The premiership of Sir Anthony Eden: a reassessment using the Greenstein model

Jack Edward Cook

Submitted in accordance with the requirements of Master of Arts by Research

The University of Leeds

School of Politics and International Studies

October 2021
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her/their own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.
Acknowledgements

For their help throughout my work I would like to thank both Kevin Theakston and David Seawright for their recommendations and guidance. They have been a great help to me in terms of helping to source information and providing insight into the academic world as well as my own work.
Abstract

This thesis provides an analysis of the leadership style of Anthony Eden (1955-57) by utilising the framework provided by Fred Greenstein in his analysis of American presidents. In doing so, it adds to the growing academic literature which has applied this model to contemporary British prime ministers. It evaluates Eden's skill in public communication, organisational capacity, political skill, policy vision and cognitive/emotional style. It hopes to distinguish itself by introducing an evaluation of Eden in terms of his personality and leadership, departing from the biographical/historical approach which dominates literature on his premiership. It illustrates how researchers can explore the effect that personality and temperament has on leadership and can reveal where personality vis-a-vis context influences a British premiership. In this sense, the research has implications for leadership studies as well as how we understand Eden's premiership, building on the work of Theakston (2007, 2011, 2012), Heppell (2012), Honeyman (2007) and McMeeking (2020), all of whom have utilised the Greenstein model to assess contemporary British prime ministers.
Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction - P8
1.1 Introduction and Thesis Outline
1.2 Literature Review: Anthony Eden
1.3 The Greenstein Model
1.4 Research Methodology
1.5 Conclusion

Chapter 2: Public Communication - P13
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Press Office
2.3 Broadcast Media
2.4 Speeches
2.5 Conclusion

Chapter 3: Organisational Capacity - P20
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Private Office
3.3 The Cabinet
3.4 Conclusion

Chapter 4: Political Skill - P32
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Persuasion
4.3 Manipulation
4.4 Conclusion

Chapter 5: Policy Vision - P46
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Domestic Policy
5.3 Foreign Policy
5.4 Conclusion

Chapter 6: Cognitive Style and Emotional Intelligence - P58
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Cognitive Style
6.3 Emotional Intelligence
6.4 Conclusion

Chapter 7: Conclusion - P70
7.1 Eden’s Leadership
7.2 The Greenstein Model
7.3 Future Research

Bibliography - P74
Abbreviations

AE - Anthony Eden
ASLEF - Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen
BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation
FO - Foreign Office
MP - Member of Parliament
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PCP - Parliamentary Conservative Party
PM - Prime Minister
POW - Prisoners of War
RAF - Royal Air Force
TUC - Trades Union Council
UN - United Nations
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction and thesis outline

This thesis evaluates the leadership of Anthony Eden (1955-57) sixty-four years after the tumultuous end of his premiership. In doing so, it utilises the framework of leadership provided by Greenstein (2000; 2009) which analyses leadership performance under six headings; public communication and organisational capacity; political skill and policy vision; and cognitive style and emotional intelligence.

Although created with the purpose of analysing American presidents, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature applying the Greenstein model to British politics and prime ministers (Honeyman, 2007; Theakston, 2007, 2011, 2012; Heppell, 2012). In a similar vein to McMeeking’s (2020) use of the Greenstein model this thesis also combines both cognitive style and emotional intelligence under a single heading given their relevance to one another.

These headings are systematically applied to Eden’s own leadership with the intention of discerning where his own personality contributed to successes and failures vis-a-vis the contextual factors he was forced to grapple with. By doing this, a novel and balanced assessment may be made of Eden’s premiership, his personality as well as the constraints faced by political leaders in the post-war 1950’s.

Although originally designed for the analysis of American presidents, Greenstein (2000) has since conceded that the model is capable of application to the British political system (Theakston, 2011). Therefore, as well as exploring the extent of Eden’s ‘actor dispensability’, this thesis seeks to contribute to understandings of the transferability of the Greenstein model across political systems.

1.2 Literature review: Anthony Eden

The first work to range away from the Suez Crisis and to focus on Eden’s career as a whole was Sidney Aster’s (1976) Anthony Eden which provides a short account of Eden’s youth through to his resignation as prime minister. Although sympathetic to Eden’s record in foreign affairs, Aster does not shy away from hinting at Eden’s shortfalls; his temper, vanity and indecision. Eden’s upbringing, violent father and war-time experiences are all stressed as factors that contributed to Eden’s demeanour, personal beliefs and working style.

Another work of the same title was written by David Carlton (1981) and proved a destructive piece of biography. Whilst most other works could find occasional strengths of Eden’s, Carlton is scathing in his assessment of Eden as an utterly vain and ineffective prime minister. While Eden’s tenure as war-time and peace-time Foreign Secretary is usually
lauded as his halcyon days, Carlton re-assesses these as victories of luck with Eden bungling his way through the inter-war years partly through the patronage of Baldwin and barely ever through his own initiatives.

Evelyn Shuckburgh’s diaries - titled Descent to Suez (1986) - proved an enduring boon to historians, detailing Eden’s temper-tantrums, his vanity and suspicion of his colleagues, as well as the wider opinions and conversations that were taking place in the Foreign Office from 1951-57 as Shuckburgh moved from Eden’s Private Secretary to Assistant Under-Secretary for Middle Eastern Affairs. Unlike Carlton’s (1981) evisceration of Eden, Shuckburgh lacks any hint of malice but the work itself still serves to be just as damaging.

Eden’s official biography by Robert Rhodes James (1987) proved more sympathetic. He attempts to stress his subject’s strengths and diminish his shortfalls. Given that Rhodes James had access to Eden’s private documents and collection of government papers the biography sheds new light on Eden’s actions throughout the Second World War as well his thoughts on issues ranging from Cyprus to inflation. It is certainly the most sympathetic of the many biographical studies listed here.

A truly comprehensive account of the domestic affairs of Eden’s government was written by Richard Lamb (1987) entitled The Failure of the Eden Government. Lamb traces Eden’s success at the 1955 general election and through the series of flare-ups he experienced on the domestic front. Immigration, inflation, the death penalty and industrial unrest all jostled for Eden’s attention, but he did little in terms of concrete legislation or even signalling a unique position of his own. Therefore, an impression is created that Eden failed to exploit the opportunities that presented themselves to him, for doing so would have prevented many issues that later came to dominate contemporary British politics.

In 1997 Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation was written by David Dutton. The work follows in the tradition of Rhodes James (1987) in sufficiently defending Eden to fall into the ‘sympathetic’ category of biographical works. Dutton specifically argues that the intellectual climate of the time imposed upon Eden confines within which he could not have realistically moved as authors such as Carlton (1981) and Lamb (1987) might have preferred. On economic matters Labour had imposed the confines of policy as conciliatory industrial relations and nationalisation, while in foreign affairs Eden was working within the limits of a retreating Empire. As such, the work proves a useful insight into the interplay of context and agency within Eden’s premiership.

The most recent biographical work on Eden is in a similar vein to Dutton’s (1997). Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden (2011) was written by D.R. Thorpe who presents Eden as a deeply-sensitive man whose morals and past experiences profoundly shaped his approach to foreign and domestic affairs, in contrast to earlier presentations of Eden as a
A tactical thinker who was rarely motivated by much else besides his own vanity (Carlton, 1981). His First World War experiences alongside the British working class engendered a deep desire to avoid recriminations or hostile legislation towards the trade unions, while his aversion to war explains his efforts for peace at the Geneva Conference (1954) and his part in creating international and collective security organisations like the UN and NATO.

1.3 The Greenstein model

Greenstein’s model is primarily concerned with a singular question: to what extent does personality affect leadership? In The Presidential Difference Greenstein (2000; 2009) utilises the examples of Eisenhower’s and Lyndon B. Johnson’s relatively different handlings of Vietnam to demonstrate this fact, musing on what the likely course of action might have been had another person held the American presidency in these periods. As he wrote in Personality and Politics (1969) political scientists should be alert to “the full range of possible psychological and non-psychological determinants of behaviour” (Greenstein, p.19).

However, it is evident upon reading Greenstein (1967; 1969; 1992; 2000; 2009) that the influence of a leader’s personality is tied to the institutional setting in which he/she finds him/herself. The fact that the American president has “at his disposal an imposing array of political resources, including the power of legislation and a wide range of possibilities for taking unilateral action in his capacities as the nation’s leader in the international arena” means there is significant scope for his/her personality to have a direct affect on policy-making and governance more widely (Greenstein, 2006, p.17).

This poses potential problems for academics seeking to apply the Greenstein model to British prime ministers operating in a very different environment to their American counterparts. Greenstein (2000, p.2-3) notes that in “Britain, with its tradition of collective leadership ... personal impact on governmental actions is at best limited”. Although he concedes personalities on the scale of a Thatcher or a Churchill inevitably permeate a government’s inner-workings and strategy, for him the delegation and distribution of executive authority which the British tradition of collective government necessitates reduces the scope for a less forceful and personalised prime minister to influence the performance of his/her government.

Theakston (2011) argued the opposite in his analysis of the leadership of Gordon Brown (2007-10) in which he successfully applied the Greenstein model to his short-lived premiership. In doing so, Theakston (2011) exhibits that British political studies can conceptually ‘borrow’ from presidential studies in line with King’s (1985, p.8) assertion that “the vast literature on the American presidency can be used to suggest questions that might usefully be asked of the prime ministership in Britain”.

The ‘questions’ King (1985) refers to may stem from any of Greenstein’s (2000) six criteria outlined in his writings. The first is that of public communication and pertains to the outer face of leadership. The second is that of organisational capacity - the inner face of leadership - which is concerned with a leader’s ability to structure their colleagues’ workloads. The third and fourth criteria address a leader’s abilities to act as a political operator - his/her political skill in handling day-to-day business and his/her policy vision. Criteria five and six are both psychological; cognitive style refers to a leader’s preferences in terms of the structure of advice received as well as workload. Emotional intelligence assesses a leader’s emotional temperament and the extent to which it is either harnessed positively or kept out of policy-making concerns.

The most significant criticism of the Greenstein model is perhaps its focus on agency and relative neglect of the role context plays in any premiership. Shifting the emphasis onto the individual and their personality to such an extent inevitably risks relegating context to a secondary consideration and overemphasising the influence of an individual leader’s traits. Having said this, Greenstein (2006, p.25) has acknowledged these criticisms and written of how “there is no conflict between an intensive analysis of the American political system and a comparably close analysis of the pivotally placed occupant of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Both are mandatory, and neither excludes the other [emphasis added]”.

1.4 Research methodology

This research is primarily the result of qualitative research. A key example of this are the diaries provided by a series of colleagues and close confidants of Eden. Alongside Shuckburgh’s (1986) own diaries, those of Macmillan’s from his tenure as a minister throughout 1951-57 prove an extremely valuable insight into Eden’s actions both as peace-time Foreign Secretary as well as prime minister (Catterall, 2003). As well as these, the Hansard UK Parliament website provides an abundance of material; Eden’s speeches, contributions and behaviour in the House of Commons are all available. The biographical literature already outlined was utilised as well as other academic sources such as material from leadership studies more widely.

This research was affected by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic severely disrupted a key aspect of my research, visiting the National Archives in Kew to access relevant Cabinet documents as well as Eden’s own papers at Birmingham University. Access was severely prohibited throughout late-2020 and 2021 and when this was not the case travel restrictions caused other issues. However, references to this material in secondary sources such as biographies allowed me to have some degree of access, although it does not compare to what otherwise could have been provided for.
1.5 Conclusion

Anthony Eden does not feature heavily in contemporary British political studies. There is also a relative dearth of material on the former prime minister when compared with his predecessor and successor, Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan. This fact indicates that his premiership is in sore need of a reassessment, whatever it may bring. But there is also the value to be found in the application of the Greenstein model as a venture in itself, adding to the growing literature on the model’s relevance to British politics. Given the material it deals with, then, the Greenstein model has also found itself at the nexus of two relevant debates: i) the relationship between agency and structure in politics; and ii) the transferability and applicability of the Greenstein model across political systems.

The first has been addressed by Greenstein (2000) himself, and the fact that he makes clear the relevance that he considers context to possess allows for its analysis and discussion within the limits of the Greenstein model. In regards to the second point, Greenstein (2000) has been forced to concede this given the success British political academics such as Honeyman (2007), Heppell (2012), Theakston (2007; 2011; 2012) and McMeeking (2020) have had in applying it to Wilson, Cameron, Brown and Major respectively.
Chapter Two: Public communication

2.1 Introduction

A prime minister’s capacity for communication can seriously enhance or hinder a premiership. Although it is not a source of strength in itself, the ability to communicate coherently with the general public allows a prime minister to ‘teach reality’ and associate themselves with an agenda (Hargrove, 2001). It is for this reason that Bose (2006, p.33) ranks public communication as below other traits of the Greenstein model such as vision, political skill and organisational capacity; “it is the substance of these three qualities that ultimately will determine the success of communication”.

Indeed, a prime minister whose sole strength is public communication risks suffering from what Seaton (1998, p.3) labels as “the politics of appearances”. She refers to those leaders whose telegenic charm underlies a serious vulnerability to the organisational aspects and pace of day-to-day governance which sooner or later makes itself evident. However, it would seem that such weaknesses can be accounted for if a prime minister is surrounded by qualified subordinates and colleagues. As Burch and Holliday (2004, p.5) have highlighted, Blair’s own telegenic charm and persuasiveness was complemented by the creation of the Strategic Communications Unit operating from Downing Street, which provided for “a unified presentation of policy and a clear government image and message”.

Where does Eden rank here? This section begins with an analysis of Eden’s handling of the press throughout his premiership, before moving onto how successful he was in terms of the relatively new medium of television. It finishes with an evaluation of Eden’s speeches in a range of settings, such as the 1955 general election, Party Conferences and the House of Commons.

2.2 Press Office

Although Eden was “very concerned that Government policy should be presented positively”, Thorpe (2011, p.444) refers to Eden as being “not very political in the sense of knowing how to lead and manipulate public opinion [emphasis own]”. This may explain why Eden chose William Clark - a former diplomatic correspondent at the Observer - rather than a civil servant to act as his Press Secretary and lead his Press Office. Indeed, Clark received an endorsement in these terms from Shuckburgh (1986) who made clear to Eden that he needed an experienced journalist who would be able to be aggressive in his dealings with the press, an attribute that may have been lacking in a civil service appointment.
However, Clark proved an utterly disloyal Press Secretary whose “garrulousness and indiscretions” were notorious (Rhodes James, 1987, 412). Dining out on “a story of flying inkwells” - for instance - served to exacerbate rumours of Eden’s short-temper (see chapter 6), whereas Clark’s main priority should have been dampening such claims, indicative of Thorpe’s (2011, p.451) reference to Clark as an “unsympathetic witness” of Eden’s.

However, by mid-1956 Clark had already been largely relegated from much of the serious cultivation of press contacts. By January 1956 Clark was supposedly looking “thin and drawn” and was rumoured to have been “having a terrible time with the PM” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.324). He was probably not helped by his habit of offering Eden opinions and advice on all ranges of subjects, from foreign affairs to economic matters. Given that Eden was acutely sensitive to these sorts of interjections (see chapter 6) this soured their relationship further (Thorpe, 2011).

This helps to explain why Eden began personally coordinating much of his press operations. Private meetings between Eden and William Haley (Editor of The Times, 1952-66) began in mid-1956 and were typically Eden’s main form of press cultivation. Eden also had “great success … for consistent support from the Herald Tribune” through private meetings with the paper’s owners, the Reid family (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.58).

However, Eden still possessed a blindspot for some of the more clandestine aspects of press relations. Rhodes James (1987, p.411-12) goes so far as to label Eden “a complete innocent” given that he decided to abolish the tightly-ran operation that had existed under Churchill at the Press Office in which “a small group met regularly to decide which confidential documents should be leaked to the press, and specifically to which newspapers and reporters”. Such action of course back-fired, as he alienated sections of the press lobby who had benefited from such an operation. One political correspondent “was at first bewildered, and then enraged, when his sources of information suddenly dried up, and became notably hostile to the Eden government as a result” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.412).

And this hostility reached a crescendo in January 1956. The ‘Eden Must Go’ campaign was seemingly orchestrated primarily by the Daily Telegraph which “turned against Eden so strongly that Eden began to feel that there was a deliberate vendetta against him” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.412). As much seems to have been spurred on by Pamela Berry, wife of the outlet’s owner, perhaps for reasons of political hostility (Eden, 2008). However, it was actually The Times that fired the first salvo on 2nd January 1956 with a column claiming that the government was under the threat of collapse if it continued to fail to exhibit “high purpose”, with the Daily Mail following this the next day with accusations of Eden’s “delay and indecisiveness” (Lamb, 1987, p.13).

The most notorious contribution came from Donald McLachlan writing for the Daily Telegraph. What was most memorable was the following, “There is a favourite gesture with
the prime minister. To emphasise a point he will clash one fist to smash the open palm of the other hand but the smash is seldom heard” (McLachlan, 1956). These words deeply-affected Eden, as attested to by Butler who claims to have been present when Eden read this article and “drew a pained and pungent oath” (Butler, 1971, p.183).

Butler’s account is indicative of how some of Eden’s characteristics served to maximise the damage dealt to his own reputation. Given the fact that “Eden has often been seen as possessing an impulsive nature and there is little doubt that he was motivated by a great deal of pride in his achievements” (Pearson, 2002, p.15), an aspect of his personality considered by Kyle (2003, p.146) to be “extremely vain” (see chapter 6), it should not be surprising that according to Anthony Nutting (1967, p.254) newspaper articles frequently “hit him right between the eyes”.

This obsession litters his personal diary, in which he would often vent his feelings on this coverage; “Torrents of abuse these days in press. D[aily] T[elegraph] has of course encouraged Tory discontent, because nobody knows the personal vendetta that lies behind it. But on the whole I think that the enemy is overplaying his hand” (quoted in Rhodes James, 1987, p.425). This occasionally flared up in public appearances, as occurred when Eden devoted a speech in Bradford on 18th January 1956 to attacking the press and his coverage, referring to “cantankerous newspapers” and labelling their comments “hullabaloo” (Eden, 1956). As opposed to ignoring the saga, Eden’s counter-attack only served to make plain that it took very little to get under the prime minister’s skin.

2.3 Broadcast media

Eden was slightly more successful when it came to courting the broadcast media. As Langer (2007) has noted, television is a particularly personalised medium compared to the print media as political coverage in this format tends to give an individual much more influence and control over how they project themselves. Whereas a politician cannot directly appear in literary coverage, broadcast coverage allows them to choose and employ varying tones, gestures and cues for different purposes. Not restricted by the literary medium or reliance on his Press Secretary, Eden “took naturally to the camera” with Theakston (2007, p.43) noting that he was in fact the first prime minister to address the nation face-to-face in this format.

This propensity was best seen in the 1955 general election campaign. Although television was still relatively novel, Eden made consummate use of the format “with his TV broadcasts during the 1955 election being highly rated” (Theakston, 2007, p.43). Eden repeatedly managed to distinguish himself as an entity separate and distinct from the Conservative Party and his colleagues, managing to convey through his tone and gestures
an image of “being less a party politician than a responsible statesman in office” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.407). He was just as skilled at utilising his colleagues to enhance this perception. He has been credited with “inaugurat[ing] a new era in electioneering when Eden, Macmillan, Butler and Iain Macleod … appeared on television to be cross-questioned by editors”, something praised as “a real triumph for Eden” (Lamb, 1987, p.11).

At an institutional level, tensions did fray between Eden and the BBC. He held a deep-seated dislike of what he referred to as “those Communists at the BBC” which came to the fore when by invoking impartiality they allowed Gaitskell to broadcast a statement on the eve of troop deployments in Egypt (Thorpe, 2011, pp.498). It was this keenness for impartiality that seems to have so angered Eden, given the crisis faced by Britain, noting in his private correspondence with Churchill that, “The BBC is exasperating me by leaning over backwards to be what they call neutral and to present both sides of the case, by which I suppose they mean our country’s and the Dancing Major’s” (quoted in Rhodes James, 1987, p.516).

Therefore, his relationship with the BBC never went beyond “uncomfortable at best” and he ruled against conducting future broadcasts at the BBC studios because he was suspicious that the staff were purposefully shining lights in his eyes (Thorpe, 2011, p.497; Shaw, 1996). Clark and the Press Office were supposedly responsible for neglecting to properly vet the premises before his broadcast on 3rd November 1956, which by the account of a Senior Producer at the BBC at the time were not “suitable to surroundings in which to make so momentous a broadcast”, a fact of which “she was ashamed” (Thorpe, 2011, p.498). Despite his personal charm, this demonstrates the importance of a well-structured media organisation so as to complement these skills.

2.4 Speeches

As in America, in Britain oratorical performances are a regular phenomenon for politicians to engage in. Finlayson and Martin (2008, pp.447) suggest that the speech is a key indicator of a prime minister’s ability to communicate with the public, as “a definitive statement of political direction” or “demonstration of an individual’s skill and public character”. They identify a series of structured events that mark the American political calendar at which a president’s ‘outer face’ is subjected to regularised scrutiny; State of the Union addresses; inauguration speeches; debating platforms.

In Britain these events similarly possess distinctive settings and are governed by institutionalised procedures; the House of Commons; PMQs; Party Conference speeches. In this sense, “the speech’ can itself be thought of as an institution in British politics” (Finlayson
and Martin, 2008, p.449). As such, this section considers Eden’s performances in a number of settings such as the House of Commons and Party Conference.

Eden has been considered an effective but modest speaker, Macmillan commenting that “Eden never makes a really remarkable speech, since he never says anything memorable. But he never makes a bad speech” (Catterall, 2003, p.491). However, his reputation in the House of Commons was immeasurably better than this, with Rhodes James (1987, p.404) praising Eden as an “outstandingly qualified” performer in the House of Commons “after over thirty years” of speaking within this setting.

While Theakston (2007) considers Eden to be in league with the likes of Thatcher and Callaghan as a competent and effective but not superlative speaker, Rhodes James (1987, p.404) views him as “one of the best - perhaps the best” speaker of his time. At his best, Eden could clearly and succinctly articulate a policy perspective, as he did in 1952 at Columbia University when he explained Britain’s ambivalence towards the ECSC in terms of “feeling it in our bones” (Eden, 1952), considered to be “a defining moment” in the development of European policy (Thorpe, 2011, p.452).

What his occasional speech-writer Peter Tapsell has referred to as Eden’s “hypnotic charm” over an audience was deployed throughout the 1955 general election in which Eden would effectively utilise the open-air meetings of “some ten thousand” to project a “patently sincere” demeanour that could “make an immense impression” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.408). This was seen at the 1955 Party Conference at which Eden (1955) outlined his desire for Britain to “lead the world in this new scientific age and discover something of the mysteries which today cloud the vision of man”.

However, Eden’s most well-received Party Conference appearance occurred in 1950 at Blackpool when he outlined his vision of a ‘property-owning democracy’ (see chapter 5). At Blackpool “Eden’s was the principal speech” and the passages contrasting “the Socialist purpose [of] concentration of ownership in the hands of the state” with “what freedom means … the fulfillment of individual personality and the maintenance of individual liberty” received an ovation from the delegates (Rhodes James, 1987, p.327; Eden, 1950). His use of such emotive language - ‘liberty’, ‘freedom’ and ‘Socialist’ - indicates an awareness of his audience and the purpose of his speech - to energise and motivate the grassroots.

However, his utterances often bordered on cliches. Shuckburgh (1986, p.105) notes of this; “AE wrote a lot of [the 1955 Party Conference speech] himself. It is crammed with platitudes”. However, this was not helped by Eden’s reliance on Shuckburgh (1986, p.151-52) who likewise suffered from a mundane style, as he writes, “Perhaps I am at fault in pandering to him - by turning the FO drafts which he hates so much … into Edenese. But I know what he likes, and give it to him”. ‘Property-owning democracy’, ‘working for peace’ and ‘balancing both sides’ are all platitudes that featured frequently in Eden’s speeches.
Shuckburgh’s (1986, p.328) irritation at ‘Edenese’ is palpable in the following excerpt; “Couldn’t bear to hear A.E.’s speech: full of ‘the work we are doing together for peace’ - it gets more insincere-sounding every day”.

2.4.1 House of Commons

Eden was a prestigious performer in the House of Commons, Rhodes James (1987, p.79) referring to him as “one of the most skilled and sensitive parliamentarians of modern times”. Although his maiden speech was considered unimpressive, his succession of Stafford Cripps as Leader of the House of Commons in November 1942 tempered a style “based on deep knowledge and preparation” rather than flashy oratory (Rhodes James, 1987, p.79). As the war-time coalition's principal spokesman in the House of Commons, Eden found himself having “to spend large parts of his working day on the Front Bench handling an infinite variety of topics” (Carlton, 1981, p.216). This style reflected Eden’s grasp of details (see chapter 6) but it requires an able public speaker to present such factual utterances in an engaging manner.

This style made Eden well-suited to tackling complex and often misunderstood issues in the House of Commons, as occurred on 5th April 1954 when he was forced to defend Churchill. The latter was being assailed for the assurances - or lack of - he received from the Americans regarding hydrogen bomb tests, and Eden’s contribution was “masterly” as he “corrected Attlee, sustained [Churchill], but managed at the same time to soothe the House and reduce everyone to calm” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.160).

Yet Eden’s detailed style was not always well-suited to the atmosphere of the House of Commons. This occurred on 7th March 1956 following the dismissal of General Glubb from the Arab Legion’s command (see chapter 4) and Eden’s subsequent appearance in the House of Commons backfired tremendously, opening up serious political space for Eden’s leadership to come under renewed pressure.

As Alderman (1992, p.67) argues, a prime minister’s performance in the House of Commons affects “morale among backbenchers on both sides of the House, who regard them as crucial tests of their leaders' mettle. They have become an important barometer of parliamentary politics”. Eden’s priority at the time was to make a purely diplomatic speech - bereft of any details or proposals - with the effect of soothing troubled Anglo-Jordanian relations (Dutton, 1997). However, perhaps a more rousing and oratorical contribution from a prime minister - in the mould of Churchill or Thatcher - might have been better-suited to rallying colleagues and countering internal critics.

Eden’s abilities in the House of Commons were tested from July to November 1956 following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. The outrage and uproar that any prime
minister in Eden’s position would have had to face in the House of Commons in light of these events certainly posed an acute risk, yet Eden’s first appearance on 2nd August 1956 was “statesmanlike, well argued and well received” (Lamb, 1987, p.201) and Thorpe (2011, p.451) refers to Eden at this time as “remarkably relaxed, in full command and not at all on edge”. Eden conveyed “considerable moderation and calmness” and “rehearsed the legal arguments” so as to assure colleagues of the legality behind the government’s course of action (Rhodes James, 1987, pp.480).

From the outset he declared “the special character of the [Suez] Canal” and proceeded to embark on a lengthy justification of his case, referring not only to his own prior comments in the House of Commons relating to the subject, but likewise to historical agreements such as “a series of Agreements over the years between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company” as well as the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1954) which was “endorsed by the Egyptian Government as recently as 10th June this year, when a formal financial Agreement was concluded between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company” (Hansard, HC Deb., 2 August 1956).

Such intense detail set Eden up for the following denunciation, “These undertakings are now torn up, and one can have no confidence - no confidence - in the word of a man who does that”, firmly positing Eden as the wronged party with “the objective [of] the praise or condemnation of someone or something” (Hansard, HC Deb., 2 August 1956; Finlayson, 2007, p.556). This attests to Thorpe’s (2011, p.451) observation that Eden’s skills in public communication were accentuated at times of crisis, “his public performances had a quiet dignity. There was a stillness about him in the darkest days when he had taken his decisions, and could do no other”.

2.5 Conclusion:

How capable was Eden at managing the ‘outer face’ of his premiership? An unruly Press Secretary meant that rumours and claims were accentuated rather than diminished, a tendency that was also influenced by Eden’s sensitivity to press hostility. This meant that Eden’s Press Office rarely ever reinforced his charm and telegenic qualities, as occurred when vetting broadcasting studios. Although he came across well in a personal capacity on both television and in the House of Commons, the alienation of much of the press meant that by the time of the Suez Crisis Eden had few contacts to draw upon and exploit. Furthermore his style was highly-dependant on context, as was seen when it was ill-suited in the case of his response to Glubb’s dismissal.
Chapter Three: Organisational capacity

3.1 Introduction

Organisational capacity is the inner face of leadership. Greenstein (2000, p.5) argues that it relates to the “ability to rally … colleagues and structure their activities effectively”. Within a British political context, Theakston (2011, p.13) views this as relating to “Number 10 staff, the machinery of government, and the organisation and use of the Cabinet system”. Another aspect of organisational capacity however is developing “effective institutional arrangements” (Greenstein, 2006, p.23) which Bose (2006, p.32) identifies as involving “defined responsibilities and chains of command” supported by a “carefully culled group of advisers [that] can help to balance a president’s responsibilities”. The Private Office and the wider civil service best resemble these kinds of processes, with the prime minister having full discretion at staffing the former.

Eden’s organisational capacity in these respects was limited. He did not exhibit the deep thought on issues of machinery of government that was seen with Attlee. His criteria for staffing tended to be those that agreed with him and a striking case of groupthink came to permeate the inner-workings of Eden’s government. As prime minister he proved an effective chairman of Cabinet, yet he created a system of constant micromanagement which proved detrimental to the performance of his leadership.

3.2 Private Office

The role of Private Secretaries is that of “intermediaries, not advisers” whose responsibility is to provide “summaries of meetings, reminders to the prime minister of matters requiring urgent attention, formal communications with ministers” (Ruane, 2017, p.36). In a broader sense, managing the prime minister’s workload and preventing overload may also be included. As Shuckburgh (1986, p.10) wrote, the “Private Secretary became better able than his colleagues to understand why the minister often cannot follow up policies which, intellectually and in the seclusion of the Office, he might have agreed were right”. Their insights into their boss is perhaps unrivalled in their immediate political environment.

However, Eden’s relationship with his Private Office took on a different tone, somewhat inevitably. Given that he was “pathetically anxious to canvass opinion” (Harvey, 1973, p.265) it would seem that Ruane’s (2017, pp.36) observation that “the day-to-day proximity of these officials to Eden undoubtedly encouraged him to use them as informal sounding boards” is a real likelihood. A more intimate relationship was hinted at by Frederick
Bishop, Head of Eden’s Private Office from January 1956, when he said that, “It was very much a relationship in which he felt he could say anything that he wanted to say and could rely on it not going any further unless it were appropriate” (Ruane, 2017, pp.36-7).

Eden’s reliance on his Private Secretaries is attested to by many of his contemporaries; Brendan Bracken commented on how he “could not live without an array of secretaries” (Lockhart, 1973, p.557); it was Macmillan’s experience that Eden would “have a mass of people round when he was trying to write a speech. How he ever wrote it I can’t imagine. Everybody talking; a tremendous flap went on” (Home, 1989, p.375).

Hence Eden’s Private Office proves a useful case study for assessing what Theakston (2007, p.45) describes as “the prime minister’s ability or willingness to be open to a range of points of view and variety of arguments”. A key aspect of organisational capacity, this involves the quality of advice a prime minister receives and the extent to which it may challenge, support or moderate Eden’s own biases and opinions.

Given their importance to Eden, what was the criteria for their selection? Eden trusted those “drawn from that narrow circle of political and professional associates with whom he had forged his career in the later 1930s” (Dutton, 1997, p.459). He tended to associate himself with individuals who fed what Kyle (2003, p.88) refers to as Eden’s “dubious historical analogies” which had such an overbearing influence on his decision-making processes throughout the Suez Crisis. Similar reasoning may explain Eden’s dependence on Norman Brook throughout his premiership and the Suez Crisis. He had worked with Eden during the 1940-45 war-time coalition and was anti-appeasement (Kyle, 1999).

### 3.2.1 Sir Norman Brook

Brook served as Cabinet Secretary (1947-62) to four successive prime ministers and served simultaneously as Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, as well as Head of the Home Civil Service, from 1956-62. His reputation in Whitehall and in the wider academic literature is impressive, with Theakston (1999, p.104) referring to him as “the great technician of Cabinet government in mid-century [emphasis own]”. His skills included “a hardly ever failing instinct for a compromise or a procedural device which would resolve the worst ministerial deadlocks” (Jay, 1980, p.95). This “mastery of the inter-departmental labyrinth” allowed Brook immense influence by “negotiating and bargaining with departments, striving to minimize the frictions and difficulties at the official level, trying to get some order into tangled discussions, preparing the ground for ministerial decisions” (Theakston, 1999, p.100).
Churchill - for one - grew to rely significantly on Brook, consulting him on Cabinet appointments and himself being privy to a personal letter in October 1956 detailing American policy as well as Eden’s thinking (Theakston, 1999). This at the very least, then, indicates that Brook in fact remained close to Eden. This in itself is a truly intriguing fact given Eden’s temperamental loneliness. As far as Eden did have an ‘inner circle’ of sorts this numbered a few truly close colleagues, such as Lord Salisbury and Guy Millard. As well as Eden’s fondness for like-minded individuals he was familiar with, then, Brook’s superlative knowledge and grasp of Whitehall would have served as further reason for Eden to increase his own reliance on him.

Brook felt comfortable enough by the time Eden took on the premiership to voice his concerns over subjects sitting well outside his own briefs. In February 1956 - for instance - Brook urged the prime minister to “make it clear that there is nothing wrong with a high level of consumption, so long as it is earned”, and in March 1956 he then encouraged Eden to devise an anti-inflation publicity campaign that would involve the government press officers working in tandem with Conservative Central Office (PRO PREM 11/1320, cited in Theakston, 1999, p.111).

The locational power which flowed from his position as Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service - affording Brook significant authority and oversight on all civil service matters - was displayed in the following correspondence from August 1955 in which Eden queried the proper definition of ‘prior consultation’ regarding documents which relate to expenditure being submitted to the Cabinet; “‘consultation” does not mean “consent” … The Treasury must not be allowed to use this rule in such a way as to bar access to the Cabinet” (PRO PREM 11/2617, cited in Theakston, 1999, p.115).

It is Theakston’s (1999, p.120) judgement that Brook played “a key role” throughout the Suez Crisis, “occupying a pivotal position in the government machinery which handled the crisis”. Such machinery is a reference to Brook’s role as secretary of the ministerial Egypt Committee - an entity that took on the role of an ‘inner Cabinet’ (see section 3.4.2) - as well as chairing the Egypt (Official) Committee of senior civil servants, and the Defence (Transitional) Committee which oversaw much of the military coordination (Hennessy, 2001).

It would seem that Brook was one of the few in Eden’s entourage who was willing to voice his concerns over policy, however unreceptive the prime minister might be. By August 1956 Clark (1986, p.168) claims that the Defence (Transition) Committee “emerged automatically from its cocoon” and Brook began warning Eden of the growing unpopularity of military action within Britain.

Brook also made sure that any references to the Sevres Protocol were largely scrubbed from Cabinet minutes (a reference to ‘secret conversations’ features once) as well as burning all sensitive and confidential documents once the ceasefire had been announced.
on 6th November 1956 (Theakston, 1999; Hennessy, 1990; 2001). Nevertheless, given that he described the military intervention as “a folly” to Shuckburgh (1986, p.366) it is likely that he was not privately supportive of the policy of which Eden had decided upon by October 1956.

3.2.2 Frederick Bishop

Bishop undoubtedly possessed “tact and skills”; having to temper Eden’s nervousness, outbursts and sensitivity cannot have been easy (Rhodes James, 1987, p.406). But Bishop’s role and influence over Eden’s decision-making ends any suggestion that he was acting as a mere intermediary. Ruane (2017, p.39) argues that Bishop’s advice certainly “left its mark” on Eden and he was “no mere functionary”. His views on foreign affairs have been referred to as hawkish and litter his correspondence with Eden.

For instance, in August 1956 Bishop stressed the “risks of letting Nasser ‘get away with this’” and on 2nd November 1956 proceeded to counsel Eden to ensure that no matter what circumstances “must leave us free to continue to occupy key parts of the canal” (PRO PREM 11/1100; PRO PREM 11/1105, cited in Ruane, 2017, pp.39). The overtones are clear; Nasser must be stopped in his tracks lest another dictator became overconfident. In the same correspondence, he did nothing to challenge Eden’s desire to marginalise the United States from the operation, recommending that the Americans should be kept as distant as possible given the use of equipment secured from them under the Mutual Defence Agreement by the invasion task-force.

Bishop - as would Brook - also gave advice on how to handle the Cabinet, conveying that he thought it “unwise to wait much longer before binding all your colleagues into our present policy” and emphasising that he thought “the Cabinet would have to realise that a point must come at which the pursuit of diplomatic methods is no longer in our interests” (PRO PREM 11/1100, cited in Ruane, 2017, pp.40-41; Kyle, 1999). Ruane (2017, p.41) is correct in asserting that this “was an extraordinary recommendation for a career civil servant to make with regard to the handling of the elected members” of the government. Even moreso, it is evident that Bishop was like-mindedly seeing a diplomatic solution as futile and that a forceful solution may soon be needed.

3.2.3 Guy Millard

Bishop was but one figure in the Private Office who reinforced Eden’s drift towards collusion in 1956. Guy Millard was one of Bishop’s subordinates, and had been Eden’s Private Secretary throughout the Second World War. He has been labelled as “primus inter
pares" of the Private Secretaries, “the closest adviser to the prime minister” (Ruane, 2017, p.43). As Owen (2005, p.397) has outlined, Millard was “not only present at all [the PM’s] most important meetings on international affairs, but would see him late at night, early in the morning, read his notations on documents and listen in on many of his telephone conversations”.

There is evidence that this role was not one particularly welcomed by Millard, though, as Shuckburgh (1986, p.326) recalls that “Guy loathes his job, and has tried to get out of it”. Eden’s working habits were certainly as unconventional as his predecessor’s. As with Churchill, Eden acquired “the habit of doing business from his bed, so that part of the Private Secretary’s duty was to conduct moderately important persons such as junior members of the government, Assistant Under-Secretaries and frightened heads of Foreign Office departments upstairs to his bedroom, standing by them there and seeing them off again” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.8).

As well as this, there was Eden’s temper and illness to contest with (see chapter six). Shuckburgh (1986, p.10) recalls that “office hours were nothing”. “Eden required attention at many unconventional times”, most commonly because of issues arising from his ill-health which meant Shuckburgh (1986, p.10) “frequently had to spend the whole weekend away at Binderton [Eden’s house in Sussex], in order to provide a link with the [Private Office]”. If for any reason Shuckburgh (1986, p.339) was unavailable he was “awoken by the PM on the telephone, with a really nasty tone. ‘Where are you? Are you in the country?’”

In any case, we can assume that “as with Bishop … he was four-square behind his master’s handling of the situation” (Ruane, 2017, p.46) given his comments that “there was a lot of humbug about Suez” and his presence at the 14th October 1956 Chequers meeting that preceded the Sevres meetings (two of which took place, both of which Millard was fully briefed on). However, although these are suggestive of Millard’s views, and centrality to Eden’s Downing Street operation, they do little to suggest direct input from Millard akin to Bishop’s in this period.

For this, Ruane (2017) references a rare piece of correspondence between Eden and Millard from 18th October 1955 in which the latter does much to reaffirm Eden’s anxieties over the Middle East and the risk of Communist infiltration in the region; “Our weakness is correspondingly great … If this is Soviet policy, we might have to defend our M.E. policy much more vigorously - with men, money” (PRO PREM 11/1079, cited in Ruane, 2017, pp.46-7). Such advice is hard to interpret as anything but akin to the hawkish views similarly espoused by Bishop.

### 3.3 The Cabinet
Certain ministerial colleagues are much more able to present their views and arguments to a prime minister than perhaps a Private Secretary. However, the deficiencies in Eden’s Private Office prove to be what Greenstein (1988, pp.350-51) refers to as “organisational pathologies”, attributes that pervade government machinery in all of it’s parts. The Cabinet was no different and this is indicative of the effect that Eden’s personality had on the operational working of his government. For Hennessy (2001, p.219) Eden practised “a malign and self-defeating version of prime-ministerial government”; William Clark (1986, p.178) thought the Cabinet to be generally “a bit weak”; Butler (1971, p. 100) thought Eden “much nearer to being a dictator than Churchill at the height of the war”.

These assessments are damning, but may be argued to contain just a hint of hyperbole, especially Butler’s. However, it is plain to see from Eden’s correspondence with Duncan Sandys that he was content on keeping advice and decision-making within a narrow circle of his own discretion, “It would not … be possible for the Cabinet as a whole to discuss the plans for any military operations that might have to be undertaken. Knowledge of these details must, for obvious reasons of security, be confined within the narrowest possible circle” (PRO PREM 11/1152, cited in Hennessy, 2001, p.238).

This narrow circle tended to include Eden, Lloyd, Macmillan and Butler - the only Cabinet ministers who he intended to know of the Sevres Protocol (Heath also ended up knowing of its existence, as did several civil servants, including Brook) (Pearson, 2002). Indeed, were Eden’s collusion with the Israelis to succeed “the full Cabinet had to be deceived … Eden’s temptation had trapped him into a course of less than full disclosure to his Cabinet colleagues as a whole” (Hennessy, 2001, p.238). Kept within the remit of four Cabinet ministers (Eden included, Heath excluded) the Sevres Protocol and the proceeding operation simply cannot have been subject to the scrutiny it undoubtedly deserved.

To what extent were ministers complicit in this, though? The question itself may sound rather ridiculous given that Eden was undoubtedly responsible for keeping collusion hidden from view, but as Heffeman (2005, pp.65-6) succinctly identifies, “[prime ministers] can dominate, but never control their government. Domination usually involves the compliance of a clique of senior ministers”. Shifting the focus to ministers themselves rather than Eden has caused Dutton (1997, p.424) to go as far as to claim “that Eden did not abandon the conventional norms of cabinet government” - a surprising evaluation of a prime minister who engaged in collusion and then lied about it to Parliament.

The behaviour of ministers may have been influenced by the fact that it was Anthony Eden they were serving under. Greenstein’s (2006, p.23) criteria for organisational skills includes “minimising the tendency of subordinates to defer to [leaders] rather than present … their unvarnished views”. Relevant here are the comments of Peter Thorneycroft who,
writing as a minister, accounts of the extent to which the organisational pathology that plagued the Private Office likewise affected the Cabinet;

“I think it’s important to remember how overpowering Anthony’s position was. He was not only prime minister but he was considered to be … the greatest foreign policy expert that we’d had for a long time. It’s very difficult to challenge a prime minister, but to challenge a prime minister on foreign policy if that’s his real strength is very difficult indeed” (What Has Become Of Us?, 1993).

Given Eden’s reputation throughout the Second World War as Churchill’s Foreign Secretary, whose skill and achievements were only refined further on his return in 1951-55 with the likes of the Geneva Conference (1954), it is easy to see how an attitude of quiet assent pervaded both the Cabinet and Whitehall. It is Rhodes James’ (1987, p.498) belief that “it was tacitly accepted that these grave matters should be handled by the prime minister’s inner team” given that “confidence in Eden was so high”.

There is a point, though, at which this belief in Eden became “a high degree of self-deception”, especially as more and more revealed itself to Cabinet ministers (Hennessy, 2001, p.223). Once the Israeli attack on Egypt was revealed to the Cabinet on 25th October 1956, “it was perfectly obvious that nothing was going to be done to stop [it] and that this was a clear pretext for putting Musketeer Revise into operation” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.537).

In this sense, “Eden was very ill served by his ministers” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.494). Primarily this is in reference to the ‘big-hitters’ - Macmillan, Butler and Lloyd. A junior minister made clear the effect that their seniors’ compliance had on the lower ranks to Rhodes James (1987, p.495); “The rest of us were not only junior, but were overawed by Eden, not because he was the prime minister but because of his great reputation in these areas. And so we went along with what we thought was wholly agreed by our seniors”.

Monckton (Minister of Defence, 1955-56) had long-held doubts about the approach that the government was taking yet did little to nothing to make Eden aware of this. The fact that, despite these, he still backed Eden earned him Birkenhead’s (1969, p.310) characterisation as a “loyal but irresolute member of the team”. But this loyalty was little help to a prime minister who was already prone to groupthink and averse to criticism (see chapter 6).

Had Monckton made clear his anxieties over Musketeer/Musketeer Revise - the United Nations situation; the lack of American support; the divisive nature at home - would Eden have changed course? Unlikely. Although he was certainly in a critical position for the operation as Minister of Defence, Monckton did not really possess a following in the Conservative Party and was primarily waiting for retirement following a laborious stint at the Ministry of Labour throughout 1951-55 (Birkenhead, 1969).
Butler’s reticence, despite possessing a following in the Conservative Party and frequently tipped as a future prime minister, is more understandable. He was “unwell and lonely” following the death of his wife in 1954 and “certainly did not press for information” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.498). Indeed, not a single member of the Cabinet pressed for the records of the Egypt Committee to be circulated to the wider Cabinet.

Lloyd, likewise with Monckton, was in a more critical position to the operation than Butler. As Foreign Secretary, it was he who had to carry out much of the groundwork in negotiating the Sevres Protocol as well as defending Britain at the United Nations. It was Harold Beeley’s assessment that Lloyd “was not very confident in his own judgement … and I think Selwyn felt that he ought not to challenge Eden’s judgement” whilst Tony Nutting perceived him to be “a pure mouthpiece of AE” (Hennessy, 1996, p.140; Shuckburgh, 1986, p.314). Lloyd was aware of his position relative to that of Eden, having told Shuckburgh (1986, p.327) that he recognised himself as “a contented animal; I know I have been over-promoted, there can be no question of my disloyalty”. Hennessy (2001, p.246) is astute in writing that “Eden paid a high price for having a cipher in the Foreign Office”.

Perhaps the most powerful minister was Harold Macmillan. Having served as both Foreign Secretary (1955-56) and then Chancellor of the Exchequer (1956-7) he was a central figure within Eden’s government. However, Macmillan was hindered by Eden’s distrust in him, with Nutting claiming that the two were “watching each other’ a little too cautiously” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.270). This cannot have been helped by the furore over bread and milk subsidies that occurred in February 1956, and by the time that the Suez Crisis erupted there was little goodwill - or even functionality - between the prime minister and his chancellor (Shuckburgh, 1986).

Clearly ministers should have played a more critical role throughout the process. But the Cabinet is ultimately an institution at the prime minister’s discretion; it is he/she who possesses the prerogative of ministerial appointment, who may direct their efforts and decide the extent of its resources. It was Eden’s responsibility to bear in mind his own faults and shortfalls, and to construct a Cabinet that could account for these.

### 3.3.1 Inability to delegate

What does the ability to “structure … activities effectively” entail? (Greenstein, 2000, p.5). In the British context, it requires a prime minister to consider the “system of collegial government” in which they find themselves “having to share power” (Heffernan, 2005, p.54). Although there is room for manoeuvre within this - Thatcher preferred a docile Cabinet reduced to ‘rubber-stamping’; Wilson desired a diverse Cabinet that frequently clashed with itself - prime ministers are generally restricted regarding the extent to which they can
conduct all government business alone. For a prime minister to “forge a team and get the most out of it” there is a need to delegate some degree of responsibility to these individuals (Greenstein, 2006, p.23).

Eden wholly failed in this regard. Although Cabinet meetings dispatched business orderly given that Eden would frequently chair Churchill’s Cabinets over the period 1951-55, this was, however, matched by the fact “he hates to let the controls go out of his hands even for a minute” (Harvey, 1973, pp.201-03). There is evidence that the Cabinet was showing signs of dysfunction well before Eden ascended to the premiership. It is notable that Eden kept his first Cabinet almost precisely as Churchill had left it in April 1955, and observers noted its inability to coordinate government business prior to the latter’s takeover. Shuckburgh (1986, p.100) considered in August 1953 that it conducted business “feebly and under pressure from the PM” as he witnessed Eden receive “so little active support in Cabinet when he is fighting the PM’s bright ideas”

Yet Eden’s own disposition contributed further to this dysfunction once becoming prime minister. He was “a great fusser … rather like an Arab horse. He used to get terribly het up and excited and he had to be sort of kept down” (Hennessy, 2001, p.207). Indeed, it is with no sense of over-proportion that Hennessy (2001, p.213) labels Eden as “the greatest fusser to have filled the premiership probably of the last century; certainly since 1945”. This commonly manifested itself in a “chronic inability to delegate” (Dutton, 1997, p.325), something Young (1988, p.13) labelled as an “intellectual disability” of Eden’s.

One such episode involved him demanding to be consulted on appointments to the boards of nationalised industries, although given his already significant workload and lack of real expertise regarding selection this did little but delay the process “for embarrassingly long periods”, much to the annoyance of Butler (Boyd-Carpenter,1980, p.122 ). Butler was subject to much of this interference specifically, with the corrective package he was due to deliver in late-1955 subjected to remorseless micro-management by Eden (see chapter 4)

Much of this took place via telephone, Dutton (1997, pp.479) referring to it as “almost a drug for Eden”. This was perhaps “the most dreaded manifestation of this passion for meddling”, Butler having complained of “innumerable telephone calls” (Hennessy, 2001, p.214; Lamb, 1987, p.13). Nor was Macmillan spared from this, having complained of Eden “ringing up all the time” (Horne, 1988, pp.371-72) while Lloyd was subject to “thirty telephone calls from Chequers over the Christmas weekend of 1955” (Dutton, 1997, pp.478-79).

Eden ultimately failed in structuring his colleagues’ activities, temperamentally disinclined as he was to take on the role of the Olympian, in Rhodes James’ (1987) language, and opted instead for an approach designed to allow him as much direct control over policy as possible. In as much, Eden showed no concern for structuring the activities and efforts of his ministers in a decentralised manner, allowing for problems to be tackled by
the individual ministers concerned. This might have allowed Eden to take a much more strategic view to policy coordination, but as many authors have highlighted he was temperamentally disinclined to do this (Carlton, 1981; Dutton, 1997).

3.3.2 Cabinet Committee System

The Cabinet Committee System truly came into its own during the Second World War as it was utilised throughout the wartime coalition in order to coordinate the sheer volume of government business that was flowing in and out of Downing Street (Finlayson, 2002). Eden, perhaps a consequence of his war-time experience with the system, proved willing to utilise it for issues which he found particularly intractable.

This was to be expected, as being thrust into the premiership forces a politician to deal with a much wider array of issues than is done when heading a single department. At the outset Eden had “sensed the need to consider a whole range of questions on economic, social and industrial relations” and subsequently instructed a series of Cabinet Committees to study them (Hennessy, 2001, p.211). The Ministerial Committee on Emergencies, for example, was created to deal with industrial strikes, while legislation in this area was delegated to the Industrial Affairs Committee headed by Monckton.

Eden was helped in this matter by the presence of Brook. His advice to Eden was often thoughtful, as the following correspondence on the creation of a Colonial Policy Committee makes clear; “I suspect that other ministers and Departments have the feeling that they are constantly being confronted by situations of great urgency because the Colonial Office have failed to let them have advance information of developments which they knew or suspected to be taking place” (PRO PREM 11/2617, cited in Theakston, 1999, p.113).

Despite this, these committees rarely “got to grips with such difficult issues, let alone initiated any action upon them” (Hennessy, 2001, p.211). For example, although he found himself intrigued by policies such as enhanced share ownership and savings schemes, Eden found himself unable to instill the necessary momentum within these committees to pursue or contemplate them.

Likewise, Eden failed to chair the Economic Policy Committee even though he had struggled to impose his will on Butler regarding bread subsidies, followed by even more firmness from his successor. As Hennessy (2001, pp.211) writes, it “simply did not occur to Eden how he might ensure that arrangements which suited him were put in place, let alone to chair such an important, strategic ministerial group himself as Attlee (though not Churchill) had done”.

Having said this, Hennessy (2001) does praise Eden’s use of the Cabinet Committee System throughout the Suez Crisis. “Within hours of Nasser’s action, a new Whitehall
structure had been created" (Rhodes James, 1987, p.462); the Defence (Transitional) Committee was created by Eden to oversee non-military aspects of the Suez Crisis at the behest of the Egypt Committee. This latter committee was officially the main decision-making unit throughout the Suez Crisis that handled military operations. It is notable that both Musketeer and its successor, Musketeer Revise, were both presented firstly to the Egypt Committee before the Cabinet was allowed access (Hennessy, 2001).

Although Hennessy (2001, p.221-39) has labelled the Egypt Committee “an unhappy and scrappy body” he nevertheless concedes that “in its unwieldy way, [it met] the need for War Cabinets to blend the political and the military aspects of an emergency”. In keeping itself abreast of developments on behalf of the main Cabinet, the Egypt Committee was well-briefed by the “eight military figures, ten civil servants and eight secretaries” that were at its disposal, while its members represented all Cabinet positions directly relevant to the operation; membership totalled Eden, Salisbury (Lord President), Macmillan (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Home (Commonwealth Secretary) and Monckton (Minister of Defence) (Hennessy, 2001, p.239).

However, the Egypt Committee fell short in functioning as “a blender of politico-military considerations and as a shaper of strategy and political direction” (Hennessy, 2001, p.240). In this regard, one can highlight the fact that zero thought or direction was provided regarding post-occupation plans - Musketeer/Musketeer Revise only extended up to the point at which the Suez Canal was seized.

3.4 Conclusion

It is difficult to envisage any critical input whatsoever emerging from Eden’s Private Office, even less so when placed in the context of a prime minister as isolated as Eden. In any case, his preference was to be isolated with “those who seemed ready to place an unquestioning confidence in his judgement”, of which both Bishop and Millard seem to represent (Dutton, 1997, p.427). Although Brook was willing to interject on some policy issues, Eden failed to utilise his knowledge and skills appropriately. As an instrument for reinforcing a prime minister’s biases and preferences, Eden’s Private Office runs counter to studies of leadership referenced by Theakston (2007, p.47) that rely on “fresh ideas, conflicting points of view and constructive dissent and to avoid ‘groupthink’”.

Similarly, Greenstein’s (1988, pp.350-51) observation that “aides can not only help their boss but can also abuse power in a president’s name, distort the information he receives, and contribute to other organisational pathologies” seems similarly apt, given that in the absence of any counter-arguments Bishop’s and Millard’s advice certainly ran the risk of distorting the proportion, and limiting the range, of the advice Eden was in receipt of.
His tendency to micromanage others’ affairs was detrimental to the activities of his Cabinet colleagues, and tended to frustrate rather than provide meaningful input. Although his colleagues are certainly guilty of supineness - only stepping in to restrain Eden following his departure for Jamaica - it was ultimately Eden’s responsibility to ensure his Cabinet was devised in a manner that would reduce rather than reinforce groupthink.

Meanwhile, his use of the Cabinet Committee System is somewhat impressive, however the fact that he was unable to utilise these committees in a manner that was amenable to his own goals and priorities limits this assessment. This was likewise the case throughout the Suez Crisis, as although an entirely new and appropriate array of committees were created, these failed to extend their considerations to the necessary post-occupation plans.
Chapter Four: Political skill

4.1 Introduction

Although Greenstein (2000) does not explicitly rank his criteria in terms of importance, Bose’s (2006) argument for placing political skill as the second most important area for a leader to excel is convincing. She argues that a successful leader “needs to be able to translate ideas into policy” by working through the various institutions that inhabit their immediate political environment (Bose, 2006, p.30). In other words, political skill is necessary “to achieve the support for the component parts of their overall goal” (Norton, 1987, p.335).

In the American political system this involves a president demonstrating to “constituencies within the system” - Congress, the electorate, party leaders - “that his proposed agenda will benefit them” (Bose, 2006, p.30). This is usually done by leveraging their reputation as a political operator, either with the general public or colleagues (Neustadt, 1980). In order for a leader to do this successfully they must possess the following; “political persuasion, negotiation and deal-making, their sensitivity to power relations and their sense of timing” (Theakston, 2007, p.48).

In this sense, a successful leader is sufficiently aware of his political environment in all of these respects, but must combine these to affect this to his advantage. As Greenstein (2014, p.45) puts it, “a singularly inept politician may reduce the manipulability of his environment” even if he is aware of its constituent parts. But the reverse is also implied, that a singularly adept politician may increase this manipulability. This involves being able to exploit the necessary opportunities when they arise.

Norton (1987) discusses the skills that a prime minister needs in order to interact successfully with the institutions that make-up the British political system, and these are the abilities to command, persuade, manipulate and hide. Given that Greenstein (2000) and Neustadt (1980) are both explicit that they do not consider the ability to command as a realistic means by which to operate in the American political system - a system which places a premium on persuasion and negotiation - Eden’s ability to command is not considered. Neither is his ability to hide, the following subsections instead focusing on Eden’s abilities to persuade and manipulate.

The first subsection considers Eden’s persuasion in relation to party management. It then considers Eden’s skills at manipulation; did he prefer to utilise his immediate environment when handling ministerial colleagues, rather than charm? Was he able to pursue his priorities through utilising the machinery of government, rather than relying on any reputation he may leverage?
4.2 Persuasion

Within Norton’s (1987, p.336) framework, prime ministers may attempt to persuade through a variety of means; “via intellectual argument, the marshalling of superior data, force of oratory, appeals to loyalty or friendship, hectoring … or sweet reasonableness” may all be utilised at one point or another. Norton’s (1987, p.336) conception of persuasion is highly applicable to the context of party management - both in the House of Commons and the Cabinet. A prime minister who provides his/her backbenchers and grassroots with “an opportunity to express an opinion … to their leader” will find them potentially more willing to compromise themselves in pursuit of a policy agenda (Norton, 1987, p.336).

An issue that plagued Eden’s leadership was party management. Dutton (1997, p.460) has argued that Eden “never possessed a strong power-base in the parliamentary party”, an important aspect of successful prime ministerial leadership. Neglecting one’s parliamentary party can mean that a prime minister is less secure and may struggle to implement a policy agenda. This was an issue of which Oliver Harvey (1970, pp.143-44) had written of some years prior to Eden attaining the premiership, himself wishing that Eden “would see more of his colleagues” for fear that “the [backbench MPs] are left out in the cold and there is risk of [Eden] himself becoming isolated from his own age group or colleagues”.

Eden was temperamentally disinclined against the fostering of party relations. Some of his colleagues perceived him as “aloof and unclubbable” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.93); Oliver Harvey (1970, pp.143-44) wrote of his “invincible distaste” for “his colleagues and the [House of Commons]”; Iain Macleod considered Eden to have “absolutely no friends” among his colleagues and the backbenches (Sulzberger, 1970, p.405). Reflecting on the troubles he had with identifying and cultivating relations with his Conservative Party colleagues, an observer had recalled to Rhodes James (1987, p.383) that they had “seldom seen a man more nervous than Eden was when he was sitting in the Commons corridor waiting to be invited into the [1922 Committee]”.

Much of this attitude can perhaps be explained by Eden’s early experience with backbench MPs. He had witnessed the difficulties of managing the Conservative Party as far back as the 1930s during the ‘Baldwin Must Go’ campaign. Reflecting on this period, Eden wrote in his memoirs of how “few in our party had much confidence in our faith [in Baldwin] and the opposition was derisive” (Eden, 1962, pp.12-14). Yet throughout his own premiership, Eden experienced relatively few rebellions in the House of Commons.

Although authors such as Piper (1991, p.222-23) have demonstrated that there was “a dramatic increase in backbench rebellions from the end of World War II to the 1980s”, Eden’s premiership nevertheless witnessed similar degrees of parliamentary rebellion to
Churchill’s peacetime government as well as the 1957-59 period of Macmillan’s tenure. This is illustrated within Norton’s (1978) study of rebellions throughout the 1970-74 Parliament, with reference to those of 1951-55 and 1955-59 possessing rates of rebellion of 1.4% of all whipped divisions.

Yet Eden’s troubles with party management are less surface-level. Rather, his failure to cultivate a following or friendly relations with backbench MPs and grassroots meant that Eden struggled to weather crises that might otherwise have been easier for a prime minister with a broader base of support within their party. Eden’s most vocal critics within the Conservative Party throughout his premiership were the ‘Suez Group’ - notable among which were Charles Waterhouse MP and Julian Amery MP. These figures were “to the right of his own political instincts” (see chapter 5) and were “determined to resist [the] abandonment of British territory and interests” yet were notably a “small but very vocal minority” (Dutton, 1997, p.422; Rhodes James, 1987, p.354). For Eden - a former Foreign Secretary who undertook to limit British overseas commitments and interests - this proved unfortunate.

Cause for anxiety about Eden’s position among the Conservative Party grassroots appeared on 14th February 1956 with the Hereford by-election. The constituency was considered a safe seat for the Conservative Party, yet the by-election witnessed a surge in the Liberal vote - widely-viewed as defunct at this time - to 36.4% and reduced the Tory candidate’s majority to under 3,000 votes (Cook, 2010).

But the first trouble Eden experienced with his own backbench MPs came in early-March 1956 with the dismissal of General Glubb from the Arab Legion. Although King Hussein’s move certainly affected Britain’s ability to conduct operations in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea, Eden’s true difficulty was “how to avoid a further deterioration of his political standing at home” (Cartlon, 1981, p.397). Eden had decided that the only sanction taken against Jordan would be the withdrawal of all remaining officers in the Arab Legion, yet “he had to face what was bound to be a sullen Conservative Party in Parliament” (Cartlon, 1981, p.397).

Glubb’s dismissal brought Eden the further opposition of the Suez Group, Hussein’s disregard for British interests a “vindication of their opposition to Eden over Egypt in 1953 and 1954” throughout the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations (Dutton, 1997, p.379). Yet there was an opportunity to regain the initiative through his appearance in the House of Commons on 7th March, perhaps the most disastrous of Eden’s appearances. His speech “ignored the mood … and rebounded against him” (Aster, 1976, p.134). One witness commented on how this was “reflected in the silent devastated ranks … behind him” (Thompson, 1971, pp.124-5).
A reading of Hansard illustrates the disquiet of these backbenchers; Amery asked Eden for assurances that “we are not going to accept these reverses lying down” and Maitland of whether he was “aware of the very widespread anxiety and indignation about this matter and that there is a clamour … for an emphatic reassertion of British interests in the area?” (Hansard HC Debate. 5 March 1956). The fact that Shuckburgh (1986, p.345) received warnings from Clark that “the ‘Eden Must Go’ movement will be redoubled” hints at the severity of Eden’s position, with opposition within the party extending beyond the specific concerns of the Suez Group.

Yet Eden’s priority does not seem to have been party management. At this point, Eden placed moderate and restrained foreign policy above placating his critics in the PCP and sought to salvage what he could of the Anglo-Jordanian relationship. As Rhodes James (1987, p.432) outlines, it “would have been easy to denounce Hussein or announce the ending of British aid to Jordan”, but what benefit would this have to British interests? Eden was already aware of overtures on behalf of Nasser and the USSR to Jordan of replacing British aid were it to be withdrawn. Nevertheless, the dismissal of Glubb and its aftermath represented a “blow to Eden’s shattered prestige” (Carlton, 1981, p.399).

The dissent on the backbenches that this episode brought about should not be downplayed. One American journalist wrote of his conversations with Conservative MPs that although “they are not now rebellious” he nonetheless felt that “another setback to British policy or to the home economy … will create an entirely new situation. I don’t rule out the sort of rebellion that I watched in late April and early May 1940” (Middleton to Aldrich, 9 March 1956, cited in Carlton, 1981, p.399). Such a comparison with Chamberlain’s troubles following the failed Norwegian intervention is telling.

Carlton (1981, p.399) does not believe that such observations were lost on Eden, and that he may well have discerned that he “simply might not survive another setback”. For him, this explains Eden’s hard-line approaches to both Cyprus and Egypt from this point forward, with his concerns shifting from a moderate conduct of foreign policy to an obsession with party management - specifically those sections of the Conservative Party represented by the Suez Group. Although the general attitude to Makarios was expulsion from Cyprus, “Eden decided to go further and, apparently against the advice of Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, insisted that he be imprisoned on the Seychelles” (Carlton, 1981, p.399).

This move was “extremely popular in his own party” and Eden returned to the Commons on 14th March to “the frenzied cheers of his backbenchers resounding in his ears” (Carlton, 1981, p.399). Again, another look at the Hansard transcripts now reveals a very different attitude among the backbenches; Amery spoke of Eden’s speech “which, I may say so, has gladdened the hearts of all hon. Members on this side of the House, not only by its determination but by the sense it showed of our resolve to carry out our responsibilities to
the people of Cyprus, and our obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean” (Hansard HC Deb., 14 March 1956).

Reflecting on Eden’s experience with Jordan and Cyprus in March 1956, Nigel Nicholson MP recalled that “it was really from this moment onwards that he felt his role to be that of the strong man who was going to speak up for England and for the empire, for this is what the Tory party in the country really wanted” (Thompson, 1971, p.125). Nevertheless, Eden’s handling of Cyprus meant that “the flood of criticism of his leadership [was] temporarily dammed” (Carlton, 1981, p.400). His actions were certainly interpreted as a “display of toughness” which “heartened the more extreme members of the Conservative Party and helped Eden recover some ground lost” by his handling of Glubb’s dismissal (Aster, 1976, p.135).

However, renewed confidence in Eden among the PCP did not translate into success at the polls. On 7th June the Conservative Party retained Tonbridge in a by-election - but the Conservative Party candidate’s majority was cut to barely 1,600 votes from a previous figure of 18,000 (Pitchford, 2013). This was a disastrous showing and reflected the fact that by mid-1956 “there was much rank-and-file discontent with the government” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.438). The fact that the Labour vote in Tonbridge had also fallen (19,325 in 1955, to 18,193 in 1956) - although not as severely as the Conservatives’ - illustrates that the “problem lay within the Conservative ranks, not in any public surge towards Labour” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.439).

From the outset of Nasser’s nationalisation, Rhodes James (1987, p.457) argues that Eden “led, rather than followed, Cabinet and [PCP] feeling”. Yet throughout the Suez Crisis time would turn out to be Eden’s greatest enemy, as he struggled to maintain the broad support that had first existed within the House of Commons and the Conservative Party. The Suez Crisis proved incredibly divisive in the country at large, yet less so within the Conservative Party. Rhodes James (1987) estimates that there were relatively few MPs who opposed the military intervention - such as Robert Boothby MP - and lacked any clear figurehead to give them leadership and organisation. Yet given the slender majority experienced by the government in no-confidence motions in this period, and the delicacy of Britain’s prestige abroad at this time, every vote counted and a significant expression of division within the PCP may have hindered Eden’s leadership.

Yet in Heath, Eden possessed an incredibly able and sensitive Chief Whip. His management of the PCP throughout was “seen on all sides as masterly” as he kept “the Parliamentary Party together in the storm” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.553). Heath was constantly “at the prime minister’s side, drumming up support for Eden in the House” by both “berating [Eden’s] own back-bench critics, on other occasions appealing to them with honeyed words and reasoned phrase” (Hutchinson, 1970, p.85).
In spite of Heath’s efforts, though, what Rhodes James (1987, p.558) refers to as a “crucial shift of opinion within the [PCP]” took place on 30th October 1956. As the situation progressed both sides - those supportive of and those against Eden's actions - increasingly clamoured for a quick resolution to the crisis. Ministers began “to cast around for some reasonable way out” and thus “almost invisibly, full support for Eden and the invasion began to dribble away at the top” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.559). This was acutely felt by both the 1922 Committee and Heath. The situation was exacerbated when a day later - on the 1st November 1956 - Britain and France deployed their veto in the UNSC effectively blocking any resolution of the crisis through that institution. Then, that evening, the RAF began its bombing campaign against Egyptian airfields and military installations.

It was at this time that the House of Commons witnessed "scenes unparalleled in modern experience … [and] the Speaker wisely suspended the Commons for thirty minutes to let tempers cool" (Rhodes James, 1987, p.546). Hansard reveals accusations of “Fascists!” being thrown at Eden and his frontbench; the Speaker exasperatedly labelling his “task quite arduous enough without giving opinions on … abstruse questions”; and Sidney Silverman MP expressing worries that the bombing campaign set a precedent for British troops “commit[ting] murder all over the world” (Hansard HC Deb., 1 November 1956).

Rhodes James (1987, p.559) - present at the time - recalls that he “felt that the House of Commons was close to a collective nervous collapse, so fraught was the temper of the time”. Although Eden received applause from backbench MPs as he announced the ceasefire to the House of Commons on 5th November, it was notable that “many did not stand and cheer, and the members of the Suez Group were aghast and embittered" (Rhodes James, 1987, p.575).

This came to a climax on 8th November 1956 with the latest in a series of no confidence motions levelled against Eden at this time, made all the more rancorous given that the ceasefire had taken place three days beforehand. Conservative MPs who had been doubtful about the military intervention could now make their opposition known; the Suez Group, dismayed by the ceasefire, may either abstain or vote against the government.

Rhodes James (1987, p.580) recalls that there now seemed “a real possibility that [the government's] majority would fall so low as to amount to a defeat”. Although Eden scraped through, his reputation and position was clearly damaged. More damage would be done by Eden’s necessary retreat to Jamaica for reasons of ill-health, but the move opened up the political space for plots and manoeuverings to take place against Eden, perhaps all the more serious because he lacked the very power-base referred to by Dutton (1997) (see above).

Upon his return from Jamaica, the atmosphere of the House of Commons was far removed from the exaltation and unity which Eden had first experienced at the outset of the
crisis. His return was a “melancholy occasion” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.592). He entered the House of Commons “virtually without any attention being paid to him” bar a single Conservative MP - Godfrey Lagden - who cheered Eden; “he looked around him, was stunned by the pervasive silence on the Conservative benches, and subsided with a thunderstruck look on his face” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.592). Eden’s absence in Jamaica had “cost him dearly not only in his popularity and political position but in his understanding of the new mood” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.592).

In relation to his political skills in foreign affairs vis-a-vis party management, Dutton (1997, p.467) provides an interesting observation that “the blurred edge of diplomatic parlance, couched in subtle ambiguities and earnest homilies, was not always appropriate to the rough and tumble of domestic politics”. A colleague once noted how it was possible to end a conversation with Eden “thinking how reasonable, how agreeable and how helpful he has been, and then [one] discovers that in fact he has promised nothing at all!” (Nicolson, 1966, p.344). This perhaps explains much of the discontent and confusion that so typified Eden’s leadership, and the corrosive effects this had on his support - especially in the murky months of July to - November 1956.

4.3 Manipulation

Was Eden able to compensate for this by being a savvy manipulator of his immediate political environment? A successful prime minister may opt to utilise their knowledge of the institutional setting and political context to achieve their policy agenda. However, to do so a prime minister must be able to plan ahead long-term and discern priorities. Tactics may include keeping topics off an agenda, utilising an ‘inner Cabinet’ or leaking.

This section demonstrates Eden’s capacity to manipulate in relation to two areas; i) Eden’s desire to maintain control over foreign policy; ii) manoeuvering so as to attain his preferred domestic policies.

4.3.1 Control over foreign policy

Dutton (1997, p.88) has commented that “the intrusion of others in his departmental affairs would become a feature of Eden’s three periods at the Foreign Office”. Indeed, Oliver Harvey (1970, p.50) had observed this as early as the 1930s, noting that Eden was “criticised and thwarted by half his colleagues who are jealous of him and would trip him up if they had half a chance”. Central among these had been Chamberlain himself, but Eden lacked the experience, prestige or longevity in high office to sufficiently outmanoeuvre the prime minister’s desire for appeasement.
Eden found this no different throughout the Second World War, and it would have been unreasonable for Eden to have expected complete control over his policy brief given the nature of total war and the prestige and locational power granted to Churchill as prime minister (Jenkins, 2012). Nevertheless, Eden’s displeasure at the arrangement was evident to colleagues, Hugh Dalton having written that Eden was “like the little boy trying to clutch all the toys” (Pimlott, 1986, p.369).

Yet by 1951 the circumstances had changed dramatically. Britain was no longer in war-time conditions and Eden’s reputation was firmly rooted in foreign affairs. Carlton (1981, p.294) has referred to Eden at this time as “the most powerful subordinate any modern Cabinet has seen” and as a result could “rely on most of his colleagues not daring to cross him”. Macmillan - whilst serving as Housing Minister (1951-54) - discovered this when lobbying Eden on behalf of the pro-European movement, regarding “Eden and the Foreign Office [as] quite unrepentant” and yet finding himself unable to do much else (Catterall, 2003, p.152).

Lord Kilmuir attested to this, speaking of how “none of the other [Cabinet] members had the knowledge or experience to question or contradict Eden’s policies” and doubted “if a Foreign Secretary has enjoyed quite so much independence since Lord Roseberry” (Lindsay and Harrington, 1974, p.148). Eden “had more first-hand experience of international affairs than either of his Permanent Under-Secretaries” - Sir William Strang and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick - and this reputation allowed Eden the opportunity to brook little dissent in his carrying out of his brief (Carlton, 1981, p.298).

The ‘independence’ Lord Kilmuir spoke of is indicated in the fact that up to November 1951 Eden had “attended only one Cabinet since the [government] was formed” and as a result while ministerial colleagues were “able of course to read the Foreign Office telegrams” they had “no real picture of the policy Eden is following” (Catterall, 2003, p.120). The success Eden had in marginalising his ministerial colleagues from his own brief primarily flowed from Eden’s superlative reputation in foreign affairs, not only having served as Churchill’s war-time Foreign Secretary (1940-45) but also widely-recognised as a principled opponent of Chamberlain’s appeasement policies.

Having said this, Eden found himself unable to utilise his reputation so as to keep Churchill out of foreign affairs. Lord Beaverbrook had warned Macmillan, “Keep out of the Foreign Office. Churchill will always dominate foreign policy while he lives” (Catterall, 2003, pp.225-6). This is best showcased in Churchill’s desires for a summit with the Russians, and Eden’s desire to prevent this throughout 1953-4.

Eden had successfully prevented this through manoeuvrings with Lord Salisbury, the latter in his capacity as acting-Foreign Secretary successfully delaying Churchill’s proposed telegram until Eden could return to Britain and decisively kill off the idea. Indeed,
on his arrival Eden had shown Churchill selective telegrams of his own correspondence with Molotov to sow doubt about the proposal, as well as exhibiting calculated outrage alongside Salisbury over Churchill's apparent disregard for collective responsibility in this matter (Thorpe, 2011). This reflects Dutton's (1997, p.221) observation that Eden "knew when to give way to Churchill, when to stand his ground and when to wage a subtle war of attrition to achieve his goal".

Yet Eden was unable to permanently quash Churchill's desire. In July 1954 on a journey across the Atlantic following a visit Churchill and Eden had conducted in America the issue flared up again. Churchill drafted a telegram to Molotov seeking a two-power summit, and was only persuaded to show the telegram to Eden by his personal staff. When this happened, the two men for "one whole day refused to meet", however, “under the pressure of the tremendous force of this old man’s character, Eden gave way” (Catterall, 2003, p.324).

Although Eden did not outright threaten his resignation - as he pondered on doing - at the Cabinet meeting that followed the following outburst indicates his frustration at the exceptional interference of his boss, “I told you that if you sent that telegram 'it would be against the advice of your Foreign Secretary' … What else could I do? Resign on board the ship, I suppose?” (Catterall, 2003, p.338).

But, of course, Eden did not resign. Had he done so - or had even seriously contemplated the prospect openly to Churchill - there is a high degree of chance that the prime minister may have backed down. But Eden was incapable of seriously utilising the threat of resignation as a means to secure his policy objectives. As Shuckburgh (1986, p.110) notes the threat of resignation appeared to everyone “like a pure manoeuver which he had no intention of pressing”. Recalling instances in which Eden threatened resignation, Colville outlines how he had “been through all this a hundred times. The fact is that the PM is much tougher than Anthony. He very soon brings Anthony to the point [resignation] beyond which he knows he will not go and then he has won the day” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.93).

When Churchill resigned in April 1955, then, Eden was presented with an opportunity to consolidate his control over foreign policy by appointing a like-minded colleague to the brief. His first choice was Salisbury, but his concern over having a Foreign Secretary in the House of Lords ruled this as a non-starter (Thorpe, 2011). Eden appointed Macmillan to the Foreign Office, yet seemed unaware of the consequences of having such an independent and creative minister in an area of significant interest to himself. For example, Macmillan actively undermined Eden’s proposal to the Americans of sharing arms exports destined for the Middle-East with the Russians and vice versa. Macmillan did “mention Eden’s ideas” although “not its content, except in the most general terms” (Catterall, 2003, pp.489).

From December 1955 onwards Eden corrected this by reshuffling Macmillan to the Treasury and replacing him with Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Secretary, 1955-60). Lloyd’s
reputation as Foreign Secretary leaves much to be desired. Musing on the appointment, Shuckburgh (1986, p.314-25) observed that “this change is not being made because [Eden] is desperate for a good man to succeed Rab; but rather because he is critical of [Macmillan] as Foreign Secretary [emphasis own]” and goes on to refer to Lloyd as a “Foreign Secretary who wants to be a cypher”. This was a fact likewise not lost on Macmillan, who when first approached by Eden about the proposed reshuffle in September 1955 wrote that Eden “w[oul]d, of course, put Selwyn Lloyd at F[oreign] O[ffice] and run F[oreign] O[ffice] himself” (Catterall, 2003, p.482).

This shows that Eden was able to utilise reshuffles in order to better pursue his own policy priorities. Lloyd’s supineness partly stemmed from an awareness of his own political position. By his own words he was a “contented animal” who was “over-promoted” and that there was therefore “no question of my disloyalty” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.327). He had little following within the PCP and the perception that he was a mouthpiece for Eden was widely held. Kirkpatrick was certainly perceptive when he told Shuckburgh (1986, p.335) that Lloyd’s “only ambition is not to get in trouble”. These facts were not likely lost on Eden, especially when taken alongside Macmillan’s considerably larger following relative to Lloyd.

Yet in his use of the reshuffle of December 1955, Eden revealed his inability to manoeuvre in a strategic manner which took the measure of his immediate environment and future priorities. Although Eden had succeeded in placing foreign affairs firmly back within his grasp, the reshuffle of Macmillan came at a cost; the diminishing of Eden’s influence over economic policy. This might not have mattered had Eden been aware of the consequences of moving a minister as independent-minded - and ambitious - as Macmillan to the Treasury, but from December 1955 onwards Eden sought to micromanage domestic and economic policy, as he had with Butler.

4.3.2 Control over domestic policy

Dutton’s (1997, p.265) observation that Eden’s greatest flaw in terms of domestic politics “lies less in the concepts he espoused than in the extent of their implementation” speaks volumes to his inability to properly manoeuvre in respect of his preferred domestic policies. He certainly held strong views on economic and domestic policy (see chapter 5), but as Medlicott (1967, p.537) notes Eden had a “tendency to mark time” in this respect, whilst Brendan Bracken had alluded to Eden’s inability to pursue policy with colleagues when he observed that he “never knows his own mind, gets up with a new idea every day and abandons it as soon as he has to risk trouble” (Harvey, 1978, 346).

Having said this, Eden did have some notable successes. His authority by February 1952 was such that the Treasury’s Plan ROBOT - a freely exchangeable sterling alongside a
blocking of the external balances - “turned entirely on what A.E. would do” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.37). Churchill’s prevarication over the proposal allowed Eden to martial Cabinet opinion against Butler - the most ardent advocate of ROBOT - “and he went into the fray to kill the plan” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.37). Thorpe (2011, p.374) has referred to this as “one of Eden’s most important interventions in economic policy”, and Edwin Plowden (1989, p.156) - a Treasury adviser at the time - wrote of how “Eden stepped in at a critical moment to arrest the momentum which the plan had developed and gave its opponents more time to organise”.

This success reflects the significance to which Churchill afforded Eden’s advice. It is telling that the Treasury - among the most powerful of ministerial briefs - was essentially overruled by the Foreign Secretary’s own views, as Macmillan noted that Churchill was “politically alarmed by Eden’s clearly hostile view” (Catterall, 2003, p.147). Although the weight of opinion within the Treasury seems to have been somewhat divided, Shuckburgh (1986, p.36) did comment that it “was strongly favoured” by “a great section of the economic planners and senior officials within the Treasury”.

Yet in this instance Eden was blessed by his main opponent; Rab Butler. Butler was considered by Macmillan to be “really too agreeable; too pliant; and too ready to go from plan to plan; accepting perhaps too readily the rejection of each [emphasis own]” (Catterall, 2003, p.148). Were Macmillan advocating Plan ROBOT, would Eden have had such an easy time? His future experiences with his soon-to-be Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer suggests not.

Nevertheless, for the beginning period of Eden’s premiership he possessed a pliant Chancellor in Butler. By late-1955 Eden had “become jittery and began to badger Butler” over the details of his upcoming budget (Lamb, 1987, p.44). Eden was concerned for the cost of living, and as a result much of his interference with Butler’s brief revolved around this issue. As a 1st September 1956 Treasury minute reveals, Eden was “strongly opposed to ‘impositions for their own sake’ because of the effect on the cost of living” noting that this sentiment did not bode well for “cuts in transfer payments (bread subsidy, school meals, etc.)” (T 171/467, cited in Lamb, 1987, p.45).

The issue of cuts to the bread subsidy was very nearly brought to resolution at the Cabinet of 20th October 1956. Butler sought to rally his colleagues by denouncing the bread subsidy as “economically indefensible” and suggested that its removal would “be taken as a sign that the government was determined to check inflation” (PRO CAB 128/29, cited in Lamb, 1987, p.50).

Yet Eden was able to utilise his locational power as prime minister in a manner to be expected of a politician as experienced as himself, insisting that Butler meet with him privately and submit his proposals in full before the next Cabinet meeting. Such tactics paid
off, Eden manipulating Butler into deferring his proposals. By the next Cabinet on 25th October the absurd situation arose at which Butler announced that the bread subsidy would be retained - as Eden wanted - though expressing his personal opinion that it should be abolished. Eden had clearly won out; yet he was “to find it more dangerous to treat in the same way his next Chancellor” (Lamb, 1987, p.51).

Indeed, Macmillan had been “disgruntled at his rapid upheaval from the Foreign Office” in December 1955 (Dutton, 1997, p.273). Dismay on behalf of both Macmillan and Butler in relation to their new briefs within the Cabinet is hinted at in Eden’s (1960, p.317) memoirs, commenting that “changes in a well-balanced team are not in themselves welcome to a prime minister or to his colleagues [emphasis added]”. The move had certainly been influenced by Eden’s desire to maintain a firmer grip on foreign affairs, but even Brendan Bracken had predicted that it would not be long before the two figures clashed on economic policy (Cockett, 1990).

Although Eden had mused that Oliver Lyttelton - now working in the private sector - would have been his preferred choice as a replacement to Butler, it is hard to discern where else a politician as savvy and well-regarded as Macmillan could have been moved (Eden, 1960). It speaks volumes to both Macmillan’s own reputation within the Conservative Party - and Eden’s limits in manipulation - that the former persuaded Eden to formally outline in a letter that “in addition to [Macmillan’s] control over financial policy” he would be granted “full responsibility for co-ordinating all aspects of economic policy, both internal and external [emphasis added]” (Catterall, 2003, p.514).

Following this letter, it is hard to understand how Eden thought he could interfere with his own government’s economic policy to the extent that he tried in 1956. Indeed, it had worked with Butler, but his attitude to Macmillan clearly reveals a blind-spot in his political awareness. Eden himself had contributed to Macmillan’s rising star, as Thorpe (2011, p.456) outlines, prior to becoming Foreign Secretary in Eden’s government “few would have foreseen only fourteen months earlier when he was still at Housing and Local Government” that he would be referred to as a potential successor to Eden.

By 10th February 1956, Macmillan found Eden “still - temperamentally - opposed to bread and milk [being cut]” (Catterall, 2003, p.534). He stood his ground against the queries of both Eden and Butler, clearly conscious of his own strong position even if Eden was not. Following a divided Cabinet on 11th February 1956, Macmillan offered his resignation. As was commonly the case with Eden, this was tactical in nature (Macmillan, 1971). Yet Eden unknowingly aided Macmillan by delaying the subsequent Cabinet meeting as the latter “welcome[ed] a delay, because I want it to get round - as it will - to the Cabinet that I shall resign if I cannot get support” (Catterall, 2003, p.535). Macmillan then made this overtly clear
to his colleagues at Cabinet on 13th February, telling them “that I should not be able to go on” (Catterall, 2003, p.536).

When Eden sent a group of ministers to tell Macmillan that he “was absolutely determined not to give in on bread and milk [subsidy cuts]”, the latter stood firm and replied that “he must get another Chancellor” (Catterall, 2003, p.536). By 15th February it seemed that Macmillan’s tactics had paid off; a compromise solution was worked out which meant that Macmillan “managed - by threat of resignation - to get \( \frac{3}{4} \) of my plan” (Catterall, 2003, p.537). Eden had attempted to reassert control over his new Chancellor, but had been out-maneuvered and manipulated by the more politically-savvy Macmillan.

Eden’s inability to manipulate his immediate environment, and colleagues, on this issue gave cause for William Clark (1986, p.161) to feel “disappointed by Eden’s lack of grip on home affairs”. Eden’s tepid opposition to his Chancellor’s desire to cut food subsidies led Clark (1986, pp.162-63) to question “is [Eden] a hollow man? Is he really opposed to Macmillan’s rather strict economic policies? … Is there really no one behind the door, where “the Consul is busy”? The lack of consistency in his policy agenda which his inability to manipulate engendered does not reflect well on Eden’s policy vision (see chapter 5).

This arguably stemmed from the fact that Eden “would not stoop to the intrigues which many others placed in his position would have seized upon” (Dutton, 1997, p.246). Although it is difficult to weigh up the relative merits and drawbacks of facing down Macmillan and accepting his resignation, the fact that Eden had brought the issue to that stage - and then backed down - undoubtedly weakened his position with his colleagues and admirers, as Clark’s comments above illustrate. Furthermore, it reveals that Eden found it difficult to prioritize issues which he might actually care for, such as the cost of living.

**4.4 Conclusion**

In terms of party management Eden certainly had difficulty. His disdain for certain elements within the Conservative Party meant that his position was weaker than perhaps most prime ministers; it is notable that despite their hostility to Tony Blair, much of the PLP was nonetheless supportive. Eden seemed temperamentally unable to approach his colleagues in like-manner to foreigners, a factor which had grave implications for his ability to retain support throughout successive crises. Perhaps this is reflective of his reputation internationally vis-a-vis that domestically.

In terms of his ability to manipulate his environment similar observations can be made. His reputation in foreign affairs allowed Eden to guard his brief fiercely from 1951-onwards, tactically withholding memos, transcripts and other documents when necessary. Yet even in this sense, Eden was dependant upon his opponent; he proved
unwilling to engage in the sort of manoeuvering necessary to compete with the reputation which afforded Churchill the ability to interfere.

Eden successfully manipulated Butler into conceding much interference over economic policy. However, when faced with a stronger and more politically-savvy colleague such as Macmillan he found himself unable to compete. Furthermore, the interactions between Eden and Macmillan reflect a weakness of Eden’s in being unable to engage in the sort of long-term manipulation which is necessary if a prime minister is to guard briefs they deem important to themselves. After greatly increasing Macmillan’s prestige, and conceding much control over economic and financial policy to him, he nonetheless expected that he could treat Macmillan in a similar manner to that of Butler.
Chapter Five: Policy vision

5.1 Introduction

The goals and priorities that a political leader intends to pursue once in office can have a significant bearing upon their leadership. Greenstein (2006, p.24) believes that leaders who can successfully articulate and associate themselves with a coherent policy vision may find themselves “better able to set the terms of political discourse”. This is because a successful policy vision will incorporate “feasibility … overarching goals [and] consistency of viewpoint” and act as “anchors for the rest of the political community” (Greenstein, 2000, p.198). Once leaders achieve this they avoid having policies and priorities imposed from elsewhere, thus reducing the risk of “internally contradictory programs, policies that have unintended consequences, and sheer drift” (Greenstein, 2000, p.198).

Yet King (1985, p.98) notes that British prime ministers tend not to “have important policy aims peculiar to themselves”. Rather their policy vision is heavily related to the aims and priorities of their political parties and governments. It is for this reason that King (1988, p.55) affords prime ministers general aims such as “maintaining party unity, preventing Cabinet resignations [and] winning the next general election”.

Although King’s (1985) conception of policy vision in the British political context usefully highlights the contextual factors that prime ministers must contend with, he risks relegating the analysis of the personal; the experiences and beliefs of a prime minister may certainly affect their leadership. Greenstein (2006) has criticised Neustadt (1990) for likewise failing to consider how these inherently political considerations interrelate with a coherent vision, hence why the former included the concept of policy vision in his criteria in the first place.

Bose (2006) considers policy vision to be highly relevant for successful leadership, ranking it the most important of Greenstein’s (2000; 2009) six criteria. She argues that above all else a coherent policy vision allows a leader to “establish - and maintain - priorities” and thus avoid “being guided by events, advisers, or the agenda of other politicians” (Bose, 2006, p.29). Greenstein (2009, p.170) observed this throughout the leadership of George Bush, referring to the “situation-determined quality to the Bush presidency”.

This chapter analyses Eden’s ability to articulate a coherent policy vision in two respects; i) his domestic policy, and ii) his foreign policy. Their success will be measured by the extent to which they were feasible and consistent, as well as whether they reflected any overarching goals. Although Eden’s domestic policy did not possess any successful policy vision - being characterised by drift and inconsistency - his foreign policy proved more
successful, with Eden being widely-associated with the proliferation of peace through freely negotiated agreements and the participation of America. Yet his conduct throughout the Suez Crisis rendered this reputation inconsistent with the final act of his premiership.

5.2 Domestic policy

This section begins with an analysis of Eden’s attempts to build on his vision for a property-owning democracy within Britain, concurrent with Skelton’s (1924) writings on the subject. It then evaluates the extent to which Eden’s economic policy was consistent and reflected his overarching goals.

5.2.1 Property-owning democracy

Among the relevant academic literature, Eden is regarded as an unsuccessful prime minister in terms of domestic politics, notable among which Carlton (1981, p.291) writes that Eden’s contributions in this respect “bordered, as so often in his career, on the banal”. Yet it cannot be denied that Eden regularly associated himself with - and sought to implement - Skelton’s (1924) property-owning democracy. Eden’s “political instincts were progressive”, writing in his memoirs of his “youthful ideas for a progressive Conservatism which would have positive aims, and knowing what we meant by such expressions as a ‘property-owning democracy’” (Hennessy, 2001, p.210; Eden, 1962, p.12).

The concept was coined by Noel Skelton (1924) and emphasised “the ‘character’ that comes from the responsibilities linked to ownership” (Lund, 2013, p.53). As such, Skelton (1924) advocated for a series of policies that ranged from share and home-ownership to agricultural cooperatives with the intention of increasing democratic participation and responsibility among the electorate. In this sense, the concept finds a legacy in Margaret Thatcher’s Housing Act (1980) which presaged the selling-off of much council housing stock, as well as the ‘popular capitalism’ her Chancellor Nigel Lawson engineered with the mass programme of privatisation and the diffused share-ownership which followed (Bullpitt, 1986).

For Eden, the relevance of the property-owning democracy was in its conciliatory approach to industrial relations and the fostering of relations across social classes. As with many of his Oxbridge contemporaries, Eden had fought alongside much of the working-class and had “seen and shared the experience of the ordinary soldier in the trenches” and “emerged with a deep respect for the British working man and no stomach for class warfare” (Harries, 1987, p.1).

Upon returning from the First World War, Eden entered politics. His experiences canvassing in his constituency of Warwick and Leamington reinforced this trait, Eden being
“appalled at the state of some of the slums in his constituency” (King, 2016, p.7). Yet perhaps the greatest influence on his policy vision stemmed from the climate in which Eden reached his political maturity; throughout the 1920s “serious industrial unrest was a constant preoccupation” of British prime ministers, notably Baldwin (Rhodes James, 1987, p.88).

In 1921, Eden was drafted for the detachment of contingency forces stationed at Barnard Castle in case of the outbreak of a general strike (Aster, 1976). However, there is much evidence that Eden would not have been comfortable with such a heavy-handed response. When a general strike did occur on 3rd May 1926 following the disappointing recommendations of the Samuel Commission on industrial unrest, Eden “believed that the delicate situation needed careful handling” and was supportive of Baldwin’s moderate and conciliatory approach (Thorpe, 2011, p.88). The bitterness from some sections of both sides of industry and politics “convinced him that a better way had to be found … in settling the inevitable disputes that arose in a market economy during a period of recession” (Thorpe, 2011, p.88)

Although Eden had little time for domestic politics over the course of 1945-51, his role in Opposition in this sense tends to be underappreciated among the relevant literature. Carlton (1981) has argued that much of the innovations in Conservative Party domestic politics during this period - such as the Industrial Charter (1947) and the Right Road for Britain (1949) - came primarily from figures such as Butler and those within the Conservative Research Department.

Here, Carlton’s (1981, p.268) comments that Eden was “content to allow others, notably Macmillan and Butler, to outflank him to the left on domestic issues” is accurate. Although Eden clearly believed in his vision for diffused ownership, the notable progressive contributions in this respect throughout Churchill’s peacetime government - the 300,000 house building target, conciliatory industrial relations and the retention of full employment - were all associated with other ministers such as Macmillan, Monckton and Butler respectively (Ramsden, 2000).

Having said this, although significant praise should be afforded to Butler and his colleagues (such as Reginald Maudling) for their work in reshaping the Conservative Party’s policy platform over the course of 1945-51, Eden’s role should not be underestimated. As Rhodes James (1987, p.325) notes, Eden would “never have described himself as an intellectual” and he rarely ever innovated specific policies. Yet Greenstein (1994, p.359) writes that a successful leader does not necessarily have to be a policy innovator so as to possess a policy vision, but may “shrewdly associat[e] … more with its general aims”. In this sense, Eden was certainly associated with the progressive movements in Conservative Party policy throughout 1945-51.
It is notable that he had served as the Deputy Leader of the Opposition amidst Churchill’s frequent absences and his “indifference to policy formulation”, which involved Eden’s chairmanship of a series of committees concerned with domestic policy (Rhodes James, 1987, p.325). The publication of the ‘Right Road for Britain’ in January 1949 was the “result of work done by a committee which Eden chaired”, while he was likewise “a strong supporter of the work of [Butler’s] Industrial Policy Committee” which produced the Industrial Charter (1947) (Aster, 1976, p.97; Rhodes James, 1987, p.328).

In October 1950, Eden spoke at length during his speech at the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool of “a nation-wide property-owning democracy” which would entail an effort to “foster and encourage schemes for the distribution of capital ownership over a wide area” (Eden, 1950). He drew distinctions between the approach of Attlee’s government and the Conservative Party’s belief that “the worker in industry should have the status of an individual and not of a mere cog in a soulless machine” (Eden, 1950). These passages cause Rhodes James (1987, p.328) to correctly write that “industrial co-partnership between employer and employee was as vital as home ownership” to Eden’s policy vision. Thus, by 1951 Eden had cemented an “image as a man of the middle way” (Dutton, 1997, p.265).

Eden reinforced this image upon attaining the premiership when his government was buffeted by a series of strikes throughout April to - May 1955 within the railway, shipping and printing industries. His response successfully set the tone of the incoming prime minister as “moderate, conciliatory, inclusive and with no desire to find scapegoats” (Thorpe, 2011, p.442). On the advice of Brook (see chapter 3) the prime minister created a Ministerial Committee on Emergencies which oversaw the day-to-day response to the strikes, while also allowing Eden to to keep “in constant consultation with both trade union leaders and employers” (Aster, 1976, p.123).

Eden invited representatives of both the TUC and the Federation of British Industries to Downing Street so that he could personally mediate the disputes and foster a compromise solution. The proposed outcome was the twenty-one-day cooling off period which Baldwin had attempted to revive in the 1920s, reflecting the conciliatory aspect which the property-owning democracy entailed given that it was a recommendation rather than a legal mechanism that could be enforced (Aster, 1976).

Although consistent with Eden’s overarching goals - fostering positive industrial relations in post-war Britain - his resolution of the April to - May 1955 strikes receives a negative assessment among the relevant literature. Lamb (1987, p.28) writes that Eden’s resolution of the dispute meant that a “great opportunity for trade union reform was missed”; Carlton (1981, p.375) suggests that “the moderate leaders of the TUC [in 1955] would have presented only token opposition” to fundamental reform; Rhodes James (1987, p.416)
argues that Eden’s efforts were “to the profound disadvantage of British industry and the trade union movement itself”.

Such evaluations are made in relation to the prolonged period of struggle which successive British prime ministers faced following Eden’s departure. The implication is that had Eden possessed more foresight and was able to view industrial relations with a more strategic mindset then he might have prevented much trouble for Wilson, Heath, Callaghan and Thatcher (Lamb, 1987; Thorpe, 2011).

For instance, Rhodes James (1987) and Carlton (1981) have both suggested that Eden had considered the implementation of secret ballots before strike action would legally be allowed to take place but was held back from doing so by Monckton. This would have predated Thatcher’s own Trade Union Act (1984) which legislated for this precise policy. Rhodes James (1987, p.416) writes that “a more confident and experienced prime minister might well have overridden Monckton’s characteristic irresolution and caution” while Carlton (1981, p.375) believes that because of his “too little experience of home affairs” Eden, “like Churchill, was prepared to allow Monckton to give way to strong unions”.

However, this analysis neglects the significance of what Norton (1987, p.340) labels the “climate of expectations”. This refers to the confines set by the electorate within which politicians must devise and implement policy. Referencing the 1940s, for example, Norton (1987) writes of how the Beveridge Report (1942) and the White Paper on Full Employment (1944) reflected a change in the electorate’s expectations of what government should and could provide.

By the 1950s, these expectations had been affected by the newfound affluence that many perceived in their lives. The delicate balancing of low taxation, full employment and the continuation of a conciliatory approach to industrial relations all exerted confines on how Eden could reasonably have responded to the April to - May 1955 strikes - Eden had to bear in mind what was feasible.

Hargrove (1998, pp.36-41) refers to this skill as “the ability to estimate, more or less accurately, the kinds of action that will be successful in a given historical context”. When applied to the American presidency, this is the ability to “sequence and pace the rate at which [presidents] challenged the country and Congress to tackle [their] many major initiatives” (Heifetz, 1994, p.766). Although he lacked the ability to view industrial relations in a strategic sense, Eden was able to discern the climate of expectations that he was operating within and how this affected what was feasible in policy terms; “Legislation to make all strikes illegal unless preceded by a secret ballot would be practically impossible to enforce. You could not fine or imprison large numbers of workers for coming out on strike without having voted to do so” (AP 20/31/605, cited in Dutton, 1997, p.271).
As Dutton (1997, p.271) notes, such correspondence suggests that “Eden himself seemed more alive to the kind of problem legislation [of this kind] might create than was Edward Heath after 1970”. Thorpe (2011, p.442) is likewise sympathetic to Eden’s resolution of the strikes, arguing that a “a conciliatory, rather than a more prescriptive, approach had much to commend” given that “it remains doubtful whether the climate of the time - full employment and mounting prosperity - was right” for the sort of approach preferred by Carlton (1981) and Lamb (1987) (Dutton, 1997, p.271). Nagel (1993, pp.141-2) notes that “strong centripetal pressures will normally confine feasible outcomes to a relatively small region of the policy space”. Given the distaste among both sides of industry for legislation, Eden’s revival of the twenty-one-day cooling off period arguably represents both consistency and feasibility in relation to Eden’s policy vision as well as the context in which he was operating. It is a near-perfect example of Hargrove’s (1998, p.41-7) belief that successful leaders can “temper purpose with prudence so that action is realistic and does not overreach”. Rhodes James’ (1987), Carlton’s (1981) and Lamb’s (1987) preferred responses would arguably have overreached.

5.2.2 Economic policy

Rhodes James (1987, p.421) refers to the economy as the “first serious setback to the [Eden] government’s position”. This is arguably because Eden’s economic policy was severely inconsistent with itself, partly due to Eden’s own indecision and inability to grasp economics, but also partly due to the very different characters which inhabited the Treasury from April to December 1955. The three budgets that Eden’s government produced over the course of April 1955 to April 1956 were wildly inconsistent. Butler’s April 1955 budget witnessed significant cuts to income tax, the reduction of purchase tax (abolishing it entirely for cotton goods) and an increase in some tax allowances. These cuts were “inflationary to the point of danger” and constituted £135 million of tax relief (Lamb, 1987, p.8).

Yet by October 1955 much of this work had been undone; Butler now reversed much of the cuts to indirect taxation from April 1955 - which had been preceded by a credit squeeze throughout the previous months - and imposed increased purchase tax on a range of household goods, leading to Hugh Gaitskell referring to it as the ‘Pots and Pans Budget’ (Thorpe, 2011). This also significantly damaged Eden’s vision of the property-owning democracy, noting in his memoirs that it “is difficult to advocate a property-owning democracy to the tune of ‘Your kettles will cost you more'” (Eden, 1960, p.316).

The April 1955 budget also had a secondary significance, as throughout the wider relevant literature it is taken as an indication of Eden’s own economic beliefs. Lamb (1987,
p.8; 46) refers to Eden as “determined on continued economic growth” and wanting to “maintain the expansion of the economy”. Yet these observations are inconsistent with Eden’s own private correspondence on the subject. He had written to Butler in August 1955 of “put[ting] the battle against inflation before anything else” and in his correspondence to Macmillan on 22nd December 1955 he wrote of his concern for the “expanding economy” which was “bursting at the seams”, this being primarily driven by “excessive spending as a nation due … to the fact that both government and industrialists have been captivated by the idea of [expansion]” (Eden, 1960, p.314; AP 20/20/142, cited in Dutton, 1997, p.272).

These beliefs were perhaps most clearly-articulated in a speech in Bradford on 18th January 1956. He told his audience; “We don’t want a blown up economy; we want a steadily developing economy … The battle against inflation is on. If the weapons we are using now do not suffice, we shall not hesitate to use others” (Eden, 1956). It is difficult to misinterpret Eden’s comments, and Dutton (1997, p.272) is correct in stating that “it is clear that Eden was not, as one critic has argued, obsessed with economic growth”. Yet this ‘battle’ was rarely translated into consistent and concrete policy. This is because although Eden was aware that inflation was a priority for his government, his lack of experience in economics meant that he had an imperfect understanding of what ‘tools’ would be effective.

His battle with Macmillan in early-1956 regarding food subsidies is explained by Carlton (1981, p.395-6) as Eden’s assumption that “other measures would achieve the same economic objectives without comparable cost to his popularity”. One of these was cutting the defence budget, the “largest single item in government expenditure” at the time (Eden, 1960, p.314). Here, Eden’s performance is impressive, setting “in train long-term reviews on both social spending and Britain’s place in the world with its associated military expenditure [emphasis added]” the latter of which laid down much of the groundwork for the Macmillan/Sandys Defence White Paper (1957) (Hennessy, 2001, p.211).

Although Eden can be praised for realising the gulf between Britain’s defence spending and its limited resources before most others, this specific ‘tool’ “needed time to bear fruit” and was not a realistically short-term solution to correct the inflationary push (Dutton, 1997, p.272). Although Eden complemented this approach to defence expenditure with his foreign policy achievements (see subsection 5.3), no serious politician was willing to call for the degree of reductions in commitments that was necessary in the 1950s (Thorpe, 2011). As Carlton (1981, p.374) argues, the increased dependence on nuclear weapons and
“the paucity of conventional capability that was to be a feature of the Macmillan era was the fulfillment and not the abandonment of Eden’s approach to defence policy”.

Another concern of Eden’s (1960, p.316) was “to find new schemes to encourage saving”. However, beyond new defence bonds there was little progress made on this front in 1955 and Eden was unable to induce Butler to take his proposals seriously enough. However, Macmillan proved slightly more receptive to Eden’s argument that “I very much prefer saving to taxation for ‘mopping up surplus purchasing power’” (Eden, 1960, p.321). Having said this, although Premium Bonds represented a novel form of savings, the bulk of Macmillan’s budget represented “an orthodox programme of deflationary measures”; interest rates rose from 4 ½ to 5%, hire purchase deposits were increased and public expenditure was cut by £100 million (Carlton, 1981, p.395; Lamb, 1987).

Although Macmillan’s April 1956 budget perhaps better reflected Eden’s own thinking than Butler’s April 1955 budget, it certainly was not an accurate representation of Eden’s vision in its entirety. Furthermore, as Dutton (1997, p.273) points out, the replacement of Butler with Macmillan “seemed to represent a repudiation of the government’s economic policy so far”. The constant flip-flopping on indirect taxation and food subsidies did not provide any consistent policy vision for the electorate to associate with Eden, and much of the measures taken by Eden’s government do not reflect many of his overarching goals in relation to economics.

This is partly due to Eden’s own limited understanding of the subject. Gaitskell wrote that “I do not think he really has a clue about how to deal with inflation”, while William Clark noted that Eden “seemed to know even less about economics than I did” (Williams, 1983, p.414; Clark, 1986, p.161). This lack of understanding was demonstrated in his correspondence with Butler in August 1955 when he wrote of how “it would be quite wrong to raise purchase tax, but arguable that we should lower it” (Eden, 1960, p.314). Eden (1960, p.314).wanted to “restrain both consumption and investment” but it is difficult to see how a reduction in purchase tax would achieve this.

It is interesting to speculate whether Eden would have been better able to see his overarching goals through to completion in this respect had his premiership not been brought to an end by the Suez Crisis in January 1957. As Dutton (1997, p.275) notes, much of his private correspondence and public utterances on inflation “offer a tantalizing glimpse of the possible domestic agenda of an Eden government allowed to run its full course”.

5.3 Foreign policy

The Suez Crisis has understandably distorted perceptions of Eden’s vision for foreign policy. Although the Anglo-French venture certainly resembled gunboat diplomacy, this is not
consistent with his previous efforts as Foreign Secretary. Whilst serving in Chamberlain’s (1935-38) and then Churchill’s (1940-45; 1951-55) Cabinets, Eden sought to secure peace through international coalitions and treaty-making. But this approach was tempered by his experience throughout the 1930s, as Eden realised the necessity of American backing if these efforts were to succeed in the long-term.

While Eden’s domestic politics had matured amidst the industrial unrest of the 1920s, his foreign policy had done so in the 1930s. Not long after his appointment as Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office (1931-34) Eden was forced to grapple with the fallout from the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Referred to as the ‘Manchurian Incident’, the occupation was “important in any chronicle of Eden’s career” as it proved the League of Nation’s inability to enforce its principles (Dutton, 1997, p.21).

Eden illustrates an awareness that such internationalist organisations - based on treaty-making and negotiation - required a sufficient degree of military power if they were to succeed, and that in the 1930s this “would fall in the first instance most severely upon [Britain]” (Hansard, HC Deb., 24 November 1927). This was because Eden’s overtures to the United States had fallen flat, and therefore the Manchurian Incident also “had shown how difficult it was to co-ordinate a common Anglo-American response” (Dutton, 1997, p.84).

His remarks in Aberdeen in July 1937 that Britain and America represented “a great stabilising factor” are indicative of his growing belief in Anglo-American cooperation in order to underpin an internationalist peace (Campbell-Johnson, 1955, p.137). This common theme in Eden’s vision was witnessed when in July 1941 he succeeded in getting the War Cabinet to agree to a complete backing of any American action taken in the Pacific, reflecting his deep concern of “the danger inherent in our lagging behind the United States government in dealing with Japan, a fortiori in our actually attempting to dissuade them from action” (PRO CAB 66/17, cited in Dutton, 1997, p.149).

The League of Nations received another blow to its prestige when Mussolini invaded Abyssinia in October 1935. Although limited sanctions were imposed on Italy, these were not sufficient in deterring Mussolini from flouting Abyssinia’s sovereignty. Eden backed oil sanctions - a significant step that may have crippled Italy’s economy and navy - which would be imposed alongside America, yet found little support in Cabinet (Eden, 1962).

His failures and successes undoubtedly affected Eden’s conduct during the closing stages of the Second World War as he participated in designing the post-war international framework that followed. The United Nations Charter (1945) and the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) reflect the fact that Eden was “an internationalist” for whom “collective security organised through” treaty-making was “the way to preserve peace” (Thorpe, 2011, p.480; Harries, 1987, p.1). Importantly, America was the principal member of both the UN and
NATO and their longevity is arguably a testament to Eden's logic that he expressed to the War Cabinet in July 1941 (see above).

Yet the necessity for Britain to rely on American underpinning of these agreements means that, as Dutton (1997, p.315) points out, the “fundamental questions for [Eden] … concerned more [Britain’s] relations with her leading ally, the United States”. It is for this reason that Pearson (2002, p.5) argues that a key aspect of Eden's policy vision involved “hard bargaining from behind the pressure of the US. [Eden] had long fostered a belief in exerting power through the US”. Indeed, his resignation as Foreign Secretary in February 1938 was primarily because of Chamberlain’s reluctance to engage in joint Anglo-American peace initiatives rather than any significant difference between the two men over Italian appeasement (Carlton, 1981).

This fact became most apparent to Eden in relation to the Middle East, a region that had been considered an acute British interest over the course of the last three centuries. In February 1953 he had spoken of how Britain “cannot hope to maintain our position in the Middle East by the methods of the last century … If we are to maintain our influence in this area, future policy must be designed to harness these [nationalist] movements rather than struggle against them” (Lucas, 1996, p.14).

This logic was behind Eden’s efforts to withdraw the British garrison from their base on the Suez Canal, himself being well aware of the unpopularity of their presence among the Egyptians. This move was consistent with Eden’s drive for economies (see subsection 5.2.2) and although America was not intimately involved with the negotiations which preceded the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1954), Eden nevertheless “assumed that the US would involve themselves in Middle Eastern politics if it believed the area to be destabilised” (Pearson, 2002, p.7).

Yet his efforts are indicative of Eden’s capacity to approach foreign affairs with a tactical mindset, rather than allowing himself to be influenced by any overarching ideology. Carlton (1981, p.303) believes that Eden “did not see the world primarily through ideological spectacles” and in the case of the Middle East his overriding ambition was a “general policy … founded on the need to protect our oil interests in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf” (PRO CAB 128/30, cited in Pearson, 2002, p.8).

Although free passage of British shipping through the Suez Canal was important, the protection of ‘oil interests’ would simultaneously be supported by the Baghdad Pact. Having started as a military agreement between Turkey and Iraq signed in February 1955, Britain had acceded to this in April 1955 with the approval of Dulles and a suggestion that America might also join at a later date (Shuckburgh, 1986). This was originally unsurprising given that the Baghdad Pact seemed to be evolving in a direction that resembled Dulles’ own concept...
of a ‘Northern Tier’ - an alliance of states along the USSR’s southern frontier - following Iran and Pakistan acceding to it later in 1955.

As a result of this, the Baghdad Pact seemed both a consistent and feasible policy for Eden to pursue. Dutton (1997, p.365) notes that “British and American policies in the area appeared finally to have come together” and given that Eden had been angling for an Iraqi-Jordanian axis on which to protect Britain’s oil interests in the region ever since he had negotiated an increase in British troops in Jordan in 1953, it may well have appeared to be the resolution of a long-held ambition of his. It likewise took on increased significance given the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1954), Eden being aware that such a relationship was very unlikely with Egypt (Eden, 1960).

However, the Baghdad Pact likewise reveals the limits to Eden’s mainly tactical approach to foreign affairs. In a strategic sense the Baghdad Pact was interpreted by America as “entwining the protection of British rather than American interests within an overall Cold War strategy”; Dulles’ conception of the Northern Tier was primarily as a deterrent against southern Communist expansion, not as a means of protecting British oil interests in the region (Dutton, 1997, p.365).

This was exacerbated by Dulles’ desire to maintain cordial relations with Nasser - and other Arab states - viewing him as the only figure in the region with sufficient prestige to carry difficult decisions, such as any settlement relating to Israel’s frontiers (Pearson, 2002). As Carlton (1981, p.365) notes, the Baghdad Pact “held little appeal for Dulles unless Eden should be successful in getting other Arab states, and especially Egypt, involved”. Eden had been made aware of Nasser’s hostility to the agreement on a visit to Egypt on 24th February 1955 when he had outright declined to accede to it (Shuckburgh, 1986).

As a result of this, by July 1955 Dulles had told Eden that he would not contemplate anything more than American observers to attend meetings of the Baghdad Pact, ruling out American accession (Immerman, 1992). Eden was therefore missing the crucial ingredient of which he knew was necessary in securing any long-term and feasible grouping in the region. His lack of sensitivity to American concerns meant that Eden “forged the Baghdad Pact without sufficient consultation with Washington and without an unambiguous promise of an American intention to join” (Carlton, 1981, p.382).

Nevertheless, Eden’s efforts throughout the post-war period to both secure peace whilst simultaneously safeguarding British interests should be commended. However, this record was ignominiously shattered by the events of the Suez Crisis. In undertaking to reverse Nasser’s nationalisation, Eden undermined the very principles he had strived to protect. Britain had directly engaged itself in a Middle-Eastern quagmire that displaced the Baghdad Pact’s relevance and alienated the Americans. Anglo-American tensions, British interests and collective security had all been damaged. In light of this, it is impossible to refer
to Eden’s vision for foreign affairs as consistent, even if up until October 1956 his conduct had reflected his overarching goals.

5.4 Conclusion

Eden’s ability to construct a policy vision and associate himself with it was limited, both by his own personality and the context in which he found himself operating as prime minister. Although he possessed a clearly-articulated vision for domestic politics which was found in the property-owning democracy, Eden was limited in his implementation of the concept. He was not a natural policy innovator and therefore could not devise original policies, yet did successfully associate himself with the progressive shift in domestic policy which occurred within the Conservative Party throughout 1945-55. Yet his colleagues - notably Butler and Macmillan - were more so associated with this. Although he showed a keen ability to discern what the context allowed for in his resolution of the April to - May 1955 strikes, he did not go further than this crisis in terms of implementing a feasible programme relating to the property-owning democracy.

This was arguably because of the economic climate in which Eden served as prime minister. He was limited in his ability to increase government expenditure and reduce taxation given that inflation was a growing threat to British prosperity. Yet Eden’s inexperience in domestic political briefs and the April 1955 budget hindered his ability to construct a consistent and realistic vision for this.

His foreign policy perhaps represents his most successful vision, with Eden being renowned for his efforts for peace and conciliation throughout his pre-war and post-war political career as Foreign Secretary. He grasped sooner than most of his colleagues the necessity for Britain to utilise America’s presence in the post-war world in order to safeguard her interests as well as a lasting peace. Yet his conduct throughout the Suez Crisis shattered any overarching consistency to Eden’s career in this sense, damaging many of his overarching goals. Although this might be explained by Eden’s ill-health and medication at the time of the Suez Crisis’ onset, this does not detract from the implications it has for Eden’s policy vision (see chapter 6). It is nevertheless tragic, as Aster (1976, p.165) puts it, “to be remembered by one failure and not by numerous achievements”.

Chapter Six: Cognitive style and emotional intelligence

6.1 Introduction

Cognitive style relates to how a leader “processes the Niagara of advice and information that comes his way” (Greenstein, 2000, p.6). Considerations of how a prime minister structures their immediate sources of advice and information, as well as workload so as to prevent overload, are relevant. George (1980, p.139) writes of cognitive style as referring to “the way in which [the president] defines his informational needs for purposes of making decisions and his preferred ways of acquiring and using information and advice”. Theakston (2007, p.53) notes that in each prime minister’s cognitive style there will be “strengths and weaknesses” and that “educational achievement is not the point”. Rather, a balanced cognitive style will encompass “a strong advisory team” whilst also retaining one’s “own attention to understanding policy debates and positions” (Bose, 2006, p.33).

Greenstein (2000, p.200) leaves little doubt as to the importance he places on emotional intelligence in terms of a leader’s ability to govern successfully; “Beware the presidential contender who lacks emotional intelligence. In its absence all else may turn to ashes”. This puts him at odds with Bose (2006, p.35), who cites a series of American presidents who did not rank exceptionally high in emotional intelligence yet due to “close advisers who can mitigate the effects of those undercurrents” managed to govern successfully. This shows that leaders who do possess uneven emotional temperaments should seek to avoid “being dominated by them and allowing them to diminish” the ability to govern successfully, and instead “turn them to constructive purposes” (Greenstein, 2000, p.6).

Widely-regarded as obsessive with detail, Eden reacted badly to adverse advice or counter-arguments and tended to marginalise figures who provided as much, whereas the like-minded were prioritised. Eden’s emotional intelligence was also problematic. Whether it was because of his upbringing or his vanity, Eden was prone to outbursts and frequently lashed-out at his closest advisers and colleagues. These are well-recorded in the diaries of subordinates like Evelyn Shuckburgh and colleagues such as Harold Macmillan. All of these tendencies were exacerbated by a faulty bile duct and the botched operation and health problems which followed.
6.2 Cognitive style

This section outlines Eden’s cognitive style and its effects on his premiership. In doing so it analyses three of Eden’s relevant traits; his grasp of details, his tendency to overwork, as well as his sensitivity to counter-advice.

6.2.1 Grasp of detail

Among the post-war British prime ministers Eden certainly stands out for his grasp of details. As Theakston (2007, p.54) notes, he was not necessarily “a man of ideas” however this was perhaps compensated for by his “big appetite for detail - perhaps too much so”. This may have been a lifelong trait. At as young as eleven Eden would “look out of the window and tell his mother which constituency they were passing through, the name of the local member and details of the majority” (Thorpe, 2011, p.24). This ability would serve him well in his studies at Oxford, attaining a First in Oriental Languages. The course itself was rigorous, involving detailed inspection and recital of complex literature such as Zoroastrian poetry, the Shahname, and the Koran.

However, this was not confined to languages. Eden also exhibited his capacity for reciting and articulating detail in his appearances in Oxford Union debates. For instance, in a debate over the relative value of Canada and Australia to the British Empire Eden “demonstrated careful preparation and research” as he “showed a detailed grasp of Canada’s geographical benefits, and technical knowledge of the country’s infrastructure, as well as the economics of railways, forestry and fishing” (Thorpe, 2011, p.26). This was an aspect of Eden which was reinforced by his war-time experiences. He admired his superiors and witnessed first-hand how “executive responsibility was best fulfilled through practical attention to detail” (Thorpe, 2011, p.42).

This is reflected in Eden’s preferred methods for negotiation, in which he “thought we should drop ambitious plans and meetings … and choose detailed topics and work them out one by one [emphasis added]” (Eden, 1960, p.9). His distrust for political panacea - the premiership of Lloyd George had impacted him so - perhaps explains why Eden so frequently butted-heads with Churchill throughout these negotiations, the latter preferring broad-brush and free-wheeling discussions (Cartlon, 1981). Churchill frequently spoke of Eden as “tired, sick and bound up in detail” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.75).

And perhaps Churchill had a valid point. Being ‘bound up’ is suggestive of overlooking or being distracted from a much more important consideration. This is a sentiment expressed by Dutton (1997, p.9) who writes of Eden as possessing “a tendency to immerse himself in details at the expense of a strategic understanding of the wider picture.
[emphasis added]”. This is perhaps best demonstrated in Macmillan’s dealings with Eden whilst serving as his Chancellor of the Exchequer. Macmillan frequently complained about how “it’s not easy to make [Eden] understand” because “he cannot follow how taking off a subsidy [bread and milk] will help” (Catterall, 2003, pp.534; 529).

Eden can by no means be considered an especially unintelligent prime minister. But his inability to grasp the interconnected nature of much economic policy is perhaps illustrative of how he was more concerned with intricate detail (prices; rates; percentages) rather than the policy’s wider part in a complex system in which knock-on effects might be considered. Indeed, although the original meeting between Eden and Macmillan pertaining to the abolition of bread and milk subsidies took place in January 1956, Eden was still “concentrated on wages and labour relations” a month later (Catterall, 2003, p.535).

This is suggestive of how Theakston (2007) presents Eden’s own cognitive workings, as a prime minister who would intuitively know the direction in which he wanted policy to move. He had a long-running obsession with industrial relations and presented it to Macmillan as a means of controlling inflation through conciliatory bargaining with moderate trade union leaders. But as Macmillan wrote, Eden “does not seem to understand that if we go on pumping money into the system at this rate, neither wages nor prices can possibly be stable” (Caterall, 2003, p.530).

One further relevant point is highlighted by Thorpe (2011). Citing the Geneva Conference (1954) as an example of this, he argues that Eden excelled when given the space and time to acquaint himself with a single issue/policy. Immersing himself in the detail and context of a policy was not a particularly suitable cognitive style for the job of prime minister, however successful in the context of a Foreign Secretary, in which the former contends with “the evolving schedule of a prime minister’s day” (Thorpe, 2011, p.467). He notes that by the onset of 1956 “such demands happened to an unusually frenetic extent, with Egypt, Glubb Pasha, Cyprus, IRA attacks on army depots, bread subsidies and by-election disappointments all jostling for his attention” (Thorpe, 2011, p.467).

### 6.2.2 Overwork

A cognitive style that prioritises a superlative grasp of details is necessarily a time-consuming one. As a result of this, Eden was plagued by an overburdened and overworked schedule. It necessarily had some benefits. Eden was “always a prodigious worker” and as a result proved “exacting, well-prepared and meticulous” (Aster, 1976, p.87). Having previously held low opinions of Eden, Lord Ismay later found that “he was now impressed by Eden’s capacity for hard work [and] thoroughness” after witnessing him at the Moscow Conference (1942) whilst serving as war-time Foreign Secretary (Aster, 1976, p.79).
Whether this was a result of his father - Sir William Eden - who “hurled himself with almost demonic energy and success” into everything he attempted is hard to discern, but what is certain is that like his father he “did too much, and at too fierce a pace” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.14). Lord Moran was of the opinion that this was partly due to Eden having “really no interests, except politics. His mind is never off them. He has no home, no roots, no obligation and really no life, except politics” (Catterall, 2003, p.380). It should be noted that after he made those comments, Eden married Clarissa Churchill and allowed for himself a fruitful and enjoyable life spent with her. But this did little to curb his overworked schedule, despite the best efforts of the adoring Clarissa.

Indeed, Eden had served in among the most high-profile and straining offices in the British government non-consecutively for twelve years - that of Foreign Secretary. Alluding to the strain and workload involved in the job, Macmillan wrote of “beginning to feel the strain” of the frequent flying across time-zones and when away from the Foreign Office he still faced “the main work of the F.O. … a mass of telegrams has to be answered, without the staff to do the work” (Catterall, 2003, p.486). Mornings consisted of “[seeing] people all day” and as a result would find himself working “from one morning to the early hours of the next” (Catterall, 2003, p.486).

However, Eden’s demeanour exacerbated these strains. He would “never delegate” and Shuckburgh (1986, p.102) “[doubted] if it is possible for [Eden] to divest himself of responsibility for substantial chunks of the work”. As prime minister he would concern himself with the most intricate aspects of his ministers’ workloads as well as his own. As Macmillan complained to Shuckburgh (1986, p.277), “He has got the habit of writing minutes on telegrams. It is a nuisance”. His successor Selwyn Lloyd fared little better; “it seems … that A.E. has been behaving very badly, and rang up poor Selwyn thirty times over the Christmas weekend from Chequers … He cannot leave people alone to do their job [emphasis own]” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.315).

6.2.3 Sensitivity to adverse advice

As alluded to earlier, Eden possessed clear notions of what direction he intended to take policy. As Theakston (2007, p.54) has noted, “some advisers felt that he was not open to unpalatable advice or alternative ideas unless he had asked for them, tending to make his own decision and then consult others, without revealing what he had decided”. This approach risked bringing about operational plagues such as ‘groupthink’, ‘tunnel-vision’ and ‘bunker-mentality’. Here, Eden proved a serial offender. In response to unpalatable - or even critical - advice Eden showed a mean and ungraceful demeanour quite unusual to the charm and sensitivity he frequently displayed.
Among the most unfortunate victims of this was Evelyn Shuckburgh. Likewise with Eden’s tantrums and outbursts, it was his closest confidantes that usually bore the brunt of these lapses in Eden’s temperament. Having served as Eden’s Private Secretary throughout 1951-54, his diaries abound with instances of Eden’s “sensitivity to criticism”, noting how confidantes as trusted as “Nutting, Kirkpatrick and I feel that we, alternately, are rejected by the PM as no good, not on the job, unhelpful … No one is trusted to the extent that his advice is regarded unwelcome” (Shuckburgh, 1986, pp.333; 346).

In one particularly disappointing instance, on protesting that the British delegation should settle for a seven-year period of occupation whilst negotiating the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1954), Eden complained to those around him that “Evelyn always wants to give everything away”, Shuckburgh (1986, p.226) being aware that it was “only a matter of time before he started saying this sort of thing about me, as he always used to about others who gave him unpalatable advice”.

Perhaps the most fateful instance of this hostility to adverse advice was the relegation of the Foreign Office’s expert on Middle-Eastern Affairs, Harold Beeley. On Eden’s instructions Beeley was to be shielded from the planning around Operation Musketeer and wider discussions about how to respond to Nasser’s nationalisation given that Beeley was proffering advice that the government should work through the UN and be prepared to lose the Suez Canal if necessary (Hennessy, 2001).

Given that at this point policy-making on the nationalisation was “led by a sick prime minister who had been exhibiting symptoms of both ‘tunnel vision’ and personal overload” some source of alternative advice would have been useful and undoubtedly improved the quality of discussion that was ongoing (Hennessy, 2001, p.242). This is a scenario given credence by the comments by Lord Hunt - Norman Brook’s Private Secretary at the time of the Suez Crisis. He claims that Brook was dismayed at how Eden “would brook no opposition at all” and as a result there was not that “sort of close, searching examination and thought which I think he felt was necessary” (Hennessy, 2001, p.219).

But Eden’s reaction against counter-advice sometimes took on a more childish and petty tone, quite apart from purely political considerations. For instance, throughout the furore regarding bread and milk subsidies Macmillan found “that I have hardly had any talk with P.M. He has avoided this” (Catterall, 2003, p.536-37). In an almost child-like manner, Eden would send Macleod or Monckton to convey his feelings, who would then take back Macmillan’s terms and compromises for Eden to decide upon. As Macmillan notes, “This seems an odd way of doing business - with these emissaries between the two High Contracting Parties” (Catterall, 2003, pp.537).

These instances seem indicative of Eden’s more general sensitivity, with Shuckburgh (1986, p.148) comparing Eden to a “sea anemone, covered with sensitive tentacles all
recording currents of opinion around him”. Indeed, as a boy Eden was frequently referred to as “an exceptionally sensitive and nervous little boy” or “a thoughtful and reflective child” (Rhodes James, 1987, p.22; Thorpe, 2011, p.14), perhaps suggesting a tendency for anxiety or overthinking what may otherwise have been offered as friendly criticism.

6.3 Emotional intelligence

This section provides an analysis of Eden’s emotional intelligence and how it impacted his ability to govern successfully. His emotional temperament was largely influenced by three traits - vanity, short-temper and his ill-health.

6.3.1 Vanity

Eden has been widely regarded by his contemporaries as an especially vain prime minister, hankering after favourable print media and prone to bouts of jealousy. Contrasting Eden with Attlee, Gaitskell noted that “Eden minds terribly” whether people are fond of him (Williams, 1983, p.422). Although this vanity was “such open and schoolboy vanity that one cannot find it detestable” it nevertheless irritated those around him at times, Shuckburgh’s (1986, p.131) being palpable when he records; “I am afraid that I realise more clearly than before how terribly vain and egocentric he is. He can’t really bear any conversation to take place which does not in some way bear upon himself, his politics, his popularity, his successes in the past or present”. As much is typical of a prime minister whose - according to Dutton (1997, p.1) - “inclination … was to seek reassurance from those around him”.

This vainglorious nature impacted policy in a series of ways. His conduct of the Suez Crisis is partly blamed on Eden’s desire to counter the accusation of ‘scuttle’ from the Conservative backbenches, while at the height of furore over the dismissal of Glubb from the Arab Legion Eden “took [Shuckburgh] aside and said I was seriously to consider reoccupation of Suez” as a means of saving ‘face’ (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.341). This is little surprise, given that Eden was “immensely sensitive” to “unfavourable comparisons with his predecessor” (Hennessy, 2001, p.212). The ‘bulldog’ Churchill who bullishly stood against Hitler and was overtly committed to the preservation of the British Empire cast a shadow over Eden’s premiership he felt a need to address.

However, his vanity also meant that he shied away from anything that might border on controversy. Following an aggressive broadcast directed at the ASLEF Eden immediately began “to have doubts about ‘face’ … [he] is beginning to be embarrassed” (Catterall, 2003, p.535). Shuckburgh (1986, pp.152) attributed this to him being “too keen on popularity to push far-seeing measures through”. This offers one explanation - quite apart from Eden’s
own ideological leanings - for his strong opposition to a raft of measures that his colleagues attempted to pursue. Macmillan’s anti-inflationary programme; Lloyd George’s immigration Bill; proposals for secret ballots all might have appealed to Eden in one sense, but even the slightest potential for negative coverage ruled them out as non-starters.

His colleagues also exhibited awareness of this trait of Eden’s. Macmillan wrote of how Eden “has great charm and some great gifts … [but] is almost childishly jealous - hence his dislike for me” (Catterall, 2003, p.122). Directing his ire at colleagues was usually a result of perceived threats to his position as the ‘Crown Prince’. At various times Lloyd was “playing against him”; Churchill was always “taking all the limelight, making it a stunt” (Shuckburgh, 1986, pp.131; 199). Macmillan sums this up as Eden resembling “an ageing woman, with a morbid fear of any younger or more attractive rival” (Catterall, 2003, p.136). Perhaps Dutton (1997, p.18) puts it more sympathetically when he writes that Eden was “the prisoner of his past … [he] felt compelled to live up to his own reputation”.

6.3.2 Emotional instability

But it is important to note that Eden possessed two ‘reputations’ which co-existed among his many admirers and critics. Eden presented an image of urbane charm whilst dashing around the world working for peace, whilst those closest to him saw another side; an explosive temper lurked beneath this exterior. Randolph Churchill coined the term the “Eden terror” to refer to this (Thorpe, 2011, p.451), while Dutton (1997, pp.6-7) alludes to the “violent bouts of temper to which his personal staff were often subjected”. As a result, those in his Private Office found working with Eden to be a trying exercise (Hennessy, 2001).

In one especially surreal instance following a serious delay to a meeting there developed “a physical struggle between [Shuckburgh] trying to shut the window between us and the driver … and A.E. leaning forward to wind it down so that he might call them bloody fools!” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.36). On another occasion, Eden was “extremely testy” and “very rude” as he accused Shuckburgh (1986, p.73) of conspiring with Butler to accredit the latter with an exchange of POWs with Adenauer. When Shuckburgh left the room in annoyance Eden followed him up with “Are you still angry with me?” - indicative of “a scene with a child of great violence with angry words spoken on both sides and ten minutes later the whole thing is forgotten” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.73).

These episodes caused severe dysfunction within the Private Office. William Clark recounts that “at the back of everything was the fear that [Eden] would lose his temper and we should be sworn at’ and as a result Private Secretaries demurred taking things up with the prime minister “because they knew it would worry him and cause an explosion” (Clark, 1986, pp.164-65). “Snappy notes via Private Secretaries” and “saccharine remarks to my
“face” were apparently how Eden typically communicated with his Press Secretary (Clark, 1986, pp.164-65).

Regardless, these tempers were not just directed at subordinates. Colleagues and superiors were likewise not spared if a potentially sensitive topic emerged, as it did at Cabinet on 14th March 1955 when Eden exasperatedly interrupted Churchill with, “I have been Foreign Secretary for 10 years. Am I not to be trusted?” (Catterall, 2003, p.405) when the issue of the succession was brought up. But perhaps the most intriguing and indicative was when Anthony Nutting was discussing Egypt policy with Eden on 1st March 1956; “The telephone rang and a voice down the other end said: “It’s me” … he gave the show away very quickly by starting to scream at me. “What is all this poppycock you’ve sent me about isolating Nasser and neutralising Nasser? Why can’t you get it into your head I want the man destroyed?” (Hennessy, 1989, p.131)

Unlike the other exchanges listed above, this suggests that Eden allowed his emotional outbursts not just to affect the dispatch of business in the Private Office, but influence his conduct of serious international policy. If so, this is a damning feature of Eden’s premiership and perhaps represents the most serious flaw in his make-up. Greenstein (2009) already makes clear (see above) his opinion that lacking emotional intelligence can severely hamper a premiership. The Suez crisis would - perhaps - fit neatly into this.

But as Shuckburgh makes clear, these tantrums usually had little actual significance - as a projection of his actual views or in terms of impact on policy. He slowly fell into the role of a “lightning conductor on these occasions” so as to “save innocent bystanders from scenes which appear far more serious to them than I know them to be” (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.35). There is certainly the risk of exaggerating the significance of these temper-tantrums. Pearson (2002) notes at length of how those closest to Eden (i.e. Shuckburgh; Macmillan; Lloyd; even Clark) have said that these outbursts represented Eden’s intense emotions and feelings at any one moment, and once these were vented a calmer demeanour would take over. Thorpe (2011, p.451) argues that Eden “did not let the sun go down on his wrath”.

Aster (1976, p.3) is of the opinion that Eden’s temper was inherited - as with his capacity for overwork - from his father, a man whose higher qualities were “overshadowed by … storms of temper”. Sir William Eden was known to have hurled weather-clocks and lamb joints through windows, and raged at red flowers when they appeared in his garden (of which blue flowers had to predominate). Carlton (1981) concurs with this assessment, pointing to the comments of Eden’s brother Timothy Eden relating to the strain of his childhood experience; “Nor will anyone readily admit that the whistling of a boy in the street can be a good or sufficient reason for breaking a window with a flower-pot” (Eden, 1933, pp.22-4). If not genetic, there was certainly the capacity for Eden to have been psychologically-affected by his father.
This was certainly the opinion of Lord Moran, Churchill’s and - for a time - Eden’s doctor. He spoke to Churchill of how “Sir William’s uncontrolled rages terrified his children, who were always on tenterhooks, fearing that they might say something that would start an explosion … it must have been a handicap to have been brought up in such an atmosphere” (Moran, 2006, p.711). And there are traces of this temper in Eden as young as 16. His House Tutor at Eton - Ernest Lee ‘Jelly’ Churchill - wrote to Sybil Eden of how he was “volatile in disposition”, with the latter writing to warn her son of how she wanted him to “keep watch over your tongue. It runs away with you & will be getting you into trouble if you are not careful” (Rhodes James, 1987 p.25).

### 6.3.3 Illness

On 17th May 1945 Eden was homebound for England on a return flight from the San Francisco Conference at which he had just laid the groundwork for the creation of the United Nations. However, upon arriving in London he suffered the consequences of a strained five years as war-time Foreign Secretary and was taken to hospital with severe abdominal pain. He was diagnosed with a duodenal ulcer. The consequences of this duodenal ulcer would take on profound proportions for Eden’s reputation as well as the direction of the United Kingdom.

As a result of this, prior to his 1953 operation it was routine for Eden’s entourage on foreign trips to carry “a black tin box containing various forms of analgesic” which would be administered by a detective when Eden deemed it necessary (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.14). Shuckburgh (1986, p.10) wrote of how “office hours were nothing” as when Eden was ill he “had to spend the whole weekend at Binderton [Eden’s home in Sussex]”. Indeed, reflecting on his time with Eden throughout 1951 upon first becoming his Private Secretary he comments that his “dominant preoccupation … was the Secretary of State’s ill health” - a truly unusual responsibility for a Private Secretary (Shuckburgh, 1986, p.14)

Finally, in 1953 Eden underwent a series of operations first in London (during which he nearly died) and then in Boston, USA. This was following perhaps the most serious flare-up of Eden’s complaints in March/April 1953 at which point Shuckburgh (1986, p.88) “saw him carried in a stretcher from the London Clinic to his car looking like a skeleton”. Although he returned looking bronzed - albeit thinner - he would now be plagued by “fevers associated with his botched operation” (Hennessy, 2001, p.214).

So can we discern any aspects of policy-making that were impacted by his illness? The most obvious concern here is the Suez Crisis. Dutton (1997, p.5) quite rightly notes that aspects of Eden’s conduct throughout seem in retrospect “incomprehensible in terms of anything that was known about [Eden]”. This was Britain’s leading statesman and perhaps
the most experienced Foreign Secretary since Lord Palmerston who had striven for peace throughout the world in his conduct. He is certainly of the opinion that “Suez represented an inexplicable lapse, induced perhaps by chronic ill health and overwork” (Dutton, 1997, p.6). Hennessy (2001, p.235) alludes best as to whether Eden’s illness affected his judgement by stating that “it is hard to appreciate how Eden could rationally have pursued the policy he did [emphasis added]”.

There certainly seems to have been some odd assumptions possessed by Eden throughout July to - November 1956. The lack of American cooperation is glaringly obvious in Eden’s correspondence with Eisenhower. The latter had made clear to Eden in writing on 3rd September 1956 that “if we are to proceed solidly together to the solution of this problem … I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly rejects the use of force”, and to underscore his point, the president trails off the correspondence with, “I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forceful means” (PRO PREM 11/1177 cited in Hennessy, 2001, p.233). It is hard to misread Eisenhower’s point - in any sense.

Medical experts had indeed expressed doubts prior as to whether Eden could physically and mentally handle the job of prime minister following his 1953 operation. Lord Moran was of the opinion that Eden would “have great difficulty in standing the strain” of the premiership given that “the state of his inside is not so good, and he ought to be careful. If the artificial bile duct … ‘silts up again’ …. It will be very serious” (Catterall, 2003, p.380). This occurred in September 1955 and in one telephone call between Eden and Macmillan the former had “a temperature of over 100” (Catterall, 2003, p.477).

An insight into the state of Eden’s health in the run-up to the Suez Crisis is offered by Hennessy (1997, p.212) in conversation with Robert Carr; “He was never the same man after the gall bladder operation that went wrong in 1953 … within the first six months of his premiership he started getting the fevers … When he actually appointed me to be a junior minister I had to go and see him in his bedroom, where he had a temperature of 102 [degrees]. That was ten months before the crisis of Suez”.

On top of Eden’s pains - and perhaps much more relevant to his conduct throughout the Suez Crisis - were the drugs and stimulants he necessarily had to imbibe. Indeed, David Owen (2003, pp.330) categorically states that in his opinion “Eden’s intemperate handling of the situation was influenced both by his health and by the amphetamines he was taking”. The specific amphetamine Eden is alleged to have imbibed was benzedrine, a brain stimulant that he had supposedly been taking in large quantities throughout the crisis. Suggestive of Eden’s heavy dependence on the drug, Sir Horace Evans had allegedly warned him in January 1957 whilst recuperating in Jamaica following the Suez Crisis’ climax that he could no longer rely on the drug to maintain the premiership (Owen, 2005).
However, within Eden’s medical records is contained a letter produced by Sir Horace Evans for any doctor that might have had to treat Eden on his convalescence to New Zealand following his loss of the premiership. In it he clearly states that Eden “has been maintained with extensive vitamin therapy - sodium amytal gr 3 and seconal enseal gr 1.5 every night and often a tablet of Drinamyl every morning” (AP39/4/2 cited in Owen, 2005, p.392). In layman terms, this indicates that Eden was “taking dextro-amphetamine, a stimulant which, combined with amylobarbitone, is contained in Drinamyl. This combination, also called Dexamyl in some countries, used to be referred to in Britain as ‘purple hearts’” (Owen, 2005, p.392).

Providing his medical opinion, David Owen (2005, p.392) outlines how amphetamines of this kind can produce over-confidence as well as energy - even though a more accurate description is that they conceal tiredness. He lists how even moderate doses can “produce insomnia, restlessness, anxiety, irritability, over-stimulation and overconfidence … Prolonged use, even of a moderate dose, is invariably followed by fatigue, and the ‘come down’ effect is also often accompanied by difficulty with sleeping”.

These can be too accurately applied to Eden, who is described throughout Shuckburgh’s (1986) diaries as having difficulty sleeping at several points. Furthermore, in this context the following anecdote from Edward Heath (2011, p.169) has renewed significance, “I went into the Cabinet room as usual shortly before Cabinet was due to start, and I found the prime minister standing by his chair holding a piece of paper [the Sevres Protocol]. He was bright-eyed and full of life. The tiredness seemed suddenly to have disappeared [emphasis added]”. Was this the after-effect of a recent imbibement of ‘purple hearts’?

It should be noted that a number of Eden’s contemporaries - including Clarissa Eden - do not believe that Eden’s illness or treatments had any effect on his conduct throughout the Suez Crisis. Is this convincing? Well, Owen (2005, p.393) does “not think that this is sustainable in the light of his rigor and fever of 106F on 5 October, eight days before one of the key decision-making moments in the Suez Crisis”. He is joined in this opinion by Robert Carr who proclaimed:

“I find it difficult to accept the judgement that Anthony’s health did not have a decisive influence at least on the conduct of his policy. I agree that he might well have pursued the same basic policy had he been well, but I find it very hard to believe that he would have made such obvious miscalculations in its execution both in the political and the military spheres” (AP 23/32/11C, cited in Dutton, 1997, p.424).
6.4 Conclusion

It is clear that Eden struggled to maintain his grip on a series of traits which negatively impacted his leadership. In terms of Eden’s cognitive style, his tendency to overwork as well as his unreceptiveness to criticism or counter-advice led to his government becoming overburdened and inducing tunnel-vision. The system around Eden - built up on the basis of constant consultation with the prime minister - repeatedly delayed decisions at his behest or opposition, and he provided little impetus in devising ways around his overly-methodical and centralising mindset. The lack of diversity within Eden’s pool of advice seriously hindered his policy, limiting the variety of ideas Eden was being exposed to or was receptive towards.

His emotional intelligence was similarly a hindrance to Eden, the vanity acquired from his reputation alongside his short temper proved a sensitive cocktail that was prone to suddenly explode over seemingly minor issues - not unlike his father. Yet his severe ill-health cannot have helped in this regard, and one can but sympathise with Eden as his premiership grew as beleaguered as his health. It seems to have impacted his decision-making throughout the Suez Crisis - despite claims to the contrary - as the medical professionals referred to in this thesis have demonstrated.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This conclusion is divided into three sections. The first addresses Eden’s reputation in the wider biographical and historical literature, and makes an assessment of whether this is consistent with this thesis. In doing so, it measures Eden’s abilities in the six criteria provided in the Greenstein model and assesses the extent to which his personality impacted these. The second section addresses the Greenstein model's strengths, weaknesses and applicability which have been revealed through its application to Eden’s leadership. Lastly, this section makes recommendations for further research going forward.

7.1 Eden’s leadership

The Suez Crisis certainly dominates perceptions of Eden’s leadership, inevitably so given i) the significance of this event in British history and in relation to the loss of Empire, and ii) given that Eden’s reputation was so heavily centred in foreign affairs. As a result, it is easy to identify Eden’s leadership not only with the negative impact that the Suez Crisis had on Britain’s prestige, but also with a failure on his part to live up to expectations. But an analysis that goes beyond the Suez Crisis and considers other aspects of Eden’s leadership are beneficial. In doing so, academics can better understand how the interplay of context and agency influence a premiership’s success.

Public communication: Eden’s capacity for public communication was certainly impressive in a personal capacity, his charm and telegenic qualities allowing him to utilise both public appearances and television broadcasts to enhance his own reputation. On top of this, his grasp of details allowed for a highly-detail oriented style, well-suited to the House of Commons. But Eden neglected to construct a media operation that would take a strategic view and provide some overall consistency to these appearances. His relationship with Clark limited the extent to which this was realistic, and his vanity and sensitivity meant that much press criticism took on a larger proportion than it perhaps actually possessed. Yet it should be noted that Eden was not blessed with a favourable print media, the climax it reached in January 1956 perhaps representing a challenge for any prime minister.

Organisational capacity: Eden’s government was plagued with an organisational pathology that narrowed the diversity of advice he received, reinforcing the tunnel-vision which characterised much of his conduct as prime minister. Although he possessed a superlative Cabinet Secretary in Norman Brook, Eden’s own disinclination for advice that ran counter to his own assumptions meant that he was ill-served in the Suez Crisis by Bishop and Millard. This was likewise the case with Eden’s Cabinet, with ministers offering near zero opposition to his conduct throughout the Suez Crisis. His obsession with details brought
about a system in which the prime minister sought to be consulted on every issue, Eden relentlessly interfering in his minister’s briefs.

**Political skill:** Party management was an ongoing concern for Eden throughout his premiership, being temperamentally disinclined as he was to foster relations with backbench MPs. His lack of a deep base of support meant that crises took on increased significance and as the Suez Crisis reached its climax he had little material support within his own party. Meanwhile, his relative successes in retaining control of foreign policy vis-à-vis domestic policy, as well as manipulating Butler vis-à-vis Macmillan reveals two things; i) the weight afforded to Eden by his reputation in foreign policy relative to that in domestic politics; and ii) that Eden was a moderately successful political operator, but unable to compete with those truly superlative individuals in this regard, such as Macmillan.

**Policy vision:** The policy vision of Eden’s government was certainly affected by his presence as prime minister. His experiences in the First World War meant that he had clear opinions on how to tackle industrial relations within the framework of a property-owning democracy. The resolution of the April to - May 1955 strikes speaks volumes to the concept of actor dispensability, as does Thatcher’s handling of the 1984-85 miners’ strike, and are a testament to his overarching goals. Furthermore, it suggests that Eden was able to discern what the confines were in which he was operating, exhibiting an awareness of the risks inherent in legislating too heavily against the trade unions.

However, his overall vision for Britain lacked consistency. His economic policy was characterised by flip-flopping on a raft of measures, from indirect taxation to food subsidies. On top of this, his replacement of Butler by Macmillan seemed a symbolic repudiation of the economic policy that had been implemented less than a year prior in April 1955. It is hard to imagine how an electorate could reasonably have come to a decisive conclusion on what Eden’s true beliefs on economics might have been. Although he was certainly not as keen on continued expansion as some might suggest, this nevertheless betrays Eden’s own poor understanding of economics.

Eden’s vision for foreign policy was more consistent - up to a point. He had a long track-record of negotiating to secure peace through treaty-making in accordance with the United States. Examples such as the UN, NATO, the Geneva Conference (1954) and the Baghdad Pact are all symbolic of this. Yet the final act of his premiership - the Suez Crisis - shatters any overarching consistency and means that Eden’s goals certainly cannot be referred to as overarching in this respect.

**Cognitive style/emotional intelligence:** The inner-workings of Eden’s government were highly-influenced by his cognitive style, with a system that prioritised consultation with a detail-oriented and overloaded prime minister which meant that decisions were constantly delayed or obstructed. His sensitivity to adverse advice meant that tunnel-vision pervaded
most corners of his government, with negative consequences for the conduct of the Suez Crisis.

His emotional intelligence, though, was perhaps the most serious negative trait for his leadership. The vanity he had acquired from his charm and success in foreign affairs irritated those around him, as did his explosive temper. As with his grasp of details, this seems to have been inherited from an early age either through his father or from trauma. It meant that those in his Private Office were disinclined to bring things up with him, but there is little evidence that it seriously affected policy-making. This was certainly not the case with his ill-health, the medication Eden was forced to take as a result of this very likely negatively impacting his ability to conduct himself throughout August to - November 1956 in a rational and clear-headed manner. Although those closest to him testify otherwise, it is difficult to take this claim seriously in light of the medical opinion of professionals cited in this thesis.

Eden's actor dispensability cannot be doubted; the January 1956 press attacks; the April to - May 1955 strikes; the Suez Crisis, all would have been dealt with differently had there been another individual residing in Downing Street. His vanity, experiences and ill-health all impacted their resolution and had consequences for Britain. Yet they also reveal the importance of context and the opportunities it provides for prime ministers to make their mark. Eden was typically ill-suited to this context, but was in other ways well-suited (i.e. April to - May 1955 strikes).

7.2 The Greenstein model

In applying the Greenstein model to Eden's premiership a series of observations can be made of his leadership which otherwise may have been more difficult. Its focus on the personality of a leader provides genuinely novel avenues for observation which more narrative historical/biographical studies may overlook. His six criteria have allowed analysis to go beyond Eden's role in the Suez Crisis and reveal some positive aspects that have otherwise received little attention; Eden's abilities in terms of public communication or policy vision, for instance. Furthermore, its application to Eden's leadership only reinforces the fact that the Greenstein model can be successfully 'borrowed' from presidential studies and applied to the British political context, with implications for further work from presidential studies in this respect.

However, it's application likewise reveals the importance of context. The influence that Eden’s personality had upon his leadership cannot be understood in isolation and necessitates a likewise rigorous analysis of the context in which such leadership is operating. Greenstein (2000) does not deny this, but his framework is heavily weighted towards the former. This in itself is not an issue so long as one keeps in mind the importance
of the latter. Through applying the Greenstein framework in this manner - valuing context as well as personality - nuanced judgements can be made about leadership. Eden’s case study - one typically couched in negativity - is arguably a perfect example of such.

### 7.3 Future research

The Greenstein model’s application to British politics has centered on contemporary leaders; Honeyman (2007) considered the leadership of Harold Wilson; Theakston (2007; 2011; 2012) applied the framework to successive post-war prime ministers, as well as the leadership of Gordon Brown and David Cameron; McMeeking (2020) evaluated the leadership of John Major and how his personality impacted his leadership.

Yet Eden represents a prime minister on the verge of the post-war era, a unique figure with feet on both sides of the divide. The successful application of the Greenstein model to Eden’s premiership suggests that further study could concentrate on much less contemporary leaders, perhaps even those prime ministers who resided in No.10 before the Second World War - even those before the First World War. Such a proposition is not unfounded. Greenstein (2009; 2013) has himself applied his leadership framework to the presidencies of Washington to Lincoln, dating back to the 19th century. Further research could also apply the model in a similar manner, whilst retaining a concern for the very different context in which those prime ministers found themselves.
Bibliography


*Hansard HC Deb. vol.210 cols.2162-3, 27th November 1927.*


*Hansard, HC Deb. vol.550, cols.387-523, 14th March 1956.*

*Hansard, HC Deb. vol.557, cols.1602-43, 2nd August 1956.*

*Hansard, HC Deb. vol.558, cols.1619-30, 1st November 1956.*


Harrison, B. 1999. The rise, fall and rise of political consensus in Britain since 1940. *History*, 84(274), pp.301-324.


