Bilateral Climate Governance in Indonesia

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Abstract

As a global issue, climate change has emerged as one of the most challenging problems faced by the international community. The failure of multilateral climate agreements, including the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Paris Agreement of 2015, has put multilateralism in peril. Due to the problems with multilateralism, bilateralism has appeared as an alternative approach to climate governance.

Since 1997, Indonesia has become a strategic partner for seven major bilateral donors aiming to tackle climate change (DNPI, 2009). As the 6th largest carbon emitter in the world, with 70% from deforestation and other forest degradation (DFID, 2014), Indonesia has important effects on climate change. This thesis aims to uncover and analyse the complexities of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships as they aimed to improve climate governance primarily between 2009 and 2016.

As part of this thesis, I have developed the ‘transformative 4Is+3’ analytical framework. This new analytical approach is used for assessing the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships in order to understand whether transformational change took place in Indonesia during this period. This research uses a qualitative approach, drawing on in-depth interviews from key informants inside and outside Indonesia, as well as documentary sources, in order to build a comparative study of three major bilateral climate donors (Norway, UK, and Australia).

The central finding of this thesis is that there was only limited evidence that the three major bilateral climate partnerships with Indonesia between 2009 and 2016 had some impact on climate policy transformation. These changes took the form of some minimal substantive changes across the 4I+3 transitions. Among the seven indicators identified in the transformative 4i+3s framework, the factors of institutionalism and leadership change had the most impact across the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships. Overall, however, the bilateral approach to the Indonesian climate change context did not lead to significant climate governance improvements.
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Declaration

I declare that the thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research background and problem statement

Climate change is arguably the most important challenge facing the world today. Since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, efforts to secure effective international action to mitigate and adapt to climate change have predominantly been in the form of multilateral strategies. This climate diplomacy has spawned extensive institutional structures and processes, including the annual Conference of the Parties (COPs), which has resulted – after years of difficult negotiations - in two notable treaties: the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the Paris Agreement in 2015. While both treaties represent remarkable achievements in climate diplomacy, the need to win over veto states has meant that in both cases the ambitions (measured by emissions reduction targets and climate finance commitments) were considerably lower than what is required to effectively mitigate climate change.

While the overall Kyoto targets were achieved, they applied only to the core group of 36 Annex 1 advanced industrialised states (Shishlov et al., 2016). Subsequently, efforts to agree on a post-Kyoto treaty eventually delivered the Paris Agreement in 2015, which was based on a new bottom-up approach that saw more than 190 states submitting their own Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This strategy proved successful in bringing all main actors on board, but the aggregate commitment - even if implemented – would be far short of delivering the extent of reductions needed to keep the global temperature increase to 2.0°C, let alone the 1.5°C most scientists believe is necessary to prevent a climate change catastrophe. While multilateral efforts to strengthen the impact of the Paris Agreement will (and must) continue, states have increasingly looked to alternative complementary approaches to climate change mitigation. One such approach is bilateralism, which many see as an effective means of supplementing multilateral approaches.

At a basic level, bilateralism means that two state parties engage in and create an agreement as to their functional relationship. I have classified three different forms
of bilateral climate partnership based on case-studies of countries around the world. The first form is called “bilateral intergovernmentalism” (Romano, 2010; Cock 2011; Torney, 2012), where the main focus is on the power of institutionalism and the essential role of state actors in a bilateral relationship. The second form concerns bilateral climate finance, which revolves around the financial mechanism in the bilateral context (Bajpai et al., 2016; Oh, 2012; Caplan, 2011). Meanwhile, the third form sets out bilateral partnerships between partners in the North and South that seek to overcome the divide between them (Muccione et al., 2018; Robertsen et al., 2015). These three forms represent different ways in which bilateralism in the climate change context can complement what multilateralism has missed or done ineffectively. Detailed explanations of, and case-studies on, all three forms of bilateral climate studies are presented in chapter 2.

In bilateral climate partnerships, Indonesia has emerged as an important country in the global efforts with respect to carbon emissions mitigation. Indonesia is the sixth-largest carbon emitter in the world (Ge and Damassa, 2014), with 70% of the country’s total carbon emissions coming from forest fires, other deforestation and forest degradation (DFID, 2014). The deforestation level in Indonesia is one of the world’s highest, with an annual deforestation rate of approximately 2% (Lang, 2010). These climate change facts had motivated several foreign donors to help Indonesia in solving deforestation and protecting its tropical rainforest. Indonesia developed bilateral climate partnerships with eight country partners (Japan, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, the UK, Australia, Germany and the USA) and several international organisations between 1997 and 2016 (National Council of Climate Change, 2009; DFID, 2016; Government of Norway, 2010; Manning and Diermeen, 2000; Adger et al., 2003). The majority of bilateral climate funding received by Indonesia has come from Norway, which announced a £781 million bilateral agreement on reducing deforestation on 26th May 2010 (RFN, 2010). As the current national commitment, President Joko Widodo has pledged to emissions reduction targets by up to 29% by 2030, or 41% with international aid (Ministry of Environment, 2015). Based on the background presented
above, this thesis aims to explore the dynamics and complexities of climate governance via bilateral climate partnerships through conducting a case study of such partnerships in Indonesia. The main research question of this thesis is **what have been the complexities involved in bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia, and in relation to these complexities, which dimensions help explain effective outcomes (with a focus on the period 2009-2016)?**

Bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia and elsewhere are highly significant because they have the potential to achieve concrete emissions reduction targets at the country level, yet they remain understudied in the academic literature.\(^1\) To develop a clear understanding of bilateral climate partnerships, section 1.2 sets out the main reasons for using a bilateral approach, along with a comparison of bilateralism and multilateralism. Section 1.3 elaborates on the nature and development of Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships, which is followed in section 1.4 by some of the key potential factors that affect these partnerships, such as institutional challenges, civil society engagement and the decentralisation process related to climate change. Drawing on climate governance studies, transformative climate governance literature and the political economy framework of Di Gregorio and Brockhaus (2012) – the ‘4Is’ (institution, interest, ideas and information) – I have developed the ‘transformative 4Is+3’ as a new analytical approach to assessing the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships as outlined in section 1.5.\(^2\) The thesis applies a qualitative method and comparative case studies, as discussed in section 1.6. The originality and contribution of the thesis, notably the development and application of the ‘transformative 4Is+3’ are set out in section 1.7. Finally, a brief outline of each chapter is provided in section 1.8.

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\(^1\) Studies from Bulkeley et al. (2010), Najam and Halle (2010), Balsiger and van Deveer (2012) and Torney (2015) and Harris (2013) have stated that the multilateral climate regime has failed to have an impact and overcome climate change problems. Based on these arguments, the Indonesian climate context in relation to global climate agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol and REDD programme has yielded the same failure (Gregorio, 2012; Caldecott et al., 2011; Angelsen et al., 2008, 2012; Astuti and McGregor, 2015). Hence, I seek to to build the theory that bilateral climate governance can complement the global or multilateral level.

\(^2\) The concept of the transformative 4Is+3 is explained in further detail in chapter 2.
Before considering the Indonesian climate change context further, the next section sets out some arguments as to why bilateral climate governance is so important generally, and the justifications submitted by some for the bilateral approach becoming an alternative way to support and enhance the impacts of multilateralism.

1.2 Why is bilateral climate governance important?

This section explains why bilateral climate governance has become increasingly important amidst ineffective multilateralism. Comparing bilateralism and multilateralism in relation to climate change is important because the multilateral environmental agreement system has so far struggled to set the planet on the right path toward transitioning to a low-carbon economy and society. There are three main reasons why the bilateral approach is chosen as the focus of this research, each of which is outlined below.

First, multilateral climate agreements have not had a significant impact on reducing Green House Gasses (GHG) emissions. Global environmental governance (GEG) is characterised as a fragmented and duplicated model, with dispersed authority and weak regulations. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s Fifth Assessment Report (2014), GHG emissions growth between 2000 and 2010 was greater than the previous three decades combined. To stop this alarming increase, the IPCC (2014: 20-21) recommended limiting the 30-year global average of combined air temperature increase to less than 2°C through mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. However, the strong evidence in this scientific report of the IPCC was not clearly reflected in the Paris Agreement 2015, which contained no blueprint for achieving the goal of stabilisation (Clémençon, 2016: 3). In 1997-2012, problems in the Kyoto Protocol had stemmed from a flawed institutional design as a global climate agreement because of its exclusion of most countries in the world (including China and Brazil), the failure of the USA to ratify the Protocol (Rosen, 2015: 42), unambitious reduction targets, and the very short period of action to implement the Protocol (pp. 40-42). Rosen also stated that the Kyoto Protocol lacked an emissions
prescription for life after 2012. The gap between the need for action and the existing responses has led global institutions to demand accountability on the part of national authorities and within national policies themselves (Kramarz and Park, 2016: 1).

There are two major causes of GEG’s failure: its ineffectiveness in addressing the deteriorating environment; and the challenge of accountability. The accountability issue revolves around the fact that both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement were not legally binding when it came to achieving emissions reduction targets, so they had a limited impact on solving the effects of global warming. The Kyoto Protocol in particular only focused on the most developed economies, and most signatory states did not fulfil their commitment to reduce emissions. Other accountability flaws have emerged from the rise of transparency among all actors in GEG, the increasingly prevalent practice of environmental actors providing justification and reasoning for their decisions, and the burgeoning efforts being made to assess compliance through monitoring and evaluation, particularly on the part of intergovernmental organisations (IOs) (Gupta, 2010). Thus, the unclear mechanism for reducing emissions targets from the Kyoto Protocol and the absence of a blueprint on limiting the global temperature increase from the Paris Agreement became major weaknesses of global climate governance.

Second, the growing interest in alternative approaches to climate governance reflects increasing concern about the ineffectiveness of multilateral climate agreements. Some scholars have identified failings in the United Nations’ (UN) climate regime and how these could be addressed (Eckersley, 2012; Falkner et al., 2010), while others have expressed concerns about the shift in focus from a global scale to regional scales of environmental governance (Balsiger and van Deveer, 2012). Regional environmental governance in the case of the European Union (EU) and China and the EU and Brazil (Romano, 2010; Cock, 2011; Torney, 2015) and EU-Brazil (Afionis et al., 2014) has shown the benefits of bilateral interest and connection in enhancing regional climate partnerships.
One specific factor that stimulates bilateral climate governance is the long negotiation process required to reach multilateral global climate deals. The failure of more than 20 years of international efforts to stem the rise of GHG emissions has led to significant scholarly innovation, seeking to identify alternative approaches for the future (Torney, 2015). Bilateralism, compared to multilateralism, is appealing because it should be considerably easier to secure an agreement on something substantial when only two countries are involved.

Third, there are contrasting views on the impact of transnational climate governance (i.e. whether the transnational approach becomes beneficial or conflictual in climate governance), which further emboldens the bilateral approach as another way of developing effective climate partnerships/initiatives. Transnational climate governance broadens the network of multilateral climate agreement, engaging both state and non-state actors in order to pursue rigorous emissions reduction targets with concrete actions. However, the complex array of actors involved in transnationalism is to its detriment, and ultimately renders it ineffective with regard to achieving emissions reduction targets. Responding to this shortcoming, the bilateral climate partnerships aim to replace the role of transnational climate governance and avoid the contradictions that have plagued transnational networks.

Transnational climate governance can be defined as a governance structure that involves transnational actors (both public and private) in responding to and combating climate change problems. Andonova et al. (2009: 57-58) mentioned the following three rationalities of transnationalisation in climate governance: there is a need for numerous transnational actors to solve complex environmental politics; climate change is a multi-sector and multi-dimensional issue; and the intergovernmental regime for climate cooperation through the Kyoto Protocol has opened up new opportunities and incentives for transnational governance. Bulkeley et al. (2009: 69) also stated that transnational actors engage in authoritative forms of governing to constitute transnational governance networks.
Cases of transnational climate governance are highly dependent on a multilateral regime in terms of funding, structure and/or governing authority. The contrasting views encountered in transnational climate governance can derive from whether the given transnational actors can have conflictual or beneficial impacts on dealing with climate change issues. Looking at beneficial impacts, Hickmann (2016) undertook comparative case-studies of the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) Local Governments for Sustainability Network and found no evidence of competition for authority between non-state or subnational initiatives and state-centric ones. A central conclusion was that “changing patterns of authority in world politics cannot be conceptualised as a zero-sum game, in which the emergence of authoritative structures beyond central governments and international institutions equals a loss of authority at the expense of state-based forms of governance” (van der Ven, 2016: 12). Thus, transnational climate governance may have some benefits in the climate regime by creating the same role for state and non-state actors in conducting climate change projects.

However, the conflictual impact of transnational governance can emerge when two major powers, such as the USA and China, deal with transactional-based climate negotiations. For example, the drastic development of China’s solar energy had a negative impact on several networks of discursive actors in the EU and in the USA in 2011. This situation was popularly called the “Solar Trade War” between the USA and the EU, and China (Caprotti, 2015: 99). According to statistics, Chinese solar exports to the USA increased from £912 million in 2010 to £2.2 billion in 2011 (US Department of Commerce, 2012), which presented a clear disparity between Chinese and American firms in the domestic US solar market. In response, Solar World Industries America, Inc. along with other international corporates lodged a petition with the US Department of Commerce on 19th October 2011 to ban or attack Chinese solar firms (p.106). Some members of US society, corporates, and government thought that Chinese solar imports threatened market security and presented risks to the US’s green economy (p.108). This dispute worsened when President Trump withdrew the US’s commitment to the Paris
Agreement (Moore, 2020). In doing so, the Trump administration de-emphasised energy and climate cooperation (Lewis, 2017). This conflict over solar power showed that transnational actors expanded the conflicts beyond their competitive advantage of environmental sustainability in business, which the conflict could be triggered by the ignorance of national leaders towards climate change issues. Thus, transnational climate governance is not the most effective solution when it comes to managing climate partnerships.

From the above three factors, it can be seen that bilateral climate partnerships are important because they offer an alternative form of diplomacy by way of substituting multilateral climate deals, which have not worked effectively to date. Furthermore, the conflictual impact of transnational climate governance has had contradictory effects on GEG. The nature of bilateral climate governance itself is different from one state to the next. A study by Hulme and Mahone (2010) outlined how scientists and research institutions in the North predominantly lead scientific knowledge on climate change. Meanwhile, Muccione et al. (2018) identified the factors that have enabled the success of bilateral climate change research and training in Peru and India through the bilateral support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. However, this ultimately led to a transparency problem, as the Southern countries (India and Peru) had limited opportunities regarding authorship due to the dominance of the Swiss researchers. In this thesis, I investigated the nature of bilateral climate governance in the context of Indonesia, which has become the leader among developing states in terms of emissions reduction targets and is a country that has opted to pursue bilateral climate governance as a key element of its climate mitigation strategy. The nature and development of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia will be elaborated upon further in the following section.

1.3 The nature and development of Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships
This section provides a brief description of the emergence of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships (which will be elaborated in section 1.3.1), three main
characteristics of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships, and the main research question of this thesis. Since 1998, many states have become strategic partners with Indonesia, aiming to build bilateral\(^3\) environmental cooperation. The first period of bilateral cooperation spanned 1997 to 2007, during which time Canada, Japan, the UK, Denmark, Norway and Sweden established their own development agencies in Indonesia such as Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Department for International Development (DFID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and allocated a specific budget to climate change (National Council on Climate Change, 2009). Many foreign donors, with their own development agencies, were interested to help Indonesia in solving climate change problems through bilateral climate partnerships.

After explaining the emergence of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships, there are three main characteristics that help explain how Indonesia conducted bilateral climate cooperation. The first characteristic came from the emergence of environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) that reshaped the Indonesian policy into a more climate-driven one. In 1997, as the beginning era of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships, Indonesian civil society groups played an important role in pushing for political reform (with the political system becoming more democratic and freedom of speech, particularly in the press being strengthened). With regard to environmental issues, environmental groups such as the Indonesian Environmental Forum (Walhi) and Telapak were concerned about the impact of deforestation (in particular, the damage caused by forest fires) and industrial development on Indonesia’s fragile ecological balance (CIFOR, 2000). In 1999, these groups began to

\(^3\) Bilateral approaches have historically functioned as an intermediate form of governance (West, 2005: 475). The end of 1997 marked the first time that the concept of official development assistance (ODA) was recognised in Indonesia and became the entry point for bilateral climate partnerships. Further readings are found in Schmit (1996), Kusumaatmadja (2000) and UNEP (2000).
play a prominent role in national and provincial politics. For instance, they criticised the Central Kalimantan governor’s policy on environmental destruction and had a significant impact on public opinion and ideas (especially among local communities and societies) with respect to climate change policy (ibid: 20). Both groups were pioneering non-state actors who strove for environmental justice and were directly involved at the micro level in demanding a transparent policy-making process, thereby illustrating the importance of donor partnerships in climate change issues engagement at the grassroots level.

The second characteristic of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships was derived from the strong national commitment for reducing emissions targets in 2009 and the new bureaucratic transformation related to climate change in early 2015. In 2009, bilateral climate partnerships were a keyway of ensuring that Indonesia honoured its voluntary national commitment to reduce emissions. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (often referred to as SBY, the former president of Indonesia) outlined a target of a 26% reduction in emissions by 2020 exclusively through the country’s own efforts, with this figure increasing to 41% with international support (Ministry of Environment, 2015). Legally, Indonesia ratified and proclaimed its emissions reduction commitment through Presidential Regulations (PerPres) number 61 and 71/2011. As a follow-up in 2015, President Joko Widodo pledged to emissions reduction targets by up to 29% by 2030, or by 41% with international aid (ibid). This increased emissions reduction targets were reflected in the modification of the Presidential Regulations.

In January 2015, Widodo disbanded the National Committee on Climate Change (DNPI) and the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) agency that were built during the reign of SBY (2009-2014).

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4 REDD = Reducing Emission on Deforestation and Forest Degradation, started since COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia 2007 as a mitigation in climate change action. In 2010, the United Nations developed REDD into REDD+ programme, which includes activities such as: forest conservation, sustainable management of forest and enhancement of carbon stocks through afforestation and reforestation. REDD+ incentives developing countries to keep their forest standing by offering result-based payment for actions (UNREDD, 2011)
Their tasks were reassigned to the newly formed Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) after the dissolution of the UKP4 in December 2014 (President of Indonesia, 2014, 2015). These institutions were all integrated under Presidential Regulation number 16/2015. Hence, the dispersed and newly created power elements related to forest governance were re-integrated into the MoEF.

The establishment of MoEF has yielded two ongoing challenges related to the bilateral climate governance context: (i) the complex prospects for the Indonesian-Norwegian climate partnership (which supported the essence of the REDD+ Agency); and (ii) the limited capacity of the Indonesian Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) to manage funding from any level of sources (Samadhi, 2016). The performance of the MoEF in coordinating all climate change institutions remains under question, and there may be some overlap between itself and the ICCTF. The capacity of the MoEF also means that the Indonesia-Norway climate partnership has had to undergo reconstruction.

The third characteristic of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships was reflected from the domestic impact of international climate agreements. Alongside the national commitment, a number of bilateral climate change agreements in Indonesia have also been affected by the global environmental agenda, such as the Brundtland Report (1987), which spawned the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 (Dodds, 1997: 5). This was the largest global environmental summit to ever take place, attended by hundreds of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In the summit’s wake, the UN created a Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994 (Carter, 2007: 242). Apart from the Indonesian involvement in the UNFCCC process, wider environmental agreements have also shaped Indonesian government policy primarily through the REDD+ programme. In practice, Presidential Regulations (PerPres) number 61 and 71/2011 and the national action plan on reducing greenhouse gases in 2011 were created based on the UNFCCC and the follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol.

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5 This case will be elaborated upon in detail in chapter 2.
Thus, the nature of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships was shaped by the role of civil society in fighting for climate change problems, the national commitment on reducing the carbon emissions, and the domestic impact of global climate agreements. Indonesia had started bilateral climate partnerships that promoted diverse actors, and the government of Indonesia did not take a simply ‘state-centric’ view. The dynamics of non-state actors have mirrored foreign donors’ increasing effort to aid Indonesia on climate change projects. Furthermore, the Indonesian national commitment to reducing emissions continuously worked in a different Presidency with the increasing percentage of targets and changing bureaucracy. The institutional transformation through Ministry of Environment and Forestry in January 2015 enhanced the Indonesian government’s capacity in leading the developing countries on achieving what international climate agreements wanted. The next section outlines the three phases of bilateral climate partnerships conducted in Indonesia.

1.3.1 Timeline of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia
This section outlines three phases of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships. Based on multiple studies (National Council of Climate Change, 2009; DFID, 2016; Government of Norway, 2010; Manning and Diermeen, 2000; Adger et al., 2003), I have identified and classified the history of Indonesian climate partnerships from 1997 until 2016 into three phases. Across this carefully selected time period, I aim to determine the specific moment in which Indonesia was perceived from a global perspective to be undertaking a commitment to climate change mitigation, as well as pinpointing the ways in which the Indonesian government has fragmented its commitment into regional and local climate policies/regulations. This classification represents the first attempt to map out the history of the Indonesian government’s involvement in bilateral climate cooperation. The timeline of bilateral climate partnerships provides a structured means through which to identify and explore how

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For further explanation, see section 1.4.
Indonesia has initiated bilateral environmental action, including bilateral climate funding. A brief summary of the timeline of bilateral climate partnerships is provided in Figure 1.1:

Figure 1.1 Timeline of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia

Source: My classification of bilateral climate partnerships based on several sources

Figure 1.1 shows that the first phase ran from 1997 to 2007, when Canada, Japan, the UK, Denmark, Norway and Sweden established their own development agencies in Indonesia and allocated a specific budget to climate change. The Canadian International Development Agency created an initiative called the Canada Climate Change Development Fund (CCCDF), which during this period had an average annual budget of £362,877. Meanwhile, The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) undertook a similar project with an annual allocation of up to £6.8 million,
3.54% of which (£242,000) went to climate change mitigation activities. At the same time, Indonesia established another bilateral programme in partnership with Japan known as the Cool Earth Partnership – a £7.5 billion project aiming to provide assistance to developing countries to reduce GHG emissions and to improve climate stability (National Council on Climate Change, 2009).

The main priority of the second phase of bilateral climate partnerships was the establishment of the ICCTF and the Climate Investment Fund (CIF), which were founded under the National Council on Climate Change (National Council on Climate Change, 2009). In the second phase, the main focus was on how the Indonesian government could internally strengthen its institutional framework on climate change. This period spanned 2007-2009, with several other bilateral government-society partnerships also emerging, such as the United States and Indonesian Diversity Foundation (US-KEHATI) and the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD). The Australian government also undertook a mutually beneficial project focusing on Indonesian forestry called the Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership (IAFCP), which aimed to support the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) initiative in 2007, with total funding of up to £23 million (Anonymous, Pernyataan Bersama Indonesia-Australia, 2010). The focus of these partnership activities was divided between two areas: Sumatra and Kalimantan.

The third phase ran from 2009 to 2016, focusing on the external institutions of foreign partners that were supposed to strengthen climate change cooperation. Pertinently, the Norwegian government pledged up to £781 million to support the REDD programme on 26th May 2010 (Government of Norway, 2010). The UK government also established a climate change organisation called the United Kingdom Climate Change Unit (UKCCU) in 2011 (DFID, 2012) and allocated a budget of £4.5 million in grant funding specifically for Indonesia from October 2012 to March 2015. In seeing this amount of money, the UK’s funding for Indonesian climate change
programme was significantly lower than the commitments of Australia and Norway. The majority of this budget was used for a low-carbon development capacity-building programme in partnership with the Indonesian Ministry of Finance (DFID, 2016).

Following the IAFCP programme, in 2010 Australia continued its climate partnership with Indonesia through the Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership (KFCP).

Having identified the three phases of bilateral climate partnerships, this thesis primarily focuses on the third phase because of the consistency of the three donors (Norway, Australia and the UK) in giving climate change aid to Indonesia. The UK, Australia and Norway are three foreign partners who have continuously given Indonesia technical aid (technological infrastructure to boost energy efficiency) and funding (National Council on Climate Change, 2015). Furthermore, the third phase (2009-2016) of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships had showed the important moment of Indonesian government voluntarily committed on emission reduction and also the bureaucratic transformation from different Presidency in strengthening climate change policy.

In order to assess the complexities of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships in the third phase, previous research and literatures demonstrated how climate change cooperation worked in Indonesia. Generally, there are three indicators to measure the effectiveness of international climate change agreements: (i) the demand for international cooperation; (ii) the numbers of states participating and their interests; (iii) and the design of the institutions that aim to promote cooperation (Victor, 2006:92). In assessing the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships, this thesis has modified and developed the model of assessment from Di Gregorio and Brockhaus (2012).

The model of assessment from Di Gregorio and Brockhaus (2012) is called the four ‘Is’: institutions, ideas, interests and information. Those indicators have become the source of comparative climate governance specifically about Reducing Emission

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7 For further clarification and elaboration on the three case-studies, see chapter 3.
on Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD)+ that Di Gregorio conducted on several developing countries in 2012. Furthermore, Di Gregorio and Brockhaus (2012:71) have simplified the political economy analysis into two parts: policy analysis (investigates politico-economic, institutional, governance conditions, and obstacles to REDD+ actions) and media analysis (how REDD+ policy debates are framed in the media and compare the dominant discourse with counter-discourses (Hajer 1995; Boykoff, 2008). In relation to this thesis, I have used the four ‘Is’ and added three factors related to leadership, policy experiment, and decentralisation in assessing the complexities of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships. This assessment started from comparison between the goals/objectives of bilateral climate partnerships based on literatures/government’s document and the empirical findings, with the details provided in chapter 2 and 3.

Given the background of Indonesia’s commitment to climate change and the timeline of bilateral climate partnerships, the main research question of this thesis is as follows:

What have been the complexities involved in bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia, and in relation to these complexities, which dimensions help explain effective outcomes (with a focus on the period 2009-2016)?

To address the research question above, the next section provides some preliminary findings based on the academic literature that has identified possible factors that might impact the Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships.

1.4 Potential factors affecting Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships

This section draws on a preliminary analysis of the secondary literature to identify possible factors affecting the success of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships. In outlining these factors, three donors – Norway, the UK and Australia – are used as examples of how climate change projects in Indonesia have been managed. Based on the issues that these donors encountered, there are two main factors that shape the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia: problems in
institutionalising climate change mitigation and the role and engagement of civil society groups.

As a donor, Norway has a strong record of helping Indonesia to combat climate change. Firstly, the Norwegian government has dealt with civil society groups in the REDD programme since the agreement was implemented in 2010, and it has remained engaged with them through the Norway International Climate Forest Initiative (NICFI). Secondly, the outcomes of the bilateral climate agreement between Norway and Indonesia include: a moratorium on forest concessions; the One Map Initiative; cooperation with the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK); and recognition of indigenous rights and the establishment of the REDD+ agency (Wahyudi and Dharmasaputra, 2014). Finally, according to a KOMPAS survey (2017), the local government of West Kalimantan recently built a new institutionalised bureau to combat deforestation and promote green growth. However, the three substantial initiatives brought by Norway have had some negative consequences, such as the loss of employment for palm oil farmers, and may have encouraged certain violations of government regulations concerning the allocation and utilisation of forest areas (Yozami and Nababan, 2011).

The complexity of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia can be further illustrated by the Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership (KFCP) project with the Australian government. Australia quietly shelved its KFCP project in 2012, meaning that this £33.5 million project was stopped before it could meet its targets (Tapp, 2011). Olbrei and Howes (2012) found that only 50,000 trees had been planted and none of the peat had been re-flooded. From a civil society perspective, Yayasan Petak Danum (YPD), a local non-government organisation (NGO) in Kalimantan, stated that the KFCP did not significantly engage the local community (Tapp, 2011). The KFCP project exacerbated the local situation, increasing the number of civil conflicts and land status disputes (Pearse, 2013).

In turn, through the UKCCU, the UK’s climate partnership with Indonesia has also encountered institutional challenges, primarily regarding the financial mechanism.
The UKCCU outlined a specific budget for low-carbon development capacity-building programmes with the Indonesian Ministry of Finance (DFID, 2016). However, the money did not flow into civil society groups because the UKCCU delivered the funding directly to the designated ministries as the bilateral climate partnership was conducted on a government-to-government basis. Accordingly, the distribution of these funds has been inappropriate, with an insignificant impact on the groups most vulnerable to climate change (Down to Earth, 2010).

The limited literature to have analysed these bilateral climate partnerships has identified two factors that require further investigation. The first is institutional problems related to climate change, which can be informed by drawing on the political power literature and the realist paradigm (Kusumaatmadja, 2000; Jackson, 1978; Waltz, 1999) in order to ascertain how political interests and the dynamics of power politics have emerged in the institution-based initiatives of bilateral climate partnerships enacted between Indonesia and the three donors. The second factor to consider is the engagement of foreign donors with civil society groups, which has been covered in civil society literature (Hann and Dunn, 1996; Anheier, 2004; Alexander, 1998; Putnam, 1998). Such civil society engagement also relates to the formulation and implementation processes of bilateral climate partnerships.

In relation to the first factor, institutional problems related to climate change emerged because the Indonesian government was unable to convince the donors that it had met concrete emissions reduction targets. The process of merging some institutions related to climate change in Indonesia, along with its complex bureaucracy, hampered the Indonesian effort to convince the donors that emissions were being reduced. This internal capacity problem could have been caused by the dynamic transition from a concentration of power to competition for power. Power politics among elites at the central government level is inevitable. The traditional bureaucracy (which is an untransparent, inefficient and uncoordinated system) remains in force at every level of governance in Indonesia (local, provincial and national). The supremacy of central power remains influential despite some decentralisation, and climate change activism
has become an alternative avenue for dissent (Kusumaatmadja, 2000). This transformation toward competition for power continues to involve the elites as the main actors. This means that the trademark of patronage and bureaucratic polity has exposed the vertical or hierarchical relations between the State and civil society, which prevailed since the late 1960s (Jackson, 1978). Thus, elite dominance in centralised governance, along with an unclear mechanism on how the responsibility for enacting a concrete plan for emissions reduction is shared between national and local levels, hampers the Indonesian effort to provide strong evidence to donors that the country has successfully cut emissions.

There is also a lack of leadership from the subnational and local governments, which represents the main problem caused by decentralisation. This issue is crucial in terms of the local government’s accountability, transparency and responsibility to the public. Ineffective leadership due to decentralisation has yielded three problems: (i) lack of support from the national government to the local government in the process of making policy instruments (for instance, fiscal transfer or building new transportation infrastructure); (ii) lack of political will on the part of the central government; and (iii) corruption (Sutrisno, 2015). One example of decentralisation having a negative impact on climate change is the issue of corruption. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) already conducts regular financial and transparency audits of several areas related to deforestation, under law number 20 of 2001 and law number 8 of 2010 (Hartoyo, 2011). During an audit, three different periods were found where the governors of Riau Province had engaged in corrupt actions with regard to deforestation (Rodzi, 2016). In relation to my thesis, corruption negatively contributes to the effectiveness of bilateral climate partnerships, which might be perceived as a void bilateral transaction from a local community perspective.

With regard to the second factor, the engagement of foreign donors with civil society groups, the Norwegian government has shown the strongest involvement with civil society groups in Indonesia compared to Australia and the UK, which was reflected through the NICFI partnership with selected Indonesian NGOs and the direct
This direct civil society engagement implies the importance of civil society’s matters in bilateral climate partnerships. Civil society is an important actor in climate governance because of its communal principles and collective action in combating climate change problems (Goldsmith, 1995; Camacho, 1998; Adger and Jordan, 2009). Other literature (Culla, 1999: 12-13; Hikam, 1999a: 260; Panjaitan, 2001: 10) has stated that the civil society movement has been a dominant factor in strengthening Indonesian democracy. The important role of civil society in international relations and political studies has been established in the active involvement of non-state actors or civil society groups in the multilateral climate change regime (Bäckstrand et al., 2017; Dryzek, 2017; Abbott, 2017; Backstrand and Kuyper, 2017). In this sense, the significance of civil society for climate governance can be tested by examining government policy objectives on climate change, and detecting whether the policy mentions and includes civil society engagement or not.

However, little scholarly attention has thus far been paid to the complexities of civil society in bilateral climate partnerships. Generally, some political scholars (Grosby and Shils, 1997; Hann and Dunn, 1996; Schmit, 1997; Turner, 2003) have argued that civil society is the key actor in environmental democracy, especially when dealing with climate change agreements or policies. In practice, civil society plays a role as a facilitator and represents the frontline for vulnerable groups and indigenous communities in ensuring that any bilateral climate partnership has a beneficial impact on emissions reduction and the sustainability of their livelihoods. However, some scholars (Edwards and Foley, 1996; Walzer, 1992; Smolar, 1996; Brainard, 1992; Open

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8 Civil society, as Larry Diamond (1999) defines it, is “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. Civil society concerns public matters and it’s not the state or economic society, such as NGOs” (Bunbongkarn, 2000). The term ‘civil society’ can be in line with other forms of civil society groups, such as: children and youth, women, trade unions, farmers, indigenous communities, scientists, business sectors and NGOs. The United Nations has coined the term “major groups” to refer to civil society since 1992. In Indonesia NGOs are similar to civil society but tend to pressure the government in a negative way. In this research, the term ‘civil society’ is relatively close to civil society organisations (CSOs) or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that either support or are opposition/pressure groups to the government.
Society Foundation, 2016) have argued that civil society can have negative effects and has even become a victim of bilateral agreements.

These two factors appear to be important when trying to understand why bilateral climate partnerships remain problematic in Indonesia. Ultimately, Indonesia as a state has complex bureaucracy and an unclear domestic political mechanism, which needs to be considered in order to comprehend the processes of Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships. Hence, further sub-research questions have been developed to explore several aspects of this issue in more detail. These sub-research questions are as follows:

1. How significant is the role of civil society in explaining the performance of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia?
2. Why and to what extent do institutions matter in explaining the performance of bilateral climate partnerships? How does decentralisation affect the processes of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia?

To sum up, this research attempts to investigate the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships and to identify the multi-faceted challenges that these partnerships face in the context of Indonesia. Second, the research proposes to explore the potential effectiveness based on a deeper understanding of the complexities involved. An initial review of the secondary literature suggests that there are two possible factors that determine the success of bilateral climate partnerships: (i) institutional problems related to climate partnerships, including the lack of regional and local government leadership; and (ii) the level of civil society engagement. To explore and test these factors, a literature review building on the conceptual framework and theoretical background is presented in the following section.

1.5 Conceptual framework

This section introduces some of the concepts that will be used to address the research question and to navigate the theoretical framework of this thesis. These concepts include climate governance, the pros and cons of transformational change, which is
derived from the concept of transformative governance, and the political economy framework referred to as the “4Is” (institution, interest, ideas and information) from Di Gregorio and Brockhaus (2012). After reviewing these concepts, I outline a new theoretical framework called the “4Is+3 analysis”, which has been developed from the transformational change of climate governance literature (the details of this conceptual framework are outlined in chapter 2) in order to map out the complexities of bilateral climate change partnerships. In order to analyse the complexities, I draw on the “4Is+3” framework, consisting of analysing institutions, ideas, interests, information, leadership change, policy experiments and decentralisation challenges.

This section is organised into two parts. The first part introduces the wider literature on climate governance, challenges and fragmentation of multilateral climate governance as a complex regime, which also reflects the complexity of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. The second part explores the notion of transformative climate governance. It begins with the debate about business-as-usual versus transformational change. The transformation literatures are blended with the 4Is framework to develop the “transformative 4Is+3” analysis. This analysis helps to specifically map and identify the indicators of the complexities in Indonesian bilateral climate governance. Finally, it outlines the transformative 4Is+3 as a new analytical approach, combining transformative governance and the 4Is+3 indicators when analysing Indonesian bilateral climate change policy, thereby making the process more holistic.

1.5.1 Climate governance

The contemporary notion of climate governance is informed by wider debates on environmental democracy, which tend to assume that effective climate governance is characterised by high levels of public participation. Environmental democracy informs climate governance when transnational advocacy networks and participation in international climate change negotiations are likely to influence the positioning of domestically-grounded NGOs – through learning, emulation and spill-over
(Finemmore and Sikkink, 1998). Individuals provide active support in civil society engagements, often paying attention to the challenges of the global climate regime. This means that public protest, or other civil society movements, serve as an indicator of ineffective multilateral climate agreements. The pressure such protests or movements creates, through strikes or demonstrations, can illustrate the extent to which the process of checks and balances in global climate policy are working.

Based on their understanding of the history and development of climate governance, Held and Roger (2013) state that the structures of climate governance emerged in the early 1990s from countries in the Global North and that they were based on multilateral perspectives. As evidence of their commitment, all EU states have, for example, established renewable energy targets and introduced carbon pricing. Developing countries have also declared their commitment under the Nationally Determined Contribution as the heart of Paris Agreement in 2015 (UNFCCC, 2016). Thus, I define climate governance as encompassing both mechanisms and diplomatic efforts aimed at managing climate change problems through adaptation and mitigation.

However, multilateral-based climate governance is not entirely useful when it comes to solving climate change problems in every state. Various forms of climate governance are currently emerging in the void left by the stalemate in the multilateral treaty-making process. Hoffmann (2011) argues that global climate governance has eroded the consensus on the large-scale multilateral response to climate change. The different agendas of different states limit the effectiveness of climate change responses. Zelli (2011) notes that global climate governance has been fragmented and failed to apply the crosscutting principle within governance itself. The overlapping duties, dyadic institution-based operations and unclear procedures of the policy-making process have become major factors in the fragmentation of climate governance.

In addition to fragmentation, Keohane and Victor (2011) argue that the diverse range of institutions involved in climate change governance constitute a regime complex (RC) with characteristic benefits and costs in comparison to the unitary international regime. This means that multiple types of institutions related to climate
change are somehow scattered and create their own problems. Further understanding can be developed from figure 1.1:

Figure 1.2 The Regime Complex for Managing Climate Change

Source: Keohane and Victor (2011: 10)

According to the chart above, climate change is a multi-sector agenda involving many different institutional frameworks. The regimes and institutions within the oval are those in which substantial rule-making or other activities have already taken place. Those completely or partially outside the oval are those in which further rule-making is needed (Abbot, 2012: 6). The figure also portrays the variety of governance (e.g., multilateral, club, bilateral, expert), issues (e.g., adaptation, nuclear, trade, financial) and governance functions (e.g., scientific assessment, rule-making, financial assistance) responding to climate change issues (Abbott, 2012: 7). In particular, one
of the institutional frameworks within the oval above is bilateral initiatives, which creates a strong pre-condition that bilateral climate governance becomes a complicated part of inter-state governance due to the inter-connection of other form of governance. Thus, the multiple forms of governance, diverse governance functions and issues of climate change justify how complex a climate change regime is and the fact that it cannot be solved by one approach only.

As an example of the complex governance, climate governance in Indonesia has emerged strongly through a national emissions reduction plan, aiming to address climate change policies and create an institution to specifically address climate change. In 2009, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced that Indonesia was committed to a major target of reducing emissions relative to a “business-as-usual” baseline of 26% by 2020 (President of Indonesia, 2011). This ambitious pledge helped to attract significant funding from Norway to support the REDD programme in Indonesia. Although the Norway-Indonesia climate partnership was perceived to be a promising one, many institutions related to REDD or other climate change programmes in Indonesia have been replaced or abolished under different Indonesian presidencies, along with the changing bureaucracy at the provincial and local levels. The next section provides further understanding and debates about transformational change as the theoretical framework used here to understand the complex bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia.

1.5.2 The definition, pros and cons of transformational change

This section sets out the definition of transformational change in the context of Indonesian climate change. The transformation itself has emerged from three discourses – ecological modernisation, green governmentality, and civic environmentalism – which have driven the debates about using the term transformational change versus business-as-usual as a justification for how complex the bureaucracy and its climate policy is at all levels in Indonesia. In particular, explaining the transformation itself is divided into two different meanings:
transformation as a fundamental policy change (Moelione et al., 2020) and as a series of small experimental changes (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017). Finally, there is a positional statement that this thesis focuses on the small experimental changes in relation to bilateral climate change partnerships in Indonesia.

Transformation is defined as a change or transition into a new system. The understandings of transformation are diverse and open up a range of contexts of change. A transformative change can be defined as a “fundamental, system-wide reorganisation across technological, economic and social factors, including paradigms, goals and values” (IPBES, 2019: 5). Thinking of business-as-usual and transformational change as two extremes of a continuum, and different discourses as located somewhere along this continuum, depending on the extent to which they address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Di Gregorio et al., 2015: 67). In short, a transformation creates a fundamental change with certain shifting paradigms, values, and goals.

In relation to sustainability transformations, there is a term called “deep leverage”, which involves the restructuring of institutions (Abson et al., 2017). Abson et al. (2017) identify four ways to leverage the structural change of institutions. The first begins with crisis or, more specifically, is “open to the potentially transformational learning and adaptation opportunities invoked by crises”, although there is little guidance on what this might look like beyond sunset clauses in legislation that force a review. The second approach is a purposeful destabilisation of unsustainable institutions to create windows of opportunity, although these opportunities provide little in the way of practical guidance. The third is a systematic analysis of institutional failure in different contexts to gain insights into improved future functioning, although this is clearly a longer-term project. The final way is ensuring that existing well-functioning institutions are not lost, which highlights the need for stability as part of transformation (ibid: 30).

In turn, a transformational change in the policy context of a sustainability transformation requires the ability of policy actors and coalitions to direct policy
discussions into new pathways rather than a business-as-usual approach, in particular moving away from institutional and politico-economic path-dependencies (Laumann and Knoke, 1987). It is inevitable that some policy makers were resistant to breaking away from conservative coalitions and their status quo, such like continuing the moratorium policy for combating deforestation in Indonesia. Dominance usually requires buy-in at least in part from state elites and business interests. Coalitions can be based on common interest, ideological beliefs or a common discourse (Hajer, 1995; Sabatier, 1999; Benford and Snow, 2000; Di Gregorio, 2012).

Another method by which to develop an understanding of transformational change is through three discourses: ecological modernisation, green governmentality and civic environmentalism (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006; Hajer, 1995; Liftin, 2004). Ecological modernisation combines the importance of economic growth and environmental protection, which reflects the configuration of liberal market approaches as leading to win-win outcomes (Dryzek, 2000; Hajer, 1995). One characteristic of ecological modernisation in the late 1980s was the reframing of environmental problems as global problems (Mol, 2001). Ecological modernisation in the context of Indonesia can be seen in the changing behaviour of Indonesians by using less plastic products/zero waste management, managing the energy transition into clean energy by adopting electric vehicles, etc. In practice, these sustainability activities are not the instant way of change, cannot be adopted only by certain individuals or groups, but need to be an integrated approach affecting all sectors and stakeholders. In comparing weak and strong ecological modernisation, weak market-based solutions are closer to business-as-usual than transformational change, because they challenge neither existing institutions nor power relations (Di Gregorio et al., 2015: 69).

Secondly, green governmentality is defined as a science-driven and centralised multilateral negotiation order, which uses the top-down climate approach in implementing and monitoring mitigation at global scales (Heijden, 2008: 835). It also refers to the use of knowledge, including on the part of governments, scientific experts and big business, to influence policy decisions such like environmental impact
assessment and how it transforms as a self-governing subject (Di Gregorio et al., 2015: 70). Reflexive green governmentality questions the very power structures that support business-as-usual and is thus more conducive to transformational change (Dean, 2004; Jasanoff and Long Martello, 2004). It means that transformational change within the perspective of green governmentality occurred in the top-down approach.

Thirdly, civic environmentalism emphasises pluralism and broad participation in decision-making, which should involve all stakeholders that have an interest in, and are affected by, relevant environmental problems and their solutions (Di Gregorio et al., 2015: 71). Civic environmentalism approaches both radical and reform-oriented narratives that challenge Northern consumption and capitalism and also the shifting role from state centric to transnational civil society movement in pursuing just world order (Heijden, 2008:386). It means that the transformational change can be obtained through the vital force of civil society groups in order to increase public accountability, transparency, and climate regime’s legitimacy. These accounts of ecological modernisation, green governmentality, and civic environmentalism indicate there is a common link among them, which involves a reform based on sustainability and restructuring the climate regime. However, ecological modernisation emphasised liberal market approaches, green governmentality the top down approach, and civic environmentalism emphasised the civil society based and public legitimacy approach in order to create transformation.

The Indonesian government employed a discourse of transformation in the context of Indonesian climate change governance, particularly the REDD+ project in 2015 (Di Gregorio et al., 2018). Some academics thought that the importance of transformation emerged from the condition that the government ownership of the state and other agents in driving the policy process was insufficient to ensure the effectiveness of national REDD+ strategies (Di Gregorio et al., 2012: 83). Support for a business-as-usual scenario by state actors, in conditions where state autonomy is low, is a likely indicator of the existence of such dominant coalitions among government officials and elites both at local and national levels. The reluctance of the government
to take strong action with respect to REDD+ when this might threaten established rent linked to deforestation and forest degradation is a case in point (ibid: 85). It means that the Indonesian government did not propose or act further on the implementation of REDD+, which triggered worse deforestation.

Two factors can determine what stage Indonesia is at in the transformational shift: power relations and deliberative actions. These two dynamic movements of the Indonesian government are needed in order to stop or continue business-as-usual in the case of REDD+ (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012: 16-17). Power relations can be seen through the indication of building strong government ownership and leadership away from business as usual manner, whilst deliberative actions mean that there are performance-based funding and incentives to non-state actors who have achieved the REDD+ goals. These conditional terms seem promising yet difficult to implement due to competition between neo-liberal imperatives and multi-level agendas/actors at both the global and the Indonesian level. Ideally, the transformational change happens when power relations among government officials/elites are focused on strengthening ownership of climate restoration and there is mutual cooperation between government and civil society groups to appreciate those non-state actors who did improvement in REDD+. The appreciation can be done through an incentive or performance-based funding from foreign donors and Indonesian government to civil society groups.

The literature shows that Indonesian deforestation is not simply or straightforwardly caused by Indonesian government policy alone. Through the REDD+ case in Indonesia, the Indonesian government is not able alone to liberate the political economy from patronage or the so-called “high cost economy”, such as bribes, extra fees and back-handers integral to multiple business operations (Maxton-Lee, 2019: 428). Maxton-Lee further explains that considering policy reforms, transparency and stakeholder participation as indications of transformation in developing countries is a dead-end strategy unless developed countries radically change their political economies (Maxton-Lee, 2020: 15). In line with this argument, Moeliono et al. (2020: 1) state that REDD+ has not yet fully succeeded in creating transformational change.
The ideas of REDD+ remain focused on efficiency and technical aspects of implementation and do not question business-as-usual and the current political economic conditions favouring deforestation. The changing structure of the REDD+ policy network and exchanges between actors and groups over time suggest that government actors and large funding organisations are becoming increasingly dominant, potentially indicating a return to established patterns of project-based governance.

Moeliono et al. (2020) argued that the transformative change of Brockhaus and Angelsen (2012) in the context of Indonesian REDD+ was an ambitious goal. The goal started with a laudable promise and then ends up as piecemeal and weakly integrated projects, effectively de-politicising Indonesian forest policy (Li, 2007; Mulyani and Jepson, 2013; Howell, 2015; Sahide et al., 2020). Moeliono et al. (2020) also mention that REDD+ in Indonesia is very much like a “projectification”, a process through which plans for systematic, long-term change collapse into incremental, simplified solutions flung rather haphazardly at complex socio-ecological problems (Howell, 2015; Godenhjelm et al., 2015; Li, 2016).

I argue that there are three critical factors necessary to explore in determining whether REDD+ delivered true transformational change, or just perpetuated business as usual, or something in between. First, there is a conflicting view (based on Moeliono et al., 2020) on whether the phase of REDD+ institutionalisation was a policy change in Indonesian governmental reform. The establishment of the REDD+ Taskforce in 2011-2015 continued to reflect the supremacy and power relations of state actors. Second, the moratorium on new concession licenses in primary forests has contributed to reduced deforestation and forest degradation, as verified by an independent actor, and led to a results-based payment from the Norwegian government (Moeliono et al., 2020: 9). However, the many loopholes, such as contestation of the definition of “primary forest”, the exclusion of Indonesia’s secondary forests, which, however defined, are vast, and the adoption of a layering process whereby earlier policies and previously approved concessions are not repealed and can therefore still operate, allows
business-as-usual to continue (Murdiyarso et al., 2011; Seymour, 2012; Austin et al., 2014; Erbaugh and Nurrochmat, 2019).

Third, the tension between decentralisation versus recentralisation through the One Map Policy in 2010-present demonstrates how arduous the decision-making process on forestry issues has been during this period. Since 1999, when Indonesia's first law on regional government was issued, the locus of decision-making has shifted back and forth, from fully decentralised to more constrained district-level autonomy (Moeliono et al., 2009). As Fred (2019) states, projectification implies the additional projects and changing variables/aspects on the skills, practices, assumption, values, beliefs, and other components in project management. The One Map Policy and the technical aspects of REDD+ all support concentrating power at the national level (Fatem et al., 2018), but also projectification at sub-national levels. The current village law, for example, provides village government with the autonomy to manage their own resources, but only within a framework of rules of implementation through projects (Indonews, 2020; Antløv et al., 2016). In short, Moeliono et al. (2020) strongly argue that projectification might be a convenient way to avoid the larger transformations required for countries (and their trading partners) to have a real chance of halting large-scale deforestation.

On the other hand, the notion of transformation from Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2019: 315) notes that transformation can be a small experiment that continuously changes the institution or system of climate policies. Through REDD+ institutionalisation, Korhonen-Kurki et al. suggest that ownership and leadership of the REDD+ strategy has created progress: when the REDD+ Agency was disbanded and absorbed by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) at the end of 2016, the MoEF, through its new Directorate General of Climate Change, restarted the process. Equally, REDD+ progress is also challenged by resistance from powerful business actors, as is the forest tenure reform agenda. 2017 marked a decade of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation’s commitment to performance-based funding, and there are plans to take stock and revitalise the initiative (324).
In analysing whether and how transformative change happened in Indonesian climate governance, Korkonen-Kurki et al. (2019) postulate that both the institutional setting and the policy arena affect the direction of REDD+ policies and their implementation. This also reveals the importance of two institutional configurations: the positive push of an already existing policy change, and the negative stress of resource scarcity and lack of effective forest laws and policies (ibid: 326). This means that new Indonesian formulations of regulation, bureaucratic division/merging institutional bodies and progressive climate policies influence the further steps of Indonesian commitment in reducing carbon emissions.

Besides the policy and institutional framework, Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2019: 327) argue that the coalitions for change might not be stable and can fall apart if domestic changes occur. If a powerful political leader who supported REDD+ leaves office, then the progress of climate policies might be halted. On the other hand, in countries where the promise of performance-based funding from a donor has accelerated transformational change, the change processes may continue regardless of developments in the domestic policy arena. Hence, it could be said that the changing leadership in the Indonesian bureaucracy will not matter much as long as the donor has a longstanding commitment to the implementation of REDD+.

Another indication of a small change in Korhonen-Kurki et al.’s transformation is the new climate funding report and mechanism that the Indonesian government implemented in 2017-2020 (Ministry of Finance, 2020). Working together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Indonesia finally created transparent and systematic climate funding at the national and local levels, which would strategically affect performance-based funding indicators. This performance-based funding factor also strengthens the characteristics Korhonen-Kurki et al. define as a transformation: they advocate specific policy reforms that address drivers of deforestation and forest degradation; they take into account potential risks of a REDD+ mechanism; they go beyond technocratic solutions to reduce emissions; and they
explicitly challenge existing power relations that support drivers of deforestation (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2019: 324).

Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2017) claim that the REDD+ Agency was successful to some extent in introducing an alternative governance mechanism and disrupting the governance structures. This governance could not stand alone; it required ownership when the REDD+ Agency was dissolved and the mandate was returned to the ministries. Policy experimentation is a process, and while the creation of novel policies and their experimentation is important, their assimilation can also lead to new opportunities. Even if there is not transformational change, there can still be important changes such as novel policies.

As the middle view between business as usual (Moeliono et al., 2020) and transformational change (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2019), or, as it is called, the pragmatic way, Clement (2021: 48) argues that change can be achieved by scaffolding what is already there, identifying the capacity and skills that already exist and building new capacities that are missing or undeveloped. This also brings in new features or practices that can displace or augment previous practices where there is a need. Although this is not as exciting as the idea that governance can be readily transformed, it is mindful that reform does not take place in “institutional greenfields”. Instead, it will always be impacted by the legacy of what has come before, not unlike the concept of ecological memory, where ecological species and processes are shaped by past modifications to the landscape (Peterson, 2002).

Clement (2021: 58) also mentions that a transformational change never separates old and new institutions, which can be adapted to fit local contexts and can provide the knowledge to achieve more radical change (Campbell, 2010; Cleaver, 2012). Although it is tempting to think of transformation as abrupt and occurring in a short timeframe, in fact, most societal and governance transformations take decades. Transformation can be sudden, but it often emerges through a long process of incremental steps and a series of interlinked, dynamic and weaving pathways, and along the way new pathways emerge (Djelic and Quack, 2007). As such, there is no
tool or framework for easily diagnosing what type of change is needed or consistently comparing different types of change across contexts (Clement, 2021: 59).

While noting these vigorous debates about the nature and extent of transformational change in climate governance, I agree with Korhonen-Kurki et al.’s argument that small experiments can yield a robust transition. In order to minimise the uncertain proof of transformation from pragmatic scholars (Clement, 2021) and unpredictability of fundamental change (Moeliono et al., 2020), small experiments provide an alternative way to a justification that change simply matter through the institutional arrangement of REDD+, a new climate finance mechanism. In addition, changing leadership reflects the importance of checking and investigating the climate policy experiments and whether the dualistic view between decentralisation versus recentralisation determines the changing governance of Indonesian climate change. For example, in the Indonesian government system, there are three different layers of bureaucracies: local, subnational/provincial, and national. If the decentralisation process exceeded the local and provincial government’s capacity to restore climate problems and cut deforestation rates, then the decentralised governance could not make improvement or reform on climate policy. If the deforestation was cut by district or provincial government actors, then it could still be interfered with by national government, thus raising re-centralisation and reducing any impact at the local level.

The small changes that happened as a result of climate policy reform in the Indonesian governance mechanisms were in fact long-term and gradual changes, but it is feasible to measure and consistently monitor and control these. In short, I find here leadership change (which brings about a strong government ownership and better coalition either government-to-business or government-to-government coalition), policy experiments and decentralisation issues/challenges become determining factors of small changes. It means that a changing leadership of either foreign donor political system or Indonesian government change, or some experiments conducted by the governmental elites, along with decentralised networks or pro-local based policies are different forms of small changes that can stimulate transformational change, as chapter
4-7 will show through the three case studies. The next section demonstrates how three conditions of the small changes above are correlated and interlinked with the “4Is” indicators from Di Gregorio and Brockhaus (2012).

1.5.3 The role of the transformative 4Is+3 in assessing the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships

This section presents the “transformative 4Is+3” as a new analytical approach and a novel way of assessing the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia, which I have developed through this research and the detail explanation was elaborated in chapter 2. The “4Is” concept builds on the “3Is” (institution, interest and ideas) of Arild Underdal (1980) and Purdon (2015). In response to Underdal’s argument, it is argued that the “3Is” are inadequate to fully consider the question of media framing of climate policy issues. Consequently, Di Gregorio and Brockhaus (2012) added “information” as a factor (or the “fourth I”) into understanding the dynamics of comparative climate politics. In practice, these authors used media analysis by measuring and checking how many media sources consider climate change a main priority. Further explanation and a detailed outline of the transformative 4Is+3 framework is set out in Chapter 2; here I provide a short summary.

Di Gregorio and Brockhaus (2012) simplified the political economy approach into two parts: (i) policy analysis through the investigation of politico-economic, institutional, governance conditions and obstacles to REDD+ actions; and (ii) analysis of how REDD+ policy debates are framed in the media and comparing the dominant discourse with counter-discourses (Hajer, 1995; Boykoff, 2008). Di Gregorio and Brockhaus (2012) found that REDD+ was being misused by the central government and manipulated by some stakeholders seeking to pursue their own interests in the name of REDD+.

Based on the 4Is underpinning the political economy approach and the concept of transformative climate governance (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017; Hölscher et al., 2019; Edmondson and Levy, 2019; Nursey-Bray, 2017; Bahadur and Tanner, 2012;
Chaffin et al., 2016; Wilhite and Hansen, 2016), this thesis develops the concept of the “transformative 4Is” further, building a distinctive analytical framework for studying the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. The transformation context in the “transformative 4Is” focuses on the Indonesian government’s capacity for changing climate policy related to their bilateral climate partnerships. The literature has shown that transformative climate governance can refer to a period of changing policy as a policy experiment (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017), changing capacity in the context of urban governance (Hölscher et al., 2019), reducing conflict through adaptive climate governance (Nursey-Bray, 2017) and changing the environment, along with improving accountability (Edmondson and Levy, 2019). The diversity of literature on this topic shows the different ways that we identify transformative climate governance.

The additional three factors that I have developed alongside the “transformative 4Is” are leadership change, policy experiments and decentralisation challenges. I will show how these three indicators should not be separated from the 4Is indicators because they can prove the importance of small experiments (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017) in the REDD+ case and in the process of building Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships. Hence, these are combined into what I call the “transformative 4Is+3” framework.

The “transformative 4Is+3” is a new analytical framework that I have developed for this thesis. The application of the institution, interest, ideas and information variables in addressing Indonesian bilateral climate change partnerships need to be supported by three additional conditions that influenced how Indonesian leadership changes (from Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency to Joko Widodo’s presidency) stimulated the progress of small transformation processes, affected the different probabilities of climate policy experiments, and shaped how decentralisation affected local governance and civil society movements. In chapter 2, a comprehensive explanation is presented on how the transformative 4Is+3 analysis was developed and used to analyse the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. The transformative 4Is+3 is a distinctive concept responding to the multitude of complex
Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships whereby multiple actors (both global and national) act through small changes and approaches to long-term transformation. The next section sets out the research methodology for this thesis.

1.6 Research methodology
This section outlines the research methodology. A qualitative method was employed in this research, which entailed data collection from in-depth interviews as the primary resource and the use of a literature and document review as the secondary data source. For data collection, various sources were consulted. These included research papers, government documents and bilateral climate change agreements and reports between 2009-2016 for aligning with the focus and specific timeline of this research along with additional current climate policy documents in 2020-2021 as complementary sources. Furthermore, this research was also conducted by a comparative study of three foreign partners (Australia, the UK and Norway) in Indonesia. This approach was adopted for two reasons, which are outlined below.

First, comparison increases a researcher’s ability to confidently identify whether it is the institutional or non-institutional factors that have caused an observed behavioural variation. A comparative study also allows the researcher to identify whether an institution was responsible, and to delineate which institutional features were “active ingredients” in an agreement’s success and which were superfluous (Mitchell, 2006: 74). Second, comparing multiple agreements can help with regard to assessing the extent of influence of a particular feature, in comparison to other features and factors outside the control of negotiators (Mitchell, 2006: 75).

I collected the primary data from research fieldwork in Central Kalimantan in January 2018 by performing a series of semi-structured interviews and interviews with elites in Jakarta. The fieldwork was conducted in Central Kalimantan because this area has received almost no humanitarian aid from the international donor community, despite the high levels of death, injury and trauma reported there. Central Kalimantan also became the main pilot project area for the REDD programme for the three selected
country partners (Norway, the UK and Australia) in December 2010 (Wahyudi and Dharmasaputra, 2014). All of the details regarding data collection and research fieldwork are elaborated in chapter 3.

The case of REDD in the Norwegian and Australian bilateral climate partnerships was chosen for this research for three reasons. First, the inception of REDD in 2005 encouraged Indonesia to become a pioneer among developing countries in tackling deforestation problems. This programme has prevailed since its first proposal of: "Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action" (Wahyudi and Dharmasaputra, 2014). Second, REDD is a promising project through which Norway pledged to give £781 million to Indonesia in May 2010. Third, REDD has proved to present an extreme risk to several provinces in Indonesia, such as Riau. It has become a source of corruption, creating new conflicts about payment distribution allocation, creating difficulties stopping leakages and providing unqualified data for reportable and verifiable measurement (Rochmayanto, 2013).

In summary, this qualitative method enabled the identification of the key factors affecting bilateral climate partnerships. As stated above, the aim here is to explore the reasons behind certain areas of bilateral climate partnerships being successful at a micro level, while also analysing the complexities through which the partnerships navigate. Identifying the complexities and any small successes will potentially lead to better understanding how more effective bilateral climate partnerships could be conceived in future climate governance. In the next section, the originality and contribution of the thesis are outlined.

1.7 The originality and contribution of the thesis

This thesis makes an original empirical contribution to transforming the knowledge and understanding of bilateral climate governance in Indonesia. By comparing the cases of the Indonesia-Norway, Indonesia-UK, and Indonesia-Australia bilateral
climate partnerships, this thesis draws together and investigates the role and impact of different Western donors in their support of Indonesian climate change mitigation.

Whilst the existing literature has focused on multilateral climate change agreements and global climate governance, to the author’s knowledge, there is limited research on bilateral climate partnerships and their complexities in Indonesia. The bilateral approach in Indonesian climate policies was a supplement to multilateral climate agreement, which became the original contribution to this thesis.

The second contribution of this thesis is the construction of a new analytical framework that provides a way to understand how the complexity of bilateral partnerships impacts the effectiveness of such partnerships in Indonesia. By bridging the transformative climate governance literature and political economy framework, the thesis presents a novel analytical approach called the ‘transformative 4Is+3’ in order to holistically analyse the complex bilateral climate partnerships based on the 4Is - emergence of institutions, interest dynamics, idea shifts related to climate change and the information system (further details of the 4Is are provided in chapter 2) as well as three further indicators - policy experiments, changing leadership, decentralisation (as discussed in Section 1.5.2).

The theoretical implications of the transformative 4Is+3 can be seen from how the policy input was created by actors such as Indonesia, Norway, the UK and Australia through their bilateral climate partnerships. Through the bilateral climate input of each donor, the complexities of the partnerships were assessed through the 4Is indicators such as: institutional arrangement, actors’ interest, actors’ ideas, and information system along with the leadership change, policy experiment, and decentralisation challenges. Then, how the relationship between Indonesia and the three donors using the 4Is+3 indicators yields policy output like new institution/coalition, states’ autonomy, national ownership, pro-climate regime, and inclusive policy processes. The policy implications of the transformative 4Is+3 can be drawn in relation to whether anything has changed as a result of Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships and whether any such policy change can evidence any impact on a transformational
process.\textsuperscript{9} For instance, the institutional REDD+ establishments that have been developed by the Indonesian government and foreign donors, such as the NICFI, the UKCCU and the KFCP, were parts of policy experiments which yielded some controversial impact in Chapter 4 and further analysis in chapter 5-7. The merger of the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Forestry also improved the institutional change but did not guarantee real transformational policy change, with further explanation provided in chapter 5.

Finally, the overall argument of the thesis is that bilateralism did not directly support Indonesian climate governance improvements due to the weakness in leadership and institutional change, the complexity of climate finance, and lack of improved climate policy impact from civil society in the decentralised network. The three highlighted bilateral climate partnerships in 2009-2016 were only partially effective due to very limited substantive change to any of the 4Is+3 transitions (institution, ideas, interest and information, leadership change, policy experiments, and decentralisation challenge). In comparing the 4Is+3 indicators, I find that the institutional factor was the most significant through creating institutions to specifically address climate change, encouraging good leadership from the government, and establishing a clear mechanism from the intermediate agency in distributing bilateral climate funding.\textsuperscript{10} Through my analysis, although institutionalism and leadership change played a key role in climate policy reform and transformational policy change, their impacts on delivering transformational change is still not strong.

The thesis also helps to shed light on the various debates of bilateralism versus multilateralism in the climate change literatures. It adds the factor of complicated financial mechanisms and shows how this affected bilateral climate partnerships, which can be seen in particular through Chapter 6.

Another contribution of this thesis is its provision of an alternative model

\textsuperscript{9} Both analytical implication and policy implication of transformative 4Is+3 are explained in chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{10} This clear funding mechanism can be seen in the case of The Asia Foundation (TAF) and the UKCCU in chapter 5.
through which to simplify the complexities of climate governance in Indonesia (the corresponding figure can be found in chapter 8). Thus, the novelty of the thesis lies in the development of the 4Is+3 indicators as a way to explore the scope for a transformational process via these partnerships and to identify the factors that shape the success or failure of bilateral climate partnerships.

1.8 Outline of the thesis

This thesis contains eight chapters. Following this first chapter, chapter 2 sets out the conceptual framework of the thesis, which starts by introducing the debates on bilateralism versus multilateralism. It is noted here that there are different forms of bilateral climate studies across countries and various types of analytical frameworks are applied to bilateral climate partnerships. Consequently, I have developed the transformative 4Is+3 as a new and distinctive analytical approach for evaluating the complexities of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships.

Chapter 3 focuses on describing in detail the methodology of this research. It begins with the research design, which involves a qualitative method and a triangulation study. There is also full justification for why and how I chose Central Kalimantan as the site of my research fieldwork and why I used three case-studies of bilateral climate partnerships: Indonesia-Norway, Indonesia-UK and Indonesia-Australia. A detailed description of the research population and analytical instruments is also presented in this chapter.

Chapters 4 covers the comparative analysis of three bilateral climate partnerships, which contains of empirical findings and their analysis related to transformative 4is+3 framework. Chapter 5-7 demonstrates thematic chapters, which start from the effect of institutional reform and leadership change on climate change in chapter 5; chapter 6 presents some assessments of the impact of performance-based finance, MRV, and land use change.

Chapter 7 provides analysis of civil society participation in Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships. This chapter also explores how civil society groups faced
complex challenges of transparency and the complicated domestic bureaucracies from each level: local, provincial, national governments.

Lastly, chapter 8 concludes the entire thesis based on the theoretical framework in chapter 2, the comparative analysis of each three case studies of chapter 4, and also overall analytical synthesis of chapter 5-7. This chapter also provides recommendations and potential bilateral climate models to be replicated in other countries/continents in future research.
Chapter 2: Bilateral Climate Governance and Transformative 4Is+3

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines bilateral approaches to climate governance, which have become increasingly important in recent years. The efforts of the international community to address climate change since the early 1990s have mostly pursued multilateral solutions (for instance, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the annual Conference of the Parties and the Paris Agreement in 2015). However, various failures in multilateral environmental agreements have been observed in the last two decades, indicating significant limitations in the capacity of multilateral-based climate governance to address climate change problems in every state (Brown, 2015). This has led to some countries shifting towards the use of bilateral approaches to climate governance, practically managing the actions of multiple stakeholders or actors in pursuit of environmental sustainability.

The purpose of this chapter is to set out the conceptual framework of my thesis in order to answer the research question ‘what have been the complexities involved in bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia, and in relation to these complexities, which dimensions help explain effective outcomes (with a focus on the period 2009-2016)?’ In the process of building the conceptual framework, I initially built upon the arguments claiming that bilateralism is beginning to complement multilateralism. The next step was to identify the gap in the literature on bilateral climate studies across countries, which could provide some justification for choosing an Indonesia as a case study and identifying specific problems in Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships. Once the country for case study was selected, some elaboration of analytical approaches to bilateral climate partnerships was undertaken. These types of analytical approaches have helped me to devise a suitable analytical framework for assessing the complexities of Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships. After explaining the bilateral case-studies and analysis, I developed a new analytical approach called ‘transformative 4Is+3.’ Briefly put, bilateral climate studies are useful when it comes to framing the
case study of Indonesia and its bilateral climate partnerships and the analytical approaches are also helpful in deeply exploring the extent to which the bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia have been complex, and the possible links between this complexity and the effectiveness of the partnerships.\textsuperscript{11}

After outlining the key features of bilateralism and multilateralism, this chapter provides an understanding of different types of bilateral climate partnerships across countries. In the process, several case-studies are examined to clarify how bilateralism tackles climate change challenges. Drawing on a review of the literature on bilateral climate change arrangements, three typologies are identified: bilateral intergovernmentalism; bilateral climate finance; and the North-South bilateral climate partnerships.

Regarding the methodologies used to evaluate the effectiveness of bilateral climate partnerships, this chapter then assesses three analytical frameworks for bilateral climate governance: media analysis (Clark et al., 2011; Cash et al., 2003); institutionalism (Angelsen et al., 2008); and political economy (Di Gregorio and Brockhaus, 2012). The political economy approach covers four practical indicators to assess the effectiveness of climate governance (4Is: institutions, ideas, interest and information), which makes it the most appropriate way of identifying the major challenges confronting Indonesian climate change policy and possible solutions. Based on the 4Is underpinning the political economy approach, and the concept of transformative climate governance (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017; Hölscher et al., 2019; Edmondson and Levy, 2019; Nursey-Bray, 2017; Bahadur and Tanner, 2012; Chaffin et al., 2016; Wilhite and Hansen, 2016), this thesis develops the concept of the transformative 4Is+3 as a new and distinctive analytical framework for the study of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{11} As an analogy, the role of the existing literature on bilateral climate studies are like routes in a map, whilst the analytical approaches are like a form of navigation to find the right route (or detailed notes to drive carefully through the route we take). Bilateral climate studies represent a case study framework and they are strengthened by the analytical framework, which results in the conceptual framework I built in this thesis called ‘transformative 4Is+3.’
This chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 2.2 examines the development and limitations of multilateralism, the emergence of bilateralism, and the relationship between the two. Section 2.3 examines several types of bilateral climate partnerships from around the world. Section 2.4 focuses on three analytical approaches to bilateral climate governance that have been applied in the context of Indonesia. Section 2.5 proposes an analytical framework that is referred to here as the transformative 4Is+3, which will be applied throughout this thesis to explore the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. Lastly, section 2.6 concludes with an overview of the transformative 4Is+3 as the conceptual framework for this thesis.

2.2 Multilateralism and bilateralism
This section demonstrates two main problems in applying multilateralism to climate change: the implementation of multilateral climate agreements across countries; and making a truly ‘global’ climate regime. Both issues emphasise the need to restructure multilateralism in the global climate governance context. Therefore, three steps are taken in proposing bilateralism as an alternative approach to multilateral forms of climate governance.

First, multilateral and bilateral approaches are defined, followed by a brief history of their development in international treaties in general, notably in relation to climate change. Second, comparisons are drawn, and interactions are presented between bilateralism and multilateralism. Third, the choice of bilateralism as the focus of this research is justified. The main reason for comparing bilateralism and multilateralism in relation to climate change is that the multilateral environmental agreements/systems have recently come under increasing strain. The bilateral approach presents an alternative practical mechanism through which to address political climate change problems, exemplified by three cases of a government-to-government partnerships in Indonesia.
Although the focus of this research is primarily on bilateralism, it is likely that in developing bilateral climate partnerships, the actors had already decided upon the outcomes of multilateral climate change institutions/policies such as the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Paris Agreement of 2015. The bilateral perspective of climate governance is derived from, and aligned with, multilateralism. Therefore, it is important to first consider the multilateralist approach to climate change.

Some foreign/international policy scholars set the minimum number of parties in a multilateral arrangement at three, which is considered by some to be reasonable and practical (e.g. Corbeta and Dixon, 2004). Meanwhile, Ruggie (1992, 1993) stated that multilateralism has three features: indivisibility; generalised organising principles; and diffuse reciprocity. Indivisibility requires multilateralism to be based around a socially constructed public good (Ruggie, 1993: 11), while generalised organising principles are derived from indivisibility among the members of the collective (Ruggie, 1992:571). Meanwhile, diffuse reciprocity is defined as an expected arrangement among members that yield equivalent benefit (ibid). Thus, these three features connect with each other and coherently become a cyclical process in pursuit of an expected beneficial outcome. By contrast, bilateralism is derived from bilateral preferences, and it changes its goals and priorities on a case-by-case basis. A typical example of bilateralism can be seen in the Asia-Pacific region, where the USA has formed a so-called hub-and-spoke type of alliance network (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002).

The first issue with multilateralism in climate change is the difficulty with which global climate agreements are secured. Multilateral approaches have dominated efforts to secure international action on climate change. However, little progress has been made. The weaknesses of the climate change regime can be illustrated by the ineffective voluntary carbon emissions target first agreed at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Among all EU member states, only three of them (the UK, Germany and

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12 This preference means that every state/party that conducts a bilateral meeting can choose what they really want and need to create an agreement.
Luxembourg) reduced their carbon emissions between 1990 and 1998 (EEA, 2000). Such a low level of implementation cannot guarantee the long-term goal of environmental sustainability, which demands sustained political commitment.

Hoffmann (2011) argued that the failure of various multilateral approaches has undermined the consensus behind these efforts and encouraged actors/states to look for alternative, or complementary, solutions (i.e. bilateralism). Meanwhile, Zelli (2011) stated that global climate governance has been fragmented and lacks a cross-cutting principle within governance itself. This means that there have been different layers of climate governance (from the UN climate regime to large-scale transnational institutions devoted specifically to environmental issues), which could create a legitimacy gap and organisational power gaps between different types of public and non-state actors (Zelli and van Asselt, 2013:9). The fragmentation of climate governance is a reflection of how delicate the institutional arrangements are, which may even impinge on transparency or other principles of governance. The multiple agendas of various actors (state and non-state) tentatively illustrate the scarcity of achievements made in relation to climate change and the use of the multilateral approach (Blum, 2008; Carter, 2009; Jodoin et al., 2015).

Multilateral climate governance is characterised by overlapping duties, dyadic institution-based operations within each member state in the multilateral group and unclear procedures in the policy-making process. For instance, according to the Kyoto Protocol, there is no standardised way or obligation for each member state to reduce their emissions. The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” based on the Rio Earth Declaration in 1992 holds that every country has the same target and action with regard to reducing emissions. However, the same declaration also contained ambiguities as to how different responsibilities would be monitored. The Kyoto Protocol was clearly a case of institutional failure in the process of reaching a global consensus on climate change (Rosen, 2015:31).

The second issue of multilateralism is that climate change is the apparent incapacity of many states to meet their obligations. Some countries lack the political
and social infrastructure, as well as technological and financial resources. However, such weaknesses may not have been fully appreciated or considered during the UNFCCC negotiations on global climate change. By focusing on the bilateral approach, this research considers the opportunities for donor states to help other states with weaker infrastructure. This challenge of improving capacity is beyond the scope of institutional solutions (Carter, 2007: 264). It means that multilateral climate cooperation could not entirely meet what each government needs to solve climate change. The example of this difficulty can be identified through the case study of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. This is why multilateralism cannot be the sole answer to global climate problems, and why bilateral approaches have become essential complements to multilateralism. The bilateral approach acts as a complementary unit alongside multilateralism to help overcome obstacles to climate policy. In order to understand the bilateral approach, the next section presents different analyses of bilateralism and the role of bilateralism in climate governance.

2.2.1 Bilateralism

Historically, bilateralism and multilateralism have been practiced by international regimes, which had been derived from the international law perspective. The impetus behind both approaches came from legal normative values. Multilateralism emerged as an international norm to promote uniformity and the equal treatment of states (Blum, 2008). For Blum (2008), multilateralism appeared before the Second World War, lasting until the League of Nations collapsed before being supplanted by the United States’ shift toward bilateralism and unilateralism (Thompson and Verdier, 2014: 2) from the dawning of the Cold War in 1945. Gruber (2000) and Guzman (1998) mentioned that bilateralism was originally a trade-off in relation to multilateralism, and the approach was mainly used as a mechanism for securing trade agreements. This means that bilateralism can either be in conflict or be consistent with multilateral agreements (which might be related to the climate change context). As there is a lack of a systematic analysis of bilateral approaches (in particular, in climate change
studies), this research aims to follow up the research of Blum (2008) and Milner (2005) and to draw greater attention to states’ behaviour when engaging with climate change bilaterally.

Approaches to the analysis of bilateralism can be divided into three schools. Firstly, studies of bilateralism in trade agreements (Rixen (2010), Oates (1999), Bond and Syropoulos (1995), Anderson and Blackhurst (1993), Bagwell and Staiger (1997), Frankel (1997) and Snidal (1996)). Secondly, literature on international regimes (Thompson and Verdier (2014), Blum (2008), Downs et al. (1998), Kahler (2004) and Sagi and Yildiz (2010)). And, thirdly, bilateralism in the context of development studies (especially the analysis of the principal-agent problem and foreign aid) (Milner, 2005). Another study falling into the third school is that of Shkaruba et al. (2018) which focused on assessing the effectiveness of project implementation with European environmental assistance in Pskov (Northwest Russia) and exploring the impact and sustainability of EU-based public-private funding. The three approaches mentioned above are all useful in portraying the roots of bilateralism which informs the selection of the most relevant approach for this research.

In the bilateral climate governance context, the second and third approaches are the most useful in terms of exploring how effective the bilateral mechanism is in engaging in climate change projects in Indonesia. International regime studies are relevant when it comes to exposing the flaws of a multilateral climate agreement like the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement, thereby revealing how important it is to use bilateral mechanisms. The third approach helps us to understand the interaction between Indonesia and foreign donors when implementing bilateral climate projects. However, this thesis deviates slightly from the third approach, as it focuses on the process of the bilateral mechanisms in Indonesia’s climate change projects. This bilateral process-based approach represents a new development that is distinctive from the previous research of Shkaruba et al. (2018) and others on environmental policy.

When comparing the effectiveness of bilateralism and multilateralism, there are two determinant factors: transaction costs and member surplus (Thompson and
Verdier, 2014: 1). Transaction costs can be measured based on the amount of money required to set up a meeting, negotiation and other administrative matters, whilst member surplus relates to whether a multilateral or bilateral partnership has an inclusive or exclusive membership (it can be seen through the number of members/parties who join a partnership). Thompson and Verdier (2014: 1) made four claims and tested the following hypotheses: (1) multilateralism is more attractive with high transaction costs and a low member surplus; (2) bilateralism is more attractive when transaction costs are low and member surplus is high; (3) combinations of multilateralism and bilateralism are employed when both transaction costs and member surplus are high; and (4) high transaction costs and high member surplus can yield the highest rate of exclusion because of the cost of attracting members. To measure and investigate the four claims above, Thompson and Verdier (2014: 16) used a quantitative methodology: statistics containing two independent variables (transaction cost and member surplus). In the climate change context, both transaction cost and member surplus potentially determine how significant the usage of bilateralism versus multilateralism is in delivering the programme design, the policy-making process and the implementation of the programme. Another argument emerged from Blum (2008: 377), who noted that bilateral treaties are competent in promoting environmental protection or proliferation as well as labour standards.

Given the above explanations of bilateralism and multilateralism and their interaction, there are strong grounds for regarding bilateralism as an important approach to promoting a climate partnership. Bilateralism can provide an alternative mechanism to modify actors’ (both state and non-state) interests and develop a more transparent method with which to create an agreement. Furthermore, the bilateral approach helps to strengthen the implementation of global climate change agreements through the increasing capacity of national governments to build mutual cooperation with international donors, for instance. The following section elaborates on how bilateralism works in climate change studies and presents the typologies of a number of climate partnerships across various countries.
2.3 Typology of bilateral climate partnerships across countries

There are a growing number of forms of bilateral climate partnerships around the world. This section aims to assess and identify three different forms of bilateral climate partnership, which are examined to better understand the use of bilateralism in Indonesia. The first form is called bilateral intergovernmentalism, which mainly focuses on the power of institutionalism and the essential role of state actors in a bilateral relationship. The cases of EU-China and EU-Brazil indicate how institutionalism works and demonstrates the challenge of accommodating the needs of recipients (in this example, China and Brazil).

The second form concerns bilateral climate finance, which places emphasis on the financial mechanisms in the bilateral context. The cases of India-China, US-China and US-India climate relations show that a bilateral finance mechanism can work well in dealing with the challenge of multilateral transactions with institutions such as the World Bank or the United Nations. However, a bilateral finance mechanism can overlap with the multilateral funding channel in terms of distributing money for developing countries on climate change projects.

The third form is bilateral partnerships between a partner from the North and the other from the South that seek to overcome the divide between Northern (developed) and Southern (developing) countries with regard to the transfer of technology or access to information on climate change. Muccione et al. (2019) and Robertsen et al. (2015) showed that the bilateral climate partnerships undertaken by Northern countries had led to a significant disparity between them and developing or very vulnerable countries in the South regarding climate change problems. The next section elaborates upon how bilateral intergovernmental-based climate partnerships are developed.

2.3.1 Bilateral intergovernmental partnerships on climate change

This section explains how intergovernmental relations and institutionalism influence bilateral climate practices. Bilateral intergovernmentalism on climate change have
assigned strong role to institutionalism. Studies by Romano (2010), Cock (2011) and Torney (2012) explain the crucial role of institutionalism in the cases of the EU-China and EU-Brazil bilateral relationships.

Bilateral intergovernmental climate studies are relevant to this thesis as they have revealed the importance of institutionalism. In a case study on EU-China climate change diplomacy, it was found that the EU promoted the institutional approach by creating some ground rules, a precise mechanism of funding distribution and a set of values for the regional group system (or EU style) as a form of soft imperialism as regards China (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005). The EU has built constructive dialogue and cooperation on climate change with China (Torney, 2012) since the EU-China partnership on climate change was agreed in 2005 at the EU-China Summit (ibid). The aim of this partnership was to develop domestic climate change policies in China and to persuade China to create an emissions reduction target for the period beyond 2012 (the end of the Kyoto Protocol). There have been three key studies on this partnership: Romano (2010), Cock (2011) and Torney (2012). All three explain how regional groups such as the EU use institutionalism to make China’s climate change projects more bilateral (i.e. government-to-government partnership).

Romano’s (2010: 2) study examined whether the EU-China partnership on climate change could be considered a contribution to a multilateral solution to climate change issues. His findings showed that the EU uses its bilateral relationship with China to expand its multilateral power. The EU, as a regional group, represents various European member states, and each of them seek to elevate their own interests with China. This means that the bilateral relationship between the EU and China supports the multilateral mechanism. In relation to this thesis, the case of the EU-China climate partnership offers some perspective on how crucial the institutional approach is and how quickly the institutional approach can shift the government-to-government relations in all levels: from multilateralism, regionalism, and bilateralism.

Romano (2010: 20-22) found that there is a fragmented internal relationship within the EU; the member states’ collaboration and ability to speak with one voice is
fragile. Hence, the EU is no longer a leading actor in advancing energy technology, for instance, and China tends to approach each member state of the EU individually. This reflects what Romano (2010: 22) calls “asymmetrical bilateralism,” where the partnerships are twofold, as China dealst with the EU as a whole and, simultaneously, with the individual member states. The concept of asymmetrical bilateralism was similarly explored in Torney (2012) with respect to the way that the EU tries to steer China through climate diplomacy. Torney analysed the challenges in EU-China climate relations and made two claims: there are difficulties on both sides; and there is potential to improve the overall functioning of the EU-China relationship.

Cock (2011: 89) further postulated that EU climate diplomacy around the 2009 Copenhagen Summit failed to persuade China to commit further to binding emission reduction targets. Cock (2011) outlined the factors contributing to the failed relationship between the EU and China through a constructivist paradigm. He claimed that the EU attempted to play the role of normative leader in relation to China and tried to convince it that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) market could provide a solution to achieving its emission reduction targets. The EU also helped to overcome China’s traditional understanding of the environment and economy as competing concerns and encouraged China to develop an industrial policy that emphasised the need to transition to a low-carbon economy. Both Romano (2010) and Cock (2011) agreed that the EU and China have gained positive impacts and benefits from their climate partnership, especially when the EU used bilateral relations to bolster the multilateral framework. Essentially, the EU as a regional group uses the bilateral approach in negotiating with China to pursue a multilateral interest.

Meanwhile, Romano (2010: 8) identified another positive side of the EU’s bilateralism towards China. He argued that the EU-China climate diplomacy had engendered multilateral action, which yielded more advantages for the EU’s multilateral framework. This occurred because the EU and China built a more institutionalised dialogue on climate change, emanating from a bilateral meeting in September 2005 at the Beijing Summit. However, Romano noted that there was a lack
of understanding of the “strategic partnership,” which created an “asymmetric bilateralism” between China and the EU member states (p. 22). The asymmetric bilateralism does not support civil society organisations’ engagement, and the lack of a definition of the strategic partnership itself renders the relationship with a non-state actor ambiguous.

Torney’s argument was more critical of the EU’s approach to building a bilateral partnership with China. Torney argued that the institutionalist spirit of the EU had become a boomerang for self-interest and created a fragmented set of relations (between China and some European countries) and fragmented policy issues with China. As a consequence, Torney asserted, this has had a negative effect on climate change policy because the fragmentation perpetuates the lack of integrated values underpinning the EU system with regard to climate change issues.

Cock (2011), in turn, acknowledged the role of the EU as a normative leader for China, in particular in the case of extracting binding mitigation commitments from China at a multilateral level (p. 95). In the context of energy issues, the EU transformed and improved the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in China, adding a bottom-up approach with strong links to the elites, along with a low-carbon development strategy that is in line with China’s growing economy (p. 105).

Torney (2012), however, again expressed a more critical view and claimed that the EU-China climate diplomacy had failed to deepen the understanding of the EU policy-makers, which reduced the effectiveness of EU climate diplomacy (Torney, 2012: 9). Despite the progress made by the institutional approach within the EU-China climate partnership, Torney (2012: 10-11) found some institutional challenges, such as a lack of institutional sources and relations being fragmented into two dimensions (China-Western/Euro-based European countries versus China-Eastern/non-Euro-based European countries). Another challenge identified was fragmented policy areas (there are still some separate meetings held at ministerial or senior staff level on climate change versus environment versus energy versus water).
In a case study of the EU-Brazil climate partnership, Afionis et al. (2014) highlighted that the EU’s role had become one of soft imperialism. They asserted that the EU had helped to address climate change problems in Brazil by pursuing individual interests and ‘returns.’ The EU set terms and conditions in pursuit of its own needs without prioritising or even considering the common shared goals of the EU and Brazil. EU bilateralism has thus made a deliberate effort to multilateralise the EU’s bilateral relations (Vasconcelos, 2010; Afionis et al., 2014: 50); this argument is in line with Romano (2010) and Cock (2011), and it also relates to the debates on bilateralism versus multilateralism outlined in the previous section.

There is some similarity between the EU-Brazil and Norway-Indonesia climate partnerships. Both used a pilot programme to combat deforestation as a way to reduce emissions, which was a part of REDD+, and the EU has an ambitious goal to help create an Amazon climate restoration project (Romano, 2010: 54). However, the practice of soft imperialism (in relation to deforestation) by the EU towards Brazil has not had a positive impact on climate change. Instead, it has developed the “interests of [the] most influential” (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2005: 547). Accordingly, the EU can use its power to persuade Brazil to cut deforestation in order to pursue the EU’s interests. This impact is also of relevance to the REDD+ case between Norway and Indonesia, which is assessed later in this thesis (in chapter 4).

Given the points above on bilateral governmental relationships, the study of Afionis et al. (2014) connects most with this research because the interest of the strongest actors (elites) reflect the power-plays within climate governance. In this research, I argue that foreign donors have a hidden interest and agenda with respect to Indonesia, which is illustrated in more detail in chapters 4-6. Clearly, a state’s role and leadership in constructing a bilateral agreement can be influenced by a vested interest and hidden agenda with regard to both foreign donor and recipient countries.

An important lesson learned from the study of bilateral intergovernmental partnerships is that institutionalism can become the determinant factor in achieving bilateral climate agreements, but at the same time it can become an obstacle because
of shifting policy or institutional challenges such as unclear programme design or the particular structure of an organization. In relation to the case study of Indonesia, this form of bilateral climate study helps to identify institutional problems in the process of bilateral climate partnerships. Furthermore, intergovernmental-based relations also demonstrate how Indonesia practices bilateral climate cooperation with three foreign donors: Norway, the UK and Australia. The next section covers in detail the literature on bilateral climate finance.

2.3.2 Bilateral climate finance

Bilateral climate finance concerns the transactional or practical implementation of bilateral treaties on climate change. An examination of this will shed light on the following aspects: first, the relationship between business interests and climate change policies; second, the role of conditionality in the mechanism of international climate cooperation. The first point of pragmatic business interest means that the bilateral climate change relationship revolves around money, cost management and how the financial support affects the business interests of any state parties. To analyse the business interests’ factor, three case-studies are explored: India-China energy/environment relations (Bajpai et al., 2016); US-China business relations on climate change (Oh, 2012); and US-India climate relations (Caplan, 2011). Secondly, the conditionality factor can be observed through the performance of international public finance and the implementation of domestic policies (Sippel and Neuhoff, 2009: 482). International public finance usually comes from the IMF and/or the World Bank, which have been working as intermediary agencies in bilateral climate agreements.

Oh (2012) described the long history of US-China bilateral cooperation on energy since the 1979 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Bilateral Energy Agreement (40) and specifically highlighted and analysed the clean energy projects that took place in 2009. Pertinently, the November 2009 US-China presidential summit in Beijing included an impressive array of agreements on joint clean energy projects. Oh described the success of US-China clean energy projects from 17 November 2009
using a table (p. 41), but found a lack of funding commitment from both countries to improve the existing clean energy projects (Lewis, 2010: 17). Oh (2012) suggested that business/private sector partnerships and private-public partnerships between the United States and China should be engaged more frequently to support bilateral climate change projects and sustain financial resources (pp. 54-57). The pragmatic and business-oriented study of Oh (2012) in the context of climate change is helpful for this research when it comes to checking whether there is a high level of business orientation between foreign donors and the Indonesian government, or whether business motives are informing the approach of the Indonesian government. Oh’s study can also inform the assessment of the funding commitment between Indonesia and foreign donors in conducting REDD+, for instance, and other relevant climate change projects.

There is some similarity between Oh’s (2012: 36) study and this thesis in that they both consider a decentralised and fragmented climate change policy. The difference here lies in the role of civil society groups. In China, civil society groups play a limited role in pressing or influencing government policy on climate change. In the United States, on the other hand, local governments and civil society actors are more keenly involved in the partnership than in China. These different types of civil society groups may also affect this study’s analysis of foreign donor motives given the progress made by civil society groups in Indonesia (which are mainly the same as those in the United States, i.e. progressive groups).

Caplan (2011) was critical of using multilateral agreements on climate change as an effective way of meeting GHG emission reduction commitments. By applying Blum’s (2008) observations on the effectiveness of bilateral treaties compared to multilateral agreements, Caplan (2011) analysed the case of the USA-India bilateral energy treaties (pp. 784-785). Caplan’s study showed that a decisive advantage has been gained by the USA-India bilateral relationship, specifically in the area of mitigation (Caplan, 2011: 782). India and the United States are both big carbon emitters and have large populations, leading them to share similar visions on climate change projects. This critique of multilateralism is strengthened by four observations made by
Blum on the importance of bilateral climate relations (Caplan, 2011: 796). First, bilateral treaties reproduce multilaterally designed legal rules in a new context. This does not mean that bilateral treaties duplicate multilateral agreements, but they instead implement multilateral commitments in a more intimate setting (Blum, 2008: 369). Second, bilateral agreements translate legal arrangements, which are clearer and may be tailored to a specified state’s obligations rather than a group of commitments laid out in multilateral treaties. Third, bilateral treaties may prescribe more profound obligations and prove more effective in securing compliance. In relation to the US-India climate partnership, Blum (2008: 371) suggested that the United States engaged closely with India in sharing technological information on energy, but there may be some constraints on sharing such information widely in a multilateral group. Fourth, bilateral treaties often use ‘carrots’ to induce parties to join multilateral agreements. This means that there is a broad consensus in the global climate agreement that may be simplified and supported through bilateral negotiations on the part of several countries.

Caplan also observed that a bilateral climate partnership is much more concrete and practical than a multilateral equivalent, especially in the case of USA-India transportation and energy projects (pp. 807-811). In applying Blum’s four observations on bilateral treaties, Caplan argued that the USA-India climate relationship had yielded a tailored way of acting upon their own energy interests. The United States provides guaranteed aid for Indian development, whilst India provides a lower-cost workforce to help spark the development of non-carbon-intensive USA clean energy industries (Caplan, 2011: 809). In addition, the strength of the USA-India energy treaties lies in their channelling of similarites and the parties’ compliance with environmental regulation and the template for climate strategies (pp. 810-811).

Bajpai et al. (2016), meanwhile, presented a case study of China and India. In the context of climate change relations, China and India were in an equal position when they supported the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and both also voluntarily pledged to reduce emissions at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit (p. 10). The intense climate change project that they undertook was in energy and mainstream technology-based cooperation (p.
120). This illustrates that technology transfer and climate finance are among the top priorities of bilateral climate cooperation between China and India. Technology-based cooperation is an essential prerequisite for building technological capacity, driving technological change at firm, country and regional level (Rogers, 2003). Bajpai et al. (2016) also used the South-South framework as the basis for cooperation, which is sometimes hindered by a lack of ‘in-depth’ interaction (pp. 119-121).\(^{13}\) The South-South framework attaches importance to improving the capacity developing countries in order to attract foreign donor support.

The study of Sippel and Neuhoff (2009: 489-492) analysed the level of compliance with conditionality,\(^{14}\) reactions in the case of non-compliance, and whether policy objectives were achieved by certain goals in the partnerships. These three factors were evaluated in the course of comparing the performance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, bilateral climate aid and the EU. They measured the conditionality performance based on the following four criteria: compliance with conditionality; stringency of reaction to non-compliance; competition among donors; and competition among recipient countries. They found that bilateral aid was stronger with regard to donor competition and recipient countries competition than the IMF, World Bank and the EU. This means that the conditionality does not work effectively because of the competitive relations among donors, which may have a negative effect on geo-strategic donor interests and the create the ‘Samaritan dilemma’ (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).\(^{15}\) In addition, the conditionalties applied to

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\(^{13}\) This lack-of-depth interaction means that there is a certain limited access to the China-India negotiation in multilateral events like the G20 summit or the UNFCCC, so, in the end, both countries did not follow up the outcome of the meetings. There was no continuous communication and response after the bilateral meeting/negotiation between China and India. Perhaps the meeting was not aimed at a long-term and transaction-based process.

\(^{14}\) According to the Oxford Dictionary, a conditionality in the context of agreements means there are some conditions and terms that a state should fulfil. The conditional terms include several requirements such as financial stability, good governance, respect for human rights, democracy, and peace and security.

\(^{15}\) There is a different explanation of the impacts of donors’ competition and recipients’ competition on conditionality. Sippel and Neuhoff (2009: 492) said that donor competition is not good for conditionality performance because it suggests a conflict of interest among donors and may thus hamper the funding
bilateral aid tend to have cross-conditionality (Sippel and Neuhoff, 2009: 486), which means a bilateral relationship ties programmes to the IMF and the World Bank, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) previously or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) currently. To make this cross-conditionality cooperative, good governance should be paramount (ibid: 490). In relation to this thesis, the conditionality factor helps when checking the interaction between the donor and the recipient countries, whether there is a high level of competition among donor countries and whether the Indonesian government as the recipient meets the requirements set by the donors.

Learning from the various case-studies above, the pragmatic business interests and conditionality factor can guide our understanding of the performance of both donor and recipient countries in conducting bilateral climate cooperation. In the case-studies of this thesis, the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships between Indonesia and foreign donors will be assessed based on how the conditionality works and manages their relationship, and whether the financial transaction relate to climate change creates business interests. However, it is argued that the financial agreements between the USA and China, India and China and the United States and India tend to be pragmatically based transactions, which may create hidden and high transaction costs. Studies by Giligan (2004) and Thompson and Verdier (2014: 5) noted that bilateral agreements multiply transaction costs since a new contract has to be negotiated, drafted and stored for each participant. The customisation of the agreement/programme design requires a further budgetary commitment and makes a bilateral approach less effective. This risk can be minimised by modifying the obligations or slightly adapting the uniformity principle to generalise each country’s divergent and complicated interests in the disbursement process and create a transparency issue. The recipients’ competition promotes the success of conditionality because this competition can be achieved by selecting a cooperative climate policy. This means that the donors/international finance institutions select the countries that fulfil certain conditions and reward the efforts that have been made.
bilateral scheme. The next section discusses the North-South divide in bilateral climate partnerships.

2.3.3 North-South divide in bilateral climate partnerships

Two studies have elaborated in detail upon how Northern and Southern countries (mostly African and Pacific Island countries) can address the gap in implementing bilateral climate partnerships. These studies are Muccione et al.’s (2018) work on the India-Peru bilateral research partnership on climate change, and Robertsen et al.’s (2015) research into bilateral adaptation-related climate change financing (ACCF) in sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.

In supporting bilateral India-China climate relations (Bajpai et al., 2016), India and Peru have also used the South-South framework to enhance bilateral climate cooperation among developing countries. Muccione et al. (2018) studied the climate change research disparity between the North and South including the lack of authorships from the global South writers/scientists in order to write IPCC assessment reports (Corbera et al., 2015). Similar to Muccione et al.’s (2018) research, a study by Hulme and Mahony (2010) outlined how scientists and research institutions in the North predominantly lead scientific knowledge on climate change. Pasgaard and Strange (2013) also noted that Northern scientists has got leading scientific reports on climate change, which yielded to the gap of knowledge about the regional and local aspects of the climate systems of the North and South. Therefore, Muccione et al. (2018) identified certain factors that enhance the success of bilateral climate change research and training in Peru and India. According to the case study, there are two important programmes that have been co-financed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, namely the Programme for Climate Change Adaptation (PACC) in the Peruvian Andes, and the Indian Himalayas Climate Adaptation Programme (IHCAP) in India. The PACC began in 2008, whilst the IHCAP began in 2012 (Muccione et al., 2018: 2). The purpose of the PACC is to strengthen fundamental capacities in different research areas relevant to climate change. The aim of the IHCAP
is to enhance and connect the knowledge and capacities of research institutions, communities and decision-makers (Orlowsky et al., 2016; IHCAP, 2016).

A positive feature of the bilateral India-Peru climate partnership is that it develops an extensive consolidation of scientific research projects. However, an institutional and scientific disparity regarding climate change has emerged between India and Peru. In Peru’s case, it lacked an institutional framework and legal and funding sources (Muccione et al., 2018: 346), whilst in India the institutional framework was well-established but its research on climate change was too diverse and the funding was unequally distributed to several regions or areas (p. 350). A central problem for the PACC and the IHCAP is the research gap between North and South on climate change topics because of Southern countries’ relatively low expenditure on education, research and development, poor governance and instability and restricted freedom of the press (Pasgaard and Strange, 2013).

Muccione et al. (2018: 346) also mentioned that the India-Peru climate research relationship was predominantly influenced by donors (for example, Switzerland). The critical challenges in their relationship are capacity, performance, salary and appreciation, funding, bureaucracy and hierarchy, publishing and data-sharing (pp. 342-344). A case-in-point here is the publication issue. Both the PACC and the IHCAP publish journals however the authors are predominantly Swiss (pp. 4-6). The bilateral Switzerland-India and Switzerland-Peru climate partnerships through the PACC and the IHCAP are not effective in providing transparent data and balancing the quality of research because the Northern donor (in this case, Switzerland) does not provide space and access to India and Peru to escalate their research capacities. Therefore, what India and Peru need does not match what Switzerland wants and pursues as the aid donor.

Meanwhile, the bilateral adaptation project in SSA countries has shown another mismatch in funding allocation between the receiving countries under the SSA project and the areas most vulnerable to climate change. The research of Robertsen et al. (2015) emphasised the importance of the accurate allocation on climate finance practices. This
climate finance mechanism adopts the adaptation programme because each country is able to repay a loan to address current climate risks (Robertsen et al., 2015: 12).

Robertsen et al. (2015:5-6) applied the 4Ps (poverty, population, policy and proximity) to SSA case-studies with seven key donors and used the methodology of ordinary least squares (OLS) with multivariate regression (quantitative methods). In the findings, Robertsen et al. (2015) stated that proximity and policy were the most important determinant factors in assessing the effectiveness of adaptation projects compared with the other two Ps (poverty and population), which also affect the model, ancient language and existing aid relationship factors (p. 6). These aspects are highly applicable to the ACCF. Robertsen et al. also claimed that the ACCF did not bring sufficient benefit to SSA countries because of a lack of aid development practices and because the donors did not support the recipient countries’ policies (pp. 7-8). In relation to this thesis, the economic gap and mismatch in donor aid could be a potential factor in making bilateral climate finance a challenging process for recipient countries.

The literature related to the North-South divide on bilateral climate partnerships has explained the interplay of developed and developing countries, inequality and the primary importance of dependency. According to Guzman (1998: 688), the North-South gap reflects how foreign donors apply a monopolistic price and reduce the number of goods sold to maximise their profits, which acutely hurts the recipients (particularly the least developed countries in bilateral investment treaties). However, the focus of this research is not disparity, such as was the case in the study of Muccione et al. (2018), and it does not propose how funding should be allocated, as reflected in the Robertsen et al. (2015) study. The focus on the North-South gap does not entirely connect to, and answer, the essential question of this research, which relates to the effectiveness or otherwise of bilateral governance. The economic gap and mismatch of donor aid could serve as a motive for the donor (in the case of either Norway or the UK) to determine which financial mechanism works best for Indonesian climate change mitigation. However, this motive is merely an additional factor in the process of forming bilateral climate partnerships with Indonesia. This thesis mainly focuses on
the institutional process and its challenges (including the problem of the financial mechanism) in the assessment of the complexities in Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships. In short, this thesis will not provide any further discussion on how the gap between the Global North and the Global South affects bilateral climate partnerships.

Of these three forms of bilateral partnership, bilateral intergovernmental and bilateral climate finance are the most relevant to this research because the bilateral climate practices in Indonesia are based on government-to-government relations and it is thus possible to analyse how the money moves between foreign donors and Indonesia. Institutionalism, transaction-based monitoring and reporting and conditionality factors in bilateral climate finance mechanisms are all key to navigating the full scope of this research, to develop clear answers, and to find out how the Indonesian government faces challenges when dealing with foreign donors (for instance, non-transparent funding disbursements/reports). Hence, Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships present a clear path for exploring the institutional process and its challenges, as well as the financial mechanism issue.

Nevertheless, it will be argued that the economic divide or North-South gap in climate change policies is less relevant to this research. This thesis does not look at the disparity and path dependencies between Northern countries (in this case, the foreign donors) and representatives of the Global South (in this case, Indonesia). Instead, this thesis will argue that Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships entail complex institutional arrangements, which affect the whole process and bring about an unclear climate funding mechanism. In order to assess how complex the institutional process and the financial mechanism is in bilateral climate partnerships, the next section provides several analyses of the REDD+ case, which serve as examples of and justification for this research’s choice of methods to analyse the bilateral climate governance in Indonesia.
2.4 Typology of analytical approaches

After establishing which bilateral climate studies can be adapted to the Indonesian case, this section provides guidance for assessing the complexities of the bilateral climate partnership process. Several analytical approaches drawn from the literature should allow for a deep understanding of how bilateral climate partnerships can be analysed. The following three analytical approaches are described: media analysis; institutionalism; and political economy framework. I compare these three approaches and then decide which analytical approach would be most relevant for this thesis.

Media analysis mainly focuses on the functions and assessment of the credibility, salience and legitimacy (CSL) of the information of environmental projects, based on Cash et al. (2003). The institutionalism approach is frequently used to analyse climate change projects, specifically REDD+. Angelsen (2008) explained clearly the importance of institutionalism for REDD+ projects in Indonesia through assessing the “three Es” (efficiency, effectiveness and equity). Finally, the political economy framework informs the 4Is approach drawn from Di Gregorio and Brockhaus (2012). Of the three analytical approaches outlined above, this thesis uses the 4Is political economy framework along with three additional factors because it encompasses institutions, interests, ideas and information, which is substantially broader than the information approach (Cash et al., 2003), the institutionalism approach (Angelsen, 2008), and policy change approach through leadership – policy experiments - decentralisation (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2019). In addition, the approach of Angelsen (2008) does not entirely match with this thesis, which aims to assess the complexities of bilateral climate partnership in Indonesia (rather than checking their efficiency and equity). The discussion also outlines where this research is in agreement or disagreement with some of the approaches, and why they are relevant to this research on bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. At the end of this section, justification is

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16 The analytical approaches become guidance for assessing which indicators of complexities in bilateral climate partnerships. This guidance is a prolonged step after knowing the path of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia, as clearly explained through the bilateral climate studies in section 2.3.
presented for a new analytical framework called the transformative 4Is+3, which represents one of this thesis’s distinctive contributions to the existing knowledge.

**a. Media analysis**

The information analysis is derived from Cash et al. (2003), who argued that the information or data related to climate change should contain three indicators – credibility, salience and legitimacy (CSL) – to ensure the effective crossing of boundaries among research, governmental and civil society actors. Credibility means that the information has a sufficient technology, whilst the salience is defined as the condition that information is congruent with what decision makers require. The legitimacy itself is meant to be a legitimate information, creates a respect among diverse stakeholders. Indeed, the perception of whether any given informational object has these characteristics will differ from person to person (White et al., 2010), and from organisation to organisation.

As Clark et al. (2011) also noted, different communities can have different perceptions of what constitutes credible, salient or relevant knowledge, producing barriers to information flows. Cash et al.’s (2003) study was also applied to a REDD+ study in Indonesia (Moelione et al., 2014), which had the following research question:

*Can the current patterns of information sharing in REDD+ policy-making in Indonesia underpin the transformational change (Di Gregorio et al., 2012) required if REDD+ is to address the problems of diverse forest economies and ecologies across a vast archipelago?* Moeliono et al. (2014: 3) hypothesised that both organisational and institutional power would be negatively related to information-sharing as organisations with these forms of power are unlikely to require an information search. Network power, on the other hand, would, by definition, be positively related to an organisation’s level of information-sharing (ibid). As a result, there is a weak information exchange among the national government, national civil society and transnational actors. Moeliono (2014: 7) also concluded that the emergence of brokers
able to connect these different clusters would be crucial for effective and inclusive REDD+ governance in Indonesia.

Given the above explanation, this analytical framework appears to be incongruent with what this thesis is addressing with regard to bilateral climate governance. Information can be one factor in assessing governance, but it should not be the main one. The Cash et al. (2003) study by itself is inadequate to explain the power interplays between the Indonesian government and foreign donors, between the Indonesian national government and Indonesian NGOs or between foreign donors and national NGOs in Central Kalimantan, for instance. Media analysis appears too narrow for the complexity of Indonesian climate governance at local, provincial and national levels. The next section examines institutionalism as another analytical framework for assessing bilateral climate partnerships.

b. Institutionalism

The key contribution to have used institutionalism as the analytical framework is Angelsen et al. (2008), who elaborated the nested approach, which involves ‘nested’ (or sometimes ‘polycentric’) institutions (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). This approach sets rules for forest use that give forest users incentives to follow the recommendations of REDD+. The concept of ‘nested’ institutions is sometimes likened to a Russian doll, where each local set of rules and incentives fits within the rules and objectives set for the larger scale (e.g. regional, national and international) (see Angelsen et al., 2008). For example, the framework for REDD+ proposed in international meetings has clear objectives (to reduce deforestation and forest degradation), agreed mechanisms (to provide incentives via carbon credits) and transparent regulations (such as regular monitoring and sanctions for failure) (Skutch, 2009: 116).

Under a subnational approach, REDD+ activities would be implemented in a defined geographic area or project scale by individuals, communities, NGOs, private companies or national or local governments. The national approach, on the other hand, addresses sovereignty issues and acknowledges that combating deforestation entails
broad policy changes, and thus has the potential to achieve larger-scale reductions (Angelsen et al., 2008: 34-36). The research question in Angelsen et al.’s study is: *what is the right scale for REDD+?* (Angelsen et al., 2008: 4) The merits of the three approaches (subnational, national and nested) can be assessed using the 3Es framework using the following practical questions: Is the mechanism achieving its greenhouse gas emission targets (carbon effectiveness)? Are these targets achieved at the minimum cost (cost efficiency)? What are the distributional implications and co-benefits (equity and co-benefits)? (Angelsen et al., 2008: 35) The following table provides a comparison of each approach:

Table 2.1 Comparison of Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Equity (3Es)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REDD model</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subnational approach</td>
<td>+ Broad short-term participation</td>
<td>± MRV costs lower overall but higher per CO₂ equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ Attractive to private funders</td>
<td>+ Differentiated incentive payment possible: lowers costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Domestic leakage a problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Does not trigger the required policy changes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Weak involvement of host countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National approach</td>
<td>+ Broader set of policies pursued</td>
<td>+ Lower MRV and transaction costs per CO₂ equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ Captures domestic leakage</td>
<td>+ Low-cost (non-PES) policies available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ Stronger host country ownership</td>
<td>- Potential for policy and governance failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unsolved issues of reference levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nested approach</td>
<td>+ Combines strengths of other two approaches</td>
<td>± Both differentiated compensation pay and low-cost broad policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ Flexibility based on national circumstances</td>
<td>- High MRV costs (which requires disaggregated national data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Potential for larger overall transfers</td>
<td>- Challenge to harmonise between national and sub national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unsolved issues of reference levels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Angelsen et al. (2008: 5-6)

Table 2.1 shows that every REDD+ model has advantages and disadvantages in the measurement of the 3Es. However, in comparison to the subnational and national approach, the nested approach smost appropriate because it combines the strengths of the national and subnational approaches and also has no difficulties in measuring the equity and co-benefit factors. One critical point with regard to Angelsen et al. (2008) is that the REDD+ complication may inexorably degenerate the nested (a combination
of the subnational and national approaches) scales because of acute bureaucratic problems and unclear job descriptions at each level of governance.

As an alternative, Pattberg (2010) developed an evaluative approach based on the appraisal of networked governance. In this concept, three sets of criteria evaluate climate governance, which is different from Di Gregorio (2012) in terms of public participation, institutionalism and the forms of climate change projects (whether mitigation or adaptation or both). These three criteria comprise a potential contribution to effective climate change mitigation and adaptation, a contribution to broader political goals such as increased participation and inclusiveness in global environmental governance, and linkages with the existing institutional architecture of international climate governance. This network-based governance entails different levels of contribution or participation and inclusive connection. This analytical framework acts as a complementary approach in explaining the governance performance and understanding the correlation with this approach in the REDD+ case in Indonesia. As a theoretical foundation, the concept of networked governance was derived from transnationalism and the importance of public-private partnership. The benefit of using networked governance is that it creates an effective mitigation and adaptation evaluation, sets a clear political goal and promotes institutionalism. Thus, Pattberg (2010) used institutionalism and political goals as his approach in assessing the concept of networked governance.

Overall, the strength of this analytical approach is that it has more structured indicators to set out the governance system and is a better framework than multilateralism when it comes to responding to problematic bureaucracy and a bilateral climate change project in practice. The reason for not applying this networked governance is that public-private partnership in general does not match the complexities of a bilateral government process on climate change in Indonesia. Moreover, public-private partnerships focus equally on the role of state and non-state actors, which differs from the case study used in this research.
Based on the comparison above, this thesis does not use the institutionalist approach for two reasons. First, the institutionalist approach from Angelsen (2008) mainly sets out the 3Es (effectiveness, efficiency and equity) of REDD+, whilst this study only assesses the effectiveness (not looking at efficiency and equity) of bilateral climate partnerships. Second, the institutionalist approach alone is insufficient to explore the factors behind failed bilateral climate partnerships. The next section describes the political economy approach and explains why it is particularly relevant to this thesis.

c. Political economy approach
The most important component of the political economy analytical approach is the usage of the 4Is – institutions, ideas, interest and information – of Brockhaus and Di Gregorio (2012), which I added other 3 factors leadership change, policy experiment, and decentralisation challenge called ‘transformative 4Is+3’. Both Di Gregorio and Brockhaus added ‘information’ as the additional ‘I’ to the 3Is developed in the earlier studies of Drake and Nicolaïdis (1992), Hall (1997) and Grindle (1999). The reason the 4Is are categorised as the political economy approach is because these four indicators do not just explain the political factors of institutionalism, ideas, interest and information of the state, but they also cover interaction between state and market in responding. In relation to this thesis, carbon trading can be seen as a way of the market meets the emissions reduction targets, which this target is in line with the government’s policy on solving deforestation, through a moratorium for instance. This was reflected in the case of REDD+ between Indonesia and foreign donors.

The political economy lens was first used by Drake and Nicolaïdis (1992), who explained the 3Is (institution, ideas and interest) in the context of trade services. There was an emerging epistemic community that questioned the multilateral liberalisation that dominated the global agenda; in particular, the case of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, negotiated as part of the so-called Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (pp. 41-42).
Meanwhile, the studies of Hall (1997: 179-185) and Grindle (1999: 17-20) suggested that the political approach of these 3Is was influenced by economic problems, and the state and market became the main actors in understanding how economy and politics were blended into one approach. The effectiveness of international cooperation on climate change is usually measured by the demand for cooperation, the number of actors and interest and the design of institutions (Underdal, 1980). These three factors are in line with what Purdon (2015) also outlined in the 3Is model: institutions, ideas and interests. However, Purdon (2015) paid greater attention to the comparative politics of climate change, which is not the focus of this thesis.

In contrast to Purdon (2015), Di Gregorio et al. (2012: 70) and Brockhaus and Angelsen (2012) explained in detail that the institution contains an institutional and political path dependency, the interests of actors, ideas from actors on translating discursive practices and information. Brockhaus and Di Gregorio added another ‘I’ – information – to break the political logjam and overcome the inherent ‘chicken and egg’ problem of transformational change (Angelsen, 2010: 16). This 4Is approach has also been used by Di Gregorio and Brockhaus to conduct and analyse REDD+ in the Indonesian context. The concept of 4Is as a political economy framework clarifies the economic problems and interests within the Indonesian governance system, which also shows how the state and market serve their hidden interests in the pursuit of greater power (either hard power or soft power).

In relation to REDD+ in Indonesia, Di Gregorio simplified the political economy analysis into two parts: policy analysis (investigating politico-economic, institutional, governance conditions and obstacles to REDD+ actions) and media analysis (examining how REDD+ policy debates are framed in the media and comparing this to the dominant discourse with counter-discourses) (Hajer, 1995; Boykoff, 2008). In addition, the political economic lens is explained when there is an economic problem and economic interest within the system and the actors: how state and market interplay their hidden interest in pursuit of bigger power (either hard power or soft power) (ibid).
As a result, Di Gregorio (2012) found that REDD+ is misused by the central government and politically contested by some stakeholders to achieve their interests in the name of REDD+. The contribution of Di Gregorio (2012) to comparative climate change is the development of the 3Is (institution, interest, ideas) into the 4Is, by adding information. In relation to the conceptual framework process, I favour this 4Is framework because it is helpful in determining which assessments to use in order to see the changes in the process of transformational change. However, this 4Is was not sufficient framework to explore the complexities of climate policy in Indonesia, which became the cause of limited transformation. The explanation of 4Is framework was settled in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 The Interaction of the 4Is

Source: Brockhaus and Angelsen (2012: 20)
Firstly, a key role is played by *institutions* and how they shape, and are shaped by, societies over time. In North’s (1990) framework, institutions are sometimes developed to capture economic opportunities for society at large; however, groups may also have the power to shape institutions to serve their particular interests. Furthermore, institutions can be seen as a public good, and there is therefore a collective action problem to be solved to provide effective institutions. Path dependencies are a reality for REDD+: *what was* and *what is* shape *what can be*. For example, existing regime types, centralised or decentralised governance structures and colonial or postcolonial norms often include embedded patterns of deforestation. ‘Stickiness’ is characterised by the resistance to change often seen in state organisations responsible for the management of natural resources. Ministries of forestry in forest-rich countries may be afraid of losing parts of their sphere of influence, or ministries of agriculture may fear that REDD+ will restrict opportunities for new agricultural land (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012: 22).

Secondly, *interests* are the material interests of actors and actor groups in the REDD+ policy arena. Different actors and groups in the REDD+ policy arena have various interests and potential to realise material advantages with, without and through REDD+. Business interests can be directed for or against REDD+, depending on the economic activity of the industry or business involved, for example, pulp and paper industry representatives (who see REDD+ as a threat) versus carbon investors (who see REDD+ as an opportunity) (ibid: 24).

Thirdly, *ideas* are sufficiently unspecified to be open to different interpretations, and can therefore fit fundamentally different normative beliefs, such as the beliefs held by environmental market liberals and ‘social greens.’ New coalitions in the REDD+ policy arena were emerging. Yet a strong disagreement is visible when details of REDD+ must be specified, such as how much it should rely on future carbon market funding and to what extent tenure and rights should be addressed before REDD+ actions are implemented (ibid: 25-26).
Fourthly, *information* is defined by Brockhaus and Angelsen (2012: 27) as a part of transformational change, yet it is inherently also a part of institutions, interests and ideas. Rather than being allowed to speak for themselves, facts are selected, interpreted and put into context in ways that reflect the interests of the information provider. New emerging information is replacing existing ‘toolkits for action,’ especially in what Swidler (1986) called unsettled situations. To clarify, the global problem of climate change can be considered as such an unsettled situation. However, what makes a decision-maker replace a development paradigm based on exploitation with a new discourse in favour of sustaining forests? Using these new ideas as a force for long-term change depends on structural conditions. In addition, factors such as data disclosure, availability and credibility in REDD+ all contribute to whether information serves to constrain or enable change. Actors have uneven access to information as well as varying technical capacities to produce, provide and transform knowledge into direct economic benefits or support for public decision-making. In the REDD+ world, information is a currency and a source of power.

After having 4Is as the analytical framework, it was not sufficient to explore and deep dive the root causes of bilateral climate partnerships becoming complex. Transformational change in the context of Indonesian climate policy could not be achieved due to the overlapping role and mechanism between bilateralism and multilateralism, the complex bureaucracy of Indonesian government at all levels. The policy making process was part of transformative 4is, and there needs further development on how leadership change, policy experiment that Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2019) stated, along with the rise of decentralisation system in Indonesia.

This research regards the 4Is and three other factors as the most useful approach to a bilateral climate change study in Indonesia as it can be a method of assessing how complex the bilateral process-making between foreign donors and the Indonesian government, as well as illustrating the reaction of civil society groups. This 4Is+3 approach guides the failures or challenges in seeing whether transformative governance can work in practice, which can be evaluated through my three case-studies (Indonesia-
Norway climate partnership, Indonesia-UK climate partnership, and Indonesia-Australia climate partnership) via the indicators of ‘institutions’, ‘ideas,’ ‘interest’ and ‘information.’ Thus, this 4Is approach becomes a part of the climate governance framework, in which climate governance and 4Is complement one another. When necessary, the 4Is approach can stimulate the development of new climate governance.

In responding to literary debates and the various analyses above, this research has developed the transformative 4Is+3 as a new contribution to bilateral climate partnership assessment. Using the analytical framework of this thesis, there are three approaches to assess: the policy change (transformation) (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017); accountability performance (Edmondson and Levy, 2019); and the 4Is. In the policy change analysis of Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2017) and Warman (2016), there are three indicators used to measure policy change: changing leaders; policy experiments; and decentralisation. The policy change process in a bilateral climate partnership also depends on the dynamics inside the entire arena and interplay among the 4Is to allow for shifts in incentives, discourse and power relations (Brockhaus, 2014: 20). The next section further explains how and why the transformative 4Is was chosen as the new conceptual framework for this research.

2.5 Transformative 4Is+3: a new analytical approach to Indonesia’s bilateral climate governance

This section presents the process of making, and the means of assessing, the transformative 4Is+3 on bilateral climate change case-studies in Indonesia. In order to create the transformative 4Is+3, I started by describing and comparing different literature related to transformative climate governance, then connected these with the ‘4Is’ indicators, and added three other relevant factors based on climate policy process in Indonesia. The reason behind using the transformative 4Is+3 as the analytical framework is related to the role of the transformation process in conducting bilateral climate projects between foreign donors and the Indonesian government. The word ‘transformative’ has been used by several authors within different areas of climate
change studies. Interestingly, literature has shown different meanings of transformative climate governance.

There are various approaches to the study of transformative climate governance, including Edmondson and Levy (2019), Ciplet et al., (2018), Hölscher et al. (2018) and Bray (2017), but the contribution with most relevance to this thesis is Korhonen-Kurki et al., (2017) who analysed transformation as a policy experiment and applied this to the REDD+ case in Indonesia (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017). These small experiments can lead to transformative changes in structures, ultimately leading to the creation of policies that are transformational. Korbonen-Kurki et al. also used the 4Is framework, which is applied to explain the different aspects of the institutional and policy setting where transformative governance operates. The 4Is+3 is used to describe the setting and how the experiment may lead to changes. This literature has some similarities with my research, which corroborates the role of institutions, vested interests among foreign donors and Indonesian stakeholders, and also measures the achievement of bilateral climate regimes and the monitoring mechanism. Meanwhile, the policy change indicator can be a mode of assessment to see whether bilateral climate projects have worked well or not.

Among the transformative analytical frameworks above, all authors above agree that transformation needs a novelty, a new transition from several experiments in the policy-making process and the act of policy implementation. This enables the policy-making process or institutional mechanism to change, impacting the effectiveness of the climate partnership. The study of Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2017) seems the most relevant and plausible in this thesis, not just because of the case being applied in Indonesia and the strong characteristics and factors, but also due to the way these authors justified substantial changes when reviewing the REDD+ case.

The research of Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2017) shows that small experiments in the policy-making process can lead to a transformative change in structures of climate governance. This means that a policy experiment can transform a policy into a more effective one. When a policy experiment is conducted, it may lead to transformative
policies, through which the 4Is become the operational factors to make the transformative policy happen. This policy experiment can be explored through the Indonesian initiatives and preparatory meetings with the foreign donors on the development of bilateral climate agreements. Korhonen-Kurki et al.’s study also entailed using the 4Is+3 to analyse the Indonesian REDD+ case. Thus, the transformative concept from Korhonen-Kurki et al. is highly relevant to this thesis.

Meanwhile, in the forest governance context, transformational change can be defined as a shift “in discourse, attitudes, power relations, and deliberate policy and protest action that leads policy formulation and implementation away from business as usual policy approaches that directly or indirectly support deforestation and forest degradation” (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012: 16-17). This definition is closely related to my research, which has considered whether bilateral partnerships have achieved transformative governance.

The ‘transformative 4Is+3’ is highly important and relevant to the case study of Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships because there are several changing policies, actors and interplays among the 4Is that were defined by Di Gregorio et al. (2012) and Brockhaus and Angelsen (2012) and three additional factors as my response to Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2019)’s concept guided the explanation of complex bilateral climate partnerships. As a distinctive concept, transformative 4Is+3 respond to this research on the complexities of governance capacities in accomplishing transformative climate governance. In the context of climate change, this transformation refers to the changing process of how any type of actor (from civil society groups to state actors/policymakers) responds and develops solutions to mitigate or adapt to climate change, which has come to be known as transformative climate governance. This means that there is a change in the transformation process itself, and a changing policy is a necessary component of exploring the complicated climate governance. The idea of transformation has emerged to explore how change processes occur in society, how societies are enabled and what obstacles prevent change processes from happening (Westley et al., 2011). Zeitlin et al. (2005: 450) presented the notion of “substantive
change” by which they refer not only to formal institutions such as law, policy and rules, but equally to “broad changes in policy thinking.” In short, the complexities of a bilateral climate partnership can be analysed through the transformative 4Is+3, which enable leadership change, policy experiments, and decentralisation to be the determining factors and use the institution, interest, ideas and information as the operational factors.

2.5.1 Method of assessment: transformative 4Is+3
As a method of assessment, this transformative 4Is approach creates a main theme or primary indicator called “policy change.” The policy change itself can be divided into three sub-themes: changing leadership; policy experiments; and the decentralisation process. The formulation of transformative 4Is+3 is developed as a way to check whether there is any new transformation or a changing transition. This changing transition suggests that the process is changing with regard to building bilateral mechanisms between Indonesia and foreign donors. The changing process could be a changing institution, changing leadership on the part of both actors, changing norms, or other objects. The units of change that I analyse are essentially taken from the 4Is+3 indicators: changing institution, changing ideas, changing interest and changing information, changing leadership, changing climate policy, and changing decentralisation. This evaluation is in line with, or a development of, the policy experiment that Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2017) carried out in the context of REDD+. In this thesis, the policy experiment has been expanded to the process of actors conducting bilateral climate partnerships, taking into account how the Indonesian government and other stakeholders respond to and interact with the Norwegian government, the UK government and the Australian government.

Through transformative 4Is+3 analysis, I will argue that this approach may provide guidance for policy-makers in Indonesia to evaluate the existing bilateral mechanisms, what they had worked on and what has been done, and then to direct them on what to do in the future learning from failures or any challenges that may have
emerged. In doing so, there is a limitation in this analysis, which mainly focuses on the process or mechanism of bilateral climate partnerships. Hence, the transformative 4Is+3 framework is applied to the process of actors (both foreign donors and Indonesia) interacting and managing the respective bilateral climate partnership, how a change in the policy-making process is conducted and whether that changing process reveals the bilateral mechanisms to be complex or not. The next section provides an overview of the typologies of bilateral climate studies, presents justification for the relevance of the political economy approach in the Indonesian climate change case study, and outlines the necessity of using the transformative 4Is+3 as a new alternative analytical framework in this research.

2.6 Conclusion
This thesis finds that bilateralism is a distinctive approach to climate diplomacy, but one that cannot deliver climate project implementation alone. Bilateralism interacts with and complements broader multilateral approaches, which, in the context of climate change, suggests that bilateral approaches can help to make multilateral approaches more effective through better implementation of climate change policies. The practice of bilateral climate partnerships can provide an alternative approach that works alongside the multilateral mechanisms through international institutions such as the United Nations or the World Bank. The case of EU-China climate diplomacy shows that bilateral climate relations support the work of the multilateral system within the EU, while also demonstrating that bilateral approaches can deliver benefits by strengthening the multilateral mechanisms within the EU that have been running for years.

There are several typologies of bilateral climate studies, which differ with respect to the characteristics and nature of the bilateral work. Of the three approaches discussed in this chapter, bilateral intergovernmentalism and bilateral climate finance are the most suitable for this research because of the congruence of the institutionalism factor, along with the good governance principle and monitoring and evaluation of
financial performance, which I will analyse. The congruence between institutionalism and the good governance principle means that institutional arrangements always serve as a sort of rhetoric employed to promote a clean or ‘reformed’ governance system. Furthermore, financial performance is problematic in the Indonesian climate change context, especially the different types of funding mechanism used by both foreign donors and local governments (as the implementing actors). This financial mechanism problem emerges as a key issue in this thesis. Moreover, this thesis will argue that the dynamically changing institutional structures and financial factors significantly affect Indonesian climate governance.

Meanwhile, the analytical political economy framework applying the 4Is (Di Gregorio, 2012) and institutionalist approach from Angelsen et al. (2008: 5-6), enables us to ascertain the effectiveness of bilateral climate partnerships based on institutionalism and the role of the market as the additional element to prove that emission reduction targets have been met. However, using the institutionalist approach and the 4Is is not sufficient to develop an assessment of how complex the bilateral climate partnerships work in Indonesia. Therefore, the transformative 4Is+3, as a new alternative analytical framework that I have developed, creates a more holistic approach to studying how policy experiments and accountability performance are applied in bilateral climate projects. Furthermore, transformative 4Is+3 explores the linking factors on how the institution, interest, ideas and information, leadership change, policy experiment, and decentralised network factors influence each three case studies in this research. The next chapter sets out the methodology of this research.
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an explanation of the research methodology I chose for this study to explore and assess the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. The methodology and methods used are outlined in the research design. George and Bennett (2005) stated that the research design is the backbone of any research. Through the research design, I explain my reason for choosing this Indonesian case study along with three foreign donors (Norway, the UK, and Australia) who have conducted and maintained their bilateral climate change cooperation with Indonesia between 1997 and 2016. In collecting and analysing the data, I used a qualitative method, a comparative approach, and triangulation analysis for the three case studies in this thesis (the Indonesia–Norway, Indonesia–UK, and Indonesia–Australia bilateral climate partnerships).

This chapter contains six sections: the introduction, the research design, the research scope, the data collection methods, the fieldwork research and its reflexive narrative, and the conclusion. Section 3.2, which covers the research design, describes the research timeline, explains the research methods (specifically the qualitative method) and elaborates on the importance of using a comparative approach. Part of this is a case study approach to analyse in depth the way foreign partners (especially Australia, Norway, and the UK) engage in bilateral climate change cooperation with Indonesia.

This chapter describes the reasoning behind selecting Indonesia, three foreign donors, and Central Kalimantan as the focus (Section 3.3). The challenging processes of the interviews and the document review are described in Section 3.4. These data sources provide triangulation to add rigour to the findings (Betsil and Corell, 2001) as diverse perspectives from the interview respondents will be compared and contrasted to shed light on this research. Section 3.5 provides reflections on doing research in
Central Kalimantan and Jakarta as well as outlining the limitations, experience, and further recommendations for such research. The last section evaluates the research plans and goals for execution and outcomes, aiming to make the research process and findings replicable; this will be highly beneficial for those interested in developing this research.

### 3.2 Research design

Research design is the process of developing research objectives and structure (George and Bennett, 2005) as well as determining the appropriate data collection methods and data analysis techniques (Philliber et al., 1980). Yin (2003: 20) defined research design as a ‘logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions’. Several authors, such as Philliber et al. (1980), viewed research design, especially in qualitative research, as the research ‘blueprint’. It is also a guide to focus the study and arrange the data and arguments systemically. A carefully thought-through research design can avoid a situation wherein the research questions are not fully answered and do not produce any outcomes (Yin, 2003: 21). In short, the research design is the primary procedure of conducting the research, academically analysing the data, findings, and discussion and focusing them on a new outcome.

However, Mason (2002), as opposed to Philliber et al. (1980), claimed that the characteristics of qualitative research are exploratory, fluid, flexible, data-driven, and context sensitive. As such, a researcher cannot possibly create an entire blueprint prior to conducting research. I personally agree with Mason (2002) that the research design gives the flexibility and space for developing explorative findings or outcomes. With regard to my fieldwork experience in Central Kalimantan, I expected to conduct several focus group discussions (FGDs) with some local NGOs, but only one responded to my idea. Furthermore, the local NGOs in Palangkaraya are characterised by their pursuit of solidarity and cooperation with activists but low capacity in budgeting/organisational skills and internet literacy. This challenged me to redesign
and reconstruct the tasks I had outlined, finding alternative ways to approach the informants and developing a strong capacity to address unexpected events (e.g. lights off in the fieldwork area, low internet connection in Central Kalimantan, cancelled meetings with informants, no responses from the NGOs).

3.2.1 Triangulation

Following the abovementioned research design, I emphasise on triangulation as a major factor of this research method. In social science, ‘triangulation’ is defined as the mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints cast light on a topic (Olsen, 2004). Triangulation is also useful for exploring and explaining the comparative analysis based on a wide range of theoretical debates among, for example, realism, liberalism, and constructivism (Bryman, 1996). Olsen (2004) and Huberman (1994) noted more specifically that triangulation can help correct researcher bias in assessing NGOs’ or CSOs’ influence on a particular issue. The overall goal of using this method in this research is to ‘understand the meaning of actions and interactions from the members’ own point of view’ (Eickstein, 1975; King et al., 1994). In relation to this research, triangulation is important to keep the process of building the conceptual framework in the right direction and check the reliability of the data through interviews and the review of documents as well as other relevant sources related to Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships.

Triangulation is closely connected to interview methods, which aggregate deductive and inductive analysis processes. Mason (1996) stated the introduction of research strategies were delivered in sequence. For instance, when we design the interview, fortuitously it is in line with the document or reports (as the secondary data). Flexibility issue tends to be synchronised with the investigator’s practicality and methodological triangulation. In relation to my research, the triangulation approach asserts the use of the qualitative method, especially the comparative case study, while also conducting interviews as the main data collection method. I identified the factors of challenging bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia as the preliminary findings.
and the variables to be tested during the fieldwork. Thus, triangulation addresses bias and resolves the research problems, along with the interview and other methods.

Meanwhile, inductive analysis in the triangulation process is based on the assumption that examining empirical data for patterns can lead to inferences. Hence, by closely examining qualitative data in the form of documents, field notes, or interview transcripts, the researcher locates patterns and commonalities that contribute to the generation of theory. Inductive reasoning can take into account topics that have been initiated by participants rather than being driven solely by testing the researcher’s questions and hypotheses. When applied to interview data, one approach would be for researchers to use pre-conceptualised codes to reduce the data and then test whether the proposed hypotheses are supported or contradicted by the findings from the analysis. Thomas Schwandt (2001: 125) pointed out that qualitative analysis typically involves both inductive and deductive reasoning given that researchers generate findings through close examinations of data in combination with the application of substantive theories from prior research to inform and develop their analyses.

In relation to my research, I found inductive analysis to be highly significant when analysing interview transcripts and developing observations during the fieldwork. This reflects the condition that fieldwork may lead to several unexpected moments and findings and undertaking observation cannot be generalised as a single argument/conclusion in the first place. I was not able to justify and adhere to indicators of effective bilateral climate partnerships while doing semi-structured interviews with the informants. The process of searching for indicators of such partnerships was not deductive, which meant that the indicators did not stem from the ‘4Is’ concept in Chapter 2. I decided to explore some possible factors that connect to the institution, ideas, interest, and information (Di Gregorio and Brockhaus, 2012) along with a potential connection to transformation in climate partnerships between Indonesia and the three foreign donors. The triangulation process guided me on how to connect relevant factors and indicators of complexities in the context of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia.
3.2.2 Research methodology: qualitative methods

The main purpose of using qualitative methods in this research is to explore and explain the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships and the challenge of governance factors, such as public participation, transparency, and accountability in Indonesian environmental policy. Qualitative methods can produce a wealth of detailed information, which is essential for explaining any hidden agenda from either the Indonesian government or foreign donors as well as the background to the politics of bilateral climate change cooperation in Indonesia. This hidden agenda emerged from my inductive approach, which I had not anticipated. The detailed information was derived from a narrative approach, which typically encouraged a discussion of real-life complexities and contradictions (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 237). The narration emerged from case study techniques, which, Abbott (1992) noted, provides ‘far better access for policy intervention than the present social science of variables’. This statement strongly supports my reasoning for choosing the qualitative method in studying bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia.

Qualitative researchers tend to engage and bond with the informants as the objects of the research. This potentially recognises individuality and yields subjectivity (Roulston, 2010: 10). This method produces richer data through a wide range of sources, such as people, documents, natural spaces, and other objects (Roulston, 2010: 12). The researcher looks for patterns in the lives, actions, and words of people in the context of the case as a whole. In relation to my research, the use of a qualitative approach is the best way to analyse complex cases with significant hidden data; this also provides an effective way to categorise and draw out these factors, here focusing on the comparison of three foreign donors engaging in bilateral climate change agreements with Indonesia.

However, the use of qualitative research can yield a number of problems. First, the lack of linguistic competence can produce language barriers during the fieldwork process (Hantrais and Ager, 1985; Lisle, 1985). This occurred when I had gone to
Central Kalimantan and approached the villagers and local communities surrounded by the forest. They spoke the local language, and I had limited understanding of this language. Second, the sampling method had multi-faceted problems, which meant that choosing the right informants could not be determined from the first step of sampling, and one-off interviews could not be taken as the technique of data collection. Potential errors from one informant or misinformation from one side that could be very subjective to the thesis were evident. As the solution, the snowballing technique (Peters, 1998) was conducted, which meant that the samples began from a core of known elements and then increased by adding new elements given by members of the original sample.

In my process, I found this to be another challenge in determining my main research informants. I considered the background of 33 different informants and decided to pick more governmental and civil society groups than private sectors or other informants as the main source. Third, management issues may be unavoidable when conducting such research. Millar (1990) described such issues in a study of the social situation of single women, in which he had to deal with class and gender conflicts in the research fieldwork. Similarly, during the interview process in Palangkaraya and Jakarta, I noticed that some informants had preconceptions about the ability of an educated woman who has pursued an academic path to address forestry problems in Central Kalimantan. This means that to them, women are not supposed to pursue high-level education abroad, reflecting the reality that Indonesia still has a strong patriarchal system. Despite these challenges, the qualitative approach has shaped this research through an exploration of how problematic bilateral climate partnerships have been established in Indonesia. Several hidden interests, conflicts, and civil society engagement issues emerged within the process of these partnerships.

3.2.3 Research timeline
In referring to section 1.3.1 on the timeline of bilateral climate partnership in Indonesia, this research mainly focused the period between 2009-2016 or the third phase of
bilateral climate partnership. The main reason on choosing this timeline is that there was a changing leadership of two Presidencies with contrasting institutional frameworks for climate policy. In 2009-2014, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) created many different institutions related to REDD+, whilst President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) merged both Ministry of Forestry and Ministry of Environment through the new establishment of Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF), and also merged all institutions related to REDD+ into one Directorate General Climate Change Control (DG-CCC) under the MoEF. Although this research timeline primarily started from 2009 until 2016, the updated climate policies and other relevant sources in 2019 and 2020 were included as part of the complementary explanation.

3.2.4 Research approach: comparative method and the case study approach

3.2.4.1 The comparative method

The comparative method that I use in this thesis is based on the qualitative approach. Arend Lijphart (1971: 682) defined the comparative method as ‘one of the basic methods – the others being the experimental, statistical, and case study methods – of establishing general empirical propositions’. This is also a method for discovering the empirical relationships among variables rather than a method of measurement (Lijphart, 1971: 683). Comparative methods17 need to be broad and general, not specialised and narrow techniques. As a consequence, political scientists often refer to three main types of comparative analysis: case studies of individual countries within a comparative framework, systematic studies of a limited number of countries, and global comparisons based on statistical analysis (Mackie and Marsh, 1995: 176).

In practice, a debate exists between quantitative-comparative methods and qualitative-comparative methods. Scholars such as Moore (1966), Bendix (1964), and Skocpol (1979) built theoretical frameworks based on a strong qualitative comparative basis. The comparative method is both a method and a strategy (Kohn, 1989: 77–102; Vigour, 2005: 17), which sometimes is a deliberate substitute for ‘method’ or a complement to it (Armer and Grimshaw, 1973; Ragin, 1987; Dogan and Pelassy, 1990; Dogan and Kazancigil, 1994; Lallement and Spurk, 2003). In support of the qualitative approach, Ragin (1987: 6) stated that comparative knowledge provides the key to understanding, explaining, and interpreting information. This means that a qualitative approach develops the result of the comparative method more exploratively and flexibly to explain the data as well as to understand the outcome of the research. However, Mayer (1989: 12) redefined the goal of comparative politics as the ‘building of empirically falsifiable, explanatory theory’, which came to be the quantitative-positivistic approach. In line with Mayer, Burnham et al. (2008: 72) defined the comparative method as observing and comparing carefully selected cases based on the presence or absence of a certain stimulus. In the social sciences and humanities, comparative research refers to the study of societies, countries, cultures, systems, institutions, social structures, and change over time and space carried out with the intention of using the same research tools to systematically compare the manifestations of phenomena in more than one temporal or spatial sociocultural setting (Hantrais, 2009: 2).

The strengths of qualitative approaches lie in attempts to reconcile complexity, detail, and context. Burnham et al. (2008: 69) stated that the goal of comparative research is to reason instead in terms of variables (Przeworski and Teune, 1970), meaning that ultimately, the uniqueness of each case itself is less important than the case being understood as a combination to generate general theories of politics. The advantages of using the comparative method are contextualised knowledge to improve classifications, to formulate and test hypotheses, and to make predictions (Hague and Harrop, 2007).
However, using a qualitative-comparative method entails some disadvantages and challenges. The ‘travelling problem’ has two manifestations: neither theoretical concepts nor empirical measurements are consistent (they do not ‘travel’ across temporal and/or spatial settings). In using a qualitative approach, researchers often do not think of independent and dependent variables. In using the case study method, the researcher must ensure that the causes to which he or she is attributing the observed outcomes are indeed the ‘true causes’ and not a function of other factors that might as easily produce the observed outcomes (Hague and Harrop, 2008: 85). This is reflected in my research process when I managed multiple case studies, especially dealing with the different characteristics of the three foreign donors (Norway, the UK, and Australia) without specific common values or indicators. I had some difficulty with ensuring the true case of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships that could show strong evidence and produce clear assessments of how effective the Norway–Indonesia cooperation is compared with the UK–Indonesia and Australia–Indonesia climate partnerships.

3.2.4.2 The case study approach

The qualitative method commonly involves the use of the case study approach. My examination of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships focused on three foreign donors as the bilateral comparative cases. Creswell (2007) suggested five types of the qualitative research approach: narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study. One way to determine the right approach is to assess the type of research questions being posed. Yin (2003) suggested that the case study approach is the most appropriate when undertaking research that mostly asks ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions. I selected this approach because it simplified the manner in which I investigate and explore the complexity of bilateral climate partnerships.

As the bilateral cooperation context was a mechanism undertaken directly in government-to-government relationships, the case study sharpened and simplified a certain analysis, e.g. the different characteristics among the donors [the way Norway had managed the funding and engaged the civil society was different from the
Australian strategy and United Kingdom on Climate Change Unit (UKCCU) management. Comparing the three case studies could draw out key differences among them. The reason for choosing these three specific foreign donors was because they were the most consistent foreign partners to conduct bilateral climate partnerships with the Indonesian government between 1998 and 2015.\(^{18}\)

To choose the case, we need to decide how important the case study to be used is in conjunction with the comparative method. Burnham et al. (2008: 88) stated that the number of cases to be included in a comparative research design depends, to a large extent, on how many suitable cases are available. Normally, comparative researchers do not find themselves in the ‘lucky predicament’ of having too many suitable cases; having to make do with what is available is more common, taking into account available research resources.

The advantages of a case study include the ability to accept complexity and multiple causation as a crucial characteristic of the research (usually called variable-oriented research) and to attempt to locate its findings in its particular historical and cultural milieu rather than assuming some degree of isolation from political events and their surroundings (Peters, 1998: 141). A case study approach also has the potential to generate data with a high level of explanatory richness (Denscombe, 2005; Yin, 2003; George and McKeown, 1985). Creswell (2007: 73) defined the case study as an approach where

the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or 100 multiples bounded [systems] (cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g. observations, interviews, audio-visual material, and documents and reports) and reports a case description and case-based themes.

\(^{18}\) I have explained in detail the choice of the three foreign donors in Chapter 2. I did preliminary research and created a timeline of bilateral climate partnership from 1998 to 2015.
In my research, this approach helps significantly with classifying the characteristics and other variables of comparative bilateral climate change cooperation among Norway, Australia, and the UK.

3.3 Research scope/limitations

The research scope helps to keep the focus of the research on the right track. In this research, I chose Indonesia because of several dimensions of climate change issues that particularly affect the country. First, the influential number of climate change effects of Indonesia in the international arena is very high. Indonesia is among the top three greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters in the world because of land use change and deforestation (World Bank, 2007), estimated to be at a rate of two million hectares (ha) per year (World Bank, 2000). Indonesia had become the 16th largest GHG emitter in the world by 2003, with 347 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year, contributing 1.34% of the world’s total emissions that year (Baumert et al., 2005). Indonesia has the world’s third largest tropical forest (WRI, GFW, and FWI, 2010), yet it ranks second in the world for tropical deforestation (FAO State of Forest, 2011). Indonesia also has a powerful influence on developing countries, having voluntarily pledged to reduce its emissions by 29% with its own efforts – or up to 41% with international support – against the ‘business as usual’ scenario by 2025 (Government of Indonesia Report, 2015).

Second, the study specifically looks at the complexities of three bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia (Norway, Australia, and the UK) between 1997 and 2016. These three foreign donors have been assessed as the current donors who are most concerned with land use, deforestation, and other forestry problems that are a major cause of climate change in Indonesia. In addition to the deforestation issue, Sunderlin et al. (2014) proposed that land tenure security has been the main problem

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19 These three donors are the result of my preliminary findings on the three phases of bilateral climate partnership. For more details, see Chapter 1.
in most countries in the Global South where REDD projects are implemented, including Indonesia. According to Moeliono et al. (2014), this REDD\(^{20}\) project was funded by the Norwegian government for up to £781 million; meanwhile, Australia built the Kalimantan Forests Carbon Partnership (KFCP), and the British government set up a low-carbon development in Kalimantan under the UKCCU program. Furthermore, their study showed that Indonesia experiences more land tenure insecurity and more external interventions and forest use than Brazil, Cameroon, Tanzania, and Vietnam, where many REDD+ projects are implemented (Sunderlin et al., 2014: 41). The complex land tenure security within the REDD+ programme was included as the complementary information related to bilateral climate partnerships with Norway (in which the Norwegian government became the pioneer donor of the REDD+ programme in Indonesia); this is elaborated on in Chapter 4.

Third, I chose Central Kalimantan for my fieldwork for three reasons. The first reason is that there has been a drastic shift in land use, which is the main cause of deforestation in Central Kalimantan. From the New Order to the reformation era, which started in 1998, the government cleared a 1.2 million ha site in Central Kalimantan for the large-scale agricultural production of rice and other crops (McBeth, 1995). In the following years, there were plans for considerable expansion to accommodate tree crop estates, notably for palm oil. As a result, Central Kalimantan experienced some of the worst forest fires in Indonesia after the 1998 reformation era, resulting in a thick blanket of smoke and haze that spread beyond Indonesia’s borders to Singapore and Malaysia. This burning peat resulted in Indonesia becoming one of the largest carbon emitters, alongside European states, China, and the United States (Maning and Van

\(^{20}\) REDD stands for Reducing Emission on Deforestation and Forest Degradation, started since COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia, in 2007 as a mitigation of climate change. The activities in REDD include forest conservation, sustainable forest management, and the enhancement of carbon stocks through afforestation and reforestation.
The second reason is that the REDD pilot project, located in Central Kalimantan, has been supported by the governments of Norway, the UK, and Australia. In 2010, Norway was a pioneer in conducting the REDD pilot project in Central Kalimantan with the implementation of the letter of intent (LoI) between Indonesia and Norway. In 2011, the British government, through the UK Embassy in Jakarta, established the UKCCU as a further step towards bilateral climate partnership between the UK and Indonesia, while in 2012, the Australian government launched the KFCP. However, this project was ended because of distrust among civil societies in Central Kalimantan and the political dynamics in Australia in late 2012 (Lang, 2013). Nevertheless, the UK has witnessed the REDD programme move beyond Central Kalimantan and forest rehabilitation, which means that the British government has been involved in REDD project sites beyond Kalimantan and the focus on forests (especially in renewable energy development; this is based on an interview with the Asian foundation manager and the UKCCU officer). The British government was not entirely in line with either of the previous initiatives; the UK put the money forward as international aid, together with other donors, through the World Bank or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) climate project in Central Kalimantan (UNDP, 2017).

The last reason is that the UNDP (2014: 12) has ranked Central Kalimantan as fourth out of 33 provinces in the Forest Governance Index (FGI). The FGI in Indonesia builds on a truly inclusive process involving different stakeholders – ranging from the government to civil society, indigenous peoples, local communities, the private sector, and academia – with a view to providing solid governance data meant to inform policy- and decision makers on how to realistically address gaps, shortcomings, and weaknesses (UNDP, 2014: 7–10). The FGI was first conducted in 2012 and created by the UNDP. Thirty-three provinces in Indonesia were evaluated and assessed based on four indicators of the FGI: (1) certain measurement of the forest area; (2) fairness in forest management; (3) transparency and integrity of forest management; and (4)
capacity of law enforcement (UNDP, 2014: 20). While Central Kalimantan has been ranked well, this ranking was problematic and controversial and needed to be investigated further during my fieldwork. Unfortunately, this report has not continuously taken place, which is why the macro analysis is no longer effective as the baseline. The reasons above clearly emphasise the main objective of my choosing Central Kalimantan as a case study for bilateral climate governance in Indonesia. The methods used for fieldwork and the selection of informants are stated in the following section.

3.4 Data collection methods: interview, observation, and review of documents

For the data collection, I engaged three main methods: interviews, fieldwork observation in Jakarta and Central Kalimantan, and the analysis of relevant documents. An in-depth interview was used as the primary data source, and the literature review of documents provided additional primary as well as secondary data. In undertaking this review, I examined research papers from various stakeholders (Greenpeace, the Forest Watch Institute, the World Resource Institute, Forest People, and REDD Monitor, both offline and online documents), government documents, bilateral climate change agreements, and reports before finally drawing up a comparative analysis across three foreign partners (Australia, the UK, and Norway) in Indonesia. This process took place throughout the research process and the discussion and analysis of the research outcomes as well as during further research.

3.4.1 Interviews

Interviews are an important tool in this research, both to cross-check and interrogate the documents examined (both state and non-state actors’ project documents and any other relevant reports) in detail and to obtain the current factual issues whilst looking up other sources about the immediate agendas of relevant actors (Schultze and Avital, 2011). Interviews also allow the researcher to confirm the data or statements from certain actors in the public sphere. The target population for the interviews was
categorised into three groups: (i) the government (the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the governor of Central Kalimantan, and actors from the Norwegian Embassy, the UKCCU, and the Australian Embassy); (ii) the private sector or corporate actors who have had an impact on or are business partners in relation to REDD issues; and (iii) civil society (Yayasan Petak Danum, the Indonesian Forum for Environment or WALHI, Greenpeace, and WWF Indonesia).

Non-participant observations of national conferences were also conducted to ascertain the actors’ positions on selected cases (Gillespie and Michelson, 2011), along with FGDs. The FGD is a qualitative research method used to engage a group of people from similar backgrounds in open conversations to gain insights into a range of opinions and ideas (Bloor et al., 2001). The FGD itself did not take place based on my initiative. Instead, WALHI, at the Central Kalimantan branch, organised it, and I was one of the observers in January 2018.

3.4.1.1 Sampling method for interviews

a. Identifying participants

This study explored the complexities of the bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. I initially asked the participants to explain in detail the problems they face. They were also directly affected by, involved in, or managing the bilateral climate partnerships. This sample is known as a purposefully selected sample. It was employed in this study because this type of sample has the potential to answer the research question and provide an understanding of the research objectives (Bryman and Bell, 2011). The data were then anonymised and categorised by institution and job position. I sent an invitation letter to all the targeted participants/informants and managed the time for the meetings or online interviews (through phone or Skype/video calls).
b. Recruitment methodology

As part of my strategy, I divided the participants into two groups: the Jakarta and Central Kalimantan groups. Those who were willing to be interviewed and who also lived in Jakarta were contacted directly through phone calls and emails in an attempt to make advance appointments. I also made a list of participants in Central Kalimantan and visited them first. Once all the interviews in Central Kalimantan were done, I continued with the Jakarta group. I am aware that a ‘snowball’ contact strategy reduces the guarantee of anonymity to participants (Peters, 1998: 20). To ameliorate this issue, I asked for a wide range of introductions to the individuals and groups, left professional contact cards, and asked the individuals to contact me anonymously should they wish to participate rather than attempting to enrol specific participants in social settings where they could be identified.

Through the interview method, the subjective views, experiences, and knowledge of key players in the bilateral climate partnerships were revealed. Altogether, 36 interviews were conducted (of which two were follow-up interviews and one was a phone interview). They were categorised into three groups: (i) 10 people from the government; (ii) 10–15 people from the private sector or corporate groups who have had an impact on or are business partners on REDD-related issues; and (iii) 15 members of civil society at the local, sub-national, and national levels.

Table 3.1 Number and classification of participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Actors</th>
<th>Level/Type of Institution</th>
<th>Number of Research Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Foreign Diplomats and International Government Institutions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state Actor</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Subnational/Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-government Organisation (NGO)</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state Actor</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media and Academia</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state Actor</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector/Corporations</td>
<td>Multinational Companies</td>
<td>National Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the number of research participants from the state actors constituted 50% of the total, followed by NGOs at 36.1%, media and academia at 11.1%, and the private sector at 2.7%. The larger number of respondents from the government sector was due to two reasons. First, the formal bilateral climate change cooperation is officially a government-to-government relationship. This type of relationship has been derived from the definition of track I diplomacy, which means that the bilateral partnership was first conducted by state actors (Mapendere, 2013). Diamond and McDonald (1996) defined the nine tracks of diplomacy within a multi-track system.
Track I diplomacy is ‘the world of official diplomacy, policy-making, and peace building as expressed through formal aspects of the governmental process’ (4) where diplomats, both internationally and domestically, play a part in creating the political world as we know it. This type of diplomacy may be in the form of international treaties, third-party interventions, domestic policy-making, and any other official acts of political affairs.

Track I diplomacy is also an example of directly influential politics. Second, the political interest and the effectiveness of bilateral governance itself were primarily derived from the government’s performance, which was based on transparency, public participation, and an accountability indicator. Transparency and accountability were checked through the national and local governments’ climate policies in Indonesia that were connected to the foreign donors and the interview transcripts from the government’s actors. Public participation was derived from the NGOs’ interview transcripts, along with the non-state actors’ climate change reports or document reviews. Thus, the empirical findings through the interview transcripts were corroborated and cross-checked with the document review and studies in the literature that showed the performance of the transparency, accountability, and public participation indicators of the Indonesian government and the three foreign donors (Norway, the UK, and Australia).

In qualitative research, what is more important is not the number of cases that social researchers can collect but how much information is studied and how the relevant information is then examined in relation to a particular research question (Ragin and Amoroso, 2011). Thus, there is no minimum number in determining the sample size for non-probability sampling. Nevertheless, Saunders et al. (2012) suggested that a sufficient number of participants for a heterogeneous population is around 12–30 people.
3.4.1.2 The Interview method

The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way; a sample of the interview questions can be found in Appendix 3.1. An interview relies extensively on the interviewer’s ability to balance the art of asking and listening, and this depends on their observational and analytical skills (Creswell, 2007; Descombe, 2005; Arksey and Knight, 1999).

Most of the interviews were done on a one-to-one basis, and phone and interactive interviews (there was often more than one informant from the same institution, especially in the initial interactive interview with the Asian Foundation) were also conducted. Interviews are also useful for investigating the subjectivity of the research. Ilja Maso (2003) described the ‘why interview’ as a method that researchers can use to investigate their initial research interests and questions. According to Maso, ‘every researcher has to know what motivated the research question, which beliefs are behind it, and of which conceptual framework it is an expression’ (2003: 42). In qualitative interviews, the researcher is the instrument, and their subjectivity may influence the research.

Whether acknowledged or not, the researcher’s self is implicated in every aspect of a research project – from the formulation and design of a study to the interview interaction and the analysis and representation of the interview data (Roulston, 2010: 15–16). As interviewers, qualitative researchers need to be aware of who they are in relation to their research projects and how that might be theorised in ways that are consonant with their epistemological and theoretical assumptions about knowledge production. Reflexive research practice does not end with the design and conducting of the interviews; it is also very much part of how others are analysed and represented in reports of studies. As Emerson et al. (1995: 216) stated, ‘in training the reflexive lens on ourselves, we understand our own enterprise in much the same terms that we understand those we study’. I observed this during my fieldwork in Jakarta and Central Kalimantan, which encouraged me not to jump to conclusions quickly after
finishing the interviews. The more preliminary conclusions emerge, the more subjectivities the researcher builds up.

3.5 Fieldwork research

When I did fieldwork research in Indonesia, all the materials that I had prepared (the interview guidance sheet, the information sheet for the research participants, the consent form, and the list of questions) were in both English and Indonesian. I had formal plans and a timeline based on background planning. However, my research did not always go as planned. In this section, I reflect on my research experience during fieldwork.

Most of the informants spoke in Indonesian. I had to learn some local words in Central Kalimantan to open up the conversation and approach them over meals. This reflects one major problem in fieldwork, which was noted by Phillips (1970: 387–388): translation. Other problems associated with this were as follows: (1) the time and effort devoted to solving this; (2) the accuracy of the translation, which depends on the time available, the budget, need, availability, the interpreters’ competence, and the researcher’s knowledge of the native language; (3) and approximations between the meanings of the two languages.

In addition, I was sometimes judged as a ‘highly educated single woman’; the research participants perceived me as a young lady who only focused on her education and rejected marriage, and thus, I was ‘too independent’ as a woman. My position as a female researcher in this context is challenging, yet it shows that age and gender were implicated significantly in the process of social science research (Millar, 1990; Pini, 2005). It frustrated me when the informants suddenly asked me private questions and were then prejudiced towards me or even underestimated me as a young ‘green’ student rather than a professional academic. I disliked these kinds of questions and judgements and tended to be emotionally influenced by them. Through this experience, I argue that positionality in the research process could give a dynamic impact to the research
participant. The position of the female researcher also tends to clash with the power and masculinity issue when the research participants are dominated by the patriarchy.

Meanwhile, Schoenberger (1992: 217) stated that gender makes a difference in research. In terms of the interview process, Herod (1993:306) agreed that gender relations shape the social interaction between the researcher and the interviewee as well as underpin the very context within which the interview itself takes place. In response to this statement, I had anticipated the social interaction between my informants and me to be professional. As the process continued, however, I became used to their unexpected personal queries and was able to handle myself more professionally when facing this situation. I learned to be well prepared to respond to critical or any other sensitive personal questions regarding the research and informality.

3.5.1 The research process: a reflexive narrative during the fieldwork
I conducted the fieldwork from December 2017 to April 2018, during which my time was divided between the two different locations of Jakarta and Central Kalimantan. The reason for such a short period of fieldwork was efficiency. I lacked funding for the fieldwork in Central Kalimantan, so I’d used most of my contacts in Jakarta to gather the main informants for the interviews and ask for their help in Central Kalimantan. I had never been to Central Kalimantan before, and it was a new experience to explore the site.

As I stayed in Jakarta, I did most of my research, and then I went to Central Kalimantan for 11 days (20–30 January 2018). I encountered some challenges during the fieldwork, both internal and external. The internal challenges were the minimum contacts I had to approach informants in Central Kalimantan, the limited sources that I had found in preparation for the interviews and FGD in Central Kalimantan, and some psychological problems when the informants were not cooperative at the start or when some prejudices emerged during the first meeting. The external challenges were the infrastructure and technical gap between Jakarta and Central Kalimantan. I was unable to conduct the FGD because of the lack of contacts, the unfamiliar culture and
environment, and the lack of infrastructure in Central Kalimantan. This meant that in each place, I had some difficulty reaching the informants. In Jakarta, the traffic was poor, and I had to reschedule meetings with the informants, while Central Kalimantan was a new atmosphere for me, and I did not know how to approach the informants.

My other concern during the fieldwork was subjectivity. In contrast to the view of subjectivity as a problem to be eradicated, Alan Peshkin (1988) proposed that the researcher’s subjectivities – or ‘subjective Is’ – can be systematically sought out throughout the duration of a project and openly acknowledged (see Peshkin, 1986). In contemporary qualitative research practice, the investigation and acknowledgement of subjective positions in relation to the research topic and participants is routinely considered an important aspect of apprenticeship as a reflexive researcher, and the absence of subjectivity statements in research reports can be a cause for suspicion on the part of the readers (Preissle, 2008).

In the fieldwork process in qualitative research, reflexivity has become an important factor to be considered. For social scientists, reflexivity opens up possibilities of providing more complicated representations of data and multi-layered accounts incorporating the researcher’s voice as an alternative to un-situated accounts from ‘neutral’ researchers who absent themselves from their texts through the use of the third-person and passive voice (Roulston, 2010: 8). Linda Finlay (2002), a researcher in the health sciences, argued for the use of reflexivity as a methodological tool whilst also urging researchers to be aware of various pitfalls. It is instructive to examine the variants of reflexivity that Finlay outlined in more detail, along with the problems she associated with each, since these views are espoused frequently by qualitative inquirers. The solution for reducing subjectivity is writing diary entries, talking to supervisors, and then reconsidering the main purpose of the interviews alongside the preliminary findings.

Linda Finlay and Brendon Gough (2003: ix) commented that reflexivity involves thoughtful, self-aware analysis of the intersubjective dynamics between the researcher and the researched objects. Reflexivity requires critical self-reflection on the
ways in which the researcher’s social background, assumptions, positioning, and behaviour impact on the research process. Reflexivity should not be confused with ‘reflection’, although the former may involve the latter. While reflection requires the process of thinking about something (Finlay and Gough, 2003: ix), it does not require an ‘other’ (Chiseri-Strater, 1996: 130). Reflexivity has been explored from a range of theoretical positions, and a wide array of perspectives is available on its usefulness in social research. For some researchers, reflexivity is an intricate and peculiar problem (see, for example, Ashmore, 1989; Woolgar, 1988).

Reflexivity also affects the process of gendered experience in collecting data (especially via the interview technique). Herod (1993: 310) argued that gender is often used in everyday life to make unfounded inferences about people’s presumed competence and knowledge ability concerning particular events and situation. Furthermore, in the case of elite interviews, Harvey (2011: 434) noted that respondents with an elite status tend to check the interviewer by asking questions so as to ascertain their knowledge. Therefore, the recognition of my crucial role in the research process is necessary to gather the specific information I need as well as build a political engagement or potential space of reflections on the interviewees.

Finlay (2002), Pillow (2003), and Lynch (2000: 47) clearly stated in their arguments that reflexivity opens up possibilities to provide more complicated representations of data and multi-layered accounts by incorporating the researcher’s voice as an alternative to un-situated accounts from ‘neutral’ researchers who absent themselves from their texts through the use of third-person and passive voicing. Subjectivity is another challenge during reflexive narration as the researcher’s position could affect the fieldwork process. This subjectivity is also intertwined with the gender issue and my ‘other’ positionality towards the research participants.

In relation to this thesis, reflexivity helps me to find the gap between my subjectivity as a researcher and that as a woman. Wojnicka (2020: 8) said that the researcher’s different positioning in the research process yields to the interplay of social factors, resulting in a number of variant power relationships. The clash between
personal and professional identity is inevitable; here, reflexivity reminds me to double-check the data I picked up and then analyse it with transformative 4Is and ensure its reliability and validity through triangulation.

3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explained two main aspects of this study: the research design and the research process. In the former, I describe the qualitative methodology, which, in this case, is the case study approach, interviews, reviewing the documents as the data-gathering method, and data analysis. The main reason for using the qualitative approach is the potential to explore factors affecting bilateral climate partnerships. As previously noted, the aim of this research is to explore the reasons behind the factors of successful bilateral climate partnerships at a more micro level than has previously been studied, which might lead to a deeper understanding of the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships and their prospects for aiding future climate governance.

The field experience led to a number of noteworthy and unexpected moments that I had to face and deal with. This fieldwork dynamic helped me to learn more about flexibility, self-management, and people-to-people contact in approaching the right persons at the right time and in the right way. It was not easy to initially start the research in Central Kalimantan. Adaptation was a foremost step – adapting to the food, the environment, and the people. However, I learned much based on the interviews and interactive FGDs with the local NGOs in Central Kalimantan, such as how to seek other perspectives on dealing with bilateral climate partnerships in the local context and the primary importance of preserving local wisdom in Kalimantan despite the presence of a big palm oil plantation and a large area of land use in the primary forest.
Chapter 4: Bilateral Climate Partnerships: Comparing Australia, Norway and the UK

4.1 Introduction

Having explained the methodology of the research, this chapter turns to the comparative analysis of three case studies: the Norway-Indonesia, UK-Indonesia and Australia-Indonesia climate partnerships. The purpose of such an assessment is to map and identify what motivated Norway, the UK and Australia to make their respective choices and engage in cooperation with Indonesia, in particular in climate change mitigation through the REDD+ programme. This chapter also aims to explore reasons for the complexities of Norway, the UK and Australia’s bilateral climate cooperation with Indonesia through a transformative 4Is+3 analysis. I deploy the transformative 4Is+3 framework of analysis to help clarify the types of changes that occurred to governance structures and processes. I also develop insights into the relationship between these changes and overall outcomes.

The comparative analysis of bilateral climate partnerships started from the Norwegian case in 2010 through the establishment of Letter of Intent and the complex implementation including the domestic politics of Indonesia, the UK case had four characteristics which strongly highlighted the institutional arrangement of the UKCCU and government-to-government based relationship, and the Australian case revealed the changing government system in Australia and its effect towards Indonesian climate policy. The Norwegian government is one of the longest-standing donors when it comes to working to reduce deforestation globally, while it also pursues this aim bilaterally with Indonesia through the Letter of Intent (LoI),\(^{21}\) signed by the Indonesian

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\(^{21}\) The LoI has been defined as a key element through the Joint Concept Note (JCN) which makes a clear reference to the need for broad-based participation in implementation. The key objectives of the JCN were: preparation for the establishment of a national REDD+ agency; a two-year moratorium on forest and peatland concessions; establishing the initial design for an independent monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) institution; developing a funding instrument appropriate for financing the activities for Phase I that operates to the satisfaction of the Indonesian authorities and is managed according to
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Minister of the Environment (Gaia Consulting Report, 2011: 8). In practice, the Norwegian government’s aid has mostly been delivered through the REDD+ programme in Indonesia (Norwegian Embassy Jakarta, 2018). As the findings of this research show, Norway has made progress through the institutionalism related to REDD+, such as the National Council of Climate Change, the National Agency on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and BPREDD+ (which were all merged into one division under the Directorate General of Climate Change, Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Republic of Indonesia) (LTS, 2018: 7). However, this institutional establishment related to REDD+ does not necessarily prove that the Indonesian government was paying significant attention to environmental sustainability, as those institutions were removed and then merged into the Directorate General of Climate Change Control (DGCCC) by President Jokowi’s regulations in 2015.

In contrast to the Norwegian case, there are four main characteristics of the UK-Indonesia climate partnership: (i) the government-to-government-based relationship was stronger in the UK’s case than Norway’s case; (ii) there was a lack of direct access for local civil society groups to funding from the UK government; (iii) there was consistent support from the Department of International Development for the United Kingdom Climate Change Unit (UKCCU) in Indonesia, whilst the Norwegian government did not have equivalent departmental support; and (iv) there was a lack of legal basis/standing towards the Indonesian Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) in the UK case. The unique features of the Indonesia-UK climate partnership were that it was built upon a strong institutional framework (DFID, 2013) and it situated a theory

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established international standards; and the development and implementation of a national REDD+ strategy that addresses key drivers of forest and peatland-related emissions. For further details, see: http://forestindustries.eu/de/content/norway-indonesian-redd-partnership-faq. The Norway-Indonesia Partnership Frequently Asked Questions (7th October 2019).
of change as the main principle of climate project implementation (Valters, 2014; DFID, 2014). The British budget for cooperating with Indonesia on climate change involved a financial contribution of up to £4.5 million from October 2012 until March 2015 handled by the Indonesian Ministry of Finance (DFID, 2016).

By analysing the UKCCU with the transformative 4is+3 framework (which was in section 4.2), it was evident that the institutional factor had the most impact compared to the three other “Is”. In line with my findings regarding the institutional factor in general, scholars have identified various determinants of institutional effectiveness (cf. Miles et al., 2001; Victor et al., 1998). A low-carbon development capacity-building programme for Indonesia with a financial contribution of up to £4.5 million from October 2012 until March 2015 through the Indonesian Ministry of Finance (DFID, 2016).

What was missing to date, however, was a detailed assessment of the UKCCU beyond the state with regard to the institutional arrangements created and sustained by different actors in order to address the problem of climate change, and this was where my thesis makes a key contribution. As the UK government built stronger procedures to support the formal state organisation and central government, it weakened the importance of inclusive connections with non-state organisations and the contribution of civil society as the main recipient of climate change aid. The establishment of the UKCCU and its rigid procedure of funding mechanism (government-to-government base) showed the dominant role of state actors in controlling/determining the future dynamics of climate change diplomacy.

In comparison to Norway and the UK, the Australian climate projects, like the Kalimantan Carbon Forest Partnership (KFCP), with a budget of £15.5 million between

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22 Theory of change is defined as an increasingly popular management tool and discourse in development – it hopes to change existing management tools, rarely encourages critical thinking, and there are considerable political, organisational and bureaucratic constraints on the promotion of learning throughout the sector (Valters, 2014).
June 2008 and June 2014, the Sumatra Carbon Forest Partnership (SFCP) initiative, with a budget of £15.5 million started in March 2010, and the Indonesian National Carbon Accounting System (INCAS), as an additional bilateral forest and climate project in Indonesia with funding of up to £5.2 million starting in August 2009 (DFAT, 2010, 2012, 2015), did not work well and all finished earlier than the agreed timeline (June 2014). In April 2013, the Australian Foreign Minister, Bob Carr, terminated the IAFCP, taking effect from mid-2014, and the budget was suddenly cut from £104.8 million to £34.1 million (Davies, 2015: 10). The Australian government experienced major upheavals in domestic politics during this time, which was reflected in the unfinished KFCP project and the removal of climate change as a priority in their development aid programme.

To engage in a more comprehensive analysis, this chapter was divided into six sections. First, it outlines the comparative findings and analysis of three case studies based on the transformative 4Is+3 in section 4.2. The complexities of the Indonesia-Norway climate partnership were then set out in section 4.3. Section 4.4 considers the dynamic implications of the UKCCU for Indonesia-UK climate partnerships, whilst the volatility of the Indonesia-Australia climate partnership is discussed in section 4.5. The analysis of the transformative 4Is+3 is discussed as the core of a complicated bilateral climate mechanism in section 4.6. Lastly, section 4.7 concluded the comparative findings and transformative 4Is+3 analysis of the Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships. The next section provided further explanation of the comparative findings of the three case studies using the transformative 4Is+3 analytical framework.

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23 KFCP was launched in June 2008 as the world’s most advanced large-scale REDD+ demonstration activity (Davies, 2015: 1).

24 INCAS was expected to be a new climate finance adding to the KFCP project at the Indonesian provincial and local level.
4.2. Comparative findings and focus of the transformative 4Is+3 analytical framework

This section discusses the comparative analysis based on the empirical findings of the three case studies: the Indonesia-Norway, Indonesia-UK and Indonesia-Australia climate change partnerships. Each case study was analysed through the seven indicators of the transformative 4Is+3: changing leadership of Indonesian government, policy experiments on climate change, challenge of decentralisation, actors’ interests, actors’ ideas, institutional arrangements and information disclosure. These indicators help with identifying which areas have been effective at reducing carbon emissions and improving environmental protection and which have not. The performance of each indicator also reflects reasons and conditions of the complex bilateral climate change partnerships in Indonesia.

Overall, I found that the three cases showed political will at the outset for creating a bilateral climate partnership. This political will of the donor countries was reflected through the creation of bilateral coalitions with the emergence of the NICFI (Norway), the UKCCU (UK) and the KFCP (Australia), and they each attempted to manage funding mechanisms with the Indonesian government. Norway’s case revealed a robust institutional arrangement (REDD+), strong engagement with civil society groups, and support for local governance. The UK government established the strongest institutional arrangements of the three, through UKCCU, which played a consistent role in building climate restoration and land-use governance projects, as well as promoting local incentives. In Australia’s case, unstable dynamics at the top government level (changing prime ministers from 2009-2015) resulted in delayed policy-making in cooperation with the Indonesian government and this situation contributed to the Indonesia-Australia partnership being the least effective of the three.

In terms of leadership change within the Indonesian government (in particular at the presidential level), the Australian case was highly affected due to the complexity of domestic leadership changes in the Australian government. The changing prime ministers led to fluctuations in the ways in which Australia maintained its commitment
to supporting the Indonesian climate restoration projects. The policy experiments on climate change in all three case studies did not perform well due to an unclear mechanism for delivering the programme design/objective/rationale of climate change. As evidence, tables outlining the policy experiments’ assessment were presented in the next sections; these show a delayed funding reimbursement and changing programme design. The other reason for unsuccessful policy experiments could also relate to the multiple layers and long process of the bureaucratic system in Indonesia. In relation to the challenge of the decentralisation process, the UK case seems to have the highest indication because it got continuous support from grassroots through the effective mediation of The Asia Foundation (one of the longest-running international NGOs in Indonesia, which first built strong connections with prominent religious groups like Nahdlatul Ulama/NU). A comparative analysis based on the transformative 4Is+3 approach is presented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Comparative analysis of Bilateral Climate Partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable of Comparison</th>
<th>Indonesia-Norway</th>
<th>Indonesia-UK</th>
<th>Indonesia-Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a Changing leadership in the Indonesian government</td>
<td>Yes, but it was not directly connected to the partnership</td>
<td>Yes, but it was not directly connected to the partnership</td>
<td>Yes, changes in both Indonesia and Australia and they affected the partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b Policy experiments on climate change</td>
<td>Weak climate policy output due to problematic REDD+ programme and a</td>
<td>Weak climate policy output resulting from changing</td>
<td>Weak climate output, unclear objectives at the initial stage of partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>The challenge of decentralisation</td>
<td>lack of progress on climate change negotiations</td>
<td>focus/programme design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Actors’ Interests</td>
<td>Political will</td>
<td>Yes, with certain caveats (delayed implementation and funding disbursement)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.1</td>
<td>Building bilateral coalitions</td>
<td>NICFI and LoI, REDD+ agency, but all were removed on 23rd January 2015 (Presidential Regulation number 16/2015)</td>
<td>UKCCU-TAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Yes, but local incentives were limited</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.3</td>
<td>Promise from corporations: &quot;no deforestation&quot;</td>
<td>Very slowly</td>
<td>Slowly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b. Actors’ Ideas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apparent paradigm shift towards pro-climate regime</th>
<th>No shift</th>
<th>Quite progressive but on a small/local scale</th>
<th>No shift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**c. Institutional Arrangements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New and alternative governance mechanism</th>
<th>New changing bureaucracy at the national government level</th>
<th>Changes at both the national and local government level</th>
<th>The governance system was the same and no clear design programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
<td>Yes, direct engagement with CSOs through the NICFI</td>
<td>ICCTF, but no legal framework</td>
<td>No evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>FREDDI-BLU, UNDP and Kemitraan as the intermediary agencies</td>
<td>DFID-UKCCU-TAF and through BAPPENAS and Kemenkeu</td>
<td>Australian budget cut by up to 40%, while UNDP, World Bank, and some consultancy developers acted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.1 identifies four primary findings. **First,** the changing leadership of the Indonesian government was a determining indicator that dictated whether or not different Indonesian presidencies would affect the transformation of bilateral climate partnership. This indicator showed a low-risk output in comparison to the other two indicators: policy experiments on climate change and the challenge of decentralisation. The results or outputs of President Jokowi’s 2015 initiative to change the national bureaucracy with respect to the environment did not fully or directly affect the
country’s relationships with Norway and the UK. The changing leadership in both Indonesian and Australian governments hampered the continuation of the bilateral climate projects with Indonesia and delayed the Indonesian progress on reducing emission target.

Second, the institutional arrangements were the dominant indicator of the transformative 4Is+3 in comparison to the other “Is”. There were different types of institutional arrangements, including the establishment of a new institution related to climate policy (mostly REDD+), public-private partnership, and the funding mechanism. These three factors worked dynamically and tended to influence the terms and conditions of the Indonesian government in dealing with climate change projects. For instance, in terms of funding schemes, foreign donors could revise or amend the system through which funding was disbursed to the Indonesian government and this affected Indonesia’s national procedures in implementing climate projects. Due to the high disparity of each of the 4Is+3, institutionalism was even the root cause of difficulties in unravelling the changes of governance structure and processes of Indonesian bilateral climate partnership (which was explained in detail in chapter 5).

Third, none of the three case studies showed an improved impact from policy experiments. Each case had different problems and climate policy barriers. The Norwegian case entailed problematic negotiation, in particular the way that Norwegian donors ended up dealing with clash of local actors (government, private, and civil society groups) in Central Kalimantan. The UK case involved changing programme design and location of the projects despite the strong institutionalism of the UKCCU. Whilst in the Australian case, the Australian government did not outline a clear mechanism and programme objective of the climate change projects with Indonesia.

Fourth, the challenge of decentralisation lead to the most varied results in all three case studies. This meant that the decentralised governance was highly complex; each local site/area has its own characteristics with different styles of district and provincial governors, along with ulterior political interests and practices of corruption. The Norwegian case involved the most corrupt projects due to the “high cost economy”
(Maxton Lee, 2020) and the large amount of funding. In the UK’s case, an effective partnership was established with Indonesia for conducting local-based implementation of climate change projects, and several land-grabbing cases and land certification problems were resolved through TAF and the UKCCU. Importantly, the UK maintained a strong government-to-government relationship (UKCCU-BAPPENAS-Indonesian Ministry of Finance), supporting cooperation with local governments through TAF and the information monitoring system. The Australian case in turn remains problematic in the decentralised area due to conflicting relationships among local NGOs and other local authorities in managing the Australian fund.

These four key findings together serve to summarise the comparative analysis, outlining in more detailed in the next section on what and how these four key findings illustrate the complexities of Indonesian bilateral climate change with very limited small experiments as the proof of transformation. The next section sets out detailed explanations and case-based examples of each indicator of the transformative 4Is+3.

4.2.1 Explaining the analysis of the transformative 4Is+3 in the three case studies
This section explains the transformative 4Is+3 in the three case studies, started with three additional factors such leadership change, policy experiment, and decentralisation challenge. After those three factors were elaborated, then each ‘I’s from 4Is was set out and linked with the three case studies. Here is seven analytical framework’s narratives of the transformative 4Is+3:

4.2.1.1 Change of leadership within the Indonesian government
The impact of changing leadership was different for each of the foreign donors, as shown in Table 4.1. Changing leadership in this context refers to a change at the top of the Indonesian government and/or a change to the Indonesian presidency and/or the government of foreign donors. The governments of the three donor countries reacted differently to changes in the presidency and this affected their bilateral climate change projects to varying degrees. The Indonesian government experienced a change in
leadership after the 2014 presidential election. The partnerships were independent, but the process of implementation altered from what had been the case before 2014 and progress slowed. The case studies’ timelines primarily begin in 2009 and run until 2015, thereby covering two different presidencies: President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Therefore, the leadership style changed in terms of institutional arrangements and general political perspective. SBY was more outward-looking than Jokowi, as evidenced through the way in which Indonesia was presented in the global arena and the establishment of institutions related to REDD+ (Satgas REDD+, UKP4, DNPI, BPRED+). These institutions were, however, dissolved and merged into the Ministry of Environment and Forestry under Jokowi’s leadership (Presidential Regulation number 16/2015). The merger made climate institutions more efficient and illustrated the new coordination style of the new Indonesian government.

The Norwegian and UK governments did not regard the new administration of Indonesia as a fundamental change to the structure of their bilateral climate agreements with Indonesia. They both believed that President Jokowi would continue the work of his predecessor in the climate partnerships. Indeed, President Jokowi demonstrated his continuing commitment by implementing significant reforms to environmental bureaucracy and merging the Ministry of the Environment with the Ministry of Forestry (MoFE) and the National Council of Climate Change (DNPI). This new large ministerial body was more efficient and made it easier for foreign donors in terms of its checks-and-balances system and in disbursing money or managing administrative aspects (Norwegian Interview 2; UK Interviews 9, 10 and 11).

On the other hand, the change in the Indonesian presidency did affect the political manoeuvring of the Australian government, the leadership of which also changed around this time. The decision-making processes and implementation of climate change projects between Australia and Indonesia were delayed for a long time after these changes in leadership. The Australian government underwent rapid changes at the prime ministerial level, where several prime ministers did not support a
progressive climate change policy. In the interviews with the Australian government officials, they made the point that the Australian government continued to support the existing climate change agreement with Indonesia, although the number of staff and leaders in the climate change division had decreased (Australian Interview 1). Most of the changes in the Australian leadership did not affect the overall structure of the partnership or other essential features or techniques of bilateral communication, for example the regular meetings and evaluation system. Any problems that did arise from the changes in leadership concerned the clarity of the overarching partnership goals and the significant emphasis placed on implementation. Meanwhile, the decreasing number of staff in the environmental governance division and AusAID in the DFAT merger negatively affected funding. The diminished Australian budget for foreign aid (Davies, 2014) for developing countries (including Indonesia) was also clearly a result of the changing policies at the prime ministerial level (seven different prime ministers from 2004-2016). In short, the Australian government continued to respect the bilateral climate agreement in principle, but in practice successive prime ministers of Australia cut the money allocated to the partnership. This reflected their political stance on climate change.

The changing leadership in the Indonesian government and the rearrangement of REDD+ continued to be critical in the case of Norway (Norwegian Interviews 1, 2 and 3; Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017; Ardiansyah et al., 2015). The REDD+ agency in the Indonesia-Norway bilateral climate partnership became a successful experiment in relation to climate change by creating a new institution as an alternative governance mechanism in the initial period (May 2010-June 2011). However, the Indonesian governance structure was still fragile, which meant that significant ownership (including any mandate related to REDD+) returned to the centralised national government in February 2016. This shows that the national government retained ultimate formal power as there was a recentralisation of governance in Indonesia (Presidential Regulation number 16/2015). Furthermore, what Norway achieved through the REDD+ agency between 2011 and 2014 (during the presidency of SBY)
would not be entirely effective in Jokowi’s presidency, ultimately rendering this a redundant effort. The changes to the implementation of REDD+ in Indonesia did not lead to a particularly effective partnership. There was also a change to the funding agency used to disburse the project funds and further steps regarding the Directorate General of Climate Change were unclear.

### 4.2.1.2 Policy experiments

The second indicator of transformative change was exemplified by the policy experiments related to bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. REDD+, as a policy experiment in climate change, can be evaluated here with respect to coping with deforestation. On the Norwegian side, there were two critical downsides to implementing its policy experiment, REDD+: delayed disbursement and a lack of progress on climate change negotiation (Angelsen et al., 2017; Brockhaus et al., 2014; Cadman et al., 2017; Boer, 2018; Fletcher et al., 2016; Interviews 1 and 18).

The CIF representative (Norwegian Interview 1) pointed out that the political change to the REDD+ programme did not have a clear bearing on the bilateral climate partnership because structural changes within the Indonesian bureaucracy made things restricted and inflexible. This suggests that political changes (i.e. changes in transparency) did not matter in the bilateral climate partnership between Indonesia and Norway. The political changes occurred because there was inconsistency and miscoordination between the Indonesian ministers and their staff. Hence, a number of follow-up actions were not thoughtfully implemented (Hein et al., 2018: 7; Butler, 2016; Enrici and Hubacek, 2016; El Espectador, 2017; SINCHI, 2016).

In relation to the UK case, the UK government effected a different aspect of transformation in the bilateral climate partnership. Originally, in February-November 2011, various climate change projects diverged from each other and were open to innovation, either from Indonesia or the UK. However, the content of the bilateral climate partnership showed that the UK government was now mainly focusing on the energy sector in its work with Indonesia (UK Interviews 2 and 10). A change in focus
was also characteristic of the Australian case, which involved a shift from deforestation to climate-disaster risk and climate change investment design (Australian Interviews 1 and 2). Despite this, the changing focus in programme design did not necessarily benefit either Indonesia or the foreign donors. The UK’s climate partnership had in-built characteristics that slowed policy-making at all levels of Indonesian governance because of the traditionally long bureaucratic process in Indonesia (the same issues that hampered the progress of the UK partnership and its follow-ups with Indonesia). Another problem was the lack of clarity in the rationale behind changing the focus of the programme. The evidence gathered from the Australian case shows that the Australian government engaged in non-continuous (on-off) communication that made the goals of the partnership unclear (Interviews 5, 6 and 9; ANAO, 2009). This meant that there was non-continuous communication between Indonesia and Australia due to the on-off establishment of an environmental department in the Australian Embassy Jakarta. This non-continuous communication and lack of clear objectives in the Australia-Indonesia climate partnership had a negative impact on climate governance.

4.2.1.3 The challenge of decentralisation in climate change

The decentralisation process of the recipient country does not always accommodate what the donor has set up for the recipient country. A foreign donor might not prioritise the local context in the bilateral agreement, or the programme itself might not be adapted to the local context of climate change. In the Norwegian partnership, one positive feature was that the decentralisation process created local incentives, particularly through the way in which Norway rewarded local leaders/initiatives to combat climate change. However, it was prone to decentralised corruption, such as the misuse of public funding related to REDD+ at the district/provincial level (Malley, 2003; Warman, 2016: 23-40; Norwegian Interviews 6, 13 and 18; CIFOR, 2015). The sub-level distribution of power between the national and local government in Indonesia was sometimes lacking in coordinated communication, and it suffered from overlapping authority as well as potential secrecy or selective distributing of
information related to the authority of government officials. This transparency issue hampered governance capacity and contributed to corruption among policymakers at all levels.

In the Indonesia-UK bilateral climate partnership, the decentralisation process ran smoothly courtesy of the UKCCU and TAF. TAF has been cooperating with the UK Embassy in Jakarta for an extended period, since the reformation era in 1998. TAF’s reputation in building Indonesian governance stems from a poverty eradication project undertaken as part of the Official Development Assistance programme. Hence, the UKCCU under the UK Embassy in Jakarta gained the trust of TAF by working and collaborating with local governments or other local stakeholders in Indonesia. This trust facilitated a supportive relationship between the UK government and the local government in Indonesia, which also enhanced the reputations of both TAF and the UK government (UK Interviews 2, 4, 5 and 6).

As an example, TAF’s SETAPAK climate programme primarily engaged with, facilitated and helped the local governments/NGOs to set up and maintain forest management, and enabled forest and land governance to reduce carbon emissions. TAF’s technical assistance and capacity building for local actors also developed advocacy skills and strengthened law enforcement (including helping the anti-corruption commission/KPK to catch incidents of corruption related to forest issues at the local level). These significant actions enabled TAF to secure funding from the UKCCU to continue SETAPAK into a second phase (until 2020). In short, enhancing the role of TAF as the intermediary agency improved the local government’s capacity in Indonesia to promote the progress of accountability and responsibility of climate policy, which was supported by the UKCCU (UK government funding).

In the Australian case, the budget had an impact on climate change programme work in relation to decentralisation. The Australian government itself debated its continued funding of climate change projects at the provincial/local level in Indonesia (Australian Interview 1; Howes, 2019). The funding issue remained a severe problem for the Australian government with regard to ensuring project implementation and the
continuation of its climate change cooperation with Indonesia. In the Central Kalimantan context, Australia was reneging on its financial commitment to deforestation cuts and the area that the KFCP handled was insufficient (15,000 hectares), with very limited progress made in comparison with the rest of Kalimantan (15.2 million hectares).

### 4.2.1.4 Actors’ interests

The actors’ interests can be divided into four sub-indicators: political will, transformational coalition, provision of incentives, and corporation promises with regard to “no deforestation”. All foreign donors had sufficient political will at the initial stage when they agreed to each respective partnership\(^{25}\); the foreign donors created a precise timeline, from formulating the agreement to implementing and evaluating the programme, and also an initiative programme for themselves and Indonesia. In the Norwegian case, the political will was reflected in the LoI between Norway and Indonesia signed in May 2010 and by the outlined phases of funding disbursement. The UK government demonstrated moderate political will by founding the UKCCU and strengthening localised governance through a local incentive of payment for environmental services (PES); there was also some cooperation between TAF and local NGOs/local governments. In contrast, the Australian government did not create a timeline for disbursement or any practical follow-up initiatives with the Government of Indonesia.

Secondly, bilateral coalitions were successfully managed by all donors to Indonesia at the start of their respective bilateral climate agreements. This can be seen from the NICFI and REDD+ agency in the cases of Norway and Indonesia, from the UKCCU and TAF under the UK partnership, and from the KFCP in the Australian partnership. Political will was expressed quite effectively in practice through building a transformative coalition and a joint group or initiative between each of the foreign

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\(^{25}\) I measure the factors of interest by adopting Korhonen-Kurki’s indicators.
donors and Indonesia that strengthened the institutional capacity and clarified guidance in each respective case (UKCCU, NICFI and KFCP).

Thirdly, local incentives/rewards were provided by two of the foreign donors to Indonesian stakeholders, such as district and provincial leaders in Norway’s case (Norwegian Interviews 5, 8, 10 and 13). There were some local incentives that the UK government established in collaboration with TAF, which were reflected through the SETAPAK programme (UK Interviews 4, 5, 6 and 11). However, no local incentives emerged in the Australian case, which meant that the KFCP (in which money was promised to local leaders in Central Kalimantan, but did not materialise) only mattered to Indonesian citizens and government at a surface or ceremonial level. The fact that the KFCP ended early could be taken as clear evidence that the local incentive was not appealing at local government level.

Fourth, the “no deforestation” promise made by corporations was merely rhetoric; it was virtually impossible to implement. Both Norway (Norwegian Interviews 4 and 9) and the UK government (UK Interview 1) made slow progress in promoting zero deforestation. Meanwhile, the Australian government showed no evidence of developing “no deforestation” actions in Indonesia.

Hence, political will and successfully established coalitions had the most influence on the indicator of actors’ interest. Both foreign donors and the Indonesian government committed to reducing emissions through bilateral climate partnerships, in particular by arranging an initial preparatory meeting for the bilateral agreement and setting up a specific institution to help implement the climate programme. Improvement was made at the time of the creation of each bilateral climate partnership, but this initial positivity did not necessarily guarantee that there would be a sustained effort made to maintain bilateral cooperation, or that emissions reductions would be achieved. In short, the bilateral climate agreements started out well, but were unable to deliver their objectives. Transformational changes through institutional arrangements

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26 The KFCP ended earlier than it was supposed to, NICFI and UKCCU were still ongoing as agreed.
took place initially as progress was made in establishing awareness of the urgency of forest management in Indonesia, but this was not sustained.

4.2.1.5 Actors’ ideas
The actors’ ideas in this context refers to whether there was a paradigm shift in the Indonesian government, from an economy-centric regime to a more pro-climate system. An actual paradigm shift here would mean that the foreign donor and the recipient (Indonesian government) share a collective desire to focus on creating a more climate-friendly environment and reduce the level of deforestation. This promising idea was difficult to maintain once the foreign donors set up legal documents formalising their bilateral climate change agreements.27

In the Norwegian case, an apparent paradigm shift did show some evidence of having an effect on its pioneer project in Central Kalimantan when it was announced in 2011. However, REDD+ in Central Kalimantan, which was considered a demonstration or pilot project, ultimately failed (Sanders et al., 2017: 77; Tolo, 2014). From 2011-2013, multiple informants reported that the REDD+ project was not on track and had a poor record, which gave negative effect on the institutional change of climate policy in Indonesia28

The UK government, in turn, focused on a climate-friendly policy and made progress on a smaller scale with the continued support of TAF. The UK government did not work directly with the provincial and local governments of Indonesia. Still, they successfully built trust among local governments through the influential role of TAF (the intermediary agency that served as the bridge between the UK’s contribution and local actors in Indonesia). Meanwhile, in the Australian project there was no evidence of a paradigm shift as the KFCP failed as a project developer (Davies, 2014).

27 These were not necessarily legally binding in the climate change context because there were no sanctions and these climate agreements were not strict.
28 See chapter 5 for further explanation of the institutional change in the Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships
Thus, actors’ ideas in terms of changing mindsets, for example encouraging the public in Indonesia to be more environment-friendly, were impactful to some extent in the UK case, with the role of TAF being the determining factor in ensuring that the pro-climate regime could last longer. This intermediary agency could be seen as a promising factor that strengthens the implementation of a paradigm shift toward a pro-climate approach.

4.2.1.6 The emergence of new institutions
Changes in institutional arrangements appear to have had the greatest impact on the pursuit of transformative climate governance. Institutional changes reflect how the foreign donor and recipient manage the partnership process and evaluation. Concomitantly, the process of national and local institutional change did affect that of transformation in each case to varying degrees.

The first indicator relating to the creation of a new institution concerns whether there was a new or alternative governance mechanism in place. Based on the Norway example discussed in chapter 4, I concluded that forest ownership tends to be centralised and that there was state supremacy involved in conducting or managing institutions (Di Gregorio et al., 2014). Similarly, in the UK case discussed in chapter 5, I concluded that the UK government applied a very formal government-to-government mechanism. These two donors showed that state supremacy (the ultimate power of the state) controlled and very likely determined the impact and policy output of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. Meanwhile, in the Australian case there was neither a clear design programme nor a governance mechanism in the KFCP until the Australian government decided to merge AusAID and DFAT in early 2015.

The second indicator with respect to institutions involved the establishment of public-private partnerships by two donors: Norway and the UK. The Norwegian government applied direct engagement with civil society organisations (CSO) through the NICFI, while the UK government created the ICCTF without a legal framework. The ICCTF was built and mandated under the BAPPENAS. This meant that all of the
funding and administrative decisions from the UK government were delegated to BAPPENAS and then flowed down to the ICCTF. The Norwegian government, in turn, launched the NICFI programme by engaging local civil society groups and NGOs in Indonesia. Norway was a pioneer in inviting civil society groups to get involved in climate projects in Central Kalimantan. However, this initiative could not be sustained and some local NGOs in Central Kalimantan had doubts about the Norwegian commitment to helping indigenous communities protect themselves from climate change-related impacts. The relationship between Norway and civil society groups disproved the notion that civil society groups were essential to sustaining the forest ecosystem (Oldfield, 2002). Although the UK did not directly engage with civil society groups, its private-public partnership enhanced the accountability of government work in ensuring that climate change projects were taken into account and had an impact on the people.

The third indicator concerns the funding mechanism. Some changes to financial tools were normal and these indeed occurred in Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnerships. The Norway-Indonesia partnership originally used UNDP to disburse money, but then the Norwegian government selected Kemitraan as its new funding intermediary agency. Meanwhile, the UK government originally mandated the DFID. However, since the creation of the UKCCU in 2011, all funding for climate change projects in Indonesia has passed from the UKCCU to BAPPENAS, the Ministry of Finance and TAF. Elsewhere, the Australian funding scheme was different from that of Norway and the UK. The Australian budget commitment to foreign aid was cut by up to 40% in 2013. The remaining money from Australia went to UNDP, the World Bank and some development consultancies as intermediary agencies (Interviews 3, 4, 5 and 11) to be disbursed to Indonesian climate projects. This funding mechanism illustrates the importance of accountability regarding foreign aid to Indonesia to combat climate change problems. Of the three approaches mentioned here, the UK’s funding mechanism was more established and well-structured than the other two because there was a specific institution in place that the UK government had created.
The UKCCU was the only doorway through which to access the UK’s aid to Indonesia. The accountability system of the UKCCU also demonstrated clarity and transparency, which was important when it came to disbursing money, and undertaking reporting and evaluation.

As Indonesia gradually becomes an emerging economy – and indeed it has been the only ASEAN representative at G20 since September 2009 – the Indonesian government and its bureaucracies need to be more competitive, more financially independent, and more prepared to influence the international political system. This shift has indirectly impacted the future of the ICCTF. In relation to the climate change context, the changing role of Indonesia as a middle-income power affects the amount of climate finance it receives from foreign donors. As the UKCCU has become one of the primary financial sponsors of the ICCTF, Indonesia’s economic transformation can reshape the UKCCU’s strategy and the proportion of budgets allocated to support the ICCTF. In the long-term, the ICCTF cannot depend heavily on the UKCCU as its legitimacy and mandate could be diminished or even scrapped.

Similar financial mechanism problems were encountered by both the UK and Australian governments. Both countries merged their development agencies: the UKCCU was centralised under the DFID, whilst AusAID was merged with DFAT in 2013. There was also follow-up action taken under the Jakarta Commitment in 2011 regarding aid for development effectiveness (UNDP, 2009: 3) and the recommendation that foreign donors rework their development budgets. Importantly, the Indonesian government needed to urgently manoeuvre to enhance its financial capacity and it created an integrated funding institution called Indonesian Aid.

A bilateral climate partnership can become more effective over time if there is sufficient money, a clear mechanism to disburse the funds, and good reporting on how the money is being spent. Choosing the right institution to deliver the money, along with the right message, proved difficult in the highlighted cases. In addition, the provision of funding alone did not suffice. The changing intermediary agencies and different decisions regarding funding management in the Norwegian and Australian
cases were primary factors that hampered the sustainability of their climate change projects in Indonesia. Ultimately, the projects themselves, set up by the respective partnerships, had little impact on the vulnerable communities or civil society groups who were potential victims of climate change-related disasters.

Thus, all three indicators identified above reveal some challenges in the steps taken and efforts made in making sure the bilateral climate partnerships worked, illustrating that much more effort will be needed to protect Indonesia’s ecosystem. Nonetheless, the establishment of new institutions related to climate change and deforestation cuts has become a pertinent factor in making bilateral climate partnerships effective. Building a new institution requires collaboration with non-state actors through public-private partnership and a precise funding mechanism. Despite its limited engagement with civil society groups in the bilateral climate project, the UKCCU, the main funding body established by the UK government, was most impactful. The effect of the Indonesia-UK partnership was particularly visible through the consistency of the UK government in implementing its financial mechanism, taking into account the due diligence principle and devolved administration.

4.2.1.7 Information disclosure

For each partnership, information- and data-sharing was in part determined by the transparency and accessibility of the data, especially with regard to the carbon emissions reports. In the Norwegian case, there was a transparent reporting system on carbon emissions reduction, but no concrete impact or significant result in terms of emissions reduction was recorded (Maharani, 2017; Caldecott et al., 2011; Bastiansen and Howell, 2015). In the UK case, there was limited access to carbon emissions reports (UK Interviews 2, 4, 5 and 6), whilst in the Australian case, the reporting system was unclear, and there was no concrete reduction reported (Australian Interviews 6 and 11).

Among the three cases, the Norwegian and UK data were the most dependable. The information factor, as one of the 4Is, is determined by how transparently a bilateral
climate partnership shares data with the public. According to my analysis and assessment, this information indicator was measured based on whether information was accessible and transparent to the public. Both Norway and the UK set up good communication systems with local partners in a specific area of Indonesia. The Norwegian and UK governments successfully built trust through Kemitraan and TAF as the intermediary agencies and they were more transparent with the general public and vulnerable people potentially or already impacted by climate change. In the Australian climate partnership with Indonesia, no such information was shared with Indonesian citizens due to the sudden cancellation of the climate change project and domestic political changes in Australia.

Thus, the information indicator was not a substantial factor compared with the other Is, which means that there is considerable scope for improvement on transparency issues. Although Norway and the UK demonstrated excellent communication with Indonesia (particularly with local partners), public trust and public opinion were always dynamic. Accordingly, this excellent communication did not necessarily result in a long-lasting and good impact. Data transparency helped to ensure that the bilateral climate partnerships created responsive chains/channels of interaction, both among foreign donors themselves and between foreign donors and Indonesia.

By applying the transformative 4Is+3 analysis, it has been shown that the bilateral climate partnerships began well, but soon lost momentum and direction in all three cases. Institutional arrangements represented the strongest “I” factor relating to the transformation process, while the other Is became less significant in all cases. The political will of the three foreign donors and Indonesia was initially strong. However, none of the foreign donors could make their “no deforestation” promise a reality. The paradigm shift toward a pro-climate regime was not entirely implemented in each case (Sanders et al., 2017: 77). Meanwhile, institution building and change proved more significant than the other Is, which was represented by the changing of the funding mechanism in the cases of Norway and the UK. In the Australian case, strong institutionalism was not evident. However, even when institutional changes were made,
these were inadequate to improve the level of engagement with civil society (although Norway did engage extensively with local NGOs and other relevant civil society groups in Indonesia). The information analysis revealed inconsistent monitoring and data sharing as part of the measurable, reliable and verifiable (MRV) principle based on the UNFCCC framework.

Based on the comparative analysis above, each foreign donor had different strengths. The Norwegian partnership performed well with regard to institutional change and civil society engagement, but less so when it came to the information monitoring system and constructing the idea of a pro-climate regime. The UK partnership had a significant influence on the decentralisation process through the positive work of TAF and two Is (institution and interest). The UK government consistently built a strong intergovernmental relationship through the establishment and development of the UKCCU and the ICCTF. TAF’s role in decentralisation saw it connecting strongly with local actors in helping with their land permits, building the capacity of the financial mechanism and literacy, and enhancing the governance system at the local government level. The Australian partnership performed weakest in comparison to the other two, which was presumably caused by the unclear objectives of the partnership itself from the outset and the numerous changes in leadership in the Australian government.

There were two points that demonstrate the potential effectiveness despite the complexity of the Indonesian bilateral climate change partnerships. First, two different forms of civil society engagement (direct access to Indonesian civil society groups in the funding of climate change projects through the NICFI in Norway’s case and the importance of intermediary agencies such as Kemitraan as a mediator between the Norwegian government and Indonesian government in order to regain their mutual trust; and the case of TAF serving as a bridge between the UKCCU and local actors’ interests) led to some improvements being made on account of bilateral climate partnerships. Second, the strong intergovernmental relationship between the UK and Indonesia was derived from a solid institutional framework (including due diligence
principles being applied in the funding mechanism and the establishment of the UKCCU), and these institutional factors had the greatest impact on the bilateral climate partnerships (in comparison to the other three Is). The next section explains the theoretical implications of using the transformative 4Is+3 for the case of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships.

In summary, the selected bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia were not entirely effective in terms of realising transformation or major policy changes. The small experiments or slight changes happening in some of factors of transformative 4Is+3 gave divergent and different complexities bilateral climate partnerships. The transformation process did not succeed because no substantive changes were made to any of the 4Is+3 (institutions, ideas, interests and information). The next section outlines the complexities of the Indonesia-Norway climate partnership.

4.3. The complexity of the Indonesia-Norway climate partnership

This section first discusses the challenging policy experiments in the Indonesia-Norway climate partnership. Through this analysis, it identifies the complex political constellation in Indonesia related to deforestation and forest degradation, as well as the complex characteristics of Norway as a donor. Internally, the complex situation in Indonesia is divided into four circumstances, as follows. First, the cliché problem such clash of sectoral priorities and miscoordination among governments (from ministerial to district level), which hampers the coordination and communication system of each government official. Second, the practice of oil redemption in the REDD+ case has been downplayed, which has resulted in a void/promises that were entirely rhetoric. It meant that the Norwegian oil companies redeemed their environmental damage through giving financial support to Indonesia on REDD+, but it the money was disbursed easily and the REDD+ programme itself did not give much impact of climate policy reform in Indonesia. Third, the practice of corruption related to deforestation in Central Kalimantan has become vast and unresolved. Fourth, the difficulty of measuring emissions reductions based on the deforestation rate. Externally, the
complex problems with the Indonesia-Norway climate partnership emerged from the inter-agency dispute between Norway and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as well as Norwegian domestic politics issues.

Norway’s experimentation with policy led to weak climate policy output attributable to the problematic REDD+ programme and a lack of progress on climate change negotiations. Table 4.2 pinpoints some of the problems Norway encountered in policy terms.

Table 4.2 Policy experiments of Norway-Indonesia Climate Partnership assessed in the Letter of Intent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline of the LoI</th>
<th>In Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Two goals of the partnership:</td>
<td>Two goals were achieved, but with a delayed timeline and implementation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Conducting policy dialogue on international climate change policy, in particular international policy on REDD+; and</td>
<td>2010: Letter of Intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Collaboration to support the development and implementation of Indonesia's REDD+ strategy.</td>
<td>2011: BPREDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014: Should have been phase 2 of implementation, but this took place in 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2018: Should have been entering phase 3 (payment and evaluation), but the first results-based payment in the Norwegian partnership was only made in 2019.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation from multiple documents and reports of the NICFI, NORAD and interviews

According to Table 4.2, the two goals of the partnership were not implemented within the scheduled timeline. On 26th May 2010, the LoI was ratified between the Norwegian and Indonesian governments, which targeted policy dialogue on international climate
change, in particular international policy on REDD+, and collaboration to support the development and implementation of Indonesia's REDD+ strategy. The policy dialogue on international climate change and REDD+ was achieved through interaction between Indonesian stakeholders (mostly local NGOs and the Norwegian government as the donor, as well as district and local governments). There was some well-organised engagement of indigenous peoples in international and national REDD+ activities, as well as in key Indonesian provinces and districts (Fay and Denduangrudee, 2018: 27).

The second goal of collaboration in Indonesia’s REDD+ strategy was implemented through BPRED. The latest Indonesian government document on this issue was the Low Carbon Development Initiative, which integrates climate action (including REDD+) with the Indonesian development agenda (BAPPENAS, 2019); this was in line with goal number 2 of the LoI and the Indonesian government at the central level has communicated on and developed REDD+ with provincial and district governments. However, President Widodo merged three government bodies related to REDD+ – the National Council of Climate Change, the National Agency on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and BPRED – into one division under the Directorate General of Climate Change, MoEF in early 2015 (LTS, 2018: 7). The long-delayed process of phase 3 (which was supposed to start in 2017) eventually saw the first results-based payment being made in February 2019.

Another factor that contributed to the failure of policy experiments in the Indonesia-Norway climate partnership is the practice of delayed disbursement and institutional arrangements related to REDD+ in Indonesia (Interviews 1 and 18; Hein et al., 2018: 7; Butler, 2016; Enrici and Hubacek, 2018; El Espectador, 2017; SINCHI, 2016). The lack of progress on climate change negotiation itself stemmed from excessively time-consuming meetings between Norwegian diplomats and the Indonesian government on dealing with REDD+ projects (Angelsen et al., 2017; Brockhaus et al., 2014; Cadman et al., 2017; Boer, 2018; Fletcher et al., 2016).

To better understand the complexity of Norway-Indonesia climate partnerships, I have found four key points that must be highlighted. It meant that there were four
domestic politics and problems within Indonesian government system. **Firstly**, the Indonesian governance and bureaucracy structures and personnel related to REDD+ were much more complex than the issue of land tenure or land use change. The sectoral priorities at the ministerial level and among relevant government bodies hampered the process of creating an integrated funding institution. Furthermore, lack of coordination between the national and lower level governments was a “normal” phenomenon that citizens and government officials at a low-level encounter. For instance, the National Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) had a conflict of interest and political competition with the Ministry of Forestry in creating the Medium and Long-term Plan for National Development (RPJMN – RPJMP) related to climate change restoration (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017: 67). This dispute is currently playing out between the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (specifically on DG-CCC) with advisory councils, and the special envoy on climate change in leading the climate policies and certain regulations (ibid).

Another critical fact was that the climate/environmental management budget has frequently been the lowest in comparison to other national budgets on infrastructure and product/service expenditure (like the budget on training, inventories, etc). Another national governance problem also emerged from the legal enforcement issue of the LoI agreement. Some interviewees, on both the Norwegian and Indonesian sides, admitted that the LoI was not legally binding and that implementation had been postponed for a long time (Interviews 1, 2, 3 and 16). As an alternative solution, the Indonesian government and Kemitraan signed a cooperation agreement to strengthen the infrastructure and implementation capacity of the United Nations Initiative for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, or REDD+, in the archipelago. This agreement was a continuation of the LoI that the Indonesian and Norwegian governments signed in 2010 (Sinaga, 2017).29 President Jokowi also

increased the unconditional reduction target to 29% of the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario by 2030, with the target then set at 41% with international aid at the Conference of Parties (COP) 21 in Paris in December 2015.\(^{30}\)

**Secondly**, the critical view of Indonesian society in ensuring the accountability and impact assessment of big funding of Norway on the REDD+ programme. An Indonesian environment (WALHI) activist stated that the REDD+ programme from Norway was like “redemption” in Indonesia, and there should have been more encouragement from the Norwegian NGOs or other pressure groups who oppose and criticise the Norwegian government when it comes to oil exploration (Interview 8). From the WALHI activist’s perspective, the Norwegian government had explored and even exploited their own oil and now played the role of the “hero” in developing countries in order to redeem the damage it had done to the environment. Other large emitters like China and the US were thought to act in a similar way to Norway in this regard, seeking environmental redemption in developing countries (Greenpeace, 2012). These statements show that foreign donors, in this case Norway, do not play an entirely positive role in reducing emissions, and there was no guarantee that Norway’s funding for Indonesia would fulfil the objective of solving deforestation and promoting the sustainability of Indonesian forests.

**Thirdly**, corruption was widespread within local governance, which was sometimes encouraged by foreign donors and non-transparent funding distribution. Indeed, there has long been a weak governance mechanism in place to handle such external money. The corruption within REDD+ itself historically emerged from the expanding palm oil sector activities in Central Kalimantan in 1999. The Environment Investigation Agency (EIA), in cooperation with Telapak (1999), revealed that Abdul Rasyid was behind the systematic theft of valuable timber from Tanjung Puting

\(^{30}\) The emissions reduction target was officially ratified by the Government of Indonesia during the Conference of Parties (COP) 21 in Paris, 5\(^{th}\) December 2015; for further information, see: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Indonesia/1/INDC_REPUBLIC%20OF%20INDONESIA.pdf. Retrieved on 3\(^{rd}\) September 2018.
National Park in Central Kalimantan. Rasyid’s activities led him to be listed as one of the biggest illegal logging bosses in the country by the Ministry of Forestry (1999). Despite this, Rasyid was never prosecuted and he has now reinvented himself as a palm oil tycoon (Interview 13). Through his palm oil company PT Citra Borneo Indah, Rasyid has acquired a land bank of around 50,000 ha around his stronghold of Pangkalanbun in the south of Central Kalimantan, worth around £150.5 million once the oil palms become productive. This land acquisition was part-funded by loans from Bank Negara Indonesia. Notably, Rasyid continues to profit from high-level connections. A ceremony to break the ground on one of his plantations was attended by the Minister of Agriculture at the time, Anton Apriantono, the media tycoon Surya Paloh, and the Governor of Central Kalimantan (EIA, Press Release, 6 May 2008; EIA, 2009: 7). In summary, corruption-related deforestation has not only been systemic at the national and local government level, but some individual players have also strongly influenced the practice of palm oil plantations and worked closely with the local authorities. In its Central Kalimantan branch WALHI also supports the opinion that corporations have “played strategically” with local police and some district governors to enable land-grabbing or forest-burning activities (Interview 8). WWF Indonesia also noted some corrupt practices in 2011-2012 (Interview 6).

In relation to the situation in 2016-2019 in Palangkaraya (the provincial capital of Central Kalimantan), the governor was criticised for carrying out “business-as-usual” within the REDD+ programme. The current governor was the nephew of Rasyid, the controversial figure discussed above.31 A Telapak Foundation activist had this to say on the matter:

‘…there was a corporation called PT Menteng Jaya which got funding from Norway for the REDD+ project. But the moratorium did not happen, and that private company did not give any access for us to investigate.’ (Interview 13)

31 REDD+ at the local level is corrupt and systemically manipulated by some corporations.
This Telapak activist had been finding evidence of corrupt practices related to the REDD+ project. However, Telapak’s investigation compromised their security, which also hampered transparency in the implementation of REDD+. Powerful actors (in this case, corporations) did whatever they could to cover up the corruption, and yet the provincial government and national government did not respond quickly and appropriately.

In the last 15 years, the number and total size of palm oil concessions awarded in Central Kalimantan has multiplied. According to data from the provincial government (2014), the total land mass of palm oil plantations went from less than 200,000 hectares in 2001 to 1.7 million hectares in 2015. This number excludes the large tracts of land for which concessions had already been awarded but where plantations had not yet begun. In 2015, WALHI calculated that local governments in Central Kalimantan had been awarding plantation licenses (IUP) for a total of 400,000 to 600,000 hectares per year since 2004. Before that, the total land mass licensed out to palm oil companies had never exceeded 180,000 hectares per year. WALHI also noted that some corporations “played strategically” with local police and district governors to manipulate land concessions (Interview 8). Based on the interview with WALHI, the rate of deforestation was worsened by the increasing land concessions being made possible by the local police and district governors in Central Kalimantan.

Interviews and other sources showed that Central Kalimantan had a very weak public forum for debating such issues. Furthermore, politicians owned most of the local media, while Rasyid’s group had shares in three newspapers (Lang, 2016). The political party Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP) owned another newspaper. Unfortunately, local newspapers also depended heavily on government advertising. Naturally, this made editors hesitant to publish any critical reports. Elsewhere, a small group of NGOs and journalists in Central Kalimantan were fearful of voicing criticism publicly, and harassment of journalists was common (Interview 18). These statements indicate how power politics has influenced the REDD+ project implementation. Local and national NGOs’ ability to save the forests was extremely limited because the elites
from corporations led and shaped government policy or hid their corrupt actions. The corruption practices related to REDD+ and other critical actions, such as land grabbing and larger palm oil plantations, was the core of the local governance problem. The major power politics among elites (the owners of political parties, media and corporations) destroyed the transparent mechanism and diminished accountability among the state apparatus and relevant local government actors.

Fourthly, difficulties emerged when it came to assessing REDD+’s efficacy in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Lang (2010) states that the two-year suspension of the conversion of native forests and peat lands to contribute to emissions reduction was grossly inadequate. According to the LoI (2010), Indonesia would implement “a two-year suspension on all new concessions for conversion of peat and natural forest.” In responding to this statement, I would assert that a two-year suspension does not necessarily reflect a significant change in addressing deforestation. It did, however, potentially produce a loophole, allowing for the handover of peat swamps and forests as concessions to plantation companies. The two-year moratorium (stop burning forests) created further opportunities for palm oil corporations and other relevant companies to seek alternative ways of cutting down trees or clearing the land. Another statement emerged from a representative of CIFOR: “REDD+ was trying to make a new mode of governance. Something that was decentralised, involving multiple actors. REDD+ will be done by the local jurisdiction, even though it was top-down” (Interview 1). Seconding this opinion, a representative of the AMAN cited an allegedly improper policy towards REDD at the provincial government level: “The REDD+ process in Central Kalimantan was not well-coordinated and there was a misuse of the authority of provincial government to pursue their own interest or it was usually called malkebijakan (not outlining the policy on environmental or forestry management properly)” (Interview 4). The policy of decentralisation also tends to be ignored by various local, district and provincial governments so that they can utilise their power and ignore the REDD+ programme. “If ignorance of all levels of government were ongoing, the only cure for that was time. It may take a generation.” (Interview 3). With
respect to the feedback noted above, the problems of local governance appear to have been rooted in the leadership of each district and the provincial governors themselves, as well as a lack of capacity and political will from the local government.

4.3.1 External factor analysis: Norwegian domestic politics

This section sets out some key points in the problems emanating from Norway that have affected the bilateral climate partnership with Indonesia. First, there has been an ongoing inter-agency dispute between the Norwegian government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Second, there was an internal political problem within the Norwegian government, which also affected the funding mechanism for REDD+ in Indonesia.

4.3.1.1 Inter-agency dispute between Norway and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

This section discusses the challenges faced by the Norwegian government in dealing with the intermediary agency UNDP. In 2010-2015, the Norwegian government chose UNDP as the intermediary agency to disburse funding to the Indonesian government. However, the Indonesian government was unable to receive money directly from Norway due to the release of the Norwegian funds being triggered by a results-based system. A Norwegian diplomat in Jakarta said this about the matter:

‘So basically, there hasn’t been a Norwegian government channel for us to put the money directly to the Indonesian government because the funding mechanism was not established, still wasn’t in 2011-2018. That’s why we had to use the proxy, working through an international organisation like UNDP. So, to a very large extent, the choice of partners has been Indonesia’s, because we didn’t want to work with partners that Indonesia did not want to work with even if were acceptable from more of the grant-management point of view. (Interview 2)’

In responding to the statement above, the Norwegian government had a strict system
by which to directly distribute climate finance to Indonesia. This funding mechanism was attributed to the principle of a “payment-based result”, which meant that Norway would not distribute the money until Indonesia provided the deforestation loss rate as evidence of reducing emissions. The strict funding mechanism of Norway was plausibly emerging from a dynamic change in national policy in the Norwegian government. As an example, closer alignment between the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004 led to the desire for a Minister of International Development, who lacked authority and influence at the time, to control and oversee the agency (Gulrajani, 2014).

As a comparison, the Australian donor had development cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was practically shown through the establishment of AusAID (OECD, 2009; Gulrajani, 2015: 15), whilst the UK aid was distributed through an independent ministry/agency through DFID. In 1997, the UK government created DFID as a distinctive department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which resulted from strong political champions for an independent governance model. With the help of powerful friends, DFID was invested with considerable influence to steer development agendas within a whole-of-government framework (Lockwood et al. 2010).

The Norwegian intermediary agency changed in 2015 due to the high administrative costs of using UNDP and other managerial problems (Interview 1). There was also a trust issue that had emerged between Norway and the UNDP (Interview 16), as well as other problems based on the multilateral nature of the arrangement. The Norwegian government did not have one standard funding mechanism that applied to all intermediary agencies disbursing the money, issuing reports and other aspects. This ambiguity in its funding mechanism affected the accountability of the Norwegian government in Indonesia. Moreover, this lack of clarity even led some Indonesian NGOs to question the sincerity of the Norwegian support for Indonesian forests. The next section explained the challenges of domestic politics in Norway, which were reflected in its bilateral climate partnership with
Indonesia.

### 4.3.1.2 Domestic politics in Norway

Having considered the inter-agency dispute between the Norwegian government and UNDP, this section focuses on the internal political problems for Norway related to the Norway-Indonesia bilateral climate partnership. In 2015, there was a domestic debate in Norway, with many claiming that Norwegian government proposals in autumn 2015 to reduce the NICFI’s budget were highly controversial. According to Collier (2002: 8): “...donors were extremely badly structured to play hardball”. Norway, however, had no tradition of playing “hardball” and was traditionally considered a soft donor. Nevertheless, repeated statements about results-based payments and slow disbursement to Guyana and Indonesia, based on slow REDD+ progress, indicated a change in the Norwegian approach (Angelsen, 2017: 256).

Leadership changes in Norway also had an effect on the Norway-Indonesia climate partnership: “There was different leadership at [the] ministerial level that affects the Norwegian government’s decisions on foreign aid, including REDD+” (Interview 18). The perception of political disunity had been quashed with a recent decision by the Norwegian parliament, which was referred to by a Norwegian diplomat in Jakarta: “There was recently more consensus and broad support from Norwegian parliaments regarding REDD+ and LoI with the Indonesian government. Of course, the 80% funding will be paid if there was a concrete result from Indonesia” (Interview 19). This statement shows that at some point Norwegian domestic politics had affected its foreign policy aim of pursuing sustainability in Indonesian forests. In this demand by the Norwegian government that the Indonesian government provide credible proof of emissions reduction, the complexity of Norway’s management of climate change funding for Indonesia called into question the seriousness of Norway’s support for Indonesian forestry.

Meanwhile, in the Norwegian government, a critical report was issued on the NICFI’s effectiveness. On 15th May 2018, the Norwegian Office of the Auditor General
completed its investigation into Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. The report was critical of the way that Norway had funded Indonesia and other developing countries through the REDD+ programme. A press statement on the Office of the Auditor General’s website highlighted the key findings: “The Office of the Auditor General’s investigation shows that progress and results were delayed, that current measures have uncertain feasibility and effect, and that the risk of fraud was not well-managed” (Lang, 2018). The Office of the Auditor General referred to cases where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Climate and Environment had not prevented and followed up the risk of financial fraud. This problem included what it believed to be inadequate partner assessments before finalising agreements, and a lack of response when collaborative partners were being investigated for possible financial fraud.

In response to the above statements, I think that domestic politics in the donor country (Norway) was beset by the problematic measurement of uncertain risks and promises of funding. The prospect of £781 million from the Norwegian government was delayed without feasible alternative targets and phases of disbursement, yet the debate on reducing the amount of money also worsened Norway’s commitment to the Indonesian REDD+. As an implication, there was a void promise from Norway to make NICFI effective and robust and the financial fraud was under serious investigation in the Norwegian internal government.

Meanwhile, the REDD+ programme could not compensate for the short-term economic gain that corporations stood to make and thereby slow down deforestation (Interview 1). This condition reflects the theoretical framework of Enrici and Hubacek (2018: 250), according to which results-based aid always faces challenges, such as reference level, uncertainty and risk-sharing, as well as promises being backed up financially. In this case, monitoring and evaluation played a significant role in making sure that the funding mechanism was operating in a functional and transparent manner between the Norwegian and Indonesian governments. The next section provides a
discussion of the practices in the Indonesia-UK climate partnership using the transformative 4Is analytical framework.

4.4. The dynamics and the implications of the UKCCU in the Indonesia-UK climate partnership
This section explains the problematic policy experiments in climate change between Indonesia and the UK. In considering such policy experiments, it implicates the challenges faced by the United Kingdom Climate Change Unit (UKCCU) as complex political and foreign policy trade-offs for Indonesia. The role of The Asia Foundation also reflects ulterior motives and power calculations through their dominating influence as the intermediary agency between the UK government and Indonesian civil society groups. The important role of the intermediary agency in the UK-Indonesia partnership continues to justify their formal government-to-government relationship, which diminishes the chance of non-state actors interacting with them directly.

In April 2011, the UK government began to focus on an environmental and climate change programme. The UKCCU was designed as a genuine and concrete institution that would primarily transfer climate funds directly to national governmental organisations (DFID, 2010). This body was supported by several UK governmental institutions, including the DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (Sofa, 2018: 23). The UKCCU also supported the establishment of the Indonesian Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) from 2009 and was one of its co-founders, along with Australia and Sweden (Barnard et al., 2014: 12). These three donors initially provided funding of up to £8.9 million, of which 86% was from the UK government, and this was disbursed for low-carbon development and land-use governance programmes (ibid: 13). In total, their committed support to the ICCTF in the period of 2009-2018 amounted to £9.2 million (UKCCU Official, 2016). In comparison to the Australian grant for the climate change programme (£54 million) and the Norwegian pledge to reduce Indonesian deforestation (£781 million), the UK
government provided the least money over this period.

As well as funding the ICCTF, the UKCCU also supported a low-carbon
development capacity-building programme for Indonesia with a financial contribution
of up to £4.5 million from October 2012 until March 2015 through the Indonesian
Ministry of Finance (DFID, 2016). The UKCCU established a low-carbon policy
support team in Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (DFID, 2016: 3) to enable key policy
departments and ministerial advisory teams to design, formulate and implement a fiscal
policy that would move Indonesia onto a low-carbon growth trajectory; and the
Indonesia Investment Agency to establish a financing mechanism for the delivery of
sustainable infrastructure and low-carbon development in Indonesia. The UKCCU’s
assistance was also visible in the programme with the Indoneisan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in designing a climate-friendly fiscal policy with a focus on mainstreaming
climate change issues into the state budget (ibid). The particular approach of the
UKCCU’s work and role related to the UK government putting forward the theory of
change in the government-to-government relationship with Indonesia. In practice, a
representative of the British Embassy officer in Jakarta said that the UK climate
programme in Indonesia was well-managed and evaluated based on particular
indicators of change and emissions reduction (Interview 2).

The small policy experiment, as the indication to transformational change of
Indonesia-UK climate partnership, did not happen due to hidden calculations on the
carbon emissions, which indirectly affected the changing direction and characteristics
of the UKCCCU. As an implication, there were some different programme designs and
budget schemes in 2016 (Interview 10), which stimulated political trade-off and change
in the UK foreign policy to Indonesia. Further explanation was provided in Table 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Reality/In Practice</th>
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<tr>
<td>Three goals of the UK in its partnership</td>
<td>Goal (a) was achieved with 35,000 ha saved from deforestation in 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with Indonesia:

a. To help Indonesia reduce CO2 emissions by 10.2 million tonnes by 2020;

b. To support the National Peat Restoration Agency (BRG) to restore 26,000 ha of fire peat land (the worst peat fire occurred in autumn 2015); and

c. To work with more than five national government ministries.

(UKCCU, 2016) and over 2.8 million hectares of forest saved, along with the revoking of 130 illegal mining licenses in 2018 (UKCCU, 2018). Goals (b) and (c) were achieved through the establishment of the UKCCU and the ICCTF, the first climate change trust fund in Indonesia.

Source: Author’s compilation of UKCCU reports and interviews

Table 5.1 shows that most areas of in-practice implementation met or even surpassed the expected baseline. The baseline itself was derived from the UKCCU reports and other UK governmental reports related to the UK’s climate partnership with Indonesia. Firstly, the central/national government-to-government approach rendered the climate partnership effective for both the UK and the Indonesian government (DFID, 2011). Indeed, two of the three following goals were successfully met: (a) helping Indonesia to reduce CO2 emissions by 10.2 million tonnes by 2020;\(^{32}\) (b) supporting the National Peat Restoration Agency (BRG) to restore 26,000 ha of fire peat land (the worst peat fire occurred in autumn 2015); and (c) working with more than five national government ministries. With regard to goals (b) and (c), these were achieved through the establishment of the UKCCU by the UK government in 2011 and the ICCTF by the Indonesian government in 2010 (DFID, 2011). In addition, there was not any clear and proper assessment on how peat forest affected the bilateral climate partnership between the UK and Indonesia.

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\(^{32}\) This discussion is detailed based on several interviews with the UKCCU and the Indonesian government.
The progress towards the bilateral goal shared by the UK and Indonesia continues to be slow, with the initial target of millions of hectares being saved from deforestation reduced only to 35,000 hectares in 2015 among million hectares as the initial target (UKCCU, 2016). The UK was one of three state-level donors (along with Australia and Germany) to consistently work together with the Indonesian Ministry of Finance on all climate change projects in Indonesia (DFID, 2015: 3). The powerful and direct relationship between the UKCCU and the Indonesian Ministry of Finance has created a clear political and legal mandate to lead and coordinate fiscal policy on low-carbon development (DFID, 2013).

However, the strong connection between the UKCCU and Ministry of Finance did not necessarily reflect positive impacts. The fast manoeuvring of the UK government through the UKCCU took place due to its strong desire to be an independent foreign aid institution, which potentially made the UK pursuing their own foreign policy. As a consequence, Indonesia would be trapped by the UK’s trade-off, which implicitly endorses the Indonesian government continuing to spend money pursuing UK foreign policy rather than engaging domestic civil society groups in Indonesia. As evidence, the UK created an autonomous foreign aid agency and was the only Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) donor that delivers aid through a separate government department, which reflects the administrative efficiency of the UK’s foreign aid system (Calleja, 2015: 4). Combined with the DFID’s reputation for high-quality and innovative aid programming, the UK’s experience suggests that autonomous agencies are not a less “optimal” model than other forms of aid organisation (Calleja, 2015: 8).

One concern related to the future of the UK-Indonesia climate partnership, however, was the shift in Indonesia’s economic performance level and the changing priorities of the UK’s foreign aid. The DFID has stopped working on poverty reduction

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33 By working with the Ministry of Finance in Indonesia, the UK government seeks to encourage the Indonesian government to build an Indonesian Investment Agency that specifically manages the climate change restoration programme.
programmes in Indonesia since March 2011 because of its attainment of middle-income status with a growth rate of over 5% (DFID, 2014: 6). Such a development suggests that Indonesia will not depend so much on the UK’s financial support in managing climate change projects. The UK government expected that, on account of the country’s elevated status, the Indonesian government would be able to call on its own financial resources and independently manage its climate change problems.

Secondly, the relationship between the UK government and local-level actors was not equal in Indonesia. Indeed, the local governments and local communities seldom met with or contacted the UKCCU or the UK government to complain or undertake an investigative report on deforestation. All such reports were instead gathered through The Asia Foundation (TAF), which was the only representative that could engage in comprehensive discussion with the UK government. This meant that pseudo-devolution occurred rather than full-scale devolution; there was no genuine engagement with local governments or local civil society groups in terms of managing climate change restoration projects with the UKCCU or another UK representative. In addition, TAF itself was not a national or local NGO; it was instead an international organisation with long-standing credibility in Indonesian governance programmes.

In the provincial and local areas, the district governors have not provided any further opportunities for local civil society groups to support climate change restoration projects. Muharjanti et al. (2014: 18-20) explain that the majority of district governors demonstrate poor participation in the forestry, plantation and mining sectors. District governments’ efforts to provide a means of participation remained low, to the point that some violations against legal regulations went unpunished. Indeed, the means of participation provided by district governments were mostly cosmetic. This was demonstrated by the low level of participation in forest reclamation, the absence of means of participation, and violations of Government Regulation number 76/2008 concerning forest rehabilitation and reclamation, which, to be enforced, required public participation via consultation, partnership and dissemination of information. The data and information used in spatial planning were also not up to date. Overall, the results
with regard to transparency, accountability, participation and coordination in the nine districts were poor (24).

In light of some of the issues and arguments presented above, the UK government had no good reason to provide civil society groups in Indonesia with direct access to funding and communication. The role of intermediary agencies such as TAF strengthened the relationship with Indonesian local governments but did not suggest that civil society engagement really mattered in Kalimantan. The main reason for this was the low impact and performance of local governments in pursuing transparent and accountable forest and land-use policies, along with minimal civil society participation.

In summary, the establishment of the UKCCU did not explicitly have a positive impact on the Indonesian government and society. The strong intergovernmental relationship between the UK and Indonesia creates good bilateral diplomacy among governments, but does not guarantee that the funding and UK support meaningfully influences the indigenous groups and their livelihoods in the rural areas. The strong institutional approach of the UK government mainly created a trade-off with Indonesia, especially in the way that they pursued their own foreign policies and designed the land and forest governance under their command/leadership.

4.5. The unclear mechanism and volatility of the Indonesia-Australia climate partnership
This section discusses the volatile and unclear mechanism of the Indonesia-Australia climate partnership. There were many changes in the bilateral climate policies between Australia and Indonesia, along with unclear objectives and goals. Two phenomena – the volatile electoral system in Australia in 2013 and the Bali execution in 2015 – also resulted in vulnerability in their bilateral climate partnership, which reshaped the significance of Australia as a bilateral donor and set back the transformation process. Consequently, the bilateral approach in the case of the Indonesia-Australia climate partnership was no longer useful with this paradigm shift. As the Australian electoral volatility of 2013 and responded to the Bali executions in 2015 showed bilateral
partnerships were vulnerable to politics and frequent changes of government and thus they failed to achieve the scale of transformation needed to realise climate targets, thus circling back to the paradigm shift that led to multilateralism.

A prominent Australian climate change programme, the Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership (KFCP), was launched in January 2010 as one of four official REDD+ demonstration activities in Indonesia (Masyhud, 2010). Its objective was to “demonstrate a credible, equitable, and effective approach to reducing GHG emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, including from the degradation of peatlands...” (Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership, 2009: 2). The IAFCP was a proponent of the KFCP, a bilateral partnership between the Government of Indonesia, represented by Indonesia’s National Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Australia, represented by AusAID and the Department of Climate Change (Barber et al., 2011). The steering committee included high-level governmental institutions, such as the BAPPENAS, the provincial government of Central Kalimantan, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Australia’s Department of the Environment (IAFCP, 2012). Table 4.2 provides a timeline of how Australia initially started the IAFCP in 2007 and follows its development in subsequent years.
Table 4.2 IAFCP timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>March.</strong></td>
<td>A$200 million Global Initiative on Forests and Climate (GIFC) announced by Australian Prime Minister John Howard.</td>
<td><strong>September.</strong></td>
<td>A$30 million Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership (KFCP) announced at the APEC meeting, Sydney.</td>
<td><strong>March.</strong></td>
<td>KFCP design mission undertaken.</td>
<td><strong>June.</strong></td>
<td>Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership (IAFCP) announced by Australian Prime Minister Rudd and Indonesian President Yudhoyono.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>December.</strong></td>
<td>Indonesia hosts UNFCCC COP13, Bali. Newly elected Rudd Labor government ratifies Kyoto Protocol.</td>
<td><strong>April.</strong></td>
<td>GIFC rebranded as the International Forest Carbon Initiative (IFCI).</td>
<td><strong>June.</strong></td>
<td>KFCP design process finalised and Australia creates A$8.4 million Kalimantan Forests and Climate Trust Fund at the World Bank.</td>
<td><strong>May.</strong></td>
<td>Rudd Labor government increases IFCI funding from A$200 million to A$273 million and extends it, including IAFCP, by one year to mid-2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009</strong></td>
<td><strong>2010</strong></td>
<td><strong>2011</strong></td>
<td><strong>2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>2013</strong></td>
<td><strong>2014</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>March.</strong></td>
<td>Australia advises Indonesia of intention not to proceed with SFCP.</td>
<td><strong>January.</strong></td>
<td>KFCP village agreements negotiated over preceding year take effect.</td>
<td><strong>February.</strong></td>
<td>Australia advises Indonesia of intention to extend IAFCP to mid-2014, with greatly reduced scope.</td>
<td><strong>April.</strong></td>
<td>Australian foreign minister Bob Carr agrees to an IAFCP “exit strategy”.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Davies (2015: 10)

The KFCP was a pilot project introduced by the Australian government. It had significant funding of up to £15.5 million and was considered a major project in Kalimantan (DFAT, 2010). The amount of Australian funding for climate projects in Indonesia lay in between that of the amount given by the UK and Norway. The project itself aimed to build a higher level of trust with Indonesia in combating deforestation.
as the most crucial climate change problem in Indonesia. However, Kalimantan was not considered feasible as a location and the KFCP struggled to cover the forest land loss. The collapse of the KFCP marked the official end of the IAFCP in June 2014 for several reasons. First, there was a lack of capacity within the Australian government to deliver and measure how feasible the KFCP was for Kalimantan sites. Robin Davies (2015) reported that the fate of the KFCP was a failure of the project developer (Australian government) to explain and prove the sustainability of the REDD+ financial incentive. Lack of research and preliminary field observation of the Kalimantan sites were identified as the potential reasons why the KFCP did not work as expected. Second, the Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership (IAFCP) lacked clear objectives and suffered from a weakening of high-level leadership due to frequent changes in the Australian parliament and prime ministers (political changes). The changes in bureaucracy had implications for the achievements of the uneven bilateral climate partnership due to a lack of political will from the Australian government (there was a pre-emptive termination of the IAFCP by the country’s Labour government).

The climate policy changes that the Australian government made to the policy experiments did not fit well with the context of the objectives of the partnership. The baseline goals and partnership of the IAFCP were set, but in practice there was no evidence as to whether these were achieved due to the unclear objectives set out in 2008-2014. In 2015, Australia removed environmental/climate governance as the main objective of the partnership. The three objectives as of September 2015 were: effective economic governance; human development and health; and inclusive society through effective governance (DFAT, 2016). The unachieved goals served as the starting point for a less effective bilateral climate partnership between Australia and Indonesia.

34 Between November 2007 and September 2013, Australia changed prime minister three times. In June 2010, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was deposed by Julia Gillard. In June 2013, Prime Minister Julia Gillard was deposed by Kevin Rudd. In September 2013, Tony Abbott won the election to become the prime minister (Davies, 2015: 16-18).
DFAT itself already removed climate change from the main objectives of Australia-Indonesia bilateral cooperation, which reflected the Australian moving to lessen the priority attached to climate change sectors. Supporting this statement, the Australian National Audit Office (2009) argued that a primary cause of weakness in the selectivity of the country’s programme aid was the failure to fulfil the country’s specific strategies and the lack of centrality to aid allocation decisions. The policy experiment was also reflected in the dissolving of the AusAID, although its removal did not play a strong role in boosting the climate partnership with Indonesia (Interviews 5, 6 and 9).

Two important events highlighted the complex Indonesia-Australia bilateral climate partnership. First, the rapid and incremental change in Australian domestic politics, which resulted in budget cuts in the Australian funding to Indonesia. In 2013, the Australian government decided to disband AusAID and merge it with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT, 2013: 2). As a result, the Australian government cut the national budget for foreign aid, specifically for Indonesia, by up to 40% (ibid: 4). According to a DFAT report (2014: 5) in order to check the funding proportion specifically in the period of my research 2009-2015, the Indonesian government received £193 million annually (previously £375 million in 2011-2013). This amount of funding shows that Australia was no longer building AusAID physically or institutionally in a number of developing countries, including Indonesia. This funding mechanism and collaboration opportunity was further challenged and hampered by the new type of Australian bureaucracy under Tony Abbott in 2013, who was not supportive of the climate change agenda.

As a technical implication of disbanding the AusAID, the ability of Indonesian actors (both government and non-government) to request climate change funding has become more limited. They have had to deal directly with the DFAT, which can make the process take longer than usual. The budget cut has also affected two main actors. First, the companies (mainly from Australia) that implement projects in Indonesia; and second, the consultants who have long been acting as “aid rent seekers” in Indonesia. Both actors in fact significantly reduced the flow of aid funds to the beneficiaries. Since
AusAID left Jakarta, the funding has not been as easy to disburse as before. This situation led to the limited progress of the Australian government on delivering accessible climate change projects. Australian climate governance has returned to a centralised system, which means that all administrative and funding activities on climate change are monitored and checked in advance by the Australian government in Canberra.

The second event was the Bali execution in 2015. Australian anger over the executions of two Australian citizens in Bali, Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, in April 2015, and the Indonesian response to Australian foreign aid has meant that Australia was no longer a main source of funding (Murat, 2015). Deliberations over the budget were being carried out at a time when the Australian public was actively discussing the aforementioned executions. For instance, Australia’s foreign minister, Julie Bishop, warned Indonesia of “consequences” for its death penalty decision (4). These political events showed that bilateral partnership between Indonesia and Australia was vulnerable. The frequent changes of leadership in Australia led to failure in the scale of transformation needed to realise climate targets. This failing bilateral process circled back to the importance of multilateral negotiation and funding.

Australia’s comparatively less committed climate policy has impacted trust and created an uncomfortable situation between the Indonesian government and local communities. The Australian government has limited non-state actors’ direct access to funding at a local level, and they may thus experience further difficulties in requesting financial support. The response from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was set out in the statement below:

‘The NGOs should apply [for] or request financial support through the four implementing agencies such World Bank and UNDP for instance, and then the Australian Embassy can review that the support goes to the right channel, whether it will engage the Ministry of Environment, the Republic of Indonesia, or just through the implementing agency itself.’ (Interview 1)

This statement clearly shows that the Australian government has not offered direct and
open access to non-state actors such as national NGOs and local communities managing climate change projects. The next section discusses the analysis based on the empirical findings of the three case studies, as well as the theoretical and policy implications of the transformative 4Is+3.

4.6. Discussion
This section presents further insights into the relevance of the transformative 4Is+3 framework for exploring the complex circumstances of bilateral climate partnership in Indonesia. It is important here to ascertain whether there were any analytical or policy implications arising from the use of the transformative 4Is+3 in my thesis. This research has focused on the process of a bilateral mechanism, explicitly checking whether the leadership changes, policy experiments and decentralisation challenges led to more conditions of complex bilateral climate partnerships between Indonesia and foreign donors in 2009-2015. Policy changes in the Indonesian bilateral climate partnership context did not materialise fully because of the change in the Indonesian political and bureaucratic leadership. There was also an unclear and uncoordinated mandate at the internal ministerial and local government levels, which further resulted in alleged corruption and undisclosed information. However, the policy transformation still had some effect with regard to institution building, changing organisational structures, and political will on the part of all three foreign donors to Indonesia. The ideas of a pro-climate regime, a new mode for disclosing information, and accessibility of data did not, however, achieve effectiveness.

In formulating the analytical implications of using the transformative 4Is+3, I classify four areas of analysis, along with three external conditions of transformation, for my three cases. First, in two cases (Norway and the UK) the transformation of an institution was beneficial to the Indonesian government because the transformation was achieved through institutional change, building an institution or strengthening the capacity of certain agencies to make the relevant climate projects happen. Norway emerged as a pioneer by creating REDD+ and giving direct access to funding for
Indonesian civil society groups through the NICFI. Following on from Norway, the UK’s initiative to establish the UKCCU led to a strong intergovernmental relationship developing between the UK and Indonesia. There was also continuous collaboration with TAF as the supporting agency, with the latter serving as the bridge between local NGOs and the UK government. However, such positive transformations did not appear in the Australian case. The dissolving of AusAID and its subsequent merging with DFAT led to the breaking down of their supposedly pro-climate partnership.

Second, the transition and apparent paradigm shift towards a pro-climate regime did not emerge cooperatively between any of the foreign donors and the Indonesian government. This was particularly evident in the unfulfilled promise of “zero deforestation”. The pro-climate regime was no more than a utopian aspiration in the bilateral climate partnerships and it was not a realistic goal. The partnerships themselves were still far from realising zero-emissions targets or even achieving concrete reductions in greenhouse gases. The nature of political coalition, the diminishing formal power of the president, and the complicated bureaucracy in both the national and local governance of Indonesia were factors that hampered the development of a pro-climate regime. Hence, what looked like an imminent paradigm shift, swiftly descended into empty promises by foreign donors and the Indonesian government.

Third, the changing actors’ interests in the partnerships between Indonesia and the foreign donors had the potential to arouse conflict, especially with Indonesian stakeholders. There was some political will, however, meaning that all foreign donors initially demonstrated a certain level of institutional and political commitment to Indonesia. They also developed incentives for local governments, which placed emphasis on protecting the forests and reducing emissions. However, the degree of political will and mutual interest did not go beyond the superficial, as there were some hidden interests among the Indonesian government and foreign donors themselves. The hidden interests became visible in the domination of Australian domestic politics in the Indonesia-Australia bilateral climate partnership, which yielded unclear objectives and
failures in the KFCP. Meanwhile, a vested interest was also apparent in the delayed reimbursement of the Norwegian funding. The transformational coalitions (through the NICFI, the UKCCU and the KFCP respectively) could not guarantee that the policy output of these institutions would be delivered directly to the general public. There were frequent misunderstandings between foreign donors and Indonesian stakeholders (both governments and non-government organisations) on how to ensure that the land moratorium was controlled or how the indigenous communities could live longer in their forests. The practices of offering local incentives (or rewarding local environmental “heroes”) at the provincial and district government level in Indonesia also showed that public awareness in Indonesia of the need to save the forests and/or address climate change problems revolved around rewards and favours.

Fourth, the new modes of information sharing did not have much of an effect due to the lack of accessible data shared by foreign donors with the Indonesian government, and also by the Indonesian government with non-state actors in Indonesia. With regard to the reporting system on carbon emissions, there were different types of reports regularly published by each donor. However, their accessibility was limited. Some local and indigenous communities were unable to access or be involved in the implementation of bilateral climate projects. They participated as observers and nothing more. This access issue also affected the capacity of the local NGOs, with some of these issues related to language barriers and computer literacy. Figure 4.1 maps the analytical implications of the transformative 4Is+3 process in the context of the Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships.
Based on Figure 4.1, I conclude that Norway and the UK played a more progressive role than Australia when it came to transformational change, which could be discerned from the following four transitions: the way the actors built institutions, the way the actors managed their interests with each other, the way the actors created common ideas on a pro-climate regime, and the way the actors monitored the public information-sharing system. The results of these transitions were new coalitions/institutions that enhanced the Indonesian government’s capacity regarding climate change restoration and ensured the state’s autonomy and national ownership, with the Indonesian government cooperating on the interests of society at large (Karsenty and Ongolo, 2012). A pro-climate regime was adopted at every level of governance in Indonesia and inclusive policy processes and transparent information were maintained.

However, policy output remains rhetoric only and an unrealistic implication as a pre-condition for transformational change. Many conflictual interests within the
Norwegian and Australian governments led to the dynamic leadership change, which indirectly affected the implementation of their bilateral climate cooperation with Indonesia. Various failures of policy experiments in the Indonesia-Norway, Indonesia-UK and Indonesia-Australia climate partnerships, as noted in the previous sections, clearly show that a bilateral approach was a fragile complement to multilateralism. The different challenges of decentralisation in each of the three case studies also meant that this bilateral climate change partnership was restructured and often bounces back to a multilateral approach. A bilateral approach in the Indonesian climate governance context therefore cannot be the only solution to complement multilateral climate governance.

4.6.1 Policy implications of the transformative 4Is+3: lessons learned from the bilateral mechanisms in the Indonesian context

This section reflects on the policy implications of the transformative 4Is+3, looking at the lessons learned from bilateral mechanisms in the Indonesian context. Among the 4Is+3 indicators, there were two conditions (pro-climate regime; and inclusive policy processes together with transparent information) that did not work effectively in the context of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships in 2011-2013 due to corruption issues and conflicting public reactions. The practice of corruption has had a long-standing impact on climate change management. Indeed, collusion and corruption weakened the forest governance of REDD+ (Kanninen et al., 2007), while illegal logging and unenforced laws were endemic in many tropical forested countries, including Indonesia (Brack, 2005). There were legal inconsistencies, mismanagement and corruption at all stages of the timber product chain, from concession-issuing to market sales (Dermawan et al., 2011). The Indonesian Commission of Corruption Eradication (KPK) and the Financial Intelligence Unit (PPATK) succeeded in a high-profile case involving a Bupati in Riau Province, who was imprisoned for 11 years for contravening regulations and accepting bribes in the granting of palm oil concessions (Indrarto et al., 2012). Several interviewees from the Norwegian and Australian
partnerships argued that the effectiveness of a bilateral climate partnership depended on the recipient country’s ability to curb the chain of corruption between the government and the private sector.

The issue of transparency in Indonesia was not treated as a priority among the Indonesian governance, especially when checking and ensuring that the public was being properly informed. The transparency problem was exacerbated by the minimal public consultation offered by foreign donors, the Indonesian government, and non-state actors. In the case of forest carbon accounting for climate mitigation (REDD+), those demanding transparency were developed countries (donors) seeking forest carbon-related disclosure from developing countries to activate performance-based compensation for environmental improvement (Gupta and Mason, 2014). However, the deforestation rate was not going down (as proof of a successful REDD+ programme) and the data on the deforestation rate were scattered and confusing when presented to the Norwegian government for instance (Norwegian Interview 18; World Resource Institute, 2019; Mongabay, 2014). Transparency failures draw attention to a contested policy on climate change (Ciplet et al., 2018: 146).

In relation to the transparency problem in Indonesia, there was a lack of accountability in Indonesian financial reporting, corrupt practices, and even financial fraud/mismanagement. Importantly, Indonesia documented cases of the Government’s Reforestation Fund financing plantation and forest rehabilitation projects, but such activities only existed on paper (Barr et al., 2010: 15). Indonesia was also ranked poorly in governance assessment by the World Bank, which includes indicators measuring the control of corruption, the rule of law, political stability, and freedom of speech and accountability (Kaufmann et al., 2008). Palm oil production has been linked not only to unsustainable resource management, but also to loss of land access among local groups (Bringezu and Bleischwitz, 2010; Kaufmann et al., 2008).

Evidence of Indonesian financial mismanagement was found in Indonesia’s Reforestation Fund (Reuters, 2010). In 2008, Indonesia’s anti-corruption agency alleged that Wandojo Siswanto, a leading Indonesian climate negotiator, had engaged
in corruption by taking £2,700 “as a payoff for favouritism in awarding tenders” (Jakarta Post, 2008). Responding to this, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono created the Judicial Mafia Task Force to examine illegal logging, but the task force itself came under criticism for alleged conflicts of interest among its members in April 2009 (Indonesia Today, 2010).

Among the five types of policy output above, only three have continued to function with donor support. The Indonesian government successfully established institutional cooperation with foreign donors through the REDD+ scheme or other relevant climate change bodies like the NICFI, the UKCCU and the KFCP. The merger of the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Forestry since Jokowi’s presidency also made the working performance of the Indonesian government more effective. Furthermore, the autonomy of each district and provincial governors to decide and implement climate change projects became a real indication that Indonesia retained a state-led policy-making process. This meant that the foreign donors, like the international actors, did not dominate policymaking and implementation of the bilateral climate agreement. The next part outlines the policy implications of the transformative 4Is+3, drawing out lessons learned from the bilateral mechanism in the Indonesian context.

According to my analysis, the Indonesian government did not clearly explained its accountability performance to the donors. This means that Indonesia was not providing an integrated funding mechanism to receive funding from every donor via a one-door system. The dispersed and diverse types of funding mechanisms potentially encourage malpractice, such as corruption by certain actors, and this allows vested interests or hidden agendas, either from the donor’s side or from Indonesian politicians, to influence decisions. Ultimately, the dispersed nature of the authorities, which lack clear communication and reporting from each level of governance in Indonesia, could severely hinder accountability.

Another policy implication of the transformative 4Is+3 is the contested and opposing aspects of REDD+. This dualistic approach will remain as long as the existing
resource oligarchies and their supporters in various political parties dominate the Indonesian regulation of forestry concessions (Di Gregorio et al., 2013; Luttrell et al., 2014). Conflicting public reactions to bilateral climate aid emerged due to the lack of continuous engagement between foreign donors and civil society groups in Indonesia. At the start of the REDD+ project in 2012, civil society engagement was successfully achieved by the Norwegian government through the NICFI programme. It distributed the money directly to NGOs via a transparent monitoring system and regular reporting (the reporting data can be easily accessed through the Norwegian government’s official website). However, this form of engagement did not apply to the UK or Australian case. The UK government continued to regard formality and government-to-government partnership as the core principles, and managed cooperation through their intermediary agency, TAF. The UK case reflects what Pattberg (2010: 284) argued: that climate partnerships were dominated by states, both in terms of leadership and general membership, while scientific institutions and business actors frequently participated, but rarely took a leading role.

However, the Australian climate partnership was beset by poor management in dealing with civil society groups. In particular, politicisation emerged as individual participants developed “expertise” through their work on the project. This means that there were political biases and interests among non-state actors affecting the allocation of what the Australian government offered to address climate change problems in Indonesia.

The climate aid pledged by the three donors (Norway, the UK and Australia) did not entirely translate into major development breakthroughs. The donor with the most tangible and progressive impact on emissions reduction was the UK, which relied on a strong intergovernmental relationship and adherence to the transparency principle as well as to the theory of change, as clearly explained in chapter 5. If aid effectiveness is to be linked more firmly to development strategies, the balance of today’s aid allocations must change. Indeed, bilateral climate partnerships could be conducted better through diversified forms of civil society engagement and a combination of
strong intergovernmental relationships and multi-stakeholder-based partnerships. Furthermore, transformational change in bilateral climate governance would only really have an impact if all four Is had the same level of impact and were interlinked. The next section concludes the analytical discussion and implications of the transformative 4Is+3 for the bilateral mechanism in the Indonesian context.

4.7 Conclusion
Bilateral climate governance in the three case studies showed a strong political commitment to low-carbon development in Indonesia. This could be seen from their creation of transformation coalitions, such as merging the roles of the NICFI agents with the Ministry of the Environment of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as the UKCCU with TAF, and the establishment of the KFCP by the Australian government. These various institutions supported the implementation of local incentives for Indonesian stakeholders at the provincial and district level who have been combating climate change problems. However, none of them actually fulfilled the promise of “no deforestation”.

The apparent paradigm shift towards a pro-climate regime proved to be little more than an empty promise, which meant that there was no strong driver for the Indonesian government to work harder on emissions reduction. Ultimately, there was a lack of access and an information disclosure problem. All three donor countries experienced severe difficulties in pursuing the targeted carbon emissions reduction, and each donor had different ways of disseminating information, particularly with respect to the style of reporting and the criteria used to assess carbon emissions reduction.

In terms of leadership change within the Indonesian government (in particular at the presidential level), the Australian case was significantly affected due to the complexity of domestic leadership changes in the Australian government. The policy experiments on climate change in all three case studies did not perform well due to an unclear mechanism of delivering the programme design/objective/rationale of climate
change. Meanwhile, the challenge of decentralisation led to the most varied results due to multiple local sites/areas with their own characteristics and different styles of district and provincial governors, along with ulterior political interests and practices of corruption.

One promising aspect of climate policy transformation in the cases studied was institutional change. All three case studies performed well with regard to institutional arrangements by using the initiative of each donor to set up a development agency or specific body to work with the Indonesian government, designing a programme for projects, and considering how to disburse the money. However, these positive institutional initiatives were weakened by other institutional problems, such as the changing leadership in Indonesia and the unclear and uncoordinated mandate at the internal ministerial and local government levels. The high performance of institutional arrangement also caused difficulties in unravelling the changes in governance structure and processes of Indonesian bilateral climate partnership.

Thus, the bilateral climate governance partnership in Indonesia did not seem to effectively and did not account for the significance of small policy experiments as an indication of transformational change. In particular, in terms of the institutional factor, the Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships performed well in initiating an organisational structure, promoting policy change, and delivering political commitment between foreign donors and the Indonesian government. There was, however, not enough evidence or action on the part of either foreign donors or Indonesia to substantiate a paradigm shift toward a pro-climate regime and transparent information system, nor was there sufficiently robust public engagement between foreign donors and civil society groups. The next chapter discusses the institutional change and challenges in the context of Indonesian bilateral climate change partnerships.
Chapter 5: The Effect of Indonesian Institutional Reform and Leadership Change on Climate Change

5.1. Introduction

This chapter explains the institutional reform process in Indonesia and the leadership change affecting the bilateral mechanism in the context of climate change. The dynamic process of both institutional and leadership change in Indonesia related to climate change has been politically difficult for both donor countries and Indonesia. In particular, the case of merging all REDD+ institutions and the National Council on Climate Change into the Directorate General for Climate Change Control (DG-CCC) represented a key point in institutional reform in Indonesia and leadership change. Before delving into the analysis, it should be briefly outlined that the Indonesian regulations and institutional arrangements on climate change under Joko Widodo’s presidency on 23rd January 2015 (Presidential Decree number 16/year 2015) were significantly modified in comparison to those introduced by the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono regime on the National Council on Climate Change under Presidential Decree number 46/2008 on 4th July 2008. The case-studies on institutional climate change reform primarily ran from 2009 until 2015, straddling two different presidencies: President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Pertinently, the leaders adopted different styles in terms of institutional arrangements and their general political perspective. President SBY was more outward-looking than Jokowi, as evidenced through the way in which Indonesia was presented on the global arena during his time and power and the establishment of institutions related to REDD+ that he oversaw (Satgas REDD+, UKP4, DNPI, BPREDD+).

In 2015, Indonesia consolidated its climate-change-related institutions under the new DG-CCC within the newly-formed Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK, 2015). The previous climate agencies under President SBY, namely the National Council on Climate Change, BPREDD+, and other relevant institutions on
climate change, were merged into the DG-CCC. Jokowi however merged the Ministry of Environment with the Ministry of Forestry in 2015 (Presidential Regulation number 16, 2015). Within this new ministry there was also a leadership change when Siti Nurbaya became the first female Minister of Environment and Forestry and initiated important measures. Notable examples here include the oil palm moratorium in 2018, the one map policy (a general spatial planning tool for all levels of government in Indonesia), and policy reform through the establishment of the Directorate General of Climate Change Control together with the Directorate General of Law Enforcement in order to combat forest crimes (Vol, 2017). These changes in climate-related institutions had a positive impact on cutting deforestation, but not significantly enough to secure the sustainability of the REDD project. Crucially, the LoI between Norway and Indonesia was terminated on 10th September 2021 (MoFA, 2021).

Beyond the Indonesian government, institutional change also took place among foreign donors, which also had an impact on bilateral climate change partnerships as observed in the three case studies. The three case-studies of the Norway-Indonesia, UK-Indonesia, and Australia-Indonesia climate change partnerships demonstrate the different institutional challenges faced by the Indonesian government and their international partners, and I will go into the substantive details of this institutional change further in the chapter. The Norwegian case faced a trust and communication problem, with the transition from UNDP to Partnership/Kemitraan (an Indonesian NGO) as the intermediary agency between Norway and Indonesia. Meanwhile, the intergovernmental partnership in the UK case improved through government-to-government interaction through the establishment of the UKCCU but had limited direct engagement with local non-state actors. In Australian case, the presence of “veto players” on the Australian conservative right of the federal coalition government limited the progress of domestic policies toward aligning with national risks on climate change. The Australian focus shifted from a pro-climate policy to one centred on international economic growth and trade policy.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian parliament took climate policy into account through the National Action Plan on Greenhouse Gases or RAN-GRK in 2011 (RAN-GRK, 2011), with the emissions reduction target increased to 29% by 2030 (through national implementation) and 41% with international aid/assistance under Jokowi’s presidency in 2015. However, the emissions reduction target in 2015 that Jokowi set was subsequently challenged by a newly-integrated law in 2020. On 2nd November 2020, there was an omnibus law passed with integrated regulations, having a negative impact on the environment and climate change (WALHI, 2020). A further explanation of the change to the Indonesian government’s leadership is provided in section 5.4. The omnibus law case portrays that the changing leadership within the domestic politics of Indonesia (from President SBY to President Jokowi) brought further complexity to climate policies and attracted criticism from civil society groups.

This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.2 outlines the complex pattern of institutional change in Indonesia in greater detail. Section 5.3 presents how leadership changes affected the process of transformative bilateral climate partnerships, using three case-studies. In section 5.4, the leadership challenges are explained through fragmented bureaucracy in Indonesia, especially bureaucratic dispute between national and local governments. After all the findings are described, the discussion and analysis of this chapter is presented in section 5.5. Finally, an overall analysis of the findings is summarized in section 5.6.

5.2 The complex pattern of institutional change in Indonesia
In the context of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia, institutionalism significantly affects government actors at national and local level. However, the efficacy of institutional change at each level has been relatively unstable due to the changes in leadership and complex bureaucracy, which has dynamically affected the governance reform process in Indonesia. Three factors in particular have been pertinent in institutional change. First, the merging two ministries to create the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. Second, the role played by female leaders at ministerial
level and, third, the moratorium policy’s pursuit of a very low rate of deforestation. These dynamic institutional changes also directly impacted foreign donors as well.

In the context of Indonesian climate governance, there have been some major policy changes arising from the change in leadership from President SBY to President Jokowi. In particular, there have been three key points in the new institutional framework on climate change: the National Action Plan on Greenhouse Gases/ RAN-GRK that was adopted into Presidential Regulation number 61 in 2011 (Bappenas, 2011); the creation of several institutions related to climate change and REDD+; and the forest moratorium through Presidential Instruction number 10/2011 in 2011 (BPK, 2011). Ultimately, there were too many institutions dealing with climate change under President SBY and significant miscoordination among them.

The thrust of the National Action Plan on Greenhouse Gases (RAN-GRK) came from the political commitment made by President SBY at the G20 Summit in 2009. President SBY announced that Indonesia was committed to a major target of reducing emissions relative to a “business-as-usual” baseline of 26% by 2020 (President of Indonesia, 2011). At the time, this was seen as an ambitious pledge and it helped to attract significant funding from multilateral organisations and donors to support the REDD+ programme in Indonesia. At the national level, the RAN-GRK was adopted by parliament and Presidential Regulation number 61 followed in 2011 (Ministry of Environment, 2012). Although there was a clear initiative to ensure that the political commitment on emissions reduction would be honoured, the central government did not directly guide or build a mechanism pursuant to the RAN-GRK’s implementation. It took three years for it to break down and socialise the RAN-GRK among local stakeholders and the general public (Bappenas, 2015). The reasons behind the delay in this process of the RAN-GRK’s implementation were a lack of climate mitigation data and access thereto, difficulty in identifying funding sources, and a lack of supporting activities to implement the RAN-GRK (both from local and national government) (Bappenas, 2014:40). Hence, the delayed implementation slowed the rate of
deforestation in Indonesia, and harmed the synchronicity of climate policies between central and local government pursuant to reducing emissions.

Another institutional approach that President SBY took was to create several agencies covering climate change and the REDD+ programme. In supporting economic growth through of pro-poor, pro-job, pro-growth, and pro-environment principles, President SBY instructed 17 ministries and the Geophysics and Meteorological Bureau (BMG) to establish the National Council on Climate Change (DNPI) in 2009. This institution was given legitimacy under Presidential Regulation number 46 of 2008, according to which President SBY became the Chair, along with the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs becoming Vice-Chair, and the Minister for Environment becoming the Managing Director (kontan.co.id, 2011). President SBY also set up the REDD+ Task Force (BPRED+) and President Delivery Unit (UKP4) in order to reinforce the DNPI and REDD+ agencies. However, the actual operation of climate governance in individual ministries did not flourish due to uncoordinated inter-ministerial cooperation and a lack of transparency in the information given to civil society groups (Mulyani and Jepson, 2013). There was also contention among ministerial officials and between government and civil society groups over the multitudinous and overlapping roles of each institution addressing climate change, which increased the miscoordination and added to the complexity of climate change governance in Indonesia.

The last institutional framework of note under SBY entailed imposing the forest moratorium through Presidential Instruction number 10 in 2011 (BPK, 2011). The forest moratorium meant that private sectors and other relevant stakeholders stopped logging changes in the use of forest and peat land illegally for up to two years. In addition, the LoI (2010) stated that Indonesia would implement “a two-year suspension on all new concessions for conversion of peat and natural forest.” However, the two-year suspension could not solve climate change restoration (Lang, 2010). Indeed, a two-year suspension (designed to stop the burning of forests) increased the chance of palm oil corporations and other relevant companies seeking alternative ways of cutting
trees or clearing land. The suspension’s timeframe was not adequate and further forest policy reform was needed. It produced a loophole, allowing for the handover of peat swamps and forests as concessions to plantation companies. In short, the law did not improve the state of forests in Indonesia, and made things even worse than before.

Jokowi’s presidency marked a breakthrough in institutional reform regarding climate change as of February 2015, while the omnibus law (which was adopted as a national law on 2nd November 2020) aligned with public needs albeit future sustainability remained a problem. First, Jokowi merged the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Forestry to create the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF). All existing agencies related to climate change (the DNPI, BPREDD+, and REDD+ Task Force) were also merged under the Directorate General of Climate Change Control (DG-CCC). Second, the Siti Nurbaya as the Minister of Environment and Forestry played a central role in improving the Indonesian government’s leadership, especially in combating climate change problems. Third, the forest moratorium introduced by President SBY and the emerging omnibus law of 2020 stirred public controversies and possibly weakened Jokowi’s consistent commitment on emissions reduction demonstrated in the Paris Climate Agreement 2015 and the introduction of the National Determined Contribution (NDC) programme. Below, three relevant factors are covered in more detail.

Firstly, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) was formally established under Presidential Regulation number 16 in 2015 (BPK, 2015). Under the MoEF, there was a specific task set to manage REDD+ and become the focal point of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) through the DG-CCC (Direktorat Jenderal Pengendalian Perubahan Iklim or DJPPI). As a consequence, the National Climate Change Council (Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim or DNPI) under the Presidential Regulation number 46 in 2008 and the REDD+ Agency (Badan Pengelola REDD+) under the Presidential Regulation number 62 in 2013 were

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35 A detailed explanation of DGCCC is presented in section 5.2.1.
no longer active in 2015 and all of their tasks were merged under the DG-CCC (Presidential Decree number 16 in 2015). This coherent institutional system brought improvements to the MoEF. As for the impact on climate change restoration in Indonesia, the MoEF implemented the REDD+ scheme through the REDD+ National Strategy, the Forest Reference Emission Level (FREL), the National Forest Monitoring System (NFMS), the Safeguards Information System (SIS), and the Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) system (MoEF, 2018). Ultimately, the monitoring and climate mitigation assessment indicated a low rate of deforestation for the period of 2013-2017, which representing 10.4% reduction in emissions compared to the baseline, and a reduction of 20.4% if peat decomposition is excluded (ibid, p. 2).

Jokowi also created an agency on peatland in January 2016, namely the Peatland Restoration Agency (BRG). This institution was tasked with restoring 2 million ha of burnt/degraded peatlands in seven priority provinces by 2020 (Ibid, page 55). His administration provided further instructions to strengthen forest fire prevention and handling measures, to strengthen the government regulation on peatlands (2nd December 2016), to accelerate the one map policy at a scale of 1:50,000 (1st February 2016) including establishing the one map policy Acceleration Team, setting a moratorium on the expansion of oil palm plantations, and evaluating oil palm plantation licenses (19th September 2018). Although much of the REDD+ scheme was implemented and a new peat restoration agency was in place, disputes among ministries was inevitable. Specifically, miscoordination arose from sectoral ego (meaning that each ministry claimed that it had its own responsibilities that did not align with others), uncoordinated communication, and ministries looking after their own interests ahead of working together for the nation as a whole.

Secondly, Siti Nurbaya as the first female Minister for Environment and Forestry played a central role in significantly improving bureaucratic leadership. In early 2015, Jokowi appointed Nurbaya as Minister of Environment and Forestry. Her background was as a politician in the National Democrat Party and she had advanced
bureaucratic experience in the Ministry of Home Affairs. During her tenure in the MoEF, she has been responsible for: implementing agrarian reform and social forestry covering up to 12.7 million ha; establishing 552 conservation areas covering 27.4 million ha; developing intensive silviculture (SILIN), reduced impact logging (RIL), and timber legality verification (SVLK) systems; reducing the deforestation rate through the continuing moratorium on primary forest and peatlands; introducing Government Regulation No. 57/2016 (replacing Government Regulation No. 71/2014 on Peatland Ecosystem Protection and Management); improving forest fire prevention; strengthening law enforcement to combat wildlife and exotic-plant-related forest crime; and improving water, air, and land pollution controls (Dwisatrio et al., 2021: 46). Nurbaya has thus proved capable and brought about many positive changes regarding climate change policies. Two such policies were the institutional reform pertinent to REDD+ (through the DG-CCC and Directorate General of Law Enforcement) and the implementation of the forestry moratorium. Nurbaya proved that her new leadership style with a fast working pace could create conducive bureaucracy. Courtesy of her strong leadership, Nurbaya remained the Minister of Environment and Forestry in the second term of Jokowi’s presidency (Presidential Press, 2019).

Thirdly, President Jokowi recommenced President SBY’s commitment to the moratorium on primary forest and peatlands in 2011, and renewed it every two years (Dwisatrio et al., 2021: 47). As a continuation of the moratorium policy, Jokowi created Presidential Instruction number 6 in 2017, and the suspension of oil palm plantations was then introduced through Presidential Instruction number 8 in 2018. Furthermore, he later made the moratorium permanent through Presidential Instruction number 5 in 2019 just before the end of his first term (Winata, 2019). The permanent moratorium was originally planned to span five years, but this was later reduced to three years (Dwisatrio et al., 2021: 48). In short, the continuation of the moratorium had a positive impact on deforestation reduction and also helped to cut carbon emissions.

Indeed, the continuing moratorium policy improved the deforestation rate (as used as evidence of climate change restoration and carbon emissions reduction pledges
made under the Paris Agreement 2015 being pursued). According to the Indonesian Center for Environmental Law (ICEL) report (2019), there was a notable decline in the deforestation rate, dropping from 1.09 million ha in 2015-2016 to 0.44 million ha in 2017-2018. Global Forest Watch also stated that the deforestation rate in Indonesia decreased by 40% in (2018) and a period (2002-2016).

Meanwhile, the World Resources Institute’s (WRI) report in 2019 stated that the deforestation rate improvement in Indonesia came from effective government policy, and specifically the moratorium on permits for primary forest and peat, as well as forest and land fire control, peat damage control, and climate change control. Furthermore, the WRI explained the following three benefits of the permanent moratorium: (i) no deforestation in primary forest and peatlands; (ii) assured livelihoods for local and indigenous communities living around the forests; and (iii) reduced likelihood of forest and land fires (Samadhi 2019).

However, an investigation by Tempo, Earthsight, Mongabay and Malaysiakini in 2018 revealed that 280,000 ha of concession land had been abandoned by the Menara Group, which failed to fulfil its pledge to develop oil palm plantations and associated infrastructure (Tempo.co, 2018). Instead, it secured huge profits from logging high-value timber worth IDR 12 trillion (around USD 847 million) (Dwisatrio et al., 2021:49). Another critic from Sawit Watch Indonesia claimed that the implementation of Presidential Instruction No. 8/2018 (moratorium on new licenses for oil palm plantations) was falling short as 19 of 25 provinces and 239 of 247 districts had yet to enforce the regulation (Dwisatrio et al., 2021: 48). This evidence shows that moratorium did not have a significantly positive impact, and palm oil plantations grew in size and number despite the regulation being imposed on cutting primary forest/land.

Elsewhere, criticism has been levelled at the omnibus law. Enacted in late 2020, the law reversed the devolution stipulated under the 1999 decentralisation law, which spurred a move away from a powerful centralistic regime by delegating power to regional governments which would better understand the needs and challenges of their given areas (The Jakarta Post, 2020). In short, the omnibus law compacted hundreds of
bills on job creation, financial capacity, taxation, and the economic sector as a whole. In relation to the environment, Jokowi proposed amendments to at least 79 existing laws (Dwisatrio et al., 2021: 50).

There has been extensive criticism of and negative reactions to the omnibus law from various non-state actors. In particular, Prof. Hariadi Kartodiharjo in the Forest Digest (17 February 2020) identified how the omnibus law weakened Law No. 23/2009 on Environmental Protection and Management. There were two particular impacts highlighted: the Environmental Management (UKL) and Environmental Monitoring Efforts (UPL) would no longer be part of the decision-making process for business operations permits (as stated in Article 1 number 22); the need for industry actors to obtain an environmental permit was removed. The omnibus law will simplify the land-based business permit process by replacing the mandatory ‘environmental permit’ (izin lingkungan) with a weaker ‘environmental approval’ (persetujuan lingkungan), potentially limiting both public participation in environmental impact assessments and the public’s ability to challenge permits in court (ICEL, 2020). Observers have raised concerns that the omnibus law sidelines environmental concerns in pursuit of economic expansion (Jong, 2020a). Mongabay (2020) reported how the proposal had the potential for adverse impacts on the environment, which would be even more pronounced than previously feared. The media reported that under the omnibus law, regional administrations’ forest and environmental management authority (including approving environment permits, plantation, mining and electricity generation permits) was revoked and transferred back to central government as the sole authority in charge of spatial planning for land and forest management. There are pros and cons of the omnibus law, however it appears to have torn up parts of the decentralization legislation and weakens environmental regulations. However, its critics cannot be proved right or wrong yet.

As covered above, the institutional picture in the Indonesian government was made complicated by political interests of certain groups (political parties, elites, and top businesspeople) in the 2015-2019 period. An institutional reform was undertaken
with complicated bureaucracy under the DG-CCC and the MoEF which rendered efforts to reduce deforestation somewhat unstable. The establishment of the omnibus law and its contentious articles also provide evidence that institutional change at the Indonesian ministerial level has entailed a complex transition toward pursuing an improved climate change governance system. In short, there were some important institutional changes that appear to have enhanced climate governance in Indonesia, but these have subsequently been weakened by the omnibus law. The next section describes the emergence of the DG-CCC, including reasons why this institution has been so important to climate governance in Indonesia.

5.2.1 The emergence of the Directorate General of Climate Change Control (DG-CCC)

In early 2015, Jokowi undertook significant institutional reform through the merging of the Ministries of Environment and Forestry (KLHK). As a consequence, BPREDD+ was removed and that restructuring would harm the LoI and also make it difficult to coordinate REDD+ and climate change issues beyond the forestry sector (Moelleono et al., 2020: 114, 145). Nevertheless, the DG-CCC took on the REDD+ institutional framework at the end of 2016 (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2018), and by 2019 it was regarded by the Indonesian government as the most influential REDD+ actor in the country (Moeliono et al., 2020). The emergence of the DG-CCC did not necessarily ensure that the central government would improve forest governance. Whether the DG-CCC’s role is one of useful governance of REDD+ projects or climate change restoration in general, it has still mostly focused on technical issues related to forestry or land-use changes (e.g. Ministerial Regulation number 70 in 2017 concerning procedures for REDD+ implementation) and it has a long journey ahead to fix the complex problems within the MoEF.

The Indonesian Forum for Environment (WALHI) and Greenpeace Indonesia were sceptical about the decision of the new agency DG-CCC arguing that combining the Ministry of Forestry’s exploitation paradigm with the Ministry of Environment’s
conservation paradigm would be virtually impossible (Jakarta Post, 2016). The former REDD+ Agency chairman, Heru Prasetyo, presented a paper at the Wetlands’ Seminar on Mangroves and REDD+ in Jakarta on 26\textsuperscript{th} April 2018, and called the situation an “interruption to the grand experiment, causing a significant slowdown in progress combatting climate change” (Dwisatrio et al., 2021: 45). The slow progress of the DG-CCC was not, in the author’s view, caused by internal factors, as the leadership of Minister Nurbaya and the designated leaders in the DG-CCC had already set the road map and work plan in pursuit of climate change restoration. These efforts were aligned with Jokowi’s expectation, namely that the merger of ministries was to streamline government and reduce overlap between ministries.

Despite the controversy surrounding the DG-CCC, it has been specified by Jokowi as the official focal point for climate change policy planning. This means that the DG-CCC had the task of submitting an updated progress report of the NDC to the UNFCCC and administering the REDD+ programme under the Directorate of Mitigation (Climate Action Tracker, 2021: 4). The DG-CCC, however, only formulated and implemented procedural regulations regarding REDD+ in 2016, as well as coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating and reporting on REDD+ implementation, while “substantive” REDD+ policies, programmes, and activities, such as the moratorium, oil palm moratorium, peatland protection, peatland restoration, sustainable forest management, social forestry, and critical land rehabilitation were formulated and implemented by other Directorate Generals under the MoEF (Dwisatrio et al., 2021). It also had limited influence on climate action and sectoral plans as line ministries often acted independently. Indonesia’s national planning agency, Bappenas, coordinated planning and policy development amongst ministries as well as amongst provinces. Notably, Bappenas translated the national climate mitigation target into sector-level mid-term targets and policies, collectively reaching an emissions reduction of more than 27%, and it pursued the development of regional low-carbon development plans (RPRKD). This situation exemplifies projectification (which means merely the formalisation of project management (being undone, and the process being left behind),
not transformational change in the climate change institutions (Li, 2015; Moeliono et al., 2020). In short, the role and work of the DG-CCC and Bappenas was not sufficient with regard to institutional reform on climate change, and most of the climate policies and their implementation were still at surface level. The DG-CCC had a limited technical role and responsibilities, with key policies devised elsewhere in departments likely not to prioritise CC/REDD+.

Based on my analysis, there was a lack of coordination among Indonesian governmental bodies because institutional frameworks such as SatGas REDD+ were not followed up or they stopped due to the change in the presidency and unclear information dissemination between national and local governments. Regarding the management of REDD+ at the national level, there was an unsystematic procedure and mechanism within the MoEF on managing the Indonesian emissions reduction target.

Between 2010 and 2015, Indonesia lost a total of 9.9 million ha of tree cover (Brazil lost a total of 14.4 million ha in the same period). Pertinently, REDD+ has failed to have any impact on the corruption and land grabbing behind the ongoing social and environmental crisis in Indonesia. According to Earthsight (2015), which created the Gecko Project, only three palm oil licenses were awarded between 1998 and 2003 in Seruyan. Meanwhile, Darwan became Seruyan’s first district chief (bupati in Bahasa Indonesian) in 2003. In his first two years as district governor, Darwan issued 37 licenses, covering a total area of almost 500,000 ha. Further evidence was gleaned from some of the interviews conducted with a number of government officials at the MoEF and a deputy from the National Development Planning Ministry/Bappenas. Many stated that the Indonesian government did not create a single integrated and transparent funding body for donors or other stakeholders in the period of 2015-2019. There was apparently a plan to do so, but limited moves were made to implement it. The capacity within the Indonesian national government was also weak when it came to setting up the funding agency as requested by the Norwegian government in 2017. Significantly, the DG-CCC at the MoEF stated that there was limited ability on the part of the Indonesian government to check and investigate how donor funding was being
distributed (Interview 20). Overall, the creation of this new agency did not bring about substantial improvement with respect to climate change.

Considering the condition and development of the DG-CCC as noted above, it is important to understand that institutionalism has played an important role, with mixed effects, in the context of climate change governance reform in Indonesia. However, the changing and dynamic relationship has been significantly influenced by contradictory regulations at central and regional levels, and weak coordination between government agencies. Their work in running and scaling-up climate change institutions run has been slow due to the specific focus on technicalities rather than on directly addressing socioeconomic and political drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. In short, transformational change through the DG-CCC has not been achieved to date (Novyanza et al., 2021: 1), whilst its operational system has taken on a “business-as-usual” character. Sectoral ego, which can be defined as the separate and uncoordinated communication of ministries with other governmental departments, has plagued Indonesian politics. The next section elaborates on the contradictory leadership witnessed in bilateral climate change partnerships, between fragmented and consolidated bureaucracy.

5.3 Leadership change and challenges in the process of transformative bilateral climate partnerships

The previous section outlined the institutional changes to Indonesian climate governance, providing the context for the implementation of the three chosen bilateral climate partnerships. This section explains the challenges faced across the three case-studies: the Indonesia-Norway climate change partnership; the Indonesia-UK climate change partnership; and the Indonesia-Australia climate change partnership. Norway emerged as a pioneer by creating REDD+ and giving direct access to funding for Indonesian civil society groups through the NICFI. However, some contradictory opinions have been presented in this research, showing that not everyone involved in
the Indonesia-Norway climate partnership had a positive view, and also that Norway has not been the most effective donor to support Indonesian climate restoration.

The UK case, in turn, reveals the part played by institutionalism through the establishment of the UKCCU and the UK’s strong commitment to engaging local governments (through its intermediary agency/trust the Asia Foundation (TAF)). The case of the Asia Foundation, and the way that it managed local NGOs and other civil society groups with frequent communication and progress reports, showed that the UK government’s leadership worked effectively in Indonesia’s local governance system. The Asia Foundation worked with more than 67 local NGOs across Indonesia on the project regarding forest and land-use governance, in particular engaging in transparency and anti-corruption activities (DFID, 2014). This arrangement became the driving factor behind the Indonesian government moving forward with better climate governance, specifically when it came to deal with illegal loggers or corruption related to deforestation in local areas.

Meanwhile, the Australian partnership treated Indonesia differently to the other two. In particular, the presence of “veto players” on the Australian conservative right of the federal coalition government, including those who are sceptical of climate change, limited the progress of domestic policies in aligning with the national interests of Australia. Hence, the backward steps taken by Australia in its own climate policy negatively affected its bilateral cooperation with Indonesia. Furthermore, the Australian government and its leadership as a whole became highly volatile in 2014-2015 due to a change in prime minister. This case reflects how the Indonesian government hit a stumbling block as its bilateral climate programme with Australia went stagnant, slowing down the impact on local actors in the Central Kalimantan project such as the KFCP in 2011-2013.

The internal analysis conducted in this research concerns the Indonesian government structure and the institutional changes therein. Indeed, there have been two key changes in the institutional system: the change in the Indonesian MoFA leadership’s approach to the UKCCU-ICCTF alignment; and the change in the funding
mechanisms within the Indonesian system. First, the leadership of the MoFA initially oversaw the negotiation and implementation of the partnership between the UKCCU and the ICCTF starting from 2000. In the National Act of International Treaty number 24 of 2000, Article 5 chapter 1 states that the consultation mechanism between the MoFA and other departments should involve intensive communication of political/judicial thoughts. Article 7 Chapter 2 of the same treaty states that the MoFA is the main actor in this regard, able to allocate mandates and powers (Indonesian Government Report, 2000). This implies that the MoFA played a prominent role in coordinating and leading the international negotiation process, both bilaterally and multilaterally. By contrast, there was still feeble leadership on the part of the MoFA regarding the environmental agreement process across all three partnerships. Since the climate negotiations began, the leadership of the MoFA has been weak and Bappenas has effectively taken over. According to one of the interviewees, the fact that the MoFA, the fact that the MoFA “threw the ball” to another department demonstrates a lack of responsibility (Interview 9). In climate change negotiations and with the continuation of climate finance aid to Indonesia, the MoFA had both an important role and the power to manage the ratification of agreements and other relevant documents.

5.3.1 The Norwegian case and its institutional challenges in the REDD+ project

This section explains the complex challenge posed with respect to Norway and its managing of institutional change, specifically concerning Indonesia and the REDD+ project. Norway publicly expressed its frustration at Indonesia’s apparently slow progress in implementing forest control and governance measures in 2011-2017, causing the Minister of Environment and Forestry Siti Nurbaya to state in turn her “regret” at her Norwegian counterpart’s bluntness. Given the importance of politeness and diplomacy in Indonesia, this suggests that Nurbaya took significant offence (Maxton Lee, 2020). Norway’s frustration reflects a lack of perspective on how entrenched norms, interests, and subjectivities cannot be overridden by new or more
effective institutions, as well as a failure to sufficiently acknowledge the complexity of Indonesia’s institutional and political history (Maxton Lee, 2020: 121).

At the initial stage, the commitment of the Norwegian government in supporting financial and practical consultation with regard to Indonesia between early 2011 until 2015 provided good evidence of its determination to build institutional and legal reforms to help reduce Indonesian deforestation, while at the same time circumventing the market and going directly to the problem of institutional and governance failure (partly laying the foundations for future REDD+ efforts).

Moreover, the moratorium (i.e. the suspension of forest burning or logging) entails a halt to the issuance of new permits to clear forests, albeit with some caveats in Indonesia. The “One Map” programme is an exercise that involves coordinating and homogenising all national forest data into one single reference map on which to base all decisions about land use in Indonesia (Dwisatrio et al, 2021). The moratorium attracted a high degree of optimism when it was announced in 2010 through the signing of a letter of intent (LoI) based on REDD+. Norway pledged up to US$1 billion in stages and Indonesia agreed to make a number of institutional changes on which to base future developments (Murdiyarso et al., 2020: 112).

The signing of the LoI did not guarantee that the climate policy between Indonesia and Norway would go well. The REDD+ project received critical reviews from civil society organisations in particular. An Indonesian environmental activism organisation (WALHI) stated that the REDD+ project brought by Norway was acting as a form of “redemption” in Indonesia, and that Norwegian NGOs or other pressure groups who oppose and criticise the Norwegian government when it comes to oil exploration should have been more focused on environmental issues at home (Interview 8). Accordingly, there was a low level of trust among Indonesian civil society groups toward Norway, as the foreign donor pledging significant funding to Indonesian climate change mitigation. The contentious reactions and opinions of the public have also been evidenced in the CIFOR’s research (2020). In Indonesia, the REDD+ project is being implemented within the challenging context of a resource-rich
economy, unclear land rights and allotment of concessions, and insufficient protection for indigenous communities (Novyanza et al., 2020:3).

The REDD+ project in Indonesia, as well as dealing with unclear land rights and their allotment, must also combat weak law enforcement and insufficient protection of indigenous rights. Some instances of deforestation and forest degradation have occurred illegally (or semi-legally), even within areas zoned-off for conservation (Luttrell et al., 2012). The forest and peatland moratorium introduced in 2011 suffered from delays and technical shortcomings, and thus was unable to fully prevent forest conversion (Murdiyarso et al., 2011, Seymour, 2012). For example, the LoI used the term ‘natural forest’ – which the Indonesian government does not recognize – whereas the moratorium wording used the term ‘primary forest.’ In addition, indigenous land recognition, as mandated by the constitutional court ruling, has progressed slowly and unevenly (Astuti and McGregor, 2016), likely because of opposition from within government and private companies, who stand to lose control of – and revenues from – forests (Moeliono et al., 2017). Ambiguity in the terms and mechanisms of the REDD+ project in Indonesia have drawn critical responses from civil society and other non-state actors.

Another form of criticism levelled by two major newspapers in Norway, Aftenposten and Verdens Gang (VG), defined that Norway was a ‘tainted hero’ in climate change mitigation, being a significant polluter itself. Globally-oriented journalism or international media would be more adept at amplifying voices of resistance and those in favour of different transnational politics of climate change compared to those that failed in Bali. If such journalism seems a somewhat utopian notion, at least a more widespread “transnational climate literacy” among reporters might widen the scope of reporting from climate summits (Eide and Ytterstad, 2011: 68). In short, these two media outlets argued that Norwegian climate politics was tainted by the country’s oil exploitation. Morality, argues James Garvey (2008: 140), “insists on a kind of humane consistency.” When Aftenposten and VG pointed to supposed Norwegian double standards, implying immorality and a betrayal of the
“polluter pays” principle and Garvey’s (2008) connections between causal and moral responsibilities, suggesting that the developed world has “extra duties, deeper responsibilities and more obligations…when it comes to action on climate change” (115). In this framing of Norwegian oil hegemony, the relevant journalists appear to echo this moral imperative (Eide and Ytterstad, 2011: 67).

In addition to the two major Norwegian press outlets, a WALHI activist also suggested that the Norwegian government had explored or exploited their own oil and played the role of a “hero” in developing countries in order to redeem itself for the damage it had done to the environment at home. However, this narrative was not the main factor in the climate change partnership between Norway and Indonesia eventually struggling. Both countries had national interests and set certain strategies to arrange institutional change such as the establishment of the REDD+ Agency and funding mechanism. However, morality and public narration had less of an impact on bilateral climate policy in Indonesia.

The main reason for analysing the fragmented REDD+ bureaucracy in Norway is that the funding of the Norwegian government was mostly delayed by the REDD+ project in Indonesia. Both Norway and Indonesia had their flaws here. The delayed implementation was mainly attributable to the complex governance problems and domestic politics in Indonesia, as well as delayed political decisions of the Norwegian parliament in implementing REDD+ in Indonesia. The delayed disbursement was also due to both a lack of a well-established and integrated funding agency in the Indonesian government system and the failure to prove that necessary achievements had been made in order to obtain results-based payment from the Norwegian government. On this matter, the representative of the Norwegian Embassy observed:

‘So basically there hasn’t been a government channel, there has not been a way for us to put the money directly to the government because the financial funding mechanism was not established, still isn’t. We also make a budget every year and we look at everything that we need and so far we haven’t reached that stage where we pay the results-based payment.’ (Interview 2)
There were also misunderstandings among Indonesian actors about where Norwegian money was being channelled and who was taking fees for administration, leading to mistrust of, and between, key agencies (Maxton Lee, 2020: 119). Rumours circulated about money being siphoned off to Western multilateral agencies, which, while unsubstantiated, fed further mistrust. There was partial disbursement of funding: as of 2014, only 4.5% of the US$1 billion had been disbursed as start-up funds and financing for the interim phase of the project. This was because some of the key components of phase one of the project had not by then been completed. The agreement period for the eventual disbursement of up to US$1 billion was extended to 2020 to allow more time for institutional reforms. There was also some misunderstanding about benefits: local stakeholders had unrealistically high expectations of the benefits of the programme, including anticipating substantial financial benefits. This fuelled disappointment and frustration when such benefits did not materialise. Suspicion was also aroused that the US$1 billion had already been paid to the national government and had been retained by Jakarta, fuelling resentment towards the central bureaucracy.

The other challenge regarding the REDD+ programme in this bilateral climate partnership was the Indonesian government’s performance on emissions reduction. Specifically, Indonesia had not accomplished the targets set by Norway under the LoI signed in December 2017. Independent evaluators (Caldecott et al, 2011) claimed that there had been no reasonable progress made on emissions reduction in the 2011-2016 period, even though £22.5 million had been paid already from the Norwegian fund into the UNDP Trust Fund. The funding from the Norwegian government was disbursed slowly due to unclear emissions outputs reported by the Indonesian government (Bastiansen and Howell, 2015). In short, the application of the deforestation rate as evidence to obtain payment was underused, so the money was disbursed late from Norway to Indonesia.

In relation to institutional change in the local context, there was a delayed response by the Indonesian national government to indigenous people’s claims to the primary forest. The LoI also did not address the pressures facing Indonesia’s forests,
indigenous people, and local communities. Moreover, it was argued by a representative of the Alliance of Indigenous Communities (AMAN), on the issue of the impact and continuation of REDD+ (Interview 4), that Norway’s REDD+ project had not continued its cooperation with the AMAN after 2013, and that Norwegian funding had had no impact on the livelihoods of indigenous communities (Interview 4). According to a CIFOR representative, no aspects of the REDD+ programme in Indonesia were effective, even after policy change and the change in political leadership (Interview 1). Through these empirical findings, it was found that the REDD+ programme, supported by Norwegian government funding, started well but then deteriorated due to stagnancy of deforestation cuts reported by Indonesia report and the slow performance of Norway.

The slow performance/implementation of Norway stemmed from several sources of evidence, such as quotes and analysis based on interviews (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 13) with representatives of the Indonesian government and NGOs, and documents pertinent to REDD+. At the Oslo Tropical Forest Forum of 26th-30th June 2018, 10 years after REDD+ was included in the Bali Road Map at the UN climate negotiations in December 2007, the Norwegian government admitted that Norway had not performed as well as expected in forest preservation or in becoming a donor on that issue. The opening speech given by Ola Elvestuen, Norway’s Minister of Climate and Environment at the time, at the Oslo Tropical Forest Forum on 27-28 June 2018 stated:

‘Today, I’d like to reflect on where we are and where we need to go, ten years after REDD+ was launched in Bali. And I think bad news first. Despite significant progress, we are not on track. Instead of forests slowing climate change, forest destruction is still driving climate change. Data from Global Forest Watch show a loss of tree cover equivalent to the area of France, Germany, and the UK combined in the last decade. This is a crisis of existential proportions. We either deal with it, or leave for future generations a planet in ecological collapse…’

The statement above came after Norway and Indonesia had concluded their bilateral programme. It shows that the achievements recorded in this partnership to stop deforestation were limited and that REDD+ failed to deliver on its promise, with both
sides to blame. On the subject of reducing carbon emissions in Indonesia, the Indonesian government did not manage to prioritise deforestation loss and Norway did not help significantly when it came to establish an effective mechanism for cutting deforestation in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, there were some benefits gained by the work of REDD+ in Indonesia. Annual tree cover loss declined in 2013 to its lowest point in almost a decade, as the REDD+ required evidence of deforestation loss amounting to 1.04 million ha according to new high-resolution satellite-based maps released by Global Forest Watch, a partnership led by the WRI. From 2011 to 2013, Indonesia’s average tree cover loss was 1.6 million ha per year.

Given the complex subjectivities of natural resource management in Indonesia, it was a tall order for one representative agency to be responsible for “substantive management of the project.” This points to the deep integration of the “common sense” of apolitical technocratic planning in Norwegian actors. It is also understandable that certain parties in Indonesia might dislike attempts being made to circumvent existing hierarchies and to construct new norms of engagement. The risk log in the “Third-party Cost-sharing Agreement Between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme” (the part of the project documentation underpinning the bilateral partnership) noted the risk that government agencies might not cooperate with one another, identifying the MoF as a particular liability in this regard. However, it recorded the risk as “stable” and noted that non-cooperation would “slow, but not prevent progress” (UNDP, 2016). In short, it only had a partial impact.

Norway has also been criticised for “cognitive dissonance,” by applying progressive emissions-reduction efforts globally while earning considerable sovereign wealth from exporting fossil fuels. However, this profile is unfair and misses an important point. Norway is in many ways in a better position than most to understand the “wickedness” of carbon socioeconomics. Norway has also gone further than most countries in financial, advocacy, and intellectual terms to find ways to address this alleged cognitive dissonance (ibid: 132). Thus, both Norway and Indonesia are in a
sense trapped in their resource-extracting economic, social, and political reform. Norway’s frustration at Indonesia’s lack of success in implementing control and governance measures indicates a fundamental lack of understanding of how people’s actions are determined by the needs, structures, and subjectivities they encounter every day. In turn, Indonesia has considered that Norway has not entirely restored and resolved climate change, and instead has sought redemption for their “sin” of extraction and exploitation of minerals, coal, and other resources.

5.3.2 Institutional change in the UK case

The case of the UKCCU and its bilateral climate partnership with Indonesia since 2010 shows the dominant role played by state actors in controlling/determining climate change diplomacy dynamics. The intergovernmental relationship between the UK government and the Indonesian government (especially the strong UKCCU-ICCTF-Bappenas bonds) indicates the continued importance of high-level politics in aligning and coordinating all climate change projects in Indonesia. Despite the unclear funding mechanisms and institutional challenges in the UK case and the overall situation, strongly aligned bilateral governance remains important to the sustainability of the UKCCU and the ICCTF, among other stakeholders. This means that the underpinning mechanism of the UK-driven climate change policy is an aligned and well-developed bilateral partnership.

Through the UKCCU, the UK’s climate partnership with Indonesia also encountered institutional challenges, primarily regarding the financial mechanism. The UKCCU outlined a specific budget for low-carbon development capacity-building programmes with the Indonesian Ministry of Finance (DFID, 2016). However, the money earmarked for civil society groups never reached them. The UKCCU delivered the funding directly to the designated ministries as the bilateral climate partnership was conducted on a government-to-government basis. Accordingly, the distribution of these funds was uneven, with an insignificant impact on the groups most vulnerable to climate change (Down to Earth, 2010). In the author’s view, the money did not reach
civil society groups because rather than the policy being poorly implemented, the money was never really intended for these groups the first place. In short, the policy design was flawed.

The institutional changes in relation to the climate change policy of the Indonesian government outlined above can be divided into two points for analysis: internal and external. The internal analysis conducted concerns the Indonesian government structure, and specifically the changing institutional system in the Indonesian government. Indeed, there have been two key changes to the institutional system: a change in the Indonesian MoFA leadership’s approach to the UKCCU-ICCTF partnership; and a change in the funding mechanism within the Indonesian system. First, the leadership of the MoFA initially oversaw the negotiation and implementation of the partnership between the UKCCU and the ICCTF in 2000. In the National Act of International Treaty number 24 of 2000, Article 5 chapter 1 states that the consultation mechanism between the MoFA and other departments should engage in judicial communication aspects. Article 7 chapter 2 of the same treaty states that the MoFA is the main actor in this partnership, with the capacity to allocate mandates and powers (Indonesian Government Report, 2000). This implies that the MoFA played a prominent role in coordinating and leading the international negotiation process, both bilaterally and multilaterally. In reality, the leadership on the part of the MoFA has been weak regarding the environmental agreement process across all three partnerships. Ever since the climate negotiations began, the leadership of the MoFA has been feeble and Bappenas has effectively taken over. The fact that the MoFA “threw the ball” to another department demonstrates a lack of responsibility (Interview 9). According to this interview statement, in climate change negotiations and with the continuation of climate finance aid to Indonesia, the MoFA did not fulfill its role or exercise its power in this regard.

Second, there was maldistribution of funding between the ICCTF and the UKCCU, as well as in funding arrangements between other foreign donors and Indonesia. Some of the funding was not shared in a transparent manner, and many
funding institutions suspected that it went unregistered in the Indonesian MoF’s system. The practice of secrecy and hidden mechanisms was, and continues to be, a dangerous governance problem in Indonesian climate policy. Meanwhile, the formation of the Public Service Agency (BLU) stemmed from Indonesia becoming an upper-middle-income country and making a commitment to support Pacific Island countries through providing foreign development aid. Although Bappenas set up an improved and consistent funding mechanism for climate change projects bilaterally, this body was not mandated as the main channel for receiving money from foreign donors.

 Institutional changes on the part of the UK government include changes to the programme design of the UKCCU and changes to the financial mechanism. Firstly, the changes in programme design affected the rate of deforestation cuts and brought about changes to the location(s) of the Forest, Land Use, and Governance (FLAG) programme. In comparison with a DFID report of 2011-2013 (DFID, 2013: 6), the number of ha where deforestation and other degradation had been avoided through the International Climate Fund was decreasing, dropping from 35,000 ha in 2011-2013 to 29,500 by March 2015. From 2017 to 2019, the UKCCU changed its focus regarding the location of the FLAG programme to Papua because this area had the most remaining natural forest and lowest human development index in Indonesia (DFID, 2018: 2). Those numbers deforestation cut had a positive impact on how the UK government took care of deforestation in Indonesia.

 Meanwhile, the UKCCU also changed the target of funding, the number of deforestation zones, and other action points. Based on a DFID report from 2014 (2014: 8), the UK government gave £10 million in funding to the Multi-stakeholder Forestry Programme and strengthened its partnerships with the Asia Foundation and UNDP (as intermediary agencies). Meanwhile, the latest report from DFID in 2018 showed that the amount of funding increased, from £10 million to £13 million, although it did not specifically mention that the money went to stakeholder programmes (1-2). This indicates the dynamic nature of policy on the part of the British government which
showed a lack of direction and had a limited impact on the climate change programme and the Indonesian government and government and society. In the author’s view, the UK government performed well between 2011 and 2015 through the UKCCU programme, with an increasing budget, maintaining and structuring the programme design and continuously working together with the ICCTF.

In summary, the establishment of the UKCCU and the ICCTF showed that the UK-Indonesia bilateral climate partnership strengthened in terms of the intergovernmental relationship. The case also showed how institutional factors constructed and influenced the funding delivery mechanism and steered the well-structured approaches of the UK and Indonesian governments in implementing their bilateral climate goals. Although there was an internal problem in the ICCTF and changes to the programme design along with the funding mechanism of the UKCCU, these two institutions continued to take improved operational and practical steps in pursuing their mutual vision of reducing emissions between 2011 and 2015.

5.3.3 Institutional change in the Australian case: the dissolution of AusAid

From 1990 onwards, Australia aimed to build a strong climate partnership with Indonesia, which was echoed in the Aid Programme Performance Report of 2011-2013. Australia also acknowledged that Indonesia was particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (AusAid, 2013). In 2013, the Australian government decided to disband AusAID and merge it with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT, 2013: 2). In doing so, the Australian government cut the national budget for foreign aid in general, while specifically for Indonesia the cut was up to 40% (ibid: 4). This step appeared to run counter to the previously-stated aim of building a strong partnership on climate change.

According to a DFAT report (2014: 5), the Indonesian government formerly received £193 million (previously £375 million in 2011-2013). This funding amount demonstrated that Australia was no longer providing physical or institutional assistance in a number of developing countries, including Indonesia. This funding mechanism and
collaboration was further challenged and hampered when Tony Abbott became prime minister in 2013, as he was not supportive of the climate change agenda (Davies, 2016).

As a technical implication of disbanding AusAID, the ability of Indonesian actors (both government and non-government) to access climate change funding became more limited. They have since had to deal with the DFAT directly, with the process taking longer than before. The budget cut affected two actors (Ibid) in particular: companies (mainly from Australia) to have implemented projects in Indonesia; and consultants who had long been acting as “aid rent seekers” in Indonesia. Both actors oversaw a significant reduction in the flow of aid funds to the beneficiaries.

Since AusAID left Jakarta, an Australian government report (2014) stated that disbursements of funding had been more difficult than before. This situation limited the progress made by the Australian government on delivering accessible climate change projects to Indonesian stakeholders, especially national and local NGOs. Australian climate governance returned to a centralised system in 2013-2016, which meant that all administrative and funding activities on climate change were monitored and checked in advance by the Australian government in Canberra.

Australia’s comparatively less committed climate policy had an impact in terms of trust and created discomfort between the Indonesian government and local communities. The Australian government hampered direct access to funding for non-state actors at the local level who also experienced further difficulties in requesting financial support. The Australian Embassy in Jakarta set out its instructions in the statement below (December 2018):

‘The NGOs should apply [for] or request financial support through the four implementing agencies such World Bank and UNDP for instance, and then the Australian Embassy can review that the support goes to the right channel, whether it will engage the Ministry of Environment, the Republic of Indonesia, or just through the implementing agency itself.’ (Interview 1)

This statement clearly shows that the Australian government was not offering direct and open access to non-state actors such as national NGOs and local communities.
managing climate change projects. This also influenced the Norwegian and UK approaches to civil society engagement, which is elaborated upon in chapter 7.

The decision-making processes and implementation of climate change projects between Australia and Indonesia were delayed after these changes in leadership in Australia. The Australian government underwent stark changes at prime ministerial level, where several prime ministers did not support a progressive climate change policy (Davies, 2016). In the interview with an Australian government official in February 2019, she made the point that the Australian government continued to support the existing climate change agreement with Indonesia although the number of staff and leaders in the climate change division had decreased (Australian Interview 1). According to the interviewee’s statement, it appeared that most of the changes in the Australian leadership did not affect the overall structure of the partnership or other essential features of bilateral communication, for example the regular meetings and evaluation system. Any problems that did arise from the changes in leadership concerned the clarity of the overarching partnership goals and the significant emphasis placed on implementation. Meanwhile, the decreasing number of staff in the environmental governance division and AusAID in the DFAT merger negatively affected funding. The diminished Australian budget for foreign aid (Davies, 2014) for developing countries (including Indonesia) was also clearly a result of the changing policies at prime ministerial level (seven different prime ministers from 2004 to 2016). In short, the Australian government continued to respect the bilateral climate agreement in principle, but in practice successive prime ministers of Australia cut the money allocated to the partnership, reflecting its diminishing commitment to climate change mitigation.

5.4 Reflection on the Fragmented Bureaucracy in Indonesia
Following on from the inter-governmental analysis, my research in Central Kalimantan also provided some new insights into the problems regarding fragmented bureaucracy in relation to bilateral climate partnerships. According to my observations during
fieldwork in Central Kalimantan, there were fragmentations and differences among and between central and local governments as well as local NGOs. The relative success of Kemitraan\textsuperscript{36} as a mediator between the Norwegian and Indonesian governments does not in itself show that civil society engagement was being fully implemented in the Indonesia-Norway climate partnership. The conflicts between local actors hampered the way in which the Indonesian government coordinated with them, and it became difficult to convince the Norwegian government that Indonesia was making progress in the implementation of REDD+. During interviews, representatives of local NGOs and regional groups suggested that the district governors were not transparent in the implementation of REDD+ with respect to forest policy and management. The local government blocked the REDD+ programme. Some district governors near Palangkaraya did not comprehensively understand the whole picture and the main problem regarding REDD+ which was one of capacity a local actors had limited resources and time to commit to implementing REDD+.

During the fieldwork, some district governors were presented with some examples of the REDD+ programme, but none of them could outline the real impact of the programme in their given district. This was potentially due to miscoordination with central government. The Mayor of Palangkaraya said that her city did not receive REDD+ money from Norway because the city was not in the main project area when it came to the implementation of the programme as introduced on 30\textsuperscript{th} January 2018. This particular mayor was a well-known personality in Central Kalimantan and later became a popular academic in Palangkaraya. When asked about the bilateral agreement with Norway, he did not express a strong opinion on it. He did not fault the provincial government and he reported that there had been no significant impact felt from the REDD+ programme or other donors because of the relatively small scale of the city’s forests. Elsewhere, other districts like Barito, Kapuas, Kahiyang and Gunung Mas had received more funding and had a stronger policy on combating deforestation.

\textsuperscript{36}Further explanation of Kemitraan can be found in chapters 1 and 4.
The Vice-Governor of Central Kalimantan during an interview also questioned the success of the REDD+ programme. He asked: “Where is the REDD+ money from? And why has Central Kalimantan rarely been involved with that project? Why does the national government never ask us to work together on that project?” (Interview 14). In addition to criticism of the national government, the Mayor of Palangkaraya blamed the inconsistency of the central government’s regulations on the moratorium policy and other environmental policies (Interview 12). Representatives of provincial and local government were in agreement and consistently questioned the REDD+ policy and Norwegian aid in general. They also did not know how the money was being distributed from the central government to certain districts. This perspective was countered by some representatives of local NGOs (Interviews 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 13) in Central Kalimantan, who stated that REDD+ had had a positive impact and it had been supported by the national government, but not the provincial or local governments.

Some NGO representatives, meanwhile, had become quite afraid of sharing their views with the provincial governor in their given area because of the strong political support he enjoyed from other elites and corporations. From the feedback presented above, it appears that complicated bureaucracy and decentralisation tended to lead to problems of overlap. Ultimately, the institutional environment had a significant bearing on how well the programme functioned.

This suggests that the decentralisation process, as part of the multi-level governance system in Indonesia, has not worked well from the perspective of donors and local communities because there is a “shadow of hierarchy” or dominance emanating from the central government (Purwanto and Pramusinto, 2018: 568). Although institutions related to REDD+ have been restructured and merged into a compact body under the MoEF, the local authorities remain out of sync with national climate policy. The case of the slow moratorium enforcement and land concessions at the local-provincial level when Jokowi took over to combat pollution in Riau, Sumatra in 2015 serves as evidence that the central government continued to control climate governance in Indonesia (CIFOR, 2018).
The rise and fall of BP REDD+ is a manifestation of Indonesia’s longstanding political culture, which has normalized the creation of an *ad hoc* multisectoral task force as a quick fix to emerging challenges (Luttrell et al., 2014). A key lesson from this experience is that governance reforms required for REDD+ need to be meaningfully mainstreamed within formal institutional structures (Moeliono et al., 2020:4). This can be done by capturing the wider political support of parliament, civil servants, businesses, and the public to ensure sustainable reforms – a challenge that has proven gargantuan so far (Luttrell et al., 2014). Today, half a decade since REDD+ was put fully under the MoEF’s domain through the DG-CCC, we find an institutionalization process that, thus far, reflects incremental changes instead of transformational ones. Business-as-usual interests are still dominant (Moeliono et al., 2020).

The dominant role of the central/national government cannot be separated from political and economic factors, especially the dependence on natural resources and land-based sectors. Pertinently, the potential impact of policy reforms brought about by REDD+ may have been significant for existing political-economic structures. The complexity of the political economy and governance presents a dilemma for policymakers who are under pressure to act swiftly on carbon emission reductions, demanding a trade-off between forcing through rapid institutional reforms and actually engaging the institutions that have traditionally blocked reform (Brockhaus et al., 2014: 73). The next section provides an analysis and further discussion of institutional and leadership changes in Indonesia and how they are connected to each other by using the transformative 4is+3 framework.

**5.5 Discussion**

Having discussed the institutional reforms affecting Indonesian climate governance and Indonesia’s bilateral climate partnership, this section analyses and further evaluates how leadership and institutional changes played a significant role in shaping the evolution of these partnerships. In analysing these reforms via the transformative 4is+3,
I find that there are three reasons as to why leadership and institutional change became a central factor in causing complex governance in the selected bilateral climate partnerships. First, the leadership change from President SBY to President Jokowi through Presidential Regulation number 16 in 2015 triggered an institutional breakthrough at first, but the latter had not delivered by 2020 genuinely sustainable policy. The diminishing of environmental impact assessments under the omnibus law (2020) emerged as another obstacle in ensuring climate change restoration. Second, the development of the MoEF as a central player in combating deforestation and other climate change problems along improved the integration of the system and the implementation of Indonesian climate policies, but did not necessarily strengthen the capacity of the DG-CCC. Third, the different institutional approaches taken by each of the three selected foreign donors (Norway, the UK, Australia) encapsulate the difficulty facing Indonesian policy-makers and stakeholders in ensuring even progress in such a complex environment.

Leadership changes in the governments of the three donor countries had varying effects on their bilateral climate change projects. Meanwhile, the Indonesian government also underwent a change in leadership in 2014. The bilateral partnerships were independent, but in all three cases progress slowed after 2014. The case-studies’ timelines all began in 2009 and ran until 2015, spanning two different presidencies: President SBY and President Jokowi. Therefore, the leadership style changed in terms of institutional arrangements and the general political perspective. President SBY was more outward-looking than Jokowi, as evidenced through the way in which Indonesia was presented in the global arena and the establishment of institutions related to REDD+ (Satgas REDD+, UKP4, DNPI, BPREDD+) during his tenure.

The Norwegian and UK governments did not regard the new administration of Indonesia as marking a fundamental change to the structure of their bilateral climate agreements with Indonesia. They both believed that Jokowi would continue the work of his predecessor on climate partnerships. Indeed, Jokowi demonstrated his continuing commitment by implementing significant reforms in environmental bureaucracy by
merging two ministries to form the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) and the National Council of Climate Change (DNPI). This newly-formed ministry was more efficient and made it easier for foreign donors in terms of checks-and-balances and in disbursing money or managing administrative aspects (Norwegian Interview 2; UK Interviews 9, 10 and 11).

The change in leadership in the Indonesian government and the rearrangement of REDD+ however did have an impact in the case of Norway (Norwegian Interviews 1, 2 and 3; Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017; Ardiansyah et al., 2015). The REDD+ agency in the Indonesia-Norway bilateral climate partnership proved a successful experiment in relation to climate change, creating a new institution as an alternative governance mechanism in the initial period (May 2010-June 2011). However, the Indonesian governance structure was still fragile, which meant that a significant level of ownership (including any mandate related to REDD+) returned to the centralised national government in February 2016. Essentially, the national government regained ultimate formal power as there was a recentralisation of governance in Indonesia (Presidential Regulation number 16/2015). Furthermore, what Norway had achieved through the REDD+ agency between 2011 and 2014 (during the presidency of SBY) was not entirely effective under Jokowi’s presidency, ultimately being rendered a redundant effort and a failure. The changes in the implementation of REDD+ in Indonesia did not lead to the establishment of a particularly effective partnership. There was also a change in the funding agency used to disburse project funds and further steps taken regarding the DG-CCC were unclear and unconvincing for Indonesian government and society alike.

Two critical leadership changes impacted upon the Indonesia-Australian partnership. There was a change in the Indonesian presidency in 2014 while there were multiple changes to the incumbent of the Australian prime minister’s office from 2007 to 2019. In terms of the Indonesian leadership, the current president (Jokowi) has been more concerned with reducing Indonesia’s dependence on Australian donors when it comes to climate investment. The political leadership dynamics in both Australia and
Indonesia were together a major reason behind the limited progress made in their bilateral climate partnership. Indeed, political tension between the two nations has also hampered the progress of the KFCP and some IAFCP projects.

Elsewhere, in two cases (Norway and the UK) the transformation of an institution was beneficial to the Indonesian government, as it helped to build an institution or strengthen the capacity of certain agencies to make the relevant climate projects happen. In particular, Norway emerged as a pioneer by creating REDD+ and giving direct access to funding for Indonesian civil society groups through the NICFI.

At the same time, the UK’s initiative to establish the UKCCU led to a strong intergovernmental relationship developing between the UK and Indonesia. There was also continuous collaboration with the Asia Foundation as the supporting agency, with the latter serving as the bridge between local NGOs and the UK government. However, such positive transformations were not apparent in the Australian case. The dissolving of AusAID and its subsequent merging with the DFAT led to the breaking down of a seemingly pro-climate partnership from late 2013 onwards. The overall analysis based on my fieldwork suggests that the Australian government’s efforts to strengthen bilateral climate cooperation did not align coherently with the initial plan and objectives. One of the interviewed analysts even stated that Australia manipulated its foreign policy to elevate its own economic development (Corbett, 2017: 100). In this regard, Jokowi suggested that the amount of aid from Australia was not as significant as planned/promised and that “talks” consumed substantial time and energy, often offending the recipient’s dignity as a state and a nation (Jakarta Post, 2015). Indonesia has treated foreign aid as a supplement to its national budget. Foreign aid is only added to projects that are being financed this way. Therefore, projects can still survive without foreign aid, albeit on a smaller scale. Hence, Indonesia appears to be preparing to lessen its dependence on some foreign donors, and Jokowi seeks to awaken Indonesian society to the benefits of working hard and building more of a national effort through small-scale entrepreneurship, digital economic activities, and other economic efforts.
Besides leadership change, institutional change also rapidly shifted Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships, in particular with respect to the administrative mechanism applied by each of the donors supporting Indonesian climate agencies. Institutional changes impact how the foreign donor and recipient manage a partnership’s processes and evaluation. Concomitantly, the processes of national and local institutional change affected the process of transformation in each case to varying degrees.

The first indicator that I identified in this research regarding institutional change concerned whether there a new or alternative governance mechanism had been put in place. Based on the Norway example discussed in chapter 4, it was concluded by some scholars that forest ownership tends to be centralised in Indonesia and that state supremacy in conducting or managing institutions had been detectable (Di Gregorio et al., 2014). Similarly, on the UK case, in chapter 4 section the UK-Indonesia climate partnership, I concluded that the UK government applied a very formal government-to-government mechanism.

These two case-studies showed that state supremacy (the ultimate power of the state) controlled and quite plausibly determined the impact and policy output of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. Meanwhile, in the Australian case there was neither a clear programme design nor a governance mechanism in the KFCP until the Australian government decided to merge AusAID into the DFAT in early 2015.

Referring again to chapter 4 in section 4.2.1.6, the second indicator of institutional change concerns the establishment of public-private partnerships, especially by two donors: Norway and the UK. The Norwegian government engaged directly with civil society organisations (CSOs) through the NICFI, while the UK government created the ICCTF without a legal framework. The ICCTF was built and mandated under Bappenas. This meant that all of the funding and administrative decisions of the UK government were passed to BAPPENAS and then flowed down to the ICCTF. The Norwegian government, in contrast, launched the NICFI programme, engaging local civil society groups and NGOs in Indonesia. Norway was a pioneer here.
in inviting civil society groups to get involved in climate projects in Central Kalimantan. However, this initiative could not be sustained and some local NGOs in Central Kalimantan had doubts about the extent of the Norwegian commitment to help indigenous communities to protect themselves from climate change-related impacts. The poor commitment of Norway towards local societies in Indonesia disproved the notion that civil society groups are essential to sustaining forest ecosystems (Oldfield, 2002). Although the UK did not directly engage with civil society groups, it still enhanced the accountability of government work in ensuring that climate change projects were both being taken into account and having an impact on the people participation (through TAF and other intermediary agencies). Based on the interaction between the UK government as a donor and the Indonesian people, it was ensured that the UKCCU’s projects would meet the needs of the Indonesian people, and this impact can be regarded as an example of effective implementation in the Indonesian context.

My research found that there were similar financial mechanism problems experienced by both the UK and Australian governments. Both countries merged their development agencies: the UKCCU was centralised under DFID, whilst the AusAid was merged into the DFAT in 2013. Moreover, there was also a follow-up action taken under the Jakarta Commitment in 2011 regarding aid for effective development (UNDP, 2009: 3) and a recommendation that foreign donors re-arrange their development budgets.

Choosing the right institution for the Indonesian government to deliver the money from foreign donors to, and with the right message, proved difficult in the highlighted cases. In addition, the provision of funding alone has not proved sufficient. The examples of changing intermediary agencies and different decisions regarding funding management in the Norwegian and Australian cases were primary factors that hampered the effectiveness of their climate change projects in Indonesia. Ultimately, the projects themselves, set up by the respective partnerships, had little impact on the vulnerable communities or civil society groups who are the most likely victims of climate-change-related disasters.
All indicators above revealed some challenges in the steps taken and efforts made to make sure the bilateral climate partnerships worked, and also showed that much more effort will be needed to protect Indonesia’s ecosystem. The MoEF-MOFA-MoF coordination had shown strong leadership and even performed well in securing a real impact on climate change restoration with some proposals made with respect to climate funding and investment (e.g., green sukuk, green bond, and blended finance). Furthermore, the importance of collaboration with non-state actors through public-private partnership was still promoted at surface level, suggesting that the follow-up actions after announcing the collaborative partnership were slower than expected.

To summarise, of the 7 elements of the 4+3, two in particular – leadership changes and institutional factors – have most resonance in explaining the complexity of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships and also help us to understand its limited effectiveness. The strength of both the leadership and institution change was manifested in the innovations and initiatives of the Indonesian and UK governments to break the business-as-usual/standard administration in managing climate policies. Institutional reform and leadership change proved a good combination and tended to bring a distinctive approach at first, but further enhancement of performance control is needed with respect to leadership (some criteria or agendas remain despite changes in the leadership of governmental bodies at all levels). The next section wraps up all of the previous sections and presents some concluding points.

5.6 Conclusion
Institutional and leadership change became very challenging factors for Indonesian climate policy reform between 2014-2016. Both donor countries and Indonesia have found it difficult to manage the dynamic process of those changes. The merging institutions related to REDD+ since Jokowi’s Presidency in 2015 represented a key point in institutional reform in Indonesia and leadership change. The political leadership shift from President SBY to President Jokowi pertinently affected the
donors’ movement towards managing their funding distribution, direction to the civil society participation, and information management system.

The constant institutional changes provoked repeated and complex challenges faced by the Indonesian government and their international partners. The Norwegian case dealt with trust, coordination, and communication problem with Indonesian government. The the transition from UNDP to Partnership/Kemitraan (an Indonesian NGO) as the intermediary agency between Norway and Indonesia also brought further complexities because Kemitraan did not align with indigenous/local communities’ interests.

Meanwhile, the government-to-government based partnership in the UK case did improvement in the initial establishment of the UKCCU and SETAPAK programme with TAF. Besides, I also found that the economic and political shift of Indonesia has indirectly impacted the future of the ICCTF. As the UKCCU has become one of the primary financial sponsors of the ICCTF, Indonesia’s economic transformation reshape the ICCTF which cannot depend heavily on the UKCCU. However, there was a lack of direct engagement with non-state actors, specifically local NGOs, hampering and limiting the access of local NGOs to directly interact and consult with foreign donors such as the UK government in this case.37

The third case from Australia had a very different situation, specifically political leaders’ shift through the parliamentary system. The presence of “veto players” on the Australian conservative right of the federal coalition government limited the progress of domestic policies toward aligning with national risks on climate change. Each donor faced different institutional problems, which diverged the reaction of Indonesian government and civil society groups, which was clearly stated in section 5.3.

In relation to the transformative 4is+3 framework, institution and leadership change served as two of the strongest factors here, alongside actors’ ideas, actors’

37 For further explanation on this factor, read chapter 7
interests, information, decentralised challenges, and policy experiments. This strong institutional factor made two contrast impacts of Indonesian climate policy reform: institutional efficiency through the merge of all REDD+ related agencies into DG-CCC and also the establishment of the UKCCU versus the institutional problem through leadership changes in Norwegian and Australian case. The Institutional reform and leadership change proved a good combination and tended to bring a distinctive approach at first, but it did not work properly and effectively when civil society groups had no direct access of funding sources, consultation with local and national governments, and no further capacity building and development for them on assessing one map policy or proving the evidence of deforestation loss data. The next chapter sets out the complex process of civil society engagement in the bilateral climate partnerships, along with examining the dynamic challenges of decentralisation in Indonesia.
Chapter 6: Assessing the Impact of Performance-Based Finance, MRV Mechanisms, and Land Use Change

6.1 Introduction
This chapter further develops how climate finance and performance-based aid affected the bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia. Changing institutions, funding mechanism on climate projects based on result/evidence orientation, and a monitoring system called Measurable, Reliable, and Verifiable (MRV), are used to measure how climate finance worked in my analysis. This MRV system also provides the technological capacity related to deforestation (for instance monitoring deforestation loss or geospatial data) on ensuring that the land use change would not be jeopardized or gave bad impact to the environment. In Norwegian case, this MRV system was heavily highlighted by my analysis due to the problematic result-based payment that was a feature of the REDD+ programme, unsynchronised data on deforestation loss, and clash of sectoral departments in the Ministerial level on managing deforestation projects. Furthermore, I provide analysis of how three foreign donors (Norway, UK, and Australia) faced financial mechanism problems in their bilateral climate partnerships. I will corroborate this analysis with the transformative 4is+3 framework and show that actors’ ideas and interests played a key role in contrast to the other factors (information disclosure and institutional arrangement, leadership change, policy experiments, and decentralisation challenge).

Bilateral climate finance in Indonesia had started in the early 2000s, and included various donors, such as: Germany, Japan, USA, UK, Netherlands, Australia, and Norway (Halimanjaya & Maulidia, 2014 :1). In 2007 and 2011, the UK government created UK Climate Change Unit (UKCCU) in Indonesia (DFID, 2012). Whilst Australia historically been a longstanding donor and has also financed enormous REDD+ pilot project such Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership (KFCP). Further explanation on these histories were set out in chapter 4.
As discussed in chapter 4 and 5, the promising financial support from Norway did not necessarily bring up new ideas or improving term for Indonesian government. Delayed disbursement from Norwegian fund, the unexpected end of KFCP from Australia in 2014, and domestic problems among governmental bodies in Indonesia, all led to climate finance disputes around the bilateral scheme. The delayed disbursement was due to both the lack of a well-established and integrated funding agency in the Indonesian government system and also the failure to prove the necessary achievements to obtain results-based payment from the Norwegian government. Internally, as outlined in chapter 5, there was a clash of sectoral interests among the Indonesian ministries, as well as the unsynchronised distribution of duties between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Indonesia and intermediary agencies such as UNDP. In addition, several ministries and agencies that managed donor-funded programs (direct grants) did not report the funds to the Ministry of Finance to be recorded on State Treasury General Account (Halimanjaya & Maulidia, 2014: 8).

Due to the multiple challenges with the climate fund, there was an important alternative funding mechanism available. REDD+ mechanism, as laid out in various UNFCCC decisions, involves payments made based on emission reductions that have been measured, reported, and verified (MRV) relative to reference levels (RLs) (or baselines), and subject to various safeguards (e.g. to protect indigenous rights, biodiversity and ecosystem services) (Goetz et al., 2015: 1). In my view, this MRV process was not easy, it needed multistakeholders’ support and alignment of vision on big emission reduction target within the bilateral climate partnerships.

Meanwhile, the different terms and conditions of the three donors’ finances affected Indonesian government’s response and became challenging for them to explain their climate policy to the general public. The limited progress of Indonesian evidence of deforestation loss data delayed the funding disbursement of Norway, which undermined the purpose of the result-based payment. Chapter 4 stated that the UK funding was the lowest compared to Norway and Australia in Indonesian climate partnerships and they had no funding disbursement problem due to improved
institutional arrangement and monitoring system from the UKCCU and also a strong approach of intermediary agencies. The Australian climate fund through the case of the IAFCP showed that Australian bilateral channels in funding aid are more politicised, reflecting greater interests between the donors and the recipients than multilateral channels (ODI Report, 2016: 16). These empirical findings suggest that the UK had fewer problems with the financial mechanism of the climate partnerships in Indonesia, and the MRV/result-based payment remained important to monitor the Indonesian climate policy reform.

In order to clearly understand the donor financing system, section 6.2 outlines the role of performance-based finance towards the bilateral climate change partnerships. Section 6.3 explains the role of MRV mechanism through different case studies and Indonesian government system. The obstacle of REDD+ finance scheme specifically in the land-use change context is then explored in section 6.4. Section 6.5 analyses climate finance policy in Indonesia from within the transformative 4Is+3 framework. The conclusion and summary of key findings of this chapter is set in section 6.6.

6.2 Performance-based finance: funding mechanism of bilateral climate partnership in Indonesia
This section outlines the history of financial support for climate change projects in Indonesia along with the development of its mechanism through bilateral channel. It is important to understand the inception of climate finance in Indonesia because this is the primary tool to assess the result or performance of climate change projects, which was reflected through the bilateral climate partnerships. The climate finance system in Indonesia has been evaluated as a performance-based payment from the bilateral donors since 2010, which was seen through the establishment of such as the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) in 2010 and the Fund for REDD+ Indonesia (FREDDI) in 2011 (GIZ, 2013:16-18). According to UNDP (2012), there were four pillars of climate finance, such as: financial planning, assessing finance, delivering finance, monitor-report-verify (which in this stage there was a performance-based
payment as the indicator). In practice, different donors have separated/unique climate finance mechanism, especially the way that Norway, the UK, and Australia distribute or disbursed the money to Indonesian government. Furthermore, this section continues with the bureaucratic structure of financing climate change programme at national level, and then I analyse the major findings of bilateral climate finance in Indonesia through three case studies. Through these analyses, I also consider the complex challenge of bilateral climate finance (e.g. delayed disbursement, fragmentation in bilateral climate finance system) in order to assess their impact to climate change policy in Indonesia.

Bilateral cooperation has developed in Indonesia since 1960s (GIZ, 2012). As a substantial factor in Indonesian foreign policy development, with bilateral donors coming from various countries. As one of major donors, the UK has supported various initiatives on climate change in Indonesia since 2007, and in 2011 after the main DFID office closed a Climate Change Unit (CCU) was created to continue to finance national climate action or it is called the United Kingdom Climate Change Unit (UKCCU). UKCCU focuses on supporting low carbon development, including programs to strengthen forest governance, and to support the Ministry of Finance to do more to encourage low carbon development. In addition, Australian funding through AUSAID has been an important financial player to pilot REDD+ in Indonesia (Halimanjaya & Maulidia, 2014 :1). The progress of these efforts was mixed and changes to the Australian aid and climate policy architecture raised questions about its continued role in Indonesia to the Government of Indonesia. Norway itself (as stated already in chapter 4) became a major player through its bilateral agreement on REDD+ with Indonesia, which pledged to give 750 million GBP as the outcome of negotiation between Indonesian and Norwegian government. The payment system of Norway through

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38 However, Indonesia terminates the bilateral agreement through Letter of Intent (LoI) with Norway on 10th September 2021. For further reading: https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/11/10/lessons-from-the-indonesia-norway-redd-break-up/
REDD+ is by a result-based payment, which needs a concrete evidence on deforestation improved rate before disbursing the money.

In relation to the Indonesian climate finance context, the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) was established under the purview of Bappenas in 2009 following the creation of National Council of Climate Change (DNPI) as the follow up of the Presidential regulation number 46/2008. The main objective of the regulations is to enhance the effectiveness of delivery of climate finance, which translates into the Fund’s mandate to pool and channel international and national grants for funding climate change activities in Indonesia (Bappenas, 2010). The Fund has transitioned from being managed by UNDP to management by Bank Mandiri, a commercial bank partially owned by the government of Indonesia (ibid, 2012). In my view, this ICCTF was quite ambitious institutional programme on climate finance, which is now still existing and remains supporting climate change projects in Indonesia. Despite changing Indonesian Presidency, ICCTF did not get bad impact on climate change policy because the institution was well-structured under the National Planning Agency (Bappenas) and the monitoring report evaluation system was clear.

Meanwhile, the National Council of Climate Change (DNPI) was set up in order to: “formulate strategies, programs and activities on climate change control; to play coordination function in the implementation of control tasks of climate change activities; to set up policies and procedures for carbon trading; to carry out monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation on climate change; and to strengthen Indonesia’s position to encourage developed countries to take more responsibility in controlling climate change” (DNPI 2012). In 2011, a working group under the Council (WG on Financial Mechanism) was set up in order to formulating climate finance strategies and coordinating Indonesia’s position on the issue in international climate negotiations. This initiative was working and improving climate policy in 2009-2014, when Indonesia became a new player in the international climate finance system. However, this DNPI did not last long since Jokowi became the President and he created a new regulation number 16 in 2015 (MoEF, 2015).
In order to have improved accountability of climate change governance in Indonesia, there were three government institutions in Indonesia that had a prominent role in climate finance budgeting and coordination. These are the Ministry of Finance, National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), and the Ministry of Environment (Tanzler & Maulidia, 2013: 21). The Ministry of Finance is responsible for ensuring that climate change requirements are reflected in budget priorities, pricing policies, and financial market rules. It has two divisions that have tasks related to climate finance: Division of Debt Management that has a finance tracking role, and a Fiscal Policy Office that sets the fiscal policy (Ibid, p.22). BAPPENAS has the mandate to decide national climate finance systems and procedures, and to coordinate loans and grants related to climate change. It is also the main agency responsible for mainstreaming climate change into national policies (Ibid). The Ministry of Environment is responsible for preparing the National Communications to the UNFCCC, which also, in principal, includes information on climate financing needs.

Through my analysis, the Ministry of Finance plays a vital role through creating the Centre for Climate Change Financing and Multilateral Policy (PKPPIM), especially compare to the current policy of MoF on climate budget tagging. It has been established as a research and think tank unit responsible for giving recommendations related to climate change policy to the Minister of Finance (Maulidia, 2013:3). Cross-minister and cross-departmental coordination with members from various ministries and agencies were effectively accommodated in the Centre (MOF Green Paper 2007). However, in practice, it now only consists of members from the Ministry of Finance and the operational mandate was less clear with limited authority to prompt attention to climate action in the budget. As a result, the climate finance mechanism was not integrated and the improvement of climate policy across Ministerial and other government agencies in Indonesia was low.

At national level, Ministry of Finance was intended to work on for mitigation and adaptation finance. Activities of mitigation under the authority of central government (ministries/agencies) was financed through sectoral ministries/agencies’
funds, the Deconcentration Fund, and the Assistance Task Fund. The financing of activities under local government authorities can use: (1) the Specific Allocation Fund for Emissions Reduction – for financing local affairs’ activities according to the priorities and criteria that are set by the central government; (2) the Performance-Based Grant, where assessment is based on the implementation of locally-proposed GHG emission reduction initiatives (RAD GRK) and accomplishment of particular targets; and (3) Local Grants for financing local affairs’ activities proposed by local governments (MoF, 2011).

Regarding adaptation finance, besides the adaptation window of the ICCTF, no other systemized funding mechanism was currently in operation in Indonesia in 2010-2019. Most of the international support is delivered via bilateral or multilateral projects. The question I raised was how to combine public and private finances for enabling different kinds of adaptation of climate change measures typically needed in Indonesia in sectors including water, coastal management, health, and agriculture. Many adaptation activities in Indonesia since 2011 such as flood prevention infrastructure, health programmes, and national disaster plans did not attract private financing from equity investors. For equity, the project must have a fixed asset component and generate financial returns that can be captured through ownership, either a revenue stream or an increasing ownership value adaptation measures yield economic benefits, but do not generate tangible financial returns (OECD, 2021). Projects in the agriculture or water sectors might be suitable targets for private investment as these sectors generate returns in crop yields or water fees.

Beside the Ministry of Finance and ICCTF, the national bank of Indonesia also played a significant role in climate finance activities since 2010. In Indonesia, this institution had experience with the private and networks necessary for mobilising private investment. Its experience with the private sector has traditionally been focused on non-climate related sectors such as consumer credits (ICCTF, 2012). However, in order to shift private investment towards green sectors, the central bank in Indonesia, Bank Indonesia (BI), has begun drafting a regulation on green banking or financing,
including tax, soft loans and guarantee schemes since 2015 (OJK, 2020). This effort seeks to encourage climate-friendly investments, although it is hard to gauge their impact since the regulations on green banking and financing are still in early stages of development and it had further assessment.

The Indonesian Financial Services Authority (OJK) is a new financial institution that is increasingly turning into a respected regulatory body in Indonesia (Aziz, 2013). OJK has the mandate inter alia to develop national banking lending policies that can shift credits from traditional focus areas such as consumption credits to sectors where climate-friendly investments are most needed. Climate-friendly investments such as in agriculture, forestry, mining, electricity, gas, and construction have generally been overlooked (Halimanjaya & Maulidia, 2014:4). This initiative was a new step to reform climate change policy in Indonesia, which became the driving factor of institutionalism in climate finance. Although this initiative was not reflected into the three case studies, it was a national effort of Indonesian government on developing better climate financial system. After the national governments’ initiatives on climate finance, there was also an initiative that engaged local communities and national bank.

The other crucial component of bilateral climate finance in Indonesia was establishing an Indonesian REDD+ funding mechanism (FREDDI). Norway insisted that the funding mechanism had to be a multilateral agency. Part of this was to secure transparency and international confidence, which Norway believed would encourage future donors to commit funding, as well as to facilitate payments to civil society, communities, and other stakeholders (CIFOR, 2013). Officially, under Indonesian law, trust funds can only be established by ministries, although pre-cedent does exist for non-ministerial trust funds. However, as of 2017, the trust fund had not been established, which meant that the UNDP continued to act as the fiduciary agent. In channelling the funds through the UNDP, Norway would boost accountability with domestic taxpayers in engaging with a country whose historical reputation for corruption was internationally renowned, as well as transparency for future donors.
(Maxton Lee, 2020). However, in doing so, they established a set of priorities and assumptions and reinforced subjectivities of mistrust on both sides (Maxton Lee, 2020:114). These arguments were reflected and aligned with my analysis on chapter 4 and 5, specifically when Norway changed their intermediary agency from UNDP to Kemitraan and financial malpractice was inevitably done in the UNDP.

Figure 6.1 Working flow of Climate Finance in Indonesia in 2010-2013

According to the figure above, there are divided tasks among governmental bodies and that chart was done during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2009, 2009-2014). In his tenure, Indonesia had three governmental institutions assigned to manage climate funds: The President’s Delivery Unit (UKP4), National Development Agency...
(Bappenas), and Ministry of Finance. the Ministry of Finance mostly dealt with climate investment, which was coming from the national budget. As discussed in chapter 5, institutionalism in climate finance was reflected in the chart and it was complicated to ensure all those three agencies working together and had the same understanding in delivering smooth financial mechanism. The different sources of funding, level of bureaucracy in each institution, and clear communication among them were the barriers on ensure the working flow of climate finance in Indonesia. Whilst Bappenas got various sources of funding (multilateral donors, bilateral donors, private, governments, civil society organizations, etc). These multiple channels created different types of mechanism in disbursing the money. The different channels plausibly gave two impacts: positively, it was easy to plot specific character of the funding of the donors and negatively it was difficult to check and monitor them all with one single evaluation system. Lastly, UKP4 was established since 2009 and they oversaw the bilateral climate partnership between Norway and Indonesia through Letter of Intent in the programme of Reducing Emission on Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). However, this UKP4 was discontinued once Joko Widodo became the President of Indonesia in late 2014 and there were some merging institutions: DNPI, REDD+ bureau in Indonesia into Directorate General on Climate Change Control (DGCCC), which affected the funding mechanism on climate change. Through these data above, my analysis stated that institutionalism in climate finance of Indonesia and three foreign donors were diverged and dependable to each donors’ characteristics and also diverged from different Ministries or other governmental agencies who got mandate on delivering climate finance.

Despite the different characteristics and dynamic mechanisms of these climate funding channels, this thesis mainly focused on the bilateral climate finance performance, in particular three foreign donors: Australia, UK, and Norway. In order to understand the trajectory or timeline of bilateral climate finance in Indonesia, below a figure is presented of the climate change funding of those three donor countries in Indonesia between 2009 and 2018.
Figure 6.2  Climate funding in Indonesia by Norway, the UK and Australia for 2009-2018

Source: Author’s compilation from NORAD, UKCCU and DFAT reports of 2009-2018

Based on the figure above, funding from both Norway and Australia plummeted from 2009 to 2018. Norway pledged a significant contribution of £781 million to Indonesia forestry in 2011. Meanwhile, the UK’s funding was the smallest in comparison to the other two donors, but the UK government at least maintained a stable delivery mechanism and disbursed funds. Between 2015 and 2018, Australia was the lowest contributor of the three donor countries. This reduced contribution occurred because the Australian government decided to remove climate change from its priority objectives in its bilateral partnership with Indonesia in 2016.

Overall, there is good evidence in each of the three cases that there was considerable political will at the point when these bilateral climate partnerships were created despite later problems. The donor countries created bilateral coalitions through
the emergence of the NICFI (Norway), the UKCCU (UK), and the KFCP (Australia) and they each attempted to manage funding mechanisms with the Indonesian government. Norway's case revealed a robust institutional arrangement (REDD+), strong engagement with civil society groups, and support for local governance although it became problematic institutionalism stated in Chapter 5. Meanwhile, the UK government established the strongest institutional arrangements through the UKCCU which played a consistent role in building climate restoration and land-use governance projects, as well as promoting local incentives. In Australia’s case, unstable dynamics at top government level (changing prime ministers from 2009-2015) resulted in delayed policymaking in cooperation with the Indonesian government and this situation contributed to the Indonesia-Australia partnership being the least effective of the three. In the latter case, delayed funding reimbursement and changing programme design led to the partnership goals not being met.

The institutional framework for climate finance in Indonesia was fluid and quite volatile under two different Presidents of Republic of Indonesia relating to the unbalanced national capacity and different characteristics of each foreign donor. It means that both Indonesian government and three donors had inability to improve their interaction and did set clear framework on climate finance. The mandate for coordination on climate finance is dispersed across multiple institutions, and there is no clear hierarchy amongst these efforts. For the most part, international climate funds and associated implementing agencies have determined the form and extent of stakeholder engagement that informs programming priorities. As my analysis, there was a cabinet level problem which somehow each of designated Ministries on developing climate finance mechanism did not have the same understanding. Although the institutionalism process and Indonesian government initiatives were positive, the coordination system hampered the direct and fast communication with foreign donor and it determined the delayed funding disbursement of the donor. Indonesian government had lack of integrated approach in accommodating multi-perception of
each governmental agencies. The next section illustrates the result-based payment of climate funding from Norway-Indonesia bilateral climate partnership.

6.2.1 Result based payment: case study of Norway-Indonesia climate partnership

Through my analysis, three most highlighted bilateral climate finance can be seen from the Norwegian case. The Government of Norway generally uses intermediary agencies because of their professionalism and neutrality, with the funding monitoring and evaluation managed by professional auditors chosen by the Government of Norway (CIFOR, 2019). The Norwegian government asked the Ministry of Environment and Forestry to build an integrated funding body called Badan Layanan Umum (BLU) by the end of 2017, and this deadline was later extended to mid-May 2018 (Interview 2). Hence, the Government of Indonesia created BLU, and this was intended to solve the coordination problem cited above through establishing a direct link through which to disburse funding to certain governmental bodies. The Indonesian government wanted this funding body to reduce the corruption of intermediary agencies, to build greater trust between foreign donors and the recipient country, and to also increase the level of transparency (Interview 20).

The main difficulties in the REDD+ programme were the delayed implementation and subsequently delayed funding disbursement. The delayed implementation was mainly attributable to the complex governance problems and domestic politics in Indonesia, which will be elaborated upon in detail in the next section. The delayed disbursement was due to both the lack of a well-established and integrated funding agency in the Indonesian government system and also the failure to prove the necessary achievements to obtain results-based payment from the Norwegian government. On this matter, the Norwegian Embassy stated the following:

So basically there hasn’t been a government channel, there has not been a way for us to put the money directly to the government because the financial funding mechanism was not established, still isn’t. We also make a budget every year and we look at everything that we need and so far we haven’t reached that stage
where we pay the results-based payment.’ (Interview 2)

In response to the statement above, the Indonesian government did not arrange a proper funding mechanism to receive funds from the Norwegians. This difficulty happened because of a clash of sectoral interests among the Indonesian ministries/civil servants, as well as the unsynchronised distribution of duties between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Indonesia and intermediary agencies such as UNDP. Linked to chapter 5, the financial mechanism did not work well due to clash of interest among Indonesian governmental bodies and lack of trust from either foreign donor to Indonesia or intermediary agencies to donor/Indonesia. This argument was derived from Centre of International Forestry Research (CIFOR) representative, who stated that the President Delivery Unit Service (UKP4) had dominated REDD+ management in Indonesia and that mismanagement of funding was inevitable at the Indonesian ministerial level (Interview 1). In short, the ministerial problem and its relevant governmental level became the factor of improper funding mechanism for climate change.

As the analysis, the funding of bilateral climate relation between Indonesia and Norway faced a delayed disbursement due to the gap of mechanism and bureaucratic clash among Ministries and other governmental organizations. The Norwegian government’s style tended to emphasise the role of intermediary agency, whilst the Indonesian government was struggling to create the new integrated funding body. There was mistake/fault between Ministerial and Presidential clashes. The discourse between BLU and optimising ICCTF remained a relentless debate within the Indonesian government in 2018.

Several ministries and agencies that managed donor-funded programs (direct grants) did not report the funds to the Ministry of Finance to be recorded on State Treasury General Account. Grant recording procedures that are time consuming may exacerbate this problem. Different budget cycles between donor and recipient and different accounting systems led to different grant records between donor and recipient. Several programs were also managed using non-APBN mechanisms. (Halimanjaya & Maulidia, 2014: 8). Hence, there was a recognised need to strengthen donor
coordination and information sharing with the government (Ministry of Finance and CPI 2014, UNDP 2014). The donor coordination and information sharing reflected to the need of stronger leadership of Indonesian government and better institutional arrangement from both donor countries and Indonesia.

In order to answer whether the result-based payment is appropriate or not, the case of REDD+ programme could not compensate for the short-term economic gain that corporations stood to make the deforestation slow down (Interview 1). This condition reflects the theoretical framework of Enrici and Hubacek (2018: 250) according to which results-based aid always faces challenges, such as reference level, uncertainty and risk-sharing, as well as promises being backed up financially. In this case, monitoring and evaluation plays a significant role in making sure that the funding mechanism is operating in a functional and transparent manner between the Norwegian and Indonesian governments. This monitoring and evaluation worked in national government since a renewal structure and leadership within the climate finance institution. As the alternative solution, the UNDP and Indonesian Ministry of Finance started to create a collaborative climate finance called Climate Budget Tagging, to improve coordination among Ministries in delivering and disbursing the climate finance in 2018. The Ministry of Finance became the command/leading Ministry that created the distribution and monitoring system in relation to climate funding from multiple sources (Fiscal Policy Bureau, 2020: 3). Thus, the Indonesian government took a new leadership role on monitoring climate finance. Concurrently, this new role and structure resulted an improved climate policy in Indonesia.

However, CIFOR conducted research on the REDD+ funding mechanism and found a lack of integration between mechanisms. The CIFOR researcher stated: ‘It needs a clearer standard of funding mechanism in REDD+; this was a lesson learned from [the] Norway funding distribution’ (Interview 1). In line with CIFOR, a representative from the Indonesian National Planning Agency (Bappenas) stated that the existing Indonesian Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) should be made fully functional instead of building new funding agencies such as BLU (Interview 21).
Indeed, optimising the ICCTF could complement the establishment of BLU. This existing BLU and the new leadership role of Indonesia government were not the only solution that guarantees the result-based payment determined the transformative climate finance. The next section explains the role of measuring, reporting, and verification of bilateral climate change partnership.

6.3 The role of MRV mechanism in bilateral climate partnership
This section discusses a more important funding mechanism in Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships through Monitor, Report, and Verification (MRV) system. The key of assessing MRV system was data management in the context of deforestation rate or tree cover loss annually. There were different findings and interpretation of deforestation rate from several credible sources and this divergence was the primary analysis on why there was an attribution problem and genuine information was difficult to be verified. In relations to the framework of transformative 4is+3, information management problem, institutionalism, and actors’ interest were more significant than actors’ ideas, leadership change, policy experiment, and decentralisation challenge. Data management problem was reflected to the lack of information coordination and the differences of data analysis was caused by different interpretation from multi institutions of Indonesian government and foreign donors. As another additional factor, it was plausible that the divergence of data interpretation and analysis came from different actors’ interest (both from foreign donors and Indonesian government), the national data based on table 6.1 was primarily stated by national institutions in Indonesia and framed as the national interest of Indonesia. Meanwhile, the table 6.2 was done by international consultant and Global Forest Watch that the funding of their research and their reliability was checked by international donors or other global institution.

MRV itself is defined as a practical and technical accountability of checking and balancing the climate management either multilaterally or bilaterally (ODI, 2014).

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39 For further analysis on transformative 4is+3, please read section 6.6
In practice of climate change policy, MRV was simply assessed through the funding evaluation and monitor along with the data verification of deforestation rate or tree cover loss annually from credible sources such Global Forest Watch, Indonesian MoEF, and other verified international institution related to climate change. It means that every climate change project happening in Indonesia that has got support either through bilateral or multilateral channels, needs to be evaluated. The MRV system came from both Indonesian government and foreign donors.

In the history of global climate regime, MRV was initially created at COP1 in 2009, Copenhagen, which was associated with the development of national systems for monitoring and reporting REDD+ activities and associated RLs (Halimanjaya et al, 2014). The decision by Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) under United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat also stipulates that national monitoring systems for REDD + and Reference Levels (RLs) provide measurement and monitoring estimates that are transparent, consistent and accurate, with reported uncertainties (UNFCCC, 2010). At the16th COP in Cancun a decision was made to create a mechanism for positive incentives and associated safeguards for REDD+ (CIFOR, 2010). The decision stipulates that these capabilities can be established over time, in order to allow countries with less limited technical capacity to advance their readiness for implementation.

The system agreed by the UNFCCC for calculating emission reductions through REDD+ includes RLs, MRV, and safeguards. The level of forest-related emissions resulting from the implementation of REDD+ activities is calculated by comparing MRV emission reductions to a benchmark rate termed a RL. RLs are ideally based on the historical rate of emissions and adjusted if necessary to account for national circumstances. The climate finance itself is contingent upon respecting social and environmental do-no-harm requirements, termed safeguards. MRV systems may have different operational needs depending on whether they are being developed for globally comparable measurements or for countries’ own national forest monitoring systems (Halimanjaya and Maulida, 2014). In relations to transformative 4is+3 as
stated clearly in chapter 2, this MRV is very closely linked to the indicator of ‘information’. The information in this MRV context means that there is a data management and information sharing which circulates and simultaneously wrapped all deforestation rate data with reliable sources and verification process. It became more problematic when data management was not done the same between Indonesian government and foreign donors’ consultant and they had different output/results of deforestation rate data, which was elaborated more details in the next paragraphs.

Indonesia started to do the MRV capacity since the LoI process for REDD+ programme between Norway and Indonesia began in 2010 (LTS, 2018:6). In technical practice, the state of the science on forest measuring and monitoring is now sufficiently mature to meet operational REDD+ needs for MRV. For some other areas of importance to REDD+, such as monitoring for biodiversity safeguards, the techniques are not currently operational, but the science is rapidly advancing (Goetz et al., 2015:19). Nowadays, the Indonesian commitment to economy-wide emission reductions was in line with national policy (i.e. RANGRK) and international agreement (i.e. Indonesia’s Nationally Determined Contribution or NDC under the UNFCCC Paris Agreement, as well as a nested MRV system for emission reductions from the forest and peatland sector (Ibid). Although the national data on carbon emission reporting was done well and became stronger justification to provide reliable evidence, two bodies of Indonesian government called National Development Agency (Bappenas) and MoEF had divergent views. Bappenas did the economy-wide emissions reporting for RAN-GRK purposes, whilst MoEF coordinated with other sectoral agencies and sub-national entities to assess the NDC’s commitment that regulate or impact forest and peatland. As consequence, there were clash of ministerial and sectoral agencies in Indonesia government with uncertainties of forest definition, boundaries, and baselines. Institutional and actors’ interest factor (of transformative 4is+3 framework) played significantly here, meant that different institutions with different interests of sharing the reliable authorities and data on deforestation rate. This disunity of data affected the compliant-LoI and MRV mechanism between Indonesia
and Norway. For further unclear and divergence of deforestation rate data, there were two different tables below:

Table 6.1 Deforestation Rate in Indonesia in 1997-2018 Based on National Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deforestation rate/year (in million ha)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Before REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2003</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>Before REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Before REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Before REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>After REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>After REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>3.8 (&lt;i&gt;highest rate after REDD+&lt;/i&gt;)</td>
<td>After REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>After REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-2015</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>After REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-2016</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>After REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>After REDD+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017-2018</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>After REDD+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.2 An Annual Tree Cover Loss in Indonesia Based on International Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total tree cover loss (million hectares)</th>
<th>GHG emissions from tree cover loss (million tonnes CO₂e)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.54 (red circle)</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.14 (red circle)</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LTS (2018:13) and www.globalforestwatch.org/dashboards/country/Indonesia
By seeing two tables above, there was a common understanding that both gave important data of the deforestation rate in order to check the progress of Indonesian carbon emissions’ reduction. However, table 6.1 based on national data differed from table 6.2 based on international data. It was bringing unclear interpretation albeit their consistent and reliable sources and verification process of the deforestation data. This divergence addressed the challenge of attribution, meant that the authorship of checking and analysing the data of deforestation rate was caused by multiple foreign donors and complex multiple stakeholders’ projects. As the implication, there was confusion and multiple understanding between Indonesian government and foreign donors that reshaped the MRV system, and eventually delayed the disbursement of funding. The data synchronisation as basis of evidence’s presentation was important factor in the mechanism of result-based payment.

As an alternative solution to reduce the data confusion on deforestation rate, two different deforestation data could be anticipated through further guideline on effective monitoring and evaluation REDD+ system. The effective monitoring and evaluation guideline were initially done by Kemitraan (refer to chapter 4 and 5) building trust with Norway and they got certain indicators on the data management and information sharing assessment (CIFOR, 2018). In addition, some suggestions for achieving a comprehensive MRV system on climate finance management in Indonesia involves: strengthening a performance-based budgeting system for mitigation as well as climate change adaptation focused expenditures by the government, ensuring stronger coordination at the national and provincial levels to enable integrated approaches to MRV, further elaborating the link between MRV of funds, the activities planned, and those to be implemented as part of RAN-GRK and RAD-GRK, and building capacities for the government to ensure an internal control system for climate change relevant activities as part of government regulation (Tanzler and Maulidia, 2013: 40). Thus, MRV was done effectively if both foreign donors and Indonesian government conducted the 3is: institutional arrangement, coordination or alignment among actors’ interest, and synchronised information through comprehensive
monitoring and evaluation on REDD+. The next section portrays how climate finance through REDD+ jeopardise the land use change and forestry scheme.

6.4 Financing REDD+: a jeopardising scheme of land-use change

This section provides evidence about and further argues how fragile the REDD+ funding mechanism was, in particular the scheme of checking land-use change and other deforestation issues. Through examining the three bilateral partnership case studies, I have here identified separate explanations and reasons from my analysis about how and why the REDD+ worked in the climate finance of Norway, the UK, and Australia. By comparing the three bilateral climate finance case studies, my analysis has shown that each donor had their own unique problem in managing their climate finance approach. The other crucial cause of the complexity of bilateral climate finance in land-use change was that there was not any strong integrated funding body in the Indonesian government that managed all the coordination and flow of funding until the BLU was established in 2020.

Based on the scientific data of land-use change usage in Indonesia, one needs to consider Indonesia’s overall emission profile as reported in the Second National Communication to the UNFCCC (SNC, 2009): the emissions from land use change and forestry (LUCF) and the peat sector in 2005 accounted for around 63% (1.125 Gg CO2e) of the country’s overall GHG emissions (1.791 Gg CO2e). Consequently, over 87% of the total emission reduction target (0.767 Gg CO2e) will be derived from actions in land-based sectors (Tanzler & Maulidia, 2013:22). This data indicates that land-based sectors played significant damage on the deforestation in Indonesia. As the consequence, international commitment for funding climate change activity in Indonesia has been relatively high and centred predominantly on REDD+ and land use related mitigation objectives. Most international public climate finance has been provided bilaterally rather than multilaterally. To gain a better understanding of the complex financial mechanism of REDD+, this section presents a summary of my findings and analysis of the Norway-Indonesia climate finance problem.
6.4.1 Norway-Indonesia climate finance problem

This section explains the complications involved in the funding mechanism in relation to the Norway case, which I will argue mostly happened due to changing funding institution and distribution related to REDD+, changing intermediary agencies, changing policies from both Norway and Indonesia, and also the complexity of the ‘one map’ policy. The changing policy in Indonesia related to REDD+ was mainly caused by the changing Presidential leadership in November 2014, which lead to a drastic institutional arrangement change to REDD+ and merged the Ministry of Forestry and Ministry of Environment under Presidential Regulation number 16 in February 2015 (refer to chapter 5). Below I present the timeline of the problematic financial mechanisms of Norway.

Figure 6.3 A problematic financial mechanism in Norway

Figure 4.1 Major developments and milestones of the one map and moratorium programme


Source: Maxton-Lee (2020:113)
Based on the figure above, it shows how complicated and problematic it is to map out their funding mechanism with Indonesian climate change policy. As previously shown in chapters 4 and 5, the delayed funding distribution became the major problem of the Indonesia-Norway climate partnership. This funding difficulty grew out of the problematic domestic politics of Norway and Indonesia (refer also to chapter 5) with such an unclear authority distribution between national and local government on implementing REDD+. This section explores the motives and reasons why the Norwegian government did not disburse the money due to the problem of Indonesian government’s preparedness in managing bilateral climate finance.

At first, in 2011, Norway applied significant effort to uphold transparency in the process of delivering funding to the Indonesian stakeholders. The ‘missing’ principle of transparency in the Indonesian funding mechanism was substantiated by several interviews and some reports (Interviews 2, 15 and 16; Gaia, 2013; UNDP, 2012; Fay et al., 2018). This missing transparency was caused due to lack of trust between Norwegian government and UNDP as the intermediary role, then another trust issue as well between Indonesian government and Norwegian government so that Kemitraan helped bridging their different perceptions. The Norwegian government allocated finances for REDD+ to Indonesian governmental bodies, some international and national NGOs, academics, and local and indigenous communities.40

Furthermore, dialogue on the proposed establishment of an intermediate-term funding arrangement related to REDD+ involved input from the Ministry of Finance, development banks, donor agencies and NGOs (Astuti and McGregor, 2015). This dialogue aimed at a better structure of funding mechanisms and communication among stakeholders, and it also sought to increase the transparency of information. There was a multilateral plan that engaged bilateral channel on REDD+ in Indonesia as the

alternative pathway on implementing the emission reduction and further concrete programme with civil society groups.

In terms of the funding mechanism, REDD+ developed the Funding Instrument for REDD+ in Indonesia (FREDDI) as a financial institution on climate change in 2011. This financial system on REDD+ did not last longer, it stopped in 2016 under Presidential Regulation number 16/2015, and there was a new financial instrument called Public Service Agency (BLU) and the Environment Fund Management Agency (BPDLH) in October 2019 (Dwisatrio et al., 2021:79). The table below depicts the Norwegian funding mechanism.

Table 6.3 Indonesia-Norway funding mechanism and its challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Funding institution: FREDDI in 2011-2016</th>
<th>Pending establishment, used UNDP but had a dispute; changed to Kemitraan as a replacement for UNDP and Indonesia created BLU in 2018 as an autonomous financial institution for international aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Funding distribution scheme: Phases 1 + 2 = £156 million Phase 3 = £625 million</td>
<td>The actual spent of phases 1 + 2 = £48.5 million with 4-6 years delayed progress on carbon emissions reduction Phase 3 = waiting for the deforestation rate to decelerate and there was unconfirmed amount of money to be disbursed due to the delayed progress of Indonesian deforestation rate. This unconfirmed money happened as the consequence of result-based payment. If there was not strong evidence from Indonesian government, Noway would not disburse the money</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The funding mechanism that Norway proposed through FREDDI did not materialise within the expected timeline in 2014. With its establishment pending, UNDP assumed the role of temporary intermediary funding body. However, there was then a dispute between UNDP and the Norwegian government in 2015. Thereafter, Norway decided to switch to Kemitraan as the replacement for UNDP in 2016 (Interviews 4 and 8) and Indonesia was preparing BLU as an autonomous financial institution for the receipt of international aid in 2018. The funding scheme of REDD+ included three phases. Phases 1 and 2 were supposed to entail funding of £156 million. In practice, Norway only disbursed £48.5 million due to delayed progress in the achievement of required results with respect to carbon emissions reduction. Phase 3 in theory was to be disbursed in 2019 at the latest (up to £625 million). However, this phase of funding has not emerged yet as the Norwegian government waits for the deforestation rate to decrease. Moreover, it took until 2019 for Indonesia to receive the first results-based payment, and even the amount paid is unknown/unclear. Given the explanation and findings above, it is understood that funding mechanism in Norway did not work well due to two reasons. First, there was a lack of trust between Norway and UNDP as the intermediary agency, which did not simplify the funding distribution albeit the establishment of FREDDI in 2011. Second, the slow progress or limited evidence from Indonesian government on cutting the deforestation as the requirement of result-based payment mechanism. The next section portrays the UK-Indonesia financial mechanism.

6.4.2 UK-ID financial mechanism problems within the Indonesian government
This section sets out the problems regarding the financial scheme and funding distribution related to the UK-Indonesia bilateral climate partnership. Through my analysis, the main reason behind the funding mechanism between UK-Indonesia being problematic was Indonesian government at first did not utilise the British funding properly due to the absence of Indonesian climate funding agency (DNPI, 2009). Once
the ICCCTF was established in 2009 (Fiscal Policy Bureau, 2019) and the Public Service Agency was created in 2019 (Bappenas, 2021:22), the conflict came from Bappenas vs MoEF. In addition, there was also the contradictive result of the UKCCU to the improvement of climate policy reform in Indonesia. Furthermore, there was not a direct impact and engagement of British government with Indonesian civil society groups, which diminished the effective public participation.

Indeed, the absence of an integrated funding body was still a dilemma for the Indonesian government in 2010 (Ministry of Finance Report, 2011). On the one hand, the Indonesian government sought to continue to receive bilateral climate aid from the UKCCU. On the other hand, this aid would inevitably require a complex form of money distribution, which it was less enthusiastic about. Eventually, the issue was addressed by the MoEF which created Ministerial Regulation number 70 in 2017, which stated that Indonesia would create an independent funding agency called Badan Layanan Umum (BLU). This funding agency (as also stated in earlier section on Norway-Indonesia climate finance problem), in particular, was designed to manage REDD+ funding and the establishment of core funding sources or investment from the Indonesian government. All REDD+ activities and other relevant projects were to be pulled into one funding agency and this was to be monitored by the Ministry of Finance. The BLU initiative represented an Indonesian decision, responding to the absence of a funding body which foreign donors highlighted as a problem (Dwisatrio et al., 2021).

The Peat Land Restoration Agency (BRG), which was established in 2016, noted some important concerns about the emerging BLU to Indonesian government. The Deputy at the BRG argued that developing BLU not only depended on Norway, but also claimed that the UK could act hand-in-hand with Norway by demanding a common certified report on carbon emissions reduction (Interview 1). He also expressed concern about data protection and claimed that the management of the One Map Policy continued to hamper the BLU mechanism. Meanwhile, the issue of authority regarding data also emerged as a concern, as data manipulation could generate ‘profit’ and hence offer another avenue of corruption (Interview 1). In
response to this statement, I argue that there was financial mismanagement and an unclear flow of funding distribution from both the foreign donors to the Indonesian government and from the Indonesian government to NGOs or other relevant recipients. Essentially, Indonesia had an opaque and prolonged process which ensured the integration of all donors and methods of disbursement.

Another point of view was presented by a former UKCCU expert, who said that the Indonesian Ministry of Finance had not set up green investment for big donors or corporations that supported green development and investment in Indonesia (Interview 10). This statement shows that the institutional changes within the Indonesian government has not enabled the coherent integration of the BLU mechanism. The green investment platform was essential to enhance the climate finance system in Indonesia, which was reflected as well in the Low Carbon Development programme between the UK and Indonesia. Instead, another avenue of climate finance has emerged, leading to confusion for both the UK and Indonesian governments.

Additional summary of funding mechanism regarding the UK’s funding mechanism is illustrated below:

Table 6.4 Indonesia-UK funding mechanism and its challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Funding Mechanism in the UKCCU founded on a G-to-G-based principle and funds are well-distributed</th>
<th>All of the UKCCU’s funding was distributed to Indonesian governmental bodies (Ministry of Finance, BAPPENAS) and then disbursed to the ICCTF, TAF and other accredited partners of the UKCCU. The credibility of the institution is important, but the UKCCU did not put their budget to MoEF, instead giving the funding to MoF and Bappenas. A divergent view happened within Indonesian government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The UKCCU’s Budget Plan 2011-2016 and 2016-2020</td>
<td>Annual budget reports and evaluations were done regularly and on schedule; the UKCCU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
were designed and published was extended to 2021. However, the UKCCU became a contradictive funding agency for Indonesian government due to the notion of improved climate accountability in Indonesia vs advanced British national interest.

Source: Author’s compilation of UKCCU reports and interviews

According to the table above, the UKCCU distributed the funding to specific Indonesian governmental bodies (Ministry of Finance, BAPPENAS) in 2011-2015 and then disbursed to the climate fund and intermediary agencies such like ICCTF, TAF and other accredited partners of the UKCCU. The primary role of National Planning Ministry (Bappenas) in receiving climate fund of the UK government was undeniable. It was confirmed by several interviews in January 2018 with the Assistant Deputy and officers of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) that the MoEF did partially manage the climate fund from the UKCCU (British Interview 3, 7, 8). The UKCCU report (2013-2018) also stated that the UKCCU had a settled agreement with Bappenas as the representative of Indonesian government, which minimised the primary role of MoEF as the leading sector of Indonesian climate governance. Bappenas also co-organised a Low Carbon Development and Green Economy in Bali, October 2018 together with UKCCU, ICCTF, and World Resource Institute (WRI) and not cooperated with the MoEF as the focal point of REDD+ and climate change control under DG-CCC (refer to chapter 4 and 5). In short, there was a divergent claim and view within Indonesian government seeing British funding (i.e. through UKCCU) as an important funding source. On one hand, UKCCU was essential for ICCCTF under Bappenas, but on the other hand MoEF perceived the strong domination of Bappenas with UK’s climate fund and then MoEF created a competitor of ICCTF called BLU in order to simplify climate fund mechanism. These two ministries contradicted each
other and made the funding more confusing because there was not any alignment within Indonesian government and this conflict hampers the coordination among government official in implementing climate policies in Indonesia.

Although the UKCCU conducted accountability and transparency through their annual report and the institution was extended in 2021 (DFID, 2016-2020), the UKCCU was not the ultimate factor in determining the effectiveness of the bilateral climate fund. In supporting this argument, Peatland Restoration Agency (BRG)’s Director stated that UKCCU funding was a part of multilateral climate fund channel and it was used by the British government to cover their economic/profit-based development funding (Interview 1). It meant that British bilateral climate fund through UKCCU was merely the small budget on mainstreaming sustainability in their economic development’s interest in Indonesia. The UKCCU funding had a partial effect to the Indonesian climate policy reform. Another argument came from World Growth Report (2013:4) stated that DFID (as the main source of UKCCU fund) set the UK aid policy for advancing its own national interests, particularly reducing the Britain’s trade deficit. In short, the UKCCU brought dual purpose for improving forest and land governance in Indonesia versus recover the British development/trade deficit through the sustainability agenda.

There was also indirect engagement but successfully from British government giving the funding to civil society groups in Indonesia. This argument was proved by statement of TAF’s managers that the UKCCU always had practical and technical cooperation with TAF directly (British interview 4,5,6). Another evidence was based on the Bappenas’ report (2021:45-85), from 196 accredited and reviewed CSOs that manage climate change projects, there was not any single funding source coming from the UKCCU. The UKCCU funding was mainly distributed to the ICCCTF scheme first, and then ICCCTF did selection process of CSOs’ climate projects. The major role of TAF and ICCCTF showed a structured climate funding mechanism in Indonesia but collapsed the effective public participation with local communities or other civil society groups in Indonesia.
In summarising the complexity of the UK-Indonesia climate partnership above, there were three main arguments that I have presented. Firstly, the divergent views and separated policy came from Bappenas and Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) on building their own climate fund agency towards the UKCCU funding. Secondly, the contradictory views of the DFID/UKCCU fund, which was defined as the improving agency on forest and land governance vs the cover of economic development and British’s trade deficit, made the climate policy reform in Indonesia getting slower and complex as the impact of dual policy. Thirdly, the absence of direct funding distribution from British government to civil society groups reduced the essence of public participation in Indonesian climate governance. The next section analysed the problematic Australian climate fund in Indonesia.

6.4.3. Australian financial mechanism problem
This section analyses how and why financial mechanism challenges evolved in relation to the Australia-Indonesia bilateral climate partnership. Climate finance in Australia-Indonesia bilateral partnership scheme started in 2008, when Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership (IAFCP) was emerged (Davies, 2015). From 2010-2012, the Australian government implemented the programme through Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership (KFCP) but there was a non-transparent funding scheme between Australian government and local civil society groups along with unclear objectives of the programme (Australian interviews 6, 7, 9, 11, and Hidayah, 2013). Through this KFCP case, there are two determining factors on assessing why Australian funding becoming problematic to Indonesia: the domestic politics of Australia that changed multiple Prime Ministers in 8 years and the domestic politics of Indonesia (both among governments and between government and civil society groups). Based on those two factors, the Australian did not create clear funding mechanism because of three causes. First, there is an unclear goals and objective of IAFCP to Indonesian stakeholders (both for Indonesian government and civil society groups), which resulted to unclear climate policy reform and there was not any improved impact on Indonesian emission
reduction’s progress. Second, the Australian funding reduction on giving foreign aid (including climate aid) through the merge of Australian Aid in Indonesia with Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in September 2013 (Bruere and Hill, 2016) gave negative impact on the climate policy instruments and unjust climate finance in Indonesia. Third, the changing political system in the internal Australia through different Prime Ministers’ leadership yielded the unpredictable climate foreign policy and unprecedented priority on climate reform in Indonesia.

Australia had a difficult relationship with Indonesia and has continually chosen intermediary agencies to implement climate aid since 2005 (DFAT, 2006). Therefore, the Australian government changed its policy and modified its rules towards the Indonesian partnership on climate change in 2008 and created Australian Aid (Aus AID) to be the finance hub for climate projects in Indonesia (DFAT, 2010). The Aus AID’s funding model is the most feasible for climate change although it did not have sufficient knowledge and leverage in this sector so it might be more appropriate to instead rely on those that already exist (Australian Interview 1). Furthermore, the abolishment of Aus AID in 2013 (which had been explained in details in chapter 4, section 4.5) and merger with DFAT collapsed the strong workstream of Australia on climate policy. The Aus AID removal also affected the Australian climate finance efficiency, which also drew back its priority on combating climate change and reduce carbon emission through REDD+ in Indonesia.

Meanwhile, the Australian climate finance through KFCP was claimed as the significant project in Kalimantan, which spent money up to £15.5 million (this budget is in between of the amount given by the UK and Norway) and had been done in two phases (DFAT, 2010). These phases of funding appeared sensible on paper and professional consultants were hired for the purpose thereof, but they were not fully implemented in practice. According to a report Kemitraan Australia-Indonesia (2009), the first implementation phase from 1st January to 30th June 2009 involved activities that laid the foundations for full-scale implementation, carried out by implementing partners, consultants, and the Peat and GHG Working Groups (Kemitraan, 2009:25).
The IAFCP built the institutional framework for the KFCP at the provincial and district levels. The second implementation phase (1st July 2009-30th June 2012) then involved a change in management. The management contractor took over the implementation of the KFCP under the direction of the KFCP coordinator. These dedicated management resources permitted the rapid scaling-up of implementation activities based on the knowledge gained and groundwork laid during the early implementation (p.15). It means that the KFCP at the beginning worked quite well and there was structured timeline in the implementation and funding disbursement.

However, there has been mismanagement and scant transparency from the World Bank consultants in terms of giving progress reports on the Australian climate project to the Indonesian government, which has deepened funding mechanism problems and trust issues between Australia and Indonesia (Interview 2). As a response, the World Bank consultant made a statement through my interview in January 2018 that there were too many layers and confusing Indonesian bureaucracy, which made the Australian climate projects more complex in Indonesia (Interview 4). Supporting the World Bank’s statement, the interviewee from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry admitted that the local government had multiple layers of bureaucracy and that they overlapped, which affects all foreign donors (Interview 2). From the local Indonesian government’s perspective, many local leaders give little attention to climate change issues and display a low level of integrity, yet they are highly dedicated to the people (James, 2006: 3). The UNDP consultant argued that many district governors in Central Kalimantan did not originally want to understand and follow up on the importance of the REDD+ project for reforestation in Indonesia (Interview 3). These evidences made an impact that climate policy in Indonesia was not high priority to national and local government, which also affected the Australian perspective and trust to Indonesian climate policy reform. To avoid further dispute and complex confusion on working with the local government, Australian government remained using UNDP and World Bank (multilateral institutions) as their intermediary/implementing agencies on bilateral climate partnership. In exploring the
detailed argument on UNDP, World Bank, and the complexity of funding mechanism of Australian funding, here is the table of the explanation.

Table 6.5 Indonesia-Australia funding mechanism and its challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Funding institution was settled</th>
<th>The AusAID was built in Indonesia since 1998, in 2013 was the ending of AusAID because it merged with DFAT (Davies, 2016). The climate change projects were conducted by the World Bank and UNDP as intermediary agencies in disbursing the money to country partners. It means that Australia use multilateral institution to conduct and implement the bilateral climate cooperation with Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Funding scheme IAFCP in 2010 (£110 million - £151 million)</td>
<td>IAFCP 2010: £55 million January 2012 - June 2013: £10.75 million April 2013: KFCP exit strategy published 2014: KFCP was officially ended without further financial support provided for climate change projects in Indonesia Source: Davies (2016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation from multiple DFAT documents and reports (2009-2018)

According to the empirical findings based on table above, the amount of money in the bilateral arrangement above was clearly decreasing in terms of what was actually spent. Although this funding scheme is through bilateral channel, the multilateral institutions
such World Bank and UNDP as the intermediary agencies started to play an important role in distributing and delivering funding (Interviews 3, 4, 5 and 11). The funding institution AUSAID was built in order to deliver a conducive financial mechanism in Australia-Indonesia climate change projects. As a concrete action, the Australian government already had the Aus AID in 1998-2013 in place as the funding institution and disbursed the funding through UNDP and World Bank to Indonesian government and civil society groups since the implementation of the IAFCP in 2008. It was decided that the funding distribution system in the IAFCP would spend £110-151 million in 2010. However, in practice less money was spent. In 2010, the Australian government disbursed £55 million, followed in January 2012-June 2013 by up to £10.75 million; in April 2013, the KFCP’s exit strategy was published and it officially ended in 2014 (Davies, 2015). The IAFCP and KFCP did not work until the ending period that Indonesia and Australia had agreed, which meant the projects had stopped early and unexpectedly due to unclear information from the project developer (Australian government) to explain and prove the sustainability of the REDD+ financial incentive (Davies, 2015:10).

The problematic climate finance in Australia was also seen through the scrutiny of Indonesian communities in local and rural areas. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the Indonesian government was satisfied with, or felt a positive impact from, the KFCP, which potentially impacted its perceived accessibility. Consequently, local actors began to question the essential functions of the KFCP and its implementation. The villagers, as the recipients of the KFCP fund, claimed that they had not received an appropriate response from the KFCP at a meeting held to negotiate the continuation of the project in the village, leading to open conflict between the villagers and the KFCP (Lounela, 2015: 68). The villagers had been informed that the KFCP did not have the funds to prepare the rubber garden sites and could only supply seeds, in accordance with the signed cooperation agreement between the villagers and the KFCP in 2009 (p. 70). Imposing new techniques was seen as a source of injustice as local knowledge and culture had not been recognised by the KFCP staff (ibid). For the
villagers, the KFCP followed in the footsteps of the many (failed) conservation and other projects that had been impacting the village since at least 2006 (Lounela, 2015: 69). In response to this topic, interviews from my fieldwork and observations in Central Kalimantan showed that the KFCP had not successfully connected to the grassroots level (Norwegian Interviews 4 and 5; Australian Interviews 6 and 11). Firnaherera (2013) also found that the KFCP in Mantangai Hulu Village, Central Kalimantan, caused horizontal conflict among villagers and vertical conflict with the foreign donor and provincial government. The village had already given 120,000 ha of forest land to the KFCP officer as per the REDD+ example. However, the villagers resisted and protested that they had not received any profit and they had no direct communication or involvement during the project implementation (ibid; Hidayah, 2013). In short, the Australian government had an insignificant impact on civil society engagements due to the absence of intermediary agencies and a lack of open access to funding distribution for civil society groups.

Regarding the changing Australian parliament and Prime Minister’s leadership, the IAFCP lacked clear objectives and suffered from a weakening of high-level leadership.41 The changes in bureaucracy had implications for the achievements of the uneven bilateral climate partnership due to a lack of political will from the Australian government (there was a pre-emptive termination of the IAFCP by the country’s Labour government). As the result, the funding efficiency of Indonesian climate change projects had been a core concern of the Australian government, before it removed climate change as a priority of bilateral cooperation with Indonesia in 2016 (DFAT, 2018).

Thus, the fundamental problem of the IAFCP as the main bilateral climate partnership between Indonesia and Australia came from both sides: the domestic

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41 Between November 2007 and September 2013, Australia changed prime minister three times. In June 2010, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was deposed by Julia Gillard. In June 2013, Julia Gillard was deposed by Kevin Rudd. In September 2013, Tony Abbott won the election to become the prime minister (Davies, 2015: 16-18).
politics of Indonesia (internal) and the domestic politics of Australia (external). In chapter 4 and empirical findings of this research, there was no evidence that the Indonesian Ministry of Finance or other relevant government officials coordinated with local governments. This missing information meant that the KFCP had a limited impact on the local communities in Kalimantan. Externally, the domestic politics of Australia were dynamic, involving six changes in parliament and prime minister between 2007 and 2019. The effectiveness of bilateral climate partnership between Australia and Indonesia was very low, which can be seen from the unachieved goals of the partnership due to unclear objectives, along with the budget cuts, and the removal of climate change as a priority in the Australian bilateral policy. In comparison to the Norwegian and UK cases, the Australian bilateral climate partnership with Indonesia performed poorly on programme design and institutional arrangements related to climate change due to the fluctuating domestic politics of the Australian government. The next section further analyses and discusses the empirical findings above by applying the transformative 4is+3 framework.

6.5 Discussion
The empirical findings and arguments regarding climate finance mechanism and three different case studies have been explained. Those complexities can be further analysed through the framework of transformation 4is+3. Of the seven indicators, only actor ideas and the decentralisation challenge played little or no role in explaining developments in climate finance in Indonesia. The MRV system was problematic in Indonesia due to clash of actors’ (both Indonesian government and donors) interests, institutional problems, and information and data management problems. The main analysis of the three case studies is that the institutional setting in climate finance did not work properly due to the unbalanced climate policy experiments from different donors and different Indonesian Presidencies. In the Norwegian case, the financial mechanism on climate change did not give improvement due to the institutional problem related to REDD+, Indonesian government’s clash of interest with Norway,
and the leadership change issue. The UK case had divergent views of funding distribution to the Indonesian government, donor’s contrast interpretation to the climate policy reform in Indonesia, and lack of direct engagement with civil society. Whilst the Australian case had domestic politics problem from both Australia and Indonesia.

In applying the 4+3is framework to the MRV system, I have found the different findings or data outcome of the deforestation rate made it very difficult to establish what caused what, but it is possible to observe increasing complexity. This complex data was reflected in the different interests among foreign donors, different interests among Indonesian governments, and also different interests between the Indonesian government and civil society groups. As evidence, the competing interests of the key actors was seen in the strong claim that a registry-based system capable of reporting reliably for REDD+ purposes was refined and updated with more detailed provincial data (MoEF, 2018). Meanwhile, Bappenas claimed that MRV on REDD+ was not only checked by a registry-based monitoring system, the assessment was a comprehensive analysis through different stakeholders and based on RAN-GRK guidance. As both had different interests and claims, it affected the institutional building specifically on the financial mechanism on climate change nationally. Furthermore, the financial mechanism was also hampered with multi-interpretation of deforestation data and information analysis problems. In short, this MRV problem was caused by three of the Is (clash of actors’ interests, institutional mechanism on climate finance problem, and information/data management problem).

Meanwhile, all three cases initially created institutions related to REDD+ or other climate change projects, such as BPREDD+ and the REDD+ Task Force, the NICFI, the UKCCU, and the KFCP through the Australian Aid Agency. They also set up financial schemes and points of progress as the money was disbursed once proof was given of GHG emission reductions (results-based payment). However, institution building was not a guarantee of improved and effective policy-making on climate change. The contradictory policy change of REDD+ and the changing national bureaucracy in Indonesia resulted from the collapsed management across all three
bilateral climate partnerships. The complexity and barriers to maintaining the institutions related to REDD+ or other climate change issues remained for the institutional analysis. On one hand, the institutional arrangement promoted organisational reconstruction. On the other hand, the institutions solved some problems while creating others (e.g. multiple and competing effects in REDD+ case). In short, each of the 3 partnerships had strong institutional support initially but over time institutional complexity impeded the effective application of climate finance in Indonesia.

In applying the transformative 4is+3 analysis to each partnership, the Norwegian case had significant institutional problems, in particular the trust issue between Norway and Indonesian government and also the information/data management problem. The trust issue was coming from the changing leadership problem (either from when the Norwegian parliament made the decision on the budget proportion or from Indonesia changing its President). In addition, the data management or information system became problematic in proving the progress of deforestation loss due to the authorship issue and clash of interests among stakeholders. The limited evidence from the Indonesian government on cutting deforestation affected negatively the result-based payment mechanism. On the ground in Indonesia, however, practitioners of REDD+ and REDD-like projects speak of the complexity of real interactions and relationships, about the need to adapt to the ‘wicked’ problem in which conservation is rooted (CIFOR, 2011). In short, the Norwegian case and REDD+ progress did not give improved impact to the climate finance mechanism in Indonesia.

Meanwhile, in the context of UK-Indonesia climate partnership, the strong intergovernmental relationship between the UK government and the Indonesian government (especially the strong UKCCU-ICCTF-BAPPENAS bonds). The UK and Indonesia created the UKCCU and the ICCTF as a strong formal institutional framework with the aim of pursuing sustainable forest management (Interviews 1, 3, 7, 8 and 9). However, this strong institutional arrangement did not align with what happened in the practice of power and funding distribution sharing on climate change
projects. Section 6.4.2 showed the competing views derived from Bappenas and Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) on building a specific funding agency on climate change (ICCTF vs BLU) and authority claims, which made the UKCCU funding difficult to implement successfully. Not only the internal Indonesian government system, the internal UK agenda with the UKCCU was also in conflict, and/or had dual agendas as the institution. The UKCCU’s role improved the climate governance vs defending the sole economic development of the UK by covering it with sustainability or forest and land governance. Both contradictions happened due to a clash of donors’ interest and Indonesian government interests, which resulted to the unperformed climate policy experiments and the strong institutional framework did not help this climate policy reform. The last complex funding distribution in the UK case was also portrayed through the lack of direct Indonesian civil society engagement with British government. Institutional problems, clashes of actors’ interest, and policy experiment problem were strong indicators in this case.

The Australian case through IAFCP had an unclear goals and objective to the Indonesian side (both for Indonesian government and civil society groups), which resulted from complex policy experiments and lack of information system/coordinated data management. Section 6.4.3 showed that the Australian funding reduction had a negative impact on Indonesian climate policy reform due to the merger of Australian Aid in Indonesia with Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in September 2013 (Bruere and Hill, 2016). Externally, the constantly changing leadership through the replacement of Australian prime ministers affected another subtheme of the institutional factor: the funding disbursement and delayed policy-making process. Between 2011 and 2020, and adjusting for inflation, Australian aid fell by 31%, while global aid increased by 26%. In 2011, Australia contributed 3.7% of total OECD aid. That ratio peaked at 4.3% the following year but has since fallen almost every year. By 2020 Australia only contributed 1.6% of global aid, less than half of our 2021 share (Howes, 2021). Below is the change in the Australian Aid performance:
The analysis leads to the conclusion that the bilateral climate finance in Indonesia in each case was uncoordinated, very complex (in particular related to each policy experiment from both donor countries and Indonesia as the recipient country), and created layers of unclear information whether the climate funding body, BLU in Indonesia, was taken into account and running in practice. The foreign donors have their own mechanisms and practices for delivering, disbursing, and managing their funding albeit the establishment of MRV as the technical accountability in bilateral climate finance of Indonesia. The land-use change also became the major source/cause of jeopardizing deforestation rate along with other complexities of institutional architecture in funding mechanism related to the civil society groups’ climate implementation/action.

6.6 Conclusion

Climate finance in Indonesia was a complex mechanism, which was caused and correlated with different three donor case studies. Despite the level of funds already pledged by donors, there is still a lot more required as various climate finance assessments conclude, and the Indonesian government is challenged to tap additional sources and opportunities to meet these needs. The performance-based mechanism, MRV system, and land use change policy did not contribute significantly to climate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australian aid: what a difference a decade makes</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid generosity (aid/income)</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our generosity relative to the average OECD donor</td>
<td>110%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. traditional OECD donors less generous than us</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our share of the global aid effort</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Howes (2021)
policy reform for three reasons. First, there was an unclear basic mechanism as to how Norway managed their result-based payment. The unreadiness of the Indonesian government in setting up the BLU as the integrated funding agency from Indonesia and also the lack of progress of the Norwegian government in spending their budget in Indonesia made the result-based payment more complex. Second, I found that the MRV system could not provide a clear answer on the deforestation rate data due to problems with attribution. It means that the authorship and data ownership on the deforestation cut was not synchronised due to clash of stakeholders’ interests (from Indonesian government, donors, and civil society groups). Third, the financial mechanism from each foreign donors/three case studies reflected different leadership changes and different institutional problems.

The result-based payment that was central to the Norwegian case the system did not work as they could not provide clear evidence on the deforestation rate and could not therefore disburse the money accordingly. The disrupted and unsynchronised information of deforestation data from multiple sources (both government and non-government actors) triggered the delayed implementation of result-based payment. In comparison to the UK and Australia case, Norway had strong and significant financial mechanism problems due to the authorship issue on the unmatched deforestation loss data, clash of multi stakeholders’ interests (Norwegian government, Indonesian national and local government, national and local civil society groups).

Through the transformative 4is+3 framework, only actor ideas and the decentralisation challenge had no impact on the problematic climate finance in Indonesia. In section 6.3, the MRV system in Indonesia faced attribution challenge due to clash of actors’ (both Indonesian government and donors) interests, institutional problem, and information and data management problem. The UK case in section 6.4.2 had contradictory views about the funding distribution from Indonesian government and the perspective of UKCCU funding due to clash of donors’ interest and Indonesian government interests, which which lead to a confusing, contradictory and overly complicated policy set up. Institutional problem was also reflected in the case of
indirect engagement between British government as a donor and Indonesian civil society groups. Institutional problem, clash of actors’ interest, and policy experiment problem became strong indicators in this case.

The Australian case had domestic politics problems with both the Indonesian and Australian governments. The complexities became more critical in the context of decreasing funding from Australian aid for Indonesia. The abolition of Australian Aid in Indonesia, the unclear objective and measurement of climate funding along with the climate change restoration through the IAFCP, and changing leadership through enormous replacement of Australian Prime Minister reshaped their climate policy and diminished their priority on sustainable development and climate restoration in Indonesia, which was clearly stated in section 6.4.3. Australia did not consistently manage their foreign aid (between 2013-2016) for deepening or exploring the various implementation of climate finance activities with Indonesia.

Lastly, applying transformative 4is+3 indicators was useful in explaining the complexities and its effectiveness of climate finance in the context of Indonesian bilateral climate partnership. Not all indicators played a role in improving climate finance in Indonesia. The most significant indicators shaping the complexities of climate finance in Indonesia were the institutional problem and the clash of multi stakeholders’ interests in managing the deforestation loss data. Furthermore, there was no clear and integrated funding mechanism from all foreign donors who helped and supported Indonesian climate change policies. Each donors has their own policy experiments related to climate finance in Indonesia. The next chapter outlines the complexities of decentralisation and civil society groups’ engagement in the bilateral climate partnership of Indonesia.
Chapter 7: Civil Society Participation and Bilateral Climate Partnerships in a Decentralised System

7.1 Introduction

This chapter reflects on the claim that public participation and active protests from civil society groups or networks put pressure on governments to develop alternatives to multilateral governance. In bilateral climate partnerships, civil society participates in the projects, protests, agenda setting, and large-scale mobilisation in driving for change. The active participation from civil society is becoming an enlightened minority issue to be engaged within climate policies and part of an enhanced decentralisation network. The local and subnational actors play a significant role in improving the mechanism of bilateral climate cooperation in order to create more inclusive engagement and transparent implementation.

However, the engagement of civil society in the REDD+ case on the elite margins did not have a significant impact on climate governance in Indonesia. It was a goal for the civil society groups to improve deforestation and to make a direct contribution, but this did not actually happen due to lack of Indonesian public support for climate policies (Lutrell et al, 2014:67) and the dispute of local authorities in building the governance reform that relates to the REDD project (Di Gregorio et al., 2013). The politicisation of the bureaucracy and increasing business–government relationships at national level are strongly needed in the REDD+’s reform. These political changes are reportedly intensifying at local level, which highlights the trade-off between working through rapid and ‘ad hoc’ institutional reforms versus engaging those institutions which have traditionally placed ‘blockages’ on reform (Lutrell et al, 2014:73).

Because of limited information provided to, and limited engagement with, civil society, by the bilateral donors, this increased a conflictual reaction to the government’s policies and bilateral aid. In order to reduce the public tension and mistrust towards bilateral climate policy discretion in Indonesia, the MoEF decided to choose
intermediary agencies as the moderator/connector between foreign donors and Indonesian stakeholders. As stated in chapter 4, Kemitraan was one of those designated to bridge the Norwegian fund to the Indonesian government. This national non-profit organisation took over the role of the UNDP in order to disburse the Norwegian climate finance to the government of Indonesia. Trust and credibility rebuilding was undertaken between Norway and Indonesia, which also reflected the trust-building process in the Australia-Indonesia climate partnership. By contrast, the British government had a strong trust in their intermediary agency called The Asia Foundation (TAF) to bridge the interest between local actors and donors.

In addition, the case of the Kalimantan Carbon Forest Partnership (KFCP) was even more challenging and was in general a failed project, ending unexpectedly in 2014. As a complicated project, KFCP leads to questions about how social learning can be flexible and adapted in the programme design of the land use context (Sanders et al., 2020). This means that a change in the REDD+ pilot project and KFCP was complex and a shared learning agenda in climate governance.

As outlined in Chapter 5, under President Jokowi, various attempts were made to improve climate policy, including at local level. This innovative climate policy was designed through the kampung iklim programme and the Constitutional Court ruling MK 35/2012 about adat (customary) land rights (Salamat, 2015). According to the representative from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry: “The interim phase also included a portfolio of time-sensitive issues, including preventing forest and peat fires, implementing the Constitution Court Ruling number 35/2012 (MK 35) recognising the tenure rights of masyarakat hukum adat (indigenous communities), land conflict resolution in national parks, and strengthening gender inclusion” (20).42

However, the implementation of MK 35 triggered a dispute between the Indonesian government and the Alliance of Indigenous People of the Archipelago

(AMAN). By July 2013, AMAN had already proposed a judicial review and further investigation into each article of the constitution because most of the clauses in the law had no impact on indigenous forestry in Kalimantan or other places in Indonesia (CIFOR, 2015). The institutional framework-building was not successful, and this affected the enforcement of indigenous communities’ legal right to land. In short, it was mostly an internal matter.

When the REDD+ case encountered local contingencies and minor groups, the problem became more complex and it was difficult to build transparency for both the donors and the government of Indonesia. The different district governors’ leadership, along with the dynamic relationship with the provincial governor, became the problematic cause for local civil society groups reacting vocally and protesting since the implementation of REDD+ in September 2010. This local politics problem resulted from the complexity of coordination and collaboration among local stakeholders, which became hard to implement and maintain between CSOs and government of Indonesia at all levels. This transparency problem also determined the divergence of the transformative 4Is+3 analytical framework, as the tool of analysis.

The role of local or national NGOs in saving the forests was limited because the corporate and government elites shaped climate policy or hid their corrupt actions. The problem of transparency meant that climate change policy transformation was hindered. The large power politics among elites (the owners of political parties along with media owners and corporates) destroyed the transparent mechanism of information sharing and diminishing accountability with states’ apparatus and relevant local governments’ actors. In relation to how this finding connects with the transformative 4Is+3 framework, the decentralisation challenge and non-transparent process made more tangled the connection between leadership change and actors’ ideas and interest; between policy experiments and institution and information.

Based on the analysis above, this chapter is divided into six sections. The overall context of civil society engagement and decentralisation are explained in section 7.2. The paradox of intermediary agencies as the bridge between foreign donors
and Indonesian government vs unfair distributor to the local civil society groups in the REDD+ case and further elaboration on the trust-building process are set out in section 7.3. Section 7.4 presents more specifically the transparency problem in the REDD+ case and decentralised governance. Then, complex indications and conditions are explored, using the analysis of the transformative 4Is+3 and discussion in section 7.5, before section 7.6 concludes.

7.2 Challenges of civil society engagement and decentralisation

This section presents the challenging engagement of civil society and its role with the foreign donors and Indonesian government, in the context of decentralised governance. Following this, some links are made between civil society engagement and the decentralisation process, which is reflected through REDD+ in all three case studies of bilateral climate change partnership. There are also three comparative empirical findings discussed regarding civil society influence in the Norway-Indonesia, UK-Indonesia and Australia-Indonesia climate change partnerships. As the common line of challenge of each of the three cases, civil society participation was limited and had less of an impact on the REDD+ reform and the climate governance of Indonesia. The decentralisation challenge was also analysed through the dispute of local authorities and local NGOs on land tenure right and deforestation loss data.

The rise of civil society action in climate change cannot be separated from environmental democracy. Environmental democracy informs climate governance when transnational advocacy networks and participation in international climate change negotiations are likely to influence the positioning of domestically-grounded NGOs – through learning, emulation and spill-over (Finemmore and Sikkink, 1998). Individuals provide active support in civil society engagement, often paying attention to the challenges of the global climate regime. This means that public protest, or other civil society movements, serve to highlight ineffective multilateral climate agreements. The pressure of civil society groups in order to change multilateral climate agreements led to the adoption of bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia.
However, Indonesian civil society had less formal influence on the policy process, which in Indonesian parliament claimed that civil society organisations (CSOs) were only encouraged to do consultation with legislative due to the limited funding support for public input (Ledergerber and Susanti, 2007, p. 96). Meanwhile, debate on REDD+-related issues in the wider public sphere in Indonesia is currently limited (Luttrell et al, 2014:71). In the context of Indonesian REDD+, CSOs have been active at national and subnational levels, both in formal consultation processes, such as those concerning the REDD+ strategy, and through informal methods (Ibid, p.72). Furthermore, different CSOs were diverged in the REDD+ based advocacy or radical environmental movements that encounter carbon offset projects (as one of industrialised countries’ proposal in order to avoid their emission reduction).

Despite the active dialogue and interactive sessions between civil society and the Indonesian government on REDD+, the REDD+ debate has not yet been mainstreamed into public discourse. The direct involvement of 11 Indonesian Non Government Organisations (NGOs) in October 2010 (Luttrell et al, 2014:70) to draft the government’s REDD+ policy did not guarantee their prolonged influence in the policy making process of climate change. Similarly, the establishment of the Working Groups of the National REDD+ Task Force (SatGas REDD+) in gathering baseline information and monitoring of the moratorium did not continue once President Jokowi ruled in 2015 and abolished this group through Presidential regulation number 16/2015.

According to the representative from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry in 2019, there was a Constitution Court Ruling number 35/2012 (MK 35) recognising the tenure rights of masyarakat hukum adat (indigenous communities), land conflict resolution in national parks, and strengthening gender inclusion. However, land and tenure rights became the core of the politics of forest and land use in many places (Myers et al., 2016; Thaler and Anandi, 2017). The cost and burdens’ transfer in REDD+ initiatives affected local societies into a more vulnerable situation, by restricting or delegitimizing certain local land uses, or by trading short-term
management rights for long-term tenure. Local communities or societies faced the problem of formal rights to the forest (Skutsch & Turnhout, 2018).

Beside the limited significance of civil society in REDD+, the dispute within local authorities occurred in building governance reform of REDD+ due to two reasons. Firstly, there was misuse of power of certain actors in the Indonesian government both at national and local level. The practice of corruption between the Ministry of Forestry and local government officials in 2010 showed the abuse of power of forestry governance in Indonesia (Dick and Mulholland, 2010, p. 78). Although there was the discretionary power of district governments who had the authority to issue location permits and plantation licences (McCarthy, 2010), the accountability of district governors using the funding for REDD+ properly was under question. Effective access to the information currently held by the Ministry of Forestry in 2014 (before this, the ministry was merged with the Ministry of Environment in February 2015) remained an issue, which amplifies the debate concerning forest sector reform (Astuti and McGregor, 2015).

Secondly, there was also a democratic problem within the local government system. Political interests, particularly around the time of local elections, had the effect of increasing levels of deforestation in some provinces in Indonesia. Purnomo (2015: 20) states that, over the previous decade, forest fires tended to spike before and just after local elections as candidates (cooperating with local businesspeople) gave land (or the right to use land) to local voters (possibly to village heads who then turned it over to local residents) in exchange for their support. Another study from researchers at the London School of Economics (LSE), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and South Dakota State University (SDSU) in 2011, stated that increased fragmentation of political jurisdictions and the election cycle contributed to Indonesia’s high deforestation rate (Burgess et al, 2011). Between 2000 and 2008, there was a 40% increase in logging in the year of the election and a 57% increase in the year following the election (Ibid). Further evidence identified that local politicians expected to receive short-term electoral benefits from either promoting agriculture-driven economic
development or raising local revenues by selling licenses to convert forest areas to agricultural production just before elections (Cisneros et al, 2019:21). This research calculated that there were forest losses of about 5% in districts that engaged in mayoral elections (Ibid, p.12). In short, politics of deforestation in Indonesia were played by certain local actors who jeopardised the democratic system through forest and land degradation.

In addition, the tension between decentralisation and recentralisation remained a governance problem, in particular in managing the climate governance and bilateral climate cooperation between foreign donors and local authorities. In commenting on the new decentralisation law, Steni (2016) highlighted that the Indonesian central government has held authority over forest by controlling planning and gazettement since the early forestry laws of 1967 and 1999. The strong role of the central government is also indicated by its endorsement of a forest management unit (FMU) implementation nationwide, dividing the forest estate into FMUs according to Article 17 of Law No. 41/1999 (MoF 2011). In April 2015, MoF had designated 531 FMUs in 28 of the then 33 provinces, including 183 protection forests (24 million ha) and 437 production forests (60 million ha) for a total of 84 million ha, which was almost 63% of Indonesia’s forest estate (MoF 2015). Sahide et al. (2016) goes a step further and argues that the 2014 revision is an extension of ongoing attempts at recentralisation, insofar as it will empower provincial governments to wrest control from district governments over FMUs (Dwisatrio et al., 2021: 29).

Therefore, together with power, corruption has also been decentralised (see chapters 1 and 2). Greenpeace (2012) and other independent researchers (Wells and Paoli, 2011; Koh et al., 2012) argued that the REDD+ programme in Central Kalimantan failed, particularly in the way the Indonesian and Norwegian governments implemented actions to reduce emissions. In the REDD+ project in Central Kalimantan, it is argued that there was a lack of transparent information, a lack of financial mechanisms, and low ability to gather and provide credible, salient and legitimate information. These indicators were applied to assess and recheck how the
local government system was managing with regard to the REDD+ programme by the provincial governor, mayor, and district governor. And I agree on this point that financial incapacity and legitimate information problem became a critical reason why the bilateral climate projects failed in Kalimantan. In seeking further clarification whether CSOs did play an effective role in bilateral climate partnerships, the next section discusses the problematic civil society issue with the Norwegian donor.

7.2.1 Norway and the civil society engagement challenge

This section demonstrates that policy reform and the roles of both governments (Indonesian and Norwegian government) remained very important in determining whether deforestation would decline or not. Furthermore, the policy reform of REDD+ in the Norwegian case was assessed through the empirical studies of civil society engagements in Central Kalimantan climate project. The Norwegian government placed a strong emphasis on civil society, and the challenge of civil society engagement is of prime importance in the challenging domestic problem with NGOs/CS in Indonesia, either with the CSO itself or with the local government. Compared to the UK and Australia, Norway was the most active donor when it came to engage with civil society groups in Indonesia, and its funding was directly disbursed through the NICFI programme. Norwegian Aid Development (NORAD) has supported civil society organisations contributing to REDD+ since 2009 (NORAD, 2010). Although there was a direct engagement and available funding for the civil society groups, the role of civil society did not entirely have an impact on the improvement of climate change policy reform in Indonesia. Furthermore, their action and participation did not reduce the deforestation loss, as the main evidence of payment-based result of REDD+ in Norway-Indonesia climate partnership.

Civil society was regarded as an important agent of change and the central actor in furthering and applying REDD+ from the perspective of the Norwegian government. NORAD managed the funding of civil society under the NICFI. NORAD divided the grants into three phases, with phase 1 running from 2009-2012, phase 2 from 2013-
2015, and phase 3 from 2016-2020.\textsuperscript{43} In the first phase, there were 39 projects supported, the second phase had 42 projects, and the third 46 projects (Ibid). NORAD received 500 concept notes annually from 2013 to 2015 from civil society projects on REDD+, of which 30-40 projects were in Indonesia. The projects funded covered one or more of the following four areas: forest sector; indigenous communities; sustainable value chain; and the main processes of Norway’s contribution to the global arena (Interview 15).

However, the notion of civil society engagement in the Indonesian context has been a complex and contentious issue. There were many different understandings of the key roles of civil society in deforestation and climate mitigation, which meant that the Norwegian government did not always support them. First, there was a civil society group who openly voiced its views, which helped the government to realise its development targets of REDD+ policy. This group was reflected in the indigenous communities’ participation to reduce carbon emissions and manage indigenous forests but did not significantly impact on the government’s policy reform (Fay and Denduangrudee, 2018: 27). Second, there were NGOs who supported the development of Indicative Maps For Social Forestry; strengthening capacity of local facilitators; and managed 200.000 hectares proposal (MoEF, 2018:14), but their actions were merely noted in the policy paper. Third, in October 2010, 11 Indonesian NGOs established a Civil Society Organisation Common Platform on REDD+, producing some important dialogue and drafting the government’s REDD+ policy (Luttrell et al, 2014:72) but there was lack of evidence that Norway still supported this initiative.

Meanwhile, some interesting thoughts were shared about civil society engagement and the Norway-Indonesia climate partnership. A representative from CIFOR guaranteed the sustainability of REDD+, and especially the recognition of “social forestry” so that the purpose of conservation could be fulfilled (Interview 1).

Elsewhere, a Norwegian diplomat (2018) stated that Norway tended to take a top-down approach with a strong political commitment to the Indonesian government. The Norwegian government, the diplomat claimed, did not believe that transformation materialises exclusively through civil society. The Norwegian diplomat stated:

‘That change is not going to come if there is no minister or president that really wants to change policies and push for that. So, we have in a way, maybe less activity on the ground than Australia and the UK, we have more emphasis on policy reform – working with the government. Then, of course, Norway values the role of civil society very highly. We don’t believe that a particular project in that village is actually going to change anything. It can change something for the village, it can change for a few people, but it’s not going to change the way Indonesia is dealing with land use.’ (Interview 2)

The quote above reflects the Norwegian view that the role of civil society and the transformation of particular projects in villages did not guarantee that the deforestation rate will be decreased. Instead, they concluded that policy reform and the roles of both governments remained very important in determining whether deforestation would decline or not. In short, working with CSOs was nice at a very local level, but had no real overall effect.

Another interviewee from the Partnership for Governance Reform NGO in January 2018, or Kemitraan, also asserted that civil society influenced and affected limited progress of climate policy in Indonesia. It was a minimal impact or less significant to the climate policy of Indonesia. The same interviewee added that NGOs were not very creative in developing climate change mitigation methods (Interview 3). The World Resource Institute interviewee agreed that civil society did not strategically bridge between government and local communities and did not facilitate understanding among communities about the realities of deforestation or forest fires, for instance (Interview 11). Pertinently, some NGOs in Central Kalimantan had already created a

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44 This is the statement from the executive diplomat of the Norwegian Embassy Jakarta.
project called the Kahiyan Initiative, which helped indigenous communities and villagers who had survived forest fires. These NGOs include Save Our Borneo (SoB), Pokker, Yayasan Batang Borneo and the The Indigenous People’s Alliance (AMAN). These organisations built a legacy for REDD+ at local level, but they did not receive support from their local government (Interviews 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 13). In relation to the context of bilateral partnerships, the potential for impact was appealing through some initiatives of CSOs, but it was not followed through and the local governance environment restricted those initiatives. Norway as a foreign donor did not determine the collapsed or hampered movement of civil society in coping with the deforestation problem in Central Kalimantan. There were some problems of access of funding and channels between local government and CSOs.

As an implication, the promised benefits of improved living conditions for indigenous communities or other local societies related to the sustainable forests of REDD+ did not motivate many local actors to continue working together with both local and national government. In other words, the benefits that were promised did not come through due to the absence of responses from either local or national government. As evidence, one of the Indonesian NGOs in Central Kalimantan carried out investigations regarding the progress of REDD+ among local communities in Palangkaraya. This NGO, Save our Borneo (SoB), issued a report to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF), Republic of Indonesia. In my interview with a SoB representative on 28th January 2018 in Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan, he stated that there had been no response or feedback from the national government and SoB repeatedly contacted the MoEF without any reply. Other local NGOs also echoed SoB’s suggestion that there was a low level of support from the provincial governor to enhance the REDD+ programme (Interviews 5, 8, 10 and 13). The WWF Indonesia chapter in Central Kalimantan added that REDD+ had a weak institutional foundation because there was no clear authority to monitor it (Interview 6). Given some empirical findings above, it concluded that there was a weak institutional foundation from national to local, which hampered the coordination link of each authorities and
discouraged trust and motivation of civil society groups.

In order to tone down the tension between the indigenous communities and Indonesian government, it is imperative to bring in the intermediary NGO as the mediator. The role of intermediary NGO bridged what indigenous/local communities need with the Indonesian climate policy made by national and provincial governments. At first sight, the Partnership for Governance Reform, or Kemitraan, was dominated by international, normative ideas. By looking more closely at both Kemitraan’s policies and activities, it became evident that Kemitraan supported concepts and issues deriving from indigenous and other social movements. Kemitraan triggered local actors and indigenous communities to collaborate with each other and create a coalition (Interview 7). The coalition-building of NGOs for indigenous peoples in Indonesia was determined by an interplay of processes between official and unofficial arenas of interaction (Sanmukri, 2017: 17).

As a legal basis, the Indonesian government and Kemitraan signed a cooperation agreement to strengthen the infrastructure and implementation capacity of the United Nations Initiative for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, or REDD+, in the archipelago. This agreement was a continuation of the LoI that the Indonesian and Norwegian governments signed in 2010 (Sinaga, 2017). Furthermore, Kemitraan were trusted by Norway to be the intermediary agency between the Norwegian and Indonesian governments in implementing REDD+, in particularly managing the funding mechanism of this bilateral climate partnership in 2016 (Norwegian Interviews 16 and 19). Through this evidence, Kemitraan showed its credibility in building improved governance reform in REDD+ and had an important impact in the climate policies of Indonesia.

However, the existence of Partnership for Governance Reform (Kemitraan) was suspiciously representing the donor, and sometimes only implementing its donors’

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45 http://jakartaglobe.id/news/kemitraan-to-assist-indonesia-on-redd-implementation/ Retrieved on 2nd October 2018
goals (Petras, 1999; Crawford, 2003). An opinion from Indonesian Special Envoy for Climate Change stated that the national NGO who received funding from the foreign donor did not always remain neutral or independent (Norwegian Interview 3). Kemitraan enlightened the Indonesian government through their linking interest between local and national CSOs but did not give the same potential aspect and opportunity to the local civil society groups. This factor might be caused by the low capacity of indigenous communities to impact the Indonesian government. As an alternative, the Norwegian government treated NICFI as the strong evidence on how Norway opened wide access directly to the local NGOs and other civil society groups in Indonesia.

Ultimately, the responses gleaned here showed that NGO actions had an impact at a very local level, in particular the projects in Central Kalimantan. Despite the potential capacity and resources that the NGO had, working with NGOs had no real overall impact on climate policy and governance reform. Whatever the role of CSOs in the Central Kalimantan project dealing with the Norwegian and Indonesian governments, their initiatives and innovation did not significantly have an impact, merely in the level of enlightening the minority issue of climate governance in Indonesia. Given all the problems I have outlined here in relation to the weak influence of local CSOs, I will now explore how the UK government engaged with CSOs and examine what impact this had”.

7.2.2 Devolved engagement and the intermediary role of The Asia Foundation (TAF)

This section outlines how the UK government used the principle of devolution in engaging civil society through the UKCCU and the intermediary role of The Asia Foundation (TAF) in order to have an impact on the climate policy in Indonesia. Through the SETAPAK programme and transparent governance on forest and land governance (FLAG), TAF built a strong trust among local authorities and NGOs and also became the bridge builder to the UK government. Although there was improved
Indonesian climate governance at local level, the local civil society groups did not significantly contribute or have an impact on it. The local government had more of an impact of transparent land use governance rather than local NGOs. This devolved engagement between TAF and local governance happened due to the UKCCU and British government’s formal approach or government-to-government based relationship. Furthermore, the TAF’s intermediary role did not apply a community-based approach or prioritise the local civil society more than local governments.

In order to understand the devolution, there were several meanings that could be related to the context of forest and land use governance (FLAG) in Indonesia. First, devolution is defined as the transfer of “natural resource management to local individuals and institutions located within and outside of government” (Edmunds et al., 2003: 1). Ferguson and Chandrasekharan (2011) state that devolution is the transfer of governance responsibility for specified functions to sub-national levels, either publicly or privately owned, that are largely outside the direct control of the central government. In relation to the UK case here, the devolution process in the Indonesia bilateral climate partnership creates a transfer of responsibility and authority from various actors from both subnational and local levels beyond the central government.

The UK government used the principle of devolution through TAF’s role approaching local actors in implementing its bilateral climate projects in Indonesia. The devolved engagement that the UKCCU built with TAF was not defined as direct devolution with local actors. Essentially, the UKCCU chose TAF as the intermediary agency or connector to local governments and communities (DFID, 2013). One implication here was that the UK government did not directly have an impact or significant engagement with Indonesian society because the channel between the UK government and them was neither direct nor inclusive. There was, indeed, a specific reason why the UKCCU built stronger trust with TAF instead of directly inviting local actors to engage in climate change dialogue.

The DFID has built long-standing and positive cooperation with TAF in Indonesia since the Indonesian reformation era (1998-1999), with the result that it has
continuously chosen TAF as its intermediary agency in dealing with civil society groups in Indonesia (TAF, 2012). There were also arguably some successes in 2014 through the Multi-donor Fund (MDF) system, while democracy was supported via an inter-faith dialogue programme. In relation to climate change programmes, TAF was the only doorway to information/funding presented by the UK government to Indonesian civil society groups. The values, principles and credibility of TAF have been continuously and strategically synchronised with the DFID and other UK government agencies (Interviews 2, 4, 5 and 6). In response to this data, I did not entirely agree with the domination of TAF to really represent and engage local society. The evidence is shown below.

Further to the activities and sources outlined above, TAF also developed the climate change programme SETAPAK, which helped to achieve 15% of the Indonesian government’s 2019 targets of 12.7 million hectares of land being community-managed, protecting 3.6 million hectares of forest in North Aceh, and the revocation of 501 non-compliant mining permits (SETAPAK, 2018). Working with 64 NGOs across 13 provinces at national and local level, the SETAPAK programme convinced governors not to issue palm oil licenses for 2-3 years (Interviews 4 and 5). SETAPAK has already saved 4.2 million ha of forest from palm oil, mining and other deforestation activities (SETAPAK Report, 2017). It has also driven 49 policies on forestry and sustainable land-use management, along with 28 female leaders fighting for forest and land justice (ibid). SETAPAK has built 42 areas of cooperation with civil society groups and local governments to accelerate the social forestry mechanism, boosting transparency, mutual monitoring and the legal framework with respect to forest fires and land-use problems. Another positive impact of SETAPAK has been the growing number of local governments increasing their budgets on forestry and land issues.

Unlike other agencies that might implement a one-off donor programme, TAF was concerned about each NGO’s working quality and performance (TAF, 2018). This was not an organisation that just gave money blindly; instead, it monitored a project and then measured its improvement based on the training/workshops provided by/to
NGOs. TAF reported that the UKCCU had an impact towards Indonesian climate restoration and it was agreed that the programme would be extended from SETAPAK 1 to SETAPAK 2. Here was the statement from TAF’s representative:

‘The difference between SETAPAK 1 and 2, TAF, is based on the financial performance. From 100% of UKCCU funds, 75% of the funds go to TAF because UKCCU is happy with TAF's work (two thirds to TAF and one third of its budget to nine other institutions). In SETAPAK 1, 322 permits were stopped by TAF. The land permit procedure is always complicated, and the bureaucracy is long.’ (Interview 6)

The excerpt above suggests that TAF successfully built strong trust and maintained a robust partnership with the UKCCU, which reflects the improvements in devolved engagement related to forest and land-use governance throughout Indonesia. As another additional evidence, a series of investigations to evaluate mining permit compliance was done by KPK in 2014, which four out of 12 provinces were SETAPAK regions. Subsequently, 265 permits were cancelled in SETAPAK regions, and a deadline of December 2014 was set for local administrations to review a larger number (Setapak, 2012). Through the SETAPAK programme, TAF became the front-line and moderator between the UK government and Indonesian local communities and local governments in helping with the land permit issue.

However, the intermediary role of TAF did not reflect what the meaningful definition of an intermediary organisation is. Research from Guerreiro and Botetzagias (2017:158) stated that the intermediary organisation builds communities’ ownership, enhances (technical, entrepreneurial and managerial) capacities, transfers knowledge and technology, and establishes innovative financing models and shaping policy. Aligned with the literature of electricity cooperatives in developing countries, these initiatives have been more successful where intermediary organisations assist with the planning and implementation processes (Holland et al. 2001). Actors in intermediaries varies, NGOs, government bodies or private concession holders contracted by governments (Dauselt 2001). It means that intermediary agency does not just bridge
and help the national and local actors, which in the case of TAF the transparency impact affected more on local governments rather than local or rural communities. The level of coordinating local project activities and coordinating partnerships outside local communities (Hargreaves et al. 2013), was not found in the case of SETAPAK.

In my personal view, this devolution did not entail a direct process between the UK government and local-level actors in Indonesia. Indeed, the local governments and local communities seldom met or contacted the UKCCU or the UK government to complain or undertake an investigative report on deforestation. All such reports were instead gathered through TAF, which was the only representative able to engage in comprehensive discussions with the UK government. This meant that pseudo-devolution occurred rather than full-scale devolution; there was no genuine engagement between local governments or local civil society groups in terms of managing climate change restoration projects with the UKCCU or another UK representative. In addition, TAF itself is not a national or local NGO; it is an international organisation with long-standing credibility in Indonesian governance programmes.

The role of intermediary agencies such as TAF strengthened the relationship with Indonesian local governments but did not guarantee that civil society engagement really mattered in Kalimantan. UK government did not have a good reason to provide civil society groups in Indonesia with direct access to funding and communication, which became a criticism on the the UKCCU as the primary source of British climate fund and institution in Indonesia. The main reason for this was the low impact and performance of local governments in pursuing transparent and accountable forest and land-use policies, along with minimal civil society participation. As explained above in section 5.2, the UKCCU placed emphasis on government-to-government-based relationships; it took considerable time and experience for the UKCCU to trust and follow-up TAF’s work on dealing with various local and national NGOs. In short, the UK did have successful work with TAF to help local government’s accountability but did not help CSO participation.
In responding to the empirical findings above, it is argued that the UK government’s engagement model on bilateral partnership was better in facilitating and helping local government rather than the Norwegian case. Although the intermediary role of TAF did not fully engage both local government and local actors, it proved that the devolved changes to the UKCCU and TAF programmes were apparently motivated by the decentralisation engagement style adopted by TAF and the local actors in Indonesia (Interviews 2, 4, 5 and 6). This model provides space for improvement and a better strategy with regard to bilateral climate partnerships and public participation because of the strong and firm role of the intermediary agency. The findings of my research into the UK-TAF project also demonstrates that the intermediary agency could enhance communication and capacity that local government did via the principle of devolved engagement (very closely working with the UKCCU and local governors and NGOs around Indonesia’s provinces/districts). The problem here is that in the long-term implementation process, TAF could not guarantee whether civil society engagement would remain independent of government interests. Another concern here is how TAF ensures that the UKCCU-TAF’s success duplicates the quality of work with local NGOs. The assessment of the intermediary role through TAF did not prove that there was a long commitment and coaching guide from TAF to local communities.

The notion of NGO regeneration and the sustainability of funding from the UK government are further challenges that TAF will face in the near future. If the UKCCU were to no longer exist and there were no other foreign donations (especially from state level), there would be no further impact of the intermediary agency on local actors and climate change policy reform. Despite the relative success of TAF, there was no evidence of the grassroots NGOs establishing a sustainable footing. In short, if funding stops, the intermediary agency will disappear and there will be an absence of local NGOs and deteriorating climate change impact. The devolved engagement had more impact on the local government more than local NGOs, which downgraded the role of intermediary agencies towards bilateral climate policies. The next section outlines the poor mechanism of civil society engagement and the domestic politics of the Australian
government. We can also compare what Norway and the UK had done to the Indonesian climate policies with what Australia did.

### 7.2.3 The Australian case and the civil society engagement problem

This section portrays the complex problem of civil society engagement in Australia and how it had limited impact to climate policy in Indonesia. Australian government’s approach to civil society used to be strong, especially when Australian NGO Cooperation Program (ANCP) was established in early 1980s (DFAT, 2010). In relation to climate change policies in Indonesia, Australia has had a bilateral climate cooperation with Indonesia since 2010 (Masyhud, 2010) through a programme called Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership (IAFCP). Developing this argument based on chapter 4 along with empirical findings of civil society groups, the initiative from Australian government collapsed due to the changing political system within national government of Australia and lack of capacity from Indonesian NGOs.

There was an initiative to engage civil society from ANCP Project, but no representatives from local NGOs received direct access to funding or other assistance on climate change projects. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the rigid bureaucratic procedure that Australia demands for NGO accreditation (which tends to benefit Australian interests). Secondly, there was a lack of capacity-building from local NGOs that met Australian expectations and due diligence requirements with regard to the climate change programme. This meant that there was some bilateral funding for combating deforestation through Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership (KFCP) but it was not well organised. This uncoordinated funding made the impact of climate policy reform less achievable.

In terms of the capacity and empowerment of NGOs, the Australian approach to the Indonesian NGOs’ empowerment has been strong, but this does not apply to the Australian partnership on climate change. This contrast of Australian policy between NGOs empowerment versus climate policy happened due to simultaneous policy change in the Australian government. In 2010-2015, the Australian government system...
had been changed enormously due to changing leadership from different Prime Ministers and different parliaments (Davies, 2016).

The Australian NGO Cooperation Program (ANCP) was a partnership between the Australian government and accredited Australian NGOs. For over 40 years, this partnership has contributed to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in some of the world's poorest countries. The ANCP was the Australian government's longest-running and largest NGO programme. Funding was given through annual grants to accredited Australian NGOs to support their projects in developing countries. The ANCP acknowledged the unique strengths that NGOs bring to development activities, which both complement and strengthen Australia's overall aid efforts. It regarded NGOs as having particular skills in supporting the poorest and most vulnerable in communities (DFAT, 2015). From 2015-2016, Australian aid supported five NGOs through the ANCP to deliver nine projects in six countries, focusing on the environment and climate change.

From the perspective of the Indonesian government however, the ANCP was insignificant for Indonesian forestry and climate change restoration. Among the selected NGOs in the ANCP mechanism, only one Indonesian NGO had been successfully accredited by AusAID in 2015: East Indonesia Aid (Nusa Tenggara Association). In the structure of East Indonesia Aid, all of the committee members were based in Australia and it was difficult for Indonesian citizens to see the Indonesian representative working with East Indonesia Aid (Howes, 2021). This example underlines Australia’s lack of engagement with local civil society groups in Indonesia. The country has distributed funding based on the implementing agencies and only selected accredited NGOs who have easy access to the Australian government. Through this explanation, it demonstrated how the Australian government gave certain funding and access of partnership to selected NGOs, which mostly came from the elite of national NGOs. In comparison with Norway, this government did give opportunity and funding source directly to local NGOs, whilst the UK government strongly put the intermediary agency as the bridge of British government’s climate support to
Indonesian local governments and society. Furthermore, the East Indonesia Aid was not located in Indonesia and they received funding from the Australian government due to the international reputation and connection that it had built.

Meanwhile, several Indonesian environmental NGOs also reported to the Australian delegation when they visited in person the location of Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership on 24 February 2011 (Lang, 2011). For instance, Yayasan Petak Danum (Water Land Foundation, an NGO in Central Kalimantan) wrote a letter explaining the concerns that local communities had regarding the KFCP and appealed to the delegation to ask the Australian government to withhold funding for the project until these concerns had been addressed (Surbakti, 2012). Other concerns included biased reporting on the KFCP’s progress, lack of indigenous rights, lack of inclusion in the local communities, and lack of confidence in the community facilitator and the international NGOs contracted to implement the pilot project. The letter was also signed by 11 Indonesian NGOs (Lang, 2011). In short, the context of the letter emphasised that KFCP did not ensure the inclusive engagement between Australian government and local or rural indigenous communities. Land tenure rights’ conflict and unclear objective of KFCP created a very low level of trust of local civil society groups to Australia as the climate donor.

In response to the letter, Greenpeace Indonesia claimed that funding climate change projects for Indonesian society had not been very impactful in solving climate change problems. Another response came from Australian society, which criticised the effective usage of their public funds and taxes to Indonesian climate projects. In general, they felt that it was better for Indonesia to reverse its illegal timber law because many of its logs had arrived from Indonesia, rather than funding a project for just 125,000 ha in Central Kalimantan. This scheme was in the context of reducing deforestation; one interviewee noted that it was better not to buy illegal wood than to give money to this project, because the people of Australia had a strong right to voice or even sue their government once they found that environmental damage was taking place (Interview 6). In response to the statement above, the level of engagement
between the Australian government and Indonesian local civil society groups was not high. Some in Australian and Indonesian societies had a common thought that the KFCP’s money had an insignificant impact on limiting the rate of deforestation in Central Kalimantan. Meanwhile, some Australians suggested that Indonesia should reform its law specifically related to illegal timbering and other forestry problems. Through my analysis, the inconsistent behaviour from the Australian government affected the level of public trust (both from Indonesia and Australia) towards the climate change policy reform. There was Australian funding and engagement with the Indonesian civil society groups, but the funding mechanism and climate project implementation was not well organised and did not give a clear measurement to give climate policy impact.

In summary, the Australian government initiative with the ANFCP project did not show equal representative from international NGOs, Indonesian NGOs, or even local NGOs in Indonesia. As a consequence, it was an indirect access of Australian funding or other assistance on climate change projects in Indonesia. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, there was a rigid bureaucratic procedure that Australia demands for NGO accreditation. Secondly, there was a lack of capacity-building from local NGOs that met Australian expectations and due diligence requirements with regard to the climate change programme (Interviews 6 and 11). Regarding the implications of this, there has been minimal engagement between the Australian government and Indonesian local NGOs. The public-private partnership principle, as an indicator of institutionalism, did not emerge in this case, which the detailed analysis was referred to chapter 4. In comparison to the Norwegian and UK cases, Australia was the weakest foreign donor in terms of civil society engagement in the bilateral climate partnership.

7.3 The paradox of intermediary agencies in REDD+

This section discusses the controversial intermediary agencies to the Indonesian government involved in implementing the REDD+ project in the Norwegian case.
Through the three case studies, Norway had strong and more complex intermediary agency issues than the UK and Australia. The intermediary role of TAF in the UK case has been explained in chapter 4 and section 7.2. Whilst the Australian government, who partnered with the World Bank and UNDP as the intermediary agency to Indonesian civil society group did not have crucial problem.

Starting with the Norwegian case, the Norwegian government first decided to choose UNDP as the intermediary agency disbursing the money. In 2010-2015, the Norwegian government chose UNDP as the intermediary agency in order to disburse funding to the Indonesian government. However, the Indonesian government was unable to receive money directly from Norway due to the release of the Norwegian funds being held up by a results-based system. A Norwegian diplomat in Jakarta commented on the matter:

‘So basically, there hasn’t been a Norwegian government channel for us to pay the money directly to the Indonesian government because the funding mechanism was not established, still isn’t. That’s why we had to use the proxy, working through an international organisation like UNDP. So, to a very large extent, the choice of partners has been Indonesia’s, because we don’t want to work with partners that Indonesia does not want to work with, as long as the ones they choose are acceptable from more of the grant-management point of view.’ (Interview 2)

In responding to the above, the Norwegian government had a strict system in Indonesia, directly distributing climate finance. As explained in chapter 6, Norway used the funding mechanism called “payment-based result”. It meant that Norway would not distribute the money until Indonesia provided the deforestation loss rate as evidence of reducing emissions. This strict funding mechanism arguably emerged from a dynamic change of national policy in the Norwegian government. The result of this for NGOs was limited access of funding in a way they increased and developed solution for REDD+ or other deforestation. As an example, closer alignment between the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) and the Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in 2004 attempted to initiate the control and oversight of the agency by a Minister of International Development who lacked authority and influence at the time (Gulrajani 2014).

Meanwhile, the progress of UNDP’s performance led to mistrust and political tension with the Norwegian government and they were finally replaced with Kemitraan (a national NGO in Indonesia). At first glance, the Partnership for Governance Reform, or Kemitraan, was dominated by international, normative ideas. Looking more closely at Kemitraan’s policies and activities, it becomes evident that Kemitraan supports concepts and issues deriving from indigenous and other social movements. Kemitraan initiated collaboration between local actors and indigenous communities and created a coalition (Interview 7). The coalition-building of NGOs for indigenous peoples in Indonesia was determined by an interplay of processes between official and unofficial arenas of interaction (Sanmukri, 2017: 17). Despite this greater collaboration between Kemitraan and local CSOs, Kemitraan had issues and complex problems with funding distribution of REDD+. On the one hand, Kemitraan worked well in bridging the Norwegian and Indonesian stakeholders. On the other hand, they were eventually criticised by local society groups due to inclusive and unfair funding distribution issues.

At first, Norway considered NGOs to represent constructive partners that remain important in protecting the forests. NGOs were involved in the starting phase of the climate policy-making process with the national government (Interviews 15 and 16). The close relationship between Norway and NGOs could be reflected through a strong bond of trust built between the Norwegian government and Kemitraan (an NGO in the governance sector in Indonesia), the only Indonesian NGO to be chosen as an intermediary agency between Norway and Indonesia. This specific trust between Norwegian government and Kemitraan demonstrated that Indonesian NGOs did not receive the same treatment and relationship status, hence there was a gap of trust between the Norwegian government and Kemitraan vs Norwegian government with other local and national NGOs.
With this in mind, the following statement was made by the Kemitraan chapter in Central Kalimantan:

‘Kemitraan has three principles and is also certified. These principles are participation, transparency and accountability. We also support and endorse good governance that is why we are also accredited. This is a strong reason why Norway built good trust with Kemitraan and we have finished transferring the trust to the Government of Indonesia as well.’ (Interview 7)

According to the statement, Kemitraan reflected its credibility to the Indonesian and Norwegian governments, which allowed this institution to bridge the interests of both. In my view, Kemitraan successfully engaged in mediation, which enhanced communication and technical collaboration between the Norwegian and Indonesian governments (at the national level, especially the Ministry of Environment and Forestry). However, the existence of the Partnership for Governance Reform (Kemitraan) was questionable in its representation of the donor, sometimes only implementing its donor’s goals (Petras, 1999; Crawford, 2003). Hence, the intermediary role of Kemitraan was not effective for bridging and supporting local civil society groups in REDD+ programme and climate policy reform. The national NGO through Kemitraan did not determine that intermediary role and process smoothening the bilateral partnership between foreign donors and Indonesian civil society groups. In short, Kemitraan had more of a negative impact on the significant role of the civil society groups to Indonesian climate policy reform.

As an alternative, the Norwegian government treated Norway International Climate Forest Initiative (NICFI) as strong evidence of how Norway opened broad access directly to the local NGOs and other civil society groups in Indonesia. NICFI’s implementation and NORAD’s relationship with select civil society organisations proves that Norway directly engaged with national and local NGOs, as well as indigenous communities in Indonesia. It was a positive engagement, which gave positive impact to the climate governance in Indonesia. However, in the decision-making process, the Indonesian government still held the power, and this bilateral
climate partnership was determined by the government-to-government relationship. Ultimately, there was some impact with NGOs, but the result was limited in particularly with funding support and communication with the foreign donor.

As a comparison to the Norway and the UK case, the Australian donor had development cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was practically shown through the establishment of AusAID (OECD, 2009; Gulrajani, 2015: 15), whilst the UK aid was an independent ministry/agency through DFID. The intermediary agency changed in Norway’s climate partnership in 2015 due to the high administrative cost of using UNDP and other managerial problems (Interview 1). There was also a trust issue that had emerged between Norway and UNDP (Interview 16), as well as other problems based on the multilateral nature of the arrangement. The Norwegian government did not have one standard funding mechanism that applied to all intermediary agencies in disbursing the money, issuing reports, and other aspects. This ambiguity in its funding mechanism affected the accountability of the Norwegian government in Indonesia, which counterbalanced the negative impact with NGOs. This lack of clarity even led some Indonesian NGOs to question the sincerity of the Norwegian support for Indonesian forests. In short, there was a trade-off between the benefit and cost of REDD+ funding from Norway to Indonesian civil society. Civil society groups represent the frontline for vulnerable groups who suffer from deforestation, but their roles in reducing the carbon emission and other climate change impact were not as important as that of the government. The next section presents transparency problems in REDD+, especially how challenging the decentralised governance and vulnerable indigenous communities’ future affected the prospects of results-based aid.

7.4 Transparency problem in REDD: the challenge of decentralised governance and vulnerable indigenous communities’ future

This section presents the critical challenge of transparency in REDD+ programme, especially the impact on the existence of indigenous communities in the decentralised
governance of Indonesia. Decade-long (early 1990-2012) participatory mapping efforts on the part of *Masyarakat Hukum Adat* (indigenous community) were integrated into the national “One Map” initiative on 14th November 2012 (DTE, 2012). Meanwhile, key achievements, according to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (2017), included the launch of the National REDD+ Strategy (Stranas) in September 2012, completing the groundwork for a measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) system, the design and preparation of a fund for REDD+, and the development of safeguards called “Principles, Criteria and Indicators for REDD+ Safeguards in Indonesia” (PRISAI) (Gapare and Perdinan, 2017). Through this description, it meant that the One Map Policy had an important impact on the livelihood and development of civil society groups, especially the future of indigenous communities.

However, there were counterproductive outcomes of REDD+. The institutional framework-building was not successful, and it negatively affected the enforcement of indigenous communities’ legal right to land. By July 2013, AMAN had already proposed a judicial review and further investigation into each article of the constitution because most of the clauses in the law had no impact on indigenous forestry in Kalimantan or other places in Indonesia (CIFOR, 2015).

Moving forward to Jokowi’s presidency in 2015, indigenous communities were initially accepted by the president and he created a specific bill acknowledging the tenure land rights of indigenous communities. According to the representative from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry: “The interim phase also included a portfolio of time-sensitive issues, including preventing forest and peat fires, implementing the Constitution Court Ruling number 35/2012 (MK 35) recognising the tenure rights of *masyarakat hukum adat* (indigenous communities), land conflict resolution in national

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46 Measurement/monitoring, reporting and verification refers to the collection of data and information at a national or subnational level and applying calculations for estimating emission reductions or the enhancement of carbon stocks based on a reference level (RL). Programme Management Unit, REDD+ Agency.
parks, and strengthening gender inclusion” (20). However, the implementation of MK 35 triggered a dispute between the Indonesian government and the Alliance of Indigenous People of the Archipelago (AMAN).

The critical condition above on land tenure right reflects the insufficient access that rural people and indigenous communities have to financial support, which devalues the progress of the results-based aid mechanism in the case of the Norway-Indonesia climate partnership. Rural communities have historically been outside the financial economy, although of course they have well-developed socio-economic exchange mechanisms that predate the modern economy (Moeliono et al, 2020). Neoliberal notions of socio-economic exchanges have sought to replace (or have simply ignored) existing mechanisms (Maxton Lee, 2020). Sophisticated indigenous socio-economic dynamics have historically frequently been based on mutual self-help (gotong royong) or community-organised banking cooperatives like arisan, which pool monetary contributions and then make pay-outs on a roster basis so that members can periodically buy more expensive items for the home or a big social event (Sihombing, 2020). In short, REDD+ strongly reinforced the “common sense” of political hierarchy of forest, which means that the socio-economic structure of REDD+ project was overlooked in discussions about changing power relations among key actors (Moeliono et al., 2013). Through my personal views, it is argued that transparency in civil society groups’ action on deforestation faced complex internal problems such as internal conflict among communities and the lack of access of financial support to the REDD+. The key actors who used the forest and managed them came from elites and those who easily gained access to the Norway and Indonesian government.

In measuring the results-based aid performance, transparency was a paramount indicator for civil society groups and local authorities. However, transparency within local governance became a key challenge in the Indonesia-Norway bilateral climate

partnership. The Norwegian case was the only one which was analysed because this foreign donor managed and had a concern on the indigenous land tenure rights. As the frontline defender of the primary forest and other natural resources, the indigenous communities play an important role in providing real evidence of whether the forest is alive and climate governance can have a concrete impact or not.

One of the steps in measuring transparency of bilateral climate partnerships was checking or assessing the corruption issue. The corruption within REDD+ itself historically emerged from expanding palm oil sector activities in Central Kalimantan in 1999. The Environment Investigation Agency (EIA), in cooperation with Telapak (1999), revealed how Abdul Rasyid was behind the systematic theft of valuable timber from Tanjung Puting National Park in Central Kalimantan. Rasyid’s activities led him to be listed as one of the biggest illegal logging bosses in the country by the Ministry of Forestry (Ministry of Forestry, 1999). Despite this, Rasyid was never prosecuted and he has now reinvented himself as a palm oil tycoon (Interview 13). Through his palm oil company PT Citra Borneo Indah, Rasyid acquired a land bank of around 50,000 ha around his stronghold of Pangkalanbun in the south of Central Kalimantan, worth around £150.5 million once the oil palms become productive. This land acquisition was part-funded by loans from Bank Negara Indonesia. Notably, Rasyid continues to profit from high-level connections. A ceremony to break the ground at one of his plantations was attended by the Minister of Agriculture at the time, Anton Apriantono, the media tycoon Surya Paloh, and the Governor of Central Kalimantan (EIA, Press Release, 6 May 2008) (EIA, 2009: 7). In summary, corruption-related deforestation was not only systemic at national and local government level, but some individual players also strongly influenced the practice of palm oil plantations and worked closely with the local authorities. In its Central Kalimantan branch WALHI also supports the opinion that corporations “played strategically” with local police and some district governors to engage in land-grabbing or forest-burning activities (Interview 8). WWF Indonesia noted some corrupt practices in 2011-2012 (Interview 6).
In relation to the situation in 2016-2019 in Palangkaraya (the provincial capital of Central Kalimantan), the governor was criticised of carrying out “business as usual” within the REDD+ programme. The current governor is the nephew of Rasyid, the controversial figure discussed above. A Telapak Foundation activist had this to say on the matter:

‘...there is a corporation called PT Menteng Jaya which received funding from Norway for the REDD+ project. But the moratorium did not happen, and that private company did not give any access for us to investigate. Some mafia of that company hit us literally and we decided to stop the investigation.’

(Interview 13)

This Telapak activist had found evidence of corrupt practices related to the REDD+ project. However, Telapak’s investigation compromised their security, which also hampered transparency in the implementation of REDD+. Powerful actors (in this case, corporations) were doing whatever they could to cover up corruption, yet the provincial or national government did not respond quickly and appropriately.

In the last 15 years (2000-2015), the number and total size of palm oil concessions awarded in Central Kalimantan has multiplied. According to data from the provincial government (2014), the total land mass of palm oil plantations went from less than 200,000 hectares in 2001 to 1.7 million hectares in 2015. This number excludes the large tracts of land for which concessions had already been awarded but on which plantations had not yet started. In 2015, WALHI calculated that local governments in Central Kalimantan had been awarding plantation licenses (IUP) for a total of 400,000 to 600,000 hectares per year since 2004. Before that, the total land mass licensed out to palm oil companies had never exceeded 180,000 hectares per year. WALHI also noted that some corporations “played strategically” with local police and district governors to manipulate land concessions (Interview 8). Based on the interview

48 REDD at the local level is corrupt and systemically manipulated by some corporations.
with WALHI, the rate of deforestation had been worsened by the increasing land concessions being made possible by the local police and district governors in Central Kalimantan.

Interviews and other sources showed that Central Kalimantan had a very weak public forum for debating such issues. Furthermore, politicians owned most of the local media, while Rasyid’s group had shares in three newspapers (Lang, 2016). The political party called the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP) owned another newspaper. Unfortunately, local newspapers depended heavily on government advertising as well. Naturally, this made editors hesitant to publish any critical reports. Elsewhere, a small group of NGOs and journalists in Central Kalimantan were fearful of voicing criticism publicly, and harassment of journalists was common (Interview 18). These statements indicate how power politics influenced the REDD+ project’s implementation. The role of local or national NGOs in saving the forests did not have much of an effect because the elite of corporations led and determined government policy or hid their corrupt actions.

To be discussed with my personal view, it is argued that the decentralisation process of the recipient country does not always accommodate what the donor has set up for the recipient country. This means that a foreign donor might not prioritise the local context in the bilateral agreement or that the programme itself might not be adapted to the local context of climate change in Indonesia. In the Norwegian partnership, a positive feature was that the decentralisation process created local incentives, particularly through the way Norway rewarded local leaders/initiatives to combat climate change. However, it was prone to decentralised corruption, such as the misuse of public funding related to REDD+ at the district/provincial level (Malley, 2003; Warman, 2016: 23-40; Norwegian Interviews 6, 13 and 18; CIFOR, 2015). The sub-level distribution of power between national and local government in Indonesia was sometimes lacking coordinated communication, and it suffered from overlapping authority as well as potential secrecy or selective distributing of information related to
the authority of government officials. This transparency issue hampered the governance capacity and contributed to corruption among policymakers at all levels.

In sum, there was a transparency problem in many local areas, especially between the district governors and certain partners such as local police and corporations. The corrupt practices related to REDD+ and other critical actions such as land grabbing by larger palm oil plantations became the core of the local governance problem. The widespread power politics among the elite (the owners of political parties, media owners and corporations) destroyed the transparent mechanism and diminished accountability within the state apparatus and relevant local government actors. The next section outlines the discussion of this chapter, which analysed the civil society engagement through three case studies with transformative 4Is+3 framework.

7.5 Discussion
In this section, I discuss the key empirical findings and assess them using the transformative 4Is+3 framework, in particular how the civil society engagement in Indonesian bilateral climate partnership in 2009-2016 became increasingly complex and how this leads to a low impact on climate policy reform. In addition, I also provide analysis on the transparency problem in decentralised government. In relation to the transformative 4Is+3 framework, civil society engagement and decentralisation challenges were affected by local actors (both government and non-government actors)’ ideas and interest (specifically miscoordination and mistrust among governmental actors at all levels and also between national government and foreign donors). The transparency problem was caused by changing institutions related to climate change and the information gap and missing links among climate change communicators (both state and non-state actors). The practice of corrupt behaviour derived from various factors, one of which came from unclear monitoring of climate justice and guidelines on contending harmful indications of financial malpractice related to climate policies. Before going further with the analysis of transparency, the
next discusses civil society engagement in relation to the transformative 4is+3 framework.

According to the explanation provided on the transformative 4is+3 framework in chapters 2 and 4, the first “I” - institution - was especially evident in the Norwegian case and the civil society groups, especially in terms of how NICFI became an alternative programme to replace the intermediary role of Kemitraan or UNDP in distributing funding to Indonesian civil society groups. Norway emerged as a pioneer by creating REDD+ and giving direct access to funding for Indonesian civil society groups through the NICFI. Although this NICFI was a good initiative, it did not necessarily guarantee that Norway successfully engaged with civil society groups. Meanwhile, the British and Australian cases showed limited engagement with civil society groups in climate policy reform in Indonesia. The intermediary role of TAF had more impact on local government than civil society, and this showed a gap between local civil society groups and local government. In contrast, the Australian government did not manage civil society engagement well in Indonesia due to continuous parliamentary change and policies back home.

The second “I” – interests – was reflected in the level of ownership of implementing climate change restoration through REDD+ or another programme. Civil society action in criticising and improving REDD+ was limited due to the dominance of some powerful business elites, the lack of their capacity, and local governance problems in Central Kalimantan, which made the governance of Indonesia weaker. There were frequent misunderstandings between foreign donors and Indonesian stakeholders (both governments and non-government organisations) on how to ensure that the land moratorium was controlled or how the indigenous communities could live longer in their forests, especially when land tenure rights became a continuous obstacle in reforming Indonesian climate policies. The practices of offering local incentives (or rewarding local environmental “heroes”) at the provincial and district government level in Indonesia also showed that public awareness in Indonesia of the need to save the forests and/or address climate change problems revolved around rewards and favours.
Actors’ ideas became the third indicator, which reflected the changing paradigm of civil society into pro-climate action and behaviour of “zero deforestation”. There was little evidence on proving this indicator because all three case studies did not have clear data that emission reduction was primarily cut, and deforestation loss happened. Various findings and reports on deforestation loss made an ambiguous and confusing baseline of carbon emission reduction’s progress. Besides, the discourse of REDD+ did not become a primary narrative to the civil society groups, especially to make indigenous people understand the effective implementation of REDD+

Information as the fourth indicator did not reflect much impact of civil society engagement. The limited access of information and lack of capacity of local civil society groups meant they were not aligned well with the implementation process of Indonesian climate policies. Norway, UK, and Australia as foreign donors did not determine the improved assessment of Indonesian civil society groups on climate policy in Indonesia, which closely links to the transparency issue. As an example, collusion and corruption weakened the forest governance of REDD+ (Kanninen et al., 2007), while illegal logging and unenforced laws are endemic in many tropical forested countries including Indonesia (Brack, 2005). The Indonesian Commission of Corruption Eradication (KPK) and the Financial Intelligence Unit (PPATK) succeeded in a high-profile case involving a Bupati in Riau Province, who was imprisoned for 11 years for contravening regulations and accepting bribes in the granting of palm oil concessions (Indrarto et al., 2012). Several interviewees from the Norwegian and Australian partnerships argued that the bilateral climate partnership became more complex due to the inability of the recipient country to curb the chain of corruption between the government and the private sector.

In relation to the leadership indicator and policy experiment, these two were not clearly seen in the three cases because both national and local civil society did not have a strong ownership in the Indonesian climate policy reform. The implication was the decentralisation (as the last indicator) contributed to a strong effect to complex local governance due to a corrupted government system. Decentralisation became a
governance barrier in solving deforestation. The pro-climate regime and inclusive policy in Indonesia were ineffective because both the foreign donors and the Indonesian government struggled to find the most effective way to prove GHG emission reduction (whether from a moratorium concession, payment for environmental services (PES), incentivised carbon, or a forest management unit). Land disputes, an unclear mechanism between provincial and district governors, elite capture in on-site climate change projects, and decentralised corruption were major problems that hampered the progress of the bilateral climate partnership between Indonesia and the foreign donors. These problems support what Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000: 135) said – ‘the lower the level of the government, the greater the extent of capture by vested interest, the less protected minorities and poor tend to be’. Thus, transforming the transparency and accountability system in Indonesia remains of paramount importance in improving the Indonesian bilateral mechanism for the future.

Overall, the issue of transparency in Indonesia was not treated as a priority by foreign donors, especially when checking and ensuring that the public was being properly informed. The transparency problem was exacerbated by the minimal public consultation offered by the foreign donors, the Indonesian government and non-state actors. In the case of forest carbon accounting for climate mitigation (REDD+), those demanding transparency were developed countries (donors) seeking forest carbon-related disclosure from developing countries to activate performance-based compensation for environmental improvement (Gupta and Mason, 2014).49 However, the deforestation rate was not decreasing (proof of a successful REDD+ programme) and the data on the deforestation rate was scattered and confusing when presented to the Norwegian government, for instance (Norwegian Interview 18; World Resource Institute, 2019; Mongabay, 2014). Transparency failures drew attention to what were,  

49 And yet the forest carbon related disclosure did not happen due to slow progress on Indonesian deforestation loss data and the domestic political tension within Norwegian government. The transparency principle in the performance-based compensation was not achieved because both Indonesia and Norway dealt with their complex political bureaucracy, especially the mismanagement and corrupted climate policy in Indonesia.
overall, a highly contested set of policies on climate change (Ciplet et al., 2018: 146). The next section concludes empirical findings and analysis of this chapter.

7.6 Conclusion

The analysis of the empirical findings above indicates that civil society engagement and decentralisation became a challenging process in Indonesian climate policy reform, especially in the context of REDD+ programme. The role of CSOs changed over time, which depending on the intermediary roles, donors’ institutional arrangement, domestic politics of both foreign donors and Indonesian government, and also the transparency of data and funding access. Although it is imperative that civil society plays a significant role in the implementation of bilateral climate partnerships (Young, 2010), their roles have clashed with bureaucratic politics and a long line of decentralised authorities from subnational/district levels in turning the regulation into action.

Each foreign donor faced different engagement problems with civil society groups in Indonesia. Norway was the pioneer of having a direct engagement with civil society groups through the NICFI programme. NICFI also became the alternative replacement of the intermediary role of Kemitraan, which used to have exclusive access to the Indonesian and Norwegian governments rather than the inclusion with indigenous communities. However, this close access from donor to local and national civil society groups did not guarantee the continuation of the Norwegian commitment and funding to the REDD+ programme because of the termination of LoI in September 2021 (Jakarta Post, 2021).

Meanwhile, the UK and Australia cases showed little evidence that their engagement with civil society mattered. The role of TAF had more impact on local government than local civil society groups. The Australian government had a volatile relationship with civil society groups in Indonesia due to changing politics within their parliament, which affected their fluctuated climate policies and diplomacy with Indonesia. Furthermore, unclear authority and uncoordinated communication
happened either among local government or between local and national government in implementing REDD+ programme or giving instruction about the financial mechanism of REDD+ to civil society groups. In the end, the concrete impact of indigenous communities protecting the forest was not enough to ensure their safety and existence in the future without land rights and legitimacy.

Based on the complex partnerships characterising the case studies, three main points can be drawn from this chapter. First, the role of intermediary agencies from foreign donors did not entirely help manage the funding distribution and real engagement with local communities. Second, the dispute between the Indonesian government and indigenous communities on the legal status of indigenous land rights and legitimacy hampered the progress of the results-based aid from REDD+. Third, transparency became a crucial problem of bilateral climate partnership in Indonesia due to decentralisation challenges such as corruption. Furthermore, through the transformative 4is+3 framework, only 3Is+ 1 (institution, interest, information, and decentralised challenge) became strong indicators in the context of civil society engagement of bilateral climate partnerships. Institutional arrangements were seen through the initiative of the Norwegian case in creating NICFI to replace the weakness of Kemitraan. Actors’ interests were reflected in the case of a lack of capacity of local CSOs in promoting and implementing climate action, which meant the Indonesian government remained in control of the national ownership of REDD+ programme. This is why the policy experiment and leadership change factors had no role in explaining civil society engagement. It means that grassroots civil society had zero influence in Indonesia during this period, whereas intermediary agencies were important and perhaps represented a pragmatic compromise of climate policies between national and local government. The last indicator, the decentralised challenge, was demonstrated by the influential practice of corruption in district and provincial government, as well as a lack of data access to the local CSOs. The next chapter summarises all the previous chapters and gives recommendations on how bilateral climate partnerships could be less complex and therefore potentially more effective.
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Future Research

8.1 Introduction

Climate change has become a problematic and complex global phenomenon in this century. The political challenges involved in dealing with carbon emission issues in multilateral global climate agreements indicate that they alone cannot provide the solution to this urgent problem. Bilateral climate partnerships present an alternative approach that can complement and enhance the role of multilateralism. The interaction among actors (both state and non-state actors at the global or local level) in national strategies on climate change can be checked to consider whether bilateral climate partnerships have changed Indonesian climate governance. To measure this change, seven indicators, as outlined in the transformative 4is+3 approach, are used – the changing institution, the changing interests of the actors, the changing paradigm from ‘business as usual’ to a pro-climate regime, the changing information system, the changing leadership, policy experiments, and changing decentralisation.

This chapter draws together the findings and the analysis to argue that governments have many priorities and that, despite the establishment of bilateral climate partnerships, these have never been a priority at any level in Indonesia. In the context of Indonesian climate partnerships in the three cases I have analysed, climate change was not the top priority for national and local government policy. The extensive evidence of this includes overlapping roles and authorities on managing tropical forests in Central Kalimantan, unclear modes/tools of implementation from the district and the local government that affected the foreign donors on disbursing climate change funding, and a changing institutional setting from different presidencies.

Synthesising the empirical findings and analytical discussion of Chapters 4–7, I highlight four main conclusions. First, the institutional and leadership change factor became the biggest determinant of complexities in Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships compared with the other three ‘Is’ (interest, ideas, and information) and other two additional factors. The Indonesian government successfully created a starting
point of collaborating with multiple stakeholders in conducting bilateral climate change projects. This initial step was shown by the establishment of stronger institutional arrangements but brought up further complex mechanisms on distributing power, authorities, delayed funding due to leadership change in both Indonesia and the donors. Second, the UK–Indonesia climate partnership did lead to institutional change through the UKCCU but had little impact on direct civil society engagement and diverged from the Indonesian government’s interest in establishing their national integrated climate fund (Bappenas vs MoEF). Third, the three bilateral climate partnerships faced different complexities of institutional and leadership change, problematic financial mechanism, complex civil society participation and transparency issues in the decentralised network of Indonesia. Transformational change driven by the bilateral climate partnerships remained a rhetorical promise. Fourth, based on the evidence from these three case studies the bilateral approach is not a worthwhile complement to multilateral climate governance. Bilateralism is not an effective way to reconstruct and reshape the challenge of existing multilateral climate partnerships.

This chapter has six sections. Section 8.2 summarises the key findings and final arguments through the three cases I considered in the context of Indonesian partnerships on climate change. Section 8.3 outlines the contribution of the thesis, continued by noting some limitations of my study in section 8.4, including some challenges encountered during the data collection and analytical process Section 8.5 provides direction for further research or other themes that could be considered in the future, which also identifies the bilateral climate aid model as a recommendation. Finally, Section 8.6 concludes the overall explanations from the previous sections.

8.2 Summary of empirical findings and arguments of the thesis

This section provides a summary of the thematic empirical and analytical chapters (chapter 4-7) regarding the assessment of the bilateral climate partnerships between Indonesia and Norway, the UK and Australia respectively. Institutionalism and leadership change were found to be key factors in explaining the complexities
characterising the bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia and how differently each case-study faced their institutional problem, financial mechanism problem, and civil society problem. None of the three case-studies should become the role model for managing bilateral climate partnerships with Indonesia as each donor had multiple layers of problems in delivering their funding and other capacities in order to support Indonesian climate policy reform.

In addition, changing leadership within the Indonesian government and the donors impeded efforts to slow deforestation loss and hampered the development of climate policy reform in Indonesia. In short, institutionalism and leadership change reshaped the bilateral climate partnership and was interpreted to be a misstep in the process of climate policy-making in Indonesia.

In the Norwegian case, the agreement at the initial phase was strong, as reflected in the LoI from 26 May 2010. Furthermore, several agencies or institutional bodies undertook genuine implementation and managed the REDD+ programme between the Norwegian government and the Indonesian government. The pilot project itself was located in Central Kalimantan, where local NGOs and international organisations worked together with both governments to reduce GHG emissions. The level of civil society engagement in the Norwegian partnership through the NICFI was the strongest in comparison with the UK and Australia. However, political interests emerged at the local level of the Indonesian government. In the context of this political interest, some disputes occurred among local and district governors on understanding how REDD+ can impact society. The delayed disbursement of funding became another challenge in this partnership. The big pledge of Norway to Indonesian climate restoration, particularly solving the deforestation, did not appeal as a convincing improvement. Moratorium concessions through Presidential Instruction No. 10/2011, a carbon reduction programme, and several bodies related to REDD+ were concrete actions that the Norwegian government had been engaged in with the Indonesian government. The NICFI programme also included a few NGOs (both international and local) and maintained the engagement to prevent land tenure disputes and to promote
transparency in the climate change restoration project. However, these initiatives were no longer viable once the BPREDD+ and other institutional bodies were merged under the Directorate General of Climate Change in January 2015 (Presidential Regulation No. 16/2015). In short, while institutionalism began as a positive initiative at the starting phase of the Norway–Indonesia climate partnership, it was not sustained as the driving factor to reduce GHG emissions and eradicate deforestation.

The UK climate partnership with Indonesia was very formal and well-structured in terms of the two countries’ communication and interaction with each other as well as the institutional arrangements of the UKCCU. The establishment and management of the UKCCU in dealing with climate change projects in Indonesia became the strength of the UK government in delivering a clear mechanism of climate change cooperation, human resources management, a closer relationship with decentralised areas through the role of TAF, and a firm relationship with BAPPENAS on supporting the ICCTF. The UK showed how successfully institutionalism can work for climate change projects and how to build mutual understanding and better trust with local society and local governors through TAF. While the level of engagement between the UK government and Indonesian civil society was not close and direct, the provincial and district levels of government showed significant improvement in managing land governance projects. Thus, the institutionalism analysis could be seen through the role of the UKCCU and TAF in managing land use and forest governance projects. The intermediary activities of TAF in aiding the capacity building of local communities and forest management had an impact on local areas that were most vulnerable to climate change.

In the Australian climate partnership with Indonesia, problematic situations outnumbered successful practices in implementing such an effective partnership. The political situation, in particular the domestic politics of Australia, was a major contributor to the obstacles of the Australia–Indonesia climate partnership. The KFCP project was a strong initiative in 2011/2012 but ended early and unexpectedly because of mistrust between the Indonesian and Australian governments and because of the
unclear objectives of the partnership. This resulted in societal loss among indigenous communities and other relevant local NGOs that were meant to receive money from Australia. In addition, political tension (within the Australian government) ensued through the prime ministers changing six times between 2009 and 2015. The Australian Aid Agency in Jakarta was also dissolved and merged with the DFAT in Canberra. The funding system of Australian aid currently has a recentralised structure, and this affected the funding mechanism for climate change projects and the changing climate division in the Australian Embassy of Jakarta, along with different phases of engagement with Indonesian civil society groups. In short, the Australian case performed poorly in terms of institutionalism, and the sudden end of the KFCP project in 2013 caused several institutional problems.

As explained above, the institutional factor highlights the complexity of the Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships in practice and yields two contradictory situations. On the one hand, the Indonesian government and foreign donors initially created or managed an institution to undertake the robust implementation of climate change projects. On the other hand, the REDD+ institution in Central Kalimantan and Jakarta, problematic KFCP projects, and a delayed financial mechanism fed existing institutional problems. Various barriers to the institutional factor made it the most challenging phase for the Indonesian government on reducing GHG emissions, making ‘zero deforestation’ a delusion.

In a comparison of the three case studies, the UK climate partnership with Indonesia had the biggest impact with regard to implementing bilateral climate change agreements because of the well-structured organisation of the UKCCU as well as continuous, consistent, and systematic relations with intermediary agencies such as TAF and the reporting system. The Norwegian case was a role model in initiating civil society engagement in a cooperative manner, which was accomplished through the NICFI programme. On the contrary, the Australian case showed the lowest performance in terms of transferring political will into real practice; the KFCP ended
unexpectedly, while Australian foreign aid underwent complex restructuring (AusAID merged with the DFAT).

As shown in Chapter 4, all three case-studies experienced severe difficulties in pursuing the targeted carbon emissions reduction and each donor had different ways of disseminating information, particularly with respect to the style of reporting and the criteria used to assess carbon emissions reduction. In ideas of paradigm shift towards a pro-climate regime, there was no clear evidence that any case-study drove pro climate and zero deforestation policies in Indonesia. Institutionalism factors played a significant role but provided different results in each three case-studies by setting up a development agency or specific body to work with the Indonesian government, designing a programme for projects, and considering how to disburse the money. However, these positive institutional initiatives were weakened by other institutional problems, such as the changing leadership in Indonesia and the unclear and uncoordinated mandates at the internal ministerial and local government levels. The clashes of actors’ interests (Indonesian government, foreign donors, and civil society groups) were reflected in all three case-studies, as described in chapters 5-7. The main cause of these clashes came from little ownership of civil society groups on REDD+ reform in Indonesia.

In terms of leadership change within the Indonesian government (in particular at the presidential level), the Australian case was significantly affected due to the complexity of domestic leadership changes in the Australian government and Indonesian Presidential leadership that made a shift from large-numbers of institutions related to REDD+ into a pack and efficient bodies under the MoEF and the establishment of the DG-CCC. The policy experiments on climate change in all three case studies did not perform well due to an unclear mechanism of delivering the programme design/objective/rationale of climate change. Meanwhile, the challenge of decentralisation led to the most varied results between the three case studies due to multiple local sites/areas with their own characteristics and different styles of district
and provincial governors, along with ulterior political interests and practices of corruption.

In summarising chapter 5, institutional change within each case study over time demonstrates the different institutional challenges faced by the Indonesian government and their international partners. The Norwegian case dealt with trust, coordination, and communication problems with Indonesian government, with the transition from UNDP to Partnership/Kemitraan (an Indonesian NGO) as the intermediary agency between Norway and Indonesia. Meanwhile, the government-to-government based partnership in the UK case did result in improvement in climate policy reform of Indonesia but gave limited access and engagement to local civil society groups. The Australian case had a very different situation, specifically political leaders’ shift through the parliamentary system. The presence of “veto players” on the Australian conservative right of the federal coalition government limited the progress of domestic policies toward aligning with national risks on climate change. Each donor faced different institutional problems, which diverged the reaction of Indonesian government and civil society groups, which was clearly stated in section 5.3.

In relation to the transformative 4is+3 framework, institutional and leadership change served as strong indicators of the existence of the 4is+3 framework compared to other factors like actors’ ideas, actors’ interests, information, decentralised challenges, and policy experiments. The strong institutional factor had two contrasting impacts on Indonesian climate policy reform. First, institutional efficiency through the merger of all REDD+ related agencies into DG-CCC under Jokowi’s Presidency simplified the layers of bureaucratic mechanism on managing and implementing climate policies in Indonesia. Second, the establishment of the UKCCU gave a strong alignment and institutional framework with the Indonesian government on climate change commitment whilst Norway and Australia did not have a similar institutional climate-based agency like the UKCCU. The institutional reform and leadership change

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50 For further explanation on this factor, read chapter 7
proved a good combination and tended to bring a distinctive approach at first, but it did not work properly and effectively because civil society groups had no direct access to funding sources, consultation with local and national governments, and no further capacity building and development for them on assessing the one map policy or in providing evidence of deforestation loss data.

Chapter 6 portrays the complex funding mechanism in Indonesia with the different styles and characteristics of each foreign donor. The performance-based mechanism, MRV system, and land use change policy did not contribute significantly to climate policy reform for three reasons. First, there was an unclear basic mechanism about how Norway managed their result-based payment. The unreadiness of Indonesian government setting up the BLU as the integrated funding agency from Indonesia and also the lack of progress of Norwegian government spending their budget to Indonesia made the result-based payment more complex. Second, the MRV system faced conflictual result of the deforestation rate data due to attribution challenge. It means that the authorship and data ownership on the deforestation cut was not synchronised due to clashes of stakeholders’ interests (from Indonesian government, donors, and civil society groups). Third, the financial mechanism from each foreign donors/three case studies reflected different leadership changes and different institutional problems.

Through the transformative 4is+3 framework, only actor ideas and decentralisation challenge had little impact on the problematic climate finance in Indonesia. In section 6.3, the MRV system in Indonesia faced attribution challenge due to clash of actors’ (both Indonesian government and donors) interests, institutional problem, and information and data management problem. The UK case in section 6.4.2 had contradictory views of funding distribution from Indonesian government and the perspective of UKCCU funding due to clashes between donors’ interests and Indonesian government interests, which resulted in the unperforming climate policy experiment. Institutional problems were also reflected in the case of indirect engagement between British government as a donor and Indonesian civil society.
groups. Institutional problems, clashes between actors’ interests, and the policy experiment problem became strong indicators in this British case. The abolition of Australian Aid in Indonesia, the unclear objective and measurement of climate funding along with the climate change restoration through the IAFCP, and changing leadership through replacement of several Australian Prime Ministers reshaped their climate policy and diminished their priority on sustainable development and climate restoration in Indonesia, which was clearly stated in section 6.4.3. As a suggestion, there should be other options to open more opportunities on developing climate finance mechanism bilaterally in Indonesia.

Chapter 7 summarises the differences in engagement problems with civil society groups in Indonesia. Norway was the pioneer of having a direct engagement with civil society groups through the NICFI programme. NICFI also became the alternative replacement of intermediary role of Kemitraan, which used to have exclusive access with Indonesian government and Norwegian government rather than the inclusion with indigenous communities. Meanwhile, the UK and Australia case provided little evidence that their engagement with civil society mattered. The role of TAF gave more impact to local government than local civil society groups. The Australian government had a volatile relationship with civil society groups in Indonesia due to changing politics within their parliament, which produced fluctuations in their climate policies and diplomacy with Indonesia. Furthermore, the unclear authority and uncoordinated communication happened either among local government or between local and national government in implementing the REDD+ programme or giving instructions about the financial mechanism of REDD+ to civil society groups. At the end, the concrete impact of indigenous communities protecting the forest was not enough to ensure their safety and existence in the future without land rights and legitimacy.

Through the transformative 4is+3 framework, only 3is+1 (institution, interest, information, and decentralised challenge) had an impact on the problematic civil society engagement. Institutional arrangements were seen through the initiative of
Norwegian case in creating NICFI to replace the weakness of Kemitraan. Actors’ interests were reflected in the case of a lack of capacity of local CSOs in delivering climate action, which meant the Indonesian government remained in control of the national ownership of the REDD+ programme. It means that grassroots civil society had zero influence in Indonesia, but that the intermediary agencies were important and perhaps represented a pragmatic compromise of climate policies between national and local government. The last indicator, decentralisation challenge, was apparent in the practice of corruption in district or provincial government, as well as lack of data access to the local CSOs.

8.2.1 Overall assessment of the 4is+3 framework

The empirical and analytical chapters 5-7 show that all seven indicators play a part in explaining the complexity that characterises the three bilateral climate partnerships. However, there is an imbalance between them because the institutional factor seems to be doing more work than all other indicators. Chapter 5 heavily provided strong arguments on why institutional and leadership changed mattered and brought various complexities from both Indonesia and donors’ domestic politics. The leadership shift between SBY and Jokowi’s Presidency also resulted in improvements in the efficiency of institutions in order to cut long bureaucratic layers on planning, implementing, and monitoring deforestation loss as an example. Chapter 6 also identified an institutional problem, specifically the climate funding distribution along with clash of multi stakeholders’ interest, which resulted in the poor application of the performance-based mechanism. The data and information attribution challenge also affected the slow progress and inconsistent data display of the deforestation rate. Whilst chapter 7 showed that the UK and Australia did not have strong engagement with civil society groups in Indonesia, which endangered the transparency principle through the practice of corruption.

I would argue that this transformative 4is+3 framework did give a significant impact to bilateral partnerships due to two reasons. First, the bilateral partnerships
merely had strong improvement and policy reform through the institutional arrangement and leadership changes. Second, the bilateral partnerships only cover or demonstrate high performance when two or three indicators were aligned. For instance, in the context of climate finance, the institutional factor and clash of actors’ interests highly affected the complexities of funding distribution (in chapter 6), or chapter 7 regarding the civil society engagement dealt with transparent information sharing and decentralisation problem. The complexities of bilateral partnerships cannot be discovered easily through the analysis of all indicators: institutions, actors’ ideas, actors’ interests, information system, leadership change, policy experiments, and the decentralisation challenge. The next section explains the contribution of the thesis.

### 8.3 Contributions of the thesis
This thesis has made two main contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it makes an original empirical contribution by providing detailed comparative analysis of three bilateral climate partnerships between the Indonesian government and Norway, Australia and the UK. By evaluating the role and impact of different Western donors in their support of Indonesian climate change mitigation it makes an important contribution to our knowledge of contemporary bilateral climate governance.

Secondly, the novelty of the thesis lies in the development of the 4Is+3 indicators as a tool to explore and identify factors that affect transformational change in bilateral climate partnerships. Thus, the thesis makes a specific theoretical contribution through the construction of a new framework that provides a way to understand the complexity of bilateral partnerships and how that complexity shapes the effectiveness of such partnerships in Indonesia. By bridging the transformative climate governance literature and political economy framework, this framework identifies seven key indicators: institutions, interests, ideas, information, policy experiments, changing leadership and decentralisation. The application of this transformative 4Is+3 framework has illuminated the complexities surrounding all three partnerships, which have shaped their effectiveness. Overall, the thesis found that there was no substantive
change produced by the three bilateral climate partnerships in 2009-2016. However, institutionalism and leadership change were identified as the most important factors shaping climate policy reform but in none of the three cases could they ensure transformational change.

8.4 Limitations of the study
This section provides a reflection on the limitations of undertaking three in-depth case studies rather than carrying out a quantitative analysis or focusing on a single case study. In addition, I provide observations on the data-gathering challenges and difficulties securing access to political information (e.g. the corruption issue related to bilateral climate partnerships), along with the challenges of constructing and applying the four transformative ‘Is’ as the new analytical approach of this thesis.

First, I carried out three case studies because the three foreign donors (Norway, the UK, and Australia) led the recent dynamics of bilateral climate change cooperation in Indonesia, especially when Indonesia pioneered the pledge to reduce GHGs by up to 29% from the national effort and 41% from international aid. Quantitative data and analysis were not considered in this thesis as my aim was to discover the motives and challenges characterising the bilateral approach in Indonesian climate governance with detailed narration of empirical findings. This explorative approach helped me to understand the complexity of Indonesian climate governance in dealing with its bilateral partners and to build a context of the different sides of bilateralism in climate change.

Second, this research was conducted using a qualitative method, and the data were mainly drawn from the interview process and documents. Although 41 informants were interviewed, the interview process was not conducted evenly between Jakarta and Palangkaraya. Most of the main sources for the Norwegian case came from the Central Kalimantan site. I encountered the most difficulty in collecting enough informants for the Australian case. Australian government agents may have dynamically applied on–off communication with the Indonesian government, along with changing structures in
the Australian Embassy of Jakarta. As an alternative solution, I gathered additional primary data and got more informants through my participation in the Australasian Aid Conference in February 2019, Canberra, to meet and talk to several Australian diplomats from the DFAT and the Australian Aid Agency. This conference helped significantly to add more sources from the Australian climate partnership with Indonesia. I did not encounter any difficulties in the UK case because access to the UKCCU was open, and they referred to TAF and other partners relevant to this thesis. In analysing the interview transcripts, I cross-checked the data with other studies in the literature, government reports, and documents, along with the four transformative ‘Is’ in the practice of triangulation.

Another difficulty I encountered in gathering data was attaining access to political information, specifically in the context of the corruption issue. While my thesis did not highlight corruption as the focus of this research, it was not easy to find secondary data or investigate important sources of corrupted Indonesian leaders in implementing the bilateral climate partnership, for instance. Transparency remains a major problem in Indonesian governance, and extra tactics are needed to investigate the political corruption issue related to deforestation. For instance, in the UK case, I did not find significant critics of corruption in the UKCCU or other relevant climate projects between the British government and Indonesian stakeholders.

**8.5 Recommendations and directions for future research**

This section presents the recommendations of this thesis and some possible directions for future research. Bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia showed improved progress as well as contradictory conditions in the process of policy change. This improvement was seen from the initial phase of creating the institutions related to REDD+ and other climate change topics to follow up the bilateral climate change cooperation. In response, the Indonesian government sought to control the level of deforestation through the moratorium concession, incentivised carbon, PES, and empowerment of local communities on land protection/forest management. The
intermediary processes between TAF and the UKCCU, the NICFI and Kemitraan, and the World Bank and the Australian government reflected a common vision to reduce carbon emissions from Indonesian deforestation.

Bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia delivered promising institutions, initiatives, and political will, but all these partnerships evidently lacked transparency and public participation. This trend was echoed in other works, such as that of Easterly (1999), who argued that the foreign aid programme was not effective and not well targeted. The foreign aid problem emerged not only from mismanagement by the donor but also from domestic politics in Indonesia, with existing oligarchies and political party support. As a consequence, the provincial and district governors’ authority was overshadowed by the formal power of the central government; no transparent interaction was evident, which inexorably hindered transformational change. Svensson (2000) and Alesina and Dollar (2000) also noted that donor countries mainly disburse foreign aid as a function of strategic consideration rather than fitting in with the real needs of the receiving countries. This argument supports the concept of the ‘Samaritan dilemma’ proposed by Buchanan (1975),\(^{51}\) which means that foreign aid can be counterproductive for the recipient countries; it also marks wasteful public consumption (Boone, 1994, 1996).

Despite the weaknesses of foreign aid, the bilateral climate partnerships in Indonesia created a robust national standpoint. This thesis recommends the creation of an integrated national funding body that gathers all financial sources from numerous areas of cooperation (bilateral, regional, and multilateral), which I have described in a new bilateral climate aid model in figure 8.1.

\(^{51}\) The Samaritan dilemma in foreign aid means that the aid has become incapable of ensuring the choices that are required to prevent exploitation by the donors, whether the donors are conscious or unconscious of this (see Buchanan 1977: 173).
According to this chart, the bilateral donors could opt for one of two different network schemes: through intermediary agencies or through a national aid institution. This national aid plays a functional role in ensuring the transparency of the financial mechanism and more coordinated management in implementing the practices of bilateral climate partnerships. Both approaches can be hand-in-hand with partner countries and local authorities. Primarily, the local authorities should be strengthened and enhanced in their capacity building. These local roles are very important to check and balance the power distribution to practice better decentralised governance. The civil society groups will continue to accommodate this and act as a catalyst, potentially pressing or supporting the government at any time.

Given the final arguments based on the empirical findings, along with the limitations of the study, some potential areas for future research can be identified. The first future research is blended finance and prospects for Indonesian aid. This concept
is the most current area of development for the financial mechanism of climate change projects in Indonesia. The second future research is the complexities of bilateral climate partnerships in the energy sector and other environmental issues as well as the difference between multilateral and bilateral climate partnerships during Jokowi’s presidency (2014–present). This potential research can also be done on a larger scale, such as ASEAN or the Asia-Pacific. The third is the geopolitical shift of the Global North to the Global South regarding cooperation on climate change aid. This topic was reflected in the three case studies of bilateral climate partnership (Norway, the UK and Australia), where Australia experienced more intensive tension politically and geographically; hence, this situation yielded slow or weak progress in the climate partnership between Australia and Indonesia. On the contrary, Norway and the UK, while geographically far from Indonesia, have less potential conflict with the country. As an expected outcome, this research could justify or prove whether Global South partnerships are more influential than Global North partnerships.
8.6 Conclusion

This section concludes the empirical findings of the Norway, UK, and Australia cases from Chapters 4–6 as well as the analytical discussion comparing these three cases in Chapter 7. Overall, there was a little evidence that the three bilateral donors had been effective in improving Indonesian climate governance between 2009 and 2016. Three factors in particular contributed to the complexities of these bilateral climate partnerships. First, there was a minimal substantive change in the 4Is+3 factors. Second, among the 4Is+3 factors, only institutional and leadership change played major roles, which shaped the transformation process of Indonesian bilateral climate partnerships. Third, the Indonesia-UK partnership played a significant role in proving the strong institutional approach through the establishment of the UKCCU and the improved due diligence principle as their accountability system on climate change partnership.

In relation to the Indonesian climate partnerships, climate change was not a top priority in the national and local government’s policy. Evidence of this included overlapping roles and authorities on managing the tropical forest in Central Kalimantan, unclear modes/tools of implementation from the district and the local government that hindered foreign donors from disbursing climate funding, and also changing institutional settings from different presidencies. The Indonesian government successfully created a starting point to collaborate with multiple stakeholders in conducting bilateral climate change projects, but this did not guarantee the continuation of the initiatives from each donor. This discontinuation was not only Indonesia’s fault but also due to the domestic politics of Norway and Australia. Norwegian politics did not significantly influence the Indonesian climate policy. The Australian government experienced the most dynamic changes of domestic politics, which was reflected in the unfinished KFCP project and the removal of climate change as a priority in their development aid programme. The British government’s performance with Indonesia was stable in managing the climate partnership through the ICCTF and the UKCCU.
Thus, overall, these experiments with bilateralism have achieved only very limited success in strengthening climate governance in Indonesia.
Appendix I. List of Interviewees

Norwegian interviewees:
1. Cynthia Maharani – 12th December 2017 (Researcher, Center for International Forestry Research/CIFOR)
2. Lisetta Trebi – 19th December 2017 (Diplomat, Norwegian Embassy Jakarta)
3. Rachmat Witoelar – 21st December 2017 (Special Envoy to President on Climate Change)
4. Simpun Sampurna – 23rd January 2018 (AMAN regional chapter Central Kalimantan representative)
5. Edy Subahani – 24th January 2018 (WALHI regional chapter Central Kalimantan)
6. Rosenda Kasih – 26th January 2018 (WWF regional chapter Central Kalimantan)
7. Andy Kiki – 26th January 2018h (Kemitraan regional chapter Central Kalimantan representative)
8. Dimas Novian Hartono – 26th January 2018 (WALHI – Central Kalimantan)
9. Habibi – 27th January 2018 (Save Our Borneo, Central Kalimantan)
11. Arief Wijaya – 28th January 2018 (World Resource Institute Indonesia)
12. Riban Satya – 29th January 2018 (Mayor of Palangkaraya)
13. Wancino – 29th January 2018 (Kaum Telapak – Central Kalimantan)
14. Said Ismail Habibi – 30th January 2018 (Vice Governor of Central Kalimantan)
15. Ellie Borge – 16th February 2018 (Norwegian Development Agency, NORAD)
16. Dayu – 2nd April 2018 (Kemitraan, National Representative)
17. Eddy Raya – 27th March 2018 (District Governor, Barito Selatan, Central Kalimantan)
19. Lisetta Trebi – 8th August 2019 (2nd interview at Norwegian Embassy Jakarta)
British interviewees:
1. Budi S. Wardhana – 26th February 2018 (Deputy of Planning and Cooperation, Peatland Restoration Agency)
2. Farah Sofa – 1st March 2018 (UKCCU, British Embassy Jakarta)
3. Emma – 26th March 2018 (Director of Mitigation, Directorate General of Climate Change, Ministry of Environment, Republic of Indonesia)
4. Lili Hasanudin – 29th March 2018 (The Asia Foundation Indonesia)
5. Frans - 29th March 2018 (The Asia Foundation)
6. Rino - 29th March 2018 (The Asia Foundation)
7. Lawin Bastian – 3rd April 2018 (Head of Law and Technical Cooperation, Directorate General of Climate Change, Ministry of Environment, Republic of Indonesia)
8. Wahyu Marjaka – 2nd April 2018 (Directorate General of Climate Change, Ministry of Environment, Republic of Indonesia)
9. Anonymous – 11th April 2018 (Deputy of BAPPENAS)
10. Stuart Bruce – 24th June 2018 (UKCCU, British Government)
11. Hanna Satriyo – 21st January 2019 (Former Director of The Asia Foundation Indonesia)

Australian interviewees:
1. Rachmi Anindita – 7th February 2018 (Australian Embassy Jakarta)
2. Riena Dwi Astuty – 9th February 2018 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia)
3. Abdul Situmorang – 12th March 2018 (UNDP Indonesia)
5. Leela – 3rd April 2018 (World Bank)
6. Arie Rompas – 16th April 2018 (Greenpeace Indonesia)
7. Kate Elliott – 19th February 2019 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade)
9. Robin Davies – 20\textsuperscript{th} February 2019 (Development Policy Centre and development consultant, Australia)

10. Heather Fitt – 20\textsuperscript{th} February 2019 (Australian NGO Cooperation Programme – Australian Government)

11. Timer Manurung – 1\textsuperscript{st} March 2019 (Auriga, Indonesian NGO)
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCF</td>
<td>Adaptation-related Climate Change Financing</td>
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<tr>
<td>AISS</td>
<td>Australia-Indonesia Science Symposium</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMAN</td>
<td>Alliance of Indigenous People of the Archipelago</td>
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<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Aid</td>
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<td>BAPPENAS</td>
<td>National Development Agency</td>
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<td>BAU</td>
<td>Business As Usual</td>
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<td>BLU</td>
<td>Public Service Agency</td>
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<td>BRG</td>
<td>Indonesian Peatland Agency</td>
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<td>CCCDF</td>
<td>Canada Climate Change Development Fund</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
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<td>CFI</td>
<td>Climate and Forest Initiative</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIF</td>
<td>Climate Investment Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIFOR</td>
<td>Centre of International Forestry Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of Parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSL</td>
<td>Credibility, Salience, and Legitimacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEFRA</td>
<td>Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs</td>
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<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department For International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG-CCC</td>
<td>Directorate General for Climate Change Control</td>
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<td>DNPI</td>
<td>National Council on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>Environmental Investigation Agency</td>
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<td>ENGO</td>
<td>Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>FLAG</td>
<td>Forestry, Land Use and Governance</td>
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<td>FLEGT</td>
<td>Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade</td>
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<td>FREDDI+</td>
<td>Funding Instrument for REDD+ in Indonesia</td>
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<td>GEG</td>
<td>Global Environmental Governance</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>Green House Gases</td>
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<td>IAFCP</td>
<td>Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership</td>
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<td>ICCTF</td>
<td>Indonesian Climate Change Trust Fund</td>
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<td>ICEL</td>
<td>Indonesian Center for Environmental Law</td>
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<td>ICLEI</td>
<td>International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives</td>
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<td>IHCAP</td>
<td>Indian Himalayas Climate Adaptation Programme</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INCAS</td>
<td>Indonesian National Carbon Accounting System</td>
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<td>Inpres</td>
<td>Presidential Instruction</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<td>IUP</td>
<td>Plantation Licenses</td>
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<td>JCN</td>
<td>Joint Concept Note</td>
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<td>JPAL</td>
<td>Jameel Poverty Action Lab</td>
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<td>Kemitraan</td>
<td>Partnership for Governance Reform</td>
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<td>KFCP</td>
<td>Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership</td>
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<td>KPK</td>
<td>Corruption Eradication Commission</td>
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<td>KSI</td>
<td>Knowledge Sector Initiative</td>
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<td>LoI</td>
<td>Letter of Intent</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MoEF</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment and Forestry</td>
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<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MRV</td>
<td>Measurement, Reporting, and Verification</td>
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<td>NAMAs</td>
<td>Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>Nationally Determined Contribution</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NICFI</td>
<td>Norway International Climate Forest Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACC</td>
<td>Programme for Climate Change Adaptation</td>
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<td>Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle</td>
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<td>Perpres</td>
<td>Presidential Regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>REDD+</td>
<td>Reducing Emission on Deforestation and Forest Degradation+</td>
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<td>SatGas REDD+</td>
<td>Working Group of National REDD+ Task Force</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SFCP</td>
<td>Sumatra Carbon Forest Partnership</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan African countries</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UKCCU</td>
<td>United Kingdom Climate Change Unit</td>
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<td>UKP4</td>
<td>President Delivery Unit Service</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>US-KEHATI</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<td>YPD</td>
<td>Yayasan Petak Danum</td>
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