Rescuing Freedom

A Study of G.A. Cohen and the future of Liberalism

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as references.
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# Rescuing Freedom

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Abstract

The School of Liberalism has faced mounting criticism in recent years by political philosophers arguing it has created a highly unequal and unjust set of societies. Critiques such as those by Thomas Piketty have fuelled those who argue that liberalism has failed to bring about freedom for the poorest in society and created unjustifiably large economic inequalities within societies. They point to democratic socialism or Rawlsian property-owning democracy frameworks as the best ways to deliver a society which is both free and socially just. I argue that there is another option which blends a form of classical liberalism and a genuine care for delivering social justice which meets the challenges many levy against Liberals and capitalists. I start by analysing G.A. Cohen’s critique of Liberalism’s ability to deliver freedom which is often overlooked in modern discourse on this topic. This argues that poverty is an unnecessary but sufficient condition to a Liberal conception of unfreedom. I then join the many in critiquing welfare state capitalism, which is the product of modern liberal philosophy. I then take a reviewed look at the scholarship of Milton Friedman, and argue that his work on freedom as choice, when combined with the work of John Tomasi on self-authorship, provides a potentially powerful avenue for Liberals looking to overcome the modern critiques of welfare-state capitalism while providing for freedom for all and creating a just society.
Introduction

This project was sparked, as most academic curiosities are, by a throw away comment in a seminar room during my undergraduate studies. In what was meant to be a discussion about a Nozickian understanding of social justice, the conversation turned to a wider exploration of the concept of freedom. As the seminar was drawing to an end, my tutor remarked on an essay by the philosopher Gerald Cohen to the effect, “and of course it was Gerald Cohen who argued that freedom is dependent on money”.

What was probably intended to be a throwaway comment turned into a year long research project attempting to unpack the relationship between freedom and money. Rescuing Freedom is the culmination of this project. Here, I shall attempt to reconcile my own liberal philosophy, at least in part, with the convincing relationship Cohen creates between freedom and money.

My journey to attempt to do this will follow 4 steps. To begin, I shall explore in detail Cohen’s essay “Freedom and Money”, explaining what his argument is and what impact it has for those who believe the market provides, at least in part, for freedom. I shall then provide a slight detour into the academic world of Liberalism, and separate out the different strands of this broad philosophy, signposting how each is broadly different. This sets up the third section which explores how the school of Liberalism, and its respective camps, are affected by Cohen’s argument. These first three sections shall set up the problem that faces liberals: if we take Cohen’s relationship between freedom and money to be true, that your access to money is linked to your access to freedom, how do you offer a route out of this problematic relationship, and can you retain a commitment to the market?
I will argue that one potential path the liberal can take without having to outright deny either their commitment to the market or denying that there is some relationship between freedom and money, is to join the emerging camp of “neoclassical liberals”. I will draw on the work of Milton and Rose Friedman, as well as their contemporaries to provide a broad sketch as to how the neoclassical liberal would deal with Cohen’s relationship between freedom and money, and provide for an alternative theory of social justice to the current prevailing liberal theories of social justice.

Before I explore Cohen, Friedman, Tomasi and others in depth, I wish to turn very briefly to the more general concept of freedom, and lay out early on a definition for what I mean by freedom throughout. There is an extensive scholarly already on the definition of freedom, and I don’t have the capacity here to explore the fundamental concept of freedom too deeply. I shall take freedom in the liberal sense, that is an absence of coercion. That is to say I am free to the extent I am not coerced by others, be that individuals, governments or other entities, into not fulfilling my desires. That definition is drawn from the extensive writings of J.S.Mill, and therefore can be caveated by his Harm Principle too as forming a part of that definition.¹

Cohen himself uses this broad definition in his argument, and it is this sense of freedom which runs through all the liberal philosophy, as I shall explore in more detail later. I therefore adopt this very simple definition of freedom so there is consistency throughout all the different streams of philosophy I am attempting to draw together.

¹ For a fuller account of the Mill conception of freedom, which forms the basis of the liberal understanding of freedom, see Mill, 2006, p7-21.
Section 1- Freedom and Money

Introducing Cohen

As one of the leading Anglo philosophers of the later 20th century, the work of G.A. Cohen is a fitting place for this project to begin. Famed for his forthright challenge to the legitimacy of private property (Cohen, 1995) and critique of the work of John Rawls and other liberal egalitarians (Cohen, 2008) (Cohen, 2009), I shall focus on another part of his academic work.

Among an impressive catalogue of work he generated, Cohen delivered a lecture which was later published, entitled Freedom and Money. Within it, Cohen sets out an argument seeking to dispute the claim that a liberal capitalist arrangement of society brings about high levels of freedom. The thrust of his argument throughout Freedom and Money is that within a liberal capitalist society, the distribution of money is intrinsically linked to the distribution of freedom, and to lack money (live in poverty) is to be unfree to a higher degree than someone who does not lack money (Cohen, 2011). This challenge, left alone, has huge repercussions to the liberal school of thought which prides itself on delivering freedom, albeit disagreeing on institutional mechanisms to bring about differing interpretations of freedom.

It is this, which motivates my own study of Cohen’s arguments laid out in Freedom and Money. I am broadly convinced by the arguments he lays out, and that is why the purpose of this project is to find a path for Liberals to, at least in part, accept and overcome the relationship between freedom and money Cohen creates. In this section I shall start by outlining his argument which allows one to conclude that in a liberal capitalist society, be it envisaged by Rawls or Hayek, to lack money would to be unfree compared to better off individuals within the same society. I will then detail the consequences of his argument and secondary issues created by what Cohen lays out in Freedom and Money. Thirdly, I will outline why his analysis should concern Liberals of all stripes. Finally, I will lay out the criteria by which a framework can be judged against to consider if it successfully overcomes the issue’s raised in by Cohen, before moving onto the next section which shall attempt to define what a Liberal actually is.

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2 Where freedom is broadly thought to mean the absence of coercion, as briefly laid out in the introduction. I argue that in the work of liberals of all stripes, the absence of coercion is a fundamental binding principle in at least part of their respective understandings of freedom.
The Argument

The line of arguments laid out in Freedom and Money are not unique to Cohen and have been detailed by other writers who show concern for the unfreedom a lack of money brings a person under the conventional liberal capitalist system. The kind of relationship that Cohen identifies between freedom and money, can be seen in works that advocate for left libertarianism or libertarian socialism. Philippe Van Parijs and Rob Larson are two examples of this, taking the general idea that capitalism fails to provide for high levels of freedom in the liberal sense because to live in a state of poverty (lack money) is to be unfree, and then prescribe the institutional arrangements of left libertarianism as the path to accept and move past the flaws with capitalism Cohen identifies (Larson, 2017) (Van Parijs, 1995).

This project focuses just on the primary arguments which have generated the recent emergence of the left libertarian movement, which shall be the focus of this section. Like the left libertarian I am broadly moved by the concern for poverty bringing about high levels of unfreedom in a conventional capitalism system. However I believe and shall argue that there is an alternative answer to the problems they identify, which can be found in the school of neoclassical liberals. I shall broadly avoid much discussion about the left libertarian frameworks. It has both its upsides and its flaws in its own way. I simply recognise it is one possible answer to the problems Cohen identifies. In this piece of writing, I hope to offer another.

Cohen’s Freedom and Money can be characterised as an internal critique of liberalism more than anything else. While a Marxist, he broadly avoids bringing Marxist theory into his analysis of capitalist’s ability to provide for freedom in this essay. He very much uses language and definitions closely associated with liberals to show the flaws in their own thinking. This technique alone is partly what makes his analysis so convincing. Rather than introducing a different interpretation of freedom, he embraces the notion of freedom which binds the Liberal School of thought together; that core to freedom is the absence of coercion. He takes this idea of freedom and then demonstrates how high levels of coercion continually occur in the basic structures of the liberal capitalist institutional framework, namely the action of buying and renting. This leads to a convincing narrative which argues that to lack money in a liberal society is to be unfree, that is subject to high levels of coercion.
The focus of Cohen’s essay is to say that to live in poverty does carry with it a lack of freedom, and to argue that traditionally liberals of the classical and more contemporary traditions have neglected this relationship (Cohen, 2011, p168-169). He does this by defining freedom in terms that almost any liberal would broadly accept to be true (See Miller, 1991, p3), that freedom is to live without coercion or the threat of coercion in one’s economic, social and political pursuits.  

I am satisfied using Cohen’s conception of coercion at this point, that is to understand it as “interference by other people” in someone’s attempt to execute an action, and the all-out prevention of a person doing something at all (Cohen, 2011, p168). This broadly captures the essence of the understanding of coercion that underpins a lot of other liberal thought. Milton Friedman, who will play a significant part in this project later, would agree with Cohen, himself defining coercion as the power to “enforce (my) tastes and (my) attitudes on others” which is to interfere or prevent a person from doing or thinking for themselves and as they wish (Friedman, 2002, p111). Friedman is not alone either in seeing eye to eye with Cohen on defining coercion in this way. From the more high liberal tradition, Berlin, in his _Two Concepts of Liberty_ essay, defines coercion as the “deliberate interference” by others in preventing you from doing something you might otherwise be able to do (Berlin, 2002, p169). Therefore, when discussing coercion later, Cohen provides an adequate definition which captures the liberal understanding of the term. Furthermore, this is evidence to show how well Cohen has placed _Freedom and Money_ within a liberal framework, bolstering the authority of his argument and demonstrating how it is convincingly troubling to a freedom-minded liberal.

Cohen characterises the liberal argument as rejecting the causal link between unfreedom and poverty. Cohen instead sees liberals as resting on the idea that to live in poverty is not to suffer at the hands of interference in your daily life, but rather to simply lack “means” and therefore poverty does not carry with it a lack of freedom. The point of _Freedom and Money_ is to state that the liberals are wrong, and that based on the liberals own understanding of freedom, poverty

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3 This is the same definition of freedom I briefly referenced in the introduction, which carries as the definition of freedom throughout.
4 That is to set aside natural impediments like being able to fly unassisted. Coercion does not explain every form of inability individuals face.
brings with it the lack of freedom (Cohen, 2011, p166-168). In Cohen’s mind, the liberal views an individual’s lack of money and other forms of property as not a threat to a person’s freedom, for as long as they are formally free to do something, the issue is rather that they simply cannot afford to do something.

While I cannot provide Cohen’s argument in Freedom and Money verbatim here, his argument is essentially that to live in a state of poverty is to be saddled with the burden of interference in your ability to do as you want socially, politically and (most consequently for liberals) economically. The distribution of money is linked to the distribution of interference a person faces in their daily lives, and to lack money would be to be subjected to a high level of, and notably threat of, interference. And as liberals argue that to be burdened with interference in your attempt to go about your daily lives amounts to being unfree, to live in poverty in a liberal capitalist society is to be unfree (Cohen, 2011, p173-178).

He demonstrates the interference an individual experiences by lacking money through a host of examples but his argument is best captured in the abstract:

“if A owns P and B does not, then A may use P without interference and B will, standardly, suffer interference if he attempts to use P. But money serves, in a variety of circumstances (and notably, when A puts P up for rent, leases access or sale), to remove the latter interference. Therefore, money confers freedom, rather than merely the ability to use it, even if freedom is equated with absence of interference” (Cohen, 2011, p176)

By upholding the principle of private property, the state or a private entity (be that individual or organisation) has the right to interfere in your ability to attempt to access property you don’t own. However, in the many circumstances that this property may be accessed and used for a fee, that distribution of unfreedom is unequal. That is to say only those who cannot afford to pay the fee face interference and are prevented in their attempt to access the private property. And, as laid out earlier, freedom is considered the absence of interference and coercion in a person’s attempts to pursue their economic, social and political wishes, these people who cannot afford to pay the fee, are unfree.
Similar to Cohen’s own example with a woman attempting to board a train, consider the case of a flight to Paris. The private company who owns the plane has full say as to who gets a seat as it is their plane, their private property. It would make zero business sense to horde this property and so, in order to be allowed to board and have a seat, a person may pay a fee to be granted access to the plane. If they can afford the fee, they are allowed on but if not, they will be prevented from boarding by the state and the company. In this way, money acts as a waiver to this interference, it buys you the right to avoid being coerced into not boarding the flight to Paris.

In Cohen’s own words, money acts as an “entry ticket” (Cohen, 2011, p181) to someone else's private property and without it, you will be interfered with in your attempt to execute your wishes which, by a liberal standard of freedom, makes you unfree. It starts to become clear how it is then arguable that our access to money is a critical factor of our distribution of freedom under a liberal capitalist market economy, with poverty acting as an unnecessary but sufficient (inus) condition of unfreedom (Cohen, 2011, p178).

I think Cohen is unfair to imply here that liberals don’t see a strong link between poverty and freedom. A number of liberals have expressed a direct concern for the effect poverty can have on freedom. Amartya Sen is an example of a liberal who wrote extensively about the various conditions a person can be put under which deprives them of basic freedom. While writing a theory of development built primarily on the extensive use of the market as a way to provide for economic freedom which in turn (when coupled with extensive political and social freedom) drives development, he is concerned about the effect of the lack of basic economic security on freedom (Sen, 1999, p15-16). Sen is among the group of liberals who are concerned with the effectiveness of an individual’s freedom, that a freedom is broadly useless without considering the effectiveness of an individual to enjoy said freedom. In defining what he means by effectiveness, Sen would probably point to an individual’s access to basic healthcare, education and income. If it was not for effective healthcare and education facilities, the ability of a person to make use of formal economic freedom is significantly limited (Sen, 1999, p11). This component of the effectiveness of freedom, although a disputed concept among Liberals, will be important later in discussions about the conception of freedom put forward by Friedman and how “effectiveness” forms an implicit principle of neoclassical liberalism’s social justice as self-authorship.
However, even considering liberals' very serious concerns for the effects poverty can have on the quality of freedom, that does not weaken the strength of Cohen’s argument that to live in poverty has a coercive effect on an individual’s life and places upon them a degree of unfreedom.

This is what I regard as Cohen’s great contribution to liberal thought and discussions over liberty & freedom. The Cohen relationship, which I shall take as truth, is that relative poverty in a society is an inus condition of unfreedom.

The Implications and Consequences

The conclusions drawn from Cohen’s Freedom and Money have significant ramifications on the school of Liberalism. What Cohen does is lay out the failure of the Liberal to consider that poverty, left unaddressed and allowed to be a constant in a person’s life, confers unfreedom on a person through the increased interference they face in their lives they wouldn’t otherwise face if that didn’t lack means. The interference arises every time the rights of private property are upheld.

The rights of private property are upheld by the rule of law. When these rights are threatened (someone tries to board a plane without the necessary ticket), the state, or another group acting on behalf of the state, will enforce these rights, which amounts to coercion. That in itself is not problematic as that is the protection of A’s rights to private property when B might otherwise threaten them. Under the Mill condition of freedom, you are free up to the point you encroach on the rights and freedom of another (Mill, 2006, p15-16) and therefore intervention to prevent B boarding A’s plane is not problematic to a liberal. However, the concerning part for liberals emerges when you consider that the intervention is not equally distributed among the people participating in this system. Should A rent seats on her plane for £100 and C has that money, C does not suffer interference when attempting to execute her desire to board A’s plane. In the same instance however, if B lacked the money to pay A for a seat on her plane, they would be interfered with in their attempt to board A’s plane. Lacking the means to pay A has conferred unfreedom to B that C does not face. B is subject to interference while C is not and the deciding factor in why this is so is because of the access each of these people have to money to pay A.

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5 We are assuming liberals support private property. As I will set out in the next section on what constitutes a liberal, it shall become clear that the degree of support for private property does differ quite significantly among Liberals.
Liberals should be incredibly alarmed of the implications of this example which follows through the Cohen argument laid out in *Freedom and Money*.

There are a number of consequences that can be drawn by accepting his argument. While I shall discuss different liberal responses to Cohen later (and why they may fail to satisfy the arguments laid out here), I would instead contend that a liberal should instead (at least in part) accept what Cohen is arguing. His argument uses liberal conceptions of freedom, interference, coercion, market exchange and private property. The fact that this argument would be classed as an internal critique of liberalism is significant as if a liberal is to resist Cohen without accepting his argument at least partially, they would have to redefine freedom and coercion. Cohen uses conceptions of both these ideas which would be (in my opinion) widely accepted by the Liberal school so I do not believe this would be a successful move and will address this in more detail later.

Returning to how one goes about facing the implications of what Cohen is arguing, there are two overriding conclusions I would draw from *Freedom and Money* that need to be considered, whether you are a liberal striving for a “just” society 6 or a “free” society 7. If we accept that to live in poverty is to be more unfree compared to their better off compatriots, two issues that an attempt to answer this problem must address are:

a) when a person lack money through no fault of their own 8,

b) when a person lack the ability to escape the coercive trappings of lacking money and are therefore consigned to being perpetually unfree in society. 9

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6 Think High Liberals of the Rawlsian kind and Ordoliberals but also, as I will argue, the neoclassical liberal school led in this pursuit by Tomasi

7 Classical Liberals following the writing of Hayek, but also Libertarians both followers of Nozick and Van Parijs

8 Which would encompass a person who lacks money despite their best efforts to utilise the skills and knowledge they have and wouldn’t lack money if it wasn’t for some factor they can’t control. Consider here discriminatory practices by a bank. Person A and B both have the same income and earning potential and live in a society with racial discrimination. Person B, from an ethnic minority group, is rejected a mortgage for reasons related to the discrimination they face because of their ethnicity, therefore they lack money through no fault of their own. The issue of mortgage discrimination is in itself complex because where in a society certain ethnicities face sustained social injustice, an individual’s ability to score highly in a credit assessment is hindered by coercive discrimination they might face in other parts of your life, such as taking on a higher debt burden to finance university thereby leaving you less attractive to a mortgage lender. (See LaCour-Little, 1999 for further detail on mortgage discrimination)

9 One critique might be why am I limiting the scope of my investigation to just those who live in poverty, and not seeking to explore the unequal levels of freedom between say, the middle and upper classes, which if you accept Cohen’s argument as I do, you have to admit exists to some degree. I have two reasons for this. Firstly, in order to remain within the given word limit, I do not have the space here to explore this line of interrogation in the detail it
However, as I seek to find an answer which remains true to the philosophy of liberalism, of which the central theme is a robust commitment to freedom, simply providing an answer to the issues of poverty Cohen raised isn’t enough. Individuals must have agency over their lives, or be self-authors as Tomasi puts it. If a socioeconomic framework is to be truly liberal, it must also safeguard a set of basic rights and liberties designed to protect an individual’s agency and right to be self-authors. While liberal scholars differ on what constitutes a basic right (understood to be necessary to protect individual agency and freedom), there is broad agreement that they are a necessary component of a liberal theory. Therefore, I introduce a third condition a framework must fulfil for this project to judge it a success:

c) To provide a set of basic rights designed to ensure individual self-authorship

This criteria offers a framework that differing liberal responses to Cohen can be held against to test if they satisfy the challenge he offers, which I shall do in a later section. A framework able to convincingly appreciate that people trapped in a state of poverty through no fault of their own would be to allow them to suffer a higher degree of unfreedom than those who don’t suffer the continuous burdens of poverty, and strive to address this issue, I argue would satisfactorily appreciate the critique Cohen identifies. Furthermore, a framework must demonstrate a robust commitment to safeguarding the rights and liberties of the individual in order to protect the core principle of self-authorship.

I shall not attempt to argue that the fix is to eliminate poverty in its entirety. However noble that cause, to try and unpack what would need to be done to achieve this goal, and if it would work under a framework committed to the broad principles of liberalism would take up too much of this project. I would argue that fulfilling the attempt to ensure poverty (and the unfreedoms that deserves. Secondly, following Cohen’s argument logically, those poorest and trapped in poverty have the least freedoms in society, and lack the very basic freedoms to participate in society such as purchase food. The wealthier in society do not lack these very basic freedoms in the same way. Therefore, you can imagine the distribution of freedom as a curve of exponential growth. Therefore, the level of freedom between the poorest 1% and the next poorest 10% is going to be vastly different than the level of freedom between the 40th and 50th percentile of wealthy people in a capitalist society, for example. I am concerned about the most unfree in society, and those who are trapped in this state of unfreedom, and I would attribute this status to those trapped in a state of poverty.
come with it) is not a fixed reality for any individual, and would be a sufficient condition to address the broad issues Cohen raises.

Providing an answer to these conditions alone would not eliminate poverty and therefore not absorb all what Cohen is arguing. An institutional framework could ensure no one is poverty stricken through no fault of their own and have the ability to escape the trappings of poverty and still have a number of people living under it in poverty and therefore more unfree than their fellow citizens. Rather, this criteria provides a way of checking if poverty is a constant in an individual’s life despite their efforts to address that.

Fulfilling these conditions ensure that an institutional framework minimises the idea that poverty is a constant in a person’s life. If poverty is easily escapable, and the pathway is not stacked against you because of some factor beyond your control, then poverty brings with it significantly less unfreedom than under institutional arrangements where poverty is a constant burden with no clear escape from and/or you are more likely to be burdened with the unfreedoms of poverty because of factors beyond their control. Consider the example of access to a good education. High quality education is considered by many liberals as one of the best pathways out of poverty (Friedman, 1978, Sen, 1999). Being born into a poorer community often means you have access to less high quality education facilities (this would be for a multitude of reasons depending on different education systems, but can be do with the income of parents, funding and quality of local education services. See Hirsch, 2007.)

A parent may want to send their child to a specialist school more suited to the child’s needs that is a bus ride away. However, unless the parent is able to afford the daily bus fare, the child will be interfered with in their attempt to travel to school. Their freedom to attend the school of their choosing is conditional on their ability to pay to get there. Without money, the child’s freedom to attend the school of their choosing is curtailed.

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10 This does not mean a framework would eliminate unfreedom altogether. A liberal framework which takes Cohen seriously should seek to grant the very basic freedoms to those in poverty to allow them to escape poverty.
This burden of lower education levels adds to the unfreedoms given to an individual as bad education outcomes (measured through exam grades often) would often lead to unfreedom to embark on careers a person might otherwise want to do. However, if this relationship between being born into a low income family and access to low quality education was to be broken, it would fulfill the criteria I laid out sufficient to address the unequal distribution of unfreedom which seems to arise in a liberal market society because of poverty. While poverty would remain, living in poverty would bring with it significant less unfreedom. If poverty is more “escapable”, then it presents a reduced risk to freedom (in the long run). While temporary poverty will bring with it a degree of unfreedom still, a successful framework which satisfies the criteria above would still convey the very basic freedoms necessary to escape poverty.

This issue shall be explored in more detail as I turn my attention to how the high and classical liberal institutional frameworks fail the Cohen test, and then in discussions on neoclassical liberalism in the second half of this project.

**Where To Next**

One of the primary purposes of government, in the eyes of many liberals, is to uphold and protect the rights and freedoms of individuals. This concern has been covered by writers such as Friedman, Tomasi, Rawls, Hayek, etc ). What Cohen does in *Freedom and Money* is demonstrate how a part of that job, to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, includes demonstrating acute concern to those trapped in poverty through systemic injustice and no fault of their own. This project shall not investigate the total elimination of poverty. The risk of the magnificent success that the market can bring to a person also brings with it the risk of ruin. This project does not worry for the people who invest greatly in the stock market and then loose since they had the freedom to invest in the first place. Their freedom does not need rescuing. Instead I am concerned for those individuals who exist in the state of poverty, so would also show concern for the individual once they have lost everything on the stock market. I argue that for Liberals the pathway past Cohen need not involve the elimination of the *risk* of poverty if you are to strive to bring about a better distribution of freedom in a liberal framework.

What *I am* concerned with is signposting a Liberal framework which shows concern for those born and/or trapped in poverty through no fault of their own, unfree when compared to their
fellow members of society not burdened by poverty. A liberal framework cannot, when faced with Cohen, simply ignore the issues of poverty as not relating to freedom. To show concern for the trappings of poverty is to show concern for the unequal distribution of freedom, and so a liberal must provide a pathway to accept and move beyond the Cohen critique if they are to remain committed to freedom.

It is with this in mind then that this project shall move onto a short detour into defining what it means to belong to the Liberal School, breaking down the competing factions within Liberalism and where neoclassical liberalism fits in. This is important to allow me to not only show the shortcomings of the current dominant strains of Liberalism in relation to Cohen, but also examine neoclassical liberalism later in accurate depth.

From this, I shall return to Cohen, and outline why I feel the two major movements of liberalism, High and Classical Liberalism, may fail to satisfy Cohen while remaining committed to the principle of freedom as absence of coercion.
Section 2-What is a Liberal?

Introducing the Liberal School

I firmly believe that the Cohen critique poses a serious danger to the collective ideologies of liberalism and their commitment to the principle of freedom. Before I dive into why I believe this is the case, it is important to clarify what I mean when I use the term “liberal” and the “liberal school”.

The term ‘liberal’ is highly contested. This is only made worse by how the practice of politics has further muddied attempts to have a consistent meaning. What it means to be a Liberal politically in the USA has a pretty different meaning to being a political liberal in Australia. This issue is made worse by the presence of many pretenders, keen to associate with the liberal banner but who’s politics and philosophy actually bears very little resemblance with liberalism (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p330).

It is therefore understandable that people would be confused by what I mean by liberalism which makes it all the more important to offer a clear definition as to what I mean by the Liberal School. In addition to this, I shall seek to make clear distinctions between the competing camps that I argue make up the Liberal School.

While attempting to do these two tasks, I should state something I am not trying to do. This shall not be a ground-breaking take on the question “what is a Liberal?”’. This remains a question contested by many scholars. Instead, the definitions and distinctions I shall seek to make are based on the work of a number of prominent Liberals who have coalesced around a consensus best articulated by Samuel Freeman in his famed article Capitalism in the Classical and High Liberal Tradition. I shall term the camps of liberalism with Freeman’s terminology, just as Tomasi does, with the high liberal camp sitting to the left of the classical liberal camp, who in turn are flanked to their right by the libertarian camp (Freeman, 2011 & Tomasi, 2012). I shall explore these camps in more detail, and what I believe is an emerging fourth camp, the neoclassical liberal camp, below.
Some call Liberalism a family of ideas (Freeden and Stears, 2013, p330), others refer to it as an ideology divided by clear lines (Tomasi, 2012, p xiv), I have settled on calling it a school. What all these terms have in common is the acceptance that within the overarching ideology of liberalism, there are legitimate lines of disagreement and sub-sections, that I shall call camps.

Since the emergence of liberalism as a dominant ideology, the rhetoric of liberalism has been deployed to defend a host of ideologies. Indeed liberalism’s success has in part been because of its ability to be incorporated into other schools of political thought. However, this has led to a number of issues with the modern world being blamed on the liberal School when in fact it is often because of these hybrid ideologies which have emerged in the 19th and 20th century (Freeden and Stears, 2013, p340-341). I will try to avoid discussions of these hybrid forms of liberalism which litter the political landscape. A good example of this might be Liberal Conservativism which was widely influential on the British and American Governments of the 1980’s. While the economic component of this philosophy is heavily influenced by Liberalism, the social policy, less so.

I recognise that there are competing camps which make up the core Liberal ideological school but these differ from the hybrid ideologies. There are certain core tenants which all these camps buy into which places them within the Liberal School, setting them apart from the many interpretations of liberalism which has spawned throughout history.

**The Uniting Principles**

The Liberal School is not homogenous. However, I feel a clear definition of liberalism can be discerned by laying out the hard principles which unite the high liberal, classical liberal, libertarian and neoclassical liberal camps. Primary among those are a commitment to a certain kind of freedom. Trending through all these camps is the belief in freedom as the absence of interference and coercion by the other. A person is free to the extent that they are able to do as

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11 Why does the Liberal support freedom? It is born out of a belief that the individual is sovereign, that every single life has worth and that a commitment to freedom recognises that individual sovereignty. This notion has been played with as liberalism has developed but is still, in my view, is best explained by Mill in *On Liberty* and I am yet to see a serious Liberal disagree with Mill’s explanation as to why the liberals support the idea of freedom. Humboldt’s work in this area is equally as compelling and argues that the liberal conception of freedom recognises each person’s individuality and allows for the individual to reach the “highest end of their existence”. For the liberal justification for supporting freedom see Mill’s *On Liberty*, 2006, p15-21 and Humboldt’s *The Limits of State Action* 1969, p16-21.
they want, without being prevented or coerced not to do so (Miller, 2006, p3). This is secured through a rights based system, where liberties are enshrined in law and the primary purpose of government is to uphold and protect these liberties, thereby safeguarding an individual’s freedom. This could be considered the primary aim of a liberal framework, ultimately seeking to preserve and protect the liberty of every individual. This notion underpins the work of many liberals who don’t sit in the same camp, with John Rawls and Milton Friedman both draw on this idea as their fundamental understanding of liberty (Rawls, 1971, p 201-05 & Friedman, 2002, p4-6). While some see social justice as a key function of government, the commitment to social justice among liberals comes from their desire to bring about equal basic liberty (Rawls, 1971, p 60-65). So even when some liberals argue the primary role of government is justice, this desire for justice is part of their commitment to the liberal conception of liberty and freedom.

So, I feel confident in stating that in order to be a liberal, an ideology must be committed to the principle of universal liberty, understood as the absence of coercion and interference, upheld by the government through a system of basic liberties.

Some theorists have identified other core principles which, while camps might prioritise in different orders, are themes present in every sub-section of the liberal school. Michael Freeden associates the camps of liberalism with 6 core principles alongside their fundamental commitment to a certain idea of liberty, being individuality, progress, rationality, the general interest, sociability and constrained power (Freeden, 1996, p141-77). Now that a general definition of the liberal school is starting to form, I need to outline why the school is broken into distinct camps. An obvious explanation for the divisions among the liberal school is that the differing strains of Liberalism interact with these 7 principles in different ways, placing different priority on them and interpreting them in different ways to draw differing conclusions for institutional structures (Freeden and Stears, 2013, p341-343). However, I would argue there is a more fundamental distinction that can be made in order to clearly define the competing camps of the liberal school, and to do this I will heavily draw on the work done by Samuel Freeman.

12 While I would argue liberals believe in this form of liberty, belief in this form of liberty does not automatically make you a liberal. Many other ideological schools utilise the concept of negative liberty, liberty as the absence of interference and coercion. This is a point Berlin himself raises which I wish to note here. (Berlin, 2002, p38-39).
The Divided Camps

As I’ve stated above, liberalism is underpinned by a commitment to a certain idea of freedom which is realised by a belief in a certain set of basic liberties that are enshrined in law. It is the role of the government to preserve and protect everyone’s basic liberties and hold these liberties as preconditions before dealing with issues of economics, welfare & inequality, and defence of society. Because everyone is entitled to these basic liberties equally, these liberties are not absolute, stopping at the point that they cause harm to others or infringe on the basic liberties of others (as well as interfering with the societal structures which allow for the exercise of rights) (Mill, 2006, p15-16 & Freeman, 2011, p19). This is an abstract framework that is replicated among most liberal theory. The divergence emerges, as Freeman clearly identifies, over what qualifies as a basic liberty. The debate centres on what to do with economic liberties, if they qualify as basic rights, or if they are not essential to safeguarding the individual basic liberty that every person is entitled to (Freeman, 2011, p19-21). Simple divergence on this issue has far reaching consequences, leading to very different conclusions being drawn by the competing liberal camps. It is a fiercely debated issue among liberals with no clear resolution in sight (Tomasi, 2012, p99-103 & Melkevik, 2017). What looks like one simple disagreement frames the entire contemporary debate about the future direction of liberalism so it is important to clearly outline the distinctions of the various liberal camps on this pivotal issue.

Freeman cuts the liberal school into three competing camps which take different positions on the treatment of economic liberties. On one side there are the Classical Liberals, who prioritise the importance of economic liberties and hold them in a near equal regard to the other basic liberties, and can only be infringed in certain circumstances (Freeman, 2011, p52-53). The libertarian camp have an even more radical position to this, arguing that economic rights,

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13 To evidence this point I point to principle theorists from each camp: for the high liberal tradition see Rawls, 1971. For the classical liberal camp, see Hayek, 1960. Libertarians are slightly more complicated, with debates if they consider the state necessary at all, but two good examples of libertarian thought would be Van Parijs, 1995 for the left Libertarian tradition and Nozick, 1974 for the more conventional right libertarian argument. As for the neoclassical camp, I would say Tomasi, 2012 follows this structure, as does Friedman, 2002 but his membership of this camp is contested and I seek to argue this point in later.

14 Noteworthy, Freeman himself argues that libertarianism is not a liberal philosophy (See Freeman, 2001). I have included the libertarian camp here for two reasons. Firstly classical liberalism is sometimes mixed up with Libertarianism, I wish to show that they are distinct camps with differences. Secondly, Tomasi mentions Libertarianism throughout Free Market Fairness and so I will include them, albeit briefly, in my project too to better articulate the wide ranging debate on the issue of economic liberties. I will not address the libertarian approaches to the Cohen problem later on for the sake of word constraint.
specifically property rights, are absolute rights and so any infringement is considered morally illegitimate. (Tomasi, 2012, p53). Both of these camps are contrasted by the high liberal camp, broadly inspired by the work of John Rawls on social justice but has evolved from other writers too in the social democratic tradition. The high liberals place less weight on the importance of economic liberties, or more specifically they narrow their view of which economic liberties can be considered basic rights to ensure these rights do not conflict with the noble aims of social justice.

In addition to Freeman’s framework, there is a new emerging camp of liberals, gaining recognition as a distinct group, the neoclassical liberal\textsuperscript{15} (see Von Platz, 2013). They are a spoiler group of liberals who seek to bridge the stale divide between high and classical liberals. While they are convinced by the social justice arguments of the high liberals, they argue that a conception of economic liberties which more closely resembles the classical liberal position is a necessary component of ensuring social justice. It is this camp which shall become the focus of the second half of this project.

Before moving on to analyze how the classical and high liberal camps would go about tackling the Cohen critique, I wish to briefly define two terms which help further clarify how the streams of liberalism perceive economic liberties. Freeman’s framework can be further clarified by dividing the different liberal conceptions of economic liberties into “thin” and “thick” notions. This is utilised by Tomasi in his analysis of liberalism and more specifically the beliefs of neoclassical liberals. These terms also help us understand Rawls’ criteria of basic rights, which has formed the basis of the high liberal’s support for a ‘thin’ conception of economic liberties while, for differing reasons, the classical and neoclassical liberal’s conclude in supporting a more “thick” conception.

\textbf{Thick and Thin Conceptions of Economic Liberties}

The ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ classifications of economic liberties are used by Tomasi to differentiate between the different liberal traditions based on whether they consider economic liberties to be

\textsuperscript{15} Key academics that are included in this strand of Liberalism are John Tomasi, Jason Brennan and David Schmidtz. It is also associated with the Arizona School. The founding principles of this camp shall be the focus of the second half of this project including how it has been influenced by Milton Friedman.
basic rights or not. The definitions of these two terms are intuitively straightforward, but how one reaches a point of supporting either a thick or thin conception of economic liberties differs. In Tomasi’s definition, a thick conception places economic liberties among the basic rights of citizens, and considers a right to private ownership of productive property and freedom on economic contract among these economic liberties (Tomasi, 2012, pxxvi). This does not mean that a thick conception conceives economic liberties to be moral absolutes. Rather, like other basic rights (such as the right to vote and the right to association), these liberties may only be suspended in exceptional circumstances. On the other side, a thin conception of economic liberties is based on Rawls’ understanding of economic liberties. A lot of liberals exclude a lot of economic liberties from their understanding of basic rights in order to arrive at a thin conception of economic liberties. A thin conception believes in only two economic liberties as basic rights; a right to personal non-productive property and a right to occupational choice (Tomasi, 2012, p74 & Rawls, 2001, p114-115). A belief in a thin conception of economic liberties does not necessarily mean an individual has no right to any other economic liberties. However, only these two rights would be considered basic.

Liberals advocate for thick and thin conceptions of economic liberties for different reasons. The classical liberal supports the thick conceptions of economic liberty for the reason that they are instrumentally valuable to the classical liberal aim (Tomasi, 2012, pxxvii & Freeman, 2011, p21-27). The classical liberal is driven by a commitment to utility and efficiency, and a thick conception of economic liberties is useful to achieving these aims. This motivation differs substantially from the neoclassical liberal position, which is the focus of this project. They believe that the role of basic liberties is to protect the general liberty of the individual in order for them to be able to have a fully formed capacity to evaluate and give legitimacy to the political system which governs them. This follows the neoclassical liberal belief that the protection of an individual’s negative liberty will promote their ability to make moral

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16 Deciding what constitutes an exceptional circumstance would depend on a number of circumstances, and I am not able to provide for a full discussion of those here. However, as a general rule and in order to stay in keeping with the wider philosophy of believers in thick conceptions of economic liberties, I would suggest the exceptional circumstances would have to be constitutionally enshrined alongside the rights itself. This would ensure the limitations of one’s rights are clearly defined and known to all, and would maximise protection of rights in most circumstances, as well as protecting those necessary occasions rights might need to be suspended or overridden.
judgments on conceptions of justice and good, which in turn forms part of the wider commitment to the basic liberal principle of treating people as free and equal moral beings, or as Tomasi puts it, ensuring people can be “responsible self-authors” (See Schmidtz and Brennan, 2010 & Tomasi, 2012, p74-76, 82). Basic rights become a condition for democratic legitimacy if we imagine the legitimacy of a political institution to stem from the ability of a person to be a free and equal moral being.\footnote{This comes from Locke but also stems through Mill and Humboldt to form one of the most basic liberal principles which is why liberals believe in freedom.}

The above framework is shared by both the neoclassical and high liberal camps. A right is judged to be basic if it is necessary to develop a sense of either justice or the good, or if it is necessary for safeguarding a liberty which would qualify in the former category (Von Platz, 2013 p5). The issue is that from this framework, the high liberals conclude with a thin conception of economic liberties, while the neoclassical liberal draws from this a thick conception of economic liberties. The rights to broad private economic freedom are considered essential to ensuring people are able to be self-authors which is where the high and neoclassical liberal camp diverge. Although they are both driven by the same commitment to a framework which has come to be called social justice, the issue of economic rights divides them.

This division on the issue of economic liberties, between the classical, high and neoclassical liberals, leads to very different institutional recommendations. Setting aside neoclassical liberalism for a while, the institutions of high and classical liberalism and how they provide an answer to the Cohen critique shall be the focus of the next section of this project. I believe that they inadequately respond to Cohen and the issues he raises and I shall now seek to demonstrate why.
Section 3- Liberalism’s Stumbling Block

Setting up the problem

I reach a stage now where I wish to take my analysis of the Liberal school of philosophy, and examine what the implications of Cohen’s relationship between freedom and money is for the two prevailing camps.

I feel this is best done by asking the question how do the institutional arrangements of classical and high liberalism fail to un-trap a person from poverty and the unfreedom that comes with it. Cohen wrote his essay as a critique of Rawls and Berlin as much as it is intended for the likes of Nozick and Hayek. If I am to successfully provide a path for Liberals who might be members of either the Classical or High Liberal camp, it is important to demonstrate the shortcomings of each, and be aware of them as I signpost towards an alternative which doesn’t fail to overcome Cohen. While I am unable to provide a comprehensive account of all the shortcomings, I have selected what I believe to be one strong argument for each. For Classical Liberalism, I take issue with the denial that issues of social justice are tied to freedom. With the High Liberal, I select Welfare-State Capitalism to be the institutional arrangement to reflect this philosophy. Using the example of welfare designed to help the poorest in society and those seeking to escape poverty, I explore the issue of dependency, and how these arrangements fail to make the poorest in society much freer than they would be under a strict Classical Liberal arrangement.

The criteria I will judge both camps against is if they successfully ‘un trap’ poverty, that is prevent the following two conditions from occurring:

- when a person lack enough money to participate in society through no fault of their own,
- when a person lacks the ability to escape the coercive trappings of lacking money and are therefore consigned to being perpetually unfree in society.

Plus they must provide for a third condition principle

- To provide a set of basic rights designed to ensure individual autonomy

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18 I recognise that many institutional arrangements can be born out of High Liberalism. I will address this shortly.
So far, I have outlined what I view as being one of the most credible critiques of liberalism around, and presented the major branches of the noble school of liberalism. It may not be clear why we just enjoyed a whistle stop tour over through the competing concepts of liberalism. My reasons for doing this are twofold: 1) to demonstrate that there are competing camps under the banner of liberalism, who will provide different institutional recommendations but they are bound by common threads and all must face up to the Cohen critique which cuts to their foundational common belief in a certain concept of freedom. And 2) provide for the intellectual foundations to set out the stool of the neoclassical liberal which is emerging from the liberal school, I shall address this later.

The purpose of this section is to examine how some of the camps of liberalism respond to Cohen's critique, whereby poverty is an _innus_ condition of freedom. It is my view that Hayekian Classical Liberalism and welfare-state capitalism in the style of the High Liberal philosopher Joseph Raz, have had the most fundamental effects on the institutions we see in western democratic society. It is therefore these two interpretations of liberalism I shall analyse, considering their ability to bring about a high distribution of freedom considering how poverty can have a serious effect on an individual’s distribution of freedom.

A case that demonstrates the failure for classical liberalism, and various forms of welfare state capitalism, to deliver a high distribution of freedom will further bolster my claim that liberals need to look elsewhere in order to promote freedom.

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19 Aside from the general point that ideology often don’t have ‘one’ definition and that titles of ideology often have little meaning without substantive details laying out what a person means by a given ideological title. Ideology is a bit like juice cordial. You may be presented with it in a set of founding texts (orange squash in the bottle), with a desire to make liberalism your political ideology of choice, but when you come to form your own ideology it (that is make orange juice out of it), you take a bit (people add different amounts of squash to make juice, and often you will never add the same amount of squash twice), and you mix it with some water (water could be personal life experience). Maybe you are a fan of orange and lemon juice, so you add a bit of lemon squash too (this could be adding a bit of socialism). Maybe it’s a Friday night so you add some vodka too). The point stands, you think you have made orange juice, but your orange juice will be unique to you, and another person may make orange juice, call it orange juice, but it will not be the same. No two orange juices are the same, just like when we are confronted with the issue of ideology.
Classical Liberalism and Cohen

Few would doubt the impact classical liberalism has had on the modern economy. While there is no nation which neatly fits the “classical liberal model”, the work of Fredrick Hayek, Ludwig von Missus and many of the other members of the Mont Pelerin Society has fundamentally shaped the way western economies function.

Along with being champions of enterprise, small states and private property, many classical liberals, both contemporary and ‘classical’, were champions of freedom. That was, freedom as in freedom from intervention, the settled definition of this thesis. No classical liberal made the case for freedom more strongly than Fredrick Hayek and his 18th century forerunner Wilhelm Von Humboldt.

Both men are arguably best known for books which were written primarily to defend an individual’s liberty. In his introduction to The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek wants to avoid a society where “unfreedom prevails”, arguing his work provides a criteria of what a society where every individual is free looks like (Hayek, 1960, p5-6). Similarly, Humboldt sets out early in The Limits of State Action that freedom is a necessary condition for an individual to realise, in grandiose language, the highest ends of his existence. He couples this with an insistence that in order for an individual to be truly free, and realise the highest ends of their existence, other people around the individual must, too, be free. (Humboldt, 1969, p16-18).

It is very clear that these two writers are concerned not only with the preservation of liberty as a concept, but also that liberty be extended to every individual in a given society. In both these pieces of work, they lay out a detailed philosophy of conditions that need to be met in order for a society to deliver, they claim, widespread liberty for all, with a lot of concern shown for minimising state overreach to maximise liberty. This philosophy is fundamentally what has come to be known as classical liberalism, a defence of the individual’s liberty from the state, and a strong desire to design social structures which promote every individual’s basic liberty. Hayekian classical liberalism boils down to a commitment to freedom, where freedom means an individual being free to pursue their own goals, and that freedom being extended to every adult member of society (Hayek, 1977).
I believe this claim, thanks to Cohen, can be contested to clearly demonstrate the shortcomings of the ‘classical liberalism alone’ approach\textsuperscript{20}.

I draw attention to classical liberalism specifically because it is the foundation on which my recommendation to moving past the Cohen Critique is built upon. While old school classical liberalism alone fails, in my opinion, to adequately engage with Cohen's analysis, it provides a lot of the intellectual foundations of an option that does deal with the facts Cohen draws attention to adequately. It is important to identify the shortcoming of classical liberalism, in order to demonstrate how the camp of liberalism championed by Tomasi and co have evolved these ideas to keep up with the modern day.

From Cohen’s account of freedom, we come to accept the fact that to lack money is to be liable to interference and coercion. If we take a look at Hayek on freedom however, he wishes to avoid making any standard of wealth a condition for freedom. He makes the classical liberal position clear that individual liberty (freedom) should not be confused with an individual’s power to do something (Hayek, 1960, p17-18). A classical liberal like Hayek would probably argue that within a market economy, money confers power (purchasing power) rather than freedom. Others have characterised the Hayekian position as one which views great differences of power in society as not a threat to individual freedom (Preiss, 2015 pg 173).

The classical liberal would simply deny the facts\textsuperscript{21} Cohen lay out, as they seem very keen to separate any question of power from a definition of freedom, valuing them as different concepts. That is not to say that the classical liberal does not emphasise with the woman being unable to catch a flight to Paris because of a lack of money. They might well have honest and constructive policies designed to help \textit{empower} individuals like her. However, they would flatly deny that she is unfree because of her relative poverty. The classical liberal position sidesteps the issues Cohen

\textsuperscript{20} I use the phrase ‘classical liberalism alone’ to distinguish from more contemporary evolutions of liberalism which might draw on much of the classical liberal tradition and combine it with other aspects of political philosophy. This critique here is with classical liberalism in its purest and most philosophical form. There is no real world example of a set of institutional systems designed by classical liberalism alone. This critique demonstrates the major shortcoming of pure classical liberalism to provide for widespread liberty, and is important later when considering neoclassical liberalism, which very much builds off classical liberalism while avoiding (in my opinion) classical liberalism's shortcomings

\textsuperscript{21} I am not the only one to call the Cohen relationship of poverty as an \textit{in us} condition of freedom as a ‘fact’. See Gourevitch, 2015, p366 and the whole article for more on this, and how more generally Cohen’s writing on freedom have been overlooked in the scholarship on this issue.
brings up, and in essence, fails to properly take on board the fact that poverty is a sufficient condition to a classical liberal account of unfreedom.

Therefore, the classical liberal theorists seem incapable of answering Cohen because they consider issues of social justice as not linked to freedom. They fail to accept the relationship which clearly exists between their conception of freedom and poverty. However, they broadly stand alone in this view, therefore they are unable to have a suitable answer to the issues of social justice raised, which increasingly link social injustice to conceptions of unfreedom. This is why the neo-classical view, which I shall explore in detail in the second half of this project, deserves heightened attention. I would also argue that certain individuals considered part of the classical liberal camp deserve reassessment. Hence Milton Friedman shall receive a lot of attention during section B.

**High Liberalism as Institutions**

Turning attention now to the prevailing camp of Liberalism, the high liberal tradition of liberalism is in part, responsible for the broad collection of welfare state capitalist nations which litter the western world. The term ‘welfare state capitalism’ (WSC) however, needs to be unpacked. WSC models are a compromise of the competing ideologies of liberalism, Christian democracy and social democracy. And the term welfare state capitalism can account for institutional arrangements which can be very different in terms of how much welfare the state is expected to provide.

One of the leading accounts on this notion of competing concepts of welfare state capitalism is by Gøsta Esping-Anderson, written in 1990 and then explored further in a collection of essays he edited in 1996. He makes the claim that there are three overarching sub-groups of welfare state capitalist economies: Liberal regimes (market-based solutions with ridged entitlement rules), Conservative regimes (often a family-based approach with welfare targeted at supporting the family unit) and Social Democratic regimes (could be characterised as the ‘cradle-to-grave’ approach) (Esping-Anderson, 1990, p58-69 & Esping-Anderson, 1996).

While this account still today is considered to shape a lot of our understanding of what the welfare state is and means, I take a number of issues with Esping-Anderson’s account of the way
he classifies welfare state capitalism. Primarily, as Esping-Anderson himself admits, it fails to capture the complex political economies of East Asia. Furthermore, it fails, in my view, to adequately account for the complex Catholic-Christian democracies of southern Europe. Finally, a lot of the political economies Esping-Anderson used as the base of his study in the 90’s have seen pretty fundamental political reform since then, so while I will be using his framework as a base, I wish to offer a sketch of the classification I will be using which is based on more contemporary discussions in political philosophy on the present and future of the welfare state.

Rawls defines welfare state capitalism as being any institutional system that allows for the private ownership of productive property, has welfare provisions which provide for a decent social minimum which would provide for basic need but lack the necessary institutional arrangements to prevent high levels of economic and social inequalities which differs WSC from property-owning democracies (Rawls, [1971] 1999 xiv-xv & Rawls 2001, 137-138). Within this very broad definition, a number of very different institutional variations of welfare state capitalism may sit. These are formed by, as I stated earlier, a compromise of a number of different political philosophies, which include a heavy amount of contemporary liberalism. The two I am going to focus on are:

1) Brownite North Atlantic Capitalism
2) Nordic Capitalism

While obviously other forms of welfare state capitalism do exist, I shall focus on these as they are the centre of a lot of the literature on the flaws and successes of welfare state capitalism. The Nordic model especially is held up in some literature as a possible saviour of WSC.

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22 I would argue that Christian democracy is woefully under-researched in general when compared to other schools of political thought in general, and this account fails to consider how catholic political traditions have shaped the unique political economies of Italy, Malta and Spain for example. Carlo Invernizzi Accetti has recently published a comprehensive study to answer the question ‘What is Christian Democracy?’ He sums up the conceptual building blocks as anti-materialism, personalism, popularism, subsidiarity principle to central government, social capitalism and Christian Inspiration. This differs from the classic ‘conservative’ account because it goes far beyond reliance on the family, but places great importance on local communities and community based welfare and politics. For a fuller account of Christian Democracy, see Invernizzi Accetti, 2019. And for a catholic specific account, see Chappel, 2018
While I understand that high liberals may advocate for other institutional frameworks, such as Rawls and other who argue for property owning democracies, the vast majority of institutions around today which mirror liberal thinking bear a closer resemblance to welfare state capitalism.

I recognise that there are a number of pathways beyond the issues I have identified here. The Liberal has three main options open to them I can identify. All three draw in some degree on John Rawls theory of justice. If the liberal wish to reconcile themselves on social justice in some regard, Rawls is the man to go to. To return to my analogy earlier about ideology, all three of these options take Rawlsian theory to some degree and mix it with very different other ingredients to make entirely different cocktails however.

The Nordic model should not be confused with Democratic Socialism which represents an evolution of the socialist ideology designed to move beyond many of the critiques of classic state socialism through embracing elements of liberal theory. Rawls himself engaged with Democratic Socialism briefly, suggesting its system of institutions would successfully realise his theory of justice (Rawls, 2001, p138). However, as I shall shortly outline, Rawls paid little academic attention to Democratic Socialism compared to the other institutional arrangement which could realise his theory of justice, Property Owning Democracy. This has allowed other academics the necessary room to develop the institutions of Democratic Socialism subsequent to Rawls. Because of recent political developments among left leaning political parties in Western Europe and the United States, there has been a recent renewed interest in it as a concept, and differentiating it from the Nordic model of Welfare State Capitalism. To summarise Democratic Socialism, it is when private property in relation to economics is abolished, and the economic mechanisms are collectively controlled and owned by workers (Bolten, 2020, p334). That would differ from Nordic WSC which is a mixed economy, which retains a degree of private ownership of economic property. Not only does Democratic Socialism have the potential to be a viable option for Rawlsian justice, but it also could be a path to fix the relationship between freedom and money Cohen establishes.
Furthermore, popular with an emerging group of high liberals and neo-republicans\textsuperscript{23} is the concept of a Property Owning Democracy (POD). Of the two institutional arrangements Rawls believed best enacted his theory of justice, POD received more attention. He dedicated a whole section of \textit{Justice as Fairness} to exploring the concept in more detail, which has in turn lead it to be written about more extensively within the school of Political Philosophy. To summarise the main characteristics of the Property Owning Democracy framework: (see Rawls, 2001, P135-140, 158-162 and O’Neill, 2021, p3)

1) Institutions work to widely disperse the ownership of wealth and capital across the society
2) Institutions designed to prevent the intergenerational accumulation of wealth
3) Safeguarding democracy and equal political liberty from corrupting influences and practises

Property owning democracy contrasts with welfare state capitalism in a number of key ways. Primarily, the commitment to dispersing the means of production throughout the population, albeit retaining private ownership contrasts heavily with welfare state capitalism which allows for the build-up of effective monopolies. These monopolies in turn limit choice and freedom within the market, violating welfare state capitalisms ability to deliver high levels of freedom right across society.

I consider both Democratic Socialism and Property Owning Democracies as valid pathways which potentially would allow the Liberal find a way to continue to commit to widespread freedom, considering the critique Cohen laid out. I shall dedicate the second half of this analysis to another possible avenue. Drawing on the work of Rawls, Hayek and, I will come to claim, the conceptions of freedom that Milton Friedman championed, John Tomasi has become the champion of the emerging school of neoclassical liberalism. It is this position I wish to explore in more detail and propose how it might satisfy the issues Cohen raises about the relationship between freedom and money.

\textsuperscript{23} Neo-republicanism is a modern day development of much of what Cicero, Polybius et all wrote about as ‘civic republicanism’. Principle among contemporary neo-republicans are Philip Pettit, who’s theory of freedom as non-domination has motivated an exciting new direction in the study of concepts of freedom. See Republicanism, A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997) and Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World (2015).
**Welfare State Capitalism - The Dependency Problem**

Welfare state capitalism in itself has significant issues with fulfilling the Cohen Critique, providing the rights necessary for self-authorship, and in following the basic school of thought of Rawls (Rawls, 2001 p135-136). My issue with welfare state capitalism is one of power. The poorest are not free as they are reliant on the state for support to live. In welfare state capitalist societies, the fundamental problem is one of dependency, where a great many people are dependent on a flawed set of state institutions for the basic resource of money to survive. Once we reintroduce Cohen’s relationship between freedom and money to this, the poorest are also disproportionately dependent on the state for their most basic freedoms, as without this welfare, they would not be free to do the most basic of actions such as heat their home and pay for water.

This problem I seek to identify is one of legitimisation within welfare state capitalism. There exists a sticky minority within welfare state societies who are trapped in perpetual poverty by the state and state regulation of markets, and rather than even attempt to help these people, the state sees political gain from continuing to subjugate and trap these sticky minorities. As already discussed, relative poverty is an *inus* condition to unfreedom. So within welfare state capitalism, there are entire minority economic groups of society who are not only left comparatively unfree by the state, but actively kept more unfree in order to maintain the status or political concerns of other sections of society. Welfare state capitalist societies, rather than being vehicles for freedom, can legitimately, in my view, be seen as an institutional arrangement which deals out highly unequal levels of freedom among its people, and then the government will maintain political control by galvanising a plurality to continually re-elect them.

This creates a legitimisation problem, with a government actively keeping minorities less free than others. In exploring this issue further, I look at divides through an economic lens. Contained and sustained intervention in the economy by the state has divided people along the same lines, with certain economic groups finding themselves stuck in the constant minority

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24 This directly links to an argument made by John Tomasi in a paper in 2011. He argued that economic liberties, a such as private properties, should be held equal to other civil and political liberties and protected constitutionally. He argues they are a necessary condition for a democratically legitimate society (see Tomasi, 2011). I am building on his argument, demonstrating that freedom is necessary for democratic legitimacy, and in a society where some are disproportionately unfree, one can question the legitimacy of that government.

25 The concept of a group of the poor being subjugated for political ends is not a new one. In Tudor England, there was the emergence of the “undeserving poor” classification of poor people, which emerged through the protestant shift away from the necessity of acts of kindness to obtain salvation. What succeeded was a group of the poor being
when it comes to economic decision making. Furthermore, the government in a welfare state economy makes political capital out of maintaining certain economic groups in a state of relative poverty, therefore consigning them a higher level of unfreedom.

An example I might give which would demonstrate this point is the trapping of individuals in low paid work who have their income subsidised by tax credits, therefore part reliant on the state for their income. This is a system where the state will top up your income in order to reduce the levels of in-work poverty. This is a classic welfare state policy that characterised the welfare reforms introduced by the Blair/Brown governments in the UK. Working tax credit was introduced in the UK in April 2003 by Chancellor Brown as an amalgamation of a series of tax credits introduced by the first New Labour Government (Brewer, 2003).

There is a prevailing level of research being conducted into the rise of in-work poverty in the UK. With 37% of households below the UK poverty line being working households (Bourquin et al., 2019), policy research seems to meet the similar conclusions as to the reason for this rise. They identify substantial growth in the cost of housing, specifically private rental markets, coupled with the real value cut in the provision of working tax credits, which are claimed by 1/3 of in-work poverty individuals (Hick and Lanau, 2017), and other working age welfare, are to blame. The conclusion which follows then, is for a substantial increase in working age welfare benefits to support these individuals where work simply does not pay enough to survive. These people would be exactly those that Cohen would be concerned by. They are trapped in a state of poverty, having their freedom severely curtailed and cannot seem to escape poverty.

However, simply increasing the benefits for working age individuals would, I argue, be the wrong step to fix the fundamental problem of in-work poverty. By increasing welfare to in-work individuals, two issues are precipitated. Firstly, people are more reliant on the state for their income, deepening the dependency relationship between an individual and the state for income,
which as has already been established, means certain individuals are reliant on the state for their freedom. This deepens the unequal distribution of freedom and unfreedom in society. The secondary issue to increasing in-work benefits is that it further subsidises the private sector’s practice of underpaying the value of work. Because of state intervention in the wage market, the private sector can afford to not increase wages, with the state picking up the tab. This in turn can slow the natural market growth of wages, as companies are indirectly incentivised by the state to not pay workers more, with the state offering to do it instead. This further deepens the dependency of the individual on the state as the sole provider as a route out of poverty, as companies continue to offer poorly paying jobs, limiting the options of the individual to solely being reliant on in-work welfare from the state. Without this being provided to a sufficient standard, those people would face a far higher level of unfreedom than many of their fellow citizens.

In a democracy, government action and policies are shaped by public perception, what is popular with a plurality of the electorate. In multi-party democracies, governments seek to win elections, this is one of their primary purposes. Therefore, individuals who are worse off are dependent on a state who will primarily act in a way which is politically salient rather than what maximises welfare, as that is the nature of a democracy and a government which is elected and seeks to be re-elected. I am convinced by Friedman’s thoughts on this issue- taken from his “The Role of Government in a Free Society” lecture [Mins 11-18:30] which build on Mill’s concerns about the tyranny of the majority and echoes the thinking of Adam Smith when he wrote about the emancipating effect of the market: Democratic societies have increasingly equated democracy with majority rule, or in the cases of the UK and the US, plurality rule, as a reason of expedience. The issue with this is that every time a government is elected or a political decision is made, the social cohesion necessary for a stable society can potentially be strained. That is because there is always a majority (plurality) who support the government/political decision, and a minority who don’t. I am not arguing that every time the government acts, society decays. As I shall go on to explain with my preferred theory of the concept of a stable society, both spontaneous competition and coordination are necessary for a stable evolution of a society. If the group who find themselves in the minority, that being the “losing side”, is subject to change, then people will retain trust in the democratic process. If people believe they could enact change in a democratic society, then the chance of social strain is significantly reduced. The issue is different
however if the same people lose out in decision time and time again. This group would see their trust in the democratic process eroded, thereby creating strain between this group and the rest of society.

Everyone in a democratic liberal society must feel they have equal or near equal stake in that society for it to function in a stable way, and committed to a similar broad set of common principles. The concept of a stable society is a hotly contested ideal. Attempting to provide a strict definition of a stable society would be futile. However, I am moved by an article by Jack Birner and Ragip Ege who join together theories of Hayek and sociologist Emil Durkheim to create their own theory for social stability. This rests on the idea that a stable society is one which evolves out of both coordination and competition between individuals, groups and other entities. Individuals and groups must be able to coordinate and compete in good faith with one another in order for a society to operate and evolve stably (Birner & Ege, 1999).

Every time a political action is taken where a majority win and a minority must conform, the social fabric can be strained. That strain is lessened in a homogenous society where people have a very similar shared history. In these homogenic societies, government action is less controversial and therefore less likely to strain social cohesion. That is, there is less disparity and heterogeneity in the society, and therefore when the government intervenes in the economy and society, the social strain created is lessened.

This explains the success of government enforced conformity in a highly homogenous society. That strain is exacerbated in diverse (diverse can mean in terms of ethnic, values, religious, economic, other identity) society, such as France, the UK or the USA. The constant use of government mechanisms in societies and the economy of a diverse society is more likely to strain people and deepen the divide between the plurality (who will collect around a similar set of values) and the divided minority (who might only share between them the common theme of being in the ignored minority, but will have their experiences, values, ignored constantly as they find themselves in the continued minority).

As countries come to rely more on the mechanisms of government, they put strain on the few identities of commonality which hold diverse societies together. Melting pot societies should be
revered and celebrated. The more these kind societies rely on government to solve problems, allocate resources, the more the society will be divided (in the same way repeatedly), creating a constantly winning (broadly homogenous [in the example I use, economic]) plurality or majority, and a constantly losing (broadly diverse) minority.

I wish to briefly explain my thinking behind this point. When we think about the driving motivators of governments in democratic systems, I am motivated by the belief that governments ultimate aim is to gain and retain power. A theory known as Statecraft, it can be best summed up as “the art of winning elections and achieving a necessary semblance of governing competence in office” (Bulpit, 1986).

If, therefore, the Government in a democratic system is fundamentally driven by the desire to be elected and re-elected, there is a real possibility that the government could be incentivised to further precipitate the issue of in-work poverty. It would not act in a way which is fundamentally against their electoral interests of retaining power. Like any other part of electoral politics, welfare policy can (and has28) become a political football in elections.

Because of the looming role the state plays in the economy removing any options other than being reliant on the state to prop up a market that is inefficient and flawed, individuals are solely dependent on a government which was elected to not help them but also has no desire to fix the fundamental issue of the flawed wage market. What that means in the UK context is that the approximately 3.9 million29 working adults in relative poverty are dependent on the state, which could be elected on a mandate not to help them.

Political intervention in the market has continued to influence wage setting decisions by the private market, who have come to rely on the state to top up wages which are indirectly incentivised by the state to remain low30. The halfway house of welfare state capitalism, between

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28 Cuts to welfare featured prominently in the Conservative Party election campaign, including a commitment to cap welfare spending and playing into this narrative of some of the poor being “undeserving” and demonstrating how the distribution of welfare, which is a condition to the freedom of the poorest, can become an issue exploited for political gain (see Conservative Party, 2015).
29 This is calculated as 12 % of the 32.9 million working adults aged 16-64 according to the ONS. I take the 12% from the Innes, 2020 report which stated that is the level of working adults in relative poverty in the UK.
30 See Bourne 2019 and Bourne & Shackleton 2016
Democratic Socialism and more free market liberalism, has created the worse of both worlds. The government is unwilling to fully commit to intervene and help those in working poverty, for it will threaten their electoral chances with a majority of the electorate (the more democratic socialist option). However, it is equally unwilling to comprehensively remove itself from the wage market and realign its role to supporting those individuals suffering from in-work poverty to be self-authors and not solely reliant on the government for their freedom (the neoclassical liberal option).

Society in welfare state capitalist economies is increasingly dependent on the state for problem solving, allocate resources and rights, leaving people with no alternatives to seek support. The poorest could find themselves dependant on a government which wins elections on not only actively seeking to not help these people, but also because of the nature of the society being highly dependent on the state for solutions and to allocate resources and social rights, are left without any alternatives to help better the situation they find themselves in. The constant holding back of a section of society by the government can lead to social fractures.

Returning to the issue of welfare then, a plurality might be able to assemble, around a common set of beliefs, to elect and re-elect governments to continuously disadvantage the poorest and those who face the greatest social injustices.

In welfare state capitalism, where so many are dependent on the state, and deprived of choice and freedom, because of a narrow conception of freedom which does not involve economic rights, the only welfare mechanism strong enough is the state. However, in these societies, the state is a flawed institution: too powerful and yet easily controlled by a simple plurality who can maintain their position at the expense of others.

Welfare state capitalists might point to the Scandinavian nations as an example of welfare state capitalist nations fulfilling social justice obligations (O’Neill, 2012 & How not to criticise the welfare state, Schemmel, 2015). However, for the reason just stated, I believe these Nordic welfare state capitalist nations are the exception which make the rule. That is to say, welfare state capitalism has been relatively successful in a Nordic setting because of the remarkable homogeneity of Nordic nations, allowing for the concept of social solidarity to take hold.
course, this sets aside the failure of social democratic systems to provide for freedom. I would make the case that the constant intervention of the state in the economy deprives individuals of basic freedom and creates an issue of democratic legitimacy (Tomasi, 2011). Basic freedom which is central to a concept of social justice. As Tomasi demonstrates, a commitment to social justice must include a commitment to a thick conception of economic liberties. With these thick economic liberties, the dependency relationship between an individual and the state is broken, as a person is not dependent on the state to deliver social justice.

Having laid out what I believe my fundamental issue with the Welfare State Capitalist system is, I shall now turn to what this means for my preferred path the Liberal could take to appreciate and move past Cohen. I am setting a dual challenge for Neoclassical Liberalism to overcome. It must seek to untrap individuals from poverty in a way which satisfies Cohen’s *in us* condition relationship between freedom and poverty. It must also find a way to overcome the issue of dependency I have identified in this section. A set of institutions which makes certain minority groups of people disproportionately dependent on the state for their freedom undermines their freedom and creates unequal levels of freedom in society. The liberal must accept that both high levels of economic dependence and poverty undermines freedom, and any solution must consider this dual challenge.

As I have already stated, other pathways for the liberal exist. I am not passing any judgment on Democratic Socialism or Property Owning Democracy programmes by selecting to advocate for Neoclassical Liberalism. I am simply prescribing the pathway of neoclassical liberalism as one such way the liberal can rescue freedom from the issues of poverty.

Before moving into a deep discussion of Neoclassical Liberalism, I shall lay out a short precis of what response the Neoclassical Liberal would offer to the challenge I am setting for the camp. They would argue for a strict form of constitutionalism when setting up a society. Government’s responsibility and remit for action would be limited and clearly defined. The role of government would be targeted and limited. The limited social security which is a feature of Market Democracies is part of the basic rights rather than a simple policy (in the Rawlsian sense that it would be established in a pre-societal way). Therefore, for a government to seek to alter social security would be to change the very structures that predetermine a society, and beyond the
power of a simple plurality or simple majority elected government. The social security system would be targeted, limited but also removed from the political sphere, removing the toxic dependency relationship between government and individuals many find themselves trapped within welfare state capitalism. It would be removed because welfare policy, which for the poorest in society is tied to their level of freedom, would be set by a set of constitutional principles, which would govern the governing, curtailing their ability to make political capital out of welfare policy. My deep seated reservation about welfare state capitalism as I have laid out here is why I turn to other liberals in order to seek a way to reply to Cohen.
**Section 4- Forging a New Path**

**Milton and Rose Friedman- Friedmanite Freedom**

After identifying the arguments Cohen makes in *Freedom and Money*, and explaining the issues I see his argument creates for a liberal, I shall now move onto exploring in depth the writing of the neoclassical liberal bloc, and signpost how I feel their vision of social justice sufficiently appreciates the facts of Cohen’s arguments.

I shall start by examining the two major players of the neoclassical school: the spirit of Milton Friedman’s writing on freedom, and the more contemporary writing of John Tomasi, and explore why both are intrinsic to understanding the neoclassical camp. This first section will include differentiating Friedman from the classical liberal camp, namely Hayek.

I will weave into this section details about what Friedmanite conceptions of freedom is, and how it works in tandem with the Tomasi Market Democracy, namely self-authorship.

Finally, I shall take the philosophical principles of Friedmanite Freedom and Tomasi social justice which hold within it as the necessary condition of a thick conception of economic justice, and outline the institutional arrangements that this philosophy will bring about. This philosophy will, I will argue, untrap poverty in a way that classical and welfare state liberalism does not, while also preserving freedom.

To provide a short pre-emptive explainer how I believe this to be the case, the institutions advocated for under neoclassical liberalism are designed to ensure a society of fairness in a genuine free market setting and so to be poor is not to be unfree as it does not have to be a constant in your life if you do not want it to be. There is intended to be no institutional barrier which discriminates based on race or gender, or any other personal characteristic, and the rights for an individual to be entirely a self-author of their own lives are constitutionally prescribed and protected. I would argue neoclassical liberalism holds a strict commitment for social justice in a way that would satisfy Cohen, while not compromising on a thick conception of economic liberties, in fact arguing a belief in a thick conception of economic liberties is a necessary condition of social justice as self-authorship.

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In order to understand this philosophy properly, I shall start by properly exploring Milton Friedman. In philosophical conversations, Friedman’s name is rarely mentioned when compared to many of his counterparts, and exploring why this is the case might be a good place to begin our analysis into Milton Friedman.

Those philosophers who have studied Friedman at length have remarked how there remains a lack of critical engagement with Friedman’s philosophy writing when compared to many of his counterparts, both by people who would agree with Friedman, and those who criticise many of the real world institutions which claim to be inspired by his writing (Preiss, 2015, p170-171). This is remarkable, considering how influential his economic and political writing has been in shaping the 21st century global economy. When you compare to his most notable counterpart, Freidrich Hayek, Friedman is rarely mentioned. Among the leading academics of the classical and neoclassical liberal tradition, it is Hayek, not Friedman, who is the centre of attention. And with the biggest critics of the free market economics that Friedman stood for often prefer to just consider Hayek and Friedman as one and the same. What this has created is a degree of ‘philosophical ignorance’ towards Friedman, with many not being clear what Friedman really stood for. This in turn has precipitated many to further not engage with Friedman, leaving a lot of his writing ignored, understudied, and in my view, misunderstood.

However, you could easily be forgiven for being confused about what Friedman stands for. The overriding reason, I would argue, for the initial unwillingness for philosophers to engage in Friedman is that throughout his academic career, his work is sometimes contradictory in nature, thin on details, and set firmly within the economic and public policy world rather than the academic world that Hayek preferred to occupy.

However, careful analysis of Friedman’s philosophical writing does allow you to discern a coherent theory of liberalism, set apart from Hayek. I have focused on his flagship book *Capitalism and Freedom*, which I argue is more philosophical in nature than his later book he

31 Best example of this is how Hayek is the centre of Tomasi’s leading study into neoclassical social justice theory, *Free Market Fairness*, despite, as I shall go on to argue, aspects of Friedman’s philosophy would better lend itself to bolstering Tomasi’s *Market Democracy* project and conception of social justice.

32 See Larson, 2017 p5-7 as a contemporary example of a democratic socialist critique of free market liberalism which fails to make any attempt to differentiate between Hayek and Friedman.
co-authored with Rose Friedman, *Free to Choose*[^33]. I have also supplemented these two works with the study of Milton Friedman’s lectures he gave during his career, which contain analysis critical to understanding the Friedman conception of liberalism and freedom.

**Freedom as Choice**

So, what is Friedmanite freedom? It is my belief that this conception of liberal freedom, discerned from a careful study of the Friedman works published throughout their lives, forms the philosophical basis of the neoclassical liberal camp I argue offers a path beyond Cohen. I do not have the space in this piece of work to offer a comprehensive study of all of Friedman’s work, which is wide ranging in nature. A study of his key texts and lectures on the issues of freedom and social justice offers an exciting formula for constructing a concept of freedom.

To the Friedman’s, quite simply, freedom is vested in choice. That is clearest in the title of their 1980 book. To simplify his work considerably, only when people have real choice, are they free. In Friedman’s mind, it is not enough to have formal rights in order to make a person free, those rights must be actualised, and constantly preserved and protected. This is best shown in an example Joshua Preiss, in his analysis of Friedman, drew heavily on to distinguish Milton and Rose Friedman from Hayek et al (Preiss, 2015, p170-171).

In an example about the right to free speech, Friedman conceives a socialist society where a person is granted the formal rights to self-expression and free speech which is vested in many liberal capitalist societies. To paraphrase Friedman’s own argument (Friedman, 1962, p17-19), imagine a person is wanting to take out an advertisement criticising the government. Under both systems, the person is formally free to do so under a rights based understanding of freedom. However, Friedman argues the person is not necessarily free under the socialist economy, demonstrating his conception of freedom moves beyond a simple rights understanding of freedom. He insists that a necessary component to the criteria to judging if this person is free is if they have these rights within a system which allows them to actualise these rights. In the case Friedman refers to, because the economy in a socialist system to managed by the state, it is hard

[^33]: When I mention Milton, I cannot go without referencing Rose Friedman and the invaluable contribution she made to the conceptions of Friedmanite Liberalism and Friedmanite Freedom I shall heavily reference. Much like Harriet Taylor Mill, Rose Friedman contributions are often overlooked. Friedmanite philosophy is as much Rose’s as it is Milton’s. (See Friedman & Friedman, 1980)
to facilitate dissent against the government, as the government would have to approve of such dissent\textsuperscript{34}.

This argument is evidenced further in Friedman’s discussions around monopolies. A key component of a system which facilitates a Friedmanite conception of freedom is one where “individuals are effectively free to enter or not enter into any particular exchange, so that every transaction is strictly voluntary” (Friedman, 1962, p14). Friedman goes on to argue that “monopoly implies the absence of alternatives and thereby inhibits effective freedom of exchange” (Friedman, 1962, p28). Friedman insists on a strong commitment to anti-trust legislation, making it a condition of the role of government in a free society. This strongly implies that Friedman does see the government having an active role in upholding and preserving individual freedom, and that it is the primary purpose of government to safeguard freedom of the individual.

Without getting too distracted in the merits of Friedman’s actual example, the key takeaway is that Friedman believes rights alone do not make a person free. The individual must have a system in place which actualises these rights, which often in Friedman's view, is choice. Friedman has stated that civil freedom is the ultimate end of his philosophy, and the economic arrangements he proposes are just conditions he sees necessary to uphold freedom (Friedman, 1988).

This commitment to a system which ‘fosters’ freedom (a direct quote from C&F, see Friedman, 1962, p19) probably comes from a more classical liberal understanding of freedom being an absence of coercion. Friedman himself mentions in a number of his works how he has been inspired by Mill’s understanding of freedom being an absence of coercion (Friedman, 1962, p15 & Friedman, 1978). However, it seems Friedman believes that rights alone do not protect an individual to live a life free from coercion. He sees freedom as being something alive, something that needs to be maintained and protected by a system so it can be actualised. He argues the

\textsuperscript{34} This is a contested point. Friedman himself concedes that such a system could be conceived where a socialist economy could facilitate dissent and freedom of speech. I would hate to have readers judge the substance of Friedman’s philosophy based on the strength of his argument on this point. Convinced or otherwise, this does not change the fact Friedman conceives choice and actualisation as necessary conditions of freedom.
mechanism to actualise freedom as the absence from coercion is thick economic liberties. However, the Friedman’s do not stop here in defining their idea of freedom in my view.

**Filling out Friedmanite Freedom**

The other necessary condition to my understanding of Friedmanite freedom comes in the form of a commitment to the government playing a limited but targeted role in society, a condition that one could term as a social justice commitment.

During his career, Friedman made no explicit commitment to social justice as far as I can find. However, a careful reading of the section of *Capitalism and Freedom* which champions a negative income tax (pg 190-196)\(^{35}\), and his lectures *The Role of Government in a Free Society & Equality and Freedom in Free Enterprise System* does allow you to gather the role he sees government playing in society, which is to preserve, protect and uphold the freedom of the individual.

Important to flag is Friedman’s notion of equality. While Friedman outrightly rejects any idea of equality in what we might consider an egalitarian sense, he does commit to equality as in no one person faces an arbitrary obstacle in their life. Every person must be equal before the law and there must be a genuine equal distribution of rights in the society, which he makes a precondition of freedom (Friedman, 1978b). He draws on the French maxim “la carrière ouverte aux talents, sans distinction de naissance, ni de fortune” which translates to ‘the career open to talents without distinction of birth or fortune’ (Friedman, 1978b).

While Friedman does not elaborate on this commitment to a form of equality beyond this, there are a number of commitments that spring off a commitment to this form of equality. Friedman indirectly is forced to commit to antidiscrimination legislation. If we take his idea of equality as to mean that no person should face unequal treatment based on arbitrary parts of their life (which I think would be a fair reading), then Friedmanite freedom would include a freedom from discrimination based on factors in your life you have no control over, including race, gender, sexual orientation and economic status at birth. It is that last part which allows you to see

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\(^{35}\) I agree with Joshua Preiss here that Friedman’s (comparatively short and admittingly thin on detail) passage in *Capitalism and Freedom* on negative income tax is highly consequential. He obviously commits to financial support to the poverty stricken as a core component of the responsibility of government.
especially how Friedmanites might be concerned with those trapped in a state of poverty and actively seek to overcome it. This is something we shall return to later when we reintroduce Cohen. This point is also key when we consider the evolution of Friedmanite ideas into the more fully formed Philosophy John Tomasi presents in *Free Market Fairness*.

In addition to this commitment to a form of equality which has a social justice element, Friedman in two separate locations, outlines his thoughts on the role of government in preserving freedom, which I have called his commitment to a limited but effective government. To save more repetition, I shall outline what this is below as part of my fuller construction of the three necessary conditions to Friedmanite freedom, but his exact wording can be found in both *Capitalism and Freedom* (pg 14) and in more detail in his lecture *The Role of Government in a Free Society*.

Compiling all these conditions together then, I propose the following as the three necessary conditions which build a Friedmanite conception of freedom:

1. The absence of coercion from another in one’s political, social and economic pursuits (Basic Rights including economic liberties Condition),
2. The existence of a competitive free market economy (Economic Choice Condition),
3. The government carrying out the functions of, ensuring that government action doesn’t violate (1) (Limited but Effective Government Condition)
   a. To provide for law and order so to prevent one person from coercing another, and to provide for external defence of a free society
   b. To provide for the “exact administration of justice”: to promote voluntary cooperation among people by defining the terms under which we will voluntarily cooperate with each other, by adjudicating disputes, defining the meaning of property rights and the interpretation and enforcement of such rights, by preventing the rise of monopoly, and to ensure no arbitrary obstacles exist so to ensure all individuals equality before the law
   c. To provide a substitute for voluntary cooperation when such cooperation is not feasible:
      i. Technical monopoly [when reasons of physical circumstance it is not possible to have competition],
ii. To address neighbourhood effects, that is to provide for public goods and negative externalities [otherwise known as externalities or third party effects- the cases whereby the action of two people entering into a deal have effects on a third person who didn’t enter into said deal]

d. To provide protection for members of society who cannot be regarded as “responsible” individuals

The first condition is what I would term as the classical liberal position akin to Hayek. However, it is the other two conditions which is where Friedman marks a break from Hayek. While Hayek focuses on freedom being judged by the extent that an individual is free from the arbitrary powers of others (Priess, 2015, 173), Friedman, in at least part of his work, is concerned with how much a person has effective freedom, especially when it comes to the issue of choice. He terms freedom as choice, and as such, shows real concern for the amount of choice open to an individual, baking that into his understanding of freedom.

Principle (2) and (3) exist to ensure genuine competitive choice in the market, which is critical to ensuring someone can make the most of their capacities and opportunities. Friedmanite freedom isn’t simply the right to be free from coercion, you need the effective element of a system to support the perpetuation and preservation of freedom.

This account of Friedmanite freedom is based on my understanding of Friedman's work. I am sure this will be contested by others, unsurprisingly considering how thin Milton Friedman’s philosophical work is compared to many others. This is why I am bolstering his work with that of Tomasi. However, the aim of this section was to in part, demonstrate how Friedman is a

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36 It is my belief, based on studying Friedman, that one such negative externality in society is poverty. Another is a lack of education. Friedman, through this provision, commits to a form of state mandated welfare as a condition of freedom. In Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman does commit to education vouchers provided by the state, to maximise choice while also eliminating the issue of a lack of money acting as a barrier to education (what he would term a negative externality in a society, as a society would always seek to maximise how educated its members are) (Friedman, 1962, p85-107. In a similar vein, Friedman’s commitment to negative income tax as a form of providing a basic financial minimum to individuals demonstrates to me that Friedman sees a basic income as a provision of being a free individual (see Friedman, 1962, p190-195). This is critical to understanding both how Friedman marries up with Tomasi and how neoclassical liberalism, rooted in Friedman and developed by Tomasi, can provide a route for liberals past Cohen.
philosophical break from other classical liberals, and how his work can provide an inspiration to market capitalist liberals who would be concerned about social justice.

**Tomasi, the evolution of the Friedmans**

I am very aware that many would dismiss Friedman as a credible writer in the philosophical world. It is for this reason, among others, I shall not rely on him alone to provide for the defence of neoclassical liberalism. The other principle reason is that I would argue that neoclassical liberalism which Tomasi is championing is the evolved and developed form of a lot of what Friedman was writing about.

As I have indicated, Friedman’s writing about freedom, in my view, sets him apart from other conventional classical liberals. He expresses real concern for, in Tomasi’s own words, the “dignity of the individual, a dignity that we respect when we allow people to develop according to their own lights” (Tomasi, 2012, p136). Friedman believes that people must have the freedom to exercise their rights, and rights alone do not guarantee freedom. It is my belief that this Friedmanite spirit has passed into the work of Tomasi and other neoclassical liberals who express genuine concern for social justice.

I seek here to only provide a brief overview in the key ways I see Tomasi’s Market Democracy (MD) theory of social justice as being the evolution of Friedmanite ideas. I would recommend anyone to read Tomasi’s book for a fuller account of Free Market Fairness and Market Democracy as political theories.

Essentially, Tomasi’s social justice theory champions the idea of every individual as a self-author, entirely free to set the direction of their own lives, with both the guaranteed constitutional rights to make that happen, and the government acting in a targeted way to safeguard the individual’s ability to do so. This is his theory of self-authorship.

What I understand this to mean is that Tomasi grounds his sense of social justice in a very broad sense of freedom, where social justice is freedom from coercion in one’s economic, political and social pursuits, and the purpose of government is to uphold and protect this principle. This, in my view, mirrors and develops the Friedmanite sense of freedom I laid out above. Throughout
his work *Free Market Fairness*, Tomasi draws on the many elements Friedman uses to defend his conception of freedom, and turns them into a comprehensive theory of social justice.

For one, both Tomasi and Friedman see the role of government in similar lights. Both are not libertarians in any Nozickian sense. As outlined above, Friedman clearly sees government playing a role in people’s lives, including serving a redistributive function through the implementation of negative income tax, and intervening in the market in the name of preserving freedom (commitment to anti-monopoly legislation). In a similar vein, Tomasi sees the government playing a pivotal role in “develop and exercise the moral capacities they have as citizens”. The chief principles of a market democracy commits to: “capacity for self-authorship” and “the capacity to honour their fellow citizens as persons who have the capacity to be responsible self-authors”. The core liberties of a society must include life defining economic rights, “in light of their own character, values and dreams”. He goes on, the “institutions of a free society must be justifiable to all classes of citizens, including the poor. This requires that the basic political and economic structures be designed so as to ensure that all groups benefit” (Tomasi 2012, p172). Clearly then, Tomasi is not committing to some night watchman state. Quite the opposite, the government has the sole responsibility in making sure that every member of society has the capacity to be self-authors. In this light, I see Tomasi and Friedman very much aligned in how they see the role of government in society.

Self-authorship as a theory of justice is, I would argue, vested in Friedmanite freedom. Both place the freedom of the individual at its heart, and are motivated to pursue their own philosophical theory by a desire to uphold the sanctity and freedom of the individual to live their life how they want. Central to them both is what would be termed a commitment to a thick conception of economic liberties. Without them, an individual cannot be free to be a self-author. But they are not moral absolutes, rather on par with basic civil and political rights. Both Friedman and Tomasi views these rights not as a means towards higher levels of aggregate societal happiness, as some classical liberals might defend their commitment to economic rights, but as a requirement stemming from their foundational commitment to respect persons as free and equal moral agents: responsible self-authors must be free to make a wide range of decisions in the economic domains of their lives (Tomasi, 2012p96-97. Friedman, 1988).
What I am left believing is that, probably inadvertently, aspects of Friedman’s work have grown into the camp of neoclassical liberalism, who seek to promote a theory which utilises Friedman’s understanding of freedom to develop a theory of social justice.

These neoclassical liberals, which include the likes of Jason Brennan and David Schmidtz, are bound together by a commitment to broad freedom from coercion but a strong commitment to social justice and government being tasked with upholding this principle of freedom from coercion in one’s economic, political and social pursuits. They are committed to taking seriously the problems of social justice while not threatening a liberal idea of freedom, building social justice (self-authorship) into their conception of freedom. A necessary condition of that commitment to social justice is to grant every individual thick economic liberties alongside political and social liberties. You cannot have social justice without a commitment to a thick concept of economic freedom, but in order to have true actualised freedom, one must commit to social justice, that is, everyone equally entitled and able to access this universal freedom.

That is how I define neoclassical liberal philosophy.

**Neoclassical Liberalism, Rescuing Freedom**

We move now to the final section. I wish to demonstrate how neoclassical liberalism, in my view, rescues the liberal conception of freedom from the real danger the issues Cohen raises places on it, while also not compromising the rest of the liberal agenda.

In order to do this, I shall devote a bit of time to sketching out how the philosophy of neoclassical liberalism translates into institutional arrangements. I shall then use this, as well as the pure philosophy of the three neoclassical architects (Friedman, Friedman and Tomasi), to provide what, in my view, is how neoclassical liberalism clearly takes onboard the Cohen critique, and sidesteps its most damning implications.

To recap, the neoclassical liberal, I would argue, conceives the conditions of freedom along the lines Friedman lays out. They are also committed to eradicating social injustices in order to bring about self-authorship to all individuals. This Friedmanite freedom essentially is self-authorship. This philosophy would lead to a belief in a set of complex institutions. I do not have the space here to provide a detailed account of who the institutions of neoclassical liberalism would look
like. Instead, I will now lay out how these institutions would look like in the narrow sense to satisfy the concerns raised for liberals by Cohen37.

To briefly also remind readers, the criteria I laid out for judging success at surpassing Cohen’s concerns while also staying true to a form of liberalism is as follows:
A set of institutions which consider for:

1) when a person lack enough money to participate in society through no fault of their own,

2) when a person lack the ability to escape the coercive trappings of lacking money and are therefore consigned to being perpetually unfree in society.

Plus the third condition principle

3) To provide a set of basic rights designed to ensure individual self-authorship

When faced with these conditions, I ask the question, why does any single person lack money? There are a number of reasons to ask this but primarily it is to ascertain why the individual is lacking resources and if they are trapped in this state of poverty or if the person has an ability to alter their poverty stricken situation. If poverty is not a fixed reality, then it is conceivable that in the instance that you are destitute and therefore find yourself unfree, that unfreedom is significantly mitigated as, unlike when poverty is a fixed reality, part of the fundamental idea of freedom is the effective power to discharge your rights and not be hindered to be a self-author. Poverty is the greatest hindrance to self-authorship and therefore untrapping people from poverty is a fundamental of the neoclassical institutional framework.

37 The following section is inspired by Tomasi’s Free Market Fairness pg 108-118, as the references will reflect. Sections on environmental regulation for example, have been omitted from my commentary. I raise it briefly because environmental politics is so substantial to modern politics and philosophies should always strive to consider the climate crisis as they are constructed. I would point readers to page 111 of Free Market Fairness, where Tomasi’s states that Market democracy should only consume resources within the boundaries of long term environmental sustainability. He also commits to the idea that capitalism and environmentalism can have a positive relationship rather than be seen as diametrically opposing views. I would also make the case that the impending climate crisis fits the Friedmanite criteria of a negative externality, “the cases whereby the action of two people entering into a deal have effects on a third person who didn’t enter into said deal”. We are dealing with the consequences of actions taken long before we are born, and therefore modern society fits the definition of a third person, especially considering how negative an externality climate change will be to modern society and a persons freedom. Therefore, targeted government action to combat climate change, while not imperilling the basic freedoms and right to be a self-author of every individual, is very much permissible under the philosophy of neoclassical liberalism.
If society is arranged unjustly, that is to say that there exists institutional barriers, or societal, individual or market coercive barriers exist because of negligent, poor or complicit institutional action to one’s ability to get on how they want in life, then one can clearly see how a case can be made for freedom to be tied to money. Since in this arrangement, the distribution of money, while not fixed, is viscous, that is to say sticky and not free flowing as is the theory of money in the free market. It is conceivable in this scenario that money will accumulate and not transfer as freely as it should in a true free market, with people lacking the freedom to obtain money (this is the underlying reason that they are unfree, not the lack of money but the lack of the freedom to earn money).

In order to satisfy Cohen, Neoclassical liberalism must remove the social injustice which makes poverty a trap for many and therefore lead them to be, to a degree, unfree. This is done through the implementation of institutions which allow for self-authorship, where economic freedoms are an intrinsic part of the basic rights toolbelt given to every individual. When asking the question, why does a given person lack money, the answer must not be because of some factor beyond their control if Neoclassical Liberalism is to satisfy the Cohen problem. Although Cohen would argue that even if someone lacks money in this scenario, they are still unfree, that degree of unfreedom is dramatically smaller.

With all this in mind then, a template for institutions which would please neoclassical liberals can be comprehensively found within Tomasi’s *Free Market Fairness*. In a way which Friedman never succeeded in doing, Tomasi did not skimp on the details in laying out the institutional reality of his philosophy. Tomasi proposes a brand of institutions he terms Democratic Limited Government (Tomasi, 2012, p116-117). It is a form of government heavily reliant on constitutionalism, where the role of government is clearly and constitutionally ordained, alongside the rights of all people. This way, the role of government in fields of welfare for example, are not political footballs, but constitutional givens, avoiding the issue of government having a patriarchal relationship towards its citizens.

Democratic Limited Government (DLG) sees the government playing a limited but critical role in the areas of healthcare and education. This is because the government must play a role to ensure real choice in all areas of one life. Tomasi, in a Friedmanite way, proposes this can be
done through universal vouchers and accreditation requirements for schools and healthcare providers. After all, information symmetry is a fundamental principle of classical liberal economics that Friedman, Tomasi and others subscribe to.

There is also a commitment to rights based formal equality before the law, with scope for the DLG to commit to a thick antidiscrimination law. This would intervene in the private market as well as public services to protect against hiring and wage discrimination, as well as discrimination in the real estate and banking sector. (a banker is not allowed to withhold loans to women for being a woman, for example). While some would say this action is in direct violation of some economic freedoms, it is all in the spirit of protecting the core economic liberties, the right to pursue a profession, start a business, own a home. DLG seeks to remove any discriminatory barriers which would threaten ones basic economic liberties, in the spirit of a Friedman like principle of equality (talents based equality of opportunity). Finally, in terms of social services, DLG favours market based services, but would commit itself to a universal basic safety net similar to negative income tax (again, Friedmanite style).

Coupled with this sketch inspired by Tomasi, very much in keeping with this model, one can apply to this system the Friedmanite belief of being very anti-monopoly, ensuring that within the marketplace there is genuine choice. Again, while this will be seen by some as preventing the economic freedom of some (the accumulation of productive property), it is necessary to safeguard the core economic liberties, the right to choice, which in turn safeguard against coercion in any form. Of course coercion threatens the ability of self-authorship. So a Friedmanite-Tomasi institution of DLG would strongly commit to preventing monopolies, in order to safeguard basic economic liberties and freedom from coercion which is a core tenant of freedom.

Bringing us back to the concerns of people trapped within a state of poverty, within DLG you have the freedom to try to succeed, to fail, to gamble and lose. You may even become poverty stricken. DLG does not ensure you are free from poverty. However under Friedmanite DLG, poverty does not have to be a permanent feature of your life, you are still free from the trappings of poverty (that is, the minimum standard of life to exercise your political and economic rights [better known as “setting a floor under the standard of life of every person in the community”
Friedman, 1962, p191) because of a commitment to negative income tax, strict anti-discrimination laws and protection, a competitive free market economy and government support for healthcare and education. Government support for healthcare would take the form of oversight over the insurance market to ensure non-monopolistic and non-coercive principles are being upheld as well as healthcare vouchers. This would be a similar arrangement for education, with targeted support to help the poorest in order to protect their fundamental right to be a self-author thereby preserving justice. Taxation is collected just to fund these projects and does not carry within it a redistributive function.

It would be the aim of this institutional arrangement to remove the trappings of poverty, with institutions striving to ensure no one is left unfree to be their own self-author. Constitutionally speaking, everyone would be entitled to a basic floor quality of life which enables you to act on your economic, political and civil rights. The government would provide for the effective element of Friedmanite Freedom, and that should aim to ensure that each individual has the power and capacity to be self-authors, absent from undue coercion in their lives by government, individual or monopolistic market power in their lives.

In a given instance, while you might lack the means to act on your desire, your reason for lacking means is not because of some institutional injustice which ties your freedom to your aggregate wealth which is fixed by institutions blind or complicit in social injustice. Friedmanite DLG breaks down the relationship between freedom and money as in an instance, while you may lack means, you do not lack the freedom to earn money to fulfil your desires as far as your talents will take you. Therefore, to lack money under a societal arrangement which commits to guaranteeing and protecting self-authorship, coupled with a strong commitment to economic liberties, is not to lack freedom.

It is my aim that the commentary set out above provides a path for liberals to recognise the issues Cohen raises and move past his critique, with the theory of this new wave of contemporary liberal thought who commit to social justice but also refuse to compromise on the integrity freedom in your economic as well as political and social lives.
Concluding comments

Modern Liberalism is facing a crisis of confidence. This crisis has been the subject of much popular political literature written by conservatives, socialists and populists delighting in the receding of Liberalism. In turn, these schools of political philosophy have been producing alternative institutions to replace the Liberal economic and social models which have dominated the global economy for many years. Liberalism must argue its case in these changing times in order to prove its relevance in the 21st century.

In *Rescuing Freedom*, I have singled out the foundational principle that underpins the Liberal school, freedom, and wanted to test the ability of modern Liberalism to defend and protect it. My own confidence in Liberalism to provide freedom for all was shaken by Cohen’s essay *Freedom and Money*. Rather than run from it, I want to take it head on, accept some of the arguments Cohen makes, and work a way for Liberalism to bring about freedom for the many.

Cohen argues that money is an *in us* condition of freedom. What this creates is a relationship where an individual's freedom is directly tied to their ability to access capital. Money acts as an entry ticket to freedom. That becomes even more problematic when this is the case for the most fundamental freedoms necessary to participate in society. The poorest in society are rendered totally unfree.

The philosophy of Liberalism, in its many forms, has wrestled with these kinds of issues before, engaging with and producing some of key texts on issues of social justice. I recognise that Rawlsian Liberalism, and the two major institutional frameworks to shoot off his work *Property Owning Democracy* and *Democratic Socialism*, have their own merits and deserve to be examined against Cohen’s critique in the depth I have done so for Neoclassical Liberalism.

I take serious issue with the model advocated by strict classical liberals, who dismiss issues of social justice as not being tied to freedom. If Cohen proves nothing else, striving for social justice is part of the strive for freedom.
I also identify my main issue with welfare-state capitalism to be one of dependency. Because of the model of welfare distribution in welfare state capitalist societies, those poorest in society find themselves disproportionately dependent on the state for their freedom. Setting aside questions of quality of freedom, if every individual found themselves equally highly dependent on the state for money (and therefore freedom), this wouldn't be such a problem. However, under a WSC model, this is not the case. What is more, this group of the poorest in society find themselves vulnerable to being actively trapped in poverty by the government they are disproportionately dependent on for their freedoms.

This picture leaves a problem for Liberals. In order to satisfy the component of Cohen’s argument I have singled out, they must strive to prevent the following two conditions from occurring:

- when a person lack enough money to participate in society through no fault of their own,
- when a person lacks the ability to escape the coercive trappings of lacking money and are therefore consigned to being perpetually unfree in society.

Plus they must provide for a third condition principle, in order to safeguard against the issue of dependency I identified in my section on Welfare State Capitalism:

- To provide a set of basic rights designed to ensure every individual basic autonomy

With this in mind, I return to Neoclassical Liberalism, principally, Milton Friedman and John Tomasi. It is my opinion that Milton Friedman is an under researched writer in the field of philosophy. Considering his seismic contribution to global economics, he does not receive the same level of academic attention that Hayek has been the subject of. That is understandable when you consider how thin and sometimes juxtaposing his writing was. However, I hope my sketch of his theory of freedom, bolstered by contemporary works of Tomasi and Joshua Priess, has provided here a concrete sketch of a Friedmanite conception of freedom. That is, freedom as real choice.

What sets this theory of freedom aside from the likes of Hayek is that choice relies on more than just a right. Choice relies on the government taking an active role in preserving and protecting choice. It is this fundamental difference that separates Friedman from the Classical Liberals.
Friedman’s implied concern for what is fundamentally a question of social justice makes his theory of freedom ideal for a basis of the Neoclassical camp of Liberalism, individuals concerned with social justice and believe economic rights play a central role in resolving issues of social injustice.

Returning to the wider question of resolving the problem I set, created by the Cohen relationship between freedom and money, I have laid out a sign posted guide as to how the Neoclassical Liberal would respond to this dilemma. Alongside their commitment to self-authorship for all, is a commitment to strict constitutionalism, a framework which would hold the government to account and minimise the issues of dependency I identified earlier.

Neoclassical Liberalism, if implemented, would not abolish poverty necessarily. It would however, remove the trappings of poverty, with institutions striving to ensure no one is left unfree to be their own self-author. The base level of freedom for all would be met, so every individual would be free to participate in society.

Questions of social justice will persist to be asked. Emerging as well are questions of environmental justice. Liberalism needs to be ready to meet these philosophical challenges head on. As some pursue Property Owning Democracy as the heir to the High Liberal camp, and others work on amalgamating socialism with liberalism in the form of Democratic Socialism, a third way exists. It is my hope with this work and signposting to the work of others, that Liberals and others alike will take a renewed interest in the scholarship of Milton Friedman, and contemporary Neoclassical Liberals, who are working hard to achieve that ultimate Liberal goal as set out by Humboldt hundreds of years ago, the freedom to realise the highest ends of their own existence.
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