The Division of Everton Football Club into Hostile Factions:
The Development of Professional Football Organisation on Merseyside, 1878-1914.

David Kennedy

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds
School of History

September, 2003

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgment.
Acknowledgements

I would like to formally acknowledge my indebtedness to my supervisors, Professor John Chartres and Professor Mike Collins for their support of this research.

I would also like to thank and offer my gratitude to staff at the following institutions who provided valuable advice and assistance in locating the variety of archival and published sources used in this thesis: Atkinson Library, Southport, Merseyside; British Newspaper Library, Colindale, London; Brotherton Library, University of Leeds; Companies House, Cardiff; Grand Lodge Library, Great Queen Street, London; Harold Cohen Library and Sydney Jones Library, University of Liverpool; Liverpool Record Office, Central Library, Liverpool; Liverpool Probate District Registry; Public Record Office, Kew, London; Probate Department, Principal Registry of the Family Division, High Holborn, London. The following individuals provided particular guidance on certain archival material: Mike Braham, Secretary of Southport Liberal Association; Mr Geoff Brandwood, Chairman of Liverpool West Derby Conservative Association; Ms Rebecca Coombes, Librarian, The Library and Museum of Freemasonry, Freemasons’ Hall, London; Mr Lee Le Clerq, Secretary of the North West Brewers’ and Licensed Retailers Association; Mr Philip Smith, Secretary of The Association of Conservative Clubs Ltd. Without the help of the individuals and staff at the institutions identified, this research would have been impossible to undertake.

Last, though not least, I should also like to take the opportunity to thank my family and friends alike who provided me not only with understanding and support throughout the period of my study, but who were also willing and able to discuss the variety of issues dealt with in the course of my research.
Abstract

This study attempts to locate Everton Football Club's early development within the context of the social characteristics of its host community, and to compare and contrast the organisational structure of Everton Football Club and Liverpool Football Club from their formation as limited liability companies in 1892 to the outbreak of the First World War. The timescale of the study is from 1878, with the foundation of the St. Domingo football team - the forerunner to the original Everton Football Club – to 1914.

The split of the original Everton Football Club in 1892 provides an obvious historical juncture for any research seeking to contextualise the broader role of the professional football organisation on Merseyside. This event allows us a unique vantage point in establishing the nature of the original organisation and those to which it gave rise. It is argued in this study that the split of 1892 was the culmination of a process whereby the original Everton club's communal identity was challenged by emerging competitive and commercial considerations facing the organisation. This was a challenge that produced two distinct strategies within the club, and gave rise to factionalism amongst the club membership. The split of 1892 resulted in the disengagement of oppositional forces within the original club and their coalescing into separate organisational forms: Everton Football Club Company Limited, and Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds Company Limited. It will be demonstrated that in the immediate aftermath of the split, distinct patterns of organisational ownership and control were adopted at each of the new organisations. However, it will also be shown that towards the end of the period dealt with in this study, earlier organisational distinctions became much less pronounced, and the profiles of the two clubs become similar.
## Contents

### Introduction
- The Central Aims and Objectives of the Thesis 1
- Thesis Structure and Chapter Content 2
- Research Method 6
- Sources 7

### Chapter One: Literature Review
1.1 Introduction 10
1.2 General Theories of the Football Club 11
1.3 Case Studies of Professional Football Clubs 16
1.4 Conclusion 27

### Chapter Two: Locality and Football Club Development
2.1 Introduction 28
2.2 Spatial Analysis and the Professional Football Club 28
2.3 Formulated Hypotheses on the 'Football District' Based on Conclusions from the Secondary Literature 34
2.4 Census Data Analysis 38
2.5 Occupational and Social Class Structure in the Five Sampled Districts 40
2.6 Summary of Census Data 70
2.7 Results of Testing Process 71
2.8 Conclusion 74

### Chapter Three: The District of Everton
3.1 Introduction 75
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Social Conditions in the Parish of Liverpool: 1800–1850</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Physical and Demographic Development of Everton, 1800-1900</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Pattern of Social Development in Everton: 1850-1900</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four: The Origins and Development of Everton Football Club</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Introduction</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 The Foundation and Early Development of Everton Football Club</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 The Structure of Everton FC</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 The Onset of Factional Opposition Within Everton FC</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Conclusion</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five: The Split of Everton FC, 1891-1892</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Introduction</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Financial orthodoxy</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Crisis Within Everton FC, 1891-92</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 The Purity Crusade</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 Internal Strife Within Liverpool Conservatism</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 Conclusion</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six: The Viability of the Two New Football Club Companies:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance Levels at Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs, Prior to 1914</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Introduction</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 The Growth of Football Attendance: 1894-1914</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Patterns of Development in Merseyside Football Attendance and Local Socio-Economic Factors, 1894-1914</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Attendance and Capacity of Goodison Park and Anfield</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.5 Conclusion

Chapter Seven: Everton and Liverpool Football Club Companies, 1892–1902

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Socio-Occupational Characteristics of Share Ownership in the pre-1914 English and Scottish Football Club

7.3 Socio-Occupational Analysis of English First Division Football Club Directors, 1889-1914

7.4 Directorial Powers in English First Division Clubs

7.5 Motives of the English First Division Club Director

7.6 Socio-occupational Analysis of Everton and Liverpool Football Club Directors, 1892-1902

7.7 Comparison of the Powers of the Directorate at Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs

7.8 Motives of Everton and Liverpool Football Club Directors, 1892–1904

7.9 Conclusion

Chapter Eight: Analysis of Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs, 1902–1914

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Share ownership Trends Amongst English Professional Football Clubs in the Pre-1914 Period

8.3 The Pattern of Share Ownership at Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs, 1902–1914

8.4 Governance of the Clubs

8.5 Boardroom Profile

8.6 Conclusion
Conclusion 307

Appendices 314

1i Socio-Occupational Profile of English Football Club Directors (%): Tony Mason

1ii Socio-Occupational Profile of Scottish Football Club Directors (%): Wray Vamplew

Footnotes 316

Bibliography and Sources 333
Illustrations

List of Tables:

Table 2.1  Shareholder Residency Patterns of Four Merseyside Football Club Companies, 1892 31
Table 2.2  1881 Occupational Structure in Five Liverpool Districts 43
Table 2.3  1891 Occupational Structure in Five Liverpool Districts 44
Table 2.4  1881 Social Class Profile of Five Liverpool Districts 51
Table 2.5  1891 Social Class Profile of Five Liverpool Districts 52
Table 2.6  1881 Accommodation and Household Characteristics Five Liverpool Districts 59
Table 2.7  1891 Accommodation and Household Characteristics Five Liverpool Districts 60
Table 2.8  1881, Place of Birth of Heads of Household in Five Liverpool Districts 67
Table 2.9  1891, Place of Birth of Heads of Household in Five Liverpool Districts 67
Table 3.1  Flow of Migration from Liverpool Parish to the Suburbs, 1800–1881 77
Table 3.2  Population Density (average persons per acre) Borough of Liverpool, 1801-1851 78
Table 3.3  Comparison of Housing and Population Density in Everton and Parish of Liverpool, 1851-1901 94
Table 3.4  Comparison of Average Number Persons Per House in Everton and Borough of Liverpool, 1851-1901 95
Table 3.5  Comparison of Rates of Mortality in Everton and the Borough of Liverpool: 1851-1891 95
Table 3.6  Occupational Structure of District of Everton 1851-1891 96
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Occupational Structure of Netherfield: 1851-1891</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Occupational Structure of Everton Village: 1851-1891</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Occupational Structure of St. Domingo: 1851-1891</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>Occupational Structure of Breckfield: 1851-1891</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>Place of Birth of Everton Inhabitants: 1851-1891</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>Church/Chapel Attendance of Denominations: Everton 1851-1902</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>Municipal Election Trends: Everton 1836-1895</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>Municipal Election Trends: Everton 1896-1900</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Income and Expenditure at Everton FC: Seasons 1885/86 – 1890/91</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Comparison of Increases in Income and Expenditure at Everton FC, 1885/86 – 1890/91</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Occupational Composition of Everton FC Committees, 1883-1892</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Combined Average Annual Attendances of Ten English Professional Football Clubs, 1893/94-1913/14</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Tea and Tobacco Consumption (lbs per head) 1894-1914</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Membership of British Trade Unions 1894-1914 (,000s)</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>British Labour Force (% Unemployed 1894-1914)</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Liverpool Mortality Rate, 1892-1912</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Average Household Size, Liverpool 1881-1921</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Number of Theatres and Cinemas as Advertised in Gores Trade Directory: Liverpool 1895-1915</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Number of Manufacturers of Consumer Durables Advertised in Gores Trade Directory: Liverpool 1895-1915</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Trade in the Port of Liverpool: Annual Total Shipping Tonnage and Value of Goods, 1893-1913</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.10 Numbers of Males Ten Years and Over Employed in Liverpool / Employed in Port-Related Occupations

Table 6.11 Everton and Liverpool League Position: Seasons 1891/92-1913/14

Table 6.12 Everton FC & Liverpool FC Annual Average Gate, 1891/92-1913/14

Table 6.13 Football Attendance in Four English Cities, 1893/94-1913/14

Table 6.14 Everton v Liverpool Attendances, 1893/94-1913/14

Table 7.1 Socio-Occupational Profile of English First Division Clubs Incorporated Prior to 1915

Table 7.2 Comparison of Socio-Occupational Profile of English First Division Clubs Incorporated in Two Periods: 1889-1899 and 1900-1915

Table 7.3 Socio-Occupational Profile of English Second Division Clubs Incorporated Prior to 1915

Table 7.4 Socio-Occupational Profile of All Scottish Clubs Incorporated Prior to 1915

Table 7.5 Comparison of Socio-Occupational Profile of English First Division Clubs Incorporated in Two Periods: 1889-1899 and 1900-1915

Table 7.6 Socio-Occupational Profile of Shareholders at Everton and Liverpool FCs, 1892 & 1902

Table 7.7 Distribution of Shares Amongst Socio-Occupational Groups at Everton and Liverpool FCs, 1892 & 1902

Table 7.8 Distribution of Everton and Liverpool FC Shareholders by Numbers of Shares Held, 1892 & 1902

Table 7.9 Socio-Occupational Profile of English Football Club Directors

Table 7.10 Socio-Occupational Profile of Scottish Football Club Directors

Table 7.11 English Club Director Financial Qualification
Table 7.12 Scottish Club Director Financial Qualification 229
Table 7.13 Socio-Occupational Profile of Everton and Liverpool FC Directors, 1892-1902 236
Table 7.14 Residential Profile of Everton & Liverpool FC Directors, 1892 & 1902 238
Table 7.15 Everton Directors Elected between 1892-1902 and their Length of Tenure in Office 241
Table 7.16 Liverpool FC Directors Elected between 1892-1902 and their Length of Tenure in Office 242
Table 8.1 Concentration of Share ownership in First Division Clubs Sampled 262
Table 8.2 Unemployment Rate and Standard of Living Indicators, 1900–1914 264
Table 8.3 Proportion of Shareholders at Sampled First Division Clubs from Different Occupations/Social Classes 266
Table 8.4 Proportion of Shares Owned at Sampled First Division Clubs by Different Occupations/Social Classes 267
Table 8.5 Comparison of Sampled First Division Clubs With Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs: Pre-First World War Concentration of Share ownership 270
Table 8.6 Proportion of Shareholders from the Working Class and Middle Class in First Division Clubs Sampled and in Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs 272
Table 8.7 Proportion of Shares Owned by Working Class and Middle Class Shareholders in First Division Clubs Sampled and in Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs 273
Table 8.8 Per Capita Expenditure Upon Alcohol in the United Kingdom, 1899-1913 283
Table 8.9 Real Wages in the United Kingdom 284
Table 8.10 Falling Profits in a Selection of United Kingdom Breweries, 1897-1914 285
Table 8.11 Number of Common Brewers Paying for Licences in the United Kingdom, 1901-1914 286
Table 8.12 Proportion of Shares Held by Directors of Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs, 1892, 1902 and 1914

Table 8.13 Proportion of Shares Held by Directors in Sampled English First Division Clubs

Table 8.14 Everton FC Directors Elected to the Board between 1902-1914

Table 8.15 Liverpool FC Directors Elected to the Board between 1902-1914

Table 8.16 Socio-Occupational Profile of Everton and Liverpool FC Directors, 1892-1902, 1910, and 1914

Table 8.17 Religious Composition of Everton and Liverpool FC Directors: 1892, 1902, 1910, and 1914

Table 8.18 Residential Profile of Everton and Liverpool FC Directors, 1892-1914

List of Figures:

Figure 2.1 Geographical Pattern of Football Club Shareholder Residency in the Liverpool Area, 1892

Figure 2.2 Occupational Profile: Everton, 1881-1891

Figure 2.3 Occupational Profile: Wavertree, 1881-1891

Figure 2.4 Occupational Profile: Bootle, 1881-1891

Figure 2.5 Occupational Profile: Scotland, 1881-1891

Figure 2.6 Occupational Profile: Princes Park, 1881-1891

Figure 2.7 Social Class Profile: Everton, 1881-1891

Figure 2.8 Social Class Profile: Wavertree, 1881-1891

Figure 2.9 Social Class Profile: Bootle, 1881-1891

Figure 2.10 Social Class Profile: Scotland, 1881-1891

Figure 2.11 Social Class Profile: Princes Park, 1881-1891

Figure 2.12 Accommodation Profile: Everton, 1881-1891
Figure 2.13 Accommodation Profile: Wavertree, 1881-1891

Figure 2.14 Accommodation Profile: Bootle, 1881-1891

Figure 2.15 Accommodation Profile: Scotland, 1881-1891

Figure 2.16 Accommodation Profile: Princes Park, 1881-1891

Figure 2.17 Proportion Local-Born for Five Sample Districts, 1881-1891

Figure 2.18 Proportion Migrant-Born for Five Sample Districts, 1881-1891

Figure 6.1 Combined Average Seasonal Attendances of Ten English League Clubs, 1893-94 to 1913-14

Figure 6.2 Consumer Expenditure at Constant Prices: Durable Goods, Books and Miscellaneous Recreational Goods, 1900-1914

Figure 6.3 Annual Total Shipping Tonnage: Port of Liverpool, 1893-1913

Figure 6.4 Everton FC and Liverpool FC Annual Average Gate for Seasons 1891-92 to 1913-14

Figure 6.5 Comparison of Everton and Liverpool Combined Seasonal Average Attendances for Home Fixtures (\(000\)) with Total Shipping Tonnage Handled Through the Port of Liverpool, 1896-1914

Figure 6.6 Percentage of Ground Capacity Used by Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs: Seasons 1893-94 to 1913-14

List of Maps:

Map 3.1 Liverpool, 1880 76
Map 3.2 Township of Everton, 1880 83
Map 3.3 Urbanisation of Everton, 1845–1880 84
Map 3.4 Breckfield, 1900 86
Map 3.5 St Domingo, 1900 87
| Map 3.6 | Netherfield, 1900 | 88 |
| Map 3.7 | Everton Village, 1900 | 89 |
| Map 3.8 | Liverpool Tramway Development, 1881 | 91 |
| Map 3.9 | Liverpool Tramway Development, 1902 | 92 |
| Map 3.10 | Development of Church of England Church Building in Everton, 1851-1891 | 104 |
| Map 3.11 | Development of Nonconformist Chapel Building in Everton, 1851-1891 | 105 |
| Map 3.12 | Development of Roman Catholic Church Building in Everton, 1851-1891 | 106 |
| Map 5.1 | Everton FC's Anfield Road Ground and Immediate Locality, 1891 | 141 |
Abbreviations

Bootle AFC  (Bootle Association Football Club)
Everton FC  (Everton Football Club)
INP  (Irish Nationalist Party)
LEA  (Labour Electoral Association)
Liverpool FC  (Liverpool Football Club)
Liverpool Caledonians FC  (Liverpool Caledonians FC)
LTC  (Liverpool Trades Council)
PCR  (Published Census Records)
UOS  (Unattributed Occupational Status)
WDPLU  (West Derby Poor Law Union)
WMCA  (Working Men’s Conservative Association)
Introduction

The Central Aims and Objectives of the Thesis

Existing literature on the early period of professional football on Merseyside has largely restricted itself to identifying the key characters and short-term issues leading to the splitting of the original £ Everton Football Club (Everton FC) in 1892. Briefly, the split of 1892 has been explained as a financial wrangle between the club president and a majority of the club's executive committee backed by the bulk of the membership, concerning the issues of ground rental and the transformation of the club into a limited liability company. The split is said to represent a parting of the ways of the club president and his supporters, who had attempted to place the club on a more profit-oriented footing, and the majority of the club membership who had resisted these moves. Any suggestions that the splitting of the club was indicative of more complex motives are dismissed. In their conclusions these established studies are reflective of, and fit comfortably into, a wider body of work that has sought to focus upon the behavioural nature of the professional football club. These studies, I argue in the following chapter, tend to reduce individual or group involvement in the organisation of professional clubs to financial or competitive gain.

It is, then, through the prism of the conclusions regarding events surrounding the split of Everton FC in 1892 that our view of the social significance of professional football in the locale has been established. For this reason analysis of the splitting of the original Everton FC lies at the heart of this thesis. The division of the club in 1892 does provide an obvious historical juncture for any research seeking to contextualise the broader role of the professional football organisations on Merseyside. This event can allow us a unique vantage point in establishing the nature of the original organisation and those to which it gave rise. My own research into the events leading to the splitting of Everton FC attempts to explain the events of 1892 as the culmination of a process whereby the original Everton club’s communal identity (manifest in the diffusion of power and decision-making over
club affairs amongst a large and overwhelmingly local membership) was challenged by emerging competitive and commercial considerations facing a club that needed to expand its operation in order to retain its position at the forefront of the English professional game. It is posited within the thesis that this challenge produced an internal struggle for power within the club hierarchy from the late 1880s. The thesis also examines the possibility that the split of 1892 was motivated in part by social divisions existing amongst the hierarchy of the club and that this fuelled the factionalism that erupted in the club from the late 1880s.

In this thesis, however, analysis of the split will be integral to a wider study of the football organisation within its locality that stretches from the late 1870s, and the formation of Everton FC, to the outbreak of war in 1914. There are three major aims set for the thesis. The fundamental objective is to locate Everton FC's early development within the context of the social characteristics of its host community, but it is also important to consider the growing impact of commercial and competitive considerations on the course of the club's movement away from its chapel roots to a nationally successful professional football organisation, and this will be another key objective of the thesis. The third major objective is to compare and contrast the early organisational development of Everton FC with that of Liverpool Football Club (Liverpool FC) – as will be revealed, the early histories of the two clubs are inextricably linked. Of particular interest here will be to examine whether, in the immediate aftermath of the trauma of the split of the original Everton FC, distinct patterns of organisational ownership and control were adopted at Everton and Liverpool football clubs, and whether the socio-political differences witnessed in the factions of the hierarchy of the original club were reinforced or dissipated in the boardrooms of the new club-companies.

With respect to these main aims the following section outlines the structure of the thesis.

**Thesis Structure and Chapter Content**

In the following chapter, Chapter One, the case is put that the original contribution of the thesis rests in its location of the development of the early professional football club within
the context of the tension arising from local informal control of clubs and the advent of commercial and competitive considerations that professional football clubs had to accommodate. To this end, a literature review attempts to highlight a discernible pattern within existing secondary literature concerned with the rise of the early football club, where emphasis is placed upon highlighting the tensions between the roles of the club as both a commercial and a competitive entity in the limited company era.

Chapters Two to Four attempt to demonstrate the importance of the connection between Everton Football Club and the community in which it was based and from which it received support. These chapters also provide an understanding and description of the process by which the phenomenal growth of interest in association football in Liverpool, and the successes of the Everton club in particular, created the conditions for negating (or at least challenging early in the 1890s) the informal, local-based control of Everton FC.

Chapters Two and Three outline the characteristics of the local environment within which professional football took root in Liverpool in the late nineteenth century. In Chapter Two, the question will be posed as to why the Everton district, above other districts in Liverpool, was able to sustain attempts to develop professional football organisation. Comparisons are made of the social profile of each of the districts where professional clubs were founded in Liverpool. (This line of enquiry is carried out on the basis that evidence from shareholder records of the various Liverpool football clubs suggests a strong correlation between share ownership – and by extension support for a club – and residential proximity to the football club in which shares were owned.) Census material relating to the three districts in the Liverpool area at the end of the nineteenth century in which professional football clubs were formed is used to reveal the socio-occupational characteristics of the districts. The findings of the census data are then compared to the typical social characteristics, identified within critical historical accounts relating to football’s development, associated with those men founding and supporting early football organisations.

In Chapter Three a closer look is taken at the physical and social development of the district of Everton. This study will allow for an appreciation of the evolution within the
district of some of the forces crucial in the formation of Everton FC, including religious and political patronage within the locality. The chapter concentrates upon a description of the infrastructural development of Everton — linking this to the exodus of population from the urban core of Liverpool. The causes and effects of rapid urbanisation on the physical environment and changes to the demographic profile of the district are discussed. Analysis is made of the ethno-religious and political profile that emerged in Everton over the second half of the nineteenth century. The chapter is important in setting the scene for later chapters concerning the split within the Everton club — an event argued within the thesis to have been influenced by local socio-political considerations.

Having analysed in Chapters Two and Three the local conditions within which professional football organisation flourished in Liverpool, Chapter Four addresses the formation and evolution of Everton FC from its chapel origins to its rise as one of the leading professional clubs in English football. In particular, Chapter Four provides a sense of the competitive and commercial pressures dictating the development of Everton FC which led, at a certain stage in that development, to the club’s break-up and the formation of two separate clubs. Thus, Chapter Four highlights the early development of the club. Issues covered here are the aims of the original club’s religious founders, the motives of those involved in the evolution of the club towards its role as district representative, the structure of the early club (including a social analysis of the club committee and membership, and the relationship between these bodies), and the financial development of the club in the pre-incorporated period.

Chapters Two to Four, then, build up a picture of contradictory forces within the football club, and suggest that this contradiction was an outcome of the evolution of the club away from its communal origins and towards its integration as a company within the football industry.

Chapter Five is a critique of existing studies,² which are concerned with, or touch upon, the split of the original Everton FC, and also offers my own understanding of the dynamics of the dispute leading to that split (already alluded to above). The chapter places additional
evidence before the reader that seeks to contextualise events occurring in the club during its period of crisis in relation to changes taking place in the social environment — changes in which many of the protagonists in the unfolding football club drama were central figures. To this end, two important tasks have been to, first, provide an account of societal relations during the period of the dispute and, second, to fill the current void that exists in established research relating to the political, social and cultural ties that key figures holding office in professional football organisations on Merseyside had during the period. In other words, an attempt has been made to build up a profile of the men controlling the fortunes of these professional football clubs and their significance within the locality.

This aspect of the dispute can highlight the extent to which the communal identity of the club, and the status of the club as a standard-bearer of local pride, was still at this stage of club development an important consideration for those acting as stewards of the organisation. It may also demonstrate the integral role the football club could have in the socio-political life of the district of Everton. This is an aspect that underlines the validity of viewing the early professional football clubs as having a dimension beyond their competitive and commercial dimensions.

In Chapter Six a study is made of the capability of the public to sustain the existence of both Everton and Liverpool football clubs. In this respect analysis is made of home attendance trends for Everton FC and Liverpool FC from the early 1890s through to the First World War. One objective of the chapter will be to demonstrate whether or not a surge in football's popularity in Liverpool occurred during the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century that created pressure on (or opportunity for) professional football organisation to cater to this demand. This might also shed light on the destabilisation of existing power relationships within the city's premier club. Another objective of the chapter is to attempt to compare the growth of football club attendance in the city of Liverpool with changes occurring in the city's socio-economic life. This analysis is given in an effort to reveal possible relationships that might explain the contours of demand for commercialised football in the locality.
Chapters Seven and Eight analyse the commercial and social structure of the newly formed Everton and Liverpool football club companies, in an attempt to discover whether the contradictory visions of progress held by the factionalists in the original club, when allowed to run their course in their newly formed organisations, created different patterns of organisational development. Using evidence principally from company files, the chapters present a profile of the two clubs' ownership and control structures. Chapter Seven looks at the period 1892–1902; Chapter Eight analyses the period 1903–1914. This chronological division in analysis is chosen on account of the death of Liverpool FC Chairman and majority shareholder, John Houlding, in 1902. The significance of Houlding to the early development of Liverpool FC has been noted in existing studies concerning the early period of that club's history. It was felt, therefore, that analysis of the post-split period should be sub-divided into the years prior to John Houlding's death in 1902, and the subsequent period up to the First World War.

Research Method
The thesis is primarily an empirical exercise involving the collection and analysis of data from a variety of primary sources. Football club shareholder records and census returns have been drawn on to highlight the social complexity of the membership and support of the Merseyside football clubs and of the environs in which these organisations were situated. Shareholder lists contain occupational and residential information on those associating themselves with professional football clubs and have provided a rich source of information for other researchers seeking to clarify the social profile of the early professional football organisation in particular. Census information has not been so readily utilised by previous researchers. It is, I believe, one of the strengths of this study that residential information from club shareholder registers has been cross-referenced with census reports to provide evidence concerning the localities within which football clubs developed and from which they received much of their support. Data collection has been made also on secondary sources so that a comparative analysis of the membership of the Merseyside clubs (in terms of social status) can be made with other, similar-sized football organisations in Britain. In order to facilitate an understanding and comparison of the hierarchies of the Merseyside football clubs the thesis utilises biographical information.
taken from the local press, and primary sources such as electoral registers, cemetery records and probate records. This study is, therefore, largely an exercise in presenting previously overlooked or unavailable information concerning the two Liverpool clubs under investigation and using that information to draw different conclusions about the early history of the clubs.

To reiterate, though, the thesis is also an attempt to interpret and understand the development of the original Everton FC, and the two professional football organisations established in the post-split period, in relation to localised and historically specific meanings. The qualitative data which will be analysed relating to the original football organisation and its successors — primarily organisational archives and local newspapers and journals — are laden with social meaning that is culturally, locally and historically bounded. There is a clear need, therefore, in order to understand more fully the concrete distinctions within the original club and between Everton and Liverpool football clubs outlined above, for a textual analysis approach to clarify the social context involved in the source material.

Sources
It would, of course, have been of great assistance to my research to gain access to internal documents of Everton and Liverpool football clubs — for example, Annual General Meeting reports and committee meeting minutes — from the pre-First World War period. This, unfortunately, was not possible. Communication was established with Everton FC, but the club informed me that their records had been either mislaid or destroyed, so I proceeded on that basis and it was only in the writing-up period of the thesis that Everton FC’s archives were confirmed to be in the hands of a private collector. Contact was made at this late stage with the owner in an effort to view these documents, but I was informed that they were at auction in readiness for a sale. Requests to Liverpool FC for access to their relevant internal records met with no response.

An inability to gain access to these materials was not, however, insurmountable in carrying out my research. There has been a long-standing inability or unwillingness of football clubs
to provide researchers with access to their archives. Nevertheless, significant research on professional football clubs has been achieved. For example, access was not gained to club archives by either Bill Murray for his acclaimed study of Glasgow Celtic and Glasgow Rangers, The Old Firm: Sectarianism, Sport and Society in Scotland (2000) or to A.J. Arnold for his business history of Bradford City and Bradford Park Avenue, A Game That Would Pay: A Business History of Professional Football in Bradford (1988). Nick Fishwick’s comparative account of the two Sheffield professional clubs, Swindon Town FC and Oxford United FC in English Football and Society:1910–1950 (1989) received only the assistance of Sheffield United Football Club, by way of the perusal of internal club documentation. As Fishwick points out, the sources for a social history of football clubs do exist outwith the clubs. The published accounts mentioned above have been able to utilise the records on professional clubs held at Companies House, which offer a complete record of directors and shareholder lists which reveal, amongst other things, the occupational details of the membership. Through this, for example, the social complexion of those in control and ownership of football organisations can be established. Local newspapers and specialist football periodicals have also proved to be a rich source of information for the football club historian hoping to reveal the status and position of their subjects within their locale. Outside of primary material, a large body of secondary material relating to football and the history of football has emerged since the early 1980s. Knowledge of the overall development of the sport allows football club researchers to contextualise their subject, helping determine what has been particular to, and general to, football club development.

Apart from locating and analysing source materials concerning Liverpool’s two professional football clubs, my research involves an understanding of the local social environment within which these organisations operated. Access to the archival material of a variety of local social and political organisations has been obtained. Amongst these are the Liverpool Constitutional Association; the Southport Liberal Party; Liverpool Trades Council; Liverpool Workingmen’s Conservative Association; West Derby Board of Guardians; and the Liverpool Band of Hope Temperance Society. Archival information from these sources can help provide context and meaning to social action and help build up a picture of a possible network of connections and associations which might permit the
locking in of those in control of the professional football organisations to social forces capable of preserving or changing prevalent power relations within the locality.

An under-utilised source, in respect to these organisations, are unpublished theses and dissertations. Again, local newspapers and journals, contemporaneous to the period under review, have also provided valuable information about dominant local socio-political forces and the issues which preoccupied civic society at this historical juncture. Official publications concerning the locality, such as directories, and a large body of secondary sources, offering critical historical accounts, have also been consulted.

Substantial accounts of the embryonic stage of professional football club development in Liverpool have never been given. This study can help to give a greater understanding of this developmental period and shed light on the assembly of the individuals associated with the original Everton FC, and their motivations for association with that club. This analysis can set the scene for a full exploration of the factional hostilities that broke out in Everton FC towards the end of the 1880s – factionalism that enveloped the club and eventually led to its split. On the other hand, there is a pre-existing body of work concerned with the post-1892 split period of professional football in Liverpool. Those studies have fostered a perception of the homogeneity of those in ownership and control of Everton FC and Liverpool FC during their formative period as limited liability companies. A detailed investigation of the two clubs, in the manner outlined above, can determine the accuracy of these studies and their conclusions.

Whilst this thesis constitutes a specific case study of professional football club development it should also be viewed as a contribution to an established literature which has explored the social complexion of those controlling and owning early professional football clubs in Britain and their motives for involvement in these organisations. This thesis can, hopefully, add to the overall body of knowledge already established in this area of study, by offering an understanding of the men at the helm of professional football organisation in Liverpool, locating them and the clubs they represented within the social matrix of late Victorian and Edwardian Liverpool society.
Chapter One

Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

Since the 1970s association football has been the focus of critical academic enquiry, applied to evaluate and explain the game’s significance and developing social role. Many studies have concentrated on the origins and early development of football. The instrumental aspect of football, which they draw out, reflects upon issues such as social class involvement in the organisation of the game, crowd disturbances, and the effect of football on local economic activity. They superseded, in an academic sense, the largely descriptive accounts concerned with the institutional development of football and the commentary on competitive achievement, which had characterised many historical studies of football up to that point.¹

Within this broader analysis of football there emerged a pointed sub-debate amongst football historians seeking to reveal the rationale of professional football clubs. It is this particular historiography, and the explanatory models of organisational behaviour used within their accounts, which will be utilised in this thesis. It is suggested here that the debate over the predominant behavioural characteristics of the professional football club within the historiography have helped to set a limiting agenda for studies conducted at the level of the individual professional club. This literature review can, hopefully, provide the reader with both a clearer understanding of the academic context within which my research should be located, and an appreciation of the basis upon which orthodox accounts of my particular subject of enquiry have been erected. This chapter will try to demonstrate the originality of the approach adopted in this thesis.
1.2 General Theories of the Football Club

Although there is no extensive body of work focusing specifically upon the study of the football club as an institution, an important debate over the nature of the football club has emerged from the analysis of the more generalised studies of the socio-economic history of the sport. Utilising information gathered on clubs (mostly from company registers and, where possible, club archives) football historians have analysed factors such as the fiscal performance of clubs and the socio-economic profile of club directors and shareholders in order to uncover commonalities and trends, and to extrapolate from them the principal motives involved in football club ownership and control. From the conclusions drawn, essentially two contradictory positions on the nature of the professional football club in the pre-1914 period have emerged. One of these viewpoints suggests that the football club is, principally, a business concern, subject to the same pressures as other commercial enterprises involved in a competitive industry where profitable return on investment is the principal motivation. The other viewpoint holds that the football club is an instrument for sporting achievement run along commercial lines, but where revenue generated is used, for the most part, to improve the prospects of on-field performance and, through this, competitive success. These viewpoints are approximated into the behavioural models of “profit maximisation” and “utility maximisation”, respectively. A brief overview of the development of the key literature concerned with explaining the operational rationale of the professional football organisation will allow for an elaboration of these models.

Though something of a consensus has been achieved on the basis of the greater validity of treating the football club as utility maximizer, the work of Steven Tischler, in particular, has provided an influential counterweight. Tischler’s *Footballers and Businessmen: The Origins of Professional Soccer in England* (1980), stirred controversy by arguing that football – a pursuit with its roots in ‘plebian’ culture and the codified amateur game of the public schools – had, by the latter part of the nineteenth century, been commodified in line with other burgeoning leisure pursuits enjoying popular patronage: ‘In the 1880’s, businessmen club directors introduced a new version of the game which reflected their aims and interests...the growth of football along commercial-professional lines was not a spontaneous occurrence. It
was the result of calculated nurturing by entrepreneurs who extended to football an ethos that touched numerous endeavours outside of sports'.  

Tischler underscores his argument by charting the stages of the rapid development of a profitable industry at the end of the nineteenth century. The dropping of the amateur-only rule by the Football Association in 1885 acknowledged the existing widespread professionalism within football. That recognition and sanctioning of an employer–employee relationship within the professional club, argues Tischler, brought it formally into line with other commercial enterprises. The creation of a national league system in 1888 secured for football clubs regular competition and thus stimulated an increase in gate revenue for their product. This stabilisation of both labour relations and income generated a favourable environment for investment, as witnessed by the rush of leading professional clubs in the late 1880s and 1890s towards the adoption of limited liability status. Dismissing the notion of the impartial control of the early professional clubs by a ‘gentlemanly class’ preoccupied with upholding a noble sporting ethos, Tischler paints a picture, rather, of a football club directorate dominated by a plutocratic elite which ‘often exploited’ the potential their position of influence gave them for ‘indirect’ profits via the self-awarding of, for example, building, clothing and catering contracts the club would otherwise have put out for competitive tender. For Tischler, then, professional football clubs had been quickly subsumed within the framework and relations of a market economy. The cash nexus that defined prevailing class relationships had been extended to an area of popular culture by an entrepreneurial class that viewed involvement in the ownership and control of football clubs as the means towards a profitable end. Tischler’s study contradicted the established general conclusions reached on football clubs which, though acknowledging the interest, even predominance, of businessmen in colonizing positions of control on football club directorates and the commercial development of football clubs, emphasised also a more holistic explanation for involvement in the ownership and control of professional football clubs during the game’s fledgling period prior to the First World War. 5
Tony Mason’s study, Association Football and English Society, 1863–1915 (1980), provides us with an influential counterweight to Tischler’s conclusions in relation to the Professional club. Mason acknowledges that, though direct profitable returns on investment of time and money in football clubs were circumscribed by the rules of the game’s governing body, the Football Association (which, for instance, outlawed the payment of directors and held down dividend payments to 5 per cent per annum), the potential for directors and major shareholders involved in commerce to exploit their position of influence for indirect financial gain did exist. Though evidence of the awarding of commercial contracts to those involved in the administration and ownership of clubs can be found, Mason argues that the prevalence of this form of exploitation is doubtful.6 Mason’s work highlights, rather, a broader impulse towards professional football club involvement. In a study that emphasises the communal antecedents of professional football clubs – their emergence from neighbourhood, church or workplace – Mason points to the social capital to be made from high-profile involvement with organisations that were, as the nineteenth century neared its end, the most obvious outward expression of local identity. Moreover, Mason points to examples of how this social capital could readily be transformed into political capital by those whose ambitions led in that direction.7 In terms of share ownership, Mason argues that, given the restrictions placed on dividend payments, people were more likely to take up shares in a club in order to formalise their support. This form of support is argued as being rewarding to the investor in terms of a measure of involvement and input into the direction of the club. Mason also raises the point that the football clubs of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century involved within their administration a cross-section of the middle classes and skilled working classes. Evidence also suggests that professional football clubs enjoyed the support and patronage of all sections of the community, to varying degrees. One of the attractions, and, indeed, functions, of football clubs and involvement in them, therefore, was their ability to forge a local, or community, consciousness bridging the class divide which threatened the social order – the social order preferred by those people, for the most part, involved in the ownership and control of football clubs.8
However, the weakness of these earlier accounts was the largely unsubstantiated (and, indeed, in some respects, unverifiable) claims they made in respect to the non-financial motives for ownership and control of professional football clubs. As the first wave of studies to attempt to analyse football and football clubs, to use Mason’s own phrase, ‘in the society in which it was embedded’, they were, perhaps of necessity, of a general nature. This was a drawback acknowledged by Mason in Association Football. Mason called for local studies to furnish the details that could fill in the broad brush-strokes of his own analysis.  

The strength of Tischler’s study was its concentration on a single, undeniable characteristic common to all professional football clubs – their operation as a commercial organisation within a competitive industry. Though Tischler’s singular line of argument has been attacked by some as an inappropriate and simplistic explanation of the complex origins and development of the modern football club, his work prompted others into challenging his treatment of the professional club in orthodox business terms. Thus, the debate over the nature of the professional football club, at this point, shifts towards a behavioural investigation of the organisational priorities of the professional club, and away from unravelling the complexity of motive for involvement in these organisations touched upon in a general way by the earlier foundational studies of professional football.

Wray Vamplew’s 1982 article focusing on Scottish professional football clubs, ‘The Economics of a Sports Industry: Scottish Gate Money Football 1890–1914’, took up the issue of commercial practices of football clubs north of the border. His work drew upon earlier economic studies carried out in relation to the behaviour of other sports organisations in North America, where the explanatory models of ‘profit maximisation’ and ‘utility maximisation’ (competence, in the latter respect, being judged by on-field competitive performance) had been established to account for the typical behaviour of professional baseball and ice hockey organisations. Vamplew sought to clarify the profit or utility maximising characteristics of the professional football club.
Specifically, Vamplew attempted to reveal the attitude towards commercial practices within football clubs by establishing their priorities on a number of issues affecting their operational efficiency. These issues were: the pricing policies of a football club, that is, spectator entrance fees charged, taking into question a club's market position (League performance); and their proximity to other similar-sized organisations; the buying of players, and players' wages, as a proportion of annual income; the proportion of income set aside for ground improvements; the incidence of playing low-revenue, high-maintenance friendly and testimonial matches; and the willingness of football clubs to incur long-run financial losses. Vamplew applied these criteria to the available evidence on Scottish football clubs' financial and competitive performances between 1890 and 1914.

Vamplew's findings supported a view of Scottish professional football clubs as utility maximising organisations. Vamplew found a lack of entrance price competition between clubs to attract more support and, therefore, gate income. He also found that most revenue was spent on the purchasing of players, the paying of players' wages, ground maintenance and improvements. Similarly, Vamplew found that there was a high incidence of uneconomic friendlies and testimonials, and that clubs accepted long-term financial losses. Thus Vamplew was persuaded that 'most Scottish soccer clubs changed their sports organisations into business enterprises and adopted company status with the intention of winning matches and championships rather than making money'. Vamplew extended this study in a later work comparing a number of English clubs with Scottish clubs. Despite his observation that 'fragmentary evidence' suggested that some English clubs were less appropriately describable as utility maximisers than their Scottish counterparts, Vamplew found that English clubs shared the same reluctance for price variation as Scottish clubs. English clubs, it was also found, devoted a slightly higher proportion of expenditure to playing staff costs. Vamplew's conclusions supported a generally held view about British football, that winning games and trophies, not securing profits, was the primary aim of professional football clubs. In general, Vamplew's work provided a
stronger conceptual framework for subsequent historical analysis that sought to question the belief of widespread profiteering in the British game.

Thus Vamplew's influence can be found in the work of Richard Holt and Dave Russell. Unconvinced by Tischler's argument, their studies are clearly bolstered by the empirically based conclusions drawn by Vamplew from his studies. In the work of Steven G. Jones, we can also see the influence of Vamplew. Whilst affirming his belief in the 'essentially economic basis of the sport' — that 'football was subject to all kinds of economic pressures and financial considerations' — Jones does not seriously question the validity of Vamplew's conclusions on the utility maximizing characteristics of the football club in the period prior to the First World War. Adding further weight to the historical view of clubs as essentially utility maximising organizations, a spate of studies carried out by economists on the football industry question the validity of treating present-day football clubs as being profit-oriented organisations. Whatever the disciplinary status of these studies their conclusions have clearly impacted upon the few academic studies that have looked at the development of individual clubs. An evaluation of these studies will now be made.

1.3 Case Studies of Professional Football Clubs

The case studies on individual professional clubs are part of the wave of academic analysis of professional football that has developed since the 1980s. They have contributed to a deeper understanding of the meaning and significance of football through their particularised object of enquiry. For instance, analysis of the tension between football's ruling bodies and national government, football's role in international relations, and studies focusing on football in Britain beyond the English and Scottish heartlands — particularly in relation to the nationalist and ethnic symbolism of the game in Northern Ireland and Wales — have emphasised further the instrumental aspect of professional football outside of financial or competitive considerations.

The research carried out on individual professional football clubs should be viewed as a contribution to the developing diversity of analysis of the game. The triumph of
these studies of individual clubs has been their imparting to us, from their familiarity and understanding of their subject, a level of detail about the people involved in professional football clubs, and how they and their organisations have reacted to the pressures and trends brought with the game’s development over time.

Notwithstanding long-established official histories of professional clubs, these studies represent, from an academic perspective, the bringing to life of football clubs for critical evaluation and mark a progression from the general and abstract studies of the football club that anticipated and prompted them. It would appear, however, that the generalised debate, outlined above, over the organisational behaviour and the objectives of the professional football club has provided a pole of attraction which researchers working in this area have found difficult to resist.

Implicit to the accounts these localised studies give of their subjects is a dialogue concerning what are seen to be the often contradictory tendencies within a club. These studies tend to emphasise that those men in control of clubs were charged, on the one hand, with providing on-field success and the upholding of the perceived traditions of a football club and, on the other hand, with administering the club as a commercial concern. It must be both conceded that this dual identity is a feature of professional football organisations, and acknowledged that any detailed discussion of a club and its development will, of necessity, elaborate on the evolution of this duality. However, it is argued here that, though the established case studies attempt, to varying degrees, to locate their subject within its environment, the pull towards analysis of the football club’s behavioural tendencies effectively marginalises the possibility of unpacking fully the broader social dimensions of the football club. Perhaps the best known of these studies is Charles Korr’s *West Ham United* (1985). Korr provides an initial and brief description of West Ham United’s emergence out of the industrial relations strife of the Thames Ironworks in 1895. The iron-works’ owner, Arnold J. Hills, hoped to promote future harmonious relations with his workforce through the promotion of various employer–employee projects in the wake of strike activity. Anecdotal evidence from spectators, former managers and players is also featured in an effort to convey the perceived traditions of the club. However,
Korr's critical analysis restricts itself, essentially, to the operational rationale of the club, which is implicitly identified in the terms of the conceptual debate over utility and profit maximisation outlined above. Korr's central theme is that the club, though owned and controlled over time by an almost self-electing and stable elite, was 'a captive of the community', a 'civic resource'. It is a study that underlines the tensions inherent throughout the club's history between the directorate's compulsion towards the provision of a winning team within a fiscally sound business organisation, and the hopes of the club's supporters for competitive success. In the jargon of recent economic literature on football, West Ham United would be best portrayed, in light of Korr's analysis, as a club 'aiming to maximize utility through... games won and competitions won subject to a financial viability or minimum security restraint'. In Korr's account there is no significant attempt to explain the homogeneity and cohesion he attributes to those in ownership and control of the club. It was this unity, however, which fostered the paternalistic relations holding the different strata of the club together and which had such a bearing on the success of those in administrative control to impose their operational agenda. Outside of familial connections, Korr fails to reveal any social or political profile of the club's hierarchy and membership which could help us to understand the absence of significant internal dissent at West Ham United despite the acknowledged long-term on-field under-performance of the club.

Korr's focus upon the internal dynamics of the members of the club's hierarchy and their objective of providing a service to the locality is, perhaps, as Tony Mason suggests in an otherwise complimentary critique, 'evaluating the club as the club would like to see itself'. Korr's description of West Ham United Football Club as a 'family club' and a 'civic resource' hints at a deep level of cultural solidarity engendered by this organisation. However, this possibility is seldom addressed in Korr's account, either by offering practical examples of the club's relations with its community, or by a discussion of the role a football organisation with the characteristics he attributes to it would play within a locality such as the east end of London, an area noted for its capacity for social unrest.
The football club case study most clearly inspired by the behavioural debate over the professional organisation is A.J. Arnold's *A Game That Would Pay: A Business History of Professional Football in Bradford* (1988). This study concentrates upon the long-term decline of Bradford's two professional football organizations, Bradford City and Bradford Park Avenue. As the title of his book suggests, Arnold restricts his analysis to factors affecting the financial performance of both Bradford clubs that, he argues, played a determining role in their development and decline.

Arnold acknowledges the constraints to normal business practices which all professional football organisations manoeuvred within as a contributory factor in the Bradford clubs' decline from their pre-First World War prominence. Arnold stresses the restraint upon dividend payments as the key feature in the failure of the Bradford clubs to attract significant capital investment. He argues, though, that local factors are crucial to understanding the financial under-performance of both clubs. Primary amongst these local factors was, Arnold suggests, the socio-economic effects of the recession experienced after the First World War by the worsted and woollen trades which dominated the local economy. The earlier prosperity brought by the boom in these trades, argues Arnold, provided the impetus for association football's growth in the West Riding. This decline in the textile industry was reflected in stagnating or declining levels of attendance at both clubs and, consequently, an inability to compete with other clubs with larger financial resources. This environmental contextualisation of the football clubs in relation to the changing fortunes of their local economy does allow for a consideration of external pressures placed on these organisations and, as such, adds a welcome dimension towards creating a greater understanding of the actions of those in ownership and control of football clubs.

However, if the performance of the local economy is, for Arnold, primary in explaining the less than conducive environment for the commercial stability of professional football in Bradford it was, he suggests, the inability of those running the two clubs to come to terms with this environment, principally their unwillingness to grasp the nettle of merging, which, ultimately, determined the fate of the Bradford clubs. And it is within this analysis that the core of Arnold's argument is located, an argument which emphasises the problems wrought by the utility maximising
behaviour of professional football clubs under certain conditions of operation. The competition between Bradford City and Bradford Park Avenue for football support within a medium-sized city such as Bradford had proven to be too heavy a burden to bear in such a competitive industry. The pooling of Bradford's footballing resources could have provided, argues Arnold, the only realistic way forward for professional football within the city. It is Arnold's belief that, despite the recognition of this reality amongst board members of both clubs (on many occasions talks about merging were held) a merger of City and Park Avenue did not take place because of the 'abnormal' attitude of the business class in control of the clubs who failed to apply the financial controls normal to other areas of business activity: 'Football clubs as a whole have been willing to stretch their finances in a way that no commercially orientated firm would consider sensible'.

There was, argues Arnold, a willingness of the two organisations to accept significant financial losses in order to retain independence.

The tension inherent within the duality of the professional football club – at one and the same time, a competitive sporting organisation that engenders cultural attachments and a commercial organisation – is pointedly brought out within Arnold's analysis. However, Arnold's success in this sense, suggests the inappropriateness of attempting to concentrate upon a purely business analysis of football clubs within a locality. For instance, it is apparent from Arnold's study that the partisanship of the Bradford clubs' supporters was of crucial importance to the failure (a hostility Arnold hints at as being class-driven). However, this is largely an intrusion into the principal theme, that of the failure of the Bradford football entrepreneurs to come to terms with, and address, the economic realities forced upon them by local trade depression and the business constraints of the industry they operated in.

Nick Fishwick's *English Football and Society: 1910–1950* (1989) is not a study overtly devoted to a professional football club, nor does it focus on one locality. Rather, Fishwick's comparative study investigates the formation and impact of football culture in three locations: Sheffield, Swindon and Oxford. Fishwick places
emphasis on the different structural features of each town in relation to the
development of these particularised football cultures. Fishwick’s stated aim is to
reveal how these football cultures ‘contributed to, and represented the continuity of,
daily local life in times of comparatively high social tension’.

However, within this account there is a discussion of the role of the local professional clubs in this process. Fishwick questions the relationship of these organisations to the dominant structural forces of a locality: ‘how and by whom they were run, and why, and how they related
to the social, working and political life of local communities’.

Fishwick manages, in his study, to reveal fragmentary evidence to support a
comparative account of the position and role of football club directors in the
formation of local elites. His analysis for the most part, however, in as much as he
attempts to demonstrate a football club’s instrumental use in the achievement or
retention of social harmony, reverts to a general debate over the rationale of football
clubs per se during the period under discussion. The ad hoc approach to commercial
activity that football clubs adopted takes up much of Fishwick’s discussion on the
professional football organisation. Fishwick, pointing to the continued dominance
over team affairs of unqualified committee men at the expense of specialised coaches
and managers, concludes that, in most ways, professional football clubs were run
more like local charities than business organisations.

Fishwick is explicit in his
affirmation of the utility maximizing characteristics of football clubs during this
period: ‘Those who ran football clubs generally ran them for their own
sakes...football clubs were utility maximizers not profit maximisers’.

Fishwick engages with the behavioural debate over the professional football
organisation in order to emphasise the football club’s role as an institution capable of
contributing to social harmony, or continuity. The preservation of paternalistic
relations within the sport, it is implied, and the continual marginalisation of market
relations, were instrumental in maintaining cross-class identity in each of the three
towns during periods of social upheaval and crises. The drawback, here, is the
generality of this claim. Substantial evidence is not presented at a local level to
demonstrate the social and political capital to be made from the running of football
clubs as utility, rather than profit, maximising organisations. For this reason, and
despite Fishwick’s attempt to inject a deeper meaning into the rather sterile debate over the utility and profit maximising characteristics of the professional club, his discussion on this issue remains at the level of abstraction. This somewhat detracts from the contextual approach of Fishwick’s study and reinforces the dominant position which behavioural analysis has assumed within other studies of professional football organisations.

Tony Mason’s *The Blues and the Reds: A History of Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs* (1985) is devoted to an examination of the major professional clubs on Merseyside and is, therefore, of special interest to my own research. Despite its expansive subtitle, this is a rather short, comparative study that concentrates on the Edwardian and inter-war periods of the two clubs. Primarily, Mason is concerned with revealing the type of people who participated in the running of these organisations and their motives for their involvement. Analysing company files concerned with the two football clubs from certain years, Mason’s findings persuade him of the social similarity of the two organisations based upon the occupational characteristics of directors and shareholders. With boardrooms predominantly drawn from the comfortable middle classes of professionals and merchants and the bulk of the membership drawn from lower middle-class and skilled working-class occupations, the Merseyside clubs were largely reflective of the social characteristics of similar-sized football organisations. In answer to the question of what the purpose for involvement in ownership and control of these clubs was, Mason comes to the conclusion that the board and membership of the Merseyside clubs were not motivated by any possible material benefits, and that both clubs betrayed utility maximising traits. Mason acknowledges that both clubs were ‘solidly supported through the turnstiles’, made a profit in all but a handful of seasons between 1892 and the outbreak of the Second World War, and that ‘dividends were nearly always paid’. He believes it more likely, however, that shareholders were involved with the clubs for the ‘psychic benefit’, that directors ‘probably did not make a lot of money out of it’, and that most profits were ‘ploughed back’ into the running of the two clubs. Mason concludes, though, that Liverpool Football Club had a more overtly commercial foundation than its near neighbour. Shareholdings at Liverpool
FC were much more concentrated than at Everton FC and the Articles of Association of the former suggest a more businesslike mentality.

The major drawback to Mason’s account, I would suggest – and one, no doubt, partly due to the brevity of his work – is an absence of any substantial exploration of the possibility of individual or group involvement in these influential cultural institutions which cannot be reduced to financial or psychic gain. Beyond his comparative analysis of the occupational structure of each club’s board and membership, and a brief discussion of the social characteristics of Merseyside football supporters during the core period of study, there is little attempt to locate, or contextualise, the clubs and their personnel within the social environment. This omission is somewhat surprising given Mason’s belief that local studies are a necessary and appropriate vehicle for revealing such complexity.

In this respect, an avenue Mason might have pursued more in The Blues and the Reds was the controversy surrounding the dispute within the original Everton FC resulting in the formation of Everton and Liverpool football clubs in 1892. Mason touches briefly on the dispute in Association Football. In that study Mason proffers a view of the split of Everton FC as revealing the intolerance of those connected with the provision of professional football in the city of Liverpool towards profiteering from football – principally through their objection to club president, John Houlding, receiving interest payments on his financial loans made to the club. In The Blues and the Reds, Mason returns to the issue of the dispute. Though acknowledging a certain social dislocation within Everton FC’s committee as a possible contributory factor in the outbreak of hostilities – the issue of Houlding’s drink trade connections is raised – Mason does not take the opportunity of pursuing this line of enquiry. The conflict within Everton FC and its resultant split is explained by Mason principally in terms of a struggle within the original club to assert a profit maximising approach to the club’s provision of football over the heads of those members concerned to further the club’s athletic achievements: ‘Football may be a business’, writes Mason, ‘but it is not there to make money for one man’,
referring to club president, John Houlding. We are left to draw the conclusion that the ‘complication’ of the split should be viewed in terms of an imbalance created in the dual function of the club as both a sporting and a commercial enterprise. It can be argued that with this re-statement of orthodox accounts of the dispute, a foundational stone is set in place, and the basis established for the straightforward empirical comparison of the occupational and social status of the hierarchy of each club we are offered in *The Blues and the Reds*.

A more recent publication on Merseyside football is *Passing Rhythms: Liverpool Football Club and the Transformation of Football* (2002), a compendium of articles concerning Liverpool FC edited by John Williams. The stated intention of this work is to ‘consider the deeper significance of the relationship between professional football and other local cultural practices in a major footballing city in England’. The stated objective of this study is to place football in the city of Liverpool, and Liverpool FC in particular, alongside other ‘social practices’ including ‘patterns of politics, gender and ethnicity, and socio-economic and spatial distributions’. The series of articles work as an example of how the development of a successful football club like Liverpool FC can be used as a social barometer for underlying social relations existing within a locality over time. The sense of Liverpool FC as a civic organisation whose actions and constructed image reflect and reproduce dominant models of social action does come across from the various contributions to the book. However, and in the context of what has been previously argued in this chapter, *Passing Rhythms* has its drawbacks. The accounts given in the work cannot be described as a concrete analysis of the club under investigation. They attempt to theorise Liverpool FC – the dominant, dramatic events in its history, its dominant personalities and its supporters – in relation to what are argued to be dominant and changing social structures and social mores. Analysis is abstract, presenting a symbolic account of the club’s relationship to its social environment rather than laying any emphasis on a more grounded, empirically verifiable approach to this task through, for example, a forensic investigation of those owning and controlling the club over time. What we see also in *Passing Rhythms* – and this is consistent with the other case studies mentioned above – is the extent to which there is a pull towards the study of the club in competitive and financial terms, despite the intention of its
authors to offer, primarily, a socio-cultural account of Liverpool FC. Many of the contributions to the book can be accommodated wholly within a framework that concerns itself with the utility and profit maximising behaviour of the professional organisation. Chapters on the style of play of Liverpool FC, and the advent of (and effect of) scientific management on the ethos of the club are counterbalanced by chapters relating to the financial management and administration of the club, the restructuring of the club’s corporate resources in the face of domestic and foreign competition and the implications for its future development on and off the field of play.

The picture portrayed thus far relating to the dominance of a behavioural model within academic studies of the football club is complicated by investigations carried out on certain Scottish and Northern Irish clubs. Here, the influence on the sport of deep ethnic and religious divisions operative in the rest of society has provided the scope for the analysis of football organisations to go beyond their behavioural tendencies.

Academic studies have been forthcoming in the 1980s and 1990s on the role, past and present, of the “Old Firm” clubs in the communal relations in the west of Scotland. Perhaps the best known of these studies is Bill Murray’s The Old Firm: Sectarianism, Sport and Society in Scotland (2000). His discussion of the identities and relationship of Glasgow Celtic and Glasgow Rangers Football Clubs is set within an overall analysis of the national, ethnic and religious divisions within the west of Scotland. In this sense this helps his study to transcend the restrictive framework of those studies reviewed above. A clear picture emerges from Murray’s study of how the two major Glasgow clubs, through the activities of those who controlled and supported them, reflected and recreated social and political conflict within Glasgow and the west of Scotland. Murray’s account, though, also demonstrates the importance of integrating the business impulses and competitive ambitions of the Glasgow clubs within its overall analysis. He is, for example, at pains to stress throughout his work what he terms ‘the business basis of the old firm’. Those men historically in control of the two Glasgow giants exploited fully the financial opportunity their ‘captive’ market provided. Murray provides various examples regarding the financial concerns and
motives of the two boards and adds weight of detail to what Wray Vamplew has described as the ‘complication’ of the Old Firm for Scottish football. In the case of Glasgow Celtic their history, Murray points out, has been marked by considerable internal dissent over the intrusion of financial considerations taking precedence at the expense of on-field success.

A counterweight to Murray’s studies on the Glasgow clubs has been the work carried out by Gerry Finn. Finn, in particular, has analysed the historical origins of the Old Firm and, in this respect, has strongly questioned the belief of Murray which he sees as placing undue emphasis on Glasgow Celtic (by their very presence as a totem of sorts for the Scots-Irish Catholic community) as the primary source of sectarian tensions in club football in the west of Scotland. Finn’s work sheds light on the social origins of Glasgow Rangers, highlighting the overlooked religious and political (Unionist) connections of many members of the Rangers hierarchy, past and present.

In the study of Northern Irish football, analysis of Belfast’s Linfield Football Club has been exhaustively achieved over the past decade, more particularly by the studies carried out by Alan Bairner, Peter Shirlow and John Sugden. The close relationship between Linfield, Protestantism and Ulster Unionism – most obviously displayed by the sectarian signing policy of the club and the connections between the club hierarchy and Unionist political parties – has been highlighted in their accounts. Because of these tensions within the west of Scotland and Northern Ireland the studies carried out on Scottish and Irish football clubs are closer to studies carried out on certain European football clubs, where the ethnic and cultural identities of clubs are outlined and their impact on the socio-political landscape is highlighted. They are, however, less relevant to the studies carried out on other British clubs (though this is not to deny the loose religious affiliations some believe can be applied to certain English clubs, particularly in London, Liverpool and Manchester).

The subject matter in these studies would offset the pull most football club historians of British clubs have felt towards offering accounts of their subjects where prominence is afforded to the study of the conflict between their competitive and
commercial roles. However, it is true to say that all towns and cities have a diversity of power relations, whether they be expressed in terms of ethnicity, religion, class or status group relations, which can insinuate themselves into organisational and institutional forms. Research concerned with revealing the motives of those involved with the control and ownership of professional football clubs, and with evaluating the significance of these organisations within their local environment, can also play a part in uncovering how these power relations are recreated.

1.4 Conclusion
It has been argued, here, that the case studies mentioned above have been overtly influenced by the effects of the theoretical sub-debate that has developed within the historical study of football over the nature of the football club. This influence has, to varying degrees, placed a constraint upon the evaluation of the wider social significance of professional football clubs within their local environment. It is acknowledged that there is an undoubted importance in revealing the role of financial and competitive considerations in professional football organisations. The tensions inherent within this dualism can, for example, generate, or be representative of, challenges to existing power structures within the club and can inform us about the behaviour and motivations of those in ownership and control of clubs. However, I would argue that (during the early history of football, more especially) the impact of the tensions between the football club’s role as a community-inspired and community-sustained organisation and developing commercial-competitive pressures is an aspect of football club history neglected to a great degree in most studies. In this thesis, and by using early professional club history as a case study, an attempt is made to highlight football club development within the context and complexity of its social environment.
Chapter Two

Locality and Football Club Development

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter an assessment will be made of the importance of locality on the establishment of professional football organisation in Liverpool during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Particular attention is given to questioning why football clubs were successfully established in one area of the city of Liverpool but not in other areas. The objective of the chapter will be to test the hypotheses formed by football historians about the emergence of professional football clubs in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. To this end census data are used to extract relevant social and economic characteristics of the populations of the districts in which football clubs were located. The first section of the chapter details the reasons for adopting a spatial approach to the subject. This will then be followed by the explanation of a number of hypotheses concerning the social characteristics of localities where professional football clubs were sustained. These hypotheses have been formulated from the conclusions reached in the secondary literature regarding the social characteristics of football club support during the period under review. The validity of the hypotheses will then be tested by applying to them the findings of the census enquiry. Finally, the results of the hypothesis testing will be presented.

2.2 Spatial Analysis and the Professional Football Club

Previous research highlighting the social characteristics of those initiating and supporting the early formation of professional football clubs has drawn heavily upon the shareholder lists of the newly incorporated football clubs. Shareholder lists, which contain invaluable information on the occupations of shareowners, remain the only available empirical
evidence capable of being used to construct a firm social profile of football support during the period. One argument in favour of the use of the earliest shareholder lists of football clubs is that they tend to be representative of the members involved in club organisation before incorporation and, therefore, provide a valuable insight into the social characteristics of professional football club support during the embryonic period of professional football—a feature highlighted by Wray Vamplew in his study *Pay Up, and Play the Game: Professional Sport in Britain, 1875–1914* (1988). Another argument in favour of using this source is that very often share-ownership in the newly incorporated football clubs was spread quite thinly, with one or two shares, rather than block ownership of shares, being typical of the pattern of ownership—a simple extension of club support is the motive attributed to the purchase of shares in the formative football club-company. This is an argument put forward by Tony Mason in his work *Association Football and English Society, 1863–1915* (1980). Mason argues that the large amount of people owning small numbers of shares in professional football clubs indicates that club identification and support would have prompted the outlay rather any aspiration for financial return. My own survey of Merseyside football club shareholding would appear to endorse the belief that small shareholdings in clubs were a feature of the early professional clubs. The social profile of the small shareholder is argued to be, therefore, representative of—a proxy for—football club support as a whole. One unexplored potential of the shareholder lists, though, lies in the possible use that can be made of the information that they contain on shareholder residency.

New research is presented here on the residential pattern of shareholders in four newly incorporated football clubs in Liverpool and district in 1892: Everton FC; Liverpool FC; Liverpool Caledonians Football Club (Liverpool Caledonians FC), and Bootle Association Football Club (Bootle AFC). In the aftermath of the split of Everton FC in 1892 professional football was sustained by people from the district of Everton on two fronts, with the formation of Everton FC and Liverpool FC. Both clubs flourished as limited liability companies. (Though Everton FC, post-split, had removed to the nearby Walton district, share registers for the first decade of the club’s existence as a limited company
reveal that addresses in the district of Everton remained by far the most prevalent. This issue is returned to in detail in Chapter Seven of this thesis). Bootle AFC hosted professional football for a number of years prior to the period when the clamour amongst clubs for limited liability status took place. After a ten-year existence as a member club Bootle AFC was incorporated as a limited company in 1892 but was dissolved two years later – losing its place within the Football League and abandoning the payment of professional players. Unlike Everton and Bootle football clubs, Liverpool Caledonians FC had only a short history as a professional football organisation. Liverpool Caledonians FC was set up in the Wavertree district in 1890, and was transformed two seasons later into a limited liability company. The venture was not a success. Liverpool Caledonians FC was dissolved as a company in 1894. So, for the purpose of analysis, I have identified three “football areas”: Bootle and Wavertree, where professional football was not successful, and Everton, where professional football was successfully sustained.

Residential information taken from the four clubs’ shareholder registers suggests that, overwhelmingly, shareholders lived in close proximity to the football club in which they invested their support and money. Records demonstrate that an average of just under 60 per cent of members of Everton, Liverpool, Bootle, and Liverpool Caledonians football clubs lived within a half-mile radius of their clubs, with over 80 per cent on average living within a one-mile radius. The diagram below (Figure 2.1) demonstrates the distance of shareholder residence from their football club. (See, also, Table 2.1 for a more detailed breakdown of the proportions of shareholders for each distance interval).
Figure 2.1 Geographical Pattern of Football Club Shareholder Residency in the Liverpool Area, 1892

Table 2.1 Shareholder Residency Patterns of Four Merseyside Football Club Companies, 1892

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0–0.5 miles</th>
<th>0.5–1 mile</th>
<th>Over 1 mile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Everton F.C.</strong></td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liverpool F.C.</strong></td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bootle A.F.C.</strong></td>
<td>81.9%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>L'pool Cal. F.C.</strong></td>
<td>74.5%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Everton FC, Liverpool FC, Bootle AFC and Liverpool Caledonian FC Club Share Registers.

It will be noted that the Liverpool FC shareholder residency is quite evenly spread through the three distance intervals. This distinction, in comparison with the other football clubs,
can be explained by the number of business addresses given in the company shareholder lists – or, rather, city centre addresses located in the business district – which, along with information on occupation, marks these addresses out as being non-residential. The number of business addresses is perhaps explicable as part of the fall-out from the split within Everton FC in 1892 when the vast majority of members subscribed to the original organisation. The newly formed Liverpool FC’s chairman, John Houlding, looked towards personal (in many cases business) contacts to subscribe to his new venture.4

The findings of the shareholder residency patterns indicate a clear relationship between the locality of a football club its support (if we accept the argument of other researchers that shareholders during this period were representative of football club support). This opens up the credible possibility of infusing the debate over the origins and development of each professional football club with the study of a much wider constituency. The football historian, by utilising the richer seam of local sources, such as census material, electoral registers, and Medical Officer of Health reports, may thus be able to go beyond an over-reliance upon the limited evidence offered by football club shareholder lists in order to establish the social characteristics of the locality within which a football club developed and to which it owed its support and growth. In turn, this can open up the possibility of the comparative study of localities, on the one hand, that sustain the development of professional football clubs and, on the other hand, those that fail to sustain their development – thereby contributing to our understanding of the typology of the successful football location.

There are strong reasons for raising the importance of the study of localised conditions with regard to the emerging professional football club. The close proximity of the vast majority of club members to their football clubs in Liverpool reminds us that the late-Victorian city was a loosely spun web of urban communities. There was an absence of mature public transportation systems within towns and cities, and the presence within urban areas of strong social and cultural barriers to mobility would have contributed to the preservation of relatively closed communities existing within the Victorian city. In Liverpool, it was only after the municipalisation and electrification of the tramway system in 1897 that public
transport provided an extensive network of interconnecting routes, and in an affordable manner, which allowed Liverpudlians to access easily all areas of the city. Prior to municipalisation the privately owned tramway and omnibus companies had failed almost totally to provide intra-suburban services and the average cost of 3d per journey charged in the 1880s was prohibitive for many would-be passengers. Much of the port’s workforce were low skilled and casually employed and poorly paid. For example, even by the 1890s dock labourers, when they could find employment, were averaging between 15-20 shillings per week. With dock work spread out through miles of dockland the payment of tram fares would have been a substantial proportion of wages received. For this reason, dockers would usually limit themselves to either dockyards in the north end or south end of Liverpool. Only with the introduction after 1897 of penny stage fares and the integration and electrification of the suburban tramway routes did passenger traffic in Liverpool rise to substantial levels. For instance, annual passenger journeys carried on public transport in Liverpool trebled from 36 million per annum in 1896, the year prior to incorporation, to 109 million per annum by 1901.5

The empirically based studies of nineteenth-century mobility carried out at Liverpool University’s Department of Geography by I. Taylor, R. Lawton and C. Pooley, and J.A. Klapas,6 give a clear understanding also of the range of social obstacles to movement in Liverpool during the period. The work of Richard Lawton and Colin Pooley provide ample evidence of economic and cultural group cohesion, fostered through institutional ties such as work and marriage. These were maintained and reinforced by residential segregation in Liverpool in the mid to late nineteenth century. Indeed each of the studies carried out at the Department of Geography at Liverpool University are quite clear in their portrayal of nineteenth-century Liverpool as a complex and differentiated urban landscape wherein each district had its distinct occupational, ethnic, and religious composition. Unskilled Irish Catholics predominantly populated the residential neighbourhoods adjacent to the north end dockland areas. Predominantly skilled manual workers (Ulster Protestant and Welsh nonconformist migrants) settled the heights above and to the east of the Parish of Liverpool. The north end district of Kirkdale was the preserve of working-class Scots;
whilst a merchant class of Scots migrant occupied the leafier districts of the south end, such as Toxteth Park and Princes Park.

The effects of urban cultural distinctions were also to be found in the advent of organised football. In his work on street football, *Working Class Football and the City: The Problem of Continuity* (1986), Richard Holt describes the development of the neighbourhood into the 'basic unit of sporting organization' of the Victorian city and contextualises this against the backdrop of just such a spatially fragmented social environment as that described above. Holt explains that available evidence would appear to suggest that professional football clubs often emerged from the coalescing of street-based football teams into formal neighbourhood representatives and that these football teams 'both reflected and reinforced territorial and cultural differences within cities'. Football clubs brought 'a shape and continuity to that most basic of feelings – the sense of place'. This is a point underlined by the work of other social historians of football in Britain such as Dave Russell and Charles Korr. The professional football organisation, then, can be viewed as an outgrowth and expression of the differentiated urban social landscape. It is somewhat surprising, then, that, given this view that football clubs were an expression of community, empirically based accounts aimed at outlining the social contours of the particular communities from which football clubs sprang have not been forthcoming. This is more especially surprising when considering that in the period prior to the commercialisation of football and the advent of mass support, the interest and identification of the population of the locality that played host to the emerging professional club must have been vital to sustaining early club development.

2.3 Formulated Hypotheses on the 'Football District' Based on Conclusions from the Secondary Literature

In this section of the chapter certain hypotheses concerning the social composition of the locality, which might have successfully played host to the early professional football club, are tested against the results of a census-based assessment of each of the three districts we know attempted to set up professional football clubs in the Liverpool area: Bootle, Everton and Wavertree. The hypotheses to be tested with regard to the football district are based on
the conclusions reached within the secondary literature on the social characteristics of football club support generally thought to have been significant to football club growth in the period. The census information gathered on each of the named districts can be utilised to help support, or contradict, three of the major assumptions gathered from the secondary literature regarding the social calibre of those involved in the organisation and support of the formative professional football club. These assumptions are:

• Membership and support for football clubs came typically from a social mix encompassing the lower middle class and skilled working class – social groups typically with greater organisational skills, economic security and leisure time to invest in football clubs than socio-economically lower status groups

• The absence of sufficient disposable income necessary for the pursuit of this sporting interest prevented the involvement of low-income, partly skilled and unskilled groups of workers

• Identification with football clubs was an expression of community allegiance and reflected a sense of parochial pride

What follows in the text is an elaboration of how, in the secondary literature, these assumptions have been arrived at. This will then be followed by a series of clearly stated hypotheses to be tested against the evidence from the census material.

The pioneering work of historians such as Tony Mason and Wray Vamplew, which sought to broaden our understanding of the social role and economic impact of football via an empirical investigation of historical sources, has influenced heavily the subsequent work of social historians and their view of the early period of professional football. In Mason’s study, analysis of the occupational information of forty-seven English professional football clubs incorporated between 1886 and 1915 was supplemented with analysis of contemporary newspaper and journal reports of the period in an effort to unearth the social significance of football in the late Victorian and Edwardian era. Vamplew’s later study extended Mason’s work on shareholder information on English clubs and also included analysis of patterns of membership in Scottish football clubs prior to their incorporation as
companies and shareholder records after incorporation. Together, their work revealed significant details of the social profile of those who supported, owned and controlled the developing football organisation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The evidence unearthed by them led them to conclude that football club support became increasingly the preserve of the skilled working class from the last decade of the nineteenth century. However, they also stress the importance of lower middle-class support in the game’s initial period of growth of the 1880s and early 1890s, and their continued presence in support, ownership and control of football clubs thereafter. Mason’s work, in particular, recognises that although in terms of attendance at matches the lower middle-class presence dwindled proportionately with the increase in attendance of skilled manual workers as the nineteenth century drew to its close, anecdotal evidence from contemporary sources of the period seem to suggest that the covered area, or ‘stands’, at football grounds remained the preserve of the middle-class supporter – ‘a bourgeois island in a sea of working-class faces’, as he puts it.

We know also, from the work carried out by Mason and by Vamplew, that the ownership and control of football clubs in the period and, more especially, after their incorporation as limited companies, witnessed the continued influence of the middle classes. Vamplew’s study of Scottish club football (where records of membership in Scottish clubs prior to incorporation have survived) suggests that as a result of incorporation there was a shift toward lower middle-class groups, in terms of ownership and control of these organisations. Vamplew demonstrates, by a comparison of club membership and shareholder lists, that the proportion of shareowners in Scottish clubs from manual working-class backgrounds declined following company formation, whilst lower middle-class representation increased substantially. Available evidence relating to English club trends suggests a not too dissimilar pattern of development of football organisation south of the border. (The socio-occupational profile of English and Scottish clubs is an issue to which we return in Chapter Seven).
membership fees and, later, share ownership — which Vamplew has demonstrated was typically set at £1 per share by incorporating clubs in the 1890s (though some clubs set shares as high as £20) — it has been argued that the price of admission into professional football grounds was prohibitive for many in the late-Victorian period. The minimum admission into professional matches in 1890 was set by the Football Association at 6d. It is said that by comparison with other, cheaper forms of entertainment, such as the music hall, football was the preserve of the materially better off in society during this period.

The conclusions of the secondary literature would seem to suggest also that there is a strong connection between localism — the identification with, and support of, cultural forms that parochially confirm one’s sense of place — and football club development. Examples of this reasoning are found in the work of, for example, Nick Fishwick, *Association Football and English Social Life* (1986); Richard Holt, *Working Class Football and the City* (1986); and Dave Russell’s *Football and the English* (1996). Football clubs were, we are informed, champions of what were considered to be civic, town or district virtues.

Turning to the first of our hypotheses, all available evidence suggests that the lower middle class and skilled working class made the most significant contribution to the formation, support, ownership and control of football clubs. For the purpose of this study, therefore, it would be a reasonable hypothesis to put forward and test whether the social composition of those localities within which football organisation was established on Merseyside will reveal a high incidence of the social groups identified generally as being key to the development of the game. We may also expect that the social composition of the most successful of these localities (successful in the sense that it sustained the development of a football club) would reflect most closely the lower middle class—skilled working class fusion which characterised the social profile of the football club established in the secondary literature.

The second of our hypotheses will be that the locality in Liverpool, which did sustain professional football club development, will display characteristics that suggest a greater
degree of material wealth than localities establishing but failing to sustain professional football clubs. Clues to the likely level of disposable income within each household unit can be observed in the census returns. Accommodation and household characteristics such as type of housing stock, number of rooms, and number of servants employed within a household can, by aggregating this information for a locality, provide us with a rough idea of the likely level of demand for professional football in that locality.

On the basis that being born within the locality where one resides fosters a greater degree of pride and identification with that locale we may, perhaps, assume that the 'successful' football location will have significantly more of its population born within the environs of the football club than those localities where football clubs were not sustained and, conversely, less of its population non-local or migrant-born than other localities where football clubs were formed. Our final hypothesis to be tested, then, will be that the census returns to be analysed would demonstrate a greater amount of local-born in the district supporting the development of professional club football in Liverpool compared with localities which failed to sustain support for their professional football clubs.

2.4 Census Data Analysis
This study uses the 1881 and 1891 census material concerning information on occupation, housing and place of birth in order to provide a comparative account of three locations in Liverpool where professional football organisations were established in the late nineteenth century. A census sample, equivalent to the average size of an enumeration district in terms of number of schedules, has been taken from each of three districts: Everton, Wavertree and Bootle. Analysis of the social characteristics of these localities, and a determination from them of the social profile of each locality, provides the core of the empirical investigation. Two other localities where no attempt was made to establish professional football have also been included in the study: one considered to be socially superior and the other socially inferior in comparison with the football club districts as defined by social class terms. Their inclusion is designed to allow the reader to comprehend how representative the football areas were of the wider environment and to establish some idea
of the level on the social scale where the possibility of football organisation becomes more favourable.

The framework adopted for this research will involve analysis of household information contained in the 1881 and 1891 census enumeration district reports for 320 residencies in each of the five localities in Liverpool and its outlying districts chosen for analysis. It is thought that 320 households—representing the average size of an enumeration district in Liverpool in the later census reports of 1891—will provide sufficient scope to draw out at least some of the flavour of the wider districts they form part of. The choice of residencies studied within these districts was dictated by evidence from club shareholder records, which suggest that club support was strongest amongst residencies in close proximity to the football clubs. The residencies sampled here, therefore, have been taken from houses in streets adjacent to the football stadium. The remaining two localities sampled are the “non-football club” districts of Princes Park and Scotland (a district in the north end of the Township of Liverpool taking its name from a main thoroughfare, Scotland Road, which marks the eastern boundary of this dockland area). The residencies studied here were concentrated on streets contiguous with parkland or a recognisable open space—places where opportunity existed for the physical development of football stadia. In the majority of cases, streets sampled in the 1881 census enumeration district reports were also sampled from the 1891 census reports. In three of the five districts sampled, however, minor adjustments have had to be made. Having initially tested the 1891 census it was found that some of the streets tested from those reports had not been built at the time of the earlier census report. In light of this it was decided to substitute other streets from the 1881 census that were also in close proximity to the ground in order to maintain the same sample size of 320 households for each of the districts in both census reports.

From the census enumeration district reports a profile of the sample populations has been constructed. A number of indicators have been used: occupation; place of birth; and accommodation and household characteristics such as the number of households living in accommodation with fewer than five rooms, living in courts or cellars, or with more than one family, and also the incidence of servants within a household. This information has
allowed for an understanding to be gained of the major demographic features of each sample population that has been used to facilitate comparisons between districts.

The 1881 and 1891 census data relating to the district samples are presented in the form of tables and graphs. This information will be analysed in the text below in three stages. First, information concerning occupational structure will be described and assessed – this will also provide the basis for a social class comparison to be made between districts. The second stage of the data presentation provides statistics concerning a number of accommodation and household characteristics (referred to above). They will be commented upon with regard to their ability to indicate income levels in each district. The final stage of the census data presentation involves providing information about the place of birth of the population in each sample district. Distinctions within district samples between the 1881 and 1891 census data will be commented on where appropriate. At the end of this data analysis an overall summary of the findings concerning the football districts will be given, which will seek to draw out overall comparisons between these districts based on all of the social indicators used in the study.

2.5 Occupational and Social Class Structure in the Five Sampled Districts

Before beginning this stage of the data analysis an explanation of the categories adopted to organise the data regarding employment status is in order.

The organisation of the information regarding occupation in the census enumeration district reports uses as its basis the employment categories used in the 1891 Published Census Reports (PCR) for England and Wales. Occupations thought to have been especially significant in the setting up of professional football organisations (such as clerks, for example), which are submerged in the broad census employment divisions and subdivisions, have been categorised independently of their allotted census group. The occupational categories to be used are described as follows:

- Professional Occupations
- Entrepreneurs
- Clerical
- Transport Employees
• Retail and Wholesale Employees
• Craft Workers
• Labourers (Domestic and Industrial)

The category Entrepreneurs used here corresponds to the ‘Merchants and Agents’ subdivision of Commercial Occupations in the PCR. The Clerical category excludes ‘Rail and Postal clerks’ in the PCR, and these workers have been included in the Transport category for this study. Transport approximates to the vast majority of occupations listed under the PCR sub-division ‘Conveyance of Men, Goods and Messages’. The three categories Retail and Wholesale, Craft, and Labour used in this study are taken from the large ‘Industrial Class’ category of the PCR.

The size of the occupational study sample is 2,338 for the 1881 findings and 2,292 for 1891. A social classification of the head of household in each district will also be offered and this will utilise the occupational data.

The social classification used here will be based on the five categories of the Registrar General, utilised throughout the social sciences, where occupation and employment status are used to determine classification. They are:
I Professional Occupations
II Managerial and Technical Occupations
III Skilled Occupations
   (N) Non-Manual
   (M) Manual
IV Partly Skilled
V Unskilled

In this study I have modified the Registrar General’s categories in order to facilitate my own research. The social classification used here is as follows:
Social Class 1 (SC 1) Professional
Social Class 2 (SC 2) Employers and Proprietors
Social Class 3 (SC 3) Skilled Non-Manual
Social Class 4 (SC 4) Skilled Manual
Social Class 5 (SC 5) Semi/Partly Skilled
Social Class 6 (SC 6) Unskilled

The most important deviations to note involve the isolation of employers from the census material and the allotting to this occupational sub-group their own social class category, and the attributing to each of the Registrar General’s skilled occupational sub-groups, ‘Non-Manual’ and ‘Manual’, their own social class category. These modifications were made in order to test within this thesis conclusions arrived at by other social historians of football clubs regarding the social class composition of those owning and controlling clubs. For instance, importance has been attached to the involvement, prior to the incorporation period of professional football clubs (beginning in earnest in the late 1880s), of the skilled trades in football club formation. The occupational skills and generally shorter working hours of clerical workers, in particular, allowed them closer, and earlier, involvement in the support of football organisations than other groups of workers. Post-incorporation, and with the issue of capital investment in clubs an important consideration, football historians have pointed to the influence of the proprietary classes on football club development, more especially in relation to share ownership. This isolation, for research purposes, of these important socio-occupational groups in football development has been adopted in groundbreaking work carried out on football clubs in the earlier mentioned studies by Tony Mason and by Wray Vamplew, and also the work of Steven Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen: The Origins of Professional Soccer in England (1980).

The size of the sample study is 320 heads of household for each of the sample districts in each of the census years 1881 and 1891. The decision to use head of household was guided by the judgement that they would reflect accurately the social status of other household members. Also, in a study where social status is being primarily determined by occupation
it is only in the sample for the Scotland district where significant numbers of household members other than the household head are engaged in employment.

Table 2.2 1881 Occupational Structure in Five Liverpool Districts:
% of Employed Population (Sample Total: 2,338)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Entrepreneur</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Office Work</th>
<th>Craft Work</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Retail</th>
<th>Labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size= 430)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavertree</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size= 379)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootle</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size= 515)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size= 655)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princes Park</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size= 359)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1881 Census Enumerator Report
Table 2.3 1891 Occupational Structure in Five Liverpool Districts:
% of Employed Population (Sample Total: 2,292)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Entrepreneur</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Office Work</th>
<th>Craft Work</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Retail</th>
<th>Labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everton (sample size=477)</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavertree (sample size=382)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootle (sample size=479)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland (sample size=557)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princes Park (sample size=397)</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1891 Census Enumerator Report

Figure 2.2 shows the occupational structure of the sample from the Everton district, that is, the district in which professional football was successfully established. The occupational structure reveals a distinctive business and white-collar orientation. Over 60 per cent of the working population of the Everton district were either employers, salaried or employed in non-manual work in both 1881 and 1891 — that is, entrepreneurs, lower professionals or those employed as clerical workers.
The numbers involved in clerical employment was especially noteworthy, accounting for almost one-third of the total workforce in the 1891 census sample of the district. In Everton, amongst those employed in manual occupations (Craft, Retail, Transport and Labourer in Figure 2.2 and Tables 2.2 and 2.3) those involved in the various branches of craft work far outweighed the presence of other manual workers, with Labourer being the most unrepresentative employment of the sample population as a whole.
By contrast, the occupational data from the Wavertree district sample in Figure 2.3 reveals a predominantly manual workforce. Over 70 per cent and 60 per cent of those employed in the 1881 and 1891 census findings, respectively, were from the manual working class. Craft-based workers figured most prominently in the Wavertree sample, accounting for almost one-third of all those employed in the 1881 census and almost one-quarter in 1891. There was also a strong presence of transport workers. The existence of the nearby Edge Hill railway depot seems to have had an impact on the results of the sample, as many railway employees were found within the sample group.

Unskilled work was also a prominent feature within the district, accounting for almost one-third of employees in the 1881 census and over one-fifth of employees in 1891. White-collar employment was most typified in the sample by those involved in office work, with less of a presence of entrepreneurial and lower professional occupations. An overall shift within the Wavertree sample between 1881 and 1891 seems to have been an increase in white-collar occupations and decrease in manual occupations.
The Bootle sample (Figure 2.4) demonstrates that manual workers were also most representative of the workforce in that district, with almost 82 per cent of those employed involved in a variety of manual trades in 1881, and 60 per cent in 1891.

![Figure 2.4 Occupational Profile: Bootle 1881-1891](image)

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Reports

By far the most dominant group in both census years were craft workers with over one-third of the sample involved in skilled manual employment. The transport sector was well represented with railway workers and, as one might perhaps suspect in a dockside district, mariners to the fore. Entrepreneurial and lower professional occupations were present in the Bootle sample, but it was office workers who were the most significant non-manual group in the Bootle sample (accounting for almost 18 per cent of the total employed in 1891). As with the Wavertree findings, Bootle displayed an observable shift in occupational structure between 1881 and 1891 with an increase in the non-manual employed and decrease in the manual employed. However, as in Wavertree, manual occupations were dominant throughout the period.
In the non-football club districts there is evidence of extremes in occupational structure (Figures 2.5 and 2.6). The Scotland district sample exhibited a striking marginalisation of the white-collar occupations. Scotland was an overwhelmingly manual working-class district, with over 90 per cent of the occupational sample employed in manual trades. More specifically, Scotland was a district where the unskilled were typical (dock labourers alone accounted for almost 60 per cent of the sample total in both 1881 and 1891).

\[ \text{Figure 2.5 Occupational Profile: Scotland 1881-1891} \]

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Reports
The Princes Park sample, by way of contrast, demonstrated a significant percentage of its working population involved in the entrepreneurial and professional occupations and a sizeable proportion of its workforce involved in office work. Evidence of manual occupation was present, though, with craft workers being the second most representative group in both the 1881 and 1891 district sample. However, other manual workers involved in transport and unskilled industrial and domestic labour were relatively underrepresented in Princes Park.

Comparing each of the districts where football clubs were established but failed to sustain themselves as successful, commercially viable organisations (Bootle and Wavertree), it can be observed that there was a certain similarity between the occupational structure of their occupational samples. Craft workers were dominant in Bootle and Wavertree, and each of these districts had a significant presence of clerical workers. Entrepreneurial and lower professional occupations were unrepresentative in both the Bootle and Wavertree district samples. The only significant differences here would appear to be the greater incidence of unskilled labour in Wavertree.
Comparing these two districts with the one district that did sustain professional football club development, Everton, the occupational structure of the Everton sample showed marked differences to those of Bootle and Wavertree. Though there were a large number of craft-workers present in the Everton sample population, manual employment was underrepresented relative to the other two football districts. Compared with Bootle and Wavertree, in Everton significant numbers were involved in entrepreneurial and lower professional occupations. Most notable of all was the greater numbers of office workers in Everton during this period.

Turning to a comparison of the football districts with the two non-football club districts of Scotland and Princes Park, it can be stated that the occupational structure of Everton, Bootle and Wavertree held little in common with the occupational structure found in Scotland. Though the number of transport workers in the Scotland sample were similar to the numbers found in Bootle and Wavertree, the conclusion to be drawn is that the Scotland sample exhibits an occupational profile in which white-collar occupations are under-represented and unskilled occupations are over-represented relative to the football districts (though the number of unskilled present in the 1881 Wavertree sample was, nonetheless, substantial). The occupational sample of Princes Park shares certain similarities with the football districts. The average levels of office workers, craft workers and those involved in retail work in the football districts were consistent with the Princes Park sample (though Bootle and Everton display greater proportions of those employed in craft employment and office employment, respectively). With the exception of Everton, however, the Princes Park sample deviated significantly from the football districts in the numbers of entrepreneurs and lower professionals resident in the sample area. It would be accurate to suggest that the Princes Park sample demonstrated a closer fit to the Everton sample in its occupational structure than to the other football districts.
The following information relates to social class status amongst the sample populations. A comparison between the Everton district sample for 1881 and 1891 and the other districts sampled can be seen in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.

Table 2.4 1881 Social Class Profile of Five Liverpool Districts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>S.C.1</th>
<th>S.C.2</th>
<th>S.C.3</th>
<th>S.C.4</th>
<th>S.C.5</th>
<th>S.C.6</th>
<th>No occup. or Living on Own Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size=320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavertree</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size=320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootle</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size=320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size=320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princes Park</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size=320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1881 Census Enumerator Report
Table 2.5 1891 Social Class Profile of Five Liverpool Districts: % of Heads of Household (Sample Size: 1,600)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>S.C.1</th>
<th>S.C.2</th>
<th>S.C.3</th>
<th>S.C.4</th>
<th>S.C.5</th>
<th>S.C.6</th>
<th>No occup. or Living on Own Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everton (sample size=320)</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavertree (sample size=320)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootle (sample size=320)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland (sample size=320)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princes Park (sample size=320)</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1891 Census Enumerator Report

The evidence relating to social class status demonstrates that in Everton there was a high proportion of both skilled non-manual and skilled manual workers (SC 3 and SC 4, respectively) amongst the heads of household in the district sample, as can be seen from Figure 2.7.
It will be remembered from the text above that craft work and, especially, office-based employment was prominent in Everton. There was, however, a slightly larger presence of heads of household from SCs 1 and 2 combined in Everton (the middle classes) than the combined heads of household for SCs 3 and 4 (the skilled working class): 41.6 per cent of those employed in 1881, rising to 42.8 per cent in 1891, though with SC 3 and SC 4 also rising over the same period – from 39.1 per cent to 40.7 per cent. Overall, the evidence suggested that the district population, with less than 10 per cent classifiable as semi-skilled and unskilled in 1881 and 1891, could be considered to be, if not exclusive, then certainly of a reasonably high social status.
In Wavertree (Figure 2.8) there would appear to have been a fairly even dispersal of the population across the social spectrum, although the larger number of skilled manual workers (SC 4) and labourers (SC 6) recorded in 1881 tempered this observation somewhat. The large number of unskilled household heads was, perhaps, a surprising feature in a suburban district at this point in time. The labourers in the district sample were described in the census reports largely as ‘general’ or ‘domestic’, rather than attached to any particular industry such as dock labour, for example.

The Bootle sample represented in Figure 2.9 suggested a district typified by the skilled manual working class (SC 4).
The semi-skilled and unskilled were also well represented in the Bootle sample (SC 5 and SC 6). Combined, the presence of the manually employed amounted to two-thirds of household heads in 1881 and 50 per cent in 1891. This decline in the numbers of the manual working class in 1891 is partly explained by the greater number of SC 3 amongst the 1891 sample, which reflected the increase in clerical employment in Bootle over the period. The number of employers and professionals in Bootle remained marginal over the period 1881 to 1891.

A comparison of the non-football club districts of Scotland and Princes Park provided us with contrasting social class profiles for the two districts (Figures 2.10 and 2.11). The Scotland sample demonstrated that SC 1 and SC 2 heads of household were marginalized in that district. Conversely, semi-skilled and unskilled heads of household (SC 5 and SC 6) were predominant in the sample, accounting for two-thirds of the district total in both the 1881 and 1891 census.
Figure 2.10 Social Class Profile: Scotland 1881-1891

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Reports

Figure 2.11 Social Class Profile: Princes Park 1881-1891

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Reports
In stark contrast to the Scotland sample, in Princes Park almost half of the heads of household sampled in 1881 and 1891 were from the highest social class background SC 1 and SC 2, whilst only 10 per cent of household heads belonged to the combined total of SC 5 and SC 6. A surprising feature of the Princes Park sample was the significant representation of skilled manual workers – surprising, that is, given the general perception of the district as being overwhelmingly white-collar.

If we compare the samples for the football districts we may observe that, as with the study of occupational structure above, the Bootle and Wavertree samples shared much in common. The proportion of heads of household in each social classification was quite similar. The only significant exception, in this respect, was the higher percentage of SC 6 heads of household found in Wavertree. Again, as with the occupational structure study, the Everton sample was, in some respects, out of step with the social structure of the other two football districts, more especially at the extremes of the social spectrum. For example, the Everton sample was the only one of the football club districts to register a significant proportion of its household heads in SC 1. There were also significantly fewer SC 5 and SC 6 household heads in Everton than in either Bootle or Wavertree. A feature which Everton did hold in common with Bootle and Wavertree, however, was the proportion of household heads classifiable in the social classes associated most strongly with skilled employment: SC 3 and SC 4. All of the football districts had a much greater incidence of these groups than was the case in the Scotland and Princes Park districts.

Turning to the two non-football districts, the social class profile of the Scotland district showed no real similarity with any of the football districts, Everton, Bootle or Wavertree. Overall, the Princes Park sample demonstrated a close similarity only with the Everton sample. However, the greater proportion of skilled non-manual workers in the Everton
sample, and the greater proportion of professionals in the Princes Park sample, was a significant difference between the two districts.

The following description and conclusions relate to the data provided on each district concerning certain characteristics within the district samples that may help to highlight income levels and social class within each district. All data relating to the district samples can be seen in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, below. The number of households in each district living in houses or courts, having five rooms or fewer than five rooms, discretely occupying or sub-letting their accommodation, with or without servants can tell us a great deal about the general standard of living experienced in a locality.

In the following assessment the three football districts of Everton, Wavertree and Bootle will first be analysed, followed by analysis of the non-football club districts of Scotland and Princes Park. The total sample size of the study is 1,600 households for each of the two census studies of 1881 and 1891.
Table 2.6 1881 Accommodation and Household Characteristics
Five Liverpool Districts: % of Households
(Sample Size: 1,600)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Accommodation Type</th>
<th>Sub-Let Residency</th>
<th>Fewer Than 5 Rooms</th>
<th>i Households with Servants</th>
<th>ii Avg. no. Servants Per Household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EVERTON</td>
<td>House: 100%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>i 34.4%</td>
<td>ii 0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellar/Court: 0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAVERTREE</td>
<td>House: 100%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>i 17.2%</td>
<td>ii 0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellar/Court: 0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOOTLE</td>
<td>House: 100%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>i 5.9%</td>
<td>ii 0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellar/Court: 0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>House: 65%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>i 2.5%</td>
<td>ii 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellar/Court: 35%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRINCES PARK</td>
<td>House: 100%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>i 48.8%</td>
<td>ii 1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellar/Court: 0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1881 Census Enumerator Report
Table 2.7 1891 Accommodation and Household Characteristics
Five Liverpool Districts: % of Households
(Sample Size: 1,600)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Accommodation Type</th>
<th>Sub-Let Residency</th>
<th>Fewer Than 5 Rooms</th>
<th>i  Households with Servants</th>
<th>ii  Avg. no. Servants Per Household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EVERTON (sample size =320)</td>
<td>House: 100% (320)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>i  28.4%</td>
<td>ii  0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellar/Court: (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAVERTREE (sample size =320)</td>
<td>House: 100% (320)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>i  15.6%</td>
<td>ii  0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellar/Court: (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOOTLE (sample size =320)</td>
<td>House: 100% (320)</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>i  15.6%</td>
<td>ii  0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellar/Court: (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND (sample size =320)</td>
<td>House: 62.2%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>i  2.8%</td>
<td>ii  0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellar/Court: 37.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRINCES PARK (sample size =320)</td>
<td>House: 100% (250)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>i  44.7%</td>
<td>ii  1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellar/Court: (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1891 Census Enumerator Report
The Everton sample suggested that the district’s inhabitants lived in a relatively comfortable environment (Figure 2.12). Cellar and court dwellings were absent and freedom from overcrowding was suggested, with no household having fewer than five rooms (applicable to 1891 census only, as the 1881 census did not carry such information) and a negligible number of families shared their accommodation with other families. If we attach a degree of wealth to the employment of servants a simple comparison between the proportion of servants employed in each district sample can provide us with another indication that the population in Everton enjoyed a relatively comfortable standard of living. The proportion of households employing servants in Everton, 34.4 per cent and 24.8 per cent of households in 1881 and 1891, respectively, compared favourably with the proportion of household employment of servants in other district samples.

**Figure 2.12 Accommodation Profile: Everton 1881-1891**

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Reports
It will be observed from Figure 2.13 that the Wavertree sample provides us with mixed signals about the likely standard of living we might expect to have found in that district. Though no cellar or court population was to be found in the sample, there was evidence of multiple-occupancy residencies in the 1881 census report. And in the 1891 census report almost one-third of all households lived in accommodation with fewer than five rooms. Also, the proportion of households employing servants was much lower than in Everton: 17.2 per cent of households employed servants in 1881, decreasing to 15.6 per cent having servants by 1891.
The Bootle sample (Figure 2.14) indicates that none of the sampled household lived in cellars or courts. Although in 1881 a significant number of households were living in multi-occupied accommodation (14.4 per cent of households) the incidence of multiple occupancy was statistically insignificant by 1891, whilst few households lived in accommodation with fewer than five rooms. Thus by 1891, no significant scale of overcrowding was evident in Bootle. The Bootle sample, though, revealed only a small proportion of households employing servants in 1881 (5.9 per cent). But this proportion did increase by 1891 when 15.6 per cent of households sampled were able to employ servants.

Turning to the non-football club districts, as with the occupational and social class studies above, the Scotland and Princes Park samples offered divergent evidence concerning accommodation and household characteristics (Figures 2.15 and 2.16). The Scotland district sample outlined a locality experiencing poor quality accommodation. Almost 40 per cent of households in the Scotland sample lived in courts, there was a significant incidence of multiple occupancy, and over 70 per cent of households had fewer than five rooms. The
A proportion of households employing servants in the district was predictably low: 2.5 per cent of households in 1881 and 2.8 per cent by 1891.

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Reports

Figure 2.15 Accommodation Profile: Scotland, 1881-1891

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Reports

Figure 2.16 Accommodation Profile: Princes Park, 1881-1891

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Reports
Conversely, characteristics that may be associated with affluence were displayed in the Princes Park sample. None of the households sampled lived in courts or cellars, none had fewer than five rooms, and few residences were multiple-occupied (incidence of this in Princes Park was usually the result of a residency within the district where servants shared accommodation with other servants working within the district). Another telling statistic related to the proportion of servants in the sample. The substantial amount of servants employed in Princes Park translated into an average of 1.42 servants per household in 1881 and 1.28 in 1891 with an incidence of households employing servants of 48.8 per cent in 1881 and 44.5 per cent in 1891.

Comparing the accommodation and household characteristics of the football districts, it is accurate to say that there were significant differences between each of the samples. Only the Everton sample demonstrated a consistent pattern as far as indicators of wealth are concerned. The sample revealed a strong association with accommodation and household characteristics that suggested a relatively high standard of living in the district and a weak association with characteristics that suggested a poor standard of living. Both the Wavertree and Bootle samples, whilst not indicating any significant levels of poverty, sent out mixed messages concerning the standard of living we might expect to have found in those districts. In Bootle, there was a significant level of multiple occupancy in 1881, though this did decrease markedly by 1891. In Wavertree, a large proportion of households had limited living space, as the significant level of households living in a limited number of rooms bears testimony to (average household size was lowest in Wavertree and the poorest of the sampled districts, Scotland).

In discussing the similarities and differences between the football districts and the non-football club districts it can be said that the Princes Park sample bears comparison only with the Everton sample – though, even here, the substantial employment of domestic servants in Princes Park tended to point in the direction of a standard of living in Princes Park out of the reach of the majority of the population of the Everton sample. The Scotland district sample, despite a degree of similarity with the Wavertree sample, in terms of the
limited nature of accommodation space, stands alone in the study in terms of the probable low standard of living experienced by its population.

The following section outlines the ratio of Liverpool-born to migrant-born within each sample population. The Liverpool-born are defined as those born in the registration districts of Liverpool, Everton, Bootle, Wavertree, West Derby, Toxteth Park and Garston. These registration districts covered the borough of Liverpool (later, city of Liverpool) and approximated in area to a Greater Liverpool rather than a region such as Merseyside. Though it is difficult to place geographical limits on identity it is thought that cultural similarities would be greater between these districts, fostered by, for example, their shared reliance on port-related activity for employment, or their common administrative bodies such as the West Derby Board of Guardians which incorporated most of this geographical area within its jurisdiction. Lancastrians born in the areas falling outside of the registration districts listed above and residing in the sample districts have been included as 'Other English'. The distance of their birthplace from the core area of urban and suburban Liverpool, and the cultural distinctions between the rural or semi-rural conditions of their birthplace and the urbanised environment of Greater Liverpool, are considered, here, to be sufficiently large enough to warrant the application of the term 'migrant' to them.

This study uses the birthplace details of heads of household. The decision was made to use head of household information because they are invariably male and the majority of household heads in the five sampled populations were between the ages of 20 to 40 years of age – the age-group agreed in the secondary literature as the most representative of football support. The total sample size of each census sample study is 1,600. Given the small number of indicators being used here, a summary of the information for each district is thought unnecessary and a comparison of the district findings will be conducted only. The following text relates to data contained in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.
Table 2.8 1881, Place of Birth of Heads of Household in Five Liverpool Districts: % of Household Heads (Sample Size: 1,600)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Liverpool Born*</th>
<th>Migrant Born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size =320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavertree</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size =320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootle</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size =320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size =320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princes Park</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size =320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.9 1891, Place of Birth of Heads of Household in Five Liverpool Districts: % of Household Heads (Sample Size: 1,600)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Liverpool Born*</th>
<th>Migrant Born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size =320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavertree</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size =320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootle</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size =320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size =320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princes Park</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sample size =320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Report. * 'Liverpool Born' is inclusive of those born within the registration districts of Liverpool, Everton, Toxteth Park, Garston, Wavertree, West Derby and Bootle.
Figure 2.17 Proportion Local-Born for Five Sample Districts, 1881-1891

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Reports

Figure 2.18 Proportion Migrant-Born for Five Sample Districts, 1881-1891

Source: 1881 and 1891 Census Enumerator Reports
Figures 2.17 and 2.18 demonstrate that out of the three football districts Bootle had a relatively different profile to Everton and Wavertree in terms of the place of birth of household heads. The Bootle sample findings revealed that in both 1881 and 1891 there were fewer local-born in Bootle than in Everton and Wavertree. The greater proportion of migrants in the Bootle sample was due in no small part to a large Scots presence in the district: 12 per cent of household heads were Scots-born in 1881 and 21.2 per cent in 1891. This augmented a large percentage of Other English migrants (36.6 per cent in 1881 and 27.2 per cent in 1891). The migrant-born in Everton and Wavertree were, for the most part, born in other parts of England: 34.7 per cent of household heads in Everton in 1881 were English migrants and 37 per cent in 1891; in Wavertree the census reports reveal that 38.1 per cent of household heads in 1881 were English migrants and 38.7 per cent in 1891. It is, perhaps, surprising that so few Scots migrants were to be found within the Wavertree sample (3.4 per cent in the 1881 census and 5.7 per cent in 1891) given that the Liverpool Caledonians Football Club – ostensibly set up for ‘the Sons of Scotia’ – chose to locate its ground there. The club was formed by prominent local businessmen and public figures who either hailed from Scotland or were second-generation Liverpool Scots who resided, largely, in the high social status Abercromby area of central Liverpool and the South Toxteth area of south Liverpool. Colin Pooley in his thesis ‘Migration, Mobility, and Residential Areas in Nineteenth Century Liverpool’ (1978) identifies the Kirkdale area of Liverpool’s north end as an area where in late-nineteenth-century Liverpool a significant number of skilled working-class Scots migrants settled. It could be ventured that the launch of an ethnically orientated football club in proximity to this group of ethnic minority workers – a social class synonymous with early football club support – might have had greater success in establishing itself as a viable proposition.

In the two non-football club districts there was also a stronger migrant presence than in Everton or Wavertree. In the Scotland sample of 1881, almost 77 per cent of household heads were migrant-born (48 per cent of these from Ireland), and in 1891 60 per cent were migrant-born. In Princes Park 70 per cent of household heads in both the 1881 and 1891 census were migrant-born. The Scotland sample was markedly different to the football
districts in the fact that the largest single migrant ethnic group of household heads were those born in Ireland. The Princes Park sample was also distinct in that the high level of foreign-born migrants (10 per cent in both 1881 and 1891) was not replicated in the football districts. The number of foreign-born reflected the presence of European and American merchants domiciled within the district. Overall, it can be said that the Everton and Wavertree samples showed the greatest degree of similarity, with both samples displaying evidence of a large presence of English-born (both ‘Liverpool’ and ‘Other English’) and similar proportions of the non-English-born amongst their heads of household.

2.6 Summary of Census Data
Assessing the profile of each of the football district samples emerging from the census data it can be said that whilst the football districts share certain similarities with each other (which, as a group, sets them apart from the social polarity of the Scotland and Princes Park district samples) there are some interesting differences between the Everton sample and those of Wavertree and Bootle. The evidence presented on occupation and social class in the Everton district clearly points to a population enjoying higher social status than the populations of Wavertree and Bootle. Everton was a district typically defined as white collar, as opposed to the artisan areas of Wavertree and Bootle. In terms of standard of living — as measured by the proxies of accommodation and household characteristics — the evidence suggests that the population of Everton was typically better off than its Wavertree and Bootle counterparts. There was, in Everton, no evidence of the overcrowding of living space which was witnessed to some degree in the Wavertree sample, and a greater proportion of servants to households than in the Bootle and Wavertree samples was evident, findings we may take as a reasonable indicator of higher income levels within Everton households. Only in the place of birth of household heads was there a close similarity between Everton’s profile and one other of the three football club districts, Wavertree, with each district having substantially equal proportions of Liverpool-born and migrant-born. It would appear from the evidence presented that, overall, the socio-economic profile that emerges from the Everton sample is distinct from the other two
football club districts. With the census assessment complete, we may now relate the findings to the hypotheses outlined earlier in the text.

2.7 Results of Testing Process
We begin by briefly recapitulating the three assumptions to be tested concerning the social make-up of the support of the formative clubs. They are that: the early football club owed its development to lower middle-class and skilled working-class support; football club support in the game's formative period (either as spectator or club member or shareholder) points toward a level of income which necessarily excluded large sections of the population; involvement in, and support of, football clubs during the formative period of the game was an expression of local identity. Using the census results from above, how valid are these widely held assumptions when considering the growth of professional football organisation in Liverpool? Do the football club districts sampled reveal the social characteristics thought crucial in the early period of football club formation, and does the Liverpool district which sustained the development of professional club football most closely fit the social profile of the 'football environment' hinted at in the secondary literature?

Social Class
The evidence presented above does appear to offer support to the assumption that a locality that sustained the development of professional football club organisation, would demonstrate a social profile where there was a mix of the lower middle classes and skilled working classes. Though each of the football club districts had a large skilled working-class presence, it was the Everton district alone that had a sizeable proportion of its population who were discernibly middle and lower middle class. The lower middle-class involvement in football was thought crucial, it will be remembered, both in terms of spectator numbers in the game's formative years and in the active part such people took in the ownership and organisation of football clubs as they evolved into large commercial and bureaucratically dominated organisations. The large numbers of clerks and bookkeepers in the Everton district sample is also an important and distinctive feature of the Everton district. Members of these skilled occupations are considered in the secondary literature to
have played an important role in football club development during the period under review by bringing to football clubs their organisational skills. Perhaps more importantly such skilled workers were granted Saturday half-day holiday much sooner than other groups of employees. This free time would undoubtedly have been significant in determining the social composition of early football club support. It is noticeable that, in the first shareholder accounts of each of the four incorporated football clubs in Liverpool and district, clerks and bookkeepers figure prominently amongst the occupations cited: 23.6 per cent of shareholders of Everton FC; 21.8 per cent of Liverpool FC; 20.4 per cent of Bootle AFC; and 27.2 per cent of Liverpool Caledonians FC. For this reason their sizeable presence within the Everton district sample is significant. In the case of Wavertree and Bootle districts, these districts did have a large skilled manual working class presence (as did Everton) and members of the craft trades were, indeed, important contributors to football club support both as spectators and as club shareholders. However, these districts, if the census samples are representative, do not appear to have had the social structure to provide the fusion of lower middle-class and skilled working-class support which the conclusions of the secondary literature point towards as being a requirement for the development of the professional football club.

**Standard of Living**

Again, as with the assumption concerning the social class profile of the locality sustaining club football, there appears to be supporting evidence for the proposition that such a location would exhibit signs of a certain degree of material wealth. We witnessed in the sample study on accommodation and household characteristics that there were perceptible (if not dramatic) associations with poverty indicators such as overcrowding in the Wavertree district. As we saw also from this study, Everton – the district at the centre of the growth of organised football in Liverpool – demonstrated a stronger association with accommodation and household characteristics which suggested that a higher level of income could be expected amongst its population compared with the population of the other football club districts. Social class and living standards are, of course, strongly related. The secondary literature on the social history of the early period of organised football points to the general absence of the semi-skilled and unskilled amongst the
surviving records of football club support. This, it is argued, is an indication of the minimum level of income required at this point in time in order to actively support football clubs. In the research carried out in this study one of the key features in the football club district samples is the larger presence in the Wavertree and Bootle districts of semi-skilled and unskilled workers in comparison to the Everton district sample. Perhaps the census-based study concerning accommodation and household characteristics reveals some of the material results of the greater incidence of those in the Wavertree and Bootle samples employed in semi-skilled and unskilled work?

**Place of Birth**

Evidence to support the proposition that there would be a significant difference between the birthplace profile of the football club district and the non-football club district, or that there would be a significant difference between the successful football district and those failing to sustain the establishment of football clubs, would not appear to be as conclusive. The assumption was that football club identification and support would be strongest in those districts where the proportion of local-born amongst the population was greater. In all of the five districts sampled there was a majority amongst household heads of migrant-born. Within the district samples it is observable, however, that Everton and Wavertree have substantially more local-born in their population than do Bootle, Scotland and Princes Park. The birthplace profile of Everton, the successful football club district, does not differ remarkably from that of Wavertree. However, a potentially more fruitful way of comparing the Everton and Wavertree data in terms of the relationship between local-born and football success or failure is to factor in the apparent ethnic dimension of the Wavertree-based Liverpool Caledonians FC: the appeal of a club with a Scots identity in an area where the sample study reveals no substantial Scots presence perhaps invalidates the importance of a larger local-born population in the Wavertree district. In this context, the substantial presence of the local-born in Everton compared with the other districts perhaps becomes more significant.
2.8 Conclusion

The use of census data offers some basis, at least, for some of the assumptions made in the secondary literature concerning the likely social profile of those people who built the foundations of club football prior to the accelerated growth of the game. It is important, however, to recognise the limitations of such a study. The conclusions reached here can only be seen as a limited snapshot of the social conditions prevailing within districts where football clubs were established in Liverpool. The study of the 1881 and 1891 census data offers us, therefore, a limited appreciation of social change, and pace of social change, over time within the districts reviewed. A drawback of the analysis is that its concentration upon information contained in the census reports cannot reveal the full complexity of the social existence of those living in the districts reviewed. With respect to this point, related material such as Medical Officer of Health Reports, Electoral Registers and ecclesiastical census reports could help to enrich with more detail the social profiles established on each district in this study. Apart from this, by concentrating upon the bare socio-economic characteristics of the various districts the study has ignored the institutional input into the establishment and development of football clubs in those districts. For example, the importance of the role of the workplace in the foundational period of football clubs is well documented. Workplace contacts rather than residential proximity to football clubs could well have generated more interest in supporting a particular football team and this factor alone may have had a greater bearing on the growth of football organisation in one district as opposed to another.

In order to supplement the census-based analysis of this chapter, therefore, analysis in the next chapter focuses with greater precision on the district of Everton in order to gain some insight into the social forces that gave rise to Everton FC and shaped its early development. In Chapter 3, a survey of the urbanisation of the district of Everton during the second half of the nineteenth century is carried out. This will prepare the ground for the analysis, in Chapter 4, of some of the local institutional influences on the provision of professional football in the district – influences that were contradictory and, ultimately, led to a divisive struggle for control of the club.
Chapter Three

The District of Everton

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the development of the Liverpool suburban district of Everton in the second half of the nineteenth century. Analysis will concentrate upon the reasons for the rapid settlement of Everton from the 1850s. An examination will be made of both the conditions within the Parish of Liverpool — the core area of the Borough of Liverpool — that led to an exodus of its population into outlying areas such as the Township of Everton, and also the infrastructural development of Everton that made the district a pole of attraction for those migrating from the urban core (Map 3.1). In addition certain demographic trends resulting from the rapid growth of Everton will be analysed. A particular objective of the chapter will be to provide an overview of the occupational, ethno-religious and political profile of the district of Everton over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century. The chapter provides a progression from the census-based analysis of Chapter Two, where some of the social characteristics of the district at the century's end were highlighted. This chapter will provide a detailed account of the historical settlement of Everton. It will also set the scene for Chapter Four by providing the context in which Everton FC came into existence and for the divisions that erupted within that organisation. The formation of the club was heavily influenced by the patronage of religious institutions that settled in Everton, principally the New Connexional Methodists who had removed their inner-urban congregations within the Parish of Liverpool (Bethesda, Bevington Hill and Chatham Place congregations) to the burgeoning borough suburbs. But political patronage was also to the fore in the early development of Everton FC and this chapter also provides an overview of the political development of the district. The importance of this last point will be seen in Chapter Five, which looks at the issues behind the split of the club in 1892. In that chapter it will be argued that as well as differences amongst the membership of the Everton club concerning corporate philosophy and the nature of the administration of the club, divisions within the organisation between key members were also informed by distinctions relating to personal animosities that had their basis in the social and political changes occurring within the district of Everton at that juncture.
3.2 Social Conditions in the Parish of Liverpool: 1800–1850

Using the 1881 census information a calculation has been made of the numbers of Liverpool-born (Parish-born) who were registered as living beyond the Parish boundary and in the borough's out-townships. The total population of the out-townships in 1881 was 312,344. Of this number 142,365 had been born in the Parish of Liverpool. The detail of their precise migration within the out-townships is given in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Flow of Migration from Liverpool Parish to the Suburbs: 1800-1881

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To Everton</th>
<th>To Toxteth</th>
<th>To Kirkdale</th>
<th>To West Derby</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40,262</td>
<td>49,296</td>
<td>20,585</td>
<td>32,222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liverpool-born as % of Everton population: 36.7%
Liverpool-born as % of Toxteth population: 46.2%
Liverpool-born as % of Kirkdale population: 35.4%
Liverpool-born as % of West Derby population: 46%

Source: 1881 Published Census

Together with Toxteth Park the township of Everton became the recipient of the vast majority of the overspill population that settled outside of the crowded Parish of Liverpool from the mid-nineteenth century. From a sparsely populated (9,200 people in 1841) and semi-rural out-township, Everton was transformed within four decades into an urban sprawl, host to almost 110,000 people (20 per cent of the total population of the Borough of Liverpool). The physical, demographic and social development of Everton will be considered later in this text. To begin, however, the focus will be upon highlighting the conditions within the Parish of Liverpool in the period prior to the mid-nineteenth century and describing the factors leading to the mass migration away from Liverpool's urban core.

From 1801 to 1851 the Parish of Liverpool’s population rose from 77,000 to 258,000 (Table 3.2). This increase coincided with the massive expansion of trade through the Port of Liverpool. By 1801 480,000 tons of shipping were cleared through the port annually.1 By 1851, annual shipping tonnage had reached 3.8 million, reflecting Liverpool’s role as the gateway into the north-west heartland of England’s industrial revolution. The massive attraction the port had for migrant labour placed severe
pressure on the social environment. Census returns relating to housing in the Parish of Liverpool indicate that an already densely populated area at the beginning of the nineteenth century experienced greater overcrowding as the mid-century point approached. Between 1811 and 1851 the percentage increase of inhabited housing (126 per cent) failed to keep pace with the percentage population increase during the period (174 per cent). The net result of this was that whilst the average number of persons per occupied house in England and Wales between 1811 and 1851 decreased from 5.66 to 5.47, in Liverpool Parish over the same period there was a marked increase from 6.05 to 7.32. Average population density per acre in Liverpool Parish was also far greater than in the surrounding out-townships of Everton, Kirkdale, West Derby and Toxteth (Table 3.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parish L’pool</th>
<th>Everton</th>
<th>Toxteth</th>
<th>Kirkdale</th>
<th>West Derby</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>138.4</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Borough of Liverpool came into existence in 1835, comprising the districts outlined above). Source: Published Census Returns 1801–1851*

Much of the population of Liverpool Parish also inhabited poor quality accommodation. In 1841, 34 per cent of inhabitants in Liverpool Parish were court or cellar dwellers (with some individual wards having a much greater proportion of this type of accommodation – 57 per cent of inhabitants in dockside Vauxhall Ward, for example, lived in courts or cellars). Court houses typically consisted of two rooms measuring 10 or 11 square feet. In Liverpool Parish in 1841 this living space accommodated, on average, 5.1 residents. Cellars typically measured between 10 and 12 square feet, located 4 and 6 feet below the surface of the street. In Liverpool Parish an average of 3.3 people resided in each cellar in 1841. This chronic overcrowding – added to the lack of basic sanitary provision such as an adequate number of privies, the absence of drainage and sewerage systems in most working-
class streets and courts, irregular municipal provision of street cleaning, refuse removal and clean water supply — facilitated the spread of disease and underpinned Liverpool's high mortality and sickness rates. Figures taken from the Registrar-General's *Annual Report* of 1843 show that in Liverpool Parish the average lifespan was 26 years (in comparison, the average lifespan of Londoners at this point was 37 years). We may presume the average lifespan of the poorest of manual workers to be lower than 26 years.

Overcrowding in the poorest accommodation was exacerbated in Liverpool Parish from 1845 with the influx of Irish famine migrants. From 35,000 (or 16 per cent of the population) in 1841, the presence of the Irish-born grew to over 70,000 by 1851 (27 per cent of the Parish population). Their arrival into existing poor sanitary conditions triggered a period of typhoid and cholera epidemics in the Parish in the late 1840s. An outbreak of typhus in 1847 saw Liverpool's mortality rate reach 46 per thousand. Though the mortality rate fell to 32 per thousand in 1848 a cholera epidemic in 1849 pushed the rate above 46 per thousand (comparable mortality rates per thousand population for London and Manchester in 1849 were 30.1 and 33.6 respectively).

The response of the middle class in Liverpool Parish to the degradation of the social environment during the first half of the nineteenth century was to take flight to surrounding semi-rural out-townships such as West Derby, Wavertree and Everton. Evidence suggests that even the more salubrious, socially exclusive, Abercromby and Rodney Street Wards in Liverpool Parish witnessed the exodus of their more wealthy families to the above-mentioned out-townships beyond the Parish boundary. From the mid-nineteenth century those sections of the working class of Liverpool Parish who could afford to do so followed in the steps of the earlier middle-class exodus by removing to the suburban districts of the borough, where the wave of construction of artisan cottage terraces between 1850 and 1880 offered a way out of the increasingly intolerable urban core. The situation presented opportunities to a class of salt-box house builder — who constructed uniform two rooms upstairs, two rooms downstairs
homes — to make their fortunes out of the consequences of population growth in Liverpool.

The tightening up of local building byelaws from the mid-nineteenth century, by the closing down of certain categories of cellar dwelling, more stringent building specifications for court houses, the implementation from 1864 of a limited programme of demolition for unsanitary properties, had the effect in Liverpool Parish of intensifying the pressure on the existing stock of working-class housing considered to be of acceptable quality. As well as the reluctance of the municipal authorities to engage in mass building programmes prior to the twentieth century there was an unwillingness on the part of private builders to meet the greater cost of construction following the introduction of more rigorous building regulations. The building of accommodation for the more economically volatile unskilled and casually employed end of the housing market — increasingly the dominant social type in the Parish — was seen as a poor return on investment. 7 Only 15 per cent of all housing built in the borough between 1841 and 1866 was of the type to be rented for £12 per annum and under — the lowest rental rate set to cater to the demand of the unskilled labourer. 8 For this reason we see the massive expansion of building programmes in the districts surrounding the Parish of Liverpool. Sixty-eight per cent of all houses built in the period 1841–1866 (40,661 in total) were built to rent annually for £13 to £25 and catered to the small army of skilled workers seeking to escape the worst excesses of urban life in the Parish of Liverpool. Eighty-five per cent of artisan cottages were built in the suburban districts of Everton 9 (which alone accounted for 46 per cent, West Derby (20 per cent), and Toxteth (19 per cent).

The opening up of the suburban belt for mass housing construction was greatly facilitated between 1830 and 1850 by road and transportation improvements in the Borough of Liverpool. Between 1832 and 1849, fifty-one omnibus services were provided by thirty-eight omnibus proprietors on routes operating from Liverpool town centre to places such as Everton, Kirkdale, Walton, Bootle, Crosby, Old Swan and Knotty Ash, all to the north of Liverpool Parish, and to Edge Hill, Toxteth, Wavertree, Woolton, Aigburth and Childwall, located to the south of the Parish. 10
There was a marked shift between 1831 and 1851 in the pattern of population growth between the Parish of Liverpool and the suburban out-townships. Though the Parish population grew by 56 per cent between 1831 and 1851, its share of the borough population fell from just over 80 per cent (165,175) to 67 per cent (258,236). During this period the suburbs experienced an increase of almost 90,000 people. This increased the suburban districts’ share of the borough total from 19.8 per cent to 33.5 per cent. More than 130,000 people were resident in the suburbs by 1851, an increase of 219 per cent from 1831. Over the next twenty-year period, from 1851 to 1871 the suburban drift of the borough population became more pronounced with a majority (55 per cent) of the borough’s population of 526,000 living outside the Parish of Liverpool (Table 3.3). It is within the context outlined above — of the plight of those living in the Parish of Liverpool and the general flight away from the degraded urban environment, first of the urban middle class, then of skilled workers — that the emergence of the suburban district of Everton can clearly be located.

3.3 Physical and Demographic Development of Everton 1800-1900
In his historical and topographical account, *Memorials of Liverpool* (1871), Sir James A. Picton offers us an evocative account of the evolution of Everton that brings to life the pattern of the Borough of Liverpool’s development outlined above. Picton describes how the imprint of a wealthy merchant class who constructed luxurious mansions in the district, first disturbed the rural environment of ‘barren sandstone ridge, with its waste of gorse and heather’. A relatively self-contained village community of less than five hundred in 1801, with few strong social or economic links with the burgeoning town of Liverpool to its west, Everton’s settlement by Liverpool merchant families brought the district within the orbit of influence of Liverpool. The growing connections between the two townships were formalised in 1835 with the inclusion of Everton (as well as Kirkdale, Toxteth and Edge Hill) into an extended Liverpool Borough. The population of Everton at this point was approximately 6,000. The bulk of Picton’s study of the district, however, is given over to a description of the urban transformation and the gradual proletarianisation of much of the areas within the Township of Everton: Breckfield, Everton Village, Netherfield, and St Domingo (Maps 3.2 and 3.3), which took place from the 1840s to
the 1870s. In disapproving language Picton informs us of how ‘philistines in the garb of builders’ succeeded in ‘covering the face of the township’ with a ‘wilderness’ of terraced streets:

Building commenced about 1840, and gradually and with accelerating steps the spade and pick-axe attacked the slopes of the hill side; the click of the chisel and the ring of the trowel were borne on the breeze to the villas above, giving warning of their coming fate; fashion and exclusiveness winged their way to more retired localities and a few years witnessed the metamorphosis of a rural suburb into a densely populated town.

Picton does highlight, however, the complicity of the merchant families of Everton in the encouragement of the speculative builders’ intrusion into the district. Pointing out many instances of how the groundwork for mass building was prepared by landowning merchants, Picton’s account affords us clues as to how and why Everton, above all the suburban districts of the borough, experienced such massive population growth in the period he was chronicling. Picton describes the process of housing development within the Township of Everton, which progressed in the 1840s from the partly settled Netherfield and Everton Village estates on the western and southern boundary it shared with the Parish of Liverpool, to encompass the whole of the township by 1870 — apart from a small area of Breckfield estate at the easternmost point of Everton (see the aerial views of the district’s housing development in Map 3.3). One of the key features of this progression was the action of landowners in widening existing arterial roads in the district and cutting access streets linking arterial roads. Picton points to the example of Thomas Shaw of Everton Village as an early practitioner of this development in the late 1820s. Shaw’s land took up a greater part of what would later become Everton Ward. Though his intentions were to build houses of a “superior” quality this original plan was superseded over the following two decades by the sale of large parts of his land to builders who constructed rows of terraced cottages. Joshua Rose and Charles Horsfall similarly laid out streets on their extensive landholdings during the 1830s and 1840s. Their ambitions to profit from the urbanisation of the Netherfield estate of the district matched Shaw’s designs in other parts of the district of Everton as they allowed builders access to develop their lands. A remarkable building boom resulted from these moves in the Everton and Netherfield estates between 1840 and 1860. From a population of 4,500 residing in
Township of Everton

Everton

Merchfield

St. Domingo

Beechfield

Map 3.2 District of Everton, 1880

Source: R. Lawson and L. Fletcher, "The Social Background (University of Liverpool, 1976)"
MAP 3.3 URBANISATION OF EVERTON, 1845-1880

little more than 750 houses in 1831, the population of the township rose to 66,500 by 1861 inhabiting 9,287 houses. The vast majority of this growth was located in Netherfield and Everton Village (over 80 per cent of housing built in these two areas).

Everton’s St Domingo estate had begun to display the signs of greater urbanisation by the 1860s, but the building boom had not yet, at that point, significantly touched Breckfield estate, the most distant area of Everton from the Parish of Liverpool. The pattern of development Picton describes in relation to St Domingo and Breckfield differs from the earlier accounts of the builders’ progress in the township in that, by and large, the merchant families who had settled in these areas had little to do with the preparation of their land for building purposes. Perhaps the rapid rate of progress northward and eastward by the builders had left little time for landowners to prepare the infrastructure for property development, but it appears that they favoured the sale of their undeveloped land to large building firms. These large private developers built over the former merchant lands, creating streets, pavements and cottages within their boundaries. An example of this was the Welsh builder Owen Elias’ development of the large St Domingo estate of William Myers in the 1860s. Picton points out that, at this point in time, it was the Liverpool Corporation rather than private landowners that resolved to widen existing roads into large arterial routes into the St Domingo and Breckfield districts during the 1860s and 1870s. This was in response to the needs of the growing population of these estates as a result of the house-building of Elias and others. By 1881 the builders had succeeded in developing the whole of the township with a mixture of artisan cottages and (mostly in the Breckfield area) larger semi-detached and detached middle-class residences. The 1881 figures for housing distribution within the township reflect the greater settlement of its northern and eastern districts at this later date. The Breckfield and St Domingo areas had increased their combined share of inhabited houses in Everton from slightly more than 19 per cent in 1861 to 40 per cent of the 19,132 houses inhabited by 1881. Ordnance survey maps (Maps 3.4 to 3.7) give an indication of the type of terraced cottage development of the district. Note the distinctions, however, between the Netherfield and Breckfield areas: the former displaying patches of court house buildings towards its boundary with the Parish of Liverpool as well as the more familiar terraced housing; the latter —
in amongst the network of larger terraced cottages – containing large detached and semi-detached residences. This gives some indication as to the social class complexity existing within the district of Everton.

Though Picton does not make reference to it in his work, part of the reason for the district’s rapid transformation into a suburban area of great importance is explained by the development of a transportation network of roads and tramways that facilitated the conveyance of people and materials. Omnibus routes both within the district and between Everton and surrounding districts were established early in the century. By 1849 the widening of existing roads and construction of main arterial roads allowed omnibus proprietor William Busby to provide fourteen trips per day between Netherfield, Everton Village and St Domingo. Busby at this point also ran eleven trips per day to and from Liverpool town centre to the township.

These early omnibus ventures, however, were designed for the transportation of "well-to-do" commuters. With fares of 6d for outside passengers and 10d for inside passengers it is unlikely that most of the largely artisan dwellers of Netherfield, Everton Village and St Domingo would have been able to afford to take advantage of the services. However, the development of adequate roadways within Everton, and those linking it with other localities (principally Liverpool), would have undoubtedly stimulated the commercial development of the suburban district. For example, carters would have been able to convey regular provisions of raw materials for the small army of craftsmen in Everton to carry out their work and provide clothing, food and drink supplies for local retailers. Just as the earlier development of the Netherfield and Everton Village (and, to a significant degree, St Domingo) areas had been stimulated by improved roads and road transportation, so too was the later development of the outlying neighbourhood of Breckfield facilitated by the growth of the tramway system from Liverpool into the Township of Everton. From the late 1870s the development of the horse tramway system provided a greater means of communication between the periphery of the borough (and those areas beyond the borough boundary such as Anfield, Walton, Old Swan and Wavertree) and Liverpool town centre. A network of horse tramways built between the late 1870s and the late 1890s (prior to the electrification of the network in 1898) provided the means for the
clerks, bookkeepers, brokers, and agents, who typified the occupational backgrounds of those settling Breckfield, to commute to their workplaces in the business district of Liverpool. With no direct route through the Township of Everton to Breckfield, because of the prohibitively steep incline of the ridge on which the majority of the township stood, it was the Breckfield area of Everton (built on the plateau at the district’s eastern extremity) along with the eastern edge of Everton Village which experienced the first fruits of tramway development in Everton (Map 3.8). Routes between West Derby and Liverpool linking Breckfield and the business district of Liverpool were laid in 1879. By 1884 other parts of Everton saw tramway development as a more direct tram route between Breckfield and the Liverpool town centre crossed into Everton Village on its outward journey. Only with the coming of the electrification of the tramways at the century’s end did the rest of the township see significant levels of tramway traffic (Map 3.9).

Two general assertions can be made in relation to the development of Everton in the period from 1840 to 1900. First, it can be said that the district was settled during this time by a combination of artisans, or skilled workers, and the middle class. Housing statistics would seem to bear out the assertion made by Picton in *Memorials of Liverpool* that it was ‘the artisan class which constitute[d] the principal population’ of the district. Of the 16,223 houses built in Everton by 1867 almost 78 per cent (12,615) were of the annual rental rate of between £12 and £25 – typically falling within the orbit of the skilled (or ‘artisan’) class of worker. This proportion, in turn, represented 54 per cent of the total of such housing stock built in the suburban out-townships by 1867. However, there was also a considerable stock of housing built in the district for the use of the middle-class residents. Almost 13 per cent (2,038) of houses built were rented for £26 to £35 and for £36 and over in Everton. This represented over 31 per cent of all such housing built in the whole of the Borough of Liverpool in the period up to 1867. The proportion of middle-class accommodation in Everton after 1867 would have risen considerably over the succeeding period to the end of the nineteenth century with the greater development of the Breckfield area of the district. The more middle-class Breckfield experienced more than a 100 per cent
increase in its housing stock between 1871 and 1901, rising from 2,909 to 5,846, whilst St Domingo and Everton Village grew at a much slower rate (56 per cent and 54 per cent, respectively) and Netherfield experienced zero growth during the period.22

The second assertion to be made about Everton’s development is that the dramatic growth it experienced did not compromise the living conditions of the township’s inhabitants. By the century’s end, Everton’s population stood at the peak of its growth, 121,000 (23 per cent of the borough’s total population) as the house-building boom reached its height. Everton’s rate of population growth between 1861 and 1901 had dramatically outstripped that of the borough as a whole: 121 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively. Table 3.3 relates to the housing and population density of Everton between 1851 and 1901.

Table 3.3 Comparison of Housing and Population Density (per statute acre) in Everton and Parish of Liverpool: 1851–1901

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1901</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Houses per acre</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses per acre</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population per acre</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>131.2</td>
<td>158.5</td>
<td>159.5</td>
<td>175.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population per acre</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>109.2</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Published Census Returns 1851–1901

The township experienced a 369 per cent increase in population per statute acre (37.3 to 175.3) and an increase of housing per statute acre of 405 per cent (6.2 to 31.3).23 Throughout the period, however, average persons per house in Everton are consistently lower than the level maintained in the borough as a whole (Table 3.4). It was only at the end of the period that Everton’s performance fell into line with the level of inhabitants per house in the borough. Relative to the borough overcrowding
was not, then, as prevalent in Everton. This may have had an effect on the generally better performance that the district demonstrated on mortality rates vis-à-vis the rest of the borough. Throughout the second half of the century mortality rates in Everton were consistently lower than for the borough as a whole (Table 3.5).

Table 3.4  Comparison of Average Persons Per House in Everton and Borough of Liverpool: 1851–1901

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1901</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borough</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Published Census Returns 1851–1901

Table 3.5  Comparison of Rates of Mortality in Everton and the Borough of Liverpool: 1851-1891 (number of deaths per thousand population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1891</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borough</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Borough of Liverpool: Proceedings of the Council (Medical Officer of Health Annual Reports), 1862, 1872, 1882, 1892. W.H. Duncan, Liverpool Medical Officer of Health Reports, 1847–1850.

3.4 Pattern of Social Development in Everton: 1850-1900

A general understanding of the impetus behind the development of Everton and an outline of the physical pattern of that district’s development has been offered above. An overview of the principal demographic features of Everton has also been given. In this section of the text I will focus upon a social analysis of the population of Everton in the second half of the nineteenth century. A variety of social indicators, such as occupation, ethnicity, religious denomination and political affiliation, will be studied in relation to the population of Everton in order to offer a meaningful social profile of the district during this period (and, where appropriate, to draw out any social
distinctions between the areas of the township). For the purpose of analysing the occupational and ethnic status of the district a 200 household sample (50 from each of the four wards of Everton) has been taken from each of the census enumerators’ reports of 1851, 1871 and 1891. This has been supplemented by figures concerning the migrant status of the whole of the Everton population taken from the 1881 published census report. The religious censuses carried out by the Archdiocese of Liverpool in 1851, and by the Liverpool Daily Post in 1881, 1891 and 1902, have been consulted in an effort to determine the religious dimensions of Everton over the period 1850 to 1900. Political identification amongst the population of Everton has been gauged by analysis of parliamentary and municipal electoral results concerning the district and (where appropriate) the noting of politically affiliated organisations (and quasi-political organisations) which exhibited a presence within the district. For this purpose the election records, local press, local official directories and the secondary literature relating to nineteenth-century Liverpool politics have been consulted.

Table 3.6 Occupational Structure of District of Everton 1851-1891 (%)  
(Total Sample Size 819: 1851, 257; 1871, 284; 1891, 278)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1891</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchants, Agents And Brokers</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Enumerator Reports 1851, 1871, 1891.
Table 3.7  Occupational Structure of Netherfield: 1851–1891, %
(Sample size: 203)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1891</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchants, Agents And Brokers</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Enumerator Reports 1851, 1871, 1891.

Occupation

The occupational profile of the district taken as a whole between the 1851 and 1891 censuses demonstrates that there is a clear majority of manual workers – a characteristic that strengthens over time. Table 3.6 demonstrates that manual workers comprised 65 per cent of the sample of those employed in the district in 1851 and increased their proportion of those employed in the district to almost 75 per cent by 1891 (see also Tables 3.7 to 3.10 for a more detailed breakdown of occupational structure in different areas of Everton).
Table 3.8  Occupational Structure of Everton Village: 1851–1891, %
(Sample size: 210)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1891</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchants, Agents, and Brokers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Enumerator Reports 1851, 1871, 1891

Table 3.9  Occupational Structure of St Domingo: 1851-1891, %
(Sample size: 200)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1891</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchants, Agents, and Brokers</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Enumerator Reports 1851, 1871, 1891
Table 3.10  Occupational Structure of Breckfield: 1851–1891, %  
(Sample size: 206)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1891</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchants, Agents and Brokers</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Enumerator Reports 1851, 1871, 1891

Significantly, among these manual employees it was the skilled workers who predominated. Over the whole of the period skilled manual workers remained much the largest single occupational group within Everton, their proportion never falling below 40 per cent. White-collar employment demonstrates a mixed performance over the period. Whilst the skilled non-manual occupations register a marked increase of almost 61 per cent in Everton between 1851 and 1891 (perhaps no surprise given the gradual settlement of the predominantly white-collar Breckfield area as the period progressed), and the presence of the professions remained static in the district, the proportion of the higher ranks of the commercial class – merchants, brokers and agents – dramatically declined. There was a 79 per cent decrease in the numbers of this group recorded during the period. From 18.7 per cent of those occupied in the district sample of 1851 merchants, brokers and agents accounted for just 3.1 per cent of the sample in 1891. Looking at the situation at ward level, however – splitting up,
for the purpose of analysis, the constituent parts of the district – we can see from Tables 3.8 to 3.11 that Breckfield bucks the trend of manual working class predominance within the district (and, more particularly, the predominance of the skilled manual occupations). In Breckfield white-collar employment increased its percentage over the period from 54.8 per cent of those occupied in the 1851 sample to 58 per cent of those occupied in 1891. The decline of the earlier dominant occupational group comprising merchants, brokers and agents in Breckfield, falling from 38.7 per cent of those employed in Breckfield in 1851 to 8 per cent by 1891, was compensated for by the rise of the skilled non-manual occupations which increased its share of those employed in the Breckfield sample from 4.8 per cent to 31.8 per cent between 1851 and 1891. By way of contrast, the occupational sample of the Everton Village area of the district displays throughout the period a distinctly blue-collar profile with the manually employed comprising 87.7 per cent of the working population in 1851, rising to 95 per cent in 1891.

**Ethnicity/Migrant Status**

What is noticeable about the origins of those settling the Township of Everton in the second half of the nineteenth century is the influx of those born in the Parish of Liverpool: as a proportion of the sample Everton population these rose from just under 50 per cent in 1851 to almost 70 per cent in 1891 (Table 3.11). Proximity could be viewed as an explanation for this prevalence. However, it can be seen that those born in other areas in close proximity to Everton – those classified as 'Other Liverpool', born in the registration districts of West Derby, Wavertree, Bootle, Walton and Toxteth Park – experienced a decline over the period in their proportion of the Everton population – falling from 5.1 per cent in 1851 to 1.1 per cent in 1891. The crowded and unsanitary conditions within Liverpool Parish, described above, must be viewed as the more likely explanation, therefore, for the dominance of those born in Liverpool within the Everton population sample.
Table 3.11  Place of Birth of Everton Inhabitants: 1851–1891 (%)  
(Sample Size: 3,052)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1891</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parish of L’pool</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Liverpool</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other English Towns</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-Born</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census Enumerator Reports 1851, 1871 and 1891
It has to be stated also, however, that the growing strength of numbers of the Liverpool-born may be attributable, in part at least, to those born in Everton district being designated by Enumeration Officers as Liverpool-born. As can be seen from Table 3.11 the number of Everton-born in the sample population diminished over time rather than, as one might expect, rising.

For those migrating to Everton from outside of the Greater Liverpool area, there was a marked decline over the period for all groups apart from the Irish-born whose proportion of the sample population rose from 4.1 per cent to 9.4 per cent. The figures relating to the Irish-born were influenced by the sizeable presence of Irish migrants in the Everton Village area, where the Irish presence rose from 7.4 per cent in 1851 to 16.3 per cent in 1871 and to 22.8 per cent in 1891. The Everton Village area (and, to a lesser extent, Netherfield) were points of attraction for the smaller numbers of skilled working-class Irish migrants from the Parish of Liverpool. The earliest Roman Catholic parish founded in the district, St Francis Xavier, was founded in Everton Village in 1845. The Welsh, an ethnic group particularly associated with the district of Everton in the nineteenth century, registered a decline in the sample population between 1851 and 1891. Writing in 1870, Sir J.A. Picton wrote:

A large part of the population is from the Principality. Chapels in which the service is conducted in the Cymric Tongue abound. Placards in the Welsh language may be seen on the walls and Welsh newspapers in the shop windows. The sharp click and guttural intonation of the Cambrian dialect may be heard from many a cottage door.25

The sample taken from Everton over the period under review here, however, demonstrates less of a Welsh presence in the area — at least of the Welsh-born — though the ‘Cambrian’ scenario in Everton conjured up by Picton in Memorials of Liverpool may be justified if second-generation and third-generation Liverpool-born Welsh are calculated to have remained within the district. There is a strong possibility of this given the continued presence of Welsh nonconformist chapels within the district up to and beyond the end of the century. There were six Welsh Calvinist churches in Everton in 1891.26
Religious Denomination

The redistribution of population from the Parish of Liverpool and out into the surrounding townships in the second half of the nineteenth century brought with it a boom in suburban church building as the various religious denominations sought to establish their presence in the newly settled areas. Maps 3.10 to 3.12 demonstrate the process of this development in Everton over the period 1851 to 1891. From 1851 to 1891 the Church of England expanded its influence in the district by the creation of ten new parishes in addition to the four parishes existing in 1851 located in the already populous Netherfield and Everton Village areas. With just one church within Everton in 1851 the Roman Catholic Church, responding to the greater migration of Catholics from the Parish of Liverpool into Everton (more especially into Netherfield and Everton Village), established four parish churches there by 1891. The biggest organisational growth, however, came from the establishment of a variety of nonconformist chapels within Everton. In 1851 nonconformity’s presence within the district was limited to just two chapels in the Everton Village area – one Baptist, the other Independent. By 1891 twenty-six chapels had been constructed and the presence of nonconformity was widely felt throughout all areas of the district. One reason for this great increase was that the congregational-based nonconformist sects took the opportunity to close existing ‘causes’ in the Parish of Liverpool and to relocate to the suburbs to where the majority of their adherents had moved. An example of this was the Primitive Methodists’ closure of weak missions in the Scotland area of Liverpool Parish and their construction of a single chapel in Everton Road in 1863. The St Domingo New Connexion Methodist chapel on Breckfield Road in Everton (the religious organisation from which the Everton Football Club originated) similarly came into existence when the two causes in Byrom Street and Scotland Road in the Parish of Liverpool were closed and transferred to Everton. This closure and removal policy was not an option for the parish-based Church of England and Roman Catholic Church. The Church of England in Liverpool especially sought to keep a comprehensive presence in the borough throughout the nineteenth century, even though their constituency in many parts of the Parish of Liverpool – increasingly Irish Catholic in composition – was numerically weak. Another reason for the substantial number of nonconformist chapels in Everton (and a point alluded to here already) was the influence of the Welsh in the development of the district from mid-century.
Source: Goes Liverpool Trade Diaries

Church Building: 1851-1881
Roman Catholic
Department of

Map 3:12

1851

1851
The Welsh not only settled in the district in significant numbers, but were also largely responsible for the physical development of Everton. Welsh builders, such as Owen Elias who built extensively in the Netherfield and St Domingo areas, Richard R. Roberts who constructed cottages in St Domingo, and Griffith and John Williams who built extensively in Breckfield, built and donated chapels in Everton for the various Welsh nonconformist sects. Calvinistic Methodism particularly benefited from such beneficence with Elias, Roberts and the Williams brothers contributing four chapels. Other Welsh nonconformist sects benefited also. The Welsh Wesleyans and the Presbyterian Church of Wales received similar help for their causes. There would seem to have been a strong organisational link between Welsh builders and nonconformity. Of the thirty-eight Welsh builders cited in J.R. Jones' *The Welsh Builder on Merseyside* twenty-one were named as high-profile members (many as Deacons) of the variety of Welsh chapels in Everton. Their influence and assistance facilitated the pattern of closure and removal of Welsh Causes described above in relation to all nonconformist sects. The Welsh Baptist, Welsh Wesleyan and Welsh Congregational causes in the Parish of Liverpool were relocated during the 1860s in Everton. Broadly, the district remained throughout the period 1850 to 1900 a predominantly Protestant area, with the Established church and nonconformity accounting for the great majority of worshippers. Data concerning attendance at churches and chapels in Liverpool - relating the strength of the different denominations present in Everton - can illustrate this point (Table 3.12).

The religious censuses carried out in the Borough of Liverpool in 1851, 1881, 1891 and 1902 highlighted the population of the various districts of the Borough of Liverpool in relation to their share of the total attendance of religious worshippers in the borough. These figures reveal that Everton accounted for 9.5 per cent of the Borough of Liverpool’s total population in 1851 and that its share of total church and chapel attendance in the borough at that point stood at 12 per cent. By 1881 these respective figures stood at 19.9 per cent and 21 per cent; in 1891, 21.3 per cent and 22 per cent; and in 1902, 22.9 per cent and 19.9 per cent. The denominational mix of the district changed quite dramatically as the nineteenth century progressed.
Table 3.12  Church/Chapel Attendance of Denominations: Everton 1851-1902

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1902</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of England</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonconformist</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The most obvious change in Everton between 1851 and 1881 was in the proportionate decline of Church of England attendances. The proportion of worshippers in the Established Church declined from 63.1 per cent in 1851 to 36.1 per cent in 1881 (however, from 1881 to 1902, a time of politically motivated evangelical Protestantism in the Established Church in Liverpool, the Church of England managed to stabilise and even slightly increase its proportion of religious attendance in the borough from 36.1 per cent to 37.4 per cent. The dramatic fall in the proportion of Church of England worshippers in Everton was principally due to the increased presence of nonconformity within the district. Nonconformist church and chapel attendees increased their proportion from 18.9 per cent to 43.9 per cent of all of those worshipping in Everton between 1851 and 1881. The share of nonconformist attendance in Everton, however, did fall from this high of 43.9 per cent to 37.5 per cent by 1902. This was principally a result of the decline of attendance at Welsh churches and Baptist chapels – denominations experiencing a combined loss of 5 per cent in their proportion of attendances in Everton between 1881 and 1902. The Roman Catholic Church increased its proportion of the district’s religious worship attendees barely at all between 1851 to 1881, from 17.1 per cent to 17.4 per cent. Much of the Roman Catholic population in the district was concentrated in west
Everton at this time (those areas of Netherfield and Everton Village bordering the Parish of Liverpool). There they constituted, in some ecclesiastical districts, over one-third of those surveyed for religious worship. Elsewhere in Everton their presence was marginal, ranging between 10 per cent and 15 per cent of the population. However, by the century’s end Everton had become the largest settlement district for Roman Catholics outside of the Parish of Liverpool, and the proportion of Roman Catholic attendance in Everton rose to 20.2 per cent by 1902.

**Political Affiliation**

Politically, Everton gained the reputation as ‘the Gibraltar of Conservatism’ in Liverpool in the second half of the nineteenth century. A look at the Parliamentary and municipal election results in the district in the nineteenth century helps us to understand why Everton was described in such a way. In every Parliamentary election between 1885 and 1910 the Everton Division returned a Tory candidate – either uncontested as in 1886, 1892, 1895, and 1900, or else with a healthy majority over the Liberal opponent (see Table 3.13 and 3.14).

In municipal affairs, in only one of the five-year periods from 1836 to 1900 was there greater electoral support for non-Tory politics in Everton. Moreover, the Tory domination of Everton in municipal politics grew stronger as the century entered into its last two decades. Up until that point, Radical, and later Liberal, candidates performed relatively well against their Tory opponents. With the serious re-emergence of the Irish Home Rule question from 1886 and the Gladstonian Liberal Party’s commitment to devolution, and also the emergence of labour electoral politics, the Tory vote was galvanised in Liverpool.

In Everton, with its higher than average proportion of Roman Catholics and massive skilled working-class constituency – the social seed bed out of which labour politics was growing – the threat to Tory domination was at its most acute. Sectarian-based bodies affiliated to the Liverpool Conservative Party such as the Orange Order and the Working Men’s Conservative Association (WMCA) were extremely active in Everton during the late nineteenth century. The creation by the Tory Party machinery
in Liverpool of the spectre of a 'Radical—Home Rule—Socialist' alliance struck a particular chord in Everton where from 1886 the Irish Nationalist Party and socialist and labour candidates had begun to contest municipal elections, and enter into electoral pacts with the Everton and Kirkdale Liberal Party. The heightened interest in municipal affairs in Everton — being fought on issues of imperial politics rather than local affairs — and the impact of the efficient electoral machinery of the WMCA ensured high turnouts in Everton and overwhelming victories there. These issues will be looked at in more detail in subsequent chapters when it will become apparent that they played a key role in shaping the course and outcome of the dispute within Everton FC that led to that club's split.

Table 3.13 Municipal Election Trends: Everton 1836-1895
(% of votes cast in elections over 5–year intervals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tory</th>
<th>Rad/Lib</th>
<th>Irish Nat.</th>
<th>Soc/Lab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1836-40</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841-45</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846-50</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851-55</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856-60</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861-65</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866-70</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871-75</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876-80</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-85</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886-90</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-95</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.14 Municipal Election Trends: Everton 1896–1900 (% of votes cast in elections over 5 year intervals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Tory</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Irish Nat.</th>
<th>Soc/Lab</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Lib Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherfield</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ev'ton Vill.</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Domingo</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breckfield</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Post 1895 Ward redistribution created four wards from the old Everton and Kirkdale council seat (those shown in Table 3.14, above). The election results are aggregated for the 1896–1900 interval.

The solidity of the Tory vote in Everton in the late nineteenth century had bemused contemporary political commentators. It was said that the large proportion of nonconformists in Everton (and especially Welsh nonconformists), coupled with the presence of a sizable minority of Irish Catholics living in the district, should have ensured the majority of the electorate for the Liberal Party in Everton, given the usual Liberal political impulse of Dissenters and the tendency of the Catholic Irish to vote Liberal in the absence of Nationalist candidates.

The Liberal-supporting *Liverpool Daily Post* viewed Everton Toryism as ‘a very artificial production’ brought about by the ‘political perversion’ of the Welsh in the district – referring to the general tendency of Welsh nonconformists elsewhere to vote Liberal. One explanation for the Conservatism of Everton put forward by Sam Davies in his book, *Liverpool Labour: Social and Political Influence on the Development of the Labour Party in Liverpool, 1900–1939* is that it is misleading to equate nonconformity with Liberal politics. Davies points out that many of the nonconformist bodies that could be described as evangelical dissent had more in common with conservative, anti-ritualistic Low Church Anglicanism, which was vibrant in the area. Two such dissenting bodies were the Irish Presbyterians and the Protestant Reform church. Both had their colony of support in the district and were
particularly associated with militant Orangeism. However, it is worth noting that Everton was not alone in failing to carry the nonconformist vote for Liberalism. The Liberal Party in other Liverpool suburban wards between 1881 and 1900 — wards with a greater incidence of nonconformists than in Everton — also failed to break the stranglehold that the Tory Party had on electoral politics outside of the Parish of Liverpool. With the reorganisation of ward boundaries in 1895 the Liberals did succeed in the reconstituted Everton ward in 1895 and 1898 (the Ward being a much smaller proposition than the seat fought up until 1895 and encompassing within it the large population of Catholics in the Everton Village area). There was, however, a rapid change in Liberal fortunes, even in the smaller Everton seat, as the Party was eclipsed politically early in the twentieth century by labour politics (though Everton Ward did fall twice more to the Liberals in the first decade of the new century).

3.5 Conclusion
We have seen from the description of the development of Everton how this district grew into a densely populated part of the Borough of Liverpool due to its settlement by a predominantly skilled, native Protestant working class (though with a large minority of professionals in the east of the district). We saw also that Everton played host to a large number of non-English migrants. They were mostly of Scottish and Welsh origin in the early period of the district’s settlement, but towards the end of the nineteenth century an influx of skilled Irish Catholic immigrants settled there, principally in west Everton. It was argued in the previous chapter that the socio-occupational characteristics of the district would have been an important factor in the establishment and sustaining of mass spectator sport. We might add to this that other demographic factors, such as the impact of the rapid and varied religious settlement of Everton, might also have stimulated the prospect of football club development in this particular area of Liverpool — Liverpool having proven to be an area that took to the association game much later than other similar-sized urban centres. The influx of many different branches of the Protestant church and the establishment of Roman Catholic enclaves would, perhaps, have stimulated a degree of denominational competition. Protestant churches, in particular, within the district of Everton sought to establish a foothold in the district by providing a variety of activities, such as fetes,
choral societies and sports — principally through the setting up of cricket and football teams — designed to maintain the interest of their congregation and, perhaps, to attract and keep those of other congregations. As we shall see in the next chapter, the competition that developed between church and chapel teams in the district was quickly outgrown and saw the rapid coalition of the football teams involved into a district team that began to compete with others from beyond Liverpool.

We must, in turn, contextualise the growth of this district-based team, Everton FC, against the backdrop of the keen political contestation of the district. As we will see in the following chapter, the identification of local politicians with the club was established early in its history. We might view this association as part of the attempt in Everton — and in other areas of the borough where the skilled working class were present in large numbers — of political parties to court the favour of the swelling ranks of the working-class electorate. The growth of the WMCA, and the attempts by the Liberals to set up a Working Men’s Liberal Association, were formal attempts to garner electoral support from this element of the electorate. The demographic changes taking place in Everton towards the end of the nineteenth century made for a more competitive political environment, and association by local politicians with a proud symbol of district sporting endeavour might well be read as a complimentary part of this wider strategy. The investment of time and energy in the club by politicians (and, as we shall see with the club’s president and local councillor, John Houlding, the investment of considerable finances) would have been a worthwhile venture.

These issues will be touched upon again in the following chapter, Chapter Four, where an elaboration of the early period of Everton FC, from its establishment in 1879 to its split in 1892, will be offered.
Chapter Four

The Origins and Development of Everton Football Club

4.1 Introduction

Having established in Chapter Two and Chapter Three the local conditions within which the professional football organisation would, and could, grow in Liverpool, in this chapter we will chart the development of Everton FC from its chapel origins in the late 1870s to its rise in the early 1890s to the pinnacle of professional club football in England. The chapter will utilise a range of primary material, including accounts of club management committee meetings from the 1880s and early 1890s, documentary evidence of club members who were contemporary to events shaping the club in its early history, parish records, political party and local Poor Law Union archives, and local newspaper and journal reports relating to Everton FC. In addition, material from the secondary literature concerned with the social history of football, both on Merseyside and nationally, will be utilised.

A number of issues concerning the origins and growth of the club are dealt with in the chapter. The religious roots of the club will be explored, and the transition of the St Domingo New Connexional Methodist Chapel team into a district-based organization will be contextualised in relation to the spread of sport generally within the city of Liverpool in the second-half of the nineteenth century. The club’s phenomenal growth from the mid-1880s will be analysed in relation to the patronage of political and, above all, business figures within the city of Liverpool. More especially, the focus of attention will concentrate on the development of the club’s relationship to figures within the local drink trade as competitive and commercial pressures were brought to bear on the ambitious members of the club to expand its organisational operation. Comment will be made on the structure of the early Everton FC, the relationship between committee and membership (and also president and committee) will be drawn out, as will the social profile of the club’s membership and committee members, and the powers enjoyed by the club committee and its responsibilities to the membership. One of the major tasks of the chapter will be to outline the growth of
factions in the club that erupted in disputes over the financial running of the club and the power relations existing within it, to be resolved only by the split of the club in 1892. The chapter can demonstrate, hopefully, that the years between 1878 (the foundational year of the club) and 1892 were marked by the gradual challenge to the original motives in setting up the club, and that the local and broad-based control of the organisation was increasingly being challenged by the competitive and commercial requirements of achieving its ultimate objective of becoming a nationally renowned professional football club. Discussion of the issues and major personalities involved in the split of the original Everton FC is dealt with in Chapter Five.

4.2 The Foundation and Early Development of Everton Football Club

The roots of the original Everton FC are to be found in the foundation of the St Domingo New Connexional Methodist Chapel, Everton. As noted already, the chapel’s foundation was part of a wave of nonconformist settlement into the traditionally Low Church working-class districts of Everton and Kirkdale in the late nineteenth century. The New Connexional Methodists had seceded from the main body of Wesleyan Methodism at the end of the eighteenth century over doctrinal matters — chiefly concerning the rights of the laity to challenge the ‘priestly domination’ of the Wesleyan ministerial hierarchy. The Wesleyans, who held a ‘hierarchical view of society and a patriarchal attitude towards authority’, were differentiated from those seceding from Wesleyan Methodism, who were guided more by ‘democratic notions and levelling principles’.

The Methodists of the New Connexion were traditionally more liberal in their social impulse and, along with other secessionist groups taking flight from the Wesleyan, took a critical attitude to any ‘institution or measure which undermined religious and civil liberties or strayed far from the dissenters’ emphasis on the primacy of conscience in religion and politics’. Politically, the propensity of such dissenters to rally to Gladstonian Liberalism becomes, as we shall see in later chapters, a pertinent feature in the dispute within the Everton Football Club.

The formation, in 1878, of the St Domingo Sunday School cricket and football teams mirrored the activities of other churches within the area (both Anglican and
nonconformist) that had begun to be concerned with providing leisure activities for their congregations. This move towards leisure provision, it was hoped, would both ensure a continued attachment to their churches and counteract the perceived growth of gambling and drink influences. Richard Rees in his study, *The Development of Physical Recreation in Liverpool During the Nineteenth Century* (1968), describes the motivations and effects in Liverpool of the advance of Muscular Christianity — within which we might locate the foundation of what was to become Everton FC. Rees points out that the move by the clergy in Liverpool towards the provision of sport was stimulated by the struggle by workers to shorten the working day through such organisations as the Nine Hours Movement. Whilst advocating this shortening of the working day churchmen were concerned with what activities workers might pursue in their extended free time away from work. By the 1870s the clergy had already moved to provide for workers what they hoped would be alternative forms of attraction to the numerous public houses and beer houses. The setting up of Hand-in-Hand clubs fits into this category. The Hand-in-Hand clubs ‘usually contained a tea-room, newsroom, library, billiard room etc...Many churchmen blatantly offered their support to the Nine Hours movement if in return the men would frequent the Hand-in-Hand clubs rather than public houses’. By the 1880s the clergy in Liverpool would seem to have switched their focus towards the provision of sports clubs as a means of attracting young men away from drink (though it is interesting to note that in the early development of Everton FC the club was assisted financially by a concert organised by members of the Foley Street Hand-in-Hand club). Rees in his study quotes from the words of Liverpool cleric, the Rev. H.S. Brown, in order to outline the rationale behind the provision of physical recreation by religious groups:

> No man is more strongly convinced than I of the value of physical education...the promotion of sound bodily health...and as a consequence of that, the capacity for hard work and for the sober and rational enjoyment of life...Never was a sound body more imperatively needed to preserve the soundness of the mind...He formed it (body), not that it should be a trouble and a plague because of infirmity and pain, much less that it should be pampered, injured or destroyed by vicious habits, but in order that it might be the strong, active and trustworthy servant through whose instrumentality as an intelligent mind and a pure heart might act in obedience to His wise and holy will.

By 1885 twenty-two per cent of football clubs in Liverpool were associated with religious organisations of one denomination or another, with nineteen per cent of
cricket clubs having such an association\textsuperscript{10} (having stood at eight per cent in 1869).\textsuperscript{11} The provision of football and cricket clubs, and also gymnastic clubs, was often accompanied by the active participation of the clergy themselves in these ventures. The thinking behind this was that a clergyman should:

...live within his flock as a member of that flock. He must be a man amongst men; he must be a model for his parishioners, setting the standard of paternal care, domestic piety, manly vigour and unselfish loyalty which he expects his neighbours to emulate.\textsuperscript{12}

It would appear that the clergy in the parishes of north Liverpool were exemplars of this involvement with their flock via sport, with many local football matches in particular having clerical representation.\textsuperscript{13} The local council’s permission in the last two decades of the nineteenth century for its existing facilities to be used for recreational purposes – more especially the parkland of the city – contributed to the growth of sports clubs in Liverpool from religious and non-religious roots.\textsuperscript{14} Rees shows that the number of football clubs in Liverpool rose from just four in 1880 to a spectacular two-hundred-and-thirteen by 1893; the number of lawn tennis clubs from seven in 1884 to thirty five by 1895; the number of rounders clubs from five in 1880 to sixty-one by 1891; and the number of rugby clubs from eight in 1880 to thirty eight by 1887 (although rugby’s influence waned quite dramatically in Liverpool during the 1890s – declining to eight clubs by 1895 – probably accounted for by the great popularity of football as the premier winter game).\textsuperscript{15}

There is little evidence relating to the St Domingo chapel football team, and the chapel’s surviving records make no reference to the setting up of its football and cricket teams at the end of the 1870s. Our only knowledge of the football team comes from the writings of men like Thomas Keates, an early director of Everton FC who had been a long-time member of the club prior to its incorporation as a limited company in 1892, and William C. Cuff, another director of Everton FC who had also been an active member of the St Domingo congregation.\textsuperscript{16} We know from these sources that the chapel team played its football on Stanley Park, Anfield, an area yet to be colonised by the breed of two-up-two-down house builders who had already made much of neighbouring Everton into an urban sprawl prior to the last two decades of the nineteenth century. We know also that the teams of nearby Church of England parishes provided St Domingo’s opposition: St Benedict’s, St Mary’s, St Peter’s, and the United Church, and that in 1879 the more skilful players of these other church-based football
teams were integrated within the St Domingo set-up. With the opening up of this subsequent venture to other football enthusiasts of the district - the adoption of the name Everton took place at the end of 1879. The original motive for the setting up of the football team was superseded by the drive towards a wider communal representation.

Thomas Keates’ jubilee history of Everton FC tells us that the football club, contrary to what we might consider were the motives of those setting up the St Domingo team, soon became associated in the early 1880s with public houses. Initially the club’s headquarters were at the Queen’s Head Inn, Everton and then at club president and local brewer John Houlding’s Sandon Hotel, Anfield. This represented a puzzling contradiction with the initial motive for forming the church-based teams. There is no documented explanation for this development. However, it might be explained by the profile of the proprietors of the two named public houses: John W. Clarke, who owned the Queen’s Head Inn, and the aforementioned John Houlding. Both men were experienced in local sporting affairs, having been influential in the setting up of the Stanley Cricket Club. Perhaps their experience, and their ability to provide premises for club business to be carried out, was a factor in the formative Everton FC becoming associated with these publicans. Both Clarke and Houlding were also councillors in Everton. If their sporting experience provided a pull-factor for the membership of the emerging club, then perhaps there was a push-factor at play in the shape of local political figures seeking to associate themselves with organisations attracting their constituents. The appeal of the club to local politicians is a theme returned to later in this chapter.

The new club joined the recently formed Lancashire Football Association in 1880. The Lancashire Football Association included other clubs that went on to become formidable professional outfits, such as Blackburn Rovers, Bolton Wanderers, and Preston North End. It also provided Everton with opposition against local rivals such as the Bootle, Birkenhead and Earlestown football clubs. Though Everton FC struggled to match the competitive feats of its more illustrious Lancastrian neighbours, the club quickly established itself as the premier football team of the locality, winning the
Liverpool Cup in three out of the first five seasons of that competition's existence between 1882 and 1887.18

Public houses offered the emerging club the benefit of changing areas for players, rooms for committee meetings and, eventually, an established ground for matches. This was a route similarly trodden by other professional clubs in their earliest days.19 In the early part of the 1880s, however, the extent of the financial benefit of the club's public house connections is debatable. The following circular, issued by the club committee to the city's well-to-do gentlemen in 1882, was, according to Thomas Keates, a plea for financial help to develop the club:

Everton Football Club.

Allow us to introduce to your notice the position attained by the above-named organisation and to solicit your most valued sympathy and support. Established in 1879, it has gradually improved in strength and importance, until it now occupies a position second to none in the district; nor do its claims to consideration rest here, for as the club has, season by season, grown in strength, its effect upon the public has been both marked and encouraging, so much so, that at any of its important fixtures there are large gatherings of persons, numbering 1,500 to 2,000, seeking the Saturday afternoon's recreation, which the public parks are intended to provide.

In order to popularize the game, we are this year [1882] playing a number of clubs of considerable renown from long distances.20 Evidence relating to those associated with the early Everton FC would appear to suggest that this appeal attracted the patronage of local political and business figures who were, perhaps, eager to be linked with a popular sports club in the north of the city. Men of both local and national prominence became patrons of the club in its earliest days. David MacIver, the co-founder of the Cunard Shipping Line and a Conservative MP in his time for both Birkenhead and Liverpool Kirkdale;21 Edward Whitley, Conservative MP for Liverpool Everton;22 and Lord Sandon, another Conservative MP for Liverpool,23 were patrons of the club in the 1880s.24 Other local notables were James Barkeley-Smith, a former vice chairman of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, and director of Liverpool United Gas Company;25 he was also leader of the Conservative Party in Liverpool City Council.26 Another was Clarke Aspinall, the Coroner of Liverpool.27 The attachment of local political figures suggests that the club retained a link with its immediate population in the working-class districts of Liverpool's north end. For those seeking to gain or retain public office the football club
— a symbol, and rallying point, of local identity — would have been courted, and a position of prominence within such an organisation, so popular with the recently enfranchised mass of skilled workers who predominated in the districts on which Everton FC relied for its support, would have been viewed as a prized asset. The most obvious example of this motive was the successful canvassing in 1884 by the committee and members of the club in the district of Everton on behalf of the club president, John Houlding, who was standing on a Conservative ticket for the Everton ward in the town council elections of that year.28

The patronage of businessmen became increasingly important towards the mid-1880s as the club sought to commercialise its operation by deciding to enclose the grounds on which the team played in order to charge the public an admission fee. This move by Everton FC towards charging the public an entry fee to watch their team was a well-trodden path in sports development in Liverpool by that date. As early as the 1840s cricket clubs in Liverpool had seized the initiative of charging their predominantly “respectable” middle-class audiences an admission fee to view their matches.29 In the last two decades of the nineteenth century Liverpool also experienced a boom in the number of athletics meetings held in the city. Two companies – the Stanley Athletic Grounds Company Limited, and the Liverpool Athletic Grounds Company Limited – were formed in order to tap into this growing public interest in athletics.30 The rise of the city’s football clubs, though, eclipsed all other attempts at creating a financially viable sporting commodity. The 1880s and 1890s saw the proliferation of football clubs vying for local supremacy, a competitive environment that culminated in the creation of four private limited football club companies in the early 1890s. As we have already seen, these were Everton FC, the Liverpool FC that would be created out of the rump of members left behind at Anfield by Everton FC in 1892, Bootle AFC and Liverpool Caledonians FC. Association football, out of all the sporting spectacles in Liverpool (as was the case in other urban centres), was best able to draw the attention and support of the majority of that mass of workers who were enjoying for the first time increased opportunities for leisure brought about by the gaining of the Saturday half-day holiday and the reduction of hours in the working day.
In the case of Everton FC this impulse towards the commercialisation of its product was given added urgency by the taking on of professional players to boost the quality of the team’s play,\textsuperscript{31} a strategy undertaken by many of the Lancashire clubs.\textsuperscript{32} Although the Football Association sanctioned professionalism in 1885, the employment of professionals by clubs was a common practice prior to that date. Prior to 1885 the Football Association formally insisted on strict adherence to an amateur code for players, with money only to change hands for purposes of expenses or lost earnings to players. However, in practice the clubs handed over “boot money”, whereby certain team members would find cash payments stuffed into their boots post-match, thus effectively bypassing the Football Association’s ban. This practice would appear to have been enthusiastically embraced by Everton FC.\textsuperscript{33} The spiralling costs of employing professional footballers at Everton FC during the second half of the 1880s can be seen in Table 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Player’s Wages (£)</th>
<th>Ground Improvements (£)</th>
<th>Gate Receipts (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885/86</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886/87</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>1,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887/88</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>2,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888/89</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>4,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889/90</td>
<td>2,059</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>5,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890/91</td>
<td>2,848</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>6,268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Liverpool Football Echo*, 7\textsuperscript{th} November, 1891.

By 1883 the club began to play its matches in an enclosed setting for the first time. The club was given the opportunity by a local landowner to play their football in his field off Priory Road, a stone’s throw away from their first home, Stanley Park. The club’s members erected a ‘primitive stand and railings around the pitch’\textsuperscript{34} in order to make the project financially viable. However, this venture was both short-lived (the landowner refused to extend the club’s tenure beyond one season) and financially
unsuccessful\textsuperscript{35} (the club taking just fourteen shillings for the gate from their first game of the 1883/84 season, and £50 for the season as a whole\textsuperscript{36}). At this stage the club became even more embroiled with the fortunes of their president, whose public house, the Sandon Hotel, provided the club with its matchday headquarters. Houlding was able to secure a field of play for the club in Anfield Road, approximately three hundred yards from his own Sandon Hotel. The circumstances surrounding the leasing of this patch of land by Houlding on behalf of the club had serious ramifications for the organisation in later years. This is a subject central to the dispute that brought about the split of the club in 1892, one we will return to and discuss in detail in the following chapter.

Once the club was ensconced at the Anfield Road site, Houlding provided it with funds to improve steadily the facilities of its ground in order to increase its attraction to the paying public. Houlding lent the club over £2,300 in the second half of the 1880s at a rate of five per cent interest.\textsuperscript{37} The amount of money lent is consistent with the amount of money spent on ground improvements to the Anfield Road ground during this period (see Table 4.1). Local builders were employed by the club to erect covered stands running the length of the pitch and enclosures behind each of the goals.\textsuperscript{38} When the club first moved to Anfield for the season 1884/85 the stadium could accommodate 10,000 people. This demonstrated the ambition of the club, whose games had previously attracted 1,500–2,000 non-paying supporters at Stanley Park.\textsuperscript{39} By the season of 1888/89, and with the benefit of the ground improvements already mentioned, the capacity of the Anfield Road stadium had reached 20,000. The investment paid dividends as Everton FC increased its gate receipts spectacularly: rising from £629 in season 1885/86 to £6,268 in season 1890/91 (Table 4.1). During this period the club benefited greatly from its inclusion in the twelve-strong group of professional football clubs invited in 1888 to form the Football League. The importance of the League was that it brought about, for those clubs involved, regular matches against teams with roughly similar ability who were also known to be able to attract large interest from the paying public whenever, and wherever, they played. The creation of the Football League, therefore, cut out the playing of unattractive (that is, financially limited) fixtures and committed clubs to playing agreed fixtures – there had previously been a problem with clubs committing to arranged fixtures only to cancel their engagement in
favour of another, more lucrative fixture at short, or no, notice. Everton FC were fortunate, it is argued, to have been invited by the founders of the Football League to take their place amongst the elite of English football. In playing terms Everton FC were eclipsed by contemporaries such as Darwen FC, Nottingham Forest FC, Sheffield Wednesday FC, and even local rivals Bootle AFC – clubs that had canvassed for inclusion in the inaugural season of the Football League. However, clubs with a greater ability to attract large attendances, Everton FC being one, were able to secure their place in the Football League ahead of such apparently superior football rivals – a point conceded by the prime mover behind the League project, Aston Villa chairman, William McGregor. The League was therefore formed in 1888 with the following clubs taking part: Accrington, Aston Villa, Blackburn Rovers, Bolton Wanderers, Burnley, Derby County, Everton, Notts. County, Preston North End, Stoke City, West Bromwich Albion and Wolverhampton Wanderers. A look at the rise in attendance levels at Anfield after the League format had come into operation demonstrates just how beneficial this connection was to Everton FC. In the last season prior to the club’s entry into the Football League (that is, the season 1887/88) the average gate at Anfield was 5,800. Whilst local rivals Bootle AFC could attract to Anfield the very healthy gate of 12,000, and other, more illustrious opponents such as Bolton Wanderers could attract 9,000 supporters, the club’s matches with less well known teams such as Haydock St James and Bootle St Johns attracted only 2,000 on each occasion. After the formation of the Football League, Everton FC’s average gate rose markedly. Thus in the season 1888/89 the club averaged 9,000; 11,000 average gate for the following season; and 12,000 for the 1890/91 season. The club at first charged 3d for entry into the non-covered areas of the Anfield Road ground, though this entry fee was increased from 1888/89 to 6d for men (boys admitted for 3d). At this later point, members of the club who paid 7s/6d for their annual subscription – the equivalent to a season ticket – were getting a much better deal from their one-off payment than were those supporters paying in for every home game. Perhaps this is why the club had such a large membership by the end of the 1880s – approximately five-hundred.

A combination, then, of the professionalisation of players, on the one hand, and the advent of a national football league, on the other hand, required the club to secure sizeable capital investment to upgrade ground facilities for the increased capacity that
would financially sustain the club and allow it to attain a position in the vanguard of English football. Everton FC, in many respects, followed a classic pattern in this transitional phase of the English game away from its regionally tied amateurism towards the national and professional basis of the modern game. The role of John Houlding in providing financial stability for the Everton club in its move toward mass-spectatorship was crucial to the club’s growth during the 1880s.

Born locally in Everton in 1832, Houlding, a central figure in the foundation of professional football in the city of Liverpool, started out in life from relatively humble beginnings. He helped his father in his occupation as a cowkeeper (during Houlding’s childhood the district of Everton was semi-rural) before finding employment in a nearby brewery when his father’s stock was lost through cattle plague. Before long, Houlding had established himself as a licensed victualler and, eventually, was able to put enough capital together to set up his own brewery: Houlding’s Sparkling Ales. By the end of the 1880s Houlding had added ownership of ten public houses to his business enterprise. His taking on a number of public roles – a civic-mindedness that earned him the sobriquet ‘King John of Everton’ – enhanced his profile within the district of Everton. By the time of Houlding’s involvement with Everton FC as president of that club he was also overseer for the township of Everton, a Guardian with the West Derby Poor Law Union (WDPLU), a member of the Everton and Kirkdale Burial Board, a member of the Lancashire Asylums Board, and President of the Liverpool Carters’ Union. In political life, Houlding had become Conservative councillor for the Everton and Kirkdale ward on Liverpool council, and was chairman of the Everton Conservative Association (in his later life Houlding would become an alderman and Lord Mayor of Liverpool). The attraction for linking up with Everton FC in the early 1880s can be viewed as yet another means by which Houlding could gain public influence. It should be acknowledged, though, that Houlding was sports-minded, having played cricket in his younger days for the Stanley Cricket Club – a club with which he would continue a close association.

Never having been either a footballer or connected with any of the churches or chapels from which Everton FC drew its earliest players and support, it is plausible to suggest that Houlding’s introduction to the Everton club may have been via his close friend and
business acquaintance, Edwin Berry, who would have alerted Houlding to the club’s existence. Berry had been a player with the club in its infancy and, after briefly setting up a rival organisation in the 1880s called Liverpool Football Club (which, despite the name, was not a forerunner of the now famous Liverpool FC), returned as a member of Everton FC. Berry was a solicitor closely associated with defending cases brought against publicans and brewers in Liverpool’s magistrates’ courts. In the 1890s both Berry and Houlding were leading figures in drink trade defence associations in the town and both men were very active in local Conservative politics in the north end of Liverpool. Berry was a crucial ally of Houlding in the period of the split in Everton FC in the early 1890s and in the setting up and running of Liverpool FC.

It does appear also that, besides the importance he would have attached to his association with the club for the purposes of enhancing his public profile, Houlding saw the possibility of profiting from his association with the club. Already having his Sandon Hotel located near to the club’s Anfield Road ground and acting as its headquarters, attracting extra custom, Houlding also sought from the club an exclusive arrangement to provide refreshments within the confines of the ground on matchdays. For all of Houlding’s financial commitment to Everton FC, however, control of the club still rested decidedly with the club’s elected committee. The committee, consisting of Houlding as president, one vice-president of the club, treasurer and assistant treasurer, secretary and assistant secretary, and seven ordinary members of the club, enjoyed ‘absolute control of the ground and finances, the arrangement of matches and selection of teams and other matters affecting the interests of the club’. Although Houlding, as president, was able to nominate a member of the club to sit on the club’s committee, it would appear that his ability to determine the destiny of Everton FC in an autocratic manner was limited. Though the composition of the thirteen-man club committee elected for the season of 1888/89 reveals a cluster of Houlding loyalists, such as Edwin Berry, Thomas Howarth, William Barclay, and Alex Nisbet – men who would later side with the president in the club split of 1891–1892 and help set up Liverpool FC thereafter – the president would not appear to have been able to influence more significantly the type of men taking their place on the committee.
It seems clear that for the majority of the officers of the club, Everton FC’s objective remained the furtherance of its on-field excellence to ensure competitive success and the concomitant prestige this success gave to both club members and their community. Though Houlding was clearly pushing for a greater say in the running and decision-making of the club, it remained, in the terminology used by Wray Vamplew on this subject, a ‘utility maximiser’ – monies gained or generated being invested in team-building, ground improvements etc. in order to secure competitive victory and honours - rather than a ‘profit maximiser’. Table 4.2 demonstrates that total annual expenditure of the club between 1885 and 1891 (on players’ wages, team travelling expenses, costs awarded to visiting teams, and ground improvements) accounted consistently for two-thirds of annual income brought into the club from members’ subscriptions and gate receipts. Increases in expenditure for the whole period of 935 per cent outstripped income for the whole period, which rose by 869 per cent.

The power of the committee rested on the base of the club’s large membership. Membership figures for the club in its formative period are not publicly recorded prior to contemporary press coverage of the growing hostility within the club in 1891–1892.

Table 4.2 Comparison of Increases in Income and Expenditure at Everton FC, 1885/86–1890/91.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Income (£)</th>
<th>Expenditure (£)</th>
<th>Expenditure Expressed as % of Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885/86</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886/87</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887/88</td>
<td>2,172</td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888/89</td>
<td>4,476</td>
<td>3,440</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889/90</td>
<td>5,460</td>
<td>3,770</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890/91</td>
<td>6,592</td>
<td>4,658</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Liverpool Football Echo*, 7th November, 1891

In October of 1891 the president, John Houlding, is quoted as totalling the club membership at approximately five hundred (three hundred of whom were ‘practically new to the club’). The extent of that influx of members was partly corroborated by
Keates\textsuperscript{52} who believed 1889 to have been a significant turning point in terms of membership acceleration. We can take it, therefore, that during the bulk of the 1880s membership stood at below two hundred. The membership voted annually to choose members of the club to take up their positions on the club committee.\textsuperscript{53} To facilitate this choice the club committee was required to forward to every member of the club a balance sheet based on audited accounts of financial transactions seven days before the club’s Annual General Meeting (AGM).\textsuperscript{54} A democratic system of one person, one vote prevailed at the club. However, the development of caucuses and ‘cliques’, for the purpose of electing to the committee groups of individuals with common goals and grievances, was a feature of club affairs and may have gone some way to compromise the one person, one vote code.\textsuperscript{55}

\section*{4.3 The Structure of Everton FC}

A rudimentary profile of the early Everton FC, including the social characteristics of its membership and its financial management, can be pieced together by studying the available evidence of company files from 1892, the work on the early history of the club by Thomas Keates, \textit{The History of the Everton Football Club} (1998) and David France and David Prentice, \textit{The Virgin Blues: 100 Seasons at the Top} (2003),\textsuperscript{56} and contemporary newspaper and journal accounts.

There is no available documentary evidence concerning the social profile of the club’s membership in the pre-incorporated era. However, the list of shareholders of the new limited company set up by Everton FC in the wake of the formal organisational division in 1892 (the great majority of whom were also members of the original club\textsuperscript{57}) does allow us to project backwards and speculate as to what sort of backgrounds the early membership were from. The occupations of the four hundred and twenty three shareholders in 1892 reveal a wide cross-section of employment, from merchants to labourers. In social class terms, there is a preponderance of skilled working-class members, with trades such as joiners, engineers, plumbers and shipwrights being heavily represented, and a large minority of lower middle-class occupations ranging from the professions to white-collar employees such as clerks, bookkeepers, commercial agents, to small-scale retail owners.\textsuperscript{58} This evidence conforms to the widely
held belief that football club membership during the game's formative period was characterised by the straddling of the social divide between the 'respectable' working class and the petit bourgeoisie.\(^{59}\)

Turning to the men occupying places on the club committee, the work of both Keates and France and Prentice informs us that the very early committees included men who were former players of the club.\(^{60}\) For example, the names of former players Frank Brettle, Tom Marriott, Richard W. Morris, Robert Hiles and Tom Evans are to be found amongst the members of the committee in 1881/82. Amongst the names of the 1883/84 committee, Edwin Berry and A. Boylett, other former players, joined Brettle and Evans as executive officers of the club. This tradition was continued in later committees. In 1888/89 James Richards joined former players Berry and Marriott on the committee. This indicates to us, perhaps, that the status of having played the game, and more particularly, having played for Everton FC, was a characteristic valued by the Everton membership every bit as much as those elected for their administrative and organisational skills. As the membership expanded, and as the bureaucratic requirements of organising a premier football club assumed greater importance, so the presence of former players on the club committee was reduced and eventually replaced (though it is interesting to note, post-1892 split, the appearance on the Everton FC's early board of directors of A.R. Wade, a former player with the early club — a man who was instrumental in the move to Goodison Park, and a director who figured greatly in the club’s subsequent history).

Occupationally men involved in professional and administrative employment dominated the ten-member committees. For example, of those eight committee members in 1883/84 whose occupations could be ascertained, four were involved in professional or administrative employment: a school teacher, a solicitor, a customs officer, and a surveyor. Two were from commercial backgrounds: a brewer (the president John Houlding) and a coal merchant. The other two committee members were also employed in white-collar occupations: as a bookkeeper and a clerk. By the season of 1888/89, seven out of eleven of the committee members for whom we have occupational details were from professional or administrative backgrounds: a doctor, a customs officer, a vaccination officer, a solicitor, a school governor, a school master,
and a chemist. Three were involved in commerce: Houlding the brewer, and his
brewery manager, the newly elected John James Ramsey, and the coal merchant,
Robert Wilson, who was re-elected to the committee. Another committee member was
a bookkeeper. The committee of 1891/92, the last elected committee prior to the split of
the club, also shows a clear tendency towards those employed in professional or
administrative occupations. Seven of the thirteen-man committee were from this broad
occupational grouping: a school governor, a school master, a vaccination officer, a
customs officer, a forwarding agent, a physician, and a company secretary. Those
involved in commercial activity numbered three: Houlding and Ramsey retained their
positions on the committee, with coal merchant James Griffiths being elected to the
committee. William Jackson, a bookkeeper, John Atkinson, a wheelwright, and Francis
Currier, a railway foreman, represented the skilled working classes (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Occupational Composition of Everton FC Committees, 1883–1892, %
(figures based on all known occupations of committee members)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1883/84</th>
<th>1888/89</th>
<th>1889/90</th>
<th>1891/92</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>____</td>
<td>____</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All data on committee men from D. France and D. Prentice Virgin Blues, p.42; T. Keates History of the Everton Football Club, p.2-16; Gore’s Liverpool Trade Directory 1883-1892; Everton FC and Liverpool FC Company Files; Liverpool Courier 13th Oct, 1891; Liverpool Daily Post, 5th Feb, 1892

Commercial interests would appear to have been underrepresented amongst the
hierarchy of Everton FC if we compare the club with the findings of established studies
on similar-sized clubs during the period. For example, in his 1981 study, Association
Football and English Society, 1863–1915 (1980), Tony Mason revealed that the occupational categories of wholesale and retail employers dominated the occupations of seven-hundred-and-forty directors from forty-six English professional clubs between 1886 and 1915.61

From the available occupational data on Everton FC’s committee men it can also be seen that skilled manual workers, who were the largest occupational group amongst the club’s membership, were underrepresented within the club committee although it can also be said that their presence grew on later club committees prior to the splitting of the club in 1892.

In the very early years of the club’s history its ability to exist was secured by a combination of the subscriptions of members and fund-raising events. Club members were charged an initial five shillings for their introduction to the club as a new member and annual member subscription of seven shillings and sixpence – or, for the more affluent club member, annual subscription charges of one guinea which, from the time the club had its own ground and spectator facilities, allowed that member entry to sit in the members’ stand.62 The club from time to time would also organise athletic events (a common practice amongst Liverpool sporting clubs)63 and even musical recitals and Hot-Pot suppers in order to gain the financial means necessary to carry on its operation. As we have seen, however, the growing popularity of the game in Liverpool, the on-field success of Everton FC, and the increased investment of capital for ground improvements in order to exploit Everton’s local superiority, enabled the club, within a decade of taking up residency at Anfield Road, to become the most successful in England on and off the field. Everton FC were crowned English champions in 1891, and boasted the country’s largest average attendances and gate receipts. Gate receipts dwarfed by this stage that other source of revenue, club subscriptions, which had in an earlier period assumed greater significance. Income from member subscriptions for the season 1890–91, charged at either a guinea or seven shillings and sixpence, amounted to £324 compared with gate receipts of £6,268 for that season.64 Within a decade the club had moved from a select social club to the forefront of a new and flourishing sporting industry.
4.4 The Onset of Factional Opposition Within Everton FC

The extraordinary rise of Everton FC as a footballing force, and the financial growth of the organisation brought forth tensions between members of the club, however. In particular, there were concerns voiced by elements of the club’s membership and committee over the role played in the club by their president, John Houlding. Specifically, the concerns raised related to the nature of the financial relationship between the club and Houlding. (This issue has been touched upon by many historians of the early period of Merseyside football and an elaboration and critique of this body of work is provided in the following chapter). Although it was widely accepted by both insiders and outsiders to the club that Houlding and his money had been instrumental in the development of the organisation, hostility grew amongst some members of the club the more it became apparent that their president, towards the end of the 1880s, had begun to insist on being remunerated for the financial commitments he had made to the club. This principally related to Houlding’s demand for the full rate of interest agreed with the committee on money he had paid out for the club’s Anfield Road ground and improvements made to that ground. Rather than a beneficent patron of the club, the president was viewed latterly as a *rentier* with self-interest uppermost in his transactions with the club committee.

The first time it became apparent that relations within the hierarchy of the club were not harmonious was the summer of 1888. With gate receipts increasing considerably, from approximately £400 for the season of 1885/86 to £1,456 for the season of 1887/88, Houlding insisted on drawing the full amount of money from the interest he charged the club for his purchase of the land on which the club ground stood. Houlding had paid £6,000 for the land in 1884. The club had previously paid Houlding £100 per season (roughly 1½ per cent on Houlding’s outlay). At the 1888 AGM it was agreed to pay Houlding the full £240 for annual rental of his land, which the club committee’s initial agreement to pay 4 per cent amounted to. However, Houlding’s refusal to commit himself to a long-term lease for the club to rent his land (the club committee negotiated annually with Houlding) brought about a decision by the committee to block any further loans from the president. Houlding had previously charged the club five per cent interest on money loaned for improvements and the hiring of professional players.
The committee reasoned that no further investments should be made whilst the club was still at the mercy of its president’s whim – a decision held to despite Houlding’s reassurances that the club’s tenancy would not be interrupted. Though the committee’s resolve faltered only months later (in November 1888, seeking to cash in on the unexpectedly large response of the public to their matches in the inaugural season of the Football League, the committee took out another loan of £1,000 from Houlding), their underlying disquiet at the conduct of their president and his supporters, who comprised a minority on the club committee, would not go away.

In the run-up to the following year’s AGM, in 1889, the local press was already reporting on meetings of members of the club preparing to unseat those on the committee they felt were incapable or unwilling to steer the club away from its apparent course of passivity or even collusion with John Houlding. For example, the May 25th edition of the Liverpool Review carried a report of members who were ‘determined to oust the present executive and replace it by one of their own’. The ‘clique’, as the Liverpool Review named them, accused the serving officers of the club of ‘laxity’ in their financial management. Another of their criticisms was levelled at the absence of ‘practical footballists’. As we have seen, the number of committeemen with experience of playing football (and with Everton FC in particular) had been reduced by the latter half of the 1880s. The ‘clique’ proposed at its meeting a raft of members of the club whom they ‘were prepared to elect at all costs’. A week later those loyal to Houlding within the club held their own meeting, denounced the rebels’ stance and agreed to organise opposition to the rebel’s plans by putting forward their own candidates for the committee elections. The Houlding loyalists proposed the re-election of the bulk of the sitting committee. The club’s 1889 AGM was eagerly awaited. At the AGM, Houlding’s and the sitting committee’s detractors, in a heated debate over club finances, brought up the issue of club money having been spent on a building contract without either first being agreed to by the club committee, or being put out for competitive tender. Also, criticism was levelled at the club treasurer, and by extension the rest of the committee, for running up expenses (unspecified) that were not agreed to by the committee. These criticisms were defended by the president himself, who was also forced by the floor of the meeting to explain the hike in rental costs the club had faced in the previous year, and which it would continue to face in the
upcoming year (the cost of renting Houlding’s land rose from £100 for the season of 1887–88, to £240 for the season of 1888–89, and to £250 for the season of 1889–90). Despite the opposition, Houlding was able to persuade the membership to re-elect a key ally, the sitting secretary, William E. Barclay, to the new committee. Barclay had seniority and a powerful voice in the club amongst the membership. Barclay was a man who would later become an executive officer in Houlding’s Liverpool FC for many years. A vote to establish the rest of the committee for the coming season was deferred to a later date. It would appear that this strategy took the wind out of the sails of those members seeking wholesale changes to the executive. When the committee was selected, six of the thirteen-man committee were incumbent officers, with five other members of the old committee not having stood for re-election. However, two men who did make it on to the 1889–90 season committee were Abraham Thomas Coates and William Robert Clayton, new members to the club in 1889. Their presence must be viewed as an advance party that heralded the arrival on to the committee of a new generation of club members (there was a huge increase in the club’s membership at this time, from approximately two hundred to five hundred) who were either unaware of or unimpressed by the personal history of key figures in the development of the organisation. This was a point of view arrived at by Thomas Keates, a member of the club at the time and a man who would go on to take up a position on the club’s board of directors in the 1890s. In his own history of Everton FC, published in 1928, Keates wrote that ‘out of the many members who joined the club in 1889...it is very suggestive that [some of these members’] names are to be found on the list of the provisional directors of the limited liability company into which the club was formed at Goodison Park’.

As the next two seasons unfolded – culminating in the crowning of Everton FC as English champions in 1891 – the outstanding issue of the club’s security of tenure became an ever more pressing one for some in the club. More of the newer members of the club took up their positions within the club committee and posed a greater challenge each year to the old guard who had run the club from its inception as a district-based club in the early 1880s – men who had built up a working relationship with Houlding. Four of the 1889/90 committee fell into this category: Tom Marriott, a former player and treasurer of the club, Richard Stockton, Robert Wilson and J.C. Brooks (though the
last two men named went on to become Everton FC directors in the post-Houlding
Everton FC). Houlding had supplemented these men from 1888 with men with whom
he had personal and/or business connections. One of these, Thomas Howarth, was said
to have attained a position as a Poor Law administrator through Houlding’s patronage
(as mentioned, Houlding was a Guardian in the West Derby Union). Another, John
James Ramsey, was Houlding’s brewery manager. Houlding would have known Edwin
Berry and another committee member, Joseph Williams, via their membership of the
Liverpool Working Men’s Conservative Association, and through their involvement in
the ruling body of Liverpool Conservatism, the Constitutional Association (more on
these political connections will be forthcoming in subsequent chapters). William E.
Barclay had connections to Houlding via the West Derby Union – Barclay was
employed as the governor of a boys’ school controlled by the Poor Law Union. By
1891, however, the tide had turned against Houlding as the Everton FC membership
loosened his grip on the committee. For the season of 1890/91, Dr James Clement
Baxter, another newcomer to the club in 1889, joined the re-elected Abraham Coates
and William Clayton on the committee. And in the AGM of the following year,
1891/92, James Griffiths, John Atkinson and Francis Currier, also later arrivals as club
members in 1889, joined Baxter, Clayton and Coates on the club committee. All six
men went on to become original directors of the newly formed Everton Football Club
Limited Company in 1892. By this point, then, Houlding could definitely rely only on
his own men who were re-elected or newly elected to the board: William E. Barclay,
Thomas Howarth, John James Ramsey and Alex Nesbit (another man who had
apparently gained his employment position within the West Derby Union via
Houlding’s intervention). The non-aligned members of the club committee, William
Jackson, Richard Molyneux and Richard Stockton, held the balance of power.

Talk of the formation of the club into a limited liability company by those opposed to
Houlding, a move motivated by the intention to buy out his interests in Everton FC,
threatened Houlding with the loss of control of an important social asset and,
potentially, financial asset. With this existing state of affairs amongst those in control of
the club the scene was set for a final reckoning for John Houlding and the manner in
which the club had been administered.
4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen that Everton FC’s development over the period 1878–1891 brought to the surface tensions between individuals who can be said to have held different motives for their involvement in the club. The club’s drive towards becoming competitively successful – first at district and regional level, then nationally – necessitated greater capital investment. This led to a situation where many members of the club perceived an undue and increasing commercial influence upon club affairs, more especially in matters of administration. The competitive and commercial requirements driving the club forward by the end of the period, then, became a seriously contested issue amongst the club membership, who viewed their organisation, the ‘Good Old Club’, in terms of a standard-bearer for communal pride and identity at least as much as they saw it as an organisation to collect trophies, and certainly more than its capacity to generate profits for those investing money for its development.

In the following chapter the crisis that engulfed the club in the latter part of 1891 and early 1892 will be analysed in detail. In particular, the main charges levelled against the club president, John Houlding, by his detractors regarding his motivation for involvement in Everton FC will be scrutinised. The purpose of this enquiry is both to highlight established accounts of the dispute, and the motives attributed in them to those seeking control over the club, and to offer my own perspective and conclusions on the events leading to the split of the Everton FC in 1892.
Chapter Five

The Split of Everton FC, 1891–1892

5.1 Introduction

The split in the original Everton FC in 1892 was a defining moment in the history of Merseyside football. Our knowledge of this event has been advanced by a handful of studies, which, though not concentrating specifically on the split, have helped to establish an orthodox view of the dynamics that lay behind it. Essentially, the split is portrayed in those accounts as a critical point reached in the relations between the Everton FC membership and their president, John Houlding, over the issue of the club’s financial obligations to Houlding.

Houlding owned the land on which the club ground stood, renting it back to the club for an annual rental fee. Drawing on criticism heaped upon Houlding by his contemporaries, the president stands accused in historical accounts of abusing his position within the club in order to impose a series of arbitrary rental increases on the Everton membership from the late 1880s, and to extract high interest rates for loans made to the club for ground improvements. Houlding’s plan to incorporate the club in the autumn of 1891, involving the club’s purchase of his land and neighbouring property, is seen as the last, and most audacious, attempt at profiteering by an opportunist landlord. The rejection of Houlding’s plan is represented as the boiling over of a simmering resentment felt by the club membership towards their president. On the basis of the above argument the subsequent period of crisis and division in the club, culminating in its split in March 1892, is primarily understood as the outcome of this financial exploitation of the club.

The established explanation of the division of the original Everton Football Club in 1892 attributes primacy to the financial motives of key agents within the club and resistance by other agents to these motives. It is posited in this chapter that this explanation of the dispute of 1892, which concentrates purely upon the financial arrangements of the club, is deficient. Existing accounts of the dispute that explain it purely as the result of irreconcilable differences over the financial arrangements of
the club offer but a limited analysis. They do not seek to locate the motive force of
the dispute outside of the prevailing power-relations within the club. In this they
betray a preoccupation with an organisational behaviour approach characteristic of
other studies of football clubs which have concentrated, either explicitly or implicitly,
on the duality of the professional football club as both a sporting and a commercial
operation. In this chapter, by uncovering inconsistencies in the arguments put forward
in established accounts, and by the provision of previously unconsidered details of the
dispute, the ground for a more complex analysis of the dispute can be prepared. This
explanation will not seek to ignore commercial considerations but to incorporate them
into a more holistic approach, offering an alternative explanation of the dispute that
also highlights the social and political interaction of the club and its members with
their social environment. It is argued that the dispute was conditioned by the
prevailing social and political climate within the city of Liverpool and that we must
contextualise its origins, development and resolution in relation to that external
environment.

5.2 Financial Orthodoxy
The established explanation of the split of Everton FC in 1892 is well known to those
familiar with football's historiography. At the epicentre of these accounts stands
John Houlding, brewer, Poor Law guardian and Tory city councillor for Liverpool's
Everton and Kirkdale ward. Houlding's role as president and principal financial
sponsor of Everton FC was instrumental in its rise to national prominence and success
during the 1880s and early 1890s. What has been established as his abuse of his
position as *de facto* club landlord has, however, been Houlding's ultimate epitaph.
Houlding's role as *rentier* to the club (owning and renting out its Anfield Road
ground) and his commercial background (Houlding had built up his own brewing
company and public houses) have rather easily marked him down, subsequently, both
as an interloper into the gentlemanly environs of the Everton FC executive committee
and as the motive force behind events culminating in the club's division. Certainly,
Houlding's perceived material designs — his credentials as a profiteer — have been
proffered more stridently than any non-financial motives or goals which the conferred
status of club presidency would have allowed for. Specifically, the charges against Houlding relate to the alleged encroachment upon club affairs of his brewing interests and his exploitation of his position as effective club landlord.

Taking these two issues in turn, it is suggested that Houlding’s involvement with the club was, in large part, motivated by the commercial possibilities it provided for the promotion of his brewery company, Houlding’s Sparkling Ales. The sale of this ale to a captive Anfield Road matchday market, and the increase in traffic into one of his public houses, the Sandon Hotel – located near to the Anfield Road ground, and used for club headquarters and changing area for the team on matchdays – are identified as principal motives for Houlding’s close association with Everton FC. With respect to this charge, it must be recognized that the commercial strategy of associating with football clubs was widely adopted by brewers during the formative period of professional football, and that part of John Houlding’s motivation for association with the Everton FC is consistent with this strategy. We must, however, also consider a contextual point here. Most professional clubs in England during this period came into existence through organisational developments outwith football. The formation of football clubs in the latter half of the nineteenth century was largely through the auspices of church, workplace or public house. To a lesser extent, clubs were formed through neighbourhood association. In this sense, the involvement of Houlding, a publican and a brewer, must be viewed as an example of the general evolutionary development of professional football out of its amateur origins. Everton FC, though initiated in 1878 by members of the St Domingo Methodist New Connexional congregation, evolved properly from public house environs. As we saw in the previous chapter, first the Queen’s Head in Everton provided the club’s base of operation and, from 1882, John Houlding’s Sandon Hotel, Anfield. The club committee’s approach to Houlding to secure ownership of the land on which their ground stood when faced with eviction in 1885 can be viewed as a logical step in the development of the club. This contextualises Houlding’s relationship with the club in his guise as publican and brewer.

More pointedly, the extent of any substantial exploitation of the club through Houlding’s brewing interests is questionable. The Everton committee as part of their
tenancy agreement gave an assurance to Houlding concerning the provision of refreshments on the Anfield Road ground. This detail has been either implicitly or explicitly interpreted, subsequently, as evidence of Houlding’s actual exploitation of the club’s ability to attract large attendances to the Anfield Road ground on a regular basis. The agreement that ‘If at any time, refreshments should be required on the ground the landlord shall have the sole right to supply’ [my italics] can certainly be read as the granting of a monopoly provision of ale to Houlding, the landlord-brewer. However, the ambiguity in the wording of this agreement has not been addressed. Whatever designs Houlding may have had to provide alcohol exclusively on the ground, the available evidence suggests that the stated requirement for this provision from the Everton committee was never forthcoming. Licensing records do not reveal any documentation that demonstrate the granting of alcoholic licenses by local magistrates for the club’s Anfield Road premises – something that would have been a necessary requirement for the sale of alcohol on match days. Statements made in the local press during the crisis period of the club in the latter months of 1891 and early 1892 indicate that the focus of Houlding’s opponents was firmly on his role as a publican and, more particularly, the club’s close association with his Sandon Hotel, the club’s matchday headquarters. The profits accruing to Houlding from this association became a serious bone of contention within the dispute.

William R. Clayton, a leading figure in the club opposed to Houlding, proposed to a General Meeting of the Everton FC membership a motion to move from the Anfield Road site in the following manner: ‘I would ask you in the interests of football — not in the interests of an hotel, or any one man — to support the resolution’. Houlding and his supporters utilised the local press to defend this attack on the Sandon Hotel association: ‘The various remarks as to profits derived from his hotel’, wrote one club member, ‘are, I think, outside the question, as whoever had been owner of the Sandon Hotel, private person or public company would have derived nearly the same benefit without in any way assisting the club’. Another Houlding supporter, giving his view of the position of the majority on the Everton committee wrote: ‘...because he [Houlding] owns the Sandon Hotel should [he] allow them the ground rent-free? Why not call on the bus company to pay their share?’. And Houlding, himself, felt the need to meet the challenge of his accusers on the issue of the benefit the association of his hotel to the club had: ‘In regard to the Sandon Hotel, of which I am
landlord...the close season takings at the house are only £10 per week less than during the winter when football is in full swing’. Apart from these attacks on Houlding’s ownership of a public house acting as the club’s headquarters no reference is ever made by Houlding’s opponents during this period to any, rather more direct and substantial, financial benefits for Houlding that he may have received from the exclusive provision of ale on the club’s ground. This would have been an obvious line of attack one would expect to have been made under these circumstances. It does not seem credible that those criticising Houlding’s associations with the club on the grounds of profiteering from his drink trade connections would have failed to highlight any more substantial relation between the president and the club, which the actual provision of ale on the club’s ground would have represented.

Houlding’s direct financial gain resulting from his football associations and the sale of alcohol, then, would seem to be confined to the takings from his own tied house, the Sandon Hotel – an association presumably enjoyed by the owners of the other public houses situated near to the Anfield Road site (Map 5.1). This last point is underlined by the complaints of a member bemoaning the benefits to a number of local brewers who had public houses near to the club’s gates and entrances. Whilst it is arguable that Houlding’s public house was the club’s matchday headquarters and would, therefore, attract disproportionate custom on matchdays, this point can be countered by the fact that other public houses were located nearer to the ground’s entrances than Houlding’s Sandon Hotel, which was over 250 yards away from the nearest gate (Map 5.1) and would, presumably, through their much greater proximity, have held a different attraction for matchday drinkers.
MAP 5.1

Everton FC’s Anfield Road Ground

and Immediate Locality, 1891

† = Public House

Source: Ordnance Survey Map, Everton Division, 1891
Perhaps of greater concern for those seeking to establish Houlding’s parasitical relationship with Everton FC has been the club president’s role as landlord of the club’s Anfield Road ground. The charges, here, relate specifically to Houlding’s acquisition of ground ownership; his apparent failure to supply the club with a written contract of tenancy; and (relatedly) what are seen to be the arbitrary increases in rental payment faced by the club.

The first of these points has already been touched upon. There appears to be a misunderstanding in established accounts of the sequence of events leading to Houlding’s advent as club landlord. The former Everton director, Thomas Keates, a contemporary of the dispute period and the author of the first history of the club in 1928, initiates the confusion. In this work he writes: ‘As soon as prosperity in the new location seemed assured, the executive found their representative tenant [club president, Houlding] had made himself their landlord, ended their nominal tenancy and substituted a rental...’. This is a version of events reiterated in subsequent accounts. This ignores other accounts contemporary to the dispute, however, which clearly refute any clandestine arrangement by Houlding to acquire the land rented by the club. They affirm, rather, not only the prior knowledge of the Everton executive committee of Houlding having taken possession of the Anfield Road site in 1885 but their petitioning of him, as president, to purchase the land – placed on the open market by its previous owner, a Mr Joseph Orrell – in order to secure the club’s tenancy. The *Liverpool Courier* of September 22nd, 1891, for example, reveals:

Some years ago the Everton Club...found itself absolutely without a ground and it was proposed to form a company and buy the ground which the club now uses. The project was warmly supported in words...and everything, for a time pointed to a successful floating of the new company. When, however, the promises came to be submitted to the stern analysis of a preliminary meeting of promoters it was found that the total capital promised amounted to the sum of £11...Mr Barclay (the present chairman) and Mr Jackson (the present Hon. Treasurer) once more turned toward Mr Houlding and urged upon him the necessity for immediate action...The outcome of this interview was that he [Mr Houlding] purchased the land for the round sum of £6,000.

Similarly, certain claims concerning Everton FC’s tenancy of Houlding’s newly acquired land must be contested. Again, Keates set the precedent by implying in his
recollections that Houlding adopted — to the club’s detriment — a deliberately open-ended, informal stance on the club’s rental responsibilities: ‘with an intimation [by Houlding] that, as the club’s income increased so would the rent’. Subsequent studies, drawing upon this earlier assertion by Keates has helped underscore its validity. In *The Blues and the Reds: A History of the Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs* (1985), Tony Mason writes of the basis for the club’s tenancy at Anfield Road as resting on Houlding’s imposition of a ‘sliding-scale procedure so that as the club’s income increased, so would their rent’. Richard Day in his study, *The Motivations of Some Football Club Directors: An Aspect of the Social History of Association Football, 1890-1914* (1976), states that: ‘The amount of rent Houlding charged and interest rates received were the basis for the dispute that caused the club to split into two’. Day extrapolates that with ‘never any written contract specifying the amount of rent to be paid...Houlding could fix the rent at whatever level he considered to be a fair return on his outlay’.

Certain evidence suggests, however, that the charges levelled at Houlding on this matter are insecure. Statements made in the local press by Houlding’s supporters during the period of the club dispute, and confirmed by Houlding’s opponents on the Everton club committee, reveal the existence of a long-standing written contract between the club and Houlding in his capacity as landlord. It was reported in the *Liverpool Courier*, 22nd September, 1891, that upon his purchase, in 1885, of the land on which the club’s ground stood, Houlding entered into an agreement which ‘allowed the club to use it upon payment of an annual rental of 4 per cent on purchase money’. Houlding had purchased the property from its previous owner for approximately £6,000. Houlding only enforced those terms four years into the contract when the inclusion of Everton amongst the teams chosen for the inaugural Football League season in 1888–89 provided the club with a regular yearly income. Prior to this point the club had paid Houlding an annual rental of £100 (approximately 1¾ per cent of Houlding’s purchase price). The agreement by the Everton Committee to carry out, fully, their rental commitment from the season 1888–1889 of 4 per cent of purchase price is recorded in the *Liverpool Echo*, 17th October, 1891. It would appear that only in this sense does the claim that Houlding operated an open-ended policy towards club rental have any foundation. It is clear from a reading of the
local press coverage of the developing dispute that the charges levelled by the Everton committee at Houlding concerning his rental demands on the club occur only in the aftermath of the membership’s rejection of the limited liability scheme proffered by Houlding in September 1891, and that such charges were rarely raised after October 1891.

Houlding had also advanced the club during this period £2000, at 5 per cent interest, for ground improvements. The rate of interest charged by Houlding to the club on money spent by him on ground purchase and ground improvements would appear to be reasonable in view of the bank rate and charges made by banks on loans and overdrafts during the period. The average Bank of England rate from 1885, the year of Houlding’s purchase of the Anfield Road site, to the end of 1891 when the club dispute approached its climax was slightly over 3.3 per cent. R.G. Hawtrey, in *A Century of Bank Rate* (1938), states that for short-term loans and overdrafts, at this point in time, the commercial bank sought a minimum of 1 per cent above bank rate. Though variations between the Bank of England and banking policies amongst provincial banks did exist to some degree, Hawtrey makes the point that the Bank’s rates had always been closely shadowed in the provinces. This is borne out to some extent by the example of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Bank’s Annual General Meeting Report from 1892. Strong emphasis is placed, here, on the (negative) influence of the fluctuating changes in the bank rate on their own relatively poor performance during the financial year June 1891 to June 1892 (although a dividend was still declared of 12 per cent).

A. Andreades, in *A History of the Bank of England* (1909), states that the rate in the provinces was normally higher than the bank rate. With Liverpool mortgage agencies during the period 1885 to 1891 charging a constant 4 to 5 per cent rate of interest on money lent on mortgage of freehold and leasehold property, the interest rate charged by Houlding, for both ground rental and loans to the club, as an individual receiving no security on his investment could, perhaps, be argued as less than commensurate with the risks of involvement with the then fledgling football club, whose annual income for the season prior to Houlding’s financial commitment was just £200. As noted above, there was a marked reluctance by the members of
the club to involve themselves financially with the purchase of the Anfield Road site in 1885.

It seems fair to say, then, that Houlding's financial relation with the club was not of an entirely philanthropic nature. Houlding never found himself significantly out of pocket through his association with Everton FC. Whilst recognising this, it is difficult to unearth contemporaneous evidence of complaints concerning the perceived long-standing exploitation of the club's membership by their president. However, the retrospective charges of long-term financial exploitation of the club levelled at Houlding, particularly concerning his role as club landlord, have succeeded in portraying the period of crisis in the club during late 1891 and early 1892 as the boiling over of a simmering resentment felt by a membership no longer willing to put up with the dictation of the club's fortunes by its president. The impact of this approach has been to downplay the significance of the final rejection of Houlding's limited liability scheme in 1892 by the club membership. The crisis period faced by the club has been represented as contingent to the long-standing ill will over the financial running of the club, rather than as events betraying the hallmarks of a well-defined and concerted struggle for power and control of the club which had come to a head at this juncture over the issue of incorporation. These issues will be explored and developed more fully later.

Evidence suggests that for a number of years prior to the split what were described as cliques or competing factions, had surfaced within the club membership – an occurrence alluded to in the previous chapter. Attempts had been made to put before the membership schemes to incorporate the club into a limited liability company prior to Houlding's 1891 scheme.²⁴ It is in the context of long-standing factional strategies to move the club forward onto a more formal commercial footing that we must view the bitter hostilities surrounding the split of 1892.
5.3 Crisis Within Everton FC: 1891–92

Between the autumn of 1891 and spring of 1892 there developed a polarisation of the membership of Everton Football Club initiated by a plan put forward by club president John Houlding to form the club into a limited liability company. This dispute culminated in the deposing of Houlding and his key supporters from the club’s executive committee. The established interpretation of this cause and effect highlights what is seen to be Houlding’s continued opportunism. It is implied that the 1891 limited scheme was the creation of a pretext by Houlding to exploit the club financially. His determination to see this limited liability scheme through, it is claimed, resulted in the resolve of the membership to rid themselves of a parasitical influence. Absent from these established studies is any detailed examination of the origins of the 1891 company scheme; an understanding of its proposals, an analysis of the objections raised to them by Houlding’s opponents; and an analysis of the aftermath of the scheme’s rejection by the membership. In the section below we will focus on each of these issues, in turn, in an effort to contextualise the moves being made to incorporate the club.

Origins of the 1891 Limited Liability Scheme

One of the most glaring omissions from established accounts is any detailed analysis of the circumstances that propelled Houlding into floating his limited company scheme for the club. In 1885 Houlding had negotiated, on the club’s behalf, a deal for the land owned by Mr Joseph Orrell Jnr,25 on which the club had played its football for the previous 1884–85 season. Joseph Orrell sold the land to Houlding prior to departing to another part of the country with his family. However, Joseph Orrell Jnr stipulated as part of his agreement with Houlding, that the perimeter of the land belonging to his uncle, a Mr John Orrell, which abutted the Anfield Road ground, must remain undisturbed, and that if at any point John Orrell decided to prepare his adjoining land for building purposes then Houlding would be obliged to join with him in laying an access road between their properties. The last two decades of the nineteenth century saw a boom in private house-building in the inner suburban districts of Liverpool surrounding the old town and John Orrell would have been fully aware of the commercial opportunities for he had, amongst other occupations, once been a builder.26 This clause, when invoked, would have disturbed the covered
standing enclosures that had been erected on that part of the club’s ground by 1891 and, bound by roads on its other perimeters, would have necessitated removal from the ground by the club (Map 5.1).

It is clear from press coverage of the conflict within the club that the membership had long been aware of this ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the future of the club’s home.27 When in August of 1891 John Orrell instructed his solicitor to invoke the clause agreed between his nephew and Houlding, enmity was expressed towards John Orrell from Houlding’s supporters and opponents alike. Both sides believed that John Orrell had bided his time on this issue.28 A possibly revealing insight into John Orrell’s actions, and one which supports this view of opportunism on his part, concerns his agreement in January 1891 to sell for £30,000 what was, after the death of his brother, Joseph Orrell Snr, his own brewing business. The incorporation of his business into a limited liability company, Orrell’s Brewery Syndicate, followed by its immediate sale, raises an interesting point about the timing of the club’s dispute and eventual split.29 In 1891 John Orrell’s solicitor explained Orrell’s actions as the result of his desire to lay out his adjoining land for commercial purposes, that is, the building and sale of houses (as per Joseph Orrell Jnr’s negotiated settlement with John Houlding). This, however, would seem to be at variance with John Orrell’s selling of his brewery and its properties (including ale houses and beer houses). Aged seventy in 1891, it perhaps makes little sense that John Orrell would sell off one established business enterprise only to start up another venture at his advanced stage in life. His stated intention to lay out his land for house-building is also at variance with depressed business conditions in the housing industry at that point. The housing market was acknowledged as being depressed at this point (an issue dealt with in more detail later below). This might indicate that Orrell’s motivation in invoking the clause in his nephew’s contract agreed with John Houlding was the grasping of a commercial opportunity in order to further rationalise his property-holding in Liverpool by selling his Anfield land. In fact, Orrell retired to a residence on the Wirral in early 1893.30

The significance of these details is its questioning of any theory of collusion between Houlding and John Orrell over the timing of the dispute by highlighting John Orrell’s actions in the context of his own individual motives and concerns for his property and
its place in his overall business strategy. Historians of the dispute have tended to stress that John Orrell and John Holding were ‘associates’ in the brewery industry.\textsuperscript{31} It has also been suggested that both men were responsible together for fixing the club’s ground rental at arbitrary annual rates,\textsuperscript{32} an assertion made despite the absence of evidence suggesting any role Orrell played in club affairs. In fact, accusations of collusion during the course of the club dispute came also from Houlding’s supporters in the club who accused members of the Everton committee opposing Holding and John Orrell of being in league against the club president. For example, the author of an anonymous letter written to the \textit{Liverpool Courier} in September 1891 asked: ‘Is it a fact that a number of those gentlemen [Everton committee members] waited upon Mr. Orrell in June or July last, and by their representations made him so dissatisfied with the present conditions of things that he decided either to force the club to purchase his land at his own price, or in the event of their refusal, oust them out of their tenancy?’\textsuperscript{33} The implication raised by the correspondent was that the crisis had been induced by Houlding’s opponents – a point of view given strength by an earlier newspaper report which had revealed that some members of the committee had, prior to Houlding’s limited scheme being voted on by the membership, obtained land valuations for the relocation of the club.\textsuperscript{34}

Whatever the reality and truth behind John Orrell’s motives the dispute within the club erupted from this decision and revolved around how the club might solve the Orrell complication that threatened the club’s tenancy. Certain members believed that Houlding, as landlord and club president, should negotiate with Orrell and pay him an agreeable rent for his land in order to retain continued tenancy. For his part, Houlding saw the way forward through the club’s purchase of both his and Orrell’s properties via the sale of shares in the club and its formation into a limited company. It is clear from contemporary sources that, far from Houlding’s preferred solution to the ground problem being ‘forced’ upon the club, his limited company scheme, when first proposed, was unanimously voted for by the full committee of the club. The committee advocated turning the club ‘into a company for the purpose of purchasing Messrs. Houlding and Orrell’s land’.\textsuperscript{35} The \textit{volte-face} on this decision by the majority of the committee at the Extraordinary General Meeting of 15th September, which had been especially called to debate the scheme, is never explained. However, the mobilisation of the membership in opposition to Houlding on this issue was organised
and implacable from this point on, and the perception of Houlding having attempted to arbitrarily force the limited scheme upon the membership has been subsequently nurtured.

**Proposals of, and Objections to, Houlding’s Limited Liability Scheme**

The core of Houlding’s proposals to transform the club into a limited company lay in the purchase by the club of both his own land and that of John Orrell’s adjoining property. This involved a payment to Houlding of £6,000 for his 15,500 square yards — involving a £3,000 initial payment, with a further £3,000 lying on mortgage at 4 per cent interest per annum. Houlding had calculated the sale of his land to the proposed new company at the land value he had paid for it in 1884 — that is, seven shillings per square yard. Similarly, John Orrell’s 13,000 square yards of land would be bought by the company involving an initial payment of £1,875, with another £3,000 on mortgage, also at 4 per cent interest per annum.³⁶

From Houlding’s stated perspective, his proposed scheme would secure the club’s location, allow for the club to extend ground capacity, and afford the possibility of creating an athletics track which could maximise the ground’s utility during the close season to ensure funds for the football club to progress.³⁷ From the perspective of those critics opposed to Houlding (nominated by the local press at this point as the ‘Dissenters’) his proposals amounted to an exploitation of the club’s difficulties with Orrell and were regarded as a convenient way to arrest the declining value of his capital investment at the club whilst retaining a prominent position within it. Though detailed analysis of the limited scheme issue is singularly absent from the historiography of the club’s crisis period, emphasis — consistent with the viewpoint of long-term financial exploitation by the club president — has rested firmly, within these accounts, on the perceived financial motivations of Houlding’s scheme.³⁸

The Dissenters argued that Houlding’s land had depreciated significantly in value in the intervening period between his payment for it and the proposal of his scheme. Thus, Houlding’s sale at purchase price would represent shrewd business on his own behalf, realising capital which had, in view of the agreed capping of Houlding’s annual rental opportunities at 4 per cent of purchase price, turned into a poor
investment. As we have seen, Houlding had purchased the land in 1885 at seven shillings per square yard. Certain members of the committee declared that as land value in the vicinity had fallen to four shillings and sixpence per square yard, the proposed formation of the club into a company was, under Houlding’s plan, the subsidisation of Houlding (and Orrell) for the loss of value on their capital investment.\(^39\) It does, indeed, appear from information obtained from local newspaper advertisements of the period that the value of land in the district might well have been in decline. One such advertisement in the *Liverpool Courier*, for example, attracting attention to the availability of land in the Everton and West Derby districts which bordered the district of the club site, was worded thus: ‘Valuable freehold and leasehold plots for building purposes sold at greatly reduced prices’.\(^40\)

Contextualisation is the key to determining the validity of charges levelled against Houlding concerning his financial exploitation of the club’s misfortunes. Taken in isolation, Houlding’s proposals for the club to purchase his land at what was an inflated valuation would seem damning. Taken in the context of Houlding’s long-term exploitation of the club – which the established studies on the Everton dispute have argued – the case against him would appear to be conclusive. However, an appreciation of the details of the financial history between the president and the club, as has been attempted in this study allows for the questioning of these assumptions. In reacting to Orrell’s demands upon the club, Houlding can be said to be claiming, no more and no less, than the value of his outlay advanced on behalf of the club. In fact, an alternative argument might be that the club’s use of Houlding’s land and capital loans at competitive rates of interest to build up their club to the pinnacle of the English game – securing its first championship in 1891-1892, attracting to it the best of professional players and ever increasing gate receipts – amounted to the long-term exploitation of Houlding.

**Rejection and Aftermath of Houlding’s Scheme**

The period of the dispute, from the rejection of Houlding’s scheme to his being deposed as club president, is a largely unexplored period in the accounts of the Everton FC dispute.\(^41\) Events during this period strongly suggest the pursuit of a strategy by those in opposition to Houlding on the Everton committee that was
designed not only to further discredit and weaken Houlding's position within the club but also to prepare the membership for a flight away from the Anfield Road ground—the trump card Houlding held against them. The reluctance of many of the members to leave behind the Anfield Road site, which had not only provided emotional attachment but also provided substantial capital investment in the club, provided a stumbling block to the plans of the committee. Houlding's opponents took full advantage of the Orrell affair from this point on to force the issue of the ground move.

The petitioning of Orrell by the Dissentient faction was key to this strategy. The securing of the Anfield Road ground until the end of the season 1891–1892 by the club's executive committee for a payment to Orrell of £100 preserved the club's cherished League status and was the first priority of the committee in the aftermath of their organised blocking of Houlding's limited incorporation scheme. From the security of this position and the opening up of a dialogue with Orrell, effectively bypassing Houlding, the Dissentients were able to secure from Orrell an agreement which would ensure the club's continued tenancy for an annual rental of £120 for his land on a ten-year lease. On the strength of this, they called upon Houlding to reciprocate Orrell's terms, which amounted to 2 1/2 per cent interest upon Orrell's purchase price of his land of £4,800. The strategy was a simple one. Houlding's refusal to tear up his original rights to 4 per cent interest on his approximate purchase price of £6,000 would leave the club facing a yearly rental payment of £360, a level the membership would find hard to accept given the annual payments of similar-size clubs. Alternatively, the prospect of reducing his annual rental from £240 to £150 (from 4 per cent interest on his outlay to 2 1/2 per cent) placed Houlding in a dilemma: the failure of the club president to follow the lead of an outsider on terms and conditions of tenure would inevitably have enhanced his negative image in the wake of the failure of his unpopular limited liability scheme.

Houlding responded by offering to 'accept a reduced sum' of his 4 per cent rental 'in the event of the club's finances being insufficient to meet this'. Though hardly a definitive commitment to reduce terms, this offer, in conjunction with Orrell's offer, amounted to a substantial improvement for the club in terms of long-term security of
tenure and rental costs. From Houlding, there was a willingness to revert to his pre-
1888 position of accepting a rental rate below 4 per cent of his purchase price and a
written commitment not to disturb the tenancy of the club. From Orrell, there was a
commitment to provide the club with a ten-year lease for an annual rental of £120,
with the option to buy the land. The club, for a fixed annual rental below £360, had
now the possibility of secure and stable tenure and the physical space to expand the
capacity of the ground to prosper.

The counter response from the Everton committee was to formulate what they
believed to be an improved offer to Houlding and to call a Special General Meeting
on January 25th, 1892, to endorse its acceptance. The terms of the Everton
committee were as follows: ‘That the Everton Football Club offer to Mr Houlding
£180 p.a. rental and that £120 be offered to Mr Orrell on a lease to run for 10 years,
the terms to be as mentioned by Mr Houlding except that he shall not have a nominee
on the committee’. The rental offer, which would result in a fixed loss on rental and
a decline in his influence upon the administration of the club, would, the architects of
the resolution knew, inevitably be unacceptable to Houlding and signalled the
determination of his opponents to rout him and draw to a close the struggle for club
control. Houlding rejected this offer. With the reinforcement by the membership at
this meeting of their earlier rejection of Houlding’s limited company scheme, and the
still outstanding threat to the club’s tenancy of the Anfield Road site, the motion to
form the club into a limited company and relocate to another site was
overwhelmingly carried. This was done at great cost to the club. The preparation of
the Goodison Park site and the construction of stands cost £8,000. However, with the
financial support of committee members and supporters of their cause external to the
club, the project was a success. Everton Football Club relocated to nearby land in
the Walton district where they erected their Goodison Park stadium. In the event, the
Anfield Road site was adopted by John Houlding’s newly formed company,
Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds Company Limited.

Whilst it is important to acknowledge that the souring of relations within the club
over the issue of its perceived financial exploitation provides context to the split, this
aspect was neither the sole, nor the primary, reason for the split. Looked at from
another angle, the club dispute and split can be viewed and understood more
coherently as the end-game of a well-defined and concerted struggle for control of the club. Evidence presented in Chapter Four suggested that as far back as 1888 concerns were being voiced amongst the membership over the governance of the club by what were described as cliques, or competing factions, that had erupted within the membership. These factions were concerned with something more than the financial wrangling over the club’s rental and interest rates. They were polarised, on the basis of wider corporate aims, between support for the club president, John Houlding, and support for a group of prominent club members opposed to his domination of the club. We must bear in mind the wider context of this emerging corporate power struggle in order to appreciate the outbreak of factionalism within the original club.

The struggle to gain control of the club from the late 1880s coincided with the formation of the Football League, of which Everton FC were founding members. As we have seen, entry into the Football League set-up ensured regular high quality competition, greater attendances and financial stability for the clubs involved. It has been suggested that the president’s designs to incorporate the club were likely to have been in direct response to these wider corporate developments, with a view towards the profit-maximisation of his outside business interests as a brewer. This argument, that incorporation of the club should be seen in terms of Houlding’s broader corporate strategy, is strengthened by noting the president’s insistence, in 1888, on the insertion of the proviso into the club’s terms of tenancy regarding his exclusive rights to provide beverages on the club ground, as mentioned above. The captive market of thousands of football supporters would have been an attraction for brewers such as Houlding. Indeed, the economic climate at this point was conducive for the acquisition by brewers of large stakes in football clubs. As Collins and Vamplew point out, in an era of increased competition in the drink trade the need to ‘communicate with their primary market of working class males’ was a significant factor in stimulating the brewing industry’s interest in football clubs during this period. The general trend of English professional football clubs towards incorporation was consistent with the timing of the growing interest of breweries in football.

Houlding’s opponents within the club had different ideas about the corporate development of the club. Primarily, they sought to check what they saw as the overtly commercial motives behind Houlding’s plans for the club. As one club member saw
it, Houlding’s plan of 1891 to float the club by the creation of 12,000 £1 shares held the likelihood that: ‘Those with the longest purses would hold the voting power and they would take great care to place men on the directorate after their own hearts. The members with their smallholdings would have very little voice in the management of the old club’. The motivations of the anti-Houlding faction to incorporate the club can, perhaps, be gauged by the words of George Mahon, the first chairman of the board at Everton FC. Speaking at the first Everton FC Annual General Shareholders Meeting in the wake of the split, Mahon stated that the newly-formed board thought it ‘desirable not to allocate the shares in large blocks, by which means we would have the whole capital subscribed, but rather to have a number of individual applications so that there will be more supporters of the club’. The advocacy of retaining the form of a members’ club into the limited company era, where a state-of-the-art stadium would be ‘practically devoted to the cause we all have at heart’, conjures up an image of Houlding’s opponents in the old club as being implacably at odds with the use of their football club for profitable purposes.

The growing polarization over corporate philosophy became manifest in the keenly contested elections to the club’s executive committee, and in the dramatic rise in club membership, which rose from approximately 200 members in 1889 to almost 500 in 1891. This is suggestive of an attempt by one or the other (or both) of the factions to engineer a majority for their plans to incorporate the club. Club president, John Houlding, clearly believed this upsurge in club membership to be antithetical to his interests.

The events of 1891–92 cannot simply be viewed, then, as the product of a popular and spontaneous revolt by a long-suffering club membership against their financial exploitation. More significantly, the split of the original Everton FC represents the denouement of a long-standing struggle between factionalists to win over a majority of the membership for their conflicting visions for the commercial progression of the club. Houlding’s limited liability scheme of 1891 must be seen in terms of this struggle between hostile forces for power and control within the organisation during the club’s faltering steps toward limited liability status. The move from a voluntarist organisation to a limited liability company carried with it the threat of a change in the power relations within the club. The club committee held this power via the support
of the membership; Houlding and his supporters wanted this control. This issue not only underscored the period of the dispute, but also defined the long-standing relationship between Houlding and the club, yet it is largely lost in the established historiography of the dispute and split. No mention, for example, is made of the previous attempts, by both Houlding and his supporters within the club, and their opponents to place limited liability prospectuses before the membership (on their own terms). The known details of the process towards division of the original Everton Football Club would appear to place a serious question mark over viewing this division in the fashion and tone of established accounts of the subject.

Perhaps more crucial still, an understanding of the wider corporate context and the role of competing factions in the division and split of the original club affords us the basis to appreciate an important social dimension to the split which cannot be ignored if an adequate explanation of its dynamic and resolution is to be given. Below, I consider how this social dimension became causally significant to the deepening of factional divisions within the original Everton club, and how its presence can account for the acknowledged bitterness of the struggle for club control, and the particular timing of the split. My research indicates that the factional struggle within the club was pregnant with the contradictions of socially distinct groups. In the following section of this chapter I argue that this factor both deepened the factional divisions within the club and expedited the struggle for its control.

5.4 The Purity Crusade

To appreciate the social dimension to the Everton FC split in 1892 it is necessary to contextualise the club dispute in relation to the social and political realignment taking place within Liverpool in the late 1880s and 1890s. Below it will be demonstrated that the power struggle in the football club was drawn into the sharpening conflict between the drink trade and the temperance movement, a conflict that had rumbled on in Liverpool during this period. It will also be demonstrated that the club dispute became entangled with a struggle within Conservative Party ranks in the city. The following section focuses on these socio-political factors and highlights the impact they had on the affairs of the original Everton club.
At a national level, prior to the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the issue of drink and its effects on the population had largely been confined to the agitation carried out by religious groups. They advocated opposition to the drink industry via moral persuasion — that is, the persuasion of their congregations to reject alcohol and to take up a teetotal lifestyle. This moral crusade was more closely identified with the various nonconformist sects than with the Established Church. Although the Church of England had established its own Temperance Society and many individual clergymen were prominent in temperance or teetotal organisations, it has been argued that the Church by and large took up an indifferent attitude to the cause in comparison to the more evangelistic nonconformists, seeing the phenomenon of alcoholism and its associated problems as a social problem rather than a moral one. But even during the 1870s — as religious groups became aware of the deficiencies in their “moral suasion” approach — political action was being sought to bring greater pressure to bear at the point of alcohol supply rather than just on those who consumed it. This was a shift in strategy that laid the basis in the 1880s for a party political division on the drink issue. Temperance campaigners had set up an organisation, the United Kingdom Alliance, to bring about legislative change through the petitioning of Parliament regarding the ability of the drink industry to ply its trade with the ease it had hitherto enjoyed. Looking for outright prohibition of the drink industry as well as the more achievable reduction in licensing hours and public houses, the United Kingdom Alliance’s stance was that if, as Lilian Lewis Shiman puts it in her study, *Crusade Against Drink in Victorian England* (1988), ‘the people would not, or could not on their own volition, become free of drink, then society, through its regulatory agency, the government, would impose a drink-free life-style on the people’. Ultimately, however, the strategy of the Temperance Party — a term used to denote individual or organisations willing to support anti-drink measures — to stay outside of the main party political affiliation, gave way to wholesale campaigning for prohibition and licensing reform within the Liberal Party. The United Kingdom Alliance, for example, officially became an auxiliary of the Liberal Party in 1891.

The Liberal Party, influenced strongly by its many nonconformist supporters, sought to impose greater controls on the drink industry. One consequence of the alliance
between the Liberals and temperance campaigners was to push the drink trade more firmly than it had been into the hands of the Conservative Party. Traditionally supported by the brewery trade, the Conservatives were lobbied hard by the drink industry to protect its rights. The drink industry donated large sums of money to the Conservative election cause in order to facilitate this. In voting terms the results of the 1895 election serve to underline the partisan position taken up by the political parties regarding the drink question. The Brewers Almanac from that year reported that out of the 410 Conservative-Unionist candidates returned, 388 were favourable to the drink trade, and that out of the 179 Liberals returned, 172 were against the drink trade.62

By 1886 the National Liberal Federation had adopted as part of its programme the policy of the 'direct veto', that is, that local electors should have the power to vote directly, as in a referendum, on the desirability of having licensed premises within their environs. By the late 1880s, then, temperance and Liberal fortunes were closely intertwined not only at a national level but also increasingly at a local level. As the prospect of local determination over the drink issue became ever more possible, the previously mundane world of municipal politics — more usually preoccupied with battles over rates than issues reflecting national concerns — was transformed by a sharpening conflict between local Liberals and Conservatives.

In Liverpool, a vibrant temperance movement had developed in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. Out of the eighty-three temperance organisations officially represented at the 1884 National Temperance Congress, twenty-three were from Liverpool.63 These organisations ranged across the different denominational and ethnic groups. In P.T. Winskill’s History of the Temperance Movement in Liverpool and District (1887), the author cites amongst other Liverpool organisations, the Catholic League of the Cross, the Wesleyan Methodist Temperance Union, the Church of England Total Abstinence Society, the Welsh Total Abstinence Society, and the Hibernian Total Abstinence Society.64

Vociferous in its attack on what it saw as decades of Conservative misrule, the Liverpool temperance movement transformed the city’s social and political landscape. As in other parts of the country, religious figures from nonconformity led
the way in the assault on the city’s drink interest. Baptist minister the Reverend Charles Aked, Wesleyan Methodist minister the Reverend Charles Garrett, and Unitarian minister the Reverend Richard Acland Armstrong, became the public face of opposition to the city’s brewers, spirit merchants and publicans. Each of these men forged a high public profile through their comments not only from the pulpit but also in the local press and their pamphlets that expressed moral outrage at the effects of alcohol on Liverpool, and the means to address it. Perhaps the best known literature from this source was the Reverend Armstrong’s *The Deadly Shame of Liverpool*, published in 1890. In this work, Armstrong articulated the links many thought existed between the drink trade and the local state in Liverpool, and drew the public’s attention to what he perceived to be the dire social consequences for the city of this union: ‘the knitting together of the wholesale liquor trade, of drunkenness, and of prostitution on an enormous scale, in one vast, compact interest, and the power which that interest has obtained within the governing bodies of Liverpool’.

Temperance campaigners in Liverpool had charged the Liverpool Conservatives — the dominant party in the council chamber from the 1850s — with the failure to curb the growth of public houses and illicit drinking dens which had, they believed, resulted in the proliferation of criminal activity, prostitution and destitution. Highlighting the interests of high-profile figures in the local Tory Party connected with the drink industry, temperance groups identified Tory self-interest as the reason for the lamentable state of civic affairs. The city’s Watch Committee, an organisation charged with overseeing law and order as well as propriety in council affairs, and the Licensing Committee were, in theory, the means by which concern over the conduct of the council regarding the drink trade’s influence could be voiced. In reality, though, they were viewed by the temperance campaigners as mere tools in the control of the ruling Conservatives. It was left to the city’s Vigilance Committee, set up in 1875 and dominated by Liberal nonconformists for the most part, to provide effective political opposition to the Conservatives in the absence of a strong second party.

However, its embrace with temperance politics revitalised the fortune of the Liverpool Liberal Party. The Liberal Party in Liverpool was traditionally weak for a number of socio-economic and political reasons. Prominent Liberal figures in the town were influential movers in the movement for slavery’s abolition. Abolition
damaged the port's economy significantly — its economy had, of course, been heavily reliant on the slave trade. Similarly, the local Liberal Party made itself unpopular by supporting the Union government in the American Civil War. The Port of Liverpool's trade in cotton was adversely affected by the outcome of the Civil War and the Liberals paid the electoral price for what was perceived to be their anti-civic policies. Also, the Unitarian-dominated Liberal leadership's support for Roman Catholic rights regarding the freedom to worship provoked the anger of the growing number of Protestant working-class voters who feared the influx of cheap labour into Liverpool from Ireland that could result from growing accommodation with the Catholic Irish.

During the late 1880s the Liberal Party in the city successfully linked temperance campaigners' concern over the city's moral condition (and the Tories overseeing of this state of affairs) with the concerns of many middle-class voters who feared the breakdown of social relations. The Port of Liverpool's trade had slumped during the 1880s. The hard times brought with them, on the one hand, a 'sullen resignation' amongst the town's workforce and, on the other hand, an increase in the move towards independent forms of political expression based solely upon the working class. For instance, a branch of the Independent Labour Party was set up in Liverpool in 1892. Middle-class confidence was further undermined by the risk to communal health from unemployment and poverty — phenomena that the temperance campaigners argued were being exacerbated by the proliferation of alcohol consumption. As the Liverpool Medical Officer of Health wrote:

There is a large and growing class among us who almost appear to be beyond the pale of enlightenment — they are left to themselves and forgotten; but disease, fostered by their habits, is apt to break through the boundaries of the unhealthy districts and spread its lethal shadow far and wide. The public should bear in mind that as the strength of a chain is that of its weakest link so the health of the community is of its weakest member.

The Liberals, by articulating the public alarm at the perceived inexorable social degradation of the town, in conjunction with the support of the moral critique of the Tories by the temperance campaigners — as well as their mobilisation for Liberal candidates — were able, in the early 1890s, to break the stranglehold Tories had on municipal control. The malaise the Liberals' had been under in Liverpool had been
dispelled and the especially damaging splits within the local party between Unionists and Gladstonian Liberals over the issue of Home Rule for Ireland were overcome to bring the Liberals to power in the city in 1892 for the first time in four decades. As P.J. Waller states in his study, *Democracy and Sectarianism: A Political and Social History of Liverpool, 1868–1939* (1981), the Liberal Party’s strategy at this juncture ‘Temperance was its Trojan Horse to capture the Town Hall’.69

The success of the temperance movement’s ‘Purity Campaign’ in dictating the moral climate in Liverpool during the early 1890s had ramifications also for the struggle for control of Everton FC. The district of Everton had, traditionally, strong temperance connections. Everton had a significant temperance presence by the 1870s – a decade when the greater mass of the district had only recently been built. There were already in the 1870s numerous abstinence organisations such as the Good Templar Lodges and Band of Hope Lodges in the district.70 In part, this tradition must have been encouraged by the Welsh nonconformists who built the vast majority of the houses of the district, some of whom inserted clauses into their sales of gable end houses located at street corners prohibiting the setting up of licensed premises there.71

The drink trade connections of John Houlding and his principal allies were a matter of considerable embarrassment for many members of the district’s football club, as a number of critical letters published in the local press bear testimony to. A Mr J.G. Allen wrote to the *Liverpool Courier* in March 1892 during the club dispute reminding its readers that Everton FC was ‘a public institution, respected from the Clyde to the Thames’ – the type of institution Mr Allan believed could not and should not be ‘financed by brewers’.72 Prior to this, and picking up on the disquiet felt amongst the membership of the club, the leader comment of the *Liverpool Echo* in January 1892 had applauded the members of the club for threatening to cut the club loose from Houlding’s control: ‘severing its too close connections with Mr Houlding’s public house’.73 Not only was Houlding a brewer and the owner of a number of public houses, but he and his closest allies in the club were conspicuous figures in drink trade defence associations in Liverpool. Houlding and the club accountant, Simon Jude, were chairman and secretary, respectively, of the Liverpool and District Incorporated Brewers’ and Wine Spirits Merchants’ Association.74 Club
vice-president, Edwin Berry, was solicitor to the Liverpool Licensed Victuallers’ Association, and Simon Jude its secretary. Both organisations were set up to directly combat the influence temperance organisations were having through the previously mentioned Vigilance Committee, which enjoyed particular success in challenging the granting and renewal of liquor licenses by magistrates in Liverpool. Solicitor, Edwin Berry, Houlding’s principal ally in the club and a man employed by many of the large breweries in Liverpool, was a dynamic figure in the defence of the drink interest in Liverpool, fighting a number of celebrated court battles against the Vigilance Committee. Berry was described by Alexander Guthrie, a leading temperance figure within the city (he was the Chairman of the United Kingdom Alliance) as ‘the most prominent advocate of the drink traffic in our licensing courts’.

The factional struggle for control of the club became entangled in its later stages with a moral concern over the development of the organisation which not only entrenched the positions of both sides, but also drew the club’s problems into the orbit of the wider social conflict engulfing the local state. Leading opponents of the Houlding group amongst the Everton FC membership took up an uncompromising stance on their adversary’s influence within the club – a stance that would find support from figures outside the club holding strong temperance opinions.

Key opponents of Houlding, club members Will Cuff and George Mahon, held strident views on football and the influence on it of the drink trade. Cuff, a central figure in the dispute, held a rather lofty view of the club’s wider role and significance, believing football to be ‘the greatest teetotal agency in the world’. George Mahon was, perhaps, Houlding’s most dogged opponent in the club dispute. He was the most able of all Houlding’s critics, and he articulated the membership’s fears that their president and his associates sought to incorporate the club in order to open it up to the control of brewers. Mahon made it plain throughout the dispute that he and his colleagues were determined to ensure that the drink trade’s advances into the club would be checked under a new regime set up away from the president and his aides. Assuring ‘the friends of the club and outsiders’, Mahon, speaking at a club sub-committee meeting, vowed ‘not to sell intoxicating liquors on the [new] ground’, and emphasised to the membership that in the new company ‘brewers would not be financing the club’. Both Cuff and Mahon were leading laymen at St Domingo, the
Methodist Chapel from which the club originally developed. St Domingo was a chapel with strong temperance associations. Chapel records demonstrate that it had its own Temperance and Band of Hope committee, and the minister of the chapel at the time of the dispute in the club, the Reverend James Le Huray, was a vice-president of the Liverpool Temperance and Band of Hope Society. Another key opponent of Houlding was Dr William Whitford, a man who would later become chairman of Everton FC. A surgeon and Justice of the Peace, Whitford gave frequent lectures on the proliferation in Liverpool of the drink interest and its danger to the community.

The November 1896 issue of the *Liverpool Review* affords us a revealing, if somewhat bitter-sweet, piece on Whitford. Referring to Whitford's constant attacks on the failure of the Liverpool police and Licensing Bench to crack down on publicans operating outside of the law, the *Review* wrote of this 'flamboyant reformer':

> Has not your tender heart bled thousands of times for the victims of inebriation? Why should you not sweep drunkenness out of Liverpool though it may cause you the annoyance of seeing your name much and often in the local newspapers...You are the elect hero of the fire and sword teetotallers...Still, some of our officials are not without need of the lash of your Hibernian whip.

Two other key figures in the struggle against Houlding within Everton FC were William R. Clayton and Dr James Clement Baxter. Both men were committee members of the club prior to the split and would go on after the split to become directors and chairmen of the incorporated Everton FC. Clayton's temperance credentials can be gauged by evidence in the years after the split that demonstrates that he gave weekly lectures to the Formby Congregational School's Band of Hope. The Band of Hope societies were set up to give guidance on morality and the building of what was termed 'good character' in children, to teach them the perils of alcohol and to encourage them to sign a pledge of total abstinence of liquor. Local press reports demonstrate that Clayton encouraged his own children to attend the weekly Band of Hope classes. Dr Baxter is cited in the local press in 1898 as having acted as the proposer for the Temperance candidate, Jonathon Hargrove, for Breckfield Ward.

The stand made against Houlding and his allies in the club drew financial support from two industrialists, William Pickles Hartley (a fruit preserve manufacturer) and
Robert William Hudson (the son of soap manufacturer Robert Spiers Hudson, who had assumed control of his deceased father’s company). Hartley was a ‘staunch Liberal’ in politics (he represented the Liberal Party in the city council chamber), a leading Primitive Methodist layman (he was vice-president of the Primitive Methodist Conference in 1892, and a vice-president of the Liverpool Temperance and Band of Hope Society. R.W. Hudson was also from a nonconformist background, Unitarian, and, like his father Robert Spiers Hudson, was a Liberal in politics, and a former chairman of Kirkdale Liberal Association at the time of the club dispute. Along with Houlding’s opponents on the Everton club committee, they agreed to act as financial guarantors of the new football company to be based away from Houlding’s Anfield Road site. Support for those opposing Houlding within the club came most notably, however, in the form of the many moralistic attacks made on the club president. Alexander Guthrie, vice-chairman of the Liverpool Temperance and Band of Hope Society, openly attacked Houlding during the course of the dispute: ‘His [Houlding’s] position is perfectly clear. He stands before the community as the very embodiment of the drink interest – precisely that interest against whose domination Liverpool has at last begun to rise in revolt’. Throughout the course of the dispute the Liberal and temperance-leaning *Liverpool Daily Post* and its sister paper, the *Liverpool Echo*, consistently intervened to pass judgement on Houlding. After the decision of the majority of club members in March 1892 to expel Houlding and remove the club to Goodison Park the *Daily Post* was unable to contain its satisfaction:

*Messrs Mahon and Clayton...took upon themselves a big task in trying to rid the Everton Club of an influence that had apparently grown stronger year after year...This independent action of Mr Mahon and his friends might be said to have produced the chaos the club found itself in, but having shaken off the incubus their action is now clear and defined...and it was gratifying to find that neither publicans nor moneylenders had been appealed to for assistance.*

Conversely, the Tory-supporting *Liverpool Courier* and *Liverpool Evening Express*, owned by Conservative MP for Everton, James A.Willox – a future Liverpool FC shareholder, and Trustee of the Licensed Victuallers’ and Brewers’ Association – consistently took the side of Houlding and his associates in the club dispute. The *Courier* was at pains to reveal what it saw as the wire-pulling of Houlding’s radical opponents in the Liberal press behind the opposition to him in the club and, from the autumn of 1891 to the spring of 1892, gave much space to letters from members of
the club (usually written anonymously) who were critical of this opposition. This press partisanship was a facet of the dispute identified by the *Liverpool Review*. The *Review* registered its bewilderment at the involvement of Radical and Tory organs in the club’s troubles:

...charges were made by a Radical organ, and, apparently, its Tory contemporary felt itself in honour bound to give the other and another version...Hitherto, simple novices in football have understood that the grand national winter game had about as much to do with questions of Home Rule and the pitch-forking of aldermen as the moon has to do with cold custard. Local football lights, however, would seem to think otherwise. As there is supposed to be a connection between moonbeams and baying dogs so they seem to make the connection with Liverpool football and politics.96

The football club dispute of 1891–92 clearly exacerbated Houlding’s political difficulties in Everton and Kirkdale. At a point when temperance concerns amongst his constituency were gathering pace, Houlding could ill afford to be cast in the light of a brewer exploiting his connections with what was viewed as a local cultural asset. One letter to the *Liverpool Courier* from a correspondent calling himself ‘Old Tory’ stated, in relation to Houlding’s bid to become Tory candidate for the vacant Everton parliamentary division early on in 1892:

There are two important factors which must not be lost sight of. [First] the political complexion of Everton has changed very considerably during the last ten to fifteen years. Streets that were filled with Protestants and Conservatives of the working class in those days are now only partially occupied by Roman Catholics and radicals...[Second] I know something of the drift of temperance opinion in Everton, and how for many years...I have watched the steady advance and growth of that opinion, and I have no hesitation in saying that to press his [Houlding’s] claim at the present moment will only lead to disaster.97

The vulnerability of Houlding’s position at this point was pointed out by a *Liverpool Daily Post* editorial commenting on the club dispute:

...Mr Houlding is now an aspirant for the honour of representing Everton in Parliament, and he is too shrewd a man to choose such a move [his conflict with the club committee over tenancy rights at the club ground] for displaying any uncalled for harshness in his treatment of an institution so popular within the limits of his hopes for constituency as the Everton Football Club...In the contrary event, however, we cannot but believe that the club will benefit by being cut-loose from its public house connections...98
Houlding was quietly persuaded by the Tory Party hierarchy to withdraw from the contest – such was the level of success enjoyed by temperance groups within the Everton division in mobilising political opposition to the drink interest.99

5.5 Internal Strife Within Liverpool Conservatism

Houlding’s political problems, however, did not stop at his drink trade connections. His position as an influential member of the governing body of Liverpool Conservatism, the Constitutional Association, also made him vulnerable to political attack at that time. Houlding faced increasing problems from the emergence of both independent Protestant and labour politics in Everton – politics that were gaining momentum with the growing disenchantment of politically active Tories in the district. Everton Tories were critical of the failure of what they perceived to be an out of touch and dictatorial Party leadership to recognise the District Association’s rights, particularly over the choice of municipal and parliamentary candidates for the district. In this section of the chapter we shall see that, as with the political debate surrounding temperance reform, the dispute over the control of Everton FC becomes drawn into the political arena as the Tory Party attempted to fight off the twin threats to its electoral dominance in Everton.

There had existed an uneasy relationship between the city’s Conservative Party and the district associations in working-class areas such as Everton. Liverpool’s Tory Party hierarchy had traditionally played on the emotions of the Protestant working class of the city by appealing beyond their class interests to their religious identity. As the party viewed by many as the political representation of the ties between church and state the Tories, in a city like Liverpool with its deep religious divisions between Catholic and Protestant communities, enjoyed a fruitful relationship with the Protestant majority amongst the electorate.100 The “villa Tory” leadership in Liverpool were rewarded with the deference shown to them by the Protestant working class in return for their close identification with the values and institutions held in esteem by this social group. The Liverpool Protestant working class support for the Conservative Party came at a material price also: the local party’s continued support for protectionist trading policies. These policies stretched back to the opposition by Liverpool Tories to the mid-century repeal of the Navigation Laws and to the local
party’s resistance at the century’s end to tariff reform and ‘the lower middle-class fraud’ of free trade. In adopting their protectionist stance the Tories themselves acknowledged that they placed ‘the needs of their working class supporters’ above the policies and practices of mainstream middle class Conservatism and orthodox political economy (the motto of the ruling body of Liverpool Conservatism, the Constitutional Association, was ‘The Church, the Throne and the People. Ships, Colonies and Commerce’).

However, as John Belchem points out in his essay ‘Protectionism, Paternalism and Protestantism’, ship-repair was ‘an erratic business at the best of times’, a situation which in the Port of Liverpool reduced skilled men to an ‘employment pattern similar to that of the casualism of the docks’. When the port trades faced a severe downturn in their fortunes during the trade depression of the 1880s they found the local state wanting in its reaction to their plight. Evidence from Parliamentary Papers shows that skilled workers such as boilermakers, carpenters and joiners, and engineers suffered increased levels of economic distress during the 1880s. Applications for charity relief in the port town increased from 11,549 in 1882–83 to 30,042 by 1885–86. The Tory-controlled Municipal Corporation, however, remained solid in its refusal to undertake employment schemes to absorb any of the higher than normal seasonally unemployed. (A situation addressed in principle from the mid-1890s with the Corporation’s creation of relief works and an unemployment registry to co-ordinate supply and demand of labour).

This turn of events placed a strain on the traditional socio-political relationships, and was compounded also by the attempts by rank and file Conservatives working within the district associations to wrest control over local affairs from the party’s ruling body, the Constitutional Association. More especially, this centred upon the ability of the former body to select candidates for municipal and parliamentary office. This developing struggle, moreover, had an unmistakable class element to it. From the mid-1880s, the exact definition of Tory Democracy – the ideological glue bonding the disparate elements of the party together – was hotly debated. For the bourgeois element in control of the Constitutional Association, Tory Democracy meant simply the continued ability of their organisation to administer the affairs of the local party,
including the registration of voters, the conduct of elections, and the choosing of appropriate candidates for office. This was a role the Constitutional Association, as part of a wider provincial network of urban middle-class Tories, took on in order to try to ensure that the party nationally gained and retained power at Westminster. This, in turn, gave provincial Tories an element of control in the Westminster party’s policy making.\textsuperscript{107} The Liverpool Constitutional Association was resolutely against any surrendering of its powers to the working men of the party’s district associations. For the party’s district organisers, the levelling process of Tory Democracy did not go far enough and the issue of selecting or, rather, not selecting working-class Tory candidates for public office provided a specific platform for their grievances. In this, rank-and-file Tories had the flames of their agitation fanned by militant Protestant organisations angered by what they saw as the Constitutional Association’s soft line on ‘ritualist offenders’ – those Protestants practising iconic ceremony within the Church of England. The Constitutional Association was said to have failed to discipline Conservative politicians associated with ritualism via their attendance of High Church services, and was overly zealous to clamp down on evangelising Protestants who publicly demonstrated against ritualist churchmen in the town.

Under these material and ideological conditions, the ‘convivial populism’\textsuperscript{108}, which had stood the Tories in good stead in Liverpool for decades, came under severe pressure. The Tories’ ability over and above the efforts of the Liverpool Liberals to ‘facilitate ready interaction between the classes’ via an ‘interlocking associational network’\textsuperscript{109} was increasingly challenged by both independent Protestant politics and specifically class-based labour politics. The working-class electorate of Liverpool’s artisan districts by the end of the 1880s had begun to ‘cast around for an alternative which would represent both interests of class and sectarianism [or one which would at least act as] a lever with which to exert pressure on Conservatives...‘.\textsuperscript{110} In John Houlding’s area of influence, Everton, the threat from both independent Protestant and labour organisations was especially acute. This was a particularly serious state of affairs for the party in a constituency the Liverpool Constitutional Association’s chairman, Arthur B. Forwood, described as Liverpool’s ‘premier’\textsuperscript{111} seat (Everton was variously described as ‘the Gibraltar of Toryism’, and a ‘bastion of “No Surrender” Conservatism’\textsuperscript{112}, and which, municipally, represented ‘the largest
division found in any city in the world'. The Everton and Kirkdale ward contained an electorate of 26,000 in 1893. ¹¹³

In an Everton ward by-election in February 1892 the Orange Order, an organisation affiliated to the Constitutional Association, sponsored an Orangeman, Thomas McCracken, in his independent challenge to the official Conservative candidate, ship owner Ralph W. Leyland. His supporters portrayed McCracken’s campaign as a struggle between those seeking greater democracy within the Conservative Party and those they described as ‘the Dale Street clique’¹¹⁴ who were, they argued, determined to dictate to party loyalists from the Liverpool Constitutional Association’s headquarters. For its part, the Constitutional Association, through its chairman, Arthur Bower Forwood, stood firm against this challenge and insisted on the right of the party’s ruling body to reject any candidate put forward by a district association.¹¹⁵ Condemning their rebellion as treachery, McCracken and a number of other Orangeman were expelled from the Conservative Party. McCracken was subsequently beaten in a closely fought contest by 4,712 votes to 3,288 (the Liberals having stood aside from the contest to benefit the Independent candidate, as did, ironically, the Irish Nationalist Party).¹¹⁶ John Houlding trod a very careful path during the campaign, siding with the Constitutional Association, but publicly declaring his admiration for McCracken his ‘friend of twenty to twenty five years standing’.¹¹⁷ To no avail, Houlding appealed to McCracken to withdraw his candidacy from the Everton contest.

Besides the threat from independent Protestant-based politics, from 1888 onwards there was a growth in the number of working-class candidates fighting on class issues in the north end of Liverpool – at first in School Board elections and then for council seats – opening up another front against the Tories. On occasion, this challenge was carried out independently of the Liberal Party through the Liverpool Trades Council (LTC), and on other occasions in conjunction with the Liberals.¹¹⁸ This had become a problem for the Conservatives, more especially in the traditional artisan districts such as Everton and Kirkdale. The slump in the local economy in the 1880s had laid the basis for the rise of class politics in Liverpool, initially through the Labour Electoral Association (LEA), an organisation enjoying the sponsorship of the LTC and the support of the Liverpool Liberal Association.¹¹⁹ The Liberals, through their alliance
with the Irish National Party (INP), controlled most of the council wards in the inner zone of the borough — the districts adjacent to Liverpool's dockland area. The Liberal Party's forging of an alliance with temperance campaigners such as the Direct Veto League and the LEA in the suburbs surrounding this inner zone threatened the Conservative stranglehold in the council chamber. As the Constitutional Association's most dominant figure in the north end working-class districts of Liverpool it was Houlding's task to attempt to meet head-on the growth in labour politics there. As we have seen already, Houlding's business interests in the drink trade had compromised his ability to lead the Tory fight in Everton. Evidence set out below would also suggest that his increasingly antagonistic relationship with the members of Everton FC provided another source of discomfort for Houlding both in his attempt to co-ordinate his party's efforts in the district and to preserve his own political presence there.

The LTC had first placed a candidate in Everton and Kirkdale ward in 1890 to challenge (unsuccessfully) one of the retiring Conservative councillors forced under council rules to stand for re-election.¹²⁰ The following year, John Houlding faced a challenge of his own for his Everton and Kirkdale ward seat from a Lib-Lab candidate, William Nicholson, leader of the Liverpool Branch of the Sailors' and Firemen's Union, a candidate sponsored by the LTC. Nicholson's campaign was run as much as a personal attack on his opponent's outside interests as on ideological issues. Nicholson and his sponsors stressed to the electorate both Houlding's occupation as a brewer and — picking up on the internal struggle occurring within local Conservative ranks — what they argued to be his autocratic behaviour as councillor for the ward.¹²¹ On this last point concerning Houlding's apparent autocratic political style, this also struck a chord with the many protestations of the Everton FC membership that were being aired in public during this time in the ongoing dispute over the control of the club. The club members had utilised the local press in order to denounce Houlding's authoritarian attitude toward them — of his attempt to conduct a 'one man government' of the club.¹²² One club member in a letter to the Liverpool Courier appealed to his colleagues in the club to:

...rally-round Messrs Clayton and Mahon and the other members of the committee who have the pluck to fight manfully in the interests of the members [and] put an end to a one-man policy
and to stamp out the autocratic, overbearing and domineering way the good old club has had to quietly coincide with in the past.123

Houlding’s political opponents, who used the club dispute to increase his political discomfort within the district, eagerly seized upon these sentiments expressed by members within the club. In a letter to the Liverpool Daily Post, James W. McGovern, the local branch secretary of the Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union, responded to an attack made on William Nicholson by Houlding at an Orange Institution meeting held in his support. Houlding had compared the sound running of the Carters’ Union (a union not affiliated to the LTC of which he was the president) with what he saw as the ‘mismanaged’124 Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union. McGovern hit back:

What Mr Houlding is going to do for the labouring classes is something on a par, I presume, with his football generosity, and should the electors be foolish enough to put the “King” in power another three years his interest in them will last as long as he can use them as he has the footballists, a la “The Merchant of Venice”. 125

Houlding and his supporters within and without the club openly accused his critics in the club of being complicit in this attack by his political opponents and of importing the struggle for civic power into the affairs of the club. Houlding accused George Mahon of assisting William Nicholson in his municipal campaign against him. This was a charge fuelled by the publication of an editorial comment in the Liverpool Athletic News denouncing members of the club who had ‘tried to make capital out of the subject [the club dispute] in his candidature for municipal honours’. 126 For his part, George Mahon denied the charge. In a letter to the Liverpool Courier during the municipal election campaign Mahon stated:

I don’t know Mr Nicholson, Mr Houlding’s opponent, nor have I ever offered to assist Mr Nicholson’s candidature...The introduction of political elements into municipal matters is a curse and not a blessing to the well being of any district or community.127

It must be said, however, that Mahon’s protestations concerning the mixing of politics and local affairs ring a little hollow. For example, Mahon was present on the committee of the Walton Liberal Association a year earlier in 1890 when the expressed aim of that body was to:
...do all we can to establish the Liberal Party in the council. At the present time that body was simply a great party machine in the hands of the Tories...we will never get Liberal representatives to parliament until we destroy the power of the Conservatives in the city council. 128

Though George Mahon denied any involvement in attempting to unseat Houlding in Everton, there is clear evidence to suggest that the relationship between the two key players in the club dispute was underscored by a long-standing political grudge. As a Liberal candidate in the Walton Local Board election of 1887 Mahon had narrowly defeated Houlding's charge, Tory councillor, Dr John Utting.129 On another occasion, in 1889, in his capacity as returning officer for the Walton Division of Lancashire County Council, Mahon had incensed Houlding, the election agent for Tory candidate Sir David Radcliffe, by rejecting Radcliffe's nomination on a technicality. Houlding accused Mahon of political sabotage, further complaining that bill posters bearing Mahon's name 'had been used to cover a large number of posters announcing Conservative Party meetings' in support of Radcliffe in Walton.130

Another example of the political edge to Mahon and Houlding's relationship can be found in a public spat during the course of the club dispute between Mahon and Sir James Thompson, the secretary of the Constitutional Association. The conflict between Mahon and Thompson, documented in letters to the Liverpool Courier between 4th March and 10th March 1892, related to remarks Mahon had made concerning Houlding's contradictory position of upholding the principle of majority rule within the Liverpool Conservative Party whilst, as far as Mahon was concerned, flouting that very principle within Everton FC. Mahon was referring here to a letter sent to Houlding by the Constitutional Association's chairman Arthur B. Forwood congratulating him for accepting the decision taken by the Association to choose James A. Willox over and above the local man, Houlding, to fight for the Everton Division in a parliamentary election the previous month in February 1892 – a decision widely condemned by the party's rank and file as a snub to the district associations. This was an issue, as we have seen already, that went to the very heart of the Tories' growing problem of credibility within some Liverpool working-class districts. Sir James Thompson condemned Mahon for utilising what had been a private correspondence between Houlding and Forwood in order to 'pursue the object
of his desires in relation to the club dispute. Implicit in Thompson's remarks was a criticism of Mahon the Liberal for dragging back into the public domain the issue of disunity within Tory ranks at a point when the party was seeking to put behind it such disunity and more especially in the Everton district.

If there is some doubt over the sincerity of Mahon's protest at being accused by Houlding of favouring his municipal opponent in Everton and Kirkdale then no such doubt exists over the status of Mahon's club colleague, Dr William Whitford in this respect. Dr Whitford was closely connected to Nicholson. As chairman of the Everton and Kirkdale Liberal Association (effectively, John Houlding's political shadow in Everton), Whitford acted as Nicholson's election agent. In his capacity as chairman of the Everton and Kirkdale Liberal Association, Whitford had specifically targeted John Houlding's 'iniquitous' influence as a brewer in the district of Everton.

Regarding these accusations of an important political dimension to the motives of members of the club in their attempt to unseat Houlding, it can be said that if letters published in the local press during the course of the dispute are any reliable guide then certainly at least some members of the club would appear to have accepted that the dispute was indeed political, not just financial or administrative in its nature. One member of the club wrote to the Liverpool Echo that:

One of your correspondents suggests that Mr Houlding 'must have been dreaming' because he stated at a political meeting that persons had been using it [the dispute] lately for political purposes. I would go further and say that it not only has been used, but will be one of the mightiest weapons used against him — wrongly I think — at the next election.

Another club member recounts in his letter to the Liverpool Courier the occasion of his attendance at one such general meeting of the club and clearly believed extra-footballing matters were providing an unwanted undercurrent to the club dispute:

...I attended a meeting in Tithebarn Street, called for the purpose of promoting an athletic meeting on Whit Monday next, but imagine my surprise when I got there (if one may judge from the speeches), the real state of affairs is entirely due to political trickery on the part of some of the members. I am a Conservative, and though I have acted with these men in the past,
believing them to be sincere, and having the welfare of the Everton Football Club at heart, it is now plain that political rancour is at the bottom of the movement, and I shall offer every resistance to any further development of those plans [to leave the club’s Anfield Road ground].

Other letters to the local press from those opposing Houlding in the club give further credence to the belief that factors other than football lay behind the opposition to the club president, as these two letters to the Liverpool Daily Post demonstrate:

Mr Houlding can please himself whether he will exercise his legal rights at the cost of the club or act the part of a generous landlord. [In the event that he didn’t take this latter option] probably the electors of Everton Ward will be asked to consider whether they are satisfied with their present representative, and if not to take steps to replace him. It will not be a question as between Mr Houlding and the club only, but the thousands of regular visitors to the ground will have to be reckoned with also.

...we will have nothing more to do with him, and we will have war to the knife with him when he dares come forward for public favour in the future

Houlding counteracted what he perceived to be a concerted political campaign against him from within the club by enlisting the support of the powerful Working Men’s Conservative Association (WMCA). The WMCA was an organisation affiliated to the Constitutional Association and came to dominate Liverpool Conservatism from the 1890s until the Second World War. Virulently anti-Catholic, wholeheartedly committed to protectionism in trade and to interventionism within the local state, the WMCA provided the Liverpool Conservative Party with the necessary link between class and religious interests to ensure the continuance of the long-standing political dominance it enjoyed in the city notwithstanding a brief interlude of Liberal rule in the early 1890s. (More information on the nature of this organisation will be given in Chapter 7).

The WMCA threw its weight of opinion behind Houlding in the club dispute at a branch meeting in Everton called in aid of Houlding’s candidature as ward councillor. Accusing Houlding’s opponents within and without the club of ‘using the club as a lever in their efforts toward his [Houlding’s] defeat’, the WMCA declared the club dispute to be a ‘political dodge’, and pledged its support to secure Houlding’s re-
election to his Everton ward seat. Members of the WMCA went on to play a significant role in the control of the newly formed Liverpool FC, an issue taken up later in this thesis). This was one of a number of meetings held in the north end of Liverpool by the WMCA in the run-up to the council elections in November of 1891 in order to bolster support for Houlding against what it perceived to be 'an extraordinary Radical-Socialistic-Home Rule combination... that was threatening to overturn the Tory majority in the largest council ward in the city. One such meeting was presided over by Edwin Berry, one of Houlding's key allies within Everton FC, and a former committee member of the club. Berry warned the electors of Everton that Houlding's opponent, William Nicholson, was:

...put forward by the Radical Party and they were finding the funds for him. They knew that a mere Radical had no chance but they thought a Radical might get returned under the guise of a Labour candidate.

In the event of the election, and the public support he received from local Members of Parliament, M.W. Mattinson and T. May Smith, from the *Liverpool Courier* and the *Evening Express* (both owned by soon-to-be Conservative MP for Everton, John Willox), and from the organisational resources the WMCA placed at his disposal, John Houlding survived the challenge from Nicholson. Houlding polled 7,120 votes to Nicholson's 5,588 votes.

The politicisation of Everton FC in 1891–1892 was not without precedent. It is clear that the use of the club for political purposes had been established prior to the outbreak of factional hostilities. In 1885, when John Houlding had first challenged for municipal honours in Everton and Kirkdale ward, the players and members of the club had been used to canvass support for their president. However, it seems equally clear that in the intervening period factors such as the changing political environment in Everton, Houlding's unpopularity amongst the membership, and an influx into the club of men politically opposed to Houlding, had all conspired to transform the football club's influence within the district into a political threat against him.
5.6 Conclusion

The split of Everton FC in 1892 can be understood only by grasping the full complexity of the relations existing between members of the club. Hitherto, historical analysis has confined itself to considering the financial obligations of the president of the club to the club's members. The split of the original club is viewed in these accounts as being caused by the souring and eventual breakdown of this relationship due to the failure of the club president to honour his obligations to the membership – or, worse still, to attempt to exploit the club financially. It has been argued in this chapter that although there was a belief amongst the majority of the club membership that their president viewed the club as an exploitable asset and that this is an important aspect of the split, there exists strong evidence to suggest that internal disharmony within the club was the result of a long-standing struggle between hostile forces or factions regarding the control of the club. The financial concerns of the club membership vis-à-vis the president and his supporters that broke out into the public domain in the autumn of 1891 were integral to that wider factional struggle.

It has also been argued that there was an important social dimension to the split that cannot be overlooked or accommodated within the existing framework of those who have, fundamentally, viewed the club split, either explicitly or implicitly, in terms of a dispute over the utility maximising objectives of the football club. Relations between members of the club stretched beyond the concerns of the football club.

It has been argued that the conflict within the local state, characterised by a shifting balance in social forces and the creation of new socio-political forces and relations, enveloped, for a time, the affairs of the club and exacerbated the already deep divisions between members over the direction their club should take. The complexity of factors surrounding the split of Everton FC in 1892 tells us that the club was clearly viewed – by those inside and outside of it – as having importance as an organisation beyond its more obvious role as a competitive and commercial enterprise.

We have seen how during the course of the dispute the status of Everton FC was uppermost in the minds of many of the members and supporters of the club. The
club's reputation was argued to have been tarnished by its association with the drink trade and by the use made of it in party political affairs. Via the press reportage of the dispute, the full extent of the role that political patronage had played at Everton FC was uncovered. From the earliest period local politicians had taken up prominent positions in Everton FC in an apparent attempt to court local favour. We saw also that during the dispute that the club's reputation as a democratically run organisation became a fundamental issue in the confrontation between members.

The truly public manner in which the dispute within the club unfolded and then split the organisation offers the historian an insight into how social identity was bound up in the early professional football organisation. How could the social import attached to the district's football club be doubted, and how could it fail to have been prominent in the dispute that split the original Everton FC? As we witnessed in earlier chapters, the district of Everton developed rapidly over a twenty-year period from 1860 from a semi-rural satellite village of Liverpool into one of its densely populated, outer-urban districts. Having migrated into Everton from near and far its inhabitants had little in common beyond their predominantly skilled working-class occupational status (in some cases, as with the large population of Welsh newcomers, many migrants into the district would even be differentiated by language). Under these circumstances, initially the desire would have been to interact through familiar institutions, hence the rapid building of churches and chapels in Everton. However, as Richard Holt suggests in relation to the importance of the street as the basic unit of identity in early urban settlements, such micro-societies began to give way eventually to a wider social consciousness as the recognition of being part of a greater economic, administrative and political whole took root. The setting up of district-based political organisations representing the Conservative and Liberal interests in Everton, and administrative bodies such as Everton Township Committee and the Everton Burial Board are indicative of, on the one hand, the drawing of the district's population into the orbit of the city of Liverpool and, on the other hand, the federalist nature of this wider social interaction, where the district retained some semblance of autonomy and the sense of a separate identity from Liverpool and Liverpudlians. One cultural example of this was the setting-up in 1888 of the Everton Brotherhood. Describing itself as 'non-political and unsectarian [sic]’, the Everton Brotherhood was a philanthropic organisation providing food and assistance for the poor of the district.
But perhaps of all examples of the district's self-proclamation of its distinct identity pride of place went to Everton FC — an organisation capable of drawing the loyalty of thousands of Evertonians. Football teams, to use Holt's words, 'embodied an idealized collective vision of themselves and their communities...’ and offered a means through which 'men could come to terms with the reality of the late Victorian city and clarify their relationship to it'. The hostility of the dispute within the Everton club in 1891–92 towards those believed to be exploiting the club for selfish financial or political purposes and the use made of the dispute by outsiders, are understandable only if full acknowledgement is accorded to the club's important communal role.

The developing commercial contradiction within the original Everton club, and the socially motivated personal animosities existing between members, could only be resolved by the disengagement of oppositional forces and their coalescing into separate organisational forms: Everton Football Club Company Limited, and Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds Company Limited. The complexion of both clubs in terms of their patterns of ownership and control in the pre-First World War period will be the subject of subsequent chapters of this thesis. However, one important question arising from the analysis in this chapter is whether or not the two organisations 'reflected and reinforced...cultural differences’ within the city. We will return to this question in Chapter Seven. Prior to this, Chapter Six looks at the level of support attracted in the post-split period by Everton and Liverpool football clubs, highlighting discernible patterns to the football clubs' home attendances in the period before the First World War and the possible factors that might explain them.
Chapter Six

The Viability of the Two New Football Club Companies:
Attendance Levels at Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs,
Prior to 1914

6.1 Introduction

In the wake of the split of 1892 the opportunity for professional football support in
the City of Liverpool was increased. However, the financial failure of both Bootle
AFC and Liverpool Caledonians FC – clubs, referred to earlier, that were dissolved as
companies within two years of their incorporation – hints at certain limitations for
successful football club organisation in the Liverpool area. The objective of this
chapter is to highlight, via analysis of attendances, the progress of Everton FC and the
newly-created Liverpool FC in securing their survival as viable operative
organisations. In particular, the chapter attempts to relate data about attendance levels
at Everton and Liverpool football clubs between the early 1890s and the First World
War to the fluctuations of the Merseyside economy and to local demographic change.
Significant relationships existing between patterns of football attendance and
developments within the local environment will be highlighted and commented upon
within the text.

The period under review is one that sees the establishment of football as a mass
spectator sport throughout the nation. For this reason, the changing levels of demand
for professional football in the city of Liverpool in the two decades prior to the First
World War will be considered within the context of national trends in the demand for
football as a spectator sport.

Before the presentation of this evidence, an explanation of the method employed to
gather attendance records will first be given. Given the absence of official Football
League records concerning club attendances for the period under discussion,
attendance data for Everton FC and Liverpool FC home fixtures was gathered from
local newspaper reports. The primary source used was the Liverpool Football Echo.
The Football Echo was chosen because of its consistency over the period in relation
to the chronicling of attendance levels at Everton and Liverpool football clubs’ home fixtures. This was a quality absent from the coverage of matches within the non-specialised Liverpool newspapers in circulation at that time. There does appear, however, to be consistency in local press calculation of attendance figures. Football Echo estimates of attendances for Everton home fixtures do, by and large, reflect closely the estimates given in other newspaper reports, such as those of the Liverpool Courier and the Liverpool Daily Post. This convergence in estimates was of assistance when the Football Echo, on occasion, failed to supply attendance figures. In this event, the estimates of the Courier and Daily Post were used (if there was a discrepancy between their reported attendance for a particular home fixture, the mean average has been used). An approximate attendance (to the nearest thousand) was calculated for both clubs for each of the seasons from 1893–94 to 1913–14. In the very few cases where figures were not given for home fixture in match reports in the local press (reporters resorting simply to a description of attendances at these fixtures, such as ‘large crowd’ or ‘small crowd’), rather than hazarding a guess at what might have constituted a large or small crowd, these fixtures were left out of my calculations.

In the case of attendances of other professional football clubs quoted within this chapter, a secondary source, Brian Tabner’s Through the Turnstiles (1992) has been used. Tabner used, primarily, two national organs, The Athletic News and The Football Times, in order to gather his data on Football League attendances, utilising local newspaper records only when his primary sources were unable to give attendance data for particular matches. In terms of a comparison of the results of Tabner’s method of data collection and that used in this chapter in relation to Everton FC and Liverpool FC attendances (which are taken exclusively from local newspaper sources) there would seem to be no significant differences. Having analysed the data concerning Liverpool’s two professional clubs between seasons 1893/94 and 1913/14 (twenty-one seasons of attendance data each for Everton and Liverpool), it was found that for only two seasons did my own data demonstrate a difference from Tabner’s calculated season averages for the Merseyside clubs of more than 2,000. Thirty-two of the forty-two season averages that I have calculated were either the same (rounded to the thousand) or just one thousand above or below Tabner’s seasonal figures. However, by using my own attendance data taken from local press reports rather than,
as with Tabner, using the possibly less sensitive national reports on Everton and Liverpool attendance figures, it was felt that a closer approximation of Merseyside football club attendances could be gained (Tabner’s use of local data to fill the gaps left by the omission in national sports journals of certain attendance figures would tend to underline the greater sensitivity of local press report).

6.2 The Growth of Football Attendance: 1894–1914

Evidence from the secondary literature points towards a surge in spectator demand for professional football in the period under review. Table 6.1, below, demonstrates this point by combining the average seasonal attendances, recorded between 1894 and 1914, at a geographically diverse selection of English professional football clubs (see also Fig. 6.1). The clubs are: Aston Villa, Manchester United, Newcastle United, Wolverhampton Wanderers, Nottingham Forest, Preston North End, Sheffield United, Burnley, Woolwich Arsenal, and West Bromwich Albion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1893/94</th>
<th>1894/95</th>
<th>1895/96</th>
<th>1896/97</th>
<th>1897/98</th>
<th>1898/99</th>
<th>1899/00</th>
<th>1900/01</th>
<th>1901/02</th>
<th>1902/03</th>
<th>1903/04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>124,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1904/05</td>
<td>1905/06</td>
<td>1906/07</td>
<td>1907/08</td>
<td>1908/09</td>
<td>1909/10</td>
<td>1910/11</td>
<td>1911/12</td>
<td>1912/13</td>
<td>1913/14</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1 Combined Average Annual Attendances of Ten English Professional Football Clubs,* 1893–94 to 1913–14

*Aston Villa, Manchester Utd, Newcastle Utd, Wolverhampton Wanderers, Nottingham Forest, Preston North End, Sheffield Utd, Burnley, Woolwich Arsenal, West Bromwich Albion.

Comparing the first and last seasons of the data, a percentage rise is recorded in the aggregate attendances of the ten clubs of over 200 per cent for the twenty-year period. As can be seen from Figure 6.1, the ascent of attendance levels was at a steady, essentially linear, rate of development.

This increase in demand for the spectacle of professional football should be considered in the context of the increasing ability of more and more Britons towards the end of the nineteenth century to extend their level and range of material consumption.\(^1\) Real wages (wages adjusted to take account of inflation) had risen by one-third between 1875 and 1902, and though they stagnated from the beginning of the twentieth century to the First World War, consumer expenditure continued to rise gently during this later period (Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2).

*Figure 6.1 Combined Average Seasonal Attendances of Ten English League Clubs, 1893/94-1913/14*

*Aston Villa, Manchester Utd, Newcastle Utd, Wolverhampton Wanderers, Notts.Forrest, Preston North End, Sheffield Utd, Burnley, Woolwich Arsenal, West Bromwich Albion.
Figure 6.2 Consumer Expenditure at Constant Prices: Durable Goods/Books and Miscellaneous Recreational Goods, 1900-1914 (£M)


Table 6.2 Tea and Tobacco Consumption (lbs per head) 1894-1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tea</th>
<th>Tobacco</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tea</th>
<th>Tobacco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The favourable economic conditions enabled all but the most destitute to purchase the cheap consumer durables proliferating with the advent of mass production and — of greater interest for the subject under discussion in this chapter — to participate on a greater scale than hitherto in the developing forms of fee-paying leisure and entertainment.²

This era of growth in demand for consumer goods and services in Britain occurred despite the domestic effects brought about by the increased economic competition Britain faced from other industrialised countries such as the United States and Germany from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onward. Though the period from 1890 to the First World War was marked by industrial unrest, particularly amongst the previously unorganised semi-skilled and unskilled ranks of labour (a phenomenon accompanied by a surge in trade union membership — see Table 6.3), the nation largely avoided the social and economic dislocation that mass unemployment would have entailed. In the twenty years prior to the First World War, for example, annual unemployment levels remained for most of the period between 2 per cent and 4 per cent (Table 6.4). The ability of British capital to ‘retreat into its satellite world of formal or informal colonies...’³ at this point was responsible in no small part for the relative continuity of trade and the avoidance of domestic economic crisis and a more serious confrontation with British labour.

These broader national and international socio-economic developments taking place during the period under discussion provide us with the context within which the general increase in demand for professional football might be understood. They are, however, fairly limited in their ability to inform us as to how socio-economic factors might have influenced patterns of attendance at particular professional football clubs over the period.
Table 6.3  Membership of British Trade Unions 1894–1914 (,000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Membership 1894</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Membership 1895</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>1,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1,608</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1,731</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>2,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1,994</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1,997</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>2,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2,513</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>2,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>2,485</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>2,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>2,477</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>2,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3,139</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>3,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>3,416</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>3,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>3,416</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>4,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>4,135</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>4,145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.4  British Labour Force, % Unemployed 1894–1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unemployment 1894</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unemployment 1895</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Regional variations, in terms of specialisation in one or more branches of industry, tend to cut across national trends. Levels of football attendance in towns and cities
supporting professional football clubs would (more sensitively) be demonstrative of the fortunes of the particular branch, or division of labour, within the national economy, as well as reflecting the broader changes taking place in the economic life of the nation state. This is a point made by A.J. Arnold in his account of the development of professional football in the West Riding, *A Game That Would Pay: A Business History of Professional Football in Bradford* (1988). Arnold writes of the foundation and development of Bradford City and Bradford Park Avenue in the first decade of the twentieth century, connecting this with the boom, between 1901 and 1912, in woollen exports from the trough experienced in that trade during the 1890s. Both Bradford clubs experienced a meteoric rise. Formed in 1903, without any prior competitive pedigree, Bradford City’s first season average gate of almost 10,000 made it the fifteenth most popularly supported club in England’s two divisions. A decade later, as a First Division club, City had an average gate of almost 18,000, making it the tenth most popularly supported club. Bradford Park Avenue gained League entry in the 1908/09 season. By 1913–14 the club registered an average gate of almost 16,000, making it the twentieth most popular supported club in England at a time when the English League comprised forty clubs. But even within this regional economic growth, Arnold points out the differing experiences during this period within the woollen industry both between different trades, and between those producing different types of fabric, and concludes: ‘The extent to which improved prosperity in the area was translated into attendances at, and entrepreneurial support for, professional sport [in Bradford] depended ultimately on personal factors’.

These points are important when evaluating the pattern of football attendance on Merseyside. Attendance levels for the two Liverpool professional football clubs, in accordance with other football clubs, rose over the period under review. Of potential benefit to the analysis of discernible patterns or changes occurring within this general upward movement in Merseyside football attendance would be to look more closely at the contours of Merseyside’s economic development and, within this analysis, to evaluate the winners and losers of local economic change, and how this may have impacted upon football attendance in Liverpool.
6.3 Patterns of Development in Merseyside Football Attendance and Local Socio-Economic Factors: 1894-1914

The general advance in living standards nationally, during the period 1894–1914, was also experienced on Merseyside. For example, municipal and census records inform us that from the beginning of the 1890s to the First World War, mortality rates in Liverpool (both the total death rate and infant deaths) and average household size were significantly reduced (Tables 6.5 and 6.6). In terms of the consumption patterns of Liverpudlians, local trade directories point to the probability that many citizens were able to acquire the consumer durables, and to make use of recreational services, which national patterns of consumer expenditure suggest most Britons enjoyed during the period (see Table 6.7 and 6.8).

Table 6.5  Liverpool Mortality Rate (deaths per thousand), 1892-1912

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mortality Rate (total population)</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate (deaths of children 5 years and under expressed as % of total no. of deaths)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Proceedings of the Liverpool City Council: Medical Officer of Health Annual Reports. Annual Reports between 1892-1912 (held at Liverpool Record Office).
Table 6.6  Average Household Size, Liverpool 1881-1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H'hold</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Published Census Records, England and Wales (census reports from 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911 and 1921)

Table 6.7  Number of Theatres and Cinemas as Advertised in Gores Trade Directory: Liverpool 1895-1915

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1915</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theatres</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinemas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gores Liverpool Trade Directory

Table 6.8  Number of Manufacturers of Consumer Durables* Advertised Within Gores Trade Directory: Liverpool 1895-1915

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1915</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing Machines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phonographs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures for 'phonographs' refer to number of dealers, not manufacturers.
Source: Gores Liverpool Trade Directory.
Another manifestation of the increase in demand for fee-paying entertainment in Liverpool was, of course, the dramatic rise of professional football in the city. The period witnessed the formation and successful establishment of two nationally significant professional football organisations: Everton and Liverpool football clubs (though the failure as professional organisations of both Bootle AFC and Liverpool Caledonians FC perhaps demonstrates the limits to this form of consumer demand). From their foundational years as limited companies in the early 1890s to 1914, Everton and Liverpool each secured a mass following in the city. Thus, Everton's annual average gate doubled from 12,000 in the season 1891–92, to 24,000 in the season 1913–14; and Liverpool's annual average gate rose sharply from the lower base of 5,000 in the season 1893–94 (the season the club first entered the Football League), to 23,000 in season 1913–14. Taking the mean average over the period 1892–93 to 1913–14 of average seasonal gates, Everton FC drew over 17,000 spectators per game each season into Goodison Park, whilst Liverpool FC attracted into Anfield a little over 15,500 spectators per game each season. In only one season, 1895–96, did either of the two Liverpool clubs drop out of the top ten of the largest supported clubs in England, with only Aston Villa and Newcastle United consistently out-performing them, in this respect, during the period under review.

Coinciding with the commercial success of the football clubs (and the general improvement of living standards in the city) was the burgeoning development of the port of Liverpool. Just as Bradford’s football fortunes rested on the basis of the prosperity of its industrial base, so too was the increase in maritime trade linked to the conditions supporting the emergence and development of Merseyside’s professional football clubs. The £32 million spent by 1914 on the development of new docks, the improvement of shipping channels, and the port’s proximity to industrial Lancashire, enabled Liverpool to become a crucial conduit through which the nation’s export trade with the outside world was conducted in the pre-First World War period. ‘The Gateway of Empire’, as Liverpool has been called, accounted for 28 per cent of Britain’s trade by 1913, as the volume of shipping entering into the port almost doubled in two decades (Table 6.9 and Figure 6.3).
Table 6.9 Trade in the Port of Liverpool: Annual Total Shipping Tonnage and Value of Goods, 1893–1913*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tonnage (millions)</th>
<th>Value of Goods (£,000s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tonnage (millions)</th>
<th>Value of Goods (£,000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>£998</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>£1,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>£1,030</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>£1,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>£1,056</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>£1,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>£1,000</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>£1,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>£1,023</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>£1,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>£1,033</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>£1,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>£1,093</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>£1,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>£1,042</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>£1,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>£1,102</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>£1,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>£1,130</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>£1,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures unavailable for 1914.
Source: Accounts of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (annual reports, 1893–1914, Liverpool Record Office)

Figure 6.3 Annual Total Shipping Tonnage: Port of Liverpool, 1893-1913*

*Figures unavailable for 1914.
Source: Accounts of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (annual reports, 1893–1914, Liverpool Record Office)
Employment in Liverpool was dominated by the port’s activities. There was a mass of dockworkers or seamen, and the small army of commercial clerks directly associated with port employment as well as skilled trades such as marine engineering or ship carpentry. The increase in activity of the port during the period can be seen in the rise in the overall numbers employed in Liverpool and, within these figures, the continued importance of occupations directly servicing the trade flowing into the port (Table 6.10).

Table 6.10  Numbers of Males Ten Years and Over Employed in Liverpool / Employed in Port-Related Occupations (these occupations expressed as % of total workforce in brackets).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total L’pool Workforce</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>157,000</td>
<td>212,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Workers* and Commercial Clerks</td>
<td>57,264 (42%)</td>
<td>58,552 (37%)</td>
<td>80,316 (38%)</td>
<td>90,494 (40%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ‘Transport workers’, within which port-related activity is dominant, are the primary group within the census occupational category ‘Conveyance of Men, Goods and Messages’.
Source: Published Census Records, England and Wales (census reports from 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911)

The great increase of the Liverpool workforce in the decade 1891 to 1901 is noteworthy – a decade, of course, which saw the successful launch of Liverpool’s two football clubs as limited companies. The workforce of the port-dominated economy of Liverpool, however, had to contend not only with the possibility of seasonal, weather and even tidal affects on their employment prospects – conditions, as Lane suggests, which were ‘scarcely felt by the more regularly employed factory workers of Manchester’12 – but also felt more severely than workers in non-port economies the fluctuations in trade between British producers and foreign markets. It was stated above that the support for the city’s two football clubs rose steadily against the backdrop of the generally improving material conditions within Liverpool society. How much did the ebb and flow of local economic activity influence the pattern of greater consumption, of which growing levels of football attendance were
symptomatic? An attempt can be made at understanding this possible relationship by comparing the fluctuations in the annual economic performance of Liverpool (measured, here, in terms of the total shipping tonnage passing through the port) with the annual average gates recorded by Everton and Liverpool football clubs. By doing this, some provisional conclusions can be arrived at about the relationship between these two variables.

We are, to a certain degree, helped in this comparison of economic variables with annual average football attendance in Liverpool by a similarity (though certainly not synchronicity) in the patterns of annual football attendance at Everton and Liverpool football clubs. In terms of competitive achievement, the clubs enjoyed contrasting levels of success during the period.

**Table 6.11  Everton and Liverpool League Position 1891–92 to 1913–14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Everton</th>
<th>Liverpool</th>
<th></th>
<th>Everton</th>
<th>Liverpool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891/92</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>1903/04</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892/93</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>1904/05</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Promoted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893/94</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>Promoted</td>
<td>1905/06</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894/95</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>1906/07</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895/96</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Promoted</td>
<td>1907/08</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896/97</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>1908/09</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897/98</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>1909/10</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898/99</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>1910/11</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899/00</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>1911/12</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>17th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900/01</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1912/13</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>12th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901/02</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>1913/14</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td>16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902/03</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Final League standings taken from the *Liverpool Football Echo*. 
Table 6.11 above demonstrates that Everton tended to out-perform Liverpool, finishing in a league position above Liverpool in all but seven of the eighteen seasons of their co-existence as Division One clubs. Also, in the twenty-one seasons from 1893–94 to 1913–14, Everton finished in the top five eleven times, never having been relegated, whereas Liverpool finished in the top five in six seasons, but were also bottom five finishers on six other occasions, and were relegated twice.

Figure 6.4 Everton FC & Liverpool FC Annual Average Gate, 1891/92-1913/1914

![Graph showing attendance levels for Everton FC and Liverpool FC](image_url)

Note: Liverpool FC were not in existence in season 1891/92 and were not a Football League club in season 1892/93.

Source: Attendances taken primarily from Liverpool Football Echo, but supplemented by match reports from the Liverpool Courier and Liverpool Daily Post.

In the latter part of the period we see that in the season 1909/10 there is a sharp distinction between attendance levels at Everton and Liverpool. This might be explained by differences in competitive performances of the two clubs (though, as will be discussed below, other seasonal performance differences did not bring about such distinct attendance figures). However, Figure 6.4 demonstrates that (leaving aside Liverpool’s first year as a league club) only in two seasons, 1895–96 and 1909–10, is there a major distinction between the attendance levels of the two clubs (see also Table 6.12). In ten of the seasons between 1893–94 and 1913–14, the gap in attendance existing between Everton and Liverpool was 2,000 or less (as noted above,
the annual average gate per game for the whole period, was quite similar: 17,000 and 15,500 for Everton and Liverpool, respectively). Moreover, if we begin our analysis of the range of seasons to 1913–14 from the season 1896–97 (the season when Liverpool FC become more firmly established as a Division One club after suffering initial relegation setbacks), and we extend the attendance spread between the clubs to 3,000, it is found that in fourteen out of eighteen of these seasons Everton and Liverpool experienced this similar level of demand for their fixtures.

Table 6.12 Everton FC & Liverpool FC Annual Average Gate, 1891/92-1913/14 (rounded to the nearest thousand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Everton</th>
<th>Liverpool</th>
<th></th>
<th>Everton</th>
<th>Liverpool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891/92</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>(formed only in 1892)</td>
<td>1903/04</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892/93</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>(not yet admitted to Football League)</td>
<td>1904/05</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893/94</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1905/06</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894/95</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1906/07</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895/96</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1907/08</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896/97</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1908/09</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897/98</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>1909/10</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898/99</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>1910/11</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899/00</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>1911/12</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900/01</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>1912/13</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901/02</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>1913/14</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902/03</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Attendances taken primarily from Liverpool Football Echo, but supplemented by match reports from the Liverpool Courier and Liverpool Daily Post.

It will be noted also from comparing Table 6.11 with Table 6.12 and Figure 6.4, that league position and attendance at times run contrary to our expectations of high attendances accompanying high league position (as shown clearly with Everton's runners-up seasons in 1904–05 and 1908–09), and that low attendances would be accompanied by low league positions (as with the increase in attendances at Liverpool for their relegation season of 1894/95, and the high attendances enjoyed by both clubs in season 1913–14, when Everton and Liverpool finished the season fifteenth and sixteenth, respectively).
The similarities in attendance levels (though not in performance), and the incongruity of high/low attendances occurring with low/high league positions, seem to give some basis for attempting to explain the patterns of attendance at Liverpool’s two premier football grounds (or at least some of the seasonal fluctuations in attendance) by relating them to changes occurring within the local environment. This approach is conducted below. The seasonal average attendances for home games of the two clubs have been combined for this purpose, in order to give a more accurate measurement of the total demand for professional football in the city in any one season. The range of seasons will begin at season 1896–97, and end at season 1913–14. As mentioned above, this takes out of the equation the early seasons of Liverpool FC when the club struggled to carve out a place for itself in the local football market.

![Figure 6.5](image)

*Note: Season 1896–7 correlates to trade year 1897, and so on.*

*Source: Liverpool Football Echo and Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Annual Accounts.*

The information in Figure 6.5 above points to the conclusion that there did not appear to be a strong relationship between the movement of football club attendance levels and the ebb and flow of trade through the port. Only in nine of the eighteen seasons
was there a mirroring of gates and trade. In detail, it will be noted from Figure 6.5 that there occurred a sharp rise in football attendance between seasons 1896–97 and 1898–99, during which time attendances ascended steadily from below 25,000 to over 30,000. A footballing impetus behind the earlier part of this surge in attendances was, perhaps, the consolidation of Liverpool FC’s gate after its early experience of relegation in 1895. This upsurge in attendances was indeed accompanied by a significant increase in annual trade: annual shipping tonnage increased from 11 million in 1896 to 12.5 million in 1899. Similar synchronicity is found at other times during the period (seasons 1905–06 to 1908–09, and seasons 1912–13 to 1913–14). However, there are sharp contradictions in the data set which places a large question mark over the validity of claiming a consistent relationship between football attendance in the city and trade through the port. It can be seen, for instance, that the very sharp fall in attendance levels in the season 1904–05 coincided with a steep rise in the port’s trade. One explanation of this phenomenon could be that, despite the increase in trade, there existed high levels of unemployment in Liverpool at this point, and that this factor might have impacted on attendance at football games. Another sharp deviation occurs in the season 1910–11, when trade significantly increases, yet attendances fall. This deviation might be explained by the falling standards of living amongst many port-related workers, conditions precipitating the 1911 Transport Strike.

It is clear that the pattern of development of football support in Liverpool cannot be said to be closely connected to annual changes taking place in the port-dominated economy. Let us, though, try to put some flesh on the bare bones of this statistical analysis. Taking Arnold’s maxim, quoted above, that the extent to which improving (or, indeed, deteriorating) material conditions existing in a locality translates into higher or lower football attendances depends ‘ultimately on personal factors’, we might ask how changes in the economic fortunes of the port might have impacted on different types of employees, and how these changes might have influenced fluctuations in football attendance levels in Liverpool during this period.

It has been suggested by some commentators that the rapid development of Liverpool as a stronghold of football attendance in the last decade of the nineteenth century
interest in the game being somewhat muted in the 1880s in comparison with other cities, such as Glasgow, Sheffield and Birmingham, and the mill towns of Lancashire) is connected to the granting of the Saturday half-day holiday to unskilled workers at the beginning of the 1890s. Certainly, the two Liverpool clubs were well supported through the decade, rising from a combined gate of 19,000 in 1893–94 to 33,000 a decade later. However, this rise in gates over the period is no greater than in similar-sized cities, such as Birmingham, Manchester and Sheffield – cities where the working class was more typified by those employed in skilled and semi-skilled occupations (Table 6.13).

Table 6.13 Football Attendance in Four English Cities, 1893/94-1913/14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1893/94</th>
<th>1903/04</th>
<th>1913/14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


If we take the first season of 1893–94 as being more representative, in its spectators’ social composition, of the period of spectator growth in Liverpool prior to the granting of Saturday half-day holiday for the unskilled, we can see that the incremental rise in Liverpool’s football demand to 1903–04 is less than in Manchester and Birmingham (though slightly more than in Sheffield). We might, however, have expected to have witnessed a much larger increase in the combined attendances of Everton and Liverpool by 1903–04, given the potential increase from previously untapped sources of support for the Liverpool clubs after the granting of Saturday half-day holiday to the unskilled.

The standard of living of unskilled workers in Liverpool remained stubbornly low during the pre-First World War period and must have provided a real obstacle to their participation in fee-paying attractions. During the 1890s it was calculated that a typical sized family of two adults and four children could live relatively comfortably
(that is, enough income for rent, food, clothing and fuel) on 30 shillings per week in Liverpool – those earning below 20 shillings per week falling below the poverty line.\(^\text{16}\) Taking dock labourers' wages to be a suitable representative of those of the unskilled workers in Liverpool as a whole, a 1909 report on casualised labour in Liverpool revealed that most dock workers earned on average only 15 shillings per week, even at this later point in time\(^\text{17}\) (with dock workers' leaders claiming that the majority of those dock workers earning less than 15 shillings, earned 7s 6d or less\(^\text{18}\)). Other unskilled workers, such as the numerous lower-rating sailors, earned roughly 17s 6d per week in 1911.\(^\text{19}\)

This type of evidence tends to underline the claims that the likely source of football support in the period prior to the First World War, even within a port economy typified by casualised labour, was the skilled working class.\(^\text{20}\) Mason's sampling of Merseyside football support in the Edwardian period reveals the predominance of artisan occupations amongst those in attendance of matches at the two Liverpool football grounds.\(^\text{21}\) The shareholder records at Everton FC during this early period tend to underline the importance of skilled workers' involvement in football support in Liverpool. It was amongst these relatively comfortably-off workers, then, that the material conditions for football's growth as a spectator sport in Liverpool were most likely to be found.

Liverpool's skilled tradesmen (including those in engineering, printing, building trades, furniture making and ship-building) more than kept pace, in terms of wage rates, with their counterparts in other towns and cities in Britain, except London, in the pre-First World War period.\(^\text{22}\) The relative shortage of skilled workers in the port helped to keep up their wages – sometimes above national average rates for certain tradesmen, such as boiler-makers and ship-joiners.\(^\text{23}\) Traditionally, skilled workers in Liverpool, in times of shortage of work in their own trades, competed for dock work in order to sustain their standards of living. Stagnation or decline in the port's trade increased competition for work and may have impacted upon the skilled workers' ability to find a surplus from their incomes to accommodate football attendance. A possible example of this is in 1893. A trade depression occurred in the port that year, the chain reaction from which saw many skilled unions in Liverpool reporting
depression in their industry and high unemployment amongst their members. The year coincided with the poorly attended football season of 1893–94, when the rise in attendance levels at Everton FC was checked, and the promotional season of Liverpool FC was seen by an average of only 5,000 per game. Reacting to the plight of the mostly artisan communities of Walton and Anfield (between which districts its new ground was located) the board of Everton FC in the winter of 1893 donated £1,000 to local poor relief charities and catered meals to 12,000 people. This could be interpreted as an organisation taking care of its core social group of support during an acute period of local economic slump.

Apart from the probable role played by Liverpool’s class of artisans and their changing material fortunes in the development of football attendance levels, we might also consider the impact of the growing number of non-casualised workers in Liverpool who serviced the port’s increasing level of trade over the period, such as postal workers, railwaymen or tramway workers. Mason mentions the presence of this type of employee amongst his sampling of football support in Liverpool. The number of railway workers in Liverpool, for example, rose from 3,700 in 1891 to 9,700 in 1911, and those involved in road passenger traffic (including tramway workers) rose from just over 2,000 in 1891, to 7,300 by 1911. The impact of rail workers on the formation and support of other football clubs is a feature of the English game’s early period. It could be argued that this type of worker – in many cases semi-skilled – began to supplement the original artisan core of support for football towards the end of the period covered here, rather than any movement of the casualised, unskilled class of workers into football support. Certainly, rail employees, whose income was well in excess of that of the casually employed unskilled workforce, would have been more capable of bearing the expense of regular football attendance, which might include transportation costs and payment for food and drink, as well as the price of ground admission. The stability of employment of this type of communications workers, who were less likely be affected by the ebbs and flows of port activity than those employed directly in dock work, could well have facilitated a stabilisation in attendance at football matches towards the latter end of the period under review when, as noted earlier, deviations occur between the trend in trade through the port and that of football attendance.
6.4 Attendance and Capacity of Goodison Park and Anfield

Before ending this chapter on attendance levels, comment should be made on the matter of the under-utilisation of ground capacity at Goodison Park and Anfield during this period. This can convey the limits of the demand for professional football in the city of Liverpool. If we take local derby-day attendances into consideration (Table 6.14) and use them as a guideline to gauge the limits of possible ground attendance at the two Liverpool clubs, it can be seen that the Goodison Park capacity rises from 40,000 at the beginning of the period, to 55,000 at its end, with Anfield’s capacity rising from 30,000 to 45,000.

Table 6.14 Everton FC Versus Liverpool FC: Attendances, 1893–94 to 1913–14
(*LFC in Div.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Goodison Park</th>
<th>Anfield</th>
<th>Goodison Park</th>
<th>Anfield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893/94</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1904/05</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894/95</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1905/06</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895/96</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1906/07</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896/97</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1907/08</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897/98</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1908/09</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898/99</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1909/10</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899/00</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1910/11</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900/01</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>1911/12</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901/02</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1912/13</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902/03</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>1913/14</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903/04</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Liverpool Football Echo

This represents an average maximum capacity at each ground over the period of 47,500 at Goodison Park, and 37,500 at Anfield. Yet, as we have seen, the average gates per game for the period for Everton fixtures and Liverpool fixtures were 17,000 and 15,500, respectively. Quite obviously, then, both Everton and Liverpool seldom filled their stadiums during the period 1893–94 to 1913–14. Attendance records
demonstrate that besides the occasion of the visit of local rivals, neither Goodison Park nor Anfield was utilised to anything approaching its capacity on a regular basis, with Liverpool FC hosting only twenty-four fixtures in twenty-one seasons when 75 per cent or more of their ground was occupied, and Everton FC recording just two fixtures when their gate rose to 75 per cent or more of their total capacity. The percentage of capacity used at each club per season is demonstrated in Figure 6.6 (changes in ground capacities over the period are calculated into these percentages).

As can be seen from Figure 6.6, at no time during the period was Goodison Park utilised to 50 per cent of its capacity, with Liverpool FC’s Anfield ground seeing more than 50 per cent utilisation of its capacity in only eight seasons.

*Figure 6.6 Percentage of Ground Capacity Used by Everton & Liverpool Football Clubs, 1893/94-1913/14*

**Goodison Ground Capacity:** 1893/94–1897/98 = 40,000; 1898/99–1904/05 = 45,000; 1905/06–1906/07 = 50,000; 1907/08–1913/14 = 55,000.

**Anfield Ground Capacity:** 1893/94–1905/06 = 30,000; 1906/07–1911/12 = 40,000; 1912/13–1913/14 = 55,000

*Source: Liverpool Football Echo*
What can we read into this obvious under-use of ground facilities? There seems little sense in building, and regularly expanding, a ground’s capacity in order to attain that capacity for just one fixture per season (and even in derby encounters the capacity was seldom reached – see Table 6.14). Though the Liverpool derbies were financially lucrative – the 1896 and 1900 games against Liverpool FC bringing gate receipts for Everton FC of £1,200 and £1,300, respectively\(^{30}\) – the expense of not only building costs, but their addition to club overheads, such as the increase to the rateable valuation of the club grounds, were hardly, in the short term, at least, off-set by the revenue to be gained from the vast majority of much smaller home attendances.

Though Everton FC gate receipts rose during the period from £7,000 for the season 1893–94, to £17,000 for season 1913–14,\(^{31}\) the clubs spending on ground improvements between 1906–1909 of £41,000,\(^{32}\) bringing the club’s capacity up to 55,000, does not seem to make business sense when we consider that all but one of the home fixtures played by Everton FC after 1906 could have been comfortably accommodated within the confines of the old ground.

There is the possibility that such ground improvements were made in anticipation of future growth in attendances – a belief borne out by the continually upward trend in football attendances nationwide during the period. Perhaps, though, the logic behind building was as much to do with local competition between the two clubs to achieve greater civic status than their rivals – the two clubs, we must not forget, were born out of an intense dispute. Or, perhaps – given that football was part of a wider entertainment and leisure industry, including the music hall, cinema and home entertainment (such as phonographs, and later radio), as well as other fee-paying sport – those charged with running football stadia in Liverpool saw the need to provide more agreeable facilities in order to secure their patrons’ attendance.

### 6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter it was demonstrated that trends in the demand for professional football on Merseyside were consistent with the surge in demand for football nationally from the last decade of the nineteenth century to the First World War. A range of socio-economic indicators relating to Merseyside at this juncture were used in order to
establish whether changes in the standard of living of the local population could have influenced the contours of attendance at the Goodison Park and Anfield stadiums. It was concluded that a pattern did indeed emerge from the data which demonstrates that mass support for the two clubs in the pre-First World War period was consistent with general advances on Merseyside in levels of material consumption, in health and housing standards and, for the skilled worker, at least, steady advances in wages.

Evidence, though, did not support the proposition that football attendance would follow closely the patterns of trade flow through the Port of Liverpool, more particularly, that increasing trade would be accompanied by surges in attendance. Limits to the demand for football attendance were also highlighted. It was noted, for example, that the clubs, apart from matches against each other, very rarely came close to utilising their own ground capacity for matches. And it was also noted that two other football club companies, Bootle AFC and Liverpool Caledonians FC – clubs that incorporated in the same year, 1892, as Everton and Liverpool – were quickly dissolved when demand for their home matches failed to grow beyond 2,000–3,000 in the two seasons after incorporation. Indeed, another recent study looking into the early patterns of development of professional football in Newcastle, suggests that the demand for football in that area was similarly restricted.33 Such evidence might temper our view of the mass appeal of professional football in what are considered to be traditional heartlands of the English game.

That said, the city of Liverpool – as we have seen - was able to sustain the development of Everton and Liverpool football clubs in the limited company era, and in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight we turn our attention towards the analysis of the commercial, administrative and social characteristics of the two new club companies established after the split of Everton FC in 1892. The question to be answered in the remainder of this study is whether or not the nature of the factional divisions within the original club went on to determine the adoption of distinct forms of organisational development at Everton FC and Liverpool FC.
Chapter Seven

Everton and Liverpool Football Club Companies, 1892–1902.

7.1 Introduction

We have already established earlier in this thesis that the split of the original Everton FC involved a clash between factional forces within that club’s membership regarding the transformation of the club into a limited liability company. In this chapter attention will turn to an analysis of the nature of the two clubs once they were established as limited companies. The key objective of this chapter will be to highlight the most significant organisational differences between those two football organisations in their early development.

With respect to this comparison three hypotheses, based upon our knowledge of the development and disintegration of the original Everton FC, have been formulated and tested. One conclusion derived from the findings in earlier chapters is that the split of the original Everton club was primarily a struggle between, on the one hand, members seeking to retain the control the membership exercised over club affairs as the organisation made the transition to company status, and, on the other hand, members seeking to utilise incorporation in order to draw the club more firmly into the orbit of commercial control. The first of our hypotheses has been formulated with this conflict in mind. Given the very different visions for the incorporation of the original Everton FC held by the factionalists, it was expected that the data would demonstrate that distinct paths to development were adopted, in terms of ownership at Everton and Liverpool football clubs in the post-split period. More precisely, it was expected that ownership of Everton FC would be more equally and widely dispersed amongst its shareholding than at Liverpool FC. The second and third hypotheses focus their attention upon matters of
boardroom control in the two new club-companies. The second hypothesis focuses on the balance of power existing between boardroom and membership at each of the Liverpool clubs. It is felt that, because of the nature of the dispute of 1892, which had strong overtones of a struggle against the concentration of power within the original Everton FC, the nature of power relations existing between board and shareholders at the two new club-companies would be distinct from each other, with an open and more democratic constitution prevailing at Everton FC, where the vast majority of the original club’s members took up shares after the 1892 split, than at Liverpool FC. The third hypothesis relates to the motives of directors in acquiring positions within the Everton and Liverpool boardrooms. Given the clear evidence concerning those men in administrative control of the original Everton FC committee, it is expected that men drawn to the boardrooms of the new companies would have sought to gain materially from their positions of authority within their club (at Liverpool FC, in particular), and also that there would be a high incidence of men with a high socio-political profile. These three propositions will be tested within the text below, and comment will be made on their validity in the conclusion to this chapter.

The overarching conclusion of the chapter is that the organisational structure adopted by the post-1892 Everton FC attempted to preserve the connection between club and locality and the democratic governance of the football club as a social institution, to a much greater degree than the newly formed Liverpool FC. The period 1892 to 1902 has been chosen to demonstrate the pronounced distinctions that existed between the clubs in terms of their organisational culture. These distinctions tend to diminish after this period and this will be considered in the next chapter.

Analysis, however, will not concentrate solely on Merseyside football. It is important also to relate our comparison of Everton and Liverpool football clubs to the findings of historians on the early development of other professional football clubs. The general trends in ownership and control of British football clubs are, therefore discussed within this chapter. Some firm conclusions have been formed by the secondary literature
concerning professional football organisations in their transition from their earliest forms to incorporated companies. It is suggested that there was a predominance of the involvement of the middle classes at both boardroom and shareholder level; that there was a centralisation of power and control into the hands of board members; that some individuals were motivated to gain the position of football club director as much by the possibility it afforded them to accrue financial or social capital as by their wish to devote time and effort to administer club affairs; and, somewhat against the grain of these other conclusions, that there was a significant representation of manual workers in the incorporated clubs, at least in terms of numbers of shareholders if not in their proportion of ownership of club shares.

These conclusions concerning observable trends in the early development of professional football club companies can provide scope to evaluate developments on Merseyside within a national context.

7.2 Socio-Occupational Characteristics of Share Ownership in the pre-1914 English and Scottish Football Club

In this section, the work of Wray Vamplew has been used in order to outline the general pattern of shareholding occurring within British clubs. Vamplew’s 1988 study, Pay Up, and Play the Game: Professional Sport in Britain, 1875–1914 (1988), provides us with the only systematic social-class study of share ownership of British football clubs in the pre-First World War period.

Analysis focuses on English First Division clubs, though consideration will be given to share ownership trends in other English and Scottish clubs and any similarities and deviations from English First Division clubs will be commented upon. Vamplew’s figures on share-prices for English and Scottish clubs demonstrate that English First Division clubs generally set their shares at a higher price than English Second Division clubs and Scottish clubs. On this basis I felt this might have affected the purchase of shares by lower-income groups between divisions and leagues. The greater part of
analysis on shareholders and share ownership, therefore, addresses the clubs identified by Vamplew as English First Division clubs – the division both Everton and Liverpool football clubs were involved in during the vast majority of the period 1892–1902.

My re-categorisation of data from Vamplew’s study also requires explanation. Vamplew used as his guide for the classification of occupations the categories outlined in Guy Routh’s *Occupation and Pay in Great Britain, 1906–79.* The full list of categories utilised by Vamplew is: Gentry; Upper Professional; Lower Professional; Proprietors and Employers (which is further sub-divided again by Vamplew into those involved in the drink trade, and ‘other’ proprietors and employers); Managers and Higher Management; Clerical; Foremen, Supervisors and Inspectors; Skilled Manual; Semi-Skilled Manual; and Unskilled Manual. In this chapter I have simplified the classifications, largely for the purpose of retaining a degree of comparison with the social classification used elsewhere in my thesis (Chapter Two). Thus, from the eleven categories used by Vamplew I have created four: Employers and Proprietors (employers and proprietors associated with the drink trade and other employers and proprietors); Professionals (gentry; upper professional; lower professional; managers and higher administration); Skilled Non-Manual (clerical; foremen, supervisors and inspectors); Manual (skilled manual; semi-skilled manual; and unskilled manual). In short, the comparison with Vamplew’s work and my own findings can be carried out by an amalgamation of the occupational sub-categories used by him in his 1988 study. One other difference to note between my own data and that of Vamplew is the inclusion in the current data for shareholders who were unspecified or untraced. Data relating to these shareholders were left out of percentage calculations in Vamplew, but have been amalgamated with the category of Gentleman to form the broader category of ‘Others’ in this study.

Looking first at the socio-occupational information concerning shareholders, the striking thing to note from Vamplew’s aggregated figures on English First Division clubs is the
substantial presence of shareholders from manual working-class occupations (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Socio-Occupational Profile of English First Division Clubs Incorporated Prior to 1915 (% of Shareholders and of Shares owned. Number of Clubs: 23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Shareholders</th>
<th>% Shares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employers &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Almost 37 per cent of all shareholders in the period 1889–1915 were occupied in manual employment, as opposed to just over 26 per cent described as proprietors and employers – the second most numerous socio-occupational group. Only in eight of the twenty-three First Division clubs surveyed by Vamplew were employers and proprietors the numerically dominant group, with manual workers being the dominant group in fourteen of the twenty-three clubs. The only exception to this employer-proprietor and manual working-class dominance was at Derby County where professionals were the numerically dominant group. In fact, if the overall figures on shareholders for the period 1889–1915 are broken down into two periods, 1889–1899 (a period when the bulk of First Division clubs included in Vamplew’s sample first issued their shares) and 1900–1915, the manual working class’s strength of numbers grows slightly in the latter period (Table 7.2).
Table 7.2: Comparison of Socio-Occupational Profile of English First Division Clubs Incorporated In the two periods 1889-1899 and 1900-1915 (% of shareholders. Number of clubs: 23).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1889–1899</th>
<th>1900–1915</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employers &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Between 1889–1899, the manual working-class accounted for 41.3 per cent of shareholders a figure that rises to 42.7 per cent in the 1900–1915 period. By contrast, employers and proprietors lose some of their numerical presence in clubs first issuing their shares in the post-1900 period: between 1889 and 1899 proprietors and employers accounted for 22.4 per cent of shareholders, but between 1900 and 1915 this proportion falls to 18.2 per cent.

Manual working-class preponderance amongst shareholders can similarly be seen amongst English Second Division clubs and Scottish clubs. In fact, we see from Tables 7.3 and 7.4 that the manual working class were even more numerous at these clubs. As alluded to earlier, this may have been due to the cheaper price of shares at many of these clubs. Similar also amongst English lower league and Scottish clubs is the large amount of employers and proprietors. This socio-occupational group, as in English First Division clubs, constituted the second largest grouping amongst shareholders.
Vamplew’s figures suggest, therefore, that manual workers comprised the most numerous group of shareholders in the formative period of the incorporated professional football club. Moreover, studies carried out on the pre-incorporated football club also suggest that this preponderance of manual workers is a continuation from an earlier period of professional football club development. For instance, Vamplew’s study of the social
complexion of pre-incorporated Scottish clubs demonstrates that an aggregate of 61 per cent of the membership of Scottish clubs could be ascribed to manual working-class occupations. As we can see from Table 7.4, their proportion of shareholders dropped to 44 per cent at Scottish clubs incorporated prior to 1915. Though no extensive range of evidence exists for English clubs prior to incorporation, as we have seen there was a high proportion of English First Division shareholders from manual working-class occupations shortly after the incorporation of clubs. This suggests that a similarly large presence of manual workers may have existed in pre-incorporated English clubs – a conclusion strengthened by my own data on Everton FC. The vast majority of the members of the pre-incorporated Everton club, we are informed, became shareholders in the new limited liability club-company after the split in 1892. Members from the manual working class dominated the first shareholder registers of the newly incorporated Everton FC (an issue discussed later in this chapter). Both prior to, and immediately after, incorporation, then, the manual working class appear to have played a critical role in British football club development.

However, if we turn our attention to share ownership (Table 7.1, above) a very different picture emerges, not only for the 1889–1915 period as a whole, but also for the two sub-periods already identified. Though they accounted for over one-third of shareholders of English First Division clubs between 1889 and 1915, the manual working class collectively owned less than one quarter of ordinary and preference shares in that period. On the other hand, employers and proprietors, comprising just over one-quarter of shareholders, accounted for 45.7 per cent of share ownership between 1889 and 1915. Turning attention towards the sub-periods, based on clubs incorporating prior to and after 1900 (Table 7.5, below), we see that the manual working-class proportion of share ownership decreased from almost 20 per cent between 1889 and 1899, to 17.4 per cent between 1900 and 1915.
Table 7.5: Comparison of Socio-Occupational Profile of English First Division Clubs Incorporated in the Two Periods 1889–1899 and 1900–1915 (% of Shares Owned. Number of clubs: 23).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1889–1899</th>
<th>1900–1915</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employers &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The growing dominance of share ownership by employers and proprietors is shown by the increase in their proportion of shares from 41.2 per cent in the earlier period, to almost 46 per cent in the latter period. This increase was achieved despite a numerical drop in shareholders from this occupational group between 1900 and 1915 – evidence which points towards a growing concentration in football club share ownership.

Data in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 demonstrate that amongst other English clubs and clubs north of the border the dominance of proprietors and employers was also the key feature of share ownership. In Scotland the dominance of employers and proprietors was even more pronounced than in England (a feature related to the extent of investment from the Scottish drink trade in Scottish clubs – an issue taken up below). Employers and proprietors at Scottish clubs were less numerically represented than at English clubs but enjoyed a greater proportion of share ownership.
The relationship of one group of proprietors to the development of the emerging football club companies, those involved in the drink industry, has been underlined by football historians. Between 1889 and 1915, just over 13 per cent of all English football club shares were owned by shareholders employed in the drink industry (though it is pointed out by Vamplew, _Pay Up, and Play the Game_, that this is well below the drink industry’s proportion of club shares in Scotland, where over 30 per cent of all club shares were owned by shareholders occupied in the drink industry prior to 1915).

The drink trade’s influence on English clubs could, and did, take other forms. Loans to clubs for ground improvements were common. For example, Collins and Vamplew in their study _Mud, Sweat and Beer: A Cultural History of Sport and Alcohol_ (2002) have shown that brewers loaned Wolverhampton Wanderers and Oldham Athletic (and Watford and Reading football clubs in the lower divisions) considerable sums for ground improvements. The issuing of debentures to local brewers Mitchell and Butler by West Bromwich Albion kept the club financially viable early in the twentieth century, and there was also the reliance of clubs on breweries for the sale of advertising space in grounds and in football programmes. This enabled clubs to boost their revenue (the breweries being keen to advertise in this form in order to ‘communicate with their primary market of working class males’). All of these examples hint at the commercial benefits to both brewers and football clubs. However, it is acknowledged by football historians that the type of dominance and overall control of brewers at clubs such as Manchester United, where ‘the club became an appendage of the brewery’ (the Manchester Brewery Company) or Liverpool FC (an issue explored below), was not a common characteristic of the early development of the English game. Indeed, the leadership at some clubs, such as Sheffield United and Sheffield Wednesday, exhibited open hostility to the drink trade’s presence within their clubs. This was a reaction, as we have seen, that was to the fore amongst certain members of the original Everton FC.

A number of characteristic features relating to the trend in ownership of shares in football organisations in England and Scotland have emerged from the secondary literature. It is
apparent that, on the one hand, and with few exceptions, shareholding in clubs was characterised by large numbers of manual workers purchasing shares – thereby extending their right to participate in club affairs enjoyed in an earlier period of football club development into the limited company period. However, on the other hand, and again with few exceptions, football clubs in the pre-First World War period had begun the process towards becoming the property of the (large and small) capital-owning classes. It is also apparent from the secondary literature that the ownership of clubs by proprietors and employers became more pronounced in the second half of the period 1889–1915, at a time when their numerical presence, relative to manual workers, had dwindled. The secondary literature also underlines the important relationship between football clubs and the drink industry (and breweries in particular) in the pre-First World War period.

Turning to evidence compiled on the early development of Everton and Liverpool football clubs, the questions to be answered are: how closely did the two Liverpool clubs fit into these established characteristics and trends which defined the ownership of shares in other professional football clubs? And how much did the Liverpool clubs deviate from each other in this respect?

To answer these questions I compiled data on the share structure of Everton and Liverpool football clubs from share registers taken from the year in which the bulk of their initial share offerings were taken up (1892, in the case of Everton FC, 1893, in the case of Liverpool FC), and from the two clubs’ share registers from 1902 onwards. It is demonstrable from the evidence that the two Liverpool clubs deviated significantly from the national trends in football club share ownership, and that they took on distinct organisational forms during their first decade in existence as limited companies.  

Tables 7.6 and 7.7 below reveal that the Liverpool clubs each exhibited one of the two common characteristics that emerged from the data on other football clubs of the period.
Table 7.6: Socio-Occupational Profile of Shareholders at Everton and Liverpool FCs, 1892 and 1902 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFC</th>
<th></th>
<th>LFC</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data compiled from Everton FC and Liverpool FC share registers, Companies House, Cardiff.

Table 7.7: Distribution of Shares Amongst Socio-Occupational Groups at Everton and Liverpool FCs, 1892 and 1902 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFC</th>
<th></th>
<th>LFC</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data compiled from Everton FC and Liverpool FC share registers, Companies House, Cardiff.

In the case of Everton FC there was a very pronounced presence of manual workers amongst the club’s shareholders. In 1892, the club’s first year as an incorporated company, manual workers were the largest socio-occupational group at the club, comprising 36.5 per cent of shareholders. A decade later, the club’s share register
demonstrates that, though the proportion of shareholders had decreased, manual workers continued to be the predominant socio-occupational group, accounting for 34.6 per cent of shareholders. As for the influence of the proprietor classes on share ownership, however, Everton FC were far from being typical of the national trend. Figures relating to 1892 demonstrate that employers and proprietors, with slightly more than 20 per cent of company stock, were not the key occupational group in share ownership terms at Everton FC. Primacy, in this respect, as with numerical presence amongst shareholders, rested with the manual working class, who held almost 31 per cent of club shares. This importance of manual workers within club ownership was sustained over the decade to 1902, although the gap between manual workers and employers and proprietors narrowed slightly, with proprietors and employers owning 22 per cent of shares by 1902, and manual workers owning slightly less than 30 per cent. The proportion of shares held by manual workers at Everton FC in 1892 and 1902 was exceeded amongst English First Division clubs only by Middlesbrough (48.7 per cent), Manchester City (36.3 per cent), Oldham Athletic (31.7 per cent) and Newcastle United (31.4 per cent).

One explanation for this share pattern at Everton FC is the decision taken by the club’s board of directors to place certain restrictions on share ownership, principally by placing an effective block on the bulk sale of shares – a step referred to in Chapter Five. Another clause adopted by the club was that no member could hold more than two votes in the running of the club. Each member holding between one and nineteen shares was entitled to a single vote, whilst those holding twenty or more shares were entitled to two votes only. This would, presumably, have discouraged bulk share ownership in the club by any individuals, or groups of individuals, seeking to wield financial influence in the club. The net effect of these corporate decisions was to ensure that average shareholdings in the club remained low, with each shareholder averaging between four to five shares in both 1892 and 1902. Another way of underlining this point is by demonstrating distribution of shares amongst those holding less than or more than ten shares in the club over this same ten-year period. Table 7.8 demonstrates that almost 90 per cent of the club’s shareholders owned fewer than ten shares in Everton FC in either 1892 or 1902.
As noted earlier in this chapter, such small holdings in clubs were typical of the average parcel of shares owned by manual workers in English First Division clubs – an occupational group predominant at Everton FC.

Table 7.8: Distribution of Everton and Liverpool FC Shareholders by Numbers of Shares Held, 1892 and 1902 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFC</th>
<th></th>
<th>LFC</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 10 Shares</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–99 Shares</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100+ Shares</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Everton and Liverpool FC Share Registers, Companies House, Cardiff

The small parcelling of shares in the club, and the limitation of voting rights connected with share ownership, should be viewed in the context of the Everton hierarchy’s stated resolve to minimise the involvement in the club of drink trade influence – a residual effect of one of the key issues involved in the split of the original club. However, with 9.8 per cent of its stock held by shareholders occupied in the drink industry in 1892, it would be inaccurate to portray Everton FC as a “dry” club. Five other First Division clubs in Vamplew’s study, for example, had smaller proportions of their shares owned by the drink trade. However, brewers did not have as significant an effect on the ownership of shares at Everton FC as they had in other top-flight clubs. Those employed in the drink trade investing in Everton FC were for the most part licensed victuallers. One shareholder whose occupation was given as ‘brewer’ bought six shares in the club in 1896. He retained these six shares by 1914. The proportion of club stock owned by the drink trade declined slightly by 1902 to 9.1 per cent of shares. The decision by Everton’s board to avoid the bulk sale of shares would also have affected the taking up of shares in the club by other types of employers and proprietors, particularly in light of the established correlation between this occupational group’s ownership of football club shares and the control of clubs (via the capture of boardroom positions – an issue taken up later in this...
chapter). Another possible consideration in explaining the lower than average share ownership of the employer-proprietor group at Everton FC is the large number of skilled non-manual workers holding shares in the club – and, more especially, clerical workers. Both in terms of numbers of shareholders and their proportionate ownership of shares, the clerical presence at Everton FC was greater than in any other First Division club other than Tottenham Hotspur (the north London club having fewer clerical workers than amongst Everton FC shareholders, but having slightly more of its shares owned by clerical workers). In 1892, skilled non-manual workers comprised 29.7 per cent (28.8 per cent clerical workers) of Everton’s shareholders and owned 24.5 per cent (23.5 per cent clerical workers) of club shares. By 1902 their proportion of both shareholders and share ownership had slipped slightly from the previous decade, and accounted for 26.4 per cent of the club’s shareholders (24.8 per cent clerical workers) and owning 22.9 per cent of club shares (20.8 per cent clerical workers). In Vamplew’s study of English First Division clubs the proportion of skilled non-manual shareholders was 17 per cent (14.7 per cent clerical workers), owning 9.2 per cent of club shares (8.1 per cent clerical workers). Historians of football have noted the relevance of local or regional occupational distinctions to ownership of football club shares.¹⁷ Liverpool’s small army of clerical employees characterised the skilled male workforce to a greater degree than in other urban-industrial centres during the period under review. Their impact on share ownership at Everton FC (and, as we shall see, at Liverpool FC) is an obvious one.

Everton FC exhibited a trend, in common with other clubs, towards the numerical preponderance of manual workers amongst shareholders. However, the club did not conform to the trend amongst other clubs regarding the domination of share ownership by employers and proprietors. The shareholding structure at Liverpool FC, on the other hand, presents us with a very different share ownership profile. It is clear from company share files that Liverpool FC during the period 1893–1902 in no sense relied upon a large manual working-class presence. In numerical terms, manual workers accounted for only 4.9 per cent of Liverpool FC shareholders in 1893 – smaller than the proportion of manual workers in any English or Scottish clubs in Vamplew’s survey except the Scottish
club, St Bernard's. By 1902 the manual working-class presence had increased, but still stood only at 7.6 per cent, making them easily the least representative of all occupational groups at Liverpool FC between 1893 and 1902. Another characteristic of Liverpool FC shareholders and, again, one distinguishing them from the shareholders of other clubs was the number of professionals involved in the club. In 1893, 44.8 per cent of club shareholders were from professional occupations – a much greater proportion than that in any other English or Scottish club. Though this proportion dropped to 38.9 per cent by 1902, this still made them the largest occupational group amongst Liverpool FC shareholders. In comparison, the number of shareholders from the professions at Everton FC was 13 per cent in 1892, and 15.1 per cent in 1902 – numerically, the smallest proportion of shareholders at that club over the period 1892–1902. One explanation for this distinction is the exodus, in the wake of the 1892 split, of the vast majority of the membership and committee of the original Everton FC to take up shareholdings in the newly incorporated Everton FC situated at nearby Goodison Park. Those setting up Liverpool FC would seem, initially, to have turned to known social and occupational associates in order to find subscribers to the new club company. Principally, the connections individuals central to the club's formation in 1892 had with the West Derby Poor Law Union (WDPLU) seem to have been utilised, and this accounts for the number of 'overseers', 'registrars' and 'vaccination officers' amongst the Liverpool FC shareholders. The reliance upon this source can also account for the large proportion of skilled non-manual workers at the club, principally clerical workers, employed at the WDPLU: skilled non-manual occupations accounted for 35.5 per cent of shareholders in 1893 (28.5 per cent clerical workers); and 24.3 per cent in 1902 (15.6 per cent clerical workers). An organisation such as the WDPLU would also have been an invaluable source in providing the new club individuals with the necessary administrative skills for the running of a large organisation. Five of the fourteen directors at the club between 1892 and 1904 were employed in some administrative capacity by the WDPLU.

Where Liverpool FC did follow national trends, however, was in the dominance of share ownership by employers and proprietors. In fact, the proportion of shares owned by
employers and proprietors at Liverpool, 53.1 per cent, exceeded both the English First and Second Division average proportion of shares held by this group (43.6 per cent) and the Scottish Leagues’ average (41.3 per cent). The Liverpool figure for proprietors and employers includes the shares held by John Dermot and Alice Knowles. Dermot was a factory worker for Copes Tobacco Company. His shareholding was 100 shares, but Dermot is likely to have been used as a proxy by Sir James A. Willox, the owner of Copes Tobacco Company as well as of the Liverpool Daily Courier. When Dermot died in 1895 Willox is listed in Liverpool’s share register the following year. Alice Knowles was brewer John Houlding’s daughter. Her shares were sold along with the more substantial amount of shares held by William Houlding (John Houlding’s son), brewer, when he withdrew from the club in 1905. The shares of both John Dermot and Alice Knowles would likely have been in the control of those in ownership of business enterprises and have, therefore, been included in this socio-occupational grouping.

By 1902, and in the context of the greater expansion of club shares (from 798 shares, to 2,953), Liverpool FC’s share ownership profile took on an overwhelming bias towards proprietors and employers, with 84.1 per cent of club shares owned by this group. The share ownership of occupational groups other than employers and proprietors at the club became marginalised over the period 1893–1902 as the domination of the brewing trade’s share of the club’s stock ensured their shrinking influence. In 1893 brewers controlled 40.1 per cent of Liverpool FC shares. By 1902 the combined shares held by club chairman, John Houlding, his son William, Bent’s Brewery, Tarbuck’s Brewery and Threlfall’s Brewery accounted for 68 per cent (2010 shares) of all club shares. Quite obviously, then, it can be observed that the average proportion of shareholding by the drink industry elsewhere amongst clubs in the English and Scottish leagues (on average, 13 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively) was surpassed at Liverpool FC, and was crucial to the club’s development. The strength of the drink trade influence at Liverpool FC would seem to have squeezed out, in particular, shareholders looking for small holdings in company stock – a feature which can also account for the small manual working-class presence amongst Liverpool FC’s shareholders (as demonstrated earlier) and the
minuscule share of club stock owned by this occupational group throughout the early period of Liverpool FC’s development. Data from the club’s share register demonstrates that the proportion of manual working-class share ownership at Liverpool FC in the early 1890s (3.1 per cent) was much lower than the manual working-class proportion of share ownership in other clubs north and south of the border. Moreover, this extremely low proportion of manual working-class share ownership at Liverpool FC fell to just 2.2 per cent by 1902.

Within the context of Merseyside, the social characteristics of shareholders and share ownership patterns at Liverpool FC resemble (much more closely than Everton’s) those of the two other Merseyside clubs who incorporated in 1892: Bootle AFC and Liverpool Caledonians FC. Share registers of these two clubs from 1892 indicate that shareholders from middle-class occupations were more numerous than those from working-class occupations: 58.3 per cent at Bootle FC, and 65.2 per cent at Liverpool Caledonians FC. In terms of share ownership, as at Liverpool FC, the middle classes were dominant. At Bootle AFC, those involved in middle-class occupations owned 65.4 per cent of shares (56.4 per cent owned by employers and proprietors), whilst at Liverpool Caledonians FC they owned a massive 92.2 per cent proportion of shares (85.2 per cent owned by employers and proprietors). It should be noted, however, that the Liverpool Caledonians’ high proportion of middle-class influence amongst shareholders and in terms of share ownership may have been influenced by the price of shares: £5 and £2 for preference and ordinary shares, respectively, as opposed to the £1 per share issued elsewhere amongst Merseyside’s professional clubs. In terms of drink trade influence on share ownership at Bootle AFC and Liverpool Caledonians FC, it can be said that although the drink trade was involved at Bootle AFC (brewer James Tarbuck was a director of the club, and two other directors, George Barratt and Henry Heard, were described as a victualler, and hotel proprietor), and though the drink trade’s proportion of shares (16.5 per cent) was greater than at Everton FC, it was the Liverpool Caledonians FC that resembled Liverpool FC’s share ownership profile more closely in this respect. Shareholders involved in the drink industry accounted for 64.9 per cent of club shares at Liverpool Caledonians FC. One
shareholder, brewer John Bramley, owned 60.1 per cent of club shares. Bramley's brother, George Phillip Bramley, also a brewer, unsurprisingly perhaps, took a position on the club's board to oversee this large investment (John Bramley's 140 preference shares cost him £700). Within a local context, then, Everton FC's shareholding profile would seem to be unique in its greater reliance on both working-class shareholders and employers and proprietors outwith the drink trade.

Returning to the first of our hypotheses, then, evidence clearly supports the proposition that distinct patterns of ownership of the two major Liverpool clubs would emerge in the wake of the split of 1892. Everton FC's company share files suggest that the club continued to exhibit the characteristics of the pre-1892 members' organisation, retaining the bulk of its large membership who became shareholders in the company. The club's strong working-class presence was, therefore, also retained. The manual and non-manual working class accounted for 68.9 per cent of club shareholders in 1892 and 66.5 per cent in 1902. Indeed, Everton chairman, George Mahon, commented upon the club's working-class identity during this period. Speaking to a shareholder meeting in 1895 Mahon stated that: 'The workingmen of Liverpool represented the backbone of the club'. Residential information also demonstrates that the club retained its very localised control. The core football districts of Everton, Anfield and Walton (districts surrounding the closely situated Goodison Park and Anfield stadiums, and typified by a mixture of skilled manual and skilled non-manual occupations) were the districts accounting for almost two-thirds of the Everton shareholders' addresses. In short, Everton FC would appear to have carried over a numerically large and socially broad-based organisational structure into the limited company era and retained its link with the communities of north Liverpool where its origins lay.

From analysis of Liverpool FC shareholder records it can be observed that the early development of Liverpool FC took a route different from Everton FC's (and, in some important respects, from most other First Division clubs). Liverpool FC's foundation after the split of the original Everton FC in 1892 carried with it the hallmark of the
ambitions and characteristics of those members (representing the rump of the original club’s membership) who formed it. Principally, this meant that chairman and majority shareholder, John Houlding, free of the shackles placed on his plans to incorporate the original club along his preferred lines, ensured that ownership of the new Liverpool club was concentrated into few hands. Brewers took the leading role in the financing and ownership of Liverpool FC and the shareholder-base of the new organisation was restricted.

As well as seeking to outline the contours of football club ownership in the limited club era, football historians have sought to determine the dominant patterns of control of these organisations by focusing on the board of directors of clubs. In this respect, the secondary literature offers us an understanding of who took control of football club boards (principally, via analysis of the typical socio-occupational profile of club directors); the extent of the directorate’s powers within football clubs; and whether individual directors had the scope and motivation to use their boardroom position for personal gain. The objective of the football historian has been to determine the nature of the football club organisation in its transition from club to club-company, offering insight into the rationale of the modern club and how much this form of organisation had changed from the informally run pre-incorporated club. In the next section of the chapter some conclusions will be reached on the men who became football club directors and the extent of their power within the club. These conclusions will then be related to my own evidence related to those in control of Everton and Liverpool football clubs.

7.3 Socio-Occupational Analysis of English First Division Football Club Directors, 1889–1914

For the purpose of outlining the socio-occupational characteristics of club directors, the findings from Tony Mason’s Association Football and English Society, 1863–1915 (1980) and Wray Vamplew’s Pay Up, and Play the Game: Professional Sport in Britain, 1875–1915 (1988) have been used in this section of the chapter. Mason’s study gives the
most comprehensive account of the socio-occupational status of directors of English clubs incorporated prior to the First World War; whilst Vamplew’s study stands alone as the only academic work to attempt a systematic analysis of the socio-occupational status of all Scottish clubs incorporating before the First World War. Together, these studies amount to the most authoritative statistical work carried out on British football club directors.

Table 7.9: Socio-Occupational Profile of English Football Club Directors (%) (Clubs Incorporated Between 1888 and 1915)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employers &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7.10: Socio-Occupational Profile of Scottish Football Club Directors (%) (Clubs Incorporated Prior to 1914)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employers &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>__</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Tables 7.9 and 7.10 the different categories used by Mason and Vamplew to present their findings on club directors in their own studies have been re-categorised into the five-category classification used to analyse shareholdings earlier in this chapter (the
original categories used by Mason and Vamplew, and the proportion of club directors attributed to them, can be seen in Appendix 1i and 1ii at the end of this thesis). The re-categorisation of Vamplew’s data is the same as explained above. For Mason, re-categorisation involved the combination of his categories of ‘manufacturers’, ‘builders and contractors’ ‘wholesale and retail (employers)’, and ‘food and drink’ to make up the single category ‘proprietors and employers’. ‘Professionals’ here constitute Mason’s categories ‘professionals’, ‘schoolmasters’ and ‘managers’. ‘Skilled non-manuals’ comprise Mason’s ‘financial and commercial’. The ‘manual worker’ category used here combines Mason’s ‘skilled manual’, ‘engineer’, ‘wholesale and retail (assistants and travellers)’, and ‘unskilled manual’. As with my re-categorisation of Vamplew’s study, Mason’s category ‘gentlemen’ has been attributed to the category ‘others’ used here. My attributing Mason’s ‘financial and commercial’ category to the skilled non-manual category requires explanation. Mason’s ‘financial and commercial’ category comprises the sub-categories ‘estate agents’, ‘land agents’, ‘agents’ and ‘clerical’. Estate agents and land agents would, ordinarily, have been placed into the ‘professional’ category used in this chapter. However, since Mason did not distinguish data for each of the sub-categories of ‘financial and commercial’ in his own study a decision was taken to place the total amount of directors in this category into the ‘skilled non-manual’ category used here. This decision was guided by my own experience of viewing club share registers suggests that agents (which I take to mean ‘insurance agents’) and, more especially, clerical workers are more numerous in football club share registers than either estate agents or land agents. A slight adjustment for the findings of Mason for both ‘professional’ and ‘skilled non-manual’, as I have re-categorised them in this chapter, should be borne in mind because of this.

It can be seen from the re-categorised data in Tables 7.9 and 7.10 that there was a disproportion of directors’ positions in both English and Scottish clubs in favour of proprietors and employers. However, there were considerable differences between the data for clubs north and south of the border.
In Mason's study of English clubs, employers and proprietors took almost one-half of directors' positions. This would suggest that, although—as witnessed in the previous section—employers and proprietors were far from being the most numerous occupational group amongst shareholders, their control over share ownership and, therefore, voting rights, ensured that men from business backgrounds were, by and large, entrusted with control over club affairs. This point, perhaps, also accounts in Mason's findings for the minority of directors hailing from manual working-class backgrounds. Just 11.2 per cent of all directors were from this occupational background—very much lower than the manual working-class proportion of share ownership in English clubs. The skilled non-manual working class fared better in terms of their proportion of directors' positions relative to their proportion of share ownership. Though skilled non-manuals comprised 15.2 per cent of shareholders, collectively owning 8.2 per cent of shares of English clubs, they accounted for 9.4 per cent of directors. Another socio-occupational group performing slightly better in gaining directors' posts were shareholders from professional backgrounds. Though their proportion of shareholders stood at 16.9 per cent, and their proportion of share ownership at 18.2 per cent, professionals took up 19.6 per cent of all directors' positions. Together with the proportion of directors from the employers and proprietors socio-occupational group they contributed to a middle-class domination of English boardrooms, with almost 70 per cent of directors attributable to their combined occupational groups.

In Vamplew's study employers and proprietors were, as in England, easily the largest socio-occupational grouping represented in the boardroom, with 38 per cent of all Scottish directors from this background. For a group who comprised 23 per cent of all shareholders they can be said to be over-represented. However, unlike in England, their share of boardroom places was not commensurate with their ownership of shares. In Scottish clubs, employers and proprietors owned almost half of shares sold in football clubs. Another major contrast to the director profile that emerged amongst English clubs was the greater presence in Scottish boardrooms of manual working-class directors, who
occupied almost 29 per cent of boardroom positions. Though the Scottish boardroom cannot be said to be entirely representative of their membership (manual workers constituted 44 per cent of all shareholders), manual workers were able to control a greater proportion of boardroom positions than they had in ownership of shares. The manual workers owned 23 per cent of Scottish club shares. In Vamplew's study professionals were less represented in the football club boardroom than in England, whilst the skilled non-manual shareholders in Scotland found greater representation than they did in English club boardrooms. All of this paints a picture of a more democratically elected boardroom in Scotland, where more opportunity existed for those from lower-income backgrounds to take positions of control in football clubs than there was in England. However, even in Scotland it can be said that the middle classes were over-represented in the boardroom, with 51 per cent of directors' posts going to employers and proprietors and professionals, in comparison with their presence of 34 per cent amongst club shareholders.

Evidence from the pre-incorporated football clubs in Scotland and England suggests that this middle-class domination represented a shift in the social composition of administrators of professional clubs. Evidence unearthed by Vamplew on Scottish football development points towards much larger working-class involvement on club committees. Though the majority of positions on the newly incorporated Scottish clubs' original boards were held by middle-class shareholders (who strengthened their control in Scotland by 1914,22 prior to incorporation positions on the committees of these clubs were dominated by the working class, and the manual working class in particular. Allowing for possible differences between the Scottish and English clubs, and also allowing for Vamplew's own qualification about the security of drawing firm conclusions from the small amount of data available for the pre-incorporated Scottish clubs,23 the Scottish sample gives us some idea of the social evolution of professional football club development in the British Isles as a whole. In this respect Vamplew's findings on pre-incorporated Scottish football club development are strengthened by evidence of the early development of three English clubs: Arsenal, West Ham United and Middlesbrough.
Mason informs us that Arsenal, formed in 1886 by workers from a munitions factory, was, prior to incorporation, a club controlled exclusively at committee level by workers. Self-consciously its leadership professed the club's working-class identity. After the initially resisted step into incorporation in 1893, the club's first board had a doctor and building contractor amongst its eight members, and the club's control quickly passed into the hands of middle-class shareholders by the end of the nineteenth century. These middle-class members were drawn into the club by the financial realities of operating a competitive and commercial organisation. Charles Korr's study *West Ham United* (1985) demonstrates that the initial club committees of West Ham United – another club originating from a works football team – were drawn from a mixture of skilled non-manual (clerical workers) and skilled manual workers. On incorporation in 1900 the ten-man board comprised six skilled manual and skilled non-manual workers and four from a commercial background. From this point shareholders from a business background began to dominate the club's boardroom – a process accompanied by the growing concentration of club share ownership into fewer hands. It can, of course, be pointed out that the initial working-class dominance of the committees of these clubs might have been an outcome of their particular industrial origins. However, a similar pattern of development occurred at Middlesbrough FC – a club without any obvious connections to industry. Steven Tischler in his work *Footballers and Businessmen* (1980) shows how the committee at Middlesbrough FC (shorn of certain members in 1889, who left due to resistance amongst the majority of committee members to their plans for a more commercial orientation to the club) was dominated by workers prior to and immediately after the club's eventual incorporation in 1892 – two-thirds of its original directors were from the working class. Figures supplied for the period 1901–1914, however, demonstrate the marginalisation of workers holding directorships at Middlesbrough FC, and their eventual domination by employers and proprietors by the period's end.
A major consideration in explaining the middle-class domination of English boardrooms was the directors’ share ownership qualification, which entailed the purchase by directors, or prospective directors, of multiple shares, thereby pricing-out the manual working-class shareholder in particular. This is a point made by Vamplew, who provides data on director share ownership qualifications for certain English and Scottish clubs.29 Tables 7.11 and 7.12 highlight the minimum amount of money required to be spent on shares at English and Scottish clubs in order to qualify as a director. The director share ownership qualification for English clubs, where the majority of clubs set their share price at £1 per share, demonstrates the financial obstacle working-class shareholders faced in establishing their presence on boards.

Table 7.11: English Club Director Financial Qualification (£s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chelsea</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>Manchester United</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portsmouth</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Queens Park Rangers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Tottenham Hotspur</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsenal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Bristol Rovers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn Rovers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Middlesborough</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolton Wanderers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnley</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Stoke City</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield United*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>West Ham United</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston Villa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackpool</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford City</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Derby County</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulham</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Small Heath</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sheff. Utd shares were priced at both £10 and £20. One share was required to qualify for director, therefore, the difference was split between the price of shares (£15) for the above calculation. Sheffield Wednesday and West Bromwich Albion amongst the clubs Vamplew surveyed had no director qualification. Source: W. Vamplew, *Pay Up and Play the Game* (1988), Table 10.4
Table 7.12: Scottish Club Director Financial Qualification (£s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Financial Qualification (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow Rangers</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilmarnock</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dundee Hibernian</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Mirren</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Academicals</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowdenbeath</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motherwell</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Fife</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partick Thistle</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Stirlingshire</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow Celtic</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumbarton</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dundee AFC</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: W. Vamplew, *Pay Up and Play the Game* (1988), Table 10.3

With manual working-class average share ownership of 5.3 shares and 4.9 shares at First and Second Division clubs, respectively, and skilled non-manual working class average share ownership of 6.4 shares and 4.4 shares at First and Second Division clubs, respectively, the chances of working-class boardroom involvement would have been slim in most English clubs. Only employers and proprietors, with an average share ownership of 19.1 shares in First Division clubs and 16.1 shares in Second Division clubs, and professionals, with an average share ownership of 12.1 shares in First Division clubs and 10.5 shares in Second Division clubs, could, perhaps, be expected to have had a realistic chance of gaining a boardroom position in English clubs. By comparison, the much lower financial qualification to be met by Scottish club directors goes much of the way to explain the high incidence of working-class shareholders on Scottish club boards. Indeed, many Scottish clubs (over one-third in Vamplew’s survey) imposed no financial qualification at all. With average manual working-class shareholding of over seven shares and average skilled non-manual shareholding of almost nine shares, it will be observed that in all but five of the thirteen Scottish clubs the typical financial qualification for becoming a director went out of the range of working-class average shareholdings.
7.4 Directorial Powers in English First Division Clubs

One of the surviving characteristics of the pre-incorporated football clubs in the game’s limited company era was the control those elected to office held over team affairs. From team selection and team tactics, to the purchase and sale of players, the boards of clubs took the same hands-on attitude to team affairs that club committees had taken in a previous period. Later in the game’s development, and more especially in the inter-war period, many club boards began to employ a ‘secretary-manager’ who took on the role of tactician, and arbiter of which players were needed or were surplus to requirements. At least up until the First World War, however, team affairs at most clubs were ‘determined by men – the directors, and sometimes the secretary – who had no specialised knowledge of the game’. 31 This simplified the role boards played at professional clubs to decision-making over the financial affairs of the club, principally to improve the financial position of their clubs through the attraction of loans and investors, or through matchday pricing policies sensitive to public demand, in order to cover the costs of attracting players and maintaining staff, and – as we have seen in an earlier chapter – stadium upgrading.

However, boards differed from committees in the most crucial of ways. Members of a club committee were democratically voted in and out of office by its membership, each member having an equally weighted vote. Directors, on the other hand, could, through the control of share ownership, prolong their period in control of clubs. The most obvious way of achieving this was for a director or group of directors to own large proportions (perhaps a majority) of company stock. Football historians have highlighted examples of this type of control of clubs, 32 but the proprietary levels of most boards, though significant, did not amount to the absolute domination of boardrooms by the largest shareholders. Vamplew’s survey of English First Division clubs, for example, demonstrates that the board held, on average, slightly more than 16 per cent of company stock. 33 Charles Korr’s analysis of West Ham United shows that the West Ham shareholder holding the majority of shares up until 1910, Arnold F. Hills, the owner of the Thames Ironworks Company from which the club originated, showed not the slightest interest in standing for boardroom election. Korr portrays Hill’s relationship to the club
as paternalistic. Hill contributed to a number of what he believed to be worthy local causes in the East End of London and, Korr believes, viewed his financial contribution to West Ham United within this charitable, non-businesslike context.34

Other directorial powers employed by boards have been pointed to in order to suggest a more bureaucratic method for the retention of their positions. One tactic used by directors, as already mentioned, was their setting of (effectively) a wealth qualification for those seeking election to the board. Other means included the board’s right to veto the sale of shares between members, thus reducing the possibility of power bases being built up amongst shareholders, which could prove to be an electoral threat against sitting directors.35 Boards also had the ability to co-opt their own choice of club shareholder as a replacement for the sudden resignation or death of a sitting director – someone, presumably, from the same social background and with the same organisational instincts as sitting board members36 – and the bureaucracy involved in putting forward a name for election to the board, often entailing detailed paper-work months in advance of annual general meetings (AGMs), would also have acted to hinder the chances of success of any challenges to incumbent directors. In many cases the board of directors were helped in their quest to retain power by the passivity or apathy of club shareholders. Fishwick makes the point that although shareholders’ associations were common, they acted as ‘watchdogs’ to club boards rather than as the seedbed from which an alternative board could grow: ‘most shareholders were reluctant to support a threat to the stability of a club’, he concludes.37 Added to this problem was the reluctance of shareholders, in all but years of crisis in the affairs of a club, to turn out in great numbers for their club’s AGM. Korr, for example, shows that AGMs at West Ham United were attended by about 25 shareholders each year between 1900 and 1913; the number of shareholders at the club in this period ranged between 121 in 1902, and 211 in 1910.38 For these reasons, then, the people in control over team and financial affairs in top-flight clubs were a relatively stable elite. The prevalence of dynasties being built within football club boardrooms is one obvious indicator of this stability.
7.5 Motives of the English First Division Club Director

Football historians, in attempting to account both for the clamour to get on, and then keep on, a football club board, and the overwhelmingly middle-class composition of club boardrooms, have highlighted certain motives which may have contributed to individuals’ seeking office. Key amongst those motives identified are the possibility individuals had of gaining financial reward from their service as club directors (a motive, for the most part, down-graded by football historians), and also the possibility of club directors gaining social kudos through their positions within such a high-profile civic institution, which could be translated into social or political influence within their locality.

Taking the first of these possible motives, Steven Tischler’s study, *Footballers and Businessmen* (1980) sets out the most strident argument, suggesting that a fundamental motive of the middle-class shareholder in gaining a boardroom position was the financial rewards it held out to those in office. Against the received view that football club directors were, in the main, altruistic in volunteering their free time to the administration of football clubs, Tischler highlights, rather, the potential this activity had for directors, the majority of whom were businessmen, to exploit for profit.\(^\text{39}\) Though it was forbidden for English football club directors to be paid for their services in administration of their clubs, Tischler points to a small number of examples in which club directors (or their companies) contracted with their club to provide, for example, kit supplies, refreshments, the building of stadia, or the leasing of land for the club to play on.\(^\text{40}\) He also suggests that the businessman-director (particularly if he was involved in the brewing industry) could take advantage of his position by advertising his company’s goods or services on the club’s grounds and in his club matchday programmes.

Tischler’s position has been criticised by other football club historians who argue that, though scope existed for directors to profit indirectly from their involvement on club boards, he overstates his case, given the fragmentary evidence used. For instance, Tischler provides limited evidence of clubs specifying in their Articles of Association the
rights of club directors to contract with their club, and though only Newcastle United amongst English clubs expressly forbade this type of 'contracting-in' it does not necessarily follow that businessmen-directors were, on the whole, able or likely to exploit their positions for financial gain. It could also be pointed out that the small number of examples Tischler highlights as proof that 'contracting-in' did occur (the same examples tend to recur within all of the secondary literature on this point) can also be argued to prove the reverse: that contracts between directors and their own clubs were rarely undertaken. On the issue of businessmen-directors gaining prominence for their commercial products via advertisement on club grounds and in club literature, Fishwick makes the reasonable point that potential gain might be offset somewhat because: 'the publicity directors of a struggling club attracted was hardly likely to improve their reputations for competence'. Generally speaking, the consensus amongst historians rejects the proposition that financial motives for seeking office as a director is a satisfying explanation in understanding the pull of attraction of the football club boardroom – a point underlined by the fact that almost half of all directors were from 'non-business' backgrounds.

Another proposition in the secondary literature is that the pursuit of status within the locality was the strongest motive attracting individuals to become football club directors. A consensus reached amongst football historians is that, as well as being a response to the newly created financial imperatives of the limited company era, the dominance of the middle-class director of professional football clubs in the period under review was part and parcel also of the middle-class voluntarist push towards the domination of civic life through a network of social institutions – including charitable, educational, religious, and political institutions. Football club directorships, increasingly so from the last two decades of the nineteenth century when football achieved prominence both locally and nationally, became coveted posts for the socially ambitious middle classes who sought to raise their public profile in a variety of paternalistic ways (Freemasonry and the magistrates' bench being two other common routes in this respect). A strong connection has been made, in particular, between the overlap of those involved in local politics and
football club boardrooms. Speaking in 1905, the President of the Football League hinted broadly at this connection: ‘In most towns it is considered a distinct privilege to be on the board of the local club directorate, and the position is as eagerly sought after as a seat in the council chamber’. As James Walvin in his study, *The People’s Game* (1994) points out:

For politicians the years after the 1884 Reform Act posed a challenge in the form of a new mass (male) electorate which had to be wooed rather than led. What better way was there of establishing a reputation, of ensuring that one’s name was before the eyes of the male electorate and for posing as a man of the people, than belonging to the people’s game; to the local football club?45

Examples abound in the secondary literature relating to football’s early period of local politicians (Liberal and Tory, in this early period) gaining administrative positions in professional football organisations. For the most part, the politician’s involvement as part of the hierarchy of a football club was, in the manner that Walvin highlights, limited to the need to construct a positive local image. However, under certain social circumstances this simple association was transformed into the ideological co-option of football clubs, as studies of the history of football organisations in Scotland and Northern Ireland have demonstrated most dramatically. It can be said also, from an ideological perspective, and more generally speaking, that the prominent business-political characteristics of the football club boardroom acted to underline the validity of the dominant order of social relations holding sway within the wider society — local and national. As Fishwick suggests: ‘Football was thus politically significant both in terms of the ambitions of parties and politicians, and of the general political and social assumptions of governing elites’.48

The secondary literature’s description of the socio-occupational characteristics, the powers, and the motives of the men gaining control of football club boardrooms prior to the First World War can be summarised thus. Directors were drawn overwhelmingly from the middle classes — in particular, those involved in business were to the fore in the boardroom (although the large proportion of working-class directors amongst Scottish clubs was also a feature that emerged). Directors owned significant proportions of their
club stock; they held wide-ranging powers within their organisation, not only over financial governance, but also team affairs, and held certain other powers (identified above) that could be used to restrict challenges to their position on the board. Information on some directors suggests that directorial positions were sought not only through a sense of selfless voluntarism, but also as an opportunity for financial gain (though evidence of this is not compelling) and as a platform to further civic social and political aspirations. Overall, club boards can be said to have been less working-class and less democratic than their forerunners, the club committee. However, it might also be said that, although clearly moving towards a competitive-commercial model and away from their communal roots, football clubs were still laden with social meaning, and the pursuit of a boardroom position by the socially ambitious within the community reflected this.

With this typology of the top-flight English football club boardroom and its personnel in mind – evidence of the hierarchical development of the two Liverpool clubs has been unearthed and analysed. This evidence suggests, as with the comparison of occupational share ownership patterns discussed earlier in the chapter, that although Everton and Liverpool football clubs individually, and in certain respects, reflected national trends, difference rather than similarity in the hierarchical development of the two clubs is the dominant feature to note. This is demonstrated below. Specifically, analysis has been carried out on evidence presented in the Articles of Association and the Memorandum of Association of the clubs, directors' registers, and from the local press which provided evidence regarding the relevant biographical details of members of Everton and Liverpool football clubs' boardrooms. One immediate data problem is the absence of any surviving copies of Liverpool FC's Articles of Association for the period 1892–1914. This document traditionally sets out company rules relating to shareholder rights and directorial responsibilities. However, the rules of the club relating to the management and control of club affairs, and the rights of directors and membership can, fortunately, be pieced together to a large degree from local press reports – more especially during the period of the formation of the club in 1892. This alternative source of information can facilitate a reasonable comparison on these issues with Everton FC.
7.6 Socio-occupational Analysis of Everton and Liverpool Football Club Directors, 1892–1902

In socio-occupational terms it will be observed from the information contained in Table 7.13 that both of the Merseyside football club-companies conform to the First Division trend of middle-class dominance of boardroom positions. The average proportion of First Division directors from the combined ranks of professionals and employers and proprietors was 82 per cent, according to Tischler’s study. My own findings on all board members serving at the two Liverpool clubs over the period 1892–1902 demonstrate that at Everton FC, 75 per cent of directors were either professionals or employers and proprietors, this figure being exceeded at Liverpool FC, where 84 per cent of directors were from these two socio-occupational groups.

Table 7.13: Socio-Occupational Profile of Everton and Liverpool FC Directors, 1892–1902 (Number of Everton Directors 21. Number of Liverpool Directors 13).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFC</th>
<th>LFC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employers &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Everton FC and Liverpool FC Share Registers, 1892–1914.

The two Liverpool clubs differ from each other, however, when we consider the relative strength of professionals to employers and proprietors at each club. It can be seen in Table 7.13 that the proportion of professionals in the Everton FC boardroom (55 per cent) far outweighs the number of employers and proprietors (20 per cent). At Liverpool FC, on the other hand, employers and proprietors, who took up 46 per cent of boardroom positions, outnumbered professionals (38 per cent). The Everton FC boardroom, therefore, was more reflective than Liverpool FC’s of the original club’s pre-incorporated
committee, which was also dominated by professionals with employers and proprietors marginalised.

Difference can also be observed in the case of working-class participation amongst the hierarchy of each club. It has been argued that the impetus behind the setting up of Liverpool FC came from the frustrated ambitions of the architects of that club to further the prospects of profitable gain from professional football within the existing structure of the original Everton FC, and that those club members overseeing the setting up of Everton FC as a limited company sought to preserve the club’s original profile as a (largely working-class) members’ club. Under these circumstances we might expect some social differentiation between the hierarchies of the two clubs in terms of relative numbers of working-class directors. And indeed evidence supports this assumption.

Again, Everton FC’s boardroom resembled more closely than Liverpool FC’s the original club committee’s social characteristics. One-fifth of Everton FC’s directors between 1892 and 1904 were from the skilled or non-skilled working class – less than the proportion these social groups held on the original club’s committee (30 per cent) in the year before that club’s split, but a greater proportion of working-class directors than at Liverpool FC: just one director from this social group was elected to office at the latter club between 1892 and 1902 (representing under 8 per cent of directors for the period). We can compare the proportion of working-class participation in the Liverpool clubs’ boardrooms with Mason and Vamplew’s national studies. Liverpool FC’s proportion of working-class directors was over twice as small as the English average and over six times smaller than the average amongst Scottish clubs. Everton FC’s proportion of working-class directors was consistent with the English club average for this group, but was well over twice as small as the average amongst Scottish clubs.

The election of working-class members to the Everton FC board was not simply a feature of the club’s first directorate, where their influence could be explained as a simple continuation from their presence amongst the pre-incorporated club’s committees, but
was also a feature of the Everton FC boardroom later on in the period 1892–1902. This was a reflection of the continuing prevalence amongst Everton FC shareholders of men from the core football districts of Everton, Anfield and Walton – districts surrounding the two football clubs in which the skilled working-class were resident in large numbers during this period. Table 7.14 shows that all but one of the nine directors of the club in 1892, and all but two of the ten directors in 1902, resided in the core football districts. With, as noted earlier, effectively a system of one person–one vote operating in the club it would, perhaps, have been strange if working-class men from these districts had not been elected to the Everton FC boardroom.

Table 7.14: Residential Profile of Everton and Liverpool FC Directors, 1892 and 1902 (Number of Directors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EFC 1892</th>
<th>EFC 1902</th>
<th>LFC 1892</th>
<th>LFC 1902</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Football Club</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrounding Districts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Liverpool Suburbs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Townships</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Address</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Everton FC and Liverpool FC Share Registers, 1892 and 1902.

Overall, it can be said that the socio-occupational complexion of Everton FC’s boardroom during the period 1892–1904 was a fusion of mostly professional men with
working-class men forming a consistently prominent social group, and that there were far fewer businessmen in the club’s boardroom than the First Division average for this social group. The Liverpool FC boardroom, on the other hand, was overwhelmingly middle-class, with businessmen and professionals contributing in almost equal measure.

One reason for these differences between Everton and Liverpool football clubs and, more especially, distinctions relating to the presence of workers and businessmen in their boardrooms, was the financial commitment required to become a director at each club. Everton FC stipulated that the qualification of a director should be not less than three £1 shares in the club (a requirement which 75–85 per cent of members of the club were able to satisfy in the period under review). This phenomenon at Everton – allowing an ownership threshold low enough for the vast majority of club shareholders to negotiate – may have been an administrative decision taken in the wake of the split of Everton FC in 1892. A major issue in that dispute, as we have seen, related to the centralisation of power in the club, more especially in the hands of the club president. Perhaps having the director qualification set at three shares was an attempt to discourage a connection between power and financial investment in the new enterprise.

The absence of Liverpool FC’s Articles of Association from the year of the club’s formation in 1892 makes it difficult to compare directly the financial requirements for becoming a board member in the period 1892–1902. However, the Articles of Association of the reconstituted Liverpool FC in 1905 state that the ‘qualification of a director shall be the holding as absolute owner...[of] shares of the company of nominal amount of not less than £10’. If this stipulation was in place in the earlier period of the club’s existence this significant financial commitment would, perhaps, account both for the negligible presence of working-class board members, and for the preponderance of businessmen in the Liverpool FC boardroom. What can be said with certainty from analysis of the proportion of director shareholdings in Liverpool FC in the period 1892–1902 is that substantial ownership of shares by Liverpool directors was a conspicuous characteristic of that club’s early development – suggesting the existence of
a significant informal ‘paper’ qualification determining entry into Liverpool FC’s boardroom. In 1892, for example, the Liverpool directors jointly owned 42 per cent of all club shares, with their proportion of shares increasing to 53 per cent by 1902 (the Everton directors’ proportion of shares at these two points in time being 7 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively).

In turn, the greater financial commitment that appears to have been necessary in order to gain a position on the Liverpool FC board – and the resultant concentration of power into the hands of sitting board members – would seem to have contributed to another major difference between the hierarchical development of the two Liverpool clubs: the rate of turnover of directors at each club.

Tables 7.15 and 7.16 list the number of directors elected at each of the clubs between 1892 and 1902, and their length of tenure in office. It will be observed that the turnover of directors elected at Everton FC (twenty) is more rapid than at Liverpool FC, where there is relative stability in the boardroom, with thirteen directors elected over the ten-year period. Another way of expressing this longevity of Liverpool FC directors in relation to those serving on the Everton board is to compare the number of directors elected at each club during the period 1892–1902 enjoying only short tenure of office with those remaining as board members for a decade or more (available information suggests three years’ service on the board to have been equivalent to one term in office before re-election was required, so this has been used as a benchmark).

It will be observed from Tables 7.15 and 7.16 that, whereas three of the thirteen Liverpool directors stayed on the board for three years or less (with one of these, John Dermot, dying whilst in office), a greater proportion of Everton directors – nine from twenty-one – were short-term incumbents in the office of director (though with A.E. Leyland dying whilst in office).
Table 7.15: Everton Directors Elected between 1892-1902 and their Length of Tenure in Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates in Office</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.T. Atkinson</td>
<td>1892-1894</td>
<td>J. Griffiths</td>
<td>1892-1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.A. Bainbridge</td>
<td>1895-1910</td>
<td>T. Keates</td>
<td>1897-1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.C. Baxter</td>
<td>1892-1924</td>
<td>B. Kelly</td>
<td>1894-1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.C. Brooks</td>
<td>1895-1900</td>
<td>A.E. Leyland</td>
<td>1895-1897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.R. Clayton</td>
<td>1892-1912</td>
<td>D. Kirkwood</td>
<td>1900-1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.T. Coates</td>
<td>1892-1895</td>
<td>G. Mahon</td>
<td>1892-1895 &amp; 1897-1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.M. Crawshaw</td>
<td>1895-1898</td>
<td>J. Prescott</td>
<td>1895-1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.C. Cuff</td>
<td>1895-1901</td>
<td>A.C. Taylor</td>
<td>1897-1901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Currier</td>
<td>1892-1893</td>
<td>W. Whitford</td>
<td>1901-1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Davies</td>
<td>1892-1914</td>
<td>R. Wilson</td>
<td>1892-1895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Everton FC Annual Company Registers
Table 7.16: Liverpool FC Directors Elected between 1892-1902 and their Length of Tenure in Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates in Office</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J. Asbury</td>
<td>1902-1932</td>
<td>W. Houlding</td>
<td>1892-1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.E. Bailey</td>
<td>1895-1902</td>
<td>T. Knowles</td>
<td>1895-1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.E. Berry</td>
<td>1892-1893</td>
<td>J. McKenna</td>
<td>1892-1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Berry</td>
<td>1902-1909</td>
<td>G. Newman</td>
<td>1902-1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.O. Cooper</td>
<td>1894-1900</td>
<td>J.J. Ramsey</td>
<td>1892-1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Dermot</td>
<td>1892-1895</td>
<td>R.H. Webster</td>
<td>1895-1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Houlding</td>
<td>1892-1902</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Liverpool FC Annual Company Registers

In terms of long-serving directors, seven of the thirteen Liverpool FC board members remained in office for a decade or more, compared with twenty of the Everton FC directors. The mean average of years in office of Liverpool FC directors elected between 1892 and 1902 was eleven years, in comparison with the mean average of eight years in office of Everton FC’s directors.

Another indication that a more democratic representation was being thwarted at Liverpool FC was the number of directors with family connections with other members of the Liverpool board. Besides father and son, John and William Houlding, who were joined on the Liverpool board by in-law Thomas Knowles, the husband of John Houlding’s daughter, Alice, there was also the presence of two brothers who became long-serving directors of Liverpool FC, Edwin and Albert Berry. Edwin Berry, it will be remembered from earlier chapters of this thesis, was a former committeeman of the original Everton FC and played a significant role in the events leading to the split of that club in 1892. Indeed, the presence of dynastic influence at Liverpool FC was a long-standing feature of the club’s development. William R. Williams – nephew of Joseph
Williams, a Houlding stalwart in the original Everton FC – was voted onto the Liverpool FC board in 1905 and, through his son, Stanley R. Williams, and his grandson, Thomas Valentine Williams, the family retained their attachment to the Liverpool board until the 1970s. The Martindale, McConnell and Cartwright families are also examples of directorships passing from father to son at Liverpool FC. This phenomenon was not so manifest at Everton FC, where father and son, James Clement Baxter and Cecil Stuart Baxter, are conspicuous as lone examples of what might be interpreted as dynastic influence. The influence of directors as the major shareholders at Liverpool FC is demonstrated also in what would appear to be the placement by club chairman, John Houlding, of men he had influence over outside the realms of football. Steven Tischler cites Houlding’s installation of his brewery manager, John James Ramsey, as an example of what he argues to have been the power of wealthy individuals to control English First Division clubs. And Tischler’s Liverpool FC example is strengthened further by other instances of Houlding’s influence upon boardroom formation, such as John McKenna’s inclusion in the Liverpool boardroom. McKenna was a vaccination officer taken on by Houlding as an employee of the WDPLU, of which Houlding was a Guardian. In one form or another, then, the influence of wealth would appear to have been a determining factor in the formation of the Liverpool FC boardroom during this period.

7.7 Comparison of the Powers of the Directorate at Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs

The social homogeneity of the Liverpool FC board, brought about by the financial and socially exclusive (even nepotistic) barriers placed in the way of becoming a director, hint at a deeper underlying distinction existing between Everton and Liverpool football clubs regarding board–membership relations. Analysis of available source material relating to the decision-making process operating at Everton and Liverpool football clubs in their early years of incorporation reinforces this belief.
At Everton FC, the Articles of Association of the club stress a situation in which, though the appointment of players was a decision taken solely by the directors of the club, the club’s administration was carried out with the joint agreement of the membership. For example, Article 2 of the club’s Articles of Association states that the objectives of the club laid out in the Memorandum of Association would be modified or altered ‘as the directors and club members may agree upon’. This flavour of a shared responsibility over the club’s affairs between board and membership contrasts with the stated rules of the newly formed Liverpool FC, which lay emphasis on the ‘sole right’ of the board in club affairs. A good practical example of the differences in the balance of power existing at each club concerns the matter of pricing arrangements with respect to club members. Solely the club’s executive committee decided upon the price of season tickets and seating arrangements for members of Liverpool FC. By contrast, the Memorandum of Association of Everton FC (Article 3a ii) reveals that members’ ticket prices and seating arrangements were determined by the Everton membership and were to be carried into effect by the directorate (a state of affairs changed by special resolution in 1908 when the determination of pricing passed to the board).

Another way of underlining the more apparently democratic lines upon which Everton FC was run in relation to Liverpool FC is by noting the use at Everton FC of independent (that is, independent from obvious boardroom connection) club auditing arrangements and legal representation. Evidence suggests firmly that Everton’s legal affairs, handled by North, Kirk and Cornett solicitors, and their accounts, audited by Theodore Rogers and Company – neither company having any discernible connection with Everton FC – were presented annually to the membership for scrutiny. The correspondent of the Liverpool Review, describing the proceedings of the 1894 Everton FC Annual General Meeting, wrote of his ‘amazement’ at ‘the intensity of interest displayed by the 500 or so club members who for three hours howled and gesticulated…over affairs financial and governmental to their body’. The Liverpool Review reporter goes on to describe the ‘iconoclastic way’ in which members ‘discussed the statement of accounts’ and brought up ‘points of legal difference’ with the executive committee.49 By way of contrast, the
auditing and legal arrangements of Liverpool FC were, during the period under review and beyond, kept “in-house”. Club directors Edwin and Albert Berry, who were also solicitors, carried out the legal affairs of the club. Club secretary, Simon Jude, who was also a chartered accountant, audited the accounts of the club. There is no available evidence to suggest that members at the club’s Annual General Meetings were privy to either the financial performance of the club, or the contracts entered into by their board of directors. The importance of independent accounting and legal arrangements at Everton FC, and the absence of such independence at Liverpool FC, is that it suggests, perhaps, a greater degree of accountability at the former club, and that there were effective administrative obstacles set in place at Everton FC which blocked the possibility of the concentration of power into the hands of the executive.

7.8 Motives of Everton and Liverpool Football Club Directors, 1892–1904
Differences in the power relations existing within each club can also be witnessed with regard to the opportunities directors had to carry out commercial contracts with their own clubs. This is something we might expect, given that a crucial factor leading to the split of the original Everton FC was the debate over the propriety or otherwise of the potential commercial exploitation of that club. Those setting up Everton FC as a limited company after the split of 1892 seem to have been seeking to safeguard the club from the type of exploitation the club’s membership had perceived in John Houlding’s actions within the original club. Article 14 of the club’s Articles of Association, for example, reads ‘No director of the club shall be entitled to receive any remuneration from the Company in respect of his office as director or as an employee of the Company’. On the other hand, the constitution of Liverpool FC formally set out the legitimate right of directors to contract with their own club. Some Liverpool directors were involved, as we have seen, in commercial activity – more especially, brewing – that could have profitably gained from association with a football club. A motion carried at the club’s first Annual General Meeting in 1892 is instructive as to the impulse of those setting up the club: ‘The office of director shall not be vacated by his being concerned or participating in the profits of supplying the company with any goods or stock, or otherwise contracting with the
company or for execution of any work for the company'. Once the obstacles placed in the path of the commercial designs of Houlding and his allies within the original club had been removed, then, the commercial rights of the board were immediately established at Liverpool FC. Early Liverpool FC matchday programmes also emphasise the commercial opportunities opened up to directors of the club. Advertisements for theatres and public houses with boardroom connections were commonplace in the programmes, as well as advertisements for brewing companies with shareholdings in the club. Adverts here relate to John Houlding's Sandon Hotel, the Empire Theatre, of which club director William Houlding had part ownership, and the Rotunda Theatre, of which club auditor and secretary Joseph West was joint proprietor. Large shareholders at Liverpool FC, such as Bent's Brewery, were also prominently advertised.

Going back to the issue of directors gaining contracts from Liverpool FC for their external businesses, it has to be acknowledged that without access to internal club documents it is not possible to say with any certainty whether, and by how much, Liverpool directors profited from their club position. For example, Liverpool licensing records for the period under discussion do not reveal any information that would suggest alcohol was sold at Liverpool FC's Anfield Road ground – a key motive, one might expect, for the Houlding family's involvement in Liverpool FC. Perhaps the prospect of financial gain for directors, held out in the club's mission statement, was not fully realised? However, what can be stated with certainty is that the philosophy of the two Liverpool clubs regarding the desirability of directors profiting from their period in office was divergent.

A more obvious way of evaluating the worth to directors of a boardroom position is by observing indicators suggesting that men elected to the board of their local professional football club gained prominence within other civic institutions. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a principal overlap identified by football historians in the secondary literature is that which existed in many towns between the personnel of football club boardrooms and local political parties. Indeed, one of the striking things to note about the
men in administrative control of Everton and Liverpool football clubs during this early period is the high incidence of political activity amongst them. It was noted in an earlier chapter concerning the non-financial issues surrounding the split of the original Everton FC that the key members of the competing factions seeking to gain control over that club were also active in the political life of the city, and that those factionalists were split along party political lines. Evidence suggests that those party political distinctions were reinforced between the boardrooms of the two post-1892 incorporated clubs.

The level and nature of involvement in Conservative politics at Liverpool FC is of particular interest. Nine of the thirteen directors of Liverpool FC were active in the Liverpool Conservative Party. Five of these were members of the ruling body of Liverpool Conservatism: the Constitutional Association. The Constitutional Association exercised complete control over district Conservative Associations in Liverpool and affiliated societies and organisations. Other points of association of the club’s leadership with Liverpool Toryism were in the Conservative District Associations and in the city council chamber. Club director Benjamin E. Bailey was chairman of West Derby Conservative Association. Fellow directors John Houlding and Edwin Berry were chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of Everton and Kirkdale Conservative Association. In the council chamber, John Houlding, Edwin Berry, William Houlding (John Houlding’s son and fellow director) and club secretary Simon Jude were Conservative councillors representing neighbouring north Liverpool wards. But perhaps the most significant of Tory Party connections existing between members of the Liverpool hierarchy were those forged through involvement in the Working Men’s Conservative Association (WMCA). It was noted in an earlier chapter of the thesis how this organization was utilised by John Houlding and his supporters in the old club to counter perceived political intrigue from their opponents both inside and outside that club. Six of the thirteen Liverpool FC directors holding office between 1892 and 1904 held administrative positions within the WMCA. Directors Edwin Berry and Benjamin E. Bailey were, respectively, solicitor and secretary to the organisation. Albert Edward Berry, also a Liverpool director, succeeded his brother Edwin as WMCA solicitor.
Other directors, Richard H. Webster, William Houlding, and club chairman John Houlding, attained committee member status in various WMCA branches in the north end of Liverpool. Club secretary Simon Jude, a member of the Association’s executive committee, joined these directors in this organisation. (Analysis of the relatively small number of Liverpool FC shareholders during its developmental period reveals other prominent figures from the WMCA).

The organisational overlap between the club and the WMCA is a significant one. With 18 branches throughout Liverpool in 1894 and 6,000 members the WMCA had established itself as the dominant force in Liverpool politics: ‘The engine of Protestant power within the Conservative Party’. This quasi-religious organisation kept Liverpool Conservatism at the vanguard of anti-Catholic opposition within Liverpool at a time when independent Protestant representation threatened the Tories’ “natural” majority in the council chamber. The political expression of the Liverpool Protestant Association, the WMCA was responsible in the late 1890s and early 1900s for promoting the Church Discipline Bill (or the Liverpool Bill as it became known). The Bill sought to stamp out what its sponsors saw as ritualistic practices in the Church of England – that is, ‘the revival or introduction of Roman Catholic ceremonial and sacramental practices in the Church of England’. The WMCA’s Liverpool Bill was designed to bring what they believed were errant clergymen within the jurisdiction of lay tribunals, operating at a local level, that would be set up to sit in judgement on their performance as defenders of the Protestant faith.

The WMCA and the Orange Order in Liverpool, according to Barbara Whittingham-Jones in her study, Down With The Orange Caucus (1936), were as ‘identical in political outlook as in personnel’. The WMCA expressly forbade its members to consort with Roman Catholics. In the context of deepening sectarian tensions in Liverpool society at this juncture, the powerful connections the Liverpool board had with an avowedly sectarian organisation lends some weight to the often-made claims concerning a historical sectarian division between Everton and Liverpool football clubs. Everton FC have often
been described as a club attracting the support of Roman Catholics, and Liverpool FC as a club attracting the support of Protestants.60

The number of directors at Everton FC involved in political organisations was not as large as that at Liverpool FC. However, there was, during these formative years of the newly incorporated club, a substantial Liberal connection in the Everton boardroom. Directors, William R. Clayton, chairman of Formby Liberal Association, 61 James Clement Baxter, Liberal city councillor for Liverpool's St Anne's ward, 62 George Mahon, committee member and founding member of Walton Liberal Association,63 and Dr William Whitford, chairman of Everton and Kirkdale Liberal Association,64 held the chairmanship of the club between 1892 and the First World War. Another Everton director, Will Cuff, also leaves evidence of involvement in local Liberal politics.65

If we consider the nature of Liverpool Liberalism the significance of the party political distinctions existing between the boardrooms of the two clubs — and, more especially, the WMCA connections at Liverpool FC's — can be magnified still further. The Liberal Party traditionally enjoyed the support of enfranchised Roman Catholics in Liverpool. This was substantially due to that party's favourable attitude towards the relaxation of prohibitive legislation concerning the freedom to worship of Roman Catholics, and also the Liberal Party's adoption of the principle of Home Rule on the Irish Question. Though the success of the Irish National Party in Liverpool in the late nineteenth century weakened these links, there remained a residual connection between Catholicism and Liverpool Liberalism.66 Everton directors Dr James Clement Baxter, as a Roman Catholic and councillor for a predominantly Irish Catholic city ward, and Dr William Whitford, as a prominent supporter of the Home Rule movement, were exemplars of the ethno-religious connections of Liverpool Liberalism. Dr Baxter enjoyed good relations with the city's Irish Nationalist Party (INP). Dr Baxter was 'the official nominee of the Catholic Church' 67 for St Anne's ward and the INP stood aside from contesting Baxter's seat after his election in 1906 until 1920, when policy differences between the city's Liberal Party and the INP became insoluble. Press reports identify Baxter as an attendee of Irish
Nationalist meetings in the north end of Liverpool. Irish-born Dr Whitford was described by Liverpool journal *Porcupine* as 'an ardent Home Ruler', and, in his capacity of Liberal Association chairman for the Everton and Kirkdale district, was a powerful voice for the nationalist aspirations of the Irish. Dr Baxter and Dr Whitford — both graduates of the Royal College of Physicians Ireland — were not only colleagues in the Everton FC boardroom but also, because of their shared political outlook, moved in the same social circles away from it.

On the subject of Home Rule – if we take into consideration the stance taken on this issue by the district political associations that the football club directors were involved in running – this would have been an issue that would have fundamentally divided certain members of the Liverpool board of directors from certain directors at Everton FC. Conservative District Associations at Everton and Kirkdale and at West Derby took a resolute line on the Irish question. Orangemen dominated the West Derby association. Their line on Home Rule was implacable: the party should 'stand steadfast to the cause of Imperial Unity and Protestant principles' and 'resist the tendency of Gladstonian legislation...to hand over the government of Ireland to Romish priests'. By contrast, the Liberal District Associations at Everton and Kirkdale and at Walton – associations that Everton directors’ were involved in – took an unshakeable pro-Home Rule line. The Walton Liberal Association, for example, affirmed its ‘total support for Home Rule’.

The different religious composition of each boardroom can, in the case of some directors, help explain the divergence in political identification exhibited between the Everton and Liverpool boards. Though the board members at both Everton and Liverpool were overwhelmingly Protestant – Everton director and chairman James Clement Baxter was the only non-Protestant representative at this organisational level of either club – a distinction that can be drawn is the greater number of the Liverpool FC hierarchy from Church of England backgrounds. Just one director of the club, John Asbury – a Methodist – was from a non-Anglican background. Indeed, some in the Liverpool FC hierarchy were very active members of the Established Church. Albert Berry was warden
of St Mary’s Church, Liscard. His brother and fellow club director, Edwin Berry, was very vociferous in his public life in defence of the Established Church against the perceived threat to it from ritualism. Berry declared himself to be a ‘loyal Churchman’ with ‘every desire to further the principles of the Church of England in accordance with the Reformation’, and ‘zealous to bring Ritualistic offenders to book’. The strain of ‘anti-ritualism’ in the Church of England was closely associated with Liverpool Conservatism via the influence the WMCA had locally on the Established Church. Identification with the Church of England became almost synonymous with the WMCA’s particular brand of politics that dominated the Liverpool Conservative Party.

At Everton FC, churchmen were in the majority, but there was a greater number of nonconformists amongst board members. Out of the seventeen board members whose religious denomination is known, five were from Methodist backgrounds and two were Congregationalists. Taken together with the Roman Catholic, James Clement Baxter, the Everton boardroom can be said to have reflected, to some extent, the denominational mix of the district of Everton from which the club originated, and in which the majority of the membership resided.

The particular form of nonconformism practised by certain Everton directors may reasonably be linked to their involvement in Liberal politics. Three directors were closely involved as laymen in the affairs of St Domingo New Connexional Methodist chapel. The New Connexional Methodists were typically Liberal in their political impulse – this sect of Methodism being also known as “Liberal Methodism” or “Tom Paine Methodism”. Neil Collins in Politics and Elections in Nineteenth Century Liverpool (1994) alludes to the connection between Liverpool nonconformity and Liberal politics. Collins points out that after the split within Liberal ranks from the late 1880s over the issue of Home Rule for Ireland, the Liverpool Liberal Party, traditionally dominated by Whig merchant families who were disproportionately from an Anglican background, there saw an increased influence of party members from nonconformist backgrounds who stood solidly behind Gladstonian Liberalism. The men involved in Liberal politics within the
Everton boardroom joined the party after the great division within it and, as we have seen, were instrumental in the running of district Liberal associations fully committed to Gladstonian Liberalism.

Turning attention away from political connections and their meaning, directors of the Liverpool clubs also gained prominence in other areas of public life. Four directors were called to the magistrate’s bench, and Liverpool FC chairman John Houlding was distinguished by the conferment of the Lord Mayoralty in 1898. The boardroom of Liverpool FC would, apparently, have been a convenient environment for the ambitious middle-class Liverpudlian to have gained access to in order to enhance his prospect of entry to another civic institution: Liverpool Freemasonry. Eight of the thirteen directors and two secretaries at Liverpool FC were Freemasons. In this respect it would be amiss, as with all other things connected with Liverpool FC during this period, not to begin with chairman and majority shareholder John Houlding’s achievements. Houlding, who had been a founding member of both Anfield and Sir Walter Raleigh Lodges, rose through the levels of Freemasonry, attaining the status of Provincial Grand Registrar and Provincial Grand Warden in West Lancashire during the 1880s. His Masonic career reached its zenith in 1898 when he became Grand Senior Deacon of England. Houlding was one of the few Freemasons who attained the 33rd Degree – the highest possible level any Freemason can attain, an exclusive order within Freemasonry restricted to seventy five members at any one point in time. At provincial level in West Lancashire and Cheshire, Liverpool FC directors made their mark: J.J Ramsey and John McKenna attained the level of Provincial Grand Deacon in West Lancashire, as did club secretary Simon Jude. Director Edwin Berry attained Provincial Grand Registrar status in West Lancashire, whilst his brother, and fellow director, Albert E. Berry achieved the rank of Provincial Grand Deacon (Cheshire). At Everton FC, two directors of the club, John C. Brooks and Albert E. Leyland, were involved in Masonic activity in Liverpool lodges. In comparison to Liverpool FC, however, where there was an obviously significant Masonic influence, the presence of Masonic activity amongst the men in control of Everton FC was marginal.
Having surveyed the evidence concerning aspects of control at Everton and Liverpool football clubs in the period 1892–1902, we can now assess whether the hypotheses formulated with regard to control at the clubs were sustained.

One of the hypotheses put forward was that clear distinctions would emerge between the clubs in terms of the balance of power between shareholders and directors at each club in the wake of the 1892 split. It would appear safe to conclude that the two clubs can be differentiated along these lines, and that a less centralised decision making process did emerge at Everton FC than at Liverpool FC, where boardroom accountability to shareholders over financial and administrative affairs was not as evident as at Everton FC. These distinctions were linked to the financial dominance of Liverpool FC by its board of directors, the by-products of which were the keeping within the boardroom of club auditing and legal affairs and the longevity of the period in office of Liverpool FC directors. These organisational characteristics ran contrary to those at Everton FC where the relative financial weakness of the board and the presence of a numerically large and volatile body of shareholders resulted in the preservation at the incorporated Everton FC of the balance of power which had characterised relations between the club’s committee and membership in the earlier period. It was noted, in particular, that the financial and legal arrangements of the Everton club were organised independently of members of the board and democratically debated by the club shareholders, and that, relative to Liverpool FC, shareholders of the club were able and willing to call their directors to account, as witnessed by the more rapid turnover of directors at that club compared to Liverpool FC. These power relations existing within the newly incorporated Liverpool clubs could reasonably be expected given that a crucial aspect of the factional struggle within the original club was the concern over the growing concentration of power among certain members of its committee. The factionalists, in setting up the two new club-companies, would appear to have made sure that the differing views on the desirability of the centralised command of a football club held sway within Everton and Liverpool football clubs.
The other hypothesis regarding patterns of control at the two Liverpool clubs related to possible motives for joining their boards. Specifically, this hypothesis proposed that the financial motives and political motives, which were evident in the involvement of committee members of the original Everton FC, would be carried over into the boardrooms of the two newly created club-companies.

As far as financial motivations of the directors are concerned, there was a discernable difference in attitude at the two clubs towards their directors gaining financially from boardroom positions. Regulations of the two clubs, outlined in the text above, underline the fact that at Liverpool FC the commercial association of directors with their club was acceptable, but that such a connection was considered unacceptable at Everton FC. This reflected the centrality in setting up Liverpool FC of brewing interests – specifically, the Houlding family. As also noted, though it is difficult to prove that directors of Liverpool FC actually profited from contracting with the club, other indicators, principally the advertisement via the club of directors’ outside business interests, offer us firm evidence of the possibilities for personal gain that becoming a board member held out at Liverpool FC, underlining a likely financial motive in attaining a position as director there.

Similarly, and this time in the case of both boards of directors, evidence does seem to back up the proposition that the position of football club director in Liverpool was likely to have had the power to attract those with (or those wishing to attain) a public profile within the locality – a characteristic of those serving on the original club’s committees. At Liverpool FC the influence of John Houlding, a senior Conservative figure in the city of Liverpool, seems to have been a key factor in the attraction to the club of Tories with an established public profile and Tory activists seeking such a public profile (three of the Liverpool FC directors gained their political office after their election to the Liverpool board). At Everton FC, though to a lesser degree than in the Anfield boardroom, political patronage was also a strong feature of the board during the period 1892–1904. At Everton FC, local Liberals rather than Tories gained a foothold within the boardroom.
This ideological distinction between the clubs regarding certain members of their boards can be argued to have been a ramification of similar distinctions discernible in the political profiles of the key factionalists who struggled in opposition to each other to gain control of the original club. It cannot be discounted that election to the boardroom of the new club-companies greatly enhanced the chances of gaining or retaining positions of public office.

7.9 Conclusion
Overall, and drawing the chapter’s analysis back to the central theme of the thesis regarding the tensions arising out of the growing commodification of the professional football club, the two major Liverpool clubs offer us distinct examples of restructuring what were, essentially, social institutions along the lines of an orthodox business. The finances required by professional clubs to operate in an increasingly competitive environment, as we have seen, propelled most English clubs to transform themselves into limited companies in order to raise revenue prior to the First World War. For Everton FC incorporation saw the club depart from its over-reliance upon members’ annual subscriptions, gate revenue from supporters and, perhaps most importantly of all for the future of the club, loans from former club president John Houlding, in order to formally place into the hands of its large membership the ownership of the organisation. This share issue was taken up by members in small units of, on average, four to five £1 shares per member – the stated intention of those figures setting up the new company. There was no appeal for major financial contributions from individuals within the club (although a member of the original club committee, James Clement Baxter, did offer an interest-free loan of £100085). It would appear that Everton FC’s incorporation as a limited company helped reinforce an existing social institution by the use of a market mechanism, changing little that was essential to the original objectives of the club. Everton FC retained its capacity to attract a broad social mix of members. In relation to those members, we might agree with Lowerson’s evaluation of the expansion of the late nineteenth century–early twentieth century middle-class sporting club: ‘For their core of dedicated members they offered a way of life, and additional layers of recognition,
occasionally as alternatives to economic roles in status reinforcement'. Lowerson goes on to argue that clubs 'generated not only income and capital formation but also social prestige [and at least for some members] opportunities for local influence...'. Indeed, the prevalence of local political figures in the boardroom (of both clubs) in the limited company period underlines the continued importance of the professional football club as a means through which local social relationships could be reinforced.

At Liverpool FC, on the other hand, formation of the club rested principally upon the financial undertaking of its chairman, John Houlding, with shareholders in the club both small in numbers and weak in relation to the club's board, in which financial and administrative power within the club was concentrated. This reliance upon a large single investor is also a feature of the early development of other top-flight clubs as club-companies. It would appear that the incorporation of such football club companies can be seen less in terms of the members of a social institution seeking to preserve their identity by use of a 'market mechanism', and more as part of an identified trend within late-Victorian and Edwardian society towards 'the seizure of economic opportunities and the manipulation of complex local status networks by urban business and professional men' – an appropriate summary of the motives of some of the hierarchy of Liverpool FC, in particular. In relation to the football club as an 'economic opportunity': as we shall see in the next chapter, when a return on, or protection of, investment in Liverpool FC by the Houlding family could not be secured a decision was made to sell up their assets and a restructuring of Liverpool FC's ownership followed. However, the rationale of most clubs seems more typical of the Everton FC model of incorporation, if the significant proportion of shares owned by working-class shareholders and the (on average) small proportion of shares concentrated within the boardroom of First Division clubs are useful indicators, in this respect.

Retrospectively, we can see from the early development of the two clubs that the cultural chasm described in earlier chapters in relation to the split of Everton FC in 1892 – though rarely articulated openly by the factionalists in that conflict – became manifest in the
differences in governance strategy, proprietary involvement of the drink trade, and the democratic involvement of the membership adopted at Everton and Liverpool football clubs. However, evidence suggests that this difference in the early development of the two clubs began to break down in the latter part of the period covered in this thesis. This is the subject matter considered in the following chapter.
Chapter Eight

Analysis of Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs
1902–1914

8.1 Introduction

In Chapter Seven a number of obvious organisational dissimilarities existing between Everton and Liverpool football clubs in the period prior to 1902 were uncovered. It was revealed that Liverpool FC in that early period of development was characterised by its small, exclusively selected share ownership base, its financial domination by individual shareholders who were also involved in the local drink industry, and a boardroom exhibiting clear signs of being drawn from an exclusive socio-political background. Everton FC, on the other hand, was characterised prior to 1905 by its large number of shareholders; typically shareholdings were small and distributed more evenly across the socio-political class spectrum, with skilled workers playing a more prominent role in the club than at Liverpool FC. It was also revealed that the boardroom at Everton FC exhibited a more heterogeneous social composition than that at Liverpool FC. The overarching conclusion reached from the evidence presented was that Everton FC’s move to limited company status helped to reinforce an existing social institution by the use of a market mechanism, changing little that was essential to the original objectives of the club.¹ The creation of Liverpool FC as a limited company, on the other hand, would appear to have been a move to maximise the commercial potential of professional football by a small number of influential club members in whose hands power within the club was to be concentrated. The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether any significant movement away from these organisational distinctions occurred in the period between 1902 and 1914 – to determine, in other words, whether or not there had been any movement towards convergence in terms of ownership and control prior to the outbreak of the First World War.
This chapter utilises primary and secondary sources concerning the trend in share ownership of a number of British professional football clubs prior to 1914. Data from other clubs' share registers suggests that, over time, many clubs experienced changes in the pattern of ownership of shares. In particular, the data demonstrated a growing trend towards concentration of ownership, and shifts in the social complexion of those who owned shares within their organisations towards middle-class domination. It was found from an investigation of Everton and Liverpool football clubs' share ownership registers that both Liverpool clubs also experienced changes to their organisational profile over the period 1892 to 1914. These changes are contextualised in this chapter within the trends in club share ownership taking place amongst other professional football clubs.

A major conclusion to the investigation is that the structural changes taking place in the shareholder profiles of the two Liverpool clubs in the period after 1902 had the effect of eliminating many of the earlier distinctions between the two organisations. However, the Liverpool clubs converged in a way that did not conform to the trend amongst other First Division clubs sampled, that is, towards a concentration of share ownership and the greater reliance on middle-class investors. Rather, the two Liverpool clubs in the latter half of the period 1892–1914 were characterised by a pattern of share ownership that was less concentrated than in the first half of that period. Middle-class influence was also checked and (in the case of Liverpool FC) even significantly reduced. This phenomenon will be explained in the text below partly as the effect on share ownership at Liverpool FC of the selling up of shares by members involved in the drink trade, and more especially brewers, and partly as the result of changes at both Everton and Liverpool football clubs to share ownership rights.

As well as this analysis of the changing shareholder profile at the Liverpool clubs, the chapter also examines the pattern of governance at the two clubs in this later period. Another major conclusion drawn is that though share ownership at both Everton and Liverpool football clubs was more widespread amongst the membership, this trend was accompanied by a greater degree of bureaucracy. This leads to the interesting question
raised in this chapter as to whether or not the football clubs were formally democratic organisations, but in essence dominated by a managerial elite. It is also argued within this section of the chapter that these changes had their effect on the socio-political complexion of the two club’s boardrooms, which had formerly been quite distinct in these terms.

8.2 Share Ownership Trends Amongst English Professional Football Clubs in the Pre-1914 Period

In order to determine the dominant trends in share ownership amongst professional football clubs prior to 1914, data from a sample of First Division clubs was gathered and analysed. The sampled clubs are: Blackburn Rovers; Bolton Wanderers; Manchester City; Middlesbrough; and Oldham Athletic. Two share registers for each of the clubs were studied: one register from their year of incorporation, the second for 1914. As the two Liverpool clubs were consistently First Division organisations prior to 1914 (aside from Liverpool FC’s three seasons in the Second Division) a decision was made to restrict the selection of particular clubs for sampling to those that were present regularly in the First Division prior to 1914. It was reasoned that clubs of similar competitive status would share similar expectations and pressures from shareholders regarding organisational objectives that may have affected share ownership patterns. This focus on First Division clubs is consistent with the emphasis laid on this level of organization in Chapter Seven. Social classification used in this chapter is that used in Chapter Seven. Though a degree of caution should be exercised in making firm conclusions about overarching trends from this sample, it is felt that data from the sampled clubs can allow for an insight into shareholder activity amongst First Division clubs in the pre-First World War period.

Analysis of club share registers concentrated primarily on determining the trends within each club over time. One of these trends concerns the degree to which there was a move towards concentration of share ownership experienced at each sampled club by 1914. The other concerns the measurement of any social class change experienced in the share
ownership structure of clubs, both in terms of changes to the proportion of shareholders’ belonging to different social groups and changes to the proportion of shares owned by different social groups. Prior to analysis of the data it was expected that a greater concentration of share ownership and social group change in the share structure of each club would be the likely outcome of the testing process. These expectations were based on the fact that the majority of shares sold by professional clubs remained unsold in the very early years of their existence, with substantial amounts of shares being bought at a later period. For instance, Wray Vamplew’s figures for the take-up of shares amongst thirty-two English professional clubs demonstrates that, on average, less than 50 per cent of club stock was taken up shareholders in the early years of their existence.³ Some clubs registered much less take-up than others for example, there was an excess of unsold shares at Newcastle United and Queens Park Rangers of 82 per cent, and an excess of 89 per cent at Huddersfield Town and Southampton. My own research on seven football clubs demonstrates that the take-up of shares in clubs rose significantly over the period to 1914. Amongst the clubs sampled in this chapter increases in shares issued between year of formation and 1914 of between 39 per cent and 400 per cent are recorded. The percentage increase in share ownership at Blackburn Rovers was 250 per cent, at Manchester City 70 per cent, Middlesbrough 118 per cent, Newcastle United 400 per cent, and Oldham Athletic 39 per cent.⁴ This increase in share ownership, coupled with the established propensity for working-class shareholders to own small amounts of shares in clubs – share buying being the result of an initial surge to register continued loyalty to their club in the change to limited company status, rather than financial speculation – dictated the conclusion that share ownership by 1914 would become more the preserve of middle-class groups who, traditionally, took up larger bundles of shares in football clubs.

Beginning with the first of the hypotheses put forward, that concentration of share ownership in clubs would occur between their year of foundation and 1914, three indicators are used to determine whether any such movement had occurred. These are the average number of shareholdings held by shareholders; the proportion of shareholders
owning ten shares or more; and the proportion of shares held by the ten largest shareholders.

Table 8.1 Concentration of Share Ownership in First Division Clubs Sampled
(Top figure gives % of shareholders or shares owned in year of formation; middle figure gives % of shareholders or shares owned in 1914; bracketed figure gives % rise or fall over the intervening period)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Average Shareholding Per Shareholder (%)</th>
<th>Shareholders Owning 10+ Shares (%)</th>
<th>Shares Owned by 10 Largest Shareholders (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn Rovers</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+5.6)</td>
<td>(+18.5)</td>
<td>(16.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.6)</td>
<td>(-1.1)</td>
<td>(+1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+1.3)</td>
<td>(+5.4)</td>
<td>(+18.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle United</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+3.3)</td>
<td>(+29.9)</td>
<td>(-8.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham Athletic</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+1.9)</td>
<td>(+6.9)</td>
<td>(+0.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blackburn Rovers FC (BT/00053482); Bolton Wanderers FC (00043026); Manchester City FC (BT/00040946); Middlesbrough FC (BT/00036633); Oldham Athletic FC (BT/00088795).

It will be observed from Table 8.1 that average number of shares held in all but one club (Manchester City) rose over the period to 1914. Again, in terms of the proportion of shareholders owning ten or more shares, all but one club (Manchester City) registered
increases – in some instances large increases, as in the case of Blackburn Rovers, where the proportion rose from 49 per cent of shareholders in 1898 to 68 per cent by 1914, and Newcastle United, where the proportion rose from 9 per cent of shareholders in 1891 to almost 39 per cent by 1914. In terms of shares owned by the ten largest shareholders there were mixed signals. Three of the five clubs registered an increase, and two a decrease in their proportionate share ownership, although even in the case of these two clubs, Blackburn Rovers and Newcastle United, the ten largest shareholders did significantly increase the amount of shares they owned prior to 1914 – from 330 to 529 shares at Blackburn Rovers, and from 100 to 343 shares at Newcastle United.

A possible reason for the growing concentration of share ownership and increase of middle-class share ownership which, overall, were the principal findings of the sample data, concerns the downward pressure on working-class living standards at certain points during the first decade of the twentieth century. Data from the sample clubs suggest that not only did the proportion of working-class shareholders decline over the period to 1914, but also that, amongst some clubs sampled, the absolute number of working-class shareholders declined to varying degrees. For example, the number of working-class shareholders at Middlesbrough fell by 4 per cent, at Oldham Athletic by 6 per cent, and at Blackburn Rovers by 21 per cent. Economic indicators signal that living standards were lowered during periods of rising unemployment in the decade prior to the First World War. Table 8.2 shows that in 1904/05 and again in 1908/09 higher than usual unemployment levels – the average hovering around the 2.5–3.5 per cent mark between 1900 and 1914 – had an effect on the population’s consumption of goods and services. Expenditure on fuel and light, clothing, and furniture and electrical goods dropped during, and in the years following, the rise in unemployment levels to 5–6 per cent in 1904–05. The sharp rise in unemployment in 1908–09 was accompanied by a decline in expenditure on food in 1908, and on clothing, household goods, and books and recreational goods in 1908 and 1909. During both of these periods there occurred also a halt to the rise in trade union membership.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unemployment (%)</th>
<th>Trade Union M'ship (.000s)</th>
<th>Food (£M)</th>
<th>Fuel/Light (£M)</th>
<th>Furniture, Elec. &amp; Household Goods (£M)</th>
<th>Books/Recreational Goods (£M)</th>
<th>Clothing (£M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1,994</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1,967</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1,997</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2,513</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2,485</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2,477</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3,139</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3,416</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4,135</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4,145</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These economic indicators might suggest that the ownership of football club shares for most working-class people – a greater proportion of whose income would have been spent on these goods and services – would have been a distant consideration, not only during the years of slump outlined above, but through the first decade of the twentieth century when economic volatility would have hampered confidence in such investment. This lack of confidence may, perhaps, have influenced some existing working-class shareholders to sell their shares.

Turning to the second hypothesis, concerning the expectancy of changes to the social structure of football club share ownership prior to the First World War, this proposition appears to be sustainable from evidence gathered on the sample clubs. The pattern of shareholding amongst the clubs shows that all registered a decline in manual workers owning shares. At two of the clubs (Manchester City and Middlesbrough) this decline was in excess of 20 per cent, at another (Newcastle United) just less than 17 per cent. A breakdown of the data can be seen in Table 8.3, below, where all working-class occupational groups have also been combined. Conversely, in all but one club (Blackburn Rovers) employers and proprietors increased their proportion amongst shareholders – a trend replicated when analysis takes consideration of the performance of all middle-class occupations.

Though the data on proportion of share ownership amongst clubs is not as conclusive in proving a similarly striking contrast in performance amongst different social groups there is, nevertheless, a detectable trend towards greater middle-class ownership of shares and a reduction in share ownership amongst working-class groups.
Table 8.3 Proportion of Shareholders at Sampled First Division Clubs from Different Occupations/Social Classes (top figure gives % of shareholders in year of formation; middle figure gives % of shareholders in 1914; bracketed figure gives % rise or fall in intervening period)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Manual Workers</th>
<th>Employers &amp; Proprietors</th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn Rovers</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.8)</td>
<td>(-1.5)</td>
<td>(-0.3)</td>
<td>(-3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-22.3)</td>
<td>(+17.8)</td>
<td>(-17.4)</td>
<td>(+14.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-20.5)</td>
<td>(+6.1)</td>
<td>(-17.3)</td>
<td>(+17.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle United</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-16.7)</td>
<td>(+1.2)</td>
<td>(-13.2)</td>
<td>(+6.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham Athletic</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-4.2)</td>
<td>(+2.1)</td>
<td>(-5.6)</td>
<td>(+1.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blackburn Rovers FC (BT/00053482); Bolton Wanderers FC (00043026); Manchester City FC (BT/00040946); Middlesbrough FC (BT/00036633); Oldham Athletic FC (BT/00088795).

In Table 8.4 it can be seen that in all but one club, Blackburn Rovers, manual working class share ownership declines, with two of the clubs, Manchester City and Middlesbrough, registering declines in excess of 20 per cent in their proportion of manual working-class ownership from the year of their formation to 1914.
Table 8.4 Proportion of Shares Owned at Sampled First Division Clubs by Different Occupations/Social Classes (top figure gives % of shares owned in year of formation; middle figure gives % of shares owned in 1914; bracketed figure gives % rise or fall in intervening period)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Manual Workers</th>
<th>Employers &amp; Proprietors</th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn Rovers</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+2.3)</td>
<td>(+2.7)</td>
<td>(-6.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-7.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-7.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-20.1)</td>
<td>(+6.4)</td>
<td>(-14.5)</td>
<td>(+10.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-22.3)</td>
<td>(+16.6)</td>
<td>(-27.8)</td>
<td>(+15.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle United</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-8.1)</td>
<td>(-7.4)</td>
<td>(-8.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-12.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham Athletic</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-4.0)</td>
<td>(+1.4)</td>
<td>(-12.7)</td>
<td>(+5.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blackburn Rovers FC (BT/00053482); Bolton Wanderers FC (00043026); Manchester City FC (BT/00040946); Middlesbrough FC (BT/00036633); Oldham Athletic FC (BT/00088795).

Similarly, all but one club, again Blackburn Rovers, saw the erosion of their proportion of share ownership for all working class groups, with two of the clubs, again Manchester City and Middlesbrough, registering working-class decline of share ownership of almost 20 per cent, and a 14 per cent decline at Newcastle United. For middle-class groups the trend amongst all of the sampled clubs was towards growth in their ownership of shares.
The data indicates that the majority of clubs registers an increase in share ownership for employers and proprietors (though one club, Newcastle United experienced a fall of 11 per cent in the proportion of shares owned by this group). This trend strengthens when considering the ownership of shares by all middle-class groups.

The data shows that in the case of the majority of clubs sampled, the middle classes increased their hold on share ownership and, in the case of Manchester City and Middlesbrough, increased their share by well over 10 per cent. Tony Mason in his study, *Association Football and English Society, 1863–1915* (1980), demonstrates that Woolwich Arsenal also conformed to this trend. Starting its existence as a limited liability company in 1893, the club’s ownership was almost completely in the hands of those involved in various working-class occupations. However, financial difficulties in the years at the turn of the twentieth century allowed local businessmen and professionals to gain control of share ownership of the club. Mason also highlights the experience of another “working-class” club, Darwen FC. Darwen FC was a limited liability company financed almost exclusively by working-class money. Its fate was sealed after just two seasons when the club went into liquidation having failed to compete with their heavily financed near neighbours Blackburn Rovers, a club owned and controlled by businessmen involved in the local textile industry. Indeed, the larger percentage of shares owned by working class shareholders at Blackburn Rovers that we witnessed in the sample results above may have been influenced by an influx of displaced shareholders from Darwen FC seeking to retain some connection with professional football in the area. Both the examples of Arsenal FC and Darwen FC tend to suggest that the growing proportion of middle-class ownership of football clubs may have been a necessity for them to prosper, or even survive, prior to 1914.

Employers and proprietors, then, were a social group with a growing presence and influence in these First Division clubs. Their greater take-up of shares might possibly be explained by ambitions to exploit the clubs either for commercial possibilities, through the provision of their own goods or services, for example (a motivation largely doubted
by football historians), or for status reasons – seeking to buy shares in order to gain boardroom positions.

What, then, are the implications of these conclusions for studying the development of Everton and Liverpool football clubs? One of the major findings of the analysis carried out on the sample group of First Division clubs is that the structure of shareholding of a football club over a long period of time tends to evolve from that established in an earlier period of a club's existence. We might expect, therefore, the Liverpool clubs to betray a similar tendency in their later development. We witnessed in the previous chapter that Everton and Liverpool football clubs by 1902 – the end of the first decade of the clubs’ existence as limited companies – had quite divergent share ownership structures. Everton FC was characterised by a widely dispersed ownership of shares distributed across the spectrum of socio-occupational groups; Liverpool FC by the concentration of share ownership in the hands of a small number of individual shareholders and by a predominantly middle-class shareholder profile. Evidence gathered on both clubs for the period 1902 to 1914 confirms that – as in the case of other professional clubs sampled – both of the Liverpool clubs’ share structures evolved considerably. However, as we shall see, the nature of their evolution differed markedly from the general shifts in shareholding established amongst other football clubs. If the general shifts had been replicated in the Liverpool clubs – with a concentration of share ownership and increased involvement of the middle classes – we would expect to see a movement of Everton FC’s organisational profile coming more into line with Liverpool FC’s. Instead, what we get is convergence, but with the share ownership structure of Liverpool FC moving towards a greater resemblance of the organisational profile established at Everton FC.

8.3 The Pattern of Share Ownership at Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs, 1902–1914

Data in this section concerning Everton and Liverpool football clubs’ share ownership between 1902 and 1914 are placed alongside data, discussed above, relating to other First Division clubs.
Table 8.5 Comparison of Sampled First Division Clubs With Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs: Pre First World War Concentration of Share Ownership

(Top figure in each category gives % of shares owned in year of formation; middle figure gives % of shares owned in 1914; bracketed figures shows rise or fall in shareownership for clubs in each category in intervening period). Note: for Everton and Liverpool FCs: top figure relates to % of shares owned in 1902 and not the year of formation (1892).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Average Shareholdings Per Shareholder (%)</th>
<th>Shareholders Owning 10+ Shares (%)</th>
<th>Shares Owned by 10 Largest Shareholders (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn Rovers</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+5.6)</td>
<td>(+18.5)</td>
<td>(-16.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.6)</td>
<td>(-1.1)</td>
<td>(+1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+1.3)</td>
<td>(+5.4)</td>
<td>(+18.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle United</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+3.3)</td>
<td>(+29.9)</td>
<td>(-8.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham Athletic</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+1.9)</td>
<td>(+6.9)</td>
<td>(+0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.0)</td>
<td>(-13.0)</td>
<td>(-2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-44.0)</td>
<td>(+30.0)</td>
<td>(-71.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blackburn Rovers FC (BT/00053482); Bolton Wanderers FC (BT/00043026); Manchester City FC (BT/00040946); Middlesbrough FC (BT/00036633); Oldham Athletic FC (BT/00088795); Everton FC (BT/36624); Liverpool FC (BT/35668).
Looking first at the issue of concentration in share ownership, it will be seen from Table 8.5 that data from both Liverpool clubs point away from the greater concentration of shares that was typical of other First Division clubs. The indicators ‘average number of shares per shareholder’, ‘shareholders owning ten or more shares’, and ‘number of shares owned by the ten largest subscribers’ show that at Everton FC the trend was towards a reduction in the proportions of shares owned in the club by individual shareholders or small groups of shareholders – a trend contrary to other clubs sampled in relation to these indicators.

At Liverpool FC also, the trend, on the whole, was towards a reduction in average share ownership (average shares owned by individuals in the club dropping from a massive forty-seven shares in 1902 to twenty-three shares by 1914, and the proportion of shares owned by the ten largest shareholders falling equally dramatically from 87 per cent in 1902 to 15 per cent in 1914). However, the proportion of individual shareholders owning ten or more shares at Liverpool FC did rise in line with the majority of other First Division clubs (a rise which will be explained later in this chapter).

Turning to the issue of social group changes in the shareholder profiles of the two Liverpool clubs, it will be seen from the data in Tables 8.6 and 8.7 that Everton and Liverpool football clubs do not replicate the trend towards middle-class domination of shareholding amongst the First Division clubs sampled.

At Liverpool FC we witness a complete contradiction of the social group trends amongst the First Division clubs sampled, with large reductions in the proportion of middle-class shareholders and shares owned by those in middle-class occupations, and large increases in the proportion of working-class shareholders and the proportion of their share ownership. Between 1902 and 1914, middle-class ownership of shares had fallen from a massive 92 per cent to just over half of the club’s stock, at 51 per cent, with the proportion of working class-share ownership increasing from 5 per cent to 36 per cent over the same period. Amongst shareholders, the middle class saw its presence fall from
Table 8.6 Proportion of Shareholders from Working Class and Middle Class in First Division Clubs Sampled and in Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs. (Top figure in each category gives % of shares owned by each class in year of formation; middle figure gives % of shares owned in 1914; bracketed figures shows rise or fall in shareownership for each class within their clubs over the period.
Note: for Everton and Liverpool FCs: top figure gives % of shareholders or shares owned in 1902 and not the year they were formed (1892)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn Rovers</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(-3.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-17.5)</td>
<td>(+14.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-17.3)</td>
<td>(+17.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle United</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-13.2)</td>
<td>(+6.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham Athletic</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-5.6)</td>
<td>(+1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-20.1)</td>
<td>(-4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+11.2)</td>
<td>(-19.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blackburn Rovers FC (BT/00053482); Bolton Wanderers FC (BT/00043026); Manchester City FC (BT/00040946); Middlesbrough FC (BT/00036633); Oldham Athletic FC (BT/000088795); Everton FC (BT/36624); Liverpool FC (BT/35668).
Table 8.7 Proportion of Shares Owned by Working Class and Middle Class Shareholders in First Division Clubs Sampled and in Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs. (Top figure in each category gives % of shares owned by each class in year of formation; middle figure gives % of shares owned in 1914; bracketed figures shows rise or fall in shareownership for each class within their clubs over the period.

Note: for Everton and Liverpool FCs: top figure gives % of shareholders or shares owned in 1902 and not the year they were formed (1892)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn Rovers</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+2.7)</td>
<td>(-6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-14.5)</td>
<td>(+10.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-27.8)</td>
<td>(+15.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle United</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-7.4)</td>
<td>(-8.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham Athletic</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-12.7)</td>
<td>(+5.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everton</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-11.1)</td>
<td>(-9.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+40.0)</td>
<td>(-40.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blackburn Rovers FC (BT/00053482); Bolton Wanderers FC (BT/00043026); Manchester City FC (BT/00040946); Middlesbrough FC (BT/00036633); Oldham Athletic FC (BT/00088795); Everton FC (BT/36624); Liverpool FC (BT/35668).
64 per cent in 1902 to 44 per cent by 1914, with the proportion of working-class shareholders drawing almost level by increasing their presence from 32 per cent in 1902 to 43 per cent by 1914.

Turning to Everton FC, as we can observe, although the club saw the reduction of the proportional presence of its working-class shareholders and a decrease in the proportion of shares they owned, consistent with the trends in other clubs, the middle class experienced a fall in its proportion of shares and shareholders at the club. (Both of these developments—working-class and middle-class decline were possible due to 31 percent of shareholders and 28 per cent of shares in the club’s 1914 share register having no stated occupational group allotted to them. The large proportion of shareholders allotted no occupational status in the later share registers of Everton FC, and indeed, Liverpool FC, was a feature of the other clubs sampled). Comparing the Everton figures to those of Liverpool between 1902–1914, we can see that the social profiles of the two clubs’ share ownership begin to resemble each other. As the proportion of shares held by the middle class and their proportion of shareholders declined dramatically at Liverpool FC, the decline of the proportion of middle-class owned shares and middle-class shareholders at Everton FC was not so precipitous, their proportion of shares falling from 40 per cent to 31 per cent, and their proportion of shareholders from 33 per cent to 28 per cent. However, the middle class presence at Liverpool FC is, even by 1914, still considerably more sizable than at Everton FC. But the decline of the working class presence at Everton FC, with their proportion of shares owned down from 53 per cent 42 per cent and their proportion of shareholders down from 61 per cent to 41 per cent, combined with the massive increase of this social class at Liverpool FC, does leave the clubs looking similar to each other in relation to the influence of waged labour amongst their respective memberships. In fact, by 1914, we see that the working-class shareholders at Liverpool FC were slightly more representative than at Everton FC – the club that had previously drawn the majority of its membership from the ranks of waged labour.

We can observe, then, that movement in both clubs, in relation to ownership of shares, brought about a convergence in the ownership profiles of Everton and Liverpool football
clubs. It will also be observed that the principal shift in this process emanates from changes to the share ownership at Liverpool FC, which made a dramatic move away from its dominance by middle-class shareholders becoming a club where share ownership, as at Everton FC, was more evenly distributed across the social spectrum.

The contradiction of the general tendencies towards greater concentration and middle-class dominance of share ownership at other clubs could be explained by particular circumstances occurring within both Liverpool clubs that affected the pattern of their share ownership. It is to these particular circumstances at both Liverpool clubs that we now turn.

Looking at Everton FC first, the absence of a trend towards concentration and the changes to the social profile of the club’s share ownership from 1902 can be explained by underlining the effects of two factors: the decline in numbers of the original shareholders of the club and the influx of new members; and changes made to the rights and privileges of shareholders at Everton FC. The vast majority of the original 443 shareholders of Everton FC in 1892 had been members of the pre-incorporated club. Through the sale of shares – due either to the death of shareholders and the decision of their executors to sell up shares owned or, by shareholders deciding to sell their shares – the numbers of original subscribers to the club greatly diminished as the first decade of the twentieth century progressed. A decade after club incorporation slightly more than 70 per cent (308) of the original shareholders had retained their presence on the club’s share register. By 1910 just 48 per cent (215) of the original shareholders remained, though the club’s overall number of shareholders never dropped below the 400 mark to this point as replacement shareholders were drafted into the club. The club’s share register for 1910 demonstrates a large increase in numbers of new shareholders from 1902 with an extra 223 being added to the club, making a total of 536 shareholders. From 1910 to 1914, although the club lost many pre-existing shareholders, another great surge of new shareholders (408) entered the club, making a total of 801 shareholders in Everton FC on the eve of the First World War.
Throughout the period 1892–1914, the total number of shares held in the club remained fairly static, hovering between 2,200 and 2,500. What did change, though, was the gradual decline in average shareholding of new members entering the club over this same period. The average number of shares held by each original subscriber to the club in 1892 was 4.7. For each new shareholder entering the club in 1910 this average declined to 3.6 shares held in the club. This was in comparison to a 4.4 average shareholding calculated for all shareholders in that same year. By 1914 the average shareholding of the 408 new subscribers entering the club after 1910 declined still further to 2.3 shares (again, a lower figure than that for all club shareholders which stood at 2.8 shares per shareholder in 1914).

A major clue as to why more subscribers were required to take up roughly the same amount of shares in the club can, perhaps, be found in the changes made to Everton FC’s rules concerning shareholder rights and privileges. The original Memorandum of Association from 1892 linked the buying of certain numbers of shares in the club to certain defined privileges: the more shares bought, the greater the benefits relating to admission fees and seating accommodation. Paragraph 3(a)ii reads:

That a member applying for one share to be entitled to admission for self and lady to Members Stand, subscription 7s/6d per annum.
That a member applying for ten shares or upwards be entitled to admission for self and lady to Reserved Stand, subscription 7s/6d per annum.
That a non-member applying for three shares be entitled to admission for self to Members Stand, subscription 7s/6d per annum
six shares be entitled to admission for self and lady to Members Stand, subscriptions 7s/6d per annum
fifteen shares or upwards be entitled to admission for self and lady to Reserved Stand, subscription 7s/6d per annum.  

(Note: ‘member’ refers to those subscribing to the company in 1892 who had previously been members of the pre-incorporated Everton FC. ‘Non-members’ refers to those associating with the club from the time of incorporation in 1892).
This paragraph in the Memorandum of Association was substantially changed in 1908 by a special resolution of the company revising the privileges on offer to shareholders. Those subscribing prior to 1908 were able to retain their entitlements as originally framed in Paragraph 3(a)ii of the 1892 Memorandum of Association. In 1910, the proportion of the club’s shareholders still entitled to the originally formulated privileges stood at 57 per cent, a proportion which had declined significantly to 29 per cent by 1914. For those subscribing after 1908, however, the link between numbers of shares held and the gradation of privileges held out previously by the club was replaced by a less extravagant and more general commitment to all new shareholders to give:

Privileges with regard to admission to the company’s grounds and season tickets or otherwise at such prices on such terms as the company may determine, and for that purpose to make regulations from time to time.⁸

With the link between varying numbers of shares and privileges broken we see at Everton FC more shareholdings of just one or two shares (it will be remembered that under the originally framed Paragraph 3(a)ii of 1892 the share threshold at which those new to the club were entitled to privileges was set at three shares significantly, almost 40 per cent of the club’s shareholders in that year took up three shares). In 1892, for example, the proportion of the club’s 443 shareholders owning one or two shares stood at 19 per cent. For those new shareholders joining the organisation between 1902 and 1910 the figure had risen to 24 per cent, and for those joining between 1910 and 1914 the figure had risen still further to 41 per cent. Significantly, in 1892, the most popular number of shares subscribed to was three. Over 37 per cent of Everton FC shareholders took up exactly three shares in the club – the minimum amount of shares necessary for non-members of the original club to gain entrance to the Members’ Stand for themselves and a guest.

In short, the incentive for some shareholders owning a modest amount of shares in the club to extend their share ownership had diminished over the period and there seems to have been an unwillingness on the part of new shareholders in the club to take up shares
in the same proportion as those shareholders originally subscribing to the club. A related point here is the sizeable number of family members of existing shareholders (existing, that is, prior to 1908) who appear amongst the names of the new shareholders' to the club in both the 1910 and 1914 share registers. Their presence could further indicate that the club had trouble in the latter part of the period under review in selling its shares to outsiders. The changes regarding shareholders privileges took away the rights of shareholders to take, free of charge, guests with them to football matches and, effectively, broke with a fixed price policy for season tickets to shareholders. This may well have resulted in the taking up of unsold shares by existing shareholders on behalf of members of their family. The advantages of this route, rather than buying up more shares under their own name, may have been to gain a greater say in the club. Voting rights, for all but those very few Everton shareholders owning twenty or more shares, were on the basis of one share, one vote. Perhaps existing shareholders of the club utilised the inclusion of family members as shareholders in order to gain a greater influence in the running of the club? In turn, this trend may well be the reason why we witness an increase in middle-class proportion of share ownership at Everton FC. Existing middle-class shareholders at the club, with greater individual amounts of shares than working-class members, would have been more likely and able to have apportioned part of their shareholdings to other family members.

Although significant structural changes to Liverpool FC's ownership began to emerge in 1905, the first blow to the club's original organisational shape was dealt in the spring of 1902 with the death of John Houlding. For a number of years prior to his death Houlding had been in ill health and played an increasingly smaller role in the day-to-day running of the club. However, Houlding's continuing status as chairman and majority shareholder ensured that Liverpool FC's ownership and control remained concentrated in his hands and that of a small number of other directors and large shareholders – men with close business and political connections to Houlding. The men with power at the club, it must also be recognised, were keen sportsmen. Their commitment to Liverpool FC for its own sake as a sporting institution regardless of other financial, social and political advantages
that running the club may have offered them should not be underestimated. John Houlding was an amateur cricketer with the Stanley Cricket Club in his younger days, becoming the club’s president later in life, and took up a close association with the original Everton FC before that club turned to him for financial assistance in the mid-1880s. Director Edwin Berry, one of Houlding’s staunchest allies in the original Everton FC and Liverpool FC, was a player with Everton FC in the 1880s. Two other directors of Liverpool FC, Richard H. Webster and John McKenna, were involved in the running of a local bowling club and a rugby union club, respectively.10

On the death of John Houlding in 1902 effective control and power in the club passed into the hands of his only son, William Houlding, also a Liverpool FC director. Houlding senior’s will made his son William the chief beneficiary of his estate. William was bequeathed his father's business of ‘brewer and spirit dealer and the business of the public houses’, the family’s suburban villa and, most importantly for the future of Liverpool FC, the ‘residuary estate’, apart from a £10,000 legacy bequeathed to Houlding Senior’s daughter, Alice Margaret Knowles, which we may take to have included stocks held in private and public companies.11

However, from the details that are available to us, it seems unlikely that William took as keen an interest in sport as his father John had done. Unlike John Houlding, a “self-made” working man, William was the beneficiary of a university education, gaining a degree in Liverpool University before graduating as a barrister at Edinburgh University. William Houlding, however, never practised at law. Instead he took up a managerial position at his father’s Liverpool brewery and also followed in his father’s footsteps in representing the Conservative Party as city councillor. It is difficult not to conclude that William’s participation in the administration of Liverpool FC was another way of emulating his father’s achievements and remaining close to him. Certainly, William
Houlding remained involved with Liverpool FC for only a short period after his father's death in 1902, stepping down from his position on the board in 1903.

Shortly before the end of the season 1904–1905 the board of Liverpool FC called a public meeting to announce the Houlding family’s financial withdrawal from the club (William Houlding’s sister Alice Margaret Knowles and her husband, and Liverpool FC director, Thomas Knowles, also held shares in the club). At that meeting the Liverpool FC chairman, Edwin Berry, outlined to the gathered audience of shareholders and supporters the important role the Houlding family had played in the creation of the club and the terms upon which their financial commitment was about to be severed. The Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury reporter recorded the event:

He [the chairman] proceeded to sketch the history of the club from the time that Everton went from Anfield to Goodison Park. The late Alderman John Houlding then formed the present club, and he practically bore all the expenses for several years. A large debt accrued, and that money was still owing. It was in name a limited company, but really it was a one man show...There was the difficulty of the load of debt owing to Mr William Houlding, and any profit that was made had to go to the reduction of that, or the payment of the interest. Their present position was this: they had, roughly speaking, 3,000 shares, and of those, 2,000 were held by the Houlding family, and the other 1,000 by outside people. There was a loan owing to the executors of £10,000 and an overdraft at the bank of £5,000. That overdraft was guaranteed by Alderman Houlding in his lifetime, and had since been continued by his executors. Mr William Holding was approached at the commencement of this year with a view to making the club more popular - that was to say, to put its interests into the hands of the people...Mr Houlding said he was willing to meet them, and he proposed, in the first place, to surrender the whole of the shares held by the Houlding family - that was, 2,000 - and, secondly, to write off entirely the debt of £10,000 owing to his late father. There still remained the overdraft of £5,000 and it was this sum that Mr Houlding stipulated he should be relieved of. The Chancery Court had consented to the two first named transactions, and the object of the meeting that night was to consider the advisability of raising £6,000 to liquidate the overdraft.12

The directors of the club appealed for the club’s supporters and existing members to take up as many shares as possible in the club in order to relieve the Houlding family of the overdraft they had taken out on behalf of the club, and also signalled their intentions to
buy up the land (owned partly by the Houlding's and Mr Joseph Orrell) on which the club
ground stood. The resultant change in ownership saw, as already alluded to, the massive
increase in both shareholders and company stock. The club’s share registers show that the
number of shareholders increased to 407 in 1905 from its previous total of 64 in 1902; the
number of shares owned increased to 5,428 from 3,022. Though no stated reason was
given for William Houlding’s actions in pulling out of his personal and financial
involvement in the club we might speculate, from certain available information
concerning the Houldings, as to why this withdrawal took place.

By the end of the 1890s it is apparent that William Houlding was beginning to diversify
his business interests. A ‘director of several other companies’¹³ increasingly William
Houlding was venturing into other areas of the leisure industry beyond the family’s core
business interests of brewing and professional football. In 1897 he helped set up, and
became director of, the Liverpool, Leeds and Hull Empire Palaces Limited,¹⁴ thus
entering early into the developing market within the entertainment industry prior to the
First World War in order to provide custom-built theatres in British towns and cities.¹⁵
Houlding’s new company was amalgamated with the larger Moss Empires in 1899,¹⁶ at
which point he became a director (later chairman) of the enlarged organisation, claimed
to have been: ‘the largest and most successful chain of variety theatres in the world’.¹⁷
These new theatres, though direct descendents of the free and easies of an earlier period,
attempted to provide an air of respectability to the urban entertainment industry: ‘Fixed
rows of seats replaced the tables and chairs. They were intended to attract families, not
just young and single; to appeal to middle as well as working class; though, of course,
safely socially divided. Drink was often not available...’.¹⁸ For the university-educated
Houlding Junior, then, involvement in the theatrical business may well have provided
him with a more socially superior position to either that of brewer or football club
director – a perceived step up and away from the world of his influential father, John
Houlding. On a more material level, we might further speculate that William Houlding’s
move into the theatrical industry was a sound business manoeuvre, edging his own and
his family’s interests away from their reliance on increasingly unprofitable investments in their traditional businesses of professional football and brewing.

When the Houlding family left Liverpool FC in 1905 the club’s financial state was not good, despite the soothing words to the contrary from chairman Edwin Berry that the organisation was ‘in a very flourishing condition’. Liverpool FC were in the Second Division of the Football League and had suffered a steady fall in gates over the previous four seasons – from a seasonal average of 17,000 per home game in season the 1901–02, down to 13,000 per home game in the season 1904–05. With just £700 held in credit at the bank, the club relied heavily on its ties to the Houlding family, not only for loans to ensure its continued existence, but also, at a rental of £179 per annum, for the use of the family’s land upon which the club’s ground stood. Though the club was ‘run at a profit’ in all but one of the seasons from 1892 to 1905 the small sums involved would hardly have offered financial reward for the Houldings’ outlay on shares. For example, we are informed that from the season 1901–02 to the season 1904–05 the club recorded a yearly profit of £1,000. With dividends set at 5 per cent by the Football League the Houlding family would not have felt any great inducement to continue with their investment on these grounds. Additionally, there is no compelling licensing evidence to support a view that the Houldings’ were able to exploit their majority ownership of the club in order to sell the family brewery’s product on club property. In part, the creation of the club in 1892 can be viewed as a means to secure a captive market for Houlding’s Ales. Though a favourable economic by-product of the Houlding’s association with Liverpool FC via the familiarisation of their ales in club advertisements and ground hoardings cannot be discounted, there is no available evidence to suggest a direct link between the sale of their beverages and the football club they financially and administratively dominated. The Houlding’s departure from the club was preceded by the withdrawal of investment from other local breweries. Bent’s Brewery, Threlfall’s Brewery and Tarbuck’s Brewery sold much of their large shareholdings in Liverpool FC shortly before the Houldings’ surrendered their shares to the club’s board. The economic climate was hostile for the brewery industry during this period and the Houlding family’s withdrawal from its
financial commitments to the club may have been influenced also by this factor. This possibility is now explored in more detail.

In the decade and a half prior to the First World War there was a downturn in per capita consumption of alcohol (Table 8.8). This was due to a combination of factors. First, there was a change in the habits of the British consumer away from the frequenting of pubs towards alternative outside leisure activities such as football spectating and the music hall, and, indeed, towards the home with the availability of cheap mass-produced items such as phonographs. Second, there was an overall decline in the trend of real wages from the beginning of the twentieth century to the First World War (Table 8.9) that would have impacted on working-class consumption of beer - the traditional alcoholic beverage of the working class. Third, there was a large increase in the number of private clubs selling alcohol after 1900, offering renewed competition to brewers' tied houses. Between 1887 and 1896 their numbers had risen from 1,982 to 3,655. By 1914 the number of clubs had proliferated to 8,700.23 Brewers, according to Gourvish and Wilson, 'disliked their competition, their lack of magisterial regulation and their payment of minimum registration duties'.24 Fourth, the opposition of temperance reformers to the brewers' product, whose consumption they perceived as being closely associated with crime and poverty, had created a powerful moral critique and an influential political lobby against the industry's interests.25 All of these factors resulted in excess capacity in the brewing industry and this, combined with the expensive legacy of their tied estates, led to a decline in profitability.

Table 8.8 Per Capita Expenditure Upon Alcohol in the UK 1899-1913 (in £s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.9 Real Wages in the UK (1914 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1902</th>
<th>1903</th>
<th>1904</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1907</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 8.10, below, demonstrates the decline in dividends upon ordinary shares from the beginning of the twentieth century to 1914 amongst a number of English breweries. The average dividend paid out by the larger brewing companies (those companies with 1 million or more ordinary shares) fell from 11 per cent in 1900 to 5 per cent in 1914.26

The industry was faced with a need to restructure and the 1904 Licensing Act – empowering magistrates to close licensed premises either on structural grounds or on their being deemed superfluous to the demands of a locality – greatly helped in this restructuring. With compensation for the closure of pubs and beer houses paid for by a levy on all other licensed properties, many brewers were able to exploit licensing regulation as a means of unloading bad investments – that is, freeing themselves of tied-house property expensively acquired in an earlier expansive period for the industry.
Table 8.10 Falling Profits in a Selection of UK Breweries, 1897–1914
(Ordinary Dividends %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Whitbread</th>
<th>Barclay</th>
<th>Georges (Bristol)</th>
<th>Phipps (Northampton)</th>
<th>Bents (Liverpool)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>2b</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>2b</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2b</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: T.R. Gourvish and R.G. Wilson, *The British Brewing Industry, 1830–1980* (1994) p. 308, Table 7.2. Note: ‘b’ was inserted by the authors and denotes that small shareholders (up to £10,000) received 5% dividend.

Compensation received could be ploughed back into the refurbishment of other tied properties owned, with ‘trade being merely transferred’ to them from houses closed. These were structural changes which benefitted, particularly, larger brewing concerns that had a suitably large tied estate and enough finances to enable this reorganisation to unfold and, indeed, had greater legal resources to demonstrate to local magistrates their ability to run “respectable” public houses.
The 1904 Licensing Act, therefore, effectively discriminated against the smaller-scale brewers and increased the competitive pressures on them during a period of falling demand for beer. This resulted in a further concentration of the brewing industry between 1900 and 1914 as the total number of brewing concerns (including publican-brewers) fell from 6,390 to 3,650. In Table 8.11 it can be seen that the number of common brewers producing less than 10,000 standard barrels per year decreased from 911 in 1901 to 580 in 1914, with those producing between 20,000 and 2,000,000 plus barrels per year much less affected by the shake-out occurring within the industry. Further evidence that rationalisation affected mostly smaller producers can be seen in the figures for United Kingdom beer output, which dropped from an annual average 35,802 standard barrels per year between 1900–1904 to 34,741 between 1910–1914 – a fall of just 3 per cent over a period which saw the destruction of 42 per cent of all brewing firms.

Table 8.11 Number of Common Brewers Paying for Licences in the UK, 1901-1914
(Persons or Firms Licensed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons or Firms Licensed</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000 – 9,999 Barrels</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 – 19,999 Barrels</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 – 2,000,000 Barrels</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One of the casualties of this process towards concentration in the trade was Houlding's Sparkling Ales, the small Liverpool brewery whose owners had played an instrumental role in the establishment of professional football in that city. In 1913 this brewing
company (by this point renamed Houlding’s Brewing Company), with a share capital of 60,000 in ordinary and preference shares,\textsuperscript{30} and a tied estate of 21 public houses, was taken over by Ind Coope and Allsopp Limited of Burton-on-Trent.\textsuperscript{31} We might speculate, in the absence of documentary evidence, that this small brewery during the period 1900–1913 would have been susceptible to the financial pressures that other similar-sized breweries faced. It can be said, therefore, that evidence tends to point towards a scenario where, prior to 1905 and the withdrawal of their investment in Liverpool FC, the Houlding family’s commitment to that club was becoming an unbearable (or unwanted) financial burden, soaking up capital that could have been used to alleviate the problems of their family business.

Evidence suggests, however, that the interest of larger breweries in other football clubs was maintained. Collins and Vamplew point towards a number of clubs in the Football League to whose expansion the support of local brewers was ‘crucial’. Brewers such as Mitchells and Butlers at Aston Villa and West Bromwich Albion, or Northampton Breweries at Wolverhampton Wanderers, provided sponsorship and/or loans in the 1900s.\textsuperscript{32} Perhaps the most obvious example of the willingness of larger brewers to continue their financial association with clubs in the years prior to the First World War was the appropriation of the ownership of Newton Heath FC by the Manchester Brewery Company in 1902 (the takeover leading to the name change of the club to Manchester United).\textsuperscript{33} My own survey of clubs, moreover, demonstrates that share ownership in some clubs by brewers increased by 1914. At Manchester City, for example, Threlfall’s Brewery – a company which sold much of its stock in Liverpool FC after 1905 – increased its stock holding from fifty shares in 1895 to 200 by 1914; whilst Middlesbrough, a club without brewery investment in its formative years in the early 1890s, had, by 1914, 100 of its shares (just over 7 per cent of company stock) bought by North East Breweries. These examples might suggest a difference in the ability of larger breweries than the Houldings’ to weather the storm of a downturn in trade and its
attendant rationalisation of business and to maintain their financial commitment to football clubs or even, for those brewers not formerly involved in football, to expand their commercial empires by investing in a local professional football club. The notion of the professional football club as being a profitable, or even manageable, form of investment was for the Houldings, though, contradicted by the experience of running (and paying for) Liverpool FC. The financial withdrawal from the club by the Houlding family would have been based on the logical decision to rationalise their business empire – a rationalisation process that would culminate with the family brewery being sold off by William Houlding in order to concentrate his efforts on running Moss Empires. William Holding left Liverpool in 1910 to live in Scotland, the headquarters of Moss Empires being in Glasgow at this time.

With the departure of the Houldings from the club in 1905, and the selling up of significant amounts of shares held in the club by three other breweries, one of the major factors contributing to the cultural distinctions existing between Everton and Liverpool football clubs was undermined. Shares held in Liverpool FC by the brewing industry fell from a 1902 high of 68 per cent to 6 per cent in 1905, and to just over 1 per cent by 1914. The possibility of brewery trade influence at Everton FC remained low throughout the period. In 1910 Daniel Higson, brewer, bought three shares in the club, joining another brewer, George Barker, who had bought six shares in the club in 1896. By 1914 their combined share ownership remained at nine shares – the two men’s share ownership representing just 0.4 per cent of total club shares in 1910 and in 1914.

The influence of figures in the Everton boardroom with temperance leanings no doubt continued to be a deterrent against brewery companies of any size entertaining thoughts of gaining a say in the running of the Goodison Park club. The temperance credentials of directors William R. Clayton, William Cuff, William Whitford and James Clement Baxter were commented on in an earlier chapter. These were men who retained their positions on the board in the later period dealt with here in this chapter, between 1902
and 1914. Baxter remained on the board until his death in 1928, and Cuff was a director until as late as 1948. The tradition of temperance-leaning directors making it onto the Everton board was maintained in the 1902–1914 period with the introduction of Ernest Green in 1912. Green was an outspoken critic of alcoholic consumption. On the other hand, although brewery influence had declined in the boardroom at Liverpool FC, the board’s previously strong connections with drink trade defence associations, a feature of an earlier period, was rekindled both before and after 1914 with the election of Thomas Crompton and John Joseph Hill as directors. Both men were committee members of the Liverpool Licensed Victuallers’ Association. In these ways, then, some difference in attitude to the issue of drink would appear to have still separated the two boardrooms even though, in terms of proportionate ownership of club stock controlled by the drink industry, the two organisations now resembled each other as the First World War approached.

8.4 Governance of the Clubs

How, if at all, did these changes to the share structure of each of the Liverpool clubs affect power relations between the membership and those in control of those clubs? This was an aspect of the clubs’ characteristics that we established in Chapter Seven as being quite distinct in an earlier period. In Chapter Seven, evidence was presented which pointed towards clear distinctions in the manner in which Everton and Liverpool football clubs were governed between 1892 (the year in which the clubs were formed as limited companies) and 1902 (the year that the leading figure of Liverpool FC, John Houlding, died). Principally, this related to differences in the balance of financial power existing within each club between directors and shareholders, and in the social complexion of the boardrooms at Everton and Liverpool football clubs. It was concluded that in the earlier period financial (and through it, administrative) power was concentrated into the hands of the board at Liverpool FC, but more widely dispersed at Everton FC between the executive and membership, and that social exclusivity in the Liverpool FC boardroom differentiated that body from the Everton boardroom.
As we have already seen, the sale of the Houlding family's shares saw the number of shareholders in the club rise from 64 in 1902 to 407 in 1905, and the number of shares in the club rise from 3,022 to 5,428. At this point the club’s Articles of Association were changed to incorporate a rule stating that the qualification of a director should be the holding as absolute owner of shares of the company of a nominal amount of not less than ten shares in the club.36 This move can be interpreted as formalising, at a not insurmountable level for the majority of shareholders, a paper threshold for exercising the right to join the board. The proportion of Liverpool FC members meeting this financial criterion was 58 per cent in 1905, 72 per cent in 1910, and 74 per cent in 1914. The large majority of members qualified to become directors arose from the club’s linking, from 1905, of the number of shares held by members in the club with ticket prices and seating arrangements. The prices for members to gain access to the Uncovered Stand and Reserved Stand in 1892 were 15 shillings and 21 shillings per season, respectively. In 1905, admission per season to the Stands (previously described as Uncovered in 1892) for members was ten shillings for those members buying five shares in the club, and five shillings for those buying ten shares. Admission to the Grandstand (previously described as Reserved Stand in 1892) for members was fifteen shillings for members purchasing five shares, and ten shillings for those buying ten shares, with those buying twenty shares getting free Grandstand admission for the season (with every extra twenty shares bought earning another free season ticket to the Grandstand). There was, then, an incentive for Liverpool FC shareholders to expand their shareholdings to ten shares or more, and the greater value of shares granted by the club is, arguably, an example of power in the club moving towards ordinary members.

The administrative move regarding the formalisation of the paper qualification to become director would appear to have been a consequence of the wider distribution of share ownership at Liverpool FC and it replaced the previously existing state of affairs where those with the greatest financial power within the club would take up places on the board, or install personal contacts there. As a result of this change in rules the large discrepancy
between the clubs in terms of the financial stake owned by the directors prior to 1905 disappeared in the later period to 1914. Table 8.12 holds data on director share patterns at the two Liverpool clubs taken from share registers at three points in time: 1892, 1902 and 1914.

Table 8.12 Proportion of Shares Held by Directors of Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs, 1892, 1902, 1914 (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1892</th>
<th>1902</th>
<th>1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everton FC</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool FC</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Everton FC Company File (BT/36624); Liverpool FC Company File (BT/35668).

It can be seen that a steady decline in the proportion of shares owned by the Everton FC board was accompanied by a massive decline in the proportion of shares held by directors of Liverpool FC by 1914. Available data for other clubs suggest that the decline in the proportion of shares owned by boardroom members in the Liverpool clubs (more especially at Liverpool FC) may not have been consistent with trends amongst other clubs.

Table 8.13 reveals data relating to Blackburn Rovers, Bolton Wanderers, Middlesbrough, and Oldham Athletic, comparing the proportion of shares owned by the board of each of these First Division clubs in the year of their formation with the proportion of shares owned by the their board members in 1914. Three of the clubs (Bolton Wanderers, Middlesbrough, and Oldham Athletic) record a sizeable increase in the proportion of club
stock owned by board members. Only at Blackburn Rovers, from the clubs sampled, did the proportion of directors’ shares significantly decrease over time.

Table 8.13 Proportion of Shares Held by Directors in Sampled English First Division Clubs (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Year Formation</th>
<th>1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn Rovers</td>
<td>27.6 (-20.2)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolton Wanderers</td>
<td>8.7 (+29.5)</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>11.8 (+4.6)</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldham Athletic</td>
<td>22.6 (+9.3)</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bolton Wanderers data utilises information from Vamplew, *Pay Up and Play the Game* (1988) for the year of formation, 1895, and data from that club’s share register of 1921 – this being the first year after incorporation that director information is available for that club.

Another way in which the financial relations at the two clubs between board and membership became more similar was the greater reliance both clubs had on loan capital to finance their operations in the 1905–1914 period. Both Everton and Liverpool football clubs struck loan deals with financial institutions in order to help finance (amongst other projects and costs) major ground improvements. In 1907 the Liverpool FC board issued debenture shares to the trustees of the Royal Liver Insurance Company in return for a £10,000 investment in the club. Another £5,500 was raised in that year in return for issuing debenture shares to a local woman, with no discernible connections to the club (a Mrs Sophia Daniel, from Crosby), who, in 1909, took up another £2,200 worth of
debenture shares in the club. In 1910, the Royal Liver invested another £1,500 in return for debenture shares.\textsuperscript{37}

The rationale of issuing debenture shares would have been to secure a substantial long-term loan for the club in order to fund capital projects, which needed to be undertaken in the short term, in this instance the reconstruction of the club stadium. The Oakfield Road end of Liverpool FC’s ground (later to be known more widely as the Spion Kop) was redevelopment of Goodison Park was partly financed by the club’s raising of £12,000 through the issuing of debenture shares to the London City and Midland Bank in 1910.\textsuperscript{38} By 1910 both club’s attendance levels had increased greatly: Liverpool’s maximum gate increased from 30,000 in the pre-1905 period to 45,000 by 1914; Everton’s maximum gate from 40,000 pre-1905 to 55,000 by 1914.\textsuperscript{39}

By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, therefore, both Everton and Liverpool football clubs had come to rely less on directors and their own club members, that is, ordinary shareholders with voting rights, and more upon external investors for their financial security. The amount of money invested by shareholders in Liverpool FC (nominal value of shares) was £12,000, compared with £19,000 invested in the club by individual and institutional investors outside the club membership; at Everton FC, these figures were £2,000 and £12,000, respectively.

With the link between large financial commitments to Liverpool FC and boardroom selection broken in the period 1902–1914, we might expect that the differences between Everton and Liverpool football clubs witnessed in the earlier period concerning director turnover would be affected by this change. What we find between 1902 and 1914 is that both clubs experienced a reduction in the number of new directors elected and boardroom stability ensued. In other words, the clubs began to resemble each other on the issue of director turnover, but with Everton FC’s pattern of director turnover moving to resemble that of Liverpool FC’s traditionally lower turnover. The Liverpool FC membership
elected into office nine new directors (a figure inflated by the required replacements for William Houlding, his brother-in-law, Thomas Knowles, and Houlding stalwart R.H. Webster, who all resigned in 1905 when the change in ownership took place). In comparison, the number of new directors elected to Everton FC between 1902 and 1914 was six (see Tables 8.14 and 8.15).

Table 8.14 Everton FC Directors Elected to the Board between 1902–1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates in Office</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Coffey</td>
<td>1912–1940</td>
<td>AR. Wade</td>
<td>1904–1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Green</td>
<td>1913–1957</td>
<td>H. Wright</td>
<td>1914–1916</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Everton FC Company File (BT/36624)

Table 8.15 Liverpool FC Directors Elected to the Board between 1902–1914.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates in Office</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EA. Bainbridge</td>
<td>1914–1926</td>
<td>RL. Martindale</td>
<td>1911–1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC. Briggs</td>
<td>1905–1920</td>
<td>AT. Parr</td>
<td>1905–1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Crompton</td>
<td>1911–1934</td>
<td>WR. Williams</td>
<td>1905–1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Fare</td>
<td>1905–1909</td>
<td>A. Worgan</td>
<td>1905–1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Keating</td>
<td>1910–1921</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Liverpool FC Company File (BT/35668).
One possible explanation for this phenomenon relates to rule changes, brought in at both clubs in 1906, regarding procedures for boardroom candidates. By special resolution at the June 1906 Extraordinary General Meeting of Liverpool FC a further article was added to the company’s Articles of Association:

No person, not being a retiring director, shall be eligible for the election to the office of director at any General Meeting unless he, or some other member proposing him, has, on or before the first day of May in the year in which such General Meeting is held, left at or sent to the registered office of the company a notice in writing duly signed, stating the full name and address of the candidate and either signifying his candidature for the office, or the intention of such member to propose him, in which latter case the name of the proposer and second shall be stated.40

An identical resolution was passed at the same time (June 1906) at an Everton FC Extraordinary General Meeting clarifying the procedure for the election of their directors.41 Research has failed to unearth any general changes to business laws at this period in time which could explain this congruity.42

In both cases it seems clear that the addition of these bureaucratic procedures for the early and formalised declaration of candidates was designed to inhibit challenges to incumbent directors from the floor at club Annual General Meetings. At Everton FC especially, in the AGMs of earlier years, the ability of the board to influence the shareholders of the club to adopt their preferred candidates seems to be questionable.43 A former chairman of the club, William C. Cuff, described Everton’s AGMs as ‘bear gardens’, 44 implying that the executive of the club generally struggled to maintain control in the face of challenges from the membership to its authority over club affairs.

It is also possible that the reduction of director turnover resulted from the fact that some directors had been sitting members on their boards for a number of years, acquiring in the process a paternalistic aura that may have been translated into deference from shareholders. Both clubs had what could be described as ever presents on their boards of
directors, members whose unbroken directorship of their club spanned the pre-and post-
1905 periods. At Liverpool FC, for example, there was John Asbury, a director from
1902 to 1932, and John McKenna, director from 1892–1922. At Everton FC James
Clement Baxter, 1892–1924, Benjamin Kelly, 1894–1918, William R. Clayton,
1892–1912, and John Davies, 1892–1914, are examples of long-serving directors. These
examples hint at the possibility that the acquisition of status within the club counted for a
great deal when decisions regarding boardroom elections faced shareholders at their
AGMs.

In the post-1905 period, the greater restrictions placed on challenges to sitting directors of
each of the Liverpool clubs, and the increasing marginalisation of members as providers
of capital investment in their respective organisations, and (in the case of Everton FC) the
reduction of membership privileges regarding ticketing and seating arrangements
previously enjoyed, tends to detract somewhat from the notion of viewing the Liverpool
clubs as being functioning democratic bodies by the outbreak of the First World War.

8.5 Boardroom Profile

One of the features of pre-1902 analysis of the patterns of ownership and control of the
two Liverpool football clubs, outlined in Chapter Seven, was the distinction at boardroom
level between the rather exclusive social profile of the Liverpool FC directorate and the
more socially heterogeneous composition of the early Everton FC board. In the wake of
the 1905 break between Liverpool FC and the Houlding family – a family connection
which had previously stamped the club's hierarchy with a distinct Tory Party–drink trade
identity – the question arises whether any bridging of the gap had occurred in the post-
1905 period between the Liverpool clubs which might have leveled out, or reduced,
social distinctions previously existing between their boards. Based on available director
profiles, the conclusion reached is that some convergence in social terms did occur
between the Everton and Liverpool boards in the post-1905 period, although some
significant differences did remain.
We have already seen the importance that the declining influence of the drink trade had in the ownership of Liverpool FC shares post-1902. Although by the end of the period under review two licensed victuallers were members of the Liverpool FC board, the domination of the drink trade within the Liverpool boardroom was also broken with the disappearance of brewers John and William Houlding, John James Ramsey and Edwin Berry (an influential figure in Liverpool drink trade defence associations). This mirrors the declining importance of the drink industry in share ownership in Liverpool FC in the period after 1905. The declining influence of representatives of the brewing trade in the boardroom at Liverpool FC effectively broke down the biggest difference between the two boardrooms existing during the earlier part of the period under review. In fact, if we look at Table 8.16, which compares the social class analysis of all directors in the Everton and Liverpool boardrooms between 1892 and 1902 with the boardrooms of each club at two later points in time (1910 and 1914), it can be seen that, overall, in occupational group terms there was, broadly speaking, a convergence between the two boards.

Table 8.16 Socio-Occupational Profile of Everton and Liverpool FC Directors, 1892–1902, 1910, and 1914 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1892-1902</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EFC</td>
<td>LFC</td>
<td>EFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Non-Manual</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 'Others' denotes directors who have no occupations given, or else are categorised in the share registers as 'Gentlemen' or 'Out of Business').
Source: Everton FC (BT/36624); Liverpool FC (BT/35668).
In the earlier (1892–1902) period at Everton FC there was a reliance on recruitment to
the boardroom of those members occupied in professional/administrative employment,
and even on those from skilled working-class occupations, with a much lower proportion
of directors than at Liverpool FC involved in commercial activity. After 1902, however,
those involved in commercial occupations formed the majority in both boardrooms.
Those involved in skilled working-class occupations (a feature of the earlier period at
Everton FC) had become marginalized. Coach-builder Alfred Wade on the Everton board
was the only skilled working-class representative at either club at boardroom level after
1905. Again, this underlines the conclusion made above that the two clubs cannot be
considered to be subscriber democracies when working-class shareholders, whose
presence remained substantial at Everton FC and whose numbers massively increased at
Liverpool FC over the 1902–1914 period, were barely represented in positions of control
at the two clubs.

Another development in the post-1902 period was the blurring of the Tory–Liberal
political distinctions existing between the club hierarchies (though more through changes
taking place in the Everton boardroom than any significant change of political hue in the
Liverpool boardroom). Men actively involved in Liberal politics, such as W.R. Clayton
and James Clement Baxter, remained on the board at Everton FC throughout the period
under review, whilst other directors present on the board between 1902 and 1914
(William C. Cuff and Alfred Wade) also leave evidence of their Liberal political
leanings. However, the death or resignation of others, such as George Mahon and
William Whitford, and the promotion onto the board of members with Tory Party
connections, such as Andrew Coffey and Herbert Halsall, meant that there was a more
mixed political complexion to the Everton FC boardroom in the post-1905 era. At
Liverpool FC (and in the wake of the staunchly Conservative Houlding family’s
departure) there was a gradual dilution of Tory Party influence on the board in the
assembled directorates of 1905, 1910 and 1914. By 1914, only two members of the
Liverpool boardroom appear to have been actively involved in Tory politics.
The context to these changes was the realignment taking place in the local political arena in the early twentieth century. Although it has been argued that at this stage “[the] fossilised politics of Merseyside still rested upon the antagonisms between the Trade and Temperance, between the Irish and the Orangemen, between Catholics and Protestants” — politics which had traditionally divided Liverpool’s Conservatives and Liberals — other issues based on economic and class interests increasingly pushed the two parties of property in the city closer together. One such issue was the growing importance of the debate over free trade and tariff reform. Nationally, this debate was traditionally argued along party lines, with Free Trade Liberals lining up against protectionist Tories. The reliance of the mercantile community in Liverpool on exploiting the port economy acted as a point of unity in Liverpool between the traditional parties of government (the Port of Liverpool, a major beneficiary of Britain’s extensive and profitable entrepot trade, was threatened by the reimposition of tariffs). Tariff reformers in Liverpool were ‘very cautious not to push Tariff Reform down the throats of certain Free-Trade Conservatives’, the tariff reformers describing their relationship with the city’s Tory Party as ‘not very cordial’. The headway made in Liverpool by Unionist Free Trade Conservatives was interpreted into accommodation between Liberals and Tories in Liverpool, at least in imperial political affairs. One such example was the free run given to Tory candidate Austin Taylor in the East Toxteth Division. The Liberal *Liverpool Daily Post* asserted that Taylor went to Westminster ‘as a Liberal quite as much as a Conservative’.

Another issue breaking down the antagonism of Liverpool’s Tories and Liberals was the growth of the politics of organised labour in Liverpool in the early twentieth century. Phillip Waller states that it was in the Edwardian period that Labour first established a foothold in Liverpool politics, and that this breakthrough was not through alliance with the city’s Liberal Party — traditional early allies of organised labour in other urban areas — but through cooperation with the Liverpool Irish Nationalist Party, who by this stage were taking greater interest in labour issues and moving away from their own traditional civic alliance with the Liberals. From the early years of the new century Tories and
Liberals were beginning to make ‘common cause against the intruding Labour Councillor’ and the prevailing mood amongst men of property in the city would appear to have been toward ‘a fusion of “Constitutionalists” against “Socialists”’. Issues such as these could help explain the breaking down of the evident bi-partisan political complexion of members of the boards of the two football clubs in Liverpool in an earlier period of their development. In fact, the changing political climate is argued by other football historians to have affected the political profile of board members at other clubs during the first two decades of the twentieth century. For example, Fishwick points out, in relation to the Sheffield Wednesday boardroom, that in 1906 Liberal and Unionist councillors sat side by side as directors of that club, the board having been previously dominated by local Liberal luminaries. Fishwick goes on to argue that this connection between the football boardroom and the local political elite became more tenuous with the rise of the Labour Party, which ‘reduced directors’ central role in the social and political life of many communities’.

More generally, Jeffrey Hill in his book *Sport, Leisure and Culture in Twentieth Century Britain* (2002) draws our attention to the ‘profound shifts that were taking place in British society’ by the 1920s. Hill identifies club culture as:

> central to a social process in which the middle classes were reformed into a more homogeneous, though certainly not monolithic, grouping. Crucial to this process was the fashioning of an a-political consciousness that enabled some of the fractions within the class principally those connected with religion to be overlain with shared values. Some of these were supplied by the sense of other arising from the growth of Labour as a political force at this time. The haste with which hitherto opposed elements of the middle class, their political allegiances previously divided between conservative and liberal, conjoined in anti-socialist alliances during the 1920s, testifies to the influence of external forces in shaping these shared values.

Although Hill, here, is referring specifically to the impact from the 1920s of the voluntarist club movement, his words have a certain resonance with an earlier period and changes taking place within the boardrooms of professional football clubs.
However, two countervailing points must be made in relation to the movement away from the conflicting political associations previously holding sway in the boardrooms of the two Liverpool clubs, and these concern the long-term development of political influence at each of the two clubs. First, available evidence — principally from the local political press, local directories, and biographical details of directors gained from obituaries — suggests that Liberal influence in Liverpool FC’s boardroom remained peripheral not just to the end of the period under review here, but also in the rest of the period up to 1945 (Liverpool director W.H. Cartwright would appear to have been a Liberal candidate in Anfield ward in the 1920s\textsuperscript{57}). Second, these same sources suggest also that a long-lasting link with Liverpool Conservatism was sustained on the Liverpool FC board up to, and beyond, the Second World War. The nine-man Liverpool FC boardroom in 1941, for example, included three Tory Aldermen and the Tory constituency chairman for Liverpool West Derby.\textsuperscript{58} Though this is a fairly dramatic example, at no time prior to the 1960s was there an absence of Tory influence within the club’s boardroom. Evidence beyond 1914 of political involvement at Everton FC would appear to suggest a continuance of the trend of a mixture of political leanings on the Everton board, established in the post-1905 period (though, compared with Liverpool FC, there was less political involvement amongst the Everton directorate). There is, for example, evidence of Liberal, Tory and Labour Party associations of certain newcomers to the Everton board up to the Second World War.\textsuperscript{59} Statements concerning the dilution of party political differences existing between the two football club boards must be qualified, therefore, by an acknowledgement of the Liverpool FC board’s long-term association with the Liverpool Conservative Party.

Another change that appears to have occurred between 1902 and 1914 is the greater complexity in the religious composition of board members at Liverpool FC than was the case in the 1892–1902 period. Again, this was a change that brought a greater symmetry to the social profile of the two boardrooms.
Table 8.17 outlines, at four points in time (1892, 1902, 1910 and 1914) the religious composition of both boardrooms. The data demonstrates that the overwhelming dominance of directors from Church of England backgrounds in the Liverpool FC boardroom, prior to the wider distribution of share ownership in 1905, is redressed to a certain degree in the later part of the period, with club members from nonconformist and Roman Catholic backgrounds taking their place in the Liverpool boardroom.

Table 8.17 Religious Composition of Everton and Liverpool FC Directors: 1892, 1902, 1910, and 1914 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1892 EFC</th>
<th>1892 LFC</th>
<th>1902 EFC</th>
<th>1902 LFC</th>
<th>1910 EFC</th>
<th>1910 LFC</th>
<th>1914 EFC</th>
<th>1914 LFC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of England</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonconformist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data on directors’ religious affiliations taken from local newspaper obituary notices and parish records.

This brought the club’s boardroom more into line with the denominationally varied Everton FC boardroom. The drop in the substantial nonconformist presence on the Everton FC board by the end of the period comes about as a result of the death in 1908 of George Mahon (who, along with William C. Cuff and Alfred Wade, helped retain the club hierarchy’s connection to the St.Domingo New Connexion Methodist chapel) and the retirement of both J.T. Atkinson, a member of the Norwood Grove Congregational Church, Everton. The presence of a Roman Catholic, Thomas Crompton, in Liverpool FC’s boardroom would, perhaps, have been unlikely in an earlier period when many of those in positions of power in the club had links with the sectarian-based Working Men’s Conservative Association. Although some post-1914 Liverpool FC directors, such as Albert Berry and Ralph Knowles Milne, retained the club’s previous links with this political-religious organisation, their strength of numbers on the Liverpool board (and,
indeed, in terms of their share-owning leverage amongst the membership) never reached the levels they had in the club's earlier period from 1892–1905. The addition of two more Roman Catholics to the Liverpool boardroom in the early 1920s, William Harvey Webb and John Joseph Hill, bears testimony to this last point.

Another pre-1902 feature distinguishing the two boardrooms from each other was the greater number of members elected as directors to the Everton board, compared to Liverpool's board, hailing from the north Liverpool districts from which the bulk of club membership and support for both clubs was traditionally taken. Table 8.18 demonstrates that here too, on the issue of director residential patterns, a greater similarity is seen between the boards towards the end of the 1892–1914 period ('core football club districts', refer to the north Liverpool districts of Anfield, Everton, and Walton that encompass the two football grounds of Everton and Liverpool football clubs).

Table 8.18 Residential Profile of Everton and Liverpool FC Directors, 1892-1914 (number of directors).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1892 EFC</th>
<th>1892 LFC</th>
<th>1902 EFC</th>
<th>1902 LFC</th>
<th>1910 EFC</th>
<th>1910 LFC</th>
<th>1914 EFC</th>
<th>1914 LFC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Football Club Districts</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surounding Districts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Liverpool Suburbs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out Townships</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Addresses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Director addresses from Everton FC Company File (BT/36624); Liverpool FC Company File (BT/35668).
The previous dominance of men elected to the Everton board from the core football club districts is broken by the end of the period, though it remained greater than at Liverpool FC. It can be seen that progressively more of those members elected to the board at both clubs in the latter part of the period resided in the middle-class areas of outer suburbia, or else in the dormitory towns surrounding Liverpool, such as Blundellsands, Formby, or across the Mersey on the Wirral Peninsula.

This was a sub-urbanisation process already mentioned in relation to the residential changes occurring amongst the membership of both clubs and reflects the greater efficiency of Liverpool’s transportation system in the years prior to the First World War. The expansion of electrified tramways in Liverpool and outlying districts, and the electrification of the Northern railway line from Liverpool to Southport, would have been developments of which the increasingly middle-class directors of each of the Liverpool clubs would no doubt have taken advantage.

One area in which social distinctions between the two boards was not broken down, however, was in their differing levels of involvement in Freemasonry. It was noted in Chapter Seven that eight of the thirteen directors of Liverpool FC holding office between 1892 and 1902 were prominent Freemasons. Many of these directors were connected outside the boardroom through their membership of the same district or occupation-based lodge, and many belonged to a number of lodges. In the period from 1902–1914 this pattern of Masonic association was maintained at Liverpool FC. Of the nine new directors joining the Liverpool board after 1902, four directors (William C. Briggs, Richard L. Martindale, William R. Williams and Albert Worgan) were Freemasons. Briggs and Martindale both reached the status of Provincial Grand Deacon through their respective lodges, Anfield Lodge and Toxteth Lodge, thereby maintaining an earlier Liverpool FC director tradition of achieving prominence within local Masonic circles. Interestingly, three of the four new directors involved in Freemasonry were members at
either Anfield Lodge or Sincerity Lodge, the two lodges in which many of those in control of the pre-1902 Liverpool FC were members. It seems possible that those Freemason directors from the Houlding era who had survived as directors into the later period may have been influential in proposing men who shared their own social interests to become directors. Directors John McKenna, John James Ramsey, John Asbury and Edwin Berry were prominent Freemasons in the West Lancashire Province. McKenna and Ramsey were long-standing members of Sincerity Lodge and Anfield Lodge, respectively, and would have known well the three new arrivals to the Liverpool FC boardroom who were members of these two lodges. The Masonic presence at Everton FC, on the other hand, was never numerically significant throughout the whole of the period 1892–1914. We witnessed in Chapter Seven that only two of the twenty directors holding office between 1892 and 1902 were Freemasons. Between 1902 and 1914, none of the six new additions to the Everton FC board was involved in Freemasonry.

8.6 Conclusion
Taking into account the changes in the administrative rules of Liverpool FC, the share ownership patterns of both clubs, and the social characteristics of their board members in the period 1902–1914, there does appear to have been a broad trend towards convergence of the organisational profiles of Everton and Liverpool football clubs. It has been argued that changes in share ownership patterns at Liverpool FC in particular led to changes in the balance of financial power at that club which, in turn, influenced a change to the social profile of those elected to the Liverpool FC boardroom. The details of the later developments of the two clubs provide evidence of a move away from the original motivations propelling the two factions in the original Everton FC that had resulted in the creation of separate and very different organisations after the split of 1892. The retreat of brewing interests in Liverpool FC can be viewed as a defeat for those in the old club who had pushed for its greater commercial use. If the Houlding family’s motive in their setting up of Liverpool FC was commercially oriented, the financial losses incurred by them is proof of the failure of professional football to realise this original goal. Those
who struggled within the original club for the opportunity to exploit the commercial potential club ownership apparently offered can be said to have failed to secure their objectives. However, the opportunity offered by control of the board and the election to it of members capable of creating commercial opportunities elsewhere cannot be discounted, and members of the Liverpool FC board, in particular, leave evidence of business connections outside the football club. This said (and turning, now, to the original aspirations of those opposed to the moves towards the commercialisation of the original club), the evidence of the latter part of the period 1892–1914 does appear to suggest, also, a movement at Everton FC away from the ideal of incorporation and the retention of local ownership and control of the club. There are, over the latter part of the period, clear signs of the gradual dominance of administrative and financial power at the club falling into the hands of men unrepresentative of the social fabric of traditionally core districts of share ownership and support for the club.

The years between 1902 and 1914, then, might be presented as a period witnessing the erosion of the distinctions existing between Everton and Liverpool football clubs established in an earlier developmental stage in terms of patterns of their ownership and control; a period when convergence begins to occur between the two clubs, though with some notable distinctions maintained, such as the higher average shareholding of the Liverpool FC membership, and a certain degree of continuity in socio-political characteristics at boardroom level.
Conclusion

In this study the early development of professional football organisation in Liverpool has been analysed. In the introductory chapter three major objectives of the thesis were given: first, to contextualise the origins of the original Everton FC in relation to the community which gave rise to that organisation and nurtured its early development; second, to highlight a complexity of influences on Everton FC’s development from within the ranks of the club’s membership – a complexity that led, ultimately, to an irresolvable contradiction that split the original club; and third, to make a comparative study of the organisational structure of the two clubs, Everton FC and Liverpool FC, that were formed as limited companies in the wake of the split of 1892. These three objectives were designed to advance the extent of our knowledge of the subject beyond established studies which, it was argued, offered a limited analytical account of the origins and early development of Everton FC and Liverpool FC. In the light of evidence presented in this thesis certain conclusions have been reached with respect to these stated objectives.

A detailed study of the district of Everton was undertaken and this allowed for a profile to emerge of the community in which professional football was successfully sustained in Liverpool. It was established that a rapid development of the district’s infrastructure occurred in the period 1860–1880. During that period the district became a point of attraction for migrants from the overcrowded neighbouring township of Liverpool and nearby Lancashire districts, and also for migrants from other parts of England as well as from Ireland, Scotland and Wales. In social class terms, those migrants who settled in Everton were mostly from skilled working-class backgrounds. Their income enabled them to take up residence in the two-up, two-down artisan cottages that were typical of the housing stock of the district. There was, however, a significant settlement of people from a middle-class background in the Breckfield area of the district, which included the original
Everton FC’s ground. The housing stock in Breckfield reflected this, with large detached or semi-detached residences being more typical than in the other areas of Everton. Overall, evidence from standard of living indicators taken from census reports, such as household size, number of rooms in a residence and the employment of servants in households, suggested that Everton exhibited signs of relative material wealth in comparison with other Liverpool districts sampled. The conclusion drawn about the Everton population was that in social class terms it tended to conform to the typology of the football district as understood from the general conclusions of the secondary literature concerning the social composition of football club shareholders.

In its developmental period the district of Everton witnessed the influx of a variety of religious denominations that were quick to establish parishes (or congregations in the case of nonconformity) in the burgeoning suburb. Overwhelmingly, the district, as with other predominantly non-Irish districts in Liverpool, was Protestant in denominational terms. Followers of the Church of England accounted for the greatest proportion of religious worshippers in Everton from its settlement in the late nineteenth century to the First World War. However, nonconformity had a sizeable presence in the district. Partly, this is accounted for by the strong Welsh presence in Everton. Many of the Welsh building-contractors, who were responsible for most of the housing development in the district of Everton and elsewhere in the north end of Liverpool, held with the practice of constructing chapels in their building of neighbourhoods. By contrast, the Roman Catholic presence in Everton remained typically low for Liverpool suburbs in the pre-First World War period, when Irish settlement tended to be confined to Liverpool’s dockside districts, more especially in the north end of the city. The Irish presence in Everton, however, is more prominent if we consider also the presence of Ulster Protestants. Their presence can partly account for the influence in the district – more especially in the St Domingo and Netherfield areas, where most of those from an Ulster background resided – of Protestant-based political organisation. These areas supported the presence of a Protestant Party, which provided the only real form of consistent opposition to the Tory Party up until the outbreak of the First World War.¹ Overall, though, the electorate of Everton during the period under review rarely deviated from its support for the two mainstream political
organisations, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party. Independent Protestant organisations, the Irish Nationalist Party and the various political manifestations of organised labour all remained largely peripheral in electoral terms. Usually, the Conservatives carried Everton in both municipal and parliamentary elections, although the Liberals contested Everton with some success in the last decade of the nineteenth century, and in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Again, as with the social class profile of the district of Everton, these demographic features have been highlighted in this study as having an influence on the development of professional football organisation. It was argued that denominational competition stimulated the rise of social and sporting activities by churches and chapels in an effort to retain, or attract, congregations. The intense, and sometimes bitter, competition between Liberals and Conservatives in the district also made the club a point of attraction for local politicians, and ensured that their influence was felt – more especially as patrons or committee members of the original Everton FC, and in the boardrooms of its two successor organisations. The various influences on the development of the original club, and the different motivations for involvement with it, laid the basis for an internal dispute over the control of the club that rumbled on from the late 1880s to 1892, ending with the split of the organisation.

It was argued that an established body of work relating to the events of the split tended to isolate the actions of club president John Houlding, and his perceived motivations in the club dispute, in order to explain the dynamics behind this event. My research placed additional evidence before the reader. This evidence gave a greater understanding of the complexities of the financial issues involved in the dispute, and put forward the proposition that the split of 1892 can only be adequately explained by contextualising it within a factional struggle for control of the club. At its core was a dispute over the form in which the club would be transformed into a limited liability company. I argued that this, effectively, amounted to a struggle between members committed to continuing with the existing structure of power relations operating within the club, with a broad-based control of the organisation via the full financial and decision-making involvement of the club’s
large membership, and a smaller group of influential members of the club who sought to incorporate it as a means to centralise power and concentrate ownership into relatively few hands.

It was concluded also from the evidence presented on the split of Everton FC that the power struggle within the club was crucially influenced by the shifting balance of power within civic socio-political relations, and that this external struggle influenced the development and outcome of the club dispute. This related, principally, to the sharpening drink trade – temperance conflict that had come to increasingly dominate the political scene in Liverpool during the 1880s and 1890s. This socio-political conflict, and the considerable involvement in it of key figures within the club, was argued to have been causally significant to the deepening of factional divisions within Everton FC. This socio-political cleavage amongst the membership added significance to the club dispute. The intervention in the final stages of the dispute of political figures external to it, and of a politically motivated local press, confirms the club split as a manifestation of the deepening civic conflict and the club’s importance beyond football within the local environment.

The split of 1892 created in its wake two organisations, Everton Football Club Company Limited and Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds Company Limited, that were distinct in their structures. It was argued that the pattern of share ownership and control of the two clubs could be viewed as the predictable outcome of the contradictory motivations that informed factional hostilities within the original Everton FC. The disengagement of oppositional forces within the original club and their reconstitution into separate organisations allowed each to carry out its objectives unhindered. My research reveals that the post-split Everton FC’s early development in the limited company era was based as much as possible on the model of the members’ club that it had for so long existed as. Ownership and control rested with the club’s large number of shareholders, the majority of whom were former members of the club. Research also establishes that Liverpool FC’s early development was more commercially orientated, that ownership of the club’s shares was concentrated into the hands of directors, and that the membership of the club had relatively little input into decision-making compared to the membership at Everton FC.
Using biographical material on club directors it was further established that differences in the power structure at each club reinforced distinct patterns of social formation at boardroom level. The centralisation of control and concentration of ownership at Liverpool FC produced an exclusive socio-political profile to the club’s boardroom, whereas the more even spread of shareholding and the establishment of membership rights at Everton FC allowed for a heterogeneous profile to emerge in the Goodison Park boardroom.

However, the organisational characteristics of the two organisations became noticeably less distinct in the period after the Houlding family stepped down from Liverpool FC in 1905. At this point, ownership of Liverpool FC became more widely dispersed amongst the expanded number of shareholders in the club, and the drink trade’s obvious presence amongst those in control of the club in a previous period disappeared. These developments would appear to have had a significant effect also on the social profile of the Liverpool FC boardroom, which in a previous period had exhibited exclusivity. The Liverpool FC boardroom displayed a greater level of social diversity in the period 1905–1914. For this reason, and with Everton FC largely retaining its organisational shape, it was argued that a convergence occurs between the two clubs towards the end of the time frame encompassed by this thesis.

The evidence presented in this thesis fill a gap in existing research of the development of professional football organisation in Liverpool. The thesis, I feel, has a number of significances. For the first time the split of Everton FC in 1892 has been placed in the context of existing social relations in the local environment. This is a dimension singularly absent in previous accounts relating to this event, which have concentrated analysis overwhelmingly on the perceived financial considerations and motivations of club president John Houlding. I would argue that my research offers greater complexity in explaining the split of the club and the ramifications it had with respect to the formation of the two football club companies. Indeed, another significance of my research is its highlighting of the significant differences that existed between Everton FC and Liverpool FC in terms of patterns of ownership and control, more especially in the first decade after their establishment as limited liability companies. Here, one major observation was that
there existed notable socio-political differences between key figures at each club. Principally, this was manifest in the dichotomy that existed between board members in their affiliation with Liberal and Conservative politics, but there was also an element of divergent ethno-religious associations that provided a distinction between the boards. This, it was concluded in the study, suggests that there may have been some foundation for the often spoken about sectarian distinctions between the two clubs. These claims have been summarily dismissed as 'urban myth' by many observers of the history of Merseyside football.²

The study can also be viewed as a contribution to a more complete understanding of the north end districts of Liverpool, and Everton in particular. By illuminating the pattern of the early development of Everton and Liverpool football clubs, and the relationships many of those in control of these organisations had with other civic institutions, a more complex picture of civic development is gained. The football clubs have been a neglected subject of discussion amongst local social historians seeking to reveal the historical nature of Liverpool society.³ Yet the football clubs helped to maintain and even reshape social and political relationships in Liverpool. We saw this in an obvious way in the period of the dispute and split of the original Everton FC. The subsequent incidence of political personalities associating themselves with the two successor organisations reminds us that identification with the football clubs was, for many local politicians, a key point of contact with their electoral constituency. More generally, the control of the football organisations by, overwhelmingly, businessmen and professionals served to reinforce social class relationships. It might be argued, given the widespread civic institutional connections of many of the club directors revealed in this study, that Liverpool's professional football clubs served as organisations helping to bond a local social elite. The thesis can, hopefully, be viewed as a contribution to an existing body of work that has, in an analytical fashion, explored the wider significance of the professional football club in Britain, adding to our knowledge of individual clubs as organisations that have had an impact on the localities they operate within.
Finally, this study takes analysis of Everton FC and Liverpool FC up to the First World War. It is hoped that my own research will be able to provide a platform for others interested in the development of sporting organisations on Merseyside to continue the comparative analysis of the two clubs beyond the outbreak of the First World War. We witnessed that between 1892 and 1914 some of the organisational distinctions that existed initially between the two clubs were eroded. Further research is required in order to ascertain whether, in terms of organisational structure, Everton and Liverpool football clubs moved further towards each other as time progressed.
Appendices

Appendix 1i: Socio-Occupational Profile of English Football Club Directors (%)  
-Tony Mason

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gentlemen</th>
<th>4.3</th>
<th>Financial &amp; Commercial</th>
<th>9.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>Food &amp; Drink Trade</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Brewers)</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Publicans/Licensed Victuallers etc)</td>
<td>(8.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Refreshment House Proprietors, Cafe Mangrs)</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoolmasters</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Unskilled Manual</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builders &amp; Contractors</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale &amp; Retail (Employers)</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Assistants)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Travellers)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix lii: Socio-Occupational Profile of Scottish Football Club Directors (%)  
– Wray Vamplew

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aristocracy</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Professional</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foremen, Supervisors and Inspectors</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Professional</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietors and Employers (drink)</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled Manual</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Proprietors and Employers</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled manual</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers &amp; Higher Administration</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Footnotes

Introduction

1 The word 'original' in relation to the pre-1892 Everton club was used by Everton chairman, Will Cuff, a contemporary of the dispute, who used the term as a description on the occasion of the club's Fiftieth Anniversary celebrations at the Liverpool Philharmonic Hall in 1929. This term will be used frequently throughout the thesis to distinguish the post 1892 split Everton PC Limited Company from its forerunner.


Chapter One


4. Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, P.71


22. Fishwick, *English Football and Society*, p.x

23. Fishwick, *English Football and Society*, p.x


25. Fishwick, *English Football and Society*, p.42


28. In Mason, *Association Football* (1980), the author, as well as acknowledging the possibility of financial gain as a motive, and the probability of “psychic” gain as a motive for club involvement also recognizes, and cites, instances of the attractions of football for those in pursuit of political power, social control and industrial harmony. p.47-48

29 Mason, *Association Football* (1980), P.43-44. Mason writes: ‘...was it relatively non-political members of the middle class as opposed to the politically active who became directors? It may well be both, of course, but only detailed local studies are likely to furnish convincing answers’.


31. Mason ‘The Blues and the Reds’ (1985) p.4


Chapter Two


In the first year of their incorporation the percentage of shareholders owning five or less shares in the Merseyside clubs were as follows: Everton F.C., 75%; Liverpool F.C., 60%; Bootle F.C., 56%; Liverpool Caledonians F.C., 89%. (Company shareholder records: Everton F.C. BT 31/36624; Liverpool F.C. BT31/35668; Bootle F.C. BT31/37503; Liverpool Caledonians F.C. BT31/36535).

3 Vamplew, *Pay Up and Play the Game* (1988), does use the residential information but in a general way: he chronicles the numbers and percentage of shareholders living within a 25 mile radius of the football club they own shares in.

4 Everton F.C. shareholder addresses (miles from club): 0 - 0.5m = 46%; 0.5m -1m = 33.1%; 1m+ = 20.9%. Liverpool F.C. shareholder addresses: 0 - 0.5m = 34.3%; 0.5 -1m = 34.2%; 1m+ = 31.5%. Liverpool Caledonians F.C.: 0 - 0.5m =74.5%; 0.5m - 1m = 4.3%; 1m+ = 21.4%. Bootle A.F.C.: 0 - 0.5m = 81.9%; 0.5m - 1m = 8.2%; 1m+ = 9.4%. (Residential addresses from company shareholder records)

5 Figures from *Liverpool Omnibus and Tramways Committee Annual Report, 1901*


8 Holt, 'Working Class Football and the City' (1986) p.7


14 The figures quoted by Vamplew for 'manual workers' are, as he stresses, mostly representative of the skilled section of the manual working class - Vamplew, *Pay Up and Play the Game* (1988) p.155. The figures for "lower middle class" shareholders incorporates the shareholders listed by Vamplew as "lower professionals", "proprietors" and "managers". In the case of my inclusion of "proprietors" as part of the lower middle class, this decision has been made from experience of the Merseyside shareholder records where proprietors were, by and large, small retailers or licensed victuallers.

15 Vamplew, *Pay Up and Play the Game* (1988), makes this point. p.156

16 Vamplew, *Pay Up and Play the Game* (1988). Vamplew indicates a range of share prices from 10 shillings to £5, but calculates the average English share price to have been £1


18 Shareholder records: Everton F.C. company no. BT 31/ 36624; Liverpool F.C. company no. BT31/ 35668; Liverpool Caledonians F.C. company no. BT31/ 36535; Bootle A.F.C. company file no. BT31/ 37503.
Chapter Three

3 Statistics from Treble, 'Liverpool Working Class Housing' (1971), Appendix 5
4 Fig.s from Treble, 'Liverpool Working Class Housing' (1971), p.188
5 Fig.s from A.Kearns, et al, 'Duncan and the Cholera Test' *Transactions of the Historical Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, number 143 (1995)
6 T.Baines, 'Liverpool in 1859' (Liverpool, 1859) p.8
7 Point made by Treble, 'Liverpool Working Class Housing' (1971) p.192
8 Borough of Liverpool: Proceedings of the Council 1866-67, pp. 775-783
9 Everton and Kirkdale were taken as one administrative unit at this point.
11 This represents the halfway point in census figs of 1831 and 1841.
12 Sir J.A.Picton, *Memorials of Liverpool* (Liverpool, 1903) p.377
13 Picton, *Memorials of Liverpool* (1903) p.364
14 Figures on housing from Picton *Memorials of Liverpool* (1903) and Ecclesiastical Records for Liverpool in *Published Census Reports*, 1851-1911
15 Housing figures from Ecclesiastical Records for Liverpool in *Published Census Reports*, 1851-1911
20 Picton, *Memorials of Liverpool* (1903) p.387
21 Figures from Borough of Liverpool: Proceedings of the Council 1866-67, p.775-783. These social class definitions are given in Treble, 'Liverpool Working Class Housing ' (1971) p.171-172. (Statistics refer to Everton and Kirkdale.)
22 Ecclesiastical Records for Liverpool, *Published Census Reports*, 1871-1901
23 Figures calculated from acreage, population and housing figures in *Published Census Reports*, 1851-1911
24 Occupational numbers of sample population for whole of Everton tested at each interval as follows: 1851 = 257; 1871 = 284; 1891 = 278.
26 Information from *Gores Liverpool Directory*, 1891
27 *Gores Liverpool Directory* 1851, 1871 and 1891
28 This is a point made by J.A.Klapas, 'Geographical Aspects of Religious Change in Victorian Liverpool, 1837-1901', (University of Liverpool M.A. Thesis, 1977), p.83
29 See J.R. Jones, *The Welsh Builder on Merseyside*, (Liverpool, 1946) p.31-33
30 Jones, *The Welsh Builder on Merseyside* (1946)
31 Klapas, 'Geographical Aspects of Religious Change' (1977), p.83
32 There are a number of drawbacks with this census data. The 1851 census was conducted by Ministers of each congregation rather than independently. The possibility of overestimation is a problem, therefore. The 1881 census took only one morning service into consideration, thus underestimating Roman Catholic and Nonconformist attendance (typically these denominations held a multiple number of services both in the morning and afternoon).
33 Religious Census data in 1851 combined Everton and Kirkdale as one administrative unit at this stage. Klapas, 'Geographical Aspects of Religious Change' (1977), p.62
34 Figures from *Liverpool Daily Post*, Oct 17th, 1881; Oct 22nd and Nov 19th, 1891; Nov. 11th, 1902
35 'Others' accounting for 4.9% of attendees in 1902
36 'Others' cited as 0.9% and 2.6% of attendees in 1851 and 1881, respectively
37 J.A.Klapas, 'Geographical Aspects of Religious Change' (1977), Appendix 3a
38 Quote from editorial, *Liverpool Daily Post*, Feb 2nd, 1892
39 Everton and Kirkdale counted as one political unit until 1895
Chapter Four

5. Teams of nearby parishes such as St. Peter’s, and St. Benedict’s – both Church of England – provided initial opposition for St. Domingo. Matches with sides from slightly further afield, such as St. John’s in Bootle where also organised. See T. Keates, *History of the Everton Football Club* (Trowbridge, 2nd Edition, 1998).
15. Rees, ‘The Development of Physical Recreation’ (1968) Figs 9 & 10, p.124; Fig 11, p.130; Fig 12, p.131
17. The chapel encouraged temperance - having its own Temperance and Band of Hope group. See St. Domingo Parish Records: Trust Committee Accounts, 1876-1948; Church Leaders Meeting Minutes, 1873-1893.
24. Letter from Everton FC member to *Liverpool Daily Post* (hereafter LDP), February 15th, 1892.
28. See LDP 27th October, 1891.
33 D.France and D.Prentice The Virgin Blues: Everton, 100 Seasons at the Top, (Essex, 2003) p.13. The authors had access to Everton FCs Management Committee Meeting Books of the 1880s and early 1890s.


37 LDP, 21st Oct.1891.


41 France and Prentice, The Virgin Blues (2003) p.19. Athletic News reported that McGregor had acknowledged that some clubs excluded were superior to those others allowed in for being able to attract large attendances.

42 My own figures based on Everton FC home match reports from LDP, season 1887-88.

43 My own figures based on Everton FC home match reports from LE, season 1890/91.


46 All biographical information on John Houlding taken from Liverpool Courier (hereafter LC) March 18th, 1902


49 Committee membership taken from LC 13th, Oct 1891 and LDP, 5th Feb 1892.


51 LDP Oct 21st 1891.


55 See, for example, Liverpool Review (hereafter LV) 25th May 1st June, 1889.


57 Bootle Times 3rd Sept.1892.

58 Everton FC company file BT31/36624

59 See, for example, the work carried out by Mason, Association Football (1981) pp37-42.


63 Rees, 'The Development of Physical Recreation' (1968), chapter 5

64 LE, 7th Nov, 1891.


67 LV 25th May, 1889.

68 LV 25th May, 1889.

69 LV 1st June, 1889.


72 In a letter to a local newspaper, a supporter of Houlding and his closest allies in the Everton club made a swingeing attack on the new breed of men challenging the existing order of control. A Mr John Woods of Everton described the Houlding faction: 'The men who have been and still are the backbone of the club'. He urged the club membership to: 'Rally around the men who have made the club prominent in the football world, not those who by causing dissension in the club wish to step into positions they have no practical knowledge of or tact for, nor even a right to'. LC 30th Jan.1892.
322

74 See report of club meeting in *LC*, 16\textsuperscript{th} March 1892 where accusations are leveled at Houlding’s influence over Howarth and other Houlding supporters in the membership of the club regarding their employment.
73 *LC*, 16\textsuperscript{th} March 1892
77 A term used by a club member in reference to the organisation in the *LC* 19\textsuperscript{th} February, 1892.

Chapter Five

4 Liverpool Liquor Licensing Records (Register of Licences Other Than Victuallers, 1888-1892; Register of Alehouse Licences, 1886-1892, in Liverpool Record Office.
5 *Liverpool Echo* (hereafter, *LE*) 17th Oct. 1891
7 Letter to *LC*, 26th Sept. 1891
9 *LDP*, 16th Sept. 1891. The owners of these other public houses are said, here, to have been Threlfalls Brewers and Bents Brewers.

12 *LC*, 22nd Sept. 1891; *LDP*, 21st Oct. 1891
13 *LC*, 22nd Sept. 1891
14 *LC*, 22nd Sept. 1891
17 *LC*, 22nd, Sept. 1891; *Liverpool Echo*, 17th Oct. 1891
18 Figs. From *LDP*, 21st Oct. 1891
22 Sample of local press advertisements (*LC* and *LDP*) consulted for period 1885 to 1891.

24 See *Liverpool Review* (hereafter, *LR*), 1\textsuperscript{st} June 1889; *LC*, 25 Sept. 1891
25 It has been stated in all other accounts of the split that this Joseph Orrell was John Orrell's brother. In fact, Joseph Orrell Snr. (John Orrell's brother) had died in 1883, leaving the bulk of his estate to his son (also Joseph). It was this Joseph Orrell - Joseph Orrell Jr - that Houlding arranged the contract with to buy the adjoining property to John Orrell's. (Will and Grant of Joseph Orrell Ref: MHP 1012/1013, Registry of Grants, Wills and Probate Index, High Holborn, London).
26 Occupation from 1861 Census Return. John Orrell, was resident at 42, Pluto St., Liverpool
27 *LC*, 22nd Sept. 1891. Statements in the local press in this period highlight the long-standing reluctance of the club to add facilities to the Anfield Road ground because of these complications.
28 See *LC*, 23rd Sept. 1891. W.R. Clayton, key figure opposed to Houlding in the club dispute, acknowledges Orrell's role in creating the initial 'difficulties'; See *LE*, also, 26th Sept. 1891.
30 *LC*, 30 Nov 1905
As the club prospered so Houlding and Orrell increased the rents.

Evidence of these prior moves are revealed in the reports of members meeting of 15th September 1891 (See LDP and LC, 16th September 1891).

Figures from: Liverpool Athletics and Dramatic News, 22nd Sept. 1891.

See LC, 24th Sept. 1891.


Evidence of these prior moves are revealed in the reports of members meeting of 15th September 1891 (See LDP and LC, 16th September 1891).

Figures from: Liverpool Athletics and Dramatic News, 22nd Sept. 1891.

See LC, 24th Sept. 1891.


Evidence of these prior moves are revealed in the reports of members meeting of 15th September 1891 (See LDP and LC, 16th September 1891).

Figures from: Liverpool Athletics and Dramatic News, 22nd Sept. 1891.

See LC, 24th Sept. 1891.


This book is held as part of the *Joseph Livesey Collection*, University of Central Lancashire Preston.


See the pages of temperance journal: *The Liverpool Social Reformer, Joseph Livesey Collection*, University of Central Lancashire Preston.


*LC*, 7th March 1892.

*LE*, 26th January 1892

*LDP*, 17th November 1891.

*Liverpool Licensed Victuallers and Brewers Journal*, 10th January 1891.

*Liverpool Licensed Victuallers and Brewers Journal*, 30th August 1890 and 12th September. See also *LDP*, 1st November 1898.

Waller, *Democracy and Sectarianism* (1981) p.491

*LDP*, 1st November 1898


See Everton Committee Meeting report and letter to editor in *LDP*, 3rd March and 16th March

St Domingo Chapel Trust Committee Meeting minutes, 1879-1884.


Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing Laws, Parliamentary Papers, XXXVI 26450.

*LR*, 7th November, 1896

See *Formby Times*, 22nd January ; 12th February ; 12th March 1910.

*LDP*, 25th October, 1898.

Obituary notice, *LC*, 26th October, 1922


*LC*, 7th August, 1884

See Waller, *Democracy and Sectarianism* (1981) p.69 & p.383n. Letters from R.W. Hudson in his capacity as Kirkdale Liberal Association chairman gives his address as the soap works on Bankhall, Kirkdale, Liverpool

*LDP*, 16th March 1892.

*LDP*, 29th October 1891

*LDP*, 19th March 1892

*LR*, 28th May, 1892

*LC*, 25th January 1892. See also letters in *LDP*, 26th and 28th January

*LDP*, 26th January 1892

The *LR* between January and March 1892 offers a good insight into the pressure brought to bear on Houlding by the Tory leadership to stand down from the contest.


The first quotation are the words of Belchem, Merseypride (2000) approximating the viewpoint of Samuel Holmes of the Constitutional Association and Mayor of Liverpool. p.175; Second quotation is by Belchem, Merseypride (2000) p.169.


A.B. Forwood speaking to an Everton and Kirkdale audience, LC, 26th October 1893.

LR leader comment, February 6th, 1892. Dale Street being the location of the Constitutional Association’s Headquarters.

LC, 13th January, 1892.

See Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism (1981) p.124-6 for details of the Liberals attitude to the campaign. The Irish Nationalist’s withdrawal from a contest in a predominantly Protestant district was not simply a symbolic act. Over 15% of the district’s population of Everton at the time was estimated to have been Roman Catholic.

LC, 13th January, 1892.


Councillors had to retire every three years for re-election.

Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism (1981) p.120-121.

LDP leader comment, 19th March, 1892.

LDP, 19th February, 1892.


LDP, 20th October, 1891.

Liverpool Athletic News, 8th November, 1891.

LC, 21st October, 1891.

Boots Times, 1st March, 1890.

LDP, 7th April 1887.

Boots Times, 12th January 1889.

LC, 7th March, 1892.

LC, 24th October, 1891.

LDP, 13th April, 1892.

LE, 21st October 1891.

LC, 4th Mar 1892.

LDP, September 19th, 1891.

LDP, February 4th, 1892.

LC, 20th October; LDP, 21st October 1891.

LC, 23rd October 1891.

LC, 23rd October 1891.


See letter by club member to LDP, 27th October 1891.


LR, 16th March 1889.
Chapter Six

1 E.J. Hobsbawm in *Industry and Empire: An Economic History of Britain Since 1750*, Fourth Edition (London, 1973) p.136-7 locates the rise of professional football as a mass spectator sport within this increase in British consumer spending.

2 Hobsbawm in *Industry and Empire* (1973) p.133

3 Hobsbawm in *Industry and Empire* (1973) p.160


8 Attendance figures accumulated for both Everton and Liverpool FCs via the method described in this chapter’s introductory comments regarding Everton FC data gathering.


10 T.Lane, *Liverpool City of the Sea*, (Liverpool, 1997). Lane uses the term to denote the important status the port of Liverpool had, more especially in the late-Victorian British economy.


12 Lane, *Liverpool City of the Sea* (1997) p.xvii

13 P.J. Waller, *Democracy and Sectarianism: A Political and Social History of Liverpool, 1868-1939*, (Liverpool, 1981), p.217. Waller states (quoting local contemporary sources) that unemployment in 1903 stood at between 20,000 to 30,000


15 R.Rees, ‘The Development of Physical Recreation in Liverpool During the Nineteenth Century’, (M.A. Dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1968), suggests that the basis for the development of football in the city was the ‘concentration of unskilled labour’ in the port. p.138. P.M.Young, *Football on Merseyside* (London, 1963), also alludes to the impact of the unskilled by stating that the club drew for support upon the more ‘modest’ section of the community: p.32.


19 Walsh, ‘Aspects of Labour’ (1976) p.131. Other types of unskilled workers, such as bricklayer’s labourers who could, perhaps, rely on steadier employment, earned 21 shillings per week in 1890, though their wages had risen only to 22 shillings per week by 1910, still well below attaining what was, a decade previously, thought to be “comfortable” material conditions (see *British Labour Statistics: Historical Abstract, 1886-1968*, HMSO, 1971), p.32.


22 See *Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom* (Annual) 1893-1914


24 see Waller, *Democracy and Sectarianism* (1981) p.144

25 See Young, *Football on Merseyside* (1963)
Chapter Seven

1 W. Vamplew, *Pay Up, and Play the Game: Professional Sport in Britain, 1875-1914*, (Cambridge, 1988). See Appendix 1a and 1c. In terms of share price, the most common set price for a single share amongst the English and Scottish League clubs survey by Vamplew was £1. However, whereas only 13% of English First Division clubs set their price lower than £1 per share, over half the English Second Division and one-third of Scottish clubs priced their shares considerably lower than £1.


3 For figures relating to club shareholders' share ownership in 'Section I' of this chapter see 'Appendix 1c', Vamplew, *Pay Up, and Play the Game* (1988) chapter 10. The clubs covered by Vamplew having played in the First Division prior to the First World War are: Arsenal, Aston Villa, Birmingham City, Blackburn Rovers, Bolton Wanderers, Bradford City, Bristol City, Burnley, Bury, Derby County, Everton, Grimsby Town, Liverpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, Middlesbrough, Newcastle United, Oldham Athletic, Preston North End, Sheffield United, Sheffield Wednesday, Stoke City, West Bromwich Albion.

4 *Liverpool Daily Post* (hereafter, LDP), 3rd September 1892. New chairman, George Mahon, states that 304 out of the club's 431 subscribers at that point were 'old members'.

5 J. Lowerson, *Sport and the English Middle Classes, 1870-1914*, (Manchester, 1993)

6 Certain First Division clubs in England, however, did have a similar proportion of drink industry investment to their Scots counterparts: Bolton Wanderers, 25%; Blackburn Rovers, 25.3%; Liverpool, 29.7%; Manchester City, 32%. (Figures from Vamplew *Pay Up, and Play the Game* (1988), chapter 10.


11 Collins and Vamplew *Mud, Sweat and Beers* (2002), p.47

12 Collins and Vamplew *Mud, Sweat and Beers* (2002), make the point regarding loans to football clubs from breweries, that the depression years of the Inter-War period probably saw the mere widespread use of loans from breweries to football clubs – the breweries acting as *de facto* bankers to the clubs.

13 N. Fishwick, *Football and English Society, 1914-1950*, (Manchester, 1989) p.28-29. Sir Charles Clegg, the chairman, at different points in time, of both Sheffield clubs 'had no time for drink and gambling'. He and others like him on the Wednesday and United boards brought with them into club affairs, implies Fishwick, 'suspicion with which drink was viewed by puritanical elements of the Sheffield bourgeoisie'.
14 The findings on Everton and Liverpool FCs in this section are taken from analysis of their company share registers: BT31/36624 (Everton FC) and BT31/35668 (Liverpool FC), Companies House, Cardiff.
15 See Vamplew Pay Up, and Play the Game (1988)
16 LDP, 30 August 1892
17 See Mason Association Football (1980), p.38
18 Share Registers: Liverpool Caledonians FC (BT31/36535); Bootle AFC (BT31/37503), Companies House, Cardiff.
19 Accessions Box (File D), Liverpool Record Office.
20 Eleven of the sixteen First Division clubs Vamplew found evidence for regarding voting rights had voting rights attached to share ownership. (See Vamplew, Pay Up, and Play the Game (1988) Table 10.4).
21 Vamplew, Pay Up, and Play the Game (1988), Table 10.2, p.160
22 Pay Up, and Play the Game (1988) p.167
23 Pay Up, and Play the Game (1988) chapter 10
25 C.Korr, West Ham United (1985) p.4
26 West Ham United (1985) p.9
27 See C.Korr, West Ham United (1985) chapters 2 and 3.
29 Vamplew, Pay Up, and Play the Game (1988), Table 10.4.
31 N.Fishwick, Football and English Society (1989) p.36
32 See, for example, Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen (1980) p.74
33 Vamplew, Pay Up, and Play the Game (1988), p.169
34 C.Korr, West Ham United (1985) pp.2-5 and pp.19-21
36 This is a point made by C.Korr, West Ham United (1985) p.31-32 in relation to the stability of the West Ham United board.
37 N.Fishwick, Football and English Society (1989) p.34
38 C.Korr, West Ham United (1985) p.23
39 S. Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen (1980) chapter 4
40 S. Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen (1980) p.76-78
41 N.Fishwick, Football and English Society (1989) p.20
43 The activities of Freemasonry during this period were prominently featured in the local press. The organization was not the distant and secretive organization many would now perceive them to be.
44 Quoted by Mason, Association Football (1980), p.48
45 J. Walvin The Peoples Game (London, 1994) p.88
49 Liverpool Review (Hereafter LR) June 30th, 1894.
50 LDP, March 30th, 1892.
51 LDP, January 30th, 1930.
52 Liverpool Constitutional Association, minutes and annual reports, 1860-1947. The five were: B.E. Bailey; Edwin Berry; John Houlding; William Houlding; and John McKenna.
53 Liverpool Constitutional Association, minutes and annual reports, 1860-1947.
54 Liverpool and Merseyside Official Red Book, 'Political Associations', 1925
55 See press reports of Working Men's Conservative Association district meetings: Bootle Times, 2 February 1895; LDP, 3 February 1892
57 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism (1981), p.286
58 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism (1981), p.172
59 Barbara Whittingham-Jones, Down With The Orange Caucus, (Liverpool, 1936), p.6.
61 Southport Liberal Association, Annual Reports, 1899-1930; Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, 1880-1930.
62 Liverpool City Council Annual Committee and Sub-Committee Reports, 1906-1921; see also, Baxter's funeral report, Liverpool Mercury, 28 January 1928
63 See Bootle Times, 11 January and 1 March 1889 for reports of Walton Liberal Association meetings
64 There are no surviving records of the Liverpool Liberal Party. Confirmation of Dr Whitford's status comes from local newspaper coverage of Liberal Party meetings during the period under review (see, for example, LDP, 13 April and 10 and 11 June 1892)
65 Cuff is mentioned in press reports of local Liberal Party meetings in the early 1890s. See Bootle Times, 26 April 1890; LDP, 18 October 1892
66 For an appreciation of this Liberal - Catholic connection see T. Burke, A Catholic History of Liverpool, (Liverpool, 1910); D. Fraser, Urban Politics in Victorian England, (Leicester, 1976), pp.134-142
67 Letter to LDP, 27th Feb 1906 from Austin J Wall, a member of the United Irish League.
68 See LDP 15 Oct 1907
69 Porcupine, 26 December 1896. The LDP, 11 June 1892, published one of Dr Whitford's impassioned speeches against the blocking of Home Rule by Ulster Unionists: 'Irish Catholic bishops and priests had not the illegitimate power they in this country were asked to believe. Their views were, however, in accordance with the nationalist aspirations of the Irish people. The priests had been loyal to the people, unlike the priests of other denominations...The Irish priests could not and had not the power to lead the Irish people in temporal matters against their honest convictions'.
70 See LDP 25 Nov 1908, both Dr Baxter and Dr Whitford are the invited guests at Saint Francis Xavier school prize giving night
71 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism (1981) p.139
72 Bootle Times, 8 Feb 1890
73 LDP, 22 Jan 1914
74 LDP, 27 Feb 1931
75 See LDP 29 Oct 1898; Porcupine, 22 Oct 1904
76 The religious census of Liverpool carried out by the Liverpool Daily Post in 1891 reveals the following proportion of church/chapel attendance for religious groups in Everton: Church of England 42.9 per cent; Nonconformist, 38.4 per cent; Roman Catholic, 15 per cent; Others, 3.7 Per cent. Source: J.A. Klapas
Chapter Eight

2 Blackburn Rovers FC (BT/00053482); Bolton Wanderers FC (00043026); Manchester City FC (BT/00040946); Middlesbrough FC (BT/00036633); Oldham Athletic FC (BT/00088795).

I arrived at this average by totalling the cash value of all nominal capital declared on their formation by the thirty-two English First and Second Division clubs studied by Vamplew, and then subtracting from this figure the total value of shares actually taken up in each of these clubs at their year of formation.
4 Blackburn Rovers FC (BT/00053482); Bolton Wanderers FC (00043026); Manchester City FC (BT/00040946); Middlesbrough FC (BT/00036633); Oldham Athletic FC (BT/00088795).

6 Mason, Association Football, (1980) p.40
7 Everton FC Co. Ltd File BT/36624, Memorandum of Association, 1892
8 Everton FC Co. Ltd File BT/36624, Memorandum of Association, 1908
9 Liverpool Daily Post (hereafter, LDP) 18th March, 1902
10 For John Houlding see Liverpool Courier (hereafter, LC) 18th March,1902; for Edwin Berry see P.M.Young, Football on Merseyside, (London, 1963) p.22; for Richard H.Webster see LC, 26th October, 1912; for John McKenna see Young, Football on Merseyside (1963), p.44
12 LDP, 23rd February, 1905
331

13 LDP, 21st January, 1930
14 LDP, 21st January, 1930
16 LDP, 21st January, 1931
18 Fraser and Morris, People and Society in Scotland (1990), p.257
19 LDP, 22nd February, 1905.
20 LDP, 22nd February, 1905.
21 LDP, 22nd February, 1905.
22 Liverpool Magistrates Liquor License Records: Alehouse Licenses and Occasional Liquor Licences.
23 Figures from G.W. Gutzke, Protecting the Pub: Brewers and Publicans Against Temperance (Woodbridge, 1999), p.195
25 See Gutzke, Protecting the Pub (1999), for an authoritative account of the drink industry's struggle against temperance reformers.
26 Gutzke, Protecting the Pub (1999), p.156
27 Gutzke, Protecting the Pub (1999), p.157
29 Figures from Gourvish and Wilson (1999), Table 2.1, p.24.
30 Information on Houlding Brewery Company share structure from Ind Coope archivist.
33 Mason, Association Football, (1980) p.41
34 See LDP, 12th September, 1957.
35 See Liverpool Echo, 30th July, 1923
36 Liverpool FC Articles of Association rule change, 1905. BT/35668
37 Liverpool FC Company File BT/35668, Certificate of the Registration of Mortgage or a Charge, dates: 6th June, 1907; 4th November, 1907; 31st October, 1907; 3rd April, 1909; 28th June, 1910.
38 Everton FC Company File BT/36624, Certification of the Registration of Mortgage or Change, 10th May, 1910.
39 Maximum gate figures based on Derby Day attendance records when each club traditionally recorded their highest seasonal gate.
40 Special Resolution of Liverpool Football and Athletic Grounds Company Limited, 11th June 1906 (Liverpool FC Co.File BT/35668)
41 Special Resolution of Everton Football Club Company Limited, 12th June, 1906 (Everton FC Co.File BT/36624).
42 The Law Reports: Statutes (Annual). A search was made of statutory changes to company law in the period 1899-1908. No changes pertaining to the rule changes at the two Liverpool football club companies were to be found.
43 See, for example, the 1892 Annual General Meeting Report (LDP, 30th August, 1892; Liverpool Review, 30th June, 1894).
44 LDP interview with retiring Everton chairman, Will C. Cuff, 10th May, 1949.
45 Wade and Cuff are mentioned in press reports of local Liberal Party meetings in the early 1890s. For Wade (the brother of J.A. Wade, chairman of the Walton Liberal Association) see LDP, 22nd and 26th October, 1891, 5th and 11th April 1892; and 18th June. For Cuff, see Bootle Times, 26th April 1890; LDP, 18th October, 1892.
46 LDP, 16th February, 1940.
47 LDP, 3rd May, 1940.
49 Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (1971), p.302
50 Quoted by Clarke, *Lancashire and the New Liberalism* (1971), p.279. It was certainly the case, however, that some powerful local Tories took up the cause of Tariff Reform and eschewed Free Trade. Municipally based Tories such as Archibald Salvidge, the chairman of the powerful Working Men’s Conservative Association, took up a solidly Protectionist policy. This was motivated less, however, from any genuine economic convictions, but more as a method of heading-off the challenge presented to Tory dominance of politically organised Protestants. The Tories in Liverpool relied upon appeals, via the Working Men’s Conservative Association, to the Protestant working class in order to keep them in municipal power. Their failure, as Protestant extremists saw it, to address rigorously Ritualism in the Established Church brought about a political threat to divide Protestant loyalties within the city, thus surrendering municipal power into the hands of the Liberals, or an alliance between Liberals, Irish Nationalists and organised labour. Salvidge’s Protectionism has been interpreted as a way of securing Protestant support for the Tories in Liverpool by rallying that Protestant support around the standard of exclusion of Irish labour which threatened the standard of living of native workers. See P.J. Waller, *Democracy and Sectarianism: A Political and Social History of Liverpool, 1868-1939*, (Liverpool, 1981), p.210-12.


53 This was the expressed sentiment of Liverpool Tory Councillor, Russell-Taylor in 1905 when holding off a strong Labour challenge with Liberal help in Kensington Ward. See Waller, *Democracy and Sectarianism* (1981) p.235


58 R.K.Milne was an Alderman in Bebington, Wirral (*LMORB*, 1940, p.428); S.R.Williams was Alderman representing Wavertree Ward (see *LMORB*, 1940, p.451); J.Harrop was Alderman representing Anfield Ward from 1940 (see *LMORB*, 1940, p.414); George A.Richards was constituency chairman for the Conservative Party in West Derby (see *LMORB*, 1947, p.296).

59 Director Richard Searle was Conservative councillor for Walton (see *LMORB*, 1947, p.407); Director A.N.Denaro was a defeated Labour Party candidate for Breckfield Ward in 1920 (see *LMORB*, 1921, p.53); Director Alfred Gates was leader of the Liberal Party in Liverpool (see *LDP*, 23rd May, 1942).

60 For A.E.Berry See *LMORB*, 1928, p.338; For R.K.Milne see *LMORB*, 1947, p.298.

61 For W.C.C.Briggs see *LC*, 22d February, 1923; R.L.Martindale see *LC*, 24th February, 1926; W.R.Williams see *LDP&M*, 22nd January, 1929; A.Worgan see *LC*, 16th October, 1920.

Conclusion


3 This is a point made by Bill Murray, *The Old Firm: Sectarianism, Sport and Society in Scotland*, (2000) p.96 n19. Murray makes the point that in PJ Waller’s political and social history of the city of Liverpool: *Democracy and Sectarianism: A Political and Social History of Liverpool, 1868-1939*, (1981) Waller fails to make any significant comment on the role of the football organisations as social organisations in civic life.
Bibliography and Sources

Manuscripts and Records
(Repository: Liverpool Record Office unless otherwise stated)

Accession Box Files: Everton & Liverpool Football Clubs

Borough of Liverpool: Proceedings of the Council (Annual)

Burton-on-Trent, Allied Breweries (Houlding Brewery Company Shareholder Registers)

Anfield Cemetery Burial Registers

Cardiff, Companies House, Bents Brewery Company, Company File Number BT31/29362

Cardiff, Companies House, Blackburn Rovers Football Club Company Limited, Director and Shareholder Registers. Company File Number BT31/00053482

Cardiff, Companies House, Bolton Wanderers Football Club Company Limited, Director and Shareholder Registers. Company File Number BT31/00043026

Cardiff, Companies House, Bootle Football Club Company Limited, Director and Shareholder Registers. Company File Number BT31/37503

Cardiff, Companies House, Everton Football Club Company Limited, Director and Shareholder Registers, Articles and Memorandum of Association. Company File Number BT31/36624.

Cardiff, Companies House, Liverpool Football Club and Athletics Ground Company Limited, Director and Shareholder Registers, Articles and Memorandum of Association, Company File Number BT31/35668.

Cardiff, Companies House, Liverpool Caledonians Football Club Company Limited, Director and Shareholder Registers. Company File Number BT31/36535

Cardiff, Companies House, Manchester City Football Club Company Limited, Director and Shareholder Registers. Company File Number BT31/00040946
Cardiff, *Companies House*, Middlesborough Football Club Company Limited, Director and Shareholder Registers. Company File Number BT31/00036633

Cardiff, *Companies House*, Oldham Athletic Football Club Company Limited, Director and Shareholder Registers. Company File Number BT31/00088795

Cardiff, *Companies House*, Whitbread West Company Limited (Threlfalls Brewery Company Limited), Company File Number BT31/26091

Everton Cemetery Burial Records

Holy Trinity Church of England, Everton, Baptism and Marriage Registers

Liverpool, *University of Liverpool* (Sydney Jones Library) Independent Labour Party Regional Records, 1865-1955

Preston, *University of Central Lancashire*, Joseph Livesy Collection

Liverpool City Council Annual Committee and Sub-Committee Meeting Minutes

Liverpool Clerks Association, Membership Lists, 1909

Liverpool Constitutional Association, Board Minutes and Annual Reports of County Associations, 1860-1947

Liverpool Incorporated Law Society, List of Members, 1892

Liverpool Liquor Licensing Records (Annual), *Register of Alehouse Licenses*

Liverpool Liquor Licensing Records (Annual), *Register of Licenses Other Than Victuallers*

Liverpool Omnibus and Tramways Committee Annual Report, 1901

Liverpool Parliamentary Debating Society Papers, 1900-1945

Liverpool Reform Club, Membership Lists, 1931

Liverpool Select Vestry, Guardians' Committee Minute Books, 1893-1897

Liverpool United Trades and Labour Council, Committee Minutes and List of Attendances of Delegates, 1890-1900

Liverpool Vigilance Association, Committee Minutes and Attendance Books, 1908-1920

London, *British Newspaper Library* (Collindale), Liverpool Football Club Official Programmes

London (Kew) *Public Record Office*, Orrell Brewing Syndicate Company Limited, Company File Number BT31/4962/33147

London (High Holborn) *Registry for Grants, Wills and Probate Index*, Principal Registry of the Family Division (Will and Grant of John Houlding and of John Orrell)

Oakfield Road Wesleyan Methodist Chapel, Anfield, Marriage Registers

Our Lady of Immaculate Conception Roman Catholic Church, Everton, Baptism and Marriage Registers

Peter Walker (Warrington) Limited, Lists of Debenture and Preference Share Holders, 1890

St Ambrose Church of England, Everton, Baptism and Marriage Registers

St Cuthberts Church of England, Everton, Baptism and Marriage Registers

St Domingo New Connexional Methodist Chapel, Everton, Baptism and Marriage Registers

St Domingo New Connexional Methodist Chapel, Everton, Trust Committee, and Leaders Committee Meeting Minutes

St George Church of England, Everton, Baptism and Marriage Registers

St Saviours Church of England, Everton, Baptism and Marriage Registers

St Simon and St. Jude's Church of England, Anfield, Marriage Registers

Southport, *Atkinson Library*, Southport Liberal Association Annual Reports and Executive Committee Meeting Minutes.

West Derby Cemetery Burial Records

West Derby Union, Board of Guardian and General Purposes Committee Meeting Reports
Works of Reference and Official Publications
(Liverpool Record Office unless otherwise stated)

Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom (Annual). Her Majesty's Stationary Office (HMSO)

Artizans' and Labourers' Dwellings: Description and Particulars as to Rental, 1908, University of Liverpool

Bennet R  Record of Elections, Parliamentary and Municipal: Liverpool, Birkenhead and Bootle, 1832-1900

Bolger, Paul  Edwardian A-Z and Directory of Liverpool and Bootle


Catholic Family Annual and Almanac for the Diocese of Liverpool (Annual)

Census Reports, 1841, 1851, 1861, 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901

Dictionary of Edwardian Biography: Liverpool (Edinburgh, 1987)


Gores Liverpool Trade Directory (Annual)


Lancashire Leaders, Social and Political, vols. 1 and 2 (Exeter, 1897)


Liverpool and Merseyside Official Red Book (Annual)

Orchard B.G.  Liverpool's Legion of Honour (Birkenhead, 1893)

Liverpool Registers of Parliamentary and Municipal Voters, 1865-1900

Liverpool Poll Book: General Election, 1857

Methodist Conference of Liverpool: Handbook and Directory, 1949

Mitchell B.R.  British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1988)
Owners of Land in 1872-73, Parliamentary Papers (1874), LXXII, Part One


Return of Number of On-Licenses in Licensing Districts Where Tenant and Owner are Different, Parliamentary Papers (1892), LXVIII


Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing Laws, Parliamentary Papers (1897), XXXVI

Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing Laws: Return of Clubs in Great Britain and Ireland, Parliamentary Papers (1898), XXXVII.1

The Law Reports: Statutes, (Annual)

Newspapers and Periodicals
(Liverpool Record office unless otherwise stated)

Bootle Times

Liverpool Brewers and Victuallers Journal (British Newspaper Library, Collindale, London)

Formby Times

Liberpolitian

Liverpool Athletic and Dramatic News

Liverpool Catholic Herald

Liverpool Courier

Liverpool Daily Post

Liverpool Echo

Liverpool Mercury
Liverpool Review

Porcupine

Protestant Standard

Southport Visitor

The Listener

The Xaverian

Theses and Dissertations


Collins C.A. ‘Politics and Electors in Nineteenth Century Liverpool’ (MA Dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1974)


Maddock S. ‘The Liverpool Trades Council and Politics, 1878-1918’ (MA Dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1959)

O’Connell, Bernard ‘The Irish Nationalist Party in Liverpool, 1873-1922’ (MA Dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1971)


Rees R. ‘The Development of Physical Recreation in Liverpool During the Nineteenth Century (MA Dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1968)


Roberts D.A. ‘Religion and Politics in Liverpool since 1900’ (M.Sc. Econ. Dissertation, University of London, 1965)


Books
(Place of publication London unless otherwise stated)

a) Football/Sport Related


Barnes, Tommy  *Third Time Lucky: Bootle Football Club* (Liverpool, 1988)


Campbell, Tom  *Rhapsody in Green: Great Celtic Moments* (Edinburgh, 1990)

Conn, David  *The Football Business: Fair game in the ’90s?* (Edinburgh, 1998)


*Football in the Digital Age: Whose Game is it Anyway?*, Edited by Sean Hamil, Jonathan Michie, Christine Oughton and Steven Warby (Edinburgh, 2000)

France D. and Prentice D.  *Virgin Blues: 100 Seasons at the Top* (Essex, 2003)

Gibson A. and Pickford W.  *Association Football and the Men Who Made It*, volume II (1905)


Hill, Jeffrey  *Sport, Leisure and Culture in Twentieth Century Britain* (2002)

Inglis S. *English Football and the Men Who Made It* (1988)

Jarvies G. and Walker G. *Sport in the Making of the Scottish Nation: Ninety Minute Patriots?* (Leicester, 1994)

Jones S.G. *Sport, Politics and the Working Class: Organised Labour and Sport in Inter-War Britain* (Manchester, 1988)


Korr, Charles *West Ham United* (1986)

Lowerson, John *Sport and the English Middle Classes, 1870-1914* (Manchester, 1993)


Murray, Bill *The Old Firm in the New Age: Celtic and Rangers Since the Souness Revolution* (Edinburgh, 1998)


Paul, David (ed) *Goodison Voices: Recollections of Supporters* (Stroud, 1999)

*Passing Rhythms: Liverpool FC and the Transformation of Football*, Edited by John Williams, Stephen Hopkins and Cathy Long (Manchester, 2002)

Pead, Brian *Liverpool FC, 1892-1986: A Complete Record* (Derby, 1986)

Redhead, Steven *Football with Attitude* (Manchester, 1991)

Roberts J. *Everton: The Official Centenary History* (Manchester, 1978)

Rodgers K. *100 Years of Goodison Park* (Derby, 1992)
Rodgers K.  *Goodison Glory* (Liverpool, 1998)

Ross I.  *Everton: A Complete Record, 1878-1985* (Derby, 1985)

Russell, Dave  *Football and the English* (Preston, 1997)

Smith, Tommy  *I Did it the Hard Way* (1980)


Sugden J. and Bairner A.  *Sport, Sectarianism and Society in a Divided Ireland* (Leicester, 1993)


Tabner, Brian  *Through the Turnstiles* (Harefield, 1992)

*The Business of Football: A Game of Two Halves?*, Edited by Sean Hamil, Jonathan Michie and Christine Oughton  (Edinburgh, 1999)


Vamplew, Wray  *Pay Up and Play the Game: Professional Sport in Britain, 1875-1914* (Cambridge, 1988)

Wagg S.  *The Football World A Contemporary Social History* (Brighton, 1984)

Walker G. and Gallagher T.  *Sermons and Battle Hymns: Protestant Popular Culture in Modern Scotland*  (Edinburgh, 1990)

Walvin, James  *Leisure and Society, 1830-1950* (1978)

Walvin, James  *Football and the Decline of Britain* (1986)

Walvin, James  *The Peoples Game*, (1994)

Williams, John  *Football and Football Hooliganism in Liverpool* (Leicester, 1987)

Williams, John  *Games Without Frontiers: Football, Identity and Modernity* (1992)
Wood I.S. (ed) *Scotland and Ulster* (Edinburgh, 1994)

Young P.M. *Football on Merseyside* (1963)

**Books**

b) General

Aked C.F. *England Free and Sober* (Liverpool, 1897)


Armstrong R.A. *The Deadly Shame of Liverpool* (Liverpool, 1890)

Ayres, Pat *Life and Work in Athol Street* (Liverpool, 1997)

Baines T. *Liverpool in 1859* (Liverpool, 1859)


Belchem, John *Merseypride: Essays in Liverpool Exceptionalism* (Liverpool, 2000)


Braham, Michael *Southport Liberal Association: The First One Hundred Years* (Southport, 1985)

Burke, Thomas *A Catholic History of Liverpool* (Liverpool, 1910)

Chandler G. *Four Centuries of Banking: Volume Two* (1968)


Clarke P.F. *Lancashire and the New Liberalism* (Cambridge, 1971)


Forwood W.B.  *Recollections of a Busy Life* (Liverpool, 1910)

Fraser, D.  *Urban Politics in Victorian England* (Leicester, 1976)


Gutzke David W.  *Protecting the Pub: Brewers and Publicans Against Temperance* (Woodbridge, 1989)

Hamling W.A.  *A Short History of the Liverpool Trades Council, 1848-1948* (Liverpool, 1948)


Hawtrey R.G.  *A Century of Bank Rate* (1938)


Horne J.B. and Maund T.B.  *Liverpool Transport: Volume One, 1830-1900* (1975)


Jones D. Caradog (Ed)  *The Social Survey of Merseyside*, (Liverpool, 1934)


Lane, Tony  *Liverpool, City of the Sea*  (Liverpool, 1997)

Knight, Steven  *The Brotherhood: The Secret World of Freemasonry* (1983)

Marriner, Sheila  *The Economic and Social Development of Merseyside* (1982)


McFarland, Elaine  *Protestants First: Orangeism in Nineteenth Century Scotland*  (Edinburgh, 1990)

Mellor G.J.  *The Northern Music Hall*  (Newcastle, 1970)


Neale F.  *Sectarian Violence: The Liverpool Experience, 1819-1914*, (Manchester, 1988)

Nightingale, Martin  *Merseyside in Crisis*  (Manchester, 1980)


Picton J.A.  *Memorials of Liverpool* (Liverpool, 1903)

Powell, David  *The Edwardian Crisis: Britain, 1901-1914* (1996)


Richmond L. and Turton A.  *The Brewing Industry: A Guide to Historical Records* (1990)

Salvidge S.  *Salvidge of Liverpool*, (Liverpool, 1934)


Stone, Norman  *Europe Transformed, 1870-1914* (Glasgow, 1983)

Stonehouse, John  *Streets of Liverpool* (Liverpool, 1870)

Swann N.F.  *Short History of St. Domingo Church* (Liverpool, 1971)


Thayer, George  *The British Political Fringe* (1965)

Walker, Graham and Gallagher, Tom (eds),  *Sermons and Battle Hymns: Protestant Popular Culture in Modern Scotland* (Leicester, 1994)

Waller, Phillip J.  *Democracy and Sectarianism: A Political and Social History of Liverpool, 1868-1939* (Liverpool, 1981)

Warhurst E.  *The Story of St. Domingo Methodist Church, 1869-1943* (Liverpool, 1943)

Werner, Julia S.  *The Primitive Methodist Connexion, Its Background and Early History* (Wisconsin, 1984)

White, Brian D.  *A History of the Corporation of Liverpool, 1835-1914* (Liverpool, 1951)

Whittingham-Jones, Barbara  *Down With the Orange Caucus* (Liverpool, 1936)

Winskill P.T.  *History of the Temperance Movement in Liverpool and District* (Liverpool, 1887)

Whittingham-Jones B.  *The Pedigree of Liverpool Politics. White, Orange and Green* (Liverpool, 1936)
Articles

b) Football/Sport Related


Gillmeister H. ‘The Tale of Little Franz and Big Franz: The Foundation of Bayern Munich FC’, *Soccer and Society*, vol.1, number 2, (Summer, 2000) pp.82-106


**Articles**

a) General


Munro, Alasdair and Sim, Duncan ‘Expatriate Scots on Merseyside’, *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, vol.150 (2000), pp.121-44


Papers


Lawton R. and Pooley C.G.  *The Social Geography of Merseyside in the Nineteenth Century*, Report to the Social Science Research Committee, University of Liverpool, July 1976

Pooley C. and Irish S.  *The Development of Corporation Housing in Liverpool, 1869-1945*, Resource paper of the North West Regional Studies, University of Lancaster, 1984