

# THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN GREEK POLITICS

1909 - 1936

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## FOREWORD

This work is an attempt to bring together what in the writer's opinion is the most significant historical information on the subject, and on that basis to propose a synthetical explanation of social change and military intervention in the politics of Greece from the turn of the century to the inter-war period.

This is not an historical work in the strict sense of the term, this being a field very ably covered by other students of military intervention. Nor is it an attempt to classify a plethora of coups according to a theoretical model of taxonomy of civil-military relations. In my final chapter on methodology -- which, incidentally, may be read first -- I give the reasons underlying my personal preference for a much less mechanistic approach. More on this subject is made explicit here and there in my main discussion, and still more is suggested implicitly. What I tried to do, as well as I was able, was to understand the interrelations and shifting movements of the fundamental forces within the Greek economy and society between the turn of the century and the 1930s, relate them to the major currents of political conflict, and then trace the officers' action, via the process of politics and back again to the roots of the conflict: the economic and social structures and their interaction with the social actors. I believe that such endeavours lie outside considerations of success or failure. Empirical research incites explanatory synthesis, this in turn indicates the dark areas where new research is needed. Thus the relations between events, their explanation, the critique of the explanation, the

new understanding derived from the critique, and the new information derived from a better-oriented empirical research are relations dialectical in nature and the process is endless -- and so is doubt over the long-term validity of every single contribution to the process<sup>1</sup>.

The approach chosen, therefore, allowed only limited research into primary sources; simply because the period investigated is so long and the area for synthesis of economic, social and political information so wide that consistent research into historical sources becomes impossible. Moreover, the sort of information needed in a venture of this kind is of such a general nature that very selective use of only really relevant material is the sole means to avoid getting swamped by details. For example, whereas data on the evolution of the number of factories between 1880 and 1930 are absolutely essential for pinpointing the period of true take-off into capitalism, the breakdown of these figures by geographic regions or even by manufacturing sectors is much less so, if at all.

Normally, such important information is available in the secondary sources, but in the case of Greece this is not always so; and even if such material does exist, it is scattered over a discouraging number of books or articles. This is not surprising: even elementary social works, such as a social history or an economic history of contemporary Greece, are lacking. So there was a need for some research in primary sources after all, to fill the many gaps in basic information. I therefore had to look in the Annual Series of the British Foreign Office Consular Report

for between 1886 and 1910; and the Special Report submitted to the British Government (henceforth referred to as Law's Report) on the economy of Greece up to 1893, the year the Greek State went bankrupt; (shortly afterwards an international financial control commission on Greece's resources was imposed; to my knowledge, this is the first time this report has been investigated.) I also examined the writings of certain foreign travellers, visitors to Greece during the 1880-1913 period, especially French and English: Martin, Deschamps, Girard, Lewis Sergeant, for example; certain statistical works compiled around the turn of the century and containing comparative data on various European countries -- Mulhall's admirable Dictionary of Statistics, as well as the works by Webb and Sundborg; and, very selectively, certain Greek pamphlets and periodicals of the 1900-09 period, during which there was an upsurge of the kind of cultural activity which often goes hand in hand with social change. Finally, in the absence of an economic history of nineteenth to twentieth-century Greece, I had to rely very intensively on the editions of the National Statistics Bureau of Greece, especially those dated between 1920 and 1938.

Many are those who helped me, and long lists of acknowledgement are not customary in the foreword to Ph.D. dissertations. However, I could not omit thanking Dr Spyros Asdrahas, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Université de Paris; Dr Constantine Tsoukalas, Université de Paris-Vincennes; and Dr (Oxon.) Thanos Veremis. I also wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr K.W.Watkins, University of Sheffield, for boldly and timely criticising, and above all for encouraging me to understand



history and then respecting my way of doing it; and to Dr Nicos Mouzelis, London School of Economics and Political Science, for having tolerated my ignorance and been patient enough to erect on it whatever ability I may now have for thinking in social terms and for doubting -- especially my own dicta.

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I final note to explain the organisation of the text. To facilitate the reader, I have relieved the main argument of too many details, references, empirical observations and figures and tried to keep it to essentials. This may, at certain points, make the argument appear formalistic, yet it is precisely such comparative simplicity which may help the non-specialised reader to grasp more easily a complex totality by not being unduly distracted from the main text. Disregarding footnotes without asterisks, which are bibliographical references or minor comments, he may wish to give his attention only to footnotes marked with an asterisk which contain more important information, comments or arguments, and this can easily be done after the reading of each chapter-section. Needless to say, the expert on Greece or the academic reader may well choose to read text and footnotes together -- but even he, I hope, will be facilitated by the above arrangement.

\* \* \*

The following Chronological Table for the years 1864-1909 is meant to help those readers who may not be familiar with Gre history; and to list the main events and relate them, if schematically, to major economic and social changes.

Tables of Chronology

## POLITICS

- 1863 Military revolt with active popular following overthrows Bavarian dynasty.
- 1864 New Constitution. Danish Prince appointed King George I. Annexation of Ionian islands.
- 1881 Annexation by treaty of central Greek provinces Thessaly and Arta.
- 1897 War against Turkey, defeat of army led by Crown Prince Constantine.
- 1909 COUP with overwhelming popular support. Parliament tele-guided by army for one year.
- 1910 Election of reform-Constituent Assembly. 40% of seats won by politically unstructured "Independents". Venizelos appointed Premier only to proclaim new elections. Forms new liberal party and assures landslide victory.
- 1910-1920 Venizelist governments. Intensive modernisation in all areas.
- 1912-1913 Balkan Wars. Annexation of northern Greece, Crete and other Aegean islands.
- 1915-1917 Conflict between Venizelos (pro-English) and King Constantine (pro-German) over Greece's participation in World War I. Venizelos proclaims Republic in northern Greece. Constantine dethroned with armed support from Entente. Greece enters war.
- 1918 Communist Party formed.
- 1919 Treaty of Sevres makes Greece major Mediterranean power, but Turkey continues war to regain Asia Minor.
- 1920 Venizelos loses election and officially withdraws from politics. Constantine returns.
- 1922 Military debacle and massacre of Greek population in Asia Minor. About 1.3 mill. refugees cross the Aegean.
- 1922 COUP by Venizelist and royalist officers. Popular support. Five royalist politicians and a Field Marshall executed as responsible for debacle.
- 1922-1924 Monarchy in question. Venizelos indirectly supports King. Interruption of his self-exile and his brief premiership in 1924 fail to save monarchy.
- 1923 COUP by royalists fails.
- 1924 Elections. Victory of Venizelists and republicans.
- 1924 PRONUNCIAMENTO requests abolition of monarchy. Compromise forces King to leave country to await result of referendum. Republic proclaimed by 70% vote.
- 1924-1928 SERIES OF COUPS and other interventions.
- 1925-1926 Dictatorship by General Pangalos, latently fascist.
- 1928 Venizelos returns, wins elections.
- 1928-1932 Venizelos government. Political and economic stability despite critical international conditions.
- 1929 Anti-Communist law deals with 3-6% C.P. threat.
- 1931-1932 Serious economic difficulties shrink Venizelos' following.
- 1933 COUP by Venizelists after royalist gains in elections. Venizelos withholds support and coup fails.
- 1935 COUP by Venizelists after open royalist effort to restore monarchy. Supported and led by Venizelos. Fails. Widespread army purges.
- 1935-1936 Restoration of monarchy. Communist MPs arbitrate in formation of government. King unconstitutionally appoints Gen. Metaxas as Premier. Metaxas proclaims dictatorship.

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

- 1871 Distribution of State land, but landowners keep their properties.
- 1864-1909 Gradually ascending rhythm of urbanisation. Formation of large, parasitic petit-bourgeoisie. Growth of the State. Peripheral pre-capitalist mode of production. Comprador ideology inside Greece, irredentism outwards.
- 1866-1890 First phase of economic development. Railroads, mining, areas of commercial agriculture, some factories. Two-thirds of invested capital is foreign.
- 1890-1910 Relative economic stagnation. Peasant unrest, armed demonstrations, minor revolts.
- 1879 89 factories, 7,000 workers, approx. 5-6,000 bourgeois population; urban pop. approx. 200,000, total pop. about 1.6 million.
- 1889 145 factories.
- 1909 15-20,000 workers, bourgeois pop. approx. 7-9,000, urban pop. approx. 450,000, total pop. 2.6 million.
- 1910 Peasant revolt in Thessaly suppressed by government.
- 1920 492 factories, 999 small manufacturers, 60,000 workers, total pop. approx. 5 million.
- 1910-1930 Capitalist mode of production becomes truly dominant. Sharp economic growth. Spectacular growth in shipping. Rise of bourgeoisie, economically and demographically.
- 1923-1924 Land reform. Installation of 6-700,000 refugees in rural areas, 650-700,000 in urban areas.
- 1923-1928 Consolidation of capitalism. Growth of industry based on the 1.3 mill. refugees as labourers, consumers, even investors.
- 1931-1932 Crisis in the economy and public financing.
- 1923-1936 Rapid urbanisation. Rise of bourgeoisie. Creating of a working class, and a Lumpenproletariat of urbanised peasants and refugees. Radicalisation towards republicanism in the 1920s, leftism/communism in the 1930s. After the 1922 debacle, irredentism is followed by a vacuum. Gradual emergence of anti-communism as dominant and official ideology.



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P A R T IBASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ECONOMY AND SOCIETY  
IN PRE-1909 GREECEChapter ATHE DIASPORA AND THE RELATIVE WEAKNESS OF THE LOCAL MIDDLE CLASS1. The Problem

The size and formidable economic power which the Greek diaspora had acquired by the nineteenth century has led to certain misinterpretations of its role within -- or rather towards -- independent Greece. These interpretations either do not distinguish at all between the locally dominant social classes and the diaspora, or make only a very blurred distinction. By presenting the diaspora as a local bourgeois element, the significance of the Greek middle class is falsely inflated to appear as a determinant economic, social and political factor, whereas actually much of its vitality reflected foreign economic activity exercised through Greek-speaking merchants and financiers established abroad. Concomitantly, the overrated economic role of the bourgeoisie may erroneously ascribe to this class a correspondingly important political role.\*2

The explanations for these misinterpretations are to be found in the way historiography has been influenced by the historic past, by the years before 1821 when generations of diaspora Greeks had functioned as the main agents of Ottoman trade with the West, whilst helping to keep alive the Greek nation's language, its culture, and its hope for freedom. The preponderance of the pre-independence approach has obscured the otherwise rather obvious fact that the diaspora should be studied using a totally different methodology when the post-independence period is under consideration.

Indeed, the historian of Greece during the years of Ottoman rule finds himself to be studying not the history of a society defined by its own sovereign organisation within a clear geographic delimitation, but the history of a nation. The difficulties for an approach based on class-analysis are obvious, but a certain flexibility is still permissible. The diaspora Greeks living inside the frontiers of the Ottoman empire were undoubtedly members of the local middle classes; at the same time they were also the bourgeois element within their own enslaved nation. On the other hand, those members of the diaspora who lived outside the empire certainly did not belong to the Ottoman social structure; nevertheless, the historian of the Greek nation may legitimately, though perhaps with some important qualifications, treat them as part of the Greek nation's class structure.\*<sup>3</sup> This approach, however, is almost instantly invalidated when it comes to the period in which part of this nation acquired its independence, enclosed itself within well-defined geographical frontiers, organised its own political system, and formed that overwhelming social catalyst which is the State.

Thus the fresh sovereignty of the Greek State, however limited it may have been; thus the new pyramid of internal power relations; the obscure but decisive role of the new national currency and the game of its parity; the customs duties levied at the frontiers and the taxes imposed within the State territory; the economic incentives, privileges and protective measures extended to certain groups and classes called upon to fulfill the essential roles of trade and industry; more generally, the structuring and functioning of this new-born totality, of the new dynamic system of economic and social structures within the recently established frontiers, in short of the new 'social formation'; all these elements require that independent Greece be examined separately not only from other societies, but also from groups which may always have been ethnically, culturally, and even economically related to her own population, but were now living outside her geographical, political and economic borders.

Unfortunately, because of the preponderance of pre-independence historical research and the concomitant scarcity of studies on 19th- and 20th-century Greece, the methodological break between pre-independence and post-1821 sociological analysis is not clearly pointed. When qualifications are accepted at all, they concern the functions of the diaspora, such as its changed economic role for example, but leave untouched its erroneous classification as a part of a local class.

Yet even the change of functions alone would justify a change in the structural classification of the diaspora. Its contribution before independence to the preservation of Hellenism, its cultural bonds with Greece, and its active role in the revolution against the Turks did not mean that when independence finally came it had to be willing to confine itself within the borders of the new State and to assume the role of a new social class: to strive not only, that is, for economic dominance, but also for local capital accumulation; not merely for political influence protective of business interests, but also for virtual domination of politics. With criteria such as these, would it not be misleading to consider the Jewish diaspora as part of the Israeli middle class? Are the Greek immigrant workers in Germany of the 1970s a part of the Greek working class? Are the late 20th-century Greek shipowners of London and New York, whose fleets sail exclusively under Liberian and Panamanian flags, members of the Greek grande-bourgeoisie?<sup>\*4</sup>

This is no mere exercise in semantics. An understanding of the historical evolution of Greece very much hinges on whether or not the bourgeoisie is seen as an economically powerful and long-term oriented class, politically selfconfident and ambitious, and this in turn depends on whether one considers the diaspora a local element or a sui generis actor -- important, but nonetheless foreign.



By excluding the term class, the diaspora can be treated as the phenomenon it actually was: as a culturally coherent but socially and geographically dispersed set of individuals doing business with, or rather against, Greece. Their comprador and financial activities in the country may, of course, be treated as an economic whole, but this is essentially a problem of econometrics. The concentration of data under one heading on the economic level does not make obligatory a similarly uniform approach on the social level.

This differentiation not only prevents misinterpretations, but is in itself a source of reasoning and explanation. Thus the economic strength of the diaspora is subtracted from the falsely padded economic image of the Greek middle class, and the bare skeleton that suddenly appears, the true local bourgeoisie, has little resemblance to the imaginary creature that usually puzzles Greek historiography with the contradiction between its borrowed economic vigour and its relatively unimportant social and political action.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. Economic Functions of the Diaspora

The very meaning of the Greek word diaspora -- signifying dispersion -- suggests a notion sufficiently wide and varied to demand an analytical approach. A dispersion cannot be treated as a cohesive and easily definable whole, not even if the purpose of the examination were to describe its static image rather than to explain its practical manifestations. While examining the nature of the social and economic relationships between Greece and the diaspora in the 19th century, one should not pay too much attention to all parts of this dispersed whole, but only to those that were actually related to Greece. The first step, then, must be to subtract from the diaspora those members who had no substantial relationship with the Greek economy and society. This will prevent the most schematic of all apperceptions of the Greek bour-

geoisie: that which is confused into attributing the total economic power of all diaspora elements to the Greek middle class.

A second deduction is possible at the other end of the spectrum, where one can pick out the only diaspora elements that can indeed be classified as Greek bourgeois: the so-called heteroethones. Although most of them had not transferred all of their interests from abroad, they all had at least established themselves permanently in independent Greece.

This process uncovers a third category, situated somewhere between the other two, and consisting of people who were neither altogether unrelated to Greece, nor physically and economically established in the country. From their foreign base, and in addition to their extra-Greek activities, they conducted some kind of secondary business related to Greece, usually banking; mining, or foreign trade. This group may be divided into two sub-categories. The first includes the few magnates who invested inside the Greek borders, mainly in banking or mining; they were also sporadically involved in big trade transactions. Another, larger category consists of entrepreneurs whose peripheral interests in Greece were usually in foreign trade. Occasionally, and generally indirectly, they too invested locally in banking or mining, through loaning funds to concerns run by the magnates.

Most members of these two sub-categories had even more important foreign interests than the heteroethones; in fact, the bulk of their interests remained abroad.<sup>\*6</sup> Many had second residences or lived only part of the year in Greece where, like the heteroethones, they conspicuously spent small portions of their incomes (which seemed like fortunes to parochial Athens). Their foreign assets and extravagant spending, though indirectly and in a complementary manner, also contributed to the common fallacies of interpretation by creating a front of bourgeois life and the impression of a large and thriving local bourgeoisie.<sup>\*7</sup>

None of these groups can be made to fit into the social structure of Greece. The less important businessmen, those who conducted a sideline in trade and occasional money-lending transactions with Greece, were representative members of the bourgeoisie of the countries where they had established themselves, but certainly not in Greece. The typical business firm of this group was set up and taxed outside Greece's frontiers. The owner had his residence abroad and usually kept his non-Greek passport. He would buy from or sell to Greece like any other Austrian or Russian merchant, for instance, or lend his money in the Greek capital market like any foreign financier; but his secondary residence in Athens, his often bad Greek, and the fact that his second passport was sometimes Greek, did not make him a member of the local middle class.<sup>\*8</sup>

Not only did the people in this category lack any local physical establishment, but the bulk of their interests was concentrated outside the country, without any wish or practical reason for transferring these interests to Greece. Yet they might be considered as a part of the middle classes if one could explain their collective behaviour in terms of class conflict, where the major, if not the only, strategic objective is political power. But it was inconceivable that these people, dispersed all over the world and presenting such a variety of origins, interests and ideologies, would ever seek to obtain full political power in Greece. It is also inconceivable that they would ever strive for full political power for and on behalf of the locally established bourgeoisie who in fact were their actual or potential business competitors.

As for the magnates who staged the big financial coups, exploited the mines and bought thousands of acres in Thessaly (because the departing Turks were selling them at bargain prices)<sup>9</sup> they bear a strong resemblance to the 20th-century multi-national jet set. The Italo-American broker who spends his summers in Italy and gambles with his Eurodollars at the Milan stock exchange is no more an Italian financier than they were members of

the Greek bourgeoisie. Their investments in Greece had certain common characteristics that are quite illuminating. Some were suitable for easy, safe liquidation and transfer of capital outside Greece in case of danger. Some yielded an unusually high rate of depreciation, thus minimising the length of the risk period. Others, which did involve a certain risk, were potentially very profitable on the typically speculative pattern. There were big commercial deals in a free-trade country, an activity which meant little local involvement, easily transferable capital, and large profit margins. There were mining concessions at excellent terms, and banking in a virgin and capital-thirsty market where interest rates of 30-36% were common practice. There was shipping, where a change of flag is a safeguard in times of local crisis and a tool of blackmail in times of euphoria. There was urban real estate acquisition in a capital city with an amazing demographic growth, and huge rural properties purchased at very low cost.<sup>10</sup> It is significant, on the other hand, that industry, the characteristically bourgeois and capitalist sector where long-term depreciations, normal risks and profits are the rule, saw no major investments by diaspora magnates.<sup>\*11</sup>

There is one more element suggesting that these two groups, and to some extent the heteroethnones as well, played a role clearly different from that of a typical bourgeoisie: their reluctance towards consistent local reinvestment. Of course, such might also be and indeed was the attitude of the local middle class. There is nevertheless a vital difference. The cash accumulated by the indigenous merchants could not be hoarded indefinitely or conspicuously consumed and illegally transferred outside the country. Partly because of the concomitant need for debouchments, partly because of their everyday interaction with the Greek market which made investment opportunities more visible, the local compradors were thus condemned to invest in the market sooner or later. Conversely, the diaspora entrepreneurs had the immense advantage of also operating in other markets where their future activities could be oriented and into which they could safely reinvest even the profits from their activities in Greece.

This was how a large proportion of the amassed money capital, part of which had been accumulated in the secondary sector, was transferred outside the country -- and, incidentally, this outward movement of accumulated capital contributed largely to the delay in Greece's take-off into capitalism.

Moreover, the accumulation transferred abroad was proportionally even greater than it would normally be in a peripheral country: the profits were not always shared between local producer or merchant and foreign buyer. However exploitative such a transaction, it leaves at least a certain part of the accumulation in local hands. In Greece, however, the local exporter of agricultural products was frequently a diaspora merchant, which is to say a foreign capitalist. Where mining was concerned, as often as not even the producer was a diaspora magnate who also exported his own produce.

In all these cases, then, the larger part if not all of the profits could be transferred into non-Greek pockets. Furthermore, they could be converted into foreign currency and shifted abroad, which was perfectly legal since Greece was a free-trade country and the drachma was freely convertible until the 1920s, and equivalent to the gold franc until 1885. Even if currency transfer out of Greece had not been easy and straightforward, there existed other legal means for this purpose: the buyer abroad, the local exporter, and even the local producer often being one and the same diaspora firm, an almost complete control over the mechanism of prices was possible.

In the 1885-1905 period, the method for transferring surplus became even more indirect but not really any more difficult: it could comfortably be done by purchasing Greek exports or by investing locally with overvalued foreign currency. As if this were not enough, the diaspora merchants did not content themselves with exploiting the existing rate of devaluation; it seems they consistently endeavoured to increase it by direct manipulation.

According to a British diplomatic report of 1893, "... half a dozen speculators (were) able to control (currency) rates arbitrarily".\*12

It lies outside the scope of this work to establish by detailed empirical research to what degree this transfer of surplus, this evident and feasible opportunity for the diaspora entrepreneurs, was actually exploited by them. In any case, it would do no more than prove the obvious. The 19th century was an age of uncontrolled and ruthless competition; no big businessman capable of doing such things legally could afford to omit them and thus place himself in an extremely unfavourable position towards his competitors. Even supposing that these men were ruthless business operators in all other respects but affected by naiveté or sentimentalism when looking after their Greek affairs, the question remains: if they did not transfer their profit abroad, what did they do with it? It is highly improbable that they chose to put it into a Greek bank -- in fact, it is quite impossible they should have done so after Greece's bankruptcy in 1893.\*13 The remaining possibilities were very few. Until 1873, as long as the great international boom lasted, their profits from trade with Greece could be reinvested abroad at excellent terms; therefore, they had no reason to reinvest them in Greece and indeed they did not.<sup>14</sup> It is not by chance that their Greek investments in mining, railroads and banking began mainly after 1873, when the great recession had already led European capital on its international hunt for good returns.<sup>15</sup> Some of their profits, along with freshly imported capital, were then reinvested in these projects. The depression also had the opposite effect, however, deterring a good many of them from investing in risky Greece -- and their reluctance could only have been enhanced by the country's diplomatic entanglements in 1878-81 and 1885, and thereafter by its ever-increasing financial difficulties. Although some chose nevertheless to accept those risks in view of the huge profits involved, it seems that many of them were finally led towards investment in shipping, which may partly explain the amazing recovery of the Greek merchant marine after 1893 and especially

in the 1900s. Yet massive investment in shipping again meant, in reality, that capital accumulated outside the Greek frontiers -- a foreign flag could easily be hoisted in an emergency.

To summarise, then: the scarcity of business savings and re-investment inside Greece throughout the pre-1909 period suggest that, parallel to the small part of the diaspora profits which was conspicuously spent in the country, a substantial share served to part-finance the private investments in mining and the big public investment projects of the 1880s; but the greatest part was transferred abroad, either directly through the mechanism of commodity prices and currency parities, or through reinvestment in shipping between 1893 and 1909.

### 3. Political Functions

Another reason for the diaspora having been confused with the local dominant classes is the political activity of certain heteroethones. Here again, some distinction must be made. The first to be differentiated from the bulk of the diaspora are the Phanariotes, previously established in Istanbul. These professional administrator-politicians eventually ceased offering their services to the Porte and entered Greek politics for many reasons unnecessary to enumerate here, since none of them was related to any hypothetical collective interests of the diaspora which they might be supposed to represent. After all, this distant Phanariote group was born in unique historical circumstances and was not at all representative of the typical Greek entrepreneurs of Vienna or Alexandria.<sup>16</sup>

Another group of heteroethones politicians who must not be considered as members of the diaspora were those whose political involvement sprang from their militant and often military role in the war of independence. In fact, they were not even heteroethones in the literal sense, since they had lived and been deeply involved in Greece for decades. By the middle of the 19th cen-

tury these families, like those of the Phanariotes, were decidedly part of the local population, and their only similarities with the diaspora are their previous residence outside Greece and, in some cases, the maintenance of occasional economic interests abroad. If one separates off these two categories, then -- the politically active families of the Phanariotes, and the active participants in the 1821 struggle -- it will be very difficult to find other Greek politicians who really belonged to the diaspora (such as for example the international magnate Zografos, who was also a landowner and an MP in Greece). <sup>17</sup>

The real question, however, was not the degree of the alleged infiltration into politics, but its objective: could this really have been the domination of Greek politics by that familiar monstrous construct, the hypothetical bourgeoisie which included the diaspora? In order to transact their business in Greece, did the diaspora entrepreneurs need to establish political dominance of a whole local class to which they allegedly belonged? Or were individual connections, patronage and bribe enough to affect such vital but occasional decisions as really did matter to them? A discussion in Chapter C will show the relative autonomy of Greek politics from the social structure and social conflicts, and the role of the State as a distributor of spoils and as an agent of power. Here it suffices to say that whatever linkage existed between diaspora and political power was simultaneously one of the symptoms and one of the causes of this autonomy. The men of the diaspora, like all such quasi-colonialists, did not necessarily depend on the local bourgeoisie and often not even on the politicians to keep or promote their advantages. They only needed the State, the Crown, and the foreign powers' indirect support.

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**NB** The reader who is not specially concerned with Greek 18th and 19th-century history may prefer to skip the following section which is mostly methodological.



#### 4. Greek Capitalism from the 18th to the 19th Century: Retgression or Divergency?

Treating the diaspora as a foreign group separate from the local middle classes has an unexpected side effect on another problem of Greek historiography. This is the controversy as to whether or not Greece had advanced into some kind of capitalism by the beginning of the 19th century. This controversy continues, despite all the opposed opinions -- whether they classify the Greek system as capitalist or not -- being unanimous on at least one point: on the underdevelopment of this system. The uninitiated will thus sooner or later meet with this paradox in Greek historiography: the system of socio-economic structures that prevailed before 1821 and even well into the 18th century, as described by the historians of that period, often seems to have been more advanced than the one that prevailed after independence and until the end of the 19th century, as described in works on this later period.

The subject is immense, and related to this work only indirectly, mainly as a methodological problem of assumptions. Hence this discussion will not attempt to deal with its essence, but will simply try to clarify method and taxonomy. It will not empirically test and answer the question of whether there was a retrogression from a relative development, perhaps even dominance of capitalism in the late 18th century to some form of pre-capitalism in the 19th; it will merely examine whether this comparison is possible and fruitful; and if not, whether a juxtaposition that will show the two non-comparable entities in opposition may prove the controversy, though not the problem itself, irrelevant for the student of the 19th century.

\* \* \*

The controversy may, of course, be partly the result of different methods of analysis. There is the well-known argument that a backward society at the periphery of a capitalist system dominated by the metropolis is 'by definition' capitalist also. This argument, on which more is said elsewhere in this work, may be seen as a matter of definitions, of the degree of analysis, and the areas chosen for the empirical observation. Notwithstanding these methodological considerations and restricting the argument to the degree, nature,

and quality of development -- or backwardness -- within the society examined, even when separated from European capitalism, the paradox remains: if capitalism was, as early as the 18th century, advanced and perhaps even dominant within the 'social formation' of Greece, how can later scholars claim that a comprador pre-capitalist 'mode of production' was still dominant in the nineteenth?<sup>18</sup>

The paradox is, at least partly, an optical illusion due to the difference in focus. As already mentioned, the scholar writing on Greek history before independence is concerned with the history of the Greek nation; the student of the post-1827 period examines the history of Greece as defined by her new, strictly drawn frontiers. Hence most comparisons are false or impossible, and the resulting contradictions only apparent ones.

Of these potential fallacies, the most simplistic is again caused by the diaspora. Greek historiography on the period of Ottoman rule is invariably concerned with an ethnic group, of which large sections had by the end of the 18th century become a thriving diaspora. Thus, the nation being examined had extended centrifugally in three concentric rings -- the closer to the centre, the higher its demographic proportion compared to the other ethnic groups: in the Hellenic peninsula itself, in the Balkans, and in the European and Asian territories alongside the great trade routes and surrounding the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Under such wide horizons could thrive not only the 'conquering merchants' of Romania and Hungary, Trieste and Vienna, but also the small industrialists and the corporatist manufacturers of Macedonia and Thessaly, or the shipowning sailors, captains and tradesmen of the Aegean islands.

Of these pioneers of Greek capitalism, as has been explained already, those residing inside the frontiers of the Ottoman State became the core of the Empire's entrepreneurial middle classes; those residing abroad were a substantial part of the local bourgeoisies -- Austrian or Russian, French or Hungarian. This is not the only classification possible: the historian of the Greek nation, seeing these people as members of a specific ethnic group, may well classify them as the bourgeois element within this group. The history of the post-independence period, however, can no longer be centred on the nation,

but rather on a society formed by a part of its members confined in the southern end of the Hellenic peninsula and deprived of the vast areas that had traditionally served as the nation's economic hinterland. Failure to make this distinction may have one or both of the following two effects. Firstly, it may falsely inflate the importance of 18th-century 'Greek capitalism' by including in this vague term the activities of all the diaspora entrepreneurs, whether established in Hungary or Istanbul, London or Egypt. Secondly, it makes any significant comparison with the 19th century impossible: if the false assumption of the whole diaspora as a local element continues to be held, then the deadlocks occur already described in earlier sections of this chapter; if not, the above-mentioned paradox of retrogression is encountered -- but in this case as the result of a methodological trap: an assumption having been accepted for the earlier period and dropped for the later one. This . . . is one of the causes of the optical illusion; there are others, however, much more difficult to pinpoint.

When meeting with the concept of capitalism in 18th-century Greece, two definitions are asked for: what is meant by 'capitalism' when such comparisons are attempted, and what exactly is being designated by the term Greece.<sup>\*19</sup> At the above simplistic level of analysis, 'capitalist' is merely an adjective affixed to certain individuals or groups, not to a system of social and economic structures. This does not make the term a particularly helpful analytical tool. The angle of observation must be changed and more rigorous procedures applied if a clear picture is to emerge of what really matters: the differences and similarities, not of individuals or of demographic groups, but of social and economic totalities. Such large entities are, firstly, the 'modes of production' prevailing in each economic sector or geographical region -- and, of course, a mode of production is not a clearly perceptible and definable concrete reality, but rather an analytic category. At a more comprehensive level of analysis, there is the overall system that embraces all the 'modes' as well as the ideological/ political forces that keep them together, the specific society as a dynamic whole, the 'social formation'; in contrast to the mode, which is an analytical category, this is a concrete category, in the sense that it corresponds to a clearly definable reality. These, then, are the criteria for answering the first ques-

tion about what is meant when the term 'capitalism' is used in a diachronic comparison. To collate the degree to which capitalism had developed in each of the two periods and to assess comparatively whether or not it had become dominant, one must work at two distinct levels. The one is the level of analytic category, the mode of production prevalent in the different regions and sectors during each of the two periods compared; the other level is the concrete category of the societies as entities of the social formations.<sup>20</sup> It remains now to be seen what is meant by 'Greek' society in the 18th century -- for in the 19th, the frontiers of the new State make the definition quite obvious.

Clearly, comparisons between regions, sectors or whole societies are possible only when the entities in question are defined with such precision as to make the comparison truly meaningful. One criterion for such precision is geographical, another could be termed qualitative. The geographical dictates that in a diachronic examination of capitalism in one of the regions or economic sectors, the precise geographical limits of this region or sector must be strictly drawn. In other words, the socio-economic structures and relations of provinces or sectors in independent Greece may not be compared with those of different regions or geographically defined sectors in the 18th century. The mode of production in 19th-century Thessaly, for example, cannot be compared with that of 18th-century Macedonia; and the mode dominant in Peloponnesian agriculture in the later period may be compared with its earlier counterpart in the Peloponnese but not with that of Euboea.

When examining the northern regions of 18th-century 'Greece', for example, one may well speak of a certain development of capitalism in agriculture. For in the large landholdings of these areas agriculture then was reasonably commercialised, but also incited some capital accumulation which naturally went hand in hand with some use of wage labour. Conversely, independent 19th-century Greece did not contain these northern regions; on its own territory, the percentage of small independent peasants was higher and went on increasing, so that the development of capitalism in the agriculture of this territory was not as pronounced as it had been decades earlier in the northern regions. Clearly, it would be an error to say that here there was retrogression in the degree of capitalist development in agricul-

ture from the one period to the other. If the agriculture of 19th-century Greece has to be compared with some counterpart in the 18th century, this should be the agriculture not of the northern, but of the corresponding southern regions.

Yet such comparisons, though legitimate and useful, are adequate only as descriptions of regions and sectors and especially of their momentary images, not for a synthetical examination of their articulation with the whole social system. This is where the qualitative criterion is important. The notion of mode of production is inconceivable without that of a social formation. It may be used independently only as a tool for an initial abstract classification, but once the definition of a mode dominant in a sector or region is established, it should be incorporated into the analysis of the wider category, the social formation. Otherwise the comparison will merely be one of analytical categories, mere sterile theorising without empirical foundation or at least empirical testing ground, without relevance for the concrete reality that is society. Moreover, comparing 'capitalism in Greece' in the 18th with that of the 19th century must finally raise the fundamental question as to which mode was dominant in the social formation as a whole -- for without an answer the existence and functioning of the regionally or sectorially dominant modes can not be confirmed and properly understood. Although it would be possible, therefore, to examine the paradox of the alleged retrogression region by region or sector by sector, the basic questions would not be answered without a simultaneous comparison between the earlier and the later social formation. Can this be done?

In moving from the analytical level of mode to that of social formation, and the need for rigour being as great as ever, the geographical criterion must again be applied. No 18th-century social entity can be compared to independent Greece unless the former contains the Ottoman provinces that correspond to the regions of the latter. Thus, such an entity cannot be the Hellenic peninsula as a whole, it cannot contain Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Roumelia, Thrace, Crete, the Ionian and quite a few of the Aegean islands. This, however, is not what historiography means when speaking of 'Greece' in the 18th century. It follows that the elementary rules of rigour, as applied

to the geographical criterion alone, make the comparison impossible and prove the paradox to be a mere illusion.

When based solely on the geographical criterion, the argument may seem somewhat formalistic; but it is singularly reinforced when tested against qualitative criteria. 'Greece' of the 18th century is invariably an arbitrary construct, erected on the historians' culturally-based apperception of a people living in the Hellenic peninsula under Ottoman rule. A comparison of this totality with independent Greece of the 19th century is excluded by quite a few major methodological impediments. It is excluded by the submission of this entity to the overwhelming factor that was the Ottoman State, a factor that can neither be ignored nor, of course, compared with the Greek State in its functions and effects; by its institutional and legal connection with the other Ottoman regions; by its fiscal contributions forming an outward flow rather than an internal circuit; by its monetary and economic articulation with the other provinces of the Empire -- in short by its fusion with the Ottoman social formation. For this fusion was so intricate as to defy distinction, and possibly may prevent the scholar altogether from using the term of social formation for the Greek provinces as seen in isolation -- doing so would after all reduce the concrete reality that is a social formation to a hypothetical construct, an analytical category.

A brief survey of certain characteristic conditions in the two periods will confirm this impossibility of comparing them. In the 18th century, agriculture in the south of the peninsula served to transfer surplus to other sectors thriving in other regions: manufacture in the north, shipping in the islands, trade in the wider areas dominated by the diaspora. (Incidentally, agriculture in the north contributed not only to a similar transfer, but also -- because of the capitalist character of its large landholdings -- to some capital accumulation in the agricultural sector itself, though less extensive than in manufacture, shipping, and of course in trade.) Without this substantial transfer from agriculture, the secondary and tertiary sectors would never have been developed. Yet the transfer would have been insufficient if it had come exclusively from the peninsula's agriculture, simply because the productive capacity of this limited area was relative low. The transfer was

effective in the accumulation process as it occurred within the wider area of the three concentric rings, because the merchants, shipowners and industrialists could draw their profits -- and the concomitant investment funds -- not only from the agriculture of the peninsula, but also from that of the other two rings where they bought and sold. With such qualifications, one can well speak of some development of capitalism in the peninsula as a whole before 1821. Going one step further, one might even consider such capitalism as indigenous, because of an accumulation that occurred locally in part -- but the fact that it was only partly local and the difficulty of defining what accumulation was local and what was not must give rise to some scepticism. Finally, going further still, a particularly bold scholar might even consider that because of the above-mentioned extensive transfer, capitalism was dominant also -- although, again, transfer is not the only pre-condition of dominance.

Conditions were radically different after the war of independence. The debilitating effect of the war, but mainly the pre-1821 international economic crisis and the devastating competition of a western industry just emerging from the industrial revolution, were fatal to Greek manufacture and shipping. But there was a more important reason still, apart from these destructive exogenous factors, why the new Greece would have been radically different from the old. When the revolution ended, the treaty which strictly delimited the country's frontiers also indirectly deprived Greece of two vital sources of accumulation. The first was the surplus traditionally transferred from the agricultural activity of the two outer concentric rings. The other was whatever capital was being accumulated by the diaspora businessmen operating in the other productive sectors of this wider area -- for Greek enterprise was mainly established outside the new country's frontiers and the bourgeois diaspora elements controlling these interests simply did not transfer their bases to Greece. This split from the diaspora; the discontinuance of surplus transfers; the concomitant decreases in capital accumulation; and the abrupt separation from the vast Ottoman market -- all these factors were inevitably set to condemn free Greece's

manufacture and shipping either to short-term disintegration through low profitability, or to a long-term degeration through lack of investment funds and the concomitant obsolescences. And this would have occurred even without the debilitating results of the war, the economic crisis, and foreign competition, simply as an effect of the above, new conditions inherent in the totally new entity that was the social formation of independent Greece.

The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion now begins to emerge. Although, when investigating the evolution of capitalism in Greece from the 18th century to the post-independence period, it is legitimate to collate regions or economic sectors with strictly defined geographical limits, no valid comparison is possible when it comes to Greece, as a social entity. The early 'Greece' is an arbitrary configuration of provinces which, at the level of dynamic-historical analysis, is inseparable from the Ottoman society, whereas independent Greece was a distinct social formation. These two totalities exhibited no generic similarities which would allow a comparison, but only a tangential one, permitting merely a juxtapositional study of the contrasts and an understanding of the dialectical relationships between the slow disintegration of the Ottoman social formation, and the divergence of the modes of production prevailing in the Greek provinces of the Empire towards the modes that prevailed in independent Greece -- a divergence through a historical process which, furthered by multifarious converging factors, gave birth to the new social formation that was Greece after her liberation.

The 'paradox' can finally be solved. Seen as a totality, the Hellenic peninsula of the 18th century may well have seen the emergence of a primitive capitalism. A bold scholar might even see it as a distinct social formation within the Ottoman one, and then consider, also somewhat daringly, that the dominant mode within this construct was capitalist. But this neither permits this mode's comparison with that prevailing in independent Greece, nor does it necessarily make it the first of an evolutionist deterministic succession of instances. Hence it can well be termed capitalist if one so wishes; whereas in independent Greece, as will be shown in the subsequent chapters, the dominant mode may nonetheless have been pre-capitalist -- and, even though later in chronological terms, have been less developed than its alleged predecessor.



Chapter BTHE BASIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES IN THE 19th CENTURY1. Notes on the Land-Ownership System and the Rural Social Structure

Although all through Ottoman rule the role of agriculture was vital, to describe in detail the complicated land-ownership system then prevailing does not lie within the scope of this work. This introduction will merely set out the basic elements of the system, and explain briefly its important changes until the completion of land reform in the 1920s.

The Turkish system of land-holding was different from western feudalism in that one of its basic features was that the land remained formally the property of the State.<sup>21</sup> The Turkish landlords, the minor Greek landowners, and the small independent peasants cultivated their land against payment of taxes and contributions, but were not its proprietors in the strict sense of the word.

Over the centuries of its evolution this system lost much of its rigidity, and in many cases the right of use was in reality little different from outright ownership. Nevertheless, the institutional foundations of Ottoman landholding account for three basic characteristics of Greek landownership after the revolution had driven out the Turkish landlords. Firstly, there was a preponderance of small independent peasants in certain regions; secondly, a significant part of the land became the property of the Greek State; thirdly, the Ottoman system was officially replaced by Roman civil law and the Byzantine Codes. In many Greek provinces these ancient legal sources had, indeed, remained in use parallel to the law of the conqueror. So the important change after the liberation was not so much their official reinstatement as rather their new ideological, ethical, and constitutional basis: the principles of the French Revolution on the inviolability

of property rights. One of the important effects of these ideological and legal changes was that rich Greeks, who had held large acreages under the non-property provisions of the Ottoman system, became propertied landowners (tsiflikades) after the liberation.<sup>\*22</sup>

The Turkish system had extracted a 10% tax on annual gross production. This was continued after the war of independence, and in addition the Greek State imposed a rent of an extra 15% on the gross product where peasants were cultivating national lands. The combination of these two payments, tax plus rent, amounted to 30-45% of the peasants' annual output.<sup>23</sup> It was in theory entirely up to the individual peasant whether or not to rent national land, thus making the payment of rent supposedly a matter of free choice. But this was true only for the propertied peasants who wished to cultivate additional acreage. For the vast unpropertied majority the choice was from free: they could either refuse to rent land and die of starvation, or rent and survive in near-starvation. It must be admitted, however, that to impose a land rent was one of the few fund-raising possibilities open to the new State.

The existence of the national lands was a continuous source of complication of the peasant problem. The landowners demanded openly that these lands should be sold so they might buy them, and found a convenient basis for their argument in the newly instituted principles of freedom to hold, acquire and use private property.<sup>24</sup> The peasants, on the other hand, expected them to be shared out freely. The State, however, could not give away one of its basic sources of revenue without an imaginative policy of public finances and relative liberation from the stranglehold of foreign economic dominance.

The issue was further confused by two land-distribution measures taken by the Greek State. A law of 1833 provided for free distribution of land to those who had actively participated in the

revolution. Two years later, the 'Law concerning the Dotation of Greek Families' (May 1835) provided that land would be distributed against small annual payments over a period of thirty-six years to cover amortisation and revenue tax. This law was virtually boycotted by the peasants and failed. The landowners were probably responsible for much of the poopaganda and rumour against it.<sup>25</sup>

The issue of the national lands was finally solved in 1871, by a law passed by the Koumoundouros government. This still required payments to be made, but they were smaller and the law was implemented more or less successfully.<sup>26</sup> Appropriation of the private landholdings, on the other hand, was not attempted until 1916, when Venizelos' government passed four decrees on land reform with indemnity for the landowners. These decrees were not implemented. The royalist government led by Gounaris amended the decrees by Law 2922 of 1921, but this was not implemented either. It was not until after the 1922 military revolt that reform was finally carried through.

\* \* \*

For a whole century, then, before the implementation of land reform in the 1920s, there were two distinct peasant classes: independent small landowners, and unpropertied peasants and farm labourers. The relative positions of these two peasant classes vis-à-vis each other and the remaining social groups varied according to regional differences in economic and social structures and in their dynamics.<sup>27</sup> A comparison of Euboea with Eleia (Peloponnese) is instructive. In the first period, Euboea's normal pattern of landownership was large landholdings, with a relatively weak group of small tradesmen and a large number of farm workers and unpropertied peasants.<sup>28</sup> In Eleia, there were very few large landholdings, small property was the rule, trade and small manufacture were flourishing, and the unpropertied peasants were few. These differences as against Euboea were reflected in the economic con-

ditions prevailing in the Peloponnese: the share of small industry (mainly silk, wool and cotton mills) was 29% of the total value of the 1804 production of the Peloponnese, as against a mere 12% average for the whole of southern Greece including Euboea.<sup>29</sup> Other areas of the Peloponnese and Sterea -- mainland Greece -- fell in between these two extremes.

The above conditions did not remain static, of course. They gradually changed during the first few decades of independence, so that by the middle of the 1880s the overall picture of Greek society was quite different. One of the basic changes, for example, was the acquisition of Thessaly in 1881. In contrast to the mainly mountainous, not always fertile old provinces with their great variety of crops, this was a large, rich region with the plain of Thessaly the most extensive in the Hellenic peninsula, given over chiefly to large-scale cultivation of cereals. In contrast to the fragmentation of the old provinces, this was a region where economy and society were structured almost uniformly along the lines of big rural property. The acquisition of Thessaly thus suddenly changed the demographic, economic and social picture of Greece, but the abrupt nature of the change can be a source of error.

The relocation of frontier posts and the change in statistical Tables does not mean that Greek society had immediately changed as a whole. This was merely a formal unification under the umbrella of common institutions of two distinct societies. The commonality of institutions, the identity of language and culture, above all the unifying effect of ever-augmenting State power, suggest that these socially distinct regions would, in the long run, most probably have converged towards integration anyway. The emphasis here is on the long-term nature of such a process. A merely institutional merger did not immediately make Thessalian society less 'quasi-feudal', nor indeed Greek society any more so.

## 2. The Delay in the Advent of Capitalism and in the Rise of the Local Middle Class

At the end of what is generally considered the first phase of Greek industrialisation (from 1860 or '70 to about 1910), the percentage of capital invested by the local bourgeoisie was lamentable. Even disregarding the immense public debt which should have been but never was considered as a (tax)liability chiefly of the local business world, the participation in 1909 of local ownership not only in industry but in all other sectors as well, was as low as 64%.<sup>30</sup> Many of the apparently local firms must, however, have been partly or even wholly owned by diaspora Greeks. Besides, more than half of this 'locally'-owned 64% was invested in trade, i.e. much of it in very small merchant firms whose owners really belonged to the petit-bourgeoisie. It would be realistic to say, therefore, that the local bourgeoisie held less than 40% of the total capital invested in the country. And as this total itself was extremely low due to the country's poverty, the said 40% share in it of the local bourgeoisie was low not only as a percentage but also as an absolute figure.

The picture is not much brighter if looked at from another angle. The share of the national income yielded by bourgeois and petit-bourgeois activities, i.e. by small manufacture, industry, shipping and commerce, was about 24% in 1825, still 24% in 1875, up to 32% in 1900, and 38% in 1910 -- fourteen percentage points, not a very significant growth for a period as long as eighty-five years. Moreover, the bulk of this -- 12% of the fourteen -- was the result of an increase in trade, largely a petit-bourgeois activity.<sup>31</sup>

These figures indicate the low rate of capital accumulation and reinvestment. The following Tables will confirm this indication and prove some other important points: the economic weakness of the middle class in all sectors of the economy but especially in industry; its demographic weakness; its low propensity to invest; its stagnation, along with that of the economy in general, during the 1885-1910 period; and its spectacular rise in the two decades from 1910 to 1930, which can thus be considered as the phase of true take-off for the economy of modern Greece and of the real capitalist transformation of Greek society.<sup>32</sup> These points are particularly important, for they disprove the commonly held view that the pre-1909 period was the one notable for its developing capitalism and the rise of the middle class. Concomitantly, they provide the basis for an analysis of the 1909 coup and its aftermath, which disproves the equally common view which lumps these events together under the term 'bourgeois revolution'.<sup>\*33</sup>

## 2.1 Statistical Tables

Notation: All values are in gold francs unless otherwise specified. Sterling = G.Fr. 25.2215 (before 1926). G.Fr. = G.Drachma, see Table I for paper-drachma fluctuation. All figures given by the sources in other currencies have here been converted to gold

francs unless otherwise specified. For the post-1910 period, conversion is usually to price-indexed drachmae, because the fluctuations of gold and currency rates depended on factors only rather remotely relevant to the Greek economy.

d = derived: If this follows a footnote number, it means that the figure is derived from data given in the source mentioned by the footnote; if it stands alone, the method of derivation is quite obvious from the Table itself.

Rounded-off figures: Figures have been rounded off to the nearest decimal, tenth, hundredth etc. -- e.g. 4.24 to 4.2, but 4.26 to 4.3; mill. 68.76 to 68.8, but mill. 68.74 to 68.7.

\*: An asterisk attached to the footnote number indicates that special explanations are contained in the footnote.

ave: The abbreviation 'ave' denotes that an average figure is given for the period indicated by the column. E.g., if the inscription 'ave 7.8' appears in the column for the period 1805-99, this 7.8 is the average for those five years inclusively. Whether averages are taken directly from the primary sources or derived is not separately specified; usually they are derived.

Statistical Yearbooks: To avoid repetition, only one reference is made and no page numbers given, e.g. "Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1938". Since footnotes are not normally used, the indication usually reads Y30, Y39, Y37 etc., next to the figure given in the Table column.

Census: Only the dates are given, e.g. C70, C07, C20 for the censi of 1870, 1907, and 1920 respectively.

Population and area: No reference is given for these data, as their sources (mainly censi) are quite well known.

Footnotes: Except for population and area, all figures given in the Tables, including those derived from censi or Statistical Yearbooks, are provided with their source. To avoid having every single figure followed by a footnote number, however, the

footnote by the top figure of any one Table-column remains valid for all subsequent figures down this column, until replaced by another. For example:

1880	1.395 <sup>113</sup>
1883	1.418
1891	1.091
1893	1.561
1897	1.417 <sup>114</sup>
1903	1.617
1907	1.471

where footnote 113 refers to all figures from 1880-93, and footnote 114 to the figures from 1897-1907.

In some Tables, this system functions not vertically but horizontally, and is then indicated by an arrow -- e.g.:

<u>1880</u>	<u>1883</u>	<u>1893</u>	<u>1897</u>	<u>1903</u>
1.395 <sup>103</sup> →	1.418	1.561	1.417 <sup>104</sup> →	1.617

Finally, if a footnote covers figures both vertically and horizontally, arrows are used for both directions: 131<sup>97</sup>↘





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Statistical Tables

(in series centred upon the period 1881-1928)

The Tables to follow have been compiled from a great variety of primary and secondary sources (see also Foreword and Introduction to Bibliography), so that their material varies in reliability and presents some long chronological gaps. The non-Greek reader should remember that there is no economic or social history of Greece, that material and statistics are scarce, and that these Tables are probably the first attempt to form a synthetical statistical image of Greece in a series ranging from 1881 -1928.

Footnotes - Table I

- 1 Zolotas, "I Hellas eis to ...", p. 157.
- 2 Charitakis, "Le mouvement ...", p. 237.
- 3 Oikonomiki kai Logistiki Encyclopaedia, Vol. III, p. 340, and Vol. "Hellas", p. 121-23.
4. Andreades, "Les' effets économiques ...", p. 285.

TABLE I : BASIC FIGURES FOR STATISTICAL INDEXING

YEAR	GOLD FR GOLD DR	YEAR	GOLD FR GOLD DR	£	₯	PRICE INDEX
1884	1.0000	1912	1.0000	25.22		
85	1.0508	13	1.0000	25.22		
86	1.2325	14	1.0000	25.16 <sup>2</sup>	5.19 <sup>4</sup>	100
87	1.2633	15	1.0101	25.01	5.35	117
88	1.2733	16	1.0000	24.72	5.21	159
89	1.2300	17	1.0000	24.68	5.18	156
1898	1.2350	18	1.0000	24.77	5.18	356
91	1.2583	19	1.0633	24.54	5.53	323
92	1.4353	1920	1.8518	34.24	9.55	351
93	1.6077	21	3.4483	70.91	13.29	398
94	1.7492	22	6.6567	166.50	37.15	535
95	1.3021	23	12.5000	296.67	64.60	1181
96	1.7382	24	11.1112	247.35		1235
97	1.6757	25	12.4000	312.74		1414
98	1.4741	26		385 <sup>3</sup>		1533
99	1.5550	27				1790
1900	1.6432	28		375	77 <sup>3</sup>	1868
01	1.5580	29		375	77	1923
02	1.6273	1930		375	77	1682
03	1.5695	31		352	77	1671
04	1.3520	32		375	147	1773
05	1.0952	33				1903
06	1.0982	34				1941
07	1.0878	35				1960
08	1.0833	36		540		2018
09	1.0315	37				2191
1918	0.9990	38			125.71	
11	1.0000	39		550	125	

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NB : PARITY OF POUND STERLING WITH GOLD DRACHMA BEFORE

1912 : £ = 25.2215 DRG.

Footnotes - Table II

- 1 Charitakis, "I helliniki viomichania...", p. 21.
- 2 Mulhall's "Dictionary of Statistics", p. 624
- 3 Papagaryfallos, "Oi georgikoi...", pp. 124-49.

NB. I did not include as urban populations the inhabitants of agglomerations of 2-5,000 people. The comparative value of the series and the evaluation of its evolution are not significantly different whichever classification is preferred for these villages, as the percentage of their total population has been fairly constant around 8% throughout the period examined.

TABLE II : BASIC GEOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FIGURES

POPULATION (TH)	POPULATION URBAN %	YEAR	AREA, TH.SQ. KM	AREA, CULTIVATED, TH.ACRES
939 <sup>Y72</sup>		1821	47,5	
824		1839		
987		1848		
1,063		1856		
		1860		810 <sup>2</sup>
1,097		1861	47,5	
		1865	50,2	
1,458	11.6 <sup>I</sup>	1870		
1,679 <sup>Y30</sup>	19.0 <sup>Y30d</sup>	1879		
		1881	63,6	
2,187 <sup>Y72</sup>	12,6	1889		2,090
		1893		2,340
2,434	11,9	1896		
		1898	63,2	
2,632	14,7	1907		
		1915		2,654 <sup>3</sup>
		1917		3,365
		1919		3,433 <sup>Y38</sup>
5,531 <sup>Y30</sup>	33,5	1920		
5,900 <sup>Y38</sup>		1922	132	3,077
6,100		1926		4,011
6,205	33,3 <sup>Y38d</sup>	1928		
		1930		4,396 <sup>3</sup>
6,600		1933		5,143 <sup>Y38</sup>

Footnotes - Table III

\*1d Law's Report, p. 29. (\* students who passed examination only, based on one year; therefore it is not possible to obtain even a very approximate 4-year average comparable to the series; either the number of failures was too high or the official figures are exaggerated)

\*2d For the post-1926 inter-war period there are figures available, but they are misleading as they do not include the students of the University of Thessaloniki, opened in 1926.

\*3d Law's Report, F.O. Annual Series 1893, p.29. Percent of conscripts, therefore male; hence the next figure in the series, 66% of the total, based on the rather unreliable 1907 census, seems highly improbable: it implies an inexplicable amelioration in the literacy percentage among the female population in just 14 years.

4 Papagaryfallos, "Oi georgikoi...", pp. 124-43.

TABLE III : EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS  
PER 10,000 POPULATION

ILLITERACY  
% OF POPULATION

1852-57 2,00 Y30d

1857-62 2,25

1862-67 2,5

1867-72 2,5

1872-77 3,0

1877-82 4,0

1882-87 4,0

1887-92 5,0

1893 2,0<sup>1d\*</sup>

1892-97 5,0

1897-1902 3,25

1902-07 4,0

1907-12 4,75

1917 4,5

1922-26 6,4<sup>2d</sup>

1870 82 Y30

1879 81

1893 70<sup>3d\*</sup>

1907 66 Y30

1920 58 Y38

1928 50

1940 40<sup>4</sup>



## Footnotes - Table IV

- 1 Evelpidis, "Oikonomiki...", p.86; percentages in total working population.
- \*2 Moskof, "I ethniki...", p.155. Landowners, only 1167 living in Athens and 10 in Syros; total for Greece probably not much higher as most landlords lived in Athens. All figures are for Athens (1879) plus Syros (1870), and should be considered indicative, though figures for urban professions should be very close to total for Greece. "Liberal professions" may include workshop owners.
- \*3d Figure not reliable. From Boyadjoglou, "Contribution à l'étude de l'économie de la Grèce", Paris 1957, p.49. Moskof ("I ethniki...", pp.138 and 142) gives a figure of about 2000 large landholdings in 1910, of which two-thirds were allegedly purchased, mainly after 1881, by diaspora Greeks.
- 4d From Stavrianos, "The Balkans...", p. 677.
- 5 Gevetsis, "I exelixis...", pp. 5 and 211, based on the Mansolas Tables compiled in the 1870s.
- 6 Dakin, "The Unification...", p. 249.
- 7 Evelpidis, "Oikonomiki...:", p. 94.
- 8 Pysros Encyclopaedia, Vol."Hellas", p.145 (text, 1st col.)
- 9 Dakin, "The Unification...", pp. 316-19.
- 10 Mulhall, "Dictionary of Statistics", p.520.
- 11 Webb, "Dictionary of Statistics", p. 398.
- 12 Girard, "La Grèce en 1893", pp. 45 and 135.
- 13 Law's Report, F.O. Annual Series 1893, p.89
- 14 Admiralty (Great Britain) Naval Intelligence "Handbook of Greece", p.170
- \*15 The figure (from the 1879 census) probably includes rural workers and/or domestic servants and/or some workshop owners. It is not comparable with the figure under "Employed in manufacture & handicraft, incl. owners", because the latter might not include mine workers, whereas the former may.
- \*16 The figure is the very approx. total of industrial workers only, derived by deducting the 1907 total of mine workers (11,900) from a hypothetical total of 25,900 for mining and industrial labour, based on the total of 26,200 which actually existed four years later (see fig. for 1911). I established this figure to help my investigation of the evolution of Greek industry (Tables X and XI).
- \*17 Gevetsis, "I exelixis...", pp.211 and 55. Difference from 1875 due to the use of three original statistical Tables with different bases for excluding very small manufacturers (two Tables by Mansolas, one by Demathas).

TABLE IV : EMPLOYMENT

Year	Agriculture, %	Mining, Handicraft, Communications, Industry, %	Banking, Trade, Transport, Communications, %	Other services and public sector, %	Landowners "professional" %	"Important entrepreneurs" %	Merchants %	Civil Servants %	Liberal professions %	Seamen, shopkeepers, th.	Tradesmen, th.	Propertied peasants, th.	Peasants, total, th.	Employed in manuf. & handicr. incl. owners, th.	Mining workers, th.	Mining and industrial workers, th.	Labour, unskilled, th.	Servants, skilled and unskilled, total, th.
1813											17,5 <sup>9</sup>							
1835											15,7							
1861	74.0 <sup>1</sup>	10.0 <sup>1</sup>	6.1 <sup>1</sup>	8.3 <sup>1</sup>	1.6 <sup>1</sup>													
1867											31,2							
1870	74.8	10.3	6.3	7.2	1.4	(11771) <sup>2*</sup>	(126) <sup>2</sup>	(1984) <sup>2</sup>	(390) <sup>2*</sup>	(1807) <sup>2</sup>								5735 <sup>C70</sup>
1875																	6,9 <sup>5</sup>	
1876																	3,7 <sup>17*</sup>	
1879											16,1 <sup>C79</sup>	34,1 <sup>C79</sup>	32,3 <sup>C79</sup>	256,9 <sup>C79</sup>	45,0 <sup>C79</sup>		24,3 <sup>15*</sup>	
1880	69.9	11.8	7.3	9.1	1.9													
1882									11,082 <sup>12</sup>		11,0 <sup>10</sup>							
1892									11,167 <sup>13</sup>									
1907	66.3	12.8	11.1	6.6	3.2				12,448 <sup>14</sup>		23,6 <sup>9</sup>						11,9 <sup>11</sup>	14,0 <sup>16d</sup>
1910								2,248 <sup>3d</sup>										
1911																	26,2 <sup>6</sup>	
1917																	36,1 <sup>C17</sup>	
1920	70.9	13.1	9.2	4.2	2.6	2,259 <sup>4d</sup>											60,0 <sup>C20</sup>	
1921						1924=					25,0							
1928	68.3	14.7	10.7	3.4	2.9	Land reform.												
1929																	110,0 <sup>7</sup>	
1930																	158,5 <sup>C30</sup>	
1933																	191,0 <sup>8</sup>	

Footnotes - Table V

- 1 Anastassopoulos, "Historia ...", Vol.II, p. 748.
- 2 Mulhall, "Dictionary of Statistics", p. 37.
- 3 Papagaryfallos, "Oi georgikoi...", pp. 124-49.
- \*4d From Statistical Yearbook 1938, average for 1909-13.
- 5 Webb, "Dictionary of Statistics", p. 12.
- 6 Sundbärg, "Apperçus statistiques...", pp. 171-72.

TABLE V

PRODUCTION OF			YEARS	CONSUMPTION PER CAP OF		
WHEAT TH. TONS	WHEAT, KGS PER ACRE	CURRENTS MILL. LIT.		WHEAT BUSH.	SUGAR KGS	COFFEE HECTOGR.
		79.2 <sup>1</sup>	1864			
		120.0 <sup>2</sup>	1885			
		250.0 <sup>1</sup>	1888			
			1891-98		3.60 <sup>6</sup>	5.30 <sup>6</sup>
			1896-00	5.10 <sup>5</sup>	3.01	3.90
			1900-05	5.20	3.55	6.50
190 <sup>2</sup>	81 <sup>4d*</sup>		1910			
			11			
566 <sup>3</sup>	66 <sup>3</sup>		15			
710	74		17			
770	70		1920			
	57		22			
624	56		23			
	45		24			
	66		25			
851	64		26			
	71		27			
	66		28			
713	62		29			
759	47		1930			
775	50		31			
465	77		32			
772	111		33			
699	88		34			
740	87		35			
532	64		36			

Footnotes - Table VI

Ratios and averages derived from my Table I, from Zolotas, "I Hellas eis ...", pp. 155-57, and Dertilis P., "La dette publique des États Balkaniques", pp. 111-13, esp. 131-33.

Values in mill. drachmas, approximate.

**TABLE VI : FOREIGN-DEBT SERVICE, TRADE-BALANCE DEFICIT,  
AND RATE OF MONETARY DEVALUATION.**

YEAR	FOREIGN PUBLIC DEBT			RATE OF DEVAL	DECADE AVER OF ANNUAL TR. BAL. DEFICIT	AVER. ANNUAL FOR. DEBT SERVICE
	NOMINAL CAPITAL	REAL CAPITAL	NETT PROCEEDS			
				%		
1867				0		
1881	180	133		0	31.5 (1863-72)	
1884	280	203		0	39.5 (1873-82)	
1886				18.5		21.6 (1879-1893)
1887	415	294		21.5		
1893	640	468	389	37.8	31.8 (1885-92)	
BANKRUPTSY						
1895				44.5		
1903				36.3	37.2 (1893-1902)	
1904				21.1		
1905				8.8		

NB.1 : All values in Million Drachmae.

NB.2 : Allocation of inputs from foreign public borrowing:

Railroads	= 120
Military expenses	= 100
Miscellaneous	= 25
	<u>245</u>

To note that at least part of these expenses is included in figures showing deficit of balance of trade.

NB.3 : Total servicing expenses of public debt, 1879-1893 = 470 mil.

Footnote - Table VII

NB. This Table was necessary because the Statistical Year-book for Greece 1938 erroneously presents figures for 1885-1909 as "values 'in gold francs" without having calculated the conversion. This is proven by comparing these figures with those included in Consular Reports. Not unexpectedly, the error is repeated by Andreades in "Les effets...", p. 274, and Evelpidis, "Oikonomiki kai koinoniki...", p. 95. As these books have been used as sources by many authors, great care is necessary whenever foreign trade figures and especially statistical derivations are encountered in the Greek bibliography.

T A B L E VII : FOREIGN TRADE, CONVERSION TO GOLD FRANCS (THE USA)

YEAR	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	TOTALS	YEAR	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	TOTAL
1881	116,294	69,887	186,182	1901	84,744	56,691	141,435
82	142,554	76,344	218,899	02	84,329	48,954	133,283
83	121,340	82,643	203,983	03	87,604	54,746	142,350
84	115,953	73,621	189,574	04	101,343	66,990	168,333
85	108,084	72,647	180,731	05	129,434	76,416	205,850
86	94,734	64,175	158,909	06	131,703	112,480	244,183
87	104,290	81,261	185,551	07	137,036	108,126	245,162
88	85,721	75,123	160,844	08	142,742	102,200	244,942
89	107,848	87,624	195,472	09	133,348	98,582	231,930
90	97,802	77,564	175,366	1910	160,697	144,715	305,412
DECADE AVER.	109,462	76,089	185,551	DECADE AVER.	119,298	86,990	206,288
1891	108,111	82,793	190,903				
92	83,065	57,273	140,338				
93	56,904	54,758	111,662				
94	62,862	42,471	105,334				
95	59,878	40,603	100,481				
96	66,894	41,697	108,591				
97	69,441	48,761	118,203				
98	93,796	59,848	153,645				
99	83,872	59,938	143,810				
1900	79,957	62,524	142,481				
DECADE AVER.	76,478	55,067	131,545				



Footnote - Table VIII

NB. On the basis of Statistical Yearbook 1938, as amended by conversion to gold francs in my previous Table VII. My figures per capita for the decades 1861-70 and 1871-80 do not correspond exactly to the averages of the Yearbook, most probably because of the different average population figure used in the calculations.

TABLE VIII : FOREIGN TRADE, decade averages, 1870s-1920s.

	<u>1871-80</u>	<u>1881-90</u>	<u>91-1900</u>	<u>1901-10</u>	<u>1911-20</u>	<u>1921-30</u>
Imports	91,959	122,081	120,257	144,042	561,537	716,646
Exports	56,827	85,981	86,419	103,196	263,249	367,309
Total	148,786	208,062	206,676	247,238	824,786	1,083,955
Imports per cap.	58	57	50	55	126	118
Exports per cap.	36	41	36	40	59	60
Total per cap.	94	98	86	95	185	178
Exp % of imp	62	70	72	72	47	51

(Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1938. Gold drachmae)

T A B L E VIII : FOREIGN TRADE, DECADE AVERAGES IN DRACHMAS AND IN GOLD FRANCS (THOUSAND)

<u>1851-60</u>	<u>1861-70</u>	<u>1871-80</u>	<u>1881-90</u>	<u>1891-00</u>	<u>1901-10</u>	<u>1911-20</u>	<u>1921-30</u>	
29,034	60,072	91,959	122,081	120,257	144,043	620,437	8,001,042	IMPORTS, DRS
15,810	32,162	56,827	85,981	86,420	103,196	201,785	4,457,408	EXPORTS, DRS
44,844	92,234	148,786	208,062	206,677	247,239	902,132	13,258,530	TOTAL, DRS
29,034	60,072	91,959	109,462	76,478	199,298	561,537	716,646	IMPORTS, GOLD FRS
15,810	32,162	56,827	76,089	55,067	86,990	263,249	367,309	EXPORTS, GOLD FRS
44,844	92,234	148,786	185,551	131,545	206,288	824,786	1,083,955	TOTAL, GOLD FRS
27,50	47.04/45.5	58.61/57.8	52.12	31,42	45,88	140,38	117,48	IMPORTS PER CAP., GOLD FRS
14,98	25.19/24.4	36.22/35.7	36,23	22,62	33,46	65,81	60,21	EXPORTS PER CAP., GOLD FRS
42,48	72.22/69.9	94.83/93.6	88,36	54,04	79,34	206,20	177,70	TOTAL PER CAP., GOLD FRS
54,5	53,5	61,8	70,4	71,9	71,6	46,9	51,3	EXPORTS, % OF IMPORTS
1,050	1,277	1,569	2,100	2,434	2,600	4,000	6,100	AVERAGE POPULATION USED AS BASIS FOR CALCULATION

Footnotes - Table IX

Footnote numbers refer to figs. on the same line, not vertically down the same column (unless otherwise specified by vertical arrow).

- 1 Dakin, "The Unification...", p. 316-19.
- 2 Andreades, "La marine marchande Grèque", pp.6 and 19. Sail over 30 or 60 tons (but not specified); steam most probably over 100 t, as Andreades' main source was Lloyd's Register. (He also acknowledges Percy Martin, but this is almost certainly only a gallant gesture.)
- 3 Girard, "La Grèce...", pp.208 ff. Ships over 30 t. Noted difference with Dakin's numbers, which thus seem to include even smaller sailing vessels, but steamships of much higher minimum tonnage.
- 4 Eleftheroudakis, Encyclopaedia, Vol.V, pp.449 (sail over 30 t, steam over 100 t).
- 5 Pysos, Encyclopaedia, Vol. "Hellas", p. 201
- 6 Law's Report, F.O.Annual Series 1893, p.26
- 7 Webb, "Dictionary of Statistics", p.570; Lloyd's figures.
- 8 Lloyd figures reported by Zolotas, "I Hellas eis..", p.56.
- 9 Ditto, vessels of over 100 t.
- 10 Consular Report (1909), F.O.Annual Series N° 4484, Piraeus. The Consul refers to a Table issued by the Greek Ministry of Merchant Marine.

**NB.1** There is an abundance of statistics on shipping. I chose not to use those including very small ships and to compute this Table with data given by Andreades and the Eleftheroudakis Encyclopaedia because they can be used in series, having both more or less the same statistical bases; Lloyd figures whenever I found them quoted; data reported in Consular Reports; and figures given by reliable contemporaries (e.g. Girard).

**NB.2** One of the reasons for the decline of Greek shipping seems to have been a French law of 1872 taxing Greek ships (Girard, "La Grèce en 1883", p.209). However, I suspect this was only a minor reason, not merely because the French trade was only part of the Greek shipowners' activity, but also because the crisis which broke out only one year later, and mainly the backwardness of the Greek merchant fleet (see slow evolution of steamer figures in the Table and discussion in Chapter B, section on railways) had such overwhelming impact as to relegate other unfavourable factors to subsidiary positions.

TABLE IX: SHIPPING

YEAR	TOTAL VESSELS	TOTAL TH. TONS	STEAMERS TH.T	STEAMERS TH.T	SAIL TH.T	SAIL TH.T	AVER. TONNAGE STEAMERS	AVER. TONNAGE TOT. FLEET	YEAR	TOTAL VESSELS	TOTAL TH. TONS	STEAMERS TH. T	STEAMERS TH. T	SAIL	SAIL TH. T	AVER. TONNAGE STEAMERS	AVER. TONNAGE TOT. FLEET
1821	600 <sup>1</sup> →	150	--	--	600	150	--	250 <sup>1d</sup>	1911			343 <sup>2</sup> →	388			1130 <sup>2</sup>	
1860	1212 <sup>2</sup> →	234	--	--	1212	234	--	193 <sup>2d</sup>	15	1217 <sup>4d</sup> →	933	433 <sup>4</sup> →	823	784	110	1901 <sup>4d</sup> →	767
1866	1668 <sup>1,4d</sup> →	277	11 <sup>1</sup> →	5	1657 <sup>4</sup> →	272	455 <sup>1d</sup>	166 <sup>1,4d</sup>	18	905 <sup>4d</sup> →	411 <sup>5</sup>	205 <sup>4</sup> →	291	700	120	1419 <sup>4d</sup> →	454
1875	1751 <sup>2d</sup> →	356	28 <sup>2</sup> →	8	1733	348	294	202 <sup>2d</sup>	19	840 <sup>2</sup> →	295	200	180	640	115	900 <sup>2d</sup> →	351
1883	1477 <sup>3</sup> →	250	73	33	1404	217	483 <sup>2</sup> /452 <sup>3d</sup>	169 <sup>3d</sup>	1920	1338	563	282	430	1056	133	1525	421
1892	1843 <sup>2d</sup> →	267	104 <sup>2</sup> →	61	1739	206	587	149 <sup>2d</sup>	21	1414	633	335	494	1079	138	1475	448
1893		270 <sup>6</sup> →	103	58		211	563 <sup>6d</sup>		22	1533	837	440	685	1093	152	1557	546
1901	1123 <sup>2d</sup> →	306	198 <sup>2</sup> →	161	925	145	857	272 <sup>2d</sup>	23	1540 <sup>2</sup>	859/859 <sup>8</sup>	419 <sup>2</sup> →	737	1121	122	1759	558
1903			210 <sup>2</sup> →	202			962		24		751 <sup>9</sup>						
1906		426 <sup>7</sup> →		236		190			25		890 <sup>9</sup>						
1907	1330 <sup>2,4d</sup> →	436	285 <sup>2</sup> →	289	1045 <sup>4</sup> →	147	1012 <sup>2</sup>	328 <sup>2,4d</sup>	26	1214 <sup>2</sup> →	933	477	934	737	60	1958	768
1908			300 <sup>10</sup> →	296			987 <sup>10d</sup>		27	1230 <sup>2</sup> →	1170	504	1111	726	59	2204	951
									28	1257 <sup>5d</sup>	1315 <sup>5</sup>	528 <sup>5</sup> →	1257	729	59	2380 <sup>5d</sup> →	1046
									1933		1657 <sup>5</sup>						

Footnotes - Table X1  
2  
34  
\*5

Zolotas, "I Hellas eis ...", p. 108.  
 Evelpidis, "Oikonomiki...", p.82; figures on corporations denote total, not merely industrial corporations. The tremendous increase in the total of sociétés anonymes, especially after 1920, is somewhat misleading. It was partly due to the favourable taxation compared with that of personal companies, and the lack of restriction on minimum capital. This situation was only partly met through the new legislation on the capital market and Law 2190 of 1922 on the sociétés anonymes; even in 1929, parliament discussed the subject of imposing a minimum-capital legal requirement for the formation of banking corporations (Venizelos' speech of 17 March 1929, in Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", Vol.II, pp. 490-91).

\*6

Kordatos, "Historia...", Vol.XIII, p.15; total corporations, not just industrial ones; figs. not altogether reliable; author does not refer to his source.

\*7

"Value of industrial installations" in gold drachmas; Pysros Encyclopaedia, p.129. Comparison with the series for the previous year, showing capital and not value of installations, is possible if one is interested in the productive capacity of industry rather than its capital in the strict sense. Moreover, there is no danger of underestimating the value of fixed capital employed by the industries in previous years. Their installations could not have been of a value much higher than their capital: it was only much later that Greek industry began using borrowed capital to any large extent.

8

Law's Report, F.O. Annual Series 1893, p.86, Table F.VI.

9

Webb, "Dictionary of Statistics", p. 398.

10

Charitakis, "Le mouvement...", p. 233.

11

Pysros Encyclopaedia, Vol. "Hellas", pp. 129-46.

12

Webb, "Dictionary of Statistics", p. 407.

\*13

Evelpidis, "Oikonomiki...", p.407 (1939 edition) pp.66-69. Figures for 1977 industrial production should be used with care: they are most probably based on a total of manufacturing establishments which includes very small workshops.

\*14

Anastassopoulos, "Historia...", based on 1917 census, therefore rather unreliable (in Zolotas' opinion).

15

Statistical Yearbooks 1930, 1934, 1938, 1939.

16

Zolotas, "I Hellas eis...", p. 149.

- \*17 Evelpidis, "Oikonomiki..." (1939 ed.) p.94; his figures on industry in 1936 are lower than Anastassopoulos' for 1930, clearly because of different criteria. Evelpidis refers to larger factories, as suggested by the average HP; this makes his data better suited for comparison with previous years.
- 18 Charitakis, "Le mouvement...", p. 227.
- \*19 Consular Report N°4484, F.O. Annual Series, Piraeus 1909. Figure refers to factories in Athens and Piraeus only. The total number of factories in the whole of the country could not have been much above 300-350, which confirms the figure of 355 factories in 1909 which I derived indirectly from two other sources (see below, fn. 27) to cover the gap in information for the crucial 1900-1910 period. The 243 listed here do not include the following, also reported by the Consul: 17 confectionary "factories", 6 manufacturers of artificial flowers, and 15 bookbinders. The Consul faithfully reporting such units indicates why his total 1909 number (281) is so much higher than that given by Charitakis for 1910 (92): the Consul includes workshops, whereas the Greek author is concerned only with more important establishments.
- \*20 Anastassopoulos, "Historia...", Vol. II, pp. 1021-24. Comparison with Charitakis' figures for the 1880-1917 series, which cover large factories only, suggests that almost certainly both authors derived their information from the same source: the report written in 1921 by the high-ranking employee of the Industry Ministry, G.A. Voudouris. I derived my figure for 1921 by adding the 61 new "large factories" of the Athens area to Charitakis' figure of 120 for 1917.
- 21 Gevetsis, "I exelixis...", p.55.
- 22 Gevetsis, "I exelixis...", p.211.
- \*23 Statistical Yearbook 1930, p.143. Increase of 50 factories between 1876 and 1889 represents, essentially, 44 new flourmills and 4 new olive-processing "factories"; The low significance of these impressive increases is obvious. But increase of HP in the existing factories is substantial, although it may be due to different statistical methods.
- The reliability of statistics on industry before 1920 is doubtful. According to the 1930 Statistical Yearbook of Greece, the figures chosen for that edition are the least unreliable (p.143); they appear in my Tables with proper reference to their source, as a guide for comparisons with data from other sources.
- The 1917 figures for industry are also very unreliable; this applies to all data derived from the 1917 census which was conducted in a period of war and political upheaval (Zolotas, "I Hellas...", p.20).

T A B L E X : INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

NUMBER OF CORPOR.	CAPITAL OF IND. CORPOR. MILL.DRS	CAPITAL OF IND. CORPOR. MILL.DRS INDEXED	MINING PROD. TH.T.	MINING PROD. MILL. DRS	YEAR	IND.PROD MILL.DRS PRICE-INDEXED	NUMBER OF FACTORIES ATHENS - PIRAEUS	NUMBER OF FACTORIES TOTAL	TOTAL HORSEPOWER TH.	TOTAL MANPOWER TH.
					1862					
					1867			22 <sup>Y30</sup>	0.296 <sup>Y30</sup>	
					1870			39 <sup>21</sup>		
					1875			95 <sup>Y30</sup>	2.0 <sup>Y30</sup>	6.9 <sup>28*</sup>
					1876			129 <sup>22</sup>		3.7 <sup>22</sup>
					1877	146 <sup>13*</sup>				
					1880		22 <sup>18</sup>			
			295 <sup>8d</sup>	13,478 <sup>8d</sup>	1887					
			263	14,564	1888					
			282	14,383	1889			145 <sup>23*</sup>	5.6 <sup>Y30</sup>	
			361	15,543	1890					
			300	14,492	86-90					
					1893			208 <sup>2</sup>	5.5 <sup>2</sup>	
13 <sup>4</sup> INDUSTRIAL ONLY	52.5 <sup>4</sup>	30.2 <sup>4d</sup> GOLD			1896					
					1900		63			
20 IND	64.7	47.8			1904					
				21,186 <sup>12</sup>	1906					
			450 <sup>9</sup>		1907					
29 <sup>5</sup> TOTAL	(148.0) <sup>5*</sup>	(148.0) <sup>5*</sup> PRICE-IND.			1909		(243) <sup>19*</sup>	355 <sup>27*</sup>		
		(40.0) <sup>6</sup>			1910		92 <sup>18</sup>			
		(270.0) <sup>6d*</sup>			1911					26.2 <sup>29</sup>
		(270.0) <sup>6d*</sup>			1914					
			579 <sup>10</sup>		1915					
			470		1917	(558) <sup>14d</sup>	120	(762) <sup>24d*</sup> (1870) <sup>Y30*</sup>	70.0 <sup>Y30</sup>	24.3 <sup>24d</sup>
56 <sup>4</sup> IND	169.6 <sup>4</sup>	46.3 <sup>4d</sup>			1918					
					1920			2905 <sup>25d*</sup>	60.3 <sup>25d</sup>	60.0 <sup>25</sup>
			381		1921	272 <sup>15d</sup>	153 <sup>20d*</sup>			
			356		1922					
			473 <sup>10d</sup>		1923	466 <sup>16d</sup>				
130 IND	549.6	44.5			1924					
					1925					
494 <sup>5</sup> TOTAL	(4882) <sup>5*</sup>	(273.0) <sup>5*</sup> GOLD			1927					
		(280) <sup>7*</sup>			1928	380 <sup>11d</sup>				
					1929	375 <sup>17d</sup>		4000 <sup>17</sup>	230.0 <sup>17</sup>	110.0 <sup>17</sup>
					1930	394 <sup>15d</sup>		5947 <sup>Y30</sup>		156.5 <sup>C30</sup>
		(382)	292 <sup>11</sup>		1932					
					1933	423 <sup>11d</sup>				191.0 <sup>26</sup>
					1934	510 <sup>15d</sup>				
880 TOTAL					1936	586 <sup>17d</sup>		4512 <sup>17*</sup>	267.0 <sup>17*</sup>	



(CONT'D FROM PG 58.β - FNS/TABLE X)

- \*24 Figures for old provinces (pre-war Greece), Charitakis' analysis of the 1917 census, but fairly reliable precisely because they are local figures. Very useful for an assessment of the real industrial growth between 1870 and 1917.
- \*25 Derived from 1920 census. Only factories above 6 workers are included here; though this distinction was not observed for previous years, I think it necessary for the evaluation of an industrial sector which, by the 1920s, was no longer in a primitive stage. Average labour power in factories employing fewer than 6 workers was, after all, only 2.6, and average HP just 1.21; this classifies almost all the 31,987 "factories" in this category listed in the census as very small workshops.
- Comparison of 19th-cent. HP evolution between Greece and Belgium, another small, but truly advanced country, is illuminating. In Belgium, the HP of steam engines alone increased from 11,000 in 1830 to 30,000 in 1838 and to 66,000 in 1950. In Greece, total HP increased from about 2,000 in 1875 to 5,500 in 1893 and 60,000 in 1920. In 1909 it could not have been much above 15-20,000 if one considers a total number of 355 "large" factories (as above fn.19, based on 1909 Consular Report, and below, fn.27), an average HP of 35 (as indicated by the averages of 38.4 in 1889, and 26 in 1904; 20.8 in 1920; 43.6 for factories with over 26 workers in 1920), plus an additional 5-6,000 HP used in very small workshops, to make comparison in series possible.
- 26 Pirsos Encyclopaedia, vol. "Hellas", p.145 (1st col. text).
- \*27 Anastassopoulos, "Historia ...", Vol. II, p.1021-24. Very approximate figure, derived from the number of large factories (6-25 and 25+ workers) in 1920, reduced by the 137 "large factories" Voudouris reports as established between 1910-1920. Up to the day of publication of this work I have been unable to locate Voudouris' report.
- \*28 Gevetsis, "I exelixis...", pp. 55 and 211. Difference with 1976 due to the use of three original statistical Tables with different bases for excluding very small manufacturers (two Tables by Mansolas, one by Demathas).
- 29 Dakin, "The Unification...", p. 249.

Footnotes - Table XI

- 1 Gevetsis, "I exelixis...", p. 211.
- \*2 See fn.23, Table X.
- 3 Law's Report, F.O. Annual Series 1893, p.82.
- 4 See fn.27, Table X.
- 5 See fn.24, Table X.
- \*6 See fn.26, Table X.
- \*7 Derived from 1920 census. The average 76 manpower for the 492 factories should be read with care. A very few large enterprises employing hundreds or thousands of workers raise the average considerably and may mislead as to the size of the bulk of the 492 factories, which was quite small, indeed near the limit of 26 workers.
- 8 Zolotas, "I Hellas eis...", pp. 19-20.
- \*9 The range includes factories with 6-25 workers, but the 9-workers average per factory suggests that distribution tilted heavily towards the smallest units (below 9 workers). To yield an average of 9, the smaller-than-9 factories must have been the rule, and most of them were family workshops as in the category of 1-5 workers. This is confirmed by the extremely low average of 6.9 HP per unit. For comparing the 1920s with the preceding decades, therefore, the truly significant category is the next one (over 26 workers), where the number of factories is 492. The reader might want to increase this number by a small part of the 2,413 factories of the "6-25 workers" section.
- NB. Number of factories or total HP, as has already been mentioned in the footnotes of the preceding Table, indicate quite clearly that the period of take-off for the Greek industry occurred not before but after 1909, and especially after 1920. This is even more clearly indicated by the evolution of labour force, the true indicator of "exchange of labour for money", the criterion par excellence of capitalism. This developed from about 7,000 in 1875, and 26,000 in 1911, to 60,000 in 1920 and 190,000 in 1933. If the number of 10-15,000 mine workers is deducted, which remained stable over the whole period, the evolution is even more significant: from about 14,000 industrial workers in 1911, to over 170,000 in 1933. (I assume the stability of mine workers from the fact that mining production was at the same level in 1932 with 292,000 t as in 1887 with 295,000 t, peaking at 450,000, 579,000 and 470,000 t in 1907, 1915 and 1917 respectively.)
- The above conclusion is confirmed by all other indicators of capitalist development: the rate of capital accumulation, indicated by the growth of industrial corporation capital from 30 mill. gold drachmas in 1896 to 148 mill. in 1910, and 392 mill. in 1932; the rate of growth in the other capitalist sector vital to Greece, i.e. shipping (356,000 t in 1875; 436,000 t in 1907; 837,000 t in 1922; 1,657,000 t in 1933); by the evolution of foreign trade, an excellent indicator of capitalist development in the mercantile sector (decade average value of foreign trade 1881-90: 186 mill.; in 1901-10: 206 mill.; in 1911-20: 825 mill.; in 1921-1930: 1,084 mill.); and finally, by the demographic growth of the bourgeoisie (see Table XII).

T A B L E X I : I N D U S T R I A L I Z A T I O N

	1867	1875	1876	1889	1904	1909	1914	1917	1920	1929	1930	1933	1936
FACTORIES, TOTAL	22 <sup>Y30</sup>	95 <sup>Y30</sup>	129 <sup>1*</sup>	145 <sup>2*</sup>	208 <sup>3</sup>			(762) <sup>5d</sup>	2905 <sup>6d*</sup>	4000 <sup>10</sup>	5947 <sup>C30</sup>		4512 <sup>11*</sup>
HORSEPOWER, TOTAL	0.3 <sup>12</sup>	2.0 <sup>12</sup>		5.6 <sup>12</sup>				(70.0) <sup>12</sup>	60.3 <sup>12</sup>	230.0 <sup>12</sup>			267.0 <sup>12</sup>
MANPOWER, TOTAL			3.7 <sup>12</sup>				14.0 <sup>12</sup>	(24.3)	60.0	110.0	156.5	191.0 <sup>12</sup>	59.2 <sup>10d</sup>
HORSEPOWER, AVERAGE	13.5 <sup>Y30d</sup>	20.7 <sup>Y30d</sup>		38.4 <sup>Y30d</sup>	26 <sup>3d</sup>				20.8 <sup>6d</sup>	57.5 <sup>10d</sup>			
MANPOWER, AVERAGE			28.5 <sup>1d</sup>					(31.9) <sup>5d</sup>	20.6	27.5	26.7 <sup>C30</sup>		
FACTORIES, 6-25 WORKERS									2.4 <sup>13</sup>				
---"--- 18-25 ---"---											1552 <sup>C30d</sup>		
---"--- 26+ ---"---									4.92 <sup>7*</sup>				
FACT'S OF 6-25 W: HP TH									16.7 <sup>6d*</sup>				
---"--- 26+ W: HP TH									43.6				
---"--- 6-25 W: HP AVER.									6.9				
---"--- 26+ W: HP AVER.									88.7 <sup>8d</sup>				
---"--- 6-25 W: MANP. AVER.									9.3 <sup>9*</sup>		10.0		
---"--- 26+ W: MANP. AVER.									76.2 <sup>8d</sup>		104.5		

} 355<sup>4d\*</sup>

Footnotes - Table XII

- 1 Evelpidis, "Oikonomiki...", p. 113.  
 2 Statistical Yearbooks, 1930, 1938.  
 \*3 This is the total number of cars in 1922 for the whole of Greece (Statistical Yearbook 1930). From then on the figure becomes statistically insignificant for the purpose of assessing the number of upper-class members, as it includes buses which in the provinces were in a proportion much higher than in Athens and thus distort the Greek total for the above purpose (though not the total for Athens).

NB.1 I propose that telephone ownership *does* indicate upper-middle class population in the initial phases of development in telephone communications. If the number of telephones hardly exceeds the number of businesses, main city shops and professionals, as in the case of Greece, then the upper middle class population is clearly very small.

NB.2 Total bourgeois population, if it can be measured separately from the petit-bourgeoisie, can be a very good indicator of capitalist development. Figures in this Table suggest that the bourgeois population of Greece grew from 5-6,000 in the 1870s to about 7-9,000 in the 1910s and 12-15,000 in the 1930s. The figure for the 1870s can be assumed on the basis of Table IV's occupational breakdown of the Athens population in 1897, and that of Hermoupolis in 1870. These cities were then the industrial centres of Greece, where most of the bourgeois population had already concentrated. The breakdown is as follows: 1,177 landowners and people living on unearned income; 126 "important capitalists", 390 high-ranking officials, 1,984 merchants, and 1,807 "practitioners of liberal professions", e.g. doctors and lawyers, but also plumbers, carpenters or tailors. The total number is then about 4,300 people, which should be substantially reduced to obtain a realistic figure for the bourgeoisie and landowning population of these two cities. This reduction, which should bring the number down to about 2,000, is necessary if one considers that most of the merchants had small, one-man businesses, and that most of those in the "liberal professions" should be classified as belonging to the petit-bourgeoisie. Thus the total strength of the bourgeoisie in the whole of Greece in the 1870s could not have been more than 4-6,000 plus 1,000 landowners. These numbers may be verified by an unusual but accurate method. According to the official census, there were 5,735 maids in 1870. It was inconceivable for a Greek upper-class family not to have at least one maid, who usually was given food and shelter but no payment, and there were maids even in petit-bourgeois or rich propertied peasants' households. It is interesting that in 1851 Britain, with a population sixteen times that of 1870 Greece, there were about 674,000 people classified as "general domestic servants", i.e. about 120 times as many as in Greece.

Total middle-class membership in Britain is calculated at about 340,000 for this period, also about 80 times that of Greece (Hobsbawm, "The Age of Revolution, pp. 363, 371.) The use of the "domestic servants" indicator suggests again that the 1870 bourgeoisie numbered no more than 4-6,000.

Disregarding for a moment the controversial 1900-10 period, the indicators for the 1920 and 1930 suggest a bourgeois population of about 1-15,000. I would not give so much weight to columns A, B, C and Table XII, showing 900, 3,502 and 9,550 persons in the three top income-tax brackets in 1938, simply because of a tax-evasion practice that may have concealed quite a few thousand very high incomes, and also because dividends were traditionally taxed at the source and therefore not individually declared (in other words, income for which corporation tax has been paid in Greece is not taxed again, as a personal income, by income tax). However, the 1929 figure of 8,958 houses classified at the top of the house-tax scale is quite indicative. Again, it is necessary to increase it by a few thousand to compensate for the inevitable evasion by the most impudent tax-payers who declared flagrantly low values for their luxurious houses. The figure thus assumed, about 12-15,000, is confirmed by the figures of about 8,000 passenger cars in Athens and Piraeus alone in 1929 (about 10,000 in the whole of Greece), and even the 8,000 telephones (total for Greece). The subsequent rise in the number of private cars for Athens alone (excluding Piraeus) to about 8,000 by 1931, and of telephones to about 14,500 by 1933, and to 36,500 by 1936, are also confirmative.

Returning to the 1900s with these later figures in mind, it becomes obvious that Moskof's hypothesis of about 12,000 bourgeois in Athens in 1909 is either exaggerated or based on different criteria for classification under the term "bourgeois" (Moskof, "I ethniki...", p. 141). That the figure is indeed too high is also confirmed by the information about Piraeus tradesmen in 1910 contained in the British Consul's Annual Report (Consular Report N° 4484, F.O. Annual Series, Piraeus 1910). This gives a total of 4,900 tradesmen. Of these, however, the majority were shopkeepers and small traders, petit-bourgeois par excellence. Piraeus was rather more commercialised than Athens at that time. Thus, even if one adds the big traders of Athens and those very few important merchants established in the two or three larger provincial towns, and even after the few hundred of industrialists and shipowners are included in the computation, the total strength of the true bourgeois population of Greece could not have been much higher than 7-8000.

T A B L E XII : INCOME INDICATORS FOR UPPER-CLASS POPULATION

A	B	C	D	YEAR	E	F	G	H	I
				1870					5735 <sup>C70</sup>
				1923			3976 <sup>3*</sup>		
				24			5604	3748 <sup>2</sup>	
				25			8152	4576	
				26	3240 <sup>2</sup>			5324	
52 <sup>Y31d</sup>	438 <sup>Y31d</sup>	2901 <sup>Y31d</sup>		27	4254			6625	
				28	5052	1400 <sup>2</sup>		7498	
			8958 <sup>Y30d</sup>	29	6326	1663		7842	
56	436	4175		1930	7258			9620	
				31	7744			10913	
				32	7973			11766	
				33	7896			14464	
				34	7835			20153	
				35	7906			25420	
				36				30988	
				37				36401	
900 <sup>1</sup>	3502 <sup>1</sup>	9550 <sup>1</sup>		38					

A : Number of persons/families taxed on an income of over 1 million drs (£2670 in 1928 and 1930, £ 1850 in 1938.)

B : Ditto for over drs 4000.000 (£1070) in 1928 and 1930, drs 500.000 (£925) in 1938.

C : Ditto for over drs 150.000 (£400) in 1928 and 1930, drs 280.000 (£520) in 1938 (Column C is more indicative of high-income persons, considering the widespread practice of tax-evasion through declaration of part of income only).

D : Buildings yielding an income (actual or taxable) of over 50.000 drs (£133).

E : Passenger cars, Athens

F : " " Piraeus

G : All motor-cars, total Greece (becomes non-significant after 1925, because of predominance of utility motor-cars)

H : Private telephones, total Greece:

I : Number of servants, maids etc.



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T A B L E XIII : DEVELOPMENT OF ROADS AND RAILWAYS

1875		KMS OF TRACK PER 10,000 SQ. MILES		
TRACK IN KMS -1000 +1000		1880	1892	1927-75
-	-	-	Greece 140	200
-	-	1000+	Belgium	
-	-	750-999	U.S.	
-	-	500-749	Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland	
-	-	250-499	Austria, Denmark, France, Italy	
-	-	100-249	Cuba, Portugal, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, U.S.	
-	-	50-99	Chile, Trinidad, Turkey, Victoria	
X	-	50-99	Japan, N. Zealand	
X	-	10-49	Algeria, Tahiti	
-	X	10-49	Argentina, Egypt, Peru, S. Africa	
-	-	10-49	Canada, Costa Rica, Ceylon, Finland, India, Jamaica, Uruguay, U.S. Virgin Is., Russia, S. Australia, Tasmania, Tunis.	
-	X	-	Brazil, Mexico	
X	-	-	Japan	

(Derived from data contained in previous Tables and from Hobbs' "The Age of Capital" pp 54-5 and 320)

YEAR	ROADS, MILES	RAIL, MILES	
1830	9		
1852	102		
1862	150		
1867	247		
1872	312		
1882	697		
1883		13	
1892	2043	540	Dakin "The Unification...." pp 316-19
1912	2880	950	Law's Report, F.O Annual Series 1893,
1921	4000	1470	
1927	6185	1609	pp 26 and 32.



Footnotes - Table XIV

- 1 Mulhall, "Dictionary of Statistics", pp. 441 and 787.
- 2 Girard, "La Grèce en 1883", pp. 45 and 135.
- 3 Mulhall, ibid., p. 118.
- 4 Law's Report, F.O. Annual Series 1893, p. 89.
- 5 Admiralty (Gt Britain) Naval Intelligence, "Handbook of Greece", p. 170.
- 6 For Greece, figures from Law's Report of 1893, p. 88 (years 1888 and 1891), and from Papagaryfallou, "Oi georgikoi...", p. 80 (years 1901 and 1911). For all other countries, figures from Mulhall, ibid., pp. 458ff. Averages derived.

T A B L E XIV : STATE-DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

	1876	1881-86	1892	1896	1907	
						<u>CIVIL SERVANTS:</u>
			29.0 <sup>3</sup>			U.K., total,
			7.44 <sup>3d</sup>			U.K., per 10,000 popul.
	83:11.1 <sup>2</sup>		11.2 <sup>4</sup>		12.5 <sup>5</sup>	Greece, total
	83:55.0 <sup>2d</sup>		50.0 <sup>4d</sup>		47.4 <sup>5d</sup>	Greece, per 10,000 popul.
						<u>POLICE-GENDARMERIE p/10,000</u>
12 <sup>1</sup>	86:13.0			14		England
23	86:28.0			29		Ireland
	81:29.0					London
	81:39.0					Paris
	83:21.4 <sup>2d</sup>					Greece

TELEGRAPH STATIONS IN 1888, TOTAL AND PER 10,000 POPULATION

Germany	13,400	2.84	GREECE	176	0.82	(1901:234/0.93 1911:642/2.33)
Belgium	1,520	2.59	Roumania	350	0.67	
France	8,000	2.09	Servia	118	0.60	
U.K.	7,030	1.80	Portugal	275	0.59	
Scandinavia	1,560	1.79	Spain	950	0.54	
AVERAGE EUROPE		1.43	Russia	3,780	0.43	
Holland	600	1.37	Bulgaria	106	0.34	
Italy	4,060	1.36				
Austria	5,240	1.31				
Turkey	670	1.10				

Footnotes - Table XV

- 1 Dakin, "The Unification...", p. 316
  - 2 Mulhall, "Dictionary of Statistics", p. 72.
  - 3 Law's Report, F.O. Annual Series 1893, p. 28.
  - 4 Dakin, ibid., p. 316, given as approx, by this author.
  - 5 Dakin, ibid., pp.316-19; no indication whether budget figures are in gold francs or drachmas.
  - 6 Dakin, ibid., pp.316-19; average defence budget excludes year 1885.
  - 7 Eleftheroudakis Encyclopaedia, Vol. "Hellas", p.452 for 1878 and 1879 (actual expenditure); Dakin, ibid., p.319 for 1876 and 1877 (budget, but probably quite near actual expenditure, as suggested by comparing Dakin's figures with the very similar ones reported by Andreades, "Ta dimossia oikonomika...", p.52; Andreades seems to have been one of Dakin's sources.)
  - 8 Eleftheroudakis Encyclopaedia, Vol. "Hellas", p.452.
  - 9 Law's Report, Table D.I.
  - 10 Law's Report, Table D.IX.
  - 11 Statistical Yearbooks for 1930, p.377; 1933, p.350, 1937, p. 345.
- NB. Averages for 1882-88 exclude 1885, for which figures are given separately.
- Averages for 1894-99 exclude 1897, as above.



Footnotes - Table XVI

- 1 I have retained the French grade-nomenclature, as in the inter-war period the Greek armed forces were still organised on the basis of the French system. Rough equivalents to pre-1926 English army/navy grades are: General, Colonel, Commander, Captain, Lieutenant Commander, Lieutenant, Ensign.
- \*2 Andreades, "Les finances publiques...", pp.28-33. Values of certain complementary earnings in kind by the officers are not available and not included: value of daily food rations in 1923-24, for example. They were about 15-35% of salaries, the higher percentage applying to the lower ranks.
- \*3 Kallitsounakis, "Legislation Ouvrière...", pp.206-11. Averages derived from daily or monthly earnings in 2-5 important categories of skilled labour in each industry. 1926 figures derived by augmenting 1925 averages by 17.5%, therefore approximate. (Kallitsounakis reports increases of 15-25% over 1925.) Merchant marine figures are wage averages for first, second, and third mechanics.

T A B L E XVI : AVERAGE EARNINGS, Armed Forces, Executive & Civil Service, Justice, Industry (1911-26)

(Monthly earnings in drachmas—see next table for conversion to indexed drs and for indices)<sup>1</sup>

14-16	16-20	1911	1914	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	
		750	1000		1500	1950	2878	6800	6324	7624	General *2d
		590	580		1000	1300	2026	5200	4836	6136	Colonel
		440	440		800	1080	1663	4400	4092	5392	Commandant
		310	300		600	877	1371	3600	3348	4548	Capitaine
		180	210		500	700	1213	3200	2976	3976	Lieutenant
		160	190		450	630	1092	2800	2604	3604	Sous-Lieutenant
		110	140		325	455	823	2000	1860	2760	Adjudant
			800	1500				8800			Minister
			480	1200				5500			Director of Ministry
			400	900				4400			Supervisor of Min.dpt.
			240	600				2640			Secretary
			110	220				1320			Clerk
			900			3000		8800	9900		President, Cour de Cassation
			650			2000		6050	8250		Members
			525			1600		4950	7150		Conseillers, Cour d'Appel
			400			1000		4850	5225		Juges de 1re instance
			250			700		3000	3850		Juges de paix
											Skilled labour, averages *3d
148	386				697	960	1400	1590	1770	2080	-Mechanics
131	525				797	891	1531	1781	2062	2422	-Building industry
116	231				437	750	937	1350	1625	1909	-Chemical industry
160	732				983	1417	1767	2000	2367	2781	-Textile
250	600					1400	2000	2250	2500	2938	-Food industry
179	475				696	1200	1558	1792	2000	2350	-Misc. technicians
200	433					933	1400	1820	2067	2428	-Merchant-marine engineers

Footnotes - Table XVII

NB.1. Comparison of 1923-1926 figures with 1921 and 1922 shows substantial retrogression of real labour earnings. The same applies to officers' salaries in 1914 and 1920-23. Both these findings should be seriously qualified. Labour earnings sky-rocketed during 1921 and 22 because of the acute shortages caused by the war. The galloping inflation not only was an argument in favour of wage increases, but also obscured the relationship between wages and prices. One can safely say that the increases given in 1921 and 22 were anticipatory rather than compensatory. As such they should be considered as having caused a change that was serious, but less dramatic than suggested by the indices' sharp rise and fall. The real basis for comparison is 1914, which indicates relative stability of labour earnings in the long term. (Whether this stability, especially as seen against the immense profits of business, was just or not is another matter. It undeniably suggests that the pattern of distribution of increased national income had become much more unfavourable for labour by the end of the period.) As for the officers' salaries, the increase in 1914 and the consistent fall until 1923 are somewhat misleading. The initial increase was not only some kind of compensation for the victories in the 1912-13 Balkan Wars, but also an anticipatory incentive born of Venizelos' irredentist dream. As for the sharp fall in 1921-23, this is not as significant, because the figures do not account for special salaries paid to the participants of the Asia Minor campaign.

NB.2 This Table is based on Table XVI; conversions and indexing having been calculated on the basis of Table I.

As I was unable to find labour earnings for 1914, and to make comparison possible, I had to compromise and derive approximate 1914 earnings from the existing 1914-16 averages. Based on a price-index increase from 100 in 1914 to 117 in 1915, and 159 in 1916, I assumed that labour was able to obtain an average increase of 20% during 1916. It is highly improbable that within 1916 labour had the time to appreciate the full impact of the 1916 price increases and raise its demands accordingly. (This is not necessarily so for the years that followed, with labour having meanwhile experienced the first two years of inflation and employers operating under conditions of inflationary demand within a war economy, when their first priority must have been production at all costs to meet these more or less inelastic conditions.) To find the 1914 basis, I reduced the 1914-16 averages by half of the assumed increases, presuming the other half already included in the 3-year average -- the latter being a figure given in the sources and therefore including part of the inflationary effects of this period.

T A B L E XVII : AVERAGE INDEXED EARNINGS, (Armed Forces, Executive & Civil Service, Justice, Industry (1911-26))

<u>14-16</u>	<u>1911</u>	<u>1914</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1922</u>	<u>1923</u>	<u>1924</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1926</u>	
	750	1000		377	307	244	551	447	467	General price-indexed drs
	590	580		251	204	172	421	342	376	Colonel " -"
	440	440		201	170	141	356	289	330	Commandant " -"
	310	300		151	138	116	291	237	279	Capitaine " -"
	180	210		126	110	103	259	210	243	Lieutenant " -"
	160	190		113	99	92	227	184	221	Sous-Lieutenant " -"
	110	140		82	72	70	162	132	169	Adjudant " -"
	100			37.7	30.7	24.4	55.1	44.7	46.7	INDEX, General
	100			44.2	36.7	30.7	76.2	61.9	69.2	" Col-Command, aver
	100			55.7	49.6	44.4	111.0	90.1	106.1	" Cap-Lieut.-S.Lieut. aver
	100			58.6	51.4	50.0	115.7	94.3	120.7	" Adjudant
	100			48.9	41.9	36.3	90.3	73.4	84.4	" <u>ALL grades except general and Adjudant</u>
	800	427					713			Minister ,price-indexed drs
	480	341					445			Director of Ministry -"
	400	256					356			Supervisor of Min.dpt. -"
	240	171					214			Secretary -"
	110	63					107			Clerk -"
	100	67					91.2			<u>INDEX, ALL grades except President, (1914=100)</u>
	900			472			713	700		President, Cour de Cassation price-ind. drs
	650			314			490	583		Members -"
	525			252			401	506		Conseillers, Cour d'Appel -"
	400			157			393	370		Juges de Ire Instance -"
	250			110			243	272		Juges de paix -"
	100			45.6			83.7	94.8		<u>INDEX, ALL grades except President, (1914=100)</u>
148	(118)		175	151	119	129	125	127		Mechanics 1* price-ind. drs
131	(105)		200	140	130	144	146	148		Building industry -"
116	(93)		110	118	79	109	115	117		Chemical industry -"
160	(128)		147	222	150	162	167	170		Textile -"
250	(200)		220	169	182	177	180			Food industry -"
179	(143)		175	189	132	145	141	144		Misc. technicians -"
200	(160)		147	119	147	146	149			Merchant marine engineers -"
100			154.5	125.3	94.8	107.5	107.4	109.3		<u>INDEX, AVERAGE, ALL CATEGORIES</u>



### 3. Economic and Social Structures, their Nature and Relationships

Alongside the embryonic capitalism which was centred on Greece's primitive industrial sector, and the quasi-feudalism that prevailed in certain regions, there were strong traits of another mode of production which was clearly more vigorous and dominant throughout Greece as a social formation.<sup>\*34</sup> Most of these traits reflected the pre-capitalist functioning of the peripheral economy and its connection with the foreign centres of capitalist domination. The predominantly agricultural production was not all absorbed by subsistence needs, taxes and tithes; a substantial part of it was directed towards the market. There was also some production of raw materials, mainly minerals for export. The capital market was relatively developed, but its best clients were the State and the peasantry. Both its sectors, big banking and private money lending, were based on usury. The productive equipment and the organisational structures of the economy, the 'means and relations of production', were not geared to the secondary, industrial sector but rather to the tertiary, commercial and financial sector.<sup>35</sup> They were centred on trade and banking networks, and fed production and surplus into two channels: to foreign centres of domination, mainly via the diaspora traders, and to the growing Greek towns, mostly via the local merchants.

This dominant mode, essentially oriented towards the tertiary sector, cannot by definition be called capitalist; and to consider it as the peripheral adjunct of the capitalism already dominant in the West would merely change the angle of observation without solving the problem. It would simply transpose the analysis from the level of the local society, defined by certain economic and cultural integration and mainly by its formal sovereignty in international politics, to that of a global capitalist system, defined by the structure of international political and economic relations. Such transposition is an undeniably useful ana-

lytical practice, allowing a better understanding of the interaction between the local and the international systems, but it does not illuminate what happens at grass-roots level within the local economy and society, however peripheral these may be.

The dominant mode was then one of simple commodity production and may be called mercantile or comprador pre-capitalism. The term has two advantages. Firstly, it signifies that the dominant class element was not the producer but the merchant; secondly, it stresses the system's inherent potential to evolve towards capitalism. In fact, the future role of mercantile profits greatly depends on the merchants' conception of this role. When the most imaginative and enterprising among them are aroused by the desire for further profits, their money is instantly baptised liquid capital and their hoard becomes accumulation. The consequent investment in the secondary sector is another step in the transition towards capitalism.<sup>36</sup>

The chosen term does not suggest a strict theoretical categorisation. It simply defines limits and draws guidelines for discussion. One of its most important roles, for example, is to constantly emphasise that the dominant mode in 1864-1910 Greece was not capitalist. Conversely, the term does not suggest that conditions within the Greek mode precisely matched an 'ideal type', a model, simply because it does not refer to conditions generally observable or obeying empirically established laws. All notions defy their terms, of course, but the notion of mode of production is one of the most defiant. It is difficult not to reify it and to simply take it for what it is: an analytical tool. It would thus be naive to try and fit Greek pre-capitalism into any pre-conceived model -- to compare it with that of England, for example, merely because there were certain similarities in mercantilist traits. Greek pre-capitalism cannot be classified using the yardstick of western European history and the concomitant dichotomy between conformity and non-conformity with the related models. But the models of the metropolis-periphery type are not sufficient

either. Less naive than citing the English example but equally misleading would be to compare Greek pre-capitalism with that of Mexico because the economies of both countries functioned in a similarly peripheral manner.

On the other hand, unconditioned empiricism can be somewhat sterile, especially in attempts to synthesize: there is indeed some need for a model, provided that it is not used rigidly and that it has precise and historically shaped contours. The Balkan countries are a group clearly distinct from western societies by their very different historical development. It was not only their common Byzantine past, their Christian cultures and their centuries-long submission to the peculiarities of the Islamic social and economic system; it was also that they did not emerge as sovereign States and as geographically distinct social systems until the 19th century. Their appearance thus coincided with, and was partly the effect of, the advent of a new state of affairs in Europe and the world. A new international equilibrium was making itself felt after the Napoleonic upheaval; a new world economy was emerging, with the triumph of capitalism, out of the depths of the industrial revolution; and a new pattern of internal social equilibrium was being established throughout Europe in the wake of the 1848-1851 revolutions. The birth of the new Balkan countries was thus very different from that of their western counterparts. Extensive empirical research on the Balkans may, therefore, provide the theoretical model for a less schematic classification of Greece.<sup>\*37</sup>

A final point of caution: it should be stressed, without further comment at this moment, that the conditions of mercantile pre-capitalism were still dominant in Greece during the years preceding the 1909 coup, despite the undeniable but very insufficient development achieved in the period 1864-1909. The emergence of a few factories could not make the system 'more' capitalist, especially as capitalism is not really measurable in degrees; nor was it sufficient to displace mercantile pre-capitalism and establish capitalism in the dominant position.

#### 4. Greece's Failure to Industrialise <sup>\*38</sup>

The discussion and the figures presented so far in this chapter indicate a peculiar inability of Greece to profit from the titanic economic progress of her western European neighbours in the golden age of capitalism, the third quarter of the 19th century. What is more, this inability persisted throughout the last quarter also. Curiously enough, Greek historiography does not treat these conditions as peculiar. Some historians simply ignore this failure, others attribute it almost exclusively to foreign economic domination. Although this discussion is concerned less with the causes of this failure than with one of its effects -- the weakness of the local middle class -- a very brief commentary on the causes will be helpful to the basic argument.

The point of view that overlooks Greece's failure as of presumably little importance, is refuted by the above figures themselves. It needs only to be added that it is wrong to consider Greece's very slow development as some kind of midget's growth, in some convenient application of a Euclidian analogy. Strict analogies are seldom useful in the evaluation of conditions as comprehensive as capitalist growth. It is not that Greece's economic development became less capitalist or less advanced than that of the West, as rather that she did not develop at all into a capitalist society and that the dominant system of economic and social structures did not transcend the boundaries of pre-capitalism.

The standpoint that attributes this failure to foreign economic domination deserves more attention. To some extent, with certain qualifications and seen in conjunction with other factors, it is not unfounded. Yet its alleged causal preponderance or even uniqueness is an error. Other factors must also be taken into account, and of these the most crucial seem to be the effects of the 1873-1896 international economic depression, and the role of railway construction in Greece. 39

The country's development in the 19th century could not, of course, parallel that of her advanced European neighbours. Her size and population in the 1850s and 1860s, her backwardness, her almost exclusively agricultural economy made it inevitable she should lag behind. Political factors too were extremely unfavourable. Before 1864 there was the acute strife that ended with the revolt against King Otho and his fall. During the entire 1850 to 1873 period of international boom, the Greek parties and parliamentary regime were suffering from teething pains. The State was sadly unorganised, banditry flourished, and illiteracy was the rule and even plagued the ranks of the administration. Yet these conditions inevitably lost some of their force with time, and the country could in the end have profited from at least the side effects of the boom. By the time Greece was ready for this, however, the rest of the world was well over the 1850-1873 boom and had plunged into the great 19th-century depression. Furthermore, the model of development then chosen for Greece, an imitation of the western one with primitive emphasis on railways, was inadequate for this country. That emphasis, in interplay with the depression, thereafter became the major cause of Greece's failure to develop in this period.

The myth of the Greek railroads is an ironic cautionary tale. The first phase of construction (1880-1890) began almost as a guilt reaction to the country's delay in joining the cult, and has always been advanced as the almost unquestionable sign of Greece's transition to some kind of capitalism. Yet in many respects the railways' utility in the transition process was doubtful, if not completely negative. Their total mileage (under 750 in 1890, about 850 in 1909) indicates that the investment injection was insufficient to create conditions for take-off into capitalism. But even a larger investment would have been almost as useless. Railway construction could not be a stimulus for industrial suppliers of construction and operation material if they were non-existent, nor was it an effective incentive for establishing such industries in a small country which had no iron or coal. This contrasts sharply with other countries where railroad

construction functioned as a vital factor in the capitalist transformation, more so because of its side effects on industrialisation than because of utility in transport.<sup>\*40</sup>

The coincidence of the international economic depression, then, prevented Greece from enjoying even such meagre benefits from railroad construction as her backwardness would have allowed. In fact, these benefits only contributed to moderating and probably delaying the country's experience of the depression. They served as a policy of reflation through fiscal expenditure in public works, Premier Trikoupis' unintentional New Deal. They played the role of reflating an economy crippled by depression and not, as in the West a few years earlier, the beneficial, mildly inflationary role of massive investment in a period of euphoria.<sup>\*41</sup>

Even in the transport sector itself the contribution of the railroad to Greece's development was not decisive, partly because there were two widths of track within the same network, mainly because the railway was built somewhat frivolously to serve mostly coastal areas. Competition from shipping might have been less severe a threat had the period been one of economic boom; it became a major handicap in the conditions of acute crisis which had created a cut-price war in the maritime transport market.

This is only one of the areas where the railroads had a negative effect. For if competition with shipping was harmful to them, it was even more so to shipping. The railways were competitors of the Greek merchant marine not only in their everyday operation, but also by the very fact of their being built. Their construction consumed immense investment funds which might otherwise have been employed in the shipping sector. It was there that Greece had some kind of comparative advantage. For the rejuvenation of Greek shipping would not be based on tradition only. Its other mainstays would be its powerful potential clients and fund-purveyors, the diaspora entrepreneurs with the international merchant and finance activities.<sup>42</sup>

Total Greek tonnage had remained generally stable for about half a century until well into the 1900s, with a drop from 360,000 to 300,000 tons between 1866 and 1876. This was in the middle of a thirty-year period of immense progress in the rest of the world. From 1850-1880, Britain increased her steamship tonnage by 1,600%, the rest of the world by about 440%.<sup>43</sup> The starting point for the growth represented by these percentages was very nearly the steamers' first appearance, which accounts for the high figures. Nevertheless, compared with Greece's lamentable record they do acquire some significance. In 1875, by the end of the boom period, this formerly great maritime country had a mere 28 steamships totalling 13,000 tons. Thus, Greece failing to invest in shipping in the 1850s and investing in railroads in the 1880s instead, is as if Belgium had failed to invest in railroads and industry in the 1850s and '60s and tried desperately to develop its merchant fleet in the 1880s.

This tale of wrong choices remains exactly the same if we look at the more specific aspects of the subject. For example, the effects which the obsolescence of the sail had on the international competitiveness of the Greek merchant fleet could have been delayed had part of the obsolete equipment and the crews been re-employed in the internal transport market which was progressing fairly well during that period. This would have been feasible only in the absence of competition from a coastal railway network. That in the circumstances it was not possible not only fed unemployment, but also had a serious side effect with far-reaching consequences: this unnecessary obsolescence suddenly and sharply devalued a great part of what little capital the local middle class had accumulated and invested in shipping, and drastically reduced its profit potential. It is mainly for this reason that the most promising sector of the Greek economy and the most vigorous section of the local bourgeoisie were condemned to a long period of hibernation.

In the above circumstances it is not surprising that nearly a century later, in 1975, the total railtrack mileage had reached only 1,600 although the country had meanwhile doubled in size,

quadrupled its population, and had about fifty to seventy times the income of 1890; that the railroad companies were always in the red and often went bankrupt, not just because of the internationally-felt reasons for railroad failure, but mainly because of the above specifically Greek conditions; <sup>44</sup> and that the Greek governments of the 20th century did not pursue the development of the railroad, precisely because it had proved neither a socially profitable transport system nor a stimulus for local industry. As for the heroic age of Greek railway construction in the 1890s, that alleged mark of the country's transition to capitalism, it simply contributed to ever heavier foreign economic dominance through increase in the public debt and, finally, to the 1893 State bankruptcy. <sup>45</sup>

##### 5. The Alleged Conflict between Middle Class and Landowners

With the emergence of some new manufacture in the 1864-1890 period, the statistical image of Greece underwent considerable change, but these statistics should be properly weighted. Undoubtedly the 1866-89 increase in the number of factories from 29 to 145, corresponding to approximately 500%, was impressive. Similarly, given a base of only three or four factories in the 1830s, the increase by the 1880s was over 4,000%. It is a fundamental if common error in development statistics to overlook the possible irrelevance of the base, the starting point. The significance of the data here is near zero; all that can be said unequivocally is that, taking into consideration Greece had meanwhile greatly increased in area and nearly doubled its population, Greek industry was at almost as primitive a stage in the 1890s and 1900s as it had been in the 1870s. <sup>\*46</sup>

This mediocre progress had nonetheless been the basis of misinterpretations which run counter the present argument. Based on an evolutionist classification, they see Greek industrialisation and the Greek bourgeoisie as fundamentally similar to those of any other society, and claim that the said mediocre development marked the beginning of a period of conflict between industrialists on the one side and landowners or merchants on the other.

If, to begin with, the difference between the English and the French landlords was great, the difference between them and the



Greek landlords was immense. It is not only a difference of historic periods, or the lack of a strictly feudal past in the Greek case, or of a typically feudal organisation of production, or the fact that two-thirds of the landowners were heteroethones. These overall conditions generated specific effects which made the relationship between the landed aristocracy and the bourgeoisie much less antagonistic than in the typical western case. It is these effects which are of interest to this discussion because they define the limits of political strife between these two classes.

Political power was not monopolised or even held by the landed aristocracy, as will be explained in detail below. The institutions chosen for the new Greek State had transcended this type of rule, somewhat prematurely, and put in its place the complex system of indirect dominance characteristic of democratic bourgeois politics. Yet even this indirect dominance was not enjoyed by the landowners alone, but by the bourgeoisie as well. If there had been an assault of the bourgeoisie against the landowners, therefore, its primary objective would not have been a political power that was already theirs, though indirectly and partially, particularly as the institutions were already bourgeois. Instead, its first objective would have been to deprive the landowners of their economic power and, therefore, of their position as one of the economically dominant social groups -- assuming, of course, that there were conflicting interests between these two classes.

The government's external trade policy was the one issue that could have provoked a struggle of the industrialists against other sections of the bourgeoisie or against the landowners. A protectionist policy, for instance, would have favoured industrialists and harmed merchants. This hypothetical case can easily be excluded. Importers' interests and their group were then so marginal, and the country so short of foreign currency, that this could hardly become a major political issue; in fact, there are no signs that it ever was one.

The other potential area of conflict might have been protectionist policy on basic agricultural products, seen as favouring the landowners against the industrialists.<sup>47</sup> The period did in fact see a succession of conflicting governmental policies on

such issues: the 1860s' policy of protectionism for agricultural production of Trikoupis contrasted with the free-trade policy followed some years earlier by the Koumoundouros governments. Neither of these, however, was necessarily the result of a struggle between landowners and manufacturers. If it had existed, such strife would certainly have found expression in opposing parliamentary lobbies, which does not seem to have been the case. Besides, and much more importantly, the thirty-odd industrialists of the 1860s, or the hundred or so of the 1880s, did not need to form a lobby to protect their interests. In a political world dominated by particularistic, petty individual strife, each one of them could much more practically use his connections to obtain some made-to-order tariff protection in his own favour, rather than try by means of lobbying to impose an overall government policy of free trade in agricultural produce. In any case, his advantages from the latter would be only indirect and very doubtful. Free trade in agricultural produce would supposedly result in lower food prices and thus in a lower cost of living for the labour force, in lower wages, and in reduced costs for the industrialists in question. These indirect and uncertain advantages to the industrialist were insignificant compared to the immediate hard-cash profits obtainable through a specific protectionist tariff in favour of his own products -- a privilege which, as already mentioned, was not too difficult to acquire in the primitive political conditions then prevailing in Greece.

Even if it were accepted that Trikoupis over-protected local agriculture to the detriment of the industrialists' interests, this in itself would not prove the policy was imposed by an aggressive landowners' lobby. This would have been in flagrant contradiction to Trikoupis' consistent effort to promote industrialisation by attracting diaspora capital, a subject on which he preached repeatedly to his fellow MPs.<sup>49</sup> There is much evidence that he believed in liberal economics as much as in industrialisation, and if he failed it was simply because this is a difficult marriage, especially in backward societies. There is no convincing evidence that he wished to support the landowners against the industrialists. That such an explanation fits the pattern common in Marxist analy-

sis is undeniable, but that it fits Trikoupis' policies is doubtful. A simpler explanation is that he wanted to raise money, save foreign currency, and especially to promote the country's self-sufficiency in wheat -- the very reasons he himself gave. Autarky in particular was then not only an internationally fashionable slogan, but also a natural government concern within an undeveloped economy and an imperative need for a country constantly preparing for a long-term irredentist war.

The main factor determining the government's trade policies was, however, the state of the world market for wheat. Whatever the landowners or industrialists might have said, Premier Koumoundouros would have been mad to impose duties on wheat during the 1867-69 period of international shortages and famines, when production of wheat was still very low in Greece. Conversely, before and during the application of Trikoupis' protective policies, three basic factors brought radical changes. Greece acquired Thessaly, one of the largest wheat-producing regions in the Balkans; the world was entering on the great agricultural depression of 1870-80; finally, the country was beginning to experience an acute shortage of foreign currency and simply could not afford to spend it on cereals.

In conclusion, Trikoupis' policy may have favoured the landowners, but was not and could not be generally harmful to the Greek industry of that period. Its effects could be considered detrimental only on the basis of two assumptions. The first, as already mentioned, is that a protectionist policy for agricultural production generates higher cereal prices and therefore higher subsistence costs for the labour force and thus causes increased wage-costs harmful to the industrial interests. The second assumption is that industrialists aim at exports rather than the internal market, in which case a policy of high agricultural prices would mean higher costs and prices of their industrial products too, and thus reduced competitiveness in the international market.

The first assumption is simplistic, the second is false. To presuppose that wages follow the price of bread and the workers' subsistence costs is mechanistically playing at Marxist economics. Moreover, when this assumption is without further qualification

applied to Marxist sociological analysis, it defeats basic rules of the very theory it is supposed to serve: it does not allow for certain facts which become evident only in a comprehensive analysis of a society as whole. There is the economic fact, for instance, that whatever cost reduction is achieved by an abolition of tariffs may well be pumped not into the workers' budget through lower food prices, but rather into the merchants' pockets, depending on the degree of monopoly prevailing in the specific market; in this case, where is the industrialists' profit? Conversely, if local industry is oriented towards the production of basic goods with highly inelastic demand, this may result in the industrialists actually supporting measures which increase the cost of these goods without reducing total consumption, since higher costs mean also higher profits. In such a case, the local industrialists might end up supporting a policy of higher subsistence costs and higher wages because it augments their volume of profits; and the only industrialists who would be harmed by this would be those selling non-basic goods, local and foreign.

As for the second assumption, it will suffice to say that, at least until the beginning of the 20th century, the primitive Greek industry was almost exclusively oriented towards the internal market. It could not have been otherwise in a world ravaged by depression until the turn of the century.

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The above discussion has shown the absence of conflict over specific issues such as might have arisen within given socio-economic structures. The question remains, however, whether these structures, and especially the system of landownership, could themselves have been an issue of struggle.

In essence, the bourgeoisie did not need to deprive the landowners of their economic power, seeing that this power was not antagonistic but frequently complementary to the bourgeois economic interests. The middle class had not yet developed a substantial

industrial sector and a long-term oriented entrepreneurial mentality. There was no urgent need, therefore, for a large internal market which could have been formed only by a relatively prosperous peasantry or, in other words, through measures contrary to the landowners' interests and, ultimately, through land reform.

Whilst the middle class was not interested in imposing land reform on the landowners, they in their turn did not fanatically oppose it either, at least as seen from a long-term perspective. Most of them had bought land from the Greek State or from the Turkish landlords at very low prices. Not only the heteroethones but also the indigenous owners were very often absentee landlords, with an economic mentality not much different from the prevailing comprador ideology. Not unexpectedly, then, the argument around land reform was soon transferred from the area of property principles to that of indemnity prices.<sup>\*50</sup>

For many landowners it was not the form of economic power that mattered, but its essence. None of them conceived the bourgeoisie as a potential threat to their economic power, whatever its form. As long as they might keep their holdings, the interests of the comprador middle classes did not conflict with their own, as has already been explained. If, on the other hand, they were to lose their land, the resultant indemnity would have to come out of funds derived not from a non-existent income tax, but from indirect taxes, and would thus be a burden not for the bourgeoisie but for the lower classes. What reason then for the bourgeoisie to oppose the landowners' indemnity interests? Supposing those same indirect taxes were not levied or not used to pay the indemnities, then they would either remain in the hands of the lower classes, or return to them in the form of some kind of social policy. Such outcomes might have interested an industrial middle class in need of developed local markets, but not the pre-1909 merchants and mining speculators. They, quite significantly, would much rather

see these funds transferred into the hands of the landowners where they would serve, at least partly, to finance their own comprador activities.

This economic argument is confirmed by the actual political practices of the time. In the whole of the 1864-1909 period there are no signs that economic policy, tariffs and land reform were consistently seen as means to enlarge the market for local industry. The sporadic bursts of interest for or against some tariff protection or other, to be found in the press or parliamentary discussions of the period, are not sufficient to prove the existence of a sustained conflict that would eventually cause a struggle among the upper classes. Likewise the tergiversations on these problems by the parties, with the exception of Trikoupis' personal policies, show a lack of consistent strong conflicts between landowners and bourgeoisie, or the parliamentary lobbies that might have represented the interests of these classes.

P A R T IIIDEOLOGY, POLITICS AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONChapter CPOLITICS AND POWER1. The Relative Autonomy of Politics against Class Structure and Social Conflict -- Historical Background

The examination in this chapter of the political practices throughout the 1864-1909 period will show a section of Greek politics across, not along class lines. By way of a working hypothesis -- for the subject is immense -- it may be said that one of the primary causes of this autonomy of politics from the class structure was the absence in the past of consistency and depth of class conflict in Greek society. Such outbursts of social upheaval as occurred under Turkish rule were sporadic. Not that economic conditions favouring conflict were absent, far from it. But the length and the peculiarities of Ottoman rule created certain social and ideological conditions unknown in western societies which mitigated the development of class conflict. It will help the subsequent argument to mention them at least in summary fashion.

The most important of these conditions was the effect of Ottoman rule on the economic activities and the social action of the Greek mercantile classes. Their outward, indeed cosmopolitan orientation in business was a successful attempt to avoid the insecurity and economic stagnation caused by Islamic absolutism, and had the somewhat unexpected result of making a typical conflict with the landowning class almost meaningless. This was not only because the economic activities of the middle class were mostly mercantile and outward-looking, but also because they were inexorably condemned to remain so. If insecurity and sluggish

growth prospects were compromising conditions for bourgeois interest in local trade, they were nearly prohibitive for any large-scale involvement in local manufacture. It is not by chance that much of the growth in manufacture and shipping during the 18th century was based on a peculiar brand of Greek corporatism and not on the typical individualistic initiative of capitalist entrepreneurs. Finally, the Christians had acquired a status similar to that of the big Muslim landholders under the political shadow of these same masters, the Turkish overlords. Not surprisingly, the commonality of economic interests between these two sections of the landowning class, Muslim and Christian, created a bond the merchant class was unable to break. The entrepreneurial bourgeoisie of the empire contained but very few Muslims, if any, whereas the Turkish landowning class was even in the days of its decadence a vital part of the Islamic administrative and military system. The conditions for the typical conflict between landowners and bourgeoisie were thus almost absent in the Greek case, as the interests of these two classes were in most cases complementary rather than opposed.

The other condition displacing social conflict was ideological and affected the social action not only of the middle classes, but also and mainly of the peasantry. It was the confusion caused by the overwhelming power of the alien conqueror whose rule, by extending over four long centuries, had made his social order appear as an almost irrevocable fate. In the absence of conflict between landowners and bourgeois -- a conflict which in other societies served as a catalyst for the ideology of all classes and, until the 18th century, lack also of the other catalyst, nationalism -- this confusion could flourish freely among the peasantry, a class which seldom develops consistent and revolutionary action on its own initiative. Thus the Christian population of the Greek provinces did not clearly distinguish between religious and social oppression, foreign rule and landowning rights of the masters. The landlord's exploitation of the peasant, or the Sultan's arbitrary measures hindering the merchant's activity, could often



be interpreted as the deeds of infidel and alien masters or, at most, of local traitors. First religion and later nationalism had blurred the borderlines between social conflict and religious or national strife. It seems that even when these conflicts reached their climax in the 1821 revolution, the borderlines still remained confused though the nationalist element was preponderant. This preponderance was, after all, dictated also by practical considerations of unity against the greatest common enemy. \*51

Two well-known interpretations of the Greek revolution are based, roughly, the one on the notion of bourgeois revolution, the other on that of the peasants' uprising.<sup>52</sup> These Marxist views are not much less rigid than are those of the non-Marxist historians who insist on the purely nationalist nature of the revolution. The strength of the nationalistic element in the revolutionaries' ideology, as expressed in declarations and official or unofficial statements, is undeniable. However, the circumstance that the landowners and the other members of the local leadership under the Turks, in short the proestoi, did not lead it or even give it their support, at any rate initially, shows that a cleavage along class lines did exist even on the nationalist issue. It is a very plausible hypothesis, however, that ideologically anyway this was a nationalist revolution and that certain class conflicts existed as undercurrents, thus simultaneously allowing and undermining the provisional alliance of the classes. This very broad alliance would embrace the peasantry, the local middle class including the shipowners, and finally the progressive and idealist elements of the diaspora middle class. The civil wars that erupted during the revolution, and especially the first one (1824), indicate both the existence and the fragility of this alliance. Another important level of alliance was a regional one. Again, its existence and fragility are strongly implied by the second civil war, this one fought on the grounds of geographical differences. To label it a class struggle because of the shipowners' dominance in one of the opposing regions, the islands, would be an oversimplification. Greece was not a unified and well-defined social entity; the social and economic structures in the islands

were radically different from those of the Peloponnese; there was no direct conflict of class interest between the shipowners and the Peloponnesian population; and the civil strife was an essentially regionalist struggle based on cleavages and alliances between individuals and cliques striving for power.

The war of independence gave birth to a bourgeois constitution. If the above working hypothesis is correct, this was not imposed by the victory of either the upper classes over the small people, or of the bourgeois over the landowners. The foreign powers, of course, would not have accepted -- and later on imposed -- a bourgeois regime on Greece unless this provided a basis for compromise between the social actors whose conflicting interests and ideologies were latently or openly hostile, simultaneously with and alongside the nationalist struggle, though often overpowered and hidden by the latter. This, however, does not alter the argument that there was no tradition of persistent and deep class conflict. As for the future, the new State was to be administered not by a socially defined aristocracy, but by more or less the same rival political groups that had led the revolution, a political oligarchy that included landlords, rich propertied peasants and local chieftains, native bourgeois, quite a few heteroethones, and certain diaspora elements.<sup>\*54</sup> Each of these groups reflected the same loose alliance of personal and regional cliques, held together by much the same need for compromise as required in the face of the Turkish threat and in the pursuit of individual personal power.

Not only was the emergence of politics in liberated Greece relatively independent of the social structure, but the seeds of autonomy were also sown on fertile soil, the institutional system itself. Indeed, such separation of politics from the social and economic structures is typical of bourgeois regimes; the Greek case may be seen as a somewhat sharp exaggeration of such typical conditions. Is it not bourgeois democracy that denies the very existence of classes and, through the mechanism of economic liber-

alism, of the free vote and multi-party rule, institutionalises individualism, conceals or even temporarily cures social conflict and imposes the autonomy of politics? Thus the rival alliances of cliques that led the Greek revolution, non-representative as they were of Greece's class structure, could now perpetuate their existence without having to resort to gaining the support of any one class in particular, merely by recruiting voters across class borders and alternating in power according to the rules of democracy.

\* \* \*

The bourgeois regime was not allowed to function immediately. Because of foreign intervention and rivalries between the competing political groups, but mainly because it was not really the offspring of a victorious bourgeoisie, the democratic Constitution was soon subverted by authoritarian rule -- Capodistria's between 1830 and 1833, Otho's between 1833 and 1843. This interval served to consolidate the parties' relative autonomy from class structure and social conflict: it forged their unity against the common enemy, the monarch; it allowed political struggle on questions of civic rights, and eventually of regime, to overshadow, displace or even postpone conflict between the classes; and it forced these socially incoherent parties to strive for the alliance of Greece's true masters, the Great Powers, rather than seek the people's support -- which further accentuated their alienation from the grass-roots of class strife, in one word, their autonomisation.

The names of the parties that were already operating during Otho's reign (1833-1863) were symptomatic of a total lack of identification with the social or ideological divisions inside Greece: the English party, the French, the Russian. This was understandable as long as they were fighting the monarch for political power and the people did not vote. Sovereign actor and supreme centre of decision-making, the Crown had been created by a consensus among the foreign protectors. The breaking of this consensus might

also break the Crown's power. The parties, therefore, had to conduct their fight against Otho by taking sides according to the latent or overt, real or imagined conflicts among the three Protectors.

Gradually, the parties acquired a significant share of power with the change of regime, first to a constitutional monarchy under Otho in 1843, then to a parliamentary democracy under King George I in 1864. Thereafter, sovereignty was no longer concealed behind the Crown; it was dispersed in the hands of the people. Power no longer held sway in the ambassadorial corridors and the Palace; a good part of it was to be enjoyed in the parliamentary and governmental offices which were the subject of bargaining at election time. But on what ground was this bargaining to be transacted? The Protectors' names were no longer representative of a political position and could be discarded. Yet the parties did not feel any need for socio-politically meaningful names. Almost half a century later they were still designated by their leaders' surnames.

\* \* \*

Before Otho's fall, party ideology revolved around anti-royalism, which of course was not a social but rather a political question, a dispute about the regime and the institutional allocation of power. For some time after 1864 the parties did not need even these mechanistic, highly formalised principles; they operated in a maze of ideological tautology and pettiness which made them indistinguishable from one another. Irredentism was not a factor of ideological differentiation during this period: all parties adhered to it in principle, the only area of occasional disagreement being the strategy and tactics to be followed. Moreover, irredentism was not really related to Greece's internal social problems. Its pathetic predominance merely proves how disengaged the parties were from the realities of economic misery and social inequality.

Post-1864 anti-royalism was another indication of the relative autonomy of politics from the country's class structure -- although in this period it was not even a consistent ideological and political trend. The few outbursts of anti-monarchism were due either to the lonely voices of individuals who were considered eccentrics rather than a real threat to the Crown, or the usual petty blackmailing of the King by the political leaders whose only objective was really to gain royal favours. The only exception was Trikoupis' attack in 1874 against the King's practices in the appointment of prime ministers. This major incident, however, can be compared neither with the struggle against Otho, nor with the cleavage of the 1915-1935 dichasmos, both of which divided the people deeply and lastingly. Was it not, after all, Premier Trikoupis who, a few years later, lavishly provided for the King's daughter before her marriage by getting parliament to vote a sizeable dowry? And was it not the same simple folk who had voted for Trikoupis in 1875 who cheered the sweet princess later on although, in the absence of any kind of income tax, they had been willy-nilly made to pay for that dowry?<sup>\*55</sup>

Absence of principles, pettiness in argument, lack of ideological distinction between parties -- all these would inevitably be reflected in the electoral practices of the period. Between 1851 and 1881 there were 13 elections, 11 of them fraudulent.<sup>56</sup> No electoral programmes for government, however primitive, were presented during these elections, but patronage attained the acme of perfection.<sup>\*57</sup> It is not surprising that the political parties, relatively autonomous from the social structure by birth, were not equipped to function on the basis of class conflict and could thus operate only on the basis of patronage and of ideologies which concealed such conflict or relegated it to a secondary position.<sup>58</sup>

Autonomy, once created (mainly by the absence of real conflict between bourgeois and landowners), thereafter became a self-perpetuating condition. Yet patronage and ideological confusion

would not have been sufficient to continue reproducing it after 1864, had certain primary conditions not combined in its favour. Autonomy could thus be maintained because of the familiar structural and dynamic characteristics of Greek society: the landowners were not a traditional elite with strong roots in a feudalistic past; the relationship between landowners and bourgeois did not deteriorate into a serious conflict; the economic might of the diaspora and the political will of Greece's foreign protectors were still crucial factors in the local balance of power; the institutions were bourgeois even before the advent of capitalism; and, concomitantly, the bourgeoisie was not sufficiently vigorous to strive for absolute economic and political dominance.

These conditions prevented the development of deep class conflict capable of breaking the autonomy by polarising politics, either through strife between the peasantry and the upper classes, or through conflict between landowners and bourgeois. It was these factors which were in part responsible for the extremely slow evolution of the peasantry's economic and social problematic, and also allowed a political oligarchy to keep this class in a state of permanent confusion -- the two main causes behind the lack of a peasant movement and an agrarian party. Again, it was these factors which meant that land reform -- and hence support from the unpropertied peasants -- was pretty well useless for a bourgeoisie interested in trade but not manufacture; and these which made an alliance with the small independent farmers meaningless for the comprador bourgeois, and useful only to the Crown.

Similarly, it was in consequence of the above factors that the economically dominant classes, bourgeois and landowners, were either unable or unwilling to break the politicians' autonomy and establish direct class rule. They were unable, because their economic power was too moderate and too circumscribed to let them undermine the oligarchy and dominate politics in the way they dominated the economy. Although there was no serious competition between them as separate classes, the purely individual interests of many of their members were in conflict, and this weakened them

both. Furthermore, the landowners' relative economic power was constantly declining -- they were responsible for about 15% of the national income in 1825, and only 4% in 1910<sup>59</sup>, and although the bourgeoisie could augment its own economic power considerably, it was still relatively weak even as late as the 1900s. Finally, the economic stronghold of the diaspora and the political privileges of the Protection and of the Crown curtailed the potential of both the bourgeoisie and the landowners even further. Neither were these classes willing to dominate politics directly, simply because the bourgeois institutions, including a Constitution that sanctified private property and excluded its expropriation, assured them that the politicians would always function within their proper limits. In such circumstances it is not surprising that the political oligarchy was able to remain autonomous of these classes, and that it did not faithfully reflect their economic dominance on the political level.<sup>\*60</sup>

## 2. Autonomy and Patronage

Given that the parties did not represent or serve class interests, the other potential points of articulation with the electorate were in the interests of individuals, of regions, or professional groups. The latter were not a promising target in a country where four-fifths of the population lived and voted in rural areas, more than two-thirds of them peasants, and where economic backwardness did not favour collective professional organisation. Campaigning on the basis of regional interests was not really much better; in a period of still strong sectionalist feelings this was actually a dangerous policy for a party to follow. In any case, the parties themselves were too primitive and badly organised for such manoeuvres, which were thus left to the discretion of individual politicians. The average politician was not all that set on systematically promoting the regional interests of his constituency, because any positive results might well be accredited not to him personally but to the party as a whole or, worse still, to the opposition MPs of the same region. So

the only alternative for attracting votes easily and safely was by appealing to the electors' individual interests, and patronage was the simplest method to communicate and satisfy such interests.<sup>61</sup>

It was this soil of political necessity, in an overwhelmingly agrarian economy and society, which nourished the roots of both patronage and the modern Greek State. Patronage was the only means to serve individual demands, the State was the means to satisfy them.<sup>\*62</sup>

Throughout the 19th century, and especially in the economic depression of its last quarter, employment was one of the strongest and most constant needs of the population. In fact, the problem was not so much unemployment -- it could not possibly have been in a primitive agricultural economy -- as the hopelessly difficult conditions and the sheer misery caused by rural under-employment.

Naturally, this was a social problem mainly among the small independent farmers and not among the unpropertied peasants: for farm workers it was marginal; as for those established on the landlords' estates, the collegoi,<sup>63</sup> they had their own sinister security of employment and could always be transferred to other farms, especially in the conditions of non-intensive cultivation prevailing on most large estates.

Conversely, the propertied peasants had to face the two problems typical for their class. The first was the gradual penetration of market capitalism. In Greece, the perplexities of the system of agricultural prices and market risks were amplified by the rising importance of wine and currant production, and especially the major part of the harvest destined for export -- a situation which by the 1890s and 1900s had culminated in the explosive currant crisis already mentioned. The second typical problem was the fragmentation of the already small landholdings from generation to generation. The propertied peasants' second and subsequent sons had few ways out of such a situation: emigration abroad was



practiced only on a limited scale until the 1900s, and borrowing at usury rates to buy new land was no particularly desirable solution. This left seeking employment in other sectors, and usually in the urban areas. In short, whether they were driven by the scarcity of land or by the evils of market penetration, the majority of those seeking employment consisted of the demographic 'redundancies' from within the propertied peasantry.

As explained above, that same long period of the entire second half of the 19th century saw no substantial development of a capitalist economy in the urban centres. Whereas in other societies the movement of the rural population towards the cities was a factor and also partly a symptom of industrialisation, this was not so in 19th-century Greece, for the reasons given in the preceding chapter. But whilst the embryonic Greek industry could not absorb the flow of migrant peasants, the youthful Greek State could. Not only was it in its age of formation and rapid growth, it was also vulnerable to the interference of politicians.

Indeed, the politicians profited immensely from these conditions. One of the most important individual demands was employment, and the largest potential employer was the State. Interaction of the two in a typical supply-demand complex was unavoidable. This market, however, had certain characteristic peculiarities. Whilst there was abundant supply of labour at any wage above subsistence level, demand was fixed at the relatively low rate of State requirements, and the wages offered were fixed at the relatively high level imposed by the need for a facade of State prestige and morality. This was an unusual case of an employer not able to exploit his monopsonistic position -- the advantage of being the only buyer in this sector of the labour market -- and depress wages to the absolute minimum. The usual outcome of such conditions is a black market, and in Greece this was provided by the patronage system: the monopsonistic profits the State itself could not realise were channelled through patronage and expressed in votes for the politicians. 64

The class that profited most from this situation was the propertied peasantry, mainly because of two reasons. The first was that the less impoverished among them were in a position to educate their children to qualify for the civil service. In this they were motivated mainly by the above problems of underemployment, but also by a cultural factor: their restless aspiration towards social mobility, the reasons for which were partly the example of thriving emigrants, and chiefly the tradition of insecurity inherited from centuries of foreign rule. These aspirations were not unfeasible for the better-off among them who could afford to send their sons to the secondary schools of the bigger towns or even the University of Athens -- though often at the cost of serious privation for the remainder of the family.\*65

The other reason that helped the propertied peasants to profit from patronage more than any other class was related to the scarcity of spoils and the hierarchical structure of the patronage networks. Scarcity meant that spoils of relatively higher value, such as employment in the civil service, had to be allocated to clients situated at the higher levels of the hierarchy. The better-off among the propertied peasants could aspire to such favours precisely because they were placed higher in the social, and thus also in the clientelistic hierarchy of the rural communities where the politicians were operating. Their economic and social position enabled them to influence larger circles of relatives, friends and protégés, to command larger numbers of votes, and to offer more in exchange for employment of their educated children.

The effects of this interaction between the small independent peasantry, the politicians, and the civil servants left deep and permanent scars on Greek social history. For it was an interaction between a conservative political elite, a conservative social actor like the propertied peasantry, and the members of an institution conservative by definition-- the State. The right-wing tendencies of the small independent peasants were thus amplified and strengthened. The rightist voting behaviour of a district like Laconia, for example, always correlated closely with the traditionally very

high proportions of Laconians within the administration, including the police and the army. The conservatism of each of these three elements of this peculiar patronage system was thus preserved and enhanced by their interaction.\*67

It is not surprising that by the end of the 19th century, after some decades of such practices, the administration was flooded with the politicians' protégés, and most civil servants were, at any rate loosely, members of political networks built on patronage.

This process led not unexpectedly to an inflationary and confusing expansion of legislation, especially on petty issues, and the development of institutionalised repression. Both of these were to some extent normal side-effects of Greece's growth, but they were also due to less natural causes, such as the incompetence of governments and parliaments, the self-amplifying functions of bureaucratic pathology, and even the deliberate obfuscation practiced by groups and individuals so as to attain their ends more comfortably. One of the most characteristic examples is the manic detail in which a plethora of Greek laws set down the composition and competence of various committees, which clearly reflects the effort of patronage forces standing behind the legislator to create new employment opportunities. As for the repression mechanisms, they were created to deal not only with smuggling and banditry, but also with unrest among the currant growers and the unpropertied peasants, and because of the need for reliable personnel to direct electoral fraud and violence neatly and authoritatively.\*68

One of the effects of these conditions is of particular interest for this discussion: the additional need they created among the people for further protection by the patrons. The politicians thus became more and more indispensable to disentangling legally confused situations; to satisfying personal requests the ambiguous legitimacy of which was a lawyer's delight; to convincing the administration that measures of repression, legitimate or not,

should be waived. The literature of the period is full of intrigues centred upon customs officials, coast guards, gendarmes, warrants of arrest for failure to pay huge interest rates, and of course the unavoidable theme of bribery.

By the turn of the century, clientelism and pervert bureaucracy had fused in a self-perpetuating system.<sup>69</sup> The monstrous Greek State had physically matured.<sup>\*70</sup> It remains to be seen whether it had also achieved some kind of ideological maturity, pre-condition of coherent behaviour.

### 3. Patronage, State Functioning, and Political Power

Clearly, the birth and childhood of the Greek State during the 19th century differ radically from the similar stages in the development of the major western States. Nothing in the Greek case resembles the administrative contribution of the British aristocracy, refined and modernised in the greenhouses of the colonial empire; or the French tradition of a meritocracy born in the visionary rule of Louis XI and developed in the long centuries of centralisation; or the bureaucratic machinery urgently but expertly created by a man like Bismarck and nurtured in the golden age of imperialist and capitalist Germany. In these western cases, the class origins, the tradition, or simply the skills assured by intelligent recruitment had by the end of the 19th century contributed to a degree of coherence in the State machinery unknown in the Greek case. Moreover, the coherent western democracies were a natural complement to historically mature institutional systems which in turn had by this time arrived at a point of relative equilibrium with the underlying advanced systems of economic and social structures.<sup>71</sup> Conversely, the Greek bureaucracy was an incoherent set of individuals who simply acted out some of the functions of the State and all of the functions of the patronage systems to which they belonged. This situation was, in fact, the natural outcome of a dominant mercantile pre-capitalism

that was backward, peripheral, and in many respects contradictory to the institutional system, itself imposed by outside factors and not matured through the conflicts and contradictions of local social forces.

The social, economic and external factors which constituted the origins of the Greek State also foreshadowed and to some extent predetermined the distribution of State power among its contenders, especially before the turn of the century. An equally determinant factor was the manner in which the State functioned: by amplifying or partly transforming the predetermined tendencies; by gradually shaping an all-pervasive State ideology; and by setting the pace for its evolution in the 20th century towards greater coherence and autonomy.

The functioning of the State in this period was strongly marked by two contradictory factors: first, the State, as the tool for gratifying clientelist needs and affecting electoral results, could command an immense amount of power; secondly, nearly all civil servants were heavily dependent on the politicians.

By their very nature, individual clientelist favours could very seldom be allocated through the channels of the legislative.<sup>\*72</sup> This would frequently infringe the constitutional principle of equality before the law, and almost certainly be impracticable, since it would be sure to result in the crumbling of that same legislature. This, of course, was by no means unheard of in Greece, but it was certainly not the rule, as is indicated by the often scandalous outcome and content of any such made-to-measure legislation. Very broadly speaking, the same applied to the executive, although to a lesser extent. According to the elementary rules of organisation, the executive was concerned with the direction and not the detailed implementation of policies, and even less with the allocation of patronage favours, since both of these were the responsibility of the administration. As has been explained already, however, politics was only occasionally based on

important issues, which were the job of the legislative and the executive, and much more frequently on the distribution of individual favours, which was the domaine of the administration. It thus becomes evident that the political process, in the specifically Greek style it had acquired, was essentially in the hands of the State. This amount of power, already large in comparison with that of the civil services in non-clientelistic societies, was further increased by the standard practice of electoral fraud and violence, which was also carried out chiefly through the State mechanisms.

The other condition that marked the functioning of the State was the dependence of the civil servants on the politicians. The method of recruitment through patronage was not the only cause of this dependence, though the usage persisted throughout the 19th and well into the 20th century. There were also the typical means of dominance through corruption; promotion or transfer to the best posting; the privilege of remaining in Athens or one of the bigger towns; promotion to the status of a permanent civil servant as opposed to holding a temporary post; frequent leaves of absence; the quality and even the quantity of work; official 'indifference' in cases of parallel employment; at the higher levels participation in well-paid committees, in missions or special training-schemes abroad -- and so on with a seemingly endless repertoire of favours that might be granted a civil servant by the minister or, through him, by any other political patron.<sup>73</sup>

This situation was facilitated by the absence of any substantial legal protection for civil servants. The principle of permanent employment was introduced for the first time with the 1911 revision of the Constitution, alongside regulations imposing that promotions or transfers should be deliberated by special committees. Even this was only an effect of new brooms sweeping clean: 87.5% of the members of the Reform Parliament were new to politics, elected under the post 1909 post-revolutionary impetus.<sup>74</sup> Shortly afterwards, the special committees were absorbed by the clientelistic networks of both old and new politicians, and the appro-

priate legal method was discovered to by-pass the law. this was the perfectly constitutional regulation which allowed a preliminary trial period before a civil servant's final employment, and the right of the executive to appoint instead a so-called extraordinary employee not protected by the principle of permanence. Thereafter the total strength of this legion of 'extraordinaries' -- whose members were supposedly appointed to fulfil only unusual and temporary State requirements -- was constantly increased and never reduced, even if turnover within its ranks was quite high and faithfully reflected the fluctuations of the parties' political power and their alternation in office.\*75

These two conditions -- the State's immense potential power and the civil servants' deep dependence on the politicians -- may easily lead to two contradictory but equally misleading conclusions. The fact that there existed such potential for centralised rule -- due to the predominance of clientelism and fraudulent electoral practices -- might suggest the convenient theory that the 19th-century State was a political factor relatively autonomous from both political and social conflict and holding a dominant, if not the hegemonic position in the power structure. On the other hand, the typical civil servant, in so many ways subservient to the politicians, and ruthlessly used by them in serving their ends, may give rise to the opposite but equally facile conclusion that the State itself was the politicians' instrument at all levels of political activity -- and consequently that the hegemony had been achieved by the already familiar political oligarchy.

Such conclusions disregard the fact that the relationships described were essentially inter-personal and did not reflect the ideology and behaviour of the civil servants as a group, but rather that of individuals or small cliques. It is not by chance that so far this paragraph has spoken mainly of civil servants or politicians and rarely of the State or parties. Because of the fragmentation and antagonism inherent in all clientelist systems, the

State and the parties, whether viewed separately or together, were not coherent and stable wholes, but unsteady associations of competing individuals.<sup>76</sup> The State power was thus almost useless to State and parties alike. Neither could properly exploit this power, for neither was subjected to the other as an entity, despite the hierarchic patronage relationships. True, these relationships were erected across the borderline between State and parties, but this implies a relationship between individual patrons and clients rather than a hierarchy between parties and the State. The patronage hierarchy, in other words, did not imply an interdependence of entities, but rather an interdependence of individual members.

A good example of this mutual weakness is the case of electoral fraud. It is well established that fraud affected almost every election held in Greece before 1963, and more extensively so in the 19th than in the 20th century.<sup>77</sup> The party in power immediately before and during the poll had of course more chances of winning the election because it could more easily organise fraud and repression. That this was possible for all parties, however, suggests two things. Firstly, that there was no specific State ideology which favoured one of the political parties over the others, and it was not the State as an entity that did the oppressing and defrauding, but the individual cliques within it (otherwise one State-favoured party would have won all the elections). Secondly and even more obviously, that no party had a stranglehold over the State as a whole, or there would always have been one single winner. The terrifying capacity of the bureaucratic and repressive mechanisms for fraud and violence was thus useless to the ideologically and organisationally incoherent State. To some extent even the parties could not fully utilise this capacity, since none of them dominated the State as a whole, and none could use it as a total weapon to put its opponents out of the running permanently, as would be the case in a so-called multi-party totalitarian polity dominated by one of the parties. The State mechanism was of real use to a party only at the lowest level and in the short term, as long as the party clients within the civil



service could function freely because their patrons were in power. If a bad crop, a turn of the business cycle, or a political crisis overthrew the government a few weeks later and caused new elections, the State machinery could be equally useful to some other party. A different set of civil servants would go to work whilst their colleagues, who up to then had been active in favouritism and fraud, would now watch in apathy or nervous impotence.

#### 4. The Distribution of Power

##### 4.1 The Crown

A somewhat unexpected effect of this situation was that the power of the Crown was greatly inflated by its rights to appoint the prime minister and dissolve parliament.<sup>\*78</sup> Interpreting the Constitution somewhat freely, it was the Crown that decided which party would bribe the electorate before the elections and for how long, and which would be given the privilege to conduct fraud and repression during the elections. It cannot be established here to what extent the King's practices in this matter were unconstitutional, nor would this be a rewarding area of investigation although it has always been a central issue in Greek politics and historiography. The above-mentioned conditions of unashamed clientelism, which were in effect an expression of division and instability, by augmenting the King's ability to manoeuvre and thus enhance his power, were initially causes rather than effects of his illegal practices. That these practices afterwards became causes of continued division is undeniable, but this simply means that the factors of a pre-existing clientelist conflict would use new constitutional arguments in the Hobbesian war of all against all. Legalism being at least as sterile as psychologism, basing a historic analysis on legalistic argumentation would not be any more reliable than explaining the division and instability in terms of national character or of frustration/aggression. Undue emphasis on legalistic argument was, after all, precisely the defect of 19th-century Greek politics. It was this which sowed the formalism that subsequently crippled not only the political practices, but

also the historiography that tried to explain formalistic practices with equally formalistic arguments. What really matters is the King's objectives towards which he utilised his powers -- legally or not -- and the forces which stood behind these objectives.\* 79

The political initiatives of the Crown certainly aimed at preserving and enhancing its own power, mainly by creating deep rifts between the parties and by maintaining a blackmail hold over them. But they served other interests as well. Whilst the politicians were busy organising and bribing their clients or at most uttering their legalistic complaints, forces alien to Greek society and politics were continually and ruthlessly participating in the power game through the King's own patronage networks.

#### 4.2 'Protection by the Foreign Powers'

If Ottoman decadence had augmented western profits, it had also created the problem of how to preserve these pleasant conditions after the giant's collapse. Greece was the first province to become independent; she became free just before the second half of the 19th century when the triumphs of capitalism and technology reduced the size of the world and distances between nations, big and small, poor and rich alike. She was, therefore, one of the first countries in this smaller world to experience certain conditions of co-existence with the Great Powers which more than a century later became known under the somewhat facile term neo-colonialism.

The fact that the foreign intervention in 19th-century Greece has also quite seriously been termed 'protection' shows the extent of an ideological confusion which partly allowed the intervention, partly brought it about, and partly resulted from it. The subject is too wide to allow even a short separate discussion here. This paragraph is meant to serve as an introduction to the frequent references to the 'protection' in the analysis of various questions nearer the scope of this work.

A few decades after Greece had won independence, foreign investments accounted for two-thirds of all her invested capital;<sup>80</sup> she had repaid three to five times the proceeds of her public debts of 1824, 1825, and 1833;<sup>81</sup> the Great Powers, according to the treaty signed on his ascension to the throne in 1864, were paying the Greek King an annual indemnity which was in reality a percentage of Greek public-debt repayment to the Powers;<sup>82</sup> and Greece's small but once thriving wool, silk and cotton industries had already disappeared under mainly British competition, but her government pursued, except for short protectionist intervals, what was basically a free-trade policy.<sup>83</sup>

Foreign policy, public finance and the purchase of armaments were the main areas where the Protection exploited its privileged relations with the Crown. This was possible through the latently recognised preponderance of the King's opinion in matters of foreign policy; through the Princes' role in leading positions in the army; and through Greece's notorious and very natural inability to repay public debts contracted at often scandalous terms, which resulted in the 1893 bankruptcy and in the sequestration of Greece's resources from taxation, which the Powers elegantly imposed by submitting the country's finances to a wholly foreign administration.<sup>84</sup>

#### 4.3 The Diaspora

The foreign powers were only one of the outside factors which occupied the power positions left vacant by the Balkanisation of Greek politics: the other was the diaspora. Parallel to the diaspora magnates' widely advertised philanthropic activities, many of which were concerned with institutions of learning that supplied the philanthropists' businesses with reliable and cheap labour, there prospered the numerous discreet deals that enabled the diaspora to exercise control over the most lucrative areas of the Greek economy. These activities, already described in the preceding chapters, were dominated by the diaspora's connections with

the Crown -- and the politicians, of course -- and not through its position as a local grande-bourgeoisie, an error which has been refuted above.<sup>\*85</sup> The dominance was the effect not of an internal socio-political power structure, but rather of a purely political game with basically foreign, though Greek-speaking, capitalists as players.

This does not mean that the Palace was where conspiracy and intrigue were continually practiced with a view to exploiting the country; in reality, things were much less schematic. Big deals were arranged more casually and in style at dinners, receptions and balls. It is a common tendency to explain the backwardness of Greece and similar countries by facile conspiratorial constructs. It may be convenient to use the stereotyped scapegoats of the British Ambassador and the gunboat for the 19th century, the Intelligence Service and the Comintern for the inter-war period, the multi-national companies and the CIA for even more recently. Nevertheless, it is a method of analysis far less rewarding than a proper investigation of every internal factor which permitted these interventions.

To consider the Crown and the diaspora, for example, as the mere instruments of foreign domination is simplistic. That they were basic elements in a complex politico-economic system of influences, interests and transactions is undeniable. The Palace was one of the meeting places for politicians, foreign ambassadors and financiers, diaspora magnates and important local landowners or grand-bourgeois. The Court was their channel of communication among each other and with the King. But the role of the King as a mediator and sometimes arbitrator and his inflated political power elevated him to a position higher than that of a pawn on the foreigners' chessboard. He was thus able to serve his own interests, those of the local upper classes, and occasionally even the nationalist interests of Greece if he so wished. The diaspora was one of the means through which the West acquired good interest rates, profitable investments, and much of Greece's external trade, including the minerals and other raw materials so precious for

western industries. But foreign economic domination would have existed even without the diaspora's mediation, would probably have been even more ruthless, and such conditions might have postponed for an even longer period Greece's development, since it was the absence of an economically powerful local bourgeoisie that permitted both foreign dominance and the diaspora's exploitative practices.

In short, Greece's role in the European division of labour was clearly defined not only by foreign interests and by the diaspora's comprador activities, but also by her own economic and social structures. Similarly, her subordinate position in European politics was determined not only by the arrangements and disputes within the Power's holy alliance, but also by the Crown's secret diplomacy and the politicians' need for the irredentist panacea.

#### 4.4 The Dominant Classes

Examination of how the dominant local classes were situated within the power structure has been deliberately postponed until the end of this chapter, mainly to show how little they needed direct power, but also how little remained for them to share. Although their profits from landownership, local business, or reasonable foreign trade deals were small compared to those of the diaspora or the immense sums of Greece's public debt, they were quite content. The taxes imposed to meet the debt obligations did not affect them; the petit-bourgeoisie aspired to their status as an enviable one; and the dominant classes had no pressing big issues to be solved in parliament or government, no great threats to fear from below or from fratricidal strife within. This absence of great issues as well as of threats allowed them to delegate power to lower levels. The politicians could be encouraged to play their petty games which helped to keep the populace under control and opened the road for good business deals through a docile administration. The dominant classes' power was exercised

in the same familiar clientelist manner. Having no serious interests to protect by exercising direct power through a strong hold over the legislature and the executive, and leaving the big business deals to the diaspora and the Protection, the landowners and the bourgeoisie were content with dominating everyday economic life by means of unchallenged property and tax systems, and the leisurely transaction of friendly business deals with the politicians and their clients in the civil service.

In the political sphere, the upper classes had little direct power. But why should they ask for more? It was as though they had delegated it to the politicians before ever acquiring it, as though they had accepted with pleasure an autonomisation of politics that profited them so much financially and deprived them of so little politically. Behind the politicians' childish rituals and delicious little sins stood the guarantors of the upper classes' tranquillity and economic dominance, of the status quo and of the bourgeois institutions, the Crown and the Protection, armed with decrees to appoint prime ministers and dissolve parliaments, to grant loans, and to satisfy, drop by drop, Greece's irredentist thirst.

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Note:

Instead of going straight on to Chapter D, the reader might find it useful to refer to the Appendix first, which gives a commentary on ideology.

Chapter DTHE MILITARY COUP OF 1909I. Introduction: Summary of Events

This very brief schematic summary of events is intended as a framework for the subsequent discussion and to relieve it of frequent interruptions for clarification of events and conditions. The analysis and explanations attempted in the discussion below are based on a long-term perspective and an inscription of events into this diachronic and tendential context. A proper understanding of these events requires familiarity with the historic background, for which this summary is to serve as a timely reminder.

Similar such introductions will also precede the chapters to follow. Since the events described are basic and widely known, footnotes will largely be avoided.

\* \* \*

There are many opinions on the origins of the Military League, the organisation that staged the 15 August 1909 coup at Goudi, then just outside Athens. A summary of them will be useful as some kind of a participants' profile.

The existence of the Military League became officially known on 25 June 1909 when the colonel who was at the head of the Athens garrison caught out a number of officers discussing their plans in the house of a member of the group, Hadjimihalis. This led to the widespread but erroneous view that the League had actually been formed that day. In fact, the date and the initiative are matters of controversy, every one of the military authors claiming the honour for himself and his group. General Mazarakis speaks of a group of lieutenants in which he as a young officer participated, meeting in the house of Cavalry Lieutenant Zymvrakakis. General

Pangalos insists that Mazarakis' group, consisting of 20-25 members, met for the first time only in May 1909, whereas his own group of ten lower-ranking officers (there was only one lieutenant) had met as early as October 1908. He does accept, however, that there was yet a third group, consisting of non-commissioned officers, which he considers as one of the major factors of the coup's success. The truth seems to be that all three groups had existed simultaneously for some time before the June meeting at the Hadjimihalis residence, where they merged and adopted a common name. Pangalos' claim, however, that his own group had started as early as October 1908 coincides with a confidential report recently located in the Austrian Archives.

The feeling of discontent in the army was so general that it is superfluous to know precisely which group had initiated the later League. What matters is that about four-fifths of the army officers and nine-tenths of the navy officers participated. <sup>86</sup>

The government was well aware of the League's existence but greatly underestimated its potential power, and for several weeks followed a peculiar policy of dialogue with the clearly illegal organisation. Twelve of the officers caught at the meeting which was surprised by the Athens garrison commander were removed from service and two lieutenants were arrested later on, but these half-measures only helped to precipitate the coup.

On the actual day of the coup there was only one minor incident in reaction to the rebels by a group of royalist officers. The King had to accept the League's demands, and the royal Princes were removed from their positions in the army. Although the new government was formed by old politicians, the executive and the parliament came gradually under the League's dominance.

The officers' ideology was confused and their objectives short-sighted, however. In the first stage of their organisation, they offered the leadership of the League to the King's aide-de-camp -- a truly monumental naiveté. <sup>87</sup> The protocol they had stipulated



before their revolt provided for violent action in case the Crown did not accept the pronunciamiento with their demands, but this clause was withdrawn after pressure from more moderate, higher-ranking officers. In the end, one of their demands was a humble request for amnesty. Although the support they enjoyed among the population was overwhelming, the officers had perceived their role very narrowly and seemed unaware of the extent of the people's feelings. It is not surprising, therefore, that they could not really govern the country and that the proposal of one of them to call Venizelos from Crete, then still autonomous, was accepted wholeheartedly and, it seems, with a sense of relief.

Although Venizelos declined the leadership of the League, he advised the military on their problems, suggested and strongly supported the moderate view of revising the Constitution rather than drawing up a new one, charmed the King and his entourage, and returned to Crete. His friends proposed him in the elections of 8 August 1910, and although again he did not officially accept the proposal and did not campaign, he received the largest vote among all candidates. The old parties formed a coalition, which was opposed by a surprisingly large number of independent candidates. Some of the so-called independents claimed to be Venizelists or anti-monarchists; others declared that after the elections they would support that parliament should not merely revise the Constitution but should declare itself a Constituent Assembly; quite a few of them were sponsored by newly-created associations of merchants and other professional unions. Despite the old parties' cohesion and the incoherence of the independents, the latter achieved substantial majorities in most towns and in the rural areas of the new provinces, obtaining 120 seats, about 40% of the Assembly. The established parties, through their lead in the rural areas of the old provinces, kept the majority of the seats, but the coming radicalisation of the electorate was already obvious.

The popular verdict led the King to take action which was clearly unconstitutional. He called in Venizelos to form a government, thus breaking the Dedilomeni principle of appointing only

the man who had the declared confidence of parliament. Some historians claim that the King also armed Venizelos with a major political weapon, the power to use the decree for the dissolution of parliament, although the Assembly was a sovereign body that could be dissolved only by its own decision.<sup>88</sup>

Venizelos managed without much delay to proclaim the new elections in which he obtained an overwhelming majority. The old parties abstained, yet the actual abstentions attributed to them amounted to no more than eight percent. In the new parliament, 87.5% of the MPs were newcomers to politics.<sup>89</sup> The mostly propertied peasantry of the old provinces kept to tradition and voted for the old parties, whereas the newly acquired rural province of Thessaly voted massively for Venizelist and Agrarian candidates.<sup>90</sup>

The ten years of Venizelist rule that followed were marked by a sharp growth of the economy; an increase of the demographic and economic importance of the bourgeoisie; a profound reorganization of an already centralised, powerful State machinery; four wars that doubled Greece's size and population; and the deep division of the country over the personal conflict between (pro-English) Venizelos and the (pro-German) King on the question of Greece's position in World War I.

## 2. A Survey of Viewpoints

Greek historians disagree as to whether the 1909 coup and the political change immediately following it expressed a revolt of the bourgeoisie, and there is a lack of extensive analyses on the subject. Kordatos considers the officers as "the avant-garde of the bourgeoisie" but adds that this same class, "because of the peculiarities of the economy ... had not yet matured sufficiently to be able to displace the old parties by itself and to initiate a new social policy".<sup>91</sup> Elsewhere, he sees the coup as a victory of the middle class over the landowners, and the officers as "executing the decisions taken in the Commercial Associations". Yet he

admits in the very next paragraph that from 1883-1907 there was a "certain stagnation ... in the functioning of Greek capitalism."<sup>92</sup> Vournas thinks that the coup was "the expression of a bourgeoisie wishing to establish a truly bourgeois society and reorganise the economy on its basis", and that the effort failed because of the "bourgeoisie's narrow-minded conservative fear of the lower classes".<sup>93</sup> Moskof examines the coup from a predominantly ideological viewpoint, and describes it as "the effect of a situation in which the feeling of having arrived at a dead end with the 1897 humiliation had become strong and widespread". He considers the new ideological elements to be "the renovated and now vigorous comprador ideology"<sup>94</sup> of the middle class, as well as apparently the cultural fermentation within an intelligentsia of mainly bourgeois origins.

Filaretos says that the revolution was actively supported by all classes "except the bandits of the oligarchy".<sup>95</sup> Pangalos reports that before the coup there was unrest and indignation among all classes.<sup>96</sup> General Sarafis writes: "The revolution came about because it had popular support. It expressed the wishes of the people..."<sup>97</sup> Melas speaks similarly of general popular unrest.<sup>98</sup>

Zakythinos' work covers too wide an area for detailed analysis of the 1909 events. He considers the coup and the advent of Venizelos as a cause of renewal (anakainissis) in the economic, political and social life of Greece.<sup>99</sup> Korizis denies the term revolution commonly used to denote the coup, and claims that the truly revolutionary change was that effected through the electoral dialogue between Venizelos and the people in 1910, thus implicitly rejecting the view of a bourgeois revolt.<sup>100</sup> Dafnis also rejects this view categorically, basing himself on the relative weakness of the middle class.<sup>101</sup> Karolidis denies it on the grounds of the somewhat peculiar argument that Greece was a society without class division.<sup>102</sup> S. Markezinis claims the bourgeoisie was already in decline, and that the coup and the popular support for the military and for Venizelos were an expression of the rise of

the lower classes.<sup>103</sup> Korizis, Dafnis, and Karolidis, like the Marxist writers previously mentioned, do not base their opinions on an extensive analysis of the social structure, but rather on their own personal methodologies. In the case of Korizis and Dafnis, however, there is also serious concern to avoid statements not backed by historical evidence. As for S. Markesinis, his explanation about the pre-eminence of the lower classes in the revolt may be more compatible with the facts, but this seems to have been intuitive rather than the result of a detailed analysis of these facts.

Ventiris, who speaks categorically of bourgeois revolution, is one of the most perceptive of the non-Marxist historians. His work is based on class analysis, but it suffers from a near-absence of economic arguments to support his sociological claims, and from a confusion of terms. Throughout, this writer lumps together the bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeoisie. He often speaks of them as "the popular classes" or as "the urbanised population", although sometimes he also confuses the bourgeoisie with the oligarchy. These ambiguities explain many of his misinterpretations. Such comment should not, however, predispose against the value of Ventiris' contribution. His book is one of the few oases of informative reading in a desert of dry-as-dust narratives, hero-oriented analyses, and mechanistic evolutionist "explanations".<sup>104</sup>

Kaltchas attributes the coup to personal ambitions and the army's overwhelming anxiety about Greece's foreign policy and internal stagnation. He also states that "the suggestive theory that the malaise was symptomatic of a somewhat belated drive of the Greek middle class for political power is perhaps too simple an explanation of a complex phenomenon. It is nevertheless true that the new ferment was prevalent in the urban centres, that it affected the mercantile and professional classes and the more advanced intelligentsia, and that it finally crystallised into a revolt of 'new men', that is, a younger generation of mostly middle-class politicians..."<sup>105</sup> Svolos offers a short but very lucid analysis. He points out the vagueness of the officers' intentions,

which assumed more concrete reformist goals only with help from the radical elements of the middle class. He considers Venizelos' intervention an effort to calm down unrest among the lower classes which were then experiencing their "awakening". He states that the bourgeoisie "followed" Venizelos, and that it was in this manner, ex post facto, that the revolution was canalised into the road towards a bourgeois transformation.<sup>106</sup>

Legg considers that "... there was uneasiness among the ... professional and commercial classes in the growing cities...", but does not explain whether this uneasiness was caused by frustrated class interests, or nationalist sentiments, or even merely by the fear of a war with Turkey and a new debacle potentially harmful to business. He says that the coup was "mainly directed against the established political elite", but was also "a protest against alleged royal failures in military matters"; however, he insists on the intra-military as well as the external causes of the coup.<sup>107</sup> Toynbee, writing about the 1909 events in Greece in an early pamphlet (1914), presents the coup as the effect of exclusively external and military factors.<sup>108</sup>

The articles of the press during this period are probably more informative. An article written by Gavrielides, written before the coup, reads:

"There are now within the country other classes, other social sectors... wishing to displace the oligarchy ... and to form another (type of) State, with different laws, ... different economic relationships. ... A peaceful revolution must displace the dominant corrupt oligarchy which does not represent peasant interests, commercial interests, industrial interests, property interests..."<sup>109</sup>

The day after the election that followed the coup, a leader-writer in Patris declared: "A revolution has indeed taken place, but not by the army: it was a people's revolution."<sup>110</sup> Similarly Kyrix, the Venizelist newspaper, wrote on 13 Sept. 1910 of "... the people's awakening which caused the revolution last August..."

Even more enlightening are the opinions of four leading contemporary politicians and prime ministers as reported by Ventiris: Venizelos, Papanastassiou (leftist republican, socialist/social democrat); Kafandaris (liberal of the centre), and Michalakopoulos (right-wing liberal).

"Venizelos purports that the oligarchy had indeed fallen and that new social and political elements had entered the government (obtained power). He does not clarify, however, whether power had been acquired by a whole class, that of the bourgeoisie.

"Papanastassiou believes that the activity in 1909 of the so-called guilds, the popular demonstrations and the rise of Venizelos implied an overthrow of the plutocratic oligarchy and its replacement by the popular classes (sic).

"Michalakopoulos thinks that the bourgeoisie has participated in governing the country since 1864. He pays particular attention to the activity of the peasants. (From conversations with Ventiris, the author, summer 1928).

"Kafandaris is of the opinion that there was a generalised feeling of dissatisfaction with the politicians' incompetence, the inefficiency of parliament, and the national misfortunes. One form this took was the 1909 coup. He does not consider the social implications of the revolt. (From a conversation with Ventiris, the author, 29 December 1930)."

(emphasis added) <sup>111</sup>

Venizelos' private secretary, S. Stefanou, reports with more precision and perhaps also more detachment, Venizelos' replies to Ventiris.

"This is one of the few chapters that you wrote without previously discussing it with me.

"You were more concerned with the philosophy of history than with history itself.

"I see the events from a more empirical viewpoint. Instead of believing that a certain period saw an economic and social cleavage between the classes in Greece, I am under the impression that new elements, more determined and vigorous, grasped the opportunity offered by the military coup to take power away from the hereditary (personalised) parties. I myself belong to these new elements. This is how Gambetta explained the Third Republic in France ...

"Whatever the interpretation of the 1909 revolution, the fact remains that a new era of our modern history began with it." (Emphasis added) <sup>112</sup>

The remainder of this chapter will deal with the above controversy in an attempt to pinpoint a common methodological error and to prove certain points. The error lies in the assumption that, since the 1909 coup was followed by the call to Venizelos, the advent of the Liberal Party, the 1910-30 economic growth and the concomitant consolidation of middle-class economic and political power, the coup itself was a bourgeois revolt.<sup>\*113</sup> This cause-and-effect assumption is denied, and five concomitant points are raised. The first is that the coup did not aim at establishing or strengthening the bourgeoisie's dominance, nor was it inspired or led by this or any other class. The second is that there was no revolutionary action by the bourgeoisie, either independently or in support of the officers' revolt. Conversely, and this is the third point, the revolutionary tendencies in the decade before 1909 among part of the peasantry and the lower urban classes, and resulting in the latter's insurgent support during and after the coup, expressed much greater radicalism than the officers' action. The fourth point is that the emergence of Venizelos and his liberals, like the fact of the coup itself, was no symptom of some non-existent bourgeois revolution; it was, however, a major factor in the bourgeois transformation of the 1910s and 1920s.

The fifth and concluding point is that this transformation became possible despite the absence of a bourgeois revolt and despite the potentially anti-bourgeois aspirations of the lower classes. For it was the army that seized power and then offered it to Venizelos, not the lower classes; and neither did the liberal party recruit from them to any large extent, nor was its electoral success based exclusively on their support. Thus in the end the abstract radicalism of the lower classes was canalised into bourgeois channels by Venizelos. And his exceptional success was the interplay of numerous factors. The most preponderant internal factors were the open or latent post-1909 conflicts between the army, the Crown, the old parties, and the upper and lower classes on the one hand, and the ideological confusion on the other, with the concomitant political deadlock. The individual importance of these factors was differentiated and amplified by the absence of

any class with truly overwhelming economic and political power in a traditionally leading position or put into power by the revolution itself. Among the basic external forces were foreign domination interacting with Greece's irredentist vision and with the approaching international crisis. For two of the focal points of World War I were the Middle East economically, and the Balkans strategically: the two feet of clay on which tottered the very target of Greek irredentism -- the enfeebled Ottoman empire.

The emphasis on the role of the bourgeoisie is more than necessary. Between achieving independence in 1827 and the second half of the 20th century, Greek history is marred by the weakness of two classes, the peasantry and the bourgeoisie. This weakness can be a great help in explaining the relative autonomy of Greek politics from the underlying class structure; the pathological importance of ideology as a political factor; the endless alternating of pluralist with authoritarian phases; the importance of the State as a political factor after 1909 and especially after 1922; and finally, the gradually increasing degree in the autonomy of the State-army complex from Greece's class structure, but also its linkages with it by means of the technical rather than social network of patronage, with its vertical rather than horizontal divisions, and its concomitantly immense potential for oppression.

### 3. Internal Army Causes of the Coup

#### 3.1 Humiliation in relations with Turkey

The 1897 national defeat by Turkey and the scorn and contempt the army had to face subsequently caused an intense feeling of humiliation among the officers.<sup>114</sup> This was aggravated by the government's policy of 'impeccable behaviour' in relations with Turkey, by the procrastination of the Cretan issue, by the deadlock in the guerrilla struggle for Macedonia and by the slow rate of



Greece's rearmament efforts -- in short, by a strong feeling of impotence and frustration due to the country's military weakness and administrative paralysis. This feeling became even more overt and universal with the 1908 Young Turk revolt in Turkey. The modernising emergence of the Young Turks, although it raised hopes for greater liberalism in the Christian provinces of the empire, was an additional threat and humiliation for Greece. It was a threat in that it could halt the Ottoman decadence and the concomitant frequent interventions by the Powers, usually favourable for Greece; it was a humiliation because it pointed the comparison with the stagnation and pettiness within Greece.

The effect of the changes in Turkey on the Greek officers was immediate. Between October 1908 and January 1909, the group of ten sub-lieutenants had been unable to recruit more than fifteen additional members. Then, in a matter of a few weeks, eighty more officers joined them. This reaction has been attributed to General Shefket Pasha's sarcastic comment that he might walk over to Athens to drink his coffee on the Acropolis. The incident, and the humiliation felt because of the changes in Turkey, were not, of course, the sole causes of reaction among the Greek officers. Every secret organisation, after all, begins with the recruitment of a few members by the initial small group, a mechanism which proceeds very slowly at first until it gathers speed with the cumulative effect of geometric progression. Yet the incident and the events in Turkey must decidedly have reduced the officers' loyalty, as they totally demolished the prestige and authority of the government.<sup>115</sup>

Two more important causes of the coup were of a strictly military nature. One was the officers' discontent with military staff positions being occupied by the Crown Princes, with the General Command held by the heir to the throne, and the resulting conditions of nepotism and inefficiency within the army. This situation was made worse by the authoritarian mentality of the royal family and the often vulgar behaviour of the Princes.<sup>\*116</sup> Another cause was the non-commissioned officers' discontent, generated by a 1908 law

preventing nco's from being promoted to the high ranks, in imitation of the German army organisation -- the first expression of then Prince Constantine's passion for all things German, a passion which would deeply divide the country a few years later.<sup>117</sup>

### 3.2 The officers' class origins

Attributing undue importance to the officers' class origins is an analytical attitude common in the literature on military interventions in politics.<sup>118</sup> Certain authors qualify it by reference to the effect of the so-called esprit de corps and military ideology. This mixture is contradictory. The army is part of the State; the values and norms transmitted by military education are normally an integral part of the dominant ideology as endorsed by the State; and officers are usually very young when first recruited for their schools. But even when the majority of officers are not graduates of military academies -- in Greece of the 1900s only about one-third of the officers were -- their recruitment can be based on a highly selective and personalised system, aimed at carefully examining the officer-candidate's family background and his own personal convictions.

An officer corps may thus be recruited from all of the classes without exception and be a perfect reflection of a country's class structure, yet every one of the officers may be totally unrelated to the ideology of his family's class and strongly attached to the dominant ideology endorsed and professed by the State and the army.<sup>119</sup> Considerations of self-preservation by the State -- a major objective, whether implicit or explicit -- more or less ensure that there will be no significant differences between the dominant ideology and that of the officers. Hence the mentality that will prevail in the officer corps depends on the importance attached to this objective and the degree to which differences from the official ideology are tolerated. When the State and the dominant political and social agents are not threatened or do not perceive any threat to this ideology and their own domin-

ance, a certain laxity in both recruitment patterns and educational orthodoxy may creep in. This seems actually to have been the case in pre-1909 Greece, and the sharp contrast with the 1945 to 1974 period may indeed be illuminating for anyone familiar with the history of the Greek army. It is then in these 'non-threat' cases that the officers' class origins may acquire increased importance. Yet, whichever of the above ramparts of the military establishment may be preponderant at one or other historical moment, the fact remains that none of them may be considered as the powder keg of military interventions in politics. The factors that cause or allow such interventions should be sought deeper in the social structures and conflicts as expressed in terms of political power -- the very same factors, after all, which also determine the dominant ideology, the recruitment policies, the military education programmes, and even the greater preference by certain classes for the military profession.

The 1909 officers were mostly of upper and middle-class origin, which seems also to have been the case with some of the nco's<sup>120</sup>, though the majority of the latter came from middle-class and petit-bourgeois families. This is merely mentioned as an incidental fact; in accordance with the above discussion it must not be seen as the cause of their uprising, nor does this make it a revolution of the bourgeoisie. Even if it could be proved that such a revolution occurred simultaneously with the coup, this would not mean that the coup itself was an integral part of it. To establish whether the uprising was in any way related to the middle class, it is necessary to examine the officers' programme and their policies after they had seized power.

### 3.3 The officers' demands and policies: military preoccupations and populist pretensions.

The programme of the Military League contained nothing resembling the demands of a bourgeoisie in revolt, hidden behind the bayonets. In the five points of this programme, the officers:

- deplored the constant humiliation of Greece in her relations with Turkey, caused by her insufficient military strength;
- declared their allegiance to the Crown and the regime;
- nevertheless demanded that the Heir to the Throne and his brothers be removed from their military posts;
- "respectfully requested" that in the future the King always appoint one of the officers to the Ministries of the Army and the Navy;
- demanded better administration of the country and reduction of unnecessary expenses; this would allow a reduction of the tax burden in favour of the "the Greek people who are on the verge of starvation" and at the same time an increase in military expenditure.

One of the five points was thus a declaration of allegiance to the Crown and the regime, another was related to foreign policy, and two dealt with military questions. Only the fifth contained any demand of a social nature, reduction of taxes, and not in favour of the middle class but of "the people". Even this seems to have been added only to pay lip service to the cause and to somehow justify the other part of this same demand: an increase of the military budget.

Similarly, in the League's subsequent policy there was almost no stepping beyond the intentions announced in the programme, in a direction favourable to the bourgeoisie. Conversely, a movement to the left could be discerned, with some strong populist and essentially anti-bourgeois tendencies, apparent in the often incendiary commentaries in Chronos, the League's semi-official newspaper. Most explicit was, for example, the attack on banks and companies which were said to exercise "an immoral and disgraceful influence upon Greek society".<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, of the measures taken many were favourable to the lower classes, whereas quite a few were harmful to both landowners and bourgeoisie, as will be shown in the following paragraphs.

Finally, the call to bring in Venizelos was in no way a revolutionary action, let alone that of a bourgeois revolution: it was an act of despair. Confronted with constitutional deadlocks, administrative and governmental failure, and especially with their own total lack of imagination, the officers sought a deus ex machina. Whether Venizelos pursued a revolutionary pro-bourgeois policy or not is another question, not related causally to the 1909 military coup, and one which will be examined at the end of this chapter.<sup>122</sup>

#### 4. The Alleged Strife between Middle Class and Landowners in the Context of the 1909 Period

If, notwithstanding the above argument, it were temporarily accepted that the coup was related to some kind of middle-class revolt, one might justifiably ask: Did the bourgeoisie really need to revolt in 1909? The question may seem strange, so widely accepted is the belief that it was in that year that this class confirmed its irresistible ascendancy. Yet a second question is inevitable: Against whom was the revolution directed? The only possible targets could have been the Crown or the landed aristocracy, but neither was the case in 1909. There can be no doubt as far as the Crown is concerned; there is no trace of any such conflict, neither had there been any economic or political tension to instigate it. As for the landowners, their case has already been sufficiently discussed to require only confirmation from examining the specific conditions and events of the 1909 period.

The first strong argument refuting the contention of a bourgeois revolt against the landowners is that it had no historical past. It would be unrealistic to believe that a conflict serious enough to lead to a revolution could have developed in the few years immediately before the coup. Even if this were so, the strife would undoubtedly have found expression in the demands of the rebel officers, which was not in fact the case.

True, it seems that certain anti-landowner tendencies did exist among the non-commissioned officers. Karaiskakis, their leader and MP for Karditsa-Thessaly, was a fervent supporter of land reform. A certain primitive agrarianism and vague populism were rather common among the nco's, but these were not conscious collective choices related to a class struggle against the landowners, they were merely individual positions. In the manifesto circulated by the nco's and signed by Karaiskakis a week before the coup there were a number of nationalist exorcisms, but no mention of the peasant problem,<sup>123</sup> and the same was the case for the programme of the League itself.

In the cascade of laws that followed the coup -- all passed by a gasping parliament relentlessly kept voting by the officers' whips -- there was not even the beginning of a solution to the most crucial social and economic problem since independence. At the height of what was supposedly a revolution against the landowners, the peasant uprising in Kileler was suppressed with bloodshed. Land reform was not imposed in 1909 but in 1924, and even then handsome indemnities were offered to the Greek landowners -- one-hundred-and-thirty years after the Jacobin Constitution had deprived the French landowners of any rights to indemnity.<sup>\*124</sup>

If there had been any real conflict between bourgeoisie and landowners other than the question of land reform, it would certainly have climaxed into serious political battle long before it exploded as a major revolution; and after the revolution it would have been more or less resolved by a series of measures against the landowners. Once more: this was not the case. There was some talk of imposing a tax on income from land, for example, but the scheme did not materialise when Finance Minister Eftaxias presented the widely publicised first post-coup budget of 1910. There was only one measure relating to the landowners, and this can be considered as neither opposing their interests nor as a result of serious strife: a tax on the number of animals used for farm labour was abolished for the small peasants and the collegoi, but not for the landowners.<sup>125</sup> It was evidently a measure directed

not against the landowner but in favour of the small peasant. It would have been scandalous, after all, to extend a tax exemption to the rich at a time of intense efforts to redress the country's finances. However, though the measure did not expressly benefit the landowners, it did not harm them either.

The stand taken by the new political forces which had emerged from the 1910 elections on the issue of land reform provides the most explicit evidence against the contention of an anti-feudal bourgeois revolt. Article 17 of the revised 1864/1911 Constitution was formulated for the purpose of expropriating private property. During discussion in the Assembly, the proposal seemed to be heading for a rejection not only by the old parties, but also by the greater part of the liberals, the very party of the allegedly anti-feudal bourgeoisie.<sup>126</sup> Only Venizelos' personal intervention saved the Article from the "revolutionary anti-landowner" zeal of his bourgeois followers.

Even if economic strife had really existed and had indeed generated a revolt of the bourgeoisie, mobilisation of this class would have been hindered by its stagnant political ideology. Although some progressive intellectuals of bourgeois origin supported the coup, the bulk of the bourgeois population was initially against it.<sup>127</sup> So much so, in effect, that the British Consul in Piraeus could attribute the 1909 recession, the worst for years, mainly to the prevailing feeling among the trading community of "... insecurity, owing to the unsettled political situation...", and could one year later speak of "complete loss of confidence".<sup>128</sup> As for the intellectual avant-garde, it would be unrealistic to attribute undue importance to the ten or so years of cultural development before 1909, and to suppose that they had been sufficient to create a revolutionary consciousness and to ferment the alleged revolt of the bourgeoisie in 1909. Moreover, with the exception of very few individuals, the intelligentsia was only relatively progressive -- and not in the area of social and political ideology. It is not surprising that a letter sent shortly after the coup by the great poet Palamas to Penelope Delta, another bour-

geois intellectual, said: "The situation in Greece today ... is (indeed) bad and difficult... yet this cannot, it should not, stop us from leading our lives (as decently as we can)..."<sup>129</sup> How could it be otherwise in a circle dominated by a Nietzschean cult and a fixation on classical Hellenism? Both these tendencies -- almost exclusively, though often latently -- expressed a frustrated nationalism, if not actually chauvinism, but certainly not any 'typical' revolutionary bourgeois thirst for more political power and more economic opportunities.<sup>\*130</sup>

### 5. Unrest among the Urban Lower Classes

If taxation was not a cause of conflict between landowners and bourgeoisie, it was certainly the field on which the two dominant classes and the State confronted the lower-class urban population. Although the major cause of unrest among the lower classes was the excess of indirect taxation, for the upper classes the lack of direct taxes and especially of income tax was a cause for rejoicing rather than revolt. Whereas there were indirect taxes from 30% to 1,400% on items of popular consumption and the tax burden on peasants' and petit-bourgeois' incomes ranged from 10 to 40%, there was a tax of only 5% on corporations.<sup>131</sup> Greece enjoyed the highest per capita taxation in the Balkans, 39 drachmas (£1.60) compared to 26 in Roumania, 25 in Serbia, and 23 in Bulgaria.<sup>\*132</sup> So if there were plenty of signs of a rebellious effervescence among the people, it was not among the middle class.

In 1908 Finance Minister Gounaris proposed a budget which included a few new taxes. Shortly afterwards a wave of protest made him resign and his proposals were withdrawn. One of them was a tax on alcohol, used as fuel at that time and extracted from currants because of a chronic crisis of currant overproduction. According to British diplomatic reports, "... the principal rock on which Gounaris was shipwrecked was the considerable tax ... on alcohol" which "... created many enemies ... among the powerful societies associated with (alcohol) production..." (By "societies"



the British Consul most probably meant "companies")<sup>133</sup> Quite obviously, the tax would mostly have affected the low-income consumers, and not the alcohol industries which could simply increase their prices in the pattern typical for taxes on goods with inelastic demand. The tax was also inoffensive to the currant growers of the Peloponnese whose level of production would hardly have been affected. Yet neither the alcohol industrialists nor the peasants bothered about refined economic analyses, and simply joined the consumers in condemning the tax. The lobby which really forced its withdrawal, as the above reports seem to suggest, was the most powerful among them: the industrialists'.

Another measure Gounaris had proposed was a light tax on corporation dividends. The very few bourgeois to whom this applied would hardly have stirred up much of a noise about it, yet this measure too was withdrawn, silently and swiftly, in the shadow of the alcohol tax.

Both these cases are illuminating. In 1908 the bourgeoisie was able to avoid these very light tax burdens under the ancien regime is allegedly desired to overthrow. One year later, after its supposed revolution, it failed to avoid much more important taxes on dividends; was obliged to endorse the principle and practice of income tax; and was forced to accept even that immense threat to the sacrosanctum of private property: an inheritance tax.<sup>\*134</sup>

By the end of the first decade of the century, the urban lower classes' unrest culminated in open contention. The above-mentioned 1908 measures brought a note of protest from the craftsmen's and workers' associations which was expressed in unusually violent terms. The parties, explicitly called in this text a "political oligarchy", were attacked vehemently.<sup>135</sup> The guilds submitted a second note of protest to the King in February 1909. On 31 March, two-thousand members of the merchants' and shopkeepers' associations paraded in front of the Palace to protest against the strong-handed policy of the Piraeus Customs Authority.<sup>136</sup>

It is a common error to identify the bourgeoisie with the associations and guilds that were mobilised before the coup. As the guilds were also extensively mobilised after the coup and made particularly radical demands, their correct classification is indeed important for the explanation of the 1909 events. The term 'guild' may have an historic past reminiscent of the early bourgeoisie, but in Greece it was used for organisations of typically petit-bourgeois professional groups, like bakers and craftsmen, or even for unions of workers in this period of embryonic syndicalism.\*<sup>137</sup> It is significant that when, after the coup, the officers carelessly proposed to parliament a law providing for penalties which would have made strikes virtually impossible, it was guild lobbying that caused the withdrawal of these proposals.<sup>138</sup>

As for the associations of merchants, the criterion should not be merely their members' occupation, but rather their economic function and social status, their income and their 'net worth', in other words all those elements that classify the bulk of them as small tradesmen and shopkeepers rather than entrepreneurs, as petit-bourgeois rather than bourgeois. That there were truly bourgeois elements within these associations is undeniable. It was not their minorities, however, but rather the petit-bourgeois majorities which elected their leadership. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the only professional group which refused to participate in the critical mass demonstration on 14 September 1909 in support of the League was the entirely bourgeois Lawyers' Association.\*<sup>138a</sup>

Meanwhile, taxes and the continuing peasant problem had generated a chronic upheaval in rural Greece. A just tax system had been the foremost and basic demand of the somewhat petty rebellion led by ex-Major Fikioris in Sparta as early as 1900. An anarcho-socialist movement had a certain success among the rural population of the Peloponnese in the 1900s. Many violent demonstrations, staged by armed currant-growers during the first decade of the century, were suppressed by the police and the army. The unrest in rural Greece thus became fertile soil for the insurrectionist

aspirations of the urban lower classes.<sup>139</sup> These aspirations are discernible not only in the already described activism of the petit-bourgeois associations, but also in the position of the students and the press.

One week before the coup, the students of Athens University addressed a declaration to the King, asking for his intervention against the inefficiency and corruption of the political parties. Greek students at that time were known for conservatism rather than radicalism.<sup>140</sup> Their pompous text, however, written in intricate purist Greek and asking the King to use his "punch" against the politicians, speaks of emigration, tuberculosis, starvation, and taxes, but not of middle-class sufferings or demands or liberal ideas.

Pre-1909 newspaper commentaries are also illuminating. Chronos and Acropolis were the most vociferous, both with clearly populist and often anti-bourgeois leaders. Chronos became the League's semi-official mouthpiece and published many articles written by Loidorikis, the Secretary-General of the League.<sup>141</sup> In Acropolis, the well-known journalist Gavriellidis regularly wrote his incendiary articles calling for a "peaceful revolution". His proposals included the imposition of income tax and the reduction of customs duties. Both newspapers ran a referendum on their proposals in June/July 1909 and had a good response.<sup>142</sup>

It was in these circumstances that the group of the non-commissioned officers chose to form political base-organisations in support of the League in the popular neighbourhoods of Athens. The effort was undertaken belatedly and organised badly. If this had been otherwise, the outcome of the 1909 events might easily have been more radical in orientation.

Such, then, were the economic causes and the actualisation of the popular outcry before 1909. The hard core of the potential insurgents consisted understandably of the insecure petit-bourgeoisie

and the heavily exploited workers. At its periphery dwelled the utterly miserable migrants who had come to Athens from the provinces and were trying to leave for America. The gates of New York remained shut as long as the great depression lasted. Fewer than an average of 1,000 immigrants a year could leave Greece before the turn of the century, then 10,000 until 1905, and more than 30,000 a year from then until 1910.<sup>143</sup> In the few weeks, months or years between their arrival in Athens and their emigration, these desperate masses poured their venom into the already poisonous social atmosphere of the capital and were an easy ally for the petit-bourgeoisie and the working class. This is how these people's economic discontent and militancy provided a social basis for the officers' hesitant populism after 1909.

\* \* \*

The composition and demands of the 14 September 1909 demonstration in support of the League will serve to confirm the argument. The assembled crowd was calculated to number about 1,000<sup>144</sup> out of a total Athenian population of less than 300,000. Even if all the few thousand bourgeois of Athens had been present, which is doubtful, they were certainly a small minority in this crowd. The very size of the demonstration, therefore, implies that the middle class was not alone in the insurrection, and perhaps that it was not even part of it.

Even if the bourgeoisie were to have been an insurgent class before that demonstration, it is doubtful whether it would have continued after it. The declaration voted by the participants and handed over to the King -- expressed in populist and leftist terms -- contained quite a few anti-bourgeois threats:

"... the People ... considering that their lawful interests and rights are being sacrificed under the cover of a liberal regime, that their (parliamentary) representatives have been transformed into an oligarchy ... (ruling) in coalition with an untaxed plutocracy whilst the People is groaning under the burden of unjust taxes ..." etc.

Some of the demands that followed this preamble were:

"The imposition of income tax, but not under any circumstances of new taxes on consumption; legislation against usury imposing a maximum interest rate; the civil servants to become the people's servants; amelioration of the condition of the worker who labours in the worst of servitudes for the benefit of vested capital."

The major mass expression of the period indicates, therefore, that the popular forces were urging the military to turn the coup into a revolution which would naturally aim not at strengthening, but rather at weakening the upper classes and especially the bourgeoisie. It was to be directed against the "plutocracy" and its bourgeois members, usury and its bourgeois practitioners, the tax system and its bourgeois protégés.

The declaration which was voted at the 14 September meeting appears to have been written by the group of the so-called Sociologists, the black sheep and at the same time the enfants gâtés of the progressive bourgeois intelligentsia.<sup>145</sup> Could these origins of the declaration imply that it was an elite-imposed, intellectualised text, unrelated to any popular wishes? This seems to be disproved by fact. The populist demand on the problem of taxation had been a central issue in all lower-class demonstrations for many years before the coup. The text was actually voted by the assembled people. It was discussed with and approved by the leadership of the associations. It was also endorsed by the League, and the officers would not have adopted it had it not expressed genuine popular demands which would assure them the conscious and consistent popular support they urgently needed. Because this demonstration, one of the first significant events after the coup, was crucial: it would show the real force behind the opposing forces, and this would be vital in the bargaining that had already begun between the officers, the parties, and the King. That the officers chose to solicit the support of the lower classes rather than that of the bourgeoisie -- how else could they have adopted these anti-bourgeois demands? -- shows that there

were revolutionary tendencies among the former, but no hope of active support among the latter. It also suggests that in the tripartite strife between army, Crown and the old parties, the officers themselves favoured the popular demands rather than the interests of the bourgeoisie, which was thus either rejected or not trusted as a potential ally.

The text of the declaration was not submitted to the King and the government in its original form as approved by the people assembled. It was amended by the Association leaders in order to sound more respectful. An Pangalos puts it, "The revolutionary roar of the people was transformed by the pusillanimous dwarfs of its committee into the mournful supplicatory mewing of a starving kitten".<sup>146</sup> This of course was a typically petit-bourgeois way of approaching a bourgeois government and challenging bourgeois legitimacy. For the officers' uprising was not a social revolution, and when it occurred it was not supported by the self-confident animal that is the bourgeoisie in the economically mature conditions of a 'typical' bourgeois revolution. The real supporters of the officers' uprising were the ideologically immature and confused, the economically and politically weak petit-bourgeois, in alliance with the few workers and the Lumpenproletariat of Athens.<sup>\*147</sup>

\* \* \*

Two major political factors of this period seem to have diagnosed the situation in a way similar to the above analysis: the so-called Protectors, as represented by the Ambassadors of England and France, and Venizelos.

Nothing reveals more clearly where the heart of the revolution lay than this quotation from the English Ambassador's report one month before the coup: "There is a strong and dangerous discontent amongst the lower orders and considerable alarm is felt by the upper classes". After the coup, too, the ambassadors were

deeply concerned about what they called "dangerous resentment" among the people. Their persistence on this matter clearly shows that they did not see the 1909 revolt as a plain coup or as an uprising against the landowners. They saw it as a still amorphous but potentially threatening revolution of the army and certain sections of the population, which could well evolve towards radical populist solutions and possibly a change of regime. It is doubtful whether the ambassadors of the two major bourgeois States would have exhibited such fears if they had perceived the situation as an ongoing bourgeois transformation. The objection that a revolutionary middle class might overthrow the King, while the Powers were interested in keeping him in his place, does not stand serious scrutiny. The Powers knew, in fact, that a purely bourgeois revolt in Greece would certainly not overthrow the Crown, for the Greek middle class had no reason to be, and indeed was not, hostile towards the King. \*148

Venizelos seems to have arrived at the same conclusion. There are many indications that he, like the two ambassadors, feared more than anything else the popular outcry and the probability of the situation getting out of control. One of these indications is particularly significant: Venizelos' analysis of the situation at his first meeting with the representatives of the League. The entire meeting was essentially oriented towards finding ways to preserve law and order and to protect, if not strengthen, the Crown. Neither the Crown nor the bourgeois legality, of course, were threatened by the bourgeoisie or by the docile leadership of the League. The threat came from below, from the lower classes and the radical younger officers. \*149

The confrontation was not, in fact, avoided. It came, but was handled in masterly fashion by Venizelos. During his historic speech in the central square of Athens, Venizelos faced a huge anti-royalist crowd which kept interrupting him, rejecting the reform he was advocating and demanding a Constituent Assembly. He insisted, raised his voice above that of the crowd, and firmly reiterated his own choice. The people were silenced. In this

famous incident Greek historians saw the confirmation of the exceptional impact a charismatic leader may have upon history, and rightly so. Certain questions have remained unasked, however. If there had been no charismatic leader on that balcony but instead the placid leader of the coup, would the crowd have been silenced? In this case, would Greek society in subsequent years have undergone the same process of bourgeois transformation? And what would have happened if the demonstration had been addressed by some Greek Gracchus Baboeuf? The crowd met only fifty yards from the parliament, five hundred from the Royal Palace.<sup>150</sup>

## 6. A Tentative Synthesis

### 6.1 The military

Following the above discussion, how is the 1909 coup to be properly classified? Far from being the instrument of an irresistible bourgeoisie, the military revolted against the political elite, wishing to replace it by a more competent and less corrupt leadership within the same bourgeois institutional framework. In this they proceeded as a political agent relatively autonomous from the country's class structure, under the pressure of mainly external and military conditions. One must not be misled by this autonomy, however: it could only be relative, as indeed it was. Both its emergence and its functioning were determined by the prevailing political and social conditions.

Its emergence was brought about by the weakness of the dominant classes, the power of the Crown and relative independence of the political oligarchy from social conflict, the weight of foreign interference -- indeed, by all the major characteristics of Greek society and politics. In other words, autonomy was possible because of the conditions of instability or at best a precarious balance among social and political forces, and the non-existence of dominant classes with overwhelming power.<sup>\*151</sup> It is unlikely that the army could have become autonomous had the bourgeoisie been a well-established, dominant class; or had the political oligarchy been sufficiently powerful, properly integrated into the social and economic system, responsive not only to its petty demands but also to its vital needs and adaptable to its changes in the crucial period of international economic uncertainty and political upheaval prior to World War I.<sup>\*152</sup>



The manner in which this autonomy operated, its functioning and its limits, were also determined by the above factors. The army was an integral part of a bourgeois State, itself fairly autonomous from the complexities of Greece's social structure, yet closely related to the political oligarchy through the bonds of a sophisticated system of patronage and spoils. How far could the military go in their struggle against this oligarchy? As far as accepting a mere change of government. How far could they challenge the bourgeois legality? As far as to beg an amnesty the very day of their coup. The officers' ideology was determined not merely by their class origins, but also by their education or at least their mutual cultural interaction within a more or less elitist army. How could they even have thought of radical economic and social changes? Why would they not remain content with the Megali Idea and the status quo, embellished by the humanistic verbalism of "the People on the verge of starvation"?\*<sup>153</sup>

## 6.2 The role of the middle class in the 1909 revolt

It is pointless to go to extreme lengths, led by a narrow evolutionism, to find a bourgeois revolution in Greek history. Put quite bluntly, there never has been one because there never was any need for one.\*<sup>154</sup> The 1843 uprising that caused King Otho's constitutional concessions, for example, may seem near the model of a bourgeois revolution, but it took place at a time when almost no bourgeoisie existed.

Where the case of 1909 is concerned, the misinterpretation is more justified. The coup was in fact followed by such progress in capitalist growth and concomitant middle-class power, by such strengthening of the bourgeois institutions, by so vigorous an assertion of a great bourgeois party, that the temptation to causally link these evolutions with the coup is almost irresistible. However justified this may seem, it remains a misinterpretation. Thus Venizelos was not the effect of the awakening of the middle class, as is often claimed, but rather one of its causes. The Crown and its British and local consultants, anxious to prevent a potential radicalisation of the officers' movement and frightened by the initially amorphous yet threatening popular support for the League, tried to neutralise these forces by playing the game suggested by Venizelos. He in turn was convinced, and not without justification, that this game was the only one that could, given

the international conditions, serve the interests of Greece. Led by this conviction and his own fervent ambition, he opted for a transformation of Greece into a truly bourgeois society. This meant a class-conscious, long-term oriented, economically powerful middle class that would also be politically dominant without the now useless landed class in tow and with the autonomy of the political elite seriously curtailed. On the institutional level, this meant a consistently bourgeois, liberal regime, a King playing the role of watchdog rather than shepherd, and well-organised bourgeois parties, preferably no more than two, administering the country. \*155

It was not precisely these options, of course, which were explicitly presented to the electorate in 1910 and 1912; neither was there any concrete programme of bourgeois transformation which was enthusiastically approved by the majority, including a good part of the middle class. \*156 The enthusiasm appears to have been for Venizelos rather than his visions, for the concrete prospect of pulling the country out of stagnation and humiliation rather than the abstract choice of a bourgeois transformation. That Venizelos' visions were truly bourgeois and as such truly revolutionary, or that the bourgeoisie ultimately adhered to them, does not mean that the 1909-12 period witnessed a revolution of the bourgeoisie. It simply means that the ambiguous revolt of the army and the ideologically confused revolutionary support it generated among the lower classes were canalised into bourgeois channels. This was the achievement of a charismatic leader who was able to convince the Crown and the foreign protectors that this solution was indeed best in terms of their own interests, and who thus obtained their support. \*157

This same charismatic leader did not, of course, and could not make his choices independently of the forces that determined Greece's internal social structure. It was obvious to him that the option of a bourgeois transformation, supported by the foreign protectors and by the diaspora capitalists, promised a more stable political development and faster economic growth than a solution risking their wrath. Moreover, his solutions had to reconcile the Powers' concern to keep Greece under control, with Greece's need to acquire the population and the riches of her provinces still.

under Turkish rule. His success depended, therefore, on the compatibility of his options with all the above conditions, external and internal. But compatibility need not imply causal connection.\*158

### 6.3 The middle class after 1909

The economic and demographic growth of the bourgeoisie had become inevitable by the second decade of the century. The necessary conditions were present already; the liberals were to provide an institutional and legal framework coupled with the appropriate economic policy.

The post-1910 economic boom and the concomitant benefits for the middle class -- both as a rule attributed at least partly to good government -- marked the turning point: it was then that this class began orienting itself massively towards Venizelos. It is doubtful whether this could have happened before he had had a chance to prove himself, or before the effects of the economic recovery were felt. In 1911, for example, following Venizelos' pro working-class measures, the middle class reacted angrily, and the rumour spread quickly that Venizelos was "wooing and rabble-rousing the workers".\*159

There were of course exceptions of immediate and enthusiastic support by certain bourgeois and quasi-bourgeois elements; exceptions in the shipowning section of the bourgeoisie, of a few lucid individuals, and of certain diaspora groups that began orienting themselves towards permanent establishment in Greece. But these exceptions merely proved the rule. The reasons behind the immediate and unconditional support by certain individuals was often personal, an effect of their education and progressive political thinking. As for the support of the local shipowners and certain diaspora groups, this was caused by the changing assessment of their collective interests. There was rising anxiety among these diaspora elements about their future in the various countries where they had established themselves, which was due

either to local xenophobic movements as in Roumania, Egypt and Turkey<sup>160</sup>, or to increasing social problems, as in Russia. It was therefore natural that these people should feel the need for a new place of residence, possibly a new passport, and certainly a national centre that would properly protect their interests outside Greece, in other words a Greek State something more than a puppet on the international political stage. It is not by chance that only around the turn of the century did the diaspora begin to contribute heavily with funds to Greece's armament needs -- for example, the donation of a whole cruiser by Averof. The same argument applies to the shipowners. The need in the shipping industry for a patron State was very understandable at a time of rising antagonism on the high seas, partly intensified by Germany's new imperial ambitions.

In consequence, part of the diaspora and the shipowning section of the local bourgeoisie supported Venizelos immediately when he appeared on the scene and projected his youthful personality and his promising leadership potential. Simultaneously, the economic conditions inside Greece herself were also changing. Under their impact, strongly felt during the very first years of Venizelist rule, other and larger sections of the middle class were also gradually attracted to the liberals. This process was neither one-dimensional in form, nor linear in movement. Furthermore, it had deep and varied effects. All these elements, therefore, require a careful and somewhat longer analysis.

The Balkan wars had greatly increased the size of the local market: by 1913, the population was two times that of 1909, four times that of 1880. The unemployed among this population, those who would consume without producing, could now emigrate en masse to America. Those who stayed worked for relatively low wages and then consumed nearly all of their income, pumping profits into the emerging industrial sector, and the proceeds from indirect taxes into the State budget. The war expenses not only stimulated production, but also yielded handsome direct returns: the plains of the North, the riches of Crete, the trade of Thessaloniki. A booming international economy created or re-opened markets for

Greece's products and opportunities for the Greek merchants and shipowners. These favourable conditions came to full fruition with the fever of the Great War. Now the profits came into Greece not only through her merchant ports, but also via the Balkan front. Initially confined to Serbia and Gallipoli, it expanded to neutral Greece by 1916, and all over the Balkans when Greece and Roumania entered the war in 1917. 161

During the same period, the new and vigorous liberal party endowed the country with the basic legal and organisational structures of a modern State and followed a sound economic policy, including a protectionism that greatly encouraged the country's primitive industry. A reflection of this effort and of the above favourable economic conditions was the new robust image of the middle class, an image clearly indicated by the figures already mentioned (chapter B).

Historians of the period tend to overlook the importance of the favourable economic conditions, and to overestimate the organisational and generally political causes of this transition to a triumphant capitalism and to the political dominance of the bourgeoisie, in one word, of the bourgeois transformation. It is very doubtful whether good government alone would have been sufficient to bring it about had the local and international economic conditions been unfavourable. Not that underlining of the economic factor in this analysis implies a rigid and universally applicable economism; the case of Japan for example is a good warning against such simplifications. In Greece the added weight of the economic factor was due to certain clearly local peculiarities, such as the nature of her economy or the mentality of her entrepreneurs.

Defeating good political leadership, in fact, the evils of a peripheral position would have blocked the transformation unless counter-balanced by an exceptionally favourable conjuncture. Lack of the range of resources needed for an autonomous take-off; exploitation of many of the existing resources by foreigners;

export of numerous products in their crudest and cheapest form; the small size of the market; short-term entrepreneurial mentality; hoarding practices; lack of capital -- all these familiar conditions meant that Greece's transformation depended on the health of the great masters, on the capricious graphs of the international business cycle, and on the existence of at least a few favourable factors in the internal market. In other words, they meant an exceptional dependence on the economic factor, its dominance over the political-organisational one.

That it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a peripheral country to base its economic take-off on its own primitive markets for goods and capital is a commonplace. That it is difficult even given an ideal institutional and legal mechanism operated by the most brilliant political elite is what has needed clarification. The implications of this conclusion are illuminating. In the forcing-frame of what was essentially a war economy and within bourgeois institutions that had been maturing for more than half a century, the transformation would have occurred anyway. It would have occurred without the encouragement of the 1909 revolt, and quite plausibly even without the organisational contribution of the liberal governments. The transformation would have been different perhaps, less spectacular, it would probably have caused more and severe disarticulations and upheavals on the economic and social level -- but it would have occurred. A sound economic policy coupled with protectionism, as well as a reorganisation of the State and of the legal system would then have been imposed upon the political leadership ex post facto, as an effect of these troubles, as a necessity. And imposed by the economic conditions of war, electoral needs or even by revolution, such progress would have seemed an effect rather than a cause of the transformation. But in both instances, the true and the hypothetical, the political factor was cause as well as effect. This, after all, is strongly suggested by the chronological coincidence of the three processes, political, social, and economic. Seen in this light, these processes can be explained in less linear

terms. There is no more truth in a causal sequence of the type 'rise of a bourgeois party - creation of animation of bourgeois institutions, laws, policies - rise of the middle class - economic growth' than there is in its reverse. There is no need for any sequence whatsoever, for the process evolved as a complex system of interacting parts.

In a manner of speaking, this process functioned as an osmosis between the social and the political level. The liberals mixed gradually with the bourgeoisie through friendship and patronage, marriage and lobby. The State was not merely reorganised, but also gradually invaded by bourgeois and petit-bourgeois friends, protégés and relatives of both the new dominant groups, the liberal politicians and the middle class. This youthful socio-political complex Bourgeoisie-Party-Bureaucracy was thus the creature and at the same time the creator of the new legal systems and regulations, the new economic and social policies, the new ideological messages. 162

Seen from another standpoint, this process of the liberals' embourgeoisement was also a gradual initiation of the bourgeoisie into the game of political power. Not that this class had had no political power before. It had, but exerted it through particularistic, individual concerns and practices, and not through class action, which is after all suggested also by its ideological orientation towards comprador competitiveness on the level of the individual, and irredentism on the level of the social group. In this new period, however, the emphasis began to shift towards general class interests because of the new development prospects, and to a search for a more concrete ideology because of the new threats from a growing working class and from imported revolution. It is not by chance that the term 'bourgeois regime' came into frequent use during this period, even before the October Revolution in Russia; that preachings on the need to preserve this regime in Greece were then much more common than before 1909; and that many of these discussions took place in parliament itself and were often led by Venizelos, the most perceptive of the bourgeois leaders.

## Chapter E

### REVOLUTION AND THE FALL OF THE DYNASTY, 1922-1924

#### 1. Introduction

##### 1.1 Brief summary of events, 1912-22

The 1912 war of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro against Turkey ended with the allies' victory and the annexation by Greece of Epirus, Macedonia and several Aegean islands. But the vast territories that had been at stake inevitably became the apple of discord among the allies later on. The 1913 war against Bulgaria too was victorious for Greece. The gains this time were the plains of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. Once again Greece had a common frontier with Turkey, but now her islands formed a rampart against Asia Minor and her armies were facing Constantinople.

Constantine, meanwhile enthroned as King, had been the leader of these armies but not quite the only man responsible for their victories: Venizelos had taken not merely all the political decisions during the war, but also some of the vital military ones. However, anxious to give the State a safe foundation of solid institutions, Venizelos promoted the royal symbol among the people and, keen to prepare the nation-at-arms for the final assault towards the east, exalted Constantine's image as military leader.<sup>163</sup>

The harmonious idyll was not to last. The Kaiser's efforts to capitalise on the support of his Greek son-in-law, and Venizelos' belief that Greece on the contrary had much to gain from joining the Entente unconditionally, brought about the acute disagreement between the two men as to Greece's neutrality in the Great War. On 25 February 1915 Venizelos resigned. From then on the situation deteriorated rapidly and irreparably. The dichasmos spread throughout the country, to begin with in the form of a bitter journalistic war, then with the first 1915 election. Although the government conducting this election was led by the royalist



Gounaris, the liberals were the victors and Venizelos formed his cabinet again. Constantine's intransigence brought about his prime minister's renewed resignation on 24 September 1915. Another dissolution of parliament was considered unconstitutional by the liberals, who declared they would abstain from the elections proclaimed for 6 December.

In November 1915 the Entente armies, their Gallipoli campaign having meanwhile failed, were transferred to Thessaloniki: the new Macedonian front was to be deployed on the soil of neutral Greece. This flagrant infringement of international law was, as it were, legitimised by the Greek electors' approval of Venizelos' foreign policy. In July 1916, Greek officers stationed in Thessaloniki staged a coup, and on 13 September Venizelos and Admiral Countouriotis left Athens to join the rebels. General Danglis, the King's honorary aide-de-camp, completed the triumvirate that was to lead the new Greek State of the North.

The allies' interference in the affairs of Greece had meanwhile continued and was shortly to culminate in the November 1916 sea-blockade of Athens, the seizure of Greece's warships, and the disembarkation of allied army units in Athens. The demonstrations that followed, and the street-fighting of 18 November, as well as the royalists' terrorist raids against the Athenian liberals on 19 November, led to the humiliation of the Greek flag in front of the allied flags in Athens in January 1917, and finally to the 29 May allied note to the Athenian government which was actually an ultimatum. Constantine had to comply: he left the country, Alexander ascended the throne, the country was formally reunified, and Venizelos set up his new government in Athens.

Greece thus entered the war, and Venizelos' wishes at last came true, solidly supported by a Greek army of 300,000 men. By 1919, the treaties of Neuilly and of Sévres had allocated to Greece the territories of south-western and eastern Thrace, the islands of Imvros and Tenedos and, under special international regime, the Smyrna region of Asia Minor.

On the other side of the frontier with Turkey, the situation was also changing rapidly. Whilst the Sultan's puppet government in Istanbul had to comply with the allies' orders, the Ankara government of Kemal Atatürk refused to acknowledge Greece's newly acquired rights, terrorised the Greek population of the Black Sea littoral, and prepared for war. Venizelos, basing himself on the unofficial support of the British government, landed Greek troops in Smyrna on 2 May 1919. Soon afterwards Greece, with the apparent indifference of the allies, and later on the latent and open hostility of France and Italy, began her Asia Minor entanglement.

The first year of the war saw a victorious advance of the Greek army, clouded only by the inevitable acts of brutality against the Turkish population. Kemal Atatürk retreated to a line of defence west of Ankara, with the depth of Asia Minor behind him. In Greece, elections were soon to be held. With the memory of his triumph at Sévres still fresh in their minds, Venizelos expected the people to crown him with laurels. But on 1 November 1920 the vote turned against him. The new royalist government called a referendum for 20 November in which the majority voted for Constantine's return. Whatever the latent wishes of the people, however, the evils of war could not be exorcised, least of all by Constantine, the proclaimed enemy of Greece's sole potential saviours, the Powers of the entente. Deprived of financial support, the Greek economy quickly deteriorated and the government was soon obliged to devalue the drachma by fifty per cent. Deprived of diplomatic support, the army was soon led into desperate large-scale offensives which bled it to exhaustion and destroyed its morale. When Kemal Atatürk counter-attacked on 13 August 1922, the brittle Greek front collapsed.

The allies' shameless and humiliating interference before 1917; the martial-law parliamentarianism of the 1917-1920 period; the arbitrary and often dictatorial methods of many Venizelist cadres; the popular emotion engendered by King Alexander's death and the concomitant prospect of exiled King Constantine's return; but above all the people's exhaustion after eight years

of wars and civil strife -- such were the main causes of Venizelos' fall. Immediately after the 1920 elections, the great leader left politics and went into self-imposed exile. He was to return, but the days of his greatness had passed; the political movement he had constantly striven for was already condemned; and the progressive bourgeoisie he had hoped to place at the head of the country was already losing vital ground to its conservative counterpart, even within its own bastion, the Liberal Party -- but this is a subject for the forthcoming chapters to examine.

\* \* \*

Venizelos' revolt against the King will not be considered in detail in this work since it does not form part of the present subject matter, economic and social change and military intervention in politics. The causes of this revolt were almost exclusively related to Greece's position in the international political game as it was shaped in the personal conflict between Premier and King. The participation on the side of Venizelos by certain officers and army units should not be misinterpreted. The crucial element was the support, indeed the open military intervention, of the allies.<sup>164</sup> From then on, the dichasmos as a question over neutrality in the war, as a political conflict, and as an issue on the nature of the regime operated across, not along class lines. Simultaneously, the continually imminent or actual war also contributed to the transcendence of economic and social conflict in some kind of a domestic truce imposed by the deadly external danger: in the decade from 1912 to 1922, Greece was in a state of war for not less than seven years. There was the war against Turkey in 1912, against Bulgaria in 1913, against the Central Powers in 1917-19, and again against Turkey between 1918 and 1922.

This work will, of course, concern itself with the continuation of the dichasmos after the end of these wars; with those of its ideological effects which are relevant; with the causes of its intra-class divisive capacity; with the general motives of the social forces that followed its protagonists; and with the

economic growth during the decade of wars. All these questions, however, will be examined in the context of the post-1922 period when they became primary factors in the evolution of Greek society -- not because this was the period of their maturity, but mainly because they then were not obstructed and overshadowed by the agony of the war, the commands of the Great Powers, and the climax of Greek irredentism.

### 1.2 Main events of the revolutionary period, 1922-24

As in the preceding paragraph, the purpose of this summary is to facilitate the reader who may not be familiar with the history of this period, and to relieve the main text of the chapter of frequent historic parentheses and footnotes. The events to be mentioned are intimately relevant to the forthcoming analysis, and constitute the major stages of the strife over the choice of regime. The protagonists were the republicans, the bloc of royalists, and the neutral Venizelists. The events to be summarised begin with the September 1922 military coup, but the discussion will centre on the period between the October 1923 royalist counter-coup and the April 1924 referendum which abolished the monarchy.

The collapse of the Asia Minor front led on 11 September 1922 to the armed forces coup which installed the so-called Revolutionary Government of Colonels Plastiras and Gonatas. Plastiras, a Venizelist, acquired the ambiguous but powerful post of Leader of the Revolution. The premiership went for a short time to a civilian and then to Gonatas, a moderate ex-royalist who had by then become a neutralist on the regime issue. On 15 November, six men -- Field Marshal Hadjianestis, as well as the prime minister of the deposed government and four other leading royalist politicians -- met their death by firing squad. The decision was taken by a court martial presided over by the Venizelist General Othonaios, despite Venizelos' strong opposition to the execution.

Venizelos' attitude had undergone dramatic changes. He was now convinced that the dichasmos had best be forgotten and the Crown saved. When, immediately after the 1922 coup, he intervened for the first time in the heated issue of the regime, his pathetic telegramme from his self-exile in Paris shows his new position very clearly and suggests both the short-term and the long-term causes behind it:

"... I am absolutely convinced that a violent change of regime will alienate Greece from (her) foreign friendships and that, in conditions of perpetual ... anomaly, internal enemies would have the opportunity to destroy the great achievements of the past decade... (whereupon) the curse of the nation will fall on the conspirators' 165 heads."

The execution was a grave but not a fatal blow to Venizelos' plans. The unnatural and precarious revolutionary-governmental coalition of moderate royalists, neutralists, and Venizelists was shaken but not broken. Gonatas remained in the government. Some royalist officers, not without justification, continued to believe that what really mattered was to save the institution of the monarchy, and this was sufficiently warranted by Venizelos' conciliatory attitude.

Such trustfulness was, however, shared by very few of the royalist officers. Those strongly doubting Venizelos' sincerity decided, therefore, that it was safer to gamble at two tables. A royalist counter-coup, led by Generals Leonardopoulos and Gargalides, took place on 22 October 1923. It was organised by the junta of intransigent royalists known as the Organisation of the Majors<sup>166</sup>, and supported, if not guided, by Metaxas. The two generals were not committed to any of the opposed blocs.<sup>167</sup> To persuade them to accept the leadership, the majors had to conceal their monarchist objectives as well as Metaxas' involvement. The same precautions were taken towards other officers whose support was solicited by the junta on the basis of their hostility to their rebel colleagues, or because of personal ambitions and allegiances. When the generals finally did accept, they were

under the mistaken impression that they would control the junta and that the objectives of the coup would be "the dissolution of the Revolution(ary) Committee, the resignation of the government in favour of a (new) government of general consent ... which will guarantee prompt elections under the electoral law of the pre-1922 period, so that the will of the Greek people be freely expressed".<sup>168</sup> It became known after the failure of the coup<sup>169</sup> that one or two of the King's aides-de-camp had been involved. Notwithstanding this, or Metaxas' role, nor the majors' royalist background, government reaction was to remove the responsible officers from service, court-martial them, and then ensure that the decisions of the court were never carried out.

However, the protests of the republicans and certain key members of the revolution -- officers like Pangalos, Hadjikyriakos and Kondylis -- forced the government to call a conference of "leading personalities" on 31 October and finally bring up the issue for discussion. The questions asked were whether or not the regime should be changed and, if yes, whether this should be done before the election by "informal consensus of the Army, the Navy, and the People"(sic), or after the election of a Constituent Assembly.<sup>170</sup> The 'leading personalities' happening to be pro-royalist -- the monarchist participants openly so, the Venizelists ambiguously -- the government declared that there was no reason to change the policy followed up to then, which had not been republican but, in essence, pro-monarchist.

This government policy was closely related to that of the Venizelist party. Indeed, on 4 November 1923 the liberals announced that they "do not accept that the regime issue be raised during the coming elections". This position was made even more explicit by the declaration of 21 November, stating that the party "does not raise the regime issue, nor does it stand for a republican regime, and will co-operate with other political groups only if they agree to those principles."<sup>171</sup> Following this declaration, a number of important cadres left the party, formed a liberal-republican group and collaborated with the Democratic

Union, the party formed by Papanastassiou and other Venizelists of the Left only a few months earlier.

Meanwhile, the leadership of the revolution had made an abortive effort to promote the formation of a new moderate party around veteran politician A. Zaimis<sup>172</sup>, the main short-term objective of which was to lead the country to elections. Indeed, entrusting this task to one of the established political agents was difficult. The revolutionary leadership did not particularly want this responsibility; the various mutually opposing forces within it could not agree on the liberal party leading the electoral government because it had been too deeply involved in the dichasmos; the royalists were out of the question; and the republicans were small and viewed with suspicion by the conservative elements within the revolution. Another, possibly more important objective of the move towards a coalition party seems to have been to assure conservatives and moderates that they too had a chance of participating in such government as might come to decide about the regime. Considering these objectives, it is clear that the unexpectedly docile and reconciliatory attitude Venizelos imposed on the liberals made the new party obsolete before it could become active: the conciliatory role would be played by the great liberal leader himself.

The elections of 16 December 1923 took place without the participation of the royalist parties, and abstentions amounted to 30%. Out of a total of 397 seats, the Venizelists won 250, the republicans (Democratic Union and Republican Liberals) 120, the Independent Monarchists 6, and the remaining 21 went to various independent candidates among whom was one socialist elected with mainly communist votes. (The total communist vote in the country was 18,000)<sup>173</sup>

The day after the election, the republican officers of the Military League (Stratiotikos Syndesmos), led by General Othonaios, issued what despite its mild content may be termed a pronunciamento, demanding the abolition of the monarchy.<sup>174</sup> The

government having accepted a compromise, the King left the country two days later. This compromise lay in the legal formula invented to cover his departure and was a major constitutional novelty: the King had gone "on leave".

On 4 January 1924, convinced by his lieutenants' calls and largely by their rivalries in the regime issue, Venizelos returned to Greece after his three-year self-exile. Not only did he ensure that his party would not take up an anti-royalist stand in the coming referendum, but he also, through the use of his parliamentary majority, endeavoured to postpone the decision on the date of the referendum and to ensure that only a majority of over 70% would abolish the monarchy. His failure to find a prime minister who would be docile enough to follow his instructions blindly and the rivalries among Venizelist cadres led him to fill the post himself.<sup>175</sup> But not for long. The reaction to his pro-royalist efforts from within his own party, as well as the republicans' violent disapproval of his clemency to the rebels of the 1923 coup, led to his resignation only a few weeks later. The same ambiguity on the regime issue, the republican officers' threats, and strong criticism from the press brought the resignation of his successor, Kafandaris. On 14 March 1924 the Regent asked the republican leader Papanastassiou to form a minority government. Venizelos having left the country again, the final schism in his party occurred on 21 March. Three groups emerged, the 'genuine liberals' under Sophoulis, the 'conservatives' under Michalakopoulos, and Kafandaris' 'progressive liberals' (approximately 60, 30 and 100 MPs respectively).<sup>\*176</sup>

The referendum of 17 April 1924 ratified the abolition of the monarchy by 69.9%. Although the new leader of the Populist Party, Tsaldaris, claimed with some justification that there had been electoral fraud, it is certain that a substantial majority of the electorate did vote republican.

On the basis of the regime issue, therefore, the political forces in operation before the 1924 referendum can be divided into



three formal groups: a) on the republican side, the republican officers, Papanastassiou's Democratic Union, and the republican politicians of Venizelist origin, as well as the small communist party; b) on the monarchist side, the dispersed and disorganised remnants of the royalist parties, the royalist officers, and Metaxas' conservative party; c) in between, neutral in appearance but pro-monarchist in reality, the liberal party with strong influence on Plastiras and, through him, on the revolutionary government. This formal division, however -- as will be argued in the following pages -- did not reflect the real distribution of forces.

## 2. The Ambiguities of the 1922 Coup

The 1922 coup is often described as republican and radical. This erroneous interpretation is based on the subsequent abolition of the monarchy and the execution of the Six, as well as the psychological impact of these events. Yet the 1922 rebels did not take a radical anti-royalist position. The government demanded not the abolition of the monarchy, but simply King Constantine's abdication in favour of his heir, Crown Prince George -- thus compromising between the demands of the royalist and republican stand.

The punishment of those responsible for the debacle had already been pre-announced by the coup leaders who actually arrested those six and intended to summarily court-martial and execute them. This, however, was inspired not by a coherent republican attitude, but rather by impulsive reactions to the stress of failure and the need for scapegoats -- a need felt strongly even by the royalist officers. The emotiveness and resiliency of this intention became evident as early as the second day after the coup, when the ambassadors of the foreign powers intervened drastically in favour of the arrested.<sup>177</sup> The Revolutionary Committee

issued a communiqué announcing that the arrested would "... remain in custody until the future (parliamentary) Assembly decides on the procedure for their prompt trial".<sup>178</sup>

That the Six were finally tried and executed was due to heavy pressure by the radical officers, the soldiers, and the people. The military government had to comply if it wished to obtain the support it needed. Without popular support it would not be able to reorganise the army, successfully collect new taxes, and thus face the Turkish threat and honorably negotiate peace. There was also a danger that the revolution might be outflanked by the most radical of the republicans, by officers and civilians -- as will be explained later on in this chapter. The anti-royalists had managed, chiefly by sheer intimidation, to take over many administrative and governmental posts. The most radical republicans among them could easily manipulate the popular outcry for justice, and possibly even overthrow the government. After all, Plastiras and Gonatas could rely for personal support only on their own two battalions, which they had managed to salvage and hold together during the disaster.<sup>179</sup>

Just as in 1909, the officers' coup triggered off militant popular support which should be seen as a parallel revolution.<sup>179a</sup> The mobilised part of the population was, naturally, unambiguously republican; but initially the hesitant attitude of the military revolutionaries was not at all obvious. That the position of the rebel officers was the outcome of a compromise never became quite clear to the population. In appearance, the military government seemed much more republican than it was in actuality. There was a lot of radical speechifying, with the republican officers able to be much more vociferous than their guilt-ridden royalist colleagues. The anti-monarchist Plastiras, the legendary 'Black Cavalier', the popular 'gypsy' with his strong peasant accent, was a much bolder figure than the neutralist Conatas. He thus tilted the image of the government towards a republicanism which even he no longer supported in reality, faithful to Venizelos and his new policy of benevolent neutrality on the regime

issue. The government's hesitation over the question of the Six was either unknown to the population, or simply forgotten after the execution which could thus appear as a sign of intransigent republicanism.

The paths of these two uprisings, the popular and the military, did not diverge until much later, when the moment for solving the regime issue could no longer be postponed and the ambiguity of the military government's position became obvious at last. In the end, the popular revolt was not expressed by the 1922 coup, but by the 1923 republican pronunciamiento.

### 3. Radical Republicanism among the Urban Lower Classes

Before the King departed 'on leave', the majority of the political factors had been neutral or in favour of the monarchy. Their solid bloc comprised the military government, the Liberal Party, the conservative parties, and the royalist officers. Only the small Republican Union, the even smaller Communist Party, the radical officers and the unorganised republican elements within the Liberal Party were opposed to the monarchy. In those circumstances, why was the monarchy ever abolished?

The question cannot be answered unless the political events are seen in the extraordinary economic and social context of the period. One could hardly envisage more ideal or typical revolutionary conditions than those prevailing in 1923 Greece.<sup>180</sup> The country had just experienced one of the worst debacles of world military history. It had received one of the largest waves of refugees ever experienced by any one country, and by far the largest in the world's modern history if judged in proportion to the local population (one to five). These refugees had settled under abominable conditions mostly in the urban centres, where they outnumbered the local inhabitants. In the provinces, a large part of the peasantry was still unpropertied. The ideology which

had nurtured the nation for nearly five centuries had, after a climax in which its wildest dreams were realised, suddenly collapsed in shame -- a psychological condition of fundamental significance for the motivation and behaviour of most Greeks.<sup>181</sup> The pathological uniqueness of Greek irredentism and the non-existence of any substitutes could not but result in frustration and anomie. The country was still one of the poorest in Europe, but the decade before the debacle had witnessed an amazing economic growth, the first phase in the capitalist transformation of the economy. The hopes and projects generated during that period seemed now to be deeply compromised. Nobody could then foresee the beneficial economic potential of the refugee population. This sense of frustrated hope may not have been too important among the rich and powerful with one leg abroad, who had accumulated a highly protective layer of fat in the previous decade; but it was destructive to those in the lower ranks of the middle class, as well as to the petit-bourgeois. For they had hardly begun on the hors d'oeuvres when the debacle occurred, and it was they who had aspired to profit the most from the increased social mobility generated by the now defunct economic growth.<sup>\*182</sup>

Once established, the revolutionary character of the period demands a major change in methodological focus. The importance of the social classes' action is instantly increased in a revolution, as simultaneously the degree of the autonomy of politics from class structure and conflict is drastically reduced. Factors which previously allowed or encouraged this autonomy no longer hold under the insurgent pressure of the boiling social temper. And although the practices, norms and values of relatively autonomous politics, having become a part of the structures prevailing in the country, continue to have a strong restrictive influence on social action, they no longer play a decisive role. This is now taken over by the revolutionary forces, by the social classes themselves, led by their economic and political interests, their prejudices and emotions, towards the explosion and the final assault on the position of power.

It was in such a setting that the drama of the abolition was played out; the first act ended with the November 1923 pronouncement, the second with the referendum of April 1924. In the first, the behaviour of the liberals was marked by their constant, though reasonably well suppressed, anxiety about the outcome of the future elections, an anxiety continually stirred by the rising radicalism of the urban lower classes, the refugees and the younger officers. Not without reason, the liberals feared they might be crushed between the royalists, whose popularity had allegedly not much declined, and the republicans, who opportunely cashed in on the popular desire for a new political leadership. N. Politis, for example, the Venizelist Foreign Secretary in the revolutionary government, wrote in a private letter to Venizelos that the liberals had not profited from the outcry against the King, and that "public opinion" seemed to be looking around for able new politicians who had not been involved in the politics of the turbulent 1915-22 period.<sup>183</sup>

Another element feeding the liberals' uncertainty before the election was the fear that their left-wingers' republicanism might split them into two or more groups. Just a few weeks after the 1922 coup half of the liberal MPs had refused to endorse the official party policy towards the Crown: a letter to provisional party leader General Danglis, by which the parliamentary group was supposed to "request" a policy of support for the King, bears only 52 signatures out of a total of 150 liberal MPs.<sup>184</sup>

By the time the elections were due, the situation had deteriorated a great deal further. Many liberals had meanwhile left the party and joined the republicans.<sup>185</sup> A few days before the vote, Danglis implicitly admitted that the party could not keep its unity unless the regime issue was dropped from the electoral debate.<sup>186</sup>

If this situation of doubt and anxiety seems to be in contradiction to the party's victory in the election, this is only apparent. The liberal party having officially adopted a neutral stand on the issue of the regime did not necessarily mean that all its election candidates had abandoned their republicanism in the course of their campaign, especially those who were contesting strongly republican constituencies. Neither did this official neutrality exorcise the widespread rumours that Venizelos, having always been the greatest of the King's enemies, was projecting his neutralism merely as a facade to appease Greece's foreign protectors.<sup>187</sup> These rumours, but far more so the liberals' unity, their electoral collaboration with the republicans, and the open republicanism of many liberal candidates, assisted in the voters' confusion and kept alive the old simplified dichotomy: liberals versus royalists. It was on this basis that the liberal party was able to win its landslide victory in spite of its official neutralism and its pre-electoral malaise.

The success of Othonaios' gentle pronunciamento the very next day confirms this point. It would be unrealistic to believe it was in itself sufficient to overcome the revolutionary government's authority, the military hierarchy, and the formal majority of the country's political forces, a majority which included both the royalists and the victorious liberals. That the occurrence of the 17 November took the form of a pronunciamento and not a coup deprived it of the advantage of surprise. If the Plastiras government had wanted to reject it, therefore, it would have stood a good chance of winning the game, provided -- and this is the crucial point -- that it had the support of the people and the new parliament, and that it could purge the army after the Military League's retreat. Neither the government, however, nor Venizelos personally, nor yet the provisional leadership of his victorious party opposed the League with any real determination, precisely because the support of the people was out of the question, that of parliament very doubtful, and an army purge would most probably have brought desperate reactions from the republicans, the radical officers, and the urban population.<sup>\*188</sup>

In the second phase of the process that led to the abolition of the monarchy, the disintegration of the liberals was more rapid and more clearly visible. Keeping the party united after the elections became impossible. Venizelos himself had to abandon his previously irrevocable decision to keep out of active politics, one of the most important reasons having been the need for someone able to discipline the party's republican left wing.\*190 Although he was thereafter obliged to accept the premiership, it soon became obvious that even this could not keep the party together unless its stand in the forthcoming referendum could be less ambiguous. When Venizelos had to admit he could not base his party's future on a lost cause, he abandoned his neutralism and declared, in one of his first speeches to parliament after he had returned to Greece, that he had "always been opposed to the monarchy". He added that he would not campaign against the monarchy in the forthcoming referendum, but this was only to save appearances: he knew only too well that his campaign would not be necessary. The referendum dies had been cast long before, in the barracks and in the streets of Athens. Venizelos had no choice other than to leave the country again and allow his party's split. Immediately thereafter, when Papanastassiou formed his minority government and it thus became clear that the monarchy had lost its last hope, nearly all MPs of liberal origins vested him with their confidence: a volte face which only a few weeks earlier would have been considered as impudent mutiny against Venizelos' neutralism.

Thus the apparently invincible moderate bloc consisting of the military government and the leadership of the major political parties collapsed under the threat of a second revolution. The minimum symbolic ritual that could exorcise it was to make a scapegoat of the monarchy and idolise the republican panacea. Had the parties and the military government refused to do so, the situation would inevitably have evolved towards more and more demonstrations, gradual disenchantment of the refugees with Venizelos, and most probably a second intervention by the radical officers. After that, three outcomes might have been possible. One was a military dictatorship which would enjoy strong popular

support and follow a radical populist or even leftist policy. The second was new elections forced by the officers, resulting in overwhelming electoral gains for the small republican party, the liberal left wing, and probably the communists. The third possibility was the outbreak of a purely popular second revolution, staged by the same militants who had participated in the first -- the radical officers leading the progressive section of the bourgeoisie, the petit-bourgeoisie, the refugees and workers. The objectives of this alliance being bigotedly political rather than social, such a revolution would not have put up some kind of people's government, but merely exchanged the regime on the spot, enjoyed a few days of petty "terreur", and finally installed in power the most radical of the republicans.\*191

#### 4. A Comparison with 1909:

##### Intensification of a Division within the Middle Class

The period under examination will be made clearer still if it is compared with the revolutionary period around 1909. The first similarity to be emphasised is, of course, the revolutionary nature of both periods. The degree of the autonomy of politics from the class structure and conflict was in both cases reduced by the very nature of the revolution.

The most obvious outcome of comparison between the two periods is that the political world was being condemned as a whole in 1909, whereas in 1922 the outcry was against the royalists and the conservatives. The great majority of the 1909 anti-royalist elements were against the King's practices, but not against the monarchy, as was the case in 1922-24. Neither revolt had much causal relation with the landowning class, the majority of whom had accepted the principle of land reform much earlier and were mainly concerned with the method and value of their indemnity -- in other words, with the liquidation of their own class and integration with the bourgeoisie at the highest possible level.



The only effect of both these revolutions on the landowners was thus indirect. By creating the conditions for the middle class acquiring increased political and economic power, the revolutionary mutation undermined the landowners' bargaining position, with the result that they received much less in 1924 than they would most probably have obtained twenty years earlier.

As in 1909, the 'locomotive' behind the 1922-24 revolution was the well-mannered 20th-century Greek sansculotterie. This time, the revolutionary sections of the petit-bourgeoisie, the working class and the Lumpenproletariat had been joined by the refugees. And as in 1909, it was not they who emerged the victors, for their radicalism was rudimentary and their political knowledge extended only to the point of seeing the republic as a panacea: the victors were their less vociferous but more privileged allies, the progressive section of the bourgeoisie.<sup>\*192</sup> It could not possibly have been otherwise, given the economic and social transformation in the decade of wars. The country had already entered its initial phase of genuine capitalistic growth; the demographic and economic power of the bourgeoisie had become undeniably significant; capitalism now was dominant within the Greek social formation. In 1922 Greece, as in 1794 France, sansculottism was indeed a "helpless phenomenon";<sup>193</sup> but in Greece, the economic and social reasons for this helplessness were much more important than the political. For the determinant factors that blocked the Greek sansculottes' road to power were not only their petit-bourgeois mentality or the bourgeois orientation of the majority of the political factors. In the Greek case there were important handicaps in the socio-economic structure itself: the bourgeois ideology of the political leadership and of the dominant classes was by then firmly supported by real economic power; the largely conservative propertied peasantry was no longer facing a potentially radical unpropertied counterpart; and, although the petit-bourgeoisie had joined the revolt because of short-term difficulties and governmental inefficiency, on reflection many of them reckoned that the already dominant capitalism seemed to promise them vast long-term opportunities for economic and social advancement. How could sansculottism be anything but temporary, indeed "helpless"?

The most important difference between these two periods was, however, the different kinds of division within the middle class and the liberal party. In 1909, the emergence of the liberal party had been a vital step in the bourgeoisie asserting its political power. Not that it was virtually created by the bourgeoisie itself, or that it was sponsored and faithfully followed by the majority of its members -- the preceding chapters have contained enough warnings against such oversimplifications. As already discussed, the liberal party was conceived and made to measure by Venizelos to promote bourgeois economic and political dominance through modernisation, reforms and concessions to the lower classes -- not because the bourgeoisie demanded it or was ripe for it, but because this was the shortest possible road, if not the only one, to Greece's relative emancipation and aggrandisement; and also because it was the easiest, if not the only, evolution which the international and local economic and social conditions allowed in 1909. It would have been surprising if the egocentric infant which was then the Greek bourgeoisie had understood Venizelos and followed him en masse. If it had already attained such maturity, it would have found its Venizelos long before 1909.

It was only natural that in these circumstances the bourgeoisie should have been divided down the middle from the very beginning. Thus in 1910 the conservatives stayed with the old parties and continued seeing the Crown as the rampart of their petty economic dominance. The moderates and progressives, fearing that this dominance would prove fragile without a modicum of reforms and a more direct political role, embraced Venizelos, invaded the liberal party, lobbied in parliament, and built their own liberal bastion within the State.

A further split was due in 1922. The moderate bourgeois elements were now to join their conservative counterparts who had remained faithful to the Crown: those moderates who had been simple supporters or members of the liberal party did so by

shifting their allegiance to the royalists; and the moderate cadres and MPs within the party, by joining the 'neutralist' alliance with them. Therefore, although the 1920s' split within the middle class clearly dated back to 1910, there was a difference in the sections that broke away from the pro-monarchist conservatives: moderates and progressives in 1910, i.e. the more numerous and less coherent; but only the progressives in 1922-24, i.e. the less numerous, more coherent, and bitterly matured in the dichasmos politics. Concomitantly, the division that had always existed within the middle class had by 1922 crept into the ranks of its political herald, the liberal party.

So it is not surprising that, whereas in 1910 the party was accepted as modelled by Venizelos, the controversial problem in 1922 was its remodelling along more open, more populist lines. In contrast to their embryonic unity in 1910, both the liberal party and the non-reactionary part of the middle class -- moderates and progressives alike -- were now divided on this strategic question. By the moderates approaching their conservative counterparts in the royalist parties, and the progressives joining the lower classes in a republican alliance, the dichasmos between royalists and Venizelists was now advancing well into the ranks of the Venizelist party. Its right wing, led by Venizelos, fearing the fresh ideological Soviet threat, and flirting with the gold-plated image of the youthful Italian fascism, still felt a great need for allies. These allies could not be the frivolous, ideologically suspect progressive sections of the population. These allies should include a powerful Crown, re-legitimised by an historic reconciliation with the Venizelists: in other words, a Venizelist Crown; the moneyed and enterprising grand-bourgeoisie and especially the financiers, badly needed by the country in such times of economic crisis; and finally Venizelos' great personal allies, the British government and the financiers of the City of London.

The liberal leader's face-about in 1924 was thus an eleventh-hour decision to embrace his progressive children too, so as to

keep his party united and in power, and to sacrifice the King while hoping nevertheless to retain the support of the Greek financiers and the British Embassy. Indeed, from that moment on his party and, following its split, the various Venizelist partisans, became officially anti-royalist and consistently fought for the new regime throughout the inter-war period. Venizelos' error was that his decision to abandon the Crown came too late; it was an error which would prove fatal -- not for the Crown, but for his party and the Republic. \*194

#### 5. The Long-term Effects of Venizelos' Conservatism

Revolution with a charismatic leader is not an uncommon blend in history. For post-1922 Greece it was an unhappy blend: the one neutralising the other. Despite his wish to end the dichasmos, Venizelos helped to perpetuate it with his vision of a liberal, bourgeois parliamentary democracy, some kind of Mediterranean United Kingdom. The radical military and the people accepted the liberal, the bourgeois, the parliamentary, the democratic, the united - but not the kingdom. They had won their Pyrrhic victory and erected a bourgeois republic that could not possibly be united.

It was the royalist bloc that was blamed, rightly or wrongly, for the 1922 debacle. Basing itself on this blame, the revolution could easily deprive the royalists of the institutional foundation of their power, the throne -- and in a firm and solemn manner, contrasting with the guilt-ridden hesitation that had proved so destructive for the legitimacy of the fragile young republic. The anti-monarchist propaganda could consistently capitalise on the royalists' failure, and succeed in depriving them of a good part of their support from among the people and the less fanatic royalist officers. <sup>195</sup> A purge of one or two-hundred intransigent royalist officers, effected before the 1923 counter-coup, would have been sufficient to prevent it. It would also have prevented a much greater and more far-reaching evil: the dismissal of not fewer

than 2,836 officers between 1922 and 1926, of whom 1,284 were to be retired en masse after the 1923 counter-coup.<sup>196</sup>

Such could have been the course of events had Venizelos adopted a radical republican position. Instead, he opted for a latently pro-monarchist policy. It was this policy that perpetuated the conflict by preventing the republican forces inside and outside the liberal party from dominating the game. It divided and weakened the Venizelist party. It frustrated its supporters in the army. It confused and neutralised the people as a revolutionary force. It served as a lifeboat to the sinking royalists, granted them absolution, and helped them to rehabilitate and re-legitimise themselves. It forced them to take sides with the mass of dismissed officers and demand their rehabilitation, a polarising issue that kept the regime question open, the army in a constant state of mutinous anxiety, and the republic in a cul-de-sac of discredit and disintegration.<sup>197</sup> The royalists were thus able to reappear in politics as a majority party in 1932 and to restore the monarchy in 1935. This in turn enabled the King and Metaxas to impose a crown dictatorship in 1936 with a strong fascist flavour.<sup>198</sup>

The emphasis on Venizelos' role must not be misunderstood. Like all great men, he had to function within certain limits. His particular delimitations did not stem from the personal preferences of the protagonists and the heroes, nor from the Greek national character. Neither did they stem from a random coincidence of structural and functional conditions operating despite the social actors -- some kind of fate dressed up in scholarly garb. The really important limits were drawn by the social conditions prevailing at this specific historic moment, as well as by the social agents' behaviour within these conditions, by their practices and apathy, their errors and ideas, their alliances and conflicts.

Venizelos' role was decisive, but his charisma did not operate in a vacuum, it was contained both by the foreign and the

internal social factors. It was the foreign factor that forced the attitude of support and fair-play towards the Crown. Following Constantine's pro-German policy, the dynasty was of course no longer the trusted child of the allies; but the Crown, any Crown, was their guarantee of access to the higher echelons of local power. All the same, the foreign factor was a crucial element in Venizelos' choices and policies only in the first year after 1922. The Protectors lost their strongest means of pressure after the formation of a new Greek army at the Evros River frontier and the signing of the peace treaty with the Turks. And even had they been able to, they were no longer interested in supporting a vigorous and potentially dangerous new Turkey, now that a balance of forces had been restored in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and the question of Middle-Eastern oil had been arranged.<sup>199</sup> Thereafter Venizelos could abandon the Crown without the risk of arousing the Protectors' wrath to a degree harmful to Greece's interests, or perhaps their suspicion of his own personal integrity. He could not, however, abandon a certain bourgeois conservatism without risking the foreign financiers' refusal to support Greece's reconstruction, aid which he considered absolutely essential.

The influence of the social agents was much more intense and permanent than that of the foreign powers, but here also Venizelos had some flexibility of choice. Nevertheless, his relative freedom to move left or right was always bound by certain limits. Not that his action on the right of the spectrum was without results. His presence, and especially his influence on the army and the refugees brought the balance of social and political forces to an equilibrium, a compromise on the relatively neutral grounds of the republican regime instead of a conflict on the controversial grounds of real political power and social justice. His limits were clear, however: he could neither spare the King his 'leave of absence' nor the Six their lives; he could not postpone the referendum, prevent Othonaios' gentle but effective pronouncement, or avoid the republic; he could not even prevent his own party from splitting three ways - into Right, Left, and Centre.

On the other hand, Venizelos could have gone far more towards the Left, where the bulk of the social forces would not have blocked but rather paved his road for him. This might have been the case, for example, had he returned to Greece not to effect a reconciliation with the Crown, but rather to lead a process of cleaning the Augean stables of royalism and to follow a radical populist policy with strong socialist overtones. In such a hypothetical case the charismatic leader would have functioned not against, but with the social actors. Instead of trying to contain and neutralise them, he would have been able to follow their somewhat nebulous wishes by clarifying and implementing them.

Chapter FTHE FIRST REPUBLIC, 1924-1935:THREATS OF RESTORATION AND FASCISM1. Introduction: Summary of Events

This very short and schematic introduction and summary of events serves the purpose familiar by now to the reader: to provide a framework for the subsequent discussion by recalling the strictly indispensable events and conditions.

Papanastassiou governed with his minority group for four months, until 25 July 1924; his successor Sofoulis for two, until 7 October; and Michalakopoulos for nine months, until his overthrow by Pangalos on 26 June 1925. All three governments had been undermined not only by the division among the various parties of liberal origins, but mainly by the conditions of constant conspiracy and the officers' interventions in the political process. Initially, there were the royalists' conspiracies, such as the plot by Papagos, Kallinski, the Vassos brothers and other officers in January 1924, or the February attempts to infiltrate the army made by the Constitutional Youth organisation. On the other side, there was the impatience of the more fanatic republicans, resulting in the quasi-pronunciamento of Colonels Langouras and Voutsinas on 6 March 1924, which asked for the immediate abolition of the monarchy; or the terrorist activities of General Kon-dylis' praetorian organisation Kinigoi (the Hunters) before and after the referendum; and finally the plot directed against Kon-dylis in June 1924.<sup>200</sup>

Once the regime issue had been superseded, a previously latent cause of military unrest came into the open: the mussolinian ambitions of Pangalos and his friends. On 25 June 1924, the majority of the country's naval officers resigned in a body -- an act of mutiny under the military penal code -- in protest against the promotions ordered by the Navy Minister which infringed con-



siderations of seniority. In reality, the 158 officers resigned because they were against Pangalos' plans and wished to prevent his virtual dominance over the Navy which he would be assured of through his friend the minister, Admiral Hadjikyriakos, his client Kolialexis, who was being promoted to captain, and their various followers, many of whom were also being advanced in rank. Papanastassiou did not give in to the officers, but felt his minister had better be removed. His courage failed him, however, when it came to Pangalos himself: he did not remove him from the Ministry of the Army despite clear indications of his dictatorial tendencies<sup>201</sup> and despite the protocol circulated in the army by Col. Voutsinas, allegedly supporting the government in case of a no-confidence vote, in reality preparing for Pangalos' dictatorship under this plausible pretext. However, following the 17 July assault by a few soldiers of Pangalist Colonel Karakoufas against the offices of two opposition newspapers, Pangalos was openly accused by his great enemy General Kondylis in parliament of having dictatorial ambitions. It was this that forced Papanastassiou to resign.

His successor, Sofoulis, reaped the fruit of these quarrels. First came the August 15 abortive coup by naval officers Vandoros and Drossinos, which was anti-republican in motive but above all anti-Pangalist. On 21 August 1924 the 158 officers who had resigned in June assaulted and occupied the Navy Ministry and demanded reinstatement. Sofoulis ejected them by force but acceded to their demand. Seriously threatened, the Pangalist clique in the navy then staged its operatic pronouncement of 23 August. Captain Kolialexis sailed the flagship Averof into the Bay of Athens and trained her guns on the capital. Sofoulis, in a shrewd but equally operatic move, sent an aeroplane to drop on the Averof thousands of reprints of a government order announcing that all sailors in the navy had been discharged from service. Two weeks later Pangalist Generals Tseroulis and Panayotopoulos were arrested for having plotted the overthrow of the government by coup. They were treated as magnanimously as Captain Kolialexis, who had been

sentenced to only two months' imprisonment: their defence counsel, Papnastassiou himself, succeeded in getting the charge of high treason changed to one of breach of discipline.<sup>202</sup> So it is not surprising that on 19 November 1924 it was the turn of Major General Loufas and Lt. Colonel Dertilis, the leaders of Pangalos' praetorian Republican Battalions, to be arrested for conspiracy.

Pangalos himself was never arrested, and could thus stage his successful coup on 25 June 1925. By presenting himself as the protector of the republic, and by using the threat of an eventual royalist revenge against republican politicians and officers alike, he succeeded in demoralising parliament. Papanastassiou advised the government "to avoid the shedding of republican blood", and not to order Kondylis to move against Pangalos. Parliament thus gave its vote of confidence to the new self-proclaimed prime minister. Three months later it found itself being dissolved by the same man. As for the President of the Republic, veteran Venizelist Admiral Countouriotis, he did not resign until much later, opening the road for Pangalos to proclaim presidential elections for 15 March 1926, announce himself as a candidate, and win. Despite the political parties having abstained from the campaign and the conditions of fraud and violence, it is undeniable that part of the pro-Pangalos vote was genuine.

Pangalos had to face immense difficulties with notoriously inadequate means. A frontier incident with Bulgaria ended with Greece being humiliated and then convicted by the League of Nations to pay a handsome indemnity. A treaty with Yugoslavia breached Greece's sovereignty over the territory of Thessaloniki so scandalously that it could easily be revoked later after Pangalos' overthrow. The public finances, rapidly deteriorating under the pressure of expenditure for the refugees, were further depleted by frivolous management. To restore them, the dictator ordered the banknotes literally cut in half -- a devaluation which would have been in order much earlier but should have been milder in application and buttressed by rigorous anti-inflationary action.

Meanwhile, ridiculous measures alternated with severe oppression: regulations on the length of women's skirts existed side by side with the breach of civil servants' security of tenure, and the 'unmarrieds' tax' with hangings for corruption.

On 21 August 1926, Kondylis overthrew Pangalos with the vital help of the ex-Pangalist Republican Battalions. Two weeks later he attacked the battalions and arrested their ambitious leaders. The republic was temporarily resuscitated, and so was the royalist bloc with the help of the anti-monarchists' conciliatory attitude. The latter were thus hoping to protect the regime from eventual assaults of ambitious officers like Pangalos, by shielding it behind the legitimization of consensus. Two years of coalition or minority governments followed before Venizelos' return to politics in 1929.

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The preceding chapter examined the coups, the upheaval among the people, the role of the liberals, and the question of the regime, all centred on the 1922-24 period. Causes and effects were analysed within the given period, when the royalists, the conservative Right and the social groups following them were crushed by the assault of the radical republican officers and politicians, the progressive bourgeois elements, the urban lower classes, and the mass of the refugees. So clear-cut an image, however, is as misleading here as for any other revolutionary period. Although the political forces of the Right were in full retreat, although their reserves in the structure of power and their supporters among the population were silenced in near-panic, they were not destroyed, nor was there any decisive change in the economic or social structures on which their existence -- and at certain moments, such as the 1920 elections, their triumphs -- had been based. True, the advent of the refugees was a dramatic change, but their future position in the social spectrum was not yet de-

ecided: as long as it was not directed against the bourgeois regime, it would also not be actually harmful, in the long run, to the Crown, the Right, and the upper classes.

This chapter will examine the outcome of the 1922-24 events in the longer historical perspective of the inter-war period. The examination will centre on the interval between the proclamation of the republic and Venizelos' return to politics in 1928, with some reference to the Venizelist coups of 1933 and 1935. For it was before 1928 that the conservatives reassembled their forces, undermined the republicans' radicalism, and prepared the ground for the return to power of the King and the Right. Although all the parties of Venizelist origin rallied to the republic after 1924 and tenaciously fought for it, the defences of the regime were undermined by the conflict between the conservative and progressive sections of the bourgeoisie as represented by the royalist and anti-royalist parties respectively. The subsequent return of Venizelos and the 1928-32 period of uninterrupted liberal government was the republicans' last line of defence, their ultimate reluctant and vain effort to unite, forced to by the conservatives' siege.<sup>203</sup> Consequently, the liberals' malaise after the elections of 1933 and their panic in 1935, as well as the abortive coups caused by these circumstances, were in reality the final spasms of a moderate bourgeois party under the determined assault of its conservative rival. The Right was soon to commence its rule which, almost without interruption, would last for more than forty years.<sup>204</sup>

## 2. Military Intervention in the Inter-War Period:

### A Two-fold Classification

The inter-war period, with its fourteen coups and pronouncements and numerous conspiracies or acts of military intervention in politics, seems at first sight a puzzling example of an army totally independent of the social structures and even the political conflict, and completely dominating these primary conditions rather than being determined by them. Thus the student of this period may well be tempted into consistently seeing military intervention as a cause and seldom an effect, and to look for the reasons be-

hind it in the army itself, thus falling into tautological traps and claiming that personal ambitions or the patronage system led to the interventions. The crucial question is rather what had brought about the rise of the patronage system and personal ambitions in the first place. \*205

The number and frequency of military interventions should not be an obstacle to their classification. A vital distinction might be made on the basis of the officers' objectives concerning the group they wished to instal in power each time they staged a plot. Two large groups of major interventions appear under such scrutiny, arranged in three chronological periods: from September 1922 to March 1924, with four major acts of intervention related to the issue of the regime; from 25 June 1924 to 9 September 1926, eight acts related to dictator Pangalos' rise and fall; and finally the two coups of 1933 and 1935, related again to the regime issue. It is noteworthy that all minor acts of intervention which took place within these periods had more or less the same orientation.

Of the minor interventions, the only one that seems unrelated to the two mainstreams of activity (the regime and the Pangalist dictatorship) is the Goudas conspiracy of Venizelist and anti-Venizelist officers aimed against General Kondylis, then Minister of Defence. It seems, however, that the plot was joined not only by those opposed to Kondylis' terrorist methods during and after the referendum campaign, but also by supporters of Pangalos, wishing to weaken an important political enemy. Even the coups staged against Pangalos were, in fact, directly linked with the regime issue. They were precipitated, if not solely caused, by the dictator's gradual reorientation towards the royalist camp, from which he solicited support and recruited cadres. In the end, Pangalos' thoughtless move towards readmitting royalist officers to the army precipitated his downfall.

Thus the two-fold classification according to objectives of the military interventions -- regime/Pangalist -- considerably

MAJOR ACTS OF INTERVENTION (M = monarchists, R = republicans)

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A	Plastiras-Gonatas		16 Sept. '22 - Coup	} Regime
	Leonardopoulos-Gargalides	M	23 Oct. '23 - Abortive coup	
	Othonaios	R	17 Dec. '23 - Pronunciamento	
	Voutsinas-Langouras	R	6 March '24 - Abortive pron.	
B	Navy officers' mass resign.		25 June '24 - Mutiny	} Anti-Pangalos/professional
	Kolialexis (Navy)		24 Aug. '24 - Abortive pron.	} Pro-Pangalos/professional
	Tseroulis-Panayotopoulos		10 Sept. '24 - Abortive coup	} Pro-Pangalos
	Loufas-Dertilis <sup>206</sup>		19 Nov. '24 - Abortive coup	} Pro-Pangalos
	Pangalos		25 June '25 - Coup	} Pangalos dictatorship
	Karakoufas-Bakirtzis		9 April '26 - Abortive coup	} Anti-Pangalos
	Kondylis-Zervas-Dertilis		21 Aug. '26 - Coup	} Anti-Pangalos, end of dict.
Zervas-Dertilis vs Kondylis		9 Sept. '26 - Abortive coup	} Post-Pangalos settlement	
C	Plastiras	R	5 March '33 - Abortive coup	} Regime
	Plastiras	R	1 March '35 - Abortive coup	

MINOR ACTS OF INTERVENTION

A	Athens Garrison officers	M	10 Dec. '23 - Conspiracy	} Regime
	Papagos	M	Jan. '24 - Conspiracy	
B	Goudas		24 June '24 - Conspiracy	} Anti-Kondylis
	Vandoros-Drossinos	M	15 Aug. '24 - Conspiracy	
C	Othonaios	R	1 June '27 - Conspiracy	} Regime
	Pangalos		30 Oct. '30 - Conspiracy	

simplifies the task of explaining the officers' action. The relation of the coups of the 1922-24 period to the regime and, through it, to the underlying conflict between social groups has already been examined in detail. As for the coups of 1933 and 1935, also related to the regime issue, it can safely be said that their relation to social structures and conflict was quite similar to that of the coups of the remaining inter-war period. Hence there remain two dark areas for a more detailed investigation: the social framework and the political ramifications of the regime question between 1924 and 1928, and especially before the 1926 coalition government; and how, out of these circumstances, arose the strife around the irresistible ascent of Theodore Pangalos.

### 3. End of the 1922-24 Revolution and the New Autonomy of Politics

With the 1924 referendum the revolutionary republican alliance affirmed its victory, achieved its objective, and came to an end. That the objective was short-sighted and the victory Pyrrhic could not put off the end of the popular revolt, nor resuscitate its momentum. Although the republic had not proved the panacea most people had expected it to be, disenchantment with it would not by itself be sufficient to bring the rebels back to the streets.

The end of the revolution allowed the political agents, the parties and the army, to disentangle themselves from the social actors' embrace. Interaction of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, progressive and conservative classes no longer determined the political process. The subtle play of bourgeois democratic politics could again establish its relative autonomy from class structure and social conflict; and the process of autonomisation was amplified and accelerated by the specific social and political circumstances of this period.

One such circumstance was the refugees' attachment to Venizelos. Over the whole inter-war period, a quarter of the country's population, consisting of people from all social strata, was to vote massively for a bourgeois party. Another circumstance was the division within the bourgeoisie -- the familiar cleavage between the few progressives and the many moderates and conservatives -- as it had matured in the process of the dichasmos. Had the bourgeoisie stood united behind one of the big parties, a certain polarisation along class lines might have been facilitated. If, for example, this class had been firmly associated with the conservatives, then the Venizelists would have been obliged and at the same time allowed to become a more radical party, addressed more clearly to the lower and especially the peasant classes -- and politics would perhaps have centred on the agrarian problem. If, on the other hand, the bourgeoisie had rallied around the Venizelists, the capitalist transformation of Greece might have been easier and faster -- and so would have been the polarisation of politics along the bourgeois/lower-class dichotomy. Thus the bourgeoisie's division was for it a blessing in disguise: it allowed this class to dominate both the big parties, establish a disorienting formalism in ideology, and lead politics away from the crucial social issues, to monopolise it with its own internecine strife for quadrennia of power.

There were two more, though less important, circumstances favouring the renewed relative autonomy of politics from social conflict. One was the implementation of land reform during this period, with both the royalists and the Venizelists in favour of the age-old peasant aspiration. The second was the gradual reappearance of shameless clientelism and patronage after the first flush of Venizelist purification which had lasted only as long as the liberals were the unchallenged rulers of Greek politics, i.e. until about 1915. The dichasmos had inevitably created the need for quickly attracting massive support and keeping it under control with bribery, oppression and electoral fraud. In conjunction with an increase of State power, these conditions, as in the 19th century, made patronage and spoils more important than class affiliation and interests.



Autonomy, however, does not mean that random events can take place on the political level in total isolation from the underlying social currents. Autonomy, as a summary term, is used here to suggest an independence which certain events and participating factors may have from the social structures and conflicts -- which means, if seen from an opposite vantage point, a loose and indirect relationship emphasised to contrast with close dependence or determinateness. It follows that, once autonomy is established, the methodological problem is not one of moving the discussion away from the social level, but rather a matter of changing focus: instead of emphasising the social factors and suggesting direct links, situations of increased autonomy show links that are indirect, and social conditions are seen as delimitations rather than as direct causes. The fact, for example, that it was not a dictatorship of the proletariat that occurred but a dictatorship of Pangalos suggests that the former was perhaps outside the delimitation set up by the social structures, whereas the latter was tolerated and possibly even encouraged by them -- always remembering, of course, that Pangalos imposed himself not abruptly but gradually, and not so much by force as by threat and persuasion. It will be useful, therefore, to examine those limits before returning to a more specific analysis of the political process.

#### 4. Social Conflict as the Framework of Political Strife

Before 1922, the conflict of interests between the upper and lower classes had seldom been so deep and clear-cut as now. The need for recovery after a decade of wars and the urgency of the refugee problem imposed an unbearable burden on the State finances. The lower classes, having long since reached a point of explosive discontent because of crippling indirect taxation, expected the rich to feed the budget -- especially after the immense profits accumulated during the wars. The bourgeoisie, until then almost untaxed, knew very well that only new indirect taxes could avert the danger to its incomes and capital.

The repatriation of almost 200,000 soldiers; an excessively large refugee labour force; the new State and private expenditure in reconstruction and housing; the reorientation of capital towards peace-time production -- all these created new markets for goods, money and labour, or restructured the old ones. The peasants, naturally, aspired to fairer prices and security in the sale of their crops; the workers, threatened by inflation and the armies of jobless refugees, nonetheless expected better wages and security of employment. The bourgeoisie, however, was merely in an agony to maintain the same rate of profit as it had enjoyed during the wartime boom.

Inflation was ravaging the country. The lower classes, not unreasonably, wanted the government to take measures against it and thereafter keep it under control, yet they also demanded credit facilities and social-welfare spending. Businessmen, on the other hand, having got used to making quick and effortless profits, wished for more and uncontrolled government spending in procurements from industry and uninhibited supplies of money to keep providing them with profits and inflationary windfalls. By having direct access to the centres of political decision, these same entrepreneurs could readily obtain the implementation of such inflationary policies, whilst at the same time hypocritically advocating financial rigour and -- what else? -- wage controls. \*207

The 1917 revolution in Russia was still present in the minds of the Greek people; after all, Greece had participated with an armed contingent in the allies' 1918 Ukraine campaign against the Bolsheviks. Even more vivid and closer to the bone during the 1920s were the impressions gradually being made on the Greek political world by next-door Italian fascism, as also by the great post-war wave of revolutions and upheavals: the revolution in Germany, the peasant revolt in Bulgaria, even the 1926 general strike in England. Some workers, peasants, and even petit-bourgeois dreamt of October Revolutions at home; but a great many others contemplated the populism of the Italian miracle because of its appeasing relative moderation, its apparent anti-capitalism, and its corporatist

productivity. Some bourgeois, on the other hand, also admired the fascist efficiency, but for a different reason: for its ability to bring law and order. And all the bourgeoisie trembled at the hateful image of communism.

It is particularly interesting that there was no chance of compromise between the conflicting interests described above. Not that the lower classes were particularly intransigent in their demands and organised to do battle for them, or that their ideology was clear-cut and free from ambiguities -- far from it. The uncompromising elements were rather the bourgeois -- too greedy and narrow-minded to accept sacrifices such as reforms, welfare-state measures, or social democratic policies. The relatively autonomous political elite that had been governing Greece for so long had deprived them of the mental agility and the maturity they might have gained from a more direct practice of politics. The lack of a long tradition of economic activities meant that most of them were first-generation pioneers, nouveaux riches par excellence, who could not have developed, in a few years or even a few decades, a general bourgeois culture comparable to that of their western counterparts, let alone a political culture. How could they exhibit the subtle art of giving way, of shedding privileges, of persuading through incentives and governing through consensus?

It was in fact the bourgeois inflexibility, solidly based on bourgeois political power, that dictated government policies in inter-war Greece. The major parties were dominated by intra-party elites of bourgeois origin and ideologies and strongly influenced by bourgeois lobbies. It is not surprising that no government could or would take measures that might satisfy large sections of the population: such measures would have had to be radically oriented and would thus have been harmful to the interests of the dominant class.

This bourgeois inflexibility, as expressed in the conservatism of all the republican governments, met with no challenge from below, however. There were two reasons behind the near-absence of

consistent popular mobilisation, the one economic, the other political and, more exactly, ideological. Despite the threatening conditions caused by the war-destruction and the debacle, and to a large extent because of their reflationary effects (as will be explained shortly), the economic condition of the lower classes did not in the end get any worse, and in some cases it even got better. Thus the petit-bourgeois population found profitable opportunities for small manufacture, service or trade activity at the periphery of a quickly progressing industry and of a house-building market which had to meet an urgent demand for about 300,000 refugee homes -- even if, in most urban areas, they were merely wretched huts of tin and hardboard. As for the workers, they were so few and relatively unskilled before the decade of wars, that even the addition of the refugee labour force was not sufficient to create a destructive surplus in the booming labour market. The result was that, aided by haphazard but often violent strike action usually inspired by the communist party, skilled-labour wages and salaries quite faithfully followed the phrenetic upward movement of the price-index; they even exceeded it for some categories of workers, notably those employed in the building industry. So most of them saw their real income consistently augment between 1914 and 1927 (see Table XVII, chapter B). The very high increases of 1921 or 1922 were absorbed so quickly by inflation that the relative fall of real income between 1921/22 and 1927 was not really perceptible to the workers. True, the situation was not so good in the unskilled labour market. But since the supply there was largely covered by women, as for example in the textile and chemical industries, this did not contribute to the mobilisation of the working class as a whole. It was not cultural reasons alone which were responsible for this, although they undeniably did play a part in a country with retrograde norms and values as to the role of women. The main reasons were, firstly, that the primary income-earner in the household was usually a male skilled worker whose real income had not gradually declined as had that of the woman, and secondly, that the woman's income was an innovation in the traditional Greek household and, however small it might have been, did increase the total family earnings.

Nevertheless, the lower classes' incomes not finally having been reduced did not mean that there was no feeling of insecurity, nor that the people did not notice the rapidly widening gap between their own condition and the privileges of the trading and manufacturing bourgeoisie. The potential for consistent social upheaval, however, was further appeased by the ideological factor, especially important in this post-revolutionary period. Indeed, all the republican governments were seen as the offspring of the 1922-24 revolution, and as such they had the people's full support; their inefficiency was, therefore, attributed to reasons which, though sometimes valid, were nonetheless minor compared to the bourgeois-inspired conservatism of the governments in question. Some critics held that there was a problem of leadership, some that military intervention was too frequent, a few that it was not drastic enough; others still that the republican regime was not so good after all, and many that the politicians as a body were incompetent and corrupt, if not downright imbecile.

What it was difficult to perceive and to apportion blame for was the characteristic disadvantage any bourgeois regime, especially a malfunctioning one, has for the lower classes: that their interests are not those which are given priority, quite simply because power is not really in their hands. How indeed could the members of the Greek lower classes believe in 1924 that power was not theirs? They had just made their revolution and had allegedly emerged the victors: the republic had been proclaimed to work its wonders, and Papanastassiou's leftists were now an important party, and had even been the government. Subsequently, between 1924 and 1925, all military interventions were staged explicitly to 'protect' the republic or the republic's protectors. Even Pangalos' ascension in 1925 could be made to appear as potentially beneficial to the lower classes. Was he not, after all, a fanatic republican and as such a friend of the people? Was he not one of Greece's best military leaders, and therefore a potentially promising political leader as well?

Not pressed by the lower classes, but strongly influenced by bourgeois lobbies and party elites, the post-1924 governments were thus to be inexorably conservative, unimaginative, inefficient and uninspiring. It would be wrong to give them credit, as is customary, for provisionally housing the refugees and for avoiding a collapse of the economy. The housing that was intended to be temporary was left to remain for decades, and the economy was not saved by any concrete and consistent governmental policy, but by the inventiveness, endurance and hard work of the people, especially the refugees.

Indeed, one of the 1922 debacle's most important effects on the economy was a sharp increase in the country's labour force. The educational standard of the newcomers was higher than that of the local working class. Some of the entrepreneurs from Asia Minor had managed to transfer their savings to Greece. They had found among their fellow refugees the same kind of labour force as had worked for them at home: skilled and ready to work for reasonable pay. Some of the traditional Asia Minor manufactures were revived on Greek soil -- carpet and textile weaving especially.<sup>208</sup> The existing local industries also profited immensely. It should be remembered that this was a period of post-war reconstruction, a process the beneficial effect of which was further encouraged by the boom of the world economy before the onset of the 1929 crash.

But the above cannot be properly understood without its necessary counterpart, the existence of a thirsty internal market. Here, too, the role of the refugees was vital. The incredible burden of the 1922 catastrophe was not only an indirect, but also an immediate blessing for the immature Greek capitalism. Many of the refugees had arrived, as was only natural, with some gold, jewelry or other kind of family treasure, and apart from small family savings quite a few large fortunes were transferred at this time. These big fortunes were put to use in a wave of small and medium-sized investments; the small household savings were gradually spent to ensure survival; and the multiplied effect of such increases in investment and consumption were dramatic.<sup>209</sup>

Seen against such favourable conditions among the productive population, the governmental omissions and errors were numerous, and nearly all of them strongly marked by conservatism and lack of imagination. If land reform was finally implemented, it was against handsome indemnities. No appropriate heavy taxation was imposed on the huge fortunes made by the grand-bourgeois in the years of the war. The 1925 fifty-percent devaluation was aimed more at taxing the lower-income consumers than at restoring economic sanity. Moreover, it was imposed much too late, thus losing much of its beneficial potential. For the governments of the period were not only affected by the lobby of importers, the bourgeois section which had profited most from the war-trade, but also crippled by the fear of the popular outcry against the inflationary effects of devaluation, and so kept postponing it until it had become inevitable: significantly, it was the dictatorial government that finally took the measure, and even then the thinking behind it was not some coherent monetarist or primitive pre-Keynesian policy, but the plain need to feed the budget.

The refugees' capital was never mobilised, it had to find its own way. Yet it should have been clear to any government that direct taxes, the indirect proceeds from devaluation, and the refugees' savings could serve to finance and subsidise State-protected or corporatist, or even mixed-ownership industries. Relevant examples were abundant in neighbouring countries: such as State-protection in Bulgaria or corporatism in Italy.<sup>210</sup> It is significant that refugee peasants were never urged to adopt a more corporatist organisation of agriculture, although this was a natural area for easy experimentation, considering that the government literally gave away State lands and could impose any conditions it wanted on the settlers.

Last but not least, no measures were taken in favour of the small independent peasants. Such measures, especially those badly needed to restore agricultural prices to a truly acceptable level, were imperative for any government wishing to follow a popular policy. What is more, they were unavoidable pre-conditions for any kind of economic growth not based on ruthless exploitation.

Papanastassiou's Republican Union, with its vaguely socialist inclinations, was indeed the only political group not totally undermined by bourgeois conservatism and therefore capable of radical measures. But, as historian Veremis puts it, "Papanastassiou ... was more interested in socialism than in civil rights. The moderate liberals were interested in the latter only in so far as these rights did not disrupt public order, while the military had little feeling for either."<sup>211</sup> No wonder then that Papanastassiou, by paving the road for the Pangalists, had no time to try out his socialist vision.

Inevitably, the governments of the period quickly established a reputation for incompetence; the republic, having raised so many irrational hopes, disintegrated in discredit and frustration; the people were pushed into political apathy or the in such circumstances typical search for charismatic saviours; and the officers' tendency to intervene in politics, nurtured in the preceding period of strife about the regime issue and shrewdly exploited by patronage experts like Pangalos, could expand and seek for its legitimation in the Greek republicans' incompetence and the Italian fascists' efficiency.

##### 5. The Near-Fascist Episode

The Pangalist phenomenon was neither a subsidiary of the regime issue, nor a mere effect of pathological personal ambitions. Certainly the royalist threat was used by Pangalos against politicians afraid of losing their oligopoly of power, and against officers keen on retaining their seniority status or good postings, or so as to avoid the dismissed monarchist officers' revengeful return. Pangalos' eccentricity, vanity and uncontrollable ambition also played their part in his consistent hunt for power, and his schemes were indeed facilitated by his excellent personal network of clientage. However, the primary factors that allowed his activity and temporary rule were of a different nature: they were related to the marginal and latent fascist tendencies in Greek society and in the army.



The strife between royalists and republicans overshadowed but could not totally expunge the factors that favoured these tendencies. Many Greek bourgeois, petit-bourgeois, and small peasants were under the spell of newly acquired property and affluence, the fascination of Italian efficiency, and the fear of socialist chaos. Their concomitant anti-parliamentary and authoritarian prejudices were enhanced by the climate of economic insecurity after the 1922 debacle, the threat of the refugee populace, and especially the revolutionary action of their progressive counterparts in the urban middle and lower classes. Their anxiety reached its peak with the frequent military interventions and the occasional vacuum in government. Lastly, the diffusion of totalitarian ideologies was aided and abetted by the ability of fascism to recruit not only from all classes, but also from all political blocs. The republic was not necessarily associated with parliamentarianism by many of its moderate supporters, who had been urged to join it more for reasons of personal allegiance than from democratic principles.

Hence Pangalos' recruitment of supporters cut across the social classes and took in the fringe of the two great political blocs. It is certain that his call for a vigorous Greek State, outwardly belligerent and inwardly authoritarian, and for a new, more ethical society, attracted a certain following. Notwithstanding any attempts to minimise the relevance of the 1925 elections in which he was elected President, it is undeniable that a good part of his votes was not simply due to fraud and violence.<sup>212</sup>

Yet the Greek version of fascism obviously lacked some essential prerequisites, as for example a relatively advanced industrial economy and hence any threat to the middle classes from a consistently revolutionary working class. The peculiarities of Greek society and history, despite the absence of those basic prerequisites, initially allowed the development of quasi-fascist tendencies: the 1922 debacle, the refugees, the recent rise and therefore inherent insecurity of the bourgeoisie, the dichasmos. It is precisely these same peculiarities that also, in the long run, caused the failure

of this Greek caricature of fascism. Thus the refugees at first indirectly furthered the fascist ascendancy by the threat of their mass and some, initially, were even directly helpful to Pangalos by supporting the would-be dictator's alleged republicanism and populism. In the end, however, these same refugees helped to bring about Pangalos' downfall by their too strong devotion to Venizelos: for their having concentrated in the cities meant that any totalitarian political leader could not possibly do without their support. Similarly, the bourgeoisie, having achieved status of importance but recently which it felt to be increasingly jeopardised, was helpful to the dictator at first by generating an initial wave of support; but in the long run it too changed into an unfavourable factor because, as a class, it had not yet acquired cohesion and coherence and thus could not support a totalitarian effort as a unified whole. Furthermore, the dichasmos certainly helped Pangalos to rise to power by enabling him to play off his enemies one against the other; yet again, by extending divisive strife to the political level, it had created gulfs so deep that even Venizelos had been unable to bridge them. Finally, the 1922 debacle had brought such social and economic upheaval that although initially Pangalos could capitalise on the resultant discontent, he could never hope to cope without the enthusiastic support of all available human resources -- a support the dichasmos had made it impossible to muster.

Little wonder then that Pangalos was faced with his own lamentable inefficiency in government: the only available sources for governmental and administrative manpower were the parties, yet they barely tolerated him, and even this only at the beginning of his brief rule, leaving him to his own devices shortly thereafter. Hence the ridiculous blunders of his government, especially in its unnecessary severity in questions of internal law and order and its notorious naiveté in foreign policy. In the face of these pressures it is quite understandable that the dictator should have approached his greatest past enemies, the royalists. Driven by necessity, he recruited cadres and strengthened his personal clientele within the army by readmitting certain royalist officers. This

was to be his last blunder. Threatened by the prospect of royalists in the government and the barracks, the republican politicians and their army clients joined forces in the first serious alliance aimed at the dictator's overthrow. They were even able to obtain the support of Pangalos' own praetorians, the Republican Battalions, by brandishing in the face of their leaders the frightful spectre of revenge-thirsty royalists once more invading the army ranks. Thus Pangalos was capsized by the same winds that had so swiftly scudded him to power.

#### 6. Party Tactics and the Resurrection of the Royalists

That the interests of the bourgeoisie would be more or less protected whatever party was in the government could not have kept the conservative section of this class and the more fanatically bourgeois parties from seeking full political power. Their clear-cut objectives were the restoration of the monarchy and a government of the Right. Their tactics, however, had of necessity to be different in the first fifteen months of the republic, i.e. before the Pangalos coup of June 1925, than what they could afford to be after the dictator's overthrow and the 1926 elections. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, during a substantial and crucial part of the first period, the ramparts of government were not held by a major party but by Papanastassiou's suspect Republican Union; the fact that it was a minority government only somewhat alleviated but did not totally eradicate the conservatives' fears. Secondly, the republican officers were far more threatening and active in the first period, whereas after 1926 they had been largely discredited by their previous activity, and their failure to 'save the country' caused a number of them to do some hard thinking, and resulted in self-doubt and a certain moderation.

The tactics of the Right, then, were inconsistent, and in some cases stridently uncompromising in this first period, whereas they became much more homogeneous and moderate after 1926.

For Metaxas' small party, the best tactics seemed to be recognition of the republic, a low-profile image, and a slow but consistent effort to undermine the regime from the inside through stunt opposition, and possibly even some collaboration with the republicans, who certainly needed allies against the Pangalist officers' harassment. The choice to be made by Tsaldaris' People's Party was otherwise: there could be no recognition of the republic. This division of the conservatives, indeed the bitter assault on Metaxas, accused of capitulation, suggest the degree of disarray in the conservative ranks during this period.

Tsaldaris' uncompromising position was not unwise. He could not know the extent of the Pangalist network in the army as well as a retired officer like Metaxas did.<sup>213</sup> Hence he was inclined to underestimate the potential for undermining the republic that existed within the army despite the officers' republicanism. He was, therefore, quite justified in choosing the only road which, at least for the time being, would hold together the royalist-inspired allegiance of the small peasants and the conservative sections of the petit-bourgeois and the upper classes.

Tsaldaris' only hope of reaping power in future elections was through sowing ideological confusion. The method was not new -- Greek politics had always been plagued by a formalism which determined the ideology and conditioned the behaviour of the leaders, elites, anonymous voters and insurgents alike. But it was between the great wars that formalism, centred upon the issue of the regime, achieved absolute dominance. If in the 1910s, during the first phase of the dichasmos, the formalist dichotomy between the pro-English Venizelos and the pro-German King was possibly justified by the nation's breathtaking irredentist effort, the subsequent period seems to offer nothing for its justification -- but whether justified or not, it was nonetheless explicable.<sup>214</sup> The parliamentary forum was useless to the conservatives since their main target, the re-establishment of crowned power, lay beyond the Constitution and could not, therefore, be the subject of parliamentary debates. The

only alternative was to divert their potential followers' interest by keeping the regime issue open, by insisting on the abstract merits of the monarchy, and by cultivating the sentimental, often metaphysical faith of the small independent peasants in the Crown, as well as the nearly paranoid conservatism of the upper classes and the threats coming from the now red steppes of Russia.

In a second phase, when elections would hopefully have proved the conservatives' renewed strength and perhaps even allowed them participation in a coalition, the subject of the dismissed royalist officers could be brought up. And at the final stage, with the army no longer dominated by the republicans, even the wildest dreams could expect to find realisation.

Subsequent events proved these tactics to have been correct. Whereas Metaxas never managed to carry through his desire for a miscegenetic alliance with the republicans, Tsaldaris' intransigence bore the sweet fruit of dividing and discrediting them. It served as an additional pretext to the Pangalists and as an effective scare to the Venizelist and republican parties, which were thus driven reluctantly to tolerate, if not to legitimise, Pangalos' activities, paving the road for his 'March to Rome'. It was too late before they realised that Pangalos' republicanism had been only a pretext to achieve absolute power, and that in his search for new allies the dictator felt he could well afford to condescendingly enthrone his own Victor-Emmanuel. Then they overthrew him and themselves sought the royalists' alliance, in a desperate effort to legitimise the republic and exorcise any eventual Pangalos imitators.

Indeed, having overthrown the dictator and tamed the Republican Battalions' ambitious leaders, General Kondylis proclaimed elections for 7 November 1926 from which his small party abstained. The vote was marginally more favourable to the republican bloc. The liberals, reunited in a purely electoral coalition, received 31.63% of the vote, and the Republican Union 6.48%, whereas Tsaldaris' People's Party obtained 20.27% and Metaxas' Eleftherofrones

15.75%. As there was no possibility of a single-party cabinet, all major parties formed a coalition government on 4 December 1926.

The new democratic government had inherited a contradictory economic situation: alongside good employment figures and the reconstruction boom, there were also grave difficulties, especially concerning public finances and inflation. In an attempt to solve the fiscal problem, a new loan was obtained with the consent of the League of Nations. Despite this success and the rapid economic recovery, and precisely because of the inflationary and profiteering nature of this recovery, unrest among the working classes continued to grow. Strikes occurred frequently and were inevitably suppressed by violence, often at the expense of a few dead and numerous injured.

On the political level, the question of the regime was slowly being resuscitated. The issue of seniority in the army, infringed by the Thessaloniki government in favour of its supporters, was also revived. The decision to reconsider the case of the 2,386 royalist officers dismissed between 1922 and 1926 raised a storm of protest among the more fanatic republicans. The compromise solutions chosen by the government pleased very few people and the question of equilibrium between royalists and republicans in the armed forces began to be openly discussed.

This growing malaise at all levels led to the usual would-be panacea: on 25 May 1928, eighteen months after the coalition government had been sworn in, Venizelos returned to Greece. After a few weeks of little trial and much error, especially where his own veteran lieutenants were concerned, he unscrupulously dissolved parliament and proceeded to his last electoral triumph on 19 August.

Venizelos' final rule was one of the longest in Greek parliamentary history -- and in an odd way one of the most successful. Between 1928 and 1932 much work was accomplished to enable Greece to capitalise on the hard work, the frugality and the inventiveness of her people, the same virtues that had created the near-miracle of the 1922-28 period. As the success of this administration was

not immediately apparent, however, it was not appreciated by his contemporaries and ended with the electorate disapproving of its architect, Venizelos. The catalyst was the great economic collapse of 1929 and its aftermath. Long before the crisis, the government had initiated a vast scheme of public works, including an unprecedented school-building programme, partly covered by a series of loans. Some of these investments, such as irrigation and drainage schemes, had the additional beneficial effect of being immediately productive. Even investments which traditionally take longer to bear fruit were in the Greek case more productive in the short term for a number of already familiar reasons. The settlement of the refugees and land reform had created conditions for an unusually rapid increase in the degree of agricultural commercialisation. Its counterpart, rapid urbanisation, had been achieved almost overnight by the very disaster of the refugee wave. The economic effect of this urbanisation, an expansion of the urban markets, did not have to wait for a gradual increase of the urban dwellers' incomes: it was fed, as already explained, by the refugees' necessarily spending their savings, their earnings, and whatever government aid and loans they were allocated. The public works programme had also begun even before the onset of the 1929 crisis, and had a similarly reflationary influence on the economy before the effects of the world crisis could reach Greece. In fact, if one takes into consideration the bad wheat and tobacco harvests in 1930-32, and poor crops of other agricultural products even earlier during this administration, the beneficial effects of these measures become even more apparent. Venizelos, without attempting to, had implemented a policy of New Deal objectives, just as Trikoupis had done fifty years earlier; and by implementing it before the crisis, he ensured the added benefit of prevention being better, easier, and much cheaper than cure.<sup>215</sup> Thus the onset of the crisis in Greece herself was related to her finances, the stranglehold of over-borrowing and the concomitant State bankruptcy, and not really to the structural deficiencies and low productivity of the economy. For such is the permanent economic condition of underdeveloped countries, though their great foreign patrons willingly overlook it and even

help in its temporary alleviation as long as they can continue with their lucrative business -- only to waive their 'support' when their own economies undergo fundamental crises, just as in the case of Greece after 1929. <sup>216</sup>

That it was not until 1931 that the effects of the crisis were really felt in Greece underscores the liberals' success, but also explains their failure in the 1932 elections. <sup>217</sup> From then on the stage was set for a return to power of the Right. The People's Party formed a short-lived minority government, based on the liberals' vote of tolerance. Rumours about dictatorial plans by Kondylis and Hadjikyriakos, who had meanwhile approached the conservative bloc, precipitated the government's fall. In the 1933 elections the People's Party obtained 136 seats against 109 for the liberals. The very next day, General Plastiras staged a coup. Venizelos' personal intervention persuaded Plastiras to give way to a mixed military-civilian government, which was immediately afterwards superseded by the victorious People's Party. The new cabinet included Kondylis (Army) and Hadjikyriakos (Navy). Plastiras fled the country, many of his clients in the army were retired, and Metaxas proposed to parliament that Venizelos himself should be tried for his connections with Plastiras and, allegedly, with the 1933 coup. On 5 June 1933 a well-known bandit made an assassination attempt on Venizelos. Shortly thereafter two Athenian police chiefs were arrested following the general outcry against the attempt, and their implication more or less proved. But the infiltration of the State by conservative elements was not restricted to the police. The perennial issue of the royalist officers' reinstatement and especially that of the army list were revived yet again. Charging true or alleged implications in the 1933 coup, the government dismissed about 45 higher-ranking officers. <sup>218</sup> The coup de grace to relations between the Right and the Liberals was the issue of the electoral law. The government proposed an alteration in the geographical definition of the constituencies, which would have meant serious losses of liberal seats in the refugee bastions of Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki.



1 March 1935 saw the eruption of a coup by republican and liberal officers, virtually led by Venizelos.<sup>219</sup> The coup failed, Venizelos and its leaders were courtmartialled and condemned to death. Generals Papoulas and Koimissis, who had not fled the country, were executed. The time had come for two new dramatis personae: King George II and dictator General Metaxas.

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Appendix I1. Comments on the Peasant Ideology and the Lack of an Agrarian Movement

This appendix will serve to clarify certain basic characteristics and effects of the ideology prevailing among the peasantry and the middle class around the turn of the century. It is not, of course, a detailed investigation of the immense subject of ideology, but rather an exposition of the writer's main assumptions and working hypotheses on this subject.

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Although the Greek peasantry never played an active part in political power, it faithfully assisted the participating classes in maintaining their collective dominance.<sup>220</sup> The peasants adhered to the systems of values propagated by and serving the interests of the dominant classes. They developed neither their own ideology, nor a cohesive and broadly based social movement, nor the political counterpart to such a movement, an agrarian party. This is in contrast with conditions in other countries, where the existence of a peasant movement strongly affected politics -- as in neighbouring Bulgaria.\*<sup>221</sup>

Certain economic and social aspects of 19th-century Greece, however, suggest that the peasantry should have been a decisive social and political actor. The problems with the highest potential for social conflict -- land reform and rural underdevelopment -- were peasant problems. The economy was predominantly agricultural. The vast majority of the population were peasants. This demographic majority, following the institutionalisation of universal suffrage in 1864, could easily have become an overwhelming electoral force. In these favourable circumstances it seems curious that such a transformation did not occur, that some degree of peasant dominance over politics was not realised. It seems even more curious that it was not realised for another whole century during which the problems of rural poverty and land reform remained unsolved.

And it seems utterly surprising that, throughout this period, these grave social problems were no more than relatively minor political issues. The juxtaposition of three important events is an illuminating example. The major and final political event of this period was the 1909 coup. Although the officers were sympathetic to the peasant problem, they considered it so marginal that they did not even give it a mention in their programme. One of the major and the last social demonstrations of the period was that of the Thessalian peasants in 1910. It was suppressed in violence and bloodshed; and although the officers, who had meanwhile staged their coup, had no involvement with the governmental decisions on this matter, the fact remains that the government was then virtually under the control of the army. A few months later, the peasants elected 46 agrarian 'independent' MPs in a total of 48 parliamentary seats allocated to Thessaly. The 'independent' candidates mostly supported the military.

Such flagrant contradictions must generate suspicion. Are we facing a paradox? How could the officers afford to ignore the peasant problem? Was the 1910 uprising in Kileler the climax in the struggle of a conscious, integrated and organised social actor? Or was it an impulsive, spontaneous outburst by a geographically isolated part of an ideologically disoriented and politically prostituted peasantry?

Two basic reasons behind the apparent paradox may serve to explain it. The political reason has been sufficiently discussed in the previous chapters to require only a summary. The other argument is that the peasants' inability to develop their own political movement was caused by the contradiction between backward economic and social structures and advanced democratic institutions.

Indeed, had the economy by this time progressed to capitalism, this would have had two clear effects: firstly, that the bourgeois institutional system would not only have been adequate but actually forced by its own nature to solve certain important peasant problems; secondly, that the vote of the peasantry could

have been used towards these ends, thus yielding it the substantial amount of indirect power which a pluralistic bourgeois democracy can offer. If Greece had been a capitalist society at this point, it simply could not have functioned without a very early solution of the major peasant problem, land reform. On the other hand, the very mechanisms of the market would necessarily have exposed the residuals of the pre-capitalist era, the factors restricting elementary market functions and thus preventing the development of the large internal market vital to economic growth -- factors such as heavy and exclusively indirect taxation, or exploitative agricultural prices. But the evils working against capitalism happen also to work against the aspirations of the peasantry. By their exposing them, the market forces can thus transform the peasant problems into real political issues on which the peasants' vote would be decisive and, almost incidentally, augment their political power.

The institutional mechanisms for solving the collective problems of the peasantry may have existed, therefore, but the indispensable economic motivation for solving them, i.e. the demands of capitalism, were lacking. As for the peasants' individual problems, clientelism seemed to provide quite a good short-term solution. It has already been extensively discussed how these political processes operated, how clientelism was in fact the natural complement to the institutional system's inadequacy to serve the peasants' class interests. The way the political oligarchy utilised these disarticulations and at the same time fell victim to them, was also examined, as was the relationship between peasants, politicians and civil servants. Why this was a relationship between individuals and not between entities -- peasantry, parties, the State -- and why the latter was impossible in a socio-economic context such as that of 19th-century Greece, are questions also already investigated. It is, therefore, the second element that prevented peasant class action which should now be examined: the element of ideological disorientation -- and more specifically that caused not by the above political problems but by factors not yet analysed. \*222

Two of these factors which delayed the evolution of a coherent peasant ideology were the simultaneous existence of two peasant classes and the regional diversities in their economic and social positions. \*223 The lack of cohesion of the rural population within each region, the fragmentation and geographic dispersion of the unpropertied peasants in many regions, each of them different and isolated from the others, were serious handicaps in the development of a peasant movement: they posed particular difficulties by augmenting its organisational and functional problems and by preventing the peasants from realising that theirs was a universal condition which could be ameliorated by their own ideological emancipation. \*224

These difficulties are not immediately apparent if Greek society is seen as a whole, and rather too much emphasis is placed on demographic data or social statistics and too little on the regional distribution of such figures and the realities of 19th-century Greece. A look at post-1881 Greece may compound this holistic error, because by then annexation of Thessaly and Arta had already greatly increased the relative importance of the unpropertied peasantry and of big-property economy. In fact, while examining the overall image of Greece in the 1890s, one may decide to disregard the ideological confusion that had prevailed until then and be tempted into vainly searching for a revolutionary attitude among the peasantry. Yet conditions for the development of a peasant movement had not really undergone any very dramatic change.

In Thessaly itself, a strictly local peasant mobilisation did not develop immediately upon union with Greece, mainly for two reasons. One was the constant threat of war, a threat particularly felt in this region which bordered on Turkey until 1912, and was indeed invaded by a victorious Turkish army in 1897. The other was that the treaty of annexation had guaranteed the Turkish landlords' property rights: the peasants could not readily develop militant action against overlords protected by international treaties. This factor lost a good part of its significance, of course, after many

Turkish properties had been purchased by diaspora Greeks, but this transfer of properties came about only slowly. \*225

With regard to Greek society as a whole, the change of frontiers and of statistical proportions did not mean that class ideology would be apocalyptically revealed to the peasantry, nor that the peasant movement had to emerge as soon as the international treaties were signed, nor that it would acquire consistency throughout the old and new provinces. The acquisition of Thessaly brought some change in the elements of the peasant problem, but not in their ramifications and the manner of their functioning. This could only come about when the peasants themselves would have perceived these new elements, understood them, and begun to act on them. And such consciousness very much depends on the relationship of the peasant to his land.

Ideological elements are no more able to explain the political conditions within the peasantry than are climatic, psycholocial or geographic ones -- unless it be in connection with the crucial factor on which the whole argument centres: the relationship between peasants and landowners in the specific conflict-area of land reform. For centuries the peasants of Galicia, for example, faced about the same climatic and concomitant psychological problems as their Hungarian counterparts. Yet, whereas the Galician serfs staged a very bloody jacquerie in 1846, the Hungarian peasants supported the dominant classes in the 1849 revolution for national independence. The crucial difference was, of course, that the Galician rebels were serfs in 1846, whereas the Hungarian Diet, virtually ruled by the landlords, had abolished serfdom earlier in 1848. The Hungarian landlords could thus neutralise Petöfi's revolutionary peasants, and even mobilise massive peasant support in the revolt against the Hapsburgs.

These two cases are in fact the two extremes of the spectrum ranging from apathy-conservatism to mobilisation-radicalism. In Greece, the peasants' position in the spectrum of political ideology was intermediate. This was chiefly due to the fact that the problem

of land reform too was in an 'intermediate', ambiguous state: it existed, but its potential solution was considered possible. The wretched peasant lived with a vision of the promised land. Problem and solution, reality and vision, kept oscillating between accepted principles and their delayed realisation, the declarations of good intentions and the alleged lack of funds, the promising liberalism of a bourgeois Constitution and the persistence, in certain regions, of quasi-feudal conditions.

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The ambiguities of landownership and land reform in Greece were rooted in the war of independence and in the aspirations of the peasants who fought in it, and thereafter were cultivated and amplified throughout the 19th century. There is a controversy in Greek historiography about the degree to which this war of independence was also a peasant revolution. It is not necessary to go into the argument in detail. That the unpropertied peasants who fought in the war aspired to independent landholdings is undeniable. Their actions against the Turkish overlords were based on the simplistic, but not totally unfounded, calculation that after the overthrow of the Turks there would be enough land to make everyone rich<sup>226</sup> and the very existence of propertied peasants made these hopes appear realistic and just.

In the first few decades after independence, a contradictory situation gradually emerged which had a strongly disorienting effect on the peasants. Their hopes, encouraged by the liberation, and not in the least discouraged by the State or the politicians, remained nevertheless constantly unfulfilled on the grounds of some very convincing justifications. Certain important political changes that promised further liberalisation and governmental competence, as well as occasional small doses of specific measures, served as stop-gaps and revived hopes. Although they were not deliberately planned to fulfil this purpose, these measures acted as excellent tranquillisers. One such was the distribution of land to the

veterans of the revolution after 1833; the implementation of the Dotation Law after 1835; perhaps also the hopes revived by the revolts against Otho in 1843 and 1863; and finally the large-scale distribution of the national lands in 1871.

The Dotation Law was a characteristic case, where the potential for ideological confusion was actually quite intentional. Otho hoped the measure would help create a propertied peasantry strongly attached to the Crown and serving as its main support. He dreamt of a single-class society, consisting of faithful small peasants, administered by an obedient technocratic bureaucracy, and led by a benevolent monarch.<sup>\*227</sup> That his vision was somewhat naive did not deprive it of its disorienting potential. The Dotation Law was the legal underwriting of the confusion that would, from then on, dominate the peasant problem. The peasants, considering the State lands as sufficient to cover their needs, tended to ignore any prospects which an expropriation of private property might offer. Moreover, the Law was the first to suggest that the principle of justice in landownership had been adopted by the State and was accepted by all sectors of the population. Even the landowners could appear as the champions of the peasants, without any danger to their own interests, by simply supporting the peasant demand for free distribution of the national lands.<sup>\*228</sup>

Last but not least, the government could rightly claim that its finances did not allow land distribution free of a rent, or of an expropriation indemnity paid by the peasants. This situation not only moderated the small peasants' cry for more land, it also had an important direct effect on the collegoi: they were led to believe that the condition of the small independent farmer paying his inevitable rent to the State was not so much better than their own relationship with the landowners.

The problem was thus transferred from the area of social conflict, where it would sooner or later have been certain to evolve, to the level of endless strident negotiations between the State and the peasantry over what seemed to be legal and financial matters.



The question as to whether the national lands would be distributed free of charge or not, and the legal details of such distribution became the major problems, overshadowing the real issue of large private properties. The forty years' lapse until the distribution of the national landholdings served to remove the peasants' interests even further from the real problem. \*229

As mentioned above, the principle of free distribution was never denied, and until the national lands were finally shared out in 1871 the delay was attributed to the State's need for not losing an important source of revenue. Similarly, in the post-1871 period the moral principle of land reform was not really rejected, but its actualisation was presented as well-nigh impossible because of institutional and financial deadlocks. The 1864 Constitution considered private property as one of the citizen's inviolable rights -- indeed, Venizelos had to destroy this legal rampart in the 1911 constitutional revision before land reform could even be envisaged. Had it been possible to find a way to overcome the constitutional handicap, the State's financial inability to indemnify the landowners remained as a conveniently insoluble problem. Land reform could thus be implicitly accepted as a highly desirable principle, but also continually postponed as a, for the time being, practical impossibility. \*230

When the national landholdings had finally been distributed, these confusing conditions were almost duplicated around the issue of large private holdings. Whatever government was in power attributed the delay in land reform to the country's poverty. Whatever party was in opposition could not possibly afford to reveal the true causes of this poverty and therefore of the peasants' misery -- the quasi-feudal conditions in certain regions, or the excessive trade profits of the local comprador bourgeoisie, or the economic dominance of foreign and diaspora capital -- since any party indulging in such revelations would have had to break with the Protection, the Crown, and the dominant classes. No opposition could destroy the myth of crippling national poverty without at the same time committing suicide.

Inevitably, the responsibility was eventually brought home to the politicians. When this happened, however, it was not because the myth had been demolished and replaced by a lucid perception of the true facts. Instead, a new myth was superimposed on the old one, which explained the persistence of poverty by casting the blame on the politicians' administrative incompetence, corruption and vicious in-fighting, without ever questioning the real causes behind these vices. It was another facet of this new myth, however, which did have really far-reaching effects: the King could pose as an innocent spectator, even as an often impotent but potentially sympathetic protector. This image, assisted initially by Otho's personal interest in the peasantry, later on by the constitutional principle of the King's non-responsibility, had two results: in the short term it enhanced the peasantry's pro-royalism which, with the lyric simplicity of rural values, had already been initiated by the irredentist ideology and the old tale of the legendary Byzantine king who would awaken to rise up and reconquer Constantinople. In the long term, this perception of the monarch as the hero and benevolent father-figure, crippled by the evils of parliamentarianism, operated to ward off widespread peasant radicalism. It is not accidental that this colourful image was cynically exploited by the royalists until late into the 20th century, and was part of the foundations of the traditional alliance between the majority of the small independent peasants and the conservative sections of the bourgeoisie and of the urban lower classes.

Such was the ideology of almost four-fifths of the Greek people at the turn of the century. Almost all of the remaining one-fifth consisted of first-generation petit-bourgeois, still strongly attached to their native villages and their peasant-ideology background. They were living side by side in the same towns with about 30,000 workers who were even more bewildered by their condition. In the suburbs, a few thousand bourgeois mimicked the diaspora magnates and tried to forge a class unity as the basis on which they would conduct their business, build their culture and, eventually, govern the country.

## 2. Comments on the Evolution of the Bourgeois Ideology

The social and political insignificance of the 1864-1909 economic development was comparable to its statistical insignificance. That a few people became industrialists did not mean that the ideology of the bourgeoisie as a whole had changed overnight, or that the environmental conditions determining its political practices had fundamentally altered. What is really significant is not abstract classifications, but the ideology and behaviour of the class, both of which depended on external conditions which had remained unchanged by the mere emergence of a few factories. The bourgeoisie was to change its ideology only after a period of adjustment, diffusion and maturation. Similarly, conflict with other classes and within the bourgeoisie could not develop unless really conflicting interests were created. This was not to happen during the 1864-1909 period.\*231

It is not within the scope of this work to enter into details of the history, the content, and especially the causes of the comprador ideology. It will be sufficient to clarify that foreign economical and political domination, the diaspora's economic rule, and the weakness of the local bourgeoisie were so closely inter-related that none of them could have retained its character had one of the others undergone notable change. In this sense it would be formalistic to attribute to any of those conditions causal preponderance. They had evolved inextricably interlinked. It was not, therefore, the diaspora tradition alone that formed the comprador ideology of the Greek bourgeoisie, it was all these conditions together. A different ideology could only have developed if, for example, the local middle class had been economically more powerful, or if foreign domination had been less extensive.

It is rather the effects of this ideology which are of concern in this discussion. It is undeniable that the short-term, low-risk, high-profit economic practices of the individual bourgeois defined the limits of their collective political action. Contrary to their counterparts in the West, the Greek bourgeois had a

distorted concept of basic capitalistic needs, as for example the need for protectionism, or a developed internal market. They conceived of customs duties as a means for increasing not competitiveness, but prices and short-term profits. They understood development of consumption not in terms of growth of income for low-class consumers, but in terms of trivialities like transfer payments, specialised or local preferences in government expenditure, even the transfer of army units to the neighbourhood of this or that town.<sup>232</sup> How could this bourgeoisie conceive and implement a consistent policy of small-peasant development on the example of Germany, or a Fordist policy of labour wages? Why would it attempt to dominate politics as a means to carry through such coherent economic policies when its members were only interested in individual privileges obtainable by patronage and bribe? What value would long-term political dominance have for those individuals whose temporal horizon was only months away and whose greatest ambition was to operate on capital depreciation rates of fifty or a hundred percent? What funds would feed capital formation if the primary concerns of a grand-bourgeois were -- not only then but in 20th-century Greece also -- to save if not to invest part of his wealth abroad, to acquire a few houses, and to lay up a growing hoard of gold sovereigns?<sup>\*233</sup>

The comprador ideology on the economic level was properly matched by the pompous idealism of the Megali Idea irredentism on the political. This juxtaposition, though useful, may lead to the facile conclusion that the bourgeoisie not only subscribed to irredentism, but consciously amplified if not created it, supposedly in a deliberate effort to divert the people's attention from the injustices of the comprador system. This is the same kind of error as found in attempts to explain the later transition from the Megali Idea to anti-communism as the plot of an omniscient, coherent, ever-intriguing bourgeoisie. Both these ideologies were in fact the unavoidable results of the prevailing international and local political conditions. Nationalism was as common a phenomenon throughout Europe in the 19th century as was anti-communism in the 1920s and the 1930s. Both ideological waves had their main sources in

common for all countries in the international geopolitical conditions of these two periods. \*234

Although the Megali Idea was not a creation of the bourgeoisie, the question remains as to whether it was consciously utilised to confuse the population and divert its attention from the injustices of the comprador system. This seems to have been the policy of the governments rather than of classes. The attempt to divert a people's attention from internal problems towards chauvinistic or imperialistic interests is as typical a policy for governments in difficulty as is the offering of scapegoats, be they Turks, Communists, Jews, or Greek Cypriots. And although the government, the State, and the decision centres of politics are often closely related to the prevailing class structure and, through its hierarchy, to the dominant classes, they can also be relatively autonomous, as for instance in the case of Greece. The imperialistic revanchism in France under Napoleon III, admittedly bourgeois-inspired, cannot be compared with the Italian irredentism, so very remote from an indifferent or hostile borghesia. The German nationalism after the 1866 Prussian victory at Sadowa was certainly inspired by a political elite, like the Megali Idea in Greece. In Germany, however, the elite consciously played a game favourable to the dominant classes, whereas in Greece the game was played by a political oligarchy highly independent of the upper classes to serve its own interests. The fact that it also served the interests of the upper classes is incidental and does not demonstrate a conscious class-policy aimed at creating ideological confusion.

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Around the turn of the century, Greece experienced an upsurge of cultural activity and certain progressive movements appeared among the intelligentsia. These important cultural changes and the intellectuals' mainly bourgeois origins may be erroneously interpreted as symptoms or even causes of the alleged rise of the bourgeoisie. However, the intellectual progress itself should not be overestimated just because it is in such sharp contrast to the cultural parochialism of 19th-century Greece. This would be the same kind of mistake as the typical statistical error of judging growth-

rates by starting from an insignificant base. Finally, whatever the value of this progress, it could not have had immediate repercussions on the level of political ideology. Like most cultural changes of elite origins, this change too had to go through a long period of maturation before it could affect the political ideology of a class. \*235

A good example of the intelligentsia's earnest concerns is the struggle by the supporters of demotiki, the language spoken by the people, against the pure -- and official -- katharevousa. Because a victory of the demotic, seen in historical perspective, could have potentially progressive effects, this conflict may be wrongly considered as the major expression of the intellectuals' -- and 'therefore' the bourgeoisie's -- progressiveness. Yet not all the intellectuals opposed the State in this matter, but only the most radical among them who thus had to face their purist fellow-intellectuals as well in what was an intra-elite conflict as much as a struggle against the State. It is not by chance that the latter could successfully defend the ramparts of purism until as late as 1975, in a stubborn alliance with a large group of purist intellectuals, especially academics, who were of course as much bourgeois as the demoticists, if not more.

Even among the section of the intelligentsia that supported demoticism it is doubtful that the movement was expressive of middle-class liberalism. The underlying ideology was a mixture of nationalism, which may at times be included in bourgeois ideology but is not necessarily an exclusively bourgeois trait, and a populism rightfully affected not by the petit-bourgeoisie but by the importance of the peasant element in modern Greek history and culture. Moreover, the Nietzschean inclinations of at least some demoticists should not be overlooked. Nationalism or chauvinism, populism, pure or perverted Nietzscheism may be potentially contradictory elements, but they nonetheless belong in the same ideological neighbourhood. What is more, they can explain far better

the roots and the targets of the demoticist movement than can the middle-class origins of its members. One of its leaders, for example, Professor Psyharis, was a bourgeois and a monarchist. Was his monarchism caused by his bourgeois conservatism, or was it perhaps, like his demoticism, an expression of his Weltanschauung? Didn't he, too, desire 'punch and glory'? \*236

Demoticism was thus never accepted, let alone adopted and supported, by a significant section of the bourgeoisie. Ventiris, for example, a progressive bourgeois historian conveying his view of the so-called bourgeois demoticism of the 1900s, published his 1931 book on the subject in perfect purist katharevousa. The Marxist historian Kordatos used the same purist language until well into the 1920s, as did also the Communist Party. The official communist daily Rizospastis was only converted to demoticism in 1926. Until then, demoticism was never really or consciously a class-related issue, and when it became one the bourgeoisie found itself in the opposite camp, supporting the State -- as usual -- in its struggle to preserve the obscurantist virtues of the purist language. \*237

The two most important political expressions of the intelligentsia at the turn of the century will confirm the argument. The one, the so-called Japanese movement, shows the pettiness within the political ideology of the bourgeoisie; the other, that of the Sociologists, was more successful, precisely because it functioned outside the limits of this class.

The first group acquired its name after the Japanese defeat of the Russians in the 1905 Blitzkrieg. The Greek-Japanese, however, managed only a Kriegsspiel which ended when the conservative Prime Minister Theotokis offered the Finance portfolio to one of the samurai. Significantly, the man was obliged to resign some time later, having failed to get a law passed which would have imposed a light tax on some of his fellow-bourgeois. They were not

at all prepared to accept such a measure, natural in liberal capitalism, being incapable of understanding the value of small concessions in keeping extensive privileges. Such was the alleged middle-class liberalism of the 1900s, on which Finance Minister Gounaris was shipwrecked.<sup>237a</sup> Even more significantly, Gounaris did not persist in his progressive liberalism which so obviously did not pay. He became a major political leader of the Right, and was finally executed as one of the six royalists who served as scapegoats for the 1922 debacle in Asia Minor.

As for the Sociologists who were equally bourgeois in origin, their political credo -- a mixture of social-democratic radicalism, Marxist arguments and consistent republicanism -- kept the middle class at a good distance. They inspired some radical individuals within the army, as well as most of the big mass demonstrations in 1909. Their offspring, the Republican Union, played an important role after 1922, but never stopped being a minor party. In the intermediary period of Venizelist glory, many of the Sociologists, including their leading spokesman Papanastassiou, formed the left wing of the liberal party. Their true social basis, however, became clearly visible only during the two periods of revolt, in 1909 and 1922. Then, in spite of their bourgeois origins, these lucid individuals blended in harmony with the Athenian sansculotterie. <sup>237b</sup>





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## Appendix II

### Methodology in the Study of Military Intervention

#### 1. A review of methodologies

There is a wide range of writings on military intervention in politics, some of them theoretical, quite a few of them case studies, other presenting a number of cases comparatively and attempting the formulation of some commonly applicable theory.

The great majority of these works are more or less consistently based on a functionalist methodology. The following quotations are indicative of a somewhat extreme use of this approach in an examination of the Argentinian case:

"The army's developments interwave with the political mobilisation unchained by the oligarchy around 1910; when the first mobilisation failed (1912-30), it put an end to it and helped the conservatives in attaining a first demobilisation (1930-43); when internal conflict between the army and the oligarchy reached its highest point, the army was the one of them in charge of a second mobilisation (1946-55). When that mobilisation went too far, it was still the army which attempted a second demobilisation (1955-66).

"In a country like Argentina, and in the second half of the twentieth century, mobilisation faces the elite with several crucial problems: how can a nation be developed without opening channels to the people's voice? How can the people be moved, motivated, to do what is needed if they are not stimulated and nothing is done to attack privilege? How is it possible to seek the people's consensus if that means running the risk of being disavowed by them?"<sup>238</sup>  
(emphasis added)

There are other questions, however, which are not asked here, although they seem to be more promising. For instance: Why was mobilisation necessary and possible? What social forces did the oligarchy consist of and why? How did the army get into conflict with the oligarchy and on what grounds other than 'mobilisation'? What caused all these social movements?<sup>\*239</sup>

The whole method is reminiscent of the use of a cybernetic 'black box'. The economic and social forces fighting out their continual strife are conveniently stored in the box, and the effects of their struggle are examined and measured as the interesting output of an indifferent process hidden in the dark -- or a process too difficult to examine without some guiding pattern of varying intensity of Marxist flavour and, therefore, inadmissible. 240

The descriptive approach is also one much in vogue, especially in comparative and typological classifications. Here is a characteristic quotation from a description of five 'types' of military elite:

"... military elites that maintain themselves as an alien body superimposed on a conquered society, military elites that maintain themselves as an alien body distributed within a conquered society, military elites which take their place in society as members of a native and politically oriented aristocracy, military elites which qualify themselves in terms of some socially oriented scale of aptitudes, and, finally, military elites whose composition corresponds to the overall structure of power within a nation at arms." 241

There is doubtless considerable use for material collected in typological and comparative lists, but the crucial point is, of course, how it is used. If, as is often the case, it is utilised for constructing models of military intervention or for explaining such occurrences in a number of societies by analogy of similarities, then the material may be wasted in mere symptomatic theorising. Similarity of symptoms, even if supported by similarity of alleged causes, does not have to denote similar social illnesses: what about parallel causes not accounted for and symptoms not observed? What of similar pathologies due to identical causes but exhibiting different symptoms? Most important, is it the task of the political scientist to describe the symptoms, or is it rather to search for the primary causes in the heart of the economy and the social conflict? \*242

Hence the "five ideal types of civil-military relations" described by S. Huntington<sup>243</sup> seem to be of little use for empirically-oriented research and of little relevance for further theorising. His various combinations of anti/pro-military ideology, high/low military political power, and high/low military professionalism are too abstract to be useful in a case study, too concrete for a comparative analysis, unnecessarily restrictive and, above all, unrelated to the crucial problem of social structures and strifes. When, however, the same author uses his remarkable insight on the social class issue, then, despite his opposition to Marxism, his argument fully attains the clarity and richness that is characteristic of much of his writing.

A popular version of the functionalist method or of the descriptive typological approach is one concerned specifically with institutions, especially with their so-called dysfunctions and their tie-up with the propensity to army intervention. Here are two characteristic quotations:

"Military intromission in the political power structure always indicates, of course, at least a relative inability of other social institutions to marshal their power effectively, and at most an advanced state of institutional decomposition."

And: "... the lack of internal balance of the modernisation process within the various institutional spheres... (strengthens) various counter-elites which have been long-term claimants for government." 244

Similarly, in the case of Greece, undue emphasis may be given to an ideological condition that contributed to the malfunctioning of the institutions during the inter-war period. This was the officers' confusion over legitimacy and authority, both as concepts and as concrete elements of political and social reality in specific historical contexts. The importance of this confusion within Greek society for creating a tendency towards sterile formalistic strife has been underlined in previous paragraphs. Between the wars this phenomenon was inevitably amplified within the army because of the unstable institutional and political environment of that period. Causes and effects were thus systemically linked and mutually

reinforced, so that the conceptual confusion was both a cause and an effect of the actual environment. But it would be misleading to attribute excessive causal importance to the dysfunction of the institutions generated by this ideological peculiarity of Greek society, and this applies to any other society equally.

Another quite common approach is the tendency to explanations and methods derived from social psychology and anthropology. Explanations of military interventions along these lines range from very simple -- and often simplistic -- allusions to psychological or cultural factors, to quite impressive displays of specialised terminology. Here are some examples:

"Today the dominant factor is not the existence of armed forces, but the prevalence of political sentiments ... Failure to solve the ... problems of a new State ... may involve the interference of the military because they ... are likely to be committed to the revolution which is the main feature of the current phase of history in Afro-Asia."

Then, a mixture of psychologism and functionalism:

"... deepening ... conflicts in the period between 1961 and 1964 generated with significant numbers of officers a feeling of institutional insecurity, authoritarian attitudes, and desires for system-transformation ..."

(emphasis added) 245

In the case of inter-war Greece, for example, the frequency of military intervention in politics is often attributed to the 1922 debacle, the humiliating effect of the Turkish victory in Asia Minor, and the traumatic experience of an army in retreat crossing the Aegean along with over a million civilian refugees. Undoubtedly, the witch-hunt for responsibilities that followed; the revolution by the remnants of that army; the military government it imposed and the execution of six leaders of the previous regime; all these were manifestations of a unique atmosphere of frustration, despair, and national crisis, virtually centred upon the army. It is therefore justified to emphasise the psychological impact of the 1922 events as an important factor behind the behaviour of the officers, provided

the explanation is not carried too far, especially in terms of time. For it may have been a good (though not unique) cause of the officers' reaction immediately after 1922, but cannot possibly be stored up and conveniently used throughout the period in question if it is not to become a highly insecure psychological-idealistic explanation.

This objection might also be applied to a more sophisticated version of the same argument. This attributes the division amongst the military to deep ideological disorientation following the destruction of the irredentist Megali Idea, the ideology of 'a Greece extended over two continents and five seas'.<sup>246</sup> While it may be true that the ideological factor played an almost pathologically inflated role in modern Greek history, as has already been discussed, this cannot by itself explain the continuous turmoil in the army. It was indeed one of its elements, but not by any means its sole cause.

The list of authors is long who attribute a major role to technical factors such as esprit de corps, patronage, the high or low degree of officers' professionalism, and the like. Some of these discussions are very stimulating, for instance the one in Rapoport's "A Comparative Theory..." on conditions of 'nations-at-arms'; and Janowitz' "The Military...". This latter author, however, is a pleasant exception in that he does not use his findings to 'explain' military intervention; he is content to suggest the channels through which such explanations should be directed (pp. 342-43). Similar is the attitude of the Greek historian Veremis in his yet unpublished Ph.D. thesis on the Greek military in the inter-war period. As mentioned earlier, Veremis exhaustively describes the officers' behaviour, unravels by painstaking research their extremely complex patronage networks, but explicitly clarifies that these excellent descriptions are not presented as holistic explanations of the causes behind intervention. Such is not always the case with other works, which often do not look beyond the technicalities of conflict in their assessment of why and how these were allowed or even forced to spread inside the army.<sup>247</sup> This area of methodology is specially appropriate for a longer critical exam-

ination, as there is fertile ground for testing it in the case of inter-war Greece, particularly along the lines of clientelism. A somewhat more detailed critical discussion of this specific approach will, therefore, attempt to explain the methodology followed in this work, so as to point the difference between the two kinds of procedure.

## 2. Testing the Functionalist Connection between Patronage and Military Intervention

### 2.1 General comment

Because clientelism was so ubiquitous in the armed forces during the inter-war period, it may be mistaken for a major cause of intervention although, as will be argued here, it was not a primary one, being determined by factors outside the army.<sup>248</sup> Admittedly, the divisive effect of patronage results in the officers' increasing involvement in politics and hence their tendency to intervene. One of the basic reasons, in functionalist terms, is the lack of any long-term efficiency in serving the interests of the groups involved. The individualism inherent in patronage is, in fact, well-nigh incompatible with the kind of efficiency that would serve entire groups. At the hypothetical level of a 'perfect' functioning of clientelism as a whole, the profits accruing to each competing group or each individual are mutually offset. (A comparison with conditions of perfect competition in economics, although somewhat simplistic, is helpful.) This can partly explain the frequent movement of individuals from their own to other competitive networks. The greater the competition, the smaller the difference between the competitors' profits and the productive potential. To regain their previous level of spoils needs an intensification of productivity and profits, and so on in continuo until boiling point is reached. Then, the only way to raise the profit is acquisition of total power through intervention in politics. Such, very broadly, would be an explanation of military intervention based on a functionalist perception of patronage relations. It may

be a reassuring, self-sufficient little construct, but it does not answer certain basic questions.

The first question is to what extent everyday functions of patronage are independent of social forces. A return to the specific example of inter-war Greece will help to provide the answer. One of the striking characteristics of the way patronage functioned in the army was the manifest fragility of its networks. The frustration caused by Venizelos' pro-royalist position; the consequent conflicts of allegiances; the fear of revenge by the royalists; all these did contribute to many officers' gradual alienation from the Venizelist party. This alienation was mostly temporary; only for a few of them did it become permanent, among them Pangalos, Kondylis, and Hadjikyriakos. Many officers who had shifted allegiances in 1923 from Venizelos to Othonaios, or in 1925 to Pangalos' dictatorship, reappeared in later years as ardent Venizelists. This instability could well be interpreted both ways, to support either of the two opposing positions: that patronage was not a primary cause of military intervention, or that it was the fragility of the patronage allegiances which caused the said shifts in the officers' loyalties; thus making conditions within and not without the army the determinant factor. The ambivalence of the approach is clearly due to its secondary causal significance. For what really matters is not the instability as such, its symptoms and its effects, but its causes: the evolution of social factors favourable or unfavourable to military interventions, and the changes in the officers' ideology and in their hierarchical position within the army -- both of which had also their roots in the political and social conditions of the period.

The second question is what sort of profits patronage is expected to yield in the army, whether they in their turn are independent of the social and political environment, and whether they by themselves are sufficient to cause intervention. The only profits not directly related to that socio-political environment would clearly be promotion and assignment of preferred postings. Here again, the Greek example is helpful. Hierarchical changes and pro-



spects of promotion undoubtedly urged the officers towards plots and interventions, but this process did not operate in a vacuum. If favourable political conditions had been lacking, and if the regime question had not been such fertile soil for rallying support, it is inconceivable that the officers would have plotted en masse and staged coups for the sake of mere promotion.<sup>249</sup>

The answers to the first two questions also provide the answer to the third: What is the causal relationship, if any, between patronage and intervention? Obviously, clientelism can serve only as an amplifier of pre-existing cleavages, not as their instigator. Once the prevailing social and economic conditions have generated political division outside the army, the patronage system may bring it into the ranks of the military where it will undergo amplification. The same process may function in reverse, too: patronage can transfer intra-military conflicts into politics, where the political forces may utilise them to their advantage through amplification of some already existing political conflict.

It follows that the utility of patronage as an analytical concept is not its alleged effects on the behaviour of the military, but its function as a communications system between them and the political forces. In the absence of such inter-communication, any analysis of the army's intervention in politics in a clientelist society would have to be arbitrarily isolated from its social environment; this would make it unrealistic, however much it claimed to be, for example, a rigorous Marxist analysis rejecting the functionalist vices of patronage as a methodological tool. Conversely, (and this was the point of the previous paragraph), the analysis will merely be mechanistic if patronage is considered as an independent phenomenon, however intensely clientelistic the society examined. The patronage system is useful in analysis only if seen as a link. It is with its methodological assistance that the officers' behaviour can be linked to the political forces, and through them to the environmental economic and social conditions which define both the structure and the dynamics of these political forces.

It should be emphasised that such a link is necessary only in a clientelist polity. In any other society, intervention can occur without the assistance of patronage networks if social and political conditions are favourable. Under the pressure of these conditions, the role of clientelism—communications and allocation of spoils—will be played by some other system within the given society. Intervention may be thwarted and delayed in the absence of patronage networks, but not necessarily avoided. Chile, a society with a developed civic culture and restricted patronage practices, is a good example. Conversely, post-war Italy, and Greece in the 23 years of civilian rule before the 1967 coup, are examples of the opposite situation: despite conditions of shameless clientelist nepotism, intervention did not occur because its social and political prerequisites were lacking.

In the case of inter-war Greece, the social and political conditions and their institutional framework enabled non-military political forces to steer to their own advantage the political activities carried out by the officers. It was only natural that these activities should have been as conflicting as the aims of their instigators; it was also natural that political conflict and division were mirrored in the armed forces. Evidently, then, the reason for the division within the army was not patronage, but the great political patrons themselves. It was neither the existence of networks within the army nor their objectives that actually caused the cleavage, it was the political forces outside it pursuing their own objectives. \*250

## 2.2 The social roots of intervention -- a recapitulation

With the exception of the Pangalist case examined in the previous chapter, it is clear that in the inter-war period the Greek officers had no wish to establish their own lasting dictatorship. When, for example, they seized power in 1923, they intended to hand it over to the civilians, and actually did so.<sup>251</sup> Throughout the inter-war years there is no serious indication that either the army

as a whole or any substantial group of officers except Pangalos' most intimate friends intended to establish a permanent military dictatorship. The military did not see themselves as a potential political leadership. They served as the sword and shield of the political leaders, but did not aspire to leadership themselves. Their actions were not conducive to creating the conditions of a garrison-State, but rather of praetorianism.<sup>252</sup> One is tempted to ask why.

Among the effective reasons for this somewhat surprising modesty was the divisive ideological fanaticism of the officers which was a reflection of the dichasmos, the fundamental division of Greek society and politics at the time. Confronting each other on opposite sides were the two pyramids of patronage relationships, Venizelist and royalist -- the latter having gradually disintegrated in the post-1923 purges, slowly coalesced again after 1926. Even if a group of dissident officers from either of these blocs had decided to ferment its own independent revolt, it would have met with determined opposition from the fanatics of both blocs, officers and politicians -- which is precisely what happened in the overthrow of Pangalos.

The above-mentioned factors being sufficient to restrain the officers from becoming too independent and totally superimposing their own will on the politicians' does not mean they were sufficient to restrain them from intervention altogether. Division and fanaticism could not but feed interventionist aspirations, though at the same time keeping them under the control of the political blocs. These factors, however, were reflected in and determined by a number of primary social and political conditions. One of these was the division within the bourgeoisie, examined in the preceding chapter, which found its expression in the royalist-republican dichotomy. The other was the fact that, after the republicans had lost their unique opportunity of 1922, none of the conflicting blocs, neither the conservative-royalist nor the moderate-republican, had the potential to overpower the other and thus institutionalise itself on a permanent basis.

Indeed, only a particularly deep social cleavage such as this division within the dominant class could have had the impact necessary to generate repeated recourse to arms; but no conflict, however deep, is able to spark a series of intervention if one of the opponents has a near-monopoly of power. In the case of inter-war Greece, not only were both the conservative and the moderate sections of the bourgeoisie weak in themselves, but the class as a whole was still too feeble economically and too infantile ideologically to play, all by itself, the consistent role of indirect dominance it has been able to play in more advanced societies. \*253

It is illuminating that the few dissident groups who did dare to take independent action were, apart from the Pangalists, the more intransigent members of the Venizelist bloc who, though they did not attempt to propose a new ideology as Pangalos had done with his peculiar brand of somewhat fascist populism, disapproved of Venizelos' moderation on the familiar issue of the regime to the extent of preferring the stick of the coup to the carrot of consensus. Such was the nature, for example, of the 1923 pronunciamiento, and of the 1933 coup. But if, as in the case of General Plastiras in 1933, their instigators came to desire a dictatorship, it was a Venizelist dictatorship they dreamt of -- condemned, characteristically, by the disapproval of Venizelos himself -- and not a military one.

It is notable also that the one really dissident group which rose to dictatorial power, the Pangalists, did so on the basis of more than mere alleged republican intransigence, indeed on an actual social following which was essentially quasi-fascist. In other words, the fact that the political and social conditions of inter-war Greece did not permit a military regime is strongly suggested by the singularity of the military dictatorship of the period, and by its prompt failure. Having been born on the fascist fringe of local society and politics, nurtured by the for Greece but marginal mussolinian ideology, and deprived of sustenance ripened on its native soil, it was condemned to die of starvation.

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For an excellent argument on this subject, see N. Mouzelis' article in Vima, Athens 6 July 1976.

#2

Throughout this work, common sense rather than dogma will be the criterion for definition of the terms bourgeoisie or middle class which will be clearly distinguished from the petit-bourgeoisie. The first two terms will be used interchangeably to denote the wealthier sections of urban dwellers and the industrialists, but not the petit-bourgeois artisans; the managers or higher executive cadres, but not the lower-ranking employees; judges but not clerks of the court; doctors, lawyers, and others in liberal professions, but not necessarily their unemployed younger colleagues recently graduated from the university. Nevertheless, the terms may well include the occasional artisan making a fortune from his expensive jewellery, the clerk lending a large sum of inherited capital at 50% interest, or the hoarding shopkeeper who rents out, as a sideline, the five or six houses in which he has shrewdly invested.

#3

It is interesting that such qualifications and the more general class analysis of distinct ethnic groups under foreign rule are methodological problems not yet investigated to an extent which might establish precedents or guidelines. In fact, analytical historical or sociological works of this kind are rare also, so the field of methodology is not only a virgin one, but the empirical applications are also lacking -- applications which could serve as a testing ground for theoretical and methodological work.

#4

The degree of the Greek immigrants' social integration into their host countries is no contradiction. In most cases their integration was more or less complete, so that one can consider the Vienna Greeks, for example, as members of the Austrian middle class. On the other hand, those Greeks for whom social integration in the host country was incomplete should not automatically be classified as middle class in the newly-formed Greece. (On the issue of integration, see T.Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Merchant".)

5

For an excellent description of the Islamic legal system and its linkage with the mode of production of the Islamic societies, see P.Anderson, "Lineages of the Absolutist State".

\*6

"Many of the richest natives (sic) of Thessaly derive their incomes from Egypt and other foreign countries ..."; Consular Report N°4492, F.O. Annual Series 1909, Thessaly. Indeed, most landowners were diaspora Greeks, see Dakin, "The Unification...", p. 251; Moskof in his "I ethniki ..." claims they numbered up to two-thirds of the total. See also the illuminating description of the relationship between the diaspora and Greece in Law's Report, 1893, F.O. Annual Series, p. 31. This is a special and very detailed report from a perceptive diplomat, written as a guideline for the action then to be taken by the Powers for the protection of Greece's creditors, in view of the country's bankruptcy. Law very clearly speaks of the diaspora Greeks as alien to the country's internal structure and sees them mainly as a source of invisible earnings for the balance of payments. Here is a characteristic extract distinguishing between foreign and local investment by the heteroethnones:

"From inquiries I have made, I have reason to put the amount of Greek gold stocks held in Greece at about 60 to 80 mill. fr., but this is probably a small figure as compared with the value of foreign stocks and shares similarly held, and regularly contributing to swell the remittances to Greece."

\*7

Deschamps, a contemporary visitor to Athens, wrote ("La Grèce..." pp. 52-53): "Si la ville n'était habitée que par des Athéniens, elle serait triste, silencieuse et morose ..."

\*8

Many of Moskof's comments on the diaspora can be interpreted as supporting the view expressed here that the diaspora cannot be treated as a local class (see "I ethniki ...", pp. 92-95, 101-02, 108). His text is most explicit on p. 152:

"Athens was for the heteroethones nothing but a place of residence; their economic activity still took place chiefly in the place abroad where they had migrated...; the choice of residence in the new Athens betrays nevertheless a will to grow roots in the free (Greek) State, a wish not unrelated to the nationalist or xenophobic movements in Rumania or Egypt in the years 1878-1907. In addition to the search for security, however, the heteroethones' presence in Athens occurs with a hegemonic perspective; deprived of participation in political power at the place of their migration, they seek and actually obtain a major position in Greek politics."

The emphasis is added to show the distinction, also made by Moskof, between the economic and political practices of the diaspora. On the importance of their political participation, however, I disagree. As explained in the text, though Phanariotes and heteroethones were politically important, they cannot be considered members of this same bourgeois and entrepreneurial diaspora which, partly because of the heteroethones' political importance, is erroneously treated as part of the local bourgeoisie. On this subject see also Psyroukis, "To paroikiako phenomeno". Filias, "Koinonia kai exoussia ...", p. 105, very clearly distinguishes the heteroethones from the local middle class, and goes on to say that economically speaking they were of "a cosmopolitan, not a national orientation".

## 9

The purchases of rural properties refer to the property of anxious Turkish landowners, and concerned landholdings protected by the 1831 Treaty of Acquisition of Thessaly and Arta, which were nevertheless sold at very favourable prices. Many diaspora magnates who bought large landholdings belonged to such very well-known families as the Syngros, Skylitsis, Zografos, Stefanovic, Baltadjis, Zarifis, Zappas, Kartalis (Vergopoulos, "To agrotiko...", p. 97). This was a repetition of what had happened in 1833, when Turkish properties in Attica were also sold to rich Greeks (p. 94) and similar sales later on, until the 1871 distribution of the national lands to unpropertied peasants.

10

The objection that banks were unable to lend at immoral and (following Law ΓΩΑΖ' of 1911) illegal rates is not valid. There is evidence of bank loans transacted in Greece as late as the 1950s and 1960s with interest rates of 18% (legal limit 10-12%). These transactions were covered by the system of parallel accounting and were therefore totally unofficial and free of tax. Zolotas confirms that illegal rates on privately contracted loans were common practice in the 1920s, and mentions rates of up to 15-30% ("I Hellas eis to ...", p.73). Illegal interest rates seem to have been admirably steady over the past century.

\*11

There can be no better witness to the prosecution of the diaspora magnates along these lines than the leader writer of the newspaper Rambagas on 9 Dec. 1882: "They do not use their capital in the development of industry or in enterprises which will revitalise the working classes. Speculating, special deals, and stock-market juggling are their best beloved interests." See also Dakin, "The Unification...", p. 252.

\*12

The quotation is from Law's Report, F.O. Annual Series 1169, April 1893.

The privileged position of the diaspora's foreign capital in Greece resembles the advantages of the dollar between 1945 and 1971 in the European and Japanese investment markets. In fact, the manipulation of the drachma's parity was even more lucrative: it was a relatively easy and private affair, which of course was not the case with the dollar.

It would be wrong to think that speculators could be brokers or financiers unrelated to the diaspora entrepreneurs. Firstly, the market was too small and there was no real fluctuation: the trend was continually towards devaluation, which means that the risks in pure day-to-day monetary speculation, not covered by merchandise or capital goods, were immense. Secondly, there were no local Greeks with the huge fortunes required for controlling a currency market, however small it may have been. Lastly and most important, the magnates who controlled investment in and exports from Greek mines as well



as a great part of the country's foreign trade, would at any rate be obliged to enter the currency market on a term-basis, this being an elementary risk-reducing measure. It would be absurd to think that a businessman buying or selling on terms large quantities of currency in a small market and seeing the rates going up as a result of his own transactions, would ever let someone else cash in on the profits, or never think of manipulating the market to his own advantage. Consequently, and considering also that the market was constantly directed towards devaluation, the only strategy the speculator/businessman could possibly pursue would be one to ensure the largest possible transfer of surplus out of the rapidly deteriorating Greek economy. His speculative funds, in other words, should stay in Greece for the shortest possible time if he wanted to maximise his total profits from his twin operation, the one in the currency market and the other in the investment or foreign trade market. It was in the nature of this process that it should be self-amplifying.

\*13

If diaspora elements had avoided deposits of their profits in Greek banks, it was different for the richest among them, who could well afford to invest it not in the form of deposits but of bank capital, which could be stipulated in gold francs even after currency controls had been imposed. Two of the four banks in operation in 1883 had been formed with diaspora capital, one in 1873 (characteristically at the onset of the great 19th-century crisis), and one in 1882 (Moskof, "I ethniki...", p.162). But all four of them, as well as the Bank of Athens which was established in 1893, enjoyed such privileges that their shares were a very safe investment indeed. There is a marked imbalance between the growth of capital and the growth of deposits in the years from 1884 to 1905, which may partly be attributed to such a tendency of diaspora capital as here described:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Capital + reserves</u>	<u>Deposits</u>	(in mill. gold francs)
1884	33.5	-	Derived from Evelpidis,
94	-	26.9	"Oikonomiki kai koinoniki..."
97	21.2	28.3	p. 97.
1901	29.1	60.1	
05	63.2	154.1	
10	125.6	337.2	
14	99.0	396.8	
19	61.6	487.6	
23	55.1	433.7	

It is clear that the ratio of deposits to bank capital became reasonable only after 1914, or even 1919. Conversely, capital was relatively high in the 19th century. This cannot be explained merely by Greece's underdevelopment; the real question is why these diaspora elements chose to establish banks in an underdeveloped country, why they not simply deposited their money with the National Bank of Greece -- a private bank enjoying the privilege of issuing currency -- and why they kept on doing so despite the unfavourable prospect for a good deposit/capital ratio.

14

Prior to 1873, the total investment in mining and industry was insignificant (see the Statistical Tables in chapter B).

15

Hobsbawm, "The Age of Capital", pp. 304-05.

16

For a brief and comprehensive analysis of the Phanariotes' initial role in the Ottoman empire, see Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan... Merchant", pp. 269-73

17

Moskof, "I ethniki...", pp.115 and 122-26. His Table shows 21 MPs of diaspora origin, six of them Phanariotes and heteroethones. On the origin of most of the 15 MPs not specified by Moskof, and especially their important role in the revolution and their subsequent settling in Greece, see their biographies in Pirsos' "Megali Helliniki Encyclopaedia". See also "Essays in Memory of Basil Laourdas", Society of Macedonian Studies, Thessaloniki 1965.

18

Explicit on this subject is, for example, Filias' work "Koinonia..."; Tsoukalas' descriptions in "The Greek Tragedy" give the reader the same impression. Vergopoulos' "To agrotiko..." supports the argument of market penetration in rural Greece, but again the impression created is one of stagnation, if not regression of the system as a whole. The same deduction holds for the work of Moskof, especially if his two books are read in juxtaposition ("Thessaloniki..." and "I ethniki...").

\*19

The argument which follows has been considerably influenced by Dr. N. Mouzelis' extensive criticism and suggestions. Needless to say that my text does not necessarily reflect his views.

In this discussion I had to infringe my rule for using a minimum of specialised terms in order to adhere strictly to Marxist terminology as I see it. The non-Marxist reader will appreciate that this was necessary for two good reasons. Firstly, the controversy is frequently couched in similar terms in the bibliography on the subject; secondly the very term 'capitalism' and the theoretical nature of the discussion demand such a deviation from my rule. The problem being methodological, it requires exactitude and rigour; but even the non-Marxist would agree that the only rigorous and sufficiently comprehensive terminology available in the field of the study of capitalism is that of Marxism.

To compensate, I have nonetheless tried to use non-specialised substitutes whenever possible, to simplify the argument as much as I could, keep it to a minimum, and revert to concrete historical discussion and empirical examples as quickly as possible.

20

On the concept of 'social formation' and for an explanation of its role in a structuralist theoretical framework, see Poulantzas, "Pouvoir politique..." vol.I, pp.69-72; Althusser and Balibar, "Lire le Capital", vol.II, pp.112-14 and 151; Althusser, "For Marx" (Penguin 1969) pp.100-02 and especially 212-14.

21

See Vergopoulos, "To agrotiko zitima...", pp.319-21, for a good critical description of the system, and Vakalopoulos, "Historia..." for a detailed enquiry into its historic roots.

\*22

According to Thiersch "De l'état actuel de la Grèce", Leipzig 1833), five-sixth of the peasants were unpropertied. Though this may have held true for the whole of the Greek peninsula, it was more pronounced in the case of the newly liberated Greek State which extended only over the southern provinces. There, small property-holdings were much more common than in the North, whilst about 35% of the land (according to Vergopoulos, "To agrotiko zitima...", pp. 83-85), was State property.

23

These percentages, as well as the previously mentioned figure of 35% for land owned by the new Greek State, are reported by Vergopoulos, "To agrotiko zitima...", pp. 83-85. They are obviously only approximate.

24

P.Dertilis, "I epanastassis tou 1821 kai ai ethnikai gaiiai" (The 1821 revolution and the national landholdings), Athens 1971. Also reprinted in full in Oikonomokis Tachydromos N° 899, 1971.

25

On the important subject of the Dotation Law, see the excellent work by Petropulos, "Politics and Statecraft...", pp. 236-38 and 254; see also Aspreas, "Politiki historia ...", pp. 137-38 and 143; Kordatos, "Historia tou agrotikou...", pp. 277-83.

26

Law YAA of 1871. For details see Vergopoulos, "To agrotiko zitima...", p. 86.

\*27

Kordatos, for example ("Historia ...", p. 179), admits that "the particularities of the ... economy in the various regions ... favoured the delay in the development of the peasants' political consciousness." Yet throughout his book he tries to overcome the difficulties he has created by considering the peasantry as a single class, by means of such constructs as "common condition" and by repeating that the small independent peasants "did not really own their land" because they were heavily in debt at exorbitant interest rates. The argument of usury, though simplistic, is employed widely among Marxist historians who have examined the Bulgarian case (see the criticism by Gershénkron in "Economic Backwardness...", pp. 220-21). For information on usury in Greece during Otho's reign, see Petropulos "Politics and Statecraft...", pp. 488 ff., and Evelpidis, "Oikonomiki kai koinoniki...", Athens 1950, p. 52, reporting interest rates of 18-40%.

On the role of usury in the stage of primitive capitalist accumulation, see Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire...", pp.241-42; see also Barrington Moore Jr, "The Social Origins...", p. 360, for a discussion of the moneylender as a central figure in a period of primitive capitalist accumulation in India; see also pp. 271 and 273 on Japan, concerning the objective of the Meiji policy to use the peasant "as a source of capitalist accumulation", which had the "immediate effect" on the peasants of making them "more dependent ... on the village usurer". It is undeniable that whether usury has or does not have an effect on capitalist development depends on the nature of the accumulation and its subsequent use. Mere hoarding will not cause capitalist transformation, neither will mere merchant investment; the differentiating element is industrial investment (see my \*38 footnote on industrialisation, beginning of section 4).

28

See Kordatos, "Historia ...", pp. 183-86 concerning Euboea; also p. 178 for a quotation from the Paris newspaper "Temps Nouveaux (1900) which, among other information, reports that "there are no tsiflikia in Achaia", the region in the Peloponnese next to and very similar to Eleia.

29

Moskof, "I ethniki...", pp. 89-90.

30

Derived from data given in Moskof, "I ethniki...", p. 168, and based on the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Nouvelle Série, Grèce, vol.XII, pp. 157-62.

31

The percentages were taken very approximately from a chart given by Moskof, "I ethniki...", p.102. Zolotas, in his invaluable book on industrialisation, "I Hellas eis to...", pp. 106-08 and 92-97, attributes the low rate of capital formation mainly to the scarcity of capital and low profits (p.107). Scarcity could well be caused by hoarding practices, however. As for

profits, it is not possible to establish whether they were low or high, but lack of investment is not necessarily a symptom of low profits.

32

This is explicitly Kartakis' view, who in fact considers a longer period (1910-1940) as the first phase of Greek industrialisation ("Le développement industriel...", pp. 6-11).

\*33

There is a basic theoretical and methodological distinction behind such differences in interpretation. Seen from a system standpoint, the structural causal linkage between coups, the rise of the middle class and capitalist transformation seems justified. Conversely, seen from an action approach, the linkage appears false. Such a negation does not necessarily lead to the extreme of voluntarism. To deny, for example, the role of the bourgeoisie in 1909 from an action viewpoint does not need to mean that its structural importance is neglected. (The useful distinction made in N.Poulantzas' work between place de classe and position de classe is well applicable here.) Similarly to stress the role of the petit bourgeoisie does not imply a voluntaristic conception of this social agent's role. What is attempted in this work as far as the writer's limitations allow, is a selective use of both standpoints, with emphasis on action approach as required by elementary dialectical rules. (On the crucial issue of methodology, I am heavily indebted to Dr N.Mouzelis' for virtually teaching me through long discussions and patient criticism. For more details on the subject the reader may wish to refer to Mouzelis' article, "Social and System Integration: Some Reflections on a Fundamental Distinction", Brit. Journ. of Sociology, vol.XXV, N°4, Dec. 1974. Closely relevant to this debate are also the works by Lockwood, "Social integration..." and Dawe, "The Two Sociologies".

\*34

Whenever possible, specialised language is avoided. Terms such as capitalist/feudalist mode of production can often be replaced by the simpler 'capitalism' or 'feudalism', provided the reader can understand whether the simpler term is being used in its

more common, wider sense, or in the strict and more precise sense that denotes a mode of production. In most cases this will be clear from the context, but wherever it is not, the more precise term will be given.

Although it is possible to simplify a term such as 'capitalist mode of production', this is not always so for the more abstract 'mode of production' when it has to stand by itself; there are many instances when such a term is very useful, which in this work is mostly the case in this paragraph only. Being empirically rather than theoretically oriented, this work will often refer to precise problems of capitalism or pre-capitalism and seldom to abstract discussion about modes of production. Hence the criteria will be clarity and facility: whenever possible, even in a theoretically oriented paragraph, the term as such will be avoided and concrete historical examples preferred. When abstract reference is made to a dynamic totality of social and economic structures without the rigorous aspects of a particular mode being necessarily implied, then words like 'system' or phrases like 'system of structures' will be employed. But whatever term is used, I wish to make it clear that my argument is guided by the notion of 'mode of production', and that my term implies more or less the same conditions as those denoted by the Marxian term. On these conditions, see of course K.Marx, "Grundrisse", pp. 97, 105-08, but also and chiefly the contradicting pp. 881-82; then pp. 254, 257, 319-20 and 856-58; and above all the beautiful analysis of original accumulation and the historical process leading to capitalist production through the dissolution of the old modes at the end of "Notebook IV" and the beginning of "Notebook V", pp. 471-514.

35

I use the term tertiary sector in its classical, functionally derived sense, and do not intend the contemporary connotations attributing to the tertiary sector a development potential related to the nature of services in the so-called post-industrial societies. After all, the service sector undergoes a primitive phase just like industry.

Marx, "Grundrisse", pp. 881, 856, 859, and again mainly pp.471-514.

\*37

a) See Anderson, "Lineages...", p. 361, for a comment on the Balkan peculiarities. See also pp. 546-49 for a discussion of the same methodological problem as encountered in the examination of Asian feudalism: "Asian development cannot in any way be reduced to uniform residual category, left over after the canons of European evolution have been established"(p. 549). The significance of the historical element in the examination of a mode of production is well summed up in Mandel's criticism of Althusserian structuralism:

"Pourquoi Marx a-t-il commencé le 'Capital' par une analyse de la marchandise, non pas en tant que 'hégélien', mais en tant que marxiste? Parce que, contrairement à Althusser,... il n'a pas voulu analyser le mode de production capitaliste comme quelque chose de statique, comme une structure immobile séparée du passé et de l'avenir?"

(E.Mandel, "Althusser corrige Marx", in "Contre Althusser", p. 266.) See also Lefebvre "L'idéologie...", p. 169:

"Pour Marx, il n'y eut jamais dans l'histoire que des tendances,... De sorte qu'on va trop loin lorsqu'on exige qu'il montre le plein accomplissement d'un mode de production..." (p. 169)

b) In the discussion on the peasantry I have distinguished between the different modes of production prevailing in various regions. This is not in contradiction to describing a mercantile mode of production as the dominant one in Greek society as a whole. The one level of analysis is geographic or sectorial, the other is not: it concerns the social formation as a whole.

\*38

Although considering industrialisation as a sufficient condition and an exclusive characteristic of capitalism is an oversimplification (see Giddens, "The Class Structure..."), this would apply to advanced societies. Conversely, there is no doubt that some degree of industrialisation is a pre-condition for capitalism in the initial stage of its dominance. This



calls for clarification of the concept of original capital accumulation as used here. Gershenkron links the concept with the "initial industrial spurt" ("Economic Backwardness...", pp.90ff; especially the argument on pp. 98-99). This is a view which is appealing, not only because it clarifies a rather schematically interpreted Marxian classification, but mainly because of its utility in the evaluation of economic reality. The term would surely be meaningless if it referred to more or less plain hoarding. If, by contrast, the accumulated capital is not hoarded but invested, then a reinvestment in the mercantile or more widely tertiary sector constitutes no real change from pre-capitalism but would simply be a quantitative change within the same mode. The change in mode begins not when this accumulated wealth is unhoarded and invested, but when it is invested in industry (p.116). I see no other safe path leading to conditions of large-scale exchanges of free labour with money. (Marx, "Grundrisse", p. 471; see also Mandel, "Traité...", vol.I, p. 150.) In Anderson's analysis of the reasons why China has failed to industrialise, the role of investment patterns is seen as the central issue ("Lineages...", pp. 544 and 540-49). Similarly, in his discussion on the delay of capitalist development in Mexico after the 1857 reform, A.Nunes underlines the same problems:

"La reforme ... ne réussit pas à imposer le capital industriel comme structure dominante... Le capital-argent accumulé ... (est) investi improductivement (usure), ou alors dans le commerce ... ou dans le textile européen."

("Les revolutions de Mexique", p. 29.)

•39

"... the depression (in Greece), due to independent and general causes..." This is from Lewis-Sergeant, "Greece in the 19th century", p. 309, which was written in 1897. The passage describes the causes of the crisis in Greece of the 1880s.

\*40

Even the 32 engineers used in railroad construction were foreign -- French and Swiss. (Dakin, "The Unification...", p.146)

The sleepers used in the laying of the rails were also wholly imported, despite Greece's ability to provide the timber (Martin, "Greece of the 20th Century", p.201). In fact, only a few years later, certain lines were mainly used in the transport of timber (58% of the total on the Agrinion line, see p.202). The necessary fuel (briquettes) was also wholly imported to the amount of 18,000 tons annually during the 1910s (p.197).

The reader interested in Greek railways will find quite an exhaustive description in this book by Martin, written just before World War I and possibly a very diligent spying job (pp.188-225).

See also the Tables earlier in this chapter for more information on the development of the railways.

\*41

It is also important to take into account the unusual reflationary impact the boom in currant production had on the Greek economy. This factor, together with government spending on railways and other projects financed by extensive borrowing abroad, were nearly the only causes of whatever economic development occurred in the last quarter of the century. The currant blessing came totally by chance: pheloxera had destroyed the French vineyards in 1878 and caused a serious shortage of grapes in France for a long period (during which, incidentally, French vines were first grown in California). The boom lasted from 1878 to 1893, and currant exports rose from 13.6 million drachmae in 1861, to an all-time high of 37.8 million in 1875 (Dakin, "The Unification..", p.250). The slow development of the country would have been even slower without these random windfalls which had nothing to do with the development of a secondary sector. They merely contributed towards a greater commercialisation of agriculture in the Peloponnese, - and not towards the country's development as a whole towards capitalism.

42

On the important though unfortunately indecisive role played by diaspora magnates in the resurrection of Greek shipping, see Andreades, "La marine marchande...", pp.20-21, which has a description of the contribution of Vagliano (London) and Zarifi (Constantinople). See also Dakin's comments on shipping in his "The Unification...".

43

Hobsbawm, "The Age of Capital", p. 58.

44

Railways receipts per mile in 1896 were 13,720.- drachmae, in 1905 they were 16,090.- drachmae (Abbot, "Greece in Evolution", p. 205).

For a very detailed account of the not-so-brilliant investment and operational finances of the Greek railroads for one of its first years of operation (1892), see Law's Report, F.O. Annual Series N° 1169, April 1893, p. 87a; the following comment on the most productive line, that from Athens to Piraeus, is illuminating: "The Piraeus-Athens Company derive a large part of their revenue from the bathing and other public establishments which they own at Phaleron."

45

On the diplomatic activity backstage of the 1893 bankruptcy, see Driault-Lhéritier, "Histoire...", vol. IV, pp. 296-98.

\*46

Girard, for example, is very enthusiastic about the growth of Greek industry before 1883 ("La Grèce en 1883", pp. 45 and 135), but his description of what he calls industry and growth shows quite clearly that his enthusiasm was caused merely by comparison with the zero point.

George Papandreou, who was to become Prime Minister in the 1960s, spoke in a 1914 interview with the magazine "Grammata" of the "future" industrialisation of Greece, which he then considered still at a pre-capitalist stage. It is interesting that, in this very early and forgotten text, Papandreou proceeds to a Marxist analysis, considering the bourgeois transformation as a future and not a past stage of Greek history. Yet this was at late as 1914.

Still later on, in 1930, Venizelos held the following views about Greek industrialisation: "Although we (Greeks) believed until 1912 that Greece would remain almost exclusively agricultural ... after the war, (this) is impossible. Of course, agriculture will always remain the main source of our wealth..."

(emphasis added). Speech to Parliament, 14 March 1930, in S.Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", vol.II, p. 484. Then, in a speech to the Senate, two years later (26 April 1932), he exclaimed: "We cannot forever remain a nation of compradors."

It is not surprising, therefore, that Zolotas explicitly classifies the 1885-1911 period as one of stagnation in spite of heavy tariff protection ("I Hellas eis to...", p.17); and that Kordatos contradicts his own interpretation of pre-1909 as the period of the rise of the middle class, by admitting that an analysis of the pre-1909 figures on industry "does not indicate a rapid industrialisation", and that it was "the 1912-1913 wars that expanded the country and supported industrial growth" and then that "industry has further grown since 1922" ("Historia...", vol. XIII, p.16).

47

In his excellent book on the peasant problem in Greece, Vergopoulos ("To agrotiko...") supports this view with very good argumentation. I believe, however, that his view is based on a false premise, as I try to show in the text.

\*48

Vergopoulos rightly emphasises the role of the Koumoundouros governments and their policies in the development of the Greek economy, although it did not result in the capitalist transformation of Greek society. It is true that until recently this role had been underrated, but its rediscovery should not lead one to the other extreme, i.e. to underestimate the role of Trikoupis. That Koumoundouros followed a protectionist policy, and that the number of factories increased from 28 to 145 in this period, are indications of relative, not absolute value. Trikoupis' concern with the economic infrastructure, railroads, modernisation, public investments etc. had an undeniable effect on Greece's later development. Progress in industry during Koumoundouros' period could not be sustained without the progress in the infrastructure achieved in the subsequent period. Gershenkron's view on the period of preparation of a certain infrastructure (railroads etc.) contributes to a less linear

understanding of the relation between industrialisation and its "prerequisites": "... it is ... possible to believe that in a backward country a period of preparation that is consummated before the industrial upsurge ... makes it impossible for the latter to materialise." (Gershenkron, "Economic Backwardness...", p.113)

49

See H.Trikoupis' 1889 Budget speech (p.33 of English text). Further comments on Trikoupis' concern to attract diaspora capital are in Toynbee, "Greek Policy ..", pp. 8-9; Kordatos, "Historia...", vol.XII, p.437, pp.417-18, and vol.XIII, p.237; and Vergopoulos, "To agrotiko...", p.321.

\*50

"...many landowners have agreed to break up their holdings if they can obtain fair prices...", Martin, "Greece of the 20th Century", p. 253. This is a book published in 1913.

See also Ventiris, "I Hellas...", vol.II, p. 27, for an explanation of the mildness of the strife between middle classes and what, without qualification, he calls the "ruling class".

Despite his opinion that a strife had developed between landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie, Vergopoulos also admits that the "landowners participated in the capitalist economic development" of Greece as financiers, businessmen, merchants etc., and did not strongly object to the land reform -- they just bargained for more economic advantages in the expropriation process ("To agrotiko...", p. 146).

See also the interesting remark on Greece by Barrington-Moore Jr., "Social Origins...", footnote 4 on p.438, and his text throughout pp. 436-41 concerning the "rough working coalition between ... the landed upper classes and the emerging commercial and manufacturing interests" and its effects on the emergence of unstable authoritarian democracies. It should be remembered, however, that in Greece the landed upper classes did not insist on keeping their role as such, though they did insist, and very successfully so, on retaining their privileges.

With the versatility and entrepreneurial skill that only people with long histories of prosecution can display, the Greek 'aristocracy' opted for more than a mere coalition with the class of merchants and industrialists. After the land reform they chose to play a dominant role within the bourgeoisie itself by becoming its financier section, though always in the particularly Greek comprador manner which, in the financing sector, implies a predominance of practices such as usury and speculation in urban properties.

\*51

Those who have devoted years of effort to disentangling the social origins of the 1821 revolution will understand (and forgive), I hope, my somewhat arbitrary statement and take it for what it is: a working hypothesis. It would be impossible to examine this problem, not even in summary, without diverging from either my main course or the elementary rules of scholarship. It is equally impossible to ignore it. No objectivity cult will ever exorcise our assumptions. I have preferred admitting my assumption on the 1821 revolution rather than pretend that subsequent events can be treated in total historical isolation.

52

See Vergopoulos, "To agrotiko...", pp.342-48 for a good brief survey of these two outlooks.

54

Giannopoulos, a fanatically pro-aristocratic writer, considers that the politicians were a distinct body totally unrelated to the aristocracy. His description of their practices (Neon Pnevma, pp.5-23) is characteristic of the autonomy he attributed to them.

\*55

The dowry amounted to drs 400,000 (£17,400). Trikoupis also conceded an increase of nearly £6,000 of the King's civil list, the gift of a tract of very fertile land in the Peloponnese, and the inscription of an amount of £20,000 in the budget (Filaretos, "Xenokratia..."; and Kordatos, "Historia..." vol.IX, pp. 496 ff). Of these £20,000 an amount of £5,600 or drs 199,700 was actually spent to build a Crown Prince's residence in Athens (Lewis-Sergeant, "Greece in the 19th century", p.309). After the 1893 State bank-

ruptcy, the King requested funds for the repair of the royal yacht. The government allowed about £2,000. By the time the repairs had cost over £34,000, the court was still asking for another £4,500, and specialist shipbuilders' calculated that it would finally cost not less than £115,000. Yet the royal family never used the yacht because the final funds were not approved and the vessel allegedly "never came up to the standards of the Russian Emperor's yacht" (Lambrinos, "I monarchia...", p.70). General Danglis, a royal aide-de-camp for quite some time, mentions quite casually how common the "vice of avarice" was among the royal family (Archives, vol.I, p.221).

56

Korizis, "I politiki zoi...", p.110

58

Moskof, "I ethniki...", p.164; see also his comments on p.153. On the autonomy of politics there is an interesting early view by Sklires, "Ta synchrona...", p.54. As Moskof puts it, "Among these (bourgeois) sections of urban society, explicit conflicts will seldom appear ... on the political level. ... This establishment will continue to rest in peace, ... more and more isolated in its uncontrolled omniscience from the masses and their still latent movement."

59

Derived approximately from a diagram given by Moskof, "I ethniki...", p.129; as there is no mention of source, the percentages have only indicative value.

\*60

To summarise in a schematic manner, a sui generis political oligarchy was called to administer a bourgeois institutional system, in order to meet problems and conflicts of an essentially non-capitalist society. The effect of such a disarticulation between the political, institutional and socio-economic levels was that social conflict could not possibly find faithful reflection in politics.

The use of the term disarticulation, and the level approach do not imply emphasis on the structural aspects of methodology.

A dialectical method is not possible in Cartesian terms. "L'erreur théorique du structuralisme consiste ... en ce qu'il privilégie inconsidérément un concept, celui de la structure" (Lefebvre, "L'ideologie...", p.10). Then, pp. 37-38: "Les totalités nouvelles entraînent à la fois la disparition des anciennes structures et la formation ... des structures nouvelles. D'où proviennent-elles? D'une activité infra-structurale, a-structurale ou supra-structurale?" And, p.40: "La dernière acception de la structure, celle qui conçoit la destructuration au sein même de la structuration, domine et enveloppe les autres dans "le Capital". Elles les subordonne au mouvement dialectique et à l'histoire."

61

For contemporary opinions see General Danglis, "Archives", especially in vol.I, pp. 93 ff, 98, 109; Deschamps, pp. 66-94; and Rontiris, "I kata syntagma...", pp. 389-406, who offers an exhaustive account of the "ways in which parliament may be corrupted". For later commentaries see Dakin, "The Unification..", pp. 140 ff. and 267-68; B.Markesinis, "The Theory...", p.148; and Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", especially vol.II, p.371.

\*62

The votes of unpropertied peasants could be easily and cheaply bought, usually with payment cash down as soon as the candidate was safely elected. A large variety of other small favours were also brought into play: assuring better terms in the relationship with the landowner, especially if he was a candidate himself; extension of expiry dates for loans; less usurious interest rates; postponement of arrest for non-payment; clemency in cases of banditry or other penal offences; help with the formalities of emigration; cheaper fees at the doctors and lawyers in the town; godfather relationships; employment of the family's children as domestic servants; and so on and so on. Many of these spoils were granted by the politician himself, some were arranged by his clients lower down in the hierarchy or his local agents.

63 For an interesting etymological point on the term collegoi see Vergopoulos, "To agrotiko...", pp.312 and 314.



An additional profit in votes was yielded by the politician's ability to increase the labour demand by creating additional civil service posts, and to meet this demand by placing his own clients in the vacancies.

\*65

a) In the last decades of the century Greece had a higher degree of literacy than other backward countries (see Table, Chapter B). This was partly due to the schools built with diaspora funds, destined to supply Greek businesses abroad with reliable and inexpensive labour. It was also due, however, to the propertied peasants beginning to educate their children, and the employment prospects created by the State.

b) On the relation between education and patronage for civil service posts, see an early and very critical opinion by Venizelos in a speech to the Second Constituent Assembly of (autonomous) Crète on 3 Nov. 1906 (S.Stefanou, ed., "Benizelos...", vol.II, pp. 383-84).

\*67

Similarly, at a more general level, the divisive effect of patronage added to the already significant split of the peasantry into two classes - propertied and unpropertied - with two distinct ideologies, thus contributing to the inability of the rural population to mobilise and generate an agrarian party movement. Simultaneously, the material and ideological fetters that patronage had gradually woven around the unpropertied peasants further helped to contain any consistent revolutionary tendencies.

\*68

See Karanikolas, "Nothes...", pp. 250-53 for a detailed description of the system of voting. See also p. 262 for a reference to Prince Nicholas' conversation with Voulgaris, the political leader who excelled in fraud and violence. In this discussion, Voulgaris went as far as to propose the assassination of his great opponent, Koumoundoures. That he dared to talk about assassination to the King shows the degree of corruption in the electoral practices.

For information on army activity during later elections, see pp. 299-300, 4-2-04, 326-28; and especially 384-85 on the 1890

elections which were held under the premiership of Trikoupis, who thus seems to have resigned himself to the bad habits after a long period of electoral honesty.

See pp. 271-72, 282-83 on the army and the gendarmerie collaborating with the bandits for electoral purposes; p.277 contains the following quotation from an 1868 newspaper reporting on the election: "... thirty graves were opened and about fifty citizens wounded..." The official announcement (30 March 1862) speaks of ten and 26 respectively. See also pp. 291, 297, 351-52. See also Dafnis, "Ta hellenika ...", pp. 70 ff. Repeated mention of fraud and violence can be found in Kordatos' and Aspreas' works, and almost all historians of the period agree that these practices distorted electoral results excessively and often decisively. Karanikolas' book is a useful comprehensive account of much information on the subject.

Rontiris, in his "I kata syntagma...", p.391, speaks of the "62 army units (that) may be used (for influencing election results) in all 62 provinces of Greece" (referring to the third quarter of the 19th century). See also Melas, "I epanastassis...", p. 167.

General Danglis, "Archives", vol.I, pp.93 ff., mentions that when he was a lieutenant in 1878 he was transferred thirteen times in about 30 months. Five times he was transferred back to a town where he had been serving only a few months earlier. He makes no comment or complaint, perhaps because transfers were then such a common phenomenon. But even more incredible are the reasons for two of these moves; in one case a unit was transferred "...so that the animals might consume the fodder stored there", and in another a whole camp for 10,000 soldiers was created out of nothing, to support the economy of the Defence Minister's constituency (D.Grivas). Dismal conditions, heat, lack of water and epidemics obliged the Minister to dissolve the camp a few months later (p.98).

69

In functionalist terms, a "deviation-amplifying mutual causal process" within the system (Magoroh Marujama, "The Second Cybernetics", in American Scientist, vol.I, 1963).

\*70

In 1905-6, the police force numbered 6,538 men, one for every 90 male adults, yet it was assisted by the army units dispersed in many

of the provincial towns (British Admiralty, "Handbook of Greece", published in the 1910s, p.124). Martin's remark on Athens of this period is characteristic (p.111): "There are few better policed cities than Athens today..." (See Table of State-development indicators, chapter B).

71

'Systems of economic and social structures' in the sense of 'modes of production'.

\*72

See the rather forgotten book by Polychroniadis, "Peri dimossion ypallilon", pp. 242 ff. In this interesting, although somewhat one-sided and eccentric work, Polychroniadis considers that the system of patronage has historically evolved in Greece on the basis of a peculiar practical transaction: the MPs 'allowed' the executive to virtually dominate their own field, i.e. legislation, and in return the executive allowed them to interfere excessively with the administration. The shortcomings of the transaction theory are evident, but the relative refinement of the argument over the functions of the executive and legislative, and its early publishing date (1918) make this rather an interesting work.

73

V. Corbett, in his Report on the Greek finances for the year 1899, F.O. Annual Series N°2370, p.24, speaks eloquently of the interrelation between politics and civil servants.

74

See chapter D, introduction to the 1909 period, summary of events.

\*75

Premier Venizelos told the Reform Parliament on 18 May 1911: "That we establish permanence for the civil servants is not for their personal benefit but because we want the administration to function properly" (Session 92, 18/5/1911, B' Reform Parliament, in "Efimeriston Sizitisseon" (Annals), vol.A, p.2347). See also Sgouritsas, "Syntagmatikon dikaion", vol.I, pp. 448-55. Rontiris, "I kata syntagma...", pp. 393-96, describes thoroughly the vulnerability of the tenure of civil servants and judges during the 19th century. He

concludes his analysis of these vices with an allusion to two "possible" outcomes or implications of such conditions: anarchy "in the Mexican style" or, even more characteristically, "Asiatic despotism" (sic), (p.403).

On the practice of firing civil servants, see Karanikolas, "Nothes...", pp. 270-71. One of its most unexpected effects was the naming of a central Athenian square Plateia Klafthmonos, or 'Square of Weeping'. It was there that many ministries had their offices, outside which would gather, protest, and weep the civil servants who had lost their employment because of a change in government.

76

In Dakin's words, "collections of groups" ("The Unification...", p. 141).

77

See Korizis, "I politiki zoi...", especially p. 110; also Karanikolas, "Nothes...", throughout.

\*78

Lambrinos, "I monarchia...", p. 63: "...He (George I) always chose the minority parties, so that no viable government could be formed." Trikoupis himself, in his "Political Testament", names the King "the greatest of all patrons, (rousfetologos, Acropolis, 3 and 4 April, 1896). See also Karanikolas, "Nothes...", pp.372-73. For a complete account of the monarch's competences and his excesses in practicing the rights of appointment and dissolution, see Filaretos, "Xenokratia...". It is significant that George I ruthlessly abandoned Trikoupis in 1895, after long years of an alliance lucrative for the throne, because the Prime Minister found it impossible to satisfy the new royal demand for more money, this time in the form of grants to the Princes Nicholas and George.

General Danglis ("Archives", pp. 100 and 229) wrote two articles on patronage in the armed forces, the one in 1897 recommending the creation of a headquarters independent of the minister, and the other in 1891 to support the Crown Prince's appointment as commander-in-chief of the army. It is sad that this appointment, which he had recommended as a measure against patronage, ended up being the supreme source of nepotism and elitism. It is even sadder and char-

acteristic of the idealistic and formalised conception of politics in Greece that Danglis never for a moment would have thought of such an outcome as only natural in the circumstances.

For a lighter and picturesque description of patronage and its linkages with the throne, see Giannopoulos, "Neon Pnevma", pp. 24-25.

\*79

On Trikoupis' article "Who is to blame?" and for a very good discussion on the "principle of proclaimed confidence", see B. Markesinis, "The theory ...", pp. 146-56. This author purports that the principle was not followed in practice, and this is basically true. What is important, however, is why it was not followed, and whom besides the Crown this asset benefited. Markesinis says, for example (p.150) that the desertion of 69 MPs from the Deliyannis party was the result of parliamentary manoeuvres by the King and Trikoupis so that this transfer of votes would allow him to form a government - which is quite true, although one should remember that Trikoupis had only days before declined another royal offer of the premiership, precisely because he did not have a majority. But Markesinis also claims that this case is similar to the 1965 events that led to the 1967 coup. (Premier Papandreou was dismissed by King Constantine on the issue of who would be the Minister of Defence during the Aspida trial in which Papandreou's son was involved.) There are two vital differences which Markesinis mentions in an earlier paragraph but does not consider important enough to use for qualifying his comparison of 1886 with 1965: that in 1886 the Deliyannis government "was forced by events to resign" (to quote the author himself, p.149), whereas in 1965 the Premier resigned in protest against the King's intervention - rightly or wrongly. And most important, the "force of events" in 1886 was Greece's immense diplomatic failure and humiliation on a major international issue, "Bulgaria's unilateral annexation ... of Eastern Roumelia" (p. 149). The 1886 crisis included a series of brutal interventions by the British Ambassador, the sea-blockade of Greece by the fleets of the Great Powers, and three days of undeclared limited war with Turkey. Deliyannis' handling of this crisis was such a failure that the isolated but also totally

uncontrolled Greek army was in danger of a major debacle, and indeed suffered a humiliating surrender of one of its units at Koutra (an event diligently distorted in sources and historical works but reported faithfully in the texts written by Gen. Danglis, ("Archives", vol.I, pp. 124-38). It was in this atmosphere of failure and panic that Deliyannis' MPs abandoned their leader. B.Marke-sinis disregards this vital element, which makes any comparison with 1965 merely legalistic; neither does his excellent discussion on the 1965 crisis (pp. 220-23) help to substantiate this comparison.

On Venizelos' opinions against the principle, see S.Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", vol.I, pp. 239-42. He specified, however, that he considered it as necessary during the 19th century but not in the 20th when there was "no danger" of authoritarian initiatives by the Head of the State. Before long, with King Constantine's flagrant intervention in politics, Venizelos fell victim to this non-existent danger.

Indicative of the politicians' formalistic and inconsistent attitude towards the Crown in the 19th century is the intransigent position taken by D. Rallis against the King, in an interview which appeared in "Asty" of 10 May 1896. The tone of this interview was not uncommon, but to hear such words from one of the prominent royalist leaders was certainly unusual. It bore the desired fruit, however: Rallis increased his vote in the next election.

80

Moskof, "I ethniki...", p. 168

81

P.Dertilis, "To dimossion chreos...", pp. 168, 208, and "Simvoli eis tin dimossionomikin...", p. 102. The ratio proceeds/repayment is based on net input-output figures. It is difficult, however, to establish it with exactitude, as it is not easy to classify objectively such outputs as 'purchases' by Greece in the creditors' internal market.

\*92

Moskof, "I ethniki...", p. 117; and Katsoulis, "To katestimeno...", p. 185. Here is a short but revealing quotation from a diplomatic document: "... we should perhaps not lose much by writing off in his (William's, later King George) favour the bad debt due to the three Powers by Greece". (Palmerstone to Russel, 6 April 1863, G.D. 22/22, as quoted by Prevelakis, "British Policy...", pp. 145-46; see also pp. 153-54 and 155. The debt was called bad only because repayments had been slow; but whether they were overdue or not did not concern the candidate King, as they would nonetheless contribute to the already substantial civil list he had demanded. In the end, Protocol N°3 of 1863 fixed a sum of £4,000 a year which each of the three Powers could take off the sum Greece had in 1860 promised to repay against her overdue debts. In addition, the Powers generously promised another £10,000 annually out of the revenue from the government of the Ionian islands (Prevelakis, p.157). This was, of course, being generous with someone else's money, as the islands were to unite with Greece the day George ascended the throne.

\*93

There are abundant data on the exploitative policies of the Powers in Greece, but their closer consideration lies outside the scope of this work. The four impressive cases mentioned suffice to show the degree of economic dominance (an effect, but also a cause of political dominance), which is the point that needed clarifying here. (On economic dominance through trade, see Moskof, "I ethniki...", and "Thessaloniki..."; through financing, see P.Dertilis, "La dette publique de la Grèce" and "La dette publique des États Balkaniques". A work on dominance through currency parities has yet to be written and would be a very interesting piece of research.

The relationship of the economically powerful European countries with the new Balkan States after their liberation from Turkey is in some ways comparable to that of the United States with Latin America after decolonisation. There is, however, a considerable political difference which seems to have been responsible for the lower degree and relative subtlety of economic domination in the Balkans. Indeed, the antagonism between the great European powers

created for the Balkan countries occasional opportunities and openings of an oligopolistic-oligopsonistic nature; conversely, in Latin America the United States enjoyed a very high degree of monopoly-monopsony. The economic ramification of the Eastern question and the Balkan problem may have been among the major causes of local and world wars, but at the same time they allowed the Balkan States a certain degree of emancipation. This, as an implicit theme, underlies the entire argument in the interesting historical works by Domna Dontas, "Greece and the Great Powers, 1863-1975", and Kofos, "Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878".

\*84

- a) For a description of the causes behind King George's dependence on the Great Powers as brilliant as it is concise, see Kaltchas, "Introduction...", pp. 111-16.
- b) Institutionalised in the 1880s under Trikoupis' government, the Princes' occupation of leading positions in the army was challenged after the debacle of the 1897 war against Turkey, when the Princes had been busy not in the frontline but "chicken-hunting" in the towns. Royal occupation of these posts was openly contested by the rebel officers in 1909, and the Princes were finally removed from the army -- only to be fatally reinstated when Venizelos decided to give the leadership of the armed forces to Crown Prince Constantine. The King thus became the glorious Field Marshal of the 1912-13 war, at the expense of Venizelos' political genius, the staff officers' military talents, and, inevitably, the common soldiers' lives.
- c) Nicholas, Prince of Greece, "My fifty Years", p. 212: "The German Minister ... suggested (to the Greek War Minister) that ... my change in attitude towards the German artillery gun began at the time when I took tea with the Schneiders." Schneider and Canet were the French armament magnates participating in the 1906 tender for the procurement of guns by the Greek government. The tea was served on board Schneider's yacht, and the Prince's negative change of mind as regards the German gun undeniably contributed in the end to Greece deciding to purchase the French Schneider-Canet gun instead.

The case of this armament procurement is extremely complicated but deserves special attention. It became the cause of a latent scandal which was discussed in Athens for many years, with rumours



flying about about Prince Nicholas' alleged favouritism towards the French gun. Whatever the truth of these accusations, the mere fact that they were levied shows there was a widespread feeling that the Crown and the Court were not impartial where such big deals were concerned.

The dismantlable Schneider gun was the invention of General-to-be Danglis. Another Greek officer, Lykoudis, had proposed a similar invention in some article, and the resulting enmity between the two rival inventors became a vital financial issue when the Greek army decided to purchase a large quantity of the Danglis gun built by Schneider-Canet. The accusations against Prince Nicholas were based on his well-known friendship with the then Colonel Danglis (see the Prince's very personal and warm letters to Danglis in the latter's "Archives", vol.I, p. 248, dated 6 April and 18 May 1905. See also pp. 255 ff. on the issue of the Schneider gun and Prince Nicholas' letter to Danglis, sent before the procurement, promising he would visit the Schneider factory in Paris, which he never did.) Danglis mentions (p. 281) that he had also visited Crown Prince Constantine, trying to convince him of the superiority of the French gun over the one built by Krupp of Germany.

I do not see why X. Lefkoparidis, who so painstakingly edited Danglis' "Archives", persisted in trying to prove that Danglis did not enjoy royal favour. He mentions, for example, that Nicholas was not interested in Danglis' invention (vol. I, p. 267). I do not know what made him so certain of this, unless it was perhaps Danglis' own remark (p.288) that Nicholas was "on principle" not interested in dismantlable guns. Yet the Prince also told Danglis that he set aside his previous principles the moment he saw the performance of the new weapon.

It is not certain that Nicholas would have helped Danglis and Schneider unless he had become convinced that the new gun was the best (which it indeed was). On the other hand, it is undeniable that Danglis was a man of honesty and integrity. But patronage is not necessarily and always extended as a cover for dishonest acts. It could well be that Nicholas intervened in the best interests of Greece as much as for the sake of his friend.

What really matters to our discussion is, of course, that armement, like other administrative decisions, was in the competence of the Crown, and that patronage doubtless did affect relevant decisions. The implication for the distribution of power between Crown, foreign suppliers, their representatives in Greece, and the Powers' ambassadors are quite clear.

\*85

Here is a description by a contemporary traveller, in slightly Victorian style:

"Les capitalistes (de la diaspora), d'abord affligés par un ostracisme a l'intérieur, ne se découragèrent pas. Ils pensèrent que le seul moyen de calmer ces politiciens hargneux c'était de les faire fumer, manger et danser. Ils ... étalèrent, sur des tables, des viandes froides, des pâtés de gibier et des vins ... C'est ainsi que plusieurs tasses de thé ont opéré la fusion des classes et que les figures du cotillon, en mêlant les partis, ont apaisé les haines sociales." (Deschamps, "La Grèce...", p.53)  
(emphasis added)

86

- a) On the early stages of the discontent within the army, see Gen. Danglis; "Archives", vol. I, pp. 236, 245-47 (letter to Premier Theotokis, dated 16 Jan. 1906 and containing an unusually strong criticism of the armaments: purchases of the government in the effort to reorganise the artillery), and pp. 256, 259ff.
- b) Mazarakis, "Memoirs", p. 97; Pangalos, "Memoirs", vol. I, pp. 17 and 52-53; Aspreas, "Politiki...", pp. 105-09; HHS Politisches Archiv Vienna, XVI/60, N°50C, as quoted by Papacosmas, "The Greek Military...", p. 102; Melas, "I epanastassis...", p.218. Pangalos is the only writer who explicitly claims that even the nco's came mainly from the middle and upper classes.

87

The officers' mild and flexible intentions are widely reported in the bibliography. See especially Melas, "I epanastassis...", pp. 213 and 227-28; and Pangalos, "Memoirs", throughout his chapter on the 1909 coup. ✕

88

On the infringement of the 1864 Constitution by the 1909 events, see Kaltchas, "Introduction...", p. 139; also cf. B.Markesinis,

"Theory...", pp. 158-61 for a thorough legal discussion and a persuasive argument that Venizelos had not assured the dissolution of parliament when he was appointed; Svolos, "Ta hellinika ...", p.46, also considers that the 1864 Constitution was infringed.

89

Kitsikis, "Le Parlement...", p. 60.

90

Korizis, "I politiki zoi...", p. 216

91

Kordatos, "Historia ...", vol.VIII, p. 93.

92

Kordatos, 'Issagogi ... kefalaiokratias', pp. 63-67 and 68.

93

Vournas, "Goudi..." p.73

94

Meskof, "I ethniki...", p. 273. Among foreign authors see also Legg, "Politics in Modern Greece", p. 68.

95

Filaretos, "Seimeiossis;...", pp. 560-63.

96

Pangalos, "Memoirs", vol. I, p. 44.

97

Sarafis, "Memoirs", p. 42

98

Melas, "I epanastassis...", p. 183.

99

Zakythinos, "Politiki...", p. 92.

100

Korizis, "I politiki zoi...", p. 215

101

Dafnis, "Ta hellinika ...", pp. 104-16

102

Karolides, in Paparrigopoulos' "Historia...", pp. 125-26, fn.3.

103

S.Markesinis, "Politiki...", vol.III, p. 72, and footnotes 5 and 6 on p. 98.

104

Ventiris, throughout "I Hellas tou ...".

105

Kaltchas, "Introduction...", p. 138. The book as whole is an excellent though unfinished work; Kaltchas' premature death deprived Greek historiography of a brilliant scholar.

106

Svolos, "Ta hellinika...", pp. 45-46.

107

Legg, "Politics...", quotations from pp. 68 and 194; also comments on p. 312.

108

Toynbee, "Greek Policy ...", pp. 11-12..

109

Acropolis, 9 May 1909.

110

Patris, 9 August 1910.

111

Ventiris, "I Hellas tou 1910-1920", vol.I, pp. 74-75.

112

From an article, "To likofos ton aston", by G. Ventiris in Embros of 18 March 1950, quoted by S.Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", vol.I, pp. 302.

\*113

The methodological error is not caused simply by a false assumption, but also by a different -- and somewhat one-sided -- viewpoint: that of a system approach as opposed to an action approach. The reader may wish to refer back to the basic commentary of fn.\*33 to remind himself of the fundamental distinction between these approaches.

114

Ventiris, "I Hellas tou 1910-1920", vol. I, p. 29.

115

On the enthusiasm caused in Greece by expectation from the liberalisation potential of the Neo-Turk revolution, see Driault-Lh eritier, "Histoire...", vol.V, pp. 5-9. On the rapid disillusionment in Greece and its effects on the Greek officers' morale and bitterness, see Kaltchas, "Introduction...", p. 138, and Manousakis, "Hellas - Wohin...", pp. 36-41. Also Ventiris, "I Hellas...", vol. I, p. 42; Melas, "I epanastassis...", p.204; and especially Pangalos, "Memoirs", pp. 44-50, who also gives the recruitment pattern mentioned in my text. See also Driault-Lh eritier, "Histoire..." vol.V, pp. 32-33.

\*116

Ventiris, referring to the discussions in the parliament of 1910, reports that the Princes and their friends used to call the army "that dirty old mob" (paliaskero). He also says that Crown Prince Constantine once told a cavalry officer, "Shut up, Captain", and addressed another with the elegant apostrophe, "Sit down, you swine". (Ventiris, "I Hellas...", vol.I, pp. 42 and 86; see also Melas, "I epanastassis ...", p. 171; and Legg, "Politics in Modern Greece", p. 188.)

On the nepotism rampant in the royal headquarters, there is an eloquent passage from the memorandum submitted to the King by D.Rallis, an essentially royalist politician, when he was invited to form a government after the coup: "The condition of the army and the recent anti-disciplinary (sic) coups have been furthered by those who declare ... that they entirely have the good-will of the General Command"(i.e. the Crown Prince). Quoted by Apostolopoulos, "O Hellinikos...", p. 15.

117

- a) Pangalos considers this law as a basic cause of the coup; "Memoirs", vol.I, pp. 52-53.
- b) For an analysis of intervention in Brazil based too exclusively on problems of professionalism, see F.M. Nunn, "Military Professionalism and Professional Militarism in Brazil, 1870-1970". Along similar lines but much narrower in its approach is the article by U. Sundhaussen, "The Fashioning of Unity in the Indonesian Army". For an explanation of Latin American military corporatism, see

E. Liewen, "Generals versus Presidents" (p. 107 gives a summary of the author's approach).

The subject of methodology is discussed in detail in Appendix II of this work.

118

On the marginal effect of the officers' class origins on their behaviour in Latin America, see the interesting discussion in H.J. Wiarda, "The Latin American Development Process...", pp. 480 and 477. For a very good critique of the social origins theory, see R. Vandycke, "Les appareils militaires...", especially pp. 66-118 and 187-88. See also L. North, "Civil-Military Relations...", p. 59, for a similarly critical position. For moderately opposite views, see J.J. Johnson, "The Latin American Military" in J.J. Johnson (ed), "The Role of the Military...", especially p. 112. Johnson, though attributing some importance to the officers' class, emphasises even more other social and economic factors. See for example pp. 113, 114, 116.

119

On the relationship between the army and the State, see the interesting discussion by R. Vandycke, "Les appareils militaires...", especially pp. 118 ff, 136, 187-88. However, I would like to go further and claim that the army can also be relatively autonomous of the State, that it is not necessarily an apparatus of the State, as seems to be Vandycke's view.

120

Pangalos, "Memoirs", vol. I, p. 52

121

As quoted in Papacosmas, "The Greek Military...", p. 147, with reference to the newspapers Chronos and Le Messenger d'Athènes. On the League's total lack of socio-political programme, Melas in his "I epanastassis...", p. 210, is categorical: "The officers had no programme whatsoever."

122

The position of Vournas, a conscientious Marxist writer, is characteristic of these ambiguities. He considers 1909 as a bourgeois revolt, yet admits that "the League did not have a specific pro-

gramme for bourgeois transformation ("Goudi ...", pp. 154-55) and that even Venizelos after 1909 did not bring about this change' (pp. 180-82).

123

Concerning Karaiskakis and the nco's, see Vournas, "Goudi...", pp. 105-06; and Melas, "I epanastassis...", p. 174. Karaiskakis' manifesto is reprinted in full by Melas, pp. 245-47. See also, for example, the article that appeared in Chronos, a newspaper supporting the officers, claiming "the abolition of feudal serfdom" (as quoted by Kordatos, "Historia...", vol.XIII, p.104). On the officers' well-known and often expressed hostility against the oligarchy, see Pangalos, "Memoirs", and the Archives of the 1909 Revolution. But these were individual positions, not the League's official policies.

\*124

The technicalities of the indemnity methods (State bonds etc.) and the fact that they turned out to be harmful to the landowners' interests when applied, make no essential difference to the argument. The harm became apparent only later on and was in no way premeditated or revolutionary. It was a direct result of Greece's economic weakness arising from the 1922 debacle and her virtual bankruptcy following the 1929-32 crisis. It also was, like the relatively low indemnity rates, a result of the landowners' reduced bargaining power after the general shrinking of their economic and political power. Again, however, this was not the direct effect of any revolution against them.

125

Vergopoulos, "To agrotiko...", p. 147.

126

S.Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", vol.II, p. 318

127

Moskof, "I ethniki...", pp. 265-66

128

Consular Report N°4484, F.O. Annual Series 1909, Piraeus; Report 4750 for 1910, Piraeus; 1909 Report on Thessaly N° 4492.

129

Moskof, "I ethniki...", p. 266 quotes this letter and attributes to it the meaning of implicit disapproval of the coup, as I also do in my text. For a commentary on the ideological evolution of a class, see also Nunes, "Les revolutions du Mexique", p. 153.

\*130

A few years earlier, in fact, Giannopoulos ("Neon Pnevma", p.33), commenting on the revolutionary climate in 1906 Greece, said that it had already existed "... for a long time". He then called for a revolution himself, in his usual Nietzschean and chauvinistic language, but for a revolution by the aristocracy, specifying that it should have a "military organisation" (p. 48).

The case of Penelope Delta may serve to sum up many of the arguments in the text. Her books, addressed mainly to young readers, were written in demotic and frequently praised the Crown. Her father Emmanuel Benakis was one of the richest of the diaspora Greeks established in Athens. He was elected Venizelist Mayor of Athens, and in 1916 almost got lynched by a royalist crowd. (On P.Delta, see also Moskof, "I ethniki...", p. 242. The same author denies that demoticism played any role in the bourgeois transformation - p.241.)

131

Ventiris, "I Hellas...", vol. I, p. 25.

\*132

The newspaper Nea Imera of 13 March 1909, as quoted by Papacosmas, "The Greek Military...", p. 101. Trikoupis, speaking on the tariff imposed in 1897: "One cannot find any principles underlying the structure of the tariff... as we have taxed every article that could (possibly) be taxed"; as quoted by Kartakis, "Le développement...", p. 8.

133

F.O. 371/677 N°36 and N°35, Elliot to Grey, Athens 6 March 1909 and 31 Dec. 1908 respectively, as quoted by Papacosmas, "The Greek Military...", pp. 100 and 56.



\*134

Martin in his "Greece of the 20th Century", p. 133 (publ. 1913), says that the then newly imposed income tax of 3% had failed. This, however, makes little difference. After nearly a century of total tax exemption, the bourgeoisie was obliged to accept some tax burden. The failure of the measure was, after all, only temporary. Only a few years later, income and inheritance taxation was properly integrated into Greece's social and economic system.

Even after the advent of Venizelos, the situation could not have appeared much less threatening to the average bourgeois. It is very doubtful whether the overwhelming majority of the bourgeoisie really did support Venizelos during his first years in politics as so often claimed. It was not only the fear that a conservative class would naturally feel of a man with the firm reputation of a revolutionary, acquired in the 1905 revolution against the Governor of autonomous Crete; it was also a most natural reaction against a man whose electoral campaigns promised the people measures clearly opposed to bourgeois interests -- such as direct taxation, in a country where one of the richest bankers paid an annual tax of 350 drachmas (£15). Venizelos would never, of course, have promised such measures in his election speeches to workers and peasants had he considered the middle class as his chief support. S.Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", pp. 470, 471, 473.

135

Note submitted by the Associations to Parliament on 3 Dec. 1908. The students' manifesto is reprinted in full in Melas, "I epanastassis...", pp. 248-49.

136

Ventiris, "I Hellas...", vol.I, p. 39; and Melas, "I epanastassis..." p. 178.

\*137

It is significant that Vournas views the guilds from exactly the opposite standpoint, i.e. from the left -- not as middle-class but rather as 'popular' associations. He then qualifies this by allowing that very few of them were of "purely proletarian composition, like the (associations of) typesetters, bakery and restaurant staff, and construction workers". The rest of these 'popular' guilds could only be petit-bourgeois, of course ("Goudi...", p.143).

138

The Times, London 17 Nov. 1909.

\*138a

Although the Lawyers' Association was the only one to refuse participation in the 14 Sept. 1909 demonstration in support of the officers, Legg considers the 1910 Venizelos as the "representative of the new political classes of lawyers and petty capitalists" ("Politics in Modern Greece", p.68); repeats "...practicing lawyers were the main beneficiaries of the revolution..." (pp. 305-06); but then qualifies, "It is difficult to determine ... how many ... actually practiced law and how many had merely taken a law degree before entering some other profession... In many respects the faculty of Law ... corresponds to the generalised liberal-arts curricula in the United States and is the school a young person would normally enter" (p.281).

The high percentage of lawyers in the post-1909 parliaments does not mean they were there as representatives of a bourgeoisie rising to political power, and even less that this class had joined the revolution in order to send its educated children to parliament. The number of lawyers had grown substantially by the turn of the century, mainly because unemployment in the households of propertied peasants, many of whom sent their son to the university to increase his chances of becoming a civil servant. After graduation, these young lawyers were chronically underemployed (there were 15 lawyers per 10,000 of the population in Greece, compared to 2 in England, Germany and France, and only one in Austria -- see Melas, "I epanastasis...", p. 159; also Dakin, "The Unification...", p.255). The bourgeois education of these people is thus misleading; their origins and their financial condition suggest they should rather be classed with the petit-bourgeois whom, surprisingly, nobody has yet acknowledged as the politically dominant class in post-1909 Greece.

However, to consider the post-1910 invasion of politics by lawyers and more widely young educated politicians as a proof that the coup was a bourgeois revolt, is a fallacy refuted not only by careful examination of the new politicians' class origin, such as attempted in this footnote, but mainly by a comprehensive analysis of the social lineages of politics in 1910-12, such as attempted in the main text (last paragraph of this chapter). Thus S.Markesinis,

("Historia...", p. 87) cites the reaction of the Lawyers' Association as an indication that popular support of the League did not have bourgeois but rather low-class origins. Indeed, this is as far as such an indication may legitimately be used for a deduction of trends. "... the court, the high society of Athens and the middle class" opposed the League, as did the grande-bourgeoisie who foresaw a bad future for the economy" (S.Markesinis, p.88). He also adds that among the diaspora only the lower-class emigrants approved of the coup (p. 87 ; see also Zorbas, "Memoirs", pp.40-41), and that the real support for the League "came from the masses, ... as would have become obvious if ... the World War ... had not generated the dichasmos with the (concomitant) resurrection of the old parties and the restraint of the impetuous progressive movement..." S.Markesinis can hardly be suspected of leftist sympathies. He is the man who, during his political career in pre-1967 Greece, "once boasted that his parliamentary speeches were addressed to the benches occupied by members of foreign embassies, not the House itself" (Thomas, p. 761); he was also one of the very few politicians who collaborated with the 1967 military regime.

139

See Vergopoulos, "To agrotiko...", p. 356, on the Pyrgos uprising and the influence of free socialists on these events. On the militant peasant action in the Peloponnese generally, see Vergopoulos, p. 355; Kordatos, "Historia tou agrotikou...", pp. 177-79 and 252; Vournas, 'Goudi...' p. 566. On the revolt at Kileler, see Kordatos, "Historia tou agrotikou...", p. 147-57; and "Historia tis neoterias...", vol.XIII, pp. 182-94, and G. Karanicholas' book specifically on this subject, titled "Kileler".

140

See Giannopoulos, "Neon Pnevma", p. 28-30, for a description of the conservatism and ideological pettiness of the students.

141

Melas, "I epanastassis ...", p. 197

142

Athens, 27 June, 7-8 July 1909.

143

Moskof, "I ethniki...", p. 194.

144

Vournas ("Goudi...", p. 144) reports a crowd of 200,000 "according to the press". The press in fact mentions various figures, exaggerated as usual. Fileratos ("Seimeiosseis...", p. 562) says certain people calculated the crowd at around 70,000, others at 100,000. Melas ("I epanastassis...", p. 312) suggests 100,000 and his description of the roads covered seems to confirm this figure. Aspreas ("Politiki historia...", p. 116) says it was the largest crowd ever seen in Athens.

145

Moskof, "I ethniki...", p. 265. It seems there were many similarities between this declaration and a pamphlet written by the same group under the title "What's to be done?" This text does not exist today, and Melas reports that it disappeared from the market under obscure conditions. ("O gios...", pp. 68-76).

146

Pangalos, "Archives...", vol. I, p. 91.

\*147

There are interesting parallels between the motives for the Athenians' support of the 1909 coup and the urban insurgents' for the 1848 European revolutions. If there is a historic precedent with which to compare the 1909 case, it is this and not the vague model of the 'typical bourgeois revolution'. To facilitate such comparison, here is a summary of Hobsbawm's views in "The Age of Capital". pp. 20-26:

"The large body of the radical lower middle classes, discontented artisans, small shopkeepers etc. and even agriculturalists, whose spokesmen and leaders were intellectuals, especially young and marginal ones, formed a significant revolutionary force but rarely a political alternative. (p.20) "... the labouring poor ... lacked the organisation, the maturity, the leadership, perhaps most of all the historical conjuncture, to provide a political alternative. (p.21) (Therefore) the most that might be achieved was a bourgeois republic. (p.23) Thus the revolutions of 1848 ... 'ought to have been' bourgeois revolutions, but the bourgeoisie drew back from them. (p.24)"

It is useful to remember, however, that although the overall similarities may be striking, the revolutionary tendencies among the Greek lower classes in 1909 were far less conscious or powerful than they had been among their western counterparts in 1848. In fact, if a 'model' must be kept in mind as a stimulant, it should not be the French, but rather the milder and simpler German one.

\*148

The quotation is from Papacosmas, "The Greek Military Revolt...", p. 74, referring to F.O. 371/678, N°104, Elliot to Grey, Athens, 15 July 1909.

The extent of the Powers' concern with the threat to the status quo in Greece is indicated by their ambassadors' post-coup interest in a matter which at first glance may seem trivial. The incident is also reported by Papacosmas:

"The results of the large public meeting might have been entirely different had not King George reversed an earlier decision not to be in Athens... The troubled ruler did not publicise his resolve but M. Deville, the French minister in Athens, learned of it from a member of the King's suite. Realising England's minister, Sir Francis Elliot, had 'the privilege of access to His Majesty', Deville relayed his fears that a boycott by George would be a disastrous mistake. Elliot agreed and visited the King... The English diplomat underscored the effect on the King's personal position if the crowd did not see him; its disappointment could easily be turned into a dangerous resentment ... The King reluctantly yielded to the argument, reiterating the hopelessness of the situation ... Elliot countered by saying that having begun a policy of concession, the King must continue for the time being until the Military League should dissolve itself." (emphasis added)

(Papacosmas, pp. 126-27, on the basis of F.O. 371/678, N°163A, Highly confidential, Elliot to Grey, Athens, 29 Sept. 1909; and F.O. 371/678, N°165, Confidential, Elliot to Grey, Athens 2 Oct. 1909.)

See also Mavrogordatos' account in "Modern Greece", p. 83: "... the alarm felt by the King, the court, the diplomats..."

In the first few weeks after the coup, the League had considered the possibility of finding a successor to George I (Driault-Lh ritier, "Histoire diplomatique...", p. 33). But these considerations existed for only a short time. Moreover, a successor

could not have been chosen without the consent of the Great Powers. Finally, the very fact that the League was thinking of a royal successor rather than in terms of a republic, speaks for itself. The ambassadors' panic could not have been caused by these short-lived and gentle ambitions of the officers, let alone by the hypothetical threat from the bourgeoisie.

\*149

Venizelos' personal opinion is invaluable to an understanding of what really happened. He was not yet involved with the everyday internal problems of Greece, and thus able to see more clearly than the local protagonists or the contemporary journalists. Besides, he was no ordinary man but an individual with rare intellectual acumen, a born political animal with an historically inclined mind, whose view of the situation could only be realistic. (His translating Thucydides was not accidental; they had certain historical and political attitudes in common.) Finally, Venizelos' analysis had to be correct: this was the crucial moment in his life when success and failure hung in the balance. His admirable deployment of tactics throughout the crisis, including his refutation of the premiership, shows how far ahead he was of his contemporaries and how sharp his understanding of the unique historical moment. (S. Markesinis tried to replay Venizelos' role in 1973; he only managed a lamentable pantomime which ended with the bloodshed of the Athens Polytechnic. Not having attained the supreme political position he had always dreamt of, and perhaps haunted by his advancing age and by Venizelos' 'immortality', Markesinis wrote a few years before Colonel Papadopoulos named him Prime Minister: "The course of the (1909) revolution was virtually ... a search for a means of escape (from the impasse). Venizelos perceived, provided, and cashed in on this". A simplistic opinion and, in relation to 1973, a simplistic comparison, with the difference that the way out so desperately sought by the colonels in 1973 -- and which he wished to help provide and cash in on -- existed only in Markesinis' mind, inflamed by megalomania and opportunism. (See S. Markesinis, vol. III of "Politiki Historia...", pp. 84-85.)

Aspreas gives a thorough account of the meeting of Venizelos with the League. The reader can get some intimation of Venizelos'

position and preoccupations if certain passages are quoted here verbatim (emphasis added):

"... Venizelos replied... 'Today you do not represent a revolution ... you represent only the people's impatience...' Then followed an explicit discussion on the Crown and whether it should be abolished or restrained, especially in its irresponsible administration of foreign policy... Venizelos elevated himself to a protector of the Crown, and declared that in the interest of Greece and of Hellenism the Crown should remain intact, ... that the national interest (even) called for a reinforcement of the Crown.

"Those present who were opponents of the monarchy were surprised, whereas the supporters of the monarchy and of law and order were encouraged ...

"(Venizelos) advised the League ... to charge the next government with the responsibility of calling elections in the shortest time possible to form a constituent assembly... A discussion of special interest followed on the various political orientations that could appear in a constituent assembly and the dangers involved. The more cool-headed of the participants ... rejected this solution... as very dangerous because of the conditions within the army and the parties and (because of) the people's impatience. The Cretan politician, however, found a solution that would neutralise those dangers, which he too considered as serious. He said ... the League should ... delimit beforehand the work-programme and the extent of the rights of the assembly, which should be (elected) under the explicit limitation of reforming the Constitution and not drafting a new one.

"Next morning... George I was informed confidentially and in detail of these discussions and decisions, the information ... coming from two persons acting independently of one another... From this day on, George I put aside a great part of his mistrust towards Venizelos..." (Aspreas, "Politiki historia...", pp.133-36)

In his first meeting with Venizelos, George I was explicit: "Be careful... don't surround yourself with men of the League." Venizelos could afford a reply much more outspoken than his utterances at the meeting with the 'men of the League': "Naturally, your Majesty, I shall not resort to them, nor to fanatical reactionaries. I shall recruit moderates... Metaxas, Dousmanis and such." (Conversation transmitted by Prince Andreas to Metaxas and quoted by the latter in his "Diary", vol.BI, p.21.) Venizelos

subsequently did recruit the moderates, one of whom encouraged an abortive royalist counter-coup in 1923 and was appointed dictator by George II in 1936. As for Dousmanis, the only sign of moderation in his extreme conservatism and royalism was that in his memoirs he could not resist the temptation to attribute to himself the military success of the 1912-13 wars, at the expense of his great patron, the King.

Not unexpectedly, then, Kaltchas concludes ("Introduction...", p. 139): "From this initially anti-dynastic crisis, thanks largely to Mr Venizelos' masterly handling, the monarchy emerged with renewed strength"; and Dafnis ("Ta hellinika ...", p. 177) comments: "What was urgent ... was to discipline the masses and guide them back to the familiar paths of the established regime." The bourgeois masses, one wonders?

150

See Hobsbawm, "The Age of Revolution", pp. 81-85 for a brilliant juxtaposition of the roles of the bourgeoisie and the sansculottes in the French revolution.

\*151

See chapter B and App. I on the relative weakness of the dominant classes.

These social and political conditions themselves are linked, in Appendix I, with two basic structural elements: the socio-economic system, the 'mode of production', and the economic-political foreign dominance. These I see from a general theoretical viewpoint as the two historic conditions that tend to evolve more slowly than the other structural elements, that belong, by their nature, to the so-called la langue durée. It is mainly this feature, I think, which endows them with a certain preponderance as causal factors -- and not only their economic elements, as might be suggested by a dogmatic economism. This is how the autonomy of a social or political actor, in this case of the military, is determined 'in the last instance' by the economy, to use Althusser's term. Yet this is an historically conceived linkage of social action with the economy, not the bed of Procrustes. (See e.g. Althusser and Balibar, "Lire le Capital", vol. II, pp. 205-17.)



\*152

France in 1870 offers a typical example of a powerful army, humiliated by defeat yet not capable of any autonomy, mainly because of a powerful bourgeoisie and a militant proletariat. The Wehrmacht, even during 1944-45, was unable to achieve any autonomy in a country dominated by a highly autonomous and powerful political oligarchy.

See also Hobsbawm, "The Age of Revolution", pp. 179-80; and Huntington's very perceptive remarks ("Political Order ...", pp. 220-21) on the middle-class weakness and its positive relationship with military intervention. They are based on Latin American data utilised, somewhat arbitrarily, to support a more or less generalised view. See also Nun, "A Latin-American Phenomenon...".

\*153

The passionate article by the leading Greek writer Karkavitsas, published in the daily Chronos of 16 October 1909, is the agonised voice of a radical intellectual expressing his anxiety and impatience with the officers' policy of procrastination and compromise. It is redolent with populist slogans, and obviously anti-oligarchy and anti-bourgeois. Yet Karkavitsas had put irredentism ahead of any other ideology when he had declared elsewhere: "The Greek people are imbued with the most internationalist ideals, provided they are satisfied in their just (nationalist) claims" (reported by Vitti, "I ideologiki leitourgia ...", p. 83). Karkavitsas is one of those typical intellectuals whose peasant origins helped to canalise their nationalism into love for the 'healthy, simple folk' and a concomitant radical and populist stand.

\*154

It would be useful to paraphrase Gershenkron's statement, "...one is forced to ask oneself whether 'bourgeois revolutions' do really resemble each other so much ..." ("Economic Backwardness...", p. 94), by admitting that "one is forced to ask oneself whether 'bourgeois transformations' do really resemble each other so much", and especially whether they are necessarily propelled by revolution. The argument throughout this chapter is not that such a transformation did not occur in Greece. It is that the transformation was neither the cause of the coup and the alleged middle-class uprising, nor an effect of this revolt which was allegedly linked with it through some kind of historical determinism.

\*155

On Venizelos' well-structured and profoundly bourgeois-democratic ideas concerning the parliamentary regime, see S. Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", pp. 166, 171-72 (Parliamentary Minutes of 21 Dec. 1929, 4 March 1931, 19 Dec. 1931): "... a national government -- in the sense that it is not the instrument of any class -- saves whatever may be the general interest, trying to be ... a real arbitrator..."

The Cretan politician had developed this consistent political outlook from the very beginning of his career, as shown by his fight against the monarchic practices of the Governor of Crete, Prince George, as early as the 1900s. Together with Trikoupis, he was an exception to the rule of Greek politicians being almost indifferent to political principles and ignorant of the real social and political meaning of democratic regime. Yet neither his petit-bourgeois family background nor his education as a lawyer were particularly favourable to the development of such exceptional insight. In fact, he was at a relative disadvantage compared to such politicians as were the offspring of the powerful landowning or bourgeois families traditionally involved in politics.

(To the accusation, thrown at him during a social gathering that he was not the son of a 'political family', Venizelos' lively sense of humour provided him with a ready reply, in the form of a mantinada, a kind of Cretan hai-kai:

No fence can stop the billy-goat,  
No fence can stop a man,  
A true man bears and leads the clan,  
And needs no clan to pave the road.)

The reader will have realised by now that for comments and details of Venizelos' action and standpoints I draw heavily on Stefanou's edition of the liberal leader's speeches and interviews. This is not only because Stefanou was Venizelos' personal secretary or because his work contains the most important material, easily accessible, but also because I preferred first-hand material to biographers' comments. Not that there is a paucity of conscientious biographies, far from it; but how can any biography of a statesman of international stature be complete without the existence of a social or economic history of the country he led?

\*157

Kaltchas, "Introduction to...", p. 139: "(The revision of the Constitution) thus achieved the essentially conservative purpose of its chief sponsors, King George I and Venizelos, who used it to defuse the potentially revolutionary movement of August 1909". Here are some of Venizelos' own opinions" "I was asked ... whether I am a participant of the (will of the) revolution or its master ('tamer'). My reply is: neither; I have been a controller of the revolution... And ... I continued it... with the vote of the Greek people." Also: "Since I came to Greece... I have never been a revolutionary. I have been a counter-revolutionary." Speech to the Senate on 23 Jan. 1933, as quoted in S. Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos ...", vol. I, p. 66; and speech to Parliament, reported in Patris of 15 June 1911, as also quoted by S. Stefanou, p. 26.

\*158

a) Stefanou says: "Perhaps (Venizelos) had not even read Marx and Engels". This is not improbable, although some of Venizelos' comments and analyses show he had at least some second-hand knowledge of Marxist theory. For example, in his parliamentary speech of 27 Sept. 1920 he said: "... the merchandise he (the worker) sells is not merchandise, it is the negation of his individuality, it is his labour". In his speech of 16 Nov. 1919 he makes a distinction between Marxism and State socialism which may be wrong, but nonetheless suggests at least some knowledge on the subject. His speech of 29 Jan. 1920 again shows awareness of the Leninist contribution to the theory of revolution. What really matters, however, is whether he would have followed a different policy had he been more proficient in Marxism. It is indeed very difficult to envisage him following any other policy more revolutionary and less paternalistic.

b) The condition of relative weakness of the bourgeoisie is one of the crucial factors to consider in examining the historical evolution of any society just emerging from its pre-capitalist era, whatever its subsequent evolution -- capitalist or socialist, democratic or absolutist. A remote example, though merely as a stimulating exercise and with all due reservations concerning its relevance, is the description of the Chinese merchant class prior to the republican revolution in Anderson's "Lineages...". Anderson concludes: "Predictably, the role of the Chinese merchant class in the revolution was one of prudence and ambivalence". See also the excellent essay by M.C.Bergeres, "The Role of the Bourgeoisie", in M.Wright (ed), "China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913", Newhaven 1968.

\*159

S. Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", vol.II, p. 317. Venizelos' later policies confirmed his liberal inclinations, but the fears of the bourgeoisie were also somewhat moderated by various factors that had meanwhile come into play: the ideological evolution towards a less narrow-minded conservatism, and mainly the wide margins for concessions created by the immense profits of the war-decade; Venizelos' confirmation as a good administrator, and mainly his capacity to match his liberalism with consistent support for capitalist development and strong-hand tactics towards labour whenever necessary.

Thus strike action was a penal offense in Greece until 1920 (Article 167 of the Penal Code). It was recognised as a right by the Venizelist law 2111/1920 and the above Article was abolished. Law 2111 recognised the right to strike, but also imposed that only the union convention could decide on whether to stage a strike. For more details on Venizelos' liberal, but definitely strong-handed position on the question of strikes, see quotations from his speeches in S.Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", vol.II, pp. 325-27, 329, 336-37, 341-42.

On the introduction, for the first time in Greece, of a State health and pension scheme by Venizelos (Law 5777/1933) and its replacement under Tsaldaris with the less generous Law 6298/1934, see S. Stefanou (ed), vol.II, p. 310. See also vol.II, pp. 323,333, 337-41, 343-51, and especially the editor's informative introduction to the chapter on Venizelos' social policy in pp. 297-315.

Very indicative of Venizelos' liberalism is the following extract from one his public speeches (of 25 Nov. 1919, in S. Stefanou, "Venizelos...", vol. II, p. 326): "My purpose is that representatives of the workers participate in the management of the (State) railways... and I actually offer them two posts on the Board..." -- an admirable vision of the Gaullist system of 'participation', half a century before May 1968; or, if one prefers less striking comparisons, an equally admirable precursor of the inter-war corporatist tendencies and the post-war German system of worker-participation in management.

160

Kordatos, for example ("Oi epemvaseis ton Anglon...", p. 68), quoting Filaretos' "To Egyptiakon zitima en ti vouli" (The issue of Egypt in the Greek Parliament), Athens 1895, purports that the problems of the diaspora Greeks in Egypt, caused by a policy of heavy taxation, had been initiated by the English government.

161

So great were the profits from commerce in a war economy that the government was obliged to block free import trade and allow the importers to continue their operations only under special controls and for strictly limited margins of commission. Still, profits remained very high -- most probably due to illegal procedures -- so that the government had to tax them after the end of World War I. (Venizelos' speeches to the House, 29 March 1918 and 24 Nov. 1919, in S. Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos ...", vol. II, pp. 488-89.) See also Dakin, "The Unification...", p. 248.

162

"... the main function of the new State apparatus (in most of the new third-world States) was a mechanism for the production of a national bourgeoisie or ruling class, which had previously barely existed" (Hobsbawm, "The Age of Revolution", p. 187). Hobsbawm uses the term 'mechanism' with only a few of its potential voluntarist implications. Clearly, such a mechanism is not scrupulously planned in every detail by an omniscient State wishing to create a bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, my use of the term 'osmosis' does not imply undue emphasis on the functional aspects of the society under review.

"... les trois notions, forme, fonction, structure, doivent s'utiliser également, au même titre, pour analyser le réel... elles permettent de saisir des stabilités provisoires et des équilibres momentanés... A travers l'emploi logique de ces concepts pour l'analyse, s'atteint un mouvement plus profond et plus réel: le mouvement dialectique de la société et de l'histoire. Il en résulte bien que toute méthodologie qui isole et privilégie un de ces concepts perd quelque chose d'essentiel."

(Lefebvre, "L'ideologie...", p. 189; emphasis as in the original).

163

On the excellent condition of the army in 1913, see Martin, "Greece of the 20th Century" (1913), pp. 87-112.

164

For an excellent historic account of the Powers' influence on Greece, see G. Leon, "Greece and the Great Powers, 1914-1917".

165

As quoted by Kordatos, "Historia tis neoteris...", vol. XIII, p.639. The conservative historian Karolidis in his volume of the Paparrigopoulos History, pp. 366-68, gives an interesting report of his personal activities in favour of the return of Venizelos, whom he considered as the only man capable of saving the dynasty. Indeed, Venizelos' stand is summed up in the following statement: "... what the country needs above all is the definite termination of the civil strife..." (interview with Elefthero Vima, 7 Dec. 1923, as quoted in S. Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", vol.I, p. 43).

166

Led by Colonel Panagos and Majors Polyzos, Skylakakis and Sarandopoulos. See Veremis, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, p. 138.

167

Leonardopoulos was a member of the Venizelist "Democratic Defense" group (Mazarakis, "Memoirs", p. 335), but was not committed at the

time of this coup because of bitterness against his patrons for favouritism shown to his junior Venizelist officers, especially Pangalos. Gargalidis was not committed either, it seems, because of his notorious opportunism. (Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol. I, p. 116, and Kordatos, "Historia tis neoteris...", vol. XIII, p. 623.) See also Veremis, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, pp. 135-46.

169

Declaration of the coup leaders, Kathimerini newspaper, 22 Oct. 1923.

169

Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol. I, pp. 116 and 158.

170

Gonatas' opening speech as reported by Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol. I, pp. 164-65. It is interesting to see Metaxas' comments on the conference in his "Diary", vol. C, p. 309.

171

Announcement of the Liberal Party, 4 Nov. 1923, and Declaration of the Directing Committee of the Liberal Party, 21 Nov. 1923.

172

The party was named Ethnikos Synaspismos (National Coalition), later changed to Komma Symfilioseos (Party of Reconciliation).

173

KKE Epissima., vol. I, p. 563. The socialist deputy was Yannis Passalidis.

174

For a detailed description of the League's organisation and background, see Veremis, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, p. 158-62.

\*175

There are of course explanations attributing the refusal of the premiership by Venizelist cadres to psychological reasons. Dafnis writes ("I Hellas metaxi...", vol. I, pp. 220-11) that "Mihalakopoulos and Kafandaris naturally refused the honor of the premiership of a government in which Venizelos would participate as a minister", but adds later more realistically that they also rejected the solution that the premiership be given to Roussos because they feared

this would mean his being groomed as Venizelos' heir (p. 214). Kordatos ("Historia tis neoteris...", vol. XIII, p. 657) attributed these refusals to the fact that any premier would have been no more than a puppet of Venizelos. The bitter rivalry in 1928 between Venizelos and Kafandaris, after the latter had left the party, seems to make the realistic stand adopted here the more plausible. The basic factor, however, was not the rivalries among personalities, but rather the intra-party rift on the question of the regime. (See the Danglis "Archives", vol. II, pp.474-77)

\*176

Kaltchas, "Introduction to...", p. 150: "Hence the retirement of Venizelos... was desired both by his enemies and by the more independent of his former lieutenants, who were anxious to depersonalise the republican regime in order to make it acceptable to the royalist section of the Greek people."

177

See General Sarafis' first-hand report in "Historikes...", p. 244.

178

Article 3 of the "Decision of the Revolution" dated 15 Sept. 1922.

179

Apart from these two battalions, the only other units saved were the two divisions that had managed to cross over to Eastern Thrace, and the small forces permanently stationed in Eastern Thrace (Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol. I, p. 22).

179a

On the popular discontent and upheaval in 1923, see also Danglis, "Archives", vol. II, p. 453; and Kousoulas, "Revolution...", p. 42.

180

Metaxas, "Diary", vol. C, p. 301: "The social pressure was indeed explosive" (comment by the editor, P.M. Sifnaios. See also pp.186-212, especially 197, 208, 210.

181

On the preponderance of shame over guilt in the Greek culture -- in contrast to western patterns -- see Vassiliou, "The Implicative Meaning of the Greek Concept of Philotimo"; Safilios-Rotchild,



"Class Position and Success Stereotypes..."; and especially Pollis, "Political Implications of the Modern Greek Concept of Self".

\*182

In the above circumstances it is indeed surprising that the Communist Party of Greece failed to exploit such revolutionary potential. It was stranger still that this potential seems actually to have been ignored altogether. The only party that had dared name the war an imperialistic adventure, the only party that could hope to really capitalise on the disaster, was modestly demanding such routine measures as elections, land reform, or the restoration of constitutional rights by the military government. (On the Party's position on the war, see the announcement of the Communist Party dated 22 Feb. 1922, "KKE: Epissima Keimena", vol.I, 1918-1924, Athens 1974, pp. 228-31. On the Party's demands after the debacle, see announcement dated 27 Aug.1922, ibid., pp. 250-253, and compare with the electoral programme (pp. 352-558) which presents more or less the same demands in more daring language.)

Although the Communist Party did consistently work for a widespread trade union movement, it seems that its objectives were mainly tactical. Not that there was a lack of sufficient potential. The wave of strikes that began with the railway workers' action and ended with the 1924 general strike was generated not only by communist syndicates, but mainly by unions with non-communist leadership. It is significant that none of the eleven victims of the last workers' demonstration in Passalimani, Piraeus, in 1924 was a communist. (S.Stefanou, ed, "Venizelos...", vol.II, p.302). It seems, however, that Party support of the non-communist union leaders, although strong in tactical matters, was almost non-existent in questions of strategy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the general strike was not properly exploited at the political level, and that the non-communist union leaders compromised with the liberals and called it off. (Kousoulas, "Revolution...", p.44, describing the 1923-24 upheaval and the events around the general strike, concludes: "After the events... several non-communist labour leaders and liberal politicians made joint efforts to find a compromise solution, and the strikes were gradually called off.")

The Communist Party's policy is thus clear: intransigence and revolutionary action only within the insurgent activities led by the Party itself or by the communist unions; reluctant tactical support and great suspicion whenever other political and social groups professed or practiced revolution; and a nearly total contempt for the insurgent potential of the bourgeois regime-issue.

Thus the Party's correct analysis of the bourgeois nature of both the 1922 coup and the strife between republicans and royalists led to the mistaken tactical decision not to collaborate with the republican bourgeois and petit-bourgeois forces, however sincere and obvious their revolutionary attitude. The Communist Party persistently refused to see the militant support for the republican cause as a revolution that could go far beyond the formalistic limits of the 1922 coup, the 1923 elections, and even the referendum on the regime. The people's radicalism was not a sufficient stimulus as long as the essentially political orientation of the popular upheaval, centred upon the regime as it was, did not resemble the classical model of a social revolution. It is clear that this game of definitions and of tactical decisions does not mean there was no revolutionary potential; it simply means that the potential did not match the Party's definitions.

See P. Nefeloudis, "Stis piges...", pp. 30-31; also "KKE Epissima Keimena..." throughout the volume on the 1918-24 period. Papanastassiou believed that communism had no chance whatsoever in Greece ("Meletes...", pp. 23 and 37). The amorphous revolutionary and leftist attitudes among the people (and the refugees before the 1930s) did not imply any willingness to follow the Communist Party. Characteristically, Venizelos feared the communist infiltration as a threat to the working class only, and not to a wider section of the population, neither to the preservation of the regime: "It is not only a matter of justice... it is also one of foresight... if we do want to prevent... our working class... from deviating towards Bolshevism." (Speech of 26 Nov. 1918, in S.Stefanou, ed. "Venizelos...", vol.II, p. 326.)

184

Letter to General Danglis, acting as parliamentary leader of the liberal party, 27 Oct. 1922. Danglis, "Archives", vol.II, p.444. Equally explicit was Danglis' official personal position in his interview with the newspaper Ethnos on 19 Nov. 1922 (p.445).

185

Danglis ("Archives", vol.II, p. 462) in a letter to Venizelos mentions the names of Vourloumis, Negrepointis and Simos as the leaders of the liberal group that joined Papanastassiou's republicans.

186

Danglis, "Archives", vol.II, p. 549, letter to Plastiras.

187

A somewhat later but typical rumour is the one which presented General Othonaios as following Venizelos' implicit or explicit instructions when he drew up his pronunciamento. It is taken up by Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol.I, p. 187.

\*188

Such was the overwhelming radicalism and republicanism of the urban population that the liberals were obliged to offer the republican party a substantial number of urban candidacies for the 1923 election; the latter in turn requested that the liberals do not present any candidates at all and let the republicans fight the election in the cities alone against the royalists (Danglis, "Archives", vol.II, p. 464).

189

Veremis seems to be of the same opinion (unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, pp. 150-51).

\*190

One has only to read through the "Archives" of Danglis, the liberals provisional leader, to understand the virtual agony of the party between the election and the split, including the short period of Venizelos' premiership. Especially indicative are the conditions of constant personal intrigue, clearly woven around the effort to neutralise the centrifugal republican forces (vol.II, pp. 472-77).

\*191

Such were probably the 'scenarios' that Venizelos himself had in mind when he talked about "internal enemies" in his first pro-royalist cable after the coup, quoted in the introduction to this chapter.

The degree of participation in the revolution by the refugees and the urban petit-bourgeoisie is indicated by the urban election results. For the (still) unpropertied peasantry it is confirmed by the results in Thessaly and the North. For the middle class it cannot be deduced from the electoral results, yet it is suggested by the attitude of the progressive press of the period, or the frequently republican, publicly proclaimed positions of various middle-class elements forged and proven in the first phase of the dichasmos when they were enthusiastic followers of Venizelos.

\*192

Two methodological clarifications should again be underlined. The first is that action by a social class, as treated in this work, does not imply a voluntaristic approach; whatever personification of a class appears in the text is merely used metaphorically for reasons of greater simplicity and clarity. The second point has already been made in previous instances, and concerns the distinction between the structural 'system' approach and the action approach. Again, a selective use of both approaches is here attempted, with the emphasis on the dynamics of social action duly modified by the limiting framework imposed by social structures. (See footnote \*33.)

193

Hobsbawm, "The Age of Revolution", p. 85. The analogy, of course, ends here.

\*194

It is my conviction that the slow death of the liberal party, and with it of the moderate centre of the Greek political spectrum, began in 1924. The period between 1928 and 1936 was only a drawn-out last spasm. The hegemony of the Right, which began in 1936 and is still continuing in 1975, should be partly attributed, I think, to the 1922-24 events and the division of the liberal party, from

which the centre has never been able to recover. And although such a division seems to be the fate of the centre in all societies, the question in the Greek case is not only why the split occurred in 1922-24 -- a question which this chapter has attempted to answer -- but also why it was the final split, why the conditions that created it continued to function afterwards -- a question which lies outside the chronological scope of this work.

195

General Mazarakis-Ainian, a conservative Venizelist, despite his strong enmity for Pangalos and many republicans, wrote in his "Memoirs" (p. 306) about the days after the 1922 coup: "The people (in Athens) watched the small demonstrations in favour of the King with indifference... The revolution(-ary forces) arrived in Athens and took control of the situation without meeting with any reaction."

196

Veremis, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, pp. 145 and 200.

197

Metaxas, "Diary", vol. Cl, p. 326: "... the extremists' struggle harmed the case of the dismissed officers' rehabilitation. I myself had obtained from Mr Papanastassiou the reinstatement of all those dismissed. This is now cancelled..."

198

For a similar view of Venizelos' policy and its effects see Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol. I, p. 223. Dafnis' recognition of and praise for Venizelos' good intentions does not change the argument.

199

Driault-Lh eritier: "Histoire...", vol. V, p. 485, quoting Bierstedt, E.H., "The Great Betrayal", New York, 1924: "Lausanne saw not only a treaty, but a sale." The authors also quote the equally descriptive phrase, "oil won the day".

200

Veremis, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, p. 385.

201

Veremis, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, p. 386.

202

Veremis, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, p. 388.

203

For a similar opinion, see Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol.I, pp. 377-96, and vol.II, pp. 7-15.

204

With the exception of the 1963-64 period of Centre Union government and some of the various governments formed between 1945 and 1952 with the participation of parties of liberal origins. Because of the polarising effects of the civil war, however, the policy followed by the latter was pretty well dominated by their latent or open allies in these governments: the groups of the conservative Right.

\*205

In contrast to many authors who are concerned with military intervention in other countries, Veremis' examination of inter-war Greece expertly uses analytical tools such as patronage, without his work being overwhelmed by one-dimensional functionalism.

206

Hopefully, the reader will understand my haste in making clear that I am no relation of Col. B. Dertilis, nor yet and especially of Col. N. Dertilis, his son, who has been convicted to a life sentence for his role in the 1973 Polytechnic uprising in Athens. (Two spellings are possible for this name in Greek.)

\*207

Hobsbawm, "The Age of Revolution", p. 55:

"It was all very well for the rich (in pre-1848 Europe), who could raise all the credit they needed, to clamp rigid deflation and monetary orthodoxy... it was the little man who suffered, and who, in all countries and at all times in the nineteenth century demanded easy credit and financial unorthodoxy. Labour and the disgruntled petit-bourgeois... therefore shared common discontents. These in turn united them in the mass movements of 'radicalism', 'democracy' or 'republicanism' of which the British Radic-

als, the French Republicans, and the American Jacksonian Democrats were the most formidable between 1815 and 1848."

209

Only three months after the debacle, the new workshops erected by the refugees were already taking orders from the USA market. ("Greek Handicraft", a publication of the National Bank of Greece, Athens 1969, p. 278.)

209

The economic contribution by the refugees' industrial and agricultural know-how is mentioned even in the diplomatic history of Driault-Lhéritier, "Histoire...", vol.V, pp. 488-89.

According to the 1961 census, one in five Greek industrialists was born in Turkey.

210

On State aid in Bulgaria, see Gershenkron's essay on Bulgarian industrialisation in his "Economic Backwardness..."; on corporatism, see Venizelos' speech to the Senate of 4 March 1931, as quoted in S. Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", vol.I, pp. 222-23. Venizelos was a declared enemy of corporatism, which he rightly considered a threat to parliamentarianism. It seems, however, that what he feared most was the possibility of corporatism with leftist inclinations.

211

Veremis, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, p. 171.

212

Among writers who consider that Pangalos had little popular following, see Karolides in Paparrigopoulos, "Historia...", vol.VIII, pp. 379-80; Papanastassiou, "Meletes...", pp. 30 and 41-42.

General Sarafis ("Historikes...", p. 253) reports a characteristic incident with Pangalos, who is quoted as saying after the 1922 coup and when he was the head of the Greek army facing the Turks in Thrace: "... when I enter Constantinople at the head of the army, I'll give one kick for Plastiras, one for Gonatas, and there I'll be -- Emperor of Byzantium."

213

It is interesting that in 1924 Metaxas proposed that the Swiss army-organisation system be established in Greece. ("Diary", vol.CI, p. 352

214

For opinions on various aspects typical of this formalism, see Papanastassiou, "Meletes...", pp. 18 and 22.

215

The economic policy of the 1928-32 administration was mainly inspired by the two Finance Ministers of the period, G. Maris and K. Varvaressos. It seems that the latter's unusual integrity and modesty kept him from imposing himself on Greek public life. Had his advice been followed, for example, in post-1947 economic policy-making, and especially on decisions as to the use of Marshall-Plan aid, the whole immense programme would have been far more productive and much less marred by corruption and nouveaux-riches absurdity.

216

In 1930-31, the relationship between national income and public debt was 9.25% for Greece, 2.98% for Bulgaria, 2.32% for Roumania, and 1.68% for Yugoslavia (Stavrianos, "The Balkans...", pp. 65-66).

On Venizelos' views about the effects of the international economic crisis on Greece, see his speech reported in the newspaper Elefthero Vima, 8 Jan. 1932, and in S.Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", vol.II, pp. 477-78. On his rejection of Greece's legal obligation to pay interest on the old public debt to the American bond-holders, and his criticism of the Tsaldaris government for paying them, see his speech of 12 Jan. 1933 in S.Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos...", vol.II, pp. 265-66.

On the crisis as one of the reasons behind the regeneration of the Communist Party, see Kousoulas, "Revolution...", pp. 82-89.

217

See Paparrigopoulos, "Historia...", vol.VIII, p. 389, for a description of the first stages of the refugees' alienation from the liberal party. Especially interesting is his report on the 1929 demon-



stration in which the participant refugees "revoked their pro-liberal vote" in the 1928 elections.

218

Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol.II, pp. 229-30.

219

On the policies of the KKE during the 1933 and 1935 coups, see Kousoulas, "Revolution...", pp. 84 and 85 and 94-96 respectively.

220

In the sense of classe-appui as defined by Poulantzas, "Pouvoir politique...", vol.II, pp. 68-69.

\*221

Venizelos opposition to the idea of an agrarian party in Greece is revealing (Minutes of the parliamentary discussion of 21 Dec. 1929, as quoted in S.Stefanou, ed. "Venizelos...", vol.I, p. 166):

"I do not think our social and economic development allows... class parties... I believe that... (we must) keep to ... national parties and not leave the peasantry unprotected from the worst of demagogues that will urge it to ideas and aims of reversing the established order."

On the other hand, the distorted view of orthodoxy held by the Communist Party of Greece in its early days created conditions of near-indifference about the peasants' political potential: peasants were in some way considered as 'classless' (see the very good critical comments by Vergopoulos in his "To agrotiko...", pp. 340-41, 348-49, 354-59).

\*222

"... l'instance idéologique (dans les sociétés pré-capitalistes) est dominante, bien que l'économique soit évidemment comme toujours déterminante en dernière instance", S. Amin: "Le Capitalisme et la rente foncière" in S. Amin and K. Vergopoulos, "La question paysanne...", p. 10.

For a more specific discussion on the formalistic role of ideology in Greek politics, see N. Mouzelis' articles on this subject in To Vima, Athens (regular contributions, March-June 1976).

For the interplay of ideology and social conditions with politics it is interesting to examine the 20th-century electoral results in Thessaly, where quasi-feudal conditions prevailed until the early 20th-century and where the peasant movement was the most pronounced. In the 1946-63 period and in a total of ten districts, the pattern was:

Left-Centre-Right, competitive: three districts  
 competitive, tendency Centre: four districts  
 Right and Centre even: one district  
 competitive, tendency Right only: two districts

(Legg, "Politics in Modern Greece", pp.325-27)

This contrasts with moderate and even conservative tendencies in all other areas, and especially in the Peloponnese where small property has always been the rule.

\*223

Regionalism was also a handicap in the development of class cohesion among the peasantry. The importance of this factor must not be underestimated. There are still cultural differences in 20th-century Greece, and their effects -- prejudice and a certain regional racialism -- are expressed through antipathies and stereotyping. These show themselves not in good-humoured jokes such as that of the English against the Scots or the Parisian satire of the Marcellais; they take the form of sweeping statements, serious mutual accusations and insults. So the Peloponnesians are 'sly peasants' and the inhabitants of the province of Eleia 'tend towards criminal behaviour', Corfiotes are 'effeminate', Cretans 'liars' and 'treacherous', Cephallonians 'mad' or 'impostors', etc.

Strong regionalist feeling was brought about not only by geographic isolation, but also by a long tradition which had its roots in the peculiarities of the Turkish administrative system, the cultural differentiation between the regions due to the variety of foreign invaders, and the method of recruitment during the revolution which relied almost exclusively on the local chieftains (Petropulos, "Politics and Statecraft", pp. 19-23; Filias also emphasises the local and particularistic tendencies within Greek society during and after the war of independence in "Koinonia kai exoussia...", p. 107). The antagonism between the participants in the war of independence, islanders, Peloponnesians and Rumeliotas, as well as the 1824 civil war, found its expressions of these sectional cleava-

ges, as they were brought to the surface and reinforced by the organisational needs of the revolution (Petropoulos, "Politics and Statecraft", pp. 21 and 87). The same local interpersonal dependence, transactions, allegiances and enmities persisted after the liberation, with the difference that now they functioned not through the hierarchy of the war-bands, but through the networks of patronage.

\*224

a) It is appropriate here to quote the famous Marxian passage (in "The Eighteenth Brumaire...", p. 239):

"In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions separating their mode of life, their interest and their cultural formation from those of the other classes and bring them into conflict with those classes, they form a class. In so far as these small peasant proprietors are connected merely on a local basis, and the identity of their interests fails to produce a feeling of community, national links or a political organisation, they do not form a class."

For a discussion of peasant conservatism in connection with both property systems and capitalist modernisation, see Barrington-Moore Jr, "The Social Origins...", p. 477.

b) A reference to today's differences between the Italian North and the Mezzogiorno would be misleading. Italy is not divided into totally different systems of social and economic structures, the main difference lies in the weight of the dominant 'mode of production' within each regional system and, of course, in the degree of its development. Conversely, comparison with the Portugal of 1975 is much more revealing. Here, as in 19th-century Greece, there is a regional differentiation in economic and social structures which is boldly reflected in the ideology of the peasantry, as shown by the results of the 25 April 1975 elections (see regional analysis of election results and commentary in *Le Monde*, 27-28 April 1975). Of course, comparison as such is simply a methodological tool and its use here does not in the least disregard the differences between Portugal and Greece -- such as that the Greek landownership system had its own peculiarities, as did the latifundia system in Portugal; also, that the Portuguese

20th-century socio-economic system as a whole cannot be compared with that of Greece in the 19th century. But whatever the differences, there is indeed regional differentiation within both societies, its degree is comparable, and so are its effects on ideology (see Marcel Niedergang, "Dans le Portugal de l'interieur", Le Monde 23 and 24 April 1975, for a perceptive juxtaposition of structural and ideological differences).

\*225

On the threat of war, here is a chronological summary pertaining to the 1881-1909 period:

1885: war between Turkey and Bulgaria with near-involvement of Greece, ending with the acquisition by Bulgaria of Anatoliki Romulia, a region of Thrace populated mainly by Greeks, which caused an upsurge of bitterness and nationalism in Greece.

1880-90: civil strife in Crete, still under Turkish rule; revolutionary upheaval and extreme tension between Greece and Turkey.

1890: acquisition by Bulgaria of seven provinces in Northern Macedonia by agreement with Turkey; Aspreas ("Politiki Historia...", p. 213) considers this the direct result of the shrewd exploitation by Bulgaria of the existing tension between Turkey and Greece.

1890-93: invasion by Bulgarian guerrillas of predominantly Greek-populated provinces in Turkish Macedonia.

1894 onwards: operations within Greece of the extreme nationalist organisation Ethniki Etairia (National Society), largely composed of members with a military background; the Society made persistent demagogic propaganda for a military conquest of the Greek provinces still under foreign rule.

1897: Greco-Turkish war and retreat of the Greek army in panic.

1904-08: Greek guerrillas in Macedonia operating against Turkish forces and Bulgarian guerrillas.

226

Petropulos, "Politics and Statecraft...", pp. 36-37.

\*227

Petropulos, "Politics and Statecraft...", p. 238. Otho appears to have grasped the utility of a supportive peasantry in 1833 well before the 1848 abolition of feudal rights in Prussia by Gierke, who

seems to have had the same intuition. See Marx, "The bill for the abolition of feudal burdens" in "The Revolutions of 1848", pp. 137-143; for a critique of Gierke's measures; and Barrington-Moore Jr, "The Social Origins...", pp. 434-43, for an analysis of the German model of "revolution from above" led by the State bureaucracy and the landed aristocracy. Otho's scheme involved only the small peasants and the State as represented by the Crown in a monarchy not fettered by landowners. His vision, somewhat unexpectedly, resembles the fascist glorification of the small peasant as it is theoretically treated in Hitler's "Mein Kampf".

\*228

Kordatos, "Historia tou agrotikou...", p. 126) says that "the bourgeoisie... was then struggling against the old families (and) seeking allies among peasants and workers, in order to obtain political power... and to organise economic production on different bases." The passage refers to the 1909-12 period, but the process of ideological conditioning which made the peasantry a classe appui, to use Poulantzas' term, had really begun many decades earlier.

\*229

a) Changing the issue from one of social conflict to an opposition between peasantry and State seems to have had far-reaching consequences on the political development of modern Greece. It was one of the incentives which encouraged the inflated role of the gendarmerie in rural Greece, the process of centralisation, and eventually the disproportionate growth of the State which, in the 20th century, was to become such a major factor in Greek politics that it obscured and falsified the role of social classes.

b) The legalistic view of the peasant problem is evident in Calligas' 19th-century novel "Thanos Vlekas". The author "insists on the defects of the land-distribution to the veterans of the revolution... By exploiting the gaps in the (distribution) law, Tasos (the villain) commits a crime against the peasants." (Vitti, "I ideologiki...", p. 27) The crime was appropriation of national land by means of fraudulent claims.

\*230

In his 1910 electoral speech to an audience of mostly unpropertied peasants, Venizelos said that the definitive solution of the issue of land reform would be very difficult. Only after the elections had provided him with a solid majority did Venizelos support the peasants' right to land. Of course, the question was not implementation of land reform, for which funds were lacking, but adoption of the principle in the revised Constitution (S.Stefanou, ed. "Venizelos...", vol.II, pp. 503ff). On Venizelos' position between 1915 and 1920, when he actually proclaimed land reform, see pp. 505-07.

On Venizelos' particular attention to the problem of land reform during his electoral campaign in 1910, see Driault-Lh eritier "Histoire...", vo. V, p. 51; and also S.Stefanou (ed), "Venizelos ...", vol.II, pp. 311-13. It is not by chance that from then on Venizelos consistently "placed the most competent and active" of his cadres in the Ministry of Agriculture (p. 313).

\*231

Speaking more theoretically, it is necessary to know from which of three possible conceptual levels the bourgeoisie was operating: consciousness of class-differentiation, consciousness of class conflict, or, depending on circumstances and the class-section examined, either revolutionary or "incumbent" class consciousness. See Giddens, "The Class Structure...", p. 112.

232

\*233

Nunes, "Les revolutions du Mexique", p. 17, in examining the behaviour of the encomenderos and the hacendados and its effects on the delay of capitalist development in Mexico, comments as follows:

"... il n'investit pas son capital-argent sur place, de fa on   aider   la cr ation d'un march  int rieur o  pourrait avoir lieu une circulation de marchandises et de capital. L'encomendero investit au contraire son capital-argent dans l'usure, dans la sp culation fonci re ou immobili re, dans le gaspillage,

le luxe, ou, alors, dans le meilleur des cas, en Europe, dans les zones manufacturiers de l'Empire espagnol.

"Le Mexique n'est pas plus 'capitaliste' à la veille de l'Indépendance, à la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, qu'au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. La persistance de structures archaïques ... empêchent... l'éclosion d'une bourgeoisie."

\*234

a) See Driault-Lhéritier, vol.V, pp. 467-68 on the effects of the Drang nach Osten. "C'est le point faible de la grande combinaison allemande que la Bulgarie et la Turquie, ses deux alliées, aient été ennemies au moment critique (1912-1913)."

b) A commonly held view even more supportive of the argument in the main text is that the Megali Idea was not only irredentist but imperialistic as well. See Zakythinos, "Historia...", pp. 86 and 106. The following incident might give the non-Greek reader a good example of the imperialistic tendencies within the Greek ideology of irredentism. In 1913 the Prime Minister had to intervene personally in favour of a professor at the University of Athens, against whom the Minister of Education as his senior had taken disciplinary action. The reason for the persecution was the professor's opinion that King Constantine should be referred to as King Constantine I and not XII -- in other words, that numbering according to the last Byzantine imperial dynasty should be abandoned. (S.Stefanou, ed, "Venizelos...", vol.II, p. 390).

c) For a comprehensive view of 19th-century nationalism in Europe, see Hobsbawm, "The Age of Capital", pp. 85-86 and 92-93.

\*235

Venizelos himself seems to have held the view that the demotic issue might have been a problem of class conflict although it was not in the end taken up by the mutually opposed classes. In his speech to the House on 2 April 1918, he considers the measure of imposing the demotic in the primary schools as simply and plainly a "democratic" one (S.Stefanou, ed. "Venizelos...", vol. II, pp. 368-69). Thus he appropriately operated the transfer of the problem from the area of cultural conflict to that of political conflict, but always at a safe distance from social strife. In this he was assisted, of course,

by the very nature of the bourgeois democratic regime. Thus, although he was in favour of the demotic in at least elementary education, he neither could nor wished to impose it as the official language (see his speech to parliament of 28 Feb. 1911 in S.Stefanou, ed. "Venizelou...", pp. 364-68). That the demotic was imposed in the primary schools by a bourgeois party is not significant; it was the effect of Venizelos' personal convictions and the support from the party's left wing and especially the republicans of the Papanastassiou group whose clientele was essentially petit-bourgeois (see chapters D, E, and Appendix II). But this support should not mislead either: the demotic was removed again from the primary-school curriculum by the 1925 Pangalos dictatorship, also vaguely petit-bourgeois in its political orientation but with fascist -- and hence 'purist'-- inclinations (see chapter F; see also Papanastassiou, "Meletes...", p. 27).

\*236

I am indebted to Elias Antonopoulos for a lengthy discussion on this subject. My writings do not necessarily reflect his views, except for the quotation from Psyharis. Of the historians, Ventiris is the most explicit in supporting demoticism as a middle-class phenomenon ("I Hellas...", vol.I, pp. 30-31).

Palamas, Greece's national poet and considered as this period's enlightened bourgeois intellectual par excellence, was member of an extremist nationalist secret organisation (General Danglis, "Archives", vol.I, p. 141). The membership list includes a few more well-known names: Professors N.G.Politis and N. Apostolidis; Ioannis Svoronos, director of the Numismatic Museum; the well-known lawyer Ioannis Zepos, and Petros Protopapadakis, civil engineer and politician. General (then Major) Danglis was one of the Panhellenic National Society's leaders, which explains his favourable comments ("Archives", vol.I, pp. 136-53). Other members from within the army were Tsontos and Zymvrakakis, well known for his part in the 1909 coup. The objectives of this organisation, the dissolution of parliament and imposition of an authoritarian regime (pp. 493-41) are characteristic of the ideological confusion among the Greek upper classes of this period. Danglis was the son of a grand-bourgeois family, a royal aide-de-camp and a monarchist until the 1915-17 dichasmos when he became a militant liberal. He ended up as the liberal party's provisional leader during Venizelos' 1920-23 self-exile.



A propos of chauvinism, I cannot resist this quotation from Giannopoulos, ("Ekkhlysis...", p.40), written in his personal version of purist: "... we Greeks (will) educate and discipline Europe, that shameless hussy who is still eating rotten fish, meat, poultry, and also a kind of cheese crawling with maggots..." This may be a caricature of the intelligentsia's chauvinism, but it is characteristic that Giannopoulos was considered by his fellow-intellectuals as merely a bit of an eccentric.

\*237 If demotic was imposed in the primary schools by the bourgeois Liberal Party, this was the effect of Venizelos' personal convictions and the support from the party's left wing and especially the republicans of the Papanastassiou group whose clientele was essentially petit-bourgeois; see chapters D, E, F. Significantly, it was removed again from the primary-school curriculum by the Pangalos dictatorship, also vaguely petit-bourgeois in its political orientation but with fascist -- and hence 'purist' -- overtones; see chapter F.

237a

F.O. 371/677 N°36 and N°174, Elliot to Grey, Athens, 6 March 1909 and 31 Dec. 1908 respectively, as quoted by Papacosmas, "The Greek Military...", pp. 100 and 56.

237b

See Hobsbawm, "The Age of Capital", pp. 20-21 for a discussion on the relationship between the intellectuals and the rebellious petit-bourgeoisie in the 1848-1851 revolutions.

238

Pangalos, "Archives", vol. I, p. 91

\*239

These, more or less, are the questions asked by authors using a more historically-oriented approach in works such as Ali Kazancigil's "La participation et les élites... Turquie", Robin Luckham's "The Nigerian Military...", Walter Weikert's "The Turkish Revolution

1960-61", and others to which there will be references in the pages to follow.

240

See L. Hamon's similar argument in his Rapport Final to the Conference at the University at Dijon, in L. Hamon (ed), "Le role extra-militaire de l'armée dans le Tiers-Monde", p. 413.

241

Feld, M.D., "A Typology of Military Organisation", p. 7.

\*242

The abstraction of very comprehensive models is often a serious handicap at the stage which naturally follows the setting up of a typology, the stage of a descriptive-historical analysis on the basis of such models. Characteristic of the variety of cases examined and their lack of relationship is the historically-oriented study by D.J. Goodspeed, "The Conspirators", dealing with the coups of Belgrade (1903), Dublin (1916), Petrograd (1917), Berlin (1920), Rome (1922), and Rastenburg (1944), although it is not clear whether the author really used a typological model when choosing these examples and not merely a number of different coups.

243

See for example S. Huntington's discussion of class in the numerous instances where he uses this approach in his "Political Development and Political Change"; also in his "Political Order in Changing Societies", especially pp. 222-23.

244

Quotations from (in order of appearance in main text): (1) Germani, G. and Silvert, K.: "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America", p. 62; (2) Lissak, M.: "Modernisation and Role-Expansion of the Military in Developing Countries", p.234.

245

Quotations from (in order of appearance in main text):

(1) Gutteridge, W.: "Military Institutions and Power in the New States", p. 177; (2) Stepan, A.: "The Military in Politics", p.135.

292

In the somewhat megalomaniac language of the period before the debacle, this expression did not sound too pompous. It was widely

used in the Venizelist press of the period, having been coined by Venizelos in his speech submitting the Treaty of Sèvres to Parliament.

247

See for example A.R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa".

248

That patronage is indeed a condition actually present in Greek society is a point well established in the various works by Prof. Campbell (see bibliography). Its specific application to the political behaviour of the military during the inter-war period is exhaustively analysed in Veremis' excellent historical Ph.D. thesis (unpublished).

249

For an analysis of intervention in Brazil based too exclusively on problems of professionalism, see F.M.Nunn, "Military Professionalism...". Along similar lines but much narrower in its approach is the article by U. Sundhaussen, "The Fashioning of Unity in the Indonesian Army". For an explanation of Latin American military politics based on military corporatism, see E. Liewen, "Generals versus Presidents" (where p. 107 gives a summary of the author's approach).

The subject of methodology is discussed in detail in this appendix.  
#250

A fine case for investigation is that of General Othonaios. (For exhaustive and reliable information on Othonaios' activity during the inter-war period, see Veremis, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, pp. 150 and 152-53.) After the 1922 revolution this man, a devoted Venizelist, rushed to take sides for an immediate abolition of the monarchy, only to change position as soon as Venizelos made known his own moderate policies in the matter. Othonaios did, however, remain adamant on the punishment of the Six. Although it was general knowledge that Venizelos wished for moderation on this subject as well, no explicit instructions were received from him until it was too late, a few hours after the execution. To contain Othonaios' revolutionary zeal, Premier Plastiras had offered him the

presidency of the court martial. He not only accepted the appointment, but also proceeded with the death sentence. He might have acted differently had Venizelos' telegramme opposing the death penalty arrived earlier.

Following the execution, Othonaios not unnaturally became one of the royalists' most hated targets. Although he was so heavily compromised, he managed to remain faithful to Venizelos' pro-monarchist directives during the whole of the first twelve months after the revolution, a year of stress and uncertainty. His position when invited to the 'Conference of Personalities' on 31 October 1923 is most characteristic. At first he refused outright to participate, and in a furious cable-reply to the invitation called the initiative "disastrous" on the grounds that invitations had also been sent to monarchists and people suspected of involvement in the abortive 1923 royalist coup (Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol.I, p. 169). But in the course of the next few hours he reversed his intransigent position and even accepted the principle that the abolition of the monarchy was a matter to be resolved only after the elections. The reason for his volte face was another telegramme from Venizelos, in which Othonaios' idolised patron said: "I ... adjure those who believe in the value of my opinion not to effect the violent change of regime (which is) under preparation." (Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol.I, pp. 168-69)

Most probably, Othonaios could at this point have imposed his will dynamically had he so wished, by using the Military League of which he was one of the leaders. The organisation had been formed as early as July 1923, and its alleged aim was to prevent a monarchist counter-revolution. But its real objective was "to ensure that the post-revolutionary regime would be favourable to those of its members who had distinguished themselves in republican fixity of pupose" (Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol.I, p. 196; see also Kordatos, "Historia tis neoteris...", vol.XIII, pp. 639 and 648 for similar comments on Othonaios attitude.) This certainly applied to Othonaios, a man deeply compromised by the execution of the Six.

His allegiance to Venizelos, however, seems to have been stronger than his sense of self-preservation. But he could not possibly remain loyal for ever under the threat of the royalists' eventual revenge. About a year later he staged his 1923 pronunciamiento. It only seems strange that he did not do so earlier. (Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol. I, p. 187, writes that Othonaios proceeded to his pronunciamiento because he was under the impression that this was Venizelos' wish. According to Dafnis, Othonaios believed that Venizelos wanted a fait accompli which would not compromise him in the eyes of the Great Powers. This seems a rather daring speculation which Dafnis does not base on any specific information. Even if Othonaios had had such an intricate view of the problem, it could well have been a rationalisation of his more or less impulsive decision to proceed to his pronunciamiento rather than any deep conviction.) It is significant that even after the pronunciamiento Othonaios was never really able to firmly oppose Venizelos. In January 1924, for instance, he threatened his patron that "he would disclose information about his (Venizelos') tactics during the trials of 1922 unless he agreed to abolish the monarchy by a simple vote in parliament". Yet once again he did not follow up his threat, Venizelos did not give in, and the referendum was not called off.

The course of events from then on proved that Othonaios' fears had been totally justified. Following the ephemeral reconciliation of Venizelists and royalists and their coalition government of 4 December 1926, the Venizelists accepted the royalist demand to remove Othonaios from the army. Naturally, he would not simply plead guilty for the execution of the Six by tendering his resignation as requested by the government. Whereupon he was retired (Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol. I, p. 354). Meanwhile, another measure imposed on the coalition government by its royalist members was the reinstatement of royalist officers purged by the 1922 revolutionary government. Thus the stage was set. It comes as no surprise that Othonaios, after having been so ruthlessly abandoned and under the threat of royalist revenge, should have got ready to prepare another coup. What is surprising is that he did not proceed with it, which is again characteristic: once more he let himself be influenced by Venizelos' telegrammes to Plastiras and Sophoulis, recommending that the coup be avoided.

The conclusion from this short 'case study' is thus plain. Patronage functioned primarily as a network for communication of the political leaders' decisions, and for the feedback of the officers' reactions to them. Othonaios' 1923 pronunciamiento and his post-1926 threatened coup were direct effects of the political conditions outside the armed force : they were facilitated, but not caused, by his extensive patronage relations within the army. This, in fact, confirms the basic argument of the discussion, that the officers' behaviour inside the army was determined by the political conditions outside it, which in turn were shaped by the economic and social factors of the period. (On the apotakti issue, see Mazarakis, "Memoirs", p. 342-43. For an analysis of the elite-role of the military in Greece, see also Legg, "Politics...", pp. 187-92.)

251

Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol. I, p. 9, supports this view very well. This appears also to have been Kordatos' and Karolidis' implicit position.

252

See Dafnis, "I Hellas...", vol. II, pp. 189 ff. An opposite view may be held if one considers pp. 201-02, but not for long; the events described on p. 211 suggest that there was an upsurge of disciplinary action in this period.

\*253

"L'armée est d'autant plus indépendante socialement de la classe dominante que cette dernière est plus faible..." -- Hamon's perceptive introduction in L. Hamon (ed), "Le rôle extra-militaire..."; see also the interesting article by Rouquié, "Révolutions militaires et indépendance nationale en Amérique Latine", especially pp. 1256 ff.

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The bibliography below is not exhaustive. It lists the works I have consulted either for information on certain specific problems, or for general purposes. The Greek works centre on the 1864-1935 period, and chiefly on 1881-1928. A few works on the eighteenth century and the war of independence, as well as Petropoulos' exceptional book on the Othonian period, were consulted for specialised background information and are referred to also in the text.

Although the bibliography was continually updated between 1973 and 1975, this was done within human limits. Following 23 July 1974, when Greece's most recent authoritarian nightmare ended, a flood of books poured into the market. There was still no sign of it subsiding by 1975, when I decided to stop reading and devote my time exclusively to writing. This decision inevitably shut out some works either published very recently or due to be published soon: for example, the essay on the demotic language by Rena Patrikiou; Moschonas' introductory essay in Pallis' "Broussos"; V.Kremmydas' "Introduction to the History of Neo-Hellenic Society 1700-1821"; Elefantis' "I epangelia tis adynatis epanastassis"; M.Nikolinakos' "Meletes pano ston Helliniko capitalismo"; and Tsoukalas' socio-historical

work discussing the period at the turn of the century, of which I was unable to secure a draft, though I fortunately elicited the author's views and general line at least, on an occasion of his sharp criticism of my own work.

The subject of military intervention in politics, both as a theoretical issue in political science and as a topic for case histories of countries other than Greece, presented me with a similar problem. My reading had to be done within the 1973-75 period, and my bibliography was updated, for the last time, in 1973; since then, some books and articles have been added to my list, but only as I came across them in my research and not as a result of systematic bibliographic investigation.

I believe strongly that the role of the bibliography as a guiding line for scholars and students wishing to examine similar subjects cannot be played properly unless some critical guidance is given by the author. Whenever possible, I tried to provide this in my footnotes. As a newcomer in the field, anxious to maintain a proper sense of proportion (and faced with a field as flooded with triviality as that of military intervention) I have annotated with a cross (+) such titles as I myself have found of some real help. This covers, without further differentiation, works of very high intrinsic standing, and essays where only three of four paragraphs are applicable. Similarly, not all the titles deprived of a +-sign are works I dare consider of lower standard. It is merely that I myself did not find them particularly helpful, which may well be due



to personal idiosyncrasies - even prejudice - in methodology. Other researchers may find them of considerable value.

This distinction seemed unfair, however, to those works to which I owe much more than information or guidance: the works that taught, strongly influenced, and even, in some cases, moved me. All I could do was to acknowledge my gratitude with an asterisk. I did not mark with crosses or asterisks certain very basic works such as general histories or the works of Marx and Weber, or encyclopaedias. But I have used crosses for archives and memoirs. As for certain basic works used for very general background information, I preferred not to list them at all, except for works by Marx, lest my bibliography appear didactic and pompous.

Finally, I have used alphabetical author listing in preference to divisions into subject matter, which I indicated by a G for books and articles on Greece, an M for works on military intervention, and an L for works on theories around legitimacy and authority, bureaucracy and organisation. Works of general interest were left unmarked, whilst some titles show a combination of letters, for example GM for works on military intervention in Greek politics.

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