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The Narrative War for Côte d’Ivoire 2002 - 2017

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Abstract

The international interventions in Côte d'Ivoire were at the centre of a narrative war, both violently contested and declared an exemplar of peacekeeping best practice. The critical intervention literature has tended to focus on acknowledged failures and not asked as many questions of the interventions labelled as successes. Analysis of competing strategic narratives of intervention enables a deeper questioning of the narratives of the intervenors, as well as the narratives of the intervened.

This thesis explores the ways in which political actors used strategic narratives to define events, create and contest historical records, and establish the competing hegemonic and counterhegemonic epistemes of the international interventions in Côte d'Ivoire from 2002 to 2017. Through analysing the hegemonic and counterhegemonic strategic narratives of intervention and the narrative strategies used to propagate them, I demonstrate the ways in which polemical strategic narratives became accepted as political fact in the Ivoirian interventions, and the ways in which these narratives shaped the beliefs, opinions, ideologies, policies, decisions, and outcomes of the interventions.

I find that the narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire was waged asymmetrically, with hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators grounding their narratives in incommensurate discourses. I foreground the dialectical contradictions inherent in these complex discourses and link these contradictions to the strategic challenges faced by narrators fighting the narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire. This thesis further develops the strategic narrative analysis theoretical framework by incorporating insights from narrative strategy analysis. I demonstrate the utility of strategic narrative analysis for better understanding the complexity and contestation which accompanies all international interventions and the broader general terrain of narrative warfare.
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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work, and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as references.
I will tell you two stories, two different accounts of the international interventions in Côte d’Ivoire which took place between 2002 and 2017. The first story is a tale of success, a narrative of liberal peace international peacekeeping missions which benefitted the people of Côte d’Ivoire. The second story tells a tale of betrayal and plot. This thesis asks – how did the same set of historical events give rise to such strongly opposed sets of beliefs?

In the first story, France, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the United Nations intervened in Côte d’Ivoire from a sense of duty, at the request of the Ivoirian government, and on behalf of the Ivoirian people at a time of crisis. In fulfilment of its security agreement with Côte d’Ivoire, France undertook Operation Licorne to ensure stability. Licorne succeeded in protecting the population by separating the combatants and preventing the crisis from escalating and becoming a regional-level conflict. The United Nations initiated United Nations Operation Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to assist the people of Côte d’Ivoire in recovery from this crisis. Through long and patient negotiation, France and the UN helped re-integrate rebels into the Ivoirian state, paving the way for national elections to re-establish a legitimate, democratic Ivoirian government. Following a fair, free, and open election in 2010 under the guidance of the international community, the incumbent president refused to cede power to the legitimately elected new head of state. The UN stayed the course through the turbulent post-election transition, prevented violence against civilians, and ensured that the new president took power in 2011. During the following 6 years, the United Nations assisted the Ivoirian government in disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, reconstruction of the economy, reform of the security sector, reconciliation, truth, and justice initiatives, and re-unification of the country, closing the mission in June 2017. UNOCI serves as an exemplar of peacekeeping success.

The second story sounds very different. In 2002, following an attempted coup d’état sponsored by neighboring Burkina Faso, the president of Côte d’Ivoire called upon France to help prevent the attempted seizure of the state under the existing Franco-Ivoirian Defence
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Treaty. No friend of the Ivoirian President, France initially refused to honour the long-standing defence agreement, but eventually, and grudgingly, became involved, standing up Operation Licorne (Unicorn). Do you know why they called it ‘Licorne’? …because a unicorn is the only creature that can kill an elephant, the symbol of Côte d’Ivoire, at one blow.

Instead of assisting the Ivoirian government in quashing a coup attempt, France divided the country, protecting and enabling warlords in the north to consolidate power and providing a secure base of operations for a disgruntled northern politician, the close friend of high-ranking French officials. France aided the rebels, demanding their insertion into the legitimate government of Côte d’Ivoire, and pushed through national elections to install their preferred candidate as president. The national elections of 2010 took place in a still-divided country. Neither the government of Côte d’Ivoire nor the intervention forces could ensure the safety and security of voters and votes, particularly in the northern half of the country, still under the control of warlords and rebels. The northern voter rolls were packed with ineligible voters, and reports of violence, voter intimidation, and vote fraud were rife. The Ivoirian Constitutional Council rejected results from regions with evidence of significant irregularities. ECOWAS election observers and other senior African observers sided with the Constitutional Council, which had the authority to invalidate votes from northern regions. However, the United Nations Secretary General Special Representative (SRSG) to Côte d’Ivoire overstepped his authority, ignored previous agreements, and overturned the Ivoirian Constitutional Council’s decision. When the incumbent president requested a recount, the SRSG had the ballots burned illegally.

Thousands of Ivoirians died in the violence following this electoral coup d'état. Instead of preventing civilian casualties, France and the United Nations were responsible for the post-electoral deaths through their demands for elections in a divided country not yet ready for a presidential election and their decisions to overrule the Ivoirian Constitutional Council.

Worse, they were actively involved in combat operations which killed civilians. Video evidence shows UN military members standing by during the execution of innocent civilians. France, the United States, and other United Nations military forces waged vigorous combat operations against the existing government to install their preferred candidate as president.
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France and the United Nations continued this charade of liberal peace following the enthronement—performing theatrical acts of post-conflict ‘justice,’ ‘disarmament,’ and ‘reconciliation’ which made good headlines but had little substance and even less impact, leaving intact the power of the warlords and the armed militias which they had supported and ushered into power. Côte d’Ivoire has been left a broken post-colony deprived again of true independence.

The first narrative presented above provides a summary of the official discourse of the conflict, the strategic narratives which can be found in UN news articles, press releases, diplomatic statements, speeches, and Security Council resolutions, as well as by journalists, analysts, and academics. The second narrative is a summary of the counterhegemonic discourse which contests the dominant narratives, produced by Ivoirian dissidents, academic and NGO analysts, global political leaders, and journalists. These competing narratives and their contestation form the core research focus on this thesis.

Research questions
I started with the question, which version of what happened during the Ivoirian interventions is true? I found that this was the wrong questions to ask in analysis of the contested discourses of a narrative war. To assume that one discourse is ‘truer’ than the other assumes that the discourses, the “bodies of knowledge” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, Roselle, 2013, p. 7) which structure, and which in turn are composed of the narratives of the interventions, are commensurate. They are not. While the narratives of the Ivoirian interventions agree in historic particulars, a focus on different aspects of ‘the truth,’ and different sets of historical facts, divides them.

I had assumed that the Ivoirian discourses were contested on truth values – but I found this also not to be the case. Contestation is based on what counts more than what is true. Discourse contestation, and its weaponised form, narrative warfare, is more a battle of values and worldviews than of facts. The question above is better formulated as ‘why do the competing narratives of the Ivoirian interventions offer such different understandings and explanations of the same set of events?’ Therefore, this thesis addresses the following set of questions: First, how did two such mutually exclusive discourses of the international
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Interventions in Côte d’Ivoire come into being? How were they formed? Who created the strategic political narratives that make up these contradictory discourses and narratives of which they are composed? Second, how were these discourses projected? What strategies and technologies were deployed? Who were the audiences? Third, what difference did this narrative contestation make in the intervention events and outcomes?

Interventions and strategic narratives
Since the turn of the millennium, the UN has recognised the need to better understand the impacts of their operations on conflict-affected populations (DPKO, 2015; DPKO, 2014; Brahimi Report, 2000, referenced here as S/2000/809), emphasising the importance of deep context analysis driving mission strategy. Academic efforts to assess and analyse host populations perceptions of intervention began with simple research designs intended to start the conversation on popular perceptions of legitimacy. However, perceptions of intervention are complicated and should not be reduced to unwarranted (in the sense of under-defined or unvalidated) numeric values for the delivery of rapid research results, as in Korson’s (2016) comparison of 'local perceptions' of intervention in Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire which reduced the issue to simple approval/disapproval of intervenors in small samples of national media coverage and did not consider the extent to which intervenors controlled that coverage.

Rather than a numeric count, or comparative group-based approach to legitimacy, in my research I examine the arguments and counterarguments of legitimacy and illegitimacy across the strategic narratives of the contested discourses. My approach cannot determine relative or absolute levels of perceptions of legitimacy across population groups within the Ivoirian population. However, by examining how arguments are made and how narratives are used, I can map in the discourses the ways that narrators contend for populations’ assent or resistance. I can also map the terrain of the contested discourses – the content on which actors argue the population should withhold or grant consent, and the reasons that the interventions should be perceived as legitimate or illegitimate. This strategic narrative analytic approach allows greater insight into the dynamics and mechanisms of resistance and consent than polls, surveys, or quantitative media analysis can provide. Mapping the counternarratives and discourses also makes them much harder to suppress and ignore.
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The attempts to construct strong, quantitatively validated hypotheses of impact and success in international intervention have consumed much time and energy over the past two decades (Ruggeri and Bove, 2019; Ruggeri, 2019; Nascimento, 2018; Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2018; Mac Ginty, 2017; Clayton, et al. 2017; Costalli and Ruggeri, 2017; Ruggeri, et al. 2017; Read, et al. 2016; Gleditsch, et al. 2014; Fortna, 2008). However, intervention impact and success evaluation has proven a difficult undertaking. Edwards (2014) has argued (in the context of the provision of international aid) that the interactions of recipients and providers are “so intricate and time dependent” that cross-country quantitative analysis, no matter how sophisticated and intricate, has produced research results that are “fragile and inconclusive.” Aggregate data cannot on its own break open the black box of international interventions (Chandler, 2018) and throw light on how the interventions impact specific populations in specific times and places. Quantitative approaches struggle to address questions of resistance and dissent among host populations, given the historic specificity of events which drive contestation and vested interests in suppressing awareness of dissent at the level of the international intervention community.

In addition to the UN recognition of the need for greater understanding of the impacts of intervention noted above, researchers across the intervention research community have called for a shift in focus from quantitative analysis across interventions to qualitative research into specific interventions. Abrahamson (2016, pp. 2, 4), Cheeseman, Death, and Whitfield (2016), Autesserre (2014b, pp. 275-288), Berdal (2009), and Cramer (2006) have argued that ethnographically and historically enriched state-based case studies present a way into the international interventions black box. Cramer calls for more “historical depth” in analysis (p. 22) and Berdal (2009) criticises the social engineering/technocratic approach to peace operations which dehistoricises and depoliticises peace operations analysis. This narrative analysis of the Ivoirian interventions refocuses attention on the specific, historic, and political aspects of narratives of intervention success.

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Bellamy and Williams 2012; Berdal, 2009; Fortna, 2008; Fortna and Howard, 2008, Pouligny, 2006). They have all argued that researchers need to include the perspectives of host populations while acknowledging the difficulty of the task, admitting limited success in their own work, and calling for more work to be done in this area, without specifying how to conduct rigorous qualitative analysis of the host populations' perception of intervention.

In her ethnography of UN peace operations, Pouligny (2006) underlines the importance of local interaction with and response to peacekeepers for the outcomes of operations, advocating the use of directive ethnographic interviews which she employed in her research. She emphasises the importance of "tak[ing] seriously how individuals and groups...understood and explained, subjectively and empirically, their interaction with the United Nations missions" (p. xii). She also emphasises the importance of narratives for understanding the population perceptions which shape the response to international interventions (p. 154). Pouligny's scope of analysis is global in breadth but does not attempt to develop a methodology for identifying and analysing the specific strategic narratives central to specific interventions.

Fortna (2008), while agreeing with the necessity of understanding the perspective of the 'peacekept,' focuses on the institutional narratives of peacekeeping. Although she includes ethnographic interviews in her methodology, her analysis of the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts remains focussed at the institutional and aggregate level. de Coning et al. (2015) emphasise the requirement to strengthen the evaluation of the effects of peace operations on host populations and the need for more research into the populations’ perceptions of the peace operations. Whalan (2013) emphasises the centrality of local compliance and cooperation in peace operations outcomes and explores the role of communication and legitimacy in shaping host populations’ acceptance of conflict resolution. I believe, with Whalan, that intervention researchers have a moral imperative to make intervention more accountable to the populations the operations purport to serve. Autessere’s (2014b) ethnographic approach analyses the challenges and limitations of the current model of peacekeeping. She critiques the moral hazards of international peace-making and peacekeeping structures, and the ways in which they are analysed in the
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academic literature. Her most recent work explores narratives of grassroots peace activists around the world (Autesserre, 2021). de Herdt and de Sardan (2015) argue that examining variant narratives of the interventions allows insight into the ‘discrepancy between official norms and actual practices’ in peacekeeping and allows us to develop an in-depth empirical knowledge of the praxis of peacekeeping and the lived reality of ‘being peaced’.

My research here responds to these calls to focus on developing analytic techniques to better understand the perceptions of host populations, to map the narratives of both the interveners and the intervened. Through analysis of the contested narratives and discourses of the Ivoirian interventions, this case study works within the black box of the Ivoirian interventions, examining narratives and discourse specific to the interventions and avoiding a technocratic, anti-politics approach to that most political of activities, international intervention. Rather than arguing for metrics of legitimacy or exploring the normative basis of accountability, this thesis examines accountability through comparative analysis of the narratives of both the peacekeepers and the peacekept. Strategic narrative analysis provides a structured way to access those elusive ‘host perceptions’ and to identify, explore, and understand areas of contestation between the peacekeepers and the peacekept in interventions.

Case study rationale

First, the Ivoirian interventions are well suited for a single-site case study because of their duration (15 years from start to finish), historical distance, and complexity. Rich and detailed documentation from multiple actors in the interventions, including indigenous and international counterhegemonic literature, allows in-depth qualitative analysis. Multiple intervention missions (France, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN) provide the opportunity for within-case comparison of interventions. The interventions are bounded, from 20 September 2002 through 30 June 2017. This bounded time span allow a
precise chronology of intervention. Four years have elapsed since the UN and French
missions concluded. Time elapsed since the end of mission allows an aperture across the
entire intervention span, and analysis of the after-effects of intervention.

Second, the Ivoirian interventions are presented as exceptionally successful by hegemonic
narrators. However, the ‘successes’ of the Ivoirian interventions are more partial and
problematic than generally described. Giving equal consideration to the discourses of the
intervened challenges the sunny assessments of the intervenors. This discrepancy between
claimed achievements and delivered accomplishments has been under-researched and
under-theorised. Strategic narrative analysis provides an innovative way of exploring
narratives of intervention success. In revealing the complexities, ambiguities, and
contradictions of the narratives of intervention success in Côte d’Ivoire, this study serves as
a test case of the liberal peace.

Third, the high level of polarisation found in the contested discourses of the Ivoirian
interventions allows a clear contrast of narratives and enables clarity in analysing competing
narrative claims and counterclaims. The polarised narratives and discourses facilitate crisp
analysis and allow insight into the dynamics of narrative warfare.

Research Contribution
This analysis contributes to the development of the Strategic Narrative Analysis theoretical
framework as applied to international intervention research through an in-depth
examination of narrative strategies and the development of narrative warfare theory within
the framework.

I use narrative analysis to examine the ways in which the discourses of the liberal peace,
peacekeeping, Ivoirité and Françafrique have been used by strategic narrators. I have
identified no previous instances to date in which strategic narrative analysis of intervention
discourse has engaged in-depth with these discourses. I do not engage with these
discourses as theories but explore how, where, and why they were deployed by strategic
narrators and to what effect. I accentuate the dialectical and contradictory nature of these
complex discourses and highlight the ways in which internal contradictions within each
discourse allowed strategic narrators to exploit the discourses as narrative resources. I foreground the ways in which these dialectical contradictions caused problems for strategic narrators, and how they navigated the narrative dangers of hypocrisy and internal contradiction in their accounts of intervention.

I build upon the approach in Arsenault et al.'s (2018) analysis of strategic narratives of the international intervention in Libya in 2011. The narrative strategies they outline in the narrative war waged before and during the Libyan intervention of 2011 show striking similarities to Ivoirian narrative warfare. The strategies of personification, polarisation, amplification, promotion by proxy, and legitimisation by hegemonic actors identified by Arsenault et al. in the Libyan conflict are evident in the narratives of the 2011 Second Ivoirian Civil War. The shared identity of hegemonic actors in both interventions is striking, as is the historical simultaneity, the role of proxies in narrative promotion, and the strategic narratives of intervention framed as moral necessity.

I expand on the Arsenault et al. analysis through the development of narrative strategy tools. By utilising both Strategic Narrative Analysis (SNA) and Narrative Strategy (NS) theory and concepts in the analysis below, I contribute to conceptual development and integration into the larger framework of the role and function of narrative strategies and narrative warfare deployed in international interventions. Application of strategic narrative analysis to the processes of discourse contestation and legitimisation has wide applicability to research on the complexities of contested interventions and conflict environments across the globe.

Thesis Overview
This thesis proceeds in four stages. In Part I, the first chapter introduces the hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives of intervention, outlines the contributions of this research, and lays out the theoretical framework of the analysis. In Chapter 2, I locate my work within the Strategic Narrative Analysis and the Narrative Strategies schools of analysis. I outline the main tenets of the Strategic Narrative Analysis Theoretical Framework, define strategic narratives, and discusses analytic issues within the framework. I conclude the chapter by defining discourse and outlining the foundational discourses of the Ivoirian interventions. Chapter 3 introduces the concept of narrative strategies, describes the importance of
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narrative strategy in strategic narrative analysis, and defines the narrative strategies which will be explored in the analytic chapters. Chapter 4 lays out the methodology I used in identifying my key texts and discourse corpus, my data collection and analytic process, and the challenges which these presented.

In Part II, I present Ivorian intervention events chronologically, introducing the historical context of the contested narratives of the interventions. Chapter 5 summarises Ivorian history through the First Ivorian Civil War. Chapter 6 covers the events of the interim period of Not War, Not Peace. Chapter 7 concludes the chronology with the events of the Second Ivorian Civil War and the post-war final stages of intervention. Strategic Narrative Analysis relies on historical context to parse the strategic narratives of intervention and their impact on intervention history. The chronology provides the documentation necessary to identify the tension between historical records and strategic narratives, and the historical context necessary to critically assess the analysis to come.

Part III examines the academic and professional literatures of the Ivorian interventions. In Chapter 8 I discuss the complexities of academic and professional narratives produced within the context of narrative war, authorial strategies to participate or avoid recruitment, and how narrator positionality shapes the production and reception of these works. I warrant my claim of a polarisation between hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives of intervention in analysis of the production and reception of scholarly, journalist, governmental and NGO narratives of the Ivorian interventions. Chapter 9 covers the Ivorian conflict literature and establishes that the dynamics of discourse polarisation prevent academics working within Côte d'Ivoire from producing their own histories of the interventions, leading to a near-monopoly of intervention analysis by researchers working outside the country, summarised in Chapter 10.

Part IV analyses the strategic narratives of intervention and the narrative strategies deployed in the narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire. Chapter 11 grounds hegemonic narratives within the discourse of peacekeeping and Chapter 12 within the discourse of the liberal peace. I describe the ways in which narrators draw upon these discourses to position the
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intervenors as moral actors, to divert criticism, to discredit Ivoirian leadership, and to establish the 'received' history of the interventions. I use counterhegemonic counternarratives to scrutinise the claims made within the hegemonic narratives and highlight the ways in which any strategic narrative may contain part of 'the truth' without including 'the whole truth and nothing but the truth.' In Chapter 13, I ground the counterhegemonic narratives in the discourses of Ivoirité and Françafrique and analyse the role of conspiracy narratives in the interventions. I articulate the complexity and ambiguity of 'conspiracy theory' within narrative warfare and the utility of 'conspiracy theory' to narrative warriors. In Chapter 14, I return to the end of the interventions and examine the impact of the intervention narratives on the outcomes of intervention and their historical consequences. I conclude the thesis by outlining the questions that must be asked to further build a useful theory of narrative warfare.
Chapter 2. Strategic Narrative Analysis

The initial description of the Strategic Narrative Analysis (SNA) theoretical framework is outlined in Antoniades et al. (2010, p. 1), who define the framework as the “empirical analysis of the formation, projection and reception of strategic narratives in [the new social] media ecology.” The theoretical framework was developed further in Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2013) and expanded in Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, eds. (2018). It was developed in response to the explosion of interest in strategic communications which dates from the turn of the 21st century, concurrent with the supercharged growth of internet technology, infrastructure, and social media (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 2) and emphasises the increasing importance of narrative in the “ideological struggle” of modern international politics in "obtaining legitimacy and support" for politics, programs, and international relations across the globe (Miskimmon et al., 2018, p. 29).

Analytic benefits of using the SNA framework
The SNA framework provides an empirical approach to narratives as the raw material of analysis. Because the framework focusses on the production process and messaging products of strategic narratives, it grounds discourse analysis empirically and substantively. It provides concepts useful for identifying the construction of ideological hegemony and resistance through specific real-world communication products and their legitimation and amplification through elite influence networks, traditional international diplomacy, and both traditional and social media. Strategic Narrative Analysis focusses attention on the 'war of words' which occurs in every narrative conflict.

Defining strategic narratives
Strategic narratives are products created to achieve goals; to justify an intervention, a political decision, a military operation, to contest an account of a political event, to establish or challenge legitimacy, to persuade and mobilise a population, to construct consent or resistance. Many definitions of strategic narrative have been developed over the past two decades, but most focus on communications produced intentionally to achieve goals. Kaldor et al. define strategic narrative as “an enduring and dynamic organising frame for security action” (Kaldor and Selchow, 2007, p. 273). Antoniades et al. (2010, p. 5) expand the definition of strategic narratives as “representations of a sequence of events and identities,
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a communicative tool through which political elites attempt to give determined meaning to past, present and future in order to achieve political objectives,” including justifying policy objectives and policy responses to crises, the formation of international alliances, the rallying of domestic public opinion, and the mobilisation of international and domestic support. Dimitriu (2012, p. 195) differentiates strategic narratives as having a “a compelling storyline which can explain events convincingly,” and emphasises that the goal of strategic narrative is “obtaining legitimacy and support.”

Strategic narratives are a mechanism for constructing common knowledge, as well as organising, coordinating, and mobilising political actions in pursuit of common interests (Antoniades, et al. 2010, p. 2; Archetti, 2018, p. 219). De Hoop Scheffer (2015, p. xxiv) notes the multiple audiences of strategic narratives in international interventions, which communicate to host and intervenor populations, as well as to the intervening forces. They are a “crucial form of strategic agency in world politics, i.e., agency that aims to transform itself and/or change the nature of the environment in which it exists and operates,” (Antoniades, et al., 2010, p. 6). Strategic narratives “create a consensus about how actors should function,” and serve as templates “which create an expectation or understanding of how the new event will unfold” (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 6). They are a “means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics” (O’Loughlin, 2018, p. 247), and a tool to for “great powers to project their values and interests to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they operate” (Antoniades et al., 2010, p. 3).

Locating strategic narratives within a narrative taxonomy
While theorists working within the SNA theoretical framework have a great deal to say about strategic narratives, they rarely address other levels of political narrative. The SNA framework would benefit from incorporation of additional concepts from adjacent theory. In the Narrative Strategies (NS) school of analysis, Maan (2018) develops a taxonomy of meta-narratives, strategic narratives, operational narratives, and tactical narratives (Maan, 2018, p. 57). A meta-narrative "influences how the international community regards a situation...consistent with coalition interests." Strategic narratives operate as influencers at the national/international interface to shape international responses. Operational narratives
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link the higher-level narratives to national and local concerns. Tactical narratives are the ground-level narratives "which address the concerns of local populations, domestic audiences, and soldiers on the ground." (Maan, 2018, p. 57). While SNA does not articulate a taxonomy of narratives, in practice, the focus is on international strategic narratives. This definition of strategic narrative occurring at the state/international level links the schools. My definition combines SNA and NS theory: strategic narratives are those narratives which are produced by political actors to achieve strategic goals at the intersection of the state and international system.

Three claims of the Strategic Narrative Analysis theoretical framework
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2018, pp. 281, 314) make three claims in their articulation of Strategic Narrative Analysis theory: some narratives are strategically significant, actors can promote their own narratives to strategically advance their position in contestation for power, and strategic narratives are becoming more influential through changes in media. I identify below the central analytic issues arising from these claims and my positioning on these issues.

I define three aspects to identifying strategic narratives: first, identifying physical instances of strategic narrative in physical language artifacts; second, identifying the patterns of meaning which create strategic narratives in the more abstract sense of the term, and third, differentiating strategically significant narratives from plain vanilla narratives. Strategic narratives are social products; they are embodied in speeches, news articles, web pages, meeting minutes, reports, and a host of other human communications, such as tweets, posts, and conversations. Embodied in artifacts such as reports or blog posts, strategic narratives can be collected into a corpus. Strategic narratives are also analytic products; patterns of meaning identified and grouped by analysts as much as the physical artifacts themselves. That analysis will always be an activity of discernment and interpretation, open to challenge and alternative interpretations. As Arsenault, et al. (2018, p. 210) point out, "Strategic narratives are amorphous and difficult to identify.” Miskimmon et al. (2018, p. 47-48) agree – it’s a challenge to “find methods to identify people’s narratives” and to differentiate one narrative from another. Therefore, the identification and delineation of a corpus and the clear, systematic, and validatable identification of the patterns of meaning
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within that corpus are the initial challenges of strategic narrative analysis. There remains also the problem of differentiating 'strategic' narratives from plain-vanilla narratives. Miskimmon et al. (2018) assert that “some narratives are strategically significant.” Implicitly, other narratives are not. For any narrative analyst, the challenge is differentiating 'truly strategic' narratives from other types of narratives.

SNA theory claims that coercion is the dispositive element of strategic narratives and restricts the term 'strategic narrative' to coercive narratives (Miskimmon, et al. 2018, p. 5). Arsenault et al. (2018) proposes as a "threshold definition" that all strategic narratives must be coercive or "threatening severe consequences to relevant actors" if the actions required by the narrative are not met (p. 192). This use of “coercion” as the defining characteristic of strategic narrative stems from two sources. First, much of the strategic narrative analysis literature focuses on hegemony and the role of coercion in constructing hegemony (Antoniades, et al. 2010; Miskimmon, et al, 2013; Krebs and Jackson, 2016, Arsenault, et al., 2018). A second driver of the emphasis on coercion seems to be the desire to establish more precise focus for truly “strategic” level narratives, as opposed to narratives created to achieve lower-level communicative goals. In this case, 'strategic' may reference the concept of grand strategy in hegemonic contestation, as in Antoniades, et al. (2010).

I argue, in contrast, that coercion is problematic as the characteristic defining strategic narratives. Coercion is too restrictive as the defining feature of strategic narratives. Coercion is transitive, a means to (another) end, rather than a strategic final goal. Further, while coercion is deployed some strategic narratives, it is by no means the only goal of strategic narratives. Miskimmon et al. include agenda setting, legitimization, diverting attention, securing acquiescence, enhancing popularity, mobilisation, securing funding, votes, authorisation, “cultivating a positive perception,” persuasion, and representational force as well as coercion as communication goals in the formation of strategic narratives (Miskimmon, et al. 2013, p. 8-9). Coercion can better be conceptualised as a strategy, a means to achieve a specific end. I will return in Chapter 11 to coercion as strategy in my analysis of the UN narratives which deploy escalating stages of coercion to achieve UN goals of compliance from Ivoirian politicians.
My incorporation of narrative strategies in this analysis supports the second claim of the SNA framework, which states that actors can promote their own narratives to strategically advance their position in contestations for power. Including analysis of narrative strategies allows a clearer and more concrete understanding of how narrative actors promote their own narratives. My thesis also engages with a significant problem in this claim - how can we identify narrative actors’ intent in the production and promotion of strategic narratives? To robustly identify strategic narratives means demonstrating convincingly that the narratives have been crafted to achieve some outcome, whether or not the specific outcome desired and intended by the producer can be clearly discerned. Whether or not outcomes have been achieved is irrelevant to the identification and analysis of strategic narratives, since some narratives succeed, some fail. Identifying that there is an explicit or implicit intent to influence at the state/international nexus in the production of a narrative is a central issue in conducting strategic narrative analysis.

The intent to influence is not the same as actor intent, which can have a different meaning – does the actor mean what they say? Does their internal intent match their external words and actions? Can we discern their ‘true’ intent? We know that political actors, like other humans, sometimes lie, sometimes misrepresent their intentions. Miskimmon et al. (2018, p. 28) state that “we do not need to know the intentions of actors to explain outcomes in world politics. We can only analyse the claims made in public and identify whose claims seem to win the day.” At times, the outcomes achieved are clearly not the outcomes intended. We must include analysis of failed, as well as successful, narratives to capture the complexities of intent.

In line with the SNA approach, I focus on the narratives embodied in texts and the patterns which connect them. The analytic focus is not on the actor’s internal thoughts but on their external public speech and communications. Within strategic narrative analysis, narrative goals can only be identified through the social context and content of the public communications. I compare public narratives with public outcomes. Miskimmon et al. point out, "We do not need to know the intentions of actors to explain outcomes in world
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politics” (Miskimmon et al., 2018, p. 28). I take this approach, keeping analysis focused on the empirical data of competing narratives of intervention, their context, and their outcomes.

The third claim of the SNA framework is that strategic narratives are becoming more influential through changes in media. In Chapters 3 and 4, I discuss the impact of asymmetric access to communication technology in the projection of hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives. I compare the global vs. local communication technologies available to the UN and other hegemonic narrators to the technologies available to counterhegemonic narrators, particularly the Ivorian government and academics who opposed the intervenors. Significant asymmetry in the technology available to the narrators shaped target audiences and communication objectives on both sides. Hegemonic narrators leveraged global communication technology to target and influence a global audience of powerful international actors but had restricted access to the Ivorian host populations. Counterhegemonic narrators lacked this global platform and audience but had a near-monopoly of access to the Ivorian population. I document the ways in which this asymmetry of technology, access, and audience shaped the polarisation of the discourses, the hegemonic and counterhegemonic strategic narratives, and outcomes of the interventions.

In addition to the issues which arise from the three foundational claims of the SNA theoretical framework outlined above, there is still much work to be done in conceptualising how to identify the impact, effectiveness, and relative importance of strategic narratives. The uncritical attribution of efficacy to strategic narratives is as much a theoretical weakness as ignoring their role in the constitution of power. Colley (2015, p. 223) points out, “Too often, foreign policy literature has uncritically portrayed narratives as a communication panacea with untold power.” Miskimmon, et al. (2013, p. 176) agree: “...strategic narratives make a difference to political change. The difficulty is knowing how and when they matter.” As Miskimmon et al. point out (2018, p. 165), strategic narratives are produced to mobilise networks of political supporters, but once those networks are mobilised, events frequently overtake intents.
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Strategic narratives may produce the opposite of the intended effect. An official Ivoirian government announcement withdrawing consent to peacekeeping forces led to peacekeepers using military force to achieve regime change and oust that government during the Second Ivoirian Civil War, the opposite of the intent of the announcement. The political actors producing narratives may have little to no long-term strategy, and the narrators may not have much skill in producing strategy or narratives, making it nearly impossible to reverse-engineer intent from outcome (Miskimmon, et al. 2018, p. 25).

There is an added complexity in identifying the impact of strategic narrative through emphasising actor intent. Once narratives are created and made public, they take on a life of their own. Strategic narrators, or members of the public, can and do adopt and adapt narratives which were produced by others with a specific intent, and use them for their own purposes. Blommaert (2019, p. 7) provides the example of a politician's tweet -- when tweets are taken up and retweeted by an audience, the evolving narrative can move far from the originator's communicative intent. Viral trolling mocking a tweet is one example of the independent life of narratives once they have been released into the wilds of social media.

While I can analyse specific strategic narratives and communication products at a detailed level, I can only link these specific products to large-scale impacts, as discussed in Part IV of this thesis. Miskimmon et al. (2018, p. 25) discuss the difficulties in measuring impact. Outputs are a simple strategic communications metric, easy to measure in terms of numbers of products created (web pages, news articles, speeches, total number of clicks, listeners, comments, time spent on a webpage per viewer). However, outputs do not necessarily create or equate to the desired outcomes, the strategic goals of “attitudinal or behavioral change” (2018, p. 25). Measuring those desired changes in the world and demonstrating that those changes occurred in whole or in part because of the strategic narrative communications is a much harder task. Direct and quantifiable impact evaluation requires significant positioning of evaluation mechanisms in advance of the strategic communication, leaving the external strategic narrative analyst with relatively few
evaluation options after the fact. However, evaluation of the effectiveness of strategic narratives post-production is possible if we look for broadscale impacts in the outcomes of specific contestations.

In this research, I balance the role of narrative and discourse in the production and reproduction of the events of the Ivoirian interventions without losing awareness that narratives are only one small part of the vast assemblages which constituted the social worlds of the interventions. Despite the acknowledged importance of impact in this framework, measuring impact has remained under-theorised, but operationalised in individual analytic efforts within SNA. In my concluding chapter, I will discuss empirical impacts of the strategic narratives in the Ivoirian interventions. I turn now to the problem posed by narrative truth and its relationship to narrative outcomes.

**Truth and narrative**
Social science research robustly demonstrates that both fictional and fact-based narratives from popular culture blend together and shape belief and action, and that elites as well as mass audiences do not clearly differentiate fact from fiction (e.g., Daniel and Musgrave, 2017). White (1980) outlines the ways in which narrative forms the foundation of historical accounts, chronicles, annals, and ‘history proper.’ de Guevara and Kostić (2017) describe narrative as the basis of the “mythologies, legends, and tales in the social construction of international politics.” Maan emphasises "Narrative is not an alternative to truth or reality; it is the mode in which truth and reality are presented. There are only versions, and narratively unmediated truth or reality is impossible" (2009, p. 60). Maan defines narrative as the foundation of personal and social identity, the basis of the social construction of meaning, and emphasises that "Narratives are about meaning, not truth...Narratives are successful or not, interesting or not, influential or not, but narratives do not rely upon truth-value for their success.... credibility, not truth, is an important aspect of narrative influence" (2018, p. 16). In politics as elsewhere, “...we evaluate the truth of narrative not in terms of its precise correspondence with the real world, but in terms of its internal consistency and its conformity with our general conceptions about the way the world works” (Mayer, 2014, p. 64). Miskimmon, et al. concur with Mayer and Maan; “What matters is not whether a narrative is more true or falser, but what effects the narrative has” (2018, p. 51), an
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important premise in narrative warfare analysis and the basis of the approach which I take in this analysis.

The impact of a strategic narrative has little to do with its relationship to 'empirical truth' and more to do with its reception. Strategic narrative analysis focusses on how narratives are used and the outcomes of those usages, rather than arguing for or against the truth values of specific strategic narratives. Strategic narratives may or may not be accurate or honest, but they are effective not so much because their truth value but because of their 'belief value.' What counts is whether the narratives are believed.

Narrative warfare as a fight to establish 'truth'
While strategic narrative analysis searches for the representations of politically contested 'truth,' narrative warfare is waged to establish 'the truth' of a conflict. Strategic narratives always play an important role in war and conflict, to account for ".... the appalling price of war. Narratives ... set out the story of why a state is involved in a conflict, who is with the state and against the state and how the conflict will be resolved" (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 182). SNA analysts describe narrative warfare in their case studies but do not explicitly define it (e.g., Archetti, 2018). The Narrative Strategies group does articulate a theory of narrative warfare, so I propose integrating that construct into the SNA framework. Maan and Cobaugh (2018, p. 35) define narrative warfare as "large scale influence campaigns, regardless of whether they are the main effort or in support of the main effort" in specific conflicts. I adopt the NS definition of narrative warfare in my analysis of the narrative contestation which occurred during the Ivoirian interventions, centred on the strategic narratives produced to influence the perceptions and positions of the international community.

The role of discourse in contested narratives
Discourse is a core concept across narrative theory and important in Strategic Narrative Analysis. Milliken defines discourses as “structures of signification which construct social realities,” and which create systems of expertise and experts (1999, p. 229). Discourses also embody the “common sense(s) of societies, limiting possible resistance.... and creating reasonable and warranted relations of domination” (1999, p. 237). Discourses are a form
and source of political power, “regimes of truth” that define what is possible, knowable, normal, part of the “discursive practices by which we make sense [of our worlds],” and “are founded not on universal truths but on historically contingent knowledge structures” (Mattern and Zarakol, 2016, 641). Miskimmon et al. underscore the generative relationship between discourse and strategic narrative: discourses are the “bodies of knowledge that actors plot into narratives” (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 7). Narrators “draw upon” existing discourses when crafting strategic narratives (p. 119) and "discourses have a structuring effect upon narrative action" (p. 7).

Precisely defining the boundaries of a discourse is not possible, as they continuously change. While discourses are not stable, the conceptualisation of discourses as “unstable grids...changeable and historically contingent” (Milliken, 1999, p.230) has been stable. Discourses are fluid and involve the continuous construction/reconstruction of worldviews and ideologies (Hansen, 2006). They are “never quite fixed” (Miskimmon, et al. 2013, p. 16). Yet, like weather fronts, discourses exist, and they impact our lives. Discourse as a body of knowledge is always in a process of flux, as beliefs and ideas change, new information is added, old beliefs are rejected. As a nexus of social power, discourses will always be contested, as they always "produce relations of power" and "This unfixed-ness creates space for politics and contestation" (Miskimmon, et al., 2013, pp 16 – 17).

I will show that hegemonic and counterhegemonic strategic narratives drew from four key separate and incommensurate discourses in Part IV. I will demonstrate the ways in which these incommensurate discourses are foundational to the asymmetric dynamics of narrative contestation in the interventions and their outcomes. I locate the hegemonic strategic narratives in peacekeeping discourse and liberal peace discourse and the counterhegemonic strategic narratives in the discourses of Françafrique and Ivoirité. Using two key texts - the Brahimi Report on Peacekeeping (2002, referenced as S/2000/809) and The Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace (Doyle, 2005) - I demonstrate the ways in which the foundational discourses of peacekeeping and liberal peace discourse grounded, supported, shaped, and constrained UN strategic narrative messaging and operational activities during the Ivoirian interventions in Chapters 12 and 13.
The three principles of peacekeeping were developed to establish and maintain UN peacekeeping as a moral activity, grounded in liberal normative values (DPKO, 2008). These principles regulate peacekeepers and the ways in which missions are conducted, not the peacekept. The principles of peacekeeping were first formed by the requirements of the Cold War era and were considered foundational to UN field operations (Paddon Rhoads and Laurence 2019; Boulden, 2005). Goulding (1993) notes that the Cold War "fostered the gradual evolution of a body of principles, procedures, and practices for peacekeeping" (p. 453) including consent of the parties to the conflict, peacekeeping "impartial between the parties" (p. 454), and the minimum use of force in peacekeeping (p. 455). Peacekeeping activities are generally considered to be authorised under Chapters V and VII of the UN Charter, which reference conflict resolution and "threats to peace" but do not specifically reference peacekeeping. These peacekeeping principles were "established" by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Goulding, p.453) and are currently documented in the "Capstone Doctrine" (DPKO, 2008).

The three principles of peacekeeping (non-use of force, consent, and impartiality) are logically consistent and support and reinforce a specific version of peacekeeping, which in the Cold War tradition did not prioritise the safety of civilian populations but rather focussed on the relationship between the UN, the host nation state, and the combatants, prioritising preventing the spread of state-level warfare. At the end of the Cold War, their utility was questioned as the result of multiple interventions which failed to protect civilian populations from violent conflict (S/200/809). The new focus on an international commitment to protect civilians in conflict created a new complexity and tension between the traditional principles of peacekeeping and the emerging international acknowledgment of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which had been hampered, or at least, not enabled by, peacekeeping's three foundational principles. While R2P may seem logically to be an additional peacekeeping principle, formally, it is still not part of peacekeeping doctrine. R2P is an international commitment by states to protect civilian populations (A/RES/60/1) but has become a de facto principle in UN international operations, and as such, exists in tension with the foundational principles of peacekeeping (Thakur and Maley, 2015; Hehir, 2012).
The Brahimi Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping (S/2000/809) re-engineered UN peacekeeping as it entered the post-Cold War era of 'peak peacekeeping' at the turn of the 21st century. The report described "consent of the local parties, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defence..." as the continuing three "bedrock principles of peacekeeping" (S/2000/809, para. 48). However, peacekeeping doctrine and principles required updating for the UN to "respond effectively to such challenges" to peace operations as those encountered in the peace operations in the mid-90s (S/2000/809, paras 49-52). While emphasising continuity, the report redefined the 'bedrock principles' to meet the perceived need for a new, more 'muscular' form of intervention. The Brahimi Report implied that the emerging R2P commitment was compatible with the three core principles of peacekeeping, which it presented as 'updated' to meet modern requirements. This attempt to minimise the conflicting values of R2P with those of the traditional peacekeeping principles led to significant consequences in the Ivoirian interventions (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). The attempt to square the circle, deploying both the discourse of an international commitment to protect and the existing principles guiding peacekeeping, resulted in UN strategic messaging during the Ivoirian interventions which was complicated at best and misleading in many instances.

Impartiality no longer implied an assumption of moral equivalence between the warring parties. UN forces must be able to "distinguish victim from aggressor," a significant change in stance (S/2000/809, p. ix). While grounding the principle of impartiality in the UN Charter, the report also claimed that "...impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time..." (S/2000/809, para. 50). Apart from redefining what impartiality wasn't, the report wasn't clear about how impartiality would now be defined. However, impartiality would now be secondary to humanitarian principles in cases of direct "targeting of civilians in armed conflict and denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations afflicted by war," which in some cases would "morally compel" the UN to use force "to oppose obvious evil" (S/2000/809, para. 50).

The Brahimi Report emphasised that the use of force by UN troops would continue to be restricted to self-defence (S/2000/809, para. 48) while also noting that "...peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so" based
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on the Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000). To carry out this moral mandate "mean[t] bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat..." (S/2000/809, paras 50-51). This phrasing illustrates the way in which the Responsibility to Protect enters peacekeeping doctrine welded to the (non-)use of force and radically alters the meaning of the non-use of force in peacekeeping.

The Brahimi report noted the ongoing problems the UN had encountered in operations in the field in enacting the bedrock principle of consent. While emphasising that "the consent of the local parties...should remain [one of] the bedrock principles of peacekeeping," (S/2002/809, p. ix), the report also noted that "consent may be manipulated in many ways by the local parties...or [they] may withdraw [their] consent altogether..." (S/2000/809, para. 48). The report, while noting the problems inherent in a principle of operations legitimised through the consent of the "local parties," provides no further guidance on the evolving doctrine on consent, or what to do if the host state withdraws consent. Nor does it acknowledge that 'consent' can be manipulated by the intervenors as well as the intervened.

I will return to the principles of peacekeeping and the responsibility to protect when analysing the role of these discourses in the contested narratives of Ivoirian intervention in Part IV.

Liberal peace theory as discourse
The central hegemonic narrative of the Ivoirian interventions is the claim that the interventions were a success of the liberal peace. If the Ivoirian interventions were a 'success of the liberal peace,' exactly what is 'the liberal peace'? Liberal peace theory has many incarnations: it is an empirical theory, a normative theory, an ideology, and a hegemonic discourse. In this thesis, I engage with liberal peace theory as discourse. I do not attempt to validate or invalidate the claims of the theory itself but focus on the ways in which the discourse of the liberal peace has been deployed by hegemonic narrators in the strategic narratives of intervention in Côte d’Ivoire.
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From the earliest moments of liberal theory, there has been paradoxical entanglement of utopian, emancipatory liberal political values and projects with their 'dark side' - the dystopic, authoritarian values and projects which are also found in the historical realities and political projects of the liberal tradition. Liberal theorists have theorised, justified, supported, critiqued, and opposed colonial, imperial, and hegemonic international projects on the basis of these contradictory normative commitments at the core of liberal theory (Rosenblatt, 2018, p. 259). Liberalism as colonial and imperial theory and practice is evident throughout American and British political discourse in the 18th and 19th centuries (documented in Bell, 2018, 2016a, 2016b, 2014, 2013; Brewer, 2017; Losurdo, 2014; Mikkelsen, 2013; Singh Mehta, 1999; Eze, 1997, 2013). Pitts (2005) analysed dialectical liberalism as a political philosophy which evolved as both an intrinsic practice of imperialism and simultaneously, a political philosophy which rejected colonial and imperial projects and practices. This paradoxical entanglement of emancipatory and authoritarian narratives is found throughout the counterhegemonic narratives of Ivoirité and Françafrique as well as the hegemonic narratives of peacekeeping and the liberal peace. Dialectical contradictions are part of any set of complex narratives, and the means by which strategic narratives are constructed and contested in the Ivoirian interventions, as in other narrative wars.

The three pillars of the liberal peace
One of the great paradoxes of the hegemonic narratives of liberal peace success in Côte d'Ivoire stems from the fact that UN peacekeepers engaged in direct military combat to 'wage peace.' However, this 'paradox' is grounded in a simplified understanding 'the liberal peace.' From his earliest publications on liberal peace theory, Michael Doyle acknowledged that liberal states were not always or necessarily “peace-loving...nor consistently restrained or peaceful in intent” (1983, p. 206).

Doyle (2005) proposed that the liberal peace rested upon 'three pillars': human rights, republican representation and transnational interdependence. According to Doyle, "Liberal principles, or norms, involve an appreciation of the legitimate rights of all individuals" (Doyle, 2005, p. 464). Doyle does not enumerate specific human rights but does link democracy to individual human rights as the foundation of the legitimacy of the state. In Doyle's phrasing, liberal states are "domestically just republics" which "rest on the consent
of free individuals" while "nonliberal governments are perceived to be in a state of aggression with their own people” (Doyle, 2005, p. 464). This concept of a state at war with its own citizens underpins much of the UN discourse throughout the Ivoirian interventions. Doyle further defined liberal states as those states with republican representation (some form of electoral representation and legal constraint through constitutional order). Doyle labeled the third pillar of liberal peace "transnational interdependence" (p. 464), emphasising that transnational interdependence is both economic and governmental, through liberal states' participation in regional and global governance and economic systems.

However liberal liberal states might be, Doyle concluded that the liberal peace did not preclude the possibility of war; rather, liberal states are less likely to engage in armed conflict with other liberal states than with illiberal neighbours. He emphasised that liberalism not only did not prevent conflict between liberal and non-liberal states, but in fact rendered liberal/illiberal state conflict more likely (Doyle, 2005). For Doyle ‘the liberal peace’ isn’t the absence of war – it is the absence of war between liberal states. By this definition, there is no paradox in waging war to wage peace. Nonetheless, the reality of war waged in the name of liberal peace is hotly contested in the narratives of the Ivoirian interventions. Part IV investigates the ways in which liberal peace discourse was leveraged to justify the actions of hegemonic actors in the Ivoirian interventions and demonstrates how narratives grounded in liberal peace discourse were central to the outcomes of intervention.

**Summary - Chapter 2**
I've outlined the Strategic Narrative Analysis theoretical framework and defined the foundational concepts of strategic narrative and discourse. I identified the three primary theoretical claims of SNA and foregrounded problematic aspects of the framework posed by conceptualising 'coercion,' 'truth,' and 'intent' in strategic narrative analysis. I've brought in the concept of narrative warfare from Narratives Strategies and discussed ways in which the NS toolset and the SNA framework are complementary. I've defined the discourses of peacekeeping and the liberal peace, the central hegemonic contested narrative terrains of the interventions, and discussed their relevance to the analysis in Part IV.
In the next chapter, I integrate existing work on narrative strategies into the SNA framework, creating a more powerful set of analytic tools with which to analyse the Ivoirian narrative war.
Chapter 3. Narrative Strategies

Chapter 3 builds upon the SNA framework to define and develop the concept of 'narrative strategy.' In addition to identifying the strategic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions, analysis of the narrative strategies defined in this chapter and identified in the war for Côte d'Ivoire forms the central research project of this thesis.

The term 'narrative strategy' is not ideal in the context of a theory of 'strategic narrative,' as the terms are close enough to cause confusion. However, the term 'narrative strategy' allows us to focus on the specific means by which strategic narratives achieve their purposes, separate from the content of the narrative. Strategic narratives are what, the underlying story, while narrative strategies are how those narratives achieve their purposes.

Work on narrative strategies exists, scattered across multiple disciplines, but I have found no commonly held definitions or typology. Narrative strategies are the communication techniques by which narrators mobilise audiences, produce political power, and achieve political outcomes through "strategies of credibility enhancement, persuasion, impression formation, derogation, legitimation" (van Dijk; 1990). Narrative strategies are also “artifacts: their rhetoric, tropes, metaphors, and sequencing can be identified, compared, and evaluated” (Barry and Elmes, 1997, p. 432). Based on these sources, I define narrative strategies as the recurring and observable techniques and patterns of political communication within a definable strategic communications corpus for an identifiable purpose.

Narrative Strategies and Strategic Narrative Analysis researchers use narrative strategies as an analytic tool but have yet to systematically theorise narrative strategies. This chapter contributes to the development of strategic narrative theory by assembling a new tool set for narrative analysis by defining narrative strategies, grounding them in existing research, and arguing for a taxonomy of narrative strategies based on the strategic narrative processes of formation, projection, and reception.
Identifying narrative strategies

Narrative strategies are grounded in multiple traditions, including strategic communications, media studies, rhetoric, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Strategic Narrative Analysis, and Narrative Strategies. As a result, the same strategy can have many names, the relationship among strategies is unclear, and the mechanisms and importance of the strategies deployed in narrative warfare can be missed for lack of concepts to name them. The lack of an agreed-upon set of terms hampers analysis of narrative strategies as well as broader strategic narrative analysis. 'Narrative strategies' need rationalisation and theory-building.

Narrative Strategies (NS) school simply equates narrative with strategy. Cobaugh states simply that "Narrative is strategy" (2021, p. 98), while Drohan, in the same volume, describes "narrative as strategy" (2021a, p. 52, emphasis added), both emphasising that use of narrative is itself a strategy and one "terrain" of contestation among others in the conduct of military operations, an aspect of the deployment of "soft power" in conflict situations (Steed, 2021, p. 22). Strategic Narrative Analysis does not explicitly describe "narrative as strategy," but provides examples of specific narrative strategies in the literature, without using this terminology. Analysis of the mechanisms used in strategic narratives are hampered by these fluid, heterogeneous, vague, and inconsistent uses of terminology. In the sections below, I map the narrative strategies which I have identified in the Ivorian interventions onto the SNA three-stage process of formation, projection, and reception.

I. Formation

Creating the narrative is the initial stage of the strategic narrative process. In this section, I discuss narrative production grounded in alignment with the deeper discourses which give strategic narratives emotional resonance and persuasive power. I define narrative frames and the framing strategies of naming, strategic attention, and strategic silence. I then turn to the importance of chronology in strategic narratives. I outline the narrative strategy of polarisation and the ways in which polarisation plays out in strategies of valorisation, vilification, and inversion. I conclude strategies of formation with a discussion of the strategies of positioning as a moral actor and coercion.
Alignment

'Alignment' in strategic narrative analysis has two separate meanings: alignment with other narratives and discourses, distinct from the alignment of words and deeds. In the first sense, strategic narratives must align with (make the same kind of sense as) existing narratives, bodies of knowledge and sets of beliefs. Schmitt (2018, p. 490) describes the importance of a process of "alignment" of strategic narratives to other narratives as a "key mechanism" through which a strategic narrative can “appeal to the values, interest, and prejudices in a target audience” by contributing to and building upon a community’s existing political myths. Alignment is also a means of focussing strategic attention, reinforced by existing narratives.

Narrative alignment with existing strategic narratives and their foundational discourses is the basis of strategic narrative success or failure. A strategic narrative on the use of military force by peacekeepers must align with foundational discourses on UN peacekeeping as a non-violent and restrained activity or be open to contestation. Conversely, the UN has established discourses emphasising its role as a moral actor; any strategic narratives which appeal to, or build upon, UN discourses which foreground its benevolence will appeal to the "values, interest, and prejudices" (as above, Schmitt, 2018, p. 490) of its international diplomatic decision makers. The counterhegemonic narratives which align with foundational Ivorian discourses, such as narratives of Ivoirité and Françafrique, speak more profoundly to those who cherish an Ivorian identity or have deep resentment of and suspicion towards France based on its imperial and neo-colonial history.

The second form of narrative alignment speaks to the alignment of "words and deeds" (Archetti, et al., 2018, 238). Strategic narrative theory claims that when words and deeds conflict, the anomalous deed will overrule the incongruent narrative and undermine the claims of the narrative. As well as providing legitimacy and authority, Finnemore posits that legitimating structures enact social constraints on powerful actors; these structures generated by the powerful can also "trap and punish" them through the perception of hypocrisy. "Actors inconvenienced by social rules often resort to hypocrisy, proclaiming adherence to rules while busily violating them" (Finnemore, 2011, p. 70). Miskimmon et al. emphasise the costs of hypocrisy to the powerful, and the constraining power and
normative costs of the legitimation carried in strategic narrative (2013, p. 114). The National Framework for Strategic Communication (Biden, 2009) makes similar strong claims for the importance of consistency between word and deed in the creation and usage of strategic narratives and the consequences of failing to align words and deeds. However, while it might be desirable that the powerful are punished for hypocrisy, the outcomes of the Ivoirian interventions challenge this truism of strategic narrative theory.

**Frames, Framing, and Naming**
The first step in strategic narrative formation is the initial framing, the act of “selecting and highlight[ing] some facets of events or issues and making connections among them to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Miskimmon, et al. 2013, p. 7). Miskimmon, et al. stress the importance of what they call "framing competitions" in "specific, bounded episodes of contestation" (Miskimmon, et al., 2013, p. 107). “...[T]he salient incidents are those that figure most prominently in the larger narrative sweep... Events that do not fit the larger narrative are either reframed as bumps in the road or simply left out altogether” (Mayer, 2014 p. 104). Determining salience, deciding what is important and what is irrelevant (or to be avoided) in narrative construction, and setting a boundary around the topic is the initial phase of framing.

Antoniades, et al. (2010, p.4) write "Narratives are, in effect, 'structures of attention' and 'structures of inattention' that can draw an audience's focus away from certain events or claims and towards others... events can be 'organised in' or 'organised out' of the narrative.'" Framing *always* contains strategic attention (what and where the narrator draws focus), strategic silence (what the narrator ignores), and naming (the particular words chosen to describe actors and events). Strategic attention draws the attention towards an issue identified as important, while at the same time, drawing attention *away* from topics with which the narrator does not choose to engage. Strategic attention plays out in strategies of deflection and diversion by moving the focus *away* from inconvenient truths towards more useful framings.

"Framing competitions" can also be conceptualised as "naming competitions," in which narrators compete to establish the 'right' way to name a situation. Naming is an intrinsic
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part of the framing of any narrative and is one of the most powerful strategies deployed by any narrator in a narrative war. Naming takes on strategic importance in the bifurcated hegemonic and counterhegemonic naming of events in the Ivoirian conflict. The importance of naming is visible in the differences between of 'land conflict' and 'genocide,' 'rebellion' and 'proxy war,' 'civil war' and 'post-election crisis,' analysed in Part IV.

Silence
Silence is part of the cluster of strategies of attention, diversion, and deflection, a powerful strategy in the production and management of strategic narratives. Strategic silence avoids issues, deflects inquiry, and manufactures 'unanimity' by ignoring dissent. Strategic silence is a complement of strategic attention in which "alternative meanings and constructions are silenced in favor of a dominant story" (Barry and Elmes, 1997, p 447). Silence as strategy is central to many of the contested narratives of the Ivoirian interventions and is deployed by both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators in a wide range of situations and issues.

Maan (2018) points out the epistemic sense-making necessity of silence in strategic narrative construction (p. 63). All narratives must remain silent on some topics, must limit discussion, and must provide focus to function as narratives and to maintain intelligibility. However, there are problems inherent in positing a strategy of silence. Patterson and Monroe (1998, p. 329) recommend caution when analysing silence. Is a silence a deliberate withholding, an absent-minded lapse, a lack of salience for the topic, or caused by ignorance? "The challenge for the analyst is to interpret what this silence signifies". Analysing silence requires differentiating deliberate, strategic silence from ignorance, forgetfulness, or irrelevance. In some cases, silence may be more a matter of ignorance than intent. In other cases, such as the withholding of an important report which would normally be made public, silence is clearly intentional and strategic.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has focussed on developing an empirical methodology to identify and differentiate strategic silence from other forms of silence, such as ignorance or irrelevance (Zerubavel, 2006; Schroter, 2013; Schroter and Taylor, 2018; von Munchow, 2018; Wang et al., 2018). CDA analysts pose questions of "intention, expectation, and relevance" in identifying silence in political communications (Pallas, 2015, p. 96). Within
CDA, 'silence' is restricted to situations in which information is known, there are explicit social conventions that the information should be shared, yet the information is withheld from public discourse (Schroter, 2013). The SNA and NS literatures do not reference the CDA work on silence. However, I use the CDA model to analyse silence as an intentional narrative strategy deployed in narrative warfare.

Silence excludes counternarratives. Milliken notes that discourses produce "regimes of truth...and subjects authorized to speak." By creating a 'common sense' understanding of the world, discourse has the power to "define and enable and to silence and exclude." Milliken advocated recognising the importance of the silencing of "subjugated knowledges," the "alternative discourses excluded or silenced by hegemonic discourse" in the "production of common sense" in IR discourse (1999, pp. 237 - 243). In addition to narrators who remain silent on inconvenient issues, Milliken points out that the powerful actively "silence" their narrative opponents through elision. Charmaz analyses silence as a strategy of marginalisation and asserts that silence is a strategy of the powerful to define "values, meanings, measures and rules", noting that "deviating from this core results in marginalization -- whether imposed or chosen" (Charmaz, 2008; p. 11). Maan (2013) references silence as strategy within the NS paradigm when she writes "...power gets played out in terms of what is said and what is silenced..." (p. 70). Both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators use silence to create consolidated, simplified, and coherent world views and to persuade and influence others.

In Part III, I discuss the ways in which the counterhegemonic intervention literature is elided from the mainstream hegemonic academic and professional literatures. This strategy of silence by exclusion of the counterhegemonic narratives is especially powerful in creating a consolidated, consistent, agreed 'common sense' understanding of the interventions. The converse is true; counterhegemonic narrators exclude hegemonic narratives from their accounts of the interventions, also creating sealed ideological systems through silence.

**Chronology as strategy**

Chronology is another intrinsic characteristic of strategic narratives. All strategic narratives are composed of actors, an initial state, an event, and an outcome. Part of the art of
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strategic narrative construction is determining the 'when' of the initial state. When did the problem start? What counts as 'the beginning'? When did the event occur? How long did it last? What happened next? Why is what happened next important? What counts as a 'resolution' or an outcome? These questions are important in identifying crucial differences in the foundational discourses of the hegemonic and counterhegemonic strategic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions.

Maan (2009) points out that "The beginning, middle and end are not features of experience, they are the effects of an ordering plot" (p. 34). Maan notes that there are always multiple "beginning points" and never a single end point in any unmediated set of events (p. 35).

Strategic attention and strategic silence -- what gets left in, and what gets taken out, what is ignored and what is the focus of attention -- are the central aspects of chronology as narrative strategy. The battles, massacres, deaths, election delays, negotiations, compromises, concessions, agreements made and broken, tend to blur over time into executive summaries, and summaries of summaries, which produce unwarranted (unsupported, taken as given) certainties in the literature of intervention. What gets left out of chronologies is just as important, and sometimes more revealing, than what is included. Hegemonic and counterhegemonic chronologies start at different points, end at different points, and focus on different sets of events in between.

Moral contraband
Maan points out that chronology creates meaning by establishing causality. The construction of chronology is strategic and purposive, not a 'simple recording of the facts,' no matter who or what the actor (Maan, 2018, p. 69). A chronology, through its temporal sequencing, ties together events which may not be causally linked, "thereby creating intelligibility out of what may actually be randomness" (Maan, 2018, p. 62) and implying or stating a causality which may or may not be accurate.

Linking the construction of a specific chronology to support a situated positionality, Maan observes that narrators can 'smuggle' 'moral contraband' into narratives. Normative content may be implicit and hidden in what may appear to be a neutral, non-normative account
(Maan, 2018, p. 69). Moral contraband appears in sequential accounts which imply causation that may not exist. I will analyse moral contraband in UN messaging in Part IV.

**Polarisation of the discourse - Creating narrative binaries**

Discourse polarisation, the reduction of complex issues into simplified binaries, is an essential characteristic of narrative contestation. In Chapter 8, I analyse the polarisation of the Ivoirian intervention and conflict literatures along a hegemonic to counterhegemonic continuum. I also describe the ways in which the literature and its authors don’t fit neatly into polarised categories of hegemonic vs. counterhegemonic. Despite the complexities identified in Part III, the Ivoirian intervention literature displays both polarisation and simplification into binaries - hegemonic vs. counterhegemonic, pro-Ouattara vs. pro-Gbagbo, pro-intervention and anti-intervention polarisations.

Writing on the linkage between polarisation and simplification, Cobb notes that

> Conflict intensifies certainty and reduces complexity, two trends that combine explosively to generate and perpetuate violence. At the center of this certainty, at the core of hegemonic narratives, the world operates according to a set of Newtonian principles. Water runs downhill; bad guys are bad; good triumphs (eventually).

*(2013, p. 197)*

Polarisation and simplification aren’t a matter of physics, of water running downhill; they are the result of active strategies which narrators deploy. Strategic Narrative Analysis links “...the narrative work undertaken by powerful states to shape international order," to the creation of binaries. "Often this narrative work is presented in binaries—good and evil; democratic and authoritarian" (Miskimmon, et al., 2013, p. 60). Simplification and polarisation into narrative binaries are equally true of counterhegemonic narratives. Mitchell describes the ways in which binary polarisation and strategies of vilification/valorisation are linked and serve to "silence the wider geopolitical and legal discussions" in the strategic narratives of the 'War on Terror.' She describes binary simplification as the core of narratives of humanitarian intervention; the construction of villains and heros is necessary to establish a moral order for intervention (Mitchell, 2014, pp. 84 - 85).
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Valorisation and Vilification
Simplification and polarisation of strategic narratives involve personalisation as a companion strategy. Writing on the Western vilification of Moammar Gaddafi in advance of the Libyan intervention of 2011, Arsenault et al. (2018) note the ways in which state actors and their national medias succeeded in establishing a narrative of Gaddafi as "an old-fashioned, theatrical sort of tyrant" (p. 205) exemplifying "eccentricity, insanity, and buffoonery" whose "speeches were edited and mistranslated for comedic effect" (p. 206). Maan describes this strategy of vilification and valorisation as "...fictions which narrate ethical and political conflict metaphysically" (2009, p. 18). Adversaries become caricatures and figures of derision; allies become heroes.

Across UN records, academic analysis, and the grey literature, both hegemonic and counterhegemonic, the wars of Côte d’Ivoire are reduced innumerable times to tales of individual Ivoirian politicians in conflict, revolving around the struggle for power of two men. Millions of people with their complex equities and conflicts based on economic interests, region, ethnicity, religion, and political ideology are symbolically reduced to their 'champions' in narratives of valorisation and vilification, tales of good guys and bad guys (and they are almost always men). I analyse these vilification and valorisation strategies, their links to polarisation and polemicisation, and their roles in the construction of intervention and resistance in Parts III and IV.

Inversion – narrative mirroring
French sociologist Michel Galy linked the strategy of inversion to the processes of valorisation and vilification in the Ivoirian interventions (Mattei, 2015, p. 217). Inversion is the strategy of accusing one's opponent of acts, or attributing to one's opponent negative qualities, which could be or are attributed to the narrator, "narrative mirroring" in SNA terminology (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 138). Narrative inversion projects the faults of protagonists onto their opponents. Inversion is a form of directed strategic attention and simultaneously an example of the strategy of divert and deflect. Mirror imaging is the offensive complement of a defensive strategy of moral positioning which strives to cast the protagonist in the best possible light. I will return to the strategy of mirror imaging in my discussion of vilification and valorisation in Parts III and IV.
Moral positioning

Moral positioning is a narrative strategy used to establish authority, used in "negotiating issues of moral responsibility" (Maan, 2018, p. 50), and is critical in establishing legitimacy. It was widely deployed by both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators in Ivoirian narrative warfare. The purpose of moral positioning is to achieve the normative soft power which accompanies perceived legitimacy. Narrative moral positioning is also used offensively to "challenge the legitimacy of enemy forces" (Miskimmon et al., p. 2018, p. 2). The hegemonic actors of the Libyan intervention in 2011 succeeded in establishing among their national audiences "not only the legitimacy but also the moral necessity of Western guidance or intervention of a specific kind.... in a story of an evil oppressor and a heroic People, the choice is simple" (Arsenault et al. 2018, pp 211-212). Arsenault et al. link narrative normative efficacy to success in using existing, familiar normative templates, such as villains and heroes (2018, p. 314). The same "tyranny/liberation" narrative template used in Libya is evident in both hegemonic and counterhegemonic messaging on Côte d’Ivoire, the same use of emotive language, the polarised dialectic of good and evil, especially during the Second Ivoirian Civil War.

SNA literature focuses on moral positioning as a hegemonic strategy. I will return to moral positioning when I analyse the UN's narratives of sexual abuse, sexual violence, and consensus in Chapter 12. I have also found evidence of the counterhegemonic narrators of the Ivoirian conflict using moral positioning to enhance or build legitimacy. I explore the counterhegemonic uses of moral positioning in Chapter 13.

Coercion and TINA - There Is No Alternative

The phrase, and narrative strategy, of TINA - There Is No Alternative - is attributed to Margaret Thatcher (Berlinski, 2008). The UN used TINA in an attempt to coerce both the Ivoirian government and opposition to comply with UN mandates at multiple points in the Ivoirian interventions. Coercion in SNA theory is considered a dispositive characteristic of a strategic narrative; for some analysts, only narratives which are coercive are truly strategic, as discussed in Chapter 2. I argued that coercion is more usefully conceptualised as a narrative strategy, or as a strategic narrative trait, than as a primary characteristic of all strategic narratives. Coercion as a narrative strategy plays a significant role in UN messaging,
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particularly between 2004 to 2006 and during the Second Ivoirian Civil War. I analyse UN messaging which deployed coercion and TINA in Part IV.

In the sections above, I have described the narrative strategies of the formation stage, including alignment, framing, silence, naming, chronology, moral contraband, polarisation, personalisation, inversion, moral positioning, and coercion. From strategies of formation, I move to a discussion of the strategies of the second stage of strategic narrative production, the projection of strategic narratives.

II. Projection
Projection is the initial act of dissemination by the originator of a given strategic narrative: publication, public speech, recording, uploading, blogging, tweeting, posting, etc. In this section, I discuss the SNA conditions for success in strategic narrative projection. I begin with a short analysis of the role of technology in narrative projection. I discuss the problems inherent in the SNA concept of "who speaks" (Miskimmon, et al., 2013, p. 113) through consideration of the strategies of dubbing and triangulation. After acknowledging the ambiguities involved in positing single or multiple originators, I discuss replication as the primary projection strategy of the originator, distinct from amplification and promotion as secondary, or proxy, strategies in the reception stage of the strategic narrative process.

Media, technology, projection, and audience
In the Ivoirian narrative war, as in other narrative wars, the formation of strategic narratives was shaped by the technologies available for their delivery. UN News articles have a global platform through the (historically recent) reality of a world-wide internet. Among other technical, managerial, and organisational changes, the 2000 Brahimi report asserted the importance of public information and public diplomacy during field missions and the crucial importance of upgrading IT infrastructure to support this new public communications function (S/2000/809, paras 146, 149, 150, 246). The report foreshadowed the change in communications infrastructure which enabled UN global messaging from the start of the interventions in 2002. The global platform increased possibilities for projection, but it also influenced the formation of those UN narratives. Without a global audience for UN
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communications, the pace of publication, the scope of the topics addressed, and message content would have been less visible and restricted to a smaller audience.

While the Ivoirian government had some communication tools to project their message to the global foreign policy community during the interventions (such as delivering speeches to the UN General Assembly or writing official letters to the Security Council), its reach was much more restricted than UN global messaging, and for the most part targeted a national, rather than international, audience. Gbagbo also maintained that he derived his power and legitimacy from the Ivoirian populace, not from international actors, which he contrasted with his predecessors (Mattei, 2015).

Côte d’Ivoire had, and continues to have, limited internet usage; the Ivoirian government, its supporters, and proxies addressed an Ivoirian internal audience through older media such as newspapers, national radio, and national television. Books published in Côte d’Ivoire still have limited international audiences and are sold through direct purchase in Ivoirian bookstores. Lack of global reach for counterhegemonic narratives also rests in part in the relative lack of strategic communications resources, including physical infrastructure, technically trained personnel, organisational culture, and clearly identified international strategic communication goals. The Ivoirian government web presence and its external reach remains rudimentary compared to the global reach of UN communications. The Ivoirian government minimally resourced online official portals and communications to international audiences, relying instead on national television, radio, and print media for Ivoirian internal communications. Because of this focus on internal strategic communication, the Ivoirian counterhegemonic narratives did not enjoy the UN strategic advantage of a single, unitary, global access platform in multiple languages.

While the UN had a significant technical advantage in addressing the international community, it did not have the same advantage within Côte d’Ivoire in addressing the Ivoirian populace. UN News complained about hostile messaging within Côte d’Ivoire against its mission (UN News, 20 Jan 2006; 25 Oct 2006; 29 Dec 2010; 19 Jan 2011) and set up its own in-country messaging architecture through a network of UNOCI-run radio
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stations to address the Ivoirian population directly (UN News, 16 Aug 2004). UNOCI also set up a Facebook page (ONUCI/Facebook) from January 2012 which posted (sparse) official messaging until the end of mission in 2017. These new platforms for broadcasting UN messaging to the Ivoirian population, however, could not answer the challenges to UN messaging of the volume, velocity, variety, and credibility posed by counterhegemonic opponents through traditional Ivoirian media, as indicated in the UN complaints against that media.

Who speaks? Triangulation and dubbing as narrative strategy
In addition to the issues of technology, strategy, and audience, SNA theory raises the question 'who speaks?' Analysis of UN strategic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions does not allow a simple answer to this question, and the question of 'who speaks' plays an important role in counterhegemonic narratives of the interventions. Strategic Narrative Analysis theory distinguishes between the initial formation and replication of narratives by an 'author' and a secondary stage of promotion and projection of a narrative by proxies. This distinction rests upon the assumption that the 'author' of a narrative can be definitively identified. Miskimmon poses "the question of who narrates the narrative...?" (2018, p. 96). He answers that "Who projects the narrative, represents the narrative, and is the guarantor of its credibility" (p. 113), collapsing questions of authorship and the formation of narratives to the projection of narratives. The question of who narrates the narrative lies at the heart of every analysis of strategic narratives. I have assumed the convention, until this point, that 'the narrator' is a discrete entity, a person or persons who create narratives for political purposes, and who is (at least in theory) identifiable. I maintain this 'discernible actor' stance across my analysis, as well. However, the identification of 'the narrator' is not always as obvious as it might seem, and in the current case study, an important question to ask.

Bamba (2016) presents a model of international political strategy which he calls 'triangulation,' with a related model of international political communication strategy which he terms 'dubbing.' From the start of decolonisation in the late 1940s, Ivoirian nationalists began to "triangulate the relationship between Ivory Coast and France" (Bamba, 2016, p. 15) through diplomacy with the United States. "The politics of triangulation" allowed the United States a point of entry into a relationship with Côte d’Ivoire and provided Côte
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d’Ivoire with a counterbalance to French power (Bamba, 2016, pps. 15, 47, 64). In response, France adopted American development terminology, "dubbing" negotiations with the Ivoirian state into American modernisation discourse to maintain their colonial advantage (Bamba, 2016, pps. 18, 64).

Triangulation and dubbing are recognisable narrative strategies in the Ivoirian interventions, but these strategies problematise authorship, rendering the distinction between projection and reception more difficult. Counterhegemonic narrators argue that France deployed triangulation and dubbing by projecting its narratives of the Ivoirian interventions through the UN. In Chapter 13, I analyse the counterhegemonic narratives of French triangulation and dubbing. I underscore here the problematic nature of identifying the authorship of strategic narratives and the challenges which this poses in analysing and theorising the projection of strategic narratives.

Replication – Flooding the media ecosystem
Replication is a primary strategy of projection by narrative originators, publishing the same narrative repeatedly. Narrators replicate a narrative by posting the same content to as many individual news articles, expert reports, resolutions, and speeches as possible. While a simple strategy, replication is crucial to narrative success. Replication makes sure "that their narrative gets heard and supported to the maximum degree while others get sidelined" (Miskimmon, et al., 2013, p. 148). Mayer (2014, p. 85, 114-115) describes repeated exposure to a narrative as the primary determinant of narrative impact.

UN messaging on the Ivoirian interventions leverages replication. News articles are doubled or tripled on topics of importance to UN leadership. At times, the same message is delivered by multiple actors at varying levels and departments of the UN bureaucracy. UN editors frequently used a cut-n-paste approach to content, publishing identical wording at the end of news articles, sometimes for multiple iterations. Identifying replication within the UN official records of the Ivoirian interventions is straightforward because of their chronological, real-time publication and the standardised narratives they transmitted. Set phrases appear and re-appear in UN news articles, resolutions, and reports, which I highlight in my analysis in Chapters 11 and 12.

III. Reception
Second order reproduction by audiences and proxies is differentiated in strategic narrative analytic theory from first order replication. Narrative entrepreneurs understand their narratives will face challenges and counternarratives from their opponents, opponent allies and proxies, elite networks, social and traditional media 'echo chambers.' The impact of strategic narratives is determined by the reception of the narrative by its audiences, who further promote and amplify, or refute the narratives, or ignore them altogether. Once a narrative has been formed, projected, and replicated, the reception of the strategic narrative “...rest[s] on the vagaries of events and the views of others” (Miskimmon, et al., 2013, p. 69), regardless of the originator's intent or strategic goals. I turn now to the reception of strategic narratives by audiences and the role played by elite networks, social media, and other actors in the strategic narrative ecosystem.

Promotion: proxies, elite performance, legitimising agents, amplification
Arsenault, et al. define promotion as "not only the persuasion of stakeholders but also the sheer exposure and momentum that may tilt perceptions of validity and potentiality in its favor, and thus compel members to follow the script" (p. 201-202). In both the Ivoirian and Libyan interventions in the first half of 2011, narrative war preceded, accompanied, and followed the kinetic interventions. Promotion by proxy of strategic narratives of moral necessity by legitimising agents such as NGOs, the State Department, elite leaders, and
media in both anglophone and francophone countries, succeeded in legitimising the interventions in both Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. The hegemonic strategic narratives were successful in both the Libyan and the Ivorian wars of 2011, the counterhegemonic counternarratives which accused the French state of corruption in these interventions, less so. I return in Chapter 13 to these counternarratives which remain mostly unknown in the global north, due in part to lack of promotion by powerful proxies and elite networks. In the following section, I examine the analytic problems presented by counternarratives.

**Counternarratives**

In any serious contestation, strategic narratives will meet with opposition and refutation. Both SNA and NS theory assert that strategic narratives are produced in iterative cycles, a series of volleys and responses. Strategic narrators don't send their narratives out into the world and sit back to watch what happens next. Most will attempt to ensure that they have crafted their narratives carefully, projected them methodically and at volume, and mobilised support and promotion by elites, proxies, and legitimising agents. Narrative adversaries will sometimes counter with strategies of silence or exclusion, as discussed earlier in this chapter and analysed in Parts III and IV. However, adversaries can also counter with oppositional narratives of their own. Counternarratives must be able to "work within the narrative structures and contents" of the existing discourses of a target audience (Schmitt, 2018). However, counternarratives, when based on the structure of the narratives they contest, replicate the original narrative in their refutations, and thereby also reproduce and reinforce the dominant narrative (Maan, 2018, pp. 95-96).

Counternarratives need validation within the existing discourses of their target audiences, and by repetition of the target narrative, risk reinforcing the narrative that they refute. Consequently, they are frequently asymmetric. Rather than countering an opponent's narrative directly, counternarratives reference other facts, other values, other discourses, to refute an adversary narrative. The strategic narrative analytic literature considers counternarratives as a primary counterhegemonic strategy and an ineffective hegemonic strategy in narrative contestation, especially those framed as a direct negation of a powerful counterhegemonic narrative (Maan, 2018, pp 95 - 96; Schmitt, 2018, p. 506). Counternarratives are usually considered as "stories which offer resistance, either implicitly
or explicitly, to dominant cultural narratives" (Andrews 2002, p. 1), deployed by "outgroups" against dominant groups, to "help document, and perhaps even validate, a 'counter-reality'" (Andrews 2002, p. 2). In Part IV, I analyse both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives as vulnerable to asymmetric counternarratives.

Conspiracy Narratives as Strategy

Conspiracy narratives are a complex and important category for strategic narrative analysis. They have played an important role in the conflicts of the Middle East and Southwest Asia (al Raffie, 2012) as well as in the current narrative war in the global north (Benkis, undated), and form the core of the counterhegemonic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions.

Traditionally, conspiracy theories are considered a form of collective disordered thought untethered from consensus social reality, a form of "epistemic arrogance" (Lynch, 2018) or "epistemic vice" (Cassam, 2010). 'Conspiracy theories,' in this usage, are a form of epistemic pathology, rather than a form of "epistemic dissidence" (Appiah, 2020).

Fenster defines this traditional characterisation of conspiracy theories as "believing in a secret, omnipotent individual or group that covertly orchestrates the events of the world" (Fenster, 2008, p. xi). He captures the dual sense of conspiracy theories as both epistemic vice and epistemic dissidence: "...conspiracy theory is often characterised as illegitimate, pathological, and a threat to political stability.... [as well as] expression of a democratic culture, that circulates deep skepticism about the truth of the current political order" (2008, p xiii). As Fenster notes, in addition to wild claims immediately rejected in mainstream political thought, some conspiracy narratives are founded on rational grounds.

The term "conspiracy theories" serves as a pejorative framing strategy, casting doubt upon an adversary's strategic narratives. However, historically, conspiracies - the planning of violent actions and events by actors who carry out preparations in secret - have occurred. The simultaneous attacks of 19 September 2002 in Abidjan, Bouaké, and Korhogo were planned in secret by actors in advance of execution, and narratives of that planning can be described non-normatively as conspiracy narratives. Conspiracy narratives may, or may not, be accurate stories of the planning of actual historical events.
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Narrative actors use this ambiguity between 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' narratives to create narratives of conspiracy for strategic purposes and to refute the conspiracy narratives of opponents. Both 'conspiracy narratives' and 'conspiracy theories' describe acts coordinated with malicious intent by adversary elites. One challenge in analysis of the Ivoirian intervention is distinguishing the reasonable narratives of actual conspiracies from unreasonable conspiracy fantasies. The common assumption embedded in much conspiracy narrative analysis is that 'conspiracy theories' are by definition 'misinformation,' whether popularly constructed or deployed by strategic narrative actors for political benefit. In this analysis, I don't attempt to differentiate factual conspiracy narratives from irrational conspiracy theories. Rather than attempting to prove or falsify the assertions of conspiracy narratives, I focus here on 'conspiracy' as a narrative strategy deployed in different ways by hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors.

Conspiracy narratives as emergent vs. strategic phenomena

Baele categorises "conspiratorial narratives" as "stories which integrate a large range of events and archetypal characters from past and present in a single teleological explanation for the alleged suffering of a given social group" (Baele, 2019, p. 706). This definition works well with the Narrative Strategies emphasis on the crucial role of identity construction in metanarratives and identity deployment to provide resonant and powerful strategic narratives. Focus on "a single teleological explanation" captures many of the characteristics of the counterhegemonic Ivoirian intervention narratives, particularly those narratives which from outside the discourse look much like classic 'conspiracy theories.' However, Baele's definition elides questions of origins, agency, and intent. Are 'conspiracy narratives' deliberately constructed strategic narratives or are they emergent phenomena?

Some conspiracy narratives are best conceptualised as endogenous forms of epistemic dissidence and sense-making, emergent social constructions, attempts by non-elites to explain social events and understand how power is constructed in a world in which power is held in mysterious ways by mysterious others (Butter, 2020; Fenster, 2008; Episteme, 2006; Appiah, undated). A defining characteristic of conspiracy theories is that they are totalising, irrefutable, and unprovable, using a circular and "inclusivising" pattern of reasoning which turns every event into part of a metanarrative, whether there are any causal or verifiable
relationships within the narratives or not (Butter, 2020). This view of conspiracy theories casts them as a form of popular, non-elite political sensemaking. NS analysts would class them as a form of meta-narrative rather than a strategic narrative purposively constructed by a political actor. If conspiracy theories are emergent popular constructions, then they aren’t always deliberately constructed strategic narratives under the SNA theoretical framework, which posits purposive actors as originators. However, there are often indications within narrative warfare environments that narrative actors form and project conspiracy theories as part of a conscious narrative strategy which serves to assign blame, is developed within existing cultural frames, and deploys narrative frames of humiliation, oppression, suffering, and grievance to create cohesive, mobilised groups (al Raffie, 2012, p. 17).

"Conspiracy theories" as hegemonic narrative strategy
Hegemonic narrators usually use strategies of silence and exclusion from the discourse rather than crafting counternarratives which directly refute narratives of conspiracy. Fenster (2008, p. xii) points out that "Employing the term "conspiracy theory" serves as a strategy of delegitimation in political discourse...[indicating] a set of illegitimate assumptions." Within the hegemonic literature of the interventions, analysts will make passing reference to a specific conspiracy narrative. These references to specific counterhegemonic conspiracy narratives are at best mentioned, but not analysed, treated seriously, or discussed in-depth in the hegemonic literature (e.g., Förster, 2013; Smith, 2011), although they are the focus of in-depth exposition within the counterhegemonic literature (e.g., Tchouteu and Chando, 2018; Kessié, 2013; Dougou, 2012). When hegemonic narrators do craft counternarratives to the counterhegemonic conspiracy narratives, a primary strategy is to brand conspiracy narratives as conspiracy theories, with the normative opprobrium that term conveys in common usage of paranoia, social pathology, intellectual deficit, and epistemic bad faith (Cassam, 2016).

Summary - Chapter 3
In this chapter, I have identified and theorised the principle narrative strategies deployed in the Ivoirian narrative warfare. I have grounded my taxonomy of narrative strategies in the NS and SNA schools of narrative analysis, presenting these narrative strategies within the
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SNA framework of the strategic narrative production process. I located alignment, naming, framing, silence, chronology as strategy, moral contraband, polarisation, valorisation/vilification, inversion, moral positioning, coercion and TINA within the narrative formation process. I identified replication, triangulation, and dubbing as strategies of projection. I discussed the importance of the changing communication technologies on strategic narrative projection and the asymmetry of audience and technology which is prominent in the Ivoirian strategic narratives to be analysed. I discussed the reception stage of strategic narratives, the importance of promotion, and complexities of narrative countering deployed by both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators. I analysed conspiracy narratives as a form of strategic narrative and 'conspiracy theories' as counternarrative strategy. I have outlined how these resources are used by both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators in the de-legitimation of adversaries. This chapter provides the tools necessary for the analysis of strategic narratives and narrative strategies in Part IV.
Chapter 4. Methodology

Hansen (2006) provides a structured template for conducting discourse and narrative analysis of contested and complex intervention in four phases: Phase I: identifying, defining, and collecting the discourse corpus; Phase II: establishing event history; Phase III: identifying dominant narratives and grouping them into contested discourses; and Phase IV: comparative narrative analysis of the contested narratives and discourses. I adapted Hansen's four phase process of analytic development and her strategy of utilising key texts to ground my analysis of the narratives of peacekeeping and the liberal peace in two key texts: the Brahimi Report on Peacekeeping (2000) and Doyle's The Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace (2005).

Phase I: identifying and collecting the corpus of data
I utilised two types of narrative data in this thesis: UN documentation and the academic, professional, and grey literature on the interventions produced outside the UN.

UN documentation
In the first phase of research, I defined my core corpus as written texts from the United Nations; web-based official records, (such as news articles, press releases, and reports) on the UN operations in Côte d’Ivoire, including 1500 UN News articles and over 200 other official UN records: Security Council resolutions, Human Rights Council resolutions, UN Secretaries-General reports on Côte d’Ivoire, official statements by the President of the Security Council, Security Council Press Statements on Côte d’Ivoire, UN Human Rights Council reports, expert reports, official minutes of Security Council meetings, and official press releases on Côte d’Ivoire, referenced in Appendix B.

In 2018, I used the UN News web search tool to identify all English language UN News articles on the UN network at that time which referenced Côte d’Ivoire. The search tool identified just over 1500 articles published between 2002 and 2017 which included the phrase 'Côte d’Ivoire.' Sometimes the articles mention Côte d’Ivoire only peripherally, but I considered all references significant in marking UN attention and focus on Côte d’Ivoire, even when not centred on the country, since the total number of references in any given
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period tracked closely with conflict events and illustrates the use of volume, velocity, and variety in UN messaging to create strategic messaging "momentum" (Arsenault et al., 2018, p. 201-202). The single largest number of UN News articles referencing Côte d’Ivoire occurred in 2011, the year of the Second Ivoirian Civil War. The news articles downloaded for analysis in 2018 are all referenced in Appendix G by date, title, and web link. The UN News website search tool in 2021 shows that fewer of these articles remain online. Some of the articles have been archived to a UN archive website, and I’ve updated the hyperlinks in Appendix G to link to the articles’ new location in that archive site. Some articles have been taken offline, or removed from public access, in which case I’ve marked them as 'removed from web.'

*Academic, professional, and grey literature on Côte d’Ivoire*

My second set of primary source materials includes documents external to the UN records of the interventions: French and English language books, news articles, NGO reports, government reports, and articles published online and in academic journals on the Ivoirian conflict and intervention. I used an iterative search of sources and topics in constructing my corpus. I collected Ivoirian books, academic articles, and web blogs from online vendors, social media accounts, academic portals, and through vendors in Côte d’Ivoire. During my field work in Abidjan, I visited bookshops and scoured them for Ivoirian, French, and UN accounts of the conflict. This aspect of fieldwork proved valuable, as many of the books available in Côte d'Ivoire I hadn't identified previously and some of them I have not found outside of Côte d’Ivoire. I then identified the texts which are frequently referenced in the literature and used those in my selection of text-based narratives for analysis.

*Fieldwork*

I made three trips to Côte d’Ivoire, which allowed me access to primary source written materials that I would have otherwise been unable to obtain. My first research trip took place September - December 2017 in Abidjan. I returned to Abidjan in October 2018, and in February 2020, when I travelled through southern and western Côte d’Ivoire. The three trips spaced across three years allowed me to observe the ways in which the country was changing and staying the same after intervention. Conducting fieldwork across three years also allowed me to develop more in-depth relationships with Ivoirian colleagues,
strengthening their confidence in my commitment to understanding their perspectives and giving my language, social, and fieldwork skills time to develop. These separate trips also allowed me to repeat my searches for Ivorian written source material until I had collected a more-or-less complete corpus, to confirm the robustness of my first observations, to extend my field of observation, and to refine my preliminary analyses, helping me to look for details deleted from hegemonic accounts.

The conversations and observations collected during fieldwork inform my analysis but do not serve as a primary source of the strategic narratives analysed. Eschewing covert observation throughout, I conducted all research openly. Since Côte d’Ivoire was, and continues to be, economically fragile and politically volatile, my primary concern was to ensure that none of the people I met were put in jeopardy by covert contact or potentially dangerous conversations. Further, given my focus on strategic narratives, the narratives that I sought to identify are embodied in public, written documents.

My conversations with Ivoirians and expatriates helped me contextualise and query more effectively the written data I collected. My field research included informal discussions (rather than formal interviews) with both elite and non-elite Ivoirians and members of the international community resident in Côte d’Ivoire. I hadn't anticipated the frankness of Ivorian academics describing the fundamentally hegemonic nature of the interventions they had experienced. We discussed the constraints put on their own research in the context of a volatile post-intervention environment, and they provided information which shaped my understanding of academic research as discourse in the Ivoirian context.

Ivoirians that I met across the social spectrum insisted on certain 'fundamental truths.' I was surprised to find that the civil wars were not considered the result of ethnic conflict, and that the framing of incipient 'genocide' was repeatedly and emphatically refuted. The Ivorians I met took great pride in the ethnic diversity and the 'ethnic harmony' which they considered a central value of Ivoirian society, from the time of the country's founding. Rejection of narratives of ethnic conflict leading to a risk of genocide, which are 'indisputable' to the hegemonic discourse, caused me to rethink my categories of analysis.
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These conversations across Ivoirian society also convinced me to rethink my baseline categories of discourse into hegemonic and counterhegemonic contestation. Without these conversations, I would have continued with my initial assumption that the important contestations would be found within the ethnic, regional, religious, and political groupings of inter-Ivoirian discourse, rather than between hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses consolidated across the national/international divide. The Ivoirians I met across the social and political spectrum consistently and adamantly blamed the French government in general, and Sarkozy, particularly for the violence of the Second Ivoirian Civil War, in which they insisted the French enacted regime change. The focus on French agency in the interventions and responsibility for the civil wars, while present in the hegemonic literature, is less emphatic in the global north.

Naming the military events as I have in this analysis (the First and Second Ivoirian Civil Wars; the six "Battles of Abidjan") comes from my fieldwork. Counterhegemonic narrators call them wars; the hegemonic discourse does not. Naming the wars as wars highlights a fundamental naming strategy deployed by the UN to skirt the reality of the war in which they engaged, discussed in Chapter 11.

Academic work at the intersection of politics and ethnography shaped my theoretical orientation and practice in the field, including Rosaldo’s (1993) problematisation of the search for ‘truth’ in the ethnographic encounter and Auyero (1999) on understanding power from the viewpoints of respondents. Bourgois (2009) helped me to recognise the structural violence of intervention through the lives of the people I met in the field. Zirakzadeh (2009) strengthened my commitment to iterative data collection and theory development, leading me to look for and find ‘the patterns in the noise’ through fieldwork encounters that could challenge my established episteme in a way that a purely desk-based approach would have failed to provide. I’ve adapted the fieldwork activities described below from several ethnographic texts. I found Stodulka (2015) on the moral economy of fieldwork useful in navigating the complex social reality of working in Côte d’Ivoire. Wilk (1997) convinced me of the moral imperative to step lightly in my attempts to uncover the contested narratives.
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of the Ivorian interventions. I adapted the practice of creating conflict maps and the approach to personal histories outlined in Wood (2009). I found Schatz's (2009) endorsement of embracing "heterogeneity, causal complexity, dynamism, contingency, and informality" (p. 11) in *What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power* and his insistence on the necessity of humility in knowledge production through fieldwork helpful in forming my practice in the field.

**Phase II: establishing event history**

In Phase II, I used the literature I had collected to define the time frame to be studied, setting as the start and finish dates the official beginnings and endings of the interventions (2002 – 2017). I defined the event domain as the international interventions themselves, rather than making the larger conflict my analytic focus. I started with UN documentation to create the outlines of the event chronologies because the UN news reporting was ‘real time’ (written and published at the time of the events in question) rather than retrospective reconstructions. Using the UN news articles as a starting point, I added other events which did not appear in the UN documentation, or which appeared in a different narrative form, to identify the contested gaps in the UN’s version of history. I selected events related to the interventions which were referenced multiple times by a wide range of narrators and identified principal narrators (journalists, diplomats, politicians, academics, NGOs, IOs) whose works were referenced by multiple other writers. I looked for points of agreement (and disagreement) on specific events, and I noted the silences, analysed in Parts III and IV.

**Phase III: identifying the faultlines in the contested discourses**

I began this research with the initial assumption, based on the US public diplomacy model of master narratives, that discourses and narratives would divide along national/international, elite/non-elite, and Ivorian regional identity grouping lines. I started with an 8-square grid of potential discourse/narrative groupings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-elite</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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I found in the initial stages of analysis that my postulated groupings did not match my narrative data. I found no significant variance between elite and non-elite discourses, and I found little official French government discourse at all – more silence than discourse. As the primary intervenors, and managers of the intervention, this seemed anomalous. I found that one set of narratives was produced by the UN and affiliated bodies and individuals such as northern think tanks, NGOs, academics, and Ivorian political actors, including Ouattara. French government and French-government affiliated texts (e.g., Ministère de Defense; Notin, 2103) aligned with the UN discourse. Francophone authors outside the French government produced a body of work, some aligned with official French narratives. US government narratives on the interventions align with the UN and French narratives of intervention, as does most of the analysis produced by anglophone academics.

The second discourse was produced by government officials, affiliates, loyalists, and Gbagbo-aligned journalists, academics, and NGOs, both national and international. I looked for a northern and Muslim Ivorian literature produced by Ouattara supporters and found little: a total of five books produced by Ouattara supporters in bookshops in Abidjan. If victors write the history, this time, they didn’t bother. In contrast, I found seven pro-Gbagbo books on Gbagbo as a politician, two anti-Gbagbo books, and 20 Gbagbo-aligned books by Ivorian writers and academics. I found one Ivorian book by Bédié and one about him. I identified books by Mamadou Koulibaly, President of the National Assembly, a Muslim, northerner, and Gbagbo stalwart (Koulibaly, 2003), one book by northern rebel leader Guillaume Soro (Soro, 2005), and one book by Jeunes Patriots leader Charles Blé Goude (Blé Goudé, 2011), but I never found any of these books for sale in Côte d’Ivoire. I am not aware of these books being repressed by the government, although I was told by Ivorian bookstore staff that the government had banned Mattei’s (2014, 2015) counterhegemonic account of the interventions from sale within the country.

Identifying the hegemonic to counterhegemonic discourse spectrum
My first analytic decision was to recognise that the narratives weren’t grouped by national identity. I also recognised that all writers would in some sense be considered members of elites. The clearest and most robust divide among the narratives was hegemonic (UN, US,
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French, and Ouattara-aligned) and counterhegemonic (Gbagbo-aligned) discourses, based on the pro- and anti-positions of the narratives rather than the nationality of the authors.

I have identified the strategic narratives aligned with UN positions as ‘hegemonic’ and the narratives which contest the hegemonic accounts as ‘counterhegemonic’ for four reasons. First, the hegemonic narratives are produced by global elite political actors (the discourse of the powerful). Second, this discourse has created the ‘common-sense’ understanding of the Ivoirian interventions in the global north (hegemony as ideology, the Gramscian construction of 'a common sense of the everyday'). Third, this discourse validates interventions through the claim of the ‘stabilisation’ of the Ivoirian state internally and within the international system (hegemony as stability, the maintenance of the status quo). And fourth, the hegemonic discourse validates the international interventions in Côte d’Ivoire (hegemony in the IR Realist sense of sphere of influence by hegemonic states over weaker states). I discussed my analytic approach with Ivoirian academics, specialists in modern Ivoirian history, sociology, and politics. They confirmed that they found analytic grouping into hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses congruent with their understanding of the discourses and dynamics of the interventions and encouraged me to use this analytic structure.

'Hegemony' poses challenges in narrative analysis since the term has normative connotations in some usages. In this research, I am using hegemony as a non-normative analytic category, aware that it may seem problematic to use 'hegemony' in non-normative analysis of what is often normative discourse. However, hegemonic theory development through discourse analysis provides a well-established conceptual model which grounds my work within an established discourse-analytic tradition within IR and intervention theory (Antoniades, 2018, 2008; Scholte 2018; Lewis, 2017; Newman and Zala, 2017; Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; Archetti, 2013; Montessori, 2011; Archetti and Brown, 2009; Newman, 2009; Suganami, 2008; Jacoby, 2007; Hansen, 2006; Milliken, 1999).

Scholte (2018) identifies four conceptual forms of hegemony: "material, discursive, institutional and performative." My research is focussed on discursive hegemony, the
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process by which elites "convince people that the dominant power rules in their interests" (Scholte, 2018). Scholte links discursive hegemony to the construction of "a ruling knowledge frame" which he equates with "discourse" or "episteme." Scholte (2018) writes, "Hegemony arises inasmuch as subjects willingly underwrite these reigning mindsets as truth." I translate this in my research to 'A discourse is hegemonic when audiences accept as proven the unwarranted assertions of the more powerful political actors without critical evaluation.'

*Hegemonic discourse does not imply hegemonic intent*

My distinction between hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourse does not imply a normative evaluation of the narratives or narrators under discussion. In this analysis, hegemony isn't 'bad' and counterhegemony isn't 'good' (or vice versa). I am distinguishing here between competing epistemes; one of which is the dominant worldview, and produced primarily by hegemonic actors, and the other, the adversarial counterhegemonic counterpart. My use of the term 'hegemonic discourse' does not impute hegemonic intent to narrators. I'm not implying that the writers of hegemonic discourse advocate oppression, exploitation, or active construction of systems of inequality and dominance (although some of them may, and the same may be true of their counterhegemonic counterparts). Much of the hegemonically positioned academic analysis of the interventions is critical of the interventions. Rather, writers working within the hegemonic episteme accept without question specific assertions about the interventions as given, as unproblematic, and as requiring no further warrant, such as the narrative that Gbagbo deliberately delayed elections and 'clung to power' for five years, that there was no wide-spread voter fraud in the 2010 election, that Ouattara won the second round of the 2010 presidential elections, and that military engagement by intervention forces 'saved lives.' These narratives are hotly contested within the counterhegemonic discourse, and it is these baseline narratives that determine my categorisation of the discourses as hegemonic and counterhegemonic. I document these observations in Part III.

**Phase IV: comparative analysis of the contested narratives and discourses**

Tamboukou (2013, pp. 12 -13) defines discourse analysis as “…the act of treating narratives as multiplicities of meanings and creating a map of how different stories connect with other
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stories, discourses and practices in shaping meanings and perceptions…” and pays particular attention to “what is left unsaid, the noisy silences…points of limits, narrative moments when discourses are contested or juxtaposed by counter-discourses, reach the limits of their possibility to function ‘in the truth’ ” (Tamboukou, 2013, pp. 12 -13). I identified two foundational hegemonic discourses – the discourse of peacekeeping, and the discourse of the liberal peace - and two foundational discourses in which the counterhegemonic narratives were grounded - the discourse of Françafrique, and the discourse of Ivoirité. I analyse the relationships among the contested narratives and these discourses in Part IV, noting the moments in which the discourses are juxtaposed and 'reach the limits of their possibility to function 'in the truth.'

I define narrative analysis as the systematic examination and comparison of texts to identify recurring terms involving actors, events, and explanations, as well as the relationships among these terms, narratives, related discourses, and their strategies of promotion. Narrative analysis of texts produces the first stage in discourse analysis through the identification of sets of narratives and their counternarratives. In this phase of analysis, I identified pivotal strategic narratives, those which were consistently disputed within the literatures, the contested narratives which recurred in both the hegemonic and counterhegemonic literatures. As I identified the most important contested strategic narratives, I identified patterns in the formation, projection, and reception of the narratives, all of which deployed multiple narrative strategies.

I noted that the strategic narratives were sometimes contested directly – in equivalent hegemonic and counterhegemonic intervention discourse versions, such as the contested narrative of the two presidents, which appears in both hegemonic and counterhegemonic forms. In other cases, I noted that the intervention discourses would deploy incommensurate narratives which created a form of indirect contestation, such as the counterhegemonic emphasis on the complot français which rebutted indirectly the hegemonic arguments of liberal peace discourse. Sometimes I would find a simple and direct refutation of a narrative as above, but generally, hegemonic and counterhegemonic writers argued asymmetric claims.
As I identified the strategic narratives and narrative strategies used, I asked why so much of the contestation was incommensurate – why arguments of apples against oranges, rather than apples against apples? I realised that contested strategic narratives were addressed to different audiences. Hegemonic narrators spoke to other hegemonic, international actors, and the counterhegemonic actors, while sometimes addressing an international audience, primarily addressed an Ivoirian internal audience and international actors who held compatible counterhegemonic views. Additionally, the incommensurate hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives were drawing from, and feeding into, different discourses – incommensurate bodies of knowledge.

In this chapter I have outlined my methodology and research process, defined the concept of hegemony as used here, described collection of my data sets, and described my analytic process. The corpus of UN documents analysed in this thesis is pre-existing, therefore less prone to selection bias on my part. I acknowledge that the collection of the works outside the UN corpus is more open to selection bias, which I have attempted to correct through multiple iterations of collection, both in Côte d'Ivoire and through standard literature reference tracing.

Summary, Part I
Chapter I introduced the competing hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses of the Ivoirian interventions. I positioned this research within strategic narrative analysis and intervention research and outlined the contributions this thesis makes to these fields. In Chapter 2, I then grounded this work within the theoretical framework of Strategic Narrative Analysis. I discussed key concepts and issues arising from the current state of theory, including the concept of truth in the context of narrative analysis, narrative warfare, the role of discourse in narrative analysis, and the key discourses of liberal peace and peacekeeping. In Chapter 3, I differentiated the concept of narrative strategy from strategy narrative and laid out a taxonomy of narrative strategies mapped to the three stages of strategic narrative production. In Chapter 4, I outlined my analytic methodology and research process, including collection of my narrative corpus.
In Part II of this thesis, I provide a chronology of the interventions, with a focus on pivotal and contested events, providing a clear and documented historical context, and enabling my readers to better evaluate the narrative analysis to follow.
Part II: The Ivoirian Interventions

Any narrative warfare leads to partial and limited descriptions of contested historical events. Narrators select and highlight events that support their stance and edit out the inconvenient parts of that history which contradict their arguments. However, there is a core historical chronology which both sides of a narrative war acknowledge. The fight isn't as much about what happened as about what gets left out of the histories and what gets emphasised.

Over time, summaries of war become more and more general, more and more vague, and more and more partial. After the first set of original contested narratives, secondary analysis proceeds on the 'givens' of the narratives developed by partisans of the narrative war and strays further and further from the complex historic specificities of the conflict. Part II provides a detailed overview of military battles, negotiations, peace agreements, and the elections which took place during the international interventions in Côte d'Ivoire. The historical detail in this summary challenges generalisations made by both hegemonic and counterhegemonic partisans.

In this chronology, I have made analytic choices in my naming conventions. I have defined the first Ivoirian Civil War as starting on 19 September 2002, at the commencement of the First Battle of Abidjan, and ending with the joint military declaration of peace issued by the Ivoirian state military and the Forces Nouvelle on 4 July 2003. I locate the start of the Second Ivoirian Civil War on 18 December 2010, when Laurent Gbagbo officially revoked Ivoirian state consent to international forces, and Ivoirian state forces directly engaged UN and French troops. I locate the end of the Second Ivoirian Civil War on 11 April 2011, when Gbagbo was captured by international forces and imprisoned by Alassane Ouattara. I have defined each of the six named Battles of Abidjan based on UN withdrawal of civilian personnel from the country in response to high levels of violence and direct violent engagement between military forces, whether formal or informal. These naming conventions are my own, as there are no agreed naming conventions for these events. I have warranted them by the defining features described here.
Strategic narrative analysis, as noted in Chapter 2, eschews ‘mind reading’ in analysis and focuses on the uses of historical context to interpret the production and usage of strategic narratives. This chronology provides the necessary historical context, supporting my analysis of the claims, counterclaims, framings, and silences of the contested narratives in the second half of this thesis. Chapter 5 describes Ivoirian political history from the founding of the Ivoirian state through the official end of first Ivoirian Civil War in July 2003. Chapter 6 surveys the time of ‘No War, No Peace,’ from 2003 through the presidential elections of December 2010. Chapter 7 reviews the Second Ivoirian Civil War, concluding with the termination of the French and UN missions in 2017.

No chronology can ever be completely neutral; constructing a chronology can create moral contraband, both deliberate and inadvertent. This chronology draws from both hegemonic and counterhegemonic sources to construct a non-polemicised timeline in which narrators, whatever their positioning, would recognise the accuracy of the events described.
Chapter 5. The First Ivoirian Civil War

France carved out and claimed the territory of *Afrique Occidentale Française* in 1893 as part of the European 'scramble for Africa' (Daddieh, 2016, p. xi). The early modern political era began in the 1920s - 1930s, when the centre of the territory which would become Côte d'Ivoire was first planted with cocoa by French and Ivoirian planters. Felix Houphouët-Boigny (FHB), one of the first wealthy indigenous Ivoirian cocoa planters, established a political and economic power base in Côte d’Ivoire from 1940s through the 1950s. He was elected as Côte d’Ivoire and Haute Volta’s African representative to the French Constituent Assembly in 1946 and played an important role in Ivoirian decolonisation efforts from 1946 (Hellweg, 2011, p. 36).

The modern boundaries of the Ivoirian state were established in the post-World War II process of decolonisation, when Côte d’Ivoire and Upper Volta were divided by France into separate political entities from the unified French colony of *Afrique Occidentale Française* (Hellweg, 2011, p. 32). Modern Côte d’Ivoire has five regions – northwest, northeast, southwest and southeast, and centre – each having unique groupings of ethnic, linguistic, religious, political, and geographic identities (Hellweg, 2011, pp. 33-36). There is a broad congruence among these ethno-linguistic, regional, and geographic groupings and political party affiliation in modern Côte d’Ivoire.

Côte d’Ivoire achieved formal independence from France in 1960, emerging as a one-party state ruled by Houphouët-Boigny’s *Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI)* for the next 30 years. From the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, a triad of powerful men have dominated the Ivoirian political landscape, competing, fighting, and forming alliances with and against each other, each representing a different ethnic group, region, and political party: Henri Konan Bédié (Roman Catholic from central Côte d’Ivoire) inherited the leadership of the dominant party, the *PDCI* from Houphouët-Boigny. Laurent Gbagbo (Pentecostal Christian from Western Côte d’Ivoire) led the *Front Patriotique Ivoire (FPI)*, and Alassane Ouattara (Muslim from northern Côte d’Ivoire) led the party he founded, *Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR)*.
Houphouët-Boigny’s death in December 1993 created a succession struggle between the designated successor, then-President of the National Assembly Bédié, and then-Prime Minister Ouattara (S/2003/374, para. 2). The Ivoirian constitution specified that the President of the National Assembly serve as the interim president should the elected president die in office. On Houphouët-Boigny’s death, Ouattara was widely perceived as attempting to seize power from Bédié, the constitutionally designated successor, by taking control of the national radio and announcing the death, rather than yielding that privilege to Bédié (Hellweg, 2011, p. 39; McGovern, 2011, p. 17; Ouattara, 1993). Bédié successfully thwarted the attempt, and became interim president, serving the final two years of the Houphouët-Boigny presidency (Refworld, 2000b, para. 3.17, Annex C). In 1995 Bédié issued revisions to the electoral code, decreeing that, in addition to the other requirements for eligibility, anyone running for president must have “a father and mother both Ivoirian in origin,” (Hellweg, 2011, p. 215). replacing the previous requirement that all presidential candidates have at least one parent of registered Ivoirian citizenship (Côte d’Ivoire, Loi No 2000-513, 2000a). This revision was interpreted as preventing Ouattara from running for president, although Ouattara would later claim that he met all requirements of the code.

On Christmas Eve 1999, General Robert Guéï led the successful first Ivoirian coup d’état, removing Bédié and installing himself as president. Guéï promised to “sweep the political scene clean” and then retire from power. He organised a national constitutional referendum and promised to investigate widespread complaints regarding fraudulent identity cards (Refworld, para. 3.4). In July 2000, Guéï held the referendum which included a revised version of Article 35 of the Ivoirian constitution based on Bédié’s electoral code of 1995. The new constitution was “overwhelmingly approved” (Refworld, 2000, paras 3.4, 4.8) by 80% of voters, formalising restricted presidential eligibility and expanded presidential power.

The October 2000 Ivoirian presidential election was turbulent. The Constitutional Council ruled that Ouattara and Bédié were ineligible to contest the presidential election in 2000 (S/2003/374, para. 4). Following the election, the Constitutional Council declared Gbagbo the winner; Guéï refused to concede. Wide-spread rioting resulted in Guéï’s Presidential Guards killing an estimated 60 Gbagbo supporters. Guéï fled, and Gbagbo was inaugurated
Waging Peace (McGovern, 2011, p. 18). In the aftermath, fighting broke out between Ouattara’s RDR and Gbagbo’s FPI supporters. In late October, 57 bodies were discovered in a mass grave in the Abidjan neighborhood of Yopougon. The RDR claimed that the victims were RDR members killed by FPI partisans, which the FPI denied (CNN Politics, 2000a). Bédié and Ouattara called on Gbagbo to authorise a new election which would include them; Gbagbo declined. At first, France and the US supported the demand for new elections, but then recognised Gbagbo as president (BBC, 25 Oct 2000).

From his election in 2000 until September 2002, Gbagbo maintained an uneasy political balance. Regional and local elections in December 2000 were boycotted by the RDR; electoral intimidation and violence were widespread (McGovern, 2011, p. 18). On the night of 7 – 8 January 2001, the Gbagbo administration experienced its first coup attempt; the RDR Secretary-General was arrested “for illegal possession of firearms and destabilizing the country” (Daddieh, 2016, p. 183). In March 2001, the RDR contested and won seats in local elections, then demanded new presidential and legislative elections; again, the demands were rejected (UNSC, 2017b, p. 11). In October 2001, Gbagbo organised a “forum for national reconciliation” to “address the issues that had polarized the Ivoirian people” including citizenship, security sector reform, and land ownership reform (S/2003/374, para. 6). In January 2002, he convened a “national reconciliation forum,” including Guéï, Ouattara, and Bédié “to try to heal the wounds caused by a decade of political and social strife. The four men .... agreed to eschew undemocratic means of achieving power” (S/2003/374, para. 6). In July 2002, Ouattara “was granted the Ivoirian citizenship he had fought so long and hard to secure” by an Ivoirian court (Daddieh, 2016, p. 28). In August, Gbagbo convened a second leadership conference to propose a “government of national unity” in which all Ivoirian parties would be offered ministerial positions. Ouattara and Bédié were invited to take part in a new cabinet in his administration (S/2003/374, para. 7). As late as the end of August 2002, Annan “hailed reconciliation moves in the country and voiced confidence that they would lead to improvements on the development front” (UN News, 26 Aug 2002).

First Battle of Abidjan – September 2002
On 19 September 2002, Gbagbo left Côte d’Ivoire for a state visit to Italy (Daddieh, 2016, p. 28) and an estimated 750 former and current Ivoirian soldiers launched simultaneous
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offensives against military installations in the southern city of Abidjan, in Bouaké in the centre of the country, and in Korhogo, in the far north (Notin, 2013, p. 48). The fighting in Abidjan was rapidly suppressed by the state Forces Armées Nationals de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI), which remained loyal to the government (S/2003/374, para. 8 - 10). By the end of September, FANCI had secured Abidjan, but remnant rebel forces held positions in Korhogo and Bouaké (S/2003/374, para. 10).

Gbagbo called upon France to honour its military defence treaty with Côte d’Ivoire and aid the government in suppressing the remainder of the attempted coup d’état. France declared that Licorne would not intervene directly in the fighting underway but announced Opération Licorne on 22 September 2002 to ensure the security of French citizens and interests and to repatriate foreign nationals (Ministère de la Défense, 2015). France claimed that the rebellion was internal, and that the treaty only covered ‘external threats’ to the country, even though the Ivoirian government insisted that the government of Burkina Faso was involved in the attempted coup/rebellion. France did, however, agree to provide logistical support (Notin, 2013, p. 52). Licorne created a ‘blockade’ separating the Ivoirian army in the south and east of the country from the rebels in the north and west, preventing the Ivoirian military from ending the rebellion through military combat against the remaining two to three hundred combatants (Busch, 2013a).

The regional organisation ECOWAS responded at the start of and during the First Ivoirian Civil War and at pivotal points of the Second Ivoirian Civil War. On 29 September the Accra I Declaration (2002) rejected the mutineers’ attempt to seize power and issued a formal statement of support to the Gbagbo government. Accra I was followed by the Dakar I and Lome I ceasefire accords in October and November 2002 under the auspices of ECOWAS. Lome II Ceasefire Agreement (2003) marked a significant change in the roles of regional actors; it specified participation at a “round table of Ivoirian political forces from 15 to 24 January” 2003 in Paris. Signatories accepted the deployment of ECOWAS and French troops to monitor and maintain the ceasefire (Lome II, para. 6).
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ECOWAS initiated a regional military observer group in late 2002 and then a peacekeeper mission in January 2003, immediately running into severe funding and capacity issues (Yabi, 2012). In response to widespread violence following the Linas Marcoussis Accord of January 2003, ECOWAS hosted the Accra III negotiations in spring 2003, and the Lome III ceasefire in May 2003 which formalised the division of the country through the Zone de Confiance. Faced with funding, capacity, and competency deficits, the ECOWAS mission was soon folded into the United Nations mission in Côte d’Ivoire.

For the next six years, ECOWAS was relatively uninvolved in the Ivoirian conflict, becoming involved again during the Second Ivoirian Civil War of 2010-2011. Beyond the formal role of the regional organisation, the neighboring ECOWAS states of Liberia, Ghana, Mali, and particularly Burkina Faso were affected by, and affected, the Ivoirian conflict both formally through interstate relations, elite networks of power and influence, and the flows of fighters and refugees across borders. The narratives contesting the roles of these neighboring states, their citizens, and ECOWAS’s role during the crisis will be discussed in Part III, in which I survey the academic assessments of the interventions, the geopolitics of the west African states' involvement, and ECOWAS's role as a regional organisation in the interventions. In Chapter 12, I analyse strategies of triangulation and the ways in which France and the UN used ECOWAS in legitimation of the interventions.

The political actors of Côte d’Ivoire gathered outside Paris on 15 January 2003 for the Linas-Marcoussis Roundtable, convened by the French government. The Linas-Marcoussis Accord (LMA) was signed on 23 January 2003 (S/2003/99). The signatories included the ten heads of Ivoirian political parties as well as rebel combatants. However, Ivoirian President Gbagbo was excluded from the talks by French President Chirac (Mattei, 2015, p. 188). France had decided to take a leading ‘advisory role’ in supervising changes to the Ivoirian constitution, citizenship laws, and government required under the the terms of the LMA. Gbagbo protested and resented exclusion from the LMA and never felt obligated by the ‘agreement’ in which he had played no part and with which he disagreed (Frindéthié, 2016, p. 123).
Second Battle of Abidjan – January 2003
On 28 January, following the conclusion of the LMA conference, the leaders of the rebel combatants declared themselves to be joined in a coalition of ‘new forces’ – Forces Nouvelles (FN) (Samson, 2003) and demanded immediate implementation of the accords. Gbagbo disavowed the accord from the day after the signing as a national “humiliation” (Abou, 2003) and referred to it as “proposals” (S/2003/374, para. 23), rejecting the post-summit unsourced announcement that “two key ministries (Interior and Defense) had been promised to the rebels” (Comarin, 2003) [my translation]. Ivoirian military leadership also rejected the agreement’s power-sharing provisions, especially that rebel forces would head the ministries of interior and defence.

The Abidjanaise populace mirrored this angry response to the LMA (Comarin, 2003). Southern Ivoirians saw the LMA as a hijacking of state sovereignty and an unwelcome renewal of Françafrique – a reassertion of French dominance in Ivoirian affairs and France rewarding rebel violence in the pursuit of power (Abou, 2003). UNHCR suspended all operations in country as anti-French violence spread beyond Abidjan (UN News, 28 Jan 2003) and the UN evacuated all non-essential staff from the country (UN News, 6 Feb 2003). On 7 February, Gbagbo addressed the country on state media, rejecting those terms of the LMA “at variance with the Constitution of Côte d’Ivoire.” He declined to appoint Seydou Diarra as an “irrevocable” Prime Minister, to disarm the state military, and to allocate the heads of the departments of defence and interior to the rebels (S/2003/374, paras 24, 25). Although met with protests by rebel leaders and pressure from the Security Council, Gbagbo’s address calmed the violence across the south (Comarin, 2003).

Accra II Accord and Lome III Ceasefire
To regain momentum towards a political settlement, then-President of ECOWAS, Ghanaian President John Kufuor, convened Accra II from 6 – 7 March 2003. The Ivoirian adversaries agreed to form a cross-party National Security Council to oversee the defence and interior ministries. On 11 March, rebel leaders met with Gbagbo in the capital, Yamoussoukro, but efforts to convene the new government fell apart when “the Cabinet members nominated by the three rebel movements and Mr. Ouattara’s RDR party refused to attend, citing security reasons.” In mid-March, the Security Council “welcome[d] the inaugural meeting of
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[the] new government” (S/2003/374, para. 28). The Lome III ceasefire was signed on 3 May between FANCI and the FN, formalising the Zone de Confiance, the French militarised zone which bisected the country from east to west.

Mission Nations Unies de Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI)
As the ECOWAS mission started operations in early 2003, the UN was already proposing a UN observer mission to “complement the efforts launched by ECOWAS” (UN News, 3 Apr 2003). Authorised in mid-May to “build confidence” (S/RES/1479, para. 3), MINUCI was set up to support a power-sharing transitional government until national elections could be held and began operation in late June 2003 (UN News, 13 Nov 2003). For a moment in the summer of 2003, it appeared that peace might break out. The heads of the Ivoirian military and rebel leadership signed a joint declaration in which they declared the war “to have ended on this day, 4 July 2003.” The commanders committed to enacting the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra agreements and exhorted Ivoirian youth, media, and ethnic groups to embrace tolerance, national harmony, and “respect for difference” (Joint Declaration, 2003, see Appendix E).

Summary - Chapter 5
Chapter 5 has taken us from the founding of the Ivoirian state, through the death of the foundational president-for-life, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, to the troubled time of elite political contestation leading to the First Ivoirian Civil War. The chronology has touched lightly on the ceasefires, negotiations, and accords of that war. I've highlighted the early role of ECOWAS, the First Battle of Abidjan in September 2002 during the first coup attempt which turned into a full-scale war, and the Second Battle of Abidjan in January 2003, when southern Ivoirians violently opposed the French-led LMA. I provided a synopsis of the international missions which became Licorne and UNOCI and concluded the chapter in July 2003 with the joint military declaration that the war had ended. Côte d'Ivoire now entered the time of No War, No Peace, outlined next in Chapter 6.
Chapter 6. No War, No Peace

The moment of unity in the summer of 2003 lasted less than a month. The time of No War, No Peace lasted from the peace treaty of July 2003 until the start of the Second Ivorian Civil War in December 2010. The government balked at the forced disarmament of the national military, when there had been no progress in rebel disarmament, and the FN refused to cede control of the north before reunification (S/2003/1069, para. 47).

In late August, suspected rebel coup plotters were arrested in Abidjan and Paris (S/2003/1069, para. 8). The FN refused to accept ministerial appointments to the posts of Defence and Internal Security, even though the appointees were taken from a list of candidates which they had approved. Over FN and opposition objections, the ministers were appointed on 13 September (S/2003/1069, para. 6). Gbagbo characterised the situation as a “false peace” (S/2003/1069, para. 8) and on the September 23, the FN withdrew from government (S/2003/1069, para. 7). By October 2003, the Government of National Reconciliation had collapsed. The FN retreated to Bouaké and blockaded roads from the capital to the north (UN News, 2 Oct 2003). On 10 November, Gbagbo addressed the Security Council and requested that the UN convert MINUCI to a peacekeeping mission (S/2003/1081; S/2004/3). UNHCR warned that the situation on the ground was deteriorating (UN News, 19 Nov 2003). ECOWAS officially requested that the Security Council transition MINUCI to a full peacekeeping operation from the limited observer mission (S/2003/1081 - annex to S/2003/1147).

Third Battle of Abidjan – March 2004

The political situation in Abidjan looked somewhat better by January 2004. Gbagbo reconvened the government, the FN elite returned to Abidjan to participate, and the Quadripartite Commission convened to begin military cooperation on Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) (S/2004/443, paras 2, 5). However, these green shoots soon withered. On 26 February, “Soro declared that unless all key issues of the Lina-Marcoussis Agreement were addressed, his movement would not lay down arms before the October 2005 elections” (S/2004/443, para. 6). Soro was joined in boycott by other opposition politicians on 8 March, the “Coalition des Marcoussistes” (S/2004/443, para. 6).
While the FN ministers had ‘withdrawn from government,’ they had not abandoned their government perquisites, including their official residences. On 10 March, the FPI youth activist group, Jeunes Patriots, demonstrated against the opposition’s Ministry of Justice appointments, and “proceeded to the residence of the Forces Nouvelles ministers in Abidjan, announcing their intention to ‘dislodge’ the Ministers.” ECOWAS and French forces intervened (S/2004/443, para. 8).

The Marcoussistes published a letter of grievances, stating that they would organise a demonstration in Abidjan on 25 March (S/2004/384, para. 22). Complicating the situation further, national and foreign intelligence reports indicated that rebel forces were “being supplied with weapons and ammunition from two neighbouring countries with the objective of capturing Abidjan” (S/2004/384, para. 28). The security services sent a letter to the (opposition) Internal Security Minister declaring the areas surrounding the presidential palace a “red zone” in which demonstrators would be considered “enemy combatants” and would be shot for violating the exclusion area (S/2004/384, para. 30). Gbagbo met with opposition leaders on 22 March and announced that he would be meeting with them on 29 March “to examine all the issues outlined in the memorandum” (S/2004/443, para. 8). Following the meeting, Gbagbo issued a decree mobilising the state security forces (S/2004/384, para. 23) and instructed the security forces to “mount a security operation able to withstand any threat, as well as to prevent a march of any type from even developing” (S/2004/384, para. 24). The SRSG made a public appeal to all parties to “follow the peace agreement” and noted that the Council had authorised French forces to “use all necessary means” to contribute “to the general security” (UN News, 22 Mar 2004).

The Marcoussistes publicly stated that they would refuse to comply with the presidential decree and would not call off the demonstrations. This was considered “a serious challenge to the President and the legitimate State institutions” and an attempt to ignite “the battle of Abidjan” (S/2004/384, para. 24, 28). Gbagbo responded with a formal decree limiting all public demonstrations in Abidjan to “places such as stadiums and assembly halls” until 30 April (Pres Decree 2004-210, cited in S/2004/384), and Annan called for calm and restraint (UN News, 24 Mar 2004). His calls went unheeded by both the government and the
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opposition. The FN made the decision “not to participate in the protest march in Abidjan, but to organise demonstrations in areas under its control” (S/2004/384, para. 32). However, opposition supporters mobilised and marched in Abidjan despite the government orders in place, resulting in a third Battle for Abidjan. The Ivorian government claimed 37 people died in the violence of 24 - 26 March; others estimated 300 people were killed in the Marcoussistes’ strongholds of Yopougon and Abobo (S/2004/443, para. 10).

The violence sparked outrage across the political spectrum; the Monitoring Committee, PM Diarra, and President Gbagbo all requested an inquiry from the UN (UN News, 2 April 2004). The ensuing UN Human Rights Violations Inquiry placed blame for the deaths in March on military and gendarmerie violence in Abidjan city centre. The report also noted that the opposition had been warned against the “regime threatening” protests and that they persisted in their mobilisations, knowing the consequences. The commission found the armed response disproportionate and worthy of prosecution and the opposition equally culpable of provocation and responsible for the violence by marching against government orders (S/2004/384 Annex – Report of the Commission of Inquiry).

The report was leaked before official release and was interpreted by government supporters as biased in blaming the state security services for the violence and an attack against their government in its response to an existential threat. The way in which the report was released (before providing a copy to the Ivorian government), the strategic and covert messaging around the report, and the criticism of the Ivorian government enraged southern Ivorians. FESCI (Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire), the national student association, mobilised “massive but peaceful demonstrations across the southern half of the country at the central and regional UNOCI HQs,” in support of the government (S/2004/443, para. 20), with violent protest in Toumoudi (S/2004/443, para. 33).

UNOCI – United Nations Operation Côte d’Ivoire
In February 2004, the Security Council had authorised the transition of the observer mission MINUCI to a full scope peacekeeping operation – UNOCI (United Nations Operations Côte d’Ivoire, ONUCI - 'Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire in French), absorbing both ECOWAS and MINUCI missions. Separately, the Security Council authorised Licorne to use
“all means necessary” to support UNOCI. UNOCI’s mandate included monitoring the ceasefire and the movements of armed groups, DDR, protection of UN personnel, protection of “institutions and civilians,” support to humanitarian aid missions, support in the implementation of the peace accords, assisting in “the field of human rights,” providing public information, and supporting “law and order” (S/RES/1528). An initial contingent of military and civilian officers arrived in Abidjan in March 2004 (UN News, 31 Mar 2004) and began operations in a country in a chronic state of ‘no war, no peace.’ At the end of May, the Security Council responded to the Gbagbo administration’s repeated requests, commissioning a second Commission of Inquiry, this one tasked to look into human rights violations from 19 September 2002 onward (S/PRST/2004/17). The Security Council “expressed its deep concern” regarding the “declarations of hate, those addressed against UNOCI personnel” as well as “reiterate[ing] its concerns at the continuing non-participation of opposition parties in the Government of Reconciliation” (UN News, 25 May 2004).

In response to the continuing high levels of violence and the withdrawal of the opposition to the north, in mid-May Gbagbo dismissed and suspended government support to three opposition ministers, including Soro, who had boycotted the government since early March (S/2004/443, para. 60). Towards the end of June, UN reiterated demands that all parties “live up to their responsibilities under the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement” (UN News, 21 June 2004). Gbagbo in turn announced that “he was determined to remove all obstacles to the Ivoirian peace process,” condemned attacks against French and UN personnel, and announced his support for immediate passage of the remaining legislation mandated by the LMA. He also reiterated the importance of DDR, reunification of the country, and preparing for national elections in 2005 (S/2004/697/para. 7). However, further attacks and violent demonstrations by Jeunes Patriots against Forces Nouvelles, French, and UN forces continued into July across the south of the country (S/2004/697, paras. 4, 29). On 29 June, the Ivoirian government and the UN signed the UNOCI Status of Forces Agreement, and UNOCI began operations.

**Accra III**

The next effort to restart the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire came at the end of July. Accra III renewed a “commitment to peace,” and to the LMA, established a Tripartite Monitoring
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Group (TMG) with representatives from ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), and UNOCI, and, again, declared the Ivorian civil war officially “ended” (Accra III Agreement on Côte d’Ivoire). The momentum generated by Accra III didn’t last long. Rather than diminishing, violence increased. The anniversary week of 19 – 22 September was intended to be a “Commemorative Week of National Reconciliation,” (S/2004/800, para. 11), but the FN instead promoted “activities commemorating the second Anniversary of the 19 September 2002 crisis” (S/2004/800, para. 1). Violence against UNOCI surged across the north, with the FN rioting against UN sites in Bouaké (UN News, 12 Oct 2004).

Opération Dignité and the bombing of Bouaké
Soro flirted publicly with the secession of the north from the Ivorian state for months in the fall of 2004 (ICG, 2004, pp. i, 23-24). On 28 October, Forces Nouvelles declared suspension of participation in the Government of National Reconciliation, and ‘a state of emergency (S/2004/962, para. 12). Gbagbo began preparations to retake the successionist north, briefing the French ambassador on his plans (Charbonneau, 2008a, p. 167; Mattei, 2015, p.91), and launching Opération Dignité on 4 November. The Security Council immediately demanded return to ceasefire (UN News, 4 Nov 2004). On 6 November, Gbagbo communicated to the UN that “that the military operations under way ... were 'limited and targeted at the recapture of specific towns,' following which the Ivorian Government would request the United Nations to ensure the security of the towns” (S/2004/962, para. 17). However, also on 6 November, two Ivorian gunships bombed the French barracks at Bouaké, resulting in the deaths of nine French personnel and one American. Gbagbo immediately disavowed ordering the strikes, attributing them to pilot error (Duhem, 2017). The French forces, however, retaliated with air strikes which destroyed the Ivorian Air Force (Hofnung, 2016), followed by a Security Council endorsement of the French retaliation (S/PRST/2994/42). The Bouaké incident of November 2004 is one of the central contested narratives of the interventions, analysed in Chapter 13.

Fourth Battle of Abidjan – November 2004
The day following the destruction of the Ivorian air force, Abidjan erupted in protest (Hofnung, 2016). Licorne retaliated, firing on demonstrators with machine guns from armored vehicles and gunboats and dropping grenades and tear gas from helicopters,
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resulting in an unknown number of deaths (Talbot, 2004, Frindéthié, 2018). French and Ivoirian military units exchanged direct fire at the Abidjan airport, French forces evacuated 5,000 foreign nationals (Talbot, 2004), and the UN evacuated staff to Ghana (UN News, 24 Nov 2004). On 9 November, Licorne troops fired on Ivoirian protesters demanding the withdrawal of France from Côte d’Ivoire, resulting in “numerous deaths and injuries among the demonstrators” (S/2004/962, para. 18). Licorne troops pursued the protesters with tanks and helicopter gunships, firing into the crowd (Frindéthié, 2016, p. 183-184; 2018). South African President Thabo Mbeki landed in Abidjan to initiate African Union mediation efforts, but the fighting proved so heavy, he left (UN News, 9 Nov 2004). The Security Council on 15 November unanimously supported a French-drafted resolution to impose an arms embargo against the government of Côte d’Ivoire (S/RES/1572, para. 7). On 6 December, the SRSG quit, and Mbeki proposed the “Mbeki Road Map” to peace (S/RES/1572, para. 7).

Once the violence in Abidjan subsided in early 2005, the Ivoirian legislature passed a series of bills which had languished for two years, since the LMA signing (S/2005/186, para. 53). However, legislative mobilisation did little to reduce the ongoing violence throughout the country. Southern Ivoirians blamed France, the African Union, and the UN for “siding with the rebels” and seethed with resentment at the “imposed will” of international pressure (McGovern, 2011, p. 22).

Pretoria I – April 2005
Mbeki played a central role in mediation of the Ivoirian interventions, from the initial ECOWAS declaration in September 2002 in which he took part as the sitting President of the African Union until Gbagbo accepted Blaise Compaoré as official mediator in concession to the opposition in 2007. In March 2005, Annan “reminded” Ivoirians to cooperate with Mbeki’s ongoing mediation efforts under the auspices of the African Union (UN News, 2 Mar 2005). The following day, Gbagbo issued a communiqué in which he stated that in the event of failure to hold elections in October, “he would remain in office in accordance with the provisions of Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution until an elected successor emerged” (S/2005/395, para. 7). In response, Mbeki invited Gbagbo, Ouattara, Bédié, and Soro to Pretoria to create an “‘African-owned and African-initiated’ accord (McGovern, 2011, p. 23)
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which would be more acceptable to the Ivorian people than the LMA accord, perceived to be imposed by the global north (Afrol, 2003). On 6 April, the opponents signed Pretoria I, which again began with a joint declaration that the war had ended. Pretoria I also specified next steps for DDR, and guaranteed the security of the FN leadership, delegation of powers to the Prime Minister, the organisation of national elections, financing political parties, and amending Article 35 which regulated eligibility for the presidency (Pretoria Agreement, 2005).

The Ivorian National Assembly refused to rewrite eligibility for the presidency in response to continued international demands. To comply, Gbagbo suspended Article 35 of the constitution, allowing Ouattara to run for the presidency in elections to be held in October 2005. While DDR talks in late April and May of 2005 seemed to have momentum following Pretoria I (S/2005/395, para. 20, 21, 22, 25; UN News, 16 May 2005, 25 May 2005), progress again came to an abrupt halt at the point that disarmament talks were to transition to disarmament actions. The Ivorian government insisted that elections were dependent on disarmament. FN leadership insisted that DDR had to be “delinked from the political process,” announced that the dates committed to in the signed agreements were “all mere proposals,” and that any action on DDR was contingent on “the dismantling of the militias; guarantees over the availability of sufficient funding for the entire DDR process; the review of …the Nationality Code, the identification of citizens, the financing of political parties, the legal regime of audio-visual communication” (S/2005/395, para. 20, 22, 25).

Violence continued throughout the summer of 2005; in Duékoué, over one hundred people were killed or wounded at the end of May (UN News, 1 Jun 2005; 7 Jun 2005; 9 Jun 2005). In response to the deteriorating security situation, the Security Council extended the UNOCI mandate until January 2006, expanded the mission to include an active role in DDR and support to national elections, and increased UNOCI force authorisation to 7,200 billets (S/RES/1609). The Ivorian backlash to the expanded UNOCI mandate was immediate, with blockades of UNOCI forces in the south (UN News, 26 Jul 2005; 27 Jul 2005; 5 Aug 2005; 12 Aug 2005). Resistance to, and violence against, UNOCI forces increased throughout the summer (S/2005/604, para. 14, 23).
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Pretoria II – 29 June 2005
President Mbeki again convened the four principals for the Pretoria II accord, signed in late June 2005. Pretoria II centred on the agreement that the National Assembly “should adopt, by 15 July, all amendments to the seven laws proposed by the Mediation” and granted Mbeki authority to decide on “exceptional measures” which Gbagbo would be authorised (or told) to take under authority of Article 48 of the Ivoirian constitution, which provided the Ivoirian president with almost unlimited executive powers. Pretoria II was a guide to the 'implementation' of the Pretoria I Agreement, laying the groundwork for national elections, and including a clause that Mbeki would recommend that the UN impose sanctions if the Ivoirian actors failed to implement the agreement (Pretoria II, para. 8).

The Ivoirian National Assembly continued to refuse to pass the legislation mandated under LMA, Accra II and III, and Pretoria I and II. On 10 July, “Mbeki formally requested President Gbagbo to use his exceptional powers under article 48 of the Ivorian Constitution to ensure the adoption of the amended laws within the timeframe stipulated by the Declaration.” On the 15 July, Gbagbo complied, and “signed a series of degrees promulgating revised versions of the laws” as outlined in Pretoria II (S/2005/604, para. 5). Violence between political groups and against intervention forces escalated further following Gbagbo’s issuance of the mandated decrees. Annan cited an “eight-fold increase in the number of cases of UNOCI movements being obstructed by Government forces and associated elements of the local population, particularly Young Patriots” between June and July (S/2005/604, para. 19). In August, Annan condemned rising resistance to UNOCI (UN News, 12 Aug 2005) and renewed pressure on Gbagbo to calm the street, particularly aggression against UNOCI (UN News, 19 Aug 2005). Gbagbo responded with a public address in which he urged cooperation. At the end of August, Gbagbo broadcast another presidential call for “all Ivorians to allow the impartial forces to move freely throughout the country” (S/2005/604, para. 22).

In mid-August the political opposition and FN leadership wrote to Mbeki, the official mediator, and rejected the decrees which Gbagbo had promulgated, claiming that the decrees “did not conform to the letter and spirit of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.” In response, Mbeki “sent a letter to President Gbagbo clarifying his views on various aspects of
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the contested laws” (S/2005/604, para. 7, 8). On 29 August, Gbagbo revised and again announced the laws to be amended under Article 48 of the Ivoirian constitution, “bringing them into conformity with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement” (S/2005/604, para. 8).

First postponement – Presidential elections 2005

In mid-August, the Security Council was still calling for the presidential election to “be held on time in October and in a peaceful atmosphere” (UN News, 19 Aug 2005). Regardless of UN demands, the ongoing violence precluded elections, or even the preparation for elections. Annan announced publicly on 8 September that the Ivoirian elections were “delayed indefinitely” (UN News, 8 Sep 2005). Several days later, Soro and the FN declared that they rejected any extension of Gbagbo’s time in office. On 30 October, Gbagbo ‘would no longer be President of the Republic but would become an ‘ordinary citizen’ and Ivoirians must ‘prepare for a transitional government’. Gbagbo countered with the declaration, “There will be no civil war in Côte d’Ivoire after 30 October,” which was well-received and quoted by SRSG Schori (UN News, 30 Sep 2005).

In recognition of political reality, on 13 October, the African Union “asked for elections to be delayed for a year” and recommended that Gbagbo remain in office during a “transition period” (Bangura, 2011). The following day, the Security Council “agree[d] to delay” the Ivoirian elections until October 2006 “at the latest,” reaffirmed support for Mbeki’s work as a mediator (UN News, 14 Oct 2005), extended the mandate for the expert group advising on arms embargo, and extended Gbagbo’s presidential mandate for a year (S/RES/1633). The Council devolved to the AU the selection of a new prime minister “acceptable to all signatories” of the LMA and specified that the new PM “should have all the necessary powers” to re-start unified administration throughout the country. The Security Council “demanded that FN” and “all militias” “proceed without delay” with the national DDR program and that “all the parties.... implement immediately all the peace accords they have signed” (UN News, 21 Oct 2005).

Gbagbo accepted the terms of Resolution 1633, under which the African Union would select a "powerful new prime minister" (UN News, 26 Oct 2005). Tensions increased as the country moved closer to the official end of Gbagbo's and the National Assembly's electoral term (UN
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News, 27 Oct 2005; 29 Oct 2005). On 30 October, Gbagbo broadcast a national address in which he informed Ivorians that he would “remain in power in view of the continued occupation of part of the country by the Forces nouvelle” and justified his decision to remain in office based the Constitutional Council’s ruling of 29 October (S/2006/2, para. 8), rather than the authorisations of the African Union and the Security Council. The opposition rejected Gbagbo’s speech and promptly quit the government (S/2006/2, para. 8).

Charles Konan Banny’s appointment as Prime Minister on 5 December did little to calm the country (S/2006/2, para. 11). In mid-December, the Security Council extended the arms embargo, increased travel sanctions and restrictions on targeted political actors, and banned the export of diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire to reduce funding for the conflict (S/RES/1643). The UN-appointed International Working Group’s (IWG) unilateral decision to disband the National Assembly at the expiration of its mandate on 16 December was the match which lit the fuse, resulting in street riots and attacks against Licorne and UNOCI. Annan labelled “The dangerous confrontation over the mandate of the National Assembly, which expired on 16 December,” as “unjustifiable attempts to prolong the mandate in defiance of the decision of the International Working Group” (S/2006/2, para. 78). The UN announced of the formation of a new government on 28 December but made no mention of the violence of the last two weeks in December 2005 in Abidjan (UN News, 28 Dec 2005). Internally, though, UN leadership reported exceptionally high levels of violence in the capital, including “persistent rumors of hidden weapons,” and the “use of automatic weapons directed mainly against the business community, particularly foreigners, as well as UNOCI staff members” (S/2006/2, para. 26).

Annan reported to the Security Council on 2 January that Gbagbo requested and received an extension to the mandate of the National Assembly from the Ivorian Constitutional Court following the Security Council’s concurrence with extension of his Presidential term for a further 12 months (S/2006/2, para. 8). Acknowledging the “volatile security situation,” in mid-January 2006 Annan recommended doubling the UNOCI troop force, adding almost 4,000 troops and police officers (UN News, 13 Jan 2006). On 16 January the UN announced that, following the Security Council’s extension of Gbagbo’s mandate for 12 months, Gbagbo
had requested and received a year’s extension of the National Assembly’s mandate, due to expire on 16 December, from the Ivorian Constitutional Council (UN News, 16 Jan 2006). That day “demonstrations outside UN offices in Abidjan turned violent and spread across the country” (UN News, 24 Jan 2006a).

Despite the widespread violence and deep unpopularity of the IWG recommendation, the Security Council “endors[ed] the IWG’s .... controversial recommendation” and threatened further sanctions, while characterising the IGW recommendation as “non-binding,” even though UN news articles had described the IWG recommendation as “effectively disbanding [parliament]” (UN News, 16 Jan 2006, 17 Jan 2006, 19 Jan 2006). Two days later, the UN reported that UNOCI forces “were forced to open fire to repel attackers” (UN News, 18 Jan 2006). The protests and violence directed against UNOCI continued through the end of January and became so severe that the UN’s World Food Programme suspended operations in Côte d’Ivoire and UNOCI evacuated staff to Senegal and the Gambia (UN News, 20 Jan 2006; 24 Jan 2006; 26 Jan 2006).

Reversing the acknowledgement made two weeks previously, on 29 January, Annan “voiced concern” regarding “the sudden announcement of a new presidential decree concerning Côte d’Ivoire’s National Assembly,” and warned against “unilateral action,” while acknowledging that the IWG’s recommendation to dissolve the National Assembly was the direct cause of the “widespread, violent protests against the UN in Côte d’Ivoire” (UN News, 29 Jan 2006). The Security Council again authorised increased troop levels and imposed increased sanctions (S/RES/1657). Nonetheless, the UN was unable to overrule the Constitutional Council’s extension of Parliament and Gbagbo’s decree.

Elections/Reunification
With the National Assembly mandate extended by the Ivorian Constitutional Council and secured by the rioting of the Ivorian populace, the violence tapered off in February, humanitarian workers and aid returned to the country, and the UN sent Gbagbo a bill for damages (UN News, 9 Feb 2006, 10 Feb 2006, 15 Feb 2006, 16 Feb 2006). Attention turned to preparations for the national elections mandated by the UN for October 2006. However, momentum had been lost and no meaningful election preparation could begin until the
disputed composition of the Ivoirian electoral commission was resolved. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) members had been contested since October 2005. The UN High Representative for Elections in Côte d’Ivoire called on the Ivoirian political leadership to “reach a political understanding as soon as possible so that the elections could be organized by the 31 October deadline the UN Security Council had set” (UN News, 16 Feb 2006). PM Banny announced that the IEC was operational three weeks later and “asked the members to produce an electoral roll for presidential and parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for October” (UN News, 7 Mar 2006).

At the end of March, Soro arrived to “take up his post” in the Banny government, but not all members of the opposition returned to their government duties (UN News, 27 Mar 2006). On 26 April, the Speaker of the National Assembly “suspend[ed] the indemnities of the opposition’s parliamentarians who had not been attending sessions of the Assembly since its mandate expired in December 2005” (S/2006/532, para. 5). Jeune Patriots launched attacks against UNOCI and began a series of public denunciations and violent demonstrations against UNOCI and the Prime Minister. Schori and Gbagbo “discussed the negative impact of [the Jeunes Patriots’] hostile campaign,” and immediately following the discussion, the presidential spokesman condemned violence against UNOCI and disavowed involvement in the Jeune Patriots’ publicly announced plans to hold more violent demonstrations (S/2006/523, para. 3). Three days later, Gbagbo and Banny held a joint press conference, during which Gbagbo “urged all Ivoirians to allow the Prime Minister to do his work” (S/2006/532, para. 1).

In mid-June, Gbagbo and Banny met with all former National Assembly members to resolve the issue of payments to the opposition members who had been boycotting the Assembly since December, forming a committee to resolve the impasse (S/2006/532, para. 6). The committee recommended that the boycotting members “return to carry on with their duties,” and that the Assembly continue to meet and legislate under the authority of “the Constitution and the Security Council resolution 1633 (2005) until the next parliamentary elections.” The committee also recommended that members “undertake peace missions” and that the members “count on the President to resolve the issue of their unpaid salaries,”
and that the amendments made in the absence of the boycotting members be rescinded (S/2006/532, para. 6). The following day, the opposition accepted the terms offered, and the IWG “demanded” that the boycotting opposition should be reimbursed for all suspended payments “so that they could devote themselves exclusively to peace and reconciliation missions” (S/2006/523, para. 7).

With a new PM in place, government mandates extended, and a newly formed IEC in position, the government and UN set up a pilot citizen identification program in preparation for national elections. The pilot program was intended to run in tandem with “pre-cantonment of the forces.” However, pre-cantonment never began. Instead, FN leadership presented new demands: to retain all current (rebel) ranks in the integrated forces, to establish a unified command structure, and to receive all salary arrears from the time of the start of the rebellion (S/2006/532, para. 2). They continually increased the number of ‘soldiers’ in rebel forces to be demobilised. What had been several hundred in 2002 had grown to thousands by 2006. There was also the issue of money – the UN estimated that DDR would cost an “estimated $150 million, out of which $140 million has been pledged” but not allocated. As with the voter identification project, there was no allocated budget for dismantling the militias, at an estimated cost of $2.5 million. Despite the absence of funding, the IWG on 23 June urged the Ivoirian government to prioritise dates for militia DDR (S/2006/532, para. 15, 16, 17, 18).

By the end of May, the UN recognised that the elections were already unlikely, “repeat[ing] its grave concern at the serious delay in the implementation of this road map” (UN News, 24 May 2006) and called for “scaled-up donor funding,” which sometimes met less than ten percent of identified requirements (UN News, 25 May 2006). Despite the multiple political, systemic, and economic failures, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Côte d’Ivoire maintained that it was “still feasible” to hold the elections in October while acknowledging that the “timeline for holding elections had to be greatly compressed” (UN News, 25 May 2006).
Probo Koala
In August 2006, a new crisis struck Abidjan. Probo Koala, a tanker from the Netherlands, dumped petroleum processing waste into the Abidjan lagoon, causing severe pollution, exposure to toxic waste, deaths, acute and chronic disease (UN News, 11 Sep 2006; 29 Sep 2006). The catastrophe brought the power struggle between Banny and Gbagbo to a head. Banny had two Gbagbo allies implicated in the crisis arrested; Gbagbo ordered them released (S/2006/939, para. 10). As Abidjan struggled with the public health crisis, the Security Council tightened scrutiny, extending the mandate of the experts group monitoring the arms embargo (S/RES/1708). The following day, Annan publicly expressed concern that Gbagbo was considering withdrawing consent for UNOCI and rejecting the UN peace process (UN News, 15 Sep 2006). When asked the following week about Gbagbo’s reported intent to “ask UN forces to leave Côte d’Ivoire,” Annan’s spokesman responded, “the UN had received no formal notifications of such a request” (UN News, 21 Sep 2006) but Gbagbo had made his decision to rid his government of Banny and free himself of French and UN control of the 'peace process.'

Second postponement – Presidential elections 2006
In early October, the UN acknowledged that the Ivoirian presidential elections would be rescheduled. This second delay further inflamed rhetoric on both sides of the Ivoirian government (UN News, 5 Oct 2006; 10 Oct 2006). By mid-October, Annan reported a “manifest lack of political will” and "put Ivorian leaders on notice to make progress towards elections.” He recommended that Ivoirians be given a “last chance” to achieve traction with the election preparations; failing an improvement in the situation, the UN should set up “a transitional government of eminent local personalities to oversee the process for elections” (S/2006/821). The report framed the delay in election preparation as a collective and personal failure of Ivoirian leadership, who had not “put the national interest first in addressing the core issue of identification of the population” (UN News, 18 Oct 2006). This framing reduced the multiple political, logistical, and funding issues described above, which had rendered the October deadline improbable in the first place, to a matter of individual character flaws. I return to personalisation narratives in Parts III and IV.
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Tensions eased towards the end of October (UN News, 25 Oct 2006) and on 1 November the Security Council extended Gbagbo’s and Banny’s transitional mandates as President and PM for a “new and final” period not to exceed 12 months, as well as extending the sanctions regime until the successful completion of elections (S/RES/1721). Gbagbo announced on 2 November that he would not implement those provisions of S/RES/1721 which he considered to infringe on Ivoirian sovereign law and constitutional distribution of power (S/2006/939, para. 2), followed by a public address made by General Mangou, head of the Ivoirian armed forces, declaring the support of the armed forces for the President (S/2006/939, para. 3). On 8 November, Banny made a broadcast address in which he stated that he would be implementing S/RES/1721 and that “no other framework was necessary,” with the opposition declaring their support (S/2006/939, para. 5-6). In response, the National Resistance Council for Democracy demanded the appointment of a new Prime Minister to replace Banny, the separation the citizenship identification program from the voter registration program, and “the withdrawal of the French Licorne force” (S/2006/939, para 3). Gbagbo was preparing an exit strategy from the LMA (S/2006/939, para 14).

Ouagadougou Political Agreement - OPA
The start of 2007 ushered in new UN players who remained in place through the endgame of the 2010 elections and the 2011 civil war. Ban Ki-moon replaced Kofi Annan as Secretary-General in early January (UN News, 3 Jan 2007). SRSG Schori left his post in February, exhorting Ivoirians not to “blow it this time,” while acknowledging that the peace process “is still at square one” despite 4 years of the UN process (UN News, 9 Feb 2007). The next, and most controversial, SRSG for Côte d’Ivoire, Choi Young-Jin, would take up his post in November 2007 (UN News, 18 Oct 2007; 21 Nov 2007).

Gbagbo used the changing of UN leadership to announce direct talks with Soro in Ouagadougou under the sponsorship of Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré. The Security Council “welcome[ed]” a new conflict resolution process, while issuing a presidential statement that new talks “must take place within the framework of earlier Council resolutions” (UN News, 9 Feb 2007). The Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA), signed by Gbagbo, Soro and Compaoré, was endorsed “with an express mandate” from ECOWAS (S/2007/144, p. 3). The agreement covered the usual ground: citizen identification,
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registration, replacement of lost or destroyed birth certificates and registers, building a new electoral roll, forward movement on DDR, re-deployment of the state in the north, and a renewed amnesty law. There were a few innovations: an ambitious timetable for implementing the accords and benchmarks expressed as fixed dependencies rather than specific dates. Unlike previous UN timetables, the OPA tied ‘next steps’ to the achievement of the previous steps, with the stated goal of completing all steps to elections within the year. OPA also provided for the establishment of an Integrated Command Centre (ICC) for the armed forces which would serve as a first step in integrating rebel and state military forces (S/2007/144, para. 3.1) and an agreement to dissolve the Zone de Confiance separating the north and south of the country (S/2007/144, para. 6.2). The OPA replaced the external monitoring mechanisms in place with an Ivoirian-plus-Compaoré internal Permanent Consultation Mechanism (S/2007/144, para. 7.1) and an Evaluation and Monitoring Committee, also composed of Ivoirians plus Compaoré (S/2007/144, para. 7.2). Compaoré became designated as the official facilitator, displacing Mbeki, in line with the opposition’s demands, who claimed that Mbeki was too favorable towards Gbagbo.

The OPA was designed to side-line the international intervention forces, relegating them to providing resources for DDR and electoral security. The new agreement shifted responsibility for most of the military tasks from the purview of UNOCI and Licorne to the Ivoirian-designed Integrated Command Center. The International Working Group was not included in the document, and the African Union and ECOWAS recommended to the Security Council a draw-down in UNOCI and Licorne troops (S/2007/275, para. 13 – 15). Ban pressed Ivoirian leadership on whether there was a continued role for the UN. Compaoré responded, assuring Ban that the signatories “expected the United Nations and the international community to continue to play an important role in the Ivorian peace process, in particular to support the implementation of the key tasks set out in the agreement.” Compaoré stressed that the UN should also “help to provide security for the elections and, in particular, observe the electoral process and provide technical advice to the Ivorian institutions” (S/2007/275, para. 17).
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Soro and Gbagbo concurred in their desire to see a continuing role for the UN in providing “requisite resources, technical advice and logistical support” (S/2007/275, para. 22) but Gbagbo was adamant that the UN must limit its role to “accompanying, advising, and assisting the Ivoirian institutions as they carry out these tasks... avoid[ing] substituting for, or imposing decisions on, the national institutions” (S/2007/275, para. 23). Soro and the opposition parties balked on this point – they wanted a strong certification and arbitration role for the UN High Representative for Elections. The UN mission assured Gbagbo that “the United Nations certification role should not replace but should rather be in addition to the prerogatives of national institutions to certify the various aspects of the electoral process” (S/2007/275, para. 73). The extent of UN authority and the limits (or lack of limits) to that authority to “certify” the Ivoirian elections, and the essential question of what that “certification” entailed are among the most contested narratives of the conflict. Did the UN abide by its commitment to "not replace but...rather be in addition to" the national institutions of Côte d’Ivoire in 2010? The UN certification of the 2010 presidential election is central to the contested narratives of consent, impartiality, and legitimacy, discussed in Part IV of this thesis.

Deadlines without funding

Election preparations gained momentum in spring 2007 then slowed to a crawl from June. The gaps between deadlines and funds available to meet them were vast for the first half of 2007 for Côte d’Ivoire, not unusual both for funding for Côte d’Ivoire (UN News, 27 Jan 2005; 25 May 2005; 25 May 2006; S/2007/275, para. 12, 25) and UN peacekeeping in general. The UN ‘peak peacekeeping’ force strength and total mission numbers at mid-decade were matched by record breaking funding shortfalls, as the UN’s reach exceeded its grasp everywhere, but particularly in funding African peacekeeping operations (UN News, 17 Jul 2007). Two-thirds of the necessary funds for DDR, population identification, elections, redeployment of state officials throughout the country, and various communication and reconciliation programs simply didn’t exist, creating a shortfall of $200 million from a $300 million requirements list (S/2007/275, para. 12). I return to 'peak peacekeeping' in Chapter 14.
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In June 2007, “international partners of Côte d’Ivoire pledged $388 million in support of the Ouagadougou Agreement” (S/2008/1, para. 38). Newly installed PM Soro convened a donors’ roundtable to develop a spending plan for the millions pledged by international partners, which exceeded the identified critical funding requirements by $136 million (S/2007/593, para. 31). Côte d’Ivoire also received $700,000 in emergency peacebuilding funds “to support dialogue between Côte d’Ivoire’s opposing political forces” (UN News, 18 Sep 2007). The headline pledges were misleading; by the end of 2007, the apparent funding windfall had turned into a funding shortfall - less than 10 percent of the pledged money had been disbursed to the UN funding structures by January of the following year (S/2008/1, para. 38) and only half of identified Ivorian critical humanitarian needs received funding (UN News, 1 Feb 2008). Ban attributed the delay in donor disbursement to Ivorian transparency and institutional capacity deficit: “Because of the delay in the launch of the disarmament programme and the lack of clarity on the way forward, donors generally delayed the disbursement of financial support for the disarmament programme” (S/2008/1, p. 19). Lack of progress meant lack of funding, and lack of funding delayed progress; this vicious circle had serious consequences for DDR and election preparations, evident as the year passed and, yet again, little progress was made in the primary tasks necessary for reunification and elections.

Performing peace

Gbagbo and Soro performed a series of reconciliation enactments while seeking donors. On 16 April 2007, they held a ceremony celebrating the start of dismantling the militias (S/2007/275, para. 10). On 19 May, Gbagbo officiated at a weapons destruction ceremony in the western town of Guiglo, the centre of Gbagbo’s regionally based political power, “officially launch[ing] the dismantling of militias (S/2007/593, para. 20). These ceremonies of integration and disarmament weren’t universally well-received. On 29 June, Forces Nouvelles commanders, rejecting the OPA and angered by what they saw as Soro cutting a separate deal which left them out, launched a rocket attack in Bouaké on the aircraft carrying Soro; four of his aides were killed but Soro himself escaped injury (S/2007/593, para. 2). Gbagbo broadcast a national statement condemning the attack, (S/2007/593, para. 2) and wrote to Ban requesting an independent international inquiry into the incident.
These requests for UN investigation of the attack on Soro were rebuffed in October, with no explanation given publicly (UN News, 1 Oct 2007).

On 30 July, Gbagbo and regional leaders attended another ceremony in Bouaké, Soro's base, to “launch the disarmament of the Forces Nouvelles.” Again, no further concrete actions were taken following the weapon destruction ceremony; with Forces Nouvelles and the state military unable to agree on FN ranks and quota numbers to enter the unified military, disarmament ground to a halt (S/2007/593, para. 20). FN again insisted on force integration before disarmament, while all the agreements made by political leadership had made integration of the fighting forces dependent on disarmament (S/2007/593, para. 21).

The Security Council, in response to Gbagbo’s insistence that the UN maintain a supporting rather than deciding role in the elections, terminated the role of the UN Special Envoy for Elections and rolled those electoral support functions into the portfolio of the next SRSG (UN News, 16 July 2007). In early August, Gbagbo publicly suggested that the elections “could take place by the end of 2007”. This statement was promptly rejected by opposition politicians, who argued against rushing the elections in advance of completing the population identification and voter registration processes (S/2007/593, para. 9). Reunifying the country in advance of elections was the priority for the Ivoirian government, including the dismantling of the military posts monitoring the Zone de Confiance. Despite increased levels of violence in the north, UNOCI and Licorne dismantled dozens of observation posts, and on 15 September, the final transformation of the Zone de Confiance into the “green line” took place (S/2008/1, para. 2).

OPA II, III, and IV
On 21 November 2007, Choi, the new SGSR for Côte d’Ivoire and head of UNOCI, arrived in Abidjan (UN News, 21 Nov 2007). A week later, the Ouagadougou principals signed the Second Agreement Complementing the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, appointing SAGEM Security to provide technical assistance with the elections, and signing the Third Agreement Complementing the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, which specified new benchmarks, timetables, and deadlines for starting DDR in parallel with restoring administrative control of the state in the north. OPA III, signed 28 November 2007, made
the optimistic statement that “the Presidential election will take place no later than the first week of the year 2008” (Article 12), even though citizenship and voter identification had made no substantial progress over the course of the previous two years. These processes were not even well-begun, let alone half-done. DDR, reintegration, and cantonment were not going well, either. Military units blocked roads protesting poor conditions of service. In the north, *FN* combatants hijacked private vehicles and looted stores, protesting non-payment of salaries (*S/2008/1*, para. 3 – 5). The *Fourth Supplementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement*, signed on 28 December, contained aspirational language on leadership “doing their utmost” to ensure the citizenship identification and electoral process succeeded, specifications for legislation for the “new national army,” more DDR promises, schemes to pay off the *FN* fighters, and yet more plans for the “restoration of the authority of the state” across the north.

Gbogbo and Soro made another ceremonial appearance on 22 December, this time together, on both sides of the former *Zone de Confiance*, marking the start of the official cantonment process, and assuring participants that all combatants would be absorbed into either the military, the civil services, or some form of other “reintegration programmes.” The estimate at that time included 5,000 *FN* combatants to join the national forces, 4,000 to join the national police and gendarmerie, 20,000 to join the civil service, and 6,000 to participate in reintegration programs of an unspecified nature, a combined estimate of 35,000 combatants requiring re-absorption into Ivoirian society from the initial remnant rebel force of 200 - 300 combatants in 2002. The Ivoirian state and partners had built five cantonment camps – and yet the combatants did not come, not surprising given the missing “financial capacity” necessary to make this elaborate DDR system work, with donors still holding back from dissatisfaction with the lack of “transparency and accountability” throughout the project (*S/2008/1*, paras. 23-25).

**Groundhog Years**
2008 and 2009 were groundhog years for Côte d’Ivoire, during which Gbagbo and Soros attempted to disband militias, unite the military forces, and prepare for the presidential election, but ended up enacting rituals of reconciliation. The United Nations continued to encourage, cajole, punish, and critique, with much the same results – performative peace
building with few concrete achievements. At the start of 2008, the new Ouagadougou annexes, signed at the end of 2007, appeared to provide fresh DDR and electoral momentum (S/2008/45, para. 3). Presidential elections were slated for June (UN News, 31 Jan 2008). Ban reported that “The overall risk of a resumption of hostilities between the defence and security forces of Côte d’Ivoire and the Forces Nouvelles is ... assessed as low” (S/2008/01, para. 2). He highlighted the symbolic and performative reunification events of the second half of the previous year and noted that Côte d’Ivoire’s “relations with international partners continued to improve” (S/2008/01, para. 2).

One concrete accomplishment towards national reunification did occur over the course of 2008: erasure of the residual Zone de Confiance (ZoC). Reunification of the country remained a primary state objective, a prerequisite for elections. The UN deemed direct military engagement between the two sides no longer a threat, but steps towards integration of the militaries showed no real progress beyond a few under-resourced patrols (S/2008/250, para. 8). By mid-April, UNOCI had dismantled "all by 2 of the 17 observation posts" along the ZoC (S/2008/250, para 15). However, there was still no substantial funding for DDR nor for the planned offloading of combatants to the “planned civic service programme” which had been intended to absorb 20,000 of the FN belligerents. Ban reported that international donors had “redirected funds to other projects” (S/2008/250, para. 19). Both regular forces and FN combatants were not receiving pay, including food and fuel allowances (S/2008/250, para. 15). FN violence flared from May through July. The last observation post was decommissioned on 30 July, bringing symbolic reunification to the still divided country (S/2008/451, para. 15 - 16). In addition to the replacement of the Zone de Confiance with the ‘Green Line,’ UNOCI and the Ivoirian government continued a slow march towards presidential elections, repairing polling stations (UN News, 29 Feb 2008), and socialising electoral certification criteria (UN News, 26 Mar 2008).

While Soro and Gbagbo were pleased with the mobile court citizenship identification progress, Ouattara’s party complained that “many Ivoirians had not been able to access the courts.” On 14 April, Gbagbo announced the election date of 30 November 2008 (S/2008/451, para. 3), which was publicly welcomed by UNOCI, with no mention made
about the projected date slipping from June until near the end of the year (UN News, 14 Apr 2008). At the end of April, to encourage the completion of the citizenship identification initiative, Ban visited Abidjan with a sweetener: $43 million which donors committed to the upcoming election (S/2008/451, para. 4 – 6). Ban was reporting internally that the electoral timelines were looking unlikely, given the slow pace and the mandatory tasks still ahead to prepare for the elections. He expressed concern that citizenship contentions could again flare into violence and acknowledged the unresolved core issue. FN demanded elections before DDR, whereas “most parties and civil society groups insist that disarmament must precede the elections” (S/2008/250, para. 42). Ban identified the “main stumbling block [as] the continued disagreement between the signatories of the Ouagadougou Agreement on the ranks and numbers of the Forces Nouvelles personnel to be integrated into the new national armed forces” (S/2008/250, para. 22).

In mid-2008, Ban changed his characterisation of reunification, reporting that “It is now expected that this issue will be addressed after the elections in November” (S/2008/451, para. 22). The FPI continued to push for disarmament and administrative reunification in front of the elections (S/2008/451, para. 3) while the state failed to allocate funds for the payment of allowances to the combatants (S/2008/250 para. 43) as well as other costs identified in the OPA, crippled by the politics of its international debt. The World Bank had frozen its accounts and the state had to prioritise "...the country’s arrears to the World Bank, which amounted to $240 million, in order to resume its relationship with the international financial institutions and facilitate relief of its $19 billion debt through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative” (S/2008/250, para. 40).

UN News in June and July 2008 highlighted progress towards elections and linked more money to more results, with Choi characterising the moment as “a pivotal post-conflict phase” (UN News, 19 Jun 2008) and Ban "commending" Ivoirian leaders for their commitment to the OPA and 81796 "commending" the UN for approving additional peacebuilding funds (S/2008/451, para. 34, 35; UN News, 14 Jul 2008; 17 Jul 2008). Even while ‘commending,’ the UN was expressing concern about the pace of election preparation in mid-July (UN News, 14 Aug 2008). The last UN news article promoting the upcoming
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elections was published mid-October – six weeks out from the projected election date at the end of November (UN News, 13 Oct 2008).

Third postponement – presidential elections 2008
From 17 October, UN reporting turned negative, warning that the elections “could become a source of instability” (UN News, 17 Oct 2008). The Group of Experts warned that the elections might trigger greater threats to security caused by the failures to demobilise rebel combatants, integrate the armed forces, and reunify the state, noting that “The redeployment exercise is symbolic, without any real hope of success unless tangible progress is demonstrated” (UN News, 20 Oct 2008). Despite these concerns, Choi continued to push hard for elections, claiming delay posed greater security risks (UN News, 27 Oct 2008). On November 7, the Security Council expressed “dismay” at the third delay in polls, attributed to the “unexpected” complexities of identification and registration processes (UN News, 7 Nov 2008). Messaging on elections for the rest of 2008 focussed on the successes of the ongoing identification and voter registration efforts (UN News, 28 Nov 2008, 12 Dec 2008).

Preparations for the presidential election dominated Ivoirian politics and UN messaging on Côte d’Ivoire throughout 2009. Starting the year with calls for establishing a robust electoral calendar, for progress on DDR, and for implementing the voter identification and registration programs, the momentum towards elections in autumn 2009 was dashed yet again on the rocks of the citizenship identification controversy, the stop-start issues of funding the elections, and the reforms necessary to conduct the elections. The winter of 2009 and the spring of 2010 were dominated by the scandal of the Grey List, in which citizen identification became hotly contested and questions of voter registration inflamed the country. The contested narratives of the Grey List is analysed in Chapter 12.

An equally important factor in the lack of election momentum was the failure of Forces Nouvelles to demobilise and ongoing division of the country, with the north remaining under warlord control. The OPA had specified that demobilisation and reunification would proceed in tandem with preparations for the elections. Election preparations progressed over the course of 2009 into the first half of 2010 while demobilisation and reunification
made no substantive progress at all. Nonetheless, the march to elections continued, despite violence in the spring of 2010 driven by anger at potential wide-spread voter fraud.

The Presidential Election of 2010
On 8 September 2010, after 3 years of preparation, Gbagbo, Soro, Ouattara and Bédié reached agreement on the composition of the final voters’ list (UN News, 8 Sep 2010). Gbagbo authorised 5,725,720 national identity cards issued to the Ivorians on the final voters list (S/2010/537, para. 13). Choi “certified the final voters list” (S/2010/537, para. 16) and called for the deployment of additional election observers to “enhance the credibility of the poll results” (UN News, 14 Oct 2010). The Security Council authorised additional 500 UNOCI troops in advance of the elections (S/RES/1942).

The campaigning for the presidential election began on 19 October and was reported as “calm and orderly.” There was considerable internal controversy on polling and vote counting procedures, with decisions to tabulate results electronically, then manually, then back to electronically, with a compromise announced on 26 October to use both manual and electronic tabulation and transmission of the votes (S/2010/600, para. 7). Voting on 31 October produced a high turnout, estimated at 80% (UN News, 3 Nov 2010).

On 3 November, the PDCI issued a statement alleging irregularities and lack of transparency in the first-round voting and called for a recount (S/2010/537, para. 20). The IEC announced the first partial results of the first-round presidential election four days later, on 4 November, with the vote split: Gbagbo winning 38.04%; Ouattara 32.07% and Bédié 25.24% (S/2010/600, para. 20). The PDCI, the FPI, and the RHDP (Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix) were unanimous on one point: all major political parties “expressed concerns” about the results and called for a recount. On 6 November, the Constitutional Council proclaimed the results, validating the provisional results announced by the IEC on 4 November, and set the date for second round of voting between Gbagbo and Ouattara on 21 November, later extended to 28 November (S/2010/537, para. 21, 23). On 7 November, Ouattara publicly pledged to share power with Bédié if elected and Bédié called upon his supporters to vote for Ouattara (S/2010/537, para. 24). Two weeks after the initial round of voting, on 12 November, Choi certified the
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Second round voting was completed on 28 November, but from the start of balloting, complaints of voter fraud, violence, and intimidation were lodged with the Ivoirian Constitutional Council by political parties across the spectrum. Conflict within the IEC caused problems with provisional certification of the vote, and the IEC passed its deadline without an official proclamation of the provisional results. On 3 December, the President of the IEC, an Ouattara ally, pronounced Ouattara the winner, in contravention of multiple IEC regulations. Several days later, the Constitutional Council invalidated ballots from four regions in the north on the grounds of voting irregularities and declared Gbagbo the president of Côte d’Ivoire. The Constitutional Council’s official decision in favor of Gbagbo was overruled by SRSG Choi in favor of Ouattara. Côte d’Ivoire entered the time of two presidents and began the descent into the Second Ivoirian Civil War.

Summary - Chapter 6
I've outlined the contested events of 'No War, No Peace' between August 2003 and December 2010, as the Ivoirian government struggled to reunite the divided country geographically, administratively, and politically. Starting with the Third Battle of Abidjan in March 2003, triggered by opposition protests during threats of another coup attempt, I’ve documented Ivoirian efforts to maintain continuity of government under their constitution. I've highlighted Operation Dignité, the government attempt to reunite the country militarily when the north declared succession, and the resulting Fourth Battle of Abidjan in November 2004, triggered by French destruction of the Ivoirian air force. The Fifth Battle of Abidjan in January 2006, responding to UN pressure to dissolve the government, preceded the Ivoirian government's turn away from the UN/French led 'peace process' to the OPA. The remainder of the chapter charts Ivoirian efforts from 2007 through 2010 to prepare for national elections while negotiating UN mandates within the constraints of stop-start funding and the intransigence of the northern warlords. I highlighted the tensions between the
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processes of reunification and elections and signposted the historical context of the controversial events at the centre of the contested narratives analysed in Parts III and IV.

I return to analysis of the contested narratives of the 2010 presidential election in Chapter 12. In the following chapter, I provide the historical context of the events of the Second Ivoirian Civil War and the post-war transition to the end of the interventions in 2017.
Chapter 7. The Second Ivoirian Civil War

The Two Presidents

On 4 December 2010, Gbagbo was sworn in as President of Côte d’Ivoire at the Presidential Palace in Abidjan, in front of the Ivoirian Constitutional Council by the President of the Council as specified in the Ivoirian Constitution and Ouattara wrote his own “swearing in” as president in a letter (S/2011/211, para. 21). Ban reported the two investitures internally but didn’t report them publicly. I will return to the importance of the presidential investiture in narratives of legitimacy in Chapters 11 and 12.

On 5 December, former South African President Mbeki arrived in Abidjan on an AU mediation mission. The following day, SG Ban conferred with African leaders on the Ivoirian political deadlock (UN News, 6 Dec 2010). On 7 December, the UN “stepped up diplomacy in support” of Ouattara and Choi briefed “an extraordinary ECOWAS summit in Abuja” (UN News, 7 Dec 2010). ECOWAS then endorsed Choi’s certification of Ouattara and asked Gbagbo to step down (S/2011/211, para. 23). On 8 December, the Security Council issued a press statement reiterating support for Choi and called upon “all Ivoirian stakeholders to respect the outcome of the election in view of ECOWAS’ recognition of Alassane Dramane Ouattara as president-elect” (UN News, 8 Dec 2010). The following day, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) endorsed the ECOWAS decision of 7 December to recognise Ouattara as the winner of the election (S/2011/211, para. 23). On 15 December, Ban called upon “Mr. Gbagbo ….to step down to allow President-elect Ouattara to assume his mandate” and called on Ivoirian stakeholders “refrain from any actions that could provoke violence” including the possibility of “reigniting civil war” (UN News, 15 Dec 2010).

On 16 December, Ouattara supporters attempted to gain control of state media facilities and state institutions; approximately 30 people died in the violence. The Security Council urged stakeholders to “exercise restraint” (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) lead prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo warned that the ICC would pursue “the perpetrators of any deadly violence” in Côte d’Ivoire (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6). On 17 December, Ban again “demand[ed that the] outgoing president step down after election defeat” (UN News, 16 Dec 2010).
The Sixth Battle of Abidjan — December 2010 to April 2011

The Second Ivorian Civil War, and the sixth Battle of Abidjan, began on 18 December, when Gbagbo officially withdrew government consent, demanding “all foreign peacekeepers” leave Côte d’Ivoire immediately, and charged Licorne and UNOCI with “colluding with the rebels” (BBC, 2010). Ban immediately rejected the demand for UNOCI forces to leave Côte d’Ivoire (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6) and Ivorian government forces fired at UNOCI troops for the first time (UN News, 18 Dec 2010). There was a short hiatus at the new year, broken when ECOWAS and AU mediators returned to Côte d’Ivoire and reported that Gbagbo had promised to lift the Golf Hotel blockade and that he was “ready to negotiate without any preconditions” (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6). Ouattara responded that Gbagbo had to leave office because “the time for negotiations was over” (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6). On 6 January, Ban announced his intention to seek additional troops (UN News, 6 Jan 2011). The following day, President Mills of Ghana announced that he would not contribute troops to UNOCI (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6).

On 11 and 12 January, violent clashes between Ouattara and Gbagbo supporters and multiple deaths were reported (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6). On 13 January, Ivorians attacked and burned UN vehicles in multiple incidents (UN News, 13 Jan 2011). Ban increased diplomatic pressure, meeting with African leaders (UN News, 17 Jan 2011). On 18 January, Ivorian state military forces fired at a UNOCI patrol, the UN reporting the incident as “armed men in military uniforms” firing a UNOCI vehicle, not acknowledging that the actors were state military (UN News, 18 Jan 2011). The Security Council authorised an additional 2,000 extra troops (S/RES/1967), Choi describing the additional troops as providing a “rapid reaction capability” for the protection of citizens in Abidjan and the west of the country (UN News, 19 Jan 2011).

French President Sarkozy declared his support for the “decision by the African Union Peace and Security Council to set up a high-level panel to help resolve the political deadlock” (UN News, 30 Jan 2011). A week later, the Chairman of ECOWAS criticised South Africa for sending a war ship to the Gulf of Guinea. A South African Defence Ministry spokesman stated that the government was maintaining neutrality in the presidential dispute and that the ship had been sent “in case it was needed” (UNSC, 2017b, p. 5). On 8 February, Ban told
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an AU summit that “the UN will continue to work with the AU in seeking ‘a solution that upholds the expressed will of the Ivorian people,’ in Côte d’Ivoire” (UN News, 8 Feb 2011). March 3 UN attack helicopters arrived in Abidjan, and a UNOCI spokesperson announced that the helicopters would be “used to promote peace and provide protection” (UN News, 3 Mar 2011). The narratives centred on these events building up to the combat of the Second Ivorian Civil War are analysed in Chapters 11 and 12.

Abobo Market Deaths
Military engagement escalated in March, with heavy fighting reported between Ivorian state military and FN rebels and supporters on both sides in Abidjan, concentrated in Abobo district. UNOCI expressed concern over Ivorians trapped in the Abobo district of Abidjan “where fighting has been raging for several days” (UN News, 1 Mar 2011b). On 3 March, six or seven women were reported killed by state forces during a demonstration in support of Ouattara at Abobo market (Provenzano, 2011; UN News, 10 Mar 2011, 11 Mar 2011). On March 17, exchange of mortar shelling across the Abobo market between Ivorian state military and Licorne forces resulted in multiple deaths and injuries (Konan, 2017). On 18 March, Ban described the Abobo deaths of civilians caught in the crossfire between the two military camps as "flagrant violations of human rights" and "abusive acts" committed by "pro-Gbagbo forces" (UN News, 17 Mar 2011), without mention of the engagement of French forces in the combat. This was followed by the Security Council “voic[ing] outrage at deadly shelling of Ivorian market” and the ICC opening a war crimes investigation (UN News, 21 Mar 2011). The accounts of the Abobo violence form hotly contested UN narratives of the responsibility to protect, analysed in Chapter 11.

Duékoué massacre
On 28 March, one of the most violent events of the Second Ivorian Civil War occurred at Duékoué, in western Côte d’Ivoire, in fighting between Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), Ouattara’s re-named Forces Nouvelles, and pro-Gbagbo partisans.
Counterhegemonic accounts characterise the deaths as a massacre rather than a battle. Estimates of deaths varied widely, with later estimates indicating that a thousand civilians or more died in the fighting (ACC, 2012; Robinson, 2011; Schafer, 2011). The deaths at Duékoué and the “tropical blitzkrieg” (Boisbouvier, 2011b) during which the massacre
occurred constitutes a primary contested narrative of the interventions and will be analysed in Chapters 11 and 13.

As Ouattara forces captured Yamassoukro and San Pedro, Gbagbo called for a cease-fire. The Security Council demanded instead that Gbagbo step down. Combat across Abidjan continued throughout the first ten days of April as the FRCI advanced into the capital, meeting heavy resistance from the Ivoirian state forces, pro-administration militias, and 'irregulars'. International commentators reported severe abuses by Ouattara forces against civilians during the military campaign as they conquered territory across the west, centre, and south of the country (Toto, 2013; Tazeserch, 2012; UN News, 3 Apr 2011; Boisbouvier, 2011b; Robinson, 2011; Emerson, 2011; Schafer, 2011).

The first eleven days of April saw the highest level of direct military engagement between intervenors and state forces; UNOCI and Licorne forces fought directly against the Ivoirian state military. UNOCI reported their headquarters were “under attack” and called for “restraint” (UN News, 1 Apr 2011). On 3 April, UNOCI and Licorne secured the FHB Airport. Ban officially requested Licorne provide direct military assistance to UNOCI and authorised "all necessary steps to protect civilians" from the “use of heavy weaponry” against them (UN News, 4 Apr 2011). On 4 April, the UN reported that UN and French attack helicopters launched a “preventative strike” strike against national army forces at the Akouedo camp in Abidjan (UN News, 4 Apr 2011), while the BBC reported five targets bombed by UNOCI and Licorne: “Mr Gbagbo's residence, a republican guard base, state television headquarters, the Akban paramilitary base and the Akouedo arms depot” (BBC, 2011a). On 7 April, the UN reported that UNOCI troops securing the Felix Houphouët-Boigny Bridge on 6 April “were shelled from the lagoon side late yesterday and had to return fire” (UN News, 7 Apr 2011). On 9 April, UNOCI accused the Ivoirian military of shelling the Golf Hotel, which the government denied (UNSC, 2017b p. 4).

On 10 April, UNOCI and Licorne forces began aerial bombardment of the Presidential Palace. Ban claimed that the UN forces were beginning operations “in response to attack by pro-Gbagbo forces” and accused the “pro-Gbagbo forces” of “having fired rocket-propelled
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grenades at UNOCI patrols and positions and used armoured personnel carriers mounted with heavy machine guns to attack civilians in the neighbourhoods of Adjame and Attécoumbé, wounding dozens of people in the process” (UN News, 10 Apr 2011). This narrative that "pro-Gbagbo forces" (the Ivoirian state military) used heavy weaponry directly targeting civilians plays an important role in the UN's justification of its engagement in combat against the Gbagbo government and will be analysed in Part IV.

Capturing Gbagbo, ending the war
On 11 April, FRCI, French, UN, US, and Burkinabe troops were reported to have launched a direct assault on the Presidential Palace, captured, and arrested Gbagbo, his wife, and supporters sheltering in the compound, ending the war (Koepf, 2012; Glaser, 2014, p. 43 - 44). The UN account states “Gbagbo (together with his wife) surrendered to Ouattara’s forces at the former’s residence. Gbagbo was subsequently detained at the Golf Hotel ... under UN protection” (UNSC, 2017b, p. 4), leaving out any mention of the international forces participating in the assault and capture/surrender.

Aftermath

On 12 April, Ban warned against “retribution towards Gbagbo’s supporters” and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) appointed a Commission of Inquiry into allegations of “serious abuses and violations of human rights” committed by both sides in the Ivoirian conflict (UN News, 12 Apr 2011). On 13 April, the head of the Ivoirian state army, with “other heads of the national security agencies, pledged allegiance to Ouattara’s administration in a televised statement” (UNSC, 2017b, p. 3) and Gbagbo was transferred to northern Côte d’Ivoire (UNSC, 2017b, p. 4). A Security Council Press Statement welcomed “President Ouattara” who was “now in position to assume all his responsibilities as Head of...
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State” and “urged all Ivorians to abstain from any reprisals, revenge and provocation and to work together to achieve national reconciliation” (SC/10224-AFR/2163, 2011). The humanitarian messaging linked the responsibility to protect to the UN’s military engagement during the four months of conflict from December through Gbagbo’s capture in mid-April (UN News, 3 May 2011, 10 May 2011, 23 Sep 2011, 30 Sep 2011). The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ narrative will be examined in Chapter 11, in analysis of UN narratives of impartiality and the use of force.

Ouattara becomes president
On 21 April, unmentioned in UN public reporting, Paul Yao N’Dré, President of the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, retrieved from Ghana where he had fled during the war, met with Ouattara in Abidjan and the Africa Union officially recognised the Ouattara government (UNSC, 2017b, p. 3). On 5 May, N’Dré "reversed the election results" of 3 December (S/2011/387, para. 16), “[b]ecause he [Ouattara] had to be officially proclaimed head of state by the Constitutional Council” (Naudé, 2011, my translation). On 21 May, Ouattara was formally inaugurated as President of Côte d’Ivoire in a ceremony attended by Ban, Choi, and Le Roy (S/2011/387, para. 16).

Prosecuting Gbagbo
ICC Chief Prosecutor Ocampo-Moreno sought authorisation from the ICC to open an investigation into crimes committed following the Ivoirian presidential election; he included among the incidents to be investigated the Duékoué massacre (UNSC, 2017b, p. 3). In response to criticism that the UN had failed in its duty to protect the losing combatants, particularly Gbagbo, on 4 July Choi met with Gbagbo in Korhogo, and on 2 August, the acting human rights chief for UNOCI met with Laurent Gbagbo in Korhogo and Simone Gbagbo in Odienné to “foster reconciliation” and to ensure that they were held in compliance with mandated international standards (UN News, 4 Aug 2011). The visits to the Gbagbos were conducted at a time of increasing violence by the Ouattara military forces, including a surge in extrajudicial killings and violent repression (UN News, 11 Aug 2011). In August 2011, twelve members of the Gbagbo administration were charged by the Ivoirian state with crimes of violence committed during the Second Civil War, and the following week Gbagbo and his wife were charged with economic crimes (UNSC, 2017b, p. 3). The ICC authorised an
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investigation into the post-electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire in October (UNSC, 2017b, p. 3). On 29 November, Gbagbo was transported to the ICC at den Hague to face charges as an ‘indirect co-perpetrator’ of crimes against humanity, including “murder, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts” (UNSC, 2017b, p. 3).

2011 legislative elections

The 2011 legislative elections were viewed as the first real test of the post-war political settlement. SRSG Koenders, Choi’s replacement, arrived in Abidjan on 24 October 2011, certifying Ivoirian legislative elections his first task in office (UNSC, 2017b, p. 3). The elections “unfold[ed] in a positive, calm atmosphere,” (UN News, 11 Dec 2011) and were described by Ban as “an important step towards the full restoration of constitutional order in Côte d’Ivoire” (UN News, 12 Dec 2011). However, the FPI boycotted the elections, the pro-FPI newspaper was banned by the Ouattara, and pro-FPI journalists were reported arrested and jailed. Turnout was low, less than half the presidential election (S/2011/807, para 7). Koenders “partially certified” the legislative election results on 17 February 2012 (UN News, 17 February 2012). By-elections for constituencies with annulled results were held 22 – 23 February 2012 (UN News, 26 Feb 2012; 27 Feb 2012). The staged certification of the legislative elections followed the same protocol as the first round of the Ivoirian presidential election in October 2010 but differed markedly from Choi’s 'one and done' certification of Ouattara as president in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections. I analyse the narratives of certification in Chapter 12.

Transitional politics: Impunity, violence, and resistance

From 2012 until mid-2015, the UN focussed on disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of the 'ex-combatants' in Côte d’Ivoire and engaged in critiques of the impunity and violence which continued under the Ouattara regime.² Violent resistance by opponents of the regime, including reports of coup plotting, and possible coup attempts,

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continued during the transition period. These years also saw sporadic violence against UNOCI and appeals for support to UNOCI in response to the continuing violence. Following the legislative election of 2011 and the presidential election of 2015, the UN began a phased drawdown of the troops in Côte d’Ivoire.

Benchmarking transition

From February 2013, the UN 'benchmarked' Ivorian progress “towards the achievement of long-term stability in Côte d’Ivoire”. Concerns about transitional justice and progress towards “national reconciliation” were the primary topics of UN messaging as the mission wound down and the UN prepared for exit. In April 2014, the US ambassador drew attention to the “unmet goals” of the Security Council in Côte d’Ivoire; no significant security sector reform, no effective demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, no meaningful reconciliation, and no equitable justice for crimes committed during the crisis” (S/PV.7163, 29 Apr 2014).

As an adjunct to benchmarking and to encourage progress towards transition, the Security Council instituted a requirement for “progress reports” on DDR and security sector reform (S/RES/2219). The 2015 presidential election was described as a “critical milestone” in the transition process (S/RES/2226), with little violence, boycotted by the opposition, Ouattara the winner against no serious competition, and less half the turnout of the 2011 election. It was declared a success and an indicator that UNOCI could be wound down (UN News, 27 Oct 2015, 2 Nov 2015, 13 Jan 2016, 20 Jan 2016). In 2016, the Ouattara administration quickly pushed through constitutional reforms which met with wide-spread anger among opposition politicians (S/2018/89, para. 3, 4) but were approved by referendum on 30 October (UN News, 3 Nov 2016) and followed by national legislative elections in December (UN News, 21 Dec 2016).

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3 SC/10668-AFR/2403-PKO/311; Security Council, p. 3; UN News, 8 Jun 2012
6 UNSC, 2017B p. 2; S/2013/197; S/RES/2112; A/HRC/29/49
Mission Accomplished
The UN remained concerned about the slow (or non-existent) progress towards DDR, security sector reform, transitional justice, and “national reconciliation” right up to the preparations for final closure in February 2017. However, on 30 June 2017, UNOCI officially ended, and the offices closed. At mission transition from May 2017, the UN abruptly changed from reports of ongoing, chronic failures to reform to success narratives as the UN declared “Mission Accomplished.” UN narratives at the end of the Ivoirian interventions quickly became operationalised as success stories of the liberal peace, discussed in Chapter 14.

Epilogue – the release of Gbagbo
Gbagbo remained in custody for eight years following his transfer to the ICC in 2011. He was acquitted of all charges on 15 January and released (UN News, 15 Jan 2019). The decision was appealed by the prosecutor, and on 16 July 2019, the judges confirmed the dismissal of all charges and pronounced that there was 'no case to answer' (Peniguet, 2019a).

Summary, Part II
I reviewed the historical context of the contested strategic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions: the creation of the Ivoirian state, the deep and problematic historical connections between France and Côte d'Ivoire, and the political and economic events leading to First Ivoirian Civil War. I then outlined the significant intervention events of the First Ivoirian Civil War, the interim period of the 'false peace,' the important political and military events leading to and through the Second Ivoirian Civil War, and post-war winding up of the international intervention missions. I have highlighted the events on which the contested strategic narratives are founded within the historical context in which they occurred and have signposted the strategic narrative analysis to come within the event timeline.

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In Part III, I discuss the academic and professional literatures which present and interpret these events across the hegemonic/counterhegemonic spectrum, the ways in which these literatures both create and reflect this ideological polarisation, and the role of analysts as proxy narrators in the interpretations of the interventions.
Part III: Literature as contested discourse

Conceptualising academic and professional literature as part of the larger discourse of the interventions is important in theorising the promotion and maintenance of the hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives of intervention and their resulting worldviews. Hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors have used the literatures for persuasion and influence and in writing the history of the interventions on both sides of the discourse.

Arsenault, et al. (2018) identify media, academics, journalists, think tanks, and other professional writers and analysts as "legitimating agents", critical to the "persuasion of stakeholders," establishment of "exposure and momentum," the "tilt[ing of] perceptions of validity," "thus compel[ling] members to follow the script" (Arsenault et al. 2018, p. 201-203). The authors in this discussion to follow were the legitimising agents through which "A strategic narrative gains momentum -- that is, diffusion, normative authority, and a sense of inevitability" (Arsenault et al., 2018, p. 203). As such, they were not merely analysts or observers, they became active protagonists in the narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire.

I assembled a corpus of approximately 200 books, electronic articles, news reports, NGO reports, and academic articles on the conflict and the interventions. In Chapter 4, I provided a brief summary of the process by which I identified the hegemonic/counterhegemonic spectrum of polarisation in the strategic narratives of intervention. In Part III, I will warrant this characterisation of the discourse as polarised along the hegemonic/counterhegemonic spectrum, detailing the indicators of positionality which other analysts have highlighted, and the ones which I identified, to position authors along the spectrum. The academic and professional literature reviewed below is balanced across the hegemonic - counterhegemonic spectrum with third of the works written from a hegemonic stance, a third which I categorised as neutral, and a third counterhegemonic in orientation.

The corpus is also roughly balanced between conflict literature and intervention literature, with a few of the works covering both intervention and conflict topics equally. I found more of the intervention literature polarised, and much of the conflict literature neutral and less polarised. Chapter 8 describes the polarisation in the literatures and explains why
polarisation is important in our understanding of the narrative war for Côte d’Ivoire. 
Chapter 9 reviews the conflict literature, focussing on the conflict root causes literature. 
Chapter 10 analyses the intervention literature.
Chapter 8. The polarised discourses of the Ivoirian interventions

In Part I, I claimed that the strategic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions could be best grouped into hegemonic and counterhegemonic adversarial camps, and that polarisation is a dispositive characteristic of narrative warfare. In the context of narrative warfare, writing about conflict and international interventions while remaining outside the fight is a difficult task, even for those analysts who would choose to remain non-aligned. In this chapter, I describe this polarisation of the literatures and the resulting polemicised discourses which exclude alternative perspectives and create 'closed circles' of knowledge and belief characteristic of narrative warfare.

Differentiating the conflict and intervention literatures
Ivoirian intervention and conflict literatures are distinct but overlapping discourses which span the range of positions from strongly hegemonic to neutral to strongly counterhegemonic. I did not initially distinguish between the conflict and the intervention literatures, since the two literatures cover approximately the same time period, the same country, the 'same' conflict, and are usually not explicitly differentiated. The Ivoirian conflict, however, started before the First Ivoirian Civil War. According to Akindès the Ivoirian conflict began with the 1999 Guéï coup d'état (2004, p. 11), although it could plausibly be dated as far back as the mid-1980s, with the emergence of multiparty political contestation and the financial shocks of the mid-80s.

Identifying the end of the conflict is more problematic. Did it end with the capture of Gbagbo in April 2011, or somewhere in the transition to post-intervention, on 30 June 2017, when the UN mission concluded? Or is the 'post-conflict' Côte d’Ivoire narrative problematic, given the high levels of ongoing violence in Côte d’Ivoire? The Ivoirian conflict and the Ivoirian interventions are not co-terminus. The Ivoirian conflict ignited years before the formal international interventions, (2002 - mid-2017), and continues to this day. I will argue in the conclusion to this thesis that while the formal interventions have concluded, the informal intervention of France in Côte d’Ivoire and the larger Ivoirian conflict continues.
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In addition to different start/end points in the two literatures, there is an asymmetry in usage and referencing. The Ivoirian conflict literature serves as a foundational discourse (body of knowledge) for the intervention literature. The intervention literature often references articles in the conflict literature, but the conflict literature does not often reference either the historical fact of the international interventions or the intervention literature. The basic research and findings of the conflict literature is frequently deployed by both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators, but the conflict authors themselves rarely engage directly in the production of intervention narratives, since they tend to stay away from the discussion of both the interventions or the intervenors, as I will describe below. While I engage primarily with the intervention literature in my analysis, I include a summary of the conflict literature below because the bifurcation of research topics and authors clearly indicate the social pressures at work in the current production of research on the Ivoirian conflict and the Ivoirian interventions, and the strategies which individual authors deploy to work in a highly charged and polarised environment.

The production of Ivoirian conflict and intervention literatures
From the outbreak of the First Ivoirian Civil War, the conflict literature which is published in the formal, peer-reviewed English and French-language academic journals has covered conflict issues in Côte d’Ivoire before, during, and after the interventions, but rarely mentions the intervention missions. This literature is produced by Ivoirian academics resident in Côte d’Ivoire and international academics, often in partnership. Ivoirian academics have confirmed to me that research on the interventions is still too sensitive in Côte d’Ivoire to be undertaken by Ivoirian academics working within the Ivoirian academic mainstream, so they have focussed their research efforts on the the larger conflict and related historical and sociological topics, but not on the international interventions. Ivoirian academics have also told me of direct control of the discourse by the Ivoirian state in limiting Ivoirian international presentations on the interventions to official state spokesmen.¹⁰

¹⁰ Confidential communication, December 2018, Abidjan
Many external academics researching within Côte d’Ivoire work with Ivoirian academic partners, and concern about potential consequences for their Ivoirian partners may shape the framing of the research topics. Both international and Ivoirian academics are usually funded by external universities, governments, and international organisations. Researchers respond to the tasking of funders, and do not welcome the difficulties in funding research which challenges the hegemonic discourse of the intervention. Few researchers working within Côte d'Ivoire want to tangle with the Ivoirian state on touchy topics residual to the civil wars, such as the disposition of the 2010 second-round presidential election ballots, which I’ve been told is 'still too controversial to talk about.'

Some Ivoirian conflict literature analysts have managed to maintain or approximate neutrality with careful use of language, vagueness, and a focus on conflict but not the co-occurring and interwoven interventions. An example of this careful, exclusionary neutrality is found in Speight throughout his writing on rebel governance in the north of Côte d’Ivoire during the central years of the interventions. Speight barely mentions the interventions which were omnipresent throughout that time and that place (Speight, 2013, 2015; Martin, Speight, Piccolino, 2017; Piccolino, Martin, Speight, 2018). This caesura is anomalous, given the historical context and events of that time and place, indicating a conscious positioning outside the narrative war.

In contrast, the literature focussed specifically on the interventions published in French and English-language academic journals is produced primarily by non-Ivoirian academics with hegemonic orientation who do not identify Ivoirian academic partners in their work. The dissident, counterhegemonic academic intervention literature is produced by Ivoirian or international academics who do not work within Ivoirian academia. Expatriate Ivoirian academics working within the counterhegemonic discourse of the interventions have published a number of books and web articles in France and the United States. However, these counterhegemonic Ivoirian authors are not published in formal academic journals.

11 These observations regarding funding and research programs for Ivoirian academics are based on confidential conversations held in Abidjan and Yamassoukro in November and December 2017, December 2018, and February 2020.
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It is politically, economically, and professionally risky for Ivorian academics who remain in Côte d’Ivoire to write on the interventions, to produce any critique of the interventions and the current administration in Côte d’Ivoire. During the Second Ivoirian Civil War, universities were targeted by Ouattara forces as centres of support for the Gbagbo government (Toto, 2013). This suppression of dissent continues with the ongoing restriction of academic research within Côte d’Ivoire and serves as one of the ways in which the Ivoirian state continues to control the narrative and to fight the narrative war for Côte d’Ivoire. Risk to their livelihoods results in silencing of openly counterhegemonic research by Ivoirian academics, while academic Ivoirians in the diaspora, as well as other non-Ivoirian academics, have more freedom of critique. This restriction prevents Ivoirian academics in Côte d’Ivoire from publishing their own research, and their own narratives, on the interventions and creates a systemic bias in favor of hegemonic and exogenous accounts in the academic intervention literature.

A polemical and polarised literature
As noted in Chapter 3, one of the characteristics of narrative warfare is the emergence of highly polarised strategic narratives and discourse. The Ivoirian interventions literature displays the polarised strategic narratives characteristic of narrative warfare, along a spectrum of hegemonic to counterhegemonic positioning. At each end of the spectrum, the discourse excludes arguments, facts, and references from the opposite positionality. The hegemonic literature references, utilises, and speaks to other hegemonic writers, and the counterhegemonic literature tends to be similarly self-referential. While hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators sometimes challenge an adversarial narrative directly, they rarely cite an author on the other side of the divide.

Identifying positionality
Much of the literature takes a stance for or against one set of protagonists, usually without acknowledging that the analysis is preferential to one side (or the other). In this section, I discuss several articles on the polarisation and polemicisation of the Ivoirian discourse which support my argument that discourses are polarised. I then describe the recurring patterns which I have identified as indicative of hegemonic or counterhegemonic positioning for specific authors.
Several Ivoirian academics have analysed polarisation in Ivoirian discourse. Blé (2009, p. 188) identified the use of brutalist iconography, caricature, and the strategic use of specific words, symbols, images, colours, and space deployed in the Ivoirian media war for Côte d’Ivoire. Kakdeu (2013, p. 147) documented the binary "linguistic codification of violence in political communication in Côte d’Ivoire" between the Ouattara and Gbagbo camps (my translation). He describes specific vocabulary used in in hate speech and political metaphor, the mirror imaging of the language, and the dialectic of ad hominem valorisation and vilification of political champions and adversaries. Kakdeu linked polarisation and polemicisation of Ivoirian political discourse to the "bipolarisation of the country" (p. 148, my translation) during the Ivoirian wars, and stressed that his goal is not to "indicate which camp was more violent, but to bring out the methods utilised" (p. 149, my translation) in this polemised discourse, similar in purpose to my focus on narrative strategies.

The contestation strategies identified by Kakdeu include impoliteness, victimisation, instrumentalisation, use of polemic, declarations and accusations without formal proof, the use of paradox, verbal intensifiers, warnings, and coercive language with the goal of intimidation, pressure, dissuasion, and condemnation. He also listed the instrumentalisation of nationalist and imperialist discourses, and describes the ways in which both camps deploy polemicised language in offence and in defence of their leaders, parties, and political positions. Outside Côte d’Ivoire, Boisbouvier (2011) documented the polarisation of discourse and positionality among African intellectuals into pro-Gbagbo vs. pro-Ouattara camps in the wake of the Second Civil War. Charbonneau (2014) also identified the discursive strategies of binary oppositions in the polarised discourse of the Ivoirian interventions such as the creation of savior and victim, imperialist and freedom-fighter narratives..

These authors are describing the same strategies I've defined in Chapter 3 with variant names. I have used these linguistic patterns and markers in my analysis of narrator positionality in the academic and professional literatures reviewed here. Narrators who deploy strongly worded ad hominem attacks or encomiums and polarised language are usually aware of their partisan positioning and easy to place along the spectrum of
positionality. In contrast, authors who use more neutral language may be neutral in their positionality, or may simply use less highly charged and emotive terms to argue for a polarised position. Their awareness of their own positionality is almost certainly less strong than that of a strongly invested partisan narrator, even when they replicate polarised narratives which they take as 'given.'

I use three metrics of polarisation in my analysis of narrator positionality: use of specific 'unwarranted assertions,' taken as established and requiring no further warranting or evidence, equivalent to Kakdeu's "declarations and accusations without formal proof" (p. 159, my translation); ad hominem vilification/valorisation; and the use of polemicated, emotive, and normative language. I describe each of these three narrative strategies in the following three sections, and explain the analytic process which I have used to sort writers into hegemonic, neutral, or counterhegemonic positions.

(Un)warranted assertions and "undeniable facts"
Both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators indicate their positionality by what they take as established fact. There will always be specific assertions unique to each side in a narrative war which are taken as given. In this section, I explore a set of foundational assertions which are 'taken as given' within the hegemonic discourse. Charbonneau specifies "four undeniable groups of facts that are relevant to the 2010-2011 post-election crisis"; that Gbagbo's methods invited or necessitated violence, that "the UN-French interventions stopped the worst violence and saved lives by putting an end to the war," that "without French military intervention, the fighting might have continued for much longer," and that "every significant state or international organisation and authority recognised the electoral victor of Ouattara" (Charbonneau, 2014, pp. 625-626).

These "four undeniable groups of facts" are repeated within the mainstream intervention literature and are assumed to require no warranting (validating), even while there remains reasonable grounds for challenging the accuracy, validity, and facticity of each of the four assertions. The declaration that these "facts" are "undeniable" (and therefore require no formal proof) in itself renders these propositions literally 'unwarranted.' These assertions are challenged in the counterhegemonic literature. I am not arguing here that these
assertions are true or false. Rather, I am arguing that these assertions are "unwarranted" (declared accepted as fact without requiring proof) and serve as stable markers of hegemonic positioning. The converse is also true; the counterhegemonic literature contains foundational assertions, the inverse of these four propositions, which are accepted as established "fact" within that discourse and analysed in Chapter 13.

Ad hominem vilification and valorisation
Language which attacks or praises an individual is an indicator of positionality along a polarised spectrum. Ad hominem attacks directed against Gbagbo are a consistent marker of hegemonic positioning. Gbagbo is cast as a pantomime villain much like Gaddafi in much of the polemicised hegemonic literature. Labeling Gbagbo a "tropical Nero" (Laloupo, 2010), a "very brutal dictator" (Bangura, 2012), "a cross between former presidents Duvalier, Mobutu and Marcos" (Emeagwali, 2011), "the baker, one who rolls his enemies and former allies in flour before consigning them to the oven" (Smith, 2011), or Simone Gbagbo as "extremist" (Marshall-Fratani, 2006, p. 25) are examples of hegemonic ad hominem attacks. Conversely, pro-Gbagbo language indicates counterhegemonic positioning. Reference to Gbagbo as "the father of Ivorian democracy" (Fagiola, 2016, p. 27), "the father of the multiparty system in Côte d'Ivoire" (Frindéthié, 2016, p. 106), or "a worthy son of Africa" (Messah, et al. 2012) are examples of counterhegemonic valorisation.

Akindès (2004, p. 35 - 36) provided examples of the hegemonic version of valorisation, characterising Ouattara as "a symbol of modernity," "a man of the world," a "Kong aristocrat." Examples of counterhegemonic ad hominem villanisation of Ouattara include "the personification of the impure identity," and the "prototype of the 'false Ivoirian'" (Akindès, 2004, p 39). Banégas (2011, p. 462) noted the ad hominem villanisation of Ouattara as "the overseas candidate," "a putischiste and a fomenter of revolt." Busch (2011) characterised Ouattara as a "half-free slave" (my translation).

Polemical, emotive, normative language
In addition to grounding positionality in specific assertions, and ad hominem vilification or valorisation, naming and framing play central roles in hegemonic and counterhegemonic positioning. Words and phrases with stronger emotive connotation indicate higher levels of
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polarisation. Schmidt used emotive, polemical language within a predominantly hegemonic set of narratives, "Opposed to a peace that might put an end to their plunder, Gbagbo and his associates encouraged Young Patriots and allied militias to wage bloody street battles..." (2018, p. 226). The phrases "opposed to peace," "plunder," and "bloody street battles" are polemical and normative, as is the claim that protagonists engaged in these battles for personal gain, rather than for valid political goals (2018, p. 231 - 233). Yet Schmidt, working from within a hegemonic episteme, produced a strong critique of the motives and discourses of the intervenors and the negative outcomes of the interventions.

Dauda (2011, p. 21) wrote that "While pro-Gbagbo militia embarked on the *slaughter* of northerners living in the south, the rebels in the north *also killed* southerners" (emphasis added). This is a more neutral, balanced description of the violence in the north and south, but the word *slaughter* is more normative than *kill*. This unevenness weights his analysis normatively against the south and less normatively against the north. This weighting and the use of hegemonic unwarranted assertions in Dauda's paper led me to consider his analysis grounded in hegemonic discourse, although his overarching critique of the discourse of humanitarian intervention used to justify the 2011 military battles in the Second Ivoirian Civil War is counterhegemonic in the wider sense of the term.

**Stability and change in positionality within the discourse**

This observation - that hegemonic discourse positioning is not equivalent to hegemonic authorial intent, or hegemonic conclusions - is one of the key findings of this thesis. Epistemic positionality is generally considered fixed in narrative warfare; we believe what we believe, and we seek facts which feed our confirmation bias. However, careful reading of the Ivoirian intervention literature challenges this common sense understanding of positionality. Positionality can change in response to events, evolve, or stay the same across the writings of a given author. While there are hegemonic analysts who conclude their research with a reinforcement of the primary hegemonic narratives, and even outright advocacy of hegemony, many working within the hegemonic episteme of the interventions produce counterhegemonic conclusions which dispute the dominant hegemonic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions.
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Where we start out as analysts isn’t necessarily where we end up. A primary purpose of analysis is to query the consensus of our field of study. Some analysts will end up agreeing with the consensus, others will find grounds to challenge that consensus. Any analyst will start their research within their own established worldviews because that is what they already know. Analysts vary in the extent to which they reach beyond the boundaries of a given episteme and investigate opposing narratives. For some analysts, looking outside their episteme leads to re-evaluation of the foundational beliefs of that episteme. For other analysts, confirmation of the episteme becomes a primary research driver. Whether academics and professionals change their narratives or confirm them, they can become, aware or not, protagonists in a narrative war.

Charbonneau’s writings on Côte d’Ivoire, some of the most influential in the literature, illustrate a change in positioning over time. Charbonneau (2008a) took a critical stance which challenges French security discourse in sub-Saharan Africa. I characterise his 2008 analysis as non-polemic, non-aligned, but counterhegemonic in general orientation. In contrast, Charbonneau’s (2014) stance shifted to endorsement of the four "undeniable group of facts" listed above. These four "undeniable groups of facts" ground Charbonneau (2014) within the hegemonic discourse, a significant change from his previous analysis. In contrast, Galy’s neutral academic position in Galy (2004) moved to a strongly counterhegemonic position by Galy (2005), from which he has consistently argued, up to and including Galy (2020). In contrast, Busch (2005) wrote from a counterhegemonic, polarised stance and has consistently written from that position through 2020. I consider a change in positionality neither good nor bad - for some writers, positionality changes in relation to evolving events; when what they know or perceive as 'the facts' change, they change their interpretations and positionality. For others, their world view and positionality, once decided, remain fixed and consistent. The larger point is that writer positionality is not necessarily fixed, and can change or stay stable, in the same way that the discourse itself can change or remained fixed around certain sets of beliefs. Why any specific author changes or maintains a consistent stance is beyond the scope of this inquiry.
Defining the corpus: exclusion and inclusion

In the sections above I have described the production constraints and characteristics of the polarised literatures of the Ivoirian interventions and the less polarised conflict literature. In this section I discuss one of the mechanisms by which this polarisation is created and maintained - the process of inclusion or exclusion of narrative adversaries. There is a substantial academic and professional literature on the interventions which has been excluded from mainstream academic attention. The only comment within the hegemonic intervention literature which I have found which directly addresses the exclusion of these works comes from Roux, who noted that in his work he relied solely on French government sources:

In spite of the exclusion of Ivoirian sources, discredited by the information war.... the assembled [literature] offer solid ground for a study of the basis of the French politics [of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords].

(Roux, 2018, p. 94)

Characterising only Ivoirian sources as "discredited by the information war" demonstrates a lack of awareness that similar "information war" issues will certainly be operative in the hegemonic sources as well. In a similar vein, Wyss dismissed Mbeki's criticism of France's military engagement on behalf of rebel forces in 2011 as "ideologically tainted" (2014, p. 146), while appearing to have no awareness that all analysis of necessity rests upon the worldview of the analysts, and that Wyss himself will certainly bring his own ideology to the analytic task at hand. We are, all of us, 'ideologically tainted,' and not just those we wish to dismiss with the wave of a hand. While other hegemonic academic writers do not explicitly comment on this exclusion of the counterhegemonic literature, the nearly complete lack of reference to counterhegemonic writers, if even only to refute their claims, speaks loudly in this silence.

Identifying my corpus as literature on the interventions produced by academic writers, published in recognised academic journals and publishing houses, and referenced in other academic work, was a painstaking but straightforward task. However, in a situation where half the authors of a corpus ignores the other half, identifying 'the literature' was more
complex task than it would have been in a less polarised situation. I realised that I needed to expand my definition to cover professional as well as academic literature for three reasons.

**First**, the academic literature freely referenced journalists, NGO reports, and other professional writers, so professional non-academic works form part of the broader corpus.

**Second**, I noticed significant movement between academia and professional positions in both the hegemonic and counterhegemonic literature. As de Guevara and Kostić point out, within the current practice of international intervention, professional identities are "heterogenous" and "fluid," "...straddling the institutional boundaries between state and non-state, public and private, local and global, and academia and consultancy, static categories of ‘policymaker’, ‘diplomat’, ‘consultant’, ‘academic’, ‘think tank expert’, ‘NGO practitioner’ or ‘UN representative’" (2017, p. 5-6). Not only are these identities "fluid" and "heterogenous" - they are also politicised, in the Ivoirian intervention context.

Stephen Smith, now a professor of African Studies at Duke University, was instrumental in the amplification and legitimation of the narrative of "death squads" from his position as the Africa desk editor at *Le Monde* (Smith, 2003; 2004; 2011). His quasi-academic "public intellectual" status gave greater weight to his anti-Gbagbo reporting than journalists without his level of academic qualification would have enjoyed. Smith’s role as a conduit for French intelligence narratives problematises an assumption of academic neutrality in his analysis.

**Third**, casting a broader net was necessary to ensure that I didn’t miss the full range of narrative contestation, particularly the counterhegemonic writers who are often without access to publication in academic journals, for the political reasons discussed above. I initially conceptualised the counterhegemonic writing on the interventions as a separate type of non-academic discourse. I considered it a ‘political’ literature which critiqued the interventions, rather than an intrinsic part of the academic and professional literature of the Ivoirian conflict and intervention. I defined the counterhegemonic political literature as writing crafted to persuade, influence, and argue for or against specific protagonists,
actions, events, and interpretations of the interventions within a specifically political context. I didn't consider the counterhegemonic literature equivalent to the academic literature until I realised that the hegemonic academic literature was also polarised, and that it, too was crafted to persuade, influence, and argue for or against specific protagonists, actions, events, and interpretations of the interventions. Further, I had (without awareness) devalued the narratives of the academics and professionals who wrote outside the hegemonic mainstream and had excluded their accounts as irrelevant, simply because they were writing outside the mainstream academic journals and publishing houses.

I recognised, for example, that hegemonic French military historian Notin (2013) was a legitimate source of strategic narrative, but I initially failed to recognise the equivalent expertise and legitimacy of the wide range of counterhegemonic writers. Neyrac (2005), the counterhegemonic counterpart of Notin, retired from his position as a communications officer for Licorne to write a strongly counterhegemonic account of his experiences in Côte d’Ivoire. While Notin is referenced within the hegemonic intervention literature, Neyrac rarely is cited, although his credentials and credibility are equivalent to Notin. American professor of International Relations (ret.) Busch is strongly polemical and counterhegemonic in his analysis of the interventions, but publishes his analysis of the interventions only in popular forums rather than academic journals (Busch, 2016; 2013; 2012; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 2010; 2006; 2005). French sociologist Galy began studying conflict in West Africa before the start of the First Ivorian Civil War. Originally publishing his research on Côte d’Ivoire in mainstream francophone academic journals, as his work became more polarised and politicised, Galy began to publish online and in informal fora (Galy, 2014a, 2014b, 2013, 2007, 2005, 2004a, 2004b).

Ivorian political analyst and member of Transparency International Dr. Calixte Baniafouna (2011a; 2011b); French professor of geo-politics (ret.) Roger Casanova (2011); French political science professor emeritus Robert Charvin (2011); Ivorian political anthropologist Djié Ahoué (2011, 2013); professor of Francophone studies K. Martial Frindéthié (2016); Ivorian professor of literature and Minister of Education until 2011 Bédi Holy (2014) are
excluded from the hegemonic academic literature, although they have published substantial
dissident analysis online and in books. Professor of economics and former president of the
Ivoirian National Assembly Mamadou Koulibaly (2003; 2011) is one of the few
counterhegemonic authors who is referenced occasionally within the hegemonic literature,
although as a politician, not as an analyst or author (Akindès, 2004; Balint-Kurti, 2007;
Banégas, 2006; Boutellis, 2011; Cook, 2011; Piccolino, 2011; Piccolino, 2014).

In addition to academics whose works are not addressed within the hegemonic literature,
professional journalists are excluded from the mainstream literature, including French
journalists Philippe Duval (2012) and Fanny Pigeaud (2015); Ivoirian political analyst and
professional writer A.M. Djéhoury (2007); Ivoirian journalist Charles Onana (2013); Ivoirian
political activist, teacher, and writer Jean Momboye (2007). These counterhegemonic
writers are professionals with credentials equivalent to their hegemonic counterparts,
presenting what many hegemonic authors consider illegitimate arguments not worth
refuting, and therefore simply absent from the hegemonic discourse of the interventions.

Why are the counterhegemonic arguments and authors excluded from the mainstream
discourse? I argue that the work of the counterhegemonic academics and professionals
cited above is invisible within the hegemonic discourse of intervention through first, a
'gentlemen's agreement' that academics and professional analysts will exclude those who
are arguing the 'wrong side of history,' leading to exclusion of the counterhegemonic work
by those mainstream academics and writers who are aware of them. Counterhegemonic
authors are then excluded from the mainstream discourse secondarily through ignorance of
the counterhegemonic work which follows this exclusion by those who have never heard of
these counterarguments, the position I was in when I wrote my master's thesis on the
Ivoirian interventions in 2013.

The same pattern of exclusion occurs within the counterhegemonic literature.
Counterhegemonic authors do not cite at length or attempt to refute hegemonically
positioned authors, as well. This systematic exclusion of counterarguments recursively
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creates even more polarisation, a characteristic of narrative warfare in general, as described in Chapter 3.

Summary - Chapter 8
The literature on the Ivoirian interventions and conflict can be divided into conflict literature and intervention literature. Ivoirian and external academics currently working within the country usually avoid analysis of the interventions, restricting themselves to less controversial conflict topics, leading to a preponderance of external analysis of the interventions and excluding indigenous analysis.

These literatures can be placed along a spectrum of positionality which runs from strongly hegemonic and polemical analysis of the interventions through a more neutral positionality to a strongly polemical and counterhegemonic positionality. Positionality can be detected through application of 'stress tests' to the discourse, based on normative language usage, foundational assertions, and the use of vilification/valorisation. Positionality can change, stay the same, become more complex, or simplified for authors. The more polemical authors are the more active participants in the narrative war for Côte d’Ivoire, and their work establishes specific versions of the history of the interventions.

The practices of defining a corpus in themselves are epistemic acts; referencing, inclusion, and exclusion contribute to polarisation. I have discussed the benefits of casting a wide net in the definition of 'literature,' arguing that the current category of 'academic' discourse excludes too many legitimate voices and overlooks the current fluidity of authors and their works when surveying the role of secondary actors in narrative warfare. I have described my efforts to define my corpus inclusively, in order to hear the dissident voices excluded for their counterhegemonic arguments.

In the next chapter, I briefly map the Ivoirian conflict literature, followed in Chapter 10 by the intervention literature.
Chapter 9. Ivoirian conflict literature

The Ivoirian conflict literature serves as a foundational discourse for many of the narratives of intervention. While the conflict literature itself is usually neutral and non-partisan in tone and intent, it has been deployed by intervention authors across the spectrum to support their narratives. Academic research on autochthony and immigration was used to support hegemonic genocide narratives and thereby justify military intervention. Within the counterhegemonic discourse, counternarratives of Ivoirité have supported the counterhegemonic episteme of the interventions. Other parts of the conflict literature, such as gendered violence in conflict, have also been deployed by protagonists in the narrative war to support their positions or attack their opponents. In the chapter below, I summarise the conflict impact literature, then outline the larger arguments of the conflict root causes literature. In Part IV, I will discuss how these literatures have been used to support or refute polarised positions in the narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire.

Conflict impact literature
The conflict literature consists of two sub-literatures: a root causes literature and a conflict impacts literature. I noted in Chapter 8 that Ivoirian academics employed in Côte d'Ivoire avoid directly addressing the international interventions and their aftermath. As a result, both internally and in international research partnerships, many Ivoirian academics or external academics working in Côte d'Ivoire focus their research on the conflict impacts. As it tends to be unthreatening to the current regime, the conflict impact literature is relatively low risk for Ivoirian academics and those who do not wish to be pulled into the narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire. The impact literature includes substantial publication on specific effects of the long conflict on Ivoirian society, such as gendered aspects of the conflict, the social impacts on families and children, and the intersecting issues of generational conflict and autochthony driving land conflict. The impact literature is outside the scope of this thesis but identified here to indicate the role it plays in conflict literature research among academics working in Côte d'Ivoire.

Root causes of conflict literature
In contrast to the conflict impact literature described above, which focuses on the problems caused by the Ivoirian conflict, the conflict root causes literature focuses on what led to the
conflict: the history, culture, politics, and social dynamics of the Ivoirian conflict. The intervention literature frequently uses the assertions of the root causes literature to warrant and support specific intervention narratives, as I will demonstrate in the analytic section of this thesis. The root causes literature informs the development, deployment, and polarisation of the polemical discourses of intervention by international actors, Ivoirian political elites, and academics who became protagonists in the narrative wars for Côte d’Ivoire. The UN referenced "root causes" in 40 articles across the interventions, moving from 'ethnic conflict' as the root cause of the Ivoirian conflict to 'land conflict' and community conflict' as later identified 'root causes. The 'root cause' literature served as a foundational discourse supporting narratives of causation.

Analysts identify six drivers of the Ivoirian conflict: economic decline and intensified competition for resources from the 1980s recession triggered by the global commodities long cycle downturn and concurrent austerity measures mandated by Bretton Woods financial institutions; the impact of democratisation on a previously authoritarian single-party state; the rise of ethnic identity politics as part of that democratisation; the post-colonial struggle to reclaim indigenous lands; West African regional conflict contagion; and France’s role as a neo-colonial actor in Côte d’Ivoire.

Economic decline
The Ivoirian conflict literature begins with analysis of Ivoirian economic decline through internal neopatrimonial failures of leadership and external economic pressures leading to immiseration of the Ivoirian population. The severe impacts of the 1980s commodity long-cycle downturn, compounded by the austerity measures of the Structural Adjustment Programs mandated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, had long-lasting, catastrophic effects on the Ivoirian economy (Conte, 2005; Gramizzi, 2003; Cogneau and Mesple-Somps, 2003; Akindès, 2002; IMF - IDA, 2002; Naiman and Watkins, 1999). Counterhegemonic analysis of the economic decline focuses specifically on the deleterious effects of French neo-colonial control of the Ivoirian economy (Yao-Kouame, 2017; Frindéthié, 2016, 2020).
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Democratisation and elite competition

Ethnification of Ivorian politics
The tension between development of Ivorian nationalism and the political operationalisation of regional/ethnic identities has been extensively researched and argued as a root cause of conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. A struggle for power at the advent of multi-party elections in the 1990s merged with ethnic identity politics at the end of three decades of autocratic rule. Allouche and Bley (2017), Babo (2014), Bah (2010), Owusu-Sekyere (2009), Banégas (2006), Toungara (2001), Dozon (2000, 2002) identified ethnification of elite competition as a primary driver. The contested narrative of the ethnification of Ivorian politics will be analysed in the discussion of Ivoirité and the genocide narrative in Chapter 13.

While most of the elite competition as root cause literature focuses on Ivorian-internal elite competition, Charbonneau (2008a, p. 2) emphasised the role of "transnational elites whose main objective is to maintain and to reproduce the social conditions which privilege them." This characterisation of the transnational aspect of elite contestation in the Ivorian conflict plays an important role in the hotly contested narratives of Françafrique, the roles played in the interventions by the transnational networks to which Gbagbo and Ouattara belonged, and conspiracy narratives, analysed in Chapter 13.

Ivorian conflict as a security issue
It is possible, but problematic, to conceptualise and research the Ivorian conflict as primarily a civil war without reference to the interventions and intervenors woven throughout the times, the places, and the events of the conflict. International academics
have written extensively on the rebel governance dynamics of northern Côte d’Ivoire, addressing the roles and dynamics of rebel warlords and non-state governance throughout the conflict with almost no reference to the interventions which framed their subject of inquiry (Hellweg 2011; Speight 2013; 2015; Martin, Piccolino and Speight 2017; Piccolino, Martin and Speight 2018).

Boutellis (2011) addressed post-intervention security sector reform, focusing on the culture of impunity within the Ivoirian security sector which continued unaltered after the Second Ivoirian Civil War, again without significant reference to the external intervenors who drove this requirement for reform, but rather as an Ivoirian-internal issue. It requires serious editing to reduce the causes of Ivoirian long war to an intra-Ivoirian conflict based on security sector dysfunction. The focus on security sector reform reduces the conflict to technical issues of governance rather than politics, an example of the "anti-politics machine" (Ferguson, 1994) of international intervention discourse in action. This stance is referred to in the counterhegemonic literature as the "Ivoiro-Ivoirien" narrative, strongly contested as eliding the critical role of foreign intervention in the conflict.

Regional conflict contagion: conflict meets intervention
The literature which addresses the root causes of the Ivoirian conflict meets the intervention literature when the intervenors become visible in the discourse. "Intervention" is usually framed as a formal, overt, state-external military operation set up with the goal of re-establishing stability in a conflict-affected state, as in Finnemore (2004). However, Finnemore (2004, p. 128) and Schmidt (2018) acknowledged that while overt international military operations are formally recognised 'interventions,' covert operations are also interventions, although less openly recognised and acknowledged. In the conflict literature reviewed above, the overt, internationally recognised military intervention operations are almost invisible, although the topics researched are linked intimately to the interventions and are widely used in both the hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses of the academics, politicians, and intervenors involved. The conflict literature begins to merge with the intervention literature in the analysis of the role played in the Ivoirian conflict by West African regional geopolitics and the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
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Authors across the hegemonic-counterhegemonic spectrum identified West African regional conflict contagion as an important factor in the Ivorian civil wars and in the strategic calculations of internal and external actors (Kouadio, 2009; Kirwin, 2006; Waldman, 2005; Galy, 2004a, 2004b; Banegas and Marshall-Fratani, 2003; Sada, 2003).

There are three aspects to this larger regional conflict in the Ivorian long war: the instability of states and populations bordering Côte d'Ivoire leading to large inflows of refugees, the regional contagion of violence as mercenaries plied their trade across borders, and the regional geopolitics of states whose leadership felt threatened by developments in neighboring states and backed transnational combatants.

There is consensus that mercenaries from across West Africa fought in the Ivorian Civil Wars. Irregular combatants and soldiers from previous conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, and Guinea found employment in the emergent war in Côte d'Ivoire on both sides. Galy (2004) considered the Ivorian conflict a "nomad war." Bovcon claimed that General Guéri's 2000 political campaign transformed the internal Ivorian "ethnic divide" created through Ivoirité into a regional issue through international ethnic linkages across borders (2009, p. 3). She argued that Ivoirité contributed to regional instability, and regional instability then further inflamed the Ivorian conflict. Mitchell (2011) and Okonofua (2014) emphasised the migration-security-conflict nexus in their analysis. Tivoly's (2018) analysis framed the conflict/migration issue as one of securitisation discourse, designed to push for specific international actions and remedies.

The main difference between hegemonic and counterhegemonic analysis of the mercenary involvement and regional conflict contagion narratives rests in the focus and framing - hegemonic narrators emphasising Gbagbo's use of mercenaries (Smith 2011) and counterhegemonic narrators foregrounding Ouattara's links to Burkinabé mercenaries (Busch 2006, 2011). UN reports and news articles acknowledged mercenaries fighting on both sides of the wars but tended to emphasise and highlight mercenaries associated with the Gbagbo administration and the Ivorian state, particularly during the Second Ivorian Civil War (UN News, 6 Jan 2003; UN News, 7 Jan 2003; 28 Jan 2003; 28 Mar 2003; 29 Mar
In addition to the consensus on mercenaries and the importance of the regional conflict contagion a driver of war in the Ivoirian context, there is a strong consensus in both the hegemonic and counterhegemonic literature that the President Compaoré and Burkinabe state directly supported the mutineer soldiers in advance of the attempted coup d'etat in 2002 which initiated the First Ivoirian Civil War (Simon and Smith 2002; Neyrac, 2006; Chirot, 2007; Ayangafac, 2007; Labertit, 2007; Charbonneau, 2008a; Bovcon, 2009; Onana, 2013; Busch, 2013; Mattei, 2015). The Liberian warlord/President Charles Taylor is also acknowledged to have played a role in the initial conflict (Sada, 2003; Smith, 2003, 119 - 120; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani, 2003; US Congressional Subcommittee, 2003; Ayangafac, 2007; Bovcon, 2009, pp. 5 - 6; Obi, 2009, p. 129; Busch, 2011). I have not found any counterargument to the consensus that Compaoré was involved in arming and facilitating the initial attempted coup d'etat of 2002, contradicting the French narrative of the Ivoirian wars as purely internal affairs.

Summary - Chapter 9
I've outlined the larger Ivoirian conflict literature, differentiating the subset of conflict impact literature from the root causes literature, which serve as foundational discourses for the contested strategic narratives of intervention to be analysed in Part IV. I identified five topics within the Ivoirian conflict root causes literature: economic decline, democratisation, the ethnification of Ivoirian politics, the Ivoirian long war framed as a ‘security sector’ issue, and West African regional conflict contagion. These literatures are operationalised as discourses deployed by both sides to justify or criticise throughout the interventions.

In the next chapter, I outline the issues and events addressed in the central Ivoirian intervention literature.
Chapter 10. Ivoirian intervention literature

In this chapter, I identify the grey zone where the Ivoirian conflict literature meets the intervention literature in analysis of covert intervention. I outline ways in which hegemonic and counterhegemonic authors treat covert intervention and introduce the contested framing of a French proxy war as the primary root cause of the Ivoirian conflict and civil wars. I review the literature on covert intervention by France in Ivoirian civil wars, and then shift focus to the formal intervention literature - that is, the literature which considers the formal and overt ECOWAS, UN, and French intervention missions.

Covert intervention: narratives of a neo-colonial proxy war

The root causes literature meets the intervention literature when it centres on the role of France in the attempted coup d'état of 2002 as the 'root cause' of the conflict. Kouadio (2009) characterised the 2002 rebellion as an additional, proximate rather than primary cause of the Ivoirian conflict. However, this characterisation of the rebellion as an indirect cause of the Ivoirian long war is contested in the counterhegemonic literature, which treats the rebellion as a primary driver of the long-term conflict. The neo-colonial role of France in the initial conflict events of September 2002 and the subsequent Ivoirian civil wars is ignored in the hegemonic literature and identified in the counterhegemonic literature as a primary root cause of the conflict (Frindéthié, 2016; Pigeaud, 2015; Mattei, 2015; Onana, 2013; Baniafouna, 2011; Djéhoury, 2007; Koulibaly, 2003; Galy, 2000).

The counterhegemonic literature consistently depicts French involvement in Côte d’Ivoire as the single root cause of the Ivoirian wars - the instigator and the bankroller of the mutineers and the Ivoirian conflict, from before the attempted coup d'etat in 2002 through the capture of Gbagbo in 2011. The counterhegemonic literature characterises the Ivoirian long war as primarily a French proxy war for control of the Ivoirian state (Kouassi, 2019; Frindéthié, 2016; Mattei, 2015; Pigeaud, 2015; Busch 2013a, 2013b, 2006; Galy, 2007; Labertit, 2007; Nanga, 2005; Koulibaly, 2003). In addition to the counterhegemonic narratives of proxy war, France’s formal role as intervenor in Licorne, and its dominant role as penholder in the UN missions, are deeply contested across this literature.
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The hegemonic intervention literature explores the formal French intervention in-depth but remains mostly silent on the problematic narrative of France as a covert initiator at the start of the conflict. I have found no direct discussion of the Ivoirian Civil Wars as French proxy wars in the hegemonic literature of intervention. Hegemonically positioned authors acknowledge anomalies in the French government's claims about the Ivoirian conflict but avoid direct discussion of the possibility of sponsorship of a proxy war. Collett, while not directly acknowledging or refuting the arguments that France directly funded the rebellion in a proxy war, wrote,

\begin{quote}
French influence over Côte d'Ivoire at all levels has had far-reaching effects, even to the extent of contributing to the outbreak of civil war. However, as it results mainly from long-term policies rather than from the recent imposition of French directives, continuous but covert interference over the past forty-five years has led to the acceptance and naturalisation of a lack of interdependence sovereignty.....
\end{quote}

Collett (2004, 168 - 169)

Collett isn't clear who is accepting and naturalising this lack of sovereignty - hegemonic actors and hegemonically positioned academics? Counterhegemonic narrators dispute this acceptance. They attempt to denaturalise France's role in Côte d'Ivoire, arguing that it is precisely this lack of acceptance of degraded sovereignty that incurred France's wrath and ended up with Gbagbo in the Hague for nearly a decade.

This halfway house to acknowledging a French neo-colonial proxy war can be discerned elsewhere in the hegemonic academic discourse as well. Banégas and Fratani (2003) foregrounded the Ivoirian conflict as part of the larger West African regional conflict, acknowledging the role of Burkina Faso, Liberia, and France in the conflict origins, but describing French intervention efforts and anomalies and contradictions in the French government's actions and discourse as "the politics of impotence" (p. 11, my translation) rather than covert operations, much along the lines of the narrative found in d'Ersu (2007).

Smith (2003) critiqued inconsistencies in French government claims in the early stages of the conflict. He highlighted France's official refusal to acknowledge Burkinabe involvement in the mutiny/coup/rebellion, describing France as resolutely remaining blind and deaf.
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towards Burkina Faso's involvement in the conflict (Smith, 2003, 119 - 120), yet avoided the question of a proxy war. However, he noted that the openness of Burkinabé state support for the northern combatants’ preparations points to French awareness of the preparations for an attempted coup d'état, and the probability of French complicity. However, Smith characterised the inconsistency of French positions as double-dealing driven by the personal animosity of French leadership towards Gbagbo rather than attempts at diversion of attention from French strategic goals.

Duval (2003) also pointed out French silence in the refusal to acknowledge the role of Burkina Faso in housing and arming the rebels without pushing analysis further to explain why that might be the case. Sada (2003) described the difficult situation in which ECOWAS members found themselves, attempting impartial peace-making while unable to acknowledge that Liberia and Burkina Faso were actively supporting the rebels. Sada also hinted at hegemonic complicity in the conflict, noting that France and the United States intervened to prevent Nigeria from aiding the Gbagbo government in 2002 (Sada, 2003, p. 328), but again, did not ask why that might be the case and did not directly address the question of France's role at the start of the conflict.

Smith's (2003) analysis of personal animus by French officials towards Gbagbo contrasts with d'Ersu (2007), who portrayed the contradictions in French policy discourse as stemming from a 'franco-francaise' internal government power struggle over French policy in Côte d'Ivoire. d'Ersu (2007, p. 88) questioned whether the French intelligence services could possibly have been blind to the rebels arming and training under the supervision of their ally Compaoré. Questioning General Bentégeat's January 2003 testimony denying knowledge of the coup being planned and soldiers being trained in Ougadougou before the DefenceCommission of the French National Assembly, d'Ersu noted the anomaly of the complete absence of French public censure of the training and equipping of the rebels, but did not then conclude explicitly that France sponsored the attempted coup which became a rebellion, rather hinting obliquely that might be the case. d'Ersu shifted focus to the French government's internal turf war over management of the Ivoirian civil war, and the external French campaign to frame the violence as "purely internal to Côte d'Ivoire." d'Ersu's
narrative serves as a 'Franco-Français' government-internal equivalent of the French framing of the conflict as a purely 'Ivoiro-Ivoirien' affair. That is, D'Erus claimed that factions within the French government did not actively promote a proxy war, but incompetently responded to the Ivoirian conflict because of in-fighting within the French government itself (D'Erus, 2007, p. 90), agreeing with Smith (2003).

While the hegemonic literature acknowledges regional involvement and hints at French involvement from the start of the First Ivoirian Civil War, it does not explicitly address whether France was the initiator and funder of the attempted coup d’état and an active sponsor of the rebellion as a proxy war on France's behalf. When the hegemonic literature does directly address the proxy war narrative, the charge that France backed the rebellion as a proxy war is treated as "conspiracy theory" as in Banégas and Losch (2002). I will return to the topic of France's role in the conflict and in the interventions in my analysis of the counterhegemonic foundational discourse of Françafrique in Chapter 13. At this point, I turn to the professional literature which focuses directly on the formal interventions.

The international interventions
The literature which examines the formal, overt, international interventions covers four time periods: The First Ivoirian Civil War, September 2002 to July 2004; the No War - No Peace interval from July 2004 through November 2010; the Second Ivoirian Civil War from December 2010 to 11 April 2011; and the 'post-conflict' period from the end of the Second Civil War in April 2011 through the official closure of the UNOCI mission on 30 June 2017. Two decades of research reflect the academic and political concerns of the times in which they were written based on the significant events of the interventions as they unfolded. Much of the research is clustered in the early stages of the interventions, between 2003 and 2008. Some of the writing covers a single event or controversy of the interventions, such as the Linas Marcoussis Accords, the Ouagadougou Political Agreements, the Battle for Abidjan in November 2004, the contested election certification of the 2010 presidential elections, or the use of force in the Battle for Abidjan in Second Ivoirian Civil War of 2011. Other research is more wide-angle in scope. A handful of articles between 2011 and 2020 pronounce the 'judgements of history' on the interventions up to that point. These
judgements tend to be strongly polarised, as in the hegemonic positionality of Novosseloff (2018) or the counterhegemonic stance of Frindéthié (2016).

Much of the intervention literature focuses upon events up to the point of writing. Written close in time to the events analysed, the literature sometimes suffers from short-term historical perspectives. Ayangafac (2007) writes about the Ouagadougou Political Accord, signed earlier that year, and poses the question: "Imminent divorce or the renewal of vows?" (answered by the events of the next five years). Roux (2018) is unusual in that he published in 2018, but his research focuses solely on the Linas-Marcoussis Accord and early stages of the French intervention policy discourse. Recchia (2020) provides another example of recent work which restricts analysis to the events of 2002-2004. These two examples of analysis written outside their period of consideration are the exception rather than the rule in the intervention literature. This historicity of the analysis is important in understanding the intervention literature and the claims it makes. Much of it was written in response to specific events close in time to those events, which led to peaks of writing around specific intervention issues, and then later troughs, with relatively little reconsideration of those events and issues, and relatively short timespans of analysis and conclusion.

The core intervention literature addresses three topics: the legitimacy of intervention; the relative roles and (dys)functionalities of the French, ECOWAS, and UN interventions; and the outcomes of the international missions in the management of the Ivoirian conflict. In the following sections, I map the intervention literature under three headings: legitimation, international intervention missions, and outcomes.

**Legalism and multilateralism as legitimation strategies**

mirrored Charbonneau’s earlier arguments within a realist framework, without Charbonneau’s critique of French security discourse packaging state interests in multilateralism rhetoric (Charbonneau 2008a; 2008b). This legitimacy, achieved through a UN mandate to intervene, served to manage "nationalist pushback against foreign intervention" in Côte d’Ivoire (Recchia, 2020, p. 513). Wyss (2017) added to Charbonneau’s critique of French policy discourse, noting the disjuncture between French rhetoric and actions in the French and ECOWAS peace-keeping partnership which France deployed to legitimate military interventions in Africa. Simonen (2012) reflected Gaudusson’s earlier emphasis on legalism in her analysis of French legalist legitimation strategies for the use of force in the Second Ivoirian Civil War.

**Pursuit of national interest as legitimate**

Rather than using a rhetoric of multilateralism or legalism to justify France's actions in Côte d’Ivoire, Collett (2004) argued that France had the inherent sovereign right to pursue its hegemonic national interest in Côte d’Ivoire, while outlining French legitimacy strategies through multilateralism and triangulation. Marshall-Fratani focussed on the costs of hegemony for the French, claiming that the French intervenors were trapped by the "will to intervene," the burden of "post-colonial heritage," an ungrateful Ivoirian populace, and a duplicitous Ivoirian government (2005, p. 22). Bovcon (2009) provided a more hard-headed justification of French decisions, actions, and strategic objectives, justifying French intervention actions on realist grounds. She argued that France had the right to protect its financial, political, and hegemonic investments in Côte d’Ivoire as a linchpin of France’s interests in West Africa and required no legitimation beyond these realist state objectives. Bovcon later argued that the waning power of French hegemony in Côte d’Ivoire resulted in a "confused" foreign policy at the mercy of predatory local Ivoirian elites (2011, p. 19). Poor France!

**Humanitarian intervention as legitimate...or as legitimation strategy**

Bellamy and Williams (2011), while noting the failures and deficiencies of the UN use of force during the Second Ivoirian Civil War, assumed rather than argued that intervention labeled "humanitarian" is a legitimate use of force in and of itself, part of the UN mission set under the rubric of the international responsibility to protect. Bellamy and Williams's later
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examination of intervention partnerships, while they identified serious humanitarian
problems with the Ivoirian interventions, reiterated their "key finding... UNOCI played a
generally positive role in helping to dampen violence, protect vulnerable populations and
support nascent peacebuilding efforts" (2012, p. 254). Dauda (2011) questioned the
humanitarian framing of the use of force in Côte d'Ivoire and the nature of the partnership
among the AU, ECOWAS, France, and the UN. While working within a hegemonic episteme,
Dauda noted that humanitarian intervention during the Second Ivoirian Civil War quickly
morphed into regime change and that the "coercive use of force escalate[d] violence with
Ojo (2012) evaluated French and UN deployment of humanitarian rhetoric in the
justification of military engagement on behalf of Ouattara and concluded that the UN
humanitarian discourse was used to excuse the unfettered exercise of French hegemony in
pursuit of French state interests. Conversely, Ouattara, working within a strongly polemic
and hegemonic discourse, insisted that the humanitarian use of military force in the Second
Ivoirian Civil war was not only justified by just war theory, but that the international
community failed in its duty to "save the lives of the more than 3,000 people who died in
the post-election conflict" by not using enough force quickly enough (2018, p. 5).

Regional and global intervention mission dynamics
The power dynamics among intervention actors, and the relative roles of ECOWAS, regional
powerbrokers, the African Union, France, and the United Nations in the Ivoirian
interventions, are contested at certain points in the Ivoirian strategic narratives, so I outline
this literature here and return to the topic in Chapter 12. Analysing the early Ivoirian
French, ECOWAS, and UN intervention missions, Gberie and Addo (2004) noted "the
fundamental change in the positive perception of the French military intervention" derived
from the discourse of multilateralism and the resulting changing perceptions among African
populations of French intervention activities. They concluded that while France may have
benefitted from changing perceptions, "the colonial past may still challenge the legitimacy"
of French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, expressed reservations about the French-led Linas
Marcoussis Accords, and questioned the French bestowal of legitimacy upon the northern
rebels. Ayangafac (2007) and Bovcon (2011, p. 19) concurred that Gbagbo's purpose in
negotiating the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement was to cut France out of the intervention equation and return to a regional management of the conflict.

Epstein (2008), in response to the OPA changes to the Ivoirian intervention terrain, provided a formulaic hegemonic summary of UN, ECOWAS, and French intervention narratives, noting that OPA might lead to the missions' withdrawal, and concludes that "without their intervention, the crisis would have been far worse." Dadson (2008), after reviewing the roles of France, the UN, ECOWAS, and the AU in Ivoirian mediation, argued that ECOWAS was the most appropriate organisation for mediation in the Ivoirian conflict. Obi (2009) compared the early ECOWAS mission to the UN missions which followed, emphasising the geostrategic concerns and aspirations of Nigeria as a subregional hegemon, and the importance of integrating regional missions into international peacekeeping operations to build regional legitimacy. Coleman (2011), in an overview of the relationship between the UN and ECOWAS, charted a changing Nigerian approach to the Ivoirian conflict, from substantial bilateral military support to the Gbagbo regime at the outbreak of the rebellion to reluctance to assume the costs of peacekeeping for the ECOMICI mission. Odobo et al. (2016, p. 172) criticised ECOWAS involvement in the Ivoirian interventions, claiming that "ECOWAS...lacked the courage and capability" to operationally enforce its order to Gbagbo to step down in 2011. They attributed ECOWAS's failure to "take a decisive step" in 2011 to lack of effective partnership with the UN and "peacekeeping fatigue" (Odobo, et. al, 2016, p. 175).

Regional organisations and intervention legitimacy
Charbonneau (2008b) discussed France's use of European Union triangulation and multilateralism as a legitimation strategy for French intervention. Bellamy and Williams (2011, p. 836) foregrounded ECOWAS and AU support for UN actions as a source of legitimization of UN combat framed as humanitarianism during the events of the Second Ivoirian Civil War. Bassett and Straus (2011) also claimed that ECOWAS and AU support, "in a remarkable display of consensus" for UN and French intervention, provided strong legitimization for the intervenors' role in the 2011 Battle for Abidjan. Wyss (2013, p. 97) rebutted this argument, noting that ECOWAS and AU backing was much less robust, consistent, and enthusiastic than portrayed by Bassett and Straus. But Wyss noted that
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France's "diplomatic offensive" worked; it resulted in garnering enough support from Nigeria to "overcome Russian and Chinese opposition" to S/RES/1975, which authorised "all means necessary" to be deployed in the conflict. I will demonstrate the importance of these claims and counterclaims of ECOWAS and AU support for military intervention as a basis of intervention legitimacy in Chapter 12.

Outcomes
Novosseloff (2018) emphasised the complexity of the multiple peace agreements and intervention missions over the course of the 15 years of formal intervention and ending by characterising post-intervention Côte d'Ivoire as "politically fragile." Piccolino (2018) and Ricard (2017) are more critical of the intervention outcomes. Piccolino's (2018) assessment of the interventions is less hegemonically centred than her previous analysis. She described the outcome of the interventions as "a victor's peace" (p. 485), "a military victory" (p. 486), the production of an "authoritarian" regime," attempting "illiberal post-conflict statebuilding" (p. 487). Ricard (2019) assessed outcomes through analysis of post-intervention Ivoirian state discourse, emphasising the continuity of resource extraction by elites, and the problems posed by ongoing extraversion. Akokpari (2016) and Schmidt (2018), in hegemonically positioned analytic overviews of the outcomes of post-Cold War interventions in Africa, produced strong critiques of intervention outcomes, including in Côte d'Ivoire. Both noted a failure by international missions to effectively address the "root causes" of African state conflict, and the use of putatively humanitarian missions to "advance the strategic interests of intervening states" (Akokpari, 2016, p. 146). In contrast, there is a small set of short encomiums which praise in general terms the "success" of the United Nations Ivoirian interventions which I discuss in Chapter 14 in analysis of the 'success narratives' of the interventions.

Summary, Part III
I have outlined the professional and academic literatures on the Ivoirian interventions and the larger Ivoirian conflict. I have shown that there are significant differences between the conflict literature and the interventions literature in focus, positionality, and the social context of their production. I have argued that this bifurcation supports characterisation of the literatures as polarised by positionality.
I have warranted my claim of the primary schism in the literatures as that between hegemonic to counterhegemonic positions through analysis of the fault lines of content, authorship and referencing which divides the literatures and by identifying the "undeniable facts" of the hegemonic intervention literature as those challenged in the counterhegemonic literature. I have analysed the difference between narrator positionality and narrator analysis and added some 'shades of grey' to more fully and accurately describes the literatures and their authors beyond the black-and-white binaries of hegemonic and counterhegemonic. I have emphasised the ways in which analysts can move beyond their episteme and shift the positionality of their discourse through their analysis. In describing nuance, variance, and exception, I have attempted to avoid the simplification and polarisation inherent in narrative warfare in my own analysis.

I have emphasised that the political realities of research in a 'post-conflict' environment have silenced dissenting internal views of the interventions. International academics partnering with Ivorian academics have likewise been restricted, or restricted themselves, to a near-exclusive focus on the Ivorian conflict, with silence on the realities of intervention. This has resulted in hegemonic external voices predominating in writing of history of the Ivorian interventions within international academic institutions and has resulted in exclusion of counterhegemonic arguments. This primary silence has carried over into second-generation research, producing exclusion through ignorance in addition to silence exclusion through positionality. I have argued to include the grey literature produced outside academia both to allow consideration of the counterhegemonic authors and narratives and to recognise the actual fluidity of current categories of employment, given the movement among NGOs, academia, journalism, and politics of both hegemonic and counterhegemonic authors.

In Chapter 9, I summarised the literature on the 'root causes' of the Ivorian conflict which focusses on economic decline, democratisation and elite contestation, ethnification of Ivorian politics, the Ivorian conflict as security sector failure, and the Ivorian conflict as part of the larger West African regional conflict.
In Chapter 10, I foregrounded the analysis of France's 'informal' and 'formal' interventions in Côte d'Ivoire and the contested relationship between France and the rebellion. I then discussed the production of the intervention literature, and its grounding within the historical contexts of the intervention. I turned to the research literature through the main themes presented: the justificatory discourses of legalism, state-interest realism, humanitarian discourse, and the legitimacy derived through multilateralism, regional, and global organisations. I concluded with a short summary of recent intervention 'outcomes' literature.

In Part IV, I turn to analysis of the contested hegemonic and counterhegemonic strategic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions.
Part IV: Narrative Analysis

As discussed in Chapter 2, strategic narratives achieve depth and significance for their audiences through their linkages to bodies of knowledge and belief. When successful, strategic narratives become incorporated into those foundational discourses. In the following chapters, I describe the central contested strategic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions within the context of the discourses upon which these narratives are founded and from which they draw their persuasive power.

I begin with the hegemonic strategic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions within their discourses of peacekeeping and the liberal peace. Liberalism, discussed in Chapter 2, is a complex political philosophy, and serves as the basis of the UN Charter. Liberalism is so much a part of the culture of the UN that the foundational discourse of liberalism can be difficult to discern. However, it can be identified through close attention to the messaging deployed by the UN grounded in two foundational liberal discourses: the discourse of UN peacekeeping and the discourse of the liberal peace. UN messaging consistently used the terminology of peacekeeping and the liberal peace to achieve positioning as a moral actor and to shape global understanding of the international missions in Côte d’Ivoire.

Close analysis of UN records of intervention in Côte d’Ivoire uncovers many instances where UN peacekeeping principles and liberal peace normative values conflicted with each other, creating situations where principles were compromised through the necessity of honouring a competing norm. When these founding principles and values conflicted with the exigencies of military combat in the Ivoirian interventions, the UN conducted narrative campaigns to deflect criticism, to shape perceptions, and to manufacture unanimity as a basis for UN legitimacy. As do all strategic narrative actors, the UN attempted to shape perceptions to fit strategic priorities rather than empirical facts, particularly during the Second Ivoirian Civil War. These liberal and humanitarian narratives are called into question when they do not align with UN actions or conceal inconvenient counternarratives. In the second half of Part IV, I analyse the counterhegemonic narratives within their discourses of Ivoirité and Françafrique which challenge the liberal hegemonic discourses of the Ivoirian interventions.
Chapter 11. Narratives of peacekeeping discourse

The UN messaging throughout the Ivoirian interventions supported positioning as a moral actor. This messaging drew resonance, authority, and legitimacy through its foundation in peacekeeping and liberal peace discourses. In this chapter, I analyse the narratives and strategies which the UN used to establish positioning as a moral actor through reference to the principles of peacekeeping (non-use of force, consent, and impartiality), foregrounding the ways in which UN strategic narratives attempted to justify actions which conflicted with these principles.

Impartiality
The UN made repeated public claims of impartiality throughout the Ivoirian interventions, including during the conduct of the Second Ivoirian Civil War. UN News used the term "impartial" or "impartiality" in 19 articles during or following intense periods of conflict between December 2004 and the end of April 2011. The first direct reference to impartiality in UN reporting occurred when the UN called on Côte d’Ivoire to create an "independent and impartial" media following the Second Battle of Abidjan in 2003 (UN News, 7 Feb 2003). A year later, the Ivoirian ambassador to the UN challenged UN claims of impartiality regarding the Commission of Inquiry Report on Human Rights, perceived as biased against the government (UN_Press, 2004). In December 2004, following the Fourth Battle of Abidjan, the UN claimed to provide "impartial information" via UNOCI-FM transmissions (UN News, 14 Dec 2004). In August 2005, during backlash against UN pressure to replace both Gbagbo and the national assembly, the Security Council decried protests blocking the movement of the "impartial forces" (UN News, 19 Aug 2005). Following the Fifth Battle of Abidjan (ignited by the UN's attempt to dissolve the National Assembly), the head of Emergency Relief claimed that the UN organisations in Côte d’Ivoire were "doing impartial, neutral, and apolitical work," followed the next day by a call for Côte d’Ivoire to ensure "impartiality" in the Independent Electoral Commission (UN News, 15 Feb 2006, 16 Feb 2006). Between 2002 and 2011, UN news articles used the term "impartial forces" 7 times (UN News, 29 Mar 2006, 29 Apr 2006, 24 May 2006, 18 Oct 2006, 21 Dec 2006, 19 Oct 2007, 10 Mar 2011). Only once did a UN News article using the term "impartial forces"
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explicitly referencing Licorne in the same article, rendering ambiguous whether the UN considered Licorne an "impartial peacekeeping force" (UN News 29 Apr 2006).

Nearly half the UN News articles using the term 'impartial' were published during and immediately following the four months of the Second Ivoirian Civil War. Choi made 5 separate claims of impartiality in his certification of Ouattara’s victory in the UN News article published on 8 December 2011 (UN News, 8 Dec 2010). On 20 December 2010, UN News claimed that "a decision to distort the mission’s impartial role was made deep inside Mr. Gbagbo's camp" and "underscor[ed] the UN's impartiality" (UN News, 20 Dec 2010). On 28 December, UnderSecretary-General for Peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, claimed "the UN's total impartiality in certifying Mr. Ouattara's victory..." (UN News, 28 Dec 2010).

The narrative of UN impartiality in the Ivoirian interventions is accepted within the hegemonic literature and rejected within the counterhegemonic literature, one of the dispositive characteristics of the epistemic polarisation of the intervention discourse. In the section below, I examine UN messaging in the early stages of the interventions which exhibit a much less impartial pattern of communications than the messaging above would indicate.

Naming, shaming, and framing 'intransigence'
In the analysis below, I will present detailed examples of UN strategies of naming, shaming, and framing Ivoirian 'intransigence' as a personal failing of Ivoirian politicians, rather than politically intractable problems which required a different solution. I will also demonstrate that this narrative based on the premise that the Ivoirian state had 'consented' to the LMA and to UN management of the Ivoirian crisis, was asymmetrically applied, and was consistently biased against the Gbagbo administration and in favor of the rebel forces.

Rather than re-thinking the LMA when it was clear that the 'Accord' was unacceptable to the National Assembly majority, the Ivoirian government, much of the southern Ivoirian population, and even the rebel forces, the dogged UN messaging, averaging 30 news items for each of the three years, reinforced a narrative of Ivoirian intransigence and presumed incompetence, focussed on Ivoirians' repeated 'failures' to make the LMA work. Much of the UN messaging on 'failure' to comply with the LMA appears impartial. There are
references within UN News articles to specific instances of rebel intransigence, although it is not named as such. However, the repeated named reference to Gbagbo in the articles, which rarely named opposition or rebel actors, over time provided a weighted emphasis, whether intentional or not. Gbagbo was the visible actor in the messaging, while for the most part, the opposition was cloaked by group identity.

UN narrators introduced the 'moral contraband' of implied causation and censure in a series of five UN News articles published between 21 July and 30 July 2004. In four of the five articles, UN News reported that, "Mr. Gbagbo suspended his support for opposition ministers in May and the Forces Nouvelles left the transitional government." In the fifth, the wording changed slightly to, "The President suspended his support for opposition ministers in the transitional government in May and the Forces Nouvelles left the government." These compound sentences in the five news articles combine two simple sentences using "and." First, Gbagbo suspended his support; second, the Forces Nouvelles left the government. The linear construction (first, then) implies causation in global north narrative structures (Maan, 2013, p.1201). The news articles as written imply that Forces Nouvelles left the government because Gbagbo suspended his support. In fact, the Forces Nouvelles had withdrawn previously from a "unity government" on 23 September 2003 (UN News, 2 Oct 2004), and hardly participated at all since rejoining the government on 6 January 2004 (S/2004/443, para. 1). Opposition ministers withdrew from government less than two months later, on 26 February 2004 (S/2004/443, para. 6) and Forces Nouvelles, along with remaining opposition groups, withdrew on 7 March 2004 (S/2004/443, para. 7). By mid-May 2004, opposition and FN politicians had boycotted participation in the Ivorian government for almost six of the past seven months. On 18 May, Gbagbo suspended payment to and dismissed opposition politicians who had not participated in government since March.

The narrative above that "The President suspended his support for opposition ministers in the transitional government in May and the Forces Nouvelles left the government" is questionable at best. The implication that Gbagbo's withdrawal of support caused the opposition to withdraw and that he was therefore responsible for their withdrawal is an example of a narrative containing moral contraband. Over the course of long war, narratives
containing moral contraband contributed to the belief that Gbagbo was personally responsible for the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire.

Gbagbo's name appears in 402 individual UN News articles between 2002 - 2017, Ouattara appears in half that number, 224, of which only 12 appear before the 2010 elections. Ouattara is always referenced, from 2002 through the 2010 presidential elections, as an opposition political leader, and is not directly tied to the armed northern combatants in the messaging. Given that the primary stated goal of the northern combatants in both civil wars was to provide a pathway for Ouattara to the presidency, this caesura is anomalous. Guillame Soro, the 'Secretary General' of the armed northern combatants appears only 64 times in the news articles between 2002 - 2012. Soro is mentioned only 5 times after the conclusion of the Second Ivoirian Civil War. Even though Soro continued as President of the National Assembly from 2012, he was no longer referenced in the reporting from 2012. Since the UN News articles are predominantly negative in tone, Gbagbo is more tied tightly to the negative reporting through the second civil war than the individual members of the opposition or rebel actors, including Ouattara, who usually remain nameless in the reporting. This silence protected Ouattara from association with the negative reporting on Côte d'Ivoire which was the norm between 2002 and 2011.

Internal UN documents cited in Part II provide abundant records of Gbagbo's multiple concessions and the complete intransigence of the northern warlords, who refused to comply with international decisions, never disarmed, and reunified the country through military conquest in 2011. The UN News articles failed to foreground rebel failure to comply, creating the impression of unilateral intransigence. By 2011, the international community had decided - Gbagbo was the problem. The asymmetric UN messaging contributed to the strategic narrative that Gbagbo was inflexible, intransigent, and unwilling to cooperate.

I'm not arguing that the damage to Gbagbo's international reputation from UN messaging was the product of a deliberate and conscious strategy by the UN between 2002 and 2017. Even with the narrative data cited above, there is inadequate direct support for that claim. However, as I argued in Chapter 2, narrator intent is less important than narrative outcome in narrative warfare. Whether discrediting Gbagbo was a deliberate and conscious narrative
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strategy or not, UN messaging on 'intransigence' was not impartial. A primary and explicit purpose of the LMA was to create a pathway for Ouattara to become president of Côte d'Ivoire. The asymmetric UN messaging which focussed on the "imperative" of complying with the LMA, and linked Gbagbo by name to the failures to comply, built consensus to replace Gbagbo with Ouattara through regime change in 2011.

The non-use of force and the responsibility to protect
In the next section, I outline the conundrums which resulted for UNOCI from the contradictions between the principles of impartiality, the non-use of force, and the normative commitments of R2P. I focus on the UN messaging which attempted to reconcile these conflicting commitments to position itself as a moral actor over the course of the Second Ivoirian Civil War and to justify its actions in the war.

The mandate to protect civilians was heavily leveraged in UN strategic messaging to justify military actions by claiming that military assault against the Ivoirian government was justified because this kinetic 'all means necessary' authorisation was enacted to protect civilians. At the start of the Second Ivoirian Civil War, Le Roy, the head of UN peacekeeping, linked impartiality directly to protecting civilians, claiming that "We protect civilians impartially as possible" (UN News, 27 Dec 2010). In early March, at the height of the fighting, Choi emphasised "the mission's commitment to the protection of civilians, underlying its complete neutrality and impartiality," claiming that the Gbagbo government directly targeted civilians (UN News, 11 Mar 2011). The article noted that "UNOCI is documenting, analysing, investigating, and accumulating evidence of abuses and human rights violations ...no matter which camp they belong to” and then referenced claims that the Ivoirian security forces had targeted and killed civilians during 'peaceful protests.'

This linkage of impartiality to civilian protection is significant, since Security Council Resolution 1975 (2011), adopted on 30 March 2011, specified that UNOCI was authorised "while impartially implementing its mandate, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence...including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population" (S/RES/1975, para. 6). On 29 March and 21 April 2011, "impartiality" in UN News articles changed to "military
impartiality" (UN News, 29 Mar 2011; 21 Apr 2011), bookending UN combat operations against the Ivoirian military and government. In what way direct combat engagement with the Ivoirian state military on behalf of the Ouattara forces could be described as "military impartiality" is unclear; nonetheless, that was the official UN messaging at that time.

In early March 2011, UN News reported fierce fighting between the Ivoirian state military and the Forces Nouvelles, with fighting concentrated in Abobo district (UN News, 1 Mar 2011, 3 Mar 2011). The reporting used highly selective framing, which resulted in narratives which portrayed the Ivoirian state as using heavy weapons targeted at civilians. During the Sixth Battle of Abidjan, French and Ivoirian forces exchanged a barrage of mortars across the Abobo market, resulting in multiple deaths and injuries (Konan, 2017). This exchange was framed in UN News as Gbagbo forces directing fire at civilians in the Abobo marketplace (UN News, 17 Mar 2011, 18 Mar 2011, 21 Mar 2011). The reporting was not completely inaccurate; the Ivoirian state military was engaged in combat with French troops, and civilians died. However, it was not 'impartial' reporting, as it implied that the Ivoirian military forces were deliberately bombing civilians rather than engaged in battle with the French forces in the encampment opposite. Several of my Ivoirian respondents confirmed their experiences of being caught in the cross-market bombardment by both sides (confidential conversations, Abidjan, November 2018). None of the UN News articles referenced above acknowledges the French bombardment going on at the same time. UN News has not subsequently acknowledged acquittal of Ivoirian military officers by an Ivoirian military tribunal on these charges in March 2015 (S/2015/320, para. 20), nor Gbagbo's acquittal on these charges (Peniguet, 2019a; ICC, 2021).

Silence as strategy also evident in the UN reporting on their own bombing campaign. UN and French helicopters attacked Ivoirian national forces at military camps in Abidjan, the Presidential Residence, state television headquarters, and the Akban paramilitary base, resulting in civilian deaths in the surrounding residential quarters (BBC, 5 Apr 2011). None of these bombings are reported in UN News. On the same day that UN and French forces were shelling the sites above, with their attendant civilian casualties, UN News published Ban's
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instruction to UN troops to "take all necessary steps to protect civilians" from the use of heavy weaponry against them (UN News, 4 Apr 2011).

Counterhegemonic narratives refute the claim that the Gbagbo administration deliberately targeted heavy weaponry against civilians. Undoubtedly there were civilian casualties incurred through Ivoirian state engagement in military combat with the FRCI, UNOCI, and Licorne troops. However, there is a difference between civilians dying as 'collateral damage' and the "indiscriminate" targeting of civilians as is claimed in the hegemonic discourse (Piccolino, 2014, p. 239). During asymmetric and irregular urban combat, distinguishing combatant from civilian becomes an almost impossible task, and the ability to distinguish civilian from combatant casualties is problematic at best. There are further claims within the counterhegemonic literature that Ouattara combatants mixed with civilians during demonstrations, using the civilians as human shields to attain military goals, which further complicates the narrative of the 'deliberate targeting' of civilians (Mattei, 2015, p. 63).

One clear example of directly competing counternarratives regarding civilians as military targets can be found in the accounts of the 16 December 2010 attempt by Ouattara partisans to take over Ivoirian state media facilities and state institutions. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported the Ouattara attempt on 16 December, "to peacefully march" to take control of Ivoirian state media (A/HRC/19/72, para. 15). However, the UNSC (2017) chronology didn't describe a "peaceful" march; their summary of the event reads, "Supporters of Ouattara unsuccessfully attempted to gain control of key state institutions, resulting in the deaths of about 30 people" (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6). The counterhegemonic counternarrative describes this event as an Ouattara attempt at seizing power through control of the Ivoirian state media and other state institutions. This counternarrative gains power within the counterhegemonic discourse through its resonance with the crisis of 1993. The narrative of Ouattara's 1993 attempt to seize power, recounted in Chapter 5, is one which several of my Ivoirian respondents independently told me, unprompted, and reinforces counterhegemonic narratives of a second attempt by Ouattara to attain control of state media in December 2010. Gbagbo refuted the UN strategic narrative of his government's ruthless killing of civilians during the "peaceful" march 16
December with a counternarrative of his own, emphasising that the march was a direct attempt to seize state institutions using "well-armed professional mercenaries, well-equipped and well-trained...". Mattei notes that the charge against Gbagbo was successfully refuted at the ICC hearing, citing evidence that the 'peaceful demonstration' included "rebels, armed with Kalashnikovs and rocket-propelled grenades..." (Mattei, 2015, p. 287). The claim that Gbagbo personally ordered military violence directed against civilian non-combatants rather than opponent military combatants during the Second Ivoirian Civil War was one of the four charges of crimes against humanity which was dismissed with 'no case to answer' in 2019 by the ICC judges (Tarfusser, 2019). However, at the time of the Second Ivoirian Civil War, that acquittal was almost a decade away.

Counterhegemonic narrators hold that the UN's actions in combat operations during the Second Ivoirian Civil War betrayed the principle of impartiality in other ways, especially the UN's emphasis on its impartiality in protecting civilians. Two events in particular call the gap between strategic narrative and military reality into question: the Duékoué Massacre of 28 March 2011 and the bombing of the Presidential Palace in advance of the capture of Gbagbo on 11 April 2011.

The Duékoué Massacre of 28 March 2011 is the among most notorious events of the Second Ivoirian Civil War, the one event which most directly challenges the UN narrative of 'military impartiality' in the use of force for the protection of civilians in imminent danger. Multiple sources have documented the killing of civilians by FRCI forces and the presence of UNOCI forces who did not engage to protect those civilians, including video footage of uniformed UN personnel observing the violence as it happened (tazeserch, 2012) and recorded statements from UNOCI administrators who claimed that UNOCI forces would have put their own lives at risk if they had intervened (ACC, 2012). UN military intervention at Duékoué would have been precisely the type of military intervention mandated by Resolution 1975 to protect civilians, but the civilians killed were Gbagbo supporters, they were killed by Ouattara forces, and the UN forces present did not intervene militarily. Despite multiple UN and ICC claims that crimes against humanity would be investigated and prosecuted
impartially, no charges were levied against the Ouattara forces involved in the Duékoué massacre (Emerson, 2011; Robinson, 2011; Schafer, 2011; Amnesty International, 2013).

During the final assault on the presidential compound in April 2011, multiple credible reports have been made that the 'impartial forces' knowingly shelled the compound while civilians sheltered there and attempted to provide a human shield for Gbagbo and his cabinet, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths during the bombardment. There are videos, personal accounts, and photo documentation of the deaths of civilians which occurred during the compound bombing (Bakaba, 2011; Baniafouna, 2011, p. 57; ACC 2012; Mattei, 2015, p. 87; Fagiola, 2016, p. 30), but UN reporting makes no mention of the civilian casualties, reporting on 11 April only that Gbagbo surrendered to "forces loyal to President Ouattara" (UN News, 11 Apr 2011). When the civilians at the presidential compound during the bombing are mentioned in the hegemonic literature, they are described to as "loyalists defending the presidential compound" (Tzanakopoulous, 2011) or "associates" (Carter Center, undated, p. 8).


The UN references to impartiality in their public messaging leveraged the principle of impartiality, as modified by the Brahimi Report, to justify its actions across the interventions and during the Second Ivoirian Civil War, despite the mismatch between the principle and the exigencies of the mission. Counterhegemonic narratives challenge the narrative that the actions of the Gbagbo government 'morally compel[led]' the UN to use force 'to oppose obvious evil' during the Second Ivoirian Civil War in an 'impartial' manner. These counterhegemonic narratives provide reason to question the strategic narratives of use of force justified by the 'impartial' protection of civilians. Some hegemonic analysis has questioned the UN narratives of the use of force as driven by the responsibility to protect
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(Dauda, 2011; Ojo, 2012; Schmidt, 2018). However, for the most part, the hegemonic discourse assumes that the UN use of force was justified by the protection of civilians, as in the 'undeniable' claims that the UN and French use of force in the Second Ivoirian Civil War ultimately 'saved lives' (Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Oved, 2011; Charbonneau, 2014). By the end of the Ivoirian interventions, the UN had substantially re-written UN narratives of impartiality in the field to include narratives of 'impartiality' in military combat against one side in a conflict.

The civil war that wasn't
When Gbagbo refused to bow to UN pressure to cede the presidency to Ouattara following the election of 2010, an immovable object came up against irresistible force. Anything short of capitulation was unacceptable to the UN, and Gbagbo was clear that he would not capitulate. Within two weeks in December 2010, the movement towards war became clear, if not inevitable. The UN found itself in a dilemma. Direct military combat in a civil war was contravened under the principle of impartiality in peacekeeping. But the principle of impartiality was no longer clear, complicated as it was by the re-definitions of the Brahimi Report. Winning Security Council approval for direct partisan military combat for a UN 'peace operation' was by no means a simple and straightforward process either, as discussed in Chapter 12, below. Strategic narrative messaging provided a smoke screen to minimise resistance at the international level to UN and French forces engaging in partisan combat.

Two narratives reveal the problem for the UN of enforcing its ruling in favor of Ouattara through military combat while claiming to adhere to the principle of impartiality. The first narrative focussed on the 'risk of war' during the Second Ivoirian Civil War. The second narrative deployed a strategy of naming and framing the Second Ivoirian Civil War as a 'post-election crisis' or 'post-electoral violence,' cloaking the UN's involvement in what became a full-blown shooting war.

Between 15 December 2010 through 25 March 2011, the UN published 16 UN News articles which referenced the "risk" or "fear" of the "possibility" of a "return to," "reigniting," or
"resurgence of" civil war."12 One news article warned of "wider armed conflict." (UN News, 24 Feb 2011). On 3 March, a Security Council press release warned of "the risk of resurgence of civil war" (SC/10191-AFR/2131). The warnings stopped abruptly at the end of March, when UNOCI and Licorne troops joined combat against the Ivoirian state army in the 6th Battle of Abidjan. On 4 April, describing the ongoing combat in Abidjan (referencing only the Ivoirian military under Gbagbo, and not referencing the UN, French, and Ouattara forces' military engagement), UN News published the statement that "UNOCI is not a party to the conflict," (UN News, 4 Apr 2011), in direct contradiction of the military realities then on the ground. Only once did UN News acknowledge that Côte d’Ivoire had staggered through a second civil war during the UN intervention. On 3 May 2017, in closing messaging as the UNOCI mission disbanded, UN News noted that "Around 3,000 died in renewed civil war, before Mr Ouattara was inaugurated in May 2011" (UN News, 3 May 2017). This News in Brief article has been removed from the UN web.

If it wasn’t a civil war, what was it? Between 17 December 2010 and 29 June 2017, UN News published 145 articles which used terms such as 'post-electoral,' or 'post-election' 'crisis,' (136), 'violence' (70) 'turmoil' (6) or 'abuses' (2) to refer to the events of the Second Ivoirian Civil War. This volume, velocity, and variety of messaging indicates a narrative strategy of flooding; using replication to establish the framing and naming of conflict. Repetition established that the UN was involved in 'peacekeeping' in a situation of violence, rather than combat in a civil war.

Consent
UN peacekeepers in Côte d’Ivoire operated within the formal state consent framework of a Status of Forces Agreement from June 2004 through mid-December 2011, when Gbagbo withdrew state consent. The next section explores the paradox of a formal state consent and de facto rejection of the interventions by a significant portion of the Ivoirian population and government. Because ‘consent’ is deeply contested narrative of the Ivoirian interventions, this section examines how consent narratives were constructed and deployed

or resisted and denied. My analysis of the narratives of consent and resistance in the Ivoirian interventions interrogates the ways in which the UN deployed strategic narratives of consent in the Ivoirian operations and the Ivoirian responses to those narratives.

The Gbagbo administration gave formal consent to UN forces by signing the UNOCI Status of Forces Agreement on 29 June 2004 (UN News, 30 Jun 2004), tried to withdraw consent in 2006 (Busch, 2006), and announced formal withdrawal of consent to UN and French forces' presence in Côte d'Ivoire in late 2010 (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6; BBC, 2010; Baniafouna, p. 31), which Ban rejected on the grounds that Gbagbo was no longer the head of state for Côte d'Ivoire (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6). UN conformity to the principle of consent in the Ivoirian case was problematic in the formal sense of government agreement to host uniformed forces when the Gbagbo administration formally withdrew consent in December 2010. However, 'consent' in the Ivoirian interventions was more problematic than the UN and France's decision to overrule the Ivoirian government's formal withdrawal of consent in December 2010. The UN and French missions were beset with both formal and informal rejection throughout the interventions by both state and rebel actors as documented in Part II of this thesis.

The UN emphasis on mandatory compliance with the French-engineered LMA and UN Security Council resolutions problematises narratives built on the assumption of consent in the Ivoirian interventions. Consent in peace operations is grounded in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in which a host government authorises an international mission and the presence of international troops in the host country. However, in common usage, consent is not consent when it is not freely given. Part II provided documentation on both state and popular resistance to French and UN actions during the interventions. Normally, we consider 'consent' which is coerced repeatedly coercion, rather than consent.

The UN deployed coercion across the interventions. In the first instance, I will analyse the UN strategy of insisting that There Is No Alternative (TINA) to the Linas Marcoussis Accord (LMA) of 2003 before discussing formal revocation of consent in the Second Ivoirian Civil War during the time of two presidents. I will analyse the narrative strategies deployed in the
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UN's manufacture of international consent to the use of military force in the Second Ivorian Civil War in my discussion of the UN's strategy of dubbing and triangulation leading up to the approval of Resolution 1975 in Chapter 12 below.

TINA - There Is No Alternative to the LMA
UN News published 89 news articles which referenced the LMA between February 2003 and the end of 2005, an escalating series of expressions of concern, moving to exhortations, and then to direct threats. Initially, the Secretary General and the Security Council "called on" Ivorian politicians to implement the LMA provisions (UN News 3 Feb 2003, 4 Feb 2003, 21 Feb 2003, 14 Mar 2003, 28 Mar 2003). "Calling on" increased to "stresses" and "concern" that the LMA be actioned (UN News, 2 Apr 2003, 3 Jun 2003). UN News escalated the demand to an imperative; "The members of the Security Council stressed that it is imperative for all the Ivorian parties to remain fully engaged in the government," (emphasis added) (UN News, 26 Mar 2004). This was followed with a direct, if vague, threat; "The United Nations Security Council threatened unspecified actions against individuals whose activities might block the full implementation of the 2003 peace accord between the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and its opposition" (emphasis added) (UN News, 26 Mar 2004). UN News reported that "Ivoirian leaders must choose between personal ambition and national interest... The only alternative to the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement.... would be further confrontation" (emphasis added) (UN News, 7 Jun 2004) and "...Linas-Marcoussis is the means by which the goals of these elections can be reached" (emphasis added) (UN News 23 Jun 2004). Both the Gbagbo government and the Forces Nouvelles rejected various provisions of the LMA through words and deeds from the first months following signing through to supersession of the LMA by the Ouagadougou Accord in 2007. Yet for 18 months, the UN insisted that the Accords, and the elections to be held under their auspices, were 'the only way' to achieve peace in Côte d'Ivoire.

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Events contradicted this assertion in no uncertain terms. Despite exhortations, urgings, warnings, threats, and expressions of concern, by November 2004 the country was re-engaged in full military combat, first in Opération Dignité and then in the Fourth Battle of Abidjan. From the end of July 2004 to the end of November 2005, UN News claimed a total of 11 times that the LMA had ended the "bitter fighting" including while the country was literally in the middle of bitter fighting (UN News 30 Jul 2004; 8 Apr 2004; 9 Aug 2004; 10 Aug 2004; 11 Aug 2004; 20 Aug 2004; 26 Aug 2004; 16 Dec 2004; 16 Jun 2005; 23 Aug 2005; 30 Nov 2005). The multiple articles clearly display the narrative strategy of replication to achieve messaging impact. The final UN News article which referenced the LMA concluded the saga with the sentence, "The Linas-Marcoussis was the first peace agreement to end the country's bitter civil conflict" (UN News, 30 Nov 2005), implying the agreement's supersession but maintaining the fiction that the LMA had ended "the country’s bitter civil conflict," which would continue for the better part of the next six years. In 2007, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreements superseded the LMA, rendering it a dead letter as the official guiding peace agreement in the Ivoirian conflict. The strategy of attempting to portray consent (or at least compliance) to a peace agreement as mandatory and inevitable appears to have had little impact on Ivoirian consent and compliance over the course of the LMA's lifespan. However, the UN News articles reporting the calling on, stressing over, threatening, and ordering Ivoirians to comply with the terms of the LMA did contribute to the perception of Ivoirian intransigence and problematised the UN's principle of consent in peacekeeping.

The Two Presidents and the principle of consent
For over five months, from 3 December 2010 until 21 May 2011, Côte d’Ivoire had two presidents. Gbagbo was the legal president of Côte d’Ivoire by his installation in the office by the Ivoirian Constitutional Council on 4 December. Ouattara was the 'internationally recognised' president. Naming and framing the 'real' president was necessary to legitimate the UN's continued presence in Côte d'Ivoire after the Ivoirian government's formal withdrawal of consent.

On 16 December 2010, Gbagbo declared withdrawal of consent and ordered the UN and French missions to leave the country. The UN rejected Gbagbo’s authority to withdraw
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consent, claiming that Ouattara was the 'internationally recognised' president of Côte d'Ivoire. By March 2011, the narrative of Ouattara as the president of Côte d'Ivoire was sufficiently established to convince the Security Council to authorise Resolution 1975 - formally authorising 'all means necessary' to protect civilians, and de facto authorising combat operations to remove Gbagbo from office. However, the narrative of Ouattara as the legitimate president through international recognition was not adequately persuasive for a large part of the Ivoirian public; it failed to prevent the Second Ivoirian Civil War and required significant narrative effort to establish within the international community.

On December 3, 2010, the Constitutional Council, the Ivoirian equivalent of the US Supreme Court, declared Gbagbo president of Côte d'Ivoire, and Choi declared Ouattara the president. On 4 December, Gbagbo was sworn in as President at the Presidential Palace in Abidjan by the head of the Constitutional Council, witnessed by the Ivoirian Constitutional Council (S/2011/211, para. 21). Also on 4 December, Ouattara wrote his own “swearing in” as president in a letter (S/2011/211, para. 21) and appointed Soro as Prime Minister (UNSC, 2017b, p. 7). Soro immediately appointed an Ouattara cabinet, which was then designated 'the government of Côte d'Ivoire' by the UN (S/2011/211, para. 21).

Analysis of UN News articles between 4 December 2010 and the end of the interventions in 2017 show striking patterns in the naming and framing strategies used to refer to Ouattara and Gbagbo. From 12 November through 4 December 2010, UN News used the terms 'incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo' and 'former prime minister Alassane Ouattara' consistently in a total of 10 news articles (UN News, 12 Nov 2010; 17 Nov 2010; 20 Nov 2010; 24 Nov 2010; 25 Nov 2010; 27 Nov 2010; 29 Nov 2010; 2 Dec 2010; 3 Dec 2010; 4 Dec 2010).

Following Gbagbo's official installation and Ouattara's self-swearing-in on 4 December, the UN terms became inconsistent, indicating uncertainty in how to best name and frame the two men. Starting on 5 December, the UN referred to "the incumbent president.... the outgoing President Laurent Gbagbo" and "opposition leader and president-elect Alassane Ouattara" (UN News, 5 Dec 2010), then "incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo" and "the winning candidate, Alassane Ouattara.... Mr. Ouattara, a former prime minister in the
country" (UN News, 6 Dec 2010). From 15 December through 21 December, UN messaging referred to “outgoing President Laurent Gbagbo" and "president-elect Ouattara" (UN News, 15 Dec 2010; 16 Dec 2010; 18 Dec 2010; 19 Dec 2010). On 23 December, referencing changed back to "incumbent President Gbagbo" and forward to "Alassane Ouattara, the duly elected president of Côte d'Ivoire" (UN News, 23 Dec 2010). Only once more did UN News refer to Ouattara as the "duly elected president," (UN News, 16 Feb 2011).

Ten days after Gbagbo revoked consent to intervention and 22 days after the dual 'installations,' UN News used the phrases "incumbent Laurent Gbagbo" (without the title 'President') and "opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara" (UN News, 26 Dec 2010). On 29 December, UN News again labeled Gbagbo the "outgoing president," for the first time using 'president' rather than 'President' (UN News, 29 Dec 2010). Up until the 29 December news article, the term 'President' was always capitalised when referring to Gbagbo, the capital letter indicating official title. In terms of diplomatic convention, the UN recognised Gbagbo as the president of Côte d'Ivoire with the official title 'President' until 29 December, nearly three weeks after Choi's declaration of the Ouattara presidency, and 8 days after Ban repudiated Gbagbo's withdrawal of consent, claiming that Gbagbo was no longer president. Only twice in 2011 - on the day of his inauguration (UN News, 21 May 2011) and on the day he addressed the UN General Assembly (UN News, 22 Sept 2011) - did UN News refer to Ouattara by his title as "President."

Between the end of December and the start of combat in mid-March 2011, UN News referred consistently to Gbagbo as the "incumbent president" and 'former president" while referring to Ouattara as the "president-elect" (UN News, 30 Dec 2010; 2 Jan 2011; 29 Mar 2011), "the country's president" (UN News, 4 Jan 2011), "challenger" (UN News, 11 Jan 2011), "a legitimately elected president" (UN News, 14 Jan 2011; 18 Jan 2011; 31 Jan 2011). The most common terms applied to Ouattara were "opposition leader,"13 and "opposition figure" (UN News, 21 Mar 2011; 22 Mar 2011; 23 Mar 2011; 24 Mar 2011). These are widely

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variant naming and framing conventions and indicate uncertainty as to how to best name/frame Ouattara during the Second Ivoirian Civil War. Particularly interesting is the choice to reduce Ouattara's status to "opposition leader," then to "opposition figure," during the peak combat periods from January through March. I interpret these usages as the UN downplaying Ouattara's role in the civil war and his involvement in the fighting then underway - much of it directed by Ouattara and conducted by his military forces.

From 29 March 2011, when the tropical blitzkrieg had succeeded, the country was under the control of Ouattara forces, and the combat in Abidjan entered the endgame, the term 'president' (always lower-case) reappears in reference to Ouattara: "president-elect" (UN News, 29 Mar 2011), "president Ouattara" (UN News, 31 Mar 2011; 4 Apr 2011), and "the president of Côte d'Ivoire" (UN News, 3 April 2011; 5 Apr 2011). On 6, 7, and 10 April, during the heaviest fighting of the war, UN News didn't name/frame Ouattara as president of Côte d'Ivoire, referring to him as "Alassane Ouattara" without a title or descriptor on 6 April, then "Alassane Ouattara, the UN-certified winner of last November's presidential election" on 7 and 10 April. The 10 April article included the phrase "the country's elected government" in reference to Ouattara's appointments (UN News, 10 Apr 2011).

On 11 April, following the capture of Gbagbo, the UN News referred to "president [small p] Ouattara" six separate times in a single article, and once in the following 12 April news article (UN News 22 Apr 2011). Between 18 April and 19 May, UN News used the phrase "Alassane Ouattara, the internationally recognized president" (UN News, 18 Apr 2011; 21 Apr 2011; 22 Apr 2011; 19 May) in four articles, and "Alassane Ouattara" without title or descriptor in five articles (UN News, 28 Apr 2011; 3 May 2011; 10 May 2011; 13 May 2011; 17 May 2011). On inauguration, UN News referred to "President Alassane Ouattara" in the title headline, but referred to "president Alassane Ouattara," and "Mr. Ouattara" (three separate times) in the body of the article (UN News, 21 May 2011). Having fought so long and hard to ensure that Ouattara was inaugurated and became the official and formal president of Côte d'Ivoire, it is anomalous that the news reporting rarely used the formal title of 'President' when referring to Ouattara once he was inaugurated. The only example of the use of the formal title 'President' following Ouattara's inauguration which I have found
in the corpus appears in the headline describing Ouattara's address to the General Assembly on 3 October 2011, "Côte d'Ivoire: UN has key role in strengthening democracy, President says" (UN News, 3 Oct 2011). In contrast, UN News reported used the formal title "President Laurent Gbagbo" in 17 separate news articles between 12 November, at the start of discussion of the first presidential poll, through 19 December, at the beginning of the Second Ivorian Civil War.\textsuperscript{14}

With only the data available from news articles, UN narrative strategy during the time of the two presidents cannot be \textit{proven}, but the artifacts can be analysed, and the strategies can be inferred. UN narrators faced a challenge - Gbagbo was legally and formally President of Côte d'Ivoire following his inauguration. Ouattara was 'internationally recognised' but not legally President under the Ivorian constitution - and the UN needed to act as if he were. The narrative framing is evident in the circumlocutions "president-elect," "internationally recognized," "legitimately elected" and "UN-certified," intended to establish legitimacy and imply presidential authority to Ouattara without explicitly providing Ouattara the official title of 'President.'

The UN defied Gbagbo's order to leave the country, contrary to the principle of consent in peacekeeping and sheltered in Ouattara's claim to be the 'real' president of Côte d'Ivoire. However, Ouattara became the President of Côte d'Ivoire on 21 May 2011, not 4 December 2010. While UN and other narrators made numerous attempts to discredit the Ivorian Constitutional Council and Gbagbo's inauguration on 4 December, that formal inauguration by the Ivorian Constitutional Council was a \textit{requirement} for presidential office in Côte d'Ivoire, not an optional extra. If it had not been a requirement, there would have been no need to 'return' the President of the Ivorian Constitutional Council from exile in Ghana and demand under pressure his participation in Ouattara's inauguration (Naudé, 2011).

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The UN attacked the autonomy and authority of the Constitutional Council through ad hominem personalisation, labelling the court "Mr. Gbagbo's constitutional court" (UN News, 28 Jan 2011) during the height of the second civil war. Piccolino (2014b) critiques the constitutional defence of Gbagbo's second presidency as a case of "obsessive" legalistic nationalism (p.3), and a form of "ultra-nationalism" (p. 1). In contrast, international legal scholars have critiqued the legal basis of the Constitutional Council's 're-decision' to revoke its previous ruling that Gbagbo had won the presidency through supersession of the Council's authority by ECOWAS and the African Union (Tetang, 2012/2013; Ntwari, 2011).

The analytic focus above is not on the legal grounds for Ivoirian presidential legitimacy; the focus is on the narrative contestation. Gbagbo, under Ivoirian constitutional law, was President of Côte d'Ivoire between 4 December 2010 and 20 May 2011, until the inauguration of Ouattara by the Ivoirian Constitutional Council on 21 May. Whether he should have been President is a separate question. In terms of narrative warfare, UN messaging was successful on the international level - by obscuring the constitutional basis of Gbagbo's occupancy of the presidency, and foregrounding Ouattara's 'international' claim, UN messaging convinced Security Council members to authorise military removal of Gbagbo from the presidency. The narrative strategies used include naming and framing of Ouattara and Gbagbo, strategic silence (ignoring Gbagbo's constitutional claims to office), strategic attention (focusing on the 'international' legitimacy of Ouattara's claims to office), ad hominem attacks against Gbagbo and the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, and replication to create epistemic awareness and then certainty. However, these strategies and messaging failed to prevent the Second Ivoirian Civil War. Emphasising Ouattara's 'international' legitimacy intensified opposition to 'the international candidate' within Côte d'Ivoire and failed to convince enough Ivoirians of Ouattara's legitimacy that thousands went to war against France and the UN. When examined carefully, the narrative that the UN maintained its mission in Côte d'Ivoire through the 'consent' of the 'internationally recognised' president of the country seems weak, at best.

Summary - Chapter 11
Chapter 11 outlined challenges to the UN narratives based in the three principles of peacekeeping - impartiality, non-use of force, and consent, emphasising the inherent
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conflict between the traditional principles of peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect, particularly as rewritten in the Brahimi Report and operationalised in Côte d'Ivoire. I have foregrounded the inherent complexity of this discourse in real-world usage and the dialectic of coercion and consent underlying UN messaging. I've highlighted the UN's use of narrative strategies to manage these messaging conflicts and foregrounded how close analysis of these messaging patterns in their historical context calls these narratives into question.

**Impartiality:** I examined the use of naming, framing, and shaming in the UN messaging on the Ivoirian non-compliance with the LMA. I provided a clear example of the narrative strategy of moral contraband in specific UN messaging on Laurent Gbagbo and called into question the overall 'impartiality' of UN messaging towards the Ivoirian protagonists through the differential use of direct and indirect naming. I highlighted the difficulties of determining 'intent' in this messaging asymmetry while emphasising the long-term effect of delegitimizing Laurent Gbagbo's presidency.

**Non-use of force:** I examined the narrative framing of the civil war that wasn't, used to deflect attention from UNOCI actions incompatible with the non-use of force, highlighting the power of naming/framing in shaping perceptions of conflict. The contradictory and sometimes incoherent UN messaging examined here reveals the difficulties the UN experienced in maintaining moral positioning through leveraging the discourse of peacekeeping while also justifying partisan military combat. The UN used silences, defection, naming, and shaming to justify UN actions, leaving the UN open to accusations of hypocrisy and dishonesty.

**Consent:** My analysis of consent examined the use of the narratives of consent through two optics: informal and formal consent, the consent of the governed vs. the formal consent given by a state to intervention. Through repeated use of coercive messaging, claiming that There Is No Alternative to the LMA, the UN's insistence of compliance problematised informal consent in the Ivoirian interventions and damaged their credibility as a narrator. During the Second Ivoirian Civil War, the narrative of the Two Presidents in response to
formal state withdrawal of intervention consent succeeded in casting doubt upon Gbagbo's claims to the Ivoirian presidency internationally, but failed to prevent the civil war which ensued, and further undermined UN credibility as a strategic narrator within Côte d'Ivoire.

In the next chapter, I explore the related discourse of the liberal peace and analyse the ways in which this discourse further contributed to hegemonic representations of the interventions.
Chapter 12. Narratives of liberal peace discourse

In addition to strategic narratives grounded in the discourse of peacekeeping, UN messaging in the Ivoirian interventions referenced liberal peace discourse to establish and maintain moral authority and positionality as a moral actor in the interventions. In Chapter 2, I outlined my approach to liberal peace theory as discourse and identified Doyle (2005) as the key text with which I would engage in this analysis.

In the chapter below, I first analyse two sets of UN strategic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions which draw on the first pillar of liberal peace discourse, human rights. I first analyse the deployment of strategic humanitarian concern in UN messaging on déguerpissement (displacement of civilian populations) and then UN messaging on sexual abuse and sexual violence in Côte d'Ivoire. I next turn to the second liberal peace pillar: the discourse of republican representation as embodied in UN messaging on the relationship between elections and reunification and on constitutional order in the Ivoirian interventions, with attendant strategies of framing and silence which appeared during the Second Ivoirian Civil War. I conclude this chapter with the third pillar of the liberal peace in the context of the interventions: the UN's messaging on the legitimacy of its decisions and actions in the Ivoirian intervention based in the discourse of transnational interdependence, deploying strategies of disciplining dissent, manufacture of unanimity, dubbing, and triangulation through 'borrowing' legitimacy from regional and sub-regional organisations.

The first pillar - human rights
UN human rights narratives of the interventions played multiple roles - to name, shame, and frame human rights violations in Côte d'Ivoire, to focus international attention on specific mission and population needs, to mobilise international decisionmakers to support and fund the interventions, and to establish and maintain the UN’s authority as a moral actor in the interventions. Across the fifteen years of intervention, over four hundred articles, nearly one-third of the 1500 UN News articles which referenced Côte d'Ivoire, also referenced human rights. Human rights were defined negatively in the messaging, which focussed primarily on "rights violations" such as "summary executions, arbitrary arrests, attacks based on nationality, ethnicity or religious beliefs, ill treatment of children, destruction of
private property and population displacement" (UN News, 16 Oct 2002). In the sections which follow, I examine UN narratives of human rights violations, looking at the ways in which the UN leveraged displacements and sexual violence to position itself as a moral actor, and to simultaneously cast Ivoirians as immoral actors, through strategic management of attention.

**Déguerpissement**

UN News published 17 articles calling attention to and criticising the practice of 'déguerpissement' - the government's clearing of 'shantytowns' which housed always poor and often immigrant communities in Abidjan. The first articles appeared at the beginning of the First Ivorian Civil War, when government and rebel forces were engaged in street battles for the control of the capital, and the government, having identified foreign fighters among the rebel forces, 'cleared' slums which served as home to refugees (and mercenaries) from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars (UN News, 24 Sep 2004; 27 Sep 2002). The initial UN article noted that "Many [of the displaced immigrants] had lived in makeshift barracks in the surroundings of the Agban Gendarmerie camp, where fierce fighting took place" (UN News, 24 Sep 2002). While the general tone is critical of the government, déguerpissement is acknowledged to be an action taken under conditions of urban warfare against asymmetric opponents (the foreign mercenaries recruited by Ivorian military combatants in the 2002 attempt to seize the state.) This contextualisation of displacement because of a battle between government and rebel forces was followed by 6 news items published in October and November 2002 without this contextualisation, during a period of significant combat throughout the country (UN News, 27 Sept 2002; 10 Oct 2002; 29 Oct 2002; 4 Nov 2002; 8 Nov 2002; 15 Nov 2002; 19 Nov 2002). UN reporting on the Gbagbo government's déguerpissement resumed in mid-January 2003, concurrent with the negotiation of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords. The reporting increased in frequency through the violent rejection of the accords by the Abidjanaise populace during the Second Battle of Abidjan, then went quiet for over two years (UN News, 16 Jan 2003; 17 Jan 2003; 20 Jan 2003; 23 Jan 2003; 27 Jan 2003; 30 Jan 2003; 31 Jan 2003; 4 Feb 2003; 13 Feb 2003; 21 Mar 2003). In September 2005, in the context of growing tensions over UN and French plans to dismiss the National Assembly, SRSG Schori condemned the Gbagbo government for plans to "expel displaced people forcefully" from a Catholic mission in Duékoué (UN
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News, 30 Sep 2005). This pattern of reporting indicates that *déguerpissement* in UN reporting was tightly linked to strategic events, and was a frame deployed by the UN to focus attention on the Gbagbo administration's putative violation of human rights through displacement.

In the years following, UN News reporting shifted focus to the plight of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) and refugees in the context of the wider conflict, usually without specific attribution of culpability (UN News, 7 Sep 2005; 30 Sep 2005; 9 Feb 2006; 18 Apr 2006; 27 Apr 2006; 2 Jul 2007; 10 Jan 2011; 3 Feb 2011) or offering a general condemnation of 'unknown' assailants, even when there was strong evidence that atrocities were being committed by Ouattara-aligned forces. The one exception to this pattern of naming and shaming the Gbagbo administration for displacement and avoiding reference to Ouattara administration actions and atrocities occurs in the UN News report of 27 June 2011, which explicitly cites "the ongoing presence of the pro-Ouattara Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), an armed group" preventing IDPs in western Côte d’Ivoire from returning to their homes (UN News, 27 Jun 2011). The final UN News reporting on displacement in Côte d’Ivoire occurs from the start of fighting in the Second Ivoirian Civil War (UN News 10 Jan 2011; 3 Feb 2011; 8 Feb 2011; 15 Feb 2011; 15 Mar 2011) to the end of the Second Ivoirian Civil War and focusses on the UN's humanitarian efforts for generic internally displaced persons (UN News 22 May 2011; 27 May 2011; 14 Jun 2011; 3 Oct 2011).

This asymmetric pattern of UN reporting on displacement in the conflict renders visible UN strategic communications drivers, priorities, and prejudices. The UN criticised the Gbagbo government slum clearances and displacements in Abidjan; the news articles cited above were silent on the military and security drivers of the government's actions, except for the first report on 24 September 2002. Rebel forces were criticised directly only once in the reporting on internal displacement. I am not arguing here that the Gbagbo government displacements weren't serious human rights breaches. I merely note that the *fact* of the violations was not the only driver of ‘naming and shaming’ articles. If the human rights violations and suffering of displaced persons were the primary drivers of the reporting, then the much larger displacements and clearances from the north of the country to the south,
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and the indigenous population driven by FN out of the west, measuring in the hundreds of thousands of persons over the course of the two wars, would have received at least equal attention, which it did not. When the northern and western population displacements were discussed at all in UN News reporting, it was in the context of generic 'refugees' and generic 'displacement' due to conflict, with no reference to the explicit agency of the rebel forces.

If UN humanitarian concern with Ivorian state slum clearances had been the primary driver of UN reporting, the reporting wouldn't have disappeared, because the Ivorian government practice of slum clearance, land expropriation, and displacement has not disappeared. Ongoing land expropriation by Ouattara's FRCI fighters in the west of the country has been documented in multiple academic research projects and reports (Klaus and Mitchell, 2015; Toupko, 2014; Allouche and Zadi Zadi, 2013; ACC, 2012), but does not exist in UN messaging.

The Ouattara administration has expanded the scale and pace of the clearance of Abidjanaise impoverished neighborhoods and commercial zones, such as the 2012 razing of the Adjame market (IvoireTv.net, 2012), the displacement of 25,000 people without indemnification in the 2020 Adjouffou clearance, and ongoing expropriation of rural land to facilitate government access to mineral rights and the associated income throughout the country (Douade, 2021; Observers, 2020; Frindéthié, 2020, 2013; Gourlay, 2019, 2020; Fontaine, 2013). Frindéthié (2013; 2014) provides details on the continuing expropriation of indigenous lands by the state for sale to international actors by the Ouattara administration and Toupko (2015, p. 61) notes that the indigenous struggle for land in southwestern Côte d'Ivoire is becoming more, not less, "complex and violent" following the international interventions. The humanitarian concern with the clearances themselves cannot be the sole reason for the UN reporting during the conflict events of the Ivorian interventions observed above, or it would have continued long after Gbagbo was sent to the ICC.

The UN reporting pattern described above indicates that déguerpissement served several purposes for the UN. The reporting focussed international attention on the crisis, positioned the UN as a humanitarian actor, and alerted member states to the need for funds. UN
naming and shaming also served to critique and discipline the Gbagbo administration. The asymmetric level of attention to déguerpissement displays a clear pattern of stronger critique of the Gbagbo administration and a much weaker critique of the rebel forces, and later the Ouattara administration. The UN reporting established a narrative early in the interventions that portrayed the Gbagbo administration as uniquely violent and brutal. This pattern of uneven criticism of the breach of human rights in the Ivoirian clearances during the Gbagbo administration, followed by silence on the rebel displacements, and the ongoing crisis of déguerpissement since Ouattara came to power, again problematises UN claims of impartiality, discussed in Chapter 11.

Sexual exploitation and sexual violence
The UN positioning as a moral actor was challenged during the interventions by allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers against Ivoirian women and children. Initial UN reports in 2005 of UN forces' sexual abuse of Ivoirians were followed quickly by news articles focusing on UN initiatives to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, then followed by a shift of focus to Ivoirian sexual violence in conflict. From mid-2007, the UN adopted a strategy of strategically managing attention by foregrounding Ivoirian sexual abuse in conflict in advance of release of new reports of UNOCI sexual abuse of Ivoirians. These communications demonstrate a recurring pattern of diversion of focus from UN forces' sexual crimes to Ivoirian sexual crimes, the strategic communications effect of which was to mitigate challenges to UN positioning as a moral actor and to support its positioning as an arbiter of human rights.

The year 2005 began badly for the UN in Côte d’Ivoire – the first UN News article of the year announced the formation of a peacekeeper “Code of Conduct Unit” for Côte d’Ivoire to address a growing scandal of the sexual abuse of children in Côte d’Ivoire by UN troops (UN News, 7 Jan 2005). A month after the initial mention of the formation of a UNOCI “Code of Conduct Unit” to prevent sexual abuse of local populations by peacekeepers (UN News, 25 Feb 2005), the UN announced an “action plan” for a world-wide reporting and monitoring network of child abuse in “situations of armed conflict” or “situations of concern” (UN News, 25 Feb 2005). The UN also began internal reporting on the use and abuse of child soldiers in Côte d’Ivoire by the FN and FANCI (S/2005/72, para. 14). Annan followed up a
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week later with a call for the Security Council to set up a world-wide “compliance regime” against child abuse, specifically naming Côte d’Ivoire as one of among a number of “situation[s] of concern” (UN News, 16 Feb 2005). Deputy Secretary-General Frechette travelled to Abidjan at the start of March to “reinforce Mr. Annan’s zero-tolerance message on sexual exploitation and abuse” with doubled-up news articles for messaging emphasis (UN News, 25 Feb 2005; 4 Mar 2005; 7 Mar 2005).

UN reporting on sexual abuse in Côte d’Ivoire returned two years later. The UN reported that it had suspended and was launching an investigation of a UNOCI contingent “suspected of sexual exploitation” (UN News, 20 Jul 2007). The news article was shortly followed by the announcement that “UN, Moroccan officials meet to address allegations of sexual abuse” (UN News, 23 Jul 2005) and a follow-up announcement again two days later that the “UN will not turn ‘blind eye’ to peacekeepers’ misconduct." (UN News, 25 Jul 2005).

The UN focus changed two months later, from peacekeeper sexual abuse to Ivoirian sexual violence in conflict. The UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict made a public statement that she would be “examining the issue of sexual violence against children in the aftermath of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire” (UN News, 4 Sep 2007). Three days later, the UN reported an “Alarming upsurge in reported rape of girls in Côte d’Ivoire,” calling out specifically the “alarming degree of violence against children at the community level” and Ban stated that he was “deeply concerned about the prevailing culture of impunity for violations against children” (UN News, 7 Sep 2007). The following month, the focus on sexual violence turned to the UN forces; Ban again referenced peacekeeper sexual violence internally in his report to the Security Council, reporting “allegations were received ... [that] warranted further investigations,” and emphasising UNOCI was working towards “full compliance” and restricting movement of military personnel to reduce future incidents (S/2007/593, para. 57, 58).

The following year, UN News returned to the topic of sexual violence by Ivoirians in advance of reporting on abuses by UNOCI peacekeepers (UN News, 28 May 2008). Ban’s July 2008 report to the Security Council first reported on indigenous sexual violence in Côte d’Ivoire
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(S/2008/451, para. 52), followed shortly after by a mention of the UK-based Save the Children report (Csaky, 2008), soon to be released publicly, which addressed “the sexual exploitation and abuse of children committed by peacekeepers and humanitarian workers in peacekeeping operations, including Côte d’Ivoire.” Ban then reported ongoing investigations, disciplinary actions, training, and a zero-tolerance policy of sexual abuse by peacekeepers (S/2008/451, para. 55 – 57). At the end of 2008, the Committee on Côte d’Ivoire sanctions reported that Côte d’Ivoire had failed to follow-up in “numerous, serious allegations of human rights violations, particularly cases of sexual violence against women and children” (UN News, 15 Dec 2008).

Another year, another scandal: on 29 October 2009, Security Council Resolution 1893 “not[ed] with concern continuing human rights violations against civilians in Côte d’Ivoire, including numerous acts of sexual violence” (S/RES/1893). A week later, UN News announced that "Dozens of United Nations peacekeepers implicated in sexual abuse and exploitation have been disciplined and punished" (UN News, 5 Nov 2009). In December, UNOCI announced that it "was taking all possible measure to investigate allegations that have emerged of sexual abuse and exploitation among its military personnel" (UN News, 5 Nov 2009).

Sexual violence returned as a topic of concern in UN reporting in the lead-up to the 2010 presidential elections and the following civil war. UN News highlighted concerns with "reported abuses, including sexual violence, against civilians persist[ing] in different parts of the country" (UN News, 15 Oct 2010). Sexual violence was again foregrounded as a concern in the early stages of the Second Ivorian Civil War (UN News, 23 Dec 2010; 31 Dec 2010; 25 Jan 2011; 27 Jan 2011). During the Second Civil War endgame, UN News highlighted a UN human rights report which referenced sexual violence as UN forces began preparations for their military assault on the Ivorian Presidential Palace (UN News, 1 Apr 2011). Following Gbagbo's capture on 11 April, UN News foregrounded the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights discussion of sexual violence among other human rights' violations in Côte d’Ivoire uncovered by her office (UN News, 13 Apr 2011). The UN SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict "stress[ed] the need to prevent conflict-related sexual violence before it begins,"
specifically naming Côte d’Ivoire as a site of "'shocking' reports of sexual violence [which] have emerged as part of the post-electoral crisis" (UN News, 14 April 2011).

During the transitional intervention period following the conclusion of the Second Ivoirian Civil War, sexual violence made intermittent appearances, returning as a topic just before the 2011 legislative elections were held (UN News, 31 Oct 2011; 25 Nov 2011). In February 2012, during the reporting on the election results, Côte d’Ivoire was listed as one of the "worst offenders" for sexual violence in conflict (UN News, 23 Feb 2012). In April and July of 2013, April of 2014, and June of 2015, the topic of sexual violence in Côte d’Ivoire resurfaced as an item of 'particular concern' (UN News, 16 Apr 2013; 24 Apr 2014; S/RES/2113; S/RES/2162). In the lead up to the presidential elections of 2015, the SRSG again flagged concerns about the possibility of sexual violence increasing in the context of electoral conflict (UN News 13 Jan 2015).

Announcing the closing out the Ivoirian mission, in March 2016, Ban Ki-Moon announced a "trust fund earmarked for victims of sex abuse by UN personnel," followed by a success narrative in May 2016, in which the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict "welcomed the progress made thus far by the Government, and by the national armed forces, in addressing sexual violence crimes in the country" (UN News, 31 May 2016). Two months later, the narrative changed: a UN report found "some progress" against sexual violence in Côte d’Ivoire but emphasised that "more must be done" (UN News, 12 July 2016). By May 2017, the UN returned to the success narrative and reported that Côte d’Ivoire was the first country to be 'delisted' from the watchlist of countries with high levels of sexual violence by armed personnel, just in time for the close of mission on 30 June 2017 because Ivoirian military commanders had signed a pledge that they would forbid their soldiers to commit sexual crimes. It is difficult to imagine that a 'pledge' to end sexual violence committed by military members 'solved' the Ivoirian problem in any significant or long-term way (UN News, 3 May 2017). The question isn't whether this 'pledge' substantially reduced sexual violence in conflict in Côte d’Ivoire; rather, why did the UN highlight this pledge?
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During the active period of intervention, the UN reporting on Ivoirian sexual violence as described above consistently preceded or shortly followed reporting of sexual abuses committed by peacekeepers. During the intervention transition period, UN reporting on sexual violence took the form of a disciplining metric - a 'benchmark' to be met by the Ivoirian government through external assessment, leading to a triumphal 'delisting' at the conclusion of intervention. Since there is little reason to believe that the deep cultural forces which create and enable a culture of sexual violence and impunity have radically changed through the interventions, the best fit for the data above is the conclusion that the sexual violence delisting narrative was written to reinforce the larger success narrative of the Ivoirian interventions.

The analysis above in no way attempts to minimise the severity of the problem of sexual violence in the Ivoirian conflict, or the exploitation and abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers. The pattern of violence and sexual abuse, particularly of children and women, before, after, and during the Ivoirian long war was, and remains, a serious topic of humanitarian concern. In the analysis above, I do not doubt the sincerity of the motives of individual UN personnel attempting to protect Ivoirians from abuse, to help victims of sexual violence, and to name and shame the perpetrators of crimes of sexual violence and abuse. I also note, though, that in addition to genuine humanitarian concern, the pattern of UN news reporting outlined above indicates that reporting was also driven by institutional image management needs.

The second pillar - republican representation

Doyle (2005) equates "republican representation" with democracy in his phrasing of the "democratic liberal peace" (2005, p. 463). "Republican representation" is absent from UN messaging on Côte d’Ivoire between 2002 - 2017, and "republican" refers solely to Gbagbo or Ouattara’s presidential guard. Doyle's pillar of "republican representation" translates in UN usage as 'democracy' and a corollary emphasis on 'elections.' Of the 1500 UN News articles which referenced Côte d’Ivoire between 2002 and 2017, 114 articles included the term 'democracy.' Articles referencing "democracy" occur across the span of intervention, including 40 published after the end of the Second Ivoirian Civil War.
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Elections and reunification of the divided country

More than direct messaging on democracy, UN strategic narratives placed heavy emphasis on elections. Between 2002 - 2017, UN News published 515 articles which referenced elections and Côte d’Ivoire, approximately a third of all articles referencing Côte d’Ivoire. From the earliest moments of the conflict, calls for new elections by the rebels were tied inextricably to calls for reunification of the country by the government. However, the drumbeat of UN messaging on elections was not met with an equal emphasis on the reunification of the country. In this section, I analyse the evolving UN narratives of elections and reunification from the first UN mention of reunification of the country in 2004 to the presidential elections of 2010. I focus on the ways in which UN messaging, with a persistent focus on elections, and an ever-shifting narrative on reunification, emphasised the role of elections and eroded the importance of disarmament and reunification of the country in the achievement of an elite settlement and end to the Ivorian conflict. Over the course of fifteen years of intervention, the UN included the topic of reunification a total of 39 times in the articles referencing the country, with 26 of those articles following the Second Ivorian Civil War. Only 13 UN News articles directly referenced reunification while the country remained divided between 2002 and 2011. While elections were a priority in UN messaging, reunification of the divided country was not. This strategic focus on elections and away from the deeper political problems of the Ivorian state led inexorably to the Second Ivorian Civil War.

From the first days of the first civil war in September 2002, when the French military divided the country into north and south, reunification of the country was a primary priority of the Ivorian state. Gbagbo argued that it would be impossible to conduct safe and fair elections in a state divided by civil war. In contrast, northern combatants had every reason not to engage in a reunification process which would remove their primary source of power and income, and little motivation to go to the polls, given the greater numbers of registered voters in the southern half of the country.

The first mention of reunification as a UN public messaging issue occurred in 2004. The UN phrased the situation as "As the parties work to reunify the divided country..." (UN News 9 Sep 2004). However, the FN had left government, retreated to the North, and declared
independence. Two months later, the Ivoirian government launched Opération Dignité to reunite the country militarily. The French destruction of the Ivoirian air force following the Bouaké strike effectively prevented military reunification and continued to protect the warlords of the north. The second UN News article on reunification of the country was published more than a year later when the Security Council “demand[ed]” that the opposition “proceed without delay” to disarm and demobilise, to “help restore State authority throughout the national territory, reunify the country, and allow the organisation of the postponed elections as soon as possible” (UN News 21 Oct 2005, repeated on 15 December 2005 at the start of the Fifth Battle of Abidjan, and 29 January, 2006, after the end of the battle).

The Ivoirian government, and counterhegemonic narrators generally, considered French intervention as the root cause of the division of the country and France the sponsor of the rebellion (e.g., Mattei, 2015; ACC, 2012; Baniafouna, 2011; Busch, 2006; Neyrac, 2006). At the end of 2006, Gbagbo attempted to cut the French out of the reunification equation through direct negotiation with Soro, Secretary-General of the FN (Ayangafac, 2007). Although unable to evict Licorne from Côte d’Ivoire, Gbagbo signed the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) with Soro in January 2007, marking a significant change in strategy. Where the LMA had created an unlinked set of requirements, the OPA instituted a series of sequential benchmarks to be completed prior to presidential elections. These benchmarks included removing the formal division of the country at the French-run Zone de Confiance, population identification, voter registration, the disarming and dismantling of militias, the integration of the Ivoirian defence and security forces with the northern combatant forces, the redeployment of state governance across the north, and the reintegration and 'centralisation' of the Ivoirian Treasury, bringing the northern economy back into the state-run institutions. In sum, the OPA formalised the requirement that the rebels give up their control of the northern territory and economy before presidential elections were held.

Over the course of the next three years, the Gbagbo/Soro partnership, with UN assistance and funding, slowly accomplished the benchmarks within its grasp; population
identification, voter registration, and preparations for the presidential election. While election preparations were slow, progress on reunification and integration of the military forces was nearly non-existent. The UN officially "welcom[ed]" the OPA, with the first news article describing the agreement as "...address[ing] the key issues... in order to ensure (emphasis added) credible, free and fair elections..." (UN News, 5 Mar 2007, repeated 28 March 2007 and 16 May 2007). Elections were to be the outcome of the successful completion of all the other steps leading up to reunification of the country. However, although signed by Soro, the OPA was rejected outright by the FN commanders, “subverting efforts at administrative and military reunification in the process” (Speight, 2013, p. 230 - 231). Over the course of the next 3 years, Gbagbo and Soro performed numerous rituals of reunification and sought, found, and spent money on the tasks of population identification, voter registration, and polling station refurbishment right up to the December 2010 presidential elections. Regardless, the northern warlords effectively prevented integration of the northern military, economy, or administration into the Ivoirian state until the conclusion of the Second Ivoirian Civil War (see for example, S/2008/598 para. 11; UN News, 17 Oct 2008, S/2008/645, paras 63-64).

The Fourth Supplementary Agreement to the OPA at the end of 2008 again emphasised the importance attached to reunification, the necessary condition to "establish favorable conditions for the elections" (Fourth Supplementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement). Ban originally agreed with the necessity of reunification before elections, warning that the presidential elections then scheduled for late November "could become a source of instability," given that the country was still not reunified, and state authority had not been re-established in the north (UN News, 17 Oct 2008). The following spring, Ban again emphasised the importance of prioritising reunification before elections; "International efforts in Côte d’Ivoire, long focussed on elections, must now prioritise uniting the country." However, Ban now elided the reunification/elections dependency; “Côte d’Ivoire is now at a stage where only two critical processes need to be completed in order to restore normalcy: reunification and elections” (UN News, 20 Apr 2009).
Choi reiterated Ban's reunification narrative; “International efforts in Côte d’Ivoire, long focussed on elections, must now prioritize uniting the country,” followed by a curious caveat: “reunification [had only become] a precondition for the polls, under new accords reached under the Ouagadougou Political Agreement that guides the country’s peace process” (UN News, 28 Apr 2009). However, reunification had been a fundamental part of the LMA, as well. Choi characterised reunification as “bogged down” due to primarily technical “differences” and “necessary, but contentious, issues” such as returning the north to the administration, authority, and control of the central government while disarming the warlords of the north. Those “necessary but contentious issues” were anything but simple ‘technical' problems; they were the primary military and political failure points of the entire intervention process since 2002.

None of the UN messaging from late 2008, when the UN acknowledged that there had been little progress on reunification (UN News, 17 Oct 2008), until early 2010 mentioned reunification as part of the preparations for elections, focussing solely on the electoral technical processes under way (UN News, 15 May 2009; 29 May 2009; 3 Jun 2009). By mid-July 2009, with the identification drive completed and the elections scheduled, security protocols in process, financing and the 'political will' in place for elections, Choi again claimed that remaining challenges were “technical, management and planning issues...” (UN News, 13 Jul 2009). Ban, however, emphasised “the need for more progress towards reunification” which he stated depended on the “political will and calculations of the main Ivorian political players” in contrast to Choi’s “technical, management and planning issues” (UN News, 13 Jul 2009). At the end of July, the Security Council “welcome[ed] the successful registration of all [Ivoirian] voters,” warned against further delays to the election, and reiterated Choi’s critique of “bureaucratic complications” to the electoral process (UN News, 30 July 2009). In late September 2009, Ban noted that Gbagbo's August electoral decrees indicated “commendable determination” to hold the polls in November while acknowledging that with only two months remained before the polls, the “major challenges” of disarmament and reintegration of fighting forces posed continued significant risk to the elections (S/2009/495, para. 51-52). By mid-October, only 6 weeks out from the election date, the Security Council urged “all parties” to “join forces” and publish a final
voter list. Uncharacteristically, rather than presenting a unified Security Council front and conforming to the official narrative, the news article also noted that Viet Nam’s ambassador had emphasised that “the Council agreed that ‘the long-term peace, stability and development of Côte d’Ivoire was also dependent on the balanced and comprehensive settlement of many other security, socio-economic and cross-border challenges’” (UN News, 13 Oct 2009). Choi distanced UNOCI from the Ivoirian polls, noting that UNOCI, unlike other UN peacekeeping missions around the world, did not “plan elections,” and told a reporter, “So it’s not up to us to predict whether the elections will be held on [29 November] or not” (UN News, 13 Oct 2009). The 2009 election foundered on the unresolved status of “more than 2.75 million people who had registered during the identification and voter registration process.... [but who] cannot be found in any of the historical files,” and therefore could not vote in the upcoming election (UN News, 16 Oct 2009). I will return to the mystery of the missing voters in the strategic narrative of the Grey List, below.

An important change occurred in UN messaging at the turn of 2010. Rather than characterising “credible, free, fair and transparent elections” as the outcome of the peace process, Ban began to characterise the elections as the basis of progress towards peace. Elections were now “intended to reunify the country” (UN News, 12 Jan 2010; 13 Jan 2010; 16 Feb 2010; 1 Apr 2010). Only two UN News articles in the 2010 run-up to the elections deviate from this new messaging position. In March, Choi noted that “presidential elections as well as reunification are the key issues for Côte d’Ivoire....,” reiterating this ‘dual process’ frame in May (UN News, 17 Mar 2010; 13 May 2010). The change in framing of the elections as the basis for reunification rather than reunification as the basis for elections reflected the reality that the south was, slowly, working the OPA process while the north was not making any progress towards reunification and the loss of power and revenue that would entail for the comzone commanders.

In mid-January 2010, Ban publicly appealed to Ivoirians to “press ahead” on elections. While noting the remaining electoral tasks to be completed in advance of the voting, Ban characterised the “other [remaining] critical challenges” extending beyond the elections as the “unfinished aspects” of the OPA, “particularly those relating to the reunification of the
country” (UN News, 12 Jan 2010). The Security Council reiterated this framing, “urg[ing] the Ivorian parties to make further concrete progress, before and after [emphasis added] the elections, to advance the process towards reunification, as well as the disarmament of former combatants of rebel Forces Nouvelles” (UN News, 28 Jan 2010), de-emphasising the agreed sequence of reunification (and disarmament) before elections. Agreement that the militias would be dismantled, the Ivorian defence and security forces would be integrated, state governance would be deployed across the country, and the Treasury would be “centralized” (with the warlords giving up their control of the northern economy) before elections were the substantive provisions of the OPA.

While Ban acknowledged that these reunification efforts were “crucial,” the UN framing already had moved these tasks to after the elections (UN News, 12 Jan 2010). Choi acknowledged the mismatch between the OPA provisions and the reality on the ground: “As agreed by the parties in 2008, a de facto reunification is to be completed two months prior to the presidential election, but progress on this has been slow” (emphasis added) (UN News, 28 Jan 2010). In March, Choi walked back Ban’s ‘to be dealt with later’ comment with a single boilerplate statement at the end of each article: “As agreed by the parties in 2008, a de facto reunification is to be completed two months prior to the presidential election” (UN News, 11 Mar 2010; 17 Mar 2010).

As electoral momentum mounted and the identification and registration programs concluded in early 2010, the UN pushed a new strategic narrative. The presidential election was now described as the “culmination,” of the reunification process (UN News, 28 Jan 2010; 4 Mar 2010; 17 Mar 2010; 1 Apr 2010; 13 May 2010), "intended to reunify the divided country" (UN News, 1 Apr 2010), and "part of the crisis resolution process" (UN News, 13 May 2010), far from the Ouagadougou Political Agreement that reunification and disarmament would be completed before elections. Between May and mid-December 2010, UN messaging makes no reference to reunification of the country. During this time, the UN suppressed the Viotti Report (S/2011/271) which warned that holding elections in the still-divided country risked triggering renewed warfare.
Throughout the Second Ivorian Civil War, the 'intended to reunify' strategic narrative was reiterated 22 times between 14 December 2010 and 16 March 2011, arguing that all along "the elections were expected to complete" reunification of the country. The final UN message on reunification in Côte d'Ivoire occurred on 12 April 2011, the day after the capture of Gbagbo. Ban called upon "both parties to reunify their security forces...re-establish State authority throughout the country and complete the unfinished aspects of the peace process" (UN News 12 Apr 2011). The UN never again mentioned reunification in messaging on Côte d’Ivoire.

The shift in strategic messaging above, from acknowledging the critical importance of reunifying the country before elections, to pressure to hold the elections before reunification, and then the reframing of the elections as the 'culmination' of reunification, served to justify UN pressure to hold elections before reunification. It also deflected criticism that UN pressure led to the conflagration caused by elections in a still-divided country. This strategic narrative reframing acknowledged the reality on the ground to some extent. The rebels had no intention of disarming or returning control of the north to the Ivorian state, while the state had made significant efforts to achieve the OPA goals within their purview. Elections were possible, reunification with the adamantly armed north was not. This reframing re-wrote history during the Second Ivorian Civil War, sought to justify UN priorities, and attempted to protect UN positioning as a moral and impartial actor in the interventions. Regardless of UN messaging, elections, after all, did not reunify the country - the Second Ivorian Civil War did.

Constitutional order
Doyle (2005, p. 456) characterised the respect for constitutional order within a state as a fundamental characteristic of liberal states and a fundamental aspect of the third pillar of liberal peace, republican representation. UN News references to "constitutional order" shows minimal messaging on constitutional order in the Ivorian interventions, including moments when UN decisions directly challenged the existing Ivorian constitutional order.

As documented in Part II, the French and rebel demands formalised in the LMA directly conflicted with the Ivoirian constitution. These demands required Gbagbo as president to assert executive prerogative to overrule the Ivoirian constitution and allow Ouattara to run for president, since the Ivoirian National Assembly refused to pass enabling legislation mandated by the LMA.

Although nearly absent in the hegemonic narratives and messaging, Ivoirian constitutional order was a critical issue throughout the interventions in the counterhegemonic discourse. When Ivoirian constitutional order is centred in hegemonic analysis it is referenced disparagingly as a "legalistic, formalist conception of democracy" linked to "ultranationalist ideology," a "stubborn and provocative" stance (Piccolino, 2014, p. 1). In contrast, throughout the interventions, the counterhegemonic narratives emphasised the importance of the Ivoirian constitution and constitutional order and the challenges posed by the interventions and intervenors to the sovereign authority vested in the constitution, as documented in Part II.

One moment of crisis occurred in 2006. The then-French Ambassador to the UN proposed a draft resolution which read in part, "The decisions of the Security Council take precedence over the Ivorian Constitution and the legislation of the Ivory Coast" and had to withdraw the draft following opposition from China, Russia, and the United States (Mattei, p. 188). This attempt by France to supersede the Ivoirian constitution through a UN resolution and the turmoil created by demands to overturn Ivoirian constitutional order was never acknowledged or discussed directly in any of the UN public messaging on the Ivoirian interventions. However, this draft resolution was directly linked to the Fifth Battle of Abidjan, when the Ivoirian populace responded violently to UN attempts to overrule the Constitutional Council and disband the National Assembly.

UN News published 4 news articles which directly referenced Ivoirian constitutional order. In the first UN News article published immediately following the outbreak of the First Ivoirian Civil War, Annan called for "immediate and unconditional" return to constitutional order (UN News, 20 Sep 2002), consistent with other UN messaging on West African coups,
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mutinies, rebellions, and coup attempts. The second message was quite different. In 2004, Anan called for Ivoirian constitutional reform (UN News, 18 Oct 2004b). Although the term "constitution" frequently appeared in messaging which also peripherally referenced Côte d'Ivoire (a total of 90 messages across the corpus), the phrase "constitutional order" didn't reappear again in UN messaging focussed on Côte d'Ivoire until after the Second Ivoirian Civil War. Ban claimed that the 2011 legislative election in Côte d'Ivoire "was an important step towards the full restoration of constitutional order in Côte d'Ivoire" (UN News, 12 Dec 2011). SRSG Koenders reiterated that the legislative elections "marked a major step forward in the restoration of constitutional order" (UN News, 26 Jan 2012), the final direct reference to constitutional order in the UN messaging on the Ivoirian interventions.

In contrast, "constitutional order" was an important theme in UN messaging on conflict across West Africa and in other states presumed to be working at a liberal deficit through lack of compliance with their established constitutional order. In messages which also referenced Côte d'Ivoire, Ban expressed concern at the "unconstitutional changes of government ...in West Africa" (UN News, 1 Jan 2010), and highlighted "the restoration of constitutional order and democracy in Guinea and Niger" as signs of a "new momentum towards peace and democracy" in West Africa (UN News, 8 Jul 2011). He praised the UN's role in "a return to constitutional order" in Guinea (UN News, 22 Nov 2011), and expressed concern when Guinea failed to immediately restore constitutional order (UN News, 16 Apr 2012; 8 Oct 2012). The Security Council "demanded" the full restoration of constitutional order following a military coup in Guinea Bissau and attempted to "ensure the full restoration of constitutional rule" there in repeated messaging (UN News, 18 May 2012a: 18 May 2012b). Further messaging followed on the "intense mediation efforts ... aimed at restoring constitutional order in Mali" (UN News 22 May 2012; 20 Dec 2012; 14 Jan 2013; 18 Jan 2013; 27 Jan 2013; 17 May 2013), and necessity of the return to constitutional order in the Central African Republic (UN News, 1 Jun 2014).

Why was the UN messaging on constitutional order in Côte d'Ivoire parsimonious, when respect for constitutional order is part of the foundational pillar of republication representation? The Ivoirian constitution from 2000 through 2015 in Côte d'Ivoire stood as a
roadblock in the path for Ouattara into the presidency since he did not meet its requirements for eligibility for the presidency. Both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators agree that Ouattara was personally targeted in this restriction, although the explanations vary on why he was targeted. Hegemonic narratives claim Ouattara was blocked from running to restrict access to power on the basis of personal rivalry, or because of the toxic ethnification of Ivoirian politics. Counterhegemonic narrators argue that Ouattara was blocked because he was not, in fact, eligible, on the basis of both parentage and personal history. Ouattara was officially "granted the Ivoirian citizenship he had fought so long and hard to secure" in July 2002 (Daddieh, 2016, p. 28) but was unable to produce documents for his parents.

The UN summary of Ouattara's citizenship problems attempted to skirt the controversy. “The long-standing controversy over Mr. Ouattara's nationality, which had become a major source of political tension and instability, was ... finally resolved when a court delivered a nationality certificate to him on 26 July 2002" (S/2003/374, para. 7). Ouattara's status was far from 'resolved' for many Ivoirians. He had completed a doctorate at the University of Pennsylvania on a scholarship for Burkinabé students, had held international positions as a Burkinabé diplomat, and had travelled on a Burkinabé diplomatic passport (Daddieh, 2016, p. 28). The constitution also blocked dual-national passport holders from eligibility. Whether or not he was Burkinabe, he was seen as 'the international candidate,' and this was not meant as a compliment. He was widely blamed for his role in imposing IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank austerity measures in the 1990s, from which the Ivoirian economy never truly recovered. Ivoirian voters had decided that he wasn't a 'true' Ivoirian, regardless of parentage or citizenship.

Beyond Ouattara's personal history, Côte d'Ivoire historically had had one of the highest non-citizen populations in the world, estimated in the 1980s to be as high as 50% of the population (Handloff, 1988) from the immigration policies of the Houphouët-Boigny regime. As discussed in Chapter 13, those non-citizens had produced useful votes for the regime. The 2000 Constitution also limited voting to registered citizens, 'disenfranchising' immigrants and other unregistered residents. Ivoirian voters had made it clear in the 2000
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constitutional referendum that they chose to restrict the right to vote to Ivoirian citizens, to prevent resident non-citizens from voting, and to prevent Ouattara from running for president.

The UN’s minimalist messaging on constitutional order in the Ivoirian interventions points towards silence as strategy, particularly in comparison with the frequency of other UN messaging on constitutional order in West African coups d’état. A potential reason for the near-total UN silence on Ivoirian constitutional order may be found in the French demands to overturn the Ivoirian constitutional order specifically to allow Ouattara to run for president. This anomalous focus on a single political figure would have been difficult to justify within the larger framework of liberal peace values and norms. The French efforts to assert precedence over Ivoirian sovereignty failed in the 2006 draft resolution to supersede the Ivoirian constitution; the existing constitutional order during the first 8 years of intervention in Côte d’Ivoire didn’t receive much support or messaging from the UN because it wasn’t the order desired by France.

The Grey List
The other problematic aspect of republican representation in Côte d’Ivoire was the irregular status of a significant portion of its population, immigrant non-citizens. The rebels claimed that the Ivoirian state systematically discriminated against northern Ivoirians and blocked northern and Muslim residents from registering as citizens and participating in voting. But the question for Ivoirian citizens was, how many of the northerners were citizens entitled to vote? The division of the country into warlord north and government south provided a further complicating factor in the identification of eligible voters and the identification of those not eligible to vote. The still-divided country posed difficulties in distinguishing citizens from resident non-citizens in the north, given the porous borders, long history of unregulated immigration, rudimentary status of reinstated state administration in the north, the understaffing of government positions, and the marginal government access to the northern territories which remained under warlord rule. While the northern combatants may have wanted citizenship and voting rights for the residents of the north, they did little to make these goals achievable for citizens as opposed to residents. Rebels had systematically destroyed Ivoirian civil registers in the north during the First Ivoirian Civil
The Gbagbo administration took the first concrete steps towards population identification late in May 2006; a pilot project intended to document citizens and resident non-citizens in preparation for voter registration. Population identification was by no means a simple technocratic task, with citizenship hotly contested in Côte d’Ivoire and one of the underlying drivers of civil war (UN News, 24 May 2006). The importation of immigrants and mercenaries by the FN and the possibility of widespread voting by ineligible residents were critical sticking points for the Ivoirian state. The administration was adamant that the country had to be unified, and the rebels disarmed, before Ivoirians could have confidence that the rebels weren’t “turning foreigners into Ivorians, producing a new electoral list and denying their party any chance of winning at the polls” (UN News, 27 Jul 2006).

In early 2007, Gbagbo negotiated the OPA with Soro, and the identification and registration processes were formally separated. Election preparations slowly achieved momentum and funding in early 2008 (UN News, 22 Oct 2007). The government initiated the next steps of preparing for the issuance of national identity and voter cards. This task was composed of two separate processes: identification of all residents, citizen, and non-citizen, and then voter registration of citizens. In March 2008, the Ministry of Justice adopted a methodology for reconstituting the civil registers which had been destroyed by northern combatants in the civil war (S/2008/250, para. 28), and the Ivoirian government finalized a contract with the technology company selected by France to issue identity and voter cards in advance of the election (S/2008/250, para. 29).

By April 2008 nearly 500,000 Ivoirians had been confirmed as citizens and issued birth certificates, "...the first step in a process to enable them to vote in national general elections..." (UN News, 10 Apr 2008). This distinction, identification as a precursor to voter registration, is an important one which became systematically elided and muddled in UN messaging over the next two years. From 2009 through 2010, identification of the population and registration of voters in preparation presidential elections brought
narratives of citizenship and voter registration fraud to the fore, such as the claim that in the run up to the 2010 elections "Non-Ivoirians were .... arriving in Ivory Coast by the busload to fill up the pro-Ouattara electoral lists" (Mattei, 2015, p. 123).

This narrative of non-citizen immigrants being provided voting rights outside of state processes drew plausibility and power for Ivoirians from the history of the 'voting cattle' (betail electorale) imported by Houphouët-Boigny to maintain electoral control of the state (discussed in Chapter 13). Concern that the opposition was importing and enabling non-citizens to vote was the driver of the conflict over the identification and registration processes of 2009 - 2010, particularly the crisis over the Grey List.

I am not arguing here whether this narrative of extensive non-citizen voting is true or false, but rather the importance of this narrative to Ivoirians, and its plausibility to them through deep historical resonance in the narratives of the betail electorale and discourse of Ivoirité. The counterhegemonic discourse is replete with these claims, the hegemonic discourse remains nearly silent. In the following section, I focus on the UN narratives of identifying citizens and registering voters, describing how the issue of distinguishing citizens entitled to vote from resident non-citizens not entitled to vote was presented (and elided) in UN narratives.

While early messaging in 2008 had clearly identified identification and voter registration as two separate and sequential processes, voter registration dependent on identification as a citizen (as in the UN News 10 Apr 2008 article referenced above), the clarity of that messaging deteriorated over the next 2 years. Throughout 2009, UN messaging conflated Ivoirian population “identification” with the registration of qualified voters and their enrolment in polling lists. This muddled distinction played a crucial role in the electoral crisis and civil war to follow. At the start of 2009, approximately 3 million Ivoirians had completed the identification process (UN News, 8 Jan 2009); by the end of January, a UN news article claimed that "the number of voters identified so far ... has passed the four million mark" (emphasis added), which was inaccurate (UN News, 31 Jan 2009). In mid-March, the UN again elided the processes, reporting that the voter identification process had
succeeded in *providing official recognition of identity* to 5.4 million Ivoirians (UN News, 12 Mar 2009) and 6 million by mid-April (UN News, 16 Apr 2009), which was more accurate, but by blending voter identification with recognition of identity, again elided and misrepresented the two separate processes. By mid-June, reporting was reiterating the 6 million Ivoirians *identified as registered*, adding that this represented “about 70 per cent of the country’s eligible voter pool” (UN News, 12 Jun 2009). This phrasing again equated identification with voting rights. In mid-July SG Ban did not distinguish progress on “identify[ing] and registering[ing] more than 6.4 million eligible voters” (UN News, 10 Jul 2009). Three days later, Choi congratulated Gbagbo on the "successful conclusion" of the identification program and noted that “With 6.5 million voters having been identified or registered” Ivoirians had established a “solid basis” for resolving the years-long crisis (UN News, 13 Jul 2009). The claim that “over 6 million voters have been registered so far, or about 70 per cent of the eligible voter pool” was reiterated two weeks later in UN News (UN News, 17 Jul 2009). Since *identification* was a separate process from *registration*, it isn’t clear from the UN messaging the 6 million people who had completed the identification registration process were not necessarily citizens entitled to register to vote.

While this lack of clarity might be put down to incompetent news editors, an alternative explanation is that the UN systematically elided the uncomfortable political reality - resident non-citizens were not eligible to vote, and the identification - registration process did not in itself constitute a pathway to citizenship or voting rights. To be identified as a resident was not equivalent to being validated as a legal voter. On 3 December, the committee composed of Gbagbo, Soro, Ouattara, and Bédié accepted the voter “registration and identification operations which were officially completed in November 2009” and which produced a “provisional electoral list of some 5.3 million persons confirmed by the technical operators” (the “whitelist”) and “some 1.03 million persons who remained to be confirmed” (the “grey list”) (S/2010/245, para. 2, 3).

In January 2010, rumors began circulating in Côte d’Ivoire of a “separate parallel list of some 429,000 individuals, produced by the President of the Independent Electoral Commission, Robert Beugré Mambé outside of the established procedures” (S/2010/245, para. 3).
Originally, 6.3 million people had been "identified" in the original government identity program, not all of whom were verified as citizens. Following the initial “identification,” 2.75 million individuals’ identities were not found in government records, requiring an extensive verification effort. The CEI had “cross-checked” 2.75 million problematic identities and had confirmed the identities of 1.75 million of them. However, a million “non-traced” people remained and from these still-unconfirmed identifications, the CEI had produced a second list of 429,000 “traced people” (UN News, 13 Jan 2010). The FPI accused Mambé of fraud and manipulation of the voting rolls in the production of this second, 'grey list' of voters and demanded his resignation. Mambé refused.

Violence flared across the country in early February 2010 during the electoral list appeals process in response to the contested grey list registrations. Gbagbo suspended voter registration, dissolved the government, and disbanded the CEI in response to the violence (UN News, 5 Feb 2010). The crisis resolved at the end of February 2010 when he announced the formation of a new government and appointment of a new electoral commission with Youssouf Bakayoko, staunch Ouattara ally, as the new President of the CEI (UN News, 25 Feb 2010). However, UN News framed the crisis as caused by Gbagbo's dissolution of the IEC; “...a new crisis erupted in February when Mr. Gbagbo dissolved the Government and the Independent Electoral Commission” (UN News, 1 Apr 2010). This phrasing is chronologically inaccurate and displays moral contraband by implying that the crisis was caused by the dissolution when Gbagbo dissolved government as a response to rapidly mounting violence, as documented in the UN news reporting quoted above.

Between March and the presidential elections in late November and early December intermittent violence flared around the confirmation process. In mid-March, Choi acknowledged the ongoing registration/electoral list controversy, claiming “This list is good in principle, and we have to select out those people who are not Ivorians” (UN News, 17 Mar 2010). At the end of the preparation period, almost a million 'unverified' registrants remained, who were not entitled to vote in the presidential election. On 8 September 2010, after nearly 3 years of preparation, Gbagbo, Soro, Ouattara and Bédié reached agreement on the composition of the final voters’ list (UN News, 7 Nov 2008) and the following day,
Gbogbo authorised issuance of 5,725,720 national identity cards to the Ivoirians on the final voters list (S/2010/537, para. 13). Choi “certified the final voters list” (S/2010/537, para. 16) on 26 September, nearly a million less than the 6.5 million residents 'identified' in the 2008-2009 campaign, setting the stage for the deeply contested election results.

**Choi's choice**

I turn now to analysis of Choi's certification of Ouattara as the winner of the 2010 Ivoirian presidential election and the ways in which UN decisions and actions overruled Ivoirian constitutional order and further problematised UN messaging on the liberal peace narratives of republican representation.

The first round of voting in the 2010 presidential election took place at the end of October, with accusations of voter fraud across the political spectrum, but relatively little violence. The second round of voting took place on 28 November, Gbagbo and Ouattara the only candidates on the ballot (UN News, 29 Nov 2010). ECOWAS observers reported relatively little violence but noted “some security incidents” and AU observers issue a statement describing the polling as “satisfactory” (S/2011/211, para. 20). However, UNHRC reported “attempts to prevent members of the Dioula and Baoulé ethnic communities from voting, significant irregularities and acts of intimidation witnessed in the Centre-North-East sone controlled by the Forces nouvelles” (A/HRC/16/79, para. 3), and the Minister for Internal Affairs and the FPI filed reports of voter intimidation committed by Forces Nouvelles militias against Gbagbo voters in the northern, centre, and western regions of Côte d’Ivoire. On 29 November, the FPI requested that the results from 3 northern regions be excluded on the grounds of ‘acts of violence’ and ‘serious violations of the right to vote’ (S/2011/211, para. 12).

The IEC was deeply divided on the certification of the second-round results. On 1 December, the IEC submitted provisional results to the Constitutional Council “in accordance with the electoral law” (S/2011/211, para. 13). However, on 2 December, Bakayoko, the newly appointed President of the IEC, Ouattara ally, and RDR political appointee, announced his version of the IEC provisional election results to international diplomats and media at the
Ouattara compound at the Golf Hotel, declaring Ouattara had received 54.10% of the vote and Gbagbo 45.90% (S/2011/211, para. 14).

Bakayoko's announcement broke multiple mandatory protocols specified by IEC regulations and the Ivoirian Constitution (Dougou, 2012, pp. 25 - 26). The IEC was required to announce results with a quorum of members present, at the IEC headquarters within a strict time limit (Baniafouna, 2011, p. 22; Dougou, 2012, 25-26). Bakayoko was not authorised to announce provisional election results without a quorum of the Commission present, the IEC had exceeded the constitutionally mandated deadline in providing results to the Constitutional Council, and the Golf Hotel was not the IEC headquarters. N'Dré, the President of the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, announced over state media that Bakayoko didn’t have the authority to proclaim results, as the IEC had exceeded the constitutionally mandated deadline, and only the Constitutional Council was “authorized to announce decisions on the contested results” (Lewis and Cocks, 2010b).

The Security Council and Ban welcomed Bakayoko's "results,” commenting that the announcement was “an important element in the process of certification of the final results by the Special Representative” while calling upon “the Constitutional Council to expeditiously initiate the process of proclamation of the final results...so that his Special Representative can certify those results..." (SC/10100-AFR/2073; UN News, 2 Dec 2010). There is no mention of the illegal and irregular aspects of Bakayoko's announcement.

On 3 December, N'Dré announced that the Council had invalidated approximately 500,000 votes from four northern regions based on voting irregularities and declared Gbagbo the winner of the presidential contest. Following N'Dré’s announcement, Ban "voiced his support for today's certification by his envoy" of Ouattara as winner of the election. The article notes that the “... [IEC] yesterday declared Mr. Ouattara...the winner". Since the IEC didn't have the legal authority to 'declare' the winner of the election, only to publish preliminary results, this was a distortion of the situation at best.

Choi’s claim that Ouattara had won the election was immediately endorsed by Ban, the EU, and the Presidents of the United States and France (S/2011/211, para. 22), with Ban
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congratulating Ouattara and calling publicly for Gbagbo to “accept the certified outcome” of the elections (UN News, 3 Dec 2010). Counterhegemonic narrators draw attention to the speed at which Choi's decision was endorsed by hegemonic actors and claim that the response was almost certainly coordinated in advance. They conclude, whether correctly or incorrectly, that the certification was rigged from the start and the winner predetermined by the hegemons. Hegemonic narrators mirror these narratives, claiming that 'the fix was in' for Gbagbo to win before the election.

Choi claimed that even if all complaints were considered, Ouattara would still be the winner, based on a narrow definition of the complaints, such as missing signatures on the tally sheets. On that narrow definition of 'complaints,' he was correct. However, the Constitutional Council invalidated half a million votes on the basis that the votes cast far exceeded registered voters in the northern regions in which results were invalidated. The discrepancies (and invalidated votes) were similar in scale to the number of contested registrations of residents who hadn't proved citizenship on the grey list. The specific issue of non-citizen voting is never mentioned in hegemonic accounts beyond Choi's general dismissal of allegations of fraud as 'irrelevant.' Multiple pieces of evidence are displayed online to substantiate these charges of excess voting (e.g., ACC, 2012; Baldwin, 2010). The ACC example provides documentation that "184,077 got enrolled in the Valley of Bandama. Whereas the report indicates 286,260 votes cast," with photographs of what appear to be official Ivoirian election documents. Rather than contest these allegations, the hegemonic narratives remain silent on the issue.

Although UN News remained silent on Choi's certification process, internal reports and a UNOCI online article claimed that Choi certified Ouattara as the winner of the election, based on an independent tally which he had conducted "... without regard to the methods used and result proclaimed by either the IEC or the Constitutional Council" (Cook, 2011, p. 13; see also S/2011/211 para. 17, 18). Given that Choi's mandate was to certify the results provided to him by the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, his 'independent tally' was problematic. When Choi decided to certify the election in favor of Ouattara, he chose to ignore the assurances that the UN had provided to the Ivoirian government that UN involvement in the planned presidential elections; "international certification would not
replace but rather would be in addition to the role to be played in this regard by the Constitutional Council of Côte d’Ivoire" (S/2007/275, para. 33). Choi’s decision overrode the Ivoirian Constitutional Council’s decision, despite the commitments made by the UN.

Choi’s certification of votes in the exceptionally high turnout presidential election in four days stands in marked contrast to SRSG Koenders’ partial certification of the December 2011 legislative election results. With less than half of the number of votes to certify, Koenders took two months rather than 4 days to "partially certify" the voting (UN News 17 Feb 2011). The Constitutional Council annulled results from 11 of the 204 constituencies in the 2011 election, and those constituencies held by-elections the following week, the results of which which Koenders then certified four days later (UN News, 26 Feb 2011).

Choi could have certified all but the contested results in the 2010 presidential election, or agreed to a recount, which Gbagbo officially requested, and which was required when requested by a presidential candidate under Ivoirian constitutional law. Or Choi could have agreed to an independent audit of the election, which Gbagbo also requested. However, Choi ignored these options. Why? This question is not addressed in the hegemonic literature, but is posed in the counterhegemonic discourse, providing abundant nourishment to conspiracy narratives of collusion and fix.

The legal basis (or lack thereof) for this supersession of the Ivoirian constitution has been extensively debated by specialists in international law (Tetang, 2012/3 p. e65; Assouman, 2011; Ntwari, 2011). The legality or otherwise of Choi's decision to certify based on IEC results and to overrule the Ivoirian Constitutional Council is outside the scope of this research. Instead, my focus here is on the silence in the UN messaging about the de facto overruling of Ivoirian constitutional order and the silence regarding previous official UN commitments given to the Ivoirian government. Rather than argue the case, UN messaging simply kept silent on the problematic legal aspects of Choi’s certification and its direct contradiction of previous commitments as it lobbied to achieve the next goal of the interventions, the installation of Ouattara as president of Côte d'Ivoire.
While counterhegemonic analysts have a great deal to say in protest of this perceived breach of sovereignty (Desgagné, 2013; Dougou, 2012; Baniafouna, 2011; Blé Goude, 2011; Busch, 2010), hegemonic analysts have relatively little to say on the topic of the overturning of Ivoirian constitutional order and the anomaly of the UN demanding constitutional order in other West African states while overruling it in Côte d’Ivoire, other than Piccolino's (2014) dismissal of the issue as "legalist and formalist...stubborn and provocative" (as cited above). Silence is a powerful narrative strategy when deployed by powerful actors. UN use of silence to avoid discussion of the French and UN supersession of Ivoirian constitutional order throughout the interventions led to silence among hegemonic analysts; constitutional order was successfully established as a 'non-issue' in the hegemonic discourse. However, silence comes with a cost - it allows counternarratives to flourish unchecked, whether factual or not.

Constitutional Coup d’état
Following Choi’s overruling of the Constitutional Council’s decision, Gbagbo requested a recount with a general audit under international supervision (Mattei, 2015, p.6-7), to which he was legally entitled under Ivoirian law. Ivoirian clergy, Thabo Mbeki, and American Senator James Inhofe also advocated a recount which was rejected by the United States and France (Mattei, 2015, pp. 7, 138). Choi refused, claiming that it would be "unjust" to recount the votes (Baniafouna, 2011, pp 54, 64-65). Once the ballots had been counted, "...they were destroyed.... If it were to be proven that the ballots were destroyed, it would constitute a clandestine and illegal maneuver...." under Ivoirian law (Mattei, 2015, p. 232). As I noted in Chapter 8, the disposition of the 2010 presidential election ballots is 'still too controversial to talk about' among Ivoirian academics. Choi was adamant in his authority to certify his own results and to refuse a recount, equating his authority to 'the truth.' In an interview titled Truth is the starting point, Choi claimed "We certified the election of Côte d’Ivoire in no uncertain terms. If they have any doubt about the certification, what better authority or institution can they trust?" (Africa Renewal Web, 2011). Within the counterhegemonic discourse, Choi’s choice and its hegemonic endorsement is framed as a 'constitutional coup d'état,' a betrayal of democracy and constitutional governance rather
than an enactment of the "will of the [Ivoirian] people," a phrase repeated in 21 separate UN News articles on Côte d’Ivoire from December 2010 through 2011.16

The third pillar - transnational interdependence
UN strategic narratives based on the discourse of transnational interdependence were central to UN messaging throughout the interventions, with a total of 632 of 1500 articles referencing Côte d’Ivoire including the term "region" or "regional." The discourse of transnational interdependence bolstered claims of the UN's authority to regulate the internal affairs of Côte d'Ivoire by leveraging the authority of subregional (ECOWAS), regional (AU), and other global (IMF, World Bank) institutions. In the sections below, I analyse the narratives of transnational interdependence in UN strategic messaging used to validate and enforce selection of Ouattara as the president of Côte d’Ivoire and the related strategies of silence, the suppression of dissent, and the construction of consent. These narratives and strategies presented transnational interdependence as a foundational norm which justified regime change through military combat.

‘All the relevant states' recognised Ouattara
As discussed in Chapter 8, one of the 'undeniable groups of facts' which form the core of the hegemonic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions includes the assertion that "the 2011 military intervention enjoyed near-unanimous international support; "every significant state or international organisation and authority recognised the electoral victor of Ouattara" (Charbonneau, 2014, pp. 625-626). In this section, I analyse the historical records which problematise this assertion. Choi’s decision to overrule the Ivoirian Constitutional Council was not directly addressed in UN messaging, but the decision was controversial. Abatan and Spies provide an example of the standard hegemonic summary of the controversy; "The election results were endorsed by the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN" (Abatan and Spies, 2016, p. 5). Endorsement was more complex than this simple statement reflects. The UN began by messaging UN chief supports certification of Ivorian presidential poll, congratulates Ouattara (UN News, 3 Dec 2010). This was not a universally popular position. On 4

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December, the AU Peace and Security Committee (PSC) appointed Thabo Mbeki to head a mission to Côte d’Ivoire, “...completely rejecting all efforts to create a ‘fait accompli’ after the election of 28 November” (Assouman, 2011, p. 208, my translation). To deal with the blowback, on 6 December, the UN News reported that Ban was "confer[ring] with [African Union] leaders on Ivorian political deadlock.” This was followed by reporting that UN steps up diplomacy in support of opposition presidential victor. Choi flew to Nigeria to brief an extraordinary ECOWAS summit in Abuja and briefed the Security Council via video conference on the "political and security situation" in Côte d’Ivoire (UN News, 7 Dec 2010). The following day, the Security Council endorsed Ouattara "in view of (regional body) ECOWAS' recognition of [Ouattara] as President-elect" (UN News, 9 Dec 2010).

Quashing dissent
Endorsement became a self-licking ice-cream cone. Choi went to Abuja to lobby a deeply divided ECOWAS for that endorsement, then Ban used the ECOWAS endorsement to enhance the legitimacy of the UN’s decision. However, that 'endorsement' was anything but unanimous. Not all ECOWAS and African Union heads of state were convinced; some supported Gbagbo and were disquieted by the UN's supersession of sovereignty in the Ivoirian elections (Abatan and Spies, 2016, p.14). The AU chairperson arrived in Côte d'Ivoire on mediation mission on 25 January and on 26 January, an ECOWAS delegation met with US officials in Washington to “discuss the Ivoirian situation" (UNSC, 2017b, p. 5). Ban's participation in the African Union's 16th summit in late January resulted in more public and private pressure to conform to the UN's decision (Assouman, 2011, p. 213). On 28 January, UN News reported that "many individual countries all recognize Mr. Ouattara as the rightly elected president." Ban publicly criticised "... some differences of opinion ... now surfacing in the AU..." as not “...desirable..." and warned that "...we must remain firm and unified..." (UN News, 28 Jan 2011). This narrative that "we" held a unified position was at best only partially accurate.

Ban’s internal messaging was even clearer; he warned the AU PSC High Level Panel to not 'obstruct' and 'misrepresent' UN actions in Côte d'Ivoire (UNSC, 2017b, p. 5). On 28 January, the AU PSC appointed a High-Level Panel to explore options to resolve the crisis “in conditions that preserve democracy and peace” (UNSC, 2017b, p. 5). South Africa and
Angola continued to openly support Gbagbo's second presidency, President Dos Santos of Angola claiming that 'the UN had misled the international community when it validated Mr. Ouattara's victory and ... call[ing] for fresh elections' (UN News, 28 Jan 2011). These initiatives and consultations provoked a public rebuke from Ban, who reiterated that the "UN and African blocs must remain united" regarding the Ivoirian crisis (UN News, 29 Jan 2011b).

Despite Ban's repeated public and private pressure to conform to the UN position, the African Union Peace and Security Council announced a decision to set up a high-level panel for Côte d'Ivoire composed of the Heads of State of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, South Africa and Tanzania, as well as the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the President of the ECOWAS Commission (UNSC, 2017b, p. 5). Ban offered to provide "a senior official to work with" the African Union's proposed High-Level Panel on Côte d'Ivoire (UN News, 29 Jan 2011), and then sent a Special Representative to lobby for support across sub-Saharan Africa, with demands for 'cohesion,' particularly among ECOWAS and AU members (S/2011/388, para. 18). Abatan and Spies (2016, p. 12) highlight the lack of clarity in UN reports on Ban's and the Special Representatives' activities lobbying the AU, and the lack of consultation between the AU Security Council and the UN Security Council during the Second Ivoirian Civil War.

Much of the hegemonic literature brushes past this controversy, collapsing the process of suppressing dissent into a final consensus to intervene. Some counterhegemonic authors, however, provide additional detail on the process of ironing out of dissent which preceded agreement to increase intervention authority. Fagiola (2016, p. 28) noted that

Jean Ping, former Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, felt powerless in 2011 as in both the Libyan and Ivoirian crises the mediation of the African Union, which had opted for a non-belligerent resolution, was swept aside.

This active suppression of dissent and construction of conformity challenges narratives of the legitimacy of the interventions based in transnational interdependence.
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'All the relevant international actors' supported combat

When the shooting concluded, and the smoke cleared in April 2011, academics, journalists, and political actors began to deliver the judgements of history. Tzanakopoulos wrote of the UN certification of Ouattara that it was "accepted by the EU, the AU, ECOWAS and most states that cared to form an opinion ..." (emphasis added) as though other states simply didn't care about the UN's assertion of international sovereignty in the selection of the president of a sovereign state. Angola and Lebanon were "notable exception[s]" to this widespread accord or lack of interest (Tzanakopoulos, 2011).

Wyss, in his analysis of the Ivoirian interventions, also promotes the UN's strategic narrative that the UN and French military interventions in Côte d'Ivoire during the Second Ivoirian Civil War were conducted by a unified international community. However, Wyss also lists states which objected to the use of military force against the Gbagbo government: China, Russia, South Africa, and Angola. Wyss then concludes that "...all relevant international actors condemned the incumbent president and adopted sanctions against him and his regime" (Wyss, 2013, p. 95). Two years later, Wyss added Gambia, Liberia, Guinea, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cape Verde, Uganda, and Zimbabwe to the list of countries opposing regime change by military force in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 (2015, pp. 138-139), with no change in conclusion, repeating the "all relevant actors" narrative in spite of the longer list of states opposed to UN combat in Côte d'Ivoire. Abatan and Spies make a similar claim: "For the most part, the international community stood united in recognizing Ouattara" (Abatan and Spies, 2016, p. 5). Schmidt added Libya and Mauritania to the list of dissenting countries, and then dismissed dissenters as anti-Western, corrupt, anti-democratic, or fraudulent, concluding that "most international power holders acknowledged Ouattara as the new president" (Schmidt, 2018, p. 229-230). Presumably dissenting states, including Russia, India, China, and Brazil, weren't 'power holders' in Schmidt's view and were therefore irrelevant in their objections.

Review of UN records details a more complex and qualified assent to combat by "all relevant actors." UN records of the discussion following passage of Resolution 1975 on 30 March 2011, which led to full UN and French engagement in combat operations against the Gbagbo regime, and, ultimately, regime change, show further dissent, concern, and
qualification of the intended authority of the resolution and calls for UN forces to remain impartial by Columbia, India, and Brazil (S/PV.6508, pp. 3-5). Bellamy and Williams note India formally registered an objection to UNOCI becoming an instrument of regime change on 30 March 2011 (2012, p. 65). In April 2011, when the UN and France began active military strikes against Gbagbo and the Ivoirian military, dissent again became public. The Russian ambassador "questioned the legality of the air strikes, suggesting the UN peacekeepers may have overstepped their mandate to be neutral" by firing on Ivoirian military forces as did the South African ambassador and the Chairman of the AU, Jean Ping, who "declared that foreign military intervention was unjustified" (Plett, 2011). Ping emphasised that while the African Union had eventually supported Ouattara as president, the PSC had clearly advocated a peaceful political process, with an emphasis on power sharing.

In the literature referenced above, in total, China, Russia, India, South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Angola, Gambia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Guinea, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cape Verde, Uganda, and Zimbabwe are listed as opposing UNOCI’s engagement in combat and regime change. The claim that the international community stood united in its support of regime change in Côte d’Ivoire is weak at best, yet that is the dominant narrative within the hegemonic literature produced after the 2011 Civil War. I question whether the countries objecting to the UN and French participation in the Second Ivoirian Civil War were truly ‘irrelevant’ international actors. How do we determine which international actors are deemed ‘relevant’? Why were so many states judged irrelevant in their dissent? Whether accurate or not, the narrative of international consensus in support of the UN actions in the Second Ivoirian Civil War is repeated and promoted within the hegemonic analytic literature as well as within UN messaging. This strategic narrative of international consensus on military combat is grounded in and leverages the logic of the third pillar of the liberal peace, transnational interdependence, but fails to convince when the records are examined closely.

*The pretzel logic of legitimacy*

Given the multiple problems with dissent outlined above, why did the UN emphasise legitimacy in regime change through AU and ECOWAS authorisation and why didn’t the UN base its legitimisation arguments on the certification agreement of 2007? Assouman points
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out that the UN promoted the narrative that the legitimacy of the UN's actions in Côte d'Ivoire rested on the 'requests' made by the African Union and ECOWAS for military intervention:

...by constantly referring to the final communiques of the conferences of the Heads of State of ECOWAS and to the decisions of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union... the resolutions...by the Security Council seemed to privilege Chapter VIII of the Charter [Regional Arrangements].

(Assouman, 2011, p. 215, my translation)

Assouman also noted that none of the resolutions or press releases validating Resolution 1975 argue the legitimacy of intervention based on Choi's authority to certify the outcome of the election, as specified in Resolution 1765 (2007). Legitimising the use of force through ECOWAS and the AU deflected attention from the certification commitments of 2007 based on the Ouagadougou Political Agreement. Resolution 1765 formally endorsed the OPA and the commitments which the UN undertook in support of the OPA process, including the commitment to respect the sovereignty of Ivorian institutions during the certification of the Ivorian presidential election. In 2007, UN undertook to 'accompany' and 'certify' the elections but made a commitment to not override the decisions of Ivorian institutions (S/2007/275, para. 73). The simplest explanation for the UN's use of an argument of legitimacy through regional requests is that the UN didn't abide by its own undertakings of 2007 not to override the Constitutional Council's decision in the presidential elections. Therefore, strategic narratives arguing legitimacy of regime change based on the undertakings of 2007 would have been even more vulnerable to refutation and would not have been able to leverage the liberal peace discourse of transnational interdependence to justify UN decisions and actions.

Summary - Chapter 12
This chapter presents UN narratives of the Ivorian intervention grounded in the 'three pillars of the liberal peace' discourse: human rights, republican representation, and transnational interdependence.
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**Human rights:** I have presented analysis of the UN's strategic messaging on the human rights abuses of 'déguerpissement' and on sexual abuse and sexual violence in conflict within their historical contexts of intervention. This analysis demonstrates the ways in which human rights discourse was leveraged by the UN at specific crisis points but ignored at others, highlighting the institutional, as opposed to normative, drivers of UN communication strategy. The déguerpissement analysis calls into question UN impartiality in their messaging on Côte d'Ivoire, and the sexual scandal analysis illustrates the organisational difficulties inherent in leveraging moral positioning for normative legitimacy and authority.

**Republican representation and constitutional order:** I examined the UN narratives of elections and reunification. The shifting UN narratives on the relationship between election and reunification undermined the Ivoirian government's efforts to ensure reunification before election, enabling the Second Ivoirian Civil War. The parallel elision of the distinction between population identification and voter registration similarly ignored Ivoirian concerns about widespread voter fraud, and similarly fed the momentum to civil war. These strategic narratives considered together further undermine UN claims of impartiality in the Ivoirian interventions.

**Transnational interdependence:** I examined the UN's messaging underpinned by the discourse of transnational interdependence in two narratives of 'All the Relevant States.' In the first narrative, the UN attempted to leverage legitimacy through the value of transnational interdependence by claiming international unanimity with its decision to name Ouattara the winner of the 2010 presidential election. The communications analysed reveal the active construction of consensus among international states and organisations, and the equally active disciplining of dissent among the states which didn't fall into line with the UN's decision. The same strategy was applied to the second narrative of unanimity of support for Resolution 1975, which authorised formally 'protection of civilians' but in practice, regime change by military combat. The reliance on narratives of international consensus is examined as an attempt to deflect the counterhegemonic narratives that the UN acted in bad faith by not complying with their undertaking to the Ivoirian state in 2007, thereby not having a stronger legal and normative basis for their intervention actions.
Chapter 13. Counterhegemonic discourses - Ivoirité and Françafrique

Chapters 11 and 12 covered two foundational hegemonic discourses of intervention: peacekeeping and the liberal peace. As discussed in Chapter 3, most narrative contestation is asymmetric. Counternarratives rarely directly refute adversarial narratives, and those that do, rarely succeed. Rather, oppositional narrators will ground counternarratives within discourses which link directly to their audiences most deeply held beliefs and values. Where international audiences understood and emotionally connected to liberal peace and peacekeeping discourse which positioned them as benevolent, moral actors, Ivoirians cared more about their own foundational discourses and sets of beliefs. While specific counterhegemonic counternarratives to the dominant narratives are described above, counterhegemonic narrators primarily constructed counterhegemonic discourses of Ivoirité and Françafrique.

In this chapter I discuss the ways in which the counterhegemonic counternarrative of Ivoirité served as a source of asymmetric counternarratives across the course of the interventions. I contrast the hegemonic framing of Ivoirité as 'hate speech' giving rise to a 'risk of genocide' narrative to the counterhegemonic framing of Ivoirité as a positive valuation of an independent Ivoirian identity rejecting neocolonialism. In the second half of the chapter, I analyse the discourse of Françafrique, and discuss the ways in which Françafrique is a form of conspiracy narrative. I conclude the chapter by comparing hegemonic and counterhegemonic 'conspiracy theories,' as counternarratives deployed by both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators in the narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire.

Ivoirité as discourse
Ivoirité is a foundational discourse of the Ivoirian state and Ivoirian people. It is a nationalist discourse of independence, originally articulated in the early decades of statehood to unite the 60-plus historical ethnic groups of Côte d’Ivoire in a shared positive national identity. There is significant contestation in the professional and academic literature on the characteristics of Ivoirité, and profound polarisation in the academic literature on Ivoirité as ideology. Divergent characterisations of Ivoirité form one of the schisms which divide hegemonic from counterhegemonic narratives of intervention. The counterhegemonic
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literature on *Ivoirité* emphasises the unifying and positive characteristics of *Ivoirité*, focussing on the initial purpose of *Ivoirité* to "forge a common culture for all those who live in Côte d'Ivoire, for strangers as well as citizens," (Le Pape, 2003, p. 34). Galy (2000; 2005), Le Pape (2003), and N’Guessan (2013) argue that, rather than an internally divisive ethnicity ideology, *Ivoirité* served as a nationalist, anti-colonial independence narrative, deployed to create a unifying, positive, shared national and cultural identity among Ivoirians regardless of ethnicity, as well as to unite Ivoirians against continued French neo-colonial dominance. Smith (2011) characterises Gbagbo's usage of *Ivoirité* as "an anti-colonial credo."

The hegemonic characterisation of *Ivoirité* emphasises ethnicised identity politics, elite manipulation, ahistorical mythologising, and bad-faith historical and ethnic revisionism on the part of Ivoirian indigenes (Bassey, 2014; McGovern, 2011; Akokpari, 2008; Chirot, 2007; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Marshall, 2005; Hara and Ero, 2002). Hegemonically positioned authors describe emergence of the political ideology of *Ivoirité* in the mid-1990s and its operationalisation as a tool of elite politics as the primary driver of the Ivoirian conflict (Piccolino, 2014, 2018; Marshall, 2005; Werthmann, 2005; Dozon, 2002; Toungara, 2001). From the 1990s, *Ivoirité* became associated with an exclusionary ideology of Côte d’Ivoire for Ivoirians, and real Ivoirians at that. Akindès (2004, p. 20 - 24) characterised *Ivoirité* as a "frightening brand" which broke with Houphouët-Boigny's "informal" politics to systematise "mechanisms of political exclusion" in the state enactment of formal citizenship which "sowed the seeds of mutual paranoia." Bédié was credited with the development of *Ivoirité* as a nationalist and unifying Ivoirian political philosophy (CURDIPHE, 2000) and accused of operationalising *Ivoirité* as an anti-immigrant, 'purist' discourse from 1995 onwards, with the goal of excluding Ouattara from competition for the presidency (Konate, 2004). Werthmann (2005) described *Ivoirité* as a "nationalist ideology" based on a politics of exclusion. However, Le Pape distinguished *Ivoirité* from anti-Ouattara political convictions: "In reality, what really inflames, and divides Ivoirians is the candidature of Alassane Ouattara" (2003, p. 33), with which most Ivoirianists across the spectrum would agree.

Hegemonic writers claimed that Ouattara is the primary *victim* of *Ivoirité* (Akindès, 2004; Konate, 2004) and that backlash against *Ivoirité* was the driving force of the 2002 rebellion (Konate, 2004, p. 12).
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Academics condemning *Ivoirité* as a toxic ideology, a "divisive concept" (Tiyambe Zeleza, 2008, p. 18), a "nativist and exclusionary discourse" (Dauda, 2011, p. 17), rarely link its emergence to the backlash by southern indigenous peoples of Côte d’Ivoire to the decades-long expropriation of communal lands by the Akan and Baoulé ruling elites under Houphouët-Boigny, and the whole-sale import of immigrant workers from West African countries for the economic and political benefit of those elites. *'Betail electorales'* refers to the Houphouëtist practice of importing 'electoral cattle' (immigrants primarily from Burkina Faso) who were granted the right to vote without formal citizenship to assure the regime's electoral majority (Schmidt, 2018; Marshall-Fratani, 2006; Chauveau, 2000). The indigene backlash against imported voters and efforts to reclaim expropriated indigenous lands which emerged in the 1990s is identified within the hegemonic literature as a *primary driver of conflict* rather than the outcome of decades of expropriation of land and political power (Marshall-Fratani, 2006, p. 20-21). Indigenes are to blame for the conflict in hegemonic narratives, while they are characterised as the victims in counterhegemonic accounts.

*Ivoirité* as a discourse of indigeneity is closely linked to land conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Land conflict as a driver of violence is widely accepted by hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators. Allouche and Zadi Zadi (2013) based their analysis of "restraint" in ongoing land conflicts in southwestern Côte d’Ivoire on the proposition that indigenous land/citizenry rights were the primary root cause of the civil wars. However, the characterisation of the nature of the conflict differs at the two ends of the spectrum. Hegemonic writers emphasise a 'bad faith' narrative - indigenes refusing to allow immigrants to own land or attempting to reclaim land that had previously been sold or gifted to them by the Ivoirian state (McGovern, 2011; Marshall-Fratani, 2006, p 20-21; Konaté, 2004, p. 12). Smith (2003) claims that land conflict derives from a 1998 law passed by the Bédié administration, which linked land ownership to citizenship, and based citizenship in indigeneity. Smith notes that this land law was named as one of the root causes of the conflict and one of the French targets for reform in the Marcoussis Accords. Smith also notes that the law was one of UN targets in the UN Human Rights Report of early 2003. However, Smith doesn't mention the vast French holdings in Côte d’Ivoire, which might have had something to do with this drive for non-native ownership laws and was certainly a source of moral hazard.
In contrast, counterhegemonic writers emphasise that the Houphouët-Boigny regime benefitted enormously and exploitatively from historically loose and informal communal land laws in the newly formed state. The regime distributed indigenous land to immigrants in return for votes and labor, even though the immigrants weren’t citizens and had no legal right to vote or to own land. The state did not have formal claim on the lands gifted to immigrants. In the counterhegemonic accounts, the land law of 1998 was an attempt to formalise indigenous rights to expropriated indigenous lands, to re-take that which had been taken from them (Konaté, 2004, p. 12; Camara, 2004, p. 477 - 478; Galy, 2004, p. 11 - 12; Woods, 2003, p. 649; Chauveau, 2000, p. 97 - 98, 111, 2002).

Cutolo (2010, p. 529) provides a complex analysis of *Ivoirité*, emphasising the "counterhegemonic connotations" of autochthonous land claims in the rejection of the Houphouëtism within the discourse of *Ivoirité*. He analyses the hegemonic-counterhegemonic dialectical contradictions within the *Ivoirité* discourse itself and characterises *Ivoirité* as a counterhegemonic strategy of resistance to Baoulé hegemony as well as a narrative justifying Baoulé hegemony in building the Ivoirian state. He characterises *Ivoirité* as a dialectical, internally contradictory ideology of modernity among Ivoirian intellectuals, politicians, and academics, as well as the general populace. Cutolo's emphasis on the dialectical internal contradictions within the discourse of *Ivoirité* is reminiscent of the dialectic of liberalism outlined in Chapter 2. Identifying both the hegemonic and counterhegemonic constructions and deployments within the discourse helps explain how *Ivoirité* was deployed as 'villainous' narrative by hegemonic narrative entrepreneurs while it served as a 'valorous' narrative for their counterhegemonic adversaries.

*Ivoirité* as moral positioning vs. hate speech
The political discourse of *Ivoirité* in its many forms was used by every Ivoirian government from Houphouët-Boigny to Gbagbo to consolidate the state, create constituencies, build community and national identity, and to mobilise supporters. Gbagbo built his career as politician and president through his deployment of the discourse and managed to maintain control of the Ivoirian state through narratives legitimating political power based in democratic indigeneity until the military defeat in the combat which concluded the Second
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Ivoirian Civil War. Moral positioning can be identified in the quote from the former president of the French National Assembly, “From the beginning, Laurent Gbagbo has cared about only one thing: making Ivory Coast an independent country. They simply cannot forgive him for this” (Mattei, 2015, p. 61). Similar moral positioning is evident in Fagiola, "For over three decades Gbagbo used non-violent means such as demonstrations, sit-ins, marches, debates, publication of clandestine leaflets and newspapers to topple the one-party dictatorship, which had been in power since independence" (2016, p. 27).

While a highly effective nationalist political discourse within Côte d'Ivoire, hegemonic characterisations of Ivoirité as 'hate speech' were equally effective in achieving opposite political ends externally. Ivoirité was successfully leveraged to mobilise internal counterhegemonic resistance to UN and French intervention up to the military defeat of the Second Ivoirian Civil War. Conversely, hegemonic actors successfully branded Ivoirité as a 'toxic ideology' which threatened to ignite genocide within Côte d'Ivoire. This framing of Ivoirité as hate speech and precursor to genocide played an important role mobilising support for the military campaign which overthrew the Gbagbo regime in 2011.

Within the literature on the Ivoirian civil wars, there are few clear examples of the 'hate speech' referenced within the literature. References include characterisations such as "hate campaigns...messages, calling for popular resistance against Ouattara and his foreign backers" (Banegas, 2011, p. 460) and "the message of hatred against the RDR and its 'foreign backers' as an insurgent group which should be resisted" (Anjide, 2013, p. 25), which do not seem particularly 'hateful' in the context of a civil war. A short but clear example of 'hate speech' is provided in an ONUCI publication which decried "anti-immigrant propaganda leaflets" proclaiming that 'the hour has come for ultimate vengeance,' and "urged autochthons to kill and chase away Ivorian and foreign migrants" (quoted in Klaus and Mitchell, 2015, p. 631 - 632; the ONUCI pamphlet is no longer online).

I have found one other instance in the academic literature which provided a clear, specific example of 'hate speech.' Marshall-Fratani quotes from a pamphlet circulating in Western Côte d'Ivoire circa 2005 which calls to "clean our villages" of outsiders using "guns and machetes" (Marshall-Fratani, 2006, p. 10). The pamphlet as quoted and translated by
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Marshall-Fratani calls for violent ethnic cleansing of 'incomers' to reclaim ancestral lands and political power by the indigenes of Western Côte d'Ivoire. Marshall-Fratani notes that the pamphlet links this call to violence to the Kragbé Gnagbé assassination and Sangwe massacre of 1970 perpetrated by the Houphouët-Boigny regime against the Bété people of western Côte d'Ivoire. While she acknowledges the "Guébié genocide" as "fundamental in Bété collective memory," she dismisses the assassination and massacre narratives as "no doubt greatly exaggerated" (pp 20-21). Marshall-Fratani’s dismissal of historically established massacres indicates simplification and polarisation of narrative to facilitate a stronger normative stance. This need to take a side in the contestation of Ivoirité as liberation discourse vs. Ivoirité as hate speech creates polarisation, minimisation, reductive framing, and exclusion in the production of both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives during the interventions which occlude the narrative complexity of 'hate speech' and its linkage to the contestation for land and power in Côte d'Ivoire. Focussing on 'hate speech' diverts attention from the land grab battles driving the speech, and conversely, focussing on the loss of traditional land and power minimises the hate speech, creating toxic polarisation.

The genocide narrative

Naming is one of the most powerful strategies deployed in any narrative war, as Mamdani (2007) points out in The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency. Naming takes on strategic importance in the Ivoirian intervention genocide narrative. The threat of genocide was used to mobilise international support for military force to defeat Gbagbo, serving as one of the most powerful hegemonic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions, and is still used as a central strategic narrative to argue the success of the interventions. While relatively sparse in messaging frequency, the UN narratives linking 'hate speech' with the threat of genocide are widely accepted within the academic and professional literatures.

Not a single UN News article from 2002 - 2017 uses the term Ivoirité. However, the UN uses a variety of terms such as 'hate speech,' 'hate messages,' 'hate broadcasts' and 'hateful propaganda' during crisis points: the Bouaké crisis and Fourth Battle of Abidjan; the crisis at the end of the National Assembly term and the Fifth Battle of Abidjan; and at the beginning of the Second Ivoirian Civil War. 'Hate speech' is the naming/framing given by the UN to the
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discourse of Ivoirité. The UN characterisation of these 'hate messages' is vague at best; "declarations of hate, in particular those addressed against UNOCI personnel" (UN News, 25 May 2004) or "hate media broadcasts aimed at foreigners" (UN News 8 Nov 2004) or "hate and anti-French messages" (UN News, 10 Nov 2004). There is not a single instance within the corpus in which any specifics of the 'hate messaging' is described.

Between 2004 and 2011, the UN published 14 news articles warning of the potential for genocide in Côte d’Ivoire because of 'hate speech' and calling for restraint. These articles, while signalling a genuine concern at escalating violence within Côte d’Ivoire, also served a disciplining function and a warning against opposing UN decisions and actions. Further, the UN messaging replicated, without attribution, a central rebel narrative - that the rebellion was ignited by Northern and Muslim Ivoirian fears of genocide (Soro, 2005).


As violence escalated in December 2010, UN actors began expressing concerns regarding the possibility of 'genocide.' On 29 December, the Ivoirian Ambassador to the UN newly

appointed by Ouattara, “cautioned that his country was on the verge of genocide” (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6) and the following day, the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Adviser focusing on the Responsibility to Protect “express[ed] concern” over the risks of genocide in Côte d’Ivoire (UN News, 30 Dec 2010). On 31 December, two days after the first announcements regarding the risk of genocide in Côte d’Ivoire, the UK Foreign Secretary announced that the UK would “support military intervention” in Côte d’Ivoire (UNSC, 2017b, p. 6). While this announcement was not linked publicly to the genocide narrative, the genocide narrative provided strong normative incentives and justification for powerful states to become involved in the Ivoirian conflict. On 19 January, the Special Advisors again announced concerns about “the possibility of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing” (UN News, 19 Jan 2011). The genocide messaging increased in volume and velocity over the course of January and February in the run-up to the approval of Resolution 1975 (passed in March 2011), then stopped during the Second Ivoirian Civil War (UN News, 30 Dec 2010; 19 Jan 2011; 25 Jan 2011; 27 Jan 2011; 31 Jan 2011; 1 Feb 2011; 2 Feb 2011; 17 Feb 2011). The UN published one final message warning of the risks of genocide under the newly formed Ouattara administration at the end of June (UN News, 29 June 2011).

The hegemonic genocide narratives play an important role in the narrative of the success of the interventions. In the middle years of the intervention, Bovcon (2006; 2009, p. 8) claimed that France had 'prevent[ed] another Rwanda.' The French UN Deputy Secretary-General DPKO, echoed the claim in 2011 that use of heavy weaponry against the Gbagbo regime "helped to prevent a situation like we had in 1994 in Rwanda" (Le Roy, 2011). Ouattara publicly credited Licorne with preventing genocide during the Second Ivoirian Civil War (France24, 2012). But it is not just direct protagonists in the conflict who cite the Ivoirian interventions as successfully 'preventing genocide.' The hegemonic academic literature echoes this claim that the international forces prevented genocide throughout the duration of the interventions (Hara and Ero, 2002; Marshall-Fratani, 2006, p. 11; Epstein, 2008; Bovcon, 2006, 2009, 2011; Dauda, 2011, pp 24-25; Schmidt, 2018; Recchia, 2020, p. 524). Charbonneau’s 2014 claims, referenced in Chapter 8, that Gbagbo's methods invited or necessitated violence, and that "the UN-French interventions stopped the worst violence
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and saved lives by putting an end to the war," imply that the military combat of the Second Ivoirian Civil War was warranted by the threat of genocide, and that the combat successfully prevented genocide. Noted R2P advocate-diplomat Gareth Evans cited the Ivoirian interventions as proof that 'R2P works' in preventing genocide during a recent lecture (Evans, 2020). But did they?

The counterhegemonic narratives of genocide

Others did not concur with the UN framing of Ivoirian violence as incipient genocide. Early on, Smith challenged French claims of preventing a "catastrophe humanitaire," noting that French narratives "opened the way to the exploitation of the 'genocide' theme by the rebels at the earliest stages of the intervention" (2003, p. 123). Gberie and Addo (2004, p. 45) argued that the Ivoirian situation was not equivalent to the conflicts of Rwanda and Liberia which led to genocide, although the possibility of genocide could not be completely "ruled out" in Côte d'Ivoire. The joint report produced by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre and the Centre for International Peace Operations (2004) dismissed the threat of genocide in Côte d'Ivoire, calling it "virtually non-existent." The African Union Peace and Security Committee never invoked Article 4(h) during the Second Ivoirian Civil War, deciding that the Ivoirian "violence therefore did not pass the threshold of grave circumstances" (Abatan and Spies, 2016, p. 18).

The counterhegemonic narratives of genocide contrast with the hegemonic narratives discussed above. According to multiple counterhegemonic authors, France and the UN leveraged the genocide narrative to build a case for the rebels, to stigmatise the Gbagbo regime, and to invert the narratives of aggression underlying the interventions. Charbonneau notes that as early as December 2002, France "open[ed] the door to the rebels' genocidal rhetoric" by calls for investigation into 'human rights breaches' during the fierce fighting of the September 2002 attempted coup d'etat (2008a, p. 166). Galy notes the polarising effect of genocide discourse among 'disinterested' observers who were "systematically pro-rebel" (2007, p. 22, my translation). Momboye (2007) characterised the narrative of a 'toxic Ivoirité' with potential to lead to genocide as a French media campaign designed to attribute the crisis to inter-ethnic violence and deflect attention from France's proxy war in Côte d'Ivoire. He emphasised that Côte d'Ivoire was historically renowned for
its "legendary ethnic tolerance" and welcoming of immigrants (2007, p. 37), noting that an exceptionally high percentage of the population were immigrants, and claiming that Ivorian culture was "fundamentally peaceful" (2007, p. 223). Momboye noted that with 62 ethnicities, a war of one ethnicity against another simply could not take place; the country was too fractionated (p. 224). Momboye further argued that France was attempting to deliberately engineer not just a false narrative of ethnic hatred and incipient genocide, but a civil war for strategic advantage (2007, p.224). Respondents during my time in Côte d’Ivoire recounted spontaneously and without prompting Momboye's argument that an ethnically fractionated Côte d’Ivoire could not produce genocide, and emphasised the narrative of a multi-ethnic, peaceful, and welcoming Côte d’Ivoire. Ivoirian interethnic intermarriage and cordial relations among ethnicities were points of pride among the Ivoirians I met, despite the civil war.

During the Second Ivoirian Civil War, Charles Blé Goudé, "leader of the Jeunes Patriotes (JP) and a key actor in the Gbagbo administration" claimed that France and UN were preparing to commit or support genocide against Ivoirians (Wyss, 2013, p. 95 - 96). This claim may seem improbable, particularly to hegemonically positioned interrogators. However, it is less outrageous than initial reactions might indicate. Busch (2013) describes the carnage that immediately followed Choi's instructions to UNOCI troops that they were to "open fire on anyone who stood in the way of UN operations on the ground in the Ivory Coast." The rebels were armed with heavy weapons and immediately began attacks on Ivoirian state military forces, police, and civilians. UNOCI and French troops directed heavy artillery against protesting Ivoirian civilians and into areas with known civilian occupants (documented in Chapter 11). UNOCI forces observed without intervening in the Duékoué massacre of March 2011, in which an estimated 800 - 1,000 western Ivoirians were killed. The 'tropical blitzkrieg' by Ouattara forces in 2011, in which northern rebels killed southern indigenes, was the single campaign which approached 'genocide' during the conflict. This relationship between strategic narrative and historical events indicates narrative inversion, "a technique of systematic perversion of information" that framed the risk of violence as derived from the Gbagbo government and the Ivoirian state, when in fact the violence was primarily enacted by Ouattara and international forces. Galy notes that the "strategy of inversion"
deployed by hegemonic actors, particularly Ouattara and his supporters, deflected claims of planned violence onto the south, and away from the northern protagonists (quoted in Mattei, 2015, p. 217).

In this analysis, I am not claiming that the rebels and Ouattara propagated a 'genocide narrative' media campaign from 2003 to invert responsibility for a planned genocide against Western and Southern Ivoirians in 2011. Rather, I am claiming here that the 'genocide narrative,' originating in French and rebel media campaigns from the start of the First Ivoirian Civil War, mobilised international support for the rebels throughout the interventions and international military intervention in the Second Ivoirian Civil War. The use of the genocide narrative successfully engaged international actors on behalf of the rebels and diverted international attention from the worst atrocities of the war while they were being committed. At the time, the ICC promised prosecution of these crimes. After the war, these atrocities were treated as moot, and the narrative which shielded them became deployed as a success story.

François Ivoirité defined 'Ivoirianness,' and was deployed in the contestation of who is entitled to citizenship and land in the modern Ivoirian state. The second foundational counterhegemonic discourse of Françafrique defines Ivoirian state identity in opposition to the ongoing role of France in Côte d'Ivoire. France's status as a neo-colonial hegemon forms the bedrock of the counterhegemonic episteme. In the section below, I outline the claims of the counterhegemonic discourse of Françafrique, discuss the near-total silence of UN strategic messaging on France's historical role in Côte d'Ivoire, the moral hazards which that created in Côte d'Ivoire, and the narrative strategies of triangulation and dubbing attributed to France in the narrative of Le Machin de de Gaulle.

In counterhegemonic narratives, the history of France in Côte d'Ivoire, and in Africa more widely, is deeply salient, contesting the role, motives, and actions of France as intervenor. These narratives draw upon and feed into the counterhegemonic discourse of Françafrique. They are grounded in the bedrock of Ivoirian statehood as outlined in Chapter 5. Houpouët-Boigny was unique among West African leaders in the closeness of the ties he
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maintained with France, propagating a narrative of Côte d’Ivoire's relatively painless emergence from French colony into independent state. Houphouët-Boigny coined the term *Françafrique* to indicate the ongoing fusion of French and African interests following 'independence.'

A dominant counterhegemonic narrative claims that Côte d’Ivoire was never 'liberated' from France and never achieved true independence because of the uniquely close relationship between the French state and Houphouët-Boigny and the role of France in supporting his 30-year personal rule. The discourse of *Françafrique* emphasises the ongoing neo-colonial role of France in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly the covert efforts of France to ensure a 'sympathetic' and 'compatible' Ivoirian government remained in power. This narrative of the emergence of Côte d’Ivoire from colony to nation-state is part of the contested narrative of 'national re-liberation' which played an important role in mobilizing the Ivoirian citizenry throughout the interventions, but particularly from the 50th anniversary of Ivoirian independence in 2010 through the Second Ivoirian Civil War (N’Guessan, 2013; Charvin, 2011).

Counterhegemonic narrators foreground French colonial and neo-colonial interventions; French sponsorship of assassinations, coups d'état, and proxy wars from colonial history to the present across the former French empire. In contrast, the hegemonic narratives, built upon peacekeeping and liberal peace discourses, almost without exception start the clock at the beginning of the interventions, from 2002. The UN narratives throughout the interventions never reference French colonial and neo-colonial historical events as part of their chronologies of intervention. As far as the UN is concerned, the intervention chronology begins with the intervention. Some hegemonic accounts in the academic and grey literature begin their chronologies in the 1990s, with short references to the death of Felix Houphouët-Boigny, the rise of elite contestation for power, and the rise of *Ivoirité* as political discourse. However, the discourse of *Françafrique* and the colonial period are conspicuously absent in most hegemonic chronologies. 'When counts' as evidence is as critical as 'what counts' in understanding the asymmetric narrative contestation which occurs in the Ivoirian interventions.
In Chapter 3, I identified a narrative strategy of triangulation and dubbing which has historically been part of the Franco-Ivoirian relationship (Bamba, 2016). Baniafouna (2011) indicates these strategies in the Ivoirian interventions when referring to the UN as "le machin de de Gaulle" (de Gaulle's plaything) after a speech in which de Gaulle used the term in reference to the UN, claiming that France would use the UN for its own purposes (Baniafouna, 2011, p. 37; Beylau, 2017). The machin de de Gaulle counterhegemonic narrative claims that France spoke through and hid behind the United Nations to triangulate the management of Ivoirian politics through the UN in the achievement of French hegemonic objectives.

Counterhegemonic narrators claim that France used triangulation and dubbing through the UN as narrative strategies in the Ivoirian interventions. There is evidence to consider this a credible claim. In the paragraphs below, I outline France's role as penholder, the near-total silence in UN messaging on the role of France in Côte d'Ivoire, the abundance of UN online documents on the Ivoirian interventions compared to the near-total lack of any official French government documentation on the role in the interventions, and the monopoly of French leadership in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (now DPO) over the past twenty years.

France serves as penholder for resolutions regarding its former colonies (Sievers and Daws, 2021). French diplomats directly authored almost all the Security Council resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire (Charbonneau, 2008a, p. 166; Wyss, 2013, pp 95-96; Abatan and Spies, 2016, p.10; Baniafouna, 2011, p. 30). However, France as the direct author of the Resolutions rarely surfaces as an issue in the hegemonic literature while penholding is frequently problematised within the counterhegemonic literature. Only when significant differences arise, such as dissent within the Security Council that overrode or moderated French resolutions in 2006 (d’Ersu, 2007, p. 102; Charbonneau, 2008, p. 169) and 2011 (Charbonneau, 2011; Campbell, 2011, Bellamy and Williams, 2011) does French authorship become visible in news reporting in the global north. However, French authorship of UN narratives would also appear to be a triangulation strategy. During the Second Civil War, when challenged on direct French military engagement in battle, the French Ministry was
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quoted as claiming that "French forces intervened only in support of a UN resolution" (Moscow Times, 2011) (which they had authored and wangled through the approval process with some difficulty).

The role of France in Côte d’Ivoire goes without note in UN messaging, except for the references within UN messaging expressing appreciation to France for its 'help' in managing the Ivoirian crisis (S/PRST/2002/42; UN News, 20 Dec 2002; S/2006/2, para. 83). Not once in over 1500 UN articles referencing Côte d'Ivoire between 2002 and 2017 is there any explicit reference to France's past imperialism, France's role in Côte d'Ivoire as a colonial power, France's role as UN 'penholder,' or France's ongoing neo-colonial involvement in Côte d'Ivoire. Across the corpus of UN articles referencing Côte d'Ivoire, there is a single reference to Côte d'Ivoire's participation in The United Nations Special Committee on Decolonialization, which makes no reference to France or France's role as former imperial power and current neo-colonial power in Côte d'Ivoire (UN News, 11 Feb 2004). UN messaging silence over the course of 15 years of intervention on the history of the French colonialism and imperialism in Côte d'Ivoire supports the counterhegemonic discourse of Françafrique, which emphasises the covert nature of French engagement in Ivoirian politics, and the strategies of dubbing and triangulation in French management of Côte d'Ivoire. While the UN remained completely silent on France's relationship to Côte d'Ivoire in over 1500 news articles, other narrators such as the BBC did not. BBC News listed "The United Nations, the US, former colonial power France [emphasis added], and the African Union," as calling for Gbagbo to step down following the UN decision that Ouattara had won the 2010 presidential election (BBC, 18 Dec 2010).

Official UN Ivoirian intervention communications are available online and copious in quantity. There are several thousand UN official records (news articles, reports, and resolutions) of the Ivoirian interventions still online and available to the researcher in 2021 on the UN external web. There is literally not a single item on the official French government website on Opération Licorne, and a single page on the French Ministry of Defence website (France: Ministère des Armées, 2017). This exceptional level of asymmetry
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and silence supports the argument of a French strategy of dubbing, 'speaking through' the United Nations.

All the UN Under Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping for the past 20 years have been French diplomats (Appendix F), which adds weight to the claim that France used its position of authority on the Security Council, its control of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and its role as penholder for the Ivorian Security Council Resolutions on Côte d'Ivoire to speak through the UN during its intervention in Côte d'Ivoire.

Was France the primary narrator of the UN narratives, using a strategy of dubbing and triangulation to project its strategic narratives through the UN? Or were France and the UN independent interlocutors and narrators in the interventions? A definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of the current analysis. However, the relationships and communications outlined above support the argument of a strategy of triangulation and dubbing, indicating that France should be considered a primary narrator of much of the UN communications.

Conspiracy Narratives of the Ivorian interventions

As a French post-colony with a complex history of coups d'états both successful and failed, and decisions regarding control of the country made by powerful, external actors, it would be strange if elites and non-elites in Côte d'Ivoire didn't generate a multitude of conspiracy narratives to meet Ivorians' need to make sense of the turmoil which has wracked their country for over three decades. In Chapter 2, I differentiated two general categories of conspiracy narrative: populist sense-making conspiracy narratives and strategic narratives of conspiracies produced by purposively strategic narrators during historical events. This difference between popular vs. strategic conspiracy narratives within the Ivorian counterhegemonic discourse breaks down in analytic practice.

In the sections below, I start from the premise that conspiracy narratives of the Ivorian interventions are purposively developed to explain historical events, justify elite decisions, assign blame for the suffering of the Ivorian peoples, and to rally (or retain) Ivorians to the
counterhegemonic worldview. I justify this assumption on the grounds that I have identified these narratives in the same documents produced for strategic purposes analysed here.

The primary conspiracy meta-narrative posits that malicious external actors caused the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. One version holds that France and Burkina Faso recruited, trained, paid, and enabled the rebel soldiers in a proxy war against the Ivoirian state and the Gbagbo government (discussed in Chapter 10). The ‘cocoa conspiracy’ narratives accuse global corporate cocoa industry actors of colluding with hegemonic actors and co-sponsoring the removal of Gbagbo throughout the interventions (Mattei, 2015, ACC, 2012; Global Witness 2007). The division of the country through French intervention in September 2002 which protected the remnant rebel force is widely held by counterhegemonic narrators to be evidence of conspiracy between France and the rebels from the earliest moments of the long war (Kouassi, 2019). Hegemonic narratives claim that France 'put a stop to the fighting' and rescued the state from military defeat. Counterhegemonic accounts claim the opposite: France intervened when the rebels were all but defeated and allowed the rebellion to fester for the next decade (Mattei, 2015, p. 225; Neyrac, 2006;).

Ouattara's role in specific historical events, particularly coup d'états and attempted coups, provides a unifying theme among these multiple counterhegemonic narratives. The successful coup d'état of 1999 and the coup attempt of 19 September 2002 are well-documented historical events. However, the actors involved in the events and their motives and intents are hotly disputed. Some versions hold that Ouattara was the 'mastermind' of multiple attempted coup d'états, recruiting, training, and deploying Ivoirian ex-soldiers and mercenaries throughout the long war to oust Gbagbo and attain the presidency (Ivoiretv.net, 2019; Kouassi, 2019; N'Guessan, 2013, p. 11); others cast Ouattara as a puppet, or a "half-free slave" of French interests, rather than 'mastermind' (Busch, 2010; Busch 2011).

Counterhegemonic narrators claim that the first successful Ivoirian coup d'état under General Robert Guéï in 1999 is linked to Ouattara through the role played in the Guéï coup by Ibrahim Coulibaly, who had previously served in Ouattara's security guard when Ouattara
was Prime Minister under Houphouët-Boigny (Smith, et al. 2002; Escande, 2003; Charbonneau, 2008a, p. 159 - 160; Champlin, 2010). Counterhegemonic narrators point to online recordings of speeches which they claim prove that Ouattara announced his intention to seize control of the state in September 1999 (Ivoire TVNet, 2019; Douhouré, 2016; Mattei, 2015, p. 190). Ouattara as leader of the *RDR* is cast as the driver of the 2001 coup attempt in which the Secretary-General of the *RDR* was arrested. Ouattara’s deep historical relationship to Burkina Faso and problematic citizenship status in Côte d’Ivoire reinforce the counterhegemonic narrative that Ouattara is also the *éminence gris* behind the coup attempt of September 2002 in collaboration with Blaise Compaoré and the organising force behind the larger rebellion (Bilé, 2020; Busch, 2010).

General Guéï and his family were killed in the fighting during the First Battle of Abidjan. Narratives of why Guéï was killed vary widely, some holding that the Gbagbo administration had him executed for leading the new coup attempt, others claiming that Guéï was killed by the rebels for failing to install Ouattara (as had been planned, according to these narratives) following the successful 1999 coup attempt. Both sides use Guéï’s killing for strategic narrative advantage. Allouche and Bley (2017, p. 168-169) note that the Ouattara administration has been restrained in seeking to definitively identify the circumstances of Guéï’s death. Ibrahim Coulibaly’s killing by Ouattara forces at the conclusion of the Second Ivorian Civil War (S/2011/387, para. 11) is similarly attributed to a clean-up operation authorized by Ouattara, Coulibaly having become too much of a liability at the start of Ouattara’s presidency (James, 2011b; Mieu and Airault, 2011; Duhem, 2020).

Counterhegemonic narratives of coup plots that never came to fruition are numerous. Some of these narratives have enough public documentation to be credible and carry significant meaning and narrative power for Ivorians. They should not be dismissed out of hand, if only for the extent to which they maintain a robust afterlife in the counterhegemonic discourse. As documented referencing UN sources in Chapters 5 and 6, suspected coup plotters were arrested in Abidjan in January 2001, the start of rebellion of 2002 was itself a coup attempt, suspected coup plotters were arrested in Abidjan and Paris in August of 2003. Rumors of a pending coup attempt and coup plotting in March 2004 were supported by Ivorian and
foreign intelligence reporting. These intelligence reports contained information that weaponry was being smuggled into the country in preparation for another attempt to overthrow the government under covered of the planned opposition demonstrations, which led to a government ban on demonstrations, opposition intransigence, and the Third Battle of Abidjan.

A further major set of conspiracy narratives focus on the events of November 2004 which led to the Fourth Battle of Abidjan. Counterhegemonic narratives maintain that the French government engineered the fatal bombing of the French encampment at Bouaké to thwart Gbagbo’s drive to reunify the country through force following Soro’s declaration of succession in autumn 2004. This narrative has enough power and verisimilitude that the legal case brought by the families of the French soldiers killed in the Bouaké bombing is currently active within the French judiciary in 2021, with the presiding judge requiring legal testimony from French ministers of state, as well as French military and intelligence personnel. The French state has yet to provide an intelligible narrative to their own court for the anomalous events of November 2004. However, there is official testimony now in the public domain by French military and government officials that French officials were directly involved in the ‘disappearance’ of the pilots involved in the Bouaké bombing.¹⁸

A further claim of the Bouaké conspiracy narrative holds that then Chief of Staff of the Ivorian military, General Doué, was recruited by the French in 2004. Some versions hold that Doué joined the French following his removal from command after the bombings and attempted to mount a coup d’état against Gbagbo using French military resources during the Fourth Battle of Abidjan (Mattei, 2015, pp. 93-94; Frindéthié, 2018). Whether or not Doué engineered the bombing of Bouaké, was working with the French and Ouattara to overthrow the Gbagbo government or commanding a column of tanks which ’got lost’ and ended up in front of the Presidential Palace on the night of 8 November 2004 remains an open question (Charbonneau, 2008a, p. 168-169). What is known, unambiguously, is that Doué was replaced as head of the armed forces by Gbagbo in November 2004 following the

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On 27 December 2007, Abidjan police arrested an “independent photojournalist” carrying documentary footage outlining a plan for putsch led by FN warlord Ibrahim Coulibaly, and Jean-François Cazé, an “obscure military expert.” The plot was referred to as ‘Noël à Abidjan,’ (Le Monde, 13 Apr 2016) echoing the successful coup of Christmas Eve 1999, when Guéï, nicknamed “Pere Noël,” overthrew Bédie (Laloupo, 2002). One curious aspect of ‘Noël à Abidjan,’ is the public silence of the UN regarding an attempted coup d’état. In the April 2008 Secretary-General’s report, Ban makes a bare note of the arrests of “11 individuals” and the international arrest warrant issued for Ibrahim Coulibaly on 17 January for “conspiracy against the state” (S/2008/250, para. 3). UNOCI had commented in general terms at the end of 2007 on the renewed levels of violence in Bouaké, which Ban linked to Coulibaly supporters in his April 2008 Secretary-General’s report. However, UN News did not address the coup plot in any public reporting. UNOCI voiced instead a general condemnation of generic military clashes, abuses of power, impunity in the commission of violence, and summary executions, and called on all political actors to abide by the new peace accords (UN News, 31 Dec 2007). The aborted coup of 2007 was the last major historical military coup narrative of the interventions until the presidential elections of 2010.

Not all narratives of coups and attempted coups were phrased as military operations. Gbagbo characterised the Linas-Marcoussis Accord of 2003, the terms dictated by France and highly favorable to Ouattara and the rebels, as "a coup d'état in white gloves" (Mattei, 2015, p. 71). Given that the rebels explicitly demanded to a path to the presidency for Ouattara from 2002, that this demand was formalised as a non-negotiable requirement in the LMA, and realised in 2011 through combat, this is not an obviously false narrative. Momboye (2007, p. 199) describes French efforts in drafting S/RES/1721 to supersede the Ivoirian constitution, dismiss the Ivoirian National Assembly, and replace Gbagbo as president with an interim Prime Minister as a "perfect constitutional coup d'état" which
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failed in the face of US, Chinese, Russian, and Tanzanian opposition on the Security Council. As outlined in the narrative of The Grey List in Chapter 12, counterhegemonic narratives depict France and the UN as colluding with rebels to provide voting access to ineligible voters in 2010, and then engineering a successful 'constitutional coup d'état' by overriding the Constitutional Council's decision to award the election to Gbagbo. SAGEM is particularly charged with claims of enabling non-citizens access to voting. That the head of SAGEM, Ouattara ally Sidi Mohamed Kagnassi, has been named in multiple scandals and investigations, including charges that in the Malian election of 2013, SAGEM issued many more voter registration cards than there were voters (Ahougnon, 2019), gives additional support to this narrative.

Charges of corruption and conspiracy extend to French officials. Mattei (2015) details Gbagbo's claims of demands for, and payment of, bribes to French officials (p. 39). Counterhegemonic narrators claimed that French President Nicholas Sarkozy prosecuted the Libyan and Ivoirian narrative and kinetic wars for personal advantage (Frindéthié, 2016, p. 7, 69, 71, 174). According to these narratives, Sarkozy decided to unseat both Gbagbo and Gadhafi because they had contributed illicit funds to his political campaigns, putting him at risk of exposure and corruption charges (Frindéthié, 2016, p. 72). In 2011, this counternarrative of French government corruption driving regime change might have seemed implausible. In 2021, as Sarkozy serves an extended sentence for campaign funding corruption, it appears much less implausible (BBC, 2021a; 2021b).

These narratives of conspiracy described above demonstrate, through their internal structuring, narrative mechanisms for reinforcing an Ivoirian identity by "driv[ing] a wedge, promot[ing] and celebrat[ing] alienation" (al Raffie, 2012, p. 17) between 'true' Ivoirians, their Burkinabe neighbors, their northern Ivoirian compatriots, their French expatriate population, and the larger international community of elite actors, including the UN and the United States. These narratives assign blame to French, international, and Ivoirian political actors, are developed within existing cultural frames, and deploy narrative frames of humiliation, colonial oppression, suffering, and grievance to create cohesive, mobilised Ivoirian groups. The complexity of narrative interweaving (the multiple conspiracy narratives
woven into a larger narrative construction), the strength of alignment with Ivoirian foundational discourses of *Ivoirité* and *Françafrique*, and the claims of hidden plotting render these narratives both totalising and irrefutable within the narrative construct. However, this does not a priori mean that these narratives are necessarily false, inaccurate, or untrue. Conspiracies do exist in the world, and some narratives of conspiracies are true. The question is .... which ones?

**Hegemonic conspiracy narratives**

Narrative analysts generally consider conspiracy narratives to be counterhegemonic; these narratives accuse powerful (hegemonic) actors of secret plots, nefarious motives, terrible acts, and exploitation, which hegemonic actors reject as fantasies and delusions. However, in addition to the counterhegemonic conspiracy narratives described above (Simon, et. al, 2002; Smith, 2003, 2011, Förster, 2013; Dougou, 2012; Kessié, 2013; Airault and Bat, 2016; Malo, 2020), within the hegemonic discourse there are hegemonic narratives of the Ivoirian interventions which are often referenced but not described as conspiracy narratives. These narratives nonetheless include attributes of conspiracy narratives.

The genocide narrative held that Côte d'Ivoire was on 'the brink of genocide' over the course of more than a decade (Recchia, 2020; Ouattara, 2018; UNSC, 2017b, p. 10; IPI, 2011 ICC, 2011; S/2006/2, para. 63; UN News, 5 Dec 2005; UN News, 15 Nov 2004; ICG, 2004). The 'deprivation of citizenship' narrative also postulated conspiracy on the part of southern Ivoirians, Christians, and the Gbagbo government to harm, deprive, neglect, and systematically murder Muslims and northerners. These narratives bear the hallmarks of conspiracy narratives, including linking, totalising narratives of secret plans by (Ivoirian) elites to harm specific groups of Ivoirians. However, these hegemonic narratives are not framed or described as conspiracy narratives in the hegemonic literature, but rather taken at face value, and endorsed as substantive. These narratives are referenced as proof that the Ivoirian interventions were a success, particularly in preventing genocide (Evans, 2020; Dauda, 2011, p. 24 - 25; Epstein, 2008). Because these narratives are widely accepted across the hegemonic literature and are often vigorously contested within counterhegemonic analysis, I class these narratives of systematic aggression and plotting for genocide by southern Ivoirians against northern Ivoirians as hegemonic conspiracy narratives. The
genocide narrative is frequently cited within hegemonic literature as justification for the UN and French resort to military combat in the Second Ivorian Civil War. If the genocide narrative were considered a 'conspiracy narrative,' it would lose much of its utility as an unwarranted (unargued, taken as given) narrative for hegemonic actors in narrative contestation. For a conspiracy narrative to be used effectively in narrative warfare, it must be unquestioned, assumed to be true. Conversely, an effective way to delegitimate an inconvenient adversary narrative is to frame it as a 'conspiracy theory.'

To reiterate, I am not claiming that either hegemonic and counterhegemonic conspiracy narratives are true or false. I'm noting the ways in which they are referenced and utilised within the narrative warfare of the interventions. I am focussing on the structural and systemic characteristics of the narratives and their associated strategies in narrative warfare.

Summary - Chapter 13
In Chapter 13, I presented two counterhegemonic discourses foundational to the counterhegemonic narratives of intervention - Ivoirité and Françafrique. I have described the historical events which gave rise to these discourses and discussed the ways in which both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators have used specific aspects of these discourses to create strategic narratives of intervention.

I emphasised the dialectical nature of Ivoirité, analogous to the dialectic of liberalism, with its long history of both inclusive and exclusive, emancipatory and repressive projects and theory. I analysed the genocide narrative of the Ivorian interventions from both hegemonic and counterhegemonic perspectives, highlighting the linkage to the contested and contradictory representations of Ivoirité. I discussed the ways in which the genocide narrative played an important role in the authorisation of military combat by hegemonic actors in the Second Ivorian Civil War, and how it continues to be used to maintain the hegemonic history of the interventions, while it is vigorously contested by Ivorian citizens.

I reviewed the narratives which directly challenge France's role in Côte d'Ivoire in general, and in the interventions specifically. I highlighted the strategies of dubbing and triangulation
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in the narrative of *le machin de de Gaulle* and analysed French and UN communication patterns strategies which support the narrative.

In the final chapter of this thesis, I discuss the ways in which the narrative warfare for Côte d’Ivoire shaped and influenced the outcomes of the interventions. I then note the unasked questions of narrative warfare waiting to be addressed in future work.
Chapter 14. The narrative war for Côte d’Ivoire

In Chapter 1, I described the primary research question of this thesis as: how did the same set of historical events in Côte d’Ivoire give rise to two different versions of the Ivoirian interventions history? I have addressed this question in three ways: First, how did two such mutually exclusive discourses of the international interventions in Côte d’Ivoire come into being? How were they formed? Who created the strategic political narratives that make up these contradictory discourses and narratives of which they are composed? Second, how were these discourses projected? What strategies and technologies were deployed? Who were the audiences? Third, what difference did this narrative contestation make in the intervention events and outcomes? In this concluding chapter, I summarise the answers to these questions which I have provided in this dissertation.

Answered Questions
In Part I of this thesis, I developed and extended the work of the Strategic Narrative Analysis Theoretical Framework, bringing into the framework concepts from the Narrative Strategies school of analysis. I then developed a taxonomy of narrative strategies used in strategic narrative contestation, drawing from work in SNA, NS, and Critical Discourse Analysis. I outlined the roles of narrative entrepreneurs in the initial construction and replication of strategic narratives and the role of proxies in promoting worldviews, narrative amplification, and recruitment to epistemic conflict through narrative engagement.

In Part II, I presented a chronology of historical events of the Ivoirian interventions, to guide the reader through the analysis of narratives and strategies deployed in the narrative war for Côte d’Ivoire. Part II provided detailed documentation to ground the events in specific records, allowing a greater degree of clarity and confidence in event chronology in a particularly muddy historical context. Part II provided the context necessary to evaluate the tension between historical records and strategic narratives of the interventions. As discussed in Part III, this level of detail is often elided, which risks uncritical repetition of strategic narratives as historical fact.
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In Part III, I analysed the ways in which academic and professional literatures support and prosecute narrative warfare and how analysts become witting or unwitting participants in a narrative war. I identified the indicators of polarisation in the Ivoirian intervention discourse, and the varying strategies professionals took to position themselves across this polarised spectrum of analysis and commentary, including strategies to engage directly or obliquely in the narrative conflict, and strategies to avoid the narrative warfare of intervention completely by positioning their research in such a way that they could exclude discussion of the interventions. I developed analytic benchmarks for assessing narrator positionality across the hegemonic - counterhegemonic spectrum and identified and analysed ways in which narrators maintained consistent positions, or changed positionality, across time.

In Part IV, I identified narrative strategies deployed in the narrative war for Côte d’Ivoire by both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narrators, including strategies of naming, framing, alignment with existing discourses, strategic attention and strategic silence, the use of chronology, the mechanism of moral contraband, the process of narrative polarisation, the ad hominem strategies of valorisation and vilification, and the strategy of inversion. I addressed the moral actor positioning drivers of hegemonic strategic narrative formation and projection by UN narrators in Chapters 12 and 13 and the ways in which the UN strategic narratives of intervention were grounded in discourses of peacekeeping and the liberal peace. In Chapter 13, I analysed the narrative strategies of dubbing and triangulation between the UN, France, and Côte d’Ivoire and the narrative of Le Machin de de Gaulle. I outlined the counterhegemonic discourses of Ivoirité and Françafrique, and the narratives of genocide grounded in these discourses. I analysed conspiracy narratives within counterhegemonic discourse, discussed the hegemonic counternarrative strategy of framing conspiracy narratives as conspiracy theories, and then reversed the optic to consider hegemonic narratives of genocide as conspiracy narratives.

My analysis of foundational discourses, strategic narratives, and narrative strategies reveal mechanisms through which competing epistemes were constructed and maintained: the narrative strategies of naming, framing, silence, inversion, moral positioning, moral
contraband, promotion by proxy, polarisation through simplification, personalisation, replication, triangulation, dubbing, and conspiracy narratives deployed in the contested strategic discourses of intervention.

Given the variety, velocity, and volume of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic messaging described in this thesis, there is little wonder, then, that half a decade after the interventions concluded, protagonists, participants, survivors, and bystanders maintain their beliefs about the morality/immorality and successes/failures of the interventions. More unexpectedly, I identified narrators who across the course of time, events, and their analysis, changed positionality in their assessments of the interventions. Narrative warfare theory tends to assume fixed narrative positions, and this research challenges that assumption.

One of my key findings uncovers the asymmetric and incommensurate basis of strategic narrative contestation in the Ivoirian interventions. Asymmetric and incommensurate strategic narratives continue to compete indirectly through their contributions to the ongoing oppositional hegemonic and counter-hegemonic epistemes. While I have identified direct counternarrative contestation in Chapters 11 and 12, I've emphasised the primary importance of incommensurate and asymmetric counter-hegemonic counternarratives in Chapter 13, particularly the narratives which the hegemonic discourse characterises as 'conspiracy theories.' I found that the hegemonic narratives draw from and feed into the discourses of peacekeeping and the liberal peace while counter-hegemonic narratives are grounded in the discourses of Françafrique and Ivoirité.

The contested discourses were held by different populations and the contested narratives were addressed to different audiences, as documented throughout this thesis. The hegemonic narratives were addressed to the international diplomatic community and stakeholders in United Nations. As discussed in Chapter 3, the UN did address Ivoirians directly during the interventions, through UNOCI in-country messaging, but removed all that messaging from the global web following the end of the UNOCI mission. However, as tactical
Waging Peace

and operational narratives, the UN narratives addressed directly to Ivoirian citizens fall outside the scope of this analysis.

The counterhegemonic narratives which I have analysed contested the specific events of the interventions and were primarily addressed to Ivoirian elite and Ivoirian educated professionals, targeting international audiences and Ivoirian citizenry peripherally. Other, more ephemeral, counterhegemonic narratives of intervention, while available to an international audience in some instances, were focussed internally - their stakeholders were primarily the Ivoirian citizenry, and again, are tactical and operational, rather than strategic, narratives.

Strategic narrative analytic theory has not addressed this asymmetry of narrative and audience in-depth. The narrative warfare analysed in this research does not indicate two sets of protagonists fighting on the same terms for the same audiences. My research emphasises that narrative warfare is waged asymmetrically, and that this asymmetry is an important, under-researched, and under-reported aspect of narrative contestation. This finding points to the need for more research into the asymmetric foundations of narrative warfare and theory building to account for this asymmetry.

Outcomes
What difference did the narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire make in the intervention events and outcomes? The short answer is, the UN fought the narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire on a global scale, and the Gbagbo administration primarily fought the narrative war in Côte d'Ivoire, grounding their legitimacy in the support of the Ivoirian citizenry. While the Gbagbo administration enjoyed strong support from much of the Ivoirian populace, the Ivoirian state was no match for international military intervention, leading to military defeat in the Second Ivoirian Civil War.

The UN messaging addressed an international audience of diplomats and achieved authorisation of the use of 'all means necessary' through Resolution 1975, which served as de facto authorisation of military combat for regime change. Since the protection of civilians was already recognised as a commitment made by the constituent states of the UN, and
already part of previous resolutions, Resolution 1975 would not have incurred significant international resistance if the Security Council members had not clearly understood that it would lead to direct combat and regime change. Without the full court strategic narrative messaging press (and the concurrent behind the scenes diplomatic pressure), it is unlikely that the use of combat to remove Gbagbo would have been authorised by the Security Council. We have no way yet to weigh a pound of messaging against the weight of diplomacy behind closed doors, but there was significant narrative messaging effort expended by the UN, and the goals of the messaging were clearly achieved, regardless of the relative weight of other efforts in the outcome.

However, there is no indication in this analysis that the broader UN strategic goals of international liberal intervention were successfully furthered or achieved through or with strategic messaging. While the UN consistently attempted to align their messages with the values inherent in peacekeeping doctrine and liberal principles, when hegemonic goals took priority, words no longer matched deeds, and the values promoted by liberal messaging became irrelevant to both sets of combatants. The fact that liberal goals were, nonetheless, part of the interventions is best seen in the end game of the interventions. From the end of the Second Ivorian Civil War right up to the end of mission, the UN continued to doggedly promote liberal values and practices, with little success by their own reporting, as documented in Chapter 7. At close of mission, reporting abruptly changed, as noted at the end of Part II, and the Ivorian interventions were touted as an exemplary success of the liberal peace.

A success of the liberal peace?
Hegemonic narrators have claimed that the Ivorian interventions provided a counterexample to the academic emphasis on the dangers of the liberal peace. At the closure of the UNOCI mission, the United Nations declared the international interventions in Côte d’Ivoire ‘a shining example’ ("une exemple phare") of success at disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-combatants, and claimed that UNOCI accomplishments included the prevention of violence, the restoration of stability, and support to Ivorian political processes (ONU-Info, 2017).
Other international voices reiterated this theme of Ivorian peace operations success. Bangura (2011) characterised the UN Operations in Côte d’Ivoire as *A Success Story about Managing a Protracted Conflict*. Stremlau, a prominent US international Relations academic and former State Department, World Bank, Carter Center, and Rockefeller Foundation officer characterised Côte d’Ivoire’s “journey to democracy” as an “under-reported good news story...” and a “counterpoint to more general international fears of democracy’s decline.” Stremlau called out improvements to the Ivorian economy, infrastructure, direct foreign investment, state capacity, and good governance and noted improvements in “the critical areas of personal safety rule of law, political participation and human rights”. He described Côte d’Ivoire as “an example to other post-conflict countries” and “another example of good news out of Africa” which he contrasted to the other “failing” and “still-weak” states of West Africa (Stremlau, 2015).

In 2016, the French Ambassador to the UN portrayed the Ivorian operations an outlier, a rare instance of peace operations which achieved their goals (S/PV.7681, 2016). In 2017, as the mission ended, the official pronouncements of Côte d’Ivoire as a success of the liberal peace became more pronounced and frequent, even as the country experienced a long and unsettling series of strikes and quasi-mutinies. While acknowledging the high level of civil unrest and flare-ups of military violence in Côte d’Ivoire over the course of 2017, the last Special Representative for Côte d’Ivoire focussed on the operations as a success story. She listed the metrics of liberal peace success in the strengthening of democracy, political and territorial integration, economic growth ‘contributing to [Côte d’Ivoire’s] development,’ an increased role for Côte d’Ivoire in the subregion, and a security situation which “continues to improve,” (S/PV.7957, 2017). The British ambassador to the United Nations claimed that Côte d’Ivoire had been "transformed" through the UN mission. He emphasised that this 'transformation' was not only as a success narrative for the country, but equally a success for United Nations peacekeeping, "a model we should seek to emulate" (Wilson, 2017).

The United States State Department also praised UNOCI in a diplomatic note titled ‘A Peacekeeping Success Story in Côte d’Ivoire,’ lauding UNOCI for its successes in protecting civilians, dispute resolution, and the monitoring and protecting of human rights. State
concluded that “By all accounts, UNOCI is a peacekeeping success story” (Traughber, 2016). The International Peace Institute (IPI) described the interventions as “a successful case of crisis management.” IPI concluded that “Côte d’Ivoire has demonstrated that not all crises are intractable ... the country is now presented as a model of crisis recovery on the African continent” (2017, pp 1-2). Alassane Ouattara (2018) added to the success narrative, with a Brookings Report titled, “Emerging from crisis: Côte d’Ivoire’s success story” which lists the (neo)liberal achievements of the post-crisis Ivoirian state.

The analysis of the strategic narratives of the interventions presented in this thesis calls these bold assertions into question. Critical examination of both the hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives reveals that, on balance, the narratives of the Ivoirian interventions as a success of the liberal peace are, at best, only partly true. However, this analysis doesn’t attempt to weigh the truth or falsity of individual narrative claims of the success of the liberal peace in Côte d’Ivoire.

As I discussed in the theoretical framework section of this thesis, strategic narrative analysis works to uncover the meaning of events to protagonists and bystanders more than the truth values of the stories told. I have focussed on how the UN and other hegemonic narrators deployed the discourses peacekeeping and the liberal peace to represent decisions and events in ways congruent with these values. Conversely, counterhegemonic narrators deployed the discourses of Ivoirité and Françafrique to leverage support for Gbagbo and counter international pressure in ways which spoke, and still speak, emotively and persuasively to many Ivoirians.

Who won the narrative war for Côte d’Ivoire? There is no ambiguity regarding the military victory in Côte d’Ivoire: France and the UN won the military war for Côte d’Ivoire. France clearly achieved its 2003 political goal stated in the LMA of clearing an electoral path for Ouattara to the Ivoirian presidency, leveraged the UN and international support to do so, and has avoided opprobrium among most of the global north. Ouattara has maintained control of the Ivoirian state as president for over a decade. Now in his third term, he appears to be the second Ivoirian President-for-life and has realigned Côte d’Ivoire with France.
Narrative war, while preceding and accompanying combat, can continue long after the shooting stops. Less clear than the decisive military victory that France and the UN achieved is the question of whether they won the narrative war for Côte d’Ivoire. France won the battle of Resolution 1975, effectively authorising the overthrow of the Ivoirian government. The narrative of the interventions as a success of the liberal peace and the narrative that the UN military intervention prevented genocide continues to be cited among international diplomats such as Evans (2020). However, counterhegemonic narrators continue to characterize the interventions as a "social catastrophe," (Charles, 2011), “not peacekeeping ... war making” (quoting US Senator James Mountain Inhofe, in Frindéthié, 2016, p. 141) a "falsehood" (Holy, 2014), and a "scandal" (Mattei, 2015) long after the shooting war stopped. Counternarratives of the Ivoirian interventions as a failure of liberal peace praxis include criticisms that the French intervention caused the civil war, prolonged, rather than shortened the war, damaged rather than strengthened democratic process and governance, and increased the number of civilian deaths over the course of the conflict (Busch, 2017, 2016, 2013, 2012; Frindéthié, 2016; Varenne, 2016; Schafer, 2011; Mbeki, 2011).

With the hegemonic narratives still the 'majority report' on the interventions a decade after the shooting war and five years after the close of mission, the narrative war for Côte d’Ivoire would appear to have concluded, and the UN and France would appear to have won. However, Côte d’Ivoire has yet again entered a period of 'no war, no peace.' The Ivoirians with whom I spoke had little love for the United Nations, and even less for France, regardless of their ethnicity or political affiliations. Anger, discouragement, disillusionment, and political despair increased, rather than decreased, amongst my respondents over the 3 years of my field research. One of my respondents characterised Côte d’Ivoire in 2020 as caught in 'the end of history.' When I asked him what he meant, he explained that Ivoirians now had no hope of positive change. Ouattara had cemented himself into the presidency, returning to the model of Houphouët-Boigny. My respondent described the Ivoirian experience as Groundhog Day - Ivoirian leadership repeating the same dysfunctional patterns over and over again across decades.
Gbagbo remains one of the most popular and divisive political figures in the country. He continues to command attention and affection from large portions of the Ivoirian citizenry, his capture and long imprisonment turning him into a political martyr (Traoré, 2021).

Regardless of the UN's claims of 'concrete evidence,' (UN News, 14 Jan 2011a), Laurent Gbagbo was acquitted of all charges of crimes against humanity by the ICC. His acquittal deeply problematises the triumphalist narrative of the ICC as a moral actor in Côte d'Ivoire (Bigot, 2018), but the UN, and the world, have moved on. While Côte d'Ivoire remains a country with high levels of internal violence, there is no global motive for attention now that the status quo ante has been re-established. At some point, Gbagbo, Ouattara, and Bédié will die, and things will change. However, not having achieved peaceful regime change post-intervention, Côte d'Ivoire has yet to attain a sustainable and enduring elite political settlement. Until an enduring political settlement has been achieved, and power transferred peacefully and regularly, at best, the internal narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire has entered an uneasy and temporary truce, a time of 'no narrative war/no narrative peace.'

Unasked questions
There are many questions I left unasked in this research. I have not attempted to systematically differentiate narrative warfare from narrative contestation; when does narrative contestation become a full-blown narrative war? In Côte d’Ivoire, the narrative war among Ivoirian political elites long preceded the civil wars, as documented in Chapters 9 and 13. When does narrative war end? Narrative contestation remains vigorous and occasionally violent in Côte d'Ivoire. It is unclear, based on the ongoing level of conflict and violence within Côte d’Ivoire, whether the narrative war there is over, fading into narrative contestation, or in a temporary lull.

While I have analysed the processes and strategies which produce, and are evidence of, toxic polarisation in narrative warfare, I have not engaged directly with theories of toxic polarisation (Coleman, 2021), a task for another time. There is currently little Ivoirian polarisation visible at the international level, but plenty visible within the country itself, seen in the mutinies, strikes, electoral boycotts, and ongoing violence which continue to beset it. Does narrative warfare prosecuted by elites ignite that polarisation, or is narrative...
warfare an effect of existing structural and functional social polarisation? Or both, iteratively? Do elites generate and propagate polarised narratives to create followers? Or do they adopt, adapt, and amplify the discordant discourses of their society to create and consolidate political power? A subsidiary question arises: to what extent is narrative warfare an emergent causal factor, or a consequence of other forms of contestation, rather than a terrain of contestation consciously and deliberately exploited by individual actors?

What is the relationship between narrative warfare and kinetic warfare? The strategic narratives of intervention analysed in this thesis played a role in building hegemonic agreement to conduct combat for the purpose of regime change as well as counterhegemonic resistance to the international community among a substantial proportion of the Ivoirian citizenry. Hegemonic narrative warfare alone was inadequate to remove Gbagbo from the presidency of Côte d'Ivoire. Kinetic warfare won the Battle of Abidjan in 2011 and the control of the presidency, but it remains to be seen whether kinetic and narrative warfare combined have won the long war.

Narrative warfare - theory and practice
Narrative warfare is widely practiced but rarely theorised, particularly by those who practice it. This research has been dedicated to narrative warfare theory building, rather than narrative warfare practice. Strategic narrative theory, narrative strategies theory, and narrative warfare theory are in early stages of development as formal political communication theories. As political communication and polarisation increasingly divides societies, there are growing requirements to better theorise these concepts and develop these analytic tools.

This thesis is a study of why participants in the narrative war for Côte d'Ivoire, including academics, thought they knew what they thought they knew about the Ivoirian interventions, and why they didn't know that which they didn't know. Academic concepts and theories are shaped and influenced by the narrative wars of our time, conceptual, cultural, and military. None of us are exempt from the shaping of our understandings of the world by narrators with specific interests. However, we can better understand our world and the conflict in it, if we ask ourselves, who is telling this story? and why? And we must
include ourselves in this query. We can widen our worldview by serious consideration of narratives which challenge our beliefs, and in Maan’s phrasing, expand our epistemes by developing an "Internarrative identity" (2009).

I have attempted to listen carefully and inclusively to the narratives across the polarised spectrum of discourse on the interventions to redress the imbalance in my own understanding by paying close attention to counterhegemonic narratives and by taking them seriously, even when I didn't agree with them. Counterhegemonic narratives are systematically excluded from hegemonic discourse. Since I include them in this analysis, it may appear to hegemonically positioned analysts that I’ve 'gone over to the other side.' I have not. I have attempted to analyse the narrative warfare of the interventions without becoming a partisan. My analysis of narratives and the strategies deployed is intended to survey the narrative battlefield - to include that which has been excluded, to explore and map the war of words for Côte d’Ivoire - rather than to fight on behalf of anyone. It is not an easy task, but if we are to understand narrative warfare, we must get up off the board and survey the landscape, note how the warfare is conducted, who wins, who loses, and why.
# Appendix A - Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOFORCE</td>
<td>ECOWAS Peace Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Military Observer Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FANCI</td>
<td>Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>FESCI</td>
<td>Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHB</td>
<td>Felix Houphouët-Boigny</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Forces Nouvelles</td>
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<td>FPI</td>
<td>Front Patriotique Ivoiren</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRCI</td>
<td>Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Integrated Command Center (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWG</td>
<td>International Working Group</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Jeunes Patriots</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMA</td>
<td>Linas-Marcoussis Accord</td>
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<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>Mission Nations Unies de Côte</td>
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<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Narrative Strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>Ouagadougou Political Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDCI</td>
<td>Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHDP</td>
<td>Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDR</td>
<td>Rassemblement des Républicains</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Strategic Narrative Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>Tripartite Monitoring Group (representatives from ECOWAS, AU, and UNOCI – created as part of ACCRA III)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDPCI</td>
<td>Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d’Ivoire (Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNHRC</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPCI</td>
<td>Union pour la Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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Appendix B - UN News Articles referencing Côte d'Ivoire 2002 - 2019

The news article titles below are live links and can be used to view the articles referenced unless otherwise noted

2002
10 May 2002 - Gambia receives new influx of refugees fleeing fighting in Senegal, UN agency reports
14 May 2002 - UN refugee agency aids people fleeing fighting in Liberia, Somalia
18 June 2002 - Annan names former leader of Côte d'Ivoire as UN envoy for Cameroon elections
26 Aug 2002 - In Côte d'Ivoire, Annan says reconciliation will foster further progress
20 Sep 2002 - Annan condemns armed attacks in Côte d'Ivoire
24 Sep 2002 - UN assists refugees displaced by instability in Côte d'Ivoire
27 Sep 2002a - UN envoy to attend emergency meeting of West African countries on Côte d'Ivoire crisis
27 Sep 2002b - Côte d'Ivoire: UN refugee agency voices concern at rising hostility towards foreigners
30 Sep 2002 - Annan welcomes results of West African summit meeting on Côte d'Ivoire
1 Oct 2002 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN agency scrambles to find shelter for refugees fleeing violence
8 Oct 2002 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN refugee agency concerned over collapse of ceasefire talks
11 Oct 2002 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN agency welcomes pause in demolition of shantytowns
14 Oct 2002 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN humanitarian team reports Bouaké a 'ghost city'
15 Oct 2002 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN agency concerned about people displaced by clashes
16 Oct 2002 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN’s top human rights chief urgently appeals for protection of civilians
18 Oct 2002 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN refugee agency welcomes news of ceasefire accord
21 Oct 2002 - Côte d'Ivoire: Annan urges parties to consolidate efforts to end fighting
29 Oct 2002a - UN refugee agency urges Côte d'Ivoire’s Government to minimize displacement
Waging Peace

29 Oct 2002b - UN food agency launches emergency push to help victims of Côte d’Ivoire’s civil unrest

29 Oct 2002 - UN panel reports violations of embargo against Liberia

31 Oct 2002 - Côte d’Ivoire: Security Council condemns attempts to overthrow Government

4 Nov 2002 - UN warns humanitarian situation in Côte d’Ivoire could deteriorate into large-scale crisis

8 Nov 2002 - Random security checks in Côte d’Ivoire refugee camps concern UN agency

12 Nov 2002 - Guinea: UN agency resumes transfer of Liberian refugees to safer inland camps

15 Nov 2002 - Agencies providing aid to populations affected by conflict in Côte d’Ivoire - UN

19 Nov 2002 - Razing of shantytowns continue in Côte d'Ivoire, UN refugee agency reports

25 Nov 2002 - Multilateralism needed to confront global ills, Annan says

29 Nov 2002 - Worsening violence in Côte d’Ivoire would be catastrophic, UN refugee agency says

3 Dec 2002 - UN urges Côte d’Ivoire neighbours to keep open borders

6 Dec 2002 - Côte d'Ivoire fighting creates 30,000 new refugees, UN agency reports

10 Dec 2002 - Côte d’Ivoire: UNHCR plans to evacuate thousands of refugees

12 Dec 2002 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN rights expert concerned by reports of executions

13 Dec 2002 - UN relief official warns fighting in Côte d'Ivoire threatens regional stability

17 Dec 2002 - UN official warns refugees to stay out of Côte d'Ivoire conflict

19 Dec 2002 - Population displacement, humanitarian crisis continues in Côte d’Ivoire, UN reports

20 Dec 2002a - Security Council calls on warring parties in Côte d’Ivoire to negotiate peace

20 Dec 2002b - UN human rights chief dispatches mission to probe possible abuses in Côte d’Ivoire
20 Dec 2002c - Refugee flow from Côte d'Ivoire slows, situation still volatile, UN agency reports

26 Dec 2002 - UN human rights mission meets with parties in Côte d'Ivoire

27 Dec 2002 - Annan appoints humanitarian envoy for Côte d'Ivoire

30 Dec 2002 - UN wraps up human rights assessment mission to Côte d'Ivoire

2003

2 Jan 2003 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN agency urging quick evacuation of Liberians from endangered camp

6 Jan 2003a - Iraq, Middle East and Africa high on Security Council agenda in January

6 Jan 2003b - Emerging conflict in Côte d'Ivoire complicates situation in Sierra Leone - Annan

7 Jan 2003 - Clashes in west worsening humanitarian situation in Côte d'Ivoire, UN says

7 Jan 2003 - Attempts to resettle refugees away from fighting in Côte d'Ivoire rebuffed – UN agency

10 Jan 2003 - Security Council concerned by lack of government control in parts of Sierra Leone

10 Jan 2003a - Top UN officials set to attend talks on Côte d'Ivoire next week in Paris

10 Jan 2003b - Access to vulnerable in Côte d'Ivoire focus of UN envoy's upcoming mission to region

10 Jan 2003c - Security Council concerned by lack of government control in parts of Sierra Leone

14 Jan 2003 - UN refugee agency welcomes ceasefire between Côte d'Ivoire rebel and loyalist forces

16 Jan 2003 - UN envoy arrives in Côte d'Ivoire to focus attention on unfolding crisis

17 Jan 2003 - Ivorian Government must provide relief for all those in need, UN envoy stresses

20 Jan 2003 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN relief official meets with displaced persons

21 Jan 2003a - Annan to attend Paris summit talks on Côte d'Ivoire
Waging Peace

21 Jan 2003b - Senior UN refugee official in Sierra Leone to observe UNHCR operations

22 Jan 2003 - UN Envoy visits Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire

23 Jan 2003 - Annan heads to Paris summit for talks on Côte d’Ivoire

24 Jan 2003 - Annan meets with French officials ahead of summit on Côte d’Ivoire

25 Jan 2003 - Côte d’Ivoire: Annan urges action to implement peace agreement

26 Jan 2003 - Leaders and people of Côte d'Ivoire hold key to peace – Annan

27 Jan 2003 - Following reports of violence, UN envoy visits shantytowns in Côte d'Ivoire

28 Jan 2003a - Security Council urges parties to implement Côte d'Ivoire peace deal ‘constructively’

28 Jan 2003b - Annan briefs Security Council on Côte d'Ivoire peace accord

28 Jan 2003c - Security concerns force UN refugee agency to suspend operations in Côte d'Ivoire

29 Jan 2003 - Only peace will stop human rights violations in Côte d'Ivoire, UN report says

30 Jan 2003 - UN envoy travels to Ghana to assess regional impact of Côte d'Ivoire crisis

31 Jan 2003a - Continuing mission to West Africa, UN aid official meets President of Burkina Faso

31 Jan 2003b - Following three-day suspension, UN refugee agency resumes partial operations in Côte d'Ivoire

3 Feb 2003a - Top UN rights official set to begin three-city European tour

3 Feb 2003b - Annan reiterates call for peace in Côte d'Ivoire

4 Feb 2003a - Security Council calls on all Ivoirian parties to fully implement peace accord

4 Feb 2003b - Côte d'Ivoire: UN continues repatriation of Liberian refugees as hostility mounts

6 Feb 2003 - Citing security concerns, UN pulls non-essential staff out of Côte d'Ivoire

7 Feb 2003a - UN's top rights official condemns 'death squad' activity in Côte d'Ivoire
7 Feb 2003b - Côte d'Ivoire: UN continues repatriation of Liberians amidst tighter security rules

10 Feb 2003 - UN envoy urges cooperation to halt 'epidemic of rebellion' in West Africa

13 Feb 2003 - Humanitarian situation in Côte d'Ivoire risks further deterioration - UN envoy

14 Feb 2003 - UN agency presses for help as thousands of Liberian refugees remain in limbo

18 Feb 2003 - Fresh fighting in Liberia sparks new flight of refugees seeking safe haven - UN

20 Feb 2003 - Annan calls on world to help Africa battle AIDS and ensure peace

21 Feb 2003a - Security Council calls on Ivorian parties to respect peace accord

21 Feb 2003b - DR of Congo: Annan mulls stronger UN mandate to counter rise in armed groups

24 Feb 2003 - UN assessment team arrives in Côte d'Ivoire aiming to shore up peace agreement

25 Feb 2003 - Desperate Liberian refugees continue demonstrations at UN office in Côte d’Ivoire

26 Feb 2003 - In letter to Côte d'Ivoire leader, Annan endorses inquiry into rights violations

28 Feb 2003 - Advance UN team tests conditions for rights inquiry in Côte d'Ivoire

4 Mar 2003 - DR of Congo: UN mission in talks to investigate killings in Ituri

4 Mar 2003 - 'Delicate question' of Iraq tops Security Council agenda for March, President says

6 Mar 2003 - UN refugee agency concerned over missing aid workers in Liberia

11 Mar 2003 - Annan strongly condemns brutal killing of 3 aid workers in Liberia

12 Mar 2003 - Ensuring peace in Africa also means tackling broader social issues - Annan

14 Mar 2003 - Security Council welcomes inaugural meeting of new government

18 Mar 2003 - Annan urges global help for West Africa to stem flood of small arms

18 Mar 2003 - Liberia: 15,000 more flee fighting in northeast, UN reduces staff in border areas
Waging Peace

20 Mar 2003 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN official voices sorrow at killing of aid workers

21 Mar 2003 - UN renews aid appeal for 163,000 refugees displaced by crisis in Côte d'Ivoire

26 Mar 2003 - Côte d'Ivoire: UNICEF finds children living in 'near catastrophic conditions'

28 Mar 2003a - Côte d'Ivoire: Security Council calls on all parties to adhere to peace agreements

28 Mar 2003b - Annan concerned by fighting in Liberia, safety of aid workers

28 Mar 2003c - UN agency relocates staff as new rebel clashes in Liberia engulf refugee camp

31 Mar 2003 - Humanitarian situation throughout Côte d'Ivoire worsening - UN

1 Apr 2003 - Liberia: UN concerned about safety of abducted aid worker

2 Apr 2003a - UN refugee agency reports more Liberians fleeing fighting cross into Guinea

2 Apr 2003b - Annan proposes new UN mission to guide peace process in Côte d'Ivoire

3 Apr 2003c - Annan hails meeting of new Côte d'Ivoire Government

10 Apr 2003 - Amid fighting in Liberia, hundreds of refugees return to Côte d'Ivoire, UN says

15 Apr 2003 - Security Council welcomes progress towards new government in Côte d'Ivoire

23 Apr 2003 - UN envoy set to launch longer-term humanitarian appeal for Côte d'Ivoire

25 Apr 2003 - UN envoy gets first-hand look at volatile western Côte d'Ivoire

29 Apr 2003a - West African leaders urge Security Council to help ensure peace in Côte d'Ivoire

29 Apr 2003b - Annan appeals to Security Council for funds to secure peace in Côte d'Ivoire

29 Apr 2003c - UN agencies launch $85 million consolidated appeal for Côte d'Ivoire

2 May 2003 - UN marks World Press Freedom Day with call to action against hate media

5 May 2003 - Security Council urged to rethink Liberia sanctions in light of regional violence

6 May 2003 - Extending sanctions against Liberia, Security Council adds ban on timber exports
Waging Peace

7 May 2003 - Security Council mission heading to West Africa to examine prospects for peace

9 May 2003a - Top envoy in West Africa meets with regional UN officials to discuss new ways to deal with crisis

9 May 2003b - UN refugee agency head on five-nation visit to West Africa

12 May 2003a - Refugee flood in Côte d'Ivoire adds urgency to Security Council trip to region

12 May 2003b - 'We want to go,' desperate refugees tell UN agency chief in Côte d'Ivoire

13 May 2003 - Security Council creates UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire, delays West Africa trip

20 May 2003 - 10,000 Liberians flee to Côte d'Ivoire fearing rebel attack – UN refugee agency

4 Jun 2003 - Annan names Bangladeshi general to lead UN military liaisons in Côte d'Ivoire

1 Jul 2003 - Security Council mission in West Africa wraps up talks in Côte d'Ivoire

23 Jul 2003 - Drought, civil strife spark food emergency in sub-Saharan Africa – UN agency

25 Jul 2003 - Lauding progress in Côte d'Ivoire, Security Council voices concern at instability

4 Aug 2003 - Security Council renews authorization of multinational force for Côte d'Ivoire

13 Aug 2003 - Côte d'Ivoire peace shows promise; determination needed for road ahead - Annan

2 Sept 2003 - Côte d'Ivoire requests UN assistance for upcoming elections

12 Sep 2003a - As situation in Côte d'Ivoire improves, UN eases security ratings in some areas

12 Sep 2003b - Top UN envoy for Liberia poised to ask Security Council for 'large force' to rebuild country

25 Sep 2003 - Poor nations call for fairness from rich at General Assembly afternoon session

2 Oct 2003 - Secretary-General concerned about recent developments in Côte d'Ivoire

3 Oct 2003 - Security Council calls for parties in Côte d'Ivoire to follow peace accords

22 Oct 2003 - UN envoy condemns killing of radio journalist in Côte d'Ivoire
Waging Peace

30 Oct 2003 - Annan presents exchange of letters on Côte d'Ivoire mission

6 Nov 2003 - Secretary-General welcomes upcoming conference of Ivorian parties

10 Nov 2003 - Annan says Côte d'Ivoire peace process encounters serious difficulties

11 Nov 2003 - Security Council holds consultations on extension of UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire

12 Nov 2003 - West African insecurity problems need regional solutions, UN says

13 Nov 2003 - Security Council sees possible reinforcement of UN presence in Côte d'Ivoire

17 Nov 2003 - UN's four West African missions discuss how to cooperate more

19 Nov 2003 - UN agencies warn Côte d'Ivoire is struggling to cope

24 Nov 2003 - Assessment mission will go to Côte d'Ivoire, Annan says

2 Dec 2003 - Tensions rising in Côte d'Ivoire, UN relief official says

4 Dec 2003 - UN Security Council concerned about 'armed elements' in Côte d'Ivoire

5 Dec 2003 - UN humanitarian envoy to visit Côte d'Ivoire next week

12 Dec 2003 - West Africa is destabilized by border-crossing foreign troops, UN says

2004

7 Jan 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire: Annan hails return of opposition group to Government

23 Jan 2004 - UN expert on freedom of expression to visit Côte d'Ivoire

5 Feb 2004 - As Africa stabilizes, world must commit troops to peacekeeping, UN official says

9 Feb 2004 - UN expert on racism to examine ethnic aspects of conflict in Côte d'Ivoire

10 Feb 2004 - UN expert calls for improvements in Côte d'Ivoire's journalistic professionalism

19 Feb 2004 - UN says aid for Côte d'Ivoire could stave off renewed regional instability

20 Feb 2004 - Peace process in Côte d'Ivoire is gaining momentum, UN official says

24 Feb 2004 - UN agencies begin mass immunization scheme against yellow fever in Liberia
Waging Peace

26 Feb 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN peacekeeping mission would cost $303 million for 6 months

27 Feb 2004a - Regional rapid deployment forces crucial to UN peacekeeping - Annan

27 Feb 2004b - Security Council authorizes full peacekeeping operation in Côte d'Ivoire

8 Mar 2004 - Annan invites NATO support for anticipated African peacekeeping missions

9 Mar 2004 - UN holds training course to promote idea of more French-speaking peacekeepers

22 Mar 2004 - UN envoy urges Côte d'Ivoire parties to follow peace agreement

24 Mar 2004a - Côte d'Ivoire: Annan urges restraint as parties prepare mass demonstrations

24 Mar 2004b - Annan to urge coordinated approach in helping to stabilize West Africa, aide says

25 Mar 2004a - Deadly clashes in Côte d'Ivoire prompt Annan to urge reconciliation

25 Mar 2004b - Annan urges West Africa to break with authoritarianism

26 Mar 2004 - Security Council calls on Côte d'Ivoire to implement 2003 peace agreement

29 Mar 2004 - UN peacekeeping chief tells of major challenges ahead as missions expand

31 Mar 2004 - Advance party of UN peacekeepers arrive in Côte d'Ivoire

1 Apr 2004 - Commander of West African force in Côte d'Ivoire to lead UN mission there

2 Apr 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire: Annan asks UN human rights office to probe deadly political clash

5 Apr 2004 - As UN starts peacekeeping operation in Côte d'Ivoire, Annan urges reconciliation

8 Apr 2004 - UN rights chief appoints panel to probe human rights violations in Côte d'Ivoire

12 Apr 2004 - Security Council elects three officers of DR of Congo sanctions committee

14 Apr 2004 - UN peacekeeping chief heading to Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana

16 Apr 2004 - UN peacekeeping chief calls on Côte d'Ivoire to match international commitment

19 Apr 2004 - Surge in new missions may strain UN's capacities, peacekeeping chief says

27 Apr 2004 - Meetings seek to boost UN cooperation with West Africans
30 Apr 2004 - Security Council threatens individuals blocking Ivorian peace pact

4 May 2004 - UN High Commissioner for Refugees to visit returning refugees in Liberia

7 May 2004 - UN refugee chief appeals for funds to resettle Liberians

11 May 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire human rights report to UN Security Council due Friday, UN says

14 May 2004 - Security Council condemns human rights violations in Côte d'Ivoire

17 May 2004 - UN recommends nation-building programme for Côte d'Ivoire

18 May 2004 - Five UN peace missions in West Africa to meet in Senegal on Friday

18 May 2004 - Without immediate donations, food aid in Liberia might be cut, UN agency warns

19 May 2004 - Liberians refugees stranded at sea have been sighted, UN says

20 May 2004a - Annan concerned about split in Côte d'Ivoire's reconciliation government

20 May 2004b - Annan calls on Mano River Union to speed up socio-economic development

21 May 2004 - Stranded Liberians arrive in Côte d'Ivoire on towed ship, UN says

23 May 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN envoy pledges full support for disarmament drive

24 May 2004 - UN disarmament teams in West Africa meet to work out strategies

25 May 2004 - Impasse in Côte d'Ivoire peace process concerns Security Council

26 May 2004 - Annan intends to appoint senior relief official head of UN mission in Burundi

28 May 2004 - Liberian refugees stranded at sea return home by air, UN says

1 Jun 2004 - Liberian ex-president Taylor subject to proceedings before UN-backed court

2 Jun 2004 - UN envoy holds talks aimed at breaking impasse in Côte d'Ivoire

7 Jun 2004a - Civilians still bearing the brunt of war, Annan says

7 Jun 2004b - Ivorian leaders must chose between personal ambitions and national interest – UN

8 Jun 2004 - UN envoy condemns violence in Côte d'Ivoire
Waging Peace

14 Jun 2004 - Security Council urged to strengthen efforts to protect civilians during war

15 Jun 2004 - UN humanitarian work for 50 million people being hit by low donations

18 Jun 2004 - Security Council mission heads to West Africa to observe peace operations

21 Jun 2004 - UN Security Council representatives start 10-day mission to West Africa

23 Jun 2004a - Security Council team in Côte d'Ivoire urges steps towards reconciliation


28 Jun 2004 - Security Council team reports signs of increasing stability in West Africa

30 Jun 2004a - West Africa full of potential but states are fragile, Security Council told

30 Jun 2004b - Côte d'Ivoire: UN and Government sign accord on peacekeeping force

7 Jul 2004 - Annan holds West African mini-summit over Côte d'Ivoire deadlock

13 Jul 2004 - West Africa needs UN help to prevent instability, Security Council says

15 Jul 2004 - Thousands of malnourished Liberians threatened with famine by December - UN

16 Jul 2004 - West Africa mission shows relevancy of UN, Security Council told

16 Jul 2004 - UN Commission of Inquiry arrives in Côte d'Ivoire

21 Jul 2004 - Annan set for summit on Côte d'Ivoire peace process next week in Ghana

26 Jul 2004 - Annan heading to Ghana for summit on Côte d'Ivoire peace process

28 Jul 2004 - In Ghana, Annan prepares for summit on Côte d'Ivoire peace process

29 Jul 2004 - Annan addresses West African summit on Côte d'Ivoire

30 Jul 2004 - Annan’s summit on troubled Côte d'Ivoire meets for an extra day

1 Aug 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire parties renew commitment to peace agreement

3 Aug 2004 - UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire confirms existence of mass graves

4 Aug 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire: Annan hails plans for first Government meeting since March

5 Aug 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire: Security Council urges parties to make good on peace pledges
Waging Peace

9 Aug 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire transitional cabinet meets for first time in four months, UN says

10 Aug 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire president signs power-sharing decree Annan helped to draft

11 Aug 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire reconciliation pact calls for monitoring group of UN and others

16 Aug 2004 - UN mission launches nationwide radio broadcast in divided Côte d'Ivoire

18 Aug 2004 - Liberia: UN extends disarmament to birthplace of country's long civil war

20 Aug 2004 - Monitoring Group finds progress in peace process in Côte d'Ivoire

26 Aug 2004 - UN team finds rebel-held areas of Côte d'Ivoire struggling for basic services

31 Aug 2004 - Monitoring Group reports progress in follow-up to peace pledges in Côte d'Ivoire

1 Sep 2004 - Annan warns of dire economic impact of continuing violence in Côte d'Ivoire

8 Sep 2004 - Annan selects two envoys to fill posts in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire

9 Sep 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN sets up 'peace corridors' to facilitate freedom of movement

14 Sep 2004 - Partisan political posturing is hurting Côte d'Ivoire, report to UN warns

20 Sep 2004 - UN-run 'peace corridors' allow civilians to travel across divided Côte d'Ivoire

21 Sep 2004 - Ahead of polls in Afghanistan, President Karzai calls for sustained global aid

23 Sep 2004 - Security Council resolution 'incentive' to Darfur rebels, Sudan tells Assembly

27 Sep 2004a - Côte d'Ivoire's Foreign Minister tells UN Assembly peace process is advancing

27 Sep 2004b - Security Council urges Côte d'Ivoire leader Gbagbo to act on peace pledges

28 Sep 2004 - Anti-terror fight must not detract from other priorities, officials tell UN Assembly

29 Sep 2004 - Annan presses Côte d'Ivoire's political leaders to deliver on peace pact pledges

4 Oct 2004 - UN envoy consults with West African leaders on Côte d'Ivoire peace process

5 Oct 2004 - Alleged human rights abuses in Côte d'Ivoire concern UN mission

8 Oct 2004a - 98 States behind schedule in reducing child mortality, UNICEF study reveals
Waging Peace

8 Oct 2004b - Rights abuses flare in Côte d'Ivoire, prompting UN mission to sound alarm

8 Oct 2004c - Africa begins largest-ever immunization campaign in bid to beat polio – UN

12 Oct 2004 - UN mission, Annan urge restraint after violent demonstrations in Côte d'Ivoire

13 Oct 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire, with least-funded appeal for aid, finds 12 new cases of polio

18 Oct 2004a - Aid for Africa’s farms drops as developed States maintain subsidies – UN official

18 Oct 2004b - Annan calls for constitutional reform, disarmament in Côte d'Ivoire

19 Oct 2004a - Gender balance in UN peacekeeping has improved, Annan says

19 Oct 2004b - Côte d'Ivoire peace process still mired in stalemate - report to UN


4 Nov 2004a - Security Council members demand respect for ceasefire in Côte d'Ivoire

4 Nov 2004b - UN suspends aid operations after fighting breaks out in Côte d'Ivoire

5 Nov 2004 - UN aid agencies forced to limit work during renewed fighting in Côte d'Ivoire

6 Nov 2004 - Conflict flares in Côte d'Ivoire prompting Security Council call for end to fighting

8 Nov 2004 - Situation in Côte d'Ivoire remains tense as foreigners seek refuge in UN buildings

9 Nov 2004 - Annan calls on all parties to resume talks in violence-wracked Côte d'Ivoire

10 Nov 2004 - UN helps in evacuation of foreign nationals from violence-wracked Côte d'Ivoire

11 Nov 2004a - Secretary-General renews call for end to violence and 'hate media' in Côte d'Ivoire

11 Nov 2004b - UN seeks $1.7 billion to help people caught in world’s ‘forgotten crises’ in 2005

12 Nov 2004 - Clashes in Côte d'Ivoire could trigger violence across West Africa, UN envoy warns

15 Nov 2004 - Security Council imposes immediate arms embargo against Côte d'Ivoire
Waging Peace

15 Nov 2004 - Special UN adviser on genocide warns of ethnic hate messages in Côte d'Ivoire

16 Nov 2004 - UN reports improvement in Côte d'Ivoire conflict with hate messages ending

17 Nov 2004 - Despite relative calm UN-patrolled separation zone in Côte d'Ivoire reported tense

18 Nov 2004a - Conflict, lack of funds threaten UN-backed polio eradication campaign in Africa

18 Nov 2004b - UN envoy visits rebel-held north in Côte d'Ivoire for first time since recent violence

18 Nov 2004c - At rare Security Council session in Africa, Annan seeks an end to Sudan’s wars

19 Nov 2004 - UN commission observer panel set to visit Cameroon-Nigeria boundary

19 Nov 2004 - UN reports alleged human rights abuses by both sides in Côte d'Ivoire conflict

22 Nov 2004a - UN says situation in Côte d'Ivoire remains unpredictable, refugee supplies run short

22 Nov 2004b - UN agency urges increased aid for West Africa to safeguard fragile peace process

23 Nov 2004 - Human rights abuses continue to be reported in Côte d'Ivoire - UN mission

24 Nov 2004a - UN humanitarian staff begin returning to Côte d'Ivoire following recent violence

24 Nov 2004b - UN emergency feeding agency calls for more international support for West Africa

24 Nov 2004c - UNESCO chief denounces journalists’ murders in Philippines

26 Nov 2004 - UN feeding agency suspends flights in western Côte d'Ivoire after shooting

29 Nov 2004 - Tensions ease in latest Côte d'Ivoire violence, some refugees return – UN

1 Dec 2004 - Côte d'Ivoire rebels pledge no repeat of hostile acts against UN relief flights

2 Dec 2004 - UN welcomes return of Côte d'Ivoire newspapers for first time since latest unrest
Waging Peace

3 Dec 2004 - UN envoys decry disorder in Côte d'Ivoire, opponents of Liberia's peace process

6 Dec 2004 - Annan's Special Representative in troubled Côte d'Ivoire resigns

8 Dec 2004 - Annan welcomes renewed peace pact between opponents in Côte d'Ivoire

9 Dec 2004 - UN to help Palestinian Authority in polls to choose Arafat's successor

14 Dec 2004a - Annan calls for long-term peacekeeping strategies for troubled Côte d'Ivoire

14 Dec 2004b - Repatriation of Liberian refugees picking up pace – UN

15 Dec 2004 - Sierra Leone raises revenues from mining but unemployment also rises, UN says

16 Dec 2004a - Security Council threatens Côte d'Ivoire further over ignored peace pledges

16 Dec 2004b - UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire funds three quick-impact social projects

17 Dec 2004 - In Côte d'Ivoire standoff, opposition-ruled north needs humanitarian aid, UN says

20 Dec 2004 - Drought, locusts, war hit food production in sub-Saharan Africa – UN report

21 Dec 2004 - Security Council renews sanctions against Liberia; refugees return home

22 Dec 2004 - Joint UN-Côte d'Ivoire patrols start today in Abidjan to improve security

29 Dec 2004 - UN mission provides security as 1992 Côte d'Ivoire currency is exchanged for new

2005

7 Jan 2005 - Peacekeepers' sexual abuse of local girls continuing in DR of Congo, UN finds

13 Jan 2005 - African leaders pledge to eradicate polio as disease spreads again - UN

19 Jan 2005 - Annan promises to seek help for West Africa as it strengthens its security sector

23 Jan 2005 - Bystander killed by gunman during exchange of fire with UN forces in Côte d'Ivoire

27 Jan 2005 - Recent humanitarian appeals for Africa receive much less than expected, Security Council told

28 Jan 2005 - Preparing mass repatriation, UN refugee chief to visit West Africa
31 Jan 2005 - UN peacekeeping chief cautions against deploying too many missions

1 Feb 2005a - Security Council calls for lists of all Côte d'Ivoire Government and opposition armaments

1 Feb 2005b - UN refugee agency will appeal for funds to rehabilitate refugee areas in Guinea

2 Feb 2005 - UN officials discuss security with rebels in Côte d'Ivoire

7 Feb 2005 - UN refugee agency chief wraps up tour of West Africa

9 Feb 2005a - Insecurity rising in certain urban centres of Côte d'Ivoire, UN mission says

9 Feb 2005b - UN expert launches action plan for systematic worldwide reporting of child abuse

11 Feb 2005 - UN refugee agency prepares for start of large-scale repatriation to Liberia

13 Feb 2005 - Four injured as UN helicopter crashes in Côte d'Ivoire

16 Feb 2005 - Annan calls on Security Council to set up compliance regime against child abuse

22 Feb 2005 - Military chiefs of UN peacekeeping missions in West Africa meet in Senegal

25 Feb 2005a - Annan heads to London next week on a visit headlined by Middle East situation

25 Feb 2005b - West Africa needs funds to head off festering problems, Security Council told

25 Feb 2005c - UN-led mass immunization drive across Africa aims to stop resurgence of polio

28 Feb 2005 - Swedish diplomat appointed top UN envoy for Côte d'Ivoire

1 Mar 2005a - UN mission reports tension high in western Côte d'Ivoire and rising in the east

1 Mar 2005b - On margins of Palestinian session Annan holds wide-ranging talks on world crises

2 Mar 2005 - Annan reminds turbulent Côte d'Ivoire to cooperate with African Union's mediation

3 Mar 2005 - Militia members handed over to Côte d'Ivoire authorities by UN mission
Waging Peace

4 Mar 2005 - UN peacekeepers increase patrols in tense areas of Côte d’Ivoire; Fréchette arrives

7 Mar 2005 - Fréchette heading to Kosovo to continue emphasis against sex abuse by UN peacekeepers

11 Mar 2005 - Security Council warns parties in Côte d’Ivoire against using force to resolve problems

16 Mar 2005a - Eastern DR of Congo surpasses Darfur as biggest, most neglected emergency – UN relief official

16 Mar 2005b - UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire calls for probe into deaths of 13 people from torture

17 Mar 2005 - Côte d’Ivoire government blocks fuel tankers from northern town, UN mission says

21 Mar 2005 - Marking World Water Day, UN to launch Water for Life Decade

24 Mar 2005 - Annan appeals for maximum restraint in Côte d’Ivoire as political tensions increase


31 Mar 2005 - UN mission decries human rights violations by Ivorian Government and rebel forces

1 Apr 2005 - Expert panel named to monitor Security Council arms embargo against Côte d’Ivoire

4 Apr 2005 - Security Council extends mandate of UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire for a month

6 Apr 2005a - Secretary-General welcomes decision of Ivorian parties to end hostilities and disarm

6 Apr 2005b - UN tsunami appeal well-funded but world’s other emergencies face huge shortfall

8 Apr 2005a - UN agency hopes new Ivorian peace pact will allow 15,000 refugees to go home

8 Apr 2005b - Humanitarian appeal for Côte d’Ivoire brings in ‘just over 0 per cent,’ UN says

11 Apr 2005 - New UN envoy arrives in Côte d’Ivoire to head peacekeeping mission
12 Apr 2005 - New UN envoy meets with Côte d'Ivoire president

13 Apr 2005 - Nearly two dozen African countries will need food aid because of weather, instability – UN

18 Apr 2005 - Africa’s economic growth highest in eight years but must be sustained – IMF report

19 Apr 2005 - UN taking part in talks between Government, opposition forces in Côte d'Ivoire

20 Apr 2005 - Côte d'Ivoire Government and rebels to withdraw frontline weapons tomorrow – UN

21 Apr 2005 - Withdrawal of heavy weapons begins in Côte d'Ivoire, UN mission says

26 Apr 2005 - Security Council hears call for expanded UN peacekeeping mandate in Côte d'Ivoire

28 Apr 2005 - Annan welcomes decision by Côte d'Ivoire President on eligibility for elections

3 May 2005a - UN mission calms tensions after ethnic clashes near Côte d’Ivoire town

3 May 2005b - UN agencies swing into action to help Togolese refugees in Benin and Ghana

3 May 2005 - UN observes World Press Freedom Day

4 May 2005 - Mandate of UN peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire extended another month

10 May 2005 - Additional staff needed to stop sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping – UN report

10 May 2005 - UNICEF ships millions of doses of vaccine to combat polio outbreak in Yemen

13 May 2005 - General Assembly budget committee hears 'mixed picture' of UN's financial health

13 May 2005 - Children in Côte d'Ivoire learn about peace from UNICEF-sponsored curriculum

16 May 2005 - Côte d'Ivoire: Annan welcomes disarmament pact, urges further action

20 May - UN sends electoral review mission to Côte d'Ivoire

25 May 2005 - Security Council welcomes military agreement in Côte d'Ivoire
Waging Peace

1 Jun 2005 - Côte d’Ivoire: More than 40 villagers killed in machete attacks, says UN mission

2 Jun 2005a - Situations in Africa, Middle East key topics for Security Council in June, President says

2 Jun 2005b - Côte d’Ivoire: Annan condemns deadly attack on western town

3 Jun 2005 - Security Council extends mandate of UN peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire

7 Jun 2005 - Security Council condemns massacres of civilians in western Côte d'Ivoire

7 Jun 2005 - Fréchette to visit Burundi reviewing UN mission's steps to prevent abuse

8 Jun 2005 - UN peacekeeping chiefs condemn killings in western Côte d'Ivoire

9 Jun 2005 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN mission begins joint patrols in west, near cite of massacres

16 Jun 2005a - Day of African Child spotlights continental children's many emergencies

16 Jun 2005b - UN envoy urges Ivorian rebels to take chances so as to restore peace

23 Jun 2005 - Côte d'Ivoire: Security Council plans to expand mission

24 Jun 2005 - Security Council extends mandate of UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire

29 Jun 2005 - UN humanitarian appeals for 2005 facing more than 50 per cent shortfall

30 Jun 2005 - Secretary-General welcomes renewed commitment to Côte d'Ivoire peace process

5 Jul 2005 - Heads of peacekeeping missions meet in Senegal to review progress and needs

6 Jul 2005a - Top UN rights official to visit three post-conflict countries in West Africa

6 Jul 2005b - Security Council demands Ivorian parties comply with new peace timetable

7 Jul 2005 - UN Security Council hears call for successful October elections in Côte d'Ivoire

10 Jul 2005 - UN's top human rights official calls for end to abuses in western Côte d'Ivoire

15 Jul 2005 - Secretary-General to appoint High Representative for Elections in Côte d'Ivoire

19 Jul 2005 - Refugee repatriation to Liberia jumps sharply, UN refugee agency says

25 Jul 2005 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN forces put on alert following attack on police post

26 Jul 2005a - West African countries face ‘serious’ human rights issues – UN rights chief
26 Jul 2005b - UN forces in Côte d’Ivoire enter town after being blocked for 48 hours

27 Jul 2005 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN finds no evidence of combat in reported town attacks

5 Aug 2005 - UN peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire deplores efforts to obstruct its work

12 Aug 2005 - Annan regrets that peacekeepers are being blocked in Côte d’Ivoire

15 Aug 2005 - UN envoys for Côte d’Ivoire peace to meet African Union mediators

17 Aug 2005 - UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire welcomes disarmament plan from western militias

18 Aug 2005a - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission chief calls for advances in peace process

18 Aug 2005b - In DR of Congo, UN mission lends means of transport to electoral panel

19 Aug 2005 - Security Council calls for Côte d’Ivoire election campaign to be held in peace

22 Aug 2005 - In Côte d’Ivoire, UN representative for elections is pleased with first mission

23 Aug 2005 - UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire condemns declarations calling for a coup

24 Aug 2005a - Annan questions abilities of those leaders who foment discord in Côte d’Ivoire

24 Aug 2005b - Annan pledges to work with Niger’s President to get help to those in need

29 Aug 2005 - UN health agency reports massive polio vaccination campaign in Indonesia

31 Aug 2005 - UN official says Côte d’Ivoire nationals must take ownership of peace process

1 Sep 2005 - In Côte d’Ivoire, UN peacekeepers teach how to avoid unexploded munitions

13 Sep 2005 - Hopes that business partners would bring UN new funding mostly unfulfilled – report

15 Sep 2005 - Secretary-General holds talks with a wide range of world leaders during Summit

21 Sep 2005 - Security Council supports peace efforts and warns of sanctions in Côte d’Ivoire

23 Sep 2005 - UN Assembly President outlines plan of action to build on Summit’s gains

29 Sep 2005 - Annan recommends strong action against those blocking Côte d’Ivoire peace
Waging Peace

30 Sep 2005 - UN official condemns plan to expel displaced from church grounds in Côte d'Ivoire

3 Oct 2005 - As peacekeepers depart Sierra Leone, numerous challenges remain – UN official

5 Oct 2005 - UN report urges action to enforce legal protections for children caught in war

6 Oct 2005 - DR of Congo: clock is ticking on political transition goals, UN Mission chief says

6 Oct 2005 - UNICEF urges Côte d'Ivoire to hold annual countrywide school exams

11 Oct 2005 - Amid political uncertainty in Côte d’Ivoire, UN food agency seeks $13.8 million for aid

13 Oct 2005 - UN mission chief says security deteriorates in Côte d'Ivoire, AU proposes election delay

14 Oct 2005 - Security Council agrees to delay Côte d'Ivoire elections until at latest October 2006

18 Oct 2005 - UN sanctions chairman heads to Côte d'Ivoire

19 Oct 2005 - Security Council extends expert group on arms embargo against Côte d'Ivoire

20 Oct 2005a - UN Security Council sanctions chair meets peace pact signatories in Côte d'Ivoire

20 Oct 2005b - Secretary-General appoints deputy executive director of UN-HABITAT

21 Oct 2005a - UN Security Council demands compliance with Côte d'Ivoire peace accords

21 Oct 2005b - UN peacekeeping chief urges States to police their troops against sex abuse

25 Oct 2005 - Annan calls on Security Council to act to avoid new Eritrean-Ethiopian fighting

26 Oct 2005 - Côte d'Ivoire President says he accepts resolution on appointing new prime minister

27 Oct 2005a - Security Council urges protecting women in war, empowering them as peacemakers

27 Oct 2005b - Côte d'Ivoire: Annan calls for calm as original date of elections nears

29 Oct 2005 - Côte d'Ivoire: Annan urges parties to cooperate as peace process moves forward
Waging Peace

3 Nov 2005 - Liberia: UN mission steps up efforts to ensure free, peaceful presidential election

7 Nov 2005 - Annan meets with French President on peace, development and UN reform

11 Nov 2005- Polio epidemic across west and central Africa halted by massive campaign – UN

15 Nov 2005- Côte d'Ivoire: UN expert group calls for measures to help track arms flows

22 Nov 2005- Ongoing military, political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire hits children hard, says UN

25 Nov 2005- General Assembly increases funding for UN missions in Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire

28 Nov 2005- UNDP-supported talks on trade between Asia and Africa are held in Paris

30 Nov 2005- Security Council urges Côte d'Ivoire leadership to appoint interim prime minister

5 Dec 2005a- Annan welcomes appointment of new prime minister of Côte d'Ivoire

5 Dec 2005b- UN special adviser calls for end to harmful impunity in Côte d'Ivoire

9 Dec 2005- Annan calls for urgent aid to Liberia's security agenda; sanctions are not lifted

13 Dec 2005- UN reports serious concern over food situation in southern Africa

15 Dec 2005- UN Security Council renews sanctions on Côte d'Ivoire, bars diamond exports

16 Dec 2005- Sudan's special court on Darfur crimes not satisfactory, UN genocide expert says

28 Dec 2005- Côte d'Ivoire: UN mission welcomes formation of new Government

2006

4 Jan 2006 - Ministerial meeting on Africa highlights January agenda of UN Security Council

12 Jan 2006 - UN refugee agency chief says aid distribution must not be media-driven

13 Jan 2006a - Over $200 million pledged at Geneva aid meeting but more still needed – UN

13 Jan 2006b - UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire should be expanded and extended for one year, Annan says

16 Jan 2006a - Protesters gather outside UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire
16 Jan 2006b - UN agency calls for international aid as millions battle for survival in West Africa

17 Jan 2006 - Annan demands end to anti-UN protests in Côte d’Ivoire

18 Jan 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN reacts to attacks with restraint as diplomatic bid to end crisis intensifies

19 Jan 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: Annan appeals for calm as Security Council threatens sanctions

19 Jan 2006 - ‘War on terror,’ African conflicts threaten minorities: UN-assisted report

20 Jan 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire is calm but hate broadcasts still target peacekeeping forces, UN says

23 Jan 2006 - Annan salutes African summit on culture and education, pledges UN support

24 Jan 2006a - Security Council extends UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire through mid-December

24 Jan 2006b - Violence forces UN’s World Food Programme to suspend operations in Côte d’Ivoire

24 Jan 2006c - Côte d’Ivoire: 10,000 Liberian refugees without aid after attacks on UN agency offices

29 Jan 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: Concerned about presidential decree, Annan urges parties to cooperate

1 Feb 2006 - Annan reminds authorities in Côte d’Ivoire to protect threatened UN personnel

3 Feb 2006 - Annan requests redeployment of some UN peacekeepers from Liberia to Côte d’Ivoire

5 Feb 2006 - Concerned at violence in Côte d’Ivoire, Annan urges boosting UN force there

6 Feb 2006 - Security Council authorizes transfer of UN troops to violence-wracked Côte d’Ivoire

7 Feb 2006a - Security Council imposes sanctions on three Ivorians

7 Feb 2006b - Annan appoints Sri Lankan human rights veteran as envoy for war-affected children

8 Feb 2006 - Liberia: UN envoy praises China’s contribution to peacekeeping mission

9 Feb 2006a - Côte d’Ivoire: UN resumes food distribution in town recovering from violence
Waging Peace

9 Feb 2006b - Annan to discuss Darfur, Iran, and other hotspots with top officials in Washington

10 Feb 2006 - Annan asks Côte d’Ivoire authorities to reimburse UN for riot damage

13 Feb 2006 - Top UN relief official to visit Côte d’Ivoire following January disturbances

15 Feb 2006 - Humanitarian workers must be protected in Côte d’Ivoire, says UN relief coordinator

16 Feb 2006a - Côte d’Ivoire: UN election official says preparations for poll delayed

16 Feb 2006b - UN official shocked at extent of anti-humanitarian destruction in western Côte d’Ivoire

18 Feb 2006 - UN troops in Liberia work to prevent cross-border violence from Côte d’Ivoire

21 Feb 2006 - UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire investigating letter that warns of attacks

23 Feb 2006 - Security Council urges Côte d’Ivoire to help humanitarian groups to return

24 Feb 2006a - 20 detainees released in Côte d’Ivoire after UN human rights officers intervene

24 Feb 2006b - More than 300,000 internally displaced Liberians return home: UN

2 Mar 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: Annan encourages leaders to continue dialogue, pledges UN support

7 Mar 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN official urges building on democratic gains ahead of October elections

9 Mar 2006 - UN launches landmark disaster relief fund to speed up emergency assistance

11 Mar 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN police train local officers in airport safety

14 Mar 2006 - South Africa’s progress may show the way for all developing countries: Annan

15 Mar 2006 - Students in war-torn Côte d’Ivoire take final exams thanks to UN-backed effort

17 Mar 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN warns of worrying rights situation, with media fanning hatred

18 Mar 2006 - With Côte d’Ivoire election commission up and running, UN official departs
Waging Peace

27 Mar 2006 - Annan says it is ‘crucial’ that UN Côte d’Ivoire mission gets more troops, police

28 Mar 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN troops deploy back to western town following January violence

29 Mar 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: Security Council urges continued progress in democratization

31 Mar 2006 - UN grants nearly $2 million from new fund to stem disease in Horn of Africa

4 Apr 2006 - UN refugee agency launches two new initiatives in West Africa

6 Apr 2006 - Denial of impunity vital to ensure peace in strife-torn countries – UN rights chief

11 Apr 2006 - Annan taps Swiss democracy expert for election post in Côte d’Ivoire

13 Apr 2006 - Some ‘encouraging’ signs in Côte d’Ivoire but more troops still needed: Annan

17 Apr 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: top UN envoy sees ‘narrow window’ for progress

18 Apr 2006 - UN advocate for the rights of displaced persons visits Côte d’Ivoire

25 Apr 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN rights official calls for aid to displaced people

27 Apr 2006 - Despite progress in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Council voices "grave concern" over delays

28 Apr 2006 - UN refugee agency re-establishes presence in western Côte d’Ivoire

29 Apr 2006 - UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire deplores murder of 5 people, urges support for probe

2 May 2006 - Security Council to consider Iran’s nuclear programme tomorrow

6 May 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission condemns attack against one of its buses

10 May 2006 - UN disaster relief fund makes first donations for under-resourced emergencies

11 May 2006 - Website and soap opera produced by UN agencies win top awards

15 May 2006 - New list of ‘10 Stories the World Should Hear More About’ released at UN

16 May 2006 - Goooooooodddddddddddaaaaal: scoring for UNICEF at this year’s World Cup
UNESCO gives President Wade of Senegal the 2005 Houphouët-Boigny Peace prize

UN eyes election preparations in Côte d’Ivoire

Annan urges continued international support to solidify West African stability

UN Security Council welcomes first public hearings on Côte d’Ivoire nationality

Côte d’Ivoire needs scaled-up donor funding to avoid undermining peace, UN says

Côte d’Ivoire’s armed factions move towards laying down weapons, UN says

Global efforts could spell end to Africa’s conflicts, Security Council is told

Security Council adds 1,500 additional personnel to UN operation in Côte d’Ivoire

UN mission delays start of disarmament in Côte d’Ivoire

UN refugee head travels to Africa to spotlight plight of returnees

On Africa visit UN refugee chief calls on rich countries to fund development

Slum dwellers in developing countries may be worse off than in rural areas: UN report

Goal! Goal! Goal! Goal! Goal! UNICEF scores for world’s children at World Cup

Annan concerned at reports of possible missile firing by DPR of Korea

UN marks World Refugee Day with message of hope and events around the globe

Annan leaves this week on trip to West Africa, Germany

UN, African officials mark 25th anniversary of human rights charter for Africa

At African Union Summit, Annan hails progress but urges further action

General Assembly lifts spending cap from UN budget, allowing operations to go on

Annan holds separate talks with leaders of Chad, Sudan, Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire
Waging Peace

3 Jul 2006a - Annan visits war crimes court in Sierra Leone

3 Jul 2006b - UN-backed conference on African diamond trade spotlights mining communities

5 Jul 2006 - In Côte d’Ivoire, Annan gathers leaders to discuss plan for progress

18 Jul 2006a - At mid-year, UN still needs $3.1 billion for humanitarian action

18 Jul 2006b - West Africa: UN appeal for relief aid short nearly $119 million

19 Jul 2006 - Security Council ‘fully prepared’ to use sanctions on those blocking peace in Côte d’Ivoire

21 Jul 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: Annan says parties must consolidate peace gains ahead of polls

24 Jul 2006 - Security Council calls for greater effort to protect children in wartime

26 Jul 2006 - Security Council condemns recent burst of violence in Côte d’Ivoire

27 Jul 2006 - Dialogue needed in Côte d’Ivoire to smooth path to peace, UN envoy says

2 Aug 2006 - Security Council president says Mideast crisis will top August agenda

7 Aug 2006 - Security Council calls for cooperation in Côte d’Ivoire’s election preparations

10 Aug 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission calls on all parties to stay in peace process

5 Sep 2006a - As Liberians return home, UN agency to close regional office in southern Guinea

5 Sep 2006b - Middle East problems expected to top Security Council agenda in September

5 Sep 2006c - Timor-Leste: New acting UN Police Commissioner named

11 Sep 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN sends team to help coordinate response to deadly toxic waste crisis

14 Sep 2006 - Security Council extends expert group on arms embargo against Côte d’Ivoire

15 Sep 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: Annan concerned after president reportedly rejects peace process

18 Sep 2006 - Private sector can help Africa advance if it shares profits, say participants at UN meeting
Waging Peace

21 Sep 2006a - UN meeting leads to stepped-up diplomatic efforts to end instability in Côte d’Ivoire

21 Sep 2006b - Côte d’Ivoire: UN health team helps out in toxic waste emergency

25 Sep 2006a - Côte d’Ivoire elections should not be delayed past December, Nigerian minister tells UN

25 Sep 2006b - UN envoy to Liberia speaks of ‘cautious optimism’ while stressing need for security

27 Sep 2006a - Cameroon hails UN for helping it settle border dispute with Nigeria

27 Sep 2006b - West African countries emerging from conflict need global support, ministers tells UN

29 Sep 2006a - Deadly toxic waste dumping in Côte d’Ivoire clearly a crime – UN environmental agency

29 Sep 2006b - New UN disaster relief fund has committed over $170 million since March

29 Sep 2006c - UN refugee agency completes Liberian repatriation programme in east-central Guinea

3 Oct 2006 - Security Council to vote formally on Monday to select new UN Secretary-General

5 Oct 2006 - All Ivorian leaders must show restraint and pursue dialogue, urges Annan

10 Oct 2006 - UN forces patrol Liberian-Côte d’Ivoire border against combatants, arms movements

11 Oct 2006 - Donors should consider ‘poor-centric’ approach to development work, UN envoy says

16 Oct 2006 - Mob attacks in Liberia injure two UN military personnel

18 Oct 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN Reports Puts Leaders on Notice to Make Progress Towards Elections - removed from web

25 Oct 2006 - Top UN officials in Côte d’Ivoire urge all sides to compromise, see some change in 2007

31 Oct 2006 - Annan calls for more aid, fairer trade and green revolution for Africa

1 Nov - Security Council votes to extend Côte d’Ivoire’s transitional Government for final year
Waging Peace

1 Nov 2006 - Annan calls for cohesion in Côte d’Ivoire to curb ‘grave violations’ against children

2 Nov 2006 - Liberia: UN mission expands number and sphere of influence of national police

10 Nov 2006 - UN peacekeeping deployment reaches record level

17 Nov 2006 - General Assembly deplores Israeli raids in Gaza, sends mission to Beit Hanoun

20 Nov 2006 - Child soldiers continue to be recruited and used around the world, says UN report

21 Nov 2006 - Global AIDS epidemic continues to grow despite some positive trends – UN report

24 Nov 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN ecology chief calls for international funds to clean up toxic dumping

4 Dec 2006a - Departing UN aid chief urges Security Council to never falter in defending civilians

4 Dec 2006b - General Assembly backs Kimberley Process to prevent diamonds from funding conflict

8 Dec 2006 - Annan warns Ivorian political leadership not to delay in reviving peace process

11 Dec 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN humanitarian officer calls for protection of civilians following attacks

14 Dec 2006 - UN environmental arm launches plan to help Côte d’Ivoire clean up toxic waste

15 Dec 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: Security Council extends UN mission, renews diamond and arms sanctions

18 Dec 2006a - UN launches new standards for disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-fighters

20 Dec 2006b - Annan urges Ivorian political leadership to seek common ground to resolve differences

20 Dec 2006c - Côte d’Ivoire: UN appeals for funds to help clean up toxic waste dumped from abroad

21 Dec 2006 - Côte d’Ivoire: Security Council says all parties must cooperate with prime minister
2007

3 Jan 2007 - DR Congo, Middle East and Côte d’Ivoire to dominate Security Council in January

10 Jan 2007 - UN’s Côte d’Ivoire mission extended with new mandate to cooperate on Liberian border

16 Jan 2007 - UN reports progress in ending mother-infant HIV transmission but urges more action

17 Jan 2007 - UN urges early funding for 2007 Humanitarian Appeal to provide aid before it is too late

19 Jan 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire

25 Jan 2007 - Goal-ace soccer star Drogba shoots for UN Millennium Development Goals

26 Jan 2007a - Lebanon’s reconstruction focus of talks between Ban Ki-moon and French leader

26 Jan 2007b - Guinea: UN agencies help wounded in hospital cut off by general strike

29 Jan 2007a - UN helps Liberia shore up rule of law through support for corrections facility

29 Jan 2007b - Ban Ki-moon calls on African Union show unity of purpose in bringing peace to Darfur

31 Jan 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN facilitates book donation to bolster university library

2 Feb 2007 - Africa again looms large on Security Council agenda for February, President says

7 Feb 2007 - UN humanitarian agency provides $85 million to fund life-saving programmes

9 Feb 2007a - Ivorians have ‘historic chance’ to resolve differences, says outgoing UN envoy

9 Feb 2007b - World cereal production outlook positive for 2007, says UN agricultural agency

14 Feb 2007 - Tennis ace Sharapova named Goodwill Ambassador for UN development arm

16 Feb 2007 - UN envoy lauds debt relief deals reached at Liberia meeting

16 Feb 2007 - UN emergency fund provides over $2 million for projects in strife-torn Guinea
Waging Peace

20 Feb 2007 - Ban Ki-moon tells Security Council that security sector reforms are crucial

21 Feb 2007 - Ace goal scorers to shoot against poverty in UN football match

5 Mar 2007 - Côte d'Ivoire: Ban Ki-moon hails rival parties' accord, calls for full implementation

14 Mar 2007 - Security Council calls for implementation of peace accord in Côte d'Ivoire

16 Mar 2007 - Ban Ki-moon recommends one-year extension of UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia

22 Mar 2007 - Despite relative stability, Liberia still faces security obstacles, says UN envoy

23 Mar 2007 - West African meningitis outbreak sparks warning from UN aid agencies

26 Mar 2007 - Liberia: UN envoy underlines need for better policing of borders

26 Mar 2007 - Côte d'Ivoire: Ban Ki-moon calls on world to be ready to help consolidate peace accord

28 Mar 2007 - Secretary-General, Security Council praise Ivorian deal to appoint new Prime Minister

30 Mar 2007 - UN refugee agency resumes repatriation of Liberian refugees by sea

19 Apr 2007 - Côte d'Ivoire: maternity hospital renovated with UN help

20 Apr 2007 - Côte d'Ivoire police to serve with UN peacekeeping mission in DR Congo

1 May 2007 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN participates in ceremony integrating former rebels into national army

16 May 2007 - Ivorians reach ‘turning point’ in peace process but challenges persist – Ban Ki-moon

16 May 2007 - Despite record cereal crop this year, some countries will struggle – UN agency

16 May 2007 - Yellow fever initiative for West Africa launched at UN-backed health assembly

18 May 2007 – Côte d’Ivoire: Peace process needs international support, facilitator says

21 May 2007 - Sport can produce valuable results in development and peace – UN official

23 May 2007 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN condemns damage to human rights organization
25 May 2007a - On Africa Day, UN officials urge support for continent’s development

25 May 2007b - UN refugee agency’s Morocco office re-opens after sit-in

31 May 2007 - Finishing tour, top UN military adviser sees rising confidence in peacekeeping

1 Jun 2007 - UN refugee agency hails crews saving lives at sea, urges coastal States to do more

4 Jun 2007 - Africa to dominate Security Council’s work this month, says President

14 Jun 2007 - Security Council members depart on five-nation trip to Africa

15 Jun 2007 - Security Council members head to Addis for talks on UN-African Union cooperation

16 Jun 2007 - UN and African Union agree to strengthen security cooperation

16 Jun -2007 - UNICEF calls for increased efforts to prevent child trafficking

19 Jun 2007 - Security Council team discusses Ivorian elections on latest leg of African tour

20 Jun 2007a - Security Council requests panel to assess situation in Liberia

20 Jun 2007b - DR Congo final stop on Security Council’s week-long Africa trip

26 Jun 2007 - Agreement should synchronize actions with African Union – Security Council

29 Jun 2007a - Rocket attack against Ivorian leader sparks UN condemnation

29 Jun 2007b - UN refugee agency set to end Liberian repatriation programme

2 Jul 2007- Displaced persons in Côte d’Ivoire need more help, says UN rights expert

3 Jul 2007 - African crises set to top Security Council agenda this month

5 Jul 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission endorses call for inquiry into rocket attack

6 Jul 2007 - Following Ivorian rocket attack, UN envoy meets key regional peace player

10 Jul 2007 - UN meeting to focus on strengthening counter-terrorism efforts in West Africa

12 Jul 2007 - UN meeting on bolstering counter-terrorism efforts in West Africa concludes

13 Jul 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission concerned about media behaviour
Waging Peace

16 Jul 2007 - Security Council renews UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire to assist with elections

17 Jul 2007 - UN humanitarian chief cites $2.5 billion global shortfall in aid for 2007

18 Jul 2007a - Decline in 2007 crop yield could lead to food shortages for 28 countries – UN

18 Jul 2007b - Côte d’Ivoire: Jordanian UN blue helmets donate medicines to educational institute

20 Jul 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN suspends contingent suspected of sexual exploitation

23 Jul 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN, Moroccan officials meet to address allegations of sexual abuse

25 Jul 2007 - UN will not turn ‘blind eye’ to peacekeepers’ misconduct, vows UN official

30 Jul 2007 - UN welcomes start of disarmament process in Côte d’Ivoire

1 Aug 2007 - UN emergency fund provides $40 million for 16 global crises

6 Aug 2007 - UN mobilizes provincial town to support peace accord in Côte d’Ivoire

4 Sep 2007 - UN envoy on children and armed conflict begins visit to Côte d’Ivoire

5 Sep 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN envoy takes part in talks on implementing political accord

7 Sep 2007a - Liberia: citing progress, top UN envoy recommends mission drawdown

7 Sep 2007b - Alarming upsurge in reported rape of girls in Côte d'Ivoire, UN reports

14 Sep 2007 - UN sends disaster assessment team to Ghana to respond to flooding

18 Sep 2007 - Ex-General Assembly president becomes first private donor to Peacebuilding Fund

25 Sep 2007 - Ghana’s leader calls on UN to prepare to step up its role in Somalia

25 Sep 2007 - UN appeals to aid more than 1 million African flood victims fall on deaf ears

26 Sep 2007a - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission supports new identification scheme ahead of elections

26 Sep 2007b - Ivorian leader urges UN Assembly to partially end arms embargo

01 Oct 2007 - Secretary-General sends team to Côte d’Ivoire regarding attack on Prime Minister
Waging Peace

4 Oct 2007 - Liberia becomes eligible for UN Peacebuilding Fund

5 Oct 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission’s military chief meets Government, rebel leaders

10 Oct 2007 - Ban Ki-moon concerned by ‘slackening of momentum’ in Ivorian peace process

18 Oct 2007 – Ban Ki-moon announces slate of new Special Representatives in Africa

19 Oct 2007 - Military impeding embargo inspections in Côte d’Ivoire, UN experts say

22 Oct 2007 - Security Council urges both Ivorian sides to meet commitments under peace deal

29 Oct 2007 - Security Council renews diamond and travel sanctions on Côte d’Ivoire

2 Nov 2007 - Two crew members dead after UN helicopter crashes in Liberia

16 Nov 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission welcomes signing of electoral code of conduct

19 Nov 2007 - Visiting UN Police chief pledges support for Liberia’s crime prevention campaign

20 Nov 2007 - Revised UN estimates show over 33 million people worldwide living with HIV

21 Nov 2007a - States must arrest International Criminal Court suspects, official says at UN

21 Nov 2007b - New UN envoy arrives in Côte d’Ivoire

23 Nov 2007 - UN’s top envoy to Côte d’Ivoire discusses peace process with president

26 Nov 2007 - Liberia: highlighting importance of rule of law, top UN envoy hands over courthouses

28 Nov 2007 - UN’s Côte d’Ivoire envoy holds talks on planned elections

30 Nov 2007 - Ivorian supplementary peace agreements welcomed by UN mission

3 Dec 2007 - UN human rights office establishes West African regional office

6 Dec 2007 - UN delegation to focus on Darfur deployment at African-European summit

11 Dec 2007 - UN agency seeks over $1 billion to assist millions of refugees worldwide

17 Dec 2007 - New report traces UN Global Compact activities in nearly 90 countries

18 Dec 2007 - Ivorian process of identifying voters has been positive so far, says UN official
24 Dec 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN hails regrouping of ex-fighters as step towards lasting peace

28 Dec 2007a - Ban Ki-moon names new deputy head for UNICEF

28 Dec 2007b - Secretary-General declares Nepal eligible for UN Peacebuilding Fund

31 Dec 2007 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission speaks out against violence

2008

9 Jan 2008 - Ban Ki-moon says progress slow in achieving targets of Ivorian peace accord

10 Jan 2008 - New UN envoy to DR Congo takes up duties

15 Jan 2008 - Security Council extends UN operation in Côte d’Ivoire for further six months

18 Jan 2008 - UNICEF teams up with African footballers to score a goal for education

24 Jan 2008 - UN envoy meets with facilitator of Ivorian peace process

29 Jan 2008a - Child recruitment continues in over one dozen countries, reports Ban Ki-moon

29 Jan 2008b - UN refugee agency needs $90 million more to help internally displaced persons

30 Jan 2008 - Some 250,000 children worldwide recruited to fight in wars – UN official

31 Jan 2008 - 2008 crucial for boosting UN-AU partnership, Ban Ki-moon tells African summit

31 Jan 2008 - UN-backed project to benefit some 20,000 poor rural families in Burkina Faso

1 Feb 2008 - UN emergency response funds allocated to neglected crises

8 Feb 2008 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN dismantling observation posts in former zone of confidence

12 Feb 2008 - Time to punish parties who use or abuse children in armed conflicts – UN envoy

19 Feb 2008 - Ban Ki-moon welcomes Japanese contribution to UN Headquarters renovation

22 Feb 2008 - Africa’s meningitis season less deadly so far than last year, UN reports

25 Feb 2008 - Sales of soft toys at Swedish retailer donated to UN children’s education projects
29 Feb 2008 - UN mission helps Ivorians repair polling stations ahead of scheduled elections

11 Mar 2008 - Peacekeeping grows yet international support uneven – UN officials

17 Mar 2008 - UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire hands over disarmament sites to Government

25 Mar 2008 - Terrorism imperils UN staff, Ban Ki-moon says on Day of Solidarity

26 Mar 2008 - Panel in Côte d'Ivoire accepts UN election certification standards

27 Mar 2008a - Head of French-speaking bloc to hold talks with Secretary-General Ban

27 Mar 2008b - Sierra Leone: UN raises awareness of laws to curb violence against women

10 Apr 2008 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN mission reports progress in identification process

11 Apr 2008a - Ban Ki-moon embarks on four-nation West African tour in late April

11 Apr 2008b - Inoculations in Mali get booster from Brazilian vaccine, UN agency says

11 Apr 2008 - Soaring cereal tab continues to afflict poorest countries, UN agency warns

14 Apr 2008 - UN mission welcomes unveiling of presidential poll date in Côte d'Ivoire

16 Apr 2008 - Secretary-General welcomes ‘steady progress’ in Côte d'Ivoire

18 Apr 2008 - UNDP sounds alarm on danger of cluster munitions to civilians, development

20 Apr 2008 - Secretary-General Ban warns against impulses towards protectionism

23 Apr 2008 - Ivorian peace process tops agenda of Ban Ki-moon’s final stops in West Africa

24 Apr 2008 - Ban Ki-moon encourages Ivorians to continue making headway in peace process

25 Apr 2008 - In Vienna, Secretary-General opens new modern, climate-friendly UN complex

29 Apr 2008 - Security Council welcomes steps toward holding of Ivorian presidential polls

13 May 2008 - Ex-combatants complete UN-led demobilization process in Côte d’Ivoire

14 May 2008 - New work rules could help fight against HIV/AIDS, UN labour agency says

16 May 2008 - Veteran Finnish diplomat named winner of prestigious UNESCO peace prize

27 May 2008 - Civilians still bear the brunt of armed conflicts, top UN official warns
Waging Peace

28 May 2008 - Security Council delegation to conduct five-nation tour of Africa

28 May 2008 - Senior UN human rights official visits Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia

2 Jun 2008 - Visiting Security Council team meets Somali leaders during stop in Djibouti

9 Jun 2008 - On last leg of African trip, Security Council discusses Ivorian polls

12 Jun 2008 - UN confirms security plans for upcoming Ivorian presidential election

16 Jun 2008 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN environment agency launches plan on toxic waste

17 Jun 2008 - UN intellectual property agency welcomes African move on industrial design pact

18 Jun 2008 - Security Council urged to support Sudan’s ‘fragile’ north-south peace accord

18 Jun 2008 - Security Council asks Ban to renew UN panel monitoring Liberia sanctions

19 Jun 2008 - Côte d’Ivoire eligible for UN Peacebuilding Fund – Secretary-General

23 Jun 2008 - Mobile phone disposal discussed at UN hazardous waste meeting in Bali

26 Jun 2008 - Life of UN envoy Alioune Blondin Beye celebrated on anniversary of his death

30 Jun 2008 - New joint UN-African Union mediator for Darfur conflict appointed

5 Jul 2008 - French children donate toys to displaced youngsters in Liberia – UN

14 Jul 2008 - Côte d’Ivoire: Ban lauds parties for committing to peace pact

17 Jul 2008a - UN peacebuilding funding approved for Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone

17 Jul 2008b - UN calls for launching of identification process ahead of Ivorian polls

29 Jul 2008 - Security Council renews mandate of UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire ahead of polls

30 Jul 2008 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission dismantles military post in line with peace agreement

4 Aug 2008 - UN human rights expert on toxic waste holds talks in Côte d’Ivoire

8 Aug 2008a - UN health agency helps yellow fever vaccination campaign in Côte d’Ivoire

8 Aug 2008b - Toxic waste sites in Côte d’Ivoire still not cleaned up, UN rights expert says
Waging Peace

11 Aug 2008 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission provides equipment for upcoming election

13 Aug 2008 - Support for upcoming polls focus of talks between UN and Ivorian officials

14 Aug 2008 - Côte d’Ivoire: ‘1,000 micro-projects’ initiative launched by UN mission

18 Aug 2008 - Liberia still needs help to protect unsteady peace, warns Ban

25 Aug 2008 - UN peacekeeping chiefs in West Africa kick off two-day summit

26 Aug 2008 - UN envoys urge Côte d’Ivoire to press ahead with electoral preparations

2 Sep 2008 - Shutdown looms for UN air service for aid workers in West Africa

15 Sep 2008 - Ivorian electoral process now irreversible, UN envoy says

22 Sep 2008 - UN-endorsed initiative to train midwives could save hundreds of thousands of lives

23 Sep 2008 - Global leadership more vital than ever to solve today’s crises – Ban

7 Oct 2008a - Whales, dolphins and manatees win protection under UN-backed pact

7 Oct 2008b - UN hails recipients of this year’s Nobel Prize for Medicine for discovering HIV

10 Oct 2008 - UN health crisis experts meet to boost Africa’s response to emergencies

13 Oct 2008 - Top UN envoy expresses confidence in preparations for Ivorian elections

16 Oct 2008 - Bioenergy could reverse poverty in West Africa, says new UN study

17 Oct 2008 - UN report warns of threats ahead as Ivorians prepare to conduct polls

17 Oct 2008 - Iraqis leading the way in growing numbers of asylum-seekers, says UN agency

20 Oct 2008 - Ivorian stability and security threatened, UN experts warn

22 Oct 2008 - General Assembly selects 18 members of Economic and Social Council

27 Oct 2008 - Delays in Côte d’Ivoire’s polls could threaten peace, warns top UN envoy

29 Oct 2008a - Women vital to peace in post-conflict zones, Security Council hears

29 Oct 2008b - Security Council extends diamond and travel sanctions on Côte d’Ivoire

31 Oct 2008 - Top UN envoy highlights sport’s role in bringing peace in West, Central Africa
Waging Peace

7 Nov 2008 - Security Council dismayed by another delay to Ivorian elections

19 Nov 2008 - UN seeks $7 billion in humanitarian aid for 2009, by far its largest ever appeal

28 Nov 2008 - Voter registration for Côte d’Ivoire poll proceeding without major incident, UN reports

4 Dec 2008 - Nearly 2 million people have registered to vote, says UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire

5 Dec 2008 - Feature: Just another day in the life of a UN volunteer

12 Dec 2008 - ‘Real progress’ made in Ivorian election process – UN peacekeeping official

15 Dec 2008 - Security Council hears briefings from its sanctions committees

16 Dec 2008 - Renowned Swedish retailer donates proceeds from toy sales to UNICEF projects

2009

8 Jan 2009a - Côte d’Ivoire election process moving ahead, UN official reports

8 Jan 2009b - Côte d’Ivoire election process moving ahead, UN official reports

12 Jan 2009 - Citing unfinished tasks in Côte d’Ivoire, Ban backs extension of UN force

21 Jan 2009 - Identifying citizenry key to Ivorian peace process – UN envoy

23 Jan 2009 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN appeals for nearly $40 million to help over 300,000 people

27 Jan 2009 - Security Council urges Ivorian parties to devise ‘realistic’ plan for delayed polls

29 Jan 2009 - Number of Ivorian voters identified so far passes 4 million mark, says UN mission

6 Feb 2009 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN helps ease former fighters’ return to civilian life

12 Feb 2009 - UN calls on Côte d’Ivoire to push for presidential elections in late 2009

12 Mar 2009 - Identification of voters in Côte d’Ivoire rises to 5.4 million, UN says

16 Apr 2009 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN envoy confers with Prime Minister to boost peace progress

17 Apr 2009 - Threats to quasi-State economy jeopardizes Ivorian stability, warn UN experts

20 Apr 2009 - Ban says timetable for fair elections urgently needed in Côte d’Ivoire
Waging Peace

28 Apr 2009 - International assistance in Côte d’Ivoire must turn to reunification – UN official

13 May 2009 - Brazilian President awarded UN cultural agency’s peace prize

15 May 2009 - Ban welcomes new date for long-awaited Ivorian election

21 May 2009 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission urges prompt resumption of voter registration

29 May 2009 - Security Council welcomes setting of date for long-awaited Ivorian elections

3 Jun 2009 - UN helps plan election security in Côte d’Ivoire

12 Jun 2009 - Ivorian polls top talks between UN peacekeeping chief and Prime Minister

10 July 2009 - Ivorian political parties must ensure elections will be free and fair – UN report

13 Jul 2009 - Ivorian leader and UN envoy discuss peace process

17 Jul 2009 - Top UN official urges immediate publication of timetable for Ivorian polls

23 Jul 2009 - Bureaucratic delays could threaten long-awaited Ivorian elections – UN

24 Jul 2009 - Ivorian ex-fighters build new businesses under UN reintegration programme

30 Jul 2009 - Ahead of polls, Security Council extends UN force in Côte d’Ivoire by six months

31 Jul 2009 - UN mission urges Ivorians to resolve difficulties, stick to electoral timetable

20 Aug 2009 - Talks between UN and Ivorian officials focus on food security, rural poor

24 Aug 2009 - Processing of voter identification in Côte d’Ivoire going well, says UN envoy

25 Sep 2009 - Côte d’Ivoire thanks UN for restoration of peace

28 Sep - Côte d’Ivoire: UN assisting in delivery of electoral materials for long-awaited polls

29 Sep 2009 - Security Council urges all sides in Côte d’Ivoire to keep to election deadline

30 Sep 2009 - Challenges remain ahead of Côte d’Ivoire’s much-delayed polls, says Ban

1 Oct 2009 - Technical difficulties could delay long-awaited Ivorian polls – UN envoy

8 Oct 2009 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN legal team assesses prisons and judiciary

13 Oct 2009 - Cooperation vital in run-up to Ivorian presidential polls – Security Council
Waging Peace

16 Oct 2009 - UN's Ivorian operation takes steps to resolve status of millions of voters missing from list

22 Oct 2009 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN envoy appeals for November presidential elections to keep on track

27 Oct 2009 - Ivorian parties continuing to rearm despite embargo, says UN report

29 Oct 2009 - Côte d'Ivoire: Security Council extend sanctions for another year

10 Nov 2009 - UN receives provisional voters’ list for much delayed Ivorian presidential poll

11 Nov 2009 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN begins transporting provisional voters’ list for upcoming polls

24 Nov 2009 - Côte d’Ivoire: Ban calls for speedy new date for yet-again-delayed elections

4 Nov 2009 - UN initiative aims to create jobs, spur lasting peace in post-conflict nations

30 Nov 2009 - UN peacekeepers plant trees in Côte d’Ivoire to fight climate change

4 Dec 2009 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN pitches in on nationwide polio immunization campaign

31 Dec 2009 - UN agency helps Côte d’Ivoire resuscitate war-hit agricultural sector

2010

12 Jan 2010 - Additional UN peacekeepers requested ahead of Côte d’Ivoire elections

13 Jan 2010 - Ban encourages Ivorian parties to complete tasks ahead of March polls

21 Jan 2010 - Long-awaited Ivorian presidential polls possible this spring – UN envoy

27 Jan 2009 - Africa facing multiple critical challenges, Ban says ahead of summit

28 Jan 2010 - Security Council extends mandate of UN force in Côte d’Ivoire through end of May

05 Feb 2010 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN urges calm as violence mars voter registration appeals process

12 Feb 2010 - UN on alert as Côte d’Ivoire halts voter registration due to tensions

15 Feb 2010 - Top UN official in Côte d’Ivoire holds talks with Prime Minister over political crisis
Waging Peace

16 Feb 2010 - Ban calls for calm in Côte d'Ivoire after Government, electoral body dissolved

18 Feb 2010 - Top UN envoy intensifies talks in Côte d'Ivoire to ensure elections remain on course

19 Feb 2010 - Ban calls on parties in Côte d'Ivoire to resolve difficulties and hold elections

22 Feb 2010a - Côte d'Ivoire: UN envoy meets with African mediator in bid to solve electoral crisis

22 Feb 2010b - Political tensions in Côte d'Ivoire easing, UN envoy reports

4 Mar 2010 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN mission highlights next steps to long-awaited elections

6 Mar 2010 - UN and partners kick off massive anti-polio drive in West and Central Africa

11 Mar 2010 - UN reiterates support for resumption of electoral process in Côte d'Ivoire

17 Mar 2010 - Elections and reunification key challenges for Côte d'Ivoire, says UN envoy

30 Mar 2010 - Ban and French leader discuss Haiti, Iran and climate change during talks

1 Apr 2010 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN pursues multi-pronged strategy for peaceful elections

13 May 2010 - UN official in Côte d'Ivoire discusses peace process with political party leader

26 May 2010 - Ban urges Ivorians to revive stalled electoral process, resolve outstanding issues

27 May 2010 - UN force in Côte d'Ivoire extended for one month as talks on revised role continue

3 Jun 2010 - Ongoing political impasse hampering Ivorian peace process – UN envoy

10 Jun 2010 - Final electoral list immediate priority for Côte d'Ivoire, says UN envoy

16 Jun 2010 - Disarmament process begins in northern Côte d'Ivoire, UN reports

25 Jun 2010 - UN agency helps set up laboratory in Ivorian port to monitor for toxic waste

30 Jun 2010 - Security Council expands mandate of UN force in Côte d'Ivoire

2 Aug 2010 - Thousands of young Ivorians to receive job training under new UN project

5 Aug 2010 - UN mission takes note of new date for Ivorian presidential polls
Waging Peace

27 Aug 2010 - Côe d'Ivoire: UN probe finds serious human rights violations during February protests

2 Sep 2010 - UN urges finalization of voters list in Côe d'Ivoire

8 Sep 2010 - UN welcomes agreement on final voters’ list in Côe d'Ivoire

20 Sep 2010 - Israeli leader and Ban discuss latest push for Middle East peace

24 Sep 2010 - With final voters list in place, Ban hopes delayed Ivorian polls will be held soon

28 Sep 2010 - Security Council to send more UN troops to Côe d'Ivoire ahead of upcoming polls

29 Sep 2010 - Côe d'Ivoire calls at UN for more aid for post-conflict development

3 Oct 2010 - UN offices in West Africa step up efforts to boost stability on eve of polls

7 Oct 2009 - Côe d'Ivoire: as elections approach, more UN peacekeepers start arriving

12 Oct 2010 - Côe d'Ivoire: UN envoy stresses role of electoral observers in presidential poll

14 Oct 2010 - On eve of electoral campaign in Côe d'Ivoire, UN envoy appeals for calm

15 Oct 2010 - Côe d'Ivoire: UN sanctions extended for another six months

19 Oct 2010 - Côe d'Ivoire: UN envoy reports peaceful start to election campaign

25 Oct 2010 - Impending presidential poll ‘historic’ for Côe d'Ivoire – UN envoy

25 Oct 2010 - Eighteen countries elected to serve on UN Economic and Social Council

26 Oct 2010 - UN-backed polio campaign to reach 72 million African children

28 Oct 2010 - Calm political, security climate bodes well for Côe d'Ivoire polls, Ban says

3 Nov 2010 - Breakthrough Ivorian elections show people’s resolve to end crisis – UN official

10 Nov 2010 - UN elects Executive Board of new agency for women’s empowerment

12 Nov 2010 - Côe d'Ivoire: UN envoy certifies results of first round of presidential poll

17 Nov 2010 - Côe d'Ivoire: UN envoy holds talks on upcoming presidential run-off

20 Nov 2010 - Côe d'Ivoire: UN mission urges peace ahead of presidential poll run-off
Waging Peace

24 Nov 2010 - Security Council authorizes extra UN troops for Ivorian run-off poll

25 Nov 2010 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN official announces new measures to ensure credible election

27 Nov 2010 - UN human rights chief urges peaceful presidential poll in Côte d'Ivoire

29 Nov 2010 - Ivorian poll passes off in democratic atmosphere despite tension – UN envoy

1 Dec 2010 - Côte d'Ivoire: Ban calls for prompt release of presidential poll results

2 Dec 2010 - Security Council and Secretary-General welcome release of Ivorian poll results

3 Dec 2010 - UN chief supports certification of Ivorian presidential poll, congratulates Ouattara

4 Dec 2010 - Secretary-General deeply concerned over political standoff in Côte d'Ivoire

6 Dec 2010 - UN chief confers with regional leaders on Ivorian political deadlock

7 Dec 2010 - ICC Prosecutor looking into possibility of war crimes in Republic of Korea

7 Dec 2010 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN steps up diplomacy in support of opposition presidential victor

8 Dec 2010 - Security Council endorses opposition leader’s victory in Ivorian polls

9 Dec 2010 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN envoy meets winner of presidential election

10 Dec 2010 - Ivorian refugees arrive in Liberia and Guinea amid election dispute – UN

13 Dec 2010 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN sets up committee on possible sanctions in elections dispute

14 Dec 2010 - Number of Ivorian refugees arriving in Liberia rises to 3,500 – UN agency

15 Dec 2010a - Iraq: Security Council ends war-related mandates in ‘milestone’ session

15 Dec 2010b - Ban deeply concerned over continuing stalemate in Côte d’Ivoire

16 Dec 2010 - UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire urges restraint amidst reports of growing violence

17 Dec 2010a - Côte d’Ivoire: Ban demands outgoing president step down after election defeat

17 Dec 2010b - Looking back, Ban calls 2010 ‘a big year for the United Nations’
Waging Peace

18 Dec 2010 - Armed men fire at UN peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire

19 Dec 2010 - UN chief underlines warning against attacking peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire

20 Dec 2010 - Rejecting call to withdraw, Security Council extends UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire

21 Dec 2010 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN officials demand end to provocation and rights violations

23 Dec 2010 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN Human Rights Council strongly condemns post-electoral abuses

24 Dec 2010 - UN hopes for peaceful solution to Ivorian crisis, stresses peacekeeping chief

26 Dec 2010 - Humanitarian needs growing as more Ivorians flee into Liberia, warns UN agency

27 Dec 2010 - UN peacekeeping chief arrives in Côte d’Ivoire, confers with president-elect

28 Dec 2010 - UN soldier injured as crowd attacks peacekeepers in Côte d’Ivoire

29 Dec 2010 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN will robustly fulfil mandate to protect civilians – top official

30 Dec - Côte d'Ivoire: senior UN officials concerned over incitement to hatred, violence

31 Dec 2010 - Any attack on new Côte d'Ivoire leader will be repulsed, top UN envoy warns

2011

2 Jan 2011 - Ban reaffirms UN's unwavering support for poll result in Côte d'Ivoire

4 Jan 2011 - Amidst efforts to solve Ivorian political deadlock, UN agencies prepare aid

5 Jan 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN demands end to new hostile campaign from defeated president

6 Jan 2011 - UN seeks to boost peacekeeping troops as Côte d’Ivoire crisis continues

7 Jan 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN agency seeks $20 million to assist those affected by crisis

10 Jan 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN seeks to aid thousands displaced by post-election turmoil

11 Jan 2011 - Number of Ivorian refugees in Liberia tops 25,000 – UN agency

12 Jan 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: Ban warns against further raids by pro-Gbagbo forces

13 Jan 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: Ban warns of consequences for those attacking UN peacekeepers
14 Jan 2011a - UN has 'concrete intelligence' of ex-Ivorian president's incitement to violence

14 Jan 2011b - From fighting poverty to building a safer world, UN chief outlines priorities for 2011

17 Jan 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: Ban steps up efforts to ensure rightful new president takes office

18 Jan 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: Gbagbo loyalists shoot at UN patrol in mounting aggression

19 Jan 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN reinforces peacekeepers as officials warn of risks of genocide

21 Jan 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN rejects Gbagbo’s call to search its vehicles as violation of accord

25 Jan 2011 - Senior UN official concerned at alleged violence against children in Côte d'Ivoire

27 Jan 2011 - UN envoy urges protection from sexual violence amid Côte d'Ivoire crisis

28 Jan 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: Ban again calls on Gbagbo to step down to avoid further turmoil

29 Jan 2011a - Côte d’Ivoire: UN and African blocs must remain united to ensure respect of poll results – Ban

29 Jan 2011b - Ban reiterates concern over Côte d’Ivoire crisis at meeting with West African officials

30 Jan 2011 - UN chief discusses global issues with presidents of France and Rwanda

31 Jan 2011 - Refugees from Côte d’Ivoire crisis could top 100,000 by April, UN warns

1 Feb 2011 - Measles campaign planned for Liberian villages hosting Ivorian refugees – UN

2 Feb 2011a - Secretary-General sets out broad agenda for strengthening human protection

2 Feb 2011b - Any political transition in Egypt should take place now, says UN chief

3 Feb 2011 - UN mission identifies thousands of displaced people in western Côte d’Ivoire

4 Feb 2011 - Countries ready to reinforce UN peacekeepers in Côte d’Ivoire amid tense impasse

8 Feb 2011a - European foreign policy chief reaffirms commitment to strong UN
Waging Peace

8 Feb 2011b - Egypt's 'key role' in Middle East peace must be preserved in any transition – Ban

8 Feb 2011c - UN agency stocking up aid to assist Côte d'Ivoire’s displaced

10 Feb 2011 - Top UN refugee official urges end to Ivorian stalemate to ease humanitarian crisis

14 Feb 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN troops prevent possible resumption of civil war, says envoy

15 Feb 2011 - As political deadlock continues, UN steps up aid to uprooted Ivorians

16 Feb 2011 - Security Council extends deployment of extra troops in Côte d'Ivoire

17 Feb 2011a - Late US diplomat Holbrooke a shining example of what UN can be, says Ban

17 Feb 2011b - On eve of African Union visit to Côte d'Ivoire, Ban calls for end to post-election crisis

18 Feb 2011a - Liberia at ‘critical juncture’ in post-war recovery as elections approach – Ban

18 Feb 2011b - UN agency starts moving Ivorian refugees in Liberia to new camp

22 Feb 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN mission deplores excessive use of force against demonstrators

23 Feb 2011 - UN Human Rights Council to hold special session on Libya

24 Feb 2011 - Human rights situation in Côte d'Ivoire getting worse, says UN report

25 Feb 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN chief voices concern over worsening violence, urges restraint

27 Feb 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN peacekeepers wounded in an ambush north of Abidjan

28 Feb 2011a - Ban discusses Libya with Obama; urges punishment of those responsible for violence

28 Feb 2011b - Ban calls for compliance with arms embargo in Côte d'Ivoire

1 Mar 2011a - Small enterprises ideal for producing quality seeds for farmers in poorer countries – UN

1 Mar 2011b - Côte d'Ivoire: UN raises concern over civilians trapped by fighting in Abidjan suburb
1 Mar 2011c - Armed conflict blocking efforts to achieve universal primary schooling, UN warns

2 Mar 2011a - UN Ambassador Angelina Jolie stresses need to reintegrate Afghan refugees

2 Mar 2011b - UN apologizes to Belarus for reporting it broke Côte d’Ivoire arms embargo

3 Mar 2011 - Attack helicopters arrive to reinforce UN peacekeepers in Côte d’Ivoire

4 Mar 2011a - Côte d’Ivoire: UN warns insecurity preventing access to those in need of help

4 Mar 2011b - Crisis deepens in Côte d’Ivoire, with 200,000 displaced within Abidjan

8 Mar 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN urges rival groups to facilitate aid delivery, protect civilians

9 Mar 2011 - General Assembly President holds wide-ranging talks with Russian Foreign Minister

10 Mar 2011 - Human rights in Côte d’Ivoire deteriorating, warns top UN official

11 Mar 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN scaling up aid delivery as post-election unrest worsens

14 Mar 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN envoy sees signs of ‘beginning of end’ to violent crisis

15 Mar 2011 - New fighting hampers UN efforts to aid thousands displaced in Côte d’Ivoire

16 Mar 2011a - Ban welcomes Guatemalan contributions to UN peacekeeping operations

16 Mar 2011b - Continued support vital as Liberia prepares for polls, handles refugee influx – UN envoy

16 Mar 2011c - Rising violence jeopardizing efforts to resolve Ivorian political crisis – UN

17 Mar 2011 - Pro-Gbagbo forces shell market in Côte d’Ivoire, killing at least 25 – UN

18 Mar 2011 - UN warns deadly shelling of Ivorian market may be crime against humanity

21 Mar 2011 - Security Council voices outrage at deadly shelling of Ivorian market

22 Mar 2011 - Thousands flee Abidjan as violence intensifies in Côte d’Ivoire – UN

23 Mar 2011a - UN allocates funds for humanitarian emergency in Côte d’Ivoire

23 Mar 2011b - Global wheat production set to rise, but still below 2009 levels – UN report

24 Mar 2011 - Death toll from post-electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire rising, UN reports
Waging Peace

25 Mar - Up to 1 million people driven from homes by violence in Côte d’Ivoire, UN reports

28 Mar 2011 - Fresh clashes break out in key Ivorian town, UN mission reports

29 Mar 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN condemns firing at helicopter and killing of civilians

30 Mar 2011 - Demanding end to violence in Côte d’Ivoire, Security Council imposes targeted sanctions

31 Mar 2011 - UN mission deploys troops to Ivorian church to protect civilians seeking refuge

1 Apr 2011a - UN staff member killed by stray bullet in strife-torn Côte d’Ivoire

1 Apr 2011b - Côte d’Ivoire: UN urges restraint amid reports of abuses by pro-Ouattara forces

2 Apr 2011a - UN humanitarian chief urges world to help Liberia bear Ivorian refugee crisis

2 Apr 2011b - Ban sends condolences to countries whose citizens died in Afghan attack

2 Apr 2011c - Côte d’Ivoire: Four UN soldiers wounded in another assault by Gbagbo's forces

2 Apr 2011d - Ban talks by phone with Afghan president following deadly attack against UN staff

3 Apr 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: Ban calls for civilian protection in phone conversation with Ouattara

4 Apr 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: Ban instructs UN troops to take all necessary steps to protect civilians

5 Apr 2011 - Pro-Gbagbo forces in Côte d’Ivoire inform UN of their intention to stop fighting

6 Apr 2011a - UN names some of the victims of deadly plane crash in DR Congo

6 Apr 2011b - Côte d’Ivoire: International Criminal Court may initiate probe into alleged crimes

7 Apr 2011a - More UN plane crash victims named as investigation into cause continues

7 Apr 2011b - Top UN relief official sounds alarm after ‘deeply troubling’ visit to Côte d’Ivoire

8 Apr 2011 - UN human rights team finds over 100 bodies over past day in Côte d’Ivoire
Waging Peace

10 Apr 2011 - UN forces begin operation in Ivorian city in response to attack by pro-Gbagbo forces

11 Apr 2011 - Ex-leader of Côte d'Ivoire surrenders as UN pledges to help restore rule of law

12 Apr 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: Ban warns against retribution towards Gbagbo’s supporters

13 Apr 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: Security Council calls for formation of an all-inclusive Government

14 Apr 2011 - UN envoy stresses need to prevent conflict-related sexual violence before it begins

14 Apr 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire stand-off over but humanitarian crisis continues, UN and partners warn

15 Apr 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN steps up humanitarian aid to ease widespread suffering

15 Apr 2011 - UN official lauds role of peacekeepers in Sudan, Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire

18 Apr 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN rushes in agriculture aid as gradual calm begins to return

19 Apr 2011 - UN health team travels to western Côte d'Ivoire to review medical needs

21 Apr 2011 - Ongoing fighting in Côte d’Ivoire threatens efforts to restore peace, UN warns

21 Apr 2011 - Ban lauds Ukraine’s contributions to global peace and security

22 Apr 2011 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN peacekeepers begin clearing explosives after election conflict

27 Apr 2011 - UN cites urgent need to boost humanitarian aid in aftermath of Ivorian crisis

28 Apr 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN calls attention to unmet needs of conflict-affected communities

3 May 2011 - Humanitarian situation in Côte d’Ivoire remains alarming, warns UN agency

4 May 2011 - Women’s participation crucial for democracies, UN officials stress

6 May 2011 - UN chief says Eastern Europe can serve as example to 2011’s emerging democracies

6 May 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN human rights team heads to alleged mass grave site

9 May 2011 - UN human rights staff discover mass graves in Ivorian city
10 May 2011a - UN officials stress Security Council’s role in protecting civilians during armed conflict

10 May 2011b - Côte d’Ivoire: UN appeal for aid falls far short of needed funds

13 May 2011 - As Ivorian pupils return to school, UN report finds critical equipment shortages

17 May 2011 - Tensions and insecurity persist in western Côte d’Ivoire, UN reports

18 May 2011 - Maternal health in the spotlight during UN chief’s four-nation trip

19 May 2011a - Côte d’Ivoire: UN peacekeepers receive arms collected in Abidjan after political crisis

19 May 2011b - UN’s ‘life-saver’ fund breaks $2 billion barrier in backing crisis relief efforts.

20 May 2011 - UN-backed meeting on West African polls wraps up with call on electoral laws

21 May 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN chief attends inauguration of President Alassane Ouattara

22 May 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: Ban pledges continued UN support for Ivorians emerging from conflict

24 May 2011 - Clashes in south-western Côte d’Ivoire hamper UN humanitarian efforts

25 May 2011 - Africa’s young people vital to sustainable development, says UN chief

26 May 2011a - Death toll in Ivorian post-election violence surpassed 1,000 – UN

26 May 2011b - Arab spring, African crises and global health on UN chief’s agenda at G8 summit

27 May 2011a - At G8 summit, UN chief stresses need to act with unity on Middle East, North Africa

27 May 2011b - UN resumes repatriation of Liberian refugees from Côte d’Ivoire

27 May 2011c - On Peacekeepers’ Day, UN honours those serving and fallen heroes

6 Jun 2011 - Ban says he would be ‘deeply honoured’ to serve second term as UN Secretary-General

8 Jun 2011 - UN to help West African musicians get paid for their creativity
Waging Peace

10 Jun 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN-appointed probe finds serious rights abuses after elections

14 Jun 2011 - Ongoing insecurity preventing return of displaced civilians in Côte d’Ivoire – UN

20 Jun 2011 - In West Africa, UN and partners pledge cooperation in fight against drugs and crime

23 Jun 2011 - ICC prosecutor seeks authorization to probe Côte d’Ivoire violence

24 Jun 2011 - Tunisia becomes first North African nation to join International Criminal Court

27 Jun 2011 - Returning Ivorians lack food, shelter and medical care, UN aid agencies say

29 Jun 2011 - Additional UN troops and helicopters to stay on in Côte d’Ivoire

1 Jul 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN mission to set up new military camps, equip police stations

4 Jul 2011 - Top UN official in Côte d’Ivoire meets former president Laurent Gbagbo

8 Jul 2011 - Security Council praises progress towards peace and stability in West Africa

14 Jul 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN to collect surrendered weapons in Abidjan suburb

18 Jul 2011 - Restoring law and order remains priority for Côte d’Ivoire, says UN envoy

20 Jul 2011 - UN requests more than $4 billion in humanitarian aid for the rest of this year

21 Jul 2011 - Horn of Africa: UN steps up efforts to bring urgent relief to millions in need

27 Jul 2011 - Bangladeshi general to head UN force in Western Sahara

27 Jul 2011 - Security Council extends UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire for another year

28 Jul 2011a - Ban to appoint experienced Dutch diplomat to head UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire

28 Jul 2011b - As key global treaty turns 60, UN urges better refugee protection measures

4 Aug 2011a - Outgoing UN peacekeeping chief hails achievements of blue helmets

4 Aug 2011b - Côte d’Ivoire: UN official meets with detained ex-leaders to foster reconciliation

5 Aug 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN forces help in rescue operations after deadly bus accident

10 Aug 2011 - UN through the lens: Three years at the helm of peacekeeping
Waging Peace

11 Aug 2011 - Extrajudicial executions carried out in Côte d’Ivoire, UN reports

15 Aug 2011 - Upcoming elections in Liberia must be peaceful, free and fair – Ban

16 Aug 2011 - With UN help, Côte d'Ivoire takes further step towards rule of law by reopening prison

19 Aug 2011 - At time of global transition, UN more necessary than ever to tackle challenges – Ban

2 Sep 2011 - Ivorian refugees living with host families in Liberia to move to new camp – UN

5 Sep 2011 - UN peacekeepers help put out fire at radio station in Côte d'Ivoire

6 Sep 2011 - World must pull together in face of unprecedented challenges, Ban warns

9 Sep 2011 - Citing successes, Ban urges more preventive diplomacy to defuse conflicts

12 Sep 2011 - General Assembly ends annual session having ‘accomplished much’ – President

13 Sep 2011a - General Assembly opens new session with plea for unity to tackle global crises

13 Sep 2011b - Consolidating peace in Liberia extends beyond upcoming polls – UN envoy

15 Sep 2011 - UN stands ready for turbulent times ahead – Ban

16 Sep 2011 - Liberia: Stressing importance of elections, Security Council extends life of UN force

20 Sep 2011a - Human rights accords receive boost as annual UN treaty event opens

20 Sep 2011b - UN peacekeepers patrol Ivorian-Liberian border area after deadly attack

21 Sep 2011 - Ban urges global leaders gathered at UN to 'shape the world of tomorrow'

22 Sep 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN has key role in strengthening democracy, President says

23 Sep 2011a - Nigerian President and UN chief discuss maternal health, piracy and security issues

23 Sep 2011b - Responsibility to protect principle must cover all who need it, Ban says

27 Sep 2011 - West African countries call for permanent African seat on Security Council
Waging Peace

30 Sep 2011 - Wave of change in Middle East shows ‘immense power’ of non-violence – Ban

3 Oct 2011a - UN refugee chief calls for greater efforts to avert humanitarian crises

3 Oct 2011b - ICC authorizes probe into post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire

4 Oct 2011a - Ban urges students to help build rule of law institutions in emerging democracies

4 Oct 2011b - UN launches phone-based scheme to help poor Ivorians buy food

5 Oct 2011 - Migiro stresses importance of UN’s work to advance rule of law worldwide

10 Oct 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN condemns violence at political gathering in Abidjan

11 Oct 2011a - UN finances improve overall as some States pay up in full despite financial crisis

11 Oct 2011b - UN commends Liberians as voting in key election takes place peacefully

12 Oct 2011 - Security sector reform in African countries emerging from conflict vital, UN says

14 Oct 2011 - International Criminal Court prosecutor to visit Côte d’Ivoire

19 Oct 2011 - UN agency calls for mobilization of financial support for Ivorian refugees

24 Oct 2011a - New UN envoy to Côte d’Ivoire urges leaders, citizens to commit to peace and stability

24 Oct 2011b - Ivorian refugees return from Liberia in UN-supported voluntary repatriation

26 Oct 2011 - ICC chief highlights ‘invaluable’ cooperation with UN

28 Oct 2011 - General Assembly calls for greater efforts to remove threat of landmines, munitions

31 Oct 2011 - Gradual progress in including women in peacebuilding processes – UN official

1 Nov 2011 - Rise in mercenary activities warrants urgent attention, says UN expert group

3 Nov 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN to provide multi-faceted support for legislative elections

8 Nov 2011 - Upcoming Ivorian election must be transparent and inclusive – UN envoy

11 Nov 2011 - DR Congo: ICC prosecutor warns election-related violence will not be tolerated
Waging Peace

15 Nov 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire: UN cites security and logistics as challenges for upcoming poll

17 Nov 2011 - Thousands of Ivorian refugees to return to their villages – UN

22 Nov 2011 - Citing value for money, Ban urges generous support for UN Peacebuilding Fund

25 Nov 2011 - UN envoy urges solidarity with survivors of sexual violence in conflict

30 Nov 2011 - Ex-Ivorian leader Gbagbo arrives at ICC to face charges of crimes against humanity

5 Dec 2011 - ICC sets date for confirmation of charges hearing for ex-Ivorian president

6 Dec 2011 - Congolese post-election violence will not be tolerated, ICC prosecutor warns

9 Dec 2011a - Côte d’Ivoire: UN envoy calls for peaceful polls, warns violence will not be tolerated

9 Dec 2011b - UNICEF warns of impending child nutrition crisis in Africa’s Sahel region

11 Dec 2011 - Côte d’Ivoire elections unfolding in a positive, calm atmosphere – UN envoy

12 Dec 2011 - Amid counting in Côte d’Ivoire, Ban calls on political parties to remain calm

14 Dec 2011 - UN needed more than ever after ‘remarkable and extraordinary year’ – Ban

14 Dec 2011 - UN seeks $7.7 billion to provide humanitarian aid to millions of people in 2012

15 Dec 2011 - Donors pledge $482 million for UN efforts to help displaced, stateless people

22 Dec 2011 - UN mission urges Ivorian authorities to enforce discipline among security forces

24 Dec 2011 - Ban welcomes approval of UN budget for next two years

2012

16 Jan 2012a - Côte d’Ivoire : UN relief official reviews situation nine months after poll violence

16 Jan 2012b - UN official reports greater stability in West Africa, but progress remains tenuous

18 Jan 2012a - Côte d’Ivoire needs continued humanitarian support, stresses UN relief official
Waging Peace

18 Jan 2012b - Responsibility to Protect: Ban urges action to make UN-backed tool ‘a living reality’

20 Jan 2012 - Mali becomes first African nation to agree to imprison ICC convicts

21 Jan 2012 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN condemns violence during meeting of former ruling party

24 Jan 2012 - Côte d'Ivoire: Relief support key to reconstruction and development – UN official

25 Jan 2012 - UN humanitarian arm allocates $104 million to underfunded crises

26 Jan 2012 - Côte d'Ivoire: Security improving but root causes of unrest remain – UN envoy

27 Jan 2012 - Côte d'Ivoire must ensure secure space for political participation – UN expert

30 Jan 2012 - Ban urges Egypt to adhere to roadmap on transition to civilian administration

1 Feb 2012 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN disarmament operation continues near Abidjan

3 Feb 2012 - In Côte d’Ivoire, UN mission to decide on election certification next week

10 Feb 2012 - UN-backed report warns of dangers of increasing electronic waste in West Africa

16 Feb 2012 - Millions of people to receive solar energy access through UN-backed initiative

17 Feb 2012 - UN official partially certifies Ivorian parliamentary elections

23 Feb 2012a - UN report on sexual violence during conflict singles out worst offenders

23 Feb 2012b - ICC expands scope of Ivorian war crimes investigation back to 2002

26 Feb 2012 - Côte d'Ivoire: UN envoy voices satisfaction with conduct of by-elections

27 Feb 2012a - Côte d'Ivoire: UN envoy deplores violent post-election incidents

27 Feb 2012b - Gulf of Guinea needs regional anti-piracy strategy, UN official stresses

8 Mar 2012 - UN envoy for West Africa stresses cooperation to address regional threats

14 Mar 2012a - Côte d’Ivoire: UN envoy lauds new premier and parliament president

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Appendix E - UN Security Council Resolution References


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Appendix F - Undersecretaries-General of UN Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Under-Secretary-General</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Years served</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre Lacroix</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>April 2017 – Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hervé Ladsous</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>September 2011 – March 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alain Le Roy</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>June 2008 – August 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean-Marie Guéhenno</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>October 2000 – June 2008</td>
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<td>Bernard Miyet</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>January 1997 – September 2000</td>
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<td>Kofi Annan</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>March 1993 - December 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marrack Goulding</td>
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