

**ORGANISED LABOUR AND THE STATE
IN ZAMBIA**

by

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the evolution, impact and dynamics of the relationship between the state and organised labour in Zambia. It is concerned with demonstrating the specific and somewhat unique pattern of industrial relations that has developed in this case. Though Zambia is a Third World country, it has a large working class concentrated in the urban areas. Over the period of its formation and entrenchment, this class developed a tradition of militancy that was deployed in support of the nationalist struggle and which the government has since sought to harness to the struggle for development. This process of engaging the support of workers and their organisations has sometimes been interpreted in terms of control. We demonstrate here that government overtures towards organised labour were intended to achieve more than mere control. Rather, since 1965, the Zambian government has endeavoured to cultivate workers' support for government policy as a means of enhancing the legitimacy of the regime and the hegemony of the bourgeoisie whose interests it ultimately represents. To this end the government has utilised such mechanisms as legislation, the promotion of cadres with the "right" ideological orientation into influential positions in the trade union movement, wage increases and ideological engineering.

However, different perceptions and expectations of what independence promised to deliver, as well as divergent interpretations of the role of trade unions in the post colonial situation have led to conflict between the ruling party and its government on the one hand and the leadership of the trade union movement on the other. This has resulted in struggles over the control of the trade union congress which were manifest in part in internal division within the labour movement itself. During the first ten years of independence the edge within this struggle was gained by politically oriented leaders who regarded trade union interests as subordinate to the Party and government's need to accumulate. Since the early 1970s, however, economically oriented trade unionists have ascended to the leadership of the labour movement. These leaders have placed emphasis on the economic interests of workers and the need of the trade union movement to maintain its organisational autonomy, perceiving this to be a necessary part of the country's development. The ascendancy of this leadership has heightened tension between labour and the state, inducing further incorporative efforts. The state's activities in this regard have been reinforced by continuing industrial action, often initiated by the rank and file, which itself serves as a measure of the inadequacy of any previous strategy aimed at worker quiescence.

Government response to strikes has been analyzed in order to illustrate further the official perception of trade union rights and of the role of unions in the country's economic development. Though strikes are regarded by the government as disruptive, the same cautious approach has been used in handling them as characterised attempts to gain worker support through ideological engineering. The general pattern seems to be the deployment of police to restore immediate order, then the punishment of strike leaders in the form of dismissals and finally the establishment of "boards" or "commissions" of inquiry to ascertain the circumstances leading to industrial action and to give workers the chance to purge themselves of their work frustrations.

In the early years following independence, wage-related strikes were often followed by wage increases. However as the country's resources have diminished and the economic crisis has intensified, there has been a growing tendency to use force to suppress industrial action and maintain peace and stability. The undesirability of the use of force against citizens has led in the 1980s to a renewed search for legislative measures to restructure the role, power and function of trade unions in Zambian society. The process of bringing about this legislative reform however, has been delayed six years by the desire to effect a consensual style of political decision making.

An assessment of trade union policy and practice in Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana and Zimbabwe has indicated that the level of economic development, the amount of resources available to government at any particular time, coupled with the state's need to accumulate exert a strong influence on the way the state relates to organised labour. Relative economic prosperity tends to make government's more tolerant of the economic activities of trade unions. In contrast economic crisis makes governments more hostile. However, it is, during periods of economic recession when workers' interests are most at risk, as money wages lose their purchasing power and job security becomes tenuous that strike activity characteristically wells up. But in the circumstances as described, though ostensibly disruptive, industrial action has a potentially significant role to play. In a society aspiring towards democracy, strike action can be regarded at the least as an important barometer of the welfare of workers and by extension of the citizenry as a whole.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AALC	African American Labour Centre
ACR	Africa Contemporary Record
ANC	African National Congress
ASCOM	Associated Chambers of Commerce
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BFL	Botswana Federation of Labour
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi
COTU	Central Organization of Trade Unions
CSUZ	Civil Servants Union of Zambia
DANIDA	Danish Voluntary Organisation
EUI	Economist Intelligence Unit
ICA	Industrial Conciliation Act (1959), Zimbabwe
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (South Africa)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	Industrial Relations Act (1971) Zambia
INDECO	Industrial Development Cooperation
JUWATA	Organisation of Tanzanian Workers
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KAWC	Kenya African Workers' Congress
KFE	Kenya Federation of Employers
KFL	Kenya Federation of Labour
LGAZ	Local Government Association of Zambia
LNWA	Livingstone Native Welfare Association
LRA	Labour Relations Act (1984) (Zimbabwe)
MINDECO	Mining and Development Cooperation
MUZ	Mine Workers Union of Zambia
MWU	Mine Workers Union
NCCM	Nchanga Consolidated Coppermines
NEMIC	National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Council
NLR	New Left Review
NLRB	National Labour Relations Board
NNWA	Ndola Native Welfare Association
NR	Northern Rhodesia
NRAMU	Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers Union
NRMWU	Northern Rhodesia Mineworkers Union
NUBEGW	National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers
NUCIW	National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers
NUTA	National Union of Tanzanian Workers

PCC	President's Citizenship College
PDL	Poverty Datum Line
PIC	Prices and Incomes Commission
PLT	Permanent Labour Tribunal
PWC	Permanent Wages Commission
RCM	Roan Consolidated Mines
RNLB	Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau
RTUC	Reformed Trade Union Congress
SAMWU	South African Mineworkers Union
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SG	Secretary General
STZ	Sunday Times of Zambia
TANU	Tanzania African National Union
TAZARA	Tanzania Zambia Railways
TFL	Tanzania Federation of Labour
TUC	Trade Union Congress
TZ	Times of Zambia
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UPP	United Progressive Party
UTUC	United Trade Union Congress
UTUZ	United Trade Unions of Zambia
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WPC	Wages and Policy Committee
WV	Workers' Voice
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Congress
ZANU (PF)	Zimbabwe African National Congress (Patriotic Front)
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZCCM	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZDM	Zambia Daily Mail
ZECCO	Zambia Engineering and Construction Company
ZFE	Zambia Federation of Employers
ZIMCO	Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation
ZNUT	Zambia National Union of Teachers
ZNPF	Zambia National Provident Fund
ZRWU	Zambia Railway Workers Union
ZTUC	Zambia Trade Union Congress
ZUFIAW	Zambia Union of Financial Institution and Allied Workers
ZULAW	Zambia United Local Authority Workers Union
ZWCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about the relationship between the state and organised labour in Zambia. Our main interest is to investigate how the state relates to workers and how it deals with working class organisations. It is recognised that during the anti-colonial struggle there were moments of collaboration against colonial rule and its economic implications between the Nationalist Party, which now constitutes the ruling Party and has formed the government and the trade union movement. How this relationship has evolved and its implications for the broader understanding of the relationship between the post-colonial state and subordinate classes in peripheral capitalist societies, is a matter of particular concern.

The following issues will be addressed:-

1. How this relationship impinges on the opportunity and right of workers to organise, and utilise working class institutions in pursuit of their interests.
2. The manner and extent to which these organisations participate in societies' affairs.
3. The extent to which trade unions have been "liberated or repressed" in the post-colonial period.
4. The extent to which trade unions have been incorporated or allowed an autonomous existence in the period since independence.
5. The outcome of the above processes in terms of class domination and state power.

At the theoretical level, the study is undertaken within the context of the debate about the nature of class and class rule in post-colonial societies [Saul, 1974; Shivji, 1975, 1986; Othman, 1980]. My aim is to demonstrate how in the process of class formation the relationship between the dominant class and the subordinate but organised classes has been politically articulated in the Zambian context. The dominant and the subordinate classes confront each other through the medium of the state. Specifically this study focuses on the relationship between the state and organised labour. The conception of the state employed in this thesis is informed by the debate on the nature and role of the post-colonial state [Alavi; Saul; Leys; Shivji; Thomas etc.]. This debate has moved from a characterisation of the post-colonial state as "overdeveloped" [Alavi, 1972], to its depiction as an authoritarian arbiter among conflicting class interests, which simultaneously intervenes in the economy to promote accumulation and ensure the reproduction of the social formation [Thomas, 1984]. An important feature of this debate has been to identify the class position of the post-colonial state by addressing the question: what class controls the post-colonial state? A second dimension has been informed by the need to delineate the process of class forma-

tion in the post-colonial society and to comment on how far the state serves as an instrument of class formation. To put it differently, the possibility of identifying a ruling class in African societies and pinpointing the location of this class is addressed.

A general discussion of the post-colonial state and the specific form it has taken in Zambia is undertaken. Our study seeks to contribute to this debate by examining the specific relationship between the state and organised labour. This study is overdue. Baylies and Szeftel have discussed the growth of a capitalist class and the role of the state in this process [Baylies and Szeftel, 1978, 1981, 1984]. Gertzel has undertaken a limited study of the trade union movement and the state only up to 1975 and on the mine workers' strike of 1981, but much has taken place since then and her study is limited by placing undue emphasis on legislation as a means of "control". On the other hand we have studies such as that of Bates' on the relationship between the UNIP and the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia. While all these are of value, it is time to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the post-colonial state and the trade union movement as a whole. Given the militancy of the Zambian trade union movement, it is time to fill this vacuum. This study will not only contribute to the debate about the post-colonial Zambian state, but also to an understanding of the nature and role of trade unionism in peripheral capitalist societies in the 1980s.

The study proceeds from the assumption that labour is subordinate to capital and that the state is a state of capital. We trace the formation of the working class in Zambia and note the circumstances within which working class consciousness develops and matures into working class organisations. To a certain extent the thesis elucidates the circumstances under which the militancy of the Zambian trade union movement has developed, suggesting the centrality of the copper industry in this process and also the partial industrialisation of the country, the limited employment opportunities and the unattractiveness of the peasant sector for most workers. It is suggested that the militancy of the Zambian trade union movement is borne of the desperate need of workers to maintain their livelihood in a very insecure labour market, encouraged by what is perceived to be a benevolent political leadership.

The central argument advanced in this thesis is that the post-colonial Zambian state seeks to develop a functional relationship with the trade union movement, not only as a means of bringing organised labour under its control but also of cultivating its support for party and government policies. One means used for generating this support is the political incorporation of the representative institutions of the working class and their leadership. The political incorporation of the trade union movement is undertaken by the state to enhance its legitimacy. Legitimation is desired by the governing class to ensure smooth reproduction of the social formation and through this process, advance its hegemonic programme. The moralistic ideological inclinations of the governing class in Zambia makes it recoil from

deliberate use of naked force against workers. As an alternative the employment of a hegemonic exercise is preferred. The governing class, therefore employs the apparatus of the state to effect a political incorporation of labour. It has done this through a "carrot and stick" approach, by a combination of exhortation, persuasion, legislation, concessions, the "engineering of consent", and limited reforms purporting to facilitate workers' participation. Given the nature of the organisation of industry in a peripheral capitalist society, and the inherent conflict between capital and labour, the success of this hegemonic programme has been problematic. Exhortations and positive ideological messages have run aground on the realities of capitalist management of enterprises, while the state's ability to effect wage increases has been severely constrained by the declining resources especially in the wake of the collapse of the copper prices. In the event emphasis has been put on the engineering of consent with the establishment of a political college which serves as a forum to explain some of these economic realities to Party cadres and trade union functionaries.

Education is, however, a long term investment, the positive results of which have yet to be realised in society at large. Meanwhile industrial action occurs, which at times threatens the peaceful functioning of industries and society in general. When this happens the state has responded in a variety of ways including the use of armed force against striking workers. Government's response to strikes is examined to elucidate its conception of trade union rights. Governmental views of the role of trade unions in Zambian society is contrasted in Chapter Six with those of trade unionists' regarding of the role of their organisations. It is suggested that the different interpretations of the role of trade unions is the cause of much of the conflict between trade unions and the government, especially since 1970.

The thesis also seeks to situate the experience of trade unionism in Zambia within a comparative scheme, whereby the Zambian experience is contrasted with that of Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana and Zimbabwe. This exercise is undertaken with regard to a number of variables: the right to organise and maintain trade union autonomy, the right to collective bargaining; the right to strike and the right to participate in politics. The intention is to assess how far labour is "liberated or repressed" in each of the five countries.

In this introduction we briefly review the literature on the state in general; the post-colonial state; and the relationship between governments and trade unions and then outline the organisation of the thesis.

0.1 THE STATE AS AN EXPRESSION OF POWER IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY

The state is understood to be an expression of power in capitalist society. Its form is determined by the level of development of productive forces and the political arrangements to which it gives expression. Marx discusses the state in early capitalism as "...a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie". In this regard it is an instrument for securing the property interests of the bour-

geois. It is able to do so because the subordinate classes had little substantive role to play in political affairs. For Marx and Engels, the state they argue, “with a few exceptions, the state in history has always been the state of propertied classes for holding down the non-propertied classes”. Although in *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Engels suggests that “the state is an organ above society, for purposes of managing the contradictions of a class society which can neither be wished away or ignored” [Engels, 1972: 102], the management of these various contradictions is ultimately in the interests of the propertied classes.

With changed configurations in the distribution of power in society, the state can take on a different character. Thus in the *18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, the state though still a class state, took on a measure of independent power, and appeared to be independent of both class and civil society. The increased size of the bureaucracy and the scope of its operations enabled the state to act in its own interest and at times to limit the power of capital. The state was able to act on its own volition without being held in check by the interests or wishes of any one particular class. Yet, it did this while simultaneously maintaining a capitalist society, thereby remaining implicitly the guardian of the dominant class.

For Lenin, the state is an instrument of class rule, and of the suppression of one class by another. The capitalist state is an instrument of the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, i.e. the unjust suppression of the majority by the minority. After the proletarian revolution, the state still retains the features of class rule, but becomes the organ of the majority over the minority. Its position, however is temporary, since with the achievement of full democracy under communism, it becomes superfluous and ultimately “withers” away [Lenin, 1929]. For Lenin, therefore, the state may take on bourgeois or proletarian character, depending on which class has control of the state apparatus. This is an important point because some African leaders interpret the anti-colonial struggle as the process through which peoples power (masses) was established and interpret their government’s as “people’s government” thereby justifying authoritarian activities in the name of the people when clearly the anti-colonial struggle was a different process from a proletarian revolution as envisaged by Lenin. The actions of such African leaders are mere revolutionary apologetics.

In the late 20th Century, Miliband characterises the state as retaining political power and ensuring the stable functioning of the system without necessarily being under the direct and immediate control of the capitalist class [Miliband, 1977]. For Miliband, the state remains an instrument of class rule by professional politicians who seemingly have no direct organic links with the ruling class. He holds that the state in modern capitalist societies “is primarily and inevitably the guardian and protector of the economic interests which are dominant in them” [Miliband, 1983: 32]. For him it is the state of the dominant class i.e. the capitalists whose political ideas are the same as those who hold political power. This line of

analysis has led critics to label Miliband's theory instrumentalist. Miliband, however, considers this categorization of his theory simplistic [Miliband, 1983]. He points out that those that man the state apparatus also have other motives other than safeguarding the interests of the dominant class. At a personal level two factors are of considerable importance. The first is that the men and women who operate the state apparatus have an interest in the sense that they derive their livelihood from their employment. The high salaries and status which accrue from the jobs are very desirable. Secondly, some, especially the politicians in the high echelons of government hierarchy, do love the exercise of power. At the institutional level, the state serves to preserve the national interest. He concludes therefore that instead of the state being considered an instrument of the dominant class, its relationship with that group may be represented as

a partnership between two different, separate forces, linked to each other by many threads, yet each having its own separate sphere of concerns. [Miliband, 1983a: 65]

In contrast to Miliband, Poulantzas conceives of the capitalist state as determined by class power. He argues that, "...political domination is itself inscribed in the institutional materiality of the state" [Poulantzas, 1983: 14]. The basis of state power being determined by the "relations of production and social division of labour". The state is therefore linked to the dominant or ruling class by its practises. This does not however mean that the state is a creation of the dominant class, *per se*. It is a state in a class society which is entrusted with the political maintenance of that society. In the interests of maintaining the *status quo*, the state acts to levy corporate and other taxes on the propertied classes, but it also delivers social welfare benefits to the subordinate classes. Simultaneously other regulatory mechanisms are brought to bear on the working class to ensure the accumulation and reproduction of capital. The state according to Poulantzas possesses a "relative autonomy" which allows it to operate above immediate specific class interests to ensure the reproduction of the capitalist system of social organisation of society. However, by ensuring the prosperity of the capitalist system, the state ultimately and disproportionately benefits the ruling class. Because of its connection to and articulation with the relations of production, the state finds expression in different forms corresponding to the prevailing mode of production. This opens the way for us to expect that the role of the state in the post-colonial peripheral countries will be different from the role of the state in industrialised capitalist social formations.

A recent contribution to the debate on the role of the state in capitalist society, particularly relevant to the study of the Zambian state, is Claus Offe's *Contradictions of the Welfare State*. In an attempt to offer an alternative interpretation of the role of the state in capitalist society, to that given by both Miliband and Poulantzas, Offe advances the view that the contemporary state is not just a "state in capitalist society" as Milliband explains, nor is it plainly "a state of capital" as Poulantzas postulates. For him the

most outstanding feature of the contemporary capitalist state is the manner in which it is caught up in the "contradictions of capitalism". These contradictions can be seen in the functions the state is mandated to discharge. In the first instance, "the state must sustain the process of accumulation and the private appropriation of resources". Secondly and simultaneously,

it must preserve belief in itself as impartial arbiter of class interests, thereby legitimating its power. [Held, 1983: 487].

Offe argues that as the state does not directly control the production processes and the accumulation of capital, it has to maintain a favourable institutional and regulatory framework to ensure a continuous flow of resources to itself through corporate and capital gains taxes. Thus the state has an interest in the accumulation process for "its own sake". On the other hand, since ascent to power in contemporary capitalist state is through the democratic process, and modern institutions of the state are supposed to be representative, the interests of the subordinate classes cannot be completely ignored. As a "significant part of the electorate", they need to be convinced that the state is a fair allocator of resources. In response to both sets of pressure, the state has to "manage the economic crisis". This seeming intervention in the economy is viewed suspiciously by the bourgeois, which objects to "excessive regulation" of the economy by the state. In order to safeguard its own existence the state moves to satisfy the representative groups of these contradictory pressures. It acts to win the support and approval of both "oligopoly capital and organised labour", by:-

1. Helping to defray the costs of production for capital and,
2. Providing a range of benefits for organised labour.

Through an informal and "extra-parliamentary negotiation process", the representatives of these crucial groups resolve differences that might otherwise have threatened the status quo [Held *et. al.* (eds.), 1983: 489]. For Offe therefore, "the state does not defend the interests of one class, but the common interests of all members of a capitalist society", including itself [ibid., p.490].

Offe's interpretation of the role of the state seems to have befitting relevance to the role the Zambian state has played in the post-colonial period. In the Zambian case, however, the state has been propelled into the centre stage to juggle the contradictory pressures of capital and organised labour not out of a structural imperative per se, but also by the ideological and political inclination of the governing class. In addition the Zambian situation is compounded by its location on the periphery of capitalism and the economic conditions that that entails. A complimentary difference is that the Zambian state is a post-colonial state. We shall now briefly review the literature on the post-colonial state.

0.2 SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE

Aspects of the post-colonial state have been the subject of academic analysis since the 1950s, but the post-colonial state itself became a popular subject for analysis with the publication of Hamaza Alavi's seminal article on the state in Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1972 [Alavi, 1972]. Alavi's article stimulated debate by asserting that the post-colonial state was different from the orthodox capitalist state. He noted the differences at a number of levels:-

1. That the class structure of the post-colonial state was different. Of special significance was the absence of a single or unified ruling class with a hegemonic hold on society.
2. That the state of the post-colony was not an instrument of a bourgeoisie in the classical Marxist sense.
3. That the post-colonial state enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy from direct class control.
4. That the post-colonial state utilised this relative autonomy to participate directly in the economy in pursuit of economic development by investing public money into commercial enterprises.

The differences persuaded Alavi to conclude that the post-colonial state was "overdeveloped". This over-development is a result of the historical specificity of the state in the peripheral countries. The state had been established in the periphery as an instrument of coercion by the metropolitan bourgeoisie to subdue and control the indigenous classes of the erstwhile colonies. At independence the class base of this state was removed, leaving the huge military and bureaucratic establishment with enormous powers of action and little indigenous class control over it. As such the state became directly involved in the process of capital accumulation while mediating among the different factions of the bourgeoisie [Alavi, 1979: 44-45].

As Alavi's analysis was based on Bangladesh and Pakistan, Africanists have attempted a critical evaluation to the applicability of the theory to the nature and role of the post-colonial state in specific African countries [Saul, 1974; Shivji, 1975; Leys, 1976; Ziemann and Lanzendorfer, 1977; Baylies, 1978 and Clive Thomas, 1984]. The notion of the "over-developed" post-colonial state has been criticised by Colin Leys, Ziemann and Lanzendorfer and Clive Thomas amongst others, with Thomas arguing that the relative autonomy of the state from its social base is common to all state forms [Thomas, 1984: 79]. Alavi's other propositions have also been criticised for having limited applicability to Africa. It has been argued for example that indigenous classes were not formed to an extent that would justify the establishment of a coercive state apparatus for their subjugation [Kennedy, 1988: 86 and Leys, 1980: 145]. If anything it is the establishment of the colonial state and the operation of foreign capital in the colonies that accelerated the process of class formation.¹

Instead of enjoying “a relative autonomy” Shivji has argued, in the case of Tanzania that, the post-colonial state under the control of an indigenous governing class is being used as an avenue of accumulation. Through the state apparatus, the governing class (which he calls the bureaucratic bourgeoisie) is creating an economic base for itself, thereby consolidating its political power, while at the same time dismantling the power and organisational autonomy of the commercial class on the one hand and of voluntary mass organisations such as trade unions on the other [Shivji, 1975, 1986]. In a related argument Szeftel has demonstrated that in post-colonial Zambia the state itself became a much sought after “resource” as “people looked up to it for the fruits of independence” [Szeftel, 1980: 73]. His argument is that the organisation of society and the operation of colonial and settler capital precluded the emergence of an African bourgeoisie. With independence people jostled with each other for control of the state for private accumulation and self advancement. The state here is not only autonomous of indigenous classes, but it is under pursuit from the different ethnic factions who seek to capture it for their own advantage. Offering an alternative interpretation of the role of the state in Tanzania, John Saul argues that the TANU/CCM leadership under Nyerere had genuinely employed the state apparatus to implement policies aimed at promoting a non-capitalist path to development in the interests of creating an egalitarian society based on self reliance [J. Saul in David Held et.al. (eds.), 1983: 470]. For Saul the centrality of the state in this process has been facilitated by the “relative weakness” of the indigenous owning class. In other circumstances such as Kenya, the nascent indigenous bourgeoisie has taken advantage of the loan, licensing and special training programmes provided by the government to acquire skills and capital to ensconce for itself, an important and expanding position in the production and distribution process [Saul, *ibid.*: 460].

On the nature of the indigenous class structure in the African post-colony Shivji has emphasised the role of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie as the most active class operating in alliance with the metropolitan bourgeoisie who still remain decisive in the economic life of the post-colony. In reaction, and while recognising that the bureaucracy in the African post-colony plays an important role in the organisation of production, Samoff objects to its categorisation as a bourgeoisie. However he argues that the significant role that the bureaucracy has come to play in the economy especially through the parastatal sector, qualifies it to be called a class in opposition to labour. The bureaucratic class, he points out,

exercises the powers of ownership and assumes the responsibility for maintaining the political conditions necessary for the reproduction of capitalist relations, the corporate group becomes a class wielding power. [Samoff, 1982: 125].

It would appear that Samoff echoes Poulantzas who argues that the bureaucracy is not a class by being a bureaucracy but by being an effective economic actor [Poulantzas, 1983(b): 459].

An alternative explanation has been provided by Baylies in her article on "The State in Post-Colonial Africa" [1985]. Reviewing the debates on class and the state, she notes that the various interpretations can be divided into two general categories. One which espouses an instrumentalist relation between the state and capital and a second which emphasises the fluidity of the class relations of African societies, thus rendering the class nature of the state indeterminate and without a specifiable ruling class. In between these positions there are analyses that identify "bureaucratic or state bourgeoisies" which play a dominant role (politically and economically) in the post-colonial state. The most crucial question concerning this inchoate class has been whose interests it represents? One position has been that they represent their own personal interests as well as those of their extended families and clients [Miliband, 1977]. Another is that although self-interest is present, it is counterbalanced by the need to reproduce the social formation [Ziemann and Lanzendorfer, 1977]. Given its important role in the economy, does this qualify the bureaucracy to be regarded as a class? Some see it as a class, sitting astride between transnational capital and internal social groups. Samoff, as we have seen above, subscribes to this view. Baylies on the other hand argues that, although the bureaucracy can, and in the case of Zambia, has occupied an important position in the regulation of production and production relations, it has not transformed itself into a class. It may have facilitated the growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie, and it may even have been an important field of recruitment for the bourgeoisie but the bureaucracy itself has not become a class [Baylies, 1985: 25-27].

The last contribution to the debate about the post-colonial state we shall consider is Leys's critique of Saul's article on the "Post-colonial State in Tanzania". He begins his critique by disputing the validity of the concept of the "over-developed state". He argues that this characterisation is wrong, that the state in the post-colony is small in relation to the population and size of the economy. He says that compared to the state in developed countries such as the U.S.A., the state in African countries expropriates a relatively small share of national wealth, and that the amount of surplus value produced is also small [Leys, 1980: 145-146]. This does not, however, mean that the state's role in the economy of the post-colonial state is unimportant. It plays a very crucial role, in some instances becoming directly involved in the class struggle, through attempting to appropriate a larger share of the surplus value. But Leys argues that the centrality of the state in the economy is common to all capitalist societies. It is the forms that this centrality takes that varies. In the industrialised countries where the infrastructure exists for the market to manage the process of capital accumulation, the state characteristically works behind the scenes to ensure the socio-political framework which guarantee accumulation of capital and the reproduction of the social formation [ibid., p.147].

On the question of who controls the post-colonial state, Leys argues that the best approach is to begin from the class struggle and not from the state. For Leys, the first task in analysing the class character of

the post-colonial state is to determine the dominant class in the social formation as expressed in the production process. This is important because the state operates to enforce this class domination. The class character of the state is a reflection of the character of the dominant class. Leys concedes that the state may enjoy a relative autonomy in certain circumstances, but ultimately the class character of the state remains that of the dominant class. He notes that in post-colonial societies such as Tanzania, the foreign bourgeoisie is still the dominant class. While an indigenous petty bourgeois has consolidated itself in the "bureaucratic function", this does not mean there have been fundamental changes in the relations between the different factions of the ruling class. Unconvinced by the "ruling bureaucratic bourgeoisie thesis", he suggests that further analysis of the class structure after nationalisation is needed to clarify the nature of the class struggle in the post-colonial society. Only then can the fundamental impact of the changes that have been made in the superstructure be understood.

0.3 STATE REGULATION OF THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTION

An example of a careful analysis of the class structure that Leys commends is that undertaken by Michael Burawoy on "The Labour Process and the State in Zambia" [Burawoy, 1982]. Although Burawoy undertakes the study as a way of filling the vacuum in underdevelopment theory, which he argues has neglected the labour process, his study also dovetails Leys' article on the post-colonial state. Burawoy's study confronts the question of how the change in the class structure after the nationalisations and Africanisation "accounts for changing relationships between production politics and state politics" [Burawoy, 1984: 209]. He focuses not on the nature of the state as such, e.g. whether it is overdeveloped or not, nor on how much autonomy it enjoys. Rather he concentrates on the integration between "production politics" and "state politics", i.e. between the organisation and management of work and the distribution of power in society. He examines case studies of changes in the relations in production, paying particular attention to patterns of intervention by the state. He observes that the state intervened in production politics, to redefine the parameters of industrial action thereby "narrowing the scope of industrial struggle". Constrained by the need to accumulate for which it required the good will and cooperation of metropolitan capital, the Zambian state intervened in industrial disputes to further the interests of capital, thereby becoming "a more direct instrument of the exploitation of wage labour by mining capital". Burawoy, argues that the post-colonial state indulges in this to a larger extent than did even the colonial state [ibid.: 241]. Burawoy's findings echo those of Kapferer, who drawing his evidence from a study of a clothing factory in Kabwe noted that "workers were certain to lose a dispute as soon as government got involved" [Kapferer, 1972]. According to Burawoy, this is because the post-colonial state facilitated the further incorporation of the Zambian economy into the world capitalist economy with itself as junior partner. This process was facilitated and cemented by the partial takeover of the

major industries. In order to attract foreign investment, it was anxious to make the country attractive to foreign capital. A part of this package includes stable industrial relations in addition to the expenditure on the infrastructure, energy and human resources development.

Reflecting on Leys' challenge about the nature of the class struggle after nationalisations, Burawoy's evidence would seem to suggest that the post-colonial state is even more interventionist than the colonial state. The pity is that it intervenes on the side of capital, "to narrow the scope of the industrial struggle". The question which remains is how the state actually goes about this? Is state action limited to random intervention in disputes when these occur or is there a systematic pattern to the state's actions? The task of this thesis is to demonstrate that there is a discernible pattern to the state's intervention in production politics. This pattern cannot, however, be observed by just examining isolated moments of industrial strife, important as these are in providing first hand evidence. Rather the pattern can be most clearly seen when we raise the canvas to the level of the interaction between the representative institutions of workers and the state, i.e. relations between organised labour and the state. This is important because, although the shop-floor may be important as the locus of the class struggle, it is also a position in which the worker is most vulnerable. He is alone, exposed and unprotected by the strength of numbers found in workers' organizations. What I am suggesting is that, just as the strength of workers is best consolidated in their unions, so their position in the class struggle is best reflected at a composite level in the relations between the trade unions and the state. It is in that relationship that the position of the state in the struggle between capital and labour becomes most clear. Also of importance is the manner in which the state takes that position and the role it accords to organised labour. This brings us to the relationship between governments and unions.

0.4 GOVERNMENTS AND UNIONS IN AFRICA

Trade unions in Africa have been studied from varying perspectives depending on the framework adopted and the period of trade union development being analyzed. In the 1950s and 1960s studies tended to concentrate on tracing the growth and development of trade unions in particular countries, their political orientation, whether they were political rather than economic institutions, whether they were well organised and assessed the state of their finances [Bowen, 1954; Williams, 1955; Epstein, 1958; Berg and Butler, 1964; Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1967; Singh, 1969]. Some studies were concerned to explain the peculiarity of African trade unionism when the work force "was illiterate, unskilled, lacked industrial discipline and was only partially committed to employment as a source of income" [Ojow, 1970: 23]. Others attempted varying combinations of these questions. Studies of African trade unions in the post-colonial period have concentrated on the role of trade unions in an economy increasingly orchestrated by an African government and geared towards development. Focus has centred on the

amount of control the African governments have exerted on the unions or conversely how much freedom the trade unions enjoy. Attempts have also been made to analyze the efforts made by unions to resist state control and reassert their autonomy as economic institutions [Damachi, 1979; Gertzel, 1975; Ojow, 1970; Sandbrook, 1975; Shivji, 1986 and Crisp, 1984]. A few have penetrated beneath the generalisations to explore in detail the particular relationships between government and unions. Bates' study of the relationship between the UNIP government in Zambia and the mine workers union portrays a power struggle between the development (productionist) party and the union which in Bates' interpretation clings to "old fashioned" concepts of trade union rights and workers' interests. What emerges is a general feeling that trade unions are generally repressed in post-colonial African countries.

In this picture of general repression of trade unions by governments, Freund notes that it is usually the "progressive" regimes among which he includes Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as recent examples, that restrict the freedom of trade unions and curtail their range of activities, while the "conservative" states seem to allow trade unions more elbow-room to operate as economic institutions [Freund, 1988: 103]. The only price to be paid is that governments in these so called "conservative" countries insist that unions remain completely depoliticised. Examples are Botswana and Kenya as we show in Chapter Seven, government policy stipulates in both that trade unions remain out of party politics and parties remain out of trade unions. Sandbrook has argued that, despite this, union leaders in the case of Kenya, have remained alive to the interests of their members and accountable to them, since otherwise they would be unable to secure their positions of leadership [Sandbrook, 1975].

Freund makes another point of interest, arguing that, even where they have resisted centralisation and control by the government, such in Nigeria, unions have so far failed to develop "into a generalised alternative centre of political activity". In some cases they may even have provided a stabilising factor, in the form of a safety valve for the tugs and tensions that have emerged since independence. This brings us to the question raised by Sturmtal,

what are the conditions which caused some labour movements in some periods to emphasize political rather than economic objectives and means of action?
[Sturmtal, 1973]

Extending the question to post-colonial Africa, we ask what circumstances have lead unions in Africa to emphasize economic as opposed to political issues, and consider whether the two can really be separated. One instructive point Sturmtal makes with reference to the development of trade unions in Britain is that they tended to grow and "prosper" during periods of expanded economic activity. During economic depressions, unions declined and workers turned their attention to political activities and political aims. It would be interesting to access the situation in Zambia and Nigeria after 1980. Would the

argument that African unions characteristically emphasize economic issues as opposed to political concerns still stand?

Sturmthal points out that ordinarily collective bargaining in respect of economic issues, tends to be most effective when workers are in short supply relative to existing demand. Yet he notes that collective agreements had been signed in Mexico and some African countries where labour was in abundance. He had been intrigued to find out how this had come about [Sturmthal, 1973: 22]. This still remains a pertinent question given that most unions in Africa and in Zambia in particular operate under conditions of incomplete industrialisation, where migrant labour continues to be common. One possible explanation suggested by Sturmthal is that the anti-colonial struggle served a similar purpose to that of the bourgeois democratic movements in the West [ibid.: 24]. Political independence for workers came to mean a consolidation of their rights in collective bargaining. On the other hand the explanation may lie in the argument that capitalism has always thrived by being bolstered by "unfree forms of labour" [Robert Miles, 1984; Cohen, 1988]. In the case of Africa the existence of migrant labour and the continued persistence of an underdeveloped subsistence agricultural sector are a part of the adaptation of the capitalist system of production on the African continent. Mention of collective bargaining brings us to the contribution of Sidney and Beatrice Webb to industrial democratic theory. For the Webbs, trade unions have a perennial role in a democratic society [Webb and Webb, 1902: 823]. Trade unions are the means through which workers, especially manual workers can defend themselves against the might of capital which itself operates in combination in huge corporations. Through unions, workers can influence public opinion, enforce their economic demands and as a last resort collectively withdraw their labour power in times of disputes [ibid., p.824]. The Webbs did not envisage trade unions to be static organizations. They expected them to adapt to the political environment, such that under a socialist government, they would "assume the character of professional associations". Taking on an increased role in workers' education for example and the preparation of labour statistics. For the Webbs, therefore, trade unions are organizations that not only help the worker secure a "living wage", but also facilitate his participation in society at large. Trade unions can serve as an information base for "magistrates, housing minister, education authorities or administrators of the poor laws". All this however is an "auxiliary capacity", since it is not the function of the trade union to be an ultimate distributor of resources [ibid, p.831].

On this last point, the Webb's conclusion seems to find an echo in the work of Selig Perlman, the American industrial relations expert, who theorised that, whereas workers desired to control their employment opportunities, they did not want to control industry as a whole, let alone society [Perlman, 1928]. For Perlman, political ideas came from outside of the ranks of manual workers, from the intellectuals who sought to politicize the economic struggle of the workers in pursuit of a "new social order".

Would this also be true of trade unions in post-colonial societies? Do unions in fact always have clear cut economic interests which can be separated from political interests? In a study of the role of Ghanaian trade unions in the development process, Damachi proposes that government and labour both have a vital role to play. Each institution has its own objectives in the development process. While the trade unions are motivated by the desire to secure the job interests of their members and the survival of their organisations, among other things, the government is motivated by the following factors:-

1. To maintain its position of power and control;
2. To promote economic, social and political development in the country;
3. To assert its control over the workers and their unions;
4. To build national unity among all citizens to guarantee peace and progress. [Damachi, 1978]

According to Damachi, during the period 1957–1975, the various governments in Ghana interpreted these objectives differently in relation to labour organisations. Under Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party, the TUC came under the direct guidance of the party and became a Party Labour Wing. After the National Liberation Council came to power in 1966, the TUC was accorded a measure of organisational autonomy, leading to what Damachi calls a period of "accommodation between the trade unions and the government" [Damachi, 1979: 20]. This was to change when the Busia government came to power in 1971. An act of parliament was passed to dissolve the TUC and the Minister of Labour appointed a board of "receivers" to wind up its affairs. According to Damachi this was a period of "open conflict" between the union and the government. A year later when Acheampong took over, the 1971 Act was abolished by decree and once again the TUC was given the right to organise. The workers demonstrated their approval of this new labour policy by responding favourably to Acheampong's "Operation Feed Yourself" by increasing productivity and working overtime without pay. Damachi concludes that there was a pattern in the way the unions reacted to political control. When the TUC was suppressed, predictably, workers felt frustrated and lost their morale. On the other hand, when the TUC was allowed some organisational autonomy, workers responded with enthusiasm to governmental initiatives. Damachi then recommends both government and TUC be more accommodating of each other's needs and interests. The important theoretical point that can be drawn from Damachi's study is that, while the unions' major objective is economic interests, they did welcome a supportive political environment and a responsive regime, even in this case where unions appear to be essentially preoccupied with economic concerns they cannot be said to be neutral to the politics in society.

Jeff Crisp has demonstrated this point with reference to Ghanaian mineworkers. In the two years following the coup that ousted Nkrumah, when the real incomes of workers increased and outstanding dis-

putes were resolved, the industry enjoyed propitious industrial relations. But beginning in 1968 when the regime began to realign its alliances in favour of “the administrative and professional elites, traditional rulers and large businessmen”, and workers began to experience harsh conditions of work such as “rigid wage restraints, mass dismissals and drastic retrenchment” [Crisp, 1984: 153] they responded with acts of violence in protest. They directed their anger at the most immediate representatives of the bourgeoisie, the managers at their places of work, whose offices were attacked and offices ransacked. Though spontaneous these events nevertheless reflected the accumulated frustration of the workers and their anger at a political-social system that they felt had failed to deliver the improvements promised on taking power. As Crisp puts it:

The workers were revolting against the emerging power structure of post-coup Ghana, its unequal distribution of rewards and the elitist ideology of its ruling class. [Crisp, 1984: 154].

In these spontaneous struggles, as will be demonstrated in the case of Zambia, even union officials sometimes became targets of attack for different reasons in the two countries. And yet despite their militancy and demonstrated willingness to engage in collective action in defence of their rights and promote their interests, Crisp argues that the militancy of the mineworkers has never extended beyond the mining industry to form links with other workers; nor have mineworkers “consciously” engaged in activities designed to bring about “progressive change” at the national level [ibid., 183]. Neither have mineworkers at any stage in their resistance advocated an alternative political ideology. This would appear to support Perlman’s theory, that workers are generally interested in protecting the opportunities of their employment and not in controlling industry or society as a whole.

This however does not mean that they are indifferent or irrelevant to the political processes in their countries. Even in the case of Ghana where the mineworkers have portrayed a marked economism, Crisp argues that “the MWU and other trade unions have the potential to represent unified occupational and class interests, and the ability to aggregate the bargaining power of all groups of workers, irrespective of their individual strengths and weaknesses”. Trade unions, he points out, are one of the few remaining institutions which can check or even challenge the power of the “Authoritarian and Elitist regimes” in post-colonial Africa [Crisp, 1984: 187]. What this shows is that trade unions as a system of class representation adapt to the socio-political circumstances in which they find themselves. When their members feel that the basic principles of democratic principles are secured, they concentrate on economic issues, to procure their immediate interests. However, where the basic democratic principles are under threat, when the existence of the trade union movement is threatened, then the trade union movement turns its attention to political issues to safeguard a social-political framework in which its right to exist and operate are recognised. The story of the trade union movement in South Africa and Solidarity in Poland are illustrative in this regard.

An earlier study on African trade unions of relevance to this thesis is Ioan Davies' work [1966]. Davies examined the whole sphere of circumstances under which an African working class came into being, the development of trade unions and their involvement (or lack of it) in the anti-colonial struggle and finally the role trade unions have come to play in independent African countries. For purposes of brevity, we shall only consider the last of these. Davies acknowledges the fact that trade unions are controlled by governments in post-colonial Africa and points out that this is not unique to Africa, that it occurs in most parts of the world. He, however, considers the relationship between governments and unions to be the most crucial factor. He argues:

the place given to the unions in the state (or the place that they manage to carve out for themselves) becomes an important indication of social cohesion and of the extent to which something like a "civil society" is developing on a broad national front. [Davies, 1966, p.135].

He points out that the manner in which the African governments deal with unions will be varied but two "main tendencies" are discernible:

1. Where unions are independent of the ruling elite and pursue policies in opposition to those of the government.
2. Where there is an attempt to assimilate unions into a centralized political structure, with the unions functioning as the "industrial wing" of the ruling party.

Davies however advises caution by pointing out that in reality the "situation is a lot more fluid". As an illustration of these main tendencies, he gives the following examples:

1. The first tendency is more likely to be found in countries where trade unions operate as the opposition. They are excluded from power and function only as an avenue for articulating dissent. The countries tend to be ruled by (right wing) elites. He gives the examples of Morocco, Nigeria, the Sudan and Zaire.

2. The second tendency is made up of One-Party (socialist) states. Here the unions are expected to play an important economic role under the government's development plan. Unions are expected by governments to be responsive to its "directives and the nuances of party policy". government emphasis is on productivity in as far as the role of the union is concerned. The unions however respond differently.

Davies identifies three sub-tendencies under the One-Party (socialist) states:

a) Where production represents almost the only function of the unions; their existence is found useful by politicians only in so far as they can help to raise economic output in growth industries and maintain discipline and efficiency in the public services. He gives the example of Egypt, Tanzania, Senegal and the Ivory Coast.

b) Where, while the productionist function of unions is stressed by politicians and leading trade unionists, the unions are able to maintain some degree of autonomy through the business enterprises and welfare services which they are encouraged to provide for themselves. He gives the example of Tunisia and Kenya, where attempts had been made to make the unions sponsors of development programmes, thereby solving the problem of union militancy while at the same time allowing unions room for manoeuvre. He concludes: "state are given a prominent place in the national committees for economic planning and wage determination (as may happen in Kenya) they are likely to seem increasingly important to their own members and increasingly expendable to the government". [Davies, 1966: 152].

As it turns out, his enthusiasm about Kenya has not been borne out by later developments [Sandbrook, 1975].

c) The third sub tendency is where the strength of the unions comes from their ideological role in the party, from the fact that they represent a "left opposition", have a powerful semi-autonomous machinery of their own and can bargain with the government over strategy, particularly in industries of the private sector. In these countries the trade unions support the ruling party, but push for progressive changes much harder than the state bureaucracies can nor the politicians wish to implement. Davies gives the examples of Ghana, Algeria, Mali and Guinea. [Davies, 1966: 182-185].

Davies' study was indeed path breaking when it was published. His focus on and recognition of an African working class was insightful. However a number of shortcomings need now to be addressed and the whole analysis updated. For a start his division of African countries into bourgeois democracies (the states ruled by elites) and One-Party (socialist) states is most inadequate and can only be excused by the fact that in the early 1960s class analysis of African societies was still in its infancy and notions of a special brand of socialism, "African socialism", sounded fresh and reassuring both among academics and statesmen alike.³ Thus Tanzania and the Ivory Coast are put into the same category as states that favour a productionist role for trade unions, without providing the important details of the socio-economic differences that obtain in the political economies of these two countries. Neither does he take the level of economic development into account, evidenced by the inclusion of Tanzania and Egypt into one category. Thirdly, Davies' categorization appears arbitrary at times. He does not distinguish between a government's assessment of its trade unions and how that government desires them to behave. Take the Kenyan case for example. Davies categorises them as "Business partners in development". This is obviously what the Kenyan government wants the trade unions to develop into. Before this however a section of the Kenyan trade union movement had been a locus of leftist opposition to the government and had for sometime considered the idea of forming a Labour Party. Yet Davies ignores this aspect of trade unionism in Kenya and concentrates on the economic role imposed on them by the government.

Many of Davies' problems arise from the categories with which he analyses African trade unions. The number of parties, I have come to discover, is not a very good indicator of social relations of power and subordination of one group by another, even in Africa. After identifying an African working class, he fails to identify its opposite number and the socio-economic structures within which they interact, instead he falls back on the ubiquitous "elite".

Instead of Party, I suggest that the most illuminating concept in understanding the relationship between the state and trade unions is class. It is important to identify the dominant economic class and determine which class is in control of the state apparatus, i.e. identify the governing class and analyze the relationship between it and the trade unions. This is because the governing class in class societies almost always advances the interests of the dominant class. To a certain extent the structure of a capitalist society, i.e. the subordination of labour to capital explains why government control of unions is so pervasive in class societies, especially capitalist societies. But the process of that subordination is also important. That is why it is important to examine the exact permutations that obtain in the various capitalist social formations.

0.5 THE ZAMBIAN STATE

The Zambian state is a product of the anti-colonial struggle. As such, it inherited most of the bureaucratic structures that comprise the army, police and civil service. Since independence a commercial sector has been appended that manage the various state enterprises. The Zambian state can therefore be characterised as an interventionist state in a peripheral capitalist society. Its class base has evolved over the past twenty-five years, from being largely comprised of petty bourgeois elements, shop-keepers, teachers, clerks, medical orderlies, a few lawyers and even fewer artisans at independence [Tordoff, 1974; Sklar, 1979; Baylies, 1978], to something which more closely approximates an indigenous bourgeoisie. This has occurred since independence as a consequence of state intervention in the economy. This process was given impetus by the economic reforms of 1968 and 1969 which opened up sufficient opportunities for local people to engage in activities leading to the accumulation of capital [Baylies, 1980]. The nationalisation of industries and the creation of a large parastatal sector also contributed to the growth of this indigenous bourgeoisie. As a consequence of the economic reforms, the state gained control of 80% of the economy, giving it access to what Alavi would call "a large portion of the surplus" [Turok, 1987: 106; Alavi, 1972]. The process of investing this "surplus" resulted in the creation of a huge "managerial bourgeoisie" in the bureaucracy and the parastatal sector [Sklar, 1979]. This managerial bourgeoisie in turn became a fertile recruiting ground for the indigenous bourgeoisie proper. Upon being reshuffled out of office, upon retirement or resignation, most members of this class joined the ranks of the business class, with varying degrees of success.⁴

This process may be seen as part of the unintended consequence of the state's desire to wean itself from dependence on foreign capital and foreign bureaucratic expertise. That it was unintended is indicated by the efforts of certain sections of the states' "organic intellectuals" to curb the growth of this class through such measures as the "leadership code" which sought to limit the amount of property and business activities that "leaders" could engage in. But once the "genie was set loose from the bottle", it generated a momentum of its own and could not be stopped by political controls. The business class took advantage of the existing democratic apparatus to propel itself into strategic decision making positions from which it could influence policy to its own advantage [Baylies and Szeftel, 1984]. Thus while the state had no indigenous bourgeoisie (except the settler bourgeoisie) to deal with at independence, by the middle of the 1970s there was appreciable evidence of this class. Opposition to the educational reforms [Brian Garvey, 1980]; opposition to the Leadership Code [Baylies and Szeftel, 1984]; opposition to the introduction of scientific socialism as a subject in school side by side with religion [Lungu, 1986]; and opposition to the introduction of workers' councils in industry [Baylies and Szeftel, 1984; Robin Fincham and Grace Zulu, 1980] provide examples of its activities and influence. The interests and influence of the indigenous bourgeoisie were also expressed with reference to Zambia's foreign policy within the Southern African region. Representatives of this class in Parliament voiced concern and opposition to the government's continued refusal to reopen the border with Rhodesia in the face of increasing suffering by the Zambian people, including the business sector whose operations were being hurt in the process of changing routes to the seaports. It is evidence of the relative autonomy of the state that it did not give in on all of the above concerns. However, it is also a measure of the growing influence of the indigenous bourgeoisie that two of the five projects referred to, the educational reforms and the introduction of scientific socialism were abandoned. Two others have been implemented in such watered down versions as to render them ineffective. The implementation of the Leadership Code has not prevented leaders from acquiring property, owning business or amassing wealth. And the implementation of the works councils has not led to genuine participation of workers in the capitalist enterprises in which they serve. The border with Rhodesia was reopened in 1978, induced perhaps as much by the economic difficulties the country was going through as by the lobbying of the business community [Cliffe, 1980].

Through a combination of these various processes, the state in Zambia has come to mediate between four important class factions; foreign capital, indigenous capital, organised labour and the peasantry. The last category is important though silent in the class struggle. The active class struggle is therefore between the state, foreign capital, indigenous capital and organised labour as representatives of the working class. Noting that the state has an interest in reproducing the social formation and its place within it, its personnel responds to the interests of foreign capital in order to secure resources for investment, technology and skills. The state also responds to the needs and interests of indigenous capital to secure the political and economic stability of the social formation. Indigenous capital services the state

machinery by providing personnel, raw materials as well as goods and services that keep the “wheels of state” running. With regard to labour the state must sustain a measure of responsiveness to maintain its legitimacy. The manner in which this is done is the subject matter of this thesis.

Gertzel has argued that post-colonial governments in Africa have controlled organised labour because they perceive it to represent a “sectional interest”. This control, she maintains, is done in the name of promoting the “national interest” [Gertzel, 1979]. This may indeed be so, but as we pointed out above all governments put restrictions on trade unions. What remains to be done as Davies suggested, [Davies, 1966] is to unravel the nature of the relationship between the state and organised labour. I explore this relationship in the *Zambian* case in terms of a process of political incorporation. Mouzelis uses the term “incorporation” to refer to the situation whereby the state, while professing a formal commitment to parliamentary democracy and formal rights of associations, proceeds to enter into “de jure” arrangements with various civil society associations for the “purpose of avoiding social strife” [Mouzelis, 1986: 75]. These arrangements result in:

the defacto control exercised by the state over associations, which while on paper free from legal commitments to keep the “social peace” are weak and therefore easily subjected to state manipulation and control. [ibid.]

Mouzelis argues that this process occurs only in the periphery and semi-periphery and should be distinguished from “regime corporatism” as occurs in some Latin American countries, because there, there is a total abolition of parliamentary democracy. Political incorporation should also be distinguished from what goes on in the industrialised countries whereby trade unions often negotiate from a position of strength and have been able to clinch genuine agreements with the state thereby winning handsome benefits for their members. He gives the example of Switzerland where through this process, which he calls “integration”, social strife has been eliminated. In contrast, in the semi-peripheral countries of Greece and Argentina, which are the subjects of his study, Mouzelis concludes that the trade unions are weak and have therefore “not reached a level of autonomy like trade unions in the developed countries and cannot therefore negotiate from a position of strength” [Mouzelis, *ibid.*]. Mouzelis explains that political incorporation takes the form of clientelism and populism. I have adopted the notion of incorporation to explain the way the state relates to the institution of organised labour in *Zambia* through what I call a “carrot and stick” approach.

The argument being advanced rests on the understanding that *Zambia* is a peripheral capitalist state. There is a growing indigenous bourgeoisie within it which increasingly makes its weight felt by influencing the direction of state policy in its favour, although the state continues to retain some autonomy. The day to day running of public affairs is in the hands of a governing class which is drawn from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and the intellectuals.⁵ Through this governing class the state seeks to

politically incorporate workers into its domain. Incorporation is attempted at two levels, at the material level and at the level of ideas. At the level of ideas, the state endeavours to inspire workers to accept the principles of self sacrifice as essential for development. At the material level the state employs a “carrot and stick” approach to reward and encourage workers, respond to some of their needs, while punishing and curbing what it sees as excessive militancy. The purpose is not just to control labour but to cultivate the support of unions for official policies, enhance the legitimacy of the government and facilitate the establishment of bourgeois hegemony in the society. Through the use of specific mechanisms, the state has tried to mould organised labour into an instrument for mobilising a disciplined and growth conscious workforce, that is alive to the states’ need to accumulate and reproduce the social formation. A number of factors have contributed to the crystallization of this approach:

1. the initial weakness of the indigenous bourgeoisie at independence made the use of naked repression untenable.⁶
2. the strength of the trade union movement, with its established tradition of autonomous existence and a record of militant action, made a complete take over by the state bureaucracy problematic.
3. the political orientation of the governing class made the direct take over an unattractive proposition. Humanism advocates a consensual approach to politics and in theory at least, excludes the possibility of an openly repressive policy.
4. the level of development attained in the country especially the copper industry and the economic resources available to the government in the first ten years of independence made a takeover of the trade union movement unnecessary.
5. repression as such does not motivate workers to increased productivity and cannot therefore lead to economic growth, let alone development.

Instead of antagonising the trade union movement, the government set about cultivating its support and re-orienting the collective consciousness of the workers of Zambia for their role in the task of developing the country.

To demonstrate this process we begin in Chapter One with a discussion of Zambia’s political economy, in order to provide the stage upon which state relations with organised labour are enacted. In Chapter Two we examine the evolution of the working class in Zambia in the context of colonial rule. In Chapters Three and Four we explore the mechanisms that the post-colonial state has utilised to effect the political incorporation of organised labour into its domain and assess the success of this exercise. In Chapter Five we examine government response to strikes between 1970—1987 as a way of assessing the means, manner and extent to which the government has gone to maintain law and order for the conduct of capitalist enterprises. In Chapter Six we examine the way in which trade unionists have perceived and interpreted their role in Zambian society against a background of the “traditional” role of trade unions in indus-

trialised countries. In Chapter Seven we undertake a comparative study of the labour policies of four East and Southern African countries in order to situate the **Zambian experience** within a regional context of countries with similar historical experiences and level of economic development. In this regard the post-colonial labour policies of Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana and Zimbabwe are examined. And finally we conclude. To anticipate, our conclusions are based on the following propositions:

1. that more than control, the **Zambian government** has endeavoured to cultivate support for itself within the trade union movement, to legitimate its rule and enhance the hegemony of the governing class over the subordinate classes.
2. The political and ideological inclination of the governing class makes the use of force alone unattractive. Instead it aspires to engineer the consent of the governed through the use of the ideological apparatus of the party.
3. The militancy of organised labour in Zambia is born of a long tradition that preceded African involvement in party politics.
4. Chiluba's right wing economic trade unionism is a product of the prevailing socio-economic circumstances of declining employment opportunities, rising cost of living, and deteriorating services for the workers. He defines and leads a trade union movement in an imperfect (peripheral) capitalist economy which is backward and super exploitative. Whereas Western trade unionism is a response to Western industrial capitalism, his trade unionism is a response to the distorted economic forces of peripheral capitalism under the I.M.F. and World Bank monetarist regimes. His main task remains to secure the basic tenets of democracy, fair elections, and the rights of interest groups to organise and participate in the political process as autonomous organisations.

On the other hand, government is constrained to maintain law and order, and effective rule, as well as to ensure economic growth and maintain its legitimacy among the citizenry. In the face of deteriorating resources, legitimacy can no longer be ensured by distributing economic benefits, hence the resort to other mechanisms, such as the "engineering of consent" through the ideological apparatus, and when this fails, through an increasing use of force.

But because this is undesirable and can be counterproductive, a final desperate attempt is made to effect the complete take-over of the trade union movement through legislative means, an avenue that had previously been considered unnecessary and undesirable. However the political orientation of this governing class, its commitment to democratic principles and desire for a politics of consensus, bolstered by pressure from the trade union movement stalls efforts to have the legislation changed to this effect.

If the most striking feature of the relationship between the state and organised labour has been the concerted effort by the government to secure labour's support, what does it tell us about the class nature of the **Zambian state**? Essentially it expresses the contradictions within which the peripheral capitalist post-colonial state is caught up. It is a state trapped in the most unfavourable of economic circumstan-

ces, it struggles to promote accumulation and reproduce the social formation which is capitalist. It intervenes and participates in the economy in the hope of promoting growth. Hence the "oscillation" noted by Samoff. At times it aligns itself with international capital in the hope of availing itself of the resources at the exposure of international capital; at others it undertakes measures that solicit the support of labour such as the enactment of minimum wages. With declining resources at its disposal, the state is not able to respond favourably to labour's demands, hence the recourse to repressive measures to silence criticism. Labour finds itself under siege, largely because the state itself is under siege. To the extent that the governing class strives to maintain effective rule and run a capitalist society more efficiently, the Zambian state has come increasingly under the influence of the indigenous bourgeoisie. But to the extent that the working class is relatively large and well organised and that its cooperation is essential to the efficient operation of the economy its subjection to outright repression remains tempered.

0.6 A NOTE ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A combination of research methods have been used in the collection of the data and information upon which this thesis is based. To a large extent the thesis is based upon an innovative reassessment of secondary data. This has mainly been through the examination and reinterpretation of existing information from a class perspective. To augment the secondary data, original research was undertaken. Field work was conducted in Zambia from December 1986 to July 1987. A large part of this was in the form of interviews with the leaders of the ZCTU and officials of the major unions. All the eighteen unions were contacted for interviews and twelve responded favourably. A total of 49 interviews were carried out, each lasting on average three hours. Interviews were also conducted with the government officials charged with the administration of labour law. In addition, the secondary literature was also reinforced with the examination of archival records. This was particularly useful in providing information on the origin and development of unions.

Field work was particularly useful in according access to original legislation pertaining to the development and growth of trade unions. In addition to consulting the public laws, interviews, as I have pointed out above, were conducted with the government officials charged with implementing labour laws in Zambian society. These were mainly in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services and related institutions. Work was also carried out at the UNIP Research Bureau, which proved to be a very good source on presidential speeches and those of other leaders. It was also a fruitful source of the Party's policy documents. The Party's President's Citizenship College was a valuable source of information on workers' education and the policy objectives behind it.

Discussions were also held with officials of the Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy. These were very helpful in providing current information on the formation and functioning of the works' councils in industry. The department's annual reports provided a wealth of information both on the policy with regard to works' councils and on their current status and performance.

In addition to the field work, desk research was carried out in the University of Zambia libraries' special collections, the ZCTU library at the national centre in Kitwe, the University of York, and London University's school of oriental and African studies.

NOTES INTRODUCTION

1. For empirical evidence of these processes refer to Palmer, 1977 and also to Sandbrook and Cohen, 1975.
2. For detailed examples and explanations of these processes refer to Swainson, 1980.
3. Note the number of titles on African Socialism during this period.
4. For evidence of this process see Baylies, 1978.
5. The governing class is understood here to comprise of the personnel that are directly involved in the conception, enactment and execution of state policy as expressed in the laws and regulations that pertain to the distribution and exercise of political power, material resources and prestige.
6. The state gained relative autonomy because of the weakness of the bourgeoisie and thus was open to an undetermined relationship to the various class groups.

CHAPTER ONE

ZAMBIA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY: CLASS FORMATION AND POLITICAL CONTROL

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter gives a brief account of Zambia's political economy in order to provide the context within which to understand state-labour relations. It is argued that the country which is now Zambia was created as an outpost of imperial capital. The territory was acquired to provide outlets for the investment of British capital through mineral exploitation. Gold was the main target. A railway was built from the south towards the Katanga copper mines as part of Rhodes' scheme to establish a Cape to Cairo chain of British colonies. The British South Africa Company, which was given a royal charter to exploit the territory used its administrative powers to alter the indigenous people's relationship to the means of production and indeed induce the formation of new classes and class relations. When mineral wealth proved elusive, the territory was turned into a labour reserve for the Southern Territories where gold had been found.

In addition to providing labour for Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the territory was also opened up for white settlement. Although the numbers of the white settlers were smaller than Rhodes would have wished or indeed expected, of the few that came, the majority settled along the line of rail to cultivate maize and raise cattle. Labour was made available to them by creating reserves for Africans and restricting Africans access to the cash crop market. The twin process of proletarianisation and peasantisation were thus set in motion.

By 1926 the intensive development of the copper industry had begun in earnest. The industry changed the status of the territory from being a financial liability to being a profitable venture. Although the position of the African peoples remained the same. Copper became the dominant industry to the virtual exclusion of everything else especially rural development. Development of secondary industries was limited. Most machinery was imported, as were most consumer goods. Economic planning was haphazard and unsystematic; this was to have consequences which even today are manifest in the underdevelopment of the rural areas. To a large extent, this underdevelopment was a consequence of the interplay between colonial office ambivalence as to what kind of colony Northern Rhodesia was to be and settler insecurity on whether to stand alone or to amalgamate with the South. When the colonial of-

fice appeared to favour ultimate African paramountcy in Northern Rhodesia, the amalgamation debate among the settlers was reactivated and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland the consequence. Southern Rhodesia being the stronger economy meant that industrial development in Northern Rhodesia was forestalled. The Northern Rhodesian market was flooded with manufactured goods from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Meanwhile, proceeds from copper went to develop the federal capital in Southern Rhodesia and to ministries mainly dealing with the affairs of the settler population. The Africans of Northern Rhodesia were the poorer for this arrangement, while the settlers benefitted from the superior services that Southern Rhodesia had to offer.

On the mines of Northern Rhodesia new social relationships were developing. Indeed the partnership of the Federation, described as "that of a horse and its rider" was given real life meaning there. A white mine workers union had come into existence and had wrestled a colour bar clause from the mining companies in its recognition agreement. Industrial unrest among the majority black workers was the inevitable consequence. Increased consciousness among the African workers led them to organise themselves into trade unions, the white unions no doubt serving as a model.

Political independence meant that government had the political power to change the formal structure, complexion and orientation of class relations. This included the determination of wages in industry as well as in the public sector and provision of opportunities for property ownership by the indigenous people. For the indigenous people of all strata, the expectations were high. The economic reforms of 1968, 1969 and 1970 were undertaken in this nationalistic light. They went some distance in satisfying the nationalist economic aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie. However the government, mindful of its populist political base, was also concerned not to create capitalist monsters of the indigenous petty bourgeoisie. A leadership code was accordingly introduced to limit the scale of the growth of the indigenous capitalist class. With regard to labour, government's initial concern was to prevent the emergence of "two nations", one urban, well off and developing, the other rural, poor and stagnating. The strategy to deal with this anomaly and simultaneously satisfy the expectations of the workers born of independence was to grant wage increases to all workers, followed first by a policy of wage restraint, and then by a search for an appropriate incomes policy and legislation to restrict trade union militancy.

The task of governing and managing rapid induced economic development in a volatile international environment unleashed such violent currents of political emotion, activity and unfulfilled aspirations that opposition to the government was inevitable. The government felt that it had not had sufficient time to prove itself through performance and against political opposition. To consolidate power, a process of incorporation was therefore set in motion. At the level of the polity a One-Party state system was legislated into being. The contending factions of the petty bourgeoisie were brought under the ambit of the

ruling party or sent into political oblivion. On the economic front, a whole gamut of strategies was tried one after another, sometimes simultaneously in a classic exercise of "muddling through". Peasants were given loans for agricultural development through cooperatives, industrial loans were made available to the petty bourgeoisie, the state sector was expanded, and subsidies were provided on basic consumer goods. Meanwhile, "African capitalists" were denounced and detained, a clamp down on worker militancy was enforced, critical trade union leaders were detained and increased use was made of the police and army to curb rioters and workers on strike. Simultaneously, workers' education is pursued to instil in the workers discipline and patriotism, just as changes were being made in the legislation to effect greater control over trade union activities.

Towards the late seventies, pressure from the IMF led to disastrous but regular devaluation of the Kwacha, culminating in the eighties with the liberalisation of the economy. The rich and prosperous applauded, while the workers gnashed their teeth. And on tiring of this, rioted and went out on strike. Pressure from the workers led to a withdrawal of the IMF programmes and the introduction of an indigenous recovery programme.

Beneath all this confusion, an underlying logic may be discerned, pivoting around the state as mediator between the different classes. This is evidenced by the furious activities of the government on all fronts, designed to incorporate all political factions beneath itself and cultivate support among all classes, the motivating drive being regime survival and the maintenance of legitimacy.

In this chapter we outline the framework of Zambia's political economy, examine the process of class formation and trace the path of political control as it shifts from one group to another, Our concern is to pin-point the locus of political power and its consequences for class relations.

1.2 FOUNDING OF ZAMBIA

Zambia was created as an outpost of imperial capital. The first carriers of the British flag into the lands were not direct government representatives but ambitious businessmen operating out of South Africa. Outstanding among them was the man by whose name the countries north of the Limpopo were to be christened. Cecil Rhodes' desire was to make the whole of Africa British by persuading British settlers to develop the continent. Later, others were to expand upon this theme by elevating the development of Africa into an international scheme in which Indian skill was to combine with British capital and African labour.¹

Rhodes' strategy was to entrust his grand mission to a commercial company. The British South Africa Company organised "concession hunters" to operate as advance parties that would strike agreements with the chiefs on the route northwards. The agreements were to enable the companies to prospect for minerals. British development of Africa was to be paid for by the mining and sale of African minerals. Agreements were signed with Lobengula in 1888, [Hall, 1966: 56] granting mineral rights in Lobengula's land to the Rhodes Company, although the Matabele leader did not at the time know that this was what he was putting his "elephant seal" to.² From Matabeleland, Rhodes' emissaries moved north to Barotse-land to seek treaties with Lewanika, who had signed a concession with the gold prospector, Harry Ware in 1889 granting permission to prospect for minerals in "the whole of the subject Batoka country...". Rhodes bought the Ware concession from Nind and King on whose behalf Ware had been working. In addition Rhodes sent another expedition to Lewanika to get a more comprehensive treaty. This mission was led by Frank Lochner who had previously worked in Bechuanaland. The Barotse concession was signed on June 27 1890 and purported to cover "the whole of the territory of the said (Barotse) nation, or any future extension thereof, including all subject and dependent territory" [ibid., p.71]. It is important to point out that in Lewanika's mind the precise physical boundaries of what constituted his kingdom were not quite the same as those the concession hunters read into the treaty. The latter and subsequently the British South Africa Company interpreted the treaty to cover what was later to be known as North Western Rhodesia.

In return for the mineral rights, the Company promised to provide the people with "schools and industrial establishments". Needless to say these promises were never fulfilled. Hall points out that in 1924 when the Company relinquished the administration of Northern Rhodesia to the Colonial Office, its expenditure on native education was exactly £348 for the whole territory.³

While the treaties with Lewanika were being signed, the Company simultaneously sought to gain control of the territory between the Luangwa Valley and the Luapula river. In the quest for the North East, Rhodes secured the cooperation of Harry Johnson who shared the dream of an "all-red" Cape to Cairo chain of British controlled territories. Johnson worked from the territory around Nyasa which was controlled by the Scottish missionaries and their African Lakes Company. He worked his way North Westwards towards Lake Mweru, signing treaties with chiefs along the way. These were the basis upon which officials from the British government and the German government determined the "Anglo—German" boundary between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa [Hall, 1966: 81]. In addition to Johnson's treaties others were concluded by other concession hunters, namely Alfred Sharpe and Joseph Thomson, both of whom worked for Rhodes. The validity of some of the treaties were in dispute, but it was all the British had to base their claim to that part of the country.

In his drive further north, Rhodes' immediate task had been to arrange a treaty with chief Msiri of the Yeke who had installed himself in Katanga. This he sought to do even when it became clear from the British agreements with Belgium that Katanga was to be part of the Congo free state. Rhodes was desperate to get Katanga because he had seen a sample of the copper from there and was anxious to gain control of the area. He was unsuccessful in this, but did succeed in uniting North West and North East Rhodesia in 1911. During the same year the capital of Northern Rhodesia was moved from Kalomo to Livingstone [Daniel, 1979: 1]. After almost thirty years of company rule, the administration of Northern Rhodesia proved unprofitable to the company. In 1924 the British South Africa Company divested itself of the responsibility and handed over Northern Rhodesia to the colonial office. Hall remarking on the company's legacy writes "...it left as a monument one of the most neglected territories in Africa. The handsome promises made in the treaties with Lewanika and other chiefs remained unfulfilled; yet the country was to be held to its side of the bargain" [Hall, 1966: 96]. Indeed even after relinquishing political control, the company retained the mineral rights.

1.3 WHITE SETTLEMENT

After the failure to find easily exploitable minerals north of the Zambezi, Rhodes' scheme for developing Northern Rhodesia turned to encouraging European settlers into the territory. To this end the BSA offered land at the very low prices of 3d and 8d per acre. The first settlers started arriving after the South African war in 1902 [Muntemba, 1977: 550]. The numbers were, however, not as large as had been expected. Szeftel notes for example that about 300 Afrikaners settled between Lusaka and Kafue along the line of rail [Szeftel, 1978]. In 1912 the European population totalled about 1,500 and increased to 2,900 seven years later [Davidson, 1947: 17]. The early Europeans mainly settled along the newly built railway, cultivated maize and raised cattle which were primarily for export to Katanga, where Union Miniere needed supplies to feed their workers [Henderson, 1973: 58]. Another group of whites settled around Fort Jameson and cultivated mainly tobacco which they exported through Nyasaland to the then Portuguese East African port of Beira. A third cluster of white settlement was in the Abercorn area near the shores of Lake Tanganyika where coffee growing was attempted. European migration to Northern Rhodesia increased with the discovery of sulphine copper ores near the Congo border in 1923. With the intensive mining of the sulphide ores beginning about 1926, the number of Europeans steadily increased. These however were Europeans of a different kind from the earlier wave. Where the earlier immigrants had been farmers, those arriving in the twenties tended to be mainly artisans, builders, carpenters and especially miners. The nature of their settlement and their problems were different from those of the farmers.

Despite the fact that the commercial farmers were operating in an area surrounded by subsistence farmers who appeared "unemployed" for most of the year, one of the major problems experienced by the white settler farmers was the scarcity of labour. Muntemba, for example, notes of the Lenge area that,

the settler farmers in the area habitually complained of a shortage of labour... In addition Bulenje workers frequently "deserted" earning themselves the name "here to-day, gone tomorrow". [Muntemba, 1977: 352]

In order to coerce Africans into wage labour, a series of measures were undertaken which impinged on their economic activities. Prior to white settlement a tax had been levied on the Africans to cover the administrative costs of the Company state. Now there was an added impetus for levying the tax i.e. as a stimulus for Africans to engage in wage labour. This was justified as a way of making the Africans contribute to the "development" of their country.⁴

Each African male was to pay a tax of 3 shillings per year and a further 3 shillings for every wife after the first. It was envisaged that the tax would persuade the African to take up employment first for the nearby settler farmer and when that sector was saturated seek employment in the mines of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Katanga. The tax was introduced in North Eastern Rhodesia in 1900 at the rate of 3 shillings; in North Western Rhodesia a year later, the rate varying between 5 shillings and 10 shillings until 1914 when the rate was standardised at 10 shillings per head [Clegg, 1960: 29]. The native tax contributed handsomely to revenue. In 1931 for example total government revenue was £309,000 of which the Native poll tax contributed £101,000 and income tax £41,000.

The response of the Africans to the tax was quite varied. The immediate one was to turn to the production of cash crops for sale. The Kaonde of Kasempa district began the production of a maize surplus for which Union Miniere offered them twenty-seven and sixpence for a 90 kg bag. In 1910 they produced 2,000 bags. The North Western Rhodesia administration was displeased by this initiative and banned it, arguing that the Kaonde were strong enough men to earn money by working in the mines at Kantanshi and Bwana Mkumbwa. Other attempts at cash cropping by Africans were met with resistance from the administration and opposition from settlers who did not want the competition. The pattern was repeated on the Tonga plateau and around the Fort Jameson area. Despite the opposition Africans still persisted in growing cash crops. Writing of Bulenge, Muntemba argues that people were still able to raise cash through the sale of agricultural crops. In 1915, for example, no Lenge were reported to have gone to South Africa while only 210 working in the mines of Northern Rhodesia [Henderson, 1973: 31-32; Muntemba, 1977: 351]. The competition from the Africans must have been irritating to the settlers, because in 1936 they persuaded the government to pass the Maize Control Act which reserved 75% of the market for settler farmers [ibid., 80; 352]. Despite the restricted market, Africans along the line of rail and especially on the Tonga plateau continued to produce maize for the market and from the proceeds

were able to buy improved farm inputs to develop to the status of master farmers. The majority of Africans who remained on the land, however, were reduced to the precarious existence of a peasant.

Other than work for the low wages offered by the commercial farmers, for example in the Luangwa valley, as late as 1933 tobacco farmers paid their labourers salt instead of cash [Henderson, 1973: 26] most of the African men who were able travelled further in search of better wages. From the Luangwa valley men migrated to Southern Rhodesia in search of jobs. Others would not be persuaded to do even this. In 1907, Henderson notes that 100 Gwenbe Tonga tribesmen, "...took to the hills to resist tax", choosing this course rather than to be recruited by the RNLB representatives who were marauding the district accompanied by district officials [Henderson, *ibid.*].

In order to create room for the anticipated white settlers reserves were demarcated for Africans on the outskirts of the major areas intended for European settlement. Reserves were also used as a further measure to curb the competition of Africans in the cash crop market. Along the line of rail a lot of ingenuity went into the demarcation of these reserves. They were located far enough from the railway line to ensure that Africans could not carry their produce to the railway for transportation to the Copperbelt market; yet they were near enough for the Africans to travel to the white farms to seek employment. Reserves had been created even before the settlers arrived and by 1936, according to Henderson, they had become well established near all the areas of white settlement where they were intended to serve as reservoirs of labour [Henderson, 1973: 26]. When the anticipated settlers did not arrive, the lands vacated by the Africans turned into a dangerous haven for the tse-tse fly. The overall effects of colonial policy on the development of African agriculture have been too well documented to detain us here.⁵ The point to make is that although European administration and European settlement altered the lives of Africans significantly and changed the way the African related to the means of production, colonial policies were not always successful in orienting the African in desired directions. In particular, government policies failed to ensure a steady flow of labour to the European farmers who suffered a chronic shortage of labour. They also failed to ensure a sufficient supply of labour to the mines of Southern Rhodesia as had been intended by Rhodes and his chartered company administration. As Henderson argues:

the movement of labour could not be accomplished at the stroke of the pen of the colonial authorities. [Henderson, 1973: 43]

Henderson interprets this in terms of "the limits of colonial power". I feel a more positive way of understanding the phenomenon is to examine it in terms of the motives and actions of the workers themselves.⁶ From this perspective workers' avoidance of the tobacco farmers in the Luangwa valley is a form of protest against the ridiculous wages (salt!) that the farmers were paying. They opted instead to migrate to the mines of Southern Rhodesia in the hope of getting better wages. This theme is developed

further in the next chapter. For the moment the most important point to note is that European occupation and settlement of Northern Rhodesia, slight as it was, had significant and lasting consequences for the people of the territory. As a consequence of European settlement and administration, Africans were forced into new relations of production. In order to raise money for the tax, Africans were forced to become either peasants or proletarians. Those who resisted this process banished themselves to lives of fugitives, living in constant fear of the RNLB and the district officials. This was the case with the Gwembe who took to the hills. In the Barotse province, some people retreated to inaccessible islands in the Lwena flats and the numerous lakes in the eastern forest areas.⁷

Simultaneously, those who were able to sell a surplus, paid their taxes and in good years were able to buy labour saving devices such as ploughs.⁸ In the Barotse province, some returning migrant workers were able to improve their herds by buying more cattle or to start a herd where they previously lacked one [Cliffe, 1980 (a): 156-158]. Contact with and participation in the capitalist economy therefore slowly increased class differentiation in the territory, both around the industrial centres and in the rural areas. For the majority of Africans this meant leading the precarious life of a peasant at sometime and that of a very lowly paid labourer at others.

1.4 DOMINANCE OF THE COPPER INDUSTRY

The development of the core of the Zambian working class was to await the discovery and exploitation of copper in large commercial quantities. Before the development of the copper industry, the only mining carried on regularly was at Broken Hill, where lead and vanadium were mined since 1906. This was exported through the railway that had been built to the mine from the south [Muntemba, 1977: 350]. In fact as Muntemba points out, before the first world war, Kabwe was the major industrial city of Northern Rhodesia. The railway used Kabwe as its headquarters in N.R. establishing workshops and residential quarters for its staff in the town. A working class developed around the mine, though the numbers involved were small and most of the miners were permanent target workers i.e. people who constantly oscillated between wage labour and subsistence farming on the land over a life time.

The white population was growing steadily as Table 1 indicates. The figures show a decrease for 1933, due to emigration during the depression. Figures depicting the growth and movement of the African population during this early period are scarce. But Baldwin notes that according to the 1921 census, 36,000 men were recorded as working for wages in Northern Rhodesia and a further 36,000 estimated to be working as migrant labourers, in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Katanga and Tanganyika. Mining had not yet assumed its dominant status as Table 2 below shows.

Table 1
White Population of Northern Rhodesia

Year	Population	Year	Population
1921	3,634	1951	37,079
1931	13,846	1956	65,277
1933	11,278	1962	77,000
1946	21,907	1966	67,400

Source: Elliot, 1971: 61

Table 2
Africans in Wage Employment in Northern Rhodesia in 1921

Category of Employment	%
Farm Labourers	38.5
Domestic Servants	10.0
Mine Labourers	7.0
Railway Workers	3.9
Carriers and Porters	3.4

Source: Baldwin, 1966, p.20

Copper deposits were discovered by Europeans and first developed at Bwana Nkumbwa and Kansanshi and in 1909 the railway reached the Congo border. But the copper deposits at Kansanshi were not of sufficient quantities to justify the extension of the railway there [Szeftel, 1978: 24 and Daniel, 1979: 6]. Intensified prospecting was resumed in 1923 and in 1925 large deposits of sulphide ores at about 3% and 5% copper were discovered. This percentage was much higher than that at Katanga and in 1926, serious development work of opening up the copper mines started. By 1930 mines were in production or undergoing development at Bwana Mkubwa, Roan Antelope at Luanshya, Nkana at Kitwe, Mufulira, Nchanga at Chingola, Chambishi mine and Kansanshi [Daniel, *ibid.*]. About 30,000 Africans were employed on the mines [Epstein, 1958]. At the height of the construction period in 1930, Clegg reports that in total some 102,000 able-bodied men or 37% of the estimated number in the territory were in paid employment outside their "traditional homes and occupations" [Clegg, 1960: 38].

The majority of these were employed on the mines. The depression jolted the smooth development of the mining industry and some of the mines such Bwana Mkubwa, Chambishi, Kansanshi and Mufulira were closed and development work at others such Roan was suspended. After the depression the indus-

Table 3
DOMINANCE OF COPPER AFTER INDEPENDENCE

% OF	1964	1965	1966	1967	1977	1980	1982	1984
G.D.P.	47	38	37	32	11	16	11	14
Exports	92	93	95	95	91	94	93	88
Govt. Revenue	53	71	64	56	0	5	0	6
African Employment *	18	17	15	15				

* After 1972 employment figures ceased to be classified in racial terms.
Source: up to 1967, Elliot, p.3: 1977-1984 *Monthly Digest of Statistics*

try recovered slowly, producing 68,000 long tons in 1932, 212,000 long tons in 1939, and in 1964 276,000 long tons, making Zambia the third largest copper producer after the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. [Daniel, 1979: 6]. The increased tonnages of copper were reflected in the amount the mineral contributed to domestic output. In 1945 for example copper contributed 55.5% to domestic output, fetched 86.5 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and contributed 32% of government revenue. By 1964 the figures were 47%, 92% and 53% respectively (see Table 3). Zambia's rich copper deposits were of utmost importance to international capital and may have helped put Zambia on the world map. However, the other side of the story is that the development of the copper industry was carried out to the neglect of other industries.⁹ The skewed distribution of industries and the low level of industrial development in general has created problems for the post-colonial government during periods of low copper prices when revenues from copper have decreased or ceased altogether

The dominance of the copper industry is also reflected in the pattern of industrial development that occurred in the territory. Szeftel for example argues that most of the industrial output produced in the country was purchased by the mining companies and the communities that had grown around the mines [Szeftel, 1978: 27; Baldwin, 1966: 33]. Although it is difficult to argue that a more rational pattern of industrial development may have developed in the absence of the mining industry, one is persuaded to argue that the existing industrial development that has emerged has been largely influenced and dominated by the mining industry. Further, because the industry was foreign owned, most of the surplus produced was siphoned off to be consumed or invested elsewhere, thereby depriving the country of valuable resources [Szeftel, 1978: 28]. The consequence in terms of class formation is that although the mining in-

dustry has created a large working class concentrated in one province, its direct contribution to the development of secondary industries has not been as dramatic. This resulted in impeded development of an indigenous bourgeoisie or a proper middle class prior to independence. For reasons that will become clear in later chapters, the dominance of the copper industry has persisted even in the post-colonial period.

1.5 RACE, CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The most outstanding feature of the Zambian economy is therefore the predominance of the mining industry and the neglect of agriculture. By comparison manufacturing is far secondary in status. In the days of the British South Africa Company administration, all industrial development was devoted to the promotion of enterprises that produced goods for export. Apart from minerals, the other commodities of interest were maize, tobacco and groundnuts. The emphasis in industrial development was on commodities that would realise the highest and quickest returns for the investors and not necessarily those which would promote long-term and integrated development. The interests of capital determined the pattern of development in Northern Rhodesia. For the financier/industrialist based in Johannesburg, his field of play covered the whole of the Southern Africa region and his investment decisions were made on the overall assessment as to availability of markets and transportation and communications, all of which worked against Northern Rhodesia. Thus the British South Africa Company concentrated most of its industrial development in Southern Rhodesia [Szeftel, 1978: 29]. Indeed up to 1935, the only major manufacturing industry established in the territory outside the mining industry was the saw mills at Mulobezi which produced railway sleepers for the southern African railway system from Northern Rhodesia to South Africa [Young, 1973: 4].

The pattern and rate of industrial development was much the same during the period of direct colonial office control from 1924 to 1953. Private capital was invested where it was deemed likely to make the most profit. Government's primary concern meanwhile was to maintain law and order as it awaited an opportunity to divest itself of the responsibilities of governing the colony. Clearly, as Hall points out, the colonial government had neither the will nor the capability to stimulate economic growth [Hall, 1966: 268]. At the same time, alternatives to colonial rule seem to have eluded the colonial office. Despite the fact that from 1923 the colonial office issued statements to the effect that Northern Rhodesia was an African country and not a colony of white settlement, it lacked a clear programme of action on how to operationalise African paramountcy.¹⁰

The colonial government's ambivalence as to the status of Northern Rhodesia was to have disastrous consequences for the territory's economic development. In 1923 the settlers in Northern Rhodesia had voted against amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. Their main concern had been the fear of "being swallowed" by the more highly developed southern territory. While the settlers in Southern Rhodesia "did not want to be saddled with the 'Black North' [Clegg, 1966: 53]. An advisory council had been set up in 1918 consisting of five elected members [Davidson, 1947: 18]. In 1924, this was replaced by a legislative council, with a majority of official members and a minority elected by the European settlers. The settlers hoped at this stage that this system would soon lead to one of self-government by the settlers on the Southern Rhodesian pattern. Lord Passfield's memorandum erased those hopes. Talk of "native paramountcy" heightened settler uncertainty about Northern Rhodesia, which was aggravated further by the depression which halted migration to Northern Rhodesia and led instead to emigration [Davidson, *ibid.*]. Those who stayed reactivated the subject of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia as a way of securing settler interests. This debate echoed the efforts of some Southern Rhodesians especially Coghlan and Moffat towards amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia. The interest for amalgamation from the south was inspired by the desire (or need) "to ensure Southern Rhodesia's capacity to attract labour for her mines and farms from the north" [Wetherel, 1979: 213]. The debate was conducted at conferences between the interested parties and during evidence-giving sessions to commissions of inquiry. The final outcome was the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. The Federation as "settler sub-imperialism" has to be seen as "an extension of the British Capitalist system in Africa" [Wetherel, 1979: 226]. And the fact that it intensified the exploitation of Northern Rhodesia's resources for the benefit of interests outside the territory should be seen in this light.

During the Federation the siphoning of Zambia's resources from the copper industry to finance development elsewhere was legalised and legitimated. Economic growth occurred during the years of the federation, but as Hall points out, this was concentrated in Southern and not in Northern Rhodesia [Hall, 1966: 279]. To begin with the Federal Capital was Salisbury not Lusaka. And relations between the Northern Rhodesian Government and the federal government were not particularly cordial. The Federal government controlled all the most important ministries including finance, which meant that Northern Rhodesia government was dependent on the Federal government for capital investment. The net result of this was that over the ten years of federation, there were major transfers of income from Northern Rhodesia to the other territories especially Southern Rhodesia, so much so that the growth that had been experienced in Northern Rhodesia in the years prior to the federation came to a halt.¹¹ It is estimated that about £50 m to £60 m more was extracted by the Federal government from Northern Rhodesia than was being spent in the country during the period of the federation. The federation made Northern Rhodesia a hinterland of capitalist development, good only for the extraction of labour and

capital for development elsewhere. Be this as it may, there were sections of the Northern Rhodesian population that benefitted from federation. The commercial sector suffered as their manufacturing industries were completely thwarted by the already well established industries of Southern Rhodesia. But commercial farmers benefited from the superior research services dispensed by the Agriculture Ministry which had advanced research facilities. During the period of federation, the number of commercial farmers increased to over 1,000, controlling 4·5 m acres of privately owned land.

1.6 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS UNDER COLONIAL RULE

Until 1940 the government of Northern Rhodesia had no coordinated policy for the conduct of industrial relations in the territory. During the 1930s government attitude can best be described as Henderson does as, "...19th-century laissez-faire". The first organised group of workers in Northern Rhodesia were the white employees of the railways, who comprised as a branch of the Rhodesia Railway Workers' Union. Through the union they were able to extend some of the labour practices obtaining in the southern self-governing territory and were able to hold down the rate at which Africans could advance to skilled jobs.

Miners were the second category of white workers to be unionised, having been influenced by the example of their counterparts in South Africa from where most had initially migrated. In 1936 the secretary general of the South African Mineworkers' Union visited the Copperbelt to assess the situation. Perturbed to find that black workers had penetrated the sphere of white jobs, he proceeded to form a branch of the S.A. Mine Workers' Union, in order to ensure that Northern Rhodesia remained

a whiter workers country by ensuring that only union men would be employed in copper mining. [Elliot, 1971: 6]

Later it was found to be contrary to the constitution of the S.A.M.W.U. to have branches outside South Africa. The Northern Rhodesian association then became an autonomous union in 1936 and was recognized by the mining companies in 1937. By July 1938 the union had organised 50% of the European daily paid workers and had a membership of 1,000. During 1938, an agreement was made with the mining companies under which it was affirmed that "the relation between white and black will not be interfered with for a period of another two years". The government did not intervene in respect of this agreement, watching things from a distance in the hope that the mining companies would prevent the operationalisation of a colour bar in the mines [Henderson, 1973: 110]. The union appears to have been in a very strong position indeed dealing as it did with an inexperienced management and an even more inexperienced and disinterested government.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1940, despite a no strike agreement in the interests of the war effort, European workers at Nkana and Nchanga went on strike for higher pay and improved working conditions. At the time, average European pay was £40 per month. Anxious not to disrupt production for too long while the war was raging, the mining companies gave in to almost all the demands of the workers which included a 5% wage increase and an understanding to observe the clause in the 1938 agreement not to change relations between black and white workers.¹³ This outcome demonstrates that the white mineworkers union had built itself into a powerful force capable of extracting attractive concessions from the employers. The style and manner of negotiation could not have been lost on the Africans, to whom the white mineworkers union served as a model.¹⁴

Self-interest and obstinacy were to characterise the attitude and conduct of the white mineworkers union until its dissolution in February 1964. In conspicuous absence was class solidarity, race forming a great divide between the workers. The only time the white union observed the principle of workers solidarity was when it could be used to its advantage in safeguarding the interests of its members, such as on the application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work".

In the early fifties, under pressure from the newly organised African workers and anxious to eliminate the constant strikes that had become a feature of the Copperbelt scene, the companies invited the white union NRMWU, the mine officials and Salaried Staff Association and the African N.R.A.M. W.U. to discussions regarding the problem of industrial relations in the copper mines. During the discussions, the companies suggested that one way of reducing African discontent and pressure for advancement was to release some jobs currently being done by whites and to separate them into tasks that could be performed by Africans, at wage rates that would be determined for those new categories, but which while lower than the current European rates, would mean an increase in pay for the Africans ascending to those jobs. The white MWU refused these proposals insisting that the principle of "equal pay for equal work be applied", knowing full well that the level of education and experience attained by African workers, coupled by the racism of the mine management, prevented their promoting Africans to European held positions at the same rate of pay. Africans thus remained condemned to the lowest level of jobs at very low rates of pay. In the impasse the magic wand of the colonial administration's authority was once again reached for, and a board of inquiry was set up in 1954 under Sir John Forster to look into the question of African advancement in the copper mines [Elliot, 1971: 65]. The resolution of this stalemate is interesting in that it shows that the white MWU was as obstinate as the mining companies would allow it to be. When the union appeared reluctant to implement the recommendations of the Forster Board, which had elaborated the idea of job fragmentation and of determining African wages from below, the Roan Selection Trust group of companies terminated the September 1955 recognition agreement with the NRMWU. It was only at this point that the NRMWU agreed to discussions which led to an agree-

ment allowing certain jobs from "schedule A" to be released for fragmentation and allocation for Africans [Elliot, 1971: 66].

The years of transition to independence saw the further use of the union's power to secure handsome monetary concessions for loss of the status of permanent employee to that of contract worker. In 1964 the NRMWU changed its name and status to that of Mine Workers Society.¹⁵ All the members of the union were transferred to staff positions thereby fossilising the wage structure in the Zambian copper mines until the Brown Commission of inquiry in 1966.

The issue of wage determination was to occupy the minds of policy makers for many years after independence, the critical question being whether to pay Africans in formerly white held positions at the same rate as their predecessors or to evolve a new wage structure suited to local conditions.¹⁶ A third issue was whether or not to have a dual wage structure, one for expatriates, the other for Zambians. Also at issue was how to relate the wages of those in employment to the reality of the country's uneven development. While the first three issues seem to have been resolved in the twenty-four years since independence, the fourth remains intractable.

1.7 INDEPENDENCE: REGAINING POLITICAL CONTROL

With independence the political control of the country passed on to an indigenous petty bourgeoisie consisting of former teachers, medical assistants, clerical officers and trade unionists.¹⁷ This group of people had organised to gain independence from Britain in order to secure political power and rid itself of foreign domination in a general sense, but the more immediate motivation was to secure the right to control and direct the economic resources and secure jobs and improved life opportunities for the African peoples. The nature of colonialism and the level of development of the forces of production was such that there was no indigenous bourgeoisie of any significance in Zambia. This had consequences for the nature of development policy. Free private capitalist enterprise would entail continued dependence on and domination by foreign capital.¹⁸ socialist development on the other hand would entail massive nationalisations for which the country had no experience and probably lacked the skills to implement. In order to buy time, and to allow the state to create an economic base for itself a mixed approach was adopted. Through a series of reforms the government gradually became the major shareholder in the most strategic industries while encouraging a training and Zambianisation programme in those industries. In the hope of availing itself of the capital and skills of international capital, joint ventures were undertaken with multinational companies. For example:-

Livingstone Motor Assembly
Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia
Kafue Textiles
Nakambala Sugar Estate and Refinery

Fiat of Italy
Kobe Steel
Ametilal and Textile Co.
Tate and Lyle [Meysn, 1984: 14]

Other measures opened up opportunities for indigenous Zambians to acquire business and engage in capital accumulation.

The process of nationalisation was initiated in April 1968 when at the UNIP National Council at Mulungushi, President Kaunda asked twenty-five large companies, mostly expatriate-owned to grant shares to the government. The amount of shares was later fixed at 51% and the companies involved were brought under the umbrella of the Indeco. Their activities were spread across the fields of transport, wholesale and retail trade, fish processing, timber, building supplies, newspapers and breweries.¹⁹

In 1969, the 51% state acquisition was extended to the mining companies which were placed under the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). In 1970 when more industries in the manufacture of food stuffs, edible oils, spirits and soaps and detergents were nationalised. Efforts were also made to extend the nationalisation measures to the financial sector, where a National Commercial Bank was established and foreign insurance companies prohibited from operating in Zambia. But moves made to nationalise the foreign owned commercial banks, were repulsed by the banks who threatened withdrawal from the country altogether.

In addition to the state enterprises, a programme of indigenization was encouraged whereby specified sectors of the economy such as minor wholesale and retail trade in rural areas were reserved for indigenous Zambians. Other specific activities and contracts below K100,000 were also indigenized.²⁰ These measures were taken in the spirit of nationalism, intended to rid Zambia of foreign economic domination and to give Zambians the opportunity they never had of participating in the economic development of their country. When it became evident that some contained seeds of contradiction with Zambia's socialist aspirations, efforts were made to temper them. To restrict the growth of the bourgeoisie, for example, the private enterprises were to be limited to K500,000 gross profit margins (1972 prices). But it may be argued that the policy was somewhat ill-conceived. If half hearted and an unreliable means of curbing capitalist enterprise, they also frustrated the efficient operation of that enterprise and growth of capitalist production. Instead of declaring profits, Zambian owned companies have tended to be wasteful by expanding sideways, with some owners establishing multiple companies that make very little profit, while others spend huge amounts of money on ostentatious living and multiple ownership of cars.

Another route to joining the ranks of the indigenous bourgeoisie has been through the state sector. Government employees in the state bureaucracy and the parastatal sectors have been keen to use their positions and their connections to acquire loans and establish businesses, farms and build houses to rent out to the public, especially the lucrative diplomatic corps. There are legitimate ways of going about this, but there is also the danger of corrupt practices and abuse of office.²¹ The government was worried about the conflict of interests among bureaucrats who also dabbled in private business. But more importantly, the government and especially the President himself, was worried that the growth of the indigenous bourgeois class would lead to the polarisation of the society between the rich 'haves' and the 'have nots'. To stem the tide of capitalist tendencies and the growth of the bourgeoisie, the leadership code was introduced. This limited political leaders to one source of income, one house and a plot of land not more than five acres.

When seen as a package the government's economic measures appear contradictory and inconsistent.²² Yet when one examines the rationale behind governments adoption of these various policies, a clearer picture begins to emerge. Structurally, the Zambian policy makers are caught up in the contradictions of the peripheral capitalist state whose economy is dependent and underdeveloped. Against this background they desire to promote growth that will benefit the local people. This growth is best achieved if the indigenous people themselves are brought into the process of economic development. However, due to colonial exploitation and neglect that confined them largely to the ranks of migrant labourers, the people do not have the resources nor the skills to take advantage of the opportunities made available to them by independence. In view of its policy objectives, the state is forced by sheer circumstance to take a very active role in the economy at the same time as it opens up opportunities for indigenous people to acquire capital and participate for themselves in economic enterprises. Yet not all the people can participate at the same level of economic activity. The government also has an obligation to the mass of the people who are not able to participate at the entrepreneurial level. Not least of the reasons for this is the fact that government needs the support of these masses at election time and in the implementation of its policies. In its design and implementation of socio-economic policies the government has to attend to the interests of the various significant groups as follows:

1. It has to be responsive to the needs of monopoly capital in order to attract investments into the country. Part of this response may be a clamp down on the right of workers to strike.²³
2. It has to be responsive to the needs of the emergent indigenous bourgeoisie, to encourage their contribution to national development.
3. It has to offer the managerial bourgeoisie attractive working conditions to ensure continued support and efficient administration.

4. It needs to respond to workers demands for a living wage and decent, humane working conditions. It needs the support of workers to enhance its legitimacy among the populace.
5. Though weak organisationally, the state needs to provide the peasantry with the requisites with which to procure a livelihood on the land.

It is important that government delivers these goods to the various groups to enhance its legitimacy and ensure its own survival. Because these constituencies are composed of antagonistic classes and the needs of the government will vary from time to time, the sum total of government policies will appear contradictory and inconsistent. Seen in the light of the government's need to appease and cultivate support from all classes, the fog of confusion and inconsistencies lifts. The basic explanation is that Zambia is a capitalist state operating under the contradictions of peripheral capitalism. However, the ideological inclination of the governing class interact with the specific historical material features of the Zambian social formation to produce a unique situation. Some of this uniqueness can be seen in the government's labour policy.

1.8 LABOUR POLICY

With regard to labour, government policy was guided first of all by the need to establish a reasonable wage with reference to the living wage and the expectations of workers, given changed political circumstances and secondly to ensure that the wage was fair in the context of the needs and condition of the rest of non-waged population. In President Kaunda's words, Zambia did not want to build a country of "two nations", one urban, well-off and developing and the other rural, poor and stagnating. Following established tradition, the government appointed two commissions of inquiry, one to investigate the circumstances that had led to the strikes in the mining industry and the wage structure in the mines (Brown Commission) and the other (the Whelan Board of inquiry) to look into the salaries and wages of the civil service, police, teaching services, defence forces, prison officers and non-civil service employees of the government.²⁴

The Brown Commission recommended a 22% wage increase. This was soon reflected in the increases in the other sectors of the economy where it was used as the reference scale. However, soon after these increases measures were taken to circumscribe the activities of trade unions. Strikes were banned, wages were frozen and the preservation of public security regulations were extended to cover most activities in the mining industry. Meanwhile, Smith's U.D.I. in Rhodesia provided the international security risk which justified these measures [Quinn, 1971: 77-80]. In fact the government had warned of just such kind of measures even before U.D.I. in November 1965. Referring to a number of strikes that had occurred in early 1965, the President declared at a rally in April 1965 that:

...the country's trade unions had abused their powers during the first six months of independence. The government will devote special attention to strikes and discipline in the labour force and if necessary Zambia's leaders would assume dictatorial powers to eliminate foreign interference in the labour movement.²⁵

Even as a clamp down on trade union militancy was being enforced, other strategies were also tried. In April 1967 the Minister of Labour called a conference in Livingstone bringing together trade unionists, employers and officials from the Ministry of Labour and social services to discuss the issue of declining discipline in industry and its effects on productivity. The search for an effective industrial relations policy was on. Within the multi-party framework, this search was to culminate into the enactment of the I.R. Act of 1971,²⁶ which had set the trend that labour policy was to follow in the next 22 years to 1983.

1.9 POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND THE PRESSURES FOR A ONE-PARTY STATE

The first five years of independence were a time of prosperity, great economic expansion spearheaded by huge government expenditure made possible by the substantial revenues from the high world copper prices and the fact that, for the first time in more than ten years, surplus was no longer transferred to the federal government headquarters [Quinn, 1971: 80]. Writing on Zambia's economic prospects, Hall refers to this optimism born of resource endowment:

The country starts from its unique and somewhat paradoxical position with a vision of where it should go, a method of approach suitable to its circumstances and resources potentially sufficient to raise its standards. It is more favoured than most of its contemporaries.²⁷

The initial resources and the phenomenal growth at 13% per annum, [Turok, 1983: 78] occurring against a background of gross underdevelopment characterised by uneven development and differential regional incorporation meant that outcomes were uneven and important sections of the population were dissatisfied.²⁸ This dissatisfaction was frequently expressed in regional terms. The government was portrayed by the leaders of the competing factions as favouring some regions as opposed to others in the distribution of resources. Those regions that had been the traditional base of the opposition party felt vindicated and for a time intensified their opposition. The more serious and newer centre of opposition emerged on the Copperbelt with the creation of the United People's Party (UPP) in 1971. It has been argued that the major ideological difference between UNIP and UPP was that UNIP was more centrally controlled and therefore more authoritarian whereas the UPP was more populist desiring mass participation and popular control.²⁹ Given the short life span of the UPP there may not be sufficient evidence to sustain this argument, especially given the record of its leader in dealing with incidents of mass participation while he was Vice-President.³⁰ The stronger argument is that the UPP provided a rallying point for people from all classes of the population "who felt frustrated by their lack of progress and promotion".³¹

Thus UPP counted among its members small businessmen, middle-level civil servants, local government councillors, disgruntled UNIP party militants, university students and politicians of all grades up to cabinet minister, but excluding the highly educated and professional individuals within UNIP and the cabinet who came from the same region and language group as the UPP leader [Gertzel, 1984: 21]. UPP supporters and sympathizers were unhappy with the general direction of development under the UNIP leadership and were particularly displeased with the nature and amount of resources and/or opportunities coming their way as groups and as individuals.

The UPP posed a real challenge to UNIP as it stood a good chance of attracting the attention of the large concentration of workers on the Copperbelt most of whom regarded independence as having brought few of the expected rewards. Some trade union leaders did in fact join the UPP, though in the short time before its proscription they were unable to carry their unions with them. Union leaders who had joined the UPP were subsequently expelled by their unions.³²

After the experience with the UPP, the government saw a real danger of factional in-fighting within UNIP leading to instability that would distract it from development efforts or worse, dislodge it from power. Such in-fighting was highly destructive and had to be eliminated. One mechanism initiated from the President was a prohibition in the formation of new parties. In the government's assessment, there was nothing inherently wrong with its development programmes. What was required was patience by the people and a monitoring of the excesses of some politicians who might attempt to turn frustration over the slow pace of change to their own advantage. Even so in the wake on the UPP debacle, announcements were made to locate industries in Luapula and Northern Province.³³

In view of the tension and the assessment that it had wastefully diverted attention from the central goal of development, the President announced the cabinet's decision to establish a One-Party State through legislation on 25 February 1972. The decision was justified in terms of creating greater opportunities for unity in the country, bringing to an end the violence that had been committed under the guise of multi-party politics and creating an atmosphere of peace and stability deemed necessary for development. The one-party state, it was argued, would allow for better, more meaningful participation by all the people in the development process. Under a one-party state system power would be vested in the masses and at the same time all the potential leaders the society had would be made available to the people. The one-party system was promoted as a vehicle for mobilising leadership and the rational utilisation of political skills.

In order to set the democratic process in motion, a commission of inquiry was constituted and empowered to solicit the opinions of all the people, not on the desirability of the one-party system, which was taken for granted, but on its mechanisms. The opposition party, ANC, however, refused to be repre-

sented on the commission. A great deal of publicity was given to the work and progress of the commission with daily radio and newspaper announcements of where the commission was sitting.

After the commission submitted its very thorough report however, the government issued a White Paper which picked out and accepted the least controversial recommendations and those that consolidated the power of the governing class and especially of the President.

To consolidate this power further, a process of incorporation was initiated, the first target of which was the legal opposition. Nkumbula and the ANC were absorbed into UNIP at the Choma declaration of 17th June 1973 at which he directed all his ANC branches in the Southern Province to "identify themselves with UNIP" [Gertzel, 1984]. No formal gesture was made to former UPP leaders, most of whom were still in detention. The process of reabsorbing UPP members was to prove more painful, with some local UNIP leaders strenuously protesting. Indeed for some politicians, the demise of the UPP was to prove the end of their effective political careers. UNIP did not appear to regret this loss, it was quite happy to rid itself of trouble makers and malcontents.

1.10 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC

From a class perspective the economic reforms of 1968 through 1970 had opened up opportunities for the growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie. This class developed as a consequence of monopoly capital appointing local directors of their *Zambian* subsidiaries, indigenous *Zambians* going into partnership with monopoly capital or indigenous *Zambians* buying out foreign owned companies whose owners were fleeing from the economic reforms.³⁴ It is important to point out that the economic reforms did not only result in the growth of the indigenous bourgeoisie proper. They also affected differentiation lower down the social pyramid. State takeovers, for example, led to the swelling of the ranks of the managerial bourgeoisie. The restrictions concerning wholesale and retail trade to indigenous *Zambians* contributed to increased *Zambian* involvement in petty commodity production and retail trade. This has led to the growth of an indigenous petty bourgeoisie. Its growth can be seen in the increased *Zambian* participation in business enterprises such as trading and commercial farming. Baylies has shown for example that the number of Liquor Trading Licences and all trading licences going to Africans were 33% and 6% respectively in 1963. The figures had steadily increased to upwards of 90% for liquor trading and 90% for all trading by the mid-1970s [Baylies, 1982: 249]. While the expansion of the education system, higher education and training schemes contributed to the growth of the middle classes. None of this may have been intended. Similarly, while the establishment of the one-party state may have been necessitated by regionalism and the threat of national disintegration, ultimately it resulted in the consolidation of power by the governing section of the bourgeoisie. The consolidation of bourgeois rule can be seen in, for

example, the increased participation of people with business interests in national and local level politics, where their representation is well in excess to their proportion in the total population [Baylies and Szeftel, 1981: 201-202].

An example of the consolidation of political power by the bourgeoisie can be seen in the increased election to the national assembly of people from the various rungs of the class. During the first elections under the one-party constitution, 40% of those who were nominated for parliamentary office were businessmen. After the vetting by the party and the voting by the electorate, their numbers among those who were actually elected to the national assembly had increased to 44% [Baylies and Szeftel, 1981: 202]. Baylies and Szeftel's evidence show that the pattern of increased petty bourgeois representation was repeated at the local level, such as the city councils. Indeed it can be argued further that a number of the district governorships of major cities including Lusaka and Kitwe were filled by people with considerable business interests.³⁵

However, the increased participation of the emerging bourgeoisie was to take place within closely guarded parameters defined by the government. The government's sensitivity to how far to allow private enterprise to flourish and how far to allow the free expression of ideas by the bourgeoisie was perhaps given clear demonstration in its reaction to criticisms of the one-party system of government by the then chairman of Standard Bank (Z) Ltd., Elias Chipimo. Commenting on the pitfalls of the one-party state, he argued that it allowed no democracy. This led to frustration among the people which in turn led to military coups. Pointing at events that had occurred in Liberia, Chipimo urged African leaders to open up their countries to real democracy, through the multi-party system, to avoid the pattern which had established itself on the continent whereby "Presidents end up with bullets in their heads".³⁶ The government reacted angrily to Chipimo's remarks, with the President disclosing that they were part of a plot to overthrow the government. He demanded a total apology from Chipimo. The Bank was pressured into removing Chipimo from his post. He later resigned.

Perhaps the most concerted effort by the bourgeoisie to effect a change of government can be seen in the failed coup of October 1980, dubbed the "coup of civilians". The alleged instigators of the coup were not soldiers but professional people with serious private business interests and/or high ranking government jobs, but whose economic manifesto differed radically both in tone and content from that of the government especially the President. In class terms these people represented the bourgeoisie proper.³⁴ Suggesting that, if the economic reforms had fostered the growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie and the one-party state consolidated the power of this class, by the 1980s this class was strong enough to want to break the mould of statism, especially state capitalism and establish free enterprise and a multi-party system of government.

The pressures for change have increased in the twelve years since 1975. During this period the realities of Zambia's underdevelopment and the consequent constraints this has placed on government action became glaringly clear. The period between 1975 and 1985 was a decade when government was forced to adopt a "crisis management" approach to public affairs. Following the oil crisis of 1973, and the recession in the industrialised countries, Zambia's economic problems have steadily increased. After an initial period of high copper prices in the early 1970s the price of copper dropped drastically from 1975. Meanwhile the import bill was escalating. Zambia's oil bill increased from K17.4 m in 1973 to K122.9 m in 1980 [Gertzel, 1984: 81]. The combined bill for petroleum and petroleum products was as follows:-

YEAR	(Million) KWACHA
1978	79,421.00
1980	195,974.00
1981	202,371.00
1982	181,577.00

Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics,
July/Agust 1986: 19

In order to sustain the high expenditure pattern and fulfil the commitments made during the early years of independence, which was necessary for maintaining its legitimacy, the government turned to heavy borrowing both internally and externally. Employment opportunities were declining, resulting in a polarisation of society along class lines. Certain members of the indigenous bourgeoisie blame government policy for this. They argue that had government opened up more economic opportunities, industry would have expanded and more people would have been as prosperous as they were. They constantly criticise government for restricting opportunities for free enterprise.³⁸ While the bourgeoisie criticised the government for poor economic management and misdirected "socialist" policies, it is becoming evident from all accounts that urban poverty is becoming severe and more evident. Letters to the editor in the two national dailies constantly lamented about the high cost of living and the inability of people in employment to procure food, shelter and clothing from their wages. Trade unionists have demanded cost of living wage increases, but even these have not been adequate in the spiral of price increases that have gripped the country since 1983.

One of the tragic and public manifestations of the poverty and deprivation in Zambian society has been the appearance of "parking boys" on the streets of Lusaka. These are boys, as young as eight years,³⁹ who patronise the streets and the parking lots of supermarkets, asking to "look after" cars while the owners shop. The need to have "look out boys" posted on cars is an indicator of another problem i.e. the rise in unemployment related crime.⁴⁰ Unemployment has been on the increase due to lack of growth in the

economy. As Table Four indicates, only about 10% of children enrolled in primary schools ever advance to secondary schools, leaving large numbers of youth unemployed. About 850,000 to 1 million pupils under sixteen are added to the labour market, without any job prospects in the formal sector. The lucky ones become parking boys, the majority just roam the streets and remain outside of the official statistics since they do not even register with the labour exchanges. To illustrate this, out of 127,700 pupils who were in Grade VII in 1978 for example (the last year of Primary school) only 17% or 21,709 were offered places in Form I (the first year of secondary school).⁴¹

The remainder of 105,991 were left out, yet this number alone is more than twenty times the recorded

Table 4
STUDENT ENROLMENT AND PROGRESSION RATES

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Primary School	936,817	966,475	996,597	1,041,938	1,073,314	1,121,769	1,194,070	1,260,366
Secondary School	83,887	88,980	91,795	94,595	98,862	104,859	115,088	125,811
Drop outs	852,930	875,495	904,802	947,343	974,452	1,016,910	1,078,982	1,144,555
Rate	91%	90.7%	90.7%	90.9%	90.8%	90.6%	90.36%	90.8%

Source: *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, July/August 1986, p.53

figure of 5,300 increase in the labour force recorded for 1978.⁴² The situation has not improved much in the intervening ten years.⁴³ In 1988, out of the 251,000 that sat for the Grade VII examinations in December 1987, only 52,000 or 20.7% were offered places in Grade VIII (the new name for Form I).⁴⁴ This slight improvement follows a heavy campaign of urging parents to build self-help schools, upgrading of primary schools to secondary schools, rehabilitation of old mission schools and urging churches and the various missionary societies that proliferate in the country to build more schools for their congregations.

The employment situation has deteriorated even for the employable between 1975 and 1985 as shown by Table Five below. The country's underdevelopment, and dependency especially as manifested in the continued dependence on one commodity, has contributed a great deal to the unemployment situation. This is because the world economic recession led to low copper prices, meaning low foreign exchange earnings which have resulted in shortages of raw materials and spare parts for most industries. This has meant industries operating at below capacity, which in turn has resulted in job cut-backs and redundancies. The trend in retrenchment has been as follows:- in 1975 10,863 workers were declared redundant.⁴⁵ In 1977 8,217 employees declared redundant were reported to the Ministry of Labour. During the period

Table 5

LABOUR FORCE AND WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN RECENT YEARS

Year	Total Labour Force	Persons in Wage-Paid Employment	%
1975	1,479,000	393,490	26.6
1976	1,526,600	368,470	24.1
1977	1,586,000	372,420	23.5
1978	1,641,000	368,460	22.5
1979	1,698,300	344,000	20.3
1980	1,758,810	384,090	22.0
1981 (June)	1,824,200	391,800	21.5
1982	1,880,400	368,000	19.6
1983	1,963,300	364,000	18.6
1984	n.a.	365,210	n.a.
1985	n.a.	361,520	n.a.

Source: Figures for 1975 to 1983 compiled from Ministry of Labour Annual Reports. Figures on Persons in wage-paid employment in 1984 and 1985 from Monthly Digest of Statistics, 1985, p.5

June 1975 to December 1976 there was a decrease of 30,000 wage earning jobs.⁴⁶ There was a slight improvement in 1980 whereby the number of jobs increased by 3.3% over the 1979 figures. The number of workers declared redundant dropped slightly from 6,304 in 1979 to 4,032 in 1980.⁴⁷ This however occurred against strict policies introduced by the government in the procedures for declaring redundancies. It also directly corresponds to improvements in copper prices between 1979 and 1980.

As Table Five shows, overall, an average of 6,250 workers a year were declared redundant between 1975 and 1985. The number of jobs, decreased by an average of 2.2% per year, such that, while 26.6% of the labour force was in wage employment in 1975, this had declined to 18.6% in 1983, the last year for which figures are available.

This then is the context within which Zambian trade unionism operates. This also constitutes the background upon which state relations with trade unions are conducted. A few summary points about this context may now be made. Of primary importance is the dominance of the copper industry in the Zambian society. We have indicated how the whole economy is dependent of foreign exchange earnings from copper and how this dependence ties the Zambian economy into the world capitalist system. We should also point out that the pitfalls of this mono-economy are recognised by the Zambian governing class and the need to diversify the economy is often emphasized in political speeches. Yet no successful alternative to copper has been developed or even envisaged. Even as the limited life span of copper is recognised, resources are still invested in the expansion of the industry. The economy has therefore continued to be dominated by the copper industry. It remains unevenly developed, with a strong bias for the urban areas. Part of the explanation for the persistence of this skewed structure of development has been the way the

state has responded to class pressures. Development seems to have been concentrated in the urban areas in response to elite pressure, while employment opportunities for workers have declined and their living conditions deteriorated. This in part is accounted for by the nature of development projects that have been undertaken, which have tended to be capital intensive and with low local value added.

1.11 THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND WORKERS' RESPONSE

If the state's mediation in the economy has been in favour of the urban areas and in projects that benefit the bourgeoisie and the urban areas, how has the working class responded? As an illustration of the workers' response to the economic crisis borne of Zambia's continued dependence on copper, I will briefly discuss the reaction to the IMF conditionalities on Zambia. I will briefly review Zambia's relationship with the Fund, the loans Zambia has secured from it, their conditionalities and the effects of these on the economy, the workers reaction and the outcome of their struggles.

Zambia first started to utilize IMF special drawing rights in 1971. Prior to that, copper earned sufficient foreign exchange to meet the countries balance of payments obligations. After 1970 a number of factors combined to alter the situation. These included a fall in the price of copper, a fall in the amounts of copper produced especially after the disaster at Mufulira mine, an increase in production costs and a general deterioration in the terms of trade. The terms of trade have deteriorated as follows:-

1970	100
1978	35
1979	50
1981	31
1983	26

Source: Woldring, 1984: 9

The deterioration in the terms of trade was reflected in a corresponding deterioration in the balance of payments. To bolster foreign exchange reserves as well as meet her budgetary requirements at home Zambia turned to the IMF for assistance. Over the next fifteen years the following facilities were arranged.

IMF LOANS 1971-1976

1971	Arrangement to cover period	1973 to 1974	SDR	19m
1976	Arrangement to cover period	1976 to 1978	SDR	19m
1978	Arrangement to cover period	1978 to 1980	SDR	250m
1981	Arrangement to cover period	1981 to 1983	SDR	800m
1982	Arrangement to cover period	1983 to 1984	SDR	211m
1984	Arrangement to cover period	1984 to 1986	SDR	225m

Source: Havnevik, 1986: 127-148

Despite these arrangements, Zambia's external debt rose from US\$750m in 1976 to US\$5,100m at the end of 1986.⁴⁸

Each of the arrangements indicated above had conditions attached to them. To give an example, the first facility required that maize producer prices be increased by 25%, wages in the public sector be frozen for three years, the subsidies for consumer goods be reduced by 60% and the Kwacha devalued by 20%. Subsequent agreements imposed further stiff conditions, such as a reduction in domestic demand, the eventual elimination of food subsidies, liberalisation of the agriculture industry, further devaluation of the Kwacha,⁴⁹ a general de-control of prices, auctioning of foreign exchange and substantial liberalisation of trade and external payments, de-control of interest rates, and reduction of public expenditure especially on social services such as education and health. This later measure culminated in the introduction of medical fees at government hospitals and fees for all boarding schools. Clearly the IMF was imposing a re-orientation of government policy from one which provided some welfare programmes to one purely market oriented.

In terms of its impact on the worker, the IMF conditionality is felt at two levels:-

1. The worker may experience insecurity in employment which can materialize in loss of job. He or she may experience loss of income due to the wage freezes and a pay package with shrinking purchasing power.
2. The worker experiences higher costs of living and a declining standard of living. The cost of living has been on the increase since the 1970s.

The consumer price index for the low income group has increased as follows:-

1975	100.0
1980	202.9
1985	513.3
1986 (July)	794.9 ⁵⁰

Escalation of the cost of living has been aggravated by the withdrawal of food subsidies as stipulated by the IMF conditions. And since 1987 workers have had to meet medical fees, school fees for boarding school and examination fees for Grade 7, 9, and 12.

As will be elaborated in subsequent chapters, the level of unionisation for workers in the formal sector in Zambia is quite high at about 90%. In the face of these assaults, the unions have endeavoured to protect the interests of their members. In 1984 for example, the ZCTU authorised its affiliated unions to demand for K50.00 wage increase to offset the high cost of living. At times however, workers have not always waited for their unions to act. In November 1974 workers in Lusaka and the Copperbelt held hostile demonstrations when the government announced an increase in the price of commodities including cooking oil and bread[Gertzel, 1984: 91]. In January 1985, the public service was gripped by wild cat strikes which included industrial action by junior doctors and nurses.⁵¹ The response of workers to price

increases would have been more ferocious, were it not that they take place against a background of severe shortages of all commodities including mealie-meal and bath soap. Such that when commodities reappear, often on the black market, workers buy whatever the price merely to stave-off starvation. Shortages have been most severe in 1978 and 1979 and again in 1983 and 1984.

Nevertheless worker militancy has been in clear evidence at the height of the 1980s economic crisis. During 1986/87 workers engaged in a series of strikes to demonstrate their displeasure and anger at the effects the IMF conditionality and World Bank inspired SAP was having on their lives. In December 1986 when subsidies on breakfast maize-meal were removed, workers went on riot, destroying property. The security forces called in to contain the situation opened fire on the crowd in Kitwe killing 15 people. The rioting and looting was brought under control, but in the end, the government was forced to rescind its decision to withdraw subsidies on breakfast maize-meal.

This was to be only the beginning. Sustained reaction to the economic crisis was still to come. Early in 1987, fifteen months after the auctioning of foreign exchange had been introduced, the country appeared to be in the grip of a strike-wave. Workers of all categories, white collar as well as blue collar went out demanding wage increases to offset the high cost of living. The campaign started with a teachers strike on the 5th February in Chipata, after that, junior doctors, Zambia Airways engineers, civil aviation workers, nurses, media and typographical workers, agricultural workers at Nakambala sugar estate and construction workers all went on strike, one after another, sometimes simultaneously, between 5 February and 30 April.

Violence occurred during some of these strikes. For example a ZECCO chief engineer had his jaw broken by irate workers who were angered by the none-payment of salary arrears. The economic crisis has made things difficult not only for workers and management but for trade union leaders as well, a point confirmed by a Lusaka based Ministry of Labour official of eighteen years experience. When asked to comment on press reports alleging that trade unionists were inciting workers to go on strike, responded,

A hungry man does not need an outsider to incite him to go on strike, his empty stomach and the cries of his hungry children are sufficient. We have many very responsible and very hard working trade union leaders... but times are hard...⁵³

There was the likelihood of the situation deteriorating further. Early in April 1987, ZIMCO announced an increase in petrol prices. After a week of hesitation, the price increases were rescinded by the President. Rumour had it that "there were 'plans' for another riot, this time a 'burn down' of petrol stations and major oil installations".⁵⁴ Workers are concerned about an increase in petrol prices, as they tend to be reflected in increases in bus and taxi fares as well as in food prices.

As an immediate response to these strikes, the government announced tough measures against strikers, including a directive to management to sack workers involved in illegal strikes. At the same press conference, the ZCTU was threatened with dissolution if:

...it persisted in misguiding its members and associating with suspicious Western organisations offering undercover funds.⁵⁵

Despite the harsh words the government could not ignore the strikes as they threatened the much prized "peace and stability" of the nation. On May 1 1987, the President announced a break in the relations with the IMF, suspended the IMF conditions, scrapped the foreign exchange auctioning and fixed the rate of the kwacha at K8·10 to US\$1·00. The auctioning system the President said, "had brought pain, malnutrition and death to the people of Zambia".⁵⁶

In order to arrest the escalating cost of living a list of controlled prices on certain essential commodities was announced. The following day, people celebrated in the streets of Lusaka with placards carrying anti-IMF slogans. To replace the IMF programme, the government, adopted its own "New Recovery Programme" in August 1987 which was promoted on the slogan, "growth with own resources".⁵⁷ Among other things this programme limits the payment of the foreign debt to 10% of all foreign exchange earnings after deductions for agriculture. Time alone will tell the fortunes of this recovery programme. The important thing to note is that, in this one instance, workers struggles and resistance had brought enough pressure to bear on the government to make it abandon a programme that was hurting the people. Given Zambia's underdevelopment, and especially its dependence on the international copper markets, it is unlikely that the "New Recovery Programme" will lead to a transformation of the economy. This can only be done if Zambia were to change its position in the international division of labour and relinquish the dominance of capital in Zambian society. For the time being there is no sign of that happening. As such, the Zambian state is still caught up in the economic crisis that has gripped peripheral capitalism in the 1980s and it must continue to mediate between the various classes to ensure its own survival.

1.12 CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have undertaken a thematic review of Zambia's recent economic history in order to establish the context within which to analyze state-labour relations. We have reviewed those aspects of the Zambian economy that impinge on the condition of labour. We have discussed the founding of the country as an economic venture. We have discussed the origin and subsequent development of the copper industry and the development of industrial relations during colonial rule. We have noted that the state has always taken an active role in the economy. The company state engaged in primitive accumulation to underwrite the costs of administering the economy. The colonial state intervened in the economy

to regulate access to the means of production, especially land, by so doing it altered the way indigenous people related to the means of production, fostering the creation of new classes. With independence, political power was transferred into the hands of an indigenous governing class. For nationalistic economic reasons, the post-colonial state intervened in the economy, to open up opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurs, create state capitalist enterprises and joint ventures with monopoly capital.

Here, we have laid out the broad outlines of economic and social history. We have noted the shape of class processes and state/labour relations. In the chapters that follow, we shall flesh them out and assess how accurate the hypotheses we have raised are. We have indicated that, as a participant in the economy, the post-colonial state mediates between the bourgeoisie (with its external and internal factions), the workers and the peasants. It initiates action towards each of these classes. We shall demonstrate how the state mediates towards labour through interactions with its representative organisations. In this chapter we have discussed the state's reassessment and eventual break in relations with the IMF, both as an example of worker militancy and of government's response to it. In the next chapter, we examine the evolution and development of the working class in Zambian society to establish the basis of the militancy of Zambian workers.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. Sir Harry Johnson said "That part of Africa which is well within the tropics must be ruled by whites, developed by Indians and worked by blacks", quoted in P. Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma*; quoted in Henderson, 1973: 9.
2. For details of Lobengula's trials with Rhodes and his British South Africa Company see; Marshall Hole, *The Making of Rhodesia*, and for an interesting fictional portrayal see Stanlake Samukange, *On Trial for My Country*.
3. For details of British South Africa Company rule and its exploitation and neglect of the territory, see H.C. Thompson, *Rhodesia and its Government*, 1926.
4. A discussion of the official justification of this view is discussed in, Fergus MacPherson, *Anatomy of a Conquest: The British Occupation of Zambia, 1884-1924*.
5. See Muntemba, 1977, on the development of underdevelopment in Kabwe rural; Momba, 1982, on Mazabuka District.
6. For the shortages of labour on the Southern Rhodesian Mines, refer to Van Velsen's *Chibaro*.
7. Personal communication from Chief Kasabi Kamwanga of Kaoma District, 17 April, 1987.
8. See Momba, 1982, On the Plateau Tonga and Muntemba, 1977, on Bulenje especially in the Mumbwa district.
9. For the regional and sectoral distribution of industries see Szeftel, 1978.
10. The despatches on African paramountcy were as follows:-
 1. 1923 — The Devonshire Declaration of the principles of paramountcy.
 2. 1927 — Amery's White Paper on "Future Policy in regard to East Africa". This paper stipulated that the British government would adhere to the principle of African paramountcy.
 3. 1930 — Lord Passfield's memorandum on "Native Paramountcy in East Africa".
11. For a thorough documentation of this process, see A. Hazelwood and P.O. Henderson, *Nyasaland: The Economics of the Federation*.
12. For an example of the experiences of Settler Farmers in Northern Rhodesia see Robert Rotberg, *Black Heart*.
13. Elliot, 1971: 64; Elena Berger, 1974, gives a different interpretation of this agreement. She argues that the increase was a cost of living allowance, a basic wage increase was rejected as was the demand for a closed shop system. Whatever was actually gained is not very important. What is important is the perception of the Africans as to what they thought the whites had achieved through strike action.
14. The Africans pointed this out to the Foster Commission that had been appointed to investigate the circumstances leading to the 1940 strike. Details are provided in Chapter Two.
15. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1966: 66.
16. Elliot, *op.cit.*, pp.78-80. See also the chapter by J.B. Knight, "Wages and Zambia's Economic Development" in Elliot, 1971: 91-121.
17. For a concise analysis of the "social character of the Nationalist struggle...", see Szeftel, 1978: 102-134.
18. Nyerere, 1968. Zambia's shortage of indigenous capital might not have been as severe as Tanzania's, however, the principle argument, against the dominance of foreign capital holds true for Zambia as well.

19. Kaunda, The President's Address to the National Council of UNIP, Mulungushi, 19 April, 1968, mimeo, Freedom House.
20. For an analysis of the growth of indigenous capital see C. Baylies, *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol.20, no.3, 1982.
21. For recent examples of abuse of office, see Woldring, 1984, Chapter 7.
22. Schuster has precisely complained about this inconsistency in government policy when commenting on the government's attitude towards women petty traders in her article, I. Schuster, "Marginal Lives: Conflict and Contradiction in the position of female traders in Lusaka, Zambia", in Edna Bay, (ed.), *Women and Work in Africa*.
23. Woldring for example, refers to the President's speech after the miners' strike, in which he warns of the damage strikes can do to Zambia's credibility with international investors and aid donors.
24. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1966.
25. President Kaunda's speech, 1965.
26. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1971.
27. The final paragraph of the last chapter of Hall's optimistic book *Zambia*, 1966: 299.
28. For a discussion of uneven development in Zambia, see Szeftel, Ph.D. Thesis, 1978: 80-81.
29. The argument is outlined in Gertzel *et al.*, 1984: 14-15.
30. Kapwepwe as Vice-President threatened to call out the Army and Police to deal with striking municipal workers in Lusaka who interfered with those who wanted to return to work. Quinn in Elliot, 1971.
31. Gertzel, 1984: 21, the argument is that the highly educated and professional Bembas in the Cabinet were well compensated for, and by their participation in government they had in fact become an effective part of the ruling elite and therefore had no cause to join the opposition.
32. Interview with the Secretary General of the NUCIW, March 1987. Also Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1971.
33. A battery factory at Mansa, a Mercedes Benz truck assembly plant at Kasama and a police training school at Chinsali.
34. For a detailed discussion of the development of the Zambian bourgeoisie, see Gilbert Mudenda in Klaus Woldring, *Beyond Political Independence*, 1984, Chapter 5. The composition of the the Zambian bourgeoisie is presented in table form in Appendix 3.
35. For example the appointment of Michael Sata as Governor of Lusaka; Godfrey Simasiku as Governor of Petauke.
36. *Times of Zambia*, 21 April 1980.
37. A look at the list of the people arrested for their alleged involvement in the coup attempt will confirm this:

Elias Chipimo	Chairman, Standard Bank Ltd.
Valentine Musakanga	Former governor of the Bank of Zambia, Chairman Honda (Z) Ltd.
Edward Shamwana	Lawyer, former High Court Commissioner, Manager ITT
Plus 3 senior army officers	
and Patrick Chisanga	
38. We have referred to Chipimo's remarks above. However, the clearest example of this is Mwaanga's testimony of an African capitalist as encapsulated in his two books:-
 1. *An Extraordinary Life*: an autobiography, 1985.
 2. *The Other Society*: A Political Detainee's diary, 1987.

The second is supposedly a book on the lives of prisoners based on his diaries while in detention on charges of mandrax trafficking, but which is full of pompous boasting, self praise and stinging criticism of government economic policy and bureaucratic inefficiencies.

39. Probably older, but look eight due to malnutrition and stunted growth.
40. View expressed by the Chairman General of the ZCTU during an interview in March 1987. Earlier in June 1985, Copperbelt member of the Central Committee (Rankin Sikasula) admitted in Ndola that "the high unemployment rate in Zambia is contributing to the rise in (sic) crime wave". *Times of Zambia*, June 17 1985.
41. ZDM, 29 April, 1987.
42. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1978, p.6.
43. See Table Four.
44. *Sunday Times of Zambia*, January 10, 1988.
45. Ministry of Labour, Annual Report, 1976.
46. Ministry of Labour, Annual Report, 1978, p.5.
47. See Table Five.
48. G.R.Z., *New Recovery Programme*, 1987: 3.
49. Kwacha devaluations:

1976	20%
1978	10%
1982	20%
1986	955% as a result of the auctioning of foreign exchange.
50. Monthly Digest of Statistics, 1986: 41.
51. *Times of Zambia*, "Opinion", January 19 1985. The opinion said wildcat strikes scared investors, whom Zambia needed and cautioned workers not to be selfish. It put the blame for the occurrence of the strikes on trade union leaders who it said did not keep members informed of the progress of negotiations.
52. *Times of Zambia*, March 5 1987.
53. D.S. Nyambe, Ministry of Labour interview, June, 1987.
54. The "Rumour" was intimated by a Kitwe based journalist.
55. *Times of Zambia*, 29 April, 1987.
56. Radio and T.V. broadcast, May 1, 1987.
57. G.R.Z. *New Recovery Programme*, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1987.

CHAPTER TWO

EVOLUTION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ZAMBIA: ROOTS OF WORKER MILITANCY

In Chapter One we demonstrated the capacity of the workers and their trade union movement to engage in collective action to promote their economic interests. In this chapter we turn to the evolution of the working class in Zambia in order to determine the roots of the militancy of Zambian workers. We do this by examining the development of different forms and degrees of consciousness among the workers and relating these to the various types of worker organisations that evolved in response to industrialisation, as an expression of the degree of collective consciousness reached. These developments are reviewed against the background of the penetration of capitalist relations of production discussed in Chapter One and against the rules and regulations that obtained in the colonial state. The legal framework is important in that it defined the parameters within which worker organisations operated. Using Cohen's framework of worker resistance as presented in his "Resistance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness amongst African Workers", I demonstrate how in the Zambian case it is possible to argue that working class organisations developed in parallel and correspondingly to the growth of the working class and the development of consciousness among workers.¹

Cohen has argued that African workers manifest different kinds of consciousness and resistance during the process of proletarianisation. The forms of resistance may be 'hidden' or 'overt' and they may be executed at the individual or group level. Further he has pointed out that the "labour process under capitalism" entails proletarianisation and the enforcement of industrial discipline among the workers. This has consequences for the worker in five significant ways [Cohen, 1980: 11]:

1. Enforced Proletarianisation

The process of proletarianisation itself involves a change in the way workers relate to the means of production and how they procure a livelihood; they may experience a change from self-sufficiency in subsistence to a dependence on wage labour.

2. Managerial Control

Workers experiences new relations in production. More likely than not, they may find themselves at the bottom of a hierarchical authority system headed by (in descending order) directors, manager, gang-bosses, foremen and supervisors.

3. Differential Rewards

Workers may find that they are regarded at varying levels through pay scales they have no control over.

4. Political Control

Workers are obliged to conform to a 'political and juridical structure' that supports the capitalist system. Cohen points out further that these various ways of relating to the means of production and to other men were in Africa delivered through the medium of colonialism.

In this context, workers have responded in a variety of ways. Cohen groups these into a list of fifteen responses that workers' may manifest towards the capitalist labour process. The responses are further subdivided into hidden forms, which range from desertion to theft, and overt forms such as unionisation and political strikes. Cautious of the danger of seeming to portray these responses in a unilinear developmental pattern, he postulates that, the hidden forms of consciousness and resistance can exist as a "subterranean reservoir of consciousness", and I would add, sometimes simultaneously with the overt forms of resistance. The overt forms are highly dependent on the capacity of leadership to build upon the experiences and 'feelings' of workers and give expression to these. He concludes, however, by noting that, in Africa, so far, trade union leaders have not succeeded in channelling worker dissent into a 'progressive or revolutionary' direction.

While workers' consciousness as such can and does exist without officially recognised leaders or formal trade unions, in an earlier study, Cohen and Sandbrook identify three levels of consciousness [Sandbrook and Cohen, 1975]. The first is elementary in form and requires simply the acceptance by a group of workers of their common identity based on similar roles in the production process. The second is a more developed consciousness which includes a recognition that workers have common economic interests as a class which need to be protected through collective organisation against the opposing claims of other classes. The third level, according to Cohen and Sandbrook is rarely attained, and

...includes a further conviction that there is an irreconcilable antagonism between capital and labour and that the interests of working people can only be achieved if the capitalist system is replaced by an alternative socialist system ...the last form is obviously a thoroughly political consciousness often associated with sporadic or continued violence involving the workers. [ibid.: 8]

Using a combination of Cohen's typology of workers' consciousness and Sandbrook and Cohen's theory of the development of worker consciousness as a framework, I demonstrate how in the Zambian case, workers' consciousness has developed from a mere consciousness of economic circumstances to proletarian consciousness.

As indicated in Table 7, agricultural producers and pastoralists develop a consciousness of economic circumstances when they come into contact with the capitalist mode of production. The contact stimulates the need and in some cases the desire for a cash income. The contact may be in the form of a labour

recruiting agent, a tax collector or a merchant. The need for cash may therefore be imposed by an outside authority or may be self-defined. Whatever the case, when the workers do engage in wage labour their relationship to the means of production changes, and they also lose some control over the ways their labour power is expended. They come under the supervision of a foreman who determines the pace and duration of work (Cohen's managerial authority). In Zambia's case, most opportunities for wage labour involved labour migrancy, which meant temporary separation from, or loss, of the traditional means of earning a livelihood. As wage labourers or as forced labour, workers develop responses to their economic circumstances. Initially they may develop only 'hidden forms of consciousness' due to the existing political structures and their resistance may be expressed at individual or group level in 'hidden forms of protest'. Depending on the size of the working class and the legal and political environment workers find themselves in, this consciousness may assume certain identifiable organisational forms. With the growth of the size of the working class and the introduction of new ideas from outside, discussion among workers of their economic condition intensifies. This may occur in innocuous associations such as the Mbeni and Kalela dance societies where the discourse of the workers is articulated in the songs of these dances.² It may also occur in anti-establishment associations such as in religious movements which may result in the formation of independent churches. Here, the discourse is articulated through the 'Word of God'. In circumstances where workers have formed stable communities and are possessive of the skills of reading and writing and the articulation of ideas in verbal form, workers may congregate in Welfare Associations, their form of protest being mainly debates and peaceful demonstrations.

With the further growth of the working class and the change from a 'permanent target' worker to that of a 'temporary target' worker and an increased commitment to and dependence upon wage labour, workers' economic consciousness increases, enabling them to rise up *en masse* in riot when they feel their economic interests threatened, such as in the 1935 protest strike in the copper mines.³ This first major disturbance came almost ten years after work began to develop the Northern Rhodesian Copper deposits. In "Resistance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness", Cohen spelt out a typology of forms of resistance. I am suggesting here that it is possible to see the development of these different forms of consciousness and resistance expressed in associations of progressive sophistication. In the Zambian case we see the various responses from both management and workers. Cognizant of the growing awareness and willingness of the workers to express their frustrations in the work situation, management responded by facilitating the formation of Associations of an intermediate nature such as the Council of Tribal Elders. These were intended as reservoirs for the containment of worker discontent, aimed at channelling this discontent through legal, administrative and traditional conduits of conflict management. The class consciousness of workers could not, however, be contained or dissipated in this manner.

Table 6

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ZAMBIAN WORKING CLASS AND WORKING CLASS ORGANISATIONS

Progression in Years	Stage of Development of the Working Class	Level and Dominance of Consciousness or Ideology	Responses to Industrialisation: Type of Labour Protest	
			Formal Structure of Organisation in the Industrial Centre	Worker Action
Up to: 1900	Agricultural Producer/Pastoralist (Pre-Capitalist mode of production)	0 Consciousness of economic circumstances		
1905	Start of Migrancy	Hidden Forms of Consciousness Socio/Economic Consciousness	Fluid/ad.hoc. Religious Organisations Burial Societies Mbeni Dance Society Native Welfare Associations	Hidden forms of Protest Independent Churches (Chiliastic ideas) Spontaneous Religious/Peasant Uprisings, e.g. Chilembwe Uprising 1915 Welfare towards members Watch Tower - (Black Christians) Dancing and discourse Debates, Protests
1935	Migrant Labour (Permanent target worker)	1 Economic Consciousness	Council of Tribal Elders Craft Associations	Protest Strikes
1945	Migrant Labour (Temporary target worker)		Elected Tribal Representatives	Industrial Strikes
From 1951	STABLE Working Class	2 Proletarian Consciousness	Trade Union and a Trade Union Congress	Well Organised Industrial Strikes

In certain circumstances workers turned these management-created institutions to their own use to procure advantages for themselves from management.

We demonstrate further that in the **Zambian case**, with the increase in the size of the working class and the stabilization of the workers from a temporary target to a stable industrial work force, coupled with the spread of ideas of collectivities, workers intensified their efforts to form labour organisations. However, in the absence of a legal framework to enable them to do so, they were at first unable to form proper trade unions. Instead, they democratised the system of Tribal Elders and elected their own tribal representatives. When the functional limitations of the tribal representative system in the industrial situation became evident, they formed craft associations of industrial workers. However, it was only when the law was changed and Africans allowed to form trade unions, that workers were able to do so. They then proceeded to use these for 'overt forms of resistance' such as strikes to support their economic demands. This is not to suggest that the hidden forms of resistance have been transcended; far from it, responses like desertion, theft, accidents and sabotage persist. But the dominant and formal means of collective resistance now find expression in trade union activity.

In other words, while I acknowledge that worker consciousness of economic circumstances exists before the formation of worker organisations and that there are forms of protest other than industrial strikes, I argue that the trade union as an organisation of workers is a higher form of worker action. In fact, as it has been argued, as far as the ultimate political liberation of workers is concerned, the trade union may be of limited value as it is dependent upon the legal sanction of the state.

According to Perry Anderson, trade unions cannot be viable vehicles of advance towards socialism by themselves, since by their nature they are tied to capitalism and while they can bargain within a society for better conditions for workers, they cannot transcend themselves and transform society [Anderson, 1977: 334]. As we shall demonstrate in the **Zambian case**, the pattern of worker action accommodated itself to the superior and conditioning power of the state. Be this as it may, I take comfort in Anderson's optimism when he argues that a democratic union is still an effective tool against capitalism. Anderson believes that wage bargaining can still lead to the abolition of 'wage slavery' especially if a 'global struggle' is waged in this regard. Workers are weak when not organised and it is only in combinations that their individual militancy can best serve their interests.

In **Zambia** therefore, as in many other territories under colonial rule, the pressure to form representative organisations in the industrial centres, emanated from the incipient working class. This pressure emerged as a spontaneous reaction of the indigenous workers to the total sphere of exploitative industrial capitalism. It was, however, guided and channelled into British style trade unionism by the efforts of a British trade union officer despatched to the colony for the purpose. Before this, the early

forms of trade unionism appeared in a non-systematic fashion and often in secrecy, not unlike the situation in England before the repeal of the anti combination laws. The development of trade unions in Zambia is therefore discussed against the background of the laws and regulations that controlled combinations of workers in the territory. Since the development of trade unions assumes the existence of a working class, the evolution and growth of the working class is discussed for this purpose and also to demonstrate the simultaneous and corresponding development between the growth of the working class and representative institutions and the development of both as an expression of workers' consciousness. The overall purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the origins and development of the militancy of Zambian workers.

Trade unions in general, and trade unions in Africa in particular have been studied from many perspectives as we have shown in the Introduction. Of the general studies Poole's study is most interesting and reviews a wide range of trade union theories. Its major limitation from the point of view of this thesis, however, is that it makes no mention of trade unions in Third World Countries. One other study that deserves mention is Scoville's analysis of the factors that influence the structure of labour movements [Sturmthal and Scoville, 1973: 58-78]. Scoville discusses the importance of the goals and means of a labour movement, pointing out that the "political characteristics" of a society seem to influence the orientation of a labour movement. Under repressive regimes, labour movements tend to emphasize political issues in order to bring about political change [ibid.: 65]. Political objectives also seem to be emphasized, he argues, at the initial stages in the growth of a labour movement especially in conditions where power in society is concentrated in a few hands. Under such circumstances trade unions would tend to emphasize the "redistribution of political power". He therefore attributes the political orientation of trade unions in the colonies to the rigid and authoritarian political systems in which they found themselves. As society progresses, the goals and structures of the labour movement change in response to the mutations in its environment. However at another level, Scoville points out that the initial structure of the labour movement exercises a lasting effect on its orientation, especially in respect of the ideology formed at the beginning, which may persist and influence the "shape of the external parameters" [ibid.: 74]. This is important in the case of the commonwealth countries, because the initial industrial trade unions were introduced by British trade union officers.

Of interest also is Richard Hyman's discussion of the industrial relations in terms of "conflict and accommodation". Hyman sees the participation of workers in capitalist process of production as being characterised by conflict given that they give their labour power out of external compulsion and work at tasks which they do not enjoy. Industrial workers resent the fact that they are not compensated at levels adequate to satisfy their needs and that they are exploited. The consequent conflict manifests itself in various forms, including strikes in extreme cases, but also in boycotts, political action, restriction of out-

put, sabotage, absenteeism, personnel turnover and even in peaceful bargaining and grievance handling procedures.⁴ Through the practice of industrial relations, industrial conflict becomes institutionalised and "provisional containment of disorder" is attained. However, because trade unions as organisations emerged historically from the conflict of interests between wage labour and capital, they must continue to express this antagonism in order to retain any plausible claim to represent employees. The trade union leader has therefore to learn to walk the tightrope of operating within the laws and regulations that allow the existence of unions, and at the same time effectively representing the interests of members. This theme of conflict and accommodation is one that can be identified in the pattern of the development of trade unionism in Zambia. Conflict was apparent very early on in the development of the working class and led to the development of worker consciousness among the migrant workers in Zambia's industrial centres. It characterised the process that led to the formation of trade unions. Accommodation became evident in the efforts of the worker organisations to work within the law and present themselves as reasonable and rational organisations that observe law and order even when they have not been a party to defining that order or making the law.

There have also been specific studies of the African working class and of the formation of trade unions in Africa as we have indicated in the introduction [Sandbrook and Cohen, 1975; Stichter, 1975; Crisp, 1984]. In this chapter we examine the formation of the working class in Zambia, noting the special role played by the system of migrant labour in this process. We examine the growth of the working class and seek to identify incidents and patterns of worker consciousness and the organisational forms in which it finds expression. We look at the tribal representative system and its limitations; at the welfare organisations and finally the trade union as the highest form of workers' economic organisation.

2.1 FORMATION OF A WORKING CLASS IN ZAMBIA

In this section of the chapter, we trace the growth of the working class and the development of workers' consciousness as a prerequisite to the formation of trade unions. We demonstrate that the development of trade unions in Zambia was a result of a dual evolutionary process. On the one hand, trade unions developed as a corollary to and corresponding to the level of the development of the numbers of men engaged in regular wage labour and their feelings of class solidarity. And on the other they evolved as a consequence of the changes in political thinking in the colonial office, which made changes in the law, enabling their legal existence. The role of the state as a facilitator of trade union activity is crucial to their effectiveness.

The formation of the working class itself did not begin in Zambia until the penetration of capitalism into Southern Africa. There are no records of gangs of itinerant workers in pre-capitalist Zambia similar to those Cohen discusses for West Africa [Robin Cohen, 1976: 156]. Generally speaking however, in the period prior to 1900, most Africans were engaged in pre-capitalist agricultural production, while paying tribute to their tribal chiefs. Wage labour began on a significant scale with establishment of the mines and manufacturing industries in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia around the turn of the century, when Africans from the territory began to travel south and engage in wage labour [Pim Report, 1938: 29; Henderson, 1973: 14]. Initially this occurred on a small scale. The need to engage in wage labour may have been internal to the individual, occasioned for example by the need to pay the bride price or to pay a fine or to provide for the basic needs of a new home upon marriage, such as a few blankets, pots and farm implements. The tempo of migration increased after 1900 when the British South Africa Company had assumed political control of the territory and granted licences to agents recruiting labour first for South Africa and then for Southern Rhodesia. At times the need was externally imposed, such as when necessitated by the requirements to pay the poll tax, which after 1905 could no longer be paid in kind [Gann, 1966: 103].

Within Northern Rhodesia itself, the first form of wage labour that Africans engaged in was as carriers for Europeans. Later when the latter established themselves in industry, on the land and as administrators, Africans engaged themselves as wage labourers to these outposts of foreign capital. Even then, in the first thirty years of industrial activity in Northern Rhodesia, 1920 to 1950, labour continued to be basically of a migrant nature. The First World War had also provided opportunities for Africans to engage in wage labour, mainly as carriers in the East African Campaign [Pim Report, 1938, p.25].

The rate of migrancy increased, along with the European need for labour. To encourage more Africans to engage in wage labour, harsh measures were employed, such as the restriction of markets for cash crops, the confiscation of land and creation of reserves for Africans, the deliberate destruction of African granaries and burning of huts. This made wage labour the only means of earning cash for most Africans except where the proximity of markets allowed agricultural produce to be sold.⁵ The pattern that emerged was that it was mainly men who engaged in migrant labour. The work was hard and the pay very low. In some areas this meant that African men engaged in wage labour on an intermittent basis, preferring short contracts to long ones. Among some ethnic groups, such as the Mambwe of North Eastern Rhodesia and Lunda of Luapula, wage labour was carefully integrated with agricultural production on a seasonal basis [Perrings, 1979: 180]. Heisler points out, for example, that among the Mambwe, wage labour was undertaken for six months between harvest until the next rains, when the men would again return to their villages to prepare their fields for planting [Heisler, 1974: 24-26].

The living and working conditions of the migrant labourers were very harsh particularly for the recruits. Conditions during transit were so bad that many arrived at work sites in an unhealthy state and often died. The mortality rate among Northern Rhodesian migrants was very high both on the Rand and in the Tanganyika gold mines. On the Rand, the number of deaths among men from the tropics prompted the authorities to prohibit recruitment north of the 22nd parallel [Pim Report, 1938: 29]. The Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau, however, continued to recruit as the figures in Table 7 below indicate. The time workers spent away from their traditional homes varied in the beginning from six to eighteen months. The average man undertook several trips in a lifetime. In the early years, however, he had no choice but to return to his village as no provision was made for his permanent stay in the industrial centre. Commenting on this pattern of participation across the two modes of production, Perrings argues that, a "structural basis to the oscillation of black workers had been established by 1911" [Perrings, 1979: 5]. The village served as a base for such a worker. With time, as opportunities opened up to engage wage labour and as village life became more impoverished due to the absence of its virile young men, African men stayed for longer and longer periods at the industrial centres. Their urban destination was variously in Southern Rhodesia, Katanga or Tanganyika, since to the African, the whole of the Central Southern African region was one economic unit. Men travelled to wherever they thought they could secure the best wages and conditions of service. For example, Merle Davies reports that in 1920 about 5,500 Northern Rhodesian Africans were employed in the Katanga mines, comprising about 48 per cent of the Africans employed there. About 24,000 more were employed in Southern Rhodesia, in the mines, on European farms, and on the railways. Another 2,500 worked in Tanganyika in the Lupa gold mines or on the sisal plantations [Merle Davies, 1938].

Table 7

**NUMBER OF LABOURERS FROM NORTHERN RHODESIA
DISTRIBUTED BY THE RHODESIA NATIVE LABOUR
BUREAU IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA**

Year	Number of Labourers	Year	Number of Labourers
1906	1579	1916	4142
1907	7590	1917	8549
1908	7411	1918	5418
1909	7457	1919	8509
1910	9120	1920	14579
1911	6588	1921	9058
1912	12126	1922	4060
1913	6501	1923	5348
1914	5408	1924	4409
1915	6602	1925	9028

Source: Henderson, 1973: 15

The longer the period spent in the industrial centres, the more likely it became for the rationale for continued engagement in wage labour to change. In the initial stages, the African aimed to earn a specified amount of money and then return to his family and relatives in the village home. However, as conditions changed, the period of stay in the industrial centre increased especially when families were allowed to join the worker, who was then obliged, in the industrial centre, to earn not only his subsistence from capitalism, but also the subsistence of his family. This happened however, in a minority of cases. Most of African wage earners found themselves engaged in a process where there was a separation between the reproduction and maintenance of labour. While the industrial sector served to maintain the worker, during the period of employment, the peasant sector maintained his family, reproducing the next generation of labour and offering the worker sanctuary at the end of his working life.⁶ Precise figures are difficult to determine but, by 1930, some 102,000 able-bodied Northern Rhodesian Africans were engaged in wage labour in the South-Central African region at varying degrees of stabilisation [Clegg, 1963: 38].

Whatever might have been the initial impetus that brought the African in search of wage employment, it meant that time spent on the industrial site away from the tribal home was in the early years short and undertaken only at intervals of two or three years. In these early years the African in the industrial centre still identified himself or herself as a member of a certain tribe from whom he received support and towards whose members he had responsibilities. This meant that while he was engaged in industrial work away from the tribe, he experienced loneliness and felt the need for a community. Yet his stay and experience in the industrial centre was not long enough and his commitment of industrial life not deep enough to enable him to form working class organisations at this stage. In addition, legal barriers prevented his doing so even if he had the desire and capability. If the working conditions in the industrial centre became unbearable, he reacted by quitting his job and returning to his kin in the rural areas. From the point of view of the African, the very practice of migrant labour at yearly intervals was a way of adapting to the harsh physical conditions [Ohandike, 1969]. The objective material position of the worker was that of a seasonal cultivator or husbandman interspersed with periods of temporary engagement in industrial wage labour. His level of consciousness and social organisation corresponded to this material position. Consequently, the African in the beginning had no formal means whatsoever for articulating his grievances, which were rather expressed through what Cohen calls "hidden forms of protest". These occurred mostly at the individual level or among small groups of workers and most were carried out covertly. They included actions such as absenteeism, desertion, accidents and underproduction. It is to a consideration of the forms of worker consciousness that we now turn.

2.2 WORKER CONSCIOUSNESS

Worker consciousness and industrial action has typically been associated with the industrial worker, but recent research on workers in the Third World, such as Crisp's work on Ghanaian mine workers and Van Onselen's study of mine workers in Southern Rhodesia, has shown that worker consciousness and resistance to economic exploitation is evident even among the peasant/workers who oscillate between wage labour and peasant production. Cohen's typology obviously occupies a central place in understanding worker consciousness among African workers and informs Crisp's study. In colonial Ghana for example, Crisp gives an account of porters who would restrict the weight of luggage carried for wages to thirty pounds and restrict travel time to daylight hours, observing that when Africans carried for themselves, they could carry up to 100 pounds [Crisp, 1984: 16]. In Southern Rhodesia, the mining industry faced a critical labour shortage during the period of reconstruction (1909-1913). Van Onselen notes that Shona tribesmen, among whose area the mines had been located, did not favour the prospect of wage labour for the low rates the mining companies offered. In order to meet their monetary requirements they produced cash crops. This strategy of avoidance and desertion also finds an echo among the emergent proletariat in Zambia. The European farmers who had settled along the railway line in Central Northern Rhodesia constantly complained of a labour shortage and the fact that their workers were not reliable, that they deserted frequently [Muntemba, 1977: 352].

There were also other strategies of protest among the migrant workers. Among those from Malawi and Northern Rhodesia who travelled south, an informal network developed along the labour routes through which returning workers communicated information to the newcomers about conditions at certain mines by making signs in the barks of trees, indicating which mines were to be avoided [Van Onselen, 1976: 234]. Through such networks, men traversed through Southern Rhodesia to the Rand, or better still to the manufacturing industries of the Cape, for better wages rather than work for the low wages offered on the Southern Rhodesian mines. The labour situation was so critical that the Rhodesian mine managers resorted to forced labour, perpetrated through the Native Labour Recruitment Bureau to meet their labour requirements. Yet even forced labour did not give them a solution because workers deserted [Van Onselen, 1976, Chap.3]. In an effort to stem desertion and stabilise the labour force, the mining industries adopted the compound system that had first been introduced by the De Beers Company at its diamond mines in Kimberley [Van Onselen, 1976: 128]. African workers were confined in these barrack-like structures for the duration of their contracts. Yet even within these forced labour camps, a culture of resistance developed, which manifested itself in such organisational forms as burial societies, dance organisations and religious groups.

A. Burial Societies

The burial societies were based on the "tribal origin" of the workers and formed to provide some sort of social welfare. Thus there was a Nyasaland burial society for workers who originated from Nyasaland and a Shona burial society for workers from Mashonaland. In 1915 "The Loyal Mandabele Patriotic Society" was in existence; in 1917 there was also a Nyasaland Boys' Club, and in 1918, a Port Herald Burial Society [ibid.: 199]. While it may be true, as Van Onselen argues, that some of these groups were clearly patterned on social and voluntary organisations existing among the white community, there is no doubt that once constituted, they served as a forum for the discussion of social issues and for the fathoming of solutions to the common problems experienced by workers in the industrial centres.

B. Mbeni Dance and Discourse

One such group was the Mbeni dance society. In Southern Rhodesia this society did not restrict its membership to any particular tribe. Nominally it was a dance society, organised in a hierarchical order, where the members wore uniforms and used drums that looked like those in army bands — hence the name Mbeni, meaning a band in Citowne. The repertoire included some drill techniques which seems to have been derived from the military drills of the Colonial armies.⁷

The society traced its roots to German East Africa where it flourished from about 1890. From there it spread southwards to Southern Africa. In the mine compounds of Southern Rhodesia, the Mbeni dance society was perceived to:

bring together men who sought mutual relaxation through a form of dancing which they enjoyed. [Van Onselen, 1976: 201]

In between drills, however, workers discussed their work situation, their conditions of work and exchanged information gained from experiences of working in other mines. This they could do as the "dances" took place in the relaxed atmosphere of Sundays, when the compound police were not at their most vigilant. The Mbeni society met the felt needs of the African workers and because of this, the societies persisted wherever Africans worked in large numbers. Its social function became evident in Northern Rhodesia in the mid-thirties. During the protest strike of 1935 the network of the Mbeni dance societies was used to communicate information and to persuade men to go on strike. Two leaders of the Mbeni society at Nkana were among those arrested for their part in organising the protest strike [Henderson, 1973: 148].

On the Copperbelt, an indigenous version of Mbeni developed from one of the "tribal" dances and became very popular during the forties, through the fifties. Mitchell discusses Kalela in this context as most of the Kalela groups were composed of workers from a single "tribe" [Mitchell, 1956: 89]. To appreciate the social significance of Kalela one has to examine the discourse of the dancers as articulated in their songs and their manner of dress. Mitchell interprets these as a "pantomime" of the European way of life.

I think it is more to the point to see the smart European clothes as a rejection of the dark, dirty overalls that were a symbol of the hard labour workers had to endure underground and the songs as a form of social commentary of life in the industrial centres. The smart European clothes can also be seen as an attempt to refute the stereotypical image held by Europeans of Africans as dirty Kaffirs, the message being, that with the right kind of resources, they too could be smart.

C. Religious Protest

The third form of protest that manifested itself among migrant workers was religious in orientation. Christian missionaries played an important role in smoothing the way of colonialism in Northern Rhodesia as Robert Rotberg has shown in his study [Rotberg, 1963]. For the majority of Northern Rhodesian Africans, missionaries and their mission stations were the first point of contact with capitalist ideology and practice. Religious protest in the form of indigenous prophets and independent churches was therefore a way of coming to grips with capitalist exploitation and Western oppression. The experience with churches was not confined to Zambia or even to Africa alone, but common to the whole colonial world. I will briefly refer to examples in other colonial territories, Southern Africa and then review Zambian examples.

Vittorio Lanternari sees religious protest as:

a rebellion of the masses against the existing official cults imposed by a ruling caste. [Lanternari, 1963: viii]

The author regards religious movements of protest as part of the general political struggle against conquest by a foreign culture and political power. Hence their appearance among the American Indians in the USA and also among native peoples in Melanesia, Polynesia, Indonesia, in the Caribbean Islands and South America. In all the cases Lanternari discusses, the religious movements appear as a means of coming to terms with the socio-economic dislocation visited upon the indigenous communities by the newly introduced capitalist relations of production. They provide relief from the strains of adjusting to the new production relations as well as a form of protest against the capitalist system and a hope of a better mode of organising society. Drawing on Central African examples, Lanternari points out that, in the Belgian Congo, followers of Andre Matswa and Simon Kimbangu complained that:

Christianity is the religion which serves to keep wealth in the white man's hands while hiding from the natives the secret of his power. [Lanternari, 1963: 16]

In certain circumstances religious protest has led to attempts of withdrawal from capitalist society altogether. This is a form of protest, a hidden form, which occurs under circumstances of a partial understanding of the mechanisms of the capitalist mode of production. As an alternative to the mainstream christian churches, separatist churches are established in rural areas as well as in urban areas. For South Africa, Sundkler identifies three broad types in his study of one community [Sundkler, 1963]:

1. Ethiopianism

These were often off-shoots of missionary churches, that made a conscious decision to establish a separate church based on the doctrine of "Africa for Africans".

2. Zionist Groups

The leaders of these churches claimed to have received a message or messages from "God" in a dream or during serious illness, instructing them to set up a church and bring salvation to the people. God is acknowledged and so is the Bible, especially the Old Testament, but they tended to be ambivalent towards Jesus Christ of the New Testament and his role in their salvation.

3. Bantu Messiah Groups

This type of messianic group do not acknowledge Jesus Christ of the Bible as their saviour. They make almost no use of the Bible. Instead, there are Bantu Messiahs who bring the message of the "Supreme Being" who is concerned with the survival, prosperity and well-being of the black people in this world as well as the next.

While on the surface, the separatist churches appear to be concerned with supernatural issues, the misery they respond to has its origins in material conditions. As Sundkler has shown:

...the separatist church problem is a corollary of the land problem. [Sundkler, *ibid.*]

He points out that the number of independent churches in South Africa increased parallel to the tightening squeeze of the Africans through drastic land legislation [Sundkler, quoted in Lanternari, p.5]. In the Southern African context, the rise of separatist churches can be seen as a reaction to capitalism, industrialisation and the new social relations of production under capitalism, whereby the indigenous people lose control over their traditional forms and sources of subsistence and are forced to rely instead on wage labour over which they have no control, whether over the process, or the rewards. In protest they seek refuge in what Cohen calls "other-worldly solutions" [Cohen, 1980: 12].

In the Zambian context, religious protest took forms similar to those identified by Sundkler for South Africa. There were separatist churches that preached the "Africa for the Africans" nationalist doctrine such as Mokalapa's Ethiopian Church in Barotseland, which was a rural based church of short duration [Rotberg, 1966: 58-59]. Then there was the Watch Tower movement, which is a sort of Zionist group although it has ties with an international organisation, the Bible and Tract Society of America. The movement was most active between the two world wars and covered almost the whole country. Thirdly, there were also what Rotberg calls "Chiliastic Separatist Churches", which are a kind of black Messiah group. The most well known ones are the "Mwana Lesa" sect, the "Ana a Mulungu" and the Lumpa church of Alice Lensina [Van Binsbergen, 1981]. This third category is differentiated from the first by its lack of a clearly articulated political ideology which is very prominent in the first.

The discussion of religious movements of protest is being undertaken here in respect of a general movement response of labour to industrialisation, white domination, exploitation and oppression. I discuss examples from the Watch Tower movement in order to illustrate the concrete conditions within which the protest movement arose. I concentrate on examples drawn from the urban centres, but rural experiences are also included in order to demonstrate the generality of the experience of alienation suffered by the people. The inclusion of rural examples also underscores the point that the formation of a working class is not synonymous with the physical movement of people from the rural areas to the industrial centres as such. Rather it is a historical process through which people's relationship to the means of production is altered, a process through which people lose control over their means of survival and become increasingly dependent on the sale of their labour power for survival. During the period from 1915 to 1950 when both industry and the working class were emerging in the colony, this form of protest could only be a part of a generalised protest against the introduction of capitalism and the consequent changes in the relations of production that it engendered. However, when understood against the background of migrant labour where workers oscillate over long periods of time between wage labour and peasant production, the proletarian aspects of this form of protest become easier to appreciate. As an example, I discuss the incidence of the Watch Tower movement in Northern Rhodesia.

i) The Watch Tower Movement

The Watch Tower movement (Chitawala or Kitawala) is a South Central African variant of the Jehovah's Witnesses and was to a large extent supplied and financially assisted by the Bible Tract Society of America. The movement falls under the second generation of religious protest to manifest itself in Northern Rhodesia, the first being the Ethiopian type churches. It covered the industrial centres of Southern Rhodesia, the Belgian Congo, later the Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt and Barotseland [Cross, 1973: 6]. Rotberg sees the Watch Tower movement as an opposition to Colonial rule in general and there may be some merit in this interpretation. However, the fact that Watch Tower preachers were heavily active and found a willing audience in the industrial centres with many workers becoming converts means that the movement merits examination in the context of the development of worker consciousness in that the practice of this religion influenced how the worker interpreted his socio-economic situation and what he did about it. And, as Rotberg argues, religious activities

...provided the only means by which aggrieved Africans might reject foreign domination, voice aspirations displeasing to their rulers and achieve prominence outside of the Colonial context. [Rotberg, 1966: 135].

One might add that the most immediate form of "foreign domination" that workers experienced was in their employment relationships, where they worked at tasks they did not enjoy, under very unfamiliar circumstances (underground) and particularly as experienced in the very low wages they got paid for

these arduous tasks. In Southern Rhodesia, Van Onselen writes that, both the mining companies and the state perceived religion to be a "potentially powerful threat" and made it their business to monitor the religious life and activities of the workers held in virtual bondage in the compounds [Van Onselen, 1976: 184].

There is, however, a major difference in the recruitment patterns to the movement. In Southern Rhodesia Van Onselen notes that the movement attracted mainly the literate groups such as clerks, capitatoes, medical orderlies and compound police; and consequently the majority of followers were the mission-educated Nyasalanders [ibid.: 206-209]. In Northern Rhodesia, on the other hand, the movement attracted not only workers on the Copperbelt,⁸ but also villagers in rural districts in most of the Northern Provinces from Mkushi and Serenje in Central Province to Abercorn in the most northern part of the country as well as remote Barotseland [Rotberg, 1966: 136]. This is a reflection of the extensive effects of Colonial capitalism in Northern Rhodesia. The spread of the Watch Tower to the rural areas was a reflection of the underdevelopment perpetrated on these areas by the penetration of capitalism into the Colonial social formation, and especially the effects of the migrant labour system. The disruption capitalism brought into people's lives and the void it left in their perceptions and understanding of the circumstances of their life provided a fertile receptor for the message of the Watch Tower preacher.⁹ The case of Barotseland is slightly different. Here the movement was used as a framework for protest not against capitalist enterprises, but by the local under-classes against the Lozi feudal establishment [Cross, 1973: 6].

The Watch Tower movement was introduced to Northern Rhodesia by migrant labourers who had been deported from Southern Rhodesia, who had themselves been converted to the sect while in Southern Rhodesia by some Nyasalander followers of Elliot Kamwana. From about 1917 onwards they started preaching their new faith in Northern Rhodesia and found followers both in the industrial centres and in rural areas. They preached a doctrine that ridiculed white authority, they forecast the imminent coming of Judgement Day and the end of the world when the "last will be first and the first last". Those who wished to be saved had to prepare themselves by undergoing Baptism. They enjoined their followers not to obey the chiefs or European officials. They cast doubt on the teaching of the missionaries of the orthodox churches whom they accused of deceitfulness, saying they did not teach the true message of Christ. What was more damaging to the local economy, they told people not to bother to work their fields or take care of their animals as Jehovah would provide food from heaven beginning Judgement Day [Rotberg, 1966: 136]. This message differed in emphasis from that delivered by the Watch Tower preachers in the mining compounds of Southern Rhodesia; there the message emphasised the virtues of mainstream Christianity such as abstinence from alcohol, monogamy and fidelity, honesty, trust and love, all of which would have been acceptable to the authorities were it not that it was sandwiched in be-

tween a vitriolic attack on white superiority and secular authority. Preachers criticised the restrictions that the company state imposed on the Africans, such as Pass Laws, the tax and the appropriation of African land by white settlers, saying that God had not sanctioned such inequities [Van Onselen, 1976: 204]. In an effort to provide relief to their followers from the frustrating experiences Africans suffered from their white overlords, they predicted the end of white rule and settler exploitation. However, this relief was not to be brought about by the actions of the workers themselves, but by the divine intervention of God.

In Northern Province in the Mbala district, the District Commissioner had some African Watch Tower adherents and preachers arrested, fearful that their seditious doctrine would cause trouble. The action caused a mini riot as the rest of the followers acted to impede the removal of those arrested. Troops and machine guns were brought in, only this show of force enabled the District Commissioner to arrest 138 people. These were later tried in the High Court. Most were sentenced to short terms of imprisonment, which the Judge hoped would deter other followers from carrying out seditious activities [Rotberg, 1966: 138]. The imprisonment of some of the Watch Tower followers did not, however, dissuade new recruits to the movement. In fact, the Watch Tower adherents looked upon the prison sentences as persecution by the secular government which earned those who suffered it, merits in heaven.

The movement was generally popular because it provided an avenue for the frustration the Africans felt in dealing with the white authorities. Its stagnation in later years can be attributed to the fact that it was unable to deliver either the material or the spiritual benefits it promised. Judgement Day was constantly postponed. The reversal of the roles between Africans and Europeans did not occur and neither did the removal of all whites "back home to England". The Church, however, continued to operate through much of the colonial period and beyond, into the post-colonial era, albeit at a reduced tempo.

Although the Watch Tower movement, like some of the other religious sects, provided some kind of relief to the frustrations suffered by subject peoples, it did not directly contribute much to the growth of proletarian consciousness or collective action in pursuit of the worker's cause. Indeed, with its emphasis on individual salvation, repentance and baptism in readiness for Judgement Day, as Van Onselen and others have argued, it may have distracted workers from developing proletarian consciousness. However, it still represents a form of protest and a reaction to industrialisation in the sense that it questioned the class relations and the subordination of the black people to capitalist relations of production. Its limitations are a function of the level of class formation attained in society at that level in society's development.

D) Welfare Associations

Among the literate, white collar workers, the development of working class consciousness found popular but tentative expression through what were called "Native Welfare Associations". These were local associations bringing together teachers, Boma messengers, clerks and shop assistants at the town level and were often designated by the name of the town. The proper categorisation of this group of people is still fraught with problems. Conventionally they are referred to as an "elite" due to their possession of skills over and above the ordinary villager and due to their education and life style [Southall, 1959]. Meebelo calls their associations "the league of the new Elites" because he says they are composed of:

a group of people who have acquired skills and talents differentiating them from the rest of the people. They enjoy positions of pre-eminence over all Africans.
[Meebelo, 1986: 42-43]

But "elite" is a status category not a class category and to call the clerks and teachers of colonial Africa an "elite" obfuscates the economic position of these workers. When we examine these teachers and clerks as part of the capitalist mode of production that had been thrust into Africa, from the point of view of the wages they received, (which in designating their relationship to the means of production, defines their class) then we are compelled to re-examine the usefulness of the term 'elite' as an analytical category. I see these groups of workers and their Associations as the precursors of white collar employees and their trade unions. The teachers now have their own National Union of Teachers, while clerks and others in similar categories have the Civil Servants Union of Zambia and the shop assistants have the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers.

The first Native Welfare Association was formed at Mwenzo Mission in 1923. The leaders of this Association were a clerk and a Reverend. These two, with other literate workers at the Mission, started the Association in order:

to provide a forum where Africans could express their political and social views.
[Rötberg, 1966: 124]

At the Association's meetings, members discussed the life of the African in the new mode of production and its attendant relations of production. These were expressed in terms of "urban conditions". There is, however, nothing urban about a mission station with just a school and a clinic, without any industries or even a tarmac road, other than the fact that it was an outpost of capitalist development. And, as such, the members of the associations were expressing their bewilderment at the nature of their incorporation into the capitalist system and protesting against the conditions of their incorporation. The class-consciousness of the group was still incipient at this stage, hence membership of the Mwenzo Association was, according to the constitution, open to "Chiefs and whites".¹⁰ It is befitting that Welfare Associations first started at a mission station because, as Mitchell points out, missionaries were among the first European employers of African labour [Barbour and Prothero, 1961: 195]. Workers at mission stations had

the longest experience of wage employment and suffered the most severe exploitation for two reasons. First, the resources available to their employers were quite limited in the sense that very little money was provided by the churches at home for payment of African staff; secondly, the interpretation of the Protestant ethic in an African situation meant that African workers on mission stations were preached into working long hours for very low wages. Here religion was actively used in the service of capitalism.

In the Mwenzo Welfare Association, therefore, members discussed their living conditions, their wages, relations with the whites in the mission and relations with their white employers. In 1923 they "protested against the heavy tax burden that the government forced rural Africans to bear" [Rotberg, 1966: 124]. The activities of the Welfare Associations in the other centres were similar. But the response from the authorities varied. In Kasama, the Provincial Commissioner for the Northern Province described the welfare association there as:-

merely a debating society that afforded a means of recreation to a number of better educated natives who might otherwise be much worse employed. [Meebelo, 1986: 45]

This comment demonstrates two important points. The first is the flippant nature with which Africans were treated by the white administrators. The second, related to the first, is that in their efforts to maintain the Colonial law and order, administrators were anxious to dismiss any attempts by Africans to organise as being of no consequence. •

The society at Mwenzo lasted a few years. When Donald Siwale was transferred it became moribund. The idea was rejuvenated in Livingstone, however, when five civil servants from Nyasaland organised their colleagues and asked the government if they could form:

A Northern Rhodesia Welfare Association in order to help the government improve the country and deal with matters and grievances affecting the native people. [Rotberg, 1966: 125].

In the perception of the members of the Native Welfare Association, the low wages they received was a consequence of their subordinate political status. They therefore thought that by getting organised they could create a forum from which they could influence government policy in their favour. The Provincial Commissioner at Livingstone conceded the request. However, he advised the workers not to use the name Northern Rhodesia, but to call their association after the town. The Livingstone Native Welfare Association (LNWA) held its inaugural meeting in late 1930. Its tone was reforming and very cautious, with some members arguing that Africans should not ever aspire to be equal to whites as the latter were their "fathers" [Rotberg, 1966: 125-126]; Meebelo, 1986: 44-48]. Other participants were not so congenial, arguing instead for a united anti-tribal stand, and contending that it was only through unity that Africans would gain "freedom" [Meebelo, 1986: 48]. Generally, however, the discussions were over common complaints such as the treatment of blacks by whites, the practice of forbidding Africans from

walking on the pavement, the lack of social services for urban blacks and the lack of a market. Some fundamental issues were also raised, such as the appropriation of black lands by whites. The land question was brought up for discussion by two chiefs from around the Livingstone area when they had attended some of the meetings [Rotberg, 1966: 126].

Subsequently, a third Native Welfare Association was formed in Ndola when the vice-president of the LNWA was transferred there. Ernest Muwamba joined forces with other clerks and formed the Ndola Native Welfare Association (NNWA). This association cajoled the administration into agreeing to build a hospital for Africans at Ndola.

Other Native Welfare Associations were formed at Kabwe, Mazabuka and Lusaka and some even in the rural areas such as Mbala, Kasama and Fort Jameson, as mentioned earlier. The activities of the associations were, however, restricted by government policy to so-called "detribalised Africans" and prevented from organising among or "speaking on behalf of natives living in the tribal areas" by the Secretary for Native Affairs [Rotberg, 1966: 132]. The Native Welfare Associations were also barred from discussing political issues. Despite these restrictions, the enforced focus on welfare issues did advance the cause of workers in Northern Rhodesia, as Meebelo argues:

the Welfare Associations had given some impetus to the struggle by the African worker in N.R. to improve his lot. ...they took up important issues with the authorities which forced the pace of change in labour relations. [Meebelo, 1986: 49]

Meebelo gives the example of the Choma Native Welfare Association which, in 1934, Challenged the "ticket system" which, members argued, among other things deprived an African worker of his pay while he was ill in bed. The ticket system worked in such a way that a worker was paid for 30 working days, excluding Saturdays and Sundays if he did not work on those days. A ticket was marked at the end of the day to indicate that a worker had completed a day's work. While an African worker was ill he got no pay as the ticket remained unmarked. He was therefore not able to meet his bills for rent and other necessities and often he ended up being evicted from his house. The Burial and Friendly Societies discussed earlier in the chapter helped to organise transport money for the return journey to the village for such a worker. The welfare societies, however, wanted to improve the working conditions of the worker within the capitalist system. In response to this complaint, the ticket system was not abolished, but the Provincial Commissioner for Southern Province was prompted into enjoining employers not to evict workers who found themselves in such situations and pointed out that in any case, under the 1929 Employment of Natives Act, employers were obliged to provide free accommodation for their employees.

The Native Welfare Associations were making clear inroads into the privileges of colonial society. Their progress was, however, hindered by strict government policy on their activities and by government creation of sponsored alternative associations in the form of Urban Advisory Councils [Meebelo, 1986: 49]. Deliberate government policy and administrative practice circumvented the growth of Welfare Associations. They continued to operate at a lower profile than when they first started and in the repressive atmosphere of a colonial political economy, increasingly focused attention on political issues. In 1948 the welfare associations held a territorial wide meeting in Lusaka and founded the African National Congress, the territory's first African political party.

2.4 WORKING CLASS ORGANISATIONS

Trade unions as organisations of industrial workers first came into being as "proto-unions" in the form of "Tribal Representative Councils". These were quasi-official organisations of workers at the plant level. In most cases they were formed at the suggestion of management in the hope of establishing control over the activities of workers. They appeared, therefore, as a consequence of industrialization and the engagement of Africans as industrial workers. More specifically, as a consequence of the development of a working class. As the working class developed over time, and as it still continues to develop from the peasantry, so different forms of organising emerged, corresponding to the level of consciousness among the workers. The council of tribal representatives was such a rung on the ladder to trade unions proper.

a) Tribal Representatives

The system of tribal representatives was a mode of representation developed by managements operating a compound system or who provided concentrated accommodation for their employees. It was promoted as a way of maintaining contact with the workers, but from management's point of view, intended as an instrument of control. The large employers of the period, Rhodesia Railways, Zambezi Sawmills and some of the copper mining companies all developed variations of the tribal representative system.

Tribal representatives evolved from the system of Tribal Elders that was first introduced at Roan Antelope mine in 1931 by the compound manager, Mr. Spearpoint [Epstein, 1958: 27]. Previously the only contact between the Compound Authorities and the workers was through the "Police Boys" who were the "disciplinary force" in the mine compounds. In 1931 mine management asked each tribal group to select representative elders to a "Council of Tribal Elders". The workers responded favourably and ten elders were selected [Epstein, 1958: 28]. Meetings of the Council were attended and chaired by the Compound Manager. Elders discussed the general situation of workers in the compounds concerning

their living conditions, the state of their accommodation, the quality and quantity of food rations, the behaviour of the "Police Boys", violence towards workers and related issues.

In addition, the council heard and settled petty cases of a domestic nature among the African workers and their families. In this function, as Epstein argues, the council supplemented the efforts of the compound police as "an agency of social control". Also of interest is the fact that this system owed its legitimacy to the institutions of the village and of Chieftainship. It was basically an institution with which to control the "temporarily displaced tribesman". Thus the Elder or the Representative was identified on a tribal basis. With time, some measure of democratic practice was added to the selection procedure, the representative was elected by members of each tribe. But those who were elected happened to be in one way or another related to a tribal chief [Epstein, 1958: 49]. As an organisation of workers, the Tribal Elder system did not accomplish much. Its achievements were limited by the nature of the institution, in particular its connections to the tribal authorities and the fact that in some places, initially at least, the tribal elders were appointed by management and not elected by the workers and consequently management could veto the range of issues with which the Tribal Elders concerned themselves and discussed. A second limiting factor was the quality and skills of the people who were selected to become tribal representatives. Although some of the tribal representatives were "boss boys", the majority were ordinary labourers elected on their standing within the "tribal community" in the industrial centre, without any regard to such issues as the level of literacy, organisational skills or ability or knowledge of trade union principles. Such knowledge was lacking in the majority of workers due to lack of exposure. Except for a few individuals who had previously worked in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and had heard of, or had come into contact with the work of Clements Kadalie and the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), the majority of workers were ordinary villagers engaged in the circulatory system of migrant labour and peasant production.¹¹ The "migration of ideas" had not yet brought these workers into contact with the basic skills of trade union organisation. Their participation in the council of elders was a way of accommodating themselves to the realities of working and living in the industrial centres. It constituted a way of taking on a new challenge. Through these councils workers were able to secure small concessions from management regarding food rations, accommodation, and work uniforms. Although they did not discuss wage rates, the tribal councils contained rudiments of trade union activities.

2.4 (a) (i) WORKER MILITANCY I: THE 1935 PROTEST STRIKE

With the growth of the working class and the increase in the experience of workers, the limited usefulness of the system of Tribal Elders as a form of worker representation became more evident. Workers' emergent consciousness, which manifested itself in the tendency to discuss wages, made mine management want to monitor, channel and contain all potential consciousness. But the workers' growing con-

sciousness pushed the structures of control forward, requiring new modes of containment. The first signs of the contradiction between the level of development of the working class and their associated level of class consciousness on the one hand and the form of representation of workers on the other manifested itself during the Copperbelt protest strikes of 1935.

However, before we examine the events of 1935, we must first of all look at the growth in the levels of employment in the period. Using figures from Table 8, we notice that by 1935 employment had almost doubled from what it was during the depression, from 9,323 in 1931 to 16,464 in 1935, but had not returned to the peak achieved in 1930 during the construction and development of the copper industry.

Table 8

GROWTH OF WORKERS IN THE MINES

YEAR	NO. OF MEN	YEAR	NO. OF MEN
1927	9,113	1932	5,503
1928	10,747	1933	8,052
1929	16,584	1934	14,617
1930	21,839	1935	16,464
1931	9,323	1936	15,137

Source: Pim Report, 1938, p.35

Another important factor contributing to the context within which the protest strike of 1935 occurred was the mining companies' policy towards the stabilization of black labour. The colonial government was committed to indirect rule, having reaffirmed the principle as late as 1929, with the Secretary of Native Affairs stating that:

The fundamental principle must be to encourage the native to develop his own areas and his own form of government by gradually absorbing ideas of civilised government as he can understand them. [quoted in Heisler, 1974: 90].

The colonial state was therefore concerned to ensure that workers remained temporary residents in urban areas. The mining companies on the other hand, recognising that stable labour was more efficient, made overtures to encourage labour to work longer contracts. The Rhodesian Selection Trust group of companies especially, were ahead of Anglo-American in this regard, so that by 1935 there were already workers at Roan Antelope and Mufulira who were committed to wage labour as a way of life. There were also many who had tasted unemployment during the depression.

The 1935 protest strike was sparked off by an announcement in May of an increase in the poll tax that was due to be paid by Africans in the urban areas. In Mufulira the announcement was made by an African "police boy" who had gone about shouting in the compound that taxes had been increased. The workers could not believe that the government could increase taxes in the middle of the financial year at a

time when they did not receive a wage increase. And indeed when real wages had declined. To the workers the increase in taxes meant a higher rate of exploitation, and they were incensed. The following day, 600 out of 3,000 stayed away from work in protest. The clerks at Mufulira held a meeting, and later contacted the leaders of the Mbeni Society. By 22nd May there were no African miners at work at Mufulira [Henderson, 1973: 146]. The skilful handling of the men by the Compound Manager averted violence at Mufulira [Russell Commission Report, 1935: 17]. The compound manager addressed the men and explained the rationale behind the tax increases. But news of the increase in the poll tax and the strike at Mufulira spread to the other mines of the Copperbelt. At Nkana the apparatus of the Mbeni Dance Society was used to mobilise the workers for the strike. But when the authorities became aware of the role of the Mbeni in the strike and two leaders of the Mbeni, Samson Chisanga and Petulo were arrested [Henderson, 1973: 148].

At Roan, the leadership of the strike was drawn from the Mbeni Dance Society, Watch Tower Society and the Council of Tribal Elders, Though other members of these societies refused to take part and sought refuge with the Compound authorities.¹² On the second day of the strike, about 2,000 workers gathered on the football field. Efforts by the District and Mine officials to address them were unsuccessful and the officials withdrew to the office. The strikers demonstrated their anger by beating the ground with sticks and stones. Acts of violence occurred, including an attack on the compound office with sticks and stones. There were also reports of looting, especially of foodstuffs, from the compound store. The police, who had been issued with rifles and ammunition, started firing into the riotous crowd. Six men were killed and twenty-two injured.¹³ These six, along with the 19 others who were to die in the 1940 strike at Nkana, are the martyrs of the Zambian labour movement. A plaque to their memory is etched in the entrance hall of Katilungu House, headquarters of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia.

The decision by the colonial government to raise taxes had been necessitated by the increasing cost of maintaining the administrative machinery in the colony. The depression had put considerable pressure on the resources available to the colonial government, which decided that one way of raising money was to put a high levy on the Africans.¹⁴ And yet most of government revenue went on procuring services for the white population of Northern Rhodesia. As the Pim Commissioners observed:

...those interested in Native development inquire on exactly what Native purposes this tax has been expended, or if indeed the Europeans of N. Rhodesia are not becoming the Blackman's burden. [Pim Report, 1938: 107]

The nature of the distribution of government revenue would indicate that the Africans were contributing more than they were receiving in services from the administration. During the 1929-30 financial year, for example, Africans contributed 1/5 of total government revenue, or £125,270. Government expenditure on Africans, on the other hand, was only £12,028, with a further £11,471 spent at departmen-

tal headquarters. Even added together the amount is still a small proportion of total government expenditure of £554,524 [Henderson, 1973: 91].

It is against this background of exploitation and oppression that the protest strikes of 1935 should be understood. The exploitation suffered by the workers manifested itself in the low wages and the high cost of living. The depth of discontent and frustration came to light during submissions to the Russell Commission which had been set up to investigate the circumstances leading to the disturbances. Witness after witness told of insufficient wages, of inadequate rations, of inhuman treatment by white supervisors, the humiliating racist attitude of white miners towards black workers and physical violence against blacks.¹⁵ The evidence shows that the worker was already well aware of his subordinate position within the community of the industrial centre and was particularly conscious of his subordinate status to his employer. He was increasingly becoming impatient with his condition and vociferously expressed the desire for change. The protest strike of 1935 was therefore an overflow of this discontent and frustration, for which the tribal elder system did not provide an adequate channel of redress.

Perrings explains the violence at Roan during the 1935 protest strike in terms of a sense of desperation of the men brought on by the retrenchment programme then in progress due to restriction in copper production agreed upon by the copper producing countries [Perrings, 1979: 210-211]. These workers were committed to wage labour and increasingly the rural areas were seen less and less as an alternative. They therefore went on strike to protect the proportion of their pay that went to maintain them and their families, he argues.

Perrings, however places undue emphasis on the desperation of the men at Roan as the cause of the violence there. A quota imposed on the whole country is likely to affect both companies in similar ways. While their desperation may have triggered the strike, the immediate cause of the violence at Roan was the manner in which mine management handled the striking workers.

The Russell Commission attributed the protest strikes to the lack of contact between the local administration and the Africans in the urban areas, especially those in the mine compounds. To the Commissioners the problem was a political and not an industrial one. The recommendations to prevent a similar occurrence included such measures as the establishment of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, which was directed to undertake research into the African's way of life. The information from such research could subsequently inform official policy. Efforts were also made to improve contacts between local government and the copper industry [Russell Commission Report].

On the question of representative organisation for Africans, the Commission, keeping in line with contemporary settler opinion and local colonial administration, concluded that no need for such a body existed. Colonial policy was committed to indirect rule and the migrant labour system and opposed to what it termed "detrribalisation" and the permanent settlement of Africans in the industrial centres [Berger, 1974: 40]. Although government recognised the mining companies' need for a stable labour force, it opposed the permanent settlement of Africans in the industrial centres. In Heisler's words:

the government was in favour of stabilisation of labour without urbanisation.
[Heisler, 1974: 5-9]

It was anxious to keep the rural option to serve as a safety net in case of a slump such as experienced in the early 1930s. Believing along with the rest of the white establishment that the reproduction of African labour should be undertaken by the peasant economy, the Russell Commission came to the conclusion that the wages of Africans were adequate. Oblivious to the glaring contradiction, the Commission stated:

...the African was a 'non-economic' man with limited needs and insensitive to the many opportunities for self-improvement that were continually unfolding before him. [Russell Commission; also Meebelo, 1986: 60]

With this assessment of the African worker, the Commission concluded that time was not yet ripe for Africans to engage in trade unionism. Instead, it recommended that the system of tribal elders be revamped; improved and introduced where not yet in operation.

The growth of the working class was not held in check by official policy nor by the attitude of the settler community. The number of workers engaged in wage labour continued to grow, reaching 26,203 in the copper mines alone by 1940 [Henderson, 1973: 139]. The number of service industries around the mining towns also increased providing further employment opportunities for Africans. On the other hand, the rural option was increasingly becoming less tenable. The prolonged absence of male labour resulted in the decline in peasant agriculture. In Barotseland, for example, land opened up for agriculture reverted to the wild swamps due to lack of maintenance of the drainage canals.¹⁶ In Northern Province the Chitemene system could not be maintained at sufficient levels without male labour. Hence, those Africans in wage labour became more reluctant to return to the villages and stayed longer in the industrial centres, moving from one town to another, reinforcing the vicious circle of underdevelopment and stagnation in the rural areas. Sadly, the political economy of settler society meant that Africans continued to receive very low wages. In contrast to the wages received by Africans, European wages are given for comparison in Table 9. The contrast, not just in wages but also in the physical conditions under which the Africans and Europeans worked and lived, as well as a realisation of the gains the European union was making through industrial action, transformed the Africans, increasing their consciousness as workers and encouraging them to adopt strike action in pursuit of their economic interests.

2.4 a) (ii) WORKER MILITANCY II: 1940 INDUSTRIAL ACTION

In March 1940, following the example of the European mine workers' strike, African miners at Nkana, Mindolo and Mufulira went on strike demanding a wage increase [Meebelo: 1986: 114]. The strike started at Mindolo on Thursday March 28th, where all except 369 men went on strike. By the following day, the strike had reached a 100% force. From Mindolo the strike spread to Nkana and Mufulira by Friday, March 29th. At issue was a wage increase demand by the workers. In the wake of the European strike and the benefits they had been awarded, the mining companies offered Africans a 2s 6d bonus per ticket. This offer was accepted at Roan where the European workers had not gone on strike but rejected at Nkana, Mindolo and Mufulira. At Nkana and Mindolo the compound manager met with the boss boys and discussed the offer. The boss boys did not accept it and made counter proposals. No agreement had been reached when the meeting broke up, but neither the compound manager nor the District Commissioner suspected that there could be a strike the following day. At Mufulira the authorities had been warned about the possibility of a strike. Through their tribal elders, the workers had informed the District Commissioner and the Compound Manager that:

they intended to go on strike soon after the European strike for the same benefit as those which would accrue to the white miners. [Meebelo, 1986: 115].

A second meeting was held again between the authorities and the tribal elders at which the elders first informed the authorities of the workers' decision to reject the 2s 6d offer and then made a counter-demand of a basic wage increase of 5s plus "equal rights with Europeans". Their argument was that Africans did all the work. They challenged the white miners for each racial group to run a section of Mufulira mine and see which would be more efficient. The mining companies rejected both the wage demand and the productivity challenge. The miners, feeling they had no alternative, left, joined their colleagues at Nkana and Mindolo in the strike.

The workers were disappointed with the performance of the Elders in the days prior to the strike, whom they felt had not represented their interests to management adequately. For further negotiations with the authorities during the strike therefore, the miners at Mufulira selected a committee of seventeen men which subsequently served as the main link between the workers and the employers and the Secretary for Native Affairs and his District Commissioner. The committee put the demands of the workers to the authorities. They reiterated the complaints of bad treatment of black workers by white supervisors. They then put forward their demands, which included a pay of 10s a day, free food, free medical treatment and free housing. In making these demands, they pointed out that white miners had learnt the work from them and did no work, yet earned more, when they had gone on strike, had been given what they had demanded. The African who did the greater part of the work earned a pittance, he earned in a month less than what a white miner earned in a day [Berger, 1974: 57].

Table 9

A COMPARISON OF WAGE LEVELS FOR THE YEAR 1937

<p>A. <u>AFRICAN WAGES: (1937)</u></p>	
<p>1. <u>Mines Average:</u></p>	
Surface labourer	18s. 0d. pm.m.
Underground	31s. 6d. p.m.
Boss boys	27s. 6d. to 67s. 6d.
Majority of surface workers at Roan and Mufulira	12s. 6d. to 17s. 6d.
Majority of Underground workers (Roan and Mufulira)	30s. 0d. to 60s. 0d.
<p>2. <u>Nkana</u></p>	
Surface unskilled labourer	12s. 6d. to 20s. 0d.
Skilled labourer including Capitatoes	20s. 0d. to 40s. 0d.
Underground ordinary mine labour	22s. 6d. to 40s. 0d.
Boss boys	40s. od. to 50s. 0d.
Clerks maximum pay	£7
<p>B. <u>EUROPEAN WAGES: (1937)</u></p>	
<p>1. <u>Broken Hill SCALE</u></p>	
Surface	£38. 7s. 10d.
Underground	£44. 15s. 8d.
Overall (average)	£37. 17s. 7d.
<p>2. <u>Mufulira SCALE</u></p>	
Samplers	£30. 8s. 4d.
Engineerin Staff	£46. 1s. 8d.
Smelter Staff	£48. 8s. 9d.
Underground Supervisory Staff	£61. 15s 9d.
<p>£71. 6s. 8d.</p>	
<p>Source: Pim Report, 1938: 51-52 and 54.</p>	

The negotiations continued with workers backing their demands by surrendering their work tickets and demanding to be paid off *en masse* while they camped out on the football field. The strike at Mufulira lasted until April 8th. The inexperienced committee of 17, however, eventually succumbed to the pressure of the Secretary of Native Affairs to persuade the men to go back to work. Realising that they had failed in the mission for which they had been selected, they were afraid of telling the men to call off the strike and chose instead to have Mr Sandford address the men himself [Meebelo, 1986: 119].

At Nkana the callousness of the compound manager and his lack of diplomacy in dealing with the workers led to bloodshed. At this mine not even the rudimentary form of organisation in the form of Tribal Elders existed. Workers therefore milled around under spontaneous and temporary leaders who had no experience of consultative contact with the authorities. At times one man was delegated with putting the demands of the miners to the authorities.

On March 29th, African workers put up pickets along the entrance to the smelter at Nkana. The majority of the men gathered on the football field and spent nights there. The miners were getting more angry by the day, their anger exacerbated by the attitude of the Compound Manager who decided to withdraw all other food rations apart from maize meal. On 3rd April, police were put on patrol and the military were deployed in the compound. To aggravate the situation further, the mine management decided to go ahead and pay the few strike breakers at the compound office in full view of the strikers who had camped on the football field. The strikers reacted with anger, converging on the office. The police and military tried to disperse the men with tear gas, the sting of which must have infuriated the miners even more. They started throwing stones, bottles, bricks and almost anything they could lay their hands on, at the armed police and at the office. In the confusion that ensued, the army fired into the crowd, killing 19 and wounding sixty-nine, while the missiles from the workers wounded twenty African soldiers. Despite the fatal wounding of the strikers, the strike continued and did not end until April 6th 1940 [Meebelo, 1986: 124].

After the strikes of 1940 a Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir John Forster was appointed to investigate the circumstances that led to them. It heard evidence from both white and black workers on the Copperbelt. The record of evidence given by African workers is most revealing in the depth of their perception of the issues by the African workers. They wondered why it was that when European workers went on strike for higher pay they got what they wanted, but when Africans went on strike for a 5s. increase they were shot at and killed instead.¹⁷

Some of the more literate workers demanded that Africans be allowed to form trade unions to represent their grievances. European opinion, on the other hand, tried to underplay the industrial cause of the strike, insisting instead that the "native labourers had no real grievances and were merely out for loot".¹⁸ This from none other than the Secretary for Native Affairs, showed once again either disjuncture between official opinion and the feelings of the workers or the wishful thinking of the colonial authorities, or both. The laxity in official thinking on the development of proletarian consciousness among African workers was recognised at least by one of the assessors on the Forster Commission of Inquiry. Gore-Browne, later Sir Stewart, who was Representative for African Affairs in the Legislative Council, directing his criticism to the conduct and evidence of the mining companies, chided them thus:

...nothing we have heard so far seems to show that the mines recognise that (the wide differences between African and European wages exist) or intend to do anything to better it in any way ... I am convinced that the root cause of the strike was that feeling of injustice between white and black, helped on by the abuse we have heard of, and of course inspired by seeing the white men get what they want. That is the root cause and evil befalls everyone of us to ignore that, and I have not heard anything yet that gives confidence that the management are accepting that view.¹⁹

The abuse that Gore-Browne was referring to was supported by evidence of black miners who complained of beatings from their white supervisors and the compound police, bad food at the compound store, poor working conditions and the fact that Africans were required to wear heavy leggings when going underground whereas white miners were not.²⁰ Africans complained of being called 'boy', even when they were grown men, who had children of their own. But most bitterly of all they complained of the fact that there was no official representative channel through which Africans could voice their grievances as industrial workers.

At one point during the strike the mining companies persuaded Chitimukulu the Bemba Paramount Chief, to appeal to the workers to return to work. Thereupon Chitimukulu sent one of the junior chiefs as a messenger with a letter to read to the workers. At Nkana, one Bemba Tribal Elder gathered Bemba tribesmen together to hear the message from the Paramount Chief. During the reading of the letter one irate worker opposed to the intervention of the Paramount Chief, urged those close to the messenger to grab the letter and tear it. In anger, he exclaimed:

Why should we listen to Chitimukulu's letter, I am here as a worker, I work for the Bwanas, why should I listen to Chitimukulu do I work for Chitimukulu?²¹

What is clear from the evidence is the fact that Africans increasingly saw themselves as workers who wanted to be compensated according to the work they performed in the industrial centres and without reference to the living standards in the villages. Secondly, they made it clear that they wanted a form of representation through which they could present their grievances to their employers. They were no longer satisfied to be represented as groups of tribesmen.

The Forster Commission, however, recommended that African workers were still not yet ready for trade unionism as it was understood in Britain. But it did recognise that,

Some scheme should be devised to make articulate mass grievances and to ensure that such mass grievances are properly brought to the notice of management.²²

The Commission did not resolve the colour bar question, but merely recommended a 2s 6d wage increase for Africans. The issue was thought to be too sensitive and it was held unwise to antagonise white mine workers during the period when Northern Rhodesia copper was urgently required for the war effort [Rotberg, 1977: 223].

Although officially considered premature for Africans to form trade unions, the strikes of 1940 once again brought the question of African representation to the fore. Management and colonial authority's immediate response was once again to fall back on the 'Elder' system. This was revamped and Councils of Tribal Representatives were established on all the mines where there had been no such councils before [Berger, 1974: 83]. In addition, within official circles, efforts were made to identify a form of collective bargaining between the mine management and some of the African employees. Official objection to

the formation of trade unions was based on the belief that African workers were too uneducated and backward to understand the concept of their operation [Epstein, 1958: 61]. It would follow, therefore, that where there were partially enlightened workers, some form of organisation in defence of their interests was not only desirable but appropriate. In line with this thinking the Labour Commissioner, Rowland S. Hudson, in 1943 introduced the formation of "Boss Boys" committees for the African "gang leaders" on the mines [Rotberg, 1966: 177]. He still disapproved of unions for the majority of African workers.

African workers, however, predictably pressed for collective organisation and fora such as the African Provincial Councils were used to put their case forward. The African representatives in the Provincial Councils pointedly rejected the system of Tribal Representatives as inadequate and unsuitable for representing workers' interests. Gore-Browne, the representative for African interests in the Legislative Council, reported, after a tour of the Copperbelt towns, that the three most discussed about issues by Africans at meetings were: "wages, strikes and African trade unions" [quoted in Meebelo, 1986: 169].

Despite the failure of the Tribal Elders to offer effective leadership, either in the protest strike of 1935, or that of 1940, there is a sense in which tribal representatives served as a primitive form of trade unionism. From its source in Luanshya the tribal elder system spread to Mufulira and Broken Hill. After the miners industrial strike of 1940, the system was introduced at Nkana, Nchanga, Zambezi saw mills in Livingstone and Rhodesia Railways at Broken Hill. One feature of the tribal representatives was that the councils were set up in the residential compound and not on the shop floor. Secondly, the Council of Tribal Representatives was often set up at the suggestion of compound managers. They were intended as a conduit of communication to channel views from workers to management and vice versa. However, in the repressive atmosphere of the compound system, the tribal representatives dealt with practically all problems that concerned their members, including living conditions in the compounds, working conditions, social services provided for African workers and food rations, as well as serving as a Court of Arbitration to settle "compound squabbles and domestic disputes".²³ In some places the Labour Commissioner discouraged the Tribal Representatives from performing the latter task. In the more established Tribal Councils, such as at Roan, on the other hand this was a central role of the Tribal Representatives [Epstein, 1958: 53].

On industrial issues, Tribal Representatives instructed their people to be good workers and to observe their contractual obligation to the employers. But they also served a progressive function. Rate of pay issues were a constant agenda item at the meetings of Tribal Representatives and compound managers, although the authorities tried to discourage them from discussing economic issues. Tribal Representatives constantly directed their efforts towards extracting better working and living conditions from their em-

ployers, which is the first principle of trade unionism. For example, at a meeting of the Elders of the Zambezi Saw Mills at Livingstone on 4th February 1943, Elders requested management to erect bath houses in the compound. This was agreed to by management and carried out, with one side for men and the other for women. Secondly, they asked that the verandahs of their houses be walled to a height of about three feet. This too was done, providing the occupants with a place where they could sit and relax, free from too much wind and dust. Thirdly, they asked that some place be provided in which the Elders could hold their meetings. The company loaned them an empty house. The Elders also raised other issues concerning the distribution of maize ration, which they requested should be raised from ten to fourteen cups a week. At subsequent meetings, shelter for train crews, the state of the rest camp for African travellers and the provision of a water pipeline to new married quarters were discussed.²⁴ Also discussed was absenteeism with the Elders pointing out that the reason workers were "sick" so often was because the work was too strenuous and often undertaken continuously without any rest days. The workers also complained that they were not getting enough war news, a problem soon rectified by the information officer in Livingstone when he procured a radio set for the compound.²⁷ All these and similar demands, though presented in a polite and orderly manner, were aimed at improving the living conditions of the worker and to mediate the rate of exploitation.

Workers in other industries at Broken Hill and the Copperbelt made similar requests through their Tribal Representatives which I regard as an exercise in the conflict and accommodation scheme. In these efforts Tribal Elders were the functional equivalent of trade unions, although they were not called trade unions.

B. Trade Unions

In spite of the pressure exerted by African workers to form trade unions, this desire could only be translated into reality when official policy changed and opened up to the idea of trade unions for African workers. In Northern Rhodesia, labour policy began to evolve in a somewhat coherent fashion only after 1940. The Labour Department was established in that year. Prior to that, matters pertaining to African workers were dealt with by the Department of Native Affairs. The main function of this department was the control of African economic activities and the maintenance of law and order. From this perspective the native was to be administered through the traditional chiefs through the system of indirect rule. He was only to be allowed to migrate to the industrial centres at such times and in such numbers as required by the capitalist enterprises established in the industrial centres.

Initially, therefore, Africans were encouraged to engage in wage labour by the introduction of the poll tax. At the same time the government did not want the establishment of a permanent black working class. By their own admission, they did not want to get caught up in the rigours of providing for old age pensions or unemployment benefits during periods of economic depression. Africans were encouraged

to go back to the village after eighteen months to two years of wage labour and to send their children to the village when the latter reached the age of ten [Pim Report, 1938: 48]. With the establishment of the copper industry, this policy soon came into conflict with the interests of the mining companies. Luan-shya, Broken Hill and Mufulira soon preferred a stabilized labour force, while Rhokana, like the government, preferred that their African workers return to their villages to recuperate after two years of wage labour [Pim Report, 1938: 42]. For their own economic interests, the colonial administration and the Anglo-American Corporation urged for a policy and practice that ensured the separation between the maintenance and the reproduction of labour.

The government's objectives in this regard found expression first in the 1929 Master and Servants Ordinance which regulated the movement, nature and terms of African employment in the industrial and administrative centres. Secondly, the 1929 Vagrancy Ordinance stipulated that an African Worker should return to his village or country of origin if he could not find work within a stipulated period of time [Heisler, 1974: 98]. However, in the next year Lord Passfield distributed his "Native Paramountcy doctrine for East and Central Africa" memorandum. This implied a re-assessment of colonial administration policy towards the position of the African in colonial society in general. The memorandum did not bring any visible changes however, and in the years between 1929 and 1935 the virtues of the migrant labour system were still extolled by the colonial authorities, who pointed out that the peasant economy had served its purpose during the depression by absorbing the unemployed.

After 1935, however, the government was prompted to search for an appropriate labour policy. Governor Young appointed a Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board to advise him on relevant issues pertaining to African labour, such as on industrial conditions, unemployment and the breakdown of tribal control. In addition, he appointed Major G. St.J. Orde-Browne as head of a commission to carry out a comprehensive investigation of the labour problem. Though paternalistic towards black labour, the Commission criticised the colonial administration for poverty among Africans in the industrial centres. Major Orde-Browne also thought that Africans were primitive and uneducated and could not manage trade unions.²⁶ After the survey, the Major recommended the creation of a labour department as a means of regulating African labour. Consequently, R.S. Hudson was appointed as Labour Commissioner in 1940. Within the new department, the attitude towards African labour was that, "Towns for Africans" should be constructed in the industrial centres within which an African could achieve "balanced stabilisation" over a lifetime. According to this line of thought, the African workers would spend his childhood in the "peasant areas, then spend the most productive period of his life in the towns, and finally retire to a village" [Heisler, 1974: 103]. The African worker was condemned to a life of a temporary target worker by official policy. In official parlance, the policy was referred to as "stabilization without urbanization" and remained government policy until the terminal period of colonialism.

Even with the creation of a labour department, the question of trade unions for Africans was still treated with suspicion. Soon after his appointment as substantive labour commissioner, Hudson visited South Africa. While there he was asked by black South African trade unionists about the possibility of organising in Northern Rhodesia; he replied that the time was not right. In his notes he wondered whether "these queries were bona fide or under the influence of our gallant allies the communists".²⁷

Government policy towards trade unions for African workers changed with the coming to power of a labour government in post-war Britain. In November 1946, the Governor, Sir John Waddington, told the new session of the Legislative Council that "the formation of African trade unions was the ultimate goal of government" [Hooker, 1965: 17]. This announcement did not, however, change the thinking of the colonial administrators in Northern Rhodesia, where there were powerful sectors that were against the formation of trade unions by Africans. As late as 1941 the Secretary for Native Affairs was advising the labour Commissioner that,

the labour officer, could in a sense carry out the functions of a shop steward and together with Tribal Representatives be in effect the native labour trade union.²⁸

The Labour Commissioner opposed trade unions for blacks, as did white trade unionists, who would concede the possibility only if their union organised black labour. Most whites feared trade unions among blacks would mean the entry of communism into Northern Rhodesian politics. On the other hand, the few knowledgeable black workers wanted some form of organisation through which they could voice their grievances and within which they could carry out collective bargaining. This is demonstrated by the formation of craft associations at places of work.

In 1943, first the Shop Assistants' Association were formed in four copperbelt towns. They collectively drew a list of grievances which they forwarded to the local Chamber of Commerce through the labour department. Secondly, on the mines, a Clerks' Association was formed. In 1946 Contractors' Labour Association was formed in Chingola and in 1947 a Drivers' Association was formed. In their desire to form trade unions, African workers had the support of the Colonial Office in London, who felt that it was time to initiate the training of Africans in democratic principles and procedures and to encourage the development of trade unions along "proper lines".²⁹

In pursuit of this policy, the Colonial Office sent William Comrie to Northern Rhodesia in 1947 with the express mission of guiding Africans to form trade unions. Comrie's reception in Northern Rhodesia was cool. He was attached to the Labour Department in Kitwe as a Trade Union Labour Officer, but received very little help from the Labour Department, because of his job description having been designed in London by the Colonial Office. Some of the established Labour Officers resented this intrusion on their territory. Comrie had to feel his way, doing a job without precedent. His environment, however,

was not as hostile as that which confronted James Patrick in Kenya, who was told by the local administration in Kenya to return in twenty years time.

Comrie's approach to the formation of trade unions by Africans was to introduce the subject through a series of meetings and seminars. In Kitwe, educated Africans had established the practice of holding meetings called the "Brains Trust" at which topical issues were discussed. Europeans sympathetic to the African cause, such as Gore-Browne, attended some of them. Comrie used these meetings as a way of establishing contact with educated Africans and also of introducing trade unionism as a subject for discussion.

When he had generated sufficient interest he began to hold meetings and seminars of his own. He discussed principles of trade unionism, trade union administration, basic trade union accounting and democracy within unions. While many African workers were very receptive to these ideas, others expressed caution. In Luanshya a group of workers asked him why the delay and need for lectures. They were ready to form unions immediately, they told him. At a meeting in Mufulira, on the other hand, a worker asked him whether, if they formed a union and went on strike, they would be shot at by the army and the police, a fear it turned out, which had been precipitated by remarks of Mr. Field, the compound manager at Mufulira as well as the events of 1935 and 1940.³⁰ The mine authorities at Mufulira were particularly hostile to the idea of African trade unions and deliberately distorted the dangers of trade unionism. Mr. Field is alleged to have told workers that "if they formed trade unions there would be shootings and killings and the leaders would be arrested" [Meebelo, 1986: 173]. When Comrie confronted Mr. Field with these allegations he reportedly did not deny them.

Mr. Comrie's efforts found a particularly ready audience among the shop assistants and tailors who had already formed Associations at Mufulira, Nchanga, Nkana and Ndola. Building on this, with Comrie's assistance, the Shop Assistant's Union was formed in 1947. Its members were regarded as the enlightened workers at this stage of the development of the working class in Northern Rhodesia, whereas miners were regarded, even by other workers, as being "too barbaric" to understand or appreciate such complex issues as trade unionism [Epstein, 1958: 90].

Soon after its formation, the Shop Assistants' Union put forward a list of grievances and demands.

These included:-

1. Uniformity of practice among employers in matters relating to housing and ration allowances for their workers;
2. A minimum wage for shop assistants;
3. A provision for periodic increases;

4. Better terms for and uniformity of practice governing piece work;
5. Some common rules concerning the use of sewing machines;
6. The provision for pensions and gratuities after fixed periods of service.

Some committees also asked for:-

7. Free or subsidised transport for employees who were proceeding on leave, and,
8. Guaranteed pay for periods when a worker was too ill to work.

The Shop Assistants' Union seems to have warmed to the idea of organising in pursuit of their economic interests. As the list of their demands indicate, they were clearly after regularising the conditions of their employment and getting better consideration from their employers for the services rendered. They were trying to mitigate the rate and intensity of exploitation. As Meebelo reports: "their meetings were conducted in a business-like manner and they always produced well typed minutes done in English" [Meebelo, 1986: 177]. Clearly they demonstrated through this practice that they were industrial workers committed to a particular way of life and determined to improve the conditions under that way of life.

The one obstacle in the path of the new union was the intransigence of the employers. The Chamber of Commerce was reluctant to grant it recognition, insisting that the problem of recognising African unions should be dealt with at a territorial level and not only by the Chamber of Commerce, but also by the government itself where African Civil Servants were organised. Numerous letters were exchanged between the Acting Labour Commissioner and Mr. Praice, the Secretary to the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASCOM) over the recognition of the Shop Assistants' Union, before the Chamber finally relented. It directed its members to:

deal with any complaints lodged with them by the African Shop Assistants' and Tailors' Associations in their respective localities.³¹

The first recognition of an African Trade Union was considered a breakthrough by the labour department, particularly by Mr. Comrie himself. In 1948, the Union concluded an agreement with the Employers' Association.

The formation of other unions soon followed. In 1948 a Drivers' Union was formed. The first branch of Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers' Union was formed at Nkana, others followed, and in 1949 the branches combined to form the African Mineworkers' Union. In the same year an Association of Domestic Servants was formed in Kitwe. 1950 saw the formation of the African Railway Workers' Trade Union and African Teachers' Association followed in 1951 by the Northern Rhodesia African Municipal and Management Board Workers' Trade Union, and the Hotels and Catering Workers' Union which in-

corporated the Association of Domestic Servants. 1951 also saw the formation of the Northern Rhodesian Trade Union Congress, with an initial membership of 12 African unions.

The formation of the Congress was a welcome development to African workers as well as to the government in Lusaka which had slowly been forced to accept the inevitable. The former looked upon this development as a crowning achievement after almost twenty years of struggle since 1935. They also saw it as a challenge through which they could demonstrate that they were mature and civilized workers who could handle the affairs of a modern organisation of industrial workers. Collectively they looked upon the Congress as an avenue through which they could get industrial problems settled peacefully through negotiations and collective bargaining. The Labour Commissioner expressed similar sentiments when he declared:

This is a welcome development for both the workers and the government. Where in the past, unvoiced grievances smouldering for long periods has led to a sudden conflagration, organised labour exposes complaints without hesitation, provided that the necessary channels exist, and settlement can usually be effected without difficulty.³²

For the Labour Commissioner, of primary interest was a peaceful industrial relations scene. The colonial administration saw the trade unions as an instrument in the management of conflict which would help ensure law and order and the freedom for enterprises to carry out their business. Development of trade unions along acceptable lines was fully in accord with these objectives as well as those of the Colonial Office in London. The protest strikes of 1935 and the industrial strikes of 1940 alerted the colonial authorities to the fact that worker consciousness on the copper mines was increasing and that the various attempts at organising indicated that combinations of industrial workers would definitely emerge in the natural order of progression. They were therefore anxious to ensure that when trade unions did emerge proper assistance was available to guide the young organisations along "correct lines". This was William Comrie's role, of which he was very conscious. In one lecture, he inserted a note of caution:

...beware of people with high sounding schemes who promise you everything. They are only cheating you and will take your unions and you will be dependent on them and remain with nothing.³³

One of Comrie's major concerns was to impress upon his lieutenants the necessity of maintaining a separation between politics and industrial issues. His success was to be seen in the behaviour of the Mineworkers' Union, particularly its President, Lawrence Katilungu over the use of the strike weapon for political ends.

African workers were able to use these structures to present their grievances to their employers and to engage in collective bargaining. In June 1952, for example, the A.M.U. submitted a demand of 2s 8d per ticket for all grades of African miners. The negotiations over this demand were protracted over a number of months. A conciliator was appointed but a conciliation meeting was only held on 26th September

1952. In the meantime, the N.R.A.M.U. declared a ban on overtime and hundreds of black workers were laid off as a consequence. On the 3rd of October, the companies made an offer which the A.M.U. refused. The conciliation process broke down and on the 9th October the Union initiated a strike ballot at all four mines in order to settle the dispute by strike action. The Unions proceeded to organise a strike plan whose features included the setting up of various committees to organise and instruct the 35,000 members how to behave during a strike. Trade union leaders urged discipline and orderly behaviour. When the results were in, 79% of the union members had voted in favour of strike action. Out of the 30,000 union members eligible to vote, 23,585 were in favour and only 113 opposed strike action. The strike began on 21st October 1952 and was effective at Nkana, Chibuluma, Nchanga and Roan at Luanshya. Of the major mining concerns, only Broken Hill was unaffected.

During the strike, the A.M.U. was able to provide food to the workers and their families, by virtue of prior planning. In the months before the strike, leaders had built up stocks of dried meats and maize meal specifically for this purpose as the Union did not have a strike fund [Epstein, 1958; Meebelo, 1986]. On the 3rd of November 1952, the Supreme Council asked government to reopen negotiations, following representations from the companies who had agreed to have an independent arbitrator from outside the country. Both parties having accepted arbitration, the union ordered a return to work on 12th November 1952. The Gillebaud award subsequently made in January 1953 was considered by observers to have been very generous as it increased the starting wage of a mineworker by about 66 per cent.³⁴

Comments on the strike testify to the orderly behaviour of the pickets. Anxious to avoid the violence experienced during the strikes of 1935 and 1940, union leaders urged their members not to move in large groups. This time there was no camping on football fields. Instead men were told to spend the time working their fields and children told to keep off the streets. The industry was brought to a halt and the compound reduced to a ghost town according to the District Commissioner. Commenting of the strike at Luanshya, he had this to say:

...no more evidence was needed to demonstrate if demonstration was necessary, the vital position occupied by African labour in the economic structure of the country and the fact that this labour force could wield immense power if effectively organised.³⁵

During the strike, the loss to the mining companies amounted to £4,590,305 in copper production and £60,931 in cobalt production [Mwendapole, 1977: 14]. The miners lost their wages too, which in 1952 averaged at £4 2s 7d. per month. But their success testified to the strength of their organisation and the episode as a whole serves as evidence of the growing consciousness and stability of the working class, which now could sustain a protracted dispute.

By 1952 the mining companies employed 36,878 Africans and 5,639 Europeans. Through this strike African miners had demonstrated their commitment to wage labour, their capacity to organise an orderly and effective industrial strike and their ability to bring the industry to a standstill. They confirmed their desire to be identified as industrial workers by voting by an almost 90% majority to abolish the Tribal Representative system which the mining companies had tried to resurrect in the wake of the 1952 strike as a mechanism with which to divide and control the African labour force and neutralise the power of the trade union.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have demonstrated that worker militancy has an established tradition among Zambian workers. The formation of trade unions as organisations of workers is an expression of that militancy. Trade unions themselves developed as the result of a dual evolutionary process, involving on the one hand the formation of the working class and worker consciousness and on the other the requisite legal framework. The working class itself developed as result of the process of industrialization and the introduction of wage labour.

Using Cohen's framework of the hidden forms of consciousness and protest, I have demonstrated that worker consciousness and protest does not await the formation of trade unions, but that trade unions themselves are a consequence of this long process in the development of the working class, their consciousness and their organisations. My argument has been that workers' consciousness develops in accord with the length and intensity of worker involvement in wage labour. Workers also respond to the political context within which they work and the organisations they form are influenced by the political as well as the economic environment. Acting upon this consciousness and in reference to the broader social situation, workers form combinations through which they articulate their responses to industrialisation and to the condition of wage labour. They may voice discontent about their living situation; the cost of living, the low wages, the pass laws, the harsh supervision by expatriate bosses, the heavy work load and long hours and even about the lack of representation and racially determined authority system. Depending on their level of consciousness and on the legal constraints, this response has been frequently expressed through "hidden forms of protest", via religious organisations and separatist churches and through welfare and dance societies. These activities were a means of coming to terms with the material conditions of wage labour. As the experience of wage labour intensified and as other alternatives became less and less tenable, workers' economic consciousness was heightened and discourse was augmented with overt industrial action in support of economic interests. Ideas of combination and organisation for economic reasons become more attractive and when the legal framework was provided partly in consequence of worker pressure itself, trade unions were soon formed.

Up to 1940 strikes were organised by *ad hoc* leadership structures and were forcibly put down. With the formation of the unions, strikes were conducted according to their rules. For example, during the strike of 1952, miners observed strict discipline, giving the authorities no reason whatsoever to use violence among the strikers. Other means of control had to be devised, hence the last desperate attempt to revive the Tribal Representatives system as a means of dissipating worker solidarity. But the workers had by then learnt their democratic principles well. They used the weapon of the ballot box to abolish the Tribal Representatives. The working class had come into its own.

Looking at the history of trade union development in Zambia, I am convinced that unions in Africa, as Davies has argued, came into being as vehicles of protest against working conditions and that in this regard they were not different from unions in other parts of the world [Davies, 1966: 15]. In the Zambian case, the militancy of trade unions in defence of members economic and political objectives has persisted even after independence, to the consternation of the new government. For its part the government has tried to harness this militancy to its own agenda with mixed consequences. In the next two chapters we analyze the mechanisms government has employed to accomplish this task.

In discussing the development of trade unions, I have been aware of running the risk of mistaking every dance society and every religious sect as a trade union in embryo. I hope, however, that I have succeeded in stating clearly that what is important is the theme of protest and the object of that protest and not the mere act of organising, because as Roberts argues, not every organisation of working people is a trade union.

I am aware that,

A trade union is a body formed from working people for the primary purpose of advancing their interests in their capacity as workers.

and that,

An industrial revolt only becomes a trade union when the decision to act together as a combined force is given an institutional shape and a continuous existence.
[Roberts, 1964: 3]

By the early 1950s trade unions in Zambia had attained this level of development.

NOTES

CHAPTER TWO

1. See Table 6.
2. See Mitchell, 1956, Kalela Dance. For example song on p.8.
3. Definitions:
 - a) Permanent Target Worker
A man (or woman) who ordinarily resides in the rural area and engages in agricultural production, but undertakes periodic (or even one) trips to the industrial centres to engage in wage labour to earn a specific amount of money (the target). The practice may be undertaken once or it may stretch over a life-time until final retirement in the rural village.
 - b) Temporary Target Worker
A man (or woman) who migrates to the industrial centre and engages in wage labour and stays over several contracts. He may remain in one job or he may change jobs and move from one town to another over a number of years, but finally returns to the rural village upon or near retirement [Heisler, 1974].
4. Some of these actions would be characterised by Cohen as "hidden forms of protest".
5. Examples given in Chapter 1 from Henderson, who quotes Kakoma's MSc Thesis; from Muntamba, Bulenge Reserves and Land Shortage in Kabwe Rural.
6. For a discussion of this concept see Michael Burawoy, "Migrant Labour in South Africa and the United States". Theo Nichols, (ed.), 1980, *Capital and Labour: A Marxist Primer*: 138.
7. The description of the dance in Southern Rhodesia differs from that which Mitchell describes for Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt in the late forties and early fifties.
8. In 1935 a District Commissioner reported for Ndola that "the movement was now part and parcel of indigenous African life in this area". Quoted in Gann, 1964: 305.
9. The case may be noted of the woman who was heard crying hysterically and running after a goat that had just eaten her vegetable garden. When the researcher enquired as to what was going on, she was told: "That is the result of suffering; when one does not have a husband (the woman's husband was away at work on the copperbelt) to cut trees for her, she cannot cultivate millet, so she is dependent on her vegetable garden. But being a woman left behind, she cannot fence the garden properly to protect it from the animals; so the goat has eaten that to and that is why she is crying, it is because of suffering". Recorded by Audrey Richards, quoted in Orde Browne, 1967.
10. Constitution of the M.N.W.A. quoted in Meebelo, 1986: 44.
11. The Muwamba brothers, Ernest Alexander and I Clements were cousins of Clements Kadalie leader and co-founder of the I.C.U. of South Africa. Ernest and Kadalie corresponded often and over a long period of time. They discussed the plight of black people in the region and the importance of organising for their cause. The government intercepted and inspected Ernest's correspondence with Kadalie. Ernest had been active and instrumental in the formation of the Welfare Associations at Livingstone and Ndola.
12. Epstein, 1958, *Politics in an Urban Community*: when Spearpoint was asked about the role of the elders during the strike, he replied, "They appeared to be refugees as far as I can make out". 31-32.
13. Details of the strike given in the Russell Commission Report.
14. Elena Berger, 1974, Chapter 3. Rotberg thinks the reason the tax for Africans residing in the Industrial centres was raised was to distribute the burden between the rural and the urban areas. By reducing the amount of tax paid in the rural areas and raising it in the urban areas, 1964: 162. I think the reason was to reduce the cost of tax collection. It was more expensive to collect the tax in the rural areas than in the urban areas. The workers in the urban areas were a captive reservoir as far as tax collection was concerned. The government calculated that it would raise more money, or about the same at a lower cost, if the Africans in the industrial centres were made to pay more than those in the rural areas.

15. Evidence to the Russell Commission Report.
16. Milimo, 1981, Thesis; Van Horn in Palmer, 1977 give examples of this process in Barotseland.
17. Edward Sampa. A Bemba Elder in Evidence to the Foster Commission, NR 3/132, File No. 10/B/1/40.
18. 1940 strikes – Notes of Chief Secretary, quoted in Meebelo, 1986: 131.
19. Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, Commission Evidence, quoted in Meebelo, *ibid.*: 132.
20. Evidence to the Forster Commission; also Perrings, 1973: 210, 217. Corporal punishment was administered by the compound manager at Mufulira. He was dismissed after the 1935 protest strikes.
21. Quoted in Meebelo, *op. cit.*: 121. Also a slightly different version is recorded in the transcript of evidence to the Forster Commission.
22. Forster Commission report; also quoted in Jack Wood's, 1963: 90.
23. File No. NR3/156 TA/21, p.57, National Archives, Lusaka.
24. Report of the Livingstone Labour Office to Labour Commissioner, File NR3/142 TA/17, p.57, National Archives, Lusaka.
25. Department of Labour Annual Report, 1944.
28. Memorandum of Orde-Browne to "Doctor" quoted in Henderson, 1973: 105.
26. R.S. Hudson; Labour Commissioner's file, quoted in Hooker, 1977: 4.
27. Secretary for Native Affairs, memo to Labour Commissioner Hudson, quoted in Hooker, 1977: 5.
28. Colonial Office memo on File NR3/293 JA/XII, National Archives, Lusaka.
29. Labour Commissioner, Notes on file NR3/142 JA/17, National Archives, Lusaka.
30. Memo from Secretary Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Commerce, NR3/391 JA/7, National Archives, Lusaka.
31. Report of meeting between the Labour Commissioner and workers at Broken Hill, on file NR3/293, National Archives, Lusaka.
32. Lecture, Copy on file, NR/293, National Archives, Lusaka.
33. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1953.
34. Mr. F.M.N. Heath, Article in *CORONA*, quoted in Mwendapole, 1977: 14.

CHAPTER THREE

THE 'CARROT' AND THE 'STICK': THE MATERIAL MECHANISMS OF POLITICAL INCORPORATION

In Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six we turn to an examination of the relationship between the government and the trade unions in the post-colonial period. This relationship is examined first in terms of government's efforts to establish its hegemony over the trade union movement and subsequently in terms of the response of workers' organisations. Those mechanisms employed in this regard on the government's side may be grouped into two categories. The first, comprised of mechanisms directed at the material sphere and characterised by a combination of 'carrot' and 'stick' elements, includes both legislation promulgated to govern the conduct of industrial relations and material benefits given to workers, such as wage increases. We examine these in Chapter Three. The second set of mechanisms relate to the level of ideas and includes such activities as the control of leadership positions on the ZCTU executive and the engineering of consent through persuasion, exhortation and workers' education. We examine the second set of mechanisms in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five we assess the success of these mechanisms and discuss the outcome. Finally in Chapter Six we switch perspectives and look at the relation between labour and the state from the point of view of organised labour.

Discussion of the mechanisms of incorporation in Chapters Three and Four is intended to provide an understanding of the manner in which the government has sought to cultivate the support of the workers. We argue that this effort is part and parcel of the dominant class's agenda to establish its hegemony over the subordinate classes. The concept of hegemony is adapted from Gramsci as it is discussed in his "Prison Notebook".¹ The tenet of most interest to us in this theory is the notion that "man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas" [Bates, 1975: 351]. The dominant class extends its ideas to the subordinate classes. When the latter accept and internalise these ideas, a common culture emerges, bringing forth

...a socio-political situation... in which the philosophy and practice of society fuse and are in equilibrium. [Williams, 1960: 387]

What is essential in this process is the consent of the subordinate class and the consolidation of the power and intellectual leadership of the dominant class. Through this intellectual and moral leadership society achieves a common culture under which new "social arrangements" between the governors and the governed are forged that maintain social order, not only by shaping "the external behaviour of the

majority”, but more importantly by facilitating their “internal affirmation” [Samatar, 1983: 25]. Once this internal affirmation is engendered in the subordinate class, the rule of the dominant class runs much more smoothly [Therborn, 1973]. The dominant class is then able to rule through consent and not only through force [Anderson, 1977 (b): 26].

The material conditions in Gramsci's Italy were different from those obtaining in Zambia in the late 20th Century. In the Zambian case, an indigenous bourgeoisie is still in the state of formation as we have indicated in Chapter One. Despite this, it is possible to observe efforts being made via state policies and action to entrench the hegemony of the ruling class. To begin with, the political dominance of the emergent bourgeoisie was given a footing by the establishment of the One-Party state in that this new structure narrowed the sphere of political debate [Szeftel, 1987: 123]. Simultaneously, emphasis was put on the consolidation of power and the building of political consensus by the political incorporation of the significant sections of the subordinate classes, especially organised labour.

We note that the group that assumed power at independence was a section of the petty bourgeoisie.² Governing status was gained via a populist ideology by which it mobilised other classes, i.e. workers and peasants. Having gained political power, the section of the petty bourgeoisie that belonged to UNIP was anxious to establish and consolidate its position of leadership in society and this included leadership over trade unions.³ Its anxiety stemmed from the very tenuous nature of its hold over power. To rectify this situation and to strengthen its hegemony over the working class, the governing faction of the petty bourgeoisie appears to have embarked on a deliberate campaign of cultivating the support of the labour movement and incorporating workers into the political process. Their strategy for the political incorporation involved drawing workers' organisations into a development process whose methods and goals were defined by the government in accord with the “national” philosophy of Humanism.

3.1 LOCATING THE DOMINANT CLASS AND ITS HEGEMONIC PROGRAMME

In order to examine this process, we need to identify the major actors and the mechanisms that are employed through specifying:-

1. Which class is in political control,
2. Whether this class has an agenda,
3. What the purpose of this agenda is.⁴

In order to find answers to these questions, we examine the political process over the last twenty-five years, reviewing labour policies, government action and workers' reaction. The answers can only form a model, a proposal which seems to fit the facts. It must be stressed that this thesis is not concerned to explore or establish the character of a governing, still less a ruling class in Zambia. Such a project is im-

portant but is outside the scope of the present work. Our concern is rather to analyse the way in which the state has acted upon working class organisations. There may well be other explanations and interpretations. But the evidence at hand suggests that government policy and action directed towards managing the interests of workers during the period 1964–1987 can best be understood as efforts to establish ruling class hegemony. In the next pages then, we shall briefly define the nature of the governing class and elaborate on the mechanisms that have been operationalised for the political incorporation of labour.

The governing class in Zambia is embodied in the ruling Party, UNIP, which is a mass party led by a faction of the petty bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie itself is not a coherent group but characterised by internal division based on economic activity and accentuated by ethnicity. As used here the concept includes owners of small to medium sized enterprises that employ labour, as well as professionals such as doctors in private practice, lawyers, university professors and the upper ranks of the state bureaucracy and management of the parastatal sector who might themselves aspire to a career in the private sector upon retirement. Despite the differences among them as regards direct ownership of the economic enterprises and degree of capital accumulation, the members of this class are identified by a common economic interest of personal gain and a desire to preserve the political system from which they derive economic benefits. The class is broadly characterised by its access to resources, level of education, managerial/bureaucratic skills, contacts within the centres of decision making and access to capital, private or state disbursed. But problems remain in its specification. As Cohen acknowledged in his 1972 article on class in Africa generally, the problem of adapting a concept from a different historical experience still remains.⁵ The petty bourgeoisie that provided leadership to the nationalist struggle and formed the government does not fit neatly into any of the categories of Marx's analysis of a class society. It is not a real bourgeoisie as most of its members do not own the means of production. Most may have had access to communal lands which they could work and produce for the market,⁶ but communal land cannot be alienated and converted into capital. Yet the life chances of the members of this group are better than those of workers because it holds political power and occupies important decision making positions in society. It is distinguished from the subordinate classes moreover by possession of certain resources and the high salaries it derives from its positions.

To overcome the conceptual problems, the term elite has been used in much of the literature on Zambia and indeed on Africa,⁷ but it is a concept whose analytical value is limited, as it tells us little about the ideological orientation of this group. Instead of elite, the term petty bourgeoisie is preferred here because it denotes the direction in which the members of this group aspire to and are moving. The governing class of the post-colonial state is a group in the process of changing its relationship to the means of production. Were it not for the unfortunate terminology, the Shivji's notion of a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" would in this respect be of value because it captures the reality of socio-economic processes in

the post-colonial state,⁸ where the governing class, which is defined by its political function, is an economic class in formation, in the process of becoming an owning class. The class of origin of most of its members is working class or peasantry. The possession of modern attributes such as literacy and organisational skills during the nationalist struggle catapulted certain individuals into positions of leadership and decision making at independence.⁹ The occupancy of these positions gives them the platform from which to influence the laws that regulate the distribution of resources in the country.

The occupancy of positions of authority either in the Party or government bureaucracy ensures them access to resources that alter their relationship to the means of production as individuals and as a group. As members of government and the bureaucracy, they have decision making powers that control the allocation and distribution of society's resources, especially through the newly created parastatal sector and the financial institutions.¹⁰ In the Zambian case, the record of operations of the Credit Organisation of Zambia and the Financial Development Corporation provides sufficient evidence of this process. Access to state disbursed loans for example enables members of this group to buy farms and private residential property (despite the leadership code) which upon leaving government service are developed into commercial enterprises.¹¹ The growth of this class and its accumulation of property is, however, checked by the dependent nature of the economy and by the fact that the ownership of private capital has largely remained in the hands of non resident investors.

Prior to 1973, opposition parties emerged which were organised on lines corresponding to regional/ethnic divisions. Ethnicity has been used by political entrepreneurs in Africa sometimes to blur, at others to accentuate class divisions. The petty bourgeoisie straddled the leadership of the governing Party as well as the various opposition parties, ANC, the UPP and the UP. Neither was ideologically a class party. The major parties were mass organisations which were used as a framework for mobilising the population for winning elections. Both sets of leaders belonged to the same class, although one party stressed the desirability of egalitarian policies, while the other stressed the need to encourage individual initiative and to create wealth before it could be shared. The class affinity of the two parties is most clearly demonstrated by the creation of the One-Party State which indicated that the differences between the two parties were tactical and not fundamentally antagonistic. In the contemporary period the rule of the petty bourgeoisie manifests itself in the One-Party State. The state, however, remains relatively autonomous, probably more so than in other capitalist societies, due to the weakness of the indigenous bourgeoisie. Its autonomy is demonstrated by the fact that it does not always rule in the interests of the bourgeoisie, that in the short-run it sometimes makes concessions to workers and the peasantry. In the long run, however, although frequently taken in the name of the 'people' and with the consent of workers, state measures invariably favour capital and the bourgeoisie at the expense of the workers and the peasantry.¹²

3.2 MECHANISMS OF POLITICAL INCORPORATION: IN THE MATERIAL SPHERE

The government extends its hegemony over workers' institutions through a set of 'carrot' and 'stick' measures. The carrot is aimed directly at workers in the form of wage increases and improved conditions of service. The stick is systematically applied to the leaders of workers' organisations through such measures as removal from office, detentions and the fielding of those sympathetic to government policy for positions of leadership in the trade union movement. There are also measures of an ideological nature intended to change the orientation of grassroots leaders. I refer to these as involving "ideological engineering" and as being delivered mainly through political education. Collectively I call these mechanisms the modalities of political incorporation. They include :-

1. Wage increases and improved conditions of work.
2. Legislation.
3. Control of leadership positions in the ZCTU.
4. Ideological engineering.
5. Use of force.

Generally speaking these mechanisms form a continuum from the most desirable to the least desirable from a union point of view. The first one consists mostly of the carrot elements. Legislation is the second most desirable and can consist of both carrot and stick elements. Control of leadership positions is not very popular and has proved ineffective as workers react by reasserting their independence by electing leaders of their choice. Ideological engineering is the most preferred method as far as the promoters of political incorporation are concerned as it is directed at changing the way workers understand and interpret social reality and their role in society. Force is used as a last resort to restore peace in a crisis situation. It is the least preferred method as workers resent the use of force against them and may react in unpredictable ways.

These mechanisms can also be subdivided into two categories: those that are aimed at the material sphere and those that are directed at the ideological sphere of human experience. For purposes of manageability, I have decided to discuss those mechanisms that are directed at the material sphere in this chapter and those that are directed at the ideological sphere in the next.

The choice of mechanism varies according to circumstances. At times one mechanism is applied to resolve a situation, at others a series may be applied one after another until a satisfactory solution is achieved for the state. The ultimate aim, however, is to have a work force that identifies itself with the stated ideals of the party and government, one that is aware of its "social responsibilities" to the society at large and one which in its trade union activities emphasises productivity rather than consumption. Consumption and improved wages and living conditions were on most workers' minds in the immediate post-colonial period. Independence to most workers meant an end to the low and discriminatory wages of colonialism. Consequently as we noted in Chapter One, the first five years after independence were characterised by many strikes sparked off by wage related disputes. We begin our analysis of the mechan-

isms of political incorporation by examining the government's response to demands for wage increases. Wage increases comprise the 'carrot' in the government's package of political incorporation.

3.3 TRENDS IN WAGE MOVEMENTS

The issue of wages dominated African industrial relations during much of the Nationalist struggle. For African trade unionists it was a political as well as an industrial relations issue. It was a political issue in the sense that claims for increased wages for Africans were made with reference to European wages. It was also an industrial relations issue in that African workers demanded to be recognised and paid on the basis of work performed without reference to living standards in the peasant sector. The demand for economic fairness in wage determination became a rallying cry in the Nationalist struggle. On the Copperbelt, most miners were hopeful that an African controlled government would pay them satisfactory wages. Their bewilderment and disappointment is therefore understandable when the first African government was unable to meet their expectations. The bitterness was widespread among the general labour force as well as among trade unionists. One official (of the UTUC) put his indignation in this way in his resignation letter from the UTUC :

...during the colonial rule we used to fight together with UNIP for the day when we would eat but that day has come and we are still starving.¹³

In responding to such kinds of pressure the government had to take into account the following factors in its wage determination policy.¹⁴

1. The uneven development of the country and the varying needs of the different sectors in order to avoid the creation of "two nations" one urban, the other rural. In 1967, average earnings in the rural areas was £5.00 per family per annum compared with an average of £206.00 for wage employees in the agricultural sector which is the lowest paid formal sector.¹⁵
2. The need to reconcile European wages or what had now become designated as expatriate rates, to African wages. The problem was whether it was politically and economically feasible to maintain the dual wage structure.
3. Concomitant with the second was how to relate wages to the level of skills without seeming to perpetuate a racial wage structure. Against this background government policies were directed towards the following goals:
 - a) to work towards wage levels which were related to productivity in order to achieve a balance between efficiency and welfare considerations.
 - b) to attain a unified wage structure.
 - c) to reduce to a minimum the incidence of strikes and work stoppages.¹⁶

It was envisaged that through these policy objectives, the government would find a solution and would achieve a balance between fulfilling the expectations of independence and ensuring the growth and expansion necessary for the creation of further employment opportunities. In order to identify the best strategy, government's preferred procedure has been the use of the commission of inquiry. Officials claimed this to be the best method of getting in touch with grassroots opinion. In the twenty-four years since 1964 there have been no less than ten major commissions of inquiry regarding the economy as a whole, the civil service and the mining industry.¹⁷ In addition, there have been smaller commissions directed at specific sectors or industries such as railways or the National Agricultural Marketing Board or public institutions such as the University of Zambia.

Official inquiries prior to the first Turner Commission of 1969 had been primarily concerned with rectifying workers' grievances arising from the colonial experience. The government was fortunate in that the breakup of the Federation and the Independence settlement left it with adequate resources to fund the restructuring of wages in the country. Thus when the Brown Commission awarded miners a 22 per cent wage increase in 1966, the Whelan Commission was able to award similar increases to civil servants. Indeed, up to the time of the Livingstone Labour Conference in 1967, the Minister of Labour could boast that the government had been able to meet workers demands for increased wages because the country was rich.¹⁸ At another level he felt the need to justify the wage increases by arguing that they were one way of letting ordinary African workers benefit from the massive sums of money (K420m) the government was pouring into the economy through the Four Year Development Plan,¹⁹ money, he argued, which would otherwise go to expatriate-owned companies, and subsidiaries of overseas multinationals. Even at this conference, employers were urged to pay incentive wages as an inducement to productivity.²⁰ Up to this stage it seemed impossible to make the kind of choice insisted upon by the Seers Report, between high wages and increased employment opportunities.

However, from 1967 onwards academics and international advisors began to ask whether wages ought not to be linked to productivity and whether there ought not perhaps be a ceiling to wage increases. Discussions between the Ministry of Labour and the trade unions indicated that a clearly defined incomes and wages policy was desirable for both parties. Consequently, at the second National Convention on labour, in Kitwe, in December 1969, the President announced a 5 per cent ceiling for wage increases pending the working out of an Incomes and Wages policy.²¹ This speech was made following the first Turner Report which had recommended the establishment of an institutional machinery to integrate a prices and incomes policy. To help speed up the formulation of a prices and incomes policy, the Turner Commission recommended the setting up of a Productivity, Wages and Prices Council.

However, implementation of this recommendation was delayed and in the meantime the bargaining power of unions resulted in wage settlements above the 5 per cent ceiling. For much of the private sector, collective agreements containing a wage increase of more than 5 per cent were approved provided they were supported by evidence of a corresponding rise in productivity.²² The Mwanakatwe Commission Report was to point out later (1975) that the productivity directive had not always been strictly observed.²³

By 1974 both the ZCTU and the Zambian Federation of Employers (ZFE) expressed concern over the lack of follow-up action over the stated policy of forming a "realistic" incomes and wages policy. While the ZCTU argued that workers' real earnings had been eroded by inflation and the rising cost of living, the ZFE was concerned about lower morale among workers and declining productivity. Both organisations called upon the government to convene a national convention to study the deteriorating economic situation with a view to speeding up the formulating of a 'more realistic' wages and incomes policy. This was deemed necessary for the stabilisation of the economy as well as to give workers greater purchasing power which would create demand. For the ZFE, demand was considered necessary for the promotion of investment and generation of further employment opportunities.²⁴ Thus even employers were not at this stage averse to pay increases.

In the absence of a specific policy, various unions continued to obtain wage increases above the 5 per cent ceiling during 1974. The Hotel and Catering Workers Union clinched wage increases of between 5 to 15 per cent; the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers 10 to 12.5 per cent; Zambia Railways 5.4 to 10.9 per cent and the Mine Workers Union about 20 per cent.²⁵ 1974 was also the year that the Mwanakatwe Salaries Commission started its investigations into the "Salaries, salary structures and conditions of service of the Public and Teaching Services, the Zambia Police Force and Prisons Service, the Defence Forces and the staffs of local authorities and workers in Parastatal companies", in other words all workers paid by government public institutions and public companies. In its deliberations, the Commission lamented the lack of an incomes and wages policy in the country. In view of the high cost of living attributed by the government to imported inflation, the Commission awarded the most generous wage increases since the Brown and Whelan Commissions. The lowest paid workers in the Civil and Public Service were awarded an almost 40 per cent wage increase, while the super grades were awarded a 5 per cent salary increase, which the government in its white paper subsequently revised downwards to 2 per cent. The Commission also recommended an incremental scale for trade-tested workmen and the raising of the minimum wage of a labourer to K480.00 per annum or K40.00 per month.²⁶ The miners received a comparative wage increase of between 7 and 20 per cent, with the higher percentage going to the lowest paid miner and the lower to the highest paid executives in the mining industry.

The trend of wage increases continued into the following year when the National Union of Engineering, Building and General Workers (NUEBEW) secured a wage increase of between 26 per cent for lowest paid and 16.3 per cent for the highest paid workers. The National Union of Transport and Allied Workers received the highest percentage at 38 per cent, while the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers secured a 5 to 16 per cent wage increase. The high percentage for the former is explained by the fact that the sector is dominated by small operators who pay very low wages and this increase brought the level of wages in this sector to levels comparable with other industries. These wage increases were made against the background of an inflation rate averaging 8 to 10 per cent during 1974 and 1975.²⁷

In 1978 Professor Turner was invited back into the country to carry out a review of the economy and assist government in the formulation and execution of an incomes and prices policy. While this was being worked out, government announced a three-phase interim wage policy. In the first phase a wage freeze was imposed in the public sector and limit of 5 per cent was set for the private sector.²⁸ Special dispensation, however, was given to allow wage increases of between K14.00 and K45.00 per month in the mining industry presumably in recognition of the political pressure the miners could wield. Permission was also given to allow a 10 per cent increase in the agricultural industry, the lowest paid sector. The second phase of the interim policy came into force in August 1979, whereby, wage increases were limited to K156.00 per annum or K13.00 per month. In its report, the Turner Commission once again emphatically recommended the establishment of a Prices and Incomes Commission and a consultative council for prices and incomes. The Commission, when formed, was to be charged with the responsibility of working out and executing the incomes and prices policy subject to government approval. A chairman for the Commission was appointed in 1980. And in 1983, the Commission was given responsibility for approving collective agreements between employers and unions.

Meanwhile, the third phase of the interim policy came into force. At a labour and management seminar on June 26th 1980, the President announced that with effect from the first of August 1980, all restrictions on wage increases were lifted and that trade unions were free to engage in collective bargaining with employers. The only constraint allowed was the ability of the employer to pay the wage agreed upon. This directive was to remain in force until the Prices and Incomes Commission (PIC) issued new guidelines. For the Civil Service the government awarded wage increases of between 12 and 60 per cent based on the recommendations of an Administrative Committee of Inquiry. Trade unions took their cue from these rates in working out their negotiating stances.²⁹

The policy of free collective bargaining continued through 1981 and 1982. Meanwhile the Act establishing the PIC was passed by Parliament in 1981. Early in 1983 a fourth phase, adopted as part of IMF conditions came into operation when the government announced a new restriction on wage increases.

The new ceiling was set at 10 per cent. The announcement drew a sharp reaction from the ZCTU, which questioned the wisdom of setting a wage ceiling while allowing the prices of commodities to soar. In an attempt to find an amicable solution, the President invited trade union leaders to a two day meeting on the 27th and 28th of June 1983. A solution was not immediately found, but consultations continued through the remainder of 1983. In the first week of December, it was announced that the 10 per cent ceiling would remain in force until the 30th of April 1984 when free collective bargaining would again be reintroduced.³⁰ Ironically, these inconsistencies became more apparent with the establishment of the PIC, which was followed almost immediately by deregulatory or price decontrol measures.³¹ These measures were a part of the IMF's package of conditions which also included a demand for the withdrawal of subsidies on food-stuffs and the reduction in the size of the civil service. The inconsistencies are a consequence of a clash between two different systems of economic management, one based on controlled wages and prices and the other based on free enterprise and market forces.

In response to the decontrol measures, the ZCTU in January 1984 gave unions a mandate to negotiate for a K50.00 a month wage increase for all categories of workers to offset the cost of living.³² By January 1985 public service workers had won salary increases of up to K30.00 of the K50.00 demanded by their unions. The increases were awarded on an ascending scale of K15.00 to the highest paid, K20.00 to the second category, K25.00 to the third and K30.00 to the lowest paid categories.³³ Later in the year, they were awarded pay increases of 40 per cent for low income groups by the second administrative committee of inquiry.³⁴ These salary increases were awarded with the express commitment to a reduction in the size of the public service. A pruning exercise was then set in motion. So it seems the choice that the Seers Report had warned the government was necessary had finally been taken though only under pressure from the IMF. While government policy had shown preference for the expansion of the economy by government spending and creation of jobs, the lack of structural changes in the economy and the bargaining power of the unions dictated an outcome of high wages, a reduction in the number of jobs in the formal sector and a decline in the standard of living of the general public.

This paradox of high wages and a fall in living standards can be further elaborated. Through the bargaining power of the unions, those in employment obtained high money wages, the government and the employers responding to their power in the interests of peaceful industrial relations and in order to maintain a contented work force. But these wage increases occurred in an environment of shrinking jobs in the formal sector. The lack of structural changes in the economy perpetuated dependence on copper and the failure to diversify the economy meant the projected increase in jobs was not achieved. A large number of the work force became immiserated, leading to an expansion of the informal sector. The high money wages received by the few in the formal sector were offset by the extended family system whereby one wage often supports up to nine people in both the urban and rural areas.³⁵ As the cost of living in-

creased the buying power of money wages declined resulting in a real fall in the living standards of the people, both those in and out of employment.³⁶ Only the bourgeoisie proper were able to maintain comfortable living standards. Yet prior to October 1985, wage increases for low income groups were above the rate of inflation. This was to change rapidly during 1985.

The period between January 1985 through May 1987 was one of unceasing crisis sparked off by the auctioning of the Kwacha which unleashed spiralling inflation further exacerbated by IMF conditions which required government to remove subsidies on food. The immediate increase in the price of mealie-meal resulted in the riots of December 1986 in which 15 people died. Workers reacted to the higher cost of living by demands for wage increases backed by wildcat strikes. As indicated in Chapter One, the spiral was only halted when the government abandoned the IMF structural adjustment program in May 1987. In Chapter Five we shall examine government's response to these strikes. Meanwhile we shall briefly recap the foregoing and assess its implication for political incorporation.

In the short term the wages issue is the most important mechanism of political incorporation as it delivers a tangible concession to workers demands. An increase in wages appeases the rank and file workers as well as their leaders. And also helps to strengthen the position of leaders in the eyes of the workers. As an increase in wages militates the fundamental conflict between capital and labour, i.e. the struggle over the distribution of profit. By securing a wage increase, workers feel good about themselves, having tempered the rate at which they are exploited. The question arises, however, whether a wage increase is a response to worker pressure or whether it is an independent act of political incorporation. It is extremely difficult to apportion weight to either factor. The initial response must then be that both factors have a role to play. A definitive answer can only be given when examining a particular case. Government responded to the 1966 miners' strike, for example, by appointing the Brown and Whelan Commissions of inquiry, which at the end of their investigations awarded wage increases averaging 22 per cent. It can be argued that the wage increases granted by the commissions were a response to worker pressure. At the same time, in granting those increases after the very high profile and 'democratic' process of a commission of inquiry, one cannot help but notice government's hope and desire to demonstrate its genuine concern for worker's welfare and thereby win the political support of the workers. This was important especially in the early years after independence when in the presence of opposition parties, government was anxious to portray itself as a "people's government" concerned first and foremost about the wellbeing of the common people, the subject of much neglect and exploitation under colonial rule and federal government. However, in later years, and especially after the establishment of the One-Party State, the government has been relatively secure in its hold on power and as financial resources have dwindled, and the ability of government to pay increased wages has declined, emphasis has shifted to legal rational methods such as the implementation of the Industrial Relations Act (1971) in 1974 and

the use of statutory instruments to deal with worker demands and temper their militancy. Although some wage increases have occurred as evidenced by the Mwanakatwe Report (1975), generally speaking after the 1973 oil crisis and the collapse of copper prices in 1975, government emphasis has been on appeals to workers' patriotism, self sacrifice and for increased productivity. Whatever wage increases have been made since 1975 have been largely due to the increased bargaining power of the trade unions. But they have been sanctioned and tolerated by the government as a demonstration of its commitment to the welfare of the workers, reflecting a hope to win the support of workers and avert industrial conflict.

3.4 LEGISLATION AS A MODE OF POLITICAL INCORPORATION

The second mechanism for the political incorporation of the workers are the laws that have been promulgated to regulate industrial relations in the country. The laws are important because they provide the framework within which workers can organise and participate not only in the industrial enterprises in which they work, but also in society at large.

Cherry Gertzel has commented that there is a high degree of continuity between the labour laws of the colonial government and those of the government of independent Zambia.³⁷ Both regimes, she argues, have been characterised by a tendency to bring trade unions under government control and to regulate their activities. This practice may well be common to all governments, not only in the periphery but in the metropole as well. There is, however, a difference in arrangements and in their motivation for government control of trade unions between the colonial and post-colonial periods. Whereas the colonial government wanted to control trade unions for purposes of guiding them to develop along "correct lines" and especially to keep trade unions out of politics and politics out of trade unions, the Zambia government wants to control trade unions not merely for this reason, but also to draw the trade unions to the side of government and to persuade them to engage in the kind of politics which is supportive of government and party policy. This can be demonstrated by an examination of the labour laws that have been passed in the country since independence.

Although Zambia is a One-Party State, in the post-colonial period, certain practices of liberal democracy have been adopted such as universal suffrage and commitment to government sponsored economic development. An attempt has also been made to amend labour laws so as to bring them up to date and in accordance with the expectations of Independence. For example, the apprenticeship ordinance was amended to end racial restrictions and to provide the mechanism through which Africans could be trade tested and certified. In 1965, a new Employment Act was passed which provided for conditions of employment, and scrapped the much detested ticket and recruitment systems. From then on employment was to be on the basis of a direct contract between employer and employee. Where they existed,

employment agencies were closely monitored. The old dual wage structure was replaced by a unified one, with inducement rates for expatriates. Legislation relating to minimum wages, wages councils and conditions of employment legislation was also introduced.

In all there are about twelve chapters in the laws of Zambia that deal directly with the hiring, firing, conditions of work and the remuneration of labour.³⁸ In conformity to ILO conventions some do provide protection for workers and safeguard their well-being. For example, cap.505 Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act 19 prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16 outside of family business, unless such a child is engaged under a contract of apprenticeship entered into under the appropriate Act, or is authorised under a certificate signed by an appropriate official.³⁹ The same law prohibits the employment of women in manual labour underground or at night, while the Factories Act provides for the minimum safety standards to be maintained in factories. The legislation I discuss in this section, however, is only that which regulates the organisation and activities of organised labour.

Soon after independence in 1964, the government introduced a bill to amend the Trade Union Ordinance. The new bill, the Trade Union and Trade Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance became law in January 1965. It legalised the formation of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and provided for the dominant position of the Minister of Labour in its affairs. For example, section 21 of the new law empowered the minister to appoint the first officers of Congress and to make its first set of rules. And although the Congress' Annual Conference was empowered to change the rules at a later stage, these amendments could only become effective if approved by the Minister of Labour.

The Act also introduced measures that closely regulated the operations of the national unions, which were now required to be registered within six months of being formed. The minimum number of members required to form a trade union was raised from seven to one hundred. Trade union officials were required to be "properly" elected and to notify the Registrar of Trade Unions of their appointment. And to qualify for election, a candidate was to have worked for a minimum of three years in the particular trade, or industry with which the trade union was concerned and in the case of smaller unions with less than 500 members, the candidate was actually to have been engaged in such a trade. Once elected, trade union officials were required to demonstrate an acceptable level of proficiency. Failure to do so made them liable to suspension by the Minister of Labour who had power to appoint a successor. Affiliation to the ZCTU was not compulsory under this Act, but government extended the privileges of a dues-stop order only to unions that affiliated to the Congress. The benefit of an extended dues-stop order facility was counteracted, however, by the requirement that the Secretary General of every trade union furnish an annual financial report to the Registrar of Trade Unions, on or before the 1st of June.⁴⁰ The government's seriousness about implementing this was evidenced by the suspension in 1972 of two secretary

generals who failed to uphold it, one was later reinstated while the second was ultimately dismissed after failing to submit proper accounts as stipulated by law.⁴¹ In addition, the Registrar's office had access to all records of union's financial transactions enabling him to monitor their financial transactions. Further, trade unions were barred from affiliating to international organisations. While condemned by International Organisations as "dictatorial"⁴³ it was promoted in terms of the government's policy of non-alignment.⁴²

Trade unions were otherwise left free to organise their internal activities and to manage their funds. Suggestions from the ZCTU executive for a more centralised structure where all funds were controlled and disbursed from the National Centre were rejected by the Minister of Labour on the grounds that "a centralised structure could run the risk of leading to allegations of tribalism, favouritism and rivalry".⁴⁴ The evidence runs contrary to Gertzel's contention that the ZCTU had "important powers over the affiliated unions".⁴⁵ The ZCTU in fact has no authority over the national unions. It cannot for example instruct the national unions to go on strike without the authority of the executive of the national union concerned.⁴⁶ The government clearly had no intention of creating a powerful ZCTU with direct access to the financial resources of all the unions. Such a ZCTU would be too strong and would have been a very attractive ally for the opposition parties. The most it did allow was to authorise an increase in the amount of a member's subscription that went to the ZCTU from 6d per member per month to 20 per cent of total subscription per member per month.⁴⁷

The structure of the ZCTU and the relationship of the national unions to the Congress was a source of concern for some in the trade union movement, especially for the politically oriented trade unionists. At the Congress General Council meeting of 1972, a working party was appointed "to enquire into the structure, administration and organisation of the trade union movement in Zambia". The working party carried out a thorough survey of the organisation of the trade union movement in the country, at the end of which it presented a 'starry eyed' report which proposed a centralised structure with fewer unions and a prominent role for the national centre. The report suggested a reduction in the number of unions from 17 to 9 and suggested a single budget administered centrally [T.Z., 24th of July, 1973]. I must point out that the "working party" that reviewed the structure of the labour movement was dominated by political trade unionists who were strong UNIP supporters, people, it was hoped, who would influence the development of the ZCTU from within. The working party was chaired by Matthew Mwendapole, with Basil Kabwe as Secretary. Both men were staunch nationalists who believe in the subordination of trade union autonomy and interests to the wider national need to accumulate. The report was, however, rejected "in total" by the General Council of 1973.⁴⁸ The General Council tends to be more representative of the grass roots opinion than either the national executive council or the working party that had reviewed the structure of the congress. The recommendations of the working party threatened the autonomy of the

national unions and also the jobs of the secretary generals of some of the unions which were to be merged and for this reason, among others, were not enthusiastically embraced.

Seizing on the void left by the rejection of the working Party's report, the Minister of Labour proceeded to amend the constitution of the ZCTU to rationalise the structure of the ZCTU and improve its financial standing so that it might serve as a more effective tool for the management of conflict. The amendment, for example made provisions enabling the ZCTU to take part in any negotiations between employers and any of the affiliated unions [T.Z., 31st August, 1973]. In addition, the percentage of subscriptions contributed by the national unions was increased from 20 to 30 per cent [Min. of Labour Annual Report, 1973: 20]. The changes effected by the Minister's amendment though not drastic, were consistent with government's desire to build an effective trade union movement. The Secretary General of the ZCTU, Basil Kabwe, welcomed the changes, particularly the creation of two posts of Assistant General Secretaries. He was optimistic this would improve the staffing situation at the national centre. The interesting point however is that, although the General Council had rejected the recommendations of its own "working party" it was powerless against the changes introduced by the Minister. Those who objected to the increase in the proportion of subscriptions going to the ZCTU, for example, had no way of redressing their grievances. In a way this demonstrated the power the Minister has over the ZCTU.

The amendments to the colonial laws extended the principles of the legal, rational and democratic principles of the political arena to the field of industrial relations and provided the framework for state mediation between capital and labour. Rather than enact a complete takeover of the trade union movement, the government used legislation to provide a framework through which organised labour could be politically incorporated to government's agenda.

Industrial Relations Act (1971)

Philosophically, legislation concerning the regulation of trade unions in Zambia is influenced by Humanism, which advocates the need for industrial democracy in Zambian industry and commerce. In Part Two of "Humanism and a Guide to its Implementation", industrial democracy is defined as the process by which:

the masses wrestle financial and economic power from a minority of committed capitalists and hold it in trust for the perpetual benefit of the "common man".⁴⁹

State control of the major means of production and distribution is specified as the first step towards this goal. The next step is the introduction of participatory democracy in industry. One of the mechanisms through which this was to be attained was the establishment of worker's councils in industry. The idea was first discussed by the Tripartite Livingstone Labour Conference as a way of transcending the racial management/worker barrier. It was endorsed by the President in an expanded version at the UNIP National Council meeting in Matero in August 1969. Dr. Kaunda later elaborated upon the idea at the sec-

ond national convention on labour in December, 1969, in Kitwe. In his speech, reiterating the ideas expressed in Humanism Part Two, the President promised that traditional management styles that resulted in the alienation of the worker would be reviewed and replaced by a system of management that allowed the worker more meaningful input and in which the manager would operate on the principle "similar to that which guided the village headman in the traditional economy". As with the economy, it is held in Zambia that management systems can be legislated for. Since major industry had been nationalised through policy declarations and legislation, it was similarly believed that industrial democracy could be brought about through the force of law. The decision to establish works councils was therefore elaborately provided for in Part Seven of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971. The 1971 Act repealed both the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (1965) and the Industrial Conciliation Ordinance (1965) whose functions it has taken over.

The 1971 Act enshrines in law the one union per industry policy. Under this policy a union may represent only one category of workers who are not already represented by any other union.⁵⁰ The Act also clearly specifies the activities a trade union will engage in. It specifically requires trade unions to state in their constitutions that worker's education will be one of the purposes on which trade union funds will be expended. The requirement to take decisions by secret ballot on any suggestion to hold a strike is also made into law. Under the IR Act (1971), the registration procedure is made more elaborate. The process itself is made the responsibility of the Labour Commissioner. The Labour Commissioner, who in 1970 was concurrently appointed Registrar of Trade Unions, and who is granted extensive powers of overseer of trade union operations. For example he can decide to cancel the registration certificate of a union when he has satisfied himself that a trade union was not properly constituted or when he has satisfied himself that:

a trade union has ceased to exist or has ceased truly and effectively to represent the interests of its members.⁵²

The Labour Commissioner also has powers to register the Congress. The Act also provides a guideline for the constitution of the Congress. It too requires that, a provision be made:

for the advancement of workers' education and their participation in national development programmes in Zambia.⁵³

With regard to the management of funds, Treasurers of unions and Congress are required to furnish a financial report at such times as specified by their constitutions to the trustees of the trade union of the Congress. The Act also empowers the Minister of Labour to appoint an accountant for the national unions and the Congress. The accountant is responsible for the receipt and expenditure of the funds as directed by the "general committee of management of the union(s) or the Congress" and charges for his services by debiting the account of the union or the Congress with his professional fees as well as any other expenses that he may incur in the course of his duties. He has tremendous power as an outsider.

Relations of the unions with the Congress are also provided for in this Act. Registration entails affiliation to the ZCTU, which is thus necessarily the only Congress to operate in the country. This places the Congress in an advantageous position and some national unions resent it, especially the MUZ, since it lost control of the Congress. But it does not necessarily mean the Congress has power over the internal affairs of the national unions.

Conciliation procedures are elaborately laid down in the Act and also become mandatory. These procedures effectively exclude the recourse to strike action. Although section 8 (j) ii allows the constitution of unions to make provision for the taking of decisions by secret ballot, including the right to a secret vote on "any proposal to hold a strike", no such provision is made in the conciliation procedure as to when and at what stage such a proposal may be made. According to Part Nine of the Act, a dispute once declared takes the following course:

1. A party to the dispute presents to the other party all its claims and demands.
2. The first party will in addition send two copies of its claims or demands to a Labour Officer who shall furnish one such copy to the Labour Commissioner.
3. The Labour Officer, within seven days, will hold meetings with the parties with a view to settling the dispute. Failure to reach a settlement:-
4. The Labour Officer shall inform the Labour Commissioner accordingly, who informs the Minister in a report explaining the reasons for failing to reach a settlement.
5. Within fourteen days of the receipt of the Labour Commissioner's report the Minister shall appoint a conciliator or a board of conciliation composed of "a chairman and not less than two but not more than four other members to conciliate in the dispute".

Alternatively, the parties to the dispute may request the Minister through the Labour Commissioner to refer the dispute to the Industrial Relations Court without first having the dispute referred to conciliation. A conciliator or a board of conciliation is required to summon the parties to the dispute to a meeting within seven days of its appointment. Further, parties are obliged to attend under penalty of law. If the conciliator or a board of conciliation fails to settle the dispute, it shall inform the Minister who then refers the whole dispute to the Industrial Relations Court, which will consider the dispute and make a decision. The decision of the Industrial Relations Court is final, binding, and cannot be challenged in any other court of law. As we can see under this mandatory procedure, no mention is made of recourse to strike action, and since to deviate from this course is an offence, the Act in fact proscribes strikes by an omission. Further, section 116 sub section 2 and 4 makes it an offence to call, incite or engage in strike action whether contemplating a dispute or while a dispute is in progress or after. Trade union leaders whose unions have engaged in unofficial strikes have been detained under the Preservation of Public Security Act even when they have disassociated themselves from the strikes.⁵⁴

By providing the Industrial Relations Court as a final court of arbitration in industrial disputes, the Act has shifted the locus of the class struggle from the shop-floor to the Judges' Chambers rendering workers exposed and without any official means of backing the struggle for their survival. Workers are no longer able officially to rely on the force of their collective action to back their demands. Instead they are forced to rely on the "rational" judgement of politically appointed judges. The judges are appointed by the head of state. Although freedom of the judiciary is often claimed, in a confrontation between the government and the workers, it is likely that the judges will be more sympathetic to the government's case.

The law and the legal establishment as a whole exists to maintain law and order including peace and stability to enable capital to carry out its business to ensure a profitable return on its investment. The legal establishment is not an impartial arbiter in a dispute involving capital and labour as it represents class interests. And in a capitalist society, the law is an expression of the dominant class interests. In this case the interests of the petty bourgeoisie would favour the preservation of law and order and peace and freedom to make profit on investment. Simultaneously, it is in the interests of capital and the capitalist system as a whole that workers continue to produce goods and services, so to ensure this, small concessions are made to labour to keep workers 'happy' and working. This is helped along by the fact that the courts in capitalist society, including Zambia, are portrayed in a neutral light as the fountain of justice. When this is coupled with all the humanist rhetoric, it becomes easy to obfuscate the class bias of the system of legal justice in a capitalist society.

Another mechanism the Act employs to restrict strikes is the use of the concept of "necessary service". All employees in a necessary service are not only prohibited from going on official or unofficial strike but would also be committing an offence if they hindered or interfered with the delivery of a necessary service. The Act however, does not define a necessary service. A service becomes a necessary one, therefore, when so deemed and declared by the President under the Preservation of Public Security Act.⁵⁵ As of May 1987 all civil service workers were essential service workers as are workers in all public utilities such as water, electricity, transport, mining and medical services.⁵⁶ The use of this concept has very serious implications for democracy. It criminalises industrial action and makes workers liable to punishment for defending their rights, although up to 1987, no workers have yet been prosecuted for going on strike.

All the above measures as contained in the Act are aimed at streamlining the operations of the union and restricting union's freedom of action. The 1971 Act was a culmination of a seven year search for an appropriate industrial relations policy. Damachi has described it as the most comprehensive labour relations Act in Africa and as constituting a policy that circumscribes every action of a trade union and cur-

tails its powers. It also restricts the role of a trade union to the management of conflict and the maintenance of peace and stability to the exclusion of safeguarding the rights of workers to fight for a decent wage and reasonable working conditions by the only avenue available to them, i.e. the right to withdraw labour to augment their demands. Even the institutions that are supposedly introduced for the benefit of the workers have been manipulated in such a way as to turn them into instruments of control. Evidence of this can be seen in the evolution and growth and implementation of the Works Council in Zambian industries. In 1970 while the Industrial Relations Act was in proposal form, the President said at a rally that the workers' council would be formed in enterprises employing five or more workers. The figure was later revised to 100 after lobbying from employers groups, especially the commercial farmers bureau.⁵⁷

The works councils were promoted as an avenue for introducing democracy in Zambian private and parastatal industry (the civil service is exempted). Every enterprise employing one hundred eligible employees or more is required to establish one unless exempted by the President. The Act gives an elaborate step by step procedure on how to form councils, and details the composition of the councils as well as their functions. The major functions of works councils falls into three categories:

1. On certain issues, management is required to inform the council of its decisions, as for example in investment policy, financial control, distribution of profits, economic planning, job evaluation, wages policy and the appointment of senior management executives in the enterprise.
2. On other issues pertaining to all schemes and programmes relating to the health and welfare of eligible employees in the enterprise concerned, the works council is entitled to be consulted and allowed to participate fully and effectively in deliberations.
3. On a third category of issues, the approval of the council is required. Management is required to seek approval of the works council on policy decisions pertaining to personnel management and industrial relations before these can be effected. These issues include:-
 - a) Recruitment of employees in the undertaking and assessment of their salaries;
 - b) Transfer of employees from one undertaking to another owned by the same employers;
 - c) Rules as to discipline applicable to the employees in the enterprise;
 - d) Redundancy of the employees in the undertaking;
 - e) Bonuses and incentives payable to the employees and the modes of payment thereof; and
 - f) Safety of the employees subject to the provisions of any other written law.

On the basis of the list of functions described, the works councils seem to have been established for mediating the rate of exploitation of workers in enterprises and for giving workers a sense of participation

in the undertaking in which they are employed. And in fact this was what was intended by workers' representatives at the Livingstone Labour Conference and by the President when he endorsed the idea in August 1969.⁵⁸ The implementation of the idea has however proved that quite apart from the technical problems, the participation of workers in the management of capitalist enterprises is rendered problematic by the nature of capitalist systems of management. Another obstacle is the possible conflict with the established institutions of capitalist enterprises. Management and employers' groups opposed the introduction of works councils in Zambian industries, resulting in the delay in the implementation of Part Seven of the IR Act (1971). The government succumbed to the pressure of the capitalist interest groups by substantially changing the provisions of the section before it finally became effective in 1975.⁵⁹ Conflict could also occur with traditional working class interest groups. The list of functions suggest that conflict is possible between the concerns of the trade unions and those of the works councils. The Act itself is silent on the relationship between the trade union and the works council, and practice reflects this ambiguity. The problem of a possible overlap between the functions of the works council and those of the trade union was raised and discussed at the "Presidential Seminar on Labour" held in Mulungushi Hall, on the 21st to the 31st of October, 1981. Participants recommended that a distinction be made between the duties of the works council and those of the trade union.⁶⁰ But as far as I could establish, in 1987, effective action had not yet been taken to resolve the areas of conflict.

While the majority of trade unionists interviewed at that time expressed the hope that since both trade unions and works councils are provided for in law, they should be able to work side by side, with each institution discharging its respective functions, concern was expressed about the likelihood of conflict between the two. Some trade unionists and personnel managers interviewed complained that often works councils took on negotiable issues that lawfully fall under the ambit of trade unions.

Concern was also expressed about the calibre of the people elected as works councillors and their ability to understand their prerogatives. Some trade unionists see works councils as being unnecessary and a misconceived consequence of the indiscriminate borrowing across different cultural experiences. On the other hand, the Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy which is designated with the responsibility of establishing and monitoring the development of works councils, foresees a future without trade unions. Some works councillors also hold this view. They envisage the full development of participatory democracy to transcend trade unions. It would appear that one of the unintended consequences of the introduction of the works councils, therefore, is to fragment the labour movement and undermine the role and existence of trade unions.⁶¹ It promises to alleviate the alienation of workers as individuals, but threatens the existence of workers' collective organisations.

Another mechanism that is used as an instrument of control, and one that is aimed at neutralising the power of organised labour is the Party Committee at place of work. The idea of having Party Committees at places of work was reactivated in 1978 by a circular from the Secretary General of the Party. Its aim was to mobilise workers as party members, to instill in them the spirit of patriotism and create an awareness of economic national interest in order to enable them to guard against economic sabotage. It was also intended to kindle in workers a sense of discipline, an appetite for hard work in order to improve productivity, and it was envisaged that the party committees at places of work would raise the consciousness of workers to party and government policies of national development and motivate workers to put in an honest day's work and ensure productivity in line with party policies. The Party hoped that gradually there would be an integration at the enterprise level between the Party committee at place of work and the trade union. The experience so far shows that there is often a tendency towards interchangeable membership between the two on the ground, but at higher levels of the trade union movement, there is suspicion of the intentions of the Party.

The industrial relations scene in Zambia appears crowded. There is the trade union, the works council and the Party committee at place of work. In theory all three have different objectives and should be able to observe their functional boundaries. In practice the boundaries are much more fluid and this results in conflict. The trade unions feel that they have the first right to organise workers for purposes of securing for them better wages and conditions of work. The Party committee feels that the Party is 'supreme' and as an organ of the Party, sees itself as entitled to organise and promote the Party and protect the national interest. The works council on the other hand feels that it is established by law and inspired by the philosophy of Humanism as a vehicle for the establishment and promotion of industrial democracy in Zambia and as such, it should be free to address any issues that pertain to industrial democracy. The consequences of these various perceptions has meant confusion as to the function of each institution, division in the labour movement and a weakening of trade union power and effectiveness.

Given the mechanisms we have discussed so far, which the government has used to effect the political incorporation of the labour movement, we now need to undertake a preliminary assessment of how trade union leaders have perceived governmental efforts at moulding their organisations into another pillar of governmental support. Trade unions perceive Party and governmental mediation in political terms. They feel that the Party and its government want to consolidate and monopolise power, in all spheres to the exclusion of any other groups. This is a source of concern to the trade unionists. They regard their trade union congress as a democratic institution which in the absence of political parties is providing the "necessary checks and balances" over the exercise of government power.⁶² The 1980-1981 miners strike over the local government bill, the food riots of December 1987 and the strike wave of January to May 1987 can be seen in this light. One trade union leader a Secretary General of a large union, blamed the

imposition of IMF conditionalities on the nature of the country's political institutions. He argued that a multiparty system would not have accepted the IMF conditions. He may have been wrong in this, but his statement demonstrates his fascination with liberal democratic principles and institutions and the role of the unions in upholding these in the absence of opposition political parties. It is for the reason of upholding democratic principles which includes the autonomy of trade unions, that trade union leaders are opposed to the principle and practice of party committees at places of work. It is also for this reason that trade unions are opposed to the proposed amendment to the industrial relations Act which would make the ZCTU a mass organisation and an adjunct of the Party. Trade unionists fear that they would lose their independence and purpose; "the ZCTU would be dancing to the tune of the appointing authorities rather than responding to the wishes of the members".⁶³ The Party committee at place of work is perceived as "a government watchdog over the trade union". This is felt as threatening the independence of the trade unions. The desire to maintain the independence of the unions is overwhelming. On the proposal to make trade unions "mass organisations", one trade unionist commented:

Trade unions are organisation of workers, they represent workers and should not be forced into representing loafers and peasants.⁶⁴

Trade unionists also object to their organisations being turned into mass organisations for fear that if that happened, trade union leaders would be appointed by the Party and its government, the Secretary General of the ZCTU would be a cabinet minister, Congress would be run from Freedom House and organised labour would be eclipsed by the Party. Their fear is that trade unions would lose their independence and their capability to represent their members' interests and would thereby fail to provide the checks and balances they consider crucial to the democratic process. Congress is emphatic on this issue. It maintains that unions have no desire to take over the government and that most of the current trade union leaders are not interested in political posts. They cite examples of current Congress leaders who had been offered top level Party posts, but who had declined. They maintain that all they are interested in is to make their contribution to the democratic process in the country by articulating workers' interests.

The greatest threat to the independence of the trade union movement is perceived to be contained in the proposed changes to the Industrial Relations Act (1971). Proposals to change the IR Act were made in 1982. The proposed bill was circulated to relevant organisations for comment. The Congress' major objections to the bill revolved around issues that had implications for further drawing trade unions into the ambit of the Party. For example, the bill requires every trade union and the Congress to declare in their constitution that:

the trade union (or Congress) shall be a mass movement of the Party and as such shall accept the declared policies, objectives, aspirations and programmes of the Party and that no person shall be qualified to be elected or appointed to any office in the trade union unless he is a member of the Party.⁶⁵

This proposal is objected to on the basis of industrial relations practice, as well as on the argument that it violates peoples constitutional rights, in that the Republican Constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and association. To bar a person from holding a trade union post because he or she is not a member of the Party is therefore discriminatory and unconstitutional. Further, trade unionists point out that membership of the Party is voluntary. Finally, they argue that employers associations, the majority of whose members are now Zambians, are not declared mass organisations, nor are their leaders required to be UNIP members before they can hold office.⁶⁶

The Bill also proposes to extend the grounds upon which the Minister can dissolve a trade union. Section 14 for example gives the Minister the authority to dissolve a trade union when:

He is satisfied that a trade union has failed to carry out its objects adequately...
OR when the Minister is satisfied that the trade union is conducting its affairs in a manner inimical to the interests of the Party or of the state.⁶⁷

The Congress wonders whether it is 'wise' to base the dissolution of a trade union on the sole discretion of the person of the Minister who has only to be 'satisfied' of the circumstances.

The Minister also seems to have been accorded further powers over the disposal of union funds. The Minister still appoints the accountant for the unions, but now also the objects on which union funds are expended are specified in the bill, the effect of which is that the union can no longer apply its funds to any other purposes unless the Minister grants his permission. Further, it is proposed in the amendment that the Labour Commissioner can remove an official of the trade union when he has satisfied himself on a number of grounds that either:

1. the funds of the trade union have been or are being expended on unlawful purposes.
2. the accounts are not being kept according to the provisions of the Act;
3. the trade union has been in breach of any provision or requirement of the Act.

While the elected official is suspended or removed the Minister can appoint a replacement of his choice. The unions and Congress feel this provision gives the government too much power over the running of trade unions. A Minister or the Labour Commissioner, as the case may be, can intervene directly and impose a government official into the trade union or the Congress, and there is no safeguard against the application of this action to an entire executive of a union or the Congress itself, except that in the case of the Congress, Presidential approval of the Minister's decision is necessary. Further, the union or Congress cannot object as to the choice of the public official selected for this purpose. Only the aggrieved person can appeal to the Industrial Relations Court against the decision of the Commissioner. Through these measures then, the proposed bill aspires to bring the trade union movement firmly and neatly under the control of the party and government. In the opinion of one law firm consulted by one union:

the proposed Act seeks to introduce fundamental changes most of which tend to compromise the bargaining power of trade unions in Zambia.⁶⁸

Trade unionists are convinced that the intended amendment is aimed at doing away with trade unions altogether as democratic institutions with a function to perform in a democratic society. While they welcome certain amendments to the 1971 IR Act, especially those that provide for appeal from the Industrial Court to the Supreme Court, they argue that the proposed bill reverses some of the positive points of the 1971 Act and they do not therefore want it repealed in the proposed manner.

We have indicated above that through a response to the material needs of workers and through the legislative process, the government has undertaken to incorporate organised labour politically into the government's own defined order. Wage increases have been granted to workers in response to trade union pressure. This has been the 'carrot' of governmental measures intended to elicit the support of workers for government policy. While some laws have provided protection for workers, the Industrial Relations Act has had the effect of restricting the activities of trade unions and increasing the power of politicians over organised labour. This is especially felt by trade unionists to be the case with the proposed Amendment to the Industrial Relations Act.

The government has therefore attempted to employ material incentives to establish its hegemony over the subordinate classes, while an adherence to legal procedures has produced formal restrictions on trade union activity, including the right to strike.

In the next chapter we discuss the ideological mechanisms of political incorporation. We shall also make a general assessment of all the mechanisms employed and consider the outcome.

NOTES

CHAPTER THREE

1. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*
2. Szeftel, Morris, Ph.D. Thesis, 1978: 74-75 for a discussion of these issues.
3. In the 1965 Trades Unions and Trade Disputes Act, the term 'Trade Union' referred to both workers organisations and employers. This anomaly was only rectified in the 1971 Act.
4. Answers to these questions form a proposed model that seems to fit the facts. It is hazardous to be definitive as it is extremely difficult to interpret class action or even identify a 'class control' given the nature of the world capitalist system and the place of the peripheral capitalist countries within that system.
5. Robin Cohen, "Class in Africa: Analytical Problems and Perspective", *The Socialist Register*, 1972.
6. For a discussion of the development of a land based bourgeoisie in one province, see C. Baylies, Ph.D. Thesis, 1978: 754-791.
7. For example, Scarrit, *African Studies Review*, vol. 14, No.1, April 1971, pp.31-54; and J.E. Goldthorpe, "Educated Africans: Some Conceptual and Terminological Problems", *Social Change in Modern Africa*, edited by Aidan Southall, Oxford University Press, London, 1961. And for more recent contributions to the debate, see Joshua Forrest, "The Contemporary African State: A Ruling Class?", *ROAPE*, No.38, April 1987, pp.66-71.
8. Shivji, Issa, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, Chap.7, pp.63-78.
9. Szeftel, 1978, Ph.D. Thesis, 1978: 76-80 gives examples.
10. Szeftel, 1978, *ibid.*; Shamabanse and the Farm Improvement Fund, p.237 illustrates these tendencies.
11. C. Baylies, for example, found that most African commercial farmers in her Southern Province sample were former or serving civil servants, a substantial proportion of whom had obtained government loans to start their enterprises or to augment their own resources. Ph.D. Thesis, pp.
12. For example the nationalisations of the major industries and the restrictions on trading in certain sectors to nationals were hailed as popular measures; in fact, the major beneficiaries were the petty bourgeoisie. For details see C. Baylies, Ph.D. Thesis, 1978: 607-673.
13. Mr. D.E. Chisanga, letter of resignation, 28th February 1965. He was resigning to take up appointment as an Industrial Relations Officer with Roberts Construction in Kitwe. National Archives, Lusaka, File No. NR3/432, vol.4, p.398.
14. For a detailed analysis of the wage situation in Zambia, refer to James Fry, *Wage Policy in an African Economy*.
15. "Hard Work in Happiness", Ministry of Labour Mimeo, January 1967 and *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, June 1971, p.5.
16. *ibid.*, "Hard Work in Happiness", p.2.
17. LIST OF MAJOR COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY
 - 1962 Morrison Commission of Inquiry to determine the pay structure in the mining industry.
 - 1964 Seers Commission; UN/UNDP general economic review.
 - 1966 Brown Commission, Mining Industry
Whelan Commission, Civil Service
 - 1969 Turner 1., General Economic Review
 - 1971 O'Rierdan Commission, Civil Service

- 1975 Mwanakatwe Commission, Civil Service
- 1978 Turner 2., General Economic Review
- 1980 Lavu 1., Administrative Committee of Inquiry in the Civil Service, Salary and Conditions of Service.
- 1985 Lavu 2., as in 1. above.
18. Livingstone Labour Conference Report, p.10.
19. *ibid.*, p.9.
20. *ibid.*, p.11.
21. H.E. The President's Speech, December 1969, Kitwe.
22. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1972.
23. Mwanakatwe Report, p.8.
24. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1974.
25. *ibid.*
26. Mwanakatwe Report, p.30.
27. Mwanakatwe Report, p.10.
28. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1978.
29. Most of the figures in this section of the chapter are calculated from the Ministry of Labour, Department of Labour Annual Reports for the respective years.
30. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1983: 4.
31. National Mirror, 1983.
32. *Times of Zambia*, 5th
33. *Zambia Daily Mail*, January 29th, 1985.
34. Lavu 2., 1985.
35. The ZCTU Secretary General makes this very point in his Quadrannual Report to the Congress in October 1986, p.22.
36. Note report of miners advocating for payment in kind. Newspaper report, Feb. 1987.
37. Gertzel in Damachi, *Industrial Relations in Africa*, p.321.
38. List of Labour Laws in Zambia
- Employment Act No.57 of 1965.
- Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, cap.25.
- Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, cap.26 of 1965.
- Minimum Wages, Wages Councils and Conditions of Employment Ordinance, cap.191.
- The Factories Act No.2 of 1966.
- Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children's Act, cap.506.
- Industrial Relations Act No.36 of 1971.
- National Provident Fund Act.
- Workmen's Compensation Act.

39. Cap.505 of the Laws of Zambia, pp.5-6.
40. 1965 Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance.
41. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1972, p.20.
42. Speech of Minister of Labour, Mr. M. Sipalo on the opening of the conference of the ZCTU in Kitwe, 16th July, 1967, National Archives, Lusaka, File No. JA/128 vol.4, NR3/412, pp.321-9.
43. International Telecommunication Workers Union. Letter to the Zambia Union of Telecommunication Workers Union, National Archives, Lusaka.
44. Letter of Permanent Secretary Ministry of Labour to the Secretary General of the ZCTU, National Archives, Lusaka, File JA/128, vol.4, NR3/412, p.349.
45. Gertzel in Damachi, 1979, p.322.
46. Chakulya, mimeo, "Brief History of ZCTU", 1974, p.4.
47. National Archives, Lusaka, File No. NR3/412, p.381.
48. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1973, p.19.
49. Humanism Part 2, p.97.
50. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, cap.517 Laws of Zambia.
51. The posts of Registrar of Trade Unions and Labour Commissioner were merged in 1970. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970, p.1.
52. Industrial Relations Act, (1971), p.16.
53. Industrial Relations Act, (1971), P.25.
54. e.g. in 1970 leaders of the ZNUT were detained following their failure to abide by disciplinary measures imposed on them due to strike by teachers on the Copperbelt, despite their condemnations of the strike. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970, p.11.
55. Industrial Relations Act, p.16.
56. Schedule of Necessary Services Refer to Note 32 in Chapter Seven for the complete schedule.

Under the Preservation of the Public Security Act, it is an offence to interfere with the delivery of a "necessary service". The schedule of "necessary service" include the following:-

- a) Any service relating to the generation, supply or distribution of electricity;
- b) Any fire brigade or fire service;
- c) Any sewage, rubbish disposal or other sanitation service;
- d) Any health, hospital or ambulance service;
- e) Any service relating to the production, supply delivery or distribution of food or fuel;
- f) Any service relating to the supply or distribution of water;
- g) Mining including any service required for the working of a mine;
- h) Any communication service;
- i) Any transport service, and any service related to the repair and maintenance, or to the driving, loading and unloading of vehicles for use in a transport service;
- j) Any road, railway, bridge, pontoon and dock;
- k) Any other service or facility, whether or not of a kind similar to the foregoing, declared by the President to be a necessary service.

Ref. vol.9, cap.265, p.787 of the Laws of Zambia.

57. Evidence of this can be seen in the opposition mounted against the introduction of Works Councils by Employers' Groups, as well as some trade union bureaucrats. For details of this see C. Baylies, Ph.D. Thesis, *op.cit.*, pp.911-912.

58. W. Richard Jacobs, "Trade Union Formation and attempts at macro-mobilisation in Northern Rhodesia", mimeo, 1973, and Robin Fincham and Grace Zulu, "Labour Participation in Zambia", in Turok, *Development in Zambia*, 1979.
59. Baylies, Ph.D. Thesis, 1978: 913.
60. Report on the Presidential Seminar on "Industrial Participatory Democracy", Government Printer, 1982, pp.
61. At this stage this outcome appears unintended, although one party (UNIP) document has discussed the desirability and possibility of doing away with trade unions altogether and substituting them with Works Councils.
62. ZCTU assessment, personal communication, June, 1987.
63. CSUZ opinion, personal communication, June, 1987.
64. General Secretary, NUCIW, May, 1987.
65. Draft Industrial Relations Act amendment bill (1982).
66. Reaction of the ZCTU to the 1982 draft amendment bill to amend the IR Act of 1971.
67. *ibid.*
68. Messrs. Mwanawasa and Company, Opinion, 1st of February, 1985, Ndola, Zambia.

CHAPTER FOUR

IDEOLOGICAL MECHANISMS OF POLITICAL INCORPORATION

Following on from our discussion of material mechanisms of political incorporation in Chapter Three, we shall undertake in this chapter a discussion of the ideological mechanisms. These are a set of mechanisms directed at the level of ideas. They are intended to influence the socio-economic values of the people so as to promote the development of a 'civic culture' which is supportive of government policy. Their purpose is therefore to cultivate the consent of the governed. The mechanisms we shall discuss include control of the leadership positions in the trade union congress, ideological engineering and the use of workers' education.

As used in this chapter, ideology is understood to mean:

A set of beliefs about man's nature and the world in which he lives; about the proper conduct of life; the organisation of a humane society and the ultimate destination of human history. [Mafeje, 1979: 76]

Many African leaders subscribe to this perspective of ideology. In their struggle for development and in the building of a new 'civil culture' or political order, African leaders may think of ideology as a tool for facilitating this task. Their hope is that by disseminating the right kind of information concerning new social values and responsibilities, the envisaged development in productive forces will be accompanied by the parallel development in peoples' attitudes and behaviour. Expressed this way, ideology may also be understood as:

the active ideational and doctrinal force which is used to guide, justify and structure the political 'will' of the people through a 'Party' speaking both for and to it. [Carlsnaes 1981: 123]

The institution used as a vehicle for delivering the 'revolutionary' message to the masses is usually the erstwhile nationalist party. This becomes the obvious choice in that it enjoys a high level of legitimacy among the people, as a residue for having concluded a successful anti-colonial struggle. It is also chosen for practical reasons, in that its organisational structure covers almost the whole country.

In the Zambian case the party UNIP was the vehicle chosen for the construction of the new civic culture. A deliberate effort was made for the Party to formulate a "national ideology" that would guide the country's social, economic and moral development [Seremekun, 1970]. This initiative resulted in the set of ideas incorporated in *Humanism Part I* (1967)¹ and *Humanism Part II* (1974). In the Zambian context,

ideology is given great credence because it is held that, "it defines the political, economic, social and cultural values of the type of society that we must mould... Without ideology, we are without guiding principles. We are unable to move from one point to another... to be without an ideology of what life ought to be, is like walking in the dark without a light. We must move to some destination which is defined by ideology".² In general terms, the values advocated by Humanism include the centrality of people in the development process, respect for the dignity of human beings and sanctity of life, and the creation of an egalitarian society through hard work, discipline and honesty in the conduct of personal and public affairs.

Through Humanism, the political leaders aspire to create a unitary value system for the society of the future. They recognise that classes exist in present Zambian society [Meebelo, 1987: 137], the class divisions are not, however, to be overcome by revolutionary political action. Instead the attainment of the egalitarian society, is premised on the ability of the party to raise the level of political and ideological consciousness of the people. This entails effecting "a revolution in the working people's ideological outlook" [Meebelo, 1987: 147]. The political leaders believe with Molteno that:

in the last resort a Humanist Zambia will only be secure and become a reality if it exists in the hearts and minds of its people. [Molteno, quoted in Meebelo, 1987: 148]

The means by which to bring about the transformation in people's outlook and value system is leadership from the party and political education for the masses. In President Kaunda's words,

Giving political education to the masses is like feeding the soil with a rich fertilizer mixture. Political education is a fertilizer which makes the Zambian minds and thoughts even more fertile for revolution. [Watershed Speech, 30th June 1975: 5]

In the long run political education is intended for the whole people of Zambia. In the short-run, the immediate target is those people who shape public opinion, including local level leaders, and members of working class organisations, such as cooperatives and trade unions. Political education is intended as the means of transmitting the values that will aid the economic transformation of Zambia. This is not a concealed process. It is undertaken openly in what is believed to be the public good. Upon analysis however, one finds that the values being promoted are defined by the political leaders alone and are aimed at enhancing the hegemony of the dominant class. As we pointed out in the preceding chapter, hegemony is being used here to mean the provision of leadership to the subordinate classes as well as the establishment of rule based on the consent, acceptance and support of the governed.

4.1 CONTROL OF LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE ZAMBIA CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS

The struggle for the control of leadership positions in the Trade Union Congress goes back before independence to the formation of the Congress itself in 1951. In 1952 a supreme action council was set up to

coordinate political activities between the nationalist party and the trade union movement [Bates, 1971: 126]. Nationalist leaders hoped to be able to call on the Trade Union Congress to effect a total withdrawal of labour at specified times in support of the anti-colonial struggle. The need to apply such a strategy was felt during the campaign against the Federation. Nkumbula called on the unions for "Two days of National Prayer" in which workers would stay away from work in a show of displeasure at the imposition of the Federation. At first it appeared as if the trade union movement would oblige, but at the last minute Katilungu as President of the Northern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress, as well as the powerful mineworkers union refused to commit the unions to the political strike. Instead he issued an advisory directive to the effect that individual workers who wished to take part in the protest strike could do so. Without the backing of the Trade Union Congress, the protest strike was not as successful as the ANC would have liked. Although many civil servants and workers in the private sector stayed away from work. In Lusaka, at Chilanga Cement workers obeyed the call to stay out. Here and at other enterprises some were dismissed as a consequence. On the mines only Mufulira managed a 100 per cent work stoppage. Miners elsewhere were not effectively involved.

After the disappointing performance of the Trade Union Congress in the anti-Federation struggle the nationalist leaders sought ways of getting the unions more involved in politics. The rolling strikes of 1956 involved one such successful deployment of trade union power as can be seen from the reaction of the politicians. European members of the Legislative Council complained that there was a move to "turn African Unions in the territory into purely political bodies."⁴ The lesson was not lost on the nationalist leaders either. They also noted that the rolling strikes had been mobilised while Katilungu was out of the country and that the calling of the strike had been contrary to the principles promoted by William Comrie who had drummed into trade unionists the virtues of the separation between trade unionism and politics. The nationalist leaders therefore decided that the most effective way of engaging trade unions in politics was to get nationalists involved in trade unionism, especially at the level of the national centre.⁵ This strategy became more deliberate after the split within the nationalist movement and the formation of UNIP. Proof of the existence of this strategy can be gauged from the reaction of its main target. After the rolling strikes of 1956, Katilungu began to voice fears of being undermined. He reiterated these fears in stronger terms at the Annual Conference of the Trade Union Congress in December 1959, accusing those who advocated the direct use of the strike weapon for political aims of "...trying to spread communist ideologies".⁶ They in turn criticised Katilungu for being a carbon copy of William Comrie.⁷

In his drive to keep trade unionism separate from politics, Katilungu had the support not only of the colonial government but also of religious organisations. The Reverend Colin Morris advised the Council during the same conference, "not to get involved in politics, it would be one of the worst things you

could do". He further advised the unions to concentrate on the struggle for African advancement in industry. "There are glittering gems to be won", he enthused.⁸ The attempt to remove Katilungu at this Conference failed. However, the militant trade unionists did manage to get the other posts on the executive filled by politically oriented trade unionists. Chakulya was elected Secretary General while Mwendapole, a sympathizer of the ZANC was elected as Assistant Secretary General and Jonas Ponde as Treasurer.⁹

The ultimate triumph for the militant trade unionists came in 1960 when Katilungu's participation in the Monckton Commission enraged the nationalists and resulted in the split in the Trade Union Congress. Save for the Mineworkers' Union and the Mines African Staff Association [Muchimba, 1974: 5], the non-mining unions all left the Trade Union Congress and then proceeded to form the Reformed Trade Union Congress (RTUC), which embraced a new ideology. At a General Council of the RTUC in May 1960, members resolved to support UNIP which was considered the most progressive party [Mwendapole, 1977: 52]. This marked the beginning of close collaboration between the trade union movement and the UNIP. It also marked the beginning of Katilungu's diminishing status in the labour movement. His insensitivity to Nationalist feelings was too much to accept even for his own union. The mineworkers' union passed a vote of no confidence and expelled him in 1960 [Gupta, 1974: 295]. Katilungu was replaced as President of AMU by John Chisata, a UNIP supporter and a former chairman of the militant Mufulira branch of the African Mineworkers' Union [Mwendapole, 1977: 52]. After Katilungu's expulsion the way was clear for the reunification of the trade union movement.

In January 1961 the United Trade Union Congress was formed. Unfortunately this did not bring the infighting within the trade union movement to an end. The struggle over nationalist politics was replaced by cold war politicking. The struggle over whether or not trade unions were to be involved in politics was taken a step further over the nature of that politics. Some trade unionists favoured an alliance with the Western oriented ICFTU while others preferred the Eastern bloc dominated WFTU. A power struggle ensued within the UTUC between those who preferred closer links with the ICFTU and those who favoured the WFTU. Wherein ideological differences were often also influenced by desires for personal gain. This manifested itself in financial indiscipline in the handling of Congress funds. One of the participants in the TUC during that period asserts that some leaders diverted money received as aid to secret individual bank accounts [Mwendapole, 1977: 52], an allegation supported by the fact that on the eve of independence the trade union movement was not only "split and demoralised" but also on the verge of bankruptcy. The structural split is indicated in Table 10.

Despite this situation some achievements were attained during the period 1960 and 1964. In 1961 the Trade Union paper *The Workers' Voice* was launched and through it, the movement had proclaimed its

Table 10

COMPOSITION OF TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS: 1964

	No. of Unions	No. of Membership
1. United Trade Union Congress	8	22,684
2. Zambia Trade Union Congress	7	44,900
3. Uncommitted	4	3,890

Source: Registrar of Trade Unions quoted in S. Sibajenee, Mimeo, East Africa University, 1969: 13

support for the cause of "self-government now". On the eve of the 1962 General elections the *Workers' Voice* proclaimed its support for UNIP thus:

The UTUC supports UNIP because UNIP stands for immediate self-government and independence... UNIP derives much of its support from the workers. UNIP is the peoples party, and its policy of self-government now, represents the voice of the people of whom 90% are workers... The interests of both organisations are complementary, the survival of one is the survival of the other. [Mwendapole, 1977: 53].

It is important to note that organised labour was at this stage under the control of politically oriented trade unionists. Their inexperience in specifically trade union affairs was a factor contributing to financial indiscipline. It was however the over zealous efforts of the nationalist leaders to engage the trade union movement in politics that led to its disintegration as a vehicle for promoting workers interests on the eve of independence in 1964.

Given its internal disunity in October 1964, the government had a clean slate on which to mould its relationship with the labour movement. It had won Independence in the name of the people and with the active support of the workers and their leaders. Judging from the speeches of the Ministers of Labour at the time and the activities of the officials of the Department of Labour, among the items on its agenda were the following:

1. to reward some of the trade union leaders for their contribution to the nationalists struggle.
2. to build a strong trade union movement under government guidance for the next phase of national development.
3. to guard the trade union movement from opposition parties.

The case of John Chisata, the African mineworkers President who stood as a UNIP candidate in the 1964 elections, may serve to illustrate the first of these. On being returned to the National Assembly, he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Transport and Works, although in his later

political career, he left UNIP to join the UPP. Jonathan Chivunga, the Kampala College Labour graduate who had been President of the UTUC since 1960, was also elected UNIP M.P. and appointed as Parliamentary Secretary Ministry of Health. Other leaders in the lower ranks of the movement were similarly rewarded with posts in the government. The lesson for ambitious trade unionists was clear: trade unionism could effectively serve as a stepping stone to bigger and more rewarding posts in the government. The only loser in these developments was the trade union movement from which many of its experienced leaders departed.

On the second point, the government proceeded to dissolve the rival executives of both the UTUC and the ZTUC and appointing a caretaker committee to mind the affairs of the trade union movement until a new executive could be appointed. To overcome its financial problems the government provided a grant of £5,614 to help the Congress pay off its debts [Muchimba, 1974: 7]. On 29th November, 1964, while addressing the newly formed Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, the President elaborated government policy thus:

My government wishes to see a healthy and effective trade union movement develop. We believe that trade unions have a vitally important role to play in the building of a nation. I say this because many people have been saying that Kaunda is against trade unions. That of course is nonsense. I may in the past have been critical of certain union practices, but I have not been hostile to the trade unions. In a young country like Zambia, it is important to remember that it is of course the future not the past that should occupy our attention. It is the future that presents to us our greatest challenge and holds for us the promise of our greatest victories. The recent history of many African countries shows that the possibility of conflict between government and trade unions is very real. In many cases these conflicts have been resolved by destruction of the trade union movement concerned. I do not want this to happen here.¹⁰

The practical demonstration of this policy came to life when the government gave the ZTUC a further grant of £5,000.00 to get it started. In addition, the President made a personal contribution of £2,000.00 for the purchase of a vehicle for the secretariat [Muchimba, 1974: 7]. The President has subsequently made several other personal donations of cash and other items to the trade union movement.

The administrative structure of the new Congress was provided for by the Minister of Labour who appointed the first executive as follows:

President	Nezia Tembo
Deputy Secretary	Edward Mubanga
General Secretary	Augustine Nkumbula
Assistant General Secretary	Jonas Ponde
Financial Secretary	Mathew B. Mwale
Trustees	Peter G. Chibuye and Andrew Leslie

Committee Members Nathan J. Mbewe, Bishop Sinyangwe and
Watson J. Banda.

This executive included some experienced trade unionists, but a number of former big names had already been creamed off and appointed to other posts in the Party and government.

In certain respects the government's commitment to an effective trade union movement cannot be called into question. The government hoped that the close relationship that existed between the Party and the trade union movement, especially after 1962, would continue. UNIP and the government envisaged a labour movement that would be an ally in development. It is the nature of that partnership that is at issue. The problems that have arisen and the conflict that has ensued revolves around different interpretations of that partnership. In one sense it can be argued that the conflict that has been experienced is not a consequence of deliberate conscious repressive measures by the government since the articulated policies speak all too loudly of government support for the workers and their unions as evidenced by the movement in wage increases since independence. Rather the conflict has been a consequence of the structural imperatives of such an economy. The nature and structure of a peripheral capitalist economy has implications for the class structure of the society as well as the state. This in turn has an effect on the realities of the exercise of political power and on how it is experienced by the subordinate classes. But if constrained by their structural situation, governments of these peripheral capitalist states still possess some independence of action as demonstrated in the nature of programmes undertaken to effect a change in the orientation of labour and the legislation that is passed to give legal backing to these programmes. In acquiescing in its role in the international division of labour, the state wants organised labour to tag along.

Between 1965 and 1970 the leadership of the ZCTU was under the control of politically oriented trade union leaders whose commitment to UNIP was much stronger than were their roots in the trade union movement. Men like Musonda and Chakulya believed in the supremacy of the Party and regarded trade union interests from the Party perspective, i.e. as sectional interests that were to be subordinated to political interests of national unity and national development.

This can best be demonstrated by examining the activities of the ZCTU during the period. After the appointed executive of 1965, the first elected executive took up office in July 1967. Its members, all of whom were UNIP supporters, were as follows:

President	Amonson Mugala
Vice-President	Abel Musonda
General Secretary	Wilson Chakulya
Ass. Gen. Secretary	Jonas Ponde

[ZM, 21.7.67]

At the time of his election to the Secretary Generalship of the ZCTU, Wilson Chakulya was still a serving civil servant in the foreign ministry, but had applied and been given leave to stand for the ZCTU post by the Labour Commissioner. During his term as Secretary General, the ZCTU applied for and was granted affiliation to UNIP. In 1969 the ZCTU expressed its support for the economic reforms. When the President announced a strike ban and a wage freeze upon the appointment of the Turner Commission into Incomes, Wages and Prices, the ZCTU expressed its support for these measures in a conference resolution which read:

In accepting the temporary ban on strikes, we do so in order to create an atmosphere conducive to peaceful implementation of the economic measures, bearing in mind that the constitution of the Republic guarantees the freedom of association and the right to organise trade unions. [TZ, 18.8.69]

It seems it was being suggested that the restrictions could be endured as a token of gratitude for the right of association. In April 1971, Chakulya was nominated to Parliament and appointed Cabinet Minister for the Central Province [ZDM, April 27th 1971]. By the end of the year, he had been transferred to the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. In the meantime, Abel Musanda who had replaced Mugala as President, had retired from trade unionism due to problems arising from within his union, the MUZ. He was later appointed as governor in the Southern Province [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970: 27].

In November 1971, a new executive was elected with Newstead Zimba as President of the ZCTU. The rest of the executive was as follows: ●

Vice President	Lavu Mulimba
Secretary General	Basil Kabwe
Dep. Sec. General	Raphael Hangambwa
Financial Secretary	Safeli Mukuka
Trustees	David Mwila, Jephath Fulilwa, Neziah Tembo

This executive consisted of strong UNIP supporters such as Lavu Mulimba who was to serve in various capacities, including Mayor of Lusaka, and by 1988 to have risen to Cabinet Minister. Another strong UNIP supporter was Basil Kabwe, who by 1982 had risen to Minister of Labour and Social Services. A third notable figure was David Mwila, MUZ president who was also UNIP member of Parliament. But for the first time the congress conference had elected to its presidency, a person who had been restricted by the government for strikes by his National Union. Newstead Zimba as President of the ZNUT had been restricted by the government between June 1970 and January 1971 [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970]. With Zimba as president, there was a new tone to labour debate. Whereas his predecessor

had accepted the ban on strikes, he made it clear in April 1972, that the ZCTU will fight "for the right to strike" [ZDM, 27th April, 1972]. The change in the orientation of the trade union movement was consolidated further with the election of Frederick Chiluba as President of ZCTU in 1974 over party stalwart David Mwila, with Newstead Zimba ascending to the Secretary Generalship of the ZCTU. David Mwila's defeat for the ZCTU Presidency angered both the MUZ and politically oriented trade unionists. Mwila and his MUZ supporters were disappointed that the K72,000.00 MUZ annual subscription to the ZCTU was not appreciated enough by the delegates of other unions to make them vote for the MUZ candidate [STZ, December 1st 1974]. There was talk among some MUZ supporters and UNIP activists of MUZ leaving the ZCTU over the issue arguing that MUZ did not need the ZCTU but that the ZCTU would collapse without the financial support of the MUZ. MUZ remained but with the defeat of David Mwila the Party's supporters within the trade union movement had lost control of the congress's most important post.

The election of Zimba to the Secretary Generalship and Chiluba to the Presidency of the ZCTU marks the beginning of an important stage in the control of leadership positions of the ZCTU. With the removal of Musonda from the Presidency of the ZCTU, organised labour was slowly but definitely moving under the control of economic trade union leaders who cherished an independent labour movement, which would act as an interest group and a broker with respect to the balance of power. Since the mid-seventies then, it would appear that the leadership of organised labour has shifted from the control of politically motivated pro-UNIP trade unionists into the hands of economic and independently minded trade union leaders. The attempt to incorporate labour through the control of the leadership of the ZCTU seems so far to have failed.

4.2 IDEOLOGICAL ENGINEERING

In this section of the chapter we turn to analyzing the mechanisms of cultivating worker support for government through the ideological apparatus. I call this deliberate cultivation of worker consent for the support of the political leadership and the rule of the petty bourgeois, ideological engineering. I use the term to refer specifically to the action of one class, the petty bourgeoisie as the governing class, over another, the workers, for purposes of establishing its hegemony over this class and to generate legitimacy for the government in society at large.

Following the formation of the ZCTU, the government launched a campaign designed to promote dialogue between employers and employees. First a national conference on labour was called in January 1967. This was the first time that Party, government, employer and employee representatives met to discuss common problems. The conference served as an exploratory meeting, to try and identify the major

problems in industrial relations in the country. The Ministry of Labour was convinced that the frequent strikes as experienced in the eighteen months between October 1964 and the 1966 Brown Commission were detrimental to development. The conference had therefore been called to "discuss the day to day problems in industry and find a formula for industrial peace" [Livingstone Labour Conference, p.2]. The specific theme of the conference was "indiscipline and its consequent effects on productivity". The Minister of Labour, Mr. Munukayumbwa Sipalo, was in attendance; as were the Minister of state for the Southern Province, Mr. M.M. Sakubita and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Labour Mr. Peterson Ngoma. Other participants included 65 workers' representatives, 34 representatives of employers, 27 officials of the government and 3 representatives of the ruling party, UNIP.

In his opening address the Minister of Labour elaborated the aims of the conference. He pointed out that it was intended to deal with the problems of "workers' output, discipline and industrial relations in the light of the National Development Programme" [Livingstone Labour Conference, p.3]. Its purpose was to search for industrial peace and harmony which he emphasized, were pre-requisites to increased productivity and sustained economic development. High productivity and growth in the economy were as desirable as was the growth in employment opportunities. Progress towards industrial peace could only be made by beginning to identify the causes of low productivity and misunderstandings that lead to strike action. He reminded trade union leaders that while they had a duty to safeguard the interests of their members, they should also be cautioned not to forget the national interest and the interests of their "neighbours", i.e. those without employment and those earning a living by working the land. To the employers he issued the advice that it was essential to maintain healthy, convenient and attractive working conditions and to ensure that the work itself was made as interesting as possible. During the conference therefore, workers and employers' representatives were enjoined to demonstrate their commitment to the service of the "common man"¹¹ and to examine their collective consciences and consider whether they were committed enough to national development to forego immediate consumption for investment and future development

Participants were called upon to temporarily put aside the inherent conflict between capital and labour and to initiate new methods of organising commercial and industrial enterprises to the benefit of all participants. The role of the private sector was acknowledged and identified as one of the pillars of national development. The Minister, however, urged for the identification of new methods of management, dynamic enough to inspire workers to greater productivity that would ensure the success of the first Four Year Development Plan. Participants were also entrusted with the responsibility of exploring the importance and contributions of workers' education which the Minister considered important as a means of improving skills leading to improved performance. He called upon the participants to formulate a "workers' motto for the Development Plan Programme" and to make recommendations for consider-

ation by the government. He called for an end to the 'old' attitudes of Master-Servant relationship in work, to racism among European employers and to a slave mentality among African workers.

The Conference then broke up into committees to consider the following issues:

1. Factors affecting the industrialization process in Zambia.
2. Industrial relations as a factor in economic development.
3. Incentives in the industrialization process in Zambia.
4. Channels of communications and the settling of disputes in industry.

What was discussed was not the possibility of altering the pattern of ownership and introducing new relations of production, but of adjusting to the existing system designed to promote the rate of productivity per worker. Of the nine factors identified as affecting productivity in industry by the first committee, half could be identified as "hidden forms of protest". These included such activities as absenteeism, reporting late for work, leaving work early, sleeping on duty and taking part in trade union activities during working hours. The rest could be categorised as factors induced by the inadequate provision of supporting services by management.

The second committee identified three main factors underlying unsatisfactory industrial relations in Zambia. These were:

1. Lack of communications and co-ordination between employer and employees;
2. Interference by an outside party not competent in the field of industrial relations. (political parties were identified later as the major culprits).
3. The prominence of racial discrimination in the sphere of industrial relations.

Recommendations were then made for the solution to each of these problems:

1. To resolve the communication problem, it was recommended that non-racial works councils be formed in industries to which workers' representatives would wherever possible be nominated by the trade union in that industry.
2. It was suggested that outside interference in industrial relations should cease and that industrial disputes should be left to trade unions and the Ministry of Labour.
3. To alleviate racial discrimination, the committee called for an improved human relation approach towards workers on the part of management and for management to endeavour to employ African personnel officers to mitigate the past record of racial prejudice in industry.

Other committees called for improved channels of communication between management and workers and increased use of the National Labour Consultative Council.

The Conference covered a lot of ground. In addition to the reports and recommendations from the four committees, a select committee produced three documents which were signed by conference participants. These were:

1. A Code for Industrial Peace in Zambia.
2. A Code for Enhanced Productivity in Zambia; and
3. A Pledge to the National Development Plan.

The Code for Industrial Peace put emphasis on discipline and the establishment of a proper dispute solving procedure in each industry. The Code for Enhanced Productivity placed responsibility on each individual to work hard, "to the limit of his ability, working short of which would be committing the offence of low productivity". It applied to the government and to private sector employers as well as to employees. In the pledge to the National Development Plan, workers agreed among other things to put the national interest before individual interests and to "do a fair day's work on every working day...". Employers pledged to run their businesses in ways that would promote the interests of Zambia and ensure increased levels of productivity through efficient management and close co-operation with the employees. In addition they pledged to provide maximum possible job security in return for a fair day's work and increased productivity.

The conference as a whole has been hailed by observers as signifying the beginning of a positive approach to labour relations and the sanctioning of collective bargaining in Zambian industry as well as a validation of the tripartite approach to industrial relations.¹² At the level of pronouncement the conference must indeed be regarded as a success. The pledges signed by the participants exude with laudable intentions. And in the aftermath of the conference, with implementation of the salary increases recommended by the Brown and Whelan Commissions, there was indeed a noticeable reduction in the number of strikes as indicated in Table 15. However it is extremely difficult to specify whether the drop in the number of wild-cat strikes was due to the salary increases or to the codes of discipline agreed by labour leaders at Livingstone. Since wild-cat strikes are initiated and carried out by workers, wage increases would carry more weight than pledges made by leaders at distant conferences. This does not, however, diminish the influence of such conferences and seminars as instruments of social engineering by political leaders. The doctrine disseminated thereby does influence the way in which shop stewards and branch officials interpret their responsibilities and carry out their duties.

Convinced of the correctness of their approach, political leaders have not tired of exhorting workers to higher productivity and discipline in carrying out their duties. In March 1969, a National Convention on Labour was called in Kitwe, which once again brought together representatives of workers, the Party and the Government. This convention reiterated the importance of economic development and economic independence. The need for hard work and discipline to stabilise the economy was again reaffirmed. In order to promote industrial peace, a Code for Industrial Peace was no longer deemed sufficient. Instead,

a ban was declared on wild-cat strikes. Power struggles within the trade union movement were condemned and the convention issued the declaration that:

...while fully encouraging the spirit and growth of the trade union movement, we fully pledge the labour movement to the declaration that, the survival of the Republic takes precedence over all other considerations.¹³

Here again, as in the 1967 conference, the emphasis was on exhorting workers' representatives to hard work and to upholding industrial discipline. Workers were enjoined to diligence in the interests of national development and reminded how fortunate they were to be in employment.

In my assessment, the purpose of this strategy was to reorientate the workers' thinking regarding their work, their place in industry and their role in economic development. They were being persuaded to accept that they were privileged to be workers, a message quite contrary to their objective position as an exploited labour force. No mention was made of the inherent antagonistic relationship that exists between capital and labour or to conscientise workers to the exploitation that occurs in the process of wage labour. No mention was made of the class struggle between workers and owners of capital, whether private or state. Instead workers were exhorted to perform, as the Ministry of Labour proclaimed, "hard work in happiness".¹⁴

Belief in the ability to change people's value systems and their attitudes to work is so strongly held that a way of institutionalising it was sought. This was to materialise in the form of the President's Citizenship College. It is to a consideration of the role of the college in ideological engineering that we now turn.

4.3 THE PRESIDENT'S CITIZENSHIP COLLEGE

The need to establish the President's Citizenship College was discussed soon after independence. The College was initially intended to be a labour college,¹⁵ but after wider discussion, the need for a political college found greater favour. Nevertheless, the college still puts emphasis on "social and labour subjects".¹⁶ It aims to provide the framework within which leaders at various levels of government, party, civil or trade union service can improve their leadership and practical skills to enable them to do their jobs better. Appropriately the President referred to the college during its official opening as "a workshop established for special instruction in the rights, privileges and duties of leadership and citizenship. It is a workshop dedicated to the production of good leaders and good workers to serve our community. It is a workshop designed to produce the tools for nation-building in Zambia".¹⁷ In other words, the PCC is a workshop for the production of the human resources with the proper orientation for the attainment of humanist development. The architects of the College believe this to be a realistic goal. The establishment and operation of the College is a reflection of this faith of the peculiar perception of the

country's political economy and of understanding on how change should be brought about. Specifically then, the government's aims for the college are as follows:

1. To impart to the citizens knowledge of "Participatory Democracy, Humanism, Patriotism, Unity of Nation, Leadership of the masses and political, social and economic problems of the Republic".¹⁸

The participants in the college are identified as:

2. Workers, trade unionists and persons engaged in the trade union movement and industrial relations.
3. People engaged in the co-operative movement, who will be provided with relevant seminars and training courses in management and organisation of co-operatives.
4. Political workers who will be taught political organisation and management of political organisations.
5. People in business, industry, civil service, local government service and in various professions and vocations, who will be taught leadership.
6. Youths who will be trained in democracy, citizenship and leadership.

In addition it is also specified that the college should provide relevant courses and seminars for the understanding of problems of Africa in general and Zambia in particular, and should help to foster Zambian Humanism, patriotism and national unity. The rationale behind these objectives is that Zambians at various levels of the society need new skills to enable them to function and carry out their duties as citizens. The government is the dominant actor in this process, not least by virtue of having defined the purpose of National Development, as is done in the philosophy of Humanism. It has subsequently drawn up the strategy for realising that purpose in the National Development Plans. Finally it has engaged in training people with the appropriate skills and attitudes to enable them to carry out these functions. As a political institution the college is regarded as "the highest teaching centre of the Party, UNIP".¹⁹

The dominance of the Party can be seen in the Administrative structure of the college. It is governed by a council whose members are appointed by the President and which is headed by the Secretary General of the Party. As of December 1987, the Secretary General presided over 17 members, of whom 7 or 41 per cent were members of UNIP's Central Committee, the highest policy making body in the country. The remainder include Cabinet Ministers, one Special Assistant to the President, One Permanent Secretary, one Provincial Political Secretary, one University Lecturer of Adult Education, the General Secretary of MUZ, the most powerful union in the country, the Executive Director of the Zambia Federation of Employers, a member of the YWCA, a vice-chairman of the Zambia Cooperative Federation and a legal counsellor from the legal services corporation. Members are appointed in their personal capacity, but their credentials, work experience and the organisations they work for are no doubt taken into consideration, such that although the Party Central Committee is the single largest block, care is taken to ensure

that the major interest groups are represented. Both the Zambia Federation of Employers and the trade unions are represented at high levels. The professions are also represented, evidenced by the inclusion of the Adult Education expert and the legal counsellor. In class terms the members of the committee are drawn mainly from the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie plus the representative of the trade union movement.

The clearest indicator of the aims of the college is the academic organisation of the units of instruction. There are four units: Political Education, Cooperative and Agricultural studies, Economic and Social Development Studies and Industrial Relations. I will briefly discuss the objectives of each.

The Cooperative and Agricultural Marketing Studies Unit aims at imparting both theoretical and practical knowledge of cooperative organisation, management and administration to people who already are or intend to be involved with cooperatives in the future. The organisational skills are intended to enable recipients to participate in economic development projects. The college emphasizes the fact that the cooperative method is one of the avenues to economic development preferred by the philosophy of Humanism. The Unit also aims at equipping the staff of the Department of Marketing and Cooperatives with the necessary skills to enable them to supervise and nurture the proper running of cooperative business. Training is aimed at board members of cooperatives as well as the general public to help them develop a better understanding of the cooperative way to economic development.

The need for training in skills and methods of cooperative organisation is a response to two factors. The first is the low level of education and skills attained by Africans during the colonial period. As the Seers Report pointed out in 1964, the lack of skilled manpower was one of the major constraints to Zambia's economic development. At independence the country had only 101 university graduates and a couple of hundred secondary school leavers.²⁰ The second factor was the lack of capital among Zambian Africans which limited their capacity to engage in business. Africans lacked capital because they had been denied the chances to accumulate, having faced restricted opportunity of participating in either commercial agriculture or in manufacturing [Baylies, 1978: 513-544]. The cooperative method was decided upon to overcome both the lack of skills by enabling participants to pull their human resources together and to facilitate easier and more effective instruction and overcome the paucity of capital by enabling government to grant loans to cooperators and enable them to engage in enterprises through which they can earn an income [Lombardie, 1971].

In keeping with the government's need to develop the economy and uplift the people's living standards, the Economic and Social Studies Unit aims at educating participants in the country's "socio-economic development", emphasizing the need for "an appropriate development strategy", and imparting to the participants the necessary tools of analysis. The need for economic development is not taken for

granted. In order to overcome the inertia prevalent in peasant societies, an effort is made to create an awareness of the need to transform the social, political and economic structures of the country, as well as to stimulate and promote a progressive involvement of Zambian citizens in the processes of these structures. Thirdly, the Unit aims to encourage the decentralisation of power through the decentralisation of administrative structures. Fourthly, it aims to retrain members of the Zambia Civil Service and effecting attitudinal changes necessary for the new responsibilities of transforming society. Fifthly, it aims to extend such training to leaders of the informal sector, parastatal organisations, private companies, public sector and the 'population at large'. Sixthly, the Unit endeavours to facilitate the study, adaptation and implementation of relevant developmental approaches. And lastly, it aims to conduct research into the social economic problems that affect the participation of Zambians of all strata in the developmental process. The research is also aimed at facilitating the implementation of the Development Plans.

These aims and objectives are targeted at a wide range of the citizenry in various capacities, from serving members of the civil service in different Ministries, to parastatal personnel, members of voluntary organisations, youth groups, church organisations, private companies and all "other organisations dealing with matters related to development". The driving motivation is to spell out to the participants the goals of development and to equip them with the skills with which to work towards these goals and as serving members of the Party, Government or Voluntary organisations, to be in a position and have the commitment to realise these goals. The fascination with Certificates and formal qualifications would give participants the opportunity to rise or be promoted to positions of responsibility from which they can implement what they have learned. The objective of the training is primarily attitudinal change, from indifference to commitment to Zambian programmes as defined in the philosophy of Humanism and as specified in the National Development Plans. Evidence does not yet exist to verify the success of these programmes, but the fact that they are undertaken at all indicates the confidence that the policy makers have in the effectiveness of this approach.

The largest unit of the college, with ten members of staff, is that concerned with political education. Unlike the Economic and Social Studies Unit, the objectives here are less specific but the target group and the courses are more narrowly focused. The spokesperson for the unit declared that;

Our major task in accordance with the policy of UNIP and its government is to provide an effective extensive and revolutionary political and ideological education aimed at raising the political and ideological consciousness of workers and peasants.²¹

The emphasis is therefore on facilitating exposure to new ideas and an understanding of participants' role in implementing those ideas. Of the fifteen aims, ten deal with exposing participants to new ideas about the organisation of society and the relevance of those ideas to the Humanist Revolution. The remaining five are concerned with helping participants understand the operation of Zambia's develop-

ment efforts. Thus the first objective is to expose participants to "socialist ideas" and principles as a way of providing a framework within which to understand the Zambian philosophy of Humanism.

These objectives are all designed to enable participants to internalise the values of Humanism and work towards their realization. This becomes increasingly obvious when one looks at the target group for political education at PCC. It is identified as follows:

- a) All officers nominated by his Honour the Secretary General of the Party from the Party.
- b) Police Officers of all ranks.
- c) Officers from parastatal organisations.
- d) Headmasters and teachers of Primary and Secondary Schools.
- e) Principals and Lecturers of various teacher training colleges as well as technical and trades institutes.
- f) Traditional chiefs and their retainers.
- g) Representatives of mass organisations.
- h) Personnel from the armed forces.
- i) Personnel from the civil service.²²

These people share certain characteristics. First of all they are already in the service of the Party or Government, so they share a certain amount of sympathy with Party ideology and its objectives. Secondly they are in a position to aggregate public opinion in the course of their work, whether as grassroots party organisers or as teachers, as members of mass organisations or as traditional leaders. The commitment born of the political education undertaken at the college is intended to result in further support for the Government which for the armed service translated into loyalty to the regime. The effectiveness of this strategy can be measured but doing so would involve further research which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. The point I am making here is that the establishment of the college and the design and content of the courses offered represent an institutionalisation of the process of ideological engineering which the government systematically embarked upon at independence. This facilitates political incorporation. The process of ideological engineering has now been systematised and groups or individuals can be sent to the College as and when identified by the Government or the Party. The consequences may however not always be those intended by the authorities. An example of this is the work of the Industrial Relations Unit. We shall briefly discuss the work of the unit over the period 1974 and 1987.

4.4 WORKERS' EDUCATION AT THE PRESIDENT'S CITIZENSHIP COLLEGE

An indication of what the college is actually doing can be gleaned from the work of the Industrial Relations Unit. The unit designs and undertakes courses of study in the fields of industrial relations, personnel management and trade union studies. Its primary objective is to impart skills to both representatives of management and of trade unions that will lead to peaceful industrial relations in the country. Government officials from relevant departments are also catered for to facilitate their meaningful participation in the tripartite system of industrial relations that obtains in the country.

The courses offered to workers representatives include workers' education, works council skills, labour law, grievance and dispute handling, trade union organisation and management, and collective bargaining. As Table 11 shows, the workers' education course is divided into four modules which have been offered a total of 38 times between January 1974 and September 1986. Each course lasts an average of 21 days. Module A1, the introduction to workers' education, has been attended by 309 worker students, with an average of 20.6 per course. While 216 have attended Module two (A2), 212 Module three (A3) and seventy seven Module four (A4). Module four is designed for training worker educators. The participants in this course are expected to teach workers education in their industries.

After workers' education, the second most popular course is the "works council skills". A total of 740 worker students have attended this course. Lasting an average of 10.2 days, it has been offered 37 times and averages 24.19 participants per course. Next in order of popularity is trade union organisation and management which has been offered 8 times, lasts 12 days with about 15.8 participants per course and has been attended by one hundred and twenty-seven workers. The grievance and dispute handling course has also been offered 8 times; with a total of one hundred and forty-two participants having attended it. The collective bargaining course has been offered four times and has been attended by an average of 50 workers students. In addition to the above courses the unit has offered numerous other specialised courses at less frequency, to specialised groups of workers and management. Altogether 4,063 worker students and management representatives have participated in courses offered by the Unit between January 1974 and December 1987.

When dealing with workers' education, the Unit has adopted the UN definition of the term as:

That form of adult education which concerns the students in their capacity as workers, enabling them to act more usefully in their trade unions, their worker-places, their works committees and on local and national planning bodies.²³

The ultimate aim of workers' education according to the ILO is "useful social action". The late Director General of the ILO espoused the hope that workers' education will equip participants with the requisite skills to enable them:

Table 11

WORKERS' EDUCATION AT THE PRESIDENT'S COLLEGE

Courses Offered by the Industrial Relations Unit	Average Duration (Days)	No. of Courses Offered	Average No. of Participants per Course	Total Attended
Workers' Education		38		
A1	21	15	20.6	309
A2	20	9	24.0	216
A3	19	9	22.0	212
A4	12	5	15.0	77
Works Council Skills	10.2	37	24.19	750
Trade Union Organisation and Management	12	8	15.8	127
Collective Bargaining	11.75	4	12.5	50
Grievance and Dispute Handling	11.1	8	15.8	142

Source: Calculated from figures provided by the Industrial Relations Unit, PCC, May 1987

To take an increasingly responsible part in securing political stability, economic growth and social justice in an ever more complex and dynamic society.

While the Unit at PCC understands that workers education is of benefit to all the three participants in industrial relations, it is also appreciated that it will bring varying benefits to different categories of participants. Hence it is expected that to the workers, workers education is understood to increase dignity and self respect, improve bargaining skills and promote effective trade unionism. To the government and the country, workers education is expected to yield high returns since initial investment is low. It is also expected to facilitate participatory democracy in industries as the worker improves his social skills. Management is also expected to boost productivity, make better works councillors and generally promote good industrial relations if provided with the right kind of atmosphere.

The trade unions which send their members to the PCC for workers education believe that the course will enlighten them as to their rights, their role in the social and economic development of Zambia and means for handling management and government. When asked whether this has been the case, during interviews with trade union leaders conducted by the author between January and June, 1987, the majority of trade unions that had participated, 70 per cent (12.0 in number), answered in the affirmative. They confirmed that workers education had enlightened their workers and sharpened their bargaining skills.²⁵

All unions have made efforts to send some members to at least one course. The most active, however, have been the prosperous ones representing workers in the mining and manufacturing industries. The courses where management sponsors participants, such as the one on works council skills have been dominated by parastatal companies, followed by the mining companies. Although some private companies have also participated, one can say in general that the most prosperous companies have been most active. This has been most noticeable since 1982 when the college introduced board and lodging fees. After this date, attendance by national unions dropped. This trend became even more pronounced after the introduction of Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 1985 which prohibited the dues stop order to unions whose members went on wild-cat strikes. As a consequence of the implementation of this Statutory Instrument, funds to the unions declined which meant unions had to cut down on activities including workers' education.

The outcome of the workers' education efforts can be assessed in the light of its intended objectives. Any precise evaluation of their effectiveness is problematic not least because of the difficulty of separating out the impact of training at the PCC from other factors influencing the course and conduct of industrial relations. But it is important to point out that one of the government's prime motivations for conducting workers' education has not seen fruition. The government had hopes that workers education would bring wild-cat strikes to an end by enlightening workers and making them more aware of their responsibilities for high productivity and national economic development.²⁶ Yet when we examine the figures for incidence of strikes between 1974, when the PCC was opened and 1985, the last year for which figures are available, we note that the incidence of strikes has increased.²⁷ But if in this respect workers education has not been wholly successful, from the point of view of the trade unionists however, workers education is considered to have made positive contributions. They comment that whether received at the PCC or from the ZCTU, workers' education has helped them understand their role better. They now understand that their primary duty is to protect the interests of their members and that this right has the legal backing of the law.²⁸ Evidence of the effectiveness of their reinforced confidence is seen in the great strides made in collective bargaining. One trade union leader made the claim that Zambia's greatest contribution to the development of trade unionism on the African continent was in the field of collective bargaining. He pointed to the gains made in wage increases and attributed these to the bargaining skills of the unions which have improved with workers education.²⁹

The increased militancy of workers and the increase in wild-cat strikes are seen by the PCC as the unintended consequence of increased trade union awareness and sophistication. While trade unionists regard the increased militancy as an inherent part of trade union development and the natural struggle for an increased share of the proceeds of their labour, they attribute the greater responsibility for the prevalence of strikes to the depressed economic situation obtaining in the country. Both the PCC and the

trade union leaders seem to be saying the same thing; that increased workers' education has contributed to a greater awareness of trade union rights and that despite the prevailing economic circumstances, workers have engaged in industrial action in defence of their rights. The only difference is that for the PCC this is not quite the result workers' education was intended to achieve. Trade union leaders on the other hand think the opposite, for them this is a positive development.

Clearly then, the government's policy on workers' education has had consequences other than those envisaged. Whereas the intended objective was to engage workers' education as an instrument of political incorporation, the implementation of the policy has resulted in greater worker awareness, confidence and militancy. The explanation for this disjuncture between intended policy and outcome appears to lie with the nature of the policy and the process of policy implementation. Whereas the policy is formulated by the Executive, the implementation of it is delegated to technocrats in the Ministry of Labour and ultimately with the academic staff of the PCC. Although there is a Political Education Unit to which the Secretary General of the Party can send Party cadres to be schooled in political theory and Humanism, trade unions send their activists to the industrial relations unit to do courses chosen by the sponsoring trade union. These courses have been designed by Western trained tutors with the help of experts from the ILO and Western trade union federations.³⁰ Although efforts are made to situate the materials so developed within the Zambian experience, there does not as yet exist a Zambian system or principles of industrial relations; consequently, the education so provided cannot produce the results desired by the political leaders.

4.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have discussed the mechanisms that the government uses to change the value systems and attitudes of workers and their leaders. We have reviewed the efforts made to change attitudes and orientations from within the trade union movement by the ascendancy of UNIP cadres to leadership positions within the ZCTU and have demonstrated that these efforts were effectively stalled with the defeat of David Mwila for the Presidency of the ZCTU in 1974. Secondly, we have discussed the mechanism of ideological engineering, and argued that, through persuasion by way of speeches, lectures and meetings, and political education classes, the party and the government has tried to change workers' meaning systems, especially with regard to work, and the generation and distribution of rewards in independent Zambian society. As a way of institutionalising this process, the PCC was established with the specific purpose of training grass-roots leaders in skills that would facilitate the mobilisation of the masses for social-economic and political development. The immediate goal in political development is to revive the support that government enjoys among the masses. To arouse these feelings among the workers, a set of courses on workers' education are provided. For the Party and the government the hope was that these

courses would instill in the workers the virtues of hard work and respect for legal procedures for the solution of disputes and a distaste for strikes. The implementation of workers' education by industrial relations experts has resulted, however, in teaching traditional trade union principles and practices. And instead of leading to a decrease in wild-cat strikes, in fact the incidence of strikes has remained almost the same during the 1970s and escalated during the 1980s.³¹ Rather than produce reticence in workers, workers' education seems to have resulted in worker confidence and militancy. For the time being at least, efforts to incorporate workers through the ideological apparatus seems to have not succeeded.

In Chapters Three and Four we have discussed both material and ideological mechanisms through which government has attempted to politically incorporate organised labour, assessing the effectiveness of each. The material mechanisms we have identified are wage increases and labour laws that provide the legal framework for the organisation of labour. The ideological mechanisms include the attempts to staff ZCTU posts with UNIP activists and to change the value systems and attitudes of grass-roots leaders and trade union functionaries. Taken as a package, one can point out that wage increases are in general the most effective mechanism of political incorporation in that they satisfy the immediate needs of the workers and therefore serves as an effective tool of legitimisation.

Using industrial peace as a measure of the success of government programme, however, we have established it to have been largely elusive. The failure of political incorporation is evidenced by the persistence of wild-cat strikes on the one hand and increased use of force to curb strikes on the other. Further, in the early 1980s a new initiative was made to introduce stringent legislation to effect the direct take-over of organised labour by the Party. The amendment that was proposed in 1982 stipulates that the trade union congress should be made an adjunct of the Party. Had it gone through it would have provided a dictatorial solution where the democratic methods have failed. In 1987, the 1982 amendment was still being revised for possible introduction to the National Assembly. It was intimated that the most contentious sections had been altered. Even if the original proposal to make the Congress a mass organisation and therefore open to any interested person had gone through, however, the success of this strategy in controlling industrial unrest remains doubtful for the following reasons:

1. It will fail to achieve industrial peace because it is directed at taking over the Congress whereas wild-cat strikes most often occur as a consequence of spontaneous action among working men and women in response to their working conditions and the remuneration they receive. Taking over of the Congress without effecting a fundamental change in property relations and management styles will not bring about industrial peace.

2. The complete takeover of the Congress may not prove easy. As long as democratic election procedures are maintained within the labour movement, workers will strive to return leaders of their choice, as the election and subsequent removal of Musonda from the MUZ and ZCTU executive has illustrated. An appointed Secretary General of the ZCTU will have a difficult time imposing his wishes on the wor-

kers and their unions, let alone maintain industrial peace. Unless of course there is a complete departure from the current declared commitment to democracy and respect for human rights.

Ideological and material mechanisms may have been important for guiding the trade union movement along lines generally in accord with government objectives, but have in no sense "tamed" the labour movement. If political incorporation has proceeded some distance, it is far from complete and the desired end of "industrial" harmony remains unrealised. If past experience can provide lessons for the future, it might be suggested that any attempts to effect more complete incorporation, whether in accord with proposed changes to the Industrial Relations Act or through overt use of force, are likely to be counterproductive. We proceed in Chapter Five to review the latter course in some detail in respect of government response to strikes, but may suggest in anticipation of that review that in the **Zambian** circumstances, the most promising avenue to industrial peace is through addressing the fundamental cause of industrial conflict which is the private ownership of property and the private appropriation of socially produced surplus.

NOTES

CHAPTER FOUR

1. There is also a growing interpretive Literature of Humanism: Zulu, 1973; Kandeke, 1977; Meebelo, 1973; Meebelo, 1987.
2. H.E. The President, opening address, 16th UNIP National Council Meeting, 14th December 1981 quoted in Meebelo, 1987: 193.
3. During 1986-87 there was a concerted effort from within the NUBEGW to oust Frederick Chiluba from the chairmanship of the union, as a way of ousting him from the congress. He was removed from the leadership of the union, but still remains Chairman General of the ZCTU.
4. So said Mr. John Grant, Midland Member of the Legislative Council, quoted in Northern News, July 28th 1956.
5. Personal Communication, Mr. F. Chitambala, May 1987.
6. Katilungu, quoted in Northern News, 19th December 1959.
7. In Sibajene, "Trade Unions in Zambia", 8-10.
8. Quoted in Northern News, 19th December 1959.
9. Richard Jacobs, The Relationship between African Trade Unions and Political Organisations in NR/Zambia, 1949-1961, p.23.
10. H.E. The President's Speech, quoted in Mwendapole, p.56.
11. "Common Man" in popular Zambian parlance refers to sub-elite categories, especially manual workers, those employed in the informal sector and the peasantry. On this occasion the term was used to mean all those not in formal employment and therefore not represented by trade unions or employer's organisations. This usage must be differentiated from the more philosophical definition given in Humanism Part II (1974).
12. Sibajene, 1969; Banda, 1976; Machungwa et.al. 1983.
13. Ministry of Information; Zambia Information Services Report on Conference.
14. Ministry of Labour document, "Hard Work in Happiness", mimeo, 1967.
15. Personal communication - UNIP Research Bureau, Freedom House, May 1987.
16. PCC Information Booklet, pp.5-6.
17. H.E. The President's Speech on the official opening of the President's Citizenship College, 1st May 1974. Note the choice of day, Labour Day.
18. PCC Act, 1972, p.7.
19. PCC Information Booklet, p.6.
20. For information on the educational attainment of Africans at independence, and the effects of this on Zambia's prospects for economic development, see the Seers Report, Chapter 6, pp.91-120.
21. PCC Information Booklet, p.5.
22. *ibid.*, pp.21-22.
23. Quoted in PCC, mimeo, October, 1980.
24. The late Director General of the ILO, quoted in PCC mimeo, 1979.
25. Workers' education is also undertaken by the national unions after their members have gone through Module A4 at the PCC, by the workers education department of the ZCTU on which 2.5 to 3 per cent of the annual budget is expended. The University of Zambia centre for

Continuing Education offers radio programmes on workers' education, the Department on Industrial Participatory Democracy, and at one stage Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation. There in fact exists a Committee on Workers' Education comprising of representatives from the PCC and the ZCTU. There is also a larger committee bringing together all the above mentioned organisations as well as the Zambia Federation of Employers and the ILO. The larger committee is called the "Workers Consultation Committee". The ILO in conjunction with the Danish voluntary organisation DANIDA is doing work with the ZCTU involving the training of worker educators for rural workers, women workers and illiterate workers.

26. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970, p.10 section 59.
27. See table on strikes, Table 14.
28. Interview 23rd March 1987, Chairman of the National Union of Postal and Telecommunication Workers. Reference is made to the study of the Industrial Relations Act 1971, undertaken at the PCC.
29. Interview - Public Service Workers Union, 4th May 1987.
30. The Module system currently in use for Workers' Education was originally designed with the assistance of Mr. P.G.H. Hopkins, a British ILO Workers' Education expert. Personal communication, PCC Industrial Relations Unit, April 29th 1987.
31. See table on strikes p. 182-183.

CHAPTER FIVE

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO STRIKES: MODALITIES OF MAINTAINING PEACE AND STABILITY

In the last two chapters we discussed the various mechanisms that the government has employed to reorientate organised labour's stance from a confrontational style of trade unionism to a collaborationist one. We have noted that both ideological mechanisms and material incentives have been used to accomplish this. Since 1965, government has made efforts to wean organised labour from conventional trade unionism to a system of industrial relations that includes other actors and other practices, thus dissipating the power of the trade union. Yet despite these attempts directed towards effecting a political incorporation of organised labour, organised labour has been able to a certain extent to pursue its interests within what the law permits. Collective bargaining still occurs, though not backed officially by the strike and trade union leaders still speak out on issues concerning workers. Occasionally the restrictions have proved difficult to abide by and disputes have arisen that have resulted in work stoppages. Given the government's antipathy to strikes, because of their disruptive effects on the process of accumulation, an assessment of the government's response to them will be instructive. In this chapter, we review this response to further illustrate government's conception of trade union rights and worker action in Zambian society.

We noted in Chapter Four that government desires to change organised labour's understanding of trade union practice and incorporate it into a mode of thinking and conception of political order consistent with the furthering of the "Humanist revolution". In 1975 a *Times of Zambia* "comment" referred to the ZCTU as "a labour bank to conserve and direct the investment of labour in development". The comment went on to add, "...the Party and the government appear to be doing everything in their power to prepare "labour power" to take its key and unique position under Humanism" [TZ, 8th November, 1975]. One major obstacle to the concrete operationalisation of this role is that the "Humanist revolution" remains in the sphere of ideology, at the level of proclamation and has little concrete manifestations. In practice, the production process is governed by the profit motive. The state itself is interested in accumulation to safeguard resources for itself. In the practice of industrial relations therefore, conflict is inevitable given the antagonistic differences between capital and labour. This manifests itself in disputes that sometimes involve work stoppages. The manner in which government has responded to these

strikes further illustrates its conception of the role of organised labour in industrial relations and society.

In discussing government's response to strikes we have to bear in mind that extensive restrictions on strikes already exist and that government has provided alternative mechanisms both for worker participation in industry and for the resolution of conflict.¹ Collective bargaining is permitted as a means for negotiation over wages and conditions of work. Almost 88% of workers in the formal sector are covered by collective agreements. When negotiation does not result in settlements, government machinery for conflict resolution is called into play with final arbitration residing with the Industrial Court as described in Chapter Three.²

While negotiation through collective bargaining entails some degree of involvement of workers, in determination of their remuneration and work situation, the notion of participation by workers in decision making conventionally refers not to this but to other mechanisms permitting involvement in day to day management of the enterprise, i.e. participation in decision making regarding the work process itself.

One such mechanism introduced in Zambia, workers' participation, has already been described in Chapter Three. The intention behind their introduction was to encourage the mutual cooperation between workers and management in order to promote industrial peace and secure good working relations in the interests of efficiency and increased productivity. But the operations of the works councils so far have revealed problems. As already noted pressure from the business lobby resulted in restricting the requirements for works councils from the original five employee company to 100 employee companies [TOZ, 6th March 1970; IRA, 1971, p.40]. Even where implemented, works councils have not led to increased participation. In 1979, Fincham and Zulu noted that the stipulation in the enabling Act on the secrecy of the deliberations of the works councils had isolated ordinary workers from the works councillors and that workers regard the institution not as an avenue of participation but an instrument of control [Fincham and Zulu, 1979: 221].

A second form of participation that has been introduced in Zambia is that of Worker Directors. Since the mid-sixties the government has appointed workers' representatives to sit on the boards of statutory companies such as the National Provident Fund and the Workmens' Compensation Board. In 1969 for example Jaffet Fulilwa and Emmanuel Mwansa, Presidents of the Transport and Allied Workers Union and of the Railway Workers Union respectively were members of the Board of the National Transport Corporation. Edwin Thawe, the General Secretary of the Mine Workers Union was member of the INDECO Board of Directors and Basil Kabwe as Assistant Secretary of the ZCTU was a member of the MINDECO Board of Directors. The trend has been growing ever since. In 1983 the President directed

the ZCTU to nominate trade union leaders for membership on all boards of Directors of Parastatal Companies and statutory boards. By 1985 there were forty-four worker directors.⁴

The worker directors engage in the normal duties of directors in the decision making process. Nominally, they share the same advantages as the shareholder representatives. They are also bound to the same degree, by the decisions of the boards on which they sit. In the assessment of the ZCTU leadership, however, this is a major drawback of the arrangement. The workers representatives feel that they are always in a minority and find it difficult to influence the decisions of the board. Consequently the boards of some parastatals pass decisions that adversely affect workers' interests, such as the withdrawal of subsidies on consumer items and the increase in the prices of essential commodities. These kinds of decisions lead to the alienation of trade union leaders from the rank and file workers. By June 1987 the ZCTU leaders were referring to the worker directors as "an experiment that has failed and in need of a serious review".⁵

A third mode of participation encouraged in Zambia is profit sharing. This was intended for introduction in worker self-management enterprises. So far it has been tried in only a limited number of agricultural producer cooperatives and parastatal companies where worker self-management has been introduced. No studies have yet been undertaken to assess the operations of these schemes. We can only note that the schemes are few in number and application of the concept depends a great deal on the disposition of the management. Newspaper reports of one agricultural scheme in Luanshya indicates high production yields [ST, 16.10.88].

Apart from these forms of participation provided by the government, the second major conditioning factor to the government's response to strikes is the geo-political situation in Southern Africa and Zambia's role in the sub region. We shall briefly discuss this factor.

After UDI in Southern Rhodesia in November 1965, Zambia's economic dependence on her southern neighbours became a source of concern. The search for alternative routes to sea ports became immediate and the identification of alternative sources for goods and services that had been imported from Southern Rhodesia became a full-time national preoccupation. For example in 1965, Zambia's imports from Rhodesia stood at £35m but these were reduced to £12m by 1969 [Hall, 1974: 32], while South Africa and Britain filled the vacuum left by the Rhodesian gap in the short term. The vulnerability born of dependence on outside sources for essential commodities was a source of worry to the authorities. Emphasis was therefore put on local production to satisfy national demand. Local companies responded to the vacuum left by the boycott on Rhodesian imports by increasing production, especially in manufacturing and food processing. It is against this background of heightened tension in the region, compounded by the need to stabilise local production that the first ban on strikes was announced by the

President in August 1969. In the 1970s escalation of the liberation wars in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia, compounded the situation, which was aggravated still further by the internal divisions within UNIP leading to the formation of the UPP. The direct effect on labour policy was the declaration of most industries including transport, mining and electricity as essential services and the prohibiting of strikes in these industries under the Preservation of Public Security Act [Cap. 106, Laws of Zambia]. The situation was further formalised by the subsequent ban on strikes and their virtual prohibition under the IR Act (1971).⁶ While a number of factors may be identified in explaining this particular process of regulating industrial relations in Zambia I would suggest that the end result gives further evidence of the hegemonic programme pursued by the state entailing further incorporation of trade unions into the government's political stratagem.

To understand this process, we shall first of all define the strike and discuss its implications for the government on one hand and for workers on the other. Secondly, we shall discuss the trends in Zambian society with regard to patterns of incidence, regularity and causes of strikes. Thirdly, we shall discuss some examples of strike action over the period 1970 to 1985 and assess the nature of government response to these strikes and attempt to offer explanations.

The argument here is that although the government's reaction to industrial disputes is rationalised in terms of maintaining peace and stability, the careful orchestration of responses engaged in suggests that the desired outcome should not be the complete annihilation of organised labour but the active participation and positive involvement of the trade union movement in the socio-economic development of the country as directed by the Party and the government. However, the kind of participation desired by the government is one that excludes an independently self-defined role for organised labour. It excludes the right of organised labour to withdraw its services in support of demands or as a demonstration of its displeasure. But from the government's perspective, it is only when the solicitous advances fail to inspire the desired response that repressive measures are taken.

We will argue that, in a situation where strikes are disallowed, the government is likely to be increasingly repressive, especially where it has provided other means of worker's participation and conflict resolution procedures. Moreover, the tendency towards repression will be stronger during periods of economic depression when government desperately needs investment and when it is feared that strikes will discourage foreign investment. In November 1972, for example, Ndola governor Boniface Zulu, warned workers of the danger to the economy of engaging in strike action:

More investors could be attracted if workers did not resort to strikes each time there was a dispute between workers and management. [TOZ, 10th November, 1972]

Such warnings were a common occurrence during the 1970s. Generally speaking, the repressive measures are born out of a desperate need to reconcile the government's conception of the nature of trade unionism suitable for Zambia with organised labour's conception of its own role and function in Zambian socio-political processes. While the government desires a politically incorporated trade union movement, organised labour aspires to an independent role and function based on a capitalist understanding of the Zambian economy and the role of trade unions within it. We develop the last point in the next chapter. For now, we return to a discussion of the strike.

5.1 THE STRIKE DEFINED

Conventionally, the strike is defined as:

a temporary stoppage of work by a group of employees in order to express a grievance or enforce a demand. [Hyman, 1972: 17]

It is basically a collective industrial act, an expression of conflict between employers and employees.

Hyman aptly captures the essence of this when he states that:

The classic strike is in many respects the industrial equivalent of war between nations... it is sometimes described as the conduct of industrial relations by 'other means'. [Hyman, 1972: 19].

And as with any other war, a strike has long term as well as immediate causes and is perpetrated to achieve some significant goal. For the social scientist, the more illuminating definition is probably the one which states that:

strikes and other related forms of collective struggle represent purposive social action: they are directed towards some objective and constitute a method of protest or demonstration designed to influence the policies, priorities or decisions of another party (employers and government). [Hyman, 1979: 327].

This is closer to how trade unionists understand strikes. Employers and governments on the other hand, tend to regard strikes as disruptive industrial action engaged in by selfish or unreasonable workers. For both, however, the action is understood to be temporary. Workers intend to resume work within the same enterprise when the cause of the dispute is resolved and employers hope to resume production.

A strike may be organised by national leaders or it can occur as a spontaneous action by workers at the local level in response to perceived injustice. The perceived injustice may be suffered by the workers themselves where they feel that their basic values have been violated or, in the case of sympathy strikes, by fellow workers in other industries. The causes of strikes are categorised by Knowles as follows:

1. Where basic values are involved i.e. wages and working hours.
2. Solidarity with other workers which may involve industrial action taken in sympathy with other workers, and
3. 'Frictional' causes which include all other categories that may be a cause of conflict.⁷

Another distinction that has been made is between economic and political strikes, the former being those directed at employers and aimed at winning better wage and working conditions and the latter being directed at the government. But this is an extremely delicate distinction. In many cases where a strike seems to be a political one, closer analysis reveals underlying economic causes. A case in point is the 1981 miners' strike in Zambia. [see pp. 172-176].

At the industrial level, therefore, a strike is a response to concrete problems experienced or perceived by workers. And from experience workers have arrived at the conclusion that striking is the most effective way of expressing their displeasure in their working environment and backing up their demands. This is because the distribution of power in modern industries in capitalist societies favours management [Cronin, 1979: 8]. Workers have few legal sanctions they can bring against employers.

The effects of a strike may not always be confined to the enterprise concerned. Sometimes the repercussions go beyond the industry, as when a strike results in the disruption of a service to the public or to certain sections of the community. Sometimes the mere occurrence of a strike gives the impression that things have gotten out of control. In these cases the government is invariably drawn in. In certain circumstances, however, the strike may have a 'political dimension' by being directed against the government itself, Hyman argues that this is the case in Third World countries where the legal right to strike is restricted. In this case, the very act of going on strike itself becomes a challenge to governmental authority, even when the strike is directed against the employer.

The Zambian government's involvement in the regulation of strikes has occurred at two levels. First legal measures have been taken to restrict the right to strike and to provide alternative mechanisms for the resolution of industrial disputes, in the form of compulsory arbitration [Shimaponda, 1984: 710]. Secondly there have been presidential directives to ban strikes and the use of statutory instruments by ministers to further prohibit strikes in certain sectors. For example, the initial ban announced in 1969 was followed in 1970 by Statutory Instrument No. 239 (1970) which extended the provisions of the Preservation of Public Security Act, Cap. 106 (1965) to the field of industrial relations. The Act is intended to ensure the:

Safety of persons and property, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, the prevention and suppression of violence, intimidation, disorder and crime, the prevention and suppression of mutiny, rebellion and concerted defiance of and disobedience to the law and lawful authority, and the maintenance of the administration of justice.⁸

Regulation 31 D.D. of Statutory Instrument No. 239 stipulates that no employer, employer's organisation or other person shall take part in a lock-out, and no employee, trade union or other person shall take part in a strike which is likely to hinder or interfere with the carrying on of a necessary service. A schedule of twenty-one 'necessary services' is given, ranging from the distribution of electricity, to sewer-

age and rubbish disposal, to health and communication services. The regulation also encompasses any other services that may be so declared in the future. In late 1970 for example S.I. No. 241 (1970) declared the teaching service to be a necessary service. In recent years medical and financial services have been declared and remain necessary services.

Despite these measures, strikes have continued to occur, though frequently as a result of the spontaneous action of workers on the shop floor and the classroom, rather than as organised by trade union officials. The manufacturing industry, which is the third largest employer, has been the most strike prone. However in recent years there has been an increase in the number of strikes in the service sector, especially among civil servants, teachers and nurses.

5.2 TRENDS IN STRIKE ACTION IN THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY

An average of slightly more than 109 strikes per year have occurred over the period 1966 to 1985. They appear to be evenly distributed over the various sectors of industry, although the percentage of strikes in some sectors appears to be higher than is their proportionate share of the labour force. Over the period 1966 to 1983, for example, agriculture employed on average 9.43 per cent of the total work force in the formal sector and contributed a corresponding 8.64 per cent of the recorded strikes over the same period.¹⁰ The highest number of strikes (32.07%) occurred in manufacturing, during the seventeen year period, although the sector provided only 11.74 per cent of all formal sector jobs. Mining accounted for 12.61 per cent of the strikes during the period, while providing the second highest number of jobs at 15.92 per cent of persons employed in the formal sector. The least strike prone sector has been the electricity and water supply sector which has accounted for only 0.45 strikes. It is also the smallest sector providing for only 1.63 per cent of jobs. There seems in general, then, to be some relationship, though not an absolute one, between the size of the sector and strike proneness. The bigger the sector the more likelihood of strikes.¹¹

The particularly high incidence of strikes in manufacturing however, may reflect a tendency referred to by Richard Hyman, that the number of strikes tends to rise in periods of prosperity or expansion [Hyman, 1972: 28]. This seems to be the case at least at the sectoral level in the sense that, the manufacturing industry has enjoyed growth and expansion since independence spurred on by the vacuum created by UDI in Rhodesia and the imposition of international sanctions against the Smith regime. In contrast, mining has suffered a decline in economic activity resulting in the reduction of the work force, closure of some divisions and ultimately in the merger of the two major mining companies NCCM and RCM into ZCCM in 1981 [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1981, pp.10-11]. The number of persons employed in the mining industry has dropped from a peak of 68,070 in 1977 to 57,730 in 1983. This may partially

explain the relatively lower level of strikes in mining where the average number of strikes per year during the period 1966–1983 averaged 11.66 as compared with 29.66 for manufacturing.¹²

Another factor we need to note in explaining the high incidence of strikes in manufacturing is the racial/social composition of the sector in Zambia. At the top, the sector is dominated by a large number of non-indigenous operators who may perpetuate many of the racist practises carried over from the colonial period. African workers contrast this treatment with the fact of political independence and their frustration is then expressed in strike action. Some of the common causes of strikes in the private sector are recorded as “use of abusive language” usually by a non African manager or supervisor, or “racist remarks” or “remarks that indicated sympathy with the UDI regime in Rhodesia”. The latter was common before the independence of Rhodesia.¹³

The first seven years of the period 1965 through 1985 witnessed the heaviest number of strikes, a total of 999, averaging 142 per year with the highest number in 1966 at 241 and the lowest 114 in 1965. These strikes involved 436,369 workers or an average of 62,338 per year. The highest yearly figure was 307,167 workers in 1966 and the lowest 10,149 in 1965. During this seven year period, a total of 876,799 striker days were recorded with 579,406 in 1966 alone and the lowest yearly figure being 18,894 in 1971.

The next eight years between 1972 and 1979 (inclusive) witnessed only 482 strikes, an average of 60.25 strikes per year, with the highest recording being 78 strikes in 1975 and the lowest being 44 strikes in 1979. During this period there were no years when the number of strikes exceeded 100. The strikes during this period accounted for 486,712 days lost, with the highest recording being in 1978 with 301,562 and lowest in 1973 with 5,663 striker days. Economically this was a period of mixed fortunes. While the oil crisis began in 1973, the price of copper showed an improvement in that year and slight improvements in 1975 and 1979. 1978, however, was a particularly difficult year, when severe foreign exchange shortages were experienced. This is reflected in the severity of the strikes recorded in this year, with the highest number of days lost over the six year period.

The last six years from 1980 to 1985 saw an increase in the number of strikes with a total of 495, averaging 82.5 a year with the highest year recording 157 strikes and the lowest 37. The strikes involved 169,952 workers and accounted for 809,021 days lost averaging 134,836 days per year. This average is higher than that recorded in the first seven years between 1965 and 1971 indicating that after a drop in the number of strikes in the middle period, the number and volume of strikes were on the rise again. To a certain extent this trend reflects the general performance of the economy which after the initial prosperity following independence has been on the decline since the middle of the 1970s.

The cause of the majority of strikes in Zambian industries tends to be economic. Specifically strikes tend to be triggered by wage related issues. During the period 1972 and 1983 when strikes were categorised by cause, we find that 50.46 per cent of the striker days were due to strikes triggered by wage related demands. The figures range from 99.1 per cent in 1983 to a low of 24.8 per cent in 1981.¹³ Although there does not seem to be any periodic pattern when strikes tend to be influenced by one type of issue as opposed to another, between 1974 and 1979 the number of striker days recorded due to wage related issues was consistently above the average of 50.46 per cent as Table 16 indicates [except for 1975]. This was a period when the economy was experiencing severe economic problems characterised by a shortage of foreign exchange. The resulting low level of imports of raw materials led to reduced activity in industry and consequently a reduction in employment levels. This was also a period when the government initiated the first phase of reducing subsidies on food products resulting in an increase in the cost of living.¹⁴

The prevalence of the wage issue as the major cause of strikes is also evident at the level of industry. Take agriculture for example. Over the period 1971 to 1982 there were 74 strikes recorded in this industry which includes hunting and forestry, which involved the loss of 45,743 days. Of these, 29,001 or 63.4 per cent were over wage demands and only 37.09 per cent were over all other issues including the enforcement of collective agreements and working conditions.

The primacy of economic issues as the cause of strikes is also evident in the mining industry, the most important sector in the country in terms of generating foreign exchange and the second most important employer of labour after the service sector.¹⁵ Over the period 1971 to 1980 there were 75 strikes in the mining industry, involving the loss of 29,010 days. Of these, 16,270 or 56.08 per cent were recorded in disputes over wage demands and only 43.92 per cent were over other issues.

That wage-related issues should be the major cause of strikes in the mining industry is instructive for another reason. The mining industry has the strongest union in the country with a well established collective bargaining machinery. This machinery has been effectively used by the unions to secure handsome wage increases for their members over the years 1966 to 1985. That unofficial strikes over wage demands still occur is indicative of the rate of the deterioration in living conditions. Collective agreements run for three years, but in recent years the rate of inflation and other pressures on the pay-packet has been such that the purchasing power of the pay-packet has been eroded before the date of the next review. This results in demands for wage increases and in strike action to back those demands.

One finds that the percentage of strikes over wage demands is even higher, however, in the less well organised industries with weak unions. The highest proportion of strikes over wage demands was recorded in the transport industry when 95.23 per cent of strikes between 1971 and 1973 related to this issue. This

is followed by the manufacturing industry with 65.10 per cent of strikes being over wage demands as indicated by Table 12.

Other factors, such as a prevalence of small scale operators in the manufacturing and transport sectors who are either unable or not willing to pay high enough wages may have contributed to the higher proportion of strikes over wage demands there. But this just goes to show the overriding importance of the economic factor as a cause of industrial disputes.

Another argument that has been made with regard to the wages factor as a cause of strikes is that it is frequently advanced as a front for other causes which may be just as vexing but less amenable to straightforward articulation, [Coates and Topman, 1988: 251] such as poor working conditions, e.g. non provision of housing or low housing allowances. Often the amount of the housing allowance may be stipulated in the contract of employment by which the employee is bound; to protest against this he would be violating his conditions of employment, so the protest is instead generalised as being over wages. In view of considerations such as this, the fixing of the cause of a strike can therefore only be approximate. Apart from those over wages, industrial strikes in Zambia followed from disputes over the implementation of collective agreements, unfair dismissals of colleagues, unfair managerial practices,

Table 12
PERCENTAGE OF STRIKER DAYS BY CAUSE

1971-1983 Sector	% OF STRIKER DAYS	
	Over Wage Demands	Over Other Issues
Agriculture	63.40	37.09
Mining and Quarrying	56.08*	43.92
Manufacturing	65.50	34.50
Transport	95.23	4.77
Service (including Govt.)	63.10	37.13

* Figures for the mining sector cover the period 1971-1980

Source: Calculated from the Ministry of Labour Annual Reports 1971-1983

delayed payment of wages, delays in the implementation of agreed wage increments, demands for removal of supervisors for "alleged use of insulting language" and demands for removal of Personnel Officers for treating workers in a "disrespectful manner". The latter two are the second and third most common causes of strikes in the private sector. A final cause of strikes was resentment against discipline and authority.¹⁶

Government has responded in various ways to these strikes. In order to discuss in more detail their causes and to assess government response, we examine five examples of strikes over a fifteen year period from 1970 to 1985. We have drawn the examples from across the range of industries, making sure that a variety of responses are covered. Our examples include:- a teacher's strike in 1970, a strike of railway workers in 1979, a strike of agricultural workers in 1980, a mine workers' strike in 1981 and a financial institution workers' strike in 1985.

5.3 EXAMPLES OF STRIKES AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES: 1970-1985

a) The 1970 Teachers' Strike

The 1970 teachers' strike is considered by those involved to have been the most traumatic event in the history of the Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT). The strike was initiated as a result of government delay in implementing the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry. The Rogers Administrative working Party had been appointed by the government following a Copperbelt teachers' strike in 1968. Among the things the commission introduced were changes in the grading structure of teacher's salaries and in the conditions of service, such as the withdrawal of furniture from teachers at the top of the salary scale and its provision to teachers in the 'low income group'. Also teachers who had been wrongly levied for unsuitable accommodation were to be refunded. The new measures were to cost the government an extra K41m per year. Although the increased expenditure was duly authorised by Parliament, the government was not fast enough in implementing the changes. Six consultative meetings were held between the ZNUT executive and Ministry of Education officials over the implementation of the recommendations made in the Rogers Report in the five months preceding the strike [Kanduza, 1980: 288]. When by June 1970 the new conditions of service had not been implemented, teachers struck between the 2nd and 22nd.

The strike started in Luapula Province, and so spread to the Copperbelt schools, Lusaka, Central Province, Southern Province, Western, Eastern and North-Western Provinces. Strikes had been banned the previous year so this was an unofficial action, as the Minister of Education pointed out at a press conference on 8th June. Early in the strike, Newstead Zimba, as President of ZNUT had visited the teachers in Luapula province and appealed to them to return to work. But at a meeting with Ministry of Education officials and labour officers, the ZNUT leaders refused to condemn the strike publicly [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970: 11]. This led the government to conclude that the ZNUT was behind the strike, and its response was based on this premise.

First, the government annulled the recognition agreement then in force between itself and the ZNUT on the grounds that the ZNUT had violated the terms of the agreement by failing both to follow the negotiating procedure it stipulated, and to extend membership to teachers in secondary schools, the former

scheduled schools and teacher training colleges. Secondly, the government withdrew the dues-stop-order facility to the union. Thirdly, since the Secretary General and his deputy and the Financial Secretary had been seconded to the union by the Ministry of Education, this provision was withdrawn. One of the individuals concerned was transferred to the Eastern Province, the second to the North Western Province and the third to the Western Province. The three union officials refused to take up their new appointments and were subsequently dismissed from the teaching service for indiscipline, whereupon the union reinstated the former leaders as full time union employees.

Ironically the strikes very effectiveness persuaded the government that it had been politically motivated by 'malcontents' who were determined to cause upheaval in the country. In order to restore peace and ensure stability, four leaders of the ZNUT were detained by Presidential order on 30th June 1970. These were Newstead Zimba the President of the ZNUT, Muletambo Mubita, General Secretary, Mr. Shiyenge Kapini, Deputy General Secretary and Mr. Langson Musonda the Treasurer [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970, pp.10- 11]. Their detention lasted for seven months, during which the Vice-president of ZNUT appointed a caretaker committee to manage the unions affairs.

Upon the detention of the four leaders, the deputy Vice-president reported the existence of a dispute between the union and the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Labour and the latter appointed a Board of Inquiry into the causes and circumstances leading up to the industrial action by ZNUT members. After hearing evidence from both parties, the Board recommended that a conciliator be appointed. It was only after the Board of Enquiry had submitted its recommendations to the Ministry of Labour that the union entered into a new recognition and negotiation agreement with the Ministry of Education.¹⁷

While the ZNUT leaders were still in detention, Statutory Instrument No. 241 was issued on 14th September 1970, declaring the teaching a "necessary service" under the Preservation of Public Security Regulations.¹⁸ This meant that any person participating, aiding or abetting a strike in the teaching service would be committing a criminal offence and would be liable to prosecution. This Statutory Instrument further reinforced the ban on strikes made by the President the previous year.

An assessment of this case provides an indication of government's perception of the role of trade unions and worker action in the country's socio-economic process. The withdrawal of secondments of the teacher/leaders of the ZNUT and their rustication to rural posts can be seen as a punitive measure against the union, for not having succeeded in educating their members well enough on the virtues of labour discipline and on the harm and havoc that strikes cause to the economy and most importantly on the disruption to law and order and smooth provision of services that they entail. When the leaders refused to take up their new appointments, they were dismissed from employment for contravening the

terms of their contracts with the Ministry of Education. The union responded by appointing the dismissed leaders to full-time positions in the union. The government must have interpreted this as defiant action against lawful authority. It responded in turn by detaining the four highest ranking officials of the union to punish them and to serve as a warning to other trade union leaders. To discourage the general membership of the ZNUT from further precipitate action, the big stick of the law was brought to bear on the teachers and their occupation was declared an essential service. But to ameliorate the effects of these repressive measures on the consciousness of the rank and file members of the ZNUT, the "carrot" of a board of inquiry was appointed to investigate the causes of the strikes. This was done despite the fact that the recommendations of previous (1968) commission of enquiry had not been implemented and that it was the delay in implementing those recommendations that had led to the strike. The teachers in Luapula had included among the written grievances submitted to the Ministry of Education the demand that there be "no more commissions of inquiry" [Kanduza, 1980: 288]. One cannot help drawing the conclusion that the second board of enquiry was appointed in order to lend the process the appearances of democratic decision making and to provide a safety valve for teachers to air their grievances.

If the teachers held their fire for the time being, the rest of the labour movement went about in pursuit of their interests even when under the threat of arrest and prosecution. In the year following the teachers' strike, there were 19 strikes in industries covered by the essential services regulations, involving the loss of 7,880 days. However, no legal action was taken against the workers [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1971: 10]. Although admittedly the number of workers involved in the strikes dropped by more than half, the number of strikes fell by only one from 128 in 1970 to 127 in 1971. This level of strike action was considered by the authorities to be too high and a detriment to development, a view which intensified in 1972 when the number of striker days recorded rose by 9.2 per cent over that of 1971 [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1972: 9]. As a remedy, the Minister of Labour, Wilson Chakulya, former Secretary General of the ZCTU issued a directive to employers empowering them to dismiss leaders of wildcat strikes. Trade union leaders protested against this measure, following which they were invited to a labour management seminar convened by the Minister of Labour and addressed by the President. At this meeting the President argued the case for the instant dismissal of ring leaders of strikes. The trade union leaders were apparently persuaded by the elaboration of his position and responded by intensifying their worker's education campaign through increasing the number and frequency of seminars [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1972: 17-18]. In this instance the ZCTU leadership, like the government, believed that workers' education would enhance their members awareness of their role in the economic development of the country and of the need for them to increase productivity. In addition trade union leaders also hoped that workers' education would enlighten workers on dispute solving procedures and contribute thereby to the avoidance of unofficial strikes.

During 1972 monthly consultative meetings between the Minister of Labour and Social Services and the ZCTU and the Zambian Federation of Employers (ZFE) were introduced as a means of promoting good industrial relations and maintaining peace and productivity in industry. The Ministry of Labour officials expressed the hope that in future the ZCTU would not measure its success in terms of the number of strikes engaged in but rather the number of strikes prevented. The outcome of these efforts and the threat to sack strike leaders was indeed a reduction in the number of strikes from 74 in 1972 to 65 in 1973 and a further decline to 55 in 1974. This may possibly have been a result of a certain coinciding of interests of government personnel and ZCTU officials, but may also be due to the fact that, despite the oil crisis, 1973 recorded high copper prices which in local terms translated into the availability of foreign exchange to companies, enabling them to import raw materials, maintain production and sustain the size of their work force.

This interpretation is supported by the change in developments which occurred during the late 1970s. With the collapse of the copper prices after 1973, the economic situation worsened. This was reflected in the shortage of raw materials, preventing industries from operating at full capacity. This meant that job security was at its lowest since independence especially in the private sector. During 1975 for example several reports appeared in the press of companies laying off workers due to lack of orders or shortage of raw materials [TZ, 7th August 1975]. There followed an increase in strikes from 55 in 1974 to 78 in 1975. However, as the crisis intensified and the number of redundancies increased, the number of strikes dropped steadily from 78 in 1975 to 44 in 1979. This is consistent with the theory on the relationship between economic performance and strike activity, which suggests that whereas the number of strikes has the tendency to rise during periods of prosperity, disputes tend to be of short duration. On the other hand, whereas strikes tend to be fewer in number during periods of depression, those that do occur tend to be more severe, i.e. they tend to involve more workers and last longer [Hyman, 1972: 28]. It has been suggested that this may be because employers are not very keen on a speedy settlement, when the order books are empty, and so they hold out longer.

But even in the depressed economic atmosphere of the late 70s in Zambia, strikes did occur. We discuss the 1979 railway workers' strike to illustrate not only the courage and determination of those involved, but also the desperation of the authorities as they grappled with the strike during this difficult time in the country's economy. We also consider the more central issue of the government's response to the strike.

5.4b) Railway Workers' Strike: 1979

The strike by railway workers in 1979 which resulted in the dismissal of 51 branch officials followed from a failure by the government to honour a promise to effect a salary review for workers on the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). In October 1978, the Zambian Minister of Power, Transport and Com-

munications made a statement promising a salary review. The Railway workers unions of both Zambia and Tanzania made suggestions to the management of TAZARA on the kind of changes necessary in the TAZARA salary structure and the management similarly prepared proposals which they submitted to the Board of Directors. The Board then forwarded them with amendments to the Council of Ministers. While the salary review was being undertaken and contrary to usual practice, however the TAZARA management suspended payment of annual increments in anticipation of wage increases from the salary review.

During its meetings of 10th to 14th March 1979, held in Dar-es-Salaam the Council of Ministers made its decision on the salary review, recommending (contrary to the conclusions of the review) not to raise the salaries of workers on the TAZARA. The Zambian Minister announced this decision through a press statement upon his arrival home from Dar-es-Salaam. Circulars bearing the same message had also been sent to TAZARA workers on the Zambian side by their counterparts in Tanzania. In anger and frustration workers went on a strike beginning at Mpika on March 15th. The strike spread to other centres along the TAZARA including Kasama, Chozi and Kapiri Mposhi by March 18th.¹⁹ Workers demanded to be addressed by their union officials, seeking explanations as to why the promised salary review had not been honoured. The union officials, including the Assistant Secretary General of the ZCTU who had been assigned to the case, had little by way of explanation, but held public meetings all the same and appealed to workers to remain calm. Workers were not appeased and remained out. Then on 21st March an incident occurred which heightened tension further. A number of striking workers were confronted and arrested by police on their way home from the picket line. In the scuffle that preceded the arrest a union official was beaten up by police and taken away in the TAZARA police Landrover. The workers were interrogated at the police cells, and kept overnight, but released the following day without charge.²⁰ This action infuriated the workers who considered it intimidatory and provocative. There were demonstrations of discontent during the night, further violence against TAZARA property was only averted by the early release of the arrested workers the following morning. But strike action still continued.

No effort was made to enter into negotiations with the workers. Instead after consultations with the Ministry (P.T.C.) officials in Lusaka, the General Manager issued an ultimatum for workers to return to work or be dismissed. The following day, the 24th March, an announcement was made to dismiss 51 union branch officials who were identified as the ring leaders. They were gathered together at the TAZARA offices and heavily guarded by the police. In the afternoon of the same day, the dismissed officials and their families were packed into buses and repatriated to their home districts. This action seems to have broken the back of the strike and it ended on 25th March 1979 [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1979: 15].

After the return to work, the Railway Workers' Union, with the support of the Deputy Chairman General and Assistant Secretary General of the ZCTU held meetings with the TAZARA management to try and secure the reinstatement of the dismissed workers. This now became the primary concern of the union and pressure to undertake a salary review was temporarily shelved. During these consultations, management maintained that the dismissal of the 51 branch officials had been sanctioned by the government and they could therefore not be reinstated without prior government consent.²¹

At this point the ZCTU resolved to take on the issue. They requested and were granted meetings with the Minister of Labour and Social Services. After several discussions with the Minister and TAZARA authorities, it was agreed to reinstate 39 of the 57 dismissed workers. The remaining thirteen were said by management to have been previously involved in cases of a criminal nature and were not wanted back.²² The selective reinstatement of the dismissed workers was no doubt intended as a warning to any would be 'trouble makers'. Upon resuming work moreover, the reinstated workers were, pressured to make an undertaking to the effect that they would not in future involve themselves in illegal strikes [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1979: 13]. This condition had apparently been laid down by the Ministry of Power, Transport and Communications.

The issues involved in this strike and the government reaction to it are instructive for a number of reasons:

1. They illustrate the implications for industrial relations in Zambia of differences in wage levels between the two countries that jointly own and operate the TAZARA. The council of Ministers decision not to effect a salary review was made because of the strong opposition from the Tanzanian Minister, who argued that wages for TAZARA workers were already higher than average wages in Tanzania. This was confirmed by ZRWU officials who argued that Tanzanian workers on the TAZARA had benefited from the high wage Zambian economy generally and in particular from the bargaining power of the Zambian Railway Workers' Union. But they also pointed out that on this particular occasion the low wages obtaining in Tanzania had cost the Zambian workers on TAZARA a salary increase that would have brought their wage levels to the same level as those obtaining on Zambia Railways.²³ The Tanzanian influence on the decision not to implement a salary review can be seen from the fact that from the Zambian workers' point of view, it was the Zambian Minister who in the first instance announced the need for a salary review. The failure to implement the review can only be attributed to opposition from the Tanzanian side.

2. The second lesson ensuing from this strike and the reaction of the government to it relates to the manner of the dismissals of the union branch officials. Despite the fact of the bungled handling of the salary review by the Minister of Power, Transport and Communications, the authorities still saw fit to invoke the 1972 directive by the Minister of Labour and Social Services to dismiss ringleaders of unofficial

strikes. This was no doubt intended to serve notice to other union leaders not to engage in unofficial strikes or face instant dismissal.

3. The third lesson to be drawn from this strike regards the reinstatement of the 39 workers from among those who were dismissed. Here again the opportunity was used to make a show of the paternalistic, caring and fair but firm government. On the other hand, the reinstatement was not made without first of all extracting a promise for future good behaviour from those involved. Finally, the process of selective reinstatement itself served as a warning that the good, caring and fair government can be forgiving, but only to first offenders.

In this strike as well as in the teachers' strike of the early 1970s the combined strategy of 'carrot' and 'stick' was employed. In addition, at critical moments a reliance on armed force and punitive measures were taken as a demonstration of resolve and to restore peace. Each, however, ultimately involved a favourable response to the pleading of organised labour to restore confidence in the government and to generate support.

5.4c) The 1980 Strike at Nakambala Sugar Estate

As we pointed out above, delays and misunderstandings over wage increases constitute a common cause of strikes in Zambian industries. The 1980 strike at Nakambala sugar estate resulted from such a misunderstanding. Negotiations for a new collective agreement had been in progress since October 1979. By March 1980 no agreement had yet been reached. The major obstacle was over which wage guidelines to use in determining wage increases. The guidelines in force were in accord with phase two of the wages policy as recommended by the Turner Report which restricted wage increases to K156.00 per annum or K13.00 per month. Basing its demand on the high cost of living, the union demanded more than the stipulated K156.00, while management offered less than this figure. The negotiating parties could not reach an agreement and on 8th January 1980, a mediator was appointed by the Ministry of Labour. With the assistance of the mediator, agreement was reached to award workers in scales 1 to 4 a wage increase of K12.00 per month and those in scales 5 to 10, K10.00 per month. The agreement was however without an effective date,²⁴ from which arrears were to be paid. The negotiating parties requested guidance from the Labour Commissioner who suggested the 1st of January 1980. The Nakambala Sugar Estate management were not happy with this suggestion and requested to see the Minister of Labour. The strike started while management was still arranging a date with the Minister.

On March 11th 700 workers went on strike. They demanded to know when they would be paid their "K13.00 wage increase with effect from 1st August 1979".²⁵ The strike increased to a force of 3,800, thus involving all the workers at the estate by the following day on the afternoon of which riot police were called to the plant. The sight of the riot police provoked violence from the strikers who began beating up members of management. The police responded by opening fire on the strikers, injuring three workers.

This led to further violence when workers attacked company property and set fire to a field of cane. The strike continued until 15th March and a total of 12,380 striker days were recorded. Some workers had been arrested during the strike, these appeared in court on the 30th July 1980.²⁶ The return to work was only secured by the intervention of the Minister of Labour who set the effective date of the mediated rate for the 1st December 1979.²⁷ This date provided less accumulated arrears than the workers had demanded but more than management had earlier been prepared to accept from the Commissioner of Labour. The Minister's decision must thus be seen as an attempt to both appease the workers and to warn management that an appeal to the Minister of Labour would not necessarily always produce a decision in its favour.

The ZCTU subsequently protested to the Minister of Labour over the use of force by police against striking workers. In response the Minister of Labour and Social Services agreed to set up a tripartite team to investigate the shooting. The Board carried out its investigations into the cause of the strike and the circumstances that led police to open fire on the strikers. After the investigations, recommendations were made to the Minister of Labour. The major gist of the recommendations was to urge the Minister of Labour to ensure that the stipulated procedures were adhered to both in the processing and implementation of collective agreements and in the resolution of disputes. Secondly, it was recommended that there should be better coordination and communication of information between the Ministry of Labour and Social Services and the trade unions on the one hand and the employer's representatives on the other. The police were advised to exercise caution in the use of fire arms and to ensure that the "riot proclamation" was read to a rioting crowd before any decision to use firearms is taken [S.G. Report, 1982: 30].

The government response to this strike was rather muted in comparison to that given to the teachers' strike. A number of factors may explain this. The first of these is the fact that the company is partially privately owned and therefore the government is not the immediate employer. Secondly the enterprise is relatively small and the plantation involved is located in a provincial town, albeit a line of rail one. Thirdly, the number of workers involved was much less than that in the teachers' strike and the strike itself did not generate an atmosphere of visible chaos as did the teachers' strike. In 1979 exports of sugar were fairly low and the sugar industry was not yet considered a strategic industry. Lastly, the union involved was relatively weak, not very well organised and has the dubious reputation of "enjoying good relations" with management.²⁸

However, the ease with which the police opened fire on unarmed strikers indicates the general intolerance with which workers who breach the peace are treated. On the other hand, the willingness and speed with which the Minister of Labour appointed a Board of Investigation is indicative of government's

desire to portray itself as a rational and caring arbiter in industrial relations. The importance attached to appearances is reflected in the outcome of this investigation. The Board's recommendations did not amount to much more than re-stating the obvious, i.e. that government institutions should perform their functions effectively and efficiently. On investigation, by the ZCTU's assessment, no tangible changes had been undertaken as a consequence of the Board's recommendations. And no one was identified and censured for the shooting and causing injuries.

5.4d) GRADUATE MINERS' STRIKE AND THE DETENTION OF ZCTU LEADERS

The graduate miners' strike which preceded the detention of ZCTU leaders in mid 1981 was one in a series that had begun the previous year. In order to put this strike into its proper perspective, I will briefly discuss the events leading up to it. It is important to note firstly that strike action increased 2.75 times in 1980 over 1979, rising from 44 in 1979 to 121 in 1980, with the striker days recorded almost doubling from 42,844 in 1979 to 80,191 in 1980. This increased number of industrial disputes occurred against a background of a deteriorating employment situation in which wage employment was increasing at a lower rate of 3.3 per cent against an average rate of 4 per cent increase in the work force [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1980: 5]. Further the security situation had been unsettled by the coup attempt in October 1980. Economic problems had forced the government to seek an IMF loan, one of the conditions of which was a reduction of the civil service and a scaling down of the public administration system from a two tiered local and central government structure to a single system. In the urban areas and especially on the Copperbelt, the new system entailed the merging of the mine system of social services with that of the government. There were also changes in the system of electing local government council representatives. The government promoted this exercise in terms of "decentralisation" and of "taking power to the people". The real implications, however, were far from these glossy presentations.²⁹ The trade union movement saw the danger of reduced services to workers especially in the urban areas and particularly on the mines. They also opposed the decentralisation bill on the following grounds:-

1. That it disenfranchised the majority of Zambian people by restricting the election of district councillors to local party officials.
2. That the introduction of full time councillors was uneconomic.
3. That government supervision of commercial enterprises would bring political interference in industrial relations and would interfere in the established relationship between the trade unions and employers. [Mijere, 1988: 28-29]

Leaders of the trade union movement sent a petition to the Secretary General of the Party expressing their opposition to the proposed bill. The Secretary General in turn instituted disciplinary action against the trade union leaders by expelling them from the Party on 19th January 1981. The expulsion sparked off widespread strikes by miners on the Copperbelt.

The strikes began at Konkola Division of the NCCM on 20th January and very quickly spread to all other mines. There were reports of assaults by police against the men on the picket lines, which resulted in the pickets turning into riotous mobs, provoking further action from the police. There followed shootings, beatings and arrests of strikers by the security forces, and in one such incident in Kitwe, a school boy was shot and fatally wounded by police.³⁰ The striking workers were eventually persuaded to go back to work when it was explained to them that though the leaders had been expelled from the Party, they still retained their positions in the unions as party membership was not a pre-requisite to holding such office. A total of 123,256 striker days were recorded during this action.

Following this, in early July, miners at Chililabombwe of Konkola Division staged a 7 day strike over management's decision to withdraw mealie-meal buying facilities that it had extended to miners during a long period of shortages of the commodity in the district. Negotiations over the issue between management and the union resulted in an undertaking to review the matter and suggestions for a solution were put forward, the most promising one being the appointment of an agency that would supply essential commodities including mealie-meal to miners in Chililabombwe [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1981: 12].

It is against this strained background of a post attempted coup with which the trade union movement is alleged to have been sympathetic³¹ and an increase in industrial disputes over issues other than wage demands that the Graduate miners' strike took place. At its inception in May 1981, the dispute appeared to be between the Graduate employees of the copper mining companies and the union. The graduates expressed displeasure over the disparity in wages between Zambian graduate miners and expatriate miners doing the same job, and blamed this state of affairs on the Mine Workers' Union of Zambia (MUZ), which they accused of paying disproportionate attention to the problems of non-graduate workers at their expense. They signed and sent a petition to the MUZ outlining their grievances and stating that unless their demands were met they would resign from the union. The union replied by stating that it could not give special attention on the problems of graduate miners to the neglect of other workers and warned the graduates against resigning.

Feeling let down by the union, the graduate miners then decided to confront the mining companies directly. With the cooperation of non-graduate artisans, they sent a petition to the mining companies demanding equal pay for equal work with expatriate miners and threatening strike action should this not be granted. The mining companies delayed a response and in frustration, the graduate miners went on strike. They were joined by non-graduate miners in strike action that almost paralysed the whole industry. Only Konkola Division was left untouched. The division was probably strike weary after the 7 day strike over mealie-meal supply. At the rest of the mines workers were only persuaded to go back to work

after repeated appeals from their trade union leaders, who had been prompted by the strike to engage in negotiations with the mining companies over the issue. Even with these belated efforts the strike lasted 9 days and 118,534 striker days were lost.

Meanwhile strikes were reported in other industries. Railway workers were engaged in a strike over the appointment of a new General Manager. Teachers and construction workers were also on strike for better working conditions. In consequence there was an atmosphere of general industrial unrest during the first half of 1981. Government responded by instituting a number of measures. Earlier in the year, there had been a cabinet reshuffle in which both the Prime Minister and the Party Secretary General had been replaced. Although reasons are usually never given for such reshuffles, informed opinion was that the general state of the economy, especially the chronic shortage of consumer commodities contributed to the timing of these reshuffles. The new Prime Minister embarked on the task of restoring peace by convening a meeting of ZCTU and MUZ leaders on 20th July 1981 to discuss the following issues:-

- a) the inadequacies in the labour laws particularly in the Industrial Relations Act (1971).
- b) ZCTU/government relations in general;
- c) the state of industrial relations and possible remedies to the 'unfortunate' industrial situation in the country.

Trade union leaders came away from this meeting feeling that a new era of consultation had come and were hopeful that relations between the government and the trade union movement would improve [SG Report, 1982: 51].

They were totally unprepared, therefore, for what followed. It came in the form of a dawn broadcast in which the arrest and detention of four trade union leaders was announced, who were held under the Preservation of the Public Security Act. The four involved were Frederick Chiluba, ZCTU Chairman General, Newstead Zimba, ZCTU Secretary General, Chitalu Sampa, ZCTU Assistant Secretary General and Timothy Walamba, MUZ Deputy Chairman. Four general charges were brought against them [TZ, 28th July, 1981].

1. That they were guilty of inciting and instructing unknown people to humiliate a Minister of Labour while the latter was visiting miners from the 16th to 17th of July.
2. That they were guilty of inciting the army and workers through speeches at Labour Day rallies in Mpika in 1980 and Mufulira in 1981 with the ultimate aim of overthrowing the government.
3. That they were guilty of telling unknown people to persuade workers to go on illegal strikes to get rid of the government and of thanking the workers for responding to such incitement.
4. That at many meetings, workers leaders were told to revolt so that the ZCTU leadership should take over the government.

In addition, each of the leaders was served with individual charges, Chiluba with seven, Walamba three, and Sampa and Zimba with one specific offence each. None of these charges were discussed, explained or substantiated.

What remained of the executive committee convened emergency meetings during which they planned their rescue strategy. They sought and were granted meetings with the Prime Minister and the Secretary General of the Party during which they pleaded for the release of the detained leaders. In addition they engaged lawyers to take up the detention of the trade union leaders in court. In the event the lawyers proved successful in challenging the grounds for detention through the writ of *habeas corpus*. Chiluba was released when Justice Moodley dismissed all the seven personal charges against him in Lusaka High Court on 2nd October 1981. Zimba was released on 9th November 1981 when Justice Sivanandan dismissed the charge against him. Mr. Sampa and Mr. Walamba were similarly released on 13th November 1981. The legal process came to an end when the state decided not to appeal against these judgements.

While the detention of the trade union leaders was a response to the general deteriorating industrial relations situation in the country, the immediate cause was the graduate miners' strike. This dispute was a source of special worry for the authorities because for the first time the intellectual sections of the working class in the mining industry managed to rally the support of the rank and file in industrial action. The potential for a general strike was too real and frightening for comfort for the authorities. One of the characteristic features of the Zambian working class has always been its fragmentation. Due to the ban on strikes, there have been very few sympathy strikes. On the mines, manual workers have waged their struggle for a living wage, while the graduate miners have remained aloof, more concerned with Zambianisation and professionalism, and the authorities were happy to keep it that way. But with the events of May 1981 all this changed and the potential for the politicisation of the strike loomed large for the authorities, hence the drastic action of detaining the trade union leaders. By joining forces with the rank and file workers, an avenue had been opened for the graduate miners to provide intellectual (political) leadership to the working class struggle. The issue of Zambianisation and parity of wages, moreover, has particular potential for politicisation as workers link these to the questions of independence and sovereignty. And that is a source of a more serious worry for the authorities than underground workers striking over the withdrawal of mealie-meal purchasing facilities.

According to Ministry of Labour officials, ZCTU leaders were detained for having failed to prevent strikes. The government sees this as one of the primary responsibilities of trade unions and its leaders. And it is for this reason that the government refrained from contesting the release of the ZCTU leaders or prosecuting them under the penal code, as the reason for their detention was not legally enforceable.

5.4e) 1984-1985 Zambia National Union of Financial and Allied Workers' Strikes

The fifth example of a strike we consider is drawn from the service sector. In fact it involved a cluster of strikes selected both for the issues involved and the response of the authorities. The first started off as a consequence of an internal dispute in which workers at the Zambia National Provident Fund (ZNPF) headquarters in Lusaka protested against unfair practices by their Board Secretary, Mr. C.L. Mundia. In May 1984, workers held a one day action and were "peacefully" dispersed. Management appealed for their return to work while investigations were carried out into their complaints. Four months elapsed and no appreciable changes had been made. In September, workers staged a second strike in which they demanded the removal of the Board Secretary. They stayed away from work for two days during which they congregated outside the ZNPF offices. Riot police were called in to disperse the crowd. Management issued an ultimatum to workers to return to work by eight o'clock the following morning or be dismissed. But the following day, workers still refused to return to work unless the Board Secretary was removed. Management then announced that all 1,400 ZNPF workers who had not returned to work by the set date had been dismissed and invited applications from members of the public who wished to be considered for the vacancies that now obtained at ZNPF. In reaction, workers in other financial institutions, including banks, staged a sympathy strike in support of the demand for the reinstatement of the dismissed workers. This created a mini financial crisis as banks were forced to suspend transactions. To avert a deepening of the crisis, the government responded by sending the Board Secretary on paid leave, appointing a commission of enquiry to investigate the affairs of the Board and reinstating the workers who had been dismissed.

A fourth response came in January 1985, when the Minister of Labour and Social Services, Frederick Hapunda, a former school teacher, amended section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act (1971) and issued Statutory Instrument No. 6 which stipulated that:-

Any deduction of subscriptions order made under Section 20 of the Act shall be deemed revoked and shall become null and void from the day when a trade union for the benefits of which such an order is made goes on an illegal strike, whether official or unofficial.³³

Upon publication the order was applied to the ZUFIAW whose members employed by the Zambia State Insurance Corporation had gone on strike early in January to back demands for a wage increase. In protest at the application of the Statutory Instrument the Union called out its workers to go on strike. They complied, demanding the withdrawal of Statutory Instrument No. 6. The strike lasted for three days in Lusaka and two days in other areas. On the last two days there was a 100 per cent turn out, bringing all financial transactions including foreign transactions to a standstill. This caused many recriminations in the press, and accusations of financial sabotage and of working with foreign saboteurs were heard.³⁴

The trade union movement reacted initially by declaring that it would sever all links with the Minister of Labour and Social Services in protest over the manner in which he had amended section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act (1971) to issue Statutory Instrument No. 6.³⁵ In addition, the ZCTU undertook legal action, seeking redress against the government decision to revoke orders for the deductions of subscriptions to unions whose members go on strike. Counsel for the state argued that the Minister had powers under the Act to make additions or variations to the terms of an order already made by him.³⁶ The judge eventually ruled in favour of the state, arguing that Statutory Instrument No. 6 was not *ultra vires*, i.e. that it was within the powers of the Minister to issue such statutory instruments and that it had been properly issued.³⁷

A further stage in the dispute came in the aftermath of a 3 day strike by ZUFIAW members in protest against the application of SI No. 6 to their union. The government responded by issuing Statutory Instrument No. 35 of 1985, declaring the financial sector a necessary service and all financial institution workers as essential workers. This meant that any financial institution workers who went on strike would be guilty of an offence and would be liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding K1,000.00 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or to both fine and imprisonment [cap. 106 Laws of Zambia, 1965].

The nature of the government's response to the strikes by the financial institution workers reaffirms the established pattern. Punitive measures were first taken to deal with the immediate crisis. Riot police with tear gas were called in to disperse the striking workers from the city centre. Secondly, the employer, a parastatal company, dismissed the workers when an ultimatum to return to work was not met. This was a show of strength by the employer and resolve by the authorities, which in this case are one since the ZNPF is a parastatal body. Thirdly, the legal mechanism was brought into play. Only in this case where there were no leaders of significant stature, no dismissals or imprisonment of leaders were undertaken. Instead the legal mechanism was directed at the union as a whole. By revoking the Order that ensures the union its financial resources, it was intended to weaken the union generally. That the ploy was at least partially successful may be seen from the fact that the union suffered a temporary drop in membership during the time the Statutory Instrument was in force, from 8,200 members in 1982 to 7,100 by May 1986.³⁸ Fourthly, to constrain the general membership from undertaking further industrial action the financial sector was declared a necessary service and workers declared essential workers, now under threat of individual prosecution and imprisonment if they went on strike. But this was preceded by an effort to placate the workers' immediate grievances. The offending official was sent on leave, while a high powered commission of enquiry was established to once again put on show the democratic decision making process through which ordinary workers of the fund carried out a purge and aired their long held grievances against management. Repressive measures were taken to deal with the immediate crisis but

generally and as a long term measure, emphasis was on the search for lasting legal and rational measures through a democratic process in which the public was called upon to participate.

5.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have reviewed the manner in which the government has responded to strikes as an important means of evaluating state/labour relations. Whereas in Chapters Three and Four we discussed mechanisms intended to incorporate organised labour into the government's political order and prevent industrial conflict, in this we have discussed what happens when the efforts at political incorporation have either failed or have not yet taken effect and have consequently failed to contain worker militancy and industrial action by workers has occurred.

We have noted that strikes are usually undertaken by workers to enforce a demand or seek amelioration of a grievance. We have also noted that in Zambia as in most other Third World countries, strikes are prohibited by law. The use of essential services legislation has criminalised industrial action in most industries. Despite this, strikes have continued to occur. In Zambia this is partly explained by the size of the industrial proletariat, which is large by African standards and the fact that the country has a long history of trade union militancy. The level of unionization in Zambia is quite high at about 90 per cent of the workers in the formal sector, though in part this is a function of the law concerning unionisation and the operation of the check-off system, whereby a union is granted the check-off facility on all workers once it organises 60 per cent of workers in an enterprise.

The size of the strikes has been mixed while most have been minor as regards duration and numbers involved, several have been large where major industries such as the mines or large employers such as the public sector have been concerned. But regardless of size strikes in Zambia are invariably visible given the relatively free reporting in the press and on television. Riots have been the exception to this rule with reporting of them tentative and partial. Most strikes have related to specific issues, given their general illegal and unofficial nature. And partly because unions are not allowed to have any strike funds, few have been protracted.

During the period we have examined, the most common cause of strikes has been demands relating to wages or implementation of wage increases. Our main concern, however, has been to assess government response across a wide range of strikes, in different sectors of the economy with different kinds of strategic importance to the economy. The response of the government overall seems consistent with our thesis that government/labour relations are characterised by state efforts to establish its hegemony over the trade unions and cultivate the consent of the governed for legitimate rule. Generally, government response to strikes has been to use police or mobile units to enforce instantaneous order. Sometimes fatal-

ities and injuries have been sustained by strikers in the process. Secondly, the offer of mediation or conciliation have been made by Ministry of Labour officials, especially when a dispute is declared. Thirdly, punishment in the form of detention or arrests of trade union leaders or dismissals of the leaders of the strike have occurred especially in strikes that have taken place in the context of heightened political atmosphere such as the teachers' strike in 1970 and the miners' strikes in 1981 which followed the attempted coup of 1980. Finally Commissions or Boards of inquiry have been established in the aftermath of strikes, to determine the proper sequence of events, the causes of the strikes and to draw recommendations that might in future prevent similar occurrences. Commissions or Boards of inquiry were formed for three of the examples we have examined. The importance of the commission of inquiry as a democratic institution cannot be overemphasised. It is used as a formal forum through which shop floor workers can express their grievances against management practices and/or government policy. It gives the impression of a democratic practice and on the surface gives credence to government's claims to being custodian of the public interest. In reality nothing much is achieved by these Commissions of Inquiry, as few recommendations are implemented. Calls in recent years by commissions of inquiry for "no more commissions of inquiry" give an indication of their practical value.

Does the government action in respect of trade unions as reviewed in this chapter constitute legal repression? I think not. Rather, these measures constitute a part and parcel of the process of political incorporation which the government has employed since independence to try to reorientate organised labour's consciousness with regard to its role and activities in Zambian society. On the whole government response to the strikes we have examined in this chapter offer further proof that state labour relations are driven by the desire to promote the governing class's hegemonic programme and not solely by the desire to repress labour.

Table 13
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY PER SECTOR: 1966 TO 1983*

INDUSTRY	AVERAGE NO. OF PERSONS EMPLOYED	%	TOTAL NO. OF STRIKES	%
Agriculture	35,613	9.30	96	8.65
Mining & Quarrying	60,104	15.92	140	12.60
Manufacturing	44,337	11.74	356	32.07
Construction	53,481	14.17	197	17.75
Electricity & Water Supply	6,168	1.60	5	.45
Commerce	56,388	14.94	66	5.95
Transport	22,968	6.08	71	6.40
Service (private and public)	91,986	24.36	179	16.12
			1110	100.00

**Table does not include figures for 1982*

Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Reports: 1966-1983

Table 14

NUMBER OF PERSONS EMPLOYED

Year	Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries	Mining & Quarrying	Manufactur- ing	Construction	Electricity & Water Supply	Commerce & Finance	Transport & Communi- cations	Other services	Total
1966	34,513	51,272	33,718	48,462	2,994	27,649	19,263	60,977	278,848
1970	33,930	56,510	36,810	69,490	2,410	33,580	23,180	81,220	337,130
1971	37,920	57,980	40,640	71,540	4,080	112,340	22,170	116,700	463,370
1972	39,432	57,522	42,560	72,242	4,844	48,016	26,620	76,725	367,961
1973	36,638	61,343	40,995	76,101	6,067	49,194	25,345	81,909	377,592
1974	36,515	64,036	43,921	75,279	5,455	50,127	26,481	85,055	386,870
1975	36,490	65,150	44,670	73,810	4,900	54,220	22,340	95,650	397,230
1976	33,710	65,880	42,340	54,510	5,940	51,330	19,700	94,950	368,360
1977	32,490	68,070	40,810	45,380	5,550	58,310	21,270	100,590	372,470
1978	32,600	62,770	50,120	40,190	7,670	51,470	21,300	102,340	368,460
1979	34,590	52,220	50,700	40,130	7,810	53,890	21,900	103,740	371,670
1980	39,590	60,690	48,990	43,630	7,860	53,820	25,370	104,140	384,090
1981	34,160	61,740	48,460	45,220	8,000	68,100	22,320	103,800	391,800
1983	35,200	57,730	48,790	32,110	7,750	52,410	23,830	105,930	363,800
TOTAL	497,778	842,913	613,524	785,094	81,330	764,456	321,139	1,313,726	5,229,651
Average	35,556	60,208	43,823	56,078	5,809	54,604	22,938	93,838	373,546

Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Reports: 1966-1983

Table 15

DISPUTES INVOLVING LOSS OF WORK: 1965—1985

Year	No. of Strikes	No. of Workers Involved	No. of Striker Days Recorded
1965	114	10,149	22,493
1966	241	307,167	579,406
1967	222	24,006	46,088
1968	206	30,770	65,898
1969	161	17,040	21,069
1970	128	32,251	122,951
1971	127	14,986	18,894
1972	74	10,453	20,874
1973	65	6,951	5,663
1974	55	7,380	38,650
1975	78	17,039	51,007
1976	59	5,619	6,527
1977	51	10,717	19,585
1978	56	43,051	301,562
1979	44	35,200	42,916
1980	121	28,007	880,191
1981	157	76,783	555,998
1982	37	3,896	6,715
1983	54	9,217	8,170
1984	76	23,215	95,062
1985 (Aug)	55	28,834	62,885
	2,181	742,731	2,172,604

Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Reports, 1966-1983 and Monthly Digest of Statistics: July/August, 1986.

Table 16
CAUSES OF STRIKES

Year	Total No. of Strikes	Over Wage Demands			Over Collective Agreements			Over Other Issues		
		No.	Striker Days Recorded	%	No.	Striker Days Recorded	%	No.	Striker Days Recorded	%
1970	128	n.a.	103,638	82.7		n.a.		n.a.	21,679	17.3
1971	127	n.a.	4,528	24.0		n.a.		n.a.	14,366	76.0
1972	74	n.a.	11,880	57.0		n.a.		n.a.	8,994	43.0
1973	65	n.a.	2,278	35.3		n.a.		n.a.	4,175	64.7
1974	55	n.a.	36,170	94.4		n.a.		n.a.	2,164	5.6
1975	78	n.a.	20,013	39.2		n.a.		n.a.	30,999	60.8
1976	59	37	3,669	56.2		n.a.		22	2,858	43.8
1977	51	28	11,522	72.1	4	745	4.7	19	3,723	23.3
1978	56	31	296,222	98.2	5	1,438	0.5	20	3,902	1.3
1979	44	28	33,424	63.6	-	-	-	16	9,492	22.1
1980	121	55	33,134	41.5	37	33,496	41.9	29	13,266	16.6
1981	156	37	137,775	24.8	15	9,864	1.8	109	408,769	73.4
1983	54	52	8,097	99.1	-	-	-	2	73	0.9
Total	1,068	268	702,350	55.2	61	45,543	3.58	217	524,460	42.22

Source: Figures for the "Total No. of Strikes" are from the *Monthly Digest of Statistics, 1970-1983*
 Figures for the "Causes of Strikes" are from the *Department of Labour Annual Reports, 1970-1983*
 Note: The category 'collective' agreements was introduced after 1976.

Table 17
CAUSES OF STRIKES
1. AGRICULTURE

Year	Total No. of Strikes	Total Striker Days Recorded	Over Wage Demands		Over Other Issues	
			No.	%	No.	%
1970	13	3,573	3,234	90.51	339	9.49
1971	13	267	-	-	267	100.00
1972	14	2,510	1,993	79.4	517	20.60
1973	6	243	28	11.52	215	88.48
1974	3	80	70	87.50	10	12.50
1975	8	7,404	7,109	96.02	295	3.98
1976	7	1,934	1,389	71.82	545	28.18
1977	1	2,400	2,400	100.00	-	-
1978	6	3,925	3,845	97.96	80	2.04
1979	6	6,993	4,730	67.64	2,263	32.36
1980	9	25,654	13,038	50.82	12,616	49.18
1981	6	1,737	1,282	73.81	455	26.19
1983	3	226	226	100.0		
Total	95	56,946	39,344	69.09	17,602	30.91

Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970-1983

Table 18
CAUSES OF STRIKES
2. MINING AND QUARRYING

Year	Total No. of Strikes	Total Striker Days Recorded	Over Wage Demands		Over Other Issues	
			No.	%	No.	%
1970	9	5,987	4,518	75.46	1,469	24.54
1971	6	2,395	2,220	92.69	175	7.31
1972	8	11,123	6,762	60.79	4,361	39.21
1973	10	403	-	-	403	100.0
1974	10	1,889	1,221	64.64	668	35.36
1975	13	23,934	371	1.55	23,563	98.45
1976	11	470	157	33.40	313	66.60
1977	6	3,401	1,728	50.81	1,673	49.19
1978	6	1,294	280	21.64	1,014	78.36
1979	7	5,503	2,215	40.25	3,288	59.75
1980	11	2,532	1,687	66.60	845	33.45
1981	30	517,635	124,730	24.10	392,905	75.90
1983	1	4	4	100.0	-	-
Total	128	576,570	145,893	25.30	430,677	74.70

Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970-1983

Table 19
CAUSES OF STRIKES
3. MANUFACTURING

Year	Total No. of Strikes	Total Striker Days Recorded	Over Wage Demands		Over Other Issues	
			No.	%	No.	%
1970	52	14,804	4,640	31.34	10,164	68.66
1971	43	6,462	1,705	26.39	4,757	73.61
1972	22	1,943	1,526	78.54	417	21.46
1973	20	3,162	2,050	64.83	1,112	35.17
1974	21	35,316	34,392	97.38	924	2.62
1975	21	13,790	9,194	66.67	4,596	33.33
1976	17	2,600	1,343	51.65	1,257	48.35
1977	19	7,174	5,610	78.20	1,564	21.80
1978	21	3,432	731	21.30	2,701	78.70
1979	19	5,783	2,043	35.33	3,740	64.67
1980	58	24,035	5,806	24.16	18,229	75.84
1981	16	10,680	8,946	83.76	1,734	16.24
1983	28	5,182	5,122	98.84	60	1.16
Total	357	134,363	83,108	61.85	51,255	38.15

Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970-1983

Table 20
CAUSES OF STRIKES
4. TRANSPORT

Year	Total No. of Strikes	Total Striker Days Recorded	Over Wage Demands		Over Other Issues	
			No.	%	No.	%
1970	7	28,394	21,150	74.49	7,244	25.51
1971	13	5,660	-	-	5,660	100.00
1972	6	1,734	1,034	59.64	700	40.36
1973	3	182	-	-	182	100.00
1974	4	264	107	40.53	157	59.47
1975	5	109	30	27.52	79	72.48
1976	2	29	29	100.00	-	-
1977	3	288	41	14.24	247	85.76
1978	4	268,638	268,368	100.00	-	-
1979	3	24,280	24,280	100.00	-	-
1980	8	8,422	1,644	19.52	6,778	80.48
1981	8	2,472	1,269	51.33	1,203	48.67
1983	4	868	868	100.00	-	-
Total	70	341,340	319,090	93.48	22,250	6.55

Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970-1983

Table 21
CAUSES OF STRIKES
5. SERVICE (PRIVATE AND PUBLIC)

Year	Total No. of Strikes	Total Striker Days Recorded	Over Wage Demands		Over Other Issues	
			No.	%	No.	%
1970	10	901	-	-	901	100.00
1972	6	321	24	7.49	297	92.52
1973	9	836	-	-	836	100.00
1974	8	129	34	26.36	95	73.64
1975	12	2,369	307	12.96	2,062	87.04
1976	5	97	97	100.00	-	-
1977	6	986	859	87.12	127	12.88
1978	5	23,276	22,451	96.46	825	3.54
1979	3	177	-	-	177	100.00
1980	17	13,968	10,283	73.62	3,685	26.38
1981	74	14,034	415	2.96	13,619	97.04
1983	8	811	798	98.40	13	1.60
	163	57,905	35,268	60.91	22,637	39.10

Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970-1983

Table 22
CAUSES OF STRIKES
6. COMMERCE

Year	Total No. of Strikes	Total Striker Days Recorded	Over Wage Demands		Over Other Issues	
			No.	%	No.	%
1970	9	367	189	51.50	178	48.50
1971	17	517	59	11.41	458	88.59
1972	3	28	-	-	28	100.00
1973	5	174	-	-	174	100.00
1974	5	253	160	63.24	93	36.76
1975	8	414	355	85.75	59	14.25
1976	7	470	115	24.47	355	75.53
1977	3	73	42	57.53	31	42.47
1978	6	509	76	19.30	433	85.07
1979	2	49	49	100.00	-	-
1980	7	589	88	14.94	501	85.06
1981	2	344	324	94.19	20	5.81
1983	2	112	112	100.00	-	-
Total	76	3,899	1,569	40.24	2,330	59.76

Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1970-1983

Table 23

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN FIVE COUNTRIES									
Country	Collective Bargaining		Incomes Policy	Workers Participation	Main Union Activity	Strikes		Dispute Resolving Procedure	
						Ordinary	Essential Service		
Botswana	Civil Service	No	Yes	No	Union Economic Ventures	Yes	Yes	Voluntary Machinery	Permanent Arbitrator
	Private Sector	Yes		No					
Kenya	Civil Service	Consultation	No	No	Union Economic Ventures	Yes	Yes	Voluntary Machinery	Industrial Relations Court
	Private Sector	Yes		No					
Tanzania	Civil Service	No	Yes	Yes	Workers' Councils Worker Directors	No	No	Voluntary Machinery	Permanent Labour Tribunal
	Private Sector	Yes		Yes					
Zambia	Civil Service	Yes	Yes/No	No	Worker Directors Works Councils Union Initiated Economic Ventures	No	No	Voluntary Machinery	Industrial Relations Court
	Private Sector	Yes		Yes					
Zimbabwe	Civil Service	No	Yes	No	Employment Councils Workers' Committees	Yes/No	No	Voluntary Machinery	Labour Relations Tribunal
	Private Sector	Yes		$\frac{1}{2}$ Yes					

NOTES

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Restrictions on strikes as specified in the Industrial Relations Act (1971) Part 9 Sections 89-95 and Section 116.
2. This is based on discussions and interviews with trade union leaders who have had cases referred to the Industrial Relations Court. Unions have always abided by the decision of the Court and none of the 12 unions surveyed (12) have challenged a decision of the Court by calling for a strikes ballot.
3. The following sectors are covered by collective agreements:-
 - Public Service (including civil service)
 - Financial Services
 - Mining
 - Construction and Engineering
 - Commerce and Industry
 - Teaching
 - Agriculture
 - Transport (Air, Rail and Road)
 - Private Security
 - Printing
 - Power Supply and distribution
 - Postal and Telecommunications
 - Catering
4. Personal communication, Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, May, 1987.
5. ZCTU Chairman General, personal interview, 27th of March 1987.
6. It has been suggested that if the Ministry of Labour officials are vigilant in the handling of a dispute and trade union officials are not, the maximum an official strike can last is one day. If on the other hand trade union officials are efficient in their handling of the law and labour officials are not, the maximum an official strike can take is 21 days!
7. Knowles, quoted in Hyman, 1972: 114.
8. Laws of Zambia, Cap. 106.
9. The schedule of "necessary service" is given in Chapter Seven, Note 32.
10. Refer to Tables 12 and 13.
11. Information on the incidence of strikes in the various industries is given in Tables 13 to 22.
12. Ordinarily miners are regarded as possessing a high propensity to strike. J.E. Cronin, *Industrial Conflict in Britain*, 1981, p.26; also Norman McCord, *Strikes*, 1980, p.4. Although in the latest edition of their book, Ken Coates and Tony Topman advise caution in the generalised use of this argument, noting that some mining communities in Britain have not shown this strike proneness. Ref. Coates and Topman, 1988 (edition): 246.
13. Ref. to Table 12 for details.
14. Refer to the President's address to the "Leadership of the ZCTU and its affiliates", June 27th, 1983, UNIP Research Bureau Library.
15. Refer to Table 13 for details.
16. Secretary General's Quadrennial Report, 1982: 31-45.
17. F.J.C. Kapatamoyo, "Origins and Development of the ZNUT 1960-1973", ZNUT mimeo, 1975.
18. The Laws of Zambia, p.793.
19. Railway Workers' Union interview, March 2nd, 1987.

20. ZCTU Quadrennial Report, 1982: 9-10.
21. Railway Workers' Union interview *op.cit.*, and ZCTU Secretary General's Quadrennial Report, 1982.
22. *ibid.*: 10.
23. Zambia Railway Workers' Union interview, Mr. Mubanga, March 2nd, 1987.
24. ZCTU Secretary General's Report, 1982: 20.
25. *ibid.*
26. Evidence to the Board on Investigation, quoted in SG's Report, 1982: 25.
27. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1980: 17.
28. Secretary General's Quadrennial Report, 1982: 25.
29. For a discussion of the decentralisation system, refer to B.C. Chikulo, "Reorganization for Local Administration in Zambia: an analysis of the Local Administration Act 1980", *Public Administration and Development*, Vol.5, 73-8: 1985.
30. Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1980: 11 and Secretary General's Quadrennial Report, 1982: 50.
31. This is an allegation that is vigorously denied by the leaders of the trade union movement.
32. Details of the detentions and court cases are compiled from the *Zambian Press; Zambia Daily Mail, Times of Zambia* and *National Mirror*, 1980-1981.
33. Minister of Labour and Social Services, 19th January 1985. Published in a Special Government Gazette, 20th January, 1985.
34. ZUFLAW interview, 13th May, 1987.
35. *Zambia Daily Mail*, February 7th 1985.
36. *Times of Zambia*, 23rd April 1985.
37. *Times of Zambia*, May 15th 1985.
38. Secretary General's Quadrennial Report, 1982: 100.

CHAPTER SIX

TRADE UNIONISTS' PERCEPTION OF TRADE UNIONISM IN ZAMBIA: MODALITIES OF RESISTANCE

In Chapters Three and Four we discussed the various mechanisms that the government has operationalised in an attempt to politically incorporate organised labour into a government defined political order. The mechanisms consist of 'carrot' and 'stick' elements. While the labour movement welcome those that consist of 'carrot' elements, those of the 'stick' variety are perceived as constraints. However, the labour movement has not succumbed to the pressure of efforts by government to incorporate it. It has fought back by asserting its role and function and defending its right to exist as an autonomous organisation. In this chapter we discuss the manner in which the ZCTU leadership understands its role in Zambian society and give illustrative examples of how it has gone about asserting and defending it.

It is important to understand that trade union leaders perceive their role in Zambian society very differently from the government's definition of that role. This being the case, it is useful to recapitulate briefly the government view, which was perhaps best summarised in a speech by the President to a meeting of the ZCTU Supreme Council at State House in October 1975.

The President began by outlining the role of workers in the economic development of the country. He emphasised that workers were in a strategic position vis-a-vis development as they could stop production to the detriment of the nation. He also pointed to the common interests between the party and the workers of Zambia. He then went on to reiterate the supremacy of the Party, pointing out that the ZCTU as a people's organisation was responsible to the Party and subject to its discipline. And in terms of political action, the "Party line" was to provide the framework within which the ZCTU was to design and implement its policies and programmes. As the President put it:

The ZCTU is an instrument of the People's Party. It is an instrument for mobilising the masses, channelling their energies into productive activity and engraining the concept of equality in the life of the nation. [Kaunda, 1975, 4]

The reference to equality alludes to the disparities in the quality of life between the workers on one hand and the unemployed in the urban areas and peasants in the rural areas on the other. It does not imply equality between capital and labour.

Further, the President reminded the leaders of the ZCTU that like government leaders, they were bound by the decisions of the National Council and the constitution of the Party. The President then went on to detail the ZCTU responsibilities with regard to: price increases; redundancies; the 'back to the land' policy; rural reconstruction programme; workers' education; mass mobilisation; Party committees at places of work; and general security and peace for development.

Pursuant to the above responsibilities and in the light of the Humanist Revolution which was launched for the protection and benefit of workers and peasants, the President called upon the ZCTU to declare its full responsibility towards the people of Zambia and to make the following affirmations, pledging support for: the Party Line in recognition of the supremacy of UNIP; Humanism and its principles; the Party's revolutionary programme in the political, economic, social, cultural, technological and defence fields; a programme of food production and production of raw materials for industry and for export; all measures to guarantee peace and security in all sections of the Zambian community; making participatory industrial and social democracy the basis for development; fighting against common enemies and isolating counter-revolutionaries; and consolidating of national independence based on self-reliance. [Kaunda, 1975: 5]

From the above one can deduce that the government conceives of the ZCTU as a broad based partner in development to be engaged in the mobilisation and education of workers for the success of the Humanist Revolution. Cooperation, loyalty and observance of party discipline are expected from the ZCTU, which is also called upon to explain to workers the causes of the economic problems the country has experienced since 1973 and through its workers' education programme to explain Party policies and diffuse discontent among workers.

This role, however, is very different from that perceived by organised labour itself as we shall demonstrate in this chapter, which draws largely on the speeches of trade union leaders, ZCTU annual and quadrennial reports and interviews conducted by the author during field work in 1986-1987.

The chapter begins with a brief theoretical review of the function of trade unions as analyzed by some "old masters" including Marx, Lenin, Selig Perlman and the Webbs, who in my view represent the four major traditions of trade union analysis. From this review we deduce that there are four major roles trade unions can play: an economic role, a social welfare role, in the Third World context a development promotion role and finally a political role. We examine the views of Zambian trade union leaders regarding these roles and then move on to discuss the concept of the 'autonomy' of the labour movement as it is understood by Zambian trade union leaders. By way of conclusion we consider the extent to which the different perceptions of the role of trade unions have become a cause of conflict between the labour movement and the government in recent years, and suggest how it might be resolved.

This chapter is crucial to the overall argument pursued in the thesis. In the preceding chapters, we have analysed government action in respect of trade unions. We have discussed the role the government has defined for trade unions, and what it is doing to harness organised labour towards fulfilling this role. In Chapter Five we discussed what has happened when the process of incorporation has failed to produce the anticipated results and strikes have occurred. In the present chapter our concern is with how the trade union leaders understand their role and have reacted to governmental pressure in consequence of this perception. By helping to explain the conflict between trade union leaders and government, this can inform future government policy and hopefully lead to better industrial relations in Zambia.

6.1 WHAT DO UNIONS DO?

The role of trade unions can perhaps best be deduced from their functions, foremost among which is the protection and promotion of its members' economic rights and interests. These may, however, vary according to the social, economic and political environment obtaining in a particular country. In this section, we shall briefly review the assessment of trade unions provided by Marx, Lenin, Selig Perlman and lastly Beatrice and Sidney Webb.

Marx

For Marx trade unions were a school whereby, through combination and organisation for improved wages, workers could develop class consciousness. The combination would result in improved wages and conditions of work. This would encourage workers and enable them to develop faith in their own efforts to improve their own life circumstances, spurring them to further action and extending the struggle to the political sphere and toward the seizure of political power. Marx believed that this would occur as an inevitable process since workers were the most productive group in society. Through the natural laws of history they would become the dominant class in society. Hyman characterises this interpretation of the role of trade unions as the "optimistic" trend of Marxism, evident in Marx's early work [Poole, 1981: 11-13]. Its themes have been elaborated by subsequent writers among whom was Lenin who did not share Marx's optimism about the revolutionary potential of trade unions.

Lenin

According to Lenin trade union action, especially in bringing to light the degrading conditions of the factory system and the very low wages paid by some industrialists, was good for mediating the rate of exploitation, but on its own was of limited revolutionary value [Lenin, 1905: 55-56]. He warned that the very process of negotiating for better wages and conditions of work could in fact retard the revolution if it was made the sole preoccupation of trade unions. Left on their own workers could only develop "trade union consciousness", which he regarded as "the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie" [Lenin in Banks, 1970: 48]. Even where workers succeeded in winning better wages and condi-

tions of work, the prospects for the revolution were gloomy. Successful trade unionism, Lenin argued, ran the risk of making workers comfortable in their position as wage earners and could prevent appreciation of their historical mission of liberating the subordinate classes from wage labour and the tyranny of capitalism. For Lenin, therefore, even political action by trade unions was insufficient to bring about socialist transformation in so far as its achievements were limited to persuading government to enact better laws for further participation of workers in capitalist society, albeit laws that might alleviate the consequences of the worst excesses of capitalism. The reforms to capitalism so secured by workers' political action also run the danger of undermining the unity of the working class, especially between the highly skilled workers in well organised trade unions, who would have come to believe that they have a stake in the success of capitalism and the masses of poorly organised manual workers [Banks, 1970: 50–52]. For Lenin therefore, trade unions on their own could only achieve limited and partial successes. For the revolutionary emancipation of the working class and structural change of the social organisation of society, trade unionism needed to be injected with the revolutionary political ideology developed by bourgeois intellectuals who have elected to adopt a working class position. So for Lenin, in the short run, the role of trade unions seems to have been to secure reforms to capitalism that would render worker participation in capitalism less uncomfortable i.e. to secure economic benefits. For the ultimate liberation of society, trade unions needed to be informed by the revolutionary ideology developed by middle class intellectuals.

Selig Perlman

Perlman was a social science researcher, born in the Soviet Union, who shared with Lenin an exposure to Marxism and socialist thought. He emigrated to the US while a student, but retained an interest in the development of the labour movement of the Soviet Union. He soon extended this interest to Britain and the U.S., the country of his final abode. His 1928 study *A Theory of the Labour Movement* is regarded in the US as a seminal work in American industrial relations,² for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that Perlman convincingly purges trade unionism of any inherent communism.³ He does this in his book *A Theory of the Labour Movement*, which is based on the premise that

...working people in the country felt an urge towards collective control of their employment opportunities, but hardly towards similar control of industry.
[Perlman, 1958: viii]

Perlman applied this hypothesis to an investigation of the history of labour in Germany, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the USA. He was interested in trade unions in the "post-revolutionary" era, when capitalism appeared to have stabilised. As Mark Palman has pointed out, Selig Perlman's theory consists of two major components. The first tries to explain why social organisation of workers was necessary. In Selig Perlman's assessment the worker's desire for solidarity is motivated by the need to protect the employment opportunities of members, to promote equal security and future earning power,

to raise and safeguard the standard of living of members and consequently to increase their leisure opportunities [Perlman, 1958: 243]. The worker has no desire to control the enterprises in which he works, let alone government. Perlman argues that

the typical wage earner, when he can express himself in and through his trade union... seldom dreams of shouldering the risks of management. Ordinarily he traces the origin of his opportunity not much farther back than the point where it materialises in jobs, and will grasp and support only such union policies as will enable or force the employers to offer more jobs, equally available to all fellow craftsmen, and upon improved terms. [Perlman, 1958: 247].

The grand revolutionary project seemed to Perlman to be forced on the workers by bourgeois intellectuals. Though working from completely different ideals, Perlman here seemed to have concurred with Lenin. For Perlman, the trade union of his contemporary capitalist society was basically a pragmatic organisation, primarily oriented towards the protection of members interests.

The second part of Perlman's project involved an attempt to provide an analytical framework for determining whether,

a given labour movement would be more or less inclined to operate within a system of private ownership, traditional Western Parliamentaryism and cultural pluralism.⁴

He used this framework to analyze the trade union movements of the four countries arguing that, as workers were generally motivated by "a consciousness of scarcity of opportunity", [Perlman, 1958: 6] they consequently combined to protect this scarce opportunity and to control entry to the enjoyment of that opportunity. To the wage earner this "opportunity" is defined in terms of available jobs as against the number of job hunters. It follows from this, then, that the nature of worker action would fluctuate with the fortunes of the capitalist system. Thus when the capitalist economy is at a boom and government is tolerant, working class militancy will decrease. On the other hand when there is an economic slump and government is repressive, then trade union activity will increase. As Banks points out, given this understanding an astute capitalist government could postpone the revolution indefinitely through a combination of efficient economic management which manipulated the trade unions through hand-outs and a tolerant government that allowed trade unions freedom to operate. Given the primacy of economic considerations in determining trade union behaviour, Perlman deemed the workers' own philosophy of trade unionism a better basis for an explanation of the labour movement than the abstract theories of intellectuals.⁵

The Webbs

From the point of view of constructing a theory on trade unions the Webbs are regarded as Fabian reformers who were convinced that the welfare of industrial workers could be improved in material terms by trade union work combined with political action [Perlman, 1958: 341]. Confining their investigation to a thorough study of British trade unions, they developed a theory of trade unionism, which sought to ex-

plain why union behaviour changes given certain environmental factors. With regard to British trade unions, they came to the conclusion that over the years three different doctrines had developed, reflecting the institutional arrangements obtaining during particular historical periods. They argued that in contemplating their conditions of employment, trade unionists are influenced by "three divergent conceptions of the principles upon which wages, hours, and other terms of the labour contract ought to be determined". The three doctrines are described as:-

- a) "vested interests"
- b) "supply of and demand for labour"
- c) "the living wage" [Webb and Webb, 1902: 562].

a) "Vested Interests"

This doctrine accounts for the varying emphasis of trade union issues from one industry to another and from period to period. Depending on the circumstances obtaining during a particular time and industry, a trade union may insist upon

legally enforced terms of apprenticeship, or customary rates of wages, or strict maintenance of lines of demarcation between trades, or the exclusion of 'illegal men' and the enforcement of 'patrimony' and entrance fees. [Webb and Webb, 1902: 595].

According to the Webbs this doctrine was predominant in the British labour movement in the early years of trade unionism and persisted long enough to be reflected in demarcation disputes at the turn of the century [Webb and Webb, 1902: 563]. The doctrine rests on the premise that wages and other conditions of service currently being enjoyed by members are not to be interfered with to the detriment of members.

b) "Supply of and Demand for Labour"

Under pressure from industrialists, the House of Commons repudiated the Doctrine of Vested Interests at the beginning of the 19th Century. Trade unionists were forced to fall back on the Doctrine of Supply and Demand for the protection of their interests. Workers were forced to accept three major important facts:

1. That they were no longer entitled to the legal protection of their established expectations.
2. That labour was a commodity like any other.
3. That like any other sellers of commodities in the market place, it was up to them to procure for their commodity the best terms they could through the ordinary process of bargaining and within the law. [Webb and Webb, 1902: 562].

Bargaining was necessary as the employer was entitled to buy labour power at the cheapest price.

The doctrine of 'supply and demand' exerted the dominant influence over trade union strategy between the years 1843 and 1880. The consequence of its application was that, slowly, the policy of exclusion was

replaced by inclusion, whereby all those who worked in a trade were forced to belong to an appropriate trade union regardless of how they had acquired their skills [Webb and Webb, 1902: 573]. The application of this doctrine to industry meant under employment and a fall in wages due to the application of a system called "sliding scales", whereby wages were adjusted according to the performance of the enterprise and the supply of labour regardless of the welfare of the workers. By the 1870s, trade unionists and working class intellectuals began to question the morality of this practice and argued that wages needed to have a bearing to their efficacy in meeting the needs of workers and their families for food, shelter and clothing [Webb and Webb, 1902: 587]. The question of a 'minimum wage' below which workers should not be paid was introduced into the industrial relations debate at this stage. Thus the doctrine of 'The Living Wage' was born.

c) The Living Wage

This doctrine proved controversial even within the labour movement within which it was debated for fifteen years until the "labour upheaval of 1889" when it was adopted as "a fundamental" principle of British trade unionism [Webb and Webb, 1902: 588]. The basic tenet of this doctrine is that workers should be able to subsist on the proceeds of their labour. Their subsistence should be assured for reasons of humanity and efficiency. It was believed that only when workers' basic subsistence needs were fulfilled could they perform efficiently. It was therefore generally felt that it was in the best interests of the community as a whole that workers were paid a "living wage" [Webb and Webb, 1902: 590]. Although practical problems remained on the exact amounts of food and quality of housing and clothing necessary for a worker's efficient performance and reproduction of labour, the doctrine was generally advocated as a useful guide in determining levels of remuneration.

In *Industrial Democracy*, the Webbs concluded that during the period up to 1890, trade unionists were inspired not by a single doctrine in the clarification of their function and pursuit of their interests, but by three, elements of which at times contradicted each other. These contradictions were reflected in the policies and strategies of the unionists [Webb and Webb, 1902: 595].

Although all four theoretical positions described were formulated a long time ago, they may still have relevance for the contemporary Zambian situation. As Zambia is experiencing the early process of industrialisation, the conditions of its workers and their relation to capital may be more comparable to those existing in England during the early years of industrialization than those obtaining in 20th Century post-industrial Britain and America. The majority of Zambian workers are still concerned with consumption of essential goods and the mass consumer society of modern Britain and America remains a remote dream. Their industrial relations problems and the perception of the role of trade unions will be closer to that of 19th Century trade unionists than to the 20th Century dockworker of Liverpool, for example.

The relationship between capital and labour is the same but the level of standard of living achieved may call for different approaches to trade unionism.

Although not many Zambian trade unionists, if any, have ever heard of Selig Perlman, I find his arguments very helpful in understanding Zambian trade unionism, especially its total repudiation of scientific socialism and communism.⁶

It is possible to identify a number of functions associated with trade unions, some emphasised by one writer, some by another. While Perlman focused on their economic role, for example, the Webbs stressed the social welfare function. Sturmthal, on the other hand, referred to their political role. A fourth role, especially relevant in third world societies, might also be identified; this we will designate as a development promotion role. In what follows, we examine the Zambian trade unionists' perception of their roles in each of these areas and then turn to the concept of the autonomy of the labour movement. This last is included because it became clear during the research that it was an issue to which the trade unionists attached great importance.⁷

6.2 ECONOMIC ROLE

The economic role of a union was stressed by most trade union leaders interviewed. The officials of all twelve trade unions surveyed stressed that securing members' economic interests was the uppermost responsibility of a union. In the words of one ZNUT official:

The duty of a trade union is to make sure that their members do not starve; so unions must bargain for higher wages.⁸

This responsibility was in some cases extended to include "conditions of work" as well.⁹ The responsibility to secure a living wage was considered the primary duty of the trade unionists and it surpassed any other loyalties, including those to "Party or Government".¹⁰ Should there ever be a conflict between government policy and the economic interests of members, the latter would get first priority. In the assessment of the majority of Zambian trade unionists surveyed, unions should try to maximise wages and secure the best possible working conditions for their members. This is broadly in line with the ZCTU General Council's definition which regards the role of unions as being centred on:

- a) improving the living standards of their members, and
- b) attaining social justice in society at large.¹¹

The question now arises, what kinds of strategies do unions employ to secure these benefits for their members? Over the past 40 years (1947-1987) of trade unionism in Zambia, collective bargaining seems to have emerged as the most favoured method of wage determination that has evolved. In this section of the chapter, we examine the concept of collective bargaining and consider how it has been put to use in

Zambia, through assessing the kind of negotiable issues on which the unions have focused, the nature of bargaining and its results. We also examine the administration of collective agreements and evaluate how far trade union leaders perceive their interests to have been safeguarded by these collective agreements in particular and the process of collective bargaining in general.

6.2 (i) COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Zambian trade union leaders regard collective bargaining as the *raison d'être* of trade unionism. This is evidenced from the way they assess their own performance and achievements. The history of a union is recorded first of all in terms of office holders secondly in terms of major agreements concluded and thirdly in terms of strikes. The NUCIW for example traces the 'founding' of their union to the conclusion of an agreement with the representatives of the chamber of commerce in 1948 which regularised pay rates for shop assistants and tailors.¹² But what does collective bargaining consist of?

Generally speaking collective bargaining is understood to be a tool for skilled workers, whose numbers place them at an advantage to bargain for better conditions and wages [Dunlop and Healy, 1955: 3].

Dunlop and Healey, for example, define collective bargaining as:

The process by which unions and managements accommodate each other at points where the two organisations come into contact. [Dunlop and Healy: 35].

They add that:

Collective bargaining is a rational process in which the parties are persuaded to alter their original positions by the facts and arguments presented by the opposite side. Disagreement is dissolved by careful investigation and appeal to logical argument. [Dunlop and Healy: 53].

So basically, collective bargaining is concerned with conditions of work and levels at which labour is compensated. However, this is only a part of the objective. The whole picture is much more complex, especially when contrasted against the motives of businessmen. While the businessman's main motivation is the maximization of profit, the trade unionist is concerned with the total subordinate status of labour to capital. This general concern will be reflected in the bargaining strategy of the union, whereby, at differing times and given certain circumstances, as Dunlop and Healy point out, some unions may emphasize the wages issue, others may emphasize the importance of the "power of the union", and still others may seek primarily "political power or revolutionary objectives" within the ambit of collective bargaining. Sturmtal, for example, makes the point that while collective bargaining may be concerned with economic objectives and deals with issues of wages and working conditions, the lives of workers away from their workplaces are subsumed also by political objectives and are the concern of public officials [Sturmtal and Scoville, 1973: 2-3]. However even he concedes that in practice, there is often an overlap between these objectives and that the distinction is not always clear cut [Sturmtal and Scoville, 1973: 3].

Apart from what it is designed to achieve, the second most important feature of collective bargaining is the circumstances under which it takes place. The first general condition is that there be private ownership of property. Secondly the right to strike must be ensured as this is necessary to enable workers to bring pressure to bear on their employers for the enforcement of agreements. The third condition is,

the existence of a legal and rational political system permitting the existence and functioning of reasonably free labour organizations. [Sturmthal and Scoville, 1973: 9]

Indeed this would be a cardinal requirement, because as the Webbs observe, collective bargaining is a harbinger of democracy in industry [Webb and Webb, 1902: 841]. Democracy in industry is assumed to be an extension of democracy in society at large; that is, bourgeois democracy with all its trappings, such as multi parties and regular elections to representative chambers. Yet in the *Zambian case*, and indeed in most Third World countries, collective bargaining appears to be taking place in circumstances quite different from that associated with the Westminster model of democracy, which begs the question whether perhaps there are circumstances under which collective bargaining can take place outside of a democratic environment, albeit as the last, or only enduring feature of democracy. If this is the case, then it remains to unravel the nature of these circumstances and the theoretical implications that these new revelations impose on us. On the other hand, a critique has been made from the radical perspective questioning whether or not collective bargaining is itself even democratic. It is argued that the form may appear to be democratic, but because the underlying power of the negotiating parties is disproportionate, they can never be equal bargainers. In this case, democracy may be an illusion and a component of false consciousness.¹³ This is a valid point, but as the perspective from which it emanates appears to be as yet beyond the appreciation of the *Zambian trade union movement*, it provides little additional understanding of the role of that movement in society nor of its function in respect of its members.

In the *Zambian case*, the right to collective bargaining is provided for in the Industrial Relations Act (1971). The Act permits the conclusion of collective agreements which are the end product of the collective bargaining process, with each collective agreement stipulating the period for which an agreement will remain in force. The Act also specifies the method and procedure by which the collective agreement will be replaced or terminated.¹⁴

Structure of Collective Bargaining

Within the *Zambian context*, collective bargaining takes place mostly at the industrial level. Representatives of the union in a given industry sit down with the employers representatives and work out an agreement. Once concluded the Secretary General of the union sends one copy to the Secretary of the Prices and Incomes Commission (PIC) and two copies to the Labour Commissioner.¹⁵ After considering the agreement, the Labour Commissioner sends a copy with comments to the secretary of the PIC. The Secretary may, if he feels it necessary, have the collective agreement published in the government Ga-

zette and invite the public or interested persons to make comments or complaints. The PIC approves an agreement when it is satisfied that the collective agreement does not contravene either the public interest or the government policy on prices and incomes. Once approved an agreement becomes a legally binding document on the parties.

National level collective bargaining is possible where Joint Industrial Councils have been established.¹⁶

By June 1987, the following were in place:

1. Copper Mining Employers Association and MUZ.
2. Zambia Railways and Railway Workers Union of Zambia.
3. Motor Traders and Transport and Allied Workers Union.
4. Local Government Association and District Councils and the ZULAWU.
5. Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors and the National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers.
6. Master Printers and Newspaper Proprietors and the Zambia Typographical Workers Union.
7. Millers Association and the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers.
8. Zambia Farm Employers Association and the National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers.
9. Clothing Manufacturing and Allied Trades and the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers.
- 10..Hotel and Catering Association of Zambia and Hotel Catering Workers Union of Zambia.
- 11..Road Transport Employer's Association and the National Union of Transportation and Allied Workers.
- 12..Security Employer's Association and the Guards Unions of Zambia.
- 13..Zambia Bankers Employers Association and the Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers.¹⁷

In the early years of trade unionism in Zambia, the main negotiable issues were wages and hours of work. But as the unions have become better established and gained more experience, the range of negotiable issues has expanded to include the following:

Leave entitlement, which includes provisions for sick leave, annual leave, maternity leave, local leave and hardship leave; provisions for housing or housing allowance; transport on duty, which may include the provision of transport to and from work; gratuity schemes for non Zambian workers and pension schemes for Zambians; assurance schemes; provisions for retirement, including the determination of retirement age, benefits and in some cases plans for the future education and employment of children;¹⁸ allowances for travelling on duty; loans and advances for special circumstances and purchases; education and training; redundancy handling procedures, recruitment of staff; termination of employment; repatriations of benefits; works rules; disciplinary procedures;

provision of staff canteens, clinics and recreation facilities; safety and health schemes.

A number of private companies now engage the services of a Doctor for their workers, either by employing one or operating account at private out-patient clinics. Bigger companies are more capable of providing these services at a higher level than the smaller companies.¹⁹

It is to the credit of the unions that they have been able to extract gains in respect to many of the above under circumstances of declining economic activity. Whether this is 'just' when considered in the context of growing ranks of the unemployed is quite a separate issue which lies outside the scope of this thesis. Even the trade unionists surveyed refused to discuss it. They argue that their first responsibility is to their members and the issue of employment creation was "not their baby", but was up to the government.

Even if our workers were not provided with transport to and from work, how are we to be sure that the company would spend the money so saved on expansion of its enterprises".²⁰

It is difficult to predict the behaviour of industrialists when the economic climate is so volatile. But trade unions have worked hard to secure a living wage for their members. That the concern with the economic wellbeing of the workers is the major preoccupation of the ZCTU is reflected in their anxiety over the performance of the Zambian economy as a whole. From time to time since the mid-1970s, the ZCTU has urged the government to call for a "National Economic Convention" to discuss the current state of the economy with a view to identifying the major causes of the economic problems and helping to formulate an appropriate strategy to alleviate them. It is believed that once the real problems are addressed, then the suffering of the workers will be brought to an end. In August 1975, for example, soon after the withdrawal of 60% of subsidies on essential commodities, which led to an increase in the prices of the affected commodities, the Secretary General of the ZCTU called upon the government to:

hold an economic convention to map out strategic policies aimed at saving the country from economic suicide. [ZDM, 4.8.1975]

During the same speech, the Secretary General drew the attention of the press to the fact that Central Committee Members and Cabinet Ministers used government supplied Mercedes Benz cars, while workers lost their jobs due to redundancies and paid high prices for essential commodities, due to the poor performance of the economy. Often government has responded favourably to these calls by inviting the labour leaders to State House for a meeting or the President addressing an especially convened ZCTU general council meeting. During these dialogues the ZCTU has consistently focused on a number of issues, including the following:-

1. The question of a minimum wage.
2. The establishment of a poverty datum line for the country.

3. A price escalation clause in collective agreements.

ZCTU Chairman General F. Chiluba says he has been campaigning for the establishment of a poverty datum line since 1977. In an interview in 1985 he asserted that:

The introduction of a poverty datum line, call it a living wage, is the closest way the world has known to achieving an egalitarian society, so often propounded by African political leaders. [STOZ, 17.11.1985].

In his 1982 report to the quadrennial conference, the Secretary General claimed that the second Turner Survey on "Incomes, Wages and Prices" was undertaken as a response to the ZCTU campaign for the establishment of a poverty datum line [SG Report, 1982, 13]. He went on to claim that the ZCTU had proposed the need for the establishment of a poverty datum line to the Turner Commission. The suggestion had not, however been accepted by the commission which instead preferred and adopted the concept of "basic needs standards" [SG Report, 1982: 82].

ZCTU leaders have argued that an official minimum wage based on the cost of living should serve as a base from which unions and workers could negotiate for salary increases. Employers too would have the knowledge of what to expect in terms of wage demands.²¹ However, they emphasize that a minimum wage would only make economic sense for all concerned if it was based on accurate information, which is still lacking in the absence of a scientifically determined poverty datum line. Work during 1986/87 by the Incomes and Prices Commission seemed inclined in this direction. However, given the inflationary pressures obtaining in the country, the ZCTU is aware that even a scientifically determined minimum wage based on a poverty datum line may not safeguard a worker's livelihood. Hence they argue that a price escalation clause should be included in all collective agreements reached between trade unions and employers. Only this could enable the worker to maintain a decent livelihood under the volatile economic environment.²² In November 1983, for example, the ZCTU directed all affiliated trade unions to ensure that all workers throughout the country "get the ten per cent wage increase before Christmas".²³

During the post '83 economic crisis, the ZCTU directed its affiliated unions to negotiate for a K50.00 general salary increase to offset the high cost of living. This follows a decision to the ZCTU General Council which in 1984, after a discussion of the prevailing economic situation, resolved to direct all affiliated unions to demand a K50.00 per month salary increase. Some unions initiated negotiations soon after the directive was given. By the end of January 1985, government workers represented by the four public service unions had won K30.00 of the K50.00 increase suggested by the ZCTU.²⁴ In February 1985, the MUZ started negotiations with the mining companies for the K50.00 cost of living wage increase [ZDM, 15.02.85]. On the need for a living wage, even the Zambia Federation of Employers has expressed its sympathy with the workers. In March 1987, Chairman Clement Mambwe appealed to all employers to take the cost of living into account when determining wages, adding that:

Employers misunderstood difficulties workers face and tend to respond sluggishly to their demands. [ZDM, 30.03.1987]

We have demonstrated thus far that the leaders of the Zambian trade union movement define the primary function of trade unions in terms of safeguarding the economic interests of their members. This has manifested itself not so much in terms of protecting their "vested interest" as in emphasizing the need to secure a "living wage". The existing socio/economic and political circumstances do not allow the operationalisation of the doctrine of vested interests to guarantee a worker job security. Hence redundancies occur and, as we have indicated above employment opportunities have declined sine 1975. This by implication means that workers' economic interests are not protected by the law as such. Labour is treated like a commodity like any other, hence the reliance on collective bargaining to secure workers a living wage, although in sectors where labour is not well organised, a minimum wage is determined by a Board set up specifically for that purpose by the Ministry of Labour.

As we indicated in Chapter Three, in general unions have used their bargaining power effectively to maintain reasonable wages for those workers fortunate enough to be in employment. Indeed in comparison with other countries in East, Central and Southern Africa, Zambia is considered a high wage economy.²⁵ When the issue is put to trade union leaders, however, they argue that the wage structure in Zambia has evolved as a consequence of the socio-economic and political history of Zambia and that it is unfair to compare the levels of wages in Zambia to any other country with a different history. In 1971, Basil Kabwe as Secretary General of the ZCTU explained:

the high wages obtaining in the country are a result of the high expectations people had of political independence. Black people moving into jobs previously held by expatriates wanted expatriate wages, a wage below that would have been considered humiliation... The current salary structure is embedded in Zambia's political history.²⁶

By the mid 1980s trade union leaders were no longer talking in terms of a high wage structure. The rising cost of living had eroded the purchasing power of worker's pay packets. Inflation had increased at the following rates:

Year	Rate
1970	5.9%
1975	10.0%
1977	19.4%
1986	60.0%
1987	63.0%

In consequence, Secretary General Zimba lamented in his report to the quadrennial conference that:

...the vast majority of wage earners in the cities and towns lived at a bare or below subsistence levels... Their money wages were hardly or barely sufficient to pay for the bare necessities of life which they and their families required to exist. [S.G. Report, 1986: 13-17]

So if the money wages are high, it appears the cost of living has risen sufficiently to level out any advantages to the workers. In June 1987, urging the government to remain firm on price reductions, following the breakup of negotiations with the IMF, MUZ chairman Timothy Walamba commented that,

Zambia was about the most expensive nation in the SADCC region.
[ZDM, 19.6.87]

Whether or not this perception is based on fact can only be determined on the basis of empirical data. What is important here is that it is on such perceptions that the trade unionist bases his negotiations strategy with his employers and his actions of support or lack of support for the government.

There are times however, when even the negotiating routine by trade unions is overtaken by events, when workers feel the niceties of negotiations are too slow and take direct action. The food-riots of December 1986 are a case in point. As we indicated in Chapter One, the riots occurred as a spontaneous action by workers quite independent of any negotiating processes then underway.

6.3 DEVELOPMENT PROMOTION ROLE – SOCIAL WELFARE ROLE

The social welfare role is perceived at two levels. In a specific sense it is perceived as the provision of social welfare benefits to individual union members. In a general sense it is perceived as the promotion of the economic development of the country as a whole.

i) Social Welfare Benefits

At the level of the individual member the social welfare benefits a union can provide are circumscribed by law. The unions do not provide strike pay as they do not have a strike fund. There is necessarily no mention of a strike fund in the IR Act (1971). Nor, since strikes are considered undesirable by government officials, is any sort of informal strike fund provided since doing so might suggest implicit approval for strikes. Neither do the unions provide unemployment pay. When a worker is subject to compulsory redundancy, the best they can do for their members is negotiate with employers for the speedy release of the worker's terminal benefits.²⁷ In practice this is accomplished much more quickly in the private sector than in the public sector. The four public sector unions reported that workers who had been "pruned" as a consequence of the 1984/85 IMF agreements experienced difficulties and delays in securing their terminal benefits. Newspaper reports and "letters to the editor" of the two national newspapers portrayed the frustration suffered by "retired" workers. The *Sunday Times of Zambia* reported that retired civil servants, many of whom had been forced into early retirement, were experiencing delays in securing the pensions due to corruption and inefficiency in the bureaucracy [STOZ, 8th March, 1987].

By custom major unions are consulted on the determination of who is to be retired. A "first in last out" policy is not strictly adhered to. Instead older men are encouraged to opt for early retirement. In the civil service the practice has been to change the law, bringing down the retirement age from 60 to 55 for men

and 55 to 50 for women. Trade union leaders concede that the prevailing economic conditions make the proper representation of workers extremely difficult, to the extent that they feel they are pushed more and more to restricting their activities to the protection of the rights of workers who are still in employment.²⁸

6.3 ii) PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In a general sense trade union movement leaders see the promotion of economic development as part of its social welfare role. The development of the nation seems intricately linked to the welfare of their members. In promoting national development, leaders hope to improve conditions for their members in the process and help create more jobs in society. Thus in July 1975, Joseph Musonda as ZCTU Deputy Chairman, advised workers and peasants to help in the implementation of the economic reforms in the "national interest" [TOZ, 12th July 1975]. In 1976, the ZCTU executive council resolved that the "entire" leadership of the labour movement, "must vigorously spearhead economic development of the nation" [ZDM, 17th May 1976]. The exact meaning and implications for worker action of this perceived commitment to development varies according to the political orientation and level of personal development of personnel manning the ZCTU. Thus according to Basil Kabwe when serving as Secretary General of the ZCTU in 1976:

As workers, we must resolve never to go on strike again even under the most aggressive and serious provocation from the expatriate or local agents of our enemies. As Zambians we fought for independence in order to rule ourselves. Now that we rule ourselves we should change our habits to that of liking our work and doing it properly. [ZDM, 12th June 1976].

Diligence at work is understood here as constituting a worker's contribution to development. While recognising the importance of worker's role in the promotion of productivity, one of Kabwe's successors in the leadership of the trade union movement, ZCTU Assistant Secretary for Finance, Mr. Sampa, took a different view. Acknowledging that strikes disrupted production, he still contended that they should not be viewed in isolation as a negative factor. Instead strikes should be seen as a safety valve calling attention to some "malaise" in the worker-management relationship. Attention, he counsels, should be paid to the cause of the strike and not just to its consequences.²⁹

In his early years as Secretary General of the ZCTU, Newstead Zimba urged the labour movement:

To be fully geared towards the economic transformation of the nation so that it is not reflected as a vehicle of protest, but of production in development. [ZDM, 25th November 1975]

Here protest is set as the antithesis of production. In other circumstances and for other leaders, the boundaries are not so clear cut. Instead both the "promotion of productivity" and "protest", especially in the form of strikes, are perceived by some as integral parts of the process of development. In the inter-

view referred to above, Sampa expressed the view that when workers are provided with the right kind of conditions, they can contribute to higher productivity. This can be achieved when workers are awarded "good wages, improved working conditions, provision of material and moral incentives for hard work, provision of health facilities, recreation facilities, on the job vocational training and job security for the workers". On the other hand, he argues, the right to strike must be recognised as a safety valve in industry and as a hallmark of a democratic society.³⁰ In Sampa's assessment, workers already contribute to national development by engaging in wage labour. It is up to the government to direct and regulate the distribution of industrial profit in the interests of development. He further points out that, in making their contribution, workers should not be made a martyr for development. They should be included to partake in that development by enjoying an improved standard of living as well as enjoy their full democratic rights as citizens. Sampa's concern is that perpetual and unmitigated exploitation of civil rights breeds apathy in the workers and can retard not only productivity but ultimately, development.³¹

The second mode identified by unions through which workers and their organisations can contribute to economic development is the direct running of commercial enterprises. Eight of the twelve trade unions surveyed indicated this to be the most immediate means through which trade unions could contribute to national economic development. This included both unions that already ran commercial enterprises, such as the MUZ with its Mukuba farm and its four storey office block building, and those such as the PSWU which do not.³² Unions indicated that commercial enterprises can be operated either at the level of the national union or at the level of Congress. It was felt that commercial enterprises can contribute to economic growth and to workers standard of living in two ways:-

1. By providing services and benefits to members. MUZ members, for example, get farm produce at reasonable rates from their farm, at the same time that proceeds improve the union's finances.

2. Commercial enterprises provide employment in the community in which they are located. Some retired trade unionists end up working as managers of ZCTU enterprises. Nezia Tembo, first President of the ZCTU was between 1975 and 1987 managing the workers' farm. David Mwila, former MUZ Chairman, was in 1987 the managing director of the Worker's Development Cooperation which was formed in 1971 [TOZ, 31st March 1976] and operates as a capitalist enterprise. It was formed by the then 17 national unions buying shares worth K10,000.00 each. The unions expect to be paid dividends when the corporation makes a profit. The workers who are employed by the corporation are paid wages. It is run by a Board of Directors and its operations include a bar and grill in Kitwe, a retail shop in Chingola and a farm. There are also workers' cooperatives that are run separately from the capitalist enterprises by the ZCTU's department of cooperatives. Cooperatives are considered an important aspect of national development as Secretary General Zimba explained:

Economic prosperity of the people... must evolve and grow by actual participation of the people themselves as essential ingredients in its growth.³³

Cooperatives and credit unions are important because they afford participants the opportunity to be a part of the experience of economic growth. The prosperity of their commercial enterprises translates into their personal prosperity.

The credit unions have been developed as a first stage towards the establishment of a workers' bank. In the mid 1970s the ZCTU mooted the idea of setting up a "Workers' Bank for Development" which would provide banking facilities to workers, encourage savings and help stabilise prices. It was not elaborated upon how this would be achieved, but the general hope was that a Bank owned by workers would not be unfair in its practices towards members.³⁴ The credit unions are supervised by the ZCTU Department of Workers' Cooperatives. In 1986 there were over 186, two thirds of which were industrial cooperatives with an approximate membership of 37,580.³⁵ By October 1986, 16 credit unions mentioned in the Secretary General's report had a combined capital share of K2,534,728.88 [SG Report, 1986, 62]. The exact number of shares held by all the unions was difficult to establish as some of the credit unions did not maintain regular contact with the ZCTU, but in 1987, the Congress was striving to rectify this omission [SG Report, 1986, 62].

An example of a reportedly successful Workers' Credit Union is the Luanshya Serioes Clothing Manufacturing Company. The Credit Union was started in 1976 by one hundred workers with a share capital of K600.00. By 1986, according to Workers' Cooperatives Director, Hudson Kabanga, it had 212 members with K67,000,00 in shares.³⁶

The ZCTU, like the government, seem to have adopted a "mixed economy" approach to economic development. Capitalist enterprises that employ labour are run and promoted side by side with workers' cooperatives that are run by members for their own direct benefit.

6.3 iii) THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT

The management of conflict is the most fundamental long term task of trade unionism in a capitalist society. Unions engage in conflict management by enforcing industrial discipline among their members, by engaging in collective bargaining and by participating in workers' education. With its socialist aspirations the Zambian society offers a challenge of some magnitude as trade unionists have to walk the tight-rope of capitalist reality and the socialist ambition. This task is made harder by the fact that sometimes in public speeches both politicians and trade union leaders, the aspiration to a socialist society is presented and perceived as if it were already reality. For example, at the time of implementing part VII of the IR Act (1971) in 1976, which provides for the establishment of Works Councils in enterprises em-

ploying 100 employees or more, Hubert Bweupe, the senior trustee, who by 1987 had risen to Deputy Chairman of the ZCTU, said that, since workers under this provision would be allowed the opportunity to participate in the decision making bodies in their enterprises, they should henceforth stop solving their problems through strikes, because if they persisted in this old manner, "they would be striking against their own decisions" [ZDM, 20th May 1976]. He seems to have been convinced that the works councils would give workers an equal share of decision making along the lines of Workers' Self Management enterprises found for example in Yugoslavia.³⁷ In accord with this line of thought, the role of trade unions is interpreted as emphasizing worker's education and participation in the newly introduced structures.

An assistant secretary of the ZCTU, for example, observed:

...the fact that there were still some strikes in the country was an indication that workers had not yet been fully educated.³⁸

Workers' education is one device employed in conflict management by trade unions. The ZCTU has a Department of Workers' Education, which was established in 1969, with Basil Kabwe as its first director. The basic objective of workers' education according to the ZCTU is to enlighten the worker about his or her rights and responsibilities in the work situation. It is undertaken against a background of limited educational opportunities in the worker's youth and is intended to make good this lack, in some cases through improving literacy and numeracy skills. It is believed that well informed workers who are aware of their rights and responsibilities will adapt more easily to industrial discipline and contribute much more effectively to high productivity and industrial peace.³⁹ In producing such workers, the ZCTU is in one sense, however, providing capitalist industry with a more complacent labour force, making it easier for private capital to accumulate more surplus value.

That this is partly the objective becomes evident from the way the ZCTU treats the issue of discipline. Discipline is considered very crucial in industrial relations. It is regarded as important for the maintenance of high productivity, but also for the handling of disputes. It is believed that educated workers will be familiar with the procedures necessary for handling a dispute and therefore less likely to resort to wildcat strikes. They would have cultivated faith in their own unions's negotiating capabilities and in management to act in "good faith". One trade unionist expressed the need for workers' education thus:

...without meaning to be offensive, workers education is necessary to overcome the lack of trust in other which may have been carried over from the peasant sector.⁴⁰

Workers' education is considered here to be an induction process through which the worker is familiarised with the rigours of industrial life and is taught to respect and trust not only the democratic process that returns capable and committed leaders, but also leaders who will seek and secure the best deal for the workers. Thus the process of proletarianisation is being aided by the workers' organisation. In

their own assessment, the task of trade union leaders in this regard has not been easy. Zimba as President of the ZCTU made the comment that it had been easier to engage the workers in the nationalist struggle,

than to get them to understand the new task of economic development or the new methods of the trade union struggle. [ZDM, 21st October, 1973]

In other words workers education is envisaged to alter the way workers perceive their exploitation, the need for development and the way the two are linked. Workers are expected to appreciate the demands of general societal development and economic growth well enough to enable them to attenuate their demands for personal benefits in the interests of national development. This whole process suggests a practice of conflict management. Of course unions are also involved in conflict management through the very process of aggregating workers' demands into negotiable issues and by the process of determining the wages and conditions under which workers produce surplus value for capital. In both respects, by sponsoring workers' education and through direct negotiations, unions are involved in the process of conflict management and are contributing thereby to peaceful industrial relations.

6.4 POLITICAL ROLE

The political role of trade unionism in Zambia is perceived by trade union leaders in terms of the stewardship of workers' rights. These rights are recognised by the government and the Ministry of Labour provides some supportive services to ensure that they are secured. Differences, however, arise over the specifics of implementation. The government, as we have demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4, has sought to harness the organisational power of the trade union movement to the ruling Party's agenda. It has sought to turn the ZCTU into an organ for the mobilisation of workers for the production of a surplus, to keep manufacturing buoyant, the mining industry earning foreign exchange and foreign investment flowing into the country. The national philosophy of Humanism has been the medium used to communicate to the people what is in the national interest and to the benefit of all, worker, peasant and the unemployed.

For some time, the ZCTU accepted this message and encouraged its members to heed it. Experience over the ten years 1977 to 1987, however, has taught the ZCTU leadership a different lesson. They have come to realise that Zambia is not yet the socialist state of the Humanist aspirations. Government is not yet in full control of all the surplus produced in the country and does not yet have the full economic power to regulate its production. Zambia is still a capitalist society, in which international finance capital has established a strong hold and the IMF, at least until April 1987, heavily influenced the allocation of resources, especially foreign exchange. To pretend that the situation is otherwise is to mislead the workers.

Given that Zambia is still a capitalist society, what political role do trade unions perceive and designate for themselves within it? At the beginning of his term of office as ZCTU President, Frederick Chiluba appealed to the government not to regard the ZCTU as a pressure group. Addressing a ZCTU General Council meeting in Kitwe in September 1975, Chiluba said that the labour movement was committed to both the Party and the government and should not therefore be regarded in this light. However, he hastened to add that as the workers' mouthpiece, the ZCTU had the right to criticize the authorities on matters concerning workers and their interests [TZ, 29th September, 1975]. Twelve years on, Chiluba not only regards the ZCTU as a pressure group but maintains that ZCTU participation in politics is crucial to maintain "checks and balances" in the system. He holds these "checks and balances" to be essential to the democratic process.⁴¹ Chiluba envisages a form of participation for the trade union movement that includes the right to criticize government policy and to suggest better economic policies as well as a role in determining wage levels for Zambian workers. He has often argued that the ZCTU leadership is duty bound to defend the work of trade unions and ensure that government discharges its duties to the people of Zambia. Elaborating on the functions of government to a ZCTU General Council Seminar,⁴² Chiluba argued that the ZCTU leadership had a duty to its members to monitor the progress and performance "of government machinery and alert the people" [Chiluba, 28.9.80].

The adoption of this new role comes in the wake of what is perceived in the labour movement as shortfalls of democracy in a One Party State. Leaders of the labour movement in Zambia have a commitment to the democratic process and they take very seriously the government's professed commitment to "democracy" within the One Party framework. The ZCTU understanding of democracy is itself informative. Secretary General Zimba pointed out in his 1982 report to the quadrennial conference that:

Democracy should include economic democracy and the distribution of collective national wealth of this country, without these democracy leaves very little to be grateful for. [SG Report, 1982: 4]

The definition of democracy is expanded to include not only political democracy but also economic forms – a sharing in the results of economic development. This is not to suggest that political democracy is itself taken for granted. Far from it. In fact the labour movement is calling the government's bluff on democracy. The government has proclaimed that it is building a "participatory democracy".⁴³ The trade union movement is holding it up to that promise by claiming its right to exercise and share in the decision making process of the country. In a "Sunday Interview" in February 1976, Chiluba again laid claim to this right saying:

We want to participate at all levels of decision-making, not just by having six members on the (UNIP) National Council. That is not full participation. We need and we must be involved in the mechanisms of implementing policy, not just its declaration. ... Trade unions helped in the freedom struggle, now we want to help run and reconstruct Zambia.⁴⁴

Therein lies the basis of their claim. They want to participate in the new participatory democracy that the UNIP government has publicly declared. And they claim the right to participate because the labour movement helped bring political independence to Zambia. However, the demand for the right to participate is followed closely with the disclaimer for the desire for direct political power. As one official put it,

...needless to say, we are not the government, and we have no intention to be one. We are a labour movement, registered under the laws of the country within which we operate. Our lines of operation have many times been misunderstood by many people.⁴⁵

Or, as a district level trade union leader put it:

The labour movement in Zambia has no ambitions other than the desire to improve the standard of living of workers. ...unions are the cornerstone of democracy, as such they will always be relevant wherever people are employed. Government and employers should not undermine the role and influence of workers' organisations which are responsible partners in national development.⁴⁶

Having noted the affirmation of the importance of democratic participation by union leaders, we still have to determine what the participation ZCTU seeks consists of. When the various views are coalesced together, one discerns the following being advocated:

1. The right to criticise government policy, especially on the handling of the economy, and advise government on industrial relations in the country especially in the determination of wage levels for Zambia workers.
2. The right to participate on decision-making committees of the Party and government at both national and local levels and the right to be included on government trips abroad.
3. The right to organise and withdraw labour.

Trade unionists insist that they want to secure these rights while remaining a free trade union movement unencumbered by Party (UNIP) discipline. We examine below what each set of rights entails.

6.4i) The Right to Criticise Policy

The major focus of labour movement criticism has been on the government's handling of the economy. The ZCTU regrets the fact that employment in the formal sector has been on the decline since 1975.⁴⁷ It criticises the chronic shortage of essential commodities and the declining standard of medical services, housing and education. Asserting this right, the Chairman General says:

...modern trade unionism cannot be restricted to begging or asking for wages and working conditions only, which in any case never get better. ...we must get concerned with how our country is being run. We can't accept the running of government, the management of our economy and the future of this country to be experimented upon everyday. ...are we going to compromise with government inability, failure and mismanagement just in order to eat yellow maize? ...workers of Zambia must stand firm and resolve to restore order.⁴⁸

The ZCTU leadership, then, sees its role extending beyond the protection of worker's immediate economic interests in terms of wages and conditions of service to include the management of the economy as

a whole. They point out that while the national unions concentrate on monitoring events in their particular industries, the Congress monitors the performance of the whole economy. In addition they argue that in the absence of an opposition party, the labour movement has an obligation to its members to speak out on their behalf. They contend that it is not only a question of democracy but also for reasons of expediency, since the current political leaders are not infallible. Chiluba again:

We who make mistakes everyday also logically expect and accept those who are entrusted with running our government must and can make mistakes. ...conversely they too must accept that there is nothing super-human about them and that they, like us, can make mistakes, so that the need for checks and balances, indeed the need for criticism becomes altogether necessary.⁴⁹

Nor is the right to criticize confined to the top ZCTU leadership. Leaders of national unions also speak out on national policies that may affect their members generally or the particular industries in which they work. During the 1983 Parliamentary elections for example, a trade unionist reacted to a call by a sitting member of Parliament to vote "yes" for the "peace and security" that Zambia was enjoying, in the following manner:

What do you mean by peace and security when criminals have taken over the running of the country and people are being butchered day and night? When we vote for President Kaunda it will be for his qualities, but peace is certainly not with us.⁵⁰

An implicit commitment is made that there will be a "yes" vote for the President. However, criticism is voiced and directed at the Ministry of Home Affairs and particularly the police, for failing to discharge duty in maintaining a peaceful environment within which workers can go about earning a living for themselves.

A second example of National Union criticism of government policy is that by MUZ National Chairman, Timothy Walamba. In July 1984, Walamba warned of serious industrial unrest over the mealie-meal price increases. He put the blame for the shortage of mealie-meal on government economic advisors who had allowed the export of maize in good years, instead of keeping the surplus for future use:

We are demanding that these mealie-meal prices be revoked without fail and we have confidence that the Party and its government being the "peoples party" will take our advice seriously. [Walamba, TZ, 7.7.1984]

The price had been increased by 22% for roller meal and 15% for breakfast meal. In protest, the ZCTU decided to boycott the "National Convention on the Economy" which had been called by the government for July 23rd to 25th 1984, thereby demonstrating its displeasure with government policy by non-participation.

In a third example, the Chairman of the Guards Union of Zambia was one of the first trade unionists to specifically call on the government to "scrap" the auctioning of foreign exchange. Addressing his union executive, he called on the government to find a system that would revitalise the value of the Kwacha and

stop the auctioning of foreign exchange in order to alleviate the suffering being experienced by workers and peasants. The auctioning of foreign exchange, he said, had aggravated the misery of workers and peasants as prices of essential household goods from pots to blankets had all gone up as a direct consequence of the auctioning of foreign exchange [ZDM, 15.4.1987].

As these illustrations show, trade union leaders have claimed for themselves the right to criticize government policy and to suggest alternative policies. Congress leaders have been most active in this regard. However, when there have been pressing issues, national leaders have not hesitated to voice their criticism, claiming this role as their democratic right. They feel obliged to monitor government action in the absence of an opposition party and to capitalise on the government's declared commitment to democracy to guarantee their right to do so. The claim respecting democratic principles also underlies the ZCTU demand for participation in the democratic process of the nation as we shall see in the next section.

Publicly, at least, there appears to be consensus on this issue among the current leaders of the trade union movement. To take too close a pro-government stand would be in bad taste as it could be interpreted by workers to be a betrayal of their interests. For leaders to maintain their position in the movement, they have to appear to espouse the interests of the workers. Otherwise they would risk the danger of being voted out of office.

6.4ii) The Right to Participate

The right to participate in the decision making process at both national and local level is held to be the launching pad of democracy. Trade unions in Zambia have agitated for this right since before independence. In 1963, for example, their leaders complained that the movement had been overlooked by the Party, UNIP, in the selection of candidates for the elections to the legislative council. According to the "Workers' Voice" the President,

had travelled to the Copperbelt for discussions with trade union leaders precisely to allay these fears. As a demonstration of his faith in the trade union movement, the President told trade union leaders that representatives from the labour movement would take part in a UNIP delegation to the Scandinavian countries to study the system of collaboration between political parties and trade unions in those countries.⁵¹

In 1969, even before the formal creation of the Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, worker directors were appointed to the Boards of Directors of State run enterprises. Thus Japhet Julilwa, President of Transport Workers' Union and Emmanuel Mwansa, President of Railway Workers' Union, were appointed to sit on the Board of Directors of the National Transport Corporation. While Edwin Thawe General Secretary of MUZ was appointed to the INDECO Board of Directors. Basil Kabwe was appointed to sit on the MINDECO board of directors to represent the labour movement as a whole.⁵² During the 1970s and 1980s this policy has been widened to enable worker directors participate

on the Boards of other state enterprises and statutory bodies, although by 1986 the ZCTU leadership was claiming that this "experiment" had failed and that it needed to be reviewed.⁵³ The desire to participate, however, extended to the arena of local government. In 1976, Sampa, ZCTU Assistant General Secretary queried the government on why its members,

were not being invited to attend district and provincial development committee meetings throughout the Republic. [ZDM, 3.03.76].

Sampa was here reiterating a call made the previous year by Chairman General Chiluba to allow the ZCTU to be represented on "all policy-making bodies of the Party and government". Chiluba had then suggested that workers' representatives be consulted on the annual budget and that the labour movement should be represented on the body which recruited expatriate labour, adding,

Any attempt by the government to 'abandon' the labour movement because of the demand for full representation in all policy-making bodies would be a negation of the philosophy of Humanism. The labour movement has under difficult circumstances worked within the framework of the country's laws. [STZ, 2.03.75]

It appears that representation on policy-making bodies was here being demanded as a reward for being law abiding citizens and workers on the basis of democracy and in keeping with the philosophy of Humanism, both doctrines to which the Party and the government has expressed public commitment. For the government to deny the labour movement participation would appear to be a public negation of these rights and that would not stand the government in good stead with the public or the international community. This general demand for more opportunities to participate has been extended even to appeals for the inclusion of ZCTU representatives on trade and other government delegations visiting foreign countries or organisations.⁵⁴ When the expected consultations or invitation to participate have not been forthcoming, the ZCTU has not hesitated to protest. In 1976 when the Kwacha was devalued by 20% for example, the labour movement threatened to protest to the government for having been "overlooked on matters that affect workers" [TZ, 10.8.76]. On other occasions the ZCTU has actually made representations to the Prime Minister on some specific government policy or has called on the government to summon "a convention on the economy" to discuss pressing problems of the day. At the ZCTU conference at which both Chiluba and Zimba were first elected to their present posts, one of the resolutions passed recommended that a ZCTU delegation meet with and pass on to government leaders the labour movement's suggestions for solving the problems of the rising cost of living and unemployment [STZ, 24.11.74]. This call was again reiterated by the ZCTU Secretary General nine months later [ZDM, 4.8.75].

In January 1976, the ZCTU was planning to send a "high powered" delegation to Prime Minister Mudenda to seek clarification over certain aspects of the implementation of the Mwanakatwe Salaries Commission award in the parastatal sector. This was a result of reports from national unions concerned that since the announcement of the commission's findings, they had been experiencing difficulties in

negotiating for higher pay [TZ, 5.01.76]. After the annual budget for the year had been presented to Parliament by the Finance Minister, the ZCTU planned to send another delegation to the Prime Minister to protest

over certain aspects of the 1976 budget and the increases in the prices of some essential commodities. ...the ZCTU... should not be left out when those in authority map out the mechanism of the country's economy.⁵⁶

In a recent example, in May 1987, following differences over the manner of celebrating Labour Day, the ZCTU sought an audience with the President, "to seek clarification on a number of serious issues causing frictions".⁵⁷

The ZCTU has throughout been determined to maintain the role of an active participant in the country's political process and it has not been shy to call on the government to involve it. What the ZCTU has objected to is to be structurally integrated into and therefore potentially subordinated to the UNIP administrative machinery. It has been anxious to participate, but only as an autonomous organisational entity. Hence, its initial objection to participate in the implementation of the new local government act (1980). The desire to participate as an autonomous organisation is asserted further in the ZCTU's right to organise and to withdraw labour in support of industrial demands as we shall demonstrate in the next section.

6.4iii) Right to Organise and Right to Withdraw Labour

The twelve trade unions surveyed indicated that their right to organise was provided for in the IR Act (1971) which gives an adequate framework for organisation. They pointed out that government has been "very generous" in this regard.⁵⁸ Zambians, they pointed out, are free to organise themselves and negotiate with employers with minimum interference from the government. The fact that Zambia has not ratified ILO Convention No. 87 on the Freedom of Association did not seem to be a source of concern. Only three unions pointed to this anomaly of their own accord.⁵⁹

Asked how conditions for trade unions in Zambia compared with other countries, six (50%) thought trade unions enjoy better conditions in Zambia than anywhere else in Africa. Two felt conditions in Zambia were fair but did not want to make comparisons with other countries. Two felt conditions in Zambia were worse than in other countries and two were not specific. They felt some African countries were better off than Zambia, while others were much worse off. Therefore they found it difficult to generalise. They were quick to point out that trade unionists in other countries, (Malawi and Zaire were two that were mentioned often) had been "locked up" for organising trade unions.

While acknowledging the right of association as provided for in the Republican Constitution, and the framework for industrial unions as provided for in the IR Act (1971), trade union leaders were quick to turn on internal weaknesses in the trade union movement itself. The first weakness identified by 70% of

trade union leaders was the tendency for trade union leaders to use the labour movement as a stepping stone to higher offices in the Party and the government. The remaining 30% were aware of the trend, but explained it in terms of the structural limitations of the economy, and specifically of the fact that there were few alternative opportunities for personal advancement other than the Party and the government;

...that is what this employment business is all about isn't it? We work hard for the collective well-being of the workers. Similarly we should also be happy when an individual leader advances and makes it... chuckle...⁶⁰

The present top leadership of the ZCTU, however, frowns on such tendencies, considering them opportunistic. Addressing the ZCTU General Council after his release from detention, Chiluba appealed to his fellow leaders:

No matter how tough the going becomes, we must all vow never to use this labour movement as a stepping stone to other areas of influence, because then we would not be honest. We must strive to provide the leadership which our workers can rely on even in stormy weather.⁶¹

In order to succeed, according to this view, trade unionists need to be committed to the workers' cause, be steady and not easily swayed by greener pastures or weakened in the face of outside pressure. As the Secretary General pointed out in his 1982 quadrennial report;

it is the duty of the leadership to lead from the front and not the back; it would be anti-trade union leadership to look for alternatives in sidestepping the issues; be absent or unavailable for comment, shake hands and look wise, and do next to nothing. [SG Report, 1982, 1]

One of the thorny issues which has confronted the trade union movement since independence has been the right to withdraw labour to back demands. Although generally held elsewhere to be a cardinal part of collective bargaining, in the Zambian situation the right to strike has been restricted by laws prohibiting striking in "essential services". Over the twenty years 1965 to 1985, the definition of essential services has been expanded to include almost all industries.⁶²

When asked to comment on this, trade union leaders acknowledged that the right to strike is an important trade union right. As some said, "striking is the last weapon for the workers".⁶³ However as the ZCTU is a legally constituted organisation, it has to observe the laws of the land. Some trade union leaders also pointed out that some unofficial strikes carried out by their members "were senseless". Several MUZ leaders cited the 1981 miners strike over a shortage of mealie-meal and the 1985 strike in protest over the Mukuba pension scheme in this regard. But other miners' leaders disagree with this assessment, pointing out that sometimes the rank and file members are in a better position than those at higher levels to decide what action is most appropriate to a particular situation especially in view of the long and complex procedure involved in legal strikes. On the effects of strikes, some ZCTU and national union leaders felt that they agreed with the government that strikes were detrimental to a developing country's economy such as Zambia's. However, they insisted that it is the cause of strikes rather than the

withdrawal of labour itself that should be looked into and regretted that this usually only happened after a strike and not before.⁶⁴ They noted also that the restriction on the right to strike has weakened the bargaining power of unions, because some employers bargain half-heartedly, knowing that unions cannot legally call a strike.⁶⁵ The restrictions on the right to strike have given employers the arrogance to offer conditions on a "take it or leave it" basis. They have also led to an increase in unofficial strikes, the number and frequency of which has increased since 1975 as demonstrated in Chapter Five. So if trade unions have been immobilised by the legal restrictions on strikes, the rank and file workers have not hesitated to take strike action. This is amply illustrated by events during the post-auctioning period of the economic crisis.

The sequence of events between December 1986 and May 1st 1987 was discussed in Chapter One. In essence workers in the civil service as well as some in the parastatal sector undertook strike action in a general protest at the high cost of living and as a back-up to demands for increased wages. An assessment of the perception of these events by labour leaders can further highlight their understanding of the role of trade unionism in Zambia. The example of the teacher's union, as the largest union involved whose strike lasted the longest, will be focused on.

The teacher's strike started in Chipata, Eastern Province on 22nd February. The teachers demanded to be paid their salary increments, their accumulated arrears and to receive a pay-rise to off-set the high cost of living. By the 29th February, teachers in Kitwe joined the strike, while Mufulira teachers did so on March 1st and those in Ndola and Chingola on March 4th. The next day, 5th March, the ZNUT "condemned" the strike and appealed to workers to go back to work. But on 6th March, the union issued another statement supporting the strike and noting previous appeals to the Ministry of General Education to pay workers their annual increments to avert the conflict [ZDM, 7th March 1987]. In spite of this, teachers in Kitwe passed a vote of "no confidence" in the ZNUT executive at a meeting which was to have been addressed by the union Chairman. The teachers refused to sing the national anthem and walked out of the meeting [ZDM, 9th March 1987]. It is probably this incident more than any other that has led some writers to argue that the leadership of the labour movement has lost the support of its members. The differences between the rank and file teachers and the leadership of the ZNUT cannot be generalised to the ZCTU as a whole, however. To the contrary, the economic crisis has generally brought about a closing of ranks between the rank and file and the leadership.⁶⁶

During the teacher's strike, the ZCTU added its voice in support of the ZNUT position, pointing out that the government was to blame for being inefficient by not paying increments for as long as four years in some cases:

What can justify that in a country with such high inflation? ... people who have a genuine cause cannot be subdued forever. [Chiluba, ZDM, 7th March 1987]

By 10th March the strike had spread to Lusaka and other towns. On the same day, in separate press conferences, the ZCTU and the Minister of Education called on workers to return to work [TZ, 11th March 1987]. Teachers at the classroom level, however, ignored these appeals and continued to stay out. Strike action only ended when schools closed for the spring holidays in April.

When asked to comment on the pattern of events, trade union leaders pointed out that, given the legal setting and the political circumstances obtaining in Zambian society, it is inevitable that there will be a certain kind of division of labour in the collective bargaining process. While trade union leaders negotiate with employers, workers have to play their part by backing those negotiations with strike action, even if it is for a few days and employers' representatives suspend negotiations in response. It seems that the pattern of negotiations by unions coupled with unofficial strikes by the rank and file is an adaptation to the legal and political environment existing in the country, a combined strategy of accommodation and resistance to the prevailing practice of politics and industrial relations in Zambian society. The pattern may be encouraged by the fact that, although strikes are prohibited in the essential services, no prosecutions of workers contravening this regulation has yet taken place, whereas leaders of unions have been detained for failing to prevent strikes in their particular industries.⁶⁷

In summary, we note that while trade union leaders are grateful that they are accorded the opportunity to organise by law, they regret the fact that they are denied the right to use their most powerful weapon – the right to withdraw labour to back their demands or to protest unfair practices. As an adaptation to this situation, there has been an increase in the number of unofficial strikes. Trade union leaders feel they have no other option than this for enforcing their demands even when they acknowledge that strikes can have negative effects on the economy of a country.

6.5 AUTONOMY OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

The autonomy of the labour movement is perceived to be essential to the existence as well as the proper performance of trade union duties. The justification for the claim for autonomy is made at two levels, first at a theoretical level and secondly at the level of practice. We look at both of these aspects.

6.5A) The Theoretical Justification

The claim was made by trade union officials interviewed that the autonomy of the labour movement is an essential ingredient of democracy. Proper democracy, they argued, is founded not only on mass participation in politics but also on the existence of separate but interacting centres of power. If Zambia purports to be a democracy, this has to be reflected in the existence of free and autonomous trade unions and other voluntary associations.

Although Zambian trade unionists have on occasion disputed that they are a pressure group in the American tradition, at other times, their claim to autonomy and their definition of democracy sounds very much in the vein of American pluralism. It is implied in their statements and speeches that the exercise of power should be widely dispersed in society and that it is dangerous and certainly undemocratic for it to be concentrated in one institution. In what sounds similar to the tradition of "Tocqueville, Durkheim and Kornhauser", they advocate a role in democratic politics of "independent groups and voluntary associations" [Livernash, 1968: 119]. It is in this vein that the officials of the trade union movement have stated over and over again that they have no intention of taking over the government [Chiluba, WV No. 29, 1987]. At the same time, they emphasize their right to criticise government policy and performance. For example, at the Seventh ZCTU Conference in October 1986, Chairman General Chiluba quoted Shakespeare in remarks directed at the President:

We have only you to pester, we have only you to trouble because we know who and what you are dear parent.⁶⁸

In respect of this spirit of democracy, the ZCTU has questioned government policy on such varied issues as the leadership code, which it opposed, on the reversal of policy on free education and free medical services which it had supported.⁶⁹ It also opposed the 1980 Local Government Act or "Decentralisation Bill". And as we pointed out above, its strongest criticism has been directed at government's management of the economy, especially in the post-1975 period. When the government showed irritation with this criticism and threatened to "dissolve" the ZCTU in April 1987, [ZDM, 29th April, 1987] the ZCTU reacted with indignation, reiterating that it played its role in the spirit of democracy and fair play and that if the government had changed the rules of the game, then it was best that it stated this clearly and loudly for all to hear. In an editorial the "Workers Voice" put it thus:

There are ramblings and agitation from the political arena to ban the labour movement. These agitators have their Master to please... But as a labour movement, we are convinced beyond doubt that UNIP is fanning trouble by assuming absolute and totalitarian powers and authority to control all organs, institutions and organisations at the complete disregard of the liberties of human beings. If the UNIP leadership has now decided to rule by bulldozing unpopular decisions, the let it be.⁷⁰ [WV, 29th May 1987]

This comment expresses a direct challenge to UNIP's commitment to and conception of democracy. The government cannot very well ban the ZCTU without appearing undemocratic. In contrast with the pluralist conception of politics, criticism in this case is directed squarely at UNIP, as the one organisation in the society trying to "bulldoze" all other organisations. Meanwhile, although UNIP has declared itself "supreme" in the Party Constitution, it is not able to claim to operate a "dictatorship of the proletariat" when there still exists a labour movement which it does not completely control. These contradictions manifest themselves much more clearly in practice.

6.5B) The Practice

At the level of practice, in my assessment, the claim to the autonomy of the labour movement is based on the fact that trade unions in Zambia have a long established tradition of participation in societal affairs. The trade union movement has many experienced leaders with valuable skills in the field of human resources management, and these skills can and must be utilised to contribute to peaceful industrial relations and national development.

In addition, trade union leaders argue that the ZCTU has a long tradition of militancy, a militancy that has been tried by the bullets of the colonial authorities. The Secretary General in his report stated:

The trade union movement has established itself through bloodshed, it therefore has a right to exist, and it is therefore dangerous and shameful for anyone through his detestful method to be against legally elected trade union leaders, to disrupt an era of peaceful co-existence between the Party and the labour movement. [SG Report, 1986: 2]

The implication is that the trade union movement earned its right to exist even before independence. It helped bring about the democratic process that is established in the country and it would be improper for UNIP to claim monolithic powers.

The practice of the trade union movement's struggle to preserve its autonomy can be demonstrated by examining three major events during the period 1980 to 1987. They are:

- i) opposition to the decentralisation bill – (1980–1981)
- ii) opposition to the integration of the labour movement into the UNIP administrative structure by turning the ZCTU into a mass organisation.
- iii) struggle for “Labour Day” celebrations.

6.5B. i) Opposition to the Decentralisation Bill

Reference has already been made in Chapter Five to the conflict that ensued after the introduction of the 1980 Local Government Amendment Bill. I will briefly review events here from the point of view of their implications for the autonomy of the labour movement. From the ZCTU's standpoint, the “era of decentralisation” began when changes were introduced to the Party Constitution at the UNIP conference in 1978 and approved there despite the fact that the item on “decentralisation of local government” was not discussed by the delegates. The ZCTU argues that subsequent inclusion into the Bill of the clause on decentralisation occurred by stealth, since the 1979 UNIP National Council in October in fact rejected decentralisation proposals. Further, they recall that prior to the 1978 conference, objections had been raised, particularly by mine workers union, against the integration of mining townships with Local Authority in 1976. In 1978, the ZULAWU and LGAZ similarly rejected the proposed changes to the local government system. There had been consultative meetings between the Prime Minister's office and the ZULAWU, but despite the fact that a satisfactory solution was not found, government made preparations to introduce the Bill in Parliament. Objections were raised in Parliament over

the Bill's provision that voting during local elections be restricted to local Party officials, and the ZCTU called a meeting of national union leaders at PCC to discuss the "economics and political administration of the country" [SG Report, 1986, 32]. It was at this seminar that a "petition" to the Secretary General of the Party was drawn up. The petition rejected the idea of decentralisation and the integration of local government and township services that it implied. It also declared that the labour movement would not participate in the proposed decentralised system of local government were it to be introduced. The ZCTU stated in the petition that it objected to the decentralisation proposal on the basis of politics, economics and industrial relations principles. At the political level its objection was that the proposed bill contravened citizens rights as granted in the Republican Constitution. It also violated UN human rights in that it restricted the right of franchise to Party members in local government elections.

On economic grounds, the ZCTU objected to the proposals because they introduced new costs to an already overstretched government budget by creating new administrative posts in the form of 1,340 full time local government councillors. The ZCTU was particularly perturbed that the new posts would not have produced any goods, but generated an income of K536,000 per month aggravating existing inflationary pressures. Concern was also voiced over the loss of economic benefits to the mine employees who might be asked to pay economic rents as a consequence of the integration of services. The industrial relations reasons for the rejection of the decentralisation system stemmed from concern for the present employees of the local government whom the government implied were to be retired. The major outcome of the petition was the dismissal of ZCTU leaders from the Party followed by strikes by miners. We have discussed these events in Chapter Five. We refer to the rejection of the decentralisation system here, therefore, as an illustration of how the labour movement has fought both to uphold democratic principles in practice and maintain its autonomy as an organisation. In this instance it refused to bow to Party discipline and expressed its reservations about major changes in the country's administrative system.

6.5B. ii) ZCTU as a Mass Organisation

In Chapter Three, in the section on legislation as a mechanism of incorporation, we discussed how the ZCTU made strong representations against the proposed amendment to the IR Act (1971), especially the sections that proposes to turn the ZCTU into a mass organisation. The strong objections are based on the belief that by becoming an adjunct of the Party, the ZCTU will lose its autonomy and its purpose for existence.⁷¹ There is a real fear that the ZCTU will be swallowed up into the Party bureaucracy and will not be able to provide the necessary "checks and balances" on the government should the amendment be adopted.⁷² Its officials believe that it is important for the ZCTU to maintain its independence in order to be effective in defending workers' interests. Most trade union leaders are convinced that the

government wants to take over the ZCTU to stem criticism voiced by its leadership. As one trade unionist put it, "intolerance of criticism is not a very good indicator of democratic rule, or is it?"⁷³

6.5C. The Struggle over "Labour Day" Celebrations

Celebrations to mark Labour Day, May 1st, have been held in Zambia since 1968. The Zambian practice is a synthesis of two traditions. It is called Labour Day after the day in September when America pays homage to its workers, but it is celebrated on May 1st when the Eastern Bloc countries celebrate workers' day. In the Zambian situation, Labour Day is the occasion when workers are given time off work to take part in celebrations as a demonstration of "working class solidarity".

For ten years, from 1968 to 1978, Labour Day celebrations were organised by the ZCTU in both urban areas and rural towns. In the major towns, they invited politicians of their choice to address worker's rallies on Labour Day. In 1978 however, the day was "accorded national status" and subsequently celebrations have been organised by tripartite committees throughout the country. In 1980 the Party took over appointment of the politicians who were to address workers on Labour Day, while the ZCTU assigned trade union leaders to speak at various locations throughout the country. The employers role has mainly been that of presenting awards to their deserving employees and facilitating the movement of their workers to and from rallies [SG Report, 1986: 31]. The most contentious changes, however, were made in 1985. Due to the differences between the government and the ZCTU over the introduction of statutory instrument No. 6, which prohibits the extension of the due stop order facility to unions whose members go on strike, the government decided to change the mode of labour day celebrations. In a letter from the Secretary General of the Party (UNIP), the ZCTU was informed that with immediate effect, only "the President will address the nation on the eve of labour day", and that Labour Day itself will only be for march past and awards presentation and not for speeches.⁷⁴

The ZCTU was taken by surprise. They argued that this was too drastic a departure from past practice and made representations to the Secretary General of the Party to that effect, to no avail. In 1985 and 1986 the President addressed the nation on radio and television on the eve of labour day. On Labour Day itself, trade union leaders and politicians took the salute at the march past, without delivering any speeches.

In October 1986, at its 7th quadrennial conference, the ZCTU resolved that unless labour leaders were allowed to address workers on Labour Day, they would stay away from Labour Day rallies altogether. This decision was reinforced by the ZCTU General Council meeting in Kitwe in February 1987.⁷⁵ It was decided that not only would leaders stay away, but national unions would appeal to their members to boycott the celebrations. The trade union leaders carried out their threat to stay away from the Labour Day celebrations on May 1st 1987, boycotting the celebrations throughout the country as a show of dis-

pleasure for government and Party interference in what was considered a purely internal labour movement affair. Trade union leaders questioned why it was that other interest groups such as farmers, celebrated farmers' day with minimum government interference, yet workers are not allowed the same liberty. They felt that this differential treatment between interest groups amounts to discrimination, which they consider "unjustified, unacceptable and a betrayal of the workers' cause" [WV, No. 29, 1982, 1] In Lusaka, President Kaunda presided at the official rally. But both here and throughout the country, it was reported that rallies were not as well attended by rank and file workers as in previous years.

This is one battle in the struggle that trade union leaders seem to have lost, however, as officially staged Labour Day rallies have continued. But the point is that they did put up a strong resistance to counter what they feel is further government effort to curtail the independence of the labour movement. Government officials say they have banned trade union leaders from addressing labour day rallies because the latter were using these to "insult" national leaders. Trade union leaders on the other hand argue that UNIP is anxious to takeover labour day celebrations because UNIP on its own is no longer able to attract people to its own rallies and it does not want 'another' organisation enjoying more popularity with the workers. There are merits in both arguments except that what one calls "insults", the other would prefer to call "genuine criticism". And the Party, claiming its supremacy, would argue that no sphere of human activity in Zambian society is outside its jurisdiction. So the debate rages on. It is a healthy sign that it is taking place at all. Meanwhile, labour leaders are barred from addressing workers on labour day.

6.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have discussed the manner in which trade union leaders perceive their role in Zambian society. We have demonstrated that they consider their principal function to be the protection of their members' interests, which in turn are understood to fall within three categories: economic interests, social welfare interests and political interests. Vital to securing these interests is the preservation of the autonomy of the labour movement. The social welfare role is met by the operation of commercial enterprises for provision of both services to members and employment. The political interests of members are protected by maintaining what the ZCTU considers the democratic principles in society. Hence the ZCTU has insisted on its right to criticize and question government policy and practice. In pursuit of these democratic principles the ZCTU insists on maintaining the autonomy of the trade union movement by opposing Party efforts to bring it under direct Party control and be administered as part of the Party bureaucracy.

This self styled role as critic goes against the grain of what the government has outlined as the role it wants the labour movement to play in Zambian society, which is as a partner in development, an instrument of worker mobilisation and a custodian of peace for productivity in industry. The Zambian government's definition of the role of labour in society is modelled upon that of the Eastern block countries where after the revolution trade unions are characteristically turned into instruments of production. The labour movement, on the other hand, rejects this interpretation of its functions, maintaining that Zambia is not yet a socialist country. It is a capitalist society in which private property prevails. They point out that the Party and the personnel within the Party bureaucracy own private property that is managed on capitalist lines. For the government to want to turn the trade union movement into an instrument of production would be to make the labour movement an instrument of exploitation of the workers for the private benefit of the owners of those enterprises.

In the true spirit of capitalism the trade union movement claims a right to participate in the affairs of the society as an autonomous interest group, by the democratic principles established under the Independence charter which it helped to bring about. Anything else would be undemocratic and unacceptable under the established rules, and will remain so until the government openly and through established procedures changes the rules to proclaim itself a dictatorship. This, of course, the Zambian government is not prepared to do. So the conflict persists and the legal attempt to amend the law and make the ZCTU into an integral part of the UNIP administrative structure still remains in the draft stage. In the meantime trade union leaders have been effectively prohibited from addressing labour day rallies, marking one less forum from which trade union leaders can voice criticism and being of a piece with the prohibition since 1980 of trade union leaders being interviewed on television. The avenues for effective public operation are becoming narrower for the trade union movement.

With reference to the theoretical positions reviewed at the beginning of the chapter, we note that while all are of relevance, some are more useful than others. Marx's optimistic expectations of the role of trade unions as harbingers of revolutionary transformation of society have proved difficult to vindicate. Lenin's argument that trade unions left on their own lead only to trade union consciousness seem more relevant. In the Zambian case no revolutionary intellectuals have made efforts to introduce trade unionists and their members to progressive theory, hence their preoccupation with trade union issues and the limiting of their political debate to liberal democratic principles. The Webb's doctrines regarding trade union organisation have been helpful in understanding internal trade union organisation. Generally speaking however, it has been Selig Perlman's theory of trade unionism that I have found to be the most useful tool of analysis for this Chapter. The experience of the Zambian trade union movement lends support to his theory that trade unions do not desire political power or even complete control of commercial enterprises, but are essentially motivated by the desire to protect opportunities for employment

and the economic benefits that accrue from it. But this must be qualified by the observation that in a society at a low level of development, the trade union movement is likely to get involved in political issues [Sturmthal, 1973] if only to steady the course of political development and ensure that the fragile democratic practice is not obliterated. An important part of that democratic practice is to ensure the survival of the trade union movement itself as an autonomous organisation. That, in the 1980s in Zambia, has been the real challenge for the trade union movement.

NOTES

CHAPTER SIX

1. The ZCTU is affiliated to the Party UNIP. In 1968 during the Secretary Generalship of Wilson Chakulya, the ZCTU applied and was accepted as an affiliate of the Party.
2. This judgment is made on the basis of the number of Journal Articles devoted to reviewing his work and elaborating on his theory. In 1960, after his death a symposium was held to discuss his theory of the labour movement. Ref. *Industrial and Labour relations review*, Vol. 13, No. 3, April 1960.
3. This may have been a necessary exercise perhaps for an East European immigrant if such a scholar was to gain acceptance and respectability in American academic life at the height of the McCarthy era. he had to endure the unenviable experience of giving evidence at a McCarthyite investigation of his research. Professor John R. Commons, IR and LR Review, *ibid.*, pp. 336-346.
4. Mark Perlman, I and LRR, Vol. 13, No. 1, April 1960, p.342.
5. Mark Perlman, I and LRR, Vol. 13, No. 1, p.336.
6. The current leadership of the ZCTU quote not Marx but Shakespeare, Cicero, John Adams and John Kennedy. In 1982 when the proposal to teach scientific socialism was made, Chiluba resolved he would be attending church everyday to pray for guidance. It appears the government and the trade union movement each accuse the other of perpetuating capitalism. In 1981 during the dawn broadcast announcing the detention of four labour movement leaders, President Kaunda remarked:

“The leaders of the **Zambian Congress of Trade Unions** are against the socialist policies of the Party; ... I am sure these leaders must be some of the very few trade union leaders in developing countries who think that capitalism is good for workers. Yet the history of trade unionism is one of a struggle between capitalism and the workers. Our own experience in this country shows that capitalism cannot be the custodian of workers' interests. This is inconceivable. For we are backward because of capitalist exploitation. We were oppressed and denied political right because of capitalist interests. Indeed, racism in South Africa is the creation of capitalism. Do these people know what they are talking about?” [Address to the Nation, 27th July, 1981: Meebelo, 1987, 195].

Upon his release from detention, Chiluba commented on the prospects of scientific socialism in Zambia,

...we have been accused of being pro-capitalist. I think we are just being honest... You cannot honestly propound socialism in a country in which we have allowed our leaders or their families to own property like farms and other business ventures for this is what leads to capitalism... When our leaders show us honestly that we are going socialist and all our families will not be allowed to hold property on our behalf, at that time I promise this nation that this congress will talk, eat and walk socialist. [TOZ, 31.12.1981: Meebelo, 1987, 201].

He does not seem to consider the possibility of the trade union movement spearheading efforts to establish socialism in Zambia.

7. The views used in the analysis that follow are those of trade union leaders, past and present as gathered from newspaper reports, official publications of the ZCTU and interviews with the author conducted between January and June 1987. They are representative of the trade union movement in the sense that they are made by the leadership who speak on behalf of the labour movement as a whole. However, another selection of workers from the labour movement, e.g. shop-floor workers, may express different views.

8. ZNUT interview, 22nd May 1987.
9. PSWW interview, 4th May 1987.
10. MUZ interview, 24th March 1987.
11. ZCTU, *Report of the Working Party Appointed by the General Council to Enquire into the Structure of Trade Unions in Zambia*, 1978, p. 21.
12. "History of the NUC&IW", mimeo, 1986.
13. Allen, 1966.
14. Industrial Relations Act (1971), Part VIII, Section 81 and 82.
15. This is only since April 1983, prior to that copies of collective agreements were sent to the Industrial Relations Court for ratification.
16. I owe this interpretation to P. Machungwa, "Labour Relations in Zambia", UNZA, mimeo, 1986, pp. 31-33.
17. Source - Assistant Labour Commissioner, personal interview, 13th April 1987.
18. The mining companies have a long established practice, whereby all other things being equal, employment is offered to the child of a miner over a candidate of non-mining parentage. Recently, beginning in 1983, a purpose built secondary school offering courses up to "A" level was opened in Kitwe for miner's children. Successful candidates are sponsored for university courses, locally but mostly overseas, with a view to employment in the mining industry upon qualification.
19. Personal communication from an official of the Zambia Federation of Employers, 20th May 1987.
20. NUBEGW, interview with reference to Lewis Construction, 26th March 1987.
21. Reported in the STZ, 22nd February 1976.
22. STZ, 22nd February 1976 and personal interview 27th March 1987.
23. Samuel Lungu, ZCTU Assistant Secretary General for Administration, quoted in ZDM, Friday November 25th 1983. The ten percent was the maximum rate of increase permitted under the IMF agreement then in force.
24. The Public Service Unions are; ZNUT, ZULAWU, CSUZ and NUPSW. TOZ, 29th January 1985.
25. At least prior to 1983. A fresh assessment will have to be made in view of the rapid changes in the economy since then. Before 1980, this feature of the Zambian economy proved an obstacle in the late 1960s when Zambia contemplated joining the East African Community. (A. Young, "Patterns of Development in Zambian Manufacturing Industry since Independence", East African Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1969). It surfaced again in the context of the TAZARA. The Tanzanian government has raised objections and indeed blocked demands by the Zambian Union (RWUZ) for increased wages, maintaining that it can hardly deep up with the high wages obtaining on Zambia Railways let alone meet demands for increased wages. [Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1979, p. 13 and Secretary General's Report, 6th Quadrennial Conference, 1982.]
26. Basil Kabwe quoted in "Sunday People", STOZ, 5th September 1971.
27. MUZ, NUBEGW, interviews.
28. MUZ interview, 24th March 1987.
29. ZCTU interview, Mr. C. Sampa, 23rd March 1987.
30. Chitalu Sampa, ZCTU Assistant Secretary General for Finance, Workshop Paper, "Trade Unionism as a Movement for the Promotion of Higher Productivity in Zambia", 5th-6th June 1984, pp. 52-67.
31. *ibid.*
32. "Katilungu House", the MUZ headquarters had cost 3/4 m. Kwacha at the time of its completion in 1978.

33. ZCTU, Secretary General Zimba, Speech when opening a cooperatives and credit union seminar at the National Museum in Livingstone, 24th November 1975. Text of speech.
34. Secretary General of ZCTU in Ndola, 20th March 1976, quoted in STOZ, 21st March 1976.
35. "Worker's Voice", Special Issue, October 1986.
36. "Workers' Cooperative Success – Story", "Workers Voice", Special Issue, October 1986, p. 19.
37. Reference – 1. Jacques Monat, "Background Paper on the Conceptual Framework and International Experience of Workers' Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings". 2. Stanislav S. Grozdanic, "The Conceptual Framework and Practices of Self-Management in Yugoslavia", workshop papers presented at a five-day IPD/ILO National Workshop on "Workers' Participation", 19th–23rd November 1984, Lusaka, Zambia.
38. Samuel Lungu, ZCTU Assistant Secretary General for Administration in TOZ, 11th June 1975.
39. Statement by Peter Chalila, ZCTU Executive Member, quoted in ZDM, 22nd May 1976.
40. Personal interview, Kitwe, 25th March 1987.
41. Personal interview with the author, Ndola, 29th March 1987.
42. Chiluba sees these functions as including the provision of medical care, security of person and property, maintenance of law and order, efficient management of the economy, provision of jobs to all capable citizens, production of sufficient goods and services of readily acceptable quality and provision of education for all its peoples. Kitwe, 28th September 1980.
43. See Ollawa, *Participatory Democracy in Zambia* for the definition and discussion of concept and its application to Zambian society.
44. Television interview, Televised on Wednesday 4th February 1976, interviewed by Frank Mutubila.
45. ZCTU Chairman General, Speech to the General Council of the ZCTU, Katilungu House, Kitwe, 30th December 1981. This speech was made after Chiluba and three other trade union leaders had been released from detention.
46. Donald Chilufya, Kasama District ZCTU Chairman, quoted in STOZ, 21st December 1986.
47. See Chapter Five, Table
48. ZCTU Chairman General, Speech to Members of the ZCTU General Council, 28th September 1980. The reference Yellow Maize – the Yellow Maize came as part of a bilateral aid package from the USA during 1979/1980, to make up for a shortfall in the local harvest. The ZCTU blames government policy for the poor performance of the agricultural sector. The locally grown maize is white and the yellow maize was not very popular with the consumer.
49. ZCTU Chairman General, opening speech to the General Council, 11th February 1986.
50. J. Mulenga, reported in the TZ, 26th June 1983 and quoted in G. F. Lungu, *African Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 340, 1986, 403.
51. *The Workers' Voice*, Vol. 3, No. 28, October 1986, p. 12.
52. *Workers' Voice*, *ibid*.
53. F. Chiluba, interview, 29th March 1987 and ZNUT interview. Also Secretary General Report, 1986.
54. Raphael Hanga'mbwa, Acting Secretary General of the ZCTU, ZDM, 12th October 1974.
55. TOZ, 10th August 1976.
56. Secretary General Zimba, 12th February 1976.
57. *Workers' Voice*, vol. 3, No. 29, May 1987.
58. MUZ interview, 24th March 1987.
59. NUBEGW; NUC&IW, and Guards Unions of Zambia.
60. ZCTU, Sikazwe, Lusaka office interview, 23rd March 1987.
61. Address, Katilungu House, Kitwe, 30th December 1981.

62. Refer to the schedule of essential services in Chapter Four.
63. NUCIW; MUZ & ZNUT interviews.
64. This reference is to the practice of setting up commissions of enquiry after strikes and not before.
65. Chairman General, Opening Speech to the General Council Meeting, 11th February 1986.
66. Refer to Kenneth Good, "Zambia Back into the Future", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1988, p. 44. Good does not offer evidence of the "loss of popular support and disagreements and divisions" that have arisen between the leadership and the rank and file.
67. Note the detention of ZNUT leaders in 1970 and the 1981 detention of a MUZ and ZCTU leaders in 1981.
68. Chiluba, opening address, 7th Quadrennial Conference, October 1986, quoted in the *Workers' Voice*, Vol. 3, No. 29, 1987. The President had attended the opening ceremony.
69. Trade union leaders opposed the leadership code on the basis that leaders who own property would be more committed to public service as they would not have become politicians to become rich. Besides, it is perceived that if leaders had legal avenues to accumulate property, they were less likely to misappropriate public funds.
70. It is my interpretation that the reference to "master" in the quote refers to international capital, it was felt that the government was repressing the trade union movement at the instigation of the IMF and the World Bank and to attract international investors.
71. CSUZ, interview, 12th March 1987.
72. Chiluba, personal interview, 29th March 1987.
73. ZCTU interview, 24th March 1987.
74. Letter of the Secretary General of the Party (UNIP) to the leaders of the ZCTU, SGP/101/1/3 - 28th March 1985.
75. *Workers' Voice*, Vol. 3, No. 29, May 1987, p. 1.

CHAPTER SEVEN

LABOUR POLICY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In Chapters One to Six we have discussed the evolution, impact and dynamics of relations between labour and the state in Zambia. The main purpose of these chapters has been to demonstrate the specific pattern of industrial relations that have developed as a direct consequence of the country's economic and political history.

We have noted that Zambia's economic development has been dominated by the copper industry which has led in turn to the development, among other things, of a strong and well articulated labour movement. This labour movement played a supportive role during the anti-colonial struggle, giving hope to the leaders of the nationalist movement that the trade unions would continue to provide partnership in the national development that was to follow independence. However, the perceptions and expectations of what independence was to entail, became a source of conflict between the ruling party and its government on the one hand and some leaders of the trade union movement on the other. This led to struggles over the control of the trade union congress. Power struggles during the first ten years of independence within the labour movement appear to have been won by political trade unionists; i.e. trade union leaders who also were committed to UNIP's political programme and who saw the trade union movement as a subordinate partner to UNIP in the struggle for development. With such people at the helm of the trade union movement, the government proceeded to create a legal and institutional framework that would consolidate the trade union movement in this role. Of those mechanisms operationalised to facilitate this process, we have discussed the following:

1. Legislation which created the necessary institutional framework through enabling statutes.
2. Promotion of cadres with the 'right' ideological orientation into influential positions in the trade union movement.
3. The effort to appease the workers and to redeem some of the promises of the anti-colonial struggle by periodic wage increases for as long as the country's resources permitted.
4. The institutionalisation of certain aspects of political incorporation through a workers' education programme run by a political college under the auspices of the UNIP bureaucracy.

Thus far the outcome of these mechanisms has not been reflected in industrial peace. Trade union leaders who have been thought by the membership to be too sympathetic to the Party have been replaced by those perceived to be more representative of trade union interests through the electoral machinery. On the other hand, the economic crisis has not only constrained the extent to which the government has been able to respond to demands for wage increases, but has also seriously eroded the buying power of "money" wages, giving rise to a spiral of wage demands and "inadequate" wage increases, strikes and an increase in the use of force to suppress industrial action and maintain peace and stability. The undesirability of the use of force against citizens has in the 1980s led to a renewed search for legislative measures to restructure the role, power and function of trade unions in Zambian society. The process of bringing about this legislative reform, however, has been delayed six years by the desire to effect a consensual style of political decision making.

The intended effect of these measures is to bring about a political incorporation of workers such that they acquiesce to the Party and government's need to accumulate and reproduce the social formation. The power of the trade union movement and its leaders' very different perception of their role has made this a difficult task for the government, a task complicated by the government's professed commitment to democratic principles and the protection of human rights.

The purpose of this chapter is to place the Zambian experience within a comparative perspective in respect of other countries in East and Southern Africa. The countries chosen for comparison, which include two from the socialist oriented camp and two from the capitalist camp,¹ are Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana and Zimbabwe. The second factor used in identifying the comparative cases was the number of political parties within each of them. We have chosen two countries (Botswana and Zimbabwe) with multi-party systems and two (Kenya and Tanzania) with single party systems.² The third determining factor is evidence of trade union activity. Malawi, for example, had been considered for inclusion early in the research but was subsequently dropped because the level of repression there has resulted in an almost total eclipse of the trade union movement. Strength of the trade union movement has been a major factor used in selecting the countries chosen in this section. Fourthly, historical relevance has been taken into account. The countries in my sample share similar patterns of incorporation into the world capitalist system (other than Tanzania perhaps) with Zambia. Three of them (Kenya, Zimbabwe and Botswana) were colonized either for European settlement or for the provision of labour to capitalist enterprises in adjacent territories or both, at different times in their history. In all five countries, state directed efforts have been undertaken in the post-colonial period to promote economic growth so as to ensure the accumulation of investible surpluses. In view of these various factors comparison with the former Portuguese ruled territories would have been problematic given both their very different historical experiences and the very different trends in development since they gained self-government. In general terms, therefore,

the countries we have chosen for consideration have important features that are comparable. They are all low income, developing countries. They share a certain type of state. They have in common a civilian post-colonial state which has made a public commitment to development. And, although attempts by the military to seize power have been made in at least two of these countries, Zambia (1980) and Kenya (1982), none has experienced a military government. The conclusions to be derived from this comparison, therefore, apply only to these countries and similar countries within the region and are not intended to apply to the whole of Africa. The great variety of historical experience, the prevalence of military governments, the varying ideological orientation and the different class configurations that make up the governing classes in the various African countries render generalisations that extend to the whole continent problematic.

It is my intention to examine the role of labour in the development processes of these countries as determined by governments and to assess the extent of freedom or lack of it that organised labour enjoys within them. The extent of freedom or repression cannot be measured with statistical precision, but it may be possible to give a qualitative indication of it along a continuum ranging from democratic to authoritarianism. Addressing the following questions will assist in this endeavour:

1. What rights do unions have to organise, to form federations and to affiliate to international organisations, as determined by government policy?
2. What rights do unions have regarding collective bargaining? Does the government have an incomes policy and how does this affect collective bargaining?
3. What procedures exist for the settlement of disputes? Is there a mechanism for compulsory arbitration?
4. What rights do workers have to withdraw their labour power? Are there sectors of the economy that are declared essential services and, if so, what rights do workers in these sectors have with regard to strike action? Alternatively, in the event of a strike, what protection against prosecution do these workers enjoy?
5. Do unions have the right to get involved in politics?
6. Finally, are there any special mechanisms for effecting a particular orientation on the part of the workers?

We shall assess the answers to these questions in each of the countries in turn. Davies' theoretical framework as to the role of the unions in post colonial Africa, which we discussed in the Chapter Two, will serve as a reference point. Basically, the central point of interest drawn from Davies' framework concerns the kind of relationship unions have with their governments. We are concerned in this chapter with the relationship between state and labour as embodied in legislation, as articulated by unions and as established in practice. Ultimately we want to assess the extent to which unions have maintained their independence of action or, alternatively, are repressed. Another outcome we evaluate is the relative de-

gree of industrial peace or industrial disruption. Clearly the state is concerned to maintain industrial peace in the interests of accumulation and attracting foreign investment. The trade unions, too, desire propitious working conditions under which their members can earn a living. However, the latter regard recourse to industrial action not just as a last resort but also their most effective weapon in the fight for a living wage and decent working conditions.

Although some primary sources have been consulted, the data for the four comparative cases has been drawn mainly from the secondary literature and is limited accordingly. But while conclusions drawn from this exercise can only be illustrative, they can hopefully provide insight into patterns and processes which will serve as a basis for further research.

7.1 KENYA

Although the Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL) had been formed two years earlier, the right of unions to represent workers in Kenya was only secured during the strike of dock-workers in Mombasa in 1955 [Iwiji, 1979: 204]. After independence the right of trade unionists was recognized in the Trade Disputes Act (1964). By this time the majority of trade unions in Kenya were affiliated to the KFL, an alternative labour federation, the Kenya Trade Union Congress having been struck off the register in 1962 when it appeared to the Registrar that it had no affiliates [Amsden, 1971: 108].

During Mboya's stewardship of the KFL, the trade union movement had close working relationship with the ICFTU to which it was affiliated [Sandbrook, 1972: 18]. The influence of the ICFTU, evident at this time, has persisted, though affiliation was discontinued in 1965 in the interests of non-alignment [Stewart, 1976: 85]. However the right to receive external assistance was reinstated in 1973.

The relationship between the trade unions and the government in Kenya after independence has been influenced by three factors:-

1. The capitalist development strategy adopted by the government.
2. The use of an "Industrial Relations Charter" between the government, the employers and the Trade Union Federation.
3. The "clientelist" style of politics which has evolved in Kenya since independence.

These three factors operate within the context of a weak trade union movement set against a strong emerging indigenous bourgeoisie, some of whose members rose to positions of prominence through trade unionism, while others continue to dominate the movement by occupying leadership positions in the KFL and later the Central Organisation of Trade Unions. We shall examine each of the above factors in turn.

7.1 1) The Capitalist Development Strategy

Kenya's development strategy was outlined in Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965. Though called "African Socialism", the strategy espoused capitalist principles. The White Paper emphasizes that the role of trade unions in economic development involves such activities as cooperatives for members and credit schemes. Cooperatives were encouraged for "generating savings for development, promoting cooperation and making workers aware of their contribution to the development of the nation" [Iwiji, 1979: 216]. Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 stipulated that the government would "assist trade unions to become involved in economic activities, housing schemes, training schemes, workers discipline and productivity and in general, to accept their social responsibilities".³ The policy regarding Trade Unions in a sense encouraged a continuation of the trade union practice developed under colonial rule. Once the principle of trade unions for Africans had been accepted, the business community in Kenya generally promoted industrial unions that focused narrowly on economic and welfare of members. Unions that erred by departing from this path, by getting involved in politics were threatened with de-registration [Sandbrook, 1970: 262]. The idea was to cultivate a trade union movement that had economic interests in the economy "beyond the wage". It was envisaged that a trade union movement which was thus incorporated would be more committed to the system from which it derived benefits and therefore less likely to disrupt economic activities [Iwiji, 1979: 215 and Mboya, 1970: 201].

Although independence in Kenya involved a change of government from white to black politicians, it did not entail a change of rule in terms of the predominance of class interests. The indigenous petty bourgeoisie which had captured political power established a system of rule that safeguarded the interests of capital. Trade unions were encouraged to operate as pressure groups in each industry to help aggregate the economic demands of their members and present these in an orderly manner for negotiations with management. The right to organise was therefore accorded workers to facilitate trade unions operating as instruments of conflict management. Hence the emphasis on "bread and butter" issues [Amsden, 1971: 105]. This is reflected in the multiplicity of industry based unions. In 1971, for example, there were fifty registered trade unions, only 32 of which were affiliated to the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU). This is a relatively high figure for a work force which in 1975 had 709,000 people in wage employment, of which only 50% were unionised.⁴ In comparison, Zambia had a population of 4 million, 398,000 people in formal wage employment and only 17 unions affiliated to one federation in the same year. Industrial unions are encouraged in Kenya in order to prevent the formation of broad based general unions which it was feared would have a tendency to "dabble in politics". The non-political industrial union policy is one favoured by the Kenya Federation of Employers (KFE) and equally acceptable to the government of independent Kenya.

Right from the beginning the government of independent Kenya endeavoured to keep trade unions out of politics. In 1963, for example, when the KFL decided to sponsor labour candidates for the general elections, KANU and Mboya reacted very angrily to the implied challenge, warning labour leaders to "steer clear of politics, otherwise KANU would deal with them when the Party came to power" [Hyden, 1970: 278]. An agreement was eventually reached to the effect that the KFL would not sponsor its own candidates and that it would support any labour candidates standing under the banner of any of the existing political parties. However, increased government pressure over the KFL manifested itself in the replacement of the organisation's Secretary General by a KANU senator. This prompted militant trade union leaders to leave the KFL and found an alternative federation, the Kenya Federation of Progressive Trade Unions (KFPTU), which later changed its name to the Kenya African Workers Congress (KAWC). Ideological orientation exacerbated ethnic alignments within the conflicting labour federations and their affiliated unions,⁵ resulting in industrial unrest, violence and death. These unfortunate events provided the government with the opportunity to do away with the semi-autonomous labour federations that had survived up to that time. After an investigation by a ministerial committee, both the KFL and the KAWC were de-registered and a new central organisation of trade unions, the COTU established. The constitution of the COTU prohibited the involvement of trade unions in politics. It also guaranteed that the new organisation would be closely controlled by the government, through the appointment of its principle officers who could be investigated and replaced by the head of state at any time [Iwiji, 1979: 207]. The divorce of trade unions from involvement in politics and compete concentration on "bread and butter" issues is also enforced by the system of tripartite agreements between employers, employees and the government. The first of these agreements, of which Tom Mboya was the architect, was signed in 1964. It provided for a standstill in wage demands and strike action by the unions and an undertaking by the employers to increase their labour force by 10 per cent [Amsden, 1971: 122]. But what are the implications of this seemingly gentlemanly agreement? We shall examine these in the next section.

7.1 ii) The Industrial Relations Charter Approach

The system of tripartite agreements called Industrial Relations Charters, has become a permanent feature of the industrial relations system in Kenya. Following the first, which ran for six years from 1964 to 1970, new agreements have been concluded periodically. The system demonstrates the extent of government cooptation of the trade union leadership. Once in operation, the agreements affect not only the right of unions to bargain collectively, but also the procedures for the settlement of disputes. By imposing a wage freeze, for example, the 1964 tripartite agreement curtailed one of the cardinal functions of

unions i.e. collective bargaining for a better wage for their members. This occasioned an observer to comment:

The common trademark of all these legal amendments is to prescribe the status quo for the workers as regards their social and economic situation. ...The control of incomes accruing from the ownership of productive assets and real estate is left to private initiative, while incomes from wage employment are increasingly put under state control. [Leitner, 1975: 105]

The agreement also placed a prohibition on strikes. Thus it not only altered the process of collective bargaining, but also the union's powers in the settlement of disputes, in that the workers' ultimate weapon, i.e. the right to withdraw labour, was severely restricted. In 1973 a new agreement was concluded with similar provisions to the one signed in 1964 [ACR, 1985: 122]. A third was concluded in 1980 when a wage freeze was imposed, although in the light of increases in the cost of living, minimum wages were reported to have increased during the year and again in 1982.[ACR, 1985: 220].

These minor "carrots" notwithstanding the freedom of trade unions to operate was still restricted. Instead of industrial action being the sanction of last resort in industrial disputes, the government has substituted an Industrial Relations Court. Established in April 1964 by the Trade Disputes Act (1964) referred to earlier [Iwiji, 1979: 223] its powers were revamped in 1965 and again in 1971, when the Minister of Labour appointed the four members in consultation with only the Minister of Finance and Planning [Leitner, 1975: 105]. The I.R.C. has had a major impact on the dispute settlement procedure. In each industry the collective agreement between employer and employees' representatives provides a procedure for solving internal conflicts. It is when these fail that recourse is made to external institutions. The parties to the conflict report the existence of the dispute to the Minister of Labour, who is advised by a tripartite committee. Upon its recommendation he may either refer the dispute back to the parties involved, initiate conciliation procedures or suggest that an investigation be carried out, appoint an arbitration tribunal, institute a board of inquiry, or refer the dispute straight away to the industrial court for arbitration. The court has the power to carry out its own investigations on the basis of which it makes "final and binding" awards within the bounds of existing laws on income and employment. While a dispute is going through the stages of this procedure, it is illegal for a union to call a strike.

Even before strikes were banned by a Presidential decree in April 1974, unions could only call strikes if the Minister failed to act within 21 days of a dispute being referred to him. I must, however, point out that the procedure in Kenya is a little more liberal than it is in Zambia where a similar Act does not even stipulate when a legal strike may take place. However, as in Zambia, the decision of the Industrial Court is "final and binding". Thus the power to decide the ultimate outcome of a dispute is removed from the workers into the hands of a judge, who may bring all the prejudices of his class to the job. As one judge acknowledged many years ago,

...the habits ...the people with whom you mix, lead to your having a certain class of ideas of such a nature that... you do not give as sound and accurate judgements as you would wish. This is one of the great difficulties at present with labour... It is very difficult sometimes to be sure that you have put yourself into a thoroughly impartial position between two disputants, one of your own class and one not of your class.⁶

The class structure in Kenya may not be as salient as it was in Britain in the 1920s when this comment was made, but the point remains valid that a judge and a worker come from different sides of the property divide and one may not appreciate the other's position accurately. It is therefore unfair for the government to make the worker ultimately dependent on the good will of the judge to guarantee impartial judgements. What is more, in Kenya as in other developing countries, the judge is instructed to be mindful of the government's concern for the promotion of accumulation in industry and the need to attract foreign investment.⁷

The performance of the court may, however, also depend on the nature of the person who is appointed to be its President. For the period 1967—73 for example, the court in Kenya is reported to have conducted its proceedings with such impartiality as to enable parties to disputes to anticipate the likely awards to be made by the court and thus help them to reach a settlement without taking recourse to its judgements. In consequence, the number of awards made by the court dropped from 133 in 1967 to 65 in 1973.⁸

A further outcome of the operation of the court has been a decline in the incidence of strikes. Muir and Brown note that whereas there was an average of 233 strikes per year between 1963 and 1968, this dropped to 98 between 1965 and 1979 [Muir and Brown, 1975: 357]. They attribute this to the high regard in which the President of the court was held by both employees and employers' representatives [Muir and Brown, 1975, 343]. While the drop in strikes may be due to the competence of the current judge, it might also be that workers have been reluctant to contravene the Presidential ban on strikes i.e. they have been repressed into apathy.

7.1 iii) Clientelism

The third feature of Kenyan politics that has affected the operation of trade unions and working class action is what Sandbrook has characterised as clientelism. This style of politics, Sandbrook argues, permeates the whole society. Sandbrook defines clientelism as "patron-client relationships construed on the basis of reciprocal exchange of material benefits and/or services of different types" [Sandbrook, 1972: 4]. In these transactions, the patron offers money and protection from "unfavourable government actions or decisions" in exchange for the client's support and intelligence gathering among the grass-roots regarding the activities of the patron's competitors. These relationships form a network from the high executives in industry and politicians to cabinet ministers down to the leaders of the national unions, who in turn will have their own networks within the unions.

The effect of clientelism is that vertical factions are formed ostensibly along tribal lines. The factions are extended to the workers' organizations, sometimes reflecting an existing political split within the union or reflecting the different KANU factions, from which the trade unionists derive their support [Sandbrook, 1975: 126]. Similarly the politicians in their role as patron, get involved in trade union politics in order to undermine the trade union base of their rivals and consolidate their own position in the Party. For all participants in this clientelist network, the reward is personal gain, either in the form of trade union office with the material benefits it brings or, for the politician, success at the next elections over rivals and the material benefits that accrue from a successful political career.⁹ Sandbrook argues that the loser in all this is the ordinary trade union member whose "welfare" is seldom debated during all this factional in-fighting and exchange of personal favours [Ibid.: 137]. The result is that the worker is atomized and exposed to the machinations of the scheming patrons. Without implying a conspiracy theory, Sandbrook's model can be extended to argue that clientelism is a bourgeois strategy which operates to fragment and subordinate the working class while promoting the interests of the bourgeoisie. For as long as union leaders remain divided along tribal lines and susceptible to feeding the clientelism programme, the trade union movement will remain fragmented and continue to play the power games of the bourgeoisie while the workers languish in poverty without political direction or alternatives [Ibid.: 21]. One important comment about Sandbrook's model needs to be made and this is that clientelist politics obtain in Kenya, not because Kenya is African, but because of the particular articulation of capitalism with the non-capitalist modes of production which obtains there.

To argue that clientelist politics have been used to militate against the development of class based politics is not the same as saying that trade unions have abandoned the pursuit of their members' interests. To the contrary as Sandbrook has demonstrated, unions have exhibited a convincing militancy in the pursuit of their members economic interests,⁹ if only because this is the only way professional trade unionists can succeed in their career and maintain their places in the clientelist network. One can therefore argue that whereas clientelist politics has so far succeeded in thwarting the development of class politics and a class conscious trade union movement, it has also served as an effective basis for the development of "militant economist" trade unionism. Evidence for this can be seen, for example, in the strikes by railwaymen, dock-workers, airport ground crew and bank staff in the middle of 1974. The strikes occurred despite the restrictions imposed by the 1970 tripartite agreement. But they attracted another ban, this time in the form of a Presidential decree in August 1974 [ACR, 1985: B206]. To counter-balance these restrictions, an upward revision of the minimum wage was announced by the President in the following May Day Speech [ACR, 1985: B224]. The minimum wage was increased again in 1980 and 1982 and periodically since. The successes these increases represent are minimal, however, and there is criticism from within the trade union movement that the current leaders have acquiesced too fully to

government policy. Government policy is thought by some to seriously restrict the freedom of trade unions in collective bargaining particularly as regards strike action [Henley, 1978: 229].

To conclude this section it can be argued that in Kenya as in Zambia, there is evidence of the "carrot" and "stick" strategy in the government's approach to the trade union movement. Although in Kenya efforts to appease workers have been minimal, what wage increases in the form of revisions to the minimum wage as have occurred have been in response to industrial action by workers. In Kenya as in Zambia, legislation has been enacted to provide protection for women and young persons in conformity with ILO conventions. The 1964 tripartite agreement while banning strikes and imposing a wage freeze, also required private sector employers to expand their labour force by 10%, thereby providing much needed employment opportunities. The following year, the Presidential decree that established the COTU while effectively eliminating autonomous trade unions also introduced a compulsory check-off system of collecting unions subscriptions, 15% of which was destined for the Trade Union Federation, thus strengthening its financial standing [Iwiji, 1979: 207]. Subsequent tripartite agreements have continued to reflect this trend. Policy has followed the same trend under President Daniel Moi. In December 1978 for example, two months after being inaugurated President, he issued a directive compelling all employers to increase their establishment by an extra 10%. To counter balance this, he later announced a ban on strikes and ordered trade unions to postpone their scheduled elections to 1980 [ACR, 1978: B279]. In 1980, the Tripartite Industrial Relations Charter was signed, establishing an Industrial Council [ACR, 1982: B191].

Thus while at the level of the superstructure clientelist politics is used to effect the political incorporation of the working class into bourgeois politics, at the economic level elements of a "carrot" and "stick" strategy are utilised to facilitate a minimal existence of trade unions whose activities are restricted to the peaceful management of conflict and the processing of their members' grievances. The major focus of trade union activity is directed towards running cooperatives and credit schemes for the provision of welfare benefits to their members. In collective bargaining the trade union's role is punctuated not only by minimum wage legislation, but also by periodic wage freezes under an indeterminate incomes policy. One can conclude that in Kenya, as in Zambia, the governing class has attempted to politically incorporate labour to facilitate bourgeois rule and prevent the emergence of an alternative political movement. In Kenya however, the weakness of the trade union movement when contrasted with the strength of the indigenous bourgeois has facilitated the wider acceptance of capitalist relations in society, not only in commerce and industry but also in agriculture. The wider acceptance of capitalist relations of production through the use of clientelist politics, has facilitated the establishment of the political hegemony of the bourgeoisie. In Kenya the political incorporation of the trade union movement has exacer-

bated trade union consciousness among its leaders, diminishing further their chances of developing an alternative political consciousness guided by workers' collective interests as an economic class.

7.2 TANZANIA

In contrast to those of both Zambia and Kenya, state/labour relations in Tanzania have evolved in a semi-revolutionary atmosphere. The Tanzanian TANU government under the leadership of Julius Nyerere attempted to undertake a transformation of society with a view to creating a more egalitarian and a more democratic system [Cartwright, 1983: 154]. However, the major focus and intended beneficiary of the transformation was the peasantry, which represented 90% of the population, rather than the workers. Though deemed important in the development process and expected to increase productivity as a contribution to that process, the workers were not considered the most disadvantaged group. In Nyerere's philosophical view, "everybody was paid too much except the poor peasants".¹⁰

The Tanzanian case is reviewed in this chapter to demonstrate an alternative set of relationships between the state and organised labour, under circumstances where there is a small to non-existent indigenous bourgeoisie and a governing class which proclaimed a commitment to a non-capitalist path of development. The Tanzanian experience serves as an important point of reference for Zambia because many of the policies Zambia adopted were inspired by events in Tanzania, including the leadership code and forays into industrial democracy, though neither was pursued with the same amount of vigour as in Tanzania. In examining the Tanzanian case, therefore, we shall proceed first to consider the attempt at transforming the economy and its implications for labour policy. Secondly, we shall examine workers' rights to organise, to bargain collectively and to withdraw labour. Thirdly, we shall consider the scope for political participation of organised labour under these circumstances. Fourthly, we shall examine the procedures for the settlement of disputes and lastly we shall look at both the mechanisms for establishing industrial democracy and the outcome of these efforts.

7.2 1) Economic Transformation and Labour Law

Although it is generally correct to say that Tanzanian labour policy was adopted within the context of an attempt at socialist transformation of the economy, it is also necessary to point out that the onslaught on the trade unions by the state preceded the formal commitment to socialism espoused in the Arusha Declaration of 1967.¹¹ The government's labour policy took shape during 1962 and 1963 when Nyerere resigned the Premiership to devote time to rebuilding TANU. Legislation passed during this period was directed at eliminating "dissident" unions and consolidating the position of loyal unions into the industrial wing of TANU as had been the case during the nationalist struggle [Bienefeld, 1975: 243]. As early

as 1962, the government passed a law that restricted the right of unions to strike and made the registration of unions compulsory when they fulfilled certain conditions [Jackson, 1979: 227].

As in Zambia and Kenya, Tanzanian workers gained the right to form unions during the colonial period only after strike action brought economic activities to a standstill. In Zambia it was the strikes of copper miners, in Tanzania and Kenya it was the dock-workers. The Tanzanian Federation of Labour (TFL) was established and registered in 1955. The colonial authorities made an effort to nurture the new unions and guide them along the "correct" path of development. They were essentially valued by the authorities as instruments of labour control, as they helped to aggregate workers grievances and present them in an orderly manner [Bienefeld, 1979: 557-560].

During the anti-colonial struggle, the TFL tried to shake off the patronage of the colonial government and forged links with TANU, although as late as 1956, the TFL discouraged its member unions from direct affiliation to TANU [Bienefeld, 1979: 568]. However, a general strike in Dar-es-Salaam later in the year helped raise the workers' political consciousness. The spark had been the rough treatment to which white owners and supervisors had subjected the striking workers during the general strike of 1956 [Tordoff, 1966: 409]. In addition, as the number of trade unions grew, instances of double membership of both the TANU and the TFL increased, reflecting people's realisation of the unity of their struggle. They began to understand that their low wages were a function of the colonial system of power and that their general wage, living and working conditions could only improve when Africans captured political power. By preaching this message the unions were able to increase their memberships and by late 1957 TFL openly supported TANU's political programme [Tordoff, 1966: 410]. The cooperation increased to such levels that as the political struggle intensified, TFL was able to stand in for TANU in areas where the Party was proscribed. In 1959 the Secretary General of the TFL, Rashid Kawawa, was elected to the Legislative Council on a TANU ticket. In 1960 he became TANU Vice-President and later in the year a minister in Nyerere's government, rising to Prime Minister when Nyerere resigned to concentrate his efforts on building the Party and developing a national philosophy for guiding development in the post-colonial period.

However, just as there was recognition of the common enemy in colonial rule and complimentary action undertaken to bring it to an end, as Tordoff demonstrates, there were also moments of conflict and competition over resources once self government had been gained [Tordoff, 1966: 412-414]. Differences crystallised over the issue and rate of "Africanisation". Whereas the politicians soon succeeded to the top jobs in government previously held by the colonial administrators, trade unionists could not do the same with management positions in foreign owned commercial enterprises.¹² This situation was aggra-

vated by the rate at which wage increases for workers were assessed and effected in the country. In 1962, while discussing the role of unions in collective bargaining, Nyerere declared that:

...it is one of the purposes of trade unions to ensure for the worker a fair share of the profits of their labour. But a 'fair' share must be fair in relation to the whole society"

and that:

Trade union leaders and their followers, as long as they are true socialists will not need to be coerced by the government into keeping their demands within the limits imposed by the needs of society as a whole.¹³

A framework for fixing minimum wages had first been provided by an ordinance passed in 1953 by the colonial government [Routh, 1976: 15]. Just before independence the nationalist government established a "Territorial Minimum Wages Board" which was entrusted with the task of assessing the existing rates" and determining minimum rates of pay for different parts of the country. Although the Board's report indicated that wages were inadequate, it also pointed out that wage increases would lead to redundancies. The government accepted the Board's analysis of the relationship between high wages and unemployment and indicated that it preferred paying "a decent wage to fewer people in employment to a continuation of the existing rates" [Routh, 1976: 15]. The new rates of pay were set as follows:

Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga Urban Areas Shs 150 per month

Eighteen Main Townships Shs 125 per month

All Other Areas Shs 100 per month

These new rates covered all workers with the exception of those on tea plantations and agricultural smallholdings. Thus on the face of it absolute wages increased considerably. In fact Routh estimates that wages trebled between 1956 and 1968 [Routh, 1976: 16]. Leaving the average wage of one in formal employment four to five times higher than that of a self-employed farmer on the land [Tordoff, 1966: 414]. But the practice, common to both governments and observers, of assessing the wage of the worker in relation to that of the subsistence farmer incensed some trade unionists who felt, and rightly so, that it did not take into account the value produced by the worker, nor did it do justice to the worker's aspirations which had inspired him or her to engage in the anti-colonial struggle in the first place. As an example of this comparison, Professor Turner commented in his 1967 Report on the structure of wages and incomes in Tanzania that:

There seems no doubt that there is a very large discrepancy between the living standards of the average wage earner and the average small holder, and that this discrepancy has substantially increased in recent years.¹⁴

This line of reasoning must have bewildered workers, who found difficulty in accepting that they had fought the exploitative colonial government and planter to bring an end to low wages, only to be paid

peasant subsistence wages by the independent African government. Their consequent frustration resulted in a number of strikes in 1962. One by railway workers, for example, threatened to paralyse the economy. Further unrest in the latter part of the year led to the detention, in remote areas, of leaders of the Public Workers Union. In spite of this, strikes continued to occur the following year, culminating in the Army Mutiny of January 1964. Trade unionists were thought to have been involved in the mutiny and 200 of them were detained following the uprising [Shivji, 1986: 233].

The mutiny provided the government with the opportunity to deal decisively with the trade union movement, the competing factions of which were both dissolved and made illegal. This was made easier by the fact that their more vocal and experienced leaders had earlier been incorporated into the government, as ministers or posted overseas to serve in the Diplomatic Service [Tordoff, 1966: 45]. Kawawa himself was Prime Minister. An Act of Parliament established the NUTA, a completely new organisation to which industrial unions would be affiliated as sections. Both the General Secretary of the union and the Deputy were to be appointed by the President of the Republic. It was envisaged that the NUTA would be a labour wing of the TANU, whose policies it would promote, with the further advantage to TANU that the salaries of this "industrial wing" would be paid out of trade union subscriptions.

With the formation of the NUTA, workers in Tanzania lost their right to form free and voluntary trade unions as they are understood in capitalist societies. But within Tanzania's African Socialism, the government utilising a "carrot and stick" strategy safeguarded certain rights and privileges of workers while withdrawing others. For example while the right to form free and voluntary trade unions was withdrawn and the right to free collective bargaining restricted, workers were guaranteed a reasonable minimum wage, buttressed with incremental scales to shield them from irregularities in price increases [Jackson, 1979: 222]. Although Tanzanian wages do not compare favourably with those in Kenya or Zambia, within Tanzania itself wage disparities have been reduced from 50:1 in 1962 to 9:1 in 1977 [Cartwright, 1983: 171] indicating the effort made in the country towards creating an egalitarian society. In 1966, for example, the President directed that top salaries in the civil service be reduced by 20% and remain at that level, while the minimum wage was raised from Shs 180 per month in urban areas in 1967 to Shs 240 by June 1972 [Routh, 1976: 31].

The policy on minimum wages was institutionalised with the creation of the Permanent Labour Tribunal (PLT) in 1967. The PLT retains supervisory authority on all decisions concerning wage increases as all collective agreements only become effective with its approval. It also acts as arbitrator over wage related industrial disputes [Jackson, 1979: 231] The initial policy of the PLT restricted annual wage increases to 5%. As in Zambia following the first Turner Report (1969), a higher rate of increase could only be granted if proof could be supplied of corresponding increase in productivity [Bienefeld, 1979: 586]. This

policy was also adopted as a result of recommendations by an ILO study on incomes, headed by Professor Turner in 1967. Tanzanian policy has continued along these lines with periodic revisions of the minimum wage.

The other "carrot" accorded workers under the new structure of trade unionism in Tanzania is job security. This was ensured by the Security of Employment Act, No. 62 of 1962. This Act lessened the liberties employers enjoy in dismissing their workers. Employers are obligated under the Act to consult the Workers' Committees in their enterprises not only in enforcing discipline but also on issues of redundancies, while an earlier law, the Severance Allowance Act No. 57 of 1962 entitled workers to 15 days pay for each year of service on the termination of employment or death for employees with a continuous service of three months or more [Routh, 1976: 17-18]. In addition a National Provident Act of 1964 made provisions for a fund to which both employers and the employee made contributions in preparation for the worker's retirement [Jackson, 1979: 228], thus in principle, contributing to the workers financial security even after they left wage employment. The extent to which this is realised is of course a different issue. What the enactment of the law demonstrates is the realisation of the workers' dependence on a cash income for subsistence.

7.2 ii) Procedure for the Settlement of Disputes

The implementation of some of these laws and associated regulations has resulted in managers complaining that workers have become difficult to discipline. Especially as these laws work in conjunction with the Trades Disputes Act No. 41 of 1962. This act streamlined the process of dispute settlement by instituting an ascending machinery which begins with voluntary negotiation between employer and employee, moves to conciliation and finally ends in arbitration. Under the 1962 Act, the main participants in the process were the two protagonists, employer and employee. However, Party branch personnel were to be involved in cases of "corruption, arrogance, lack of socialist discipline, nepotism, immorality or sabotage" [Mihyo, 1979: 257]. The government Division of Labour officials act as referees in most of these processes. The primacy of government officials came to the fore with the creation of the Permanent Labour Tribunal already referred to above. Here we discuss the role of this institution in the settlement of disputes.

Under the 1967 Labour Tribunal Act, when a dispute is declared, that is when the parties fail to reach an agreement through bilateral negotiations, it is immediately reported to the Labour Commissioner by one of the parties. The Labour Commissioner is obligated to appoint a conciliator at once. The conciliator may initiate "fresh negotiations". If he is able to bring about an agreement this way, he forwards this to the Labour Commissioner, who passes it on with recommendations to the Minister of Labour. The Minister in

turn adds his own recommendations and forwards the agreement to the Permanent Labour Tribunal (PLT). A dispute is also reported to the Labour Commissioner for onward transmission to the PLT if the conciliator appointed by the Labour Commissioner fails to procure an agreement.

The minister must act within 21 days of a dispute being referred to him. Failure to do this, as in Kenya, gives the workers involved the right to go on strike [Mihyo, 1979: 259]. The PLT on the other hand does not have a time limit to observe.¹⁵ It has the right to seek expert advice from any person or institutions it deems necessary. In its deliberations, it is guided by a nine point schedule of precepts, ranging from the need to promote a "high rate of domestic capital accumulation" to the need to "reduce unreasonable income differentials between various sectors of the economy" [Mihyo, 1979: 259]. If the PLT is satisfied with an agreement, it may register it with or without changes. Should it find cause to refuse an agreement, then the case is sent back to the Minister who in turn passes it back to the Labour Commissioner to appoint another conciliator so that the process can begin again. However, if no agreement is reached through conciliation, the PLT can still make an award which, once granted remains binding for "not less than 12 months" before it can be renegotiated or become the subject of a dispute [Mihyo, 1979: 260]. The indefinite period given to the PLT to consider a dispute or an agreement would seem unfair to workers and would tend to discourage them from submitting disputes for arbitration and perhaps exercise undue pressure on them to reach agreement at conciliation level.

Although the dispute settlement procedure would appear more straight forward in Tanzania than in either Zambia or Kenya, the structural features are similar in all three countries. This may be due to the influence of the work of Professor Turner who had headed ILO sponsored commissions of enquiry into wages and incomes in all three countries, Kenya (1965), Tanzania (1967) and Zambia (1969 and 1978).

It would appear that apart from the needs of the governing classes in these countries to restructure the systems of labour relations to ensure the accumulation of capital for the purposes of reproducing the social formation and their own dominant places in it, the specific organs of labour control have been influenced by international organisations, such the ILO and its experts.

Consequently, in Tanzania as in Kenya and Zambia, participation of workers in industries through strikes have been outlawed except in tightly specified circumstances. In Zambia these circumstances are not even specified. It would take a very sharp secretary general of a union to make a thorough scrutiny of the statutes to find the circumstances under which he may call a legal strike. Be that as it may, in Tanzania, other forms of participation are permitted. These are through the various kinds of workers' committees that have been established in industries. We shall consider these now.

Workers' Participation in Tanzania

As Mihyo points out, in Tanzania as in other countries such as Germany and Yugoslavia where it has been implemented, workers' participation is designed to help workers develop a sense of belonging to the enterprise in which they work [Mihyo, 1979: 260]. Workers' participation can assume different forms depending on the circumstances obtaining in a country. In Tanzania, workers' participation has evolved as a way of implementing industrial democracy. This in effect was an integral part of the socialist programme of transformation which Tanzania embarked upon with the Arusha declaration in 1967 and which was reinforced by the Mwangozo guidelines in 1971. If the peasants were to be engaged in rural development through Ujamaa villages to build self-reliant communities, workers were to be meaningfully involved in the enterprises in which they worked not only as a means of contributing to national development by increasing productivity, but also as a way of generating self-fulfilment.

The policy outlining the form of workers' participation in Tanzanian industries was enunciated and given impetus in a Presidential circular in January 1970, which issued the directive that Workers' Councils be formed in institutions and industries. Every establishment employing ten or more people was required to implement the directive [Mapolu, 1972: 16]. The comparative figure for Zambia is one hundred. The main objective of the Works Council in Tanzania was:

To bring workers close to the management of industries and to promote better industrial relations while giving the workers more say in formulating policies. [Mapolu, 1972: 22].

In addition to the Workers' Councils, there are also the Workers' Committees which is the trade union organ at the plant level, as well as TANU branches in enterprises. In theory, therefore, as in Zambia, there are three organs of worker representation at the work place. In practice the Tanzanian situation has evolved differently. To begin with, the Tanzanian case is characterised by the participation of high management in the workers' representative organs. The general manager of the enterprise is usually also the chairman of the TANU branch as well as the Workers' Council. The functions of the Workers' Councils include the consideration and giving advice to management on such issues as "wages and incomes policies; marketing, productivity, planning and general organisational and technical problems". Substantial preparatory work was carried out, in the form of seminars which were conducted all over the country, educating workers on the formation and function of the Workers' Councils prior to their implementation. As a result more than a hundred councils were formed and were functioning in various parts of the country by 1975.¹⁶

The performance of the councils seems to be very satisfactory from the point of view of management but they have brought few benefits to the workers. In his assessment of the implementation of the policy of Workers' Councils, Mapolu found incidents where the policy had succeeded. But the success has been in making workers "more manageable" in capitalist enterprises. Workers still remained differentiated from

the managers by income, power and "the general standard of living" [Mapolu, 1972: 34]. The implementation of the workers' councils has also floundered on efforts to try to integrate workers into the decision making process. It would appear that in most cases, management has been unwilling to take the time and effort required to afford workers a genuine opportunity to participate. Workers have not had access to resources of time and information that would have facilitated their meaningful contribution to the deliberations. Consequently, the councils ended up "rubber-stamping forums" [Mihyo: 1971: 269]. In his study of workers participation in Tanzania Mapolu found one further factor accounting for the estrangement of workers. This was the standard requirement in capitalist enterprises for "confidentiality". As in Zambia, workers on the councils are obliged to keep the deliberations of the council secret. Consequently those workers not serving on the councils not only remain ignorant of the important issues of their firm but are also effectively excluded from the participation for which the councils were intended. So the participation in the workers' councils has remained a participation of workers' representatives and not of workers as such.

The outcome of the TANU/chama cha Mapinduzi government labour policy in Tanzania can be analyzed at two levels. For the leadership of NUTA/JUWATA the policy can be regarded a success in that it has facilitated their cooptation into the government administrative structure and secured for them well-paying jobs. This cooptation of the leadership is so obvious that workers refer to NUTA/JUWATA as a "parastatal", pointing out how useless to their interests the trade union movement has become since acquiring that status [Mapolu, 1972: 21]. Referring to the same development, Shivji argues that the JUWATA officials have become more like administrators of labour, rather than trade union leaders [Shivji, 1986: 235]. And workers have not been slow to notice this change. In reaction they have made calls for the abolition of NUTA/JUWATA, maintaining that the organisation no longer represents their interests but has in fact assumed the role of "an industrial relations officer" [Mapolu, 1972: 21-22]. With one major exception, as we pointed out earlier, the workers pay the wages of this particular kind of industrial relations officer. What is worse, workers have no control over these officials, as they do not elect them. Rather they are appointed by the government. This appears to be a most undemocratic practice, in that the officials are not accountable to the membership upon whose subscriptions (collected through check-off) they depend for their wages. From the point of view of the workers, the policy can only be considered a failure for the following reasons:-

1. The total incorporation of the trade union movement into the government administrative structure has robbed workers of their one means of effective representation.
2. With the system of appointing trade union officials by the government, workers have also lost an important means of democratic participation.
3. Without a trade union that genuinely represents the interests of members and is accountable to them and works to protect their interests, workers feel that they

are left exposed to the most blatant exploitation. They have complained of cases where:

"racial discrimination was reported rampant; child labour practised openly, where working conditions are said to be close to slave conditions, yet NUTA has just stood by". [Mapolu, 1972: 22].

So if official records indicate that strikes have "disappeared" in Tanzania, as Jackson claims, the explanation for this must be sought elsewhere, but it has not been due to the fact that workers are content [Jackson, 1979: 219-251]. A number of factors can be cited as an explanation. Firstly, the method of calculating strikes in Tanzania does not include stoppages that last less than 24 hours. It is therefore possible that a lot of one-day strikes remain unrecorded. Secondly, the ban on strikes and the illegalization of strikes may have disoriented the trade union consciousness of the workers, especially in cases where such consciousness is a recent phenomenon. In other words repression has stifled worker action generating apathy in the workers. Thirdly, the socialist pronouncements of the government, one that is ostensibly committed to promoting the welfare of its people may have had the effect of muting worker militancy. Having said that, research evidence has indicated that there are periods of industrial unrest in Tanzania. Mihyo for example, reports strikes having occurred in many parastatal enterprises during the period 1972 to 1973. In some private enterprises workers have taken over factories and "locked-out" management. In most of these cases workers were demanding wage increases and improved conditions of service, citing clauses from the government's industrial policy (the Mwongozo guidelines) to back up their arguments and demands [Mihyo, 1979: 270]. So, for Tanzania while one can argue that the leadership of unions has been coopted and incorporated into the governing bureaucracy, the workers on the shop floor, in their own way, like the peasants, perhaps remain "uncaptured".¹⁷

Events in Tanzania during the 1980s seem to suggest that the socialist transformation of society has not been effected. Despite the nationalisations following the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the assertion of self-reliance and the subsequent commitment to industrial democracy emphasized in the Mwongozo guidelines, Tanzanian society has remained capitalist structurally. Consequently, attempts to promote workers participation have not brought genuine relief to the workers. If anything, they have helped to facilitate the incorporation of workers' leaders into the decision-making structures of capitalist enterprises, stifling their class consciousness, reducing their sensitivity to the workers' real needs and facilitating the further exploitation of workers. The workers' committees and the workers' councils have been effectively used by management, especially in the parastatals, as instruments of workers' control. The ban on strikes has further stifled worker action resulting in apathy among workers.

Contrary to expectations, the efforts to establish a self-reliant socialist society in Tanzania has not led to greater independence of trade unions. Instead trade unions have been taken over by the government and incorporated into the government administrative structure. While the workers remain working in capi-

talist enterprises and state-owned enterprises run on capitalist profit motive without effective trade union protection. From the trade union point of view, it would appear that this variant of socialism is more repressive of workers than the African capitalism that obtains in Kenya.

7.3 BOTSWANA

In terms of population, Botswana is the smallest country in our sample, with just under a million people at 983,096 in 1984. The rate of population growth, however, is quite high at 3.67% per annum. The country can boast of a thriving economy based on free enterprise. But most industrial development in the country is however a post-colonial phenomenon. Unlike Kenya, Tanzania or Zambia, no major plantations for cash crops or mining enterprises were developed during the colonial era. During most of that period, Botswana's primary commercial reason for existence was as a supplier of cheap labour to the mines and households of South Africa, a function it has been fulfilling for the past eighty years [Massey, 1980, 9]. This practice has continued even after independence in 1966, as can be seen from the figures below:-

	Wage Employment in Botswana	Employed in South Africa	Subsistence Agriculture
1964	31,600	35,700	250,700
1971	51,400	48,000	282,500

Source: Simkins, *South African Labour Bulletin*, 1975, 20.

In 1985, the figure of those absent from the country was estimated at 42,069, most of whom were presumed to be working as migrant labourers in South Africa [Olsen and Frimpong, 1985: 1].

The settler phenomenon was very minimal in Botswana. This occurred in the form of white farming "blocks" which were established in three tribal areas from which the original inhabitants were shunted into reserves, much like the experience of the Lenge along the 30 mile corridor of the line of rail in Zambia. But nothing compared to the "white highlands" saga in Kenya.

One of the consequences of late industrialisation in Botswana is that there was but a small working class at independence, which in turn meant that the trade union movement was weak. Since then, mining and the beef industry have been developed as the primary earners of foreign exchange. Other industries such as construction, commerce and manufacturing have also expanded to offer formal employment which in 1984 had reached 110,000 people. This represents an increase of almost four times since 1964. So unlike Tanzania, where formal employment has been on the decline since 1953, or Zambia since 1975, there has actually been an expansion in formal employment in the past two decades in Botswana [Pearson, 1980:

45]. The parastatal and private sectors have been the most major providers of employment opportunities with 64% of formal employment opportunities, while the central government provided 29% and local government 6.8% [Olsen and Frimpong, 1985: 3]. The ratio of people in formal employment to population is quite high at 1:8 compared to Zambia's 1:48. Employment per sector is as follows:-

Sector	Number of People	%
Commerce	18,115	16.5
Construction	11,085	10.0
Mining & Quarrying	7,509	6.8

As much of the formal sector local employment is a post-colonial phenomenon, the government benefited from a much freer hand than most in developing a progressive labour policy had it wished to do so. However, the character of the governing class and its choice of development strategy led to policies that favour capital and display a contemptuous disregard for labour. In examining the Botswana example therefore, we begin by looking at the chosen development strategy and its implications for the prospects for trade union growth. Secondly, we examine labour policy and assess its implications for workers rights to organise and bargain collectively, the procedures for solving disputes, the right to strike and of involvement in politics. In analyzing this, we shall assess the extent to which the government has allowed participation or alternatively has been authoritarian towards labour. Lastly we shall consider what major lessons can be drawn from the Botswana case in comparison with the other four countries.

7.3 1) Development Strategy

The industrialisation process in Botswana is being pursued through private enterprise. Private companies with minority government participation have spearheaded mining, construction and commercial enterprises, and government has been anxious to maintain a favourable environment for private investment. This policy was started in the Khama period and has continued under the present regime of Quett Masire.¹⁸ But private capital makes decisions based on the profit motive and not on the need to create increased employment opportunities. Thus, although mining has increased its contribution to the GNP and has become the second most important foreign exchange earner, it provides only 6% of employment. The reason is that diamond mining as it has been developed in Botswana has been highly mechanised, ostensibly for security reasons [Massey, 1980: 211].

The need to attract foreign investment has necessitated the running of an open economy, whereby, as in Kenya, the repatriation of profits is guaranteed and emphasis is placed on the production of export com-

modities, in this case beef and diamonds. As Massey points out, this has necessitated investment in infrastructure for the movement of machinery and commodities and cheap labour is thrown into the bargain to attract foreign capital. As in Kenya, too, the development of an enclosure system is underway. The local emergent bourgeoisie is acquiring titles to land while the poor peasants unfamiliar with modern land law are caught up in a whirlpool of poverty and stagnation.

The workers and peasants have not shared in the prosperity that has characterised Botswana since independence. If we take the workers, for example, we find that the system of migrant labour to South Africa has not abated and that the government by its own admission has not done quite enough to develop alternative employment opportunities at home to allow an end to the system.¹⁹ Instead of discouraging it, the government has tried to put the migrant labour system to its own use by trying to make miners pay the local tax while they work in South Africa, though this has been resisted. Revenue is also raised on the number of workers recruited to work in South Africa at a rate of P. 10 per head of persons recruited. Further, rather than stop migrant labour to South Africa, it has been demonstrated that through a combination of low wages in the urban areas and lack of rural development, the government of Botswana has replicated the system of migrant labour within Botswana itself, whereby, workers are forced into a vicious circle of "oscillating" back and forth between town and country just to eke out a living [Massey, 1980, 18]. An examination of the government's incomes policy will demonstrate how this has come about.

The government's incomes policy was published in a government White Paper in 1972.²⁰ However even before the White Paper was issued, President Khama alluded to aspects of this policy in a speech at the opening of the trade union centre in Gaborone in 1971. The point of departure for considering a wages policy seems to have been the level of development the country had reached and the fact that people in wage employment are only a small minority of the total population. As in Kenya, the minimum wage was determined with reference to the living standards in the peasant sector. In Botswana, this was done with the express intention of discouraging rural-urban migration, thereby trying to solve the government's own problems of planning and administration by excessive exploitation of the workers.

Clearly, the value produced by the diamond miner can have very little relation to the subsistence level of a cultivator on the land, even when this is differentiated by an urban weighting [Parson, 1980, 51]. Officially, however, the low wage policy is justified in terms of such factors as the need for reinvestment to create more jobs and the need to increase government revenue to enable it to provide for more social services such as schools and clinics.²¹ The low wage policy is also justified by the argument that it will encourage employers to use labour intensive technology. But as we have pointed out above, this has not been the case in the diamond mining industry, which is still capital intensive, though wages continue to

be low. Massey reports, for example, that in the copper and nickel mine at Selebi-Pikwe, owned by multinational companies, wages are two thirds what a miner is paid in South African mines for similar work. What is worse, this wage is below the government recognised poverty datum line for urban areas [Massey, 1980: 19].

As would be expected these repressive labour practises obtain in a situation where the trade union movement is badly organised and weak, that very weakness permitting such processes to persist. There have been trade unions in Botswana since 1949 which played a noticeable role in the anti-colonial struggle by staging public demonstrations in the major towns [Parson, 1980: 45]. But due to the low level of industrialisation, the trade union movement did not prosper. Industrialisation has accelerated after independence, but other factors have intervened to thwart the emergence of an effective trade union movement.

In principle Botswana are guaranteed the freedom of association by Section 13, Chapter 2 of the Republican Constitution [Khama, 1972: 14]. And employers are prohibited from discriminating against workers on the basis of their participation or non participation in trade unions by Section 48 of the Trade Union Act (1969). The same law also requires that all unions must be registered. To qualify for registration, there are specific conditions to be met, failure of which attracts fines and imprisonment for the perpetrators. One of the conditions is that a trade union should only be "made up of people working at one trade or calling". Another is that none of the office-bearers of a proposed union should be foreigners. The implications of this are grave. A third condition is that managers, supervisors and administrative grade workers cannot belong to the same union as the "employees". This is a fair stipulation and obtains in the labour laws of other countries in the region, Zambia for example. Fourthly, an employer can only recognise a representative organisation, which is one defined as having recruited at least 25% of the eligible membership in an enterprise. The only drawback is that this provision is not backed by a closed shop to compel workers to belong to a union. In comparison, there is no closed shop legislation in Zambia either, but, there is also no restriction on foreigners holding positions of leadership in the unions and a union can be registered by seven members. Once formed, a trade union enters into a recognition agreement with the employer to which its members belong, provided such an employer engages 25 or more eligible employees and is registered with the Commissioner of Labour as an employer [Cap. 517, p.57, Laws of Zambia]. The most objectionable provision of the Botswana Trade Union Act (1969), however, is one which forbids the formation of a single union of all workers in the country [Parson, 1980, 48-49]. Given these restrictions, it is not surprising that the trade union movement is weak. In 1984, there were sixteen registered trade unions, of these only eight were federated in the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions [Olsen, 1983: 21].

7.3 ii) The Process of Collective Bargaining

The weakness of its trade union movement is perhaps best demonstrated by examining collective bargaining in Botswana. The collective bargaining process is highly politicised by virtue of the central role within it of the government in providing detailed guidelines for its enactment. The government has endeavoured to promote an orientation toward routine negotiations and consultations in order to engender an atmosphere of trust between unions and employers and harmonious industrial relations. To facilitate collective bargaining, the Trade Unions and Employer's Organisation Act (1983) grants the right to negotiate. No restrictions are made on the kind of issues which can or cannot be subject to collective bargaining. There are, however, other indirect government imposed restrictions. For example, since 1972, all substantive collective agreements over wages, salaries and other financial benefits have been required to observe the guidelines of an incomes policy. This policy was formulated with the expert advice of a consultant supplied by the Ford Foundation of America [Massey, 1980: 18]. To ensure that its guidelines are observed, all collective agreements have to be submitted to the government's Wages and Policy Committee (WPC) for approval. The Incomes Policy stipulates the statutory minimum wage. It also imposes a ceiling on the maximum levels for salaries and wages. Wages in the private and parastatal sectors are not to exceed too greatly those paid to government workers doing similar jobs [Olsen, 1985: 11-14].

The WPC also vets employers proposals for wage increases. It is quite a high powered committee chaired by the Assistant Minister of Finance and Development Planning, with a membership made up of senior civil servants drawn from the Ministry of Finance, Home Affairs, Office of the President and Directorate of Personnel. Since 1978, employers' representatives and unions have submitted joint proposals to the committee. Submission of proposals is also required of employers even where negotiations are not contemplated. This requirement covers the whole field of employment in the private sector. Through this committee, the government becomes the final arbiter over the wages and salaries reached through collective agreements. Once concluded, agreements have to be registered with the Commissioner of Labour and become legally binding on the parties.

Collective bargaining in Botswana is restricted to private sector employees. Unlike the public service workers in Zambia, trade unions covering civil service workers do not as yet have a right to negotiate with government. Instead government sets the scales unilaterally after a Salaries Review Commission. These have been held regularly every two years since 1974. In addition, government gives cost of living awards following recommendations from the tripartite National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Council (NEMIC) [Olsen, 1983, 16]. The government also holds consultations over such issues as maternity leave, hours of work and training.

In Botswana, the government seems to have succeeded in making its incomes policy effective. This I think is largely due to the weakness of the unions. As we demonstrated in Chapter Three, in the Zambian case, not even the limiting of wage increases to 5% by the Turner Commission or the IMF stopped the unions from demanding higher increases which they were frequently successful in achieving. In the case of Botswana, not even the provisions of the law are exhausted by the unions to their advantage. For example the law provides that all issues are negotiable, yet according to Olsen, only 15,000 employees are covered by collective agreements which include substantive issues, with only an additional 20,000 covered by recognition and procedural agreements. This shows not only a very low level of unionisation, but a very ineffective manner of unionisation, when such issues as leave, hours of work, sick leave benefits, pensions and gratuities are left out of a collective bargaining process for which a statutory framework has been provided. Olsen points out further that in Botswana it is the employers who initiate and dominate the collective bargaining process, rather than just react to union demands employers invariably initiate negotiations [Olsen: 1985, 18]. This is quite unlike Zambia where unions not only make demands on their employers, but request audiences with ministers or even the Prime Minister to discuss "the state of the economy".

The weakness of the trade union movement is a consequence of "the constraints put on the unions by the state on behalf of capital". To a certain extent, the weakness of trade unions is a residue of the colonial experience, but this has been exacerbated in the post-colonial period by state action. State action itself is influenced by the structure of the economy and the ideological orientation of the ruling party. This can be best demonstrated by a consideration of the dispute resolving procedure in Botswana. It is to an examination of this process that we now turn.

7.3 iii) Dispute Resolving Procedure

The settlement of disputes in Botswana is governed by the Trade Disputes Act (1982), which provides machinery for the settlement of disputes in general as well as those in essential services. The first line of action in the settlement of disputes is a voluntary mechanism within the enterprise between management and workers' representatives. However, in Botswana, the Labour Commissioner may intervene or cause one of his officers to intervene in a dispute at any stage, "when he is satisfied that a trade dispute exists or is apprehended". The intervention is intended to encourage the parties to the dispute to reach an amicable settlement. When an agreement is not reached, he persuades the parties to make an official report of the dispute to him. The Labour Commissioner may then take one of the following steps:-

1. Persuade the parties to reach a collective agreement.
2. Proceed to mediate in the dispute himself.
3. Appoint a conciliator.

4. Refer the dispute to the Permanent Arbitrator.
5. If permission for permanent arbitration is not granted by the parties, he may report the dispute to the Minister who may refer it in turn to the Permanent Arbitrator.

The Permanent Arbitrator is appointed by the President of the Republic in consultation with the Minister of Health, Labour and Home Affairs. Such a person must be either qualified to be a judge of the High Court or be of such a level of integrity and experience in industrial relations as the President may consider appropriate. He need not be a Motswana, but can be anybody qualified to serve as a judge anywhere in the commonwealth.²² So while trade union officials are restricted to Botswana nationals, the government is free to scout the whole commonwealth of nations for the most qualified candidate for Permanent Arbitrator. In considering a dispute, the Permanent Arbitrator may investigate, hear or dismiss a case. When he makes an award, it becomes binding upon the parties to the dispute. And this may not be varied by him, even upon appeal, for at least 12 months after the award comes into force. This provision bears very close resemblance to the Tanzanian law. Botswanan awards are published by the Permanent Secretary in the government Gazette and a person so bound who fails to abide by the Permanent Arbitrator's decision is guilty of an offence and liable to a P.500 fine and six months imprisonment.²³ At any stage while a dispute is in progress if the minister satisfies himself that industrial action is planned or undertaken before the dispute solving procedure is exhausted, he may make an order, declaring industrial action unlawful. Participation in an unlawful strike is an offence which attracts a fine and 12 months imprisonment. This provision compromises all the apparent advantages and democratic features of the Act. In the final analysis, the Labour Commissioner can intervene in a dispute at any stage and halt the negotiations, while the Minister of Labour can declare any action workers take in support of their demands illegal, thereby criminalising industrial action and robbing workers of their only real and effective weapon.

There is a schedule of ten essential services in Botswana.²⁴ Nominally, strikes are not outlawed even in essential services. Industrial action may be undertaken in an essential service if a settlement is not reached within 21 days of the dispute being reported to the Commissioner of Labour.²⁵ This seems generous enough on paper, but the Minister of Labour can cut any industrial action short by declaring it unlawful at any stage. This provision in the law appears to have been put to very good use, resulting in what has been described as "strife free industrial relations" in Botswana.

On the surface it would appear that Botswana, like Tanzania has achieved peaceful industrial relations in the fifteen years preceding 1985 [Olsen: 1985, 27]. This peace however has been attained at very high cost to the workers. When workers have gone on strike, the government has reacted harshly by using force or threats of force. In 1974 for example, a strike by bank employees was brought to an abrupt end

by government declaring it illegal, and participants were threatened with dismissal [Parson, 1980: 51]. In 1975 the diamond workers' strike at Selebi-Pikwe mine was broken up by mobile police charging at the strikers. The workers were dismissed and 200 were not re-hired later. This is an old colonial practice which appears prevalent in East and Southern Africa and has been perpetuated in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe as we shall see in the next section. Usually it is the ring leaders who are not re-hired. The action is intended as a warning to remaining workers not to engage in active trade unionism as this may endanger their jobs. In situations of high unemployment, this generates tremendous pressure. At Selebi-Pikwe, for example, 34 workers were jailed for periods ranging from three to 12 months. In addition, to illustrate the cynical attitude of the political authorities towards workers, a top trade union official was publicly flogged in the presence of the Vice-President as personal punishment because the Vice-President's car had been man-handled during the strike (while he had been inside) [Massey, 1980: 19]. There have not been any major strikes in Botswana since. One could cite the relative prosperity that the country has enjoyed during this period as an explanation for the peace. But the level of the minimum wage and the lack of fringe benefits for manual workers would indicate that the manual workers have not shared in the prosperity. Olsen suggests that, rather than pursue a dispute up to arbitration level, managements and employees' representatives have tended to resolve their differences by the voluntary machinery of collective agreements [Olsen, 1983: 13]. But such machinery only covers a minority of workers in the big multinational companies in mining and meat processing. For the majority of workers in distribution, hotel and catering, construction and farm employment, there are no collective agreements. In some cases there are not even established structures for wage scales and wages tend to be set on an individual basis. There is no minimum wage for agricultural workers or domestic servants for example [Massey: 1980, 43].

Although the right to strike exists on the statute books, it is very difficult to operationalise to the benefit of the workers. The harsh treatment of strikers by the authorities has essentially preempted strike action, such that even the elaborate dispute solving procedure laid down under the 1982 Act has not yet been put to use. In 1984, for example, the Permanent Arbitrator had yet to be appointed [Olsen: 1985, 29].

7.4 Right of Involvement in Politics

Botswana is a multiparty state, and possibly for this reason trade unions have been kept out of politics and the ruling Party has tried to keep politics out of trade unions. The preference for such a course of action was made clear by the first President of Botswana, Sr. Seretse in the July 10th, 1971 speech referred to above. While acknowledging that trade unions were an essential component of a democratic society, he also stressed that they could only make a positive contribution to national development if, "not man-

ipulated by government or political party or by any external agency" [Khama: 1975, 9]. Similarly, trade unions were not to engage themselves in party politics by aligning themselves with one or other of the political parties. They were advised to represent the interests of their members in a non political, non partisan manner and to ignore political issues. Their views were, however, sought on non political issues such as "education, vocational training and localisation in the private sector". Rather than confront government in an antagonistic manner, the trade union movement is encouraged to participate as a partner in capitalist development. In 1979 for example, the Vice-President at a symposium on "Employment and Development", suggested to trade unionists that they should consider running such ventures as shops for members, poultry schemes and house maintenance schemes. In Botswana, it appears that trade unionists have adapted very well to this role, and at even higher levels of finance than the minister suggested. It is reported that unions have established thrift and loan societies, as well as operate educational and death benefits for their members. There seems a trend underway in Botswana, as in Kenya, of trade unions taking on a social role of providing welfare benefits for its members. This role is played by Zambian trade unions as well, but not to the same extent and for slightly different reasons. In Zambia, unions engage in economic ventures as a way of augmenting the economic benefits their members receive from employers and government. Economic schemes are also undertaken to strengthen the economic resources of unions. But most important of all, the economic ventures are undertaken in addition to the political role the trade union movement has carved out for itself and in addition to regular trade union duties. In Botswana, the social and economic activities of unions are being promoted as an alternative to traditional trade union functions such as collective bargaining [Olsen, 1985: 21-22].

For Botswana then, one can argue that the governing class has employed self-interested paternalism in their approach to trade unions. They have cautiously encouraged trade unions to promote democratic appearances, but put obstacles in their path, to render the practice of trade unionism divided and weak. Thus government policy evidences no major ruptures in approach to labour. no reorganization or forcible creation of new structures. This is due in part to the level of development attained by the trade union movement, which in turn is a function of the level of capitalist development the country had reached at independence. So taking advantage of this initial weakness of the trade union movement, the government has proceeded to encourage an apolitical and economic movement, aided by the expert advice of the American capitalist establishment and the ICFTU. No attempt is made at incorporating the labour movement through specifically tailored mechanisms, except the automatic acceptance of capitalism as the only rational strategy for development. Emphasis is put on individual success. Workers are not encouraged to seek participation in the enterprises in which they are employed. Instead, they are advised to run their own profit making schemes through their unions. One senses here an attempt not only at making the trade union movement a partner in development, albeit a very weak partner, but also

at diverting trade unions from being an interest group to being investors and active participants in the capitalist market place.

7.4 ZIMBABWE

We turn now to an examination of our last example in the comparative schema, Zimbabwe. In comparison to the other four cases reviewed, Zimbabwe is a relatively new country, its independence having come almost 20 years after that of Tanzania and Kenya, sixteen years after Zambia and fourteen years after Botswana. Unlike Tanzania and Botswana, and to greater extent than Zambia and even Kenya, Zimbabwe was a settler colony, the white settlers having had self-government since 1923 [Stoneman: 1978, 63]. The black majority of the then Rhodesia had to wage a fourteen year guerilla war before it was able to wrest political power from the white settler minority. However, despite the armed struggle, Zimbabwean independence came as the immediate result of an agreement between the former colonial power, representatives of the white minority regime and the representatives of the black majority who were united for the purpose in the Patriotic Front.

This agreement known as the "Lancaster House Agreement" has provided the framework for Zimbabwe's development in its first seven years of nationhood [Mandaza, 1986]. According to Mandaza, the Lancaster House agreement represented a "compromise of class forces" [Mandaza, 1986: 2]. The inherent compromise has affected the nature of development policy in Zimbabwe, including labour policy. One of the intentions of the Lancaster House agreement was to safeguard the property rights of the white minority population and to consolidate the country's position in the world capitalist system. On the other hand, the nature of the anti-colonial settler struggle, ZANU's manifesto and its success at the polls in April 1980, indebted Mugabe's government to the masses and their aspirations [Mandaza, 1986: 61]. In response to these contradictory forces, the government has endeavoured to walk the tight rope of encouraging private (local and expatriate) investment to promote economic growth, as well as expanding social spending to alleviate the impoverishment of the masses. This approach was first enunciated in chairman Mugabe's speech after the announcement of the election results in 1980. In what has been described as the "reconciliatory speech", Mugabe promised his listeners that there would not be any wholesale nationalisations and that civil servants would be guaranteed their pensions [Mandaza, 1986: 41-42]. In the government's first major economic policy document, entitled *Growth with Equity*, commitment was also expressed to the welfare of the masses and rural development in particular was singled out for special attention. The document expressed the government's commitment to "the attainment of a socialist and egalitarian society".²⁶ Through rural development, the government hopes to create enough jobs to correct the imbalances of the past.

In as far as labour policy is concerned, government expressed commitment to follow ILO principles on tripartism in the determination of wages and conditions of service.²⁷ With regard to incomes, government was cognizant of the prevailing gaps between the incomes of the different racial groups and expressed the wish to create a more just society.

While expressing its desire to build a more egalitarian society, government was aware of the constraints place upon it by both the Lancaster House Agreement and perhaps more importantly by the silent financial pressure from the world capitalist establishment to manage a rational, efficient and pragmatic economy in which free private enterprise would thrive, if only to prove that blacks can manage a modern economy and thus vindicate the liberation struggle and the granting of political power to the indigenous population. This latter point is important not only for Zimbabwe, but has relevance to the liberation struggle in the whole Southern Africa region. In response to these divergent pressures, the government has made a public commitment to a curious, yet cautious mixture of socialist policies in the social sphere while pursuing policies that encourage private ownership of productive forces and foreign investment [EIU, 1981: 1]. This caution is reflected in President Mugabe's government labour policy, in our review of which we shall comment on the workers' right to organise and to bargain collectively and discuss the procedures for resolving disputes, the right to strike and the right of unions to be involved in politics.

7.4 i) The Development Strategy and Trade Union Development

Given the settler colonial circumstances obtaining in the then Rhodesia, labour legislation was designated to control labour to facilitate the greatest returns on capital investments. Beginning with the Masters and Servants Act 1901 down to the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) in its amended form in 1959, the laws were intended to suppress labour, rather than encourage the development of trade unions, especially among black workers.²⁸ When in 1959, the law was amended to allow trade unionism among black workers, it was only to provide white unions with the opportunity to control black workers within the multi-racial unions [Wood, 1987: 53]. Given these historical factors, the trade union movement among black workers in Zimbabwe was weak at independence. It appears, as Wood points out, that in Zimbabwe the repressive labour laws and practices succeeded in thwarting the development of a militant trade union movement [Wood, 1987: 48]. This is unlike the case in South Africa or the Latin American countries (in their different ways) whereby militant trade unionism has emerged as a credible challenge to undemocratic regimes, despite or perhaps because of the repressive laws.

The right of workers to join unions was granted in the ICA (1959). Under this Act, workers in all sectors have the right to join unions except

persons engaged in private domestic service, all employees of the state, persons employed in the education sector, university students and officers of Parliament.²⁹

The right of workers' unions has been reaffirmed in the Labour Relations Act (1984), which recognises even domestic service workers and agricultural workers. But the level of unionisation among black workers has been characteristically low. In 1979, for example, out of 299,290 workers eligible for unionisation only about 89,000 were members of registered and non-registered trade unions [Wood, 1987: 52]. According to Wood this gave a union density of 29% among the mine and urban industrial and commercial workers. Farm and domestic household workers who make up a substantial number of the employed were not at this time eligible for unionisation. When these are included, as they are in the LR Act (1984), the level of unionisation would be lower still. In general it has been argued that, apart from the railways, and the mining, textiles and catering industries, the state of organised labour is poor in Zimbabwe [EIU, 198: 60]. By 1981 for example only 10% of the more than one million employees were paid up members of registered trade unions.³⁰

The weakness of black unions in Rhodesia was exacerbated by the fact that, the anti-colonial struggle was fought in the bush and that no effective attempt was made to organise on behalf of the struggle among the industrial working class. Individual workers did leave their jobs to become fighters in the bush, but this is not the same as organising on an industrial basis, or as the liberation movements establishing industrial wings among the workers [Wood, 1987: 70]. Also the trade union movement was weakened by the fact that hundreds of trade union leaders were arrested and gaoled by the Smith regime [STZ, 30.06.1984]. Its weakness was reflected in the fact that, upon independence, it was not the secretary general or chairman of the trade union organisation who was appointed to the first cabinet. In Kenya for example, Tom Mboya, who had been president of the KFL was appointed Minister of Labour. In Tanzania Rashidi Kawawa, former President of the TFL, was appointed Prime Minister and John Kamaliza, President of the TGWU, was appointed Minister of Labour. In Zambia John Chisata became a minister of state.

In Zimbabwe, however, it was the President of the Commercial Farmer's Union who was appointed Minister of Agriculture and another Rhodesian Front member was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry [Mandaza, 1986: 43]. In addition to these appointments being a gesture of peace, and an invitation to cooperation, they also reflect an acknowledgement of the power and potential importance of the sectors and lobbies from which the two were drawn. On the other hand the absence of representatives of organised labour was a reflection of the weakness of that movement.

Despite its weakness, workers did not hesitate to express their frustration over the perceived delayed delivery of the "fruits of independence" and to draw attention to their cause. Beginning February 1980, a "wave of strikes" was experienced in Zimbabwe [Sachikonye, 1986: 252], which continued through March, April and May. A characteristic feature of them was that they were not organised by trade union offi-

cial, but resulted from the spontaneous actions of workers. The workers were agitating for better pay and improved conditions of work. They were also protesting against the dismissals of colleagues or demanding the "dismissal of abusive managers and supervisors". Viewed from a comparative perspective, the pattern of strikes, coming as it did at the time of change of government from white/colonial to black nationalist government, seems familiar. It happened in Kenya in 1963 to 1964; in Tanzania in 1962, 1963 and 1964 and in Zambia in 1964 and 1966. Also familiar is the list of the causes of the strikes. Apart from the perennial one of "wages and improved conditions of employment", the complaint of "abusive managers and supervisors", so characteristic of a colonial situation, has frequently been a cause of grievance in the immediate post independence period.

Equally familiar is the response of the government. As an initial measure to placate the workers, a temporary minimum wage was announced for all categories of workers, including one for farm employees and domestic servants [Sachikonye, 1986: 258]. Then a commission of inquiry was established to examine and gather evidence on the condition of workers and their employment in the whole country. As we have demonstrated above, a commission of inquiry was held in Kenya following the 1963/64 strikes in Mombasa, which resulted in the establishment by government of the COTU. In Zambia the miners strike in 1966 led to the Brown Commission which led to substantial wage increases.

In Zimbabwe the Riddel Commission submitted its Report in June 1981. It not only recommended instant wage increases, but also suggested the determination of a minimum wage pegged to the poverty datum line. Increases were to be paid in stages in such a way as to enable the minimum wage to be equal to the PDL by 1984 [Riddel Report, 1981: 235]. It was also recommended that the minimum wage be based on the need of the worker and not on the sector in which they were employed or the region where the work was located [Riddel Report, 1981: 105]. As a lasting solution, the Commission recommended the establishment of a permanent wages commission (PWC) which would monitor government guidelines on minimum wages and consider appeals from those claiming to be unable to pay the minimum wage. A third major recommendation was the establishment of a National Labour Relations Board (NLRB), which was proposed as a forum for hearing and resolving all industrial relations disputes. The recommendations for fixing a minimum wage and the establishment of a Labour Relations Board have been accepted and are reflected in the provisions of the LR Act (1984).

7.4 ii) Right to Collective Bargaining

At independence, collective bargaining in Zimbabwe was governed by the ICA (1934), (1959) and amended again in 1981. This applied mainly to workers in the private sector as public service workers were not covered by collective bargaining. The private sector was partitioned into a number of industrial

groupings in respect of general employment conditions. Where workers were entitled to form trade unions and where these had been formed, collective bargaining took place within industrial councils. Where workers had not formed trade unions, the government established industrial boards for the purposes of determining wages and conditions of work. The boards were made up of employees and employers from the appropriate industry as appointed by the Minister of Labour [EIU, 1981: 59]. As a consequence of trade union weakness, there were only 21 industrial councils in the country in 1981 covering 20% of the people in wage employment, as well as 67 industrial boards, covering a further 45% of the employees. This left 35% of employees without cover of either industrial councils or industrial boards.

Representation of Workers in Zimbabwe: 1981

Mode of Collective Bargaining	No.	No. of Employees Covered	%
Industrial Councils	21	154,000	20
Industrial Boards	67	480,000	45
None	-	366,000	35

Source: Riddel Commission Report, 1981

Once concluded, the agreement of an industrial council became binding upon the parties. Similarly, once an industrial board made a decision, the proposed conditions were submitted to the Minister of Labour for approval. When this was appended to the deliberations of the board, they became binding on all who fell under that particular industry. Both the agreements produced by the industrial councils and the regulations agreed upon in the industrial boards remained effective for a year whereupon they were re-negotiated or reviewed.

After the strikes of 1980, a new mechanism found favour with the government, the workers committee. Such bodies had been in existence in some firms in the early sixties in some cases, but the majority were formed in the mid to late 1970s [Riddel Report, 1981: 255] as a means of facilitating consultation between employees and employers where trade unionism was weak and were seen by some as a "labour control" mechanism, directed at solving shop-floor issues. Now the new Minister of Labour wanted their wider application as "liaison committees" [Wood, 1987: 69]. A later development was the fusing of the workers' committee and the works councils.

In the aftermath of the strike the major role of these committees was seen as the maintenance of "harmonious relations" in the work situation and as means for increasing productivity and workers' "loyalty" to the firm. Wood doubts the potential of these committees for facilitating workers' control of jobs and job related issues, given that they had no power to engage in negotiations for wages with management.

But workers seem to have reacted favourably to the suggestion, such that committees were formed in, "the vast majority of medium to large sized firms by early 1981", according to the Riddel Commission Report. An anomaly of these workers committees is that they were being formed outside of the structures of the existing trade unions. The Riddel Commission points out that the guidelines on the formation of the Workers' Committees is not clear as to the relationship between these committees and the trade unions [Riddel Report, 1981: 235].

Could the formation of these committees have been an attempt then to establish an alternative to the trade unions? The Anglo-American Group, for example, noted in its evidence to the Riddel Commission that, while it accepted the idea of a workers committee, it wondered what a workers committee could accomplish that a trade union would not [Riddel Report, 1981: 236]. The government for its part established the committees on the advice of "Industrial Relations experts" and regarded them as a way of cultivating in the workers a sense of belonging to the company and an avenue for participating in the decision making process thereof [Sachikonye, 1986: 257]. Time and further research is required to determine whether this in fact reflects the experience of the workers or just the pious hopes of the government, or indeed whether the institution is merely a mechanism to effect the incorporation of workers in their own domination and exploitation by capital with the connivance of the state. Evidence from Tanzania [Mapolu, 1972] and Zambia would indicate the latter to be the case there. Workers' Committees are sanctioned in the LR Act (1984). They may be formed by workers at the enterprise level and have the power to represent such employees in negotiating collective agreements with the employer. This they can do when such employees are not represented by a union or, where a union exists, when the latter has granted written permission for the workers' committee to so act [LR Act, (1984): 194]. A collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a workers committee is referred to the concerned employees and trade union for approval. Such an agreement becomes binding on the employees and the employers once approved by the trade union and more than 50% of the employees.

7.4 iii) Procedures for Resolving Industrial Disputes

The procedures for resolving industrial disputes provided in the ICA (1959) involved a combination of conciliation and arbitration. They were often long and cumbersome and probably quite difficult for the ordinary worker to follow. This, in the view of some observers leads workers to resort to wildcat strikes [EIU, 1981: 61]. The Riddel Commission acknowledged the need for the law to provide an effective framework for the resolution of disputes in the work place and at the industrial level. It also observed that the two most common causes of disputes, were "rights issues" and "interests issues". The former disputes involved the infringement of rights already agreed upon in an existing collective agreement, while the latter refers to disputes that arose in the process of workers' negotiating their "rights" such as

improvements in their physical environment at the local level or work site, the extension of canteen facilities or use of toilet facilities by rank and file workers.³¹ Under the ICA (1959) a dispute at the industrial council level may be resolved by a mediator invited by the industrial council or failing this, the parties to the dispute may refer it to the Industrial Tribunal for arbitration. Where the parties voluntarily refer the dispute to the Tribunal, the decision of the Tribunal becomes binding and forecloses any resort to industrial action. Where the parties to a dispute do not agree to call a mediator or submit the dispute to the Tribunal, they must report the dispute to the Minister who submits the dispute for mediation. If this fails the Minister submits the dispute for arbitration. Where the parties are compelled by the Minister to submit their dispute to arbitration, the decision of the Tribunal is not binding and industrial action is permissible [Riddel Report, 1981: 278]. The Commission felt that this procedure was too involved and suggested as an alternative the establishment of a National Labour Relations Board for hearing and resolving all industrial relations disputes the decision of which should be final.

Some of the recommendations of the Riddel Commission have been accepted by the government and incorporated into the new Labour Relations Act (1984). The Act stipulates new procedures for resolving industrial disputes and the specific circumstances and industries in which industrial action is permitted. As in Zambia, however, the LRA has utilised the concept of "essential services" to prohibit strike action in 21 economic activities. The schedule of activities is very similar to the one stipulated in the Zambian Industrial Relations Act (1971).³²

7.4 iv Government Response to Strikes

The Zimbabwean government's response to strikes can perhaps be gleaned from an examination of some incidences during the 1980-1981 strike wave. In two cases in 1980, the government forcibly intervened. In the case of the miners striking at Wankie owned by Anglo-American, the army was deployed to protect mine installations as well as to safeguard the personal safety of strike breakers [Wood, 1987: 66]. At sugar estates in the south of the country, owned by the same multinational company, police were deployed ostensibly to protect company property. As Wood points out these two strikes must have been a source of embarrassment to the government as they occurred at a time when the Prime Minister was conducting meetings with Harry Oppenheimer, head of Anglo-American, owners of the enterprises at which the strikes were occurring. This must have contributed to the manner in which the strikes were handled. At Wankie, the full force of the law (ICA) was brought to bear upon the strikers and 13 were arrested [Wood, 1987: 66]. At another mine, guards opened fire on striking workers some of whom sustained injuries. At Swift Transport in Harare, the Minister of Labour and Social Services, Kumbirai Kangai, ordered police to disperse the crowd of workers on the pickets and issued the warning:

I will crack my whip if they do not go back to work. They must go back now.

When the workers refused to go back to work, 1,000 were dismissed. As in Botswana, the colonial practice of selective re-hiring was used. All the workers, save 98 were re-hired [Wood, 1987: 67]. Despite the demonstrated use of force and intimidatory tactics against strikers, industrial unrest continued in Zimbabwe throughout much of 1980. Workers were probably striking as a way of calling attention to their conditions. Industrial action is reported to have escalated during the period the Riddel Commission was gathering evidence on industrial relations in the country, such that by the end of the year, Zimbabwe had recorded the highest figures for strikes and striker days since the general strike of 1948. As the figures below show, Zimbabwe recorded a higher number of striker days than South Africa.

1980	Zimbabwe	South Africa
Strikes	153	207
Striker Days	300,000	174,000

Source: Wood, S.A.L.B., 1987: 87

Nor was strike action confined to 1980. Strikes continued during 1981, involving teachers, nurses, railwaymen, firemen and bus drivers. Government response continued to be severe, with strikers being arrested and charged with criminal offences. In 1981 emergency powers (described as "draconian" by Wood) were proclaimed by the government to curtail strikes on the railways and called on railway workers to devote their whole time to the railways [Wood, 1987: 68].

7.4 vi) Trade Unions and Politics

Instead of discussing the formal rights of trade unions to participate in politics, I will examine the process of building the federation of trade unions after independence. By so doing, it will be possible to show both the attempts by political parties to attract the support of trade unions and the extent of trade union involvement in politics. We shall also be able to determine whether the formation of the federation was a voluntary action by the unions. While a multi-party state, the possibility existed in Zimbabwe of different trade unions being aligned to different parties. It is reasonable to assume that the white unions would favour the conservative alliance, while the black unions were more likely to be aligned with either ZAPU or ZANU (PF).³³ Some of the unions were pro "internal settlement" parties, while others had clandestinely supported the liberation struggle. In 1980 two identifiable major trade union centres had emerged, the United Trade Unions of Zimbabwe (UTUZ) which had been "pro internal settlement" and the Zimbabwe Trade Union Congress, (ZWCTU) which was sympathetic to ZANU (PF) [Sachikonye, 1986: 256]. There were also other middle-of-the-road centres. Since 1980 the government has been interested in encouraging the building of a national centre and creating a trade union federation that would operate as the "industrial wing" of ZANU in the effort of national construction. Responding to

trends in political fortunes, most black union organisers switched support from the "pro-settlement" UTUZ to the pro-ZANU grouping the ZWCTU led by Albert Mugabe, the Prime Minister's brother. Whereas before independence the ZWCTU had had no affiliates, having concentrated its energies on political mobilising for the liberation struggle, this soon changed. The ZWCTU cadres in industries used the government supported campaign to form workers' committees to improve their standing at the local level. Meanwhile the UTUZ was allowed to "wither away". This led to complaints from members of the chamber of commerce of "the apparent entry of party politics into the work of the workers' committees" [Riddel Report, 1981: 247].

In 1981 a seminar on "The role of Trade Unions in the Economic and Social Reconstruction of Zimbabwe" convened by a consortium of Western oriented labour organisations, such as the ICFTU and the Commonwealth Trade Union Council, provided an opportunity of bringing the various trade union centres together. Following this seminar, the Minister invited "20 prominent trade unionists to elect a national co-ordinating committee of the Zimbabwe congress of trade unions" (ZWCTU). After deliberations, these chosen men were appointed to the National Committee which as might have been expected, was made up mostly of ZANU(PF) supporters. In February 1981 the ZWCTU held its first congress and Albert Mugabe was elected Secretary General of the Congress [Wood, 1987: 72-73].

In Zimbabwe therefore, the government with the financial assistance of the ICFTU, Commonwealth Trade Union Council, the African American Labour Centre and the Frederick Ebert Foundation of West Germany has used its political position to build for itself a trade union organisation under the wing of its Party.³⁴ Time and further research will reveal how this relationship will evolve, whether the Trade Union Organisation will extricate itself from the wing of the ruling party to seek organisational autonomy, or whether as in Tanzania it will acquiesce in this role. Theoretically, the LR Act (1984) allows "any group of trade unions to form a federation". So unlike Zambia, in Zimbabwe, a central federation is not imposed on the workers by the state. It remains to be seen whether this will continue to be the case under a One-Party State.

The Zimbabwean trade union experience in the first seven years of independence reflects the same cautious approach that has characterised government's economic policy. The government is committed to promoting economic growth with the participation of private foreign investment and Western aid. Foreign investors need to be reassured of peaceful industrial relations and the government appears willing to guarantee this. This is portrayed in its response to strikes, whereby it has not hesitated to use the police and army against strikers to protect private property. Simultaneously, government's socialist rhetoric has created expectations among the workers which it cannot quite ignore. These have been partially whetted by such measures as the announcement of a legal minimum wage for all categories of wor-

kers including farm labourers and domestic household workers. The government has also tried to consolidate its hold on organised labour by promoting ZANU oriented trade unions to prominence in the ZWCTU, although observers report that Albert Mugabe was quite open in expressing criticism of government policy and practice. It may be that continued ZANU government control of organised labour may depend on the nature of the leadership that emerges after the demise of Albert Mugabe.

Another source of irritation for the government has been the activities of the International Labour Federations. Much as the ZANU government has tried to bring organised labour under its control and engage it as a partner in development. It is also quite anxious to protect it from the influence of the international organisations such as the ICFTU, AALC and the West German Frederick Elbert Foundation. These organisations offer financial aid to African trade union centres, but the ZANU government does not want the ZWCTU to be imbued with ideas of organisational autonomy to the extent that it will pose a threat to the hegemony of the government as the fountain of all authority in the land.

One can conclude that a combination of the historical weakness of the trade union movement, the nature of the economic structure obtaining and the ideological orientation of the ZANU (PF) government have produced a situation in Zimbabwe whereby organised labour is evolving under the tutelage of the state. It is being cultivated as a partner in development, preferably a loyal and subordinate partner. The government still has the resources and the political will to provide most of the welfare services to workers both on the land and in the commercial sectors. Organised labour for its part is encouraged to concentrate its efforts on building its administrative structure and mobilising the masses. Time alone will tell the outcome of these efforts.

7.5 CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the situation obtaining in Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana and Zimbabwe and placed it in a context based in conclusions drawn from our research on the Zambian case, we may now ask how far any of the five may be described as possessing labour control regimes. By labour control regimes we mean a systematic and comprehensive set of policies, backed by legal statutes, designed for and directed at the mobilisation, education, deployment and control of labour. A definitive answer to this must await further comprehensive research on all aspects of labour policy. For purposes of this thesis we can give a partial response based on those aspects of labour policy that pertain to organised labour.

To begin with, the tradition of workers organising in collectivities was established during the colonial era. But the strength of trade unionism achieved varies from one country to another. In all cases the ability of the trade union movement to assert itself in the post-colonial period, has been to a large extent, determined by the historical strength attained before independence. In all the four cases reviewed, only

Kenya approximates as strong a trade union movement in the colonial period as Zambia. In Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Botswana, the trade union movement was by comparison weak. A number of factors explain the varied developments. Firstly, the nature and level of economic development was a major contributory factor. Zambia's mining based economy played a pivotal role in facilitating the development of a strong trade union movement led by the workers concentrated in the mining towns. In contrast, Botswana which had been established as a source of labour for the South African mines did not develop a strong trade union movement at home. Secondly the nature of colonial rule was a major influence on the prospects of trade unionism in the colonies. In settler colony Zimbabwe, the legal framework tightly restricted the formation of trade unions among Africans as the democratic structures that were being developed were not intended to include blacks. In contrast, although Kenya had a large settler community, the colonial office had included it in its 1929 memorandum on the paramountcy of African interests. Hence when the time came to instruct colonial peoples in democratic principles, Kenya also received its own trade union adviser to help Africans develop trade unions along the correct lines.

After the attainment of independence the role of trade unions has in all cases been redefined by the African governments. Some have been more drastic in this than others. The main factors influencing the determination of the resulting role has been the level of economic development coupled with the concern for the state to accumulate. For this the state needs to promote economic growth. Lacking sufficient resources for investment, the state has been anxious to attract foreign capital. To do this the state feels it needs to portray a peaceful industrial relations scene. This general trend has been tempered by the existing level of economic development and the ideological orientation of the leaders. Thus in resource poor Tanzania with a weak indigenous bourgeoisie and a socialist oriented government, there was a complete transformation of the trade union movement. The trade union federation was taken over by the government bureaucracy, despite or perhaps because of the socialist rhetoric of the TANU government. This pattern seems to have been replicated in capitalist oriented Botswana. At independence in 1966, Botswana was one of the poorest countries in Africa with a low resource base and an almost non-existent indigenous bourgeoisie. Consequently, the state has jealously guarded its post-colonial prosperity, by strictly guarding newly established industries. It has restricted the development of trade unions to narrow economic issues and prevented the formation of general unions and reacted viciously to strikes.

In contrast, in relatively resource rich Kenya with a relatively strong indigenous bourgeoisie, trade union activity has not been taken over by the government. Instead it has been diverted to participate in economic activities alongside private and state owned enterprises. At the political level trade unionists and their organisations have been drawn into the clientelist politics of the bourgeoisie, thus to a certain extent dissipating the class consciousness of the trade union leaders who have concentrated on their own

economic interests and those of their members. But from a liberal perspective trade unions would appear relatively free to operate as interest groups.

The benign tolerance of trade unions can also be seen in newly independent Zimbabwe, where a socialist oriented government with reasonable economic resources and an established industrial base has adopted a policy of cautious encouragement of trade unions. However, while trade unions are encouraged to organise on an industrial basis, the government in its desire to maintain the confidence of private capital and the international capitalist community has, as in all the other cases reviewed, put restrictions on the right of workers to strike. In contrast, Zambia at independence was characterised by a combination of factors that made it possible for the government to adopt a supportive attitude towards trade unions. First the government had sufficient resources to pay increased wages to an expanding workforce in wage employment. Secondly, the trade union movement was sufficiently strong to make its complete takeover, both unnecessary and undesirable. Thus, while it had the resources, the government was willing to grant workers substantial wage increases, both in response to workers' demands and its own need to legitimate its rule. The need to establish legitimate rule is part of an effort to entrench bourgeois hegemony. This effort seems to have been pursued more zealously in Zambia than in the other four countries reviewed.

In the other countries workers' education, for example, is undertaken by the trade unions themselves or by trade union centres funded by international organisations as in Kenya and Botswana. Nowhere else is there a political college dedicated to the cultivation and development of a civic culture among workers and grass roots leaders on the scale and level of the Zambian president's Citizenship College. In this regard the Zambian experience remains unique. For the time being worker's education has not yet produced the desired results especially in terms of preventing strikes. Shop-floor workers have continued to engage in industrial action to back demands or in protest against unfair practices. The government has not hesitated to deploy the use of force to end the strikes and restore order, which as we have demonstrated in Chapter Five, is undertaken simultaneously with efforts to mould the orientation of the trade unions as to their role in industry and in society. Strife persists, as we have demonstrated in Chapter Six, because of the divergent interpretations of the role of trade unions in contemporary Zambian society.

As well as differences, the four countries reviewed in this chapter, along with Zambia, portray certain common features regarding the government defined role of trade unions in the post-colonial period. As Table 23 demonstrates, all five recognise the right of workers to engage in collective bargaining in the private sector, though only in Zambia is this right enjoyed by civil servants. However, much civil service work has been declared an essential service over the years in Zambia, making striking largely illegal within this sector. Thus, although there is collective bargaining, it is not backed by the freedom of wor-

kers to strike. In the other four countries we have examined, civil servants are accorded the right to have consultations only in Kenya, while the other three use other methods of determining civil service salaries.

In all five, collective bargaining takes place within a framework of some form of incomes policy, although the degree to which these incomes policies are implemented and adhered to vary from one to another. Botswana seems to possess the most clear and closely regulated incomes policy, while Kenya's incomes policy is operationalised through the tripartite agreements between government, employers and employees representatives, which while imposing wage freezes, also extract commitments from employers to increase their work force by a stipulated percentage. In as far the right to strike is concerned, two of the five give a qualified freedom to workers to strike, Botswana and Kenya. In both cases, however, mechanisms exist for government intervention to declare any industrial action unlawful. In Tanzania and Zambia strikes are to all practical purposes proscribed. In Zimbabwe, strikes were allowed in certain circumstances under the ICA (1959) but the LRA (1984) seems to have prohibited strikes altogether, except in defense of the existence of a trade union. One mechanism common in all five countries is the concept of "essential service". Special regulations are promulgated for governing the conduct of industrial relations in essential services. In Zambia strikes are criminalised in essential services. In Botswana they can occur only when the Minister fails to act within the stipulated time. But in all strikes are tightly restricted and those contravening these regulations are subject to severe penalties.

Greater uniformity is evident in dispute resolving procedures. In all five countries, voluntary machinery exists within the framework of collective agreements. When these fail to resolve disputes, an ascending order of conciliation and arbitration is provided leading to arbitration by an Industrial Court or a functional equivalent. Thus strike action as the ultimate mechanism of resolving disputes is replaced by the decision of a legal practitioner. This brings us to the question of the role governments envisage for trade unions. In Botswana and Kenya, the two most capitalist oriented countries in our sample, government regards trade unions as junior partners in economic development. The preferred role of the union is to mobilise workers for greater productivity. Secondly, emphasis is placed on unions engaging in profit making ventures, although the extent to which these have been successful is debatable. In Tanzania on the other hand, emphasis is placed on workers' participation in the enterprises in which they are employed, as worker directors or through the workers councils. This being the most socialist of all countries, no attempt is made to encourage workers to engage in profit generating schemes. In Zambia, the government has promoted the idea of worker directors in parastatal companies and works councils in both parastatal and private companies, while the trade union congress and some of the unions have initiated their own economic ventures. In Zimbabwe, the government is cautiously encouraging trade unions to develop as instruments of collective bargaining within carefully (government) defined param-

ters. Unions are also encouraged to be instruments of mass mobilisation and of inseminating government policy to the workers.

The above analysis refers to the institutional framework and the schedule of laws and regulations as laid down by the governments. The practice however, is an outcome of the interaction between the three major actors in industrial relations - the government, the employers and employees representatives - and depends on how each of these interprets and implements policies laid down. The implementation of policy in each country is influenced by such factors as the political structure, the economic structure, the strength of the labour movement, the historical tradition of trade unionism and, lastly, the ideological orientation of the political leaders at the national level.

The economic structure, which to a certain extent is determined by the ideological orientation of the national leadership, is perhaps the most important factor. Thus we have seen that in the most capitalist countries Botswana and Kenya, considerable pressure is brought to bear upon the trade unions to direct their energies into business ventures, while attention is deflected from the union's role in collective bargaining by the stringent application of an incomes policy in one and the use of tripartite agreements in the other. In the most socialist country, Tanzania, emphasis has not been on building trade unions as autonomous organisations. Instead, the effect of government policy has been to reorientate the nature of trade union activity from the articulation of members' economic interests to being solely instruments for management of conflict to ensure amicable industrial relations and higher productivity. Simultaneously, an effort has been made to facilitate the participation of workers in the enterprises in which they are engaged. This is a laudable intention. However, the capitalist structure of the economy, which has persisted despite nationalisation, and especially the capitalist structure of the enterprises, render these efforts incapable of delivering meaningful opportunities for genuine workers' participation.

The political structures of the countries we have analyzed do not appear to have had much effect on trade union policy. Both multiparty Botswana and the One Party Kenya seem equally anxious to keep trade unions apolitical. They have been especially concerned to ensure that political elements opposed to the ruling party do not exercise any influence with the trade unions. On the other hand, both the TANU/Chama Cha Mapinduzi government in One Party Tanzania and the ZANU (PF) government in multiparty Zimbabwe, have encouraged close relations between the union and the Party, especially at the shop-floor level where the leadership of unions and that of the Party has been in the same hands. One explanation of this is that ZANU's (PF) efforts in building an industrial wing is part of the consolidation of power going on at the political level towards establishing a One Party State. If this is accepted one can then conclude that it is not so much the number of parties that matter, as the nature of the governing party and the ideological orientation of the party concerned. Thus a party that has socialist aspir-

ations exhibits tendencies of being omnipotent throughout society. It would want to be active in mass mobilisation in society in general but particularly in industry. In contrast, a political party that espouses capitalism does not have the same motivation towards mass mobilisation and once it rids itself of political opponents, it atrophies as has KANU in Kenya. In Botswana the BDP persists because it faces credible challenges in the political arena. But neither is really concerned to establish industrial party wings.

The economic and political structure of a polity, however, constitute only the environment within which a trade union movement either thrives or withers. An essential component of this survival game is the nature and strength of the trade union movement itself. One lesson that can be drawn from the comparison undertaken above is that none of the four countries exhibit as strong and as well articulated a trade union movement as exists in Zambia.

In terms of Davies' categorisation, one can argue that trade unions in Botswana and Kenya have been incorporated as government's business partners in development. In Tanzania and Zimbabwe, government efforts are directed towards turning trade unions into militant industrial wings of the ruling party. In Zambia, on the other hand the trade union has carved out a role for itself as the right wing opposition to the ruling party and government.

NOTES

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Tim Shaw's categorization in the article in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 20, 2, 1982. We are really referring to professed orientations rather than to institutionalised systems.
2. At the beginning of my research and for the period covered in this chapter, Zimbabwe was a multi-party state, yet to be declared a one-party State. And during the "Dawn Broadcast" (1980) Mugabe had declared his ruling Party, Socialist, to be guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Ref. Riddel Commission Report.
3. Government of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 10, 1965, p.56.
4. For the number of unions, refer to *Africa Contemporary Record*, ACR B. 132. For wage employment as a percentage of the work-force, ref. Muir and Brown, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 1975, Vol. 13, 3, p.334 and J. S. Henley, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 1978, Vol. 26, 2, p.226.
5. The KFL under Mboya was Luo led and pro-capitalism, but Kenyatta had been against it as he suspected Mboya intended to use it for higher political ambitions. The KAWC was also Luo led and initially had enjoyed the President's support as a means of neutralising Mboya's power base. However its radical orientation posed the threat of a trade union movement dominated by Oginga Odinga's allies [Sandbrook, 1972, 136]. This prospect was more objectionable to government because Odinga was both Luo and socialist. The way out was enforced unity of the trade union movement and neutralisation of both contending factions.
6. Ken Coates and Tony Topham, *Trade Unions in Britain*, 1988 ed., p.31. They quote a statement by a Judge in Britain in 1923.
7. This point is elaborated further in Lubeck, 1987, *The African Bourgeoisie*, Chapt. 1; and Iwiji In: Damachi, 1979, p.223.
8. Federation of Kenya Employers, Annual Report, 1973, p.5.; and Iwiji, 1979, p.224.
9. For details of examples during 1972-73 period, refer to Sandbrook, 1975, Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.
10. Nyerere makes this point in a speech quoted in Pratt, *The Critical Phase*, pp. 233-234.
11. Social transformation of society entails a realignment of roles of individuals and institutions in keeping with the desired ideals. In Tanzania the role of unions was, however, being redefined even before the formal commitment to socialism was made.
12. For an example of a Zambian parallel, read Mr. Musonda's letter of resignation from the ZCTU in 1966 in Chapter 3 above.
13. Nyerere, speech, 1962, quoted in Bienefeld, JOMAS, 1979, 571 and in Bienefeld in Sandbrook and Cohen, 1975, p.245.
14. Turner Report on Tanzania, quoted by Routh in Damachi et al., 1976, 29.
15. According to the original Act. I have not had access to any amendments which might have been passed since.
16. Mapolu gives the details of the process of the formation of workers' councils. See Mapolu, 1972, pp. 25-29.
17. Mihyo gives details of worker's attempts during the strikewave of 1971-73 to take over privately owned factories and convert them into cooperatives [Mihyo, 1975, p.62].
18. Massey, 1980, for example, quotes a speech in which the President defended police action during the 1975 strike.
19. At the OAU conference, Botswana opposed a proposed resolution urging African countries to withdraw labour from South Africa. Botswana suggested an amendment to the effect that employment at home should be provided first. Cited in Massey, 1980, p.17.

20. Government of Botswana, "National Policy on Incomes, Employment, Prices and Profits", Paper No. 2, 1972.
21. Sr. Seretse Khama, "Trade Unions in Botswana", Africa Today, Vol. 19, 2, p.11, 1972.
22. Government of Botswana, Trades Disputes Act, 1982, p. A70.
23. *ibid.*, p. A82.
24. Government of Botswana, Schedule of Essential Services:-
 Air Traffic Control Services
 Bank of Botswana
 Botswana Vaccine Laboratory
 Electricity Services
 Fire Services of the government, of the railways and of local authorities
 Health Services
 Sanitary Services
 Telecommunication Services
 Water services
 Transport Services necessary to the operation of any of the above named services
 Source: The Trade Disputes Act (1982).
25. *ibid.*, p. A83.
26. Government of Zimbabwe, Growth with Equity, p.1.
27. *ibid.* p. 10.
28. Sachikonye in Mandaza, 1986, pp. 249-250.
 Schedule of Laws
 i) The Master and Servant Act, 1901
 The Pass Law of 1902
 The Private Locations Ordinance of 1910
 The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934
 The Native Registration Act of 1936
 The Sedition Act of 1936
 The Compulsory Native Labour Act of 1943.
29. ICA, (1934), (1959), cited in the Riddel Commission Report, 1981, p. 239. These are the essential workers of the white establishment. Wood includes farm workers among the groups precluded from forming unions under this Act. The Riddel Commission does not.
30. Economist Intelligence Unit, 1981, 60. Also Wood, 1987, 50.

**No. of Workers in Employment in
Zimbabwe**

	Year	No.
	1974	1,033,000
	1975	1,050,000
June	1980	1,026,000
December	1980	1,001,000
March	1985	1,042,500

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1981,
27 and Country Profile, 1987, 11.

31. Definition given in the Riddel Commission Report, p. 276.

32. Schedules of Essential Services in Zambia and Zimbabwe:

ZAMBIA	ZIMBABWE
a) Any service relating to the generation, supply or distribution of electricity	a) Any service relating to the generation, supply or distribution of electricity; or
b) Any fire brigade or fire service;	b) Any fire brigade or fire service; or
c) Any sewerage, rubbish disposal or other sanitation service	c) Any sewerage, rubbish disposal or other sanitation service; or
d) Any health, hospital or ambulance service;	d) Any health, hospital or ambulance service; or
e) Any service relating to the supply or distribution of water;	e) Any service relating to the production, supply, delivery or distribution of water; or
f) Any service relating to production, supply, delivery or distribution of food or fuel;	f) Any service relating to the supply or distribution of water; or
g) Mining, including any service required for the working of a mine;	g) Mining, including any service required for the working of a mine; or
h) Any communication service	h) Any communication service; or
i) Any transport service, and any service relating to the repair and maintenance or to the driving loading and unloading of a vehicle for use in the transport service.	i) Any transport service, and any service relating to the repair and maintenance or to the driving, loading and unloading of a vehicle for use in any transport service; or
j) Any road, railway, bridge, ferry, pontoon, airfield, harbour or dock;	j) Any service relating to any road, railway, bridge, ferry, pontoon or airfield; or
k) Any other service facility, whether or not of a kind similar to the foregoing, declared by the President to be a necessary service for the purposes of and under the Preservation of Public Security Regulations or any other regulations or enactment replacing the same;	k) Any other service or occupation which the Minister may, after consultation with the appropriate trade union and employers organization

Source: Industrial Relations Act, (1971), p.10

Source: Labour Relations Act, (1984), p.233

33. In fact, Wood has argued that white workers were not revolutionary in Zimbabwe, and that if anything, they constituted the majority of those that emigrated from Zimbabwe between 1978 and 1984. Wood, 1987.
34. None Western Trade Union Federations and countries such as the WFTU, Eastern Europe, China and Cuba have also given aid to unions and union federations in Zimbabwe. Wood, 1987, 71.

CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter we shall review some of the major points of the research that has been made with regard to **Zambian workers**, situate our own research within it and assess the major lessons that can be drawn from it.

One of the earliest studies on **Zambia labour** and the development of trade unions is Epstein's *Politics in an urban African Community*, which was carried out from the social anthropological perspective. He was concerned with analyzing the emergence, conditions, social differentiation and organisation of the new African workers in the towns. His study is relevant to an understanding of the working class, not only because the institution with which he was affiliated – the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute of Human Relations – was charged after the Copperbelt strikes of 1935 with facilitating an understanding of Africans in urban areas, but also because it gives detailed accounts of early working class organisation and action. He acknowledged the growth of an African working class as opposed to the more common tendency to regard Africans as migrant labour. He also traced the various stages in the growth of workers' organisations. Valuable as it is, however, Epstein's study is restricted to the early development of the **Zambian working class**. Moreover, it does not address the specific relationship between the state and organised labour, which is our main interest in this thesis. A second work, that by Zelniker, also provides an account of the formation of the **Zambian working class**. From a political science perspective, Zelniker investigated the changing "patterns of trade unionism" covering the period from 1948 to the eve of independence in 1964. By analyzing the relationships between the AMU and the political parties, ANC and UNIP, Zelniker concluded that the miners had evolved into a labour aristocracy of some sort by putting emphasis on monetary gain at the expense of political issues. Leaving aside the accuracy of this interpretation, what is of interest to us is his discussion of UNIP's struggle to take over the AMU, coopting its leaders. Zelniker's analysis of the patterns of trade unionism is limited, however, to the case of the AMU. In an important sense, the present study extends the analysis to the trade union movement as a whole, by looking at how the leadership of the Trade Union Congress has shifted from pro-UNIP, politically oriented trade unionists, to pragmatic, economic trade unionists.

Zelniker's study is paralleled by that of Bates on UNIP and the Mineworkers' Union. Like Zelniker, Bates seems to portray the MUZ as a selfish economic trade union that resists the well-intentioned development efforts of the government. Bates has analyzed the attempts by government to use UNIP and the AMU to constrain the economic demands of the miners in the interests of the development of the country as a whole. The government has sought to entice the unions to adopt a productionist stand.

But in response to their members' interests, the unions have resisted this role. Bates concludes that "the development labour policy of the government fails partly because the union is unable to fulfil the productionist role assigned it by the government". Bates' optimism about the intentions of UNIP to promote development is commendable but the problem is that he fails to analyze the nature of development in respect of which the workers are invited to eschew strike action and increase productivity. What is happening is not development but underdevelopment and the workers are loath to contribute to this. Instead they ask that they be paid increased wages to enable them to purchase sufficient mealie-meal for their families.

Both Zelniker and Bates have made important contributions to Zambian labour historiography. Similarly important, although fashioned along anthropological rather than historical lines, is Kapferer's study of factory workers in Kabwe. His analysis concerns interpersonal interactions and the relationship of workers and management on the shop-floor. It mentions the problems the union, the NUCIW has had in securing recognition in the enterprises. Of interest from the perspective of this thesis is the relationship observed between the local union officials and the local Party and government officials, whereby the government's concern for economic development and economic stability made for an anti-strike policy and rendered shop-floor union and party officials incapable of using their militant tactics to advance the interests of their members. But Kapferer's study is limited by virtue of being a case study of one factory in one town. My own project has been to extend the investigation further, to discover whether incidences discussed by Kapferer are part of a common pattern in the whole society or not and, if so, what meaning one should attach to them. Central to the argument of the thesis is an analysis of the role of the state in the promotion of development. The works of Kapferer, Bates, Zelniker and Epstein all assume that the government is promoting development. None has systematically analysed the social composition of the state to determine the class interests it represents or promotes, although, in their defence, it can be argued that that would be too grand a task to be accomplished in one project. Subsequent studies that have investigated the growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie have revealed that there has been a significant expansion of this class following the economic reforms of the late '60s. And that during the 1970s this class has found its way into the decision making institutions of the country such as the National Assembly [Baylies and Szeftel, 1982].

What is still lacking is a comprehensive analysis of the link and relationship between the Zambian capitalist state and the trade unions. The subject, however, has not been entirely neglected. Gertzel in [1975 and 1984] discussed the relationship between "labour and the state" concentrating on certain incidences involving the government and the mineworker's union. In the 1975 study her main aim was to demonstrate that the government had thwarted the development of a strong union among the mineworkers in order to prevent the growth of an autonomous centre of power which could have been used as a spring-

board of political opposition in the One Party State [Gertzel, 1975: 290]. In the 1984 study, Gertzel focuses on the 1980–1981 strikes among the mineworkers against the introduction of the local government bill and as a reaction to the expulsion of the ZCTU leaders from the Party (UNIP). Her main aim was to demonstrate the political orientation of that particular strike wave. Although I have drawn on these studies the subject of my main interest has been the relationship between the state and the ZCTU as a federation of trade unions in the country and as the spokesman of the labour movement as a whole.

Shimamponda's recent work on the "evolution of the Zambian Industrial Relations Systems" is an important contribution to the growing historiography of Zambian labour, but he is concerned with analyzing the administrative structure of the industrial relations system and the extent to which this has been influenced by "ILO standards and the British system".

Kalula in a recent monograph discusses the relationship between the state and trade unions, concentrating on the government's efforts to control the latter through legislative means. He stresses the fact that in its efforts, the government has used pressure rather than force. But he does not explain the purpose of this control or its social consequences.

Despite the work that has been done on various aspects of trade unionism, workers' struggles, relationships between unions and the Party and even between capital and labour, on the Zambian Copperbelt, there is little consensus as to the precise relationship between the Zambian trade unions and the government. Davies made the passing reference that "although Zambian unions are outside the ruling party structure, they are subjected to strict legislative controls over administration" [Davies, 1966: 137]. Turok has gone even further, arguing that "the trade union leaders have been incorporated into the party-state apparatus" [Turok, 1988: 88]. Freund, on the other hand, holds that the Zambian trade union movement has not been incorporated by the state [Freund, 1988: 104]. Hence the questions still remain: has government in fact incorporated organised labour? What mechanisms has government used in attempting to do so? What has been the aim and the consequences of these incorporative efforts and how has labour reacted? In the final analysis, what does an account of the process tell us about the nature of the post-colonial state and the role of trade unions in it?

In this thesis we have addressed these questions and analysed the process and mechanisms through which the state has attempted to incorporate labour. We have argued that this process is consistent with the agenda of the dominant class to establish its hegemony over the subordinate classes. As a peripheral capitalist state, some sections of the dominant class in Zambia are domiciled outside the country. It is those locally resident who are most directly involved in the political process and who take on board the political effort required to ensure that industrial relations are conducive to the generation of profit and accumulation of capital. More specifically, it is the local governing class which exercises most influence

and whose interests can be seen as most immediately reflected in action by the state. While the process of mediation involves concessions to various interests, the overall result is in the direction of increasing bourgeois hegemony. With regard to workers, the process has involved restrictions in the scope of action of trade union organisation.

Nevertheless, the Zambian trade union movement still remains outside of the administrative structures of the party and government. Freedom of association is still guaranteed by the Republican constitution, such that, at the industrial level, workers are free to form workers' associations so long as they observe the "one union, one industry" policy. In theory the right of association exists but in practice it is qualified by government policy. In certain respects, this epitomises the manner in which government relates to labour in Zambian society. The approach of the state has not been through a forcible take over of the trade union movement, but a methodical and considered strategy of changing labour's attitude and perception of its values, methods, goals and role in society.

This state of affairs has evolved as a consequence of the specific economic, industrial and political history of Zambia. The development of mining and associated service industries resulted in the growth of an industrial community concentrated in one province. The process of proletarianisation that emerged in consequence entailed both the physical separation of workers from their traditional means of production (land) and the emotional, social-psychological experiences of alienation, loneliness and frustration. The combination of these factors led gradually to the emergence of a workers' consciousness which was expressed both at an individual and at a group level and also found expression in covert as well as overt forms of protest. Slowly, this worker's consciousness materialised in tentative workers' organisation, such as dance societies, religious organisations, burial societies and welfare organisations before finally being expressed in proper industrial trade unions. By the time of independence, therefore, a militant tradition of trade unionism had been established among Zambia's proletariat. Workers had staged protests in 1935, industrial strikes in 1940 and 1952 and political strikes in 1956. Although the leadership of the trade union movement was weakened by factional in-fighting, personality clashes and contests for leadership positions, the movement was still too strong for the government to take over. In addition, the political inclination of the governing class and the resources available to it made a complete take-over of the movement both unnecessary and undesirable. Rather than integrate organised labour into the administrative structure of the government bureaucracy, the Zambian governing class opted to encourage the development of a separate organisation of workers and then attempted to use the latter to incorporate workers into a government defined political order.

During the first eight years of independence this was done under the political framework of a commitment to Westminster Democracy. This framework of political organisation was abandoned, however, in

the wake of regional conflicts which threatened national integrity. As an alternative the One Party form of parliamentary democracy was adopted. It was justified as more conducive to political unity under circumstances where ethnic diversity provided opportunities for politicians to advance their personal political careers by exploiting ethnic differences. Theoretically, commitment to democratic principles has remained under the One Party state rule. The right of association, for example, has been retained in the constitution. But in practice, restrictions are placed on the circumstances under which workers may associate with each other. The same applies to the freedoms of speech, movement and the press.

The government has endeavoured to develop a functional relationship with the trade union movement, not only as a means of bringing organized labour under its control but also of cultivating support for Party and government policies. In order to achieve this, the government has employed a two-pronged strategy. The first consists of "carrot" and "stick" elements whereby, for example, government has granted wage increases as a way of both satisfying workers' demands and of soliciting their support so as to enhance the hegemony of the governing class. Other "carrot" elements are contained in the legislation that forms the framework for labour policy. This is especially true of certain aspects of the IRA (1971) such as those providing for the extension of dues-stop-order facilities to a trade union. Between 1974 and 1984, this provision worked in favour of unions, strengthening their financial resources. Since 1985, however, the government has turned this "carrot" into a "stick" by threatening to withdraw the dues-stop-order from any union where members went on wildcat strikes. During 1985 and 1986, eight unions were affected by this statutory instrument before it was suspended in 1986. Other forms of punishment have been the detention of trade union leaders whose unions have gone on strike. The major emphasis of pronounced government policy and practice, however, has been on positive achievements in favour of workers. Government has demonstrated a capacity to concede workers' demands for wage increases and improved standards of living, at least for as long as available resources permitted it.

The second prong of government strategy in relation to labour has been aimed at the level of ideas and implemented through the control of leadership positions within the congress, through exhortation, persuasion, workers' education and reforms for the facilitation of workers' participation in industries. The main aim is to change the political orientation of grassroots leaders with regard to their social and political values and ultimately those of the work force at large. The desired values are informed by the philosophy of Humanism and put emphasis on such issues as hard work, community spirit and self sacrifice for the common good. The effort to bring about a change in values and cultivate a civic culture are delivered through seminars, speeches of political leaders, meetings, public addresses and much more concertedly through workers' education. Workers' education is undertaken by the Department of Participatory Democracy of the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, by trade unions, but on a more institutionalised basis by the PCC. Whatever the medium or the agency involved, it can be seen as an instrument of

ideological engineering, intended to bring about a civil culture appropriate for the development path chosen for the country. Workers' education is intended to wean them from the traditional Western oriented trade unionism which emphasizes the rights of workers and the rewards they get in exchange for their labour. Instead it is anticipated that workers will develop a sense of duty and responsibility toward the development of the country as a whole by increasing productivity, observing industrial discipline and resisting the temptation of staging spontaneous strikes by following the established procedures for the resolution of disputes.

The intentions of the governing class notwithstanding, the implementation of workers' education has not proceeded as envisaged. At the PCC, political values are taught by the political education department. Meanwhile trade unions sponsor their members to study workers' education in the industrial relations unit where they are taught works council skills, labour law, grievance and dispute handling procedures, trade union organisation and management and collective bargaining. After 14 years, workers' education has not produced the results desired by the governing class, i.e. less strikes, more political awareness and more willingness to eschew strike action for the economic development of the country. The number of strikes between 1974, when the PCC was opened, and 1985 is about the same with upward surges in 1975, 1980 and 1981 and again in 1984.

Apart from the method of implementing workers education, the structure of the economy and its location in the international division of labour has intervened to hinder the efforts directed at changing workers' orientation and their effective participation in capitalist economic enterprises. Even with political independence, Zambia has remained on the periphery of the capitalist world system to which it is structurally bound by its dependence on exports of copper and cobalt and imports of machinery, chemicals, medicines, petroleum and petroleum products, transport equipment and manufactured goods. Additionally, despite the nationalisation of major industries in the country, these are run on the basis of the profit motive and capitalist relations and politics of production still prevail. Consequently efforts to introduce democratic practices at the enterprise level, such as works councils, have not yet produced the anticipated outcome. Strikes have continued to occur as an expression of working class consciousness.

In the early days of independence, government granted wage increases to all sectors of the economy and raised the minimum wage for all categories of workers in the formal sector, except farm workers and domestic household employees. However, the wage increases could be sustained only as long as, in the assessment of the governing class, the country had the resources to do so. When the price of copper began to fall during the 1970s, the government initiated a variety of measures, designed to put a break on the rise in wages. However, the power of the unions to bargain collectively and their awareness of their rights made this a difficult task for the government. The result has been a parallel spiral of rising money

wages and rising inflation. The rise in wages demonstrates the strength and militancy of the Zambian trade union movement but it has not had positive results in terms of improving or even maintaining decent working and living conditions for Zambian workers. It would appear that for the latter not just union militancy, but fundamental change in the structure of the economy is required.

In the prevailing circumstances, worker militancy has persisted. Realizing that the governing class has not yet established its hegemony, the government has responded to worker militancy by an increasing use of force, showing a heavy reliance on police and paramilitary police to disperse strikers and rioters and restore order. However, even while this is done efforts are made to portray an atmosphere of democratic practice, by holding commissions of inquiry in the aftermath of strikes. To augment this, efforts were made between 1982 and 1987, to change the legislation in ways that would have integrated the trade union movement into the Party and government administrative structure. Pressure from the trade union movement delayed the proposed amendment and possible revision of the law, indicating once again, both the commitment to democratic principles and the strength of the trade union movement in Zambia.

Building on the established traditional militancy of Zambian workers, the leadership of ZCTU has gradually shifted from primarily politically orientated trade unionists into the hands of pragmatic, economic trade unionists. But in the pursuit of economic ends, ironically, this leadership has been politicised in a new way. Under Newstead Zimba and Frederick Chiluba, the trade union movement has carved a role for itself within the Zambian political process which includes more than the mere advocacy of members' economic interests. As a necessary concomitant to economic matters, there is also concern within the labour movement about the whole process of government. The leaders of the trade union congress believe that within the political structure of the One Party State, they have the responsibility to monitor government policy and safeguard workers' political as well as economic interests. For this reason congress leaders criticised the education reforms in 1978, sent a petition to the Party's Secretary General protesting the new local government Bill in 1980 and spoke out against proposals in 1982 to teach scientific socialism in schools. And throughout the late 1970s and 1980s they have persistently criticised government handling of the economy.

It is probably in the manner of criticism of economic policy that the nature of the Zambian trade union movement is best revealed. In the past the congress has been critical of such initiatives as the leadership code and the introduction of workers' councils in industries. The leadership code was criticised for blocking legal avenues through which leaders could accumulate wealth. This, the congress leaders argued, posed the danger of corruption as political leaders would be tempted to seek extra-legal ways of acquiring wealth. They went on to suggest that leaders who had financial security would devote more

time to public duty than leaders who were concerned about basic subsistence. The introduction of industrial participatory democracy on the other hand was opposed on two grounds: first, that it would scare off investors and thus endanger employment opportunities; and, second, for its ineffectiveness, in that so long as workers representatives on management boards remained a minority they would be unable to influence the decisions of these bodies in any meaningful way.

More than the policies it has opposed, it is probably the ones it has supported that are most indicative of labour's own political orientation. Under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, the government has undertaken a set of measures to effect the liberalisation of the economy and have been applauded by leaders of the congress for those measures that have promoted free enterprise in the economy. In supporting the policy liberalising imports, for example, they argued that it could improve the availability of commodities in the economy even as they berated government for the escalating cost of living, a large part of which was in fact a result of imported inflation. Congress leaders also supported the changes in the tax policies that gave incentives to investors on the grounds that it held the promise of increased employment opportunities.

When one aggregates the points of opposition against those of support for government policy a pattern begins to emerge. In supporting free enterprise, free collective bargaining and freedom of companies to import and export the congress was essentially advocating an alternative economic policy to the one being pursued by the government. When this is coupled with congress' insistence on the right to criticise government generally, to maintain what it considers "checks and balances" on the exercise of political power, it becomes clear that congress has asserted a claim to a political role for itself within the Zambian political system. Its opposition to scientific socialism gives us an indication that the kind of politics it advocates for Zambian society is essentially social democratic. It advocates the creation of a society in which private property and free enterprise prevail, capitalist enterprises operate profitably, so as to provide "a living wage" for the workers, free collective bargaining flourishes and the role of government is limited to the provision of security and the necessary framework for propitious industrial relations. It is only in this context, for example, that we can understand the trade union movement's support for the government's decision (made in 1989) to require students in higher institutions of learning to meet part of their tuition fees [TZ, 6.4.1989]. Ordinarily, a socialist oriented trade union movement would have foreseen the burden this policy imposes on workers' wages and would therefore have suggested alternative methods of raising state revenue.

One question which still needs to be addressed is whether or not the Zambian trade union movement constitute a political movement? It does not itself admit to the possibility. However, its actions and its pronouncements are consistent with a preference for a multiparty state. In the absence of opposition

parties, it has not hesitated to fill the vacuum, so as to provide "checks and balances" on the exercise of political power. At the least, it advocates a pluralist approach to politics, with different and diverse centres of power in society and has expressed a preference for the capitalist system of organising the economy and society. This is indicated by its international contacts, which predominantly involve working relationships with Western oriented trade union organisations such as the ICFTU and the Frederick Ebert Foundation of West Germany.¹ It may perhaps be concluded, therefore, that to the extent that one understands politics to be concerned with the distribution and exercise of power in society, the Zambian trade union movement is a political movement advocating a different kind of politics from that which currently prevails in the society.

Given the state of the economy, particularly the workers' experience of it, it is likely that workers will continue to give support to the current leaders of the congress in the hope that the changes they advocate will bring not only increased wages and improved working conditions, but also a better performance of the economy as a whole, entailing improvements in social services, as well as increased provision of water, electricity, fuel and energy and refuse collection. Under the current political regime, workers have experienced a deterioration in all of these. The government is aware of this. And while it may give the structural dependency of the economy as the cause, emphasising the dependence on copper, the fall in copper prices and the high prices of imported oil, fertilisers and machinery, the trade union movement blames government mismanagement and the workers are more likely to understand and accept the latter explanation. There is also the serious implication of this situation, which is that congress criticism of economic mismanagement of the economy locates the failure of the policy in the professed socialist orientation of the government. Workers are being told that only a change in this orientation towards more straightforward capitalist activity will improve their conditions of work and the level of social services. As far as the current leaders of the trade union movement are concerned, socialism does not seem to be on the agenda. Not only do they make "compromises to capitalism", but they also see the efficient running of a capitalist economy as in their immediate interest. The professed goals of a socialist society seem desirable enough, but in the short-run, the ZCTU leadership is determined to secure workers' economic, political and democratic rights within a capitalist society.

The capitalist development strategy is advocated even when it is becoming increasingly obvious that Zambia's participation in the world capitalist system has brought little prosperity and much crisis. The state is caught up in the local manifestation of this crisis and is literally being strangled by debt obligations which have increased from \$750 m in 1976 to \$5,100 m by the end of 1986. The need to service this debt has necessitated the further procurement of loans from the IMF and the World Bank over the period from 1971 to 1984. One of the conditions attached to these loans has been the requirement to adjust the value of the Kwacha downwards against the US dollar. In 1976 the Kwacha was devalued by 20%, in

1978 by another 10% and in 1983 by a further 20%. Between October 1985 and May 1987 foreign exchange was distributed by the method of auctioning; through this process, the Kwacha had by April 1987, depreciated by 955%. At the level of human experience, this has resulted in increased cost of living and falling standards in the quality of life.² This has been aggravated by the IMF condition that government reduce public spending. Since 1974 the government has been cutting down on subsidies on consumer goods. In 1987 medical fees were introduced in government hospitals and school fees in government boarding schools. Despite these cuts, the government budget deficit has increased from K264 m in 1984 to K2,992 m in 1986. Most of this is accounted for by the need to service the international debt. The combination of the fall in real wages and the reduction in social services has resulted in a fall in GNP per capita from \$600.00 in 1981 to \$580.00 in 1983 and down to \$390.00 in 1985. Rather than experience development, Zambia's particular way of participating in the international capitalist economy has resulted in further underdevelopment.

To a certain extent the government must accept the blame for failing to restructure the economy during the first ten years of independence when the country earned adequate foreign exchange from copper. This was not done. The country still depends on copper for 90% of all its foreign exchange earnings, but the metal's declining contribution to the economy is indicated in the table below.

Copper's contribution to economic activity		
Year	To GNP	To government revenue
1964	38.00%	53.0%
1984	14.80%	6.0%
1986	8.56%	n.a.

Source: New Recovery Programme, 1987

In the current circumstances it is perhaps too easy to confuse lack of sufficient foresight or planning expertise with the government's consistent advocacy, at least at the level of rhetoric, of a socialist orientation.

A further question which needs consideration in evaluating the nature of the labour movement's political role concerns the extent of trade union participation in wider societal affairs. In the Zambian case there is obvious tension between the role the government wishes the trade unions to play and that which

the labour movement has selected for itself. The government desires the trade unions to participate in societal affairs through the established structures of the Party and government bureaucracy, such as the national council, the party committees at places of work and on the Boards of directors of commercial companies. The trade union movement, on the other hand, perceiving itself as an autonomous interest group aspires to participate in societal affairs not only through party and government structures but as an independent actor. It particularly aspires to the role of critic in the absence of opposition parties, much to the consternation of government.

It is this role of critic which has become politically contentious and produced repressive measures from the government. The criticism of government policy in speeches and public interviews first led the government to ban trade union leaders from being interviewed on television in 1981. Subsequently, the criticisms voiced by trade union leaders at Labour Day rallies prompted the government to stop them addressing these rallies. The roots of such repressive measures lie in the different interpretations of the role of trade unions in Zambian society. The government considers criticisms of its policies as completely inappropriate to the proper role of labour unions. Yet, ironically, it is because of general government tolerance that vigorous trade union expression and criticism of public policy has developed and persisted.

Other aspects of government policy, in particular the legislation on strikes, extending the definition of essential services to most industries, are more repressive. The application of the law regarding the prohibition of strikes and the summary dismissal of leaders of strikes can be seen as repressive despite the efforts made in the aftermath of such activities to appoint commissions of enquiry and initiate conciliation measures. In other words, while the trade union movement can remain free to operate, it can do so only within the narrow cloisters allowed by government law and policy.

Is the trade union movement autonomous or has the government succeeded in incorporating it? Administratively the trade union congress remains outside the structures of the Party and government bureaucracy. Trade union officials from the branch level up to the congress headquarters are elected by members and not appointed by government. Congress and the unions raise their funds from members' subscriptions, from commercial ventures and from donations of friendly overseas organisations rather than from the government budget. When we take these factors into consideration, the Zambian congress cannot be said to be integrated to the same extent as Tanzania's JUWATA, for example, where the Secretary General of Congress is the government appointed Minister of Labour. Having said that, the autonomy of the trade union movement is not appreciated by the government which over the past twenty-two years has tried to find a middle ground between total takeover and complete autonomy of the trade union movement. The Zambian government's attitude, however, has not been like that of Botswana,

where trade unions have received very little official encouragement, and then only in response to the efforts and aid of international organisations. The nature of encouragement from government also differs from the Zambian case. In Botswana, government support has been in aid of running economic enterprises. In other words, trade unions are invited to act as partners in capitalist development. In a sense this is the case in Zambia as well, but here the approach is much more subtle, yet at the same time more fundamental and comprehensive. The Zambian government does not just encourage trade unions to undertake commercial enterprises. Rather, it has endeavoured to change the way trade unions and their leaders perceive their role in society, the values they hold and the way they go about fulfilling them. I have argued in this thesis that the Zambian government's approach has been to use the trade union network to cultivate the support of workers and thereby promote governmental legitimacy toward the ultimate end of achieving the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. The Zambian trade union movement, however, is not yet incorporated into the government structure, but remains relatively autonomous. And the Zambian government aspires to utilise this relative autonomy to mould the trade union movement into an instrument for augmenting its legitimacy.

In the past, other methods of effecting state legitimacy have been employed. Up to 1975, for example, when available resources could allow it, government sanctioned substantial wage increases in response to trade union pressure and as a way of legitimating its power. To a certain extent similar processes are underway in Zimbabwe. There government still has the resources to respond positively to workers' demands for increased wages and services, while adopting a benign, paternalistic attitude towards the trade union movement. As in Zambia, strikes in Zimbabwe are restricted by law. And like Zambia twenty-one categories of industries are designated as essential services, in which strikes are prohibited. There is one exception; workers in Zimbabwe can go on strike in defence of the existence of their trade union, a privilege which would seem to suggest that Zimbabwean trade unions can use the strike weapon to resist a complete takeover of their trade union by government. But Zimbabwean unions are a relatively recent phenomenon. It still remains to be seen how they will evolve and what kind of relationship they will establish with government.

In Kenya, on the other hand, trade unions have fallen into the groove determined by the government's preferred development strategy. They operate commercial enterprises as they are encouraged to do by government and individual members of the movement participate in clientelist politics largely for personal gain and prestige. The pattern of trade unionism is characterised by periodic tripartite agreements between the government, employees and employers. The trade unions and their members appear to have adapted well to this role and continue within the limits allowed by a peripheral capitalist economy to secure some benefits for their members. Kenyan trade unions are not integrated into the administrative structure of the government but have been incorporated into the ideological ethos of the state and the

bourgeois defined political order. This is evident in their acceptance of an economistic role, in their participation in the power games of the bourgeoisie through clientelism and by accommodating themselves to the pattern of industrial relations dominated by trilateral agreements and the industrial relations court. By not seeking to spearhead an alternative pattern of politics and acquiescing in the role determined for it by the government, the Kenya trade union movement remain incorporated. Further research is required to establish why this mould has not been broken by the rank and file workers.

The Zambian government might well desire a pattern such as that which obtains in Kenya where the trade union movement has accepted the role assigned to it by government. However, the peculiar historical situation of Zambia and the ideological orientation of the governing class have produced a pattern of state/labour relations involving the government seeking to incorporate labour, on the one hand, while the latter fights to maintain its autonomy, on the other.

Economic structure and the relative prosperity of the country is clearly of fundamental importance in determining the nature of state/labour relations. This can be seen with particular clarity in the case of resource-poor Tanzania which, though socialist in orientation, has been most repressive towards trade unions among the five cases reviewed. Botswana, most clearly capitalist in orientation, was also resource-poor at independence. Its government was similarly repressive of trade unions, restricting them to little other than a narrow economic role. Trade unions are still encouraged to put emphasis on economic ventures, but as the country has increasingly prospered through the expansion of mining, the BFL has been permitted to revive in the eighties. Some restrictions remain in the legislation but observers report an improvement towards a more tolerant environment.

Our analysis of the Zambian situation, supplemented by a review of the four other cases, suggests that factors influencing state/labour relations include the level of economic development and of financial resources available to a government, the strength of the trade union movement and of the local bourgeoisie and the political orientation of the national political leadership. The nature of the economy and the level of development affects the manner in which the state mediates between classes in the sense that, when the state has adequate resources, it is able to promote the legitimacy of its rule by responding favourably to workers demands and allow for wage increases. However, as the resources diminish, the capacity to do this decreases and the state has tended to adopt more repressive measures.

The strength of the trade union movement serves as a mitigating factor in respect of the pace and scope of government mediating between classes. Where there is a strong local bourgeoisie and weak trade union movement, the state tends to be more restrictive of trade union activities and more accommodating of bourgeois interests. The Kenyan case would seem to illustrate this model. On the other hand, where there is a weak local bourgeoisie and a strong trade union movement, as in Zambia at the time of

independence, then the state approaches the task of mediating between classes with caution. In the **Zambian case** a direct takeover of the trade union movement was avoided in favour of other methods intended not just to control, but also to cultivate the support of the governed. This decision was also influenced to a large extent by the third factor, the political orientation of the national leadership. The political leadership in Zambia has exhibited a particularity for consensual politics over the years. It seeks to find a consensus and avoid resolution through force. In most cases erring political leaders are rehabilitated and brought back into the fold. This same approach is evident in the state's mediation between classes. Rather than antagonise labour and destroy the workers' organisation, the government has chosen instead to reorient labour's own comprehension and exercise of its role. In this effort, worker's education has been the most important instrument of political incorporation.

In the **Zambian situation** the state has taken the form of a single party. But this system of government does not seem to have had any fundamental impact on the nature of the state's mediation of conflict between classes. Even so, it is important to note that it provides a structure particularly conducive to incorporation by virtue of leaving unions without alternative political competitors to which they might look for support. Yet, contradictorily, the absence of alternative political brokers has tended to produce two related consequences: firstly, trade unions leaders have been forced, as we have shown, to speak for themselves on political matters and, second, workers are more quickly brought into conflict with the state itself. The combined effect of these processes may not always work in favour of the state, therefore. Indeed, it may ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the governing class by bringing to the fore the fundamental confrontation between capital and labour in a political form. The prominence of class confrontational politics provides a glimmer of hope for the workers, entailing as it does a continuing dynamic for progressive change. The confrontation allows further pursuit of working class interests which, therefore, remain on the agenda, forming part of a continuing political dialogue, albeit a dialogue which occasionally flares into open conflict. Although the struggle between capital and labour is far from resolved as a result of incidences of industrial action and other forms of workers' resistance, its continuation need not be viewed entirely pessimistically from the viewpoint of either workers or the state. Expressions of trade union opposition reflect the understanding of workers of the socio-political development in process in their society. And if the ultimate aim of development is improved material wellbeing of the people, expressions of worker consciousness and even discontent make an important contribution, not least as barometers of success and failure in the broader project of development.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE
LIST OF TOPICS COVERED IN THE INTERVIEWS: OPEN ENDED
QUESTIONS

A. Questions for Trade Union Leaders:

1. Relations between the government and trade unions.
2. The right of workers to organise.
3. Freedom to organise in comparison with other countries.
4. Contributions to the mechanics of establishing a One Party state.
5. Trade union leaders' participation in parliamentary politics.
6. Industrial democracy.
7. Role of trade unions in Zambian development.
8. Relationship between wages and economic development.
9. Industrial action and relationship to development.
10. Relationship between union and Party, past and present.
11. Wage determination.
12. Dispute settling procedure.
13. Role of the Industrial Relations Court.
14. Unions and their members.
15. Unions and the economic crisis.
16. Future direction of labour legislation.

B. Topics for Government Officials

1. Role of the trade union movement in the Nationalist struggle.
2. Purpose and intended effect of labour legislation.
3. Role of trade unions in development after independence.
4. Role of seminars and conferences in state/labour relations.
5. Workers' participation in industries in the public parastatal sector.
6. Relationship between the Party (UNIP) and the trade unions.
7. Role of the Party committees at places of work.
8. The turning of ZCTU into a mass organisation.
9. Economic crisis and the trade union movement.
10. Future direction of labour legislation.


APPENDIX TWO

EXAMPLES OF FINANCIAL AID TO THE ZCTU FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

1985	Kwacha
ILO for Workers' Projects	120,000.00
AALC for credit unions and workers' education	60,000.00
Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions for workers' education and economic research projects	48,000.00
ICFTU for ZCTU farm project and economic planning seminar	30,000.00
Confederation of Trades Union Congress for workers' director symposium	15,000.00
Friedrick Ebert Foundation for workers' education and workers' participation seminar	35,000.00
Total 1985	308,000.00
1986	
ILO for workers' projects	120,000.00
AALC for credit unions and workers' education	90,000.00
Friedrick Ebert Foundation for workers' education for workers' representatives on the boards of directors	100,000.00
Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions for workers' education and economic research projects	40,000.00
ICFTU for reasearch and library	5,000.00
Commonwealth Trade Union Council	10,000.00
Total 1986	365,000.00
1987 (up to June)	US\$
Friedrick Ebert Foundation for workers' education	19,600.00
AALC for credit unions and workers' education	36,000.00
Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions for workers' education and economic projects	15,000.00
ICFTU for workers' education	15,000.00
Total US\$	85,600.00
Total in Kwacha equivalent (1987)	K870,000.00

Source: Ministry of Labour (June) 1987.

APPENDIX THREE THE ZAMBIAN BOURGEOISIE



Source: Derived from Mundela, 1984 •


APPENDIX FOUR

LIST OF NATIONAL UNIONS AFFILIATED TO THE ZCTU AS OF 1ST JULY 1987

	Number of Members	
	1982	1986
Mineworkers Union of Zambia	55,000	46,000
National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers	28,361	28,000
National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers	25,887	35,000
Guards Union of Zambia	7,543	8,000
National Union of Postal and Telecommunication Workers	4,000	5,000
Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union	25,649	24,000
Zambia Electricity Workers' Union	4,538	4,200
Railway Workers' Union of Zambia	11,161	10,243
National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers	11,340	10,143
National Union of Public Service Workers	67,000	82,025
Hotel and Catering Workers' Union of Zambia	3,022	8,000
Zambia National Union of Teachers	26,000	25,000
National Union of Transport and Allied Workers	12,000	9,000
Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers	8,200	7,100
Airways and Allied Workers' Union	3,000	2,092
Zambia Typographical Workers' Union	2,100	1,400
Civil Servants' Union of Zambia	30,000	33,000
University of Zambia and Allied Workers' Union	2,500	2,748
Total	327,301	340,951

Source: Secretary General's Report, 1986.

APPENDIX FIVE DISPUTES INVOLVING LOSS OF WORK: 1965-1985



Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Reports and
Monthly Digest of Statistics, July/August 1986

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- | | |
|----------------|--------------------|
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| | Conference Papers |
| | Mimeos |

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- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| February 11th 1987 | Assistant Labour Commissioner, Industrial Relations. |
| February 12th 1987 | P.C.C. Head of Department, Industrial Relations. |
| February 18th 1987 | Political Provincial Secretary, Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy. |
| February 20th 1987 | Deputy Director, Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy. |
| May 15th 1987 | Labour Commissioner |
| February 26th 1987 | Personnel and Training Manager, Zambia National Building Society. |

2.

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| February 23rd 1987 | Ray Simons, Roma, Lusaka. |
|--------------------|---------------------------|

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- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| February 9th 1987 | ZCTU, Lusaka Office |
| February 16th 1987 | Zambia United Local Authority Workers' Union, Lusaka. |
| March 2nd 1987 | Zambia Railways officials, Kabwe. |
| March 12th 1987 | Civil Servants' Union of Zambia, Lusaka. |
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| | Editor, <i>Workers' Voice</i> . |
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| March 25th 1987 | NUCIW, Officials. |
| March 26th 1987 | NUBEGW, Officials. |

March 27th 1987	NUBEGW, Officials.
March 27th 1987	ZCTU, Chairman General, Ndola.
April 29th 1987	P.C.C. Head of Industrial Relations Unit.
May 4th 1987	PSWU, Officials, Lusaka.
May 11th 1987	UNZAWU, Officials, Lusaka.
May 13th 1987	ZUFLAW, Officials, Lusaka.
May 19th 1987	Transport and Allied Workers' Union.
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