The role of the city in expanding and preserving political autonomy: A capability theory

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Declaration

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Abstract

The late twentieth and early twenty-first century saw a rapid expansion of city populations. Concurrently, a wave of intensified globalisation occurred, propelled in good part by the confluence of substantial technological development and ideological shifts that affected the relationships of nation-states and capital. Together, these phenomena indicate a radical reshaping of power, which threatens the possibility of holding political autonomy locally. This thesis draws on theoretical and empirical material to illustrate why this is the case, and also why it is so problematic. The city is shown to be a key site involved in this shift of power as well as having an impact on human flourishing. By re-framing the goals of the city in light of this shifting landscape, we can develop the ability of the city to preserve and expand space for opportunities necessary for the practice and development of political autonomy. The thesis uses the capability approach to frame the importance of political autonomy. By showing this, we can see why the current global phenomenon is problematic and in turn how we might reframe the ends of the city. The capability approach highlights why such an ability to have some control over one's political environment is important and thus a concern that requires greater scholarly attention. To ground these conceptual ideas in practice, this thesis will further examine how global forces have affected the capacity of individuals in London as well as through an exploration of housing policy from other cities. By doing so, this thesis shows alternatives to the London and similar city models, indicating the importance of cities for citizens' wellbeing, how political autonomy in cities is under threat from globalisation, and how a refraining of the city in light of capability theory might help mitigate this threat.

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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of the Thesis

This thesis aims to better understand the role of the city in preserving and developing capabilities to enhance political autonomy in a time of enhanced globalisation. In doing so, it will be argued that the city is a key political space for human capabilities, which is increasingly impacted upon by forces of globalisation. As has been noted, during the twentieth and early twenty-first century, there has been a rapid expansion of urban populations, both in relative and absolute terms, and the number of people living in cities is undeniably growing (Harvey, 2013; WHO, 2020; UN, 2018; IMF, 2007). In this period, the world has also become more interconnected, experienced more international trade (Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2016, Wild, 2000; Rodrik, 1998, p.1), and undergone a considerable expansion of communicative capabilities (Bartlett, 2018). All of this in effect has made us more globalised (Giddens, 1990; Held, 2010).

In a nutshell, we are becoming more globalised and urbanised, a relationship that remains under-studied, but with huge implications in terms of human flourishing. For example, expanding city populations show us that a rising number of people pursue their life-goals in cities, whilst the expansion of globalising forces, in many cases, has become more influential than ever. As this thesis argues and demonstrates, the dynamics of globalisation in many cases pose a threat to the political autonomy of city dwellers, which is a key capability involved in how we think about the prospects for human flourishing.

The research aims to contribute in three areas:

Firstly, in deepening an analysis of globalisation and its effects.

Secondly, in helping to develop a new understanding of cities in such an environment.

Thirdly, to develop and contribute to existing literature on development, and in particular the capability approach literature pertaining to cities.

It will be argued that the city space is vital to understanding the development, expansion and preservation of that which is key to flourishing. When global forces threaten individuals' political autonomy, the city can be used to counter that movement. Further, expanding space for more local decision making is advantageous in preserving and expanding space for political autonomy when pressures from outside the local space are rising. The analysis shows that this is possible by reimagining the role of the city. At the national and international levels, the city emerges as a reimagined space worthy of more decision-making powers. The city also emerges as necessary to preserving those spaces necessary for human flourishing, particularly political autonomy. The value of the thesis is in understanding the importance of threats to political autonomy posed by globalisation and, further, the role the city can play in protecting opportunities for human development in a globalised world.

In this thesis, the importance of political autonomy is framed using the capability approach, a normative framework used across philosophy, economics and various applied fields in social science. As is common practice, the framework is used to analyse the justness of social arrangements as well as to determine the wellbeing of individuals (Robeyns, 2017, p.24). The capability approach is predicated on the notion that, when evaluating an individual or society's wellbeing, what counts is what people are able to do and be (Robeyns, 2017, p.7). In other words, their freedom to do the kinds of things they have reason to value (Sen, 1990, p.460). In a social context, our ability to do and be things. These abilities and freedoms rely to a large extent on our ability to co-legislate with

others. In order to think about the ability to exercise such freedom in a social context, this thesis adopts and adapts the idea of "effective autonomy", which, according to Garrett Brown (2009, pp.156-157), is: "The ability to reasonably achieve the intended or desired result of one's conscience and self-legislation in a social context".

This ability is influenced to a large extent by what Brown terms one's "aspect capacity". Aspect capacity is "the ability to formulate, hold and act upon an individual's social conscience based on external elements (aspects or facets for external freedom) affecting the development of one's co-legislative capabilities" (2009, p.157). We find a clear relationship here between innate human potential (the ability to reason and self-formulate ends) and the interaction between the agent and the environment in which that capacity can be expressed. In other words, an aspect capacity is, in effect, the capacity for autonomous self-reflection within a particular environment where aspects of autonomous action are hindered, permitted or passively and/or actively advanced.

As will be argued throughout this thesis, developing the capabilities required for effective autonomy is reliant not only on one's innate capacity, but on the external environment in which one finds oneself. This relationship, which is explored in detail in Chapter 4, shows how political autonomy is developed in a social context. It exists in individuals, but is practised and nurtured in social settings. It is this expression and practice of co-legislation, and the coexistence of autonomous agents within cities of capabilities, that this thesis is concerned with.

The capability approach helps to frame effective autonomy as key to citizens living good, flourishing, lives. And the city is the space in which most people live and attempt to realise their life- goals. Cumulatively, if the city should concern itself with the flourishing of its citizens, its institutions,

spaces and opportunities must also be organised in a way that promotes the development of effective autonomy as a key capability. Relatedly, this thesis shows why forces of globalisation are a threat to the development of these capabilities required for political autonomy, and why political autonomy is important. By reframing the city as having the expansion of capabilities as a primary goal, it is suggested that a new political theory of cities may be developed.

1.1 Structure

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. This first chapter sets out to demonstrate why contextualising the development of capabilities in a city context is an important project. Chapter 2 introduces in more depth the capability framework used in the thesis. The chapter gives an overview of key debates and situates them within the context of cities. It also shows why the capability approach is useful as an analytical tool, in comparison with other frameworks, more generally used to evaluate wellbeing and fairness in city settings. In doing so, the chapter sets up the way in which we can understand key aspects of capability development as offering a useful alternative to more traditional approaches to economic development, and, in doing so, better places human development at the heart of the city.

Chapter 3 gives an overview of the city in history, outlining the way in which the city and our understanding of what it is to be political in Western political theory are interwoven. It is the city-state that Aristotle used to explain the aims and ends of political communities in Nicomachean Ethics in the fourth century BC. The concept of polis (city-state) emerges in ancient Greece, from which we find the etymological roots of the word politics. In the ancient city of Athens, for example, we understand the polis as the source of political life for those given citizenship, organised around equality, liberty and the rule of law (Held, 2006, p.13). Further, this chapter highlights the reflexive rela-

tionships with citizens and how the development of both individuals and the city is synergistic. I show how the city is a spatialising of norms. Finally, expanding city populations indicates how cities can increasingly offer space for flourishing. Inversely, this indicates how a lack of consideration for the role of the city could lead to the ignoring of serious problems for citizens' political autonomy, problems caused by pressures for the city from globalising forces. By recognising the city's role in producing and maintaining political autonomy, we can see how greater political autonomy can be produced within city structures. To paraphrase Alexandre Frediani (2021), the city is often understood as an engine of growth for the economy, yet can also be seen as an engine of human development.

Chapter 4 explores the relationship between globalisation and autonomy in the late twentieth century. I argue that, whilst cities have become increasingly important for the expansion and preservation of human flourishing, forces of globalisation have simultaneously disempowered many citizens within cities. This disempowerment is due to the fact that facets of globalisation have led to power being distributed unevenly. Technological development and the expansion of global trade have made it easier for some to affect others globally. At the same time, dialectically, this has had the converse effect of making it easier to be affected, without recourse to engage with these globalising forces. In this chapter, I will clarify why co-legislation is important for development and human flourishing, and, cumulatively, why such uneven distribution of power is a threat to human flourishing.

Chapter 5 introduces the city of capabilities. Framing cities in this way helps to create a juxtaposition between the city that aims primarily at GDP expansion, with the city that has as its goal the expansion of its citizens' capabilities. In this light, cultural and economic policy can be framed using

the capability approach to foster, expand and protect capabilities, particularly capabilities aimed at enhancing political community and conditions of mutual self-lawgiving.

Chapter 6 applies the theoretical material discussed in chapters 1 through 5 by examining changes in house prices (and in turn the affordability of living), alongside political decision making in London. London property pricing can be seen to be directly affected by processes of globalisation, which negatively impacts many citizens' political autonomy. The capacity of technology to capture, store and manage preferences is contrasted with a relative lack of development in political decision making; that is, in providing space for technology to expand political participation. In this chapter, we have a focused exploration of the city, showing how globalisation in the late twentieth/early twenty-first century has affected it.

Chapter 7 further seeks to apply the framework articulated in chapters 1 through 5 by examining global examples where technology has been used to expand the gathering and communicating of data. This is done through an examination of examples of city spaces and policies that aim to stem some of the pressures of globalisation. This chapter helps to demonstrate the generalisability of the framework and how it might be used heuristically. It also shows that cities across the world are having to engage with the issues that I present in this thesis. These ideas concern expanding the space for legislation using technology and ameliorating pressures of globalising forces on space. The thesis helps to frame exactly what those issues are, and, by doing so, offers normative and practical guidance as to how we might tackle them. Through the analysis provided in this thesis, it will be argued that cities are a key space in the development of that which is required for human development – in particular, the space for political autonomy, necessary to living good lives. Further, that

this space is under threat from globalising forces, so, in order to create space for citizens' political autonomy, and in turn flourishing lives, we need a reframing of the role of the city.

1.2 The city as a key political space

The thesis focuses on the city as a key political space, a space that is becoming. As described, cities are intrinsically linked, in the Western tradition, to the roots of political theory. They are also normative spaces, which help people develop. City populations are also growing dramatically. We can see from the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), the importance of city spaces, cities added as a key focus in the renewal of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The explicit aim of Goal 11 is to make "cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable" (UN, 2018).

Cities have existed in some form for well over 7000 years. But in recent times the ratio and absolute number of people living in them have grown exponentially. In 1800, an estimated 2% of the world's population lived in cities of 100,000 people or more, rising slightly by 1850 to 2.3%, and around 5.5% by 1900 (Lampard. 1955, pp.81-82). In the twentieth century, this figure grew exponentially. In 1950, fewer than 50 cities had populations of over 1 million (Lampard, p.102). Now there are over 100 cities with populations of one million plus. Between 1890 and 1990, US urbanisation rose dramatically, almost doubling – from 39% in 1890, 53% in 1940, 73% in 1970, to 75% in 1990 (Glaeser, p.1998). In China, small villages like Shenzhen have become metropolises, with populations exceeding 6 million (Harvey, 2012, p.11). In North America, in 2016, more than half of the population lived in a city with 500,000 inhabitants or more and 1 in 5, in a city of more than

500,000. In Latin America, 12.7% lived in a city of 10 million people or more. Cities as spaces where people pursue their goals have grown rapidly, and across the globe (UN. 2016).

Currently, 23% of the world's population live in a city with a million inhabitants or more. By 2030, that is predicted to reach 27% (UN, 2016, p.3). Five hundred million, 6.8% of the world's population, live in a megacity – a city with 10 million people or more. By 2030, this is predicted to reach 730 million, or 8.7% (UN, 2016, p.3). In 1950, 751 million people lived in urban settings; in 2018, that figure was 4.2 billion (UN, 2018). This trend is expected to continue (WHO, 2020), with a predicted 68% expected to live in urban environments by 2050 (UN, 2018). What this means is that there will be an estimated 2.5 billion extra people living in urban settings. Writing in 1955, Eric Lampard suggested that the question of "why live in a city?" had shifted to "why not live in a city?" Aside from certain activities such as growing basic food, there could be no great economic reason for living away from cities (Lampard. p.94). In the twentieth century, we can see then that a shift occurred, making city living the norm for far more people than previously.

Cities have been described as the concentration of many people living near each other for "residential and productive purposes" (Hubbard, 2006, p.1), where "large numbers of people live and work" (Saunders cited in Hubbard, 2006, p.1). They are, of course, these things; they are where we combine, and therefore where our preferences aggregate. Cities are where we navigate our mutual needs, distribute goods and access services. The city is, as Hubbard describes, a "...Spatial location, a political entity, an administrative unit, a place of work and play, a collection of dreams and nightmares, a mesh of social relations, an agglomeration of economic activity" (2006, p.1). All these areas of social relations, work, play and where we live are also intrinsically linked to our pursuit of lives we deem worth living, or, at least, we would ideally like them to be so. Cities have been reli-

gious centres, places for recreation, administration, defence, economies (Lampard, 1955, p.84). Cities have then always been key spaces for human development.

This rise in the numbers of people living in cities presents both opportunities and challenges surrounding climate change and food security and access, disease control, and other health risks. With increasing city populations comes the opportunity to reframe the ends of cities and renew a sense of what cities can be. We must renew the sense that cities play a key role in challenges for individuals (their sense of autonomy being the focus of this thesis). The framing of the city as a possible great agent for change could attempt to tackle issues that nations are currently struggling with, such as climate change. This thesis will primarily focus on the impact of globalisation on individuals' ability to be active autonomous agents within their shared political community and the city's role in mitigating some of the impacts that globalisation has on what I am referring to as political autonomy (the ability to be a self-lawgiver within social legislative processes – formal and informal). As part of this, this thesis argues that we must better recognise the city as a critical site for human activity, in a way that is often overlooked in much political theory.

1.3 Defining the city

In discussing the city, we ought to have some clarity as to what constitutes a city. It has been argued that there is no correct definition, and any measure will cause disagreement (Glaeser, 1998, p.237). We might think of cities in terms of size or density, or in terms of their constitutive parts. But again, it is difficult to pin down exactly what a city is in a way that escapes contestation. If we look at density, for instance, we risk creating a definition that potentially misappropriates crucial elements, under-represents key populations, or misapplies the concept in a way that promotes a political end

versus one that better captures human experience. As Glaeser (1998, p.141) observes, in 1998, both Portland and Newark in the US had populations of around 1.8 million, but their density and their proximity to other urban areas differ significantly. Definitions of cities are particularly problematic, in part, because the term is global (Glaeser, 1998, p.237). A small city in China would be a huge city in Wales. Debate about defining the city has lasted at least a century (Batty, 2018). In the US, technically, the Census defines a "city" as an urban political unit that contains more than 25,000 individuals (Glaeser, 1998, p.141). But that number may or may not be appropriate for societies with smaller and larger populations.

Finally, when looking at the purely spatial elements of the city, boundaries can cause issues. This is because there are also no standardised international criteria for defining the boundaries of a city, and, in many cases, boundaries are defined in multiple ways (UN, 2016). The UN considers three different modes from which we might understand the space a city covers:

A sense of the "city proper", which is accompanied by an administrative boundary.

A city may be defined by its "urban agglomeration". On this definition, a city is defined using the extent of a city's built-up area to define its boundaries.

We might understand a city as being analogous, in some instances, to a "metropolitan area". The metropolitan area relates to the city's economic and social impact on its surrounding area and includes commuting patterns (UN, 2016). World Bank data also relies on information from countries that use varying ways to demarcate the urban from the rural (World Bank, 2018). Defining the city conceptually and also practically is, then, never easy and is always bound to be problematic.

Beyond the purely spatial, we may define the city by traits that cities have in common. Cities have been described variously as places where wealth and power are concentrated, and as locations of

maximum power and culture for a community. They have also been described as places manifesting power relations, displaying two main dimensions – the supply of opportunities and the distribution of services (Therborn, 2017, pp.7-15). In this light, the city is the space in which humans organise, trade and develop human settlements. With that comes the development of culture and also power relations.

In related form, focusing on economic activity, cities have been described simply as the concentration of many people, living near each other for "residential and productive purposes" (Davis Hubbard, 2006, p1), where "large numbers of people live and work" (Saunders cited in Hubbard, 2006, p.1), and as "dense agglomerations of people and firms" (Glaeser, 1998. p.140). The city is a "mode of social organisation that furthers economic activity efficiently" (Lampard, 1955, p.92). It certainly appears true that, in many cases, this understanding of the city appears correct. Whatever the key criteria, for all of these definitions, the city is a space where humans come together to trade products, skills and knowledge. In order to define the city, it is necessary to accept that it is a number of things. As Hubbard describes it, it is a "spatial location, a political entity, an administrative unit, a place of work and play, a collection of dreams and nightmares, a mesh of social relations, an agglomeration of economic activity…" (2006, p.1). Further, what a city is may look different in different environments/scenarios/contexts.

Moreover, we often find terms like city, urban and metropolitan region overlapping. So, one may ask whether the word 'city' is a useful term at all. In response to this, we can see that, in both common parlance and institutional language, the city is a term that is widely used and thus is enshrined in our political and social imagination. People live *in cities*, which is opposed to an urban area. A city like London or Manchester may have a sprawling urban district, but it is the city of London or

Manchester that people live in as a source of self-identification. As Bell and De Shallot (2011)

show, we ascribe certain characteristics to cities, as is the case in Paris, Montreal, Oxford and

Berlin, etc. We also speak of cities and their relationship with the citizen (Harvey, 2013, p.ll). Al-

though other terms exist, the fact that cities in some real sense exist is not in doubt. In this light, we

cannot ignore the ways in which people understand and frame the space in which they live. Fur-

thermore, the UN uses the term cities for both its SDGs (UN, 2018) and World Cities Day (UN,

2022), the World Health Organization uses the term *healthy cities* (WHO, 2022). We have discus-

sions in mainstream media about cities (Guardian, 2014; Spectator, 2020). Cities are, in this sense,

transcendentally involved in our everyday sense of living.

As Bookchin (1992, p.xv) argues, the city may not be reducible to a single proposition; instead, the

city is indelibly linked to the history of the city, a "uniquely human, ethical, and ecological commu-

nity". The city described in this thesis, therefore, mirrors the broader and more encompassing no-

tion of Bookchin, Jacobs and Young. As a result, this thesis agrees, definitions that merely describe

purely the urban nature of the space will not suffice. Bookchin describes the city as creating a new

social form, where a group can become secular citizens. It is the 'being together' of strangers"

(Young, 1986, p21), where strangers can inhabit and one day become members of the community,

the move from a clan or tribe to a polis or political city (Bookchin, 1992, pp.xv-xvi):

> The city, in effect, has become a historic tradition – often a highly moral one that tends to
>
> expand uniquely human traits and notions of freedom, and an idea of civic commonality that
>
> corrodes the parochial bonds of blood ties, gender distinctions, age status, groups, and ethnic
>
> exclusivity" (Bookchin, 1992, p.xvii)

The city in this vein is not synonymous with urbanisation alone. On the contrary, it is that which "sprawling urbanization threatens to obliterate" (Bookchin, 1992, p.xxv). In chapters 3 and 4, I further lay out the way in which the city is an explicitly reflexively-produced space with the citizen. That is, it is not merely an entity of continuous physical development, the concrete and roads, the shopping centres and residential areas. The city through history has been, and is something, that is co-created with the people of the city. The city of this thesis is then linked to this historically developing notion of cities, and the city's role in human life. Building from this basic notion, Chapter 5 will encourage the reader to view the city as it could be, and contrast it with the city that often is. In doing so, this thesis suggests that the city has a unique place in human life, and that some of that uniqueness is under threat by forces of globalisation. As a result of this encroachment, we ought to preserve and expand the space cities provide us for human development.

Whilst the framework of the thesis is clearly aimed at reframing how we can understand cities as cities of capabilities, philosophically, there is no obvious reason why the arguments developed in this thesis could not also be applied to other urban spaces. It is also quite likely that alternative-sized human settlements, such as the town, village or hamlet, are also subject to similar conditions. The thesis describes phenomena around global forces, made possible by certain changes that occurred in the twentieth century.

In order to advance, and in order to speak of cities, we need some kind of working definition. As shown, such a definition will need flexibility if it can accurately reflect different peoples' experiences of cities. That there are issues around any attempt to concretise a definition of cities has been acknowledged. But still, we must settle on some kind of definition. In 1907 the UK government and King Edward VII agreed on the following criteria for city status: the area in question ought to have

300,000 inhabitants, a local metropolitan character, a centre that is part of a wider area, and a good record of local government" (Beckett, 2005). As we must have some working definition, an approximation of this definition will be used, whilst accepting that an element of openness to local specification is useful, even necessary, to discuss cities globally. My working definition of a city will then involve four criteria;

1. A population above an amount appropriate to the local region (this is 300,000 in the UK, but, due to that relating to the UK's size, we will say this may be flexible based on the country in question; for instance, it may help to relate the size of a space to the size of the nation it is part of, smaller in smaller nations, larger in larger nations).

2. A centre which is part of a wider area (recognised internally and externally as such)

3. A local character of some kind

4. A local government

Defining cities will likely be contingent on context, most notably, perhaps, coming from their respective nations. The population of this categorisation, for instance, is suitable for the UK. But these characteristics point to certain factors that it is felt any city should have: a population which makes the space sizeable in relation to the nation that it is part of, a defined centre which is recognised as such by those living in and around the city as well as by external viewers, and character and institutions that provide some local governance. When discussing cities in this thesis, then, it will be human settlements that generally satisfy these criteria. The population size may be different in different spaces, but that gives a contextual relevance required for global examination. A centre, local character and some local governance seem key for the city not to be subsumed and therefore essentially part of a wider space.

1.4 Political autonomy

Political autonomy is of central importance to this thesis and will be developed fully in Chapter 4. However, due to its centrality, it is important to briefly define what is meant by the term. Political autonomy refers to the capacity for individuals to act in a self-determined way in concert with others. That self-determined autonomous expression is, of course, constrained, in line with the needs of others. Political autonomy therefore refers to the freedoms and capabilities available in a society governed by mutually consistent laws, where all are constrained to some extent, so that one's autonomous will can be politically reconciled with the autonomy of another. Consequently, the freedom described here is one that is constrained. It is, as Kant describes "(independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law" (1996, p.30). Freedom in this context is inherently social, it is in relation to the freedom of others, it is externalised freedom which is politically bounded. In the context of this thesis, the city ought to offer capabilities for one's autonomous will to make determinations that impact one's life. However, it also ought to constrain the autonomy of all so that a mutually consistent condition of political autonomy can flourish, and, by doing so, allow broadened human flourishing.

1.5 Research objectives & key questions

The overarching objective of the thesis is to understand the role the city can play in expanding and preserving capabilities, in particular political autonomy. The city is argued to be an increasingly important space, in part due to rapidly expanding city populations. Much of this expansion has oc-

curred in the late twentieth century alongside the forces of globalisation. This thesis argues that these global forces pose a threat to the political autonomy of cities' citizens.

Consequently, thesis attempts to answer the questions: how are cities and citizens impacted upon by globalisation? What is the role of the city in expanding and preserving space for capabilities in a globalised world? How should we frame the goals of the city to ensure more flourishing lives for citizens?

Chapter 2: Research Design

This chapter will demonstrate where the thesis is situated in existing literature, as well as giving an overview of the methods used. The core literature it sits within is that of the capability approach, and in particular the growing field of cities and urban literature within the capabilities field. The research poses three questions: a) how are cities currently inhibited from facilitating space conducive to political autonomy, and in turn, flourishing? b) how are capabilities for political autonomy catered for by cities? and c) how can cities do more to expand political autonomy?

As described in the first chapter, these questions place cities as key loci in the increasingly globalising world at the end of the twentieth century and start of the twenty-first, in terms of the development and preservation of capabilities.

The study is largely desk-based, predominantly an analysis using analytical philosophy. Each of the questions and examinations of the hypothesis combine normative principles and empirical data. The capability approach is used to frame political autonomy as key to flourishing. The development of that which allows us to co-legislate is part of what allows humans to make their own lives better and influence the world. In Chapter 3, I develop an understanding of how the city is, in part, an expression of norms. The individual exists, is shaped by, and shapes the norms of the city. In order to develop fully, the individual's innate capacities require space to develop. Such development requires an environment conducive to the development of co-legislative capacities. In Chapter 4, I then set out to identify the effects of globalisation in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first, in particular, on that which pertains to political autonomy. I use empirical data to indicate the expansion of the movement of capital and the impact on housing costs. Across chapters 4 to 7, I also highlight the way in which technological development has offered a rapid expansion in the

ability to gather preferences – something which can be seen to be used to gather information about individuals, yet which is not a marked development of expansion of democratic space. I use this synthesised data and argumentation to analyse and theorise how the capability approach can be used to make interesting suggestions for the city's role.

The thesis aims to offer a new framing and language of the city, which can be a useful philosophical foundation to policy makers and stakeholders working within and in the interest of cities. From those in local government to those in national government, who are charged with developing city cultures and solidarities. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to engage with those looking to reframe what cities are for, particularly as cities expand and adapt to new political, economic, environmental and population demands. As a result, it is hoped to be especially useful for those involved with navigating the use of resources and provision of opportunities in cities. Often such development uses a language embedded in economic orthodoxy, reflecting the usual map of the city as an engine of economic growth. In response, the framing offered in Chapter 5, of the City of Capabilities, is aimed at offering an alternative conception of what the city should be and what it could reinvent itself to be.

In section 1.3, I noted the complexities around defining the city. Such complexity highlights the difficulties of a one size fits all understanding of cities. In other words, a city can be many things, defined by geographical size, population size, institutions, economic output, etc. Settling a specific definition of a city is therefore problematic, contested and often undeterminable. As an alternative, we often rely on our intuitions to understand what is a city. This explains why Lagos is a city as much as Leeds, despite the numerous differences across the usual definitional properties. As a result, this thesis understands the city more intuitively and flexibly so as to focus on key normative

aspects versus on delivering hard definitional characteristics. In this vein, Chapters 3 & 4 frame the city as a key normative space and show why such space is being impacted upon by global forces. It is purposefully ubiquitous, like the forces of globalization, experienced and defined by human interactions and identifications of place. Thus, in Chapters 6 & 7, the thesis extends the argument that cities experience solutions / challenges differently, highlighting different responses to globalisation that cities offer.

That said, what is common to all city spaces is the threat or actual existence of globalising forces which acts upon them as political entities. Such pressures are external downward pressures on the internal space afforded for political autonomy within the city. The technological and ideological factors that this thesis focuses on exist, and are pressures upon cities everywhere despite how those cities are defined, via the combination of technological development and free flowing capital. This does not mean that all cities experience these dynamics similarly. Yet, it is hard to imagine any large grouping of people who see themselves as members of a city escaping these dynamics.

The thesis highlights examples predominantly in Western cities. Though in chapter 7, I also highlight the impact of such forces, and responses from the Singapore government. Further, in Chapter 4, I note that the Chinese government has been keen to stem pressures of global capital flows, whilst also being open to the benefits of global trade (Keping, 2011, pp, 1-3). The push to open up to the free movement of capital, has left barely any nation untouched. From nations as diverse as New Zealand, China, Sweden, Russia & South Africa (Harvey, 2005, p.2). Certain cities have been particularly open to such forces. We think here of London, Barcelona, New York, Tokyo, namely, global cities that opened up with incentives to mobilize capital flows. The development of these cities has been particularly interwoven with the globalisation (Sassen, 2001). The scope of the the-

sis is thus aimed at providing analysis useful to any city space, whilst recognising that nuances related to language, governmental approaches and other factors will play a part in how easily such forces impact cities. The forces are universal, while local organisation and resources show differing responses and potential capabilities. This is explored more fully in Chapters 6 & 7.

In terms of empirical data, the research will look at two areas, cities and global forces. Firstly, it explores how city populations have changed over the last century. From this, we can understand how more and more people are reliant on city spaces to provide structures from which they pursue flourishing. This is key to the thesis, as it contextualises cities as increasingly important for human development. Chapter 6 places the key areas of contestation in the context of London. Firstly, in terms of the impact of globalisation on the cost of space. Secondly, on the expanded opportunities modern technology provides for the gathering of preferences, and the lack of expansion seen in democratic space. The chapter highlights the rise of housing costs, as London increasingly became a hub of global capital. Further, whilst technology developed in such a way as to increase the capacity humans have to gather information on preferences, this expansion has barely been felt in the space for Londoners to express preferences in democratic ways. Chapter 7 explores these themes in several cities outside of the UK, highlighting the generalisability of the framework. I present policy frameworks aimed at tackling rising housing costs. I also show city governments working to expand the space offered by technological development for citizens to communicate preferences in their cities. Through examining these forces it is possible to see a) that the space in cities has become increasingly at the mercy of global forces which b) threatens the political autonomy of citizens within cities, and, further, that, c) whilst the expansion of data gathering on citizens has dramatically increased, this has not always, or often even, been accompanied by a parallel development of prefer-

ence gathering in democratic space. Cumulatively, the framework and data highlight that globalisation has posed a threat to the political autonomy of cities' citizens.

2.1 The capability approach

I will now give an overview of the capability approach, in order to contextualise it both as a framework and within this thesis. I will then go through some key junctures, debates, alternative frameworks and finally its current use in work on cities. In doing so, I aim to show the usefulness of applying the capability approach to cities, in the aim of preserving and expanding capabilities.

The capability approach has been used across a number of areas pertaining to social justice, public policy, and human and economic development. The approach was first introduced in a speech by Amartya Sen in 1979 titled the 'Equality of What', which attempted to answer a common question within liberal egalitarian literature, namely, if equality matters morally, then what are we concerned with making equal? The paper sparked lively discussion as to what the ends of egalitarian pursuits ought to be, with lines being drawn between equality of outcome scholars (social democrats and left-liberals) and equality of opportunities scholars (right-liberals and capability theorists). By the early 2000s, the capability approach had become the leading alternative to standard models of thought on development (Clark, 2005, p.2).

The capability approach has been used in many areas, from the philosophical to the applied, broad and narrower (Crocker and Robeyns, 2009). It has been used in constructing theories of justice (Robeyns, 2017), such as those of Martha Nussbaum. It has influenced UN policy, education, and child studies (Biggeri, Comim and Ballet, 2011). It has been applied to global public health

(Venkatapuram, 2011), environmental policy (Schlosberg, 2012; Holland, 2014), global public development ethics, technological design and welfare state policies (Robeyns, 2017, p.9).

The main contribution by Sen, Nussbaum and others was to focus on measuring what people are able to do and be. Further, that this focus is useful for analysing the wellbeing of individual lives and better measuring the 'justness' of any society. This can be seen, in part, as a critique of orthodox economic approaches, approaches such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP). These approaches tend to use a standard utilitarian framework. For proponents of the capability approach, it is thought that they often leave out important information about those things that make life worth living. When looking at development, Sen suggested that the capability approach can help us ask "alternative questions" and look for "different dimensions" to such approaches (Robeyns, 2017, p.7). The capability approach, by looking for what people can do and be, and the capabilities available to them in those efforts, can help to locate information that reaches beyond economic improvement measures. As a result, the capability approach is generally understood to be:

…a conceptual framework for a range of evaluative exercises, including most prominently the following: (1) the assessment of individual levels of achieved wellbeing and wellbeing freedom; (2) the evaluation and assessment of social arrangements or institutions;3 and (3) the design of policies and other forms of social change in society. (Robeyns, 2017, p.24).

2.2 Separation of capabilities and functioning

All versions of the capability approach hold a metaphysical claim of the importance of free will and human agency; freedom is framed as the goal of economic development (Dreze and Sen, 2002, p.4). In the words of Sen, "capabilities… reflect the actual freedoms that people respectively enjoy in being able to lead the kind of lives they have reason to value" (1990, p.460). Central to the approach is what counts when evaluating an individual's situation. Namely, what a person can do and be (Robeyns, 2017, p.7). In order to understand what people are able to do and be, the capability approach sets out a division between capabilities and functionings. These concepts are at the centre of the approach (Robeyns, 2017, p.38).

Functionings are understood as actual achievement, whereas capabilities are the real freedoms or opportunities that can help reach that achievement if one wishes. So, the ability to cycle is a capability, cycling a functioning. Having enough to eat and the ability to do so is a capability, eating is a functioning. Beings are what people can do and be, functioning the corresponding achievements (Robeyns, 2017, p38). This thesis will be more squarely aimed at expanding and preserving political autonomy as an area of a human's capabilities. We might understand the expression of such capabilities quite reasonably, even rightly, as functionings. But this thesis will not dwell on whether such capabilities are practised, only on whether one has the capacity to do something if one wished to.

To explain this difference, to use cycling again as a metaphor: I am concerned that people have the capacity to cycle, the skills, the bike, the environment, and everything necessary to cycle. As important as actually cycling may be, whether they choose to cycle is beyond what I am attempting to demonstrate. To remove the metaphor, and for the purposes of clarity, what is the concern of this thesis is that people can meaningfully co-legislate with others as a capacity of effective autonomy;

if they opt not to, then that is their autonomous decision, as long as the capacity to co-legislate is available.

2.3 Listing capabilities

Having established the difference between capabilities and functioning, I will move on now to another key area of the literature. Namely, discussion around how we understand different capabilities as being either 'important' or 'necessary'. It is often asked what kinds of capabilities are important. Further, if important, or even necessary, then ought these capabilities be listed? Or is it the case that capabilities cannot be listed outside of the environment and context in question? Should an important element of the process be for the community to be responsible for such an investigation as to what capabilities matter most? Sen has not specified which capabilities should be selected as relevant, which has provoked criticism (Robeyns, 2003, pp.35-36). The strongest criticism is that of Martha Nussbaum, who claims that a list of capabilities ought to be developed (Robeyns, 2005, p.191). Nussbaum's claim is that there is a minimum set of capabilities that humans are entitled to, in order to live dignified lives (Nussbaum 2006).

Nussbaum suggests a list of capabilities which, whilst flexible, aims to offer something towards a universal framework. For Nussbaum, in order for the capability approach to be able to tackle issues of social justice, we must have some agreement over a set of the relevant capabilities (Robeyns, 2006, p.195). Nussbaum's account lists the following categories of capabilities: 1. Life. 2. Bodily Health. 3. Bodily Integrity. 4. Senses. 5. Imagination and Thought. 6. Emotions. 7. Practical Reason. 8. Affiliation, Other Species. 9. Play. 10. Control over one's Environment. This final point,

Control over one's Environment is broken down into the following parts: A. Political. Being able to

participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the right of political partici-

pation, and protections of free speech and association. B. Material. Being able to hold property

(both land and movable goods) and having property (Nussbaum, 2011, p.33-34).

Sen, however, as mentioned, refuses to provide such a list. Sen's original use of the word approach,

rather than theory, was intended to signify an inherent incompletion within his capability approach

(Qizilbash, 2016, p.2). The term approach is used to signify a way into the analysis of a problem or

evaluation, not necessarily a totalising response. Thus, it is not an attempt at an overarching theory,

such as Rawls' A Theory of Justice, but an approach, a way in, to address a particular issue. For

Sen, we find a way of framing analysis. For Sen, it is for democratic and social choice procedures to

produce a list of capabilities (Robeyns, 2003, p.36).

Robeyns (2017, p.29) describes this difference in the literature as between the capability approach

and a capability theory, with the capability approach being broad, open ended and underspecified,

and a particular capability theory being an application of it. On this understanding, Sen's account is

indeed lacking something if we would like it to be used in order to give specific policy advice. But

it is underspecified by design. Nussbaum's account, on the other hand, fleshes out the approach to

provide a particular framework, with a list of capabilities that we ought to take seriously. Using

Robeyns' distinction between the capability approach and capability theories then, we find Nuss-

baum's attempt to create a holistic theory of justice would then be a capability theory based on

Robeyns' description, whereas Sen's work is an underspecified capability approach. Capability the-

ories are specific applications of the capability approach to creating a theory about a given situation.

On this understanding, capability theories are specific theories that have: "…a specific goal, such as

measuring poverty and deriving some policy prescriptions, or developing a capabilitarian cost-bene-
fit analysis, or theorising about human rights, or developing a theory of social justice" (Robeyns,
2017, p.29).

On Robeyns' distinction, Amartya Sen's work can be seen as, in some sense, necessarily incom-
plete. It is an attempt to create a way into problems and their analysis, whereas others, such as
Nussbaum, have attempted to create a more complete theory of justice (Clark, 2005, p.6). Sen's ac-
count can most easily be identified as maintaining a need for finding lists of capabilities from more
direct means (Clark, 2005, p.7), as he argues that:

"The problem is not with listing important capabilities, but with insisting on one predetermined
canonical list of capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general social discussion or public
reasoning. To have such a fixed list, emanating entirely from pure theory, is to deny the possibility
of fruitful public participation on what should be included and why…" (Sen, 2004, pp.77, 81).

However, all accounts of the capability approach take freedom seriously. As such, whilst all ap-
plications of the capability approach have some space for political autonomy, this thesis allows
Robeyns' distinction, and therefore the thesis is a capability theory.

2.4 The capability approach and alternative frameworks

In this section, I will present alternative frameworks to the capability approach, showing where it
can help in discussions of distributive justice and, therefore, why the capability approach has been
chosen for the theoretical underpinning of this thesis. The thesis attempts to explain how the city is

an important space because it can be more effective in preserving and expanding political autonomy. It is also central to this thesis to demonstrate that the capability approach can help us frame the tensions between local and global issues as a threat to political autonomy. In the following section, I will contrast the capability approach with two widely used alternative frameworks in discussions of evaluative justice, showing how the capability approach offers advantages over both. By doing so, this thesis will be in a better position to offer an expanded framing for discussions of the importance of local autonomy amidst globalising forces.

Rejecting utilitarianism – GDP as a measure of societal and individual wellbeing

The first framework which will be considered is a utilitarian framework based on GDP. The utilitarian account was a key target of Sen when the capability approach was in its infancy. Part of Sen's conviction was that this economic orthodoxy had omitted key elements that make a society good. The economic orthodoxy of GDP, or GNP per capita, broadly implies that, the more a country produces, the more developed it has become (Robeyns, 2017, p.11). Such an approach can often signal that a society is improving and becoming a better place to live. It is, of course, true that, when economies develop to produce more, they often become better places for people to live, with better opportunities and more complex technologies. People are often able to produce more, and, in turn, enjoy more. In such circumstances, we can rightly say that the economic development in the twentieth century has often correlated with, even instigated, a bettering of those social elements individuals need to flourish.

But this may not always be the case. GDP/GNP may grow whilst at the same time a society may not become a better place for its inhabitants. Sen (2004, p.2) argues that much economic theory had an

omission regarding what Bernard Williams had described as a central motivating question of ethics, namely "how should one live?". Writing on contemporary economic thought, Sen added that: "This 'ethics-related view of social achievement' cannot stop the evaluation short at some arbitrary point like satisfying 'efficiency'" (2004, p.4).

So, as exemplified by GDP/GNP, we find the utilitarian account appears to miss something fundamental. Growth in GDP may tell us something important, but it also may not. If GDP is argued to be a signifier that things that are key to human development have improved, the question is begged: why not focus on those key things instead? The capability approach attempts to solve that problem by shifting the focus towards the things that are necessary for a flourishing life. This refocusing has been described already; it is a shift towards capabilities, those things a human needs to flourish. I will now briefly look at scenarios in which the limitations of the utilitarian account are laid bare.

Rawls famously criticises the utilitarian account for not taking seriously the separateness of individuals. This critique elegantly describes a core issue with accounts like GDP. For example, when we look at the first quarter of 2018, the UK's GDP was £493,278 million (ONS, 2018), average weekly earnings were £513, and full-time working hours were 37.2. (ONS, 2018). But of course, within that, there are all kinds of variations. Whilst footballer Wayne Rooney was on £150,000 a week playing at Everton, many cleaners around the country were on minimum wage. A cleaner at Manchester United would need to work for 41 years to earn the same as one of its players, Alexi Sanchez, earned in a week (The Telegraph, 2018). However, none of these variations will show up in a summary of average earnings. A rise in average earnings may be good for the average worker, but it also may not. Stalling wages at the bottom but rising earnings at the top may worsen things for those at the bottom. The relative decline of wages means house prices and goods may go up.

GDP measures are susceptible to such methodological issues because more nuanced information becomes submerged within headline statistics, such as a rise in average wages.

To further understand how this information, and the framing of information, can produce undesirable outcomes, we can observe mortality and morbidity statistics in the USSR between 1987 and 1993. The data clearly shows declining living standards. An analysis based on welfare would have identified this, but one based on consumption would not have. This led Ellman to suggest that the capability approach would have been a superior measure of understanding what was happening (Ellman cited in Robeyns, 2003, p.27). Similarly, Qizilbash's study of South African provinces showed that household expenditure was often misleading compared to their multidimensional poverty capabilities counterparts (Qizilbash, 2002, p.768). Collectively, proponents of the capability approach argue that it offers a richer sense of what society should aim at whilst avoiding some of the pitfalls of the utilitarian approach.

The capability approach then seeks to capture information pertaining to flourishing that is often missing in standard economic analysis. In analysing the wellbeing of both a society and individuals, political freedom appears key. Of course, a thriving economy may also indicate that political freedoms are in a good state. But it also may not. The capability approach avoids this issue by focusing on flourishing. Autonomy, political freedom – these things have a benefit a) that will not always show up on such analysis, but also, b) these things are important in and of themselves and do not need to be boiled down to or understood solely in terms of economic growth (Sen, 1999, p.16).

In producing an analysis on the distribution of political autonomy, we may find that a traditional GDP-type analysis is imprecise and misses key factors needed (if it can tell us much at all). We may

even find that, as people become wealthier in a country, perhaps during significant economic progress, things become much worse for a minority. Further, if it is the case that expansions of GDP are a signifier that an individual's freedoms are likely to have improved (with expanded earnings), why not focus on those freedoms instead? After all, as we can see from the argument laid out so far, expansions of GDP may also miss inequalities in distribution.

When analysing the political autonomy of a city's citizens, the capability approach offers insights that the utilitarian model cannot. By framing the issue with the capability approach, the shift towards the development of that which is necessary for such capabilities can be focused on, rather than a metric like GDP, which may or may not indicate something relevant.

Moving beyond the resourcist account

Another account used in the evaluation of distributive justice is that of resources. The resourcist account has, in most cases, broadly similar aims to that of the capability approach. If we hold that humans ought to have some condition of equality, then we ought to look at distributive equality.

The capability approach, however, questions the focus on resources. To the extent that the resources account focuses on resources alone, the question remains, what are those resources for? If resources enable a better way of living for flourishing, then the challenge from the capability approach is similar to the utilitarian critique – why not focus on flourishing and the conditions those resources enable? For the capability approach, the key benefit and aim of resource distribution is better lives, and, in order to have better lives, an expansion of capabilities and functionings.

Rawls' account focuses largely on primary goods. These are goods that are needed by all to promote the ends of a life worth living and include "rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases for self-respect" (Rawls, 1971, pp.60-65). Here we see Rawls taking a broad view of those things needed for a flourishing life, broader than a strictly economic calculus such as GDP.

To the extent that the resources account might consider such values as autonomy, then it can be said that the two are in line with each other. The resources can be said to be looking beyond the importance of resources and their distribution towards other values. This is very much in line with the capability approach. The idea arises then that resources are a means to an end and not the end themselves. However, the capability approach is stronger on this, in that, from the outset, it is those things that affect what we can do and be which count. That is, from the off, resources are helpful only as much as they improve our chances of flourishing. For the resources, this is development; it is an added element, something added to the approach. If we accept that the resources account is improved by considering such things as Rawls discusses, rights and opportunities, why not just make resources secondary? Resources then are instrumentally important, something which is part of the core of the capability approach. When we start to see a movement within the resourcist account towards the kind of language used here, of rights and liberties, we must ask: why not just start with the things required for flourishing and let resources follow? That is, make resources part of a more holistic search for conditions focused on flourishing. This is the way of the capability approach.

One strength of the resourcist account is that resources are, on the whole, much more measurable than ephemeral capabilities. This is perhaps true, and the capability approach may need work in the area of measurability – a criticism levelled at it and even accepted as a difficulty by key defenders

of it. Quantifying capabilities is harder than quantifying resources, and that is problematic for the capability approach. Measuring income and resources is also, on the whole, more clear-cut than measuring all kinds of important things. Whether rights are upheld or not, for instance, may at times be challenging to quantify. At the very least, rights appear more complex to calculate, to discuss in empirical terms, than cash flow or the counting of resources.

However, the outcomes would be perverse if we restrict our ethical stances to the easiest to count. Rights and capabilities may be less easy to count or quantify in many instances, but that is not a fatal issue for rights. Rights and capabilities are important, regardless of their being harder to measure than income. As this is the case, we must see beyond the simplicity of measuring income or resources and argue for the importance of those things which resources and income are instrumental in developing, namely flourishing. For some, this complexity reflects the fact that important things are indeed more complex than income. The complexity inherent within the capability approach has then been found useful by some (Chiaperrito, 2006).

The capability approach can better evaluate socially just conditions due to conversion factors and how individuals derive ends from means. People have very different needs – an equal distribution of goods will not always create matching results. People are often in very different circumstances when it comes to the converting of goods into functioning. They may have all kinds of physical or psychological factors that affect their ability to convert goods or opportunities. By focusing from the outset on capabilities and functionings, a focus on conversion factors becomes paramount. In other words, it is the capabilities for these resources to be converted to functionings that should be of the highest concern.

By shifting ideas around development in cities from resources, and a pure focus on the expansion of the economy, the capability approach allows for a shift of focus. This focus, onto those ends, such as the expansion of political autonomy requires further steps on both the utilitarian and resourcist accounts. The capability approach allows for the expansion of political autonomy to be shown to be a key goal of the city.

Conversion factors

Another core concept of the capability approach literature is that people have differing abilities to convert resources into functionings (Robeyns, 2017, p.45). In the literature, this is described as conversion factors. Conversion factors are a useful conceptual tool for further understanding why the focus should be on capabilities and functions rather than on resources or expanded GDP.

As a way of illustrating the significance of conversion factors, let us consider the trusty bike. The bike is potentially a very useful vehicle. But a great part, if not all, of its usefulness, is based on the ability of it being ridden. We may describe a person with the skills and body that make using the bicycle useful as having a high conversion factor. In contrast, a person who cannot use the bike does not have such a high conversion factor.

There are different types of conversion factors. They are often categorised into three categories: Personal conversion factors, Social conversion factors and Environmental conversion factors. Personal factors refer to internal factors, such as metabolism, physical condition or reading skills. Social factors relate to the society in which one lives, public policies, societal hierarchies, and power relations between genders or classes. Environmental factors refer to those within the physical or

built environment in which one lives. This may take in the existence of bridges, roads, the possibility of earthquakes, pollution or nearby seas. In this thesis, conversion factors are best understood as a background concept to understand elements that allow autonomous choices to be rendered into social co-legislation, grounding and highlighting the benefits of the capability approach, but also how to protect/increase political autonomy. Alternatives to the capability approach, therefore, most notably resources and utilitarianism, are wanting when considering conversion factors.

2.5 Cities and the capability approach

In this section, I will give an overview of work on cities within the capability approach literature, and where the thesis aims to make contributions. In a recent chapter aimed at bringing together work on the capability approach and the city, P.B. Anand remarked that, compared to the vast and growing body of capability approach literature, there is relatively little on the city and urban issues (2018, P.520). This is correct, though recent years have seen increasing interest in the area. The 2018 Human Development & Capability Association conference (one of the key organisations working on capability approach) theme was "Human Development and Social Inclusion in an Urbanizing World". In 2021, Alexandre Frediani's book Cities for Human Development: A Capability Approach to City-Making is perhaps the most comprehensive work drawing capabilities and the city together.

I will first summarise three of the most significant contributions to the space, before going on to suggesting what this thesis adds. One of the earliest and most significant contributions is Severine Deneulin's work creating more just cities for life: The Right to the City and Capability Approach (2014), which situates the development and expansion of cities in city spaces. The paper argues for

'Just cities for life', an outcome of combining the capability approach and Lefebvre's The Right to the City. Deneulin describes the Right to the city as a rejection of the economic and social relations found in capitalist modes. Instead, the Right to the city proposes that all citizens have a right to the production of the city, in terms of "regain[ing] access to the city and all the employment, social, cultural and other opportunities urban life could bring (Deneulin, 2014, P.2). Deneulin aims to bring together the capability approach with the right to the city, in order to show contributions that can be made from it. Firstly, that the capability approach provides tools for wellbeing evaluation. Secondly, it creates a framework for understanding the linkages between rights. Thirdly, it helps to provide a structural understanding of the role of institutions in the development of space for rights in the city. Fourthly, the capability approach can help to understand the right to the city from a democratic pluralism point of view. This combination leads Deneulin to propose "Just cities for life" (2014, p.7).

Claudia Basta makes important contributions to the capability approach and its application to urban issues, in particular to planning theory. Basta argues that, although implicitly, the notion of capabilities and a focus on what one can do and be has infiltrated planning theory (2015, Pp.191-192). Basta aims to highlight the rationale involved in planning and how capability work could inform it (2015, p.192). The paper has two main aims. Firstly, to draw together a comparison of Rawls' and Sen's theories of justice and their relevant application, and evaluative uses for spatial planning. In doing so, Basta also aims to draw out some of the uses of the capability approach and show that, although these works provide alternative visions to some extent, they are both complimentary in terms of a suggested shift towards establishing "planning for justice". Basta notes the Rawlsian move against utilitarian appraisals of wellbeing. Rawls' attempts to move the conversation from maximising happiness, or utility, towards, broadly speaking, equality of opportunities. Sen, of course, shifts the focus from goods and opportunities towards capabilities (2015. pp.192 - 201).

Basta proposes that the application of the capability approach serves to attach to those goods and services an intrinsic need to reflect the needs of those they are for. So, in terms of staircases, or access to greenery, the vision of whether something is just or not, is incomplete without an understanding of those whom the article affects: "The general implication of this 'extension' of planning interventions is that the latter do not 'end' with the provision and maintenance of the good; they 'end' with enhancing the intrinsic capabilities of the individuals for which the extrinsic nature of the good is meant for" (Basta, 2015, p.204).

In his chapter Space and Capabilities: Approaching Informal Settlement Upgrading Through a Capability Perspective (2015), Alexandre Apsen Frediani argued that, although the capability approach had emerged as a "prominent evaluative framework in the redefinition of poverty as a multi-dimensional, dynamic and socially constructed phenomenon… there has been very limited interrogation of how such an understanding of poverty takes into account the role of space" (2015, p.64). The paper then sets out to demonstrate how spatial arrangements affect capabilities, and in doing so how we might think of expanding the space for capabilities for the urban poor in a way that helps produce more social just space. Frediani's paper aims to link the capability approach to emerging themes in critical urban theory, drawing on Lefebvre in arguing that "the ways in which spaces are conceived, perceived and lived has [sic] a direct relationship with how urban citizens have access to entitlements in the city" (2015, p.68).

Frediani also highlights the links between wants, aspirations and space. In this, Frediani draws upon Appadurai, who shows that wants are immediate desires, with aspirations linking to higher-order values (2004, pp.67-68), drawing on participatory workshops which aim to capture the aspirations of urban dwellers. Frediani has more recently followed this up with Cities for Human Development:

A Capability Approach to City Making. The book invites us to look at cities as "engines of human development" (Frediani, 2021, p.1). This idea is counterpoised with the way in which cities are often seen as engines of growth, for instance by the World Bank's urban development programme (Frediani, 2021. p.1). This vision of the city is based on urban development as a key driver of GDP. But urban development can often be accompanied by rising inequality and expanding insecure settlements. A growing precarity around housing and livelihoods then translates to unequal access to services and infrastructure (Frediani, 2021, pp1-3). Cities are good for addressing needs linked to capabilities; they have "great potential for the expansion of material, relational, and subjective wellbeing, and for advancing human flourishing" (2021,p.3). In this, Frediani draws on Colenbrander (Colenbrander in Freidani. 2021. p.3), who argues that, materially, the density of cities offers greater chances to expand these things than is seen in their rural counterparts. This mismatch between the potential and failures of cities places them at the heart of social and economic justice movements (2021, pp.4-5). The book proposes cities as the engines of expanding capabilities and human development. Frediani's idea of city making is rooted in the word of Lefebvre, recognising similarly that the production of space is intimately related to the structure of social relations (2021, p.20). The capability approach can also help us understand the diversity of wellbeing that occurs across urban life (Frediani, 2021, p.30).

This thesis builds on these contributions by encouraging a wide look at how technology has helped shape cities. Chapter 4 analyses the interplay between technology and ideological shifts which occurred in the 1970s. Ideological shifts towards freeing up markets have been key in causing vast shifts of capital which have affected land prices, who owns land, and where they can be based; i.e., global capital shifts have made it more possible for foreign investment in space. Accompanying these ideological forces, and less discussed, is the way that vastly developed information communi-

cation technology is combining with the forces to create change in cities. This is due to the expanded capacity of companies to trade globally, which is in part due to an expanded ability to gather, store, manage and use information – as well, of course, as an increase in the ability of companies to communicate rapidly. With this, comes the movement of employees working for international wages, and the buying up of land for offices and real estate, both of which cause rises in living costs in cities.

Anand follows similar themes to those already discussed, using the approach to question whether cities are inclined to help citizens live better lives, finding that in Bradford, UK, two wards have inequalities that have led to a 14-year life expectancy difference between their citizens' life expectancy and the UK average. As Anand (2018, p.534) notes, cities are engines of economic development. But it can be less recognised that they are also "social dynamos" where social norms can be challenged and new opportunities created. In fact, cities can be disempowering. Anand points to fruitful avenues that are as yet unrealised, including work on smart cities. This is a theme taken up by Baldascino and Mosca (2016, p.887), who note that the capability approach can be seen as of crucial importance at the emergence of the Smart City. They note that the Smart City aims at making more efficient traditional networks and services by the use of digital technologies and telecommunications. Baldascino and Mosca (2016, p.888) invite us to ask questions like: "What is the idea of development inside the Smart City strategies? What are the ultimate goals of a city government, where information technology is used as a tool to solve problems that characterize it?", arguing that, "In this context, it is particularly crucial to connect the idea of development of urban contexts, promoted by [sic] Smart City, with the general theory of Sen".

This thesis contributes by offering an additional critical lens through which to examine smart cities. Agreeing with Baldascino and Mosca that technology offers great potential, it is also argued that technology can have the opposite effect. Chapters 6 and 7 show this in the example of London, in which the gathering of information made possible by technology has not been matched by similar deepening of co-legislative possibilities. I also introduce the alternative approach of techno politics, which encourages the use of participatory processes in the development of city technologies. Examples from Calgary, Barcelona and Madrid demonstrate the benefits of considering participation and democratic values as technologies for managing cities are being developed.

A final contribution the thesis aims to bring is a nuanced examination of the way in which capabilities are developed in city spheres. Through an exploration of aspect capacity, the city is shown to be the space in which the individual develops their capacity to co-legislate. Through the practice of such capacities, the individual is able to contribute, have some control of their political space and, in turn, develop more fully, practising their political autonomy. In chapters 3 and 4, I develop an understanding of how the city creates a normative environment which provides space for co-legislation, or alternatively, does not.

As well as work focused on cities and capabilities, it is worth noting that there is a vast array of literature which, though it is not explicitly oriented around the city, can be applied to it – from broad analysis to specific policies, theories of social justice to a micro-level analysis of the outcomes of political practices. The capability approach has been used to study transport and resource structures in cities, from transportation (Rashid et al., 2010), urban design and planning (Astuti and Diningrat, 2016; Sithole 2008; Basta, 2017), residential segregation (Bucheli, 2016), and analysing the benefits of urban gardens (Sithole, 2008). It has been used in public policy, in uses of technology (Oost-

erlaken, 2009; Baldascino and Mosca, 2016), to understand outcomes caused by local government policy, such as job resettling policy in China (Day and Yang, 2015), and to understand the life trajectories of children living on the streets of cities in Africa (Ibrahim and Tiwari, 2014).

Summary

The capability approach is a normative framework that aims to indicate the importance of what a person can do and be. It is useful for judging individual wellbeing and the justness of societal structures. It has been used in several settings, including development, education, health, the judging of financial structures, investment and many others. It has influenced UN policy and created interdisciplinary debates across philosophy, politics and economics. It has been used in an attempt to offer an alternative to a classically utilitarian doctrine. Moreover, it also has benefits when looking beyond a strictly resourcist account of distribution of justice. There is a growing body of work applying the capability approach to issues relating to the city, and other urban contexts. This thesis aims to contribute to the body by analysing the impact of globalising forces on the capabilities of the capability approach and the city, and in particular the relationship between the city and a sense of citizens' autonomy, is a fruitful avenue to pursue. The capability places the expansion of individuals' freedoms as central to the project of societal development. This thesis will explore perceived threats to that – those forces of globalisation that, it will be argued, pose a threat to the political autonomy of individuals in local environments.

The aim of this thesis is to draw upon this existing body of work, whilst contributing in the following ways:

Firstly, by expanding our understanding of globalisation, and how we might understand such phenomenon as a threat to the ability of citizens to develop that which is necessary for their development within cities. The development of an understanding of globalisation which takes in recent technological developments can be seen to support the arguments of Lefebvre (and in doing so those mentioned who follow him), by showing that technological developments have increased the possibilities of the citizen to lose the ability to control the space in which they live.

Secondly, by understanding the role technology plays in levels of participation and co-legislation in cities. The ability to store, manage and utilise information has expanded rapidly. But the use of such technologies to expand space for co-legislation is not always so clearly present in cities. Further, the uses of such data may actually be a threat to such space. As discussion about smart cities expands, there is a need to critique the use of technology in civic space.

Lastly, by showing how we might understand the reflexive relationship of city and citizen through a capability lens. Chapters 3 and 4 develop this sense that the citizen develops in conjunction with their environment, and that their environment is often that of a city. Chapter 5 explains how we might understand the city as having different aims, and provides the contrast between the city of capabilities and the city as a node of global capital. Chapters 6 and 7 examine these phenomena in the world, demonstrating how we might understand the different aims of the city as providing environments which increase or inhibit human development – in particular, the expansion and preservation of capabilities pertaining to human development.

Chapter 3: The Interrelated Origins of Cities and Politics

The city is indelibly linked to our understanding of what it is to be 'political' in Western political thought, from its Aristotelian roots of Greek city-states to a Christian moral vision of a city of man. These foundations in political thought are no less germane to our understanding of politics today, with the huge increased in people living in city environments. In section 3.4 I will go into this in more detail. Cities and urban centres are undeniably growing, expected to home two thirds of the population by 2050 (UN 2022). As a result, it raises a renewed question about the city's role in our political lives and how it has transformed, or should further transform, to meet the empirical conditions of the twenty-first century. This chapter aims to highlight the importance of city spaces to the political, framing the city as a significant part of the development of citizens. As such, the city in this light is no mere node of the nation, an institution of the more extensive state apparatus, but in its own right a political environment, which is key to shaping the individual and providing space for their flourishing. As stated above, this understanding of the city takes on extra significance in a world where an increasing number of people live in urban environments.

In order to examine the importance of the city for human flourishing, this chapter is divided into three sections. In section 3.1, a brief history of the city will help explore the interrelated roots of political thought and city spaces. As part of this discussion, it will be argued that the city is key to the development of the individual and that the citizen and city share a reflexive relationship whereby the city develops the citizen and shapes the possibilities of the citizen. In turn, the development of the citizen helps shape the future development of the city.

Section 3.2 will explore the reflexive relationship between the citizen and the city. It will be argued that the relationship between the two is one of co-constituting. The city creates the structures through which the citizen develops, and, in turn, the citizen helps shape the city. Further, the citizen's shaping of the city is part of what allows the citizen to develop.

In section 3.3, this theme will be developed as I explore how cities are spaces through which norms are conveyed. The city then conveys values, which in turn conveys a sense of the city's ends to citizens. As such, the values a city conveys have a role in shaping the goals of the individual. This has historical roots and is inherent in city life. In ancient Athens, for example, we find that one such norm is the expectation and right of the citizen to participate.

Section 3.4 explores rising populations of cities and the significance of this empirical phenomenon for how we understand the city's role in our everyday political lives. This is an important empirical condition because it shows an increasing number of people who pursue their goals in city spaces. In other words, their flourishing is dependent, in good part, on the politics of the city.

Section 3.5 will bring these points together to summarise the importance of rethinking the role of the city when considering the preservation and expansion of human flourishing.

3.1 The interrelated roots of Western political theory and city spaces

City spaces and Western political thought share a common lineage. This is true in both historical practices but also in terms of professed values. For example, there is little debate about solid connections between the Athenian city-state and modern Western democracy.

The Athenian development of democracy has been a key source of inspiration for modern political thought (Held, 2006, p13). We might then agree with Waldron, who famously noted that politics was a "dialogue across the centuries" (Waldron cited in Schofield, 2006, p.5).

It is in Athens that we find early evidence of humans beginning to reflect upon what constitutes a good life (Hall, 1998, p.26) and how to live together. In turn, the Greeks were asking what the purpose of human settlements ought to be. In Athens, we find early attempts at a formalised democracy to capture the essence of communal living. However, the sense that individuals have clear rights cannot be traced directly to Athenian culture (Held, 2006, p.13).

Prior to this period in Athens, there were others in the region developing some of the philosophical traditions we now associate with ancient Greece. For instance, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes of the Ionian Greek city Miletus were already practising what we would recognise as philosophy in the Western tradition at the beginning of the fifth century BC (Hall, 1998, p.26). Greek culture had a growing tradition of philosophy and political philosophy that predates Athens. But in Athens, this tradition begins to develop into the culture that would play its part in shaping Western culture for millennia to come.

Cities existed before those of ancient Greece, of course. We may understand politics in a broad sense of what manifests when humans live together, or we may consider it in a more narrow sense of organised governance. Either way, neither originated in ancient Greece. But a certain understanding of the commitments, rights and obligations, a particular tradition of political philosophy can be most clearly understood as descending from ancient Greece. This lineage of political theory that

links ancient Greece with contemporary Western political theory originates from a time when the city and politics were intrinsically linked. The city, and in particular Athens, are where ideas of equality, law and liberty begin to take root in thought and practice in Western political theory. As such, we can see that cities are intrinsically linked to what we often understand politics to be. Cities are therefore intrinsically linked to how we understand the practice of norms, rights and obligations, between citizens and institutions.

In Athens, we find a professed devotion to values that would be recognised as at the core of modern liberal democracies. Ancient Greece and contemporary ideas of Western political philosophy share a common lineage; it is in these city spaces of pre-Christianity Greece that ideas begin to form which we might recognise as sharing a philosophical lineage with those of contemporary liberal democracies. For those who held Athens's full citizenship, the city-state was a space that bound to-gether cultural and political ends. There are several key ways in which Athens links culturally with Western notions of the city and politics: a devotion to equality amongst citizens, the rule of law and the exaltation of liberty; all three of which are indelibly associated with ideas of (if not always the practice of) Western political philosophy (Held, 2006, p.13).

The city for ancient Greece was a political space, the demos and polis inseparable (Hall, 1998, p.35). It is no coincidence that the etymological roots of contemporary world politics are derived from the Greek word polis, which in ancient Greece also meant city. Cities are thus indelibly linked to politics, and the key values of Western political philosophy have grown out of them.

If we find the roots of Western political philosophy in Athens, we also find problems with the Athenian understanding of politics, mainly who counts as citizens. The direct democracy of the

Athenians is often heralded as the purest democratic form yet achieved (Hall, 1998, p.24). Yet, the democracy of Athens is not unproblematic. Of course, women and slaves fared poorly, as they were not considered citizens (Held, 2006, p.13). Only a small fraction of the population of Athens had rights of citizenship (Montgomery, p.16).

As a result, issues around gender, class and ethnicity meant that only a small population achieved full citizenship. This is problematic for discussions that attempt to equate the democracy of ancient Greece with a more modern understanding of democracy. Universal suffrage is so embedded in contemporary notions of democracy that partial suffrage appears as an affront to the notion of democracy. Athenian democracy was then not unproblematic, but these problems do not negate that Athenian democracy laid the blueprint for Western democracy.

The Athenians may have been the first to properly excavate and develop what the political ought to look like (in the Western tradition). This is significant since it may be said that, to have an environment capable of such discussion, a level of political development must exist prior to this. For the contemplation of these matters to be possible, a level of political development has taken place. It may, of course, also be the case that we can understand the political as beginning as soon as there are relations between humans, that politics is what goes on between individuals, and therefore thoughts that arise from such relations are in some sense political. If this is the case, then we ought to look a lot further back for where early political thought occurred, and, in truth, the city-state predates both Athens and formal city-states of the West. In Mesopotamia, for instance, evidence of cities exists long before their Western counterparts (Held, 2006, p.12). Humans gathering in political ways may be said to precede Athens, of course, but in the Athenian city, the values of Western democracy can first be found. So, it is not the beginnings of politics that we find in Athens, but the

beginnings of a politics that we might recognise today, a politics of democracy and a professed exaltation of freedom, equality, self-authorisation and justice.

Although this chapter and this thesis are embedded more squarely in the tradition of Western political philosophy, it is not only the West that derives its early political workings from cities. Mesopotamia has been mentioned, but in China too – another great political power of our time – the beginnings of large political settlements can be seen in the walled city spaces. These cities had many of the mechanisms of modern states: they collected taxes and registered people that lived there, for instance. By having developed political settlements and comparing them and people travelling between them, the benefits and negatives of different political arrangements became measurable. Ideas on governance were then developed and exchanged. Chinese thinkers always believed that the city would join with others to form a borderless world, unlike their Greek counterparts, who saw cities as ends in themselves. Their separation from other cities is part of their makeup (Bell and De Shallit, 2011, p.1).

3.2 The city of purpose and the reflexive relationship with the citizen

As outlined above, the city and politics have always been, in some way, inseparable. This, of course, makes sense since politics can be understood partly as the activity of dealing with shared and conflicting preferences. Cities gather large numbers of people together, engendering this activity. The political community and the city are thus imbued with normative questions: what is allowed, what is forbidden, what is shared and what is privately owned, what rights ought we expect to protect, and to what extent are we at the mercy of others? Likewise, the city helps to shape our understanding of the aims of humans. We find linkages here with Athens too, where Aristotle opined that

the city "comes into existence for the sake of mere life, but exists for the sake of the good life" (Hall, 1998, p.37). The answers and norms that develop in response to these matters have an effect beyond any temporal moment. At any time, new individuals are born, raised and shaped by the norms of their environment. In turn, each individual has the potential to shape the environment and the norms of the city. Then, the city and individual have a reflexive relationship (Bell and De Shallit, 2011, p.2). In Athens, those accepted as citizens were both subject to and the creators of the city's laws (Held, 2006, pp.12-13). Both the city and politics were led by a sense of what values should apply to those living together. In modern economic terms, they understood what preferences one should have and play out with others.

From the influence of Jeremy Bentham in the early nineteenth century on London, to the ancient Greeks on Athens (and subsequent political arrangements around the world, but in particular Europe and North America), to libertarian and political economists on the building of the US and the neoliberal turn towards the end of the twentieth century, to Scandinavian welfare states, cities have configured themselves based on the image of political philosophies (Hall, 1998, p.6). Cities are where citizens learn the values of their society. As Göran Therborn (2017) notes, the values of cities can be read.

The city is formed of individuals and their normative values; it aggregates them in a meaningful sense. Through this new environment, further individuals pass and are shaped by and shape the normative framework that is the city. And so the process goes on, fluid, never static, constantly shaping the new, and, in turn, being shaped by the new. The city and its citizens thus live in a relationship of reflexivity. In essence:

1. The city exists.

2. The city has a set of norms. These norms may be contested, but there is a normative environment.

3. Individuals are born into that environment.

4. These individuals are shaped by that environment.

5. These individuals add to that environment.

6. The city that exists after this process is, to some extent, new, reaffirmed and renewed.

This relationship and cycle are of key significance to this thesis. The city, a space in which individuals can develop. As shown, it is also increasingly the type of space in which individuals develop – due to the expanding numbers of people living their lives in city spaces. Chapter 4 will show how cities are increasingly under pressure from forces outside of themselves, and, in turn, why this diminishes the space for individuals to help shape their environment. Later in this chapter, it will be explained why that is an issue if we take the development of citizens seriously.

For Aristotle (1999, p.63), the city had a clear teleological purpose; it "…exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only". The city may have been founded due to people's natural social drive to be around others, further their own needs and better their physical environment, but, ultimately, the city, for Aristotle, has a guiding aim: the good life.

The city then, according to Aristotle, has a purpose beyond individual aims. The city is organised around the collective good and, in return, services the individuals that reside within it. The city here then is not neutral in its aims. It ought to aim at the good life. Citizens should build a city aimed at the good life and benefit from living in such a place. As observed above, the city is a reflexive

space, constantly relying on the efforts of its citizens and constantly creating an environment that, ideally, provides the foundations for the good life. On and on, the city is built anew, its DNA a product of its citizens' actions, desires, flaws and talents.

For Aristotle, this was encompassed in the idea of Eudaemonia – the Aristotelian model for flourishing. It was not simply that the city would provide the environment necessary for flourishing. Taking part in the production of the city is also a key component of developing fully as a human. Citizens can only live fulfilled lives within and through the polis (Held, 2006, p.13). The development of the city is thus key to developing individuals with it. We find then the sense that the city and its citizens are in a reflexive relationship. It is not merely that the individual shapes the environment they are in, the city. In Chapter 4, I will describe further why space for co-legislation is of particular importance.

Initially, the city provides the environment for the individual, but, in turn, the individual takes part in the city's development. This is not merely beneficial for the city and the other individuals living there, but for the individual themselves. In developing the city, the individual is provided with part of what is necessary for their development, their eudaemonia.

As a result, the city has two roles that are key to living a flourishing life:

> 1. Firstly, the city provides a space, the cultural and material conditions that foster or inhibit flourishing, while

2. Developing the city offers the chance to take part in one's community, contributing to the development of the city in which the individual also continues to develop.

It is important to note here that this theme of the reflexive relationship between the city and the citizen's development, the development of the individual reliant, in part, on their ability to co-legislate in the city, runs through the thesis. For example, in Chapter 4, I will demonstrate how we might understand how the city helps develop the capacities of individuals. Co-legislation is key to this development, as autonomous cohabitation with others requires it. The city provides space for this. In Chapter 5, I will also show how such an understanding helps frame the purpose of the city. To do this, I will use the capability approach. I will also demonstrate that, in order to provide such space, the city has a similar relationship with the wider world: the city needs to have proper space from external forces in order that such space is afforded its citizens. In Chapter 6, I will explain why this is such an issue by taking London as an example and showing the diminishing possibilities of many citizens to take part in shaping their city. In Chapter 7, I will focus on how cities worldwide are looking to deal with this issue.

3.3 Cities as the spatialising of norms

The kind of environment a city provides for its citizens to develop is key. It is key for the kinds of people they can become and the possible types of society they can inhabit. Cities have normative climates linked to their history and also their contemporary narratives – narratives about what kind of city they are, what kind of behaviour is permissible, the opportunities available, and ultimately their values. Many cities have been described as having an ethos, a set of values generally accepted by those living in them (Bell and De Shallit, 2011, p.2). This is not the case for all cities, but it is for

many. Or perhaps, at least, it is fair to say that all cities do in some way have narratives or competing narratives, but some cities have created clearer archetypal stories. In this way, we find Jerusalem as the city of religion (Bell and De Shallit, 2011, p.18), Montreal the city of languages (Bell and De Shallit, 2011, p.56), and Singapore the city of nation-building. Hong Kong, Beijing, Oxford, Berlin, Paris and New York all have different ethoses generated around identifications with materialism, political power, learning, tolerance, romance and ambition, respectively. The city mirrors certain values, and, in doing so, ambitions and expected behaviours are collectively built. This process, as discussed, is reflexive: cities not only reflect but also shape citizens' values and vice versa (Bell and De Shallit, 2011, p.2).

To what extent a city's ethos is generally accepted is debatable. But it can be seen that galvanising messages can bring cities together towards shared goals. These messages build on existing understandings of the normative environment held within a city. For example, after the terror attacks in New York and Manchester, both cities drew on a sense of community to develop narratives around the love of many of their citizens for the attacked spatial area. These attacks were not simply an attack on the city's physical space but on the identity of the city itself and those who cohabitate its space and values. But values can also have a corrosive effect. When areas deteriorate, they too reflect the values of a society, and often its aims, or lack of aims, regarding social justice (Harvey cited in Bell and De Shallit, 2011, p.2).

Cities as normative environments usually reflect the values of past and present citizens and some who live outside of the city (most obviously perhaps in the case of national laws). Where cycling is typical, or virtually non-existent, where traffic rules decision making, where street cleaning is handed to private enterprise, all of these things are symptoms of the manifestations of values. The activi-

ties in the city, the space left for alternative modes of being, are an expression of actors who affect the city's values.

One cannot walk through the centre of Vienna without being acutely aware of there being a time when patronage of the arts was key to self-identity, like in the case of Franz Josef. Likewise, the years of rent caps in Berlin, or the high rents in London, create certain environments and are signs of underlying beliefs about political economy and ethics. Despite living in times where the effects of globalisation are often all around us in cities, the differences between cities can also be felt (Bell and De Shallit, 2011, p.3). These differences, as well as the more apparent aesthetic kind, are also differences in values. Intricately-layered institutions and norms represent the values of citizens and those with the power to affect a city whilst living outside of it.

Cities are then clearly normative environments. They are sites of both ethical and political importance. They are where we spend much of our time pursuing our goals and attempting to craft our worlds. Much of modern political philosophy, however, is more concerned with the nation or the individual. The canonical political philosophies of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau concern themselves with the nation. Economics likewise often looks to the nation or the individual as the ultimate unit of moral or political concern. The city space is, comparatively speaking, rarely high on the list for philosophical analysis.

As argued, cities are by their very nature ethical and political sites. They are spaces in which humans come together, have differences, agree on distribution, hold power, and coerce. They are also spaces in which we find collective action tasks organised and fulfilled. Rubbish is collected, streets are cleaned, transport runs, and buildings are used to maintain the health of citizens. Keeping cities

safe, clean, functioning and, beyond that, maintaining a space where culture can flourish, are aims we can see as having their parallels at the national level. That said, far from being merely nodes of the nation, as often seen in contemporary times and debates, cities are the original building blocks from which nations were founded. Cities should be seen as important political and ethical entities, generating consideration akin to national counterparts.

In pursuing political meaning and what it means to be political, the city has a long history of framing the purpose of human activity. We find cities of God, the city on a hill, the relationship between city and citizen (Harvey, 2013, p.ll). These things help us understand the city as more than a physical space imbued with political meaning. Within the idea of the city, there has often also been implicit prescriptive information as to how humans imagine we ought to live. The city as a unit is prime to be understood in both ethical and political terms.

In projecting and embedding meaning, cities are also the sites of structured power relations. Cities create social environments which reflect and embed power relations. They convey those relations and meaning upon which their foundations lie – the city structures power since it organises space in relation to power structures. We might think about the space left for leisure, the grandiosity of some architecture, the dominance (or otherwise) of university campuses, the wasteland. The city also conveys meaning with regard to that structuring. It conveys the values of those who have shaped the city and its uses of space. As a result, the city simultaneously reproduces structural relations and conveys meaning; the city can be read as showing meaning about the relations at play (Therborn, 2017, p.12).

The city then creates an environment that structures the development of its citizens. At the same time, those structures that make up the city distribute opportunities unequally; the city produces and embeds inequalities of opportunity. This relationship is not theoretical but lived. For example, Chapter 6 will explore increasing living costs in London boroughs like Hackney. These increasing costs, to some large extent caused externally, can in time shape who can live in the area. The city's relationship with the external then, in turn, reflects who can shape the city.

Cities have areas that some can go, and some not. Sometimes, this is literal, such as the private club, private land, or gated community. But often, the divisions are subtle. The living costs of an area may make it attractive or not so attractive. An area may be more or less welcoming of diversity. The city has space where some feel comfortable, and some do not, where some can afford rent or coffee, and some cannot. The city then both creates spatialised divisions and yet also reproduces them or attempts to break them down. It reproduces divisions by creating both formalised and informal gateways that some, but not all, can pass through. Further reproduction is achieved through the potential benefits, or lack of, in different specialised areas. Some clubs and social hangouts, along with areas, offer a greater ability for networking than others.

The city then creates development opportunities, but those opportunities are partly reliant on the individual to take advantage of them. In terms of capabilities, we can imagine this as a relationship between the individual and their environment. The individual relies upon the environment for their development; the environment also requires them to take advantage of such opportunities. The relationship is reflexive and not simple. This will be explored more in Chapter 4, in a deeper dissection of the relationship between individual and environment.

Through the production of city space, cities are, as Therborn notes, where wealth and power are concentrated (2017, p.7). We may then understand that power is gathered and maintained to exist in a spatial sense that is closer to some and further from others. The city then spatialises the ease of how some will learn how to gather and maintain power. A city that aims at its citizens' flourishing ought to work to bridge such gaps.

In cities, these power relations and their distribution have two main dimensions – the supply of opportunities and services (Therborn, pp.10-15). Therborn echoes the thoughts of Mumford, who described cities as points of maximum power and culture for a community (Mumford cited in Therborn, 2017, p.7). It is not merely across a nation or globally that the distribution of access to such opportunities then ought to be questioned.

Some questions benefit from analysis beyond the national. For instance, wage equity will affect prices within a city – something that will be lost if we question only inequality at the national level. It is within our close communities quite often that we truly develop. To re-emphasise, this will require lots of thought at the national and international levels. But the city level, where we encounter peers and the physical manifestation of distribution that often occurs beyond the city level, is essential. It may be at the national level that we organise transport, but it is in the city that we feel its effects. Nationally and internationally, migration policy is set, but it is in cities we must live together.

As a result, we must also recognise the city's role in distributing opportunities to be and develop. Later in the thesis, I will discuss the city's role in developing the effective autonomy of individuals. This inequality of distribution of opportunity is important when considered in this context that the

city has a role in developing the individual but can also be the site for diminishing the opportunities of development. The city is never benign in the development of its citizenry.

Therborn (2017, pp.12-13) notes that, through power, the meaning of life in the city is constructed in several ways, including:

1. Opportunities and limitations

2. The sense and the priorities of urban living

3. Identities in the city

4. The meaning of the city and the nation past, present and aspired future.

The city then can be read; it can be read as displaying information pertaining to the political and ethical, the values espoused, the expectations of its citizens, the esteem of the city, and how this plays out in its internal and external politics. Amongst the ways in which a city deals with its physical environment, one can also read a moral code. That moral code is the aggregation of its citizens and stakeholders. The city collectively displays the code of conduct allowed and that which is not permitted. We can see how important public space is or is not. We can see how important commerce is or is not. All of these things are the result of millions of interactions that occur over long periods. The city is the result of normative battles won and lost, moulded towards the values of those who had the power to sculpt it. The city and its citizens are in a constant reflexive relationship – the norms of one affecting the other and vice versa. The type of city we live in has dramatic consequences for the type of life we are able to live.

If the city spatialises norms, then one such norm we might understand a city or any society as conveying is to what extent individuals ought to be able to participate. We may even go further and say to what extent they are in some sense obliged to participate.

In the first chapter of book 3 of Politics, Aristotle states that a city-state is some kind of composite. That is, the city is made up of many parts; these are the citizens. (1999. P52). Thucydides too stated a similar view, arguing that "It is the men that are the polis"; it is the people that made the city (Hall, 1998, p.36). From this, we find Aristotle saying we must investigate who counts as a citizen, as there may be a difference of opinion. (1999, p.52). We find Aristotle looking for the unqualified citizen, discounting those who merely pass through a city. Minors, too, are found to be unqualified due to being too young. As slaves, guests or minors, such citizens are, in some sense, according to Aristotle, lacking that which would qualify them as citizens (1999. P52). This widely-known fact is highly contentious to modern ears. It at least tells us that the sense that all have the right to participate meant something different in ancient Greece to that which many would consider reasonable today.

There is something telling about how Aristotle arrives at who might count as such a qualified citizen. For Aristotle, such a citizen participates in the administation of the city.. He goes on to describe a citizen ".whom no exception can be taken, and this special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices." (1999. P52). In doing so, Aristotle finds that "He who has he power to take part n the deliberative or judicial administration any state is said by us to be a citizens (sic) of that state; and, speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life" (1999. p53).

We can derive two things from the above, then. Firstly, that since at least Ancient Greece, there is an understand of the city that it is, to some extent, the multitude of citizens within it. Aristotle here clearly sees the city-state in almost leviathan mould, as the "multitude" of citizens.

Secondly, to be a citizen, one has to participate in that which constitutes the deliberation within the city. To be ineligible to take part in that process then would render one not a citizen. As the city is a multitude of citizens of this kind, by following this logic, the citizen who cannot deliberate and take part in the city's civic life is essentially not a part of the city.

By virtue of this, a city is a city to the extent that it has citizens who deliberate. This may strike us as a stretch away from the modern city. It is not altogether clear that, when cities are spoken of in day-to-day discussion, their classification is based on their ability to show they are a multitude of deliberative citizens. Further, it may not appear to the modern viewer of cities that they are often measured in their ability to provide evidence of being such cities. In Chapter 4, this will be developed as we look at political autonomy as necessary to flourishing lives.

3.4 Expanding city populations and the expanding space for flourishing

We have so far considered the connection between cities and the roots of Western political theory. Section 3.2 explored how the city has a reflexive relationship with the citizen, with both co-constituting each other, and 3.3 expanded on this to explain how cities spatialise norms. The following section shows evidence of dramatically expanded city populations in absolute terms. It also highlights the dramatic rises in city populations relative to their rural counterparts. Cities, which were

once the standard political unit, are shown to be increasingly important spaces through which to understand the provision for environments conducive to flourishing lives.

As described, cities are important to our understandings of what it is to be political together. But there is a further reason for taking this political space more seriously than it currently is. We find that the city is increasingly the space where we live together and pursue our goals. This is partly because urban populations have been dramatically rising, both in absolute terms and relative to rural populations. Cities are undeniably growing (Harvey, 2013; WHO, 2020; UN, 2018; IMF, 2007). In a world with a rapidly expanding population, this amounts to rapid growth in the number of people opting to live in urban rather than rural environments. This growth has several implications for the role that cities play. Primarily, for this thesis, cities are increasingly the sites from which we pursue our goals, from which we attempt to make sense of life and live in accordance with those thoughts.

The rise in the importance of city spaces can be seen in the shift to the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), which added cities as a key focus in the renewal of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The explicit aim of Goal 11 is to make "cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable" (United Nations. 2022).

As described in the first chapter, city populations have risen dramatically over the last century. Though cities have existed for over 7000 years, the modern city, as seen from around 1750, has witnessed unprecedented growth. Many towns and villages have developed from regional marketplaces to vibrant centres in their own right (Lampard, 1955). This expansion of urban living has been a global phenomenon. Currently, 23% of the world's population live in a city with a million inhabitants or more. By 2030, that is predicted to reach 27% (UN, 2016, p.3). This trend is expected

to continue. What this means is that there will be an estimated 2.5 billion extra people living in urban settings (UN 2022). In the twentieth century, we can see that a shift occurred, making city living the norm for far more people than previously.

Such growth suggests that the city is a prime place for human development. Cities are often spaces primed for economic activity because they make economic activity more efficient (Lampard, pp.82-84). They do this in part by reducing transportation costs and other transaction costs, such as holding meetings or having access to a multi-vendor environment. Economic activity may be satisfying for its own sake; people may enjoy working or solving a problem using entrepreneurial skills. But much economic activity is, on the whole, and philosophically speaking, not an end in itself. Economic activity is useful in producing the kinds of goods, services and indeed environments that humans view as more fitting for their pursuit of flourishing.

Cities have been described in various ways: as the concentration of many people living near each other for "residential and productive purposes" (Davis Hubbard, 2006, p.1), where "large numbers of people live and work" (Saunders cited in Hubbard, 2006, p.1). They are, of course, these things: they are where we combine, and therefore where our preferences aggregate. Cities are where we navigate our mutual needs, distribute goods and access services. The city is, as Hubbard (2006, p.1) describes, a "...Spatial location, a political entity, an administrative unit, a place of work and play, a collection of dreams and nightmares, a mesh of social relations, an agglomeration of economic activity". All these areas of social relations, work, play and where we live are also intrinsically linked to our pursuit of lives we deem worth living, or, at least, we would ideally like them to be so. The movement of people has created cities for a variety of purposes. Cities have been religious centres, places for recreation, administration, defence, economies. Cities often provide numerous things pertaining to human needs (Lampard, 1955, p.84).

To bring these points together, this thesis's underlying premise is that the rapid growth of city-based human activity calls for a reappraisal of the city's place in political and philosophical literature. Cities have always been inextricably linked with the human pursuit of perceived goals. But, with the rapid growth in the number and proportion of humans living in city spaces, a reappraisal of their role is due. The rise in the numbers of people living in cities presents both opportunities and challenges. The expansion of city living plays into challenges surrounding climate change, food security and access, disease control, and other health risks. With increasing city populations comes the opportunity to frame the ends of cities and renew a sense of what cities can be. We must renew the sense that cities play a key role in challenges for individuals (their sense of autonomy being the focus of this thesis). The framing of the city as a possible great agent for change could attempt to tackle issues that nations are currently struggling with, such as climate change. This thesis will largely focus on the impact of globalisation on individuals and the city's role in mitigating some of this impact. But recognising the city as a key site for human activity, which is often underplayed in much political theory, could help solve further collective action problems. Cities are historically where much of our political understanding comes from, but they are also where much of our political activity will occur going forward. The distribution of opportunities to flourish will be key to many of us.

3.5 The expanding importance of the city in the provision of space for human development

Taking these points together, we can understand the scope for thinking of cities and their impact on capabilities. Using the capability approach framework, we can frame the city as a space for expanding human development. This chapter has brought together four components; firstly, the city as a

key political unit in the development of politics, mainly Western politics. Secondly, the reflexive relationship between citizen and city, how the city and citizen combine in a state of mutual shaping. Thirdly, the normative qualities of the city. That is, the way that the city spatialises norms. Lastly, the fact that city populations are expanding.

Cities then do not just have an essential role in the development of citizens; they have an increasingly important role to play in doing so. Though the city often finds itself relegated in favour of the individual or nation-state across philosophy, politics and economics, the city plays an integral part in creating environments conducive to flourishing.

Much political and economic discussion places the individual in relation to the national or global economy. But, in offering citizens opportunities, the city has several advantages that will be looked at in this thesis. By shifting some of the attention from the national and global, the city may help maintain citizens' sense of autonomy as the complexity and integration of global relations expand. The city, then, may be key to understanding issues around belonging, identity and a sense of autonomy in this increasingly complex world of interconnection.

As such, the city should be understood as not just a key political space, but that this is, and will be, increasingly the case. Using the capability approach, this thesis will frame the ends of the city in such a way as to develop a sense of what cities could be. This framing is increasingly key as increasing numbers of people use the city space to pursue their goals.

In Chapter 4, I will look at the city in the context of an increasingly globalising world. I will further develop an understanding of political autonomy which shows the importance of co-legislation in

cities and, further, how we might understand the reflexive relationship described in this chapter, and the development of capabilities necessary for co-legislation. I will explain how such phenomena have a central role in the human development which occurs in cities.

Then, in Chapter 5, I will attempt to bring this all together by showing how a new political theory of cities, framed using the capability approach, might look to stave off some of the potential issues caused by globalisation. By reframing the city space in such a way, the thesis argues for a new way of seeing the city, one which attempts to place the expansion of freedoms and the ability to co-legislate as central aims of the city. In Chapter 6, I will then use this framing to explain how we might understand diminishing political autonomy and thus human development in the context of London. The chapter draws upon themes of globalisation developed in Chapter 4 to demonstrate why technology and movements of capital are diminishing political autonomy. Chapter 7 then looks at attempts in cities around the world to use both technology and measures to protect local autonomy from such phenomena.

Chapter 4: Globalisation and the Dialectics of Autonomy

The late twentieth century and early twenty-first mark a period of immense change. Mass global integration of markets occurred, technology rapidly progressed, computing power dramatically increased, and the internet was born. Concurrently, from the 1970s onward, there was a push, initially from the UK and the US, towards a more free-market approach to national economies. From the post-Soviet states, to social democracies like New Zealand, welfare states such as Sweden, through economies as diverse as India, China and post-apartheid South Africa (Harvey, 2005, p.2), this ideological shift towards what is commonly known as neoliberalism, left barely a national economy untouched. (Harvey, 2005, pp.9-10). Global trade and travel boomed. The lives of billions of people became increasingly integrated, and technology reduced our sense of space-time difference, an intensification of social relations (Giddens, 1990, p.64). Subsequently, technological development created conditions through which smaller numbers of people can organise and use technology to shape the conditions of a larger number of others. The previous chapter focused on the expansion of city populations, and the city's role in the history of Western politics and in human development. This chapter will focus on themes of globalisation and its interconnection with the city's environment in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. A combination of globalisation and its impact on cities will be argued to pose a threat to the political autonomy of citizens.

This chapter is structured as follows. In the opening section, section 4.1, I sketch a definition of globalisation and discuss alternative ways of seeing this phenomenon. The chapter explores how both technology and ideological shifts have driven change. In section 4.2, I explore how these changes have created greater interconnection between people. In section 4.3, the chapter develops a conception of autonomy based on one's ability to co-legislate in relation to others. The final section,

4.4, brings these points together, and argues that the phenomena of globalisation and its expansion of technological growth, communication and environment of pro-integration of markets, pose a threat to individual autonomy – a threat we should take seriously to seek alternatives to mitigate its effects.

4.1 The globalisation of what?

The late twentieth century was marked by a discussion of a hyper-globalising era delineated as a process of globalisation (Held, 1997). In both academic and lay circles, the term has been used to attempt to understand dramatic changes in cultures across the world. Since the 1990s, the term has seen increasing use across academia, and has been explored across disciplines, continents, theoretical approaches and the political spectrum (Scholte, 2008, pp.1471-1472). Discussion of globalisation understood as the economic and social integration of a global community was portrayed as inevitable by many, and, as it was inevitable, the only reasonable position was to embrace it. Ex-British prime minister Tony Blair recently reaffirmed this view, saying that, "... globalisation is a force of nature, not a policy: it is a fact" (Blair cited in Bourne, 2019). Acceptance of the globalising process became an orthodoxy in the late 90s, enjoying an assumed position across the mainstream parties, financial papers and company reports (Cole, 1998, p.315). The sense of the power of globalisation is evidenced by the connected discussion of the decline of the nation due to globalising forces (Fulcher, 2000, p.522).

But what should we understand globalisation to be? It is beyond the scope of this thesis to unpack all aspects of globalisation. Further, the impact of globalisation will differ whether one is a Western citizen, a citizen of China or a villager in Africa. There are issues of contestation, and it is not the

purpose of this thesis to unpack them all. As Garrett Brown contends, globalisation has "… Various manifestations, meanings, connections and interrelated complexities" (2008, p.43). I will briefly discuss why we ought to understand this recent period as one of globalisation, a period of globalisation that demands further investigation into its effect on political autonomy.

4.1.1 The expansion of global trade

Economic integration in the late twentieth century to the early twenty-first centuries is a key element for understanding globalisation, particularly that international trade expanded significantly. As illustrated in Figure 1, we see radical growth in global exports. As can be seen, global exports were four times larger in 2013 than they were in 1975 (Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2016). Markets opened up significantly, foreign investment (Wild, 2000) and imports grew (Rodrik, 1998, p.1), with trade up from 19% to 36% of world output between 1950 and 1997. FDI rose from 3.5 to 12% between 1973 and 1997 (Wild, 2000, p.2). From the mid-1970s to the 2000s, imports in the US more than doubled (Rodrik, 1998, p.1). Therefore, a significant part of understanding globalisation and how the world changed at the end of the twentieth century is understanding how national economies have become significantly more interlinked.

Table 1: Value of global exports (values indexed at 1913 = 100)

Source: Federico and Tena-Junguito (2016).

Global economic integration in the late twentieth century was propelled and enabled in good part due to technological development. Much of the impetus for these changes, however, was also fuelled by an ideological shift. Free markets, deregulation and reduction in government size were vital to this shift. We can see the beginnings of this movement earlier in the twentieth century in the writings of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. Friedman, writing in 1951, described how such ideas of neoliberalism would guide legislators of the following generation though it "could hardly affect" the ones of the time of writing (Friedman cited in Jones, 2015, p.85).

By the 1970s, these ideas had developed into political and economic analysis and spawned policy prescriptions (Jones, 2015, p.85). This movement was led mainly by the UK and US, US President Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. These ideas radically changed the political and economic life of both countries. In 1988, the Thatcher government made this explicit, saying, "the expansion of the world economy requires us to continue the process of removing barriers to trade" (The Telegraph, 2008).

Both Thatcher and Reagan were hugely influenced by thinkers such as Friedman, Hayek and Becker, who gave neoliberalism a philosophical underpinning (Jones, 2015, p.85). This school of thought was so influential that, when Friedman died, conservative intellectual William F Buckley wrote that the period from 1980 was known as "The age of Friedmann" (Larson, 2018, p.11). As Buckley wrote, "The age of Friedman began approximately in 1979 - 1980 when his disciples, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, took power… and these two leaders embarked on economic policies, broadly inspired by his theories" (Buckley cited in Larson, 2018, p.12).

Friedman's approach was presented in dichotomous fashion with, and as a defence against, more leftist approaches to the economy, particularly economies that espoused a more significant role for public planning and centralisation. Yet, at the same time, much of the twentieth century had seen strong support for more planned approaches. China and the USSR are two key examples that had led the way, building expansive, centrally planned economies. From 1978, in China, Deng Xiaoping set the country on course for reforms and openness (Greenspan, 2011, p.1), famously saying the cat's colour did not matter if it caught the mice (Naughton, 2009, p.96). His analogy was that it did not matter whether the economy was more capitalist if it created the conditions for a flourishing economy. China was moving ideologically more in line with the UK and US.

The idea that there was a lack of a viable alternative to free-market capitalism became mainstream. The acronym TINA emerged in the popular press: There Is No Alternative (Bateman, 2002, p.310). This sense that there was only one reasonable discourse available was powerful in itself, which will be discussed later in the chapter. Yet, it is essential to recognise the ideological background for the globalising economy for several reasons. From the 1980s, neoliberal ideas almost drifted out of view, the background to much political policy, a dominant set of values and ideas that appeared

without alternative. Prior to the crash of 2007-8, ideas we might consider neoliberal were so prevalent that they had ceased to be a large part of public debate in Europe and the US.

The ideological environment of the time laid the normative conditions for the deregulation of markets. This deregulation makes international trade cheaper and ultimately more attractive. As trade becomes cheaper and more attractive, it increases and, in turn, makes various markets more integrated. This then reinforces the lexicon of deregulation as a preferred normative priority.

Further, deregulation creates the conditions for power to shift from nation-states and their governments towards privately owned capital. That is, private capital became more powerful in relation to national governments. The integration of global economies and diminishing of national autonomy was predicted (Cole, 1998, p.316) and, in some circles, celebrated as the end of the nation-state. As capital more easily moves worldwide, nation to nation, its power relative to nations increases.

The quarter-century up to the economic crash of 2007 saw the fastest rate of economic growth and globalisation in history, with international trade increasing dramatically between 1980 and 2007 (Erixon and Ranzen, 2010, p.2). This increase of power towards market forces would have serious consequences, as nations would find themselves increasingly at the mercy of capital flows. We might think here of the East Asia crisis of the 1990s, in which panic spread through markets, a flood of international funding and then withdrawal (Sachs, 1998). As seen during the economic crisis of 2007-2008, international flows of finance have been too powerful at times for previous methods used by nations, methods developed before such complex integration (World Bank, 2008). Globalisation, this integration of economic interests, "represents a major transformation in the territorial organisation of economic activity and politico-economic power" (Sassen, 1996. p15).

4.1.2 Rapid technological development

Technology advanced at an incredible pace in the late twentieth century. This advancement has hugely altered the capacity of humans to pass on information and communicate. Global communication and travel costs have, on the whole, become much cheaper. Increased affordability has dramatically amplified the capacity of billions of people to communicate at instantaneous speed. Modern computing has had a profound effect on the cost of and channels for sending information. The cost of sending information by computer dropped from $100 per second to one cent per second between 1975 and 1995. Internet use rose between 1990 and 2000, from 1% to 14% globally, with that figure at 55% in the US (Dehesa, 2006, p.3). Where physical mail sent by post transported information taking days, huge files containing a nearly unlimited number of documents can be transferred in nanoseconds. The movement of ideas, thoughts, images and text has become exponentially more possible. Humans have transitioned rapidly, from existing with information scarcity to information overload (Bartlett, 2018). This rapid advancement in the ability of humans to communicate information affordably and at speed has had a profound effect. It has radically altered our space/time experience. In doing so, we now experience a wider geographic area as essentially within our own time-space experience. Our communications have moved from mainly being those we contact directly to any global person with internet access. In that sense, what happens elsewhere, also happens, in some way, where we are.

In turn, this dramatically affects our ability to communicate instrumentally and our interaction with others able to communicate instrumentally and inter-subjectively with us. That is, it has altered our ability to communicate in a way that aims at modifying the world, running businesses, and building

narratives in politics and commerce. All of these abilities have dramatically expanded. With an expansion in digital communication, more people can now broadcast activities. Instead of a small amount of owned communicative space for political campaigns, there were now thousands (Hindman. 2009, p.2), even millions. As Arthur Lupia and Gisella Sin describe (2003, p.316):

"The World Wide Web... allows individuals – even children – to post, at minimal cost, messages and images that can be viewed instantly by global audiences. It is worth remembering that as recently as the early 1990s, such actions were impossible for all but a few world leaders, public figures, and entertainment companies – and even for them only at select moments. Now many people take such abilities for granted."

This has led some to argue that the internet has incredible democratising powers comparable to or surpassing that of the printing press (Trippi. 2005, p.235). Some also argue that the sheer public sphere has been enlarged (Hindman, 2009, p.6). Simultaneously, we are all creating a digital footprint, a trove of information about our behaviour and preferences. This information is helpful for anybody gathering information to influence behaviour or to alter our preferences. In order to give advertisers the reach they want, our online searches accrue data following us everywhere we go online and sometimes beyond. This creates enormous and asymmetric amounts of data useful for those wishing to affect an individual's behaviour (Moore, 2019, p.140).

These technologically driven changes are significant and form one strong pillar of globalisation, or contributing factor, in an examination of how the world has changed over the last half-century. As discussed, the instrumental capability of communicative technology has dramatically increased. Yet, as will be described later in this chapter, this ability has not been spread evenly: some have en-

hanced capacities, whilst others are increasingly at the mercy of the increased capacity of others.

Key to this are inequalities relating to access to the internet. That includes both accessing and communicating via the net. It may be hard to find particular information. But it may also be hard to communicate certain information (Hindman, 2009, p.142). Inequalities on and offline both contribute to inequalities online. The ability to find information and also to communicate it reflects this.

So, we have dramatic technological advancement, and thus abilities, coupled with pre-existing and newly formed inequalities. Thus, inequalities do not merely reflect pre-existing inequalities; they are reflected and have the potential to be exacerbated. As such, some individuals are increasingly at the mercy of others' preferences, while others can use such a change in environment to further develop inequalities of power . In section 4.4, I will return to this theme and look at ways in which we can understand technology to be exacerbating inequalities and threatening the political autonomy of citizens.

Alternative globalisation(s)

So far, we have sketched out one particular understanding of globalisation and its effects on communication and the opportunity for expressions and practices of autonomy. Though it may be obvious to most that a period of globalised change has occurred and that this period may rightly be termed as a continuous process of globalisation, some reject the use of this term. Rejecting the use of globalisation as a paradigm mostly fall into one of two categories:

A rejection that this period is in any way unique.

Accepting that it is unique but rejecting the transformative narrative so far provided.

Having already sketched a basic understanding of globalisation, I will now briefly explain positions that oppose the notion of globalisation and why they ought to be rejected. Doing so will set the background for understanding globalisation in such a way as to highlight the potential threat this movement poses to political autonomy.

Rejecting the uniqueness of globalisation as a modern phenomenon

One way of rejecting current conceptualisations of globalisation is to suggest that this period signals no significant change. Under this view, other periods in history can show great trade and communication across the planet, and, as such, there is not a new period of globalisation to discuss, just a continuation of ongoing processes. This argument is often based on the understanding that globalisation has been with us since the beginning of human history and began "once the first humanoid stepped off the African continent' (Brown, 2008, p.46).

On the surface, it is understandable why this position is attractive since there have been other significant periods of globalising. The Roman Empire, the Silk Road, the acts of Columbus, Cook, and Colonialism, early Chinese trade – all of these point to a world that has always seen movement and trade across the globe (Flew, 2020. p102). East and West have been interlinked through a form of globalisation since 500 BC (Hobson, 1995, p.2). European exploits around the globe in the fifteenth century onwards, and the global expansion of trade due to the Industrial Revolution also suggest an ongoing expansion process at the global level. For example, the latter recorded dramatic drops in transport costs and also commodity price convergence, signifiers of which have been argued as key to indicating a process of globalisation taking place (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2002. pp.23-27). There is disagreement about how globalised the world was at these various points, but it is clear that

there has been increasing trade at other points in history. This fact clearly demonstrates that the period in question – the late twentieth century – was not the only globalising period.

That there have been other periods of globalisation is no threat to the sense that the late twentieth century to early twenty-first was a period of globalisation. Globalisation, then, is not new, but the period in question, from the mid-1970s to the present, has seen a rapid acceleration of a particular kind of globalising. Globalisation is marked by both globally expanded trade and a huge spike in the ability to communicate globally. There may have been other spikes of globalisation in the past, and a gradual globalising process may have been at play for millennia. Still, our current period is a unique spike in those globalising processes, and, with the added advent of the internet and expanded computing capabilities, I suggest it is worthy of extra attention.

There is clear evidence that the late twentieth century to the early twenty-first was when something significant occurred concerning global integration. As Table 2 shows, world exports dramatically increased after the Second World War. Markets opened up, foreign investment grew (Wild, 2000) and imports grew (Rodrik, 1995, p.1).

Table 2: World exports/GDP (in 1990 constant dollars, percent)

Source: Maddison cited in Rodrik (1995), Tables G-2, I-4.

Accepting the uniqueness whilst questioning the narrative of globalisation

The second way of denying that a process of globalisation has taken place is to accept that a change, or phenomenon, has taken place but to deny the suitability of the term globalisation. Those who reject the language of globalisation often do so by alternatively describing the process in one of the four following ways: internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation and Westernisation. Following Scholte (2008, pp.1473-1478), I will briefly sketch these

First, globalisation is often described as a Westernisation of culture. On this understanding, globalisation is presented as a hegemonic discourse, the inevitable progress of Western civilisation. On this presentation, the domination and destruction involved in this Westernisation are often masked or submerged beneath a more progressive human narrative (Scholte, 2008). Much globalisation is indeed a process of Western development and expansion. The spreading of values can easily be seen

in much commercial culture and the economic orthodoxy discussed above. As Giddens points out, much globalisation is an effect of or can be seen to have resulted from the expansion of capitalist production, automation and rationalist knowledge (Giddens cited in Scholte, 2008). As such, many globalising processes are presented as the pushing of Western values. This is understandable in that much of what has taken place during this period has, at its base, a Western influence, free-market ideology, and Western cultural descriptors and values.

However, there are two reasons not to conflate Westernisation with globalisation. One, Westernisation, colonisation and modernisation have a much longer history than this modern period of globalisation (Scholte, 2008, p.1477). Two, multiple globalising forces take the form of Islamic, Buddhist, Confucian, or other 'postmodern' forms of globalisation. These empirical and historical conditions still hold, even if it is the case that the predominant force behind the recent period of globalisation has specific origins in the West.

Second, it is common to view the trends above as a process of internationalisation, not globalisation, since the increased numbers of transactions and dependencies take place between countries, thus entrenching internationalism versus a post-national constellation (Scholte, 2008, p.1474).

This idea is predicated on movement between nations; that is, national physical territories. Here, nation-states are the primary focus, and what counts is what happens between them. These transactions may be formally linked multilaterally or between businesses and individuals of different states. From this viewpoint, the focus is on cross-border transactions such as cross-border calls, travel, membership of international organisations and foreign direct investment.

The attractiveness of this understanding lies partly in that it offers the opportunity to extend previous paradigms on international exchange simply. Modern global economic transactions can be seen in large part as simply an extension of that which has happened for millennia. As the new is very similar to the old, there is no need for a paradigmatic shift of thought or reconceptualisation. This understandably lightens the load in terms of work and allows business narratives as usual, which in many cases supports traditional ideological positions. So, the appeal to internationalisation is clear: it makes understanding what has happened easier while allowing for global explanations that can easily be categorised into existing analytical frameworks and ideological traditions.

However, one problem of this approach is that it rests upon an empirical understanding of the world that pre-dates the internet and modern communication. This is not to deny that nation-states are still critical political units. But we should also accept that much of the modern world we inhabit has new spaces via technologies. These spaces, and the relations that form from them, are not easily placeable within a traditional territorial space. This space, which is supranational in some sense, also has a very real impact on material space. For instance, technology plays into how physical spaces must deal with human relations, jobs, markets and the movement of goods. There is then excellent reason to look for new ways to understand the world, and internationalisation, as traditionally understood, struggles to capture existing empirical conditions. It is this recognition of an expanded space that is key to this thesis. Namely, the technological developments in the twentieth century created a virtual world that now interplays with the more material landscape humans have historically occupied. Individuals still inhabit the nation-state, and, as such, still occupy legally and normatively bounded physical spaces. Nevertheless, at the same time, we have increasingly connected in an online world that in some way transcends those physical territories.

Understanding globalisation as simply a continuation of what has gone before is therefore insufficient. The idea that the late twentieth century saw an expansion of international behaviour does not say all that is needed. The globalisation this thesis will look at then requires an understanding which recognises and examines more deeply these technological developments.

A third way that globalisation has been characterised is that of liberalisation. This signifies the removal of imposed, existing barriers, be they the movement of people or trade. Neoliberalism has become synonymous with globalisation (Scholte, 2008, p.1475). There are two main sides within this strand of the debate, one based on anti-laissez-faire economics and one positive of free markets and minimal regulation. As a result, to be anti-Neoliberalism is often to be anti-globalisation, and to be pro-Neoliberalism, is to be in favour of hyper-globalisation.

The liberalisation of many of the world's key economies has certainly been pivotal to understanding the contemporary world. The deregulation of markets and removal of barriers to global trade has dramatically affected this period and is a key component of globalisation. And, as was argued above, it is also true that much of this has been driven by neoliberal ideology.

But the form of globalisation being discussed here is more than liberalisation and its neoliberal underpinnings. As will be discussed further below, technological developments are a huge part of what drives contemporary globalisation. These developments interplay greatly with economic integration, which has been fuelled by liberalisation. However, there is more to be said than just declaring that markets have liberalised. And, in so far as that is true, liberalisation does not accurately depict the changes that have taken place. This is important if we consider the implications for our attitudes towards globalisation. One could be pro-liberalisation and anti-globalisation, or vice versa. High-

lighting this difference and showing that globalisation is not merely liberalisation makes this possible; the conflation of the two does not (Scholte, 2008, pp.1475-1476).

Finally, globalisation may be described as simply a form of universalisation. This understanding draws upon a sense that cultural elements have become ubiquitous, such as Premier League football or American sports, TikTok, Twitter, coffee, curries, world music, tobacco or blue jeans. This way of viewing globalising processes has some benefits, and there is some evidence of this. People who travel from city to city, country to country, will often comment on how high streets appear the same. Coca Cola, Starbucks, McDonald's – all can be seen in far-flung places. Universalisation draws upon a sense that the globe, a globalising culture, is becoming universalised, with cultures across the world merging into a more singular or concentric global culture.

The exchange of ideas, products and cultural practices has taken place as long as humans have roamed the Earth. We can find coins thousands of years old far from where they were minted, and the same for pots. This is before even a cursory examination of the movement of world religions. These have existed for centuries, even millennia, in some form. Elements of or attempts at universalism existed before globalisation or as part of it. The period in question does then indicate that something different is going on. It is worth rejecting the notion that what we are seeing is simply a universalisation of culture because one may wish to reject cultural homogenisation whilst not opposing the creation of a strongly interlinked global community. One may think the latter is positive while decrying the movement of Western culture around the world. Now Western culture may have, in many cases, moved with the global economic integration, and it may even be the case that there was a certain amount of inevitability about that. But that still would not make them the same thing. The two are not the same, and it is not helpful to imagine them as such.

That is, we may want to defend and encourage global cooperation whilst understanding the concerns of those who perceive globalising forces as a threat. We may hope for global integration and yet wish to defend the possibilities of cultures to stay protected from some of the accompanying forces of globalisation. We may appreciate the benefits of global markets whilst recommending the protection of local industries. We may see the benefits of vast global markets and yet be concerned about the effects on currencies and culture, where little power is held locally to stem some of that global power. We may enjoy the mass of information and cultural exchange that a global community brings whilst rejecting the sheer force of global capital. We may then reject a thoroughgoing vision of universalisation whilst envisaging potentially positive globalisation. If this is feasible and desirable, then it is important that we do not conflate globalisation immediately with universalisation but recognise their differences and areas of connection.

None of the four alternative framings set out above encompass the changes that took place in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first as well as that of globalisation. For the purposes of this thesis, the term globalisation used going forward denotes a combination of economic and technological developments that have impacted people to create a more integrated world. It intensifies social relations (Giddens, 1990) and the changing essence of social space (Scholte, 2008). Globalisation has not merely brought together people worldwide in tighter, more connected supply chains, though it surely has done that. It has also brought us into more immediate contact socially.

The phenomena of global social and economic integration, experienced in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first, then, deserve and require a new language to properly analyse and understand what has taken place. Globalisation more accurately describes this than the other four approaches

for the reasons described. This period was one in which the immediacy of others dramatically expanded. Likewise, the interconnections between individuals globally became tighter and more intricately woven. For these reasons, it is suggested that the phenomena experienced in this period are described as 'expanded immediacy'.

4.2 Expanded Immediacy

So far, this chapter has steered the focus towards technological development, the large part of which has been communicative technology development and large-scale economic integration between 1975 and the present day. This combination of accelerated communication and economies has radically influenced how humans engage with and affect other humans – this phenomenon of expanded interrelations that compress time and space is what I call a form of *expanded immediacy*. In order to better understand the implications of this expanded immediacy, particularly on the city, as discussed in later chapters, the remainder of this chapter will now explore this concept further and argue that it has potentially serious implications for the distribution and meaningfulness of personal autonomy. That is, in a world of limited resources and radically integrated global cohabitation, the changes associated with expanded immediacy have impacted the autonomy experienced by individuals.

At its broadest understanding, expanded immediacy describes an environment in which the lives of humans are, on the whole, more interconnected. With their ability to make decisions, communicate with each other, trade globally, and employ each other to perform tasks, humans are generally increasingly able to do things that affect other humans. Lots of the restrictions of physical distance are, for many, diminished. We can use social media, email and other communicative technologies to place orders, offer our skills, request help and do many other things that involve others. As de-

scribed earlier in this chapter, globalisation has led to an intensification of social relations (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). It has added width and depth to networks internationally across fields as diverse and impactful as the political, economic, technological, cultural (Bauman and Tomlinson cited in Ozer, 2019), military, ecological and migratory, and affected political and cultural flows (Held cited in Cole, 1998). Such an intensifying of social relations has expanded the ability of many people to affect others because our lives are more interwoven.

This ability to affect others then is due to a complex mix of expanded technology and economic integration. We can communicate more quickly and with more people, and our economic activity has the potential to be more far-reaching than before. Examples of affecting others range from the benign ease of setting up a Facebook event and inviting hundreds of people in seconds to targeting ads for products people may or may not like through micro-targeting adverts with information aimed at affecting national elections. All of this is possible in a way that was not just 15 years ago. This was once the preserve of world leaders and global entertainment companies (Lupia and Sin, 2003, p.316).

For an example of how rapidly such technology has grown in everyday use, we may look at the rapid expansion of communicative abilities from the mobile phone alone. The first call on a portable handheld cell phone took place in 1973. In 1981, only 24 people in NY could use their phones at the same time. And there could be only 700 active contracts. By the end of 1996, around a 44 million Americans subscribed to wireless phone services. By 2016, there were 395.9 million wireless phone users (CTIA, 2017). By 2017, worldwide shipping of phones was at 1.5 billion units, five times the quantity shifted in 2010. Smartphones have moved through 3G (surfing the net) to 4G (streaming), and now we have 5G (Internet of Things). Their role in our lives has dramatically

shifted. We can order food, search for places to live, organise a protest, or create adverts from our phones. The mobile phone alone has shifted our abilities to connect and communicate with others dramatically.

This appears like a radical expansion of our abilities to communicate with others; in many ways, it is. Undoubtedly, we can now communicate much more effectively, with more people, more easily and more cheaply than ever. But, at the same time, the ability to harness this power has become concentrated. This will be discussed in more detail later in section 4.4 onwards.

Part of how this manifests is also in the spread of ideas and culture. Globalisation has, for example, led to an expansion of Western-style diets, which has increased meat consumption (Hoyle and Greenberg, 2009). This expansion has led to what Hoyle and Greenberg describe as a decoupling of food production from consumption. It has also led to a move away from small-scale production to large-scale production. Such evidence is just one example of how globalisation, liberalising markets and a sharing culture have dramatically affected behaviours. Such consumption, at such levels, is a phenomenon we can see as the ability of some through consumption to affect others they are unlikely to meet or have been able to affect in this way pre this period of globalisation.

Through trade and technological developments, cultural producers have also been able to export as global culture, fashion and football from Europe, American pop culture, music and movies, anime from Japan, and mindfulness from India. The cuisine is in many cases now global, retaining its country of origin in its name, but being available much more widely – for example, Chinese, Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern cuisine, and American fast food. This awareness of global culture has been made possible in large part through technological communication, information and

knowledge of far-off societies that has become much easier to pass on (Ozer, 2019, p.164). This effect has been described as deterritorialisation (Tomlinson, 2007). Globalisation is far from passing from one spot to another, unidirectionally. Instead meaning can becomes detached from its original context. Then becoming exchanged globally, the original link lost, or at least detached to some extent. The effects of such increased interconnection have led individuals to be influenced intensely by this new environment, as it brings challenges to a sense of belonging and self; this has been described as a "multidimensional process of complex connectivity" (Ozer, 2019, pp.164-165). So, we can see the expanded opportunities to communicate and share knowledge and ideas, which has a greater possibility of affecting others or being affected by others.

Expanded immediacy is the process through which the world's population is increasingly part of a complex interconnected system of trade and communication, most of whom have an increased capacity and likelihood to affect most others, to some extent. In some sense, the ability of others to affect us and us affect them has increased, and the sense of space-time between them and us has diminished.

But this, of course, is not all of the story. A globally joined-up world brings power relations embedded within a growing new culture of global communication. Consequently, we have existing power imbalances, many of which will be transferred into or maintained in this time of expanded immediacy. In section 4.3, I will outline an understanding of autonomy, which is reliant on space for co-legislation. The ability to co-legislate is key to development, and linked to individuals' external environment. Then, in section 4.4, I will argue as to why technology may exacerbate existing inequalities, by posing a threat to the autonomy of individuals in cities.

4.3 Autonomy and Co-legislation

To this point, I have described a phenomenon, what I call expanded immediacy, which alters the ability of individuals globally to affect each other. I argue that these forces of technological and economic integration have a crucial role in shaping the levels of ability we all have to affect the lives of others and make decisions over our own lives. This movement, I argue, has an impact globally on individual levels of autonomy. In this section, I will describe why that is potentially autonomy reducing.

One way to understand this relationship between external moderators and one's capability for autonomous action is the concept of effective autonomy. According to Garrett Brown (2009, pp.156-157), effective autonomy is defined as: "The ability to reasonably achieve the intended or desired result of one's conscience and self-legislation in a social context".

Brown describes how effective autonomy is influenced to a great extent by what he terms aspect capacity. Aspect capacity is "the ability to formulate, hold and act upon an individual's social conscience based on external elements (aspects or facets for external freedom) affecting the development of one's co-legislative capabilities" (2009, p.157). There is a clear relationship between an individual's innate potential (genetic capacity for autonomous self-reflection) and the interaction between that potential and the environment in which that capacity can be expressed. In other words, an aspect capacity is, in effect, the capacity for autonomous self-reflection within a particular environment where aspects of autonomous action are hindered, permitted or passively and/or actively advanced.

We find here two interlocking phenomena. There is the ability to co-legislate with others generically and the environment, which makes it possible for this ability to develop. The ability to co-legislate is reliant on elements that are both internal and external. Aspect capacity shows that internal capacities are developed in conjunction with one's external environment. This might therefore be described as a chain, where: a) an agent exists with a set of natural reflective capacities, self-interests, mutual interests and emotions; b) the agent interacts with the external environment; c) the social spaces for interaction ideally develop the capacity for the agent to co-legislate (express political autonomy), meaning, to pursue one's existence in co-relation to others. The ability to pursue meaningful relations relies on social and material aspect capacities that allow meaningful co-legislation to take place; d) manifestly, the external environment provides structures (aspects) within which the agent can practise such capacities. Ultimately, the developed agent co-legislates and, in Kantian terms, becomes a self-law giver in concert with others.

This structure mirrors the Aristotelian process described in Chapter 3, where the agent is born into the city and then ultimately (ideally) develops within and then further helps to help develop the city.

We might understand the role of autonomy as having two related, but different, reasons for it being valued. One is that freedom has inherent importance to humans as reflective social beings with the capacity for moral reason and self-law (often referred to as human dignity). The second is that we may pursue other goods that make life valuable through our capacity for autonomous action.

Autonomy seems to rest at the centre of much of what we understand as part of being human and pursuing 'the good life'. Of course, there are situations where those with little autonomy are still human; much of the project of understanding the value of humans appears to rest on the existence

of the possibility of autonomous action. Again, this mirrors Kant in the sense that the possibility of autonomous behaviour appears to allow for the sense of a moral world. If we do not have freedom, morality appears not to be self-imposed, but coerced by laws beyond our making (Brown, 2009, p.34).

Thus, political autonomy as an exercise of freedom gives the human project a foundation through which to understand the self. The individual is in some way itself and separate from the external world. From this spring forth moral agents and also ideas of how we might order society. If autonomy is not possible, then it makes little sense to understand a thesis such as this as a proclamation of the possibility of anything. It would be something entirely different.

In sum, autonomous action and its possibility within social/political contexts are important because they form the idea that individuals can choose how they live, including how they live together.

Moreover, such autonomy allows for the pursuit of further ideals that make for better lives. Individuals can pursue things they see as meaningful, which bring benefits of their own. For instance, the freedom to educate oneself may lead to more productive work. Greater freedom helps the individual make their own life better and influence the world. The ability to make decisions over one's own life is therefore essential for human flourishing. Not merely as an end, but also as a means to ends. Not merely as intrinsically useful, but for its instrumental benefits.

Human lives are, to a large extent, usually social lives. The least social of us almost always have some connection to society. To be free, we must take this into account in a human social context in any real sense. Our freedoms are socially contingent. Freedom is then, in some real sense, as Brown

describes, the freedom to self-legislate in a social context (2009, pp.156-57). Co-legislation is the process through which we aim to preserve the individuals' key freedoms via intersubjective capacities to create self-law in concert with others.

Co-legislation is so key to human life because, as Kant argues, the capacity for co-legislation represents the power to be moral agents and represents the highest form of human dignity. By acting in accordance with moral principles, in line with reasoning, the agent is acting in accordance with their separation from the natural world (Brown, 2009, p.34). The ability to co-legislate is then part of what makes the civil, moral world. Co-legislation is key to being a human, and a human with others. These freedoms interlock with the freedoms of others through a process of co-legislation. Thus, co-legislation allows for the coming together of mutual freedoms. These freedoms, which are social, must be limited in order that each individual maintains a satisfactory level of freedom. In Kant's categorical imperative, we find a way of understanding limitations on our autonomous behaviour. Kant (1996, p. 237) goes as far as to say that, "There is only one innate right… Freedom (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law". In the categorical imperative, as well as the ability to act, we find the proper limit to the reach of one's action. One's actions ought to be in accordance with the ability of others to act. By recognising the values of others, one recognises the rational limits on individual activity (Palmer, 2019, p.57.). This maxim also gives us a sense of what society might have as an end: the expansion of space for the maximum autonomy for the individual, in accordance with others. Here we find guidance for both the individual and the political form, blended. The ideal political form aims to expand the space for the individual's political autonomy. In order for this to work, the individual's actions are constrained in order to make it viable (Beiner and Booth, 1993, p.2). These limits on autonomy, in order to protect space for autonomy for all, are

of profound importance for understanding the threat of globalisation to human flourishing, to which I will return, in section 4.4. Before that, I will explain the concept of aspect capacity and what it adds to an understanding of autonomy.

4.3.1 Understanding autonomy as aspect capacity

Aspect capacity relies on the social conditions that make autonomous self-legislation in relation to others possible. In order to highlight the relationship between effective autonomy and aspect capacity, let us use an analogy;

Most healthy humans are born with the potential to speak in some form. That is, a physiology and mental ability necessary to pick up language. Here, there is a potential capacity innate to the human, and all humans, in question. Of course, there are humans, for whatever reason, who cannot speak. Of those, many can communicate in other ways, through machine-assisted communication, for instance. The point here, is merely that humans have an innate capacity for communication.

Those who can communicate in some form will develop that ability in conjunction with the external world. What will help the human who can speak is to be around others speaking, being shown basic rules of language, and being given an environment that develops this innate potentiality. The distance between the range of possible innate skills (natural capacities) of the individual and their actual skills (those fostered in conjunction with external influences), we may define as relating to aspect capacity. In this regard, aspect capacity helps us understand the difference between what could be possible given innate capacities and what actually occurs due to conditions available externally. By analogy, a pint glass has the innate capacity to hold a pint of fluid. This represents its aspect ca-

pacity (what it could hold given the right conditions). If the pint glass exists within an environment where only a half-pint of water is available, then we could say that the glass's aspect capacity has been diminished by an external factor and it is thus not fully enjoying its full capacity. What aspect capacity does here is allow us to focus on what is affecting capacities, which would be filled, if external conditions were different.

If we accept a person's capacity for co-legislation as key for individual autonomy, we ought then to understand the importance of an environment which helps to develop our potential as co-legislating agents, and in turn flourishing humans. We might understand a threat to a person's ability to co-legislate to take the following key forms:

If a person is increasingly unlikely to participate in the decisions that affect their lives due to burdensome processes, economic or social exclusionary practices, or the denial of access to institutions, then they can be said to be experiencing diminished co-legislative powers. As such, they are experiencing diminished political autonomy under constraints that restrict their aspect capacity. As a hypothetical example, suppose one person is increasingly able to set the conditions enhancing or diminishing the aspect capacity of others or/and to manipulate others' behaviour and/or thoughts. It could be argued that they are experiencing an expansion of their own autonomy, but at the expense of others; their autonomy relates in part to their ability to control the people and resources that impact their life.

If we return to globalisation, it appears that the complexity of globalisation makes it increasingly likely that some people's acts can have a more significant effect on other individuals. That is to say, humans are increasingly interlinked and able to affect each other. As such, the ability of one person

to affect the lives of others can be increased. As we look at the increased potential ability to affect others, and vice versa, to be affected by others, we can see that this has potential permutations for people's autonomy. It alters the gap between aspect capacity (full potential) and capacity in practice (what results). If the distribution of the ability to affect the world changes, this seems likely to change levels of political autonomy. If this stands as a potential side-effect of globalisation, then it is essential to understand how globalisation alters the aspect capacity of people, namely, how the combination of technological development and prevailing economic policies poses a threat to political autonomy, as outlined above.

The city is key to the development of one's capacity to co-legislate. Nevertheless, this raises questions on the scope of co-legislation and what decisions require the co-legislation of the citizenry. Further, how should we establish who ought to be part of this co-legislation? As described in Chapter 3, and developed in this chapter, the space for co-legislation is important as it offers the ability of the citizen to communicate preferences, practice their political autonomy and ultimately contribute to the development of the city. All these elements are key to the political autonomy of individuals since they represent opportunities to effect decisions that will affect their lives. Habermas describes this as part of a procedural minimum, contingent on; the political participation of as many people as possible, majority rule and communication rights and choice of programs and leaders, and the protection of the private realm (1996, p.303). Individuals are situated in space and time "… caught up in networks of communicative action" (1996, p.324), where they are not merely caught up in their lifeworld, but part of its reproduction, through communicative action. Constitutional principles then have a reflexive relationship with citizens' opinions, and modes of communication (1996, p.298) . Co-legislation is the organisation of diverse and sometimes competing visions of how decisions ought to be made, brought together. It is the self-governing of citizens, in procedures

which allow for such self governing. Such a process allows for individuals' actions to be aggregated. The power formed, allows not just for a mere monitoring, but also of its programming (1996, p.300). To place this within the city, individuals ought to be able through communicative action then, to help program their own governance.

Now let us consider a distinction that will be familiar to the reader of political theory, that of the private - public realms. The notion of a collective, participatory public sphere has a long history from Athens, through the Renaissance (Benhabib, 1997, p.1). Aristotle noted the difference between the public arena, and that of the domestic, or family (Decew. 2018). The public - private distinction invites us to consider space which is open for public discussion, and that which is rightly private. The distinction gives us a broad idea of when the city ought to offer space for co-legislation. First, on topics that are generally understood to be public in nature, regarding shared space, resources, social regulation and opportunities. Second, that those involved in the discussion, and decision making, ought to be those affected by such decisions. The correct space for public decision making would be in regards to planning in the city, uses of space, allocation of shared resources, or the permitting of potentially controversial activities. Essentially, where people are affected in space they share, there should be co-legislation.

Now, as has been discussed, the city has two key roles with regards to co-legislation. First, in developing space for the development of capacities necessary to co-legislate and, second, in providing space for the practice of such capacities. The development of faculties key to co-legislation are reliant on the city. So, we must be careful in not applying too strict a sense of what the city is and isn't responsible for, in terms of its relationship with citizens and co-legislation. In other words, drawing hard boundaries between public and private negates the fact that this boundary itself should be open

to co-legislation, especially where overlaps between individual action and communal effects (or vice versa) are complex, changing or indeterminable. The key to co-legislation is for one to be able to affect decisions that affect their lives. This requires processes to determine these social constructions, not necessarily for the outcomes of those constructions to be predetermined.

In light of this, public participatory space has been described as "…avenues, opportunities and entry points available for citizens to express their voice and influence political processes and outcomes" (National Democratic Institute. 2016). To describe political processes in such a way may seem to imply that some space is non - political. A rejection of this is found in the *personal is the political* rallying cry of feminist movements from at least the late 60s. The slogan meant to articulate that in some way, the political encompassed power relationships generally, not mere electoral politics. (Hanisch. 2006).

One view may be that there is no real distinction between public and private. Whilst another may posit that whilst there is a distinction, it is one that should be made with care. Accepting that the two are often closely related. Not all challenges are rejections outright of the distinction (Gavison, 1992, p1). In some sense, if there is a real division between public and private space, much private space is undeniably impacted upon by what happens in public space. Our media, potential roles, the space we occupy, our material wealth, all very reliant on norms and opportunities affect our private space too. Therefore, we should be wary of sharp lines between public and private, and always build in an understanding that prior public arrangements shape individuals' ability to operate in space we might understand as private. This thesis is predicated on there being decisions rightfully more public than others. As mentioned, those of planning, aesthetic decisions and other decisions with necessarily communal outcomes. Whilst also accepting that a) the distinction may not always be as clearcut as

we may think and b) that the city has a role in developing citizens capable of deliberating in the private sphere too.

In regards to who counts in political decision making, this is a subject with a long contentious history. From the lack of inclusion in Athens, that saw women and slaves not counted as citizens (Held, 2006, p.13, Montgomery, p.16), through to contemporary issues around voting rights for asylum seekers and refugees regardless of how long they have been in the country (Migrant Partnership, 2022). If we hold effective autonomy as morally important, then people living in the city of capabilities must have equal claims over what happens there. This not only satisfies an all-effected principle (output legitimacy), but further develops input oriented intersubjectivity, communicative action, constitutional patriotism, and what Kant would describe as Willkür, the *ability* to be a law onto oneself (input legitimacy).

The logic for an all-encompassing idea of the citizenry is clear. Namely, if the city's key goal is the expansion of wellbeing of those living in it, and such expansion relies on the development and preservation of space for effective political autonomy, then those living in it ought to have the space and capacities for the practice of their political autonomy. Such space means their ability to contribute to decision making over their space in enabled. So, by virtue of living in a city, a citizen requires the space to contribute through co-legislation to any decisions which affect or have the potential to affect them (as determined via meaningful social deliberation).

In Chapter 5 I introduce the principle of subsidiarity, which gives guidance as to when decision making should be made locally, which in some cases may be even more locally than the city level. This is a useful heuristic for developing a sense of when city level is too high for meaningful and

impactful decision making. Likewise, the principle explains when decision making ought to be taken nationally, to meet economies of scale or respond to collective action problems requiring expanded co-legislated scope.

In section 4.4, I will go into more detail as to how these phenomena manifests. In Chapter 5, I will return to this theme, but move from the individual in abstract to the way individuals experience political autonomy in the city. I will argue that, to have cities that provide space for individual flourishing, we must protect cities from external forces that diminish a person's aspect capacity. Cities then, as people, are impacted upon by external forces. The development of cities, and their ability to provide space for legislation, is subject to the broader environment they find themselves in.

4.4 The impact of globalisation on political autonomy

This chapter opened with a description of globalisation, with a focus on the importance of ideological shifts and technological developments. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 followed this with an outline of how we might understand the importance of political autonomy. Individual's levels of autonomy have been described as directly relating to their ability to co-legislate and develop these capacities, which is reliant in large part on their environment (Brown, 2009, pp.156-157). The following section will now draw the chapter together, showing how globalisation poses a threat to personal levels of autonomy.

In section 4.12, technology was shown to be a key driver of globalisation. It has both driven globalisation and is now more ubiquitous *because* of globalisation. We can understand technology, in a broad sense, as helping us create the world. It is a large part of what helps create our economies, ways of being, and often how we achieve wealth (Arthur, 2009, p.10). Technology, then, is intimately connected to political questions, surrounding power, both for individuals and collectives. Who has access to technology, of course, intrinsically relates to the power of opportunity. Distribution of access to technology affects levels of agency. Whether that be the freedom to produce goods necessary for basic needs or to earn different amounts of wealth, as technology affects the distribution of power and agency, dramatic expansions of technology should be examined regarding how they af-

fect power and agency. Technology could be argued to be primarily about expanding the human ability to live towards the goals individuals perceive to be worth pursuing. Alongside social structures, technology is a great component in this pursuit. We might see a large part of this pursuit as the delivery of circumstances that expand the possibilities of autonomy. Forks, wheels, Sodastream machines – all of these will increase the likelihood of an individual having the freedom to do something (eat, move things, enjoy soda drinks). For those who consider an expansion of freedom to achieve the ends one has reason to wish to achieve as a good thing, technology can be crucial in furthering that which humans aim at furthering.

The expansion of the technological capabilities of humans can also be understood, of course, to be negative. It is undoubtedly true that technology has been used to do horrendous things – the weapons of war are, for the main part, technological. The technology of this kind could be argued to be good for some and bad for others. Of course, technology can also be good for the person who has access to it and either good for everyone else as well or neutral. While it may aim at some good, technological development may or may not be good for any given individual. It may also be good for some, not good for others.

Sometimes technology may be good for some and have minimal effect on others. Technology that aids the blind to decipher symbols to be read is, all things being equal, hardly likely to be argued to be detrimental to others. Technology that aids the healthy development of babies seems perfectly compatible with mutually consistent autonomous living. Nobody is harmed by making babies healthier. In these circumstances, the expansion of autonomy for a given individual is largely neutral or delivers overall social benefits for others.

We may also argue that technology may play a role in the mutual expansion of autonomy; that is, that technology develops in such a way as to affect all those affected by it positively. My ability to communicate with a far-off uncle is potentially also an expansion of his aspect capacity to do so with me. This is also the case for some financial technology expansions. New payment channels, faster payments, better international transfers of funds – all of these could conceivably be part of that which expands the aspect capacities of all to become effective agents. The better movement of finance in this scenario may make an economy that works better for all.

So, there are certainly examples of technology either being neutral or positive since it can expand the autonomy of all, if only marginally. In the following section, however, situations in which technology affects levels of autonomy differently will be examined. The expansion of technology for some also negatively affects the levels of effective autonomy for others.

Technology can expand our freedom, and a lack of technology can diminish it. This is especially so in social contexts where the ability of others to control key structures by using technology plays into how we can monitor and control those very structures. Access to technology is, of course, not a zero-sum game. One may benefit from the wheel's existence, the fork or the 4G, while somebody else also does. But having different levels of access is also key. Whilst our absolute access to technology, whether we have access to it or not, is important, so is our level of access in relation to others. That is, in order to live good lives, it is not merely our access in absolute terms, but our access in relation to others living in our time, which counts.

As moral philosopher Adam Smith noted (1776), there was relativity to the material elements of the world required to live a good life. Smith remarked how a linen shirt was necessary to live a reason-

able life in Scotland in 1776, but comfortable lives were possible in ancient Greece and Rome with no linen. Smith's point was that living well, in social settings, is in some meaningful way relative. In a contemporary setting, we could replace linen shirts with mobile phones or access to the internet.

Wealthy Victorians lived well without the use of the internet. This was because that which was needed to live well at the time did not require the internet. But, as the internet became an increasingly commonplace piece of technology in people's lives, having no or even poor access to the internet would be separate from a large amount of what most people require to function properly in modern society. As banking and other services are increasingly found online, not to mention the vast amount of information available there, being excluded from the internet would be a disadvantage. Our Victorian cousins did not have this issue. So, like Smith's citizen without a linen shirt, our modern citizen's chances of living well do not just rely on an absolute level of material and technological wealth, but also a level relative to their fellow citizens.

Technological development is important for the relativity of power: your ability to master or be mastered by your environment relates to the technology available at a particular time and your access to it. Technology can also expand or limit autonomy: cars, the internet or aeroplanes are all examples of potential expansions of autonomy. But, as in our Victorian case, or the case of Smith's linen shirt, technology can affect our ability to properly participate in our society by also affecting our capacities to participate in a shared culture. There are two distinct ways in which we can be affected by the technology of our time. Firstly, we can be manipulated by it. Secondly, we can be affected by our lack of access to it, especially if it grants others more control over an environment we share.

There are scenarios in which the expansion of technological capacity could affect different people in varying ways. Further, there are scenarios where the expansion of individual autonomy levels may impact the aspect capacities of other's people's autonomy.

I identify at least two outcomes of recent technological development that can expand the gulf between those with considerable aspect capacity and those with little. Firstly, in that there is unequal access to new technologies. Existing inequalities are then exacerbated by being close to the event horizon of new technologies. Secondly, such technologies make it easier to affect others.

In the first category, we can see examples of how technology might exacerbate inequality. Firstly, for those ahead of the game, massive companies have been built with vast cash reserves. The creation of such wealth is one thing. Being ahead of the game in terms of understanding technological development has allowed for an expansion of inequality. This is an effect of being able to take advantage of spotting trends and access to tech early. In itself, much of this may be socially valuable, but it can increase inequality. Increased inequality is a threat to the equality of individual aspect capacities, and thus one's effective autonomy.

Secondly, this technology has made possible increasingly swift and complex communication. The quicker the communication, the lower the barrier to running a business from multiple locations. Also, it is easy to run a business that trades away from where it is domiciled for tax purposes. Chapter 6 explores this in the context of London, where the rise of multinationals is coupled with expanded costs for those already living in the city. This is for several reasons, which will be gone into in more detail, but a prime reason is that the capital that accompanies those companies moving into

a city pushes up the property costs for those already in the city, due to space being bought up and the attraction of new people working at salaries that multinationals can pay. Cities like London are not merely a repercussion of globalisation but a part of the process (Sassen, 2001). The city's development is interwoven with the rise of globalisation: London, for instance, is a key hub for the processes of globalisation (Sassen, 2001, p.87).

The potential to run a business from multiple locations allows for complexity as to exactly where business occurs. Multinational companies often have multiple bases, which allows them to take advantage of differing taxation. This poses difficulties for the abilities of governments to regulate conditions for co-legislation. First, multiple countries can be used as bases for trade, whilst tax bases can be shifted easily. This means that, while a nation may provide the environment for trade, it may sometimes not collect taxes from that company. Second, nations may find themselves in competition, with companies choosing their base based on tax promises from their host nation.

This leads to an environment where companies may take advantage of a country's infrastructure and base themselves elsewhere. When first deciding where to base Amazon, founder Jeff Bezos considered a Native American reserve for tax purposes until the state of California intervened. Amazon arrived in Europe in 2003, securing a confidential agreement with the Luxembourg authorities (The Guardian, 2018). This is a particular problem caused by globally integrated markets and modern tech. Modern tech allows a company to effectively operate in one country whilst being domiciled, having all its staff and offices, in another. Global integration combines with such tech to make a company such as Google, Amazon or Apple a global entity.

Nations have previously competed to provide better tax environments. But, until now, it has not been so easy to provide a sales environment that spans nations whilst being domiciled in the specific one that provides the most lenient tax policy. This has led some to call for taxes on where goods are bought and consumed. But, for the time being, nations are increasingly shifting from being price givers to takers when it comes to tax policy; the Archimedean point between democratically elected governments and international companies has shifted. The agency of governments has been impacted – MNCs have more autonomy, global private capital has more autonomy than it did before.

Even before the crash of 2007, Dehesa (2006) writes how even proponents of free trade foresaw that, eventually, free capital movements might have the effect of turning opinion against trade liberalisation. Dehesa describes how many governments blamed globalisation for a diminishing of sovereignty. The cause of this diminishing was the "irresistible rise and influence of financial markets and multinational corporations" (Dehesa, 2006, p. viii). Thus, international flows and economic integration posing a threat to national economies is not new.

Expanded ability to affect others, created by technological development

There are three ways that data storage and digital platforms can utilise newfound powers in a way that is potentially threatening to political autonomy:

• To gather information

• To store information

• To use information

These three things are advancing rapidly as they have created a considerable asymmetry between those able to take advantage of such inequality and those who are not. This asymmetry is throwing up surprise election results across the world.

Expanded ability: elections

A key way that political autonomy is expressed is in elections. Elections are perhaps the most obvious example of the direct co-legislating that humans do. As such, if something dramatically affects how elections are run, it may pose a potential threat to people's ability to co-legislate. Elections do occur, of course, in cities but the most striking examples of data being used in elections in recent times are those of a national nature. In the following section, I will use some examples of national elections to outline why this is an issue. Of course, what happens at the national level more often than not influences the city level. Further, national elections have shone a light on how technology is affecting our democratic processes. They are a useful case study in how technology is expanding the possibility of some to affect others. In the 2016 elections in the US and UK, the ability to micro-target electors and create opaque systems for buying advertising affected the election results. The micro-targeting created a system in which small numbers of people were newly able to target voters with information gained about their characteristics. These developments were great but not new. In 2012, US President Barack Obama's campaign had a far greater emphasis on data than his previous campaign: "We measured and tested everything", said Obama's campaign manager, Jim Messina (Moore, 2018, p.58). As the US campaign, the UK Brexit campaign recognised the value of data and digital platforms and invested heavily in them. Arron Banks, key Leave campaign funder, would afterwards claim that AI won the campaign for them (Moore, 2018, p.67). Few doubt that

technological developments seriously impacted the 2016 elections of the United States and the UK EU referendum.

Intricate information patterns were made possible due to the collection of vast amounts of information on people. As Alexander Nix, chief executive of Cambridge Analytica (CA), said in 2017, communication now meant gathering "as many data points as you can get your hands on" (Moore, 2018, p.55). Technology made this possible. It was now easier and easier to amass data on the electorate and consumers. Companies like Acxiom, Experian and Datalogix were accruing vast amounts of information: one data broker's database alone was found to hold 1.4 billion transactions and over 700 data elements. Groups like Cambridge Analytica described the process as behavioural analytics, and what this meant was the use of mass data to understand how to make somebody do something, or not, like vote a certain way. CA announced on their homepage that they "use data to change audience behaviour" (Moore, 2018, pp.59-61).

Facebook and other sites and apps were able to gather vast amounts of data about potential voters. This kind of understanding of preferences and behaviour was simply impossible before. This info was, in many cases, collected without the person knowing. Most of the business of social media apps relies on providing a free service in exchange for data; the data is then used to target us with adverts. Google and Facebook are not merely tech firms; around 90% of their revenue comes from adverts.

Further, information can also be targeted in such a way as to play on biases as never before. Of course, this is not a new phenomenon in itself, but the vastly expanded possibility is. Cambridge Analytica, the group embroiled in controversy around methods used in the US election, used around

5000 data points to profile 230 million Americans. This data was purchased from commercial sources – people's web-browsing history, consumption, and voting records. This led to micro-profile people, groups like American mums who had not voted before and been worried about child-care, pro-gun males living in the Midwest, security-conscious Hispanics, etc. (Bartlett, 2018).

Companies like Google and Facebook were able to use exchanges of words as exchanges of data. In this way, information has multiple uses (Cukier and Schonberger, 2013). Information is both the manifestation of a service, it is what the customer uses the platform for, and the trail left behind that can be mined for value. Giant tech companies have a massive information asymmetry, and that information is valuable to manipulate others to do or not do things – nudging us to buy a new watch, watch a cat video, or vote to leave a huge trading block. This dramatic rise in the power of some to affect others is a dramatic rise in inequality of autonomy. Elections are perhaps the most striking examples of changes that have occurred so far due to technological advances. But this massive asymmetry of information is also used to nudge people daily. Further, the gains from the control of resources for those who run a tech company capable of reaching the heights of Amazon, Uber or Airbnb are huge. In this environment of expanded immediacy, we can then see a dramatic ability to affect others without those affected having a reciprocal ability. This will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6, in the context of London, where democratic processes have been slow to expand the space for legislation.

Economic integration, nation-states and political autonomy

As described, during the late twentieth century, the world's economy became more integrated. As markets became more integrated, predictions were made that this integration could diminish nation-

states' autonomy (Cole, 1998. p.316). Below it is argued that such a diminishing has taken place

and that there are two key ways we may understand this movement as a threat to autonomy. The

first is practical, namely, how markets have formed which now threaten the sovereignty of govern-

ments. The second is more philosophical, with the appearance of market-driven neoliberalism as a

hegemonic logic.

The practical threat to national sovereignty

We might understand globalisation and the free flow of capital as a threat to autonomy via the di-

minishing power held within a nation. We might understand this as a threat to national sovereignty.

As sub-sections of nations, threats to national sovereignty are necessarily threats to the political au-

tonomy of city dwellers. The notion of sovereignty was at one point that of the leader of a nation; in

contemporary times, such sovereignty is an expression or function of the people. Sovereignty may

be organised in alternative ways, such as supranational organisations or nomadic groups. But this

section will focus on the threat of capital to the sovereignty of national interests, as understood as a

group of people situated in a physical space (Sassen, 1996).

The economic integration described in the previous sections leaves governments more at the mercy

of financial markets and global capital. This is because national markets and industries are more

interlinked. We can see this in the crash of 2007 and the way it spread around the globe. As gov-

ernments are the mechanism through which citizens aim at self-determination, we can understand a

threat to the agency of governments as a potential threat to the agency of individuals; if govern-

ments are more at the mercy of external factors, citizens are less in control of their governments. If

governments are a way in which citizens can exercise self-legislation, then citizens having less gov-

ernment control means they are less able to self-legislate, which, as has been discussed, is key to effective autonomy.

Of course, within a paradigm dominated by neoliberal economic thinking, the threat to the sovereignty of governments may be recognised as inevitable, even as part of the mission. It is clear that the project as taken up, and in part made possible, by Thatcher and Reagan, had faith that markets and small government were the best routes. As discussed, UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher saw the expansion of the world's economy as primarily about removing trade barriers. Thus, we ought to see this not necessarily as an accidental, unfortunate outcome, but, in part, as an element of the project. The state's role is purposefully minimised to advance the freedom and power of markets and privately-led initiatives. As David Harvey (2014, p.71) describes:

"Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political, economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices…. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit."

There are then various practical reasons why the increasingly globalised economy created problems for national governments' autonomy. Firstly, as previously discussed, the increased integration of the global economy means that national economies are increasingly at the mercy of global move-

ments. These global financial flows that were hoped for can destabilise governments, as seen in the East Asian crisis.

International flows and economic integration posing a threat to national economies is not new. The financial crisis that hit East Asia in the late 1990s has been partly attributed to panic spreading through the international investment community (Sachs, 1998). Whilst finger pointing at states took place, Radelet and Sachs (1998, pp.1-2) suggested that as much attention ought to be placed on international markets "and their vulnerability to sudden reversals of market confidence. They described the crisis of 1997 as a "crisis of success", a flood of international funding followed by withdrawals. There is then an expansion of relative and absolute power held in private markets globally compared to national economies.

Thus, the threat to national sovereignty posed by global economic integration was commented on and recognised at least as early as the 1990s. Whilst Thatcher, Reagan and, following them, Blair pushed for dramatic integration, some nations took care to mitigate their exposure to the risks posed. One notably different approach to economic globalisation was the approach taken by China. Regarding the relationship between national governments' autonomy amidst global markets, China's approach is telling in its difference to the UK, US and much of the rest of the West.

Whilst China aimed at economic globalisation and fared well in many ways from the move to open up to markets and the globalisation of the second half of the twentieth century, it also kept a watchful eye on potential risks. Part of the success of China's economic policy of recent times has been argued to be due to the dual nature of opening up to global markets and maintaining a high level of autonomy (Keping, 2011, pp. 1-3).

Chinese officials perceived that integration into global markets posed three potential threats to national autonomy. Firstly, the threat to domestic economic security is an explicit threat that China perceived. This is through foreign control of key industries. By virtue of this, the threat to the economy of becoming reliant on foreign investment was also recognised. Large-scale investment and interchange between domestic and global economies also posed a volatility threat due to economic integration. Secondly, the threat to sovereignty posed by international treaties and agreements was perceived in the sense that these are Western and represent pre-existing power networks. Developing countries have often become less autonomous, weakening their sovereignty to join the international framework. Thirdly, the threat to domestic values and the culture of globalisation was recognised. Western control of the course of globalisation with capital, tech and products perceived as a potential threat to political and social instability (Keping, 2011, pp.4-5).

The Chinese approach highlights that political theorists and governments have seen global economic integration as a threat to government autonomy. China is seen as attempting to participate in the global economy whilst protecting itself from threatening its autonomy by doing so. One thing then is clear: the rise of a globalised, cosmopolitan world economy has been perceived to be coupled with or even the cause of an eroding of national sovereignty.

The dominant logic of neoliberalism

As described earlier, philosophically, neoliberalism has had a profound effect on global attitudes about the roles of governments and markets. Having indicated how ideological shifts have led to a threat to political autonomy, I want to finish by explaining how such a threat is not merely a conse-

quence of, but inherent in, the logic of neoliberalism. Local political autonomy is often something to overcome.

In part, we can understand part of the victory of neoliberalism as the presentation of market interests as almost value-free. Let us take this passage from Jeffrey Sachs' The End of Poverty – here we find the economy of a country presented as a patient in need of a clinician:

"I propose a new method for development economics, one that I call clinical economics, to underscore the similarities between good development economics and good clinical medicine. On numerous occasions during the past twenty years, I have been invited to take on an economics patient – a crisis-ridden economy – in order to prescribe a course of treatment. Over the years, I have marvelled at how that experience is akin to that of my wife Sonia's clinical practice of paediatrics. I have watched in awe, often in the middle of the night, how she approaches a medical emergency or complicated case with speed, efficacy, and amazing results. Development economics today is not like modern medicine, but it should strive to be so" (Sachs, 2005, p.75).

This language equates economics and, in particular, the economic orthodoxy of free markets to the natural sciences. One does not question the ethics of gravity or the boiling point of water, or indeed the claims to truth that come from them. They are presented as part of a world of information that is much less open to normative subjectivity. Sachs then explains how, for some, the neoliberal approach had, by the early 2000s, taken a place that suggested it was almost as value-free as natural sciences. Is this how we ought to see economic systems? Sachs here seems to leave little room for what Amartya Sen describes as the Socratic questioning of "How should one live?" (Sen, 1987 p.2). Sen proposes that much of the utilitarian calculus that underpins the neoliberal faith in markets is

incomplete in a meaningful way. Economics, and questions surrounding the running of business and distributive justice, are, of course, normative questions. As such, a push for free markets is a normative push; it is ideological. Sen attributes this division of economics to two different origins, both related to politics, but one more heavily weighted in ethics. The other, Sen describes as having roots more obviously in economics as analogous to engineering. The engineering approach to economics sees markets as providing almost everything humans need from an economic system.

In contrast, those who question such an approach argue, with Sen, that economic systems are inherently ethical. That is, they spring forth from first ethical and political questions about what kind of society we want. The ethically rooted understanding of economics is then built around Aristotelian ideas. Politics is the master art, and all other sciences must work towards the goals set by politics. Though wealth is an aim, it is not the end; wealth is always used for other goods (Sen, 1987, p.3). From this viewpoint, economics is entangled with politics and philosophy, especially ethics. There is no view here that allows for disembodied value-free economics. This is especially useful for remembering that, whilst some economic arguments pertain to what humans do, that is, at some kind of essential human nature, the ethics view of economics cannot lose the sense that what humans do and what they ought to do may or may not correlate. In the ethical view of economics, economic systems then require a framing, a relationship with a broader ethical argument about how one ought to live. The two approaches can be divided between those more interested or motivated from the ethical point of view, with Smith, Mill and Marx of this background. The engineering or logistic approach is more the work of Petty, Ricardo, Cournot and Walras (Sen, 1987, p.6).

Further, the orthodoxy of neoliberal economic modelling has not been confined to even the economy. Gary Becker was considered the heir of Friedmann (New York Times, 2014) and applied the

economic approach of the engineering type to problems of marriage, crime, labour markets and the family. The economic approach in this form was to be all-pervasive. This all-pervasive framework means that the neoliberal approach is the lens through which we now understand much of the world; Thatcher's "there is no alternative" (Fisher, 2009, p.8) enveloping the economic realm and then proceeding beyond that to encapture a world view that reinforced the neoliberal project of Hayek and Friedman. It has not just been the practical dominance of the neoliberal project but the ideological dominance which has fuelled the rise of globalisation which has posed a threat to local autonomy.

It is in this vein that we find the closing of the mines in the 1980s. The closure is due to their remaining open not being "economically realistic" (Fisher, 2009, pp.7-8). Economic realism here is presented as having a logic of its own. Economic orthodoxy here shifts the discussion to a sphere of its own. The logic of neoliberal economics, with its faith in small government, is exalted.

We can then understand that the economic orthodoxy which has come to be known as neoliberalism holds a hegemonic position. It frames the discourse and shapes discussion around economies. We can understand a cycle that has been formed:

Neoliberalism is the hegemonic ideology

Which leads to threats to autonomy

Such a threat could be perceived as a gap between ethics and economics as a feature of neoliberalism. But is also a feature of the system: this threat to autonomy is necessary for free trade that un-

dermines local autonomy. This then perpetuates neoliberalism as the hegemonic order, as the power to create such an order is solidified in a small percentage of the global population.

This cycle then creates motion towards its reproduction. The more pervasive a global, free trade becomes and the more power and wealth is confined to the few, the greater the move away from local autonomy. The greater the move away from local autonomy, the greater the diminishing of the possibility of individuals to develop in ways that require the possibility of co-legislation. The political structure forms a normative climate, which allows for shifts in the relationship with the economic, which affects the political. We are here reminded of Roy Weintraub's statement that, "The economy constructs our ideas and is constructed by our ideas" (1999, p.150).

If we understand spaces of local autonomy as somehow protected from the reaches of free markets, then it could be said that we find, as Sneyd suggests, that "autonomy (is) a problem to overcome" (Sneyd, 2016. p2). Autonomy, space not yet devoured by markets, and commodified, is essentially problematic. The ideology surrounding the opening up of markets and the minimised role for governments is inherently about overcoming localised political autonomy. Globalisation has been shown to be part propelled by neoliberal logics: freeing up of markets, minimising of the role of governments. Understood as such, we can see that the threat to political autonomy in localised city spaces is not merely an accidental consequence of globalisation. In the form examined, it is part of what globalisation needs. Thus, globalisation of the kind discussed is necessarily opposed to the political autonomy of citizens of cities.

Conclusion

It has been argued that globalisation created a perfect storm which is a threat to the autonomy of citizens across the world. Growing technological capacity has allowed for a large amount of global economic integration, primarily by creating the capacity to communicate at drastically reduced speed and cost. These capacities allowed for the organising of information key for a rapid expansion of cross-global trade. Secondly, this technological development was coupled with economic orthodoxy, with neoliberalism as the framework. Cumulatively, this growing international economic integration led to the increased economic and social integration of citizens globally. This phenomenon posed a threat to individuals' autonomy for various reasons. Firstly, global markets were more powerful, and individuals and governments were more at their mercy. In a linked fashion, the vast integration of and the ability to manage complex information systems have made possible an environment where companies can run globally in a way that makes regulation difficult and produces issues for tax collection. Further, those vastly expanded technological capabilities have made possible an environment conducive to power being concentrated in the hands of the few.

This poses a particular threat to the autonomy of individuals when the measuring, storing and communicating of data makes possible the manipulation of information to manipulate individuals. Elections and consumption are two key cases. This was framed as expanded immediacy, where the ability to affect others has, on the whole, been expanded. But such expansion of the ability to affect others has, for reasons described, not been distributed equally.

With regard to political autonomy, this chapter outlined the importance of aspect capacities. The capacities of individuals are developed within their environment. Developing one's potential is reliant on the ability to have that potential available to one. The key to this is developing one's ability to co-legislate. Both the capabilities that an agent possesses and the structures they find themselves

in make this possible. That is so, both in terms of their ability to develop and also to use such skills. In Chapter 5, I will depict two ways of seeing the city and show that one of them, the city as a node of global capital, may diminish the possibilities for citizens to develop co-legislative powers at the local level – the level in which they experience their daily lives and co-legislation with others (formal and informal). Alternatively, seeing the aim of the city as to develop capabilities, may enhance the possibility of such. The following chapter then demonstrates how the phenomenon outlined above demands a reassessment of local space. That is, that local space, in the form of cities, can protect us from some of these global forces. But, to do so, we need a revised understanding of the role of the city. Such a city, underpinned by ideas based on the capability approach, can provide space for the individual's expansion and preservation of political autonomy.

Chapter 5: Cities in Response to Globalisation; Preserving Space for the Expansion of Effective Autonomy

The city has been shown to be an important political space. Important for historical reasons, in the development of human culture, important in the human development of citizens of cities and increasingly important due to expanded populations. This thesis has explained some ways globalisation poses a threat to individual autonomy. This autonomy is understood as reliant, at least in part, on one's ability to co-legislate with other mutual co-legislators. Drawing upon the capability approach, this chapter will outline a vision for the city which places political autonomy, the ability to co-legislate as a self-law giver in concert with others, as key to evaluating the city as a source of capabilities of flourishing for its citizens.

Thus, as a response to the threats to autonomy highlighted in Chapter 4, this chapter focuses on the need to ensure that cities are participatory and democratic spaces to delineate and secure key capabilities required for meaningful co-legislation and effective autonomy. As a key part of this, the chapter will tackle the issues of subsidiarity, namely, when some decisions should be made locally, at national level, or in combination of the two; and how capabilities should be understood as differentiated in these contexts. The chapter argues for criteria as to when a decision should be made within the city or externally. Where it is made externally, the aim here is to determine on what basis decision making should be: a) national, b) trans-national, c) global, and what justifications exist for passing one's location of agency outside the city to any of these broader levels. The default position argued here is that decisions should, whenever possible, be made as locally as possible, since our lives are most impacted on a day-to-day level by local conditions. Thus, any legitimacy test must normatively justify itself against this basic subsidiarity position. Crucially, via this examination, I

will argue that cities are often at the mercy of external forces, which inhibit their ability to provide appropriate space for co-legislation. This condition requires normative and substantive reform if we are to take effective autonomy seriously.

Using the capability approach, we can see that the justness of a social arrangement is partly based on individuals' political autonomy. Essentially, to give people greater co-legislative powers, we ought to involve them in decision-making processes. We should devolve powers where possible unless there are clear normative justifications to do otherwise (economies of scale, collective action problems, universal ethical considerations). Where decisions are made outside the city, they ought to be done so on the basis that this format expands agency within the city as well as in relation to the normative aim of expanded jurisgeneration (the capacity of democratic decisions to cascade upwards as foundational legal determinants – see Benhabib, 2008).

To explore the idea of '*the city of capabilities'*, the chapter is divided into three sections. Section 5.1 describes the city in context; that is, its connection to a globalising world, offering alternative visions as to the ends or goals of the city. I then lay out an argument for a new way of imagining a political theory of cities. Section 5.2 builds upon this foundation to further draw ways to understand how co-legislation within cities is affected by things outside of them (national and global forces). Section 5.3 attempts to move beyond critique and frame a theoretical basis for understanding how decision making within cities, and decisions that affect cities, should relate to exogenous forces that emerge beyond cities. That is, how global forces impact cities and how this may be dealt with to preserve space for political autonomy within cities.

Having established this division in how to frame the ends of the city, chapters 6 and 7 will then explain how we can see the two at play in practice. Chapter 6 describes how London, under pressures of globalisation, has been primarily driven by market demands and its role as a base for global trade and property investment. Those values have created a situation where the political autonomy of citizens in London is under threat. London increasingly appears to be the *city as node of global capital*. Chapter 7 looks at alternative approaches to fending off globalising pressures on house market prices. Alongside this, it also looks at cities which are using technology in a bid to expand the space for political participation.

5.1 Towards a new political theory of cities

As discussed in Chapter 3, for most people, cities are crucial to understanding and providing space for that which is necessary for human flourishing. It has been this way for millennia, yet the rapid rise in urban populations makes cities even more relevant in pursuing human flourishing. In Florence, London, New York, Carthage or Egypt, cities have been essential to understanding the pursuit of the good life and act as an everyday point of contact point for social and political interaction. P. B. Anand posits, "we cannot think of human flourishing without thinking about cities" (2018, p.1). It is undoubtedly true that vast amounts of human development and flourishing have occurred in city spaces. When we talk of great periods of culture, for instance, they are often the renaissance of Florence, the great leap forward of Athens, and the modern-day metropolises of London and New York.

This delivers two key empirical implications. On the one hand, this ever-present role of the city in human flourishing makes it clear why the city has always been important for humans. On the other

hand, the expansion of humans living in cities makes that role even more critical. As global urban populations rapidly increase, the city's relevance also increases, particularly in a location where people most often pursue what they have reason to value.

Due to modern communication, trade and travel, cities are also globally connected in a way never before seen. In their personal lives and work, citizens of cities communicate globally in a manner beyond that which was possible just 15 years ago, let alone 50 years ago. As such, the spatiality of decision making that affects cities has changed. This poses questions for the city's relationship to the nation-state and has implications for how cities are potentially much more global than ever before. External forces impact the city. Still, the extent to which the city and citizens of any given city can impact the world varies significantly from person to person, city to city.

As described in Chapter 4, globalisation has led to pressures on the effective autonomy of individuals around the world. Technological development and economic integration have meant that finance and trade can move around the world more than ever in ways that pose new challenges to the nation-states' ability to control the conditions within their borders. Indeed, nation-states and international agreements on trade are also the very structure that has, in part, created the conditions for globalisation of the last half-century. This has led people to feel they have little control over local environments (Guinan and O'Neil, 2019), which has increased feelings of disenfranchisement. Cities are spaces through which global capital travels. As was argued in previous chapters, this increased power of global capital to set the conditions of local environments can be understood as a threat to the autonomy of those in those local environments.

Thus, the conditions created by the last half-century of expanded immediacy pose questions for how our political spaces will maintain, preserve and expand space for effective co-legislation for citizens globally. If the nation-state is struggling to deal with many of these pressures, then we ought to readdress and analyse the city's role as a means to mitigate and protect effective autonomy and its political manifestations of co-legislation. The city has a long history of being the seat of political action and there is reason to suggest that it can still play a crucial role in our social and political flourishing. These conditions point to the need to revisit its role and a new political theory of cities, recognising the need for their changing role and relationship with the world.

5.1.1 Capability approach and cities: what are cities for? Towards a city of capabilities

In examining the role of the city, a key question central to this thesis is who and what are cities for? In answer to this, the capability approach offers a clear framework. This North Star is the expansion of space for people to live the kinds of lives they have reason to value (Sen, 1990, p.460). It is what people can do and be that ought to concern us (Robeyns, 2017, p.7). We can use the capability approach to help judge a social arrangement on how it "enables a person to achieve a set of valuable doings and beings" (Deneulin, 2014, p.5). It is about "expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy" (Sen, 1999, p.3). In other words, a capability approach to cities would require us to examine the freedoms that individuals have to pursue that which they have reason to value (autonomy) and the opportunities available (aspect capacity) for those values to be expressed as a civic co-legislator (effective autonomy). Expanding individuals' freedoms would enhance the city's justness and the effectiveness of autonomously derived co-legislation. If we hold these moral considerations as paramount, then social structures ought to aim at such expansions.

To understand the impact of focusing on the expansion of capabilities, it is useful to look at the alternative. In this chapter, I counterpoise the city of capabilities with that of the city as node of global capital. Whereas we might see the city as an "engine of human development" (Frediani, 2021, p1), we also see the city's purpose expressed in a very different way, that as an engine of growth.

The capability approach can help develop an understanding of the links between cities' institutions and human development. Beyond economic growth, it can help to show other things we ought to value, such as the preservation of rights (Deneulin, 2014, p. 7). It does this by shifting the level of analysis away from traditional economic measures towards a more broad base of analysis which highlights these other things, such as rights that relate to living good lives.

In the city, this movement towards capabilities can also guide areas such as planning, shifting our focus from the good in question towards enhancement of the capabilities that the good aims at (Basta, 2015, p.204). This is useful in and of itself. It shifts the focus towards the underlying human needs being met by decisions around space in the city. But, further, it is useful because the production and allocation of space is closely tied to social relations (Frediani. 2021, p20). How we organise the city, its institutions and space, is closely linked to the lives of its citizens. In Chapter 3, I explored the relationship between citizen and city, in particular the way that the two have a reflexive relationship. The capability approach can help us more fully understand how institutions and opportunities shape the space for citizens to live good lives. Chapter 4 showed how such institutions are key to the development of an environment conducive to co-legislation. The metaphor of speech was used: most healthy humans are born with the potential to use speech. In collaboration with their environment, their capabilities pertaining to co-legislation are developed from using speech to understanding social conventions and political structures; amongst other things, the environment and the

individual combine to develop necessary to co-legislate. City institutions are key to the development of citizens' capabilities. The capability approach can help frame the role of such institutions, and give the city a clear focus: the flourishing of its citizens.

There are two clear reasons for looking to the city to help deal with the imbalance of aspect capacities; that is, to help preserve and expand space for co-legislation. By shifting some focus to the city, we can expand that which the city can deliver itself. That is, we can reframe the ability of the city and highlight the potential of such space in providing that which is necessary for co-legislation. We can also see and understand how the city is impacted by globalisation and look to protect as much autonomy as possible within it.

Using the principles of the capability approach, namely making clear that we ought to be interested in expanding the doings and beings of individuals, we can help shape the city's purpose. In doing so, this will highlight principles that guide the city's purpose based around principles of co-legislation and the development of citizens' aspect capacities.

As argued, the city has a role in creating the normative conditions through which the individual develops. In turn, the individual contributes towards the city, the pattern of which is ideally an upward spiral of development. The structures which individuals are born into offer the early opportunities for their development. Once they develop, they then contribute to the structures through their actions.

It is in this cycle that we can see the city as important for citizens' development, but then also for their further development through the provision for space and structures which allow for co-legislation. Of course, co-legislation is not the only source of development, but it plays into other areas.

We can understand the importance of such space for legislation in the city of capabilities in at least two ways. Firstly, instrumentally, individuals must apply their preferences into a system that impacts their lives. Having some input, at some level, over what would make transport or healthcare work for you is important because it allows the individual's viewpoint to be relayed into the system. Simply, if we think individuals' lives are important, we should also take their concerns seriously. This is instrumentally useful in that people can input into the system; it is useful for the ends its can help to achieve. For instance, a healthcare or transport system can be better because it can incorporate views of a more diverse citizenry. Co-legislation here is important for its gathering of preferences.

Secondly, it is inherently important that structures create the possibility of individuals' legislation. This is due to legislation being important for people's lives. Part of living a flourishing life is affected by the ability to legislate. This is less about outcomes as about the sheer act of co-legislation. We understand the difference between the two when we consider democratic elections. Even if my government of choice is not elected, it is important that I am able to vote. By participating in decision making and contributing, I am acting in the space created for co-legislation.

The city of capabilities then has a clear purpose and framework from which to judge its efficacy: To create the conditions of increased aspect capacity through which the individual can develop necessary personal autonomy.

To create an environment of increased aspect capacity through which individuals can practise effective autonomy via co-legislation.

In doing this, the city aims to create the conditions through which its citizenry can be and do the kinds of things they have reason to wish to do and be in concert with others, and in turn to be the kinds of people they have reason to wish to be.

As was described in Chapter 4, political autonomy has both an inherent and instrumentally valuable element. First, we must value the ability of people to "lead the kind of lives they value- and have reason to value" (Sen, 1999, p.18). Second, and importantly Sen is clear on this, expanding this freedom "... is viewed as both 1) the primary end and 2) the principal means of development" (Sen, 1999, p.36).

The constitutive element of this is those substantive freedoms that enrich human life. The instrumental concerns how distributing rights, opportunities and entitlements helps to expand human freedom generally (Sen, 1999, p.37). Expanding freedom as a primary end is largely down to expanding what Sen terms substantive freedoms. That is, the freedom to avoid starvation or escapable morbidity, which relates to being literate and enjoying political participation. We may understand these as having an intrinsic value. Regarding instrumental freedoms, what is meant s that there are freedoms that are means rather than ends. Sen provides five areas of instrumental freedoms: Political Freedoms, Economic Facilities, Social Opportunities, Transparency Guarantees, Protective Security. As well as being part of what makes a person able to live freely, they contribute to each other. In speaking of instrumental importance, one key thing is how they interlink. That is, that certain

inherent and instrumental freedoms rely on instrumental freedoms (Sen, 1999, p.38). Why might

this be of concern in this current globalised context? It may be of concern if globalisation has

opened up the field of that which affects an individual's life without maintaining that which allows

the individual to retain their political autonomy.

As described in this thesis, the world has seen dramatic changes due to processes of globalisation.

Capacity for decision making and information gathering has increased considerably. But how much

have cities expanded the space for co-legislation of their citizens? Political freedoms and practices

relevant for the mid-twentieth century may need revising. It is clearly the case that it is easier for

many to make decisions which have global effects now. We only have to look at Uber, Airbnb and

other companies which affect cities to see this. As the ability to affect cities becomes easier for

some, we must look at the space for citizens' decision making. In Chapter 6, these issues will be

explained in the context of London where, despite substantial technological advances, democratic

space has not shifted drastically to offer new space for co- legislation. Further, the ability of some to

use technological advances and economic means to affect London, has increased in a way which

has the effect of diminishing the political autonomy of others. Chapter 7 will look at some cities

that have taken steps to expand space for co-legislation in this new climate of added space for deci-

sion making.

Political freedoms ensure the continued ability to have a say over who governs and an ongoing abil-

ity to scrutinise and criticise authorities. As well as voting, Sen (1999, p.38) includes political dia-

logue and dissent. Economic facilities refer to those things that individuals can enjoy with regard to

consumption, production and exchange. Social opportunities are those opportunities regarding

healthcare, education, etc. They play into the kinds of lives people can lead and other freedoms, for

instance, in those political and economic fields. Transparency guarantees relate levels of trust in society, the sense that people are likely to receive what they have been offered, and openness as to what that is. Protective security is the safety net that underpins a sense of protection for all – that there is a basic level of support in moments of vulnerability. This would include basic unemployment and pay supplements and less regular support during crises such as famine (Sen, 1999, pp.38-40). So we can see that freedoms are interrelated. It is not the case that freedom is merely an end result, to be enjoyed or not. Some freedoms are instrumentally valuable. Both freedoms, which are inherently and instrumentally important, are key to individuals being afforded environments conducive to good lives. As a result, given their baseline importance, the city of capabilities ought to take both seriously.

Global forces that impact cities have been shown to have increased. The city which took the expansion of capabilities seriously would place a high value on both inherent and instrumental freedoms. Freedoms have been shown to be interlinked, with some key to the development of others. Co-legislation in particular is important for both inherent and instrumental reasons. If global forces have made decision making which affects cities easier for some, then we ought to be concerned with the preservation of decision making for others within cities. As will be explored in chapters 6 and 7, developing space for decision making which utilises modern technologies will be key to this.

5.2 The interface of markets: the city as a node of global capital

The city of capabilities is here contrasted with the an alternative understanding of the role of the city, that as *node of global capital*. We can contrast the two cities, one which is a node for the development of global capital, where local tensions are to be tolerated or even managed to create a

good space for such development. The other, a city of capabilities, as we describe it here, has a clear set of aims built around the development of its citizenry and their ability to develop that which relates to co-legislation and their political autonomy.

Cities do not exist in vacuums but in geographical spaces and normative environments. They exist within national and international contexts. As such, cities are subject to external pressures which frame possibilities of action. For instance, a shift in thinking on national fiscal policy impacts cities. Likewise, where financial flows are global, cities may have some power to decide what is within their jurisdiction. Still, their decision making is both limited and subject to external forces.

Cities have, in many ways, been the sites of globalisation. They have been the physical spaces where global finance has been organised from and passed through. Cities like London, New York and Tokyo have developed in a way that has been interwoven with globalisation (Sassen, 2001). Cities are often the site of investment, where financial gain is the key motive. Furthermore, cities are often the location of industry and labour forces, which receive and send goods that drive fundamental forces of globalisation. Urban space is then often used for the flow of international capital. These developments and investments often come from outside the city, from which cities are often metamorphosised. Global capital seeking investment needs opportunities, and the restructuring of urban space is a crucial way to find profits. Importantly, we can see a deep division between who does and does not get to take part in this kind of decision making. Moreover, importantly, those without political and economic power are most likely subject to it (Harvey, 2013, p.16).

As cities are the site of much global investment, they are often influenced by those with power from outside them. As a result, this challenges us to think about how we provide space for those living in

a city to affect that city. In turn, how much political agency – i.e. effective autonomy – does the citizen have over their own space?

Lefebvre used the Marxist distinction between exchange and use value in his work on The Right to the City (Lefebvre in Deneulin, 2014, p.2). Lefebvre argued that cities were increasingly becoming sites whose value was primarily based on their exchange value. The use value of citizens in cities was secondary to that exchange value. As such, the city could be seen to be increasingly exclusionary towards those without the means to buy land. Lefebvre was concerned that cities were increasingly bases for capital accumulation. Those who can afford the city use it, whilst those who cannot are increasingly driven to the periphery. The right to the city is then an attempt to recover cities as "places for social, cultural, and political encounters" (Deneulin, 2014, pp.2-3). For Lefebvre, the role of the city is more significant than a hub for markets to flow through and trade in.

The city of capabilities serves as a valuable alternative to the city as a node of global capital. The city of capabilities has as its aim the developing of its citizens' abilities. In contrast, the city as a node of capital has as its purpose the development of capital. Lefebvre's framing shows the Marxist distinction of use and exchange value at play, where the city of capabilities has as its aim the use value of the city for humans to flourish as autonomous agents.

The distinction highlighted by Lefebvre emphasises an issue those familiar with capabilities literature see all too well: markets have a value system that often misses out on qualities that we ought to value in the pursuit of living and providing for good lives. The city has a space in human life beyond being a hub for trade; Lefebvre's answer is for the city's users themselves to occupy decision-making space in the city. The right to the city extends to those rights concerning social, economic,

civil and political matters, but also to the participation in the issues which affect them (Deneulin, 2014, p.3).

Thus, we can see parallels with the right to the city and a capability approach to cities, namely that the city's use in providing space for flourishing lives may be undervalued in a system that over-commodifies all. The city in this over-commodification becomes a vessel for capital to pass through and create profit. As will be explored in the next chapter, the financialisation of housing in London can be seen as a key example of this. The link between exchange value and use value is argued to be broken (Minton, 2017, pp.22-24). An alternative would be to place exchange value as useful in so much as it expands flourishing. Here, we may understand then that the local needs of citizens are potentially in conflict with the desires of those inside or outside who wish to use the city more overtly for its exchange value.

We can use the capability approach as an additional analytical lens in the pursuit of understanding the purpose of the city. Deneulin brings the right to the city and the capability approach to argue for "Just Cities for Life" (2014). Creating just cities for life begins with translating the idea of 'just cities for life' into practice, which starts with capability evaluation. What kinds of lives do urban residents live? Do they have "opportunities to achieve a set of valuable beings and doings?" (Deneulin, 2014, p.11).

So far, this chapter has described the broader context in which cities find themselves and briefly sketched two alternative visions of the city; the city of capabilities and the city as a node for global capital. This context indicates the pressures cities are under from external forces, which impact their ability to produce environments conducive to expanding the freedoms of their citizens. The pres-

sures to produce environments conducive to flourishing are not merely internal; they are also external forces. Regarding examining political agency in cities, we ought to explore what is happening within cities and externally to cities. Such phenomena shape the possibilities of the city and its citizens. Two very different ideas of what a city is for have been presented. The former, is as a space for the expansion of citizens' freedoms, a city of capabilities. The latter, a localised hub for global capital. In the pursuit of the former, global pressures of the latter exist. The following sections explore this dynamic.

5.3 Relationships of political autonomy: the city in the world

In this section, I will discuss some interrelated areas of autonomy concerning the city and the context in which it exists. In Chapter 4, I discussed the space for the individual's development in their environment. Such space would allow for legislation, which was shown to be threatened by global forces. Whereas the focus of Chapter 4 was on the individual and nation amidst these forces, in this section, I will look specifically at the city and how it might provide such space. Also, how much space might be threatened by forces outside of the city.

I will use the distinction of positive and negative elements of autonomy to highlight the relationship between both types of freedom. That is, primarily, how outside forces affect the ability to build structures conducive to freedom within the city, most notably, the relationship between global forces and space for co-legislation within the city or one's local environment.

We can consider these positive and negative elements of autonomy as relating to Chapter 4 in the following way. External forces threaten the space necessary to legislate within the city in two ways.

First, there is some space for citizens to legislate within the city (as explained in Chapter 4). Such space is then: a) space for the positive acts of legislation, and b) space from that which would impede such legislation. The individual relies on the city, as shown in Chapter 4, to develop such skills. They require space and certain conditions. But they also require such not to be impeded.

Cities then must have some space protected from that which would impede their ability to provide the space to legislate. In practice, these two things, the negative space afforded the city and the positive space which the city can afford, may be inseparable. But the distinction helps to see why the city's ability to provide space for legislation is in part predicated on the external environment to not have forces that impair such space.

Positive and negative notions of freedom are a longstanding philosophical tradition and have been a source of considerable debate (Sen, 1988, p.272). The distinction followed in this chapter is in line with Berlin's classic two concepts of liberty: negative liberty, "the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others… If I am prevented by other persons from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree" (Berlin, 1969, pp.15-16), and positive liberty, "the freedom which consists in being one's own master" (p.23).

In terms of the city, we can understand a negative use of autonomy as applicable in two ways. Firstly, for the space which citizens have within the city. Secondly, the space in which the city is within the broader context of the world.

In terms of a positive understanding of autonomy, we can understand the city in two ways. Firstly, offering space is necessary for developing the individual's ability to legislate; secondly, it is neces-

sary in terms of the space for the citizen and the city to operate outside of the city. This thesis will have nothing to say on the latter.

The distinction used here is primarily conceptual, and a means to categorise analysis, namely, to more easily separate elements of that which constitute various freedom within cities. This is heuristically useful for understanding the phenomena of global pressures on the space for co-legislation within cities. Chapters 3 and 4 clarified that an individual's ability to co-legislate and have a level of political autonomy is very much impacted by those forces and structures around her. And, as such, we can see this as an interplay between positive and negative liberties. They will help delineate different elements of a more ideal (than is often seen) relationship between the city and the world.

Using notions of positive and negative understandings of autonomy, I will attempt to explain the relationship between political autonomy within the city and pressures outside the city.

Within the city, negative and positive space for political autonomy

Global forces can have a huge effect on cities. At the same time, cities are often beholden to the decisions made by nations. For example, tax policy, spending regulation, immigration – these decisions are primarily national decisions or the remit of supranational level bodies (as is the case with fiscal regulation and immigration policy within the EU). As a result, cities are, to a large extent, subject to decisions made outside of them that affect their space. Some of this lack of power is by design. Cities have often been left out of debates on such issues as urban development and migra-

tion by the UN, for example. These disparities are even stronger in many emerging countries, where political power is more densely organised within federal structures (WEF, 2018).

In theory, globalisation opens the world up to competition, leading to a better allocation of labour, capital and tech (Dehesa, 2006, p.51). There is a relationship between the allocation of capital and the distribution of decision making. That is, by opening up the greater possibility of capital being moved around, we see a development of the possibility of external investment.

Cities are, of course, as most spaces are, at the mercy of private capital. As Clyde Wingfield wrote most eloquently of the American political system, "One fundamental aspect of the American political system is that persons who have not been elected or appointed to public office nonetheless exercise decision making influence and power on matters public in nature" (1963, p.74)

Of course, access to power depends on how centralised power is in a given structure. There may be local, regional and national levels that all offer a place to express and deliberate over individuals' preferences and highly centralised power structures. One way in which decision making and power can be held outside of a space is in external investment and development. It is this that David Harvey speaks of when he speaks of surplus capital, held globally, that is invested through cities, thus transforming them in the interests of capital often held outside of them. Often those at the mercy of such movements of capital are the poor, those with little political voice. In Haussmann's Paris, the poor were displaced, a practice on which Engels was to comment: that it led only to them appearing immediately elsewhere. Brooklyn and Harlem had similar gentrifying periods. In Mumbai, slum areas have been gathering value if cleared. In China, investment means that many people without

property rights are being moved on, a relatively simple manoeuvre for the state (Harvey, 2013, pp.16-20).

We find then that the right to space and power in the city is "increasingly in the hands of private or quasi-private interests (Harvey, 2013, p.23). This is often accompanied by a project to minimise public ownership. This has led the UK to sell off 2 million hectares of land, or around 10% of the entire British landmass, since Thatcher took power in 1979 (Christophers, 2018, p.2). So, we can understand this meeting of forces, global trade and deregulation, and a prevailing ideology that meant local authorities were selling off local space. The two together lead to an environment conducive to cities being more likely to be affected by the external investment. That is, to some extent, decision making and power held outside of the city. Of course, inequalities of decision-making power are not new, but what is new is the scale and speed with which investment in one country can affect a remote community.

In terms of positive and negative liberties, we might initially understand this as a violation of negative liberty; that is, interference from the outside occurs. The negative liberties of the city are impacted upon from the outside. In turn, we may understand that as impeding the ability of the city to properly build an environment that is conducive to the practice and expansion of positive liberties. That is, the ability of citizens to co-legislate the space in which they inhabit is under threat – the table below sketches how we might understand the relationship between positive and negative freedoms and the city.

Table 3: City and liberties – ideal and non-ideal, positive and negative

	Positive	Negative
Internal - ideal	Citizen is able to co-legislate with fellow citizens within a system of mutually consistent co-legislation	Citizen has some space which is rightfully theirs
Internal – non-ideal	Decisions are made by powerful stakeholders, often affected greatly by external investment	Decisions are made by large stakeholders, often affected greatly by external investment
External - ideal	Citizens, via the city as a structure of capacities, are able to engage and co-legislate globally with fellow citizens, and organisations external to the city.	Citizens have a reasonable capability to make decisions about their own city, and are not subject to overwhelming global forces that render them merely decision takers
External – non-ideal	Citizens and cities are largely unable to co-legislate and instead are in an international climate dominated by a small number of private interests	Cities are largely dominated by global movements of finance, and the space for citizens to co-legislate is small; local decision making and government has little power

Source: Author

5.4 Locating the correct space for decision making – using the Capability Approach and the Principle of Subsidiarity

So far, we have discussed cities regarding their internal freedoms; that is, the ability of their citizens to co-legislate. Cities, as discussed, are part of complex frameworks. I have described how pressures external to the city impact decision making within it in a way that threatens individual freedom. One might be tempted to think the conclusion to be drawn from this is that the city ought ide-

ally to be its own hermetically sealed political environment. This would not only be impossible, but wrong, even by the principles which have been discussed so far. If the aims of the city are to expand the freedoms of the citizens of the city, then relying on that which is beyond the city may quite often be appropriate. One only has to look at transportation or health to find systems that, through linking the city up to knowledge and resources beyond it, expand the possibilities of citizens within it. It would be illogical to think that each community should plan its roads, sea or airways separately. Likewise, there are collective benefits from knowledge from beyond the community being used in areas such as health, where joining up nationally or globally provides much greater chances for individuals.

Further, because the agency and wellbeing of the wider community will depend on such linking up, it is entirely consistent to believe that there are times when decisions ought to be made beyond the city. That is, that decisions which affect the city and citizens are made beyond them. During a pandemic, we would not want individuals, towns or cities all working alone. The threat to all requires a collective response. A local response will sometimes mean decisions made in one place greatly affect another. There are cases consistent with the argument made here which would allow for decisions to be made outside.

One class of decision in this category, which there is no space for here, is a decision that would greatly benefit group x but that is imposed on group y. We may think here of reparations, or perhaps sacrifices made during times of war or great need. It is conceivable that there are times when decisions are made beyond a community that are legitimately weight-carrying for that community. But those situations ought to carry some extra moral information; that is, they ought to be justified. At least for now, I will leave the cases aside.

In Chapter 4, I developed a concept of political autonomy in cities reliant on space for co-legislation. This co-legislation was necessary to provide space for the development and exercising of capabilities relating to co-legislation in a social context. When might we think it is acceptable for decisions to be made outside of the city of locality? I argue that, in ordinary circumstances, power to affect the city should be passed on only when it is in the city's or, more precisely, its citizens' interests. Justification for passing decision making upwards then takes the following form: a) co-legislation is key to flourishing, and b) cities are where much of this takes place. As such, we ought to take seriously and give weight to the provision of decision making in cities. But c) – supra-city spaces and networks can aid the city and its citizens in achieving environments conducive to flourishing; therefore, d) where this is so, cities can cede power to outside themselves.

The city space needs to be protected from too much external pressure/decisions, which may threaten the possibility of co-legislation within it. Decisions made that affect the city ought to be justified. Equally, if it is found that a community does not have space for a level of co-legislation which is adequate, there ought to be ways and means for both adjudicating that and also opening up a process towards change.

A city is likely to have a threat to it in such a way from two places: broader political power (the region or nation) or private ownership, making levels of co-legislation within the city below desired levels. Using the capability approach, we can have principles that guide our understanding; what is desired is an environment conducive to expanding freedoms, which people can do and be. Part of that is the ability to co-legislate.

One way we might understand this then is to justify decision-making power to move beyond the local. If there are benefits in decisions being made beyond the local, they ought to be articulated. We should also be clear when and why they are appropriate. Subsidiarity gives us such a principle. We can understand subsidiarity as an attempt to clarify the most appropriate local point possible to decide. From each individual, and then small group, to the city, the decision is made at the most appropriate local point, only moving to a higher level when it is not possible effectively at the lowest level.

We can see similarities with the Principle of Subsidiarity as employed by the EU. The EU recognised the potential issues of decision-making structures in such a vast body and described them in the following way: "In areas in which the European Union does not have exclusive competence, the principle of subsidiarity, laid down in the Treaty on European Union, defines the circumstances in which it is preferable for action to be taken by the Union, rather than the Member States" (European Union. 2019, p.1). The principle has as its aim, the "guarantee a degree of independence for a lower authority in relation to a higher body or a local authority in relation to central government" (p.2).

In the context of the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity is meant to act as a defence against the EU intervening where member states are capable of dealing effectively with issues at the "...central, regional or local level" (2019, p.2). The principle of subsidiarity, as described here, shows the intent to leave decision making as local as possible. Decision making is to be moved beyond the local when it is not possible at the local level.

By drawing back on the capability approach, we can find two levels for understanding decision making. Firstly, in using the principle of subsidiarity, we can see the importance of local decision

making unless there are grounds for moving beyond the local. By applying the capability approach, we can understand how to ground those grounds. That is, moving beyond the local ought to show that doing so would expand the likely wellbeing of the agents in question. We can see these two moves as:

1. Decision making is made locally where possible, where such decision making can be done effectively.

2. Decisions should be made to expand that which people are able to do and be. A good part of this relates to co-legislating and participating in the political environment in which one lives.

By combining the capability approach and the principle of subsidiarity, the city has a framework to understand how decision making should be understood. It ought to take place within the city, where possible. It can be moved externally, where it can be shown to expand the wellbeing of its citizens. Decisions can be made nationally and internationally. Investment and ownership can be brought in from outside.

Pope Francis described subsidiarity in such a light, arguing that "... freedom to develop the capabilities present at every level of society, while also demanding a greater sense of responsibility for the common good from those who wield greater power." (Francis, 2015. p.143). Pope Francis is right to connect up subsidiarity with capabilities at differing levels and the sense that they are intrinsically linked to power. In developing capabilities at a local level, we cannot ignore that individuals and communities can only do so if we make sure there is space for co-legislation.

Subsidiarity empowers individuals and enhances democratic structures by moving the decision making as close to the physical region or problem (Evans and Zimmermann, 2014, p.2). Writing in 2004, in the Journal of Business Ethics, John Kelly described how;

we are in need of the organising and directing principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. Both of these principles speak to the need of transforming our public and private institutions in such a way that all persons are placed in positions whereby they can share in the benefits of the newly formed global economy (2004, p.283).

In an ever-complicated and interwoven world, subsidiarity gives a clear principle to help organise decision making in a way that preserves local autonomy.

Subsidiarity is a valuable heuristic in giving precedence to the most local place a decision could be made. At the same time, subsidiarity makes clear that the place a decision should be made partly depends on the level that will be most effective and that spaces beyond the local will sometimes be helpful. When we add a capabilities framework to this, we have a conceptual framework from which to understand how decisions can be made which affect cities:

Much decision making about the way cities should be the product of decisions and preferences from within the city itself. This decision making will be contextual and ought to involve the citizenry where possible and appropriate. Where decisions are made outside, and often this will be of benefit to them, those decisions must be justified on the grounds that they expand the freedoms of those

within the city. These principles can strengthen our understanding of the application of the capability approach to decision making in local spheres.

We can understand from subsidiarity that the spatiality of decision making in a globalised world matters a great deal. Local decision making is still important, as the recent period of globalisation has led to power concentrating.

Understanding decision making in such a way gives us both a form of analysing the problems described in Chapter 4 and a suggested solution. In Chapter 4, it was explained how technology helped condense power in several ways:

• Making easier the gathering, storage and use of information.
• By exacerbating existing inequalities through access to such technologies.

By coupling the principle of subsidiarity with the capability approach, we can see clearly that such an environment is problematic. Further, we are offered an understanding of a more desirable distribution of power.

There are various levels at which decisions can be made, from the individual to the global. It is not necessarily the case that the individual's ability to live a flourishing life requires each individual to make all the decisions that affect them, of course. We do not expect all transport decisions to be made at the individual level. Flight paths, motorway building, the possibility of mass ecologically-sound transport solutions, etc., will require regional, national and even international coordination. Often this is perfectly compatible with spaces that can be said to be taking capabilities seriously.

But understanding how decision making is often made outside of the the environment it will affect it is essential. It holds enormous implications for the level of an individual's ability to co-legislate. From chapters 3 and 4 in this chapter, two visions of the role of cities can be seen. The following chapter will indicate the urgency of the situation in the context of London, where political autonomy is under threat from both of the key elements of this thesis: global movements of capital and their impact on local property and space, and technological development and the repercussions on space for local decision making.

5.5 Subsidiarity, global pressures and space for capabilities

In allowing decisions to be made as locally as possible, what is being argued for is the need to expand and preserve space for decision making by those who exist in the space in question. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 provided two distinct visions of the city. Firstly, of the city of capabilities: this city has as its goals the expansions of people's capabilities, as depicted in Chapter 2. This was contrasted with the city as a node in the global economy. I then attempted to use positive and negative freedoms as a heuristic to explain the external pressures cities face, and how these impair the abilities of citizens to co-legislate properly. The city of capabilities then is based in large part on allowing as much local decision making as possible.

The capability approach offers limitations to the scope of subsidiarity. Where subsidiarity does not expand those capabilities (in the case of this thesis, political autonomy) then it may well be that subsidiarity is trumped by other values. In section 5.4, the EU's principle of subsidiarity was shown to operationalise a sense that decision making should be made at the most effective level (2019,

p.2). This shows the relationship between subsidiarity and other values. Local decision making is one value, but the attributes that make up the effectiveness of the decision provide necessary qualification. This might be the case for transport networks or health arrangements, where local inputs are crucial to meet localized needs, but where universalization is also required to assure consistency across jurisdictions, to assure broadened utility, to locate economies of scale, and to make sure that regional disadvantage is not resulting from failures are local levels (national safety nets).

Thus, subsidiarity is not the only value we ought to take seriously. But it does provide a sense as to how to judge when decision making ought to be localized and to what degree. This requires case-by-case determination, but it does provide a guiding principle, similar to the precautionary principle in medicine or when pilots determine flight risks and actions. In other words, it guides that decision making ought to be as local as is possible, relative to the expansion of capabilities. Hospital building, national travel, dealing with a pandemic are all, arguably, not legitimately addressed appropriately at the local level alone. The principle, as described suggests decisions are best made at the most local & effective level. This means that without our calculations, sub city level may also be correct in some circumstances (i.e. decisions about a street, or park are done by those closest to and most using the park). The principle then is likely to suggest micro decision making that goes beyond the city level, to the sub city level. In addition, as part of any calculus, we should, all things being equal, apply extra weighting to those affected most by decisions.

If effective autonomy is to be taken seriously, then principle of subsidiarity must take into account who else is affected. For example, ecological concerns may cause us to appeal to non-local decision making or to include others (those downstream for example). But this can be understood as an application of subsidiary; the most effective level being beyond, or higher than, the local. In section

7.4 I argue that the City of Capabilities, with its concern for local decision making where possible, ought also to be compatible with the same for other cities, and their citizens. As such, it would not be right if the city in question were to impede the ability of others to live in a capability expanding way. On the contrary, the City of Capabilities ought to commit in principle, to the expansion of capabilities of citizens of other cities.

But ultimately, so long as the individuals, or collectives in question are not harming others, then it ought to be the case that the onus is on explaining why a decision about their own space shouldn't be made by them. As described, there are good reasons to think that joined up national or international infrastructure or responses to crisis may be in the everybody's interest. Further, there may be cases where children, or those vulnerable are not being looked after well via the provision of those co-legislating locally. In such cases, it may be well be right for national, or international bodies to intervene or regulate, but only when meeting justifiability criteria that can be seen to reasonably override local control. In this case, the justifiability of external interference must be explicitly made and not assumed.

Where it affects local space, it should be on those wishing to not allow for co-legislation to explain why that is the case. Above I have described two scenarios to give a basis for when that may be legitimately done. Firstly, if wider than local decision making would be beneficial for all and secondly if local harm is likely. The principle of subsidiarity can handle both issues, as it places emphasis on finding the best and most effective level for decision making. When this is brought together with the City of Capabilities' commitment to not impact negatively on other cities, we have sufficient constraints to the city and its impact on areas outside of itself. It is constrained by other areas' right to the best decision making level for themselves too.

The focus of this thesis is specifically on those capabilities pertaining to political autonomy. This chapter has shown how understanding the goals of the city is important. If the city aims at expanding capabilities and space for political autonomy, it will lead to different policy decisions than a city that aims solely at more orthodox economic aims. In Chapter 6, I will look at London housing and political decision making. I will aim to demonstrate that London has moved towards the city as node of global capital. In Chapter 7, I will provide examples of policies that have been undertaken by cities around the world that are more in line with the City of Capabilities.

Conclusion

This chapter began by explaining the need for a new political theory of cities. Such a theory ought to understand that providing space for co-legislation within cities is contingent on cities' decision making being protected from external forces. The importance of co-legislation drew on the city as a space of co-legislation and the importance of this in human communities. This need for co-legislation has been argued in previous chapters to be key to a fully developed, flourishing life. Understanding co-legislation requires a composite of negative and positive freedoms. To protect those freedoms, we can understand external forces as a threat to the city's negative freedoms that ought to be enjoyed. Building a city committed to expanding capabilities will sometimes involve making decisions outside the city. The principle of subsidiarity helps us understand when that should be done. That is, decision making should be made externally when it is likely to expand the freedoms of citizens. It is hoped that this discussion can add to an emerging discourse about the local and global relationship; thus, helping to create a capability promoting account of how cities can act as a

fundamental unit in creating a healthy participatory politics that respects the need for local space in

an integrated globalised world.

Chapter 6: Globalisation, London, Space and Decision Making

So far, this thesis has argued that processes of globalisation have posed a threat to the political autonomy of citizens of cities. Chapter 4 focused on technological development and the expansion of global trade as drivers for this period of globalisation. This chapter will situate these phenomena in London, a centre and prime display of globalisation (Therborn, 2017, pp.304-306). Chapter 5 laid out two visions of the goals of the city: the city as node of global capital and the city of capabilities. Key differences centred around the city's ability to provide its citizens with the co-legislative space to practise their political autonomy. As Chapter 4 showed, such abilities are essential not only for their own ends but also for citizens' development in and of itself. The ability to co-legislate with others is part of the expansion of individuals' capabilities, and thus their development.

With this in mind, this chapter will focus on two ways globalisation with its advances in technology and free movement of capital, have played out: housing and technology for gathering preferences. Firstly, we will look at how space, in the form of property and housing, has been affected. The free movement of capital has seen housing costs soar in London, which can be viewed as an expansion of the ability of some to affect others in a way that is not reciprocal; that is, the way that global firms can affect local spaces in a way that the people living in those local spaces could not affect global firms. Secondly, the chapter will highlight the disparity between the incredible development of private companies' data gathering and the relative lack of development in gathering preferences in democratic spheres; that is, the conscious expression of preferences by citizens.

Having framed the two modes of cities in Chapter 5, we can see that London has fallen more towards the city as a node of global capital, with both negative and positive freedoms of its citizens

under threat from globalising forces. Elsewhere in this thesis, I have argued that globalisation, particularly the combination of technological development, the deregulation of global capital, has diminished the political autonomy of many. This chapter situates these issues in the context of London. As will be shown, globalisation has led to the cost of property and home ownership being more expensive for many London citizens. At the same time, whilst technology has developed immensely, democratic decision making has failed to make similar advances. Cumulatively, we see an expansion of political autonomy for those able to benefit from this environment, and, for others, a diminishing of political autonomy.

6.1 London, global city

When thinking of major cities at the centre of globalisation, few stand out like London. Until the end of the Second World War, it was the capital of the British empire, the largest in the world. It remains to this day the world centre of financial transactions (Therborn, 2017, p.304). It was said that, at the peak of the British Empire, the sun did not set on it. But the impact of London on the world now is perhaps even more relentless. Alongside New York, Tokyo, Frankfurt, Hong Kong and Tokyo, London is where a significant share of world banking occurs; 58% of the foreign exchange market is held in London, New York and Tokyo (Sassen, 2002, p.29). Canary Wharf, where many of those transactions occur, displays various facets of globalisation: built with foreign capital, materials and techniques by foreign designers. Foreign workers from the Global South and Eastern Europe clean the offices (Therborn, 2017, p.306). London has, in this period, become a truly global city, both part of the system which developed this globalising period and subjected to globalising forces.

For the most part, through the twentieth century, cities were treated as a sub-national phenomenon, held within national territories and hierarchies. But, in the late 20th century, cities like London became supranational, for instance, in the way that they handled a disproportionate amount of the world's business. These cities have become known as global cities, a development of the term 'World City', a term coined by Patrick Geddes and developed by Peter Hall (Keil and Ren, 2018, pp.XXIV-XXV). Alongside business, they are gatherings of professional talent (Hall, 1966, p.7). We can also understand such cities as "spatial materialisations" of the system they are in and help reproduce – processes associated with capitalist modes of production; in particular, accumulation and class struggle (Keil and Ren, 2018, pp.XXIV-XXV).

In many ways, the development of London, like other global cities, can be seen as symbiotic with the development of the global moment. Alongside other global cities such as New York and Tokyo, the development of London in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first is a part of the movement of globalisation (Sassen, 2001). Such cities gather global capital and power practices: global brands and companies' staff live and work there; consumers of globally produced products and services consume there. London is very much in this mould. Its global ambitions and reality are clear; this can be explicitly heard in the rhetoric of politicians like current UK Prime Minister and then London Mayor Boris Johnson, who said, "London must retain and build upon its world city status as one of the three business centres of global reach" (Therbon, 2017 ,p.309). When examining the impact of globalisation on cities then, London is a prime candidate. The following section will look at how London's housing market has been affected by being such a city.

6.1.1. London, globalising forces and property prices

In this section, I will look at how global capital has shaped the ability of the citizens of London to afford space. I will examine two areas as reasons for added demand:

1. London as a centre of global trade has attracted firms that service this network. This has had the effect that companies with bases there have bought up space. Such companies and industries bring their staff, and salaries, which then bring their own culture.

2. London being a space for foreign investment has meant that space has been bought up as an investment.

London attracts firms that occupy space in the city. Such firms represent a new spatial organisation of the global economy: the development of firms expressly set up to service globalising industries such as finance and service. The growth of many firms that service and build the globalising economy contributes to the rise in property prices. This is due, in part, to the way that certain industries such as financial and service firms concentrate. Much of the shift in property prices is due to internationally owned property by industries such as finance. This has, in part, led to London being described as the most concentrated and specialised international property market in the world. We can see part of this in the high rate of financial-service firms owning the buildings they occupy (Baum and Lizieri cited in Sassen, 2001, p.193).

The late twentieth century saw radical shifts in the global economy. Such changes were transformative for major cities like London. That makes them key sites of production, servicing, marketing and innovation (Sassen, 2001, p.87). While governments have a role in approving and legitimising this movement, the deregulation of financial services and foreign investment has created a space for

transnational economic activity. A second related way such movement of industry affects local economies is by gathering large numbers of people on salaries above the norm for the area. These high-income workers also bring a demand for residential space, luxury shops, art galleries, etc. (Sassen, 2001, pp.190–195). The economy here pivots towards those with more consumptive power.

A further reason for the rise in prices for London property is that the city has been used as a safe house for capital. Assets have been bought with foreign money. This is not a phenomenon restricted to London, of course. In recent years, governments worldwide have conducted enquiries into the impact of foreign investment in property. From Chinese investment, Barcelona and Berlin rents, Canadian house prices, foreign investment is having a real impact on housing costs for residents worldwide. Some countries wish to attract more attention and create Visa schemes specifically to target potential investment. Spain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus have all done this to attract investment from Russia, Asia and North America (Koh and Rogers, 2017, p.2). Cities like London have been significantly affected by such investment. One explanation for the influx of foreign direct investment is that global cities like London present relative safety for money from less politically stable economies (Badarinza and Ramadorai, 2018, p.1). On this model, a rise in political risk in Russia, parts of Africa and the Middle East manifests as a rise in property prices in London. It is not merely the promise of a return on investment that acts as a pull. The push of capital from risk is also at play (Badarinza and Ramadorai, 2018, pp.3-4).

The new global environment of the 1980s created an increasingly active environment for foreign investment. As the network of global cities grew, so did foreign investment. This gave rise to phenomena such as London land prices becoming increasingly unlinked to the conditions of the nation-

al economy. Such high prices were also not spread around the city equally but confined to certain areas of central London. This led to the development of run-down areas, such as the old docks (Sassen, 2001, pp.190-191). Foreign capital was reshaping the city in order to provide a return on investment. Wealth created away from London is deposited in London, with space and buildings in the city used as assets, stores of value. London has even been linked so clearly to global political strife that one property executive described how "'every mortar bomb in Libya adds £1/sq foot to investments here" (Minton, 2017, p.23), leading to it being said that the exchange value has had its link to the use value entirely broken (2017, pp.22-24). The use of space in this way has some, perhaps to be expected, results. Land banking and the preservation of buildings as long-term assets are very different from a space being used locally by the people who need to see and experience it daily. In 2016, Sajid Javid, then UK Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, spoke of how he could not:

...look the other way when I see land banking holding up development. Some of you have conceded to me, in private, that it happens. Some of you still deny it's an issue. But there's clearly something going on. The number of plots approved for residential development each year rose by 59 per cent between 2011 and 2015. But the number of building starts rose by just 29 per cent. (Minton, 2017, p.66).

Shelter, a UK housing and homelessness charity, estimates there are almost 500,000 sites in the UK with planning permission that has not been acted upon. Banking the land helps control the price – the exchange value, as mentioned in Chapter 5, is developed but not the use value. Even the perceived abandonment of land can be a political strategy used by the interests of private capital to

pressurise councils and planning departments (Hackworth, 2015). Efforts should be made to ensure that companies do not land-bank.

Land banking relies on having the resources in the first place to sit and wait for the right time to cash in an investment. But this is not how people locally behave with space. It shows a divergence from the interests of the locals, the use value of space. Barcelona's PAH translates as the Platform for People Affected by Mortgages. Ada Colau, a leading PAH activist, argues that the right to the city ought to be taken seriously: "The point is to be open; to keep innovating, listening to citizens" (Minton, 2017, p.169). Land banking and the use of space and buildings as assets make such space move to the tune of a global song, not a local one. It is fundamentally to shift the relationship between space and its relation to the local and make it part of a new system of movement, where such space looks to the constellation turns of stock markets and wide investment cycles, not the needs of the local populous.

Cumulatively, the movement of capital characteristic of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century can be seen to do two things. Firstly, it has pushed up prices as firms have become based in global cities. Such firms have brought with them staff who have pushed up prices. Secondly, London has been used as a safe space for capital in the property market. When considered in the context of local political autonomy, it can be seen that the period has witnessed a diminishing of such autonomy. Decision making and power over space have moved away from the citizens of many areas of London. London here can be seen to epitomise the city as node of global capital of Chapter 5.

6.2. London house price rises

In this section, we will see how such movement affects house prices. Housing will be framed through the capabilities lens, in opposition to the financialised housing model. As will be shown, housing and political autonomy are strongly linked. Data from three key areas (house prices, house price to earnings and salary growth in the lowest quartile of the London population) from the mid-1990s to 2020 indicates a marked rise in both absolute housing costs and housing costs relative to earnings. House prices, especially house prices to earnings, tell us something important about the cost of living and impact people's ability to spend on other things that contribute to expanding their capabilities and functions. An upward curve in the ratio would also suggest increasing numbers for whom housing costs will be difficult.

Table 4: Ratio of house price earnings, residence based (London Datastore, 2021)

Area	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
City of London	6.29	:	:	:	:	:	:	14.83	16.55
Barnet	7.42	8.63	9.12	9.16	9.70	10.05	12.14	14.05	14.45
Brent	8.10	9.24	9.85	9.89	10.31	11.13	12.39	15.21	16.32
Camden	9.71	10.40	10.38	11.97	12.63	13.30	17.43	18.53	18.23
Ealing	7.09	8.68	8.88	9.66	9.61	9.94	12.28	14.73	14.17
Greenwich	5.99	6.86	7.70	7.88	7.61	7.96	10.09	11.87	11.95
Hackney	7.37	8.70	9.48	9.06	9.63	10.41	12.82	16.67	16.34
Hammersmith and Fulham	8.55	9.83	10.80	11.76	12.36	12.48	16.95	19.21	20.04
Hounslow	7.00	8.65	9.03	9.02	8.54	8.67	10.30	12.62	12.75
Islington	8.71	8.67	8.91	10.84	10.95	10.64	13.57	16.51	13.09
Kensington and Chelsea	10.68	10.04	11.19	15.26	15.93	21.32	25.28	30.46	33.43
Lambeth	8.02	8.38	8.98	9.49	8.97	9.85	12.43	15.01	13.82
Richmond upon Thames	7.26	8.35	9.18	9.85	10.35	10.35	12.79	14.38	14.88
Tower Hamlets	7.81	7.97	8.56	9.12	8.88	8.70	10.88	12.82	12.73
Westminster	11.01	10.57	12.32	12.93	12.14	14.09	20.38	23.48	23.71
London	6.90	8.02	8.37	8.52	8.75	9.15	10.77	12.91	13.09
South East	6.12	7.33	7.68	7.89	7.74	7.64	8.20	9.43	9.92
England	5.11	6.60	6.95	6.96	6.85	6.77	7.09	7.72	8.04

The ratio between house prices and earnings shows striking growth across the city between 2002 and 2018. In 2002, the average house price was 6.9 times average annual earnings. This was compared to the UK equivalent of 5.11. By 2018, this had grown considerably in both London and the UK more broadly. But, in London, this had developed to 13.09 compared to the UK-wide rate of 8.04. Furthermore, within this data we can see more pronounced unequal growth in particular areas. Hackney in this period went from 7.37 times to 16.34. Hammersmith and Fulham, from 8.55 to

20.04 (London Datastore, 2021a). Between 2002 and 2018, house prices outstripped earnings across London. This, of course, makes house buying less accessible to more people.

Whilst UK housing has had increases in costs above earnings, this has been more pronounced in London and the South East. These areas have an above-average spend on housing in the UK, and, since the 1970s, housing in these areas has grown faster than in the rest of the UK (Holly et al., 2010). Further, the rapid rise in house prices in London has been accompanied by rapid rises in rents. October 2019 to September 2020 saw the highest ever recorded median monthly rent in England, £725. London, at £1435, was almost double (ONS, 2020). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the greater difficulty of buying houses is accompanied by higher housing costs for those renting.

As discussed in section 6.1, one reason for raised house prices and rents is the sheer added demand that a global city like London has. This can be seen when we look into the data of areas like Spitalfields. Between 1997 and 2016, the population of Spitalfields grew by around 40%. Spitalfields is in the Tower Hamlets borough, a borough which saw 7.81 times average earnings in 2002 jump to 12.82 times average earnings by 2016 (London Datastore, 2021a)

Area	1999	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018	2019
City of London	22,515	24,516	27,016	29,427	32,000	33,251	34,535	36,659	35,816	35,999	39,021	38,323
Hackney	17,391	16,779	17,400	20,485	22,653	22,844	25,668	23,772	23,676	24,553	25,745	24,990
Hammersmith and Fulham	18,664	18,793	21,214	21,672	22,898	25,260	26,657	26,118	25,221	25,097	32,230	27,691
Westminster	17,562	18,926	20,872	22,986	23,899	25,584	26,604	27,080	27,340	27,752	30,000	30,719
London	16,090	17,362	18,689	20,496	21,817	23,441	24,417	24,547	24,760	25,381	26,930	27,299
Inner London	-	-	-	22,804	24,049	25,833	26,998	27,300	27,108	27,873	29,884	29,927
Outer London	-	-	-	17,711	19,036	20,290	20,868	20,846	21,121	22,000	22,345	23,465
England	12,852	13,778	14,852	15,948	16,734	18,078	18,577	19,011	19,390	20,252	21,263	22,014

Table 5: Salary growth - London 1999 - 2019 - Lowest quartile (ONS, 2021)

Table 5 shows salary growth amongst the lowest quartile in London between 1999 and 2019. Hackney, for example, shows a rise from £17,391 annually to £24,990. In 2015, the GLA (Greater London Authority) published figures updating household income estimates. In 2001/2, Hackney had a figure of £22,000, which by 2012/13 was £35,140. At the same time, Hackney, like most areas, had complex arrangements of people living there. A 2014-2015 report found that 31% of households with children were workless, more than double the national rate of 14% (Hackney Learning Trust 2015). So, in areas like Hackney, we can see a pronounced element of the phenomenon we are discussing: rising housing costs. Alongside ratios of house prices to earnings, there are those with lower earnings who live in an area where house prices and rent are increasing. Table 5 shows how, between 1999 and 2019, earnings in the lowest quartile went from £17,391 to £24,990 (ONS 2021).

Table 6 shows how in almost the same period, between 2000 and 2020, average house prices went from £121,135 to £555,696. This demonstrates then that, whilst average earnings may show us something important, there is something else going on: housing in the area is becoming increasingly out of reach for those on the lowest incomes, both relative to earnings and in absolute terms. This is especially important when we consider that new people will be on higher incomes within the price to earnings data. Those already in the area on lower incomes are effectively a drag on the average earnings. Understanding that tells us something significant about the increasing difficulty of Hackney residents to afford housing: some are moving to the area, whereas those already there are faring much worse on this equation. What can be seen is that the poorest are increasingly priced out of areas like Hackney.

Table 6: Average house prices, Hackney, London and England (London Datatstore, 2021)

	Hackney	LONDON	England
	E09000012	E12000007	E92000001
Jan-95	61,297	74,436	53,203
Jan-00	121,135	130,411	75,219
Jan-05	230,551	232,422	158,572
Jan-10	295,824	279,724	174,458
Jan-15	469,391	402,847	202,856
Jan-20	555,696	475,918	247,970
Jan-21	602,507	503,308	267,711

That London is an expensive city to live in and that this expense is partly due to high land values is widely accepted. The London Assembly (an elected body, which scrutinises the activities of the Mayor of London) recognises that the city as a whole is an expensive city to live in, in part because of high childcare and transport, being two key costs. Part of this is attributed to the high land values. Of course, if the cost of living goes up, other costs like childcare must too (London Assembly, 2021).

We can see that this massive rise in land value has created wealth for some. But that rise in wealth has been accompanied hand in hand with poor living standards for many. The figures of poverty in the city do not show a city that is a wealthy one. Over 1 in 6 Londoners, including 3 in 10 children, live in persistent poverty; 13% of pensioners in the city live in material deprivation, double the UK rate. Between 2005/6 and 2019/20, the number of rough sleepers in the city almost quadrupled, according to records (London Assembly, 2021).

This section has shown clearly escalating property prices. These property prices have outpaced earnings growth. But, further, in the data is also the story that, whilst property price to earnings ratio has risen, within those earnings will be people whose earnings have barely grown. Some of the earnings growth will relate to those who have moved in. All of this suggests that areas like Hackney have become increasingly expensive for those who live there. In the following section, we will see the relationship between access to housing and political autonomy.

6.2.1 House prices and political autonomy

As described in Chapter 2, the capability approach is a conceptual framework that can be used to frame individual wellbeing, evaluate and assess social arrangements, and design policies and other spaces for social change (Robeyns, 2017, p.24). By focusing on what people are able to do and be, the capability approach poses a challenge to more standard ways of evaluating a societal arrangement. Regarding housing policy, the capability approach can be used in this arena in two ways: firstly, to evaluate a given situation: people's access to housing. The second is by attempting to understand the nature of sources of capability deprivation and inequity. The capability approach allows for a shift away from the focus of housing that has traditionally been on material and monetary resources (Kimhur, 2020, pp.262-263).

Housing and the spatial elements of people's lives also appear key to most capability theories. After all, people exist somewhere. As such, housing and access to space can be seen as key to other elements of living. The UN links housing to work, education, health and security (UN-Habitat, 2021). The provision of adequate housing speaks to living dignified lives (OHCHR, 2021).

In Nussbaum's central capabilities, we find both "adequate shelter" and "being able to hold property" (2003, p.42). As discussed in Chapter 2, the capability approach evaluates the beings and doings that people have. These beings and doings are split into capabilities and functionings. As Kimhur (2020, p.266) describes, we can understand housing as both: housing can be seen linguistically to straddle both noun and verb, material object and the activity of housing.

Yet, housing has become subject to increasing financialisation. It has become "a commodity, a means of accumulating wealth and often as security for financial instruments" (UNHRC cited in Boram, 2020, p.257). In London, house prices have grown rapidly in both absolute terms and in terms of the ratio to earnings (ONS, 2021). In cities like London, booming house prices can be seen as a sign of a market in demand, a positive thing. But with rising prices comes an impact on those who do not benefit from those rises in wealth.

The two views of the role of the city explored in Chapter 5; the expansion of capabilities of its citizens, or as node of global capital. In that chapter, Lefebvre's use of the Marxist distinction between use and exchange value was explored. Exchange value is the value of something as it is being exchanged, as with commodities. Use value is the value that something has in its use, like a playground or a good view. This distinction is useful when observing the two modes of the city described, and property uses in cities like London. The financialisation of property shows how much housing is being used for its exchange value, creating pressure on its use value.

In section 6.1, the rise of the global city was argued to be accompanied by a rise in firms and individuals who owned property in big global cities like London. Likewise, that London and other

cities' property was used for their stability in property markets; London property, including housing used for its exchange value. We can see from Table 6 that London housing is doing well on this understanding. Absolute prices are rising. Housing on the exchange value metric is, in London, performing well.

On the other hand, we will remember the distinction Lefebvre makes. Use value is an alternative metric. For the dweller of the house, on the other hand, there is use value. The capability approach helps explore this. As Kimhur demonstrates, using a capabilities framework, we can understand many things that are valuable in providing people with the space to live good lives, that exchange value will struggle to pick up, including the ability to live and do so in a healthy environment. Housing is also linked to being able to work and generate income, as well as income levels after paying for housing (Kimhur, 2020, p.269).

Between the UN-Habitat report extolling the reasons for enshrining a right to adequate housing and the UNHCR report on how housing is increasingly part of a financialising process, we can see the tension between the two. The exchange value of housing is rising, being pushed by London attracting foreign investment and global companies. This makes using housing for all the capability-enhancing reasons cited by Kimhur (2020) more challenging to achieve.

Housing and Political Autonomy

The primary target of this thesis is the impact of globalisation on the political autonomy of citizens and the sheltering/enhancing role of the city. Namely, a concern regarding people's ability to legis-

late over the space and political environment in which they live. There are various ways that we might understand housing prices relating to political autonomy:

People's ability to have control over their own space.

The economics of paying more for housing: we either work more to keep the same preference set, in which case we have less time or work the same amount and have less to spend on other things. We have less freedom in a market-governed space.

The capability approach is a valuable framework for a number of reasons. In part, it highlights how it is not merely what exists, what architectural assets, or new flats, buildings or space in general. Instead, we are invited to ask how different individuals have access to it. In this instance, citizens in areas of London like Hackney might find it increasingly difficult to achieve a reasonable living standard, where property prices and rent are being driven up by the use of housing as an asset.

The capability approach can help highlight differing individuals' abilities to access such space. Alongside this, we are also invited to look at the relationship between space, justice and injustice, ways in which spatial segregation occurs in the urban environment (Frediani, 2015, pp.65-66). One way we can understand the relationship between housing and political autonomy is simply in a just arrangement of space. In Chapter 4, I used Garrett Brown's model of effective autonomy where, "The ability to reasonably achieve the intended or desired result of one's conscience and self-legis-lation in a social context" (Brown, 2009, pp.156-157).

Effective autonomy was shown to be reliant on aspect capacity, "the ability to formulate, hold and act upon an individual's social conscience based on external elements (aspects or facets for external freedom) affecting the development of one's co-legislative capabilities" (Brown, 2009, p.157).

The ability to legislate then was critical to the individual's development when people could not afford to buy or rent houses easily. When they need to move away from their friends and family, and when these things disproportionately affect groups of people with low income, we can see this as an unfair distribution of space in which people have to live. In the context of cities, it is hard to think of an understanding of political autonomy that does not in some way rely on an ability to have some space to live. If one has to move out of the neighbourhood, or the neighbourhood becomes increasingly expensive, then it, of course, impacts the resources we have to legislate.

Further, if we attempt to stay in an area with rising costs, our political autonomy is curbed because we must cut back on other things, or else we have to work more to achieve the same basket of options. Either way, our political autonomy, understood as our ability to legislate and have some kind of control over the space in which we live, is diminished when the movement of global capital creates rises in rent and house prices in the areas in which we live.

6.3. Politics, technology, data and decision making

The impact of global capital and development on London property prices seems clear. A second, related, issue will now be examined: how decision making in London kept pace, as technological development has enhanced the ability to express and monitor preferences.

As described in Chapter 4, we can see that it has now become increasingly possible to gather, store and monitor people's preferences. Companies like Acxiom, Experian and Datalogix have accrued vast amounts of information. One database alone has 1.4 billion data points (Moore, 2018, pp.59-61). This gathering of information by private companies is now well documented. Companies like Facebook and Google have become some of the biggest companies ever, powered by their understanding of user preferences. This has led to micro-profiling in consumer behaviour and political parties in elections (Bartlett, 2018). What this shows is that there exist technologies that can gather preferences.

Further, this is being used by private companies and political parties to pursue their goals; expanded revenue and becoming elected. Further, this expanded ability to gather and utilise information is, undoubtedly, producing real change. In 2016, the UK's decision to leave the European Union sent shockwaves around the world. It has been described as a precursor to the Trump election win in the US. Leave campaign funder Aaron Banks claimed it was AI that won it for them. Few deny that the US and EU campaigns were seriously impacted by technology (Moore, 2018, p.67).

As was also described in Chapter 4, this technological development, accompanied by deregulated capital, creates an environment in which a very small number of people can affect large numbers of others. The affected people have little recourse. Chapters 4 and 5 then explained how we could partly understand this as a deficit for the affected people to control their environment. A threat exists to the political autonomy of citizens, where there is an expanded ability to take advantage of these dual phenomena (technology and deregulated capital) for some, an increased likelihood of being at the mercy of such phenomena by others.

Technological capacity could be used in cities like London for greater political participation. Such participation could even help counter the phenomena discussed, allowing more significant decision making input to local preferences. We will remember from Chapter 4 that effective autonomy and, in turn, aspect capacity require that an agent take part in a process, which allows for the expression of that which they can "formulate, hold and act upon" (Brown, 2009, p.157). The technology available could, in part, allow for citizens to engage in meaningful deliberation about the space in which we might consider their need for legislation to exist.

But, our democratic institutions have not kept pace with these developments. These democratic institutions were in part shaped by another period of technological development: the Industrial Revolution. They were shaped in this period because the Industrial Revolution created an environment in which labour could organise. The new supply of energy, which powered the revolution, accompanied a radical shift in societal organisation. The wave of technological development described in this thesis has drawn comparisons with the Industrial Revolution due partly to how seismic the changes could be to many areas of life. The new revolution is in part fuelled by data and information, which are both consumed and exchanged. Information, of course, flows much more quickly now. With these dramatic shifts created by technological development, one might expect that our institutions need to follow suit. The internet could be seen as providing an opportunity to help develop democratic participation and fill this void (Contucci et al., 2019, pp.V-VI).

This sentiment can be felt in the following statement, shared by London borough Lewisham council, which describes how, though we can bank, study, communicate globally with others: "One area that seems to have remained impervious to these benefits is our model of democratic governance, which has remained largely unchanged since it was invented in the 20th century" (Nesta, 2021).

Even how we vote seems at odds with how we live much of the rest of our lives (Nesta, 2020).

Though that which surrounds our democratic system has been radically reshaped, the processes

themselves have not. This has been argued to have led 47% of British citizens to describe feeling

like they have no say over local politics (Nesta, 2020). A professed desire for strong participation

can be found in the SDGs. Goal 16 calls explicitly for "responsive, inclusive, and participatory and

representative decision-making at all levels" (Stockholm Environment Institute, 2019).

An alternative level of everyday participation is possible with modern technology. However, as yet,

in London, like the rest of the UK, it has not arrived. This is so, even as a more democratic partici-

pation through digital engagement seems possible. This is due to the low entry barrier and the vast

scalability of programmes (UNICEF, 2020, p.3). Support for a greater enabling of digital democra-

cy comes from a wide range of places, receiving enthusiastic support from sources as opposing as

government officials and libertarians, from Liberal individualistic digital democracy, deliberative

digital democracy, counter-publics digital democracy and autonomist Marxist digital democracy.

The possibilities of digital democracy to offer a more deliberative space have been discussed for

some time and have been linked to Habermas's work on deliberative democracy. In part, the prom-

ise of the internet, and contemporary computing, is the possibility of a two-way, low-cost space for

information sharing (Dahlberg, 2011, pp.2-9).

Managing information flows is integral to any democratic environment. Since the late twentieth

century, information and communication technologies have affected society much more in general.

The term Digital Transformation (DX) has been used to describe such changes. Looking at informa-

tion management has drawn comparisons with how Athenian democracy is depicted based on trans-

parent and inconclusive knowledge management processes. Digital Transformation affects communities, allowing the development of both local and global organising. One reason to look to Athenian democracy for examples of pursuing a better digital democracy is how Athens excelled at "organising useful knowledge". Delivering democratic self-governance has been argued to be possible, in part by using "…openness, transparency and inclusivity in these knowledge management systems." (Diaconescu et al. 2017. p38 - p44)

There have been high hopes for expanding democratic capacity due to the internet, but they have largely not been seen in many countries. The internet was expected by many to expand participation in democratic decision making. A development which promise "to host and extend all that participation, expression, and social connection" (Gillespie, 2018, p5). A UK parliament enquiry was set up to look at the internet, digital voting and issues around the digital divide. In 2015, the Digital Democracy Commission (DDC) report said that the digital revolution had disrupted and posed a serious challenge to representative democracy.

The report had five aims:

1. By 2020, the House of Commons should ensure that everyone can understand what it does.

2. By 2020, Parliament should be fully interactive and digital.

3. The 2015 newly elected House of Commons should create a new forum immediately for public participation in the debating function of the House of Commons.

4. By 2020, secure online voting should be an option for all voters.

5. By 2016, all published information and broadcast footage produced by Parliament should be freely available online informants suitable or re-use. Hansard should be available as open data by the end of 2015 (Digital Democracy Commission, 2021).

These are the aims set by the House of Commons, yet, except for the 5th, they have not been met. When it comes to formal legislation, in the form of democratic processes, London and the UK have barely moved forward. Yet the citizens of London are, for the most part, both: a) expressing preferences regularly when using phones and laptops, and b) subject to forces that are harnessing such technology.

Conclusion

In a move towards the city of capabilities described in Chapter 5, there are two key issues described in this chapter:

The ability of local people to have more control over their space.
The expansion of deliberative and decision-making space, using contemporary technology

In Chapter 5, two modes of understanding the role of the city were depicted. Firstly, the city of capabilities. Such a city has at its core an aim to expand the capabilities of those living in it. In order to preserve such space for capability expansion, citizens must be able to come together in mutual legislation. As described in chapters 3 and 4, such legislation is not merely for communicating preferences. The space to legislate is itself part of what allows the citizen to develop. The second mode

of understanding the city is that of the city as node of global capital. On this understanding, the city is open to global forces, and faith is put in such forces. Local political autonomy is not a goal.

In London, we can see a city with much of its space prioritised by exchange rather than use value. In order to preserve London as both a global city and a liveable city, a balance must be struck between market forces and the needs of citizens living locally. This chapter has shown that global markets have radically shaped London's housing market in a way that has undermined how liveable the city is for its residents.

This has happened due to several phenomena:

Space is being bought up and used as assets for global companies.

The culture and salaries these companies bring, and the distortions this adds to local markets.

The use of London space as a safe asset.

These three phenomena have combined to produce a London housing market increasingly out of reach for many London citizens. This has had the effect of: a) making it harder to stay living in an area and b) where people can have space, making it more expensive for them to cover basic living costs. This, in turn, diminishes their choices beyond paying for housing. Cumulatively, this can be seen as a diminishing of citizens' political autonomy and, in turn, an increase in the ability to affect London space by others, which are not based there, using, to take Lefebvre's distinction, the city for its exchange rather than use value.

This was described alongside the rise in he ability of companies to gather people's private information, preferences and data. This has increased such companies' ability to run an international business and also affect elections. In London and the UK, this has not been accompanied by increased transparency, space for deliberation or participation politically.

All of this means that the relationship between London citizens and global capital has been an uneven one. London citizens have seen a diminishing in political autonomy, whilst the city has developed global capital. In order to mitigate this, it is argued that decision-making processes ought to be reconfigured, taking advantage of contemporary technology and offering space for radically different decision-making processes. Such processes would be developed around the needs of the citizens living in London. This would involve the transparency of information. At the same time, with regard to housing, in particular, it ought to be recognised that such global capital movements threaten citizens' ability to have control over their own space. As such, steps should be taken to empower citizens and mitigate against the threats described caused by roving global capital. By using this data on London housing, and empirical findings on the use of technology for decision making, the central arguments of this thesis can be seen at play.

Chapter 7: Intervening in Markets and Using Technology to Expand Space for Local Autonomy in the City of Capabilities

The city of capabilities is predicated on a driving notion that the city is a key space for human development. As has been shown, cities are increasingly the spaces in which people live. Clarifying the goals of cities is then increasingly important. But it may be asked what does this look like in practice? Chapter 5 described the difference between the city of capabilities and the city as the interface of markets. Chapter 6 used London as a case study to indicate how globalising forces impinge upon a key capability, political autonomy. Two aspects of globalisation and the city were looked at: property prices and housing, and how technology is expanding potential space for decision making and political participation. This chapter will look at examples of existing policies, groups and ideas situated in cities as a potential response to some of the issues put forward in this thesis. Some of these solutions, or part solutions, point to how the twenty-first-century city can cope with, and flourish within, a globally interconnected economy. In order to provide opportunities for citizens to co-legislate adequately, cities require local protective measures. Such measures need to be embedded in such a way as to protect and enhance capabilities in relation to the positives and negatives of global forces.

Across the world, cities are seeing interventions in the course they are taking. For example, in Detroit, New Orleans or Philadelphia, Urban Consulates are being set up, parlours for exchange. At People for Urban Progress in Indianapolis, unwanted goods are recycled for the public good; in Leeds, Playful Anywhere creates playful environments. The Vancouver Public Space Network is an organisation whose aim is to tackle the growing corporatisation in the city. These projects all represent a collection of groups aimed at developing cities beyond mere economic nodes, rather than a

corporate top-down model or that of grassroots only. We can see "rapidly emerging constellations of connected experiments that sit between and within all of these" (Chatterton, 2019, pp.2-4).

Cities and nations are finding mechanisms to increase participation in decision making. This chapter will look at some of the solutions found in cities worldwide to help ameliorate some of the issues found in this thesis, with a focus on housing and decision making in cities.

In section 7.1, I will continue the theme developed in Chapter 5: housing and space as key components of political autonomy. In this section, I will draw upon policy practices in Singapore, Berlin and Bilbao. By doing so, and touching upon housing commitments in the UK, we can see that: a) cities' commitments to housing already recognise that housing cannot be left to markets and b) cities recognise the wide-reaching effects of good and bad housing.

In section 7.2, I will go on to look at participation in city decision making, using Calgary's Engage project, Barcelona's Decidum and Decide Madrid as prime examples of how contemporary technology could be used to make decision making in cities more inclusive. In this section, I will outline a notion of Technopolitics, which is helpful in critiquing ideas around Smart Cities. In section 7.3, I will briefly argue why the City Of Capabilities must have at its core a commitment to sustainability.

7.1. Keeping homes affordable and maintaining their links to other capabilities

As discussed in Chapter 6, housing is key to the expansion of people's capabilities in a way that is both simple and complex. Simple, in that people require a place to stay, the "adequate shelter" of Nussbaum's central capabilities (2003, p.42). Complex in the way in which housing plays into a

wide range of other areas of life. For instance, being adequately nourished, literate and free of disease are linked to more complex functionings. We see this in the way that being educated to elementary level is very difficult to achieve without being able to participate in society (Mehrotra cited in Frediana et al., 2019, p.365). As well as access to schooling, access to jobs (including commuting times), security, amenities, open space and transport links, where we live plays a crucial role in our access to many other essential things, which relate to our ability to live in a dignified fashion (UN-Habitat, 2021; UNCHR, 2021). The capability approach helps us shift away from the traditional focus on housing, which is predominantly material in nature (Kimhur, 2020, pp.262-263).

Providing good affordable housing is a challenge facing all countries and in particular fast-growing cities. Hence the issue's appearance on the UN's urban agenda (Shelter, 2018, p.i). Of the 36 OECD countries taking part in the 2019 and 2016 OECD Questionnaire on Affordable and Social Housing, 31 reported policy objectives that target people with disabilities, seven that target seniors, 27 that target families and children, 26 that target youth, 26 the homeless, and 16 that target cultural or ethnic groups (OECD, 2019). The World Bank calls on cities to prepare for the future, and, when doing so, to consider "spatial inclusion" and social and economic inclusion (World Bank, 2021a). Successful cities are intimately linked with human capital (Glaeser, 2012, p.223); housing is key to cities being liveable.

In this section, I will sketch some alternative ways in which housing in cities has been protected from forces of globalisation. Chapter 5 used the Marxist distinction of use and exchange value via Lefebvre to highlight the issues arising from such methods. In Chapter 6, this was placed within a case study on housing and property in London. Global speculation on housing and the movement of large international companies to London were given as two key reasons why house prices for those

living in London have dramatically shifted in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. This chapter will demonstrate some of the different approaches to protecting housing in cities from such forces.

7.1.1 Global markets and local housing policy

As Chapter 6 showed, one key aspect of housing provision is the relationship between markets and governments. Of course, the roles of both local and national governments differ across countries and even within them. This difference helps to show the normative space for housing, i.e. how housing provision is affected by differing ideological positions.

One of the most significant aspects of twentieth-century politics and at the heart of the welfare state was the development of a national sense of responsibility for housing (Therborn, 2017, p.172). Amongst countries with welfare states, widely differing ideas of the role of government in such provision can be found. Some provide housing to be seen as for only the working classes (like the UK), whereas others, such as those in Scandinavia, provide public housing aimed at a broader cross-section of society. Singapore in 2009 homed 82% of the population in publicly built (but individually owned) housing (Therborn, 2017, p.172). In Austria, social housing makes up 23 % of housing stock, and 80-90% of the population are eligible. In the Netherlands, an even more prominent role exists, with 40% overall and 57% in cities like Rotterdam (Shelter, 2018, p.iii). In Vienna, 80% of the population rent (Shelter, 2018, p.1). In Denmark, cooperative housing has pioneered the provision of individual homes, with shared facilities like eating together. This has appealed to young families and older people who want to avoid living alone (Shelter, 2018, p.9). So, whilst there is general agreement across these societies that the state should be involved in housing, there

is disagreement about the extent. Welfare states have also utilised mixed housing to avoid social polarisation (Therborn, 2017, p173). The distinctions in such mixed spaces are sometimes subtle and sometimes not. For instance, there have been separate entrances for the affordable housing tenants and the market value tenants (Therborn, 2017, pp.173-174).

Whilst the provision of housing differs from city to city, cities tend to have a commitment to providing good housing for their citizens. Within these visions, we can see a commitment to housing beyond its role as shelter. This is important, as it shows that even openly capitalist countries tend to agree that housing cannot be left purely to markets.

In the UK, we find the following strategy statements from Leeds, Manchester and London. In Leeds, we find a commitment to "Effectively meeting affordable and social housing need, promoting independence and creating sustainable communities to make Leeds the best place to live" (Leeds City Council. 2021). Manchester's housing strategy aims at creating "successful neighbourhoods that are well connected to areas of future opportunity and employment, and which attract and retain people from diverse communities where people feel secure and can reach their full potential" (Manchester City Council. 2021). London's housing, as discussed in Chapter 6, has been dramatically affected in recent years and is described as the greatest challenge facing the city today (London Assembly, 2021). Part of the city's strategy relies on house building and more normative commitments such as creating inclusive neighbourhoods, fairer deals for renters and leaseholders, and tackling homelessness.

Despite these commitments, and the significance of housing supply to the national economy and general wellbeing, UK housebuilding has long been associated with a lack of supply, fragmented

industry structure, overall risk-averse attitudes, a general reluctance to innovation, skills shortages, a slow take-up of sustainability and a less-than-responsive planning system. These features, coupled with the recent sharp economic downturn, impose significant challenges (Goodier, 2010).

Across cities and nations, government roles in housing differ, but there is broad agreement that it cannot be left purely to markets, and that housing has a value beyond shelter. The following section will look at three examples of different market interventions – local solutions to housing issues.

7.1.2 Intervening in house prices – Singapore and Bilbao

One fundamental way local and national governments can counter the threat that global markets pose to citizens' ability to find quality housing is to find mechanisms that allow for market intervention. One approach is to make it more expensive for those with foreign capital to buy property, as in Singapore. Singapore's approach is to add a duty of 15%, under what is known as the Additional Buyers Stamp Duty. This is then reinvested as a housing subsidy in an attempt to stave off inflation. Here we see a direct intervention that utilises the market interest in Singapore to help subsidise the public provision of housing. Eighty percent of the population currently live in publicly governed and developed housing. So far, this approach, reliant on state leadership in the housing market, has helped keep the housing market stable compared to elsewhere in the international housing market (Shelter, 2018, pp.5-6).

The Singaporean government also has a land acquisition act. The act allowed Singapore to buy land based on two broad principles:

1. No private landowner should benefit from development at public expenses;

2. The price paid on acquisition for public purposes should not be higher than what the land would have been worth had the government not contemplated development generally in the area (Shelter, 2018, p.6).

This act helped the Housing and Development Board of Singapore own 90% of land by 2002. Singapore is not directly comparable to most cities in that it is a city-state, and the policies described may reflect a particular political and economic history. Nevertheless, the two policies show direct ways governments can intervene in housing markets to create local stability amidst global demand.

Another example of the state being more involved in house building is in Bilbao, where efforts are taken to ensure affordable housing is possible: 75% of new housing must be affordable. Affordable housing is set at 150,000 Euros, around seven times average earnings. This intervention has been credited with enabling Bilbao to avoid some of the over-speculation on housing which has affected other Spanish cities (Shelter, 2018, p.27)..

7.1.3 Government intervention in rents – Berlin

Another way to use legislation is to make profiting from housing rents more difficult. In Germany, a combination of powers is given to local states to do this, including the ability to impose rent capping and public rent subsidies. Federal law allows states to impose a 15% rent rise cap over three years. This was first utilised in Berlin. In Germany, there is also a policy to help subsidise rent. Around 13% of housing receives these subsidies (Shelter, 2018, pp.13 - 14). The Mietpreisbremse

or "rental price brake" was introduced by then Chancellor Angela Merkel at the federal level in 2015. By 2020, 12 of the 16 German federal states had opted to use the brake (Hahn, 2021, p.7).

In February of 2020, a more radical piece of legislation was enacted in Berlin: the Mitteneckel, or rent freeze. As opposed to the Mietpreisbremse, which may be understood as second-generation rent control, due to its focus on limiting rent increases, the Mietpreisbremse focuses on absolute demanded rent price. Since 1919, when rent controls were introduced in Baden and Prussia, they have been at the federal level. Berlin's move in 2020 is the first case of such a policy being imposed at the state or sub-federal level (Hahn, 2021, p.1).

The policy received attention nationally and internationally, with London Mayor Sadiq Khan speculating on adopting similar policies. The freeze is based on a maximum cost per square metre. There is flexibility to allow for things like differences in prices based on area. Undercutting the maximum cost is permitted, but exceeding it can lead to sanctions. Interestingly, movements following the freeze have been reported as normal, yet rent prices have dropped by between 7 and 11% (Hahn, 2021, pp.1-2).

Berlin, unlike many English-speaking cities, is dominated by rental housing. Around 24% of housing is public housing or housing cooperatives, with 150,000 housing units owned by institutional investors. Berlin has long been perceived as having low rents and living costs, made possible in large part by large public subsidies and investments. Compared to other German (and many other European) cities, rents have been considered to be low. By making it more difficult to increase rents dramatically, the problem of finding affordable housing is attacked from two fronts: firstly, rents are less likely to be exclusionary. That is, rents have some weight holding them back from becoming

unattainable for renters. Secondly, the idea of buying housing as an asset form becomes less attractive (if still, in many cases, very attractive).

In Singapore, Berlin and Bilbao, then, we can see attempts to tackle the effects of global property speculation through government intervention in markets locally. Each intervention aims at offering a counterweight to property being bought as assets. All three cities and their policies are examples of how local authorities might look to take some of the issues surrounding housing and rising costs due to being part of global markets into their own hands, creating local solutions which return at least some autonomy in the relationship between global and local, back to the local

7.1.4 More space for local decision making – Vienna

In section 7.2, we will focus more clearly on participation in the city. But, of course, participation can be strongly linked to property and physical space in the city. One example of a participatory process which plays into how housing policy develops is in Vienna. In Vienna, there are 220,000 municipal housing units and an additional 200,000 subsidised housing units. The city of Vienna is the largest landlord in the city. Aside from this, around 650,000 homes are limited profit and form most of the rest of the city's housing. The city has a Mietermitbestimmungsstatut or tenant's participation statute. This lays down the terms between the city of Vienna and its residents. Through this, tenants have participation rights with regard to maintenance costs, utilities and housing management in order to preserve a sense of ownership and control over their living environment (Shelter, 2018, pp.1-2).

Participation in decision making around space and housing is important. As cities develop and populations create more density, difficult planning decisions must be made between the demand for housing and commercial density, with openness and citywide interests with local communities (Fuchs, 2012, p.49). When thinking of participation, of course, time and size are significant issues (Pearce, 2010, p.3). Therefore as city populations expand, there is further reason to check that participatory processes are working.

Taken together, we can see that local governments can look to both interventions in markets and expanding participation in decision making to maintain a level of autonomy and access to housing locally. This is of particular interest for its own sake, as housing is key to other elements of our political autonomy, including access to work, education and socialising.

When cities have local policies, ownership and decision-making space, they have some manoeuvres to deal with these global forces. By building in policies as seen in Bilbao, Berlin, Singapore and Vienna, the city can participate in the global economy and political community whilst navigating a path that allows local citizens the keyspace necessary for a level of political economy. The examples provided here are not exhaustive, but instead show the space in which local governments can operate to negotiate a relationship between market forces and local decision making.

7.1.5 Local groups occupying space

Another way such a city can be seen to be being developed in multiple locations around the world is how communities are developing methods to communally take over space and buildings. From London's Southbank to Berlin and across the US, models can be seen in many places. Groups like

the East London Trust aim to provide 5000 homes by 2025. In the UK, 52 community pubs have been saved and put into communal ownership. The community land trust in Kenya, in the Voi municipality, is exploring forms of communal land ownership not seen since pre-colonial times. The International Land Coalition has over 200 members in 64 countries (Chatterton, 2019, p.97).

These interventions highlight two things. Firstly, there is an understanding of the need to protect city spaces from global forces. Secondly, that such interventions are possible. In fact, in the cases described, they are not particular avant-garde. The notion that city spaces must be protected from global forces is understood. Using the city of capabilities framing and the capability approach framework, such on-the-ground understanding can be framed. By giving language to such action, we can draw what is opposed: the city as a (mere) node of global capital.

7.2. Using tech for political participation and going beyond the Smart City

Chapter 4 explained how technology has developed in such a way as to allow for the expansion of information processing. Such information can be collected, stored, managed and utilised to understand people's preferences better. This phenomenon is at the heart of a tectonic shift in the way people are marketed, which has swung elections, and created upheavals across a wide range of industries, from travel, to transport, house buying to day-to-day shopping. Almost no area of life has remained unaffected by this vast new potential to manage information and develop complex pictures of people from their inputs and behaviour online.

That chapter demonstrated that political autonomy is predicated on a sense that we co-legislate with others. Co-legislation was shown to be a part of how we develop as fully as we can. It could be ex-

pected that those same forces being used to gather preferences so widely in commercial spheres are being applied to our democratic space. We are gathering preferences and building models of what collections of those preferences mean for our co-authored space, our political sphere. In Chapter 6, however, focusing on London, it was shown that the use of ICT in the democratic sphere had not kept pace with the expansion of ICT for commercial purposes.

In Chapter 4, I described this state as *expanded immediacy*. That is, that online space has created a new, vastly more interconnected and immediate network of communication between people. As such, this new space and spatial arrangement require that we take the non-democratic use of information and information management seriously, and look at how this newly expanded capacity to gather information might apply to our democratic spaces and stem the flow of their being crowded out by vast expansions of information and preference gathering in the non-democratic space of commercial organisations.

At the nexus of the city and modern ICT lies the idea of the Smart City. The Smart City understands the city as a space where modern tech can deliver significant efficiencies, providing solutions from environmental to cost-cutting, participation and service delivery.

But within discussion of the future city lies a divide that highlights the tensions running through this thesis. ICT has made possible much greater levels of communication and mapping of preferences and behaviours. But, at the same time, this process can consolidate power. In this section, I will discuss this tension, highlighting the different understandings of the role of technology, primarily through highlighting elements of Smart City discourse and an alternative, that of Technopolitics.

Technopolitics and the Smart City: tech for management or deliberation?

Since at least the 1950s and the expansion of computing, urban development and the digital realm have become ever more intertwined (Cardullo et al., 2019, p.2). Computers were increasingly used to store and process city administration through the second half of the twentieth century. Academics also used systems to model and look at areas of urban living, such as transportation scenarios. In the late 1960s, the idea arose of the city as a system of systems that might be optimised (Forrester cited in Cardullo et al., 2019). As personal computers became more widespread in the 1980s and 1990s, cities utilised computers more and more to administer and deliver services. As the internet grew in the 1990s and 2000s, these computers became increasingly networked. This led to a significant investment in e-governance (Castells cited in Cardullo et al., 2019) and the widespread proliferation of networked infrastructures such as traffic management and surveillance systems (Lyon cited in Cardullo et al., 2019).

Table 7: Smart technologies in city spaces

Much thinking about the interface between modern ICT and urban spaces is encapsulated in the idea of the Smart City. This notion of engaging modern technologies in cities is key to ideas of the Smart City. Modern technology and technology companies have, through the Smart City, been utilised globally in urban government agencies and planning scenarios. They are often presented as ways to increase efficiencies and economic development and increase participation (Levanda et al., 2020, p.2). At the same time, uses of big data, AI and the Internet of Things have moved beyond technologies we merely access into regular features of life (Hitachi, 2020, p.xi). Discourse around the Smart City has dominated discussion around digital technologies and governance in research, policy and practice (Marvin et al., 2015).

Domain	Example Technologies
Government	E-government systems, online transactions, city operating systems, performance management systems. urban dashboards
Security and emergency services	Centralized control rooms, digital surveillance, predictive policing, coordinated emergency response
Transport	Intelligent transport systems, integrated ticketing, smart travel cards, bikeshare, real-time passenger information, smart parking, logistics management, transport apps, dynamic road signs, mobility apps, share-ride services
Energy	Smart grids, smart meters, energy usage apps, smart lighting
Waste	Compactor bins and dynamic routing/collection
Environment	IoT sensor networks (e.g., pollution, noise, weather, land movement, flood management), dynamically responsive interventions (e.g., automated flood defenses)
Buildings	Building management systems, sensor networks
Homes	Smart meters, app-controlled smart appliances, digital personal assistants

Source: Kitchin (2016).

At the heart of Smart Cities is essentially the search to improve city life through the application of digital technology. This is through applying such tech to "the management and delivery of city services and infrastructures and solving urban issues" (Cardullo et al., 2019. p2). Examples of this can be seen above in Table 7.

Modern technology undoubtedly offers some expansion of capabilities. One vision of the future is that technology could even lead to the ability to organise in such a way as to create a more decentralised and autonomous city. It is this vision that led the Japanese government in 2017 to write about a Society 5.0 where:

"…the vision of future society tow[ard] which… we should aspire, will be a human-centred society that, through the high degree of merging between cyberspace and physical space, will be able to balance economic advancement with the resolution of social problems by providing goods and services that granularly address manifold latent needs." (Hitachi, 2020, p.xii).

Part of this discourse is the notion that, as technology develops, public city spaces are behind the curve. The public sector is placed as the broker, developing relationships with private providers where expertise can be found (Cardullo et al., 2019, p.6), whilst companies seek to find value.

A key critique of the Smart City discourse is that governance of cities often becomes public-private partnerships dominated by corporate technology. A particular logic flows from this set-up, where corporate technology often installs and runs platforms. Such platform technocracy is critiqued for the opacity of decision making, which denies the existence of the politics beneath (Martin and Smith, 2021, p.313). This critique sees the Smart City as essentially a continuation of the neoliberalisation of the city, helping drive values like competitiveness, inward investment, productivity and efficiency (March and Ribera-Fumaz, 2014), where entrepreneurship is prized above democratic concerns like the rights that accompany being a citizen of the city (Kitchin et al. cited in Martin and Smith, 2021, p.313).

Smart cities are understood in various ways to be an attempt to improve cities by integrating improved data management possibilities into how cities function. This might mean improving efficiencies, competitiveness, issues around poverty, environment and social deprivation (Batty et al., 2012, p.483). But smart cities, like much of technology, throw up questions around consent, data management and participation. In taking participation seriously, we ought to be careful around our

use of data. We ought to be aware that observing what people do, is not necessarily to capture what they would like to do, or their potential. Developing technologies that create widespread participation then ought to be a goal of the uses of smart technology (Batty et al., 2012, p.485). Censors and platforms allow for the gathering and integration of information. Such data can then be monitored, visualised and form the basis of action. Big data is gathered in real time (Martin and Smith, 2021, p.312). Amidst all this, questions arise about how citizens relate to these technologies: how do citizens' rights and priorities interplay with these developments? (Kitchin et al., 2019).

Amidst this, what role for participation? How is the citizen to do more than merely be watched, their data gathered? Smart cities and online engagement are complicated by the mass of online platforms that allow for public expression, but in a way that is not necessarily linked to more meaningful participation (Levanda et al., 2020, p5). Therefore, if the Smart City means more than simply the confluence of existing power structures and new technologies, work must be done to ensure that such technologies are used in a way that is genuinely participatory.

Chapter 3 described how participation for citizens (though not all citizens) was key to the development of what we would now understand as Western political philosophy and, in particular, ideas around democracy. Arnstein's Ladder of Participation (1969) is a model often used to display differing modes of citizen participation at the heart of the civic experience. The model is used to critique tokenistic consultation, where engagement is merely a method of placation (Levanda et al., 2020, p.2). A dichotomy exists between citizen engagement as participation and merely as management through information. This division is at the heart of discussions around the Smart City, where information can be intentionally given or merely collected. We are minded of Arnstein' description of the tokenism of consultation in which: "What citizens achieve in all this activity is that they have

'participated in participation.' And what powerholders achieve is the evidence that they have gone through the required motions of involving 'those people'." (Arnstein, 1969, p.219).

Smart participation, of course, needs to go beyond the superficial. Levanda et al. found that smart participation could be superficial, more so than in-person dialogue. This is, of course, a criticism of contemporary political activism generally. The ease of online political action means that the level of commitment may be lower than when barriers are higher, for instance, when attending a protest or town meeting. But in-person meetings have their barriers, raising questions around who can be there in person (2020, p13). There are also digital divides that mean that not everybody has the necessary resources or skills to access online space. This is a serious concern, and, as discussed in Chapter 6, governments ought to take it seriously and create systems that people are educated to understand. When creating ICT systems to be part of our democratic frameworks, we should be wary that ICT is likely to have a pre-existing relationship with existing power structures. The same things that concern us should remain with us as we look to greater participation in democratic processes locally. As they say, "digital technologies can be helpful tools for organising and activating communities, but not replacements for the hard work needed to ensure inclusion and empowerment" (Levanda et al., 2020, p.13). In the following section, I will look at the idea of Technopolitics, which aims to place contested ideas of democracy and deliberation at the heart of city uses of tech.

Technopolitics

Elsewhere in this thesis, I have described how there is much work on how cities spatialise power and the uses of capital, and how cities are organised around the movements of capital and desires of

those with it. In this mode of critical urban theory, we can understand cities as "major basing points for the production, circulation, and consumption of commodities", as well as themselves being intensely commodified (Brenner et al. cited in Cardullo et al., 2019, p.5). This operation of cities is for the relative few, who control the means of production and reproduce inequalities (Harvey and Sassen cited in Cardullo et al., 2019.). A process which adds to accumulation (Harvey cited in Cardullo et al., 2019) and enclosure (De Angelis cited in Cardullo et al., 2019.)

The Smart City can be seen to begin as a corporate agenda aimed at expanding markets for IT. Since then, it has grown to become a potential encompassing vision for tackling city issues as diverse as sustainability, mobility and health. But the implementation of the Smart City has seen city authorities and corporate organisations run into important questions regarding the city, such as where citizens' priorities for their cities fit in and whether and how citizens relate to such tech (Kitchen et al. cited in Cardullo et al., 2019).

Technologies that recognise the lineage of democratic processes as key to urban development can be seen to make explicit what appears implicit at best about many Smart City discussions. In this way, we find the notion of Technopolitics as distinguishable from much Smart City discussion (Martin and Smith, 2021, p.311). From this vantage point, the notion is that much of the discourse around Smart Cities is contested. We might, in this mode, see much Smart City discussion as "bolted onto the neoliberal city" and thus incapable of delivering properly, meaningful democratic participation (Peña-López cited in Martin and Smith, 2021, p.311).

Technopolitics is a discourse that represents the movement of digital democracy platforms, which contrast with those modes described by the Smart City. It is informed by a sociological understand-

ing of technology and seeks more democratic developments of the uses of technology in political space (Kurban et al. cited in Martin and Smith, 2021, p.312). In cities, citizens are often participants, testers who may provide feedback but are rarely in the role of proposer or co-creator, not leading in any meaningful sense. Contrary to this, Technopolitics invites questions of control, representation and participation. Democracy is a key starting point. Technology here is to be critiqued, expected to carry normative elements. Its use is strategic, and aimed at improving the arena of the democratic, with emancipation and decentralisation as goals (Martin and Smith, 2021, p.313).

However, the roots of Technopolitics are not in opposition to the Smart City, but an alternative vision of a contemporary role for technology and the internet, a hacking-free environment of open-source software (FOSS) and the possibilities of culture and knowledge which could be reproduced at almost no cost. A parallel is the rise of corporations' approaches to digitising the city. But Technopolitics is not merely an urban practice, more one predicated on how we should direct this expansion of digital capabilities. Technopolitics is a recognition that tools and tech are never neutral; that assumptions about society are embedded in them (Martin and Smith, 2021, p.313).

Technopolitics then aims not at obscuring the political but raising it to its explicitly democratic state; to use technology to advance democratic aims. This may be through enhanced activism, platforms for citizen debate, coordination and decision-making tools. The technology aims to create space for voice, recognition and to make possible action, including developing the tech itself. It is inspired by Manuel Castells, Yochai Benkler, and others (Martin and Smith, 2021, p.314). Such space aims to provide a network capable of uniting different forms of knowledge and expertise – space for deliberation, but also space for the expression of diverse lives and professional knowledges. The hope is that, rather than see democratic deliberation diminish, it is possible at a scale

never before seen – democracy as process, without outcome (Martin and Smith, 2021, p.314). We must embrace the fact that participation proper is messy. It is political. For this reason, we cannot take a cookie-cutter approach to it (Hammock cited in Biggeri et al., 2019, pp. 40-45), but, instead, have some clarity on the commitments involved.

The commitment is to try and maintain some of the messiness of democracy and deliberation that advocates of Technopolitics espouse. The logic of computational language persists and must be acknowledged. These technologies are placed and understood as a site amidst a broader political struggle (without end). This coding aims to place the contested notions and ways of democracy into existing frameworks of power. This assumption is based on the notion that technology may be developed democratically, which is an inherent but perhaps a necessary weak spot in Technopolitics (Martin and Smith, 2021, p.314).

Two diverging roads

We can see emerging two distinct uses of information technology. On the one hand, databases, sensing networks and apps (Cardullo and Kitchen cited in Martin and Smith, 2021) for gathering information on the behaviours, movements and choices of citizens. And, on the other hand, platforms that aim at creating more participation (Calzado cited in Martin and Smith, 2021), where possibilities aim to catch more of the arguably expansive elements of citizens' lives.

The ability to gather citizens' preferences, experiences and thoughts has been expanded in many ways. But the job of creating democratic processes for such modes of information gathering and expression will require an immense amount of work if they are really to aim at being systems of

participation. In the following section, we look at three examples of technology being used to expand deliberative space.

Calgary, Madrid and Barcelona: three examples of technological development and the expansion of space for deliberation

In terms of developing platforms, we might look to Calgary's Engage project. The project strapline is "Meaningful Dialogue. Informed Decisions" (Engage, 2021). The website explains that:

"This site, the Engage portal, was established to provide Calgarians with an online space to learn about and participate in City projects and initiatives that are open for public input.

Within the Engage portal, you can:

• Provide feedback on projects that are currently open for input.

• Learn about upcoming in-person public engagement events.

• Find out what we heard from participants on projects previously open for input.

• Check the progress of ongoing projects.

• Discover what final decisions were made on projects that had public involvement."

The project has led to upwards of 50,000 pieces of engagement, compared to 200 attendees consulted at a typical event. By going online and building a bespoke platform to create space for participation, Calgary's Engage project opens up issues and space for dialogue and views from new perspectives. In this way, it has been argued that being online can create a more diverse set of views for Engage (Levanda et al., 2020, pp.6-7).

In a second project in Calgary, Levanda et al. studied participatory budgeting in which Calgarians were asked how they might help manage city finances via an online app (2020, p.7). This type of project demonstrates the exciting inroads that could be made in the creation of a more participatory civic space. Many citizens are used to utilising such technology for inputting preferences concerning personal spending. To invite them to use such a method to join in city spending is an exciting prospect.

In September 2015, Madrid launched its citizenship participation panel, Decide Madrid. Barcelona followed shortly after, with Barcelona Decidim. Both have similar features, such as discussion threads, scoring and ranking of discussion and points, and the ability to share files. They also both have the ability for users to follow each other and create space for discussion of proposals and budgets for their respective cities. Anybody can contribute to discussion, but a higher level of access is afforded to those who can verify residency. This level allows residents to vote on topics. Common to both are space for citizen debates, citizen proposals, citizen budgets and citizen plans. Any citizen can initiate a debate, which then allow others to comment. Any citizen can propose policies, propose how council budgets should be spent, and participate in development and planning discussions for their city. In September 2019, 655,559 users created over 27,000 proposals, making over 200,000 comments. Decidim Barcelona had launched 40 participatory processes, with almost 15,000 proposals and 1100 citizen initiatives. Roundtables, local meetings, walks and online interactions all gather in these spaces to add the ability for citizens to input on decision making in their city. In Barcelona, citizens added 17 proposals to the council's 45, including improved pavements, neighbourhood cleaning, bus routes, cycling facilities and sports facilities. Participatory budgeting has been active in Madrid, with 60 million Euros of funding for citizen proposals. Safe houses for women, extra trees, drinking water, noise monitoring, urban allotments and many more local

projects were funded. The local nature of these projects requires a level of input from citizens; if it were merely the behavioural observation of the city, surely some of these preferences would be lost (Martin and Smith, 2021, pp. 317-318)

Such work is onerous. Whilst technology may be used to expand the space for deliberation, humans are still needed to work through proposals and negotiate between the expectations and desires of citizens and the bureaucracy of the council. This has led to some problems in Madrid, where projects have moved more slowly than anticipated. This has led to frustration amongst campaigners working hard to increase engagement (Martin and Smith, 2021, p.321).

The commitment of platforms like these is a commitment to connecting the decision making of councils to the lived experience of citizens. This is an ongoing process. Experiments have been made to add in physical workshops. The design of sites inevitably relies on human assumptions about cities, which can be proved wrong (Martin and Smith, 2021, p323).

Technopolitics here highlights the difference between itself and Smart Citizenship. Firstly, with an open commitment to direct democracy and a sense of collective intelligence. A commitment to Technopolitics and the expansion of space for deliberation accompanies representative democratic institutions. Leaders of the spaces discussed were committed to new kinds of urban democracy. Platforms then are not merely contracted to technology companies by those without a commitment to widening participation. This widening was an in-house programme conducted by cities (Martin and Smith, 2021, pp.324-325)

The platforms are also committed to a sense of collective intelligence. Professional planners and administrators respond to citizens. This authoritative intelligence is, however, open to criticism and discussion via the platform. This is a reversal of the situation in which many proposals take place, where proposals exist and then citizens are invited to comment on them (Cardullo and Kitchen cited in Martin and Smith, 2021).

Technopolitics fits well into the central tenets of this thesis, predicated on the importance of deliberation and legislation as a means to bring about the development of cities, but also as a means to develop citizens themselves. Both Decide Madrid and Decidim Barcelona are thus examples of how we might encourage greater activity in the space for urban deliberation, planning and budgeting. Many cities and organisations are taking up the ideas (Martin and Smith, 2021, p.326). Technopolitics sees technology as a commons requiring participatory development. City councils often have to deal with low engagement, power imbalances and a lack of diversity in voices: an often strong free-market private sector and weakened civil society (Chatterton, 2019, p.90). Technopolitics can help ameliorate this by expanding the voices heard in city decision making, space for civil society and engagement.

In our two conceptions of the city, we can see that the expansion of space for deliberation is key to developing the city of capabilities, and, as a result, aspect capacity towards effective autonomy. Likewise, the simple measurement, monitoring and storage of information on citizens is more easily compatible with the city as node of global capital.

7.3 Capable agents

Chapters 3 and 4 explored the reflexive relationship between city and citizen. In Chapter 3, the city as the spatialising of norms was discussed. As Therborn describes, the meaning of life in the city is constructed in a number of ways. This construction develops the sense of priorities, opportunities and limitations, identities of the city, and various meanings and histories of a city across past, present and aspired futures (2017, pp.12-13). Chapter 4 looked at the dialectical relationship of the individual and their environment; how the ability to legislate is part of that which allows a citizen to develop fully. It was shown how the city and the citizen have a reflexive relationship of mutual in-fluence. The city provides space for the agent to develop, and, in turn, the citizen influences the city. In order to do this, the citizen needs an environment conducive to the development, and practice, of their political autonomy.

This political autonomy was framed using the concept of effective autonomy. Effective au-tonomy was used to describe "the ability to reasonably achieve the intended or desired result of one's conscience and self-legislation in a social context" (Brown, 2009, pp.156-157). This effective autonomy was reliant to a good extent on aspect capacity, described as "the ability to formulate, hold and act upon an individual's social conscience based on external elements (aspects or facets for external freedom) affecting the development of one's co-legislative capabilities" (Brown, 2009, p.157).

If deliberation and participation are an aim of society, then the city should help form capable agents (Bonvin and Glaster cited in Biggeri et al., 2019, p.397). That is, if deliberation and legislation are key. When we consider new approaches to technology and participation, we ought also to consider the agents involved so that the creation of agents capable of navigating such participatory spaces is part of that which is necessary for such spaces to flourish.

So, one aim of the city of capabilities should be to promote space for deliberation and develop skills conducive to such space. To do this, we must not look merely to adults, but also the development of children to be capable of knowing their skills, responsibilities and planning abilities (Clark et al.2019. p.397). This process of empowerment and participation can then help develop "evolving capabilities", which help to further this process over their lives (Ballet et al. cited in Clark et al. 2019. p.397). In a similar sense, we can understand the city as, in part, a combination of its citizens' development. Just like the growing capabilities of the individual can help develop evolving abilities over time, so too can the city.

As Sen (1999, p.284) describes, "without the substantive freedom and capability to do something, a person cannot be responsible for doing it". The city of capabilities then ought to commit to two things:

1. The institutions, practices and communication of their inner workings to allow for citizens to properly deliberate. Such deliberation allows for their development, as described in chapters 3 and 4.

2. The development of environments which develop the skills through with citizens understand how to navigate such processes.

The city must have the vehicles, space and opportunities for deliberation, practising one's political autonomy. It also must aim to create that which is likely to develop a culture, and the skills amongst its citizenry, so that its citizenry might be able to co-legislate effectively together. We are reminded here of Dewey's comments on democracy and freedom. Dewey, writing in 1903, discussed how the

efforts of the previous two-thirds of the nineteenth century had helped to build "the ways and means for housing and equipping intelligence", but he added that, "What remains is that the thought-activity of the individual, whether teacher or student, be permitted and encouraged to take working possession of this machinery: to substitute its rightful lordship for an inherited servility" (Dewey. 1903. p194.

When considering the integration of information and communication technologies into our existing political systems, we must consider what kind of framework and training would allow people to use them in a way that satisfies the desired notion of legislation. Across our political and commercial spheres, these technologies radically shift our ways of engaging with each other. To match these seismic changes, we ought to develop the space for individuals to learn how to use these technologies to legislate together safely. By viewing the different uses of the technology described, particularly these two approaches (the Smart City and Technopolitics), we can see that, to develop citizens capable of a full deliberative experience, we must build our cities' ICT space with deliberation in mind. Further, as the ability to legislate has been argued to be key to citizens' human development, then such consideration becomes no small matter. Even in the cases of Madrid and Barcelona, where space has been created for deliberation, users need "time, equipment, skills and inclination" (Smith and Pietro, 2021, p.317).

Technopolitics, rather than the Smart City, gives a clearer framework for understanding the role of new technology in city development. Technology must reflect the inherent tensions within political discourse and create space for disagreement and a plurality of views on the kinds of cities each city has within it. By beginning at the later stage, often accompanied by the Smart City discourse, key questions around cities' goals have already been decided. Again, we see the space for political au-

tonomy under threat where technology could be used for its expansion but is often used for the concentration of power and decision making. For this reason, the aims of the city should be present as new technologies are introduced. If an aim of the city is to expand space for the political autonomy of its citizens, these values must be embedded in the introduction of new technologies. In tandem, where technologies appear to bypass the political autonomy of the city's citizens, we should see this as a threat to the citizens' political autonomy, and thus to their human development, and flourishing.

7.4 Cities, sustainability and a commitment to other cities and citizens

Finally, a central theme of this thesis is that cities are key normative spaces in the provision of space for many individuals' political autonomy. The provision of this space is partly reliant on the city offering citizens the ability to live lives of legislation. The city cannot be too impacted by pressures from outside it to achieve this. What arises from this is the city's obligation not to impose on other cities and citizens in similar ways. If we commit to political autonomy seriously and believe that citizens ought to have such space, then it would not make sense for our city of capabilities to impose such pressures on citizens from elsewhere. After all, we are not discussing the needs of a particular city but of cities and their citizens generally.

The city of capabilities then has a strong synergy with a commitment to the political autonomy of other cities and sustainability. Its impact on spaces external to itself ought not to contravene the principles laid forth in its proposal. In some important sense, it would appear paradoxical to argue for the need of citizens for political autonomy and that which allows for it and then not to curtail the ability of our city of capabilities to limit that which other cities can provide.

The city of capabilities ought then to be committed to being a sustainable city. There is not space to fully develop this here. But this commitment towards the lives of citizens in other cities should be clear. An interesting avenue for future discussion on the city of capabilities would be towards the commitments such a city should make towards the possible lives of future citizens – that is, not just those alive now, but those alive in the future.

The future of cities is then dependent in part on our ability in the present to create more sustainable cities (Dempsey and Jenks, 2005, p.1). Cities are held as important, positioned to tackle environmental issues (Bulkley et al., 2018, p.1). Balancing the development of cities with environmental concerns is of vital importance to the creation of a sustainable world. Chinese development for instance, has offered a version of rapid development that appears to be efficient, but at a price that seems to be questionable with regard to sustainability (Fuchs, 2012, p.47).

On a related note, a further useful line of enquiry beyond the protection of our city from nowhere would be to look at what an interconnected sense of development might look like from the local to the global. That is, how multiple cities of capability might co-exist. This thesis has aimed to show that globalising forces pose a threat to local space for autonomy. In this sense, the globalising project that begins here might then look to how cities contribute to the space for the expansion of capabilities, and, with this thesis in mind, the political autonomy of citizens of other cities. Of course, some cities vastly outweigh their neighbours, in terms of effects on other cities. With some, such as New York and London, having a disproportionate effect on the world, many other cities are being affected much more greatly (than they affect) (Bulkley et al., 2018, p.1).

Conclusion

Section 7.1 highlighted a number of ways cities might intervene in housing markets to preserve access to housing for their citizens. Housing was shown to be key to multiple areas of life key to political autonomy. Access to housing is then shown to be important a) because housing and space and shelter are key but also b) for access to things such as education and housing. Section 7.2 highlighted how cities are increasingly utilising technological solutions. Smart City discourse was argued often to create opacity around the inherently political nature of cities. Technopolitics was argued to offer insight and a useful ability to critique the uses of technology in cities. This was due to the commitment that politics is perpetual and that any technological developments should recognise the inherently political nature of such development. Thus, citizens need access to key discussions around the goals and nature of the city in which they live. Projects in Barcelona, Madrid and Calgary indicated how technology could create space for this dialogue. In section 7.3, I briefly looked at why the city of capabilities ought to be committed to sustainability and suggested some future study around how the various themes of the thesis might provide fruitful discussion when cities cooperating is considered. Taken together, we see policies and interventions aimed at preserving space for political autonomy locally. This again emphasises that a) the central arguments of this thesis describe real phenomena and b) that there are interventions possible and taking place to do just that. This thesis aims at contributing towards our understanding of this dichotomy of modes and goals of cities. Doing so helps provide a framework from which to look to expand the space cities offer for the development of their citizens. This chapter has provided an overview of some existing attempts to do just that.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

This thesis has identified several key things pertaining to cities in a globalised world, and their role in preserving and expanding space for political autonomy. In doing so, it has shown that cities are increasingly key spaces in political theory and practice. It has also shown how we should understand the impact of globalisation in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century as a threat to the political autonomy of citizens of cities. This is partly due to the combination of two factors – technological development advances and ideological shifts that accompanied these developments in this period. This phenomenon is increasingly important due to cities being increasingly where people live, in relative and absolute terms (Harvey, 2013; WHO, 2020; UN, 2018; IMF, 2007). The twentieth century saw a huge shift of populations towards living in city environments; therefore, city spaces are increasingly where people pursue their goals. If there is a threat to the ability of such spaces to provide that which is necessary to human flourishing it is then of increasing importance. Though the impact of globalisation on the nation-state has been widely noted, the impact on cities has received less attention.

A threat to political autonomy is a threat to the key conditions through which humans develop. Thus, the relationship between globalisation, city spaces and their citizens is one in which we can see a potential diminishing of the ability of people globally to live flourishing lives. Inversely, we can see the importance of cities in preserving and expanding space for such political autonomy. Further, that cities, in this vein, are due more attention in contemporary political theory.

The thesis set out to make contributions in three areas:

Firstly, in helping to develop a new understanding of cities.

Secondly, in deepening an analysis of globalisation and its effects.

Thirdly, to develop and contribute to existing literature in development, and in particular the capability approach literature pertaining to cities.

8.1 Cities and co-legislation

Cities are often framed as engines of economic development. They are surely this, but the city for many is where goals are pursued, lives lived, relationships fostered. The very essence of being human together happens, for the most part, in city spaces. The thesis focuses attention on the city as a key normative space – something that is often missed in the simplified language of economic orthodoxy.

The city and Western political theory have a long interwoven history. The thesis aimed to show how cities were due more attention in political theory. The city was demonstrated to be a key normative environment through which an increasing number of people live their lives. The focus was placed on political autonomy and the city's role in its development. One key way in which cities do this is by offering space both for co-legislation and that which is necessary for the development of capacities necessary for co-legislation. Co-legislation was, in turn, argued to be key to human development.

The citizen has a role to play in shaping the environment in which they live. As Bell and De Shallit observe, cities both reflect and shape citizens' values (2011, p.2). The city spatialises various normative factors, like power relations. It also conveys meaning about such structures (Therborn, 2017, p.12). Though we may live in nations or other spatialised settlements, for many, the city is the key

space in which they pursue their goals. This has always been important, but, due to the expansion of city populations, it is becoming more so, as this thesis has demonstrated.

Chapters 3 and 4 highlighted how the city plays this key role in creating the normative conditions through which the individual develops and contributes towards the city. The pattern of this is ideally an upward spiral of development: the structures they are born into offer the early opportunities for their development. The city is then a normative space key to shaping the citizen. In turn, the citizen helps to develop the city. The two have a reflexive relationship, and develop together. In Chapter 4, I showed that we can understand this development of the individual as reliant on the ability to live in a state of co-legislation with others. This was explained through the idea of aspect capacity, where the ability to co-legislate with others is reliant on the environment to develop. If the environment the citizen is in does not allow for the development of such capacities, then the individual does not have them. Co-legislation, control over one's political autonomy, is therefore key to development, to living a flourishing life; thus, the lack of an environment conducive to it hinders the development of the individual.

The environment an individual is in helps to develop these capacities. But, further, the environment is then conducive to the practising of such capacities. The city is key to the provision of space for both of these steps. Aspect capacity helps to show the distance between that which an individual has the innate capacity to develop towards and their development towards such capacity. This aspect capacity is useful for demonstrating the role in the environment in developing or inhibiting the individual. The example of language was used as an analogy. Most humans have the capacity to develop linguistic abilities. But, in order to develop the ability to use language in a social environment, they must rely on external attributes. This external environment combines with their innate abilities

to help them develop towards their potential. Similarly, the ability to co-legislate is to some extent innate, but it is in combination with the external environment that the citizen develops more fully.

The use of such capacities has both an instrumental and inherent value, both of which are key to an understanding of political autonomy. Such capacities are instrumentally valuable in that they allow for a contribution of preferences to the space in which the individual lives; the outcome being affected by the citizen showing the instrumental importance of co-legislation. But such co-legislation has an inherent importance, too: it is in part how the individual appears as a dignified equal in their community. This exploration of the city's roles is hoped to contribute to an understanding of the growing importance of cities in the provision of space for human flourishing, and provide a framework for understanding the expansion of effective autonomy as something that the city can play a key role in. Understanding the importance of co-legislation in the city helps to understand why a threat to such space for development should be taken seriously.

I will now go on to describe how globalisation has been shown to be a threat to the space described in this section before adding the final contribution, which is in the capability approach literature.

8.2 Globalisation

In Chapter 4, I explored the relationship between globalisation and the city. At first, I drew out facets of globalisation to demonstrate a number of things. Firstly, that globalisation is an appropriate term in advancing our understanding of what happened to most economies around the world from the 1970s to the early twenty-first century. Two key elements were looked at: firstly, ideological shifts which led to an opening up of the global economy and a minimised role for the state; sec-

ondly, a rapid development of technology. This technology helped make the integration of the global economy possible. But, further, this technological development when combined with economic integration helps to organise the world in a way that makes decision making about space (both in a physical and non-physical sense) more easily concentrated in a small number of people. The capacity to gather information has grown exponentially. Companies like Acxiom, Experian and Datalogix have accrued vast amounts of information. One database alone has 1.4 billion data points (Moore, 2018, pp.59-61). Technology can be seen to have a) driven the possibilities of global trade in terms of communication and storing information, but also b) provided ongoing assessments regarding people that would help understand citizens globally regarding voting and consumption. This has led to micro-profiling in consumer behaviour and political parties in elections (Bartlett, 2018). Few deny, for example, that the US or EU campaigns were seriously impacted by technology (Moore, 2018, p.67).

Such concentrations of power, made possible by technology, are a key threat to political autonomy. The thesis demonstrated this in a number of ways. One key way was in the use of technology to monitor and gather information in cities in ways that were shown to be leaving behind democratic processes. Such technology also enables those with access to it to develop organisations that move capital in ways that are also a threat to political autonomy.

In Chapter 6, I explored these themes by bringing together data and empirical evidence relating to London. In London, we can see dramatic rises in housing costs. The ratio between house price and earnings shows striking growth across the city. Furthermore, we saw within this data pronounced unequal growth in particular areas: Hackney house prices to salary ration in this period went from 7.37 times to 16.34; Hammersmith and Fulham, from 8.55 to 20.04 (London Datastore, 2021a). Be-

tween 2002 and 2018, house prices outstripped earnings across London. This, of course, makes

house buying less accessible to more people. Further, this rapid rise was accompanied by a rapid

rise in rents: October 2019 to September 2020 saw the highest ever recorded median monthly rent

in England, £725; London, at £1435, was almost double the national average (ONS, 2020). In terms

of pressures on housing, I also examined examples from Berlin, Bilbao, Singapore and Vienna.

Through various methods, from rent caps to added taxes for those buying from abroad, to greater

space for local decision making, and policy on profit making on space, cities worldwide are looking

to take measures to relieve pressure caused by the movement of global capital.

Chapter 5 depicted two types of city: the city that aims at expanding capabilities and the city as

node of global capital. In chapters 6 and 7, I looked at how we might understand this battle of pur-

poses at play in real-world cities in the early twenty-first century. Chapter 6, as described, focuses

on London and boroughs like Hackney, which have seen large increases in the cost of land and

housing. Chapter 7 looks to attempts to rebalance away from exchange to use value in Berlin, Bil-

bao and Vienna. The notion of Technopolitics was introduced. Technopolitics is a discourse that

represents the movement of digital democracy platforms, which contrast with those modes de-

scribed by the Smart City. It is informed by a sociological understanding of technology and seeks

more democratic developments of the uses of technology in political space (Kurban et al. cited in

Martin and Smith, 2021, p.312). The cities in question were shown to be looking to embed more

democratic decision making within emerging technologies. This can be seen in contrast with the

example of London and the UK in Chapter 6. This is important, as Chapter 6 indicates, the dramatic

expansion of technology experienced by many Londoners did not see a correlative movement in

democratic space; that is, technological development used for participation and the gathering of

preferences politically, it was found that there was not as much movement in this space. As Chapter

6 shows, comparatively little had happened in this space. As a report by Nesta (2021) argues, "One area that seems to have remained impervious to these benefits is our model of democratic governance, which has remained largely unchanged since it was invented in the 20th century". Even how we vote can be seen as at odds with how we live the rest of our lives (Nesta, 2020). Though that which surrounds our democratic system has been radically reshaped, the processes themselves have not. This has been argued to have led 47% of British citizens to describe feeling like they have no say over local politics. (Nesta, 2020). A professed desire for strong participation can be found in the SDGs. Goal 16 calls explicitly for "responsive, inclusive, and participatory and representative decision-making at all levels" (Stockholm Environment Institute, 2019). Chapters 5 to 7 then bring together the themes of the thesis to show how technological development and ideological shifts, these facets of globalisation, are a threat to political autonomy and thus human development.

Further, chapters 6 and 7 highlight the implications of the thesis. Namely, without active work, global capital and advances in technology will negatively impact the political autonomy of citizens of cities. And that citizens of cities are an increasingly large population. Without taking steps to ameliorate these pressures, the stage of globalising development at the end of the twentieth and start of the twenty-first century will create a diminishing of political autonomy, and therefore human development.

If we take seriously people's ability to legislate and join in in shaping the world, expressing their preferences, then we should look to rethink the role of cities and local environments. Whilst cities are increasingly where we pursue our goals, they are also spaces that often cannot protect themselves from broader forces. This tension requires a new political theory of cities, of which this thesis aims to provide a small amount of the work required.

8.3 Two alternative cities

The upwards spiral of development leads us to an understanding of the city that is based on the expansion of capabilities. In order to explain this vision of the city clearly, I develop two ideas of the role of the city in order to indicate the differences in how we might understand how the city can expand or diminish space for political autonomy. In Chapter 5, I laid out both, with the first being the city of capabilities. The city of capabilities is organised around expanding people's capabilities and developing its citizens. Political autonomy is a key part of human development and the expansion of people's capabilities; political autonomy, space for legislation, is then key for the city of capabilities.

The city of capabilities is contrasted with the idea of the city as a node of global capital. This city is largely open to global markets and does not necessarily have local political autonomy as its end. Cities are, in this vein, hubs for global trade. As such, various facets of globalisation have the effect of diminishing autonomy locally. This idea of the city, and it's housing, and space attribution is very much subject to these global forces. In turn, they are for many city dwellers, increasingly difficult for local people to organise. Chapter 5 introduces Lefebvre's use of the Marxist distinction between use and exchange value to show how cities have increasingly become commodified and space financialised. In Chapter 6, I explain how this has affected the ability of London residents to affect and control the space in which they live. Chapter 7 looks at examples of cities that have attempted to build safeguards to address this balance between use and exchange value.

The city of capabilities then has a clear purpose and framework from which to judge its efficacy to create the conditions of increased aspect capacity through which the individual can develop necessary personal autonomy, and to create an environment of increased aspect capacity through which individuals can practise effective autonomy via co-legislation. This is contrasted with the City as Node of Global Capital. This mode of understanding the city sees the city as largely at the mercy of global capital flows. Local autonomy is much less important, and therefore cities become increasingly impacted by external forces. Rather than local people, this understanding of the city sees those without political and economic power, who live in cities most likely subject to it (Harvey, 2013, p.16).

In Chapter 5, I also suggest that the principle of subsidiarity can help us when thinking of the City of Capabilities. It can do this by helping us find a framework for decision making. The principle of subsidiarity organises around the notion that decisions should be made at the lowest or most local level practically possible. This allows for room for decisions to be made outside of the local. If a decision is better made outside then it should be. The framework of the thesis offers a guide as to when that would be; when doing so would expand the capabilities of those affected. For instance, transport, healthcare and trade may all have elements that would serve the citizens best to do be done across cities, at a national level. Subsidiarity takes this into account. But where a decision can be made locally, then it should. Subsidiarity empowers individuals and enhances democratic structures by moving the decision making as close as possible to the physical region or problem (Evans and Zimmermann, 2014, p.2).

There is a developing body of work on cities in the capability literature. Most recently, Alexandre Apsen Frediani has brought together much work in his book Cities for Human Development. Sever-

ine Deneulin's work highlights where the Right to The City and Capability Approach compliment each other. Claudia Basta's work explores the linkages between contemporary planning and the Capability Approach.

This thesis aims to make a modest contribution in adding an exploration of the technological dimensions of globalisation, showing that an expansion of space for decision making on the private side requires a correlative expansion on public decision making. In short, the ability to affect space has become much easier for some. By focusing on the drivers of technology, the thesis hopes to have contributed to that work which brings together the Right to The City and the Capability Approach.

I hope to have added in bringing together work on globalising forces as above. Frediani and Basta have developed greatly the body of work on capabilities in urban spaces. I hope to have added a useful examination of how forces which impact these spaces are developing. That is, when considering capabilities in an urban context, I hope to have added some insight into where these forces are coming from, what is occurring that makes them happen; and drawn a line between these forces of globalisation and the political autonomy of individuals in cities. I hope that, by developing this sense of political autonomy in city settings, I have contributed to an understanding of the importance of the city environments in developing capabilities. This was done through an examination of the reflexive relationship of the city to citizen. The city was shown to be a key normative space, if not the key normative space for most human development. Further, the city was shown to be key in at least two very important ways: the initial existence of that which is useful for capability development, so the institutions and available opportunities to develop capabilities necessary for political autonomy; secondly, for the practice of such political autonomy.

The thesis has contributed towards the capability approach literature in two ways. Firstly, in bringing together an analysis of globalisation and technological developments, and their role in shaping human development. This is hoped to contribute to existing work on cities that highlights the benefits of using the capability approach in city contexts. The second way is in providing a case study of London in Chapter 6 which aims to explain with empirical evidence why such a capability theory is useful.

Finally, by developing the idea of the city of capabilities, it is hoped that this thesis will contribute towards and sit alongside the work of Deneulin in The Right to the Just City and Frediani's Cities for Human Development in putting forward alternative visions of the city to the economic orthodox. It aims to show the city's role in human development, and why economic orthodoxy requires extra language in order to create spaces conducive to human development.

8.4 Significance and contribution

Technology is set to continue developing. City populations are expected to continue to grow. The significance of this research is in showing that, in order to have cities conducive to human flourishing, extensive attention must be paid to how we preserve space for political autonomy. Further, that we are experiencing conditions that are likely to continue to apply pressure to the city's ability to provide such space. Cities have been shown to be the key space for developing capacities key to human flourishing. They are then a site that deserves more space and attention.

There are two key areas that the thesis analyses: firstly, housing and physical space. Without attention and intervention, the ability of citizens to co-legislate over their space will continue to be under threat. Secondly, technology poses several threats to human flourishing. Firstly, in concentrating power. The huge expansion in the ability to gather, store and manage information creates an asymmetry between those with such power and those without it. Efforts must be made to ameliorate such power differences. In the city context, they manifest in the ability to manage space and opportunities. Further, decision making in democratic space must take into account issues arising from such developments. Chapter 7 provides examples in Calgary, Barcelona and Madrid where such threats are taken seriously. This will become increasingly necessary to avoid technology contributing to unequal access to decision making in cities. Such inequality of decision making is a threat to human flourishing.

8.5 Limitations and future research agenda

The thesis sets out to highlight the pressures globalisation presents for cities and, further, why such pressures are a problem for political autonomy and why issues of political autonomy are a threat to human flourishing. This is largely then a job of presenting the issues. Chapter 7 demonstrates how policies can be used to ameliorate this. Part of a future research agenda could be to expand on the work of Chapter 7 and develop further policy suggestions on ameliorating the phenomena described and how to use technology well in cities to expand the local decision-making space. Chapter 7 focuses on existing policies used by cities. Future research could develop this further by using the city of capabilities framework as a starting point. Cities are shown to be key sites of human development. There is much to be added here in terms of how we construct cities around these principles. This thesis has primarily focused on diagnosing a problem. A follow-up piece of research would be

to frame more clearly how these findings might be applied to constructing cities more clearly around notions of human development. The thesis has also focused on threats to political autonomy. This has been done purposefully in order to not be too prescriptive about what the city of capabilities ought to look like. But future research could investigate empirical examples of cities that provide space for both political autonomy and capabilities more generally, in an attempt to forge a clearer understanding of the types of institutions, spaces and frameworks that would be useful.

The thesis highlights local problems caused by facets of globalisation. Further space could be useful, in order to look at the importance of local political autonomy for both cosmopolitan projects and globalisation. A future successful project of cosmopolitanism and globalisation may need to rely on local political stability. By using the ideas of subsidiarity in this thesis, a more joined-up cosmopolitan global order could be strengthened by focusing on a distribution of political autonomy.

More space would be welcomed in understanding the impact of nascent technologies on human development, from working relations to huge expansions of communicative potential. The lives of humans, and therefore their political environment, are radically shifting. More space in the capabilities literature could reflect this.

The world clearly faces a time of great change. Technology and economic integration have helped to create a much more interconnected world. For some, the rewards of global economic development and technological development are clear; in part an increased ability to shape the world. These increased capacities represent a world in which relationships of power and space are changing. The expanded ability of some to affect large amounts of human culture has an impact on the space left

for others' autonomy. In this context, this thesis invites a review of the role of the city and aims to provide a framing for some of the challenges ahead. For millennia, city spaces have been intrinsically linked with humans' pursuit of goals. At this increasingly important crossroads for the species, understanding this relationship has never been more important.

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