EMOTIONS, LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL PRACTICE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

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I, the author, confirm that the Thesis is my own work. I am aware of the University’s Guidance on the Use of Unfair Means (www.sheffield.ac.uk/ssid/unfair-means). This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, university.
ABSTRACT

This thesis studies the intersections between emotions, language and social practice in early modern England through the use of a variety of lexicographical, philosophical, didactic and judicial sources. It first identifies and analyses the early modern affective lexicon and the key concepts by which emotions were categorised and understood. The thesis argues that, at this conceptual level, emotions were fundamentally related to action and social practice. It identifies and outlines a historicised theory of practice through which early modern people related emotions to character, motivation, action and the wider social contexts and relationships in which they were situated. As such, by establishing early modern understandings of the place of emotion in social practice, rather than imposing modern sociological or historiographical theories of emotion onto the past, this thesis takes a historicist approach of reading emotions in early modern sources according to the beliefs of people at the time.

Building on these conceptual underpinnings, the second half of the thesis examines didactic literature and judicial records in order to explore the semantics of early modern affective language and how understandings of the emotionality of practice were applied. This approach enables an examination both of the prescribed ideals of appropriate emotional expression and of actual social practice as it was described and contested in different judicial contexts across the period. Therefore, a key achievement of this thesis is that it provides a model by which emotions and social practice can be approached by early modern social and cultural historians. By extension, the thesis shows how the history of emotions can be incorporated into early modern history more widely, and how it should not be considered an adjunct or separate field of historical research.
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ABBREVIATIONS

BIA  Borthwick Institute for Archives
BL  The British Library
TNA  The National Archives
INTRODUCTION

This thesis studies the intersections between emotions, language and social practice in early modern England through the use of a variety of lexicographical, philosophical, didactic and judicial sources. It explores what early modern people thought emotions were and what words they used to describe them; how they conceptualised the role emotion played in social practice; how the expression of emotion was contextualised and deemed appropriate or inappropriate according to the social circumstances; and how these links manifested across different planes of discourse, social contexts and over time. In so doing, the thesis argues that affectivity is an important category of historical analysis that can further our understanding of culture and society in early modern England, as well as how people at the time viewed that culture and society. As such, this thesis is separated into two sections: one focusing on early modern concepts of emotion, the other on the application of those concepts in conduct literature and legal records. It first identifies and analyses the early modern affective lexicon and the key concepts by which emotions were categorised and understood. At this conceptual level, the thesis argues, early modern writers saw emotions as intrinsically related to social practice. As such, it identifies and outlines a historicised theory of practice through which early modern people related emotions to character, motivation, action and the wider social contexts and relationships in which they were situated. Rather than imposing modern sociological or historiographical theories of emotion onto the past, by recovering an early modern sense of the emotionality of social practice, this thesis discusses both emotion and behaviour in historicist terms according to the understandings and beliefs of people at the time.

As well as the semantics and theories of emotions, this thesis examines how early modern people modulated, or were expected to modulate, their emotions in relation to the
social and political roles they performed in society. The second broad section of the thesis builds on these conceptual underpinnings and examines how they were applied in didactic literature and judicial records throughout the early modern period. These sources demonstrate how emotions were understood to provide the impetus for people’s actions, and how emotional expressions were judged to be appropriate or inappropriate depending on the type of emotion that was being expressed, the intensity of its expression and the specific social, spatial and institutional contexts in which that emotion was felt or expressed. Didactic sources show that early modern people recognised both the central role played by emotion in social practice, and how appropriate expressions could be both instrumental and beneficial for people, as well as harmful and potentially dangerous. As such, early modern didactic literature included the management of emotion and the cultivation of positive feelings alongside other advice on social life more generally. Judicial sources allow for an analysis of whether this advice shaped or reflected actual social practice, and how the ideals of appropriate expression were employed in adversarial settings in order to evaluate, contest and defend the propriety of social practice. They also show that early modern legal institutions recognised the importance of the relationship between emotions, interpersonal relationships and illicit behaviour. Therefore, one of the primary achievements of this thesis is that it provides a model by which emotions and social practice can be approached by early modern social and cultural historians. As such, this thesis brings the history of emotions into conversation with early modern social and cultural history more widely, and argues that it should not be considered an adjunct or separate field of historical research.

Historians of emotion have shown that language both describes and shapes feeling, and that it is through cultural and historical specificity of language that emotional concepts,
experiences and social practices vary across time and space. Historicising and contextualising affective language, as Rob Boddice has argued, is the core of the history of emotions, and the necessary precondition to approach ‘the semantic, conceptual and experiential worlds of affective life in different times and places’. Changing medical, philosophical and scientific theories of emotions, and the words and concepts they coin or bring to the fore, have been shown to shape emotional language and experience, although at the same time those theories are also products of what is considered ‘emotional’ in that particular historical and cultural context. Yet the category of ‘emotion’, as Thomas Dixon and others have shown, is not a universal concept shared between different cultures past and present, but is rather a product of the specific historical and scientific context of nineteenth-century Britain, when ‘emotion’ became the primary ‘psychological category’. Also, studies of individual emotion terms, such as ‘kindness’, ‘meekness’ or ‘disgust’, have demonstrated the role of those emotions and emotion in general in rhetoric and social life, as well as the historically mutable cultural values placed on certain emotions or the modes of sociability they represented or expressed.

Here the history of emotions clearly speaks to early modern conceptual history, which has shown how terms and concepts both described and shaped the social and political norms


and behaviours they were bound up with. For example, Keith Wrightson, Naomi Tadmor, Phil Withington and others have studied concepts relating to early modern society and politics; how and in what contexts these concepts were used; and how they not only reflected and shaped social practice, but also provided the interpretive framework through which practice was evaluated. For people living within a particular cultural and historical context, then, it is through language that people categorise their own feelings, associate them with certain social situations and evaluate their own and other people’s characters, motivations and actions. Both the language through which emotions are understood, expressed and evaluated, and the historical contexts in which these emotions are expressed or repressed, are historically mutable and culturally specific. Therefore, understanding emotional language and its semantics – the meanings of words and their use in historical, discursive and social contexts – is the foundation on which a historical study of emotions must be built.

This thesis also builds on early modern emotions historiography stressing the political nature of emotional expression and the efforts of political authorities to marshal or cultivate desired emotional dispositions and behaviours in those under their authority. Historians have discussed the instrumental and political uses of early modern emotional language in maintaining or challenging power hierarchies, whether in terms of the status distinctions that determined who could legitimately express ‘negative sentiments’ to others, or in the strategic invocations of ‘displeasure’ expressed by subordinates to their superiors in order to restore the proper bounds and mutual obligations of their hierarchically differentiated

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social roles. Focusing on ‘pre-modern’ households, Susan Broomhall has argued that the contextualised expression of emotion was inherently related to status, authority and subordination of different household roles, whether between husbands and wives, parents and children and masters, mistresses and servants. In short, the relative freedom of people to emote in certain social contexts was entwined with their status within them, and was core to the relationships between emotions, power and social practice. Similarly, focusing on eighteenth-century colonial Pennsylvania, Nicole Eustace has argued that emotions and power relations were closely related in two principal ways. Firstly, she describes emotional expression as a form of ‘social communication’: while warmer and less restrained feelings were shown among social equals, relations between superiors and subordinates were expressed by restraint and distance. Secondly, Eustace argues that assumptions about gendered, racialised and status distinctions in the capacity for finer feelings and self-government were the basis on which political dominance and subordination were explained and justified, and on which the post-Revolutionary American political nation was built, to the exclusion of women, low-status whites, Native Americans and enslaved Africans. Focusing on late medieval France, Emily Hutchison has posited that ‘collective emotions’ provided ordinary people with a shared identity and an impetus for political action and the assertion of their perceived rights and privileges. At the same time, the collective expression

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10 Ibid., pp. 61-105.
of these political emotions in civic assemblies provided the ruling elite with the pretext to delegitimise their subordinates’ political claims as irrational and disorderly.

Having situated this thesis in the context of early modern emotions historiography, which has demonstrated the fundamental relationship between emotions, language and power, the following sections of this introduction discuss the place of emotions in history and the theories and methodologies historians have used in order to approach emotions in the past. After outlining these conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of emotions historiography, the introduction then turns to an analysis of how the history of emotions can be brought into conversation with early modern social and cultural history. It does so through a discussion of emotions and social ‘roles’, ‘offices’ and ‘places’, which were the lens through which early modern people conceptualised, described and evaluated social practice, interpersonal relationships and the structure of society as a whole. Finally, the introduction provides an outline of each of the chapters of this thesis, which approach the relationship between emotion, language and social practice in different ways.

However, before moving onto these discussions, the use of the terminology of ‘emotion’ in this thesis must be briefly outlined, especially as language is one of its central concerns. So far, the term ‘emotion’ has been used in order to situate the thesis explicitly within the context of the history of emotions (and is why subsequent sections of this introduction continue to use the term ‘emotion’). Yet, as Dixon and others have demonstrated, ‘emotion’ itself is a specifically anglophone category related to modern understandings of feeling and psychology. As such, the term ‘emotion’ conceals as much as it reveals when studying understandings, experiences and contextualised expressions of feelings in the past. This is especially true if the aim of the history of emotions is to understand the past in historicist terms through the words and concepts used by people at

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the time. In answer to this problem of historicisation, Boddice uses ‘feelings’ as his analytical category, which he argues is ‘less loaded’ than ‘emotion’.\(^{13}\) By contrast, Barbara Rosenwein, perhaps the most influential historian of emotions, uses ‘emotions’ as a convenient shorthand to refer to ‘affective reactions of all sorts, intensities and durations’.\(^{14}\) Therefore, in light of these historiographical discussions and the historicist impulse of this thesis, as much as possible the terminology will follow the words used in early modern sources, although ‘feelings’ and the early modern typologies of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’, and the adjective ‘affective’ is much preferred to the presentist ‘emotional’. The use of these terms, it is hoped, will allow for a study in and through the terms used by early modern people themselves to describe feelings and social practices, which means that feeling and practice can be placed in their specific historical contexts.

**THE HISTORICITY OF EMOTION**

Traditionally, the history of emotions has reflected debates between the life sciences and anthropology about whether emotions are ‘essential’ or ‘socially constructed’.\(^{15}\) The essentialist view holds that emotions are ‘hard-wired’ drives within natural and unchanging bodies that are independent of their social, cultural or historical contexts.\(^{16}\) Social constructionism, by contrast, stresses the cultural specificity and historical mutability of emotion, positing that emotional experience is constructed by the linguistic norms and concepts through which it is described and understood. In short, the question has been whether emotions belong to the realm of ‘nature’ or ‘nurture’.\(^{17}\) Due to the growth of scientific disciplines such as psychology over the last two centuries, emotions are commonly

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viewed as the subjects of science alone, with the humanities relegated to the changing
cultural and historical understandings of and attitudes towards emotion.\textsuperscript{18} In this view,
emotions are described in terms of their evolutionary function, and humans today are
considered to be essentially the same as our Stone Age ancestors.\textsuperscript{19} The work of the
psychologist Paul Ekman exemplifies the essentialist view of emotions. In the 1970s Ekman
identified six ‘basic emotions’ – happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, disgust and fear – which
he argues are expressed by universal facial expressions common to all cultures and societies.\textsuperscript{20}
Yet he treated English words, whose meanings have changed over time, as universal concepts,
and Ekman’s study was based on the identification of actors’ facial expressions in
photographs, which were performances rather than actual expressions of emotion.\textsuperscript{21} For
essentialists, then, while attitudes towards emotions and their expression differ between
cultures and over time, emotion itself has no history.

Social constructionist views of emotions, which stress their cultural and historical
specificity, developed first in anthropology, with the differences between present-day
cultures being evidence of historical change over time. For example, in her well-known 1980s
study of the Micronesian Ifaluk islanders, the anthropologist Catherine Lutz argued that
emotion is more an ‘ideological practice’ than a natural ‘essence’.\textsuperscript{22} Emotions, she posited,
are products of ‘cultural meaning systems and social interaction’, which reveal what specific
cultures define and experience as ‘intensely meaningful’.\textsuperscript{23} For Lutz, ‘concepts of emotion can
more profitably be viewed as serving complex communicative, moral, and cultural purposes

\textsuperscript{18} Dixon, \textit{From Passions to Emotions}, pp. 135-79.
\textsuperscript{20} Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen, ‘Constants across Cultures in the Face and Emotion’, \textit{Journal of
\textsuperscript{21} Plamper, \textit{History of Emotions}, pp. 144-63; Boddice, \textit{History of Emotions}, pp. 116-17; Barbara H. Rosenwein and
\textsuperscript{22} Catherine A. Lutz, \textit{Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll & Their Challenge to
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 8.
rather than simply as labels for internal states whose nature or essence is presumed to be universal’. As such, emotions are a form of ‘discourse’ for the communication of social and power relations – which can be read and decoded by the anthropologist. By focusing on the Ifaluk community’s specific conceptualisations of emotion and modes of emotional expression, Lutz was explicitly challenging twentieth-century Western views of the essential and universal nature of emotion. If emotions are essential and unaffected by culture, Lutz argued, then reading other people’s emotions would be as simple as following Ekman’s approach of matching universal facial expressions to a few basic emotions. However, for Lutz the conceptualisation, experience and expression of emotion was culturally specific.

By situating emotion within its shifting social, cultural and historical contexts – and stating that emotions are subject to change over time – social constructionism has naturally influenced historians more than essentialism. In an early modern context, for instance, Michael MacDonald has discussed the role of narrative and texts in the construction of the group identities of English Protestants, which were based on the ‘distinct emotion’ of ‘religious despair’. He argues, firstly, that ‘conceptions of the self are socially constructed, and that narratives are one of the tools used in their construction’; and, secondly, that ‘emotions can be fully understood only by reconstructing the cultural milieu in which people manifest them’. Similarly, Linda Pollock has argued that expressions of anger served ‘communicative’ and instrumental social ‘functions’ for the early modern English elite, and were a tool to regulate, assert and delineate the perceived proper bounds of social relationships. Here the communicative uses of anger lay in ‘protecting rights’, seeking

24 Ibid., p. 5.
25 Ibid., p. 7.
27 Ibid., p. 59.
‘redress for injury’ or circumscribing the ‘limits of deference’, although distinctions were made between useful moderate anger and excessive unrestrained fury.\textsuperscript{29} As can be seen, Pollock explicitly adopts a social constructionist view of emotions, describing them as imbued with ‘meaning’ and of practical use in negotiating ‘interpersonal relationships’.\textsuperscript{30} By stressing the historical specificity of anger in early modern England – noting that it was understood, experienced and expressed within particular social, cultural and historical circumstances – Pollock countered the then-prevailing grand narrative, famously espoused by Norbert Elias, of ever-increasing emotional restraint as a defining feature of modernisation.\textsuperscript{31} Instead, Pollock has argued that, depending on the context, seventeenth-century ‘norms validated sharp emotional response as well as self-control’, and that anger ‘had a valued place in the regulation of everyday personal interaction in early modern England’.\textsuperscript{32} Therefore, social constructionism shows how emotional expression is inherently communicative and related to social practice; counters essentialist views of the unchanging nature of human experience; and accounts for different experiences and expressions of emotion across time and space.

However, taken to its logical extreme, social constructionism downplays the importance of the physical body, which sets material and corporeal limits on the shaping power of culture, while also being the medium through which culture is experienced, and so can be read as a history of emotions with emotions left out. Yet the dichotomy of ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ – of essentialism and social constructionism – has recently been seriously critiqued in both the sciences and the humanities. Instead, emotions are increasingly understood as the products of bodies shaped by the social, cultural and historical contexts in which they inhabit. Most recently, Boddice has discussed the fusing of nature and nurture in

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., pp. 582, 577.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 569.
terms of a 'biocultural' model of emotions, in which 'how we feel is the dynamic product of the existence of our minds and bodies in moments of time and space'.33 Since an individual can never exist outside a social, cultural or historical context, he argues, the physical body is also a 'worlded body' shaped by the contexts it inhabits.34 Even seemingly ‘unconscious’ and reflexive emotional expressions and gestures, Boddice argues, ‘are subject to the world in which they are situated’.35 The theoretical grounding for this ‘biocultural’ perspective is the convergence of the hitherto essentialist and social constructionist disciplines of neuroscience and anthropology, in which the anthropological view, that ‘cultural context undoubtedly prescribes, delimits and influences experience’, complements ‘the neuroscientific insight that humans are neurobiologically plastic, writeable pieces of hardware’, whose brain patterns are shaped by being in the world.36 In short, culture works on the material body and nature exists within culture. This understanding provides the theoretical basis for historicist studies in the history of emotions, which view the past in and through the terms used by people at the time, and Boddice accordingly labels his approach ‘biocultural historicism’.37 Whereas strong social constructionism cannot account for emotional change over time – for there is no impetus for variation if a person is infinitely malleable to culture – emotional change can be accounted for by viewing nature and nurture as being fused. In the perspective of biocultural historicism, as outlined by Boddice, change is caused by the practices of individuals within social contexts and spaces that are themselves subject to change over time, which in turn produces divergent emotional responses and actions in a never-ending cycle. Therefore, while it might seem paradoxical to frame an historicist study in contemporary

35 Ibid., p. 68.
36 Ibid., pp. 10, 34.
‘biocultural’ terms, to establish that people are shaped by the world they inhabit in fact provides a solid basis on which historicist study can be conducted.

**HISTORICAL APPROACHES TO EMOTION**

Since the birth of the modern history of emotions in the 1980s, shifting understandings of what emotions are and how they are historicised have manifested in the different approaches that historians have taken towards emotions. Initially, emotions historiography reflected essentialist distinctions between historically shifting beliefs about emotions and norms of emotional expression, on the one hand, and ‘actual’ emotion, on the other. Such distinctions are evident in the concept of ‘emotionology’ formulated by Peter and Carol Stearns in 1985, which is defined as ‘the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression’, and how ‘institutions reflect and encourage these attitudes in human conduct’.38 For Stearns and Stearns, emotionology provided a ‘cultural variable’ for historical study, but they conceded that historians have little to say about essential ‘basic emotions’.39 In this view, the subject of the history of emotions is emotionological change – changing norms of appropriate emotional expression and how those norms were enforced – such as a ‘growing restraint of anger’, the adoption of a ‘cool’ style and the ‘modern need to seem cheerful’ in modern America.40 From a modernist perspective, Stearns and Stearns claimed that the principal sources of emotionology were advice books from the nineteenth century onwards, in which

39 Ibid., p. 814.
ideas about emotions and ideals of emotional expression were explicitly inculcated.\textsuperscript{41} Although they noted that changing emotionology could cause ‘emotional changes’, such as a supposed increase of parental affection in modern families, Stearns and Stearns argued that ‘emotionology is not the same thing as emotional experience’, and criticised social constructionism for ‘confusing standards for emotion with emotion itself’.\textsuperscript{42} Over time, however, Peter Stearns collapsed the distinction between emotion and emotionology, noting that standards play some role in the ‘incidence’ and ‘intensity’ of emotional experience.\textsuperscript{43} In other words, he became more social constructionist.\textsuperscript{44}

Like Stearns and Stearns, William Reddy has also criticised ‘strong constructionist’ views for eliding the disjuncture he sees between standards of appropriate emotional expression and actual emotional experience.\textsuperscript{45} As such, in the late 1990s and 2000s he developed the two linked concepts of ‘emotives’ and ‘emotional regimes’, through which he discussed not only how social norms influence feeling, but also how the interaction between society and the feelings of individuals is both inherently political and the impetus for historical change. To begin with, Reddy defines emotions as ‘activations’ of mental and corporeal feelings that are subsequently ‘translated’ into culturally encoded words and ideas, which he terms ‘emotives’.\textsuperscript{46} In other words, although we use language to describe and express embodied feelings, Reddy argues that language and feeling exist on two different planes – one pre-cultural and corporeal, the other acculturated and discursive – and so emotives can never fully express the underlying emotion, and can even alter or intensify that

\textsuperscript{41} Stearns and Stearns, \textit{Anger}, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{44} For Peter Stearns’ move towards social constructionism since the 1980s, see Rosenwein and Cristiani, \textit{What is the History of Emotions?}, pp. 30-1.
feeling. Building on the concept of emotives, which represent the effort to conform inner feeling with cultural codes, language and practices, Reddy defines an ‘emotional regime’ as the ‘set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them’.47 ‘Strict’ emotional regimes, which Reddy claims have only a limited number of normative emotives, cause ‘emotional suffering’, as the social penalties they impose on ‘deviant’ emotional behaviour preclude the ‘self-exploration’ and ‘navigation’ that Reddy claims are the ‘fundamental character of emotional life’.48 The response to a strict emotional regime, he argues, is the formation of an ‘emotional refuge’: a ‘relationship, ritual, or organization … that provides safe release from prevailing emotional norms and allows relaxation of emotional effort’.49 By these means, Reddy claims, emotions are central to historical change, as the dialectic of regime and refuge ultimately produces a new prevailing emotional regime.50 Applying this concept, Reddy argues that the French Revolution constituted a shift in emotional regime, as the emotional refuge of ‘sentimentalism’ and ‘sincere’ emotional display replaced the prevailing strict monarchist regime based on insincere formality and politesse.51 Therefore, for Reddy emotions are inherently political. The effect of a given society’s normative emotives on underlying feeling, which he describes in essentialist terms as universal and pre-cultural, demonstrates how that society’s power structures impinge on the feelings of individuals. At the same time, however, Reddy argues that resistance to these effects is the driver of historical change.

Adopting a more social constructionist approach, through the concept of ‘emotional communities’ Rosenwein has shifted the focus from the impositions made by emotional regimes on the feelings of individuals to ‘the social and relational nature of emotions’.52

47 Ibid., p. 129.
48 Ibid., pp. 125, 129.
49 Ibid., p. 129.
50 Ibid., p. 128.
51 Ibid., pp. 145, 147.
52 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, p. 25.
Emotional communities are defined as ‘groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value—or devalue—the same or related emotions’. They consist of shared ‘fundamental assumptions, values, goals, feeling rules, and accepted modes of expression’ among certain groups of people, consisting of common concepts of what emotions are, a common emotional vocabulary and common ways of expressing emotions in different contexts. Rosenwein stresses the importance of language and vocabulary, as emotions are ‘inchoate’ until they are interpreted and practiced according to the shared words, concepts and norms of an emotional community. This means that ‘emotional vocabularies are exceptionally important for the ways in which people understand, express, and indeed “feel” their emotions’. Consequently, an emotional community can be a ‘textual community’ as much as a ‘social community’. Therefore, emotional communities form the structure that shapes or influences their individual members. However, this is a loose structure because individuals belong to any number of subordinate or competing emotional communities. In addition to structure, the concept of emotional communities also incorporates agency and social practice. Rosenwein states that ‘people move (and moved) continually from one such community to another ... adjusting their emotional displays and their judgments of weal and woe (with greater and lesser degrees of success) to these different environments’. Also, in explicit contrast to Reddy’s monolithic ‘regime’, which she argues is a stand in for the modern nation state, Rosenwein stresses the multiplicity of concurrent emotional communities. Focusing on early medieval Europe, she attributes emotional change over time to the rise and fall of localised communities, centred on particular monasteries and

53 Ibid., p. 2.
54 Ibid., pp. 24, 26.
56 Ibid.
57 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, p. 25.
royal courts, from generation to generation.\textsuperscript{59} Later emotional communities, she argues, inherit or appropriate emotion words, norms and practices from their predecessors and adapt them to new historical contexts.\textsuperscript{60} Therefore, Rosenwein’s concept of emotional communities encompasses the historicity of emotion; the relationship between individual and community; and the centrality of emotional language and concepts to the experience, expression and evaluation of feeling within a particular group.

Whereas Rosenwein approaches from a social constructionist position the questions of how emotional communities mould emotional dispositions, and how these dispositions influence action and behaviour, Monique Scheer has conceptualised these links in praxeological terms, explaining, firstly, how emotions are the practices of bodies shaped by their cultural, social and historical contexts, and, secondly, how emotions are manipulated, moderated or marshalled by other practices dependent on the use of the socially conditioned body.\textsuperscript{61} Arguing that emotions are ‘practices’, Scheer defines an emotion as an embodied and historically situated ‘act of experience and expression’.\textsuperscript{62} ‘Conceiving of emotions as practices’, Scheer explains, ‘means understanding them as emerging from bodily dispositions conditioned by a social context, which always has cultural and historical specificity’.\textsuperscript{63} In order to do so, Scheer develops the social theorist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘

\textit{habitus}', which denotes the mental and bodily dispositions or competencies moulded through the enacting and habitual repetition of social and cultural norms.\textsuperscript{64} The suffusion of the body in social, cultural and historical contexts means that the \textit{habitus} accrues implicit, practical knowledge – or a ‘feel for the game’ – of the feelings and actions appropriate to a variety of

\textsuperscript{59} Rosenwein, \textit{Emotional Communities}, pp. 19-24, 199-200.
\textsuperscript{60} Rosenwein, \textit{Generations of Feeling}, pp. 12, 15, 319-20.
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 209.
\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 201-4.
Like other practices, Scheer argues, emotions are also ‘simultaneously spontaneous and conventional. The *habitus* specifies what is “feelable” in a specific setting, orients the mind/body in a certain direction without making the outcome fully predictable’, meaning that emotions are embodied ‘cultural practices’. Bodily dispositions become ingrained over time through habitual practice, as social norms and expectations become second nature through habitual repetition. As such, seemingly automatic feelings and behaviours are in fact learned, and the embodied, ‘practical sense’ of the *habitus* guides what feelings and actions are appropriate to various social contexts and circumstances. Emotions are just one product of the *habitus*, alongside other forms of ‘implicit knowledge’ such as social acuity, gesture and gait, all of which are likewise forms of practice attuned to different social contexts. Lastly, because the *habitus* provides only a ‘feel’ for appropriate feelings and actions, the concept accounts for the unpredictable sides of emotional experience, meaning that actual emotional expression often deviates from the standards appropriate in those specific contexts.

From the theoretical basis of emotions as practices, Scheer’s approach is to study four general ‘emotional practices’ – or ‘habits, rituals, and everyday pastimes that aid us in achieving a certain emotional state’ – which involve ‘manipulations of body and mind’ in order to raise, alter or restrain specific emotions. Firstly, ‘mobilizing’ emotional practices are actions, rituals and forms of consumption intended to achieve a certain emotional state, including everyday actions that seem almost second nature, as well as customary or codified social rituals related to particular groups or spaces. Secondly, Scheer argues that the

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66 Ibid., p. 205.
67 Ibid., pp. 202, 200.
68 Ibid., p. 203.
69 Ibid., p. 204.
70 Ibid., p. 209.
71 Ibid., pp. 209-12.
‘naming’ of emotions is an emotional practice based on the implicit and habituated knowledge connecting amorphous and inchoate feelings into culturally acquired and historically mutable words and concepts.\(^{72}\) Although naming and understanding emotional experience might seem to be automatic and natural, Scheer argues that they are the learned practices of an acculturated body. Thirdly, ‘communicating’ emotional practices relate to the expression of emotion, both intentionally and subconsciously, as well as the evaluation of other people’s emotional expressions.\(^{73}\) Emotional expression and appraisal, Scheer posits, are practices rooted in the embodied knowledge located in the *habitus*. Emotional expressions intersect with the norms of different social contexts and historically shifting cultural conventions such as civility or sincerity. Notions of proper emotional expression are culturally and historically variable, meaning that seemingly natural emotional expressions demonstrate the *habitus*’s internalisation of an emotional community’s norms. Fourthly, ‘regulating’ emotional practices consist of the conscious management of emotions according to a given community’s norms or ‘emotionology’.\(^{74}\) Like all emotional practices, the regulation of emotion is a bodily practice that utilises the implicit ‘feel’ an individual acquires for appropriate behaviour in different social and spatial contexts. All these emotional practices, then, build upon and make use of the implicit and practical knowledge of the *habitus*. As with all practices arising from the *habitus*, the habitual repetition of emotional practices tends to produce the desired effect, although there is still space for indeterminacy, alteration and failure. It is by these means, Scheer argues, that practice causes emotional change over time. As spaces and contexts are subject to historical change, so too are the emotional practices that are embedded in those contexts. Therefore, Scheer’s praxeological approach means focusing on what people do, and reading ‘textual sources for traces of


observable action’, which offers the best means to approach emotions and their relationship to other cultural norms and social practices.\footnote{Ibid., p. 218.}

This section has outlined how historians have identified conceptual and methodological tools for approaching emotion, whether in terms of the relationship between individuals and the communities to which they belonged, or in terms of the social practice and the management of emotion. As an approach, Stearns and Stearns’ ‘emotionology’ entails the study of explicit prescriptions for appropriate emotional expression in advice literature, but overlooks the role of genre – the question of whether these prescriptions were reflective of wider social norms – and how emotions actually played out in social practice. Meanwhile, although Reddy’s concepts of ‘emotives’ and ‘emotional regimes’ highlight how understandings of emotion and norms of appropriate emotional expression are the products of the power structures of a particular society, they also raise methodological questions of how historians are supposed to access the seeming disjunction between norms and actual experience. For instance, Reddy’s categorisation of particular emotional regimes as ‘strict’ or ‘loose’ presupposes both an authentic, pre-cultural self and a universal desire for ‘emotional liberty’, which are subsequently impinged upon by different regimes to greater or lesser degrees. Additionally, his dialectical model of emotional change over time implies a progressive narrative of ever-increasing emotional liberty. By contrast, Rosenwein’s ‘emotional communities’ concept, which consists of identifying emotional language and its semantics across different types of surviving source material, offers a more workable approach to the historical study of emotion. Here the focus is on what was or was not considered to be ‘emotional’ and how certain emotions were appraised in different social, spatial and institutional contexts. Lastly, Scheer’s praxeological approach views emotions as embodied cultural practices that reflect the social and cultural norms shaped by power.
structures, and also recreate or adapt those norms in the practical act of repetition. As such, Scheer reconciles these historiographical discussions of the relationships between norms and feeling, individuals and communities, and the role of emotion in social practice. Like Boddice’s ‘biocultural historicism’, Scheer’s use of practice theory suggests that the self is a product equally of nature and nurture, meaning that norms and ‘actual’ feelings cannot be disentangled, and evidences the collapsing distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ described in the previous section.

However, this thesis does not simply apply one or more of these approaches to the study of emotions in early modern England, but rather uses them as jumping-off points for showing the sorts of questions raised by the history of emotions and how they can be answered. These questions concern the identification of emotions in historically shifting language; the management of emotion and its expression or repression in social practice; and whether or not those expressions were socially appropriate in different social, cultural and historical contexts. As will be discussed in the following section, an important way to study the relationships between emotional norms and actual practice is to approach emotion through the social and political roles inhabited and performed by men and women in early modern England.

**Emotions and social and political roles**

Early modern English people, as Conal Condren has argued, conceptualised and described society, morality, behaviour, duties and obligations through the concept of ‘office’.

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churchwardens, constables, magistrates and justices of the peace – that comprised the broad participatory governmental structure of early modern England at various parish, civic or county levels. Around 1700, Mark Goldie has estimated, in any one year approximately five per cent of adult males held offices, with the number rising to around half of adult males over the course of a decade. Officeholding, as historians have shown, was entwined with the identity, reputation and social standing of the early modern ‘gentry’ and ‘middling sort’, and provided the means by which these ideals were understood and performed in practice. Yet, as Condren has argued, the term ‘office’ also encompassed all sorts of social roles, such as parents, citizens, lawyers, philosophers and children. The early modern social world was ‘organised’ through this ‘vocabulary of office’, a term which denoted anything to do with identity and social status as well as the actions that put these structures into practice. Roles and offices were relational and embedded in a framework of superior and subordinate offices, and so the whole structure of society was understood as a network of interconnected and reciprocal offices, divided both horizontally and vertically in terms of status, gender, occupation, subordination and authority. In turn, the various spatial and institutional contexts of these offices – cities, households, companies, churches – were all entwined with the ubiquitous early modern ‘commonwealth’ discourse, which referred both to the ideal of the common good and more broadly to ‘society’ as a whole, meaning that the modern


80 Condren, Argument and Authority, p. 22.
historiographical ontologies of ‘political’ and ‘familial’ in fact were subsumed into the early modern ontology of ‘office’. In other words, notions of ‘office’ spanned what we now think of as ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres, indicating that early modern people considered their own roles and offices as inherently related to the power hierarchies of a holistic social structure that included all sorts of roles and offices in a variety of contexts. Therefore, a historicist study must view the ‘office-driven world’ of early modern England in terms of roles and offices, both as a means of conceptualising early modern society, and as a means of approaching it in historical study.

The nexus of early modern ‘offices’ not only provided the structure of early modern society, but also influenced social practice and its assessment. Michael Braddick and John Walter argue that early modern society was comprised of a ‘complex’ of ‘hierarchies of power’, which ‘were experienced not as abstract social orders but as relatively standardised social roles, which were played out in the public eye’. Roles, they argue, are ‘predictable forms of behaviour’ that ‘connect the abstract order of society with the actual experience of everyday life’. The performance of roles ‘required a public, and often embodied expression, in a complex linguistic and gestural code’. As Condren has shown, understandings of appropriate behaviour were entwined with the boundaries, expectations, duties and obligations of these commonly recognised roles and offices. Put simply, ‘an office provides an expectation of and the boundaries for proper conduct’, and the early modern ‘presupposition of office’ held ‘that people must behave according to the requirements of

82 Condren, *Argument and Authority*, p. 32.
84 Braddick, *State Formation*, p. 76.
86 Condren, *Argument and Authority*, p. 32.
their respective offices’. The terminology of ‘office’, then, denoted not just the roles themselves, but also the multitude of actions that lay within (or outside) the expected bounds of those offices.

As Withington has argued, early modern social roles were also entwined with notions of ‘place’, a term which denoted not only specific locations but also the spatially determined and embodied norms, perceptions and practices associated with roles within those locations, such as the urban ‘freedom’ associated with the towns and cities in which individuals were ‘placed’. The ‘ubiquity’ of the term ‘place’, he argues, exemplifies the early modern view of ‘the structural basis of society’, consisting of a ‘broadly defined sense of structure – social, architectural, and geographical – that impinged in important ways upon the way in which a body experienced and perceived the world’. Although social offices and ‘places’ had structurally defined norms and expectations, these could only be enacted by the agency and ability of the individuals who held those places. In other words, structure had to be put into practice. As well as their social disposition or place in society, a person’s ‘ability’ or ‘fitness’ for a specific role was based on their personal competency to adhere to behavioural norms such as ‘civility’ and ‘honesty’. As Withington has argued, honesty and civility encompassed ideals of ‘modesty’, ‘decorum’, ‘discretion’ and the ability to behave appropriately whatever the social context.

Consequently, the performance of roles, places or offices depended on the restraint or expression of specific emotions in certain circumstances, and for early modern people this had ideological force, as honesty and civility were self-conscious appropriations of classical behavioural norms, both in the theory promulgated in Renaissance

87 Ibid., pp. 8, 25.
88 Ibid., p. 45.
90 Ibid., p. 88.
texts and the social practice of men and women throughout the social hierarchy. Therefore, as Braddick has noted, the performance of office ‘entailed the presentation of a self which confirmed the authority of their office’. While Braddick refers here to state officeholding, the importance of personal fitness for an office or ‘place’ was central to all early modern social roles, and was the medium through which structure and agency were conceptualised and described by people at the time. In short, early modern social roles, offices and places consisted of a structure of duties and obligations, which required competent individuals possessed of a variety of ideal personal and behavioural qualities to enact – including civility’s requirements for emotional self-restraint – and which were associated with and legitimated by particular spatial, political or institutional contexts.

The link between emotional management and the performance of social roles has been studied in emotions scholarship. Most famously, in the 1970s and 1980s the sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild discussed the ‘emotional labour’ of flight attendants, which she defined as ‘the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display’ that ‘produces the proper state of mind in others’. As these roles were enacted in a commercial setting, Hochschild saw this putting on of emotion as a conscious performance of the prescribed cultural scripts and ‘feeling rules’ of a given context. As such, for Hochschild emotional labour causes feelings of ‘estrangement’ between a flight attendant’s ‘true’ internal and ‘false’ external selves. She situates the ‘managed heart’ of airline

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stewardesses in the context of power relationships in the twentieth-century service economy, in which the feelings of the customers were privileged above those who served them. As Rosenwein has noted, the specific ‘feeling rules’ of flight attendants mean they comprise a discrete ‘emotional community’. By extension, all social roles can be seen as a form of emotional community or ‘regime’, with their own defined ‘emotionology’ (or ‘feeling rules’) and appropriate social practices, which are promoted, regulated and enforced by the prevailing power structures of a particular group or society. However, while Hochschild’s study shows the historical continuities of the relationship between the management of emotions and the performance of social roles, and how deference to another’s feelings is inherent to social differentiation, there are problems with applying her approach to an early modern context. For instance, the dyad of false and true selves is based on a modernist view of a ‘true’ self that precedes culture, while ‘biocultural’ and praxeological approaches have fused this false nature/nurture dichotomy. Instead, as Michelle Addison has argued along similar lines to Scheer, the concept of habitus suggests that ‘we use dispositions as knowledge of how to act and feel in certain situations, and knowledge of how to express, and importantly manage, our emotions’. In other words, while the performance of roles may involve intentional ‘acting’, those performances are still built on the implicit knowledge of a person’s habitus of the feelings and actions appropriate in different contexts.

Medieval historians have linked the enactment of social roles to the performative and communicative uses of emotional expression in the context of the semiotic and face-to-face political culture of the Middle Ages. For example, Gerd Althoff has described the ‘staged’, ‘displayed’ and ‘demonstrative’ emotions that were part of the ‘personally grounded system

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97 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, p. 24.
of rulership’ of medieval monarchs. Ira regis, or the anger of the king, as Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy have also shown, was an inherent part of the exercise of justice and government, as the king’s person and the realm as a whole were considered to be two entwined bodies. Expressions of emotion, in this view, were the ‘performative’ acts through which government was carried out and alliances made and revoked. Stephen White similarly argues that medieval emotions had ‘political meaning’, and should be understood not simply as irrational expressions but rather as communicative and performative ‘gestures’ inseparable from their cultural contexts. Additionally, Timothy Reuter described medieval politics as a ‘game’ played out in ‘symbolic and ritualised forms of interaction’ that formed a ‘symbolic language’ by which political actions were directed and interpreted, and which was highly contextualised according to the ‘ground-rules’ of different contexts and assemblies. Within this political culture, Reuter argued, the ‘staging’ of ‘demonstrative’ and symbolic performances of ‘emotions’, by individuals as well as ‘collectivities’, both signalled and actually constituted ‘honour, rank and satisfaction for injuries to honour and rank’. As such, in medieval historiography emotions are symbolic and communicative, comprising either a means for rulers to physically demonstrate their favour or displeasure within a symbolic political culture, or as a textual convention by which writers referenced political motivations, alliances and enmities. Here medieval historians have had to contend with the predominant characterisation, most famously espoused by Elias, that emotions in the Middle Ages were unrestrained, intense and ‘childlike’, from which

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102 Ibid., p. 171.
105 Ibid., pp. 178-81, 189.
developed a modernity defined by increasing emotional restraint.\textsuperscript{106} Instead, in these more recent accounts, medieval emotions were imbued with ritualistic and symbolic meaning in the context of a visual, demonstrative and performative political culture. Rather than reflexive expressions of ahistorical and transcultural feelings, then, emotions have been shown to be central pillars of the performance of historically contingent and culturally specific social roles.

In the early modern period, as this section has demonstrated, roles and offices represented the convergence of social structure and the social practice of individuals. Such practices were guided by commonly shared norms as well as judged by others according to those same norms. Drawing together the historiographies of emotions and social roles is helpful in theoretical and methodological terms. It not only allows us to conceptualise the interaction of different sorts of people performing different social roles, but also provides a means of approaching this in the early modern historical context. Conceiving of emotional expressions in roles as communicative performances has had two main benefits. Firstly, it has shown that emotions are inherently social and incomprehensible without reference to the social circumstances in which they arise and are expressed. Secondly, this has helped to complicate inherited conceptualisations, such as the dichotomy of ‘emotion’ and ‘reason’, by showing, for instance, that the realm of politics is in fact suffused with emotion. However, while this approach is fruitful – demonstrating how emotional displays can be communicative and instrumental – if coupled with praxeological perspectives the spontaneity of emotional experience and expression is also accounted for, even if it has in fact been shaped by the habitual repetition of cultural codes (as described by the concept of \textit{habitus}).\textsuperscript{107} In a sense, the difference is whether a role is \textit{inhabited} or \textit{performed}: whether the

\textsuperscript{106} Rosenwein, \textit{Emotional Communities}, pp. 5-10.
\textsuperscript{107} Rosenwein and Cristiani, \textit{What is the History of Emotions?}, pp. 46-8.
emotional expressions related to the carrying out of roles are ‘automatic’ and ‘second nature’, or whether they are consciously put on – although both require the learnt bodily competencies or dispositions acquired through subconscious habitual repetition. As Withington has noted, early modern people thought of their roles and ‘places’ along similar lines, both in terms of their personal qualities and dispositions that fitted them to their place as well as the quality of their actions and behaviour within that place. Included in this early modern view were an individual’s ‘disposition’, denoting their ‘behavioural tendencies’; their ‘will’, meaning ‘the capacity for agency’ and action; and the individual’s ‘ability’, or ‘their social and cultural resources’, which included their education, reputation and knowledge of proper social behaviour. Therefore, viewing emotions in terms of roles both offers a perspective from which early modern emotions can be approached, and one that accords with how people at the time understood emotions, social practice and social structure.

In line with these early modern views of society and social practice, this thesis uses the concepts of roles, offices and places in order to analyse the relationship between affective expression and social practice, focusing on how different people were expected to modulate their feelings in different ways, and how certain affective displays were deemed appropriate or inappropriate based on the socially differentiated roles they performed.

**CHAPTER OUTLINE**

This thesis consists of five chapters that approach the relationship between passion, language and social practice in early modern England in different ways. The first two chapters comprise the linguistic and conceptual bases for the final three chapters of the thesis. Chapter

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109 Ibid.
1 conducts quantitative and qualitative analysis of ten early modern dictionaries in order to construct an affective lexicon, from which continuity and change in the meanings and use of affective language across the period can be charted. Consisting of 153 words (see Appendix 1), the affective lexicon reconstructed in this chapter reveals continuities in the most commonly used affective terms throughout the period, as well as changes in the less frequently used terms as some words fell out of use while others became more prominent.

As such, this chapter situates affective language and the affective lexicon in the wider context of the expansion of the English language, which was one of the defining characteristics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Methodologically, the chapter identifies and analyses ‘clusters’ of linked and synonymous affective terms, which are revealing of early modern categorisations of feeling in general, the semantics of specific affective words, and how interpersonal relationships and society as a whole were understood in affective terms. As will be shown, both the quality of relationships between hierarchically differentiated individuals, and the states of social and political bodies more widely, were characterised positively and negatively in affective terms. In other words, the language of passions and affections provided one of the discourses through which social practice was conceptualised, described and evaluated in early modern England. Consequently, this chapter forms the linguistic foundation on which the rest of the thesis is built. The meanings and applications of affective language in lexicographical sources were both reflected in, and products of, wider language use in the medical, religious, philosophical, didactic and judicial sources discussed in the following chapters of this thesis.

Following the linguistic analysis of the early modern affective lexicon, Chapter 2 identifies and analyses a corpus of texts (see Appendix 2), discernible by the appearance of the terms ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ on their title pages, that from a variety of medical, theological and philosophical perspectives discussed what passions were and how they
should be managed in everyday life for the benefit of social, physical and spiritual wellbeing. Using this textual corpus, the chapter argues that in place of a single theory of ‘emotion’, early modern writers appropriated, adapted and synthesised Aristotelian, Stoic, Galenic and Christian understandings of passions and affections. This meant that multiple conceptualisations of the physiological, psychological, supernatural or social causes, manifestations and effects of passions and affections coexisted at that time. While historians have shown that these views, which were inherited from the classical and medieval past, were explicitly challenged by philosophers such as René Descartes and Thomas Hobbes from the mid-seventeenth century, the chapter posits continuity rather than decisive change, as older ideals continued to be printed as part of the passions and affections corpus into the eighteenth century. Across these concurrent conceptual frameworks, the chapter shows, affectivity was considered to be directly implicated in action and social practice. After these discussions of affective ontologies, the chapter identifies and outlines a historicised theory of practice by which early modern people understood passion in relation to character, motivation, action and the performance of social roles, offices and places in terms that would have been recognisable to people at the time. As such, this chapter provides the conceptual underpinnings for analysing the affectivity of social practice in subsequent chapters. By extension, it also constructs a model through which early modern social and cultural historians in general can study social practice and its affective aspects in the same terms as it was both implicitly understood and explicitly described by people at the time.

Having outlined the early modern affective lexicon and how passion was related to action, the remaining three chapters analyse the relationship between passion and social practice, both as it was prescribed in ideal terms in didactic literature, and how it was described and contested in judicial sources. As such, Chapter 3 studies four types of early modern conduct literature – learned humanist treatises, parental advice, guides for household
management and texts for public and political offices – in which contemporary writers described how passions should be expressed or repressed as part of the performance of particular social roles within different social, spatial and institutional circumstances. Focusing on different genres of advice allows for an examination of the similarities and differences of affective advice across different social and gender roles and over time. Across these various types of text, conduct writers generally saw the performance of men and women’s roles as fundamentally related to the appropriate expression of passions and affections. While humanist treatises and parental advice provided broad instruction for a wide variety of scenarios and situations, the household and officeholding guides offered more contextualised and specific advice centred on authority and subordination, whether in terms of hierarchical relationships between husbands and wives, as well as between masters, mistresses and servants, or in terms of the public officeholder and those under his authority. Ultimately, the chapter argues that the common aim of these sources was to inculcate in readers the ideal ability to express the appropriate feelings in the correct contexts – skills that were encompassed in the concepts of ‘civility’ and ‘honestas’. While historians have argued that the restraint of the will and negative feelings such as anger was a core part of civility and honestas, this chapter shows that these behavioural ideals also related to the cultivation and expression of warm and positive feelings. Therefore, the chapter tells two stories: one of the idealised expression of positive feelings in different forms of interpersonal relationship; the other, which tempers this rose-tinted view, of self-restraint and authoritarian and hierarchical social relationships.

Shifting the focus from ideal behaviour to social practice as it was recorded in judicial records, Chapter 4 conducts an examination of early modern marital separation suits in the church court of York. By examining cases of marital abuse, which included graphic and disturbing accounts of sustained violence, the chapter recognises that such accounts were
suffused in affectivity, both for those who recounted them and for those reading them. It also argues, however, that the specific use of affective language that described these actions and the performance of spousal roles more generally followed the recognisable pattern linking passion and action that is outlined in the historicised theory of practice in Chapter 2. In these church court records, litigants and witnesses invoked common understandings that passion was related to notions of character, motivation, action and the proper or improper performance of household roles. The chapter argues for continuity in the invocation of these understandings of passion and action throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet despite these continuities, the chapter also outlines changes in the specific uses of affective language in church court records, which from the second half of the seventeenth century increasingly standardised its use of affective language in relation to the motivation and enaction of illicit and violent behaviour. While this demonstrated the church court’s institutional recognition of the role of passions and affections in notions of character, motivation, action and the performance of social roles, it was also an expression of pre-existing affective concepts and understandings of social practice. The remainder of the chapter consists of six case studies of individual separation suits from across the period. Each case study centres on different aspects of the relationship between affective language, behaviour and the performance of household roles, such as one case which revolved around the propriety of the relationships between the master, mistress and household servants, or another which adjudicated the extent to which ‘corrective’ violence and chastisement was a necessary and permitted part of the role of a husband. The chapter demonstrates that the links between passion, social practice and social roles informed actual social practice and its contestation in judicial contexts.

Continuing to study judicial records, as well as a report of a political trial, Chapter 5 shows that understandings about the relationship between passion and action also informed
discussions and contestations in judicial contexts about the performance of political roles. It does so through four case studies – focusing on Beverley, Chichester, Chester and London – which focus on disputed elections to various civic and parliamentary political roles in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. Each case study concerns disputes over the eligibility for, and correct performance of, particular political roles, both of which were bound up with the shared understandings of the relationship between passion and appropriate or inappropriate social practice outlined in the preceding chapters. Through these case studies, the chapter shows how affective language served to legitimise or delegitimise political claims or actions; was directly related to deeming people’s behaviour proper or improper; and was the lens through which wider society and the social order were understood by people at the time. Importantly, this last point shows that the framing of social and political states in affective terms by lexicographers (discussed in Chapter 1) was also used by individuals in adversarial legal contexts in order to legitimise or delegitimise certain political positions. The chapter argues that these politicised understandings of passion persisted throughout the period and eventually became entwined with the language of party politics in the later seventeenth century. Therefore, since early modern people conceptualised and described politics in affective terms, the chapter makes the wider point that the history of emotions, especially if motivated by historicism, can and must be brought to bear on early modern political history.

Taken as a whole, this thesis makes two key historiographical contributions. Firstly, motivated by historicism, it looks systematically at the semantics of affective language in the early modern period. In other words, it establishes how early modern people thought about and described passions and affections. Secondly, it then takes historicism one step further by attempting to recover an early modern sense of ‘practice’, of how people at the time thought passions and affections were related to people’s social behaviour and how they thought social
behaviour itself was inherently affective. In so doing, the thesis posits that, through a focus on practice, the history of emotions can be incorporated into early modern social and cultural history more generally. The historicised theory of practice outlined in Chapter 2, and its application in subsequent chapters of the thesis, provides a model through which early modern historians can draw on the history of emotions to discuss social practice and the performance of social roles in terms that people at the time would have recognised and understood.
CHAPTER 1

LINGUISTIC OVERVIEW

One of the defining features of early modernity was the rapid expansion of the English language through the introduction of neologisms and loanwords.¹ Compilers of dictionaries played an important part in this process of vernacularisation, not simply by passively documenting the expanding lexicon, but by actively translating, defining and using new English terms. As Richard Foster Jones argued in the 1950s, the production of early modern dictionaries reflected ‘a desire to survey and take stock of the remarkable growth of the language during the preceding century, and to mold it into a more effective instrument’.² On the one hand, this linguistic development was one of the achievements of Renaissance humanism, in which the improvement of vernacular languages was seen as a core part of a wider reform of society along classical lines. On the other hand, as Ian Lancashire has more recently argued, the expanding lexicon was also the product of technological advances, as the development of printing caused little-used words to be artificially preserved. From the later sixteenth century, in his view, the early modern English lexicon ‘began to bifurcate into a core (mother) tongue that people used, and a much larger archival lode that accumulated as information. … Words were not added so much as not lost’.³ Either way, dictionaries were vital to vernacularisation in this period, and so are obvious sources in which to study the early modern affective lexicon and chart its trajectory in this labile linguistic and historical context.

² Jones, Triumph of the English Language, p. 277.
The historiography of early modern English dictionaries has largely told a progressive narrative of typographical and lexicographical advance, whether in terms of the advent of monolingual English dictionaries in the seventeenth century, beginning with Robert Cawdrey’s *A Table Alphabeticall* (1604), or in terms of the multilingual, predominantly Latin-English, dictionaries that preceded them. Despite the importance of language to the history of emotions – Rosenwein argues that an ‘emotional community’ is defined by a common emotional vocabulary – dictionaries remain an underused source in emotions historiography. One recent exception is Merridee Bailey’s recent study of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century dictionaries to chart changes in the concept of ‘meekness’, which in the fifteenth century generally meant ‘gentleness’ and ‘mildness’, but by the turn of the eighteenth century increasingly denoted humble social behaviour and a specific ‘emotional state’. However, while Bailey’s study is limited to one concept, this chapter undertakes a broader examination of dictionaries in order to establish the early modern affective lexicon and chart its continuities and changes across the period. It does so through quantitative and qualitative analysis of ten dictionaries published between 1499 and 1677.

The ten dictionaries analysed in this chapter fall into two broad types: six multilingual dictionaries dating to the earlier period of the study, and four later monolingual dictionaries. These dictionary types allow for a diachronic study of changes to the affective lexicon and the appearance and disappearance of affective terms. The inclusion of both monolingual and multilingual dictionaries – instead of using only Latin-English dictionaries, for example –

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5 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*.

means that the diversity of lexicographical texts can be somewhat accounted for, allowing for a study of affective language both across the genre and over time.

The six multilingual dictionaries analysed in this chapter include the first printed English dictionary, the English-Latin *Promptorium parvulorum* (1499), which was based on a c.1440 manuscript by a Dominican friar of Bishop’s Lynn (Norfolk), known to historians as ‘Geoffrey the Grammarian’, whose aim was to improve the Latin of aspirant clerics. The second dictionary is the English-French *Lesclarcissement de la langue Francoyse* (1530) of John Palsgrave, a clergyman in royal service as tutor to both Henry VIII’s sister, Mary, and his illegitimate son, Henry Fitzroy. This royal connection continued with the third text in this study, the humanist Sir Thomas Elyot’s *Dictionary* (1538), which like the *Lesclarcissement* was dedicated to the king. Demonstrating the cultural and political importance of the developing English vernacular in the early sixteenth century, Elyot’s *Dictionary* was a key part of his humanist aim to reinvigorate classical learning and augment the English language with Latinate neologisms and loanwords, and Elyot consciously overlooked the medieval Latinity of earlier dictionaries such as the *Promptorium parvulorum*. As such, Elyot provides the clearest example of how dictionaries, as products of humanist study and the conscious appropriation of classical Latin forms, both reflected and shaped the early modern affective lexicon. The fourth dictionary studied in this chapter is *Huloets Dictionarie* (1572), a trilingual revision of the English-Latin *Abcedarium Anglico Latinum* (1552) of Richard Howlet (often latinised as ‘Huloet’), with French translations added by John Higgins. This dictionary was

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followed in 1598 by the Anglo-Italian Protestant John Florio’s ‘Most copious’ Italian-English dictionary, *A Worlde of Wordes*.12 Demonstrating the continuing royal patronage of lexicography, in 1611 Florio augmented and republished this dictionary, which was dedicated to Anne of Denmark, the wife of James VI and I, and retitled *Queen Anna’s New World of Words*.13 That same year was published the final multilingual dictionary in this study, Randle Cotgrave’s *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues*.14 Remaining popular throughout the seventeenth century, Cotgrave’s *Dictionarie* was republished in 1632 and expanded by James Howell in 1650, 1660 and 1673.15

The remaining four dictionaries analysed in this chapter are monolingual English dictionaries, of which the earliest was the puritan clergyman Robert Cawdrey’s *A Table Alphabetical* (1604). In contrast to the neologising Elyot, Cawdrey lamented the increasing use of ‘inkborne termes’ – or foreign loanwords and scholarly terms not used in day-to-day speech – and his stated aim was to improve understanding and behaviour by making the ‘hard’ words found ‘in Scriptures, Sermons, or elswhere’ legible in ‘plaine’ English, particularly for female readers and other ‘unskilfull persons’.16 Cawdrey’s *Table Alphabetical* underwent four editions by 1617, by which time it had been superseded by the next dictionary in this study, the Roman Catholic physician John Bullokar’s *English Expositor* (1616), who

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13 John Florio, *Queen Anna’s New World of Words, Or Dictionarie of the Italian and English tongues, Collected, and newly much augmented by Iohn Florio, Reader of the Italian vnto the Soueraigne Maiestie of Anna, Crowned Queene of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, &c.* (London, 1611).
similarly focused on defining ‘the hardest words used in our Language’.\textsuperscript{17} An immensely popular text, a nineteenth and much-augmented edition of the \textit{English Expositor} was published as late as 1775. The next dictionary is Edward Phillips’ \textit{The New World of English Words} (1658).\textsuperscript{18} Since it was advertised as ‘a General Dictionary’ containing not only ‘hard words’ but all sorts of terms, John Considine has argued that Phillips’ \textit{New World}, which was frequently revised and reprinted until 1706, heralded a move towards the more comprehensive English dictionaries of the eighteenth century – of which the most notable example is Samuel Johnson’s \textit{Dictionary of the English Language} (1755).\textsuperscript{19} The tenth and final text analysed in this chapter is the schoolmaster Elisha Coles’ \textit{An English Dictionary} (1676), which returned the focus to ‘Hard Words’ and ‘difficult Terms’.\textsuperscript{20} However, Coles also defined ‘Old Words’, demonstrating an awareness of lexical shifts; ‘Canting’ or slang terms, indicating general usage; and claimed to have more comprehensively defined ‘some thousands more’ words than ‘Mr. Philips World of Words’.\textsuperscript{21}

This chapter conducts quantitative and qualitative analysis of these ten dictionaries in order to examine continuity and change in the semantics of affective language across the early modern period. It first outlines the quantitative and qualitative methodologies used to examine the dictionaries, showing how the early modern affective lexicon can be established, and how continuity and change within that lexicon can be mapped. Here the key category of analysis is the study of ‘clusters’ of linked and synonymous affective terms, which shed light on understandings of ‘emotion’ itself, how it was linked at this conceptual level to different


\textsuperscript{18} Edward Phillips, \textit{The New World of English Words: Or, a General Dictionary} (London, 1658).


\textsuperscript{20} Elisha Coles, \textit{An English Dictionary} (London, 1677), title page.

forms of social relationship and even understandings of society as a whole. Following this methodological section, the chapter discusses five different clusters of affective terms. Firstly, it outlines the cluster of terms that were largely equivalent to the modern category of ‘emotion’. While this cluster includes ‘passions’, ‘affections’ and ‘perturbations’ – terms generally accepted by historians to have been the key early modern English affective taxonomies – this section also argues that a looser category of ‘motions’, ‘movements’ and ‘stirrings’ combined the notion of being ‘moved’ from one feeling to another with the subsequent actions those feelings ‘moved’ people to. Secondly, this chapter traces the continuities and changes in clusters centred on ‘joy’ and ‘sorrow’, showing, for example, the increasing visibility of ‘happiness’ throughout the period and the corresponding decline in the use of the Old English ‘gladness’. Thirdly, this chapter examines affective terms denoting positive and negative social relationships, whether between superiors, equals or inferiors. Positive social relationships were described in terms of ‘love’ and ‘fear’, terms which denoted the proper performance of hierarchically determined duties that an individual’s role or office prescribed for them. Negative social relationships, meanwhile, were described in terms of ‘anger’, ‘hatred’ and ‘malice’, which simultaneously denoted a person’s maladjusted inner feelings and the disharmonious interpersonal relationships those feelings led to. Lastly, this chapter will trace how terms describing the feelings of individuals were also used to describe social bodies and the ‘commonwealth’ as a whole. Indicating an inherently affective view of society and social order, this section argues, affective terms such as ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’ described both ideal tranquil feelings and ideal orderly and harmonious polities. Understanding and delineating the affective lexicon, therefore, is a necessary precondition to studying its use in wider society and culture.
Whereas quantitative analysis reveals continuity and change in word-use over time, qualitative analysis shows the semantics of those terms in different discursive contexts. In order to identify and build up an early modern affective lexicon, this chapter has conducted close reading of dictionaries, focusing on related terms that indicated feeling. To begin with, as Rosenwein has noted, at a core level there has been a marked continuity in European ‘emotional’ taxonomies since antiquity, whether in the form of the Greek pathē or the Latin passiones and affectus – the etymological roots of the English ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ – as well as the individual feelings and expressions subsumed into these categories: ‘words such as fear, love, hate, and gestures such as weeping’. Beginning with these root terms – many of which Ekman still referred to as ‘basic emotions’ in the 1970s – the affective lexicon has been organically built up by noting down the affective terms that were linked to, or used synonymously with, ‘passions’, ‘affections’ and other key terms, based on the language used by early modern writers. Particularly revealing was the frequent use of synonymy and ‘doubling’ by early modern writers: the use of two similar terms to explicate and clarify a complex concept or difficult term. Such an approach enables a historicist study of early modern affective language, focusing on the terms used by people at the time, rather than tracing backwards modern concepts and language of emotion.

For the quantitative analysis of dictionaries, this chapter has made use of two online databases, Early English Books Online (EEBO) and Lexicons of Early Modern English (LEME), in which affective terms identified through close reading can be digitally searched. In order to compare like with like, the quantitative analysis has only counted English affective terms

22 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, pp. 191, 32.
that appeared in the headwords or definitions of the dictionaries ‘proper’, while prefatory or closing matter, such as dedicatory epistles, prefaces or end matter, have been discounted. Derivative words and alternative spellings have been grouped with their root term. For example, in Howlet and Higgins’ *Huloets Dictionarie* (1572), ‘desire’ also includes ‘desier’ and ‘desyre’, as well as ‘desierous’, ‘desireth’ and ‘desyred’ and so on. By these means, a lexicon comprising 153 affective terms has been constructed (see Appendix 1), which runs alphabetically from ‘abashment’ (105 mentions) to ‘zeal’ (33), with 23,618 total appearances across the ten dictionaries. Of these, five terms (‘passion’, ‘affection’, ‘perturbation’ and ‘motion’) were early modern taxonomies broadly equivalent to the modern ‘emotion’, with 641 appearances between them (or 2.7 per cent of the total) – although ‘affection’, with 355 appearances alone, counted for over half of this amount and by far eclipsed ‘passion’ (196 appearances). These early modern affective taxonomies will be discussed in the following section of this chapter.

The ten dictionaries analysed in this chapter differed in size, style and structure. For example, the number of headwords or entries in these dictionaries ranged from the 2,446 in Cawdrey’s *Table Alphabetical* (1604) to the 47,310 in Cotgrave’s *Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues* (1611). Moving from headwords to total word counts, Bullokar’s *English Expositor* (1616) contained 69,865 words while *Huloets Dictionarie* contained as many as 638,038. These differences in size reflected differences in style. For instance, the earliest dictionary in this study, the *Promptorium parvulorum* (1499), had the tersest style, consisting of English headwords and brief glosses of those headwords, which were then translated into Latin. Bullokar’s *English Expositor* was similarly brief and to the point. Inevitably, the trilingual English-Latin-French *Huloets Dictionarie* was longer, and made longer still by the

inclusion of several subentries after the main headword. At the other end of the scale were Florio’s Italian-English *Worlde of Wordes* and Cotgrave’s French-English *Dictionarie*. Florio’s ‘Most copious’ dictionary listed numerous synonymous definitions of the Italian headword, often consisting of a ‘progression of usage from formal to slang and from respectful to slanderous’.²⁶ Cotgrave went even further, providing moral lessons for his readers by translating innumerable French proverbs. For example, he translated ‘*Dueil*’ as ‘Dole, griefe, sorrow, heavinesse; mourning, wayling, moaning, lamentation’, before adding the proverb: ‘Drinke after dole goes merrily downe’.

Such entries allow for the construction of the affective lexicon, in this case showing the links between ‘grief’, ‘sorrow’ and ‘heaviness’, its juxtaposition with ‘merriment’, as well as its links to gestures and expressions of ‘wailing’, ‘moaning’ and ‘lamentation’. As such, the changing frequencies of word use in the ten dictionaries have been calculated according to the number of appearances of each term (and its derivatives) against the total number of counted affective terms within that dictionary. Therefore, while this methodology can never be exact, based as it is on the subjective reading of polyvalent terms, it does allow for comparable results of continuity and change within the early modern affective lexicon.

**Table 1.1: The 20 most common affective terms across all ten dictionaries.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Love</td>
<td>1,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Trouble</td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Desire</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Care</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Favour</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Pleasure</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Doubt</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Joy</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Quiet</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Cruelty</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Madness</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Vexation</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Affection</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Merry</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Pleasing</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Stirring</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


²⁷ Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*, ‘*Dueil*’.
Table 1.1 shows the 20 most common affective terms across all ten dictionaries. As can be seen, ‘love’ (1,133 mentions) was by far the most commonly used term, followed by ‘fear’ (863). As will be shown later in this chapter, alongside their general senses that are recognisable today, both ‘love’ and ‘fear’ could describe social relationships in positive terms. ‘Love’ described the affective bonds that held society together, while ‘fear’ ideally characterised the feelings of subordinates towards their superiors and governors in normative terms. ‘Favour’ (589) also denoted ideal interpersonal relationships, particularly of superiors to their inferiors, in contrast to ‘anger’ (507), ‘cruelty’ (388) and ‘vexation’ (362), which pejoratively described personal qualities, disharmonious relationships and disorderly actions. These social senses of affective terms continued with the third most common word, ‘trouble’ (714). The term ‘trouble’ could refer to feeling in general, with ‘trouble of mind’ being synonymous with ‘passions’ and ‘affections’, or more particularly to negative feelings. In a later section, this chapter argues that ‘trouble’ and its antonym, the twelfth most common term ‘quiet’ (413), described not only the presence or absence of feeling, but also ideal or unideal social, political and religious states. For example, in Huloets Dictionarie (1572) a series of Latin affective concepts – ‘Pathe’, ‘Passiones’, ‘Affectio’ and ‘Perturbatio animi’ – defined the English entries ‘Disquietnes of the mynde’ and ‘Trouble of minde, or spyrite’.28 As will be discussed below, these same terms conceptually and linguistically linked physical bodies and bodies politic, such as in the subentry ‘To trouble the quietnes, and government of the publike weale’.29

‘Doubt’ (430), the tenth most common affective term, was a polyvalent word which in the first half of the period denoted both the modern sense of uncertainty and was also synonymous with fear. Yet by the later seventeenth century ‘doubt’ had shed its connotations

29 Ibid., ‘Trouble of minde, or spyrite’.
of fear, although its remnants persist in the phrase ‘doubts and fears’. This sense of ‘doubt’ was evident in Palsgrave’s *Lesclarcissement* (1530), in entries such as ‘I Dowte I feare or drede a person’ and ‘I Feare I drede or stande in doute of a thyng to my hurte’.30 Similarly, in 1538 Elyot defined the Latin ‘Religio’ as ‘relygion, a reverende drede, doubte leste he shall offende’ and ‘Religiosus’ as ‘relygious, dredefulle, doubtefull’.31 While in 1598 Florio could translate the Italian ‘Dubbio’ as a combination of ‘doubt’, ‘feare’ and ‘uncertaintie’, by 1658 Phillips only attributed ‘doubt’ its modern meaning, such as in his definition of ‘Dubious’ (‘uncertain, doubtful’).32 Evidencing an awareness of linguistic change, in the 1670s Coles noted that ‘Endoubted’ was an old word for ‘feared’.33 As such, the history of the term ‘doubt’ in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is a striking example of a semantic shift in the early modern affective vocabulary – in this case of a word losing its affective connotations.

‘Affection’ (355) and ‘stirring’ (339), the seventeenth and twentieth most common terms on Table 1.1, shift the focus away from individual feelings and towards early modern taxonomies of feeling itself. While ‘affection’ could denote an individual positive feeling, such as in Palsgrave’s (1530) ‘I Love I beare affection to one’ and Florio’s (1598) ‘affection, love, kindnes or good will’, it also constituted an overarching category of feeling.34 The following section of this chapter outlines the multiple and often overlapping concepts by which early modern people categorised feelings broadly equivalent to the modern ‘emotion’. For instance, the use of ‘affection’ as a taxonomy of feeling was evident in Elyot’s 1538 definition of the Latin ‘*Flexanima oratio*’: ‘an oration or spech, wherby a mans mynde is stirred to pite, rejoysynge, or other lyke affection’.35 Here ‘affection’ encompassed the feelings of ‘pity’ and

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30 Palsgrave, *Lesclarcissement*, ‘I Dowte I feare or drede a person’, ‘I Feare I drede or stande in doute of a thynge to my hurte’.
35 Elyot, *Dictionary*, ‘*Flexanima oratio*’. 
‘rejoicing’, and is caused by the ‘mind’ being ‘stirred’. Frequently coupled with ‘movement’ (337), ‘stirring’ denoted the actions of passions and affections. Other examples of this word-use included Palsgrave’s ‘Styrryng of ones mynde’, Elyot’s ‘Commutus’ (‘meved, troubled, afraid, angrye’) and Cotgrave’s (1611) ‘Boutade’ (‘A starting; a suddaine, violent, and unexpected passion, or stirring’).36

This section of the chapter has outlined the quantitative and qualitative methodologies used to examine the dictionaries and establish the early modern affective lexicon that is analysed in the subsequent sections. It has also carried out a brief overview of the affective lexicon, showing the 20 most common affective terms across all ten dictionaries. In one sense, this analysis has indicated many of the continuities between early modern and present-day affective language, as many of the terms on Table 1.1 would still be among the most used emotion words today, only so much can be learned from studying words in isolation. As such, the following sections analyse clusters of affective terms, showing how linguistic analysis of dictionaries can add to our understandings of how early modern people used affective language to conceptualise and describe social life and society as a whole.

**AFFECTIVE TAXONOMIES: ‘PASSIONS’, ‘AFFECTIONS’, ‘PERTURBATIONS’ AND ‘MOTIONS’**

As historians have shown, early modern English people conceived of a variety of taxonomies, such as ‘passions’, ‘affections’, ‘perturbations’ and ‘motions’, which were broadly equivalent to the modern ‘emotion’.37 The term ‘passions’ derives from the Latin passiones, a translation

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of the Ancient Greek pathē (the plural form of pathos), which was the general taxonomy of feeling Aristotle outlined in the fourth century BC. The Aristotelian view that passions are external forces that act upon the passive soul is imbued with senses of suffering and passivity, which are evocatively expressed in the ‘Passion of Christ’.38 Christian writers also used the Latin terms affectus or affectiones, from which originate the English ‘affects’ and ‘affections’. While historians have identified ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ (or passiones and affectiones) as the principal typologies used in the Middle Ages and early modernity, they disagree about whether the terms had discrete or overlapping meanings. For example, Thomas Dixon argues that ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ were clearly differentiated in ‘classical Christian psychology’, which for Dixon encompassed the wide temporal expanse from the early Middle Ages to the eighteenth century.39 As judgements and desires of the ‘will’ – the ‘intellective appetite’ located in the higher, rational part of the soul – Dixon notes that ‘affections’ were active, cognitive and, above all, rational feelings.40 ‘Passions’, by contrast, denoted ‘involuntary’ and ‘passive’ feelings rooted in the ‘sensory appetite’ in the lower, sensual part of the soul.41 Relating more to physical pleasure or pain, Dixon continues, in the ‘classic Christian’ view ‘passions’ represented the discord between sense and reason caused by the fall of humanity, which had disturbed and pathologised human nature.42 Similarly, Russ Leo has argued that medieval and early modern theologians and philosophers, such as St Augustine of Hippo and Baruch Spinoza, clearly distinguished between the active and moderate affectus, and the

38 James, Passion and Action, p. 11; Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, p. 6; Rosenwein, Generations of Feeling, p. 147; Erin Sullivan, Beyond Melancholy: Sadness and Selfhood in Renaissance England (Oxford, 2016), p. 139.
39 Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, p. 22.
40 Ibid., p. 46.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., pp. 29, 56.
passive and sinful passions. More recently, however, Kirk Essary has stressed the ‘ambiguity’ of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ in sixteenth-century usage. While a ‘conceptual distinction between useful and harmful emotions’ was made at this time, Essary argues that this distinction did not ‘consistently’ manifest as a ‘semantic distinction’ between ‘passions’ and ‘affections’. Rather, ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ could be interchangeable as well as differentiated.

Graph 1.1: Appearances of ‘affection’, ‘passion’, ‘motion’ and ‘perturbation’.

Building on historians’ discussions of these early modern taxonomies of feeling, this section conducts quantitative and qualitative analysis of the use in dictionaries of the terms broadly equivalent to the modern ‘emotion’. As can be seen on Graph 1.1, ‘affection’ (355 appearances) and ‘passion’ (195) were the most commonly used typologies. By contrast,

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‘motion’ (60) and ‘perturbation’ (30), were used at a much lower but generally consistent level, although the use of ‘perturbation’ declined as the seventeenth century progressed. The only exception was the *Promptorium parvulorum* (1499), which neglected to use the term ‘passion’, although it did use ‘affection’, both in the general sense of ‘Affeccion’ as a category of feeling, and in the positive sense of ‘Affect or wele Wylling’.

The vast difference in total appearances within all the dictionaries between ‘affection’ and ‘passion’ (160 uses) was in large part due to Cotgrave’s tendency to use ‘affection’ in his expansive French-English *Dictionarie* (1611), despite his use of ‘passion’ being consistent with the levels in other dictionaries. Although Cotgrave frequently used ‘passion’ and ‘affection’ interchangeably, as will be shown below, the spike in the use of ‘affection’ in his *Dictionarie* possibly reflects the term’s dual meanings as an overarching taxonomy of feeling and a particular positive feeling within that taxonomy. For instance, Cotgrave’s translations of the French ‘*Polyphilie*’ (‘Affection divided, love unto many’) and ‘*Desir*’ (‘Desire; a coveting of; a wish, wishing, or longing for; a fancie, affection, or appetite, unto; a lusting after’) both exemplified the positive, active and cognitive feelings described by Dixon. By contrast, the following dictionary, Bullokar’s *English Expositor* (1616), used ‘passion’ far more than ‘affection’. Reflecting Bullokar’s profession as ‘Doctor of Physicke’, Bullokar’s definitions of ‘*Impassible*’ (‘Which cannot feele any paine, or passion’) and ‘*Symptome*’ (‘Any passion or griefe following a disease, or sensibly joyned with it’) both stressed the connotations of suffering in the term ‘passion’, although his definition of ‘*Stoike*’ (one ‘who taught that a wise man ought to bee free from all passions and never to bee mooved either with joy or griefe’) showed that ‘passion’ could refer to positive (‘joy’) and negative (‘grief’) feelings alike (as well as its link to ‘movement’).

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46 *Promptorium*, ‘Affeccion’, ‘Affect or wele Wylling’.
47 Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*, ‘*Polyphilie*’, ‘*Desir*’.
48 Bullokar, *English Expositor*, title page, ‘*Impassible*’, ‘*Symptome*’, ‘*Stoike*’. 
Other uses ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ in dictionaries support Essary’s view of the inconsistent semantics of these terms, whose meanings were sometimes overlapping and sometimes discrete. For example, in 1530 Palgrave associated ‘passions’ with negative feelings, such as in his entries ‘I Stere to anger or to any other passyon’ and ‘I Worke one sorowe or anger or any suche lyke passion’.\(^4^9\) By contrast, Palgrave more positively defined ‘Love’, ‘Favour’ and ‘good mynde’ as the French ‘affection’.\(^5^0\) In 1538 Elyot similarly contrasted his negative association of ‘passion’ in his definitions of the Greek ‘Pathe’ (‘troubles or vexacions of mynde, passions’) and the positive definition of ‘Affectus’ and ‘affectio’ (‘affection or naturall motion, as gladnesse, desyre’).\(^5^1\) Relating it to ‘an opinion of a thing good or pleasaunt’, Elyot linked ‘affection’ to ‘joye’, ‘myrthe’ and the ‘inwarde devotion’ of ‘reverence’.\(^5^2\) However, elsewhere Elyot implied the equivalence of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ in his definitions of ‘Apathes’ (‘phylosophers, whiche of a frowarde and stubborne nature, held opinion that a wyse man had non affections or passions’) – a definition that indicated Elyot’s disapproval at these ‘froward’ ideals of impassivity.\(^5^3\) As well as these distinct and equivalent uses of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’, Elyot also pejoratively defined ‘affection’ in his definitions of ‘Affectio’ (‘affection, sometyme trouble of mynde’) and ‘Temperantia’ (‘temperance, which is a firme and moderate governance of reson against sensualitie and other vycyouse affections of the mynde’).\(^5^4\)

The lexical ambiguity of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ continued in later dictionaries. For the definition of ‘Passions’, John Baret’s *Alvearie or Triple Dictionarie* (1574) simply told

\(^{4^9}\) Palgrave, *Lesclarcissement*, ‘I Stere to anger or to any other passyon’, ‘I Worke one sorowe or anger or any suche lyke passion’.


\(^{5^1}\) Elyot, *Dictionary*, ‘Pathe’, ‘Affectus ... affectio’.


\(^{5^3}\) *Ibid.*, ‘Apathes’


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readers to see the definition of ‘Affections’.\textsuperscript{55} Similarly, in 1604 Cawdrey defined ‘\textit{patheticall}’ as ‘vehement, full of passions, or moving affections’, while in 1611 Cotgrave translated the French ‘\textit{Passion}’ as ‘Passion, perturbation, trouble, or affliction; also, a motion, disposition, inclination, or affection, of the mind’.\textsuperscript{56} At the same time, Cotgrave translated ‘\textit{Affection}’ both positively as ‘An affection, liking, love, good will unto; a desire of, or longing after’, and negatively as ‘a passion, perturbation, or trouble of mind; (and hence) also a sicknesse, disease, or imperfection (of mind, or bodie.)’\textsuperscript{57} Defining ‘\textit{Passion}’ in 1658, Phillips noted general sense of affliction, its synonymity with ‘affections’ of the ‘mind’ and its positive sense of ‘love’.\textsuperscript{58} Lastly, in 1677 Coles followed Phillips in defining ‘\textit{Passion}’ as ‘suffering, also an affection of the mind’ and, in contrast to Cawdrey, simply defined ‘\textit{Pathetical}’ as ‘affectionate’.\textsuperscript{59} Therefore, while Essary focused only on the sixteenth century, the ambiguity he describes continued into the seventeenth century.

As is shown on Graph 1.1, the typologies of ‘perturbations’ and ‘motions’ were used less frequently than ‘affection’ and ‘passion’ in order to categorise feelings broadly equivalent to ‘emotion’. While ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ both positively and negatively referred to feelings, ‘perturbation’ was invariably used in pejorative terms, doubtless because the English ‘perturbation’ is derived from the Latin \textit{perturbationes} (confusions or disturbances), which Cicero used in the first century BC to describe feelings in Stoic terms as irrational misjudgements.\textsuperscript{60} This negative sense was repeated, for instance, in Elyot’s definition of the Latin ‘\textit{Perturbatio}’ as ‘a trouble of mynde’.\textsuperscript{61} In 1572 Howlet and Higgins similarly defined

\textsuperscript{55} John Baret, \textit{An Aluearie or Triple Dictionarie, in Engrishe, Latin, and French} (London, 1574), ‘Passions. Vide Affections’.
\textsuperscript{56} Cawdrey, \textit{Table Alphabeticall, ‘patheticall’}, Cotgrave, \textit{Dictionarie, ‘Passion’}.
\textsuperscript{57} Cotgrave, \textit{Dictionarie, ‘Affection’}.
\textsuperscript{58} Phillips, \textit{New World, ‘Passion’}.
\textsuperscript{60} James, \textit{Passion and Action}, p. 11; Dixon, \textit{From Passions to Emotions}, p. 40; Rosenwein, \textit{Emotional Communities}, pp. 38-9; Rosenwein, \textit{Generations of Feeling}, pp. 7, 17, 28.
\textsuperscript{61} Elyot, \textit{Dictionary, ‘Perturbatio’}.  

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‘Disquietnes’ as ‘Perturbatio’, and added that ‘Disquietnes of the mynde’ could be translated as the Greek ‘Pathē’, Cicero’s ‘Perturbationes’ and Augustine’s ‘Passiones’. Most (23 out of 30) of the uses of ‘perturbation’ appeared in Florio’s Italian-English (1598) and Cotgrave’s French-English (1611) dictionaries. Examples included Florio’s definition of ‘Perturbamento’ (‘a perturbation, passion, vexation, or trouble of mind, a troublous passion, affliction or motion or agitation of the minde and spirits, disturbance, disquieting’), and Cotgrave’s similar – and probably lifted – ‘Perturbation’ (‘Perturbation; disturbance, unquietnesse of mind; a troublesome passion, restlesse affection; an agitation of spirit’). Here the term ‘perturbation’ was a direct anglicisation that was immediately glossed with more the common English ‘passions’ and ‘affections’. Indicating that ‘perturbation’ was more a scholarly ‘inkhorn term’ and less an affective taxonomy in everyday use, in the monolingual English dictionaries it appeared as one of the ‘hard words’ that were defined by easier, plain English terms. For instance, Cawdrey (1604) defined ‘perturbation’ as ‘disquietnes, or trouble’; Bullokar (1616) as ‘A trouble, a great disquietnesse’; and Phillips (1658) as ‘a disquieting, or troubling’. By 1677 Coles simply defined ‘Perturbation’ as ‘a troubling’, which despite being a more opaque rendering without an explicit reference to feeling, did demonstrate in the simplest terms the negative sense of the term.

Meanwhile, ‘motions’, the final ‘emotional’ typology included on Graph 1.1, derives from the Latin motus animi (movements of the soul), which described Scholastic Aristotelian understandings of the pathē as the positive and negative feelings caused by movements within the soul (see Chapter 2). In early modern dictionaries ‘motion’ could be used

63 Florio, World of Words, ‘Perturbamento’; Cotgrave, Dictionarie, ‘Perturbation’.
65 Coles, English Dictionary, ‘Perturbation’.
synonymously with the more common ‘affection’, such as in Elyot’s definition of the Latin ‘Affectus’, where the English ‘affection’ was glossed as ‘naturall motion’.

Elyot also used the term ‘motions’ to describe feeling in general, such as in his description of the hedonistic Greek philosopher ‘Aristippus’, who ‘put the principall good thynge in the pleaasunt mocions of the mynde: the pryncipall yll thinge, in gryefe’. In this definition, then, ‘pleasant motions’ were the opposite of the negative feeling of ‘grief’, a term which he elsewhere defined as a ‘passion’. Showing the interchangeability of affective taxonomies, Thomas Cooper’s Thesaurus Linguae Romanae & Britannicae (1578) also defined ‘Affectus’ as ‘Affection: motion: or passion’, while Thomas Thomas’ Dictionarium linguae Latinae & Anglicanae (1587) rendered it as ‘Affection, disposition: motion: passion: or accident of body or minde’. While this usage declined in the seventeenth century, in 1657 the anonymous Physical Dictionary still defined the Latin ‘Affectus animi affectionis’ as ‘motions, or passions of the mind’.

‘Motion’ also formed the etymological basis of ‘emotion’, which literally means ‘outward movement’ (from the Latin prefix e- and noun motio). Originally a French loanword, ‘emotion’ was first used in English in the later sixteenth century, when it variously described political disturbances as well as mental or physical ones, and ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ remained the dominant taxonomies of feeling into the nineteenth century. This history of ‘emotion’, as it were, was reflected in early modern dictionaries. In 1611 Cotgrave had been the first to include ‘emotion’ as a direct anglicisation of the French headword ‘Esmotion’: ‘An emotion, commotion, sudden, or turbulent stirring; an agitation of the spirit,

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68 Ibid., ‘Aristippus’.
69 Ibid., ‘Passio’.
71 A Physical Dictionary or, An Interpretation of such crabbed Words and Terms of Arts, as are deriv’d from the Greek or Latin, and used in Physick, Anatomy, Chirurgery, and Chymistry (London, 1657), ‘Affectus animi affectiosis’.
violent motion of the thoughts, vehement inclination of the mind’. Here ‘emotion’ referred to movements both inward and outward, whether within the physical body or the wider body politic. However, these senses of ‘emotion’ had also been evident in earlier French-English dictionaries in English translations of the French esmotion and esmoy. As early as 1530, Palsgrave’s ‘Mocion or meving’ was defined as both ‘motion’ and ‘esmotion’, while ‘Styrryng’ was also defined as ‘agitation’ and ‘esmoy’. Both Lucas Harrison’s A Dictionarie French and English (1571) and Claudius Hollyband’s A Dictionarie French and English (1593) defined ‘Esmotion’ as ‘a motion, a stirryng of the mynde’. While ‘emotion’ also appeared as a ‘hard word’ in both Phillips’ New World of English Words (1658) and Coles’ English Dictionary (1677) – defined in both dictionaries as ‘a moving out, a stirring up, also trouble of mind’ – it continued to be a difficult and less obvious word in the later seventeenth century.

Graph 1.2: Appearances of ‘movement’ terms alongside ‘passions’ and ‘affections’.

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74 Cotgrave, Dictionarie, ‘Esmotion’.

75 Palsgrave, Leselarciissement, ‘Mocion or meuing’, ‘Styrryng’.

As has been shown, the French *esmotion* and English ‘emotion’ were related to affective notions of ‘movement’ and ‘stirring’. As such, Graph 1.2 shows the ‘emotional’ uses of terms such as ‘movement’ (337 appearances), ‘stirring’ (339) and ‘provoking’ (307). The rates of usage of these ‘movement’ terms were comparable to those of ‘affections’ and ‘passions’, suggesting that this cluster of terms constituted an important means of referring to feeling that has largely been unrecognised by historians. As can been seen on Graph 1.2, the language of movement was used more frequently in an affective sense than ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ in the sixteenth-century dictionaries. Subsequently, although ‘stirring’ and ‘provoking’ remained relatively stable, the use of ‘movement’ declined as the period progressed. The higher proportion of uses of both ‘movement’ and ‘stirring’ in the *Promptorium parvulorum* (1499) reflected both the smaller overall size of that dictionary and the more ambiguous entries – for instance, ‘Mevynge’ and ‘Steringe’ were both simply defined as the Latin ‘Motus’ – which could refer to movements ‘emotional’ or otherwise.\(^\text{77}\)

Graph 1.2 also shows that ‘motion’ (60 appearances) and ‘emotion’ (three), were the least commonly used ‘movement’ words.

In early modern dictionaries the language of movement could describe the actions or effects of specific passions and affections, as well as notions of persuasion, instigation and motivation. For instance, demonstrating the entwining of ‘passion’ and movement, Palsgrave translated the French *‘je suis esmeu’* as ‘I Am meved by passyon’.\(^\text{78}\) This sense was also evident in Palsgrave’s entries, ‘I Sharpen a person I provoke hym to anger or to be moved’ and ‘I Stere to anger or to any other passion’.\(^\text{79}\) Similarly, Elyot’s *Dictionary* (1538) included definitions such as ‘meved, troubled, afraid, angrye’, ‘to inflame, to be stered or provoked’ and ‘to be moved with affection’, while Howlet and Higgins’ *Huloets Dictionarie* (1572)

\(^{77}\) *Promptorium*, ‘Meuynge’, ‘Sterynge’.

\(^{78}\) Palsgrave, *Lesclarcissement*, ‘I Am meued by passyon’.

\(^{79}\) *Ibid.*, ‘I Sharpen a person I prouoke hym to anger or to be moued’, ‘I Stere to anger or to any other passion’.
contained the similar entries, ‘To move, or stirre to anger’ and ‘Move affection (or disposition) to good, or yll’.\textsuperscript{80} Within the general entry for the verb ‘to Moove, or stirre & provoke’, Baret’s Alvearie (1574) included the subentries, ‘angry or mooved’ and ‘to move greatly the harte or the minde’.\textsuperscript{81} Similarly, in 1611 Cotgrave defined the French ‘Irritation’ as ‘An irritation, or stirring up; an incensing, urging, or moving unto anger; a provocation; an appetite’, an example which shows that these movement words could be used interchangeably.\textsuperscript{82} Lastly, in 1677 Coles defined ‘Wrathed’ as ‘moved to anger’ and ‘Lacession’ as ‘a provoking to anger’, of which this last entry was taken from Elyot’s ‘Lacesso’ of 140 years earlier: ‘to provoke a man to wrathe or displesure, with wordes, writynge, or acte’.\textsuperscript{83} As such, across the period, descriptions of being ‘moved’ described feeling in general and the actions of particular passions and affections, often in negative terms.

This connection between passions, affections and movement is particularly evident in dictionary entries relating to rhetoric, a humanist skill that was taught in grammar schools and universities, and widely practised in sermons and speeches, that aimed to ‘move’ the passions, opinions and actions of readers and listeners.\textsuperscript{84} For example, the Promptorium parvulorum’s ‘Steryn or mevyn with a plesauns’ combined notions of flattery with feeling (‘pleasance’), and noted that the motivating force of this feeling was concerning and negative – a sense that was also true of the entry, ‘Prowkyn or styren to goode or ba’d’.\textsuperscript{85} Also invoking the link between rhetoric, affectivity and motivation to action were Elyot’s definitions of ‘Flexanima oratio’ (‘an oration or spech, wherby a mans mynde is stirred to pitie, rejoysynge,

\begin{itemize}
\item Elyot, Dictionary, ‘Commotus’, ‘Concalfacio’, ‘Affici’; Howlet and Higgins, Huloets Dictionarie, ‘To moue, or stirre to anger’, ‘Mooue affection (or disposition) to good, or yll’.
\item Baret, Aluearie, ‘to Mooue, stirre & prouoke’.
\item Cotgrave, Dictionarie, ‘Irritation’.
\item Promptorium, ‘Steryn or meuyn with a plesauns’, ‘Prowkyn or styren to goode or ba’d’.
\end{itemize}
or other lyke affection’) and ‘Peroratio’ (‘the last part of an oration, wherein the affectes of the herers are chiefelye styred’).\(^8\) Similarly, in 1598 Florio defined the Italian ‘Peroratione’ as ‘the last part of an oration, which most mooves the hearer’, while for Cotgrave in 1611 it was ‘A peroration; the conclusion of an Oration, applyed to the humors, or praying the favors, of the Auditorie’.\(^7\) Focusing on rhetoric, then, these entries all demonstrated the affectivity of ‘moving’, ‘stirring’ and ‘provoking’, whether in the actions of passions or affections in the body, or as motivating forces that directly linked inward feeling to external action.

This section has put the quantitative and qualitative methodologies outlined in the introduction of this chapter to the test, and has analysed a cluster of early modern English terms that were broadly equivalent to ‘emotion’ as we understand it. Rather than being represented by terms with discrete and defined meanings – such as positive, cognitive ‘affections’, and negative, corporeal ‘passions’ – reading early modern dictionaries emphasises lexical ambiguity and interchangeability. Meanwhile, the typology of ‘perturbation’ invariably referred to negative feelings, and was most frequently translated as ‘trouble’ or ‘disquiet’. These common affective terms – ‘trouble’ was the third most common term, ‘quiet’ the twelfth – denoted negative feelings in general as well as disturbances to the polity in particular, which will be discussed below. Also belonging to this cluster of ‘emotion’ terms were ‘motions’, ‘movements’ and ‘stirrings’, which referred to feeling as a whole; the actions of passions and affections; and formed the etymological and conceptual bases of ‘emotion’. This section has demonstrated that notions of movement related the internal movement of passions within the body to external movement in the world. Above all, this section has shown the diversity of affective taxonomies in early modern English.

OPPOSING CLUSTERS: ‘JOY’ AND ‘SORROW’

Having discussed the different terms that comprised the cluster broadly equivalent to the modern category of ‘emotion’, this section now turns to the two clusters of ‘joy’ and ‘sorrow’, and shows the continuities and changes undergone by such affective terms during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To begin with, ‘pleasure’ and ‘joy’ belonged to a cluster of terms that over the course of the early modern period was increasingly denoted by ‘happiness’. Withington has argued that the ‘invention of happiness’ and its accrual of diverse meanings over time was an important social, political and linguistic development of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Graph 1.3 shows the frequency of a cluster of eight terms centred on ‘pleasure’, ‘joy’ and, increasingly, ‘happiness’. As can be seen, ‘pleasure’ (510 mentions), ‘joy’ (421), ‘happiness’ (210) and ‘glad’ (195), appeared much more frequently than the subsequent four terms, ‘felicity’ (29), ‘blessed’ (27), ‘bliss’ (24) and ‘beatitude’ (seven). In his Lesclarcissement (1530), the dictionary in which ‘pleasure’ and ‘displeasure’ appeared with the highest relative frequency, Palsgrave used ‘pleasure’ in order to gloss other entries, such as ‘Delectation pleasure’, ‘Luste pleasure’ and ‘Myrthe pleasure’. ‘Displeasure’, meanwhile, also glossed ‘anger’ (‘I styll or cease ones angre or displeasure’), a disordered interpersonal relationship (‘He hath brought me in displeasure with my mayster’) and a specific bad turn done by one person to another (‘Who so ever doth me a displesure I wyll revenge me’). Perhaps as a word of French origin, the term ‘pleasure’ was more apparent to Palsgrave when describing ‘any passion of pleasure or displeasure to the mynde’, which was his phrase to refer to feeling in general.

90 Ibid., ‘I Acloye/ I styll’, ‘I Bring him out of fauour or out of conceyte’, ‘I Reuenge me of a displeasure done to me’.
91 Ibid., f. 46v.
As can be seen on Graph 1.3, another keyword in this cluster was ‘joy’, which remained either the first or second most commonly used term in this cluster across all the dictionaries. For example, in order to describe positive feelings, the *Promptorium parvulorum* (1499) frequently coupled ‘joy’ and ‘glad’, such as in the entries ‘Joy and gladnesse’ and ‘Joy in hert’.  

Similarly, Howlet and Higgins’ *Huloets Dictionarie* (1572) included the entries, ‘To crie out for gladnesse’ and ‘Joyfull to be inwardly, or to shoute for joye’, while in 1611 Cotgrave coupled ‘joy’ and ‘gladness’ in his translation of the French ‘*Esjouissance*’: ‘Joy, mirth, glee, rejoycing, gladnesse’.  

The term ‘joy’, and references to the action of ‘rejoicing’, appeared most frequently in Bullokar’s *English Expositor* (1616), such as in the entries for ‘Applause’ (‘A rejoycing or clapping the hands for joy’) and ‘Jubilie’ (‘A publike rejoycing or a great shout for joy’). Bullokar also noted that ‘Blith’ was an old word for ‘Merry, frolicke, joyfull’, and this term had appeared in the earlier *Promptorium*: ‘Blithen or gladden in herte’.  

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93 Howlet and Higgins, *Huloets Dictionarie*, ‘To crie out for gladnesse’, ‘Joyfull to be inwardly, or to shoute for joye’; Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*, ‘*Esjouissance*’.  

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In this earlier dictionary, ‘gladness’ had been a key term denoting positive feeling in general – such as in the entries defining comedy (that which ‘begynneth with sorow and endeth with gladnesse’) and tragedy (that which ‘begynmeth with gladnes and endeth with sorowe’) – but as can be seen on both Graphs 1.3 and 1.4, its use rapidly declined in use throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.96

Graph 1.4: ‘Pleasure’, ‘joy’, ‘happiness’ and ‘gladness’.

By contrast, Graphs 1.3 and 1.4 show that ‘happiness’, which steadily increased in use throughout the period, underwent the opposite process to ‘gladness’. In the two later dictionaries in this study, Phillips’ New World of English Words (1658) and Coles’ English Dictionary (1677), ‘happiness’ became the second most commonly used term in this cluster after ‘joy’. Demonstrating an important semantic shift in this period, while the terms ‘Happe’, ‘Happy’ and ‘Onhappy’ appeared 17 times in the earliest dictionary analysed in this chapter,

96 Promptorium, ‘Joy and myrthe that begynmeth with sorow and endeth with gladnesse’, ‘Joy and myrth that begynmeth with gladnes endeth with sorowe’.
the *Promptorium parvulorum* (1499), they were mostly used in a general sense of good fortune unconnected to affectivity. However, the entry ‘Sely or happy’ (translated as the Latin ‘Felix’ and ‘Fortunatus’) denoted both the good fortune and blissful feeling that are caused by divine favour.\textsuperscript{97} This link between fortunate happenstance and inward feeling continued throughout the period, and the term ‘happy’ or ‘happiness’ became increasingly affective throughout the period.

Graph 1.5: ‘Happiness’, ‘felicity’, ‘blessed’, ‘bliss’ and ‘beatitude’.

![Graph showing the percentage of affective terms over time](image)

The combined senses of ‘happiness’ – good fortune, divine favour and positive feelings – were also distributed among less common terms, such as ‘felicity’, ‘blessed’, ‘bliss’ and ‘beatitude’, which can be seen on Graph 1.5. In the *Promptorium parvulorum* ‘Blysse’ was defined as ‘Beatitudo’ and ‘Gaudium’, which in that dictionary was also the Latin translation for ‘Joy’.\textsuperscript{98} Three decades later, Palsgrave similarly combined these senses of ‘happiness’ in

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\textsuperscript{98} *Promptorium*, ‘Blysse’, ‘Joy’.
his entries, ‘Blysfull gladsome’ (‘joyeux’), ‘I Make blessed or happy’ (‘je beatifie’, adding the gloss that ‘the presence of Christ dyd make her blessed’) and ‘Blysfull/ very happy/ well fortuned’ (‘bieneureux’). In Huloets Dictionarie (1572) ‘Felicitye’ and ‘Happinesse’ were both translated as the Latin ‘Beatitudo’ and ‘Foelicitas’, while in 1598 Florio defined the Italian ‘Felicità’ as ‘felicitie, blisse, happines, prosperity, good lucke’ and ‘Infelicità’ as ‘ unhappines, infelicitie, infortunatenes, adversitie, misfortune’. In 1611 Cotgrave defined ‘Beatifier’ as ‘To beatifie; to make blessed, sacred, or happie’ and ‘Bienheureux’ as ‘Happie, fortunat, prosperous, blisse-full, blessed’. While the English ‘beatitude’ had first appeared in Thomas’ Dictionarium linguae Latinae & Anglicanae (1587) as an anglicisation of the Latin ‘Beatitas’ and ‘Beatitudo’ (‘Happines, blessednes, felicitie, beatitude’), of the dictionaries included in the quantitative analysis, ‘beatitude’ first appeared as a ‘hard word’ in Cawdrey’s Table Alphabeticall (1604), defined as ‘blessednes, happines’. Other entries in this latter dictionary also demonstrated the connotations of good fortune and warm feelings of the term ‘happiness’: ‘blisse’ (‘joy, or happines’), ‘fortunate’ (‘happie, having good successe’) and ‘felicitie’ (‘happinesse’). While in 1658 Phillips defined ‘Beatitude’ as ‘blessednesse, hapinesse’, by 1677 Coles simply rendered it as ‘blessedness’, indicating a shift away from pleasant feeling towards divine favour. ‘Felicity’, meanwhile, remained a ‘hard word’ in all the seventeenth-century monolingual dictionaries that was defined by the simpler term ‘happinesse’. Therefore, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the rise of ‘happiness’ as a polyvalent term encompassing senses of good fortune, divine favour and positive

102 Thomas, Dictionarium, ‘Beatitas ... Beatitudo’; Cawdrey, Table Alphabeticall, ‘beatitude’.
103 Cawdrey, Table Alphabeticall, ‘blisse’, ‘fortunate’, ‘felicitie’.
feelings, showing not only how terms could become increasingly affective, but also the complex entwining of affective and other factors in a single term or concept.

Graph 1.6: ‘Sorrow’ cluster.

Having outlined some of the continuities and changes in the ‘happiness’ and ‘joy’ cluster, Graph 1.6 shows the proportional usage in the ten dictionaries of related terms generally denoting ‘sorrow’ or ‘sadness’. Here the first five terms – ‘heavy’ (309 appearances), ‘sorrow’ (307), ‘grief’ (213), ‘sadness’ (160) and ‘melancholy’ (119) – were again much more commonly used than the three remaining terms on the graph: ‘thought’ (80 mentions), ‘pensiveness’ (67) and ‘egrimony’ (eight). ‘Heavy’ and ‘sad’ both associated sorrowful feelings with weightiness and dejection. For example, the Promptorium parvulorum (1499), which proportionally contained the greatest use of ‘heavy’ as an affective term, included the entries ‘Sorynesse or hevyynesse’ and ‘Hevy man or woman nat glad in chere’.105

105 Promptorium, ‘Sorynesse or hevynesse’, ‘Heuy man or woman nat glad in chere’.
Similarly, in 1538 Elyot translated the Latin ‘Haurire dolorem’ as ‘to endure hevines or sorow’ and, while his definition of the verb ‘Maero’ (‘to make hevy’) at first seems ambiguous, it was immediately followed by the noun ‘Maeror’, defined as ‘hevinesse with wepynge’, showing that the term ‘heavy’ was inherently affective. In 1616 Bullokar defined ‘Dole’ as ‘Sorrow, hevinesse, grief’, while in 1677 Coles defined ‘Mestifical’ as ‘making heavy or sad’. The term ‘sad’, which Coles coupled with ‘heavy’, had the same connotations of seriousness and weightiness as well as sorrow. For instance, Palsgrave’s entries included ‘Sadde discrete’, ‘Sadde full of gravyte’ and the more evidently affective ‘Sadnesse hevynesse’ (‘tristesse’) and ‘Sadly sorowfully’ (‘Douloureusement’). For Bullokar in 1616, ‘Melancholy’ denoted not only ‘One of the fowre humours in the body’, but also the ‘hevinesse and sadnesse of minde’ caused by the overabundance of that humour.

Bullokar’s definition of ‘melancholy’ showed how the term could refer both to the physiological humour of melancholy or black bile as well as the negative affective states caused by that humour. Similarly, in 1611 Cotgrave included both the physiological ‘Melancholie, blacke choler’ and the affective ‘sadnesse, pensivenesse, hevinesse, thoughtfullnesse, care-taking’ in his translation of the French ‘Melancholie’. As a physician, Bullokar mostly invoked the physiological sense of ‘melancholy’, focusing on the ‘hot melancholy humors’ and ‘grosse melancholy blood’ that both cause and are symptoms of sickness and disease. The psychosomatic focus of the term ‘melancholy’ was also evident in the term ‘grief’, which could likewise describe maladies of body and of mind. For example, in 1538 Elyot defined ‘Dolor’ as ‘griefe or paine of body or mynd, also sorowe’, although a more general sense of ‘grief’ as physical pain or infirmity was also evident in his reference

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110 Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*, ‘Melancholie’.  
to ‘the griefe of the stone’ and Cawdrey’s 1604 definition of ‘symptome’: ‘any griefe, or passion, following a disease’.112

As Erin Sullivan has recently noted, historians have exaggerated the extent to which early modern people conceptualised passions and affections in terms of the psychosomatic humoral system (see Chapter 2).113 In other words, not all forms of sadness were equivalent to melancholy. Reading early modern dictionaries also shows how sadness and sorrow were not simply reduced to mechanical operations of the physical body. For example, the Promptorium parvulorum distinguished between the religious affections of the ideal ‘Sorowe for synne wilfully taken’ (‘Contricio’), which indicated proper Christian feeling and relationship with God, and the vicious ‘Sorowe for drede of peyne moore than for the displesaunce of god’ (‘Attricio’).114 Likewise, in 1677 Coles defined the English form of this term, ‘Attrition’, as ‘imperfect contrition or sorrow for sin’.115 For Howlet and Higgins a century earlier, the seemingly negative feelings of sorrow could in fact be positive and justified, such as in the entry, ‘Sorowe taken for iuste, and reasonable cause’.116 As such, passions and affections belonged as much to the realm of religion and the health of the soul as they did to material understandings of physical health.

As is made clearer on Graph 1.7, the linked terms ‘thought’ and ‘pensive’, in the specific sorrowful senses of ‘taking thought’ or ‘thoughts and cares’, were less commonly used terms of the cluster of ‘heaviness’ and ‘sadness’. For example, Palsgrave’s Lesclarcissement (1530) included the entries, ‘Thought hevynesse pensifnesse’ and ‘Thoughtfull/ full of thought or heavynesse’, of which the latter contained the subentry, ‘He

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112 Elyot, Dictionary, ‘Dolor’.
113 Sullivan, Beyond Melancholy.
114 Promptorium, ‘Sorowe for synne wilfully taken’, ‘Sorowe for drede of peyne moore than for the displesaunce of god’.
116 Howlet and Higgins, Huloets Dictionarie, ‘Sorowe taken for iuste, and reasonable cause’.
toke so extreme thought that his herte dyd burste a sonder'. In 1572 Howlet and Higgins included the entries ‘Take thought, or to be sorowfull’ and ‘To be in great pensifenes, or heavines’. In 1611 Cotgrave used ‘thought’ and ‘pensive’ alongside other terms in the cluster of sorrow terms in his translations of the French ‘Esmoy’ (‘Carke, care, thought, sorrow, heavinesse, pensivenesse’) and – showing the contrast of these terms with the ‘joy’ cluster – ‘Deshaité’ (‘Sad, grieved, pensive, heavie-hearted, deprived of joy, devoid of gladnesse’). After not appearing as part of the sorrow cluster in Bullokar and Phillips’ dictionaries in 1616 and 1658, ‘thought’ appeared alongside ‘pensive’ in Coles’ 1677 definitions of ‘Cogitative’ (‘thoughtfull, pensive, Musing’) and ‘Pensive’ (‘thoughtfull’), but these uses are distinct from sorrow, indicating notions of rational, non-affective thought. Yet, demonstrating links between physiology and psychology, Coles also defined ‘Melancholy’ not only as ‘black choler, one of the four humours’ of the body, but also as the ‘pensive distemper

118 Howlet and Higgins, Huloets Dictionarie, ‘Take thought, or to be sorowfull’, ‘Pensifenes, care, or heuines’.

Graph 1.7: The three least common ‘sorrow’ terms.
from the abounding thereof.\textsuperscript{120} As such, while a distinction between ‘thought’ and ‘feeling’ might have been forming by the later seventeenth century – as ‘thought’ became less frequently used across the period, from a highpoint of 0.99 per cent of counted affective terms in Palsgrave’s Lesclarcissement (1530) to no appearances at all in Bullokar’s English Expositor (1616) and Phillips’ New World of English Words (1658) – quantitative and qualitative analysis of dictionaries shows that ‘thought’ and ‘pensiveness’ remained affective terms.

Graph 1.7 also shows that ‘egrimony’, the final term in the sorrow cluster, only appeared – and only as a ‘hard word’ – in the final three analysed dictionaries: Bullokar’s English Expositor, Phillips’ New World of English Words and Coles’ English Dictionary. In 1616 Bullokar defined ‘Egritude’ (a term synonymous with ‘egrimony’) as ‘Grieue of mind, or paine of bodie’, while in 1658 Phillips similarly rendered ‘Aegrimony or Aegritude’ as ‘sickness of body or mind’.\textsuperscript{121} However, in 1677 removed the link to affectivity, simply defining ‘Aegrimony, or Aegritude’ as ‘Sickness’.\textsuperscript{122} Yet focusing on the use of ‘egrimony’ and ‘aegritude’, which are both derived from the Latin aeger (sickness), in English does not tell the whole story. In 1538 the Latin ‘Aegritudo’ was defined in Elyot’s Dictionary as ‘grief of mynde, or sorow’, while the revised edition, retitled the Bibliotheca Eliotae (1542), translated ‘Aegrimonia’ as ‘syckenesse, great hevynesse’.\textsuperscript{123} In 1572 Howlet and Higgins translated ‘Heuinesse or great sadnesse’ as ‘Aegrimonia’ and ‘Sorow’ as ‘Aegritudo’, among other words.\textsuperscript{124} As such, the history of the terms ‘egrimony’ and ‘aegritude’ offers a window into the practice of neologising and coining ‘inkhorn terms’ in dictionaries. While the Oxford English Dictionary states that ‘egrimony’ was not used outside of lexicographical texts, a character in the playwright Thomas Meriton’s ‘Tragy-Comedie’ The Wandring Lover (1658)

\textsuperscript{120} Coles, English Dictionary, ‘Melancholy’.
\textsuperscript{121} Bullokar, English Expositor, ‘Egritude’; Phillips, New World, ‘Aegrimony or Aegritude’.
\textsuperscript{122} Coles, English Dictionary, ‘Aegrimony, or Aegritude’.
\textsuperscript{124} Howlet and Higgins, Huloets Dictionarie, ‘Heuinesse or great sadnesse’, ‘Sorow’.
says that ‘love’ could cause ‘a perpetual egrimonie to her minde’, although the term was not used beyond this literary context.125

Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, this section has shown the continuities and changes in the meanings and uses of different affective terms within two clusters centred on ‘joy’ and ‘sorrow’. Within the wider context of the expansion of the English vernacular, this section demonstrated the effects of this expansion on the affective lexicon, whether in introduction of terms or the disappearance of others. The most common terms, such as ‘pleasure’ and ‘joy’, were marked by continuity. By contrast, ‘happiness’ became increasingly prominent throughout the period, while ‘gladness’ underwent the opposite trajectory. By focusing on lesser-used terms, such as ‘felicity’, ‘bless’ and ‘beatitude’, the rise of ‘happiness’ was shown to be caused by its increasing polysemy, as it encompassed the varied meanings of good fortune, divine favour and the positive feelings those ideal states produced. Also, focusing on the ‘sorrow’ cluster, this section has argued that the adjective ‘heavy’ was overall the most commonly used term, although its frequency in each dictionary declined throughout the period. ‘Heavy’ had the same connotations as ‘sad’, the term much more commonly used today, although both terms share the same connotations of seriousness, weightiness and dejection. Also, although the frequency of ‘melancholy’ actually increased over time, this section contributes to recent historiographical discussions about how humoral understandings of feeling, which emphasise the physiological causes of feeling, were only one among many coexisting understandings of the nature of passions and affections. Dictionary compilers, as has been shown, distinguished between sorrow caused by or expressed corporeally – melancholy – and sorrow for sin or other external objects. The section also showed that terms such as ‘thought’ underwent semantic shifts during this

period, as (like ‘doubt’) it became shorn of its affective connotations. ‘Egrimony’, by contrast, was an ‘inkhorn term’ created in and rarely used outside of lexicographical contexts, and its persistence in dictionaries exemplifies how dictionary compilers borrowed (or lifted) from earlier dictionaries. As such, dictionaries both reflected and deviated from wider usage. Although they had the obvious role of making difficult words legible in simple terms, dictionaries also translated loanwords and created neologisms that were restricted only to learned print and not used in everyday parlance.


Following discussions of changes to the early modern affective lexicon in clusters of terms relating to feeling in general and ‘joy’ and ‘sorrow’ in particular, this section turns to the use of affective language in dictionaries to characterise social relationships in ideal and unideal terms. As was shown above, quantitative analysis revealed that ‘love’ (1,133 mentions) and ‘fear’ (863) were the two most common affective terms across the ten dictionaries analysed in this chapter. They both belonged to a cluster of terms that denoted positive feelings and characterised interpersonal relationships in ideal terms. As can be seen on Graph 1.8, the use of ‘love’ and ‘fear’ was similar throughout much of the period, although the frequency of ‘love’ spiked in Phillips’ *New World of English Words* (1658) and, to a slightly lesser extent, in Coles’ *English Dictionary* (1677). Demonstrating idiosyncrasies in the types of words and subjects defined in each dictionary, 74 (or 67 per cent) of Phillips’ 110 uses of ‘love’ appeared in entries on classical history and mythology, such as ‘Cleopatra … first loved by Julius Caesar’ and ‘Venus’ (‘the goddesse of love, pleasures, and delights’). Showing the

continuities in the affective lexicon for the most common terms, like today ‘love’ could denote romantic love, such as in Palsgrave’s (1530) ‘Amorous loyynge or belonging to love’ and Phillips’ ‘Dilection’ (‘a tender affection or love’). At the same time, ‘love’ also belonged to the negative semantic field of ‘lust’, such as in Howlet and Higgins’ (1572) ‘Burne in luste, or with unhonest meanes of love’ and Cotgrave’s (1611) ‘Contr’amour’ (‘A holie, and honest love; opposite unto the lascivious, & dissolute passion, which is commonly termed love’), which explicitly contrasted between the lustful and sanctified loves. Both these examples related love to ‘honesty’, which denoted the ideal qualities of being able to express the appropriate feelings in different contexts (see Chapter 3).

Graph 1.8: ‘Love’, ‘fear’, ‘favour’ and ‘kindness’.

Other terms within this cluster relating to positive social relationships and the due performance of hierarchically distributed social and gender roles, as Graph 1.8 also shows,

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128 Howlet and Higgins, Huloets Dictionarie, ‘Burne in luste, or with vnhonest meanes of loue’; Cotgrave, Dictionarie, ‘Contr’amour’.
were ‘favour’ (589) and ‘kindness’ (152). Alongside other terms in the cluster, ‘favour’ and ‘kindness’ appeared in Howlet and Higgins’ ‘Amitie, love, favour, & mutuall frendshippe’, Cotgrave’s ‘Faveur’ (‘Favor, grace, good opinion; kindnesse, love, good-will’), and Bullokar’s 1616 definition of the hard word ‘Sociable’: ‘Kinde, loving, one that will keepe company, or is curteous in company’.129 By contrast, Hollyband’s Dictionarie French and English (1593) described the opposite of this sociable ideal: ‘Insociable, where there is no fellowship: the contrarie is, sociable, civil, loving, fellowship’.130 As such, both ‘courtesy’ and ‘civility’ were associated with positive feelings of ‘love’ and ‘kindness’, as well as the actions that expressed those feelings. Along these same lines of social practice, the Promptorium parvulorum (1499) used the affective language of ‘Lovely or semely’ to refer to appropriate social behaviour, which was translated as the Latin ‘Decens’.131 The proportionally greater use of ‘kindness’ in this dictionary also demonstrated this combination of positive feelings and good deeds. In similar terms, ‘kinde or fre or Jentyll of herte’ was defined as the Latin ‘Gratus’, of which the combination between feeling and positive behaviour is apparent in the opposite terms defined as ‘Ingratus’: ‘Onkinde or ongentyl’ and ‘Oncurteys’.132 As such, in this dictionary, which was printed in 1499 but first compiled in the mid-fifteenth century, ‘kindness’, ‘courtesy’ and ‘gentleness of heart’ combined to describe affective and social ideals, which would later be suffused in the language of ‘civility’ in the sixteenth century.

The relationship between the positive conceptual field of ‘love’ and the performance of social roles was evident in Baret’s (1574) ‘Very lovingly, like an earnest & hartie friend’, Florio’s (1598) ideal ‘hartie, loving, affected servant’ as well as Cotgrave’s (1611) descriptions of the ‘Faithfull love of a wife to her husband’ and the ‘recipocall love of children to their

130 Hollyband, Dictionarie French and English, ‘Insociable’.
131 Promptorium, ‘Louely or semely’.
132 Ibid., ‘Keend or kinde or fre or lentyll of herte’, ‘Onkinde or ongentyl’, ‘Oncurteys’.
However, while these definitions included the familial love of spouses and children, Cotgrave also translated the French proverb that ‘Love, and lordlinesse never held companie together; a friend, and a lord are incompatible’. This entry not only noted that overfamiliarity between superiors and inferiors breeds contempt, but also the common early modern view that a prerequisite of friendship was social parity.

As was stated at the beginning of this section, ‘fear’ also belonged to this cluster of terms denoting ideal social relationships and practices. This was only true in certain contexts, however, as many uses of ‘fear’ simply defined it in terms that are recognisable today as a negative feeling evident in outward expressions such as trembling. For instance, this sense of ‘fear’ was evident, both at the beginning and the end of the period, in Palsgrave’s ‘I Am spechelesse as ... one that is in a sodayne passyon ... The poore man was put in so great feare that he was speche lesse foure dayes after’, and Coles’ ‘Intimidate’ (‘to affright or make fearful’). Yet ‘fear’ also positively denoted the ideal feelings social subordinates had for their superiors, and so directly linked feeling to social status and social order. These two faces of fear were explicitly invoked in Thomas Wilson’s Christian Dictionarie (1612), which defined ‘Feare’ both as a ‘naturall affection’ relating to a real or imagined ‘evill’, and as ‘The free voluntary reverence which inferiours shew to the ir Superiors, for the Lordes sake, making them carefull to obey, and loath to offend’. This second, ideal sense of fear, which for Wilson was divinely ordained, related feelings both to relationships between social subordinates and their superiors, and the actions that properly fulfilled those hierarchical relationships. It had also been seen in Palsgrave’s 1530 entry, ‘I Feare with a love & reverence

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134 Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*, ‘*Amour*’.
135 Palsgrave, *Lesclarcissement*, ‘I Am spechelesse as a sycke body is that hath lost the vse of his speche or one that is in a sodayne passyon’; Coles, *English Dictionarie*, ‘Intimidate’.
as a subjecte dothe his soverayne or as a servante dothe his lorde’, and its didactic subentry, ‘It is the offyce of a subjecte to feare his soverayne and to love him’. Here, then, ‘fear’ and ‘love’ combined to form a conceptual field of superiority and subjection. For Wilson, the relationships ideally defined by fear were those of wives towards their husbands, and of children to their parents. Similarly, in 1538 Elyot defined the Latin ‘Obnoxie’ as ‘fearefully, lyke a subjecte’, while he translated ‘Vereor’ as ‘to feare as the child doth the father’ and ‘as the slave or boye dothe his mayster’.

The ideal fear of social subordinates to their superiors also defined notions of the proper relationship between Christians and God. In his Christian Dictionarie, for example, Wilson described a particular religious fear: ‘An holy affection of the heart, awing us, and making us loath to displease God by sin, in respect of his great goodnesse and mercies, and for a love we beare to righteousnesse’. The actions motivated by this ‘filliall or child-like Feare’ of God are ‘to restraine from vice, and constraine unto well doing for desire to glorifie God’. Also, the concept of religion itself was bound up with affectivity and rightly directed fear. For instance, Elyot defined ‘relygion’ as ‘a reverende drede’ and ‘doubte lest he shall offende’, while ‘Religionem inducere’, or to lead into religion, meant ‘to brynge in feare of goddis displeasure’. He also associated superstition with fear, defining ‘Superstitio’ as ‘a vaine reverence or feare towarde that thing, wherin is no efficacye or power, but by the illusyon of the dyvelle’ and superstitious people as ‘they which be tymorous without cause, fearinge that god is displeased, where there is none offence done’. In this sense, then, the difference between true religion and superstition was the rightness of the object of fear.

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137 Palsgrave, Lesclarcissement, ‘I Feare with a loue & reuerence as a subiecte dothe his souerayne or as a seruante dothe his lorde’.
139 Wilson, Christian Dictionarie, ‘Feare’.
140 Ibid.
142 Ibid., ‘Superstitio’, ‘Superstitiosi’.
Likewise, Florio’s *Worlde of Wordes* (1598) defined the Italian ‘Religione’ not only as ‘godliness’ and ‘true worshipping of God’, but also as ‘a reverence, a feare, an honestie, a dread, a scruple, a conscience, an uprightnes or dreadnes to do amisse, a devotion, a solicitous care & feare, a reverent feare, and doubt of conscience least he shall offend in any thing’.\(^{143}\) The contrast to this ideal religious fear, according to Wilson, was the ‘servile and slavish Feare’ in ‘the heart of wicked men, dreading God as a Judge, being loath to offend him by sin, in respect of his punishements, and not from a hatred of wickednesse’.\(^{144}\) Florio used the term ‘attrition’ to describe this misplaced fear, which consisted of ‘a remorse proceeding of servile feare, fearing either punishment, or losse of something, a fained contrition’.\(^{145}\) A century earlier, in the *Promptorium parvulorum*, this same term, the Latin ‘Attricio’, was the definition of the pejorative ‘Sorowe for drede of peyne moore than for the displesaunce of god’\(^{146}\)


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144 Wilson, *Christian Dictionarie*, ‘Feare’.
146 *Promptorium*, ‘Sorowe for drede of peyne moore than for the displesaunce of god’.

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While ideal hierarchical social relationships were ideally characterised and motivated by feelings of love and fear, another cluster of terms such as ‘anger’ (507 mentions), ‘hatred’ (248), ‘malice’ (159), ‘envy’ (140) and ‘disdain’ (138), shown on Graph 1.9, pejoratively characterised negative relationships and the feelings that motivated them. ‘Anger’, the keyword of this cluster, denoted feelings associated with disharmonious social relationships and the precipitous actions those feelings motivated. For instance, in the dictionary in which ‘anger’ was the most used in relation to other affective terms, Palsgrave’s *Lesclarcissement* (1530), this active sense of anger as revenge appeared in the entry, ‘I Wreake myne anger or revenge me of a displeasure that is done me’.

The connection of ‘anger’ to the other terms in this cluster was evident in Elyot’s translation of the Latin ‘Infensus’ as a person who ‘beareth malyce’ and is ‘displeased, moved with angre or hate towarde an other’. In Baret’s *Alvearie* (1574) the entry, ‘Envie, hatred, malice, ill will: spite’, showed not only the interchangeability of negative affective terms, but also the polyvalence of the term ‘envy’, which until the early eighteenth century could denote both the modern sense synonymous with ‘jealousy’ as well as negative feelings and hostility in general. The duality of ‘envy’ was particularly in Florio’s definition of the Italian ‘Inuídia’, which encompassed ‘the griefe to beholde and heare that another prospereth’, which is recognisable to modern readers, as well as general feelings of ‘envie’, ‘hatred’, ‘rancor’, ‘spite’, ‘malice’, ‘grudge’ and ‘ill will’. ‘Envy’, then, linked feelings and social dissatisfaction, whether with one’s own place or that of another.

Across the dictionaries, the term ‘disdain’ was frequently linked to the causes of hatred and anger, such as in Palsgrave’s ‘I loke upon hym disdaynfully to provoke hym to
anger’ and ‘I Disdayne I dispyte or sette at naught’, which includes a subentry directly linking such ‘disdain’ and ‘spite’ to contestations of social status: ‘Whye disdaynest thou me/ I am as good a mans son as thou’. The Promptorium parvulorum (1499) coupled ‘Scorn or disdeyne’, combining notions of derision (‘Derisio’) and loss of status (‘Indignatio’) in its Latin translations. A century and a half later, Thomas Blount’s Glossographia: or A Dictionary (1656) defined ‘Indignation’ as ‘disdain, scorn, anger, wrath’, and ‘Subsannate’ as ‘to scorn or mock with bending the Brows, or snuffing up the nose’. Therefore, this cluster of terms described the causes of interpersonal conflict as well as physiological manifestations of that conflict, and did so in terms continuing throughout the period.

In early modern dictionaries the cluster of negative feelings centred on anger and hatred was directly related to social relationships. For instance, Elyot’s expanded Bibliotheca Eliotae (1542) linked ‘hate’ to a particular kind of interpersonal relationship in his definition of the Latin ‘Novercale odium’ (‘the accustomed hate whiche stepmothers are wonte to beare to theyr husbandes chylderne’). At the end of the sixteenth century, Florio described ‘enmitie’, ‘deadly feud’ and ‘foedom’ as expressions of ‘hatred’, a connection that was echoed in Phillips’ ‘Feud, Feed, or Feid, a combination of one Family against another, being inflamed with hatred or revenge’ and Coles’ ‘Feud, feed, feid’ (‘a deadly and implacable hatred’). A stirrer of such hatreds, according to Cotgrave, was termed ‘A brabling make-hate; a renewer, a reviver of old, and over-worne quarels’, or ‘A firebrand, make-hate, stirre-suit; a brabling, litigious, or contentious fellow’. In contrast to the ideal ‘fear’ of social inferiors for their

151 Palsgrave, Lesclarcissement, ‘I Bocke vpon one’, ‘I Disdayne I dispyte or sette at naught’.
152 Promptorium, ‘Scorn or disdeyne’.
154 Elyot, Bibliotheca Eliotae, ‘Novercale odium’.
superiors and governors, Cotgrave also included the proverb, ‘Poore is the Prince thats hated by his subjects; as good loose all his countrey as their hearts’.\textsuperscript{157}

The imputed presence of these negative passions was intrinsically related to notions of legality and illegality. For example, John Cowell’s \textit{Interpreter} (1607), a dictionary of legal language, noted that the presence of ‘malice’ distinguished between manslaughter, or ‘casuall’ killing, and ‘voluntary’ murder, which ‘is deliberated and committed of a set mind and purpose to kill’ with ‘prepensed malice’ (or malice aforethought).\textsuperscript{158} Noting the active potential of malice and malignity, Cawdrey’s \textit{Table Alphabeticall} (1604) defined ‘\textit{maligne}’ as ‘to hate, with purpose to hurt’.\textsuperscript{159} Fifty years later, Blount also demonstrated the legal applications of affective language by defining ‘\textit{Malignity}’ as ‘malice prepensed, ill-will, grudge, despight, villany’.\textsuperscript{160} In the mid-seventeenth century, as Thomas Leng has noted, ‘malignancy’ became ubiquitous in political discourse as the pejorative label used to describe those opposed to parliament and ‘true religion’.\textsuperscript{161} This politicised malignancy seeped into contemporary dictionaries. For example, while the first edition of Bullokar’s \textit{English Expositor} (1616), simply defined ‘\textit{Malignant}’ as ‘Envious, spitefull, mischeevous’, the edition of 1654, revised by ‘W. S.’ and published during the Interregnum, added that ‘\textit{Malignant}’ was also ‘a nick-name, in these days, cast upon such as have taken part with the King in his late contestation with the Parliament’.\textsuperscript{162} A century later, demonstrating the continuing political resonance of malignancy, Samuel Johnson’s \textit{Dictionary of the English Language} (1755) defined ‘\textit{Malignant}’ as ‘A man of ill intention; malevolently disposed’, but added the Tory gloss that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Ibid., ‘\textit{Subiect}’.
  \item \textsuperscript{158} John Cowell, \textit{The Interpreter: or Booke Containing the Signification of Words} (Cambridge, 1607), ‘\textit{Homicide}’, ‘\textit{Murder}’, ‘\textit{Manslaughter}’.
  \item \textsuperscript{159} Cawdrey, \textit{Table Alphabeticall}, ‘\textit{maligne}’.
  \item \textsuperscript{160} Blount, \textit{Glossographia}, ‘\textit{Malignity}’.
  \item \textsuperscript{162} Bullokar, \textit{English Expositor}, ‘\textit{Malignant}’; John Bullokar, \textit{An English Expositor: Teaching the Interpretation of the hardest words used in our Language ... Newly Revised, Corrected, and with the addition of above a thousand words enlarged. By W. S.} (London, 1654), ‘\textit{Malignant}’.
\end{itemize}
'It was a word used of the defenders of church and monarchy by the rebel sectaries in the civil wars'. As such, the generalised language of ill intent and affective framings of motivations as caused by malicious and malign feelings was transposed onto national politics. This meant that, like social behaviour in general, political belief and action was conceptualised and rhetorically invoked in affective terms. More than a century after the Civil Wars, the ‘malignant’ label continued to have enough valence for Johnson’s derisive definition that it was the term used by ‘rebels’ to asperse the loyal ‘defenders of church and monarchy’.

Early modern lexicographers also noted how the improper feelings belonging to the cluster of ‘anger’ and ‘hatred’ served to threaten the social and political order. For instance, Cooper’s *Thesaurus Linguae Romanae & Britannicae* (1578) defined the Latin ‘*Fremo*’ as ‘To murmur and shewe themselves discontented: to be angry or greatly mooved’. In this entry the terms ‘angry’ and ‘moved’ denoted social dissatisfaction and unrest, expressed in the actions of ‘murmuring’ and ‘discontent’. This entry contained subentries such as ‘The soldiours shewed themselves greatly discontented’ and “The people murmured or grudged greatly at those things.” In other early modern dictionaries, to ‘murmur’ and ‘grudge’ denoted a specific physical expression linked to the discontentment and disobedience of social inferiors to their superiors and governors. For example, in 1530 Palsgrave had included the entry ‘I Murmure I grutche or repyne as an inferior person doth agaynst the actes of his superyor’, as well as the more general ‘Murmuryng/ grutchynge as folkes that be nat contented’. Wilson’s *Christian Dictionarie* (1612) defined ‘Murmure’ as ‘A grutching discontented person, which is displeased with Gods dispensation & dealing’.

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164 Cooper, *Thesaurus*, ‘*Fremo*’.
165 Ibid.
166 Palsgrave, *Lesclarcissement*, ‘I Murmure I grutche or repyne as an inferior person doth agaynst the actes of his superyor’, ‘Murmuryng/ grutchynge as folkes that be nat contented’.
Poole’s *English Parnassus* (1657), an alphabetised guide for poetry writing, the headword ‘*Mutiny*’ was linked to terms such as ‘angry’, ‘froward’, ‘spleenful’, ‘murmuring’, ‘repining’ and ‘grumbling’.

The ‘*Multitude*’, meanwhile, were described as ‘head-strong’, ‘moody’, ‘humerous’, ‘self-willed’, ‘malignant’, ‘furious’ and ‘outragious’, while the term ‘*Servant*’ was linked to others such as ‘rebellious’, ‘murmuring’, ‘grumbling’, ‘repining’, ‘saucy’, ‘uncivil’, ‘disobedient’, ‘proud’ and ‘insolent’. As can be seen, these uses of negative affective language related to disorderly relationships between superiors and subordinates, and were evident aurally in the ‘murmuring’ that, for Wilson and Poole, irreverently expressed a person’s ‘discontent’ at their place in the divinely ordained social hierarchy.

While the discussion so far has only focused on hatred in pejorative terms, Wilson also distinguished between positive and negative hate. In the social realm, he defined ‘Hatred’ as ‘Rooted or grounded malice, when the heart is possessed with desire of revenge, upon true or supposed wrongs done to us’, clearly linking the feelings of hatred and malice to subsequent improper actions. Here hatred either meant ‘To desire revenge, or to wish evill, out of a rooted and setled malice’, for which Wilson provided the biblical example that ‘*Kain* hated *Abell*’, or the refusal to perform the actions appropriate to different roles, hence why ‘*He that soreareth correction, Hateth his child*; that is, he doth as hateful persons would do, who keep back from others, that which should do them good’.

In other words, sparing the rod was an act of hate and a dereliction of parental duty. By contrast, Wilson also outlined a ‘Charitable Hatred’, by which people ‘hate sinne in themselves, and others; pittying the persons of others. This is a hatred of sinne, and not of their persons which do sinne’.

‘*Wrath*’, similarly denoted both the positive ‘Just Vengeance taken upon sinners in this

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169 Ibid., ‘*Multitude*’, ‘*Servant*’.
170 Wilson, *Christian Dictionarie*, ‘Hatred’.
171 Ibid., ‘to Hate ... Referred to men’.
172 Ibid., ‘to Hate’.
world’ and the more pejorative ‘perturbation of minde, which mooveth men to revenge their owne wrongs’, which again associated hatred or anger with revenge and the negative acts those feelings cause.\footnote{Ibid., ‘Wrath’}

This section has demonstrated how early modern lexicographers used affective language both to characterise different forms of social relationship and to describe motivations for actions in positive and negative terms. Firstly, it has shown how lexicographers described positive social relationships in terms of ‘love’ and ‘fear’. In early modern dictionaries ‘love’ and ‘fear’ belonged to a cluster of terms denoting the proper feelings that were the bases of harmonious interpersonal relationships. ‘Love’, for instance, was associated with ‘courtesy’, ‘civility’ and other terms for appropriate social behaviour. Although the introduction of this thesis showed how civility was predicated upon and synonymous with self-restraint, the examples from dictionaries in this section suggest that civility also entailed the cultivation and expression of good and fitting affections such as ‘love’ and ‘kindness’, indicating appropriate warmth and not just the impassive restraint often implied (see Chapter 3). Yet, at the same time, ‘love’ also denoted the obedience subordinates, such as wives and servants, owed to their superiors. It was through this connotation of obeisance that ‘love’ and ‘fear’ belonged to the same affective cluster, with the grouping of ‘fear’, ‘love’, ‘dread’ and ‘awe’ to describe the ideal feelings and actions towards social superiors and God alike. Secondly, this section has also shown that negative interpersonal relationships were associated with a cluster of negative feelings such as ‘anger’, ‘hatred’, ‘envy’ and ‘malice’. These terms pejoratively described specific relationships and roles, such as the ‘hate’ (rather than ideal love) of subjects for their rulers, and the expressions of ‘disdain’ and ‘scorn’ that demonstrated ill feeling, disharmony and challenged existing hierarchies. Therefore, while ‘love’ and ‘fear’ harmoniously knitted society together, ‘hatred’,
‘malice’ and ‘grudge’ split it asunder and upturned the proper order – although, at the same time, a specific Christian hatred of sin did leave room for a positive hatred directed towards the appropriate objects.

**Physical Bodies and Bodies Politic: ‘Peace’, ‘Quiet’ and ‘Trouble’**

In early modern dictionaries, the ideal states of ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’ contrasted with ‘trouble’. Quantitative analysis reveals that ‘trouble’ (714 mentions) was the third most common affective term used in these dictionaries, while ‘quiet’ (413), was the twelfth. As was noted above, early modern writers used the term ‘trouble’ to refer to negative feelings in general, or to translate or gloss the more technical Latinate term ‘perturbation’. By contrast, the anonymous Latin-English *Ortus vocabulorum* (1500) defined the Latin ‘Animequus’ as ‘quiet wyth out troble’, while the same Latin term denoted ‘A quiet mynde’ in Howlet and Higgins’ *Huloets Dictionarie* (1572). Yet, alongside affectivity, ‘quiet’ and ‘trouble’ were polyvalent terms that also described political states. For instance, in the *Promptorium parvulorum* (1499) the political entry ‘Rore or trouble among the peple’ was translated not only as ‘Tumultus’, ‘Commocio’ and ‘Sedicio’, but also as the more affective ‘Perturbacio’. These connections between ‘trouble’, ‘tumult’, ‘commotion’ and ‘perturbation’ were echoed in later dictionaries. Demonstrating the use of ‘trouble’ to indicate political unrest or disharmonious social relationships, for example, in the 1530s and 1540s Elyot defined the Latin ‘Tumultuosus’ as ‘troubous, or makynge rumoure’; ‘Dividia’ as ‘tediousnes, somtyme it betokeneth discorde, busynes, trouble, variance’; and ‘Patrocinium’ as ‘defence of menne beinge in trouble or suyte’. Cooper’s *Thesaurus Linguae Romanae & Britannicae* (1578) included the political entries, ‘Tumult: businesse: rufflyng: sturre: trouble: whourlybourly that ryseth of a sodaine

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175 *Promptorium*, ‘Rore or trouble among the peple’.
and great feare: sedition: insurrection: commotion of people’, and ‘The stirre, broile and trouble that is at assemblyes for election of officers’. Following this, Cotgrave’s French-English Dictionarie (1611) defined ‘Commotion’ both as ‘A commotion, tumult, stirre, uprre, hurly burly’ and ‘a perturbation; trouble, disquietnesse’. Similarly, Cawdrey’s Table Alphabeticall (1604) defined the ‘hard word’ ‘commotion’ as ‘rebellion, trouble, or disquietnesse’, while Blount’s Glossographia (1656) defined ‘Turbulent’ as ‘troubous, angry, full of contention, busie, seditious’.

Building on these politicised and affective senses of ‘trouble’, analysis of early modern dictionaries also shows that ‘peace’, ‘quiet’ and ‘trouble’ were entwined with ‘commonwealth’ discourse, a core concept of early modern society and politics. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as historians have shown, the concept of commonwealth (or ‘commonweal’) encompassed the ideal of the common good and society as a whole, and so was a powerful rhetorical tool for political legitimation and delegitimation. In contemporary dictionaries, ‘trouble’ was frequently used to denote deviations from the common good and public order. For instance, adjoined to the entry ‘I Parturbe I trouble’ in Palsgrave’s Leslarcissement (1530) was the political subentry, ‘It is a daungerouse thing to parturbe the estate of a comen welthe though it be nat all the best’. Howlet and Higgins’ Huloets Dictionarie (1572), the affective entry ‘Trouble of minde, or spyrite’, which was defined as the Latin ‘Perturbatio animi’, ‘Affectio’ and ‘Pathos’, similarly included the political subentry, ‘To trouble the quietnes, and government of the publike weale’ – a term synonymous with ‘commonwealth’ as the anglicisation of the Latin res publica. Two years

177 Cooper, Thesaurus, ‘Tumultus’, ‘Vndæ commitiorum’.
178 Cotgrave, Dictionarie, ‘Commotion’.
179 Cawdrey, Table Alphabeticall, ‘commotion’; Blount, Glossographia, ‘Turbulent’.
181 Palsgrave, Leslarcissement, ‘I Parturbe I trouble (Lydgat)’.
later, the similar subentries ‘To vexe and trouble the common weale’ and ‘A trouble or ruffling in the common weale’ were included under the general headword ‘to Trouble’ in Baret’s *Alvearie* (1574). In this same dictionary, these political senses of ‘trouble’ appeared alongside the explicitly affective ‘A troublous affection of the minde’ (‘Perturbatio’), ‘With trouble of minde: unquietly’, ‘To make atraide or trouble: to astonish and make he cannot tell what to dooe’ and ‘Astonyiung: trouble of minde: great griefe’. In 1578 Cooper likewise included the entries ‘Great trouble, businesse, or ruffling in a common weale’, ‘To make a sturre or trouble in the common weale’ and ‘To trouble andAlter the state of the common weale’. Here political change, in the Latin verb *permutare*, was simply translated as ‘trouble’, demonstrating how changing a divinely ordained system was considered to be inherently negative.

By contrast, dictionary compilers characterised ideal feelings, interpersonal relationships and polities as a whole in terms of ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’. While Withington has shown that, through the concept of ‘civil peace’, early modern people saw ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’ as synonymous with ‘government’, this section shows that these terms were also fundamentally affective, demonstrating how the conventional links between physical bodies and bodies politic were also seen in terms of passions and affections. Conventionally likening ‘the body of the common weale’ to the human body, for instance, Baret’s *Alvearie* (1574) graphically justified the capital punishment of ‘those hell houndes, which will lay violent handes upon other mens bodyes or their gooddes’, who must be cured either by incysion and letting bloud in the necke veyn, or by searing with a hoat yron ... & so at the lest to vomit them out, & cut them off[.] from the quiet society of citizens or honest

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183 Baret, *Aluearie*, ’to Trouble’.
184 Ibid.
Christians'. Cooper also used the term ‘quiet’ to describe both the ideal polity – ‘A moderate and quiet state’ – and the means to reach this ideal, either through the peaceful ‘To appease or quiet a sturre or tumult’ or the forceful ‘To pacifie and quiet a countrey’. Similarly, Wilson’s *Christian Dictionarie* (1612) defined ‘Peace’ in affective and religious terms as ‘That sweete and comfortable quietnesse and tranquility of Conscience, which is the immediate fruite of our attonement with God’. He then added the political definitions, ‘The publick tranquility and quiet State of the Church, when it is not trobled within, by Schisms and Heresies; or without, by persecuting Tirants’ and ‘The tranquility of the publicke weale, or politicke State, when it is free from forren and Civill warres’.

Edmund Bohun’s *Geographical Dictionary* (1693) showed the links between affective and political ‘quiet’ in the entries, ‘California’, which was ‘full of People, of a good and quiet humor and disposition’, and ‘Hungaria’, which ‘became more quiet, and better civilized’ when it was forcibly ‘broken by the Forces of Germany, and sweetned by the Christian Religion’ in the eleventh century. Bohun’s linking of ‘quiet’ and ‘civil’ qualities echoed Cotgrave’s *Dictionarie*, which eight decades earlier had included ‘quietnes of disposition’ among terms such as ‘Civilitie’, ‘gentlenesse’, and ‘courtesie’ in his definition of the French ‘Civilité’. For Cotgrave, the opposites of this ‘civil’ and ‘quiet’ ideal were encompassed in his definitions of ‘Remueur de mesnage’ (‘An unquiet, seditious, turbulent, or troublesome fellow’) and ‘Ocrisse’ (‘A scould, shrew, unquiet or impatient woman’).

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190 Ibid.
192 Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*, ‘Civilité’.
193 Ibid., ‘Mesnage’, ‘Ocrisse’.
action, interpersonal relationships and society as a whole were all implicated in the languages of ‘trouble’, ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’.

This section has shown that, for dictionary writers across the period, notions of ‘peace’, ‘quiet’ and ‘trouble’ linked the state of the physical body to that of the body politic or commonwealth, in both affective and physiological terms. As historians have shown, understandings of the constitution and functions of the physical body were transposed onto the wider body politic, shaping and naturalising notions of social organisation, hierarchy and the social roles of individuals.\textsuperscript{194} In both cases the ideal was for ‘quiet of mind’ or peace, while ‘trouble’, ‘disturbance’ and ‘commotion’ referred to unquiet minds and unsettled polities alike. In one sense, the political application of affective language was also evident in the discourses of ‘fear’, ‘love’ and ‘malignity’, which denoted the positive and negative feelings that either forged a harmonious social order or broke it apart. Yet the distinction was that ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’ denoted social and political states in and of themselves. The same was also true of the term ‘emotion’, which in its early uses in English denoted stirrings both physical and political.\textsuperscript{195} As later chapters of this thesis will show, throughout the early modern period the languages of ‘quiet’ and ‘trouble’ were used in judicial settings in order to describe character, motivation, action and ideal or unideal polities in highly charged terms. Therefore, the social connotations of affective language found in dictionaries were not restricted to a conceptual level, but rather informed and played out in social and legal practice.


\textsuperscript{195} Thorley, ‘Towards a history of emotion’, pp. 3-19.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has conducted quantitative and qualitative analysis of ten early modern dictionaries in order to map continuity and change in the meanings and use of affective language across the period. It has made several arguments, both methodological and substantive. In terms of methodology, this chapter has firstly shown the fruitfulness of combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, both to the study of dictionaries and of affective language within them. As dictionaries were one of the drivers of the introduction and assimilation of new terms in the context of the expanding English vernacular, quantitative analysis shows the rise and fall of different terms, such as the increasing visibility of ‘happiness’ and decreasing importance of ‘gladness’ within the cluster of terms related to ‘joy’. From this analysis, this chapter has also told a narrative of continuity and change in the early modern English affective lexicon. On the one hand, the period saw continuity at the level of the most common affective terms, and ‘love’, ‘fear’ and ‘anger’ would no doubt top the lists of frequently used emotions today. Even terms such as ‘trouble’, ‘favour’ and ‘quiet’, which perhaps would not appear near the top of such lists, still showed continuity within the period studied in this chapter. On the other hand, the quantitative analysis also revealed lexical change, consisting of the introduction and recession of affective terms, but this occurred with a lower level of frequency. From this basis, qualitative analysis has also been made of clusters of linked terms that are revealing either of early modern conceptualisations of the category of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’, or of the relationships between feeling, interpersonal relationships and society as a whole at this conceptual level. Through the identification and analysis of two clusters centred on ‘love’ and ‘fear’, and on ‘hatred’ and ‘malice’, this chapter has shown how affective language characterised social relationships in positive and negative terms. Furthermore, through the study of the cluster contrasting ‘trouble’, ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’, this chapter has revealed how social and political
states were also described in the same terms as states of the mind and soul. While it is a historiographical commonplace to note the symbiosis in early modern thought between physical bodies and bodies politic, this chapter has shown that social bodies were also regarded in affective terms – something that would not have been possible without linguistic analysis across a variety of lexicographical texts.

As Rosenwein has argued, emotions are ‘inchoate’ until they are interpreted according to the shared words, concepts and norms of an ‘emotional community’, meaning that ‘emotional vocabularies are exceptionally important for the ways in which people understand, express, and indeed “feel” their emotions’.196 Building on this argument, this chapter has examined early modern English affective vocabulary in order to understand how that language – and the change it underwent – reflected and shaped understandings of ‘emotion’ and their relationship society and social practice. In so doing, it has reconstructed the early modern affective lexicon, which is something that has never before been attempted by emotions historians, and analysed how and in what contexts affective terms were used. In this regard, this chapter has situated the history of emotions in the context of early modern conceptual history, which has argued that the study of the semantics and contextual use of historically mutable language is a vital means of approaching early modern society and social practice in terms understood by people at the time.197 As such, this linguistic overview of affective language does not exist in a vacuum, but rather as the linguistic basis for the rest of this thesis. For instance, the meanings and uses of affective terms found in lexicographical sources were also used in other planes of discourse, such as philosophical and conduct literature, as well as in social practice and its adjudication in judicial contexts. In particular, the identification of ‘motion’ and ‘movement’ as constituent terms of the ‘emotion’ cluster

196 Rosenwein, Generations of Feeling, p. 4.
reveals how early modern writers defined affective life in terms of movement from one state to another, which provided the impetus for action in the social world. This link between passion and action – how early modern people saw social practice as affective, and affections as motivating forces – will form the subject of the following chapter of this thesis. Focusing on how passions were invoked in court, later chapters will show that notions of motivation were suffused in affectivity, meaning that the conceptual links between malice and the malperformance of roles outlined in dictionaries also played out in social and legal practice. Ultimately, then, this chapter has shown the use and applicability of findings in lexicographical sources for studies of early modern society as a whole.
Chapter 2

Passion and Action

Early modern philosophers, as Susan James argues in *Passion and Action* (1997), understood affective life to be defined by both passivity and activity. In the dominant intellectual paradigm of ‘Scholastic Aristotelianism’, she states, ‘passions’ were ‘understood to be thoughts or states of the soul which represent things as good or evil for us, and are therefore seen as objects of inclination or aversion’. Since the external world is acting upon the soul, the result of which are feelings of pleasure or pain as the soul moves towards or away from the perceived good or evil, passions were conceptualised as passive states. Yet James also argues that this Aristotelian tradition also stressed the activity of affective life. In this view, not only did passions alter the body and manifest in gestures and vocal tones, but they could also overwhelm the will – the rational faculty of the soul that ideally directs the actions of the body according to reason – meaning that passion leads to irrational and precipitate action. Consequently, in Scholastic Aristotelian thought ‘passions’ and ‘volitions’ (or acts of the will) were thought to be the ‘principal antecedents of action’, and the ability to govern passion with reason was therefore paramount. Scholastic Aristotelianism, James states, was the product of the adaptation and augmentation of Aristotelian concepts of the soul and body by medieval Christian thinkers, such as the thirteenth-century Scholastic philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas, and remained the predominant means of conceptualising passions and affections in the seventeenth century. However, James argues that this ‘long and palimpsestic tradition’ was challenged and overturned in the mid-seventeenth century.

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1 James, *Passion and Action*, p. 4.
3 James, *Passion and Action*, pp. 5-6.
by philosophers such as René Descartes and Thomas Hobbes, who formulated radically different models of the nature of passions. In place of the Aristotelian view of the soul as hierarchically divided into rational and ‘sensual’ faculties, Descartes distinguished between the physical body, which he viewed as a mechanism, and a unified rational soul, which governed and directed the mechanical body. However, despite overturning the Aristotelian conceptualisation of the soul, Descartes still attributed action to the soul’s volitions and the physical body’s passion of ‘desire’. Hobbes, meanwhile, jettisoned any reference to the soul and collapsed the Aristotelian distinction between active volitions and passive passions entirely, instead viewing passions as thoughts that directly result in action. Therefore, James argues that despite the paradigm shift from Scholastic Aristotelianism in the seventeenth century, philosophers still fundamentally related passion to action.

While James has noted that ‘good life’ was thought to be ‘partly a matter of experiencing passions that are held to be appropriate to one’s station and its duties, and ideally consists in possessing them to just the right degree’, for the most part the implications for social practice of the relationship between passion and action have lain beyond the scope of her studies. Additionally, in her narrative of a decisive mid-seventeenth-century shift from Aristotelian to post-Aristotelian understandings of the passions overlooks other ontologies, such as Stoicism and Galenism, by which passions and affections were conceptualised, described and managed in this period.

As such, this chapter explores how affectivity was considered by early modern writers to be directly implicated in action and social practice. In order to do so, it identifies and examines a corpus of early modern texts – discernible by the use of the terms ‘passions’ and

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4 Ibid., p. 4.
5 Ibid., p. 18.
6 Ibid., p. 135.
‘affections’ on their title pages – which first appeared in print in the later sixteenth century, and which discussed the nature of passions and how they should be managed in everyday life (see Appendix 2). From various medical, theological and philosophical perspectives, these ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ texts variously stressed the physiological, psychological, supernatural or social causes, manifestations and effects of passions and affections. This chapter uses the passions and affections corpus in two key ways. Firstly, it outlines the multiple concurrent conceptualisations of passions found in early modern English print, and argues that the relationship between passion and social practice was a common and important feature of affective thought. As will be shown, alongside the Aristotelian discussions outlined by James, early modern writers appropriated and synthesised a variety of Stoic, Galenic and Christian understandings of passions and affections, complicating James’ narrative of a clear ontological shift from Aristotelianism to post-Aristotelianism in the mid-seventeenth century. Even if Cartesian and Hobbesian discussions of passions signalled a rupture from the past, this chapter demonstrates that conventional Aristotelian perspectives continued to be printed into the eighteenth century, evidencing continuity rather than change. As Goldie has argued, the later seventeenth century showed ‘a powerful continuation of scholastic Aristotelian styles of philosophy’. This chapter shows that this continuity was also true for Aristotelian understandings of passions and affections. Secondly, passions and affections texts are used in order to recover an early modern sense of ‘practice’ itself, and the chapter argues that practice was fundamentally understood in affective terms. In so doing, the chapter identifies and outlines a historicised theory of practice by which early modern writers commonly related passions and affections to character, motivation, action and the performance of social roles. Ultimately, by recovering the understanding of practice outlined by early modern writers, this chapter will provide the interpretive

framework for the subsequent chapters of the thesis, showing how early modern conceptualisations of the role of passion in social life are the means by which early modern social practice can be accessed and analysed by historians.

‘PASSIONS’ AND ‘AFFECTIONS’ TEXTS

Before the relationship between passion and action can be discussed, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ corpus that comprises the source base of this chapter needs to be established. As was shown in the previous chapter, in early modern English the key affective taxonomies were ‘passions’, ‘affections’, ‘perturbations’ and ‘motions’. A series of printed texts can be identified by the use of these affective keywords on their title pages. As Withington has argued, title pages played a mediating role between the ‘production’ and ‘subsequent reception’ of texts.9 By comprehensively advertising their contents, lengthy early modern book titles contained intentional word choices with the ‘cultural resonance and purchase’ that would semantically ‘position’ texts to ‘potential audiences’ and maximise commercial success.10 The appearance of ‘passions’, ‘affections’, ‘perturbations’ and ‘motions’ on a title page, then, signalled to potential readers the affective content of the texts. After searching for these terms on early modern title pages, it is evident that a distinctive corpus of passions and affections texts, which discussed the nature of passions and affections as well as their management and expression in social practice, began to be published in the later sixteenth century. These texts were almost exclusively advertised with the terms ‘passions’ and ‘affections’, and the less common typologies of ‘perturbations’ and ‘motions’ (in this specifically affective sense) each appeared on only two title pages.

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9 Withington, Society, p. 80.
10 Ibid., pp. 8, 80.
throughout the period.\textsuperscript{11} The passions and affections corpus encompassed medical, theological and philosophical genres, and so situated passions and affections in their various physiological, psychological, supernatural or social contexts. Consequently, these texts shared common themes, such as the relationship between soul and body, the nature or causes of passions and affections, and the social, moral and divine implications of their expression and restraint. However, while passions and affections texts were a ‘new’, sixteenth-century development, they were shaped by classical and medieval philosophy, medicine and theology. Early modern writers appropriated, adapted and synthesised Aristotelian, Stoic, Galenic, Augustinian and Thomist theories of passions and affections. What was ‘new’, then, was the printing of vernacular texts in which passions and affections were not only the central subjects but were also clearly advertised as such. Therefore, texts explicitly signalled with ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ on their title pages provide a useful, delineated sample in which to contextualise early modern understandings of what we would term ‘emotion’.

Graph 2.1 shows the number of passions and affections texts printed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As can be seen, these texts first appeared in the 1570s, were printed in increasing numbers until reaching their zenith in the 1650s, before gradually declining in numbers in the later seventeenth century. This chronology suggests an important cultural resonance was attached to passions and affections in the century following the 1570s. The graph also accounts for multiple editions of the same text, as the reprinting of these works reveals their continuing popularity and influence. During the sixteenth and

\textsuperscript{11} ‘Perturbations’: Tobias Venner, \textit{Vie\ae Recte ad Vitam Longam ...} \textit{VWherein the true use of Sleeepe, Exercise, Excretions, and Perturbations is, with their effects, discussed and applied to every age, constitution of body, and time of yeare} (London, 1623); William Vaughan, \textit{Directions for Health, Naturall and Artificiall ...} \textit{Perturbations of the mind, and spirituall sicknesses} (6th edn, London, 1626). ‘Motions’: Levinus Lemnius, \textit{The Touchstone of Complexions ...} \textit{whereby every one may perfectly try, and throughly know, aswell the exacte state, habite, disposition, and constitution, of his owne Body outwardly: as also the inclinations, affections, motions, & desires of his mynd inwardly}, trans. Thomas Newton (London, 1576); John Bulwer, \textit{Pathomyotamia or A Dissection of the significative Muscles of the Affections of the Minde ...} \textit{the Voluntarie or Impetuous motions of the Mind} (London, 1649).
seventeenth centuries, 41 individual passions and affections texts were printed over 91 total editions (see Appendix 2).

**Graph 2.1: The ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ corpus (1576-1699).**

Passions and affections texts can be crudely divided into three strands: seven ‘medical’ texts (17 per cent); seven ‘religious’ texts (17 per cent); and, by far the most common type, 27 ‘philosophical’ texts (66 per cent) that combined classical and Christian views of passions and affections. The seven ‘medical’ texts were all practical guides for the management of the six ‘non-naturals’ – air, diet, exercise and rest, sleeping and waking, repletion and evacuation, and passions and affections – which were thought to affect the ‘natural’ body and preserve or recover good health.\(^{12}\) For instance, the physician Humphrey Brooke’s *Conservatory of Health* (1650) conventionally stated that the ‘Regulation’ of ‘the Affections, or Passions of the Mind’ ‘conduces to the Conservation of Health’.\(^{13}\) Next, the ‘religious’ strand included printed


sermons, such as the puritan clergyman Richard Sibbes’ posthumously published *Spirituall-Mans Aime* (1637), which was advertised as ‘Guiding a Christian in his Affections and Actions, through the sundry passages of this life’ in the service of ‘his owne Salvation’ and ‘Gods glory’. Another religious text, Edward Reyner’s conduct manual *Precepts for Christian Practice* (1655), similarly provided advice for ‘the Government of the thoughts and of the affections’ in practice. Generally, such texts advised – in the words of Thomas Pierce, the Anglican controversialist and president of Magdalen College, Oxford – that ‘affections’ should be directed by ‘Reason’ to ‘things above’, and not to ‘the Riches and the Pompes of the world’. Lastly, the large strand of ‘philosophical’ texts described not only the nature and essence of passions and affections, but also how they should be expressed or restrained in practice. For example, Thomas Bowes’ 1594 translation of the second volume of the French philosopher Pierre de La Primaudaye’s *Academie françoise* was advertised as discussing both ‘the naturall causes of all affections, vertues and vices’, and how to put them to ‘profite and use’. The Church of England clergyman Edward Reynolds’ *Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man* (1640) synthesised ‘Theologicall’ and ‘Materiall’ understandings of the nature of the soul, body and ‘passions’, and also how they should be directed in social and religious life. As such, the religious and philosophical strands are very similar: both combined classical and Christian perspectives, and clergymen were the authors of both sorts of text. However, religious texts were more explicitly framed in biblical terms, such as the

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14 Richard Sibbes, *The Spirituall-Mans Aime. Guiding a Christian in his Affections and Actions, through the sundry passages of this life. So that Gods glory, and his owne Salvation may be the maine end of all* (London, 1637), title page.

15 Edward Reyner, *Precepts for Christian Practice, or, the Rule of the New Creature New model’d. Containing Duties to be daily observed by every Beleever … Hereunto is added a Direction for the Government of the thoughts and of the affections* (8th edn, London, 1655), title page. The first edition was published in 1645, although ‘affections’ only appeared on title pages from the eighth edition onwards.

16 Thomas Pierce, *The Signal Diagnostick whereby We are to judge of our own Affections; And as well of our Present, as Future State* (London, 1670), p. 101.

17 Pierre de La Primaudaye, *The Second Part of the French Academie. VVherein, as it were by a naturall historie of the bodie and soule of man, the creation, matter, composition, forme, nature, profite, and vse of all the partes of the frame of man are handled, with the naturall causes of all affections, vertues and vices, and chiefly the nature, powers, works and immortalitie of the Soule*, trans. Thomas Bowes (London, 1594), title page.

18 Edward Reynolds, *A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man* (London, 1640), sig. a3r.
puritan divine John Preston’s *Sins Overthrow* (1633), which was an exegesis on the ‘Mortification’ of ‘Inordinate Affection’ (Colossians 3:5). Yet common to all these strands was a conceptualisation of passions and affections as products of an interconnected mind, body and soul. From this basis, each strand emphasised the importance of the regulation of passions and affections, whether in terms of the preservation of health, the promotion of virtuous social behaviour or a proper relationship with God.

However, it should be noted that the identification of a textual type through the terminology of title pages does have some drawbacks. Firstly, only a fraction of texts that included the terms ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ on their title pages have been categorised as part of the passions and affection corpus. Examples of such texts, among many, include Luke Shepherd’s antipapal poem, *Pathose* (1548), which mocked the pope’s ‘inward passion’ at the reformers’ attacks on ‘the Masse’; the dramatist Robert Greene’s posthumously published *Greene’s Vision* (1592), which was framed as ‘a penitent passion for the folly of his Pen’ in writing ‘amourous trifles’ throughout his career; and the royalist clergyman Thomas Bayly’s 1649 description of the recently-executed Charles I’s ‘constant affection to the Protestant Religion’.

Such texts lacked the sustained discussion and analysis of passions that characterised those texts included in the corpus. Secondly, this methodology also misses those texts which contributed to the growing interest in passions and affections in print, but did not use those terms on their title pages, such as Robert Burton’s popular *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621). Thirdly, this methodology overlooks medical, philosophical and

religious discussions of passions and affections printed before the 1570s. According to this analysis, the earliest passions and affections text was *The Touchstone of Complexions* (1576), Thomas Newton’s translation of the Dutch physician Levinus Lemnius’ treatise, *De habitu et constitutione corporis*, which was first published in Latin in 1561.22 Far from original, this treatise espoused the Galenic humoral tradition that dominated early modern medical theory and practice. Although earlier printed medical treatises, such as the humanist Sir Thomas Elyot’s *Castel of Helthe* (1539), first published the year after his *Dictionary*, had likewise discussed the ‘affectes and passions of the mynde’ in the context of physical health, the *Touchstone*’s title page was the first to advertise its use for the reader to understand both his physical ‘Body outwardly’ and ‘the inclinations, affections, motions, & desires of his mynd inwardly’.23 This latter phrase was an expanded English rendering of ‘*animi motus*’ (movements of the mind or soul), which appeared on the title page of the original Latin edition, suggesting that the equivalents of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ were already being used on Continental title pages.24 As such, passions and affections texts should be situated in the wider European intellectual context of humanism, which was based on the recovery and appropriation of classical knowledge and rhetorical forms as a means to educate and improve individuals and wider society, and in which England followed wider European trends.25

Despite these caveats, the main benefits of this methodology are that it shows a growing cultural and commercial interest in passions and affections from the later sixteenth century, and that it delineates a source base in which to study the different ontologies in

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23 Sir Thomas Elyot, *The Castel of Helthe. Gathered, and made by syr Thomas Elyot knight, out of the chief authors of Phisyke, whereby euery man may knowe the state of his owne body, the preseruation of helthe, and how to instruct well his phisition in sicknes, that he be not deceyued* (London, 1539), f. 64r–v; Lemnius, *Touchstone of Complexions*, trans. Newton, title page.

24 Lemnius, *De habitu et constitutione corporis ... animique motus*, title page.

which early modern people understood the nature and management of passions and affections. While earlier texts did discuss passions and affections, only from the 1570s did they become the central subjects of medical, philosophical and religious printed works, and were advertised as such on their title pages. Translating, appropriating and synthesising a combination of classical and Christian perspectives inherited from the past, passions and affections texts were one means by which classical and medieval knowledge of feeling was disseminated and vernacularised in early modern England. This was true both for original English works, which drew upon and integrated various Aristotelian, Stoic and Galenic ontologies, as well as for translations of French, Latin and Italian works. Of the 41 passions and affections texts, 13 (32 per cent) were translated works, of which nine (22 per cent) were French originals. That this genre appeared around the same time that other humanist genres were increasingly being printed and read in England, such as the Italian-inspired literature on ‘courtesy’, ‘civility’ and ‘civil conversation’, demonstrates the suffusion of humanist thought by the later sixteenth century and the important place of passions and affections within it.  

In short, from the later sixteenth century there were both quantitative and qualitative shifts in the visibility and centrality of passions and affections in print across a variety of discourses. These passions and affections texts provide a corpus in which different conceptualisations of passions and affections can be outlined and analysed. As such, the following section will discuss the different ontologies of feeling found in this corpus of texts and their developments over time.
EARLY MODERN ONTOLOGIES OF PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS

First outlined by Hippocrates (460-370 BC) and developed by Galen (AD 130-210), humoral theory continued to dominate medical theory and practice in the early modern period. Humoral theory provided a psychosomatic model linking the soul and body both to each other and to the wider natural, environmental and social worlds.  

In Galenic physiology, the body was understood to be a microcosm of the universe that was directly affected and influenced by natural cosmic and supernatural events outside the body. In this view, the body was thought to be composed of the same four elements – fire, air, water and earth – whose hot, cold, moist and dry qualities were physically manifested in four ‘humours’ or liquids: blood, yellow bile (choler), phlegm and black bile (melancholy). The prevalence of a particular humour, it was believed, determined a person’s ‘complexion’, or humoral balance, which was either sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic or melancholic. Complexions were both inborn and affected by ‘natural’ and environmental factors, such as the stages of the lifecycle, ranging from sanguine youth to melancholic old age, as well as the changing of the seasons, climate and the motions of celestial bodies.  

As such, in humoral theory factors both within and outside the body influenced mental and physical wellbeing as well as character, personality and affective disposition. For example, Lemnius’ Touchstone of Complexions (1576) noted that while choler aids digestion in the liver and the gall bladder, its hot and dry qualities mean that it is also a ‘fiery force’ in the body, giving a person a ‘naturally fierce, arrogante, imperious, stately untractable and unruly’ character, and whose sudden ‘motion … stirreth up and incenseth our minds to hasty moodes and furious rages’. Consequently, the choleric complexion was linked not only to anger but also to diseases affecting the liver, such as

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29 Lemnius, Touchstone of Complexions, trans. Newton, ff. 131v, 128r.
jaundice. Thomas Walkington’s *Optick Glasse of Humors* (1607) also invoked this conventional Galenic physiological and psychological linkage, stating that those of the ‘golden’ sanguine complexion – in which the prevailing humour was blood, the life-giving humour which was thought to convey the vital and animal spirits around the body – are ‘affable in speech’, bear ‘constant loving affection’ to others and are ‘never caried away with the heady strame of any base affection’. By contrast, Walkington described melancholy, the cold and dry humour, as the ‘greatest enemy to life’, as its debilitating physiological properties cause the melancholic to be ‘sad countenanced’ and ‘subject to passions’. Therefore, Galenic understandings not only situated passions and affections in the context of physical health and wellbeing, and outlined a psychosomatic structure in which not only were mind and body conjoined, but also saw human beings and their feelings as symbiotically related to the wider environments they inhabited.

Based on the centrality of humoral balance to health and sickness in Galenic theory, medical passions and affections texts provided readers with practical advice on determining their own complexions and preserving health through the management of the six ‘non-naturals’, or non-medicinal uses of the body that influence its health and wellbeing. The non-naturals were explicitly listed and advertised on the title pages of William Vaughan’s *Approved Directions for Health* (1612) and Brooke’s *Conservatory of Health* (1650): ‘1. Aire. 2. Meat and Drink. 3. Motion and Rest. 4. Sleep and Wakefulness. 5. The Excrements. 6. The Passions of the Mind’. On this final non-natural, Lemnius similarly noted that the management of the ‘affections’ prevents ‘both Soule & Body’ being ‘distempered’ by

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31 Thomas Walkington, *The Optick Glasse of Humors. Or The touchstone of a golden temperature* (London, 1607), ff. 15v, 56v, 57r, 58r-v, 59r-60r.
33 Brooke, *Hygieinē*, title page; Vaughan, *Approved Directions for Health, both Naturall and Artificiall ... 1. Ayre, Fire and Water. 2. Meate, drinke with nourishment. 3. Sleepe, Earely rising and Dreames. 4. Auidoance of excrements, by purga. 5. The Soules qualities and affecti* 

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‘Sicknesse or grievous malady’.34 For those with an excess of melancholy – the humour causing diseases of the spleen and ‘affections’ of ‘Heavynesse’, ‘sadnesse’ and ‘feare’ – Lemnius prescribed not only the medicinal use of wine and herbs, but also ‘banquetting and good cheere amonge honest and mery company’, in order to cultivate the melancholic’s ‘curtesye & familiar humanitye’.35 Similarly, in 1623 the physician Tobias Venner advised that in order to preserve ‘the tranquility both of minde and body, which of this life is the chiefest happynesse’, his readers must use their ‘reason’ and ‘understanding’ ‘to bridle all irrational motions of the minde’ and ‘observe a mediocritie in their passion’.36 In order to counteract the dangerous ‘affection’ of ‘sadness’, which weakens the heart and ‘dryeth the bones’, Venner prescribed ‘moderate joy’, by which he meant having a ‘good conscience’ and ‘living soberly, uprightly, and godly in this present world’.37 Four decades later, as a cure for melancholy, the physician Everard Maynwaringe also prescribed readers to ‘Avoid solitariness, and keep merry company’.38 John Archer’s Every Man his own Doctor (1671), the title of which stressed the practical, do-it-yourself nature of these vernacular medical texts, likewise noted that a ‘well setled mind ... doth very much tend to the preservation of health ... moderate joy and a cheerful spirit doth preserve the body in health, and sound constitution, for it recreates and refreshes the heart and spirits, and whole body’.39 Therefore, these practical guides to health related internal humoral complexions, and the passions which were adjoined to them, to external social circumstances. ‘Courtesy’ and ‘merry’ company, in this view, were as much a matter for medical as social practice.

34 Lemnius, Touchstone of Complexions, trans. Newton, ff. 59v-60r.
35 Ibid., ff. 5v, 141v, 138r.
36 Venner, Vie Recte ad Vitam Longam, p. 30.
37 Ibid., pp. 28, 30.
While Michael Schoenfeldt and Gail Kern Paster have argued that Galenic humoral theory was the principal theory by which passions and affections were understood by early modern people, Richard Strier and Erin Sullivan have shown that early modern thought on affective life was pluralistic, with Galenism only one among multiple coexisting ontologies. For instance, Strier has criticised the ‘physiological determinism’ of what he terms the ‘new humoralism’ – the historiographical trend of treating humoral theory as the early modern ontology of feeling – while Sullivan has argued that the ‘psychological materialism’ of humoral theory was only one among many forms of early modern selfhood. Shifting the focus from embodied Galenic theory, Sullivan has instead highlighted ‘the significance of the “immaterial” dimensions of passionate experience’, which were informed as much by ‘the theology of predestination’ and philosophical discussion of ‘the powers of the rational soul’, as by ‘medical humoral theory’. Discussing religious understandings of affective life, Essary and Jennifer Clement have both argued that religious expressions of affections as ‘metonymic expressions of God’s movements within the believer’ should not be overlooked in favour of ‘lay-medical Renaissance physiology’. In contrast to the materialist focus of humoral theory, Essary and Clement argue that ‘religious affections’ were understood to be immaterial and the properties of the higher, rational parts of the soul. Depending on their perspective or purpose, then, early modern writers could stress spiritual, mental and moral causes and effects of passions and affections as much as the physiological. ‘Even in those cases where early modern thinkers understood human physiology in largely “humoral” terms’, Essary

40 Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves, pp. 1-3; Paster, Humoring the Body, pp. 4-7, 9-23; Paster, Rowe and Floyd-Wilson, ‘Introduction’, pp. 15-18; Richard Strier, The Unrepentant Renaissance: From Petrarch to Shakespeare to Milton (Chicago, 2011); Sullivan, Beyond Melancholy.
41 Strier, Unrepentant Renaissance, p. 20 n. 51; Sullivan, Beyond Melancholy, p. 72.
42 Sullivan, Beyond Melancholy, pp. 4-5.
argues, ‘it is far from clear that they all imagined the emotions to be only or even mainly physiological or humoral phenomena’. It is these religious understandings of passions and affections that will now be turned to.

Predictably, ‘religious’ passions and affections texts focused more on the soul than the body. Recognising the multiplicity of affective concepts, the clergyman Thomas Cooper’s *Mysterie of the Holy Government of our Affections* (1620) noted that there were ‘two contrarie Opinions’ of ‘the Causes of Affections and Perturbations’: to ‘Philosophers’ they ‘arise from the Complexions’, ‘Humours’ and the ‘carnall part of man’; to ‘Divines’, they ‘proceede immediately from the disposition of the Divine Soule’, which, if ‘qualified by grace’, expresses affections tending to ‘good’, or, if ‘oppressed with corruption’, expresses corrupted affections like ‘Malice’ and ‘Envie’. Here, then, affections originate in the soul, and only through God’s ‘grace’, which undoes the work of original sin, can we reorder our affections and set them upon their proper objects. Likewise, the Scottish clergyman John Weemes’ *Pourtraiture of the Image of God in Man* (1627) claimed that faith in Christ ‘subdueth the passions that they arise not inordinately’, and ‘setts the passions upon their right objects’, while the minister William Fenner’s *Treatise of the Affections* (1650) averred that ‘the main work of grace is the ruling of the affections aright, it takes them off from the things here on earth, and lifts them up to the things that are in Heaven. When grace doth convert a man, it doth not take away the affections, but it ruleth them’. Further relegating the importance of the material body, Cooper claimed that some ‘perturbations’ reside only in the soul and do not affect the physical ‘Senses’. In particular, our ‘noblest Affections’ – love and joy – even ‘accompanie

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45 Essary, ‘Clear as Mud’, p. 691.
us after death’ as we enjoy ‘eternall Happinesse, even when the body lyes rotten in the Grave’. In other words, if affections are dispositions of the soul, and the soul is immortal, then embodied feeling and expression is only a temporary part of eternal affective life.

Contrasting with Cooper’s negation of materiality, the eighth edition of Reyner’s Precepts for Christian Practice (1655), to which was annexed ‘a Direction for the Government of the thoughts and of the affections’, integrated Aristotelian and Galenic views of the nature of affections with Christian precepts for their management in social and religious life. For instance, Reyner distinguished in Scholastic Aristotelian terms (which will be outlined below) between ‘Sensual’ and ‘Rational Affections’, which are hierarchically distributed in the lower and higher parts of the soul. While sensual affections concern only corporeality and ‘sensible things’, rational affections are ‘Motions of the Will’ and ‘Understanding’, two faculties of the rational part of the soul. Despite emanating from the will, rational affections have bodily effects: ‘the Will stirs up the Sensuall Affections, and they stirre the humors and parts of the Body, especially the Spirits and the blood, and make the whole man to suffer, both Body and Soul; hence the Affections are called Passions’. To this view, Reyner added in Galenic terms that the experience of certain affections is mediated by ‘the Temperature of the Body’ – its humoral complexion – which is why Anger is so vehement in a Cholerick Body, and ‘Fear and Sorrow in a Melancholick’. In order to preserve both spiritual and physical health, then, Reyner prescribes ‘Holinesse of Will’ as well as ‘the subjection of Sense and of Appetite unto Reason’.

49 Ibid., f. 16r-v.
50 Reyner, Precepts for Christian Practice, title page.
51 Ibid., sig. Aa3r.
52 Ibid., sig. Aa3r-v.
53 Ibid., sig. Aa4r.
54 Ibid., sig. Aa4v.
55 Ibid., sig. Aa4r, Aa5r.
Like Reyner, other religious writers also provided practical precepts for the management of affections. They described affections as expressions both of humanity’s fallen nature and of its possible redemption. For instance, the puritan divine John Rogers’ *Treatise of Love* (1629) asserted that wile ‘affections’ are ‘in themselves good, and not evill, being given to Adam in his creation’, ‘since the Fall’ the will had become ‘rebellious’ and the affections ‘disordered’, turning ‘true Love’ – the love for our neighbour – into ‘malice’, ‘selfe-love’ and ‘the love of evill’.\(^{56}\) However, Rogers claimed that the will of one who is ‘regenerate’ and ‘sanctified’ through faith becomes ‘plyant and frameable to the will of God’, meaning that their affections are ‘purged’ and rightly ordered ‘to hate the evill, so to love the good, to love God’.\(^{57}\) Similarly, Preston’s exegetical *Sins Overthrow* (1633) prescribed the ‘Mortification’ of ‘inordinate Affections’, by which he meant to ‘slay every foule affection’ and ‘inordinate desire of earthly things’, and instead direct the affections only to God.\(^{58}\) In Sibbes’ *Spirituall-Mans Aime* (1637), the very essence of ‘Religion’ itself – a term combining belief and practice – lay in ‘purging the affections from the evill that is in them, and moderating them, if they bee lawfull and good’.\(^{59}\) Through divine grace, Sibbes added, both positive and negative affections, such as joy or grief, should be ‘tempered’ and ‘qualified’, so that we neither ‘over-Joy’ nor ‘over-grieve’.\(^{60}\) Repeating this theme was Fenner’s *Treatise of the Affections*, a series of sermons on Colossians 3:2 (‘Set your affections on things that are above, and not on things which are on the earth’), which stated that God alone should be the object of affections, and only through grace can the ideal ‘sober and temperate’ expression be achieved.\(^{61}\) Echoing this view, Pierce’s *Signal Diagnostick whereby We are to Judge of our own Affections* (1670) stated that ‘Our affections in themselves are indifferent things; apt to be cleaving to any object,

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\(^{57}\) Ibid., pp. 25-6.  
\(^{60}\) Ibid., pp. 41-2.  
whether evil, or good, as they shall happen to be directed, by carnal Appetite, or Reason’.  

Lastly, in his 1701 sermon, The Government of the Passions, Musidorus Burghope likewise described ‘irregular’ and disordered ‘Passions’ as ‘vitiﬁc Habits’, but if properly directed and ‘reduced to Government’, they are ‘wondrous Incitements to Virtue and Religion’.  

Therefore, religious passions and affections texts simultaneously described passions and affections both as a symptom of humanity’s fallen nature, and as potential means by which grace and redemption could be achieved. While religious writers did attribute affections to the soul, as Essary, Clement and Sullivan have argued, they also incorporated Galenic and Aristotelian understandings of the physiological expressions of these spiritual phenomena, demonstrating the blurred boundaries between these philosophical frameworks.  

As such, religious passions and affections texts were closely related to the ‘philosophical’ strand, which combined classical and Christian perspectives of passions and affections, and comprised the majority (66 per cent) of the corpus. Like those in the religious strand, philosophical texts discussed both the nature of passions and affections, and how they should be moderated, directed or expressed in social and religious life. However, these texts were qualitatively distinct from those in the religious strand. Although both synthesised a variety of classical, medieval and more contemporary concepts of passions and affections, the texts in the philosophical stand were less explicitly framed in biblical or religious terms, although their writers were obviously part of the same intellectual and religious tradition. The remainder of this section will outline the adaptation and augmentation of classical Stoic and Aristotelian thought in these texts, and show how both views emphasised the relationship between passion and action.  

62 Pierce, Signal Diagnostick, p. 112.  
Christopher Tilmouth has argued that affective thought in late-sixteenth-century England was dominated by the pejorative Stoic view of passions as dangerous forces that are diametrically opposed to reason, but that this paradigm was replaced in the seventeenth century with the more positive Aristotelian view that affections, if properly moderated, can be used in the service of virtue.\(^{64}\) However, this Stoic intellectual dominance is not immediately evident in the passions and affections corpus studied in this chapter. Only two (5 per cent) of the passions and affections texts explicitly adopted a Stoical position, and both were published towards the end of the period. The first is *Man without Passion* (1675), subtitled *The Wise Stoick*, an English translation by ‘G. R.’ of a 1662 treatise by the Flemish-born Franciscan friar Antoine Le Grand.\(^{65}\) In Stoic terms, Le Grand claimed that ‘*Passion*’ was ‘a violent motion of the Soul against Reason’, which serves to ‘deprave the mind and corrupt the will, persuading them to be approvers of their advices, and to follow their irregular motions’.\(^{66}\) In other words, passion leads to precipitate action. The second explicitly Stoical text was Christopher Wase’s 1683 translation of Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*, of which the fourth book discussed ‘*The Government of the Passions*’.\(^{67}\) While this work had already been translated in 1561 by John Dolman, it had not included the terms ‘passions’ or ‘affections’ on the title page.\(^{68}\) In Wase’s translation, Cicero claimed that the wise and ‘Happy’ man, ‘through Moderation and Constancy, hath quiet of mind, and is at Peace with himself; so as neither to Fret out of Discontent, nor to be confounded with Fear, who neither is inflam’d with an impatient longing after any thing, nor ravish’d out of himself into the Fools Paradise

\(^{66}\) Ibid., pp. 70-2.  
of an empty Mirth’.\textsuperscript{69} As such, both positive and negative feelings disturb the ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’ of the ‘happy’ man. While only these two texts were explicitly framed in Stoical terms, the Stoical ideal of impassivity – the use of reason to extinguish passion – was appropriated in other texts in the corpus. For example, the Lemnius’ Galenic \textit{Touchstone of Complexions} cited Cicero when advising that physical health can only be preserved if the ‘mynd’ is ‘reyned by reason, and curbed by temperance, that it yeld not to affections, but procure to it selfe quietnes & tranquillity, which ... is the chiefe point that helped us in this lyfe to lyve well and happily’\textsuperscript{70}. Further demonstrating the synthesis of affective ontologies, Lemnius added that the only means to achieve this impassive Ciceronian ideal was the ‘fyrme & assured truste and beliefe in God’.\textsuperscript{71} In practice, writers drew upon and synthesised a variety of intellectual traditions, and in general early modern affective thought stressed the importance of affective self-control as the necessary precondition for appropriate social behaviour.\textsuperscript{72}

The incorporation and synthesis of different affective ontologies is particularly evident in the naming and categorisation not just of passion as a whole, but also of individual passions. For instance, one of the earliest passions and affections texts, the physician Timothy Bright’s \textit{Treatise of Melancholie} (1586), synthesised the corporeal focus of Galenic humoral theory with an Aristotelian or Christian understanding of ‘perturbations’ as acts of the heart and soul principally caused by external circumstances, which only subsequently manifested physiologically. Bright claimed that if ‘affections’ were simply the product of the humours, then ‘no counsel of philosophy, nor precept of wise men’ could ‘calme these raging passions’, which would merely be the preserve of ‘the purging potions of Phisitians’.\textsuperscript{73} As such, the title

\textsuperscript{70} Lemnius, \textit{Touchstone of Complexions}, trans. Newton, f. 59v.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibid.}, ff. 59v-60r.
\textsuperscript{73} Timothy Bright, \textit{A Treatise of Melancholie. Containing the causes thereof, & reasons of the strange effects it worketh in our minds and bodies: with the phisicke cure, and spirituall consolation for such as haue thereto adioyned
page of Bright’s *Treatise* explicitly advertised its discussions of the ‘*affections of the soule, spirit, and body*’, as well as its use in providing both a ‘phisicke cure’ and ‘spirituall consolation’ for those whose melancholy was caused by an ‘afflicted conscience’.74 Turning to individual perturbations, Bright claimed that the two ‘simple’ perturbations are love and hate.75 Depending on the temporality of their objects, these simple perturbations had four ‘derivatives’: joy, hope, sadness and fear.76 While joy and sadness referred to the present in positive and negative terms, hope and fear had future objects. As such, Bright’s scheme distinguished between the type and temporality of specific perturbations, which related either to the present or future. From these ‘simple’ and ‘derivative’ origins, Bright claimed, were formed ‘compound’ perturbations that directly related feelings to their to their contexts and circumstances.77 For instance, envy consists of an ‘equall mixture’ of love and hate because ‘the thing we love’ belongs to another, while jealousy is stirred when we are ‘grieved’ that ‘such benefit as we enjoy’ should go to another.78 Trust, for Bright, was ‘love mixed with hope’; and distrust a compound of love and fear.79 Meanwhile, anger – which for Bright, as well as contemporary lexicographers, was the ‘affection of revenge’ – consisted of hate ‘compounded’ with the ‘hope of being satisfied’, which in turn compounds with hate to become malice.80

Although Bright’s 1586 *Treatise* was the first English passions and affections text to outline a qualitative and temporal division of ‘perturbations’, the concept was far from original, having adapted his framework of simple and compound perturbations from Cicero’s

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75 *Ibid.*, p. 82.
78 Bright, *Treatise of Melancholie*, p. 83.
79 *Ibid*.
Tusculan Disputations. According to Dolman’s 1561 translation of Cicero, the four basic ‘perturbations’ – the typology also used by Bright – were ‘gladnes’ and ‘sorowe’ (relating to the present), and ‘desyre’ and ‘feare’ (relating to the future). Continuing, Dolman’s translation noted that these basic perturbations divide into many ‘sortes’, depending on the context in which they arose. For instance, envy is ‘a sorowe taken for some other mans prosperity, which nothinge hurtes the envyour’. Meanwhile, for Cicero, ‘Anger is a desyre to punishe him which seemeth to have hurt us wythout cause’, while ‘Discorde, is a bytter anger, conceyved with inward hatred, from the heart’. As such, while Bright did not explicitly cite Cicero, his treatise was part of the adaptation and vernacularisation of Ciceronian thought on passions and affections. Bright’s adaptation was clearly influential. Nearly four decades later, Cooper’s religious Mysterie of the Holy Government of our Affections (1620) lifted Bright’s discussion almost verbatim in a further example of adaptation and synthesis.

Demonstrating the commonalities between different conceptualisations of passions and affections, the distinctions between simple and compound passions also appeared in Thomist discussions of passions. However, in order to explain this, Aristotelian concepts of the soul, on which Thomist thought was based, must first be outlined. The term ‘Aristotelian’ is used here in the broadest sense, incorporating its adaptation and Christianisation by St Augustine and Thomas Aquinas in the fifth and thirteenth centuries respectively. As Michael Edwards has argued, Aristotelian thought was so paradigmatic in the early modern period that the plural ‘Aristotelianisms’ would be more accurate. Put simply, the basis of

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81 Cicero, _Those fyue questions_, trans. Dolman, sig. S6v-S7r.
82 _Ibid._, sig. S8v.
83 _Ibid._, sig. T1r.
84 _Ibid._, sig. T2r-v.
85 Cooper, _Mysterie of the Holy Gouernment of our Affections_, ff. 2v-6r.
86 Dixon, _From Passions to Emotions_, pp. 26-61.
these views was a tripartite conceptualisation of the soul as divided into vegetative, sensitive and intellective faculties – a view which was recited in many passions and affections texts.  

Here the lowest, vegetative faculty controls those bodily functions necessary for nutrition and maintaining life, and is common to all living things: plants, animals and human beings. Next, the sensitive part relates to the physical senses and a person’s relationship with the material world, and is therefore common to the next highest forms of life: animals and humans. In this view, passions are perceptions and expressions of the sensitive faculty of the soul, which are caused by external circumstances relating to positive or negative sensation and the maintenance of physical wellbeing. Lastly, the highest, intellective part of the Aristotelian soul ideally governs the sensitive soul and its passions. Exclusive to humanity alone, this part of the soul was thought to contain the passive, apprehending faculty of ‘understanding’ and the active, appetitive faculty of the ‘will’, which ‘wills’ or ‘nills’ – that is, desires or rejects – objects it judges to be good or evil, and directs the actions of the body accordingly.  

Whereas the sensitive soul pertains to material objects, with the aim of pleasing the senses or preserving health, the will relates to immaterial objects, such as those related to truth, virtue or divinity. Since human beings have physical bodies, the will makes use of the sensitive soul and the physical body to carry out its desires. However, due to the disordered nature of postlapsarian humanity and the concept of original sin developed by Augustine, it was thought that reason was usually overcome by sense, as the sensitive faculty

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89 Weemes, Pourtraiture of the Image of God in Man, p. 140.  
90 James, Passion and Action, p. 52; Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, p. 37; Bright, Treatise of Melancholie, p. 81.
rebels against the government of the intellective part of the soul, which was a metonym for humanity’s disobedience to God.\footnote{Dixon, \textit{From Passions to Emotions}, pp. 29-30; Rosenwein, \textit{Generations of Feeling}, p. 28.}

Although none of his works were translated and published in English in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, the thirteenth-century development of Aristotelianism by Thomas Aquinas was a defining feature of early modern passions and affections texts, which adapted and vernacularised Thomist thought for English readers. Within the Aristotelian framework of a tripartite soul, Thomas further subdivided the sensitive part of the soul into ‘concupiscible’ and ‘irascible’ faculties. While the concupiscible faculty, in this view, is either inclined or averse to objects it perceives to be good or evil, the irascible faculty causes more active passions that provide the impetus to attain or avoid those good or evil objects.\footnote{James, \textit{Passion and Action}, pp. 56-7.} Into these two faculties Thomas placed 11 basic \textit{passiones animae} (passions of the soul).\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 57; Dixon, \textit{From Passions to Emotions}, pp. 36, 44; Knuuttila, ‘Emotion’, p. 436; Rosenwein, \textit{Generations of Feeling}, pp. 149-50.} The concupiscible faculty contains six passions centred on love (\textit{amor}) and hate (\textit{odium}). Like the Ciceronian division of the \textit{perturbationes}, these passions are temporally subdivided, with joy (\textit{delectatio}, \textit{gaudium}) or sorrow (\textit{dolor}, \textit{tristitia}) relating to the present, and desire (\textit{desiderium}) or aversion (\textit{fuga}) relating to future objects. Conversely, the five irascible passions are directly related to action and the striving to either attain or avoid the objects that are determined good or evil by the concupiscible faculty. While hope (\textit{spes}) and courage (\textit{audacia}) pertain to the action of attaining positive objects, fear (\textit{timor}), despair (\textit{desperatio}) and anger (\textit{ira}) relate to the avoidance of negative objects.

Early modern passions and affections texts commonly recounted this structure of 11 passions divided between concupiscible and irascible faculties. For instance, the French Jesuit Nicolas Caussin’s \textit{Holy Court}, of which the ‘fourth tome’ was translated by the Roman

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\footnote{James, \textit{Passion and Action}, pp. 56-7.}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 57; Dixon, \textit{From Passions to Emotions}, pp. 36, 44; Knuuttila, ‘Emotion’, p. 436; Rosenwein, \textit{Generations of Feeling}, pp. 149-50.}
Catholic Sir Thomas Hawkins in 1638, noted (without reference to Aquinas) that the ‘Passions ... take their origen from two Appetites’, and outlined the six ‘Concupiscible’ and five ‘Irascible’ passions, although Caussin slightly adapted this Thomist view by adding the passions of ‘Shamefastnesse, Envy, Jealousy, and Compassion’.\(^9^4\) Following Aquinas, the Protestant clergyman Reynolds’ *Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man* (1640) described ‘Love’ and ‘Hatred’ as ‘the two radicall, fundamentall, and most transcendent Passions of all the rest’, by which he meant the 11 Thomist passions.\(^9^5\) The Thomist model was also described in other passions and affections texts.\(^9^6\) The ubiquity of this model was pictorially represented on the frontispiece of the French philosopher Jean-François Senault’s *De l’usage de passions* (1641), translated in 1649 by Henry Carey, second earl of Monmouth. Although this text claimed in Augustinian terms that love was the basic passion from which the others derived, as ‘all the motions which molest our soul are but so many disguised loves’, its frontispiece in Thomist terms depicted ‘Reason’, watched over by ‘Divine Grace’, governing the concupiscible passions of ‘Love’, ‘Hatred’, ‘Joy’, ‘Sorrow’, ‘Desire’ and ‘Eschewing’, as well as the irascible passions of ‘Boldnesse’, ‘Feare’, ‘Hope’, ‘Despaire’ and ‘Choller’.\(^9^7\) Here, then, the entwining of affective concepts was made visible.

The entanglement of affective ontologies was also expressed in other works that echoed Bright’s conceptualisation of ‘simple’ and ‘compound’ passions. Whereas Bright adapted the Ciceronian structure of perturbations, others used the Thomist model. The French theologian Nicolas Coeffeteau’s *Tableau des passions humaines* (1620), translated the

\(^{9^4}\) Nicolas Caussin, *The Holy Court. The Command of Reason over the Passions*, trans. Sir Thomas Hawkins (London, 1638), sig. a5r.


following year by Edward Grimeston, described all other passions as ‘budds and branches’ of the ‘eleaven primitive and generall Passions’ outlined by Aquinas.98 One such primitive passion is ‘Flight’ (or ‘Aversion’), the opposite of ‘Desire’, which becomes ‘griefe’ if its object cannot be avoided.99 Different objects produce different branches of grief: ‘compassion’ is ‘griefe for another mans misfortunes’; grief ‘for another mans prosperity’ is ‘indignation’, ‘envie’ and ‘despight’; and ‘shame’ is ‘griefe for our owne infamy’.100 Similarly, while ‘Desire taken absolutely is a generall Passion, which regards the object of good, without any other limitation’, desire of ‘honor’ becomes ‘ambition’ and a ‘desire of riches’ is ‘covetousnes’.101 That same year, after outlining a Thomist division of ‘affections’, Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy noted that the ‘Simple’ ‘Bad affections – sorrow and fear – compound to form ‘those mixt affections, and passions of anger, which is a desire of revenge, Hatred which is inveterate anger, Zeale which is offended with him which hurts that he loves, and epikairekakia a compound affection of Joy and Hate, when wee rejoyce at other mens mischeife, and are grieved at their prosperitie’ (or, in modern terms, schadenfreude).102 Within the same Thomist framework, the French physician Marin Cureau de La Chambre’s Les caractères des passions (1640), translated into English in 1650, defined ‘Mixt Passions’ as those which combine the concupiscible and irascible faculties.103 For example, ‘Shame is a mixture of Grief and Fear, caused by Infamy’, ‘Impudence proceeds from the Pleasure and Boldness we take in doing of dishonest things’, and ‘Indignation comes from Anger and Grief, that we see Good or Ill happen to those who are unworthy of it’.104 The Huguenot David Papillon’s The Vanity of the Lives and Passions of Men (1651) noted that ‘These eleven generall

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98 Coeffeteau, Table of Humane Passions, trans. Grimeston, sig. a3r, p. 32. Following Aquinas, these 11 primitive passions are ‘Love, Hatred, Desire, Flight, Pleasure, Paine, Feare, Courage, Hope, Despaire and Choller’.
99 Ibid., pp. 32, 34.
100 Ibid., p. 39.
102 Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, p. 38.
103 La Chambre, Characters of the Passions, sig. a5r.
104 Ibid., sig. a4v-a5r.
passions may be multiplied by the limitation of their objects to be as numerous as a swarm of Bees’.

As late as 1708, the Protestant clergyman Francis Bragge’s *Practical Treatise of the Regulation of the Passions* described the qualitatively and temporally divided ‘passions’ of love, hatred, hope, fear, joy, sorrow and anger as ‘the Primitive, or Mother Passions, from whence the rest are deriv’d’ and ‘do spring in all their various Mixtures’.

In the mid-seventeenth century, as James and others have argued, the existing ontologies derived from antiquity and the Middle Ages were explicitly challenged by the philosophers René Descartes and Thomas Hobbes, whose texts are part of the passions and affections corpus. Descartes’ *Les passions de l’âme* (1649), translated into English the following year as *The Passions of the Soule*, began with the bold assertion that ‘There is nothing more clearly evinces the Learning which we receive from the Ancients to be defective, than what they have written concerning the Passions’. In place of the hierarchically divided Aristotelian soul, Descartes instead distinguished between the physical body, where he believed passions originated, and a unitary rational soul, which he described as being passively affected by those passions. Caused by motions of the animal spirits stirred in response to external circumstances, in this view, passions begin in the body, which is understood as a natural mechanism, and are carried through the nerves to the pineal gland in the brain, the point at which the nervous system converges and meets with the soul. These motions then physically move the pineal gland, causing sensory perceptions and passions within the soul. As such, for Descartes the ‘Passions of the Soul’ were

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111 James, *Passion and Action*, p. 92.
‘Apprehensions, resentments, or emotions of the Soul’, caused by ‘some motion of the spirits’. Here the terms ‘apprehensions’ and ‘resentments’ denoted how the soul is passively affected by the material body’s ‘exteriour senses’, while the term ‘emotions’ emphasised the intensity of passions, which distinguished them from other kinds of thoughts in the rational soul: ‘of all the kinds of thoughts’ the soul can have, Descartes claimed, ‘there are none that agitate, and shake it so hard as these Passions doe’. Consequently, both Descartes and his anonymous English translator used ‘emotion’ to describe the physiological actions of the heart and blood that accompany the ‘motions of the spirits’. Once they have affected the soul, according to Descartes, passions manifest physiologically in the quickening of the pulse, weeping, laughing and blushing. Yet, despite these differences, Descartes’ conceptualisation of passions shared much with the Aristotelian perspectives he explicitly repudiated. For instance, in Cartesian thought the will remained the active faculty of the rational soul, using the body’s animal spirits to direct the body to carry out what is willed. Corresponding exactly with Aristotelian understandings of the sensitive faculty of the soul, Descartes similarly defined the purpose of passion as to ‘dispose the Soul to will the things which Nature dictates are profitable to us’. As James has argued, Descartes also retained the Aristotelian distinction between active volitions and passive passions.

Like Descartes, Hobbes also explicitly criticised the philosophy inherited from the classical and medieval past in the mid-seventeenth century. At this time, he discussed the relationship between ‘passions’ and behaviour in two works published a year apart: *Humane Nature* (1650) and *Leviathan* (1651). Subtitled ‘a Discoverie of the Faculties, Acts, and Passions

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112 Descartes, *Passions of the Soule*, p. 23.
of the Soul of Man’, only *Humane Nature* technically belongs to the passions and affections corpus, but Hobbes’ development of his thought on passions in the well-known and controversial *Leviathan*, which was principally a treatise on the state and sovereignty, makes it an important text in the history of emotions.\textsuperscript{119} Hobbes centred his theory of passions, and conceptualisation of the body more widely, on motion. He outlined ‘two sorts of Motions’: ‘Vitall’ motion, or the body’s internal functions; and ‘Animall motion, otherwise called *Voluntary motion*’, by which he means conscious actions that are ‘first fancied in our minds’.\textsuperscript{120} Passions, in this view, are ‘the Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions’, rooted in ‘Desire’ (or ‘Appetite’) towards ‘Good’ or ‘Aversion’ from ‘Evil’.\textsuperscript{121} Desires and aversions are themselves motions within the body, causing either ‘Pleasure’ or ‘Displeasure’ as they reach the heart, where they ‘either help or hinder’ vital motion and bodily wellbeing.\textsuperscript{122} Hobbes termed these ‘small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man’ as ‘Endeavour’, meaning that desire is an ‘endeavour’ towards an object, and aversion an ‘endeavour’ away from an object.\textsuperscript{123} As different forms of desire and aversion, then, passions are internal and material motions within the body which directly cause further external and ‘voluntary’ motions and actions in the world. They occur in sequences beginning with perception and ending with action. However, before this action or voluntary motion can be achieved, there is a complex process of ‘Deliberation’ in the mind, as an ‘alternate Succession’ of ‘Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Fears’ vie for dominance ‘till the thing be either done, or thought impossible’.\textsuperscript{124} For Hobbes, the will is the final passion in the process of deliberation that immediately causes action. Unlike Descartes, then, Hobbes substitutes the Aristotelian view of the will as a

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\textsuperscript{119} Thomas Hobbes, *Humane Nature*: Or, The fundamental Elements of Policie. Being a Discoverie of the Faculties, Acts, and Passions of the Soul of Man, from their original causes; According to such Philosophical Principles as are not commonly known or asserted (London, 1650), title page.


\textsuperscript{121} *Ibid.*


distinct rational ‘faculty’ of the soul with one in which it is simply ‘the Act ... of Willing’, the final passion in a sequence that provided the impetus for action. Therefore, Hobbes jettisoned the soul entirely, viewing passions as internal motions of the body as a whole that subsequently cause external motion. Yet this emphasis on action meant that there were strong continuities between Aristotelian and Hobbesian conceptualisations of passion.

Although they explicitly repudiated pre-existing thought on the passions, Descartes and Hobbes continued to describe similar structures of basic individual passions that become more complex or ‘compounded’ by the circumstances in which they arose and also the temporality of their objects. For example, Cartesian passions begin with ‘six chief, or Primitive’ passions – ‘Admiration, Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy, and Sadnesse’ – which occur in temporal sequences beginning with admiration, defined as ‘a sudden surprize of the Soul’ and denoting a change in circumstances, which is then the active passion of desire, before ending in either joy or sadness. Then, from these primitive passions, all others are ‘compounded’. Compound passions include ‘Hope, Fear, Jealousie, Security and Despaire’, which relate to the ease or difficulty of attaining or avoiding objects, and ‘Irresolution’, ‘Courage’, ‘Boldnesse’, ‘Cowardice’, ‘Scaring’ and ‘Affright’, which concern the ‘meanes’ of attaining or avoiding objects. As such, these passions fulfil the same function as the Thomist irascible passions. Hobbes similarly described seven ‘simple Passions’ – ‘Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and Griefe’ which compound according to their ‘divers considerations’ and objects. For Hobbes, the combination of these simple passions with their objects, both good and evil, produced different passions. For instance, the desire for knowledge is ‘Curiosity’, while ‘Benevolence’, ‘Good Will’ and ‘Charity’ are desires for the

125 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 28.
126 Descartes, Passions of the Soule, p. 45.
127 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
128 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 25.
good of others.\textsuperscript{129} Conversely, the desire of ‘Riches’ and ‘Office’ or ‘precedence’ is
‘Covetousnesse’ and ‘Ambition’ respectively, while ‘Revengefulnesse’ is the desire to hurt
another.\textsuperscript{130} Therefore, for Hobbes the quality and morality of individual passions depended
on the wider circumstances, and all related directly to action and social practice.

This section has outlined the coexisting Christian, Aristotelian, Stoic, Galenic,
Cartesian and Hobbesian ontologies by which passions and affections were understood in
medical, religious and philosophical texts in the early modern period. In each view, passions
and affections were defined by their objects in the natural, religious and social worlds. They
were understood to be perceptions or judgements relating to the senses and the preservation
of health, and the cause of involuntary physical expression in weeping, blushing and a variety
of other corporeal effects. These ontologies also shared views that passions and affections
could be misjudged, misdirected and uncontrolled, with deleterious effects to the health of
soul, body and social status. Only Hobbes, who blurred distinctions between thoughts,
passions and the ‘voluntary motions’ they cause, excluded the soul entirely. While the
dominance of Aristotelianism was challenged in the mid-seventeenth century by Descartes
and Hobbes, historians have also stressed the continuities between these different
philosophies.\textsuperscript{131} This continuity is evident in the passions and affections texts studied in this
chapter. Individual passions continued to be defined by their circumstances, and temporality
was built into different understandings of passions.

By focusing on the passions and affections corpus printed in the later seventeenth
century, rather than asking whether or not Cartesian and Hobbesian thought heralded a
paradigm shift away from Aristotelian philosophy, this section has shown that older ideas of
passions and affections remained relevant into the eighteenth century. The physician and

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., p. 26.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
natural philosopher Walter Charleton’s *Natural History of the Passions* (1674) criticised Descartes’ conceptualisation of a unitary soul located in the pineal gland because it was incompatible with conventional distinctions between ‘Rational’ and ‘Sensitive’ parts of the soul.\(^{132}\) Similarly, in 1700 William Ayloffe’s *Government of the Passions* could still conventionally describe ‘Passions’ as ‘motions of the inferiour part of the Soul’, which should be brought ‘under the Government of Reason: and by the assistance of Grace happily transmute them into so many Virtues’.\(^{133}\) Much like Senault half a century earlier, while Ayloffe espoused the Augustinian view that ‘Love is the only Passion which agitates us’, with positive and negative feelings being caused by present or absent loves, he still demonstrated the synthesising nature of the passions and affections corpus by using the 11 Thomist passions in order to structure his discussion.\(^{134}\) Depending on the context, then, different views could be drawn on and assimilated, and the appearance of new thinking did not immediate erase the old. Despite conceptual differences, passions were universally understood as causes of action.

**Passion and Action**

As was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, James has argued that seventeenth-century philosophers defined affective life in terms of passivity and activity. Put simply, she argues that, across these different views, passions began as passive perceptions of external objects, which in turn cause action. Building on James’ convincing argument, this section uses the passions and affections corpus in order to outline how different early modern philosophies described the relationship between passion and action. It will then outline a theory of practice.

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\(^{132}\) Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions*, sig. A7v-bb3r.


by which early modern people themselves conceptualised the relationship between passions and social practice. This theory consists of three main factors. Firstly, as was shown in the previous section, affections writers determined the type or quality of particular passions and affections according to their objects, where ‘simple’ passions also ‘compounded’ with the circumstances in which they arose to form ‘mixed’ or ‘compound’ passions. In other words, the type of passion or affection was defined by the context in which it arose. Secondly, passions and affections writers focused on the intensity of feelings, and in this context linked the management of feeling to notions of virtue and vice. Thirdly, the quality and intensity of passions were deemed appropriate or inappropriate depending on the social context. As will be shown, specific social contexts, depending on the relationships between different sorts of hierarchically differentiated people, required different types of feeling and different levels of intensity. This will ultimately form the basis for understanding the relationship between passion and action, and will form the interpretive framework for viewing social practice in the remainder of the thesis.

In passions and affections texts, passions were not only described as feelings but also as the cause of actions. For instance, Burton’s *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621) directly invoked this Aristotelian conceptualisation of passion and action. Burton situated ‘passions’, ‘affections’ and ‘perturbations’ in the ‘moving faculty’ of the ‘sensitive soul’, which is subdivided into the ‘appetite’ and the ‘faculty’ of ‘Mooving from place to place’. Since Burton claimed that it would be ‘in vaine … to desire and to abhorre, if we had not likewise power to prosecute or eschewe, by mooving the body from place to place’, he directly linked passion and action. However, Burton described how original sin had disordered this divinely ordained affective system. Instead, the heart – the ‘seate of our affections’ –

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136 Ibid., p. 38.
‘captivates and enforceth our will’, causing us to reject God and embrace the ‘Devill’, who tempts ‘our depraved will to some ill-disposed action, to precipitate us to destruction’.\textsuperscript{137} In short, ‘Reason is over-borne by Passion’.\textsuperscript{138} We are led by sensual appetite, ‘headstrong Passions’ and ‘violent perturbations of the Minde’, which cause both physiological ‘Diseases’, as well as ‘vitiuous Habits’ and ‘customs’, by which Burton meant vicious and sinful actions.\textsuperscript{139}

Following Burton’s active conceptualisation of passion, which stressed both the motivating force of feeling and the dangers of the action that feeling caused, Fenner’s religious \textit{Treatise of the Affections} (1650) described affections as ‘the Souls horses, that draw her as it were in a Coach to the thing that she affects’.\textsuperscript{140} As such, ‘a man is moved by his affections. By \textit{Anger} he moves out to revenge: by \textit{Desire} he moves out to obtain: by \textit{Love} he moves out to enjoy: by \textit{Pity} he moves out to relieve’.\textsuperscript{141} In almost identical terms, La Chambre’s \textit{Characters of the Passions} (1650) claimed that ‘the essence of human actions consists in the inward emotion which the object forms in the appetite; and that all those things which are done in pursuance thereof, are but as rivolets running from the same spring’.\textsuperscript{142} Anglicised from the French ‘\textit{esmotion}’, here ‘emotion’ denoted the interior motions of the soul, which proceed outwards and cause action: ‘anger is nothing but a desire of Vengeance; and in the pursuit of that emotion, the soul produceth exterior actions, which may serve to this purpose; as threatenings, blows, and other violences’.\textsuperscript{143} Similarly, the French conduct writer Antoine de Courtin’s \textit{Treatise of Jealousie} (1684) also termed ‘passions’ the ‘very principles’ – or foundations – ‘of all our actions, in such manner, that what is internally

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 43-4.
\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{140} Fenner, \textit{Treatise of the Affections}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{142} La Chambre, \textit{Characters of the Passions}, p. 4
\textsuperscript{143} Marin Cureau de La Chambre, \textit{Les characteres des passions} (Paris, 1640), p. 6; La Chambre, \textit{Characters of the Passions}, pp. 4-5.
a passion, is externally an action most commonly’. Following Aristotle, Courtin stated that ‘the use of Passions … consists in the disposing and exciting the Soul to Will the things, which the dictates of Nature pronounce to be convenient … and to produce the Action necessary, for the acquiring the good we propose to our selves … or the avoiding of an Evil’.

Importantly, as James has also argued, notions of passion and action persisted in the Cartesian and Hobbesian theories that challenged the Aristotelian orthodoxy in the seventeenth century, although they were conceptualised in different ways. For instance, Descartes claimed that ‘the principall effect of all the Passions in men is, they incite, and dispose their Souls to will the things for which they prepare their Bodies: so that the resentment of fear incites him to be willing to fly; that of boldnesse, to be willing to fight, and so of the rest’. In this view, which could also describe Aristotelian affective understandings, passions stir the will to actions that please the sense or preserve bodily health, although the will should simultaneously ‘restrain’ intense passions, lest they pervert or misdirect it. Similarly, as has already been shown, Hobbes termed passions the ‘interior beginnings of voluntary motions’, meaning that they were the inward motions that precede outward action.

Yet while Descartes saw the will as the means to moderate passion, for Hobbes – writing after years of civil war – the entwining of passion and action meant that the internal motions of the physical body had potentially grave effects for the body politic as a whole. Outlining this politicised view of passion in his Leviathan (1651), Hobbes posited that the role of a ‘Common-wealth’ (‘or State’) was to pacify the ‘condition of Warre’ that defines the state of nature, in which individual human beings are subject to no authority other than their

145 Ibid., p. 10.
146 James, Passion and Action, pp. 65-81.
147 Descartes, Passions of the Soule, p. 33.
148 Ibid., p. 38.
‘naturall Passions’. Since these unrestrained natural passions inevitably lead to the vices of ‘Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like’, which are antithetical an ordered society, a strong political authority is needed to instil the ‘awe’ and ‘feare of punishment’ that impels people to restrain their passions and conform themselves to the ‘Lawes of Nature’, by which Hobbes meant the virtues of ‘Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy’ and the golden rule of ‘doing to others, as wee would be done to’. Encompassing society as a whole as well as the arms and institutions of the state, the titular ‘Leviathan’ therefore manifests not only as a political authority, but also as the source of the restraint of the passions and the cultivation of virtues, on which communal life is based. Therefore, while Aristotelian, Stoic, Galenic, Christian and even Cartesian ontologies all viewed reason as the (admittedly flawed) means to manage and moderate passion, for Hobbes this could only be achieved by an external authority.

Having shown how passions and affections writers linked passion to action in general, the rest of this section identifies and outlines the particular model by which passion was thought to provide the impetus for action and how it related to social practice and the performance of social roles. Firstly, the type or quality of a specific passion was determined by its context. For the most part, as has been shown, passions and affections writers outlined a limited number of basic or ‘simple’ passions, which formed ‘mixed’ or ‘compound’ passions depending on the circumstances or objects they were directed towards. By their type or quality, these passions were judged to be appropriate or inappropriate within certain social contexts. For instance, Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations distinguished between four basic perturbations and more specific ‘sorts’ of perturbations, depending on the context. In Wase’s 1683 translation, these contextualised feelings were termed ‘subordinate Passions’. Despite Cicero’s negative Stoic view of passions as selfish misjudgements, some were inherently

149 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 85, 1.
150 Ibid., p. 85.
better than others. Depending on its object, for instance, the passion of ‘Emulation’ had both a ‘good’ and a ‘bad Sense’.152 When emulation denoted the ‘imitation of Virtue’, it was ‘praiseworthy’, but it was also more negatively a subordinate form of the basic passion of ‘Discontent’, defined as coveting something possessed by another.153 Similarly, Papillon’s *Vanity of the Lives and Passions of Men* (1651) described hatred as ‘the projector of all the horrid actions of men’, particularly the hatred, envy, ‘spleen’, ‘malice’ and ‘desire of Vengeance’ that provoke murder, war and ‘impiety’.154 However, Papillon contrasted this worldly hatred with the positive Christian hatred of sin, which ‘should be the onely object of mens hatred’ and is ‘a strong motive to the propagations of a godly life’.155

Secondly, early modern writers focused on the strength or intensity of specific passions and affections. For example, the Mancunian royalist Nicholas Mosley’s *Psychosophia: or, Natural & Divine Contemplations of the Passions & Faculties of the Soul of Man* (1653) claimed that, while the inherent qualities of some ‘affections’ make them ‘virtuous and godly in themselves’, such as love, pity, joy and charity, or inherently ‘diabolical’, such as envy, wrath and malice, other affections are only good or evil depending on the intensity and context of their expression.156 For example, ‘in its first motions and natural inclination’, anger is ‘neither good nor evil’, but only becomes so ‘according to the circumstances of time, and adjuncts of manner, and measure’.157 To be angry either without ‘just cause’ or out of ‘measure’, Mosley claimed, is wrong, such as ‘when our anger exceeds the value of the cause or the proportion of other circumstances and adjuncts’158 In other words, the context and manner in which an affection is expressed was just as important as its type or quality. In a religious

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152 Ibid., p. 221.
153 Ibid.
155 Ibid., p. 129.
156 Mosley, *Psychosophia*, p. 103.
157 Ibid., p. 105.
158 Ibid.
context, Preston’s *Sins Overthrow* (1633) similarly combined the qualities of particular affections – noting that ‘the objects must be good, else the affection is inordinate’ – with the intensity of their expression: ‘though the object bee right, and the end right, yet if they exceed the measure, the affection is not good’.\(^{159}\) Inordinate affections, for instance, ‘produce evill actions, which ordinarily they doe, when they exceede the measure and the manner’.\(^{160}\) Likewise, in his *Inquiry Concerning Virtue* (1699), Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury, noted that passions such as ‘Rage’ and ‘Revengefulness’ in themselves ‘constitute an ill Creature’, even seemingly virtuous and ‘rightly plac’d’ passions such as ‘Kindness and Love’ become ‘vitous’ if they are ‘immoderate and beyond a certain degree’.\(^{161}\) At the same time, ‘not to have it at all, or not to have it *to a certain degree*, is a Vice in the Temper’, as is the ‘double Vice’ of transferring a proper passion to an ‘improper’ object, such as ‘when a fantastical Woman is fonder of a Toy, or of some tame Animal, than of her Child’.\(^{162}\) Therefore, the propriety of an individual’s passions and affections also related to their intensity and strength as much as their inherent nature and quality.

Notions of appropriate and inappropriate intensity meant that passions were directly related to virtue, vice and the management of those passions. In Aristotelian thought, virtue served to modulate the intensity of affective expression in order to direct those passions to virtuous ends. For instance, Coeffeteau’s *Table of Humane Passions* (1621) claimed that ‘*vertue* does not mean ‘to roote all naturall Passions out of the soule, but to moderate and governe them by the rule of reason’.\(^{163}\) After outlining the Thomist structure of 11 basic passions, the Scottish clergyman Weemes’ *Pourtraiture of the Image of God in Man* (1627) added that ‘There are eleven *morrall vertues*, that cure these passions ... when they are either

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\(^{159}\) Preston, *Sins Overthrow*, p. 217.

\(^{160}\) Ibid., p. 219.


\(^{162}\) Ibid.

in excess or defect, by drawing them to a mediocritie’, by which he meant an ideal moderate expression.\textsuperscript{164} These 11 virtues were ‘Liberalitie, Temperance, Magnificence, Magnanimitie, Modesty, Fortitude, Justice, meeknes, affability, urbanity or Courtesie, & Verietie [verity]’, which entwined the management of passions with the ‘courteous’, ‘affable’ and ‘urbane’ behavioural norms by which a persons could appropriately behave in social life (see Chapter 3).\textsuperscript{165} Yet Weemes also argued that the only way to attain these moral virtues was through divine grace. Also describing the interplay between passion and virtue, La Chambre’s \textit{Discourse upon the Passions} (1661) described passions and virtues as interconnected ‘motions’: while passion is ‘a motion of the Soul’, virtue is ‘nothing but a regulated motion, and a Passion moderated by Reason’.\textsuperscript{166} Therefore, to adapt early modern terminology, virtues and vices can be seen to ‘compound’ with and modulate the passions in the service of appropriate social behaviour.

Thirdly, passions and affections texts showed that the expression of passions had to be appropriate for the different social contexts and interpersonal relationships in which people found themselves. For example, Reynolds’ \textit{Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man} (1640) noted that passions could be discussed in terms of ‘Naturall’, ‘Morall’ and ‘Civill’ philosophy.\textsuperscript{167} Natural philosophy, for instance, focused on ‘their essentiell Properties, their Ebbes and Flowes, their Springings and Decayes, the manner of their severall Impressions, the Physicall Effects which are wrought by them’.\textsuperscript{168} Moral philosophy discussed ‘how the indifferencie of them is altered into Good and Evill, by vertue of the Dominion of right Reason, or of the violence of their own motions’, and ‘how they are raiyed, suppressed,

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{164} Weemes, \textit{Pourtraiture of the Image of God in Man}, pp. 167-8, 178.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Ibid., p. 178.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Marin Cureau de La Chambre, \textit{A Discourse upon the Passions. In Two Parts}, trans. R. W. (London, 1661), sig. A3v-A4r.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Reynolds, \textit{Treatise of the Passions}, p. 41.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
slackned, and govern’d’. Lastly, civil philosophy highlighted how passions ‘may be severally wrought upon and impressed; and how, and on what occasions, it is fit to gather and fortifie, or to slack and remit them; how to discover, or suppress, or nourish, or alter, or mix them, as may be most advantagious; what use may be made of each mans particular Age, Nature, Propension; how to advance and promote our just ends, upon the observation of the Character and disposition of these, whom we are to deale withall’. In this ‘civil’ context, then, the propriety or impropriety of passionate expression was determined by the ‘circumstances of Time, Place, Person, Occasion’. In other words, certain passions could be expressed in different ways depending on the social context, which could include the spatial or institutional setting or the relative age, role and social differentiation between people. This meant the management and expression of feeling, as well as the judgement of other people’s feelings, were not only understood to be central to social life, but also seen in instrumental terms as necessary skills to achieve different goals. Therefore, early modern people were conscious of the need to understand the social contexts and relationships in which they found themselves, and so different passions and intensities of feelings were appropriate in different circumstances.

Based on the inherent contextuality of appropriate affective expression, the Roman Catholic priest Thomas Wright’s *Passions of the Minde* (1601) not only discussed the natural properties of passions, but also gave practical advice about ‘how to behave our selves when such affections extraordinarily possesse us, the which is the chiefest poynt of prudence, and fittest meane to attaine unto religious, civil, & gentlemanlike conversation’. Discussing the relationship between passion and prudence, Wright gave practical advice both on the management of one’s own passions in order to achieve social benefits, as well as what he

169 Ibid.
170 Ibid., pp. 41-2.
171 Ibid., p. 51.
termed ‘pollicie’: how to behave profitably when navigating the passions of other people, especially social superiors.\textsuperscript{173} For Wright, the prudent management of passion meant not to act when we are ‘mooved with a vehement passion’, which ‘corrupteth the judgement, and perverteth the will’.\textsuperscript{174} In other words, prudence entailed breaking the link between passion and action. Also vital, in Wright’s view, was the ability ‘to conceale, as much as thou canst, thy inclinations, or that passion thou knowest thy selfe most prone to follow’.\textsuperscript{175} A reputation for ‘inordinate passion’, he claimed, undoes ‘a grave mans credite, a great mans authoritie, and a civile mans good conversation’, and all should avoid ‘the infamie of a passionate person’.\textsuperscript{176} In terms of ‘policy’ – the profitable navigation of other people’s passions – since people are naturally ‘pleased’ with those who are subject to the same passions, Wright advised that ‘if thou wilt please thy master or friend, thou must apparell thy selfe with his affections, and love where hee loveth, and hate where hee hateth’.\textsuperscript{177} While Wright conceded that this putting on of affection is an example of ‘flatterie’, he posited that ‘if it be well used’ it becomes an act of ‘charitie’, the passion that binds society together.\textsuperscript{178}

Similarly, when navigating the passions of others, Wright advised that when someone is ‘possessed of a vehement passion’, it is not politic to respond with ‘reprehension or indignation’, but the reader should rather adopt ‘a milde and soft maner of perswasion’.\textsuperscript{179} Yet Wright’s advice was not universal but socially differentiated. While mildness was appropriate for dealing with ‘equalles’, if a ‘superior’ or a ‘magistrate’ sees an ‘inferior’ or ‘subject’ to be ‘vehemently caried in any passion’, he should ‘threaten’ and ‘reprehend’ him.\textsuperscript{180} This act of government enables one passion to cure another: ‘so here the passion of

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., sig. K3r.  
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., sig. K4v.  
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., sig. K4v, K6v.  
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., sig. L2v.  
\textsuperscript{179} Wright, \textit{Passions of the Minde}, sig. L5r.  
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., sig. L5v.
feare may expell the passion of anger, lust, or what else soever tempteth, eyther to the passions evil, or any disorder in the common-weale’. Therefore, for Wright the interaction of virtue and passion was fundamental to successful social practice. The management of a person’s feeling was linked to their social status, ‘credit’ and ability to attain the ideal of ‘civil conversation’, in which ‘passions are moderate, and behaviour circumspect’. Yet ideal behaviour also had to be fitted to the social context. While gentleness should be shown to equals, the forcible restraint of the passions of inferiors was required to preserve the social and political order. If social inferiors cannot govern themselves, Wright argued, they must be governed by their superiors in the service of the common good and orderly hierarchical relationships.

Also demonstrating this link between the objects, intensity and appropriate social contexts of affective expression was the puritan clergyman John Downname’s *Spiritual Physicke* (1600), a religious text that aimed to cure ‘disease of the soule’ of ‘unjust anger’. In its nature, Downname averred, anger was neither good nor bad, but only became so depending on its ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ causes: ‘as the perturbation of the minde which is moved uppon unjust causes is also unjust and evill, so that which caused upon just & necessarie occasions is just and commendable’. Demonstrating the inherent link between passion and appropriate action, Downname claimed that anger could be unjust in three key ways. Firstly, the justification of anger depended on its object, such as when it is ‘stirred up in us by unjust causes’, based in ‘selfe love’, ‘covetousnesse’ or ‘pride and arrogancie of spirit’, rather than the legitimate causes of ‘the glory of God’ or ‘the good of our selves or our brethren’.

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181 Ibid., sig. L5v-L6r.
182 Ibid., sig. B6r.
183 John Downname, *Spiritual physicke to cure the diseases of the soule, arising from superfluitie of choler, prescribed out of Gods word*. Wherein the chollerick man may see the dangerousnesse of this disease of the soule vnjust anger, the preseruatiues to keepe him from the infection thereof, and also fit medicines to restore him to healthy beeing alreadie subiect to this raging passion (London, 1600), title page.
184 Ibid., f. 6r.
185 Ibid., ff. 24v, 25r, 27v, 26v.
Secondly, intensity and a lack of ‘moderation’ made anger unjust.\textsuperscript{186} Expressed in a ‘violent’ and ‘immoderate maner’, for instance, anger devolves into ‘wrath’ or ‘furie’, which Downame defined as ‘unjust and inveterate anger’.\textsuperscript{187} Thirdly, anger could be unjust due to the actions it motivates. For Downame, anger was a ‘desire of revenge’, expressed by ‘words’ or ‘deeds’, and unjust anger was therefore a ‘wrongfull’ and ‘unreasonable desire of revenge’.\textsuperscript{188} Relating it to action, Downame then noted that ‘unjust anger is ‘the chiefe meanes and cause which moveth men’ to ‘murther’.\textsuperscript{189} Due to humanity’s ‘corruption’ and original sin, ‘your just Anger may easily degenerate and become unjust, if due time, place, person, and other circumstances be not observed’.\textsuperscript{190}

As such, by referencing these social ‘circumstances’, Downame linked expressions of anger to social status and office, noting that ‘in our anger there be observed a fit decorum, and due respect, and that both in regarde of the partie himselfe, who is provoked to Anger, and also the other with whome hee is angrie’.\textsuperscript{191} The person who is angry, Downame stressed, ‘is not to behave himselfe alike in what place and calling soever he be’, but rather must tailor this to his status and role.\textsuperscript{192} For example, focusing on superiors, Downame noted that a ‘magistrate’ ought ‘to shew his anger not onely in countenaunce and woorde, but also in action’, while a father should not ‘shewe his displeasure towards his rebellious sonnes onely by milde admonition, but also by discreete correction’.\textsuperscript{193} As such, the anger of superiors towards their subordinates should be forcibly expressed in words and actions, whether sitting in judgement or violently chastising disobedient children. Here a ‘mild’ lack of intensity was worse than active ‘correction’. By contrast, describing the socially differentiated anger of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., f. 24v.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., ff. 24v-25r, 8v.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., ff. 24v-25r.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., f. 21v.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., f. 8v.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., f. 16r.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., f. 16r-v.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., f. 16v.
\end{flushleft}
subordinates, Downame claimed that a ‘private man’ may only ‘manifest his anger in woord or countenance’, for it is ‘unlawfull for him to proceede any further unlesse his calling warrant him thereunto’. More particularly, ‘a mean private man is not to shewe his anger in the same maner to a noble man or a magistrate as he would to his equall or inferior, for though he may justly be angry with his sinne, yet he is to reverence his place and calling’. Similarly, the ‘sonne must not shewe his anger towards his father as the father sheweth his towards his sonne, for he is bound to feare and reverence his person though he justly hate his sinne’. Therefore, the appropriate expression of anger was socially differentiated and bound up with different social roles. For Downname, as for other passions and affections writers, affective expression was proper or improper not only in terms of the object or intensity of a particular passion, but also in terms of the relative social roles and status of those expressing and those with whom they were in company.

CONCLUSION

Building on James’ Passion and Action, this chapter has explored how passion and action were entwined in different Christian, Aristotelian, Stoic, Galenic, Cartesian and Hobbesian conceptualisations of the nature and management of passions and affections. In order to do so, it has first identified a corpus of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ texts, based not only on the appearance of the typologies of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ on their title pages, but also on their qualitative similarities as discourses of the nature, moral worth and appropriate expression of passions and affections. Using this corpus of texts, this chapter has explored the similarities and differences of these coexisting ontologies. While some writers stressed

194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
the corporeality of passions, others emphasised their spiritual origins and subsequent physiological effects, or even viewed them in entirely immaterial terms. Passions were also diversely viewed as useful tools, if properly moderated, and an inherent part of life, or rather as something negative to be extinguished entirely. However, all writers viewed passions both as passive responses to external or internal phenomena, and the cause or impetus for subsequent action or behaviour. Although the pre-existing ontologies, inherited from ancient and medieval thought, were explicitly challenged by Descartes and Hobbes, this chapter has stressed the continuities between these seemingly opposed ontologies, and has shown that, from the perspective of action, Cartesian and Hobbesian thought had little impact on the passions and affections texts published in their wake. This continuity either demonstrated the persistence of conventional Aristotelian thought, or was perhaps a product of the genre conventions of passions and affections texts, which consisted of similar discussions of the nature and utility of passions along broadly Aristotelian lines.

From this basis, this chapter has identified and outlined the implicit theory of practice by which early modern writers discussed the quality, intensity and social consequences of passions. This sense of practice consisted of three main factors. Firstly, the quality of passions was determined by the context in which they arose. A delimited number of ‘simple’ passions – four for Cicero, 11 for Aquinas, six for Descartes and seven for Hobbes – formed ‘compound’ passions depending on the wider circumstances. These passions were thought to be virtuous, vicious or neutral in their inherent qualities. Secondly, passions were also judged in terms of their strength and intensity. Overwhelmingly, the ideal was for moderation, a middle way between a lack of feeling and strong, unrestrained passion. Thirdly, despite this general moderate ideal, judgements about the propriety or impropriety of passions and affections also depended on the wider social, spatial and institutional contexts in which they were felt and expressed. Expressions of passions and affections were judged
and governed according to the same norms of time, place and audience as other forms of early modern social practice. In a sense, passions can therefore be seen to ‘compound’ with behavioural norms and concepts, such as civility, by which appropriate social behaviour was ideally directed.

As such, this thesis will use this theoretical framework outlined in passions and affection texts in order to analyse how early modern people related passions to social practice in a variety of didactic and depositional sources. Focusing on the nature, intensity and social implications of affective expression both foregrounds the importance of feelings to social practice, and allows for historicist analysis of feeling and action in terms that would be recognisable to early modern people themselves. Therefore, as well as forming the theoretical basis of the rest of this thesis, the understanding of the social dynamics of the link between passion and action will also enable early modern social and cultural historians more generally to read and understand in historicist terms how people at the time directly related passion to social practice.
CHAPTER 3
PASSION AND PRESCRIPTION

In early modern England a vast swathe of conduct literature offered readers moral and practical instruction as a means of self-improvement and social advancement. Also known as ‘advice’, ‘counsel’, ‘instructions’ or ‘precepts’, these texts encompassed learned philosophical treatises, guides for local officeholders and parental and household advice. As Kate Loveman has argued, early modern people saw this panoply of texts as a single genre of ‘manuals: works of practical knowledge that taught important skills’. As texts that explicitly attempted to outline and inculcate ideal behaviour, conduct books are an obvious source for the history of emotions. As such, this chapter demonstrates how early modern conduct writers saw the performance of men and women’s roles and offices as fundamentally related to the appropriate expression of passions and affections. In order to do so, it focuses on four genres of advice literature, including learned humanist treatises, parental advice, guides for household management and officeholders’ manuals, which show how contemporary writers believed passions should be expressed or repressed in different social, spatial and institutional circumstances, and as part of the performance of men and women’s social roles.

Historians of emotion have made much use of conduct literature. In the 1980s, as has already been described, Stearns and Stearns used eighteenth- to twentieth-century American marital and childrearing manuals to develop their concept of ‘emotionology’, or the prevailing ‘attitudes’ and ‘standards’ of ‘appropriate’ emotional expression, and how institutions and society ‘reflect’ and ‘encourage’ these standards. However, they saw emotional restraint and its encouragement in texts as uniquely modern developments, in

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contrast to unrestrained ‘premodern’ emotions.\textsuperscript{3} Going back further, in the 1930s the German sociologist Norbert Elias based his concept of the ‘civilizing process’ on his study of early modern conduct literature. Tracing changing behavioural prescriptions in European conduct literature between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries, on subjects such as table manners and the public display of bodily functions, Elias argued that the childlike, ‘violent’ and ‘direct’ emotional expression of the Middle Ages was replaced in early modernity by emotional ‘restraint’ and increasing ‘feelings of displeasure, distaste, disgust, fear or shame’ at previously accepted forms of behaviour.\textsuperscript{4} In other words, for Elias emotional control was both the cause and effect of modernisation, and conduct books are useful sources in which changing emotional norms can be charted. However, Elias treated the historically shifting norms in conduct literature as descriptions of actual behaviour and, like Stearns and Stearns, has been criticised for having a caricatured view of medieval emotions that is dismissive of ‘premodern’ change in emotional norms.\textsuperscript{5} Similarly, Pollock has criticised Elias for ‘erroneously equat[ing] repression with civility’, and instead argues that emotional expression was highly contextualised, with greater or lesser restraint being appropriate in different social contexts.\textsuperscript{6} In short, critics of Elias suggest that both his narrative of emotional change over time and his reading of early modern conduct literature is simplistic and uncontextualised.

Outside the context of emotions historiography, historians have used conduct books as sources of the normative codes, particularly relating to gender and civility, that underlay early modern society. For example, using household advice texts, Susan Amussen has argued that the household, which was ideally structured by hierarchical relationships between husbands and wives, parents and children, and masters and servants, was conventionally

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\textsuperscript{3} Rosenwein, ‘Worrying about Emotions in History’, pp. 823-6.
\textsuperscript{5} Bryson, \textit{From Courtesy to Civility}, pp. 10-11; Rosenwein, \textit{Emotional Communities}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{6} Pollock, ‘Anger’, p. 568.
\end{footnotesize}
understood to be the basis for social order, religious duty and personal fulfilment. Studying this same literature, Laura Gowing has related prescription to social practice, arguing that the normative codes of women’s obedience found in conduct literature provided powerful ‘scripts’ that shaped behaviour and provided the framework through which it was evaluated, particularly in judicial contexts. Similarly, Alexandra Shepard has shown how household guides and fatherly advice texts ‘sought to define manhood in broadly patriarchal terms of discretion, reason, moderation, self-sufficiency, strength, self-control, and honest respectability’. Yet Shepard argues that the connections between the precepts in conduct literature and social practice were not absolute. For instance, while violence demonstrated the loss of self-mastery by which patriarchal authority was normatively justified, in practice that authority was also established and expressed in violence. Therefore, historians have principally used early modern conduct literature to outline normative prescriptions for social relationships and behaviour, which they have then used to ask whether social practice conformed with or deviated from these ideals. While they have shown the importance of self-restraint in conduct literature, historians have not centred their studies on the normative discussions of emotion, their relationship to different social roles and offices, nor how they changed over time.

Conduct literature has also provided historians with sources in which to study the core early modern behavioural ideal of civility. Using these sources, Anna Bryson has outlined a conceptual shift in normative codes of behaviour from medieval ‘courtesy’ to early modern ‘civility’ in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Whereas courtesy, she argues, was externally focused on good manners and obedience to superiors, the more

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10 Ibid., p. 16.
11 Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility.
‘psychological’ concept of civility saw external behaviour as a ‘representation’ of a person’s inner self, and good manners consisted of ‘accommodating’ or ‘framing’ oneself to be ‘pleasing’ to other people in a variety of social contexts.¹² As such, while Bryson has criticised Elias’ simplistic readings of conduct literature as accounts of actual behaviour, she still followed his developmental narrative of a shift from the external propriety of medieval courtesy to the internalisation of appropriate behaviour in civility. While she has also argued that civility and conduct literature were restricted to the social elite, Withington and Jennifer Richards have shown that conduct books and the standards of civility they propagated were both diffused and appropriated by men and women throughout the social hierarchy.¹³ Linking conduct literature to wider social practice, Richards argues that the dialogue format of ‘courtesy literature’ – particularly in Italian works such as Baldassare Castiglione’s Il cortegiano (1528), translated into English as the Courtyer in 1561 – provided sixteenth-century English Protestant humanists with a model for ‘civil conversation’ that would reform religious and political debate, individual people’s manners and society as a whole.¹⁴ Richards argues that this new mode of civil conversation was rooted in the Ciceronian concept of ‘honestas’, which encompassed discretion, self-restraint and social astuteness, and theoretically provided a structure allowing all, regardless of social status or gender, to speak and peacefully negotiate conflicting interests – although naturally reality did not always conform to this ideal.¹⁵ Shifting the focus to the seventeenth century, Withington also argues that ‘conduct books ... were crucial in propagating the ideals of honestas’, not only to the social elite, but also to women and urban tradesmen.¹⁶ However, whereas Richards argues that literature informed social practice, Withington stresses how the normative ideals of

¹² Ibid., pp. 110-11.
¹⁴ Richards, Rhetoric and Courtliness, p. 2.
¹⁵ Ibid., p. 42.
civility and *honestas* were also learned and practised in ‘company’, revealing the symbiosis of social practice and humanist literature.\(^{17}\)

However, just as Rosenwein criticised Elias’ deprecation of emotional expression in the Middle Ages, John Gillingham has argued that neither civility nor advice literature were early modern innovations.\(^{18}\) Firstly, he notes that civility, in its Latin form *civilitas*, sat alongside other medieval behavioural ideals, such as ‘courtesy’, ‘urbanity’ and ‘gentility’, which also focused on the ideal of accommodating behaviour to the feelings of others.\(^{19}\) Secondly, since both advised on table manners, the performance of household and administrative roles, and the management of ‘emotions’, Gillingham has stressed the continuities between twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin and French ‘courtesy literature’ and early modern conduct literature.\(^{20}\) The only change, for Gillingham, in the early modern period was the vernacularisation of pre-existing ideals, as English learned culture shifted from Latin to English. However, this chapter argues that it was precisely this process of vernacularisation that led to the social dissemination of civility in conduct literature in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Entwined technological, educational and ideological developments, such as the ‘print revolution’, increases in literacy and the spread of Renaissance humanism, which aimed to improve society through the recovery and appropriation of classical knowledge and behavioural ideals, meant that increasing numbers of texts could be read by ever greater numbers of people from a variety of social backgrounds.\(^{21}\) While, as Gillingham argues, the rules of civility long antedated early modernity, it was during this period that they became the foundation for the identity, social

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\(^{17}\) Withington, *Society*, p. 175.


\(^{19}\) Ibid., pp. 277, 281-3.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., pp. 272-8.

status and social practice of large swathes of people, for whom civility was the framework by which behaviour was directed and evaluated.

As Rosenwein has argued, an ‘emotional community’, or a group of people sharing common views about the nature and appropriate expression of emotion, can be a ‘textual community’ as well as a ‘social community’, meaning that texts play a key role in propagating the ‘fundamental assumptions, values, goals, feeling rules, and accepted modes of expression’ of a particular emotional community. As such, early modern conduct literature can be seen as a tool for the self-conscious formation of an emotional community based on the inherited and reinvigorated concepts of honestas and civility, which historians have shown entailed the restraint of feeling in order to tailor outward behaviour according to the circumstances of time, place and audience. Also, as Pollock and Loveman have argued, the epigrammatic reading culture of early modern England focused on ‘text particles’, which were memorised, recited and re-enacted in social practice. Consequently, reading and social practice were inextricably bound together. While this does not mean, as Elias seemed to believe, that conduct books were accounts of social practice, they did aim to cultivate ideal dispositions and behaviours in readers, and were also products of the vernacular humanist culture that they reinforced and promoted. Therefore, early modern conduct literature is a vital source for approaching the socially differentiated norms about the expression of passions and affections in the social, textual and emotional community of early modern England.

Using learned humanist treatises, parental advice, household guides and officeholders’ manuals, this chapter explores how contemporary writers believed passions should be expressed or repressed as part of the performance of men and women’s social roles.

22 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, pp. 24-6.
As such, it shows how the inherent relationship between passion and action discussed in the previous chapter shaped understandings of social life, as written in idealised and didactic texts. To begin with, this chapter explores the key concepts of early modern conduct literature – moderation, civility and honestas – which denoted the ideal qualities of being able to express the appropriate feelings in the correct contexts, and which inherently related passions and affections to understandings of social practice. Importantly, this chapter argues honestas – the ability to behave appropriately in different circumstances – promoted the cultivation and expression of warm and positive feelings, both in oneself and others, as well as the repression of negative feelings that historians have previously emphasised. The remaining sections of the chapter show how civility and honestas were the core concepts of parental, household and officeholding guides throughout the period, which demonstrated the continuing importance and increasing social diffusion of these concepts as models for ideal affective expression, as well as early modern understandings of the centrality of feelings to the performance of different social roles and offices.

**KEY CONCEPTS: MODERATION, CIVILITY AND HONESTAS**

The core precept of early modern conduct literature was for moderation in all things, including the expression of passions and affections. In early modern England, Ethan Shagan has argued, ‘moderation’ was a ‘ubiquitous moral principle’ that encompassed both a ‘state of equipoise’ and the ‘act of control’ by which that state was achieved.25 In social, religious and political contexts, he argues, invocations of ‘moderation’ served to justify the exercise of power, coercion and even violence to reduce unruly subjects to an obedient and moderate state. While the Aristotelian ideal of the ‘golden mean’ had been a commonplace of classical

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25 Shagan, *Rule of Moderation*, p. 3.
and medieval thought, Shagan posits that the particular early modern English social, religious and political context reinvigorated this ideal. For example, the emergence of the ‘middling sort’ of people in the sixteenth century, meant that artisans, traders and professionals self-identified with their ‘mediocrity’ (in a positive sense of ‘middleness’) and the ability to moderate their passions. Moderation, in this sense, was understood as an active force and a ‘bridle’, which reined in the uncivil and animalistic aspects of human nature, including passions. Yet early modern writers described moderation as a largely unattainable ideal, whose inevitable failure necessitated government by social, religious and political authorities. In this view, ‘women, servants and other subordinate ranks were virtually incapable of self-restraint and required exterior restraint by definition’. Therefore, Shagan argues, through the concept of moderation early modern people intrinsically linked the external government of the body politic to the internal government of the natural body. In these views, the greater capacity of elite men for internal moderation both justified their government over their inferiors and ideally meant that such government would itself show more restraint and moderation. Moderation, then, was the conceptual framework linking passions to notions of gender, social status and the performance of social roles.

In early modern conduct literature passions and affections fitted into the overarching ideal of moderation. For instance, the humanist Sir Thomas Elyot’s Boke Named the Governour (1531), which outlined the education and personal qualities of an ideal public officeholder, advised readers always to follow the golden mean, which was defined as the ‘the verye myddes of two thynges viciouse/ the one in surplusage/ the other in lacke’.

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., pp. 222, 236-42.
28 Ibid., pp. 30-4.
29 Ibid., pp. 45-6, 48.
30 Ibid., p. 46.
31 Ibid., p. 69.
32 Sir Thomas Elyot, The boke named the Gouernour (London, 1531), f. 139r.
particularly, for Elyot the virtue of temperance was ‘the moderatrice as well of all motions of the minde/ called affectes/ as of all actes procedynge of man’. As such, Elyot directly related ‘affects’ to ‘acts’ – or passion to action – as he did when describing moderation as setting ‘the limites and boundes whiche honestie hath appoynted in spekynge and doynge’. The moderation of ‘affects’, then, was prerequisite to moderate action. By using the term ‘honesty’, the English form of honestas, Elyot was invoking the Ciceronian ideal of behaviour as the external practising of inner moderate qualities. Similarly, John Higgins’ introduction to The First Parte of the Mirour for Magistrates (1574) – which was simultaneously a historical work outlining the downfalls of those who ‘suppresse not unruly affections’ and a conduct book for contemporary officeholders – explicitly cited Cicero in order to promote temperance, which he defined as the ‘sure and moderate dominion and rule’ of ‘reason’ over ‘lust and other evil assaultes of the minde’. Demonstrating the social and political importance of temperance, Higgins claimed that ambition – ‘an immoderate desire of honore, rule, dominion, and superiorite’ – causes ‘the very destruction of nobilitie, and commune weales’. Writing at the end of the sixteenth century, King James VI of Scotland instructed his son, Henry, to use ‘moderation’ not only in his ‘affections’ and ‘passions’, but also in ‘foode’, ‘sleeping’, ‘ayment’, ‘speaking’, ‘writing’, ‘gesture’ and the use of ‘pastimes’, ‘exercises’ and ‘companie for recreation’. Finally, readers of the Gentlewomans Companion (1673), a women’s behavioural guide and recipe book, were advised that ‘in all things (except Piety) Mediocrity, or the Golden-mean, is to be observed’. Therefore, the moderation of

33 Ibid., f. 131v.
34 Ibid., f. 224r.
35 John Higgins, The First parte of the Mirour for Magistrates, containing the falles of the first infortunate Princes of this lande: From the comming of Brute to the incarnation of our sauiour and redemer Iesu Christe (London, 1574), sig. *4r-*5r.
36 Ibid., sig. *4v.
37 James VI and I, king of Scotland, England and Ireland, Basilikon Doron. Or His Maiesties Instructions to His Dearest Sonne, Henry the Prince (Edinburgh, 1603), pp. 84, 104-5, 108, 110, 121, 122.
38 The Gentlewomans Companion; or, A Guide to the Female Sex: Containing Directions of Behaviour, in all Places, Companies, Relations, and Conditions, from their Childhood down to Old Age (London, 1673), p. 80.
passions and affections formed part of a wider paradigm of moderation, one which was thought to affect the health and status of the individual, as well as of society in general.

Encompassing the ability to behave appropriately in different social, spatial and institutional contexts, the Ciceronian concepts of civility and honestas linked the moderation of passions to the performance of social or gender roles. These concepts were promulgated in a series of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English translations of Cicero’s De officiis, a treatise outlining the ideal qualities by which publicly active men can attain personal honour and the common good, by Robert Whittington (1534), Nicholas Grimald (1556), the schoolmaster John Brinsley (1616) and the Tory press censor Roger L’Estrange (1680). A ‘ubiquitous’ grammar school textbook, De officiis offered linguistic and moral instruction to generations of pupils, with the Latin and English appearing side by side in Whittington and reprintings of Grimald’s translations, while Brinsley referred to a paratextual ‘latine book’ for translation exercises.

Although he later rejected this scholarly focus – even lamenting the ‘disgust’ associated with a text ‘we were whipt for, when we were Boyes’ – L’Estrange still praised Cicero’s treatise as ‘a Manual of Precepts for the Government of our Selves, in all the Offices, Actions, and Conditions of Human Life’, leading readers not only to the ‘Love of Virtue, but also ‘to the Practice, and Habit of it’. For early modern readers and writers, then, both De officiis and conduct literature in general were fundamentally associated with the learning of ideal personal qualities and dispositions and their subsequent enaction in social practice.


For the most part, Cicero’s sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English translators generally rendered the Latin *honestas* as ‘honesty’, although the concept’s entwining of ideal personal qualities and social practice was also evident in Grimald’s rendering as ‘commelinesse’ and L’Estrange’s ‘Gracefulness’ and ‘Decorum’.\(^{41}\) In *De officiis* Cicero argued that the basis of these ideal behavioural traits is the capacity for self-government. While ‘sober moode’, ‘modestie’ and the government of the ‘passions’ and ‘*Perturbations* of the Mind’ lead to honest and comely behaviour, according to the different English translations ‘Uncomely’ actions are caused by ‘troublesome affections’ that ‘excede their boundes’ and ‘measure’, such as ‘lust’, ‘feare’ or ‘overmuch pleasure’.\(^{42}\) Cicero’s early modern translators stressed the universality of his advice. As Grimald claimed, not only did the treatise teach ‘men in authoritie’ how to ‘make themselves, and theyr subjects happy, and fortunate’, but it also advised ‘all sortes of men’ about how to act ‘according to theyr age, trade, and estate: with respect to the circumstaunces of times, places, and persones’.\(^{43}\) Two decades earlier, Whittington had likewise noted that the text was useful for readers of every ‘dignyte/ state/ condycions/ or ... degree’, while Richard Hyrd’s contemporary translation of the Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives’ *De institutione feminae Christianae* (1523), which outlined his view of the humanist education and personal qualities that defined an ideal woman, recommended Cicero for female readers to learn ‘howe honest it is to lyve chastely/ sobrely/ sadly/ & measurably’.\(^{44}\) Through the moderation of passion, in this view, everyone could act appropriately to their social station in a variety of contexts. Yet despite these universalist claims, the early modern English translators also saw the capacity for *honestas* to be


\(^{43}\) Cicero, *Duties*, trans. Grimald, sig. ¶¶1v.

differentiated by social status and gender. Discussing ‘comlynesse’ in embodied posture and
gesture, for instance, Grimald’s text advises the reader not to act ‘womannishly’, ‘deyntily’,
‘blockishly’ or ‘cartarly’.\textsuperscript{45} By 1680, L’Estrange rendered this as a precept to moderate
between ‘Loose, Nice, and Effeminate’ behaviour, on the one hand, and ‘Harsh, Rough, and
Uncivil’ behaviour, on the other.\textsuperscript{46} However, despite these differences, the precept of
moderation still predominated early modern conduct literature, whether in translations of
classical texts or in ‘original’ early modern English texts that appropriated \textit{honestas} and
civility.

The entwining of civility and moderation of passions was also the core argument of
Desiderius Erasmus’ \textit{De civilitate morum puerilium} (1530), a Latin conduct book for boys
which explicitly invoked \textit{civilitas} in its title. Like his edition of \textit{De officiis}, published two years
later, Whittington’s translation of this text, titled \textit{A Lytell Booke of Good Maners for Chyldren}
(1532), included parallel Latin and English versions, reflecting the joint humanist ideals of
linguistic and moral instruction.\textsuperscript{47} In the text, written for the children of the nobility, Erasmus
stressed the interior values of ‘temperaunce’, ‘cyvilite’ and ‘norture’ over the shallow
outward signifiers of nobility in heraldic display.\textsuperscript{48} For instance, Erasmus admonished his
young readers to keep their eyes ‘stable’ and ‘honest’, lest they betoken the vices of ‘crueltie’,
‘malapertnesse’, ‘disceyte’, ‘malyce’ and ‘yvell [evil] chastyte’, a collection of vices and
feelings that were antithetical to appropriate social behaviour.\textsuperscript{49} Similarly, according to
Whittington’s translation, ‘Grinnyng & laughyng out of mesure’ is a ‘passyon’ that ‘is nat
semynge to any age’, including children, while showing ‘mery countenaunce to fylthy

\textsuperscript{45} Cicero, \textit{Duties}, trans. Grimald, f. 50v.
\textsuperscript{47} Bryson, \textit{From Courtesy to Civility}, pp. 29-30.
\textsuperscript{48} Desiderius Erasmus, \textit{De civilitate morum [sic] puerilium ... A lytell booke of good maners for chyldren}, trans.
Robert Whittington (London, 1532), sig. A2v-A3r.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid.}, sig. A3r.
wordes or dedes’ signifies ‘leudnesse’.

In other words, immoderate affective expression was both socially inappropriate and an outward indicator of uncivil inner qualities. However, these precepts only related to expressions that were unfitting and ‘out of meaure’, and for Erasmus civility did not entail a complete Stoical suppression of feeling. For instance, while ‘merry countenance’ should not be shown to ‘filthy words or deeds’, Erasmus did permit ‘myrthe’ when dining, provided it did not lead to unmeasured ‘rybaudrie’.

Therefore, for Erasmus moderation did not mean total impassivity, or the lack of positive feeling, but rather the civil and ‘honest’ suiting of expression to the context.

Another key work of conduct literature demonstrating the links between honestas, social acuity and appropriate affective expression was the Italian Baldassare Castiglione’s Il libro del cortegiano (1528). Translated in 1561 by Thomas Hoby and entitled The Courtyer, this text was presented as a dialogue in which the interlocutors not only outlined the qualities of ideal male and female courtiers, but also personally exemplified the pleasing and affable qualities of courtesy and civility. According to Castiglione, the role of a courtier was to have the social acumen to win the ‘good will and favour’ of his prince, whom he can then advise and direct ‘in the waye of vertue’.

As such, the courtier must possess ‘grace’, an assemblage of virtues linking the inborn qualities of high birth and good looks with the learned ability to act properly according to time, place and audience (or honestas, in other words). The ‘true fountain’ of grace was Castiglione’s concept of sprezzatura, which Hoby rendered as ‘a certain Reckelesness’ by which the courtier can ‘cover art’ and make it ‘seeme’ that all his words and actions are ‘wythout pain’ and ‘as though they were rather naturally in him’.
other words, the courtier should behave with an affected ‘nonchalance’ – the term used in French translations – meaning that *sprezzatura* requires both self-government and ability to ‘understand what pleaseth his prince and a wit and wisedom to know how to applie it, & a bent wil to make him pleased with the thing which perhappes by nature should displease him’. In short, the courtier should be able to simulate the appropriate affections that will please his prince. For Castiglione, *sprezzatura* was also required of the female courtier, or the ‘perfect gentilwoman of the Court’, whose role was to ‘to have the knowleage to wynn and kepe the good wyll of her Ladye and of all others’. The gentlewoman, then, should be able to ‘gentlie entertain all kinde of men’ according to the proprieties of ‘time’, ‘place’ and ‘the degree of the person she communeth withall’. However, unlike her male counterpart, the gentlewoman should also be ‘sober’, ‘quiet’ and use ‘honestye’ as a ‘stay to all her deedes’. Therefore, according to Castiglione, the roles of male and female courtiers entailed the expression of appropriate affections, the restraint of inappropriate feelings and the ability to elicit positive affections in others. Despite these similarities, the ideal of ‘honesty’ was also gendered, with its feminine form stressing even further the need for self-restraint and quietness as a means to preserve a woman’s reputation for sexual propriety.

As well as an entertaining dialogue, Hoby’s English translation was also an explicitly didactic text. To the end of the dialogue he annexed ‘A breef rehersall of the chief conditions and qualities in a Courtier’ and ‘a waytyng gentylwoman’, reducing Castiglione’s lengthy narrative to pithy maxims – 82 for the male courtier, 48 for the gentlewoman – which catered to the epigrammatic reading culture discussed by Pollock and Loveman. As in the main text, these lists prescribed the contextually appropriate expression or restraint of passion. For

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example, the courtier should be ‘amiable in countenance’, ‘pleasantlie disposed’ and not ‘wilfull’, ‘spiteful’, ‘envious’ or ‘malitious’. He should ‘delite’ those he speaks with and should never ‘put anye man out of countenance’ through scoffs, jests or ‘Ruffianlike pranckes’. When interacting with superiors, he should avoid ‘fonde saucinesse or presumption’. Neither should he be ambitious and ‘love promotions’ or ‘unshamefastlye’ seek any office. The courtier must ‘endeavour himself to love, please and obey his Prince in honestye’, and never be ‘sad, melancholie or solenn’ before him, but behave only with ‘the respect that beecommeth the servaunt toward his maister’. Likewise, the gentlewoman should moderate between the ‘grace’, ‘courteious’ and ‘pleasant’ behaviour required of court life and the feminine ‘sober’ and ‘quiet’ ideals. She should have the affective wherewithal not to mix ‘grave and sad matters’ with ‘mirth’, ‘laughinge’ or ‘meerie jestes’, but rather to speak and act appropriately. Since a woman’s reputation was easily lost and irrecoverable, she should not be too free with her ‘love’, nor ‘use over much familyaritie without measure and bridle’, and in conversation the wanton talk of ‘oversaucie’ men should be met with expressions of ‘blushing’ and ‘bashfulnesse’. Therefore, for Castiglione and Hoby, repressing or cultivating certain affections were the means to please others and gain favour; to protect reputation; and to structure relationships between people of different social status.

The notion of civility as the behavioural qualities to please and accommodate others was also the central concept of Giovanni della Casa’s Galateo (1558), translated by Robert Peterson in 1576, which advised readers on matters such as the public display of natural bodily functions, behaviour at table and how to engage in pleasing conversation. Unlike

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60 Castiglione, Courtyer, trans. Hoby, sig. Yy4r-v.
61 Ibid., sig. Zz1r.
62 Ibid., sig. Yy4v.
63 Ibid., sig. Zz2r.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., sig. Zz3r.
66 Ibid., sig. Zz3v.
67 Ibid., sig. Zz4r, Zz3v.
Castiglione, whose courtier was already high born, della Casa framed his discussion of management of affections explicitly in terms of social advancement. The ideal, according to Peterson’s translation, was ‘to frame and order thy maners and doings ... to please those, with whome thou lyvest’, as ‘cherefull’, ‘pleaunt’ and ‘gentle’ behaviour leads to ‘advauancement’ and ‘greate preferments’, while ‘gross and rude maners’ make others ‘hate’ and ‘despise’ us.68 However, the social aspirant must use ‘Discretion’ and ‘Measure’ to moderate between the excesses of the over-accommodation of a ‘flatterer’, and the antisocial ‘rude’ and ‘uncourteous fellowe’ who has ‘no care or mynd to please’ the company.69 This latter vice, della Casa claimed, stems from pride and ‘selfe love’, which he defined as ‘to despise and disdaine another’, while the ideal of pleasing accommodation demonstrated care and concern for the feelings of others.70 Therefore, della Casa emphasised the instrumentality and personal benefits that arise from possessing the civil qualities of moderation and accommodating oneself to the feelings of others. As such, he grounded the concept of honestas in social realities and shifted the focus from Castiglione’s more altruistic treatment of civility to one of individual gain and social advancement.

The Galateo was a popular and much published work. In 1616 the soldier Thomas Gainsford appended ‘An Epitome of Good Manners’ to his Rich Cabinet, which summarised della Casa’s ideal of accommodating ‘civill conversation’ as both a positive good and a means for social preferment.71 In 1663 Nathaniel Walker translated and paraphrased the Galateo, which was then over a century old, under the title The Refin’d Courtier. In his address to the 14-year-old duke of Monmouth, Charles II’s illegitimate son and potential successor, Walker

68 Giovanni della Casa, Galateo of Maister Iohn Della Casa, Archebishop of Beneuenta. Or rather, A treatise of the manners and behauiours, it behoueth a man to vse and eschewe, in his familiar conuersation. A worke very necessary & profitable for all Gentlemen, or other, trans. Robert Peterson (London, 1576), pp. 4, 3.
69 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
70 Ibid., pp. 22, 59.
71 Thomas Gainsford, The Rich Cabinet Furnished with varietie of Excellent discriptions, exquisite Charracters, witty discourses, and delightfull Histories, Deuine and Morrall ... Whereunto is Annexed the Epitome of good manners, extracted from Mr. Iohn de la Casa, Arch-bishop of Beneuenta (London, 1616), sig. Z1r.
recited della Casa’s ideal of pleasing accommodation: ‘A courteous and comely behaviour sets off virtue, and obliges much, and gains upon the affections of men; but then if the Soul be not adorn’d with Modesty and solid goodness, all external accomplishments look like mere Pageantrie’. Josiah Dare’s Counsellor Manners his Last Legacy to his Son (1673) also rehearsed della Casa’s definition of ‘civil’ behaviour as doing nothing that is ‘unpleasant’ or ‘offensive’ to other people’s ‘Senses’. In this text, Dare explicitly linked affective expression to the proprieties of the social context: ‘At merry meetings shun the relating of melancholy matters, but let thy discourse be genial and frollick fit for such Times and Places; it were far better to be silent, than to relate such things as may contristate their minds, who are met only for the sake of mirth and jollity’. Evidencing the continuing cultural sway of the concept of civil accommodation, a fourth edition of Walker’s Refin’d Courtier was published in 1686 (discreetly lacking the dedication to the recently executed Monmouth), and a sixth edition of Dare’s Counsellor Manners appeared as late as 1710, one and a half centuries after its initial publication. As Bryson has argued, the ‘durability’ of the Galateo either reflected continuities in social practice or simply the reuse of conventional and authoritative texts. Yet this durability also evidences the vernacularisation and appropriation of these common ideals about passions and affections.

The vernacularisation and social diffusion of the ideals of honestas and civility was also demonstrated in conduct literature specifically aimed at readers lower down the social scale. For example, as Withington has argued, William Scott’s Essay of Drapery (1635) appropriated humanist behavioural ideals based on Ciceronian honestas for middling urban

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73 Josiah Dare, Counsellor Manners his Last Legacy to his Son: Enriched and Embellished with Grave Adviso’s, Pat Histories, and Ingenious Proverbs, Apologues, and Apophthegms (London, 1673), pp. 6-7.
74 Ibid., p. 21.
75 Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility, p. 80.
tradesmen. In this text, Scott argued that in order to profit both socially and economically, the draper must be able to ‘live Pleasingly to others’, by which Scott meant he must be able to judge other people’s feelings and tailor his behaviour accordingly. For example, the draper’s ‘discourse’ should be ‘pleasing’ to his customers, with words ‘discreetly chosen’, ‘properly applied’ and accompanied by ‘a grave naturall action’. In order to persuade ‘his Customer to the liking of his commodity’, Scott advised the draper to ‘put on the same liking himselfe; for putting on the same passion hee would stir up in others, he is most like to prevaile’. Aware of the inherent insincerity of putting on passion for profit, Scott asserted that certain vices become virtues if they are unconnected to sin and deceit. Without flattery, Scott explained, customers become ‘dull’ and ‘displeased’, for ‘downe-right honest speeches discontent them’. As such, for Scott the positive expression of feeling and its cultivation in others, which he frames in della Casa’s terms of pleasing accommodation, was central to the role of the middling urban tradesman. Although conduct literature focusing on elite roles, such as Castiglione’s *Courtyer*, was read by all sorts of literate people, their explicit targeting to a middling readership evidences the social penetration by the 1630s of humanist behavioural ideals and the literary forms that promulgated them.

The ideals of moderation, civility and *honestas* also framed women’s didactic literature. As Sara Mendelson has argued, for women ‘civility’ encompassed sexual propriety, obedience and deference. Vives’ *Instruction of a Christen Woman* (1529) claimed that the feminine virtue of ‘shamefastness’ was the means by which a woman’s words, actions and feelings should be moderated: ‘Of shamfastnes cometh demurenes and mesurablenes: that

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whether she thynke ought/ or say/ or do/ nothyng shalbe outragious/ neither in passions of
mynde/ nor wordes/ nor dedes/ nor presumptuous/ nor nyce/ wanton/ pierte/ nor bostyng/
nor ambitious’.\textsuperscript{82} In other words, moderation leads to the subservient and unpresuming social
behaviour that for Vives defined the ideal woman. A century and a half later, the
\textit{Gentlewoman’s Companion} (1673) defined civility as the ‘modesty’ and ‘handsome decorum’
in behaviour, which is suited to a woman’s ‘condition’ and social status, that allows her to
use her ‘words and actions in their proper and due places’ and so ‘procure the applause and
affection of all sorts of people’.\textsuperscript{83} Echoing della Casa, the author further defined civility as
‘the framing and adapting our actions to the satisfaction of other people’, emanating from a
mixture of ‘affability’ and ‘a moderate and submiss opinion of our selves’.\textsuperscript{84} Synthesising this
with Castiglione’s \textit{sprezzatura}, another concept then well over a century old, the
\textit{Gentlewoman’s Companion} stated that the ideal gentlewoman must use a ‘seeming
carelessness’, consisting of ‘well-becoming’ discourse and behaviour without any hint of
‘affectation’ or ‘formality’, in order to win the esteem of others.\textsuperscript{85} Therefore, despite their
temporal distance, these two texts saw the qualities of civility and \textit{honestas} to pertain as much
to women as men, although they feminised this concept with the repeated invocation of
‘modesty’. Importantly, both texts were written by men – although the \textit{Gentlewoman’s
Companion} was spuriously attributed to the household advice writer Hannah Woolley – but
they still evidenced the assimilation and continued resonance of the works of Cicero,
Castiglione and della Casa into the later seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{86}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{82} Vives, \textit{Instruction of a Christen Woman}, trans. Hyrd, sig. M1r.
\item \textsuperscript{83} \textit{Gentlewoman’s Companion}, pp. 44-5.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid., pp. 54, 47.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Ibid., pp. 36-7.
\item \textsuperscript{86} For the spurious attribution of the \textit{Gentlewoman’s Companion}, see Elaine Hobby, ‘A woman’s best setting
out is silence: the writings of Hannah Woolley’, in Gerald MacLean (ed.), \textit{Culture and Society in the Stuart
\end{itemize}
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Using English translations of learned humanist treatises, this section has shown how *honestas* and civility were key concepts in early modern conduct literature, which explicitly cited, translated and appropriated these ideals for both men and women as part of a wider humanist movement that saw itself as recovering classical behavioural norms in order to reform individuals and society as a whole. While these ideals, as Gillingham argues, were not ‘new’ – pleasing accommodation, for instance, was seen in the precept in the *Book of Curtesye* (1477-8) for children to ‘Lete maner & mesure/ be your gydes tweyne / So shal ye best plese’ – their renewed importance in the early modern period was evidenced by their vernacularisation and appropriation in conduct literature aimed at men and women of differing social status.  

Although moderation and affective self-restraint were apparent in medieval courtesy literature, early modern writers ignored these texts and followed Castiglione’s *Courtyer* and della Casa’s *Galateo*, as well as the classic Ciceronian thought on which they were based. Therefore, while the humanist concepts themselves showed continuity, their printing, social diffusion and broad social application showed change. This section has also demonstrated that, in didactic literature, passions and affections were inherently related to social practice, which was framed in terms of the expression of the appropriate feelings in the correct contexts. While historians have shown the repressive aspects of civility and *honestas* – Richards simply defines *honestas* as ‘self-restraint’, while for Withington it denotes the sociable qualities that restrained ‘wilfulness, passion, and violence’ – this section has also argued that these concepts also encompassed the expression and cultivation of positive and warm feelings, both in oneself and others.  

Both sides of ‘honesty’ or *honestas* – the warm and the cold, as it were – were particularly apparent in the poet Sir Thomas Wyatt’s April 1537 letter of paternal advice to his son, Thomas, in which he defined ‘honestye’ as ‘wisdome, gentlenes, sobrenes, disire to do good, frendlines to get the

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PARENTAL ADVICE

Manuscript and printed parental advice, in which fathers and (less commonly) mothers imparted practical wisdom, humanist ideas and proper religious practice to their children, constituted a popular and highly conventional genre of didactic literature in early modern England. Again, the overarching influence for these texts was Cicero’s *De officiis*, which was framed as his fatherly advice to his son, Marcus. Following the publication of King James VI and I’s *Basilikon Doron* in 1603, which outlined a Ciceronian vision of the ideal qualities and duties of a king for his eldest son and heir apparent, Henry, increasing numbers of parental advices were penned and printed in seventeenth-century England. Originally written in 1587 for his younger son and eventual political successor, Robert, the ten ‘precepts’ of Elizabeth I’s chief minister William Cecil, first Baron Burghley, were posthumously printed as a broadside in 1611 and in four book editions between 1617 and 1637. Covering the choice of a wife, household management and how to gain and keep friends, Burghley’s advice was pithy and practical. The advice was copied into commonplace books, such as that of Gilbert Frevile of Bishop Middleham, or was appropriated and plagiarised by others, such as in the 1640s advice of the royalist James Stanley, seventh earl of Derby, to his son, Charles. While

the conventional nature of fatherly advice may mean, as Richard Helgerson claimed in the 1970s, that these works were defined by ‘impersonality’, Fred Tromly has more recently argued that these texts exhibited a form of ‘paternal rhetoric’, showing that the intergenerational passing down of biblical and classical precepts was seen as a core part of the parental role.93 Throughout the seventeenth century, the parental advice genre was written not only by members of the social elite, such as Sir Walter Ralegh (1609), and George Savile, first marquess of Halifax (1688), but also by mothers and fathers of more middling status, such as Elizabeth Grymeston (1604), Dorothy Leigh (1616), Francis Osborne (1656) and Caleb Trenchfield (1671). These texts were very popular and long remained in print. For example, the fifteenth edition of Halifax’s advice for his daughter, The Lady’s New-Year’s Gift (1688), was published as late as 1765, and the text was even published in French and Italian editions.94

Parental advice texts were important sources for the appropriation of the behavioural and affective ideals of civility and honestas. For example, in 1629 the former courtier and ambassador Sir Charles Cornwallis admonished his son of the need ‘to putte a bridle on thy affections’.95 Reciting conventional views distinguishing reason from ‘our senses and sensualityes’, Cornwallis used tropes of government to contrast the disastrous ‘servitude’ and ‘slavery’ to our ‘appetites’ and ‘fancyes’ with the ideal ‘commandment upon thy selfe’.96 In 1636 the MP and English administrator in Ireland Christopher Wandesford instructed his son, George, to follow ‘the Examples of the wise and temperate Antients’, whose ‘Moderation’ and

95 BL: Add MS 39853, Sir Charles Cornwallis, ‘His letter of direction and advice to mee his sonne’, in ‘A Collection of Sr Charles Cornwaleys my fathers Manuscripts’, f. 1r.
96 Ibid.
‘Virtue’ subdued ‘their inordinate Appetites’. For Wandesford, the virtue of patience consisted of ‘Moderation in your Passions and Affections’ and the ‘Judgment to know when to be offended, and when not’, meaning that affective moderation meant the ability to properly tailor feeling to the context. However, recognising the difficulties of living up to the moderate ideal, Wandesford lamented his own ‘Rashness’ in discourse, ‘hasty and choleric Expressions’, and ‘many other unbridled Affections which I could not govern’, which led to his ‘breaking the Rules of Civility in Conversation’. The dangerous links between excessive passion and infelicitous action were also invoked in Instructions to a Son (1661), which was spuriously attributed to Archibald Campbell, marquess of Argyll, who had recently been executed for supporting the anti-royalist English invasion of Scotland in the early 1650s. The Instructions advised readers to ‘Master all your passions and affections, and so discipline them that they may become your most necessary Servants’, meaning that passions should be harnessed only for advantageous action. In a piece of political propaganda, playing on the trope of linking passion to action, ‘Argyll’ advised his son not to bear any ‘animosity’, ‘anger’ or ‘heart-burnings’ against his father’s enemies, as these were feelings that had caused ‘the destruction of many a Noble person in this Kingdom’. Instead, he was advised in conventional Stoic terms to ‘Demean your self in an equality of mind’, and use ‘prudence’ to protect against the ‘excesses’ and ‘recesses’ of ‘Fortune’. In other words,
the use of affective self-restraint and prudence would maintain equanimity against both strong positive and negative feelings.

In August 1636 the former high sheriff and MP for Cheshire, Sir Richard Grosvenor, linked passions to social and legal disputes in his letter of advice to his son, Richard. Written seven years into his imprisonment in the Fleet after standing as surety for his improvident brother-in-law’s debts, Grosvenor’s concern about passion’s links to litigation was understandable.\textsuperscript{104} According to Grosvenor, the passions that ‘commonly inflame in conversation’ were ‘collor’, ‘emulation’, ‘intemperance in discourse’ and ‘tow sudden apprehension of injuries’.\textsuperscript{105} These passions are fundamentally antisocial: ‘choler’ and ‘intemperance’ denoted intense, unrestrained action; ‘emulation’ meant envy for others and discontentment with one’s place; and a strong ‘apprehension’ or feeling of ‘injuries’ and affronts indicated an inability to move dispassionately through daily life – and was invoked by Wandesford in his advice to know when and when not to be ‘offended’. While conceding that ‘noe man can have a soule soe puerified that hee shall bee free from all resentments’, and ‘sometimes a man may have just cause to bee angrey and passionate’, Grosvenor instructed his son ‘to repress all motions which combate against reason that they sparkle not in the sight of others, both to your owne disadvantage and the ill example of those who shall bee witnesses thereof’.\textsuperscript{106} In other words, for Grosvenor the importance lay in the social consequences of immoderate passion in ‘conversation’, ‘discourse’ and the ill opinion caused by the expression of irrational ‘motions’.


\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ibid.}
While these texts all emphasised the importance of moderation and tended to view feeling in pejorative terms, the 1604 advice of William Wentworth for his ten-year-old son, Thomas, the future first earl of Strafford, outlined the social uses of passions in more nuanced and pragmatic terms. On the one hand, he described ‘Love, anger and ambition’ negatively as ‘the 3 most pourefull passions’ with potentially deleterious effects on social status.\textsuperscript{107} For instance, Wentworth warned his son about intemperate love and ‘an excessive desyre for a Woman’s Bewty’, which leads to disadvantageous marriage.\textsuperscript{108} Yet, on the other hand, despite claiming that anger was the cause of litigious ‘Revenge’ – which is costly to the purse – Wentworth also added pragmatically that because ‘nothing butt feare of revenge or suits can hould backe men from doing wronge’, his son should be able ‘to make showe of a revengeful mynd and something enclyning to contention’, although ‘the contrary inwardlye must be sought’.\textsuperscript{109} In other words, in order to protect himself and his purse in a litigious world, Thomas should learn to express and ‘show’ anger if the circumstances require it, while he should strive inwardly for ‘quyett’, the opposite of anger.\textsuperscript{110} As such, for landowners such as the Wentworths, \textit{honestas} in this sense required the ability to ‘mixe severity and showes of crueltye and revenge with lenitye and gentlnes’.\textsuperscript{111}

Writers of parental advice also explicitly discussed the social distinctions in appropriate affective expression. In his ‘precepts’, for instance, Burghley outlined a tripartite model for behaviour to ‘Superiours’, ‘Equalles’ and ‘Inferiours’, which demonstrated the instrumentality and personal benefits that accrue from contextually differentiated affective display.\textsuperscript{112} Among superiors, Burghley advised that ‘humble, yet generous’ action ‘prepareth
way to advancement’. To equals, Burghley’s son should be ‘famiariare, yet respective’, as this ‘will make you knowne for men well bred’. Lastly, among inferiors, one should ‘shewe much humilitie, with some familiaritie; as to bow your body, stretch foorth your hand, uncover your head, and such like populace complements’, which gain the ‘respect’ and ‘good report’ of the ‘multitude’. Here the two keywords were ‘humility’ and ‘familiarity’, which denoted both self-restraint and the more open expression of affections. The purpose of such socially graded behaviour, in Burghley’s view, was to elicit positive feelings in others, whether for personal advancement, reputation or popularity. The clear distinction between superiors, equals and inferiors, as well as the implicit knowledge of how to behave appropriately according to each person’s ‘degree’ shows not only that the relative social status of different people was readily apparent in dress and demeanour, but also that it was expressed in specific affective expressions to specific sorts of people.

Showing the reliance of early modern conduct literature on authoritative and conventional texts, Burghley’s tripartite distinction of appropriate behaviour towards social superiors, equals and inferiors provided the structure for subsequent advice writers. For instance, in 1636 Wandesford instructed his son to treat his social superiors with ‘Humility’ and ‘Respect’, and his inferiors with ‘Mildness’ and ‘Courtesy’. While the first earns the ‘Regard’ of superiors, the second wins the ‘greater Estimation’ of inferiors. Written on the eve of his involvement in the Glorious Revolution in 1688, the paternal advice of Henry Booth, second Baron Delamer and later first earl of Warrington, focused on the political uses and consequences of affective expression and cultivating positive feelings in others. Delamer

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Wandesford, Book of Instructions, p. 7.

Ibid.

Ibid.
instructed his children ‘to behave your self with the like familiarity to all sorts of Persons’ when in ‘a very high Station’, not only to gain their ‘esteem’ but also to keep their ‘respect’ if they fall from grace.\textsuperscript{118} While he cautioned against ‘Pride’ towards social equals and inferiors alike, for by ‘haughty and stately behaviour’ a man loses ‘respect’, Delamer wrote that a ‘humble friendly deportment wins strangely upon all sorts of people; the pulling off your Hatt may sometimes gain you the heart of that Person you took notice of’.\textsuperscript{119} Therefore, in fatherly advice socially differentiated behaviour consisted both of suitable expressions, a presumed rightly turned inner feeling and, importantly, the cultivation of positive feelings in others.

Just as Scott’s \textit{Essay of Drapery} (1635) explicitly appropriated civility and \textit{honestas} for urban tradesmen, Caleb Trenchfield’s \textit{A Cap of Gray Hairs, for a Green Head} (1671), framed as a ‘Fathers Counsel to his Son’, did the same for apprentices and others occupying the social ‘level of the greatest part of persons’.\textsuperscript{120} In the text, Trenchfield aimed to cultivate a circumspect apprentice who should be content as a servant until he is wise enough to strike out for himself. For Trenchfield, the ideal quality for an apprentice was an ‘industrious officiousness’, as ‘affability and officious respect to men, conduceth not a little to attract their good opinion’, whereas ‘the contrary disgusteth those many times, who are not unwise men; and causeth them to set a note of dislike upon those, who have passed by them without that acknowledgement of respect, which they conceived due to themselves’.\textsuperscript{121} In other words, a combination of respect, affability and conscientious service cultivates positive feelings in social superiors.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 22-3.
\textsuperscript{120} Caleb Trenchfield, \textit{A Cap of Gray Hairs, for a Green Head. Or, The Fathers Counsel to his Son, An Apprentice in London. To which is added, A Discourse on the worth of a good Name} (London, 1671), p. 4, title page.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 40, 80-1.
Paternal advice to daughters was also structured by the core concepts of honestas and civility. Around the turn of the seventeenth century, an anonymous father (quoting Colossians 3:12-15) enjoined his daughter to follow the feminine virtues of ‘kindnesse’, ‘humblenesse of minde’, ‘meekenesse’ and a ‘milde patient and temperate spirite’. From these godly and temperate qualities, the daughter’s behaviour ‘curtuouse’ and ‘affable’, and she should bear ‘a moderate, gentle, loveinge affection towards all sortes of people’. By contrast, she should be free from the antisocial vices and passions of ‘peevishnes, wrath and malitiousnes’. Similarly, the Kent gentleman Maurice Tuke’s ‘Fathers Blessinge’ (1641) advised his daughter, Dorothy, to ‘Bee Courteous, Loving and Ami-able … in thy Carriage towards all’, although he added the caveat of social distinction: ‘But nott to all alike’, for Dorothy must ‘sute and proportion thy respects to the degrees and qualities of those … to whome they belonge’. While the anonymous father had advised his daughter to be ‘courteous’ and ‘loving’ to ‘all sorts of people’ alike, Tuke stressed the importance of social differentiation, since ‘gracefull and pleasinge’ behaviour in one context is ‘absurd and ridiculous in another’. Above all, Tuke advised that while a ‘Maydenly Modestie’ was preferred in Dorothy’s behaviour, she should defend her reputation by expressing ‘Scorne’ at ‘uncivill Impudence’. However, among ‘choyce and fittinge Companie’, Tuke advised his daughter to be ‘seasonablie merrie’ and show ‘cheerefullness’, although she should ensure that ‘thy liberty bee not licentious’ or ‘pernitious’. Therefore, the manuscript advices of these fathers professed both the open and restrained views of honestas and contextually appropriate affective expression. On the one hand, for these two fathers, humility, meekness

123 Ibid., ff. 263v, 241v.
124 Ibid., f. 263v.
125 BL: Add MS 83259, Maurice Tuke, ‘A Fathers Blessinge. To his motherless, and (as farre as the world can make hit) fatherless, Deare and onely Daughter Dorothee Tuke’ (1641), f. 4r-v.
126 Ibid., f. 4v.
127 Ibid., f. 6r-v.
128 Ibid., f. 7v.
and patience were ideal feminine virtues as well as the means for women to preserve their reputations. Yet, on the other hand, both also stressed the importance of courtesy, affability and loving affection, even if, for Tuke, these warmer feelings were not equally expressed to all alike.

Fatherly advice discussed their daughters’ future roles as wives, mothers and mistresses of households – the subject of the following section of this chapter – which were also framed in terms of the ‘civil’ and ‘honest’ norms of appropriate expression. Tuke’s ‘Fathers Blessinge’, probably written upon Dorothy’s marriage, provided advice on affective expression and household management: ‘To the Servants amongst whome thou livest Carrie thy selfe with all meekness, gentleness and affabilitie’, and show ‘thankfullness’ for their service and generous do them ‘good offices’.129 A ‘froward’, ‘captious’ and ‘peevish’ mistress, Tuke warned, is ‘hated of all’.130 By contrast, through ‘gentleness, quiettness, and fayre entreaty’, the mistress earns the ‘love’ of the servants, making them more ‘willinge’ and ‘ready to doe any thinge for thee’.131 The marquess of Halifax’s Lady’s New-Years Gift (1688) provided his daughter Elizabeth with similar advice, although his keyword describing various household relationships was ‘kindness’. In her future role as mistress of a household, for instance, Elizabeth was advised to show the servants ‘Kindness’ and ‘good Usage’.132 Since a ‘foolish haughtiness in the Style of speaking, or in the manner of commanding them’ will beget ‘Aversion’, Halifax advised that ‘you will be so much the more obeyed as you are less Imperious’.133 Kindness also applied to Halifax’s advice concerning his daughter’s roles as a wife and mother. If her husband is ‘Cholerick’ and ‘ill-humour’d’, for example, Elizabeth

129 Ibid., ff. 3v, 5v.
130 Ibid., f. 5v.
131 Ibid.
should answer him with ‘Gentleness’, ‘a kind Smile’ and ‘a little Flattery’.\textsuperscript{134} Likewise, Elizabeth should not be ‘angry’ with disobedient children, but rather treat them ‘gently’ and ‘flatter away their ill Humours’.\textsuperscript{135} By these means, children will both ‘Love’ and ‘Obey’ their mother, and they should be ‘more in awe of your Kindness than of your Power’.\textsuperscript{136} Yet this maternal ‘tenderness … must be subject to the Rules of good Breeding’.\textsuperscript{137} Although ‘a Woman of Quality ought not be less kind’ to her children ‘than Mothers of the meanest Rank are to theirs’, the ‘manner’ of expressing kindness must be socially appropriate and far removed from the ‘course Methods’ of social inferiors.\textsuperscript{138} Therefore, seventeenth-century fathers did not simply promote patient, loving and kind behaviour for their own sake, but rather because they were instrumental for their daughters’ future household roles, as well as a means to express their social status in the proper fashion.

Written only in the first half of the seventeenth century, albeit subsequently reprinted in later editions, motherly advice was a less common genre of didactic literature. In the 1980s Elaine Beilin argued that maternal advice works aimed ‘to provide explicit evidence of women’s Christian virtue’ in an ‘exclusively and specifically feminine’ context.\textsuperscript{139} Yet they can also be seen as a parallel genre to works of paternal advice and demonstrations of the importance of religious instruction to the role of a mother. For instance, Dorothy Leigh’s \textit{Mothers Blessing} (1616) provided ‘godly counsaile’ in order to instil patience, prudence and a proper Protestant faith in her children.\textsuperscript{140} Describing ‘unruly affections’ as ‘corruptions’ of the ‘flesh’, Leigh discussed the management of affections in religious terms, admonishing her

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{134} Ib., pp. 45, 47-8.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 79.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Ibid., pp. 77, 80.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Ibid., pp. 76-7.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Dorothy Leigh, \textit{The Mothers Blessing. Or The godly counsaile of a Gentle-woman not long since deceased, left behind her for her Children: Containing many good exhortations, and godly admonitions, profitable for all Parents to leave as a Legacy to their Children, but especially those, who by reason of their young yeeres stand most in need of Instruction} (London, 1616), title page.
\end{itemize}
children that only through faith and a ‘humble heart’ would God ‘bride their unruly affections’ and restore the sanctity of the soul.\textsuperscript{141} Similarly, Elizabeth Grymeston’s \textit{Miscelanea} (1604), a learned Catholic treatise, briefly advised her son, Bernye, on the appropriate moderation and direction of feeling only at the appropriate objects: ‘Desire the best: disdaine none, but evill companie. Grieve but be not angrie at discourtesies’ and to ‘Redresse, but revenge no wrongs’.\textsuperscript{142} In \textit{The Countesse of Lincolnes Nurserie} (1622), Elizabeth Clinton, dowager countess of Lincoln, stressed in affective and biblical terms that the ideal ‘modest loving mother’ should breastfeed her own children and not engage in the common practice of wet-nursing, since to refrain from nursing one’s own child was an expression of the vices of ‘\textit{unmotherly affection, idlenesse, desire to have liberty to gadd from home, pride, foolish finenesse, lust, wantonnesse, \\& the like evills’}.\textsuperscript{143} Published two years later, Elizabeth Jocelin’s \textit{Mothers Legacie to Her Unborne Childe} also focused on her child’s ‘religious training’ rather than social practice, although she claimed that the text itself was an expression of her ‘motherly zeale’ for the spiritual health of her child.\textsuperscript{144} In all these texts, then, mothers either provided explicit precepts for affective expression that centred on conventional norms of the objects and intensity of affections, or framed women’s roles in terms of a complex of positive and negative affections. These ranged from ‘motherly zeal’ to ‘unmotherly affection’ and a prideful ‘desire’ to leave the household, the space and institution that encompassed women’s social roles.

Although Jocelin’s \textit{Mothers Legacie} underwent seven further editions in the seventeenth century, the last new motherly advice text of the period – or the last text framed as motherly advice – was M. R.’s \textit{Mothers Counsell} (1630), a series of maxims on the core

\begin{quotation}
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\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 114-15.
\textsuperscript{144} Elizabeth Jocelin, \textit{The Mothers Legacie, To her vnborne Childe} (2nd edn, London, 1624), sig. B1r.
\end{quotation}
feminine ideal of ‘Modesty’.

This text was plagiarised from Kepe within Compasse (1619), an earlier fatherly advice book, and so demonstrated the similarities and differences between the advice given to men and women. While Shepard has emphasised the gendered distinctions between the two texts, their advice on governing the passions was remarkably similar. Although in Kepe within Compasse moderation was in the service of masculine ‘Vertue’ rather than feminine ‘modesty’, both texts included the near-identical maxims that ‘He is worthy to be called a moderate person which firmly governeth and bridleth (with reason) the vice of sensuality, and all other grosse affections of the minde’, and that ‘Shee is firmly to be accounted temperate, which from the ground of reason can governe and bridle the vice of sensualitie, and all other grosse affections of the minde, and passions’.

As such, the similarities and differences between these two texts reflect those of motherly and fatherly advice in general. On the one hand, moderation and the implicit ability for men and women alike to temper their feelings framed the overarching discussion of passions and affections. The plagiarism of M. R.’s Mothers Counsell demonstrated that it was permissible to transfer masculine advice to female readers. On the other hand, however, this affective self-government was highly gendered, such as in the core distinction between masculine ‘virtue’ or feminine ‘modesty’ depicted on the title pages of the two texts.

This section has shown how the core concepts of civility and honestas – and the different affective expressions according to the circumstances of time, place and audience they prescribed – were appropriated in vernacular parental advice texts in early modern England. Above all, these didactic texts revealed that, for early modern parents, passions were understood to be integral to social practice, and that this link between passion and action was

146 Shepard, Meanings of Manhood, pp. 32-3.
147 Kepe within Compasse: or, The worthy Legacy of a wise Father to his beloved Sonne; teaching him how to liue richly in this world and eternally happy in the world to come. Meete for all sorts of people whatsoeuer (London, 1619), title page, sig. C1r; M. R., Mothers Counsell, pp. 12-13.
a source of concern. Properly applied, passions could be turned to a person’s social advantage, but they were equally seen as dangerous and the cause of unpropitious action. That the management and proper expression of passions and affections belonged to the discourse of parental advice not only showed how important these skills were believed to be as part of education and upbringing, but also that that their inculcation was a crucial part of the parental role. The fact that the same affective advice ran throughout the texts suggests both that writers followed the conventions of the genre, with affective advice being something that was expected of them, and also that conceptualisations of the dangerous relationship between passion and action were widely shared and paradigmatic. While civility and honestas imbued the advice to both sons and daughters, these concepts were applied in gendered ways, with masculine ‘virtue’ being distinguished from feminine ‘meekness’ and ‘patience’. Although the ‘cooler’ and ‘warmer’ sides of appropriate affective expression related to sons as well as daughters, greater emphasis was placed on restraint for daughters as a means of preserving a reputation for sexual propriety, which figured less in the advice to sons. However, for both men and women alike, the overarching precept was for proper expression in the proper context – honestas – and the relationship between passion and action was in the forefront of early modern parents’ minds.

**Household roles**

Another key strand of early modern conduct literature focused on household government. The site of spousal, parental and contractual relationships, the household was the core social, political and economic institution of early modern society, and was termed the ‘little
commonwealth’ by early modern writers.  

Since the concept of ‘commonwealth’ denoted both the social order and the common good, historians have debated whether households in this period were institutions of vertical patriarchal ‘authority’ or of more horizontal ‘reciprocal obligation’, even if the benefits of this co-operation were unequally distributed among hierarchical superiors and subordinates. Amussen and Gowing have argued that normative household guides propagated patriarchal authority, while Shepard has shown how normative texts described marriage as a fulfilment of social status, and the institution in which men put into practice the ‘discretion, reason, moderation, self-sufficiency, strength, self-control, and honest respectability’ that justified patriarchal authority. Focusing on social practice, Withington has argued that the household was a fundamental space in which people interacted and engaged in ‘civil society’. Based on the ideals of ‘civility’, which entailed not only ideal social behaviour, but also the government of the will on which that behaviour was based, the early modern household was less a space of absolute patriarchal authority and more one of ‘sociability’ and ‘reciprocity’. Within this historiographical context, historians have also distinguished between loving and ‘companionate’ marriages, on the one hand, and conflictual, patriarchal and authoritarian relationships, on the other. Offering a nuanced view of these two extremes, Keith Wrightson has argued that ‘patriarchal’

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152 Ibid., p. 198.

and ‘companionate’ marriages were products of the twin early modern ideals of matrimony as an institution both of ‘male authority’ and ‘a practical and emotional partnership’.154

Intervening in these debates, this section argues that the affective language used to describe the performance of household roles, which centred on a combination of ‘love’ and ‘fear’, showed that people in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw no distinctions between love, authority and obedience. Not only did ‘fear’ and ‘love’ express in affective terms the proper feelings between hierarchically differentiated people, but as Pollock has argued in relation to marriage, ‘love’ also meant obedience and obedience was an act of love.155 Stephanie Tarbin has shown that ‘fear’ was instrumental in childrearing and conceptualising parental authority over them.156 Building on these discussions, this section argues that the affective language of ‘love’, ‘fear’ and obedience was not restricted to normative discussions of husbands and wives or parents and children, but rather referred to all superior and subordinate household relationships, including contractual relationships between masters, mistresses and servants. As such, this section will first discuss the treatments of relationship between husbands and wives in early modern household guides, before turning to the relationships between masters, mistresses and servants, to which the same affective terms and concepts applied.

Outlining the humanist ideal of the education and personal qualities of elite women, Vives’ De institutione feminae Christianae (1523) described the performance of household roles and relationships, whether spousal, parental or contractual, in normative terms of appropriate and hierarchically differentiated affective expression. In youth, according to Richard Hyrd’s 1529 translation, a girl should ‘gladly’, with ‘mery chere’ and ‘without

grutchynge’ obey her parents’ commands. This ideal of cheerful obedience to superiors carried over into marriage, as a husband was at once his wife’s ‘companion’ and ‘counsellour’ as well as her ‘maister’ and ‘lorde’. Wives, according to Vives, should profess ‘chastite’ and ‘great love toward her husbande’. For Vives, these appropriate feelings opened the door to a good life. If a wife behaves with ‘pure chastite’, ‘mekenes’ and ‘buxumnes’ – a term which denoted obedience – her husband will be ‘plesant & lovyng’, and ‘thou shalt be mastres in a merye house/ thou shalt rejoyse/ thou shalt be glad’ and ‘blesse the day that thou were maried unto hym’. By contrast, Vives warned, the life of a ‘disobedyent’ and ‘ragious’ wife will be ‘unpleasant’ and ‘full of myserye’. Here, then, positive and negative affective language described both the performance of superior and subordinate household roles, and their effects on those hierarchical relationships and the household as a whole. ‘Love’, ‘gladness’ and ‘merriness’ were entwined with obedience, ‘meekness’ and ‘buxomness’, which were the opposites of the ‘rage’ and ‘disobedience’ that disordered the household.

Throughout the early modern period, household guides followed this conventional model of loving and cheerful obedience as the bedrock of household order. For instance, in his introduction to The Office and Duetie of an Husband (1555), his translation of another of Vives’ works, Thomas Paynell linked ‘love’ to patriarchal authority and the violent means by which it could be preserved’. The husband’s role, Paynell claimed, was to ‘love’, maintain and ‘chasten and correcte’ his wife. As the head of the household, in other words, enforcing obedience within the context of a divinely ordained hierarchical order was an act of love. Wives, meanwhile, should ‘love, obey, and serve theyr husbandes’, and, as mistresses of

158 Ibid., sig. e2v.
159 Ibid., sig. V3v.
160 Ibid., sig. V2v.
161 Ibid., sig. V3v.
households, govern the children and servants.\textsuperscript{163} According to the anonymous \textit{Glasse for Housholders} (1542), spouses should avoid all occasions of ‘angre’ and strive to live ‘quyetlye’ together in ‘grace’, ‘favoure’ and ‘concorde’.\textsuperscript{164} Towards his wife, a husband should be ‘famylyer & lovyng’ in his ‘conversacion’, and should eschew ‘rygorousnes’, ‘crueltie’ or ‘tyranny’.\textsuperscript{165} However, the author prescribed physical correction if a wife shows ‘obstinacie’ to her husband, although this must be done ‘moderatly’.\textsuperscript{166} However, as Shagan has argued, ‘moderate’ violence was that which restored the proper order, and did not necessarily mean moderation in the sense of lightness of force. As such, these normative texts left much room for forcible correction, which was couched in the language of love. Applying the concept of \textit{honestas} to the due performance of household roles, the author of the \textit{Glasse for Housholders} claimed that if a wife is ‘honest & verteous’, she will naturally obey her husband.\textsuperscript{167} For Vives, in Paynell’s words, ‘mutuall love’, ‘concorde’ and ‘quietnes’ between husbands and wives was instrumental to the orderly government of the household as a whole, since these ideal feelings between the master and mistress cause the servants to be ‘mery’ and ‘more obediently & gladly’ carry out their duties.\textsuperscript{168}

Attributed to the puritan clergyman Robert Cleaver, \textit{A Godlie Forme of Householde Government} (1598) framed the household a ‘little common wealth’ comprising a godly, patriarchal order that was characterised by authority and obedience as well as material aid and mutual ‘love’.\textsuperscript{169} For Cleaver, love was ‘a naturall affection of the minde, inflaming all

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} A glasse for housholders, wherin thei maye se, bothe howe to rule theim selfes & ordre their housholde verye Godly and fruyftfull (London, 1542), sig. d3v-d4r.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., sig. d1v.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., sig. d2r.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., sig. d1v.
\textsuperscript{168} Vives, \textit{Office and dutie of an husband}, trans. Paynell, sig. Bb8r, Cc1r.
\textsuperscript{169} Robert Cleaver, \textit{A Godlie Forme of Householde Gouernment: For the Ordering of Priuate Families, according to the direction of Gods word. Whereunto is adioyned in a more particular manner, The seuerall duties of the Husband towards his Wife: and the Wifes dutie towards her Husband. The Parents dutie towards their Children: and the Childrens towards their Parents. The Masters dutie towards his Servants: and also the Servants dutie towards their Masters} (London, 1598), p. 13.
the powers of the Lover with willing dutie towards the beloved’. As such, action was built into Cleaver’s definition of love, and this action was specifically a ‘willing duty’ or a performance of their specific role in the hierarchy to others within that hierarchy. For instance, the husband – the ‘Cheefe governour’ of the household – should ‘love, cherish, and nourish’ his wife and not be ‘bitter, fierce, and cruel’ towards her. In return, Cleaver claimed, a wife (the ‘fellow helper’ in household government) should be ‘dutifull, faithfull, and loving’ towards him. She should also ‘patiently’ bear her husband’s rebukes and should never retort with ‘uncomely or unkinde words’, but only ever show ‘a loving and cheerfull countenance’. Even if the rebukes are groundless, Cleaver stressed, a wife should rather ‘take the fault upon her’ than ‘seeme’ or appear ‘to be displeased’. At the same time, however, as this love was bound up with the proper performances of mutual duties within the household, Cleaver stressed that the husband should not treat his wife as ‘a Handmaide or servant, but as a fellow’, for if he is ‘rigorous’ towards her, she will not ‘love him faithfully’. In other words, the negligent performance of spousal roles attenuated the love between husband and wife.

The normative ideals of moderate patriarchal government and cheerful wifely obedience continued in seventeenth-century household advice literature. In his treatise Of Domesticall Duties (1622), Cleaver’s fellow-puritan clergyman William Gouge emphasised the importance of love between spouses, which he described as both a ‘bond’ between them and the impetus by which their mutual duties were properly and ‘cheerfully’ performed.

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170 Ibid., p. 89.
171 Ibid., pp. 19, 97.
172 Ibid., pp. 19, 88.
173 Ibid., p. 220.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., pp. 166-7.
Without ‘A loving mutuall affection’, Gouge wrote, ‘no dutie will be well performed: this is the ground of all the rest’. In positive terms, Gouge also claimed that a wife’s ‘inward feare’ of her husband should be the basis for her ‘Outward’ expressions of ‘Reverence’ and ‘Obedience’. This ‘wive-like Feare’, according to Gouge, ‘is manifested by two effects: one is Joy, when she giveth contentment to her husband, and ... the other is griefe, when he is justly offended and grieved, especially with any thing that she her selfe hath done’. Obedience, for Gouge, should be accompanied with ‘cheerefulnesse’ and a real ‘contentednesse and willingnesse to be ... ruled by him’, rather than ‘sullen and forced obedience’ or mere ‘outward comple mentall subjection’. In return, the husband should temper his authority with ‘courtesie’, which is a ‘voluntary’ sign of ‘kindnesse’ and ‘favour’ when shown to an inferior, and is the opposite of an overly ‘loftie carriage’. Despite his ‘authority’ and ‘eminencie’ over his wife, a husband should not forget the neere conjunction and union betwixt them’, and his ‘Countenance’, ‘Gesture’ and ‘Actions’ should be of ‘mildnesse’ and an ‘amiable pleasantnesse’, for ‘the outward composition of the countenance’ reveals ‘the inward disposition of the heart’. As such, for Gouge the husband’s authority should be tempered in affective terms with ‘mildness’ and ‘kindness’, and he was particularly opposed to marital violence, which he described as the ‘furious’ and ‘spightfull’ actions of ‘unkinde’ husbands, which contrasted with his approval of the moderate chastisement of servants. Wives, meanwhile, should express both ‘cheerful’ obedience and an ideal ‘fear’ of their husbands’ higher office.

177 Ibid.
178 Ibid., p. 274.
179 Ibid., pp. 274-5.
180 Ibid., pp. 334, 275, 278.
181 Ibid., pp. 364-5.
182 Ibid., p. 387.
183 Ibid., pp. 389-93, 660.
Seventeenth-century writers continued to describe wifely obedience in terms of the repression and expression of feelings depending on the context, which required the qualities of temperance and *honestas*. For instance, Gervase Markham’s *English House-Wife* (1631), a practical text that mostly focused on cookery, the preparation of medicines and other household tasks, opened by describing ‘great modesty and temperance’ as a housewife’s key virtues.\(^\text{184}\) These virtues, Markham claimed, should be expressed in wife’s obedience to her husband, towards whom ‘she shall shunne all violence of rage, passion and humour’, and even if he is wrong she will always ‘vertuously ... suppress’ her ‘contrary thoughts’ and be ‘pleasant, amiable, & delightfull’ to him.\(^\text{185}\) Later in the seventeenth century, the *Gentlewomans Companion* (1673) outlined the ‘good esteem’, ‘honour’, ‘respect’ and ‘reverence’ a wife should owe to her husband.\(^\text{186}\) This obedience should be expressed in affective accommodation, and the directly instructed women readers to ‘conform your self to him as to confirm your love in him, and undoubtedly this conjugal duty, mixt with affability, will compleatly conquer the moroseness of his temper’.\(^\text{187}\) Consequently, a wife should ‘Be quiet, pleasant, and peaceable with him, and be not angry, when he is so; but endeavour to pacifie him with sweet and winning expressions’ or otherwise ‘bear his anger patiently’, even if it is unjustified.\(^\text{188}\) In order to express loving subservience, the author claimed that the wife should ‘apply and accommodate her self ... to his humour and disposition’.\(^\text{189}\) Therefore, the author applied the pleasing accommodation outlined by della Casa and other conduct writers

\(^{185}\) Ibid., p. 106.

\(^{186}\) *Gentlewomans Companion*, pp. 105-6.

\(^{187}\) Ibid., p. 90.

\(^{188}\) Ibid., p. 106.

\(^{189}\) Ibid., pp. 105-6.
to the particular social and institutional context of marriage and the household, which was understood to be the site in which civility was both located and practiced.

Turning from the affective framing of spousal relationships, household guides throughout the period also used the language of passions and affections to describe relationships between masters, mistresses and servants. As mistresses of households, wives occupied an intermediate status below her husband but above her servants and children. In the 1520s Vives claimed that the government of a mistress over her servants should be ‘gentyll and favorable’, as ‘feare’ and ‘reverence’ are gained more by ‘mekenese’, ‘discretion’ and ‘sadde conditions’ than ‘rygorousnes’, ‘chidying’ or ‘scoldying’.190 In other words, the positive ‘fear’ and ‘reverence’ that ideally structured relationships between social superiors and inferiors was achieved by ‘quietnes’, rather than ‘angry’ and ‘hasty breemnes’ (a term meaning fury and anger).191 In return, servants should do their duty ‘mekely’, ‘buxomly’, ‘merily’ and ‘pleasantly’, and neither ‘bable’, ‘murmoure’ nor ‘shewe any displeasant countenaunce’.192 Rather than making any ‘displeasent’ expression, which would indicate the servants’ seditious and blasphemous dissatisfaction with their place in the divinely ordained household hierarchy, Vives claimed that servants should ‘love and worship’ their masters and mistresses as ‘thoughe they were theyr fathers and mothers’.193 Still, at the same time, they should ‘nat love her so moche as obey her’.194 As such, Vives – or Hyrd, his English translator – likened mistress-servant relationships to those between parents and children and used the same language to discuss them. For instance, while ‘love’ defined the mother-child

191 Ibid.
192 Ibid., sig. i4r.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid., sig. i4v.
relationship, this was a hierarchical love expressed by the mother’s education and correction of her children, who should repay her with the same cheerful obedience as the servants.\textsuperscript{195}

A century later, Gouge’s \textit{Of Domesticall Duties} (1622) similarly instructed servants express their ‘\textit{Good will}’ to their superiors in ‘\textit{Cheerfulness}’ and ‘\textit{Faithfullnesse}’.\textsuperscript{196} Citing Ephesians 6:5-6, which admonishes servants that faithful service to their temporal master is part of their service to God, Gouge noted that cheerful obedience must sincerely come from ‘\textit{from the heart}’ and not be mere surface-level ‘\textit{Eie-service}’.\textsuperscript{197} Mirroring his discussion of ‘wife-like fear’, Gouge rooted the servant’s role in the ‘affection’ of ‘\textit{Feare}’, which he defined as ‘an awfull dread of a master. An \textit{awe} in regard of his masters place: a \textit{dread} in regard of his masters power’.\textsuperscript{198} As such, for Gouge the affection of fear was the embodiment of the servant’s subordinate place to their master. Demonstrating the inherent links between affection and action, Gouge then described how fear provided the impetus for the servant’s acts of service, which included further displays of appropriate affection. In Gouge’s words, ‘This feare will draw servants on, cheerefully to performe all duty: the more it aboundeth, the more desire and endeavour there will be to please, and to give good contentment … yea it will glad the heart of a servant to see his service prosper well’.\textsuperscript{199} In more negative terms, but still emphasising the motivating force of affection, the ‘feare of provoking his masters wrath’ will also cause the servant to endeavour ‘to please him’.\textsuperscript{200} However, the fear of servants for their masters should fit the golden mean between an excessive ‘\textit{slavish feare}’ of an overweening master and the defective ‘light esteeme’ and ‘plaine contempt’ of a weak master.\textsuperscript{201} While the former, for Gouge, was self-defeating for the master, as ‘[s]uch servile

\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Ibid.}, sig. k4r-n3r.
\textsuperscript{196} Gouge, \textit{Of Domesticall Duties}, p. 590.
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 594.
\textsuperscript{199} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 595.
servants will never be profitable’, the second threatened the divinely ordained social order, as ‘disdainfull proud servants shew that they regard not Gods image at all’. Since they are tied by service rather than kinship, Gouge claimed, servants have ‘small love’ for their masters, meaning that they are ‘kept in compasse’ by fear, ‘awe’ and ‘dread’. Yet, like wives and children, servants should outwardly express their ‘Reverence’ and ‘Obedience’ in gestures such as standing, bowing and uncovering the head, and in speaking only in a ‘meeke, milde and humble’ manner at opportune times, such as when the master’s ‘minde is quiet, not troubled with passion’. Contrary to this ideal were the affections of ‘Sawcinesse’, ‘Arrogancy’ and ‘Disdaine’, which all expressed inappropriate discontentment with their place in life. Disaffection, for Gouge, was expressed in the ‘loud’ and retorting speech of ‘Scolding maids that will have the last words of their mistresse’, in ‘Muttering and murmuring upon every occasion of discontent’ or in ‘too much familiaritie’ and a contemptuous lack of respect.

In similar terms, the Gentlewomans Companion (1673) provided behavioural advice for female household roles at different levels of social status. As the mistress of the household, the author conventionally noted, the gentlewoman should be ‘kind’, ‘courteous’ and bear a ‘loving carriage’ to her servants, and not be ‘peevish’, ‘froward’ or ‘too passionate’ with them. However, despite this courtesy to servants, the gentlewoman was enjoined not to be ‘over-familiar with any of them, lest they grow rude and sawcy with you’, as ‘too much familiarity’ breeds ‘contempt’ in social inferiors. Such behaviour was not only ideal but pragmatic: gentle treatment will breed ‘a constant diligence’ in a ’good natur’d’ maidservant,
meaning one who is ‘willing to please’. Moving down the household pecking order, the author also advised ‘Chambermaids’ to be ‘modest’ and ‘willing to please’, which will earn not only a good salary, but also the ‘love’ and ‘respect’ of her mistress. While the Gentlewomans Companion, as was noted above, was falsely attributed to Hannah Woolley, in her own more practical household guide, A Supplement to the Queen-like Closet (1674), Woolley similarly warned mistresses that although servants who are ‘Civil, neat, cleanly, and careful to please’ should be ‘cherished’ with kind words and gifts, ‘too much of Familiarity … will breed much Contempt. Keep your distance as you being her Superior, and shew your love and favour in what may benefit her’. Meanwhile, Woolley instructed, household servants should always observe what will ‘please’ their mistress, be neat and tidy in dress, and ‘humble’ and ‘modest’ in behaviour. By such actions, she addressed those servants, ‘you may oblige her to be loving and kind to you, and cause her to speak well of you’. As Withington has noted, compared with the Gentlewomans Companion, Woolley’s own advice was ‘homelier but still humanistic’, based on cultivating civility and contextually appropriate speech and behaviour in both mistresses and servants in the domestic context. This argument is borne out by focusing on the affective language used to idealise the hierarchical relationship between mistresses and servants. Both texts continued to situate correct affective display, whether on the ‘kind’ and ‘loving’ authority of the mistress or on the servant’s cheerful obedience and willingness to ‘please’ her mistress, as a core part of the performance of their household offices, which was unchanged from Vives’ De institutione feminae Christianae 150 years earlier.

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209 Ibid., p. 27.
210 Ibid., pp. 209-10.
211 Hannah Woolley, A Supplement to the Queen-like Closet; or A Little of Every Thing (London, 1674), pp. 101-2.
212 Ibid., p. 146.
213 Ibid.
This continued conventionality was also evident in the bookseller Nathaniel Crouch’s *Apprentices Companion* (1681), written under the pseudonym Richard Burton, which like Gouge and other godly texts normatively framed service as a pathway to salvation. Among the duties of ‘a true and faithful servant’, Crouch claimed, were to ‘Respect’, ‘fear’ and ‘reverence’ his master.215 Echoing earlier household advice, for Crouch this fear should be ‘implanted in the heart of a Servant’, and his obedience ‘must not be a grumbling and unwilling service, but ready and chearful’.216 Even unjustified rebukes and punishment should be ‘suffered quietly’ instead of any ‘angry and passionate contradicting’ of his master.217

In early modern household guides, as this section has demonstrated, the ideal household was discussed in normative terms as a divinely ordained hierarchy in which the appropriate expression or repression of passions and affections was key to the hierarchically differentiated duties of one member to another. Love and fear, the two key affections, both motivated and constituted harmonious interpersonal relationships between people of varying social status. Husbands and wives, the governors of households, ideally behaved ‘lovingly’ not only to each other, but also to the children and servants under their authority. Importantly, love was compatible with violence and ‘correction’, evidencing a fundamental shift in its meaning and expression between the sixteenth century and today. Fear, the other key affection in the texts, was an ideal feeling characterising the proper reverence for social superiors, and related as much to contractual relationships between masters, mistresses and servants as to spousal relationships between husbands and wives. As such, this suggests that ‘fear’ and ‘love’ provided a comprehensive early modern language of government and

215 Richard Burton, *The Apprentices Companion, Containing Plain and Useful Directions for Servants, especially Apprentices, how to perform their Particular Dutys to their Masters, so as to please God. And discovering such Sins and Vices which are the Common Hinderances to them therein* (London, 1681), pp. 6, 8.
216 Ibid., pp. 7, 37.
217 Ibid., pp. 49-51.
authority at various levels. Through affective language, normative accounts of early modern households showed them to be simultaneously authoritarian and loving. While the obedience of subordinates was both expected and divinely sanctioned, both obedience and governance were ideally seen as acts of love. Both the general precepts for the restraint and expression of certain passions and affections, as well as the language in which they were described, persisted throughout the period. For example, with its precepts for ‘cheerful’ obedience, ‘fear’ of masters and condemnation of ‘sauciness’ and ‘over-familiarity’ with them, Crouch’s Apprentices Companion (1681) could have been written at any point in the previous two centuries. What had changed, however, was that Crouch’s text was explicitly advertised to and discussed a role at a lower level of social status, especially compared to the elite women’s roles prescribed by Vives in the early sixteenth century in his De institutione feminae Christianae, a text addressed to Catherine of Aragon for the education of Princess Mary. Following the trajectory of other early modern conduct literature, then, household advice evidenced the vernacularisation and social diffusion of humanist ideals by the end of the seventeenth century.

**POLITICAL ROLES**

Having discussed how affective language characterised different forms of household relationship, this section examines conduct books specifically targeted at a variety of public or political roles and offices. Early modern England was characterised by an expansive participatory structure of government, consisting of civil, judicial and ecclesiastical offices such as churchwardens, constables and justices of the peace at various parish, civic or county levels, and around five per cent of adult men held offices in any one year.\(^{218}\) Directly relating

the ideals of civility and *honestas* to the roles of publicly active men striving both for personal honour and the common good, Cicero’s *De officiis* was perfectly suited to the social and governmental context of early modern England. Here it should be re-emphasised that conduct books were not simply a literary form divorced from social practice, but instead were seen as practical guides for self-improvement through the proper performance of broadly recognised roles, offices and places.

For Cicero, men in positions of authority required the capacity for self-restraint in order to perform their offices properly and thereby preserve the social order. As L’Estrange translated in 1680, the responsibilities of ‘publique Officers’ meant they are subject to ‘greater Perturbations of Thought’ than those ‘in Privacy and Repose’.219 In Grimald’s 1556 translation, marginal headings helpfully pinpointed to readers the ‘Affections, which rulers ought to resist’, including ‘Mynding of private profite’, ‘Injustice’, ‘Discorde’, ‘False accusation’, ‘Ambition’, ‘Dissension’, ‘Anger’, ‘Frowardnes’ and ‘Malice’.220 Many of these ‘affections’ focused on the officeholder’s fixation only on his own ‘commodities’ or in favouring one group’s sectional interests at the expense of society as a whole, such as ‘peoplepleasers’, on the one hand, or those who are ‘affectionate to nobilitie, but fewe to the holle’, on the other.221 Importantly, the magistrate should refrain from ‘anger’, ‘frowardness’ and ‘malice’. In place of anger towards the commonwealth’s internal and external enemies, governors should show both ‘myldnesse’ and ‘noble corage’, lest at the slightest provocation they fall into frowardness and ‘a testifenesse of minde’ that is both ‘unprofitable’ and ‘hatefull’.222 Yet this does not mean that magistrates should show ‘meeknes’ and ‘mercie’, but rather that all punishment must be ‘voide of malice’ and done only for the ‘commonweales

221 *Ibid.*, ff. 33v-34r.
222 *Ibid.*, ff. 34v-35r.
Here Cicero explicitly rejected Aristotelian views of anger as ‘profitable given of nature’ and the spurs to virtuous action. Instead, in Grimald’s words, Cicero cautioned that ‘in all cases, that affecction is to bee refused’, for the ‘angrie man, that gothe about ponnishment, shall never keepe that measure, that is bitwene to mickle, & to litle’, and justice should be based only on ‘equitie’, rather than to satisfy ‘wrath’. As such, for Cicero – or his early modern translators – an officeholder’s personal capacity for self-restraint (honestas) and the subsequent performance of his public duties were understood in affective terms. Most strikingly, as has been shown, Grimald listed the governor’s negative qualities as well as their subsequent negative social and political effects as ‘affections’, suggesting that the performance of public office and the state of the body politic were both understood in affective terms.

Although it was first published three years before the first English translation of Cicero’s De officiis, Elyot’s Boke Named the Governour (1531), framed officeholding in Ciceronian terms, and this text was a core means for the vernacularisation and appropriation of the Ciceronian ideals of moderation and honestas. As Cathy Shrank has argued, the Governour was part of Elyot’s humanist objective to improve individuals and the ‘nation’ more widely by reinvigorating classical behavioural ideals and ‘augmenting’ the English vernacular with classical neologisms. In this text, Elyot stated that ‘to hym that is a governoure of a publike weale/ belongeth a double governaunce’: an ‘inwarde governaunce’ over ‘his affectes & passions/ which do inhabite within his soule/ & be subjectes to reason’, and an ‘outwarde governaunce’ over ‘his children/ his servauntes/ and other subjectes to his autoritie’. For Elyot’s governor or public officeholder, then, the capacity for self-

223 Ibid., f. 35r.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid., f. 35r-v.
227 Elyot, Boke named the Gouernour, f. 196r.
government was the basis for the government of his household and the ‘public weal’ or society. As such, Elyot appropriated Cicero’s view that the ‘moderation’ of ‘wrath or appetite of vengeaunce’ is also central to the governor’s administration of justice.\textsuperscript{228} When meting out punishment, Elyot counselled, governors should not be ‘chaufed or meved with wrath’ or ‘provokedde’ with ‘displeasure’, but must have ‘pacience’ and act only according to ‘equite’.\textsuperscript{229}

As well as viewing the governor’s official duties in affective, Ciceronian terms, Elyot also appropriated the concept of honestas, with its focus on appropriate affective display, to describe the ideal governor’s general behaviour. This outward behaviour, Elyot claimed, should express ‘Majestie’, by which he meant ‘a beautie or comelynesse in his countenance/ langage/ & gesture apt to his dignite/ and accommodate to time/ place/ & company’.\textsuperscript{230} While majesty pertained to the governor’s exalted status, for Elyot it lay not in ‘haulte or fierce countenaunce/ nor in speche outrageous or arrogant’, but rather ‘in honorable and sobre demeanure’ and ‘an excellent temperance’ in speech, without ‘rudenesse’, ‘dishonestie’ or ‘inordinate jangling’.\textsuperscript{231} As such, Elyot’s ‘majesty’ was honestas entwined with governance. By these means, in Elyot’s idealistic view, the governor’s behaviour would impart the ‘pleasaunt & terrible reverence’ in inferiors that preserved the social order.\textsuperscript{232} Conversely, succumbing to unrestrained ‘furie’ reduces a man of ‘nobilitie’ to a ‘horrible figure’: his face contorted with ‘rancour’ and his speech an animalistic ‘roryng and brayienge’ of ‘despitefull’ words.\textsuperscript{233} Unrestrained ‘passion’, in other words, causes a man to lose both his ‘reason’ and his social ‘astate or condition’.\textsuperscript{234} Therefore, as an appropriation of Ciceronian thought,
Elyot’s *Boke Named the Governour* framed the performance of public office, the personal capacities that qualified someone to serve in that office and the societal effects of the performance of office in terms of passions and affections. Government itself, in this view, was entwined with feeling.

Written at the end of the sixteenth century, King James VI of Scotland’s *Basilikon Doron* provided ‘Instructions’ for his eldest son and heir apparent, Henry, on the duties of a king and ‘the behaviour in your own person’. Opening the treatise, James noted conventionally that ‘As he cannot be thought worthie to rule and command others, that cannot rule and dantone his owne proper affections and unreasonable appetites, so can he not be thought worthie to governe a Christian people ... that in his owne person and harte, feareth not and loveth not the Divine Majestie’. In other words, it was as much a commonplace for James that the capacity for self-government, and a properly directed religious faith, preceded government over others. Importantly, both commonplaces centred on the capacity for appropriate feeling, whether in the ‘love’ and ‘fear’ of the king’s only superior, God, or in his moderation of ‘affections’ and ‘appetites’. Relating these conventional precepts to the various duties of kings, James advised his son that the king’s affective expressions should be appropriate to the social, spatial and temporal context, such as acting ‘gravelie & with a majestie’ when sitting in judgement; ‘homely, when ye are in private with your owne servantes’; ‘merelie [merrily], when ye are at any pastime or merrie discourse’; and showing ‘courage’ and ‘magnanimitie’ in his ‘countenance’ during times of war. Generally, for James the cardinal virtue of temperance was central to the role of a king, both as a means to ‘command all the affections & passions of your minde’, and also to moderate all the ‘actions’ that result from them. On the subject of the administration of justice, James

cited Cicero’s *De officiis* when instructing Henry that ‘true Magnanimitie’ consisted in ‘thinking your offender not worthie of your wrath, empyring over your owne passion, and triumphing in the commanding your selfe to forgive’.\(^{239}\) Yet James then immediately added the Aristotelian and biblical gloss about the utility of properly moderated passion, noting that ‘husbanding the effectes of your courage and wrath’ means they can be ‘rightly employed’ against ‘injuries within’ and ‘in revenging injuries without, by just warres upon forraigne enemies’\(^{240}\). As such, despite explicitly criticising ‘that Stoick insensible stupiditie’ or the valorisation of impassivity, the *Basilikon Doron* discussed the role of a king in recognisable terms to any English readers who had read and translated *De officiis* in grammar school or elsewhere.\(^{241}\) Either way, for James kingly office was fundamentally related to the expression and repression of feelings depending on the context.

So far, this section has only focused on humanist treatments of elite public roles. Although such texts had broad appeal as discussions of Ciceronian behavioural ideals, another genre of conduct literature directly provided practical advice for officeholders at lower levels. Mostly, these texts were not moral philosophical works prescribing ideal forms of social behaviour, but instead practical guides on the statutory duties and responsibilities of state officeholders. However, although they were ostensibly technical texts, early modern officers’ manuals still framed the characters of suitable officers, the manner of their assumption of the office, their performance of office and the feelings they stirred in others in affective terms. For instance, the lawyer William Lambarde’s *Eirenarcha: or Of the Office of the Justices of Peace* (1581) noted that justices must be men of ‘substance’ and wealth, otherwise ‘povertie’ makes them both ‘covetous & contemptible’, and that they must swear oaths in order ‘to set God continually before their eyes’, which will ‘strengthen their minds,

\(^{239}\) Ibid., p. 95.  
\(^{240}\) Ibid.  
\(^{241}\) Ibid., p. 97.
and arme their currencies, against the force of humane affections, whiche otherwise might allure & draw them out of the way’. The barrister William Sheppard’s *Offices and Duties of Constables* (1641) claimed that ‘honesty’ makes a man ‘fit’ for office and ‘likely to execute his office truly, without ill affection, or partiality. And therefore it seems, a scandalous liver, a malitious and contentious man cannot be a fit man’. In another text, *The Whole Office of the Country Justice of Peace* (1650), Sheppard also outlined the ideal qualities of a justice of the peace: he needed to possess the ‘Reputation, Power, and Ranke’ that elevated him above those under his authority; he required understanding and good judgement; he had to be ‘A man fearing God, not a man wicked in life and conversation’; and he required the ‘Courage’ to undertake the office and lay aside ‘aside all partiality, respect of persons, base fear, foolish pity, sinfull favour, and malice, unnecessary delay, precipitate rashness, and self-seeking’. Half a century later, Robert Gardiner’s *Compleat Constable* (1692) similarly noted that the ideal constable should have both a competent estate and the qualities of ‘Honesty’, ‘Ability’ and ‘understanding’ that enable him to perform his office ‘truly and diligently, without Malice, Affection, or Partiality’. As such, for these writers affective language pejoratively described the causes of malperformance of office, such as the extremes of ‘affection’ and ‘malice’, that deviated from the impartial and dispassionate ideal. They also echoed the Ciceronian sanctions against ambition (or ‘self-seeking’) and the importance of the cardinal virtue of ‘courage’ (or ‘magnanimity’) that combatted against undue affection in office.

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244 William Sheppard, *The Whole Office of the Country Justice of Peace. Wherein is plainly set down all their Power and Duty both in and out of the Quarter Sessions. The First Part Containing their Power and Duty out of the Sessions* (London, 1650), sig. A6r–A8r.

245 Robert Gardiner, *The Compleat Constable. Directing All Constables, Headboroughs, Tithingmen, Churchwardens, Overseers of the Poor, Surveyors of the Highways, and Scavengers, in the Duty of their several Offices, according to the Power allowed them by the Laws and Statutes: Continued to this present Time, 1692. Also Directions for the London Constables. To which is added, A Treatise of Warrants and Commitments, proper for the Knowledge of All Constables, &c.* (London, 1692), p. 7.
These same notions of social fitness and the correct affective temperament for officeholders were also expressed in the anonymous *An Ease for Overseers of the Poore* (1601), which explicitly appropriated Ciceronian ideals of officeholding for a middling readership. As Steve Hindle has shown, this manual focused on the demeanour of overseers of the poor, an annually elected parish officer charged with poor relief, that would allow them to perform their offices between the opposing extremes of granting the poor too much freedom or governing them too rigorously. Yet the overseer’s role was also bound up with prescriptions on appropriate passions and affections. For example, the author conventionally claimed that those who are ‘fitte’ to be overseers of the poor must be ‘substantiall men’, by which he means those with ‘wealth’, ‘wit’, ‘wisdome’ and the ‘Care of a good conscient[e]’.

Mixing social and affective status, these ‘substantial’ qualities were instrumental not only in allowing the overseer to perform his office, but also in the feelings and obedience they caused in those whom he was overseeing by which order would be maintained. Wealth, for instance, added ‘grace & majestie to a man’, while ‘povertie’ made him ‘dispiseable’.

Following King James’ contemporaneous advice, the author claimed that a person is not ‘fit to be made Governour over others, which wants discretion to governe himselfe’. While a ‘discrete’ officeholder is ‘feared’, a ‘foolish’ one will be ‘skorned’. By a ‘good conscience’, the author meant the overseer’s ‘feare’ of God, which gave him the ‘diligence’ that moderates between negligent and domineering extremes. The ideal ‘discrete government’ of an overseer, according to the author, consisted of a mean between ‘rigorous dealing’, ‘raling’, ‘reviling’ and ‘abusing the poore’, which because ‘a busie bodie is hated’ is self-defeating, and an

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247 *An ease for overseers of the poore: Abstracted from the statutes, allowed by practise, and now reduced into Forme, as a necessarie Directorie for Imploying, Releeuing and ordering of the poore* (London, 1601), pp. 9-10.


overseer that is ‘too milde’ cannot ‘animate the idle: for where the officer hath not a countenance mixt with some austeritie the poore will presume too much of libertie’. In other words, both the overseer’s own actions and the desired feelings they instil to ‘animate’ the poor and earn their respect were conceptualised and described in affective terms. They also followed the same pattern as the authority of householders over their servants, which likewise described the ‘hate’ caused by overweening authority. The author also repeated the Ciceronian precept to ‘sequester all malice from the office ... for it is a common fault in these daies that men will revenge their private displeasures under colour of their office’. Going further, the author claimed that ‘it is not onely an abuse to the office, but a sin in overseers to be tainted with malice’ and ‘ill affected’.

First published 1618, the barrister and JP Michael Dalton’s Countrey Justice similarly outlined the statutory duties of justices of the peace, and was clearly an immensely popular and useful guide, as a nineteenth edition was printed as late as 1746. Like the other officeholders’ manuals, Dalton’s Countrey Justice framed passions and affections as irrational forces that pervert the course of justice. For instance, Dalton contrasted the ‘just and meete’ performance of the JP’s duty with unjust actions proceeding from ‘malice’ or ‘other corruption’. Justices of the peace, he claimed, cannot properly execute their office if they ‘Feare ... the power or countenance of another’; ‘Favour’ and ‘seek to please their friend, neighbour, or others’; or if their acts are motivated by ‘Hatred or malice’. Likewise, justice is perverted by the ‘Covetousnesse’ of those who expect a fee or reward, or the ‘Precipitation, or too much rashnesse’ of a JP. Above all, for Dalton, ‘Perturbation of mind, as anger, or

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252 Ibid., p. 28.
253 Ibid., p. 13.
255 Michael Dalton, The Countrey Justice, conteyning the practise of the Justices of the Peace out of their Sessions. Gathered for the better helpe of such justices of Peace as haue not beene much conversant in the studie of the Lawes of this Realme (London, 1618), sig. A5v.
256 Ibid., p. 4.
257 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
such like passion’ was inherently antithetical to justice. In short, the ideal justice of the peace acted rationally, dispassionately and knowledgeably. Yet Dalton did also claim that justices could not properly perform their office without the ‘feare of God’ and ‘love of Truth and Justice’, which suggests that certain justified and well-directed feelings were considered to be inherent to the role, but that these positive feelings were not categorised as ‘passions’ or ‘perturbations’.

In 1693 the press licenser and Sussex JP Edmund Bohun outlined the virtues requisite for an ideal justice or, more generally, any ‘publick person’. In so doing, Bohun combined ‘Natural Abilities’, such as intelligence, memory and judgement; ‘Civil Abilities’, such as a good education, estate and reputation; and ‘Politick Qualifications’, such as a knowledge and ‘Love’ of true religion, the English government and the nature of the English people. As such, these categories included the JP’s innate characteristics, place in society and conformity with the post-Glorious Revolution religious and political settlement. To these, Bohun added the ideal ‘Moral Qualifications’, which included the behavioural virtues of ‘Prudence’, ‘Patience’, ‘Meekness’, ‘Sobriety’, ‘Chastity’, ‘Industry’, ‘Courage’, ‘Honesty’ and ‘Humility’, and the ‘Publick Qualifications’ of a ‘Love of Justice’ and ‘Aversion’ of ‘Favour’, ‘Hatred’, ‘Covetousness’, ‘Laziness’ and the ‘Irregular Heats’ and ‘Hopes’ that pervert the course of justice. While the former included virtues that either moderated behaviour or gave the JP the capacity to act appropriately, Bohun framed the ‘public qualifications’ in terms of rightly ordered passions and affections that enabled him to perform his office. Ultimately, these qualities preserved peace and social order. In Bohun’s view, ‘honesty’ made ‘a man’s Conversation Safe and Profitable, Easie and Delightful’, earning the justice the ‘respect’ and

258 Ibid., p. 4.
259 Ibid.
261 Ibid., ‘To the Making of a Good Justice of the Peace these Things are required’.
262 Ibid.
‘Confidence’ of his equals, the ‘Love and Reverence’ of his inferiors, and his own ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’ mind. Coupled with learning and a good estate, these qualities lessen the ‘Envy’ among the ‘common People’, who ‘Repine’ at being ruled by men of no estate, ‘Civility’ or ‘Vertue’, from which spring unrest and, ultimately, civil war. Therefore, the social, economic and affective qualities of justices of the peace allow them not only to perform their individual offices, but also instilled the proper feelings in those under their authority that was thought to prevent the fabric of the nation from unravelling.

CONCLUSION

Focusing on early modern conduct literature, this chapter has argued that passions and affections were an inherent part of how writers viewed different sorts of idealised social relationships and the social practices that constituted and defined those relationships. As texts vernacularising and appropriating the humanist ideals of civility and honestas, which denoted the ability to express the appropriate feelings depending on the social context, the general trend throughout these texts was one of continuity. However, the key change over time was the explicit diffusion of these ideals throughout the social scale, for both men and women. There was an explicit link between the restraint of socially inappropriate feelings and the expression of ideal feelings across a broad range of roles, whether in the inherent relationship between self-government and the authority and government of others, or in the self-management of oneself and one’s household. Yet at the same time, these texts did not focus solely on the repression of negative feelings, as historians have described, but also on the expression of warm and positive feelings. As such, this chapter suggests that the ideals of civility and honestas, at this conceptual and didactic level, also valorised warmer feelings.

263 Ibid., pp. 54, 62.
264 Ibid., pp. 15, 19.
of ‘love’ and friendliness. However, this rose-tinted view is tempered by an understanding of ‘love’ and ‘cheerfulness’ as expressions of superiority and subordination, and even acts of ‘corrective’ violence could be framed as acts of love.

For the early modern period, historians have not specifically focused on conduct literature as a source for the history of emotions since Elias, perhaps due to Rosenwein’s convincing criticism of Elias’ use of these sources to formulate his grand narrative of the ‘civilizing process’. However, if early modern conduct literature is broadly taken as a source for the explicit discussion of ideal practices and behaviour, and how they were understood by early modern people to be based in the management of negative feelings and valorisation of positive feelings, then they are a vital source for understanding early modern views of the relationship between passion, action and social practice. However, these sources represent the ideals of how they should be played out in practice, but not necessarily how they were. As such, it is therefore important, as Gowing, Shepard and Withington have done, to couple the study of didactic sources with accounts of actual social practice. The following two chapters, then, match this didactic literature with judicial sources, revealing how the idealised norms in conduct literature provided the framework and language of those disputes, but also how practice deviated from these norms when relationships broke down.
CHAPTER 4

PASSIONS AND HOUSEHOLD ROLES

In early modern thought, as was shown in the previous chapter, there was a direct link between political and household governance and the self-government of passions and affections. Building on that study, this chapter uses church court records in order to examine how social practice either adhered to or deviated from these ideals found in didactic sources. Historians such as Ulinka Rublack and Katie Barclay have studied the role of emotions in judicial contexts, such as how judgements about behaviour in court influenced verdicts of guilt and innocence.¹ Stephanie Tarbin has used early modern legal sources as a means to access ‘accounts of behaviour and feelings’ in order to study different forms of relationship, such as female friendship and parent-child relationships.² Fay Bound Alberti and Bailey have both used court records to identify emotional language and its strategic use in judicial contexts, with a particular focus on how certain emotions played a role in determining innocence or guilt. For instance, they have demonstrated how ‘malice’ referred to ‘a range of mutually reinforcing matters including action, character, emotion, and true disposition’, the use of which in legal settings was one of the ‘legally constitutive elements of a suit’, rather than simply an unmediated account of social interaction.³ In other words, proving the presence of ‘malice’ or ‘anger’ determined whether certain words or actions were justiciable.⁴ Similarly, Daniel Lord Smail has shown that in late medieval France ‘hatred’ was understood

in legal contexts to provide a recognisable ‘social script’ for actions such as feuding, initiating legal action and deposing falsely against one’s enemies, meaning that, in that judicial context, negative emotions were bound up with notions of illicit action.5

Developing these discussions, this chapter identifies affective language in early modern church court records and then analyses how social practice and the performance of household roles were conceptualised, described and contested using this language. As such, it is not a history of the early modern household or marriage per se, but rather a study of the contextual use of affective language in judicial sources and what it can tell us about ideal early modern behavioural norms and actual social practice.

Historians have used church court separation suits in order to study the household, patriarchal authority and masculinity in early modern England. Aiming to regulate morality, restore social harmony and protect the rights of the church, church courts dealt with non-criminal cases concerning morality, slander, sex and marriage cases, as well as cases relating to church property, religious uniformity and the church’s financial rights to tithes.6 Unlike other courts, church courts were a less restricted venue for women to issue litigation and the proportion of female litigants increased throughout the early modern period.7 While most matrimonial suits litigated the formation of marriage, focusing on matters such as the legitimacy of marriages due to age, consanguinity or breaches of contract, historians have studied the numerically fewer cases about marital breakdown in order to study gender roles and early modern marriage as an institution.8 For instance, Margaret Hunt studied early-

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7 Gowing, Domestic Dangers, pp. 11-12.
8 Ingram, Church Courts, Sex and Marriage, p. 171.
eighteenth-century cruelty cases in the London consistory court, tying domestic abuse to the ‘direct and unequivocal’ authority of husbands over their wives.9 Susan Amussen has situated marital violence in the context of the inherent association of the right to commit violence and the establishment and maintenance of patriarchal authority in wider early modern politics and society, although ideally this authority was ‘quiet’ and harmonious.10 Focusing on the relationship between masculinity and marital violence, Elizabeth Foyster has argued that marital violence could either uphold authority and ‘male honour’ or undermine it, as excessive violence and ‘passion’ also revealed a loss of the self-mastery associated with patriarchal manhood.11 Gowing has outlined gender ‘ideologies’, centring on women’s subordination and obedience, in normative literature, and subsequently shown how these ideologies informed social practice and its invocation and contestation by litigants and witness in church court records.12 As she has shown, husbands sued their wives for adultery, while wives sued their husbands on grounds of violence.13 By contrast, this chapter uses matrimonial suits as sources in which social practice was described and contested, and so can be used to understand how social practice was conceptualised and described through affective language. In so doing, it focuses not only on the relationship between husbands and wives, but also encompasses relationships between masters, mistresses and servants.

However, while church court records offer a window into everyday life in early modern England, their very existence is owed to breakdowns of the ordinary pattern of social relationships that were serious and atypical enough to have led to litigation. As such, historians have shown that legal records more generally should be read contextually

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12 Gowing, *Domestic Dangers*.
according to the social and institutional circumstances in which they were created. This is especially the case for a society as litigious as early modern England, in which ordinary people had knowledge and skill in strategically using the law.\textsuperscript{14} Historians have stressed that the accounts in judicial records are ‘legal narratives’ that are simultaneously products of the strategy of individuals and their attempts to appear credible by invoking normative tropes and ideologies, as well as products of the language, structures and proceedings of legal institutions that mediated those accounts.\textsuperscript{15} In this sense, as Derek Neal has noted, the court and legal process represents the intersection of the ‘individual’, who ‘sets the process of litigation in motion’, and the ‘institution’, which ‘defines the terms’ by which the dispute can be described and conceptualised.\textsuperscript{16} Yet historians have also emphasised the utility of legal records and the language used within them for accessing culture and society in early modern England. Joanne Bailey and Frances Dolan have both argued that judicial accounts provide access to the words and worldviews of people at the time, and that historians have exaggerated the extent to which testimony was mediated by institutions.\textsuperscript{17} As Dolan has argued, ‘Legal terms were not alien to many litigants, imposed on them from above, but part of the vocabulary through which they understood the world and through which they apprehended themselves as aggrieved’.\textsuperscript{18} As Bailey has shown in relation to the concept of ‘malice’, which referred to ‘a range of mutually reinforcing matters including action, character, emotion, and true disposition’, the semantics of emotional language were shared

\textsuperscript{14} Craig Muldrew, \textit{The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England} (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 199-271.
\textsuperscript{18} Dolan, \textit{True Relations}, p. 120.
across legal and ‘extralegal’ contexts, meaning that the use of affective language in court reflected general usage.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, while the accounts in judicial records were clearly mediated, there was no clear distinction between everyday and legal terminology, which mutually interacted with and influenced the other.

In light of these discussions of the utility of early modern legal records and their place in society in general, this chapter studies the uses of affective language in church court separation suits in order to understand its relationship to social practice and the performance of household roles. It examines the 27 York church court cases, dating between 1551 and 1697, that were explicitly labelled as ‘cruelty’ cases. However, as the courts were abolished by parliament in 1640, and reintroduced in 1661 with the re-establishment of the Church of England following the Restoration, there was a two-decade gap without cases in the mid-seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{20} Through these cases, the chapter first analyses how affective language related to accusations of marital mistreatment and violence in general throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Accusations of abuse were suffused in affectivity, but this chapter argues that these accusations and discussions of them in church court records followed a recognisable pattern that linked passion to character, motivation, action and the proper and improper performance of household roles. It also shows that these linkages remained across the period, demonstrating continuities in conceptualisations of the role played by affectivity in behaviour. However, despite this continuity in affective concepts, the language in which they were used in church court records became increasingly standardised after the court was re-established after its 20-year hiatus, although in both the pre- and post-Civil War periods the centrality of passions and affections in notions of character, motivation, action and the performance of social roles was recognised by the court.

\textsuperscript{19} Bailey, ‘Most Hevynesse and Sorowe’, pp. 18, 13.
Following this discussion of affective language, maltreatment and violence from across the period, the chapter conducts six case studies of particular separation suits over time that all hinged on the relationship between affective language, behaviour and the performance of household roles. The first case study is a suit and countersuit of Sir Rowland Stanley and his wife Lady Ursula on grounds of adultery and cruelty in 1561, which revolved around the propriety of Stanley’s relationship with his servants, as well as on malicious feelings of some of the servants towards their mistress. The second case study focuses on a 1563 dispute in which Geoffrey Rishton countered his wife Alice’s claims of violence and neglect with accusations that she was an unfaithful and disobedient wife, an improvident mistress and a neglectful mother. The third case study focuses on Anne Brown’s 1587 cruelty case against her husband Thomas for cruelty, which contested the justification and intensity of Brown’s physical ‘correction’ and whether it was a necessary and permitted part of his role as a husband. Following a gap of almost nine decades, during which time the church courts were disbanded for 21 years, the fourth case study, focusing on the 1670s suit of Jane Currer against her husband Henry, combines issues of extreme violence, neglect, financial impropriety, and reveals a common and pejorative use of affective language of ‘kindness’ to describe improper relationships between men and women, particularly of different social status. The fifth case study, Grace Allenson’s 1676 suit against her husband Charles, centred on how marital abuse prevented her from performing her roles as wife, mistress and mother and disrupting the correct household order. The final case study, focusing on Anne Shaw’s 1696-7 separation suit against her husband Robert, neatly encapsulates the inherent relationship between passion, character, motivation and action, both in the words of the litigants and the witness who testified on their behalf. Across all these case studies it is shown that the use of affective language continued over time and reveals a common and persistent early modern understanding of social practice that was inherently affective.
AFFECTIVE LANGUAGE AND MARITAL VIOLENCE

In the 1570s or 1580s, Elizabeth Hardwick of Bolton (East Riding) alleged in the York church court that her husband Robert had ‘often mysused’ her ‘in cruell manner’ throughout their 16-year marriage.21 Although Elizabeth had already complained to the court several years earlier about her husband’s abuse, Hardwick had continued his ‘evell’ behaviour, and now Elizabeth informed the court that his ‘crueltye’ was ‘to[o] intollerable ... to beare’.22 After he had ‘cruelly beaten hir’, Elizabeth alleged, Hardwick had evicted her from his household, forcing her to spend a winter’s night in January in an ‘ownt howse’.23 Despite her ‘greate feare of further harme’, Elizabeth informed the court, she had still wished for ‘reconciliatyon’ with her husband and so had returned to him.24 However, ‘after manye Railinge and cruell wordes’, Hardwick not only ‘fell into his old extremitye’ but even ‘muche encreased it’.25 Allegedly, he grabbed her by the throat and would have strangled her but his ‘rage’ was ‘partelie staied by two wenches there present’.26 At this time, Elizabeth alleged, Hardwick drew his ‘woode knife’ and swore ‘terrible othes that he wolde slea hir’.27 In ‘dispaire of hir life’, Elizabeth fled the house and went into a wood, where she was found by the constable.28 The constable and other ‘neighboures’, who had heard of the ‘dysorder’ at Hardwick’s house, found him there ‘still raginge withe his woode knife in his handes, and swearing that he wolde washe his handes in his bloude that lodged hir that nighte’.29 Preceding this account of life-threatening violence in her bill of complaint to the court, Elizabeth claimed that despite the ‘good portion’ she had brought into the marriage – £80 in goods and an annuity of £4 – Hardwick was ‘a man of verye litle Substaunce’ who had not provided her ‘compitent meate

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
and drinke and other the duties of a husbande’. As such, by his cruel treatment and material neglect, Hardwick had doubly failed in his ‘duties’ and role as a husband, leaving Elizabeth with no choice but to sue him for separation.

Although nothing survives beyond Elizabeth Hardwick’s allegations, this case still offers a good example of how affective language was used in this judicial context to describe the causes, instances and effects of marital violence and abuse. Elizabeth’s case demonstrates how the language of passions and affections was used in judicial contexts to describe character, motivation and action, as well as the consequences of that action. For instance, the repeated refrain of ‘cruelty’ indicated both the motivation of Robert Hardwick’s abuse and its intensity in practice. In the case of verbal abuse, ‘cruelty’ was coupled with ‘railing’, while the intensity of Hardwick’s physical abuse was described by ‘rage’ and ‘extremity’. The consequences of Hardwick’s ‘misuse’ were likewise described in affective terms, as Elizabeth described her ‘great greife’ at her husband’s maltreatment of her. In this legal context, Elizabeth also used affective language to frame her own character and actions in ideal terms. Despite her great and justified ‘fear’ of violence, by invoking ‘reconciliation’ Elizabeth showed that her interests and those of the court were aligned. Although church courts could grant ‘separation from bed and board’, allowing still-married wives and husbands to live apart, the church’s goal was reconciliation, thereby preserving the marriages and households that structured society as a whole. However, the court would grant separation if marital abuse could be proved to be life threatening. As such, by repeatedly invoking her husband’s ‘cruelty’, and the ‘despair of her life’ that cruelty put her into, Elizabeth showed that her marriage was irreparable and that separation was the only remaining option. Therefore, while each cruelty case, including Elizabeth’s, contained grisly descriptions of verbal and

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Gowing, Domestic Dangers, p. 181; Houlbrooke, Church Courts and the People, pp. 67-8.
physical abuse that were specific to those individual cases, the use of affective language to conceptualise and describe character, motivation, action and the proper or improper performance of household roles was a connecting thread between the cases. The rest of this section of the chapter outlines this common thread in other cases across the period.

Unlike Elizabeth Hardwick’s discontinued or partially surviving case, Alice Cockson’s earlier successful separation suit demonstrated that the use of affective language to describe the enactment and intensity of marital violence was convincing to the court. In 1551 Alice accused her husband Robert of ‘beatinge her veraie sore and out of measure and drawing his dagger at her like as he wolde have slaine her’.33 This account of violence ‘out of measure’, which invoked the normative linking of moderation and ‘corrective’ violence discussed in the previous chapter, was corroborated by the servants in Cockson’s house in Wakefield. Janet Warren, for example, deposed that she had often seen her master ‘unreasonably beate and entreate’ his wife.34 Her fellow servant John Dockray also deposed that he had witnessed Cockson ‘unresonablye’ beating and ‘mysusynge’ his wife ‘aboute hir hede with his ffyste’.35 Janet Brian, a servant who slept in the same parlour as her master and mistress, likewise claimed to have heard Cockson ‘unreasonably use’ his wife ‘in bunshing and nypping hir in hir bedde’.36 For instance, in April 1550 Brian had awoken when her mistress gave a ‘great skryke’ as Cockson had ‘Ryven hir side with his nayles’ and said threateningly, ‘thowe snorest in thy slepe/ And I wolde I had a knyf’.37 Consequently, Brian claimed that Alice was ‘brought in suche a feare’ that despite ‘all the warme clothes’ that were brought to her, she ‘coulde not bringe hir to hir self agayne’ and was ‘more like to dye than to lyve’.38 Here Brian’s association of fear and coldness – and the remedy of warm clothing – accorded with

33 BIA: CP.G.3401, Alice Cockson c. Robert Cockson (1551), articles of Alice Cockson.
34 Ibid., deposition of Janet Warren.
35 Ibid., deposition of John Dockray.
36 Ibid., deposition of Janet Brian.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
contemporary Galenic medical theory. In Sir Thomas Elyot’s humanist medical treatise, *The Castel of Helthe* (1539), published just over a decade earlier, for instance, ‘Fearfulnes’, ‘Slownesse in actes’ and a weak pulse were all symptoms of a heart ‘distempered’ with ‘cold’.39 In Alice and the servants’ accounts, then, references to actions ‘out of measure’ and the adverb ‘unreasonably’ described the intensity of Cockson’s abuse, showing that it could not have been the reasonable ‘correction’ that was normatively understood to be part of his role as a husband. Ultimately, the repeated invocation that Cockson’s abuse was ‘unreasonable’ and life-threatening, supported by the understandings of the psychosomatic effects of passion on physical health, convinced the court, which granted Alice separation from her husband in December 1551.

While the references to unreasonable and unmeasured violence in Alice Cockson’s successful separation suit described the intensity of her husband’s specific acts of violence, in other cases the motivation for such actions was conceptualised and described in terms of passions and affections. For example, in 1597 Margaret Towers of Tarvin (Cheshire) alleged that she had been ‘sore beaten’ and ‘evell intreate[d]’ by her husband John, even while she was pregnant, leaving her ‘in such great feare of her lyfe’ that she was ‘afrayde to cohabite with him’ any longer, much to her ‘greate greefe’.40 Directly attributing this abuse to her husband’s passion, Margaret recounted that her husband, ‘not having his fury towardes her appeased by extreme beating of her’, but ‘still continewinge in his envious mynd towardes … his wyffe’, evicted and ‘thrust her furthe of his howse’.41 Additionally, having ‘alienated his affecion from her’, Margaret alleged, Towers also moved to ‘have his anger towardes her appeased’ by bribing a ‘boy’ servant with ‘a suite of Apparell’ and ‘one of his neighbours a scoope of barley’ to slander Margaret as an adulteress.42 Since her eviction from her

39 Elyot, *Castel of Helthe*, f. 5r.
40 BIA: HC.CP.1597/13, Margaret Towers c. John Towers (1597), articles of Margaret Towers.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
husband’s household, Margaret had been maintained by her ‘frendes and other good people’ – albeit ‘meanely’ – to their ‘great discontent of mynd’ and her own ‘discomfort’.

Answering these allegations, Towers claimed that Margaret had confessed herself to be an adulteress who had not ‘dutifully demeaned herselfe’ towards him ‘as his lovinge wife’, meaning he was ‘lothe to dwell with her’. As such, Margaret’s case focused on the relationships between passion, action and the performance of spousal roles. Towers’ physical abuse, false allegations of adultery and eviction of his wife had been motivated by his ‘anger’, ‘envy’, ‘fury’, alienated ‘affection’ and his ‘owtragious’ mind against her. The material effect of this was the breakup of his household and his refusal to fulfil his role in maintaining Margaret, much to her ‘grief’, ‘fear’, ‘discomfort’ and her relations’ ‘discontent’. Cementing this link between affectivity and spousal roles, Towers’ defence centred on Margaret’s alleged marital malperformance as a ‘loving’ and ‘dutiful wife’. Therefore, feeling, action and the discussion and contestation of the proper performance of roles were all entwined in this judicial context.

The combination of affective language, action and the improper performance of spousal roles also formed the core of other church court cases. In 1610 Dorothy Wyrley accused her husband, the antiquary and officer of arms William Wyrley, of ‘great severitye’ and assaulting her ‘in verie furyous and daingerous maner … with his Dagger Drawne’. Dorothy claimed that Wyrley was ‘a lunatike person and not able to governe himselfe’, and so his inability to perform the ‘Dutie’ he owed to ‘his wiffe’ had put her into ‘suche feare and danger of her liffe as she darre not Cohabite and Dwell with him’ any longer. Similarly, in 1624 Elizabeth Cowlton alleged that immediately after their marriage 14 years earlier, her

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., personal answer of John Towers.
45 Ibid., articles of Margaret Towers.
46 BIA: CP.H.3860, Dorothy Wyrley c. William Wyrley (1610), articles of Dorothy Wyrley.
47 Ibid.
husband James ‘did alienate and estrange his mind from the love’ he should have felt for her, and instead gave himself to drunkenness, and ‘in his drunken fitts did behave himselfe like a madd man, not able to guyde himselfe in word or deed’. Continuing, Elizabeth alleged that against the ‘mutuall love which ought to be betwixt man and wife’, Cowlton also ‘evill intreated’ his wife ‘in very uncivill fashion’ and ‘furiously beat her’ while she was pregnant, causing her to fall into labour and deliver her child ‘long before her tym to the great danger of her life’. Alleging some of the most heinous violence in any York separation suit, Elizabeth described how her husband ‘violently beat’ her ‘like a man destitute of all reason and common sence’ and threw her down ‘a payre of stayers’, which broke her back and caused her to ‘lay lame and at surgery’ for over three years. Such ‘cruelties and outrages’, Elizabeth claimed, meant that she no longer dared to live with her husband. Therefore, by stressing lunacy and madness, the cases against Wyrley and Cowlton both framed their alleged violence, ‘severity’ and ‘cruelty’ as an abdication of the self-government that was the ideological basis for patriarchal authority. Elizabeth also described her husband’s abuse as ‘uncivil’, showing the links between his ‘fury’, lack of restraint and ability to govern and ‘guide himself’ and well as alienated ‘love’ for his wife. Therefore, in this context civility denoted the combination of self-restraint and the cultivation of positive feelings such as love that together constituted the proper performance of spousal roles. Both cases, then, not only demonstrated the link between passion and action, but also between passion and the due performance of spousal roles.

So far, this section has only discussed the links between violence, spousal roles and the language of passions and affections in cases that predated the dissolution of the church courts in 1640. Following their re-establishment in 1661, the use of affective language in

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48 BIA: HC.CP.1624/3, Elizabeth Cowlton c. James Cowlton (1624), articles of Elizabeth Cowlton.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
church court records was subject to both continuity and change. On the one hand, passions and affections continued to be key to conceptualising and describing character, motivation and action. Yet, on the other hand, in post-Restoration church court records the use of affective language became increasingly standardised – using repeated and formulaic language in order to contrast how a wife had fulfilled the affective and behavioural ideals of her role, with the husband’s failure to meet those same ideals. For example, in Lady Mary Smithson’s 1679 allegations against her husband Sir Jerome Smithson, second baronet, the entwined languages of passion and virtue described her character, relationship with her husband and performance as a wife in ideal terms. In this church court record, the wife’s role involved the cultivation of positive feelings in her husband in the precept to ‘please’, ‘content’ and avoid ‘provoking’ him. The allegations began by describing Mary as ‘a person of a vertuous Life and Conversation’, who had ‘behaved her selfe with that duty and respect … that becomes a wife to a husband’ by always endeavouring ‘to please Content & avoyd provokeinge of him’. This was contrasted with allegations attributing Smithson’s ‘cruel’, ‘barbarous’ and ‘inhumane’ actions to his ‘aversion’, ‘disaffection’, ‘hatred’ and ‘malice’ for his wife. Despite Mary’s ideal qualities, Smithson allegedly expressed ‘his aversion disaffeccion and hatred’ for his wife in verbal abuse, such as using ‘most unbecoming Expressions to her’, ‘Curs[ing] her bitterly & bid[ding] God Damne her’ and ‘Chideinge and brawleing’ with her. Going further, the allegations claimed that ‘in further manifestacion of the hatred’ of Smithson for his wife, he ‘Cruelly’, ‘barbarously’ and ‘in a most unhumane manner’ beat her. In particular, Mary graphically recounted how her husband cut her face with a paire of Sissers or a knife from her Eye brow to her Lip’ while they were ‘in his

52 BIA: CP.H.3469, Lady Mary Smithson c. Sir Jerome Smithson, second baronet (1679), articles of Mary Smithson.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
Summarising this verbal and physical abuse at the end of her allegations, Mary outlined how her husband’s ‘malice & hated’ for her had been ‘soe inveterate’ that ‘scarce one day has passed’ wherein he had not committed ‘some act of Cruelty against her’. Consequently, she stressed the long-lasting temporality of this abuse by stating that her life had been ‘nothinge but a Continuall & unsupportable trouble and misery’. In other words, the language of passions and affections was central to the court’s descriptions of both motivation and the intensity of illicit action, as well as directly describing the proper and improper performance of spousal roles in affective terms.

This more formulaic use of affective language was echoed in Martha Brooke’s 1683 allegations against her husband, the Leeds gentleman Timothy Brooke. In this case, Martha was likewise described as a ‘vertuous’ wife who had shown ‘that duty and respect ... that becomes a Wife to her husband’, and had always endeavoured ‘to please content and avoid Provoaking’ him. However, in identical terms to Mary Smithson’s case, Martha’s ideal wifely qualities contrasted with her husband’s ‘aversion disaffection and hatred’ of her, which he verbally expressed in ‘most unbecoming expressions’, ‘bid[ding] God damne her for a Whore’ and by ‘ever Chideing and brawling with her’. Even worse, ‘in further Manifestacion of the hatred’ he had for his wife, Brooke ‘beate’ her ‘in most inhumane Manner’ and turned her out of his household. On one occasion, Martha alleged that when he was ‘in such Passion and rage’, Brooke had allegedly drawn his sword at her and ‘vowed and swore in great fury and rage if he could have found her he would have killed her’. Again, Martha’s allegations against her husband combined graphic accounts of marital abuse

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 BIA: CP.H.3516, Martha Brooke c. Timothy Brooke (1683), articles of Martha Brooke.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
specific to her case with these formulaic affective attributions of motivation and action, which were built into the legal language and structures of the post-Restoration church courts. Each new allegation began by describing the specific offence it outlined as ‘manifestation’ of Brook’s ‘hatred’. Therefore, the formulaic affective legal language of the post-Restoration church courts revealed the recognition by the institution of the central role of passions and affections in character, motivation, action and the performance of social roles and offices.

While this understanding of passions and affections had also permeated the pre-1640 court, it was now a standardised template for framing allegations of marital maltreatment in the records of the court, as can be seen in the three post-Restoration case studies later in this chapter. In other words, the legal language of the court explicitly recognised the link between passion, action and the performance of social roles.

Focusing on separation cases involving accusations of marital violence, this section has argued that the language of passions and affections was key to early modern people’s conceptualisations and descriptions of character, interpersonal relationships and the motivation, enaction or effects of behaviour in general and marital abuse in particular. In church court records, alienated ‘love’ was understood as both a cause and an effect of disordered spousal relationships. As has been shown, in 1597 Margaret Towers gave a detailed account ascribing ‘fury’, ‘envy’, ‘anger’ and estranged ‘affection’ as the impetus of her husband’s ‘evil’ treatment of her, while John Towers had defended himself by claiming that Margaret had not been a ‘loving’ and ‘dutiful’ wife. In 1624 Elizabeth Cowlton similarly attributed her husband’s alleged abuse to his estranged ‘love’, and also invoked the concept of civility to encompass notions of self-restraint, warm feelings and the performance of social roles. This use of civility was echoed in Grace Ballard’s 1634 allegation that her husband, William Ballard of Southwell (Nottinghamshire), had physically abused her ‘in violent
barbarous and uncivill manner’ and ‘without any remorse’.\textsuperscript{62} That same year, Richard Stephenson of Snaith (East Riding) was similarly sued for his ‘irreligious, uncivill, and barbarous’ treatment of his wife, Elizabeth, who ‘lived in daylie feare of her life’.\textsuperscript{63} As such, both Grace Ballard and Elizabeth Stephenson invoked the common early modern dichotomy of civil and ‘barbarous’ behaviour, and showed that the household was considered to be a site in which civility – which, as has already been demonstrated, encompassed appropriate behaviour and affective expression – was be put into practice in spousal and other household relationships.\textsuperscript{64} The consequences of marital abuse for wives were also described in affective language that stressed feelings of ‘discontent’, ‘discomfort’, ‘trouble’, ‘misery’ and the ‘fear’ of life and limb for which the court could grant separation. After the reinstitution of the church courts in the second half of the seventeenth century, this section has also argued, affective understandings of motivation and disordered spousal relationships became more ingrained in the legal language and structure of court records. Here each cruelty case contrasted the ‘pleasing’, ‘contenting’ and avoidance of ‘provocation’ that defined the ideal wifely role with the ‘hatred’, ‘disaffection’ and ‘malice’ characterising the feelings and motivating the illicit actions of delinquent husbands. Although throughout the period affective language continued to describe character, motivation and action in the context of marital violence, post-1661 their application in church court records had become more standardised and formulaic, although the disturbing accounts of violence continued to be specific to each case.

\textsuperscript{62} BIA: HC.CP.1634/6, Grace Ballard c. William Ballard (1634), articles of Grace Ballard.

\textsuperscript{63} BIA: HC.CP.1634/4, Elizabeth Stephenson c. Richard Stephenson (1634), articles of Elizabeth Stephenson.

Having outlined the relationship between affective language, violence and the performance of spousal roles from across the period, the remainder of this chapter comprises six case studies of particular separation suits over time that all centred on different aspects of the relationship between affective language, behaviour and the performance of household roles. The first of these case studies, consisting of the suit and countersuit brought by Sir Rowland Stanley and his wife Lady Ursula in 1561, particularly focuses on the propriety of Stanley’s relationship with his servants, as well as on malicious feelings of some of the servants towards their mistress. As such, this section emphasises the use of affective language to describe not only spousal roles, but also contractual relationships between masters, mistresses and servants.

Initiating the proceedings, Stanley sued his wife in the York church court for separation on grounds of adultery with Richard Hurleston, for which he had evicted her from his household, the Cheshire manor house Hooton Hall, on 23 April 1561. Stanley’s allegations seem to have been part of a wider feud with Hurleston. A year later, Hurleston would sue Stanley in Star Chamber for financial irregularities in mustering soldiers for service in Scotland, shirking his own military service and even plotting to murder him. The cause of this dispute possibly lay in religious differences. As members of the Cheshire gentry, both Stanley and Hurleston had served as justices of the peace for the county. However, described by Roger Virgoe as a ‘puritan’, Hurleston had been removed from this office in the mid-1550s under the Catholic government of Mary I. These roles would eventually be reversed in 1580, when Stanley’s name was included in a government list of ‘Justices of peace ... suspected to

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be Papistes’, and ‘Richard Hurleston esquier’ was listed as one of those ‘fitte’ to replace them.\(^{67}\) Either way, in 1561 Ursula soon responded to her husband’s accusations with allegations of her own. She claimed that Stanley had evicted her with ‘great woordes’, ‘muche crueltye’ and without cause; that he had committed adultery with two women, including her maidservant Ellen Thomason; that he had used violence to prevent her from exercising her governing role as mistress of the household; and that he suborned his servants to give false testimony against her.\(^{68}\) As such, Ursula’s allegations all related to Stanley’s household government, and focused on the ‘crueltye’, ‘flatterye’ and ‘faire promises’ he used towards his servants in order ‘to obteane a dyvorce’ through ‘corrupted wytnesses’.\(^{69}\) These witnesses were Robert Pitts, Henry Lloyd, William Powell, Roger Thomas and Hugh ap William, all of whom were Stanley’s servants. They unanimously deposed that on the night of 16 April 1561, while their master was away, Hurleston entered their mistress’ chamber and later left in a state of undress. Thomas and Pitts added that ‘my Lady Stanley is comonly taken to be a woman of Evell fame’ and ‘an evell woman of hir body’.\(^{70}\)

However, as Ursula’s 21-year-old maid Elizabeth Bushell claimed, the perjured testimony of Stanley’s servants was motivated by ‘feare of Sir Rolande Stanley/ or for malice they beare against my lady his wife/ & not upon any good grounde/ or juste cause’.\(^{71}\) As such, the affections of ‘fear’ and ‘malice’ were understood to be key motivations for illicit action and antithetical to justice. Another maid, Emme Winnington, similarly described Stanley’s deponents as ‘men of small Credence’ who deposed either ‘for feare’ or for ‘hope of some gayne’, and that Stanley had ‘corrupted & intyced them to depose an untrueth against my

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\(^{67}\) Names of 12 gentlemen and one lady in Cheshire whose houses are greatly infected with popery (1580), *State Papers Online*, SP 15/27/2 f. 170.

\(^{68}\) BIA: CP.G.975A, Lady Ursula Stanley c. Sir Rowland Stanley (1561), articles of Ursula Stanley.

\(^{69}\) Ibid.

\(^{70}\) BIA: CP.G.1042, Sir Rowland Stanley c. Lady Ursula Stanley (1561), depositions of Roger Thomas and Robert Pitts.

\(^{71}\) BIA: CP.G.975A, deposition of Elizabeth Bushell.
lady Stanley’. In terms of fear, Ursula claimed that after her husband’s servant Powell had deposed against her, he had had burst out ‘into an extreme weping’ and said that he was ‘sorye for hir even in his hart’, adding that he had been forced to ‘falcelye belye’ her in his deposition ‘or els have left my service/ and also have had bothe myne ears cut off[ʃ]’. As such, Powell’s ‘weeping’ expressed his remorse for perjuring himself against his mistress due to his master’s threats. Coupled with this fear of dismissal or violence, Stanley’s deponents were also allegedly motivated by malice. In particular, the servant Richard Humphrey claimed that his fellow servants Lloyd and Pitts ‘hate[d] the said lady wonderfully’, and their testimony expressed ‘mere malice’. The cause of this malice, according to Humphrey, was that Lloyd had asked his mistress ‘to give him a paire of hose’, and when Ursula refused to do so, Lloyd told Humphrey ‘in great anger’ that ‘I shalbe even with hir’. The hatred of Pitts for his mistress, meanwhile, stemmed from his alleged fornication with one of her ‘maydens’, Elizabeth Pendleton. As a result, Ursula put Pendleton ‘being great with child forthe of hir howse and service’ and pressed her husband to do likewise with Pitts for his ‘lewd demeanour’ and ‘dishonestye’. However, ‘much favoring’ Pitts, on 5 April 1561 Stanley ‘did fall forthe in displeasour’ with his wife’s demands and ‘did Stryke hir’, saying not only that he would keep Pitts ‘in the Spite of hir head’, but also that he wished that Pitts ‘had gotten all the women in his howse with child’. This, Humphrey deposed, left Ursula ‘wepinge wonderfullye’. After Stanley had beaten his wife on his account, Pitts ‘openly’ said among his fellow servants that ‘I will never looke for hir favour/ And therfore upon monday next I wilbe goone/ but by godes woundes I shall make suche a styrr and rewle in this howse before

72 Ibid., deposition of Emme Winnington.
73 Ibid., articles of Ursula Stanley.
74 Ibid., deposition of Richard Humphrey.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., articles of Ursula Stanley.
77 Ibid.; BIA: CP.G.1042, interrogatories of Ursula Stanley.
78 BIA: CP.G.975A, articles of Ursula Stanley.
79 Ibid., deposition of Richard Humphrey.
I goo as never was made in Hooton’. Elizabeth Bushell added that Pitts had spoken against his mistress ‘openlye in a grete rage’. Ursula also alleged that Pitts ‘in malice did threaten’ her, saying that before a year had passed ‘he wold wrythe the said ladye suche a pyn that all hir freindes showld not loos yt’. In other words, having lost the ‘favour’ of his mistress, he knew his days in the household were numbered, and so – motivated by ‘malice’ – he would revenge himself against her.

As such, for Ursula and her deponents, invoking feelings of ‘fear’, ‘hatred’ and ‘malice’ was a means to ascribe motivation for the alleged perjured testimony of Stanley’s servants. Here the causes of malice and hatred were favours not granted, or another sense of lost ‘favour’, a term that denoted both a positive feeling and characterised a positive interpersonal relationship between people differentiated by superior or subordinate social status. For instance, while Stanley ‘favoured’ Robert Pitts enough to strike his wife when she attempted to dismiss him, the attributed cause of Pitts’ malice was his permanent loss of Ursula’s ‘favour’. Further emphasising the link between negative feeling and motivation for illicit action, Elizabeth Bushell added that Pitts’ words were spoken in ‘great rage’. However, as well as focusing on his perjured deponents, Ursula and those who testified on her behalf also discussed Stanley’s active efforts to convince or cajole them to bear false witness against their mistress by a mixture of bribery and ‘cruelty’. In terms of bribery, Stanley ordered Lloyd and Pitts to promise Richard Humphrey that he would have ‘his master[’s] favour as well as ever he had’, and Ralph Simpson that ‘his master wold bere hime against all Chesshier yea and against all England and that then his master wold favour hime as much as ever he did and give him his hat full of gold’. Although this bribery was linked to the status-inflected

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80 Ibid., articles of Ursula Stanley.
81 Ibid., deposition of Elizabeth Bushell.
82 Ibid., articles of Ursula Stanley.
83 Ibid., depositions of Richard Humphrey and Ralph Simpson.
'favour’, his cruelty was linked to violence and so was incompatible with the ideal of good mastership.

In addition to describing the negative affective motivations and consequent ‘little Credyt’ of Stanley’s five witnesses, Ursula and her deponents also accused Stanley of physically abusing those servants who would not obey his unjust commands. On the night of 23 April 1561, immediately after he had forced his wife out of the household, Stanley allegedly ‘did threaten’ his then servants Richard Humphrey and Ralph Simpson. At that time, Humphrey was not only Stanley’s household servant but also his tenant and the keeper of Hooton Park. That night, Stanley ordered Humphrey to say that his wife had committed adultery with Hurleston. When Humphrey refused, Stanley called him ‘horeson’, violently took him ‘by the beyrd’ and threatened to kill him if he did not do his bidding. He then gave him ‘such buffettes and strokes’ with his knife that ‘he brast his eares of his head Brast his Chastes and a tothe in his heade so that his face and mouthe ranne all with bloyd’. A few days later, on 26 April, after being summoned again by Stanley, Humphrey fell to his ‘knes’ and ‘desyred hime for the passion of god to be good master unto hime’ as he had never heard his mistress to be suspected of ‘evell condicion’ or being Hurleston’s ‘hore’. Consequently, Humphrey lost his tenancy and office, which was worth £10 per annum, and was replaced by the more dependable – or corrupt – Lloyd. Similarly, Stanley attempted to bribe Simpson, promising him a ‘lyvinge’ if he said that Ursula was a ‘hore’ with Hurleston. When he refused, his master said he would ‘sley hime’ and ‘held the pointe of his naiked dagger’ against his ‘harte grevousley threatenynge hime’. When Simpson also ‘desyred hime to be

84 Ibid., deposition of Richard Humphrey.
85 Ibid., articles of Ursula Stanley.
86 Ibid., deposition of Richard Humphrey.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., deposition of Ralph Simpson.
90 Ibid.
his good master for he knew no dishonesty’ of his mistress, Stanley ‘smote’ him ‘with his
dagger that he had almost maymed hime of one of his fingers as ys yet to se’.91 As such, both
Humphrey and Simpson invoked the ideal of a ‘good master’ in the context of Stanley’s
violence against them. In this context, good mastership can be seen to have formed a ‘public
transcript’ – a concept formulated by the anthropologist James Scott and subsequently
applied to early modern social and political history by Michael Braddick and John Walter –
by which subordinates could invoke shared ideologies and discourses in order to restore the
proper bounds of hierarchical social relationships, which were ideally based on legitimacy,
consent and the mutual performance of roles and offices.92 The affective power or ‘wounding
force’ of this transcript was evident in Stanley’s two violent reactions, meaning that it was
plausible in this judicial context to ascribe rage and violence to a servant’s imputation of the
good mastership of his superior.93

From the partially surviving church court material, the outcome of Sir Rowland and
Lady Ursula Stanley’s mutual separation suits is unknown. In a subsequent suit with
Hurleston, whom Stanley had accused of adultery with his wife, Stanley claimed that he had
been ‘advised by his frendes’ to abandon his suit because ‘he shulde never have ende in the
matter/ but shulde have byn driven to beare both his owne charges and hires’.94 By contrast,
Hurleston claimed that Stanley had since admitted that Ursula was ‘an honest woman &
ffalselye slandered’.95 As such, Hurleston invoked the common ideal of ‘honesty’, which, as
was shown in the previous chapter, encompassed ideal behaviour and the proper
performance of roles. However, what can be ascertained from these cases is that motivation

91 Ibid.
and the politics of subsistence in early modern England’, in Michael J. Braddick and John Walter (eds),
Negotiating Power in Early Modern Society: Order, Hierarchy and Subordination in Britain and Ireland (Cambridge,
95 Ibid., interrogatories of Richard Hurleston.
was conceptualised and described in affective terms. This sense of passion as motivation was inflected by the hierarchical distinctions within Stanley’s household at Hooton Hall. Here ‘fear’, ‘hatred’ and ‘malice’ – those negative feelings commonly described by those involved in the case as the impetus for illicit actions such as perjury – were all entwined with the shifting ‘favour’ of superiors, which as both a feeling and a social state characterising the relationship between two socially differentiated people was something to be sought for, but also something that was perilous to one’s place in the household if lost.

**RISHTON C. RISHTON (1563)**

The second case study consists of Alice Rishton’s separation suit against her husband, the gentleman of Antley (Lancashire) Geoffrey Rishton, which she commenced in late 1563. While the only surviving record of this case that survives is Rishton’s answer to his wife’s allegations, she evidently accused him of cruelty, adultery, neglect, imprisonment and undermining her authority as mistress of the household. As the York church court had ordered Rishton to readmit Alice into his household as recently as October 1562, this case was clearly part of a longer dispute between husband and wife. In his answer Rishton alleged that Alice was an unfaithful and disobedient wife, an improvident mistress and a neglectful mother. After Alice’s return, Rishton left the household in her ‘order’, ‘custodye’ and ‘governance’ when he was absent for several weeks or months at a time while attending either to the queen’s ‘service’ in London or to his own coal mine near Burnley.  

96 BIA: CP.G.3296, Alice Rishton c. Geoffrey Rishton (c.1563), answer of Geoffrey Rishton.  

ways. Coupled with being a profligate mistress, Rishton alleged that Alice had also committed adultery with an ‘unkownen’ man. This ‘muche offended’ the household servants, who ‘rebuked hir and said yt was shame for hir to use suche facyons’. As such, Rishton entrusted the management of his household to ‘his man servant called Fyshe and his wife’, who were to bar the door against her if their mistress attempted to leave late at night. Yet Rishton stressed that, throughout this period, he continued to use his wife ‘boothe at bedd and at boorde as lovinglie as any man ought to use his wife’. By contrast, he claimed that ‘of hir froward stomake’ Alice would no longer share a bed with him, simply because he ‘went abowt to reforme hir unthriftie huswiferye’. In September 1563, for instance, Rishton had asked Alice for her housekey, but she was ‘sore moved’, refused to hand it over and ‘went forthe of his hows against his will and wythowt any occatyon … And never sins that tyme she woold coome at him’.

The affective language in Rishton’s answer was directly related to his and Alice’s interactions with one another as husband and wife. Describing his actions towards Alice, Rishton used the adverbs ‘lovingly’, ‘charitably’ and ‘gently’. As has already been seen, ‘love’ was commonly invoked in early modern separation suits to refer to the proper feelings between husband and wives, and marital violence was commonly attributed to a loss of love. In this case, Rishton linked love to ‘bed and board’, showing that for him loving behaviour denoted both proximity and materially providing for his wife. This echoed discussions in conduct literature of love as both a feeling and the motivation for carrying out the reciprocal duties of different household members. ‘Charity’, meanwhile, denoted not only specific good
deeds but also the benevolent feeling that motivated them, and was a term synonymous with ‘love’ and social harmony. Juxtaposed with this ideal behaviour, in Rishton’s answer, were pejorative descriptions of Alice’s actions. Motivated by her ‘froward stomach’, in Rishton’s account she was unjustifiably ‘moved’ at his reasonable requests, and so both these terms directly associated Alice’s affectivity with her alleged disobedience as a wife. Therefore, in this judicial context, the conceptualisation and description of the proper and improper performance of spousal roles incorporated passion alongside the other duties expected of wives and husbands. In other words, the tenor of their behaviour to one another, which was understood in affective terms, was entwined with expectations, for example, of a husband’s maintenance of his wife and a wife’s capability for household management, which was a key pillar of a wife’s credit and reputation.

This relationship between passion and the performance of spousal roles was particularly evident in the most affectively charged moment described in Rishton’s answer, which centred on a dispute about Alice’s role as a mother. On 10 April 1563, Easter Saturday, Rishton had allegedly asked his wife to give her son, who was ‘somewhat Seeklie [sickly]’, some ‘warme podage or something els for the comforting of his stomake’. However, she allegedly ‘answered verey earnestlye and angerlye that she had nought to gyve him’. But ‘mistrusting hir untowardlie condycions’, Rishton went into the house, where he claimed he ‘found warme podage alredye on the fyer’. Consequently, Rishton alleged that he ‘did partelye rebooke’ his wife for her ‘untowardlynes’ in not feeding ‘hir own child’. Then ‘in a rage’ Alice responded with ‘verey spytefull language’, for which in Rishton’s words he

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105 Barclay, *Caritas*.
107 BIA: CP.G.3296, answer of Geoffrey Rishton.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
'gave hir a lytill blow on the cheeke with the bakke of his hand'. If he had done any less, Rishton added, he ‘should have bene counted a verey beest’. Yet in retaliation to this apparently justified violence, Alice ‘tooke him by the beard’ and painfully pulled on his hair and attempted to grab his ‘dagger’, for which Rishton gave her ‘half a doosen strookes’ with ‘a Kydgell or hors wand’. Since that day, he claimed, Alice had never spoken to him ‘except it were in malice calling him knave/ or suche lyke wordes/ nor woold doo any thing at his commaundement’. As such, in this interaction Rishton justified his moderate correction with his wife’s extreme provocation. Having stressed his loving, charitable and gentle treatment of his wife, it was only at this point that Rishton admitted to using violence. Yet still the ‘little blow’ he allegedly gave his wife was presented as an act of reason, contrasting with the unfeeling beastliness of overlooking Alice’s ‘rage’, ‘anger’, ‘earnestness’ and ‘spiteful’ words. Despite justifying his violence in these terms – adding that he never beat her ‘at any other tyme sins he tooke hir againe’ – from that time Alice had only ever spoken words of ‘malice’ to her husband. As such, in his answer Rishton used affective language, such as the contrast between his love and Alice’s malice, as well as other descriptions of character, such as his wife’s ‘untowardliness’ and ‘frowardness’, in order to claim that Alice was a disobedient wife, a spendthrift mistress and a neglectful mother.

BROWN C. BROWN (1587)

The third case study concerns the use of affective language, particularly the repeated invocation of ‘cruelty’ and ‘extremity’, in descriptions of the causes and intensity of marital violence. The case also contested the justification and intensity of a husband’s physical

111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
‘correction’ and questioned whether it was a necessary and permitted part of his role as a husband. In 1587 Anne Brown of Wawne (East Riding) alleged that her husband, Thomas, had ‘moste Cruelly beate’ and ‘extremely bet and Buffeted’ her throughout their marriage, and that he had even ‘set his Dagger to her harte’ in order to force her ‘to take unadvised and rash othes not to reveale his Cruelty’. More particularly, on 15 June 1585, when they were returning home on horseback, Brown allegedly ‘thruste’ her from the horse and ‘dyd extremlye beat her with a Cudgell and by his Cruelty there dyd force her to sweare there not to reveale his said Cruelty’.

Within a fortnight, Brown again expressed his ‘extreme Tyranny and Cruelty’ over his wife when he beat her ‘in moste Cruell manner’, and almost strangled her when he ‘thruste his gloves in her mouthe’ to stifle her cries. This abuse, Anne alleged, continued even while she was pregnant. On 3 April 1586, Easter Sunday, acting ‘more lyke a Turke then a Christyan’, Brown beat her ‘most Cruely’, saying that he would ‘brayke the Braynes of the Child … before yt should ever inheryte any of his to hande’. The following Sunday, 10 April 1586, ‘havinge neyther measure nor meane of his extreme Cruelty and tyranny against her’, Brown allegedly carried his pregnant wife into a ‘close’ near his house in Wawne, where he ‘most Cruelly beate and evell entreate[d]’ her, before ‘Cruelly’ forcing her into a ‘depe ponde’. Anne claimed that she would have drowned if her cries not been overheard by Richard Watson and George Martin, who came into the close and pulled her out of the water. Even to these witnesses, Anne alleged, Brown ‘extremely by speches dyd rage’, telling Watson, who was a blacksmith, that ‘he wold make him eat the coles of his furnace’.

Even after the birth of the child, Anne alleged, Brown expressed his ‘extreme mallyce and hatreed [sic]’ for her by taking away her food, clothing and barring all

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117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
company from visiting her ‘in most barbarous and inhumane manner’.\textsuperscript{122} Lastly, Anne claimed that Brown had ‘manaced and threatened’ to kill her, saying that he ‘cared not’ if he would be hanged ‘so that he might be revenged of her’.\textsuperscript{123}

In her allegations, then, Anne invoked ‘cruelty’ nine times, both to ascribe motivation for her husband’s abuse, in terms synonymous with ‘malice’, ‘hatred’ and ‘revenge’, as well as to describe the intensity of that abuse in practice, which was also described in terms of ‘extremity’, ‘rage’ and being without ‘measure’. Twice Anne also coupled ‘tyranny’ with ‘cruelty’, a term which explicitly associated Brown’s alleged violence with his government and authority over her as a husband. Further emphasising this cruelty, Anne played on the common trope of associating the Turks with barbarism to describe violence that allegedly occurred on ‘Easter daie’, the holiest day of the year.\textsuperscript{124}

In response to these repeated accusations of cruelty, Brown never denied using violence, but claimed that he had justifiably ‘corrected’ his wife numerous times.\textsuperscript{125} For instance, he claimed that with ‘juste cause’ he had ‘beaten her with a Rodd’ after she ‘did confess her selfe to be of unhonest behaviour and that she had abused her bodye in fornication or adulterye’, meaning that her child was illegitimate and that Anne had fallen short of the ‘honest’ ideal in her role as a wife.\textsuperscript{126} As well as this claim of justified correction, Brown also claimed that his violence was never extreme. For instance, he described how, he ‘moderately beat her withowt any hurte to her bodye’ in order to ‘chastice’ her.\textsuperscript{127} Brown stated that, on another occasion, he ‘did beate’ Anne, ‘but not unreasonablye’.\textsuperscript{128} Describing the incident in April 1586, Brown claimed that he had given his wife a mere ‘boxe on the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid. For the association of the Turks and barbarism, see Thomas, Pursuit of Civility, pp. 119, 149-51.
\item \textsuperscript{125} BIA: CP.G.2235, personal response of Thomas Brown.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
eare’, at which she had unreasonably ‘cryed owt with a very lowde voyce’, and he was ‘greeved that she so exclaimed for a boxe on the eare and that ther neighbours did heare ther disagreement’.\textsuperscript{129} Brown claimed that after he ‘willed’ Anne to follow him into the house, she ‘voluntariyle’ leapt into the pond and ‘almost drowned her selfe having no occasion so to do but being a woman voyde of the feare of god could not abyde any due correction’.\textsuperscript{130} This focus on correction was the crux of Brown’s defence, and he reiterated that although he ‘did beate and chastice her’, it was only ‘to make her a duetifull wyffe’.\textsuperscript{131} Therefore, like Geoffrey Rishton two decades earlier, Brown not only stressed that his wife had been undutiful and unfaithful, but also that the violence or correction he had administered had been both justified in cause and moderate in effect.

The frequent invocations of ‘cruelty’ in this suit can be read in several ways. Since cruelty was a legal standard by which the court could grant separation, stressing the cruelty of Brown’s actions could be part of the ‘legal narratives’ strategically crafted to serve the purposes of the court.\textsuperscript{132} However, the witnesses in this case, who did not need to strategise in this way, also frequently described Brown’s behaviour in terms of ‘cruelty’. For example, the Browns’ household servant Elizabeth More deposed that Brown ‘verie cruellie’ ‘beat’ his wife ‘with a rodd, because she … had eaten a pece of bacon, & did not kepe it for his supper’.\textsuperscript{133} Deposing about the events in April 1586, the witness George Martin claimed that although he ‘exhortid him to quietnes’, Brown continued to make ‘most cruell speches’ to his wife, who was ‘lying pitifully weping upon the ground’, such as that ‘he carid not if he killid hir & that in hir bellie’.\textsuperscript{134} Martin further deposed that after he had pulled Anne out of the water, when she was in danger of drowning as her clothes had risen to the surface above her, Brown

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} Gowing, Domestic Dangers, pp. 41-8.
\textsuperscript{133} BIA: CP.G.2235, deposition of Elizabeth More.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., deposition of George Martin.
began to use ‘evill speches’ against her, saying ‘gett the[e] into the house thow arrand whore’, and ‘threatened hir most cruelly not anyway pittiing hir being great with child & half dead’.

Therefore, invocations of affective terms such as ‘cruelty’, which was the affective keyword of this case, were not simply a strategic use of language dispassionately attempting to convince the court, but rather expressed commonly held views of the proper and improper performance of spousal roles, which were inherently understood in terms of passions and affections. In contrast to Brown’s claim that his violence constituted justified and moderate ‘correction’ in his role as a husband, Martin’s descriptions of Brown’s ‘cruelty’ and lack of ‘pity’ demonstrated in affective terms the limits of what could legitimately be labelled as correction.

**Currer c. Currer (1673-5)**

Almost nine decades after Anne Brown’s case, the fourth case study focuses on the separation suit initiated in 1673 by Jane Currer of Bordley (West Riding) against her husband Henry. As has already been explained, in the intervening years there were relatively few cruelty cases in the York church court, which have already been discussed in the context of the relationship between affective language and acts of marital violence earlier in this chapter. Additionally, during this time the church courts had been dissolved and reinstituted. In addition to Jane’s explicit accounts of abuse, the records of this case reflect the increasingly standardised use of affective language in the post-Restoration church courts to describe character, motivation and action in the context of marital violence and the performance of spousal roles. This case study combines issues of extreme violence, neglect, financial impropriety and is also

revealing of a common and pejorative use of affective language of ‘kindness’ to describe improper relationships between men and women, particularly those of different social status.

The use of affective language in Jane’s allegations of marital abuse combined her own disturbing descriptions of excessive violence with the standardised affective legal language that the post-Restoration church court used to attribute abusive action to a cluster of related negative affective terms. As in Mary Smithson and Martha Brooke’s 1670s and 1680s cases, this language explicitly contrasted Jane Currer’s proper performance of her role as a wife with Henry Currer’s negligence and dereliction in his duties as a husband. For example, Jane’s allegations formulaically claimed that although she had been a ‘civill’, ‘vertuous’ and a ‘loving and obedient wife’, her husband had unjustifiably ‘conceived a greate hatred and enmity against her’, which he expressed ‘in words gestures and Accions’. From this standard invocation of ‘hatred’ and ‘enmity’ as motivating forces, Jane’s allegations included her own graphic accounts of abuse that were specific to her case, such as her account that her husband frequently beat her ‘with staves and bridles with bitts att them in a most furious and violent manner’. Another allegation, repeating the terminology of other contemporary cases, described how ‘in greater manifestacion of his hatred enmity and disaffeccion’ for his wife, Currer ‘cruelly used her’ and ‘soe long continued beating her till with the violence of his blowes he knocked or felled her downe to the ground where she lay some time for dead’. Therefore, Jane’s invocation of ‘cruelty’ and ‘fury’ indicated the intensity of the abuse she suffered, while the coupling of ‘love’ and ‘obedience’ demonstrated the entwining of affection with the other duties expected of an early modern wife that have already been seen in other cases in this chapter. Indeed, in denying his wife’s allegations Currer simply asserted that Jane had lived ‘very contentiously’ both with her former husband and

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137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
himself. Also, the explicit attribution of Currer’s ‘hatred’, ‘enmity’ and ‘disaffection’ as the impetus of his violence reflected both longstanding conceptualisations of the relationship between passion, illicit action and the performance of spousal roles, as well as the increasing standardisation of the language through which these concepts were expressed after the reimposition of the church courts in 1661.

Currer’s abuse of his wife seems to have been linked to a wider dispute with Jane’s family with her previous husband, which seemed to relate both to establishing his authority over her and to financial disputes with her relations. Remarrying widows, as Gowing has noted, were more likely to possess wealth of their own, meaning that subsequent husbands were more likely subject them to violence in order to establish superiority over them. In this case, Currer had forcibly prevented both Jane’s son John Garforth and son-in-law Marmaduke Drake from seeing her, and Jane’s allegations attributed some of his violence against her to her attempts to visit her family. The legal dispute actually began with Currer suing Jane for restitution of his conjugal rights, claiming that he had financially ruined himself paying off the debts Jane had contracted as a widow, for which he had been repaid only with disobedience and abandonment. Jane, meanwhile, alleged that her husband had refused to pay the £200 marriage portion of her daughter Margaret upon her marriage to Thomas King, for which Jane was imprisoned for 22 weeks in York Castle, where she would have ‘perished had not her owne relacions given her releife and released her upon their own accompt and charge’. Currer had had also been involved in financial litigation with Drake, Jane’s son-in-law, in a Chancery dispute in 1671 over a debt of £50 he allegedly owed to Drake. Whereas Currer claimed that, in or around February 1668, he had asked Drake ‘in a frindly manner’ to settle his debts with him, Drake attested that Currer, ‘haveing married

140 Gowing, Domestic Dangers, p. 215.
141 BIA: CP.H.4662, articles of Jane Currer.
this defendant’s wife’s mother & pretending very much love & affection to this defendant had
by fair & flattering Speeches so much Insinuated himself into the defendant’s good opinion’
that he had bought livestock from Drake without paying. Consequently, in the church
court case Currer declared that ‘noe Credit’ should be given to Drake and Garforth’s
testimony because they were his ‘utter Enemys’ and the ‘sowers of the great dissention’
between him and his wife. Here references to ‘friendliness’, ‘enemies’, ‘love’ and ‘affection’
showed how character, motivation and action were likewise conceptualised and described in
affective terms in a financial context and social practice more generally, away from the more
physical and intense context of marital violence. However, at the same time, Currer’s
concerns about his credit, or his social and economic reputation, and his disputes with Jane’s
family, more than likely manifested in his physical abuse against her, which suggests how
these wider fears of credit and reputation provoked physical violence.

As well as violence and neglect, Jane alleged that Currer had also been ‘suspiciously
and scandalously kinde’ with various women, to whom he had ‘committed the charge and
care of his house and household affaires’, and in particular kept a ‘scandalous’ Scottish
woman whom he decked out in Jane’s clothing. As Pollock has shown, in early modern
English the concept of ‘kindness’ combined notions of ideal feelings between people, such as
‘goodwill’, ‘courtesy’ and ‘affection’, as well as the practices which expressed them, such as
giving ‘material aid’, ‘favours’ and other ‘acts of humanity or thoughtfulness’. However,
Pollock makes no reference to pejorative invocations of kindness, particularly that between
social superiors and subordinates. This negative use of kindness did not feature in earlier
church court cases, but did appear in other post-Restoration suits, suggesting a shift in

142 TNA: C 5/468/86, Henry Currer v. Marmaduke Drake (1671), bill of complaint of Henry Currer, answer of
Marmaduke Drake.
143 BIA: CP.H.3230, articles of exception of Henry Currer.
144 BIA: CP.H.4662, articles of Jane Currer.
affective legal language from the mid-seventeenth century. For example, in 1672 Lady Grace Chaworth successfully sued her husband Patrick Chaworth, third Viscount Chaworth of Armagh, for separation on grounds of multiple adulteries and cruelty. Among these many adulteries, Grace not only alleged that her husband had been ‘susptiously kinde’ with the wife of a gentleman he was staying with in London, but also ‘susptiously & scandalously kind’ with Mary Millett, a married woman of Annesley (Nottinghamshire), near Chaworth’s family seat at Annesley Hall.\textsuperscript{146} The witness Martha Poyster also pejoratively invoked kindness in her deposition that Chaworth had been ‘very kind & familiar’ with his washmaid Jane Brograve, who had allegedly borne his illegitimate son, to whom Chaworth had since shown ‘great kindnes’.\textsuperscript{147} Similarly, in 1697-8 the clergyman William Mompesson – who had famously led self-sacrificial quarantine of the village of Eyam (Derbyshire) during the plague outbreak of 1665-6 – was sued for allegedly fathering an illegitimate daughter with his servant Faith Shepherd. While one deponent claimed that Mompesson had been ‘addicted to lasciviousness & unchastity before he marryed his last wife by being too kind & familiar with some woman or other’, Mompesson’s servant Simon Reddish said that he had ‘never observed them to bee too kind together’.\textsuperscript{148} By contrast, Mompesson’s housekeeper Mary Hawkins deposed that Faith Shepherd had been ‘very suspitiously familiar & very scandalously kind with one mr Proudfoots man’, who was the suspected father of the child.\textsuperscript{149}

Returning to Jane Currer’s allegation of her husband’s scandalous kindness with several women, then, it is clear she was invoking a commonly shared use of affective language to describe the improper relationship between a social superior and a subordinate, and particularly between a master and servant, with a clear connotation of sexual

\textsuperscript{146} BIA: CP.H.3000, Lady Grace Chaworth c. Patrick Chaworth, third Viscount Chaworth of Armagh (1672), articles of Lady Grace Chaworth.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., deposition of Martha Poyster.
\textsuperscript{148} BIA: CP.H.4549, Office c. William Mompesson (1697-8), depositions of Joseph Clay and Simon Reddish.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., deposition of Mary Hawkins.
impropriety. Both Currer’s adultery and violence were conceptualised and described in terms of passions and affections. Several years earlier, in 1667, Currer had already been ‘condemned’ by the church court for being ‘very familiar and Intimate’ and fathering an illegitimate child with Alice Proctor. In the case of kindness, affective language pejoratively characterised inappropriate social relationships between people differentiated by status and role. In relation to violence, as in other separation suits, the language of passions and affections was the medium through which those involved in the case conceptualised and described the motivation and enaction of illicit behaviour, in terms that both demonstrated continuity across the early modern period and the recent post-Restoration developments in the language of the court that rendered passion as motivation in formulaic terms.

**Allenson c. Allenson (1676)**

The fifth case study in this chapter, Grace Allenson’s successful separation suit of 1676 against her husband Charles, demonstrates that a person’s shifting social place within the dynamic household hierarchy was conceptualised and described in the language of passions and affections. Like Jane Currer’s before them, Grace’s allegations combined the formulaic use of affective legal language with her own graphic account of her husband’s physical abuse towards her. For instance, Grace claimed that she had always shown ‘that duety and respect ... that becomes a Wife to a Husband’, and had constantly endeavoured ‘to please, Content and avoid provokeing of him’. Despite these ideal wifely qualities, throughout their 16-year marriage Allenson had frequently expressed his ‘Aversion, disaffection and hatred to

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150 BIA: CP.H.4662, articles of Jane Currer; CP.H.2839, Office c. Henry Currer (1667-8), presentment of the churchwardens of Rylstone.
her’ in verbal abuse and, further demonstrating his ‘hatred’ for her, also ‘Cruelly’ and ‘barbarously’ beat her ‘in a most inhumane manner’.152 Here Grace’s ‘pleasing’, ‘contenting’ and ‘unprovocative’ performance as a wife, which used identical terminology to other contemporary cases, contrasted with Allenson’s ‘aversion’, ‘disaffection’ and ‘hatred’ for her. From this conventional description of the role of feeling in motivating action, stemmed Grace’s individual account of the abuse she had suffered. For instance, Allenson allegedly ‘threw her headlong downe a paire of Staires with great violence and fury, And itt was as great a wonder as a mercy she did not breake some of her limbs, and that she was not for ever lamed’.153 Continuing, Grace alleged that ‘soe inveterate has his malice and hatred been to her … that scarce one day has passed’ in which Allenson had not ‘practised and Committed some act of Cruelty against her’, even when ‘she was with Childe’.154 Even against this violent backdrop, the catalyst of Grace’s litigation was her eviction from her husband’s household in York in February 1676, even while ‘she was as still is great with Childe’.155 Consequently, Grace claimed in exactly the same language as Mary Smithson’s 1679 case, that her life had been ‘nothing but a Continuall and insupportable trouble and misery’.156 Therefore, in Grace’s graphic account, ‘malice’, ‘hatred’ and other negative feelings were the impetus for her husband’s ‘fury’, ‘cruelty’, ‘barbarity’ and ‘inhumanity’, of which the outcome was her unremitting ‘trouble’ and ‘misery’. As such, the language of passions and affections was key to conceptualising and describing the character, motivation and action in the context of marital abuse and the performance of marital roles.

Allenson also framed his defence in affective terms, particularly in terms of ascribing motivation and describing the intensity of action. Blaming his wife for severing the

152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
‘Conjugall Tye’ between them, Allenson claimed that over the past ten years Grace had
‘alienated her affeccion’ from him, and so had ‘behaved her selfe very perversly and
unduetifully towards him, usually provokeing and disobligeing him (without any occasion
given) both by her unseemly, and unsufferable passionate angry words and deeds altogether
unfitt and unbecoming a modest wife to her husband’.157 Five years before the suit, Allenson
alleged, Grace, ‘upon some humour or dislike by her then taken’, had lived separately from
him for around six months.158 While stressing that Grace had both been an unaffectionate
wife who had ‘provoked’ him with her ‘unsufferable’, ‘passionate’ and ‘angry’ words,
Allenson claimed to have exercised restraint and not to have risen to these provocations. For
instance, Allenson alleged that Grace ‘often at the Table (they being with their Children at
Dinner together) hath used such uncivill and provokeing speeches and language to him, that
he hath been forct severall tymes to arise from her and quit the roome’.159 As well as verbal
abuse, Allenson alleged that Grace had been violent towards him. While he claimed to be ‘a
weake and sickly man’ constantly ‘under the Phisitians hands’, Allenson alleged that his wife
had ‘struck’ him, ‘scratcht and spit in his face’, ‘throwne Knives and Candlesticks’ at him and
threatened that ‘she would poyson him and be his death’.160 Added to this account of his own
restraint in the face of his wife’s disobedience, provocation and incivility, Allenson also
claimed to be in dire financial straits, describing how he was indebted, his seven children
expensively educated, his houses dilapidated and his lands untenanted and unfarmed. Rather
than being abandoned or fraudulently evicted, furthermore, he also alleged that Grace had
voluntarily ‘absent[ed] her selfe’ from him and conveyed ‘goods of great value’ out of his
household worth over £100.161

157 Ibid., allegations of Charles Allenson.
158 Ibid., personal response of Charles Allenson
159 Ibid., allegations of Charles Allenson.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
The seven household servants who deposed in this case supported Grace over Allenson. Like their mistress, these servants also used affective language and concepts to describe the motivation, enactment and consequences of Allenson’s verbal and physical abuse. While they did not use the exact same language, they invoked the same underlying concepts not only of the motivating force of passion, but also of the ideal warm feelings between husbands and wives, and the normative ideal of wifely obedience. This shows that such views were commonly held and not simply imposed by the language or officials of the church court. For instance, the former servant Frances Turner deposed that although Grace was a ‘discreet’, ‘modest’, ‘dutiful’ and ‘very submissive’ wife, Allenson was ‘never or very seldom quiet with her’, and even when she was ‘with child’ would ‘not at all refrain his barbarous and wonted cruelty to her’. Similarly, Sarah Dawson contrasted Grace’s ‘obliging Care’, ‘kindness’ and ‘Circumspection’ in her behaviour towards her husband, by which she endeavoured not to ‘displease his humour or provoke him to be angry’, with his ‘dayly practice’ of ‘beating and Kicking her’ in ‘a very Cruell severe passionate furious and in humane manner’. Allenson’s ‘Crosse furious passionate & strange disposition’, Dawson added, meant that Grace could not speak to or approach him ‘without trembling’. Margaret Green, the Allensons’ ‘household servant to looke to their children’, deposed that her master expressed his ‘hatred’ and ‘malice’ to Grace in both verbal ‘dayly quarrelling & brawling’ and physically beating her ‘in a very severe furious & inhumane manner’, including on one occasion when he chased her from room to room and, ‘in a strange furious manner’, threw her down the stairs. The effect of this abuse, in Green’s words, was that Grace’s life was ‘full of sorrow trouble & misery’. Continuing, she added that, while ‘many times weeping’

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162 Ibid., deposition of Frances Turner.
163 Ibid., deposition of Sarah Dawson.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid., deposition of Margaret Green.
166 Ibid.
in the nursery, her mistress had confided in her that if she only had ‘but bread & water to live on’, she would be ‘happy if she could but be quiet with it’. Consequently, using language that did not appear in Grace’s allegations, three servants – Dawson, Green and Mary Sparling – each deposed that Grace lived in ‘a continuall Slavery and misery’.

Discussing the case in terms of ‘household governance’, Withington has shown how Allenson’s abuse amounted to the ‘usurpation’ of Grace’s ‘place’ in the household. The term ‘place’, he argues, denoted the social roles that regulated spatially appropriate norms and practices as well as the physical spaces in which those roles operated. As wife, mother and mistress, Grace’s ‘place’ in the household should have beneficially structured her relationships with other members of the household: her husband, seven children and numerous servants. However, Withington has argued that Grace lost her place in both spatial and social terms. Spatially, Grace was banished from the dining table, the ‘civil centre’ of the household, and was reduced to the status of a child when she was forced to eat with the children in the nursery. In social terms, Allenson undermined Grace’s authority as both a mother and a mistress when he violently prohibited her from correcting their son and transferred his affections to his maid, Frances Hardy. At their household in urban York, Withington argues, Grace was concealed from public view and civil society, while at the Allenson’s rural residence at Crayke, ten miles north of the city, Allenson made a public spectacle of his wife’s subjection. Luke Mawburne, the rector of Crayke, deposed that Allenson brought home ‘Country fellowes who had been drinking with him to see what an obedient wife he had’, and forced her to serve them, even though they were her social

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167 Ibid.
168 Ibid., depositions of Sarah Dawson, Margaret Green and Mary Sparling.
169 Withington, Politics of Commonwealth, pp. 221, 222.
170 Ibid., pp. 87-8.
171 Ibid., p. 222.
172 Ibid., pp. 222-3.
173 Ibid., pp. 223-4.
inferiors and he could have asked his own servants.\textsuperscript{174} Therefore, Withington argues, Grace’s social and spatial displacement and exclusion from ‘civil society’ in the household – the fundamental social and economic institution of early modern society – was for the deponents Sarah Dawson, Margaret Green and Mary Sparling the very definition of ‘slavery’.\textsuperscript{175}

Yet the social and spatial usurpation of Grace’s ‘place’ in the household was also conceptualised and described in terms of passions and affections. The ‘slavery’ invoked by the servants, it should be remembered, was always coupled with ‘misery’. For instance, Margaret Green deposed that her mistress’ life was ‘continuall Slavery and misery’, and also used this term in her view that Grace’s life was ‘full of sorrow trouble & misery’.\textsuperscript{176} Describing Grace’s banishment from the dining table, the servant Frances Turner deposed that her mistress was soe much afraid of him that she scarcely durst Speake to him or goe to him to dinner or any other place and almost trembled when she saw him’.\textsuperscript{177} As Turner, Green and Sarah Dawson deposed, Grace was banished from the dining room because of the ‘passion’, ‘anger’ and ‘aversnes’ of Allenson, who ‘thrust her out of the roome’.\textsuperscript{178} In the urban context of York, where Withington argues Grace was restricted from civil society beyond the household, Allenson was reportedly ‘angry’ and ‘beate’ her after she talked ‘about some busines or other in his absence’ with the York merchant Gawen Hodgson.\textsuperscript{179} Also, Dawson deposed that Allenson would have been ‘angry’ if Grace left the house without asking his leave, ‘as tho she had been a servant’.\textsuperscript{180} This social displacement would have been all the more evident because Grace, like her husband, was a member of the civic elite of York. Both their fathers, Sir William Allenson and Sir Roger Jaques, had served as lord mayors and

\textsuperscript{174} BIA: CP.H.3264, deposition of Luke Mawburne.
\textsuperscript{175} Withington, \textit{Politics of Commonwealth}, p. 223.
\textsuperscript{176} BIA: CP.H.3264, deposition of Margaret Green.
\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Ibid.}, deposition of Frances Turner.
\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Ibid.}, depositions of Frances Turner, Margaret Green and Sarah Dawson.
\textsuperscript{179} \textit{Ibid.}, deposition of John Goldsbrough.
\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Ibid.}, deposition of Sarah Dawson.
MPs of the city, and so Grace’s limited scope for agency made her reduction in status particularly evident. As such, the affective language used to frame Grace’s spatial displacement and slavery also described her loss of social place. For example, like her servants, Grace invoked ‘misery’ when describing that her husband had evicted her in order to ‘compleat’ her ‘Misery’ after years of abuse, as ‘if he thought it too great a favour to allow her a house wherein to putt her head’. Likewise, the former household servant Richard Thackwray deposed that when Hardy, the maid who had won Allenson’s affections, had said to her master that she ‘wished him hanged’, Allenson had ‘taken noe notice’, even though ‘he would have been past guiding’ if Grace had ‘given him such a word’. Consequently, Thackwray believed that ‘her life was in his opinion a continuall trouble & misery to her, and her greife and trouble almost in Supportable’. Therefore, Grace’s loss of place – in both social and spatial terms – was experienced and described in affective terms of ‘trouble’ and particularly the repeated use of ‘misery’, both by Grace and several of her servants. That Grace had been reduced from elite to servile status was no doubt why Dawson, Green and Sparling all likened that misery to ‘slavery’, a term not used in any of the other contemporary cruelty cases and which particularly highlighted the combined social and affective consequences of Allenson’s abuse.

In November 1676 the church court granted Grace separation ‘from bed, board & Mutuall Cohabitacion’ with her husband. During her husband’s lifetime, Grace was ordered to ‘Live Single and unmarryed, unless she shall thinke fitt to be Reconciled’ with him. However, she did not have long to wait as Allenson was buried only the following

183 Ibid., deposition of Richard Thackwray.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid., decree of separation.
186 Ibid.
month on 7 December 1676.\textsuperscript{187} In July 1676, while the separation suit was ongoing, Allenson had fallen ‘sicke’ and made his last will, in which he ‘made no provision’ for his wife.\textsuperscript{188} As such, the following year, when Grace was described as a ‘widow’, Grace sued her eldest son, the 15-year-old Charles Allenson, in the court of Chancery over land she claimed was due to her during her lifetime according to her marriage settlement with Allenson.\textsuperscript{189} Having asked ‘in a friendly manner’ for what she claimed was due, Grace alleged that her son’s guardians, Gawen Hodgson, Francis Elcock and John Wyvell, as well as her brothers Henry and William Jaques, had ‘combyned & confederated themselves to defeate & Defraud’ her of her rightful property.\textsuperscript{190} This must have been even more galling for Grace because this was the same Gawen Hodgson that had once occasioned her husband’s anger and violence by discussing ‘business’ with her in his absence. The cruel irony was that Grace’s success in her separation suit merely set the stage for further litigation with her children and other relations. The success of Grace’s separation suit was based on the conventional understandings of the relationship between passion, character, motivation, action and the performance of spousal roles provided by Grace and her witnesses convinced the court, which proved the ‘Severity & Cruelty’ on which the court based its judgement of separation.\textsuperscript{191}

\textbf{SHAW C. SHAW (1696-7)}

The final case study in this chapter, the separation suit brought by Anne Shaw of Wistow (Yorkshire) against her husband Robert, demonstrates how both sides of a separation dispute – including the litigants and their supporting witnesses – invoked common conceptualisations of the relationship between passion, character, motivation and action, and

\textsuperscript{188} TNA: C 5/441/57, Grace Allenson \textit{v.} Charles Allenson \textit{et al.} (1677), bill of complaint of Grace Allenson.
\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{190} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{191} BIA: CP.H.3264, decree of separation.
also shows the continuities in these understandings of the role of affectivity in social practice by the end of the period. Taking place between late 1696 and 1697, the case consisted of two sets of allegations by Anne and Robert Shaw, as well as witness testimony from among their household servants and other inhabitants of Wistow. Within the established affective and linguistic framing of post-Restoration separation suits, Anne alleged that her husband had repaid her ‘duty’, ‘respect’ and endeavours ‘to please Content & avoid provoking’ him with ‘avertion’, ‘disaffection’, ‘hatred’, ‘ill will’ and ‘malice’, which he expressed verbally in ‘unbecoming Expressions’ and physically in ‘Inhumane’, ‘severe’ and ‘Cruell’ violence. Added to this conventional framing were more individual and graphic descriptions of physical violence. For instance, Anne alleged that Shaw further expressed his ‘ill will hatred & malice’ for her by ‘violently’ forcing her out of bed and dragging her out of doors ‘upon the ground Naked above three score yards among Netles, Thistles, Stones, & Gravell and thereby tore a greate parte of her Skin from her back’. In fact, only five years earlier, Shaw had allegedly slandered and assaulted Anne Wintringham ‘in great passion’ in George Morrett’s alehouse in Wistow. Allegedly, Shaw was also ‘much addicted to whoring’, and had promised to marry his servant Elizabeth Stephenson, ‘if he could dispatch’ Anne. Worst of all, Shaw had ‘furiously’ and ‘inhumanely’ continued beating Anne during her pregnancies. Six of her eight children with Shaw, Anne sadly described, had been ‘abortive births occasion’d … by the undue & bad usage’ he gave her. As well as this violence, Anne alleged that Shaw – who held the status of a ‘gentleman’ – prevented her from exercising ‘her owne will’ in the government of the household and did not materially provide her with

192 BIA: TRANS.CP.1697/2, Robert Shaw c. Anne Shaw (1697), articles of Anne Shaw.
193 BIA: DC.CP.1696/3, Anne Shaw c. Robert Shaw (1696-7), personal response of Anne Shaw; TRANS.CP.1697/2, articles of Anne Shaw.
195 BIA: DC.CP.1696/3, personal response of Anne Shaw.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
the food, drink and clothing ‘suitable to her ranke’ and ‘degree’. Consequently, while Anne was ‘not naturally’ of ‘a passionate or unquiet temper’, the past two decade of ‘intolerable abuses’ had given her such ‘Just Cause’ to be ‘passionate’ that they ‘would have made ... a stone to speake’.

In making his defence, Shaw likewise used affective language to describe motivation, action and the performance of spousal roles. For example, Shaw described himself as ‘civill’, ‘courteous’ and ‘of a very mild & peaceable temper & deportment’. By contrast, Shaw alleged that Anne was ‘a woeman of a passionate & unquiet temper, very perversse in her nature, much addicted to quarelling & scolding’. Shaw alleged that Anne expressed her ‘hatred dislike & ill Will’ for him in physical abuse, such as when she ‘spitt in his face, tore his Cravat, pulled him by the Haire of his head’. Further putting ‘her base & inveterate mallice’ into practice, Anne allegedly took him ‘by his members & in a threatening manner endeavoured all she could to dismember & undoe him’. Again motivated by her ‘ill Will’, ‘Malice’ and in order ‘to vent her spleene’ against him, Anne also removed some of his goods out of his household and into that of Christopher Lodge, the vicar of Wistow and Anne’s son-in-law, much to Shaw’s ‘great detriment scandall & loss’. This allegation of Anne’s thievery for the benefit of her relations lay at the heart of Shaw’s defence. He claimed that the dispute between him and Anne was financially motivated. Following the loss of their eight children together, Shaw alleged, Anne had endeavoured to make him settle his estate upon her three surviving adult children from her first husband. After he refused, Anne allegedly verbally abused him and said that if her children would not inherit his estate, she would force him to

198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid., allegations of Robert Shaw.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
spend it in legal fees, and so ‘hath most malitiously unjustly & vexatiously begunn this suite’. As such, Shaw attributed both his wife’s disobedience, violence and litigation against him to her ‘passionate’ and ‘unquiet’ temper in general, and her ‘dislike’, ‘hatred’, ‘ill will’, ‘malice’ and ‘spleen’ for him in particular. The language of passions and affections, then, was the medium through which he both conceptualised and described his own ideal performance of his role as a husband and Anne’s alleged improper performance as a wife. As in Jane Currer’s case, a link is made between previous families and financial disputes, but here roles were reversed, with the husband accusing his wife of improper financial pressure.

As well as generally using affective language to describe Anne’s feelings and behaviour towards him, Shaw’s defence particularly centred on the link between passion and ‘provocation’, which directly related passion to action. The avoidance of provocation was always listed as a key part of a wife’s role in their allegations in the standardised legal language of the post-Restoration church court, including Anne’s own reported endeavours in her allegations ‘to please Content & avoid provoking’ her husband. For instance, Shaw claimed that he behaved ‘very respectfully’ towards his wife and had ‘alwayes treated her with that love & tendernessse as a good Husband ought to doe’, apart from in reaction to her undue ‘provocations’. Focusing on Anne’s behaviour, Shaw claimed that she did not behave ‘with that respect and duty she ought to have done’, but instead ‘frequently abused’ him and ‘used all wayes & meanes possible to provoke him, and put him into passion’. On his alleged verbal abuse, Shaw responded that he never used any ‘unbecoming or unkind Expressions’, unless ‘he was provoked and put into passion by her base & scurrilous Language to him’, such as when ‘he did call her baggage … upon a very great provocation’.  

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205 Ibid.
206 BIA: TRANS.CP.1697/2, articles of Anne Shaw.
207 BIA: DC.CP.1696/3, allegations of Robert Shaw.
208 BIA: TRANS.CP.1697/2, personal response of Robert Shaw.
209 Ibid.
Following his refusal to pass on his estate to Anne’s children, Shaw claimed, she had ‘taken occasion ... to fall into a very great passion’ and, in order ‘to provoak her said Husband to passion’, called him a ‘pocky rotten whoremasterly Rogue’ who ‘kept his owne Sister for his whore’. Allegedly, Anne had said that she wanted ‘to provoak him to mischeive her & kill her’, so that her children ‘might have the pleasure to see him hanged’. The few occasions when he had struck his wife, Shaw claimed, were only after she had ‘unreasonably provoked’ him to ‘passion’ by verbally abusing him with ‘Scurilous & scandalous Names’. Usually, however, he would merely leave the house ‘to avoyd her rayling & his falling into passion’. Even when he did strike his wife in retaliation, Shaw claimed that he ‘did not thereby in the least hurt her’. Shaw claimed that he never used ‘any severity’ towards his wife ‘either by words or blowes’, although he did give her the ‘moderate Correction’ that ‘the Law allowes him’ as a husband to apply, and even this was only after ‘a very great and unreasonable provocation’.

The witnesses in this case likewise conceptualised and described motivation, action and the performance of household roles through the language of passions and affections. This was most evident in the identical language used by witnesses deposing on the behalf of both sides. For instance, while Anne’s daughters Dorothy Lodge and Anne Thirkell both deposed that Shaw bore a ‘perfect hatred’ towards their mother, Shaw’s household servant – and alleged lover – Elizabeth Stephenson claimed that Anne had a ‘particular hatred’ for her husband. George Morrett – in whose ‘publick house’ Shaw had defamed and assaulted Anne Wintringham in 1691 – deposed that Anne Shaw was a ‘kind’, ‘loveing’ and ‘obligeing’

210 BIA: DC.CP.1696/3, allegations of Robert Shaw.
211 BIA: TRANS.CP.1697/2, personal response of Robert Shaw.
212 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
216 BIA: DC.CP.1696/3, depositions of Dorothy Lodge, Anne Thirkell and Elizabeth Stephenson.
wife, who had come to his alehouse ‘severall times in a modest Civill and obligeing manner to desire her husband to come home when he has beene drinking with company att nights’.\textsuperscript{217} Similarly, Anne’s brother-in-law Thomas Rawson deposed that she had never given her husband ‘the least provocation’, but had always been ‘very obligeing’ and behaved ‘handsomely & dutifully towards him’.\textsuperscript{218} Like Morrett, Rawson deposed that when he was ‘in a publick house drinking’ with Shaw, Anne came in and ‘gave her husband a great many good words & very civilly desired them to part’.\textsuperscript{219} Here, then, through the adjectives ‘loving’, ‘civil’ and ‘obliging’, Morrett and Rawson demonstrated not only Anne’s positive feelings and due obedience to her husband, but also her self-restraint and civility in her behaviour towards him. Similarly, those deposing on Shaw’s behalf stressed his ‘kindness’ as a husband. For instance, Anne Thomlinson stated that Shaw always behaved ‘very kindly’ to his wife and ‘treated her with as much respect and reall kindnesses as any husband ... did his wife’.\textsuperscript{220} Susanna Lazenby, a ‘hyred servant’ of Shaw’s in late 1695, deposed that her former master was ‘a very kind tender husband’ who had ‘Express[ed] very great sorrow that his wife made her selfe & him soe uneasie in the world & wo’d often say it was a great pitty that she was of such a temper, and say with how much satisfaccion they might live together if she cu’d but correct & governe her passion’.\textsuperscript{221} By contrast, Dorothy Ellis deposed that Anne had a ‘passionate’ and ‘uneasy temper’, which had caused her to have ‘great differences’ with her first husband, Thomas Rummans, and ‘used much to perplex him by the untowardness of her humour’.\textsuperscript{222}

Like Shaw himself, those witnesses who deposed on his behalf framed Anne’s alleged behaviour in terms of provocation. For example, Francis Doughty deposed that Shaw

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., deposition of George Morrett.  
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., deposition of Thomas Rawson.  
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., deposition of Anne Thomlinson.  
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., deposition of Susanna Lazenby.  
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., deposition of Dorothy Ellis.
‘behaved himself very lovingly & civilly’ to his wife, and had never heard of Shaw beating his wife, although he had ‘once or twice stroke at his said wife when shee did give him unreasonable provocacions’.223 Field Dunn deposed on Shaw’s behalf that he knew him to ‘demean himselfe very respectfully’ towards his wife, like a tender good husband’, apart from when Anne gave him ‘great provocacions’ causing him to be ‘somewhat angry’, although he generally behaved ‘with as much patience as it was possible for a man to doe’.224 Dunn claimed that in his hearing ‘she had endeavoured frequently thus to degrade her said husband & put him into passion’.225 The servant Elizabeth Stephenson deposed that ‘her master is a very quiet peaceable prudent man’, and ‘save when his said wife gives him strainge provocacions (which she frequently does) they live very happily together’.226 Stephenson added that Anne could ‘lead a quiet & peaceable life with her husband if she was minded so to doe’, but instead she was ‘a passionate peivish illnatured woman’ who ‘studies to provoke him’.227 However, echoing that language found in Jane Currer’s and other cases, the gentleman Robert Bond deposed that he had heard that Shaw and his servant Stephenson ‘were tooe kind together’.228 Similarly, Elizabeth Morrett, wife of the alehouse keeper George Morrett, deposed that Stephenson ‘had beene much suspected to have beeue kind with her master mr Shaw and is a great favourour of all his undertakeings’.229

Although this case contains no judgement and was probably not pursued to completion, some of its after-effects can be seen in subsequent church court suits. In March 1697, only two months after the last witness testimony was given in Anne Shaw’s separation suit, Robert Shaw sued Anne’s daughter Dorothy Lodge for defamation, alleging that she

223 Ibid., deposition of Francis Doughty.
224 Ibid., deposition of Field Dunn.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid., deposition of Elizabeth Stephenson.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid., deposition of Robert Bond.
229 Ibid., deposition of Elizabeth Morrett.
slandered him of committing adultery with several of his servants. Elizabeth Stephenson, the servant whose alleged adultery formed part of Anne’s case, deposed that she had heard Dorothy Lodge speak ‘scandalous and reviling words’ against Shaw ‘in a most malicious & revengefull manner’. Two years later, Anne sued Shaw’s servant Dorothy Barker for defaming her as a ‘burnt arst whore’ and ‘an old baud’. Allegedly, Barker had accused Anne of committing adultery with Robert Bond, one of her deponents in the separation suit, and her son-in-law, Christopher Lodge, in whose household Barker had previously served. In February 1699, two years after Anne’s separation suit, the 58-year-old gentleman John Woodall defended Anne as ‘a very honest woman of good life and conversacion and of very good esteeme and Credit amongst her neighbours’, and a woman ‘very much injured and wronged’ by the slander, which had ‘caused much difference and disagreement between her and her husband’, from whom she was evidently unseparated. However, as recently as October 1696, during the separation suit, the same John Woodall, then 56 years old, had deposed in Shaw’s favour that Anne was ‘a passionate ill natured woeman & much adicted to scolding & Quarrelling’, and that he ‘knowne her call & abuse her former husband Thomas Rumands’ as well as Shaw. While this shows that we should be wary of witness testimony and see it as a product of friendships or rivalries otherwise invisible to historians, it still shows that – whatever Woodall’s purposes – he still framed such testimony in terms of the inherent link between the language of ‘passion’ and the performance of household roles.

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230 BIA: DC.CP.1697/7, Robert Shaw c. Dorothy Lodge (1696), deposition of Elizabeth Stephenson.  
231 BIA: CP.H.4518, Anne Shaw c. Dorothy Barker (1698), articles of Anne Shaw.  
232 Ibid., deposition of John Woodall.  
233 BIA: DC.CP.1696/3, deposition of John Woodall.
CONCLUSION

Focusing on early modern church court separation suits, this chapter has demonstrated that affective language was the means through which character, motivation, action and the performance of household roles was conceptualised, described and contested in judicial settings. While the principal focus of this chapter has been on spousal relationships, it has also discussed the contractual relationships of masters, mistresses and servants. Interestingly, children have been noticeably absent from this chapter, much as they were in the church court records on which it is based. Invariably, the names, ages and identities of children went unmentioned in these sources, and only adults appeared as litigants or witnesses. Yet this chapter has not primarily been a history of the early modern household. Instead, it has used household roles as a prism through which the relationship between affective language and social practice can be seen, within the terms used by early modern people at the time.

Historians have characterised early modern legal records as either mediated by the legal structures, procedures and language of the court, or as the product of strategic testimony, language use and narrativity. By focusing on the use of affective language in court records, this chapter has also shown that both the court as an institution and the individuals – litigants and witnesses – who interacted with that institution shared similar understandings of the role of passions and affections in the motivations, performance and consequences of people’s behaviour. Rather than viewing judicial sources as unreliable or heavily mediated accounts, then, this chapter has argued that they reveal a great deal about early modern understandings and perceptions of social practice, and reflected understandings found in philosophical and didactic literature.

The accounts of violence in these cases were inherently affective, both for those recounting them and for hearers and readers. The purpose of such accounts was to convince the court of innocence or guilt, and either consciously or subconsciously played upon
common understandings of the link between passion and action, as well as the propriety of that action in certain relationships and contexts. Although we do not know the extent to which these allegations were ‘true’ or not, the commonly used defence by husbands that ‘correction’, ‘chastisement’ or violence was considered to be an inherent part of the role of the husband and his relationship with his wife. Many of the women’s accounts referred to years of abuse before they sought legal intervention, and so the role of the wife was understood in normative terms, as was shown in the previous chapter, to entail obedience and, as had been shown in this chapter, a certain level of acceptance of the violent enforcement of that obedience in practice. The point of contention was the proper limits of that violence. While some husbands invoked that their violent acts were justified by the context and ‘moderate’ in their enaction, other witnesses and sometimes the court itself disagreed, suggesting a practical and contextualised understanding of excessive violence, even if there was no legal standard. Even the concept of ‘moderation’, as Shagan has argued, denoted both a mean and the physical act that enforced that mean. Therefore, references to ‘moderate correction’ signalled that certain forms of violence were justified in their circumstances and served to restore normative understandings of the proper household hierarchy.

This chapter has developed Bound and Bailey’s studies of emotions in early modern legal records. Bound has shown how anger and malice were ‘legally constitutive’ elements of defamation suits, as proving that defamatory words were motivated by these emotions was to prove their illegality. Also focusing on malice, Bailey has shown that emotional language in legal records combined character, motivation and behaviour. She has also shown how invocations of emotions served specific legal strategies of establishing credibility, guilt or innocence. Expanding upon these studies, this chapter has focused on the totality of affective language in church court records and shown that it was not only part of the legal strategies
of gaining the sympathy of the court or proving another’s guilt, but also fundamental to understandings of the proper and improper performance of social roles and social practice more generally. These understandings conformed with a view of practice in which the character and motivation of individuals, as well as the action itself and its consequences, were all described using the language of passions and affections. This view of practice largely continued over time, although the form of specific uses changed, such as the church court’s increasingly formulaic attribution of illicit actions to affective motivations from the later seventeenth century. Therefore, by not searching for specific or expected ‘emotional’ terms but focusing on affective language as a whole, this chapter has outlined a new way of interpreting early modern social practice in the terms used by early modern people themselves.
Early modern historians have briefly discussed the role of emotion in early modern English political culture. For example, Withington has shown that early modern English people saw ‘honestas’ and ‘civility’, which encompassed the personal qualities of ‘discretion’, ‘decorum’ and ‘self-restraint’, as prerequisites for participation both in civil conversation and civic governance.\(^1\) Urban government, he argues, was a corporate form of government that was both conciliar and conciliatory, meaning that accommodating qualities inherent in civility served to restrain passion and preserve communal integrity and government. However, Withington also argues that perceived social distinctions in the capacity for self-restraint meant that, in practice, civility was as much a means of exclusion and social differentiation as it was a means of social inclusion and harmony.\(^2\) Early modern historians have also discussed the role of emotion in the formation of political allegiance and identity. For instance, on women’s agency in the English Revolution, Ann Hughes has noted that ‘Allegiance in a traumatic civil war was not based straightforwardly on rational decisions about political programmes, but was also profoundly influenced by less easily defined matters of interest, imagination, and emotion’.\(^3\) Here ‘emotion’ is described as an ineffable part of political belief that is sharply contrasted with reason and ‘rational decisions’. With a more sustained focus on emotion, identity formation and political mobilisation, Braddick has shown that John Lilburne rhetorically used Christian tropes of suffering in the service of his secular political aims of preserving the civil liberties he claimed were the inheritance of all

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Englishmen: ‘The aim was to elicit indignation, sympathy, and anger—collective emotions which ... can be highly productive of political change’.\(^4\) In this context, the purpose of rhetoric is to raise ‘collective emotions’ in order to persuade and move people to a desired political action, and this raised emotion is itself a means to foster a collective political identity. Similarly, Mark Knights has mentioned the persuasive role of ‘passion’ in the rhetoric and propaganda of the partisan ‘political culture’ of later Stuart Britain.\(^5\)

Despite these historiographical references to emotion in the context of early modern politics, there has been no sustained study of the role of emotions in early modern political culture, and the above studies have not engaged with the history of emotions. One recent exception to this is Emily Hutchison’s study of the ‘political’ and ‘anti-government passions’ of the ‘*menu peuple*’ (or common people) in late medieval urban France, which she argues were central to their shared identity, political action and interactions with their social superiors.\(^6\) In order to delegitimise the ‘political actions’ of the *menu peuple*, Hutchison argues, the ruling elite framed this ‘urban emotion’ as ‘frenzied, monstrous, and irrational’.\(^7\) Yet while they denigrated the feelings of their subordinates as excessive, irrational and antithetical to the ‘common good’, the elite still recognised that the ‘urban affect’, or heightened feeling generated, of the *menu peuple* was also ‘a concrete political force that had to be taken seriously’.\(^8\) In particular, the ‘collective emotionality’ of crowds was a core element of fifteenth-century urban political culture, which took the form of assemblies of people in designated political spaces, such as town halls.\(^9\) In these spaces, Hutchison argues,


approbation or opposition was expressed in ‘collective affect’ and ‘group emotion’ in both positive or negative feelings. The elites, meanwhile, framed such collective feeling and action in terms of ‘tumult’, ‘riot’ and ‘noise’. For the menu peuple themselves, collective affect was the means through which their common identity was both forged and expressed, meaning that it could also be ‘a potent counterweight to the power of the ruling elites’. Therefore, Hutchison has shown that emotion was an inherent part of late medieval French political culture and practice. Judgements about the emotional expression of people of different social groups, or of their capacity for finer feelings, were a means by which their political claims were either legitimised or delegitimised; the contextualised expression of emotion was also fundamentally tied to socially differentiated notions of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour; and collective emotional expression could either serve to foster group identity or cause ruptures in the prevailing power structures.

As can be seen from her use of the terms ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’, Hutchison uses present-day ‘affect theory’ to analyse invocations of passion in early-fifteenth-century French sources. Affect theory distinguishes between ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’, conceiving of ‘affects’ as pre-cultural and non-cognitive bodily ‘intensities’, which only become ‘emotions’ once they have been interpreted in cultural and linguistic terms and categories. Emotions, as Hutchison puts it, are our ‘understandings’ and ‘cultural interpretations’ of the ‘forces ... of affect’. Hutchison argues that the late medieval French elite’s concerns about ‘crowd affect’ and the ‘exploitability of emotion’ in motivating direct political action is ‘congruent with the understanding of modern affect that theorists have developed’. Affect theory, she

10 Ibid., p. 37.
11 Ibid., p. 25.
12 Ibid., p. 20.
14 Hutchison, 'Passionate Politics', p. 29.
15 Ibid., p. 25.
notes, stresses the ‘motivational propensity’ of affect towards thoughts and actions in both individuals and groups.\textsuperscript{16} For instance, Hutchison describes how the French verb \textit{émouvoir} (which, importantly, is the verb form of \textit{émotion}) denoted both movement in general and ‘an emotional response’.\textsuperscript{17} However, focusing on early modern England, this thesis has shown that movement and action were central to both learned and vernacular conceptualisations and descriptions of passions and affections, so much so that affectivity was intrinsic and inextricable from understandings of social practice and the performance of social roles. Many of the influences on English behavioural ideals at this time came from the translation and appropriation of Latin, French and Italian texts, and so this thesis and Hutchison’s study speak to a wider European view of ‘emotional’ life as one of motion and movement, either from one feeling state to another or into actions driven by the force of ‘emotion’ – in this case, direct collective action in urban settings. However, rather than imposing modern affect theory onto the past in order to understand the emotionality of movement, this chapter analyses early modern political case studies and the role of affectivity in social and political practice in historicist terms through the language and concepts used by people at the time.

In order to approach politics in early modern England, this chapter focuses on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century election disputes. As yet, the history of emotions has not been brought to bear on elections in this period, which historians have mostly studied in terms of the development of political culture in early modern England. For instance, in the 1970s Derek Hirst argued that, from the early seventeenth century, parliamentary elections, and the composition and extent of the franchise, became increasingly important, politicised and contested in the decades leading up to the outbreak of civil war in the 1640s.\textsuperscript{18} However, in the 1980s Mark Kishlansky argued that a shift from consensual and uncontested

\begin{footnotes}
\item[16] Ibid.
\item[17] Ibid.
\item[18] Derek Hirst, \textit{The Representative of the People?: Voters and Voting in England under the Early Stuarts} (Cambridge, 1975).
\end{footnotes}
parliamentary ‘selections’ to contested and politicised ‘elections’ occurred only after the contingency and turmoil of civil war, rather than from internal developments within the parliamentary political system. Only after the Restoration, Kishlansky claimed, did the rise of party politics make contested elections the norm. Responding in turn to this revisionist account, Richard Cust has argued that contested elections in the 1620s expressed, contested and resolved political and religious ideological disputes, and were not simply venues for localised power struggles and interpersonal rivalries. In other words, the long-term origins of the Civil War can be seen in these contested elections. As can be seen, early modern elections historiography has generally focused on seventeenth-century parliamentary elections, attributing either the 1640s or an earlier part of that century as the origins of modern contested party politics. However, Christian Liddy has shown the importance of choice and politics to ordinary citizens in civic elections between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. While disputed civic elections in the late Middle Ages did, on the one hand, evidence ‘factions’ within the aldermanic elites in towns and cities, they were also, on the other hand, the product of agency, choice and ‘citizen politics’. As such, elections were bound up with the rights, politics and identities of particular polities, and so are fertile ground for the history of emotions.

Consisting of four case studies examining the litigation of disputed elections in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, this chapter takes a historicist approach, focusing on how politics were conceptualised, discussed and contested in affective terms, in order to show that the history of emotions should not be considered separate from political history in this period more generally. Focusing on different civic and parliamentary political

roles, these case studies enable a study of the interaction of affective language and different sorts of political engagement across the early modern period. At the same time, they all share similar urban contexts, and are essentially about eligibility for and the correct performance of particular political roles, which allows for comparison and continuities over time. The first study focuses on two disputed elections of town governors in mid-1530s Beverley (East Riding), which saw the nearby rural gentry and some of the townspeople challenge the archbishop of York’s de jure lordship over the town. The second case study examines the contested parliamentary election in Chichester in 1586, which raised questions about who was eligible to stand as MP and who was eligible to elect him. In both Beverley and Chichester, constitutional questions led to disorder and allegations of riot. By contrast, the third case study focuses on the disputed election to and performance of the legal and civic office of clerk of the Pentice in Chester in the 1610s. Instead of the contested claims of violence found in the Beverley and Chichester disputes, this case study explores the relationship between passion and more everyday civic political culture. These three case studies use suits tried in the court of Star Chamber, a prerogative court which technically tried criminal cases involving violence or trespass, but which in reality litigated the political or property disputes underlying those alleged crimes, and was the usual venue for resolving parliamentary election disputes.\(^\text{22}\) However, as Star Chamber was abolished in 1641, the final case study focuses on a printed account of a King’s Bench trial, which followed the common law procedure of trying cases in an adversarial open court before a jury. The case discusses the tumultuous 1682 London shrieval election, showing how civic politics, and the affective language in which they were conceptualised and described, had become entwined with the development of party politics in later-seventeenth-century England.

This chapter uses these four case studies as vignettes of the role of passions, affections and social practice in early modern political culture. As will be shown, each of these studies reveals how affective language was central to legitimising or delegitimising political claims or actions; was directly related to the propriety or impropriety of the behaviour of individuals; and was the means through which wider society and the social order were conceptualised and described. Election disputes are useful sources for studying the practical and contextualised use of affective language and concepts that are directly related to the performance of different social roles in a specific social context. However, as was shown in the previous chapter, these accounts were mediated by the personnel and procedures of the courts. Despite being a criminal court, Star Chamber followed civil law procedure, consisting of written pleadings prepared in advance and witness testimony given behind closed doors rather than in open court. Testimony in King’s Bench, meanwhile, was mediated by its question-and-answer format, the scribes who documented the trial and the printers who published the official account of the proceedings. The individuals interacting with the courts also had the purposes of establishing credibility, guilt or innocence by formulating narratives that conformed with the expectations of the court. Yet, at the same time, in the accounts given by those involved in the cases, affective language was used to describe the character, motivations and actions of individuals as a means of legitimising or delegitimising their political claims. Consequently, this chapter argues that the language of passions and affections was a key means by which politics were conceptualised, described and contested in both legal and political contexts. As such, since people at the time framed politics in affective terms, this chapter makes the wider point that the history of emotions, especially if motivated by historicism, can and must be brought to bear on early modern political history. Rather than seeing passions and affections simply as responses to political events, this chapter argues that they were embedded within the motivations behind, and performances of, political roles, as well as the prism through which politics was seen and understood by early modern
people themselves. Therefore, passions were not simply politicised, but politics itself was understood to be passionate by people at the time.

**Beverley (1535-6)**

In the mid-1530s consecutive civic elections in Beverley were marred by disorder, violence and constitutional wrangling between the townspeople, the rural gentry and the archbishop of York. Annually, members of Beverley’s trade and craft guilds elected 12 ‘governors’ to exercise civic, economic and judicial authority in the town for the ensuing year. While the inhabitants saw the ‘free ellecion’ of governors as a part of their ‘awncyent customs’, Beverley was technically an archiepiscopal manor under the lordship of the archbishops of York. Although the townspeople had become used to *de facto* self-government by the 1530s, the archbishops of York, including the then-incumbent Edward Lee, were increasingly asserting their *de jure* manorial rights over the town. In April 1535 these simmering tensions boiled over with the re-election of Sir Ralph Ellerker as a governor, for which some of the leading burgesses of Beverley and Archbishop Lee subsequently sued Ellerker in Star Chamber. K. J. Allison has situated this long-running power struggle between the town and the archbishopric in the context of Beverley’s eventual ‘achievement of self-government’ in the 1570s, when the town was granted a royal charter. However, the language of these election disputes, and especially the importance of affectivity, has not been analysed by historians. For instance, in Star Chamber Ellerker’s alleged ineligibility to be a governor was framed not only in legalistic terms, but also in terms of his ‘furyous countenance’ and violence at the election. The archbishop’s success in this case solidified his authority over

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23 TNA: STAC 2/19/255, Edward Lee, archbishop of York v. John Rafulles et al. (1536), answer.
the town, causing many of the townspeople to fear that their ‘free election’ was imperilled. Despite the archbishop’s commands to the contrary, in April 1536 the townspeople held another election, for which Lee sued several of the ringleaders in another suit in Star Chamber. Whether or not these actions constituted a free election or a riot depended on the alleged violence and intense affectivity of the inhabitants in carrying them out. Therefore, in this adversarial judicial context the actions of individuals, as well as the legality of those actions, were conceptualised and described in the language of passions and affections.

In 1535 the civic election dispute in Beverley concerned Ellerker’s eligibility to be one of the 12 governors of the town. The head of one of the county’s leading families, Ellerker was based at Risby, a couple of miles south-west of Beverley, but he had been already elected governor in 1534 after purchasing property in the town.26 Consequently, his re-election the following year not only broke town ordinances that guildsmen alone could be governors, but also that no individual could be elected in successive years.27 At the election on 25 April 1535, St Mark’s Day, Ellerker and seven other incumbent governors were re-elected amid allegations of fraud, intimidation and violence. In their Star Chamber bills of complaint, the main sources of this case study, Archbishop Lee and several of the leading burgesses of Beverley combined notions of legality and affectivity to frame their allegations. For instance, Lee claimed that Ellerker and 20 ‘adherentes’ forcibly prevented 14 of the ‘Chief’ inhabitants of the town from attending the election.28 This number included Robert Raffles, the lead plaintiff against Ellerker among the townspeople and an ally of the archbishop. In their own suit, Raffles and the other ‘chief’ burgesses alleged that Ellerker and his followers confiscated the papers containing the guilds’ nominees for governors and instead canvassed for support

28 TNA: STAC 2/19/243.
among the ‘Comens’, which was contrary to the ‘Aunciant order’ of the common hall, the civic heart of Beverley.\(^{29}\) As such, not only had Ellerker allegedly disrupted the procedures of the guilds in elections, but he had also done so with the aid of the ‘commons’ at the expense of the elite or ‘chief’ inhabitants.

Added to these legal arguments, both bills of complaint used affective language to frame the actions of Ellerker and his adherents as well as their consequences on the wider polity. For example, the chief townspeople claimed that Ellerker and the incumbent governors Robert Grey and Richard Brown rose from the governor’s bench in the common hall and used ‘highe terryble and vyolent wordes’ to intimidate the assembly into re-electing them.\(^{30}\) These ‘grett wordes and threattes’, they alleged, so ‘soore trobelid’ the townspeople that ‘grett besiones’, ‘styrreyng grogis [grudges]’ and a breach of the peace were ‘very lyke to ensue’.\(^{31}\) Allegedly, with ‘ffurious Countenance’, ‘opprobrius wordes’ and a ‘lowde voyce’, Grey called the saddler Richard Taylor (one of the plaintiffs against Ellerker) a ‘busy felowe’, shook his gown and attempted to stir the ‘Comens’ to ‘Ruffe hooedes’, but was only stopped by the ‘dyscrytte Counsell’ of some ‘honeste persones’.\(^{32}\) Meanwhile, the archbishop alleged that after Ellerker had ‘threttened and manased’ the gathered townspeople ‘with great and highe wordes and terrrible countenance’, he caused ‘grete altercations, variaunces, and lowde voyces’ among the assembly, the ‘better and gretter part’ of which averred that ‘no person ought to be governour two yeres togeder’.\(^{33}\) Reacting to this dissent, Ellerker allegedly rose from the governor’s bench and ‘in grete fury raged and cast of[f] his gowne’ and – wearing only ‘his Jakett with his wodknyf or hanger and dagger by his syde’ – approached the

\(^{29}\) TNA: STAC 2/4/74, Robert Raffulle et al. v. Sir Ralph Ellercar et al. (1535).
\(^{30}\) Ibid.
\(^{32}\) TNA: STAC 2/4/74.
\(^{33}\) TNA: STAC 2/19/243.
townspeople and used ‘terryball’ and ‘opprobryous’ words and ‘thretenynges’. Consequently, according to the archbishop, Ellerker and seven other governors were re-elected ‘with force and armys and in riotous maner’, much ‘to the great inquyetacion and trouble’ of the inhabitants of Beverley.

As can be seen, in both Star Chamber bills of complaint, both Ellerker’s actions and notions of illegality were conceptualised and described in affective terms. Here the terms ‘rage’ and ‘fury’ most explicitly described the intensity and irrationality of Ellerker’s alleged conduct. As Nicole Eustace has argued, the labelling of a particular emotional expression as ‘anger’, ‘indignation’, ‘rage’ or ‘wrath’ is an evaluative act of judging the ‘moral worth’ and propriety of an emotion in that context, including the ‘status’ of the person emoting. While the more neutral ‘anger’, as Pollock has shown, was considered by early modern people a justified response to perceived improper behaviour and a means to re-establish proper social relations, here the pejorative ‘rage’ and ‘fury’ stressed the illegality of Ellerker and his adherents’ ‘unreasonable purpose’. This was particularly true in the archbishop’s allegation that in ‘rage’ and ‘fury’ Ellerker threw off his gown, which was most likely a robe of civic office representing his status as a governor, before approaching the assembly while armed. At this time, when sumptuary laws enforced hierarchical distinctions in dress, clothing demonstrated social status. Therefore, in an unrestrained outburst Ellerker had shed both his gown and the external symbol of his status and office, while simultaneously revealing that he was armed and a threat to the peace. Also, in these bills of complaint Ellerker’s intense affectivity was emphasised in the accounts that he ‘threatened’ and ‘menaced’ the

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Eustace, Passion Is the Gale, p. 152.
townspeople with ‘terrible’, ‘great’, ‘high’, ‘violent’ and ‘opprobrious’ words. As Alberti has argued, passions were invoked in early modern legal records in references to shouts and noise.\(^\text{39}\) In late medieval and early modern civic politics, as Liddy has shown, ‘opprobrious words’ expressed the ‘personal animus’ of the speaker by impugning the reputation and honour of the recipient.\(^\text{40}\) As such, the repeated invocation of the term ‘opprobrious’ simultaneously described Ellerker’s negative feelings for the inhabitants as well as his insults against them as a collective. Since Star Chamber pleadings were drawn up in collaboration with legal counsel and submitted in writing to the court, this language use was deliberate and strategic.\(^\text{41}\) As such, Ellerker’s alleged rage and fury was as important as the use of formulaic legal phrases such as ‘with force and arms’ and ‘in riotous manner’, which indicated that a breach of the peace had occurred and so brought the election dispute into Star Chamber’s jurisdiction.\(^\text{42}\)

In both the archbishop and townspeople’s allegations, affective language was entwined with notions of Ellerker’s elevated social status. After Ellerker had allegedly cast off his gown, according to the archbishop, one of the assembled inhabitants, Roger Laundell, ‘desyred’ him to be a ‘gode master’ and permit the town the ‘free eleccion’ it had enjoyed ‘in dyvers yeres past’.\(^\text{43}\) However, Ellerker ‘rebuked’ Laundell with ‘unfyttyng wordes’, and threatened that if he met him in the town he would do him a ‘displeasure’.\(^\text{44}\) Here the archbishop framed Laundell’s supplication for Ellerker to be a ‘good master’ in exactly the same terms as the appeals made by Ralph Simpson and Richard Humphrey 25 years later in response to the violence and unreasonable demands of their master, Sir Rowland Stanley (see


\(^{41}\) Guy, *Court of Star Chamber*, p. 28.


\(^{43}\) TNA: STAC 2/19/243.

\(^{44}\) *Ibid.*
Chapter 4). As in that later case, in the archbishop’s narrative the appeal for good mastership elicited a violent response in Ellerker. Allegedly, Ellerker immediately ‘rebuked’ Richard Taylor (who had also allegedly been abused by Ellerker’s ally, Robert Grey) and Richard Pounderson with ‘opprobryous Wordes’.\(^{45}\) Ellerker forcibly ‘thrust’ Pounderson away with ‘strenght [sic] and violence’ that he almost felled him to the floor, before declaring that ‘if it were not more for pyte than for feyre of any man he wold not moche dred’ to strike Pounderson with his dagger, as well as ‘half a dosen moe of suche wretches’.\(^{46}\) As such, in this judicial context it was plausible for the archbishop to ascribe rage, fury and violence to a common townsman’s imputation of a knight’s good mastership. Further relating these affective accounts to Ellerker’s status and eligibility to serve as a governor of Beverley, the chief townspeople attributed the motivation of Ellerker’s actions to his ‘gredye mynde … to Contene nott only a governoure but lyke a lorde amonge your highnes peple in the said Towne’.\(^{47}\) By contrast, demoting Ellerker from these pretensions of lordship, Lee informed the king’s chief minister Thomas Cromwell that Ellerker was ‘a mann more meete to bee a capiteigne of evell ruled persons, than to bee a governour of a towne’.\(^{48}\)

Both Archbishop Lee and the townspeople also conceptualised and described Ellerker’s actions as a governor following his re-election in affective terms. Continuing his ‘evyll purpose’ and ‘malyce’, the archbishop alleged, Ellerker led 160 armed men in ‘riotous maner’ and prevented a commission of justices of the peace, which Lee had sent to examine what had occurred in Beverley, from entering the town.\(^{49}\) He also claimed that many of the townspeople had been ‘troubled inquieted and put in pryson’, and informed Cromwell that Ellerker was likely to make ‘some great revell’ in the town.\(^{50}\) The archbishop also alleged that

\(^{45}\) Ibid.
\(^{46}\) Ibid.
\(^{47}\) TNA: STAC 2/4/74.
\(^{48}\) Edward Lee, archbishop of York, to Thomas Cromwell (28 May 1535), State Papers Online, SP 1/92 f. 181.
\(^{49}\) TNA: STAC 2/19/243.
\(^{50}\) Ibid.; Edward Lee, archbishop of York, to Thomas Cromwell (16 May 1535), State Papers Online, SP 1/92 f. 149.
his officers such as his steward ‘have dowbte to comme’ to Beverley ‘for feare of sir Raufe’. In a concurrent Star Chamber suit, the archbishop also accused Ellerker of expressing his ‘Malyce’ by poaching in his archiepiscopal deer parks throughout the summer of 1535. In August 1535, for instance, Ellerker allegedly demonstrated his ‘crueltie & Malyce’ towards the archbishop when he led his son-in-law Oswin Ogle and several Beverley men to hunt Lee’s deer to their ‘utter decaye & distruccyon’. The chief townspeople, meanwhile, claimed that with ‘vyolens’, and against ‘all good order right and Conciens’, Ellerker and his adherents had restricted their rights to graze their cattle on the common and had revoked the freedom of prominent burgesses such as Robert Raffles. Allegedly, Ellerker and his adherents had also ‘hatffully and Cruelly’ imprisoned and threatened these townspeople, which had put them ‘in daily fferre of bodily harme’. Therefore, in the context of Ellerker’s governorship, his alleged ‘malice’ for the archbishop, his ‘cruel’ and ‘hateful’ actions towards the townspeople and the consequences of these actions in the ‘fear’ of those he had ‘troubled’ or ‘inquieted’ were all described in affective language, alongside descriptions of his disrespect for the town’s customary rights and freedoms.

At this point, it should be re-emphasised that these accounts consist solely of complaints made against Ellerker and his adherents by his political opponents in an adversarial judicial context. As his answer and depositions do not survive, Ellerker’s own voice is conspicuously absent. However, the combination of Ellerker’s legal ineligibility to serve as governor and the plaintiffs’ use of affective language in their pejorative descriptions of his character, motivation and action – as well as the consequences of that action – clearly persuaded the court. The court’s judgement is evident from a decree made by the king’s

51 Lee to Cromwell (28 May 1535), State Papers Online, SP 1/92 f. 181.
52 TNA: STAC 2/19/242, Edward Lee, archbishop of York v. Sir Ralph Ellerker et al. (1535).
53 Ibid.
54 TNA: STAC 2/4/74.
55 Ibid.

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council in Star Chamber on 30 November 1535. In order to preserve ‘the quyttness, good ordore and pease’ in Beverley, the council declared the election ‘frustrate and voide’, and decreed that on the vigil of St Thomas’ Day (20 December) new ‘discrete and honeste’ governors should be chosen, before Beverley would return to the usual order of elections in April 1536.\textsuperscript{56} Yet the decree also solidified the archbishop’s ‘ordore and rewell’ over the town, as future elections were required to be overseen by the officers of the archbishop.\textsuperscript{57} Additionally, both Ellerker and his son-in-law Oswin Ogle were forbidden from ever holding civic office in Beverley again, and the decree also prohibited other ‘gentlemen’ from purchasing land in the town in order to be elected governor.\textsuperscript{58} In short, the government of Beverley, as it would seem, had been placed firmly into the archbishop’s hands.

However, this seemingly definitive settlement of Beverley’s constitutional contests merely set the stage for division among the townspeople in the following year. Here one faction supported the archbishop, while another championed the town’s accustomed liberties. As will be shown below, the composition of these factions more or less replicated the previous year’s divisions between Ellerker’s adherents and the chief inhabitants. Consequently, at the interim election held on 20 December 1535, which had been ordered only three weeks earlier by the king’s council, several of the townspeople complained that the archbishop’s officers rejected their free election and simply chose ‘suche persons as pleasythe them’.\textsuperscript{59} These new governors, the townspeople claimed, were ‘persons of mysbehavor’ who lacked the ‘substaunce’, ‘wytyt’, ‘dyscressyon’ and ‘any other good qualite to Rule and govern over any good town’.\textsuperscript{60} Instead, they continued, the governors would ‘favor yvyll [evil] dysposyde persons’, such as ‘nyght wachers’, ‘dycters’ and ‘cardars’, and

\textsuperscript{56} ‘Order in Star Chamber as to election of governors’ (30 November 1535), in Leach (ed.), \textit{Beverley Town Documents}, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{59} TNA: STAC 2/19/255, rejoinder.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ibid.}, rejoinder, answer.
neglect to maintain the town’s ‘artillery’. Here the townspeople employed the concepts, if not the terminology, of civility and honestas, using terms that directly linked social status (‘substance’), intelligence (‘wit’) and judgement (‘discretion’) to behaviour in general and the ability to perform governing roles in particular. Only two years after the publication of Robert Whittington’s first English translation of Cicero’s De officiis, the canonical text relating ideal personal qualities to public roles in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the townspeople’s invocation of these ideal governing qualities suggests, as Liddy has argued, that they also belonged to ‘a native tradition of urban citizenship’, with these vernacular ideals becoming suffused in a classical humanist framework later in the sixteenth century. The new governors’ personal qualities were also linked to affectivity, both in the sense of the lack of respect they caused in those they governed and in the subsequent alleged unrest in the town. These personal deficiencies, the townspeople alleged, had made the new governors ‘hatyd’ by the ‘most part’ of Beverley’s inhabitants, who blamed them for the ‘stryff and debayt’ between the archbishop and the ‘holl inhabytaunce’ of the town. In particular, they singled out William Wysse as ‘a sedycyous person’ and a cause of ‘stryff’ in Beverley. Demonstrating the temporal continuities in the disputes, the previous year Lee had claimed that ‘one Wiese, burgesse of the towne’ (doubtless the same person as Wysse) had been evicted from his house by Ellerker and his adherents for advocating the archbishop’s ‘liberties’. As such, the townspeople claimed that the inhabitants of Beverley unanimously ‘hated’ their newly installed governors for their base socio-economic status and personal qualities, by which they were negligent in their duties of defending the town both from enemies without and the vices of the ‘evil disposed’ people within.

61 Ibid., answer.
62 Liddy, Contesting the City, p. 2; Liddy, ‘Sir Ye Be Not Kyng’, pp. 571-96.
63 TNA: STAC 2/19/255, answer.
64 Ibid., rejoinder.
65 Lee to Cromwell (16 May 1535), State Papers Online, SP 1/92 f. 149.
On 19 April 1536, a week before the next election was due, some of the townspeople of Beverley made the 30-mile westward journey to Cawood Castle, the residence of the archbishop of York, in order to petition for the restoration of the ‘olde ordre and Rewles’ to which the town was ‘accustomed’.

The contrasting accounts of these townspeople and Archbishop Lee about this encounter demonstrated how political disputes were conceptualised, described and delegitimised using affective language. For example, the townspeople described how they made their ‘humble’ supplication ‘upon thare kneys accordyng to thare dewtes [duties]’ for ‘hys grace to be good unto them & to the town of Beverlay’. However, Lee was unjustifiably ‘sore movyde and agrevyde’ at this humble petition, which the townspeople claimed was because he wanted the government of Beverley at ‘hys wyll and pleasor’, despite his duty to preserve their ‘awncyent custom’.

In response, the archbishop claimed he had been accosted at Cawood by 50 ‘evill dysposed and sedycyous persones’, who used ‘greate wourdes’ to force him to forfeit his manorial rights over the town. In his account, Lee claimed that when he told the townspeople that they could only have the ‘olde orders and rules’ he thought ‘good and reasonable’, they were ‘not … contented’ and began to use more ‘great wourdes’, such as threatening that ‘mannes murdre’ would ensue at the next election if the archbishop’s officers again chose new governors.

Reiterating the connections to the previous year’s election dispute, the archbishop claimed that the townspeople’s great words included claims that they had not been ‘indifferentlie herde’ in Star Chamber, and so ‘they wolde goo unto the kinges presence and there make theire complaynte unto his highnes for theire remedie’. Consequently, Lee did not deny that he had been ‘moved or greved’, but rather claimed that he had been so ‘for goode and

66 TNA: STAC 2/19/255, answer.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., replication.
70 Ibid.
juste causis’. Since the alleged demands and the manner of the inhabitants – ‘great words’ implied intense affectivity, although the exact words spoken and their manner of expression are obscure – in the archbishop’s account, disturbed the ‘ordre’ and ‘quietnes’ of Beverley, the archbishop’s self-description of being ‘moved’ and ‘grieved’ symbolised the proper performance of his office and his desires for the town’s best interests.

Following this encounter at Cawood, Archbishop Lee ordered the upcoming election to be deferred. Yet a week later, on 25 April 1536, the townspeople independently elected 12 new governors for the ensuing year. In his subsequent Star Chamber suit against the townspeople, Lee alleged that around 100 inhabitants of Beverley had ‘malicyously’ disobeyed his orders and ‘riottously assembled’ outside the common hall, where they made ‘out Cries and great noyse’ and elected 12 governors ‘without any maner of order’. Four of the rioters, the archbishop alleged, then rang the common bell ‘with suche violence and fury’ that they forced it ‘out of frame’, and made ‘great manasses and threttes’ to the occupants of the house in which the bell was hung. When a religious procession of ‘wele dysposed persones’ observing St Mark’s Day approached the common hall, Lee claimed, the rioters used ‘greate and lowde voyces’ to urge ‘every true burges of this Town’ to join them, and were joined by those ‘wilfull dysposed persones’ who were ‘effeccyonate’ to the rioters. Allegedly, the rioters used pieces of timber to try to batter open the common hall door ‘with great force and violence’, but instead broke a window and entered the hall. At two in the afternoon, according to the archbishop, the aged and sickly common clerk, John Anderson, was brought to the common hall, where he enrolled the pretended governors’ names out of

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., bill of complaint.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
‘feare’ of the ‘great manace’ of the rioters. Following the illegitimate election, Lee alleged, one of the newly elected governors, Richard Wilson, whom the archbishop had sued the previous year as an adherent of Ellerker, stood upon a bench in the common hall and ‘openly and solemnly’ announced the previous year’s ‘pleynt’ against Ellerker as a means ‘to procure gretter groge [grudge]’ against the previous governors and other ‘substancyall inhabitauntes’ allied to the archbishop.

Against these allegations, the defendants claimed that they had peacefully held a ‘fre elleccion’ in order to preserve their ‘awncyent lyberties’ from being ‘utterly forfayt … into the archbysshops handes’. They denied making any ‘ownt Crye’ outside the common hall, and claimed that they only climbed onto the roof of the house to ring the common bell as the rope had been removed on the archbishop’s orders. Once in the hall, the defendants claimed, they elected 12 ‘substauncyall Inhabytaunces’ to serve as governors for the ensuing year ‘accordyng to the olde usagez in peaceble & quyet maner’. These substantial inhabitants, they added, were chosen not for ‘lowe [love] favor or meyde’ for any individual, but only for the ‘good ordre & conservacion’ of the town. Having held this free election ‘in peaceble & quyet maner’, the defendants claimed that the townspeople departed home ‘in quyet and peasseble maner’.

In this case, the question of whether the actions of the townspeople constituted a legitimate free election or an illegitimate riot depended on two factors. Firstly, it depended on the legal question of the place of elections in Beverley’s constitution, either according to its legal charters or its time-honoured customary freedoms and practices, as well as whether

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77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., answer.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., rejoinder, answer.
they were carried out according to the spatially appropriate practices of elections. For instance, in his allegations Lee claimed that, as the archbishop of York, he was the town’s manorial lord who could both permit and revoke elections. He also stressed that the ‘rioters’ had held a disorderly election outside rather than within the common hall, the proper place of elections. By contrast, the defendants not only claimed that Beverley had the right to hold elections both by ‘custom’ and ‘dyverse grauntes and conyrmationes’ made by kings and archbishop’s past, but also that they had held the election in the proper manner inside the hall. Secondly, the legitimacy of the townspeople’s actions depended on the affective intensity and violence of the inhabitants. Lee claimed that the inhabitants were ‘riottous persons’ who had violently conducted an illegal election and damaged property. In common law a riot was defined as three or more people violently or tumultuously assembled, under their own authority, with the intent to commit a breach of the peace. As such, invocations of riot encompassed affective intensity, violence and disobedience to rightful authority. Passion was also invoked in Lee’s descriptions of the townspeople’s ‘malicious’ motivation to cause ‘grudge’ in the town; their audible ‘noise’, ‘outcries’, ‘menaces’, ‘threats’ and ‘loud voices’; and the ‘violence’ and ‘fury’ by which they had damaged the common bell, a symbol of civic government and the means by which assemblies were called. Meanwhile, the defendants repeatedly invoked ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’, terms which simultaneously indicated calm and moderate feeling, manner of behaviour and – as will be seen – an ideal social order or polity.

Once again, the archbishop’s combination of legality and affectivity convinced the court. In November 1536 an agreement was made between Lee and the burgesses of Beverley intending to settle the town’s constitutional questions firmly in the archbishop’s favour.

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84 Ibid., answer.
85 Ibid., bill of complaint.
According to this agreement, as ‘chyef lord of the town’ the archbishop alone could appoint civic officers such as the clerk of the market, and would receive any fines issued in the town courts, which would be presided over by the archbishop’s steward.\textsuperscript{88} As an expression of Lee’s ‘tendre love and zele’ for the ‘good ordre’, ‘rule’ and ‘commenweale’ of Beverley, the agreement stated that the townspeople could retain their ‘free eleccion’ of governors, albeit only from a limited body of 36 common councillors, whose membership would only change with the death or demerit of existing councillors.\textsuperscript{89} In order to ensure ‘a more quiet and peaxable election to bee had’, it was agreed that any person disturbing ‘the good ordre, peaxe or tranquillitie’ of the town would forfeit his house, ‘without hope of restitution to the same for ever’.\textsuperscript{90}

In the three Star Chamber suits, then, affective language conceptualised and described the character, motivation and behaviour of individuals, and was a tool to legitimise or de legitimise political action. As such, the use of affective language in these cases cohered with the inherent relationship between passion and practice established in the preceding chapters. Determining allegations of riotous behaviour, in these suits the language of passions and affections focused mostly on the intensity of action. While intensity could be explicitly invoked as ‘rage’ and ‘fury’, the same was also true of more implicit descriptions of ‘great’, ‘loud’, ‘high’, ‘terrible’, ‘opprobrious’ words and deeds, as well as the ‘menaces’, ‘noise’, ‘threats’ and ‘outcries’ of Ellerker and the townspeople. In this judicial context, descriptions of intensity of feeling combined with political disorder to delegitimise the elections and bring them into the court’s criminal jurisdiction, and it is important that the archbishop was successful in each of his cases. Yet away from these central themes of rage, fury and violence, affective language was also the prism through which these political claims

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 68-9.
were legitimated or delegitimated. In the competing accounts of the encounter between the archbishop and some of the townspeople at Cawood, the propriety or impropriety of Lee’s being ‘moved’ and ‘grieved’ was directly related to their conflicting political positions. For the townspeople, Lee’s expressions were entwined with his alleged desire to revoke their rights and liberties. However, Lee stressed that he was justifiably moved and grieved by the intimidation of the townspeople, which in turn showed his sedulous performance of his office and his defence of the rights of the archbishopric.

Away from the actions of individuals, in these cases affective language also framed perceptions and discussions of society more widely. Particularly important in this context were invocations of ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’, which were a frequent refrain in the townspeople’s defence. As was shown in Chapter 1, these terms simultaneously described calm and moderate feelings, actions and an ideal polity or social order. For instance, the archbishop claimed to govern in the interests of the ‘peace’, ‘quyetnes’, ‘tranquylytie’, ‘good order’, ‘rule’ and ‘comen welthe’ of Beverley.91 As such, passions and affections were implicated in the discourse of ‘commonwealth’, which in the sixteenth century encompassed ideals of the common good and society as a whole.92 Notions of quietness also informed the ideal of uncontested selections, which Kishlansky showed made up the majority of pre-Civil War parliamentary elections.93 Until the disputes of the mid-1530s, Lee asserted, these elections had been held ‘wele quyetly and indifferently’ and ‘without dysturbance’.94 Showing how quietness informed the language of social description, distinguishing the ‘quiet’ and ‘honest’ elite from the commons, the chief inhabitants who sued Ellerker and his adherents in 1535 described themselves as the ‘quyet and honeste’ people of the town.95 Associating Ellerker

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91 TNA: STAC 2/19/243; STAC 2/19/255, bill of complaint, replication.
93 Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection, pp. 10-12.
94 TNA: STAC 2/19/255, bill of complaint.
95 TNA: STAC 2/4/74.
with the ‘commons’ – those who should not govern but be governed – the ‘quiet’ and ‘honest’
townspeople claimed in affective terms that this upturning of the proper, divinely ordained
social order had caused ‘rage’, ‘rore’, ‘murmure’, ‘debate’, ‘dyssension’ and ‘perturbacion’ in
the town. Consequently, in their bill of complaint the chief inhabitants requested that the
archbishop be authorised to reduce the ‘perverse libertie’ of the commons and return
Beverley to ‘peace and quyetnes’. Similar terms were used the following year by the
opposing faction of townspeople, who blamed the governors installed by the archbishop’s
officers for the ‘debate’ and ‘strife’ in the town. Additionally, the November 1535 decree of
the king’s council invoked ‘the quyttness, good ordore and pease’ of Beverley. Following
this decree, an injunction commanded Ellerker, on pain of 500 marks, never again to disturb
the ‘comon welth and quyetnes’ of the town. Lastly, the ‘good order’, ‘peace’ and
‘tranquillity’ of elections were also idealised in the November 1536 agreement that seemingly
settled the constitutional disputes in Beverley firmly in the archbishop’s favour. Therefore,
passions and affections were not simply politicised, but politics itself was understood in
affective terms by people at the time.

This relationship between passion and politics was true both at the local level of civic
politics – the focus of this case study – and at the national level. By the time of the November
1536 agreement, Beverley had been engulfed in the uprising known as the Pilgrimage of
Grace, in which tens of thousands of the ‘commons’ were up in arms against the central
government’s perceived attacks both on traditional religion, with the break with Rome and
the ongoing dissolution of the monasteries, as well as on local customs and the ‘commonweal’
more generally. Demonstrating not only the blurred boundaries between local and national

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 ‘Order in Star Chamber’, in Leach (ed.), Beverley Town Documents, p. 64.
100 Richard Hoyle, The Pilgrimage of Grace and the Politics of the 1530s (Oxford, 2001); Ethan H. Shagan, Popular
politics, but also their inherent affectivity, the Ellerker adherent, alleged rioter and now pilgrim Christopher Saunderson attributed the townspeople’s ‘comocyon and stering’ in the rebellion to the ‘old grudges’, ‘quarrells’ and ‘discencion’ caused by ‘a great sute betwixt the Bishopp of York and them for their liberties, wherin some toke parte with the Bishopp and som with the Towne’.101

CHICHESTER (1586-7)

Half a century after the civic contests in Beverley, a disputed parliamentary election in the city of Chichester similarly caused unrest in its common hall, constitutional controversy and litigation in the court of Star Chamber. On 7 October 1586 James Colbrand, captain of the city’s trained band, stood against Richard Lewknor, the incumbent in the three parliaments since 1572. The election, which was presided over by George Chatfield, the mayor of Chichester, overran by several hours due to the ‘Disorder’, ‘Clamour’ and ‘cryinge out’ of those in the common hall.102 Attempting to restore order, Chatfield ordered all unfranchised persons to leave the hall, before a division was made and the names of Colbrand and Lewknor’s supporters were recorded and sealed up.103 Three days later, Chatfield convened a meeting in the council house of the merchants’ guild, at which Colbrand was judged to be ineligible to be elected MP because he was not a ‘ffree Cittizen infraunchised’ and, after unsealing the election papers, Lewknor had more names among the ‘Aldermen’ and ‘ffree Cittizens’.104 Subsequently, Colbrand sued Chatfield in Star Chamber on the grounds of 49-54; M. L. Bush, ‘The Tudor polity and the pilgrimage of grace’, Historical Research 80, 207 (2007), pp. 47-72; Claire Cross, ‘Friars, the Pilgrimage of Grace, and the Dissolution of the Dominican and Franciscan Priories in Sixteenth-Century Beverley’, Yorkshire Archaeological Journal 90 (2018), pp. 96-110.
102 TNA: STAC 5/C23/37, James Colbrand v. George Chatfield, mayor of Chichester, et al. (1587), interrogatories of George Chatfield.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
holding a disorderly election and falsely awarding Lewknor the seat.\textsuperscript{105} Previously, Robert Tittler has used this case as an example of how civic architecture and space could both symbolise civic authority and provide the space in which that authority was challenged.\textsuperscript{106} The disorder in the common hall, Tittler argued, affronted mayoral authority in symbolic and spatial terms, both by forcing Chatfield to come down from the bench that spatially represented his elevated status, and when several inhabitants climbed onto the ‘magistrate’s table’, a form of ‘civic furnishing’ whose dignity was literally being trampled underfoot.\textsuperscript{107} However, by focusing more on the language used by those involved in this suit, it can be seen that the election dispute – and civic politics more widely – was conceptualised and described using the language of passions and affections. As will be seen, while Colbrand’s alleged ‘great rage’ and ‘hott speaches’ demonstrated his electoral ineligibility, Chatfield’s self-professed ‘goodwill and ffrendship’ towards Colbrand indicated that his case was baseless.\textsuperscript{108} Therefore, as in the earlier cases relating to Beverley, affective language was central to conceptualising, and contesting, early modern civic politics.

Fundamentally, this parliamentary election dispute was about who was eligible to be an MP and who was eligible to elect him. As a borough constituency, Chichester elected two MPs for each parliament. For the first seat, the franchise was limited to the mayor and ‘Thirtie’ of the ‘ffree Cittizens’ of the dominant merchants’ guild, who assembled that morning in the council house.\textsuperscript{109} Here they elected the non-resident Valentine Dale, an ally of Lord Burghley and, like Lewknor, the incumbent since 1572.\textsuperscript{110} The franchise for the second election was broader, although exactly how broad was the core issue of Colbrand’s

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 114, 116.
\textsuperscript{108} TNA: STAC 5/C23/37, interrogatories of George Chatfield, deposition of John Sherwin.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Ibid.}, deposition of John Cooke, interrogatories of James Colbrand.
Star Chamber suit. In this period, as Kishlansky showed, the selection of MPs was both ideally and most commonly an uncontested expression of the common assent of a particular polity, and so the precise size and structure of the electorate was generally inconsequential.\(^{111}\) However, when Colbrand contested the seat, the number of votes and the eligibility of the voters became an important issue. Colbrand claimed that Chichester’s second election belonged to the ‘Commoners’, which he claimed was the ‘accustomed’ term to denote members of other guilds, such as the ‘Taylours’, ‘Cordyners’ and ‘whytetanners’, whose support he enjoyed.\(^{112}\) However, opponents such as the alderman, former mayor and MP John Sherwin used ‘the Commoners and the baser sorte’ to refer to those who had no say in government.\(^{113}\) In his defence, Chatfield asserted that only ‘ffree Cittizens infrarchised’ – a term Colbrand never used – could give voices in either election.\(^{114}\) As such, while Lewknor boasted the support of ‘Esquiers’, ‘gentlemen’, ‘Aldermen’ and ‘the Chiepest and best sorte of the free infrarchised Cittizens’, Chatfield claimed that Colbrand only had the backing of the ‘souldiers’ he trained and ‘the residewe of the meanest and basest sort of the people’.\(^{115}\) Furthermore, although he was captain of the trained band, Colbrand was not a ‘free citizen’ of Chichester, but rather held gentry status, although he claimed that the winners of elections were customarily granted the ‘freedom’ of the merchants’ guild. Early modern urban ‘freedom’, as Jonathan Barry and Withington have shown, consisted of a combination of economic, social and political rights and responsibilities, which underpinned a person’s social status and socially differentiated interpersonal interactions with others within the spatial bounds of the city.\(^{116}\) Here, then, formal civic status, divided into ‘free citizens’ and ‘commoners’, combined with the language of ‘sorts’, which, as Wrightson has shown, was an

\[^{112}\] TNA: STAC 5/C23/37, interrogatories of James Colbrand; STAC 7/19/32, James Colbrand v. George Chatfield, mayor of Chichester, *et al.* (c.1587), articles of James Colbrand.
\[^{113}\] TNA: STAC 5/C23/37, deposition of John Sherwin.
\[^{114}\] Ibid., interrogatories of George Chatfield.
\[^{115}\] Ibid.
informal language of social description that in this later-sixteenth-century context divided the city into the ‘best’ and ‘barest’ sorts.\(^{117}\)

As well as these constitutional and customary questions, much of the case focused on Colbrand’s behaviour at the election. Chatfield claimed that the inhabitants of Chichester had assembled in the common hall in ‘peaceable and quiett order’, but when Colbrand arrived he ‘immediatlie’ began to use ‘very quarrelsome and contentious speaches to Edward More Esquire and other gentlemen’.\(^{118}\) In the case, the ‘fallinge out’ between More and Colbrand was recounted by Sherwin, Richard Stanney ‘Esquier’ and the ‘Citizen’ Ranulph Barlow, who were all members of the civic elite of Chichester and deponents on Chatfield’s behalf.\(^{119}\) Allegedly, Colbrand claimed that More was only attending this election because he had opposed More the day before at the ‘Election of Knightes’ for the county of Sussex, at which More was unsuccessful.\(^{120}\) In response, More said that Colbrand could do him the ‘Leaste harme of all men’ as he had no ‘ffreehoulders’, ‘Coppie houlders’ or ‘Tenantes’ to bring in his support.\(^{121}\) Reportedly, this gibe provoked Colbrand. In ‘great heate’, he allegedly said that ‘I can bringe as many or more then you can’, before adding that while More’s father was merely ‘Chippinge of Bread in the Pantrie in the Courte’ and ‘had noe Lande in Sussex’, his own father was a ‘gentleman’ possessing lands worth hundreds of pounds a year.\(^{122}\) To this More answered that his father had owned land, but not in Sussex, and that ‘yf you can spende Two hundred poundes I can spende flower hundred, And yf you fower hundred I can spende Syx hundred’.\(^{123}\) Against this one-upmanship, Colbrand allegedly retorted that ‘I have as much Lande as thou, And am as good a gentleman as thou arte’.\(^{124}\) In his deposition, Barlow

\(118\) TNA: STAC 5/C23/37, interrogatories of George Chatfield.
\(119\) Ibid., depositions of Richard Stanney and Ranulph Barlow.
\(120\) Ibid., depositions of Richard Stanney and John Sherwin.
\(121\) Ibid., depositions of John Sherwin, Richard Stanney and Ranulph Barlow.
\(122\) Ibid.
\(123\) Ibid., deposition of Ranulph Barlow.
\(124\) Ibid., depositions of Ranulph Barlow and Richard Stanney.
praised More, who had ‘patientlie putt up’ the ‘many harde speaches’ used by Colbrand.\textsuperscript{125} This he associated with More’s office as a justice of the peace, as ‘there was like much harme to have ensued’ due to ‘the multitude on both sides’ had More not remained patient.\textsuperscript{126} Taking place ‘in the Midle of the hall’, Barlow claimed that this dispute ‘was like to have raysed a great tumult’, but the mayor came between them and commanded them ‘to kepe the Queenes Majesties peace’.\textsuperscript{127} 

The dispute between Colbrand and More offers a snapshot into the importance of affective self-restraint in interpersonal contestations of social status and political officeholding. In the Star Chamber records, Colbrand and More were both given the titles ‘Mr’ and ‘Esquire’, which could indicate gentility or public officeholding.\textsuperscript{128} A member of the rural gentry, Colbrand owned lands across Sussex, and by 1586 had captained Chichester’s trained band for around a year.\textsuperscript{129} Colbrand was also connected to the lower nobility; his second wife, Martha, was the daughter of Oliver St John, first Baron St John of Bletso.\textsuperscript{130} As such, Hirst has characterised the dispute as an example of ‘gentry intervention’ into civic politics, with Colbrand the ‘gentleman outsider’ challenging the civic ‘oligarchy’ of the merchants’ guild.\textsuperscript{131} By contrast, More’s status derived from his familial connections to the royal court. His father, John More, had been a gentleman pensioner and member of the royal household, an office that Edward More had also held since 1577, and doubtless it was this service in the ‘pantry’ that Colbrand was impugning.\textsuperscript{132} In the accounts told in this case,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid., deposition of Ranulph Barlow.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Wrightson, ‘Estates, degrees, and sorts’, p. 39.
\item \textsuperscript{129} W. J. J., ‘Colbrand, James (bef. 1544-1600), of Chichester, Suss.’, The History of Parliament: British Political, Social & Local History, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1558-1603/member/colbrand-james-1544-1600 [accessed 17 May 2020].
\item \textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Hirst, Representative of the People?, pp. 61-2.
Colbrand’s ‘great heat’ and ‘hard speeches’ contrasted with More’s ‘patience’. Colbrand’s intense affectivity was also implied in his reported use of ‘thou’ when arguing with More. The informal and familiar ‘thou’ was used by superiors to address social inferiors, and so its use is unsurprising in a heated exchange primarily about relative status and one-upmanship. Yet at this time ‘thou’ indicated intense feeling, allowing the deponents Stanney and Barlow to highlight Colbrand’s ‘great heat’. Notably, none of these deponents attributed the use of ‘thou’ to More. That this encounter was recounted by his opponents suggests both that Colbrand lost this contest, and that this loss had a wider meaning in the context of an election dispute about his eligibility to be an MP for Chichester. As such, in his interrogatories Colbrand did not mention his dispute with More, although his deponent Thomas Triddles described in neutral terms that he exchanged ‘wordes of Anger’ with More. Therefore, intense expressions of passions and affections demonstrated the importance of reputation, wealth and relative social status, and descriptions of them formed a central part of the narratives crafted in this judicial context.

Following Colbrand’s dispute with More, the town clerk Robert Addams ‘quietlie and orderlie’ read to the assembly a letter from the privy council calling for the re-election of MPs from the previous parliament in 1584. Since this meant the re-election of Lewknor, Chatfield alleged that Colbrand fell ‘into a great rage’ and told Addams ‘with a lowde voice’ that he had acted ‘impudentlie’ by reading the letter. Barlow deposed that Colbrand was ‘not well pacified of his late Contention with Mr More’ and so castigated Addams ‘in furious

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134 Ibid., pp. 2, 290.
135 TNA: STAC 5/C23/37, deposition of Thomas Triddles.
136 Ibid., deposition of George Chatfield.
137 Ibid.
manner’. At this time, the common hall was filled with clamour and unrest. Barlow claimed that Colbrand’s supporters ‘Cryed Colbrande Colbrande’ and were ‘verie like to make a Tumult’. Due to this alleged ‘Outrage and disorder’, Chatfield claimed that he was forced to rise from the bench ‘to goe downe amongst them to pacyfie them and to kepe the Queenes Majesties peace’. Sherwin added that they would have committed ‘great bloudshed’ had the mayor not ‘quietlie pacified’ them. After Chatfield ordered ‘all servingmen and other that hadd noe voyces’ in the election to leave the common hall, he told Colbrand ‘to pacifie and quiett the people that were soe outrageous on his side’. In response, according to Barlow, Colbrand said that ‘yf you will have them quiett you muste please them’, to which More interjected, ‘muste we please the people, Noe noe the people muste be governed not pleased’. Reportedly, Lewknor then declared to the assembly that ‘he was sorie that this busines had ben so troublesomme unto them, or that any man shoulde Conceave yll of him’, and ‘yf any man were grieved that he had Delt yll with them he was readie to reconcyle himself and make satisfaction’ with him, before he ‘prayed them all in Quiett manner to departe home’. After these ‘good wordes’, Sherwin deposed, Colbrand then ‘burst out in Choller’ and said that Lewknor ‘had no other shifte to drawe the people to him but by his desemblinge with them’. Barlow stated that Colbrand then ‘stepped up upon the Midle of the Table before the Mayour verie Disorderlie’ and made ‘unpacient speaches’ deriding ‘this gentleman’ for ‘preach[ing] of hym self and of his doinges’, and that he would do as much as MP as Lewknor had done. Chatfield and Lewknor then told Colbrand that it was he who

138 Ibid., deposition of Ranulph Barlow.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid., interrogatories of George Chatfield.
141 Ibid., deposition of John Sherwin.
142 Ibid., interrogatories of George Chatfield.
143 Ibid., deposition of Ranulph Barlow.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., deposition of John Sherwin.
146 Ibid., deposition of Ranulph Barlow.
was preaching as he was upon the table, and that he had used ‘unconvenient speaches’ when he should have ‘pacifie[d] the people’.147

The accounts of Colbrand and his deponents differed from those given by the civic leadership of Chichester by attributing the unrest to the disorderly and lengthy electoral proceedings presided over by Chatfield. Tasked with recording the names of Colbrand and Lewknor’s voters, Triddles deposed that when the names of those considered ‘insufficient’ to give their voices in the election were struck out, Colbrand had 13 or 14 more names than Lewknor on his side.148 In order to increase his support, Lewknor then allegedly canvassed for support among the ‘Aldermen’ and ‘ffree Cittizens’ of the merchants’ guild – those who Colbrand claimed had no say in this election – whose names were added to the list.149 Since this process had taken around three hours and only finished around noon, Colbrand alleged that ‘a multitude’ began to chant ‘the name of Colbronde’ because they were ‘Discontentid toe bee holden so longe in the Comon halle and soe Contrarie too Custome’.150 He then claimed to ‘intreat the multitude to have pacience’, saying that ‘if they would bere Quietlie all thinges the matter in the end would faule to ther desire’.151 Allegedly, Lewknor’s allies then ‘Revyled’ and assaulted Colbrand’s supporters, making them ‘afraide’ to vote for him.152 For instance, William Bole, a ‘servant or frynde’ of Lewknor’s, said that Colbrand was ‘noe gentleman’, and ‘disorderly Thrust or Shouldred’ the high constable, Thomas Byrd.153 Another ‘servant or ffrinde’ of Lewknor’s, Matthew Taylor, called the high constable a ‘ffoole’ and ‘Revile[d]’ the merchant John Byrd with ‘Opprobrious wordes’.154 Colbrand and John Byrd alleged that many of Lewknor’s supporters were ‘standinge upon the table which

was before the maiour’, who should have had no part in the election because they were ‘noe houshoulders’.\(^{155}\) Despite being Chatfield’s deponent, Edward Bellingham ‘Esquier’ recounted that people on both sides were ‘Cryinge out’ Lewknor and Colbrand’s names.\(^{156}\) Triddles deposed that Colbrand both entered and left the election ‘in verie good order’, and that Chatfield did not conclude the proceedings until as late as five o’clock.\(^{157}\)

In these contested accounts, both sides used the language of passions and affections to describe the actions of their opponents at the election. The most explicit affective language was used by Chatfield and his deponents, who described Colbrand’s alleged ‘great rage’, ‘unpatient’ and ‘furious manner’ after Addams had read out the privy council’s letter, as well as how he ‘burst out in choler’ at Lewknor’s conciliatory declaration to the assembly. As in the Beverley election disputes, the terms ‘rage’ and ‘fury’ stressed the alleged intensity and irrationality of Colbrand’s actions. This was especially evident in Sherwin’s version of the events. He deposed that Colbrand ‘verie undiscreetlie and in a great rage openlie with a Lowde voice before all the whole Assemblie’ told Addams that he should not have ‘published’ the letter.\(^{158}\) By coupling ‘rage’ and ‘undiscreet’, Sherwin further stressed the impropriety in that context (before the assembled inhabitants) of berating Addams with his ‘loud’ and angry voice. Also, Sherwin’s evocative account of Colbrand’s bursting into ‘choler’ was framed in humoral terms. For instance, in Timothy Bright’s *Treatise of Melancholie* (1586), published the same year as Chichester’s disputed parliamentary election, the humour of choler was conventionally described as the physiological cause of ‘anger’, ‘rashnesse’ and ‘unadvisednesse’.\(^{159}\) Furthermore, Colbrand’s lack of patience, a virtue centred on affective self-restraint, contrasted with More’s patience with Colbrand’s ‘hard speeches’ and

\(^{155}\) Ibid., interrogatories of James Colbrand, deposition of John Byrd.
\(^{156}\) Ibid., deposition of Edward Bellingham.
\(^{157}\) Ibid., deposition of Thomas Triddles.
\(^{158}\) Ibid., deposition of John Sherwin.
\(^{159}\) Bright, *Treatise of Melancholie*, pp. 52-3.
Colbrand’s own claim to have beseeched his supporters to have patience. For Chatfield and his deponents, these accounts of intense affectivity served a political purpose, demonstrating both Colbrand’s unfitness for the role of MP and that he had stirred up the ‘commoners’, who they saw as having no say in government, and thereby challenged civic authority. By contrast, Colbrand claimed that the unrest in the common hall was motivated by the inhabitants’ ‘discontentment’ at being held so long in the disorderly and illegitimate election presided over by Chatfield. The intensity of the crowd was described by terms such as ‘clamour’, ‘crying’, ‘disorder’, ‘outrage’, ‘outrcy’ and ‘tumult’, which as in Beverley 50 years earlier demonstrated that a breach of the peace had occurred, against the ideals of ‘peace’, ‘quiet’ and civic authority. Therefore, these accounts of affectivity were entwined with both sides’ notions of legality.

Away from the events on the day of election, Chatfield also used affective language to describe Colbrand’s character in negative terms and his own motivations more positively. For instance, Chatfield alleged that Colbrand was ‘soe contentious vaine glorious and troublesome’ that ‘the most parte of the gentlemen’ and ‘men of best accompt’ did ‘greatlie mislike of him’ and ‘forbeare to kepe him Companie’.\(^\text{160}\) In other words, Colbrand’s unsociable character had alienated him from the elite of Chichester, without whose support he could not serve as MP for the city. By contrast, Chatfield claimed that he was positively affected towards Colbrand, and showed him no ‘malice enmytie Dislike or hatred’.\(^\text{161}\) As was shown in Chapter 4, these same negative passions – ‘malice’, ‘enmity’, ‘dislike’ and ‘hatred’ – were the normative judicial language of the church courts for ascribing motivation for illicit action. By explicitly denying such feelings, Chatfield stressed his innocence in affective terms. Similarly, Chatfield’s witnesses used the language of ‘affection’ and ‘friendship’ to

\(^{160}\) TNA: STAC 5/C23/37, interrogatories of George Chatfield.
\(^{161}\) Ibid.
characterise Chatfield’s relationship with Colbrand. For instance, while Stanney deposed that Chatfield was ‘more affected’ to Colbrand than to Lewknor, Barlow claimed that Chatfield was ‘soe affected’ to Colbrand that he had ‘used him to[o] Courteouslie’ by not imprisoning him for ‘his misdemeanours at the Election’.

The aldermen, according to Sherwin, feared that Chatfield had ‘great mislikinge’ for them, because Chatfield was so ‘Affected’ to Colbrand and treated him as a ‘ffrinde’.

Following the election, Sherwin continued, Chatfield had shown his ‘goodwill and ffrendship’ to Colbrand by asking the two re-elected MPs, Dale and Lewknor, to yield their seats to him. At the meeting held in the council house three days after the election, which determined its outcome, Chatfield stressed his ‘frendlie manner’ in informing Colbrand that he was ineligible to serve as an MP for Chichester.

At this same meeting, Colbrand alleged, Lewknor had said that ‘it was not fit’ that Colbrand should be elected or granted the freedom of the merchants’ guild because he ‘might bee to muche liked or growne to to[o] great Creaditt’ in Chichester. Therefore, it was through the language of passions and affections that character and motivation were conceptualised and described in both positive and negative terms.

As with most Star Chamber suits, this case contains no final judgement, although events evidently did not turn in Colbrand’s favour. Not only did he lose his captaincy of Chichester’s trained band in 1587, the same year he sued the mayor, but at the next election, in October 1588, Dale and Lewknor were again chosen as the city’s two MPs, and Lewknor would continue to be returned until 1597, when he was appointed the chief justice of Cheshire. However, Colbrand would continue to live in Chichester until his death in 1600,
by which time he had attained the offices of justice of the peace, sheriff and deputy lieutenant of Sussex.¹⁶⁸ While Colbrand’s unsuccessful case focused on constitutional questions and electoral procedure, Chatfield’s defence used affective language to delegitimise the political claims of Colbrand and his supporters among the soldiers, ‘commoners’ and ‘basest sort’ of people. It should also be re-emphasised that Chatfield not only represented the civic elite of Chichester, but he also claimed to be dutifully carrying out the privy council’s wishes by re-electing Dale and Lewknor. As the court of Star Chamber was a prerogative court consisting of the privy council ‘sitting judicially’, Colbrand’s case was therefore doomed to failure.¹⁶⁹ In this case, the language of passions and affections focused mainly on the alleged intensity of the actions of Colbrand and his supporters on the day of election. Although this language most explicitly included ‘anger’, ‘choler’, ‘rage’, ‘fury’ and ‘great heat’, it also included terms that become affective through contextualisation, such as ‘hard’, ‘loud’ and ‘great words’ among the alleged ‘clamour’, ‘tumult’ and ‘disorder’ of the crowd in the common hall. As in the Beverley cases, ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’ remained ideals, but more in the sense of the behaviour of individuals and groups rather than an ideal state of the polity as a whole. In the interrogatories and depositions that comprise this case study, which focused on action and customary electoral practices, the discourse of ‘commonwealth’ was not invoked, meaning that it is unclear whether views of the body politic had been shorn of their affective connotations. As well as action, in this judicial context the opposing conceptual fields of ‘affection’, ‘goodwill’, ‘courtesy’ and ‘friendship’, on the one hand, and ‘malice’, ‘enmity’, ‘dislike’ and ‘hatred’, on the other, simultaneously denoted specific feelings, characterised different interpersonal relationships and ascribed motivation for proper and improper action. Importantly, they were also determinants of guilt, innocence and the outcome of legal cases. Since these same terms were also used to describe contemporary cases of marital violence,

¹⁶⁸ J., ‘Colbrand’.
¹⁶⁹ Guy, Court of Star Chamber, p. 1.
there is a strong sense that deponents described incidents in terms that resonated with legal language and procedures, which suggests that affective legal language reflected wider use.

**Chester (1617-18)**

While the case studies focusing on election disputes in Beverley and Chichester revolved around contested claims of violence and the customary and constitutional roles of elections and the electorate, the third case study, which centres on the city of Chester in the 1610s, explores the relationship between passion and more everyday civic political culture. On 1 June 1618, at a Portmote court in Chester presided over by Charles Fitton, the mayor of the city, Robert and Thomas Whitby were expelled from their civic offices as joint clerks of the Pentice on grounds of extortion and abuse of office. The local term for town clerk, the clerk of the Pentice was an important and lucrative office, earning the holders the profits and duties due from the various courts in Chester. Although Robert was away in London, his 32-year-old son Thomas was then imprisoned in the Northgate gaol and the accoutrements of his former office were taken from him. At the same assembly, the mayor, aldermen and common councillors of Chester elected Robert Brerewood to the clerkship. The culmination of months of factional intrigue, which had pitted the Whitbys against Fitton, Brerewood, his father-in-law Sir Randle Mainwaring, and others among the civic elite, the loss of the clerkship shifted the balance of power in the city, and neither Whitby would ever again hold office in Chester. Consequently, Robert and Thomas Whitby did not go down without a fight, but sued their opponents in Star Chamber, alleging that they had been dismissed by baseless rumour, perjured testimony and untrue information sent to the king. Historians have situated this dispute in the context of civic and parliamentary politics in early-seventeenth-century

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Chester. John Gruenfelder and Hirst briefly mentioned the Whitbys’ dismissal from the clerkship as an important antecedent for the contested parliamentary election of 1620-1.\textsuperscript{171} In their Cheshire county history, C. P. Lewis and A. T. Thacker framed the clerkship dispute in the context of factionalism in the participatory officeholding culture of the early-seventeenth-century Chester urban elite.\textsuperscript{172} However, none of these historians has studied this particular case in depth, or what it can tell us about the language or semantics of civic politics. As such, this case study focuses on the affective language used in the Star Chamber suit, and shows how affective language described character, motivation and action in ways that served to legitimise or delegitimise political claims and actions.\textsuperscript{173}

At heart, this dispute concerned the meteoric rise of the Whitby family in the civic government of Chester in the early seventeenth century. According to the charter of 1506, Chester was governed by an assembly of a mayor, two sheriffs, 24 aldermen and a common council of 40 other citizens.\textsuperscript{174} Annually elected, the mayor and sheriffs were the judges in Chester’s various civic courts, such as the Pentice and Portmote.\textsuperscript{175} J. W. Laughton has described how, after the Cheshire lawyer Robert Whitby moved to the city in 1589, he quickly ascended the hierarchy of civic offices, becoming a sheriff in 1607-8, an alderman in 1610 and mayor in 1612-13.\textsuperscript{176} As mayor, Whitby wielded his influence to have one son, Thomas, chosen as sheriff, and another, Edward, installed as recorder, another important legal office in Chester. In contrast to the annual terms of the mayorality and shrievalty, the recordership was not only a lifetime appointment, but also an automatic choice for one of the city’s two

\textsuperscript{174} Lewis and Thacker (eds), \textit{History of the County of Chester}, vol. 5, pp. 97-102.
\textsuperscript{175} Laughton, ‘House that John Built’, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 99-100.
As a result, Edward Whitby was returned as MP in the six consecutive elections between 1614 and 1628. Within a relatively short period, then, the Whitby family had risen from rural outsiders to holders of the mayoralty, shrievalty and recordership of Chester, as well as one of the city’s parliamentary seats, albeit at the cost of growing ‘enmity’ against them. In Star Chamber the defendants claimed that the Whitbys had shown ‘great presumption and insolencye’, and become ‘ambitious’ to rule the city according to their ‘wills and pleasures’. Furthermore, as early as 1602 Robert Whitby had been elected clerk of the Pentice, and from 1608 held the office jointly with his son Thomas, and both Whitbys claimed they would do so throughout their ‘naturall lives’. However, this term was cut short in 1618, when the opposing faction, which included that year’s mayor, Fitton, and sheriffs, Gilbert Eaton and Foulke Salisbury, successfully removed the Whitbys by judicial means. As Mainwaring claimed in Star Chamber, while the mayoralty and shrievalty were ‘greate and eminent places’ in the city’s government, the clerk of the Pentice was merely a ‘mynisteriall office’, meaning a lower, functionary role. Since this would mean acting both as judge and clerk of the court, Mainwaring averred that the clerkship had legally been vacant since Robert and Thomas Whitby’s assumption of the mayoralty and shrievalty in 1612-13.

In their bill of complaint, Robert and Thomas Whitby alleged that their opponents (the ‘Confederators’) had concocted a ‘malitious designe’ to deprive them of their offices and livelihoods by installing Brerewood as clerk of the Pentice. This malicious design, they

177 Lewis and Thacker (eds), History of the County of Chester, vol. 5, pp. 97-102.
182 TNA: STAC 8/297/15, answer of Sir Randle Mainwaring.
183 Ibid., bill of complaint of Robert Whitby and Thomas Whitby.
claimed, consisted of two key strategies. Firstly, in November 1617 their opponents had ‘unlawfully and malitiously’ misinformed the king that the clerkship was vacant.\textsuperscript{184} Yet, recognising their ‘longe service’ to the city, King James decided that the Whitbys should remain joint clerks.\textsuperscript{185} In January 1618 this decision was sent in writing to the civic government by George Villiers, the marquess of Buckingham, privy councillor and favourite of the king.\textsuperscript{186} While this letter ‘did conteyne your Majestys pleasure’ and had been sent by a man of ‘great worth’, Fitton allegedly received it in a ‘strange contemtuous and scornfull manner’, cast it onto the table ‘with much neglect’ and ‘most unjustly and contemtuousely’ refused to ‘publish’ its contents to the assembled citizens.\textsuperscript{187} Further demonstrating their ‘scorne’ and ‘contempte’ for both James and Buckingham, the ‘Confederators’ instead ‘privately whisper[ed]’ about the letter amongst themselves and refused to send a reply.\textsuperscript{188} Secondly, having failed to prove that the clerkship was vacant, the Whitbys claimed that their opponents accused them of misconduct in office. In March 1618 the confederators ‘most unlawfully wickedly and malitiously’ sent the king a ‘libellious wrytinge’ accusing the Whitbys of ‘briberie extorcion oppression imbeseling altringe and raysinge of Records’, and used ‘undue unlawful and terrifying meanes’ to enforce citizens to subscribe their names to the petition.\textsuperscript{189} Continuing these ‘malitious unlawfull and indirect Courses’, they also petitioned the 17-year-old Prince Charles, among whose titles was the earldom of Chester, in order to bring the Whitbys into ‘scandall’, ‘disgrace’ and ‘ill opinion’, both with James and his heir apparent.\textsuperscript{190} Yet when the king again reiterated his desire for the Whitbys to remain joint clerks, Fitton once again showed him ‘great neglecte and contemt’ by refusing to

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
publish the letter. However, James did grant Fitton leave to try Robert and Thomas Whitby in the civic courts if they had committed any crimes. Consequently, the ‘malice’ of the confederators was finally executed on 1 June 1618, when a Portmote court presided over by the mayor stripped the Whitbys of the clerkship of the Pentice.

Answering these allegations, the defendants claimed they had shown ‘favoure’ to the Whitbys by deferring to the king before choosing a new clerk of the Pentice, despite the office being legally vacant. In November 1617, as Mainwaring had been ‘credeably informed’, Robert and Thomas Whitby were present when the ‘maior aldermen and sheriffs’ collectively composed the letter to James, and had ‘seemed ... to be therewith well pleased’. Despite this ‘publique agreement’, the other defendants alleged, in truth the Whitbys were ‘not content’, but sent ‘private lettres’ to the king, which untruly claimed that it was a ‘custome’ for clerks to hold higher judicial offices and that the citizens were ‘desirous’ that they keep their places. In January 1618, meanwhile, when Thomas Whitby delivered Buckingham’s letter to the mayor at an assembly in the Inner Pentice, Mainwaring claimed that he ‘caste’ it onto the table ‘in a moste contemptuous and scornfull manner’ to cause Fitton ‘afronte and disgrace’. Yet Fitton still received the letter ‘reverentlye and respectfully’, before rebuking Whitby for his ‘unfittinge’ and ‘scornefull manner’. The defendants also accused the Whitbys of malpractice in office. Most seriously, Mainwaring alleged that Thomas Whitby, motivated by some ‘former displeasure’ done to Whitby or ‘his servant or under Clarke’, had ‘maliciously falsly and untruly’ misentered the jury’s verdict in the case against Robert Evans, who was tried for the killing of George Conway. Misentering the verdict as manslaughter

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191 Ibid.
192 Ibid., answer of Robert Brerewood et al.
193 Ibid., answer of Sir Randle Mainwaring.
194 Ibid., answer of Robert Brerewood et al., answer of Sir Randle Mainwaring.
195 Ibid., answer of Sir Randle Mainwaring.
196 Ibid., answer of Sir Randle Mainwaring, answer of Robert Brerewood et al.
197 Ibid., answer of Sir Randle Mainwaring.
rather than the less serious crime of killing in self-defence, Whitby had allegedly hazarded Evans’ life. Evans only escaped death by successfully pleading benefit of clergy, although he did suffer the ‘perpetuall infamy’ of being branded on the hand. On another occasion, Mainwaring alleged, motivated by ‘a Covetous and overgreedy desire’ for his fee, Whitby had rushed through the due process of law in a property dispute by falsely recording that Ralph Appleton and John Dunsterfield had appeared in person in the Portmote court when they had not done so. As such, rather than attempting to instal Brerewood to the clerkship, the defendants claimed to have been motivated by their ‘zeale and love of Justice’ after many of the inhabitants of Chester, who had been ‘agreeved and oppressed’ by the Whitbys but also ‘terrified’ of their ‘greatnes’ and ‘power’, began to make complaints to the mayor and aldermen, which they then forwarded to the king. In short, for the defendants the Whitbys’ ejection from office was both justified and legal.

In this judicial context, then, affective language pejoratively described the characters, motivations and actions of opponents in attempts to delegitimise their political claims and provide convincing accounts of behaviour. For instance, the key affective term of Robert and Thomas Whitby’s allegations was ‘malice’, a term which simultaneously denoted disharmonious interpersonal relationships and the negative feelings that motivated illicit actions, such as misinforming the king or using legal chicanery to oust the joint clerks. The concept of malice encompassed the links between legality and affectivity that have already been seen in other early modern lawsuits, and were repeatedly expressed in the bill of complaint in repeated references to the defendants’ alleged ‘malitious wicked and unlawfull practice and Conspiracie’. The defendants countered claims of malice by stressing the ‘favour’ they had shown to the plaintiffs, suggesting that the civic elite was positively

198 Ibid., bill of complaint of Robert Whitby and Thomas Whitby.
199 Ibid., answer of Sir Randle Mainwaring.
200 Ibid., answer of Sir Randle Mainwaring, answer of Robert Brerewood et al.
201 Ibid., bill of complaint of Robert Whitby and Thomas Whitby.
disposed towards the Whitbys. Yet Mainwaring did invoke malice in his allegation that Thomas Whitby had ‘maliciously’ misentered Robert Evans’ verdict as manslaughter as a form of judicial revenge for some previous ‘displeasure’, meaning that the link between misaffection and misdeed was used by both sides of the dispute. Similarly, both sides also used the term ‘terrified’ to describe the effects of the improper use of power, whether in the means by which the citizens signed the anti-Whitby petition to the king, or as the effect of the Whitbys’ dominance on the inhabitants of Chester. Returning to the case against Evans, the plaintiffs alleged that their opponents, who were the ‘chiefe magistrates’ of the city, ‘did threaten and terrifie’ those jurors who refused to depose that Whitby had misentered their verdict ‘with ymprisonment and other punishments’.\textsuperscript{202} Here, then, being terrified was a feeling that impeded action, to negative effects. Lastly, focusing on the delivery of Buckingham’s letter, the plaintiffs and defendants both used the terms ‘scorn’ and ‘contempt’ to describe actions in pejorative terms that directly linked feeling and disobedience of rightful authority. Mainwaring also claimed that, in 1616, when Thomas Whitby was asked by Edward Button, the mayor who preceded Fitton, to read a petition to an assembly, in an ‘insolent contemptuous and scornfull maner’, Whitby put the petition ‘into his pocket’ and refused to read it ‘excepte he were payed for it’.\textsuperscript{203} Therefore, affective language directly linked the propriety or impropriety of motivation and action that, in this judicial context, served political purposes of legitimisation and delegitimisation. It also demonstrated the importance of gesture and comportment, which both sides of the dispute claimed expressed ‘scorn’ and ‘contempt’, whether in Whitby’s allegedly scornful pocketing of the petition or Fitton’s scornful casting of Buckingham’s letter onto the table, which purportedly expressed his disregard both for the marquess and the king.

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., answer of Sir Randle Mainwaring.
On 1 June 1618 Robert and Thomas Whitby were formally stripped of the joint clerkship of the Pentice at a Portmore court held in the common hall of Chester. For the Whitbys, this court was the outcome of their opponents’ ‘malice’ and ‘Confederacie’. While Thomas Whitby attended, his father Robert was away in London. Even though they were dismissed from office at this court, the Whitbys alleged that many of the supposed witnesses against them were ‘ashamed’ of their perjured depositions and refused to swear to them. After discharging the joint clerks, the mayor ordered a serjeant-at-mace, one of his officers, to take the accoutrements of the clerkship of the Pentice from Thomas Whitby. The Whitbys alleged that the serjeant and other officers ‘most forcibly and violently’ and ‘in a most violent riotous and forcible manner’ took from Whitby the books and records belonging to the clerkship. Upon Fitton’s orders, the sheriff Gilbert Eaton ‘in a most strange unusuall and disgracefull manner’ then ‘forcibly and violently hayled’ Whitby out of the court and ‘through the most open and publicke streets’ to the Northgate gaol, where he remained for ‘a longe space’. ‘Cryinge’ for Whitby’s ‘further disgrace’, the ‘Confederatours’ told the gaol keeper to ‘Clappe bolts’ on his legs and carry him through the streets of Chester. After installing Brerewood as clerk at the same court, the Whitbys alleged, the confederators ‘most forcibly violently and outragiously’ broke into the office of the Pentice, and ‘in a most riotous routous and unlawfull manner’ took the legal records and some of the Whitbys’ own money contained within those rooms. By contrast, the defendants claimed that while Fitton had asked Whitby in court ‘in gentle manner’ for the books and keys of the clerkship, he ‘obstinantly’ and ‘contemptuously’ refused to do so. Whitby was gaoled for this public ‘contempt’ of mayoral authority, and Eaton took him to the Northgate ‘in as mylde and

204 Ibid., bill of complaint of Robert Whitby and Thomas Whitby.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid., answer of Robert Brerewood et al.
temperate a manner as possible’ by the ‘onely and directe waie’.

The following day, Robert and Thomas Whitby alleged, Fitton convened an assembly at which he ‘most malitiously’ declared in public that the Whitbys had been dismissed for their supposed crimes. Brerewood, the new clerk of the Pentice, then entered this into the civic records, ‘to the perpetuall scandall infamie and disgrace’ of the Whitbys.

In their conflicting accounts of the dismissal and imprisonment of the Whitbys, then, both sides used the language of passions and affections to stress the propriety or impropriety of the events in the court. For example, the Whitbys emphasised that these actions had been improper (‘strange’, ‘unusual’, ‘disgraceful’) and intense (‘forcible’, ‘violent’, ‘riotous’, ‘routous’, ‘outrageous’). Again they invoked malice to ascribe the motivation for their opponents’ actions that culminated these events. By contrast, the defendants not only claimed that Thomas Whitby’s ‘contempt’ had directly led to his arrest, but also that this arrest was done in a proper, ‘gentle’, ‘mild’ and ‘temperate’ manner. These uses of affective language served the same function as the language used more widely in this case: to delegitimise the political claims of opponents. Both sides also used the terms ‘contempt’ and ‘scorn’ when referring to the letter of January 1618 that expressed the king’s will and was sent by Buckingham (a privy councillor), which referred to improper feelings and actions in interactions between social superiors and subordinates. Such uses of language were clearly strategic and attuned to the particular context of Star Chamber, a court consisting of the judicial prerogative of the king and his privy council. Yet although this case only consists of the bill of complaint and the defendants’ answers, it is evident that the plaintiffs’ uses of affective language to make their case were ultimately unsuccessful. While Robert and Thomas Whitby never again held office, Brerewood remained clerk of the Pentice until 1627.

211 Ibid., answer of Robert Brerewood et al., answer of Sir Randle Mainwaring.
212 Ibid., bill of complaint of Robert Whitby and Thomas Whitby.
213 Ibid.
when he was ironically removed on grounds of extortion and neglect of duty after Edward Whitby complained to the privy council about his conduct.214 These actions provoked the contested parliamentary election of 1628, at which Whitby defeated Mainwaring, who had earlier succeeded Fitton as mayor of Chester.215 However, Brerewood would have the last laugh, succeeding Whitby as recorder of Chester after Whitby’s death in 1639.216 Ultimately, this case has shown how affective language provided the framework by which political disputes were conducted in a judicial context, even in cases that did not involve the riot or unrest seen in Beverley and Chichester. The case therefore demonstrates that, even in more everyday civic politics, the language of passions and affections were central to conceptualisations and descriptions of character, motivation and action.

**LONDON (1682-3)**

Having demonstrated in the previous three case studies how the language of passions and affections conceptualised and described the character, motivations and actions of individuals in political contexts, and was also implicated in concepts of politics and society as a whole, the final case study shows how these affective implications had become entwined with the development of party politics in later-seventeenth-century England. On 24 June 1682 the disputed election of sheriffs of London was a key flashpoint in the development of party politics in this period. At this time, the opposition Whigs advocated religious toleration for nonconformist Protestants and opposed the future succession to the throne of the Catholic James, duke of York, while the loyalist Tories defended the existing Anglican Church settlement and the royal prerogative, even if this included a Catholic succession.217 Following

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216 Lewis and Thacker (eds), *History of the County of Chester*, vol. 5, pp. 97-102.
Charles II’s dissolution of parliament after the recent Exclusion Crisis (1679-81), during which opposition MPs had attempted to forestall James’ future succession, the locus of party politics shifted from parliament to the Corporation of London, the city’s governing body.\textsuperscript{218}

In this factional context, London’s two annually elected sheriffs became crucial, as their role of selecting juries gave one party control of the city’s courts for that year. Held in the Guildhall and overseen by the incumbent Whig sheriffs, Thomas Pilkington and Samuel Shute, the June 1682 election saw the vast majority of liverymen elect as sheriffs the former Exclusionist MPs, John Dubois and Thomas Papillon (son of the ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ writer David Papillon).\textsuperscript{219} However, according to the crown and loyalists, this election was both unconstitutional and riotously conducted. In constitutional terms, the question of whether both sheriffs were elected by the liverymen, or whether one was appointed by the mayoral prerogative, had become a matter of party-political dispute. In May 1682, a month before the election, the lord mayor, Sir John Moore, had selected the Tory candidate Dudley North to be one of the sheriffs. Allegedly, when the mayor ordered the election to be adjourned, claiming that the liverymen were unconstitutionally electing both sheriffs, he was assaulted when he attempted to exit the hall. Despite the announced adjournment, Pilkington and Shute continued the election and declared Dubois and Papillon the victors. As Gary De Krey has shown, the ‘climactic’ shrivial election sparked three months of arrests, further inconclusive elections and threats of an armed conflagration.\textsuperscript{220} Only when the crown installed Tory sheriffs in September 1682 was the dispute settled. Subsequently, on 8 May 1683 the alleged ringleaders of the ‘riot’, headed by Pilkington and Shute, were tried in a politicised King’s Bench trial held in the Guildhall, the site of the disputed election 11 months earlier, which allowed the crown to charge many opposition leaders in one stroke.

\textsuperscript{218} De Krey, \textit{London and the Restoration}, p. 223.
\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 256.
\textsuperscript{220} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 225.
While De Krey has situated this dispute in the context of the central role of London in the development of party politics and the constitutional wrangling of the 1680s, the disputed shrieval election has not been studied in terms of the role played by the language of passions and affections in party politics. But focusing on this election reveals how party politics were conceptualised and contested in affective terms in the later seventeenth century.

The principal source for this May 1683 trial is a printed quarto text, titled *The Tryal of Tho. Pilkington, Esq; Samuel Shute, Esq; ... For the Riot at Guild-Hall on Midsommer-Day, 1682*, which was published around a month later by the printer and bookseller Thomas Dring, and which was presented as both a verbatim and an official account of the proceedings.\(^{221}\) The text’s claims to being an official account were made evident upon opening the text. The verso of the title page included the commission of Sir Edmund Saunders, Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench and the Tory-leaning judge in the trial, for Dring ‘to Print this Tryal’, which was dated 11 May 1683, three days after the trial was held.\(^{222}\) As can be seen from Dring’s ‘Advertisement’ of upcoming publications at the end of the text, the *Tryal* account was published and sold in early June.\(^{223}\) The other advertised texts indicate the purpose of the *Tryal* account, both for Dring and Saunders. As well as collections of historical legal reports written in French, one of the texts was the second volume of the arch-Anglican clergyman John Nalson’s pro-royalist history of the Civil War, *An Impartial Collection of the Great Affairs of State* (1683), which was dedicated to Charles II and ‘Published by His Majesty’s Special Command’.\(^{224}\) This suggests Dring situated his *Tryal* account in the context of other historical, legal and politically charged texts. It was therefore both an account of the trial and


\(^{222}\) Ibid., sig. A1v.

\(^{223}\) Ibid., sig. P2v.

\(^{224}\) John Nalson, *An Impartial Collection of the Great Affairs of State. From the Beginning of the Scotch Rebellion in the Year MDCXXXIX. To the Murther of King Charles I*, vol. 2 (London, 1683), title page.
a work of party-political propaganda documenting the judicial downfall of the Whig ascendancy of the early 1680s.

Structured as a dialogue or a play, the *Tryal* text purportedly recounted what was said by those involved in the trial. As such, Dring’s *Tryal* text offers a glimpse both at the descriptions of the contested events at the election, and at the behaviour of those involved in the trial, which was evidently highly charged and interrupted by shouts and laughter. At the same time, however, the question of the audience of this text also distinguishes this case study from the earlier case studies, which consisted of institutional records meant only for those directly involved in the disputes. Seen alongside the other texts Dring was selling in June 1683, the *Tryal* was marketed either to lawyers or Tory-leaning readers invested in the party politics that, as De Krey has described, engulfed London in the early 1680s. Consequently, through publication the trial and the disputed shrieval election were not only adjudicated in court but also in the wider court of ‘public opinion’, or at least the ‘civic opinion’ of the citizens of London who, it should be remembered, were active participants in shrieval elections, and who it appears had given more votes to the Whig candidates Dubois and Papillon. Therefore, the entwining of passions and party politics was evident not only in the accounts given in court but also in the behaviour of those in the courtroom, as well as the wider civic and national readerships, all of which will be the focus of this case study.

During the trial, according to Dring’s *Tryal* account, the prosecution and its witnesses emphasised the disorder at the election, the affronts made to mayoral and royal authority and, most importantly, the culpability of the Whig-supporting sheriffs and liverymen. The Guildhall, they claimed, was filled with ‘great clamors’, ‘Controversie’ and ‘Hubburb’. The assembled liverymen ‘were all in an uproar, and not cool enough for any Debate; for they were wound up to that height of Fury or Madness, that they had not a good word to bestow

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225 *Tryal*, sig. B2v, D1r, G1r.
upon their Magistrates, nor upon him whom their chief Magistrate did represent’ – the
king.\footnote{Ibid., sig. D1r.\footnotetext{226}} Since the ‘pubrick Peace’ of the city and kingdom were ‘much disturbed’, Moore
decided to adjourn the assembly.\footnote{Ibid.\footnotetext{227}} Although the common crier proclaimed, ‘Pray God bless
the King, as is usual for the Officer upon such Occasions’, a ‘great part’ of the liverymen
‘hiss’d’ and ‘cryed, No, God bless the Sheriffs, the Protestant Sheriffs’, and seditiously shouted
‘No Lord Mayor no King’.\footnote{Ibid.\footnotetext{228}} When the lord mayor attempted to leave the hall, accompanied
by the sword-bearer and a train of aldermen, in ‘Riotous’, ‘tumultuous’ and ‘Outragious
manner’ the ‘Rabble’ impeded him, ‘offered Insolencies to his Person’, ‘struck him, struck his
Hatt off’, ‘had him down upon his Knees’ and would have ‘trod him under feet’ had some
‘honest Gentlemen’ not come to his aid.\footnote{Ibid.\footnotetext{229}} Among these was Henry Crispe, the common
serjeant, who ‘laid hold’ of one decrying the king and mayor, but ‘the Rabble got him from
me’.\footnote{Ibid.\footnotetext{230}} The crowd was also ‘thrusting’, ‘pressing’ and ‘bruising’ Moore, and ‘hunched’ the
alderman and former lord mayor Sir James Edwards ‘with their Elbows’.\footnote{Ibid.\footnotetext{231}} According to the
prosecution witness ‘Mr Farrington’, the defendant John Wickham said that the city would
not ‘be ruled by any of your Tory Lord Mayors’, to which Farrington replied, ‘This is not the
first aspersion ... that you have cast upon a Gentleman that loves the Church and the
Government established by Law’.\footnote{Ibid.\footnotetext{232}} The reported response to Farrington’s loyalty, expressed
in terms of ‘love’, was that the Whig liverymen ‘fell about me’ and ‘trod upon my Toes’.\footnote{Ibid.\footnotetext{233}}
Despite the adjournment of the assembly and obstructed exit of Moore, the sheriffs, Thomas
Pilkington and Samuel Shute, continued the ‘disorderly Tumultuous Proceedings’, after
which the crowd cried out ‘in a factious manner, God bless the Protestant Sheriffs’ and ‘hollowed’ loyalists in the streets.\textsuperscript{234}

As can be seen, in the \textit{Tryal} account the prosecution and loyalist witnesses were presented as combining notions of illegality and affectivity in similar ways to earlier cases, albeit now in the service of party politics. In their view, Pilkington and Shute’s continuation of the election after Moore’s adjournment was ‘disorderly’ and ‘tumultuous’ because it unconstitutionally usurped upon the mayor’s prerogative. This legal focus was coupled with explicitly affective language, such as references to ‘fury’, ‘madness’ and being ‘not cool’, as well as the more implicit terms ‘riot’, ‘uproar’, ‘clamour’, ‘hissing’ and ‘crying’. The combination of legality and emotionality was vital because, as the defence counsels William Williams and Sir Francis Winnington noted, although there was ‘some rudeness by some of the people’ in the hall, whenever ‘there is a question upon an Election, it is impossible such a thing shall be carried on but there will be reviling, ill language, and the like’, and it would be wrong ‘to turn all these things to a Riot’.\textsuperscript{235} Instead, they claimed, Pilkington and Shute had acted constitutionally, as it was the ‘Custome’ for the incumbent sheriffs, and not the lord mayor, to manage shrieval elections, which could not be adjourned ‘till the Business was done’.\textsuperscript{236}

Yet propriety and affective restraint remained key to the narratives of both sides. Although in the trial the defence attempted to minimise what had happened and argue that the election was constitutional, contemporary Whig handbills praised Pilkington and Shute for managing the election ‘with the greatest impartiality, condescension, and forbearance imaginable’, despite the actions of the mayor and other ‘Betrayers and Subverters of the Rights and Privilegedes of the \textit{Corporation}’, and were ‘not to be provok’d upon by the heats

\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., sig. C2r, C2v, I2r.
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid., sig. I2r, M2r, K1v.
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., sig. K2r, N1r.
and passions of others, to do any thing which may either be an offence against the Government, or endanger the quiet and peace of the City'. A\textsuperscript{237} Another account praised the ‘Citizens’ for showing great ‘Moderation’ despite the ‘almost insufferable Provocations’ of certain non-citizens, as they did no more ‘than modestly to reprove their want of respect to Authority, and their Incivility’. A\textsuperscript{238} Therefore, to the Whigs, the sheriffs had behaved properly in both constitutional and affective terms, in contrast to the ‘incivility’ of their opponents.

Continuing the party-political framing of the trial, Dring related how the loyalist King’s Serjeant Sir George Jeffreys, speaking for the prosecution, claimed that the ‘Rabble’ consisted of many, including the defendants Richard Goodenough and Ford Grey, third Baron Grey of Werke, who were ‘not Livery men, nor concerned in the Election one way or other, but came there on purpose to foment and to raise up the spirits and malignant dispositions of a sort of people that are Enemies to the Government; they came to foment Quarrels, and not maintain Peace’. A\textsuperscript{239} Expressed in affective terms, for Jeffreys these actions were motivated by the ‘spirits’ and ‘malignant dispositions’ of the Whigs. In this legal context, ‘malignant’ was synonymous with ‘malice’, which simultaneously described underlying character and ascribed motivation for illicit actions. A\textsuperscript{240} Yet in this party-political context, the term ‘malignant’ also had connotations of the Civil War, when the term was used by parliamentarians to refer to their enemies (see Chapter 1). A\textsuperscript{241} Here Jeffreys was turning the language of malignancy on its head, using it to denigrate the Whigs, who he was framing as the new rebels against the king. Jeffreys’ invocation of ‘malignancy’ was indicative of a wider shift in the political applications of the term. Addressing the king in his \textit{Impartial Collection}

\textsuperscript{237} The Sheriffs of London for the time being, are the proper Managers and Legal Judges of the Election of Sheriffs For the year ensuing (London, 1682).
\textsuperscript{238} An Impartial Account of the Proceedings of the Common-Hall of the City of London, at Guild-Hall, June the 24th, 1682. For Electing of Sheriffs for the said City and County of Middlesex (London, 1682), sig. Av.
\textsuperscript{239} Tryal, sig. D1r.
\textsuperscript{241} Leng, ‘Meaning of “Malignancy”’, pp. 835-58.
of the Great Affairs of State (1683) – the other pro-royalist or Tory treatise that Dring published and sold in and around June 1683 – John Nalson referred to the ‘Malignant Faction’ to associate the parliamentarian side with the present-day Whigs. More widely, Nalson framed politics and the state in affective terms, lamenting the ‘unreasonable Fears’ and ‘groundless and unsatisfiable Jealousies’ of ‘the Dangers of Popery and Arbitrary Government’ that characterised both the parliamentarian and contemporary Whig position, and outlined his hopes for the ‘Happiness’, ‘Peace’ and ‘Tranquility’ of the remainder of Charles’ reign. Like Nalson, the Tryal account also characterised the party-political factionalism of the 1680s and a continuation of those of the 1640s. It recorded that the judge, Sir Edmund Saunders, rhetorically asked whether ‘the King must be put out of his Throne, to put these two Sheriffs in it’, after they had attempted ‘in a tumultuary way [to] make a Riot to set up a Magistracy by the power of the People’. Affective accounts of character and motivation, then, were entwined with the language of party politics, contrasting the Tories’ ‘love’ for government and the established church with the ‘malignity’ of the Whigs, who wanted to overturn them.

As was stated above, the printed account of the trial was also a representation of the behaviour within and heightened affectivity of the courtroom, which was an adversarial space in which guilt was proved or disproved in the presence of third parties such as judges, juries and other onlookers. One of those present was the loyalist judge, Saunders, who frequently derided the defence’s arguments. The most active parts were played by the prosecution and defence counsels, who used displays of humour and anger to serve the credibility of their cases. These included Jeffreys, who was pitted against Williams, the exclusionist speaker of the last House of Commons in 1681 and Jeffreys’ frequent adversary

243 Ibid., sig. A2r-v.
244 Tryal, sig. P1v-P2r.
in the politicised trials of the 1670s and 1680s. Lastly, by noisily expressing affirmation or antagonism, the spectators were also active participants in the trial and were not mere passive observers. Historians have shown the importance of emotional expression in judicial settings. For instance, as Rublack has shown, early modern women had to ‘perform’ emotions in court in order to appear credible and sympathetic to others. These emotional performances, she argues, had to be ‘natural’ as well as ‘controlled and readable’ within ‘a relatively fixed semiology of feeling’. Focusing on the nineteenth-century British courtroom, Dixon has described the different uses and interpretations of weeping, whether as an attempt to ‘move’ a jury, elicit sympathy or support a claim for another’s guilt. Barclay argues that ‘expression of emotion by the court gallery played an important role in shaping power dynamics, signalling if testimonies were trustworthy, acting as public opinion on whether justice was served, and influencing how judiciaries and juries determined truth’. Therefore, it is not only important to focus on the actions at the election that led to the trial, but also to understand the role of affectivity during the trial itself – as they were represented by Dring, at least – in the wider context of party politics in the 1680s.

On the one hand, this affectivity reflected judicial and political rivalries. For example, responding to the cross-examination of a defence witness, the defence lawyer Williams told his rival, the prosecution counsel Jeffreys, that ‘You are in a Passion now’, which Jeffreys denied, saying ‘No Sir, I am not’. Since ‘passion’ referred to unrestrained and deeply embodied feelings, Williams’ accusation of Jeffreys’ passionate questioning and behaviour in

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246 Rublack, *Crimes of Women*, p. 60.

247 Ibid.


249 Barclay, *Men on Trial*, p. 83.

250 *Tryal*, sig. H2v.
this judicial context aimed to undermine the prosecution’s case. This shows how the language of passion was used and contested in social practice – admittedly in a judicial context aiming to appeal to the sensibilities of the Tory jury – and that it was not just recorded as a form of formal legal written language. On the other hand, it is clear that the affectivity also came from those attending the trial, showing that they were not mere passive spectators, but rather active participants in the proceedings. At one point, for instance, Jeffreys said, ‘There is such a noise that I did not very well hear that word’, and later complained about the ‘horrid noise’ and asked those in the courtroom to ‘have a little Patience’.251 Arguing that the defendants were not to blame for the noise during the election, Williams likened the noise in the courtroom to that at the election, noting that ‘In this crowd where we are, I hear hissing, especially at to’ther end of the Hall’.252 Towards the end of the proceedings, Attorney General Sir Robert Sawyer ‘clamour’d’ and spoke over Lord Chief Justice Sir Edmund Saunders, who said, ‘Gentlemen, you shall not over-rule me so’.253 Summing up for the jury at the end of the proceedings, Saunders likened the Whig assaults on the mayoral prerogative to the rebellion against the king four decades earlier. When he said that the riot ‘was somewhat of the Common-wealths seed that was like to grow up among the good Corn’, according to the pamphlet, ‘Here the People hum’d and interrupted my Lord’.254 In response, Saunders told them to act appropriately to the court context, noting that their behaviour ‘is a very undecent thing, you put an indignity upon the King, for you ought not to do it if you knew your Duty, pray Gentlemen forbear it, it does not become a Court of Justice’.255

Rather than focusing only on the heightened affectivity and its verbal expression in partisan shouting, the affective dynamics of the courtroom also became audible in the

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251 Ibid., sig. H1v, N2r.
252 Ibid., sig. I2v.
253 Ibid., sig. O2r.
254 Ibid., sig. P1v.
255 Ibid.
responses to witness testimony reported in the *Tryal* pamphlet. This is particularly evident in the examination of the defence witness, exclusionist Whig MP and former lord mayor Sir Robert Clayton. During Clayton’s mayoralty, the shrieval election of 1680 had also been adjourned, and the questions turned to whether Clayton or his sheriffs had ordered that adjournment. In response to Clayton’s selective memory, as his adjournment undercut the defence’s claim that Sir John Moore’s actions were unprecedented, Sawyer cautioned him not to ‘serve the Court thus’. To this Williams said, ‘Don’t brow-beat our Witness’, before adding, no doubt sarcastically, that ‘I know, Mr. Attorney, you are an example of fair practice’. Sawyer and Jeffreys then repeatedly asked the former mayor about his adjournment of the assembly. Clayton’s evasiveness made him the object of ridicule in the hall, for he said that ‘I don’t know I have given any great occasion of Laughter to my Brethren’. In both early modern thought and social practice, laughter was understood to be linked to contempt, derision and was a means by which superiority and exclusion were established and expressed. As such, the leading Whig and erstwhile mayor had become laughable in this context, and this moment perhaps represented a Tory ‘community of laughter’ mocking a political opponent. Therefore, while laughter expressed derision at Clayton, his response was to deny that this laughter was fitting to the ‘occasion’. As such, this was the same as Saunders had done when he reprimanded the crowd for ‘humming’ and interrupting his remarks that the disputed election had threatened mayoral and royal authority.

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256 Ibid., sig. L1r.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
With a jury selected by Dudley North and Peter Rich, the Tory sheriffs installed by
the crown the previous September, the outcome of the trial was never in doubt. The
defendants were found guilty of committing ‘a Riot and Battery ... upon the Person of the
late Lord Mayor’.\footnote{The Proceedings and Judgment Against the Rioters; Viz. Thomas Pilkington Esq; Samuel Shute Esq; Henry Cornish, Alderman. Ford Lord Grey of Wark. Slingsby Bethel Esq; Sir Thomas Player, Knight. Francis Jenks. John Deagle. Richard Goodenough. Richard Freeman. John Wickham. Robert Key. Samuel Swinock. And John Jekyll Senior. Who were Fined at the Kings Bench Court at Westminster on the 26th of this Instant June, 1683. for a Riot and Battery committed by them upon the Person of the Late Mayor, &c. in Guild Hall, at the Election of Sheriffs, containing what remarkably occurred in the Debates admitted upon passing Judgment of Fine (London, 1683).} Requesting an attenuation of the fines issued after the guilty verdict, the
defendants claimed that they had acted ‘rather out of Ignorance than Malice ... as not being
then capable to determine whether the Right to Adjourn the Common Hall lay in the Lord
Mayor or Sheriffs’.\footnote{Ibid.} However, despite invoking common understandings of the motivating
role of malice, the defendants’ application was unsuccessful: all were found guilty and fined
between 100 and 1,000 marks (apart from Pilkington, who was fined £500 and had already
been imprisoned for seditiously traducing James, duke of York).\footnote{Ibid.} While the nature of politics
had changed over time following the development of post-Restoration party politics, the
relationship between affective language and its uses to legitimise or delegitimise political
claims had shown a broad continuity across the early modern period. Here the language of
riot combined with affective descriptions of party-political differences, in which the loyalists
distinguished their ‘love’ for the established government and church from the Whigs’ malign
affronts to mayoral and royal authority. Due to the common law procedure of King’s Bench,
the printed Tryal account also described behaviour in the courtroom. Here intense affectivity,
expressed in partisan shouting, was judged inappropriate in that context as an affront both
to the court and the king. Affective expressions were a means of showing derision for the
uncredible testimony of political opponents, as well as something that was contested by those
directly involved in the trial proceedings, with falling into ‘passion’ symbolising a lack of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[262] Ibid.
\item[263] Ibid.
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self-restraint. Lastly, Dring’s *Tryal* text was also a literary and propagandistic work, consisting of a representation of the trial rather than an exact account (if such a thing is possible), but it still showed how the appropriate expression of passions and affections was politicised and contested in judicial settings and social practice, or at least was portrayed as such for a wider readership.

**CONCLUSION**

Examining lawsuits and a representation of a trial proceeding relating to disputed elections, this chapter has shown that the eligibility for and performance of political roles was both conceptualised and described in the language of passions and affections. In the Beverley case study, affective language was central to legitimising or delegitimising political claims or actions; directly related to the propriety or impropriety of the behaviour of individuals; and descriptive of wider society and the social order more widely. In the very different political, religious and geographical context of Chichester, much of the affective language had remained the same as in Beverley 50 years earlier, as had the importance of proper civic practices at elections as well as civic constitutional questions more generally. In Beverley, Chichester and London the language of ‘rage’ and ‘fury’ described the intensity of individuals and crowds engaging in direct action. By contrast, the Chester case study focused on more everyday and less kinetic scenarios in early modern civic politics, which were nonetheless understood and contested in judicial settings through the language of passions and affections. Meanwhile, the London case study has shown how civic politics, and the affective language in which they were conceptualised and described, had become entwined with the development of party politics in later-seventeenth-century England.
As has already been shown, early modern conceptualisations of passions and affections had a tripartite focus on a person’s character or motivation; the intensity of their actions and behaviour; and how character and action intersected with the wider social context. As in the cases studied in the previous chapter, here illicit actions were frequently described as being motivated by negative feelings such as ‘malice’. In the case studies centring on riots and civil disturbances, ‘rage’ and ‘fury’ continued to describe the intensity and irrationality of those illicit actions. Claims of positive and legitimate action were similarly associated with feelings of ‘love’. Unlike Chapter 4, in this chapter affective language has been shown to have served the broader purpose of legitimising or delegitimising political claims, as well as being about the propriety or impropriety of motivation and action and the proper performance of specific roles. It was only because wider political culture and society were considered to be affective in nature that people could invoke affective language and concepts concerning political contests and the performance of political roles. Despite the significant political changes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the relationship between passion and politics remained consistent throughout the period and was applied to these different political contexts. More widely, this chapter has shown a different way to read election disputes outside of studies focusing on political development and changing electoral practices in early modern England. The chapter is therefore itself a case study for bringing the history of emotions to bear on early modern social and political history. This has been achieved by focusing on understandings of the relationship between passion and social practice held by people at the time.
CONCLUSION

Using a variety of lexicographical, medical, religious, philosophical, didactic and judicial sources, this thesis has studied the intersections of passions, language and practice in early modern England. Over its five chapters, it has demonstrated that passions and affections were fundamental to understandings of social practice, the performance of social roles, and society as a whole. The thesis has shown that passion was both implicitly understood and explicitly described by people at the time as an inherent part of social practice, whether for good or ill, and was central to the way in which people described and evaluated social behaviour. Importantly, this understanding of affectivity also informed legal theory and practice, and so had practical and significant consequences, both for individuals and wider society. Going further, this thesis has also demonstrated that affective words and concepts informed conceptualisations of hierarchically differentiated interpersonal relationships, as well as society and the social order, meaning that politics were understood to be suffused in passion. The affections of individuals, in this view, were thought to be of consequence for society and the social order, whether in terms of the propriety of the affections between superiors and subordinates, or in the use of the same language to describe orderly affections and an ordered polity.

The first two chapters outlined the terminology used to describe feelings during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and how social action was understood to be predicated on the feelings so described. Through the close reading of ten early modern dictionaries, Chapter 1 constructed an affective lexicon, which could then be quantitatively and qualitatively analysed (see Appendix 1). While quantitative analysis revealed the changing frequencies of word-use over time, qualitative analysis allowed us to see semantic shifts and continuities of affective language within the wider context of the expansion of the English
vernacular in the early modern period. As such, the chapter argued that the period saw continuity at the level of the most common affective terms, such as ‘love’, ‘fear’ and ‘anger’, but also changes in the use of less visible affective language. The chapter also analysed ‘clusters’ of linked and synonymous affective terms, which shed light on understandings of the overarching categories equivalent to ‘emotion’ itself, as well as the relationships between feeling, interpersonal relationships and society as a whole. Through the identification and analysis of two clusters centred on ‘love’ and ‘fear’, and on ‘hatred’ and ‘malice’, the chapter showed how affective language characterised social relationships in positive and negative terms. It also revealed, through the analysis of the cluster contrasting ‘trouble’, ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’, how social and political states were also described in the same terms as states of the mind and soul. This shows that the well-known linkages between physical and political bodies went further, as these links were also conceptualised, described and given rhetorical force in affective terms.

Chapter 2 identified and analysed a corpus of what have been termed ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ texts: a series of medical, theological and philosophical works printed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which were identifiable by the appearance of ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ on their title pages (see Appendix 2). These texts reveal how early modern writers synthesised Aristotelian, Stoic, Galenic and Christian understandings of passions, which suggests that affective thought in this period can be seen as a bricolage of multiple traditions in a dialogue between the past and present. Despite the Cartesian and Hobbesian challenges to this tradition in the mid-seventeenth century, which Susan James argues constituted a philosophical ‘divide’ and break from the thought inherited from the classical and medieval past, this chapter argued that older ideas continued to be printed into the eighteenth century. The chapter also argued that, within these distinct but overlapping ontologies, passion was understood to be a direct cause of action and social behaviour. Here
it developed James’ *Passion and Action* (1997), which outlined how in the seventeenth century passion was thought to be defined by a combination of passive and active forces within the body and soul, but which did not explore the consequences of this passivity and activity on early modern understandings of social practice. It was through this link between passion and action, the chapter argues, that passions were inherently related to virtue, vice and morality. The government and moderation of feeling was the main overarching ideal, and offshoots of this included the self-restraint of *honestas* and civility. From this link between passivity and activity, this chapter outlined a historicised theory of practice to show how early modern writers related passions and affections to character; the motivation and intensity of actions; and the propriety or impropriety of action and expression according to the social context, relative social status and particular social roles that were being performed.

Uncovering this early modern sense of practice provided the interpretive framework for studying affective language and social practice in different early modern sources in terms that would have been recognisable to people at the time. Chapter 3 showed how early modern understandings of the relationship between passion and social practice were applied in didactic literature. It focused on four main types of advice literature – learned humanist treatises, parental advice, guides for household management and officeholders’ manuals – all of which directly instructed on ideal affective behaviour, and which showed how contemporary writers believed passions should be expressed or repressed in different social, spatial and institutional circumstances as part of the performance of particular social roles. As the core concepts of conduct literature were moderation, civility and *honestas*, the chapter emphasised the affective aspects of these concepts and argued that they denoted the ability to express the appropriate feelings in the correct contexts. While historians such as Jennifer Richards and Phil Withington have demonstrated that these concepts emphasised the restraint of negative feelings such as anger, this chapter argued that they were also important
for the cultivation and expression of warm and positive feelings, both in oneself and others. As the framework for understanding and describing the relationship between passion and social practice, the concepts of civility and *honestas* were part of a learned humanist tradition that was promulgated not only in translations of Latin and Italian works, but also in the vernacular parental advice written by English men and (less commonly) women. Through the study of household conduct literature, the chapter showed that notions of affectivity were also imbued in the conventional discussions of the household as a divinely ordained hierarchy. The expression or repression of passions and affections, the chapter argued, was key to the mutual duties of the different members to one another. In this domestic context, the two key affections were ‘love’ and ‘fear’, which both reflected and constituted harmonious interpersonal relationships between people of varying social status, showing similarities in the hierarchical relationships between husband and wives, as well as between masters, mistresses and servants. Finally, the chapter explored how early modern conduct writers related civility and the management of passion to government and public officeholding. Here, it was argued, the capacity for self-government justified and was a necessary precondition for government and authority in the wider world, not only in the performance of their duties, but also by eliciting positive feelings in those under their authority, which was how social order was thought to be preserved. Throughout these varied texts, then, the uniting feature was the restraint of negative feelings and the expression of rightly directed affection suited to the circumstances of time, place and audience.

Chapter 4 shifted the focus from didactic sources to social practice by examining sixteenth- and seventeenth-century marital separation suits in the church court of York. By focusing on disturbing and graphic accounts of marital abuse, this chapter used sources that were in their very nature affective and affecting. Yet it also showed that the use of affective language by litigants, witnesses and even the institutional structures of the court was, in
accordance with the historicised theory of practice outlined in Chapter 2, the means through which character, motivation, action and the performance of household roles were conceptualised, described, evaluated and contested. These depictions of the place of passion in social practice were consistent across the period, and in the post-Restoration period became increasingly evident in the formal legal language used by the court in framing the specific allegations of the motivations for violence in separation cases. This suggests that changes to affective legal language were influenced by everyday uses, rather than everyday use being shaped by legal or official language. The chapter was structured by six case studies highlighting how the ideals or norms laid down in conduct literature informed discussions and contestations of the correct performance of household roles in a judicial setting. This chapter also showed that the conduct literature studied in Chapter 3 reflected wider norms as much as it attempted to impose them. These normative ideals also granted husbands a certain level of ‘appropriate’ violence that was described as part of the role of a husband, and the separation suits aimed to determine the legal bounds of this violence. As defendants in these separation suits, husbands invoked these norms by describing violence as ‘moderate’ or justified because of their wives’ ‘provocation’ or malperformance of their role as ‘loving’ wives. In wives’ allegations, framed in the legal language of the court, the ‘pleasing’ and ‘contenting’ ideal expected of wives was contrasted with the ‘malice’, ‘disaffection’ and ‘hatred’ of abusive husband. In other words, these cases were contesting the propriety of passions and the actions that they could result in as part and parcel of adjudicating the performance of spousal roles.

Chapter 5 examined four case studies of disputed elections to various civic and parliamentary political roles in Beverley, Chichester, Chester and London, in order to demonstrate the political importance of the relationship between passion and social practice, and how it was discussed and contested in judicial settings. The chapter showed that, rather
than seeing passions simply as responses to political events, they were in fact embedded within the motivations behind and performances of political roles, as well as the prism through which politics was understood by early modern people themselves. While three of the case studies focused on allegations of riot and violence in political contexts, which all centred on the role of passion in motivating violent action, the Chester case study also showed that the same relationship between passion and action was also evident in more everyday politics and institutional wrangling. Additionally, despite the significant political changes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the relationship between passion and politics remained consistent throughout the period and was applied to these different political contexts. The London case study showed that these understandings and beliefs about the propriety of passion and political action continued into the 1680s, becoming entwined with the development of party politics. Rather than studying judicial sources directly, the source for the London case study was a printed representation purporting to be a verbatim account of a trial, and showed how the relationship between the appropriate expression of passion was both judicially and politically contested. All the case studies, ranging from the 1530s to the 1680s, demonstrated not only that affective language related to the motivations, actions and expressions of individuals, but also that politics and the polity as a whole were understood and described in affective terms.

This thesis has built on the fundamental questions posed by the history of emotions, such as what emotions are, how are they subject to change over time and by what means can historians access emotions in the past. In addressing these questions, the thesis has argued that rather than applying modern historiographical, anthropological or sociological theories, such as Hochschild’s ‘emotional labour’, Reddy’s ‘emotives’ and ‘emotional regime’ or the ‘affect theory’ espoused by Hutchison, the history of emotions benefits instead from taking a historicist approach of reading sources from the bottom up and identifying the words,
concepts and assumptions held by people at the time. As such, this thesis has accorded more with the approaches of Rosenwein, whose concept of ‘emotional communities’ emphasises the importance of emotional vocabularies and beliefs about appropriate emotional expression, and Boddice’s approach of ‘biocultural historicism’, which argues that the symbiotic relationship between human beings and the social, cultural and historical contexts they inhabit forms the basis on which historicist studies of emotions can be justified and carried out. However, this thesis has focused much more on social practice than Rosenwein and Boddice do. In doing so, this thesis brings the history of emotions into conversation with early modern social and cultural history more widely. By outlining and applying a historicised theory of practice, which takes into account the importance of passions and affections, it has provided a model through which early modern social and cultural historians can understand practice in the same terms as early modern people themselves. The thesis therefore argues that the history of emotions can be – and must be – incorporated into the history of society and culture of early modern England.
### APPENDIX 1 THE AFFECTIVE LEXICON

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APPENDIX 2

THE ‘PASSIONS’ AND ‘AFFECTIONS’ CORPUS

1570s

Levinus Lemnius, *The Touchstone of Complexions*. Generallye appliable, expedient and profitable for all such, as be desirous & carefull of their bodylye health. Contayning most easie rules & ready tokens, whereby every one may perfectly try, and throughly know, aswell the exacte state, habite, disposition, and constitution, of his owne Body outwardly: as also the inclinations, affections, motions, & desires of his mynd inwardly. First written in Latine, by Leuine Lemnie, and now englished by Thomas Newton (London, 1576).

Subsequent editions in 1581 and 1633.

Francesco Petrarca, *Phisicke against Fortune*, aswell prosperous, as aduerse, conteyned in two Bookes. Whereby men are instructed, with lyke in differencie to remedie theyr affections, aswell in tyme of the bryght shynyng sunne of prosperitie, as also of the foule lowryng stormes of aduersitie. Expedient for all men, but most necessary for such as be subiect to any not able insult of eyther extremitie. Written in Latine by Frauncis Petrarch, a most famous Poet, and Oratour. And now first Englished by Thomas Twyne (London, 1579).

1580s


Timothy Bright, *A Treatise of Melancholie*. Containing the causes thereof, & reasons of the strange effects it worketh in our minds and bodies: with the phisicke cure, and spirituall consolation for such as haue thereto adioyned an afflicted conscience. The difference betwixt it, and melancholie with diuerse philosophicall discourses touching actions, and affections of soule, spirit, and body: the particulars whereof are to be seene before the booke. By T. Bright Doctor of Phisicke (London, 1586).

Subsequent edition in 1613.

1590s

Pierre de La Primaudaye, *The Second Part of the French Academie*. Wherein, as it were by a naturall historie of the bodie and soule of man, the creation, matter, composition, forme, nature, profite, and vse of all the partes of the frame of man are handled, with the naturall causes of all affections, vertues and vices, and chiefly the nature, powers, works and immortalitie of the Soule.
1600s

John Downame, *Spiritual physicke to cure the diseases of the soule, arising from superfluitie of cholere, prescribed out of Gods word*. Wherein the chollericke man may see the dangerousnesse of this disease of the soule vniust anger, the preseruatiues to keepe him from the infection thereof, and also fit medicines to restore him to healthy beeing alreadie subject to this raging passion. *Profitable for all to vse, seeing all are patients in this disease of impatiencie* (London, 1600).

Subsequent editions in 1608, 1616 and 1673.


Subsequent editions in 1604, 1620, 1621 and 1630.


Subsequent edition in 1618.

1610s


Subsequent edition in 1617 (earlier editions did not include ‘passions’ or ‘affections’ on title page).

1620s


Nicolas Coeffeteau, *A Table of Humane Passions. With their Causes and Effects*. Written by the Reuerend Father in God F. N. Coeffeteau, Bishop of Dardania, Councillor to the French King in
his Counsels of Estate, Suffragane and Administrator generall of the Bishopricke of Metz. Translated into English by Edw: Grimeston Sergiant at Armes (London, 1621).

John Weemes, The Pourtraiture of the Image of God in Man. In his three estates, of Creation. Restauration. Glorification. Digested into two parts. The first containing, the Image of God both in the Body and Soule of Man, and Immortalitie of both: with a description of seuerall members of the Body: and the two principall faculties of the soule, the Vnderstanding and the Will; in which consisteth his knowledge, and libertie of his will. The second containing, the passions of man in the concupiscible and irascible part of the soule: his dominion ouer the creatures; also a description of his active and contemplatiue life; with his conjunct or marryed estate. All set downe by way of collation, and cleered by sundry distinctions, both out of the Schoolemen and Moderne Writers. By John Weemse of Lathoquar in Scotland, Preacher of Christs Gospell (London, 1627).

Subsequent editions in 1633 and 1636.

1630s

John Preston, Sins Overthrow: or, A Godly and Learned Treatise of Mortification. Wherein is excellently handled; First, the generall Doctrine of Mortification: And then particularly, how to Mortifie Fornication. Vnclanes. Evill Concupiscence. Inordinate Affection. and, Covetousnes. All being the substance of severall Sermons upon Colos. III. V. Mortifie therefore your members, &c. Delivered by that late faithfull Preacher, and worthy instrument of Gods glory John Preston, Dr in Divinity, Chaplaine in Ordinary to his Majestie, Master of Emanuel Colledge in Cambridge, and sometimes Preacher of Lincolnes-Inne (London, 1633).

Subsequent editions in 1635 and 1641.


Subsequent edition in 1638.


Subsequent editions in 1650, 1663, 1664 and 1678.

1640s


Subsequent editions in 1647, 1650, 1656 and 1658.


Also included in *The Works of the Learned and Faithful Minister of Gods Word, Mr. William Fenner, Sometime Fellow of Pembroke-Hall in Cambridg, and Rector of Rochford in Essex. In Four Treatises, viz. 1 Wilfull Impenitency, 2 Of Conscienc, 3 Of the Affections, 4 Christs Alarm to drowsie Saints. Finished by Himself, and Published by his Over-seers. To which is annexed His Catechism on the Creed, Lord's Prayer, and X. Commandments* (London, 1651).

Henry Walker, *The Protestants Grammar, For Help to Beleevers to understand the Scripture. Concerning the Name, Essence and Attributes of God, the union of the Trinity, and the glory of the Eternall Majesty. To know what the Soule is, whence it comes, when and how it enters into the body. Its Originall purity, how defiled. What is its essence, power, sense, vitals, passions, and faculties: Its passage to joy or torment, and its abode after death: and the vertues and faculties of the body and minde, with the relations of the flesh and spirit to each other. What the Resurrection is. And how to be sensible what Heaven and hell, ioy and torment are. Written by Henry Walker, S.S. Theol. S.* (London, 1648).

John Bulwer, *P[athomyotomia or A Dissection of the significative Muscles of the Affections of the Minde. Being an Essay to a new Method of observing the most Important movings of the Muscles of the Head, as they are the neerest and Immediate Organs of the Voluntarie or Impetuous motions of the Mind. With the Proposall of a new Nomenclature of the Muscles. By J. B. Sirnamed the Chirosopher* (London, 1649).


Subsequent edition in 1671.

1650s

René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soule In three Bookes. The first, Treating of the Passions in Generall, and occasionally of the whole nature of man. The second, Of the Number, and order of the Passions, and the explication of the six Primitive ones. The third, Of Particular Passions. By R. des Cartes. And Translated out of French into English* (London, 1650).


Subsequent editions in 1651 and 1684.

Also included in Thomas Hobbes, *Hobbs’s Tripos, In Three Discourses: The First, Humane Nature, Or the Fundamental Elements of Policy. Being a Discovery of the Faculties, Acts and Passions of the Soul of Man, from their Original Causes, according to such Philosophical Principles as are not commonly known, or asserted. The Second, De Corpore Politico. Or the Elements of Law, Moral and Politick, with Discourses upon several Heads, as of the Law of Nature, Oaths and Covenants; several kinds of Governments, with the Changes and Revolutions of them. The Third, Of Liberty and Necessity; Wherein all Controversie, concerning Predestination, Election, Free will, Grace, Merits, Reprobation, is fully decided and cleared. The Third Edition. By Tho. Hobbs of Malmsbury* (London, 1684).


Subsequent edition in 1693.


Sir John Davies, *A Work for none but Angels & Men that is, To be able to look into, and to know our selves. Or a Book Shewing what the Soule is, Subsisting and having its operations without the Body; its more then a perfection or reflection of the Sense, or Temperature of Humours; Not traduced from the Parents subsisting by it self without the Body: How she exercises her powers in the Body the vegetative or quickning power of the Senses. Of the Imagination or Common sense, the Phantasie, Sensative Memory, Passions, Motion of Life, the Locall Motion, Intellectuall powers of the soul. Of the Wit, Understanding, Reason, Opinion, Judgement, Power of Will, and the Relations betwixt Wit and Will. Of the Intellectuall memory, which is the Souls store-house, wherein all that is laid up therein, remaineth there even after death and cannot be lost; that the Soule is Immortall, and cannot dye, cannot be destroyed, her cause ceaseth not, violence nor time cannot destroy her; and all Objections answered to the contrary* (London, 1658).

Subsequent edition in 1658.
First published as John Davies, Nosce teipsum. This Oracle expounded in two Elegies. 1. Of Humane knowledge. 2. Of the Soule of Man, and the immortalitie thereof (London, 1599).


Subsequent editions in 1657, 1658, 1662 and 1688 (earlier editions did not have ‘passions’ or ‘affections’ on the title page).


Subsequent edition in 1661.

Also included in Marin Cureau de La Chambre, A Discourse upon the Passions. In Two Parts. Written Originally in French. English’d by R. W. Esq; (London, 1661).

1660s

Everard Maynwaringe, Tutela Sanitatis. Sive Vita Protracta. The Protection of long Life, and Detection of its brevity, from diætetic Causes and common Customs. Hygiastic Præcautions and Rules appropriate to the Constitutions of bodyes, and various Discrasyes or Passions of Minde; dayly to be observed for the preservation of Health and Prolongation of Life. With a Treatise of Fontinells or Issues. Whereunto is Annexed Bellum Necessarium sive Medicus Belligerans. The Military or Practical Physitian Reveiwing his Armory: Furnished with Medicinal Weapons and Munition against the secret invaders of life; fitted for all persons and assaults; with their safe and regular use, according to medical art and discipline. By Everard Maynwaring Doctor in Physick (London, 1663).

Subsequent edition in 1664.

1670s

Thomas Pierce, The Signal Diagnostick whereby We are to judge of our own Affections; And as well of our Present, as Future State. Or the Love of Christ Planted upon the very same Turf, on which It once had been Supplanted by The Extreme Love of Sin. Being the substance of several
Sermons, deliver’d at several Times and Places, and now at last met together to make up the Treatise which ensues. By Tho. Pierce. D.D. (London, 1670).

Subsequent edition in 1679.

Also included in Thomas Pierce, The Sinner Impleaded in his own Court. Wherein are represented the great Discouragements from Sinning, which the Sinner receiveth from Sin it self. To which is Added the Signal Diagnostick whereby We are to judge of our own Affections; And as well of our Present, as Future State. By Tho. Pierce, D.D. Dean of Sarum, and Domestick Chaplain to His Majesty (London, 1679).

John Archer, Every Man his own Doctor. In two Parts. Shewing 1. How every one may know his own Constitution and Complection, by certain Signs. Also the Nature and Faculties of all Food as well Meats, as drinks. Whereby every Man and Woman may understand what is good or hurtful to them. Treating also of Air, Passions of Mind, Exercise of Body, Sleep, Venery and Tobacco, &c. The Second part shews the full knowledge and Cure of the Pox, and Running of the Reins, Gout, Dropsie, Scurvy, Consumptions, and Obstructions, Agues. Shewing their causes and Signs, and what danger any are in, little or much, and perfect Cure with small cost and no danger of Reputation. Written by John Archer Chymical Physitian in Ordinary to the King (London, 1671).

Subsequent edition in 1673.

Walter Charleton, Natural History of the Passions (London, 1674).

Richard Head, Proteus Redivivus: or The Art of Wheeling, or Insinuation, Obtain’d by General Conversation, and Extracted from the several Humours, Inclinations, and Passions of both Sexes, respecting their several Ages, and suiting each Profession or Occupation. Collected and Methodized By the Author of the First Part of the English Rogue (London, 1675).

Subsequent editions in 1679 and 1684.


John Harris, The Divine Physician: Prescribing Rules for the Prevention, and Cure of most Diseases, as well of the Body, as the Soul: Demonstrating by Natural Reason, and also Divine and Humane Testimony, that, as vicious and irregular Actions and Affections prove often occasions of most bodily Diseases, and shortness of Life; so the contrary do conduce to the preservation of Health, and prolongation of Life. In two Parts. By J. H. M.A. (London, 1676).

1680s


Everard Maynwaringe, The Method and Means of Enjoying Health, Vigour, and long Life. Adapting peculiar Courses, for different Constitutions; Ages; Abilities; Valetudinary States;

Thomas Willis, Two Discourses concerning the Soul of Brutes, Which is that of the Vital and Sensitive of Man. The First is Physiological, shewing the Nature, Parts, Powers, and Affections of the same. The Other is Pathological, which unfolds the Diseases which Affect it and its Primary Seat; to wit, The Brain and Nervous Stock, And Treats of their Cures: With Copper Cuts. By Thomas Willis Doctor in Physick, Professor of Natural Philosophy in Oxford, and also one of the Royal Society, and of the renowned College of Physicians in London. Englished By S[amuel] Pordage, Student in Physick (London, 1683).

Courtin, Antoine de, A Treatise of Jealousie, or, Means to Preserve Peace in Marriage. Wherein is Treated of I. The Nature and Effects of Jealousie, which for the most part is the Fatal Cause of Discontents between Man and Wife. II. And because Jealousie is a Passion, It’s therefore occasionally Discoursed of Passions in General, giving an exact Idaea of the Production of Passions, and of the Oeconomie of the Body so far as it Relates thereunto. III: The Reciprocal Duties of Man and Wife, with Infallable means to Preserve Peace in the Family, by avoiding Dissentions that may arise from Jealousie, or any other Cause whatever. Written in French, and Faithfully Translated. Highly necessary to be Considered by all Persons before they enter into the State of Matrimony, as well as such as are already Married (London, 1684).
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Add MS 83259, Maurice Tuke, ‘A Fathers Blessinge. To his motherless, and (as farre as the world can make hir) fatherless, Deare and onely Daughter Dorothie Tuke’ (1641)

Egerton MS 2877, ‘The counseell of a father to his sonne, in ten seuarall precepts left as a legacie at his Death’, in ‘The Commonplace-book of Gilbert Frevile, of Bishop Middleham, County Durham’ (1579-1622), ff. 66v-67r


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