Anglo-Iberian Relations 1939-1947: Britain, Spain, and the Survival of the Salazar Dictatorship

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Nunc Dimittis
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... iii

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................... iv

Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 7

Introduction: Anglo-Iberian Relations 1939-1947: Britain, Spain, and the Survival of the Salazar Dictatorship ......................................................................................................................... 8

The two regimes at the European and disciplinary periphery ....................................................... 11
The international history problem ................................................................................................ 15
The Second World War ....................................................................................................................... 17
The origins of the trilateral relationship ......................................................................................... 19
The colonial conundrum .................................................................................................................... 22
The liminal biennium ........................................................................................................................ 25
What we have and what we lack ................................................................................................. 26

Chapter One: Britain, Portugal, and Spanish Neutrality, 1939-1940 ..................................... 30

Our friends on the Peninsula ......................................................................................................... 32
The trilateral relationship at the outbreak of the War ................................................................. 38
The Eccles era ............................................................................................................................... 40
The end of the “Phoney War” ....................................................................................................... 44
Growing imperial ambiguities ..................................................................................................... 48
Change in Spain ............................................................................................................................ 50
The end of appeasement? .............................................................................................................. 59
Súñer and the Axis temptation ....................................................................................................... 66
The end of appeasement, deferred ............................................................................................... 74
The ruse and the rubes .................................................................................................................. 77

Chapter Two: A Year of Continuity, A Year of Change, 1941-1942 ..................................... 79

1941: a year of continuity ............................................................................................................... 80
The axis temptation, revisited ...................................................................................................... 82
Looming doubts on the Peninsula ............................................................................................... 87
Portuguese difficulties: Anglo-American threats to the Azores ............................................. 91
Questions of Peninsular security .................................................................................................. 94
Salazar between positions of weakness and strength ................................................................. 98
The first divergence of paths ....................................................................................................... 100
The Timor crisis .......................................................................................................................... 101
The pre-War situation .................................................................................................................. 103
The beginning of a crisis ............................................................................................................... 106
The long half-life .......................................................................................................................... 108
Conclusions

Chapter Five: Inter-imperial Relations After the War ......................................................... 211
The end of the Timor affair ......................................................................................... 214
Portugal as a Western European colonial power ...................................................... 216
The Tangier question ................................................................................................. 224
Portuguese India and the limits of Anglo-Portuguese imperial co-operation ........... 229
Portuguese rule in the quagmire .............................................................................. 231
The ambiguous imperial embrace ......................................................................... 240

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 243
The era of Spanish dominance ................................................................. 244
A certain idea of Portugal ....................................................................... 246
The Salazar myth .................................................................................... 248
The Portuguese Empire and the Azores .................................................. 249
The differing paths to survival ................................................................. 250
Post-War legacy ...................................................................................... 251
Salazar’s particular survival .................................................................... 253
Bibliography ............................................................................................ 255
Abstract

This thesis studies the trilateral relationship between the United Kingdom, Spain, and Portugal during the Second World War. It shows that, faced with enormous difficulties in keeping Spain from belligerency, Britain turned to Portugal to keep Franco from giving in to his Axis temptation. Drawing together British, Portuguese, and Spanish sources, this thesis shows that Portugal played no meaningful role in keeping Spain out of the War. Nevertheless, the idea of Portugal’s role in the War created a certain vision of Salazar’s Portugal in the minds of British policymakers as an allied neutral. This vision and idea of Portuguese allyship, promulgated by both leading Portuguese and British politicians and diplomats, created genuine and long-lasting developments in Anglo-Portuguese relations which long outlasted the live question of Spanish belligerency.

This vision created the circumstances in which the neutral Estado Novo – and its considerable global Empire – came to be seen as an ally in a war in which it had not participated. On the latter count, this thesis demonstrates the considerable interrelations between the European and global spheres, showing how the slow progress of the Portuguese Empire from neglected relic to centrepiece of Anglo-Portuguese relations was intimately related to the question of Spanish neutrality. In turn, it demonstrates how the legacy of this relationship – however imagined or poorly-understood – provided the basis for the Estado Novo to overcome domestic, international, and imperial uncertainties after the Second World War but before the Cold War. This thesis argues that these trilateral relations, never hitherto studied in the round, allowed Salazar’s Estado Novo’s a unique form of survival as an ally in the nascent Western order.
Introduction: Anglo-Iberian Relations 1939-1947:
Britain, Spain, and the Survival of the Salazar Dictatorship

Britain, their old ally, banker and protector, now owed them £80,000,000. Spain, their old rival, was in the United Nations’ doghouse, while Salazar, in spite of his anti-democratic sympathies, had pursued throughout World War II a serpentine policy whose final tack was enough in the Allies’ direction to earn their tolerance, if not their approval.¹

In July 1946, Time magazine thus described the conduct of Dr António de Oliveira Salazar during the Second World War.² On the front cover, he wore a pensive expression and a black suit with pinstripe grey stripes. Fifteen years the ruler of Portugal, he had practically forged the Estado Novo in his own image. Next to him, a perfectly ripe apple had been cut in half to reveal a rotten, maggot-eaten core. ‘How Bad Is the Best?’ asked the article.³ Time made a clear case: the Portuguese regime’s unique place in the world depended in great measure on two factors. The first was its role in the Second World War, and the successful diplomatic game it had played between 1939 and 1945. The second was its relationship with Great Britain, its oldest ally, and Spain, its historic rival and authoritarian kin. Two years earlier, in July 1944, the following exchange had taken place in the Foreign Office along remarkably similar lines:

This paper, of course, deals with Spanish-Portuguese relations but I think that in regard to recent years it should bring in the background of Anglo-Portuguese relations if misunderstandings are to be avoided.

Note by Frank Roberts, Head of the Central Department, on the paper ‘Relations between Spain and Portugal’, 5 August 1944.⁴

It was my original intention to do a paper on Anglo-Portuguese relations at the same time as this, and I realise that without this, the ‘Spanish-Portuguese’ hardly presents a complete picture.

Reply of H. V. Livermore, paper’s author, 25 October 1944.⁵

¹ ‘How Bad is the Best?’, Time, 48, 4, 22 July 1946, pp. 28-33.
³ ‘How Bad is the Best?’, Time, 48, 4, 22 July 1946, pp. 28-33.
⁴ The National Archives, Kew (Henceforth: TNA) FO 371/39762, Roberts note on: C10007, 5 August 1944.
⁵ TNA FO 371/39762, C10007, Livermore reply to Roberts, 25 October 1944.
Harold Livermore, then a young researcher in the Foreign Office, had been charged with writing an account of Spanish-Portuguese relations in the twentieth century.\(^6\) Frank Roberts, the head of the Central Department, responded with a critical note. The story was incomplete. The paper ‘should bring in the background of Anglo-Portuguese relations if misunderstandings are to be avoided’.\(^7\) These bilateral relations could not be understood without reference to the third party: Great Britain. This was because the \textit{Estado Novo} under António de Oliveira Salazar had been key to Britain’s aim of keeping Francisco Franco’s Spain neutral. In drawing ‘Spain gradually away from the Axis’, Portugal had rendered a valuable diplomatic service under the terms of the 600-year-old Anglo-Portuguese alliance.\(^8\) \textit{Time} and the Foreign Office understood it instinctively: the three-way wartime relationship between Britain, Spain, and Portugal was intrinsic to understanding the position of Salazar’s Portugal after 1945.

The aim of this thesis is to uncover that trilateral relationship between Britain, Spain, and Portugal in the Second World War and to demonstrate how this relationship accounted for the \textit{Estado Novo}’s unique form of post-War survival. Its survival was unique for several reasons: it was considered an ally, despite its wartime neutrality; it derived political benefits from that allyship; it was accepted by Western powers with no need for political change; and it survived with its disparate but substantial Empire wholly intact. Taken in combination, these factors created a form of survival particular and unique to Portugal.

In support of this aim, this thesis answers a series of clear but hitherto under-researched problems. How did that trilateral relationship emerge? What were its consequences during the Second World War? How did it create the circumstances for the survival of the Salazar regime? And why was the form of the \textit{Estado Novo}’s survival so unique? Combining these questions leads us to the central question, implicitly posited by \textit{Time} but hitherto since overlooked: how did the trilateral relationship between Britain, Spain, and Portugal account for the \textit{Estado Novo}’s particular form of survival after the Second World?

In answering these three questions, this thesis makes three central contentions. Its first central contention is that it is impossible to understand Anglo-Portuguese relations during the Second World War without reference to the shared object of their foreign policies: the


\(^{7}\) TNA FO 371/39762, Roberts note on: C10007, 5 August 1944.

\(^{8}\) TNA FO 371/39762, C10007, 28 July 1944.
neutrality of Francoist Spain. Between 1939 and 1942, Anglo-Portuguese relations hinged on the question of Spanish neutrality. The British view was that the Estado Novo would play an important role in keeping Spain neutral. Since then, it has been widely supposed that Salazar’s Portugal helped to keep Spain out of the War, thus providing a service to Great Britain under the terms of the 800-year-old Alliance under the guise of neutrality. Salazar’s Portugal was the lynchpin which kept Franco’s Spain out of the War.

Its second central contention is that this was a substantially mistaken view. There is no proof that Spanish leaders, particularly Franco and, during his apogee, Serrano Súñer, viewed Portugal as a serious equal nor found its foreign policy choices compelling or important. The Portuguese themselves were desperately aware of their irrelevance and weakness during Spain’s Axis temptation. Only British policymakers did not see this. They saw Portugal – like Paul the Apostle – in a mirror, dimly. In the desperate, contingent circumstances of having to keep Spain out of the War, they knew Portugal in part, and they prophesied in part. But this partial, obscured view of Portugal produced great changes in Anglo-Portuguese relations. It created a vision of Portugal as the allied neutral, even as the allied dictatorship. What became important was not so much Portugal’s role as the idea of Portugal’s role. In the long term, this view of the regime as an ally provided the basis for its particular form of survival as a recognisably Western dictatorship.

Its third central contention is that the Second World War led to a significant development in inter-imperial Anglo-Portuguese relations, a global development which was linked in great measure to the trilateral and nominally inter-European relationship. After the disastrous Allied invasion of Timor in December 1941, the British elite were forced to acknowledge that their designs in Iberia were linked to Portuguese desires about the security of their imperial rule. The future of the global Portuguese Empire was intrinsically linked to the need for Portuguese help in Europe. This belated realisation facilitated a dramatic change in how the British elite viewed the hitherto neglected Portuguese Empire and provided the basis for its extraordinary wholesale, intact survival after 1945.

This thesis contends that all three factors have been hitherto neglected. The connected history of Anglo-Spanish-Portuguese relations during the War; the unique survival of the Estado Novo between 1939 and 1947; and the dramatic developments in inter-imperial relations in those years all remain incomplete. Studies of Anglo-Portuguese relations have

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tended to neglect Spain; studies of Anglo-Spanish relations have tended to ignore Portugal; and studies of Hispano-Portuguese relations have tended to ignore the sizeable role of Great Britain. In studying these relations in the round, we can answer the above questions and evidence the above contentions. We can, in this thesis, discard the mirror, and see the historic record of Anglo-Iberian relations face-to-face.

**The two regimes at the European and disciplinary periphery**

*Time* and the Foreign Office papers make the clear case that the stories of Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain were closely bound together in the Second World War. But why have these trilateral relations not been studied until now? What do we know of the three sets of bilateral relations in the Second World War? And what do these studies omit that this thesis intends to correct? Studying these questions allows us to examine the origins of the two dictatorships and their taxonomic relationship to other European regimes; and, therefore, to examine how their foundations and organisation explained their likely attitude at the outbreak of the Second World War. In covering them, we can discern the historical and methodological gaps which mean there is space to demonstrate a novel historical hypothesis in one of the most researched conflicts in history.

It might be observed from the outset that there are two general contributory factors to this omission. The first is historical geography. In 1812 the French priest, diplomat, and historian Dominique-Georges-Frédéric Dufour de Pradt wrote in *Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d'Espagne* that: ‘it is an error of geography to have allocated Spain to Europe; she belongs to Africa: blood, manner, languages, manner of living and making war; in Spain everything is African’. The trope was enduring: in 1984, Donald Cameron Watt argued that there was ‘a good historical warranty for regarding them as having split from the common path of European experience after 1830’.

There is one exception to this hypothesis. Debates about the regimes’ taxonomic nature have always recognised that Franco’s Spain and Salazar’s Portugal belonged to a recognisable European continuum. In the inter-War period, the two regimes have been viewed as an essential part of a wider international debate. In 1964, the sociologist Juan Linz wrote his seminal paper

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‘An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain’. Since Linz argued that Franco was authoritarian, but not fascist, ‘Spanish historiography has been immersed in debate over issues of fascism versus authoritarianism’; was Francoist Spain fascist, authoritarian, or, as Ismael Saz Campos put it, a ‘fascistized dictatorship’, which while stunted in its ‘subordination to the state’ nonetheless possessed ‘innovation and functionality […] clearly attributable to fascism’? Was it a fascistizing regime which nonetheless never wholly fascistized? Was it entirely fascist? Clearly, Franco and Salazar are not fringe cases at the periphery, but closely linked authoritarian-fascist phenomena which have shaped international debate from the very outset. The important methodological point, for this thesis at least, is that all of these historic characterisations and debates hinged on placing Spain and Portugal squarely in an international context.

The debate over Spain’s taxonomic relationship with fascism reflected its origins, closely bound up with both fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. After a coup against the democratically elected, left-wing government on 17 July 1936, the military rebels – who came to be led by General Francisco Franco – waged an exterminatory crusade with the help of both Hitler and, particularly, Mussolini. The regime that emerged in 1939 was therefore unsurprisingly in ‘clear political alignment with the fascist powers’, both ideologically and strategically. Germanophilia was widespread, and especially prevalent amongst the upper

15 For an interpretation which views both as essentially fascist regimes, see: Manuel Loff, ‘Salazarismo e Franquismo: Projecto, Adaptação e História’, Revista de História Das Ideias, 31 (2010), 449-498; see also: Loff, Salazarismo e Franquismo Na Época de Hitler (1936-1942): Convergência Política, Preconceito Ideológico e Oportunidade Histórica Na Redefinição Internacional de Portugal e Espanha (Porto: Campo das Letras, 1996); Loff, O Nosso Século é Fascista: O Mundo Visto Por Salazar e Franco (1936-1945) (Porto: Campo das Letras, 2008).
17 Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War (London: Palgrave, 2004), pp. 25-39 (on background of Italian and German attitudes); pp. 87-99 (on active military and economic intervention).
ranks of the fascist single-party, the *Falange*. That was compounded by the debt – figurative and literal, financial and military – that had been accrued by Franco from the Italians and Germans during the Civil War. At the outbreak of World War in September 1939, this clear link with the fascist powers of Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Italy created the clear and present danger that Spain would enter the War on the Axis side. The regime’s origins, European and international as much as domestic, laid the foundations for close imitation of these regimes, in turn explaining the regime’s probable attitude at the outbreak of general European war.

The origins, political characteristics, and therefore likely position of the regime in Portugal were significant more ambiguous. A little after Linz, in 1968, the Portuguese sociologist Hermínio Martins published ‘Portugal’ as a chapter in the Random House collection *European Fascism*. The following year, Hugh Kay’s *Salazar and Modern Portugal* raised the question: what sort of ruler was Salazar – and over what sort of regime did he rule? Born into near-poverty near Santa Comba Dão in 1889, he considered the priesthood, but the extraordinarily intellectual Salazar opted instead for academia, becoming a professor in the law school at Coimbra at just 29. He combined Catholic piety, a right-wing Republicanism, and a fierce, intellectual fiscal hawkishness, the latter of which afforded him a degree of national notoriety. After a military coup in May 1926 – in which he was not directly involved – he balanced the state budget as finance minister, quitting, before returning to the brief to wield a dominating power, culminating in his appointment as Prime Minister in 1932. While the state officially remained under the control of the President, General Óscar Carmona, Salazar exercised practically unlimited control over the *Estado Novo*, the “New State”, which was created and run in his image.

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Was Salazar’s *Estado Novo* – it pays to think of the possessive noun and the proper noun together – a fascist dictatorship with characteristic particular to Portugal? Was it an authoritarian regime: reactionary, Catholic, and anti-liberal, which possessed aesthetic similarities with fascism but was not fundamentally the same sort of regime? Was António de Oliveira Salazar, its founder, architect, and leader of 36 years, chosen by God, or by the people? Ought we to think of its ruthless nationalistic anti-liberalism, enforced by the secret police, as fascism? Or ought we to think of his obvious affinity with the Catholic integralism of Charles Maurras’ *Action Français*, and his crushing of Francisco Rolão Preto’s explicitly fascist *Movimento Nacional Sindicalista*? Ought we to think of the constant first-rank priority of his foreign policy: the 600-year-old alliance with the liberal, democratic United Kingdom? Already, the reasons for the political, taxonomic, and therefore probably strategic ambiguity in the face of European war are becoming clear.

The origins of the two regimes created the historical precedent and environment in which their attitudes to a general European war was to be decided. But interlinked, international histories of the regimes disappear until the demise of both regimes – in a military coup in Portugal in 1974, and through relatively peaceful transition in Spain in 1975 – with both renewing comparative, connected interest. The regimes were once again *European*, even international, now on belated journeys into the European process of unification centred ‘around the values of democracy and capitalism’. But while there was still space for intellectual historians to investigate the two regimes’ nature, international histories – concerned with nation-states, foreign relations, and diplomacy – had long passed their zenith. Charles Maier incurred everybody’s wrath when he characterised international history as ‘languishing’ at the

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26 Ibid.
30 Benny Pollack, ‘Spain and Portugal between regime transition and stabilized democracy’, *Iberian Studies*, 19, 32-56.
margins of the academic study of history. But he identified a clear and present risk, to which the continuous and vigorous response and rebuttal – but never resolution – is a testament.

There is some risk that international history is nothing more than the ‘history of nation-states as marbles bashing against one another in a bag’. But as David Reynolds put it, ‘traditional questions about states, power and policy still matter, especially at the interface between peace and war’. Methodological innovations which seek to de-centre the state always return to face the same, similar problem: the state still matters as the prime capacitor of raw power. This thesis, at its broadest conception, is part of the ‘outburst of scholarship’ that has since followed Maier’s bold criticism. It is an affirmation that the foreign relations of the Iberian Peninsula, and Britain’s attitude to those two nations, matters to resolved unanswered questions. It is a riposte to A. J. P. Taylor’s contention that they left and re-joined the European mainstream – squarely disproven for in the inter-War period but not during the War itself. It follows the lead of intellectual historians who place Spain and Portugal firmly in the centre of the entangled web of international history, and in so doing seeks to understand how a trilateral entanglement created the circumstances for a unique but poorly-understood survival.

The international history problem

The origin of this problem – a lack of connected international histories of the two regimes – lies perhaps in the relatively simplistic view of the Estado Novo’s attitude toward the Spanish Civil War. The democratic foundations, periods of left-wing constitution, and overtones of anti-Catholic reformism of the Spanish Republic were an anathema to the Estado Novo. After the Francoist coup of 18 July 1936, it was natural that the two countries would

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come closer together. Historian Alberto Peña Rodríguez branded Salazar’s Portugal ‘the great ally of Franco’. Focusing on the media: newspapers, radio, and propaganda efforts in particular. The Civil War marked the beginning of a rapprochement: ‘Without a doubt, the 18 July 1936 opened for Salazar’s Portugal the beginning of a path toward an understanding with Spain, with the “New Spain” of General Franco’. In short, the Portuguese regime was an uncritical cheerleader and friend of Francoist Spain; enquiry into their relations during the Second World War was in light of this understandably never a priority.

While materially unable to supply the Francoists, Lisbon acted as a conduit by which they could procure vast quantities of arms on the open market. Portugal effectively laundered the insurgents’ war materiel. Further, Salazar permitted Mola’s troops to move from Seville to northern Spain; General Alfredo Kindelán later recalled that Portugal ‘facilitated our every request from the very beginning’. Coming under British pressure to join the Non-Intervention Committee, Salazar dragged his heels and the state’s diplomatic machinery, ‘exemplifying Salazar’s cynicism and the fundamental ideological principles which dictated his foreign policy’. According to Charles Halstead, the substantial but informal support afforded to the Francoists by the Estado Novo was formalised into stronger bilateral relations as a result of the Munich Crisis of September 1938. ‘The Spanish Nationalists had no desire to be sucked into any such struggle’, and accordingly believed that an agreement with Portugal provided a neutral and regionalist counterweight to both British and German pressures. At the same time, the British view was thus: ‘the Munich crisis allowed the Foreign Office to draw two conclusions: a) an interest in strengthening ties with Portugal as both a guarantee and as a form of pressure over Spain; b) the Burgos regime could be manipulated and was not completely tied to the Axis’. Spain and Portugal were closely tied together; those close ties could – and

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41 Ibid.
42 César Oliveira, Salazar e a guerra civil de Espanha (Lisboa: O Jornal, 1987), pp. 149-150.
43 Alfredo Kindelán, Mis Cuadernos de Guerra, 1936-1939 (Barcelona: Planeta, 1982), p. 89.
44 Serem, p. 215.
perhaps ought – to be exploited by Britain, struggling for a strong political foothold in Franco’s Spain.

The nominal culmination of these new, closer, relations came in the March 1939 Portuguese-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. Halstead hailed ‘its importance and remarkable longevity’, and it has been presumed since then that Hispano-Portuguese relations from 1939 until the beginning of the Cold War were defined by the 1939 Treaty. If this were the case, the lack of an international history of the two regimes during the Second World War might make sense: enduring and never doubting friendship might not urgently warrant historical enquiry. However, studying the relationship in the Second World War reveals several problems with this presumed hypothesis, not least its failure to account for why the two regimes took such different paths in the War, and why the Estado Novo survived in such a distinctive way relative to Franco’s Spain.

The Second World War

The 1939 Agreement put Spain and Portugal into a defensive pact, one which resembled the much older and more pedigreed Anglo-Portuguese Alliance as it provided a significant political link between the two countries. Already we can see a contradiction, for it is well-known that Franco, at the outbreak of the Second World War, sensed an opportunity to consummate this ideological and material affinity with the Axis. This contributed to a two-fold risk: Franco and many in his diarchic military-Falange regime sensed variously material gain, colonial expansion, and a prime seat in the new world order after German victory. This attitude only hardened as the War wore on. The fall of France ‘brought about a marked change in the Spanish attitude to the conflict’. This culminated in Franco’s declaration of “non-belligerency” on 12 June 1940, a step, it was admitted internally, that ‘imitated Italy’s earlier

47 Halstead, ‘Peninsula Purpose’, p. 287.
49 Ibid.
conduct’ before that country’s entry into the War. Nazi Germany ramped up pressure over the debts still owed from the Civil War. Cabinet files show that British policymakers ‘had become convinced of the strong likelihood of a Spanish entry into the war’. Infamously, Franco met Hitler in Hendaye in October 1940, entering the meeting with the intention of joining the War on the Axis side. The risk of Spanish entry in the first years of the War was high and continuously live.

For Great Britain, the consequences of Spanish entry into the War were as obvious as they were profound. Arguably the greatest was the loss of Gibraltar, the Germans having planned its capture with “Operation Felix”. ‘For the Axis, Spain’s entry in the war could have resulted in the taking of Gibraltar, [and] the closing of the Gibraltar Straits, consequently asphyxiating the British forces’, dependent as they were on the Mediterranean to transit imperial troops, goods, and foodstuffs. Its loss threatened the connection with the Empire-Commonwealth, increasingly vital in supporting the British war effort. After American entry in late 1941, Allied policymakers well understood ‘the serious and variegated threat which Franco’s Spain posed to the security of Operation Torch’. The prospect of Spanish intelligence (and potentially military) threatened Allied troop movements in the Strait of Gibraltar between Spain and Spanish Morocco. Accordingly, ‘the strategic importance of Spain to the Axis cause made Franco the object of courtship by both sides’. The ‘critical period between 1940 and 1942’ meant that ‘Spain’s sovereign foreign policy choices, especially that most fundamental one of war or peace’ commanded huge attention – especially from Great Britain.

It is therefore unsurprising that so much should have been written about Anglo-Spanish relations in the Second World War. In 1986, Denis Smyth provided a detailed almanae of

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52 Moradiellos and Hernández-Sandoica, p. 251.
55 The myth that he hoodwinked Hitler was demolished in typically rigorous fashion by Preston; Paul Preston, ‘Franco and Hitler: The Myth of Hendaye 1940’, Contemporary European History, 1,1 (1992), 1-16.
57 José Mario Armero, La Política Exterior de Franco (Barcelona: Planeta, 1978), p. 78.
59 Ibid.
60 Preston, Franco, p. 358.
British policy in those fateful years, 1940-1941: *Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival: British Policy and Franco’s Spain, 1940-41*. 62 For both Britain and Spain, ‘the need to survive was the pressing exigency, and the will to survive, the constant and immediate inspiration of their foreign policies’. 63 This shared exigency in that biennial provided the foundations of a working relationship which ensured Franco’s regime survived past 1945. 64 Enrique Moradiellos’ *Franco frente a Churchill* uses both the British archives and the records of the Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores (MAE). His essential contention is that British policy of “the carrot and the stick” successfully contained Franco’s desire to join Mussolini after June 1940. 65 In a similar vein, Richard Wigg’s *Churchill and Spain* uses Foreign Office and Cabinet papers to explain why the British government never moved decisively against the Franco regime either during the War or after 1945. 66 His contention is that Franco’s survival was sealed during the Second World War – above all by Churchill himself – meaning the period of post-War pressure would always amount to nothing. 67

**The origins of the trilateral relationship**

Keeping Spain out of the War was a serious and live preoccupation for Great Britain; we already benefit from a substantial number of studies which allow us to understand bilateral Anglo-Spanish relations in this crucial period. What is missing is the effect of this preoccupation on a wider set of international relations. As we have seen, historians interested in the intellectual and political development of fascism have always understood the intrinsic link between Spain and Portugal, but that is not the case in the international history of Spain during the Second World War. Yet, it was precisely the aim of keeping Spain out of the War which provided the centrepiece of Anglo-Portuguese relations during the Second World War. It was precisely this connection which has hitherto been neglected and which this thesis aims to examine.

63 Ibid., p. 244.
64 Ibid., *Diplomacy and the Strategy of Survival*, pp. 246-248.
67 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
A reasonable amount of scholarship has considered Anglo-Portuguese relations during the Second World War. The fundamental premise of Anglo-Portuguese relations was the “Alliance”, first formalised by the Treaty of Windsor – somewhat implausibly – in 1386. While of dubious effect for long periods, by the late nineteenth century it had become a central part of Portuguese foreign policy. With the creation of the Estado Novo, the Alliance only grew in importance as the central plank of the regime’s foreign policy aims. The effect of the Alliance on Salazar’s foreign policy was aptly described by the historian Fernando Rosas: ‘the maintenance of colonial and national sovereignty and the essential functioning of the domestic economy depended largely on British goodwill and on Britain’s commitment to the alliance’. For Salazar, preservation of the Alliance was the best way of protecting the regime, both in Europe and globally; as we shall see, the preservation of its large and weak Empire depended on the aegis of the world’s largest Empire.

Before 1939, however, this was hardly reciprocated, reflecting the power imbalance between the two states. ‘The British guarantee of Portuguese integrity remained a conditional one’, and relations from 1913, even during the First World War, which Portugal joined under British pressure in 1916, were ‘only lukewarm’. The official British attitude was ambivalence, particularly with regard to Portugal’s colonial Empire. But at the outbreak of War, the Alliance acquired a new import. Salazar had spent many years drawing ‘to London’s attention the potential threat posed to British interests in North Africa by the existence of the Franco regime’. The question for Salazar’s Estado Novo at the beginning of the War was what its formal effects would be in light of Britain declaring war. As historian Glyn Stone put it, it was question of degrees: ‘how strict would that neutrality be?’, would it be ‘the benevolent neutrality sought by the chiefs of staff and foreign office’?

On this count, the quasi-official histories of the regime align exactly with the British Government’s aims: Portuguese neutrality was to take the form of contingent benevolence

68 A wonderful overview of the Alliance’s long life, unencumbered by the bias of accounts which became popular in the Second World War, is: Edgar Prestage, ‘The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 17 (1934), 69-100.
70 De Meneses, Salazar, p. 374.
within the framework of the Alliance. The key part of this contingent benevolence, as seen by British policymakers, was that Portuguese neutrality would serve as a weapon in the fight against Spanish belligerency. ‘The Allies, especially Great Britain, were interested in keeping Portugal out of the conflict and making use of that country’s services to keep Franco’s Spain away from the forces of the Allies’. Structurally, in staying neutral, Portugal reduced the risk of some form of Hispano-German invasion of Portugal, and thus the opening of another front in Europe.

This political-strategic utility was the manifestation of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance in the context of a world war. Portugal was thus the ‘Allied Neutral’ amongst Europe’s other neutrals. Politically, as Joaquim da Costa Leite put it, ‘Portuguese non-belligerency was essential to keep Spain from entering the war on the side of the Axis’. This was “Neutrality by Agreement”; ‘Portuguese neutrality had its attractions in London for those who believed it imperative to keep Spain out of the war’. The normative history of Portugal in World War Two, in other words, accepts that Portugal’s role in this trilateral relationship was the basis of its political allyship with Great Britain despite its official neutrality.

How ought we to reconcile this with studies of Portuguese conduct in the War which give a more ambivalent account of the Estado Novo’s conduct? António Telo identified three phases of Portuguese neutrality: ‘neutrality during the phase of Axis supremacy’; ‘neutrality during the phase of the balance of forces’; and ‘neutrality during the phase of Allied supremacy’. These began, respectively, from June 1940, from December 1941, and from mid-1943. Telo’s own two-volume study began in 1941, covering the latter two periods of these three phases, beginning with American entry into the War after Pearl Harbour and the Allied invasion of Timor. But in overlooking Spain as the nominal joint object of British and Portuguese foreign policies, Telo leaves us with a huge problem: what of the antecedents of

79 da Costa Leite, p. 189.
80 Tom Gallagher, Salazar, p. 105.
81 On the normative understanding of Portugal’s role in WW2, see: Serem, ‘Portugal e a Guerra Civil de Espanha’, pp. 217-219.
83 Telo, Portugal Na Segunda Guerra, pp. 11-13 and pp. 43-47.
survival detailed by *Time*? What about the central aim and belief of British policymakers revealed by the Foreign Office in 1944? What of the trilateral relationship?

The nature, course, and legacy of the international, trilateral relationship has hitherto eluded us. We have the bones of a normative hypothesis: Portugal, at British behest, kept Spain from the substantial Axis temptation. The *Estado Novo* was the conduit to a wavering Spain. Studying Anglo-Portuguese relations without reference to Spain misses this altogether. Studying Hispano-Portuguese relations without reference to Great Britain – and eventually the United States – excludes the influence of the great Allied power(s). Studying Anglo-Spanish relations ignores the intimately related, substantial developments in the position of Portugal. We lack, in summary, a history which allows us to account for the actual relationship, and thus the extraordinary developments in Anglo-Portuguese relations which accounted for the dictatorship’s unique War – and unique post-War.

**The colonial conundrum**

This thesis’ first two contentions – that a unique set of Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish trilateral relations in turn accounted for Portugal’s particular form of survival after 1945 – are intrinsically linked to its third: that the Second World War revolutionised Anglo-Portuguese inter-imperial relations. No study of the *Estado Novo*’s survival can ignore the imperial question, since the Portuguese Empire and Portugal’s status as an imperial nation was at the very heart of the regime’s ideology. ‘The myth of Empire was at the heart of the *Estado Novo*’s ideology’ – Portuguese national identity, and the Portuguese nation itself, was not just built on but inexorably intertwined with the overseas Empire.  

84 The preservation of the Empire was the dividing line between the liberal decadence from which Salazar had rescued his country; ‘in contrast to the supposed decay of the Portuguese Empire under the First Republic’, the ‘resurgence of Portugal would be a particular achievement of the Estado Novo’.  

85 The regime and its empire were inexorably ‘twinned in his mind’. Indeed, the regime was the colonies

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85 Heriberto Cairo, ‘“Portugal is not a Small Country”: Maps and Propaganda in the Salazar Regime’, *Geopolitics*, 11, 3 (2006), 367-395 (p. 381). This is despite the fact that the First Portuguese Republic was imperialistic and, indeed, in many ways continued earlier policies when concerned with the colonies. See: Cláudia Castelo, ‘O nacionalismo imperial no pensamento republicano’, in: *A Primera República e as Colónias Portuguesas*, ed. by José Miguel Sardica (Lisboa: CEPCEP, 2010), pp. 28-47.  
and the colonies were the regime. The *Estado Novo* was explicitly defined as ‘a nation not reducible to its metropolitan and peninsular existence but anchored both historically and territorially in an overseas pluri-continental colonial empire’.87

Since the two were inseparable, *survival* in the Portuguese context meant survival of the metropolitan regime and survival of its overseas Empire. One of Salazar’s central preoccupations at the outbreak of war was ‘the vulnerability of its colonial Empire, scattered across the globe and inadequately linked by the smallest of navies’.88 This was a deep-seated fear. Salazar kept in mind the 1890 British ultimatum, which threatened Portuguese control over Angola and Mozambique if they did not withdraw from lands between the two.89 While the inter-war period had seen Anglo-Portuguese relations improve, with the Anglo-Portuguese relationship amounting to ‘a coherent defence policy for the Empire and Portugal’s Atlantic reach’, fears remained.90 The threat of War compounded these fears. In 1938, Britain, supposedly Portugal’s protective power, gave serious consideration to using Mozambique and Angola as leverage for Hitler’s territorial desires.91 In the end, Glyn Stone argued, ‘only Hitler’s refusal to consider colonial retrocession […] spared the government considerable embarrassment’.92

Yet in August 1945, the British Ambassador in Lisbon categorised Portugal as an imperial ally, arguing that there was ‘advantage to British interests in having another colonial power at the conference table’.93 Many histories have focused on the process of *decolonisation* in the Portuguese Empire.94 Some have taken a comparative approach, but again these have usually focused on the endgame of the two Empires.95 What we might term international histories of Empire, those which study the relations between the Empires from the metropoles,

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88 De Meneses, Salazar, p. 224.
89 Especially true in the era of colonial expansion, when Portugal’s envy of Great Britain was always tempered by its security dependence. Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in European and World History* (London: Reaktion, 2009), pp. 190-193.
91 Stone, Oldest Ally, pp. 110-112.
92 Ibid., p. 112.
93 TNA WO 208/1633, Portuguese Timor, O’Malley (Lisbon) to Foreign Office, 15 August 1945.
have tended to focus on the 1960s.\textsuperscript{96} All of these later histories have been implicitly premised on Britain acting as Portugal’s imperial ally; British support for Portuguese rule continued well into the 1960s, helping to prolong Portuguese rule in an era of rising popular discontentment and amidst a decolonising wave in other colonial territories.\textsuperscript{97} But, given the situation in 1938, what was the origin of this allyship? What changed during the Second World War?

A tendency to overlook the imperial context of Portugal in the Second World War means we lack an explanation as to why this transformation took place.\textsuperscript{98} The overall inter-imperial dynamics at play between Great Britain and the Empire-Commonwealth and Portugal, the only neutral European Empire, remain unclear.\textsuperscript{99} We are left with several questions. Why did the inter-imperial relationship change so dramatically? What happened to inter-imperial relations during the Second World War? How was Britain converted from imperial doubter to imperial guarantor?

This thesis answers these questions by studying the consequences of the disastrous Allied invasion of the Portuguese colony of Timor in December 1941. It demonstrates how, until that point, Britain had been entirely willing to countenance simply seizing Portugal’s colonies without regard for the consequences. Following the invasion, however, British policymakers were forced to accept that their strategic designs on the Iberian Peninsula – in which Portugal was to play a key role – could not be separated from their attitudes to the Portuguese Empire. It was realised, owing to strategic needs in Spain, that the European and global spheres were inseparable. This realisation provoked a significant change in inter-imperial relations: the Alliance acquired for the first time a formal imperial element, including guarantees about the maintenance of the Portuguese Empire which would linger long past 1945. Britain was forced by this flashpoint to become an imperial guarantor, a position it became more comfortable with in the following years. While politically awkward in the case of Goa amidst the British exit from India, these guarantees made up a core constituent part of Salazar’s unique survival; his global Empire, as his regime, survived intact as a consequence of wartime relations.


\textsuperscript{97} Aires Oliveira, ‘Live and Let Live’, p. 192.


The liminal biennium

The imperial guarantees which provided the Portuguese Empire with a formal degree of British protection were the legacy of contingent wartime decisions. This legacy is important in addressing one final, temporal conundrum. In overlooking the interconnected international history of the two regimes in the Second World War, historians have created a significant problem: what happened to the *Estado Novo* after the Second World War, but before the Cold War? In Spain, Franco’s regime lived two dangerous years, relegated to the international fringes and subject to condemnation. The geo-strategic exigencies of the Cold War – the brute questions of the strategic need for a well-placed ally against communism – allowed Franco into the new US-led fold, bringing international recognition and investment.

But what about Portugal’s liminal biennium? Only two explanations have been suggested. The first is that Salazar’s decision to cease trade with Nazi Germany in 1944 afforded him just enough international respectability to enter the Western fold after the War. The second is that the need for airbases in the Azores explained everything: Portugal’s entry into the Marshall Plan, Portugal’s entry into NATO. The scale of the problem can be assessed by the number of histories which deal with Spain as a unique case: ‘Franco’s survival in power at the end of the II World War was an authentic anomaly’; ‘the Iberian Peninsula was still dominated by a totalitarian regime’. This thesis then deals with the absence of the Portuguese regime in these years, linking changing British ideas about its role to its survival after 1945.

In summary, this thesis contends that taking an innovative trilateral approach to the period 1939-1943 allows us much more fully to account for the origins of the *Estado Novo*’s oft-overlooked survival. It allows us to shed the idea of Spain as an outlier, and to rid the illusion that the freezing of Europe into Cold War blocs alone accounted for Portugal’s entry into the Western bloc. Instead, it shows how the exigencies of the Second World War – for long periods, exigencies shaped by the question of Spain’s orientation – pushed Great Britain

and, in turn, the United States into a form of allyship with a regime inimically opposed to their liberal, democratic constitutions.

**What we have and what we lack**

Let us pause for a moment to take stock of what we have and of what we lack in respect of the historiography to date. We have an abundance of answers to the question: what sort of regimes were they? We have a dialectical historiographic debate about that question, a debate which always has an implicit international element. We have histories which compare the regimes in Spain and Portugal. We have histories which account for the *Estado Novo*’s unusual, even *sui generis* taxonomic structure. We have a multitude of studies of bilateral relations: Anglo-Portuguese, Anglo-Spanish, and to a lesser extent, Hispano-Portuguese. The framework exists to write joint histories which examine continuities and discontinuities between the two regimes and their place in the world.

But we lack answers about the international history of the two regimes in the Second World War, one which accounts for their intrinsic intertwining. Studying the international relations of the three states allows us to account for a clear, unanswered question: how did the trilateral relationship between Britain, Spain, and Portugal account for the *Estado Novo*’s particular form of survival after the Second World War? Its first central contention is that, from 1939 to 1942, it is impossible to understand the international situation of Salazar’s Portugal without reference to Franco’s Spain. Its second central contention is that this relationship paved the way for the particular form of Salazar’s survival after 1945. Its third central contention is that this relationship had a significant imperial element. These are the thematic considerations which run through each chapter of the thesis.

There is one final thematic consideration: that of contingency. This reflects both the circumstances of the time and the circumstances of this thesis. The diplomatic and political actors who made the decisions which led to Portugal’s unique survival did so in existentially contingent terms: their ability to keep Spain out of the War would make a material difference to Britain’s war effort and therefore its survival as an independent nation. The circumstances limited their Overton windows, their worldview, their options. It should be explained from the outset, therefore, that this thesis passes historical judgement on the cause and effect of things, but not moral judgement on the historical actors themselves. Historians are afforded the great benefit of hindsight; we ought not misuse it.
The circumstances in which this thesis was written were much less serious. But it was constrained all the same, largely by the Covid pandemic. The decision to focus on Portugal was motivated by its neglect relative to Spain and by the accessibility of sources in the circumstances. The records of the Arquivo Salazar, of the Arquivo Histórico Diplomático, the published (edited) papers of the Dez Anos de Política Externa, and the selected correspondence of Salazar with his lieutenants, Pedro Teotónio Pereira and Armindo Monteiro, all allowed a reasonably full view of Portuguese diplomacy to be taken. They complemented – even when they contradicted – the voluminous official British records, available if not always accessible at The National Archives. One hopes a similar understanding of the contingent circumstances will be extended by readers to the writer as well as the actors.

Each chapter deals with what we lack. Chapter one deals with the Salazar myth: the idea of Salazar as the lynchpin that kept Franco’s Spain out of the War. It corrects the systemic distortions and absences created by purely bilateral histories which cannot account for this supposed role in a trilateral relationship. From 1939 to 1942, it is impossible to understand Anglo-Portuguese relations without reference to Spain, since Anglo-Portuguese relations in those years were explicitly premised on keeping that country out of the War. Yet, as we shall see, Hispano-Portuguese relations were hollow, greatly strained, and characterised by no political convergence nor personal warmth on either side. This chapter introduces the Iberian blockade, created by the Ministry of Economic Warfare, showing how it created a real trilateral relationship, much to Salazar and Franco’s chagrin. It also shows how the idea of Portugal took root in many imaginations, including those of Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir Walford Selby, and the enigmatic economic envoy David Eccles. Salazar and his Ambassador in Madrid, Pedro Teotónio Pereira, encouraged these men to believe that Portugal was a vital ally, laying the groundwork for a certain vision of Portugal to coalesce in British policymaking circles.

Chapter two deals with the convergence of Hispano-Portuguese relations in 1941 and 1942. It deals with early signs of a split, particularly Anglo-Portuguese defence negotiations in 1941, scuppered by the Allied invasion of Timor in December. It demonstrates the effects of this invasion in Iberia, where Franco and Salazar met for the first time in February, showing how the development in Hispano-Portuguese relations was intimately linked to developments in Anglo-Portuguese relations. It examines the consequences of the invasion on British policymakers, particularly the realisation that strategic aims in Spain constricted British and Commonwealth designs over Portuguese colonies. It concludes by showing how General Jordana’s visit to Lisbon in December 1942 and the conclusion of the Iberian Pact was motivated not by Portuguese strength, but by changes in internal Spanish politics and Anglo-
American advances in North Africa following Operation Torch. Both chapters one and two deal with how the idea of Portugal in the official British mind affected British policymaking; how an imagined ally created policies apt for actual allyship.

Chapter three accounts for the divergence between Spain and Portugal in the era of Allied ascendancy, arguing that Salazar’s path lay as much in a mercantilist understanding of the global power dynamic as in altruistic co-operation with the Allied powers. It shows how the imperial question in Anglo-Portuguese relations developed significantly as the course of the War wore on, demonstrating for the first time how the Portuguese regime secured an allyship that was imperial as much as domestic, global as much as European. It further shows the emergence of a substantial threat to the Portuguese regime: the risk of comparison and even identification, with the Spanish regime, particularly on the vexing issue of wolfram trade. It further accounts for the growing, even threatening, role of the United States in Iberian affairs, and the effect of this role on British relations with both Spain and Portugal.

Having accounted for the greatly changed nature of Anglo-Portuguese relations during the War, chapter four moves to examine why Portugal, in contrast to Spain, never became the object of formal British opprobrium nor suffered the same international isolation as the Franco regime after 1945. It shows that the Salazar regime faced a number of hitherto unaccounted for threats which were markedly similar in both scope and nature to post-War Spain: a potentially hostile Labour government, the risk of liberal contagion and – crucially – the threat of the collapse of the Franco regime. It shows how the idea of allyship and “good offices” not only sustained the Estado Novo against these threats but laid the solid foundations for acceptance into the nascent Western order.

Finally, chapter five examines how the changed inter-imperial dynamic during the War – in large part a consequence of the need for Portuguese help in Spain – created in Portugal’s Estado Novo an imperial ally for Great Britain. It demonstrates how, before the onset of the Cold War, the regime secured a form of imperial allyship, the legacy of wartime assurances about the future of the Portuguese Empire. In Africa, this allyship amounted to Portugal obtaining informal membership to a network of post-War European imperial conferences, and thus a coveted seat at the table. This allyship was never total: in India in particular, it was always subordinate to British desires for good relations with the newly independent state. Yet, particularly in Africa, the allyship would go on to fortify Anglo-Portuguese relations in the era of decolonisation. In sum, it shows how a new inter-imperial dynamic was a significant factor in the particular form of Salazar’s survival.
We can thus give some preliminary consideration to the questions raised at the beginning of this introduction. Portugal evaded the opprobrium that plagued Franco’s Spain in large part because of a wartime relationship that had been premised on its relationship with that very regime. The trilateral relationship between Britain, Spain, and Portugal created a vision of Salazar as an important ally, despite the Estado Novo’s steadfast functional commitment to neutrality and lack of influence in Spain. Crucially, it provided the catalyst by which the British government was forced to reckon with its hitherto dismissive policy toward the Portuguese Empire, starting a chain of events which would not only secure the Empire’s future after 1945, but secure a significant imperial element to the existing old alliance. After 1945, these factors were enough to provide the foundations by which the dangers produced by the end of the War never seriously threatened the regime.
What would be Spain’s attitude at the outbreak of war: would they join their Axis backers, or would they remain neutral? How could Great Britain influence that choice? The question of Spanish neutrality was, at the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, the pre-eminent question facing Britain in Iberia. The question mattered for several great, even existential reasons. If Spain were to join the Axis, Gibraltar might be lost.\(^1\) Control of the Straits would therefore be threatened, if not lost completely.\(^2\) The umbilical link to the Far East could be lost. French North Africa could be lost.\(^3\) Submarines operating from the Canary Islands could threaten control of the Atlantic arena.\(^4\) The risk posed by Spanish belligerence to Great Britain’s war effort, even its survival, was serious.

The great difficulty for British policymakers was that they had very few options in Spain. Franco’s hostility to Britain was obvious. He regarded the British as enemies of the new Spain. Non-intervention, widely acknowledged even in official circles as a sham that had helped Franco to power, had not been enough to secure Spanish friendship. There were manifold pull factors toward Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.\(^5\) Both had afforded enormous material support during Franco’s bloody rise to power. He owed them a great debt for this. Spain’s party, FET y de las JONS, was nominally a syncretic blend of the various reactionary forces that had helped Franco to power. In reality, it was the vehicle of the openly fascist Falange, sympathetic to and modelled on the European fascist parties.

It was in this context that Great Britain turned to Portugal. On 15 August 1939, Halifax wrote to Lisbon to explain the desired basis of Anglo-Portuguese relations amidst the backdrop of looming European conflict: ‘His Majesty’s Government are anxious to bring about a closer measure of co-operation with the Portuguese Government as regards Spanish affairs’.\(^6\) Co-operation during the Civil War had been difficult owing to the divergence between Portugal’s overt sympathy for the Francoists and Britain’s own nominal neutrality. Now, Halifax wished

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\(^1\) TNA CAB 24/286, Committee of Imperial Defence, Chief of Staffs Committee, Report (COS 02), 10 May 1940.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^6\) TNA FO 425/418, Halifax to Selby, 15 August 1939.
to take ‘advantage’ of Salazar’s ‘deep anxiety’ now that Franco had secured uncontested power in Spain.⁷ In short:

Portugal is now not only our ally, but is now in the best possible position to follow and understand the internal evolution of Spain […]. We viewed with favour the Spanish-Portuguese Non-Aggression Treaty in the hope that it might lead to some stability in the Peninsula, and rather than see it denounced we would much prefer to try and draw Portugal into closer consultation upon our policy and interests in Spain.⁸

Halifax’s suggested policy aligned very closely with Salazar’s desires, and it was enthusiastically adopted by the latter. He replied that ‘keeping Spain neutral is the greatest service we can render’ to both Britain and France.⁹

This role – and particularly this role relative to Spain – has been systematically overlooked by bilateral accounts which tend not to include Portugal as an object of study in Anglo-Spanish relations, much less as an actor in its own right. In this regard, some historians have described British policy as a ‘wedge strategy’, driven between Spain and the Axis.¹⁰ We should in that case examine the state actor which functioned as the wedge. Others have described this policy as ‘neutrality by agreement’.¹¹ We should in that case dissect the meaning of agreement, including how this functioned relative to stated British intentions – or whether it did at all.

Did Portugal keep Spain neutral on Britain’s behalf? Such a question demonstrates the difficulty of studying only Anglo-Spanish relations, which ignore the supposed role of Portugal. It demonstrates the difficulty of studying only Anglo-Portuguese relations without due reference to Spain, which ignores the object of much of both countries’ attention and efforts. It demonstrates the difficulty of studying only Hispano-Portuguese relations, which ignore the ever-present power and influence of Great Britain. All three bilateral relationships can only be securely studied, from 1939-1941, with reference to the other two.

A systematic evaluation of British and Portuguese sources show that Portugal emphatically did not keep Spain neutral, and in fact played very little role in keeping Franco’s

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⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid.
prevarication favourable to British interests. But the Portuguese created the impression in British minds that they had done so. That was almost as important as having done the thing itself. This was the great victory. But from July 1940 onwards, however, the Portuguese paid a high price for the British perception that the Iberian Peninsula was one discrete unit. After the fall of France, Hugh Dalton’s accession to become Minister of Economic Warfare in the Churchill Ministry saw both countries subject to systematic and near-total blockade.

The consequences of both Portugal’s “role” in keeping Spain neutral, and of the blockade, were extremely significant in Spain between 1939 and 1941, while Franco prevaricated over his Axis temptation. What these two things established in Portugal were significant long past 1941, deep into the War, and past 1945. The third question, therefore, is: what were the consequences of a British policy that saw Portugal as the key link in a trilateral relationship?

Our friends on the Peninsula

Since 1937, Portugal had been represented in London by the able, affable Armindo Monteiro. Formerly Minister of the Colonies and Minister of Foreign Affairs, his posting to London demonstrated both the high esteem with which Salazar regarded the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and a certain fear and jealousy of the capable man. A consummate Anglophile, Monteiro had long strongly advocated, often to Salazar’s chagrin, for a closer association with Great Britain. In a long missive in March 1937, he implored his master to opt for British-led rearmament and a total commitment to co-operation with the British. Salazar rejected this suggestion with some suspicion. In early 1938, a minor misunderstanding about the British wish to re-reformulate the Alliance eventually provoked, after a period of internal Foreign Office wrangling, Monteiro to implore Salazar to re-define the Alliance in more precise

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14 CPAMOS, doc 21, Armindo Monteiro to Salazar, 22 March 1937, pp. 68-84.
He believed that more precise definition of Portugal’s rights and duties would help Britain understand Portugal’s strategic value – and thereby secure the future of her Empire.17

At a time when vain attempts to avoid war with Germany were the guiding preoccupation of British foreign policy, Monteiro’s attempts were hamstrung both by Salazar’s reticence and British preoccupation elsewhere. Increasingly frustrated by Salazar’s reticence to accept closer relations with Great Britain, Monteiro attempted to resign in May 1939.18 But events in Spain began a new chapter in Anglo-Portuguese relations. On 1 April 1939, Franco declared victory in Spain, having won his internecine war of elimination with Hitler and Mussolini’s help. In Franco’s Manichean worldview, Salazar’s ambiguous aid and political sympathies, as well as the dictatorial foundation of his state, meant he would be included with these friends.19 Great Britain, meanwhile, despite the effective aid it had rendered his cause, was to be included amongst his enemies.20

The Portuguese connection was, therefore, a potential opportunity for British policymakers in a barren political landscape as far as prospects in Spain were concerned. But impetus to make the most of this opportunity remained on the backburner for a combination of reasons. The first was urgency. The Cabinet and the Foreign Office were living in the ruins of the 1938 Munich Agreement.21 The likely attitude of Spain was the first-rank question in Iberia. But Hitler, and the question of whether war with Nazi Germany was inevitable (or what form it would take), was the guiding preoccupation of almost all foreign policy thoughts and efforts. After the occupation of Prague in March 1939, Halifax and Cadogan, Minister and all-powerful Permanent Under-Secretary and their officials, began working with the French on guarantees to Poland, Greece, and Romania in an ill-fated attempt to place hard limits on Hitler’s expansion under Chamberlain’s ill-principled guidance.22 The Portuguese offer of acting as an

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16 Aires Oliveira, Armindo Monteiro, pp. 182-184. Aires Oliveira, citing Nogueira, puts the misunderstanding down to Admiral Woodhouse, on a military mission to Portugal, believing Brigadier Tasso de Miranda was seeking a “special guarantee of defence”.
17 Aires Oliveira, Armindo Monteiro, p. 185.
18 DAPE, Vol. II., Doc. 700, Monteiro to Salazar, 10 May 1939; Aires Oliveira, Armindo Monteiro, p. 189.
interlocutor might have been interesting, but it was not pressingly important in the same way as the question of general European settlement.

This is to say that in the months leading up to the War, Spain – and certainly Portugal – were not the Foreign Office’s first-rank priorities. That is not to say that the British were disinterested in Spain. Between April and August, Halifax – usually through Alba – attempted to improve rather strained Anglo-Spanish relations. London’s strategy was simply a question of immediate threat based on stated intentions and calculated capacity; on that front, Spain belonged firmly in a second or third tier of strategic import for the United Kingdom. Owing both to Portugal’s stated political inclinations and her economic situation (its colonial economy was particularly tied to Britain and her Empire), Portugal belonged recognisably to a tier of strategic importance below that of Spain.

Salazar, however, clearly sensed an opportunity. In June 1939, he told Selby that he was ‘anxious for an improvement in Anglo-Spanish relations’ and believed that ‘Portugal might prove of some help to His Majesty’s Government’. Salazar’s suggestion became Selby’s suggestion. ‘I think Dr. Salazar is probably right’, the latter wrote to London, ‘and if we gave him the necessary encouragement in substantial and effective support, he might exercise an influence in the Iberian Peninsula calculated to contribute to counter the pressure of the Axis Powers’.

The bilateral British approaches, particularly commercially, were unsuccessful. This prompted the government to change its approach in August. From the very beginning, Britain’s policy toward Portugal was premised on strategic aims in Spain. This development may have been partly encouraged by Monteiro visiting Halifax on 9 August 1939 to discuss a particularly wide set of topics – Macau, Japan, and Spain – thus impressing on the Foreign Secretary Portugal’s potential strategic importance in a global war. On 15 August, Halifax wrote to Selby to explain the desired basis of Britain’s policy toward Spain and Portugal’s role therein. He wished to approach Salazar in this regard under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Salazar accepted post-haste. As historian Futscher Pereira wrote, ‘the neutralisation of the Iberian Peninsula was the foundation stone of Salazar’s strategy to keep Portugal on the

24 TNA FO 425/418, Selby to Halifax, 15 June 1939.
25 Ibid.
26 TNA CAB 23/100/1, Cabinet Conclusions (CC(39)), 21 June 1939. Item 6: ‘The International Situation – Relations with Spain.
27 TNA FO 425/418, Halifax to Selby, 15 August 1939
28 TNA FO 425/418, Selby to Halifax, 17 August 1939.
In other words, Britain’s proposed strategy was convenient; it allowed the dictator to pursue his own (or the nation’s) self-interest dressed in the veil of helping his oldest ally.

The issue was, however, that as war loomed ever closer, Hispano-Portuguese relations became increasingly tentative. On 14 August, the Portuguese Ambassador to Spain, Pedro Teotónio Pereira, visited Burgos. Teotónio Pereira had first been sent to Spain as Salazar’s own man during the Civil War to improve relations with the Francoist administration and – in so doing – to rid the dictator of a gregarious administrator whose popularity threatened to eclipse his own; ‘a valuable asset but also a problem within the regime’. A capable administrator, he had previously worked in finance-related briefs and as Minister of Commerce and Industry, where for a time between 1933 and 1937, he had seemed to capture to dictator’s attention in a notoriously personalised administration.

Sent to Spain with no diplomatic experience – the small size and lack of professionalism in the MNE meant that Salazar had free rein to pick diplomats – he quickly compensated for this with a natural ability, particularly an ingratiating manner. In Burgos, he met the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Juan Luis Beigbeder. Beigbeder was, like Franco, a former Africanista; joining the coup in 1936, he had persuaded several indigenous leaders in Spanish Morocco to back the insurgents. The former High Commissioner in Spanish Morocco was ‘tall, thin, and nervous eccentric’ with a reputation for womanising of a certain kind. Eccentric or otherwise, he assured Teotónio Pereira of Spain’s ‘friendship with Portugal’ which was ‘the basis of Spain’s foreign policy’.

But when the Ambassador met the Generalissimo himself on 23 August, the conversation was part absurd and part threatening. Franco was ‘obsessed with power and with personal power’, the Ambassador wrote; ‘more than once the Generalissimo’s ideas struck me

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32 Martins, Pedro Teotónio Pereira, pp. 547-549; on Salazar’s role in diplomatic appointments, Futscher Pereira, p. 34.
33 Payne, The Franco Regime, p. 255.
34 Ibid.
as bizarre'. 36 Franco made repeated disparaging comments about Portugal, arguing that it remained poor and backward despite the regime’s best efforts, all the while speaking in an utterly ‘condescending tone’. 37 He made opaque, if not threatening, references to this internal situation, criticising salaries in the armed forces while unemployment, with which he appeared obsessed, was so high. 38 He said that ‘masses of our [Portugal’s] population have a low standard of living’. 39 Turning to the War, he expounded one or two random observations, including that Italy closing the Mediterranean would ‘quadruple [shipping] rates’. 40

While overtly assuring the ambassador that the two countries were allies, his tone, his volatile attitude, and his rejection of lending this public recognition by visiting Portugal all pointed in the opposite direction. It was suggested that Carmona’s return from Africa ‘would be the best opportunity for the Generalíssimo’s visit’; Teotónio Pereira then recounted the following: ‘when was he thinking of making this visit? – “Well, as soon as possible” – he replied. I saw then that it wasn’t like that’. 41 He explained that he had promised trips to Rome and Berlin first. 42 Italy and Germany were the basis of his foreign policy; Portugal was a distant third. 43 The conversation unsettled the Portuguese, who saw little in it to celebrate, and much to fear.

These negative antecedents explain why, three days before the outbreak of War, Franco did not directly communicate his neutrality to Salazar. On 29 August, Franco declared his neutrality to Marshal Pétain, which was relayed to the Foreign Office, who broke that news to the Portuguese government. 44 Spanish neutrality was revealed to London before it was revealed to Lisbon. 45 Already we can discern serious problems with the idea of ‘Peninsula purpose’; if the declaration of neutrality was not to be shared then where, or what, was the purpose? 46 This went both ways. In the other direction, Nicolás Franco explained the Portuguese position to Madrid: ‘The position of Salazar and his government in the current conflict is to try and

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.; Futscher Pereira, p. 199.
44 Futscher Pereira, p. 200.
46 Halstead, ‘Peninsula Purpose’, p. 287.
conserve a benevolent neutrality toward England’. Historian Maria Inácia Rezola argued that the outbreak of war ‘caused a dangerous disturbance to the modus vivendi established by the Iberian Pact’ – but such an argument presupposes that a modus vivendi existed to be disturbed in the first place. Nothing in those weeks in 1939 suggested that it did.

On the other hand, in September 1939 the two countries were clearly not at loggerheads. Since 1938, Franco had entrusted the Ambassadorship to his brother, Nicolás. Farmed out of government in light of Serrano Súñer’s personal distaste for the man, he had since ensconced himself in Lisbon. He considered the posting something like ‘leaving purgatory to enter paradise’. Certainly it was a financial paradise; Nicolás used the position in frenetic pursuit of money, trading primary resources, involved vaguely in all kinds of industry, and freely issuing letters of invitation – for a price. In light of his familial connection, he also made a substantial sum from the British Government’s bribery scheme, fronted by the Mallorcan businessman Juan March.

Clearly Nicolás Franco coveted wealth; but he was not a poor observer nor diplomat. He understood the decisive bearing Spain might exercise over Portugal even at a time of distant relations. Appearing uncomfortable with Britain’s great and unnerving influence over the press, he reported ‘a great deal of fear that they will have to take part in the war’ but acknowledged that ‘this fear is greatly diminished by the pact and by the Spanish position of neutrality’. A week later, he reported that he had explained to Salazar, in slightly menacing terms, that ‘our neutrality […] will without doubt be maintained as long as Portugal strictly maintains her own’. Salazar, in turn, assured him that ‘there will on no account be interventions […] which could irritate or be disagreeable to Spain’. The latent power dynamic on the Peninsula was thus established.

47 AGA, lg. R 1081, ex 19, Nicolás Franco to Beigbeder, 1 September 1939.
50 Ramón Garriga, Nicolás Franco, el hermano brujo (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980), pp. 165-166.
51 Ibid., pp. 167-188.
52 Ángel Viñas, Sobornos: De Cómo Churchill y March Compraron a Los Generales de Franco (Barcelona: Crítica, 2016), pp. 415-418. The scope of this bribery scheme, and its effect, are outside of the scope of this thesis. The main difficulty in assessing its effectiveness, or otherwise, with regards Nicolás Franco is that his most important conversations with his brother were face-to-face and unrecorded, usually after he made a drunken trip on the oft-delayed Lisbon-Madrid flight.
53 AGA, lg. R 1081, ex 19, Nicolás Franco to Beigbeder, 1 September 1939.
55 Ibid.
The trilateral relationship at the outbreak of the War

On 1 September, as German troops marched into Poland, Selby informed London that Portuguese neutrality would help to keep Spain neutral, thus serving both Portugal and Spain.\(^{56}\) In view of Halifax’s stated aims, this must have been somewhat comforting. For whilst Hispano-Portuguese relations were ambiguous, Anglo-Spanish relations were abject. In the context of Spain’s waver ing neutrality, the British Ambassador in Madrid, Maurice Peterson, made three suggestions.\(^{57}\) There were some ‘outward and visible signs’ that a “‘benevolent’” attitude ‘towards Germany is tending to diminish’.\(^{58}\) To encourage this position, the Ambassador said that an ‘endeavour should be made to discourage General Franco from making or associating himself with any peace appeal’.\(^{59}\) Such an endeavour should be pursued by two means: ‘every possible step should be taken to start and to encourage the flow of Anglo-Spanish trade’ and, secondly, ‘the aid of the Portuguese Government might usefully be enlisted’.\(^{60}\) Peterson was encouraged in this course not only by Halifax’s suggestions from London, but by the slightly privileged position occupied by Teotónio P eireira. Peterson’s information about Beigbeder was from Teotónio P eireira; his information about Franco was from Teotónio P eireira. Teotónio P eireira, for his part, had become so unhappy in Madrid that he was attempting to resign.\(^{61}\)

The lack of a clear and potentially successful British strategy in Spain afforded the Portuguese Government a way of pushing its own preferred strategy. This served Portugal above all. As Futscher P eireira put it, ‘the neutrality of Spain continued to be his [Salazar’s] great priority […] still distrustful of Franco, the English Government decided to follow the policy recommended by Portugal, avoiding isolating Spain.\(^{62}\) But the British and the Portuguese did not share the same conception of the Portuguese position. The Portuguese position was reactive: if they did nothing, Spain would be less likely to join the Axis and Portugal would remain unthreatened. The British believed the Portuguese position to be

\(^{56}\) TNA FO 371/24064 W12998, Selby to Foreign Office, 1 September 1939.
\(^{58}\) TNA FO 425/416, C14135, Peterson to Halifax, 14 September 1939.
\(^{59}\) E.g. for a negotiated peace with Hitler. TNA FO 425/416, C14135, Peterson to Halifax, 14 September 1939.
\(^{60}\) TNA FO 425/416, C14135, Peterson to Halifax, 14 September 1939.
\(^{62}\) This quote highlights a recurring theme in this thesis, the use – mainly by contemporaries but also by historians – of ‘English’ as a synonym for ‘British’. This is not strictly accurate, but it is too much of a liberty to “correct” the translation. It should therefore be observed that ‘English’ almost always means ‘British’; in no case where it has been quoted in this thesis has it meant ‘English’ as opposed to ‘British’. Futscher P eireira, p. 203. He uses the word preconizado.
proactive: by taking action, the Portuguese were keeping Spain out of the War. It is obvious, *ad oculus*, that a reactive position merits no special gratitude whereas a proactive position deserved special reward.

Yet their position was necessarily reactive, since the Portuguese themselves possessed no leverage in Spain. On 22 September, Teotónio Pereira admitted this bluntly, writing to Salazar that: ‘*With war in Europe, the Spanish question has shifted to a plane which is far above our strengths*’.63 The Spanish position ‘depends on factors about which we can do little or nothing’.64 At the rain-soaked swearing-in ceremony for the Council of State four days later, Franco warmly acknowledged the Portuguese Ambassador, as did Beigbeder, who extended him a friendly public greeting.65 But when Teotónio Pereira pushed Beigbeder on the publication of an article that would confirm Spain’s neutrality, his tone changed. He returned to ‘the awkward attitude’ he had shown before, and later, ‘I got the impression he was avoiding me’.66 Teotónio Pereira wrote: ‘I returned to Burgos with the same uneasiness and the same feeling of sadness that all this caused me a few weeks ago’.67 Public acknowledgement and promotion of close relations with Portugal disguised, on the Spanish side, considerable political distance and disinterest.

Meanwhile, the Spanish regime drew up plans to convert their significant military capability into useful resources for the Axis bloc. The Generals, under Franco’s direction, drew up plans for use of the Army and Navy ‘with a view to a confrontation with two not insignificant enemies: France and Great Britain’.68 Manuel Ros Agudo’s comprehensive survey of Ávila’s military archive shows how serious and comprehensive these plans were.69 Franco immersed himself in delusional plans for Spain’s resurgence, premised on ideas of autarky, borne of a disdain for the Allies and pathological hatred of communism.70 While certain details were shared with the German and Italian representatives, there was no indication that the Portuguese were informed.

The trick adopted by Teotónio Pereira in Madrid was to ride two horses at once, keeping both Spain and Portugal happy while giving the appearance to the British that the two policies were in fact one, and that Portuguese diplomacy was being guided by British interests. A little

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63 CPTPOS, Vol. I, Doc. 93, Teotónio Pereira to Oliveira Salazar, 28 September 1939, pp. 201-205.
64 Ibid.
65 ‘*La Jura de los consejeros nacionales*, ABC (Madrid), No. 10,484, 27 September 1939, p. 1.
67 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Preston, *Franco*, pp. 344-345.
over a month later, amidst significant Portuguese disquiet, he met with Peterson. He suggested that the British ought to issue a statement or declaration opposing the spread of communism, which, he said, would be particularly effective in Spain and Italy.\(^{71}\) Owing to the sensitivity of Anglo-Soviet relations, Peterson rejected the idea of a public statement, but he did counsel to London that more tact in dealings with the USSR – even secrecy – would help Britain’s objectives in Spain.\(^{72}\) While a relatively anodyne suggestion in the era of the “Phoney War”, Teotónio Pereira’s suggestion demonstrated the degree of Portuguese influence over HM’s Ambassador at Madrid, and thus hinted at a route by which Portuguese suggestions might influence government policy in London.

Already we can see three key themes emerging. The first is the lack of British options in Spain, freely acknowledged by Peterson, more regretfully so by Halifax. Directly linked to this is the way in which Portugal pushed itself and was pushed to become privileged interlocutor. The Estado Novo, it was supposed, was playing a key role in keeping Spain neutral. Finally, even in the early months of the War, we can already see the disconnect between the way in which it was believed Portugal occupied the role and the way in which Portugal actually occupied the role. Hispano-Portuguese relations were characterised by serious uncertainty on the Portuguese side and a form of disinterested contradiction on the Spanish side. That was perhaps not well-understood in London.

**The Eccles era**

In November 1939, the British government began a policy of their own in Spain, along the lines of the second prong of the approach suggested by Halifax that August. The British sent a delegation to Madrid to negotiate a War Trade Agreement. A policy premised on economic negotiations, even economic appeasement, was to be very difficult if the Foreign Office – never the most economically adept department – were in charge.\(^{73}\) The man charged with leading this was an outsider, David Eccles, a businessman who had been in semi-official contact with the Francoists during the Civil War in lieu of a Foreign Office economic expert. Despite a studied snobbishness and the languid air of *noblesse oblige*, Eccles came from solidly...

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\(^{71}\) TNA FO 371/23170, C18786, Peterson to Halifax, 14 November 1939.

\(^{72}\) Ibid.

middle-class stock. Eccles was chosen to go to Spain in March 1939 because he was pro-
Franco and, through his City of London role with the Santander-Mediterranean Railway, knew
Spain and Spaniards well. Eccles’ appointment complicates a much more contentious, if
earlier, debate about British economic interests in Spain. That the Government could find few,
if any, good candidates ought to serve as a rejoinder to the idea that the City was stuffed with
rabid pro-Francoists who saw Spain as a petty economic colony. Why, if that were the case,
was a more qualified representative so hard to find?

Alongside Eccles’ improvised appointment, there was also a dearth of qualified
officials in Whitehall, where even the newly-formed Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW)
had poor information about Spain and Portugal. The MEW was to play an important but
poorly understood role in British policy in Spain and in binding the two Iberian nations
together. It had first been seriously mooted under that name in February 1938, to be ‘directly
responsible for negotiations and correspondence with neutrals on all blockade questions’. At
first under FO control, though eventually becoming its own body, it grew from a skeleton staff
of 22 at the start of the War to some 199 by June 1940. In November 1940, when the
negotiations began, the MEW occupied a curiously subordinate position to the FO, the Board
of Trade, and the Treasury though its two technical novelties: hold-back guarantees and
“navicerts”, commercial permits discussed later in this thesis, which were in use to control
exports to Germany. It was in this fugue state of decentralised bureaucratic authority that
negotiations with Spain began – and which allowed Eccles an outsize role.

The negotiating team that was cobbled together demonstrates the absurdity of the idea
that the Foreign Office had a well-founded economic enmity against the Spanish Republic.
Eddie Playfair had been doing university grants with other Treasury wonks and Ralph Nowell
had been at the Board of Trade; together with Eccles, they led the delegation. A team
featuring no Foreign Office men hardly supports the hypothesis that they were all financially
interested in Franco’s victory. The fact of the matter is that nobody in the Foreign Office knew

75 David Eccles, By Safe Hand: The Wartime Letters of David and Sybil Eccles (London: The Bodley Head,
121-146.
79 Ibid., pp. 63-65.
80 On hold-back guarantees: ibid, pp. 87-94; on navicerts (discussed in more detail later in this text), ibid., pp.
94-101.
81 Leitz, Economic Relations, p. 117 (footnote 10).
very much about the Spanish economy. They regarded the sort of people who did business, in Spain of all places, as the concern of people who bought their own furniture; and nobody in the Foreign Office bought their own furniture.

The furniture-buying delegation were given only very vague directions by the Foreign Office and its curious child, MEW. As Eccles put it, ‘we came out here without any definite instructions’. Sir George Mounsey, Foreign Office stalwart and an unhappy choice to head the new department, had apparently ‘sat on any idea of instructions’, saying that ‘you could not plan a battle without a map of the country’. Peterson had an arm’s-length relationship with the negotiations, preferring to remain busy with the ongoing political discussions. Such an imprecise brief highlights how muddled British strategy in Spain remained muddled. In lieu of a well-defined economic strategy, the meetings beginning in November 1939 were winding and laborious. The delegation’s primary aim was to deal with the substantial commercial debts racked up during the Civil War: a noble ambition, but incompatible with the Foreign Office’s wider strategic aims in Spain. Without instructions from either London or the Embassy, the negotiating team merged contradictory commercial aims (the repayment of debt) with political ones (the strategic purchase of goods).

The difficulties encountered during these negotiations should thus be understood in two ways. Firstly, the Francoist administration – and particularly Súñer – clearly did not wish to conclude an amiable commercial agreement with the United Kingdom. But secondly, the United Kingdom did not have a commercial strategy that matched its political aims. The absence of a well-defined strategy allowed a space which cried out to be occupied; perhaps by Eccles, perhaps by Salazar.

On 26 March, the British finally achieved Spanish agreement and the Anglo-Spanish War Trade Agreement (WTA) was signed. It provided for a mechanism, a clearing agreement, for Spanish companies to repay their debts to British companies; a £2 million loan for use in the sterling area; and agreements on certain goods which could be imported but not

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82 David to Sybil Eccles, By Safe Hand, 10 December 1939, pp. 32-35.
83 Ibid.
85 TNA FO 371/23166, C19913, Minutes of the Anglo-Spanish meeting, 7 December 1939.
87 TNA FO 371/24496, C4259, ‘Anglo-Spanish War Trade Agreement’, 26 March 1940; Leitz, Economic Relations, pp. 117-118; Stone, Spain, Portugal, p. 149.
re-exported from Spain.\textsuperscript{88} The impact of the WTA was obvious at the time. It was the centrepiece of ‘a larger strategy of controlled economic assistance to Spain which aimed at keeping the Iberian Peninsula out of the war’.\textsuperscript{89} But serious problems remained; it appeared to have somewhat improved Anglo-Spanish relations, but Franco’s overall attitude remained impetuous and menacing. There was no guarantee that £2 million was enough to keep Spain from temptation. Italy, from whom it was widely believed Spain might take its lead, loomed over the belligerent precipice. Publicly, Spain seemed as interested as ever in German superiority and eventual victory.

The conclusion of the Anglo-Spanish WTA, however, raised questions about the attitude and inclination of “allied” Portugal. While its reverberations inside Spain as an embryonic economic link are well-understood, its international repercussions in Portugal have been ignored.\textsuperscript{90} Monteiro reported it thus: ‘I have seen grow anew, lately, incomprehension at the Portuguese attitude. The change of atmosphere in the Foreign Office strikes me as patently obvious. I now fail to find there the spirit of “confidence” which I was used to’.\textsuperscript{91} Salazar’s reticence to conclude a similar agreement cast Portugal in an unfavourable light.

This resulted, on 7 March, in a significant two-pronged demarché at Halifax’s insistence. He told Monteiro he was ‘strongly disappointed’ in the form of Portugal’s neutrality, which did not live up to the benevolent neutrality that had been hoped for.\textsuperscript{92} His complaints are interesting insofar as they all seem relatively minor: the sale of four trawlers; meteorological broadcasts from the Azores; the refusal of economic statistics, etc.; but taken together, they contributed to a general feeling of disappointment in Anglo-Portuguese relations.\textsuperscript{93} Selby’s aide-mémoire to Salazar talked in particular at the ‘profound disappointment’ over the failure to conclude a War Trade Agreement.\textsuperscript{94} Indeed, the first few months of 1940 marked the strangest period in Anglo-Portuguese relations. At first Selby, in turn joined by Eccles, blamed this on the shortcomings of the Lisbon Embassy’s economic
But the mood music in London was changing; it would change further, particularly in Halifax’s mind, in the following weeks.

As the War entered the twilight of its first phase, Monteiro intuited that the potential utility of Portugal as Halifax had imagined it in September 1939 was not aligning with its actual conduct. Halifax told Monteiro that ‘All [Britain’s] requests had been refused’ and Great Britain ‘was therefore extremely disillusioned’. The comparison with Spain further endorsed this negative impression. As the War entered a new, much more dangerous phase, the battle between Portugal’s envisaged place and its actual role would acquire new and much greater importance. The collapse of France would bring German troops to the Pyrenees; whether they crossed would become existentially important to the British war effort – the place of Portugal between Britain and Spain would become more important than ever.

The end of the “Phoney War”

The Agreement was concluded in the lull of the Phoney War; Germany’s move to a much more aggressive war footing in May 1940 changed everything. The Foreign Office understood that German victories would have a profound effect on Spain. In mid-April, Roger Makins, the Head of the Central Department, minuted that Spanish belligerency would be markedly more likely if Italy entered the War. Tellingly, too, he wrote that ‘the effect on Portugal would be disastrous’. This was indicative of just how muddled British thinking about the Estado Novo had already become. If Portugal’s main use, from a British perspective, were to keep Spain out of the War, it followed that in case of Spanish entry, this utility would disappear. Fully aware of just how difficult things in Spain could become, the Foreign Office began to muse replacing Peterson, who it was believed had exhausted his potential utility.

Two events in quick succession tore up Britain’s hitherto phoney war. The Norway Debate in the House of Commons between 7 and 8 May began as a non-voting debate under the guise of an adjournment motion, but quickly became a fierce, cross-bench condemnation

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97 TNA FO 371/24510, Makins note on: C5924, 18 April 1940.
98 Ibid.
99 Peterson’s own account posited that Hoare simply had to be found a job: Maurice Peterson, *Both Sides of the Curtain* (London: Constable, 1950), pp. 228-229.
of Chamberlain’s war policy. One of Halifax’s biographers described it as the Commons at its ‘most theatrical, powerful, and merciless’. After Sir Roger Keyes had excoriated the Government on behalf of officers and men ‘of the fighting, sea-going navy’, Leo Amery channelled Cromwell with his riposte: ‘In the name of God, go’.

The house divided on 8 May, the Government winning so badly it seemed like a defeat. On 9 May, it was obvious Chamberlain had to go; on 10 May, Churchill was made Prime Minister of a national government.

The fall of France created the most notable event in wartime Iberia in the British public mind: the flight from France, through Spain and Portugal, of the Duke of Windsor, formerly King Edward VIII, and his wife, Wallis Simpson. This royal psychodrama occupied much diplomatic time that might have been better spent pursuing genuine political aims. In summary, the Duke – a probable pro-Nazi sympathiser – spent June in Spain and July in Portugal under the watchful eye of S.S. agents who wished to kidnap him for the Nazi war effort. In August, having stolen a great deal of civil servants’ time, the Duke was forcibly decamped to become Governor of the Bahamas. Not a serious issue in Anglo-Iberian relations, the story ought nonetheless to be remembered when considering the kind of stress and pressure diplomats worked under in those febrile days.

Considerably more serious than the royal migration was the effect of the War’s development on the Franco government. “The Germans have a good eye”, Franco said, “They always pick the right place and time”. Salazar became increasingly fearful of Spanish intentions. At the same time, Teotónio Pereira assured Peterson in Madrid that ‘the Portuguese influence here is so strong that the Italian [sic] are jealous of it’. This was a very optimistic assessment, for Franco continued to pursue closer relations with both Italy and Germany. On 18 May, Nicolás Franco visited Salazar immediately after his return from Madrid, explaining to him ‘in a clearer way statements of the Spanish Government’s decision to maintain its neutrality so long as others did not attack them’. But it was obvious that Salazar’s fears – not without reason – lingered on.

Salazar’s fears about Spain explain his reticence to commit more publicly to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Shaken by the speed of the German war machine, Halifax considered

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101 Keyes was in uniform; a few other Conservative MPs did the same.
102 Lochery, pp. 61-84.
104 TNA FO 371/24490, Peterson to F.O., 7 May 1940.
Portugal’s position in the gloom of May 1940. It had become apparent to that Portugal’s neutrality was not what had been imagined, and that, perhaps, it meant different things to Portugal and Britain. The government had become ‘less forthcoming’ than it had been, had dragged its heels over a War Trade Agreement while rushing to sign one with Italy, and was ‘a considerable gap in our contraband control system’, with Italian and German shipping a particular issue. Some movement had been made through limited arms sales, including Spitfires and anti-aircraft guns, but an inability to supply more slowed Salazar’s capricious cooperation. Halifax had realised that Salazar’s full co-operation, especially economic co-operation, would probably only come at a high price: ‘we cannot look forward to any appreciable co-operation until we have convinced the Portuguese that we could assume their protection’.

While Germany moved into Denmark, Norway, and the Low Countries, Eccles pressed on, believing that economic incentives would keep the Iberian Peninsula out of it. He went to Portugal with a certain vision: to bring Salazar’s Estado Novo into a triangular economic pact. This, to Eccles, would cement an Anglo-Spanish-Portuguese economic triangle, effectively placing Spain in a secure position between the two. As had been the case in Spain, he was there with no particular brief, claiming to have written the instructions himself. He loved Lisbon, more Italianate than Spain, covered with flowers, which he described as ‘the most adorable place’. He breakfasted with Selby on the Embassy terrace, writing that ‘the orange juice the best in the world’, only wishing that the Embassy itself would move somewhere bigger and more salubrious. He liked its leader just as much. ‘I […] was immensely impressed, nothing I had heard could have equalled the dignity, good sense and charm of the best-looking dictator in Europe’.

The Foreign Secretary was having doubts about Portugal’s role in keeping Franco out of the War. No such doubts clouded Eccles’ mercantilist mind. Appearing almost unconcerned by the fall of Chamberlain, and regarding Halifax’s prognosis with cool disdain, Eccles pressed on with his charm offensive. On 14 May he met Salazar alone, telling him ‘he wished to convince his Government of the necessity of treating the Iberian Peninsula as just one problem,

106 TNA CAB 66/7/34, (50) 154, ‘Situation in Portugal’, Memorandum by Halifax, 11 May 1940.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
110 David Eccles to Sybil Eccles, 30 April and 5-9 May, By Safe Hand, pp. 106-108.
112 Ibid.
and of unifying its policy in relation to Portugal and Spain”. He posited that in terms of keeping Spain out of the War, ‘the probability of success would be much higher if it were dealt with by a third-country intermediary, a friend of both, like Portugal is’. His aim was nothing less than to secure Peninsula peace through Portugal.

On 18 May 1940, Eccles held court with the Joint Planning Staffs, where ‘the point was made that the neutrality of Portugal was closely bound up with the neutrality of Spain and, it was, therefore, important that the Government of General Franco, as well as that of Doctor Salazar, should be maintained and strengthened’. Eccles believed the best way to do this was through economic ‘concessions’, the economic carrot with no mention of the stick. The Foreign Office were persuaded, and even wanted the Chiefs of Staff to consider South African troops to support Portuguese defence. The ultimate aim was ‘consolidating the regimes of General Franco and Doctor Salazar’ and in doing so ‘confirming the neutrality of Spain’.

The very same day, the Chiefs of Staff Committee considered a report from the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee on intelligence in Portugal. It concluded that ‘the information that we get […] as to the currents of opinion in Portugal itself, is rather meagre’. Recommending the establishment of an in-house intelligence set-up in the Embassy, the report clearly revealed the intelligence services’ shortcomings in Lisbon. More subtly, it underlined the extent to which relatively small numbers of people: Selby, Eccles, and Monteiro, chiefly, were responsible for the vast majority of day-to-day information and therefore for the “narrative” about the country in London. It was on that basis that Eccles was able to set the bearing of government policy so decisively.

Four days later, Eccles explained his – and now the government’s – position in a gushing note to Salazar:

The maintenance of the neutrality of the Iberian Peninsula has been, from the outbreak of the war, an interest vital both to Portugal and to the United Kingdom. On this point His Majesty’s Government have from the first made their attitude perfectly clear, and have always recognised that the personal influence of the head

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113 Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, Arquivo Salazar, (Henceforth: TdT AOS). D-J/6/5, ‘Conferencia com Mr. Eccles a sos’, 14 May 1940.
114 TdT AOS/D-J/6/5, ‘Conferencia com Mr. Eccles a sos’, 14 May 1940.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
of the Portuguese Government is the strongest factor making for peace in the Peninsula. They do not hesitate, therefore, to ask Dr. Salazar to undertake the difficult and delicate task of securing from Spain certain practical assurances concerning her intentions and ability to remain neutral.\textsuperscript{121}

What Eccles intended was not simply an economic triangle but a much bolder, much broader scheme: one which would officially tie Portugal and Spain together in neutrality under British aegis. The WTA was now to be widened ‘to include Portugal as trading partner in a triangular arrangement’.\textsuperscript{122} This triangular set-up achieved two British aims at once: firstly, it pushed Spain toward Portugal, Britain’s reliable neutral ally.\textsuperscript{123} Secondly, it combatted Salazar’s long-term dissatisfaction with British disinterest in the Portuguese economy, demonstrating renewed British interest in Portugal’s market.\textsuperscript{124} On both counts, therefore, it was particularly pleasing to both the British government and to the Portuguese regime. The growing incomprehension at Salazar’s perceived poor allyship, it seemed, had been aptly dealt with by this new agreement.

Growing imperial ambiguities

It was clearly hoped that this three-way agreement would create a degree of inter-Iberian economic dependency, rebalancing Spain’s economic inclination away from Germany. Portugal was to become the economic as well as the political lynchpin between Great Britain and Spain, supported by the easy supply of sterling. For Salazar, there was a third great benefit to the scheme: it would offer Spain a further £4 million ‘on easy terms […] to import from Portugal and its colonies’.\textsuperscript{125} Salazar was ‘particularly pleased’ that the agreement included colonial products, agreeing that their integration formed a serious basis on which an agreement could be reached.\textsuperscript{126}

The preservation, whole and intact, of Portugal’s colonial Empire was of course one of Salazar’s key war aims.\textsuperscript{127} The integration of the Portuguese colonies undoubtedly contributed to shift Salazar’s initially recalcitrant attitude to economic agreements with Britain in spring 1940. The government’s economic interest in the Portuguese Empire, much to Salazar’s

\textsuperscript{121} Note by Eccles to Salazar, 22 May 1940, printed in \textit{By Safe Hand}, pp. 111-113.
\textsuperscript{122} Wigg, \textit{Churchill and Spain}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{123} Telo, \textit{Portugal Na Segunda Guerra}, Vol. 1, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{124} Stone, \textit{Spain Portugal, 1931-41}, p. 119.
\textsuperscript{125} Wigg, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{126} Stone, \textit{Oldest Ally}, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{127} De Meneses, \textit{Salazar}, pp. 266-274; Rosas, \textit{O Salazarismo e a Aliança Luso-Britânica}, p. 8.
chagrin, had for many years been practically zero.\textsuperscript{128} For the first time since the outbreak of the War, the May 1940 negotiations showed Britain willing to engage positively with the \textit{Estado Novo}'s imperial vision. The trouble for the dictator was that the British attitude to the Portuguese colonies was significantly more ambiguous than this agreement suggested. The British – and their Commonwealth allies – had potential strategic interests in certain Portuguese colonies which they were quite willing to take them by force if needed.

While Eccles was willing to engage positively with the Portuguese Empire, in London, the attitude appeared starkly different. The risk of Spanish entry threatened to upend the Portuguese Empire. On 15 May, the Chiefs of Staff were tasked with producing a paper on Portugal and its colonies; they produced a typically narrow and sanguine report.\textsuperscript{129} The Azores and the Cape Verde islands were of utmost importance and ought to be taken immediately.\textsuperscript{130} The Beira railway in Mozambique, too, would need to be taken by South Rhodesia alone or in concert with South Africa.\textsuperscript{131} India would need to occupy Goa, Daman, and Diu, an easy task.\textsuperscript{132} ‘On no account’ should Britain ‘take any action in Timor’ in advance of a potential Japanese move.\textsuperscript{133} On 31 May, the War Cabinet met to discuss the Portuguese colonies’ future if Portugal were to fall.\textsuperscript{134} While Halifax explained that Salazar was ‘undoubtedly pro-Ally’, events in Spain and the Mediterranean might reluctantly force a change of policy in Portugal, hence the need to make such plans.\textsuperscript{135}

Antonio Telo’s detailed assessment of British interests in the Portuguese colonies explains the precursors to the plans drawn up with 1941 and 1942, which would more intimately involve South Africa.\textsuperscript{136} However, in ignoring the centrality of Spain, Telo overlooks the cause of these initial discussions. The political-strategic trigger for revanchist British interests in the Portuguese Empire, particularly the Cape Verde islands, was Spain. Positive developments had been spearheaded by Eccles in Lisbon on the basis that such actions would help to keep Spain out of the War; negative developments clouded the horizon in London, with Spain as the same central basis of those concerns.

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\textsuperscript{128} See, for example, the reports in: TNA FO 371/23163, C19957, Selby to F.O., 8 December 1939. The reports explain the trifling amount of British capital invested in Portugal’s two largest colonies.
\textsuperscript{129} TNA CAB 66/8, (WP (40) 180), Portugal, 29 May 1940.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} TNA CAB 66/8, (WP (40) 180), Portugal, 29 May 1940.
\textsuperscript{134} TNA CAB 65/7, (WM (40), 149), Cabinet conclusions, 31 May 1940.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
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Change in Spain

In beginning these negotiations, Eccles, together with Selby, had taken Salazar’s role as the key man and formalised it within an institutional framework. They were about to be joined by a further, vitally important actor in this cause. After Churchill’s accession, Labour had explicitly ruled out working with two members of Chamberlain’s Cabinet: Sir John Simon, the Chancellor, and Sir Samuel Hoare.137 The new Prime Minister was ambivalent toward Simon and shunted him to a Viscountcy and the Lord Chancellorship. He loathed Hoare and took his political revenge by dropping him from Cabinet with no new role.138 On Halifax’s prompting, out of loyalty and professional respect, Churchill agreed to send him to Spain on a special mission.139 Cadogan told Halifax and his wife that there was ‘one bright spot – there were lots of Germans and Italians in Madrid and therefore a good chance of S. H. being murdered’.140

Hoare’s posting resolved a problem in Madrid. Eccles had told his wife in his usual colourful manner that Peterson, who had ‘a huge head’, a ‘body too large and fat’ and a loathing of the Spaniards, was ill-suited to the posting.141 Eccles wrote: ‘The Spaniards only like failures, or people with exceptional charm and manner, so these two do not and will not get on here’.142 At any rate, it served Churchill well while allaying a diplomatic problem, and it hit Eccles’ brief perfectly: for Hoare was a charming failure. Eccles also played a key part in a particularly under-appreciated episode of Hoare’s posting, his first two days over the border in Lisbon. Dining with Selby and Eccles, he was so shaken that he ‘turned pale, cried out that he had been deceived, said his mission was useless and he would go back to London in the morning’.143

The relative security of Portugal, with its welcoming party and its louche social scene, lodged in Hoare’s mind. The contrast with Spain was immediate and the difference between

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138 Churchill’s animosity stemmed primarily from Hoare’s status as an arch- appeaser, but his political disagreements with him pre-dated that, and Churchill had attempted to indict Hoare for breaching parliamentary privilege in 1934. Churchill was technically right in attempting to do so, but his attempt was so ‘politically inept’ that Hoare won out. Carl Bridge, ‘Churchill, Hoare, Derby, and the Committee of Privileges, April to June 1934’, The Historical Journal, 22, 1 (1979), 215-227 (pp. 226-227).
139 Wigg, Churchill and Spain, p. 8.
141 He said he would be better placed, by class and temperament, in the Foreign Office ‘stirring them all up with his bourgeois ferocity and brains’. David Eccles to Sybil Eccles, By Safe Hand, 6 January 1940, pp. 51-53.
142 Ibid.
the two left a permanent mark in Hoare’s mind. Hoare wrote: ‘Flying over the whole breadth of Portugal and the western half of Spain we noted for the first time the striking contrast between the two countries. On the one hand, Portugal, verdant and varied […] On the other hand, the Spain of Estremadura and Castile […] a uniform brown and grey, scarcely a tree’. Life in Madrid, he complained to Halifax, was ‘entirely abnormal’, ‘the Germans and Italians deeply entrenched in every department of government and in every walk of life’.

‘Our own prestige […] is very low’, food was scarce, nerves were high, and ‘the Embassy itself is the most horrible house I have ever seen’. The overall atmosphere was one of swirling, German-backed rumours and plans, of ‘instability, risk and sudden surprise’. In support of Britain’s diplomatic aims in Spain, Hoare had managed to make ‘a very friendly and useful contact’ with the Archbishop of Toledo, but ‘unfortunately he is on his death bed’. Of the contacts he had made who were not terminally ill, the French, American, and Portuguese Ambassadors stood out: ‘The ‘Portuguese Ambassador is regarded as the most intelligent of the diplomats here and a possible successor to Salazar’.

He arrived at the zenith of Spain’s Axis temptation, which was the entire point of his posting. On 3 June, Franco wrote personally to Hitler: ‘to express to you my admiration and enthusiasm and that of my people, who are watching with deep emotion the glorious course of a struggle which they regard as their own’. But he plead poverty and material difficulty as reasons why Spain could not enter the War immediately. Just a month after Hoare’s arrival, with his blessing but not on his account, the tripartite economic was gathering steam. Selby, on Eccles’ behalf, assured London that ‘the problem of Portugal was indissolubly linked with that of Spain and could not be dealt with as a separate issue’. ‘The best approach’ was, in Eccles’ view, to reach Spain ‘through the intermediary of Dr. Salazar’. This would counter Salazar’s concern that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was being neglected, and would secure him as the lynchpin that kept Spain neutral: ‘But for the collapse of France […] there is no my mind no
possible room for doubt that in the success of these negotiations lies our best chance of securing our position both in Spain and Portugal’. 156

On 11 June, the Cabinet discussed a suggestion brought to them by Monteiro, who had called on Halifax the day before. Monteiro had said that Portugal sought ‘a simultaneous declaration of neutrality’ with Spain, and the Foreign Secretary had assented to the idea on the basis that a joint declaration was preferable to Portugal acting alone. 157 The suggestion was for naught. On 12 June, spurred on by the fall of France, Spain declared “non-belligerency”, a precursor to entry on the Axis side. This was an ironic failure for the Portuguese. Teotónio Pereira confessed to Salazar that he had known nothing, believing Súñer to have won Franco over at a meeting the day before. 158 Their diplomatic manoeuvres had, in less than 48 hours, gone from a message to the British Foreign Secretary that they would attempt to declare a joint neutrality with Spain, to Spain openly declaring its Axis sympathies on the world stage. The black humour only underscored how little Portugal could influence the Spanish regime.

Three days later, on 14 June, Franco’s Spain invaded the neutral zone of Tangier, officially on a protective mission. This was ‘the first positive step towards a full-scale African empire’ and an attempt to stake a wider claim amidst the chaos of the French collapse. 159 The Portuguese, as the British, were informed after the fact. 160 France, their most important continental ally, had fallen, and was now an occupied zone and a client state. In that context, there was simply no way to think about the Portuguese failure. There were no available options. If Portugal’s attitude was disappointing, how ought Halifax, or anyone else, to change it? He could not supply arms to Portugal nor give it up as an anchor against Spanish belligerency. Franco ploughed on with his march toward the Axis. On 27 June, Yagüe was sacked as Air Minister. The ‘feeble official pretext’ was his telling Hoare that England had lost the war (and deserved to), but in reality, his sacking owed to his increasing criticisms of Franco. 161

There were, meanwhile, general political currents which augured well for the Salazar regime. In June, Makins wrote a minute ‘with a general comment […] on the political plane’: ‘I do not ever believe that democracy as a form of political organisation will ever work in Spain’; ‘Enlightened totalitarianism with a religious flavour is more the “form” (cf. the Salazar

156 Ibid.
157 TNA CAB 65/7/56, War Cabinet Meeting, 11 June 1940.
159 Preston, Franco, pp. 361-362.
161 Preston, Franco, p. 365.
regime in Portugal’). Strang, at least, also agreed. The aim for the British ought to be to push Franco toward Salazar, to institute the form of the Estado Novo on Franco’s Spain. The Portuguese dictatorship was the political model which at least some British policymakers had in their minds when they thought of the ideal Spanish regime.

Non-belligerency made the task of keeping Franco’s Spain out of the War even more urgent, even existential. Hoare redoubled his efforts. ‘I agree with Eccles that our chief line of approach should be through Salazar and Portugal’, he wrote, and he hoped that Halifax would treat Eccles’ proposals with ‘great urgency and importance’. He even began to implore the Cabinet to look at further colonial concessions. After meeting Beigbeder, who was obsessed with Morocco, Hoare posited ‘that they need some further trophy like the trophy of the occupation of Tangier’; ‘Have we not something to gain by showing ourselves not unsympathetic to Spanish aspirations’?

If Spanish colonial appeasement was the suggested order of the day by Britain’s new man in Madrid, toward Portugal, the policy was something like the reverse. A naval cypher from 21 June 1940 outlined the strategic position. If Spain were to enter the war, Portugal would follow. In such a circumstance, ‘we should not propose to take action against mainland of Portugal’, as the whole Peninsula being Axis would render such a move pointless. In short: ‘Portuguese Islands and colonial possessions are however most important, and we are working out plans’. The Azores and Cape Verde Islands were of ‘outstanding strategical value’ for trade and cable routes. Of equal importance were ‘railways through Mozambique and Angola which are of considerable economic importance to Northern and Southern Rhodesia’. While these were only military plans, they had, as we have seen, Churchill’s implicit backing and continued interest; the nominally distant and distinct Portuguese Empire was in fact umbilically linked to the European theatre, and its future appeared directly contingent on the attitude of Spain.

Though Salazar was not aware of these plans, he was greatly perturbed by and fearful of the Spanish move to non-belligerency, the German sweep through Western Europe, and the British reluctance (and inability) to supply Portugal. He became almost existentially fearful. The Spanish, at Súñer’s provocation, took to opportunity to pressure their neighbour to distance

162 TNA FO 1093/223, Makins minute, 12 June 1940.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 TNA CO 323/1787/99, Admiralty to C in C East Indies, Number 13062, 21 June 1940.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
themselves from Great Britain. This resulted in the signing of an Additional Protocol on 30 July 1940. At first sight, this appeared to be a success for Portuguese and British diplomacy; according to Glyn Stone, the Additional Protocol was planned by Salazar and ‘aided by Franco’s desire not to be drawn too precipitately into the general conflict’.169

In fact, as we shall see, the Protocol was a Hispano-German plot. The whole thing had been orchestrated by Súñer, and Stone confuses Salazar’s long-standing interest in such an agreement with its actual immediate cause. At the end of June, Súñer created an animus in Teotónio Pereira’s mind that French North Africa, particularly Morocco, would join the British and threaten the Canary Islands and the Azores.170 Súñer wanted a military alliance to hinder British designs and potential Anglo-Portuguese military co-operation. Doubting, however, that the Portuguese would accede to it immediately, he asked the German central press agency (the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro) to plant press stories in Switzerland or Hungary that such a pact had been concluded ‘providing for immediate intervention of Spain in Portugal if the English took the liberty of encroaching there’.171

Teotónio Pereira met with Franco on 6 July. The meeting ‘began with a little difficulty’ due to Franco’s ‘certain protective manner’.172 For the first half, Franco violently lambasted England at every turn. He made a slightly threatening offer of help, explaining to the Ambassador that ‘you [Portugal] are going through a rough patch at England’s hands’, but that ‘you can count on Spain’ to be of assistance.173 Teotónio Pereira understood who was behind the machinations: ‘It was clear that Franco had spoken at length with Serrano Súñer’.174 He wrote: ‘I returned to precisely explaining our idea. Franco declared that he absolutely agreed with producing an additional protocol which went further than the current pact’.175

‘“You cannot believe what the English say”’, said Franco, who then ‘stopped bashing England and started eulogising Germany’, telling the Ambassador that ‘“Germany has the war won”’.176 In relations with Germany: ‘Speaking about the colonies he said he had already spoken about the issue with the Germans and he supposed that we could feel calm about it’.177 In contrast, when Teotónio Pereira began to talk about the new ‘triangular agreements’ for

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169 Stone, Oldest Ally, pp. 133-134.
170 DGFP, Series D, Vol. IX, Doc. 95, Stohrer to Berlin, 3 July 1940, pp. 105-106.
171 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
colonial goods, Franco ‘showed no interest’ and changed the subject. He promised as a friend that he would do everything he could to maintain Portugal’s independence. In the ante-chamber after the meeting, Teotónio Pereira ran into Varela, who said to him: ‘Tell Dr. Salazar that if Portugal needs our military support (against England, of course!) I am ready to help’.  

Spain was ready to “help”, and Salazar was ready to accept that help. This caused a habitual clash between Monteiro and Salazar as the latter, after some months of relative quiet, announced that he wanted the British to stay out of things as far as the Peninsula was concerned: ‘any act […] that puts the neutrality of the Peninsula at risk would be fatal for the status quo’. Britain should continue – without public declaration – ‘to persist with along its favourable line toward Spain’ while Portugal signed a further treaty with Spain. Monteiro disagreed, expressing with some sadness that he was being left in the dark about ongoing talks between Nicolás Franco and Salazar, as well as events in Madrid.

The dictator continued, however, to seek an agreement with Spain. A few days later, Súñer met Teotónio Pereira and told him that Germany would not move against Portugal if she abandoned the Alliance; ‘It was therefore in Portugal’s interest to detach herself from England. The first step in that direction would be the conclusion of a military alliance with Spain’. Salazar was, according to Súñer, explicitly willing ‘to denounce the English-Portuguese alliance’ after the conclusion of a Hispano-Portuguese pact. Whether this was completely true is dubious. But clearly the Portuguese were willing to conclude a pact that they understood came from Súñer and which they understood involved distancing themselves from the British. Neither Súñer nor Franco hid their intentions. It was obvious that on this question that Portuguese interests (self-preservation) and British interests (the preservation of Iberian neutrality) were not identical. It did not seem to trouble them.

Indeed, Teotónio Pereira seemed content actively to mislead Hoare. After meeting Franco, the Portuguese Ambassador returned to the Embassy, where an ‘anxious’ Hoare was waiting for him: ‘I didn’t tell him where I’d come from’. Hoare told him about an
‘extraordinary conversation’ between Monteiro and Halifax in London, in which ‘it was said that N. Franco had affirmed that in case of a German advance on Portugal and Gibraltar not only would they not oppose it, but they would strike against Gibraltar!’ Teotónio Pereira replied to Hoare that that was not the case; that Franco only wished to ameliorate the Germans and that ‘for that it was necessary to not provide any pretext against Portugal’. Teotónio Pereira wrote: ‘The essential thing was for England not to interfere in the Peninsula and in particular to leave us be amongst ourselves’.

The Foreign Office, via Hoare and Selby, had become by mid-1940 an early partisan of the Portuguese position. But the diffuse nature of both civil service organisation in London and the Empire-Commonwealth meant that other departments – and ministers – needed to be restrained by more enlightened minds. The Cabinet discussions about the Portuguese colonies at the end of May 1940 appeared to have spiralled, and the diplomats were left to try and dampen the Dominions’ pre-emptive enthusiasm for a move into Portuguese territory. On 2 July 1940, Stephen Holmes of the Dominions Office wrote to Makins, emphasising that although it was understood that Portuguese entry was not imminently likely, it was possible that the Southern Rhodesians would need to move pre-emptively were Spanish entry to cascade into Portugal. Makins replied five days later: ‘The whole question of hostilities with Portugal has, I am afraid, been rather distorted by a misinterpretation of a Foreign Office paper which was written some time ago on Anglo-Spanish relations’. ‘The prospect of our being at war with Portugal, which is at the moment extremely well-disposed and friendly towards us is therefore a rather remote contingency’, and would happen only after Spanish entry. In the meantime, he asked for such plans to be kept very secret – though not abandoned.

Similarly, on 15 July, Selby wrote to Halifax after the Foreign Secretary had mooted the idea of talking to the Portuguese opposition. Selby absolutely refuted such a plan, which ‘would be a complete breach of the basis of understanding’ with Salazar, ‘on which the important economic negotiations with Spain are proceeding – negotiations for the success of which we are largely relying on Dr. Salazar’. For Selby, Dr Salazar was the key not just to the economic agreement but to peace in the Peninsula, therefore:

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187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 TNA CO 323/1787/99, Stephen Holmes (Dominions) to Makins (FO), 2 July 1940.
191 Ibid.
192 TNA CO 323/1787/99, Makins to Holmes, 7 July 1940.
193 Ibid.
194 TNA FO 800/321, Selby to Halifax, 15 July 1940.
I remain convinced that our best chance of averting confusion if not a catastrophe in the Peninsula which would certainly carry with it the resentment of our oldest ally, is to follow the advice of Dr. Salazar and not to embarrass him in any way.\textsuperscript{195}

This was echoed by Eccles, keen to talk up his own achievements. On 20 July he was in high spirits: ‘Our Peninsula policy – the economic side – works well. We have removed all doubt of the vitality of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance [and] given sufficient support for Franco’ to resist German pressure in one fell swoop.\textsuperscript{196} On 24 July, he felt vindicated by the signing of the tripartite agreement, which appeared to vindicate the view propagated by himself, Selby, and Hoare.\textsuperscript{197} Selby, Eccles, and the Foreign Office mandarins in London were patiently expounding the softest possible political course toward Portugal and her Empire at a time when there was scant concrete evidence that Great Britain was receiving any political or strategic benefit in return.

Six days later, Portugal signed the Additional Protocol. This was sold so successfully the British Ambassadors in Madrid and Lisbon that it appeared to be the hitherto absent benefit Britain had been seeking. Hoare fell for a substantial distortion of the truth. Teotónio Pereira had, given the nature of the agreement, kept it secret from his British counterpart in Madrid, who asked to see him on 30 July. The former wrote to Lisbon: ‘I had not said a word to the English Ambassador about the projected protocol. I had, indeed, spoken quite a lot about the [existing] treaty of friendship and its current value, but without specifically detailing the planned idea’.\textsuperscript{198} Hoare told Teotónio Pereira with some concern that the Germans and Italians said the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance was over, but he was corrected: ‘it was a great victory which Portugal won and, with it, the party of peace in Spain’.\textsuperscript{199} ‘Well’, replied Hoare, ‘on second thoughts, and in spite of all appearances, I believe that this is how the case should be viewed’.

Teotónio Pereira then ‘produced a copious number of arguments to consolidate seeing it that way’.\textsuperscript{200} He told Hoare that the negotiations had been quick and involved only Salazar, Franco, and Nicolás Franco, and that he ‘knew little’; ‘therefore [Hoare] was not surprised by

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} David Eccles to Sybil Eccles, 20 July 1940, \textit{By Safe Hand}, pp. 141-143.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid.
my reserve about it’. They then read the evening newspapers at the direction of Teotónio Pereira, who had already seen them. After this, Hoare concluded: ‘There is no doubt this is a great victory for you and for the party of peace! […] Congratulations! Congratulations!’

After this meeting, Hoare wrote to London, where he repeated this dishonesty wholesale. The Protocol constituted ‘a Spanish guarantee of Portuguese Iberian independence’; ‘Salazar kept negotiations in the hands of Franco, Nicholas Franco and himself’; the Germans had reacted with ‘fury’. Franco had ‘in the teeth of Súñer’s opposition, declared for peace’.

Hoare proposed that the Prime Minister thank Salazar and that he thank Teotónio Pereira on Halifax’s behalf: ‘we owe much to these two Portuguese in helping us to avoid a serious crisis at a moment of great danger to the Empire’. Teotónio Pereira expressed further surprise when, two days later, Hoare sought him out to congratulate him formally on the Protocol. Selby wrote a saccharine letter of thanks for Salazar’s work which ‘secures the stability of the Peninsula and which takes full account of the mutual obligations between our two countries’.

Something was wrong with the Additional Protocol. Hoare, a bright man with long experience, sensed this intuitively. Denis Smyth believed Hoare was ‘ready to interpret the additional protocol […] in a favourable light’, since he understood that it ‘had originated, at least in part’ from Halifax’s approach in May 1940. Smyth gives the British perspective too much credit; there is little outside the British files to suggest this was so. The British probably believed it since nobody had told them anything about it; the Portuguese had kept their ally in the dark, and the Italians and the Germans were celebrating it as a victory. Hoare took these concerns, in general terms, to Teotónio Pereira. The latter in turn hoodwinked Hoare; he told him that its strategic outcome was a victory for Britain by extension. Teotónio Pereira persuaded Hoare that this was the case, and outright lied to him about how it had been planned and executed. This was an act of incredible duplicitousness, both by Salazar and at his lieutenant’s own initiative.

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202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 TNA FO 425/417, Hoare to Halifax, 31 July 1940.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
209 There was a personal quality to the letter as Selby wrote it in French, while technical documents were translated from English. DAPE, Vol. VII, Doc. 1083, Selby to Salazar, 3 August 1940, p. 345.
210 Smyth, Strategy of Survival, p. 34.
211 Smyth himself, citing the German documents, caveats this view. Ibid., p. 35.
Hoare had not only been hoodwinked himself; he had in turn hoodwinked London. The Portuguese interpretation of the Additional Protocol was extremely partisan. It ignored the implication that Portugal would be drawn away from Great Britain toward the Axis, which was clearly the Spanish intention when it was signed. Súñer’s agreement evidenced this but had been hidden from the British Ambassador. Salazar and his man in Madrid had connived to paint a radically optimistic picture of the Protocol’s effect, so optimistic that it stretched credulity. This account was accepted by London. Both men were praised by the British government for promoting peace in the Peninsula.211 On 31 July, Halifax told Cabinet, based on a report from Eccles, that the situation in Spain looked better.212 Many years later, Glyn Stone evidenced ‘Salazar’s genuine support in helping to prevent Spain’s entry into the war, as witness his part in the making of the Protocol’.213 So Hoare had, in the end, even hoodwinked the historian.

Contrasting Hoare’s, Selby’s, and Eccles’ correspondence in the build-up to the Additional Protocol with the Portuguese accounts and German records of Spanish intentions allow us to analyse the profound disconnect between British beliefs about Portugal’s role and Portugal’s actual conduct. Purely bilateral studies (Anglo-Portuguese, Anglo-Spanish, and Hispano-Portuguese) all overlook crucial elements: the intentions of the Spanish, the place of the Portuguese in British strategy, and the British position overall, respectively.214 The Additional Protocol of July 1940 was a case study in how Portugal secured its own position between two difficult poles; a political stunt by Serrano Súñer designed to bring Portugal away from the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance had been successfully sold to London as a victory for Anglo-Portuguese diplomacy in Spain.

The end of appeasement?

Both the Additional Protocol and the tripartite agreement were understood by the men on the ground as a success in what was recognisably a larger policy of appeasement, tailored for Spain and re-hashed for actual war. Hoare wished, as he put it, ‘to treat Spain as a not unfriendly neutral’.215 On this he was particularly keen to see supplies reach Spain, both as part

211 TNA FO 425/417, Halifax to Selby, 3 August 1940.
212 TNA CAB 65/8, War Cabinet Conclusions, 31 July 1940.
213 Stone, Spain, Portugal, p. 184.
215 TNA FO 800/323, Hoare to Halifax, 16 July 1940.
of the Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish trade agreements but also within the overall context of the blockade. Spain was so short that occasional leakages into Germany were justified by ‘the value of keeping the Iberian Peninsula out of the war’. 216 ‘The right approach is to start by saying that we will guarantee them the necessities of life so far as we can’, Hoare wrote, and asked on that basis for no re-export. 217 In this Hoare was joined uncritically by Selby, and the two continued to promote a soft line on Spain and a vision of Portugal as an ally.

A new and contradictory current, however, was swirling in London. Under Churchill’s premiership, Hugh Dalton had acceded to become Minister of Economic Warfare on 13 May. 218 His first priority – and indeed his obsession – was dealing with Italy. 219 On the subject of supplies to Italy, he fought fiercely with a Foreign Office stacked full of officials he regarded as weak-willed appeasers. 220 After Mussolini entered the War on 10 July, Dalton combined vindication with utter fury, violently angry that Mussolini had been allowed to enter the War with considerable stocks. Determined to avoid a repeat of those circumstances, he proposed precisely the opposite to Hoare: to ‘begin by insisting on the blockade and then talking about the concessions to Spain as secondary questions’. 221 He hated Franco, hated dictatorships, and hated that the Foreign Office had undermined him. He was determined that such a thing could never happen again.

Eccles’ suggestion that Portugal and Spain be dealt with as one unit had really been intended to promote his trilateral trade scheme, and not as a single unit for control purposes. But in Dalton’s view, the two could only ever be dealt as a single unit; they were inseparable. The fall of France meant that the British must apply ‘measures of contraband control to Spain and Portugal’. 222 And it had to be both Spain and Portugal. As he explained to the Cabinet:

Portugal is less directly exposed to German pressure. The present Portuguese Government is not likely to promote the passage of supplies to the enemy, but it cannot effectively control the trade across its frontier with Spain. The Iberian Peninsula must, therefore, be treated as a whole. 223

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216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 TNA FO 800/323, Hoare to Halifax, 16 July 1940.
223 Ibid.
The origin and aim of Dalton’s policy was two-fold: to prevent the supply of goods reaching occupied Europe, and to prevent Spain preparing for War. ‘We must secure that, as a belligerent, she shall be an economic liability and not an asset to Germany’.\footnote{Ibid.} On the basis that starving Spain might push Spain into belligerence, ‘we should also guarantee to Spain the supply of the goods so rationed’.\footnote{Ibid.} This was a policy for Spain; Portugal was simply an unavoidable part of that plan. After a technical exposition of the suggested approach to Spain, he proposed that His Majesty’s Government ‘should make a similar communication to the Portuguese Government with regard to Portuguese imports’.\footnote{Ibid.}

Portuguese policy was, in the MEW in London, a subsidiary aim of Spanish policy. British policy was, for the first time, balanced between camps: Dalton’s MEW, who viewed Portugal as subordinate to Spain; Hoare, Eccles, and Selby, who viewed Portugal as essential to Spanish neutrality, and Halifax, who vacillated. There was nothing to suggest that Dalton himself particularly cared about Portugal. As Eccles put it, he ‘hate[d] dictatorships in principle’ and scorned Franco very publicly, but he only hated Salazar ‘in private and half-heartedly’.\footnote{David Eccles to Sybil Eccles, \textit{By Safe Hand}, 20 July 1940, pp. 141-143.} For Dalton, Portugal was not an object worthy of scorn, nor even of attention, but was a means to two ends: the prevention of Franco’s Spain entering the War, and the wider victory over Hitler and Mussolini.

As the policy was visibly and publicly intended for Spain, Hoare reacted violently to Dalton’s proposed course. As the Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky recalled, Dalton told him that ‘Hoare is in a state of permanent panic. He has got into his head the idea that Hitler dreams of capturing him and holding him as hostage’.\footnote{Ivan Maisky, \textit{The Maisky Diaries: Red Ambassador to the Court of St James's, 1932-1943}, ed. by Gabriel Gorodetsky (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). Entry for 27 July 1940, p. 301.} Hoare was so worried that he had been ‘inundating the British Government with desperate telegrams of the “Munich Type”’.\footnote{Ibid.} Out of fear, he had vetoed Dalton’s desired statement that Britain was to “‘put Spain on rations”’.\footnote{Ibid.} But Dalton wanted a stricter policy, and he wanted it there and then.

Halifax was dragged into the mess, badgered by both men to see sense and back their policy. He admitted to ‘a bit of a tussle with Dalton’ to make him see Hoare’s view, who was finally ‘coerced’ into a delay of the blockade announcement.\footnote{TNA FO 800/323, Halifax to Hoare, 30 July 1940.} He also hoped that Eccles, as another interlocutor, might get Hoare’s view ‘into the heads of the Ministry of Economic
Warfare’. The delay was fleeting. Dalton anyway got what he wanted; a total oil embargo over Spain, formally beginning 27 July and coming into effect in August. A ship-by-ship analysis of Spain’s imports shows the oil imports fell to statistically zero. At British suggestion, Dalton also enlisted the Americans to back this embargo. As far as oil was concerned, he had not put Spain on rations; he had put Spain on no rations.

The oil embargo was significant, not least because it was the first example of successful strategic economic warfare in Spain. It was significantly harder for Hoare to plead his usual emotional case that this was a cruelty, as he did with food supplies. People did not eat oil. In Spain it had two effects. The first was to prompt the Spanish to make explicit requests to Germany for supplies, not just for oil but for wheat and other diverse primary resources. With Germany herself in a tight position for these supplies, the unsuccessful requests served as a warning about Spain’s supply situation in case they threw their lot in with the Axis. The Nazis simply could not supply them. The second-order effect was to focus Spanish minds; ‘in the end the only solution that the Spanish government considered practical was to reach an agreement with the Allies’.

The difficulty with Dalton’s policy was that it was impossible to act in Spain without acting in Portugal. If the first oil embargo has been under-examined by historians given its strategic value, then the relationship between the political decision vis-à-vis Spain and the effect on Portugal has been almost completely ignored. As Dalton himself explained when he was finally permitted to give his blockade speech in the Commons on 30 July, the two were inseparable. In view of German control up to the Pyrenees, would ‘a system of contraband control [...] be instituted over the imports of Spain and Portugal’? Not exactly, Dalton replied:

His Majesty's Government have decided to extend the navicert system to all seaborne goods consigned to any European port, as well as to certain Atlantic islands and to certain neutral ports in North Africa. In future ships sailing from a

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232 Ibid.
237 House of Commons, Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: The Official Report, HC Deb 30 July 1940 vol 363 cc 1130-1. Available online at: <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1940/jul/30/contraband-control-navicerts>. [Last accessed: 11-10-2022]. An amusing anecdote is recalled in the footnotes of Maisky’s diaries: the two diplomats who went to the session were the rather improbable pairing of Maisky and Alba. When the “strangers” were expelled, Alba asked Maisky which one of them was the stranger, to which he replied: “‘Who can tell?’”. Maisky, p. 301.
neutral port to any such destination must obtain navicerts for all items of cargo, and in addition a ship navicert at the last port of loading. Any consignment not navicerted and any ship without a ship navicert, will henceforth be liable to seizure by our patrols. The same rules will apply to outgoing trade. Ships sailing from European ports, or from certain Atlantic islands, or from certain neutral ports in North Africa must have certificates of non-enemy origin for all items of their cargoes, and any ship whose cargo is not fully certificated will be liable to be seized together with all uncertificated items of the cargo.\textsuperscript{238}

This dense explanation contains multitudes. This was not contraband control; it was full naval control of the Peninsula’s imports and exports. His Majesty’s Government, not the governments of Spain or Portugal, nor private merchants there, would decide what was to be admitted to and exit Iberia. Every ship required British permission to bring goods to or from Iberian ports. Every item on every ship required British permission. If a ship sailed without permission, it would be seized. If an item on a ship was not inventoried, it would be seized. Britain had signalled its intention to control the entire seaborne trade policy of both Spain and Portugal.

All this would be controlled through the use greatly expanded use of navicerts. The overall blockade, and particularly the place of navicerts, has been undervalued by historians.\textsuperscript{239} Marcelo de Paiva Abreu described navicerts as ‘commercial passports granted to cargoes approved by the British authorities’.\textsuperscript{240} While a neat description, the metaphor is imprecise. Passports can be used by the same holder for each trip. Navicerts were more like single visas, granted sparingly, and – crucially – needing to be newly applied for each time. Each cargo proceeding to or from the Peninsula would require a navicert. The effect was a ‘new programme for blockade by “control at source”’ which contained three central points: ‘(1) compulsory navicerts; (2) ship warrants; and (3) compulsory rationing of neutrals’.\textsuperscript{241} All this would apply with no distinction between Spain and Portugal.

The effect of Britain’s policy on the Portuguese economy has been studied in unbelievable detail by Fernando Rosas, who termed the period beginning July 1940 the ‘Dalton era’ for good reason.\textsuperscript{242} While Rosas is by no means ignorant of the wider developments in the

\textsuperscript{238} Hansard, HC Deb 30 July 1940 vol 363 cc1130-1. Available online at: <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1940/jul/30/contraband-control-navicerts>. [Last accessed: 11-10-2022].
\textsuperscript{239} Apart from Medlicott’s official history, Robert Matson wrote a volume on navicerts within the framework of Anglo-American relations during the latter’s neutrality. See: Robert W. Matson, \textit{Neutrality and navicerts: Britain, the United States, and economic warfare, 1939-1940} (New York: Garland, 1994).
\textsuperscript{241} Dalton, \textit{Fateful Years}, p. 353.
\textsuperscript{242} Fernando Rosas, \textit{Portugal entre a paz e a guerra 1939-1945} (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1990), p. 49.
War and their effect on the blockade, his account again ignores Spain. But ignoring Spain leaves unanswered and indeed unanswerable questions. Why would Dalton choose to blockade a country that did not border occupied Europe, and which was considered by many policymakers to be an ally within the boundaries of its neutrality? The origin of Dalton’s policy, its conception as a pan-Iberian blockade, and its effects on both countries, has been overlooked. Indeed, there is still no good single volume on the MEW in Iberia. The new policy of total control caused a significant strain on Anglo-Portuguese relations. Initially the Portuguese government did not take the measures particularly seriously, apparently believing it could ride out the measures as it had done as a result of its successful diplomacy since September 1939.

As it became increasingly obvious that he had misplaced his heart in the house of mirth, Salazar slowly came to enter the house of mourning. His fury with Dalton’s policies grew for two connected reasons: in his view, it upset Spain, and therefore risked Portugal’s neutrality and territorial integrity. Monteiro pushed Dalton on Salazar’s lines, arguing that the blockade was a threat to Spanish neutrality and therefore to Peninsula peace. Dalton was unmoved, rather bluntly telling the Ambassador that Portugal’s greatest interest was defeating Hitler; the blockade was something it would have to suffer in pursuit of that worthy goal. Having achieved the long-hoped-for British interest in the colonies with the tripartite financial agreement, Salazar now faced the ignominy of having to apply for navicerts for colonial imports. Since he regarded the Portuguese Empire as a single territory, this was particularly galling.

The Portuguese response was self-defeating, mostly because of Salazar’s tetchy reluctance to commit to banning re-exports. Dalton abhorred this reluctance and noted that it was the primary barrier to further supply quotas. Like much else, the dictator viewed the issue through his narrow lens of total sovereignty. Portugal’s sovereignty was total, and Salazar was to be in charge of it. His jealous refusal to commit to not re-exporting ultimately provided

243 Ibid., pp. 49-51.
244 In British historiography there has been some focus on the Special Operations Executive, for operational purposes uncomfortably lumped in with the MEW. The MEW’s blockade had a profound effect on Portugal, while the SOE’s operations caused a serious diplomatic spat in early 1942 and did little else. ‘SOE was particularly unfortunate in Portugal, failing not only to sustain an active role within Britain’s policies towards the country, but also in defending itself against critics at home and abroad.’ Neville Wylie, ‘“An Amateur Learns His Job”? Special Operations Executive in Portugal, 1940-42’, Journal of Contemporary History, 36 (2012), 441-457 (p. 441).
245 Rosas, Portugal entre..., p. 51; Medlicott, Economic Blockade, p. 516.
246 DAPE, Vol. XIV, Doc. 337, Salazar to Monteiro, September 1940, pp. 319-324.
247 DAPE, Vol. XIV, Doc. 341, Monteiro to Salazar, 10 October 1940, pp. 326-328
248 It might strike readers that Salazar himself did not himself “apply” for navicerts. He did not fill in the paperwork. But he was so intimately involved in obtaining them that ultimately, he did apply for them. Inter alia: DAPE, Vol. XIV, Doc. 348, Salazar to Monteiro, 25 October 1940, p. 334.
249 TNA FO 425/417, Dalton to Lisbon, 13 December 1940.
the grounds for the strictest possible interpretation of Dalton’s policy, as much in Portugal as in Spain. In mid-July it also ran another risk: Churchill advocated for the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands on the basis that control at source was failing. The Prime Minister was restrained only by Halifax’s intervention that such a move would be counter-productive in both Spain and Portugal.

Hoare objected just as much in Madrid. His unwavering commitment to the relentless blockade of Spain was only encouraged by this personal clash. It was impossible to divide the personal from the political; Dalton thought Hoare a joke, and he thought a policy of economic appeasement in Spain a joke: ‘Embassy staff [in Madrid], who had to deal directly with the protests of the Spanish authorities, concluded that the Minister was motivated by a mixture of socialist prejudice and personal vindictiveness’. But at its heart, ‘at the centre of the controversy between Dalton and Hoare […] stood the question of how to treat Spain economically’.

Dalton was primarily motivated by the Italian experience and would not let Mussolini’s cautionary tale go unheeded. In August 1940, Dalton explained this in a letter to Eccles, who passed it on to Hoare, who in turn gave it to Halifax. In Spain, Britain was ‘offering pretty “liberal” rations, but I am a bit disconcerted by the persistent refusal to apply for navicerts’ and the refusal of British wheat, the offer of which had been ‘an act of appeasement’ and the ‘anti-British orgies’ in the press. Dalton preferred Spanish neutrality; but if that were not to be, it would be better that Spain were a poor combatant. On this, he wrote to Eccles: ‘I have confidence that you will not fall, nor drag me into another Italian trap!’

Hoare naturally hated the letter, as much for the implication that he could control the Spanish press as on any substantive issue. Halifax attempted to mollify him; he wrote of Hoare’s working on improving Anglo-Spanish relations which ‘we all appreciate here, Dalton included’; ‘Dalton is perfectly alive to the stickiness of the wicket on which you are batting’,

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250 TNA CAB 65/14/13, Confidential Annex to WM (40) 209, ‘Portugal: Atlantic Islands’, 22 July 1940.
251 Ibid. Churchill obliged the Chiefs of keep the plans live: TNA CAB 79/5/56, COS (40)231, 24 July 1940. Churchill himself, at a Defence Committee meeting an hour and a half later, raised the subject. TNA CAB 69/1/6, DO (40) 21, 22 July 1940.
252 Pimlott, Dalton, p. 287.
254 TNA FO 800/323, Hoare to Halifax, 3 September 1940.
255 TNA FO 800/323, Dalton to Eccles, 10 August 1940.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
258 TNA FO 800/323, Hoare to Halifax, 3 September 1940.
‘whatever he may say in his letters to Eccles!’ But Dalton was not grateful. As his letter to Eccles revealed, perhaps Spain would enter the War; but if it did, its capacity was in many ways limited. And in the meantime, the “stick” was the best method of keeping Spain out of the war entirely.

Spain and Portugal were joined politically by the Additional Protocol and embryonically connected economically by the tripartite agreement. There was an element of elasticity in both. There was no elasticity in the blockade, which forcefully bound them together, a point overlooked by studies of the blockade in Spain. Its effect was startling; Portugal was now subject, permanently, to a Spanish minimum. It could not freely import nor export, not even to its own colonial possessions, without British approval. The price of the economic weapon’s application in pursuit of Spanish neutrality was collateral damage in Portugal. Dalton thought it a price worth paying.

**Súñer and the Axis temptation**

While the blockade focused some minds in the Spanish regime, other influential figures were keen to press on with securing Spain’s rightful place in the Axis comity of nations. In September, Serrano Súñer went to Berlin. Portugal was a surprisingly popular topic. Meeting Von Ribbentrop, Súñer outlined Portugal’s changing attitude to the Spanish point of view and the Axis cause; Portugal did not believe ‘in a German victory, and therefore her policy had been vacillating’. The sum of Portugal’s rapprochement was that ‘she had merely concluded a protocol with Spain’, a ‘rapprochement by Portugal with the authoritarian states’ only ‘toward the outside’. But Portugal’s attitude had ‘improved somewhat’ lately, and ‘if at that time [June 1940] Germany and Spain had made a joint diplomatic effort with Portugal, she could perhaps have been drawn entirely over to the side of the authoritarian states’. He then ‘criticised the attitude of the Spanish diplomats rather sharply and underlined once more how easy it was to influence Portugal by means of joint pressure on the part of Germany and Spain’.

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259 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
As Ángel Viñas put it, Súñer ‘had implicitly abrogated himself’ power over Anglo-
Portuguese relations. But he had abrogated himself something much greater: power over
Portugal’s sovereignty. Súñer mused that although the Spanish remained grateful for help
afforded in the Civil War, nonetheless ‘one could not avoid the realisation in looking at the
map of Europe that geographically speaking Portugal really had no right to exist’. This was
the most radical embodiment of a phenomenon with a long pedigree in extreme Spanish
nationalism: the destruction of Portugal, or rather, the integration of Portugal into a
Hispanicised Iberian Peninsula. While the British were aware of these longstanding fears,
they never coherently understood the ramifications for their Portuguese policy, clearly also
unaware of the scale of feeling as evidenced by Súñer’s comments.

On 22 September, undoubtedly on the basis of Serrano’s proclamations, von
Ribbentrop, Mussolini, and Ciano agreed, in light of Spain’s agreed entry into the War, to exert
pressure ‘on Minister President Salazar by Germany, Italy, and Spain to induce a turning away
from England and toward Spain’. Meeting Hitler himself later that week, Súñer ‘repeated his
earlier statement’, that ‘geographically her [Portugal’s] existence was not justified’. All
that was keeping Spain from invading was the fact that ‘she had lived independently for 800
years, and it would be difficult for Spain to absorb 7 million “weeping Portuguese”’. Súñer
therefore counselled bringing Portugal into the Tripartite Pact, disagreeing with Hitler that such
a course was impossible. Whether or not this was a serious plan is unclear, but it betrays the
contempt that Súñer, at the height of his powers in Spain, had for his nearest neighbours. He
clearly did not believe that Portugal was a serious force. The ease with which he believed it
could be drawn into an Axis pact does not suggest he believed Salazar held leverage or even
any influence over Spanish affairs.

Súñer’s power augured badly for Peninsular neutrality, and indeed perhaps even for
Portuguese independence. Despite this, it served only to draw the British closer to the
Portuguese. Hoare and Eccles, disorientated by the speed of events, called on Teotónio Pereira.

265 Viñas, Sobornos, pp. 199-200.
266 DGFP, Series D, Vol. IX, ‘Record of the Conversation between the Reich Foreign
Minister and the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Serrano Súñer on September 16 1940, at
267 Loff, Salazarismo e Franquismo, pp. 188-189; Juan Carlos Jiménez Redondo,
Franco e Salazar: as relações luso-espanholas durante a guerra fria (Lisboa: Assírio &
268 DGFP, Series D, Vol. IX, Doc. 87, Record of the Conversation between the Reich
Foreign Minister and the Duce, 22 September, pp. 150-153.
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid.
Selby had informed them that negotiations over the blockade had gone badly when he had met with Salazar, and that, along with Hoare’s difficulties with the same in Madrid, the outlook was bad. Eccles was to go to Lisbon, apparently to attempt to fix things, and was seeking a private audience: ‘I understand very clearly that they do not trust Selby. I found the general tone of his telegram detestable which was very long, and I read it all’. It was the first indication that Eccles and Hoare were prepared to throw their friend and ally under the bus for a more able man. But by far and away the most significant approach came from Churchill, who wrote to Salazar on 24 September:

I have followed with the greatest sympathy and admiration the efforts which you have made during recent months to prevent the war spreading to the Iberian Peninsula. As so often before during the many centuries of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, British and Portuguese interests are identical on this vital question.

Once again, without its own political leverage in Spain, the British – now including the Prime Minister himself – turned to Salazar as their man in the Peninsula. They were motivated by fear. Germany had two probable options in September 1940, Halifax believed. The first was an attack on Egypt, possibly co-ordinated with the Italians through Libya. The second was ‘towards the Iberian Peninsula’, where Spain would be pressured to join the ‘Axis and to permit the passage of German troops through Spain to Portugal and Gibraltar’. Spain was now facing ‘the climax of ‘the struggle between the interventionists (Súñer and the Falangist party) and the non-interventionists (the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the army’). Súñer would return from Berlin with ‘grandiose ideas’ about Spain’s role, its economy, and its expansionist prospects in Africa. The German documents – narrated by historian Norman Goda – support the idea that German interest in Spanish entry and the fall of Gibraltar reached a new peak in early autumn 1940.

Such fears were greatly exacerbated on 16 October, when Beigbeder, in a darkly comic moment of consummate nastiness, read of his own sacking in the newspaper while he ate his breakfast. Beigbeder’s fall caused profound consternation in the British Embassy, in the

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273 TdT AOS/E/64/10, Churchill to Salazar, 24 September 1940.
274 TNA CAB 66/12/24, Spain, Gibraltar and Morocco, 28 September 1940.
275 Ibid.
276 Ibid.
278 Preston, Franco, pp. 391-392.
Foreign Office, and at Cabinet. Halifax found some cause for optimism; there was ‘a good deal of information which seemed to show that this change might not mean quite so much as appeared at first sight’, and Cabinet ‘should still not assume that Spain was bound to come into the war against us’. However, this was unexpectedly sudden, ‘bad from our point of view’, and ‘a definite set-back’ for British policy.

Súñer’s accession threatened to upend all three axes of Anglo-Iberian relations, since Serrano’s rise ‘led many to believe that Nicolás’ days in Lisbon were numbered’. In Madrid, Teotónio Pereira appeared rather less worried. Recounting the extraordinary circumstances of Beigbeder’s fall, he was circumspect about Súñer’s rise, the ‘coup de théâtre’ belying the fact that ‘Serrano’s trip was a failure’. His accession to the heady, desired heights of high office ‘could be a disaster or it could end up being nothing. Serrano has so little tact that he could self-destruct in 15 days’. There were two risks; what the Germans intended to do with him, if anything, and whether Súñer planned ‘a new trip and, this time, [one] to Lisbon’. The next 15 days, Pereira opined, would give the measure of Súñer’s power and intentions.

While widely assumed that Nicolás Franco would be removed from his post, Franco left the decision to Súñer, who calculated that removing the Caudillo’s older brother from the post would be a step too far. Understanding the world had changed, the elder Franco wrote for the first time asking for permission to visit Spain for a few days; he had always previously come and gone at his leisure. Súñer gave him carte blanche, and received him in his office, but any political influence was gone: ‘he was not interested in his opinions on how he saw the world from his observatory in Lisbon’.

Events in Spain were in Súñer’s hands; possibly the future of the Iberian Peninsula was in German hands. On 17 October, Salazar saw the German Ambassador Huene, telling him that he envisaged keeping the War out of the Peninsula. An imminent attack on Gibraltar, he said, would be a disaster since Spain would be cut off from its external food supply and starve. But ‘since Spain, due to her weak position, could take action only in closest agreement with Germany, the future of the Iberian Peninsula was in German hands. On 21

279 TNA CAB 65/9, Conclusions of War Cabinet 273 (40), 18 October 1940.
280 Ibid.
281 Garriga, p. 196.
283 Ibid.
284 Ibid.
285 Ibid., p. 196.
286 Ibid., pp. 196-197.
288 Ibid.
October, he let it be known to Eccles and Selby that he was writing a letter to Churchill in support of Hoare’s ‘intelligent policy’ in Spain.289

British fears about Spanish intentions were fully consummated when on 23 October 1940, Franco met Hitler at Hendaye. Again, the Portuguese knew nothing. It did not even appear that Nicolás Franco knew anything. After the meeting at Hendaye, Nicolás ‘left and returned to Lisbon sine die. I feel it is extremely worrying. He still has not spoken to his brother after that strange trip to Hendaye. He knew nothing [about it]’.290 In Madrid, ‘panic reign[ed] in the diplomatic corps’; members of the Belgian and Polish legations had visited the Portuguese Embassy for visas.291 When Teotónio Pereira sought out Súñer at a state function:

He ran away from meeting with me and I have a hunch that despite all his grandiose mania he must now be terrified like the aprenti sorcier of music who can no longer stop the sorcery's march.292

Despite the fact that the Portuguese were being actively kept in the dark, the very next day, Salazar assured Selby and Eccles that he ‘did not consider the meeting between Franco and Hitler as important other than as a check to Mussolini’, apparently a purely intuitive suggestion.293 On 27 October, Teotónio Pereira and Salazar had dinner, spending two and a half hours talking over developments in Spain.294 Trying to work out what Spain would do became a recurring theme in his working week. On the 29 October, the Spanish Ambassador, Alba saw Butler at the Foreign Office, vaguely telling him that he ‘had no specific information’ about Hendaye.295

Finally, a week later on the morning of 31 October, Salazar met Nicolás Franco, discussing ‘what happened at the Franco-Hitler meeting’.296 The reason for the delay is not clear; that Salazar felt confident enough to give the British information in the interim is paradigmatic. Teotónio Pereira felt Nicolás gave an honest account of what he knew as he recounted him the same ‘smallest details’ when they met on a plane journey a few days later.297 But the implication was that the Ambassador did not know everything. For in the meantime,

291 Ibid.
292 Ibid. Aprenti sorcier, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, is left in French in the original.
295 TNA FO 425/417, Halifax to Hoare, 31 October 1940.
296 Diários de Salazar, 31 October 1940.
297 CPTPOS, vol. II, Doc. 37, Teotónio Pereira to Salazar, 2 November 1940, pp. 102-104.
Teotónio Pereira followed the rumour mill in Madrid, searching for information about Súñer’s and Franco’s true intentions after Hendaye. ‘The American told me that he had seen Serrano Súñer two days ago’; he had told the American that ‘there was a change in the processes but not in substance’, that ‘Spain was in political solidarity with the Axis’ but that it remained open to contacts with all.298 A visit to Portugal was once again strongly rumoured.299

Later that day, a troop of Madrid newspaper editors attended the Exposition, culminating in a banquet with Salazar.300 Nicolás Franco gave a speech at the Anniversary of the Battle of Salado: ‘He affirmed that Portugal and Spain, joined together one to the other by the laws of nature, were great for as long as they were joined together, and declared that after living with their backs to one another to face the outside world [they should] turn to face one another to shake hands and embrace’.301 Friendship between Franco and Carmona, he added, would be ‘perennial’.302 Meanwhile his meeting with Salazar – by far the more politically important event – was relegated to a four-line EFE report.303 The difficulty was that at this crucial moment, there was a clear gap between the friendly but politically impotent declarations of the Ambassador and the menacing silence of the Minister.

Súñer finally resolved the greater part of Portuguese fears when he took Teotónio Pereira to La Granja, the famed palatial town near to Segovia on 7 November. It was an odd lunch, with a two hour walk afterward in the gardens, during which Súñer summarised his foreign policy and recent sojourns. The two men seemed at times to behave like caricatures of their respective nations: Teotónio Pereira, reserved, dignified, with a degree of suaveness; Súñer, bombastic, unpredictable, cunning. After praising Hitler, conversation turned to Hendaye, when Súñer interrupted the Ambassador:

- ‘I put up with them, but I had to put my mind to it! But look, the Generalíssimo is a simpleton. Fortunately, he spoke very little with Hitler!’
- ‘What now!? Franco has great qualities of prudence, and he is very lively. Being a Galician…’
- ‘But for Hitler being Galician isn’t enough! He [Hitler] wraps them all around his finger’.304

298 Ibid.
299 Ibid.
300 ‘Los Directores de los Periódicos Madrileños en Lisboa’, ABC (Sevilla), 31 October 1940, p. 2.
301 Ibid.
302 ‘La conmemoración de la Batalla del Salado en Évora’, ABC (Sevilla), 11620, 1 November 1940, p. 4.
303 ‘Don Nicolás Franco conferencia con Salazar’, ABC (Sevilla), 2 November 1940, p. 5.
After this outburst, Súñer told the Portuguese Ambassador that Europe’s future was soon to be decided, and that ‘it is indispensable that Portugal and Spain agree on the defence of their mutual interests’. Teotónio Pereira agreed, reminding Súñer that they had signed the additional protocol for that exact purpose: was there some imminent danger that Súñer was aware of? ‘He said that he would do anything to maintain the closest collaboration with Portugal but he complained about our politics of fear’. The Ambassador shot back that Portugal had every right to reserve in its dealings, unsure of Spain’s intentions whether through disorganisation in the Ministry or through ‘a second intention toward Portugal’. He told Súñer this ‘in friendship and trust’, which allowed ‘total frankness’. Súñer, in this atmosphere of “trust”, promised that Spain’s essential preoccupations were a ‘close relationship with Portugal, a certain distance from the conflict, [and] the necessity of looking after the country’s economic situation’.

This long and ambiguous meeting is stacked full of uncertainties and allusions that require unpacking if we are to fully appreciate Hispano-Portuguese relations during Súñer’s supremacy. Teotónio Pereira’s record is the only one we have; though he is generally a reliable diarist, we cannot ignore his position vis-à-vis Salazar, nor his willingness to ameliorate certain hard facts for his master’s sensitive palate. But we can discern certain key developments: Súñer did appear to confirm, in his cunning way, that there would be no imminent change in Spanish policy. He resolved the mystery of his trips to Berlin and Rome. Teotónio Pereira had challenged the ambiguity of Spanish policy toward Portugal, which had been partially resolved, or at least answered. The gamble on which Portugal’s relations with Britain were based – that Spain would not enter the War – seemed to have paid off. The Portuguese must have breathed a sigh of relief.

The Portuguese correspondence shows just how fearful the Portuguese were of Súñer’s intentions, and how powerless they were to stop them. They had a very minor, almost negligible advantage over the British. We must think here, in the context of Britain, Portugal, and Spain, not only of information, but of positions. By virtue of meeting Nicolás Franco, Salazar had more information than the British, who could not rely on an under-informed Alba. After Teotónio Pereira met Súñer, Lisbon certainly had more information about the meeting than London. But this was not a particularly privileged position. Salazar was forced to wait, even

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305 Ibid.
306 Ibid.
307 Ibid.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid.
then for second-hand information from Nicolás Franco who, it appeared, had not himself been positioned to receive a full and timely explanation of his brother’s meeting. Only at Súñer’s convenience, only after Súñer and Franco had chosen their position, was a full and rather colourful explanation offered across the border.

Amidst the ongoing crisis, and probably hoping to escape the intolerable atmosphere for a break, Hoare headed to Lisbon on 12 November. He wrote to Halifax: ‘It is urgently necessary for me to discuss with Salazar the broad position of the Iberian Peninsula’.310 Moreover, he wished for closer association between the Madrid and Lisbon embassies: ‘the Embassy in Lisbon does not know nearly as much as it should about tendencies and possibilities in Spain’.311 Hoare’s preference was for much closer cross-Iberian relations between the two embassies day to day.

On 14 November, Hoare dined with Sampaio, and on 15 November he met Salazar along with Selby, discussing ‘problems of Spain and the War’, ‘his conversations with Franco and Súñer’ and ‘peninsular peace’ amongst other topics.312 Hoare’s account of the meeting was revealing:

My visit to Lisbon greatly helped me to take a broad view of the Iberian position. Salazar and the Patriarch are two of the wisest men in the Peninsula and both of them agreed that we must cling to our foothold in Spain and that if we lost it Spain and Portugal would fall together into the German abyss. It is not for me to talk about Portuguese affairs. You must get the Portuguese side from Selby, but I think that I ought to tell you that Salazar spoke to me with anxious gravity about the administration of the blockade.313

The British Ambassador to Spain was doing the Portuguese dictator’s diplomacy for him. Despite Hoare’s praise, the dictator continued to hedge his bets, as did Nicolás Franco. The day before, Salazar saw Huene, telling the German Ambassador that ‘a victory by England was in any event no longer possible’, and that ‘he was following our struggle with sympathy’ given the two countries’ shared ideology.314 On 15 November, Teotónio Pereira recounted a conversation with Nicolas Franco, who was ‘so worried that he came to tell me that he wouldn’t go to any lunch or dinner that the English Ambassador [Selby] would give for Sir Samuel

310 TNA FO 800/323, Hoare to Halifax, 11 November 1940, sheet 243.
311 Ibid.
312 Salazar, Diários de Salazar, 14 and 15 November 1940.
313 TNA FO 800/323, Hoare to Halifax, 11 November 1940, sheet 243.
Hoare, without express permission from the Ministry. He did not know what Spain wanted to do and too much intimacy didn’t suit him’.315

In light of such comments and the Additional Protocol, the Germans felt increasingly confident that Portugal would not interfere with their plans. Von Stohrer told Berlin that in case of an English landing, the Portuguese ‘would immediately request Spanish (and hence German) aid’, and that Nicolás Franco had told him that Portugal, moreover, ‘had promised full information on any English designs against Portugal or Spain that came to light’ while steadfastly attempting to remain neutral.316 Was this the policy Hoare, Selby, and Eccles believed was being carried out? Was this anywhere near it?

The situation in the Peninsula presented a mixed picture for Salazar. On the one hand, the naivety of Hoare, Selby, and Eccles ensured that Portugal was now considered a political ally. On the other, the blockade was beginning to chafe, bringing home to Portugal the economic realities of a global war it had hitherto avoided. Further, the risk to its territories – in which Churchill was particularly interested – hung like the imperial sword of Damocles. Designs over the Azores were kept “live” over the summer months.317 Designs over the Portuguese territories in Africa were similarly kept ticking over; the Prime Minister himself was being kept abreast of potential Rhodesian and Union action.318 These did appear to be serious plans. South Rhodesia and South Africa were prepared to move ‘at 15 hours’ notice’.319 Moreover, ‘General Smuts has been given a pledge that, before any action is taken against Portuguese territory in any part of the world, he will be consulted’.320 The good news for Salazar was that the three diplomats’ legacy would endure longer than Churchill and Smuts’ threats.

The end of appeasement, deferred

On the eve of his departure, Selby wrote two missives to London that summed up his political position toward Portugal. The first, on 9 December, was addressed to the Minister for Economic Warfare, written after his farewell meeting with Salazar, at which his wife was present. Salazar, he said, spoke ‘with quite unusual earnestness’ about ‘Portugal in respect of

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317 TNA CAB 65/14/13, Confidential Annex to WM (40) 209, ‘Portugal: Atlantic Islands’, 22 July 1940.
318 TNA CAB 120/676, LG Hollis to Churchill, 24 November 1940.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
our blockade’.  

He had drawn up questions under four headings, about which they parlayed at length, before turning to the problem of ‘principle’, in which, ‘Portuguese needs, and, in particular, Portuguese neutrality’ were not being given fair consideration.  

In this regard Salazar spoke at length, which in turn was repeated at length to London. The blockade’s inflexibility would stoke inflation – ‘Did His Majesty’s Government realise the economic and political consequences not only for Portugal but for Anglo-Portuguese relations?’

Salazar went on for some time, saying that some had counselled turning away from Britain and toward Germany and Italy, while implying he had resolutely rejected this.  

Fixating for a while on colonial sugar, he then ‘made what amounted to a fierce appeal to me to realise what indignation and consternation was being aroused in Portugal by our blockade procedure’.  

After some limited appeals by Selby, who cited his experience of the blockade of exports to Germany in the First World War, Salazar countered that he saw the point, but wanted Britain to ‘subordinate [the blockade] to certain political considerations in respect to Portugal, her position to-day in the Iberian Peninsula’.  

Selby asked for ‘the most urgent attention’ to be given to the matter, asking for ‘certain relaxations of the principles of our blockade’ toward ‘our oldest ally’.

On 10 December, Selby wrote to the Foreign Office with an outstanding example of the attitude which the Portuguese government would so miss. ‘The outstanding feature […] of Anglo Portuguese relations in the past few years’, he explained, ‘has in the main been our unfortunate inability’ either to supply Portugal with arms or to be in a position to defend her.  

Therefore, ‘to all intents and purposes Portugal was without effective defences of any kind’ and Salazar ‘took the only course that seemed to him open’ without provoking Spain. He had meticulously followed that policy, upsetting ‘the more fastidious interpreters of the obligations of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance’ with a ‘too detached and lukewarm’ attitude.  

However, Selby argued:

Against this should be weighed the undoubted service he has rendered to His Majesty’s Government in Spain by exercising from the first all his influence on the
Spanish Government to maintain their neutrality. Indeed there can be little room for doubt that, but for the restraining influence of Dr. Salazar, the development of Spanish policy might have been very different from what it has been.\textsuperscript{331}

Salazar had kept Franco out of the War. Considering the documentary evidence, Selby’s view is delusional. His grandiloquent request at the end of the report, that the future historian ought not to forget the ‘closest of political and military association’ between Britain and Portugal ‘since the 14\textsuperscript{th} century’ was plainly an emotive plea, not a considered reflection.\textsuperscript{332} Such emotion seriously impaired his judgement and, therefore, the Foreign Office and Cabinet’s view of Portugal’s role. But he had fomented in these government departments a vision of Portugal as an ally, in spite of Portugal’s actual conduct.

This was Selby’s swansong. He was not forced out, and the end of his mission was amicable, but he was given early retirement and not invited to take up a new position elsewhere.\textsuperscript{333} His replacement was to be Sir Ronald Campbell, formerly Ambassador to France. ‘Hoare says he is a man of great merit and spoke of him warmly’, Teotónio Pereira wrote; ‘Franco said that Selby was inoffensive but that he [Campbell] is in a different category’.\textsuperscript{334} A week later, Monteiro wrote from London: ‘I spoke with the new Ambassador. He is a man of great distinction and manners, and from all that I hear he is a very intelligent and cultured man’.\textsuperscript{335} Unlike Selby, he did not worship ‘the religion of parliamentary democracy’ and had ‘the greatest desire to please and make friends in Portugal’.\textsuperscript{336} But he underlined that “I have in front of me one barrier: the blockade is one of England’s greatest weapons, and it is only useful if used with force”.\textsuperscript{337}

Campbell did not present his credentials until January, but his appointment and Selby’s retirement meant that some considerable change in Anglo-Portuguese relations, and by extension the trilateral relationship, was likely. Almost concurrently, there was another profound change in London. The British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, died unexpectedly, and Churchill took the opportunity to ship out Halifax to replace him.\textsuperscript{338} It was said that Eden felt like a man going home. What would Campbell’s attitude be? What would Eden’s attitude be?

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{333} TNA T 164/193/23, Selby, Sir W H M, Ambassador, Lisbon: early retirement under Superannuation’, 1940.
\textsuperscript{335} CPAMOS, Doc. 30, Monteiro to Salazar, 21 December 1940, pp. 112-118.
\textsuperscript{336} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{337} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{338} Churchill, \textit{Their Finest Hour}, p. 504.
There was another potential diplomatic front opening. Monteiro wrote to Salazar having seen Butler and been informed that “the United States are watching with the utmost interest the preservation of Portuguese independence”\(^{339}\). This development was linked to ‘certain diligent work that Y. E. instructed me to undertake here a few months ago’.\(^{340}\) Via London, Monteiro had won at least the interest of the United States, where Portugal had previously existed outside or on the very periphery of its vision. What was the Americans’ self-interest in this regard, Monteiro wondered? Would it not pay to enquire, ‘to know to what extent we can count on American help’ on arms and on Portugal’s Atlantic position?\(^{341}\) He wrote: ‘Perhaps this is our fated opportunity to create a new and precious friendship – which can join that with England, without the latter being diminished by it’\(^ {342}\). What would the Americans’ attitude be?

The ruse and the rubes

We should now take stock of trilateral relations at the end of 1940, to consider a few general points and to consider their impact on the overall thesis. Firstly, it cannot seriously be said that Salazar had a restraining influence on Franco, much less on the Svengali Súñer. There is no evidence in 1939 or 1940 that Lisbon was important to Madrid’s vacillating temptation, much less that it had the diplomatic or political purchase to affect Spain’s decision. Indeed, there is some evidence that, at least as it was seen from Berlin and Rome, the relationship in this period was the other way around, and that Madrid had some influence over Lisbon. This is probably the most accurate reading of why the Additional Protocol of June 1940 was signed, and that Protocol should, based on the available evidence, be seen as a reasonably successful Spanish attempt to move Portugal away from British influence. This was an example of cross-Iberian political rapprochement, but the impetus was Spanish, and the effect the opposite of that which was desired and imagined in London. This was Salazar’s, and Teotónio Pereira’s, successful ruse.

Secondly, the sum effect of Selby and Hoare’s missives to London was to create in the minds of policymakers a certain idea of Salazar’s Portugal as a key ally responsible for keeping Spain out of the War. By the end of 1940, we can clearly see both the origin and the development of the Salazar myth. Both Hoare and Selby wrote accounts that were steeped in a

\(^{339}\) CPAMOS, Doc. 30, Monteiro to Salazar, 21 December 1940, pp. 112-118.
\(^{340}\) Ibid.
\(^{341}\) Ibid.
\(^{342}\) Ibid.
certain vision of Portugal and her place in the War. This was sometimes carried out with the deliberate machinations of the Portuguese, according to both Salazar and Teotónio Pereira’s designs. This is not to say that the two Portuguese acted nefariously; they simply ruthlessly promoted Portugal’s self-interests, always endeavouring to tie these to British aims. This laid the groundwork for how Portugal would be understood during and after the War, and provided a blueprint for future events, most notably after the Allied invasion of Timor.

Selby’s desire for concessions toward Salazar mainly revolved around the loosening of the blockade. He was joined in this effort, from June 1940 onwards, by Samuel Hoare. Both men showed themselves cowed by circumstances, and both men showed themselves willing – sometimes cravenly so – to look favourably on Portuguese requests. These people were the rubes. The antidote to Selby and Hoare’s missives, both obviously influenced by the slippery, supple Eccles, was the accession of Hugh Dalton to the MEW. He ended the unambiguous policy of appeasement which the British Government had pursued vis-à-vis Franco’s Spain. As Franco’s political machinations became more overtly pro-Axis, so London demanded in its dealings with the regime much stricter contingencies. The aid offered by the Ministry of Economic Warfare was limited and conditional; there was for the first time actual use of the stick that had been vaguely threatened against Hitler and Mussolini throughout the 1930’s. For the first time this was mutual appeasement; London would provide for Madrid, but only so long as Madrid behaved.

This mutual appeasement – not Salazar’s diplomacy – made a serious contribution to Franco’s decision-making. Dalton’s steadfast commitment to the blockade, driven by a pathological hatred of Mussolini’s pre-belligerence stockpiling, prevented potential catastrophe in following the Ambassadors’ proposed course. This had a considerable, under-appreciated effect on Portugal’s position in 1939 and 1940. But it made little difference to the idea of Portugal in British policymakers’ minds. Selby was to return home, but Hoare was to continue under Teotónio Pereira’s gentle influence. Four days before the new year he wrote to Lisbon: ‘I made Hoare see the danger of working with the reds’; ‘I asked him to explain this well to London’. Knowing his English counterpart sought a meeting with Salazar, meanwhile, he counselled that this should be secret, ‘at night and without publicity’. Being shuffled through the service door in darkness was Hoare’s just reward.

343 CPTPOS, Vol. II, Doc. 46, 27 December 1940, pp. 139-144.
344 Ibid.
Chapter Two: A Year of Continuity, A Year of Change, 1941-1942

In January 1941, German troops were at the Pyrenees and by the Baltic Sea; Italian troops had crossed into Greece and were camped in Western Egypt. The strategic concerns about Spain’s potential entry into the War remained live. Politically and strategically, 1941 was a year of continuity as far it concerned Spain and therefore was a year of considerable continuity in Anglo-Iberian relations. This chapter demonstrates how this continuity paved the way for the structural foundations of an enduring British “allyship” with Portugal, including the bizarre spectacle of Dr Salazar being given an Oxford doctorate and the first round of Anglo-Portuguese staff talks. It further demonstrates the continued political gap between Spain and Portugal, even as economic relations between the two countries grew somewhat closer.

There were, however, also some notable developments, particularly in the second half of the year. Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 pulled Spain and Portugal in opposite directions. Franco, unable to resist the lure of a (second) fascist anti-communist war, sent troops to Russia; Salazar, fiercely anti-communist but also fiercely fearful, resisted that temptation. This chapter shows how the slowing of the German advance permitted Portugal to obtain, at some cost, its desired semi-independent strategic relationship with Great Britain, with Spain as an object in that relationship rather than an actor. Both halves of the year, in short, continued to demonstrate the central place of Spain in Anglo-Portuguese relations while allowing some autonomous developments in the latter bilateral relationship.

These early signs of change, however, were destroyed in December 1941. Pearl Harbour bringing Japan and the United States into the War would lead to a chain of events which would reverberate in Anglo-Iberian relations from the Far East to Europe. The Allied invasion of Portuguese Timor in December 1941 was the crowning disaster of British policy toward Portugal. It caused an immediate crisis in relations, threatening to break the Alliance definitively. It also brought about two poorly understood consequences. Firstly, it provided the opportunity for the Spanish leadership to approach a Portugal newly estranged from its traditional protector. Secondly, the eventual Portuguese reaction created the conditions for a long-term revolution in Anglo-Portuguese relations, which would ensure the survival of the Portuguese Empire and thus the particular form of survival with which the thesis is concerned.

1942 was the year of change since it brought Spain and Portugal together in genuine cross-Iberian rapprochement for the first time. First, the long-held Portuguese desire for Salazar
and Franco to meet was realised with an ambiguous meeting in Seville in February 1942. This was followed by a great change in Spanish internal politics where, after the Begoña attack of 1942, Serrano Súñer was finally deposed. In November 1942, Operation Torch, the first demonstration of American-led Allied military power definitively changed the international situation and with it the relative context of the Iberian Peninsula. The signing of the Iberian Pact by Salazar and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Jordana, was the real development in inter-Iberian relations that the British had hoped for since 1939.

These changes represented a watershed; improved inter-Iberian heralded the effective end of Spain’s imminent Axis temptation (though Franco’s desire for a total German victory never wholly diminished). 1941-1942 can be seen in one of two ways. It can be seen as the intermediary stage between the first phase of Anglo-Iberian relations seen in chapter one, and the endgame of Anglo-Portuguese relations to be seen in later chapters. It can also be seen as a biennium of great, even violent, contrasts. Ultimately, the developments in 1941 and 1942 portended two paths: one of closer Anglo-Portuguese relations, along the lines originally dreamt up under the Alliance; the other of closer Hispano-Portuguese relations, premised on genuinely close political relations. Only one development would last the course of the War and thereafter.

1941: a year of continuity

The majority of 1941 was characterised by continued uncertainties, particularly in Hispano-Portuguese relations. These uncertainties contributed in large part to the major pre-Azores agreement between Britain and Portugal, a bilateral defence agreement in November 1941. This was not, however, a decision taken by Salazar with particular joy. Its origins lie in the circumstances created by the trilateral relationship. The Portuguese aim was to divorce Spain and Portugal strategically but bring them together politically. In fact, the inverse happened.

For 1941 demonstrated how futile attempts to divorce Spain and Portugal were strategically, given continued Spanish flirtation with belligerency and the concomitant British need to enforce the blockade. The military staff talks were a contingent decision borne of an isolation in which Spain refused co-operation and the perceived threat of American intentions

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1 Wigg, Churchill and Spain, pp. 60-61.
in the Azores finally reminded the dictator of the utility of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Nonetheless, that contingent decision marked the potential divergence of paths: a divergence that would see Spain, with the creation of the División Azul, incline ever-closer to the Axis, and Portugal, with the reluctant conclusion of a kind of formal defence pact, genuinely orientating toward the British.

However, change was afoot in London. In London, after Halifax’s demise, ‘the “radicalisation” of the Foreign Office, begun with the accession of Eden’, was to continue with the fall of R.A. Butler.2 His meeting with Björn Prytz ended his Foreign Office career. Chamberlain, Halifax, Butler; these three men had been three standard-bearers of appeasement. The first was dead; the second was in the United States; and the third was in ministerial purgatory in the education brief. Butler’s removal was particularly important for two reasons: it was the end of ministers involved with appeasement in the Foreign Office, and it robbed the Duke of Alba and Monteiro of a friendly man in high office.

In Lisbon, the significant change was the departure of Sir Walford Selby and his replacement by Sir Ronald Campbell, who had secured his reputation as Ambassador to France during the country’s disastrous collapse in May 1940.3 Like many of his contemporaries at the Foreign Office, Campbell was from a wealthy but not aristocratic family. His father had served as an Assistant Under-Secretary of State, but Ronald Campbell’s progress in the Foreign Office was his own. He was made counsellor in Paris in 1929, with a ‘perfect command of French’ and ‘many friends in official circles’.4 From there, he was promoted to become minister in Belgrade in 1935 and knighted (KCMG) in January 1936.5 In July 1939, on the eve of crisis, he was appointed ambassador in Paris and made a Privy Counsellor. In Paris, he saw the outbreak of War and became increasingly intimately involved in the increasingly desperate French planning.6 Ageing but distinguished, with a particularly distinctive gaze and wide mouth, receding hair brushed back neatly, Campbell arrived in Lisbon at the turn of 1941. On 11 January he was formally accredited in a ceremony of extraordinary pomp and circumstance,

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5 Ibid.
with Carmona and the new ambassador giving flattering speeches.\textsuperscript{7} Life in Lisbon began well: how would it continue?

If the hope had ever been that Halifax’s downfall and Campbell’s arrival would have changed the hated blockade policy, it was quickly dashed. The change in personnel presaged no change in policy. Eden explained to Monteiro that ‘this policy of blockade England has, in the West, three powerful arms […]: dominion over the Atlantic, a quasi-monopoly on shipping, and the help of the United States’.\textsuperscript{8} The spectre of inflation, which Salazar believed was intrinsically linked to the blockade, hung over Portugal like a suffocating mist.\textsuperscript{9} Inflation brought with it the risk of internal discontent: ‘the growth in prices, expectations about the future course of the war, discontent over necessities, the bad public image of rationing and the corporate system and its new organisation of working conditions, the labour movement showed signs of awaking from its long slumber’.\textsuperscript{10} The fundamental difficulty in Salazar’s foreign policy was that a bilateral solution was needed to a trilateral crisis. Yet, Portugal, as we saw in chapter one, could not on the one hand hope for political association with Spain while hoping for strategic separation.

**The axis temptation, revisited**

This was a particular difficulty in early 1941, since the atmosphere in Spain was tenser than ever. The atmosphere in Spain could not have been more different. There, the Germans were increasing the pressure to almost intolerable levels. On 8 January, Súñer told the Italian Ambassador that Spain was ready to enter the War immediately ‘if she had grain to prevent a famine’.\textsuperscript{11} On 20 January, Von Stohrer explicitly asked Franco and Súñer to enter the War. The dictator plead at length that Spain’s conduct was driven by its food situation; if Spain were to enter the War, it would starve.\textsuperscript{12} A ‘minimum subsistence level had to be provided for the life of the Spanish people; only then would entrance into the war be possible’; ‘Without bread it would have been “criminal” to start a war’.\textsuperscript{13} There was much mention of the United Kingdom

\textsuperscript{7} TNA FO 225/418, Campbell to Eden, 11 January 1941.
\textsuperscript{8} CPAMOS, Doc. 31, Monteiro to Salazar, 16 January 1941, pp. 120-127.
\textsuperscript{9} Rosas, *Portugal entre a paz e a guerra*, pp. 298-301.
\textsuperscript{10} Telo, *Portugal na II Guerra*, vol. II, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{11} DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, Von Stohrer to Berlin, Doc. 629, 8 January 1941, p. 1056.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
and the United States this regard, as the unfortunate handmaidens of necessary but unwanted
aid – but no mention of Portugal.

On 23 January, the German Ambassador went to see Franco again, arguing at length
with the dictator in a fractious meeting. Franco engaged ‘in a lengthy discourse’, listing ‘all the
long-familiar aspects characterizing his country’s economic weakness and distress’. But,
according to the German account, he again made no reference to Portugal. Indeed, the first and
only reference to Portugal in this regard was made on 27 January when Franco told the
Germans ‘that at the present moment one could no longer reckon with certainty that Portugal
would resist an English landing’.

Amidst the chaos, Hoare entered a pessimistic panic. He wrote of Súñer’s impact on
government; he was ‘the man who attempts at one and the same time to control the Foreign
Office, the Ministry of the Interior and the Falange caucus’. In doing so, he ‘never appears
to read any document’, and at times he was ‘completely elusive and could not be run to earth’. He was not deliberately malicious, Hoare alleged, he was simply unwilling ‘to accept a
situation that not only meant the acceptance of many of our demands, but also the acceptance
of economic help from us. For in accepting our help he had to admit his past miscalculations’. Tellingly, ‘General Franco and he are a partnership that cannot be broken without
liquidation’.

On 24 January, in the middle of this difficult situation, Hoare met Teotónio Pereira. He
reported to London that Teotónio Pereira had been instructed to seek an immediate meeting
with Franco to explain that the passage of any troops through Spain, presumably to Gibraltar,
would be a breach of the 1940 protocol. The Portuguese would endeavour to stave off the
very real pressure Franco was facing to enter the War or to permit German troops free run to
Gibraltar as part of Operation Felix. Teotónio Pereira’s account of the meeting was slightly
different. Hoare told Teotónio Pereira that Hitler had asked Spain to enter the War; on 12
January, Hitler had asked for the free passage of troops; now, Hitler had invited Franco to a
new meeting. Fortunately, Hoare had heard that Franco rejected the German demand for free
passage of troops based on the ‘protocol with Portugal’, and on that basis ‘repeated many times

16 TNA FO 371/26896, C486, Hoare to Foreign Office, 11 January 1941.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Preston, Franco, pp. 414-417.
that Your Excellency [Salazar] has more influence than anybody over the Generalissimo’.  

But the German documents in fact show no reference to Portugal.

Nonetheless convinced of Portugal’s importance, in February 1941, Hoare stumbled into an idea. His suggestion was that with Súñer in control, but the generals ‘now almost solidly anti-German’, the time had come for Britain to make a political gesture that would bolster the latter group. The idea that the generals were wholesale against Germany was wrong, but it may be a more opaque reference to the generals under British pay with whom Hoare was in regular contact and who were certainly anti-German. Regardless, Hoare felt that the Peninsula, the North-West of Africa, and the Atlantic were about to become very strategically important both to Britain and the United States. Therefore, ‘we should be prepared to make comprehensive proposals to Spain and Portugal for ensuring their integrity’. Along these lines, Hoare asked: ‘Is it not too fantastic to imagine that […] it is essential that we should have a kind of Munroe doctrine to cover them?’

Hoare’s bold vision was not successful. Makins noted that the letter was partly ‘written in ignorance’ of developments in Anglo-American relations, in Gibraltar, and in staff talks with Portugal. It was preferable to continue ‘along current lines’ rather than to adopt Hoare’s euphemistically ‘more ambitious suggestion’. Eden replied in less stark terms, noting that he had ‘given a great deal of thought to the position of the Iberian Peninsula in the framework of the general strategy of the war’, and the ‘importance of integrating Spain and Portugal’ into the system of anti-German defence. But he thought Hoare’s ideas were not urgent, since the Portuguese were about to participate in military staff talks in London. These talks, it was hoped, would address the issues of defence in the Iberian Peninsula and in the Azores and ‘lead to further indirect contact with the Spanish Army’. Even Salazar freely admitted at the end of February that he had no idea whether his demarché via Nicolás Franco would get through.

While Hispano-Portuguese relations were crossing into ever more uncertain territory, there were important developments in Anglo-Portuguese relations. The staff talks beginning in

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25 TNA FO 954/27A/116, Hoare to Eden, 4 February 1941.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 TNA FO 954/27A/117, Foreign Office minute on 116, 8 February 1941.
29 Ibid.
30 TNA FO 954/27A/118, Eden to Hoare, 11 February 1941.
31 Ibid.
32 TNA FO 371/26957, C3047, Campbell to Foreign Office, 27 March 1941.
March 1941 represented the most important development in Anglo-Portuguese relations since the beginning of the War. Churchill himself was intimately aware of these conversations, and somewhat, though distantly, involved in their development. He intervened at the end of February to comment that he agreed ‘in principle’, but heard ‘indifferent reports about the quality and even the trustworthiness of the delegation’, and they ought accordingly ‘not be shown anything that matters’. The Portuguese leader’s attitude was more forthcoming. Lieutenant-Colonel José Filipe de Barro Rodrigues had actually been empowered by Salazar as his man, and was therefore able to hold meaningful discussions. Despite Churchill’s stated objections, and a certain hesitancy on the part of the Chiefs of Staff, there was agreed a general ‘plan and timetable for supporting the Portuguese by a suitable force’ which would ‘have the effect of stiffening Portuguese resistance and might result in our securing bases in the Atlantic Islands’.

These initial conversations did not achieve a strictly formal agreement encompassing these plans, but they did achieve a skeletal agreement along those lines and, most importantly, provided a clear direction of travel for the close defence relations which Portugal had coveted for so long. While doubts on both sides lingered, the talks established the basis for more substantial talks to be held later in the year. But even these purely bilateral conversations could not, or would not, be separated from the Spanish question. As Campbell wrote to London:

I gave the minutes to Hoare, while he was here, to glance through and had some discussion with him on the subject. The thing which struck us both was that whilst there is a plan for Spain and a plan for Portugal there does not seem to be much relationship between the two. And it seemed to us both that they ought, so far as possible, to be linked up and co-ordinated.

Campbell and Hoare recognised the strategic inseparability of Spain and Portugal; problems would germinate from this issue of separation. The difficulty was that the British military planners had allowed the imperial to separate from the political, and the Far Eastern sphere from the European one. When the Dominions – Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South

33 These were mooted by Campbell and agreed to by the Joint Chiefs in January 1941, see: TNA CAB 121/505, (J.P. (41) 27, ‘Liaison with the Portuguese: Report by the Joint Planning Staff’, 11 January 1941.
35 TNA FO 371/26813, C1786, Downing Street to Cadogan, 24 February 1941.
36 The rest, Campbell observed, were ‘sent as camouflage’. TNA FO 371/26813, C1790, Campbell to Foreign Office, 24 February 1941.
38 Stone, Oldest Ally, pp. 169-172.
39 CAB 121/505, Campbell to Strang, 28 March 1941.
Africa – were told of the positive outcome of the talks, they were also informed that Timor was discussed only ‘in very general terms’ with hope for future discussion.\textsuperscript{40}

Hoare’s proposal, Eden’s hopes for the staff talks, and Campbell’s intervention highlighted two important constants in Anglo-Iberian relations in 1941. The first is that, in British minds, Spain and Portugal were inseparable as a single Iberian unit. Hoare and Eden disagreed over how best to keep the Peninsula neutral, but they shared the basic assumption that it would have to be kept neutral as one contiguous bloc. The second is hinted at in Eden’s remarks that Portugal would provide the means of contacting the Spanish army. Despite the lack of evidence, it was hoped or believed that Portugal was be the best conduit to an agitated and ambiguous Spain. The British knew Spain and Portugal were a single geographic unit; they hoped and acted as if they would become a single geo-political unit.

This was best summarised in a long memorandum of 21 March 1941 by Roger Makins. His memorandum put it thus: there were profound political differences between the two. ‘In Portugal 95% of the population are pro-British’, whereas in Spain, Serrano Súñer meant there was significant Axis influence and inclination at the highest levels of government.\textsuperscript{41} But: ‘In the long run Spain and Portugal will hang together, i.e. The collapse of Spanish resistance to German pressure would bring with it the collapse of Portuguese resistance and vice versa’.\textsuperscript{42}

Spain and Portugal formed a contiguous strategic unit and it was hoped that they might form a contiguous political one, too. In reality, their political relations did not mirror their geographic ties. Salazar wrote to Monteiro about Franco’s threatening meetings in Bordighera and Montpellier on the 12 and 15 of February respectively: ‘I want to say that we only know what has been published in the newspapers. Nothing more’.\textsuperscript{43} Since Súñer’s appointment, Nicolás Franco ‘does not have the same power and sadly does not represent the same value for us’.\textsuperscript{44} Salazar had ‘not been able to find out from Spain anything for certain about these two trips and conferences’, and was left to guess, by intuition and inclination, what would be discussed, what course Spain would take, and what would be the result for Portugal.\textsuperscript{45}

For the Portuguese government, the desire in early 1941, was for Spain and Portugal to form a contiguous political unit but two separate strategic units. Political fraternity would not only dampen the risk of Spanish policy affecting Portugal, possibly existentially, but it would

\textsuperscript{40} TNA CAB 121/505, Dominions Office to Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 24 November 1941.
\textsuperscript{41} TNA FO 371/26896, C2817, Memorandum by Makins, 21 March 1941.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} CPAMOS, Doc. 34, Salazar to Monteiro, 14 and 15 February 1941, pp. 144-155.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
also provide a convenient justification to the two British ambassadors, new and slightly older, who believed Salazar was Britain’s man on the Peninsula. Strategic separation would allow them to bypass the hated blockade and, at least in an ideal world, ease the inflationary pressures which now threatened political action.

Neither aim was achieved; indeed, if anything, early 1941 was characterised by Iberian strategic unity, under the yolk of the blockade, and the threat of German action – with or without Spanish acquiescence – and political disunity, with Súñer plotting a course that even Nicolás Franco could not hope either to influence or even to know intimately well. The question now was not whether strategic unity could be broken; Eden, and then Campbell and Hoare together, had effectively dashed that aim. It was whether either political unity could be achieved and, if it could not, whether in those circumstances closer Anglo-Portuguese political relations were a desirable aim.

**Looming doubts on the Peninsula**

Given that Portugal was considered essential to British aims in Spain, there was growing concern about British prestige and standing in Lisbon. In January 1941, the Foreign Office had suggested honouring Salazar with a doctorate from Britain’s most esteemed institution, Oxford. Their justification was the fear that Britain, amidst the difficulties of the blockade, was losing ground in Portugal. This generated one of the oddest spectacles in neutral Europe. Salazar was given an honorary DLitt by the University of Oxford. These honorary doctorates were largely awarded *in absentia* in the Radcliffe at Oxford, with the names of the recipients read out and duly entered into the books. Only two recipients had their doctorates conferred in person away from Oxford: António Salazar and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The affair revealed much about British political priorities in Portugal and the increasingly bizarre esteem which Salazar was held.

Professor William James Entwistle, the Chair of Spanish, was briefed in the Foreign Office in March of that year. In April, the Oxford dons made their way to Lisbon and on 26 April, Salazar was made an Oxford doctor. Surrounded by academics from Coimbra in full ecclesiastical regalia and carrying birettas, Salazar stood amongst them in unmistakable

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Oxonian purple and red silk. While all speeches at honorary degree ceremonies possess eulogising characteristics, this was amongst the most sycophantic:

Dr. Salazar seems to follow in the footsteps of the most beautiful who laid the foundations Portuguese Empire. For just as they always displayed the arts of peace, a more refined way of life, and – most importantly – true reverence for God which they have always shown to other nations, they can now show other nations the means by which the honour of our nation can be achieved, and the how the highest honour can be conveyed.

Salazar even allowed himself a little self-congratulation, paraphrasing parts of Ecclesiastes before concluding that giving science a ‘social aim’ and ‘essential morality’ were the two aims of government; ‘no merit can be justly assigned to me save that I have upheld these two conclusions’.

Campbell wrote from Lisbon that their visit had been ‘an unqualified success’; Salazar, who had ‘refused honorary degrees from several German universities’, gave ‘a reception at his private house – the first time he has ever done this’. He was thrilled, the British were thrilled, and, most importantly: ‘The Germans are livid’. He later wrote to Eden that Salazar had included a clever reference to the Western unity which tied together Great Britain and Portugal. This – in Campbell’s eyes – was a success.

This little-known and then little-understood affair had three effects. It played on Salazar’s self-conception, widely shared and acknowledged amongst British mandarins, as an intellectual. Dr Salazar was a dictator unlike other dictators. The propaganda value – accentuated by Salazar’s decision to reject similar overtures by German universities – was obvious. Yet, the propagandistic pageantry of the event did not flow in only one direction; the event served too to confirm Salazar as one of their own. He was afforded a particular social and cultural marker as a Doctor of Oxford, the alma mater of roughly half of the British elite. The degree conferred was a recognition of esteem, but also a social and class marker: Doctor Salazar is one of us. In Alexandre Moreli’s article ‘The War of Seduction’, he highlighted the ‘struggle’ to engage with the Portuguese elite, opening with the affair but then discarding it in favour of analysis from 1943 onwards.

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48 TdT EPJS/SF/002-D/4214C, 20 April 1941.
49 TNA FO 371/26811, C4658, Campbell to Eden, 5 May 1941.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 TNA FO 371/26811, C4618, Campbell to Foreign Office, 26 April 1941.
53 TNA FO 371/26811, C4658, Campbell to Eden, 5 May 1941.
While a good description of Anglo-American competitiveness, Moreli overlooks both this two-way interplay and the success of the visit.55 The two were linked: the successful event confirmed a certain vision of Salazar. This was the view espoused by Roger Makins just after the ceremony: ‘There is an essential difference between the régime of Dr. Salazar and the Nazi régime [...] Dr. Salazar’s political philosophy is far more akin to our own than to any other’.56

Salazar had acted well; he was Britain’s man in Iberia, their lynchpin to keep Spain out of the War, and their ally. Felicitas Von Peter thought the initial success was overshadowed by an ensuing debacle in which the robes were lost twice, delaying their arrival in Portugal until long after the event.57 Certainly it caused a great deal of consternation in the Foreign Office.58 But there is little in the Portuguese documentation to suggest the issue played on Salazar’s mind; instead, he was clearly thrilled, and the effect lingered for some time afterward, writing to thank the University for honour.59 The embarrassment existed – like much else in British policy – largely as an animus in policymakers’ minds.

Materially, however, Salazar was more fearful than ever for British chances of victory in the War. As the Axis position in North Africa looked ever stronger – the Italians well-entrenched in Egypt – he feared for the Portuguese Empire in Africa. He admitted as much to Campbell in a very downbeat meeting; if the British could not hold on in Egypt, it augured badly for the prized Portuguese possessions.60 Meanwhile in Spain, Súñer treated the British reverses with glee, sliding ever closer to a declaration of a break with Britain. In May, Alba underlined ‘the alarm caused amongst Spanish residents in England about the news received in the last few days’ of a potential ‘break in relations with England’.61

The perennial threat of Spain’s next move defined relations between all three states. In May, there were promising internal changes that potentially portended improvements in cross-Iberian political relations. Súñer – never officially in post – lost control of the Ministry of the

55 Moreli’s article also begins with a factual error. He says: ‘In an elaborate ceremony conducted in Latin, Oxford’s public orator, Thomas Higham, bestowed upon the Portuguese dictator, Oliveira Salazar, the insignia of the degree of “Doctor Honoris Causa” recently awarded to him by that prestigious university’. In fact, Higham as Public Orator gave the speech. The degree was conferred by J. R. H. Weaver of Trinity College. The Public Orator explains why a degree is being conferred; Weaver was representing the Vice-Chancellor and therefore conferred the degree. Entwhistle, who Moreli does not name, was there as the Alfonso XIII chair of Spanish, and probably because he had some Portuguese. Ibid., p. 654.
56 TNA FO 371/26794, Makins note on: C4781, Campbell to Eden, 1 May 1941 (Note 9 May 1941).
57 Von Peter, p. 93.
58 Ibid.
60 TNA FO 371/26794, C5034, Campbell to Foreign Office, 7 May 1941; C5133, Note by Ellis Rees, 10 May 1941.
61 AGA 82/3697 (1083), Alba to Súñer, 6 May 1941.
Interior and was replaced by the anti-Falangist Valentín Galarza. Teotónio Pereira reported with pride that ‘this choice was not Serrano’s nor to his liking’. Upon meeting Galarza, the Ambassador was struck by his warmth, by the visual contrast with Súñer’s Falangism, and by his promises to reduce attacks on Portugal in the press. In Galarza, the Portuguese appeared to have a legitimate friend in the Madrid. It is impossible to guess the influence – if any – that British funds had on this attitude.

On the other hand, the Portuguese faced the same challenges as ever, and Nicolás Franco appeared as impotent as ever. ‘I telephoned N. Franco asking him to come and see me before he left [Madrid]’, wrote Teotónio Pereira, but ‘he did not come’. Nicolás Franco showed himself cautious, even closed, feigning ignorance of live issues in Hispano-Portuguese relations: ‘I don’t know what these topics are… I don’t remember’. Reminded in no uncertain terms that Salazar had sought a meeting with Franco in January, Nicolás Franco awkwardly demurred before Teotónio Pereira said to him: ‘Don’t go to Portugal without the being able to respond to what was asked’. The two ambassador’s awkward Madrid meeting showed not only the problems in Hispano-Portuguese relations, but the feebleness of the Spanish ambassador, who was unable and unwilling to resolve them.

On the other, Franco had created the División Azul to join Germany’s fight against the Soviet Union. As Hilgarth put it to Churchill, Franco had ‘openly identified himself with a German victory’. The División Azul has attracted great attention as a major question in Spanish historiography of the Spanish Civil War. But as an object of difficulty in Hispano-Portuguese relations it has received much less interest, despite its significant impact. It put the fiercely anti-communist regime into a bind. As Monteiro put it to Colonel Egerton: ‘If Portugal, at this moment of danger, were to show itself favourable to the Russian cause – or indifferent to it – it would provide an excellent pretext for a Spanish attack’. Monteiro’s comments underline the futility of studying Portuguese policy without reference to Spanish foreign policy; they also underscored the degree to which Portuguese policy, even toward Britain, had to be shaped in the Spanish wake.

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62 Wigg, Churchill and Spain, p. 33.
64 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Wigg, Churchill and Spain, p. 36.
69 CPAMOS, Doc. 38, Monteiro to Salazar, 16 September 1941, pp. 182-189.
Portuguese difficulties: Anglo-American threats to the Azores

Politically impotent, Nicolás Franco did at least intervene in an area of great personal interest: finances. Commercial negotiations had begun following the previous year’s trilateral agreement; Portugal, with its healthy surplus of pounds sterling, proposed to Spain ‘a subvention for our needs for colonial goods, a small loan to the Spanish state for goods of that origin, stipulated by prior negotiation’. On this front, Nicolás Franco had proved a great help, ‘doing all he could so that the negotiations would not fail’. The commercial agreement, signed 1 July 1941, provided a 50-million-escudo loan to Spain for ‘copra, castor oil, palm oil, sisal, haricot beans, maize and fish oil’, with a seven-year repayment period. These commercial negotiations replaced Britain as Spain’s financier, as in the 1940 pact, with a direct bilateral financing deal.

The bilateral deal was a significant development more in terms of what it represented rather than what it achieved. The sums involved were not enormous. Firstly, however, it demonstrated that both sides had an innate preference for a bilateral deal, one not involving Great Britain. Secondly, it provided the basis for further and more significant deals – particularly the elusive political agreement. For the moment, however, the agreement remained small and purely financial.

This small if promising agreement with Spain came at a time of great difficulty for Portuguese foreign policy. While the United States were not yet formally involved in the War, Roosevelt was discussing the Azores with Churchill. The United States had proposed a friendly naval visit to both, but were violently refused by the Portuguese, allergic to any potential demonstration of American power over their territory. But the actual threat, in May 1940, was the Prime Minister. Roosevelt himself counselled caution toward the Azores, writing to Churchill that: ‘It is, of course, of utmost importance, in my judgment, that you send no expedition to either place unless Portugal is attacked or you get definite word of an immediate German attack on the Islands’. Moreover, the British should reassure the United States and Portugal that the occupation would be temporary. Churchill agreed, with a caveat: ‘should we

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70 AGA 82/6143 (2075), Folder 15.
72 AGA 82/6143 (2075), Folder 15.
73 Jiménez Redondo, ‘Bases teórico-políticas…’, p. 188.
75 Ibid.
decide to move against these islands not only would we declare that they are occupied only for
the purpose of British defence and not for permanent occupation and that we will restore
the islands to Portuguese sovereignty at the close of the war if Portugal is restored as an
independent nation’.76

Churchill’s proviso, that telling *if*, ought to remind us that his belief in Portugal at the
time and his belief in Portugal’s future were far from total. But in fact, it was the United States
which made the major, public blunder. At the end of May, Roosevelt made a loose and
unfortunate reference to the Azores.77 This perceived threat against Portuguese sovereignty
provoked an immediate and furious reaction. On 30 May, the Portuguese Legation sent an
extraordinarily wordy missive to the State Department, deploring Roosevelt’s reference to the
Azores and Cape Verde Islands in a recent fireside chat.78 An exhaustive defence of Portugal’s
foreign policy and the integrity of its Empire was contained therein. On 10 June, Hull re-
affirmed the United States’ policy – non-intervention in the Azores, respect for Portugal’s right
to self-defence, and respect for Portuguese territorial integrity.

This was insufficient for the Portuguese, who labelled it a ‘generical and vague
declaration which did not even refer individually to the very country in question’.79 When
Bianchi handed the note to Under-Secretary Welles, he was rather puzzled by the Portuguese
position, declaring that it was ‘difficult for me to understand what was implied by the
Portuguese Government’.80 A rather exasperated-sounding Welles added:

    I would, consequently, like to know quite frankly and definitely from the Minister
whether I was to understand that his Government seriously believed that any further
assurances were required from this Government that it was not in fact determined
to embark upon a policy of aggression and of despoiling Portugal of her overseas
colonies and possessions.81

76 FRUS, 1941, Vol II, Europe, Doc. 833, The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of
State, 3 May 1941. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v02/d833>. [Last
accessed: 7-10-2022].
77 DAPE, Vol. VIII, Doc. 1850, Bianchi to Salazar, 28 May 1941, p. 450; Doc. 1851, Bianchi to Salazar, 28
May 141, pp. 451-456. The latter contains Roosevelt’s speech, transcribed with some errors. On the background
of Portuguese administration in the Azores, see: Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra*, I, pp. 82-83.
78 FRUS, 1941, Vol. II, Europe, Doc. 838, Portuguese Legation to Roosevelt, 30 May 1941. Available online at:
79 FRUS, 1941, Vol. II, Europe, Doc. 841, The Portuguese Minister (Bianchi) to the Secretary of State, 13 June
1941. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v02/d841>. [Last accessed:
10-11-2022].
80 FRUS, 1941, Vol. II, Europe, Doc. 842, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles), 13 June 1941. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v02/d842>. [Last
accessed: 10-11-2022].
81 Ibid.
Roosevelt’s accidental disaster confirmed the degree of Salazar’s mistrust of the Americans and the continued primacy of the British in Portugal. Amidst American-Portuguese difficulties, there was formal agreement that the British government would be the *primus inter pares* in Portugal. As Eden put it to Halifax:

> In the course of a conversation this morning the United States Ambassador said that his government had agreed that we should deal with Portugal ourselves and that his government would remain in the background.  

Moreover, the US government accepted Britain’s trilateral economic policy; ‘the President agreed with the policy’ of spending ‘£1 million in purchasing from Portugal food which would be sent to Spain. He understood that we regarded it as a better procedure to pay Portugal than to give a loan to Spain’. On 27 June, Monteiro visited Eden, who endeavoured ‘somewhat to allay the irritation’ caused by Roosevelt’s interjection with the soothing balm of diplomatic intervention with the Americans and the assurance that ‘the United States Government did appreciate that they had caused some offence, and I knew regretted it’. ‘The trouble’, Monteiro told him, ‘was that the United States Government did not know how to treat the Portuguese Government, while His Majesty’s Government did’.

This affair revealed several critical things about Anglo-Iberian relations. Firstly, as de Meneses has explained, the Portuguese perceived the United States as a threat to their possessions. But it also revealed several other things: that Anglo-American disagreements over Portugal (while in this case relatively mild) had a much earlier genesis than has been suggested; this disagreement pre-dated US entry into the War. At this stage, however, it was clearly understood by both the British and the Americans that the British were firmly in charge of policy in Portugal. British primacy was unquestioned. The British were the interlocutors and the guarantors of Portuguese sovereignty. Or, on the latter count, they were publicly. For this policy had an air of duplicity about it, not dissimilar to Salazar and Teotónio Pereira’s machinations in Madrid. It was rather ironic that Roosevelt was being restrained in Portuguese eyes by the British government. After all, it was the British government which had designs on the Azores, and Roosevelt who was restraining Churchill.

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82 TNA FO 954/21/58, Eden to Halifax, 23 June 1941.
83 Ibid.
84 TNA FO 954/21/59, Eden to Campbell, 27 June 1941.
85 Ibid.
On the back of British suggestions, and following repeat visits by Bianchi, on 7 July Welles informed the British that Roosevelt was ‘planning to write a personal note to Dr Salazar couched in a very friendly and informal tone’. The note would ‘make clear to Dr. Salazar that this Government has never had the slightest intention of encroachment in any form upon Portuguese sovereignty over the Azores or the other Portuguese colonial possessions’. Roosevelt, writing an ‘entirely personal and informal letter’, assured Salazar of ‘the continued exercise of unimpaired and sovereign jurisdiction by the Government of Portugal over the territory of Portugal itself, over the Azores and over all Portuguese colonies’.

The imagined American intervention had, however, shaken the Portuguese leader, as well as Monteiro and Teotónio Pereira. While the blockade was proving a perennial irritant in Anglo-Portuguese relations, it was obvious – at least from Salazar’s perspective – that the British government had no designs on his territory nor his regime. The continued difficulties with Súñer, with Franco, and indeed with the whole Spanish administration, served to remind the Portuguese of the functional importance of the Alliance. It was on that basis that, in summer and autumn 1941, Britain and Portugal came to reach their closest relations since the outbreak of the War.

Questions of Peninsular security

In the context of improving bilateral relations, the importance of Portugal to British designs in Spain, and the continued uncertainty over Spanish intentions, the need for closer cooperation in the event of German action on the Peninsula was obvious to both sides. In July 1941, there was a frank exchange of views between the British Chiefs of Staff and the Salazar government. At the first round of staff talks, the British line had been to persuade ‘the Portuguese Government that the problem of Peninsula security [was] indivisible and that, if Germany entered Spain, Portuguese independence could no longer maintained on the mainland’. Knowing how unpalatable this line would prove, such a move was thought unwise.

89 Ibid.
90 FRUS, 1941, Vol. II, Europe, Doc. 846, President Roosevelt to the Portuguese President of the Council of Ministers (Salazar), 14 July 1941. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v02/d846>. Last accessed: [10-11-2022].
91 TNA CAB 65/23/6, Confidential Annex to: WM (41) 77 (4), (5). ‘Draft Telegram to Sir R. Campbell’, 10 July 1941.
by Campbell, who stated that the Portuguese would ‘assume we shall then be co-belligerents and have full use of Portuguese territory’.  

Given Portuguese sensibilities, there might have been some latitude for eschewing this view in favour of a more bilateral approach. But as missives from the MEW. revealed, that department’s hard-line ensured the two countries could and would not be separated in case of Spanish entry. Regarding trade with Portugal in case of Spanish entry, the Dominions Office suggested to the High Commissioners that ‘we should, whilst possible, consult Portuguese Government on such matters’. But the MEW. held fast that Spain and Portugal ought to be treated as one; that in case of Spanish entry, no navicerts ought to be issued to Spain, Tangier, Portugal, or even the Atlantic islands. 

Two respective binds held the British position and the Portuguese position; on the British side, the strategic inseparability of Spain and Portugal; on the Portuguese side, the jealous defence of Portuguese sovereignty under any circumstances. The Portuguese position, that British forces ought to use Portuguese territory and the government ought to retreat to the Azores only if Portugal itself were attacked, was rejected by the British chiefs of staff, who feared Gibraltar would be ‘unteachable’ while they were left ‘without any certainty’ that they would have use of the Azores instead.

In London, Monteiro was seen as ‘a good friend to this country’, but he was increasingly seen as a bad friend to his boss. The interminable staff conversations highlighted the differences between Britain and Portugal in 1941. They also threatened two ruptures: one between Britain and Portugal, the other, more serious, between Monteiro and Salazar. By August, Monteiro had become ‘exasperated with the intransigence of Salazar’ and wrote to Lisbon proposing a climb-down that would accept a middle-ground between the “pre-emptive” and “reactive” approaches favoured by both sides – a climb-down that appeared closer to the British position than his master’s position.

Unfortunately for Monteiro, his approach to Salazar came at exactly the wrong moment. Salazar became increasingly interested in the creation of a third-world force, one that resisted

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92 Ibid.  
93 TNA DO 35/1040, Dominions Office to Commissioners, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland and Southern Rhodesia, 27 September 1941.  
94 TNA DO 35/1040, to Chadwick (Colonial Office), 25 September 1941; TNA DO 35/1040 Ewart Williams to Braddock (Dublin), 15 December 1941.  
95 TNA CAB 65/23/6, Confidential Annex to: WM (41) 77 (4), (5), ‘Portuguese Atlantic Islands’, 4 August 1941.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Aires Oliveria, Armindo Monteiro, pp. 210-211.
both the uniform totalitarianism of Nazism and the insipid imperialism of the United States.\textsuperscript{98} The close affinity with Franco in this regard has not been referenced in great detail. Whereas Franco’s delusions about a third bloc have been comprehensively dismantled, Salazar’s have not.\textsuperscript{99} This was a genuine example of cross-Peninsula purpose; both men believed working with South America would create a third bloc which would also bolster their claims to and possession of colonial empires.

It was as much cross-Peninsula delusion as cross-Peninsula purpose. Franco’s misty-eyed plan, mostly institutionally drawn up by men working under Súñer’s cabal, was characteristic of his intellect.\textsuperscript{100} But Salazar suffered similar delusions not because of a lack of intellect but because of a blind spot: the Empire. In July 1941, Portugal signed an Additional Protocol on trade with Brazil which, like its political counterpart with Spain, contained significant aspirations but had scant real effect.\textsuperscript{101} While providing good political relations (‘the agreements provided evidence of a good Portuguese-Brazilian relationship, with the tacit recognition of internal political options and joint stances being adopted in relation to the world conflict’), these agreements ‘were unable to stimulate the economic forces necessary for the development of reciprocal contacts […] which remained in a passive state’.\textsuperscript{102} Spanish and Portuguese promises to work together to achieve pan-Iberoamerican unity amounted only to ‘a generic accord to maintain Hispano-Portuguese influence in the Americas. The decision did not yield anything’.\textsuperscript{103}

Salazar was capable of similar aspirational delusions to Franco but, blessed with greater intellect than his fellow dictator, recognised the real-life limits of such dreams. While he and Monteiro argued, he did implicitly recognise his Ambassador’s argument that Great Britain was essential to Portugal’s security. Hence, in September, Monteiro was authorised to agree to a second round of staff talks.\textsuperscript{104} Salazar’s hesitation about the chances of British victory lingered on, but were somewhat subdued by doubts on two other fronts: the German chances of victory in Russia following Barbarossa, and the potential belligerence of the United States. For Roosevelt’s inopportune remarks had cemented Salazar’s long-standing anti-American

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., pp. 211-213; Helena Pinto Janeiro, \textit{Salazar e Pétain: Relações Luso-Francêsas Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial (1940-1944)} (Lisbon: Edições Cosmos, 1998), pp. 113-123.
\textsuperscript{99} de Meneses, \textit{Salazar}, p. 265.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Gomez-Escalonilla, p. 310. (Footnote 169).
\textsuperscript{104} TNA CAB 121/505, Campbell to Foreign Office, 6 September 1941.
animus, reassuring him in broad terms that his old ally represented his best chance of surviving the War. As he put it to Monteiro, if the United States were to enter the War, ‘the only great power capable of a moderation or arbitration would disappear’, while ‘an English victory obtained through the United States seemed undesirable, since it would become an American victory’.  

In October, Attlee passed through Lisbon on his way to the United States. Treated to a long and expensive dinner by an unimpressed Eccles, it seems he had little to say about the regime or its dictator. More significant was Eccles’ own posting, in November, to head the MEW’s pre-emptive purchasing programme in London; while he would return in January 1942, the posting confirmed his relegation to a second tier of importance. The Anglo-Iberian agreement having been long concluded, and with Britain excluded from the spring 1941 economic negotiations, it was obvious that negotiations now belonged chiefly to the political and strategic rather than economic planes. Eden and Campbell were now, plainly, significantly more important to developments in Anglo-Portuguese relations than Eccles.

Strategic developments in Anglo-Portuguese relations were about to take a significant step forward. On 15 October: ‘The Portuguese Government agree to define in a secret agreement […] their attitude in the event of an invasion of their territory on the continent of Europe’, an agreement which would encompass strategic withdrawal ‘to another point in the national territory’. In exchange for this agreement, the Portuguese government made two requests: military supplies, particularly anti-aircraft and coastal artillery to protect Lisbon, and a loosening of the blockade for ‘certain stocks of raw materials’ necessary for domestic production of defence materials. The question of material British contribution to Portuguese defence which plagued Eccles and Selby in their dealings in 1941 would be resolved; in exchange, Salazar would climb down from his demand for material British military support to the mainland in case Portugal were attacked.

These negotiations were a marked departure from the course of diplomatic relations in 1940 in that they were bilateral. That is not to say that Spain did not factor into the equation; the central question of whether Spain would acquiesce or even join the German advance into Iberia was the essential cause of these negotiations. But unlike the previous political and

105 CPAMOS, Doc. 40(c), Salazar to Monteiro, 4 October 1941, pp. 205-214.
107 Eccles, By Safe Hand, p. 329.
economic agreements, the defence negotiations in 1941 featured Spain as a causal factor rather than as an active party. Both the continuity – Spain as an object in Anglo-Portuguese relations – and the developments – Spain moving from its place as the central actor in Anglo-Portuguese relations – outlined in this chapter’s introduction can be clearly discerned.

The negotiations of October and November, painstakingly pushed by Monteiro, led to the significant agreement that the Portuguese government would relocate to the Azores in case of an attack on Portugal, while the British would work to reinforce the islands’ defences. Implicit in the final settlement was something which, in the long term, would be much more consequential than the agreements over defences or relocation: the degree of British support for Salazar’s Estado Novo, rather than simply for Portugal. The British demonstrated their continued commitment to Salazar’s chosen form of government. After Campbell raised a slight gripe over the PVDE, Portugal’s secret police, Salazar laughed slightly and told him he had not been in post long enough to understand things perfectly:

Unfortunately, in the English Embassy […] it is thought that because England is democratic and liberal and parliamentary and the regime is anti-democratic, illiberal, and anti-parliamentary – in the Embassy it is thought that the true friends of England, the defenders of the alliance, the guarantors of Portuguese loyalty and traditional friendship, at the enemies of the Government.  

Perhaps taken aback, Campbell replied that he had not intended to criticise in broad terms; that ‘the English government had not the slightest reason to see the Government replaced. Why would they? To return to the institutions and to the men who brought the country into chaos’?

Salazar between positions of weakness and strength

Why had Salazar agreed to negotiate, when he had not done so in spring 1941? A realist assessment of the German position in Russia undoubtedly influenced this change. Tovar, the Portuguese minister in Berlin, sent a pessimistic account in September 1941: ‘there were planning errors, both psychologically and materially’, he wrote after meeting Hitler. Even as he sketched out a German victory on the continent, he admitted that this would come at much greater material cost than the Germans hoped. Monteiro latched onto this. ‘Napoleon

110 Stone, Oldest Ally, pp. 179-180.
111 CPAMOS, Doc. 40(c), Salazar to Monteiro, 4 October 1941, pp. 205-214.
112 Ibid.
113 DAPE, Vol. IX, Doc. 2491, Annexe 1, Tovar to Salazar, September 1941, pp. 466-474.
began his march on Moscow around the same time of year as Hitler began his own’, he wrote acerbically: ‘we have arrived at the 31 October and Hitler has still not breached the Kremlin’.114 Salazar was too intelligent to have missed the point. The Portuguese government saw clearly that Hitler’s advance into the Soviet Union was a doomed foray; the Spanish government were actually involved in that very same advance.

Salazar did not agree to conclude the agreement from a position of weakness, but nor did he conclude it from a position of strength. This was particularly true of the Empire, where close relations with Great Britain represented the best chance of economic renewal. Outwardly, Salazar steadfastly maintained that problems derived from the blockade. But the issue, as the British Consul-General at Luanda wrote in a report to London, was ‘not so much the loss or restriction of markets […] as the lack of shipping facilities’.115 Before the War, Portugal had used its own shipping capacity to transport colonial produce to the mainland, but was dependent on foreign shipping for transport to the rest of the world. With war, foreign shipping capacity had disappeared and its own capacity was being stretched running to the United States and Brazil and, in lieu of actual troop carriers, was occasionally used for the movement of troops.116 ‘The consequence is that even the quantities of produce for which navicerts are authorised cannot be exported’; in September 1941, there were 2,600 tonnes of coffee, 850 tonnes of beans, and 284 tonnes of rice, amongst other goods, unshipped from Angola.117

Salazar and policymakers in the Foreign Office and the MEW understood the implications of the consul’s report, intended as a briefing rather than a political missive. Animated rhetoric about the navicert system reflected a legitimate grievance that the blockade was hamstringing trade with its own colonial Empire. But if the issue was shipping, which was outside of their control, and on which count they owed Portugal nothing, then violent objections over the navicert system were much less warranted. The imperial perspective reminded contemporaries of some important elements of the Anglo-Portuguese relationship as they actually existed; they provide similarly important functional clues to historians.

The realities of Portugal’s foreign policy options; the enduringly non-committal attitude of Spain; the promise of material support; and Monteiro’s entreaties are the most likely explanation of Salazar’s change in attitude to more genuine co-operation with the British in autumn 1941. Accordingly, in October, Colonel Rodrigues was joined by an aide-de-camp,

115 TNA FO 425/418, Enclosure in: Cusden (Luanda) to Eden, 22 October 1941.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
Uva Silva, further staff talks were held.\textsuperscript{118} In November, the Portuguese delegation agreed to a concrete plan of action in case of a German attack on Portugal, particularly regarding demolitions and – crucially from the British perspective – an agreement to evacuate to the Azores in case of German invasion of Portugal.\textsuperscript{119}

**The first divergence of paths**

1941 was, in summary, the first divergence of paths between Portugal and Spain, with the former finally opting – with Salazar’s usual reticence – for formal military talks with Great Britain. He likely opted for this course as much in the absence of other options, for much of Portuguese foreign policy in 1941 was frustrated. Aiming for political accord with Spain was pointless, since Súñer relentlessly pursued his own vision of Spain’s place in the world. Aiming for strategic divorce was an equally null aim; since the MEW – largely correctly, as it happened – believed that the blockade was the essential factor keeping Spain out of the War.

As we have seen, then, through 1941, the trilateral relationship acted as a profound constraint on Salazar’s desires. It has been argued with good cause that he was not an ultra-nationalist.\textsuperscript{120} But he was an ultra-sovereignist. Spain impinged on his vision of an Estado Novo as free to act as it liked, a hope dashed again and again on the rocks of trilateral contingency. None of this, however, diminished the British belief in Salazar’s essential political trustworthiness, a fact they clearly communicated time and time again. It was in those circumstances, reluctantly, certainly much more reluctantly than his own ambassador, that he agreed to staff talks.

In reports to Madrid, Nicolás Franco highlighted Salazar’s interlocked, threefold foreign policy concerns as he saw them: the preservation of Portugal’s colonial Empire, loyalty to ‘the traditional political alliance with Great Britain’, and ‘the desire to maintain its current relations with Spain’.\textsuperscript{121} During 1941, Salazar had inclined toward the first two aims, devoid of agency of the last aim. The British had long ignored the last aim altogether, believing the Portuguese Empire to be weak, even dispensable, and wholly separate from Britain’s Iberian aims. But at the very end of 1941, imperial misadventure would destroy this misapprehension.

\textsuperscript{118} TNA CAB 121/505, C.O.S. (41) 361, Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 20 October 1941
\textsuperscript{119} TNA CAB 121/505, C.O.S. (41) 663, ‘Anglo-Portuguese Conversations’, 11 November 1941.
\textsuperscript{120} Gallagher, Portugal, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{121} AGA (10) 073.002, Leg. 6650, N. Franco to M.A.E., 1 November 1941; N. Franco to M.A.E., 10 November 1941.
A watershed crisis thousands of miles from the Iberia would jeopardise Anglo-Portuguese relations and threaten every one of Salazar’s threefold foreign policy aims. The reverberations of that crisis would have tangible and lasting consequences in all three spheres: Hispano-Portuguese, Anglo-Iberian, and inter-imperial.

The Timor crisis

In December 1941, Anglo-Portuguese relations exploded. A mixed contingent of Dutch and Australian troops occupied Portuguese Timor with British blessing but without Portuguese permission. It was believed by Allied commanders that Portugal could not hold her own territory against potential Japanese aggression. The invasion immediately provoked a crisis in Anglo-Portuguese relations and became an issue of singular importance in bilateral relations. Timor threatened Portugal’s entire policy of neutrality to the extent that it seriously considered a break with Great Britain. Even the sanguine official British history, duty-bound to avoid hyperbole, called the affair a ‘crisis’.

Despite the extraordinary consequences of the invasion, scholars have tended to focus on the either the build-up to the invasion or the immediate crisis that it provoked. Nicholas Tarling’s account of Britain and Portugal during the invasion, for example, focuses on the diplomatic wrangling in the months before the December invasion. That is also true of Robert Lee’s account, more attuned to the intelligence-gathering process that took place across 1941 and led to the decision to occupy the territory. Likewise, Glyn Stone’s account of the crisis focuses in particular on the Foreign Office’s attitude to Timor, primarily in late 1941 and with some consideration of events in very early 1942. Arguably the most detailed English-language overview of the Timor case, which considers the case right up until the re-imposition of Portuguese sovereignty, dates from 1946.

There is no reliable study that traces the long legacy of the Allied invasion of Timor using both British and Portuguese sources. As a result, sizeable gaps remain in our understanding of the overall, rather than purely short-term, impact of the event. In particular,

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125 Stone, Oldest Ally, pp. 182-199.
the consequences of the Timor invasion are poorly understood. In the short-to-medium term, three questions stand out. How did it impact relations with Britain, and British desires for Portugal’s role on the Peninsula? How did the fallout affect Hispano-Portuguese relations? In other words – how did the global affect the European; how did the Far East impact Anglo-Iberian relations? In the longer-term, two questions are outstanding. What were the lasting effects of the invasion? How did it impact Anglo-Portuguese inter-imperial relations?

The invasion of Portuguese Timor should be seen as a short-term crisis which conditioned two major changes directly relevant to this thesis. It conditioned a major change in Hispano-Portuguese relations in the medium term and a major change in Anglo-Portuguese inter-imperial relations in the long term. The Timor crisis, which has hitherto been situated as a siloed event belonging to the Far Eastern theatre, ought to be seen as an integral part of changing Anglo-Iberian relations with a long reverberation through and past 1945.

In the medium term, Salazar’s utter disgust with the invasion conditioned Spanish overtures to meet, for leading Spanish figures – particularly Súñer – sensed an opportunity to wean Portugal from her traditional ally. In the long term, the crisis had a profound impact on British understanding of Portugal’s self-conception. As a result of the Timor affair, for the first time in the twentieth century, the British understood Portugal as a country whose Empire was to be taken seriously. In other words, the Timor question was the conduit through which the Portuguese Empire came to be given serious consideration both in London and in turn in Washington.

Timor was not an issue that began and ended in early 1942. It lasted well past that year and intersected with practically every major question in Anglo-Portuguese relations thereafter. This chapter is thus particularly focused on the intersection of the Timor question with apparently separate affairs: particularly Britain’s policy toward Spain and the Azores, nominally purely European affairs. No other issue at any point in the War threatened such a rupture in Anglo-Portuguese relations. It occurred more than 8,000 miles from both countries. The whole saga demonstrates that it cannot be understood in isolation: Timor was intrinsically linked with the Anglo-Portuguese relationship in Europe, and therefore to Britain’s policy of keeping Spain neutral. By 1945, both Britain and America understood that the part could not be separated from the whole: Portugal could not be understood, nor negotiated with, without reference to her Empire.
The pre-War situation

By the late 1930s, the British were aware of three strategic risks in Timor: Portugal would be unable to hold off a potential attack on Timor; the Japanese were likely to invade in the case of war; and the Dutch and the Australians, fearful of a Japanese foothold on their doorstep, were therefore interested in the territory. The Australian interest was so acute that there were active discussions in Canberra about taking control of the territory. This much was strongly implied by the Counsel at Batavia when Major A. E. Neves da Fountoura, then Governor-General of Portuguese Timor, visited in April 1939.\(^1\) Short of formal control, the Australian government also maintained an acute interest in Timor’s unused oil resources, hoping that such an economic foothold would keep Japan from establishing a strong presence in the colony.\(^2\)

While potentially interested, however, the colony’s small size and trivial economic profile meant that at the beginning of 1939, neither the British nor the Australians stationed even a consul in Dili – it was thus the only Portuguese territory never to have had official British representation.\(^3\) Not until spring 1941 was a special envoy – C. H. Archer, an Old Asia Hand working as a British Consul between China and Japan – sent to Timor.\(^4\) This mission was the subject of an excellent account by Robert Lee, who termed the situation in 1941 a ‘crisis in a backwater’.\(^5\) Archer was struck by the perceived backwardness of the colony: ‘electricity was available from late dusk until midnight, but it was very weak and continually failed’ and ‘the water supply had not recovered from the damage done by the floods of 1939 and was fearful’.\(^6\) The administration possessed characteristics that were at once harsh and ineffective.\(^7\) The entire colony was defended by ‘300 soldiers, only 15 of whom were European’, with so few guns that Archer could count them all; ‘90% of the small arms ammunition was believed to have perished’.\(^8\)

This view of Timor as an economic and political backwater was not limited to Britain or Australia. Even an article in the *Boletim Geral das Colónias* presented Timor as ‘very detached from the metropole, not only by real geographic distance, but by the sparsity and

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\(^1\) TNA DO 35/557/7, F126/59, Fitzmaurice to Foreign Office, 14 April 1939.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) The only other territory not to have a British representative was São Tomé, where the Vice-Consulate was shuttered in 1926. See the records in: TNA FO 375/9.
\(^4\) Lee, ‘Crisis in a Backwater’, p. 182.
\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Ibid., p. 184.
\(^8\) Ibid., p. 185.
expense of communications’. Its total imports in the first quarter of 1940 were 2.313 million escudos, just under £22,000, whilst is exports were 1.935 million, just over £18,000. In 1940 and 1941, Portugal faced three inter-locking problems in this distant territory. To begin with, if war broke out, it could not muster the defensive strength to protect Timor. Secondly, even if its shortcomings in defensive capacity were somehow resolved, defending Timor against Japan would necessarily involve a war which would see Macau lost.

The British, appraised of the military reality in the Far East, recognised the manifest weakness of the Portuguese situation. They were not alone in this. The Australians, less than four hundred miles from Timor, were greatly concerned by any weak spot in a defensive European chain. The Dutch, who controlled the West of the island as part of the larger Netherlands East Indies, felt likewise. The three thus formed an uneasy triumvirate in the Malay Archipelago, all concerned with the manifest shortcomings of the Portuguese situation. As one British aide summarised, ‘the safety of Macao and Timor depends ultimately on our ability to hold our own against Japan in the event of War’, ‘since the Portuguese are themselves in no position to defend their possessions’.

Given the British felt that Timor was utterly insecure in Portuguese hands, it is surprising that the British failed to communicate clearly their concerns explicitly to the Portuguese. The Portuguese government had agreed an airline route with the Japanese government, which raised hackles in London and led to Eden calling in Monteiro. While the British, Australian, and Dutch objections to the new air route were obvious, those allies were less forthcoming about wider strategic doubts concerning Portugal’s ability to defend her colony. Eden summoned Monteiro on 4 November to discuss the Timor situation. He was clear about the risk of ‘Japanese plans in the Far East’ and ‘the possibility of hostile action against Timor’. However, his attitude toward the Portuguese themselves was somewhat euphemistic.

136 Ibid. As discussed in chapter one, Sterling gradually weakened against the escudo throughout 1940. This calculation is taken from the quoted rates at the end of March 1940, when the first quarter of the Portuguese fiscal year would have ended. The escudo was 106-107 to the pound. ‘Money market’, The Times, 48475, 28 March 1940, p 14.
137 TNA FO 371/27792, F494, note on Telegram, 20 January 1941.
139 DAPE, Vol. IX, Doc. 2510, Monteiro to Salazar, 5 November 1941, p. 494. The missive – which reports a press article concerning the Dutch refusal to export oil to Portuguese Timor less it be used by Japanese planes – embodies the euphemistic Dutch attitude.
140 TNA FO 954/21/69, Eden to Campbell, 4 November 1941.
Instead of directly criticising the Portuguese military shortcomings – as was happening in London at the time – Eden told Monteiro that he ‘had been considering whether it was likely that the Portuguese Government, under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, would ask for our help in such an eventuality’.\textsuperscript{141} A similar report given to Lisbon by the Dutch that they were ‘somewhat concerned at the developments’ around Timor elicited a reply that Lisbon ‘saw no reason for their anxiety’.\textsuperscript{142} Even accounting for the legalese of such reports, neither the British nor the Dutch seemed capable of making explicit reference to Portuguese defensive problems. Indeed, the British in particular appeared to be making an open inquiry about Portuguese plans, rather than intimating that Britain was planning to intervene.

By early December, the Allies had a direct military intervention planned and ready to go. A Foreign Office memorandum, circulated to Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff, laid bare the situation: ‘Dutch forces are standing by to enter Portuguese Timor’.\textsuperscript{143} The British were endeavouring to secure agreement in Lisbon under the terms of the Alliance, but there were clear limits to the extent to which they sought active Portuguese consent: ‘It is hoped the Portuguese government will agree to, or at least acquiesce in, this procedure and that they will send instructions to the Governor of Timor to co-operate, or at least acquiesce in, the occupation of Dilli’.\textsuperscript{144}

The memorandum, seen at the highest levels of government, was a crystal-clear account of the Foreign Office’s thoughts.\textsuperscript{145} As we have seen in chapter one, Britain had agreed with Portugal a plan in case of German overrunning of the Peninsula, a plan that would see the government evacuate to Madeira or the Azores, the destruction of certain key installations in Portugal, and British use of the Cape Verde islands and Azores; ‘But the successful execution of the plan naturally depends on our keeping the confidence of the Portuguese government’.\textsuperscript{146} Timor was not a mere clod washed away from the diplomatic main, but a crucial part of Britain’s wider war efforts in a global sense:

It is quite likely that if Allied forces were to occupy Portuguese Timor in the face of Portuguese objections, the position achieved as a result of the staff

\textsuperscript{141} TNA FO 954/21/69, Eden to Campbell, 4 November 1941.
\textsuperscript{142} TNA FO 954/21/70, Eden to Sir Nevile Bland (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Netherlands Government in Exile, London), 17 November 1941.
\textsuperscript{143} TNA CAB 80/32, COS 41 (741), ‘Portuguese Timor: Memorandum by the Foreign Office’, 11 December 1941.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid; Discussion by Chiefs of Staff in: CAB 79/16/21, 13 December 1941.
\textsuperscript{146} TNA CAB 80/32, COS 41 (741), ‘Portuguese Timor: Memorandum by the Foreign Office’, 11 December 1941.
conversations would be impaired and our plans in the Atlantic in the event of an occupation of Spain and Portugal would be jeopardised.\textsuperscript{147}

In light of these potential consequences, the central decision might become one of ‘the use of Portuguese Timor immediately, or the use of the Portuguese Atlantic islands and the implementation of the Alliance in the future’.\textsuperscript{148} Successful co-operation in Timor would ‘set an important precedent’, but by contrast, ‘if we ride rough shod over the Portuguese in this matter we may not only prejudice future co-operation, but may cause some immediate political reactions in Lisbon which would be unfavourable to our interests in the Iberian Peninsula’.\textsuperscript{149}

In short, invading Timor threatened not only a diplomatic spat, but the rock on which British diplomacy was built in Iberia. If Timor were to be invaded without Portuguese consent, there was a clear risk to Britain’s strategy in Spain, carrying with it the acute danger of the loss of Gibraltar and access to the Mediterranean. Timor was therefore an existential threat to British diplomatic efforts in Iberia.

\textit{The beginning of a crisis}

The Foreign Office’s clear-eyed analysis of the situation, however, was effectively for nothing. The Australian-Dutch force, with British military blessing, precipitated a crisis by landing on 19 December. It is arguable that the crisis owed to the diffuse nature of policymaking, which, along with the fractiously difficult nature of a tripartite military action, allowed a schism on the issue to occur in the first place. The Portuguese governor, Manuel de Abreu Ferreira de Carvalho, protested to no effect; he had no troops to mount a counterattack. Salazar sat in São Bento furiously sending missives off to all parties.\textsuperscript{150} The ‘unjustifiable violation’ was the subject of complaints to Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands, though Monteiro himself maintained a somewhat more conciliatory tone.\textsuperscript{151} In Lisbon, the domestic reaction was even stronger. Even De Meneses, who gives little credence to the idea of a particularly serious crisis, admitted that Salazar was furious, and that fury cascaded down, with other regime notables even ‘more extreme in their statements’.\textsuperscript{152}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[147]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[148]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[149]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[150]{Summarised in an intelligence report in: TNA PREM 3/361/2 129, Eden to Halifax, 24 December 1941.}
\footnotetext[151]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[152]{De Meneses, \textit{Salazar}, pp. 270-271.}
\end{footnotes}
The Foreign Office wrote again to the Chiefs of Staff on the Timor case. The memorandum of 11 December had, the Foreign Office noted dryly, been ‘overtaken by events’. Britain now faced a ‘serious crisis in our relations with Portugal’ and Salazar had made ‘a veiled threat of a rupture of relations’. The Chiefs were effectively asked, in light of events, to choose whether the military necessity of Dutch and Australian presence or continued good relations with Portugal were more important. As Glyn Stone put it, ‘the dilemma confronting the British authorities in late December 1941 was essentially one of priorities. Should the Atlantic and Iberian, or the south western pacific dimension prevail?’. This was the Gordian knot at the heart of the question. Stone’s study, which ends in 1941, leaves this question unanswered, but the answer which would have a serious long-term effect on Anglo-Portuguese relations and thus the Empire’s survival and standing.

The Foreign Office itself offered five considerations in order to answer the question. The first was by far the longest: if no agreement were reached ‘our position in the Atlantic islands […] our communications through Lisbon, and our vital supplies from Portugal (wolfram and cork) will at once be endangered’, as would any future ‘prospect of an unopposed occupation of the Atlantic islands’. Moreover, in their second point they again drove home the importance of Portugal to Britain’s Iberian aims: ‘a deterioration of Anglo-Portuguese relations will inevitably lead to increased Axis influence in Portugal and a corresponding deterioration of our relations with Spain’. There was a growing awareness in the Foreign Office that Britain simply could not act without damaging its position in Europe, particularly in Spain. Keeping Spain out of the Axis grip depended on settling the Timor question favourably for Portugal.

Not totally blind to the opposite reaction, they noted in points three and four that the Portuguese counter-proposals may be so unacceptable to Australia that they would ‘throw further strain on our relations with the Dominion’ and Portuguese troops alone may not ‘seriously oppose a Japanese landing’. Finally, the memorandum posited, ‘the worst result’ would be damaging relations with Portugal whilst not defending Timor. In the end, it was this worst result that came dangerously close to becoming reality.

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153 TNA CAB 80/33, COS 42 (4), ‘Portuguese Timor’, Foreign Office to Secretary, 1 January 1941.
155 Ibid.
156 Stone, Oldest Ally, p. 194.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
The long half-life

While it is widely known that the Timor invasion provoked a crisis in Anglo-Portuguese relations, it is in fact the consequences and legacy of the invasion which changed these relations in the long-term. However, existing studies have in general not considered the sum of these effects, either in the moment or in the longer-term. The subsequent Japanese invasion has usually been seen as the end of the affair. This sense of an ending is logical, especially from a military perspective. It also stopped the diplomatic wrangling over what to do in Timor in the moment, since with the Japanese in control of the island nothing could be done. But the Timor question did not stop with the Japanese invasion; it did not cease to be an issue in 1941. Instead, it went on to have a much longer-lasting and fundamental impact on Anglo-Portuguese relations and the Portuguese Empire itself.

The Japanese invasion heralded a new phase of diplomatic wrangling, one based on considerations and problems that first reared their heads during the Allied invasion. These were: the inseparability of Timor from general relations with Portugal; by extension, the inseparability of the Atlantic sphere from the Far Eastern one; the vital importance of Empire to Salazar in a general sense; and the re-discovery of the importance of Portuguese neutrality to British aims, particularly keeping Spain out of the War. All of these problems would, after the Japanese invasion of Timor, engender important changes in British policy toward Portugal, with important consequences for both wartime relations and the eventual post-War settlement.

To begin with, we must note that at the beginning of 1942, the Timor case had done serious damage to Anglo-Portuguese relations. Salazar’s hurt feelings were communicated to Eden when Monteiro visited him on New Year’s Day 1942: ‘Portugal had once been a great imperial Power’; ‘every Portuguese was conscious of this’ and an action that appeared as ‘an act of charity’ was therefore particularly galling to Portuguese sensibilities. But he also hinted at a communication problem between the two governments: ‘Dr. Monteiro opined that our case had been put in quite the right way to the Portuguese government’. Indeed, while the Ambassador himself was conscious of the fact that Timor

161 Stone, Oldest Ally, p. 199.
162 TNA FO 954/21/76, Eden to Campbell, 1 January 1942.
163 Ibid.
formed an important part of British defences, especially in Australia, that case had not been clearly explained.\textsuperscript{164} The failure in communications had the most acute impact on relations with Salazar, but it was by no means limited to him alone, nor even to the upper echelons of Portuguese society. This was communicated by Campbell, writing to Eden on 7 January. He was unsparing about the nature of Portuguese colonialism and the apparent backwardness of Portuguese rule: ‘The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, reaffirmed in 1899, remained, however, to guarantee the possession of substantial colonies to this backward people’.\textsuperscript{165} Feeling that this trust had been broken, ‘the Timor affair [had] now supervened to shake the confidence of many educated Portuguese in the trustworthiness of Great Britain’.\textsuperscript{166}

**Timor and the European theatre**

It was almost certainly as a result of this significant disruption in Anglo-Portuguese relations that there was a significant development in Hispano-Portuguese disruptions. In early 1942, Franco became interested in Portugal, a development apparently of his own initiative. António Telo believed that the fuel crisis and the German reverses in Russia motivated this interest.\textsuperscript{167} Along with US pressure on the economy, Spain was obliged ‘to rethink its relations with Portugal’.\textsuperscript{168} Javier Tusell believed that the entry of the US changed Súñer’s inclination.\textsuperscript{169} Teotónio Pereira, operating on informed guesswork, concluded that ‘it wasn’t the “Axis” who advised the meeting’, and indeed they feared that closer Iberian co-operation would eventually ‘run away from them’.\textsuperscript{170} Instead, it was Franco who wanted the meeting, ‘since Spanish policy [was] at a critical moment’; getting closer to Portugal may have been propitious for a pivot toward neutrality.\textsuperscript{171}

Both Telo’s explanation, which pays little heed to the Spanish domestic situation, and Tusell’s explanation, which overlooks the role of Great Britain, are excessively beholden to later changes in Spanish foreign policy which were not yet discernible in Spanish conduct. Only by studying Anglo-Spanish-Portuguese in the round – including the global imperial

\textsuperscript{164} TNA FO 954/21/76, Eden to Campbell, 1 January 1942.
\textsuperscript{165} TNA PREM 3/361/2, sheet 101, Campbell to Eden, 2 January 1942.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{169} Tusell, *Franco, España*, pp. 304-305.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
dimension – does this change in the European theatre makes sense. Teotónio Pereira’s uncertainty underlines that we may never find a decisive answer as to why the meeting was proposed at the beginning of 1942. However, the nadir of Anglo-Portuguese relations correlated exactly with the time of Franco and Súñer’s proposal, a correlation that defies mere coincidence.

When Súñer finally suggested a meeting in January 1942, Teotónio Pereira somewhat coldly remarked that he had suggested a meeting with Franco more than a year before. In the absence of any trustworthy account of the Seville meeting – even Salazar’s diary barely sketches an outline of the event – we are forced to treat it as a black box, considering what went in and what went out. From the outset, there was disagreement over the form the meeting would take. As Teotónio Pereira wrote: ‘I perceived that Serrano was left a little perplexed when I said to him: no banquets, no receptions, nor events with the authorities or the diplomatic corps. The President comes to talks to Franco and nothing more’. Naturally, the British were pleased, since such a meeting was the natural outcome of a belief that Portugal could, and indeed would, moderate Spain. When Teotónio Pereira went to see Hoare, he ‘seemed delighted and told me it was the last opportunity that would be offered to Spain to change its course’.

From a British perspective, 1942 thus began with the contradictory currents engendered by, on the one hand, chaos and division in Anglo-Portuguese relations caused by the invasion of Timor, and on the other, the desired improvement in Hispano-Portuguese relations which might persuade Franco away from the Axis cause. Amidst this contradiction, a split emerged. Lower-level officials worked to ameliorate the situation, establishing a plan for the Allied troops to be replaced by a Portuguese contingent. At the highest levels, however, discussions were less sympathetic to Portugal. Churchill himself maintained an acute interest in the issue, but his papers show the depth of the disconnection between Portugal and Britain on the issue. On 19 January he fired off a bitter, acerbic missive to Eden: ‘The Portuguese are obviously not capable of protecting their neutrality, and Timor is a key-point’. Churchill himself did not seem to quite yet grasp the potential diplomatic fallout of the invasion, nor did he for the moment link it to British policy elsewhere. ‘The military security of Timor’ took precedence,

\[173\] Salazar, Diários de Salazar: amongst the entries for January and February, many undoubtedly refer to the plans for the meeting, but few related explicitly to the discussion.
\[176\] TNA PREM 3/361/2 112, Personal Minute from Churchill to Eden, 19 January 1942.
‘regardless of the effects produced on Portuguese pride’. In light of Portugal’s military shortcomings, even if the Portuguese troops arrived, the Allied forces would not withdraw.

For Downing Street, the defence of Timor in order to protect the Dutch East Indies and Australia outweighed the hurt feelings of the Portuguese. In Lisbon, meanwhile, Nicolás Franco sensed a changing mood centred around the Timor affair, sending reports to Madrid of unexpected seditious propaganda and the hostility of the Lisbon dailies. Likewise, on the ground in Lisbon, Campbell saw things differently and began a period of endeavouring to change in British policy. The problem for the British was not that occupation would merely hurt Portuguese pride; continued occupation ran the risk of fundamentally destabilising Anglo-Portuguese relations, and thus the neutrality of the Peninsula. The problem for the British was:

[...] one of balance of advantage. We have to safeguard our strategic interests in the Far East without endangering our relations with Portugal to the point where this would react on our strategic interests in the Atlantic and North Africa.

Campbell made the patient case that any action in the colonial sphere threatened a reaction on the Iberian Peninsula or the Atlantic Islands. That was the heart of Anglo-Portuguese relations. Portugal was more than willing to combine its imperial possessions and its strategic position astride the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. But this was not, or at least not yet, how London appeared to understand it. Campbell bemoaned the fact that ‘no indication’ had been given by the Foreign Office ‘that the matter was being considered from this wider as well as from the purely Far Eastern aspect’. But when he visited London in mid-January 1942, the issue was finally taken up by the Chiefs of Staff, who agreed that continued Allied occupation of Timor ‘would not justify, from the point of view of the war as a whole, the risk of a rupture in our relations with Portugal’. With this wider view – European and global – now in mind, the Chiefs suggested agreeing a Portuguese re-occupation, at which point Allied troops would withdraw.

Campbell was pleased with this agreement, but was nonetheless clear-eyed about the challenges ahead. He held on to a lingering fear that the Allies would not, after all, depart when the Portuguese arrived. He feared this so strongly that he wrote bluntly to Eden. Salazar was a

177 TNA PREM 3/361/2 112, Personal Minute from Churchill to Eden, 19 January 1942.
178 AGA (10) 073.002 (Embajada de España en Lisboa) 6.651, 23/4, N. Franco to M.A.E., 17 January 1942.
179 TNA FO 954/21/77, Campbell to Eden, 23 January 1942. Also in: TNA CAB 66/21/27.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
‘strange man’ but ‘the only man in Portugal capable of uniting the country behind him’. The British risked chaos if they upset him, particularly as regards Spain. Therefore, ‘if, from the general strategic aspect the local situation is held to be paramount, well and good. But do not let us be deluded into thinking that, having called Dr. Salazar to order once, we could get away with it a second time’. 

There was little sign, however, of any general improvement in relations. As Pedro Aires Oliveira noted, in the first few months of 1942, ‘feeling that the behaviour of Great Britain over the Timor case conferred upon him a kind of moral superiority over his ally’, Salazar used Timor to ‘score points’ over war contraband, the blockade, and wolfram trading with Germany. As we saw briefly in chapter one, the Timor issue bubbled alongside the two long-standing grievances in Anglo-Portuguese relations: wolfram, which excised the British, and the blockade, which excised the Portuguese.

The Timor issue remained a sore point in Anglo-Portuguese relations. For the Estado Novo and above all for the people of Timor, bad had thus begun; worse remained behind. On 20 February, Japanese forces landed on Timor, beginning an occupation that would last until 1945. The Timorese people now faced the misery of Japanese occupation only months after an Allied invasion. Lisbon faced a new diplomatic battle with Japan, which, on account of the precarious Portuguese position in Macau, it could not afford to upset.

But the affair – not yet over, but rather on a hiatus – had already engendered a significant change. By the end of January, the British Chiefs of Staff understood a point which has hitherto been neglected by historians: Portugal, the European nation which it was hoped would keep Spain neutral, could not be separated from Portugal, the self-defined pluri-continental Empire. Developments in the global, imperial sphere had impinged on Britain’s strategic aims in the Peninsula. Timor was not simply a sui generis case, detached from the diplomatic main, but a Far Eastern part of a much wider set of relations. The two spheres, it was finally understood, could not be separated from one another. This fact had been impressed on Campbell who in turn impressed it on the Chiefs of Staff and Eden and Churchill. The legacy of that impression of inseparability would, in the long run, creating lasting change in Anglo-Portuguese relations.

If the Japanese invasion meant that the question of Allied occupation was a moot point, it did not appear immediately to improve Anglo-Portuguese relations. Whilst the Timor

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182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
issue did not disappear in 1942, the problem was that Salazar had essentially no leverage to secure a favourable outcome. Under Japanese occupation, information from the colony was sporadic, patchy, and not entirely reliable. In May 1942, the Australians sought David Ross, who had been appointed as the de facto Australian-British consul in Timor in 1941, for a forthcoming diplomatic prisoner exchange with the Japanese. A London mandarin mused: ‘We have no idea what may have become of the Australian representative, Mr. Ross. He may well be engaged in guerrilla fighting in the hills’. Meanwhile, around half of the some 500 Portuguese on Timor were under Australian protection in Australia, and Portugal was – somewhat reluctantly – paying through their Consul for their upkeep. Sparrow Force, the Australian contingent, was successfully continuing guerrilla warfare on the island, but had lost effective control of Dili. In May, probably hoping to cut the Australian lines of communication, Portugal lost its telegraph link to the country; Timor went completely dark. Diplomatic attention returned, once again, to the Iberian Peninsula. But it was obvious that imperial questions could not be so easily ignored again in the future.

Peninsula purpose?

On 11 February 1942, Franco and Salazar met for the first time in Seville. The few photos that exist of the event seem to paint a stiff and formal atmosphere: surrounded by their entourages, there is Salazar in his English-style three-piece suit, complete with overcoat and bowler hat, and Franco, dressed to the nines in his military uniform. The contrast could not be more obvious. But what was actually discussed is much harder to ascertain, and the documentary evidence is scant. To illustrate the uncertainty, one only needs to look at the meeting from the perspective of the two leaders’ biographers. Paul Preston argued that Franco used the meeting as an attempt to draw Portugal into a position of Spanish influence at the expense of the British and the Allied cause more generally. Felipe Ribeiro De Meneses, meanwhile, believed the meeting to be ‘a lot less sinister than Preston paint[ed] it’, with the

185 TNA FO 371/31741 F3817, Evatt to Eden, 18 May 1942.
188 This situation did not change. By late 1944, Salazar had become so desperate that he was highlighting reports on Timor from Spanish newspapers. ‘Australia quiere comprar Timor’, Mundo, 3 December 1944 in: PT/TT/AOS/CO/UL-10A, ‘Noticias sobre Timor’, sheet 584.
189 AGA 33/F/03304, Folder 16, ‘Franco: Oliveira Salazar (Entrevistas)’.
190 Preston, Franco, p. 427.
time taken up discussing issues of mutual interest including navicerts, offering a defensive pact only in case of British invasion, which was politely declined.\textsuperscript{191} The lack of further evidence, beyond a twice-filtered missive sent from von Stohrer in Madrid to Berlin, accentuates the air of mystery about the meeting.

In a similar vein, there was very little press coverage of the event on the Spanish side and ambiguous coverage in Portugal. The \textit{Diário da Manhã} ran a front-page piece titled ‘O Encontro De Sevilhá’, but the photo was of Nicolás Franco, Salazar, Súñer, and Teotónio Pereira – sans Franco.\textsuperscript{192} In Spain, \textit{Arriba} made no mention of the reunion, unusual for a state meeting, leading instead with ‘Singapore has been conquered’ and a report of the 52-hour overrun of 30,000 British imperial troops.\textsuperscript{193} In fact, this declaration was premature. It was not until 13 February that \textit{Arriba} acknowledged the meeting: ‘Generalíssimo Franco and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serrano Súñer, have met in Seville with the head of the Portuguese Government, Oliveira Salazar’.\textsuperscript{194} Ismael Herraiz, the special correspondent, led with ‘Spiritual Union of the Iberian Peninsula’.\textsuperscript{195}

Not until 14 February could the paper bring itself to file an editorial on the meeting, even then rather mutely running: ‘Hispano-Portuguese dialogue’.\textsuperscript{196} While the attention of the world had been on Seville, there was no need to deal with boring minutiae such as the discussions themselves or their consequences.\textsuperscript{197} In fact \textit{Arriba} forged clever silence into a common Iberian trait: ‘Parsimony is one of the virtues of the Caudillo’; Salazar ‘makes silence one of the arts of prudence’.\textsuperscript{198} The Portuguese press was warmer, and such warmth was not unnoticed in Madrid.\textsuperscript{199} Even there, however, the warmth of words apparently exchanged could not be supported by photographic evidence. They usually opted for their portraits side by side, or the photo of Nicolás Franco, Salazar, Súñer, and Teotónio Pereira all together.\textsuperscript{200}

In summary, there is little to suggest that Seville went badly, but there is nothing to suggest it went well in a way that caused fundamental and immediate change in Hispano-Luso relations. There are nonetheless two important reasons why the meeting was important, despite

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\textsuperscript{191} De Meneses, \textit{Salazar}, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{192} AGA 82/3686 (1079), \textit{Diário da Manhã}, ‘O Encontro De Sevilhá’, Saturday 14 February 1942, No. 27, 303, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{193} BNE, REVmicro/232, \textit{Arriba}, 895, 12 February 1942.
\textsuperscript{194} BNE, REVmicro/232, \textit{Arriba}, 896, 13 February 1942.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} BNE, REVmicro/232, \textit{Arriba}, 897, 14 February 1942.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
its apparent limited successes. Firstly, the 1942 meeting was a détente of a sort. It represented the first time that the two heads of state had met in person, and only the second time in his life that Salazar had travelled abroad. Secondly, though there was no concrete agreement, as we shall see, military and economic agreements followed relatively soon thereafter.

Meanwhile, the Allies watched on, fascinated by the meeting but adrift from any appraisal. The American Secretary of State, Hull, wrote to the American chargé Beaulac on 18 February: ‘The Department has been disappointed in not receiving a more thorough appraisal, for example, of the significance of the recent meeting in Seville’. Beaulac finally saw Súñer on 4 March, who told him that the meeting had been under consideration for some time, but ‘that Spain requested the meeting because there had been rumors circulating for some weeks that the United States was planning a military attempt against the Azores’. Clearly untrue, the State Department would be left disappointed and in the dark about the cause or outcome of the meeting.

This was a slightly unhappy conclusion for the curious Americans, but for the British it was a more profound disappointment. Hoare, ‘who certainly heard the description of the meeting given by Súñer through the deciphering of German telegrams’, was supremely disappointed by the meeting, and began acting ‘cold and distant’ toward Pereira. He had probably heard that Salazar had hardly come across as pro-British at all, instead opting for a hard neutrality that favoured neither Britain nor Germany. For a moment, Hoare was forced to confront head-on the idea that Salazar was not the ally he imagined him to be. Probably this was compounded by the frustration of uncertainty; at least some of his information was actively incorrect. He dubiously recalled in his autobiography that ‘when the Caudillo met Salazar in Seville, it was Franco who did the talking, and did it in his native Gallego that Salazar could understand’. More compelling, based on a search of documentary evidence, is Xesús Alonso Montero’s assertion that Franco never spoke, and probably did not know, Galician. That

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204 Hoare, Ambassador on a Special Mission, p. 141. This is repeated in: Armero, p. 63.
205 Xesús Alonso Montero, ‘Falou Franco, algunha vez, en galego?’, La Voz de Galicia, 27 July 2019. Available online at: <https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/opinion/2019/07/27/falou-franco-algunha-vez-galego/0003_201907G27P18993.htm>. [Last accessed: 10-11-2022]. Much more likely is that Salazar spoke Spanish. Serrano Súñer, who did not speak Portuguese, recalled a meeting with Salazar much later in life in which they were the only two people, save for Salazar’s housekeeper, in the entire house. It is therefore much
Hoare felt confident enough to make the assertion, and repeat it in print, indicates the weaknesses of his sources.

If Hoare felt frustrated that Salazar was not, in fact, the useful ally of the British but the relentless mercurial defender of his own interests, worse was to come. In Lisbon, Campbell had heard, probably deliberately, ‘from a good independent source’ that ‘economic matters’ dominated. 206 Salazar was probably behind the new demands presented to the British by the Portuguese:

> Facts presented from the Spanish side during examination of the problem of overseas supplies are stated to have led Dr. Salazar to conclude that Spain, despite her Axis leanings, gets on the whole better treatment at the hands of His Majesty’s Government than is accorded to Portugal, the ancient ally. 207

Writing from Madrid, Hoare vehemently protested against that idea, arguing ‘that the facts to the contrary are so obvious that no-one could ignore them’. 208 The protest was worth nothing. Campbell wrote again on February 27: the Portuguese ‘did not take my hint’ and ‘seem to have got it in their heads’ that sending a delegation, as Spain had done, would clear up their economic grievances, especially with regards to the ongoing blockade. 209 Campbell worried that, in the eventuality the Portuguese trip secured compromises, ‘the influence of His Majesty’s Embassy would henceforth be diminished not only in economic but perhaps by rebound in political matters’. 210 In March, Colonel Wylie Fernandes arrived in London, engaging officials at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Foreign Office. The first meeting between the Spanish and Portuguese heads of state had not provided the British with a welcome buttressing of Spanish neutrality, but another slowly unfolding headache brought on by renewed Portuguese feelings of inequity.

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206 TNA FO 371/31164, C1748, Campbell to F.O., 16 February 1942.
207 Ibid.
208 TNA FO 371/31164, C1881, Hoare to F.O., 17 February 1942.
209 TNA FO 371/31164, C2227, Campbell to F.O., 27 February 1942.
210 TNA FO 371/31164, C2403, Campbell to F.O., 1 March 1942.
Entropy in Anglo-Portuguese relations

These developments collided with Salazar’s particularly draconian reaction to the discovery and subsequent breaking-up of the Special Operations Executive ring in February and March. All this only furthered the great rise in tensions in Anglo-Portuguese relations in spring 1942, with Timor the cause and Salazar’s tempestuous reaction fuelling the fire. There were some signs of softening. He spoke again to the National Assembly on 21 February, pinning blame on the Allies whilst cautiously and partially accepting the Japanese position. There were signs that, at least, he was moderating his position, conceding that Britain had accepted the Portuguese right to protest, and had endeavoured to find an agreement acceptable to both the Netherlands and Australia and to Portugal. But for Salazar’s half-hearted attempts at amelioration, the daily outbursts of indignant outrage in the Portuguese press continued unabated. The situation for Campbell, for perhaps the first and only time in the War, came to resemble that of Hoare in Madrid: a diplomatic interloper in an unwelcoming land.

Monteiro wrote bluntly to Salazar, painting a bleak portrait of the impression in London. Chief amongst Portugal’s problems in Britain was: ‘our reaction to the incidents in Timor’, along with ‘the mystery of what was discussed in the conversations at Seville’, including ‘the threatening discourse of General Franco’. Those factors had intertwined to create a feeling of hostility and mistrust: ‘I cannot hide from Y. E. that the popular atmosphere toward us is not one of great sympathy nor of confidence’.

Relations with Spain, however, appeared to have been put on an altogether different plane by the first Franco-Salazar meeting. Though it took some time to coalesce, undoubtedly the meeting caused a change in the tone of Hispano-Portuguese relations. Once the meeting was over, there was no high-level contact between the two states until 23 March, when Súñer met Pereira in Madrid. Pereira gave Súñera letter from Salazar and helped him read it; Súñer’s reaction strongly implied that it was the first exchange of impressions since the event. As Pereira retold it:

211 Wylie, “‘An Amateur Learns His Job’”, pp. 452-453.
212 Marques Guedes, A Aliança Inglesa (Lisboa: Editorial Enciclopédia, 1943), pp. 530-533. In this section of the book, Guedes extensively quotes Salazar directly, offering little more than abridgement and occasional commentary.
213 AGA (10) 073.002 (Embajada de España en Lisboa) 6.651, 23/4, N. Franco to M.A.E., 24 February 1942.
214 CPAMOS, Doc. 48, Monteiro to Salazar, 31 March 42, pp. 247-259.
215 Ibid.
From the first few lines I could see it had made a big impression on him. He was silent a minute and asked:
- So Dr. Salazar returned from Seville well disposed?
- [Disposed in] the best possible way, with very favourable impressions.
- Well, you can be sure that I was deeply impressed to have met him.216

When Pereira met Franco a week later on 31 March, the Spanish general, now assured of the meeting’s success, ‘received me with great friendliness and more naturally than usual’.217 The meat of Franco’s conversation: talk of threats to Portugal, threats to Spain, and his old obsession of masonry all made an appearance, but there seemed for the first time to be a recognition of the similarity of Spain’s and Portugal’s circumstances.218 At a dinner on the Day of Victory in Spain, for the first time Pereira was seated next to Franco, who then called him for one-to-one conversation, later joined by Súñer. ‘Ostensibly he did not talk to the German Ambassador’ nor any other Germans or Italians; ‘everyone would thus know that good relations continue with Portugal, and in a special way’.219 It is true that little concrete progress was made in Hispano-Portuguese relations as a result of the Seville meeting. However, it is also true that the direction of travel had changed. The Seville meeting inaugurated the circumstances in which rapprochement might be possible; dramatic changes in Spain and North Africa would soon act as the trigger.

**Change in Spain**

It would take a profound change in Spanish domestic politics to concretely alter Hispano-Portuguese relations, and with it the trilateral relationship.220 That came in the form of the Begoña attack, ‘the most serious internal crisis faced by Franco […] possibly in the entire course of the dictatorship’.221 The crisis was caused when the *Falange* decided to attack monarchist and traditionalist generals attending a memorial mass for Carlist fallen in Begoña, near Bilbao, on 12 August 1942. Juan José Domínguez Muñoz aimed to kill Monarchist generals including the Minister of the Army, General José Varela. More broadly, the aim was to weaken the traditionalists and create a Falangist ascendancy within the government.

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218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
221 Ibid, p. 466.
The attack was met a ‘deathly silence’ in the Spanish press, but it provoked an enormous crisis for Franco, who needed to punish the Falange without upsetting the balance of his upper echelons. Varela himself was dismayed by the press silence, writing to General Alfredo Kindelán, Captain-General in Catalonia, ‘to give [him] the news directly’. The press crisis belied a profound shock to Francoist Spain’s body politic; Varela and other generals pounced, attempting to use it as an opportunity to consolidate their power and reduce the Falange’s influence. Ultimately, both the Falangist’s attempt to keep the issue under wraps and the traditionalists’ attempt to rob the Falange of their influence were to be unsuccessful.

The post-Begoña reshuffle was carried out ‘following his [Franco’s] famous law of compensations’ to keep the Falange, Monarchy, and military in equal positions of power. Thus, Franco’s decision was focused on internal, not external politics. Having overplayed his hand, Varela, along with the monarchist Minister of Government, Valentin Galarza, was dismissed from government. So too was the Falange’s éminence grise, Serrano Súñer. Despite Franco’s changes being motivated by nothing more than pure internal political consideration, Súñer’s fall had profound consequences for Spain’s foreign policy over the course of the War. The vehemence with which Arriba insisted that ‘domestically and externally that substitutions of a few people in Government or Party posts does not produce nor can produce the slightest variation in internal or international politics’ only underlined that change was afoot.

Hispano-Portuguese political rapprochement was greatly aided when Serrano Súñer, always overtly pro-Axis, was replaced by General Francisco Gómez-Jordana Sousa, always a realist. Súñer himself was never explicitly anti-Portugal, bar apparent outbursts in Germany and to various Germans. Indeed, as we have seen, he was rather taken with Salazar himself. Rather, his departure was significant because it dampened pro-Axis sentiment in foreign policy: ‘Although Franco did not intend to realise any change in his foreign policy, General Jordana had a personal posture that leaned toward neutrality […] Jordana drove Spanish foreign policy toward strict neutrality’. Even if unintentional on Franco’s part, designed only to balance his cabinet, Jordana’s arrival began a new phase in Spanish foreign policy.

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223 Kindelán, La verdad de…, Varela to Kindelán, undated, pp. 204-205.
224 Preston, Franco, pp. 467-468.
226 BNE REVmicro/232, Arriba, 1069, 4 September 1942.
Moreover, alongside these general changes, Jordana was to some degree a Lusophile. It is difficult to say if this was a genuine fondness for Portugal, or if it simply stemmed from a political philosophy that recognised that the two countries faced an extremely similar situation. Teotónio Pereira wrote to Salazar on 16 September, having spoken with General Vigon: ‘he said to me that his impression was that with Jordana, our things will start to run better’.229 That conveyed a sense of positive change without, necessarily, a strong sense of pro-Lisbon sentiment. But when Pereira met Jordana in person around a week later, that sentiment did emerge, with Jordana assuring him personally that the Spanish government’s new position, published in 22 September 1942, was very good for the Portuguese.230

The changing of the guard both sped up the process of détente with the Allies begun under Franco in early 1942 and altered its forward trajectory. The Anglo-Allied ambassadors seemed to think Jordana pro-Allied. Carlton Hayes, the American Ambassador, found him ‘courteous, dignified and very friendly’, and ‘of course much easier to talk to than his predecessor’.231 Hoare believed his appointment showed that ‘providence had certainly intervened in our favour’, whilst others including Yencken perceived at least some opportunity a more collaborative relationship with Spain.232 Jordana’s appointment, the result of the culmination of internal Spanish regime wrangles spilling out into the open, caused some change of direction in Allied-Spanish relations and would, in time, build Hispano-Portuguese relations anew.

**Operation Torch**

The other major change in the War, important from a global perspective and particularly important in Iberia, was Operation Torch. Torch was the codename for the Allied landing in North Africa, designed to drive out Vichy France from North Africa, Morocco and Algeria. A major military operation happening in such close proximity to Spain and Portugal, and with the aim of capturing a permanent foothold there, was naturally the cause of great unease on both sides. Broadly speaking, there were threats to both. On the one hand, there was the threat of non-compliance or even Axis facilitation by the Iberian regimes, especially Spain. David

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Messenger went as far as to say Torch ‘depended upon Spain’ as much as on Vichy non-resistance.\textsuperscript{233} On the other, there was the threat of military action against the regimes by the Allies. The potential tinderbox of these actions led to decisions being taken which further down the line would prove crucial in Britain’s relationship with the regimes. The success of Torch would also prove vital in changing the Hispano-Portuguese relationship.

The scale of uncertainty about the Spanish reaction was obvious, both from the considerable attention Spain received in the months leading up to Torch and the subsequent actions adopted by the Allies. The minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff demonstrated the intense military concern about Spain jeopardising Torch.\textsuperscript{234} The volume of British intelligence operations in Spain, often transited through Portugal, increased exponentially.\textsuperscript{235} Spanish Morocco was no less serious a risk. The Joint Staffs had given General Eisenhower ‘complete discretion as to what action was to be taken in the event of Spanish advance into French Morocco’.\textsuperscript{236} This was significant insofar as it removed the cautious political calculations surrounding Spain; its wording, namely ‘what action’, strongly implied action would, rather than simply could, be taken.\textsuperscript{237} Whether Backbone was strictly theoretical, in the sense that its enactment was never likely, or theoretical by posterity, in the sense that it was simply never enacted, is hard to say. The fact that its planning was left in situ, with Eisenhower stating that ‘no relaxation could be allowed’ until 31 January 1943 at the earliest, suggests it was the latter.\textsuperscript{238} The fact that it was drawn up demonstrates the profound uncertainty over Spanish intentions; the fact it remained in place demonstrates the extent of mistrust toward Spain even as the risk of belligerency subsided.

The scale of uncertainty about Spanish intentions and the profound fear that Spain would scupper Operation Torch explain the generous provisions made toward the Iberian dictatorships in November 1942. The military threat was in keeping with the previous British policy of experimenting with both carrot and stick. Indeed, it was its direct descendent, and shows the extent to which American policy ploughed in the British furrow. The carrot, in November 1942 as in general, proved to have a more significant impact on both Spain and

\textsuperscript{234} TNA CAB 79/58/14, Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 29 October 1942.
\textsuperscript{235} Smyth, ‘Screening “Torch”’, pp. 336-337
\textsuperscript{236} TNA CAB 79/58/25, Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Operation “Torch”, 7 November 1942. This reflected Eisenhower’s deliberate near-total control of the operation, including over different branches of the military. See: Charles E. Kirkpatrick, ‘Joint Planning for Operation Torch’, \textit{Parameters}, 21 (1991), 73-85 (pp. 79-80).
\textsuperscript{237} TNA CAB 79/58/25, Operation “Torch”, 7 November 1942.
\textsuperscript{238} TNA CAB 79/25/5, Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee, 5 January 1943.
Portugal. On 4 November 1942, President Roosevelt wrote to Franco (addressed as ‘General’) and General Carmona (addressed as ‘President’). His message was simple: Torch was not a threat to the regimes, and neither were the Allies.

There were subtle differences in the assurances given to Madrid and Lisbon. In the opening salvo, Madrid was told of a ‘powerful American Military Force to the assistance of the French possessions in North Africa’; Lisbon was told rather more tactfully that for ‘the assistance of the friendly French possessions in North Africa’, ‘a strong army of the United States’ was being sent. The Portuguese were also invited to consider the danger of Axis occupation in North Africa as ‘an inherent danger to the defences of the Western Hemisphere’. These were more than semantic differences are reflected the appreciably less strained relations with Portugal compared to Spain, and Portugal’s budding membership of the slightly nebulous but not altogether unimportant “West”.

The fundamental assurances, however, were the same. The Spanish were assured that ‘these moves are in no shape or manner directed against the government or people of Spain, or Spanish Morocco, or Rio De Oro, or Spanish Islands’; ‘Spain has nothing to fear from the United Nations’. The Portuguese were assured that the operation ‘presages in no manner whatsoever a move against the people or government of Portugal or against any of Portugal’s continental or island possessions’. In short, there was for the first time an explicit guarantee that the Anglo-American Allies did not intend to move against the regimes, politically or territorially.

On 8 November 1942, Torch began. A three-pronged attack under Eisenhower’s control, it achieved most of its major objectives quickly. By 10 November, Italian and German troops were massing in Tunisia, aware of the fight to come. Torch had been a major success. In Spain, it had an immediate effect. It galvanised the most pro-Axis forces – Asensio pushed to join Germans. A more mainstream effect was to persuade waverers of the superiority of Allied military force. El Alamein, in fact a part of the Western Desert campaign in Egypt though fought more or less concurrently, ‘was a singularly important win for Britain, not least with Spanish doubters’. As Preston put it, ‘by the time that the proposal of Asensio, Girón

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239 TNA FO 954/21/139, Foreign Office to Madrid and Lisbon, 4 November 1942.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid.
245 Ibid.
246 Wigg, Churchill and Spain, p. 60.
247 Ibid.; See also: Preston, Franco, pp. 477-478.
and Arrese for an early declaration of war on the Axis side was on the cabinet agenda, Allied successes were so spectacular as to inhibit any Spanish thoughts of independent hostile action’.  

In sum, Torch effected three crucial changes in Spain. Firstly, the changing of the guard in Spain had changed the regime’s internal make-up. Serrano Súñer’s departure had been significant, though ‘Churchill did not apparently grasp the significance’. Secondly, for the first time, the regime had been given direct assurances about its future security, and Allied intentions – or lack thereof – in Iberia. Finally, in their first major joint operation, the Allies had been successful. They had captured their objectives, demonstrated their military might, and secured important strategic footholds. After Torch, Allied policy changed ‘from being a policy of defence to another offensive aimed at eliminating German influence’. Spain henceforth receded irrevocably as a major strategic risk.

The direct assurances were just as significant for Portugal, if not more so. Regime security, and geographic security, was a short-term boon for the Spanish, especially in their ability to hang on to Morocco. For the Portuguese, geographic security implied an American acquiescence toward maintaining the Portuguese Empire whole. That was, as we will see in a later chapter, an important harbinger of Allied attitudes toward Portugal’s colonies. In the short-term, it also disarmed any residual fear that the Allies would necessarily seek regime change in Spain. This was yet another factor responsible for changing the Spanish outlook.

The success of Torch coupled with the regime developments in Spain was the cause of the change in inter-Iberian relations in 1942. It was Jordana’s visit to Portugal in December 1942 that marked the culmination of these Hispano-Portuguese relations. Curiously, this meeting is overlooked by most historians, even though Jordana’s December visit to Lisbon was well-documented and, unlike Seville, provided visible concrete outcomes. Jordana was motivated by his own belief in Spanish neutrality, but the proximate cause was the Axis reverses following Torch. He admitted to Pereira in November that he ‘thought the war lost for the Germans’. Pereira in turn asked Jordana what he thought ‘of a common declaration about

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249 Wigg, *Churchill and Spain*, p. 56.
our position toward the belligerent parties’. Although the idea was not taken up, it was equally not rejected out of hand, and the two ‘agreed to stay in constant contact’.

As in Seville, it was Spanish reconsideration that prompted the meeting. That reconsideration was almost certainly secret, limited to ‘the three of us’ (Pereira, Salazar and Jordana) and Franco himself, who considered the meeting ‘indispensable’. The meeting was arranged in such secrecy owing to the febrile atmosphere of mistrust between Jordana, and perhaps Franco himself, seeking rapprochement with Portugal, and the Falangist and pro-Axis members of government. On 9 November 1942, Pereira had telegraphed Salazar, subsequently writing in a letter: ‘I did not want to go further in the telegram because Jordana himself asked me to use it with the utmost caution’. As talks progressed, Nicolás Franco, the man who had signed the 1939 Hispano-Portuguese Treaty, was kept in the dark.

A full plan was drawn up for a five-day visit from the 18-23 December 1942: Jordana and Salazar would spend the four days, 19-22 December, together. In amongst official meetings, there were trips to Cascais (19), Sintra (20), the theatre (20), sightseeing trips around Lisbon (21), the countryside (22), and various dinners that straddled official engagements and pleasure. A large Spanish delegation was brought, too, with Jordana joined by at least twelve Spanish officials. The crowning of the trip was the signing of the Iberian Pact. This concrete step benefited both sides. Spain gave ‘an obvious wink toward the Allies’ that its non-belligerence was permanent and that its policy was not Axis-serving, but self-serving. Portugal could draw ‘into a tacit pact that united the two countries without the need for rigid commitments’.

In effect, the Pact was a formalisation by Spain that it was pivoting toward a stricter neutrality and away from the Axis. Jordana made this clear very publicly. In a speech at the Palace of Belém, the Minister eulogised Portugal: ‘Nothing could make us more grateful than to make clear how once again Portugal, loyal to its glorious history, today attracts the approving looks of the world’ for its neutrality, with Spain and Portugal now together as ‘a serene region.

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254 Ibid.
258 AGA 82/3689 (1081), Folder One, ‘Anticipo del Programa del Viaje Oficial’.
259 Ibid. ‘Lista de Personas que componen la comitiva del Señor Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores en su viaje a Portugal’.
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
where the waves of passion which flood the world today cannot reach’. 263 In a speech at Sintra immediately after the signing, Jordana praised the Iberian Bloc as ‘a new entity [which] has been created for the world, capable of acting in international politics utterly efficiently and beneficially’. 264

Unlike the long and uncertain wait that followed Seville, Salazar reached out immediately to Jordana by telegram to echo the ‘sentiments of great friendliness and admiration the Portuguese people for Your Excellency and for the Great Spain’. 265 In Madrid, he seemed content to attach himself to the success as if it were his own. 266 Salazar was content. For Portugal, which from a political standpoint had long followed such a policy, the Pact was a victory which ensured its own security against either Axis or Spanish aggression. Salazar wrote to Jordana: ‘I trust in the excellent results understanding and confident friendship of the two countries’. 267

In contrast to the muted domestic reception of the Seville meeting, the Jordana-Salazar meetings were covered extensively in the press. Arriba’s weekly supplement on 18 December 1942 had a full front-page spread, a painting of the Armada at Lisbon. This was followed by 16 full pages, each one on Portugal: ‘Organisation of the Portuguese Youth’; ‘Mission of the Peninsula’ by the Portuguese propaganda chief Antonio Ferro; a biography of Salazar. 268 On page seven, ‘Portugal and her Empire’ by Manuel Murias had a print in Spanish of ‘Portugal is not a small country’. 269 El Alcazár led simply with the headline ‘HISPANOLUSITANA’ on 21 December. 270

The British reaction demonstrated that the effect of the meeting had been to confirm, almost by chance, their biases about Portugal. Pereira had revealed the hollowness of such attitudes when he had met Hoare on 10 December. Hoare went on about Portuguese successes vis-à-vis Spanish policy; Pereira commented that ‘I suppose he knew nothing but still thought it positive’. 271 After the Jordana-Salazar meeting, Hoare visited Pereira again on 24 December. ‘He was very well disposed’, full of ‘congratulations right from the start’. 272 British political policy toward Portugal had been declared a success based on nothing more than changes in

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263 AGA 82/3689 (1081), ‘Discurso del Señor Ministro de A.E. En el Palacio de Belem’.
264 AGA 82/3689 (1081) ‘Discurso del Señor Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores en el Palacio de Cintra’.
265 AGA 82/3689 (1081) Telegram, Salazar to Jordana, 24 December 1942.
266 Tussell, Franco, España, pp. 372-373.
267 Ibid.
268 AGA 82/3689 (1081), Folder two, copy of Arriba weekly supplement, 18 December 1942.
269 Ibid.
270 AGA 82/3689 (1081), Folder three, cutting from El Alcazár, 21 December 1942.
271 CPTPOS, Doc. 52, Teotónio Pereira to Salazar, 10 December 1942, pp. 278-279.
272 CPTPOS, Doc. 53, Teotónio Pereira to Salazar, 27 December 1942, pp. 280-283.
Spanish internal politics and Operation Torch, neither of which involved Portugal. Portugal still reaped the rewards.

Unlike the British, the Americans understood that the Spanish, and not the Portuguese, were essentially in charge of cross-Iberian rapprochement. On 22 September, Hayes wrote that ‘very significant and favorable to us is the emphasis on solidarity with Portugal coming so closely after the Portuguese Government’s statement of moral solidarity with Brazil upon the latter’s entry into the war’. Similar information was given directly to Roosevelt, again with an emphasis on the changed internal Spanish circumstances as the driver of Hispano-Portuguese engagement. The American assessment was more accurate. Rapprochement did not stem from Portuguese strength over Spain, but was instead caused by the slow evolution of Spanish foreign policy toward realism. However, Jordana’s visit did formalise a renewed, and altogether more serious, commitment by the Spanish not to draw the Iberian Peninsula into conflict. Portuguese consent, for the first time, had become a realistic break on Spanish designs.

In conclusion, there are several factors that we should reiterate in explaining why Hispano-Portuguese relations took until 1942 to change, why they changed at that precise moment, and the importance of that change. Firstly, it is important to underscore that the Hispano-Portuguese relationship was, from 1939 until 1942, distant and distrustful. The two heads of state were in an incredibly similar, even shared, situation, but never once met. Madrid is a similar distance from both Lisbon and Hendaye; Franco only visited the latter. At times, especially under the malign influence of Serrano Súñer, the Spanish regime was openly dismissive and critical of Portugal, most seriously in the Berlin meeting in and in the press in February 1941. All of this meant Salazar’s favoured policy of meeting Franco went unrealised for two and half years of the War.

In 1942, several factors altered this. Allied economic pressure and the ebbing of Súñer’s influence led to the notable but inconsequential meeting of February 1942. It was notable that the two heads of state met, and at least avoided open disagreement on the major issues. It was inconsequential insofar as avoiding disagreement did not exactly lead to agreement, per se. February 1942 can be interpreted as a first step or a false start. At any rate, Franco’s internal machinations as a result of Begoña, and the stunning military success of Torch, were genuinely

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revolutionary for cross-border relations. After 1942, Portugal and Spain did embark on a common path, cemented by Jordana’s signing of the Iberian Pact in December 1942. Finally, the two regimes had intertwined. The intertwining had come late, at a high price for the British in particular, who had endlessly rewarded the Portuguese in search of that rapprochement. Ironically, by the time it came in 1942, it was because of the Spanish, not the Portuguese.

In sum, Hispano-Portuguese rapprochement was to some extent based on mutual weakness. The weaker and more isolated the states became, the more fervent their rapprochement became. Despite three years of the same overall boundaries in international circumstances – namely, totalitarian neutrality during war – and the much-vaunted shared history, geography, and culture, Spain’s self-belief meant Franco simply saw no need to consult with Salazar. This reflected a wider pattern in which Franco was unable to reconcile a grand vision of Spain’s political strength and Spain’s material circumstances. When Franco reconciled himself with Salazar in 1942, he had definitely opted for the latter.
Chapter Three: The Great Divergence, 1943-1945

Salazar began 1943 as if nothing had happened; reading before midnight, meeting to discuss agriculture at 9:30 the next day.¹ The uncertainties and ambiguities which had plagued Hispano-Portuguese relations since the beginning of the Second World War had significantly diminished. The Iberian Bloc had secured Portugal’s position vis-à-vis Spain and changed, subtly though eventually definitively, Spain’s orientation toward the War. The Bloc had, moreover, crowned a British policy which, as we saw in chapter one, was in the main mistaken and, as we saw in chapter two, came to be a success through a mix of internal Spanish politics and Anglo-American military might. The Torch landings had given both dictators a vision of the world to come.

In 1943, these visions would crystallise. The German capitulation in Tunisia would end the campaign in North Africa; two months later, the landings in Sicily would show the Anglo-American Allies capable of striking Europe. In June 1944, Rome fell; in July 1944, there were Allied troops in France; by December they had taken it. The steady drum-beat of Allied victory wore on. For Salazar, the question until 1942 had been how to triangulate for survival while appearing to accommodate the British. For Franco, it had been the degree of co-operation with the Axis. For both, these questions were now consigned to the past. Now the shared question was how to adjust for future survival.

Between 1943 and 1945, each of the three states faced variations of the same two interlocked questions: what would the post-War settlement look like in Iberia? What was the best course of action to achieve a favourable outcome? For the British state, the question was no longer how to keep Iberia out of the War; it was what to do with Spain and Portugal when it was over. For Spain, the question was not whether to join the Axis, but the extent of co-operation with each side. For Portugal, the question was how best to navigate changed but newly dangerous, Allied-dominated waters. The trilateral relationship from 1943 until 1945 was characterised by the way in which each of the three states recognised these questions, and the way in which they dealt with them.

Accordingly, Anglo-Iberian relations between 1943 and 1945 were defined by the way that the two Iberian dictatorships attempted to answer these two questions and to plot their respective courses. Their contrasting answers meant that almost as soon as they had come

¹ Salazar, Diários de Salazar, 31 December 1942; 1 January 1943.
together, the two countries underwent a major international divergence. Put simply, Salazar foresaw the answer to the first question more clearly, and therefore inclined his state to answer it in a much more satisfactory way. Moreover, he understood the need to stake a definitively imperial claim on Allied interests and resources, a claim he staked definitively and successfully. Franco and too many of his ministers could not answer the first question; the second question was therefore moot until it was too late. Genuine ideological differences intermingled with changed strategic visions in the metropole as in the colonies. This led, in autumn 1943, to a reversal in British eyes: where once Salazar had been forced to act by Franco, perhaps now Franco would be hemmed in by Salazar.

This led to a definitive split between the trajectories of the two dictatorships. From then onwards, the question for Salazar was not how to survive with Spain, but how to secure the best possible terms for his own regime’s participation in the post-War settlement. In understanding the risk, Salazar opted finally and definitively for an agreement for the Azores. In this respect, the trilateral relationship functioned for the first and only time the other way around: with Jordana translating the Anglo-Portuguese agreement for Nazi Germany. Historically understood as a definitive break with the previous form of Portugal’s neutrality, the agreement was in fact a new iteration of Portugal’s existing policy of outward allyship with the minimum political work, updated for the new wartime circumstances. At the same time, the new risk of comparison emerged: where Spain went, for example, on the wolfram trade, the Portuguese regime was now obliged to follow. This question of comparative connection provides both a framework for understanding the precedents for both Portugal and Spain’s radically different places in the post-War world.

**Signs of change**

In January 1943, a new German Ambassador, Hans-Adolf von Moltke, presented his credentials in Madrid. Like his predecessor, he was a career diplomat; unlike his predecessor, he was of solidly Prussian stock and a more convinced Nazi. Despite the success of Torch, it was not yet widely believed in Spain that an Allied victory was inevitable. This view was not limited to Franco. It was widely believed in the MAE that British aversion to Russia would cause them to sue for peace with Germany, particularly if it protected their Empire.

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3 AGA 82/4395 (1371), M.A.E. to chargé d’affairs, Spanish Embassy, London, 4 February 1943.
There were, however, developments in Spanish foreign policy. Beginning in February, the foreign minister made repeat visits to see Hoare, with a frequency that would have been unthinkable just a year ago.⁴ The nominal reason for these visits was to press for peace talks and an armistice, an old idea of Franco’s given new life and urgency by his new doubts about the German war effort.⁵ Such efforts were futile, and achieved nothing except to frustrate Eden, who resented the posturing. Similar approaches were made to the United States, where the Madrid government would apparently act as intermediary. The Argentine Ambassador’s reporting of a conversation with the Romanian Ambassador, in which it was suggested that ‘Hitler is a changed man’, all recounted to Hayes, gives some idea of the almost comic complexity of these approaches.⁶

Though this approach would prove patently unsatisfactory, both to the United Kingdom and the United States, that Jordana attempted it at all reveals that he did understand Spain’s changed position. According to Wigg, Franco himself was behind them.⁷ Whether this is true, Jordana at the very least had his blessing to make these approaches. The question was whether these approaches would develop into something more helpful for the international litmus test that both regimes were about to face. In March, Churchill gave a speech at Mansion House: ‘I believe myself to be what is called a good European’, he said, ‘and deem it a noble task to take part in reviving the fertile genius and in restoring the true greatness of Europe’.⁸ These good Europeans would work together ‘under a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations’ and also, in Europe, ‘a Council of Europe’.⁹ Would the regimes of Spain and Portugal be ‘good Europeans’, according to Churchill’s loose definition? What would they need to do to get there? And what would happen if they were not?

In this respect, Portuguese foreign policy was now presented with a conundrum. Before the “Iberian Bloc”, as we have seen, Portugal could make a claim that its diplomacy in Spain rendered it a good European nation. Now, with that task apparently complete, would it still be included in that club? Uncertainty about this question was one possible cause for the British showing limited interest in alternatives to the Estado Novo in the spring of 1943. As in Spain, the object of their attention was not the democrats but the monarchists. Unlike in Spain, they

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⁴ Wigg, Churchill and Spain, p. 67.
⁵ See despatches in: FO 371/34810; FO 371/34811, C4345, Hoare to F.O., 17 April 1943, inter alia.
⁷ Wigg, Churchill and Spain, p. 67.
were not overtly enthusiastic. Campbell believed the movement was supported only by ‘ancient Monarchist families and certain uninfluential sectors of the extreme right’. Characteristically, Churchill had lunched with Monteiro and accidentally launched a defence of limited monarchy while speaking ‘warmly of Dom Manuel’, the Portuguese pretender. But his more substantial dalliance came when the Minister, John Balfour, was obliged to attend dinner with Princess Filippa of Bragança in April 1943. Possessing a certain Waugh-esque literary style, Balfour dined with characters including ‘a loutish middle-aged man, who spoke nothing but Portuguese’, ‘an apple-cheeked, white-haired lady’, and ‘a tumble-down old courtier’.

After dinner he was left to ‘hobnob’ with Princess Filippa of Bragança, sister of the pretender, and was beguiled by her intelligence and good conversation. She was keen to ‘steep herself in the Portuguese atmosphere’ (she spoke Portuguese with a ‘Central European inflection’) to support her brother’s claim, but was ‘woefully ignorant of the entire lack of popular enthusiasm’ for monarchy. Campbell’s, Balfour’s, and even Churchill’s encounters with the monarchists show that the British were not entirely ignorant of alternative to the incumbent regime. They were aware of another world, even if they were not explicitly interested in it. Dalliances were always brief, sometimes accidental, and never amounted to systematic interest. But they represented a degree of threat for the Salazar regime at a time when leading British figures were beginning to think about questions of post-War legitimacy.

Across the border, the same questions of post-War legitimacy dominated British interest, though with markedly more potency and urgency. Some figures in the regime upped their criticisms of the German war effort. Kindelán, ‘elderly, tired, and altogether lacking in pep’, told Sir Frederick Edward-Collins, Flag Officer in Gibraltar, that Germany ‘was in no position to open a new front in Iberia’, that its Air Force was so stretched an offensive in Russia was impossible, and that the Allies should take Tunisia ‘within three weeks’. Questions about the monarchy, the regime’s future, and Franco himself swirled about almost daily in London, Madrid, and even Washington. In addition to the peace approaches, Jordana changed tack and made a direct approach about the post-War settlement. While framed as suggestions, they clearly also constituted a form of enquiry. Roberts explained that British policy had been set

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10 TNA FO 371/34707, C4222, Note by Campbell, 17 April 1943.
11 TNA FO 371/34707, C4736, Strang to Campbell, 29 April 1943.
12 TNA FO 371/34707, C5165, J. Balfour, Conversation with Princess Filippa of Bragança, 2 May 1943.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 TNA FO 371/34811, C4382, Chief of H.Q. Command, Gibraltar to British Embassy, Madrid, 19 April 1943.
16 TNA FO 371/34811, C3059, Halifax to Foreign Office, 18 March 1943.
17 TNA FO 371/34811, C3399, Hoare to Foreign Office, 26 March 1943.
out by Churchill at Mansion House, and suggested flagging ‘Dr. Salazar’s welcome to the speech’.

The eternal trick of favourable comparison to Spain was still, it appeared, serving Salazar well. However, in the spring of 1943, it did appear as if Franco’s attitude to the question of his regime’s international legitimacy was shifting. This was manifested in several politically significant internal changes. After the displacement of the Falange, which resulted in their dislodging as the primary power but not their destruction, two trends emerged in Spanish politics. The Falange turned inward, resuming ‘their old discourse of national and social revolution, defending a process whereby the culture of the party that had been defeated in the civil war would be selectively integrated into the new regime’. The plan they identified was something like the ‘third way’ espoused by fascists elsewhere on the continent. The second major emerging political current was the Catholic reactionaries of Opus Dei. Believing the Falange now appeared to be revolutionaries, they instead sought ‘link a seamless, reactionary and Catholic anti-liberalism to a modern “Europeanized” economic practice’.

These vexed questions of political organisation simply did not trouble Lisbon in the same way. Salazar, who had never uncritically espoused the ideas of revolutionary fascism, having long ago destroyed Rolão Preto’s explicitly fascist movement, required no such ideological renovation. But the link between Catholic anti-liberalism and capitalistic renewal, which the Opus Dei now pointed toward, was similarly unthinkable. Unlike Spain, where the question was increasingly the regime’s political settlement, no such development would have been possible under Salazar’s one-man regime. He could soldier on unencumbered by these internal debates, and therefore proceed with more surety about the international position of his regime. But it also represented, in comparison to Franco, a very real risk: stasis.

**Stasis and the Azores**

This stasis, a failure to understand the changed requirements of international legitimacy, threatened the regime when, in April 1943, Allied military attention once again turned to the Azores. During a visit to London in April 1943, Campbell was questioned at

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18 TNA FO 371/34811, Roberts note on C3399, 2 April 1943.
19 TNA FO 371/34811, C3849, Madrid to Foreign Office, 6 April 1943. The source on Franco’s changing attitude was one of the Generals in British pay.
21 Ibid.
length by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, where he answered honestly if, from a strategic perspective, frustratingly. Although advances in North Africa reassured him that Portugal was now at less risk of attack, any request for facilities would likely be turned down on the basis that this broke Portuguese neutrality and therefore represented both an immediate threat and a risk to the foundations of Portugal’s post-War recovery.

On 13 May, Campbell was finally received by Salazar after some ‘hanky-panky’ had denied him an interview for several weeks. Ill, suffering insomnia, and impressed with the final victory in Tunisia on 7 May, the dictator covered a mountain of issues during the five-hour marathon. He made sure to impress on the Ambassador the vital importance of his contribution in Spain and thus to the Allied war effort. Campbell replied that ‘His Majesty’s Government placed a high value on the able manner in which Dr. Salazar had seconded their efforts to bolster up General Franco’s resistance to German pressure, and generally to promote tranquillity in Spain’, and furthermore, ‘attached great importance to the Allied governments (Great Britain and Portugal) maintaining this fruitful collaboration’.

Gratitude, however, could only take Portugal so far in British eyes and, given the radically changed situation after Torch, the limits of just how far that was were within sight. Campbell took the opportunity to explain the British response to Jordana’s diplomatic overtures. The British attitude at the end of the war, he explained, would depend on any neutral’s attitude in the war, particularly from then on. The question of comparison was already rearing its ugly head; ‘His manner clearly showed that he had not missed the point’. From London, Monteiro pushed his master to adopt a more clearly pro-Allied attitude. ‘There is patent irritation with us’ he wrote; ‘we make agreements which don’t last and which, when they do, create constant difficulties. The negotiations as slow, complicated, and irritating’.

In May 1943, whether Salazar truly understood the point raised by both Campbell and his own Ambassador would become existentially important for the survival of the regime. It faced a threat from a new and unexpected critic: Churchill, over an old and well-known topic: the Azores. This challenge from Churchill was serious and has been under-appreciated.

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22 TNA CAB 81/91, J.I.C. (43) 20, ‘Visit of Sir Ronald Campbell’, 16 April 1943. Robert Sloan, of the Western Department, was also present.
23 Ibid.
24 TNA FO 371/34656, C5656, Campbell to Foreign Office, 14 May 1943.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. While not missing the point, Salazar also took the opportunity to once again pay tribute to Hoare.
Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff agreed on 18 May that a diplomatic approach was preferred, with ‘prompt seizure’ only ‘if diplomacy fails’. But at the Trident Conference between the Heads of State the next day, the President’s adviser Harry Hopkins made clear that he highly doubted the Portuguese would give up the islands willingly. Therefore: ‘Probably the best way of handling the matter would be to have ample force available off the Islands, and to inform the Portuguese Government that the Islands would be occupied the following morning and that resistance would be hopeless’. Churchill supported this view, and it was agreed this would be telegrammed through to the Cabinet in London.

In London, where the situation looked very different, this suggestion was received badly. Its reception highlighted the extent to which Churchill’s newly aggressive Portugal policy was out of step with the majority opinion. This was not, as some have suggested, a quarrel with Eden but with a majority of the Cabinet. Attlee, in his capacity as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, warned of the effect on other Portuguese possessions, that the action would set a ‘dangerous precedent’, especially for Smuts in South Africa. The Minister of Production Oliver Lyttleton thought there was ‘No serious reason why you shdn’t [sic] give them the warning involved by starting by negotiation’. Bevin, in his capacity as Minister of Labour, thought it would both endanger operations in Sicily and crucially that there was ‘Something still to be gained by treating an Ally decently’. Sir James Grigg concurred; the ‘Real objection is the moral one. Vital to retain some shred of integrity for postwar’. In this he was joined again by Bevin, Attlee, and Oliver Lyttleton: ‘Our power in the world depends on our behaving well’. Only Herbert Morrison was alone in arguing that Portugal had not behaved as it should have towards its “Oldest Ally”. Lyttleton finally concluded: ‘we don’t like this at all’. The final conclusions considered that ‘the Prime Minister’s proposal seemed to involve making an attack, without warning, on the territory of our oldest Ally’.

30 FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, Doc. 43, The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, 18 May 1943. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943/d43>. [Last accessed: 10-11-2022].
31 FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, Doc. 49, Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes, 19 May 1943. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943/d49>. [Last accessed: 10-11-2022].
33 TNA CAB 195/2/63, Sir Norman Brook Notebook, WM (43) 74, 21 May 1943.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 TNA CAB 65/38/8, Confidential Annex to WM (43) 74, 21 May 1943.
Away from Cabinet in Washington, Churchill took a very different view. Five hours after the Cabinet had met and recoiled at the option of using military force, Churchill ‘reiterated the view which he had expressed at the previous meeting that nothing would be gained by a diplomatic approach to the Portuguese Government which was not backed up immediately by force’.  

He favoured presenting the Portuguese with a *fait accompli*, ‘with only sufficient time in which to send a message to order that there should be no resistance’.  

His position was so hard-line that he even wanted references to diplomatic efforts removed from the Chief of Staffs’ plan.  

After receiving the Cabinet’s rejection, Churchill softened his position somewhat, though neither did away with it entirely nor reported it wholly faithfully at that day’s meeting. He actively supported sending a force, whereupon ‘7 to 10 hours before its arrival, the Portuguese Government might be approached diplomatically and told that the force was en route’, not quite the *fait accompli* earlier favoured, but hardly the diplomatic route backed by the Cabinet.  

He further added that in any event ‘he personally favored an expedition in sufficient force to take the Islands’ but that ‘his government, however, had not as yet authorized him to approve such action’.  

This was clearly not an exact report of the Cabinet’s strong rejection of the plan. Meanwhile Roosevelt, cold on the dictator, ‘said that he had never liked the idea of being put in a position of permitting President Salazar to call our bluff’.  

The Cabinet, to whom Churchill made his disappointment clear, again reacted strongly to his call for force. Attlee did not ‘understand the hurry’ and Eden seemed to express some frustration at having informed Campbell one thing where it appeared another was going ahead, and that they had been told Roosevelt ‘wanted to do it’ but that it ‘now appears that he doesn’t’.  

Eden further thought that ‘This P.M. plan gives us worst of all worlds’ while Lyttleton was ‘totally against’ it.  

Again, only Morrison was for – the ‘Oldest ally hasn’t played the game’, but, countered Attlee, Britain had not ‘been able to defend them’.  

The conclusions noted that ‘the general view’ was that ‘even if the Portuguese showed that they

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42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid.  
47 TNA CAB 195/2/64, Sir Norman Brook Notebook, WM (43) 76, 24 May 1943.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.
would resist the occupation’, Britain would press on anyway and thus be declaring War against Portugal.\textsuperscript{50} This newly aggressive footing, created by the military successes after American entry into the War, presented new and considerable risks to the Portuguese position.

While it was true that Churchill favoured remaining in the European sphere, while his American cousins were divided over strategic moves into \textit{inter alia} the Pacific and Burma, it was obvious that post-Casablanca, regardless of which theatre was to be the first-rank priority, Churchill was willing to approach Portugal with considerably more force and less tact. Monteiro understood this clearly: ‘the Allies are coming to the point of not admitting, without strong reaction, resistance or even not very friendly positions. They are coming to the moment of changing a policy of compromise for one of imposition’.\textsuperscript{51} Historians tend only to have seen this \textit{after} negotiations over the Azores began; Telo in particular views these inter-Allied discussions as distant from Portugal.\textsuperscript{52} But in fact, in early 1943, Churchill’s personal interest in Portugal was, for the first time, analogous to that of his interest in Spain. It might even be said, given his excellent relations with Alba, to have been less friendly.\textsuperscript{53}

So long as the Cabinet resisted Churchill’s bellicose tendencies, there was little risk of immediate armed action against the regime. However, there was clearly a developing threat to the regime’s future survival in the spring of 1943. Strangely enough, the man who did most to ensure it did not become a consummated threat was Ronald Campbell. Years later, he recounted the story of his visit to Churchill and the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs, in which his suggestion of negotiating with Salazar was practically laughed out of the room by a body that had made up its mind to take the Azores by force.\textsuperscript{54}

Just as Campbell was preventing the dismemberment of the Portuguese state by force, Salazar was growing ever more critical of the Ambassador. In May 1943, he complained about the length of his meetings with Campbell after a four and three-quarter hour session.\textsuperscript{55} In a personal handwritten letter to Cadogan in May 1943, Campbell provided in his defence a forensic account of what it was like to deal with the dictator. The fault, Campbell said, was Salazar’s. He described an immensely capable and frustrating man: ‘One has to weigh every word one says for the two-fold reason that he himself has every detail at his fingers’ ends and that any injudicious or hasty remark goes down on record in his mind where it remains chalked

\textsuperscript{50} TNA CAB 65/38/10, Confidential Annex to WM (43) 76, 24 May 1943.
\textsuperscript{51} CPAMOS, Doc. 67, Armando Monteiro to Salazar, 31 May 1943, pp. 409-412.
\textsuperscript{53} Wigg, \textit{Churchill and Spain}, pp. 69-71.
\textsuperscript{55} The meeting began at 5PM and finished at 9:40. Campbell had a dinner booked at 8:30, which he presumably missed. TNA FO 1093/268, Campbell to Cadogan, 31 May 1943.
up, so to speak, against one’.\textsuperscript{56} Then there was the nature of the state this engendered, in which Salazar ‘allow[ed] no-one to take a decision on any matter but himself’.\textsuperscript{57} It was on this count that it was not surprising that the meetings took so long.

The bitter irony was that it was Campbell who was defending Salazar by patiently defending his case to London: ‘For all his fundamental loyalty to the alliance, the fervour and constancy with which he pursues these aims are not tempered by sentiment’.\textsuperscript{58} He was ‘jaundiced by his fear’ that a German victory would see communism and anarchism on the continent; he chafed at ‘the short-sighted harshness of our blockade’, and he thought the Allies ‘expected unlimited sacrifices’ from neutrals.\textsuperscript{59} Rather un-modestly, he told London that ‘I have always predicted that, as the day of our victory drew nearer, our dealings with this country would increase rather than decrease in difficulty’.\textsuperscript{60}

Torch had fundamentally altered Anglo-Iberian relations insofar as it had largely neutered the risk of Spanish belligerence, hitherto the common concern of British and Portuguese foreign policies. But it was not clear that Salazar understood the risks to his own regime. Campbell alone stood firm against military action, putting his case to Eden, who in turn plead the case to Churchill.\textsuperscript{61} But even if Campbell and Eden won, an approach which did not involve taking the Azores by force depended on Salazar accepting the diplomatic approach. Both men raised the possibility of the colonies as an important part of any diplomatic action.\textsuperscript{62} This connection to the Empire is a particularly under-appreciated element which may have helped to dissuade Salazar from opting for stasis. In late June, the South African government was approached to join Britain’s colonial guarantees to Portugal. Smuts was prepared to offer this agreement conditionally:

\begin{quote}
Should the Portuguese Government agree or acquiesce, Union Government are prepared to associate themselves with United Kingdom government in assurances about maintenance of colonial status quo in East and West Africa. If, however, their attitude remains unfavourable or hostile Union Government prefer to remain uncommitted and free to shape their policy as future developments and Union interests might dictate.\textsuperscript{63}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{56} TNA FO 1093/268, Campbell to Cadogan, 31 May 1943.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} TNA FO 371/34656, C6822, Campbell to F.O., 7 June 1943.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} TNA CAB 79/61/20, ‘Operation Lifebelt’, 7 June 1943.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} TNA FO 954/21/169, Smuts to Eden, 14 June 1943.
Smuts further pointedly opined that ‘viewed in light of modern progress and developments the position of Portuguese Southern Africa is becoming more and more of an anachronism’, and if the Portuguese did not make the right choice, ‘an opportunity for righting this position will present itself which should not be missed’. Salazar’s reluctance to commit to Allied desires in the Azores thus posed a distinct risk to his colonies which has hitherto been overlooked. The colonial changes discussed in chapter two, and the recognition that one sphere could not be secured without action in the other, were finally having a serious effect on British policy. As part of that process, the threats to the Portuguese Empire which coalesced in early summer 1940, discussed in chapter one, were being slowly challenged and for the first time possibly neutralised.

A narrower view of Timor as the central issue is helpful to understand the Portuguese position, but a wider view of the colonial empire writ-large is necessary to understand the British position. Union accession to British guarantees at once contributed to Portugal’s defence and nullified a potential aggressor. Clearly Salazar was pleased by these assurances, reacting with ‘particular pleasure [to] the assurances with which the Union Government were associated’. Having long been fearful of Union designs on his territory, which in Smuts’ case pre-dated even the First World War, South African participation in their defence was a particularly important reversal. Armed with this guarantee, on 18 June, Eden and Campbell made their diplomatic approaches in London and Lisbon. Salazar appeared inclined to accept the British proposals.

Once again, a comparative approach at this critical juncture helps us to understand the differing trajectories of Spain and Portugal in mid-1943. While an international realignment looked possible in Portugal, Spain was still officially non-belligerent. Was it not now time, Hoare opined, ‘for the Allies to bring to an end this unsatisfactory state of affairs’? Britain had taken each day and each week at a time while living under the Falange’s ascendancy. Now it could live more freely and, more importantly, plan for a future policy in the long-term. Considering Britain’s growing military superiority, ‘we should be able to make more convincing and effective our arguments with the Spanish government’. The ‘broad lines’ of

64 Ibid. These views were sent to FDR: FO 954/21/170, Churchill to Roosevelt, 15 June 1943.
65 TNA FO 954/21/212, Churchill to Smuts, 28 June 1943.
67 TNA FO 954/21/177, Eden to Campbell, 18 June 1943; FO 954/21/8154, Foreign Office to Washington, 19 June 1943.
68 TNA FO 954/21/8158, Eden to Campbell, 21 June 1943.
69 TNA FO 425/421, C7567, Hoare to Eden, 23 June 1943.
70 Ibid.
Spanish policy should remain intact, but from a new position of strength, His Majesty’s Government ‘ought to use our influence with increasing effect’. Spain was at last turning economically toward Britain; it could be ‘economically focussed on the Anglo-Saxon orbit’.

For the first time since 1939, Britain possessed genuine capacity for meaningful political and economic influence in Spain. It could hope to influence Spain’s trajectory. The Portuguese connection, previously so vital to Hoare, was not as important as it once was. In his missive, unlike prior similar reports, he did not mention Portugal once. That Portugal had disappeared from Hoare’s despatches was a problem for Salazar while unhappy uncertainty loomed over the possibility – and form – of an Azores deal. While taking his time to think, Salazar leant heavily on his previous role. He chastised Campbell, reminding the British not to ‘underestimate the value of the alliance up to late. But for it and for Portugal’s strict observance of her neutrality Spain would long since have been over-run and the Germans would have been on [the] Portuguese seaboard’. That alone was proof of its value; and ‘As to the post-War period, he personally felt certain that the value to us of the Alliance […] would be even greater than before’. But this gambit that Portugal had kept Spain out of the war – and ought to be thanked for it – was becoming increasingly less compelling in light of the changed situation. Campbell expressed clear irritation at these boorish lectures, ending early feeling that it was ‘useless and undesirable to prolong to the conversation’. Whether Portugal’s “role” in Spain would continue to be regarded as useful hinged on agreement on the Azores.

The Azores, Timor, and the Portuguese Empire

As António Telo noted, ‘from 1943, the true diplomatic battle of Timor would not be fought with the Japanese, but with the Allies’. As we have seen, Salazar’s diplomatic battle over Timor actually began from the moment the Allies stepped foot in Portuguese Timor. But from 1943, as the Allies continued to make favourable advances in the War, Salazar’s total preoccupation with the island once again came to the fore. For when truly concerted Anglo-American attempts to gain facilities began in late spring 1943, the Timor question acquired a new status: a bargaining chip in the Azores negotiations.

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71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 TNA FO 954/21/204, Campbell to Eden, 24 June 1943.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
The link between Timor and the Azores is better covered in Portuguese historiography, though that literature is not without problems. There is a particular tendency to consider the Azores agreement through an American-Portuguese lens, influenced by the post-War American occupation. The primary issue has been a tendency to see the settlement of the Timor question as a side issue or minor part of the overall negotiations. The other tendency has been to view the issue as a bilateral one, a problem shared between the United States and Portugal, first emerging seriously in 1944. This is true of the best work on the period, and the first to draw an explicit link between Timor and the Azores, a 1988 working paper by Geoffrey Gunn. In fact, both of these assumptions are incorrect.

Timor was from the very beginning of the Azores negotiations a key issue and stickling point. Although the negotiations initially took place between Britain and Portugal, it was in turn through Britain that America became aware of the strength of Portuguese feelings on Timor and total commitment to Empire. As researchers elsewhere have pointed out, Portuguese relations with the Allies, particularly over the Azores, were by virtue of the Alliance always Britain first, America second. Though we should not discount an emerging picture of purely bilateral American-Portuguese diplomacy over the Timor question and the Azores, it was ultimately the British who remained as arbiters of Timor’s future, who returned Portugal to power there in 1945, and who acted as an imperial conduit to Washington.

From the very beginning, Salazar sought to tie together favourable resolution of the Timor question, wider guarantees over Empire, and any potential agreement over the Azores. He met with Campbell in June 1943 in a long appointment that was explicitly part-conversation, part-negotiation over the Azores. Sensing an opportunity, Salazar immediately attempted to expand the scope and scale of Britain’s imperial guarantees to Portugal: ‘The problem of knowing whether the dominions are or are not linked by the treaties of alliance has not yet been discussed between England and ourselves’.

What followed was an example of leverage diplomacy par excellence, a case of Salazar using the Azores negotiations as a springboard for what could, by some interpretation, be considered a commitment by the Empire-Commonwealth to protect the Portuguese Empire. He

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81 AHD S3.E69.P4/37147, Folder 1, Apontamento com o Embaixador de Inglaterra, 23 June 1943.
went on; ‘Nothing disgusted me like a dominion excusing itself from defending the Portuguese colonies with the claim that the treaties had been concluded with Great Britain and not the Empire’.\(^{82}\) Whilst ideally the guarantee would cover all of the British Dominions, Salazar sought as a minimum ‘a guarantee on Australia at least in respect of the Far Eastern colonies’.\(^{83}\) Whilst he appeared to be aiming for a general agreement over the Portuguese Empire, his explicit short-term desire was to see an Australian promise with regards to Timor’s future. It was obvious from the beginning that the wider Empire, and not only Timor, was to be a salient point in the discussions.

At almost exactly the same time that Campbell was beginning negotiations in Lisbon over the Azores, Roosevelt and Churchill were corresponding over Portugal. The long-term effect of Timor can be discerned from their exchanges. It showed the extent to which Britain had become, if not exactly Portugal’s cheerleader, then its imperial defender. Roosevelt rather offhandedly observed that ‘Australia might be interested in purchasing Timor’; ‘it has never brought the Portuguese government any interest on the investment’.\(^{84}\) He thought it best left until the end of the War – but ‘the same thing’ applied to Macau.\(^{85}\) Ever remote from Lisbon, the President’s understanding, perhaps even a wider American understanding, was that Timor and Macau served little purpose, and were primarily a financial burden for the Portuguese.

After a stern, scrawled warning from Eden that ‘it would do well to remind the President of the probable Portuguese reaction’, Churchill’s reply, largely based on Eden’s drafted wording, put paid to the idea of discussing the status of the Portuguese Colonies.\(^{86}\) It also quite subtly altered the trajectory of the conversation, away from the implicit American assumption – that the status of the colonies was liable to change – and toward the implicit British assumption – that Portuguese sovereignty was to be protected at all costs:

I agree that questions of Timor and Macao can well be left until after the war. Meanwhile we have told the Portuguese that if they help us now we are ready to give them assurances regarding maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese Colonies. In reply to their enquiry we told them that this assurance covered Timor and Macao. The Portuguese would therefore probably resent any early questions concerning the disposal of Timor and we shall have to tread warily. They are particularly touchy about Timor in view of Allied military occupation

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\(^{82}\) Ibid.
\(^{83}\) Ibid.
\(^{84}\) TNA FO 954/21/187, No. 4115, President to Prime Minister, 22 June 1943.
\(^{85}\) Ibid.
\(^{86}\) TNA FO 954/21/201, Eden note and draft reply, 24 June 1943. Also in: FO 954/4B/542.
without their agreement in December 1941 which imposed a severe strain upon our relations with Portugal.\(^{87}\)

It is extremely significant that both the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister acted to stymie American interest in dismantling the Portuguese Empire. The British response showed how, at the very highest levels of power in London, Portugal had managed to secure defenders of her colonies. It can hardly be said to be an enthusiastic defence; Eden’s wording was not one of wholehearted support of a friend but one of stoic acceptance that Portugal would react badly. But it can hardly be said to matter if, as was the case, the end effect was a de facto British defence of the Portuguese Empire.

On 4 July, technical-military discussions began in Lisbon.\(^{88}\) Salazar’s modus operandi was to ‘go on bargaining until he is satisfied that he has screwed everything out of us that he can possibly screw’.\(^{89}\) With negotiations now underway, Monteiro had pushed Salazar too far: ‘Our ambassador in London continues to write for History’. Excoriating Monteiro, accusing him of intellectual and personal pomposity, of betrayal of Portugal and of himself, Salazar denounced him as unfit to serve. With this missive his fate was sealed.\(^{90}\) Not since Henry VIII turned on Cromwell, ‘depriving himself of his outstanding servant’, had a leader willingly annihilated their own most talented servant.\(^{91}\)

Amidst the Azores negotiations, little could be done for Monteiro. When informed of the change, Campbell only pushed back in very modest terms, for fear of upsetting Monteiro’s position, while explaining that he feared ‘that that he has committed the unforgivable sin of criticising his master’.\(^{92}\) Campbell was instructed to say nothing further in case it harmed Monteiro.\(^{93}\) The notes on the documents concerning his departure confirm the high esteem in which he was held and his personal generosity in his willingness to see Palmella succeed.\(^{94}\) Interestingly, the Spaniards were informed of the change very late. Not until 2 September did Nicolás Franco inform the MAE of a rumour ‘which should not be taken as absolutely accurate’ but which was ‘circulating insistently’ that Monteiro had been removed from office to be replaced with the Duke of Palmela.\(^{95}\)

\(^{87}\) TNA FO 954/21/8176, No. 4258. Prime Minister to President, No 331, 26 June 1943.
\(^{88}\) TNA FO 954/21/224, Campbell to Eden, 6 July 1943.
\(^{89}\) FO 954/21/234, Campbell to Eden, 13 July 1943.
\(^{90}\) De Meneses, Salazar, pp. 299-301.
\(^{92}\) TNA FO 371/34706, C8917, Campbell to Foreign Office, 23 July 1943.
\(^{93}\) TNA FO 371/34706, C8917, Foreign Office to Campbell, 28 July 1943.
\(^{94}\) TNA FO 371/34706, C9720, Roberts note, 25 August 1943.
\(^{95}\) AGA (10) 073.002, 6.654, N.F. To M.A.E., 2 September 1943 - ‘Informe sobre posible cambio Embajador Portugal en Londres’ (no. 331).
While Monteiro had been removed, the coming Azores agreement was the more important development in Anglo-Portuguese relations. The looming deal helped reduce pressure from, and was perhaps partially inspired by, growing domestic pressures. Strikes – some wildcat, some planned – broke out in the area around Lisbon.96 ‘This “hot summer” of 1943 ‘represented the “peak” of social agitation against the Government during the war’ and a significant development in domestic opposition to the regime.97 The government responded quickly and harshly, raising battalions of troops, rounding-up and imprisoning the leaders, and threatening further repercussions against those taking part.98 The British reaction was muted. Campbell conceded that Salazar ‘has gone a step further along the road of oppression’ but ‘however distasteful’ it looked, ‘Dr. Salazar could hardly have acted less vigorously’.99

This episode was important since it revealed not only the Ambassador’s increasingly Salazarist tendencies, but the impact of the British decision on the regime’s domestic stability, and the probable future course of British policy. To take them in order: Campbell had now revealed himself, in contrast to his attitude earlier in the year, to be sympathetic to the regime’s worst tendencies. He also couched this new sympathy in personal terms toward Salazar. With the new British-supplied arms being ostentatiously paraded in Lisbon, the arms constituent part of the Azores deal had important domestic repercussions as well as international ones. While the primary outcome was to afford the regime an obvious token of its international legitimacy and to induct it formally into the Allied comity of nations, weaponry for the regime directly secured it against potential domestic opponents at home as well as in the colonies. The combination of these two changes provided clues as to the likely future course of British policy.

The Azores Agreement had a resoundingly positive effect on British policy toward both the metropole and its overseas polities. As in the European sphere, attention increasingly turned to co-operative planning with Portugal rather than pre-emptive planning without her. The Foreign Office, mindful that formal co-operation with Portugal was now an integral part of Britain’s war effort, pressured covert British and South African actors to act within stricter confines in Mozambique.100 Again, the question of comparison presented a risk to the other Iberian nation; Portuguese co-operation made Spanish non-co-operation seem worse.

96 TNA FO 425/421, C9386, Campbell to F.O., 12 August 1943.
97 Rosas, *Portugal entre...,* pp. 386.
98 Rosas, *Portugal entre...,* pp. 386-387.
99 TNA FO 425/421, C9386, Campbell to F.O., 12 August 1943.
The idea of a German threat to the Peninsula slowly became less convincing in London. Talking up the likelihood of a German invasion served both Hoare, since it appeared to make his mission in Spain more worthwhile and important, and the Portuguese, since it justified their neutral position. But at the beginning of July, Churchill himself minuted that the Russian front had made the position in Iberia much more secure.\footnote{TNA CAB 122/965, Churchill minute on: COS 43 (366), 7 July 1943.} His generals meanwhile opined that ‘H.M. Ambassador has overstressed the power of the Germans to do us harm in Spain’ and ‘a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula is now most improbable’.\footnote{TNA CAB 122/965, COS 43 (366), 7 July 1943.}

The other great development in Anglo-Iberian relations was the fall of Mussolini, which had profound reverberations as a cautionary example in both Spain and Portugal. The Duke of Alba told Eden that the consequences of Mussolini’s fall were far-reaching in Spain.\footnote{TNA FO 371/34811, C8676, Eden to Hoare, 28 July 1943.} At the start of August, a rather taciturn Jordana agreed ‘by several nods of approval’ that he believed Italy was finished militarily, while Ellis-Rees met the Director-General of Political economy at the MAE who told him ‘that similarities between Spain and Italy could not be overlooked’.\footnote{TNA FO 371/34811, C8744, Hoare to FO, 1 August 1943; C8775, Hoare to FO, 31 July 1943.} Privately, the Foreign Minister was much bolder. In an undated memorandum, an exasperated Jordana asked why the regime had not publicly supported the new government: ‘this tactic strikes me as suicidal’.\footnote{Documentos Inéditos Para La História del Generalísimo Franco, Vol. IV., 1943 (Madrid: Azor, 1994). (Henceforth: DIGF). Doc. 9, ‘Notas de Jordana sobre el cambio de situación en Italia’, undated but 1943, pp. 41-42.}

Knowing the profound effect the collapse of Italy would have on Spain, in July Churchill invited Alba to dinner, which Alba thought ‘an exception as the only neutral Ambassador to be invited to his house’.\footnote{DIGF, Vol. IV, Doc. 93, Alba to M.A.E., 27 July 1943, pp. 354-356.} He impressed on Alba the rapid advancement through Sicily, including the fall of Palermo two days previously. He also made it clear that ‘he desired a prosperous and strong Spain which occupies the greatest role it deserves in the post-war [era] given that Italy will lose much political power in the Mediterranean’.\footnote{Ibid.} British approaches to Spain had changed in two ways: firstly, they were now direct, and secondly, they were made based on future reward rather than threat. This was the policy of the carrot much more than the stick, but this was a much later development than has been suggested elsewhere.\footnote{Leitz, “‘More Carrot than Stick’”.}
Very quickly after Mussolini’s fall, there was an agreement in principle in Lisbon. Oliver Harvey, Eden’s Principal Private Secretary, revealed the dynamic behind the agreement:

Salazar has now practically agreed to our minimum desiderata in the Azores and the P.M. Has agreed to close on it. He admitted that he hadn’t believed that we should get it. If it hadn’t been for A.E., the P.M. Would have insisted on raping Portugal and I don’t believe anyone else could have stopped him.109

The unpleasant force of his language underscored just how much Churchill had been restrained by the Foreign Office and Eden. This was a notable success for diplomacy when another path was being enthusiastically proposed by the Prime Minister. There was also some indication that Hoare’s interjections on the subject were viewed warily. As Oliver Harvey put it: ‘Sam Hoare is as usual in a fright and conjures up all sorts of false alarms about what the Spaniards may not do to the Portuguese at the instigation of the Germans. Old wives’ tales’.110 The success of the Azores deal saw Campbell’s stock rise considerably, as did Frank Roberts’. Harvey wrote: ‘Portugal is in the bag […]. This is very satisfactory and a tribute to Ronnie’s painstaking diplomacy. Alone he did it’.111 Churchill himself was moved to write a personal letter of congratulations to Campbell on the course of negotiations: ‘I recall that it was largely on the opinion that you gave that we embarked on this course’; ‘I congratulate you on the justification of your advice, and on the patience and ability with which you, and the staff under you, conducted these negotiations’.112 Campbell’s prestige would have important diplomatic consequences in the coming months.

As Campbell celebrated, Monteiro was departing London. This was the other major change in Anglo-Portuguese relations. Monteiro’s replacement was the fantastically named Domingos Maria do Espírito Santo José Francisco de Paula de Sousa Holstein-Beck, known always as the Duque de Palmela or the Duke of Palmella. Palmella had slicked hair, a weak chin, and a kindly face.113 A Cambridge graduate, in 1915 he married Maria do Carmo Pinheiro de Melo and together they raised an extraorordinary eleven children.114 He faced contradictory currents in London. On the one hand, spirits were extremely high in the wake of the Azores agreement. On the other hand, he was replacing a cosmopolitan and gregarious ambassador...

110 Ibid.
111 Harvey, 11 August 1943, pp. 285-286.
112 Churchill Archives, Cambridge, Chartwell Papers, (Henceforth: CHU, CHAR) 20/121/60, Churchill to Campbell, 16 August 1943.
who was his own man as much as Salazar’s, widely liked on his own terms, and highly appreciated for his attempts to ameliorate his master’s invariably inflexible line.

*The Times*’ article on Palmella’s arrival was overshadowed by a long eulogy for his predecessor:

Dr. Monteiro’s departure will be widely regretted. From the time of his appointment seven years ago he has done much to strengthen Anglo-Portuguese ties and to advance the interests of the two peoples, and under the strains of the war his faith in the alliance has never wavered. In the continuing cooperation of Great Britain and Portugal he saw the hope of preserving the good in European culture and tradition.\(^\text{115}\)

There were several further indications that Monteiro was unusually well-liked by the British establishment. He was personally vested with the insignia of the Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (GCB) by the King.\(^\text{116}\) He was subsequently given lunch by Eden. *The Times* again noted: ‘It is long since a retiring Ambassador was singled out for so high an honour as that which has been conferred on Dr. Monteiro’.\(^\text{117}\) Thanks to Dr Monteiro: ‘The alliance today is more firmly based than it ever was’; Palmella, relegated to a single closing paragraph, would ‘warmly follow the traditional policy of friendship with Great Britain’.\(^\text{118}\)

When Palmella arrived, however, it was obvious that the sadness over Monteiro’s departure was to be overshadowed by the public announcement of the Azores agreement. Palmella’s courtesy tour of the House of Commons coincided with Churchill’s speech. As the *Telegraph* put it: ‘Many Ambassadors have attended debates at the House for years without being so closely concerned in what was going on as was the Duke of Palmella on his first visit’.\(^\text{119}\) This was not at first necessarily a good thing, since ‘The idea of an announcement arising out of a treaty signed in 1373 struck M.P.s who lack the historic sense as exceedingly funny’.\(^\text{120}\) Palmella wrote to Salazar acknowledging that there had been ‘some laughter’ in the chamber, but assured him that this ‘was quickly contained once the importance of the declaration was realised’.\(^\text{121}\) A celebratory *Times* piece praised Salazar, Campbell, and Frank Roberts.\(^\text{122}\) As the RAF unloaded supplies at Lajes, the British had achieved their aims. So too

\(^{115}\) ‘Portuguese Ambassador to Britain’, *The Times*, 49651, 15 September 1943, p. 4.

\(^{116}\) ‘Anglo-Portuguese Friendship’, *The Times*, 49662, 28 September 1943, p. 3.

\(^{117}\) Ibid.

\(^{118}\) Ibid.


\(^{120}\) Ibid.

\(^{121}\) DAPE, vol. 12, doc. 216, Palmela to Salazar, 12 October 1943.

\(^{122}\) ‘Secret talks in Lisbon’, *The Times*, 49675, 13 October 1943, p. 4.
had the Portuguese: ‘this Agreement should give new life and vigour to the Alliance which has so long existed between the United Kingdom and Portugal to their mutual advantage’. 123

**Jordana, the Azores, and the sealing of a myth**

An important question arose in light of this agreement: wither Spain? In London, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet dismissed the vague threat of serious Spanish or German reaction out of hand. In September 1943, the Sub-Committee considered four scenarios: ‘Germany with Spain acquiescing’; ‘Germany with Spain resisting’; ‘Germany and Spain’; and ‘Spain alone’. 124 Recent events in the Mediterranean, accelerated by ‘the capitulation of Italy’ made it inconceivable ‘that Spain would by herself attack Portugal’ while she would neither ‘join the losing side’ in a joint attack. 125 Similarly, acquiescence had ‘receded almost to vanishing point’ in light of successes in Italy and North Africa, while Germany would not want the ‘serious and unacceptable commitment’ of an occupation. 126 The Joint Chiefs’ assessment proved remarkably accurate and prescient, and underscored the extent to which Torch’s success had changed the strategic position of, and diplomatic options available to, Spain.

It appeared that Jordana well understood this. In September, he informed Alba that the División Azul was to be greatly reduced in size but not entirely disbanded. 127 This was another success for the neutralist. On 16 October, he wrote to Alba in triumphant tones. The División Azul was gone ‘really without having done great harm to our relations with Germany, it seems like a dream’. 128 Franco had refused to recognise Mussolini’s chaotically reconstituted government; the German agents in North Africa had been side-lined as far as possible. 129 But short of curtailing close relations with the Axis, under Franco’s leadership he possessed few diplomatic options which could be useful to the Allies.

The Anglo-Portuguese Azores agreement would present Jordana with such an opportunity. His neutralist leanings and his personal role in creating the Iberian Bloc meant

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125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 AGA 82/4395 (1371), Jordana to Alba, 25 September 1943.
128 AGA 82/4395 (1371), Jordana to Alba, 16 October 1943.
129 Ibid.
that Salazar turned to him for help as the Azores agreement was imminently to become public. On 7 October, Salazar crossed the border in secret, travelling to Ciudad Rodrigo to meet with Jordana. His intention was to ask the Spanish Foreign Minister for help. The fact that the rather agoraphobic Salazar was travelling to Spain underscored how serious this approach was. Franco was aware of, though not involved in, the meeting which Jordana hoped ‘could be held without being noticed’.\footnote{DIGF, Vol. IV, 1943, Doc. 151, Note from Jordana to Franco, 6 October 1943, pp. 470-471.} Unsigned minutes from the 8 October, the day they met, outlined Jordana’s intended discussion: ‘General Examination of the International Situation’; ‘International Position of Spain’; ‘Situation[s] in Spain which may affect us’; ‘Possibilities for peace’; ‘International situation in Spain’; ‘Internal situation in Portugal’.\footnote{Ana Vicente (ed.), Portugal visto Pela Espanha, Correspondência, pp. 34-35.} According to Wigg, ‘Spain’s Foreign Minister made no objections, only voicing surprise that Britain had not made such a request for base facilities long before’.

Travelling back with Nicolás Franco, Salazar wrote a note confirming that he had asked for help with Germany, and allowed Jordana and Ambassador Franco to begin planning their approach to German representatives before the British formally informed them, ‘provided that he [Jordana] does not show in advance that he knows what Sir Samuel Hoare is going to say’.

Similarly across the border, Jordana and Teotónio Pereira returned to Madrid together, both happy with how the conversation had gone. The four men’s journeys demonstrated how close they had become, and how important Jordana was to closer Hispano-Portuguese relations after the creation of the Iberian Bloc. That Salazar had made the request demonstrated, perhaps for the first time, the direct utility of Spain to Portugal vis-à-vis Nazi Germany.

As a result of the meeting, Jordana began a painstaking diplomatic crusade on Portugal’s behalf.\footnote{Wigg, Churchill and Spain, pp. 97-98.} On 12 October, Jordana wrote to Alba, explaining how Salazar had sought Spanish help in explaining the decision to the Germans.\footnote{Salazar to Nicolás Franco, 9 October 1943, cited in: Ana Vicente (ed.), Portugal visto Pela Espanha, Correspondência, pp. 34-35.} That day, he met the German Ambassador to ‘prepare the ground to tell him about the concessions made by Portugal to England in the Azores’, saw Taboada from the Portuguese Embassy, and then began ‘constant diplomatic conversations about the Azores’ with the German, Portuguese, and British Ambassadors.\footnote{Francisco Gómez-Jordana Souza, Milícia y Diplomacia: Los diarios del Conde de Jordana, 1936-1944, ed. by Rafael Gómez-Jordana Souza (Burgos: Editorial Dossoles, 2002). Entry for 12 October 1943, p. 214.} Missing scheduled events to persuade the German Ambassador that the Portuguese had no choice, Jordana was finally successful. He wrote to the Spanish Ambassador...
in Berlin, detailing how he had persuaded the German Ambassador that Portugal had been forced to act under severe pressure from Britain, but would, importantly, continue to respect its neutral pact with Spain.\(^\text{137}\)

A day later, Hans Lazar met Jordana and confirmed that the latter’s painstaking explanation that Portugal ‘had no other choice’ had ‘satisfied’ the Ambassador and left it ‘well-understood’ by Berlin.\(^\text{138}\) In the German capital, the Spanish Ambassador Ginés Vidal similarly energetically worked to assure the Nazi leadership that the Portuguese had made the concession only to avoid further concessions.\(^\text{139}\) Four days later, Teotónio Pereira, now in possession of the German note, visited him to thank him for his work.\(^\text{140}\) While Franco was aware of Jordana’s diplomatic battle, as in Lisbon in December 1942, the work was Jordana’s own.\(^\text{141}\)

The German response contained ‘only [one] spiteful passage’ which described the Alliance as ‘a mechanism to subjugate the Portuguese economy to Britain’s will and to usurp Portuguese colonies’.\(^\text{142}\) This emotive approach might have stung more – and thus been more diplomatically salient – had Portugal not secured the extensive colonial guarantees precisely as a result of the Azores agreement. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Azores deal, there was never a time when British aggression toward the Portuguese colonies looked less likely. Alba wrote from London that the story was being given great importance whilst emphasising Portugal’s neutrality, and it was unofficially being noted that Germany had little choice but to accept the decision.\(^\text{143}\) Jordana’s diplomatic crusade played a vital role in softening the German reaction, thus securing a favourable outcome for the Portuguese. While the Germans reserved the right to attack British positions on the Azores, they promised not to act against Portugal or her territories.\(^\text{144}\) At any rate, no such attack took place.

Furthermore, it caused a very positive reaction in London. When Churchill and his wife lunches with Alba at the Embassy, Churchill noted with satisfaction Spain’s help with the Azores.\(^\text{145}\) At the Foreign Office, Roberts ‘had always expected that Spain would not act against [Portugal], but their actual reaction had exceeded even the best expectations’.\(^\text{146}\)
Roberts referred to ‘reports received from Madrid’, ‘a great many of which had been given to Sir Samuel Hoare by our Ambassador’, as de Faria put it.\textsuperscript{147} Roberts then, according to de Faria, summarised Hispano-Portuguese relations during the War thus:

\begin{quote}
Dr. Salazar is reaping the fruits of his labour. During the first phase of the war one could get the impression that Portugal was clinging on to Spanish coattails to stop Spain going over Germany’s side. Now it seems that it is Spain which is clinging to Portuguese coattails, not to not go over to Germany’s side, but for Portugal to bring her over to this side.\textsuperscript{148}
\end{quote}

What Roberts was formally describing was a reversal of the power dynamic which had hitherto characterised cross-Iberian relations. What he was implicitly describing was Britain’s perception of Portugal’s policy. Such a perception had only been confirmed by the Azores; had the deal not taken place, as we have seen, it is likely that the earlier “diplomacy” would have been forgotten and counted for nothing. Moreover, such a belief was conditioned by the essential place of comparison between Portugal and Spain in the British official mind. How did one look in light of the other? The major evolution in 1943, as compared to 1939 to 1942, was that Spain and Portugal now faced the other country’s conduct as a yardstick. How they measured up might determine their relationship with the Allies and position in the post-War world.

The Azores agreement thus confirmed existing biases and beliefs about Portugal’s role in the War much as it created new ones. In the aftermath of the Azores agreement, Campbell, hitherto becoming slowly more critical of Salazar’s conduct, reversed this course. When the Americans proposed a harsh line against wolfram exports in November, Campbell acted quickly to suppress their whims. The Americans’ suggestion was ‘particularly ill-timed and incomprehensible at the present juncture’.\textsuperscript{149} Salazar had remained neutral with British approval and although he had objected to the severity of the British blockade, he had never challenged their right to enforce it. More interestingly, Campbell expounded that:

\begin{quote}
Doctor Salazar has always contended that this situation was the price we paid for strategic benefits accruing from Portugal's neutrality and that if her neutrality instead of being strict had been benevolent in our favour Spain would inevitably have thrown herself body and soul into the arms of Germany. If this had happened the Peninsula would have been occupied and then North Africa, with the result that
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{149} TNA FO 371/34696, Campbell to F.O., 5 November 1943.
the whole course of the war would have been altered to the advantage of the Axis. “You cannot have it both ways,” he had said to me over and over again.\footnote{Ibid.}

Campbell’s new position was undoubtedly borne out of the goodwill generated by the Azores agreement. He was also likely inclined by confirmation that his preferred approach of determined diplomacy had proved better than force. These two points accounted for the main substantive reason for his rejection. Within them, we can clearly discern the way in which the Azores agreement confirmed earlier British beliefs about the value of Portuguese foreign policy to British interests.\footnote{Stone, Spain Portugal, pp. 212-213.} There was a probable third reason for the force of his rejection: growing fear, even resentment, of American influence.

The United States

It is necessary to briefly describe the limited US role hitherto played in the Anglo-Portuguese negotiations before explaining their own approaches from October onward. The Americans had played the part of interested and well-informed observers. It had long been presumed that, once the British had a foothold on the islands, the Americans would wish to follow.\footnote{AHD S3.E56.P7/36286, Monteiro to Salazar, 4 July 1941; Luis Andrade, ‘Os Açores e a II Guerra Mundial’ in: Franklin Roosevelt e os Açores nas duas Guerras Mundiais, ed. by Luis Nuno Rodrigues (Lisboa: Fundação Luso-Americana para o Desenvolvimento, 2008), pp. 123-139 (pp. 133-134).} The British had kept their US cousins apprised of the guarantees being offered, including that ‘Portuguese sovereignty will be maintained over all Portuguese colonies’.\footnote{FRUS, 1943, Vol. II, Doc. 481, Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, 10 August 1943. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v02/d481>. [Last accessed: 10-11-2022].} On 12 August, the Americans agreed in principle that they could join the colonial guarantee, though pushed for Portuguese acceptance of American aircraft.\footnote{FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, Doc. 311, Hull to Winant, 12 August 1943. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943/d311>. [Last accessed: 10-11-2022].} At this stage, American agreement was not yet communicated to Salazar himself; there was every indication that the State Department wished to use it as a trump card in ensuing negotiations. For their part, the Foreign Office had told Campbell to limit any colonial assurances to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth ‘in case the United States Government wishes to link any assurance from
it about the future of the Portuguese Colonies with the grant of the facilities desired for the United States forces’. But they counselled their ally that:

None the less, His Majesty’s Government believe that an early communication from the United States Government to the Portuguese Government in respect of Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese Colonies might make it easier to obtain the Portuguese agreement now, and also in the future the facilities which the United States Government requires.

On 4 November, FDR sent a letter to the American Embassy intended as a direct approach to Salazar. While clearly an approach for the Azores, it was an odd and somewhat rambling missive, wrapped up in a story about his having visited the archipelago in 1919 to see the dismantling of the US installations there. He further suggested that Portugal might like to join the United States and Brazil in a closer relationship, before closing with a promise that ‘the United States has no designs on the territory of Portugal and its possessions’. Roosevelt wrote: ‘I am thinking in long range terms because I do not think that our peoples have been in close enough touch in the past’.

Uncle Sam’s chaotic and random approach underlined just how much they did not understand this curious little people on Europe’s periphery, who were entirely culturally alien to them. But the United States had two things which would be vitally important in the post-War settlement: money and power. They also helped their case by sending the talented and capable R. Henry Norweb to head up their legation in Lisbon in October 1943. While these factors would help their case in the long run, in the short run, as had been the case in 1941 and 1942, the Americans defaulted to asking for the British to take the lead. On 9 November, FDR appealed for British – and more specifically, Campbell’s – help in negotiations. The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, hitherto imagined as the Portuguese explaining the British to the Spanish, was in these circumstances to become the British explaining the Portuguese to the Americans.

The Embassy in Lisbon began to mobilise in support of their American allies, possibly encouraged in this endeavour by the helpful optics that an approach with British backing was more likely to succeed than an approach without them. Hopkinson, Campbell’s number two,

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155 FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, Doc. 313, British Embassy to the Department of State, 18 August 1943. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943/d313>. [Last accessed: 10-11-2022].
156 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 TNA FO 954/21/293, Roosevelt to Churchill, 9 November 1943.
was said to be using ‘the “Friends of Friends” thought’ and ‘earnest hope’ to encourage the
dictator direct in Lisbon.\textsuperscript{161} Winant was also instructed to informally induce Palmela in
London, where the request might ‘come with better grace than if it is said direct to Salazar’.\textsuperscript{162}
The British government, and its Lisbon Embassy, thus began closer relations with the
Americans in Portugal as a privileged interlocutor. For the time being, this represented an extra
benefit to Campbell’s Embassy, not a threat to its status.

Almost as soon as these approaches had begun, however, the State Department showed
itself willing to act more freely and along different lines to the British. Largely freed from
colonial preoccupations of their own, for example, they willing to consider direct settlement
over Timor. One suggested course was to encourage Salazar ‘to enter war against Japan, though
not against Germany, and to give us the facilities and consequences of this move’.\textsuperscript{163} British
policymakers in London, Washington, and Lisbon found themselves acting as brakes on such
designs, which appeared hubristic. The ‘British have impression that Germans have promised
Japanese to take same action if Japanese-Portuguese relations were disrupted’.\textsuperscript{164} At the tail
end of 1943, there was clearly an incipient sense of Anglo-American tension over Portugal.
The new American approaches to the Portuguese, which were approaches and not demands,
reflected a changed geo-strategic situation and power balance between the two Allies.

However, the new part-joint, part-competitive approaches worked in Portugal’s favour.
Amidst encouragement to find solutions from both British and American leaders, in November
1943 the Chiefs of Staff agreed that Portugal might be allowed a limited and fairly narrowly-
defined role in Timor’s recapture, but the Foreign Office saw ‘some difficulty’ in their idea,
and sought a ‘more definite’ reply.\textsuperscript{165} Giving Portugal an open invitation to enter the War
against Japan with a view to their spearheading the capture against Timor would be of benefit
to Britain. Again, the Foreign Office’s considerations were linked not only or even primarily
to Timor itself, but to the consequences elsewhere. It would mean ‘the Portuguese will no doubt
be willing to give us further assistance such as the concession of bases in Portuguese East
Africa’.\textsuperscript{166} Moreover, ‘a reasonably forthcoming response may not be without influence upon
the Portuguese attitude in regard to the more immediate issue of extending the facilities in the

\textsuperscript{161} FRUS, 1943, Vol. II, Europe, Doc. 512, The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, 24
November 1943. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v02/d512>. [Last
accessed: 10-11-2022].

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{165} TNA CAB 80/76, COS 43 (734), ‘Portuguese Participation in the Capture of Timor’, 27 November 1943.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
Azores’. Finally, an agreement was reached in principle with the Americans, who thus joined the British as the guarantors of the Portuguese Empire.

With this agreement in place, Salazar could afford to relax his diplomatic crusade on the Timor question to a degree, at least until the end of the War was definitively in sight. The United States had paid a high price for their own agreement in the Azores, a price set by Salazar and extracted in part with British help. The broad imperial guarantees afforded by the British in their negotiations had almost been matched by the United States and, while the latter country was less interested in the various colonies, their assurances would set the scene for Portugal’s privileged imperial survival after 1945.

1944

In January 1944, Palmella met Eden and assured the Foreign Secretary that Portugal’s good offices had been used to try and bring Spain closer to the Allied powers: ‘the Portuguese government would do what they could to help’. But: ‘Dr. Salazar had emphasised that Dr. Jordana [sic] was our friend, and he thought we would be wise not to take action which might bring about his downfall’. This was a further example of Portuguese foreign policy aims being dressed up as altruistic political advice. Jordana was reasonably friendly to the United Kingdom (even if he was not, per se, a “friend”). Yet, Portugal’s interest lay not in good Anglo-Spanish relations, which served little immediate interest, but in a secure Spanish government which did not threaten Portugal. That is the more convincing motivator of Palmella’s intervention.

The British Embassy’s annual report for 1943 evidences the “re-writing” of the Salazar and Portugal narrative, even in official, diplomatic accounts: ‘When the year opened, Portugal was still maintaining the strict neutrality which she had adopted at the beginning of the War with the approval of her ally, Great Britain’. There was ‘a hard core of Nationalist opinion that had no wish to see Germany defeated’, but this was restricted to certain individuals in certain roles, particularly in the SPI and the Portuguese Legion; ‘rabid Nationalists, still obsessed by the ideologies of the Spanish civil war’.

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167 Ibid.
168 TNA FO 425/422, C769, Eden to Campbell, 11 January 1944.
169 Ibid.
170 TNA FO 371/39619, C362, Annual Report for 1943, 4 January 1944.
171 Ibid.
Such statements were untrue; most importantly, they would have been understood as such by contemporaries. Great Britain had approved Portuguese neutrality, but it had quickly grown weary of the fastidiousness with which it was observed, particularly in London and, after Campbell’s arrival, in Lisbon. There were clear and profound disagreements about the general form of Portuguese neutrality and about what could be afforded under terms of the Alliance within a neutral framework. There were serious problems on concluding a war trade agreement, leading the Foreign Office to become very sombre about Portuguese neutrality. It was not so much neutrality by agreement as neutrality in dispute.

Moreover, it was understood – indeed Salazar himself even explicitly said – that he did not wish to see Germany defeated. He maintained a clear preference for a negotiated settlement in which Germany would act as a bulwark against Russian communism. The idea that having ‘no wish to see Germany defeated’ was restricted to extreme nationalists, when such a view was expounded by Salazar himself, was absurd. But the more absurd development was that this was being argued not by the dictator, nor by his propaganda secretariat, but by the British Minister in Lisbon.

Wolfram, the United States, Spain, and Portugal

Concern that the Americans were gaining ground in Portugal in 1944 has been well-documented elsewhere. Much less has been written about the effect this had on British policymaking. In January, Roberts confided to Campbell that there was ‘some disquiet in London’ over ‘a certain amount of anxiety here lest Dr. Salazar was beginning to put his money on the U.S.A.’. This led to the Foreign Office gambit of inviting Salazar to London to meet with Churchill. Laying on the dictator’s long-harboured desire both to be fully inducted into the British club and to meet Churchill in particular, he was ‘patently pleased and flattered’ at the invitation. The approach may have been made not so much in hope as without hope that it would be accepted, but in hope that the approach itself would prove a valuable reminder of the British social draw. Its success demonstrated both the awareness of the Foreign Office of their continued cultural pull and, in contrast to what has been argued elsewhere, their success in trying this approach.

172 TNA FO 371/39602, C612, Roberts to Campbell, 11 January 1944.
173 TNA FO 371/39602, C989 Campbell to FO, 23 January 1944.
These fears had provoked a more energetic policy of cultural diplomacy in London, which further contributed to the *habitus* of treating Salazar as a friend. From Lisbon, Campbell assured Whitehall that these fears may have been overstated: ‘Unless something like a miracle occurs, there is no fear that Salazar will regard us as having dropped out of the race and transfer his money to the U.S.A.’. The Americans had, through Kennan, sent a letter to Salazar which the British had never seen. However, Campbell claimed that the Americans had serious problems: being Americans, they could not distinguish between when Salazar was thinking and when he was agreeing. Campbell’s view seemed to be confirmed when, just a few days later, Salazar dedicated much of his meeting with Campbell to slating the United States.

A fear of American influence focused minds in London, and though Campbell appeared unperturbed, his meetings with Salazar seemed to betray some degree of concern. London became more energetic in pushing not only to assuage Salazar but to secure him as one of “theirs”. The threat of American influence, in other words, gave new and urgent life to the process that had been underway since 1939. But what was Salazar’s genuine policy toward America? Did he – as he had suggested to Campbell – see a situation in which the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance would always be the first-rank priority of his foreign policy, at the expense of the Americans? Or did he in fact wish for the British to think this while he pursued closer relations with the United States?

One thing that was obvious was that the United States was playing a significantly more active role in both Spain and Portugal. This was exemplified by its forceful diplomacy on the issue of wolfram. The wolfram issue was not triangular, but rather two or four sets of bilateral relations. However, a trilateral framework allows us to see several continuities in both British and American policies which have hitherto been overlooked. In the case of Caruana and Rockoff’s economic history paper ‘A Wolfram in Sheep’s Clothing’, an earlier working paper addressed Spain and Portugal jointly, but the published article excluded Portugal.

In Spain, where explicit Anglo-American tensions had a much longer pedigree, and where British primacy had never been plainly codified as in Portugal, tensions broke out in winter 1944 over wolfram exports. In January 1944, the American Ambassador in Madrid told Washington that Franco believed Germany could hold firm, and that the War would come to

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175 TNA FO 371/39602, C1192, Campbell to Roberts, 18 January 1944.
176 Ibid.
177 TNA FO 371/39602, C1193, Campbell to Roberts, 22 January 1944
an end only by negotiation in 1946. Accordingly, he was taking a middle line. ‘So long as our economic supplies to Spain particularly of petroleum are furnished as nearly automatically as at present’, Hayes wrote, ‘I fear that he will continue to believe that he can maintain his present attitude without penalty from us’.\(^{179}\) He recommended, in agreement with Hoare, an embargo beginning February.\(^{180}\) The pressure was immediate. At the beginning of February, the Foreign Office suggested limiting exports to Germany to 60 tons a month, ‘a “drastic limitation” which might be acceptable to us [the United States]’.\(^{181}\) It was not: the State Department wished for nothing less than a total embargo.

The issue brought Anglo-American tensions – or rather, tension between London and Washington – about Spanish policy to the boil. The State Department advised Hayes that ‘it probably would be disadvantageous for your British colleague to attempt a discussion with Jordana. This is not the first time your British colleague has differed from your policy, as you are well aware’.\(^{182}\) From mid-February onwards, the issue was elevated to be dealt with by Churchill and Roosevelt, whose positions reflected those of their foreign ministries: ‘Washington argued that if the Allies remained firm, they could have a complete embargo; London argued that Spain would resist the humiliation of a total embargo, but would settle for a face-saving formula, with similar practical effects’.\(^{183}\)

Neither ally “won”, and the affair generated lingering ill-feeling in Washington that their British allies had been too weak and let them down.\(^{184}\) The British gave more ground than they would have liked, and the Americans did not win a total embargo; meanwhile, Spain continued to smuggle significant amounts of wolfram across the Pyrenees.\(^{185}\) While this has been understood as the end of the matter in Spain, these feelings had important reverberations in future dealings with Portugal.

The missing element from these studies is the effect of these negotiations on Portugal, on Hispano-Portuguese relations, and most importantly, on the future course of Portuguese policy. After the panicked Spanish reaction to the American embargo, Teotónio Pereira wrote to Lisbon. The Ambassador strongly disapproved of the Spanish move, believing it weak and craven, and was concerned about the future repercussions of such an early surrender. He


\(^{181}\) Ibid., p. 216.


\(^{183}\) Caruana and Rockoff, ‘Wolfram in Sheep’s Clothing’, pp. 121-123.

\(^{184}\) Leitz, Economic Relations..., p. 190.

\(^{185}\) Ibid., p. 191.
attempted to impress these concerns in Madrid but found himself frozen out: ‘On the Spanish side I only find silence and reserve: Jordana keeping silent or letting this go, certainly because of Franco’.  

The open (and somewhat effective) communication that had characterised 1943 had been lost as Franco, still convinced Germany would not lose, lessened his foreign minister’s latitude.

The combination of Spanish actions in the face of American pressure, weak and worrying, and Franco’s attitude, strong and worrying, convinced the Ambassador that Portugal ought now to distance itself from Spain. He made this point remarkably clearly: ‘I am of the opinion that – while maintaining the same determination to keep Spain on the right path – we should try to make our own policy’.  

More forcefully, he argued that ‘we must have one hand ready to help Spain but the other always ready to swim away from this sinking ship’. Portugal should attempt to align itself with Spain only so long as it was convenient for Portugal.

Franco’s militant delusions that a German victory was still possible and desirable continued. This confirmed Teotónio Pereira in his suspicions that distance was the preferable course. He became increasingly firm on this issue. ‘I don't think such a united front would be convenient – nor even possible. But since it doesn't exist, it only harms us if the rumour is believed. We are not responsible for the way in which Spain has conducted herself, and we gain nothing… on this issue, for the future’. The tense of Portuguese foreign policy had changed away from an urgent present continuous to a determined future perfect: talk was no longer of ‘now’ but of the ‘future’. The Ambassador did not believe that he could influence Franco’s course – and following Franco’s course would be disastrous for Portugal:

I continue to do everything in my power here to maintain the closest contact with this Government and to make them understand that it would be catastrophic if the Spaniards now let themselves get dragged into war on the other side to the one we’re linked to. But as always this refers to a purely unilateral action. Spain goes the whole way on its own desires and it is only, with regret, that it is obliged to recognise our existence and our politics.

The problem was that comparison flowed both ways. With Hoare’s departure from Spain now imminent, the MEW played an increasingly forceful role in policy toward Iberia.

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186 CPTPOS, Vol. IV, Doc. 68, Teotónio Pereira to Salazar, 16 February 1944, pp. 422-430.  
187 Ibid.  
188 Ibid.  
189 Preston, Franco, pp. 506-507.  
191 Ibid.
As had happened after Dalton’s accession, the new power balance in London presented new challenges. Portugal had surreptitiously been exporting tin via Spain; caught by informants, the British protested that Portugal was in effect illegally exporting to Germany. Spain accepted the rebuke. Teotónio Pereira wrote: ‘Since Spain [has] accepted the doctrine […] our position is very difficult to explain. This circular was a very great blow against us’. While the surreptitious export of a few wagons of tin was hardly the great political question of the age, it portended a wider issue for Portugal, the same as with wolfram. It could not be seen to be less co-operative than Spain.

The Ambassador expounded his fears to Salazar:

We are now entering the most critical period, now that Spain – I wouldn’t say, surrendered – but gave up resisting very easily. All the batteries will now be turned the fire on us and politically we are going to run great risks. Is it worth it? In my opinion, it does not suit us to drag out the negotiations. Anything they say against us – now that Spain has buckled – will be more important and carry weight in the future. And this could be costly.

Spain’s wolfram war had passed to become Portugal’s wolfram war; that it had done so demonstrated the extent to which Portugal, by virtue of simple size and geography, would always be beholden to the decisions of her larger neighbour. Teotónio Pereira clearly understood the problem that such a comparison would present. Spain – regarded with suspicion by the Allies – had acted as a shield for Portuguese dealings. Now that shield had disappeared and become a cautionary example. It had generated much Portuguese resentment. It had also generated much risk.

The subsequent decision to suspend wolfram exports to Germany entirely must then – as it has not always hitherto – be seen in light of the Spanish case. For a brief moment, it might have looked as if the Portuguese had escaped the Spanish fate when, in April 1944, the United States upgraded their legation to become a full Embassy. But behind this public symbol of close relations, the United States pushed for a total cessation of wolfram exports from Portugal. Acting under US pressure, Britain was no longer able to ‘turn a blind eye’ to Portuguese wolfram exports. Accepting payments only in kind – ‘arms and gold’ – Portugal had

192 CPTPOS, Vol. IV, Doc. 79b, Demarché, probably by Ellis-Rees, 14 April 1944, p. 492.
193 CPTPOS, Vol. IV, Doc. 80, Teotónio Pereira to Salazar, 19 April 1944, pp. 493-497.
194 CPTPOS, Vol. IV, Doc. 84, Teotónio Pereira to Salazar, 2 May 1944, pp. 518-524.
196 TNA FO 425/422, Enclosure in: C5518, Campbell to Foreign Office, 22 April 1944.
197 Wigg, *Churchill and Spain*, p. 105.
stockpiled ‘between 38 and 47 million tons of German gold’. In 1943, Portugal had produced more than 60% of the available wolfram in Europe.

As in Spain, the United Kingdom was less inclined to support a demand for a total and immediate embargo. As in Spain, it was Churchill’s intervention which had particular impact at this crucial juncture. But unlike in Spain, Churchill’s interventions remain in the shadows. At the end of May, he wrote to Roosevelt: during the Azores agreement, ‘as you know I was prepared to go all lengths; but still be felt it would be incongruous for our two countries to maltreat a small neutral’. In the end, Portugal had conceded facilities to the United States with ‘consent and in the name of the old British Treaty’. With wolfram, therefore, Churchill suggested limiting Portugal simply to exporting only 40 tonnes a month for the coming three months. ‘We find it difficult to keep in step’ with the United States’ policy toward Portugal; Britain had to ‘wrangle over wolfram’ with ‘this oddity Salazar’ while the United States made ‘a sort of sign to them that all is well’ with the upgrade to an Embassy. Then, the United States Chiefs wished Portugal to join the entire War; then, Portugal were assured there would be no sanctions to do with wolfram; then, they were told a total embargo was wanted.

Britain, Churchill suggested, had worked with the Portuguese to secure facilities in the Azores without guarantee of military aid. Therefore, ‘I find it hard to be too rough with them’. He concluded: ‘we are doing our very best; but earnestly ask you to let us play the hand in order to achieve the best results for both’. This was a question of pure, rather old-fashioned, spheres of influence. The British followed the American lead in South America – would they not see the benefit of returning the favour? Churchill’s letter betrayed some irritation, but in Eden’s Foreign Office-inspired antecedents to the letter, there was also fear of displacement and of lost influence. It was not a simple disagreement over wolfram; it was a disagreement over creeping American influence and over the privileged British position that had governed Anglo-American policy in Portugal. It was a disagreement over power and its exercise.

198 Stone, Spain, Portugal, p. 174.
200 TNA CAB 120/674, Churchill to Roosevelt, 22 May 1944.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
At the start of June, Campbell wrote to Halifax; the United States government ‘would do well to fall into line’. Their alternative of ‘pushing [the] matter to breaking point […] would leave an atmosphere of ill-feeling’ in which future concessions would be unlikely, if it worked at all. He summed up: ‘It must not be forgotten that Dr. Salazar is not a wholehearted ally’. He had ‘a constitutional instinct against yielding about anything what[so]ever’; ‘This is why he employs every art of temporization and prevarication in meeting our requests, whilst clinging simultaneously to the advantage of alliance’.

Campbell had become an ultra-realist about Salazar, and this guided not only his dealings with him, but the British Government’s approach and, through Halifax, influenced the American position as well. The dictator rode two horses at once; he wanted the benefits of neutrality as well as of allyship. This was an irritant, but it was also the price to be paid. In contrast to studies which have seen only wolfram as the price of neutrality, this study shows that wolfram needs to be understood simply as one part of a larger relationship in which the price to be paid for Portuguese concessions was a benevolent attitude to its duplicitous neutrality.

While Anglo-American relations over Portuguese wolfram were riven with power-motivated divisions, the direction of travel was obvious. Salazar had given an ambiguous “half-way” house style concession on 3 June, and on 5 June he gave in completely. The fall of Rome was particularly emotionally salient: it was one thing for the Allies to take southern Italy, another for them to take the heart of Roman Catholic Christendom. On 7 June, Eden announced the Commons that ‘further proof of Anglo-Portuguese friendship’ was cemented, which would ensure a strong ‘bond between the Governments and peoples of the British Commonwealth and of Portugal in the future as in the past’. The speech was ‘frankly good’ and ‘very favourable’, wrote Teotónio Pereira, and it was a stroke of luck that it happened just before D-Day, when any agreement would have been too late to generate much goodwill.

What, conceptually, was the Portuguese position on wolfram after the concession of the Azores? Was it the last vestige of the former policy of strict neutrality? Was it a hold-out against the impression of total capitulation? Was it a legitimate defence of Portugal’s

207 TNA CAB 122/965, Campbell to Halifax, 5 June 1944.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
212 CPTPOS, Vol. IV, Doc. 93, Teotónio Pereira to Salazar, 7 June 1944, pp. 568-571.
sovereignty? The Americans seemed not to care, and so Anglo-American tensions over Portugal continued to mount, mirroring the difficulties in Spain in earlier stages of the War. Again, a comparative approach frees us from the illusion that Spain was a unique case. After it was intimated to Halifax in Washington that the Americans were unhappy with Britain’s slow, conciliatory conduct toward Salazar, Campbell retorted furiously: ‘I am not clear what the State Department means by reproaching us with “leniency” towards the Portuguese. The only thing the Americans have wanted from the Portuguese they have obtained through the medium of British alliance’.213 Campbell particularly objected to the American implication that Portugal should be forced to enter the War against Japan. He did so on strategic grounds: ‘If we exercise pressure we shall expose ourselves […] to a number of exaggerated counter-demands’.214 In short, just as neutrality came with a price, so too would belligerency; and that price would be higher than either ally ought to be willing to pay. Eden agreed.215

British fears about American primacy motivated much policymaking from 1944 onwards. But were these fears well-founded? Were they to lose their primacy in Portugal? In summer 1944, there were indications that these fears were misplaced, or at least premature. As Palmella put Salazar’s view to Eden: ‘We have, the President says, the U.S.A.-U.K.-Portugal triangle, we are allies of England and we are friends of America’.216 With Britain, Portugal ‘could take certain actions which seem to harm our neutrality’ on the basis of the Alliance, but ‘with the Americans we cannot do anything without breaking our neutrality: we are friends, but we are not allies’.217 His irritated dismissal of American insistence that facilities at Santa Maria would help with ‘operations in the Far East’ revealed a continuing mistrust of Uncle Sam.218 The American gambit – ‘almost anodyne’ – was too facile to fool the dictator, since it went without saying that the islands were the wrong way from the United States to Japan.219

The idea that in 1944, Salazar had already definitively thrown his lot in with the United States is a premature, even naïve, view.220

213 TNA CAB 122/965, Campbell to Halifax, 20 June 1944.
214 Ibid.
215 TNA CAB 122/965, Eden to Halifax, 21 June 1944.
217 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
Partly the Portuguese position stemmed from the difference in strength between the two countries, and again a comparative approach helps us to see the historical picture more fully. Portugal had fewer urgent material and economic needs than Spain, and had already offered significant concessions elsewhere. Thus, the wolfram issue would be negotiated from a position of strength. But at the same time, this position of strength could become precarious and perilous. Weakness – as in Spain – translated to helpfulness in negotiations. Strength – as in Portugal – translated to intransigence. This was ‘beginning to chafe’ and led to unfavourable comparisons. In February, it was noted that Portugal was behaving even more intransigently than Spain, and it was minuted that ‘we ought to get much better from an ally’. Drogheda, of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, pointed out that ‘Spanish concessions […] had a great effect on in influencing Salazar’, and that Spain’s embargo during negotiations had been ‘in marked contrast’ to Portugal’s attitude. This was an unfavourable and even threatening comparison.

What the British bought Portugal was a respite from American pressure, not a reprieve. In October, Norweb was instructed to issue an ultimatum: economic aid and further supplies would depend on Portugal allowing an airport in the Azores. When this was presented to Sampayo two days later, the normally unflappable diplomatic chief ‘evinced some agitation’ and told Norweb ‘that it was far too “hot” for him to handle’. After some verbal wrangling, Salazar agreed to reverse his position in exchange for an American guarantee of Portuguese sovereignty in Timor.

This agreement had important implications, both for Portugal’s future participation in the post-War settlement and for the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The United States had obtained concessions ‘greater than the British obtained via higher price’, and ‘even though we have no alliance to invoke’, had signed a treaty on ‘better terms than the British’ with no commitment to wider ‘political and economic guarantees’. Moreover, ‘the bugbear of British insinuation into control has been eliminated’. Norweb had bested the British, not only through obtaining

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{221} Stevens, ‘Portuguese Wolfram’, p. 550.} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{222} TNA FO 371/39570/3318; Winant to State Department, 27 February 1944.} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{223} TNA CAB 122/965, Drogheda to Dingle Foot (in Washington), 8 June 1944.} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{224} FRUS, 1944, Vol. IV, Doc. 82, Secretary of State to Norweb, 6 October 1944. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v04/d82>. [Last accessed: 10-11-2022].} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{226} FRUS, 1944, Vol. IV, Doc. 85, Norweb to Secretary of State, 11 October 1944. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v04/d85>. [Last accessed: 10-11-2022].} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.}
a more favourable agreement, but through largely removing them from negotiations and altogether from control over Allied-Portuguese relations more generally.

This was the harbinger of three changes. Firstly, it was obvious that the Americans were willing to use more forceful tactics, backed by a position of economic superiority. Secondly, the Americans were willing to act without the British being involved, as in previous negotiations. Finally, this implied a wider change in Allied-Portuguese relations, one in which the Alliance no longer guaranteed the British primacy in Portugal. The inversion that had earlier taken place in Spain was now happening in Portugal. It bore many of the same hallmarks: an American inclination toward strong-arm diplomacy coupled with the ability to use economic force to back this up, and simmering – though never existentially threatening – Anglo-American resentment over looming American supremacy.

The outcome of Salazar’s slow and cautious policy makes considerably more sense when examined next to that of Spain. What had he gained from all his foot-dragging over the Santa Maria airfield and wolfram? Not goodwill, to be sure. If anything, his over-thoughtful approach had bred a good deal of irritation, particularly amongst those who had to deal with direct in Lisbon. But he had obtained two important assurances: one, on the commencement of a programme of economic aid, probably paid for from London’s coffers; and two, guarantees over Timor. In other words, in the face of threats Salazar had been able to extract concessions. Spain, meanwhile, had extracted no concessions: only the return of shipping it could not live without.

The death of Jordana and Hispano-Portuguese relations

Hispano-Portuguese relations worsened significantly after the sudden death of Jordana in August 1944. Chances of future policy alignment, progressively slimming through 1944, definitively died. Teotónio Pereira paid homage to ‘his smiling calm, his good sense, his consistent character, his honourability and dignity […] [which] made it a real pleasure to deal with any topic with him’.229 He was a ‘true friend of Portugal’ who admired Salazar and held his country up as a true equal.230 But his personal mourning was the most moving tribute: ‘I

229 CPTPOS, Vol. IV, Doc. 100, Teotónio Pereira to Salazar, 6 August 1944, pp. 594-596.
230 Ibid.
know that I have lost in him a friend with a great soul’. Hoare wrote Jordana a eulogy in *The Times*.

In light of the previous year’s good relations and the last eight months’ difficulties, it was obvious why Teotónio Pereira’s was so upset. Relations with Spain were good in large part because of Jordana; they turned bad when Franco overruled him. Lequerica was ‘a militant germanophile’ and ‘was evidently not a man of Jordana’s moral fibre’; Teotónio Pereira softly tried to persuade him to give him time. Jordana’s death and his replacement by a man of uncertain politics and morality clearly augured badly for Hispano-Portuguese relations; they also augured badly for British views on Spain.

Jordana’s death represented the final demise of closer relations which he had done so much to better and, in the end, personified. All this meant that in London, Portuguese diplomacy increasingly turned to securing Portugal’s position after the War. In October, Eden intimated to Palmella certain details about the Washington Conference. The Ambassador explained Portuguese fears about American interests in the Azores and the future place of Portugal in the future world system. Eden ‘said that we had no reason to be wary, and promised that before the Conference he would speak [to us]’. He then offered the Ambassador reassurance in more specific terms. He ‘referred to the Western European group for the first time […] He explained that this group was made up of Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France and Portugal. I noticed that he did not mention Spain’. A few days later, Palmella met Orme Sergeant and Cadogan, who, wishing for neither ‘irritating discussions or any friction’, asked the Portuguese Government in very careful tones for ‘a generic declaration’ about war criminals. A fortnight later, Selborne declared that the United Kingdom could no longer pay *dividas* in gold. There were increasing diplomatic opportunities for the Portuguese state to exploit.

This was to be Portugal’s path alone. In October 1944, Teotónio Pereira described the final break in trajectories between Portugal and Spain: ‘I saw that the Generalissimo had no desire to act in concert with us on the way forward, despite the opportunity offered to him’. As if to emphasise how bad things had become, the casual revanchist ideology of Súñer’s reign

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231 Ibid.
233 CPTPOS, Vol. IV, Doc. 104, Teotónio Pereira to Salazar, 4 September 1944, pp. 608-611.
234 TdT AOS/B/0011, Folder 2, Conversa com Eden, 3 October 1944.
235 Ibid.
236 TdT AOS/B/0011, Folder 2, Conversa com Orme Sergeant, 9 October 1944.
237 TdT AOS/B/0011, Folder 2, Conversa com Selborne, 21 December 1944.
arose once again. On being asked about outstanding economic issues with Portugal, the Minister of Finance, Demetrio Carceller, was reported to have snapped that “All this with Portugal deserves just one solution: occupy it and administer it on our account”.

In Spain, the personal element of Anglo-American rivalry became so acute that neither the American Ambassador nor his wife saw off Lady Templewood when she left Spain. The Portuguese Ambassador, very warmly sent off by Lady Templewood, took the opportunity on the tarmac before her flight to give her his speech in Córdoba, for her and her husband to read and in the hope it ‘could be useful in London’. Hoare liked the text so much he wrote back to say he would shortly return to Madrid ‘to bid farewell “to friends”’.

Relations with Spain continued to regress. A long note by Salazar entitled ‘Portugal – Spain’ laid out his views of the situation: ‘In his last interview the Generalissimo made no reference to the peninsula bloc’, but ‘this should not surprise us. This is in harmony with the previous attitude of the Generalissimo: it is known that Franco never refers to Portugal because of a vague and unjustified feeling that Spain is somehow diminished by this’. The plain uncertainties and mistrust that had characterised relations at the start of the War returned, with Lequerica assuring the Portuguese that Spain had no intention of recognising the Soviet government.

It seemed Salazar and Teotónio Pereira disapproved of everything. He disapproved of Franco’s ‘marked approximation toward the United States’, partly ‘a reaction against the English manner [of doing things] which is sometimes official English policy and is sometimes what they permit certain sectors of English (left-wing) opinion to do toward Spain’. Fearful of their prized spokesman’s departure, Salazar concluded that ‘Hoare’s departure is disastrous for everyone’. Again, a focus on Spain allows us to shed new light on a conundrum in Portuguese politics. If by late 1944 Salazar had become definitively pro-American, why did he regard Spain’s turn toward the United States with such hesitancy? Apart from the broader question, Salazar still harboured one fear above all: ‘For us the fall of Franco, if he were not

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240 Ibid.  
241 Ibid.  
242 Ibid.  
244 Ibid.  
245 Ibid.  
246 Ibid.
replaced by the Monarchy, would be disastrous, and not only for us but for the entire Peninsula’. 247

It was this fear rather than any continued genuine closeness of relations with Spain that helped to guide Portuguese foreign policy from November 1944 onward. Portuguese foreign policy was increasingly premised on two things: securing the future of the regime within Allied aegis and ensuring Franco survived in office in Spain. The latter was an ancillary aim of the former. At the start of December, at a party in Madrid, Teotónio Pereira saw Norweb, where he ‘explained to him the role of our protocol with Spain in July 1940’. 248 By this point, it was obvious that this was a convenient myth. Antas de Oliveira, the Portuguese Counsellor, put it to Kindelán that ‘There is one thing which cannot be denied. Franco defended peace in the Peninsula and made an agreement which Portugal which is proof of his good faith’. 249 ‘You’re deceived’, replied Kindelán; ‘It’s not like that. The truth is that Franco had a secret military agreement with the Germans to join them at a convenient moment, and this agreement was reached as Hitler had promised him a free hand in North Africa’. 250 In fact, ‘Kindelan said he knew all of these things straight from Franco’s own mouth’. 251 The myth had been explicitly spelt out to Antas de Oliveira, and in turn to Teotónio Pereira and to Salazar. But the three men knew well that they had strong motivation to perpetuate it.

In December 1944, the Portuguese crusade for the regime and its Empire began again with renewed enthusiasm. On 21 December, Palmela appealed to his ‘friend’ Cadogan for an audience with Eden, who he found ‘visibly tired after the two days of parliamentary debate’. 252 Fearing time was short, he nonetheless quickly began rattling off questions and instructions from Lisbon about the Timor case. 253 After some discussion about Spain and the wider conduct of the War, ‘the moment had arrived to talk about the western bloc and ask whether England had lost interest in the subject’. 254 ‘In some ways’, replied Eden, but it was still in some ways, cautiously, on track. 255 The degree of caution and question of whether such a plan remained on track would be of definitive importance for the form of the Estado Novo’s survival.

249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
255 Ibid.
The Portuguese play for privileged survival

For Salazar, 1945 began inauspiciously at home, but ‘The domestic situation, if anything, seemed to be worsening’.256 ‘Morale in the armed forces was especially low’, threatening the aegis which underpinned his state.257 Amidst this unhappy domestic situation, Salazar met Campbell on 26 January. Campbell was full of fearful premonitions about Salazar and the Soviet Union’s plans for Europe, and seeking assurances about his place in the post-War order: ‘He spoke again of a Western bloc and looked rather glum when I suggested that, although this, in my opinion, was a desirable development […] it should on no account have the appearance of being directed against Russia’.258 Still: ‘He remains convinced that Stalin will never consult any interest save those of Russia and that every effort to transform him into a good European is foredoomed to disappointment’.259 The implication was obvious; Salazar was already a good European. The question was not, for him or for Campbell, whether Portugal would participate in this Western Bloc, but the precise form of its participation.

The two contexts were linked, and the British attitude was to have a decisive bearing on why domestic rumblings did not materialise into serious threats in the next two years. On 19 February, Campbell wrote to London to tell them that Salazar had undoubtedly faced ‘the most serious internal crisis’ of his rule so far, a military ‘revolt’ over conditions, pay, and the country’s political constitution.260 This revolt was particularly serious, since it was rumoured that Carmona was supportive of the cause; though a highly unequal diarchy, Carmona’s presence was a sine qua non for the Estado Novo. Even Santos Costa, the newly promoted German-leaning Minister of War, made critical remarks about military pay in the context of Portugal’s gold reserves.261

While Salazar’s steady ability to stare down internal critics has been well-documented, the implicit British support for his place in the Western bloc has hitherto been neglected as a contributing factor to his ability to survive such crises. At the next Council of Ministers, he took them all to task with a lecture, before sweeping ‘his listeners with a stony glare’ and leaving immediately.262 Performing his usual trick of absenting himself to Santa Comba, he returned and conceded a pay rise. He had won, said Campbell, ‘at the expense of a serious blow

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256 De Meneses, Salazar, p. 328.
257 Ibid.
258 TNA FO 425/423, Z1492, Campbell to Eden, 28 January 1945.
259 Ibid.
260 TNA FO 425/423, Z2748, Campbell to Eden, 19 February 1945.
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
to his prestige’. The ‘shock’ of the fact that they would no longer ‘follow him blindfold [sic]’ had damaged him; ‘His ship has sprung a leak, and when further dirty weather is encountered it will less easily withstand the strain’.

Still, Salazar fulfilled Campbell’s belief that he would not bend towards democracy: ‘I have always expressed the opinion that, as popular clamour for a return to democratic institutions became more insistent and more vocal with the approach of the Allied victory, Dr. Salazar would decline to bow to it’. He might make a few superficial changes designed to ‘give him the appearance of moving with the times’, but he would not fundamentally change. The question was whether these superficial changes would be enough; whether implicit British support would hold, as it had through his predicaments in January and February 1945. If Salazar’s domestic support was sapping, with loyal ministers prepared to criticise him, and Carmona linked to embryonic coups, international support was ever more crucial to sustain his regime.

Even more pressing was the question of colonial guarantees, where the British attitude was to be decisive. Portugal had been afforded a role in Timor’s recapture in principle – but would that guarantee hold? The degree to which the European and imperial spheres were inexorably linked was highlighted when in February Palmela sought out Orme Sergeant to discuss the post-War settlement, the communist threat in Europe and, of course, ‘the lack of reply to our requests about Timor’. Going through to meet Hoyer Miller, they spoke, again, about Timor. Again on 3 March, Palmela met with Eden, and on entering his office asked immediately asked ‘about Timor’, underlined in thick pencil by Salazar. Eden ‘hoped […] in a few short days to give us the response of the Combined Chiefs of Staff which he judged would bring us full satisfaction’. While Eden was making positive sounds, the increasing desperation rankled the Foreign Office. Alexander Cadogan, who saw Palmela on 10 March, recalled it thus in his diary: ‘Friday 10 March 12.30. Palmella, about Timor. That is sheer pantomime’.

How, then, would international – and particularly British – support hold up, both domestically and imperially? In February 1945 Palmella reported that ‘for Franco […] the

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263 TNA FO 425/423, Z2748, Campbell to Eden, 19 February 1945.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
271 Cadogan, p. 609.
situation is worse every day’. 272 Meeting the Tablet’s Douglass Woodruff, Palmela learned that ‘there was a general offensive on against Franco and his regime’, that ‘Belgium and Holland refused a Spanish minister’ and Owen O’Malley, who had been lined up to replace Hoare, had refused the post.273 As Palmela noted: ‘Talking about what happened at the Trades Union Congress, Woodruff regretted that they were always deliberately mixing Spain and Portugal up together’. 274 The editor’s ruing highlighted a serious risk: what if Spain and Portugal were to be mixed up together? What if domestic discord could not be defeated? What if the colonial guarantees would not, at the last, come good?

**Anglo-American competition and the return of appeasement**

Growing British concern about the influence of the United States would help the Portuguese. The wolfram affair and direct Portuguese approaches to the United States concerning imperial guarantees had grown British fears about American influence; in early 1945, these fears acquired an economic dimension.275 In particular, concern that Portugal would not return to the ‘Sterling Bloc’ began to grow.276 Britain’s position as ‘the world’s greatest debtor’ meant that ‘both altruism and self-interest required international expansion’ to stymie the rise of the Dollar’s ascendancy.277 The Treasury’s Ellis Rees was sent to negotiate, in a unique position of strength (possessing Sterling) and weakness (needing Portugal to use it for trade). This made for an interesting power balance in the conversation: ‘England wanted a new financial agreement for the future, it wanted a Sterling bloc and it was asking for help from friendly countries’.278 Britain needed assistance: ‘The rehabilitation of Sterling is a necessity for Britain but it cannot do it without help’.279 Both countries had something to gain from such an approach: Britain, strength and prestige for its currency; and Portugal, the

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272 TdT AOS/B/0011, Jantar com Cartier, 9 February 1945.
274 Ibid.
275 TNA FO 371/39604, C10830, Campbell to F.O., 9 August 1944.
276 Before the War, Portugal had belonged to the British “bloc”, one of several blocs in the pre-War system. After the 1920s, the world’s major economies had been divided into several groups: the ‘Dollar Bloc’; the ‘Gold Bloc’: France, Italy, Switzerland, and the Netherlands; the Central European Bloc: Austria, Czechoslovakia; and the ‘Sterling Area’. Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin, ‘Trade blocs, currency blocs and the reorientation of world trade in the 1930s’, *Journal of International Economics*, 38 (1005), 1-24 (p. 7).
278 TdT AOS/B/0011, Conversa com Ellis Rees, 16 February 1945.
279 Ibid.
political stability conferred by choosing to trade in Sterling. It was much harder to justify political action against a country in one’s own economic bloc.

Rees’ mission was not helped by the diffuse nature of British policymaking, particularly when three days later Garran made the indiscreet comment that ‘instability in economic relations could not hinder the immutable stability of political relations’. 280 Palmela was rightly particularly pleased with these comments, as Garran was in early 1945 ‘the only “expert” in Portuguese issues in the Foreign Office’. 281 Having served as Second Secretary in Portugal during the War, he had already shown himself well-disposed to Portugal, its dictator, and its Ambassador. 282 The Portugal desk was now his, and any risk that might have come with a “changing of the guard” in the Foreign Office’s Western Department seemed, at least for the moment, to have been avoided. Garran showed himself quite open continue along long well-established lines, openly discussing Franco’s future in Spain while taking Salazar’s in Portugal for granted. 283 Yet, Garran appeared to be making a familiar British mistake; seeing Portugal in a mirror, dimly. Portugal was unlikely to go the way Australia was threatening, abandoning its traditional relationship with Great Britain for a new one with the United States. 284 But with Garran heading Portuguese affairs at the Foreign Office, the Estado Novo’s interests were protected there at a crucial juncture.

There was, however, still a strong motivation to secure the best possible outcome for the regime. In March 1945, Eden met with Palmella and offered several guarded assurances about the place of ‘neutrals’ in the United Nations. 285 The Ambassador expressed irritation that small countries had been invited while ‘Spain and Portugal which, without a doubt, had founded civilisations’, had not. 286 The Foreign Secretary offered further assurances and said that ‘there had been no reference to Portugal at the Yalta Conference’. 287 But he grew somewhat animated during a conversation about Spain, telling Palmella that ‘Franco is behaving like a fool’, had been ‘very silly’, and that ‘Franco is a dunce’. 288 Perhaps inspired

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281 Ibid.
283 TdT AOS/B/0011, Almoço com Garram, 19 February 1945.
285 TdT AOS/B/0011, Folder 5, Conversa com Eden, 8 March 1945.
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid.
by Eden’s outbursts, the Ambassador moved to offer the Foreign Secretary some advice: ‘A revolution in Spain could cause the country to fall into a communist regime’ which would put Russia in the heart of the Mediterranean and ‘Western Europe’ and cause ‘great disadvantages for us and, much less for the British Empire’.289 This was not well-received; ‘Eden showed himself visibly irritated’ and snapped that ‘“the British Empire knows her interests better than anyone”’.290 When the Ambassador said he had simply ‘been thinking aloud’, Eden retorted that Campbell had always had to listen to advice from Salazar ‘but never really agreed with it’.291 He said the Government’s view was that each government knew its own interests best; ‘“if only the same could be said of each government”’.292

The Portuguese had forced Eden to boiling point: ‘The ferocity with which Eden responded’ would dissuade the Ambassador from in future offering ‘any reflection which appears to be advice’.293 The age of accepting Portuguese advice, as had been the case in the War’s early stages, was over – without the risk of Spanish belligerency, Portuguese agency was greatly reduced. Peace planning rendered Portuguese advice unnecessary. Similarly, Hoare’s departure from Spain – the mission on which he had been sent either complete or redundant – had robbed Portugal of its interlocutor and revealed the ugliness of its dealings. Finally, both pointed toward a situation in which Portuguese political leverage in Great Britain had been greatly reduced. The new situation of more stable Anglo-Portuguese friendship brought with it security, but it also diminished Portugal’s ability to attempt to intervene in British policy.

From then onwards, the continued obsession with Timor and the colonial settlement became a serious irritant. Following Salazar’s senseless decision to lower the Portuguese flags after Hitler’s death, the British reacted with fury. At the Foreign Office, Oliver Harvey called Palmela to see him, ‘charged with expressing to me the deep regret of His Majesty’s at the Portuguese national mourning at the death of Hitler’.294 In this moment of profound bitterness and even hurt, Palmela ‘tried again to undo the bad impression’; ‘Then I turned to talk about Timor’.295 Salazar made no notes or marks on the harrowing talk about Hitler, but he underlined the sentence on Timor and highlighted the entire paragraph in the margin.296 The next day,
Palmela met Richard Law (an MP and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs). Law commented that Britain was ‘deeply hurt’ and that Portugal had committed a ‘big blunder’. 297 As Palmela had done previously: ‘Then I turned the conversation to Timor’. 298 Again, Salazar highlighted the paragraph; Timor, even above cordial relations with England, was his real interest.

But for all Eden’s utter disdain for Palmella’s over-bearing approach, and the wider qualms about Salazar’s foreign policy, and the resentment of growing American influence, it was possible that Portuguese foreign policy had ultimately been successful. At least the Prime Minister had been converted. Churchill’s own view on Portugal, and Salazar’s capriciousness, combined his usual paternalism with a degree of complicity; ‘If you are a 400 year old Ally, you must be able to kick about sometimes as you choose. I should treat them like well-loved children who make absurd grimaces’. 299

297 Which Palmela included in the original English. Ibid.
298 Ibid.
299 TNA FO 954/21/8269, Churchill minute to Law, 10 May 1945.
Chapter Four: The End of the War and the Labour Government

How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world,
That has such people in ’t!

_The Tempest_, V. 1. 186-187

On 8 May 1945, Alfred Jodl signed the German Instrument of Surrender and the War in Europe ended. Portugal made no secret of its joy at this outcome; ‘GERMANY CAPITULATED: Surrenders without conditions’ ran as the headline in the _Diário da Notícias_.¹ Beneath it, there was the congratulatory explanation: ‘Portugal and the victory of the Allies’.² Salazar, at the very height of his serpentine statecraft, wrote the same day to tell of Portugal’s ‘great and sincere joy’ at Britain’s victory.³ Like Miranda’s joy at the island’s new arrivals, the regime’s panegyric belied a certain latent fear: what would Portugal’s place be in the new world?

Beneath these public declarations of joy, there were clear uncertainties. The War had produced the circumstances in which the _Estado Novo_ had been able to occupy a unique role as an allied neutral. What position would it take now the War was over? Would British benevolence continue? Would the colonial guarantees that had been afforded to its Empire last after 1945? These uncertainties became distinctly more threatening with the election of a socialist Labour government in July 1945, distinctly hostile to Franco’s Spain and inimical to Salazar’s worldview.

The regime’s anxieties centred around three great uncertainties, all linked to the election of the Labour government. Firstly, there was the direct effect of a Labour government on Portugal – would this provoke a crisis in bilateral relations? Secondly, there was the knock-on effect of socialist government in Portugal – would this inspire the Portuguese opposition amidst a febrile political atmosphere? Could the regime count on HMG to support it against new internal opposition? Thirdly, there was the question of the effect of the new Labour government on Spain. Would Labour’s hostility to Franco see the regime fall; and would Franco’s fall bring Salazar’s with it?

² Ibid.
³ CHU CHAR 20/228/111, Salazar to Churchill, 8 May 1945.
In 1945 and 1946, the *Estado Novo* faced an under-appreciated struggle for its immediate survival. This struggle was intrinsically linked with both Britain and Spain. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate these potential threats, to explain why they never materialised into a serious threat against the regime, and to link this to the regime’s privileged survival. It begins by explaining the gaps in our understanding, particularly concerning international attitudes to Portugal after 1945. Drawing comparisons with Spain, it shows why discussions about the regime’s future became the almost exclusive preserve of the British government. Finally, it analyses why the above challenges did not topple the regime, assessing the long legacy of the wartime relationship and its importance in the post-War years.

**The dangerous biennium and the liminal biennium**

The pre-eminent question in the Iberian Peninsula in 1945 was: what would happen to fascist fellow-traveller Franco after 1945? This was the “Spanish Question”, the best account of which is Enrique Moradiellos’ ‘The Potsdam Conference and the Spanish Problem’.\(^4\) The Potsdam Conference ended with strong censure against Franco, but contained ‘no effective sanctions, whether diplomatic, economic or military, against the censured Franco regime’.\(^5\) After this, ‘between 1946 and 1947 British and US diplomacy progressively abandoned the policy of rhetorical “pin-pricks” as far as Western public opinion allowed and as the Cold War took hold’.\(^6\)

Clearly, Franco’s wartime conduct accounted for the international opprobrium his regime suffered after 1945.\(^7\) The regime’s gradual rehabilitation, particularly its attempts at integration into the post-1945 American peace, has attracted a great deal of attention, much of which is centred around Spain’s relations with the UN. Dedicated research on the topic began in the United States in the 1960s, greatly amplified in quality and volume after Alberto Lleonart and Fernando María Castiella’s 1978 volume *España y ONU*.\(^8\) Lleonart’s later single-authored article ‘El ingreso de España en la ONU’ was printed in an issue of *Cuadernos de Historia*

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\(^5\) Ibid., p. 74.
\(^6\) Ibid., p. 90.
Contemporánea dedicated to the UN, and offered a succinct account of how changing geopolitical winds in the UN led to Spanish entry.9

In the same issue, Antonio Fernández García and Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares’s 1995 article ‘La percepción española de la ONU (1945-1962)’ provided a robust account of the Spanish attitude to the UN during the years of the “Spanish Question”, particularly the Falange’s frequently hostile attitude in the press.10 A useful companion piece, Arturo Jarque Iñíguez’s journal article ‘Estados Unidos Ante El Caso Español En La ONU’ explains the American attitude to the Spanish Question at the UN Security Council and in the General Assembly.11 More recent volumes, including Irene Sánchez González’s Diez años de soledad, have had a broader focus on Spain’s relations with the West, but Sánchez González’s monograph is again focused on the process of UN entry after 1948.12 These studies are helpful for understanding Spain’s process of integration into the UN, particularly after 1947.

Alongside these texts, works by Javier Tusell and Paul Preston detail Franco’s policy of Catholic camouflage after 1945, continuing the process of replacing the Falangist plurality with a more Catholic-monarchist lilt.13 The function of these changes in the international arena, and their link to Portugal, are discussed in the chapter. Perhaps the only work to fully synthesise Spain’s internal situation with a comprehensive account of the regime’s attempts to attain international legitimacy or at least escape international censure after 1945 is Franco Portero’s Franco Aislado. Portero’s rather brief 1988 article on the Labour government’s policy toward Spain relied mainly on Bevin’s House of Commons statements.14 At greater length in the book, Portero highlights the British Cabinet’s prevarication over Spain, fearing intervention for a huge host of reasons centred around stability in Spain.15

In Spain, then, we have a clear understanding of two things: the regime’s manifold challenges and the manner of its eventual, Cold War-inspired integration into the Western

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10 Antonio Fernández García and Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares, ‘La percepción española de la ONU (1945-1962)’, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, 17 (1995), 121-146 (pp. 128-129).
12 Irene Sánchez González, Diez años de soledad: España, la ONU y la dictadura franquista, 1945-1955 (Seville: Editorial Universidad de Sevilla, 2015).
13 Javier Tusell, Franco y los católicos: La política interior española entre 1945 y 1957 (Madrid: Alianza, 1984), pp. 36-38; Preston, Franco, pp. 533-534.
comity, including *inter alia* the Marshall plan. These two historical phenomena are linked by their origins in Spain’s wartime conduct, which accounted for Francoist Spain’s period of isolation and delayed integration. But what happened to a regime which did not suffer this international opprobrium? Were the challenges faced by the *Estado Novo* analogous to those faced by Franco’s Spain? In light of these challenges, whether analogous or not, why was Salazar’s route to Western respectability so different? Could the Azores alone explain Portugal’s ready invitation to the Marshall Plan in 1947, to NATO in 1949, and to a series of colonial conferences before 1950?

On the topic of Portugal’s participation in these bodies, the Marshall Plan, NATO, the OEEC, as well as several explicitly Western conferences, we have a significant corpus of quality scholarship. This covers both the broad trends and the specific processes. De Meneses has talked of the ‘gradual evolution towards the acceptance of partnership’ with Western Europe after 1947. Similarly, José Medeiros Ferreira’s overview of Portuguese foreign policy in the twentieth century concluded that Salazar had ‘the greatest openness toward the continental powers after the Spanish Civil War than any other Portuguese leader since Barros Gomes or Barbosa du Bocage’.

Individual processes of integration into formal bodies are similarly well-understood. Nuno Severiano Teixeira and António Telo have studied Portugal’s entry and position in NATO from 1949 to 1989 and 1976 respectively. Maria Fernanda Rollo’s account of Portugal in the Marshall Plan explains the country’s candidature and, most usefully, the function of the funds and their use in Portugal, with a particular focus on the 1950s. The best account of Portugal’s integration into the nascent OEEC, beginning in 1947, was written by Nicolau Andresen. Lucia Coppolaro and Pedro Lains, meanwhile, wrote a useful overview economic history of Portugal and its integration into the European mainstream, focusing on the above

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18 José Medeiros Ferreira, ‘Características históricas da política externa portuguesa entre 1890 e a entrada na ONU’, *Política Internacional*, 1, 6 (1993), 113-156 (p. 126). Barbosa du Bocage and Barros Gomes both served as Foreign Minister, 1883-1886 and 1886-1890 respectively.
mentioned institutions as well as the European Payments Union, the European Free Trade Area, and the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs.  

There is thus a clear gap: the international history of Portugal between 1945 and 1947, which accounts for the attitude of Great Britain and the general trends in Portugal’s relations with the Western Allies. The precedents of Portugal’s integration into the European mainstream remain to be uncovered; the changing role of Great Britain as its de facto Western protector remains little-understood, and above all, there is a knowledge gap between the end of the Second World War and the start of the Cold War. Without a solid understanding of Portugal’s international situation in this liminal biennium – which we already possess in the case of Spain – the Estado Novo’s integration into these bodies jumps from 1945 to 1947. What happened in those years? Did Salazar’s Portugal face threats analogous to those of Franco’s Spain? Why did difficulties facing the regime not overwhelm it? How did Portugal’s wartime international relations translate to the post-War period considering these difficulties?  

With these questions in mind, it is therefore the aim of this chapter to account for Portugal’s liminal biennium. It analyses the risks faced by Portugal, similar, though in a different order of magnitude, to those faced by Spain. It uncovers these challenges: the attitude of the Labour government, the continuing risk presented by the Spanish regime – albeit for different reasons than during the War – and the attitude of the British Foreign Office. It demonstrates how Soviet disinterest and public disinterest in Britain largely confined interest in the Portuguese regime to the Foreign Office. In turn, it analyses the department’s crucial attitude to the regime’s stunted liberalisation, the growth of democratic opposition in Portugal, and the risk of military regime change. In studying these challenges, this chapter demonstrates the intrinsic link between the Estado Novo’s wartime international relations – with their umbilical link to Spain – and the post-War international relations which ensured Britain’s benevolent response to these challenges. For while in 1945, the wartime trilateral relationship was over, but its effect endured; Anglo-Portuguese relations, built along those lines during the War, created the foundation for the Estado Novo in the post-War world.

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Portugal at the War’s end

It was no surprise that Salazar sought to tie Portugal as closely as possible to the western Allies and to Britain in particular after the Victory in Europe. Speaking in parliament on 9 May, he first praised the end of War, the end of the horrors of conflict, and the freedom of the occupied countries. ‘Let us bless peace!’ He concluded.24 Secondly, he stated that Portugal should celebrate its achievements; since ‘Providence [had] set out in its high designs that we could traverse the conflict without being directly and actively involved in it’, Portugal had kept itself from the horrors of War.25 Yet, ‘whenever it was necessary to take a position by word or by deed in favour of friends or allies, whatever their situation, we did so either spontaneously or rushed benignly to meet their appeal’.26 Portugal had secured the best of both worlds as a benevolent neutral. Its neutrality had benefited Portugal and its neutrality had benefited the Allies.

Third, Portugal was grateful because England had won the War. Portugal’s ‘national interest’ had always been ‘in solidarity with the position of England’ throughout the War.27 The end of the War magnified, rather than diminished, that affinity:

Now behold, although bleeding from numerous wounds, England arises, from amongst great ruins, not only victorious, but invincible; and, having consolidated ties with the diverse parts of the Empire, it can present itself to the World, amongst the greatest, as a true educator of peoples, mother and leader of nations.28

Salazar looked expectantly to a Britain that would recognise and celebrate this Allied neutrality; one that recognised, as he did the great assistance rendered to the Western war effort; a Britain that would reward Portugal with security in the post-War era.

Despite this outward expression of confidence, however, two bad omens conspired against Salazar in May 1945. The first was the risk of domestic liberal currents. In Lisbon, D-Day had ‘caused spontaneous popular demonstrations’, and more liberal and Anglophilic companies felt able to outwardly display their loyalty to the Allied bloc.29 This could clearly

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25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
become a problem for the regime if the celebration extended or mutated into explicit admiration for their liberal and democratic values. Worryingly for the regime, when Germany fell, this appeared to be the direction of travel. Demonstrations multiplied and spread; the waving of Allied flags was also accompanied by the chanting of ‘democratic slogans’. The Allied victory had brought with it ‘unprecedented manifestations of opposition’. Such public pronouncements probably gave Salazar some cause for concern; they would soon grow to become a serious problem.

The second was the British attitude. The Foreign Secretary, in light of the serious irritation explained at the end of chapter three, was in no mood to support Salazar at this crucial juncture. His mooted reply to Salazar’s congratulatory missive is an instructive case, a terse and guarded single sentence that did no more than ‘thank Your Excellency for your telegram of the 8th May’. Eden’s draft indicated two things: that significant figures in the wartime government were less enthusiastic toward Portugal than might have been imagined, and that it was not the case that Portugal’s wartime conduct would see it uncritically adopted as a firm ally now the War was over. But fortunately for Salazar, the Prime Minister scrapped Eden’s draft, altering it beyond all recognition in replacing it with an effusive missive that fizzed with gratitude. He added: ‘This tribute from our Portuguese ally is greatly valued. So also is the assistance which was given in the name of the Alliance of 1387 to the Anglo American trans-Atlantic communications by the use we were able to make of the Azores’. It was this draft, which completely changed Eden’s original, that was sent to Lisbon in reply. Once again, Salazar’s great defender was Churchill.

In Churchill, Salazar had the great ally and defender he eulogised in his speech of 9 May. In this regard, we ought already to be wary of treating Churchill’s attitude to Spain as a “special case”. For the Prime Minister was equally content to adopt a jarringly magnanimous approach toward the Portuguese regime at crucial juncture, even as his Foreign Secretary and officials plotted a much more cautious course. Eden’s hesitations about Portugal, which had lingered even past the Azores agreement, were not to survive past the end of the War. With Churchill in power, Portugal’s position in the post-War world, and, crucially, the official

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 CHU CHAR 20/228/114, Delegation (San Francisco) to Foreign Office (to repeat to Lisbon), 10 May 1945.
33 CHU CHAR 20/228/109, Draft telegram from WSC to Salazar, May 1945. For confirmation that Churchill himself made these changes, see: CHU CHAR 20/228/108, John Peck (Prime Minister's Private Secretary) to Lawson (F.O.), 15 May 1945.
34 Wigg, Churchill and Spain, p. 173.
35 Woodward, British Foreign Policy., p. 70.
memory of its wartime conduct, looked secure. While it was certainly possible to discern challenges to the regime, so long as Churchill remained in power, any serious disapproval of the regime looked unlikely.

The *Estado Novo* and Francoist Spain at Potsdam

In London, no serious threat was yet forthcoming. But the meeting at Potsdam, beginning 17 July, was yet another potential pitfall. At discussions in May 1945, there had been some indication that the Soviet Union objected to Portugal’s entry into any post-War international organisation just as it did with Spain. Whilst discussing the establishment of international courts in May, Spain and Portugal were both viewed as objectionable by the Soviets: ‘The Soviet Union would not allow Portugal, Spain and Switzerland to join the court […] the Russian representative had definitely questioned both Spain and Portugal’. But at Potsdam, Stalin raised no such objection. Salazar was the beneficiary of indifference. This was a major difference between the two regimes; it was not so much that Franco and Salazar were considered differently, but that Salazar was hardly considered at all. In the same long conversation over Spain, Stalin said that ‘No such regime exists in any country of Europe’, to which Churchill replied that ‘Portugal might be considered a dictatorship’.

Quite what Churchill intended with the comparison is unclear, but Stalin was unmoved. He replied tellingly that:

> It was not the dictatorship that mattered. The regime in Portugal resulted from internal developments, whereas the regime of Franco resulted from intervention by Hitler and Mussolini.

It is notable that for Stalin, the difference between the two regimes was not their wartime conduct but their origin. It seemed Salazar was saved from Stalin’s ire by the fact the 1926 coup had been successful, in contrast to the 1936 one across the border. One report recorded Stalin as explicitly stating that ‘I do not place on the same level Spain and Portugal’.

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38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.
Potsdam Conference produced a palpable feeling of relief in both Lisbon and Madrid; an affinity that has hitherto been ignored. Cristocal del Castillo, the Spanish Subsecretary of Foreign Affairs, wrote to Martín Artajo on 7 August: the situation at Potsdam was ‘serious, but not grave’. But the relief in Lisbon was even greater. As one observer in Lisbon wrote:

The fact that the Potsdam Conference has not debarred the Salazar government from taking part in the organisation of the United Nations (as it has decided to do in the case of Franco’s Government) has produced here a feeling of relief. For Laski’s recent statements had tended to increase the apprehension and the bewilderment caused in Portuguese official circles by the victory of the English Labour Party and the fear was entertained that the two Iberian dictator régimes might be measured by the same standard.

At the same time, the observer’s report hinted at several anxieties which essentially outlived the United Nations and the Potsdam meeting, and were therefore more threatening to the Estado Novo: would the Labour Party turn against the regime? Would the two regimes be measured by the same standard – and if they were, what would the consequences be?

All change in London

Potsdam had not become the threat it might have been have amounted to; but, famously, mid-way through, Churchill and Eden had been replaced by Attlee and Bevin. The Soviets might have been disinterested – but what of the new Labour government? As the Portuguese chargé d’affaires wrote to Lisbon, ‘the Labour party's program is frankly Socialist; their attitude towards FRANCO’S Government is extremely hostile’. There was precedent in recent history to suggest real cause for concern. When Chamberlain’s administration recognised Franco in February 1939, Attlee accused Chamberlain of having ‘connived at the starving of women and children’, of ‘scrambling with indecent haste to try to make friends with the perpetrators’. The government was, in recognising Franco, ‘stabbing in the back the heroic defenders of democracy’. The same man was now Prime Minister.

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40 AGA 82/6684 (Leg. 2303), Cristocal del Castillo to Martín Artajo, 7 August 1945.
41 TNA HW 1/3788, 148262, Italian Legation, Lisbon, to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 6 August 1945.
42 TNA HW 1/3777, ‘Intelligence reports submitted by C (Head of MI6) to the Prime Minister’, ULTRA/ZIP/BJ 146765, Portuguese Chargé d’affaires, London, to MFA, Lisbon, 1 July 1945.
44 Ibid.
Churchill’s benevolent passivity had given both Iberian dictators little cause for concern. Quite suddenly, they seemed to face cross-Peninsula existential risk. Intercepted Italian diplomatic cables painted a picture of the scene in Lisbon:

The overwhelming victory of the Labour Party in the English elections has provoked here much amazement, and in those political circles which counted on CHURCHILL’s remaining in power and on the tolerance of the Conservative Party for the régime of Salazar, a certain amount of apprehension and anxiety.  

The potential risks caused by the Labour Party could be broken into three: internationally direct (open hostility); domestically indirect (the provocation of domestic opposition); and internationally indirect (contagion of open hostility against Spain). Open hostility was perhaps the first risk to come to mind. It was widely recognised that Churchill had been Salazar’s great cheerleader. It was, after all, Churchill who had reified the Anglo-Portuguese alliance for the twentieth century by explicitly framing the Azores agreement as an outcome of the alliance. In August 1945, there was ‘a strong feeling that, at a time of world difficulty, the fact that the régime has been preserved in peace is in no small measure due to what he has done behind the scenes’.  

Churchill’s departure was therefore particularly difficult. His replacement by the Labour Party compounded this difficulty. Britain’s left-wing parties had objected to the Alliance since 1938, ‘and Portugal, therefore, is apprehensive lest the British Labour cabinet should denounce the Alliance’. Toward the end of July, the Italian ambassador said that the Portuguese believed that, as regards British foreign policy, ‘the continuity of its main lines [would] be preserved’ vis-à-vis Portugal. But by August, this cautious optimism had been somewhat tempered; Portuguese officials were ‘wondering how severe the examination will be which Salazar’s dictatorship will have to pass’. This was made all the more worrying by publicly anti-Salazar comments made by Harold Laski, the chair of the Labour Party. These comments would become even more violent in the coming months.

45 TNA HW 1/3788, ‘Intelligence reports submitted by C (Head of MI6) to the Prime Minister’, ULTRA/ZIP/BJ 148114, Rossilonghi to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 29 July 1945.  
46 TNA HW 1/3788, ‘Intelligence reports submitted by C (Head of MI6) to the Prime Minister’, ULTRA/ZIP/BJ (P) 148241, Japanese Minister, Lisbon, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 13 August 1945.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
The second threat was indirect and domestic. The Portuguese government feared the impact the election might have on the Portuguese public, and ‘encourage and strengthen currents of opposition’.\(^51\) The election might prove ‘a fillip to the Portuguese Left-wing movements and hasten the Bolshevisation of the Portuguese people’.\(^52\) These were serious fears, and the state press was charged, somewhat comically, with ‘endeavouring to prove that English Socialism has more affinities with the corporative system than with liberalism’; ‘It would seem that their object in so doing so is to prevent unrest amongst the Portuguese people likely to result from the victory of the British Labour Party’.\(^53\)

Liberal contagion was a serious concern. In August, the PVDE was charged with writing a report on this threat to the regime. It began: ‘In consequence of international events – the English elections and Potsdam conference – there has been a certain ferment in Portuguese political circles’.\(^54\) Clearly, Attlee’s victory had already caused ripples in the regime’s artificially calm waters. Whilst directly acknowledging this effect, the report ultimately wrongly gave the regime ‘a clean bill of health’, confidently predicting little to worry about in either military or opposition circles.\(^55\) The report’s sanguine conclusions confirmed Salazar’s biases, laying the foundations for a certain degree of planned regime liberalisation.

For observers in the Japanese Embassy, however, the ‘more serious consideration’ was well outside of Portuguese control: ‘whether the present régime will not be upset by the repercussions of the fall of Franco’s régime’\(^56\). Franco’s position would, still, have a decisive bearing on Salazar’s. Salazar himself feared that were Francoist Spain to collapse the knock-on effect in Portugal would be too much for the regime to bear.\(^57\) Reports from the Irish Legation highlighted that an enthusiastic populace was celebrating just as the regime was its most gloomy and nervous about Spanish prospects and the effect on the regime.\(^58\) In the cold São Bento office, Salazar followed it all.\(^59\)

\(^{51}\) Ibid.
\(^{52}\) TNA HW 1/3788, ‘Intelligence reports submitted by C (Head of MI6) to the Prime Minister’, ULTRA/ZIP/BJ (P) 148241, Japanese Minister, Lisbon, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 13 August 1945.
\(^{53}\) Ibid.
\(^{55}\) De Meneses, Salazar, p. 378.
\(^{56}\) Ibid.
\(^{58}\) Ibid.
The politics of continuity

Why, in light of these challenges, did the Labour government not after all pose a serious risk to the *Estado Novo*? Part of the answer is Bevin’s attitude, and the relative lack of interest from Parliament. In late 1944, as Nazism’s death rattle echoed over the continent, there was latent potential for parliamentary criticism of Franco and Salazar. Limited disapproval from parliamentarians had crept in. The left-wing Labour MP Aneurin Bevan levelled the following criticism of the government’s *laissez-faire* attitude to Spain and Portugal in December:

> It is impossible on the one hand to nourish and encourage the excesses of General Franco and the absurdities of Salazar, and at the same time expect people elsewhere to regard us as friends of democratic institutions.\(^{60}\)

Bevan’s criticism neatly encapsulated a problem for the *Estado Novo*: the British policy was contradictory. The regime was clearly taxonomically similar to the Franco regime, and opposed to the democratic institutions for which the Allies had nominally fought.

It also portended a second problem, realised in July 1945, when Bevan became a Minister of the Crown. But when Bevin himself came to tackle the problem in the Commons in August 1945, he opted for a conciliatory or, at least, non-threatening policy, saying:

> May I now turn to a very popular subject—Spain? A good deal has been said in this Debate about General Franco and the Spanish question. I will briefly quote His Majesty's Government's view. It is that the question of the régime in Spain is one for the Spanish people to decide.\(^{61}\)

The new Foreign Secretary had declared quite publicly that Britain would not directly interfere in Spain. In so doing, he stared down several rambunctious segments of his own party. Bevin’s line was criticised, most roundly by Labour MP Dr Hyancinth Morgan, who posited perhaps the most clear-sighted reproach of British policy in Iberia:

> We do not want civil war but wish to prevent civil war. But who can tell me the difference between totalitarian Spain and authoritarian Portugal? Authoritarian

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Portugal has not a democratically representative system but she is our Ally and is, apparently, to come within the comity of nations. But in Spain, which, I agree, has one of the most contemptible despotisms in Europe at the present time, and is a country which should be our Ally from its geographical situation—in view of aeroplanes and the possibilities of atomic bombs—we have that situation. I wonder how and why it is decided that one totalitarian country is not to come within the comity of nations, and another country is to come in? 62

Morgan introduced a third problem, to add to the two problems raised by Bevan the year before. British policy in Portugal was clearly contradictory not only in allying with an authoritarian dictatorship while promoting democracy; it was contradictory in treating one Iberian dictatorship with opprobrium while allying with another. Yet, Bevan and Morgan’s interjections simply never snowballed. Permanent and acute interest in Spain after 1945 was simply never matched, in parliamentary or public terms, by much interest in Portugal. The Portuguese regime simply did not attract the same level of attention as Franco’s Spain.

Given the intrinsic link between Franco and Salazar’s future, Bevin’s interjection portended extremely well for the Estado Novo. In Lisbon, Salazar was content, even enthralled, with this speech. A long missive followed to the Foreign Office via the Embassy in Lisbon; Salazar ‘showed his great admiration and appreciation for the speech’. 63 Amongst other accolades, he considered the speech ‘a great piece of political oratory, very thoughtful, constructive and courageous’. 64 Above all, he thought to pay ‘special reference to the parts concerning policy toward Spain’. 65 His fascination with a speech that did not even mention Portugal, and his deliberate reference to approving the pronouncements on Spain, underlined the extent to which Salazar directly appreciated the importance of the interlinked British and Spanish elements of his regime’s survival in summer 1945. The implication, too, was obvious.

Britain’s new man in Lisbon arrived just in time to see the effects of this statement. After Victory in Europe, Sir Ronald Campbell finally retired in a ceremony of great pomp. He was replaced by Sir Owen St. Clair O’Malley, who had served, inter alia, as the Ambassador to the Polish government in exile from 1943 to 1945 and, between 1933 and 1937, as the Head

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63 TdT AOS/CO/NE/2E2/6, ‘Discurso de Ernest Bevin’, 22 August 1945.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
of the Southern Department. In that role he had overseen the British response to interwar Italy and been involved in Spanish policy during the Civil War, and was a particularly early convert to ardent anti-communism. Otherwise, his personal political tendencies matched the atavistic but not ardent conservatism of the Foreign Office, with one or two personal scandals as a Consul in China thrown in for good measure. At his mid-August presentation, he revealed that he was not a potential threat to the regime, describing Portugal and Britain as political and moral allies, linked ‘by the numerous ties that exist between our respective overseas territories’.

O’Malley’s dispatch thus unsurprisingly reflected and redoubled Salazar’s enthusiasm. ‘There is no doubt the speech is regarded as reassuring and encouraging’, particularly on the British attitude to Spain and on Bevin’s flexible definition of democracy. The Portuguese newspapers were particularly pleased with Bevin’s speech, and the only disappointed party were ‘political malcontents who hoped that the new government in Britain would somehow interfere in Portuguese internal affairs’. It was still obvious, even amidst fermenting Anglo-American discontent with the Franco regime, that Britain’s attitude to Spain would have decisive bearing on Portugal. The light touch course publicly adopted by Bevin thus did not affect only Madrid in August 1945; it affected Lisbon and, by extension, the global colonies under its control. Bevin’s pronouncement was very welcome. All the same, Salazar would embark on a period of reform designed to shore up the international image of his regime. It was the unexpected consequences of these reforms which would, ironically, pose the greatest threat to the survival of his regime.

Madrid and Lisbon after 1945

Franco’s strategies to overcome the international opprobrium, including his doleful camouflage strategies, are well-known. His desk was now adorned, almost comically, with a

69 TdT AOS/CO/NE 2E2, Documento composto 5 Apresentação de credenciais pelo Embaixador inglês, Sir Owen O’Malley, 17 August 1945.
70 TNA FO 371/49475 Z9834, O’Malley to London, 23 August 1945.
portrait of General Carmona. It was an outward sign of the mimicry – deliberate or otherwise – that he was about to undertake of the Estado Novo. Faced with ‘the most fundamental turning point in the life of the regime’, Franco’s efforts were concentrated on attracting ‘new Catholic political personnel and intensify[ing] the Catholic image of the regime’. His reforms were domestic, but their intention was international, aimed at solidifying relations with the Vatican and the democracies. In May 1945, Franco met with ‘the chubby forty year-old Catholic lawyer’ Alberto Martín-Artajo, a leading propagandist for Acción Católica and proponent of substituting the Falangists with more Catholic influence. His wish was to give the regime a new Catholic face, one which would assuage international concerns without the need for serious reform.

There is some evidence that these strategies mirrored Portugal’s serpentine example of pursuing international respectability while maintaining the authoritarian core intact. Franco attempt an outward projection that brought Spain into line with Portugal, which had always openly sold itself as a branch of conservative Catholicism. Faced with the mounting threat of international ostracism at Potsdam, ‘the Generalissimo publicly began the process of fabricating a new and internationally acceptable façade for his regime’. Alongside changes that included a Charter of Rights, Franco also moved toward projecting the regime internationally as ‘a heavily conservative variant of Christian Democracy’.

In addition to pursuing an international profile that looked suspiciously like the Estado Novo, the Franco regime attempted to strengthen diplomatic ties in order to secure an ally on the world stage. On 2 August 1945, the new Spanish Ambassador in France, winemaker and businessman Miguel Mateu y Pla, met the Portuguese Minister, Augusto de Castro. Showing ‘some apprehension at the Labour victory at the elections’, he thought France would assume the role ‘of coordinating and uniting the western bloc’. ‘It was in this direction that they were going to use their diplomatic efforts here’, particularly to quickly conclude a trade agreement.

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72 FO 954/27C/562, Templewood to Eden, 12 December 1944; Hayes, Wartime Mission, p. 243. Franco and Carmona, unlike Franco and Hitler, had not yet met.
73 Payne, The Franco Regime, p. 349.
74 Ibid.
75 Preston, Franco, p. 533.
77 Preston, Franco, p. 537.
78 Ibid., p. 538.
79 TNA HW/1/3788, ULTRA/ZIP/BJ 148079, Portuguese Minister, Paris, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2 August 1945.
80 Ibid.
with France to secure political favour with De Gaulle’s government.\textsuperscript{81} He wanted to ask the Portuguese ‘to collaborate […] but to do so without the slightest appearance of any understanding and in secrecy’, asking for this offer to be passed onto Salazar.\textsuperscript{82}

Spanish diplomacy had entered a new and more dangerous phase in Europe, and as a potentially valuable ally for Spanish designs, Lisbon grew in importance in Spanish thinking. Unfortunately for the Catalan winemaker, Salazar disapproved of the idea; the idea of a French-led Europe ‘is not a system which we can take seriously in view of a France divided by hatred, passing through a grave economic crisis, and claiming for herself, so many times unsuccessfully, a position as one of the Great Powers’.\textsuperscript{83} Accordingly, Salazar considered ‘that our own interests are bound up with those of England, France, the United States, and Spain’ to secure the future of the Iberian Peninsula against communism.\textsuperscript{84} Portugal had made ‘written demarchés’ demanding a place at the Tangiers Conference in London and Washington only, reflecting a realpolitik understanding of an Anglo-American led Western order in which France and Spain occupied an important but nonetheless distinct position.\textsuperscript{85}

Much less well-known, and much less well-studied, are the \textit{Estado Novo}’s strategies. As António Costa Pinto has underlined, relative to Franco’s explicitly Axis-aligned and overtly fascist-inspired regime, Portugal had less need to change to win Allied approval.\textsuperscript{86} Portugal had a President ‘elected by direct suffrage’, ‘a National Assembly with representatives’, ‘the “liberties” of the constitution’; ‘even the \textit{União Nacional}, the sole party, was not legally “sole”’.\textsuperscript{87} These existing veneers of liberty provided some thin basis on which he might hope to deflect some international criticism. The trick would be to pass this veneer off as the real thing.

Salazar’s reforms were thus aimed squarely at heading off two of the three challenges his regime faced: domestic discontent and British disapproval. The two were linked; at the beginning of August, the British Shipping Attaché in Lisbon submitted an alarming report. Two revolutions were being actively planned in Portugal, one by retired officers, the other by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{83} TNA HW/1/3788, ULTRA/ZIP/BJ 148311, Minister for Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Minister, Paris, 10 August 1945.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{86} António Costa Pinto, ‘O Estado Novo português e a vaga autoritária dos anos 1930 do século XX’, in: Francisco Carlos Palomanes Martinho and António Costa Pinto (eds.), O corporativismo em Português: estado, política e sociedade no Salazarismo e no Varguismo (Lisboa: Imprensa de ciências sociais, 2008), pp. 24-49 (p. 44).
\item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
serving army officers. The promises of regime reform were put to the test in August 1945, when the former Governor-General of Angola, General José Norton dos Matos spearheaded a civil-military plot against the regime.88 This new ‘effervescence’ amongst the opposition was undoubtedly ‘partly stimulated by the result of the British election’, but the opposition ‘lack[ed] cohesion and leaders’; the threat would only materialise were substantial segments of the army to definitely back any rising.89

Reform efforts and the election debacle

Quickly extinguished, the plot against the regime nonetheless provided an intriguing introduction for the new men in the Western Department who were responsible for Portugal. Garran, himself not in post for long, was joined by Spain experts Robert Sloan and William Hogg; another former antipodean Lance Thirkell; and future Permanent Under-Secretary Derrick Hoyer-Millar. All capable and intelligent men, they were nonetheless largely new to the Department and the peculiarities of the Iberian Peninsula. It was these men who would need to be persuaded of the Estado Novo’s merits in the post-War world.

With the twin aim of cementing his international image as an allied dictatorship and dealing with these domestic problems, Salazar began his reforms. António Ferro’s propaganda and censorship vehicle, the Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional was ‘rebaptized’ the Secretariado Nacional de Informação, Cultura Popular e Turismo (SNI), reflecting a new softer face of the repressive infrastructure. Long weary of commemoration of Portugal’s participation in the Great War, these commemorations were suddenly ‘renewed, and publicised, now as part of the post-1945 campaign designed to stress the importance to the Allies of Portugal's “collaborating” neutrality’.90 However, the centrepiece of Salazar’s reforms was the promise of free elections, as free as in England, to be held in November 1945.

The official British reaction to these reforms was rather muted. O’Malley admitted that their effectiveness depended on ‘what interpretation the government intends to give to them’, while in London, Sloan minuted that the ‘minor modifications’ had ‘been made with an eye to world opinion’, but also came about at a time of increasing threat from the opposition; ‘This

89 TNA FO 371/49475 Z9094, Clarke to FO, 2 August 1945.
suggests that Dr. Salazar’s confidence may be rather artificial’.\footnote{TNA FO 371/49475 Z10598, O’Malley to Bevin, 20 September 1945; Sloan note on: TNA FO 371/49475 Z10598, O’Malley to Bevin, 14 September 1945.} Garran, now probably the most talented mind in the Western Department, slyly disagreed with Sloan by minuting that the reforms were motivated by the ‘victory of the United Nations’ rather than the ‘ineffectual activities of the “conspirators”’.\footnote{Garran note on: TNA FO 371/49475 Z10598, O’Malley to Bevin, 14 September 1945.}

Garran later betrayed the Foreign Office’s natural inclination when on 11 October, he opined that Salazar was ‘beginning the patient task of educating the Portuguese up to a more liberal form of government’.\footnote{Garran note on: TNA FO 371/49475 Z10598, O’Malley to Foreign Office, 11 October 1945.} The paternalistic belief that Portugal was not yet ready for full democracy and needed to be patiently induced by Leviathan himself to a more enlightened form of government was on full show. Convinced that Salazar was accordingly taking a ‘step in the right direction’, Garran only rued the use of ‘“organic democracy”’ on the premise that Franco had recently used a similar phrase.\footnote{Ibid.} His remark demonstrated the categorical difference that was still drawn between Franco and Salazar, and the risk for the latter of being thrown in with the former.

The Foreign Office’s preferred course, as can be seen, was a liberalisation that would permit limited plurality in Portugal. This was a mainstream view amongst Britain’s upper- and upper-middle classes, and can be discerned from several articles \textit{The Times} on the elections. The newspaper of record fairly approvingly acknowledged that Dr Salazar’s ‘benevolent despotism’ had provided ‘twenty years of orderly administration and moderate prosperity’.\footnote{‘Elections in Portugal’, \textit{The Times}, 50273, 15 October 1945, p. 5. See also: ‘More Freedom In Portugal’, p. 3; ‘Party Politics Revived in Portugal’, \textit{The Times}, 50271, 12 October 1945, p. 3.} ‘Authorititarian systems, however, are only tolerable as temporary measures in an emergency’, and the regime’s real test would be in managing the transition toward plural democracy or at least a more tolerant regime.\footnote{‘Elections in Portugal’, \textit{The Times}, 50273, 15 October 1945, p. 5.} Salazar’s promised reforms seemed to align comfortably with these British hopes.

However, the relatively comfortable situation – both for Salazar, and for the Foreign Office charged with formulating policy toward the regime – was to be severely tested by unexpected domestic developments. In the aftermath of Norton dos Matos’ failed, only ever embryonic, coup, a new guard of Portuguese democrats organised to test Salazar’s promises of liberalisation and freedom, and on the 8 October the \textit{Movimento de Unidade Democrática}
(Movement of Democratic Unity, MUD) was born. Explicitly premised on fighting the November elections, this was Salazar’s most serious test.

It seemed that there were many in Portugal who were willing to take up this mantle, and perhaps take things even further. In O’Malley’s absence, Clarke wrote to London to report that a nascent Republican Party comprised of respectable middle-class professionals was taking advantage of relaxed restrictions on the press and gatherings to meet and disseminate its programme. Salazar had loosened his grip, and new groups rushed into the new vacuum of alternative opinions. That was the current situation. Diagnosing the future was more difficult. Salazar was unlikely to let any other hand run Portugal, and the opposition themselves ‘appear[ed] weak and disunited in leadership’. In a subsequent letter, O’Malley said he was ‘rather disappointed in the Republican Party’, particularly their prime demand that the elections be delayed. This demand being the centrepiece of their platform seriously damaged their standing in British eyes: what did they stand for, other than dithering? And what did ideas of their own did they contribute? O’Malley seemed particularly averse to them, wondering aloud why they had not reconciled themselves to ‘moderate and constructive and helpful’ work with the opposition – which seemed a rather odd definition of opposition. Garran characterised them as ‘a sorry lot’. Though they had hardly caused a stir in London, the scale of opposition which suddenly swelled clearly upset Salazar. The strength and speed with which the opposition grew seriously upset the dictator. He thereafter speedily reversed course. In ‘a calculated game of cat and mouse’, the regime paid lip-service to reform while indulging in ‘selective repression and harassment’ to smother the MUD. When the MUD seriously began to threaten the regime’s stranglehold on Portuguese society, even the marginal toleration was abandoned. Salazar’s volte-face was quick and harsh. Having promised free elections, when lists of MUD members were found, the PVDE were sent in, the MUD was driven underground, and ‘censorship of the press, somewhat relaxed for a while, once again hardened’.

The official British reaction to the opposition was muted disdain; but there was equal scorn for Salazar’s apparent sudden volte-face toward repression. This calculated game of selective repression won no plaudits in London: ‘Not a healthy situation. Sir Owen O’Malley

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97 Ibid.
98 TNA FO 371/49475 Z11451 Z11877, Clarke to Foreign Office, 13 October 1945.
99 TNA FO 371/49475 Z11940, O Malley to Hoyer Miller, and Garran note on, 15 October 1945.
100 Ibid.
101 TNA FO 371/49475 Z11940, O Malley to Hoyer Miller, and Garran note on, 15 October 1945.
102 Raby, p. 24.
103 Léonard, pp. 195-196.
should keep up pressure on Dr. Salazar or the latter may find himself one day in the same position as Franco in the eyes of the public’.104 Again, a clearly underappreciated risk for the regime can be discerned; that of both potential and actual comparison to the Franco regime. Sloan understood that Salazar’s actions would cost his regime on the world stage: ‘By resorting to arrests the government may have strengthened their chances, but they have weakened their position before the world’.105 On the 23 October, he made a rather wistful criticism of Salazar’s opponents: ‘they might have achieved quite a lot if they had pursued better tactics’.106

Alongside thin and ephemeral reforms, Salazar embarked on a propaganda offensive, aimed as much domestically as toward Britain. In November 1945, he gave a long interview in which he elucidated that ‘The permanent interests of Portugal have brought us to be at England’s side from the very beginning’.107 This was certainly an ironic statement, given he had dismissed Monteiro in opposition to precisely the policy he was now pretending to have followed.108 There was a ‘certain affinity between the national or imperial constitution’ of the two states, which was international and overseas, in contrast to the extinguished German model of continental expansion.109 These interests had meant that Portugal ‘from the very beginning, served England with our collaborative neutrality’; ‘the Germans themselves had no illusions in this respect […] they knew perfectly well that our neutrality would be maintained when it was right or possible to maintain it, but that our belligerence would always manifest itself against them’.110

Finally, Salazar claimed, Hitler did not invade Gibraltar ‘because this would have had to go above Portuguese neutrality’.111 What was the functional difference between Franco’s claim that his hábil prudencia thwarted Hitler’s designs on Gibraltar, and Salazar’s claim that his neutralidade colaborante did the same?112 If anything, given Portugal was some 180 miles from Gibraltar, the latter was the more fantastical claim. But such a claim served two audiences at once; it assured the British that Portugal had always been Great Britain’s ally, even if its

104 OM note on: TNA FO 371/49475 Z12118, 22 October 1945.
105 Sloan note on: TNA FO 371/49475 Z12742, Clarke to Bevin, 9 November 1945. The minute is curious as this despatch does not mention arrests.
106 Sloan note on: FO 371/49475Z12927, Clark Kerr (Moscow) to Foreign Office, 23 November 1945.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
surety of the British victory had sometimes wavered. Meanwhile, it assuaged a potentially restive population, assuring them that Salazar had been instrumental in keeping Portugal on a steady, pro-Allied course during the War.

Repeated widely in the Portuguese press, Salazar’s public statements seemed to have little tangible impact on a weary Foreign Office, at least immediately. Two days after the interview, O’Malley wrote to London. The opposition had put forward no coherent plan for government; they were weak and divided, but also hamstrung by Salazar’s extremely short notice and restricted electoral roll. On this count, O’Malley was sympathetic. Ashley Clarke had met with Dr Lima Alves of the MUD; Alves had pleaded that ‘Dr. Salazar’s constitutional correctness was only a façade behind which he was endeavouring to get a firmer grip than ever on the country’. Beyond this broad objection, Alves also explained the opposition’s state-sanctioned difficulties in organising: thirteen days to field candidates, the necessity of sponsorship, and of approval for those candidates from the state itself. It was death by bureaucracy.

With the added difficulty of having middling French (which he nonetheless insisted on speaking) and no English, Alves hardly made a strong positive impression on Clarke. But neither the Minister nor the Ambassador totally dismissed the opposition’s views; the latter argued that to their credit, the ‘corporative system’ was a failure and ‘the very low standard of living of the bulk of the population’ still plagued the country. The very fact that they had met showed the British willing to deal with the Portuguese opposition directly, despite their reservations about their organisation. But the opposition ran up against the ingrained belief that Portugal was not yet ready for democracy. O’Malley believed that Salazar was trying his utmost in a country that was ‘on the whole, primitive’. ‘In Portugal order, stability, and comparative economic well-being are inevitably hard to come by’, and the preservation of these good things was Salazar’s motivation; ‘He is a man genuinely without ambition for himself’.

Meanwhile, Salazar’s quasi-Francoist myths achieved little traction in the British newspapers. If anything, Salazar’s window-dressing eventually invited unwanted attention and scorn rather than approval from the British establishment. During the period of faux liberalisation, The Times ran a number of articles on Portugal’s new direction, somewhat approvingly acknowledging in one that Dr Salazar’s ‘benevolent despotism’ had provided

114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
‘twenty years of orderly administration and moderate prosperity’. Authoritarian systems, however, are only tolerable as temporary measures in an emergency, and the regime’s real test would be in managing the transition toward plural democracy or at least a more tolerant regime.

When this did not come to pass, Salazar’s reputation was hampered rather than helped. A month later, The Times concluded that the liberalisation had been a sham; the results in the next day’s election had ‘never been anything but a foregone conclusion’. On 18 November, the elections took place, with only União Nacional candidates standing and accordingly only União Nacional candidates elected. Uneasy tension gave way to uneasy calm. Lisbon returned to the status quo ante election; the opposition went underground, newspapers published foreign news and Christmas charity appeals, Carmona talked up the British Alliance and Iberian neutrality during the War. Domestically, the fact that a credible leader of the opposition had not emerged during the process had even somewhat bolstered Salazar’s position. In Great Britain, as evidence in The Times, the opposite appeared to have happened: ‘While dressing his window the dictator left the door open to more opposition than he could ever have suspected existed’.

In certain sectors of British elite opinion, attitudes to Salazar hardened. Harold Laski once again waded into the debate, and his letter to the anti-Salazarist Lucio Pinheiro dos Santos was printed approvingly in the communist newspaper Avante!; Laski was clear that the Labour Party was behind the struggle for democracy in Portugal. Moreover, though ‘the fascist Sir Ronald Campbell’ had protected Salazar, ‘the conservative English newspaper “The Observer”’ had run stories that pointed to the strength of opposition in Portugal. It was to be expected that Portugal’s semi-underground communist newspaper would object to Salazar’s elections. Criticism that ran the gamut of British domestic opinion, however, was less expected. The Times had run articles underlining that the elections were designed to win Anglo-American approval, and the Manchester Guardian, News Chronicle, and Daily Herald had all, too, joined

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120 Ibid., p. 3.
121 TNA FO 371/49475 Z12966 Z13751, O’Malley to Bevin, 13 December 1945.
122 Ibid.
123 ‘Elections in Portugal’, The Times, 50302, 17 November 1945, p. 3.
in criticisms of the elections. The Guardian was the most acerbic of all, branding the affair ‘electoral farce’. The Americans had not recognised the Bulgarian elections (held under the Soviet thumb), and the British should do the same for the travesty in Portugal. Meanwhile, the Spectator opined that ‘The one purpose of the elections […] seems to have been to proclaim publicly the dictatorial nature and the restricted popular basis of Dr. Salazar’s régime’. Dr Salazar, the brief article concluded, ‘has the virtues of honesty and frankness’ in his anti-democratic tendencies, which was hardly a ringing endorsement from one of Britain’s most conservative weeklies. It appeared that Salazar’s rather disingenuous of outward-facing democratisation, over before it really began, had achieved the opposite effect intended in certain sectors of British society.

The whole affair of the Portuguese elections left no-one satisfied. The British had shown themselves willing to countenance alternatives to Salazar. They had also shown themselves quite content to leave Salazar in office, and open to his gradual move toward limited opposition and liberalisation. When sensible opposition failed to materialise, and particularly to organise, the sense of paternalistic disappointment at the missed opportunity was palpable. But the affair also damaged Salazar’s standing. By introducing reform and subsequently reneging on it, he needlessly paraded his status as an uncompromising authoritarian. Moreover, in making a patently incorrect decision, he looked stupid. He reified his status as a man apart, denting – though not destroying – British faith in his judgement and in his regime at a time when squandering either was a risk. Although the British never expressed any sympathy for the opposition’s organisation, they had time for their views and well understood Portugal’s problems. It was the vehicle of their views that they objected to, and not the views themselves.

The long afterlife of the “good offices”

Having settled on a policy of “pin-pricks” in Spain, it might have been supposed that the British government would have definitively graduated from the need for Salazar’s “good offices”, particularly following the damaged caused by the election debacle. Yet in early 1946, the good offices returned at a highly politically convenient time for Salazar. In February 1946,

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126 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 ‘Dr. Salazar’, Spectator, 175, 6126, 23 November 1945, p. 478.
130 Ibid.
the political position of Spain was finally discussed by the Cabinet writ-large. Cristino García, a Republican maquis who had fought with the French resistance, was executed by Franco. The affair revealed some discontent over the government’s hitherto handling of Spain. Ellen Wilkinson, the Minister for Education, called García a ‘very good man’, and declared his execution a ‘deliberate affront’ to the English and French. Manny Shinwell similarly spoke against Franco, also interestingly raising the ‘possibility of collusion’ between Franco and Salazar, although the British were ‘on good terms with the latter’. ‘ Couldn’t we apply some sanctions v. Franco’ mused Wilkinson, a pro-Republican figure during the Civil War.

Attlee rather optimistically countered his former ally on Spain by suggesting that the Spanish themselves ‘were on point of throwing him out’ anyway. The problem for the anti-Franco voices was that Attlee and the new Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, had already undergone under-appreciated reversal on Spain. In Autumn 1944, as Deputy Prime Minister, Attlee had been willing to support actions against Spain that would put such pressure on the regime that it would collapse or else be dismantled. Whilst conscious that ‘overt action’ was unlikely to produce results, he suggested that ‘We should use whatever methods are available’ to dislodge Franco. Freed in 1945 from the shackles of his Conservative coalition partners, it might have been expected that Attlee would be free to pursue such a course of action. In fact, whilst he never explicitly renounced his opposition to Franco, and made clear his disdain for the regime, his disapproval never translated into concrete action.

The rare Cabinet debate revealed the depths of feeling amongst pockets of the new Labour administration as well as Bevin’s unerring commitment to ambivalence. It also provided a route for Salazar’s regime to renew its wartime image. During the War, vis-à-vis Spain, Salazar had been their man in the Peninsula. Now the War was over, he could be once again. On the ground in Madrid, as in the Cabinet in London, the various British parties found themselves in a bind: how ought they to influence Franco? Garran suggested the obvious course: the old Ally. ‘Dr. Salazar is, indeed, in his own patient way, able to exercise a certain amount of influence over the Spanish Government’. As during the War, Salazar could serve

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132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Portero, pp. 211-212.
139 FO 371/60466, Z2179, Garran note, 1 March 1946.
as a moderating anchor over Franco: ‘there might be some advantage in instructing Sir Owen O’Malley to discuss the Spanish situation with Dr. Salazar’.  

In light of the Foreign Office’s disapproval of his handling of the elections and the regime’s economic stagnation, this idea did not receive the same plaudits it had done in 1940. Oliver Harvey admitted that ‘his record vis-à-vis Franco is good’ but ‘he is really himself a totalitarian also, albeit a mild and unobtrusive one’. Moreover, he feared ‘that anything we said to Salazar would eventually reach Franco’. The problem for the more Salazar-sceptic contingent in London was that O’Malley seemed fairly content to press on anyway. Accordingly, he consulted Mathias on Spanish matters in March 1946. They talked at great length about the Spanish opposition: Fernando de los Ríos, Largo Caballero, José Giral, and their various machinations with the crown. Discussing the execution of prisoners including Cristina Garcia, ‘legally convicted of murder’, Mathias characterised the French outcry as ‘unreasonable and provocative: symptomatic of the ineptitude and dishonesty’ of the Fourth Republic.

Apart from revealing Portuguese acceptance of Franco’s extra-judicial killings, which was instructive but perhaps not surprising, there was another question: who was extracting information from whom? O’Malley appeared to be receiving a number of facts from Mathias, including who was cavorting with whom, who was in league with whom; but O’Malley himself seemed to be revealing something more important to Mathias – the attitude and beliefs of the British government toward Franco. Moreover, when the time came to discuss the Franco regime, rather than subordinate issues, Mathias replied buoyantly: ‘the avoidance of another civil war in Spain’ was the guiding concern. There had been no plans for the ‘transfer of power to anyone else’, accordingly, ‘civil war and chaos would ensue, offering ample opportunities for Communist mischief-making’. Besides, ‘in what respect was Franco damaging British interests? In light of Russian strength, ‘was this the moment […] to risk setting Spain and perhaps the whole Iberian peninsula in a blaze?’

Mathias carried on for some time. O’Malley hoped the Foreign Office would not think him ‘poor spirited for having listened to rather than argued with him’, but it was, he thought

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139 Ibid.
140 Oliver Harvey note on: FO 371/60446 Z2179, 1 March 1946.
141 Ibid.
142 TNA FO 371/60446, O’Malley to Foreign Office, ‘Portuguese Views on Spanish situation’, 7 March 1946.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
'the fact that what Dr. Salazar says to Spanish politicians carries considerable weight’ that made him listen. Whilst he was ‘not presuming to recommend [...] a policy in Spain’, he noted that the Foreign Office had followed such advice in the past and, for good measure, copied the dispatch to Spain. Hoyer Millar admitted: ‘I find these interminable lectures from Dr. Mathias slightly irritating. He is nearly as much a schoolmaster as Dr. Salazar’. Mathias seemed ‘unconscious of the developments of public opinion abroad and of the fact that we no longer are living in the early part of the early part of the 19th century’. The rest of the Foreign Office’s notes on the conversation betrayed a similar sense of irritation at Mathias’ brazen and anachronistic attitude. But the damage, as it were, had been done by their man in Lisbon. Mathias ensured that Salazar’s talking points – the stability of the Peninsula; the avoidance of another Civil War in Spain – would be relayed to London. As during the War, the “good offices” had led Britain to Salazar’s Portugal once more.

**Changing winds and the return of allyship**

The civil opposition had failed. The elections marked the end of any chance they might once have had at holding power or at becoming a permitted pressure group. With the opposition neutered as a serious force, attention now turned to the army as the potential force for regime change. The British were now more alert and to a degree more open to a potential change in regime; though they had always been acutely aware of Portugal’s problems, the end of the War and the subsequent elections debacle precipitated a less forgiving attitude to the regime’s shortcomings. In the wake of the elections, a front-page *Observer* article hinted at what may come next: ‘Portuguese Look to Army for Freedom’. The opposition’s crusade had heightened sensitivity toward Portugal and paved the way for the Foreign Office to monitor the army very closely as a potential force against the *Estado Novo*. After November 1945, and until around the end of 1946, Foreign Office officials monitored both the remnants of the opposition and, very closely, the army.

Through 1946, the British began to sense more widespread discontent in Portugal. Salazar was slipping to a position of malaise and inertia while ordinary people became
increasingly discontent with his government. In particular, inflation was becoming a serious issue and causing rising discontent. In March 1946, Marcus Cheke visited Lisbon for the first time in four months and gave an account of a city sliding into sickness. Inflation was out of control. ‘The prices in shops’, he noted, ‘have risen to astonishing levels. Nobody knows how the poor can live’.153 Potatoes had risen from 80 centavos a kilo to 5 escudos. Portugal had returned to ‘the era of King John the Fifth, when the courtiers were millionaires and the poor crowded for alms at the convent gates’.154 A Foreign Office note asked ‘What benefits, if any, are reaching the poor in return for the police state conditions in which they have to live’?155

The arch-imperialist Viscount Cranborne visited two months later in May 1946.156 Despite seeing Portugal anew, unlike Cheke, a seasoned expert, Cranborne returned with similar views. Cranborne liked Salazar and found him more likeable than he had thought he might, but he ‘got the impression that Dr. Salazar’s own position in Portugal was not as strong as it might appear’; ‘there were a great many people in Portugal who would be glad to see him go and who were becoming increasingly restive under his rule’.157 Salazar had restored order, but economic conditions were worsening, ‘and the condition of the poorer classes was lamentable’.158 Like the rest of the Foreign Office, he thought the absence of a good opposition leader accounted for much of Salazar’s longevity. However, Cranbourne did have an alternative: Armindo Monteiro. ‘Lord Cranbourne thought that the most likely person to head up the opposition was Dr. Monteiro’, having been ‘rather impressed by Dr. Monteiro’s ability and personality’.159

At the same time, the slow crystallisation of a more pronounced anti-Soviet outlook in Britain, though not yet the centrepiece of British foreign policy, buoyed Salazar’s reputation in London. While Britain had been an ally of the Soviet Union, Salazar had been seen as a dogmatic and paranoid ally. But as attitudes to the Soviet Union changed, the adjectives were quietly dropped. as Ashley Clarke wrote in March 1946: ‘Salazar is an astute observer. I used to think him morbidly fearful of the Communist menace but events […] are beginning to show that his fears have some foundation’.160 Salazar’s prescience on communism was yet another victory in his winning-round of the British establishment.

153 TNA FO 371/60287 Z3369, Cheke to Foreign Office, 9 April 1946.
154 Ibid.
155 OM note on: TNA FO 371/60287 Z3369, 6 April 1946.
156 TNA FO 371/60287 Z4299, Note by Hoyer Millar, 2 May 1946.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Hoyer Millar note on: FO 371/60287 Z4299, 2 May 1946.
160 TNA 371/60264 Z2130, note on Transcript of Ashley Clarke’s interview with Salazar to Bevin, 6 March 1946.
On the subject of communism, there was much less debate and disagreement. This was limited to a handful of voices, internally and externally. One such occasional note mused that Salazar’s prescience over the Soviet Union:

[...] would be all the more impressive were it not that Dr. Salazar himself is running a totalitarian state and is therefore in fact on the side of the dictators. He does not believe in democracy any more than Stalin or Franco.\[^{161}\]

Indeed, he did not. However, both growing concern about the prospect of instability in Spain and an increasing hostility to the Soviet Union should be borne in mind as significant currents in official British thought about Portugal in 1946. In May, the annual report for 1945 arrived.\[^{162}\] Essentially the work of Ashley Clarke, it began succinctly: ‘when the war ended in Europe Dr. Salazar was able to claim that Portugal, under his guidance, had had it both ways’; ‘Portugal’s service to the Allies, the austere integrity of her dictator and – after all – her smallness in terms of continental territory combined to shelter her from the world-wide disapproval accorded to Spain’.\[^{163}\] Britain’s status was still strong. Salazar had gone overboard with his praise of Britain on VE Day, and the Alliance was still the mainstay of his foreign policy; here at last was official British recognition of his manifold public pronouncements of November 1945.

Economic concerns – which as we saw in chapter three grew in importance from early 1945 – also played a role. The Portuguese had agreed a 30-year repayment plan for the £80,000,000 debt racked up by the British during the War.\[^{164}\] Moreover, they had agreed, at a time of profound British economic weakness, to not attempt to convert any of these debt in US dollars, which further alleviated British worries. Both actions counted in Salazar’s favour.\[^{165}\] There were also much needed commercial openings in Portugal. The English Electric Group was to build a hydroelectric dam on the River Zêzere, and Sir Alexander Roger had managed to exempt British telecommunications and tramway companies from nationalisation.\[^{166}\] Alongside this, there was the threat that Uncle Sam – with his behemoth economy – might yet displace John Bull. ‘American commercial concerns have been seeking a foothold in what were hitherto British concerns’, and the American government was prepared to exercise a much

\[^{161}\] TNA FO 371/60264, Z177 O’Malley to Bevin, 3 December 1946.
\[^{162}\] TNA FO 371/60287, Z4451, Annual Report for Year 1945, 13 May 1946.
\[^{163}\] Ibid.
\[^{164}\] Paiva Abreu, pp. 547-548.
\[^{165}\] TNA FO 371/67859A Z8498, Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Portuguese MFA, 22 September 1946.
\[^{166}\] TNA FO 371/60287, Z4451, Annual Report for Year 1945, 13 May 1946.
greater role in Portugal on account of its interests in the Azores.\(^\text{167}\) As a result: ‘Competition between the United States and Great Britain will be keen’.\(^\text{168}\)

At this point, it may be prudent to answer a question that may have struck readers: where was the elusive Foreign Secretary himself, Ernest Bevin? Having directly intervened on numerous occasions on Spain, it might be supposed that a similar thing would have happened in Portugal. So far as we can reconstruct from the available evidence, opposition to the regime was outside of his purview. It was these other factors: Spain, and Portugal’s relation to it; the rise of communism, and Portugal’s role against it; and British economic concerns in Portugal (particularly debt), which came to his attention. His absence from these conversations is telling, since it limited the latitude of available actions to junior officials, nominally his civil servants.

For the civil servants themselves, all these factors: Spain, Salazar’s proto-anti-communism, and economic interests, grew in importance from mid-1946. The rumour mill about the regime, however, of course continued unabated. Through the summer, rumours swirled in Lisbon and London that Salazar was in ill-health; non-appearances at state anniversaries and meetings fuelled those suspicions.\(^\text{169}\) The Foreign Office continued to seek information about the strength of the regime, internal affairs, the political landscape, and particularly opposition from the army. This was not idle intrigue, but nor did it amount to active scheming. Rather, the civil servants had come to believe that Salazar’s position was not as strong as it had once been, and by implication, the British policy of total support for Salazar as it existed in the War had changed.

**Portugal and the UN**

It was in this context that Portugal’s unsuccessful application to the UN should be considered. Salazar’s attitude to the UN was ambiguous; on the one hand, he recognised the importance of the organisation in securing the regime’s international standing as a legitimate member of the community of nations.\(^\text{170}\) This interest was clearly motivated in part by the legacy of the War, but also spoke to Portugal’s more traditional policy of attempting to secure policy successes – particular imperially – through participation in international bodies, as it

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\(^{167}\) Ibid.

\(^{168}\) Ibid.

\(^{169}\) TNA FO 371/60287, Z5584, O’Malley to Bevin, 14 June 1946; Z6856, Stirling (Lisbon) to Hoyer Millar, 26 July 1946.

had done during the era of the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{171} On the other, he maintained his usual firm reluctance to participate in a body that pre-supposed any pooling of sovereignty, particularly one in which both the United States and, worse, the USSR were intrinsically involved.\textsuperscript{172}

The attitude of the Western Allies, and particularly Great Britain, was therefore likely to have a decisive bearing on Salazar’s attitude to joining. Despite growing concerns about the form of government in Portugal, it was still broadly believed that it was beneficial to have an allied country obtain UN membership. This was significantly truer of the men on the ground in Lisbon – Ashley Clarke and Owen O’Malley – than the men in London. In Lisbon, they were competing against the violent anti-Soviet sentiment: ‘the championship of the British cause which might have been expected has been tempered by the cool and rather sceptical attitude’ of the closely controlled, Soviet-phobic press.\textsuperscript{173}

In light of growing concerns about the Soviet Union, on 6 July 1946, Mathias was visited by a joint British and American delegation, which solicited Portugal’s application to the UN.\textsuperscript{174} Fernando Martins has usefully highlighted the positive attitude not only of Great Britain and the United States, but also of, for example, Belgium and France, making this a Western request led by Britain, rather than a purely Anglo-American request.\textsuperscript{175} While Mathias confined himself to the usual attitude of reticent ambiguity, Palmella appeared as usual to contort himself to Salazar’s position, counselling that on balance the opportunity ought not to be turned down.\textsuperscript{176}

On 1 August, Portugal applied for membership: ‘from hereon in, the Portuguese authorities’ room for manoeuvre became much smaller. The letters were sent, and it remained only to be seen whether the accession request would be accepted’.\textsuperscript{177} The request was rejected by the veto of the Soviet Union, opposing Portugal based on its wartime neutrality and refusal to establish diplomatic relations.\textsuperscript{178} Ironically, in the manner of her rejection, Portugal had been further ensconced in the Western comity: amongst the states voting for Portugal’s entry were the UK, the USA, France, and the Netherlands. The vote was embarrassing, but it seemed to

\textsuperscript{172} Nogueira, \textit{Salazar}, Vol. IV, pp. 52-53.
\textsuperscript{173} TNA FO 371/60264, Z1837, O’Malley to Bevin, 21 February 1946.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{175} Martins, ‘“A crise da paz”’, p. 59.
\textsuperscript{176}Ibid., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., p. 25.
confirm Salazar’s February hypothesis that Portugal’s position in West would continue ‘independently’ of UN membership.\(^{179}\)

**The British Government and new internal threats**

While the UN debacle had hurt Portuguese pride, the more substantial risk was the threat of internal discontent which simmered over in autumn 1946. A further steady stream of rumours reached Whitehall, though none seemed a tangible and immediate threat to the regime’s stability. In October, however, army discontent finally seemed to be simmering over. In October, Whitehall received a report from the military attaché on discontentment in the Army. General Pereira Coutinho had openly criticised low pay and standards of living in the military.\(^{180}\) The military attaché C. N. Stirling wrote that ‘the armed forces are the only organisation in the country capable, if they so desire, of forcing a change in the present form of Government’.\(^{181}\) ‘There is dangerous material here’, wrote Thirkell.\(^{182}\)

And dangerous it was. Only a few days after Stirling’s prognosis, it seemed to come true. O’Malley sent an urgent telegram to London: there was a ‘military move against the government in the north’.\(^{183}\) He had lost telephone lines to many cities and there was ‘trouble in Oporto and Coimbra’.\(^{184}\) There was an uprising of some 70 cavalry men at the Mealhada barracks, near Porto; their intention was to capture to holidaying Salazar and force a change in regime. The ‘dismal collapse’ of the revolt, abandoned by its officers, was speedy.\(^{185}\) A day later he telegrammed again. Calm had been restored in Portugal. Official reports said 70 cavalry troops had revolted; perhaps a whole regiment had.\(^{186}\) It was likely that officers had inspired the rising, but lost their nerve at the last minute, leaving the troops to take the flak from the failure.\(^{187}\)

In a note, Thirkell commented that it was ‘A very small rising; but due to deep cause – insufficiency of pay & a low standard go living’.\(^{188}\) Hogg meanwhile said that ‘If the army

\(^{179}\) TNA FO 371/60264, Z2130 O’Malley to Foreign Office, enclosing report by Clarke, 6 February 1946.

\(^{180}\) TNA FO 371/60287, Z8670, Stirling to Bevin, 4 October 1946.

\(^{181}\) Ibid.

\(^{182}\) Ibid.

\(^{183}\) Ibid.

\(^{184}\) Ibid.

\(^{185}\) Ibid.

\(^{186}\) Ibid.

\(^{187}\) Ibid.

\(^{188}\) Ibid.
want to revolt they must get the backing of the Generals; it should then be fairly easy’.\(^{189}\) This small, failed uprising at the Mealhada barracks had led British mandarins to speculate openly about how the regime could be dismantled. Conversely, it contributed to a growing cynicism about the likelihood of a successful coup, particularly since the officers who were rumoured to be involved had abandoned the plan.

As Tom Gallagher would point out, the regime never attempted to ‘destroy military freedom of action by systematically colonizing the institution’.\(^{190}\) Accordingly, ‘the armed forces preserved important degrees of authority in a setting where the ruling system was not slow to monopolize other positions of power’.\(^{191}\) This autonomy was possibly borne of the last nominal check on Salazar’s power: namely, General Carmona’s ability to remove him from office. A supplementary explanation is that Salazar simply lacked the political will to move against a well-organised unit that had the capacity to dislodge him but had never seriously tried. Both explanations speak to Salazar’s inherent caution and highlight his sclerotic conservatism. From the available evidence, we know that the Foreign Office civil servants understood this and were likely too to have intuited the causes.

The uprising, small, and abandoned by its officers, had like the elections failed. But as after the elections, the event provided the impulse for the British to seek fresh information about alternatives to the regime. This time it was a smaller jolt. Hogg wrote to Lisbon asking for detailed briefs on the internal situation.\(^{192}\) What was the position of José de Souza, former communist leader, apparently refused admission to the Socialist Party? ‘What is Armando Monteiro doing? Playing at being a minor Professor of Political Economy still or is he beginning to take an interest in politics again?’\(^{193}\) A few days later, London even enquired about the Portuguese monarchy, which had been casually dismissed as an irrelevant two years previously.\(^{194}\)

On 16 October, the Foreign Office wrote to Lisbon on the back of ‘rumours and gossip’ which amounted to a ‘rather disquieting’ picture of Portugal. Hoyer-Millar worried about low pay and inflation: in Portugal, ‘like Egypt, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer’.\(^{195}\) While no fan of Salazar, Hoyer-Millar seemed even less inclined toward his opponents. He wrote that

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\(^{189}\) Hogg note on: TNA FO 60288, Z8734, O’Malley to FO, 11 October 1946.

\(^{190}\) Tom Gallagher, ‘Controlled Repression in Salazar’s Portugal’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 14, 3 (1979), 385–402 (p. 394).

\(^{191}\) Ibid.

\(^{192}\) TNA FO 60288 Z8721, Hogg (FO) to Curle (Lisbon), 15 October 1946.

\(^{193}\) Ibid.

\(^{194}\) TNA FO 60288 Z8905, O’Malley to Bevin, 18 October 1946.

\(^{195}\) TNA FO 60288 Z8848, Hoyer Millar to O’Malley, 16 October 1946.
'The opposition to the Salazar régime we know to be weak and indeed futile’, and ‘there seems to be no outstanding man on the opposition side, or anyone to take Salazar’s place’.196 However, dissatisfied army and navy officers ‘could bring about a revolution overnight’ off the back of popular dissatisfaction amidst ‘mute and passive’ opposition to the regime.197 Finally, Hoyer-Millar reflected on Britain’s place in all of this: ‘In general, we are blamed for “letting the Portuguese down” – which seems to mean failing to turn Salazar out. We are familiar with similar criticisms from the Spanish Republicans’.198

What was Hoyer-Millar’s alternative? By late 1946, it was not clear. Both the civilian and military opposition had failed. Both had tried, but neither had organised effectively in a way that represented a serious challenge to the regime. Salazar had kept both under the thumb. In O’Malley’s view, the imminent arrival onto the scene of a capable opposition leader was unlikely.199 The communist leader de Souza was unlikely to reintegrate into polite society, much less to wield influence; and having met Monteiro himself on 5 November, the now manager of two factories ‘was lying low and waiting to see what is going to happen with Salazar. In this I am sure he is wise’.200

A fortnight later, having perhaps considered his position, O’Malley wrote to London. He set out the principles on which Britain should base its policy on Portugal:

I conceive of British interests Portugal to consist in (a) a generally friendly disposition on the part of the Portuguese, (b) the preparedness and availability of Portugal considered as a potential military associate, (c) a general readiness on the Portuguese side to cooperate in international activities, (a) a particular readiness to co-operate, if the occasion arose, in any association of Powers led by the United Kingdom and/or the United States of America, (e) stability and reliability, permitting expanding commercial and industrial activity, (f) changes in social legislation which would earn the approval of a Labour Government in London.201

Salazar had essentially upheld those principles. After forty governments and sixteen armed revolutions in fifteen years, ‘Portugal is like a casualty which has been for twenty years in plaster of Paris’.202 Change would have to be ‘very gentle and cautious’, and ‘an authoritarian régime which was stable and dependable […] would be preferable to a more “democratic”

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196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 TNA FO 60288 Z8905, O’Malley to Bevin, 18 October 1946.
200 Ibid.
201 TNA FO 60288 Z9675, O’Malley to FO, 20 November 1946.
202 Ibid.
régime which was exposed to the variable gusts of inexperience and unorganised and conflicting (though perhaps well meaning) political groups’.203

In London, Hoyer Millar minuted that ‘from a purely material and strategic point of view I expect he is right in saying that a firm efficient Government even though based on authoritarian principles (i.e. One like the present régime) would suit British interests better than a weak hesitant Government based on more democratic principles’.204 A December 1946 meeting of the MUD headed by Norton de Matos served as confirmation for this belief. ‘They have no common policy’, O’Malley opined, ‘they are a union of the democratic parties each one with a policy of its own’.205 They at least omitted any public criticism of Great Britain, despite their disappointment in Britain’s attitude toward the democratic cause. Perhaps they knew, after all, that they needed Britannia more than Britannia needed them.

In December 1946, Harold Laski once again complained to the Minister of State, Hector McNeill, in connection to Portugal’s admission to the United Nations. McNeill handed it over immediately to the Foreign Office, where the civil servants’ unsympathetic response was instructive. The Foreign Office replied on 19 December, and Laski was let flatly let down: Portugal met the supposed criteria, ‘and as we recognise no other special criterion there are no grounds for imposing special conditions’.206 But perhaps more revealing than the official response was Thirkell’s note on Laski’s original letter, confirming that while UN membership had failed, Britain was to remain Portugal’s ally. Disparagingly channelling the Enlightenment poet Alexander Pope, Thirkell wrote: ‘It is no use telling Mr Laski’s correspondent what would happen if there were free elections in Portugal or producing the old saw “For forms of g’ment let fools contest; Whate'er is best administer'd is best”’.207

The *Estado Novo* and the Brave New World

Salazar clearly faced four problems in the summer and autumn of 1945: British indifference toward his regime; the risk of liberal contagion in Portugal; the growth of domestic opposition; and British hostility toward Franco’s régime. Tentative signs of their emergence could be seen at the end of the War. They were crystallised and greatly amplified by the election

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203 Ibid.
204 Hoyer Millar note on: TNA FO 60288, Z9675, 20 November 1946.
205 TNA FO 371/60288 Z10296, O’Malley to Bevin, 5 December 1946.
207 Note by Thirkell on: TNA FO 371/60264 Z10289, Laski to McNeil, 6 December 1946.
of the new Labour government. Taken together, were theses a veritable post-War crisis for the regime, or a series or interlocking problems? This is of course a problem of interpretation.

When considered individually, no one problem looked likely to definitely overwhelm the regime. That was particularly true of the bilateral and transnational problems; the Labour government seemed to lack the impetus to diverge from Churchill’s course of paternalistic allyship, and the regime eventually moved ruthlessly against popular demonstrations for liberal democracy or even socialism, spurred on by the Labour victory. The third problem, however, that of contagion from Spain, presented a clear and consistent danger to the *Estado Novo*.

In the previous chapters, we have traced the development of an intertwined trilateral relationship. In many ways, the over-arching story of these chapters was the conversion of Francoist Spain from an existential threat to a foreign policy benefit. That intertwined relationship did not disappear in 1945; it simply graduated to a form particular to the post-War world. Franco’s Spain was for the *Estado Novo* at once more of a threat to its stability through the risk of contagion and less important to its foreign policy aims, since the Portuguese regime now had a sound basis on which to act independently with the Western allies.

That relationship, however, was not perhaps as smooth as has hitherto been assumed. Glyn Stone has posited that ‘the compatibility of the perceived interests of both countries still existed in 1945 and continued into the post-war world’. But those interests, as for much of the War, were vague and, moreover, this was not such a smooth transition as Stone suggests. Taken together, the series of problems that Salazar’s regime faced from 1945 to 1947 closely resembled a crisis. Perhaps we could term it a crisis in parts. This is a rejoinder to histories which have tended to gloss over the end of the War in Portugal’s international history, particularly relations with Great Britain. While ultimately this crisis did not destabilise the regime, careful examination of the available evidence does show that Portugal’s transition to its place in the post-War world was not entirely smooth, nor without serious problems. Finally, it also shows the importance of the Spanish regime for the future of the *Estado Novo*, and the importance of the trilateral link in understanding the post-War survival of both regimes.

Why, in summary, did these threats never materialise? The first point to consider is the attitude of the Foreign Office. Content to consider the alternatives internally, the Foreign Office’s disapproval of the Salazar regime never extended to a willingness to discuss it with others, but it was not a purely academic exercise, the prize possession of cerebral but politically impotent young men in London. The sheer volume of discussion on the topic suggests that this

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was not the case. Hypothetical foreign policy might be diversionary once, but the issue of the regime’s future, and civil and military alternatives, returned again and again over a year and a half. We can comfortably conclude on the basis of this evidence that the Foreign Office did acknowledge alternatives to the *Estado Novo*, were willing to countenance alternate forms of government, and followed those civil and military groups with some interest.

Why then did this interest never translate into actual support for the opposition, civil or military? Firstly, we have seen how at many points the British were extremely critical of the opposition’s organisation. The plural groups engaged in the struggle for democracy never worked together convincingly. Their initial demand that the elections be delayed made them seem weak, and their subsequent failure to organise faintly ridiculous in British eyes. Another key reason the British were averse to working with the opposition in Portugal, unlike in Spain, was that it lacked a cohesive figurehead around whom such a movement could coalesce. After Monteiro’s dismissal, the British had held on to the hope that he might regain influence. But these suggestions never seemed particularly serious; although as late as 1946, his name was mooted to Cranbourne as a potential leader of a new regime, Monteiro endured more as a hopeful synecdoche for an Anglophile ascendancy in Salazar’s regime rather than as a genuine potential replacement. Like the Leviathan described in Job, Salazar could not be vanquished.

The opposition were further severely hamstrung by the ruthlessness with which Salazar cracked down on them – a factor not of their own making. They could not compete with the brute force of the PVDE, nor the regime’s legal barriers, which amounted to a smothering blanket on the flames of popular discontent. These actions shored up Salazar’s domestic position, but they attracted much scorn and chagrin in the Foreign Office. In plumping for liberalisation, then double backing on himself, and returning with vengeance to repressive authoritarianism, Salazar lost much esteem in British eyes. In the first instance, he looked indecisive. More damagingly, he underlined how alien his form of illiberal dictatorship was to British liberal democracy. He ran the risk of looking like a Franco.

His paranoid response also made many officials consider the strength of his position, which explains why they became so interested in army plots against him. The Foreign Office understood that a well-planned coup could yet destabilise Salazar while, hopefully, preventing a slide into chaos. But opposition, military and civilian, ran up against another innate tenet of British belief about Iberia: the status quo was preferable. Owen O’Malley in particular did

210 TNA FO 371/60287, Z4299, Conversation with Lord Cranbourne, 7 May 1946.
much to cement Salazar’s position where a less favourable ambassador may have pursued a different course. His despatches served as a warning to London: the regime is lamentable, but the alternative may be worse. It might come as little surprise to readers that in Franco Nogueira’s hagiographic biography of Salazar, he noted that the dictator preferred the troublesome Sir Ronald Campbell to O’Malley, but O’Malley admired Salazar more than Campbell ever did.211

It was an obstinate belief that the Estado Novo was preferable to any alternative, as much as any “interests” that accounted for much British reinforcement of the regime. This was in turn stimulated by later currents favourable to Salazar: the future of Spain and a growing fear of communism amongst them. Ultimately, no opposition group nor plot ever was ever able to obtain enough traction to attain direct British help. The issue never became so pressing that Bevin himself became directly involved, as in Spain. But that should not blind us to the very real consideration that British officials gave the Portuguese opposition after the Second World War. The safety of his regime was not as secure as one may suppose on first examination, particularly not after the self-inflicted wound of liberalisation was promised then snatched away. British officials were not as smitten as they had been in the Second World War; but at key moments, the legacy of Salazar’s good offices, his status as an “ally”, and the supposed intrinsic connection to Spain provided a counterweight to the threats against his regime. The threats of the post-War era were counterbalanced by the legacy of the wartime relationship.

Chapter Five: Inter-imperial Relations After the War

The Portuguese Empire had survived the War intact. In chapters two and three, we saw just how intrinsic this extraordinary imperial survival was to Portuguese survival writ-large. And it was indeed extraordinary. Across the Empire's disparate territories, the Portuguese flag flew by the end of 1945 just as it had in 1939. While Macau had ‘lived almost as an occupied state’ and Timor had ‘suffered invasion and occupation’, the survival of the Empire had proved a remarkable, unexpected, and even internationally significant feat.¹ The threat of War had diminished; its bellicose troubles were now in the preterit, and it was farewell to all that. The question for Lisbon was: what now? Most pressingly: what now, in the context of improved inter-imperial relations with a British Empire that was facing new, global, challenges to its rule? How would the changed dynamic and the changed international situation affect the Anglo-Portuguese imperial relationship?

Chapter four focused on the international threats which rose and receded for the Portuguese regime. This chapter moves to focus on the international situation vis-à-vis Portugal’s colonies. It does so in order to correct a major oversight in both Portuguese imperial history and the international history of Anglo-Portuguese relations, and to account for the greatest – and least predictable – legacy of the Anglo-Spanish-Portuguese wartime relationship.

The immediate post-War period is a blind spot for historians. As with international histories of the regime, imperial histories have tended to begin much later, focusing on the process of decolonisation in the Portuguese Empire.² Some have taken a comparative approach between the British and Portuguese Empires, but these have focused on the imperial endgame in both.³ The international imperial histories – those studies of the Empires from the metropoles, of the haute politics of Empire – have focused on the 1960s.⁴ Even studies which nominally begin in 1945 focus explicitly on ‘imperial endgame’ rather than the re-imposition of the imperial meridian.⁵ We understand from these histories that the Portuguese Empire’s

history is closely bound up with both the international ambit in which it was ruled and, particularly, the United Kingdom.

We still lack, however, an account of that history in the immediate post-War period. The inter-imperial relations which established Portugal as an imperial ally in the Western comity of nations – and particularly the continuity between wartime developments and the post-1945 settlement – remains poorly understood. We have no clear map of how the legacy of contingent guarantees over Timor, intimately connected to both Spain and the Azores, and the wider assurances over Empire carried over into peacetime. There is a clear gap which leaves us with space to explain how the two countries became formal imperial allies on the basis of the contingent wartime imperial co-operation.

Addressing this gap accounts for a major omission in understanding the Estado Novo’s survival and in the role played by the British state. For while these histories of decolonisation are immensely useful in understanding the political culture and economy of two receding Empires during decolonisation, we know almost nothing about what we might term recolonisation in the immediate aftermath of, and as a direct result of, the Second World War. As we established in the introduction, the survival – wholesale and intact – of the Portuguese Empire was both one of the regime’s key aims, and therefore a key part of the unique form of its survival.

As in the War, the British attitude was crucial. Would greatly changed Anglo-Portuguese imperial relations provide lasting security for the Portuguese Empire? Would Britain continue to consider Portugal an imperial ally, and in what ways might this benefit the regime and its Empire? Would there be limits on this co-operation, and what would guide those limits? Would the Empire help Portugal’s integration into the nascent Western order? More broadly, what would be the attitude of the United States? How would the developing British attitude, in light of general threats to the foundations of European colonial rule, affect inter-imperial relations? Answering these questions allows us to see just how important the Portuguese Empire was in affording the Portuguese regime a privileged position as a European imperial power, a position it never held in the pre-War system.

This chapter argues that after 1945, we can delineate Anglo-Portuguese inter-imperial relations into three categories. The first category was Timor, sui generis, which had been particularly and specially guaranteed in embarrased recognition that the Allied invasion had

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6 In a manner such as Célia Reis’ study of the Far Eastern (Macau, Timor, Goa) Portuguese colonies after the First World War. Célia Reis, ‘Novas Situações Coloniais No Final Da Grande Guerra: As Colónias Do Oriente’, IDN – Cadernos, 34 (2019), 115-124.
precipitated Japanese action. As we have seen, in this regard, Britain became bound to guarantee Portuguese sovereignty. It did so despite the prejudicial outcome for Australia, since in this case the strategic need for Portuguese allyship – particularly in negotiations over the Azores – outweighed the wishes of its Commonwealth cousin. In studying the end of the Timor affair, which straddled Victory in Europe, Victory in Japan, and the formal end of the War, we can also see the continuity between the contingent wartime guarantees given over Timor and their survival and formalisation in the post-War era.

The second category accounted for the most populous and important Portuguese colonies: Mozambique and Angola. These territories had been the most “at risk”, first by the menace of colonial retrocession to Hitler in 1938, and then in 1940 by the threat of direct intervention by South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. But after 1945, they were effectively saved by Great Britain. These were not, as Timor, underwritten by special guarantee. Nonetheless, they were now protected by the guarantees which, as we saw in chapter three, had been given as an integral part of the Azores negotiations. In the post-War years, these guarantees graduated into indirect protection under British aegis by virtue of Portugal’s integration into the Anglo-French-Belgian sphere of colonial co-operation.

The third category was Macau and Goa. The British had been willing to promise Portuguese sovereignty during the War, but their situation changed in 1945. The British were not willing to underwrite either territory. In China, the British believed Hong Kong was a wholly separate political entity to Macau, and signalled their intent to resist any attempt to tie the two territories’ futures together. Nonetheless, the British determination to hold on to their own territory sent a strong signal to the Nationalist Chinese government that colonial rule in its one de jure territory was not over, even though British interests elsewhere in China had come to an end. This provided an effective, but not formal, protection for Portuguese rule.

In summary, changed Anglo-Portuguese imperial relations both afforded the regime legitimacy in and of itself and provided the regime opportunities to seek further international legitimacy through participation in cross-European colonial schemes. This co-operation was not total. Where competing interests abroad dictated that formal co-operation was not in the British interest, as in India, the Portuguese Empire occupied a familiar position of dependent weakness as before 1939. Overall, however, the formalisation of greatly improved Anglo-Portuguese imperial relations afforded the regime a great deal of security in the post-War era. Moreover, the updated obligations of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance – which was crucially by 1946 understood to contain a general commitment to the security of the Portuguese colonies –
effectively obliged the British government to act as a formal guarantor to the Portuguese Empire.

This approach also provides us with an important insight into the comparison between the forms of Franco and Salazar’s respective survivals. The small but instructive case of Tangier illuminates just how violently the United Kingdom and the United States opposed Francoist Spain’s colonial adventures, dashing the regime’s last shot at colonial revanchism in North Africa. Studying the strident opposition to the Francoist presence in North Africa not only provides a missing imperial dynamic in the pre-Cold War studies of Franco’s isolation, but demonstrates the way in which the Portuguese Empire formed a crucial part of the Estado Novo’s integration into the Western European mainstream. While colonial co-operation with Portugal came with caveats, it also provided prestige and security to the regime which form an integral part of the particular form of its survival.

The end of the Timor affair

As jarring and irritating as the constant diplomatic press over Timor had proved in mid-1945, it was not wholly ineffectual. For, from late 1944 until the end of the War, Timor was discussed on no less than 20 occasions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In July 1945, these plans progressed from theoretical to concrete. The Chiefs’ first idea, centred around Portuguese desires, was that some 4,000 Portuguese troops would be sent to Australia to participate in a joint recapture. This had unsurprisingly received an ‘unfavourable reply’ from Canberra.⁷ A new plan was drafted, routing the troops via Ceylon.

In a major development from 1941, the Chiefs showed themselves quite open to promoting politics above military strategy. Major-General Simpson ‘said that while he was not favourably disposed to the proposal on military grounds he recognised the political advantage to be derived from making an offer of this nature to the Portuguese’.⁸ Air Vice-Marshal Dickson thought that, in case the area fell under British operational command, Britain ‘should be prepared to welcome the services of forces of our allies’.⁹ Portugal – despite being neutral in the War – was seen offhandedly as a military ally.¹⁰

⁷ TNA CAB 79/36/1, ‘2: Portuguese Timor’, 3 July 1945.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Ibid.
¹⁰ Ibid.
The Foreign Office asked the Committee to consider Australia’s request to stop the Portuguese ships from sailing to Ceylon. Sir Alan Brooke suggested that, as Portugal had not actually been at war with Japan, it would be necessary for the Japanese to move to Dutch Timor to surrender and be disarmed there.\textsuperscript{11} Captain Guy Grantham pointed out, quite presciently, that the Portuguese were likely to request shipping aid to move both troops and goods to Timor, as they barely possessed the capacity themselves.\textsuperscript{12} The Joint Chiefs conceded that Timor’s future ‘was entirely a matter for political consideration’.\textsuperscript{13} That would change, however, if negotiations by Australia or the Dominions Office were to ‘adversely affect the agreement reached with the Portuguese Government over our use of the Azores’.\textsuperscript{14}

The Australians asked for the Portuguese ships to be ‘detained at Colombo’, but Sir Alan Brooke ‘felt the Committee had no authority on military grounds to detain these ships’.\textsuperscript{15} The Australians, via the Dominions Office, pressed for Australian occupation, but were constantly rebuffed by the Chiefs of Staff, who thought the ‘difficulties and implications’ too great.\textsuperscript{16} The Portuguese Timor question put Britain between Australia and Portugal. It was somewhat unusual that a diplomatic quarrel between two nations should play out by proxy in a third, but Britain nonetheless found itself in that position. In the end, the Joint Chiefs chose Portugal. This was both realpolitik and an honest assessment of the competing claims. Portuguese Timor was Portuguese, but it was also deemed politically more expedient to give into the Portuguese than to satisfy the Australians.

In an ironic coda, it was the Australians who actually accepted the surrender of the Japanese. The chief reason was practical: the Australians were both nearer and able to put together a force capable of accepting the surrender. The surrender angered both the Dutch, who ‘while present, were not allowed to sign the document’, and the Portuguese ‘who were not even present’.\textsuperscript{17} For obvious reasons, ‘the announcement of this surrender was suppressed in the Portuguese press’.\textsuperscript{18} Whilst there were surely hurt feelings, they were outweighed by the fact that the Portuguese had landed their troops and once again hoisted their flag, albeit over a territory essentially ruined by a long and hard Japanese occupation.

\textsuperscript{11} TNA CAB 79/37/16 ‘3: Portuguese Timor’, 3 August 1945.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} TNA CAB 79/38/7, ‘1: Portuguese Timor’, 29 August 1945.
\textsuperscript{15} TNA CAB 79/38/13, ‘6: Portuguese Timor’, 5 September 1945.
\textsuperscript{16} TNA CAB 79/38/11, ‘16: Portuguese Timor’, 3 September 1945.
\textsuperscript{18} Levi, p. 223.
It seemed not to matter. Two Portuguese sloops and a warship, supplied mid-trip by the British Admiralty, finally landed a few days later.\textsuperscript{19} As a result of British and then American acquiescence, Portugal had re-occupied Timor, now with new guarantees about its future. A territory that had looked definitively lost in 1941 was once again ruled over by a Portuguese governor. Portugal’s imperial war was over. The Australian presence on Timor, at one point the effective rulers, had by October 1945 been reduced to a petition for a single Consul in temporary buildings.\textsuperscript{20} As with the wrangling throughout the War, the request was made in London.

Was the re-occupation of Timor the last wartime aim of the neutral regime? Was it the first post-War aim of the regime? The Timor issue was, of course, both, and shows the impossibility of separating the changed wartime colonial relations from subsequent post-War developments. Salazar himself saw Timor as both; in August 1945, the American Ambassador in Lisbon wrote of Salazar’s obsessive attitude toward Timor: ‘it is clear that Dr. Salazar’s present serious concern is to establish a juridical and moral basis upon which Portugal can seek invitation to participate in eventual Far Eastern settlement’.\textsuperscript{21}

More fully, in offering the Azores and, crucially, sending a force to Timor, ‘in the war operations against Japan, Portugal’s role was integrated with the United Nations’, thus confirming ‘her right to participate, as she has traditionally and consistently done, in conferences or acts regarding the settlement of Pacific problems is once more fully established’.\textsuperscript{22} In brief, then, the recapture of Timor would both resolve the bitterest rupture in Anglo-Portuguese relations writ large. In time, it would provide the basis on which Portugal would occupy a privileged seat at the post-War table; not only in Europe, but globally.

**Portugal as a Western European colonial power**

In 1945, Britain and Portugal faced a series of colonial problems common to all European colonial powers. The general imperial problems were interlocking, and could be

\textsuperscript{19} TdT AOS/D-J/12/15, ‘Garantia, do Almirantado inglês, de abastecimento, em Colombo, dos avisos “Bartolomeu Dias”, “Afonso de Albuquerque”, “Gonçalves Zarco” e “Gonçalo Velho”’.  
\textsuperscript{21} FRUS, 1945, Vol. 5, Doc. 325, The Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) to the Secretary of State, 17 August 1945. Available online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v05/d325>. [Last accessed: 10-11-2022].  
divided roughly into four: mistrust and hostility from the nascent United Nations, particularly in open forum; ambivalence from the West’s leading power, the United States; the precarity of their own domestic economies; and anti-colonial ideas and demands for self-government in the colonies. The Portuguese Empire’s problems were further compounded by particular Portuguese characteristics, usually related to poor infrastructure and economic stagnation, rooted in decades of under-development.23

In light of the shared challenges, Whitehall came to see international co-operation with other colonial powers as essential. As a lengthy report on the UN’s attitude to colonial empires put it: ‘The significant differences are rather between one colonial region and another than between one colonial power and another’.24 International co-operation between the European colonial powers would be essential were the system not to collapse.25 These new circumstances naturally lent themselves to developing Anglo-Portuguese rapprochement. This development did not begin immediately. Although Portugal became did eventually become more important, this was not the case at the very beginning, where it still ranked behind France and Belgium in British plans.

These shared challenges were linked to an idea long harboured by Bevin, a Euro-African ‘Third World Power’ which would provide European strength and security through confederation or co-operation between European powers and their respective empires.26 After the War and Bevin’s accession to office, ‘the starting point for Britain’s leading role in a global third force had to be France’ despite tensions in Anglo-French relations.27 Discussions on the creation of an Anglo-French, Euro-African Third World Power began in mid-1946, reached their ‘most intense’ in 1947, and carried on into 1948.28 Britain’s natural partner in these neo-colonial Euro-African designs was its old antagonist-ally, France, with whom it forged the deepest and broadest international colonial links.29 It also began formal Anglo-Belgian bilateral

25 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 840.
28 Ibid., pp. 841-842.
colonial talks in June 1946. In May 1947, the three met for international Anglo-French-Belgian talks in Paris.

These talks were fruitful. There was unanimous agreement to undertake ‘in-depth and permanent inter-imperial technical cooperation’. The three powers also agreed to consider the challenges posed by the UN, with a particular focus on how best to deal with relations with the body in order to ‘mitigate any potential intrusion into colonial affairs’. Interestingly, two historians who studied the conference through the records of the Belgian delegation said that ‘Portugal’s right to inclusion was also discussed at the meeting and was delayed only by the indecision of the British’.

This apparent indecision is interesting. Were the British indeed hesitant to include Portugal in the trilateral imperial talks, and if so, why? To try and find the answer, we have to track back momentarily from focusing on these trilateral conferences. In July 1946, a forthcoming health conference in Accra prompted the Foreign Office and Colonial Office to reconsider together ‘liaison, much on the lines already followed in the case of the French and Belgian Govts., but on a more modest scale’. The motivations were obvious: ‘Portugal was our Ally, she had helped us during the war and our relations with her were friendly’. The British were not alone in wishing to invite the Portuguese. Secretary of State for the Colonies, George Hall, presented the case to Bevin, noting that the Belgians were amenable to inviting the Portuguese while the French were ‘very anxious to open discussions’.

Hall presented two political considerations to Bevin. If Portugal were ‘not invited to the Accra Conference, it will be evident that the opposition came from Great Britain’. Conversely, ‘we may possibly be laying ourselves open to criticism in certain quarters on the score of collaborating too closely with a semi-totalitarian state whose war record is not altogether sound’. The Portuguese themselves were naturally keen to associate with the British Empire. This was unsurprising, given the Portuguese Empire’s long history of dependency on British aegis. If the Portuguese were to be invited to Accra, then Hall thought

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30 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 244.
33 Ibid.
34 TNA FO 371/60267, Z6370, Minute by Garran, July 1946.
35 Ibid.
36 TNA FO 371/60267, Z6736, Hall (Colonial Office) to Bevin, 19 July 1946.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
‘we must begin to develop liaison with them in a wider sphere’ comparable to France and Belgium. Britain could either extend the imperial hand of friendship wholeheartedly or not at all.

The reply, on the balance of probability the joint product of Bevin and Noel-Baker, was unambiguous: ‘I am definitely in favour of asking the Portuguese to participate’. ‘Their collaboration should be valuable and I do not think that there is any reasons why we should forego it’, since any criticism could be met without difficulty. Britain should, too, ‘pursue the idea of further cooperation with the Portuguese in the colonial field’. Portugal was to be invited to Accra, and further co-operation was likely. Britain had opted to extend the hand of friendship wholeheartedly. As a result, Portugal was to be given a more privileged position as an imperial power. But the May 1947 talks were too early, and Portugal was not ultimately invited. This changed in December 1947. In that month, formal ‘discussions were held in London with representatives of the Portuguese Colonial Office to discuss the participation of Portugal in the series of technical Conferences in Africa and at the same time to establish liaison between the two Colonial Offices’. A Portuguese delegation headed up by Dr José de Almada visited London, finally beginning of bilateral talks in the Anglo-Belgian and Anglo-French style.

These talks were conducted in the usual Portuguese style, with one representative anointed Salazar’s man. Dr de Almada was ‘Advisor on Colonial Matters to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ and as Salazar’s man, ‘held a whip hand’. The initial negotiations reflected Salazar’s neurosis over control of the state, with the Portuguese initially refusing ‘direct dealings with our opposite numbers in the Portuguese Colonial Office’. This was a point of differentiation with both France and Belgium and reflected the nature of dealing with a particularly tightly managed autocracy as opposed to the relatively diffuse administrations of the liberal democracies.

Despite these organisational differences, there was a high degree of mutual affection between the two sides, ‘and the Portuguese delegates told us repeatedly how pleased they were’

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39 Ibid.
40 TNA FO 371/60267, Z6736, Department to Hall, 29 July 1946. The draft reply is dated 29 July and marked as being from the Secretary of State. This typed authorship is struck through with pen (possibly in Noel-Baker’s handwriting), dated 30 July. The reply is signed by Noel-Baker, dated 29 July.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 TNA FO 371/73294, Z526, Galsworthy (Foreign Office) to Crosthwaite (Colonial Office), 21 January 1948.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
with British hospitality and treatment. Some particular agreements were drawn up: the boundary between Portuguese East Africa and Nyasaland being one, and road links between Angola and Northern Rhodesia another. The general agreements were more important. There was an agreement to improve contact, both ‘on the metropolitan level’ and, more importantly, between the local administrations. Communications – as favoured by the Portuguese, and probably by Salazar himself – should be through the countries respective Foreign Offices, though with potential for ‘non-political’ matters to be dealt with by the Colonial Offices in the future. There should be a ‘regular interchange’ of scientific and technical experts. These agreements, while somewhat vague, signalled both mutual intent to improve bilateral colonial links, and amounted to a change in the direction of travel for both sides.

Although concrete steps were limited, the British ‘felt the talks to be quite satisfactory as a first step’ in paving the way for deeper future co-operation. The direction of travel seemed to be set. Alongside these talks, Portugal was invited to a handful of international conferences on colonial affairs. Both concerned quite specific topics but were not necessarily fringe issues. One in December 1947 concerned plant disease and one in February 1948 focused on Trypanosomiasis (a disease more commonly known as sleeping sickness). In between these two conferences, in January 1948, there was an agreement made with the French that the next Anglo-French talks would discuss ‘how Belgium and Portugal can be brought in’.

This renewed thinking about Portugal was not limited to the civil service, and we should be careful to avoid thinking that this was a development limited to the bureaucratic sphere. Ernest Bevin intervened in Cabinet in January 1948, just after the Anglo-Portuguese staff talks. He posited that the Soviet threat to the Western system had become existential, and the colonial and nascent Cold War spheres had thus become definitively intertwined:

I believe therefore that we should seek to form with the backing of the Americas and the Dominions a Western democratic system comprising, if possible,

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46 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
54 BDEE, Vol. 2, Doc. 105 (FO 800/435, sheets 90-96 ), ‘[Development of Africa]: minute from Sir O Sargent (FO) to Mr Bevin, commenting on Field-Marshal Montgomery's memorandum’, 1 January 1948.
Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Portugal, Italy and Greece. As soon as circumstances permit we should of course wish also to include Spain and Germany, without whom no Western system can be complete.55

At the Cabinet meeting that considered Bevin’s memorandum, he posited that ‘almost all the countries […] listed have been nurtured on civil liberties and on the fundamental human rights’.56 This distorted truth was challenged; ‘Doubts were also expressed about the suggestion […] that Portugal should be included in the western democratic system’.57

Bevin’s explanation was simple and, as usual for British policymakers, involved a cross-Iberian comparison. Spanish membership was a long-term aim, and ‘there was no intention of attempting to bring Spain into the union so long as the Franco Government continued in power’.58 But: ‘The inclusion of Portugal in any Western European union would be most important because of her Colonial possessions in Africa’.59 In short, Portugal was to be invited to a seat at the Western table not because it was a liberal democracy – indeed it was the opposite – but because it was a colonial empire. Salazar’s tenacious, obsessive grip on the Empire had paid political dividends in the post-War.

In the uncertain and precarious years after the War, Portugal not only held on to her Empire, but used it to secure a privileged position in the Western order. Portugal was now on the precipice of near-total inclusion into the Western order, in the American-sponsored OEEC and the Marshall Plan, in the post-War colonial co-operation amongst the imperial powers, and as part of Bevin’s mooted western European defence plan. What happened next, therefore, was unexpected. The Portuguese assented to the agreements drawn up at the Anglo-Portuguese staff talks in December 1947, but not until six months later in June 1948.60 Thereafter, with the loss of momentum, the putative high-level Anglo-Portuguese talks on imperial matters faltered.

The two long delays, first British, then Portuguese, give us important information about Anglo-Portuguese imperial relations. The British clearly did harbour reservations about closer co-operation with Portugal, in particular relative to the France and Belgium. The Second World War, coupled with a generalised post-War imperial anxiety, had promoted Portugal from its previous nineteenth-century and inter-war position. The Portuguese Empire was no longer on

56 TNA CAB 128/12/2, Cabinet Conclusions, 8 January 1948. For specifics of the discussion, see: TNA CAB 195/6/2, Sir Norman Brook Notebook, 8 January 1948.
57 TNA CAB 128/12/2, Cabinet Conclusions, 8 January 1948.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 TNA FO 371/60267, Z5133, Chancery (Lisbon) to Foreign Office, 16 June 1948.
the periphery. Nonetheless, it was also not afforded a first-rank status in British thinking. This intersected with a genuine caution in the Foreign Office and Colonial Office borne of Portugal’s authoritarian political system. Ultimately, however, these reservations amounted to a temporary rather than permanent barrier and delayed rather than prevented Anglo-Portuguese imperial talks.

The Portuguese delay is more interesting, for it shows that Portugal was not the abjectly willing partner that had perhaps been anticipated in London. The delay casts some doubt on the idea that Salazar sought a Europe-wide post-War renaissance led by exploitation of the hitherto underutilised colonial assets. If Salazar did indeed see this Euro-African mobilization as ‘a “Third Force” being led by Britain’, then his relative hesitancy toward international colonial meetings and long delay in accepting the British proposals is particularly challenging to explain. Why did Portugal demur? The outward signs from Salazar were initially encouraging. In a speech in November 1947, he opined that ‘England, France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain have, through political regimes and diverse economic interests, the effective control and responsibility for the work, progress and well-being of the African continent’. He further suggested that a common policy of defence and economic growth would bolster both Europe and Africa. This supports the thesis mooted by Aires Oliveira that Salazar saw Euro-Africa as the future, much like Bevin.

One possibility is that Salazar liked the idea of a third force but was perturbed by the reality. This attitude was in common with his attitude toward Europe, where he clearly favoured European co-operation but balked at the requisite price of pooled sovereignty. Alternatively, new realpolitik rapprochement with the United States, particularly after the Lages airfield agreement, demonstrated that Portugal was willing to work definitively with the new Western superpower. The American-sponsored order in Europe order was proving both more palatable and more necessary than previously thought, and positive developments in the Portuguese-American relationship undoubtedly reduced the necessity – perhaps even the appeal – of close imperial collaboration with the British. Whatever the explanation of Portugal’s rather

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61 Aires Oliveira, ‘Live and Let Live’, p. 188.
62 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Aires Oliveira, ‘Live and Let Live’, p. 188.
66 De Meneses, Salazar, pp. 346-348.
mercurial attitude, closer Anglo-Portuguese imperial co-operation amounted to relatively little concrete by 1948.

Nonetheless, the tentative signs of Anglo-Portuguese imperial co-operation still mattered. For although the talks created little tangible co-operation, there had been a substantial shift in the direction of Anglo-Portuguese relations, which seriously contributed to the security and stability of the Portuguese Empire. Previous inter-War and wartime conversations, those that had talked of stripping Portugal of her Empire, had disappeared altogether. The talk had moved to the degree of co-operation, not the degree to which she would be stripped of her colonies. Angola was not going to be given to Germany; Mozambique was not going to come under Union rule; and Macau was not going to be sold to the United States. Britain’s attitude to the Portuguese Empire was unrecognisable from its nadir of the early interwar period. Perhaps Salazar’s reluctance to commit stemmed from the fact that the invite itself was what counted for the standing and security of the Portuguese Empire.

Despite Portugal’s reticence, the British now included Portugal amongst the first-rank players in the imperial arena. In February 1948, the Colonial Office signalled it wanted to advance discussions on ‘developing collaboration in Africa with the French, Belgians and Portuguese’. Notwithstanding the lack of further talks in London or Lisbon, Portuguese representatives subsequently did attend various regional conferences in 1948: on soil usage in Leopoldville; on Rinderpest in Nairobi; and on Nutrition in Dakar. These lower-level talks were a sign that Portugal was included in the gradual internationalisation of colonialism, even as it shied away from the higher-level talks at a metropolitan level.

In May 1948, while awaiting word from Portugal as to whether co-operation would go ahead, the Cabinet itself agreed that ‘The signatories of the Brussels Treaty, together with Portugal, would be primarily responsible for the development of European Colonial territories overseas’. By virtue of its colonies alone, Portugal was sitting in a secure and privileged position alongside the five powers that signed the Brussels Treaty.

This may, in fact, be the explanation we are looking for when we earlier asked why Portugal demurred. For Portugal had colonial support without closer international colonial co-operation. The United States had demurred, and Britain was not urgently needed as a colonial

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partner, since it was already a colonial underwriter. This was a distinct position from the rest of the European nations, and on balance Portugal occupied a unique space within Europe’s imperial post-War.

The Tangier question

In contrast to Portugal, Spain’s imperial remnants in Morocco and off the west African coast were insignificant in allied designs and thinking. However, its legally dubious occupation of Tangier was an active bone of international political contention. Surrounded by Spanish Morocco, itself a coastal enclave of the much larger territory of French Morocco, early twentieth century wrangling over the geographically important city had led to the creation of an international zone under Western control. Aggrieved by this anomaly and convinced that 1940 would begin the long-held dream of making the Spanish Empire great again, Franco moved to occupy the city on 14 June 1940. His motivations were obvious: ‘Franco and Serrano Súñer saw the seizure of Tangier as the first positive step towards a full-scale African Empire’.

The invasion raised hackles in London and Washington. However, the risk of Spanish entry in the War as well as the situation in the Vichy French colonies precluded any serious diplomatic action at the time. In April 1941, the British had reached an uneasy aegis with Francoist Spain, recognising special Spanish interests while ensuring that the area would not directly interfere with British shipping or naval operations. This situation of recognising Spanish primacy endured throughout the War, long after Operation Torch, and even after D-Day.

By 1945, with the War in Europe won this power balance had definitively changed, and it was obvious that continued Spanish occupation was a minor embarrassment that would no longer be tolerated. This view was true both in the metropoles and on the ground; ‘In the British Consulate they thought that if the allies did not consider occupying Tangier before the end of

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71 ‘Nota Oficioso’, ABC (Madrid), No. 10,704, 15 June 1940, p. 1. See also: p.3.
72 Preston, Franco, p. 362.
73 TNA, FO 954/27A/89, Hoare to Eden, 12 December 1940.
the war opportune, they would have to do it immediately afterwards’. 76 Again, the British led the policy in an area of the world that had historically fallen outside the American purview. In May 1945, the British approached the Americans ‘saying that our two Governments agree that the Spanish occupation of the International Zone of Tangier should be terminated as soon as possible’. 77

The associated aide-mémoire revealed the Janus-faced British approach to Spain in 1945. The British ‘consider[ed] that the present illegal occupation of the International Zone of Tangier by the Spanish Government should be terminated as soon as possible’. 78 This strong language was not matched by the proposed action. Given the ‘long-term desire to establish friendly relations with the Spanish nation’ as well as ‘the willing collaboration of Spain in the maintenance of the security of the Straits area’, Spain should not be forced out; the transition should instead be carried out ‘peacefully and with the full consent of the Spanish Government’. 79

The Spanish had every intention of holding on to their prized possession. Whilst Tangier was a relatively small territory, it occupied a disproportionately outsized role in the Spanish imperial imagination. Tangier was the stepping-stone from which Spain would jump into the rest of Morocco, displace France, and regain its place in the comity of European imperial nations. Accordingly on 6 July, Alba went to plead his case with Cadogan, ‘on which I was quite firm’, as Cadogan recalled in his diary. 80 The Spanish were squarely to blame over problems in Tangier.

The election of a Labour government changed nothing in Tangier. Attlee believed that the Spanish could not be trusted with such a strategically important location, right at the mouth of the Mediterranean. 81 Bevin uncritically adopted Eden’s earlier view on the matter from April 1945. 82 Indeed, his own paper on the subject was essentially a regurgitation of Eden’s with a few lines of approval and an annexe on how to enact the policy. The Cabinet concluded that:

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79 Ibid.
80 Cadogan, entry for 6 July 1945, pp. 759-760.
‘All the complications, including Soviet demand for participation, are due to Spanish unilateral action in 1940’.83 Once again in Spain, the Labour government opted for a policy of total continuity, though this policy of continuity was rather harsher toward Spain than policy elsewhere.

The Spanish were excluded from the formal Paris conference on Tangier’s future in August 1945. The MAE mustered only a weak pro-forma complaint.84 Once the discussions began in Paris, the Soviets finally presented their hand: there should be no role for the Spanish at all on Tangier. Moreover, the Soviets wanted to use ‘Tangier to force the Franco issue’.85 Franco’s imperial adventure would be the tool with which they would dislocate his government in Madrid. The British expressed strong concerns about either idea, joined by the French and the Americans. Completely forcing out even minimal Spanish presence from Tangier ‘might well have effect of rallying to Franco many of those elements now opposed to him and endeavouring to find a way to get him out’.86

The final agreement was that Tangier should return to international control, with the lead countries being France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (as in the pre-War system).87 Administratively, Spain was relegated to the minor leagues that included the Swedish and Swiss. The fact that the new chief Administrator was Portuguese was certainly poetic and might have hinted at the influence of a Portuguese soft power. The reality was more prosaic: Portugal was next on the alphabetical list of administrators according to the pre-War system.88 In reality, the Portuguese felt nonplussed about the Tangier administration, ruing ‘that historical, geographical, and economic special rights of Portugal were not recognized in new Tangier regime’.89

83 TNA CAB 128/1/1, CM (45) 18, Cabinet Conclusions, 7 August 1945.
86 Ibid.
After the Paris Conference, Spain exited the city; ‘With this exit the imperial African dream of Francoism definitively disappeared’.\(^\text{90}\) As Preston noted, ‘Spain’s only imperial conquest in the Second World War was thus erased’, significant for a country that had coveted a North African empire so highly.\(^\text{91}\) But neither the Americans nor the British, Conservative or Labour, were willing to tolerate Spanish presence in such an important location. There was no chance of appeasement. The Anglo-American decision to strip Spain of its one imperial territorial gain is even more significant than has been suggested in light of its appeasing attitude toward the Portuguese Empire.\(^\text{92}\)

While there was no appeasement, there was some amelioration. Spain was not to be completely ejected from Tangier. Bevin noted that there ‘were important Spanish interests in the Tangier Zone’, ‘and the Spanish Government had a right to be invited to participate in the formal conference’ on Tangier’s future.\(^\text{93}\) His motivations were two-fold, based on British trade interests in Tangier and the fear that ‘if we attack Spain as [a] whole, [it] may rally them around Franco’.\(^\text{94}\) The question we are presented with, then, is which mattered more? The lack of appeasement or the amelioration?

The outcome of the Tangier affair is ultimately open to two interpretations that can be drawn from the same set of facts. Spain no longer exercised any formal control over the territory. It was also allowed to keep almost all of its economic interests there. And it was allowed to play some small role in its administration. It is clear that depending on which set of evidence one privileges, two interpretations can be admitted. The first is that Spain was expelled from Tangier in every sense that mattered while being given some small sop. The second is that Spain was given a semi-detached position in the international administration of Tangier, in this regard more closely resembling Portugal.

The Soviets favoured the latter interpretation. Such was the interpretative split that by the end of the conference, ‘the Anglo-Soviet difference over Tangier was […] intractable’.\(^\text{95}\) The issue ‘marked a small but significant stage in the evolution of Anglo-Soviet relations: away from imperial rivalry and towards ideological confrontation’.\(^\text{96}\) While important not to dismiss

\(^{90}\) Rocío Velsaco de Castro, ‘Marruecos, el último sueño imperial del franquismo’ in: Guerra, derecho y política: Aproximaciones a una interacción inevitable (Valladolid: Asociación Veritas, 2014), pp. 211-244 (p. 242).

\(^{91}\) Preston, Franco, p. 544.


\(^{93}\) Ibid.

\(^{94}\) TNA CAB 195/3/50, CM (45) 18, Sir Norman Brook notebook, Cabinet Meeting, 7 August 1945.


\(^{96}\) Ibid., p. 133.
the second interpretation outright, it privileges factors of secondary importance. The Spanish community maintained a reasonable degree of control of much of the city’s economic life. However, the Spanish government lost a great deal of its power outright. While not unceremoniously dumped from Tangier, the government was unequivocally stripped of its imperial outpost, thus robbing Franco of the last vestige of his perennial dream of colonial expansion in North Africa. The Francoist dream of North African imperial irredentism lay crushed.

The Soviets ignored the fact that Tangier was an instructive case about British and American imperial policy; we need not suffer the same fate. In the limited imperial sphere, Britain and America were markedly more willing to adopt a harder and more inflexible line toward Spain. They would not tolerate any official Spanish presence, a demand further spurred on by French insistence. Though they were willing to countenance continued Spanish presence, this was limited to the private sphere and one official post, counter-balanced by an international cast of high officials drawn from a wide range of countries. Spain was not to be invited to take a seat at the international imperial table. In a post-War Europe where overseas empire continued to play an important role, this was a significant action.

Still, it was not quite as clear cut as Britain and America excluding Spain from the international imperial scene. The situation in Spanish Morocco was less severe and attracted much less scorn than the situation in Tangier. This reflected the view that the territory was legally under Spanish control. In March 1945, Franco appointed the pro-Allied General Varela as Spanish High Commissioner in an apparent gesture to the Western Allies (one of the Generals in British pay). This was quite effective; the British Embassy in Madrid reported the development as positive and was effusive in its praise of the General.

The British had two intentions: to displace Spanish control in a strategically important imperial outpost while not destabilising the regime by completely crushing its interests there. This was consistent with the wider British strategy toward Spain as a whole, and strongly contrasted with British strategy towards the Portuguese Empire. The latter was appeasement; this was simply diplomatic lubrication. The Soviet response was highly critical of the Anglo-American policy in Tangier, and raised numerous objections to the supposedly soft line of appeasement adopted by the western allies. This ignores the relatively intransigent and absolutist attitude toward Spanish rule in Tangier. It was therefore at best an uncritical

98 Ibid.
transposition of its attitude toward Spain proper and at worst a deliberately bad faith misunderstanding of the western allies’ policy.

In sum, Spain’s continued post-War colonial rule in the western part of Morocco and Fernando Póo hardly moved the Western allies either way. The situation in Tangier forced the Anglo-Americans to move against the Spanish and displayed their distrust for them in key strategic locations. However, once the issue of Tangier was settled, the Anglo-American allies did not object to Spanish colonialism *per se*. Varela’s appointment as High Commissioner certainly helped to assuage any lingering concerns, and Spanish rule in Morocco was largely a non-issue that neither helped nor hindered Spanish attempts to integrate into the Western order.

The British attitude to Portuguese rule in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly when contrasted with their attitude to Spanish rule in Tangier, shows the legacy of imperial developments during the War. These developments were premised on the interconnected issues of Portuguese rule in Timor and Spanish belligerency. As we saw in chapter three, the inseparability of the two spheres provoked a profound change in the Anglo-Portuguese imperial relationship, a change which – as in the wider Anglo-Portuguese relationship – ran on past the end of the War itself. But the major change, the acceptance of a formal imperial element to the defence guarantee entailed by the Alliance, also brought with it challenges and awkward political questions for the British state. Where its own imperial rule was subject to more substantial challenges and even imminently facing its end – in Hong Kong and India respectively – this new inter-imperial relationship tested the boundaries of the legacy of wartime allyship and demonstrated the limits of the *Estado Novo*’s integration into the post-War order under British aegis.

**Portuguese India and the limits of Anglo-Portuguese imperial co-operation**

Diu, Daman, Goa, Maké, Karikal, Pondicherry, Yanam – how odd these places, strung out along the coast of India, used to look in the school atlas; as though small, alien teeth had been nibbling at the edges of the huge vermillion expanse of British India.

“Couldn’t we turn them out, Sir?”

“Of course. Any time we wanted to.”

“Then why don’t we, Sir?”

And were told that these quaint survivals were a part of history, of the remote days when France and Portugal competed with us for empire: furthermore
that their neglected condition provided a salutary example to any Indian who was crass enough to doubt the benevolence of the British Raj.\textsuperscript{100}

With Indian independence promised by the Labour government, these quaint survivals became antiquated survivals. In the build-up to independence on 15 August 1947, and in its immediate aftermath, the future of Portuguese rule in India became increasingly uncertain. For Portugal, continued sovereignty was \textit{a sine qua non}; for the British, it was an awkward situation from which they attempted to extricate themselves between 1945 and 1947. Britain’s strategic need for good relations with the Indian Union outweighed its need for co-operation with Portugal over a territory it regarded as peripheral, weak, and anomalous. In those years, Britain opted for a policy of non-intervention essentially favourable to India, while Portugal struggled to articulate and carry out its own policy of continued colonial rule autonomously from Britain.

Unlike in Sub-Saharan Africa, where co-operation was conditioned in part by the wartime guarantees and in part by Britain’s post-War desire to secure a more stable international set-up for European colonial rule, in India, co-operation was rendered difficult by the competing demands engendered by looming Indian independence. Studying this period reveals the limits of Anglo-Portuguese colonial co-operation and highlights inconsistencies in British policy, supportive of Portuguese colonial rule in some places, but not in others. More widely, it shows how new guarantees about the Portuguese Empire were not infinite; and thus, it shows how Salazar’s desired guarantees about the Empire were not granted absolutely. Comparisons with British policy toward Macau reveals the extent of Portuguese dependence on British agency in the post-War era, a further legacy of the position of strategic dependence established during the War. Despite a similar official policy of non-intervention, Britain’s firm attitude toward its own continued rule in Hong Kong afforded Macau a degree of protection by implication. Negotiations over Goa’s future neatly demonstrate the limits of Anglo-Portuguese imperial co-operation and thus the boundaries of the \textit{Estado Novo}’s integration into the post-War Western order.

Portuguese rule in the quagmire

The Portuguese Empire in Asia had made it out of the crisis of the Second World War only to find itself facing a new and arguably more profound crisis. France was already being forced to fight to re-establish its rule in Indochina. Indonesia’s war of independence against Dutch attempts at re-occupation ‘could have repercussions in Portuguese Timor, still not recovered from the damage caused by the Japanese occupation’.101 Macau had held out only through a combination of luck and a diplomatic balancing act with Japan.102 Now its position was directly threatened by China, at first by the Nationalists who at first held the territory around it, and then the communists they were fighting.103 For Portuguese rule in Asia, 1945 was a year characterised not by joyous victory but by uncertainty and fear.

In South and South-East Asia, only Britain, and only then with American indifference, was wholly restored to rule as it had done in 1939. The Portuguese regime intuited early that after the War was over, the likelihood of continued rule in its Asian possessions depended in part on the attitude of the British government. The Portuguese Ambassador therefore began direct discussions about the future of the territories in early 1945. In February, Palmella met with Orme Sergeant, Oliver Harvey, and Hoyer Millar. As usual, Timor occupied a great deal of Portuguese attention.104 The British party, meanwhile, asked for news about Macau. At this February meeting, Orme Sergeant intimated that the British position was that Goa might have no choice but to fold into the future Indian Union.105 The early indication was that Goa would in future be treated differently from Portugal’s other Far-Eastern colonies.

A month later, in March, Palmella met Eden himself. During their previous meetings, Macau had often arisen in connection to Timor. This meeting was different; Palmella wrote to Salazar that ‘for the first time he [Eden] did not speak about Macau in relation to the reoccupation of Timor’.106 This was the first indication of a contradictory current in British policy. Even as the British position toward Timor grew ever more amenable to the Portuguese, at the expense of Australian strategic interest, it seemed to become less favourable to Portugal in other territories. These early indications about Macau and Goa indicate that even before the

103 Nogueira, Salazar, IV, p. 83.
105 Ibid.
end of the War, British policy toward Portugal’s more peripheral Asian possessions was far from settled.

This contradictory current acquired unfavourable overtones with the election of the British Labour government. The future of Portuguese India was now inexorably bound up with the newly promised independence of British India. The success of India’s anti-colonial movement, mounting costs, a general fear of imperial overreach, and a degree of moral obligation all led Attlee to accept that British rule in India was over.\(^{107}\) Once he had determined this policy, he was unwavering.\(^{108}\) Indian independence was now official and unstoppable British policy; what was the future of a territory hitherto implicitly dependent on a colony that would soon cease to exist?

In autumn 1945, there was one possible alternative to such a potential crisis. The Hyderabad government, which had signalled it would remain outside the Indian Union, wished to purchase Goa, or at least to buy Murmágão harbour. This offered the Portuguese an intriguing option for Goa’s future. The Hyderabad government’s basic interest was in access to the port via railway, since Hyderabad might otherwise be landlocked by an Indian Union it was reluctant to join. Hoyar Millar mooted ‘that Dr. Salazar would be likely to reject any such proposal as he does not regard the Portuguese Empire, or any part of it, as being up for sale’.\(^{109}\) Beyond this, the most telling element was Hoyar Millar’s unwillingness to involve the Foreign Office in any negotiations: this was a problem for India, in whatever form it would take, and Portugal.

In Goa, the first unfavourable winds began blowing across the border from British India in early 1946. This was an uncomfortable, but not untenable, situation, one of fear and uncertainty in the face of the forthcoming British exit, but not yet a crisis. It slowly became one in 1946. The closer independence came, the more it threatened Goa’s stability; the Portuguese governor wrote to Lisbon requesting military aid. Of the two companies of Portuguese troops, he could only count on the loyalty of the First Company, made up of African recruits, and not of the Second Company, composed of Indians.\(^{110}\) Popular discontent over shortages threatened to boil over into violence amidst Indian agitation, and in July 1946, the Governor requested the troop ship *Lourenço Marques* to be sent.\(^{111}\)

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\(^{108}\) Ibid., p. 38.


\(^{110}\) TdT AOS/D-N/10/2/2, Governor-General, Nova Goa, to Lisbon, 3 January 1946.

\(^{111}\) TdT AOS/D-N/10/2/2, Governor-General, Nova Goa, to Lisbon, 17 July 1946.
Most tellingly, the Governor’s telegrams allow us to reconstruct the Portuguese colonial attitude on the ground. In the circumstances, the lack of a coherent policy is striking. ‘English prestige is losing force’, the Governor-General wrote, and the ‘viceroy at least in appearances can only play a role similar to that of the Crown in England’.112 Amidst communitarian strife, ‘confusion and [a] decline in authority’ wrecked British authority, and strikes and civil disturbances were becoming widespread.113 Rather fancifully, however, the Governor-General wrote that ‘All of these things should not affect and will not affect Portuguese sovereignty’, ‘despite the Congress party’s policy of interventionist absorption’, which looked to take advantage of the territory’s hitherto ‘absolute dependency’ on British India.114 Most pressing in this regard was the ‘generalized fear of whether Bombay will give or deny [us] rice’, which necessitated urgent help from the metropole and the rest of the Empire.115 In the colony, the official Portuguese policy constituted a heady mix of pessimistic material realism and striking, even delusional, political optimism.

The British displayed a keen interest in these developments, but they appeared motivated more by a desire to avoid conflict or strife, and less in intervention in support of Portugal. In July 1946, concerned by reports of instability in Portuguese India, they began to engage with Portugal over the territory’s future. On 20 July 1946, C. N. Stirling wrote to Bevin after hearing reports that Gandhi was to work with the Goa branch of Congress to launch a ‘passive resistance movement’ there.116 Meeting the Portuguese Minister, Stirling asked him about Congress and the future of Goa. The Minister replied with ‘an air of unreality’ that these territories could not be considered anything other than integral parts of Portugal.117 Stirling betrayed his contempt for this argument, noting that Portuguese India was made up of ‘three widely separated and illogically demarcated districts’ on India’s fringe, ‘even less viable and defensible than Macau’.118

In the summer of 1946, the looming independence of British India coincided with civil disturbances in Portuguese India. The paucity of archival sources makes it difficult to imply causality, and reliable reports on scale and severity remain – probably as at the time – hard to obtain. In August 1946, the Consul-general at Pondicherry was sent to Goa to investigate, with

112 TdT AOS/D-N/10/2/2, Governor-General, Nova Goa, to Lisbon, no precise date, August 1946.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 IOR L/PS/12/4451, EXT 5329/46, Stirling (Lisbon) to Bevin, 20 July 1946.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
the strong implication that the Portuguese could not keep their own house in order. Both the British Indian authorities and London appeared particularly concerned that the Portuguese were apparently sending a warship to Goa. Meanwhile, Stirling interviewed d’Almada in Lisbon. Unusually straight-talking, he admitted that ‘The Governor General was behaving very foolishly’, that Goa was entirely dependent on surrounding foreign territory, and that ‘the Portuguese administration in India is in a very weak position’ (with which Stirling concurred).

The Governor saw it rather differently. He wrote to Lisbon that the Consul, nominally on a ‘recreational visit’, had visited him and had ‘a long friendly conversation on Indian politics, saying nothing unfavourable for us’. The Consul-General, Sinclair, provided an eye-wateringly different account. The Governor ‘exercises dictatorial powers in an administration which is entirely corrupt and inefficient’; if the Portuguese did not urgently liberalise, Goa might be lost. These assessments of the Portuguese as backward and corrupt administrators harkened back to pre-War views of the Portuguese Empire. Not only was Portuguese rule on the ground despotic; its metropole was equally at fault for failing to come to the realisation that European rule in India was over, for failing once again to follow Britain’s enlightened lead.

As in the 1930s, the British were once again attuned to ‘the inadequacy of the Portuguese colonial practices, which were not appropriate to the modern world’. But they were now attuned to them in a very different geographic space than before, and in a very different political context. No longer was this the view of Africa in the context of colonial retrocession to appease Hitler. Now it was the view of India in the context of decolonisation. Where once, as Waugh had put it, Goa provided a salutary example of bad rule, it now provided a salutary example of the wisdom of Britain’s withdrawal and ‘imperial rationalisation’ in India. British assessments of the suitability of Portuguese rule, it seemed, were closely matched to the strategic needs of the British Empire.

Questions of administrative competency in Goa had previously mattered because Portuguese India shared a border with British India. They would continue to matter in the future.

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119 IOR L/PS/12/4451, External Affairs, Government of India, to Consul-General, Pondicherry, 3 August 1946.
120 IOR L/PS/12/4451, E.P.O., India office, to Hogg, F.O., EXT5370/46, 3 August 1946.
121 Ibid.
122 TdT AOS/D-N/010/2/2, Governor-General, Nova Goa, to Salazar, 16 August 1946
123 IOR L/PS/12/4451, External Affairs to SoS for India, EXT6023, 2 September 1946.
because Britain was formally tied to the defence of the Portuguese possessions under the terms of the Alliance. The Foreign Office’s legal adviser concluded that these obligations would ‘remain just the same in the future […] that HMG [is] no longer in control of India has no legal effect on these obligations’.127 This advice is crucial to understanding why the British took such an interest in Portuguese India, in London as in Delhi, and why the awkward British policy of non-intervention ossified before August 1947. The Foreign Office legal adviser’s understanding of the legal ramifications of this bond stemmed in part from the guarantees granted to Portugal over Timor in 1942 and 1943.128 The British government was further compelled to adopt this uncomfortable position in India by their stated intention of co-operation in Sub-Saharan Africa. As in the War, they could not pick and choose dimensions nor strategic spaces; just as the Iberian Peninsula was intrinsically linked to Timor, so Goa was linked to Angola and Mozambique. Britain was formally bound to the defence of a territory it regarded as extremely incompetently ruled.

The situation worsened in September and October 1946, when a wave of arrests, searches, trials, and imprisonments swept the territory.129 If anything, the Portuguese line hardened, with Mathias railing against the involvement of any ‘foreign government’, British or Indian, ‘in the political affairs of Portuguese India’.130 The inviolability of Portuguese India and of sovereignty in foreign affairs became the theme du jour, and when in November O’Malley and Stirling met Mathias, he fiercely rejected their proposed course of rapprochement with the Indian Congress.131 A month later, the Portuguese National Assembly passed ‘a resolution declaring their fraternal feelings towards their fellow citizens in India’; a public declaration of their resolve, even without British support.132

Rather belatedly, and with the prospect of British support receding, the Portuguese government did at least begin to show interest in reform. On 21 February 1947, the Minister sent the Governor-General a ten-point telegram concerned with standards, security, and governance in Goa, seeking information on the territory’s general political position, on its supplies, and on the Governor’s confidence in the administration and armed forces there.133 Further, Lisbon sought information about the ‘bettering of economic conditions in the State

127 TNA FO 371/67725, W.E. Beckett, note on request from Western Department, Foreign Office (undated), 10 August 1946.
128 Ibid.
129 IOR L/PS/12/4451, EXT 7282, Vice-Consulate Murnagao [sic] to New Delhi, 29 September 1946; 2 October 1946; 10 October 1946.
130 IOR L/PS/12/4451, EXT 7856, Minute by Stirling, 29 October 1946.
131 IOR L/PS/12/4451, O’Malley to FO, 5 November 1946.
132 IOR L/PS/12/4451, O’Malley to Attlee, 19 December 1946.
133 TdT AOS/D-N/10/2/2, Folder 16, Minister, Lisbon, to Governor General, ff. 282-283, 21 February 1947.
and neutralisation of the populace’s discontentment’. But even this weak attempt at reform buffeted against the increasingly grandiloquent and delusional views of the Governor: ‘we can reinforce our position and orientation to make Goa a European refuge or oasis when their life becomes difficult or uncomfortable in a Hindu India as is said to be happening in Shanghai’. Possibly motivated in part by the attitude shown in Goa, the British continued their move to a more hands-off position. ‘We should certainly much prefer it if the Indians and the Portuguese could deal directly over Goa without bringing the U.K. Government into it’, wrote Hoyer-Millar in April 1947. Finally heeding British advice, the Portuguese moved to establish direct diplomatic relations with India. Orme Sergeant thought this might prove difficult, since Nehru had ‘privately expressed the view that the Salazar government is as bad as Franco’s’. But, at least, it was likely to be Portugal’s problem and not Britain’s. In making the approach, ‘it does not look as if they expect us to be that channel [to India]’.

Orme Sergeant, however, overestimated the Portuguese desire or ability to act unilaterally. On 27 May 1947, Palmella met Orme Sergeant in the Foreign Office. After discussing Portuguese Africa, Palmella ‘asked the Under-Secretary about the problem of Indo-Portuguese diplomatic relations’. Orme Sergeant clarified that the British ‘had not sounded out Congress about our position’, and Palmella asked for ‘the intervention of the British government’ to approach the Indian government. Neither accepting nor denying the Ambassador, Orme Sergeant demurred. This amounted to an implicit rejection. He similarly implicitly rejected the request for a meeting with Mountbatten.

While trying to remove Britain from Portugal’s orbit in India, Orme Sergeant did counsel caution on Portugal’s conduct, particularly with the Princely States, ‘since our closest neighbours were the Indians of Congress, with whom we ourselves sought diplomatic relations. One false step could cause an unpleasant situation’. The Permanent Under-Secretary’s gentle approach showed he was not keen to upset his Portuguese ally, but his amenable manner should not obscure the fact that he would not accede to any Portuguese request about India, nor allow Britain to become embroiled in Indo-Portuguese relations.

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134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
137 TNA FO 371/63532, F6193, ‘Portuguese Desire to Open Diplomatic Relations with India’, 7 May 1947.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
A soft tone but firm line was the order of the day in London; in Delhi, the outgoing British administration adopted a harsh tone and a firm line. A despatch from the High Commissioner’s office in July 1947 made it clear that they regarded the Portuguese position post-independence as perverse: ‘France and Portugal have maintained themselves in their Establishments and Possessions only by the tacit agreement of the third European Power with territorial interests, infinitely greater, in India, and that once British paramountcy has gone the other Powers will be soon be compelled by force of circumstances to follow’.  

When the force of circumstances forced the Portuguese out, the British wanted nothing to do with it; ‘we should do well to keep out of this’.  

The effective British refusal to commit to Portuguese sovereignty caused serious headaches in Lisbon. Just before independence, Salazar met with Teotónio Pereira and Mathias at the Santo António Fort in Estoril. The main point of discussion between the three men was the future of Goa. Teotónio Pereira was ‘indignant with the English, who would not intervene in our favour in the case of Goa, regardless of the Alliance, and recommended that we denounce the Alliance’. While undoubtedly words uttered in anger, Pereira’s outburst revealed the depth of frustration and sense of betrayal at the hands of the British over Goa. In a wider sense, it also showed the bubbling frustrations of a privileged position in the world, of a unique form of survival, which depended so acutely on British aegis.

Mathias was more sanguine: ‘For my part, I thought it to be unrealistic that Great Britain would enter into conflict with the Indian Union to defend Goa’. As he himself put it: ‘The problem was not the existence of the Alliance, but in our idea that it could function against Great Britain’s own political, economic, and strategic interests’. Accordingly, the arriviste minister suggested a course that would not involve direct British support: a referendum to decide Goa’s future. Salazar believed that, if they lost the referendum, this would be ‘an abandonment’; Mathias agreed, ‘but it’s better to leave with honour than to leave all beaten-up, crushed, with dead, injured, and prisoners in the hands of the Indian Union’. Yet, ‘Salazar seemed shaken up by my point of view, because after that he didn’t answer, and neither did Pedro Teotónio Pereira’. At a consequent cabinet meeting, the idea died.

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144 IOR L/PS/12/4451, ACB Symon, Deputy High Commissioner to Secretary of the Cabinet, 7 July 1947.
145 IOR L/PS/12/4451, EXT8058, Terence Shone, High Commissioner, to RHS Allen, FO, 13 August 1947.
146 Mathias, pp. 89-90.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., p. 90.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
Mathias’ plan was almost unreal. How could an authoritarian state that had crushed organised opposition just two years before now turn to the polls to continue its rule? Under what circumstances would such a referendum be accepted as legitimate? And how would it be underpinned by five states, including Spain, with whom the other four had no official diplomatic relations?\textsuperscript{152}\ But Teotónio Pereira’s suggestion, to denounce the alliance that had been the nominal backbone of Portuguese foreign policy for two decades, on whom the rest of its Empire still leant, and to abandon Portugal’s greatest friend amongst the Western allies, was patently an even worse idea. But his rhetoric revealed some of the frustrations involved in living under British imperial aegis, and the trade-offs involved in this method of entry into the post-War Western comity of nations.

The exchange revealed the extent to which Portugal remained dependent on British aegis for the basic functioning of its Empire, and the lack of alternative options. The gradual build-up of anti-colonial literature aimed at the Portuguese: pamphlets, publications, and newspapers, all seen by Salazar, speak both to Congress’ determination to inspire anti-Portuguese opposition in Goa and to the dictator’s preoccupation with the territory. The Goan exile Tristão de Bragança Cunha’s ‘Civil Liberties in Goa’ spared the Portuguese no criticism for their disastrous rule, arguing passionately that Goa ought immediately to be freed from its imperial yoke: ‘A FREE GOA IN A FREE INDIA’ was its succinct conclusion.\textsuperscript{153} Jawala, A Voz do CSP published a message from Dr Ram Manohar Lohia particularly aimed at ‘young people […] Indian soldiers in the Portuguese Army and Police’, ‘a group of young people with heart [who will] “do or die”’.\textsuperscript{154} The words of such propaganda, obsessively collected, echoed in Salazar’s cold office in São Bento.

After independence, the British proved unwilling to provide any protection, attempting to extricate themselves wholly from the future of Portuguese India. Non-intervention became the official British line. Before the new Foreign Minister Caeiro de Matta met Bevin in September 1947, the latter was briefed on the major bases in Anglo-Portuguese relations. The elements on Asian colonial affairs were unsparing. The British were not Portugal’s ally in China: ‘Any attempt by the Portuguese to link the fates of Hong Kong and Macao and to form a common front vis-a-vis the Chinese Government should be avoided’.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153} TD T AOS/D/N/14/2, sheets 56-67. Tristão de Bragança Cunha, \textit{Liberdades Cívicas em Goa} (CSP do Congresso Nacional (Goa), 28 April 1947. The speech the pamphlet was based on was made on 7 April 1946.
\textsuperscript{154} TD T AOS/D/N/14/2, sheet 68. ‘Mensagem de Dr. Lohia’, in: \textit{Jawala, A Voz do CSP}, I, IV, 28 August 1947.
\textsuperscript{155} TNA FO 371/67859A, Conversation between Mr. Bevin and Portuguese MFA in Paris, September 1947.
Macau’s future, which had briefly seemed so intertwined in the War, had once again unravelled after its end.

The line on Goa was more important for the Portuguese, since the Indian Union benefited from a much more stable basis on which to act than China, embroiled in Civil War. ‘There is every possibility of trouble over Goa’, Bevin’s briefing read; ‘The Government of India have made it clear that they hope to get the Portuguese out, but the Portuguese have made it clear that they will not leave except by force of arms’. 156 Bevin was instructed by his civil servants simply to avoid discussing the subject: this was between Portugal and India now.

In the run up to independence, the British had sought to extricate themselves as far as possible from Goa’s future. With the establishment of more direct Indo-Portuguese relations, they had been partially successful. After independence, a new question had arisen: were the British obliged, in case of a conflict with the Indian Union, to come to Portugal’s aid? The Foreign Office’s legal adviser thought so: ‘By our treaties with Portugal […] we are bound to help the Portuguese, if called upon to do so, to defend their possessions in India as elsewhere’. 157 ‘His Majesty’s Government naturally have the final right of judging the circumstances in which help may be given or withheld’, but ‘legally we are committed in regard to Goa’. 158 The Government was therefore doubly ‘anxious that the Governments of India and Portugal shall settle any difficulties direct’. 159

The Commonwealth Office agreed in the hope ‘that we can keep out of any trouble’, but ‘India will be disposed to deal fairly firmly with the Portuguese possessions as soon as it is convenient and the Portuguese, for their part, will dig their toes in firmly’. 160 The Commonwealth Office wanted to discern whether ‘embarrassing requests’ from Portugal were likely, and to balance Portugal’s demands against Britain’s ‘undefined but more intimate obligations towards India’. 161 As Smith notes, the uncomfortable contortion between Portugal and India, with an institutional preference for the latter power, endured well past 1947. 162

The policy in Portuguese India was nominally favourable to Portugal. But the papers of the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the reaction of the Portuguese, in Lisbon as in Goa, amount to clear evidence that, post-Indian independence, Britain was hoping to avoid its

156 Ibid.
157 TNA FO 371/69743, Murray (Foreign Office) to Walsh-Atkins (Commonwealth Relations Office), 2 September 1948.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 TNA FO 371/69743, F12517, Walsh-Atkins to Murray, 8 September 1948.
161 Ibid.
obligations under the Alliance. The British attitude in 1948 foreshadowed that which it adopted in 1963: a non-intervention ultimately more amenable and favourable to India.

The ambiguous imperial embrace

Anglo-Portuguese inter-imperial relations after the Second World War were clearly the legacy of wartime developments. This relationship was, in the main, changed beyond recognition from the disinterest and hostility which characterised these relations in the pre-War era. In studying the British attitude to the restoration of Portuguese rule in Timor, toward Portuguese colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa, and Anglo-Portuguese relations concerning Goa amidst Indian independence, we can clearly discern the three spheres discussed in the introduction. But more than that, we can account for both the crucial imperial element in Salazar’s unique survival in sharp contrast to Spain and delineate the limits of Anglo-Portuguese post-War co-operation and thus Portugal’s place in the post-War world.

The Iberian dictatorships’ experience in the imperial realm reflected their post-War situations more broadly. Spain was largely shunned as unacceptable to the international community and stripped of any lingering pretentions in Tangier, robbing Franco of his long-held dream of Empire. Tangier effectively signalled an Anglo-American unwillingness to accept Spain as a significant geo-strategic actor outside its own borders. The Spanish role was very limited as a consequence of its wartime conduct.

Portugal, however, was to experience something of a renaissance in international, and particularly British, attitudes to its colonial Empire. Long denied a seat at the European colonial table, the Timor affair had intervened to wedge in the minds of British policymakers a vision of an ally whose utility vis-à-vis Spain depended in great measure on the British attitude to its Empire. This vision, which as we have seen in chapter three was impressed on the United States, saw Portuguese rule re-imposed despite Australian chagrin.

This new attitude was reflected in British policy toward Portugal’s African colonies. Portugal was formally assured of its sovereignty, finally resolving the threatening ambiguity of British and particularly South African attitudes towards its colonies. Invited to a series of international conferences as well as to formal bilateral co-operation with Britain, both locally and internationally, Portugal joined the club of Western European powers it had been excluded from in the pre-War era.
In both Timor — which Allied troops had actually invaded — and Angola and Mozambique — which British politicians had not hesitated to sacrifice in 1938 — the consequences of imperial developments during the War were obvious. In sum, this amounted to a significant reversal in Portugal’s fortune and status as an imperial power. The forging of a genuinely imperial element in Anglo-Portuguese relations was a significant part of the unique and wholesale survival of the Estado Novo.

In Goa, an element of lingering ambiguity, unresolved by the War, remained. This implicit support of the status quo could be understood to be a policy that favoured Portugal, as in Timor. Portugal was sovereign in Goa, Britain supported the current sovereign, and therefore Britain supported Portugal. Moreover, it was acknowledged internally that the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance did formally oblige Britain to some degree. But the wider machinations of British foreign policy and their intimations to Portugal suggest more convincingly that they favoured the Indian Union. The most optimistic interpretation of British policy toward Portuguese India is that Britain was adopting a protective paternalism to encourage the Portuguese to adopt a sensible policy in their own best interests. The most pessimistic interpretation is that Britain was simply keen to extricate itself from its obligation to Portugal as it was no longer convenient. On the balance of evidence, the Foreign Office’s attempts to encourage Portugal to approach India itself – the optimistic interpretation – can be shown to be motivated by Britain’s own desire to remove itself from an awkward international entanglement. The pessimistic interpretation therefore holds more weight.

In India, Britain’s strategic and diplomatic needs centred on good relations with the newly independent Indian Union. Clear-eyed assessments of the shortcomings of Portuguese rule, therefore, were used to evidence the fact that was Goa a backward and anachronistic hold-out. These same criticisms were levelled at Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique; yet, since Portuguese control there did not conflict with British foreign policy objectives, this never translated into British refusal to co-operate, as it did in Goa. Succinctly, the dividing line between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” Portuguese rule was whether it conflicted with Britain’s own foreign policy. When it did, as in Goa, the British did not hesitate to afford implicit – though never official – favour to their former colony. The British refusal to back Portugal delineates the limits of Anglo-Portuguese imperial co-operation in the post-War era.

But in Goa, as in Timor, as in Africa, the British were bound by the novel imperial guarantees afforded as a consequence of the wartime trilateral relationship. This new imperial guarantee held together all three spheres. The Foreign Office’s legal advice was ill-received, and the British embrace was ambiguous. But it was also binding. So long as the Alliance
endured – and despite Teotónio Pereira’s outburst, there were no other strategic options – it would, from 1945 onwards, serve as a guarantee of British support for the Portuguese Empire and thus Portugal’s place in the world.
Conclusion

On 25 November 1946, Clement Attlee was the Guest of Honour at the inaugural Anglo-Portuguese Society annual dinner. Palmella held court and Attlee extolled the virtues of their old and venerable relations: “it is a very notable thing that in all the changes and chances of 600 years the treaty of alliance and the friendship between the British and Portuguese peoples should have endured”.¹ Attlee had gone from being Deputy Prime Minister to Prime Minister, and his view on Portugal had not changed. Portugal had been an ally in the War. It was, therefore, to be an ally in the post-War era. The Alliance had endured without interruption. Attlee’s intervention was less probing, even less true, than *Time’s*, but his intervention was more significant.

In the introduction, this thesis posed several questions about the trilateral relationship. What was that relationship? How did it develop during the War? Why did Portugal evade the opprobrium that plagued Franco’s Spain after 1945? Why did Salazar survive in such a unique way? In sum, how did the trilateral relationship between Britain, Spain, and Portugal account for the *Estado Novo’s* particular form of survival after the Second World? The unifying thematic answer, as we have seen, is that a certain vision of Portugal as an ally emerged as a direct consequence of this trilateral Anglo-Spanish-Portuguese relationship. Between 1939 and 1942, British policymakers believed Salazar’s Portugal was essential in keeping Franco’s Spain out of the War. A vision of Portugal as an ally translated into policy, particularly in the emergence of new, and eventually surprisingly broad, imperial guarantees.

In studying the development of this trilateral relationship, we have seen how a vision of Portugal as an ally translated into policy, policy which lasted course of the War, had a profound bearing on Anglo-Portuguese relations, and endured well after 1945. The thesis has shown us how the progression of Anglo-Spanish-Portuguese relations through the War created the essential conditions which led to the *Estado Novo’s* unique survival after 1945. It has shown how intertwined the three countries’ courses became, particularly until 1942. It has demonstrated the essential futility of studying any of the bilateral relations without reference to the third partner, a particularly acute problem in Anglo-Portuguese relations. It has vindicated the view of the Foreign Office in mandarins in 1944: that studying one set of bilateral relations does not present a complete picture.

This conclusion aims finally to do three things. Firstly, it aims to recap the major developments in the tripartite relationship, considering the changing relations in light of the research objectives laid down in the introduction. This allows us to see, in the round, the progression of the tripartite relationship and the way it created the conditions for the Estado Novo’s survival. Secondly, it aims to address and settle certain thematic considerations. These are, in turn: the role of Spain and its era of dominance in the trilateral relationship; the idea of Portugal in British designs in Portugal; the Salazar myth in Anglo-Iberian relations; the place of Empire and the Azores; the two regimes’ differing paths toward survival; their place in the post-War world; and Salazar’s particular survival therein. In doing so, it finally aims to identify the future avenues of research on the basis of this thesis’ research.

**The era of Spanish dominance**

From 1939 until 1943, Spain was the central object of both British and Portuguese foreign policy. It has been long been suggested that this was the case, but these studies have three broad problems: firstly, that the Spanish dimension was an important, but ultimately discrete, part of Anglo-Portuguese relations, detached from the main; or, secondly, an assessment that this policy was successful, without any further analysis on whether this was true; or, lastly, both. The Spanish dimension is seen, ultimately, in a rather off-hand and tangential way, and the trilateral element reduced to a perfunctory note about its success.

Anglo-Portuguese relations from 1939 to 1943 simply do not make sense if divorced from the context of Spain and her neutrality. Indeed, until 1943, it is impossible to separate Anglo-Portuguese relations from the main object of their diplomatic attention: Spain. Using a trilateral framework, one which recognises the essentially intertwined international choices facing the three countries, affords us a broad and more accurate view of these inter-connected relations. It allows us to see how British policymakers saw Portugal as a conduit to Spain. This role as a conduit fulfilled the idea of benevolent neutrality these men sought.

However, this view was substantially mistaken. Was there ‘Peninsula purpose’ in 1939, as both Halifax, at the time, and Halstead, with hindsight, believed? Was this ‘the beginning of a new phase in Iberian relations’? Rezola talks of the ‘predominant argument that what was

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3 Halstead, ‘Peninsula Purpose’, p. 287.
4 Rezola, ‘Franco-Salazar meetings’, p. 3.
at stake was the guarantee of Iberian neutrality during the course of the War. So, more broadly – was this period the progeny of a guarantee of Iberian neutrality, deliberately sought out by the Francoist state as a binding counterweight to Axis pressure? Did Franco see Salazar as a helpful escape hatch from Hitler’s demands?

Such claims, which Rezola accurately describes as historiographically normative, are difficult to substantiate. If Franco really intended a period of Iberian neutrality in reasonable co-operation with Portugal, then why, as we have seen, did Teotónio Pereira experience such serious diplomatic difficulties in Madrid? If Salazar was a helpful ally in avoiding Hitlerian pressure to join the War, why did Franco never meaningfully correspond with him? If the two were allies, why did Salazar and Monteiro repeatedly express such fears about Spain? There is little documentary evidence that Franco considered Spain’s relations with Salazar’s Portugal a guarantee of Iberian neutrality, and much documentary evidence that the Portuguese certainly did not believe this.

Relations between the Iberian nations were particularly poor between 1940 and 1941, those years were when Súñer was in his ascendancy, and when Portugal was at its most peripheral in Spanish thought. Súñer’s famous comments in September 1940 that ‘that geographically speaking Portugal really had no right to exist’ were off-the-cuff remarks which betrayed his whole view of Portugal. Teotónio Pereira’s material difficulties with Súñer, his concerns about his mentality and his conduct, the impossibility of meeting him, and his attitude toward Nicolás Franco all further evidence just how difficult Hispano-Portuguese political relations had become. As Jiménez Redondo put it, ‘in this period, the role of ambassador Franco was vastly surpassed – in activity, importance and intensity – by the role of Serrano Súñer, who became the real protagonist.’

While “plans” to invade Portugal certainly existed, it is difficult to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they were serious. That they do not appear in the personal accounts which still constitute a substantial amount of evidence on the Spanish side seems to indicate that they were, at least, not widely discussed. That Súñer, Beigbeder and Jordana make no mention of them could be coincidence or more fantastically a pact of mutual silence, or it could

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5 Rezola, ‘Franco-Salazar meetings’, p. 3.
6 Ros Agudo, La Guerra Secreta de Franco, p. 33.
7 Payne, Franco y Hitler, p. 123.
9 Garriga, El hermano brujo, p. 148-149;
11 Ros Agudo, La gran tentación, pp. 269-280.
be that these military plans remained, like others, exclusively theoretical. Plans to ignore Portugal, however, certainly did exist. Franco did not mention his supposed Iberian ties at Hendaye.\(^\text{12}\) Nor, when German pressure to enter the War increased in early 1941, was Portugal mentioned, except as a figurative and rather weak ancillary argument. This thesis has shown that Franco’s Spain was not kept out of the War by Salazar’s Portugal.

**A certain idea of Portugal**

What was significant, however, was that this was not how it was understood by British policymakers or – if it was understood – this never created a lasting mark in the official mind. In the view of many officials, Franco was kept out of the War by a trinitarian formula of material difficulties, his own inclination toward neutrality, and Salazar’s *Estado Novo*. The role of Sir Maurice Peterson, the Ambassador in Madrid, was to reinforce the need for an effective British strategy toward Spain.\(^\text{13}\) In support of this policy, Halifax first elucidated this view in the summer of 1939; the use of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, from a British perspective, would be to act as a conduit for British policy in Spain.\(^\text{14}\) This view was reinforced by Selby, who while a likeable diplomat, never quite matched Salazar’s intellectual capacity.

How was this approach formalised and translated into British policy? The arrival in Spain of Sir Samuel Hoare was particularly significant in this respect. Hoare’s extraordinarily difficult tenure in Madrid, coupled with his diplomatic inexperience, made him susceptible to poor political decision-making. David Eccles’ tenure formalised the trilateral relationship, nominally affording Britain a strategic victory in Spain while also providing a small boon for Portugal. Under Campbell, a more able and shrewd diplomat that his predecessor, this view waxed and waned, but never completely subsided completely. It is reasonable to say that Campbell, in his hitherto little-studied posting in Portugal, caveated the official British view without challenging it altogether.

Yet, Salazar skilfully promulgated this view of himself and was joined in this endeavour by his lieutenant, Teotónio Pereira. The Portuguese Ambassador ably fed Hoare a vision of Portugal’s role; Salazar, on rarer occasions, did the same to Selby, and then both Hoare and Eccles. Evelyn Waugh once observed in *Brideshead Revisited* that charm is the English blight,


\(^{14}\) TNA FO 425/418, Selby to Halifax, 15 June 1939.
but one measure of Salazar might be the degree to which he appeared to possess it. He was prepared to use this charm in his diplomatic endeavours, with great success in London.

That charming success, however, was not repeated in Madrid until 1942. Again, this turning point in Hispano-Portuguese relations makes little sense without prior reference to Anglo-Portuguese relations. Seen in isolation from the context of Anglo-Portuguese relations, the one period of close affinity between the two regimes makes scant political sense. Why did Franco turn his attention to Portugal in that moment and agree a meeting? Why were the Portuguese so receptive? Why was a substantive pact finally signed in December 1942? As we have seen, the crisis caused by the Timor invasion provided the perfect opportunity for Franco and Súñer to attempt to draw Salazar away from his traditional inclination toward Britain. The trilateral view does not resolve the mystery of what was discussed – probably, even in hindsight, the meeting ‘accomplished little and was only a qualified success’. But it does resolve the mystery of why they met when they did, of why a relationship previously plagued with uncertainty and reasonable suspicion on the Portuguese side underwent some change in early 1942.

It would take two further changes to bring Spain and Portugal further together; one domestic – the Begoña attack – and one international. Jordana’s trip and the founding of the Iberian Pact cannot be properly understood without reference to the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942. Otherwise, at least as a matter of timing, it appears a frankly random development. Unlike the 1939 agreement and the 1940 Additional Protocol, both of which were essentially Spanish attempts to wean Portugal from the Alliance, the Iberian Pact represented a genuine change in Spanish orientation. That change involved the Estado Novo’s diplomacy to a limited extent, but it also reflected internal changes in the Spanish regime – above all Súñer’s fall and Jordana’s accession to the MAE – and the dramatically changed strategic situation after Torch. For Campbell and Hoare, however, the Iberian Pact appeared to substantiate the British view that Salazar’s work had and yet would, in the end, keep Franco’s Spain from belligerency.

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15 TNA FO 371/31164, Note by Makins on C1951, 21 February 1942.
The Salazar myth

That view was in the main mistaken. This thesis demonstrates the profound gap between the official British conception of Salazar’s role and Salazar’s actual role, particularly as it related to Spain. We ought surely to be left in no doubt that a systemic evaluation of the British sources paints a certain picture of Salazar as a difficult but essential partner in keeping Franco from belligerency. We ought surely also to be left in no doubt that a systemic evaluation of the Portuguese sources demonstrates the weakness of Portuguese diplomacy in Spain.

Salazar was his own myth-maker; he wilfully embellished and disseminated the myth. But he was helped in that endeavour by Samuel Hoare above all. In Hoare’s memoirs, as in Eccles’ account, there can be no doubt about the utility of the dictator and thus the service rendered during the War. He was further supported, in the next administration, by both Churchill’s legacy and Bevin and Attlee’s recollection of his diplomatic endeavours. Finally this view made its way into the historiographic mainstream, particularly in Spanish historiography, though also in popular understanding. All that contributed to the enduring view that Salazar’s Portugal had, during the whole Second World War, been not a neutral but an ally.

What was important was not actually Portugal’s role, but the idea of Portugal’s role. Franco was not kept neutral from Lisbon, but the idea that he was made a significant and enduring contribution to a certain official view of the Salazar regime, of its place in the world, and of its utility to and relationship with Great Britain. The Estado Novo was neutral, but it was an ally, a role it had achieved by endeavouring to keep Spain out of the War. Salazar was a dictator, but he was an allied dictator, whose “good offices” had helped to keep the War from the Peninsula, and with it save Gibraltar and access to the Mediterranean. Already by the end of 1942, before the Estado Novo had ever proved materially useful to the Allied war effort, it was considered an allied regime.

17 Note by Eccles to Salazar, 22 May 1940, printed in By Safe Hand, pp. 111-113; Hoare, Ambassador on a Special Mission, pp. 57-58.
19 Da Costa Leite, ‘Neutrality by Agreement’.
The Portuguese Empire and the Azores

Any study of Anglo-Portuguese relations which relegates the imperial ignores the centrality of the issue in Portuguese thought and therefore in its War aims. It ignores the way that the Portuguese Empire, largely via the long diplomatic afterlife of the disastrous pre-emptive invasion of Timor, found its way to the heart of the British decision-making process about Portugal. Where previously the Empire had occupied a peripheral role, it now occupied a central one.

This speaks to the central problem. Timor and the Azores have been linked but divorced from their wider global and European contexts. What happened in Timor was not simply an exchange agreement, a diplomatic barter in a vacuum. It was a long and complicated process, one which drove the Portuguese Empire right into the centre of the British worldview. Discussions over Timor secured guarantees about Mozambique and Angola, far more substantial possessions whose position vis-à-vis Britain and South Africa had been uncertain since at least 1890. It resolved a profound ongoing uncertainty on the Portuguese side: did the Alliance hold for the colonies?

The Azores agreement was obviously the most impactful development in Anglo-Portuguese relations. The agreement really was of immense value to the Allied war effort; it was truly a great practical use of the Alliance. While Portuguese historiography has long understood that this represented a change from an ambivalent “triangulated” to a more cooperative “allied” neutrality, that distinction has not yet found its way into the English-speaking mainstream. But even this more nuanced view ignores what this thesis has shown: that, from a British perspective, the Azores agreement was the culmination of Portuguese allied neutrality, rather than the beginning of Portuguese allied neutrality.

After the success of the Azores agreement, American interest in Portugal grew exponentially. American interest in the Azores and American support for the re-imposition of Portuguese rule in Timor must be seen in the context of British antecedents; otherwise, Kennan’s intervention in late 1943 appears out of nowhere, an apparently new thought entirely

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20 Von Peter, p. 5.
21 Carlos Bessa, A Libertação de Timor Na II Guerra Mundial. Importância Dos Açores Para Os Interesses Dos Estados Unidos (Lisboa: Academia Portuguesa da História, 1992).
of his own. The colonial assurances mooted in late 1943 represented an American conversion to the British position rather than a novel American approach. They can be definitively traced to thinkers in the Foreign Office, to Campbell, and even to Churchill’s direct personal intercession with Roosevelt.

What studies of US-Portuguese relations overlook is the British precedent; the degree to which the United States’ overtures to Portugal were built on a British foundation. The origins of most American policies toward Portugal can be traced to British diplomacy up until 1943. Historians have rightly focused on the somewhat competitive co-operation between Britain and the United States in Portugal and Spain. But they have not always made clear that most of the United States’ policies in Portugal were directly influenced by, sometimes even created by, the British diplomacy that had preceded their own overtures. While it was true that the United States had long had a considerable strategic in the Azores, it has oft been overlooked that short of the preceding British diplomacy, they lacked a coherent political strategy to gain a foothold there.

The differing paths to survival

Almost soon as Hispano-Portuguese relations had looked to become close, they appeared to become distant again. The Portuguese documents support the view that Franco never surrendered his ultimate hope for a German victory; it was for this reason that he could never collaborate with the Allies in the way that Salazar had. After Torch, the Sicily landings and the subsequent Italian campaign showed the Portuguese dictator a vision of the future that his Spanish counterpart could never understand. Freed, in these circumstances, from Spanish and Axis threat, the Portuguese regime was able to jostle for position, rather than simply play for survival.

However, the Spanish regime provided an unfortunate yardstick by which the Portuguese regime would be measured. This was particularly true of wolfram trading. The

Portuguese decision to cease exports must, again, be seen in the context of Spanish actions. When Teotónio Pereira wrote to Lisbon, it was obvious that he feared the precedent as much as the decision itself; what such a comparison portended, as much as its function then. Comparison to Madrid would become a risk; only the regime’s conduct could account for how serious a risk that might become.

Post-War legacy

As a result of Portugal’s conduct in the War, part-imagined, part-real, and part-hard-won, there was no “zero hour” for the Estado Novo in 1945; there was not even a perceived threat of a “zero hour” as there was for Franco.28 The arrival in Portugal of Owen St. Clair O’Malley, a man seemingly more preoccupied with his retirement fund, and never particularly interested in elucidating a new policy to London, helped this seamless transition.29 That is not to say that Foreign Office mandarins did not consider alternative policy; however serious these plans were, there were clear signs in 1946 and 1947 that a more realist assessment of Salazar’s regime was beginning to foment in London. Ultimately, however, Ernest Bevin never shared this view. He always considered Portugal an ally. The whole affair is a case study in the “politics of continuity”, in which the paradigm – conservatively-inclined officials influenced ministerial policy – is in fact reversed.30

This ought to rob us of the illusion that Spain was a wholly unique case. Salazar’s survival ought also to challenge the myopia about Franco’s survival, and statements such as: ‘Franco’s survival in power at the end of the II World War was an authentic anomaly’.31 Or worse: ‘the Iberian Peninsula was still dominated by a totalitarian regime’.32 Both claims would have been news to the Portuguese people in 1945; both ought to alarm historians. The isolation of the Franco regime was unique, but its survival was not. The survival of the Estado Novo was unique; but its form was.

This form laid the foundation for Portugal’s inclusion in the Western system. Firstly, it had strong diplomatic relations with Great Britain and, through Great Britain, the great victor

31 Martinez Lillo, p. 307.
32 Liedtke, p. 5.
of the peace: the United States. In the coming American ascendancy in Europe, Salazar’s ambivalent embrace of the United States, whose policies in Portugal had always followed their British counterparts, had won his regime great favour and security. All this owed to the War; we ought not to omit the wartime relations that made it so. Take, for example, Luís Nuno Rodrigues’ (correct) argument that ‘despite being an authoritarian regime, Portugal was easily integrated into the new international system’. Shorn of its context and its precedents, such a statement is difficult to understand. As this thesis has shown, Salazar’s Estado Novo did not survive because of the Cold War; the particular form of its survival rested on a much wider base of geopolitical factors, most of them forged in the Second World War.

That is not, however, to suggest that there were no doubts on the part of the British. The Foreign Office’s mandarins did raise questions about the regime. The unfavourable comparisons which had plagued Salazar in 1944 and on wolfram never wholly disappeared. Moreover, in the imperial sphere, there remained significant ambiguities and complexities: British reluctance to become involved in Goa, for example, and to associate the fortunes of Hong Kong and Macau. These ambiguities provide important foundational clues about later imperial controversies. The ultimately dissociative attitude to Macau illuminates the relentless national-colonial self interest in Hong Kong, rather than an interest in the Portuguese position in China. Moreover, during the Indian invasion of Goa, formal British support for Portugal without any provision of actual support might seem contradictory (as indeed it was). But seen in the context of post-War Anglo-Portuguese relations, it was hardly surprising.

The relationship had, however, undergone substantial development, a change that was a direct descendant of British strategic designs in Spain. It was unrecognisable from 1939. Anglo-Portuguese imperial relations from 1939 until 1947 provide instructive, and perhaps even essential, precursors to later British attitudes toward the Portuguese Empire during decolonisation. Aires Oliveira’s excellent studies of the British attitude to Portugal’s hold-out against decolonisation rests on the presumption that there was an imperial alliance in the first place. As this thesis has demonstrated, the “Alliance” acquired a real imperial element as a direct result of the Second World War. After 1945, Portugal was invited to become an imperial power at the Western colonial table; a tremendous reversal of its fortunes. Formal Anglo-

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35 Aires Oliveira, ‘Live and Let Live’; Os Despojos.
Portuguese co-operation in colonial affairs did not begin on the eve of decolonisation, but rather in the vespers of the Second World War.

In this ambit, in brief conclusion, the thesis makes four novel contributions. Firstly, it retrieves the imperial element in Anglo-Portuguese relations, showing how it came to occupy a central place in the Alliance, intrinsically linked to and both influencing and influenced by events in Europe. Secondly, it demonstrates the precise mechanism by which this changed, addressing a hitherto under-theorised change in Anglo-Portuguese relations. Finally, it provides the historiographic foundation which strengthens later studies of inter-imperial relations, particularly during the period of decolonisation. International histories of the Salazar regime, and particularly international histories of Anglo-Portuguese relations during that time, can simply no longer ignore the central place of empire in the two countries’ relations.

Salazar’s particular survival

The survival of Salazar’s Estado Novo took a particular form which was unique for four reasons. It was the first post-War Western European dictatorship with good diplomatic relations with both the United Kingdom and the United States. It survived with its authoritarian core intact. It survived with its Empire and with new guarantees about its overseas sovereignty. Furthermore, it derived both benefits from the Second World War. No other authoritarian regime in Western Europe accrued such benefits as a result of the War.

This was a much more significant survival than has hitherto been appreciated, built on a complicated set of relations which until 1943 often intimately involved Spain and always involved Great Britain. This was much wider than simply a quid-pro-quo for the Azores. It encompassed a significantly broader set of relations in which Salazar’s Portugal evolved from a peripheral dictatorship on Europe’s fringe to become a useful and important ally, both European and colonial. As a result of that transformation, the regime was afforded membership of the most important structures in the post-War West: NATO, the Marshall Plan, and various inter-colonial bodies.

The origins of this survival lay as much in London and Madrid as in Lisbon. It was the idea that Portugal was a key collaborator in keeping Spain neutral that created the overwhelming impression of allyship. That, as we have seen, was a myth. But the idea was as important as the thing itself; the imagined Portugal obtained several real and concrete benefits. The survival of the regime without any need for change was the most important of these; the
survival of its Empire the most unexpected and the most substantial; entry into the above-mentioned organisations the most significant in the long-term. The Cold War provided the impetus for Portugal’s formal entry into these organisations, but this was practically assured by the legacy of the Second World War, not by the changed geo-strategic considerations of that new age.

The value of the myth was, for Salazar, enough to secure victory in a War his country did not fight in. That is not a moral judgement. Salazar opted for a course which he believed was the best for his country, or for his vision of the country as it ought to be. Similarly, that the myth became rooted in the official British mind at a time when Great Britain had extraordinarily few strategic options in Spain ought not to be the subject of a moral judgement. People, even civil servants and politicians, make contingent decisions. We ought not to pass moral judgement on the myth. Neither ought we to allow it to live on. Blessed with hindsight, we have no need for the myth. Franco’s hábil prudencia has been consigned to the past; perhaps the same ought to happen to Salazar’s “allied neutrality”.


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