish SNAs, which is the weak organizational capacity in terms of financial and human resources to have an individual presence in Brussels. Naturally, establishing an office in Brussels, to a certain extent being a member of the interregional organizations, requires financial strength. As argued, only a select subset of SNAs has allocated financial resources to represent their cities or regions outside Turkey (see Chapter 7).

For the case of RDAs, although their organic law encourages promoting the regional business and investment opportunities at national and international level as well as joining in the activities of international programmes (Law 5449), it seemed rather early for a number of RDAs to operate internationally. They are currently on the way to institutionalization and the learning process. Today, the main priority of each RDA is to understand the potential and the capabilities of actors and institutions in their respective hinterland and collaborate with other local and regional authorities so as to envisage regional plans or goals. Furthermore, the creation of the Investment Support and Promotion Agency under the Prime Ministry in 2006 (Law No. 5523) has aimed to cooperate with RDAs in order to define national investment support and promotion strategies and conduct the implementation process in collaboration with RDAs and other related institutions. The Investment Support and Promotion Agency seems to be an umbrella organization for the international networks of Turkish RDAs. It is also relevant to mention here that the EU does not wish to deal with the issue of one particular region or local authority. Rather, they prefer to see the group of SNAs around a thematic issue, i.e., maritime issues, environment, rural development, and so forth (see Chapter 4). Consequently, it seems better for SNAs to engage with the interregional organizations or organize together in one single office in Brussels.

***National Representations in Brussels***

Despite the scarce SNA presence in Brussels, several representative offices have been created by nation-wide public, private and non-governmental organizations (Table 8.5). These offices have carried out several projects and activities with the aim of lobbying for Turkey’s EU bid and have played an important role in the country’s public diplomacy as an attempt to convince the European public on Turkey’s full membership (Çelik, 2010). The Custom Union Agreement of 1995 along with the country’s trade relations with European countries have resulted in Turkish business associations developing close ties with their European counterparts. The representative offices of the Economic Development Foundation (IKV), Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), Turkish Research & Business Organizations (Tur&BO), and Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) may be regarded as the pioneer institutions of their kind.

**Table 8.5** National Interest Organizations in Brussels



The presence of national interest organizations in Brussels has paved the way for communication with European counterparts and created opportunities to open channels of communication with the EU institutions. As Visier (2009) observes, both European Commission Desks and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) are in close contact with these national interest groups in Brussels. Approximately the same number of representative offices (not necessarily the same ones) are also accredited to the European Parliament (ibid). They consider that there is a high level of Turkish national representation offices in comparison with other (former) candidate states[[148]](#footnote-148).

These national offices, including the permanent representations of Turkey to the EU, have unsurprisingly become the most popular destinations for SNAs. An interview participant even stated that:

‘I have witnessed that lots of SNAs have only visited the Turkish permanent delegation and some other offices created by Turkish Business organizations or NGOs instead of interacting with EU institutions or interregional organizations in Brussels. They do not even visit regional offices or their counterparts from other EU member states’ (Interview 60).

This reinforces the idea that a number of SNAs mobilize towards Brussels as courtesy visits or symbolic gestures rather than as the result of a rational calculation by local and regional leaders. In many instances, these visits are not well organized and very few direct relations with the EU institutions and the interregional organizations actually take place. This unorganized and purposeless mobilisation in Brussels neither produces any concrete outcome, nor arises optimism regarding the institutionalized relations with the EU in the future. For instance, experienced Turkish lobbyists in Brussels remarked that various representatives from different SNAs come to Brussels without having any agenda or specific knowledge regarding how to approach the EU institutions (Interviews 51 and 59).

On the other side of the coin, some proactive SNAs have sought assistance for their specific projects, programs or plans. The director of TUSIAD office in Brussels reported that:

‘They [SNAs] usually visit us especially for information exchange. Although we are not a representative of local administrations, if they have a specific project in mind or they seek assistance, we can work for them. For instance, we lobbied on behalf of Izmir for the EXPO 2020 and of Istanbul for the Cultural Capital of Europe. Especially for Istanbul, we worked a lot and did the most substantial lobbying in Brussels’ (Interview 51).

The national representation to the EU is another frequently visited destination for Turkish SNAs. However, officials from the aforesaid representation stated: ‘regional offices from the different EU countries or interregional organizations in Brussels also visit us to obtain information about specific regions or cities in Turkey or they seek help in order to find a Turkish partner for their projects or activities’ (Interview 52). It is therefore clear that in the absence of regional and local offices, part of their function has been conducted through various nation-wide representative offices in Brussels. Nonetheless, the primary roles of these offices, apart from those established by the national government, are to conduct their own policy agendas and interests in the EU arena and fulfil the needs of their members at home. By comparison with their European counterparts, most of the national representations tend to be understaffed, mostly representation by a single person and with some secretarial or internship support. In this respect, it is naïve to expect those national offices to meet the demands of all Turkish SNAs.

Overall, SNAs may stick to national institutional venues in Brussels because they lack strong institutional allies at the EU level (Princen & Kerremans, 2008: 1137). In this case, the most organized and high-level visits have been conducted by the municipalities that are headed by the opposition municipalities from the CHP party (see above). Essentially, because of their membership of the Party European Socialists (PES), the CHP in general and the SODEM in particular have strong allies at the EU level. One may interpret this as those municipalities from the CHP having a better chance to become active players in Brussels than other SNAs attached to other established political parties in Turkey. The CHP was also the first Turkish political party to establish its own office in Brussels in 2009, which is adjacent to the EU Commission (Rond Point Schuman 14). Therefore, the CHP municipalities have better access to EU opportunities. During the interview with the representative of CHP office in Brussels, it became clear that mayors from the CHP have been involved in a number of organizations and events. In many cases, some of the mayors have even had a chance to meet with the Commissioners, the members of the EU Parliament and political members of the CoR (Interview 57).

## 

## 8.4. REASONS FOR SUBNATIONAL MOBILISATION ACROSS THE EU ARENA

Engagement with the process of Europeanization has provided a number of SNAs with unprecedented access to new sources of information, legitimacy, financial gains, and not least, non-material benefits in terms of ideational spheres. From the loose sister city or twinning links to establishing a liaison office in Brussels, SNAs have sought to exploit the EU benefits depending on their organizational capacity, the vision of their leaders and characteristics of their respective regions/cities. Such interactions both with their counterparts from different member states and with the institutional and non-institutional EU channels have not only intensified the process of Europeanization on a subnational level; these communications have also led them to filter down the principles of multi-level governance such as partnership, programming and subsidiarity to their respective regions or cities.

Documenting all sorts of EU activities that have been carried out by each Turkish SNA across the EU arena may be impossible in one single PhD thesis. Yet a number of patterns may be grouped as informational, ideational and material spheres. How SNAs approach these spheres varies. The research found that they are concerned primarily with pragmatic reasons (money, networking, gathering information, learning best practices and so forth) in their engagement with horizontal and vertical channels. This suggests that the Europeanization of SNAs in Turkey appears to be consistent with the expectations of the multi-level governance approach. However, apart from some cases (discussed below), SNAs do not generally use their mobilisation as a means to challenge national governments in terms of state by-passing or to seek political gains at home. In this respect, one may not find clear evidence that undermines the liberal intergovernmentalist approach considering the national governments act as a powerful gatekeeper between subnational and supranational levels (see Chapter 2).

Although some SNAs, such as Izmir and Samsun, because of their organizational capacity, have a more systematic strategy when they mobilize towards the Brussels showcase (see Chapter 9); in some instances subnational mobilisation is more aleatory in the sense that it happens for certain contingencies. For instance, someone in Brussels begins a project but it is afterwards not really followed up. As one free-lance lobbyist in Brussels reported:

‘although many of the local and regional administrations see the EU as an economic matter, almost none of them chose to build a strategy or prepare a concrete project for pursuing their interests in the EU arena. If they see that other SNAs conducted a project in one particular area supported by EU fund programs, they also tried to obtain similar support from the EU institutions despite having no concrete project in that area’ (Interview 59).

This evidently clarifies that some visits to Brussels have remained symbolic rather than strategic and organized. Another example of this is given by a civil servant in Ankara. As he stated: ‘after one RDA visited the ERVET (Emilia-Romagna) in Italy after searching the most appropriate RDAs for their regions. And then what we realized was that a number of RDAs have subsequently visited there, although there was no close similarity between them and ERVET’ (Interview 6). Thus, the repetitive visits to similar places clearly reveal the contagion effect among Turkish SNAs. After a while, however, it has become socially appropriate behaviour; in other words, if you are a good municipality or RDA, you must have a relationship outside or you must conduct relations with your European counterparts.

A number of visits are also conducted in a prestigious manner. In particular, during the proto-Europeanization period when there was a good relationship between the EU institutions and the ruling party, the representatives of SNAs close to the ruling party mobilized in Brussels mainly for their local press to show the extent to which they are aware of European or international issues or to serve political point-scoring games (Interview 10). An example for this was given by an interview participant in Brussels. In his example: ‘many of those local leaders coming from the ruling party side usually made it clear that I went to Brussels to hold a meeting with this institution or I am going to Brussels to do this or do that’ (Interview 60). These are generally symbolic rather than planned, organized and influential visits. Strangely enough, while the visits from those SNAs close to the AKP had the highest level during proto-Europeanization, those SNAs close to the CHP party have increased their visits to Brussels in the Alaturka Europeanization period.

A number of SNAs have engaged with the EU institutions through various different channels. However, not all of them are confined to symbolic or courtesy visits. There has been a recent catalyst underpinning the vertical mobilisation of Turkish SNAs in Brussels deriving from a tug-of-war between the opposition-led municipalities and the national government. This so-called hostility of central government to local level has been heightened by different incidents, such as dismissing the mayor from his office (in the case of Adana), exerting excessive central control on a municipality (in the case of Izmir), and linking the activities of certain municipalities with the separatist Kurdish movement (in the case of Diyarbakir) (see Chapter 9). Many of these accusations were made during the interviews and some of these cases have been investigated under Turkish legal authorities (see Chapter 7). Yet what needs to be emphasized here is that in situations where poor working relationships between the central government and regional/local government exist, the latter may be tempted to bypass the former and develop an independent relationship with the EU institutions (Hooghe & Marks, 2001:87). Consequently, the mediating effect of the quality of intergovernmental relations has a substantial effect on subnational mobilisation towards the Brussels arena. This effect has been triggered by the Europeanization process because of the openness and receptiveness of the multi-level system of the EU governance.

Although the representatives of the SNAs from the opposition party side did not use the term of state bypassing, the motives and attitudes of those SNAs towards the EU institutions may be evaluated within that context. At least part of the reason why some municipalities or groups of municipalities devoted so much effort to the EU was the perception that their interests differed from those of national government in certain areas, and that Ankara was incapable of representing their local interests. Concrete examples to show this can be found in the activities of SODEM and the idea of the creation of the House of Izmir (see Chapter 9). Direct relations with the EU institutions from opposition municipalities gained momentum after the creation of a CHP office in Brussels in 2009 and establishment of SODEM in 2010. Accordingly, a number of social democrat municipalities have been able to show their organized interest in the EU institutions in a more strategic and organized way. As a result, such an institutional form of networking in Brussels enables some SNAs to actively pursue multi-level strategies and engage with the EU multi-level polity.

It is also worth noting that the general belief among interview participants is that interactions with their counterparts and EU institutions are an effective way to support Turkey’s EU membership and reduce prejudice about the country. For the most of the informants, the interaction is a two-way process; not only do SNAs download preferences from the EU level institutions but they also upload their interests or expectations to the supranational level. This in turn may gradually shape the European policy-making process as the bottom-up Europeanization literature suggests (see Chapter 1). Although it is difficult to gauge the extent to which Turkish SNAs are able to shape the Europeanization process, the establishment of good relations on a subnational level may help to represent Turkey’s interest and increase the support for the country’s EU bid. Accordingly, this may shape the process of Europeanization in the long-run in favour of Turkey’s full-membership.

## 

## 8.5. CONCLUSION

The present chapter empirically focused on Turkish SNAs’ activities beyond the national setting and across the EU arena by using horizontal and vertical channels (i.e., the last two stages of the subnational mobilisation framework). Although the EU did not provide an institutional channel for Turkish SNAs’ claims and interests as in the case of SNAs from member states, by the Helsinki Summit of 1999, it has opened the different access points, which a creative SNA can exploit. Such a passive leverage and indirect effect for the subnational claims and interests is essential. For instance, recent years have witnessed a burgeoning in the number and range of horizontal activities between Turkish SNAs and their counterparts in the wider EU arena in terms of sister city agreements, reciprocal visits and twinning projects. Being a horizontal platform for SNAs, the EU has led a number of Turkish local and regional actors to integrate with their opposite numbers in other EU member states. Such interactions with their counterparts have enabled them to Europeanize their organizational logics by disseminating ideas, norms, best practices and ways of doing things. However, this largely depends on the particular SNA’s willingness to continue their transnational partnerships. In many cases, these partnerships were obsolete after the finalization of certain EU programs. This hinders the learning process and brings about discontinuity in terms of Europeanization of the subnational level.

With regard to the European activities of SNAs, each of them has created its own European networks, twinning arrangements and relevant transnational activities. They have also decided autonomously whether to participate in interregional organizations and to establish their own offices beyond Turkish territory. The research claims that these are bottom-up efforts and depend entirely on the organizational capacities of those SNAs that take on board the mobilisation issues. Motivation behind their engagement through horizontal and vertical channels has similarities with their counterparts from the EU countries. These activities usually include seeking funds, lobbying, networking and sharing best practices. What is different with other SNAs from different EU countries is that certain SNAs consider that their mobilisation across the EU arena may reduce prejudice against Turkish membership and support its EU bid. It is also important to emphasize here that although a number of SNAs see the EU mostly as an instrumental way, almost none of them chose to build a strategy or prepare a concrete project for pursuing their interests in the EU arena. Their visits to Brussels have therefore remained symbolic rather than systematic and strategic. This derives from the traditional form of interest mediation at home depending on personal and party political links, which sharply contrasts with that of EU logic.

Central administrations have seemed to be extremely careful about direct relations between SNAs and Brussels. Despite Ankara’s support for the external activities of SNAs in the EU, the main considerations are to ensure that these activities do not comprise any separatist or political facilities. What is required from SNAs is to have coordination with the centre about their activities in the outside world. Such a strict position has gradually softened to a situation whereby today while such contacts are not actively encouraged, neither are they systematically obstructed (except for the relations with the CoR). Apart from a few exceptional cases, the majority of SNAs prefer to act together with the national institutions in their dealings with the EU matters outside the national setting. Although this contradicts with the concept of Europe of Regions suggested by some supranationalist scholars, one may argue that the receptiveness of certain EU institutions, the EU Parliament, the CoR, and to some extent the EU Commission, has fuelled the enthusiasm of opposition municipalities, whose behaviour contrasts sharply with that of the central government. Furthermore, the excessive tutelage in terms of administrative and economic spheres on the opposition SNAs at home may stimulate their interests outside the national jurisdiction and cause them to engage with the EU institutions. This is closely related to the quality of intergovernmental relations, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

Overall, the national context provides limited flexibility for the external activities of Turkish SNAs and the national government acts as a strong gatekeeper. There is also a political climate between Turkey and the EU, which may affect the behaviour of different SNAs. Such an atmosphere also goes hand in hand with the insignificant pull effect of the EU accession process because of the centralization of fund mechanisms. Yet, as laid out in chapter two, the existence of EU competences in the area of regional policy, and the deliberate funding and promotion of regional representation by the Commission, are not the only explanations for the different levels of subnational mobilisation in the EU arena. In other words, SNAs tend to mobilize across the EU arena not because of the competences of the EU (i.e. pulling effect), but because of their own competences and incentives vis-à-vis national governments (i.e. pushing effect of organizational capacity). Accordingly, a top-down understanding may miss the empirical reality because SNAs may themselves, and from the bottom-up, actively seek to change and succeed in changing those dynamics in ways which facilitate mobilisation. The research claims that both the top-down understanding of Europeanization and MLG has been unable to fully explain why and under what conditions this mobilisation may take place. What the research offers is that both approaches will be more valuable if weighted with the domestic lens. This is also an example of second generation Europeanization. Taking the bottom-up perspective, the next chapter builds on the importance of subnational contexts by offering an in-depth analysis of three selected case cities.

# 

# CHAPTER 9 EURO-ENGAGEMENT OF SUBNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS: SOME CASE STUDY EVIDENCE

## 9.1. INTRODUCTION

The implementation of pre-accession financial programs has led to initial contact with Europeanization processes at subnational level, with SNAs becoming increasingly aware of the EU’s influence on their practice, with a knock-on effect on their adaptation to organizational structures (see Chapter 7). The impact of Europeanization has also provided SNAs with windows of opportunity that have changed their behaviour and encouraged them to mobilize across the EU arena (See Chapter 8). As a result of these processes, a direct interplay between the subnational and the European level has been achieved. Yet, this has raised a number of questions. How do some characteristics of a subnational context in which SNAs are embedded become important intermediating factors for the mobilisation of SNAs in Brussels? Under what conditions does Europeanization facilitate the mobilisation efforts of SNAs in Turkey? These are the questions that constitute the main themes of this chapter.

By reflecting on in-depth case study findings based on three sample cities of Turkey, Izmir, Samsun and Diyarbakır (for the selection criteria see Table 3.4), the present chapter addresses the above questions from a bottom-up perspective. The chapter argues that a complementary subnational analysis is important for two main reasons. To begin with, the national conditions may offer an incomplete view, unless one considers the subnational context to be a separate territorial tier. This is because national conditions in general and characteristics of regions/provinces in particular represent the key determining factors in how subnational mobilisation in Brussels occurs. Nonetheless, given the idiosyncrasy of SNAs within and beyond the state, the variables that explain subnational mobilisation across the EU arena are found at a subnational level, not national (Smyrl, 1997).

Secondly, the pull effect of the EU for Turkish SNAs is less significant than for those SNAs from the EU-15 context and, to certain extent, from the new member states. There are various reasons for this: the low credibility of the EU; the centralization of the EU fund mechanism; the changing dynamics of Turkish foreign policy; and the reduced attractiveness of the Europeanization process (see Chapter 6). Each of these factors, albeit to varying degrees, has shaped the behaviour of SNAs and caused them to reorient their positions on EU matters, particularly during the Alaturka Europeanization period. Moreover, the research seeks to understand how the particular structural characteristics of SNAs’ subnational contexts have affected their EU activities. In short, the chapter argues that pressures and motives for engagement with EU matters differ from city to city and organization to organization in the nature of the mobilisation process and in the timing and pace of the process.

As laid out above, the first part examines the potential intermediate factors which may cause variation among different SNAs. This gives us a chance to observe which intermediate factors are at work; the second part illustrates four stages of subnational mobilisation: growing awareness, organizational changes, transnational links and vertical mobilisation; and the final part concludes by considering what lessons the three case cities provide in terms of understanding the political effects of Europeanization and the resulting changes in subnational mobilisation across the EU arena.

## 


## 9.2. SUBNATIONAL CONTEXT AND EFFECTS OF POTENTIAL INTERMEDIATING FACTORS

**Regional Distinctiveness**

Federal state traditions, a distinct identity, economic and financial sources and regional party politics are essential ingredients for subnational mobilisation that is motivated by regional distinctiveness (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, aside from regional party politics, the insufficiency of cultural elements and financial strength correspondingly supports the claim that subnational mobilisation depending on regional distinctiveness is not the case for Turkish SNAs. The Kurds, largely living in the southeast part of Turkey, are one of the largest ethnic groups to have retained a distinct identity in terms of cultural and linguistic spheres. However, regarding the distinctiveness of Kurdish society, Cornell (2001:35) argues that the Kurds are not a homogenous ethnic group in terms of religion, language and ways of life[[149]](#footnote-149). He also adds that a more important element of the problem is Kurdish social organization, which has conventionally been, and essentially remains, tribal[[150]](#footnote-150) and feudal.

In the context of socio-economic development, the regions predominantly dominated by the Kurds are located in the least developed regions in Turkey[[151]](#footnote-151). In this regard, Dulupçu (2005:106-107) states that in the eastern regions with a low-income and agriculture-based economy, there is a greater engagement by voters and the population in general with local politics and a better reflection of regional identity. However, he thinks that this does not necessarily mean civicness in these regions. Arguably, the agricultural based population in those regions contains ‘the Ottoman Empire’s semi-feudal territorial structure’ (Köymen, 1999 cited in Dulupçu, 2005).

In the light of the above consideration, regional party politics seems to be the sole dimension that supports regional distinctiveness in Turkey. The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)[[152]](#footnote-152) is the only party with a regional dimension (Massicard, 2009:23). Its electorate strength may reach more than 60 per cent in the Kurdish areas, while they hardly reach 6 per cent of the country even in the big cities with a sizeable Kurdish population (Akarca & Başlevent, 2011). In the last general election of 2011, because of the 10 per cent election threshold, the BDP joined the election with independent candidates[[153]](#footnote-153). Map 9.1 illustrates that independent candidates from the BDP largely clustered around the southeast part of Turkey. More specifically for the case of Diyarbakır, while the candidate from the Kurdish supported party (DTP) obtained 65.6 per cent of the votes in the local election for the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality in 2009, independent candidates (from BDP) obtained 61.17 per cent of votes in the general election in 2010.

**Map 9.1** The 2011 General Election Map of Turkey

Samsun

Diyarbakır

İzmir

***Source:*** *Secim Haberleri (2011)*

Although it remains a fact that the Kurds have a distinct regional party politics for an ethno-territorial movement, the research found that subnational mobilisation deriving from this is not the case. Quite the opposite, it has negative consequences for a shift towards the creation of multi-level modality in general and subnational mobilisation in particular. In fact, for the Kurds in Turkey, there is a range of obstacles for initiating any kind of ethno-regionalist movement and even to a certain extent the articulation of functional interests outside the country. As explained, Turkey has a strong statist tradition. With its constitutional provision as well as its law on political parties[[154]](#footnote-154), Ankara prohibits the formation of political parties with particularistic, especially ethnical or regionalist claims (Massicard, 2009:24). Accordingly, the BDP and all its predecessors hardly frame their claims as regionalist or specific to any region[[155]](#footnote-155). Mayors affiliated with the BDP have a number of problems in terms of benefitting from EU opportunities and of engaging with EU level opportunities (Interview 33).

In the case of Diyarbakır, it was clear to observe such negative impacts of regional distinctiveness. Because of the long-lasting Kurdish issue and its related problem of terror since 1984, it is difficult to establish partnership among local stakeholders. Particularly, the relationship between elected and paid officials has verged on conflict even on simple local or urban issues (Interviews 29 and 32). An instance for this is clear in the following quote from the Vice-President of Diyarbakır Provincial Assembly. As she expressed:

‘We do not have good relations with paid officials in our city. Despite the support of the local representatives from the AKP [ruling party], our budget [the annual budget of Provincial Assembly in 2011] was not approved by the Governor. [...] I think, they [central institutions] put extra pressure on us. In such a situation, how can we work together on EU matters?’ (Interview 32).

Under the above circumstances, given the EU’s emphasis on the partnership principle across horizontal levels, it is naïve for one to expect that stakeholders (particularly elected and paid officials) may collectively engage in EU matters. The confrontation among stakeholders does not only impede the creation of partnership but also hampers any long-term strategic programming for the future of the city as in the case of Izmir or Samsun (discussed below). Almost all informants from Diyarbakır agreed that provincial issues in general and activities for the EU in particular are generally over-shadowed by the problem of terror. A paid official in the city reported: ‘the main priority of Diyarbakır is security and terror. Our activities are always of secondary importance. [...] in my opinion, Ankara is also suspicious of whether subnational actors in the city misuse the EU monies [implying that local actors may use EU monies for the terror activities]’ (Interview 30). The following quote from Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality is also illustrative of the negative effect stemming from the regional distinctiveness:

‘[...] we wanted to start an Urban Development Plan, which was going to be supported by the EU and EIB [European Inv Bank]. The UK provided £70,000. But then the SPO [the Ministry of Development] opposed it. They [the central administrations] are afraid of such activities. They do not let us do anything by ourselves, even if these activities are project based and the funding is in the form of a grant’ (cited in Ertugal, 2005).

Despite these apparent problems between elected and paid officials in the city, during the process of Europeanization, the impact of EU projects has moderately increased the interactions among local actors. Moreover, through the EU projects, there has been a growing awareness regarding the EU, though this is not as much as in the case of Samsun and Izmir (discussed below).

Given Diyarbakır’s significance for the Kurdish issue, one may argue that problems related to regional distinctiveness cause the city to play an important role in Turkey’s problems with terror and separatism. For instance, Keyman and Lorosdağı (2010: 134) consider Diyarbakır as the symbol and key city for the solution of Turkey’s Kurdish problem. The then Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, even publicly commented: ‘the road to the EU passes through Diyarbakır’[[156]](#footnote-156). These considerations suggest that as long as Turkey solves its Kurdish problem, it may become a member of the EU. Attributing such political roles to the city seems to be the main obstacle for the mobilisation efforts of SNAs from Diyarbakır towards the EU arena. At the same time, such a role makes Europeans consider the Europeanization process of Diyarbakır in the context of the EU’s political conditionality such as democracy, minority rights and education in the mother tongue. Put bluntly, using the concept of Europeanization with Diyarbakır in a single sentence most likely occurs in many people’s minds as with Turkey’s democratization process or the Kurdish issue in the case of the Europeanization as Democratization period.

How this affects the image of the city is exemplified perfectly by an interview participant in Diyarbakır. He reported that:

‘When we raise our problems about regional development or our business potential to the representatives from the EU or our European counterparts during their visits to our city, they always discuss the Kurdish problem or terror. As if we have no other local agenda. This creates a bad image for our city and impedes our relations with our European counterparts’ (Interview 34).

It is clear that local actors in Diyarbakır want to move from an environment where large portions of society are responsible or part of the Kurdish problem to one where they can also conduct other activities in terms of urban regeneration, economic development, touristic facilities, exchanging best practices and the like. In other words, there is a demand to shift from a top-down understanding of Europeanization within the first generation to bottom-up and horizontal Europeanization in the context of second generation Europeanization. This can only be possible through greater exchange with their counterparts in the EU and their mobilisation across the EU arena. Yet there is no strong indicator to examine this in the city due to the ongoing Kurdish problem.

Such an image also makes central institutions alert to the interplay between SNAs from Diyarbakır and the EU institutions or the visits of Europeans in the city. A bureaucrat in Ankara said that: ‘if you go to Diyarbakır airport, you always see the Europeans [implying officials from the EU institutions or members of the EU Parliaments] there. What are they doing there? Turkey consists of 81 cities, why do they always want to visit Diyarbakır but no other cities’ (Interview 8). This perspective in fact has its roots in history, which is evoked in the ‘Sevres Syndrome’ (see Chapter 5). However, this is not a common consideration among bureaucrats in Ankara and paid officials in the city. Many of them realized that they cannot prevent the interaction between the SNAs of the southeast region and the EU as in the old-style gatekeeping. What they can do is to extend their gatekeeping role during the implementation stage (also see German Foundation File in Chapter 6). The interview with a Vice-Governorate in Diyarbakır confirms the shift towards extended-gatekeeping from the perception of Ankara. He stated that:

‘Since we are the representatives of the centre in Diyarbakır, we have sometimes problem with visits of some Europeans. They want to establish direct contact with them [local administrations]. [...] they do not care what we are doing here. [...] they should know that there are certain things that local administrations have no right to take a decision. [...] the EU should be more sensitive on Turkey’s situation, particularly in this region. We never say no, if the representatives from the EU want to visit Diyarbakır and contact with them [the local administrations], but they should respect us (Interview 29).

Consistent with the discussion sketched above, one may claim that regional distinctiveness seems to play a negative role and cause problems in relation to SNAs’ engagement with horizontal and vertical channels outside the national setting. Ankara has been suspicious of the activities of SNAs from the southeast region in the EU arena. Accordingly, the interactions between SNAs from that region and the EU have always been considered in the axes of security and terror. The relations with the CoR and with the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe are two concrete examples for this sensitivity emerging from the issue of regional distinctiveness.

For the case of the CoR, Schönlau (2010:19), who is a political advisor in the CoR, argues:

[....] the proposed setting-up of a Joint Consultative Committee with the country [Turkey] has repeatedly been delayed because of disagreement between the CoR and the Turkish [national] authorities with regard to the ‘appropriate interlocutors’ for the CoR members: while the Turkish authorities wanted to send government officials, the CoR insists on having ‘elected’ local or regional politicians as members of the JCC, thus underlining its support for the development of genuinely democratic subnational structures. This is particularly sensitive with regard to a number of ethnic Kurds who are mayors of towns and cities in South Eastern Turkey’.

However, an interview participant believes that it is to some extent reasonable for Ankara to become cautious when it comes to the creation of Joint Consultative Committee. This is because of a bad experience deriving from the groups of Turkish members working in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe[[157]](#footnote-157) (Interview 46). For him, members from the southeast region in the Turkish delegation to the Congress periodically expressed certain opinions regarding local self-government in Strasbourg, which were not appreciated by the national government.

In light of the experiences derived from the Congress, Ankara has become more cautious and sought to hold its gatekeeping role on the issues threatening its politico-administrative and security culture. One should also note here that despite the fact that a number of SNAs have considered the European Union as well as the Council of Europe (via the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities) for support in their resistance towards the central government with regard to the principle of subsidiarity and enhancing their local competences, what these aforementioned European-wide organizations can actually do is insignificant (Marshall, 2005). For instance, while the Commission can create networks and encourage others to be involved with a wide range of actors or participate within these networks, it can do little to shift the long-standing power dependencies between central and local government (Bache *et al.*, 1996: 317). This substantially holds true for the Turkish case particularly in the era of Alaturka Europeanization.

Another issue requiring more elaboration is that the gatekeeping role of Ankara not only affects mobilisation from Diyarbakır at EU level but also impedes the visits from the EU to the city. A representative from the CoR went further to claim that: ‘Ankara hampered the visit of a working group to Diyarbakır, and told us clearly that if you hold a meeting in Diyarbakır, it would damage our relationship’ (Interview 49). As argued already, the ongoing sensitivity towards the separatism inside the country not only causes a problem for decentralization and regionalization rhetoric, but also has consequences for the interplay between SNAs and the EU institutions. In such an atmosphere, it is challenging for one to observe a genuine shift towards the multi-level modality, particularly for the case of regional distinctiveness. Furthermore, it plays a negative role in the course of subnational mobilisation from the southeast part of Turkey for the time being.

Apart from the Kurds, there is a remote possibility to find an appropriate case for strong politicization of distinct territorial identity elsewhere in Turkey. There is, however, an issue regarding the quality of intergovernmental relations, causing some municipalities to act in Brussels. Some interview participants in different cities similarly stated that not only did the local politicians from Kurdish origins feel pressure but also other local politicians such as the former mayor of Adana, Aytaç Durak, and the mayor of Izmir, Aziz Kocaoğlu[[158]](#footnote-158), associated with the opposition parties and who are subject to a number of trials and accusations. Such situations led the opposition municipalities to interact with the EU institutions to raise their interests. This is an important dimension for the Metropolitan Municipality of Izmir and will be analyzed in the next section.

**The Quality of Intergovernmental Relations**

Although the fear of insecurity largely determines the state of SNAs in the traditional Turkish administrative system, one should not neglect the influence of the politico-administrative culture on the relationship between national government and SNAs. The obvious reason is that subnational structures remain strongly influenced by national traditions, and reflect the differences of bureaucratic cultures and political conflicts of the past because of path dependency. As a result of this, subnational politics in Turkey have become fragmented and weak, which has been largely shaped by the mode of patron-client relations (see Chapter 5).

The tradition of patron-client relation stands in the way of subnational politics and has consequences for the mobilisation of SNAs in Brussels in two ways. Firstly, it impedes the lobbying culture and/or the forming of organized interests in a given territorial setting. Because of such personal and party political links through intra-state channels, many SNAs (particularly those close to the ruling party), fulfil their territorial needs without fostering subnational dynamics and organizing horizontal networks. Interviews with the national and subnational actors evidently ascertained that these informal and somewhat individual ties have become the modus operandi of Turkish subnational actors as the vast majority of them still opt for party political or individual links with the centre or EU institutions (Interviews 4, 22 and 39).

Second, and as a consequence of the first point, the patron-client mode affects the entrepreneurial capacity of local leaders, whilst enhancing paternalism among SNAs. This is because SNAs have been on the receiving end of what they have offered from the centre, without much prospect of effective counter-argument beyond the ballot box. Within this context, it is valuable to remember what Beyers and Kerremans (2007) affirm, namely the more domestic interest groups depend on resources exclusively provided by government agencies such as subsidies, the more these groups restrict their actions to the domestic political system.

However, the pull effect of Europeanization embraces new opportunities for action and new channels for influence. The new opportunity structure (access points) and welcoming ambience of EU level institutions (receptiveness) have created possibilities for SNAs to interact directly with the EU level. Therefore, a number of SNAs either individually or collectively have started to circumvent the intra-state arrangements and address the European level. Such activities of SNAs, on the surface, fundamentally contrast with the intergovernmentalist explanation which considers that the lobbying activities are restricted to the domestic policy arenas. However, Turkish SNAs, either individually or collectively, have started to lobby in Brussels.

Individually, as shown in the previous chapter, municipalities from CHP and BDP have sought to circumvent the centre by engaging with the EU institutions, particularly through the EU Parliament and the CoR. The most concrete example for this was that the mayor of Izmir Metropolitan Municipality, Aziz Kocaoğlu, held a meeting with the former DG Regio Commissioner (Pawel Samecki) in 2009. Apart from interview findings as well as news appearing on the national media, there is no reliable data to explore the extent to which the individual visits have been taking place in Brussels and also what has gained from these visits[[159]](#footnote-159).

Collectively, the most organized attempt for breaching the intra-state arrangements has been conducted by the Union of Social Democrat Municipalities (SODEM)[[160]](#footnote-160). This may be considered the most systematic and organized union that lobby and represent their interests at the EU level. The majority of CHP municipalities have to date benefitted from the SODEM, which was founded by the initiative of twelve CHP Istanbul district municipalities in 2011. The SODEM is currently planning to establish a liaison office in Brussels, although the general secretary of the organization acts as a listening post most of the time (Interview 64).

Prior to SODEM’s first collective movement in Brussels, there was a project called the ‘House of Izmir in the EU’ in 2009. Although the project was never realized, it is worth examining because of its importance for the subject matter, particularly for the case of Izmir[[161]](#footnote-161). The House of Izmir project was a collective attempt to lobby in Brussels, which was largely facilitated by the quality of intergovernmental relations. The tension between the two mainstream political parties, CHP and AKP and the reflection of this tension in Izmir provided a strong basis for ‘the House of Izmir in the EU Project’ because it was conceived by a number of CHP municipalities in Izmir in 2009. The coordinator of the Project explained the reason for attempting the project as follows:

‘[...] after having a number of meetings with the mayors in the city, we conjectured a number of difficulties that may affect our activities in the future. [...] if we have some troubles with Ankara regarding financial issues and that our municipalities do not obtain as many financial incentives as they deserve [...] we believe that we can do a better job if we are in Brussels. Yet our project was never realized [...] but 2, 5 years later, it became clear that the idea was so true (Interview 35).

Interestingly enough, the idea of the office in Brussels was obstructed by the CHP itself, not because of the AKP, financial problems or legal constraints. The project coordinator stated that: ‘the CHP considered that if the municipalities of Izmir created an office in Brussels, our party office [the CHP office in Brussels] would be undervalued. And there would be competition between us [the House of Izmir] and them [the CHP office]. And this affects our party’s [CHP] image’ (Interview 35). This is a rather strange finding for the subnational mobilisation literature because the centre generally exerts restraints on the creation of such external offices. However, some informants from Izmir and Brussels considered that the project was not modelled appropriately and therefore the CHP did not allow them to establish this office in Brussels (Interviews 42 and 57).

The experiences of some opposition municipalities show that the opportunities of Europeanization may be shaped by the intergovernmental relations in order to bypass the central authorities. This is largely the case for Izmir municipalities. However, one should not always consider the quality of intergovernmental relations in a negative sense, causing a direct engagement with the EU level within the context of state bypassing. In some instances, the EU opportunities have led SNAs to mobilize to an EU level as a complementary way in their relations with the national government. The situation for SNAs in Samsun is an example of this. There is a coherent relationship between the national government and the local actors in Samsun. Besides, all interview participants in the city regardless of their organizational background and political orientations commonly underlined that the centre should be informed about international activities. An example of this is clear in the following interview: ‘during our membership to these organizations [CPMR and AER], both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported us. We do not want to do any international activities independently from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (Interview 23). This is again inheritance from one voice outside the country tradition as well as the indivisibility principle in the Turkish administrative system (see Chapter 5).

It seems that the quality of intergovernmental relations depends on the SNAs’ party-political orientation. If they are closely associated with the opposition parties, mainly CHP, they are usually instrumentally motivated in order to gain financial incentives. They also raise their problems to the effective and powerful local administrations. The requests of CHP municipalities from the EU level and their EU activities do not clash radically with the state structure. However, one may see their relationship both with the centre and paid officials in the city in a competitive manner. Representatives from the Kurdish-dominated regions of Turkey have often discussed or lobbied about the local self-government, subsidiarity and some ethnic rights in terms of language and education. This generally clashes with the centralist tradition leading to confrontation with the paid officials in the respective cities.

Taking the SNAs from three different case cities into account, three strategies, albeit imperfectly, can be defined as cooperative, competitive and confrontation, depending largely on the quality of intergovernmental relations. This typology comes close to what Daoudov (2012) already found for Turkish municipalities (also see Chapter 8). SNAs close to the government (e.g. Samsun) usually cooperate with the national institutions for their international activities. Other SNAs that are close to the opposition parties use non-cooperative strategies (sometimes competitive as in the case of Izmir and at other times conflictual as in the case of Diyarbakir).


To sum up, all the above-mentioned limitations in the context of local/regional distinctiveness and the quality of intergovernmental relations have, in varying degrees, consequences for the political culture of SNAs, whose restricted responsibilities, limited financial strength and narrow geographical reach have often encouraged a rather parochial attitude. The impossibility of playing any effective role in policymaking and management created a sense of vulnerability in the face of central governments, which often obstructed any decentralization and regionalization efforts. However, what still needs elaborating on in the context of engaging with the EU multi-level modality is whether there was any bottom-up dynamics in the creation of territorial networks, which in turn facilitate the Europeanization of SNAs and their mobilisation beyond the national jurisdiction.

**Pre-Existing Territorial Networks**

Given its relevancy for the articulation of organized interests at subnational levels, the research found that the ‘pre-existing territorial network’[[162]](#footnote-162) has a positive impact on facilitating the Europeanization process at subnational level and particularly on the partnership principle of multi-level governance for RDAs from Izmir and Samsun. Before running through how the pre-existing territorial network has contributed to the subnational mobilisation efforts (particularly for RDAs) in three cities, it is important to examine their experiences for territorial networks.

Izmir is the third most developed city according to the socio-economic development index of 2003 in Turkey (Dinçer *et al*., 2003). It is also the third biggest city in terms of demography (TUIK, 2009). Keyman and Koyuncu (2010) perfectly describe Izmir as ‘the city with no excuses’. Their observation significantly reflects the current reality in the city. For instance, 2009-2010 URAK’s competitiveness index for 81 cities in Turkey clearly demonstrates the comparative advantage of Izmir in many areas in comparison with the other case cities, Samsun and Diyarbakır (Table 9.1).

**Table 9.1** URAK 2009-2010 Cities Competitiveness Index (out of 81 cities)



Aside from its success in socio-economic development and competitiveness, the city has also experienced a number of international activities, like the Mediterranean Olympic Games of 1971, Universiad of 2005. Of those international activities, the Izmir International Fair is highly important for the city as it is the oldest tradeshow in Turkey dating back to the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923[[163]](#footnote-163). Nowadays, the main target which is largely shared by all stakeholders in the city is to be the host of EXPO 2020[[164]](#footnote-164). All these activities described briefly have not only put the city under the spotlight of the international and European stages but also led subnational stakeholders in the city to gain experience in partnership and culture of lobbying when it comes to realizing the grand objectives for Izmir.

Despite *undeclared* competition among elected and paid officials in the city due to party political issues (see above), Izmir has also gained significant practices for local and regional governance throughout its history. Eraydın (2005) went further to claim that Izmir is the most important region in Turkey in terms of its experience of governance practices. In highlighting the importance of network governance, Eraydın *et al.* (2008) found that policy networks in Izmir have not only contributed to the city’s economic competitiveness but also supported the administrative decentralization process in the city. The latter is important for the effective creation of multi-level modality in the city. However, due to the limitations, this research is not able to document all networking practices in Izmir but mentions the contribution of the Aegean Economic Development Association (EGEV) to the city during the Europeanization process. EGEV was often stated during the fieldwork in Izmir in order to underline the extent to which these pre-existing networks before the Helsinki Summit of 1999 helped SNAs, particularly the Izmir Development Agency, to develop links in the EU arena.

The experience of the Aegean Economic Development Foundation (EGEV) is the major territorial network practice in the region. The membership composition of EGEV[[165]](#footnote-165) suggests the preliminary foundation of regional governance in Izmir prior to the Helsinki Summit of 1999. The basic purpose of the organisation is to enhance the economic development of the Aegean Region through nurturing the region’s endogenous potential (EGEV, 1993). In 1993, EGEV initiated studies about the possibility of establishing an RDA under the name of the Aegean Region Development Agency (EBKA)[[166]](#footnote-166). Through this project, it could draw on financial resources worth 300,000 ECU from the EU MEDINVEST programme (EGEV, 2002). Within the context of this project, EGEV conducted a number of activities: sending two staff members to different regional development agencies in Ireland, Germany, France and Italy; publishing brochures about Izmir and its region and distributing them in different European cities; and organizing international symposiums (Temizocak, 2006).

EGEV/EBKA has also accomplished a number of EU activities and gained experiences in terms of horizontal mobilisation across the EU arena. These activities include regional technical secretary for Interreg III/A program between Turkey and Greece, partnership with one of the oldest development agencies in France (ADIRA), a number of workshops with the European representatives both in Izmir and in other European countries and engaging in the building of support networks with various European RDAs (Temizocak, 2006). EGEV has contributed significantly to the growing awareness on EU matters in the region. One example for raising awareness about the EU is the project titled ‘Aegean Opinion Leaders EU Education Series’[[167]](#footnote-167).

Overall, the experiences of EGEV since the early 1990s have contributed immensely to governance practices in the region, particularly in Izmir. This success was also appreciated by the national authorities and therefore Izmir has been chosen as one of the pilot regions to create regional development agencies (Interview 41). All the necessary groundwork done by EGEV has provided a broader basis for support and legitimisation for the Izmir Regional Development Agency. Their institutional memory and networks in the EU arena have transmitted to the Izmir Development Agency. With EGEV’s valuable heritage in terms of regional governance and EU activities (in a sense of learning from past), Izmir Development Agency seemed to be ahead of other RDAs in Turkey. As an example of the effect of this valuable heritage, Izmir RDA has continued EGEV’s networking with other RDAs in the EU. More importantly, one of the first actions of the pilot RDA in Izmir was to apply for membership to EURADA in 2007. Today, the General Secretary of Izmir Development Agency is a member of the EURADA Executive Committee with eleven other members from different cities in Europe. Consequently, Izmir is a fair sample to unveil the positive effect of pre-existing territorial networks contributing to the mobilisation efforts of SNAs, particularly for the Izmir Development Agency.

Samsun is a middle-ranged city and it has a comparatively lower socio-economic development rate and competitiveness ranking than Izmir (see Table 9.1). Unlike Izmir, Samsun did not have notable international activities or experiences prior to Turkey’s EU accession process. Despite this, the city has benefitted substantially from the pre-existing territorial network prior to the EU accession process. In the current situation, Samsun is the centre city of the Middle Black Sea Development Agency, which was established in 2008. The Middle Black Sea is a polycentric region encompassing four cities, Samsun, Amasya, Tokat and Çorum. These cities were not inadvertently selected for the sake of creating NUTS II region. Prior to the creation of the Middle Black Sea Development Agency, there was a pre-existing territorial network called the Yeşilırmak Basin Development Project[[168]](#footnote-168).

Different from the experience of Izmir, Samsun is not the centre of this territorial network. Even so, Samsun gained valuable experiences in terms of forming organized interests and establishing partnership among local and regional actors for common problems. The most important aspect of the Yeşilırmak project is that, it is of a regional nature and the project management is governed by the cooperation of local units. In terms of gathering different partners (public-private-third sectors) under an umbrella organization, Yeşilırmak was also found to appeal to the EU, and with its management aspect, it was deemed exemplary to other NUTS II regions (Interview 23).

Although the project was created by bottom-up initiatives, the EU has played a considerable role in its subsequent success particularly after the 2004-2006 fund programs. With the historical institutionalist terminology, timing and tempo seem to be important aspects for explaining the effect of the EU on the evolution of the Yeşilırmak Project and its contribution to the mobilisation efforts of the Middle Black Sea Development Agency. An interview participant in Samsun reported that:

‘In 2004, the EU was looking for an interlocutor in some selected regions to open regional development programs for Turkey. Then, they [the EU] knocked at Yeşilırmak’s door but at that time it was not so active, though it has its own cooperation charter. In amending slightly this charter, the EU took the Yeşilırmak Project as an interlocutor for the development programs. I think, this was the turning point (Interview 20).’

What has changed since the EU’s significant touch on the Yeşilırmak Project is worth examining because it was the test drive for Turkish SNAs to shift towards the multi-level modality. For instance, after 2004, the name of the Union was changed to Association of Development. For the effective use of EU funds, together with the Ministry of Development and of the Association of the Development, ‘a project team’[[169]](#footnote-169) was established. Some of these staff shifted over afterwards to work in the Middle Black Sea Development Agency. This has subsequently brought significant institutional memory to the Agency in terms of EU project management and the idea of joining in EURADA (Interviews 21 and 22). Furthermore, Turkey received a grant from EU pre-accession funds of 2004-2006 for the technical assistance contract on the Regional Development in Samsun, Kastamonu and Erzurum NUTS II regions. Yeşilırmak played a significant role in the preparation of this EU-supported development programme and received around a 24 million Euro grant. According to its official website, with this grant, 194 projects were managed by the Yeşilırmak Union in four cities. This is a valuable contribution to the project generation capacity of the region as well as raising awareness about the EU projects.

More specifically, 2004 was a critical juncture for Samsun, too. By that time, with the success gained from Yeşilırmak, a number of representatives from public-private and NGOs in the city decided to establish Samsun Regional Development Council (SABEK). Over thirty local actors from different organizations (including paid and elected officials as well as businessman) attended a four-day long seminar in the Ministry of Development in 2004 in order to understand how to prepare a regional plan for the city[[170]](#footnote-170). Immediately after this seminar in Ankara, the Samsun City Development Plan was prepared with the participation of a number of local actors including governorship, municipalities, university, trade and industry unions, and the like (Interview 25).

After several search conferences in Samsun, the development strategy of the city was prepared encompassing the period of 2006-2013[[171]](#footnote-171). In terms of organizational adaptation to the EU process, in 2004, a research and development unit under the Samsun Special Provincial Administration was created in order to learn how to prepare a project in line with the EU standards (Interview 23). An informant stated that: ‘several experts including me from different public organizations started to work there. We learned many things about the EU projects and then we shared our knowledge to other local people’ (Interview 20).

The pre-existing network has facilitated the Europeanization process in Samsun but also being in an eligible area for EU funds has led them to be active in terms of exploiting EU fund opportunities. An interview participant stated that: ‘we care much about conducting projects in line with the EU standards. This not only provides extra money to our projects but also brings some disciplines. For me, gaining funds from the EU and conducting as many projects as possible for Samsun is a success’ (Interview 23). The statistics also confirm the success of Samsun. According to recent statistics, 132 grant contracts amounting to 15.112.041 Euro have been signed in Samsun[[172]](#footnote-172). Of the 81 cities in Turkey, such success made them become ranked 6th in terms of those most benefitting from EU funds (see Table 9.2. below).

The research argues that the EU projects contributed considerably to this process in Samsun but it was accelerated by the existence of a pre-existing territorial network in the region. This is particularly clear for the case of the Middle Black Sea Development Agency because Yeşilırmak has provided valuable institutional memory for it. The General Secretary of the Agency reported that:

‘Our region is familiar with the regional development issues and EU matters thanks to the Yeşilırmak Project. More importantly, there is a strategic plan demonstrating the vision of the region till 2023. So, roles and strategies for each organization in the region were already determined [...] each organization has its own capacity and these capacities operate collectively when it is necessary. If there is a region which is not familiar with the EU projects or there is no such network for that region, these activities could be a new exercise. But we already have them’ (Interview 21).

The EU activities of the Middle Black Sea Development Agency are affirmative for the facilitating effect of the pre-existing territorial network on the Europeanization of SNAs in Samsun. For instance, the Middle Black Sea is the first agency which is accredited by Ankara and Brussels as an operational body for managing the EU’s development programs if the next round of pre-accession funds (2014-2020) permits Turkish RDAs to be involved in this process (for the issue of accreditation see Chapters 6 and 8). More concretely, the Agency has gained two grand projects from the EU, seven million Euro for the opening of the Agency’s service building and four hundred thousand Euro for unregistered employment (Interviews 21 and 22). As for its membership to the EU-wide organizations, the Agency has become a member of EURADA— one year after its foundation (in 2009). In 2012, the General Secretary of the Agency became a member of the EURADA’s Executive Committee, with its counterpart from the Izmir Development Agency. The agency held two main EURADA meetings in Samsun with the participation of a number of European partners[[173]](#footnote-173) in 2010 and in 2012. Overall, there is a positive and considerable contribution of the pre-existing network for the Europeanization of SNAs in Samsun.

Up to this point, the research has found that there is a considerable impact of the pre-existing territorial network on facilitating the Europeanization process of SNAs in Izmir and Samsun. Although Diyarbakır has been a component of the largest and oldest territorial network, the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP)[[174]](#footnote-174) since 1989, there is no clear evidence suggesting that the GAP has facilitated the mobilisation of SNAs from the region to the European Arena. In fact, until the creation of two pilot RDAs in Turkey in 2006, the Southeast Anatolian (GAP) region of Turkey was the only exception to the regional structure in Turkey because of its multi-sectoral and somehow decentralized nature.

Given that the GAP is the only exception to the traditional sectoral approach of Turkish regional policy, it has been headquartered in the capital Ankara, with only a directorate based in the region. With its top-down creation, the GAP has not succeeded in contributing to the practices of partnership and programming for Diyarbakır prior to the EU development programs. In this respect, unlike Izmir and Samsun, the case of Diyarbakır forms a different pattern. This is mainly because the issue of terror in the southeast region has dominated the local agenda. Although recent years have seen some developments such as the creation of a regional development agency and the AKP’s recent Kurdish initiative in 2012[[175]](#footnote-175), the effects of these developments remain to be seen.

In the recent regional development plan for 2014-2023 prepared by the Karacadağ Development Agency, three main problems were determined for Diyarbakır: 1) unemployment; 2) the image of the city and its lack of representation; and 3) insufficiency in industry infrastructure. The General Secretary of the said Agency expressed that: ‘We have a number of main issues to do before the EU matters. Our priority is to understand the nature of the region and also to prepare our first strategic plan for the region’ (Interview 28). This evidently confirms that the RDA in Diyarbakır needs some time for building institutional capacity as well as improving its capability to become an interlocutor for its region as there were no strategic plans or groundwork laid down by any other organizations in the city. Another interview participant explained that: ‘everyone knows the problems for our city but there was no intention to come together and discuss this. [...] if you do not have a clear plan or strategy, what can we do in Brussels? We can only go there to drink coffee with Europeans if we do not have any purpose [...]’. Consequently, the creation of the Karacadağ Development Agency has provided a platform for different stakeholders but they are now in the learning process and seeking to explore what should be done for the city before engaging in EU politics.

Overall, each city had a pre-existing territorial network prior to the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Yet the research found that RDAs in Izmir and Samsun benefitted largely from these pre-existing networks; Diyarbakır, because of the Kurdish issue, has not benefitted properly from the GAP. Considering three intermediating factors on the subnational level examined so far, the remainder of the chapter compares the four stages of Europeanization in three cities in order to demonstrate the similarities and contrasts for each SNA.

## 


## 9.3. FOUR STAGES OF EUROPEANIZATION: CONTRASTS AND SIMILARITIES

Drawing insights from John’s ladder metaphor and adapting it to the situations for Turkish SNAs, four stages of SNA engagement with the EU multi-level modality are determined as growing awareness; organizational arrangements; transnational activities through horizontal channels; and vertical mobilisation (see Chapter 4). To recap, while the first two stages refer to the absorption of Europeanization in a top-down manner (as in the context of first generation Europeanization), the last two stages are usually followed by bottom-up and horizontal activities (as in the context of second generation Europeanization). SNAs in the three cities have acknowledged the opportunities of the EU and climbed up on the ladder. Yet the crux here is that the different characteristics of subnational settings determine the ultimate outcome and their speed on ascending the ladder. This section therefore presents the contrasts and similarities for each SNA from the selected case cities.

**Growing Awareness**

The initial attachment with the process of Europeanization started EU-funded projects. These projects are usually seen as a way to bring the concept of the EU from being something abstract at the supranational level to the subnational level. Being in eligible areas for the pre-accession fund programs since 2004, SNAs from Diyarbakır and Samsun are in a better position to profit from EU opportunities. Izmir has not been included in any EU development programs. Yet, for non-eligible SNAs, new fund opportunities have arisen from a variety of community programs such as civil society dialogue, cross-border cooperation, Youth, Leonardo and Grundwig. Izmir, like other non-eligible cities, can participate in those community programs. Considering all the available fund programs since 2003[[176]](#footnote-176), Table 9.2 illustrates the number of projects implemented in the selected cities.

**Table 9.2** Number of EU Projects Implemented in the Selected Cities since 2003



The actual influence of EU funds is to promote partnership across different stakeholders. This is also clear evidence for growing awareness about EU logic. Instead of treating the EU as a pot of money, the Commission aims to foster cooperation and partnership among SNAs within and beyond their national settings. SNAs from Izmir and Samsun became more aware of cooperation and partnership before the implementation of EU funds as a consequence of their experience deriving from the pre-existing territorial networks. The EU projects have strengthened those existing partnerships in both cities. However, in examining closely the quality of partnership and cooperation among local actors for the EU projects in the selected cities, a rather different picture emerges.

A number of informants in Izmir highlighted that the main difficulty is the inter-organizational dispute marked by the interest maximization of each organization participating in a project. This may be considered an organizational chauvinism. If the institutions seeking partnership are relatively equal and/or smaller, it is easier for them to work together. Otherwise, organizational chauvinism does not allow the larger institutions to participate in the collaborative efforts unless there is a grand project for the city. An interview participant in Izmir reported that: ‘if the local institutions are large, they do not seem pleased to collaborate with each other. Leaders in those organizations think that they are the most important person in the city’ (Interview 39). As discussed, the partisan consideration also exacerbates the establishment of strong partnership among local stakeholders in Izmir.

Samsun seems to be more organized when it comes to benefitting from EU projects. Local organizations in the city are relatively smaller in size and fewer in number, facilitating the collective action for a single EU project. After the creation of the R&D unit under the Samsun Governorship in 2004, it has become a hub for EU projects. An informant from Samsun explained the importance of this unit as follows:

‘[…] we created this unit and called it a project kitchen. When we see project calls, we produce as many projects as possible, sometimes more than ten. Then we start looking for partners in the city, if necessary, in other EU countries. […] at the end of day, all these processes make us integrate with each other [...]’ (Interview 23).

The creation of partnerships around the EU funds in Samsun seems to be ad hoc rather than a structured or institutionalized form of partnership. The favourable condition for the durable and institutionalized partnership may be provided by lack of visible cleavages among local leaders. Samsun has more favourable conditions for the structured or institutionalized form of partnership as the political orientations for the actor are more compatible. Because of an undeclared cleavage among local leaders (particularly elected and paid officials) and the number of larger organizations, it may be difficult to construct a sustainable partnership in Izmir. For Diyarbakır, the partnership issues are new practices, which have been introduced by the European projects. However, as argued above, the main problem is to find a permanent solution to the Kurdish issue as it makes other local and civic issues (including the EU activities) become side-lined.

Next to projects, a number of different sources may raise awareness of EU matters at subnational level. In this respect, SNAs of Izmir are in a better position than those of Samsun and Diyarbakır. There are nine universities (private and state) in Izmir; four of which have either EU specialist departments or information centres or documentation centres[[177]](#footnote-177). These universities not only provide an informational (empirical and theoretical) contribution to the city, they also provide human resources and intellectual capital. For instance, several international conferences have been held by those universities in the city since 1999. The majority of them were related to EU-specific issues[[178]](#footnote-178). On the other hand, neither Samsun nor Diyarbakır has enough support from their local universities in terms of an empirical and theoretical basis for EU matters.

The common point for each case city is that chambers of trade and industry or business organizations are the earliest subnational organizations to become contact points for EU politics[[179]](#footnote-179). This is because Turkey signed the Custom Union Agreement with the EU in 1995. Since then, business organizations have been involved in the Europeanization process and disseminated EU information to the subnational level much earlier than any other public or private organization (also see Chapter 7). By the proto-Europeanization period, the learning process among subnational actors gradually intensified, which brought about the creation of several EU units under different organizational frameworks.


Having several EU units under different organizations does not suggest a successful integration of a given city with the Europeanization process. It may cause a fragmented EU function of the city if there is no sufficient communication among organizations. In fact, insufficient and irregular coordination are correspondingly considered one of the major shortcomings in the creation of a partnership. For instance, because of the insufficient coordination, a number of stakeholders undertake similar projects or organize identical visits to the EU arena by spending their money on and assigning their personnel to the preparation of necessary plans. Such duplication has resulted in wasting both money and staff hours of their personnel. In order to arrange and coordinate different EU activities, EU Coordination Offices were created by the Ministry of Interior Circular under the governorship of each city in 2010 (see Chapter 7).

Apart from the EU Coordination Offices, there is no institutionalized partnership specifically designed for EU matters. As argued, although RDAs (through development councils) and some other pre-existing territorial networks (EGEV and SABEK) provide a horizontal platform for Izmir and Samsun, most of these networks are urban specific with no particular emphasis on the EU politics. Izmir Metropolitan Municipality has also initiated the ‘Economic Development Coordination Board’[[180]](#footnote-180) since 2009. This is one of the best examples for horizontal grouping in Turkey of its kind but again there is no particular reference to EU politics. Next to the institutionalized form of partnership, one should also discuss whether the organizational capacity of an SNA in the selected cities is adequate to conduct EU activities in Brussels or not.

**Organizational Arrangements**

SNAs from Izmir have a big lead in finding necessary human resources and intellectual capital for the EU matters. First of all, it is one of the most developed cities with a high ranking level in quality of life. This makes the city a centre of attraction for qualified human resources. Secondly, it harbours several public and private universities and some of these universities have a specific department for EU politics[[181]](#footnote-181). Finally, the financial capacity of the Izmir Metropolitan Municipality is more prosperous than those of Diyarbakır and Samsun (discussed below). This provides more scope to appoint extra employees. Table 9.3 evidently illustrates the amount of workforce and the educational background of employees for each organization. Several staff working in SNAs in Izmir hold master or above degrees. Apart from SNAs in Izmir, the Middle Black Sea Development Agency has some staff with a master or above degree.

**Table 9.3** Educational Background of Personnel in the Selected SNAs (2012)[[182]](#footnote-182)



Izmir Metropolitan Municipality has a special EU office, with several experts dealing with EU matters. They have different language skills (e.g. English, French, German and Italian) (Interview 37). Such language ability helps the given organization widen its transnational links with different SNAs in Europe. As for Samsun and Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipalities, both are understaffed regarding EU politics. Yet, as argued above, in 2004, the Samsun Governorship took a bottom-up initiative to create an R&D unit, which brought about several qualified EU experts. They were usually selected because of their language abilities. Those experts were only trained and educated in EU projects and therefore had limited knowledge about general EU politics. Such a smattering of EU knowledge may not be sufficient for these organizations to mobilize across the EU arena in terms of joining transnational links or participating in interregional organizations in Brussels.


As for the organizational level, Samsun and Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipalities have project offices under the international relations departments rather than a specific EU unit. The obvious reason is that the assignment of particular EU issues to the existing employees in the respective organizations is common practice particularly during the Alaturka Europeanization period. Experts working in these offices (in Diyarbakır and Samsun) shared the same idea that EU issues have become side-lined with other issues and thus there is no point in allocating an expert for EU matters. However, if the organization has already appointed EU experts and created project offices, personnel working in those offices have become engaged with several national or international projects (i.e. JIKA, Development Agency, and the like) (Interview 47). An informant from Samsun, for instance, expressed that: ‘we learnt the project culture from the EU but now are using it for other national and international projects. […] our RDA [Middle Black Sea] goes for project calls every three months and their project criteria are similar with the EU logics, why should we only depend on the EU funds?’ (Interview 24). This shows that there is a spillover effect suggesting a thick learning within the organizational logic. The organization started with recruiting experts for EU projects, but then those experts had to establish their position by being involved in different projects because of the low credibility of the accession process and insufficient EU funds.

With regard to the situation for RDAs in the three cities, the number of staff is less but the educational background of staff is generally higher than municipalities. Although there is a direct relation with the creation of RDAs in Turkey and the process of Europeanization, none of the RDAs in the selected cities have a specific EU office. There are contact persons for EU affairs, particularly for the relationship with EURADA. Officials and experts in the selected RDAs have good knowledge of administering EU funds because the fund management system of the RDAs is identical with that of the EU (See Chapter 6). This makes experts in RDAs learn rapidly about the logic of EU fund management and thus they easily adapt themselves to EU standards.

On the whole, most of the staff working in those SNAs as EU experts or responsible for EU matters are usually young and they come from a different institutional background because of their language skills. The grant procurement side has become more specialized. Yet most of the personnel are not adequate in understanding the complexity of EU politics and they are not able to do more policy-oriented work. For instance, there is no expert with experience in all EU institutions. One may argue that Izmir Metropolitan Municipality and Izmir Development Agency (because of the abundance of qualified human resources in the city) as well as the Middle Black Sea Development Agency (because of transferring staff from the Yeşilırmak Union) are ahead of other selected SNAs in terms of having the necessary expertise level for EU politics; however, to move from a simply project-oriented approach to a more Europeanized stage requires skilful experts, who know about the EU institutions and have experience in Brussels. This is a common point shared by informants in Brussels.

The financial strength of a given organization is another component to conduct international activities in the EU arena. Therefore, the question is whether those SNAs have sufficient financial resources to conduct horizontal and vertical mobilisation across the EU arena. The short answer is affirmative. Although the financial strength of Turkish SNAs is comparatively lower than their counterparts, particularly in the EU-15 countries, Table 9.4 reveals that the financial capacity of each organization (except for Samsun and Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipalities) is sufficient enough to conduct a number of horizontal and vertical activities in the EU arena and even establish a liaison office in Brussels.

**Table 9.4**[[183]](#footnote-183) 2012 Income and Expense Account for the Selected SNAs ***(million €)***

******

Financial and human resources are important dimensions for the organizational capacity but a particular emphasis should be placed on the role of leadership. Given that the attractiveness of the EU had faded away by the Alaturka Europeanization era, EU activities require a political leadership and direction in order to support the bottom-up initiative. During the Europeanization as Democratization period, local leaders, except for some mayors from the southeast part of Turkey because of the Kurdish issue, were not included in any part of the EU accession process. The Metropolitan Mayor of Diyarbakır, Osman Baydemir, seemed to be involved in EU matters more than his counterparts in Turkey during this period[[184]](#footnote-184). As argued, Diyarbakır is the central city for the Kurdish issue, which made the Metropolitan Mayor interact with a number of European officials, parliaments, media members and local leaders.

The proto-Europeanization period was the time when a number of local leaders wished to be involved in EU activities by making several organizational arrangements (see Chapter 7). Many mayors associated with the AKP had a more pro-EU outlook than other mainstream political parties during this period. By the Alaturka Europeanization period, although some of the local leaders from the AKP reverted back to a more sceptical or passive position, others remained reactive or proactive on EU activities. For instance, the Mayor of Samsun, Yusuf Ziya Yılmaz, did not distance himself from the EU matters and had been actively participating in the wider European politics. He was a member of the Turkish delegation to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (in Council of Europe) between 2004 and 2008. He has been vigorously involved in the CPMR-Black Sea Region initiatives supported by the EU cross-regional programs under neighbouring countries. The most recent activity of Mayor Yılmaz was to organize the kick off meeting for Black Sea Basin Buildings Energy Efficiency Plan in Samsun in August 2013. This is a joint operational programme funded by the EU Commission[[185]](#footnote-185).

During the Alaturka Europeanization period, the CHP municipalities have engaged with EU politics more than their counterparts from other mainstream political parties. The creation of a CHP office in Brussels in 2009 and the active involvement of SODEM in EU politics have consistently stimulated the municipalities in Izmir to engage with the EU institutions. The Mayor of Izmir Metropolitan Municipality, Aziz Kocaoğlu, had a chance to meet several EU politicians (particularly the members of Party of European Socialist) as well as the DG Regio Commissioner. The active involvement of Mayor Kocaoğlu in EU politics not only stems from a partisan inducement but also from his strong leadership[[186]](#footnote-186).

The leadership in the selected RDAs requires more explanation. RDAs are run by the Executive Committee in which the Governor(s) is/are chairing the committee. The General Secretaries of RDAs have managing roles and thus their visions are correspondingly relevant for the EU activities of a given RDA. General Secretaries in selected RDAs are highly educated and have around ten to fifteen years’ experience in public or private sectors. Two of them (Izmir and Karacadağ) have obtained PhD degrees in social science and the other one (Middle Black Sea) had a master’s degree in agricultural economics. Each of them speaks fluent English and has educational experience in the UK.

General Secretaries of RDAs in Izmir and Samsun seem to have more advantage due to the pre-existing territorial network in their respective regions. Furthermore, the General Secretary of Izmir Development Agency has a supportive educational background in terms of being involved in EU politics. After the completion of his PhD in Economics, he conducted his studies on EU regional policies and structural funds, regional development and the Turkish accession process to the EU[[187]](#footnote-187). Such an academic background offers him a great advantage when it comes to conducting the activities related to the structural funds and EU regional policy. It is also important to emphasize here that the General Secretary of Izmir Development Agency and that of Middle Black Sea have become members in the Executive Committee of EURADA for the term 2012-2014. The relative weight of pre-existing territorial networks in both regions accompanied by the proactive leadership has led both RDAs to become active players in the EU multi-level polity.

Generally speaking, the first two stages (i.e., growing awareness and organizational changes) are mostly shaped by the top-down effect of Europeanization, particularly with the logic of EU projects. Therefore, these stages are considered within the first generation of Europeanization. In order to exploit the new opportunities, SNAs in the three cities have embarked upon adjusting their organizational framework by recruiting staff and/or creating a unit to deal with the EU projects. The more those SNAs are involved in the projects, the more they learn about the EU project culture. However, the next two stages (i.e., transnational activities and vertical mobilisation) necessitate different mechanisms including horizontal and bottom-up Europeanization, which is a case for second generation Europeanization.

**Transnational Activities**

Transnational links and networking in the EU arena are the ways in which SNAs start to move from a top-down understanding of Europeanization (i.e., responding to the EU fund calls and change in organizational arrangements) to a more Europeanization stage in terms of a normative and ideational phase (i.e., learning best practices, networking and information sharing). This stage is usually essential for horizontal Europeanization (see Chapter 1). As argued in the previous chapter, Turkish SNAs are generally reactive in order to exploit EU opportunities. They usually apply for EU funds or create networks with other organizations in their respective cities. Once they become involved in EU projects and grasp the value of networking with their counterparts in the EU, they may start to conduct transnational activities through horizontal links, such as sister cities, twinning links or reciprocal visits. Interview participants in each city commonly pointed to the importance of networking and sharing best practices or information with their counterparts in the EU arena. Whereas this is clear for Izmir and Samsun, there is no evidence for Diyarbakır. The obvious reason is that SNAs from Samsun and Izmir have more favourable conditions in terms of organizational capacity and subnational context than those of Diyarbakır. Such advantages have facilitated their transnational activities through horizontal channels.

EU matters in Diyarbakır may be considered in between first and second generation Europeanization because of the unfavourable subnational context. Europeanization is neither side-lined by other issues nor mainstreamed in the city, except for the EU projects. There are no remarkable transnational links between SNAs from Diyarbakır and their counterparts in the EU arena. Some developments, the creation of Karacadağ Development Agency in 2010 and the AKP’s recent Kurdish initiative in 2012 may affect the behaviour of SNAs and lead them back into EU matters. Accordingly, developments on this front should remain to be seen. It is also worth emphasizing that the city is more engaged with the Middle-East region in general and North Iraq in particular because of its geographical position (Interview 34). Subnational interest towards Turkey’s south borders has also been encouraged by Ankara’s activist foreign policy in that region. Furthermore, with the impetus of the Turkey‐Syria Interregional Cooperation Program between 2010 and 2012, the Karacadağ Development Agency has canalized its human and financial resources to exploit the benefits from these regions[[188]](#footnote-188). One should note that the potential benefits from the Middle East context have economic and cultural dimensions (Interviews 28 and 34). For learning best practices regarding city regeneration or several urban-specific issues, interview participants in the city commonly acknowledged the prominence of European values, norms and practices.

As regards the situations for SNAs from Samsun and Izmir, they have been involved in several transnational links with their counterparts in the EU. The pre-existing networks in these cities, particularly for Izmir have provided a fertile ground for embarking on horizontal links with European counterparts. Furthermore, local and regional leaders in these cities (Metropolitan Mayors and General Secretaries of RDAs) have been active in some EU-wide organizations (e.g., CPMR and EURADA). The personal relations of those leaders with their European counterparts have promoted the image of their respective cities. Horizontal links with the European counterparts along with the number of international seminars and conferences held in Samsun and in Izmir have also increased the learning process about Europeanization.

In the absence of gaining structural funds directly from Brussels, the horizontal links have become initiators for subnational mobilisation and mode of normative changes in terms of learning best practices. The growing transnational activities of Samsun in the EU arena after 2005 substantiate the important results for this learning process. The President of Samsun Provincial Assembly expressed that:

‘[...] we had many European friends [implying project partners], we still keep in touch with them [...] sometimes they visit us, sometimes we visit them. Thanks to these mutual interactions, we always update each other on the developments in the EU. We always want to learn new things and good practices. Our networks in Europe helped us a lot for these purposes’ (Interview 27).

Joining in interregional organizations also seemed to be a product of the EU projects and transnational links with the European counterparts, particularly for the case of Samsun. An interview participant reported that:

[…] when we see flags or logos during our joint projects with partners from Europe, we asked what these flags or logos are […] when we learnt that it represents an organization in Brussels, we got its details [internet addresses or phone numbers] […] after searching on the internet, if our organizational situation is available, we consider to be a member of that organization’ (Interview 20).

Above all, Izmir and Middle Black Sea Development Agencies’ connections with EURADA and their active involvement have correspondingly accelerated the transnational activities in Samsun and in Izmir. A recent event held in Samsun may be a good example of the transnational links with a number of European counterparts. In 2012, the Middle Black Sea Development Agency organized a EURADA event titled AGORADA 2012. This event was about the adoption of a regional innovation strategy. Several local and regional actors from different EU states participated in this event. This was a real success for Samsun to shift from first generation Europeanization, i.e. adjusting the organizational logic for the sake of the utilization of EU funds in the context of top-down understanding, to the second generation Europeanization, i.e. transnational links and learning best-practices in the context of horizontal Europeanization.

Although Izmir has a similar trajectory with Samsun regarding the involvement of EU politics, the international and European level experiences of SNAs in Izmir have their roots in history that coincides with the pre-Helsinki period. Starting from the EGEV/EBKA experiences, Izmir has established various partnerships with Italian, British, French and Spanish local and regional authorities to establish a region-wide platform which integrates public private and third sectors to each other (Temizocak, 2006). As argued, Izmir Development Agency has largely inherited the experiences of EGEV and its networking in the EU but it has developed ardently its networking with European counterparts. Although it is a qualitative evaluation, the reputation of Izmir for Europeans is much higher than many Anatolian cities. This provides a fertile ground for organizing various international events in the city. Besides, visits from a number of EU countries as well as from EU levels in Izmir have also been arranged by other institutions such as universities, NGOs and local administrations[[189]](#footnote-189). Accordingly, Izmir has more advantages to diversify its transnational links than other cities in Turkey.

Summing up, there is a clear shift towards second generation Europeanization, though the pace of such a shift varies from organization to organization and region to region. Izmir and Samsun, because of their experiences from pre-existing territorial networks and relatively stronger organizational capacity and leadership, seem to be forerunners for embarking on transnational links. The continuation of the third stage suggests a vertical mobilisation, which is the stage that one may mention about a shift towards the multi-level modality. This stage also should be bottom-up in terms of organizational capacity.


**Vertical Mobilisation**

This is the stage when SNAs should perceive their role in the wider EU politics and act accordingly. To reach this level, a strong organizational capacity and a proactive leadership are essential push factors to exploit the opportunities within the EU multi-level polity. Particularly, when there is no strong pulls effect (e.g. membership prospect or financial incentives), voluntary mechanisms (i.e. bottom-up or learning) should initiate the behaviour of SNAs to mobilize across the EU arena. If there is a sufficient subnational context, (e.g. pre-existing territorial network) the shift towards the multi-level modality may be easier and faster. If SNAs cannot organize locally and do not seek to act internationally, or if their subnational context and organizational capacity does not permit them to mobilize across the EU arena, it may be difficult to discuss a shift towards a multi-level modality.

The research argues that SNAs from Diyarbakır have not reached the full Europeanization stage as there is no evidence to suggest a vertical mobilisation. Moreover, the regional distinctiveness of the city has obstructed any mobilisation from Diyarbakir to the EU level or vice versa (discussed above). Although the Metropolitan Municipality of Diyarbakır has hosted a number of European Parliaments and EU officials in the city since 1999, they have no institutional channel to articulate their functional interests in Brussels. There is a Kurdish-Friendship group in the EU Parliament but it is largely confined to party-political considerations, whereby Kurdish politicians from BDP can discuss minority rights or some other democratic rights (see Chapter 8). These are national level issues and not related to any specific city or region. Once it accomplishes its institutionalization process, Karacadağ Development Agency may articulate the functional interests of Diyarbakır in the EU arena and embark on vertical mobilisation. It is a member of the EURADA, but currently is not active enough to benefit from it.

Unlike Diyarbakir, SNAs from Izmir and Samsun, with their broad European networks, strong organizational capacity and favourable subnational context, seem to have more confidence in their ability to engage with the EU multi-level polity. In principle each individual SNA, either municipality or regional development agency, from both cities can make use of EU opportunities in Brussels; but in practice it is difficult for a single organization to lobby successfully at the European level (see Chapter 8). This leads to a collective action under the umbrella organization to establish a liaison office or to participate independently in interregional organizations. For the former case, there is no clear evidence apart from the failed House of Izmir initiative (see above). If there is a membership prospect and a possibility to draw EU funds directly from Brussels, SNAs from Samsun and Izmir may pursue creating an office in Brussels. Under the current conditions, it seems neither rational nor realistic to establish an office in Brussels. Accordingly, SNAs from both cities have so far chosen the latter strategy and they have participated in a number of European-wide interregional organizations. Table 9.5 illustrates these interregional organizations in which local and regional actors from Samsun and Izmir are members.

**Table 9.5** Membership to some European-wide Interregional Organizations[[190]](#footnote-190)



As seen from Table 9.5, membership of those interregional organizations has taken place in the Alaturka Europeanization period where there is low credibility of the EU membership perspective. This emphasizes that more complex interactions including bottom-up and horizontal mechanisms are at work, as suggested by the second generation Europeanization framework. Their participation in those interregional organizations is also important to show that rather than being counteractive, passive or reactive to EU opportunities, SNAs from Izmir and Samsun take a proactive view on EU matters. This does not suggest that they are pro-European. Rather, it shows that the EU membership is not an ultimate goal but is considered as a standard that their respective organization should reach. Therefore, in the absence of adaptational pressure, one may put a greater emphasis on voluntary adaptation through policy transfer, learning and lesson-drawing.

Not all SNAs within those interregional organizations are active. While the Metropolitan Mayor of Izmir used his personal and party political links to engage with the EU institutions, RDAs from Izmir and Samsun established an institutional channel through their link with the EURADA. General Secretaries of both RDAs were elected as members of the EURADA Executive Committee for two years, 2012-2014. The General Secretary of Izmir Development Agency was also elected (in 2012) as Vice-President of the Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies for the period of 2013-2015. Metropolitan Municipality Mayors of Izmir and Samsun are also actively engaged in some interregional organizations but they have no administrative or executive roles for the time being.

The General Secretary of the Middle Black Sea Development Agency commented on his membership in the EURADA Executive Committee and provided insights into some SNA activities in the European multi-level system. He explained that:

‘[...] by participating in board meetings and working groups in EURADA, we represent our country. Also, we want to catch the trend of European local and regional agendas, [...] if there is a possibility, we also want to participate in lobbying activities [...] we want to be heard by our counterparts, we do not only want to learn best practices but also share what we know [...]’ (Interview 21).

The above passage is important for several reasons. First, SNAs see themselves as a representative of the country outside the national setting. This is clear evidence of path dependency stemming from the unitary state culture. As argued by intergovernmentalists, SNAs usually cooperate with their national government and behave as representatives of their country. Secondly, it shows that some SNAs have already realized the importance of lobbying in Brussels. Finally, there is a normative dimension in terms of transferring knowledge and best practices.

As for the relations with the EU institutions (the Commission, the EU Parliament and the CoR), it seems that only SNAs from Izmir have engaged with the formal EU institutions. Mayor Kocaoğlu’s visit to the DG Regio Commissioner, Pawel Samecki, in 2009, was already mentioned (see Chapter 8). Izmir Metropolitan Municipality and Development Agency has also participated in CoR activities. In 2010, a seminar was organised in Izmir by the CoR Working Group on relations with Turkey with the support of the Izmir Development Agency and the Innovative Technology Centre Europa (ITC-Europa). Apart from these examples, there is no reliable data available to show the extent to which SNAs from the selected cities have engaged with the formal EU institutions.

Considering all the stages, it is clear that SNAs are on different levels of the four stages. While Diyarbakır started to move towards the third stage, SNAs from Izmir and Samsun has sought to establish their places in the final stage. Yet there is a spillover phase. Rather than considering being Europeanized, they prefer to become more internationalized. One may claim that what they learn from their European links makes them become an international actor. This is also closely related to Turkish-EU relations and the changing dynamics of Turkish foreign policy. For instance, instead of establishing an office in Brussels, SNAs from Samsun have discussed establishing an office in Russia (Interviews 21, 23 and 27). Good relations between two countries have led SNAs to become more strategic in their mobilisation. The European dimension is always on the agenda in terms of learning best practices, networking or joining in the projects, but economically and strategically the idea of having an office in Russia seems more attractive. In this respect, geography is a factor but it changes the direction of mobilisation if there are economic purposes in mind. For each case, it seems difficult to refer to a fully Europeanized stage as argued by Peter John. This is largely because of Turkey’s current relation with the EU and the low EU membership credibility. There are efforts for shifting towards the multi-level modality but because of the decreasing importance of the EU, SNAs have a ‘wait and see’ strategy.

Table 9.6 summarizes the four stages of subnational mobilisation for each case city and selected SNAs within these cities. It is clearly seen from Table 9.6 that SNAs do not usually follow any specific patterns when they engage with the Europeanization process. For instance, without having an EU unit, they may join in transnational links. In other words, it is not always progressive but may be erratic movement.

**Table 9.6** Summary of Four Stages of Subnational Mobilisation

***(the darker the colour, the higher the stage)***



## 9.4. CONCLUSION

This chapter has considered both formal and informal realms of EU governance with a special reference to first and second generation Europeanization. The obvious reason is that Europeanization not only affects the legal and institutional framework within each city, but also has consequences for informal structures in regard to the adaptation of SNAs to the Europeanization process. Yet subnational responses and outcomes to the Europeanization process have revealed a clustered convergence but not clear indications for harmonization. Moreover, empirical findings have supported the idea that changes at subnational level vary city to city and organization to organization. Accordingly, the differential impact of Europeanization is apparent from the evaluation of case study SNAs from the selected cities.

As suggested from the outset, focusing on different subnational contexts in a single state is one of the key methodological strategies to examine variations among SNAs. More importantly, as Jeffrey (2000) suggested, one needs to consider the ‘bottom-up drive’ for examining the intra-state factors that may explain subnational mobilisation, but the latter has received little attention from the MLG approach. Taking the bottom-up perspective, the chapter has focused on regional development agencies and metropolitan municipalities from three different subnational contexts, Samsun, Diyarbakır and Izmir. The choice of comparing SNAs from the selected cities enables us to explore the uneven effects of the Europeanization process in different subnational contexts, and to examine why some SNAs have used the EU to advance their functional territorial interest, whilst others have not.

In comparison with their equivalents in other EU cities (those having a federalized state structure), Turkish SNAs have generally lacked competences because of a long history of statism. To begin with, regionalization and decentralization raise the delicate issue of the Kurdish question in the southeast part of Turkey which has a strong and distinctive ethnic and linguistic identity. Although regional distinctiveness is the significant motivation for a region to mobilize across the EU arena (Marks *et al.,* 1996), it has negative connotations for the case of Diyarbakir. The Metropolitan Municipality of Diyarbakir is highly politicized and thus some of its EU activities have occasionally clashed with national interests. Rather than mobilizing in the EU arena, the city has received a number of EU officials, Parliament and local leaders. Such a state of affairs has made the national authorities more alert when it comes to interplay between local administrations of Diyarbakir and supranational institutions. Although the centre has not obstructed all possible access points, it has extended its gatekeeping during the implementation phase. The visits of Europeans are usually held on an elite level. Therefore, there is no space for low-ranking staff in the municipality to grasp the benefits of Europeanization. This reduces the internalization and absorption of EU norms, practices or ways of doing things within organizational practices. Confined to the political level also does not provide space for the Municipality to learn best practices or create networks with their counterparts in the EU arena.

The chapter has also examined the intermediating effects of intergovernmental relations with regard to partisan contestation. By-passing the state to promote a policy line contrary to Turkey’s position in the EU arena may be politically unwise. Although Ankara has recognized the impossibility of obstructing channels for SNAs attempting to reach the EU level, SNAs or EU institutions do not have a chance to put pressure on central institutions to change their own agenda regarding decentralization or other related issues. In this regard, the new opportunity structures of the EU do not underpin the powers of SNAs vis-à-vis the national government. Furthermore, a cooperative strategy in mobilizing across the EU arena has better pay-off than competition and confrontation. From the case studies, each RDA as well as the metropolitan municipality of Samsun is more successful than other Anatolian cities of a similar size in articulating a set of common interests of their respective city or regions and in bringing them into the national and EU level. This approximates with the ideas of intergovernmentalists rather than supranationalists or MLG scholars. What the intergovernmentalist argues is that SNAs need to rely entirely on their national government if they want to pursue their interests in the EU arena. Such understanding also comes close to the path dependent understanding of historical institutionalism.

The last but vital subnational mediating factor was the pre-existing territorial network. The cities covered by a pre-existing territorial network have gained considerable experience from the application for EU funds and established contacts with their counterparts in the EU. This suggests that the impact of Europeanization on the subnational level is most visible in increased learning; either from their own experiences in the past or from similar experiences of other SNAs. The transmission of experiences derived from time and space is remarkable for two case cities, Samsun and Izmir. As a concrete example, during the creation of RDAs, these pre-existing territorial networks transferred their institutional memory during the creation and institutionalization of their respective regional development agencies. Besides, such experiences have constituted a valuable bottom-up push for these RDAs. The heritage inherited from Yeşilırmak and EGEV has provided a set of institutional as well as inter-personal relations on which SNAs in Samsun and Izmir, respectively, have based their European policy initiatives. It is therefore not a surprise to observe that both RDAs have actively engaged with EU matters and even become members of the EURADA Executive Committee. It is also possible to claim that those cities or regions having pre-existing territorial networks may take more chances for mobilisation across the EU arena, though Diyarbakir is an exception to this because of its political conditions.

The chapter has finally outlined the four stages of subnational mobilisation for each case SNA within three selected cities, in terms of growing awareness and organizational arrangements, albeit to varying degrees, taking place in each SNA. It was also seen that those SNAs have certain access points to the horizontal and vertical channels in the EU multi-level system. This implies that the new opportunity structures have offered possibilities for SNAs to engage with the EU multi-level polity. Yet it also involves the caveat that there is a large variation in the substance, content and timing of their mobilisation across the EU arena. Accordingly, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests a pattern of variation in subnational engagement with EU politics, rather than any neat conclusion in terms of homogeneous Europeanization of SNAs. The chapter therefore argued that subnational factors rather than national and EU level developments shapes the mobilisation (or non-mobilisation) of SNAs towards the EU arena. In this respect, the pace of their adaptation to Europeanization and their readiness to shift towards multi-level modality are largely facilitated by specific organizational capabilities (money, expertise and leadership) and mediated by specific subnational factors (regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relationship and the pre-existing territorial network).

Overall, the conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that opportunity structures are a necessary but not sufficient condition for subnational mobilization: It should be weighted with the actors’ capacities to exploit the opportunities. More specifically, the pre-existing territorial network accompanied with the favourable organizational capacity and leadership provides a fertile ground for a shift towards the multi-level modality. These conditions are found in Izmir and to some extent in Samsun. Despite having a pre-existing territorial network since 1989 in its vicinity, Diyarbakır has a major problem derived from its regional distinctive character, that is the Kurdish issue. Accordingly, while Izmir and Samsun have shifted towards second generation Europeanization, Diyarbakir is still in the transition process from first to second generation Europeanization.

# CONCLUSION

## INTRODUCTION

The primary aim of the thesis has been to explore the interplay between the effects of Europeanization and the mobilisation of SNAs from Turkey across the EU arena during the country’s accession period since 1999. This is one of the basic ideas of the multi-level governance approach. The empirical reference for the interplay between subnational and supranational levels has been appraised in the context of EU regional policy and structural funds. Within these policy spheres, the evolution of European integration has witnessed an ever-increasing active role of SNAs in all phases of policy making and a regional basis for the distribution of funds. Yet despite the growing numbers of studies on the impact of Europeanization in the Turkish domestic context, scholarly attention has remained relatively absent at subnational level. Addressing this lacuna in the extant literature, the research has sought to answer the following questions: How has Europeanization impacted on the mobilisation of Turkish SNAs across the EU arena after the Helsinki Summit of 1999? What kind of changes have SNAs gone through in order to adapt themselves to the impact of Europeanization? Under what conditions does the impact of Europeanization make SNAs mobilize across the EU arena?

In agreement with the questions listed above, the research has employed a number of analytical approaches, including Europeanization, multi-level governance and domestic politics. All of these approaches suit the theoretical background of the thesis, which is new institutionalism. After setting out these analytical approaches (Chapters 1 and 2), a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization was defined (Chapter 3) in order to comprehend the issue from the structural changes in the governance system of Turkey to the involvement of subnational administrations to the EU multi-level polity. This involvement has been described as four stages of subnational mobilisation: growing awareness; changes in organizational arrangements; transnational activities through horizontal links; and vertical mobilisation (Chapter 4). To illustrate the different mechanisms that have been involved within every stage of mobilisation, the research found the distinction between two generations of Europeanization reasonably valuable. Whereas the first two stages of subnational mobilization come close to the first generation Europeanization, the last two stages are evaluated within the second generation Europeanization (see Table 1.1.).

The thesis has built upon four distinctive methodological approaches, document analysis, cross-sectional survey, extensive interviews at three different administrative levels and case studies of three cities in Turkey (see Chapter 3). Alongside the domestic context of Turkish SNAs (Chapter 5), the empirical analysis of the research has consisted of four parts: the first part dealt with the formal implications of EU regional policy and its related financial incentives on the Turkish governance system, at both national and subnational level (Chapter 6); the second part explored the overall changes at subnational level (comparing both municipalities and regional development agencies) in relation to the first two stages of subnational mobilisation, growing awareness and changes in organizational arrangements (Chapter 7); the third part built on exploring the overall transnational and vertical activities of Turkish SNAs, which form the last two stages of subnational mobilisation (Chapter 8); and the final part focused specifically on the situations in three cities in order to explain the extent to which intermediating factors at subnational level affect the behaviour of SNAs in their engagement with the EU matters by considering the four stages of subnational mobilisation (Chapter 9).

The main finding of the research has been consistent with those scholars who put more emphasis on subnational dynamics rather than national and EU contexts. This finding also supports the idea that the top-down understanding of Europeanization and the MLG approach should be weighted with intra-state dynamics in order to explain the empirical reality. To illustrate this in more detail, the remainder of this conclusion begins with an assessment of the empirical findings, in line with the research questions, and then continues by developing a broader analysis. The chapter ends by explaining the main contribution of the thesis to the literature and how its findings might inform future studies.

## EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research has studied the direct and indirect effects of Europeanization in territorial relations in Turkey since the announcement of its candidate status in 1999. The direct and indirect realms of Europeanization have impinged on cultural, political and economic dimensions at the subnational level. As a result, SNAs have emerged as agents of Europeanization as well as being transformed in the process of Europeanization itself. This was the analytical basis that guided this research to explore how these processes have occurred at the domestic level, what the changes were suggesting a shift towards a multi-level modality and under what conditions one may observe such mobilisation across the EU arena. A full discussion of the Europeanization of Turkish regional policy was beyond the scope of the thesis because the main focus was on the effect of the structural funds (i.e. pre-accession funds 2000-2006 and 2007-2013) on subnational mobilisation and the change in the gatekeeping role of Turkish national governments. In other words, the main empirical boundary was on the vertical dimension of the multi-level governance approach.

The vertical dimension has been discerned as changes *within* and *beyond* the national setting. Both changes have been explained throughout the research by making specific references to the direct and indirect effects of Europeanization. While the direct effects are prominent in the adoption of the NUTS system, in the creation of RDAs and in the involvement of SNAs in the EU fund management system (Chapter 6), the indirect effects, are not as straightforward as the EU only provides passive leverage in terms of creating opportunity structures (e.g. access points and receptiveness for the SNAs’ claims) and platforms for voluntary mechanisms (e.g. learning, lesson-drawing and sharing best practices). This leverage should be supplemented with the organizational capacity of a given SNA and its entrenched subnational context (Chapter 7).

The direct effect is usually evaluated within the context of EU conditionality and it is generally related to the policy and polity dimensions of Europeanization. Within these dimensions, given its asymmetric power, the EU has set the rules governing its structural fund policies and played an active role in creating conditions that could improve the chances of participating regional and national players to successfully play a role in the framework of the structural fund programs. The progress reports since 2001 have entailed Turkey to strengthen its governance structures for managing regional development, both at central and regional levels in order for better territorial management. Considering its strong centralist tradition, the lack of an intermediate level and the high-level of interregional disparities, those demands constituted a major misfit between EU standards and that of Turkey, which caused strong adaptational pressure.

This pressure has subsequently been aggravated by the close observation of the EU Commission through its progress reports. This systematic observation provided a clear indication of the top-down direct effect of Europeanization. In consequence of the EU’s assessment, the adaptational pressure stemming from the EU level has triggered the legislative and institutional compliance in the years just after the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Adoption of the NUTS system in 2002 seemed to be a response to the EU’s demand resulting in a policy convergence between Turkey and the EU standards. Furthermore, the Preliminary National Development Programme of 2003 clearly reaffirmed that the responsibilities are to be shared between different institutions at central and regional level (pNDP, 2003). The steps towards regionalization in line with EU conditionality eventually followed with the creation of two pilot RDAs in 2006. Twenty-six RDAs have been operating in Turkey, though the majority of them are currently at the formative stage of institutionalization and they need time to learn how to engage with EU politics. All these changes at subnational level brought convergence between the regional policy of the EU and of Turkey, which was an early sign of the Europeanization of Turkish SNAs. This also underlined a trend towards the creation of a multi-level governance structure in Turkey.

Changes in Turkish regional policy and polity were causally related to EU level developments because of the Commission’s close observation. This causality was also clear in the harmonization of the Turkish administrative system into the EU context evoking direct expectations as regards the future of intergovernmental relations and regionalization. Even though some sceptics may claim that this is a process of disintegration of the Turkish administrative system, nevertheless, from the bottom-up perspective (i.e. examining the causes of effects), the empirical evidence of the research has demonstrated that the reality is more multifaceted than political theorists have predicted for three interrelated reasons.

First of all, the research has emphasized the importance of temporality in terms of timing and tempo of the Europeanization process. This was largely neglected in previous studies and therefore the research aimed to contribute to the extant literature by offering a periodization (discussed below). As shown throughout the thesis, the impact of Europeanization in the Turkish domestic context has changed over the course of time, which was presented as three different periods: *Europeanization as Democratization, Proto-Europeanization* and *Alaturka Europeanization*. For the case of regional and structural fund policies, the second and third periods were specifically highlighted because important changes within the vertical dimension of multi-level governance have occurred within these periods. During the proto-Europeanization period, the acceptance of pre-existing regional policy failure, the stance of the ruling party towards decentralization and regionalization and learning among bureaucrats were the main national mediating factors. It has also became clear that a process of change in the Turkish administrative system has been driven by other endogenous factors (IMF, OECD and World Bank) such as their precise form and timing being closely linked with the launch of Turkey’s accession process. In this respect, the research has claimed that not only the EU but also other external and internal factors have played a role in the timing and tempo of the regionalization process in the country.

Secondly, for the creation of RDAs and allocation of the EU monies, the research has found that the top-down understanding of the EU impact is rather ambiguous and ill-defined. The progress reports did not indicate any model but suggested an operational body at subnational level to allocate the EU funds. This had offered Ankara great flexibility to implement its own model in line with the country’s tradition. Furthermore, it has brought about a limited and differentiated impact on intergovernmental relations in Turkey. As for EU fund management, national actors have been at the centre of formulating and implementing the pre-accession funds. Through the re-centralization of financial incentives with the IPA, this has reinforced the central role at the interface between subnational level and the European level (see Table 6.1 for the distribution of EU funds in Turkey). This has evidently illustrated the importance of the gatekeeping role exerted by the national authorities and therefore the re-centralization of power narratives has offered more credit to the scholars of intergovernmentalism than those of MLG.

Finally, the creation of RDAs has coincided with the low credibility of the EU and the centralization of EU financial incentives, which were evaluated within the Alaturka Europeanization period. In the absence of adaptational pressure, it was difficult to observe the changes that derived from the ‘goodness of fit’ perspective. The finding has correspondingly suggested that while the EU’s regional policy, in the sense of the implementation of regional policies and management of structural funds, has shifted towards the more centralized model in the post-Lisbon era, developments in these areas in Turkey have gone in opposite directions; more accurately, through a more decentralized model. Regarding decentralization in terms of subnational participation in the regional policy-making process as well as in the management of distribution of national funds, Turkish SNAs have gained important access to the policy-making process in regards to the allocation of national funds and preparation of regional plans. These were not possible before the creation of RDAs. These changes in the logic of Turkish regional policy, however, reflect the pre-Lisbon practices of EU regional policy and structural funds. This underlines a thick learning resulting from the dissemination of EU practices and policies and suggests that there is a trend towards the creation of multi-level governance in Turkey that is characteristic of Type II MLG rather than Type I (see Chapter 6).

While the purpose of this research is not specifically to assess the general implications of regionalization or decentralization, a meaningful regionalization is essential for subnational mobilisation. The extant literature has paid attention to the creation of formal structural fund partnerships (see Chapter 6), but the emergence of RDAs should not be neglected. RDAs now exist in 26 NUTS II regions in Turkey, though they emerged as top-down initiatives and have a bureaucratic design. In this respect, the research has argued that the establishment of RDAs is an obvious piece of the subnational mobilisation process. The very creation of RDAs and their participation in interregional organizations (e.g. EURADA) in Brussels are a quintessential example of how Europeanization may affect the institutions of candidate states. While the former fits with the formal institutional change, the latter suggests the informal effect of Europeanization.

By exploring the potential value of the RDAs as organizing interests on a subnational level, the research has helped to understand the likely outcomes of a broader trend of regionalization in Turkey. The major challenge for RDAs is that with a little legal protection in the Turkish Constitution, it is easy for national government to shift the balance of power between itself and the RDAs. Therefore, the future trajectory of RDAs is ultimately in the hands of national government. However, what RDAs offer is to mediate the competing claims of top-down policies of national government and the bottom-up claims of localities. This is a feature of the ‘region as arena’ (or MLG Type II) (see Chapter 2). Yet there had been a lack of cooperation at subnational level before the creation of RDAs. Collaboration and joint action only seemed to be possible when incentivized, such as in the form of EU monies, or coerced through government policies and directives, or where there was a pre-existing territorial network. Otherwise, the issues of competitiveness and overlapping local agendas between and within cities are highly noticeable (see Chapter 6 for regionalism versus provincialism). Such conditions are particularly the case with polycentric regions, which consist of various different cities. Consequently, although it is premature to predict the extent to which those RDAs (in the form of regions as actors) will articulate the regional interests towards the EU arena, the research has argued that their success largely depends on the subnational contexts within which they are embedded. For instance, those RDAs having a tradition of pre-existing territorial networks, such as Izmir and Middle Black Sea Development Agencies, have rapidly completed their institutionalization process and articulated the regional interests outside the national setting (see Chapter 9).

Taking all the above discussions together, an evaluation of the decentralizing and regionalizing impact of the EU accession process in Turkey depends on whether the researcher prefers to see the glass as half-empty or half-full. Realist explanations would undoubtedly emphasize the proven ability of the national governments to reassert central power. Others may point out the pluralistic effect of EU financial incentives that has the potential to influence territorial relations in Turkey. Consequently, an ultimate judgment would be premature. A centralized reading of Turkey needs to be qualified because there are important elements of multi-level governance manifest in several policy networks. Moreover, while one is able to reach conclusions about the impact of EU regional policy on the intergovernmental relations in Turkey thus far, one also enters the caveat that the changes are recent and thus their long-term significance remains uncertain. Yet what the research has found is that the subnational impact of EU regional policy and its related financial incentives remain uneven and differentiated on the actors’ preferences, attitudes and capacities. In this respect, the question of how the EU affects SNAs’ mobilisation should be supplemented with other questions, such as what has changed at subnational level to demonstrate SNAs’ response to the impact of Europeanization and under what conditions does the impact of Europeanization make SNAs mobilize across the EU arena? In doing so, changes at subnational level can reveal the direct and indirect effect of Europeanization on the behaviour of Turkish SNAs.

**Assessment of Four Stages of Subnational Mobilisation among Turkish SNAs**

The discussion up to this point has demonstrated that the EU has had a direct impact on both the policy and polity dimensions of Turkish regional policy. Adaptation to the EU’s regional policy is, however, one of those areas where Europeanization not only affects the domestic system of intergovernmental relations; it also creates new opportunity structures and a new political space for political action and territorial interests of SNAs beyond the national level. In this respect, a litmus test of the Europeanization and multi-level governance theses is whether local and regional authorities have mobilized towards Brussels and have provided policy inputs to the EU politics. It is for this reason the research has defined the Europeanization of territorial organizations as *redirection and reorientation of SNAs’ activities, not only towards national institutions but also towards supranational institutions, politics and/or the policy-making process.*

Unlike the SNAs from the EU member states, those SNAs from Turkey are not in a position to input into the EU multi-level modality due to the candidacy status of the country. What they can do is participate in the EU’s fund management together with national and supranational institutions. Particularly, since the centralization of the fund management with IPA (see Chapters 4 and 6), the EU has not offered any institutional framework for Turkish SNAs to be involved with the EU multi-level polity (except for the Sectoral Monitoring Committee). However, within the Sectoral Monitoring Committee, central institutions have played a strong gatekeeping role as they chair the Committee. For this reason, a more likely way for Turkish SNAs is to mobilize towards national institutions in Ankara rather than to have a presence in and around Brussels. This is because Turkish SNAs can only apply to the EU funds through accredited national institutions (i.e. the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Industry and Technology) in the current situation. Another limitation in this respect is the accreditation problem of Turkish RDAs (see Chapter 8). Without being accredited as an operational body for EU funds, there is no way to develop the creation of a direct relationship with the EU institutions and therefore it is not possible to illustrate the formal establishment of a multi-level governance system in Turkey.

Although the EU funds are the main motive behind the creation of opportunity structures for SNAs’ involvement in the EU multi-level polity, the research has defined the opportunity structure in a broader sense including access points to the EU institutions and their receptiveness of SNAs’ claims (see Chapter 1). This has generally been underemphasized in the subnational mobilization literature to date. The exploitation of the opportunity structure, however, must come from the SNA itself. Such appreciation led us to take a pragmatic approach to reveal the shift towards the engagement with the EU multi-level polity in four stages: growing awareness, changes in organizational arrangements, transnational relations and vertical mobilisation. The concept of four stages for subnational mobilization was adapted by the ladder model for Europeanization of governance of Peter John (2001) (see Chapter 4). The ladder model simply divides the steps into stages that reflect the degree of choice SNAs have over their activities. The more action the SNAs undertake, the greater the interplay with European ideas and practices and the higher they ascend ladder (Figure 4.1, Chapter 4). Consistent with the ladder metaphor, analysing each stage has presented answers to the question of what has changed at subnational level to reveal subnational engagement with the EU multi-level polity. A full account of changes at subnational level was documented throughout the empirical chapters (Chapters 7, 8 and 9). A number of findings from this discussion need to be emphasized here.

Growing awareness among SNAs is usually overlooked in the extant literature[[191]](#footnote-191). Yet this research found that it is preliminary elements for a shift towards the multi-level polity because the EU funds provided the initial attachment with the Europeanization process at subnational level. Through engaging with EU funds and development programs, the majority of SNAs for the first time encountered EU standards, policies and norms in terms of partnership, accountability, programming and traceability. While these EU activities were in high-profile cities before the Helsinki Summit, with the EU fund programs (2004-2006 and IPA), these activities have been extended to the lower profile local and regional arenas that are eligible for the pre-accession funds.

Although EU financial incentives have no strong pull effect for Turkish SNAs to mobilize across the EU arena, these have brought about a number of organizational changes in several Turkish cities. More concretely, the outcomes of the EU projects in these areas are the increasing project generation capacity and the culture of partnership. The majority of SNAs have also made organizational changes by employing staff, creating EU offices and disseminating EU procedures and policies inside their respective organizations. However, in comparison with many of their European counterparts (particularly from the EU-15 context), Turkish SNAs are not well organized, are poorly staffed and are only moderately committed to EU activity. The majority of them have a small EU team including one staff or two dealing with project calls or informing others about the EU opportunities. This may be enough for taking some steps on the ladder but not enough to shift towards a fully Europeanized level as in the case of the third and fourth steps.

In terms of general activity and of collecting information, SNAs are more likely to be passive or reactive rather than proactive. They largely depend on official sources or government departments for information. This is a case of the top-down effect of Europeanization rather than a bottom-up response to exploit EU opportunities. The foremost reason is that national institutions have long monopolized the formal relations with European institutions, while SNAs have been largely excluded from such opportunities. Interview participants also spell out the following issues, which were commonly considered obstacles for SNAs from being fully involved in EU matters: lack of finance and human resources; leadership; sufficient information; and coordination and language skills. Because of such problems, only some SNAs (such as those from Izmir and Samsun) are active on the European stage in terms of networking and partnership. This supports the notion of MLG being ‘pluralist with an elitist bias’ (Hooghe, 1995).

The volume of EU work at subnational level has recently increased but the majority of SNAs have still found themselves on the EU learning curve. This is usually a case of thin learning (instrumental logic) as many SNAs only wish to benefit from EU funds. If this holds true, given the Europeanization literature in general, it seems that the rational institutionalist camp (resource dependency approaches) offers the best explanation. This is mainly because a large number of SNAs have an instrumental logic for exploiting EU funding opportunities and therefore changes in organizational arrangements have remained at the margins. However, this research considers that learning is not always based on strategic calculations or instrumental choices but may also result from thick learning (logic of appropriateness or normative rationality).

Thick learning differs from thin learning (instrumental logic) in that actors also try to do the right or appropriate thing rather than maximising or optimising their given utilities (see also, Börzel & Risse, 2009). For instance, SNAs learn to internalize the new norms or rules of EU politics because they come to share these norms and/or values, This is because they believe it to be the right way to act, not because there will be a reward such as ‘acceptance, money or EU membership’. That is, to be a ‘modern’ or ‘European’ municipality or RDA, you should act in certain ways (see Chapter 7 and 8). Another example of this is also clearly seen in some participants’ drawing of a distinction between reaching EU standards and becoming EU members (see Chapter 7). However, thick learning generally occurs incrementally among those experts involved in any EU-related activities. Although their numbers are small in the respective SNAs, they have been voluntarily transferring knowledge derived from the EU project culture to other national and international projects. This spillover effect suggests a deeper transformation and deeper learning. In other words, those experts have learnt how to implement and conduct EU projects and therefore the logics of EU programmes have been taken into SNAs’ own practices. This illustrates how Europeanization has shaped the organizational logics of several SNAs (see Chapter 7).

The low credibility of EU membership has also caused many SNAs to feel that they are not part of EU politics and therefore they reverted back to their earlier position (passive or counteractive). This underlines the idea that the adaptation of several SNAs to the Europeanization process is often tactical and symbolic. However, recent years have shown that EU activities are also able to bring about ideational change for Turkish SNAs. This is because a number of SNAs showed their interest in the process of Europeanization, although there is no prospect of membership for Turkey. This led them to treat the EU as a system of standards that their respective organization must reach. This is a rather different finding from the first generation of Europeanization as the SNAs’ action proves the bottom-up initiative and voluntary mechanisms rather than top-down influence. Those SNAs that are involved the EU politics are usually well organized (such as Izmir and Middle Black Sea Development Agencies) and they seek to exchange information and learn best practices.

Related to the above point, the findings suggest that engagement in EU matters has provided a number of SNAs with unprecedented access to new sources of information, legitimacy, financial gains, and not least, non-material benefits in terms of ideational spheres. From the loose ‘sister city’ link to establishing a liaison office in Brussels, SNAs have sought to exploit the EU benefits depending on their organizational capacity and the vision of their leaders. However, this largely depends on the particular SNA’s willingness to continue their transnational partnerships. In many cases, these partnerships become obsolete after the finalization of certain EU programs. This hinders the learning process and brings about discontinuity in terms of Europeanization at subnational level.

For the last two stages of subnational mobilisation, the research found that a number of SNAs have started to mobilize across the EU arena through the horizontal and vertical channels during the Alaturka Europeanization period. The research claimed that such mobilisation has taken place not because of the pull effect of the EU but because of bottom-up and voluntary mechanisms. Therefore, it has become clear from the experiences of some Turkish SNAs that they are moving from the first generation to the second generation of Europeanization. Overall, engagement with the horizontal and vertical channels may drive SNAs to the wider EU politics and lead them to filter down the principles of multi-level governance such as partnership, programming and subsidiarity to their respective regions or cities. As reflected from the interview findings, networking in the EU arena brings SNAs closer to European level discussions whereby they can achieve their interests (Chapter 8).

As long as the EU accession process proceeds and there is a strong indication for Turkish membership, several SNAs will be provided with more opportunities to articulate their interests in the EU multi-level system. This confirms the importance of the credibility of EU membership. For instance, in comparison with the situation in the Alaturka Europeanization, SNAs during the proto-Europeanization period were pulled towards the EU arena. However, by the Alaturka Europeanization period, although there was a slim chance of exploiting EU opportunities, there seemed to be a bottom-up endeavour coming from some strong SNAs in terms of organizational capacity and leaders.

Instead of supporting the idea of a Europe of the Regions (Loughlin, 1996), the research findings have confirmed the ‘Europe of some Regions’ thesis (Marks *et al.*, 1996) (see Chapter 4). This is because the adaptation to the Europeanization process at subnational level varies among Turkish SNAs. The research has therefore found that there is a differentiated adaptation rhythm to the process of Europeanization. Some SNAs, especially the more developed ones in terms of finance, human resources, and political leadership, take good advantage of the EU opportunities and have broad concerns, i.e. trading city brand and competing internationally. On the other hand, some other SNAs are usually concerned with infrastructure matters and their investments in the EU remain concentrated on such basic needs. Although many SNAs are aware of the importance of the role of EU related activities, for them, the reasons why their organizations are not able to conduct any activities are related to financial and organizational limitations (experts, coordination and political leadership).

In appreciating the differential impact of Europeanization on Turkish SNAs, the research has employed a four-fold typology of SNAs - counteractive, passive, reactive and proactive – that were developed by Goldsmith and Klausen (1997) (see Chapters 4 and 7). Whereas counteractive and passive SNAs are usually inactive for the general Europeanization trend, proactive SNAs (though small in number) actively seek to exploit the opportunities that originate from this trend. Even in some cases, those proactive SNAs have made substantial changes in terms of organizational arrangements and their EU activities outside the national setting. Between these two extreme groups, there are a large number of reactive SNAs that have been trying to follow what the proactive SNAs are doing in terms of exploiting the opportunities presented by the process of Europeanization. The research, however, asserted the idea that all these variations in the level of subnational mobilisation cannot be reduced to the organizational capacity or explained by economic determinism alone. Social, political and cultural differences within which SNAs locate must also be taken into account. This was the main reason for zooming in on the subnational level and conducting in-depth case study analysis in order to examine how their embedded subnational setting mediates the mobilisation of SNAs across the EU arena.

**Zooming in on the Subnational Context**

Through the process of Europeanization, new opportunity structures have been opened for Turkish SNAs. However, the domestic context has largely mediated the direct and indirect effects of Europeanization. More particularly, national and subnational contexts have exerted significant mediating factors on the issue of subnational mobilisation. Having similar conditions to those unitary states of the EU, the research has demonstrated that the territorial and institutional context as well as the historical legacy and political cultures do not provide fertile ground for the shift towards a multi-level modality in Turkey. Unlike the federal and decentralized states in the EU, Turkey was not able to deal with the spatial externalities of European integration through the political representation of subnational interests. It is evident that national conditions are not supportive for the interest representations of SNAs outside the national setting. Given that the national context applies homogenously to all SNAs in the country, the research has asserted that it is vital to zoom in on the subnational context which may drive some SNAs towards the EU arena and cause them to take more advantage of the EU opportunities.

At the outset, the research included a number of potential intermediating factors at subnational level in order to select the sample cities for in-depth analysis. These factors include the level of socio-economic development, eligibility for EU funds, geographical location, regional distinctiveness[[192]](#footnote-192), the quality of intergovernmental relations and the existence of a territorial network (see Map 3.1, Table 3.4, Chapter 3). Considering these factors, the research identified three different cities, Samsun, Diyarbakir and Izmir for the in-depth case study research. These cities have several similarities as well as differences (see Chapters 3 and 9). Special attention, however, has been paid to variation among SNAs in these cities in order to analyze what kinds of potential intermediating factors at subnational level have an impact on subnational mobilisation. Although the aforesaid factors, albeit in varying degrees, played a significant role in other national contexts (see Chapters 2 and 4), this research found some of them (e.g., socio-economic development, eligibility and geography) are negligible for this research. The research has therefore focused closely on three potential intermediating factors: regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relations and the pre-existing territorial network. While the pre-existing territorial network and the quality of intergovernmental relations have stimulated the efforts of SNAs towards the EU arena, regional distinctiveness has had a negative impact on the issue of subnational mobilisation (see Chapter 9). Let us briefly summarize the potential effects of these six intermediating factors at subnational level.

In terms of socio-economic development level, some scholars[[193]](#footnote-193) have accepted that better resourced arenas in terms of financial and professional competencies have been involved in the EU multi-level polity more than less well-resourced subnational arenas. However, the research has found that the relatively less developed cities, such as Uşak, Kahramanmaraş, Urfa, Kırşehir and Samsun, have been involved more in EU politics through horizontal and vertical channels than some of those resourcefully more developed cities. More specifically, two case cities, Izmir and Samsun, have different socio-economic development ranking but RDAs from these cities have been actively involved in the executive board of the European Association of Development Agencies (EURADA) (see Chapter 9). As a result, the research considered that socio-economic development level is not sufficient to explain the variation among Turkish SNAs’ engagement with the EU multi-level polity.

As for the eligibility for the EU funds, the main research claim was that the EU financial incentives are the main motivation for the initial attachment with the Europeanization process at subnational level. True, it was the major driving force behind the growing awareness about EU politics and changes in organizational arrangements at subnational level. However, it neither provided institutionalized channels in Brussels nor increased the power of SNAs in Turkey. More importantly, with the centralization of pre-accession funds, it even changed the direction of mobilisation towards Ankara rather than Brussels (see Chapter 6). The findings also suggested that those regions which implemented the most EU projects in their respective cities such as Konya, Kayseri and Van are not the most proactive SNAs to have mobilized across the EU arena.

Geographical location has rather different mediating effects on the behaviour of SNAs for two reasons: geographical proximity and regional economic dependence. For the former case, those SNAs sharing a border with the EU member states (Bulgaria and Greece) have usually opted for cross-border cooperation but they are not active enough to exploit the EU opportunities in Brussels. For instance, Samsun, Gaziantep, Bursa and Yalova do not share border with EU member states but SNAs from those cities have already engaged in a number of activities in Brussels. In this respect, geographical proximity does not translate into full Europeanization (see Chapter 8). The latter is closely related to the changing dynamics of Turkish foreign policy towards its neighbour countries[[194]](#footnote-194). Particularly, with the shift in Turkish foreign policy (the so-called ‘zero-problem’ with neighbour countries, see Chapter 6), several SNAs have participated in a number of activities with their opposite numbers in those neighbour countries during the Alaturka Europeanization period. The research has argued that geography has changed the direction of mobilisation and presented alternative routes for SNAs where there is an economic motivation prominent. The evidence for this argument is particularly clear for Samsun and Diyarbakir (see Chapter 9). However, when it comes to learning best practices, sharing information regarding the recent regulations, networking and cultural activities, SNAs usually turn towards the EU arena (see Chapter 8). The obvious reason is that the EU has become an arena for dissemination of best practices in terms of urban-specific issues such as waste management, housing, transportation or sustainable development. More concretely, during the initial years of RDAs, the local and regional leaders visited their equivalents in the EU arena rather than in the Middle East or Russia in order for the institutional preparations for the establishment of RDAs in their respective regions.

Regional distinctiveness, which is facilitated by the existence of ethnic historical, linguistic or religious ties distinguishing a local community, was one of the most challenging tasks in order to detect its intermediating effect on subnational mobilization. The obvious reason is that the issue of regional distinctiveness of some regions (e.g., southeast part of Turkey where the Kurds mostly live in) has gone hand in hand with the security concern of the country throughout the history. The most visible resistance to the shift towards a multi-level modality was in fact caused by fears of fragmentation and nationhood insecurity (i.e. Sevres Syndrome, see Chapter 5). This has not surprisingly shown itself as compliance on the surface, but resistance below, like playing hide and seek. It has clearly manifested itself during the creation of regional development agencies in Turkey and the interplay between certain SNAs and the EU institutions (particularly during the creation of Joint Consultative Committee in the CoR). Because of this insecurity in Turkish political life, the regional distinctive character of Diyarbakir has had negative outcomes for the mobilisation of SNAs across the EU arena. Moreover, visits from the EU level to the city have sometimes been obstructed by the national authorities (as in the case of CoR’s working group meeting, see Chapters 8 and 9). This caused those SNAs in the city to remain at the first two stages of subnational mobilisation, which is considered the first generation of Europeanization (see Chapter 9).

As for the quality of intergovernmental relations, it has different outcomes depending on the political orientation of the given municipality. This has its roots in the legacy of history. Starting from the late Ottoman Era, the resource dependency of SNAs has remained extremely path dependent (see Chapter 5). Apart from some exceptional situations, municipalities as the only elected and institutionalized actor at the subnational level have not posed much of a challenge from below to centralized political power. Because of the statist tradition, all societal actors have organized their activities at the national level. This sort of interest mediation of SNAs in Turkey constituted a great misfit with the EU model. However, the receptiveness of several EU institutions for the claims of SNAs has recently fuelled the enthusiasm of several opposition municipalities, whose behaviour is contrasting sharply with that of the national government. The finding suggests that a number of opposition municipalities (either organized like SODEM or unorganized like Antalya and Izmir Metropolitan Municipalities) have interacted with the EU institutions (see Chapter 8). True, the national government has not been an effective gatekeeper in the traditional sense (i.e. preventing the access points), but it holds ‘flexible gatekeeping’ (Bache, 1996) at its disposal when SNAs gain the funds or support from the EU institutions (see Chapters 7 and 9). Accordingly, the presence of SNAs in Brussels and their relations with the EU institutions are clear examples for growing interaction between subnational and supranational level. However, there was no indication that what SNAs obtained from Brussels was implemented at the domestic level. This was shown in the case of Izmir and Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipalities. However, the majority of SNAs prefer to act together with the national institutions in their dealings with the EU matters. This reflects the importance of the coordination of SNAs with Ankara and of the ‘speaking with one voice’ tradition in the outside world (see Chapter 5). Such coordination has better rewards than competitive and conflictual strategies. This certainly contradicts the supranationalist approach but comes close to the intergovernmentalist claims.

Finally, the relative strength of the pre-existing territorial network has been evidently seen for the cases of Izmir and Middle Black Sea Development Agencies. The research has found that those SNAs having an existing territorial network along with sufficient organizational capacity and leadership have mobilized better than any other SNAs. The cases of Izmir and Middle Black Sea Development Agencies have illustrated that their success in engaging with the EU politics have largely derived from the pre-existing territorial network (see Chapter 9). These networks have not only provided considerable institutional memory (by learning from the past) but they have also provided a wide range of networking in the EU arena.

Overall, considering all six intermediating factors at subnational level, the research has argued that while the pre-existing territorial network has a positive outcome, the regional distinctiveness has a negative effect on subnational mobilisation. With regard to the quality of intergovernmental relations, three different strategies have been followed by the municipalities: cooperative (Samsun), competitive (Izmir) and conflictual (Diyarbakir). As for the factor of socio-economic development and eligibility, the research has found no clear implications of this on the level of subnational mobilization. However, the geographical location has changed the direction of subnational mobilization because of Turkey’s changing foreign policy dynamics.

**General Conclusions**

The overall conclusion of this research is that there has been a clear increase in EU activities of Turkish SNAs after the Helsinki Summit of 1999. The findings have supported the idea that the process of Europeanization at subnational level has altered the preferences, practices and policies of municipalities and regional development agencies. All these activities have revealed that there has been a general trend of Europeanization in Turkish SNAs. This ranges from a growing awareness in the EU matters and changes in organizational arrangements to mobilisation across horizontal and vertical channels. These are also features of multi-level governance. A number of Turkish SNAs have gained new space for political manoeuvre because the process of Europeanization in the country not only provides multiple access points but also EU institutions are receptive to SNAs’ claims or interests. In this respect, not only has a top-down process been evident during the Europeanization of SNAs in Turkey, but also a horizontal and to some extent bottom-up process, signalling a shift from the first to the second generation of Europeanization.

What conclusions can be drawn in relation to a shift towards multi-level modality in Turkey? The present situation is undoubtedly too complex to observe or to determine the precise orientations. To begin with, the empirical findings have suggested that the mobilisation of Turkish SNAs has achieved modest success in shifting towards the EU’s multi-level modality. This shift, however, has mainly derived from the success of SNAs’ organizational capacity, which has largely been mediated by subnational factors: regional distinctiveness, the quality of intergovernmental relationships and the pre-existing territorial network. Secondly, the empirical findings of the research are more useful for the resource dependency approaches of Europeanization, namely intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance. The intergovernmentalist approach is correct in its assertion of national government as an important gatekeeper. MLG scholars are also surely right to claim that there are multiple access points for SNAs to be involved in the EU polity. A number of Turkish SNAs have utilized these opportunities as some of the EU institutions are welcoming to the inputs coming from them. There seems to be no space for the supranationalist argument that expects that SNAs from the unitary states become stronger vis-à-vis national constraints. However, the finding suggests that the relationship between SNAs and supranational institutions neither weakens central power nor puts impact on Ankara to shift its focus from centralization to more decentralization. For the intergovernmentalist and multi-level explanations, there is also evidence on the issue of state by-passing. While some SNAs closely associated with the national government employ more cooperative strategies towards central institutions in their engagement with the EU, some SNAs which are close to the opposition parties use non-cooperative strategies (sometimes competitive as in the case of Izmir and at other times conflictual as in the case of Diyarbakir). The cooperative strategy has better pay off as the intergovernmentalists suggested (see Chapter 9).

Finally, although several SNAs have entered the multi-level game either by passing the state, or cooperating or confronting with it, it is not correct to claim that the national government’s power has been declining. The research was not interested in explaining the zero-sum nature of integration theories (whether states are losers or winners). It rather focused on how (and under what conditions) the Europeanization process changes the behaviour of SNAs in Turkey and caused them to mobilize across the EU arena. The research argues that the winner of this game was some selected SNAs because of their strong organizational capacity and favourable subnational conditions. In this regard, while SNAs from Izmir and Samsun with solid experience, organizational capacity, and entrepreneurial leaders can take up the matter and they have no excuse to stay outside the EU’s multi-level polity, those SNAs from Diyarbakir have a number of obstacles to mobilize across the EU arena. This clearly suggests that the devil is in the subnational details rather than the national and EU levels.

## CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RESEARCH FIELD AND THE LIMITATIONS

This research has sought to contribute to both empirical and theoretical knowledge guided by research questions derived from the main theoretical frameworks: Europeanization, multi-level governance and domestic politics. The main contributions of this thesis are generally related to the study of Turkish politics and Turkey’s relationship with the EU, but also to previous research that has explored the interplay between EU regional policy and subnational mobilisation across the EU arena. In the extant literature, how the process of Europeanization has shaped subnational politics and promoted the creation of multi-level governance were largely studied within the EU-15 context and later within the new member states. Yet the situation of SNAs from incumbent candidate countries was largely overlooked. Scholars taking Turkey as an empirical case study have usually focused on the policy and polity impacts of Europeanization but neglected the politics dimension. Particularly for the case of municipalities and regional development agencies, there was no systematic and rigorous data about the manner in which they have adapted their habitual methods to exploit the EU opportunities in terms of using EU monies or interacting with the EU institutions. This research attempted to fill this gap by focusing empirically on the situations of Turkish SNAs on EU matters. However, the empirical study of this research not only describes, examines and explains the territorial changes in Turkey because of Europeanization but also presents some new insights on the mobilization of SNAs on the EU arena. In this respect, this research is the first study of its kind and it has generated considerable empirical data that contributes to knowledge about an important potential member state of the EU. More generally, it adds to knowledge about the Europeanization effects of states engaging with the EU pre-accession.

The research employed a combination of different methods that may inform other relevant studies in the literature. More importantly, mix method strategies have not yet been incorporated into the field of Turkish-EU relations. Therefore, taking a new methodological approach, the research conducted a much more comprehensive approach in terms of its methodology and theoretical assessment to examine the formal and informal effects of Europeanization than other existing research has done so far. This is a significant contribution because the research did not only rely upon institutional evidence of Europeanization of Turkish regional policy, such as the creation of regional development agencies, but also upon the perceptions of the actors involved as to changes which were occurring. This does not suggest that the perceptions of respondents, either in the survey or in the interviews, were accurate reflection of reality. However, the interview and survey participants provided original data which enabled a picture to emerge as to the form of Europeanization and multi-level governance that has been taking place in Turkey.

Using mixed methodological strategies and triangulating the qualitative and quantitative data in a systematic way are also essential to identify the limitations of each methodological technique. For instance, while the cross-sectional survey analysis has demonstrated the involvement of several SNAs in the EU multi-level polity, semi-structured interview and case study approaches have offered an in-depth analysis to understand why those SNAs engaged with the EU, what they want from this engagement and under what conditions Europeanization may bring about change in actors’ behaviour. Given the 79.4 per cent participation rate in the survey, the findings from the survey analysis are particularly important regarding the behaviour of Turkish SNAs on the EU matters because it was the first systematic effort to present the overall picture on the topic because of the limited research on this front. Likewise, conducting interviews at three different administrative levels was a crucial attempt in research projects on the EU activities of Turkish SNAs. As a result, this thesis has provided original and primary data that allow for a reasoned assessment of the current situations for the impact of Europeanization on Turkish SNAs.

Another main contribution of the thesis is that the way that it used the ladder metaphor of Peter John (2001) with the subnational mobilisation literature and it combined it with the discussion of Europeanization of SNAs in the EU. Although the ladder model for Europeanization of Governance is a valuable metaphor, this research has contributed new insights into its uses and limitations. First, it is important that the metaphor is used in a time-sensitive manner. This is because the research here indicates that the movement of SNAs on the ladder is not always progressive (i.e., towards greater Europeanization) but at times may be regressive when the activities of SNAs are less Europeanised depending on developments at the national and supranational level. Secondly, SNAs do not always follow the same pattern because they sometimes skip over steps on the ladder. For instance, without applying for EU funding or undertaking organizational changes, they may conduct horizontal or vertical activities in the EU arena. Furthermore, some SNAs may also move sideways within the same stage (e.g., using EU project office for different national and/or international fund calls). Accordingly, drawing insights from the ladder metaphor and developing it further, the research has contributed four stages of mobilisation—growing awareness, organizational changes, horizontal interactions and vertical mobilisation—to the subnational mobilization literature in order to make this framework more useful for other studies (for instance see Table 9.6 Chapter 9).

As for the theoretical discussion, Chapter One and Chapter Two performed two important functions. First, they provided us with a general overview of Europeanization, multi-level governance and domestic politics approaches. Second, these two chapters set out the more specific theoretical and conceptual terrain on which the bottom-up research design was employed (see Chapter 3). One of the major challenges for this research is to link the literature on Europeanization and MLG in the frame of a coherent and valuable analytical framework. Both literatures usually tend to analyze the subject matter in a top-down fashion. In this respect, the research has contributed to the theoretical understanding of our knowledge in two ways. It has first addressed how the impact of Europeanization causes domestic change, with different degrees of change depending on the potential domestic factors in favour or opposed to subnational mobilisation across the EU arena. In this respect, the research has confronted the top-down understanding of Europeanization and MLG approaches as they overestimate the effects of Europeanization on domestic arenas and underestimate the causal effects of domestic variables, which may not only mediate or facilitate change but directly cause or trigger it (e.g., push effect of organizational capacity and leadership). Accordingly, the research has utilized the domestic politics approach enabling us to focus closely on intra-state dynamics. In this way, the research has constructed a bottom-up research design, by selecting domestic intervening variables and treating them as potential independent and intermediating variables.

A bottom-up research design was supported by the models of Europeanization, multi-level governance and domestic politics approaches. Each approach has great merits in pointing out major elements of subnational mobilisation in the EU. But none of them controls for the other potentially important dimensions. Addressing this shortcoming, the research has sought to integrate them in a consistent explanation of SNA access to the EU institutions. Following the bottom-up research design, it is likely to consolidate, and when necessary, to modify our established understanding by integrating these approaches. The bottom-up research design is actor-centred and considers the actors’ situation in its own context. It is not as structural as the top-down research design, which is more dynamic in understanding the variations among the selected actors. Consequently, the bottom-up approach attests to the use of different casual logics and is regarded as a contribution to the extant literature. The research design employed in this research can also inform other studies within the framework of multi-level governance; not necessarily with regard to regional policy but also for other policy areas such as environment and transport.

Secondly, yet closely linked to the first point, the thesis identified the insufficient understanding of top-down Europeanization in general and conditionality in particular in applicant state literature, in relation to the changing behaviour of Turkish SNAs. These are necessary but not adequate to understand all the aspects of Europeanization impact on the subnational level when there is no adaptational pressure or strong membership credibility. More particularly, when there is no explicit model for the chosen subject area and when the national and subnational context rather than the top-down effect of Europeanization is important, employing a bottom-up perspective on Europeanization is also essential. The research therefore argued that Europeanization in Turkey has entered a new phase, which is defined as second generation in terms of mechanisms of Europeanization (i.e. more horizontal and bottom-up). The particular case for this shift can be found in the behaviour of Turkish SNAs. Distinguishing two research generations of Europeanization from each other, the research has sought to illustrate how the second generation of Europeanization is well-equipped to understand changes in the political dynamics by showing bottom-up and voluntary mechanisms. The research has also underlined the importance of temporality through periodization for the different time periods, Europeanization as Democratization, Proto-Europeanization and Alaturka Europeanization. Emphasizing the distinctions between first and second generation Europeanization research in this thesis and conceptualizing a periodization for temporal analysis, the research aimed to offer a new time-sensitive Europeanization framework for other empirical case studies in terms of Turkish-EU relations.

As a final note, however, there are certain limitations that one should acknowledge for future studies. Although some methodological limitations were presented in Chapter 3, it is important to delve further into this point, particularly for future studies. The research utilized a mixed-methods strategy including document analysis, cross-sectional survey, interviews and case studies of three cities. Employing such an eclectic approach in a single research study has a number of advantages because it permits openness to a variety of theoretical perspectives and approaches with no one methodology being seen as superior to all others (Burnham et al., 2008:29). Triangulation also increases the reliability and validity of the research. However, at the same time, there are caveats relating to each method.

First of all, the survey allowed a large amount of responses to be gathered in a cost-effective way. Its 79.4 % participation rate also implies a degree of validity and reliability. This made it easier to generalize findings across similar cases. However, survey analysis requires a high level of expertise and is not suitable for historical analysis (Buckingham & Sanders, 2004:44). Therefore, it was not well suited to carrying out exploratory work. Although the author aimed to include senior staff and experts in the survey, one cannot be certain about the survey participants’ expertise on the subject matter or about the seriousness with which they addressed survey questions. In practice, the statistics and figures derived from the cross-sectional survey did not reveal much about the content and scope of subnational mobilisation, but they did present some valuable descriptive information. To achieve a more in-depth, exploratory analysis, the survey was therefore complemented by semi-structured interviews at three different administrative levels.

The interview method is an effective and widely used research method of collecting information for several types of research questions in order to interrogate a number of assumptions. Yet, the major challenge is to obtain appropriate participants and to access their expertise and knowledge on the subject matter. There were various problems relating to this process during the field work, owing mainly to the limited time spent in each place. Additionally, timing of the fieldwork coincided with a period of low-level EU membership credibility. Therefore, it was sometimes difficult to collaborate in producing retrospective (and prospective) accounts or versions of interviewees’ past (or future) actions, experiences, feelings and thoughts. Some participants were also reticent about their experiences, especially where interviews were recorded. Although the interviewees were reminded that they could express confidential views or information, “off the record” some remained extremely cautious in their answers. This impedes retrieval of reliable information that should enable clear judgments, yet it is somewhat unavoidable given the controversial nature of the themes discussed.

As for the case study, there is an issue of generalizability because the scope of the research includes only three case cities. Given that there are 81 cities in Turkey, one may question the extent to which findings from this research can be applied in the rest of the cities. To overcome the problem of generalizability, the research chose different cities from Turkey to make the comparison possible, while deep differences in political, economic and social conditions within each city increased the likelihood of variation. However, the small N issue remains. In this respect, one could have considered the explanatory survey analysis apart from the descriptive survey analysis in order to test the potential independent and intermediating factors throughout the Large N.

There is also a further restriction due to the temporal scope of the research. This research covers the period from 1999 to 2012 but the fieldwork was completed at the end of 2011. Therefore, some of the developments at Turkey’s borders (e.g. with Syria) had to be excluded from the research because their prominent effects occurred after 2012. There is also another ongoing development between Turkey and the EU with regard to opening Chapter 22 (i.e., Regional Policy and Structural Funds). During the course of writing, this Chapter was frozen so there was no opportunity to consider the effects of this on subnational mobilization (see Chapters 6 and 7). The Syrian crisis is closely related to Turkey’s general foreign-policy orientation and to the behaviour of certain SNAs sharing a border with Syria, whereas the opening of Chapter 22 has a potential effect on the intergovernmental relations in the country. In this respect, the long term effects of the Syria crisis and the Chapter 22 should be taken into account by future studies (discussed below). There is also a limitation deriving from the geographical scale of Turkey, which is as large as Germany and France combined. Therefore, it is difficult -- if not impossible -- to conduct field research over a geographical area encompassing 81 provinces in 26 NUTS II regions for one single PhD thesis. Consequently, these caveats can be highlighted for the future studies regarding the impact of the Europeanization process in Turkish governance in general and territorial relations in particular.

## VENUES FOR FUTURE STUDIES

Having explained the contributions to existing research and the potential limitations in the course of the study, I would like to propose new research venues for the further investigation. In so far as our empirical knowledge is limited, my remarks concerning consequences for political practice and conclusions for the future research should be taken as preliminary. Although the findings of the research may not be likely to play out with exact similarity elsewhere, the case of Turkish SNAs seems to be a model which is worth considering in a comparative perspective for future studies. In this respect, the following suggestions for future studies should be considered as illustrative rather than exhaustive.

First of all, to extend the insights and explanations on the conditions under which subnational mobilization across the EU arena may occur, additional empirical research will be needed. More case cities or regions within Turkey or in other candidate (or potential candidate) states have to be analyzed in order to test the relevance of independent and intervening variables proposed in this thesis. It would be useful in furthering academic understanding to explore whether these independent and intervening variables play a similar role in different subnational and/or national settings.

Secondly, the majority of Turkish RDAs have not been accredited by the EU Commission as an operational body for EU funds. Once the accreditation process has been completed, the effect of Europeanization may intensify. As discussed, the national authorities have been the sole managing and operational bodies for the distribution of EU monies. If there is a prospect for RDAs to be involved in this process, this may create an institutional channel towards the EU institutions, particularly to the EU Commission. However, this necessitates waiting for the result of the 2014-2020 fund programs to see how they intensify the interaction between Turkish RDAs and the Commission. In this respect, one may make a clear judgement on the effect of EU monies on the mobilization of SNAs across the EU arena. Related to this point, the possibility of opening Chapter 22 may also have a further impact on Turkish SNAs. After Chapter 22 has opened, a number of SNAs which are currently in a passive mode may move back to EU matters in the foreseeable future. One should also emphasize that RDAs in Turkey have been recently created and they still need time to deepen their institutionalization process. Once they finish this process, they may become more actively engaged with the EU matters. This necessitates longitudinal research on Turkish RDAs’ engagement with the EU multi-level polity.

Thirdly, Turkish foreign policy has shifted its direction on a macro level. While Ankara has engaged more with its neighbouring countries and developed a regional cooperation and sphere of influence in its vicinity by using historical and cultural links (Renda, 2011), the euphoria of becoming a full member to the EU has faded away. Given that the majority of SNAs avoid following their own foreign activities without the consent of Ankara, one should be aware of this wider picture in exploring the future intergovernmental relationship in Turkey because the changing dynamics of Turkish foreign policy has affected the direction of subnational mobilisation towards the neighbour countries, while causing the process of de-Europeanization among certain (particularly passive and counteractive) SNAs. However, the recent crisis (e.g., Syria) around Turkish borders may again change the behaviour of Turkish SNAs in those regions as it prevents any kind of transnational activities between Turkish and Syrian cities which share a border. In this respect, changing Turkish foreign policy seems to be a central dimension for the behaviour of SNAs, which is often overlooked in studies of intergovernmental relations in Turkey. However, one cannot understand developments properly without some reference to the wider geopolitical and political-economic factors. By considering the macro politics of Turkey’s relation with the EU and the geostrategic position of Turkey, the important question arises as to how SNAs are affected directly or indirectly by changes in the wider political environment.

Finally, additional potential explanatory variables, both internal and external, may further our understandings for the issue of subnational mobilization. For instance, the advancement of technology and increasing interactive communication from the internet reduces the physical contact between SNAs and their counterparts and between SNAs and the EU institutions. However, it intensifies virtual interaction. To date, the subnational mobilisation literature has generally overlooked the influence of the internet on the interaction between SNAs and supranational levels. Accordingly, the questions of how the internet may contribute to Europeanization at subnational level, to what extent virtual interactions reduce or increase subnational mobilisation and whether the internet changes the form of subnational mobilisation are some questions that are worthy of further research.

The questions and issues listed raise new agendas for the study which would be ideally examined comparatively (through time and space). They would further deepen our understanding in a range of areas such as the general phenomenon of subnational mobilization in the EU arena and domestic institutional change towards the creation of multi-level governance in the context of EU integration and enlargement.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akarca, A. T. and Baslevent, C. (2011) ‘Persistence in Regional Voting Patterns in Turkey during a Period of Major Political Realignment’, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 18 (2): 184-202.

Aksoy, Ş., and Polatoğlu, A. (2003) ‘The Turkish Administrative System: Concepts and Issues’. In K. Tummala (ed.), *Comparative Bureauratic System,* New york: Lexington Books, pp. 435-460.

Allen, D. (2008) ‘Cohesion Policy Pre-and Post-Enlargement’, in M. Baun and D. Marek (eds.) *EU Cohesion Policy after Enlargement*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 15-33.

Altunışık, M. B. and Tür, Ö. (2005) *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change* London, New York: Routledge.

Amin, A. (1999) ‘An Institutional Perspective on Regional Economic Development’*, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 23 (2): 365-378.

Anderson, J. J. (1990), ‘Sceptical Reflections on a Europe of Regions: Britain, Germany and the ERDF’, *International Public Policy*, 10 (4): 417-447.

Anderson, J.J. (2003) ‘Europeanization in Context: Concept and Theory’, in K. Dyson and K.H. Goetz (eds.) *Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Armstrong, H.W. (1995) ‘the Role and Evolution of European Community Regional Policy’, in M. Keating and B. Jones (eds.), *The European Union and the Regions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23-62.

Aydın, M. and Esen, A. T. (2007) ‘A Concluding View from Turkey’, in N. Tocci (ed.), *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice*, IAI-TEPAV Report (9).

Bache, I. (1998) *the Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-Level Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping?*, Sheffield: UACES/Sheffield Academic Press.

Bache, I. (2008) *Europeanization and Multi-Level Governance: Cohesion Policy in the European Union and Britain*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher.

Bache, I. (2010) ‘Partnership as an EU Policy Instrument: A Political History’, *West European Politics*, 33 (1): 58-74.

Bache, I., George, S. And Rhodes, R.A.W (1996) ‘the European Union, Cohesion Policy, and Subnational Authorities in the UK’, in L. Hooghe (ed.) *Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 294-319.

Bache, I. & Flinders, M. (2004) *Multi-level Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bache, I. and Marshall, A. (2004) Europeanization and Domestic Change: A Governance Approach to Institutional Adaptation in Britain, *Queen’s Papers on Europeanization*, No. 5.

Bache, I. and Jordan, A. (eds.) (2006) *The Europeanization of British Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bache, I. and George, S. (2006) *Politics in the European Union*, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bache, I., Andreou, G., Atanasova, G., and Tomsic, D. (2011) ‘Europeanization and Multi Level Governance in South East Europe: the Domestic Impact of EU Cohesion Policy and Pre-Accession Aid’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18 (1): 122-141.

Bachtler, J. & McMaster, I. (2008) ‘EU Cohesion Policy and the Role of Regions: Investigating the Influence of Structural Funds in the New Member States’, *Environment and Planning: Government and Policy*, 26 (2): 398-427.

Bafoil, F. and Kaya, A. (2009) *Regional Development and the European Union: A Comparative Analysis of Karabuk, Valenciennes and Katowice*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari.

Bailey, D. & De Propris, L. (2002) ‘European Structural Funds, Regional Capabilities and Enlargement: Towards Multi-Level Governance?’, *Journal of European Integration*, 24 (4):303-24.

Bailey, D. & De Propis, L. (2004) ‘a Bridge to Phare? EU Pre-Accession Aid and Capacity Building in the Candidate Countries’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42 (1):77-98.

Balme, R., and LeGalés, P. (1997) ‘Stars and Black Holes: French Regions and Cities in the European Galaxy’, in M.J.F. Goldsmith and K.K. Klausen (eds.) *European Integration and Local Government*, Cheltenham: Edwards Elgar.

Baun, M. (2002) ‘EU Regional Policy and the Candidate States: Poland and Czech Republic, *Journal of European Integration*, 24 (3): 261-80.

Baun, M & Marek, D. (eds.) (2008) *EU Cohesion Policy after Enlargement*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Bauer, M. W., Börzel, T.A. (2010) ‘Regions and the European Union’, in H.Enderlein, S. Walti and M. Zurn (eds.), *Handbook on Multi-Level Governance*, Cheltham: Edward Elgar. Pp. 253-267.

Bayraktar, U. S. (2007) ‘Turkish municipalities: Reconsidering Local Democracy Beyond Administrative Autonomy’, *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, (available at http://www.ejtsorg.revues.org/document1103.html, accessed on 4th January, 2013).

Benz, A. and Eberlein, T. (1999) ‘the Europeanization of Regional Policies: Patterns of Multi-Level Governance’, *Journal of European Public Policy,* 6(2): 329-48.

Berg, B. L. (2007) *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 6th Edition, New York: Pearson Education.

Beyers, J. and Kerremans, B. (2007) ‘Critical Resource Dependencies and the Europeanization of Domestic Interest Groups’, *Journal of European Public Policy,* 14(2): 460-481.

Blatter, J., Kreutzer, M., Rentl, M. & Thiele, J. (2008) ‘the Foreign Relations of European Regions: Competences and Strategies’, *West European Politics,* 31(3): 464–90.

Blatter, J. Kreutzer, M. and Thiele, J. (2009) ‘Preconditions for Foreign Activities of European Regions: Tracing Causal Configurations of Economic, Cultural, and Political Strategies’, *Publius: the Journal of Federalism*, 40 (1): 171-199.

Bolgherini, S. (2007) ‘Europeanization and Structural Funds in European Peripheries’, Unpublished Conference Paper, Presented at the General Conference ECPR, University of Pisa, September 6-8, 2007.

Bomberg, E., and Peterson, J. (1998) ‘European Union Decision Making: the Role of Sub-National Authorities, *Political Studies*, XLVI, 219-235.

Bomberg, E. & Peterson, J. (2000) ‘Policy Transfer and Europeanization: Passing the Heineken Test’, *Queen’s Papers on Europeanization*, No. 2/2000.

Boschma, R., Schobben, R. (2000), ‘Introduction’, *Regional & Federal Studies*, 10 (2):1-9.

Bölükbaşı, T., Ertugal, E., and Özçürümez, S. (2010) ‘the Impact of the EU on Turkey: Toward Streamlining Europeanization as a Research Programme’, *European Political Science*, 9: 464-480.

Börzel, T. (1999) ‘Towards Convergence in Europe?’ *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39 (4): 573–96.

Börzel, T. (2001) ‘Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging and Fence-Sitting. Member State Response to Europeanization’, *Queen’s Papers on Europeanization*, No.4/2001.

Börzel, T. (2002) *States and Regions in the European Union: Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Börzel, T. (2005) ‘Europeanization: How the EU Interacts with its Member States’, in S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds.), *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Börzel, T. (2010) ‘the Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded: the Limits of External Europeanization’, *KFG Working Paper* No. 11.

Börzel, T. and Risse, T. (2000) ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change’, *European Integration Online Papers,* 4(15) (http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm, accessed on 26th September 2011).

Börzel, T., and Risse, T. (2003) ‘Conceptualising the domestic impact of Europe’ in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.), *The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford University Press*, pp. 57-82.

Börzel, T. and Risse, T. (2009) ‘The Transformative Power of the Europe: the European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas’, *KFG Working Paper*, No.1.

Börzel, T. and Panke, D. (2010) ‘Europeanization’, in M. Cini and N.P.S. Borragàn (eds.) *European Union Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 405-417.

Börzel, T. and Soyaltin, D. (2012) ‘Europeanization in Turkey: Stretching a Concept to its Limits?’*, KFG Working Paper*, No.36.

Brande, L.V.D. (2010) ‘Sub-State Diplomacy Today’, *the Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 5: 199-210.

Brusis, M. (2002) ‘Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Re-creating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, *Governance,* 15 (4):531-59.

Brusis, M. (2010) ‘European Union Incentives and Regional Interest Representation in Central and East European Countries’, *Acta Politica*, 45 (1): 70-89.

Bruzst, L. (2005), Governing Sub-national/Regional Institutional Change: Evolution of Regional (Sub-national) Development Regimes - Challenges for Institution Building in the CEE Countries and Sub-national Institutional Experimentation, (http://www.eu- newgov.org/database/DELIV/D15D01\_Evolution\_of\_Regional\_development\_Regimes.pdf, accessed on 23 March 2011).

Bruzst, L. (2008) Multi-Level Governance—the Eastern Versions: Emerging Patterns of Regional Developmental Governance in the New Member States, *Regional and Federal Studies*, 18 (5): 607-627.

Bryman, A. (2008) *Social Research Methods*, 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buckingam, A. and Sanders, P. (2004) *the Survey Methods Workbook: From Design to Analysis*, Malden: Polity.

Buller, J. and Gamble, A. (2002) ‘Conceptualising Europeanization’, *Public Policy and Administration*, 17 (2): 4-24.

Bullmann, U. (1997) ‘The Politics of the Third Level’, in C. Jeffery (ed.), *The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards Third Level in Europe?,* London: Frank Cass.

Bulmer, S. (1983) ‘Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 21 (4): 349-363.

Bulmer, S. (1993) ‘the New Governance of the European Union: A new Institutionalist Approach’, *Journal of Public Policy*, 13 (4): 351–380.

Bulmer, S. (1998) ‘New Institutionalism and the Governance of the Single European Market’, *Journal of European Public Policy,* 5(3): 365-386.

Bulmer, S. (2007) ‘Theorizing Europeanization’ in P. Graziano and M. Vink (eds.) *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 46-58.

Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (1998) ‘Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British State and the European Union’, *Public Administration*, 76 (4): 601-628.

Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (2000) ‘Coming to Terms with Europe: Europeanization, Whitehall and the Challenge of Devolution’, *Queen’s Papers on Europeanization*, No. 9.

Bulmer, S., and C. Lequesne. (2005) *the EU and its Member States*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bulmer, S. and Radaelli, C. (2005) ‘The Europeanisation of National Policy’, in S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds.) *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 338-355.

Burnham, P., Lutz K. G., Grant, W. and Henry, Z.L. (2008) *Research Methods in Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bursens, P. (2007) ‘State Structures’ in P. Grazziano and M.P. Vink (eds.) *Europeanization New Research Agendas*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, p.p. 115:127.

Bursens, P. and Deforce, J. (2008) ‘Europeanization of Subnational Polities: the Impact of Domestic Factors on Regional Adaptation’, *Regional and Federal Studies*, 18 (1): 1-18.

Caporaso, J. (2007) ‘the Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory’, in P. Graziano and M. Vink (eds.) *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carter, C. and Pasquier, R. (2010) ‘The Europeanization of Regions as ‘Spaces for Politics’: A Research Agenda’, *Regional and Federal Studies*, 20 (3): 295-314.

Checkel, J. (2001) ‘Constructing European institutions’, in G. Schneider and M. Aspinwall (eds.) *the Rules of Integration: The Institutionalist Approach to European Studies*, Manchester: Manchester University Press: 19-40.

Christou, G. (2003) ‘European Union Enlargement and the Solution of the ‘Cyprus Issue’: Creating a Climate for Change? Agora Without Frontiers, *Institute of International Economic Relations*, Vol.8 (4).

Christou, G. (2013) 'The European Commission as an Actor in the Cyprus Conflict', *Journal of European Integration*, 35 (2): 117-133.

Christou, G. and Simpson, S. (2006) ‘The Internet and Public-Private Governance in the European Union', *Journal of Public Policy*, 26 (1): 43-61.

Christou, G. and Simpson, S. (2011) 'The European Union, Multilateralism and the Global Governance of the Internet', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18 (2): 241-257.

Cizre-Sakallioglu, and Yeldan, E. (2000) ‘Politics, Society, and Financial Liberalization: Turkey in the 1990s’, *Development and Change*, 31 (2): 49-74.

Cornell, S. E. (2001), *the Land of Many Crossroads: the Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics*, Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Cowles, M., Caporaso, J. and Risse, T. (eds.) (2001) *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Çelenk, A.A. (2009) ‘Europeanization and Administrative Reform: The Case of Turkey’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 14 (1): 41-60.

Çelik, M. (2010) ‘Turkish Lobbyists in Brussels Assisting Turkey in its EU Bid’, *Today’s Zaman*, (http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail\_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=200832) (accessed on 10th May, 2013).

Dalgıç, E. (2005) *Türkiye Belediyeler Birliği ve Güney Doğu Anadolu Projesi, Avrupa Birligi Uyum Sureci ve Yerel Yönetimler (the Union of Turkish Municipalities and South-East Anatolia Project, European Union and Local Administrations)*, T.C. Basbakanlik GAP Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi ve Turk Belediyeler Birligi Ortak Yayini, Ankara: Seminer El Kitabi.

Daoudov, M. (2008) ‘Yerel Dış Politika Geliştirme Zamanı’, *Birlik Dergisi*, 3, http://www.marmara.gov.tr/document/dergi/ab\_birlik\_dergisi\_ocak\_08.pdf, (Accessed on 22.11.2011).

Daoudov, M. (2012) Yerel Yönetimlerin ve Birliklerin Uluslararası Alanda Konumu ve Ulusal Dış Politika İle İlişkileri (the State of Local Administrations on the International Arena and their Interactions with the National Foreign Policy), *Unpublished Master Thesis*, University of Marmara, Istanbul.

Darvish, Z. D. (2007) ‘EU-Supported Regional Development Programmes, Implementations, Monitoring and Evaluation in Turkey’, in D. Tsarouhas, E. Ertugal and A.I. Aybars (eds.) *Bridging the Real Divide: Social and Regional Policy in Turkey’s EU Accession Process*, Ankara: ODTU Yayincilik.

Della Porta, D. and Kriesi, H. (1999) ‘Introduction’, in D. Della Porta, H. Kriesi and D. Rucht (eds.) *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 3-22.

Demiröz, N. (1990) ‘Bölge Valiliği Üzerine’ (Upon Regional Governorships), *Amme Idaresi Dergisi*, 23(4):55-70.

De Rynck, D. (1998) ‘Civic Culture and Institutional Performance of the Belgian Regions’, in P. Le Gales and C. Lequesne (eds.), *Regions in Europe*, London: Routledge, pp, 199-218.

De Vaus, D. A. (2002) *Surveys in Social Research*, 5th Edition, London: Routledge.

Devine, F. (2002) ‘Qualitative Methods’, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd Edition, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 197-215.

Dinçer, B., Özaslan, M., and Kavasoğlu, T. (2003) *İllerin ve Bölgelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması (Study on the Socio-Economic Development Ranking of Provinces and Regions)*, Ankara: State Planning Organization.

Diez, T. and Wiener, A. (eds.) (2004) *European Integration Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Diez, T., Agnantopoulous, A., and Kaliber, A. (2005) ‘File: Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society’, *South European Society & Politics*, 10(1): 1-15.

Dobre, A. M. (2007) ‘Europeanisation from a Neo-Institutionalist Perspective: Experiencing Territorial Politics in Spain and Romania’, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, KU Leuven, Belgium.

Dodd, C. H. (1969) *Politics and Government in Turkey*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Dodd, C. H. (1988) ‘Aspects of the Turkish State: Political Culture, Organized Interests and Village Communities’, *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies*, 15 (1/2): 78-86.

Duchacek, I. (1990) ‘Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in International Relations’, in: H. Michelman and P. Soldatos (eds.), *Federalism and International Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon.

Dulupçu, M.A. (2005) ‘Regionalization for Turkey, an Illusion or a Cure?’, *European Urban and Regional Studies* 12 (2): 99-115.

Düzgit, S. A. and Tocci, N. (2009) ‘Transforming Turkish Foreign Policy: The Quest for Regional Leadership and Europeanization’, *CEPS Commentaries*, 12 November 2009, (Policy Paper).

Dyson, K. and Goetz, K. (2003) (eds.) *Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eder, M. (2004) ‘Populism as a barrier to integration with the EU’ in M.Ugur and N, Canefe (eds), *Turkey and European Integration. Accession Prospects and Issues,* London: Routledge, pp. 49-74.

Eising, R. (2006) ‘Interests Groups and Social Movements’ in P. Graziano and M.P. Vink (eds.) *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 167-181.

Eising, R. (2009) *the Political Economy of State-Business Relations: Interest Mediation, Capitalism and EU Policy-Making*, London, New York: Routledge.

Eliçin, Y. (2011) ‘the Europeanization of Turkey: Reform in Local Governments’, *International Journal of Economic and Administrative Studies*’, 4 (7): 103-126.

Eraydın, A. (2005) *From a metropolitan core with a large hinterland to a polycentric city region,* Unpublished report prepared for TUBITAK (The Scientifi c and Technological Research Council of Turkey).

Eralp, A. (2008) ‘The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU Relationship’, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40: 149-170.

Eraydın, A., Köroğlu, B.A, Öztürk, H.E., Yaşar, S.S. (2008) ‘Network Governance for Competitiveness: The Role of Policy Networks in the Economic Performance of Settlements in the Izmir Region’, *Urban Studies,* 45 (11): 2291-2321.

Ersoy, M. (1992) ‘Relations Between Central and Local Governments in Turkey: an Historical Perspective’, *Public Administration and Development*, 12: 325-341.

Ertugal, E. (2005), ‘Europeanization of Regional Policy and Regional Governance: The Case of Turkey’, *European Political Economy Review*, 3 (1): 18-55.

Ertugal, E. (2007) ‘AB Bolgesel Politikalarinin Uye ve Aday Ulkelere Etkileri’ (the Impact of EU Regional Policies on the Members and Candidates), 2nd Regional Development and Governance Conference, 25-27 October, 2007, Izmir.

Ertugal, E. (2010) ‘Multi Level Governance and Europeanization in Turkey’, *Journal of South East European and Black Sea Studies*, 10 (1): 97-110.

Ertugal, E. (2011) ‘Institutional Change and Europeanization: Explaining Regional Policy Reform in Turkey’, *Policy and Politics,* 39 (2): 257-73.

Exadaktylos, T. and Radaelli, C. (2009), ‘Research Design in European Studies’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47 (3): 507-30.

Exadaktylos, T. and Radaelli, C. (2010), ‘New Directions in Europeanization Research’, in M. Egan, N. Nugent and W. Paterson (eds.), *Research Agendas in EU Studies*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fargion, V., Morlino, L., and Profeti, S. (2006) ‘Europeanization and Territorial Representation in Italy’, *West European Politics*, 29 (4): 757-783.

Featherstone, K. (2003) ‘In the Name of ‘Europe’, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.) *the Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University, pp. 3-26.

Ferry, M. (2007) ‘From Government to Governance: Polish Regional Development Agencies in a Changing Regional Context’, *East European Politics and Societies*, 21 (3): 447-474.

Finkel, A. (1990) ‘Municipal politics and the State in contemporary Turkey’, in Nükhet Sirman and Andrew Finkel (eds.), *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, London: Routledge Curzon, pp. 185-218.

Fitjar, R. D. (2010) *the Rise of Regionalism: Causes of Regional Mobilization in Western Europe*, London: Routledge.

Gedikli, B. (2009) ‘The Role of Leadership in the Success of Participatory Planning Processes: Experience from Turkey’, *European Urban and Journal of Regional Studies*, 16 (2): 115-130.

Given, L.M. (2008) *the Sage Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, London: Sage.

Goldsmith, M. J. and Klausen, K. (1997) *European Integration and Local Government,* Cheltenham: Elgar.

Goldsmith, M. J. and Sperling, E. (1997) ‘Local Governments and the EU: the British Experience’, in M. J. Goldsmith and K. Klausen (eds.) *European Integration and Local Government,* Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 95-120.

Goldsmith, M. J. (2003) ‘Variable Geometry, Multi-Level Governance and Subnational Government in the Millenium’, in K. Featherstone & C. Radaelli, C. (eds.), *the Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford University Press: 112-133.

Goldsmith, M. J. (2010) ‘More or Less? Europe and Local Government’, Unpublished Conference Paper, Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Edinbutgh, March 29th – April 1st , 2010.

Goldsmith, M. J. and Page, E. C. (2010) *Changing Government Relations in Europe: From Localism to Intergovernmentalism*, 2nd Edition, London: Routledge.

Göymen, K. (1999) ‘Türk Yerel Yönetiminde Katılımcılığın Evrimi: Merkeziyetçi Bir Devlette Yönetişim Dinamikleri’ (the Evolution of Participation in Turkish Local Administrative System: the Dynamics of Governance in a Centralist State’, *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 32 (4):67-83.

Göymen, K. (2007) ‘Dynamics of Changes in Turkish Local Governance: Demise of the Bureacratic Ruling Tradition’, *Society and Economy*, 28 (3): 245-266.

Göymen, K. (2010) *Türkiye'de Yerel Yönetişim ve Yerel Kalkınma (Local Governance and Local Development in Turkey)*, Istanbul: Boyut Yayın Grubu.

Grabbe, H. (2001) ‘How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity’*, Journal of European Public Policy,* 8 (4): 1013-31.

Grabbe, H. (2003) ‘Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process’, in K. Feathersone & C.M. Radaelli (eds.) *the Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press*: 303-327.

Grazziano, P. and Vink, M.P. (eds.) (2007) *Europeanization New Research Agendas,* Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Gray, D.E (2009) *Doing Research in the Real World*, 2nd Edition, London: SAGE.

Greenwood, J. (1997) *Representing Interests in the EU*, Hampshire: MacMillan Press.

Greenwood, J. (2003) *Interest Representation in the European Union*, Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan.

Gualini, E. (2004) *Multi-Level Governance and Institutional Change: The Europeanization of Regional Policy in Italy*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Güney, A and Çelenk, A.A. (2010) ‘Europeanization and the Dilemma of Decentralization: Centre-Local Relations in Turkey,’ *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 12 (3): 241-257.

Haas, E.B. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Halkier, H., Danson, M., and Damborg, C. (eds.) (2000) *Governance, Institutional Change and Development*, London: Ashgate.

Hall, P. and Taylor, R. (1996) ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, *Political Studies*, XLIV: 936-958.

Haverland, M. (2006) ‘Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? Improving Case Selection in Europeanization Research’, *West European Politics*, 29 (1): 134-146.

Hay, C. (2002) *Political Analysis*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Hay, C. and Rosamond, B. (2001) ‘Globalization, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives: A Question of Convergence?’, *Queen’s Paper on Europeanization*, No. 1/2001.

Henn, M., Weinstein, M. and Foard, N. (2009) *A Critical Introduction to Social Research*, London: Sage.

Heper, M. (1985) *State Tradition in Turkey*, Northgate: the Eothen Press.

Heper, M. (ed.) (1989) ‘Introduction’, in *Local Government in Turkey: Governing Greater Istanbul*, London: Routledge, pp. 1-12.

Heper, M. and Keyman, E.F. (1998) ‘Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34 (4): 259-277.

Heritier, A. (1999) *Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe. Escape From Deadlock*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heritier, A. and Knill, C. (2001) *Differential Europe: the European Union’s Impact on National Policy Making*, Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.

Herrschel, T. and Newman, P. (2002) *Governance of Europe’s City Regions: Planning, Policy and Politics*, London: Routledge.

Hix, S. (1994) ‘The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics’, *West European Politics*, 17 (1): 1-30.

Hix, S. and Goetz, K. (2000) ‘Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems’, *West European Politics*, 23 (4): 1-26.

Hix, S. and Hoyland, B. (2011) *the Political System of the European Union*, 3rd Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Hooghe, L. (1995) 'Subnational Mobilization in the European Union', *West European Politics,* 18 (3): 175-98.

Hooghe, L. (1996) 'Building a Europe with the Regions: The Changing Role of the European Commission', in L. Hooghe, *Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (1996) ‘Europe with the Regions: Channels of Regional Representation in the European Union', *Publius* 26 (1): 1-20.

Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001) *Multi-level Governance and European Integration,* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Hooghe, L. and Keating, M. (2006) ‘Bypassing the nation-state? Regions and the EU policy process’, in M. Richardson (ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy-Making*, London: Routledge, pp. 269–86.

Hooghe, L., Marks, G. & Schakel, A.H. (2010) *The Rise of Regional Authority: a Comparative Study of 42 Democracies (1950-2006)*, London: Routledge.

Hughes, J., Sasse, G., and Gordon, C. (2004). *Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: the Myth of Conditionality*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Huysseune, M., Jans, T. (2008), ‘Representations of local and regional governments to the European Union. Final report’,

http://blbe.be/files/studies/Study%20VUB%20Region%20offices.pdf, (accessed on 22.11.2011).

Ivan, A. and Cuglesan, N. (2009) Multi-level Governance and Decentralization in the Unitary States of the European Union. Case Study: France and Romania, *Novos Estudos Juridicos*, 14 (1): 47-59.

İnalcık, H. (1963) ‘Turkey’, in R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow (eds.) *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey,*  New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 42-63.

İzci, İ. (2011) ‘the EU Accession: A Window of Opportunity for Local Authorities in Turkey’, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 10 (2):117-124.

Jeffrey, C. (1997a) *The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe?*, London: Frank Cass.

Jeffrey, C. (1997b) 'Regional Information Offices in Brussels and Multi-Level Governance in the EU: A UK-German Comparison', in C. Jeffery, *The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards Third Level in Europe?*, London: Frank Cass, pp. 183-203.

Jeffrey, C. (2000) ‘Sub-National Mobilization and European Integration: Does it Make Any Difference?’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38 (1): 1-23.

Jessop, B. (2004) ‘Hollowing out the Nation State and Multi-level Governance’ in Kennett, P. (ed.), *A Handbook of Comparative Social Policy*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 11-25

John, P. (1994) T*he Europeanisation of British Local Government: New Management Strategies*, Luton: Local Government Management Board.

John, P. (1996) ‘Europeanization in a Centralising State: Multi-level Governance in the UK’, *Regional and Federal Studies* 6(2): 131-144

John, P. (2000) ‘Europeanization of Subnational Governance’, *Urban Studies*, 37(5–6): 877–894.

John, P. (2001) *Local Governance in Western Europe*, London: Sage.

Jupille, J. & Caporaso, J.A. (1999) ‘Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond Comparative Politics and International Relations, *International Review of Political Science*, 2: 429-444.

Kaliber, A. (2008) ‘Reassessing Europeanisation as a Quest for a New Paradigm of Modernity: the Arduous Case of Turkey’, unpublished conference paper, the 49th Annual Convention of International Studies Association, San Francisco, 26-29 March 2008.

Kapucu, N., and Palabıyık, H. (2008) *Turkish Public Administration: From Tradition to the Modern Age,* Ankara: USAK.

Karpat, K. H. (1973) ‘Structural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization, and the Role of Social Groups in Turkish Politics’ in K. H. Karpat (ed.), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis,* Leiden: E.J.Brill, pp. 11-92.

Kassim, H. (2005) ‘The Europeanization of Member State Institutions’ in Bulmer, S. and C. Lequesne (eds.) *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 285-316.

Kayasu, S. (2006) ‘Institutional Implications of Regional Development Agencies in Turkey: An Evaluation of the Integrative Forces of Legal and Institutional Frameworks’, 42nd ISoCaRP Congress.

Keating, M. (1995) ‘Europeanism and Regionalism’ in M. Keating and B. Jones (eds.) *The European Union and the Regions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-22.

Keating, M. (1998) *the New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Keating, M. (2000) ‘Paradiplomacy and Regional Networking’, paper presented on the Forum of Federations: An International Federalism, Hanover, Germany, October, 2000.

Keating, M. (2006) ‘Territorial Politics in Europe’, in P.M. Heywood, E.Jones, M. Rhodes and U.Sedelmeier (eds.), *Developments in European Politics*, Basinstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Keating, M. (2008) ‘A Quarter Century of the Europe of the Regions’, *Regional and Federal Studies*, 18 (5): 629-635.

Keating, M., and Jones, B. (eds) (1995) *The European Union and the Regions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keating, M. and Hooghe, L. (1996) ‘By-Passing the Nation-State? Regions and the EU Policy Process’ in J. J. Richardson (ed.) London: Routledge, 216-29.

Keating, M. & Loughlin, J. (eds.) (1997) *the Political Economy of Regionalism*, London: Frank Cass.

Keating, M., and Aldecoa, F. (1999) *Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments*, London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Keleş, R. (2011) *Yerinden Yönetim ve Siyaset (Decentralization and Politics)* (7th ed.) Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi.

Keleş, R. and Payne, G. (1984) ‘Turkey’ in M. Wynn (ed.), *Planning and Growth in Southern Europe,* London: Mansell, pp. 165-197.

Kettunen, P. and Kungla, T. (2005) ‘Europeanization of Sub-National Governance in Unitary States: Estonia and Finland’, *Regional and Federal Studies*, 15 (3): 353-378.

Keyman, E.F, Koyuncu, B. (2005) ‘Globalization, Alternative Modernities and the Political Economy of Turkey’, *Review of International Political Economy*, 12 (1): 105-128.

Keyman, E. F. and Öniş, Z. (2007) *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations*, Istanbul: Bilgi University Press.

Keyman, F. E., and Lorosdağı, B. K. (2010) *Kentler: Anadolu'nun Dönüşümü, Türkiye'nin Geleceği (Cities: The Transformation of Anatolia and The Future of Turkey),* Istanbul: Doğan Kitap.

Kirişçi, K. (2004) ‘the Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy’ in L.G. Martin and D. Keridis (eds.) *the Future of Turkish Foreign Policy,* London: MIT Press.

Knaap, P.V.D (1994) ‘The Committee of the Regions: The outset of a ‘Europe of the regions’?’, *Regional Politics and Policy*, 4(2): 86-100.

Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2002) ‘the National Impact of EU Regulatory Policy: Three Mechanisms’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 41 (2): 255-80.

Knodt, M., Quittkat, C., and Greenwood, J. (eds.) (2012) *Functional and Territorial Interest Representation in the EU*, London: Routledge.

Koçak, S. Y. (2006) ‘European Integration and Its Impact on Domestic Systems: Inferences for Turkey’, *D.E.Ü.İ.İ.B.F Dergisi*, 20 (1): 123-136.

Koçak, S. Y. (2007) Europeanization of Turkish Regional Policy, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, University of Sheffield.

Kohler-Koch, B. (1996) ‘Catching up with Change: the Transformation of Governance in the European Union’, *Journal of European Public Policy,* 3(3): 359-380.

Kohler-Koch, B. and Eising, R. (eds.) (1999) *the Transformation of Governance in the European Union*, London: Routledge.

Kolars, J. (1973) ‘The Integration of the Vilager into the National Life of Turkey’, in K. H. Karpat (ed.) *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysisn* Leiden: E.J.Brill, pp. 182-202.

Koyuncu, E. and Sertesen, S. (2012) ‘ Yerelleşmede Bir İleri Bir Geri (One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward in Decentralization)’, *TEPAV Policy Briefing*, Ankara, February 2012.

Köker, L. (1995) ‘Local Politics and Democracy in Turkey: An Appraisal’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 540: 51-62.

Kösebalaban, H. (2007) ‘The Rise of Anatolian Cities and the Failure of the Modernization Paradigm’, *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 16 (3): 229 –240.

Kungla, T and Kettunen, P. (2005) ‘Europeanization of Sub-National Governance in Unitary States: Estonia and Finland’. *Regional and Federal Studies*, 15 (3): 353-378.

Kvale, S. (2009) *Doing Interviews*, London: Sage.

Kymlicka, W. and Opalski, M. (2002) *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lagendijk, A., Kayasu, S. and Yaşar, S. (2009) ‘The Role of Regional Development Agencies in Turkey: From Implementing EU Directives to Supporting Regional Business Communities?, *European Urban Regional Studies*, 16 (4): 383-396.

Landrech, R. (1994) ‘Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 32 (1): 69-88.

Landrech, R. (2010) *Europeanization and National Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lavenex, S. (2004) ‘EU external governance in 'wider Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11 (4): 680-700.

Lavenex, S., Lehmkuhl, D. and Wichmann, N. (2009) ‘Modes of external governance: a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16 (6): 813-833.

Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2011) ‘EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from leverage to governance?, *Democratization*, 18 (4):885-909.

Lecours, A. (2008) Political Issues of Paradiplomacy: Lessons from the Developed World. Discussion Papers in Paradiplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

Le Galès, P. (2002) *European Cities: Social Conflicts and Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Le Galès, P. and Lequesne, C. (1998) *Regions in Europe*, London: Routledge.

Leonardi, R. (2005) *Cohesion Policy in the European Union: the Building of Europe*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lewis, B (2002) *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loughlin, J. (1996) 'Europe of the Regions and the Federalization of Europe', *Publius* 26 (4): 141-162.

Loughlin, J. (1997) ‘Representing Regions in Europe: the Committee of Regions’, in C. Jeffery (ed.), *The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards Third Level in Europe?*, London: Frank Cass, pp. 147-165.

Magone, J. M (ed.) (2003) *Regional Institutions and Governance in the European Union*, Westport: Praeger.

Mair, P. (2004) ‘The Europeanization Dimension’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11 (2): 337-348.

Marcou, G. (2006) Local Administration Reform in Turkey: a Legal Appraisal Based on European Principles and Standards, Ankara, Ministry of the Interior / UNDP, available online at: http://www.lar.gov.tr/downloadables/MARCOU\_ RE-PORT\_LocGovReformTurkey\_final.doc (accessed on 21st March, 2012).

Mardin, Ş. (1971) ‘Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2: 197-211.

Mardin, Ş. (1973) ‘Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?’, *Daedalus*, 102 (1): 169-190.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1996) ‘Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions’, *Governance*, 9 (3): 247–264.

Marks, G. (1993) ‘Structural Policy and Multi-Level Governance in the EC’ in A. W. Cafruny and G.C. Rosenthal (eds.), *The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond*, New York: Longman, pp. 391-410.

Marks, G. (1997) ‘An Actor-Centred Approach to Multi-Level Governance’, in C. Jeffery (ed.) *The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe?*, London: Frank Cass, pp. 20-38.

Marks, G., Hooghe, L., and Blank, K. (1995) ‘EU Integration since 1980s; State Centric Versus Multi-Level Governance’, paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1995.

Marks, G., Nielsen, F., Ray, L. Salk, J.E. (1996) ‘Competencies, Craks, and Conflicts: Regional Mobilization in the European Union’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 29 (2): 164-192.

Marks, G. and McAdam, D. (1996) ‘Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union’, in G. Marks, F.W. Scharpe, and P.C. Schmitter (eds.) *Governance in the European Union*, London: Sage Publications, pp. 95-120.

Marks G., Haesly R., & Mbaye H.A.D. (2002), ‘What Do Subnational Offices Think They Are Doing in Brussels?’, *Regional and Federal Studies*, 12 (3): 1-23.

Marks, G. & Hooghe, L. (2004) ‘Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance.’ In I. Bache & M. Flinders, (eds.) *Multi-level Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 15-30.

Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R. (eds.) (1992) *Policy Networks in British Government*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marsh, D. and Furlong, P. (2002) ‘A Skin, not a Sweather: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science’, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd Edition, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 17-41.

Martin, S. (1997) ‘The Effects of EU Regional Policy on Local Institutional Structures and Policies,’ in J. Bachtler, and I. Turok, (eds.), *The Coherence of EU Regional Policy*, London: Jessica Kingsley, pp.51-65.

Massicard, E. (2009) ‘Regionalization in Turkey, France, Poland and the EU’ in F. Bafoil and A. Kaya (2009) *Regional Development and the European Union: A Comparative Analysis of Karabuk, Valenciennes and Katowice*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, pp. 17-33.

Mason, J. (2002) *Qualitative Researching*, London: Sage.

Mazey, S. and Mitchell, J. (1993) 'Europe of the Regions? Territorial Interests and European Integration: The Scottish Experience', in S. Mazey and J. Richardson, *Lobbying in the European Community*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McCauley, D. (2011) ‘Bottom-Up Europeanization Exposed*:* Social Movement Theory and Non-state Actors in France’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49 (5): 1019-1042.

McMaster, I. (2006) ‘Czech Regional Development Agencies in a Shifting Institutional Landscape’, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58 (3): 347-370.

Moore, C. (2008a) ‘A Europe of the Regions vs. the Regions in Europe: Reflections on Regional Engagement in Brussels’, *Regional and Federal Studies*, 18 (5): 517-535.

Moore, C. (2008b) ‘Beyond Conditionality? Regions from the New EU Member States and their Activities in Brussels’, *Comparative European Politics*, 6: 212-234.

Moore, C. (2011) *Regional Representation in the EU: Between Diplomacy and Interest Mediation* Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Moravcsik, A. (1995) 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 33 (4): 611-28.

Müftüler-Baç, M. (2005) ‘Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union’, *South European Society and Politics*, 10(1): 17-31.

Nielsen, F. and Salk, J. (1998) ‘Ecology of Collective Action and Regional Representation in the European Union, *European Sociological Review,* 14: 231–254.

Nordström, L. (1988), ‘European Developing Regions—Reality or Chimera’, in J. Alden and P. Boland (eds.), *Regional Development Strategies: A European Perspective*, London: Jesica Kingsley. pp: 38-54.

O’Dwyer, C. (2006) ‘Reforming Regional Governance in East Central Europe: Europeanization or Domestic Politics as Usual?’, *East European Politics and Societies*, 20 (2): 219-253.

Ohmae, K. (1995) *the End of the Nation-State: the Rise of Regional Economies*, New York: Simon and Schuster Inc.

Okçu, M., Gül, H., and Dulupçu, M.A. (2006) ‘Turkey Towards the EU: In-Between State Centrism and Multi-Level Governance’, Conference Paper Presented at 6th European Urban and Regional Studies Conference, Denmark, 21-24 September, 2006.

Okçu, M., Kösecik, M., Özgür, H., Aktel, M., Kerman, U., Koçak, Y., Marcou, J. Tek, H. and Kanat, Selim (2008) Türkiye ve Fransa’da Yerelleşme ve Bölgeselleşme: AB Çok Düzlemli Yönetişim Çerçevesinde İki Üniter Devlet İçin Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz ( Localization and Regionalization in Turkey and in France: A Comparative Analysis of two Unitary States in line with the EU Multi-Level Governance System), Project Number: 107K336, Isparta.

Olsen, J.P. (2001) ‘Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism, and the Study of Politics’, *American Political Science Review,* 95 (1): 191-198.

Olsen, J.P. (2002) ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(5): 921-952.

Olsen, J.P. (2007) *Europe in Search of Political Order*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Öniş, Z. (2006) ‘Turkey’s Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and the Challenges Ahead’, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 8 (3): 279-298.

Öniş, Z. (2009) ‘the New Wave of Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey Drifting Away from Europeanization?’ in *DIIS Report* 2009, 5, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Özbudun, E. (1981) ‘Turkey: the Politics of Political Clientelism’, in S.N. Eisenstadt and R. Lemarchand (eds.) *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development,* London: Sage, pp. 249-268.

Özcan, G. B. (2000) ‘Local Economic Development, Decentralization and Consensus Building in Turkey’, *Progress in Planning*, 54: 199-278.

Özcan, G. B. (2006) ‘A Critical Analysis of Decentralisation and Local Economic Development: the Turkish Case’, *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 24: 117-138.

Özcan, G. B., and Turunç, H. (2008) ‘the Politics of Administrative Decentralization in Turkey Since 1980’, in J. Killian and N. Eklund (eds.), *Handbook of Administrative Reforms: An International Perspective*, Boca Raton: Aurbeach Publications, pp. 177-193.

Page, C.E. and Goldsmith, M.J. (eds.) (2010) *Changing Government Relations in Europe*, 2nd Edition, New York: Routledge.

Paraskevopoulos, C. J. and Leonardi, R. (2004) ‘Introduction: Adaptational Pressure and Social Learning in European Regional Policy—Cohesion (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) vs. CEE (Hungary, Poland) Countries’, *Regional and Federal Studies*, 14(3): 315-354.

Park, B. (2005) *Turkey’s Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives*, the International Institute for Strategic Research, New York: Routledge.

Parlak, B., Sobacı, M. Z., and Ökmen, M. (2008) ‘the Evaluation of Restructured Local Governments in Turkey within the context of the European Charter on Local Self-Government’, *Ankara Law Review*, 5 (1): 33-52.

Peters, G. B. (2000) ‘Institutional Theory: Problems and Prospects’, *Political Science Series*, 69.

Pierson, P. (1996) ‘the Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis’ *Comparative Political Studies* 29(2): 123-163.

Pitschel, D. Bauer, M.W. (2009) ‘Subnational Governance Approaches on the Rise—Reviewing a Decade of Eastern European Regionalization Research’, *Regional and Federal Studies*, 19 (3): 327-347.

Plujm V. R. and Melissen, J. (2007) City Diplomacy: The Expanding Role of Cities in International Relations. The Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20070400\_cdsp\_paper\_pluijm.pdf (accessed on 23.06.2012).

Pollack, M. (1995) ‘Regional Actors in an Intergovernmental Play: the Making and Implementation of EC Structural Policy’, in S. Mazey and C. Rhodes (eds.) *the State of European: Building a European Polity*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Polatoğlu, A (1978) ‘the Turkish Province as an Administrative Division of Central Government’, *Amme Idaresi Dergisi*, 18: 53-86.

Polatoğlu, A. (2000) *Introduction to Public Administration,* New York: Longman Publishing.

Princen, S. and Kerremans, B. (2008) ‘Opportunity Structures in the EU Multilevel System’, *West European Politics*, 31 (6): 1129-1146.

Putnam, R. (1993) *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Quaglia, L. Neuvonen, M., Miyakoshi, M. and Cini, M. (2007) ‘Europeanization’ in M. Cini, *European Union Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 405-420.

Radaelli, C. (2000) ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change’, *European Integration Online Papers* 4 (8). (http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008.htm, accessed on 23rd April, 2012).

Radaelli, C. (2003) ‘the Europeanization of Public Policy’, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.) *the Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University, pp. 27-56.

Radaelli, C. (2004) ‘Europeanization: Solution or Problem?’, *European Integration Online Papers*, 8 (16).

Rapley, T. (2004) ‘Interviews’, in C. Seale, G. Gobo, J.F.Gubriun and D. Silverman (eds), *Qualitative Research Practice*, London: Sage.

Read, M. and Marsh, D. (2002) ‘Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Methods’, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 2nd Edition, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 231-248.

Renda, K. (2011) ‘Turkey’s Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependence’, *Insight Turkey*, 13 (1) 89-108.

Reves, T. (2006) ‘Regional Development in the EU and Turkey’, *Bolgesel Kalkinma ve Yonetisim Sempozyumu (Regional Development and Governance Symposium)*, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 7th- 8th September 2006.

Richards, D. and Smith, M. J. (2002) *Governance and Public Policy in the UK*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Richards, L. (2005) *Handling Qualitative Data: A Practical Guide*, London: Sage.

Robson, C. (2002) *Real World Research: a Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers*, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Blackwell.

Rose, R. (1993) *Lesson Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space* Chatham: Chatham House.

Rosenau, J. N. and Czempiel, E.O. (1992) *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Saatçioğlu, B. (2010) ‘Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle: The Case of Turkey‘s AKP under EU Conditionality’, KFG Working Paper Series 14.

Sadioglu, U. And Dede, K. (2011) ‘Effects of the Regional Development Agencies on the Role and Decisiveness of the Local Elites in Turkey’, Conference Paper Presented at the EGPA-Conference, Bucharest-Romania, September 2011.

Salomon, M. (2011) ‘Paradiplomacy in the Developing World’ im M. Amen, N. Toly, P. Mccarney and K. Segberg (Eds.) *Cities and Global Governance*, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 45-68.

Sandoltz, W. & Sweet, S. A. (eds.) (1998) *European Integration and Supranational Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Samur, H. (2010) ‘the Europeanization of Upper Mesopotamia: Current Status of Its Societal Structure’, CEU Political Science Journal, 5 (1):102-126.

Sapala, M. (2003) ‘Sub-national Mobilization in the European Integration Process: Eurofitness of Polish Regional Authorities’, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan009032.pdf (Accessed on 27th November, 2009).

Saurugger, S. (2005) ‘Europeanization as a Methodological Challenge: the Case of Interest Groups’, *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 7 (4): 291-312.

Scherepereel, J.A. (2007) ‘Sub-National Authorities in the EU’s Post-Socialist States: Joining the Multi-Level Polity?’, *Journal of European Integration*, 29 (1): 23-46.

Schimmelfenning, F., Engert, S. and Knobel, H. (2003) ‘Costs, Commitment and Compliance: the Impact of EU democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey’, *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 41 (3): 495-518.

Schimmelfenning, F., and Sedelmeier, U. (eds.) (2005) *the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe,* Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press.

Schimmelfenning, F., and Sedelmeier, U. (2007) ‘Candidate Countries and Conditionality’, in P. Graziano and M. Vink (eds.), *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, Basingstoke and New York, pp. 88-101.

Schneider, G. and Aspinwall, M. (eds.) (2001) *the Rules of Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Schönlau, J. (2010), ‘The CoR at 16: Growing up or Still under Age?’, Paper presented at UACES Research Conference, Bruges, 5th-8th September, 2010.

Schuman, Michael H. (1992). Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies. Foreign Policy, No.86, ss. 158-177.

https://umdrive.memphis.edu/rblanton/public/POLS4510\_6510\_sum09/shuman\_dateline\_main\_street.pdf (accessed on 17.05.2012).

Scott, J. (1995) *Development Dilemmas in the European Union Community: Rethinking Regional Development Policy*, Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Sedelmeier, U. (2011) ‘Europeanization in New Member and Candidate States’, *Living Reviews in European governance*’, 6 (1).

Sharpe, L. J. (1993) *The Rise of Meso Level Government in Europe*, London: Sage.

Silverman, D. (2005) *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*, 2nd Edition, London: Sage.

Smyrl, M. (1997) ‘Does European Community Regional Policy Empower the Regions?’, *Governance* 10(3): 287-309.

Sobczak, A. (2007) ‘the Impact of Europeanization on the Mobilization of Local Actors in European Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Krakow and Glasgow’, Panel on Urban Governance, EURA Conference, Pisa, 12-14 September 2007.

Sørensen, G. (2006) ‘Transformation of the State’, in C. Hay, M. Lister and D. Marsh (eds.) *the State: Theories and Issues*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Steinmo, S. (2001) ‘the New Institutionalism’, in Barry Clark and Joe Foweraker, (eds.) *The Encyclopaedia of Democratic Thought*, London: Routlege.

Sturm, R. and Dieringer, J. (2005) ‘the Europeanization of Regions in Eastern and Western Europe: Theoretical Perspective’*, Regional and Federal Studies,* 15 (3): 279-294.

I. Sunar. (1994) ‘the Politics of State Interventionism in Populist Egypt and Turkey’, in A. Oncu, C. Keyder and S.E. Ibrahim (eds.) *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey,* Cairo: the American University, pp. 94-107.

Şeker, N. (2007) ‘Vision of Modernity in the Early Turkish Republic: An Overview’, *HAOL*, 14: 49-56.

Şengül, T. (2003) ‘Yerel Devlet Sorunu ve Yerel Devletin Donusumunde Yerel Egilimler (the Question of Local State and New Trends in the Transformation of the Local State)’, *Praksis*, 9:183-220.

Şengül, T. (2009) *Kentsel Çelişki ve Siyaset: Kapitalist Kentleşme Süreçlerinin Eleştirisi (Urban Paradox and Politics: A Critique of Capitalist Urbanization Process)* 2nd edition, Ankara: Imge Kitabevi.

Tatar, M. (2009), ‘the Impact of the European Union Regional Policy on Sub-National Mobilization in a Unitary State: The Case of Estonia’, *Understanding and Shaping Regions: Spatial, and Economic Futures*, RSA Annual Conference, Leuven.

Tatham, M. (2008) 'Going Solo: Direct Regional Representation in the European Union', *Regional and Federal Studies,* 18 (5): 493-515.

Tatham, M. (2010) ‘With or Without You’? Revisiting Territorial State-Bypassing in EU Interest Representation, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17 (1): 76-99.

Tekeli, I. (1983) ‘Democracy in Local Administrations and the Development of Municipalities in Turkey’, *Amme İdaresi Dergisi.*

Temizocak, Y. (2006) ‘Kalkınma Ajanslarının Önemi ve EGEV-EBKA Deneyimi (the importance of Regional Development Agencies and the Experinces of EGEV-EBKA), Bölgesel Kalkınma ve Yönetişim Semposyumu (Regional Development and Governance Symposium), TEPAV, Ankara.

Thelen, K. & Steinmo, S. (1992) ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.’ in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, (eds.) *Structuring Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: pp. 1-32.

Thielmann, E. (1999) ‘Institutional Change and European Governance: an Analysis of Partnership’, *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 9 (2): 181-97.

Thielmann, E. (2000) ‘Europeanization and Institutional Compatibility: Implementing European Regional Policy in Germany’, *Queen’s Papers on Europeanization*, No: 4.

Tocci, N. (2005) ‘Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?’ *South European Society and Politics*, 10(1): 73:83.

Toprak, Z. (2011) ‘Yerel Yonetimlerde Baskanin Rolu (The Role of Mayors in Local Administration). *ÜHFM C.* LXIX (1- 2): 299-316.

Tunali, I. and Filiztekin, A. (2002) ‘Anatolian Tigers: Are They for Real?’, *Koc University Working Paper*.

Uğur, M. (1999) *European Union and Turkey: An Anchor Credibility Dilemma,* Aldershot:Ashgate.

Uğur, M. and Yankaya, D. (2008) ‘Policy Entrepreneurship, Policy Opportunism and the EU Conditionality: the AKP and TÜSİAD Experience in Turkey’, Governance: *An International Journal of Policy, Administrations and Institutions*, 21 (4): 581-601.

Ulusoy, A. and Akdemir, T. (2009), ‘Yerel Yönetimler ve Mali Özerklik: Türkiye ve OECD Ülkelerinin Karşılastırmalı Analizi (Local Government and Fiscal Autonomy: Comparative Analysis of Turkey and OECD Countries)’, *BAU- SBED*, 12 (21): 259-287.

Ulusoy, K. (2005) *Saving the State Again: Turks face the Challenge of European Governance”, SIGMA Papers*, Paris: OECD.

Ulusoy, K. (2009) ‘The Changing Challenge of Europeanization to Politics and Governance in Turkey’, *International Political Science Review*, 30 (4): 363-384.

Uygun, O. (2012) *Suggestions on the New Constitution for Local and Regional Government,* TESEV Good Governance Programme, Istanbul: TESEV Publications.

Visier, C. (2009) ‘the Turkish Interest Groups in Brussels’ in S. Devaux and I. Sudbery (eds.) *Europeanization: Social Actors and the Transfer of Models in EU-27*, Praque: CEFRES, pp. 95-114.

Wallace, H. (2003) ‘Contrasting Images of European Governance’, in B. Kohler-Koch (ed.), *Linking EU and National Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1-9.

Weyand, S. (1997) ‘Interregional Associations and the European Integration Process’, in C. Jeffery, *The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards Third Level in Europe?*, London: Frank Cass, pp. 166-182.

Woll, C. and Jacquot, S. (2010), ‘Using Europe: Strategic Action in Multi-level Politics’ *Comparative European Politics*, 8 (1): 110–126.

Yılmaz, H. (2012) *Euroskepticism in Turkey: Comparative Findings from two National Surveys*, Istanbul: Bogazici University Publication.

Yin, R.K. (2003) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (3rd Edition), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Yoder, J.A. (2003) 'Bridging the European Union and Eastern Europe: Cross-border Cooperation and the Euroregions', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 13 (3): 90-106.

Young-Hyman, T. (2009) ‘the Potential for Effective Regional Development Agencies in Turkey: A Comparative Analysis’, *Regional and Federal Studies*, 18 (4): 375-402.

Zürcher, E. J. (2010) *Turkey: A Modern History,* 3rd edition, London, New York: I.B. Tauris.

**Official Documents**

Article 3335 (1987), ‘the Act for the Establishment of International Associations’, passed in Turkish Grand National Assembly on 30th March, 1987, and issued in Official Gazette on 07th April, 1987 with the issue number of 19424.

Article 5449 (2006), ‘the Act for Creation, Coordination and Tasks of Regional Development Agencies’, passed in Turkish Grand National Assembly on 25th January, 2006, and issued in Official Gazette on 08th February, 2006 with the issue number of 26074.

COR (2007) ‘Relations with Turkey on the Objectives, Mandate, and working Methods of Working Group’, Commission for External Relations and Decentralized Cooperation, 19 March, 2007, Brussels.

CEC (2001) ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession’, SEC (2001) 1756.

CEC (2004) ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession’, COM (2004) 656 Final.

CEC (2005a) ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession’, COM (2005) 561 Final.

CEC (2005b) Negotiation Framework for Turkey, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002\_05\_tr\_framedoc\_en.pdf, (Accessed on 15th March, 2010).

CEC (2006) ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession’, COM (2006) 649 Final.

CEC (2007) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the EU Parliament. Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Multi-Annual Indicative Financial Framework for 2009-2011. November 6, COM (2007) 689 final, Brussels.

CEC (2007a) ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession’, COM (200) 663 Final.

CEC (2007b) Commission Decision on a Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD, 2007-2009) for Turkey, available at http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/AB/TeknikMevzuatDb/MIPD.pdf (accessed on 15th March, 2010).

CEC (2008) ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession’, COM (2008) 674 Final.

CEC (2009) ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession’, COM (2009) 533 Final.

**Web Site**

Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), www.aebr.net

Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON, Turkish Acronym), www.tuskoneu.org

Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), www.cpmr.org

Economic Development Foundation (IKV, Turkish Acronym) Turkey, www.ikv.org.tr

EUROCITIES, www.eurocities.eu

EU Regional Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/regional\_policy

The Committee of Regions (CoR), www.cor.europa.eu

The European Associations of Regional Development Agency (EURADA), www.eurada.org

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.tr

Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmens’ Association (TUSIAD, Turkish Acronym) Brussels Office, http://www.tusiad.us/rep\_office\_details.cfm?REP=2


Turkish Research and Business Organizations (TuR&Bo) Brussels Office, www.turboppp.org


Union of Municipalities Of Turkey (TBB, Turkish Acronym), www.tbb.gov.tr


Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey (Kadiger, Turkish Acronym), www.kadiger.org


# 

# APPENDIX 1: THE INVENTORY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL SURVEY









# APPENDIX 2: SURVEY PARTICIPANTS

**(The Name of Organizations)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **City Municipals** | **Metropolitian Municipalities** | **Regional Development Agencies** |
| 1) Adıyaman CMs  2) Afyonkarahisar CMs  3) Ağrı CMs  4) Aksaray CMs  5) Amasya CMs  6) Ardahan CMs  7) Artvin CMs  8) Aydın CMs  9) Balıkesir CMs  10) Bartın CMs  11) Bayburt CMs  12) Bilecik CMs  13) Bitlis CMs  14) Çanakkale CMs  15) Çankırı CMs  16) Corum CMs  17) Denizli CMs  18) Düzce CMs  19) Edirne CMs  20) Elazığ CMs  21) Giresun CMs  22) Gümüşhane CMs  23) Hakkari CMs  24) Hatay CMs  25) Iğdır CMs  26) Isparta CMs  27) Karabuk CMs  28) Karaman CMs  29) Kars CMs  30) Kastamonu CMs  31) Kilis CMs  32) Kırıkkale CMs  33) Kahramanmaraş CMs  34) Kütahya CMs  35) Malatya CMs  36) Muğla CMs  37) Muş CMs  38) Nevşehir CMs  39) Niğde CMs  40) Ordu CMs  41) Siirt CMs  42) Sinop CMs  43) Sirnak CMs  44) Sivas CMs  45) Tokat CMs  46) Trabzon CMs  47) Tunceli CMs  48) Şanlı Urfa CMs  49) Uşak CMs  50) Van CMs  51) Yalova CMs | 1) Adana MCMs  2) Ankara MCMs  3) Antalya MCMs  4) Diyarbakır MCMs  5) Erzurum MCMs  6) Eskisehir MCMs  7) Gaziantep MCMs  8) İstanbul MCMs  9) Kayseri MCMs  10) Kocaeli MCMs  11) Konya MCMs  12) Mersin MCMs  13) Sakarya MCMs  14) Samsun MCMs | 1) Ahiler  2) Çukurova  3) Doğu Anadolu  4) Dicle  5) Doğu Akdeniz  6) Doğu Marmara  7) Fırat  8) Güney Ege  9) Güney Marmara  10) İpek Yolu  11) İstanbul  12) İzmir  13) Batı Akdeniz  14) Karacadağ  15) Kuzey Doğu Anadolu  16) Kuzey Anadolu  17) Mevlana  18) Orta Karadeniz  19) Trakya  20) Zafer |

# APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

**AT THREE DIFFERENT ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS**

**National**

1. What has been changed in Turkish regional policy within last decade in terms of legal, economic and administrative aspects?
2. What is the most important factor that is responsible for this change? (To what proportion do the EU/other international factors/domestic development have played a role during this process?)
3. How can the EU promote regionalization process? (Which instruments/ strategies; what kind of incentive mechanisms).
4. How important regionalization in Turkey is to the EU? Does Turkish regionalization process satisfy the EU’s expectation? If it is not, what are the most important factors which affect the regionalization process in Turkey?
5. Can the EU make any difference to SNAs domestically – through additional resources, legitimacy, knowledge etc? If it can, what is the most important factor which induces SNAs to engage with the EU institutions?
6. How ready are Turkish national government and/or administrative structure and SNAs in the situation of subnational mobilization? If they are not ready, what are the biggest obstacles which obscure Turkish SNAs to mobilize across the EU arena?
   * What channels (if any) are Turkish SNAs aware of (apart from the national channels)?
   * How do Turkish SNAs know about these channels?
   * What do Turkish SNAs know about these channels?
   * What do they expect from the engagement with the EU level mobilization?
   * What are the costs and benefits of their involvement?

**Subnational**

1. Do you believe that SNAs also need to involve / be involved in Turkey’s accession process? **(If yes, in what way?)**
2. What kind of preparation has your institution done for Turkey’s accession process? (Such as recruiting personnel, designating special post and/or office)
3. Have you consulted with other institutions in your region or do you get support from those institutions for your EU activities? How do you describe your relations with other institutions in your region? (Strong-Moderate-Weak) **(Give Examples)**
4. Do you get enough information from centre regarding the EU opportunities? **(Give Examples)**
5. What kinds of opportunities **(Rewards and benefits)** do you see, if your organization starts to engage with the EU institutions?
6. What kinds of risks do you see, if your organization starts to establish interaction with the EU institutions? What sources do you prefer to access to learn more about the EU?
7. What issues should be kept in mind when your organization is developing interactions with the EU institutions?

**Supranational**

1. What does the EU want to see/expect in terms of Turkey’s regionalization and role of SNAs in Turkish governance?
2. Does Turkish regionalization process satisfy the EU’s expectation? If it is not, what are the most important factors affecting the regionalization process in Turkey?
3. What are the incentives exerted by the EU for domestic change? Which instruments/ strategies; what kind of incentive mechanisms?
4. Does your institution open to representations from Turkish SNAs or welcoming to the input of such actors?
5. Does your organization open to the claims of Turkish SNAs in the area of the structural funds? Or are you welcoming the local expertise of SNAs and relying on their cooperation in implementing and delivering the structural funds in their areas?
6. Has there any municipality or regional development agency seeking an autonomy directly contacted with your organization or institution?
7. Does your organization seek to find a partner in city or regional level in Turkey? if does so, what plays role in the selection of this partnership?
8. When did Turkish municipalities or regional administrations first start establishing relations with your institution?
   * How do Turkish SNAs know about your organization?
   * To what extent are they engaged in your organization’s activities? (willing to take part in executive committees, working groups etc).
   * Are they active in their engagement with your organization? How active are they in their engagement?
   * What do they expect from this engagement?
   * What are the costs and benefits of their involvement? (How much they should pay for the membership fee? What they gain)
9. Considering the last decade, have you observed any increase in Turkish SNA’s engagement with your institutions or their institutions in Brussels?

# THE LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

#1: Hasan Soygüzel, Expert for Local Administrations, the Municipality of Yalova, the director of Local Agenda 21, Yalova (phone interview on 02.04. 2010).

#2: Gaye Doğanoğlu, Vice-President of Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, Muratpaşa District Municipality, Antalya, (30.03.2011).

#3: Prof Murat Ali Dulupçu, EU Team Players in Turkey, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Süleyman Demirel University, Isparta, (31.03. 2011).

#4: Gülhan Bilen, Senior Specialist on Regional Development, Development Bank of Turkey, Loan Evaluation Department, Ankara, (07.04. 2011).

#5: Bahar Özden, Expert, the Union of Municipalities of Turkey, the Department of International Relations Ankara, (11.04. 2011).

#6: Celil Yaman, Senior Planing Expert in General Directorate of Regional Development and Structural Adjustment, Ministry of Development, Ankara, (12.04.2011).

#7: Füsun Çiçekoğlu, Sector Manager in Regional Development and Cross Border Cooperation, Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, Ankara, (13.04.2011).

#8: Dr. Deniz Akkahve, City and Regional Planner, Ministry of Development, the then Head of Department in General Directorate of Regional Development and Structural Adjustment, Ankara, (13.04.2011).

#9: Murat Zorluoğlu, Head of Department, Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Local Authorities, Ankara, (13.04.2011).

#10: Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Interviews in Governance Studies, Emin Dedeoğlu, (Coordinator), Emre Koyuncu, (Policy Analysts), Tunga Köröğlu, (Policy Analysts), Ankara, (14.04.2011).

#11: A. Deren Doğan Yavuz, Head of Department, Ministry of European Union, Directorate for Social, Regional and Innovative Policies Director, Ankara, (14.04.2011).

#12: Burcu M. Dıraor, Expert in General Directorate of Regional Development and Structural Adjustment, Ministry of Development, , Ankara, (15.04.2011).

#13: Bülent Özcan, Head of Department in the Implementation of Projects, Ministry of European Union, Ankara, (15.04.2011).

#14: Mesut Kamiloğlu, Head of Department in General Directorate of Regional Development and Structural Adjustment, Ministry of Development, Ankara, (19.04. 2011).

#15: Nilgün Arısan Eralp, Coordinator in EU Studies, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara, (20.04.2011).

#16: Hayrettin Güngör, Secretary General, The Union of Municipalities of Turkey, Ankara, (26.04.2012).

#17: Fulya Evren, Expert in General Directorate of Regional Development and Structural Adjustment, Ministry of Development, Ankara, (26.04.2011).

#18: Serkan Valandova, Head of Department in General Directorate of Regional Competitiveness, Ministry of Development, Ankara, (26.04.2011).

#19: Prof Korel Göymen, EU team players in Turkey, Department of Political Science and Public Administration Sabancı University, İstanbul, (16.11.2011).

#20: Cevdet Karaca, Coordinator in EU and External Relation Coordination Centre, Coordinator, Samsun Governorship, Samsun, (01.11.2011).

#21: Mevlüt Özen, Secretary General, Middle Black Sea Development Agency, Samsun, (21.11.2011).

#22: Gökhan Yalçın, City and Regional Planner, Middle Black Sea Development Agency, Samsun, (21.11.2011).

#23: Aslan Karanfil, Secretary General, Samsun Special Provincial Administration, Samsun, (21.11.2011).

#24: Eyüp Elmas, R&D Coordinator, Samsun Special Provincial Administration, Samsun, (21.11.2011).

#25: Ramazan Aydın, Foreign Affairs Coordinator, Samsun Metropolitan Municipality, Samsun, (22.11.2011).

#26: Samsun Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Okan Gümüş (Deputy Secretary General), Müberra Genç (Coordinator in EU Coordination Centre), Samsun, (22.11.2011).

#27: Mustafa Karakurt, Chairman (elected), Samsun Provincial Assembly, Samsun, (22.11.2011).

#28: Dr. İlhan Karakoyun, Secretary General, Karacadağ Development Agency, Diyarbakır, (29.03.2011) (28.11.2011).

#29: Mehmet Yiğit, Deputy Governor, Diyarbakır Governorship, Diyarbakır, (28.11. 2011).

#30: Hamit Ercengiz, Coordinator in EU Coordination Centre, Diyarbakır Governorship, Diyarbakır, (28.11. 2011).

#31: Ahmet Akyol, Secretary General, Diyarbakır Special Provincial Administration, Diyarbakır, (28.11.2011).

#32: Fatma Sümbül, Vice Chairman (elected), Diyarbakır Provincial Assembly, Diyarbakır, 29.11.2011.

#33: Zerrin Türk, Foreign Affairs Expert, The Union of Southeast Municipalities, Diyarbakır, (29.11.2011).

#34: Abbas Büyüktaş, Expert, Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Diyarbakır, (29.11.2011).

#35: Rıfat Nalbantoglu, Republican People’s Party Izmir Provincial President (previous), Coordinator for the House of Izmir in the EU project, İzmir, (07.12.2011).

#36: Dilara Sülün, Coordinator in EU relations, İzmir Chamber of Commerce, İzmir, (08.12.2011).

#37: Başak Somuncu, EU Expert, İzmir Metropolitan Municipality, Izmir, (08.12.2011).

#38: Prof Zerrin Toprak, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Dokuz Eylul University, Member of Izmir Development Committee, İzmir, (08.11.2011).

#39: Ahmet Önal, Konak District Governor, EU and Foreign Relations Coordinator, İzmir Governorship, İzmir, (09.12.2011).

#40: EU Team in İzmir Governorship, Güldan Kalem (Senior Expert), Zehra Kibar (Expert), İzmir, (09.12.2011).

#41: İrfan İçöz, Secretary General, İzmir Special Provincial Administration, İzmir, (09.12.2011).

#42: Devrim Çukur, European Regional Assebly- Member of Turkish Committee, İzmir Provincial Assembly, İzmir, (09.11.2011).

#43: Göksel Uçak, Expert in EU Info Centre, Association of Aegean Industrialists and Businessmen, İzmir, (09.12.2011).

#44: Begüm Tatari, Expert in City Marketing and Foreign Relations Unit, İzmir Development Agency, İzmir, (09.12.2011).

#45: Bursa Eskişehir Bilecik Development Agency (BEBKA), Eskişehir Investment Support Unit, Ahmet Kalkan, (Coordinator), Gülsen Kaya (Expert), Eskişehir, (13.12.2011).

#46: Murat Daoudov, (Former) Director of International Cooperation, Union of Municipalities of Marmara, İstanbul, (15.12.2011).

#47: İnan İzci, EU Coordinator, Municipality of Sarıyer, İstanbul, (15.12.2011).

#48: DG Regio, Kristian Gavel (IPA Programme Managers), Anna Burylo (Turkey Desk Officers), Brussels, (18.06.2012).

#49: Fornea Aliona, Policy Advisor in PES Group Secretariat, the Committee of Regions, Brussels, (18.06.2012).

#50: Victor Tilea, Desk Officer, the CoR, Brussels, (18.06.2012).

#51: Bahadır Kaleağası, International Coordinator, Representation fo the European Union and Business Europe, Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD), Brussels, (18.06.2012).

#52: Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU, Dr. Nurşen Numanoğlu (Deputy Permanent Delegate), Fatma Can Sağlık (EU Consellor), Brussels (18.06.2012).

#53: Eurocities, Tara Schineider and Sorayo Zanardo (Experts), Brussels, (19.06.2012).

#54: Regine Kramer, Policy Coordinator in Standing Committee for Institutional Affairs, Assembly of European Regions, Brussels, (19.06.2012).

#55: Egle Puodziukaite, Programme Assistant-EU Policies Turkey, DG Enlargement, Brussels, (19.06.2012).

#56: Carol Thomas, Senior Policy Officer, Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR), Brussels, (19.06.2012).

#57: Kader Sevinç, Representative to the EU, Member of Socialist International, Republician People’s Party (CHP, Turkish Acronym), Brussels, (19.06.2012).

#58: Nicola Aimi, Deputy Head of Unit, IPA/ISPA, Accession Negotiations Team, DG Regio, Brussels (21.06.2012).

#59: Murat Demir Seyrek, Free Lancer Lobbysist, Glocal, Brussels, (21.06.2012).

#60:Yaşar Tümbaş, Honorary Representative EU-Belgium for the Metropolitan Municipality of Gaziantep, Brussels, (21.06.2012).

#61: Dr. Thomas Grunert, Head of Unit, Enlargement and European Economic Area, European Parliament, Brussels (21.06.2012).

#62: Prof Michel Huysseune, Head of Department, International Relations, Vesalius College, Brussels, (22.06.2012).

#63: Amanda Paul, Policy Analyst and Programme Executive, European Policy Centre, Brussels, (22.06.2012).

#64: Onur Eryüce, Secretary General, Association of Social Democrat Municipalities, Brussels (Phone interview, 12.07.2012).

#65: Hande Özhan Bozatlı, President of Committee 3 (Culture, Education, Youth, and International Cooperation), President of EU and International Relations Committee of Istanbul Provincial Council, Istanbul, (Email Interview, 17.07.2012).

#66: Christian Saublens, Secretary General, the European Association of Development Agencies, Brussels, (Email Interview, 17.07.2012).

#67: İbrahim Evrim, Deputy Secretary General, Metropolitan Municipality of Gaziantep, Gaziantep (Phone interview, 17.07.2012).

1. During the writing-up stage of the thesis, Croatia was a candidate state but it is now a member of the EU. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The definition of Europeanization for SNAs was adapted from McCauley (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For the alternative view on this, Koçak (2007:22-24) discusses that because of Turkey’s unique geographical position, there may be two-way interaction. This includes bottom-up Europeanization. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. In analysing the impact of Europeanization on British politics, Bulmer and Burch (1998: 603) similarly observe that while change has been substantial, it has been more or less wholly in keeping with British traditions. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The most common categorization, particularly with regard to the downloading perspective of Europeanization, comprises four variants that embody different degrees and directions of change (Radaelli, 2003:37; Börzel, 1999; 2005; Cowles et al., 2001; Heritier & Knill, 2001). These are ‘inertia’, ‘absorption’, ‘transformation’ and ‘retrenchment’. Inertia is a situation suggesting a lack of change. Absorption indicates change but the degree of change is low. Transformation is the paradigmatic change which occurs when the fundamental logic of political behaviour changes (Radaelli, 2003: 37). Retrenchment implies that national policy becomes less European than it was (ibid). Börzel and Risse (2003) also present three different outcomes: absorption, accommodation and transformation. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. For instance, see Hix & Goetz, 2000; Cowles *et al.*, 2001; Olsen, 2002; 2007; Knill & Lehmkul, 2002; Börzel 2002; Börzel & Risse, 2003; Radaelli, 2003; Bulmer & Lequesne, 2005; Graziano & Vink, 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. What Richard Rose (1993:4) suggests is that time and space are important components for lesson-drawing. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The State Planning Organization (SPO) was named as the Ministry of Development in 2011. Both refer to the same institutions. However, for consistency, the Ministry of Development is used throughout the research. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Inter alia, Bulmer, 1993; 1998; Jupille & Caporaso, 1999; Thielemann, 1999; 2000; Schneider & Aspinwall, 2001; Checkel, 2001. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Five usages see Olsen 2002; Buller & Gamble, 2002; and six usages see Bache & Jordan, 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. There is generally an accepted differentiation between European integration as the process of creating a polity at the EU level and Europeanization as the effects of the EU on its member and accession states (Bache, 2008: 1). This definition fits to the former (EU integration) and it is opposed to an analytically distinct process to which European integration gives rise (Bomberg & Peterson, 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. For the rich account on this see, inter alia Grabbe, 2001; Hughes *et al*., 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Börzel, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011; Bache *et al*., 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Some scholars evaluated Europeanization in applicant states as changes in external boundaries by enlargement (Olsen, 2002) or a particular form of Europeanization ‘abroad’ (Pitschell & Bauer, 2009:335). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. For a similar discussion and comparative analysis of cohesion countries and some CEE countries see, Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004: 316. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is a geo-code standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes. The standard is developed and regulated by the European Union, and thus only covers the member states of the EU in detail. The NUTS is instrumental in European Union's Structural Fund delivery mechanisms. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For discussion about the horizontal feature of the MLG, see Ertugal, 2010; Lagendijk *et al.,* 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Alaturka is an adjective in Turkish and refers to ‘compatible with the old Turkish tradition and life-style’. It is also used synonymously with ‘Alafranga’ which means westernized (source: Turkish Language Institute, www.tdk.gov.tr). In this respect, the usage of Alaturka of Europeanization refers to the changes in line with the Turkish tradition. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The Turkish Grand National Assembly approved 34 constitutional amendments in this period, most of them in the areas of human rights, laws regarding Penal Code, and the anti-terror law. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The Cyprus issue stands in the heart of Turkey’s accession process with the EU, for the rich account on this issue, see (Christou, 2003; 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. In the latest survey conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), public support for EU membership has decreased around 25 % between 2004 and 2012. While 70.2% of people supported the EU membership in 2004, this has decreased to the level of 45.4% in 2012. For more detail see ‘Life-Satisfaction Survey of 2012’, www.tuik.gov.tr. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Only one chapter, Science and Technology, has been so far closed. Twelve Chapters are open but still under observation. Two Chapters were invited to be presented and Turkey has presented its negotiation position. Eight chapters are reserved as the additional protocol with Cyprus the opening criterion for these chapters. 10 chapters are still being discussed in the Council. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. For the summary of PM Erdoğan’s speech, see the Journal of Turkish Weekly, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/14088/erdogan-copenhagen-criteria-would-become (accessed on 1st March, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. For the rich historical summary see Marks *et al*., 1995; Hooghe, 1995; Bache, 1998 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. For further discussion about what undermines both state-centric and supranational accounts for grasping the role of SNAs in the EU policy-making process, see (Marks *et al*., 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. For an overview see Diez & Winer, 2005; Graziano & Vink, 2007 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. For the extensive analysis on the MLG approach see Marks *et al.*, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Bache & Flinders, 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Layering refers to the emergence of change on the margins, implying local rule transformation within a basically unchanged institution that does not challenge the dominant characteristics of the mode of governance (Bruzst, 2008:620). Ertugal also argued that the creation of RDAs in Turkey also fits the concept of layering (see Ertugal, 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Those scholars are, inter alia, Hooghe, 1996; Marks *et al.,* 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Jeffrey,1997a; 2000; Bullmann; 1997; Tatham, 2008; 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. For the extensive empirical findings of the EU activities of Turkish SNAs in Brussels see Chapter 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. For exceptions see Anderson, 2003; Saurugger, 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. See also Anderson, 2003: 47-48; Radaelli, 2004: 8; Bache & Jordan, 2006:30. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Although territorial interests are seen as one division of interest representation, there are a number of convergences between functional and territorial interest representation at the EU level. For further analysis for the distinction between functional and territorial interests see Knodt *et al.*, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. The selection of RDAs as an example of NUTS II level does not have any problem because in that territorial unit, RDAs have a single, continuous and non-intersecting boundary. Yet when one defines what NUTS III levels in Turkey consist of, the problem arises. The Turkish administrative system at this level is governed through a dual structure: on the one hand, there are provincial administrations headed by centrally appointed governors who at the same time chair the provincial assemblies, whose members are directly elected. On the other hand, there are directly elected (metropolitan) municipalities, whose numbers and size vary from province to province depending on population size. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. As Marsh and Furlong (2002:37) put it, most MLG theorists are realist in epistemological terms, emphasizing how the continuity of rules, norms and operation procedures, and sometimes of deep, non-observable structures can and do determine the outcomes of decision-making in the long term. As such their logic is inductive rather than deductive. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. There is not enough research conducted based on descriptive survey analysis in the literature for analysing the behaviour of SNAs on the issue of mobilisation. The majority of studies implementing survey analysis are mainly explanatory in nature and designed to test theories or hypotheses (inter alia, Marks *et al.*, 1996; 2002; Tatham, 2010). Yet there are some studies, inter alia Goldsmith and Klausen (1997) and Eising (2009), from which this author drew insight to prepare the questionnaire. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. For this, the formal administrative structure of the given organizations was checked to find relevant personnel working in the foreign relations department and/or EU office if the organization has one. If not, assistance from the human resources unit and/or operator over the phone was required to find out staff who at least knows about the internal structure of organizations as well as its EU activities. It is crucial to give one detail about this phone call which I conducted with operators in those institutions where there is not any special post for the EU affairs. During the phone calls, as soon as I spelled out about my project and why I am doing this survey, almost all the operators tended to direct me to the project office in which staff are mainly concerned about the EU-funded project. This nuance may show that the EU echoes in the logic of those organizations as financial or in an instrumental way. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. There was one misunderstanding derived from the translation. In fact, it was not a translation error but two institutions, the Council of Europe and the European Union Council are often confused with one another in Turkey. This is because the Turkish name for both institutions is often translated as ‘Avrupa Konseyi’. After realizing that some SNAs chose the answer of EU Council to show who they have a relation with, the author phoned up again to make sure whether they mean the EU Council or the Council of Europe. After that call, they realized that they made a mistake as they in fact meant to say the Council of Europe. Except for that, no problems occurred regarding the translation. The cover letter clearly explained why this survey was conducted and why their participation was important. Even so, during the distribution of the survey, each participant was instructed on the phone to choose the most appropriate answer(s). If they are not able to answer a question, they were reminded to ask for help from their colleagues — as there are some questions which may necessitate a certain level of expertise and knowledge. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. The interview in DG Regio was carried out on 18 June 2012; the visit of the mayor of Antalya Municipality was on 25th June 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. The interview took place in Samsun on 21st November 2011; the general secretary of the Middle Black Sea Development Agency, Mevlüt Özen, was elected as a member of EURADA executive board on 17th November 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. The Ministry for EU affairs used to be named the General Secretary for the EU Affairs under the Prime Ministry. However, by 2011, it was created as a separate ministry. For consistency, the Ministry for EU Affairs is used throughout the research. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. The author also carried out many valuable interviews with individuals (in Istanbul, Isparta, Antalya and Eskisehir), who have specific knowledge or publications regarding the research interest. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. The representatives from regional development agencies, municipalities, governorships, special provincial administrations and chambers of trade and industry were interviewed in the selected sample cities. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Devine (2002: 205) suggests that the snowball sampling model is worth utilizing, though this model may ‘nominate a set of interconnected people’. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. However, three interviews were not analysed because of several reasons such as irrelevancy, shortness and insignificancy. In some cases, the interview participant only answered the questions by saying yes or no. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Nvivo is one of the recent programmes for analysing qualitative data. It helps to carry out coding; organize and evaluate the qualitative data in an efficient way. By using it, annotations, memos, links, free and tree nodes are easily created (for further information, see Richards, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Categorization is a major component of qualitative data analysis by which investigators attempt to group patterns observed in the data into meaningful units or categories (Given 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. As Given (2008: 72) argues, the process of categorization continues in a research project until saturation (i.e., no further categories are discovered or constructed based on examination of new generated data) or exhaustion (i.e., the existing system of categories accounts for all meaningful or significant aspects of the phenomenon in question). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. The concepts of mono-centric and polycentric were borrowed from Herrschel and Newman (2002). Mono-centric regions suggest a greater emphasis on the local dimension through the influence of the dominant core city. Polycentric regions, by contrast, suggest more of a regional emphasis, because of the rivalry between the smaller cities across the region. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. The socio-economic development index was prepared for NUTS II and NUTS III regions in Turkey by using different indicators. The index was derived from demography, employment, education, health, industry, agriculture, construction, fiscal, infrastructure and some welfare indicators (for further details, see Dinçer *et al.,* 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Scholarly endeavours and their concepts to describe this novel type of territorial politics in the EU vary considerably. As such, the 1990s have been the era of a ‘Europe of the regions’ (Mazey & Mitchell, 1993; Loughlin 1996), ‘a Europe with the regions’ (Hooghe, 1995, Marks *et al*., 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001), ‘a Europe with certain regions’ (Hooghe, 1996; Marks *et al.*, 1996; Le Galès & Lequesne, 1998), ‘a Europe through regions’ (Kukawka, 2001 cited in Tatham, 2008), the emergence of ‘a third level’ in European decision making (Jeffrey, 1997a; 2000; Bullmann, 1997) and the evolution of a system of MLG in the EU (Marks, 1993). A burgeoning literature (Hooghe 1995; 1996; Jeffrey, 1997a; 2000; Keating, 1998; Le Galès & Lequesne, 1998) has emerged around what have been termed subnational mobilisation (Hooghe, 1995), paradiplomacy (Keating & Aldecoa, 1999), territorial representations (Moore, 2008a; 2011) and the foreign activities of subnational actors (Blatter *et al.*, 2008; 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Such as Keating & Jones, 1995; Jeffrey, 1997a; 2000; Bullmann, 1997; Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Le Galès & Lequesne, 1998; Goldsmith & Page, 2010; Fitjar, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. In one of the recent empirical-driven studies, Fitjar (2010) particularly illustrates the main causes behind the regional mobilisation in Western Europe by identifying five broad explanatory factors: globalization, Europeanization, cultural distinctiveness, regionalized party system and economic development. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. For rich explanation on this account, see Sharpe, 1993; Scott, 1995; Amin, 1999 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. According to Sharpe (1993), there has been a general trend toward decentralization in most western countries since the 1970s, the most important exception being in the UK, which witnessed an increased centralization under Margaret Thatcher. By contrast, France is a good example to show this decentralization effort, which was undertaken by the Raffarin government in 1982. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Sørensen (2006:190-191) argues that there are three standpoints in the debate on the transformation of state: ‘retreat of the state’; ‘the state-centric tradition’; and state transformation. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Arguing for a shift from the Keynesian Welfare National State to the Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime, Jessop (2004: 11) describes the hollowing out of state as the re-scaling of the nation-state’s powers upwards, downwards or sideways; a shift from state-based government to network-based governance; or incremental changes in secondary aspects of the nation-state that leave its core intact. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. While the old members refer to the EU-15, the new members simply refer to those states participating in the EU after the fifth enlargement process. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. The EU statistical standard for administrative units (NUTS) developed by Eurostat at the beginning of the 1980s, dividing the European territory into five levels of geographic aggregations: from sections of a country (NUTS I) to villages and towns (NUTS V). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. In 1993, Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance was also added to the cohesion policy structure. For an extensive summary of the evolution of EU regional policy and its funding mechanisms, see Armstrong, 1995; Bache, 1998; Leonardi, 2005; Bailey & De Propis, 2006; and Allen, 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. ‘A close consultation between the Commission, the member states concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal’ (EEC, 2052/88). [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. The general tendency in the literature is that SNAs are usually more powerful during the implementation and monitoring stage, particularly for the community program. They are also not expected to play a role in high politics issues such as migration, security, and the like, while they may have influence on some low politics issues such as environment, health care, and so forth. For the extensive account on the SNAs’ activities in Brussels, see Bullmann, 1997; Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Jeffrey, 1997a; 2000; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Tatham, 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Jeffrey (1997a; 2000) mentions about two broad types of access channels: ‘intra-state channels’, with indirect SNA access to the EU policy process conducted through the institutions of the member state; and ‘extra-state channels’, with direct SNA access to European institutions. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. For instance, in his quantitative driven research, Tatham (2008) analyzes how and under what conditions these six channels can be more efficient for regional interest representation. Scherpereel (2007) also analyzes the effectiveness of this channel for SNAs from the new member states. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. The treaty overtly requested that ‘the Commission should (...) consult widely before proposing legislation and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents’ (Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 7, Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Provisions 9) (Official Journal C 340, 10 November 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. The CoR replaced the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities (CCRLA) which had been established in 1988 as part of the new regional policy regime. The members of the CCRLA had been appointed by two European-wide subnational associations: the Assembly of European Regions and the Council for European Municipalities and Regions. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. The Maastricht Treaty specified that the CoR had the right to be consulted not only in the adoption and implementation of EU regional policies but also in all policy areas that had implications for European economic and social cohesion. See Schönlau (2010) for a practitioner point of view regarding the institutional trajectory of the CoR and its evolving place within the EU policy process. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. For the list of more interregional organizations see Greenwood, 2003; and for in-depth analysis of the creation of interregional associations during the EU integration process see Weyand, 1997. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Huysseunne and Jans (2008) gauge the required budget of having a presence in Brussels. For them, it ranges from 42.000 to 1.987.700 Euros, with an average of 381.705 Euros [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. For instance, see Marks, *et al.*, 1996; 2002; Jeffrey, 2000; Husseyyune & Jans, 2008; Tatham, 2008; 2010; Moore, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Three strategies are distinguished: Pace-setting, i.e. actively pushing policies at the European level, which reflect a member state’s policy preference and allow minimizing implementation costs; foot-dragging, i.e. blocking or delaying costly policies in order to prevent them altogether or achieve at least some compensation for implementation costs; and fence-sitting, i.e. neither systematically pushing policies nor trying to block them at the European level but building tactical coalitions with both pace-setters and foot-draggers. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. At the beginning of the Republic, Turkish territory was divided into 63 provinces, which have been the only intermediate power level and remain the main administrative units thus far. During the last 20 years, 18 provinces were created mainly for political reasons. There are now 81 provinces equalling the NUTS III level of European territorial system. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. For further discussion on the creation of metropolitan municipalities see Heper, 1989. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. The municipality law of 1580 was replaced with the Municipality Law of 5393 in 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. In terms of the situations for SNAs, there are regulations in their organic laws. These laws include Article 5302 of 2005 (Cl.62) for Special Provincial Administrations, Article 5393 of 2005 (Cl.74) for Municipalities. In the organic law of RDAs (5449 of 2006), there is no explicit consideration for international relations. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. This certainly comes close to the concept of facilitating institutions described by Cowles *et al.* (2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. For detailed historical evaluations see, inter alia İnalcık, 1963; Mardin, 1973; Karpat, 1973; Heper, 1985; 1989; Ersoy, 1992; Lewis, 2002; Zürcher, 2010; Ulusoy, 2009; Göymen, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Kemalism, an ideology of reform named after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the former chairperson of Turkish Grand National Assembly and the first President (1923-1938) of the new state that embraced positivism, nationalist and solidarity components of statist-centralist thought of the previous decade. For further details see Köker, 1995 and Şeker, 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. For the issue of political patronage and clientelism see Özbudun (1981), Sunar (1994), Adaman and Çarkoğlu (2000), Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan (2000) and Eder (2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. The law establishing the metropolitan municipalities (No.3030) lists their duties and defines a division of labour between the district municipalities and the metropolitan municipalities. The law of 3030 was replaced with the ‘Metropolitan Municipality Law’ of 5216 in 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. The Anatolian cities are a generic definition, which is used here to distinguish those cities from the central cities of Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Without support from the state, actors in the cities of Anatolia have been able to benefit from the advantages of openness brought about by neoliberal reforms. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. A number of studies have highlighted the rise of Anatolian tigers and changing local politics; inter alia, Tunalı and Filiztekin (2002) Keyman and Öniş (2007) and Kösebalaban (2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Examples of these administrative reforms are as follows: Neumark Report (1949); Barker Report (1950); Martin and Cush Report (1951); MEHTAP (1960); the Report of the Administrative Reform Consultation Board (1971); KAYA (1990). Furthermore, nine development plans have until now been prepared by the MoD since its establishment in 1960. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Nine five-year development programmes have been launched since 1960. The ninth plan will actually last seven years because of the harmonization with the EU Acquis. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. The term province and region are generally used interchangeably in official rhetoric on development issues. Yet, oddly enough, the same official rhetoric employs the term ‘region’ for statistical purposes at a very different scale and divides the country into seven geographic regions—namely, the Marmara, Aegean, Mediterranean, Central Anatolia, Black Sea, Eastern Anatolia, and South-eastern Anatolia regions—reflecting the topography and climatic conditions (also see Dulupçu, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Many scholars refer to this insecurity problem in Turkey as a ‘Sevres Syndrome’, which is based on the belief that the West have tried to weaken Turkey both through partitioning and through instigating domestic political turmoil. For example see Kirisçi (2004) and Bill Park (2005: 13). [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. According to the interview with the Secretary General of SODEM, their union has no connection with the previous movement of social democrat municipalities of the 1970s (Interview 83). [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. It is remarkable the regional disparities between the east and west part of Turkey. GDP per capita ratio was 60 for eastern Turkey and 123 for western Turkey (2004 national average=100). There are significant economic and social differences between these regions in terms of socio-economic indicators (see Socio-Economic Development Index Prepared by Ministry of Development in 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. These regional plans include Eastern Marmara Project, Çukurova Region Project, Antalya Region Project, Zonguldak–Karabük-Bartın Regional Development Project, Eastern Anatolia Project (DAP), Eastern Black Sea Development Project (DOKAP), Yeşilırmak Basin Development Project and South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP, Turkish acronym). The most comprehensive project in this field is the GAP project aiming to increase prosperity in underdeveloped regions through agricultural activities and increasing income. The completed and still prepared rural development projects can be listed as: Çankırı-Çorum Rural Development Projects, Erzurum Rural Development Project, Bingöl-Muş Rural Development Project, Yozgat Rural Development Project and Ordu-Giresun Rural Development Project. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. The most comprehensive project in this field is the South-eastern Anatolian Project (GAP), the implementation that started in 1989 as a multi-sector integrated project aimed to achieve sustainable development for 9 million people. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. LA 21 was initiated by UN Development Programme (UNDP) for the promotion of good governance and local democracy. In line with this objective UNDP launched an LA 21 Project in 85 countries including Turkey. Local Agenda implementations commenced at the end of 1997, under the project title ‘Promotion and Development of Local Agenda 21 in Turkey’. The project of encouraging and developing LA 21 initiatives has been developed by the Association of International Local Administrations, East Mediterranean, and Middle East Regional Organization (IULA-EMME). The UNDP selected the ‘Local Agenda 21 Program’ of Turkey as a world-side ‘best practice’ in 2001, and decided to present this program as ‘best practice’ to the world leaders and governments in the UN ‘Rio+10’ Summit in Johannesburg (UN Report, 2003) [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. See http://www.undp.org.tr/Gozlem2.aspx?WebSayfaNo=22 [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. For the full account of financial relations between the EU and Turkey, see the Republic of Turkey, Ministry for European Affairs, official website. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. For the full account of pre-accession assistance for Turkey since 2000, see http://www.abfonlari.gov.tr/adaylikdonemimaliyardimlar.html (accessed on 12th February, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. In 2003, the Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU) was established by the Memorandum of Understanding which is between the EU Commission and Turkish Government. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Four Programmes {Eastern Anatolia Development Programme (DAP) covering TRB2 NUTS II regions, Samsun, Kastamonu, Erzurum Regional Development Programme covering TR82, TR83, TRA1 NUTS II regions, Ağrı, Kayseri, Konya, Malatya Regional Development Programme covering TRA2, TR72, TR52, TRB1, NUTS II Regions, and Doğu Karadeniz Regional Development Programme (DOKAP) covering TR90 NUTS II regions} are implemented under the 2000-2006 EU-Turkey Pre-Accession Financial Cooperation. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. From 2007 to 2013, the available funds for regional development were 167.5 for 2007, 173.8 for 2008, 182.7 for 2009, 238.1 for 2010, 293.4 for 2011, 367.8 for 2012, and 378.0 for 2013. (For more detail, see the Regional Competitiveness Operational Programme Framework, 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. For example, see Dulupçu, 2005; Ertugal, 2010, 2011; Koçak, 2007; Bafoil & Kaya, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. The response from one interviewee is a good example of the general view of the majority of interviewees for the question of what is (are) the most important factor(s) that is/are responsible for the change in Turkish regional policy over the last decade. The respondent stated, ‘it is impossible to assign only one factor to explain the entire change in the Turkish regional policy [...] we are not living in an isolated world. Factors for change are not independent from each other as everything interacts. However, the best we can do is to categorize what are the more dominant factors and what are the lesser ones in this interaction’(Interview 3). [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. For the full discussion about the creation of RDAs in Turkey see Lagendijk *et al*., 2009; Young-Hyman, 2009; Ertugal, 2010; 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. In the beginning of 2003, as an extension of AKP’s promises, a series of official reports regarding a comprehensive reform package were produced by the Public Administration Basic Legislation Working Group. One of the most important reports prepared by this group was ‘Change in the Administration for Managing the Change’. This report pointed at the strong central tutelage over the local administrations as well as lack financial capabilities of SNAs. This report was conducted by one of the most important AKP proponents, Prof Dr Ömer Dinçer, while he was a head consultant for the Prime Minister, in 2003. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. For instance, during the creation of two pilot RDAs in Turkey, Italian experts have been consulted by both national and regional actors in Turkey (see Young-Hyman, 2009). Also, interview findings with the civil servants in the Ministry of Development suggest that English RDAs were taken as an example, given Turkey’s administrative closeness with England. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. This expression is stated in the AKP’s 59th Government Programme, which was declared by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkish Grand National Assembly in 18 March 2002. Yet many scholars usually name the AKP as Islamic Democrat or Muslim Democrat Party. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. For instance, in one of his speeches, PM Erdoğan publicly explained that ‘a state cannot be built upon fears’. (for the detail about this speech, see the following links, http://www.posta.com.tr/siyaset/HaberDetay/Erdogan--Korku-uzerine-ulke-insa-edilemez.htm?ArticleID=8633 [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. In their specification, policy entrepreneurs tend to have a long term view over which they expect to reap the benefits of entrepreneurship whereas policy opportunists prefer to secure the benefits of a shorter term outlook. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. A total budget of nearly €125 million has been earmarked for the development agencies in the 2009 national budget (see CEC, 2009). The average allocation is about 20.8 million Euros. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. They used the data set from IMF. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Prof Michele Huysseunne is a Brussels-based academic who has been working on the issue of liaison offices in Brussels for a long time. In Huysseunne and his fellows’ recent research, they have been analyzing liaison offices established by the non-member countries, like Bosnia-Herzegovina. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. The tension between Turkey and Syria occurred after the field work in Turkey. Right now, there is only a security consideration with the cities of Syria. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. This is one example showing Ankara’s sensitivity, ‘Turkey: PM Erdoğan calls for probe into ties with German foundations’ http://www.businessturkeytoday.com/turkey-pm-erdogan-calls-for-probe-into-ties-with-german-foundations.html, (accessed on 30th August 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. In taking the French SNAs as an empirical case study, Balme and Le Galès simply argue that there are stars, having strong political autonomy and administrative capacities from the developed regions and cities, and black holes, having insufficient administrative capacity from the peripheral regions in Europe. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. These findings particularly derived from the interviews 20, 21, 24, 26, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 46, 47, 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. When compared to the level of pre-accession funding for the CEECs, the ratio of EU funds available for Turkey may be as little as 1:10 in terms of per capita figures (Ertugal 2010:95). This was also the case before the introduction of IPA. For instance, Bulgaria received in total around 300 million Euros per annum from the 2000-2003 period. The equivalent total for Turkey would be around 3 billion Euro per annum but in fact Turkey received 250 million Euro in 2004 and 300 million Euro in 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. It is also stated in the Negotiation Framework in 2005 that the financial aspects of the accession of Turkey must be allowed for in the applicable Financial Framework. Hence, as Turkey's accession could have substantial financial consequences, the negotiations can only be concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014 together with possible consequential financial reforms. Any arrangements should ensure that the financial burdens are fairly shared between all Member States. This shows the extent to which the EU worries about the accession of Turkey to the EU. Derogations in this chapter are also exerted because of some other member states’, France and Germany, objections. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. For this question, survey participants were allowed to select more than one option. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. This was a common point underlined by those interview participants from the Ministry of Development and the EU Delegation Ankara, as they have often visited the areas where the EU funds were implemented. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Data available on Central Finance and Contract Unit and Ministry of EU Affairs web sites. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Turkey’s most indebted municipalities, http://www.habermonitor.com/en/haber/detay/turkey-s-most-indebted-municipalities/157148/ (accessed on 3rd September 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. As an example of this low interest, an interview participant reported that: ‘four or five years ago when we announced the free courses and certificate programs regarding the EU matters, there used to be 1500 applicants, and so we had to choose the most eligible candidates for the courses. Yet in our recent call for EU training programs that was last week, we could not find any candidates to participate in our EU certificate programs’ (Interview 39). [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. For instance, the info-centre in Izmir (ESIAD) prepared a project called ‘the European Horizons on Anatolian Heaven’ in 2002. This project aimed at training experts, professionals, and students as well as spreading correct EU information in Anatolian cities (Interview 43). [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. RDAs in the monocentric city region (i.e. Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir) have only one governor. However, in the case of polycentric city regions, governors become a chairman of the RDA on a rotating basis. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. To be a general secretary for RDAs, the person needs to ‘have bachelor degree in the fields of law, economy, finance, business administration, public administration, …architecture, urban and regional planning and engineering’, ‘to have a minimum 10 years of experience in the activity field of the Agency’ and ‘to have English proficiency in terms of oral and verbal aspects’ (Sadioğlu & Dede, 2011) . [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. The study was conducted by Kemal Doğrusöz, for more detail see Polat, 1978. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. This interview was spontaneous and personal with the President of the aforesaid institution in Antalya (March 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Such a procedure generally starts with an application to the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The aforesaid ministry consults with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If the application does not gainsay with the general implications of national foreign policy and it is suitable with the international agreement that the country is a party, SNAs are able to acquire the necessary permission to carry out their international activities (Keleş, 2011: 194 & 283). [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. For this question, survey participants were allowed to select more than one option. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Articles 5302/62 for Special Provincial Administrations and 5393/74 for Municipalities legalize the international activities of SNAs in Turkey. Both articles make a similar statement which is that parties wishing to conduct international activities (i.e. sister city agreements, joint international projects, and membership to the international organizations) must consider the national foreign policy choices, act upon the international agreements that the country is a signatory to, and request permission from the ministry of interior affairs. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. In line with its statutes, the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) works on behalf of the European border and cross-border regions with the aim to: highlight their special problems, opportunities, responsibilities and activities; represent their common interests vis-à-vis national and international parliaments, bodies, authorities and institutions; initiate, support and coordinate cooperation between the regions throughout Europe; promote exchanges of experience and information with a view to identifying and coordinating common interests among the diverse range of cross-border problems and opportunities and to propose possible solutions. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. The aforementioned cross-regional programmes with Greece include Vorio Egeo-Turkey, Notio Egeo-Turkey, and Euroregion Network Polis-Kent (source: Association of European Border Regions). [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. For further detail please see the link (http://www.aebr.eu/en/news/news\_detail.php?news\_id=154) (accessed on 15th April, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. For further information for the Sinop Declaration in 22 June 2012 please see the following link, http://www.crpm.org/pub/news/323\_sinop\_final\_declaration.pdf (accessed on 10th April 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument managed by the DG Enlargement of the EU Commission. TAIEX supports partner countries with regard to the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation. It is largely demand driven and facilitates the delivery of appropriate tailor-made expertise to address issues at short notice. (For the extra information, see www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex). [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. For the further information and the contexts of these TAIEX meetings held in Turkey, please see the following link http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/dyn/taiex-events/library/index\_en.jsp?EventTypes=&LibMonths=&LibCountries=12&Keywords=&Speakers=&submit=Submit (accessed on 4th May, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. However, there is a recent development for Chapter 22 which is Regional Policy and Structural Fund. General Affairs Council (GAC) held on 25 June 2013 agreed to open Chapter 22. The Inter-Governmental Conference with Turkey will take place after the presentation of the Commission’s annual progress report and following a discussion of the GAC which will confirm the common position of the Council for the opening of Chapter 22 and determine the date for the accession conference (source Ministry for EU Affairs, www.abgs.gov.tr, accessed on 23rd July 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Except for the Human Sources Development Operational Programmes [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. The European Parliament-Kurds Friendship Group is composed of several members of the EP from various member states and from different political groups. Among the creators of the initiative are MEPs from four political groups and eight countries. The political groups involved in the creation process include, the Group of Greens–European Free Alliance, the European United Left–Nordic Green Left, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, and Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. These MEPs are as follows: Emine Bozkurt (Netherlands), group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialist and Democrats; Ismail Ertuğ (Germany), group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialist and Democrats; and Metin Kazak (Bulgaria), group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. ‘Bursa Days in Brussels’ initiated by Osmangazi Municipality was the first of its kind. It was both a contribution to the promotion of Bursa and a remarkable support to Turkey’s EU process. (for more detail, see the following link http://www.bursaab.gov.tr/haber\_goster.asp?haberID=503) (Accessed on 12 May 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. The issues discussed in those meetings were related to governance, decentralization, regionalization, shared competences, shared capacity, capacity building, administrative management and fiscal decentralization. In the last meeting in Muğla (on 4th June 2012), the discussion was centred on how SNAs are involved in the process of writing the new civil constitution in Turkey. See the minutes of the 12th meeting of the Working Group on relations with Turkey, Muğla, Turkey on 4 June 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Eurocities brings together the local governments of over 140 large cities in more than 30 European countries and seeks to influence and work with the EU institutions to respond to common issues that affect the day-to-day lives of Europeans. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. AER is the largest independent network of regions in wider Europe. Bringing together 270 regions from 34 countries and 16 interregional organizations, AER is the political voice of its members and a forum for interregional co-operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. AER press release, 5th April 2011, (http://www.aer.eu/en/news/2011/2011040501.html) (Accessed on 16 May 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. In its dealings with EU institutions and national governments the CPMR has been targeting its action towards ensuring that the needs and interests of its member regions are taken into account in all its policies with a high territorial impact. It predominantly strives to ensure a strong EU regional policy targeted at all of Europe’s regions and to work towards the delivery of an integrated maritime policy designed to contribute to Europe’s economic growth. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. In 2003, the Ministry of Development conducted research to examine the development ranking of cities and statistical regional units (NUTS2) in order to collect regional data, analyse socio-economic differences and determine the framework for regional plans. According to this study, cities are ranked as first, second, third, fourth and fifth. While the first refers to the most developed regions or cities, the fifth is considered as the less developed (Dinçer *et al,.* 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. As examples for these events, see inter alia, EURADA Agorada 2012+ meeting in Samsun, (http://www.eurada.org/index.php?option=com\_events&task=view\_detail&agid=265&jevtype=icaldb&Itemid=154&lang=en); Eurocities in Cities in Beyoğlu (Istanbul) meeting (http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/events/EUROCITIES-in-the-Cities-in-Beyoglu-Istanbul-16-17-04-2012-) ; and CPMR More 4 More General Assembly of the BBSC in Sinop (http://news.cpmr.org/tag/sinop/). [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Germany has the largest representation, with an average of 9.3 members of staff. Spain also scores highly with 8.8 representations; Austria, Denmark, and Finland on the other hand have an average of 3 to 4 employees. (Huysseunne and Jans, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. For the issue of internet and its effective usage in EU governance, see Christou & Simpson (2006 and 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. This category includes consortia of regional and local authorities and international networks. It always involves public authorities, nonetheless. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. For example, before the 2004 enlargement, the Network of Interest Representation Offices from Candidate Countries (NIROC) was composed of 24 organizations (from 6 countries); of these, 8 were Turkish. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. For a recent study on the cultural mosaic of the southeast region in Turkey, see Samur 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. The tribes, usually referred to as *ashiret* in Turkey, are ‘fluid, mutable, territorially oriented and at least quasi-kinship groups’ that range in size between tribal confederacies of thousands of members to small units of several dozen individuals (Cornell, 2001:35). [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. In terms of GDP per capita (2011), while the richest regions of Turkey, (Kocaeli sub-division) have 11.740$, this number is as low as 2100 $ in the poorest regions of Turkey, which are encompassing largely Kurdish dominated cities (Source TUIK 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. The name of the so-called Kurdish party has changed its name several times because it has been banned from the political life by the decisions of Constitutional Court. These names, respectively, include People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP), Democratic Society Party (DTP), and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. The results of the last general election for the BDP party in 2011 are as follows: Hakkari (79.88%); Şırnak (72.5%); Diyarbakır (61.17%); Mardin (60.98%); Batman (51.7%); Van (48.48%) and Muş (44.4%). The data is derived from Turkey Supreme Committee of Elections (www.ysk.gov.tr). [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. In the political parties Law of the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, advocating for federalism, regional autonomy or different languages and cultures were considered as a means to shut political parties down (Uygun, 2012:6). For example, the legal documents include Article 14 of the 1982 Constitution, and Article 96 of the law on political parties. It is one of the reasons that many parties established by Kurds were prohibited and they have established after each time they were closed. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. Another important problem for these parties is that many mainstream parties as well as the majority of the public have ascertained that there is a close relation between these parties and a Kurdish terrorist organization (PKK). This situation has always produced enormous suspicion about their political agenda. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. For the entire speech of Mesut Yılmaz on Diyarbakir’s importance for Turkey’s Candidacy, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=yilmaz-road-to-eu-passes-through-diyarbakir-1999-12-17 (accessed on 11 August 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. It is important to note here that the Turkish delegation to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities consists of 12 permanent members and 12 substitutes depending on political orientations and geographical coverage. Two members (one permanent and one substitute), Leyla Güven and Şeyhmus Bayhan, from the BDP cannot operate because they are in detention. In fact, the interview in the Diyarbakir Provincial Assembly was supposed to be conducted with Şeyhmus Bayhan (the President). Because of his situation, the interview was conducted with the vice-President. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Aytaç Durak is accused of engaging in collusion over awarding tenders from within the Adana municipality. Aziz Kocaoğlu currently stands trial on accusations of corruption and engagement in the crimes of preparing fabricated documents, causing financial loss to the state and rigging tenders. A prosecutor demands up to 397 years in prison for the mayor. (source: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-314136-reduced-sentences-for-tender-rigging-will-promote-the-crime-critics-warn.html) (Accessed on 26th April 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. During the interviews, it was asked to representatives from the EU institutions (the Commission, the CoR and the EU Parliament) to provide me any data regarding the visits of Turkish SNAs to their respective organization. However, each informant said that there is no such data at hand. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. By having 43 members and representing 6.5 million people under member municipalities, the primary mission of SODEM is to maintain dialogue between its members and their European counterparts. Thus, it aims to enhance the capacity of the member municipalities and contribute to Turkey’s accession process to the EU. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Izmir is usually considered in Turkish political life as the bastion of CHP and secularism. Being the third biggest city after Istanbul and Ankara, mainstream political parties throughout Turkish history have always had their interests in winning the local election in Izmir. The importance of the city for the mainstream parties has usually created sources of frictions if the national government and local administrations of Izmir are poles apart. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. For instance, in analysing the empowerment of French and Italian regions in line with the EU’s regional policy, Smyrl (1997) also found that in regions where the pre-existing territorial network exists, an SNA takes a European dimension and makes it possible for subnational actors to extract full benefit from the resources in Brussels. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. See the Izmir International Fair official website, www.izfas.com.tr [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. For further details about Izmir’s candidacy for EXPO 2020 see www.expoizmir.org.tr [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. It was established in Izmir in 1992 by the provincial governors, municipalities, chambers, industrialists and business organisations. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. EGEV (1993) ‘EBKA Presentation Document’, Aegean Regional Development Foundation, Izmir. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. This project was aimed to raise awareness about Turkish-EU relations, EU Acquis and benefitting from the EU Community Programs. Within the scope of the project, 1124 people attended a two-day long seminar program in the region and were trained in EU matters. For more information on this project see www.egev.org.tr [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. Through the initiatives of the Amasya Governor in 1996, it was established as an issue network to deal with environmental problems in the region including four cities: Samsun, Tokat, Amasya and Çorum. For further information regarding the Yeşilırmak Project see its official website, www.yesilirmak.org.tr [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. The project team consists of 1 Project Coordinator, 4 Project Directors, 1 Information Technology Specialist, 1 Accountant, 1 GIS (Geographical Information System) Technician, and 1 Maps Specialist (gathered from the official website of Yeşilırmak River Basin Development). [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. Information gathered from Samsun Regional Development Council, www.sabek.com.tr [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Information gathered from Samsun City Development Plan, www.sabek.org.tr [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. The data derived from Central Finance and Contracts Unit in August 2013, (www.cfcu.gov.tr). [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. For more information about these two meetings see the following links http://www.oka.org.tr/eng/haber-detay.asp?NewsId=114 (Mirroring EU and Turkish RDAs in 2010) and http://www.oka.org.tr/eng/haber-Detay.asp?NewsId=117 (Agorada 2012+ Adoption of a Regional Innovation Strategy: the Day after Samsun in 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. The GAP project started to be implemented in 1989 in order to achieve sustainable development for 11 million people in the region, which consists of nine cities. The main goal of the project is to eliminate regional disparities through raising income level and living standards. It also gives consultancy services for the entrepreneurs in the regions. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. It is however important to note here that the interviews in Diyarbakir took place before the government’s so-called Kurdish Initiative. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. The Central Finance Contract Units as a main contractor for the EU funds in Turkey were established in 2003. Therefore, the available data starts from that time. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. Three universities (Dokuz Eylül, Yaşar and Izmir Economy) have EU Research and Implementation Centres. Two out of 14 EU Documentation Centres created by the EU Delegation in Turkey are in Izmir (Ege and Dokuz Eylül Universities). Two universities (Dokuz Eylül and Izmir Economy) have a master program for EU Studies. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. In one of the recent conferences held by Yaşar University in 2011, Thomas Diez and some other European scholars were invited to give a speech. The conference was on Turkey’s Accession to the European Union in post-Lisbon Period: Challenges and Expectations. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. Izmir EU Information Centre under Aegean Industrialist and Businessmen Association (since 1996); Samsun EU Information Centre under Samsun Chamber of Trade and Industry (since 1997); and Diyarbakir EU Information Centre under Diyarbakir Chamber of Trade and Industry (since 1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. For further information for this board see the link http://www.izmirelele.com/Content.aspx?id=1&mid=4. The translation of the name of the website goes as ‘hand by hand for Izmir’. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Two informants for this research are currently enrolled in a PhD programme in EU politics. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. This table was prepared based on each institution’s 2012 Activity Report. Only white collars and permanent staff were included. Blue collars and temporary staff were excluded. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. The table was prepared by deriving data from each organisation’s 2012 income and expense account. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. As a concrete example of his political involvement activity in the EU, Mayor Baydemir has been a supporter of the EU Turkey Civic Commission which favours Turkish membership in the European Union since 2004. The Commission wishes to contribute to a democratic, peaceful and lasting solution of the Kurdish problem. An article written by Mayor Baydemir about the Turkish-EU relations with specific reference to the Kurdish issue was published on the website of the aforesaid organization. His article is titled ‘Turkey’s Integration to EU and Solution of Kurdish Problem’ and can be found in the following link http://www.eutcc.org/articles/8/20/document213.ehtml (accessed on 27th August 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. For more information see http://r2e2.am/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/press-release-en-for-kick-off-meeting.pdf (accessed on 27th August 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. The work of Mayor Kocaoğlu seems to be having a valuable effect on the city and its inhabitants. The US-based Brookings Institution placed Izmir 4th in its 2011 edition of Economic Performance Rankings . This is a global assessment of metropolitan areas. It is the highest ever ranking of the city. In December 2012, the London-based organization (City Mayor Foundations) selected Mayor Kocaoğlu as the Mayor of the Month, making him the first Mayor from Turkey to gain this award. This information was gained from Izmir Metropolitan Municipality 2012 Activity Report. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. For more information about the General Secretary of Izmir RDA, Dr. Ergüder Can, see the following link: http://www.izka.org.tr/en/kurumsal/organizasyon-yapisi/genel-sekreterlik/genel-sekreter/ (accessed on 28th August, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. For the implementation guideline for Turkish-Syria Interregional Cooperation Program, see the following link http://www.karacadag.org.tr/ContentDownload/Program\_Implementation\_Guidelines\_09\_November\_2010.pdf (accessed 31st August 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. For instance, the Commissioner responsible for the DG Enlargement, Gunter Verheguen, visited Izmir in 2004. This visit was arranged by one Business Association (ESIAD) in Izmir. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=verheugen-opens-key-visit-to-turkey-2004-09-06 (accessed on 29th August, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. Data derived from each organization’s official website. Only European-wide interregional organizations were included. In fact, Izmir Metropolitan Municipalities and Development Agencies are also members of some global scale interregional organizations, such as World Union of Wholesales Market, UCLG-MEWA and International Network for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. The exception for this is Goldsmith and Klausen (1997) as well John (1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. Regional distinctiveness simply refers to a distinct identity, economic and financial sources and regional party politics. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. For instance, Balme and Le Gales (1997) used the metaphor of stars and holes in order to describe the variations between wealthy and less-resourced cities in France. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. For a rich account on Turkey’s Neighbor Policy and the potential of regional economic cooperation, Renda (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-194)